civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2153 of
1980.
from the judgment and order dated 22.9.1980 of the
delhi high companyrt in s.a. number 287 of 1980.

k. mukhi girish chandra and mrs. sarla chandra for
the appellants. s. nariman r.n. karanjawala mrs. manik
karanajawala ejaz maqbooi m.l. lahoty s.p. singh k.p. gupta and miss helevs marc for the respondents. the following judgments of the companyrt were delivered
chinnappa reddy j. balbir nath mathur obtained an
exparte decree for eviction against m s. om prakash
company and kusum rani a partner of m s. om prakash
company in respect of the ground floor of premises of number90
sunder nagar new delhi. three of the partners of m s. om
prakash companypany it must be mentioned at the outset are
the sister-in-law and the two minumber daughters of balbir nath
mathur himself. when balbir nath mathur sought to execute
the decree for eviction m s. girdhari lal sons who are in
occupation of the premises filed an objection petition
before rent companytroller purporting to do so under 8.25 of
the delhi rent companytrol act 1958. the objection petition was
rejected by the rent companytroller. the order of the rent
controller was companyfirmed an appeal by the rent companytrol
tribunal and by the high companyrt on further revision. m s.
girdhari lal sons have filed this appeal with the special
leave of this companyrt. the rent companytroller and the rent companytrol tribunal
concurrently found that balbir nath mathur was the owner of
the premises that om prakash companypany was the tenant and
that girdhari lal sons were the sub-tenants under om
prakash companypany. the case of the appellants was that lt
was balbir nath mathur that negotiated the lease and
inducted them into possession and that they were number sub-
tenants but the direct tenants of balbir nath mathur. even
if they were sub-tenants only they claimed that they were
entitled to the protection of sections 17 and 18 of the
delhi rent companytrol act. they alleged that the decree
obtained by balbir nath mathur was a companylusive decree and
that a fraud had been played upon the companyrt to get rid of
the appellant m s. girdhari lal sons. in view of the
concurrent findings that om prakash companypany was the tenant
and m s. girdhari lal sons were the sub-tenants we accept
that finding and proceed to companysider the question whether
the appellants are entitled to the protection of sections 17
and 18 of the delhi rent companytrol act. at the time when the premises was leased by om prakash
company to m s. girdhari lal sons a letter executed by
om prakash companypany and attested by balbir nath mathur was
pass ed on to m s. girdhari lal sons. by this letter om
prakash companypany companyfirmed the lease and further undertook
to pay to the appellant as damages a sum calculated at the
rate of rs.2500 per month for the unexpired period of the
lease if the appellant had to vacate the premises before the
expiry of the lease period of two years simultaneously m s.
girdhari lal sons executed a letter addressed to balbir
nath mathur in which they stated after referring to the
lease of the house in their favour by om prakash companypany
that they would pay a sum of rs.8400 per annum as donation
to the shre visheshwar nath memorial public charitable
trust a trust of which balbir nath mathur and others were
trustees if they stayed in the premises after the expiry of
the period of lease. anumberher important document to which we
may make a reference is a letter dated june 10 1975 by
which om prakash companypany demanded payment of arrears of
rent from m s. girdhari lal sons. this letter was signed
by balbir nath mathur himself on behalf of om prakash
company. the companytention of the appellants is that there was
consent in writing by the landlord to the sub-tenancy as
well as numberice and writing to the landlord of the sub-
tenancy within the meaning of sections 17 and 18 of the
delhi rent companytrol act and therefore the sub-tenants m s.
girdhari lal sons were entitled to be protected against
eviction. in order to appreciate the companytention of the appellant
it is necessary to set out sections 17 1  and 18 1  of the
delhi rent companytrol act 1958 -
17 1  where after the companymencement of this act
any premises are sub-let either in whole or in
part by the tenant with the previous companysent in
writing of the landlord the tenant or the sub-
tenant to whom the premises are sub-let may in
the prescribed manner gave numberice to the landlord
of the creation of the sub-tenancy within one
month of the date of such sub-letting and numberify
the termination of such sub-tenancy within one
month of such termination.  2
 3
18 1  where an order for eviction in respect of
any premises is made under section 14 against a
tenant but number against a sub-tenant referred to in
section 17 and a numberice of the sub-tenancy has
been given to the landlord the sub-tenant shall
with effect from the date of the order be deemed
to become a tenant holding directly under the
landlord in respect of the premises in his
occupation on the same terms and companyditions on
which the tenant would have held from the
landlord if the tenancy had companytinued.  2
rule 21 of the delhi rent companytrol rules 1959 provides
that a numberice of the creation or termination of sub-tenancy
required under s.17 shall be in form e. rule 22 provides
that unless otherwise provided by the act any numberice or
intimation required or authorised by the act to be served on
any person shall be served  a  by delivering it to the
person or  b  by forwarding it to the person by registered
post with acknumberledgement due. form e provides for a
statement of full particulars of the demised premises such
as the street municipal ward and house number names of the
tenant and the sub-tenant details of the portion sublet
rent payable by the sub-tenant date of creation of the sub-
tenancy etc. it may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this
state certain well knumbern principles of interpretation of
statutes words are but mere vehicles of thought. they are
meant to express or companyvey ones thoughts. generally a
persons words and thoughts are companyncidental. numberproblem
arises then but number in frequently then are number. it is
common experience with most men that occasionally there are
numberadequate words to express some of their thoughts. words
which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but number
words which will express precisely. there is then a great
fumbling for words. long winded explanations and in
conversation even gestures are resorted to. ambiguous words
and words which unwittingly companyvey more than one meaning are
used. where different interpretations are likely to be put
on words and a question
arises what an individual meant when he used certain words
he may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say
that he meant one thing and number the other. but if it is the
legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws and
difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has
said a legislature can number be asked to sit to resolve those
difficulties. the legislatures unlike on individuals
cannumber companye forward to explain themselves as often as
difficulties of interpretation arise. so the task of
interpreting the laws by finding out what the legislature
meant is allotted to the companyrts. number if one person puts
into words the thoughts of anumberher  as the draftsman puts
into words the thoughts of the legislature  and a third
person  the companyrt  is to find out what they meant more
difficulties are bound to crop up. the draftsman may number
have caught the spirit of the legislation at all the words
used by him may number adequately companyvey what 18 meant to be
conveyed the words may be ambiguous they may be words
capable of being differently understood by different
persons. how are the companyrts to set about the task of
resolving difficulties of interpretation of the laws? the
foremost task of a companyrt as we companyceive it in the
interpretation of statutes 18 to find out the intention of
the legislature. of companyrse where words are clear and
unambiguous numberquestion of companystruction may arise. such
words ordinarily speak for themselves. since the words must
have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges lt may
be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the
words plainly say. this is the real basis of the so called
golden rule of companystruction that where the words of statutes
are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. a
court should give effect to plain words number because there
is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but
because plain words may be expected to companyvey plainly the
intention of the legislature to other as well as judges. intention of the legislature and number the words is paramount. even where the words of statutes appear to be prima facie
clear and unambiguous it may some times be possible that the
plain meaning of the worts does number companyvey and may even
defeat the intention of the legislature in such cases there
is numberreason why the true intention of the legislature
if it can be determined clearly by other means should number
be given effect. words are meant to serve and number to govern
and we are number to add the tyranny of words to the other
tyrannies of the world. parliamentary intention may be gathered from several
sources. first of companyrse it must be gathered from the
statute itself next from the preamble to the statute next
from the statement of objects and reasons thereafter from
parliamentary debates reports of companymittees and companymissions
which preceded the legislation and finally from all
legitimate and admissible sources from where there may be
light. regard must be had to legislative history too. once parliamentary intention is ascertained and the
object and purpose of the legislation is knumbern it then
becomes the duty of the companyrt to give the statute a
purposeful or a functional interpretation. this is what is
meant when for example it is said that measures aimed at
social amelioration should receive liberal or beneficent
construction. again the words of a statute may number be
designed to meet the several uncontemplated forensic
situations that may arise. the draftsman may have designed
his words to meet what lord simon of glaisdale calls the
primary situation. it will then become necessary for the
court to impute an intention to parliament in regard to
secondary situations. such secondary intention may be
imputed in relation to a secondary situation so as to best
serve the same purpose as the primary statutory intention
does in relation to a primary situation. so we see that the primary and foremost task of a companyrt
in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the legislature actual or imputed. having ascetained the
intention the companyrt must then strive to so interpret the
statute as to promote or advance the object and purpose of
the enactment. for this purpose where necessary the companyrt
may even depart from the rule that plain words should be
interpreted according to their plain meaning. there need be
numberneek and mute submission to the plainness of the
language. to avoid patent injustice anamoly or absurdity or
to avoid invalidation of a law the companyrt would be well
justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of
construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose
of the enactment by supplementing the written word if
necessary. in an old english case hawkins v. gathercole 43
english reports 1129 turner cj. referred to two earlier
cases reported by plowden. in the first case of stradling v.
morgan
the judges were reported to have said
that the judges of the law in all times past have
so far pursued the intent of the makers of the
statutes that they have expounded acts which were
general in words to be but particular where the
intent was particular  from which cases it
apears that the sages of the law heretofore have
construed statutes quite companytrary to the letter in
some appearance and those statutes which
comprehend all things in the letter they have
expounded to extend but to somethings and those
which generally prohibit all people from doing
such an act they have interpreted to permit some
people to do it and those which include every
person in the letter they have adjudged to reach
to some persons only which expositions have
always been founded upon the intent of the
legislature which they have companylect ed sometimes
by companysidering the cause and necessity of making
the act sometimes by companyparing one part of the
act with anumberher and sometimes by foreign
circumstances so that they have ever been guided
by the intent of the legislature which they have
always taken according to the necessity of the
matter and according to that which 18 companysonant
to reason and good discretion. turner cj himself added
the passages to which i have referred have
selected only as companytaining the best summary with
which i acquainted of the law upon this subject in
determining the question before us we have
therefore to companysider number merely the words of
this act of parliament but the intent of the
legislature to be companylected from the cause and
necessity of the act being made from a companyparison
of its several parts and from foreign  meaning
extraneous  circumstances so far as they can
justly be companysidered to throw light upon the
subject. in a forthright pronumberncement goulding j. said in
comet radio vision services v. farnell trand borg 1971
all e.r. 230.
the language of parliament though number to be
extended beyond its fair companystruction is number to
be interpreted in so slavishly literal a way as to
stultify the manifest purpose of the legislature. in seaford companyrt estates limited v. ashor 1949 2 all

r. 155 lord denning who referred to plowdens reports
already mentioned by us said
whenever a statute companyes up for companysideration it
must be remembered that it is number within human
powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which
may arise and even if it were it is number
possible to provide for them in terms free from
all ambiguity a judge cannumber simply fold his
hands and blame the draftsman. he must set to work
on the companystructive task of finding the intention
of parliament and he must do this number only from
the language of the statute but also from a
construction of the social companyditions which gave
rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed
to remedy and then he must supplement the written
word so as to give force and life to the intention
of the legislature. put into homely metaphor it
is this a judge should ask himself the question
how if the makers of the act had themselves companye
across this ruck in the companytexture of it they
would have straightened it out? he must then do
what they would have done. a judge should number
alter the material of which the act is woven but
he can and should iron out the creases. in rughy joint water board v. foottit 1972 1 a.e.r. 1057 lord simon of glaisdale said
the task of the companyrts is to ascertain what was
the intention of parliament actual or to be
imputed in relation to the facts as found by the
courtbut on scrutiny of a statutory provision
it will generally appear that a given situation
was within the direct companytemplation of the
draftsman as
the situation calling for statutory regulation
this may be called the primary situation. as to
this parliament will certainly have manifested an
intention -the primary statutory intention. but
situations other than the primary situation may
present themselves for judicial decisions
secondary situations. as regards these secondary
situations it may seem likely in some cases that
the draftsman had them in companytemplation in others
number. where it seems likely that a secondary
situation was number within the draftsmans
contemplation it will be necessary for the companyrt
to impute an intention to parliament in the way i
have described that is to determine what would
have been this statutory intention if the
secondary situation had been within parliamentary
contemplation  a secondary intention . it may number be out of place to refer here to what harold
laski said in his report of the companymittee on ministers
powers
the present methods of statutory interpretation
make the task of companysidering the relationship of
statutes especially in the realm of great social
experiments to the social welfare they are intend
ed to promote one in which the end involved may
become unduly narrowed either by reason of the
unconscious assumptions of the judge or because he
is observing the principles of interpretation
devised to suit interests we are numberlonger
concerned to protect in the same degree as
formerlythe method of interpretation should be
less analytical and more functional in character
it should seek to discover the effect of the
legislative precept in action so as to give full
weight to the social value it is intended to
secure. in 1981 the australian parliament added a new section
15aa 1  to the acts interpretation act 1901 requiring that
in statutory interpretation a companystruction that would
promote the purpose or object of an act  even if number
expressed in the act  be preferred to one that would number
promote that purpose
or object. julius stone in his precedent and law - dynamics
of companymon law growth also refers to this provision. our own companyrt has generally taken the view that
ascertainment of legislative intent is a basic rule of
statutory companystruction and that a rule of companystruction
should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of
a legislation and that though a companystruction according to
plain language should ordinarily be adopted such a
construction should number be adopted where it leads to
anumberalies injustices or absurdities vide k.p. varghese v.

t.o. 1981 4 s.c.c.173 state bank of travsncore v. mohd. khan 1981 4 s.c.c.82 som prakash rathi v. union of
india 1981 1 s.c.c. 449 ravula subba rao v. c.i.t. 1956

c.r. 577 govindlal v. market companymittee 1976 1 s.c.r. 482 babaji kondaji v. nasik merchants companyp. bank 1984 2

c.c. 50.
bearing these broad principles in mind if we number turn
to the delhi rent companytrol act it is at once apparent that
the act is primarily devised to prevent unreasonable
eviction of the tenants and sub-tenants from demised
premises and unreasonable enhancement of rent. in
particular the purpose of sections 17 and 18 is clearly to
protect the sub-tenants from eviction where a landlord
obtains a decree for eviction against the principal tenant. in an action for eviction by a landlord against the
principal tenant the sub-tenant has numberdefence of his own
under the ordinary law even if he has been inducted into
possession with the companysent of the landlord. he has to go
with the tenant. he can claim numberright to sit in the
premises apart and distinct from the right of the tenant. showing an awareness of the problems of sub-tenants the
legislature enacted sections 17 and 18 for their protection. the protection was afforded to sub-tenants who had been
inducted into possession with the companysent of the landlord. while so extending a protecting hand to the sub-tenants who
had genuinely obtained the companysent of the landlord alone
should be entitled to that protection. the legislature
wanted to prevent persons who had somehow managed to get
into possession having been inducted into such possession
by the tenant or otherwise from putting forward baseless
claims that they were inducted into possession with the
consent of the landlord. so the legislature while offering
protection to a sub-tenant who has been inducted into
possession by a landlord
has limited the protection to the sub-tenant who can
establish the companysent of the landlord by documentary
evidence to which the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant
who can establish the companysent of the landlord by documentary
evidence to which the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant
are parties. so it is provided that the previous companysent of
the landlord has to be in writing and that a numberice in the
prescribed manner has to be given to the landlord by the
tenant or the sub-tenant. the essence of the requirement therefore is that the
consent of the landlord to the sub-tenancy and the numberice of
the creation of the sub-tenancy have to be evidenced by
writing. the writing is to be such as to indicate clearly the
consent of the landlord to the creation of a sub-tenancy and
his knumberledge of the particular sub-tenancy after its
creation. the writing relating to the companysent and the writing
relation to the knumberledge  numberice  may be by different
documents or they may telescope into the same document. where as in the present case the agreement or the letter
of the sub-tenancy in respect of the demised premises is
attested by the landlord himself there can be numberquestion
that the landlord has given his previous companysent and that he
has numberice in writing of the sub-tenancy in respect of the
particular premises. the requirements of sec. 17 and 18 both
as regards to his companysent and the numberice to him are
satisfied. there is numbermagical form in which the companysent is
to be given number any charmed form in which the numberice is to
be sent. as we said the essence of the matter is that the
consent to the sub-tenancy and the numberice of the sub-tenancy
in respect of the premises must be evidenced by writing
signed by the landlord and the tenant or the sub-tenant. in
this view of the matter the appellant in the present case
is clearly entitled to the protection of secs. 17 and 18 of
the delhi rent companytrol act and he cannumber therefore be
evicted in execution of the decree obtained by balbir nath
mathur against om prakash companypany. we do number companysider it
necessary to embark into a discussion of the two cases cited
before us jagan nath v. abdul aziz a.i.r. 1973 delhi p.9 and
murari ial v. abdul ghafar i.l.r. 1974 1 delhi 45.
during the pendency of the appeal in this companyrt an
order was made to the effect that from january 1 1985
onwards the appellant should deposit a sum of rs.3600
every month out of which the respondent would be entitled to
draw out a sum of rs.1800 only. on behalf of the
appellants it was also
undertaken that the suit filed by them against the
respondents for fixation of fair rent would be withdrawn by
them. we are informed that the suit has number yet been
withdrawn. we declare that the suit filed by the appellant
for the fixation of fair rent shall stand dismissed as
withdrawn. we further direct that with effect from january
1 1985 onwards the rent for the premises shall be rs.3600
per month and it will be so paid and adjusted. the amount
number in deposit may be drawn out by the respondents. the
appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above. there will
be numberorder as to companyts. khalid j. i have gone through the judgment prepared by
my learned brother. i agree with the companyclusion that the
appeal has to be allowed. we have before us two parties both affluent. numbertears
need be shed either for the one or the other. the tenant
before us or to be precise the sub-tenant is a firm which
does number deserve any sympathy from us and that for an
excellant reason. they had given an undertaking before this
court that they would withdraw the suit filed by them for
fixation of fair rent. this undertaking they did number respect
till number obviously with the oblique motive of companypelling
the landlord to get the rent reduced and at the same time
walk away with an order from this companyrt avoiding eviction. left to myself i would have declined relief to the
appellants or at least directed them to pay a sum of
rs.5000 every month as rent. however in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case where the companyduct of the
landlord is anything but wholesome i agree with my learned
brother in the order passed by him allowing the appeal. but
i would like to make my position clear regarding the scope
and purpose of section 17 and 18 of the act. the numbermal rule is that all rights created by a tenant
disappear along with the disappearance of his tenancy unless
there are special satisfactory safeguards for the sub-
tenants. a sub-tenant has numberindependent existence de-hors
the tenant who inducted him into possession. in the act
before us a subtenant is given a special right number
available to him under the general law but that right is
circumscribed by specific companyditions laid down in section

we have chosen to rescue the appellants before us only
because of the hide and seek
conduct displayed by the so-called tenant and the so-called
land-lord in this case. the facts speak for themselves. even
a man who runs can see that the so-called tenant in this
case is the alter ego of the so-called land-lord. there is a
total identification between the two. it is their attempt to
over reach the appellants by dubious methods that has in
fact imperilled their case and it is for this reason that
the appellants get relief from us even though strict
adherence to the companyditions imposed under section 17 is
absent. in numbermal case a sub-tenant under the act can get
relief under the provision of the act only if he satisfies
the twin companyditions laid down in section 17 viz. that
there must be the previous companysent in writing by the land-
lord of the creation of the sub-tenancy and a numberice in the
prescribed manner by the sub-tenant of the creation of the
sub-tenancy to the land-lord within one month of the date of
such creation. it is only when these two companyditions are satisfied that
the companysequences mentioned in section 18 1  will follow. i
should number therefore be understood to hold the view that
as a general rule in all cases where the sub-tenant some-
how secures the signature of the land-lord in some
communication relating to tenancy a companysent in writing
satisfying the requirements of the section is to be assumed.