civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number
823--826 of 1962.
appeals by special leave from the order dated march 7
1962 of the central government labour companyrt at delhi in

c.a. number. 246 to 249 of 1962.

c. setalvad n.v. phadke j.p. thacker o.c. mathur
ravinder narain and j.b. dadachanji for the appellants. v. viswanatha sastri m.k. ramamurthi r.k. garg d.p. singh and s.c. agarwal for the respondents. 1963. april 19. the judgment of the companyrt was
delivered by
gajendragadkar j.--this group of several appeals has
been placed together for final disposal because the appeals
included m the group raise a companymon question of law m regard
to the companystruction of s. 33c 2  of the in. industrial
disputes act 1947  number 14 of 1947   hereinafter called the
act . we propose to deal with this. point m civil appeals
number. 823 to 826 of 1962 which have been preferred by the
appellant the central bank of india limitedagainst the
respondents its employees and in accordance with our
decision on the said point the other appeals included in
this group would be dealt with on the merits. civil appeals 823 to 826 of 1962 arise out of
applications made by four respondents under
s. 33c 2  of the act. the case for each one of the
respondents was that besides attending to his routine duties
as clerk he had been operating the adding machine provided
for use in the clearing department of the branch during the
period mentioned in the list annexed to the petition and it
was alleged that as such he was entitled to the payment of
rs. 10/-per month as special allowance for operating the
adding machine as provided for under paragraph 164 b  1  of
the sastry award. on this basis each one of the
respondents made his respective claim for the amount companyered
by the said allowance payable to him during the period
specified in the calculations. the appellant disputed the respondents claims. it
urged three preliminary objections against the companypetence of
the applications. according to it the respondents companyld
claim only number-monetary benefits under the award that were
capable of companyputation and so s. 33g 2 was inapplicable to
their claim. it was also companytended that without a reference
made by the central government the applications were number
maintainable and it was pleaded that since the applications
involved a question of the interpretation of the sastry
award they were outside the purview of s. 33c 2 . on the
merits the appellants case was that the special allowance
claimed by the respondents was payable only to the companyptists
and companyld number be claimed by the respondents on the ground
that they were operating adding machines. in support of
this companytention the appellant alleged that a certain amount
of manipulative skill is required for the handling of a
comptometer since the operater has to execute a series of
somewhat companyplex operations in quick succession before he
can arrive at a result. the art of operating a companyptometer
has to be learnt over several months but the work of
operating the adding machine needs numberspecial training and
does number require even the skill which a typist has to show. that is why according to the appellant
numberspecial allowance companyld be claimed by the respondents
under paragraph 164 b  1  of the sastry award. the central government labour companyrt before which these
applications were made by the respondents over-ruled the
preliminary objections raised by the appellant and on the
merits found that the respondents were entitled to claim
the special allowance under the relevent clause of the
sastry award. that is how the applications made by the
respondents were allowed and the respective amounts claimed
by them were ordered to be paid by the appellant. it is
against this order that the appellant has companye to this companyrt
by special leave. the principal companytention which has been urged before us
by the appellant is one of jurisdiction. it is argued t.hat
the labour companyrt has exceeded its jurisdiction m
entertaining the applications made by the respondents
because the claims made by respondents in their respective
applications are outside the scope of s. 33c 2  of the act. in dealing with this point it is necessary to read section
33c

where any money is due to a workman
from an employer under a settlement or an
award or under- the provisions of chapter va
the workman may without prejudice to any other
mode of recovery make an application to the
appropriate government for the recovery of
the money due to him and if the appropriate
government is satisfied that any money is so
due it shall issue a certificate for that
amount to the companylector who shall proceed to
recover the same in the same manner as an
arrear of land revenue. where any workman is entitled to
receive from the employer any benefit which is
capable of being companyputed in terms of money. the amount at which such benefit should be
computed may subject to any rules that may be
made under this act be determined by such
labour companyrt as may be specified in this
behalf by the appropriate government and the
amount so determined may be recovered as
provided for in sub-section  1 . for the purposes of companyputing the money
value of a benefit the labour companyrt may if
it so thinks fit appoint a companymissioner who
shall after taking such evidence as may be
necessary submit a report to the labour companyrt
and the labour companyrt shall determine the
amount after companysidering the report of the
commissioner and other circumstances of the
case. it is companymon ground that s. 33c 1  provides for a kind of
execution proceedings and it companytemplates that if money is
due to a workman under a settlement or an award or under
the provisions of chapter va the workman is number companypelled
to take resort to the ordinary companyrse of execution in the
civil companyrt but may adopt a summary procedure prescribed by
this sub-section.i this sub-section postulates that a
specific amount is due to the workman and the same has number
been paid to him. if the appropriate government is
satisfied that the money is so due then it is required to
issue a certificate for the said amount to the companylector and
that leads to the recovery of the said amount in the same
manner as an arrear of land revenue. the scope and effect
of s.33c 1  are number in dispute before us. there is also numberdispute that the word benefit used in
s. 33c 2  is number companyfined merely to monetary benefit which
could be companyverted in terms of
money but that it takes in all kinds of benefits which
may be monetary as well as number-monetary if the workman is
entitled to them and in such a case the workman is given
the remedy of moving the appropriate labour companyrt with a
request that the said benefits be companyputed or calculated
in terms of money. once such companyputation or calculation is
made under s. 33c 2 the amount so determined has to be
recovered as provided for in sub-s. 1 . in other words
having provided for the determination of the amount due to
the workman in cases falling under subs.  2  the
legislature has clearly prescribed that for-recovering the
said amount the workman has to revert to his remedy under
sub-s.  1 . sub-section  3  empowers the labour companyrt to appoint a
commissioner for the purposes of companyputing the money value
of the benefit and it lays down that if so appointed the
commissioner shall take such evidence as may be necessary
and submit report i to the labour companyrt. the labour companyrt
is then required to proceed to determine the amount in the
light of the. report submitted by the companymissioner and
other circumstances of the case. this means that
proceedings taken under sub-s.  2  maybe determined by the
labour companyrt itself orin a suitable case may be determined
by it after receiving a report submitted by the companymissioner
appointed in that behalf. it is clear that if for companyputing
in terms of money the value of the benefit claimed by the
workman an enquiry is required to be held and evidence has
to be taken the labour companyrt may do that itself or may
delegate that work to a companymissioner appointed by it. this
position must be taken to be well settled after the decision
of this companyrt in the punjab national bank limited v.k.l. kharbanda  1 . the question which arises for our decision is
however slightly different. it is urged by the appellant
that sub-s  2 can be invoked by a workman who
 1  1962  1  l.l.j.284
is entitled to receive from the employer the benefit there
specified but the right of the workman to receive the
benefit has to be admitted and companyld number be a matter of
dispute between the parties in cases which fall under sub-s.
 2 . the argument is if there is a dispute about the
workmans right to claim the benefit that has to be
adjudicated upon number under sub-s.  2  but by other
appropriate proceedings permissible under the act and since
in the present appeals the appellant disputed the
respondents right to claim the special allowance the
labour companyrt had numberjurisdiction to deal with their claim. in other words the companytention is that the opening words of
sub-s.  2  postulate the existence of and admitted right
vesting in a workman and do number companyer cases where the said
right is disputed. on the other hand the respondents companytend that sub-s.
 2  is broad enumberghi to take in all cases where a workman
claims some benefit and wants the said benefit to be
computed in terms of money. if in resisting the said claim
the employer makes several defences all those defences
will have to be tried by the labour companyrt under sub-s.  2 . on this argument all questions arising between the workmen
and their employers in respect of the benefit which they
claim t6 be companyputed in terms of money would fall within the
scope of sub-s.  2 . before dealing with the question of companystruction thus
raised by the parties in the present proceedings it would be
material. to refer briefly to the legislative history of
this provision. the act as it was originally passed made
relevant provisions on the broad basis that industrial
disputes should be adjudicated upon between trade unions or
representatives of labour on the one hand and the workmens
employers on the other. that is why section 10  1  which
deals with the reference of disputes to boards companyrts or
tribunals has been interpreted by this
court to mean the disputes which are referable under s.
10 1  should be disputes which are raised by the trade
unions to which the workmen belong or by the representatives
of workmen acting in such a representative character. it
was however realised that in denying to the individual
employees a speedy remedy to enforce their existing rights
the act had failed to give due protection to them. if an
individual employee does number seek to raise an industrial
dispute in the sense that he does number want any change in
the .terms and companyditions of service but wants only to
implement or enforce his existing rights it should number be
necessary for him to have to take recourse to the remedy
prescribed by s. 10 1  of the act that was the criticism
made against the omission of the act to provide for speedy
enforcement of individual workmans existing rights. in
order to meet this criticism an amendment was made by the
legislature in 1059 by section 20 of the industrial disputes
 appellate tribunal  act 1950  number 48 of 1950 . section 20
of this act provided for recovery of money due from an
employer under an award or decision. this provision filled
up the lacuna which was discovered because even after an
award was made individual workmen were number given a speedy
remedy to implement or execute the said award and so s.20
purported to supply that remedy. section 20  1   provided
that if money was due under an award or decision of an
industrial tribunal it may be recovered as arrears of land
revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate government
on an application made to it by the person entitled to the
said money. section 20 2  then dealt with the cages where
any workman was entitled to receive from the employer any
benefit under an award or decision of an industrial
tribunal which is capable of being companyputed in terms of
money and it provided that the amount at which the said
benefit companyld be companyputed may be determined. subject to the
rules framed in that behalf by that industrial tribunal and
the amount so determined may be recovered
as provided for in sub-s.  1 . in other words the
provisions of s.20  2  roughly companyrespond to the provisions
of s.33c 2  of the act. there are however two points of
distinction. section 20 2  was companyfined to the benefits
claimable by workmen under an award or decision of an
industrial tribunal and the application to be made in that
behalf had to be filed before the industrial tribunal which
made the said award or decision. these two limitations have
number been introduced in s. 33c 2 . section 20 3
corresponds to s.33c 3 . it would thus be numbericed that
s 20 of this act provides a speedy remedy to
individual workmen to execute their rights under awards or
decisions of industrial tribunals. incidentally we may add
that section 34 of this act made a special provision for
adjudication as to whether companyditions of service had been
changed during the pendency of industrial proceedings at the
instance of an individual workman and for that purpose
inserted in the act s.33a. act 48 of 1950 by which s.20 was
enacted came into force on may 20 1950.
in 1953 the legislature took a further step b? providing for additional rights to the workmen by adding
chapter va to the act and passed an amending act number 43
of 1953. chapter va deals with the workmens claims in
cases of lay-off and retrenchment. section 25 1  which was
enacted in this chapter provided for the machinery to
recover moneys due from the employers under this chapter. it
laid down inter aria that any money due from an employer. under the provisions of chapter va may be recovered in the
same manner as an arrear of land revenue or as a public
demand by the appropriate government on an application made
to it by the workman entitled to the said money. this was
of companyrse without prejudice to the workmans right to
adoptany other mode of recovery. this provision shows
that having created additional rights in the workmen in
respect of lay-off and retrenchment the
legislature took the precaution of prescribing a speedy
remedy for recovering the. said amounts from their. employers this amending act came into force on december
23 1953.
about three years later the legislature passed the
industrial disputes  amendment and miscellaneous provisions
act 1956  number 36 of 1956 . this act repealed-the
industrial disputes  appellate tribunal  act number 48 of 1950
s. 25.i in chapter va and inserted s. 33c 1   9  and  3
and s. 36a in the act. the result of these modifications is
that the recovery provisions are number companytained in section
33c and an additional provision is made by s. 36a which
deals with cases where doubt or difficulty may arise in the
interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement. this act came into force on august 28 1956.
in order to make the narration of the legislative
background of s. 33c companyplete we may refer to the fact that
by the amendment act number 18 of 1957 two more provisions
were added to chapter va which are numbered as s. 25ff and
s. 25fff. this act came into force on june 6 1957.
the legislative history to which we have just referred
clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes on the
basis of companylective bargaining the legislature recognised
that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to
enforce their existing individual rights and so inserted
s. 33-a in the act in 1950 and added s. 33-c in 1956. these
two provisions illustrate the cases in which individual
workmen can enforce their rights without having to
take recourse to s. 10 1  of the act or without having to
depend upon their union to espouse their cause. therefore
in companystruing s. 33-c we have to bear in mind two relevant
considerations. the companystruction
should number be so broad as to bring within the scope of s.
33-c cases which would fall under s. 10 1 . where industrial
disputes arise between employees acting companylectively and
their employers they must be adjudicated upon in the manner
prescribed by the act as for instance by reference under
s 10 1 . these disputes cannumber be brought within the
purview of s. 33c. similarly having regard to the fact that
the policy of the legislature in enacting s. 33c is to
provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce
or execute their existing rights it would number be reasonable
to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing
rights which are sought to be implemented by individual
workmen. in other words though in determining the scope of
s. 33c we must take care number to exclude cases which
legitimately fall within its purview we must also bear in
mind that cases which fall under s. 10 1  of the act for
instance cannumber be brought within the scope of s. 34c. let us then revert to the words used in s. 33c 2  in
order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a
fair and reasonable companystruction. when sub-s.  2  refers to
any workman entitled to receive from the employer any
benefit there specified does it mean that he must be a
workman whose right to receive the said benefit is number
disputed by the employer? according to the appellant the
scope of subs.  2  is similar to that of sub-s.  1  and it
is pointed out that just as under sub-s.  1  any disputed
question about the workmens right to receive the money due
under an award cannumber be adjudicated upon by the appropriate
government so under sub-s. 2  if a dispute is raised about
the workmens right to receive the benefit in question that
cannumber be determined by the labour companyrt. the only point
which the labour companyrt can determine is one in relation to
the companyputation of the benefit in terms of money. we arc
number impressed by this argument. in our opinion on
a fair and reasonable companystruction
of sub-s.  2 it is clear that if a workmans right to
receive the benefit is disputed. that may have to be
determined by the labour companyrt. before proceeding to
compute the benefit in terms of money the labour companyrt
inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the
workman has a right to receive that benefit. if the said
right is number disputed numberhing more needs to be done and the
labour companyrt can proceed to companypute the value of the benefit
in terms of money but if the said right is disputed the
labour companyrt must deal with that question and decide whether
the workman has the right to receive the benefit as
alleged by him and it is only if the labour companyrt answers
this point in favour of the workman that the next question
of making necessary companyputation can arise. it seems to us
that the opening clause of subs.  2 does number admit of the
construction for which the appellant companytends unless we add
some words in that clause. the clause where any workman
is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit does
number mean where such workman is admittedly or admitted
to be entitled to receive such benefit. the appellants
construction would necessarily introduce the addition of
the words admittedly or admitted to be in that clause
and that clearly is number permissible. besides it seems to
us that if the appellants companystruction is accepted it would
necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the
employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy
provided by sub-s.  2  because he has merely to raise an
objection on the ground that the right claimed by the
workman is number admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the
labour companyrt to entertain the workmans application. the
claim under s. 33 c  9  clearly postulates that the
determination of the question about companyputing the benefit in
terms of money may in some cases. have to be preceded by an
enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry
must be held to be incidental to the main determination
which has been assigned to the labour companyrt by sub-s.  2 . as maxwell has observed where an act companyfers a
jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing
all such acts or employing such means as are essentially
necessary to its execution 1 . we must accordingly hold
that s. 33c  2  takes within its purview cases of workmen
who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled
should be companyputed in terms of money even though the right
to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by
their employers incidentally it may be relevant to add
that it would be somewhat odd that under sub-s.  3  the
labour companyrt should have been authorised to delegate the
work of companyputing the money value of the benefit to the
commissioner if the determination of the said question was
the only task assigned to the labour companyrt under sub-s.  2 . on the other hand sub-s. 3 becomes intelligible if it is
held that what can be assigned to the companymissioner includes
only a part of the assignment of the labour companyrt under sub-
s.  2 . it is however urged that in dealing with the question
about the existence of a right set up by the workman the
labour companyrt would necessarily have to interpret the award
or settlement on which the right is based and that cannumber
be within its jurisdiction under s. 33c  2  because
interpretation of awards or settlements has been
specifically and expressly provided for by s. 36a. we have
already numbericed that s. 36a has also been added by the
amending act number 36 of 1956 along with section 33c and the
appellants argument is that the legislature introduced
the two sections together and thereby indicated
that questions of interpretation fall within s. 36a
andtherefore outside s. 33c  2 . there is numberforce in. this companytention. section 36a. merely provides for the
interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement
where any difficulty or doubt arises as

maxwell on interpretation of statutes p.350. to the said interpretation. generally this power is
invoked when the employer and his employees are number agreed
as to the interpretation of any award or settlement and
the appropriate government is satisfied that a defect or
doubt has arisen in regard to any provision in the award or
settlement. sometimes cases may arise where the awards or
settlements are obscure ambiguous or otherwise present
difficulty in companystruction. it is in such cases that s. 3ca
can be invoked by the parties by moving the appropriate
government to make the necessary reference under it. experience showed that where awards or settlements were
defective in the manner just indicated there was numberremedy
available to the parties to have their doubts or
difficulties resolved and that remedy is number provided by s.
36a. but the scope-of s. 36a .is different from the scope
of s. 33c  2  because s. 36a is number companycerned with the
implemention or execution of the award at all whereas that
is the sole purpose of s. 33c  2 . whereas s. 33c 2  deals
with cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen
falling under its provisions s. 36a deals merely with a
question of interpretation of the award where a .dispute
arises in that behalf between the workmen and the employer
and the appropriate government is satisfied that the dispute
deserves to be resolved by reference under s. 36a. besides there can be numberdoubt that when the labour
court is given the power to allow an individual workman to
execute or implement his existing individual rights it is
virtually exercising execution powers in some cases and it
is well settled that it is open to the executing companyrt to
interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. it is
of companyrse true that the executing companyrt cannumber go behind
the decree number can it add to or subtract from the provision
of the decree. these limitations apply also to the labour
court but like the executing companyrt the
labour companyrt would also be companypetent to interpret the award
or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under s.
33c  2 . therefore we feel numberdifficulty in holding that
for the purpose of making the necessary determination under
s. 33c  2 it would in appropriate cases be open to the
labour companyrt to interpret the award or settlement on which
the workmans right rests. we have already numbericed that in enacting s. 33c the
legislature has deliberately omitted some words which
occurred in s. 20  94 of the industrial disputes  appellate
tribunal  act 1950. it is remarkable that similar words
of limitation have been used in s. 33c  1  because s. 33 c
 1  deals with cases where any money is due under a
settlement or an award or under the provisions of chapter
va. it is thus .clear that claims made under s. 33c  1  by
itself can be only claims referable to the settlement
award or the relevant provisions of chapter va. these
words of limitations are number to be found in s. 33c  2  and
to that extent the scope of s. 33c  9.  is undoubtedly
wider than that of s. 33c  1 . it is true that even in
respect of the larger class. of cases which fail under s.
33c  2  after the determination is made by the labour companyrt
the execution goes back again to s. 33c  1 . that is why
s. 33c  2  expressely provides that the amount so determined
may be recovered as provided for in sub-section  1 . it
is .unnecessary in the present appeals either to state
exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other
categories of claims can fall under s. 33c  2 . there is no
doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in s.
33c  1  fall under s. 33c  2  and in that sense s. 33c  2
can itself be deemed to be a kind of. execution
proceeding .but it is possible that claims number based on
settlements awards or made under the provisions of chapter
v a may also be companypetent under s. 33c  2  and that may
illustrate its wider scope. we would however like to
indicate
some of the claims which would number fall under s. 33c  2
because they formed the subject matter of the appeals which
have been grouped together for our decision along with the
appeals with which we are dealing at present. if an employee
is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the
dismissal or demotion is wrongful it would number be open to
him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages
under s. 33g  2 . his demotion or dismissal may give rise
to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried
but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or
demoted him a claim that the dismissal or demotion is
unlawful and. therefore the employee companytinues to be the
workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due
to him under a preexisting companytract cannumber be made under s.
33 c  2 . if a settlement has been duly reached between the
employer and his employees and it fails under s. 18  9.  or c3  of the act and is governed by s. 19  2 it would number
be open to an employee numberwithstanding the said settlement
to claim the benefit as though the said settlement had companye
to an end. if the settlement exists and companytinues to be
operative numberclaim can be made under s. 33c 2  inconsistent
with the said settlement. if the settlement is intended
to be terminated proper steps may have to be taken in that
behalf and a dispute that may be arise thereafter may to be
dealt with according. to the other procedure prescribed by
the act. thus our companyclusion is that the scope of s. 33g
 2 is wider than s. 33g  1  and cannumber be wholly assimilated
with it though for obvious reasons we do number propose to
decide or indicate what additional cases would fall under
s. 33g  2  which may number fall under s. 33g  1 . in this
connection we may incidentally state that the observations
made by this companyrt in the case of punjab national bank ltd
 1  that s. 33c is a provision in the nature of execution
should number be interpreted to mean that the scope of s. 33g
 2  is exactly the same as s. 33g  1   page 238 .  1  1962  1  l.l.j.234. it number remains to refer to some decisions which are
relevant. in m s. kasturi and sons  private lid v. shri n.
salivateeswaran  1  where this companyrt was companysidering the
question about the scope and effect of s. 17 of the working
journalists  companydition of service  and miscellaneous
provisions act 1955 number 45 of 1955  reference was made
to the fact that the procedure prescribed by the said s. 17
was different from the procedure prescribed by s. 33c  2
and it was observed that under the latter provision
where an employee makes a claim for some money an enquiry
into the claim is companytemplated by the labour companyrt and it
is only after the labour companyrt has decided the matter that
the decision becomes enforceable under s. 33c  1  by
summary procedure. numbersuch enquiry was companytemplated by the
said s. 17.
in shri ambica mills company limited v. shri s.b. bhatt  2
section 15 of the payment of wages act 1936  number 4 of 1936
fell to be companystrued and it was held that under the said
section when the authority exercises its jurisdiction which
is made exclusive by s. 22 it has necessarily to companysider
various questions incidental to the claims falling
thereunder and it was added that although it would be
inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast rule for
determining the scope of such questions care should be
taken number to unduly extend or curtail its jurisdiction- as
we have already indicated. we have adopted the same
approach in interpreting s. 33c  2 . the respondents relied on the decision of the bombay
high companyrt in m s. sawa tram ramprasad mills company limited
akola v. baliram  3 . in support of the very broad
construction which they seek to place on the provisions
of s. 33c  2 . in that case the high companyrt was dealing
with a claim made under chapter va of the act
 1  1959 s.c.r. 1.  2  1961 3 s.c.r. 220.  3   1962  65 bom. l.r. 91.
and there can be. numberdoubt that such a claim together
with .all a question incidental to its decision can be
properly determined under s. 33c  2 . in reaching its
conclusion the high companyrt has numberdoubt made certain broad
and general observations in regard to the scope of the
jurisdiction companyferred on the labour companyrt under s. 33g
 2 . those observations are in the nature of obiter dicta
and in so far as they may be inconsistent with our present
decision they should be held to be number justified by the
terms of s. 33c  2 . in the result the preliminary point
raised by the appellant that the labour companyrt had no
jurisdiction to entertain the respondents applications
fails and must be rejected. that takes us to the merits of the respondents claim. we have already seen that the main basis on which the
respondents have claimed the special allowance under
paragraph 164  b   1  of the sastry award is that they have
been operating upon the adding machines provided by the
appellant for use in its clearing department. the
appellant however has companytended that the special allowance
can be claimed only by companyptists and since the respondents
had number even claimed that they are companyptists their
applications should be rejected. for deciding this dispute. it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the
sastry award as they were modified by the decision of the
labour appellate tribunal. chapter x of the sastry award
deals with the problem of special allowances. in paragraph
161 of this chapter the sastry tribunal observed that there
were certain posts even in the clerical and subordinate
grades for which an incumbent requires special
qualifications or skill for the efficient discharge of
his duties and so it thought that an extra payment in such
cases is necessary by way of recognition of and
compensation for this special skill or responsibility. in
paragraph 162 the tribunal examined three alternatives
suggested for
its acceptance for making a provision for some special
payment and .it ultimately decided that a special allowance
should be paid to those categories of employees who by
their special qualifications or skill deserve
recognition. in paragraph 163 the tribunal observed that
the special allowance which it was about to prescribe was
the minimum and i.t was open to the banks to pay higher
allowance if they thought necessary to do so. then followed
paragraph 164 in which it specified 10 categories fit for
special allowances. the first of these categories was
graduates and the claim of this category of employees was
dealt with by the tribunal in paragraph 164 a . paragraph
164 b  deals with the remaining 9 categories and the
comptists are the first in these 9 categories. the tribunal
provided that the companyptists should receive rs. 10/-
p.m. as special allowance in cases of all the four
classes of banks abc and d. it is on this provision that
the respondents rely in support of their claim. when the sastry award went before the labour appellate
tribunal the labour appellate tribunal dealt with this
question in paragraph 140 of its decision. the tribunal
observed that during the companyrse of the hearing it became
clear that the numberenclature by which. particular
categories of employees are described differed from bank
to bank and so in order to avoid disputes between banks
and their employees as to whether a particular category
of employees is entitled to a special allowance under the
award or number the tribunal asked the banks to supply it with
statements of different names given to the categories of
employees for whom special allowances have been provided by
the sastry award. accordingly some of the banks supplied
the necessary information. the tribunal then set out
eight of the categories the equivalents of which had
been supplied in the statements of the banks. as against
the companyptists statement number b-247 which had been supplied
by the imperial bank of india showed that the numberenclature
adopted by the said bank in respect of the said category was
adding machine operators addressographers. having set out
these equivalents1. the tribunal took the precaution of
adding that the equivalents set out by it were helpful but
did number exhaust the subject and so in the absence of data
it had to be left to the banks to pay the appropriate
allowances having regard to the duties and responsibilities
of a post. that is how the matter ended. in the present proceedings the respondents seem to
base their case on the sole basis that they are .operating
the adding machines and can therefore be treated as adding
machine operators and they argued that since adding machine
operators were equated in the statement of the imperial bank
of india with companyptists they must be held to be companyptists
for the purpose of paragraph 164  b   1  of the sastry award
and thus entitled to the special allowance of rs. 10/-. in
fact in allowing the respondents claim the tribunal seems
to have accepted this companytention for it has observed that
according to the decision of the labour appellate tribunal
the adding machine operators must be held to be in the same
category as companyptists. in other words the tribunal appears
to have taken the view that since the imperial bank of india
described the employees who did the work of companyptists as
adding machine operators it followed that whenever any bank
employee was operating on the adding machine for howsoever
small a period it may be he must be held to be a companyptists
and as such entitled to the special allowance. -in. our
opinion this is clearly erroneous.it is true that the
imperial bank of india adopted the numberenclature of adding
machine operators for its companyptists and that may presumably
be for the reason. that at the relevant time its companyptists
were
doing the work of adding machine operators and ad-
dressographers so that it made numberdifference whether the
bank called them companyptists or adding machine operators or
addressographers all the three types of work being
entrusted to one category of employees but however that may
be the numberenclature adopted by the imperial bank of india
cannumber be said to be binding on the other banks which did
number adopt it and so it is obviously erroneous to hold that
the equivalent adopted by the imperial bank of india must be
taken to have been adopted by all the other banks. indeed
the award recently made by mr. justice desai who was
appointed the national industrial tribunal in the bank
disputes clearly brings out the distinction between
comptists on the one hand and adding machine operators
addressographers and photostat machine operators on the
other in paragraphs 5. 242 and 5. 265.
in the present appeals numberevidence was led on behalf of
the respondents. the appellant however examined its
officer mr. shivodkar. this witness stated that an adding
machine can be operated by a clerk with half an hours
practice. it only does additions mechanically. operating a
comptometer however involves companyplicated calculations and
in order to handle it efficiently the employee has to take
three months training and practising. he added that
about two hours work is put on the adding machine by the
several respondents but it is included in their numbermal
working hours. there has been some discussion at the bar in
the present appeals as to the nature of the work which is
done on the companyptometer and on the adding machine but there
can be numberdoubt that companypared to the companyptometer the adding
machine is a simple mechanism and for operating on it number
much experience or technical training is required in fact
it may number even require that amount of skill and efficiency
which is expected of a typist and it is significant that a
claim made
by the typists for special allowance was rejected by the
sastry tribunal. that shows how the respondents claim for
special allowance as companyptists solely on the ground that
they can be described as adding machine operators cannumber be
sustained. therefore -the sole basis on which the
respondents claim has been allowed by the labour companyrt is
unsound and so the order passed by it cannumber be affirmed. it has however been urged before us by the respondents
that they should be given an opportunity to substantiate
their claims on the merits. it is argued that they were
advised that the equivalent supplied by the imperial bank of
india by itself furnished a firm basis for their claims and
so numberother allegations were made by them in the present
proceedings and numberevidence was led by them to prove the
nature of the work done by them and the e for which they do
the special kind of work to justify the claim for
special allowance. on the other hand the appellant
has strenuously companytended that the delay made by
the respondents in making the present applications
speaks for itself and so numberindulgence should be shown to
the respondents for remanding the present cases to the
labour companyrt once it is found that the basis on which the
claim has been allowed is number justified in law. it is true
that though the sastry ward was passed in 1953 and the
labour appellate tribunals decision was pronumbernced in 1954
and it became final on october 21 1955 the respondents did
number make their claims until 1962. we have had occasion in
the past to emphasise the fact that industrial adjudication
should number encourage unduly belated claims but on the other
hand numberlimitation is prescribed for an application under
s. 33c 2  and it would on the whole number be right for us to
refuse an opportunity to the respondents to prove their case
only on the ground that they moved the labour companyrt after
considerable delay. we would therefore
set aside the order passed by the labour companyrt and remand
the proceedings to that companyrt with a direction that it
should allow the parties to amend their pleadings if they
so desire and to lead evidence in support of their
respective cases. it may be open to the respondents to
prove that they are doing the work which may be properly
described as the work of companyptists. in that companynection it
may also be open to them incidentally to show that the work
which was being done in the imperial bank of india by the
adding machine operators who were shown as equivalents of
the companyptists at the relevant time is being done by them in
the appellants branches. if the labour companyrt is satisfied
that the work done by the respondents can be reasonably
treated as the work of companyptists as properly understood in
the banking industry then it should proceed to determine
the respondents claim on that basis. we have already
referred to the fact that the labour appellate tribunal
made it perfectly clear that the particular numberenclature
was number decisive and that what mattered in these cases
was the nature of the duties and responsibilities of a post. if the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the
posts held by the respondents legitimately justify the
conclusion that they are companyptists then the special
allowance can be claimed by them. it is in the light of
these observations that the labour companyrt should proceed to
deal with these cases after remand.


original jurisdiction writ petition number 1149 of 1979.  under article 32 of the companystitution.  n. ganpule for the petitioners. p. singh for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
krishna iyer j.-numberconstitution number companye number companyrt can
interdict illegal incarceration where companyscientized agencies
of the law at the grass-roots level are absent. such is the
only explanation for the lawless lot of the two prisoners
who are petitioners before us. these two humans sojourning
for long years in some jail or other in bihar since 1972
found their personal liberty subverted by the police prison
officials and the magistracy that they wrote letters to the
hon. chief justice in desperation. the above habeas companypus
petition is a legal
1106
incarnation of those letters. sensitized by the prima facie
hideous facts disclosed the companyrt directed a rule to issue. somehow despite several adjournments the state did number even
furnish the basic facts about the imprisonment of the
petitioners the offences for which they were kept in
judicial custody for how long and at what stage were the
proceedings and the like. this gross indifference of the
bihar state in regard to citizens deprived of their liberty
for indefinite and prolonged spells is an unconscionable
aspect of that states unconcern for human rights. indeed
counsel for the state did his level best to get relevant
information. being at the end of our patience and finding a
helpless companynsel we had to pass an order in the following
terms
it is numbericed that an order dated 17-12-1979
directed jail authorities and district magistrates
under whose jurisdiction the petitioners are kept in
confinement to explain before 14-1-80 the nature of the
charges against the petitioners the stage of trial of
each of these cases and the reason for the delay in
proceeding with the trial. it is surprising that
despite companymunication having been made to them through
the state companynsel for the state represents that telex
message to the companycerned district magistrate and jail
authorities had been sent but numberinformation has yet
been furnished in companypliance with this companyrts order. we are companystrained therefore to issue numberice to the
jail authorities and the district magistrates to show
cause why action for violation of this companyrts
direction should number be taken against them. the companyrt
will issue numberice to be personally served on these
authorities with a direction that they shall appear in
court in person on 25-2-1980. companynsel for the state
undertakes to furnish the names of the district
magistrate companycerned and jail authorities by 12-2-1980.
post the matter on 13-2-1980 with office report whether
the companynsel has submitted names and addresses of the
authorities companycerned as directed above. when the directive of the companyrt went beyond mere
censorious observations into hint at action against the
defaulting officers the scene began to change and at the
hearing on february 25 1980 the superintendent of the jail
and the district magistrate who were in a sense vicariously
responsible for the custodial companydition of the petitioners
appeared in person and prayed to be excused for the default
or delay in furnishing vital information about these unfree
individuals. fuller facts have been furnished by the
superintendent central jail suffi-
1107
cient to enable us to discover the incontestable illegality
of the detention and to direct the release on bail of the
petitioners. law is what law does and number what law writes in the
books beyond the reach of those behind bars. in this
perspective art. 21 of the companystitution and s. 167 2  of
the criminal procedure companye are dead letter for each
petitioner. article 21 guarantees personal liberty in these
terms -
numberperson shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by
law. section 167 2  of the criminal procedure companye companytains the
following mandate
the magistrate to whom an accused person is
forwarded under this section may whether he has or has
number jurisdiction to try the case from time to time
authorise the detention of the accused in such custody
as such magistrate thinks fit for a term number exceeding
fifteen days in the whole and if he has no
jurisdiction to try the case or companymit it for trial
and companysiders further detention unnecessary he may
order the accused to be forwarded to a magistrate
having such jurisdiction
provided that-
 a  the magistrate may authorise the detention of
the accused person otherwise than in the custody of
the police beyond the period of fifteen days if he is
satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so but
numbermagistrate shall authorise the detention of the
accused person in custody under this paragraph for a
total period exceeding-

ninety days where the investigation relates
to an offence punishable with death imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term of number less than ten
years

sixty days where the investigation relates
to any other offence
and on the expiry of the said period of ninety days
or sixty days as the case may be the accused person
shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does
furnish bail and every person released on bail under
this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released
under the provisions of chapter xxxiii for the purposes
of that chapter
1108
 b  numbermagistrate shall authorise detention in any
custody under this section unless the accused is
produced before him
 c  numbermagistrate of the second class number
specially empowered in this behalf by the high companyrt
shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. in maneka gandhis case and a crop of cases thereafter
this companyrt has emphasised the need for fair procedure to
justify detention of persons. to put a man in prison and
forget his personhood thereafter to deprive a man of his
personal liberty for an arbitrary period without monitoring
by the law to keep a man in companytinued custody unmindful of
just fair and reasonable procedure-these shake the faith in
the rule of law and militate against the mandates of part
iii of the companystitution. and yet that is precisely what has
happened in the present case. the frightful facts frankly furnished in the return
filed are that the two petitioners have been enduring
incarceration for over seven years in various prisons in
bihar on the basis that they are implicated in several cases
of 1971 and 1972. a long list has been annexed to the
counter-affidavit. but what scandalises us is that apart
from mentioning the sections in the penal companye by way of a
passport into the prison house there is numbermention of any
investigation of the case number a single charge-sheet laid
before the companyrt against either accused. what flabbergasts
us is that even the magistracy have bidden farewell to their
primary obligation perhaps fatigued by over-work and
uninterested in the freedom of others. if we see the chart
produced by the superintendent of the jail we find that a
large number of dates are given on which the prisoners have
been produced before the magistrates companycerned from 1973 to
1980 without so much as the companyrt checking up whether the
investigations have been companypleted charge-sheets have been
laid and there is justification for keeping the petitioners
in custody. section 167 2  which we have extracted above empowers
the magistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in
such custody as he thinks fit for a term number exceeding 15
days in the whole. more importantly there is a precious
interdict protective of personal freedom which states that
numbermagistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused
person exceeding 90 days in grave cases and 60 days in
1109
lesser cases. on the expiry of the said periodthe
accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared
to and does furnish bail number 60 days but six years have
passed in the present case number 90 days but 1900 days or
more have passed and yet the magistrates companycerned have
been mechanically authorising repeated detentions
unconscious of the provisions which obligated them to
monitor the proceedings which warrant such detention. in
short the police have abdicated their function of prompt
investigation. the prison staff have number bothered to knumber
how long these internees should be companytinued in their
custody and most grievous of all the judicial officers
concerned have routinely signed away orders of detention for
years by periodically appending their incarceratory
authorisations. we knumber number how many others are languishing
in prison like the petitioners before us. if the salt hath
lost its savour wherewith shall it be salted ? if the law
officers charged with the obligation to protect the liberty
of persons are mindless of companystitutional mandates and the
codes dictates how can freedom survive for the ordinary
citizen ? we must record our deep appreciation of shri ganpule
who has appeared amicus curiae and proceed further to
register our profound satisfaction at the fair and frank
statement made by shri u. p. singh for the state who rightly
pointed out that the companytinued detentions in the face of s.
167 2  were indefensible. we direct the release forthwith of the two petitioners
on their own bond without sureties. this companyrt has held in
earlier cases that bail does number involve a necessary
component of sureties. we therefore direct that on taking
the personal recognizance from the petitioners both of them
will be set free subject to such other legal proceedings
that the state may take if so warranted. we have stated earlier that in the population of
prisoners there may be many other whose legal illiteracy and
pecuniary indigence may have forbidden their moving this
court or the high companyrt by way of habeas companypus petition. it
is a bad state of affairs when we see the bihar state being
oblivious or callous to the prisoners whom it is
warehousing. for what purpose one knumbers number. it may be an
act of penitence on the part of the authorities of the state
and also of cleansing of companyscience if only a special
officer with judicial experience or other law officer
familiar with criminal justice were appointed to make an
extensive survey and study all the cases of prisoners to
find out whether illegal custody has become a large scale
phenumberenumber.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 300 of 60.
appeal from the judgment and order dated numberember 13 1958
of the rajasthan high companyrt in d.b.c. writ application number
58 of 1957.
chand mal lodha and brijbans kishore for the appellant. k. kapur and d. gupta for the respondent. 1962. april 19. the judgment of the companyrt. was delivered
by
gajendragadkar j.-the appellant firm ghulam hussain haji
yakoob . sons moved the rajasthan high companyrt by a petition
under art. 226 of the companystitution for the issue of a writ
in the nature of prohibition or other writ or appropriate
order declaring that it was number liable to pay the customs
duty sought to be levied on it by the companytroller of sirohi
by his order of the 9th feb. 1956. it appears that one
mohammad sagir had taken a companytract for cutting forest of
haranj amrapura from the thakur of nibaj on the 12th july
1946. the duration of this companytract was five years and the
purpose of the companytract was to enable the companytractor to
prepare charcoal. this companytract was subsequently
transferred to the appellant by the said sagir on the 13th
september 1948. in due companyrse the companytract was extended
by the thakur of nibaj by two years and on endorsement was
made on it to that effect on the 15th april 1950. under
this companytract the appellant prepared charcoal and exported
it out of the state of sirohi. the assistant companymissioner
customs and excise sirohi took the view that the appellant
was liable to pay
customs duty as. /8/- per maund on the quantity of
charcoal exported by it. the asstt. companymissioner found
that the charcoal thus exported by the appellant was 2 7
003 mds. accordingly the said asstt. companymissioner made a
report to the companymissioner on the 11th february 1954. the
matter was then dealt with by the dy. companymissioner customs
excise and he passed on order that the appellant had
exported charcoal without payment of duty. this order was
made on the 17th december 1954. according to the finding
made by the dy. companymissioner the charcoal exported by the
appellant after the 30th numberember 1948 amounted to 48650
maunds. on this basis the appellant was asked to pay rs. 24325 - on account of the duty on export of charcoal as. /8/- a maund. the appellant challenged the companyrectness of
this order by preferring an appeal to the government but
its appeal was rejected on the 24th may 1956. the
appellant came to knumber about this order on the 5th april
1957 when it was asked by the tehsildar to deposit the
duty assessed on it along with interest. since the
appellant did number deposit the amount the customs
authorities had in the meanwhile made a requisition to the
collector of sirohi for recovery of the said amount and the
collector had issued a numberice on the appellant under the
public demand recovery act on the 9th february 1956. it is
the validity of this numberice that the appellant challenged by
its present writ petition. the appellants case was that
the order purported to have been passed by the state companyncil
of sirohi by which the customs duty as. /8/- was levied
on charcoal was invalid and ultra vires and so it was number
competent to the customs authorities to levy any duty on the
charcoal exported by the appellant and it was number companypetent
to the companylector to issue a demand numberice for the recovery
of the said duty under the public demand recovery act. on the other hand the respondent the state
of rajasthan disputed the companyrectness of the appellants
allegation that the duty had been illegally levied. it was
urged by the respondent that the said duty had been levied
validly by the resolution passed by the state companyncil which
had been approved by her highness shri rajmata saheba since
the said resolution had been duly passed by a companypetent
authority the levy of the duty imposed on the- appellant
was valid and the companylector was justified in issuing the
numberice of demand under the public demand recovery act. the high companyrt has upheld the plea made by the respondent
with the result that the writ petition filed by the
appellant has been dismissed with companyts. the appellant then
applied for and obtained a certificate from the high companyrt
and it is with the said certificate that it has companye to this
court by its present appeal. the customs tariff had been prescribed in the state of
sirohi by the sirohi customs act of 1944 section 14 of the
said act lays down that except as hereinafter provided
customs duties shall be levied at such rates as are
prescribed in the sirohi customs tariff on all goods
mentioned therein at the time of import or export of goods
 including those belonging to the state  into or out of
sirohi state by rail road or air. it would thus be seen
that s. 14 which is the charging section provides that
customs duties shall be levied on the goods mentioned in the
tariff at the rates prescribed by it. the result is that it
is only in respect of goods mentioned in the tariff and at
the rates. specified therein that customs duties companyld be
leived. section 15 of the said act companyferred upon the darbar power
to fix and alter tariff rates. it says that the darbar may
from time to time by
numberification in the sirohi state gazette save in emergency
cases alter the rates prescribed in the tariff and such
altered rates shall companye into force from the date mentioned
in the numberification or in the event of the numberification number
reaching any customs post companycerned on a subsequent date
from such date. the effect of this section is that the
power to fix and alter tariff rates has been companyferred on
the darbar which is required ordinarily to issue a
numberification in that behalf. the high companyrt thought that as
a result of reading sections 14 and 15 together it was open
to the darbar number only to alter rates at which customs companyld
be levied but also to include new items under the taxable
articles mentioned in the tariff. this view is clearly
erroneous. the power companyferred on the darbar by s 15 is to
fix and alter tariff rates. numberpower has been companyferred on
the darbar to add to the list of taxable companymodities in the
tariff itself the goods on which customs duties companyld be
levied have been specified in the tariff attached to the act
and numberaddition companyld be made to the said tariff in that
behalf by the darbar by virtue of the authority companyferred on
it by s. 15. there is numberdoubt about this position. at this stage it is relevant to add that in the tariff
prescribed by the act of 1944 charcoal is included in the
list of companymodities the import of which is liable to pay
the customs duty. it is however number included in the list
of companymodities the export of which is liable to pay customs
duty. this position is number disputed. therefore in order
that export of charcoal should be made liable to pay the
customs duty the respondent ought to be able to rely upon
some legislative enactment in that behalf. it appears that in 1940 the ruler of the sirohi state
brought into existence the companyncil of
state and its functions and duties and its rights were duly
numberified in the state gazette. the companyncil which was
designated as the companyncil of state sirohi was to companysist
of his highness as president the chief minister as vice-
president and such other member as his highness may appoint
from time to time. the general working of the companyncil had
to be under the companytrol of the president who under rule 9
was empowered if the matter was urgent to act on behalf of
the companyncil provided that the companyncil was duly informed
about the action taken by the president as soon as possible. rule i i of the numberification provided that all cases of the
kind enumerated in schedule i shall be referred to the
council for decision before final orders are passed save as
provided in rule 9. number amongst the matters specified in
schedule i is included the topic of any new taxation or
alteration or abolition of taxation. this is entry 7 in the
said schedule. it would thus appear that it was within the
competence of the companyncil to companysider the proposal for any
new taxation or alteration or abolition under rule 11 and it
was for the ruler to pass final orders in the light of the
decision by the companyncil on that point. rule 11 makes it
clear that though it wag companypetent to the companyncil to reach a
decision on topics companyered by entry 7 in schedule 1 it was
for the ruler to pass final orders which would make the
decision effective. in other words there can belittle
doubt that the power of the companyncil in respect of the
matters companyered by schedule i were numbermore than advisory
it was always for the ruler to decide what final orders
should be passed in respect of the matters referred to the
council for its decision. that is the nature and scope of
the power companyferred on the companyncil. since the ruler of the state his highness maharajadhiraja
maharao taj singhji bahadur was
a minumber in 1947 his excellency the crown representative was
pleased to sanction the passing of the regency act for the
sirohi minumberity administration on the 14th august 1947.
this act provided that it was to companye into force on the 14th
august 1947 and was to companytinue until the ruler attained
the age of 18 years. section 3 of the act prescribes that
for the purpose of the companystitution of the sirohi state the
word ruler wherever occurring in the companystitution shall be
deemed to be the board of regency. section 4 provided for
the companystitution of the board of regency. it was to companysist
of her highness the dowager maharani saheba of sirohi
maharana shri sir bhawani singhji bahadur of danta and raj
saheban shri bhopalsinghji of mandar. section 6 of the act
provided that the board of regency shall be legal guardian
of the ruler. after this act was passed the functions of
the ruler were discharged by the board of regency which for
all companystitutional and legal purposes represented the ruler
during his minumberity. in pursuance of the material
provisions of this act numberification was issued on the same
clay companystituting the board of regency. thus it would be
clear that when the impugned order levying a duty on companyl
was passed on the 31st may 1948 the companystitutional
position was that the governance of the state was entrusted
to the board of regency and under the board of regency was
functioning the state companyncil which had been companystituted by
the previous ruler in 1940. it is in the light of this
constitutional position that the question about the validity
of the impugned levy of customs duty on the appellant has to
be judged
on the 31st may 1948 an order was passed which purports to
have been issued in pursuance of the companyncil resolution
dated 15th may 1948 for which approval had been obtained
from her highness shri raj mata saheba. as a result of
this order the duties imposed on goods specified
in the tariff attached to the earlier act were enhanced in
respect of bones wool timber and fire wood and a fresh
duty was imposed in respect of export of charcoal. this
duty was imposed as. /8/- per maund. as we have already
soon it is companymon ground that according to the tariff
prescribed by the act of 1944 charcoal was number included in
the list of articles the export of which was liable to
customs duty. the question which calls for decision in the
present appeal is whether the order thus issued is valid
and the answer to this question depends upon whether or number
the imposition of the customs duty on charcoal has been
levied by an authority which was legislatively companypetent to
issue such an order. if the levy has been ordered only by
the state companyncil without the approval of the board of
regency then it would be invalid because it was number
competent to the state-council to pass a law. it was open
to the state companyncil to reach a decision on the question
about the imposition of customs duty on any new article but
that decision had to be approved and accepted by the board
of regency which alone was clothed with the requisite
legislative power. therefore the validity of the order can
be sustained only if it is shown that it has been passed
with the approval of the board of regency of which shri raj
mata saheba was the president. in dealing with this question it is necessary to bear in
mind that the order does number formally recite that shri raj
mata saheba had approved of the order as the president of
the board of regency. the order has been issued by the
secretary of the state companyncil and does number purport to have
been issued by the executive officer of the board of
regency. the order does number refer to the board of regency
at all and does number purport to say that shri rajmata saheba
when she gave her approval was acting on behalf of the
board. if the order had formally been passed as on behalf
of the board of regency it would have been open to the
respondent to companytend that the assumption should be that it
was duly passed by the board of regency and has been
promulgated according to the rules of business prescribed by
the said board. but since the order does number purport to
have been issued either on behalf of the board of regency or
on behalf of shri raj mata saheba acting for the board of
regency it is necessary to enquire whether in fact the
board of regency has approved of this order and it appears
that so far as this enquiry is companycerned the respondent has
placed numbermaterial before the companyrt which would assist it in
coming to the companyclusion in favour of the validity of the
impost. indeed the plea taken by the respondent is disputing the
correctness of the appellants claim before the high companyrt
was that shri raj mata saheba was the president of the board
of regency and that whenever she acted she did so on behalf
of the board and it was for her to take companynsel from the
other members. it was therefore urged that in the
circumstances it would be presumed that she has passed the
orders in companysultation with other members till the companytrary
is proved. it is significant that this plea proceeds on the
assumption that it was at the option of shri raj mata saheba
either to companysult the board of regency or number. the
respondents case appears to be that the raj mata being the
president of the board of regency companyld act on her own in
matters relating to the government of the state either
executively or legislatively and that it was for her to
decide whether she should companysult the other members of the
board or number. the case set out by the respondent is number
that the raj mata as the president of the board always
consulted the board before she acted on its behalf. on the
contrary the plea taken seems to suggest that the raj mata
was number bound
to companysult the board and companyld have acted independently of
the board in passing orders either executive or legislative. that being the plea it is difficult for us to accept the
argument that the approval of the raj mata to which the
impugned order makes a reference can be safely taken to be
the approval of the raj mata after she had companysulted the
board in that behalf. there is numberdoubt that as a result of
the sirohi regency act the governance of the state was left
in the hands of the board of regency and it was the board of
regency alone acting companylectively that companyld legislate or
pass executive orders. if the raj mata took the view that
she companyld act on her own without companysulting the board. that
was clearly inconsistent with the material provisions of the
act. therefore we are number inclined to accept the
conclusion of the high companyrt that the impugned order can be
said to have been passed as a result of the decision of the
board of regency since the board of regency alone was
clothed with the necessary legislative authority unless the
board passed the resolution it companyld number take effect as a
law in the state of sirohi. the approval of the raj mata to
the resolution passed by the state companyncil cannumber cure
infirmity arising from the fact that the state companyncil had
numberlegislative power. the high companyrt seems to have taken the view that since the
raj mata entered into the agreement of merger she can be
treated at the de facto ruler of the state and as such she
was companypetent to exercise the necessary legislative power to
pass the impugned order. we are number inclined to accept this
view. it is clear that the document of merger has been
signed by the raj mata describing herself as the president
of the regency board but the high companyrt thought that since
the document had number been signed by the board itself the
raj mata companyld be treated as the de facto ruler of the
state. this view is clearly erroneous. since the raj mata was the
president of the board of regency it was companypetent to her
to sign the document on behalf of the board and she
purported to sign it as the president of the board of
regency obviously because she had companysulted the board and it
was as a result of the decision of the board that she
proceeded to execute the document and sign it as the boards
president therefore there is numbersubstance in the
contention that the raj mata alone without the companycurrence
of the board companyld have validly given sanction to the
passing of the impugned order. in the result we must hold
that the impugned order has number been validly passed and no
levy of customs duty can be legally imposed on the appellant
in regard to the charcoal which it has exported out of the
state of sirohi. it is however urged that the duty levied against the
appellant for the export of charcoal can be sustained under
the provisions of rajasthan ordinance  number16 of 1949 . section 4 2  of the said ordinance authorised the government
to issue any revised tariff and in exercise of this power
the government of rajasthan has issued a numberification number
211/srd on the 10th august 1949 whereby a revised tariff
was imposed and it was directed that the duties of customs
shall be levied and companylected in accordance with the said
revised tariff. according to item number367 in the said
tariff export duty on charcoal was as.-/8/-per maund. the
respondents argument was that when sirohi became a part of
rajasthan the ordinance in question applied to sirohi and
so the claim for the customs duty made against the
appellant was justified under the relevant provisions of the
said ordinance. this ordinance came into force on the 4th
august 1949.
in our opinion this argument is number well-founded. when
ordinance xvi was passed and
same into force it numberdoubt applied to the whole of
rajasthan as it was then companystituted but the state of
sirohi was at the relevant time number a part of rajasthan and
it became a part of rajasthan as from the 25th january
1950. it appears that the ministry of states issued a
numberification on the 24th january 1950 in exercise of the
powers companyferred on the government of india by subsection
 2  of section 3 of the extra-provincial jurisdiction act
1947  47 of 1947  and it was as a result of this
numberification that the central government delegated to the
government of the united states of rajasthan the extra-
provincial jurisdiction including the power companyferred by
section 4 of the said act to make orders for the effective
exercise of that jurisdiction. it is thus clear that until
the 25th january 1950 sirohi was number a part of rajasthan
and was number amenable to the application of the ordinance in
question. the respondent attempted to suggest that as soon
as sirohi became a part of rajasthan the ordinance in
question applied to it. this argument is obviously falla-
cious. when sirohi became a part of rajasthan the laws
applicable to rajasthan prior to the merger of sirohi companyld
be made applicable to sirohi only after an appropriate
legislation had been passed in that behalf. in fact in
1953 the rajasthan laws  application to sirohi  act  numberiii
of 1953  was passed to declare that certain rajasthan laws
applied to sirohi. section 3 of this act provided that the
rajasthan laws specified in the schedule to the act shall
in so far as they relate to any of the matters enumerated in
lists ii and iii in the seventh schedule to the companystitution
of india apply and as from the appointed day be deemed to
have applied to sirohi number withstanding any thing to the
contrary companytained in the sirohi administration order 1948
or in any other law or instrument. there is a proviso to
this
section with which we are number companycerned for the purposes of
the present appeal. the ordinace in question is number
included in the schedule and so it is clear that the said
ordinance was number intended to apply to sirohi. it is number
suggested that any other law passed by the rajasthan state
or any other instrument executed in that behalf made the
ordinance in question applicable to sirohi.


criminal appellate jurisdiction special leave petition
 crl.  number 1383 of 1978.
from the judgment and order dated 3-1-1978 of the
punjab and haryana high companyrt in crl. a. number 1039/74. l. jogga and l. n. gupta for the petitioner. hardev singh for the respondent. the order of the companyrt
was delivered by
shinghal j.-we have heard learned companynsel for the
parties at length. accused bachan singh gurnam singh and chanan singh
were companyvicted by the sessions judge of gurdaspur of an
offence under section 304 part i read with section 149

p.c. and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10
years and a fine of rs. 1000/-. they were also companyvicted of
an offence under section 148 i.p.c. and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 2 years. the remaining two accused
ravail singh and vir singh were companyvicted of an offence
under section 304 part i read with section 149 i.p.c. but
they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and
a fine of rs. 500/-. further they were companyvicted of an
offence under section 147 i.p.c. and were sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for 1 year. an appeal was filed by the accused against their
conviction and sentence and the state filed an appeal for
their companyviction and sentence under section 302 i.p.c. a
revision petition was filed under
section 401 crl. p.c. for enhancement of the sentence of
imprisonment and fine to meet the ends of justice. the
high companyrt of punjab and haryana made an express order on
december 9 1974 that the revision petition would be heard
alongwith the criminal appeal  number 1039 of 1974  filed by
the accused. by its impugned judgment dated january 3 1978 the
high companyrt dismissed the appeal which was filed by the
accused but enhanced the sentence of bachan singh gurnam
singh and chanan singh accused under section 304 part i read
with section 149 i.p.c. to rigorous imprisonment for life
and of accused ravail singh and vir singh under the same
section to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. while making
that order the high companyrt observed that the state appeal
for enhancement of punishment was partly accepted. that
is why all the five accused have applied to this companyrt for
special leave under article 136 of the companystitution. it has been argued by learned companynsel for the accused
that the high companyrt companymitted an error of law in enhancing
the sentence of the accused without giving them a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement and
without allowing them to plead for their acquittal or for
reduction of the sentence as companytemplated by sub-section  3
of section 377 of the companye of criminal procedure. it appears to us however that as the state government
did number file an appeal against the sentence under sub-
section  1  of section 377 cr.p.c and as it is number disputed
before us that its appeal was directed against the acquittal
of the accused for the offence under section 302 i.p.c. there is numberjustification for the argument that the high
court companymitted an illegality in number companyplying with the
requirement of sub-section  3  of that section for giving
the opportunity to the accused of showing cause against the
enhancement of the sentence or of pleading for their
acquittal or for reduction of the sentence. as has been stated a petition was filed under section
401 cr.p.c. for enhancement of the sentence and it was
clearly maintainable as it was number permissible for the
revision petitioner to file an appeal under section 377. it
will be recalled that the high companyrt made an express order
on december 9 1974 for the hearing of the revision
petition alongwith the appeal which had been filed by the
accused. the fact therefore remains that the high companyrt had
before it the above mentioned appeals which had been filed
by the accused and the state and the revision petition
under section 401 cr.p.c. for enhancement of the sentence. while that companyrt dismissed the appeal of the
accused and allowed the appeal of the state in part it
forgot to make a reference to the revision petition while
drawing up the operative part of its order. that was an
inadvertent mistake for after reading the impugned judgment
of the high companyrt we have numberdoubt that it effectively
disposed of both the appeals and the revision petition even
though the wordings of the judgment in that respect were number
quite appropriate. but even otherwise there is numbermerit in the grievance
of the accused that they were number given the opportunity of
showing cause against the enhancement of the sentence or to
plead for their acquittal or for reduction of the sentence. the opportunity for pleading for acquittal was amply
furnished at the hearing of their own appeal against their
conviction and the same appeal furnished them the necessary
opportunity for pleading for the reduction of the sentence. that in fact was the subject matter of their appeal. it is number disputed before us that the high companyrt heard
the state appeal against the acquittal of the accused
alongwith the appeal which was filed by the accused and
that furnished further opportunity to the accused to plead
for their acquittal or reduction of sentence or to show
cause against the enhancement of the sentence. there is thus
numberforce in the argument to the companytrary. it has to be
appreciated that in respect of the petition which was filed
under section 401 cr.p.c. for the exercise of the high
courts powers of revision it was permissible for it to
exercise the power of a companyrt of appeal under section 386
for enhancement of the sentence and if that had been done
there is numberjustification for the argument that the
enhancement was illegal. there is anumberher reason for this view. it was
permissible for the high companyrt under section 397 cr.p.c. to
call for and examine the record of the proceeding before the
trial companyrt for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
correctness legality or propriety of any finding
sentence or order recorded or passed by that inferior
court. the high companyrts power of revision in the case of any
proceeding the record of which has been called for by it or
which otherwise companyes to its knumberledge has been stated in
section 401 cr.p.c. to which reference has been made above. that includes the power companyferred on a companyrt of appeal under
section 386 to enhance or reduce the sentence. so when the
record of the case was before the high companyrt in companynection
with the two appeals and the revision petition referred to
above there was numberhing to prevent the high companyrt from
invoking its powers under section 397 read with section 401
cr.p.c. and to make an order for the enhancement of the
sentence. there is thus numberforce in the argument to the companytrary. all the same we gave an opportunity to the learned
counsel for the accused to advance his arguments on question
of sentence and all that he was able to argue was that as
the accused had undergone a portion of the sentence and as
the offence was companymitted in 1972 the high companyrt was number
justified in enhancing the sentence. as is obvious both
these arguments are untenable and inconsequential because of
the companycurrent findings of the trial companyrt and the high
court that the accused emerged from the house of accused
bachan singh as soon as sarup singh  deceased  reached the
place of occurrence shouted that he should be taught a
lesson for getting liquor recovered from them and beat him
with their respective weapons. it has been found further
that while accused vir singh caught hold of the hair of the
deceased and ravail singh caught hold of his legs and felled
him on the ground gurnam singh who was armed with a datar
dealt belows on his right knee while chanan singh gave a
kirpan blow on his left hand and then accused gurnam singh
gave a blow on his right knee while chanan singh gave a
kirpan blow on his left hand and he gurnam singh and bachan
singh dealt further blows on his left leg near the knee as
a result of which the left leg was companypletely severed from
the body. it has also been companycurrently found that the
accused took away the chopped off leg of the deceased after
wrapping it in his turban and that he succumbed to the
injuries soon after. the facts and the circumstances which
have thus been established by the evidence of pal singh

w.4 and nishan singh p.w.5 on which reliance has been
placed by both the companyrts justify the view taken by the
high companyrt that the accused deserved the sentence awarded to
them by it.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 2531 and
2533 of 1966.
appeals from the judgments and orders dated april 1 1965 of
the bombay high companyrt in special civil applications number. 804 and 697 of 1964 respectively. c. bhandare badri das sharma for s. p. nayar for the
appellant  in both the appeals . s. barlingay and a. g. ratnaparkhi for respondent number
1  in c. a. number 2533 of 1966 . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ray j.--these two appeals are by certificate from two judg-
ments dated 1 april 1965 of the bombay high companyrt. both the appeals turn on the question as to whether
relationship of landlord and tenant companytinued to subsist
between 20 july 1955 when the inams were abolished by and
the land vested in the state under the hyderabad abolition
of inams act 1954 being act viii of 1955  hereinafter
referred to as the 1955 act  and 1 july 1960 when a
numberification under section 1 3   b  of the 1955 act made the
entire 1955 act applicable. the companytention on behalf of the state was that when the 1955
act came into existence on 20 july 1955 inams were
abolished and the land vested in the state and therefore
the relationship between the inamdar landlord and the tenant
in respect of the inam land ceased. the companytention on
behalf of the inamdar and the tenant on the other hand was
that though inams were abolished and the land vested in the
state on the companying into force of the 1955 act on 20 july
1955 the relationship of inamdar landlord and tenant
continued upto 1 july 1960 because all the provisions of
the 1955 act did number companye into effect until 1 july 1960 and
those which did number companye into operation had the effect of
saving and preserving the relationship between inamdar
landlord and tenant. the high companyrt upheld the companytention
of the inamdar landlord and the tenant. the 1955 act received the assent of the president on 16
july 1955 and was published in the hyderabad gazette extra-
ordinary on 20 july 1955. under section 1 3   a  of the
said 1955 act sections 1 2 3  except clauses  d   g   h
and  i  of sub-section  2  of section 3  sections 30 to 34
 both inclusive  section 35 to the extent to which it
enabled rules to be made for the purposes of the aforesaid
sections section 36 and section 37 of the 1955 act came
into force on the date of the publication of the 1955 act in
the official gazette. the other important provision is
section 1 3   b  of the 1955 act which enacted that the
rest of the act cc shall companye into force on such date as the
government may by numberification in the official gazette
appoint in this behalf. it may be stated here that the short title of the 1955 act
was hyderabad abolition of inams act 1954. by the
hyderabad abolition of inams  amendment  act 1959 the title
of the 1955 act was changed to hyderabad abolition of inams
and cash grants act 1954. the amendment was by reason of
the act being made applicable to cash grants and inams in
the nature of companymunity service inams and watans by
introducing sub-section  2a  in section 1 of the 1955 act. the 1959 amendment act came into force on 1 july 1960 by a
gazette numberification dated 3 june 1960. there was anumberher
gazette numberification on 3 june 1960 number hda-1060-iv- b l-
that in exercise of the powers companyferred by clause  b  of
sub-section  3  of section 1 of the hyderabad
abolition of inams and cash grants act 1954. the government
of maharashtra appointed 1 july 1960 to be the date on
which the rest of the said act shall companye into force. that is how all the provisions of the 1955 act came into
force on 1 july 1960.
the state relied on section 3 1  of the 1955 act in support
of the proposition that the inams were abolished and the
land vested in the state and therefore the relationship
of landlord and tenant came to an end. it is numbericeable that section 3 2  of the 1955 act provided
save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of
the act and with effect from the date of vesting the
consequences mentioned in clauses  a  to  i  will ensue. the important clauses in section 3 2  of the 1955 act are as
follows
 b --all rights title and interest vesting
in the inamdar kabiz-e-kadim permanent
tenant protected tenant and number-protected
tenant in respect of the inam land other than
the interests expressly saved by or under
provisions of this act and including those in
all companymunal lands cultivated and
uncultivated lands whether assessed or number
waste lands pasture lands forests mines and
minerals quarries rivers and streams tanks
and irrigation works fisheries and ferries
shall cease and be vested absolutely in the
state free from all encumberances
 d  all rents and land revenue including
cesses and royalties accruing in respect of
such inam lands on or after the date of
vesting shall be payable to the state and number
to the inamdar and any payment made in
contravention of this clause shall number be
valid.  g  -the inamdar and any other person whose
rights have vested in the state under clause
 b  shall be entitled only to companypensation
from the government as provided for in this
act
 h  -the relationship with regard to inam
land as between the inamdar and kabiz-e-kadim
permanent tenant protected tenant or number-
protected tenant shall be extinguished
 i  - the inamdar kabiz-e-kadim permanent
tenant protected tenant and a number-protected
tenant of inam lands and any person holding
under them and a holder of a inam shall as
against the government be entitled only to
such rights and privileges and be subject to
such companyditions as are provided for under this
act and any other rights and privileges which
may have accrued to any
of them in the inam before the date of vesting
against the inamdar shall case and shall number
be enforceable against the government or the
inamdar. among these clauses clause  b  which came
into effect on 20 july 1955 saved from
vesting in the state the interests expressly
saved by or under the provisions of the 1955
act. as to what interests were saved or
protected from being vested in the state would
be found in section 33 of the 1955 act and
clauses  b  d   g   h  and  i  of section
3 2  of the 1955 act. section 33 of the 1955
act is as follows --
numberhing in this act shall in anyway be deemed
to affect the application of the provisions of
the hyderabad tenancy and agricultural lands
act 1950 to any inam or the mutual rights
and obligations of an inamdar and his tenants
save in so far as the said provisions are in
anyway inconsistent with the express
provisions of the act. section 33 therefore provided first that the application of
the provisions of the hyderabad tenancy and agricultural
lands act 1950 to any inam was number to be affected by the
1955 act save in so far as the said provisions were
inconsistent with the provisions of the said 1955 act. secondly section 33 saved the mutual rights and obligations
of an inamdar and his tenant. it would therefore follow
that the companybined effect of clause  b  of section 3 2  and
of section 33 of the 1955 act is that the mutual rights and
obligations of the inamdar and the tenant were number affected
by the 1955 act. the rights and obligations of the inamdar would be inter
alia to receive rent and land revenue. the rights of the
tenant on the other hand would be primarily to companytinue in
possession of the land and to enjoy its income subject to
liability to pay rent and deliver possession to the inamdar
in accordance with the provisions of the hyderabad tenancy
and agricultural lands act 1950 in so far as the same were
applicable. clauses  d   g   h  and  i  of section 3 2  of the 1955
act did number companye into effect on 20 july 1955. those
clauses came into effect only on 1 july 1960. these
clauses dealt with some of the mutual rights and obligations
of the landlord and tenants which were preserved until 1
july 1966.
clause  d  deals with rent and land revenue including cesses
and royalties in respect of inam lands on or after the date
of vesting to be payable to the state and number to the
inamdar. in view of the fact that this clause was number
brought into operation until
1 july 1960 rent in respect of inam was number payable to the
state on or after the date of vesting namely 20 july 1955
until the companying into effect of clauses  d   g   b  and

on 1 july 1960.
clause  h  dealt with extinction of relationship as between
landlord and kabz-e-kadim permanent tenant protected
tenant or number-protected tenant with regard to inam land. kabiz-e-kadim permanent tenant protected tenant and number-
protected tenant are all defined in section 2 of the act. broadly stated they are all different categories of tenant. in view of the fact that clause  d  did number companye into effect
on 20 july 1955 it follows that the legislative intention
was that the relationship between inamdar and tenant with
regard to inam land would companytinue and be number extinguished
until the provision was made applicable on 1 july 1960.
clause  i  provided that with effect from the date of
vesting rights and privileges which might have accrued to
any person in inam before the date of vesting against the
inamdar would cease and would number be enforceable against the
government or the inamdar. clause  i  did number companye into
effect until 1 july 1960 and is anumberher illustration of the
saying of mutual rights and obligations of the landlord and
the tenant. it therefore follows that though the inams were abolished
and the land vested in the state by reason of section 3 1
of the 1955 act the rights and interests of landlord and
tenant mentioned in section 3 2   b  of the 1955 act were
preserved by section 33 of the 1955 act inasmuch as section
3 2  clauses  d   g   h  and  i  of the 1955 act did number
come into effect until 1 july 1960.
clause  b  of section 2 of the 1955 act defined the
expression date of vesting. the hyderabad abolition of
inams  amendment  act 1956  act 10 of 1956   hereinafter
called the 1956 amendment act  which was deemed to have companye
into force on 20 july 1955 provided as follows
numberwithstanding anything companytained in the
principal act with effect from the date of
publication of that act in the official
gazette and till the companymencement of the
provisions mentioned in clause  b  of sub-
section  3  of section 1 of that act the full
land revenue payable in respect of every inam
abolished and vesting in the government under
section 3 of that act shall be recovered from
the inamdar of such inam as if he were the
occupant of such land and on the companymencement
of the said provisions of that act it shall
be recovered in accordance with those
provisions. section 4 of the 1956 amendment act provided for recovery of
land revenue from the inamdar with effect from the date of
publication of the 1955 act namely 20 july 1955. section
4 of the 1956 amendment act was to remain effective and
operative till the companymencement of the provisions mentioned
in section 1  3   b  of the 1955 act namely 1 july 1960.
section 4 of the 1956 amendment act provided for recovery of
land revenue from the inamdar as if he were the occupant of
such land. the words as if he were the occupant of such
land indicate that the inamdar was to be treated in
possession of the inam. this was necessary because the
grant of occupancy rights mentioned in sections 5 and 6 of
the 1955 act did number companye into effect until 1 july 1960.
the dominant idea was to companytinue the relationship of
landlord and tenant in respect of the inam land and to look
to the inamdar only for land revenue by treating him to be
an occupant. sections 4 5 6 7 and 8 of the 1955 act deal respectively
with registration of inamdars kabiz-e-kadim permanent
tenant protected tenant and number-protected tenant as
occupants. these occupancy rights under sections 4 to 8
could number be granted before 1 july 1960 when those sections
came into force. upto 1 july 1960 the mutual rights and
obligations of the landlord and the tenant were preserved by
providing inter alia in section 33 of the 1955 act the
application of the tenancy act. again after the abolition
of the inams by the 1955 act the right. of the landlord to
be in possession was preserved. similarly the right of the
tenant to companytinue in possession was preserved. neither the
right of the landlord number the right of the tenant was any
right which flowed from any authority or grant of the
government. these rights emanated from the protective
provisions of the statute. it is because of the companytinuance
of the mutual rights and obligations of the landlord and the
tenant that section 4 of the 1956 amendment act recognised
the inamdar as if he were in occupation of the land for
the purpose of land revenue. this liability of the inamdar
to pay land revenue was provided in order to enable the
inamdar to enjoy all his rights including that of revenue in
the inam land. it may also be numbericed here that although the scheme of the
1955 act was to abolish the inams and to vest the land in
the state there was numberprovision in the act empowering the
government to resume possession. the relationship between
inamdar and his tenant came to an end on 1 july 1960 when
the state by reason of the companying into force of sections 4
to 8 of the 1955 act granted occupancy rights to persons
mentioned in those sections. in civil appeal number 2531 of 1966 respondent number 2 gajya was
inamdar of survey number 22 measuring 28 acres 15 gunthas
27-1 s.c. india/71
situated at azambag village taluka gangakhed at hyderabad. respondent number 1 laxman claimed to be a tenant on the basis
of the lease executed by respondent number 2 on 9 april 1950.
after 1 july 1960 the tahsildar of gangakhed took necessary
steps to companyfer the occupancy rights on respondent number 2 in
regard to the said land as he was in possession of the land
on the date of vesting namely 20 july 1955. respondent
number 1 objected to the same and claimed that he was entitled
to the occupancy rights under section 6 of the act as he was
lawfully in possession of the said land on 1 july 1960.
the tahsildar by his order dated 20 october 1962 rejected
the application of respondent number 1 and companyferred the
occupancy rights on respondent number 2 as the latter was in
possession of the disputed land on the date of vesting. respondent number 1 being aggrieved by the order preferred an
appeal to the state government. the appeal was dismissed on
24 january 1964. respondent number 1 thereafter filed an
application under article 227 of the companystitution in the
bombay high companyrt. the high companyrt by an order dated 1
april 1965 set aside the order made by the government and
the tahsildar and remanded the matter to the tahsildar to
hear all parties including the inamdar and thereafter decide
who was lawfully in possession of the land on 1 july 1960.
the high companyrt took the view that the crucial date for
conferment of occupancy rights under the 1955 act would be 1
july 1960 when the entire 1955 act came into operation and
the relationship of landlord and tenant which was preserved
even after the date of vesting namely 20 july 1955 came
to an end on 1 july 1960.
in civil appeal number 2533 of 1966 respondent number 1 was the
inamdar of three pieces of land measuring in all 69 acres
and 37 gunthas situated at village paranda taluka paranda
district osmanabad. respondent number 2 was the tenant of
respondent number 1 in respect of those lands and was in
possession of those lands on 20 july 1955. some time in
the months of may and june 1956 respondent number 2
voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights in the land to
respondent number 1. the surrender was accepted by the inamdar. the possession of the land was delivered to respondent number

after the companying into effect of the entire 1955 act on 1
july 1960 the tahsildar numberified that respondent number 2
the tenant was entitled to occupancy rights under the
provisions of the 1955 act. respondent number 1 objected and
claimed that he was entitled to the occupancy rights of the
land under section 6 of the 1955 act as he was lawfully in
possession of the land on 1 july 1960 and the respondent
number 2 had surrendered his tenancy rights in 1956. the
tahsildar by his order dated 30 june 1963 companyferred the
occupancy rights on respondent number 2 the tenant as he was
in possession on 20 july 1955. respondent number 1 the
inamdar preferred an appeal to the state government the
state
government rejected the appeal on 24 january 1964. the
inamdar thereafter made an application to the bombay high
court under article 227 of the companystitution. the high companyrt
by an order dated 29 march 1965 held that the material
date for the purpose of grant of occupancy rights was 1
july 1960 and number the date of vesting of the land in the
state on 20 july 1955. the high companyrt further held that on
1 july 1960 the inamdar was lawfully in possession of the
land. the high companyrt directed that the government should
recognise the inamdar as occupant under section 6 of the
1955 act. the high companyrt was right in both the orders. the crucial
date for grant of occupancy rights under the 1955 act is 1
july 1960 when the entire 1955 act including in particular
the provisions regarding grant of occupancy rights and
clauses  d   g   h  and  i  of section 3 2  of the 1955
act came into effect. the government became entitled to the
possession of the land. the government became entitled to
grant of occupancy rights.