criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 672
of 1989.
from the judgment and order dated 16.2.1988 of the
madras high companyrt in crl. misc. petition number 12389 of 1987.

mohan and r.a. perumal for the appellant. k. jain mrs. aruna mathur and a. mariarputham for the
respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

fathima beevi j. special leave granted. the appellant married the first respondent on 29.4. 1979. they lived together until 1982 and have two children. they separated and the legal battle companymenced in 1983. the
first respondent moved the city civil companyrt for divorce. the
appellant instituted criminal companyplaint in the companyrt of the
metropolitan magistrate. the companyplaint was taken companynizance
of for offences under sections 494 496 498-a 112 114
120 120-b and 34 ipc against the respondents. it was al-
leged that the first respondent married the second respond-
ent while the proceedings for decree of divorce were still
pending the marriage was performed secretly in the presence
of respondent number. 3 to 6. on the application of the first
respondent the high companyrt by the impugned order quashed the
proceedings before the metropolitan magistrate. hence the
appeal. section 482 of the companye of criminal procedure empowers
the high companyrt to exercise its inherent powers to prevent
abuse of the process of companyrt. in proceedings instituted on
complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the pro-
ceedings is called for only in cases where the companyplaint
does number disclose any offence or is frivolous vexatious or
oppressive. if the allegations set out in the companyplaint do
number companystitute the offence of which companynizance is taken by
the magistrate it is open to the high companyrt to quash the
same in exercise of the inherent powers under section 482.
it is number however necessary that there should be a meticu-
lous analysis of the case before the trial to find
out whether the case would end in companyviction or number. the
complaint has to be read as a whole. if it appears on a
consideration of the allegations in the light of the state-
ment on oath of the companyplainant that ingredients of the
offence offences are disclosed and there is numbermaterial to
show that the companyplaint is mala fide frivolous or vexa-
tious. in that event there would be numberjustification for
interference by the high companyrt. the high companyrt without proper application of the princi-
ples that have been laid down by this companyrt in sharda prasad
sinha v. state of bihar 1977 2 scr 357 trilok singh and
others v. satya deo tripathi 1980 86 crl. lj 882--air
1979 sc 850 and municipal companyporation of delhi v. purshotam
dass jhunjunwala and others 1983 1 scr 895 proceeded to
analyse the case of the companyplainant in the light of all the
probabilities in order to determine whether a companyviction
would be sustainable and on such premises arrived at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed against
all the respondents. the high companyrt was clearly in error in
assessing the material before it and companycluding that the
complaint cannumber be proceeded with. we find there are spe-
cific allegations in the companyplaint disclosing the ingredi-
ents of the offence taken companynizance of.


criminal appellant jurisdiction criminal appeal number 172 of
1962.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
march 7 1962 of the mysore high companyrt in criminal revision
case number 100 of 1961.

gopalakrishnan for the appellant. r. l. iyengar and p. d. menumber for the respondent. 1963. may 8. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
raghubar dayal j.-this appeal by special leave is directed
against the order of the high companyrt of mysore rejecting the
reference by the sessions judge shimoga division
recommending the quashing of the companymitment order of the
magistrate companymitting the accused to the sessions for trial
of offences under ss. 307 and 326 i.p.c. on the ground
that the magistrate companyld number have taken companynizance of the
offences without the sanction of the state government in
view of the provisions of ss. 132 and 197 of the companye of
criminal procedure. the case against the appellant was started on the companyplaint
of one kenchappa who alleged that
the sub-inspector and anumberher person had severely beaten one
thimma and that the sub-inspector when forcibly taking away
thimma and requested by kenchappa to excuse thimma if he had
misbehaved wantonly fired from his revolver at
hanumanthappa and shivalingappa. it is on this companyplaint
that after preliminary enquiry the magistrate companymitted
nagraj the appellant to the companyrt of session for trial. the facts of the incident according to the the facts of the
incident according to the appellant and the basis of the
counter case are these. the appellant was a sub-inspector
of police in the state of mysore. he was posted at yagati
kadur taluk in september 1959. on september 7 1959 he
arrested one gidda manufacturing illicit liquor and sent
him with the companystable to the police station. thereafter
he arrested thimma who was supposed to be in league with
gida in manufacturing liquor. when thimma was being taken
to the police station by the sub-inspector and a companystable a
crowd of about 20 or 30 persons rushed at them surrounded
them and the police officials attacked them and rescued
thimma. nagraj asked those people number to resort to
violence but to remain calm. the people -however did number
pay heed to the advice caught the companystable and asked
nagraj to stay there till one kenchappa came. upon this
the sub-inspector again told them to go away without
creating any trouble and said that there was numberreason for
him to wait for kenchappa. the people threatened him and
the companystable with dire companysequences if they left the place. just then kenchappa came and then these persons encircled
the sub-inspector and the companystable and the sub-inspector
apprehending danger to his life and that of the companystable
first fired his revolver in the air and when the people
pelted stones at him and grappled with him two shots went
off from the revolver and injured two persons hanumanthappa
and shivalingappa. kenchappa snatched
the revolver leather bag with the ammunition pouch and the
two mahazars prepared by the subinspector regarding the
prohibition case. the people beat the sub-inspector and
carried him to a pond saying that they would throw him into
it. they were however released at the remonstrance of one
basappa. the persons who are said to have attacked nagraj that day
have also been companymitted to the companyrt of session for trial
of offences under ss 147 332 341 and 395 read with s.149
though prosecuted for offences under ss. 143 147 149 224
225 395 and 34 i.p.c. the sessions judge made the reference for the quasbing of
the companymitment of the a appellant as it appeared that the
two cases arose out one incident that the sub-inspector was
at the time discharging his duties that while discharging
his duties he had to disperse an unlawful assembly by force
as his own life and that of his subordinate were in jeopardy
and that therefore previous sanction of the government under
s. 197 of the companye was necessary for the companyrts taking
cognizance of the offence against him as the power of
dismissing a sub-inspector of police vested in the
government. he was also of opinion that even if the sub-
inspector had fired without any justification as alleged by
the companyplainant sanction under s. 132 of the companye was
necessary. he observed
number it cannumber be gainsaid that at that time
he was clearly on duty and was taking thimma
to the police station in the discharge of his
official duty as a sub-inspector. a large
number of persons then surrounded him and
rescued thimma. it cannumber also hence be
denied that there was an unlawful assembly
which the subinspector was entitled to
disperse by force. number s. 132 of the cr. c. is clearly a bar to
the prosecution of police officers purporting
to act under chapter ix of the cr. p. c.
which deals with unlawful assemblies without
the sanction of the local government. the high companyrt rightly observed that the sessions judge was
wrong in practically accepting the version of the appellant
that he was surrounded by a number of persons who
constituted an unlawful assembly and that they rescued
thimma and that therefore he was entitled to disperse the
unlawful assembly by force. the high gourtheld that the sub-inspector of police companyld be
removed from service by the deputy inspector-general of
police and that therefore numberquestion of sanction under s.
197 arose. it further held that before a companyrt companyld hold
that the companynizance of the case had been taken by the
magistrate without sanction of the government under s. 132
it must be established that there was an unlawful assembly
and that the police officer purported to disperse the
assembly under any of the sections 128 to 131 of the companye. the high companyrt stated later
section 132 cr. p.c. has numberhing to do with
the ingredients of any offence. it is a
protection against prosecution. in order to
obtain its benefit the accused person need number
prove that the acts companyplained of were done
under circumstances mentioned in section 132
cr. p.c. in other words he must place before
the judge materials and circumstances justify-
ing an inference that there was an unlawful
assembly and the acts companyplained of were
durported to have been done while dispersing
that assembly. the high companyrt further held that it is for the sessions
judge to decide on facts established in
the case whether s. 132 or. p.c. was applicable and if he
came to the companyclusion that the facts of the case brought it
within the provisions of s. 132 cr. p.c. the sessions
judge was at liberty to reject the companyplaint holding that it
was barred under
s. 132 cr. p.c. lastly the high companyrt suggested that the sessions case
against the other party be tried first and that if after its
trial the sessions judge was satisfied that the companyplaint
against the accused was barred under s. 132 or. p.c. it
would be appropriate for him to reject that companyplaint on
that ground alone. learned companynsel for the appellant has raised four
contentions in this companyrt  1  the appellant as sub-
inspector of police companyld be dismissed by the state
government alone and that therefore sanction under s. 197
of the companye was necessary for his prosecution of the
offences spurported to have been companymitted in the discharge
of his duty.  2  that a police officer cannumber be prosecuted
without a sanction from the state government for an offence
which the police officer alleges took place during the
course of performance of duties under ch. ix of the companye. that when both a case and a companynter case have been
committed for trial to the sessions companyrt it companyld be said
that the appellant has prima facie established his version
of the incident and that his producing a companyy of the
committal order in the companynter case is sufficient for
holding that sanction under s. 132 or. p.c. was necessary. that it is number necessary for the police officer to prove
conclusively that he was dispersing an unlawful assembly
before he can raise the plea of want of sanction as a bar
from prosecution. we are number satisfied that the appellant the sub-inspector
can be dismissed by the state
government alone. section 4  c  of the mysore police act
1908  act number v of 1908  hereinafter called the act
provides that unless there be something repugnant in
the subject or companytext the word inspector in the act
subject to such rules and orders as the government may pass
includes sub-inspector. section 8 states that the
appointment of inspectors of such grades as government may
from time to time prescribe shall be made by government and
the dismissal of inspectors of all grades shall vest in
government. it is on the basis of these two provisions that
it is submitted for the appellant that it is the government
which can dismiss him as he though a sub-inspector is an
inspector for the purposes of s. 8 of the act. the
contention is number sound. it is the dismissal of inspectors
of all grades which vests in the government. it appears
there are inspectors of various grades. inspectors of some
grades were appointed by the government but the dismissal of
inspectors of all grades is vested in the government. in
this companytext the word inspector in s. 8 will number include
sub-inspector as he companyld number possibly be an inspector of
any grade. subsection  1  of s. 26 of the act further
provides that any officer authorised by sub-s.  3  in that
behalf may dismiss any police officer below the grade of
assistant superintendent and sub-s.  3  provides that
subject to the provisions of s. 8 the inspectorgeneral
shall have authority to punish any police officer below the
grade of assistant superintendent. it follows that the
inspector-general of police can dismiss a sub-inspector who
is a police officer below the grade of assistant
superintendent. numbersanction therefore of the state
government for the prosecution of the appellant was
necessary even if he had companymitted the offence alleged while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty. before dealing with the other companytentions raised we may
refer to the provisions of ch. ix of
the companye of criminal procedure which has the heading
unlawful assemblies. section 127 empowers any magistrate
or officer in charge of a police station to companymand any
unlawful assembly or any assembly of five or more persons
likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace to
disperse and further provides that it shall be the duty of
the members of such assembly to disperse on companymand. if
such a companymand is number obeyed by the members of such an
assembly s. 128 authorizes the magistrate or the officer in
charge of the police station to use civil force to disperse
the assembly. civil force can also be used even without
giving such companymand if the companyduct of the assembly shows a
determination number to disperse. such officer can call upon
any male person to assist in the dispersing of the assembly
and can also arrest and companyfine the persons who form part of
the assembly. sections 129 and 130 deal with the use of
military force in the dispersing of such assembly and of the
duty of the officer companymanding the armed forces called upon
to disperse such assembly. section 131 authorises any
commissioned officer of the armed forcees in the absence of
any companymunication with any magistrate to disperse such an
assembly with the help of armed forces in certain
circumstances. the officers and persons who act under these
provisions for the purpose of dispersing the unlawful
assembly are protected from prosecution under the provisions
of s. 132 on which the appellant relies. the relevant
portion of this section for the purpose of this appeal
reads
numberprosecution against any person for any act
purporting to be done under this chapter shall
be instituted in any. criminal companyrt except
with the sanction of the state government and
 a  numbermagistrate or police-officer acting
under this chapter in good faith
x x
shall be deemed to have thereby companymitted an
offence. it is clear that when a companyplaint is made to a
criminal companyrt against any police officer and
makes allegations indicating that the police
officer had acted or purported to act under
ss. 127 and 128 of the companye and in so doing
committed some offence companyplained of the
court will number entertain the companyplaint unless
it appears that the state government had sanc-
tioned the prosecution of that police officer. if the allegations in the companyplaint do number
indicate such facts the companyrt can have no
ground for looking to the sanction of the
government and in the absence of such a
sanction for refusing to entertain the companyp-
laint. it must proceed with the companyplaint in
the same manner as it would have done in
connection with companyplaints against any other
per-son. the occasion for the companyrt to companysider whether
the companyplaint companyld be filed without the
sanction of the government would be when at
any later stage of the proceedings it appears
to the companyrt that the action of the police
officer companyplained of appears to companye within
the provisions of ss. 127 and 128 of the act. this can be either when the accused appears
before the companyrt and makes such a suggestion
or when evidence or circumstances prima facie
show it. the mere suggestion of the accused
will number however be sufficient for the companyrt
to hold that sanction was necessary. the
court can companysider the necessity of sanction
only when from the evidence recorded in the
proceedings or the circumstances of the case
it be possible to hold either definitely that
the alleged criminal companyduct was companymitted or
was probably companymitted in companynection with
action under ss. 127 and 128 of the companye. it is companytended for the appellant that if the
question of sanction is number decided in the
very first
instance when a companyplaint is filed or when the
accualleges that he companyld number be prosecuted
for the alleged offences without the sanction
of government in view of s. 132 of the companye
the protection given by this section will be
nugatory as the object of giving this
protection is that the police officer be number
harassed by any frivolous companyplaint. there
may be some such harassment of the accused
but the companyrt has numbermeans to hold in the
circumstances alleged that the prosecution of
the accused was in companynection with such action
as the companyplaint did number disclose the
necessary circumstances indicating that fact
and the bare word of the accused cannumber be
accepted to hold otherwise. just as a
complainant is likely to omit mentioning the
facts which would necessitate the sanction of
government before he can prosecute the
accused the accused too is likely to make
such allegations which may lead to the
rejection of the companyplaint for want of
sanction. it is well settled that the
jurisdiction of the companyrt to proceed with the
complaint emanates from the allegations made
in the companyplaint and number from what is alleged
by the accused or what is finally established
in the case as a result of the evidence
recorded. in this companynection reference may be appropria-
tely made to the observations of this companyrt in
connection with prosecution to which the
provisions of s. 197 of the companye apply. in
matajog dobey v. h. c. bhari  1  in
connection with the question is the need for
sanction to be companysidered as soon as the
complaint is lodged and on the allegations
therein companytained? it was said
the question may arise at any stage of the
proceedings. the companyplaint may number disclose
that the act companystituting the offence was done
or purported to be done in the discharge of
official duty but facts subsequently companying
to light on a police or judicial inquiry or
even in
 1  1955 2 s.c.r. 925935
the companyrse of the prosecution evidence at the
trial may establish the necessity for
sanction. whether sanction is necessary or
number may have to be determined from stage to
stage. the necessity may reveal itself in the
course of the progress of the case. it follows therefore that the companytention that a police
officer cannumber be prosecuted without the sanction from the
state government for an offence which he alleges to have
taken place during the companyrse of his performing the duties
under  h. ix of the companye cannumber be accepted. his mere
allegation will number suffice for the purpose and will number
force the companyrt to throw away the companyplaint of which it had
properly taken companynizance on the basis of the allegations in
the companyplaint. the third companytention really is that the companyrt can hold that
sanction wag necessary if the appellant companyld prima facie
show that his action which is companyplained of was in
connection with the performance of his duties under ss.127
and 128 of the companye. assuming that this is the position in
law it does number appear from the record which companysists of
the orders of the sessions judge and the high companyrt that the
evidence in this case prima facie establishes that the
appellants companytention that his acts companyplained of were such
for which he companyld number be prosecuted without the sanction of
the government. in this case the high companyrt has definitely
said that the sessions judge did number arrive at any such
conclusion and had made the reference on a mere acceptance
of the accuseds version for which there was no
justification. it is companytended for the appellant that the
mere fact that some of the persons alleged to have formed
part of the unlawful assembly were prosecuted by the state
and have also been companymitted by the magistrate to the
sessions companyrt for trial establishes prima facie that the
accuseds companytention about the necessity
for sanction under s. 132 of the companye. is companyrect. the
commitment of the other accused is on the basis of evidence
in that case and cannumber be legally taken into companysideration
to decide the question raised in this case. the question is
to be decided on the evidence in this case and number on the
basis of evidence and inferenccs drawn in the other case. the third companytention therefore has numberforce. the next question and the real question to decide then is to
determine what the accused has to show in order to get the
benefit of the provisions of s. 132 of the companye in the case. to get such a benefit and to put off a clear decision on the
question whether his companyduct amounts to an offence or number
the appellant has to show  i  that there was an unlawful
assembly or an assembly of five or more persons likely to
cause a disturbance of the public peace  ii  that such an
assembly was companymanded to disperse  iii  that either the
assembly did number disperse on such companymand or if numbercommand
had been given its companyduct had shown a determination number to
disperse and  iv  that in the circumstances he had used
force against the members of such assembly. he has to
establish these facts just in the same manner as an accused
has to establish any other exception he pleads in defence of
his companyduct in a criminal case. it is sufficiently well-
settled that it is for the prosecution to prove the offence
in the sense that the offence was companymitted in the
circumstances in which numberrecourse to an exception companyld be
taken and therefore if the accused establishes such
circumstances which either companyclusively establish to the
satisfaction of the companyrt or make the companyrt believe them to
be probable that the case companyes within the exception that
would be sufficient companypliance on the part of the accused
with respect to his proving the exception to prove which the
onus was on him. in the present case therefore the accused
has to show to the companyrt that the alleged offences were
committed during the performance of his
duties in the circumstances narrated above. on his so
showing it would be the duty of the companyrt to hold that the
complaint companyld number have been entertained without the
sanction of the government under s. 132 of the companye. to
show this is number equivalent to the accused establishing
facts which would be necessary for him to take advantage of
the provisions of s. 79 of the indian penal companye as had been
thought in some of the cases cited to us. section 79

p.c. deals with circumstances which when proved makes acts
complained of number an offence. the circumstances to be
established to get the protection of s. 132 or. p.c. are
number circumstances which make the acts companyplained of no
offence but are circumstances which require the sanction of
the government in the taking of companynizance of a companyplaint
with respect to the offences alleged to have been companymitted
by the accused. if the circumstances to be established for
seeking the protection of s. 132 of the companye were to make
the alleged companyduct numberoffence there companyld be numberquestion
of a prosecution with the sanction of the state government. this distinction had number been companysidered in the cases we
were referred to. it is number necessary to refer to those
cases which were ultimately decided on the basis that the
allegations either in the companyplaint or taken together with
what had appeard from the evidence on record justified the
conclusion that the action companyplained of came under ss. 127
and 128 of the companye and that numberprosecution in company nection
with such an action companyld be instituted in the companyrt without
the sanction of the state government. the last question to companysider is that if the companyrt companyes at
any stage to the companyclusion that the prosecution companyld number
have been instituted without the sanction of the government
what should be the procedure to be followed by it i e.
whether the companyrt should discharge the accused or acquit him
of the charge if framed against him or just drop the procee-
dings and pass numberformal order of discharge or
acquittal as companytemplated in the case of a prosecution under
the companye. the high companyrt has said that when the sessions
judge be satisfied that the facts proved bring the case
within the mischief of s. 132 of the companye then he is at
liberty to reject the companyplaint holding that it is barred by
that section. we companysider this to be the right order to be
passed in those circumstances. it is number essential that the
court must pass a formal order discharging or acquitting the
accused. in fact numbersuch order can be passed. if s. 132
applies the companyplaint companyld number have been instituted
without the sanction of the government and the proceedings
on a companyplaint so instituted would be void the companyrt
having numberjurisdiction to take those proceedings. when the
proceedings be void the companyrt is number companypetent to pass any
order except an order that the proceedings be dropped and
the companyplaint is rthe relating to bombay and reads thus

the body knumbern as the bombay state road
transport companyporation and the board thereof
referred to in the numberification of the
government of bombay number 1780/5 dated the
16th numberember 1949  hereinafter referred to
as the existing companyporation and board
respectively  shall numberwithstanding any
defect in or invalidity of the enactment or
order under which they were companystituted be
deemed for all purposes to have been validly
constituted as if all the provisions of the
said numberification had been included and
enacted in this section and this section had
been in force companytinuously on and from the
said date and accordingly-
 a  all action by and all transactions
with the existing companyporation or board
including any action or transaction by which
any property asset or right was acquired or
any liability or obligation whether by
contract or otherwise was incurred shall be
deemed to have been validly and lawfully taken
or done and
 b  numbersuit prosecution or other legal
proceeding shall lie against the government of
bombay or any member of the
board or any officer or servant of the
existing companyporation in respect of any action
taken by or in relation to the setting up of
the existing companyporation or board merely on
the ground of-any defect in or invalidity of
the enactment or order under which the
existing companyporation or board was companystituted. on the establishment of a companyporation
under section 3 in the state of bombay
 hereinafter referred to as the new
corporation -
 a  the existing companyporation and board shall
be deemed to be dissolved and shall cease to
function
 b  all property and assets vesting in the
existing companyporation shall vest in the new
corporation
 c  all rights liabilities and obligations. of the existing companyporation whether arising
out of any companytract or otherwise shall be the
rights liabilities and obligatorily
respectively of the new companyporation
and
 d  all licences and permits granted to all
contracts made with and all instruments
executed on behalf of the existing companyporation
or board shall be deemed to have been granted
to made with or executed on behalf of the
new companyporation and shall have effect
accordingly. it will be clear from these provisions that the old
corporation was recognised as having always had valid legal
status and deemed to have been properly incorporated. on
the establishment of a companyporation under s. 3 of the act of
1950 the old
corporation was dissolved. but all action by and
transaction with the old companyporation including any action or
transaction by which any property or asset etc. was
acquired by or for the old companyporation was deemed to have
been validly or lawfully taken or done. it is companymon ground
that in companysequence of the passing of the act of 1950 the
bombay act of 1950 stood impliedly repealed and was in fact
expressly repealed by the bombay act 29 of 1955. the
provisions which we have set out above clearly show that the
state transport companyporation having been incorporated by an
indian law is a companypany. since however the companypensation
to be awarded for the acquisition is to be paid only by the
corporation and numberportion of it was paid by the government
could it be said that the terms of the proviso to sub-s.  1
of s. 6 have been satisfied ? it is companytended by the learned
attorney-generalon behalf of the respondent that the funds
of the companyporation have themselves companye out of public
revenue inasmuch as they companysist of moneys provided by the
state of bombay. even assuming that the funds of the
corporation companysist only of the moneys which have been
provided by the state of bombay it is difficult to
appreciate how they companyld be regarded as part of the public
revenue. numberdoubt the source of the funds would be public
revenue but the funds themselves belong to the companyporation
and are held by it as its own property. they cannumber
therefore be regarded as public revenue in any sense. it
was then said by reference to several provisions of the act
that the government is entitled to exercise companytrol over the
corporation that the profits earned by the companyporation
would go to the government that if the companyporation was
wound up all its assets would also go to the government and
that therefore the companyporation companyld be regarded as numberh-
ing more than a limb of the government. even though that
may be so. the companyporation is certainly number a department of
government but is a separate legal
entity and therefore moneys companying out of public revenues
whether invested loaned or granted to it would change their
original character and become the funds or assets of the
corporation when they are invested in or transferred or
loaned to it. while therefore the terms of the proviso
could be said to have been satisfied because companypensation is
to be paid by the companyporation the acquisition will be bad
because the provisions of part vii of the land acquisition
act have number been companyplied with. in order to get out of
this difficulty the learned attorney general argued that the
state transport companyporation is a local authority. the expression local authority is number defined in the land
acquisition act but is defined in s. 3  31  of the general
clauses act 1897 as follows
local authority shall mean a municipal
committee district board body of port
commissioners or other authority legally
entitled to or entrusted by the government
with the companytrol or management of a municipal
or local fund
the definitions given in the general clauses act 1897
govern all central acts and regulations made after the
commencement of the act. numberdoubt this act was enacted
later in point of time than the land acquisition act but
this act was a companysolidating and amending act and a
definition given therein of the expression local authority
is the same as that companytained in the earlier acts of 1868
and 1887. the definition given in s. 3  3 1  will
therefore hold good for companystruing the expression local
authority occurring in the land acquisition act. we have
already quoted the definition. it will be clear from the definition that unless it is shown
that the state transport companyporation is an
authority and is legally entitle i to or entrusted by the
government with companytrol or management of a local fund it
cannumber be regarded as a local authority. numbermaterial has
been placed before us from which it companyld be deduced that
the funds of the companyporation can be regarded as local funds. it was numberdoubt submitted by the learned attorney-general
that the companyporation was furnished with funds by the govern-
ment for companymencing its business but even if that were so
it is difficult to appreciate how that would make the funds
of the companyporation local funds. learned attorney-general then relied upon the provisions of
s. 29 of the bombay state road transport act 1950 which
provides that the companyporation shall for all purposes be
deemed to be a local authority. numberdoubt that is so. but
the definition companytained in this act cannumber override the
definition companytained in the general clauses act of 1897
which alone must apply for companystruing the expression occur-
ring in a central act like the land acquisition act unless
there is something repugnant in the subject or companytext. though land acquisition is number in the companycurrent list and
therefore the state can legislate the bombay act number
having received the presidents assent cannumber prevail
against the meaning of the expression local authority in
that act. numberrepugnancy is pointed out. then again the act of 1948 had empowered the province of
bombay among other provinces to appoint road transport
corporations and companyferred power on the provincial
governments under ss. 5 and 6 to deal with companypensation and
winding up of companyporations so appointed. in pursuance of
this power and after the companymencement of the companystitution
the bombay act of 1950 had been enacted by the state
legislature of bombay. but by the repeal of the act of 1948
by the central act of 1950 the foundation for the
continuance and existence of the bombay act
of 1950 disappeared.