civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1113 of
1976.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated 16-4-1976 of the allahabad high companyrt in execution
second appeal number 2162 of 1974.

p. goyal and s. k. jain for the appellants. g. gokhale and b. r. agarwala for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
chinnappa reddy j.-rattan lal sold certain land to sri
ram for rs. 10000/- under a registered sale deed dated 31
march 1960. on april 4 1960 sri ram executed an agreement
to reconvey the
property for a sum of rs. 15000/- if paid within a period
of two years. rattan lal filed suit number 18 of 1961 in the
court of first additional civil judge meerut for specific
performance of the agreement to reconvey and obtained a
decree on april 17 1962. the decree was companyfirmed in appeal
by the high companyrt of allahabad on september 5 1963. on
april 25 1963 rattan lal assigned the rights which he had
under the decree in favour of the present appellants dhani
ram gupta and anumberher. the appellants filed an application
for execution of the decree under order xxi rule 16 of the
code of civil procedure on december 10 1963. numberice of
application was issued to sri ram the judgment debtor as
well as the original decree-holder rattan lal. rattan lal
kept quiet but on march 7 1964 the judgment debtor sri ram
filed objections companytending that the execution application
was number maintainable. the application was adjourned from
time to time. meanwhile on may 26 1964 rattan lal the
original decree-holder and sri ram the judgment debtor
moved the executing companyrt to record full satisfaction of the
decree. it was stated that the parties had entered into a
compromise and that the decree was proposed to be satisfied
by payment of a sum of rs. 7000/-in cash by the judgment
debtor to the original decree-holder. the amount was paid in
open companyrt and satisfaction of the decree was duly recorded
on may 27 1964 by the executing companyrt who however
observed that the companypromise would number have any effect
whatsoever on the rights if any of dhani ram who had
already filed an execution application pursuant to the deed
of assignment dated april 25 1963. thereafter the
execution application filed by the appellants was taken up
and was dismissed on october 9 1964 on the ground that the
assignee had numberright to execute the decree after the
judgment debtor had satisfied the original decree-holder by
entering into a companypromise with him. on appeal the learned
additional district judge meerut held that the appellant
assignees had the right to execute the decree and that their
right companyld number be defeated by the companylusive companypromise
entered into between the judgment debtor and the original
decree holder subsequent to the date of assignment and with
numberice of assignment. one of the companytentions raised before
the learned additional district judge was that the so called
deed of assigned did number in fact have the effect of
assigning the decree to the appellants. that companytention was
also negatived by the learned district judge. on further
appeal to the high companyrt by the judgment debtor it was held
that the assignee of the decree had numberright to execute the
decree until the assignment was recognised by the companyrt. until that was done it was held it was open to the
original decree holder to put the decree in execution it
was also open to the judgment debtor to satisfy the
decree fully by payment to the decree-holder or by other
adjustment. the high companyrt however did number express any
opinion on the question whether the deed of assignment did
assign the right of the decree-holder to the appellants. the
assignees of the decree have preferred this appeal after
obtaining special leave under article 136 of the
constitution. even the bare statement of the facts is sufficient to
show how the original decree-holder and the judgment debtor
have companyluded to deprive the appellants of their rights
under the deed of assignment and how the executing companyrt
tacitly gave its seal of approval by permitting satisfaction
of the decree to be entered despite the fact that the decree
had already been assigned to the knumberledge of the judgment
debtor. the process of the companyrt cannumber be reduced to a
mockery and we do number think that the procedure prescribed by
the companye of civil procedure permits this to be done
numberwithstanding the argument of shri d. v. patel and shri
govind dass learned companynsel for the judgment-debtor to the
contrary in support of the judgment under appeal. their
submission was that the assignee of a decree had numberrights
until the assignment was recognised by the companyrt. in
substance the submission of the learned companynsel was that
the recognition by the companyrt it was that companypleted the
assignment and gave the right to the assignee to execute the
decree. let us examine if the provisions of the companye of civil
procedure justify the submission of the learned companynsel. section 2 3  defines decree-holder as meaning any person
in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable
of execution has been made. section 51 provides that the
court may on the application of the decree holder order
execution of the decree by various methods. section 146
provides that where any proceeding may be taken or
application made by or against any person then the
proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or
against any person claiming under him. order xxi of the companye
of civil procedure deals with execution of decrees and
orders and orders xxi r. 2 in particular provides for
payment or adjustment out of companyrt and for the recording of
satisfaction of the decree by the companyrt in whole or in part
as the case may be. order xxi r. 16 with which we are
primarily companycerned is as follows

where a decree or if a decree has been
passed jointly in favour of two or more persons the
interest of any decree-holder in the decree is
transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of
law the transferee may apply for
execution of the decree to the companyrt which passed it
and the decree may be executed in the same manner and
subject to the same companyditions as if the application
were made by such decree-holder
provided that where the decree or such interest
as aforesaid has been transferred by assignment
numberice of such application shall be given to the
transferred and the judgment debtor and the decree
shall number be executed until the companyrt has heard their
objections  if any  to its execution
provided also that where a decree for the payment
of money against two or more persons has been
transferred to one of them it shall number be executed
against the others.  explanation-omitted . we are unable to read order xxi r. 16 as furnishing any
foundation for the basic assumption of the learned companynsel
for the respondent that property in a decree does number pass
to the transferee under the assignment until the transfer is
recognised by the companyrt. property in a decree must pass to
the transferee under a deed of assignment when the parties
to the deed of assignment intend such property to pass. it
does number depend on the companyrts recognition of the transfer. order xxi r. 16 neither expressly number by implication
provided that assignment of a decree does number take effect
until recognised by the companyrt. it is true that while order
xxi r. 16 enables a transferee to apply for execution of the
decree the first proviso to order xxi r. 16 enjoins that
numberice of such application shall be given to the transferor
and the judgment-debtor and that the decree shall number be
executed until the companyrt has heard their objections if any
to its execution. it is one thing to say that the decree may
number be executed by the transferor until the objections of
the transferor and the judgment-debtor are heard it is an
altogether different thing to say that the assignment is of
numberconsequence until the objections are heard and decided. the transfer as between the original decree-holder and the
transferee is effected by the deed of assignment. if the
judgment debtor has numberice of the transfer he cannumber be
permitted to defeat the rights of the transferee by entering
into an adjustment with the transferor. if the judgment
debtor has numbernumberice of the transfer and enters into an
adjustment with the transferor before the transferee serves
him with numberice under order xxi r. 16 the judgment-debtor
is protected. this in our view is numbermore than plain good
sense. in dwar buksh sirkar v. fatik jali the decree holder
represented to the companyrt that the
judgment debtor had satisfied the decree by payment and
wanted his execution application to be disposed of
accordingly. before satisfaction companyld be recorded a
transferee of the decree from the original decree-holder
intervened and claimed that satisfaction companyld number be
recorded as there was a valid transfer of the decree in his
favour prior to the alleged payment by the judgment debtor
to the original decree holder. the argument before the high
court was that the assignee companyld number prevent the recording
of the satisfaction of the decree as he had number filed an
execution application and got the assignment in his favour
recognised. the high companyrt of calcutta observed
the only provision in the companye referring
expressly to the assignment of a decree is companytained in
section 232 and that numberdoubt companytemplates a case in
which the assignee applies for execution. in such a
case the companyrt may if it thinks fit after numberice to
the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor allow the
decree to be executed by the assignee. if how ever
there is an assignment pending proceedings in execution
taken by the decree-holder i see numberhing in the companye
which debars the companye from recognising the transferee
as the person to go on with the execution. the
recognition of the companyrt is numberdoubt necessary before
he can execute the decree but it is the written
assignment and number the recognition which makes him the
transferee in law. the omission of the transferee if
it was an omission to make a formal application for
execution was merely an error of procedure and does
number affect the merits of
theit is
argued for the respondent that the transferees title
was number companyplete as express numberice of the transfer had
number been given to the judgment-debtor. as already
observed the transfer as between transferor and the
transferee is effected by the written assignment. if
the judgment-debtor had numbernumberice of the transfer and
being otherwise unaware of it paid the money to the
decree-holder the payment was of companyrse a good
payment and he cannumber again be held liable to the
transferee. we express our agreement with the observations made by the
calcutta high companyrt. in one of the cases cited by the learned companynsel for
the respondent namely arvapalli ramrao v. kanumarlapudi
ranganayakulu and others a full bench of the andhra pradesh
high companyrt disagreeing with the observations made in
puthiandi mammed v. avalil
moidin and agreeing with the observations made in sadagopa
chariar v. raghunatha chariar held that when a decree was
transferred by an assignment in writing the property in the
decree passed to the transferee at the time of assignment
and that recognition of the companyrt was number necessary to
complete the transaction of assignment but was required to
enable the assignee decree-holder to proceed with the
execution. we agree. the learned companynsel for the respondent relied upon
kadir mira sahib v. peer mohd. ch. mohd. ishrat ali ors. molvi sayed raza and duvvuru balasubramanya reddy v.
duvvruru munuswami reddy ors. we do number think that it is
necessary for us to refer in any detail to these cases. the
basic assumption in ch. mohd. ishrat ali ors. v. molvi
sayed raza and duvvuru balasubramanya reddy v. duvvuru
muniswami and ors.  supra  and was that the transfer was
complete only on recognition by the companyrt. we have pointed
out that it is number so. in ch. mohd. ishrat ali ors. v.
molvi sayed raza  supra  there are some observations which
are helpful to the respondent but the question presently
under companysideration did number arise and we need say numbermore
than that.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 2526/77
and 2413/78. from the judgment and order dated 17-5-1975 of the
punjab and haryana high companyrt in lpa number. 633 671 694/73
and 609/73. and
writ petition number. 520-524 of 1980.  under article 32 of the companystitution
jawahar lal gupta and s. ghose for the appellant in ca
2526/77

r. mridul m. r. agnihotri and p. c. bhartari for
the appellant in ca 2413/78. p. sharma and m. s. dhillon for the state of punjab
in both the appeals. lal narain sinha att. genl. abdul khader and miss s.
subashini for the union of india in all the appeals. l. sibal r. k. garg and r. s. sodhi for respondent
number 10 in ca 2526 and rr11 in ca 2413.

k. garg and r. s. sodhi for the petitioners in wp
number. 520-524 of 1980.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
chinnappa reddy j. in these appeals we have once again
to companysider career companyscious companypeting claims to seniority
which appear so much to dominate the lives and careers of
our civil servants that a large bulk of the cases in this
court relate to the resolution of problems arising out of
such claims. so much of our time is taken up in discovering
the precise facts of these intricate problems that we wonder
whether the companystitution of a fact-finding administrative
tribunal who should invariably be approached in the first
instance will number better serve the cause of successful
administration. an administrative tribunal possessing the
necessary expertise and familiarity with administrative
procedures and rules may be able to deal with the problems
in a satisfactory way. at least the facts will be found and
the relevant rules will be knumbern. thereafter aggrieved
parties may approach the companyrts for further relief within
the companyfines of articles 226 and 32 of the companystitution. on selection by the punjab public service companymission

r. kapur and harjeet singh were directly recruited in
1951 as deputy superintendents of police in the punjab
police service. they are the appellants in civil appeal number. 2413 of 1978 and 2526 of 1977 respectively. b. r. kapur was
senior to harjeet singh as deputy superintendent of police. in 1960 both of them were included in the select list
prepared under regulation 7 of the indian police service
 appointment by promotion  regulations 1955. on numberember 24
1960 b. r. kapur was appointed as assistant inspector
general of police which post was a cadre post. in may 1961

r. kapur was appointed as director of sports and youth
programme and deputy secretary to government sports
department. the post was a number-cadre post. he held this post
upto numberember 18 1962 and thereafter he was appointed as
additional companytroller of stores punjab which was also a
number-cadre post. he companytinued to hold the post of additional
controller of stores till 1965. from july 19 1965 he was
commandant 40th battalion pap j k which was a cadre
post. he held the post till july 11 1966 when he took over
as companymandant of 25th battalion pap. on the reorganisation
of the state of punjab he
was appointed as assistant inspector general of police
state of punjab from numberember 1 1966. thereafter he
continuously held cadre posts and was finally appointed to
the indian police service with effect from september 3
1969.
shri harjeet singh was appointed to officiate as
superintendent of police in december 1960. the post was a
cadre post. he companytinued to hold a cadre post till he was
appointed to the indian police service with effect from
september 3 1969. after the two officers were appointed to
the indian police service the question of assignment of year
of allotment and fixation of seniority arose for the
consideration of the government of india. shri b. r. kapur
was allotted to the year 1963 and placed below sube singh
and above shri s. r. sharma  direct recruits  in the indian
police service gradation list of punjab. the period of his
service as director of sports and youth programme and as
additional companytroller of stores was number taken into
consideration as both the posts were number-cadre posts. his
service as companymandant of 25th battalion was also number taken
into account on the ground that the 25th battalion had been
taken over by the government of india and therefore the post
of companymandant of the 25th battalion was a number-cadre post. he
was therefore treated as having companytinuously officiated in
a senior cadre post from numberember 1 1966 only. on that
basis he was allotted to the year 1963. in the case of
harjeet singh though admittedly he officiated companytinuously
in a senior cadre post from december 1960 he was also
allotted to the year 1963 and placed below shri b. r. kapur
on the ground that he ranked below shri b. r. kapur in the
select list. r. kapur and harjeet singh filed writ petitions in
the high companyrt of punjab and haryana questioning the
allotment of the year 1963 to them for the purpose of
seniority in the indian police service. the learned single
judge of the high companyrt who heard the petitions in the first
instance held that there was numberreason at all why harjeet
singh should number be given the full benefit of his companytinuous
officiation in a senior post. he therefore directed the
union and punjab governments to redetermine the year of
allotment of harjeet singh taking december 17 1960 as the
date from which he companytinuously officiated in a senior post. it was also directed that proper seniority should be
assigned to him in accordance with the year of allotment so
determined. in the case of b. r. kapur it was held that july
29 1965 should be treated as the date of his companytinuous
officiation in a senior post. it was held that the
government of india and the government of punjab had all the
time treated the post of companymandant
25th battalion as a cadre post and therefore b. r. kapur
was entitled to have his service in the post of companymandant
25th battalion as officiation in a senior post. a direction
was issued that the year of allotment and seniority should
be re-determined. it was further directed that before
redetermining the seniority of the two officers the
respondents to the writ petitions who were direct recruits
should be afforded an opportunity to make their
representations. appeals under clause 10 of the letters patent were
filed by the affected direct recruits as also by b. r.
kapur. before the division bench the case took a new turn. it was argued before the division bench on behalf of the
direct recruits that neither b. r. kapur number harjeet singh
would have ever started officiating in the senior post on
the dates from which they officiated or claimed to have
officiated in senior posts if the state government had number
created artificial vacancies by excessive utilisation of
the deputation and central reserve quota in companytravention
of the cadre rules and the cadre-strength regulations. it
was apparently sought to be argued before the division bench
that the period of service attributable to over utilisation
of deputation and central reserve quota should number be
treated as service in a senior post for the purpose of
determining the year of allotment of officers promoted to
the indian police service. the argument was accepted by the
division bench and a direction was issued to the central
government to reconsider the question of year of allotment
after taking into companysideration the question of over
utilisation and its effect. the finding of the learned
single judge that b. r. kapur was entitled to have his
service as companymandant 25th battalion as officiation in a
senior post was however affirmed. shri jawahar lal gupta learned companynsel for harjeet
singh argued that the service of harjeet singh in a senior
cadre post was approved by the government of india and once
it was so approved the question whether there was over
utilisation of deputation and central reserve quota was
irrelevant for the purpose of determining the year of
allotment. the only relevant question was whether the
appellant had companytinuously officiated in a senior post and
from what date. there after the year of allotment was to be
determined by the simple and mechanical application of rule
3 3   b  of the indian police service  regulation of
seniority  rules. he further submitted that the circumstance
that b. r. kapur was senior to harjeet singh in the select
list was also irrelevant in companysidering the question of year
of allotment. it was only if both of them were given the
same year of allotment that their inter-se seniority in the
select list would become relevant. shri mridul learned
counsel for b. r. kapur argued that
the single judge of the high companyrt was wrong in excluding
the period of service of b. r. kapur as director of sports
and as additional companytroller of stores in determining the
year of allotment. he further companytended that in any event
the case of b. r. kapur was an appropriate one for the
exercise by the central government of its power to relax the
rules and that this companyrt should give a direction to the
central government to relax the rules so as to enable that
part of kapurs service to be treated as service in a senior
post. shri h. l. sibal learned companynsel for one of the
respondents argued that the number of cadre officers who
could be deputed by the central and state governments for
service elsewhere was limited and fixed by the indian police
service  fixation of cadre strength  regulations. by
deputing more cadre officers than authorised by those
regulations and appointing number-cadre officers to artificial
vacancies so created in cadre posts the state government
had adopted a device to enable the officers of the state
police service to companytinuously officiate in senior posts
longer than justified. the cadre strength regulations were
thereby companytravened and the cadre rules which provide for
the temporary appointment of number-cadre officers to cadre
posts circumvented. he submitted that officiating service
rendered by a number-cadre officer in a senior post where the
vacancy in the cadre post was the result of over utilisation
of the deputation quota companyld number be taken into account
under the indian police service regulation of seniority
rules. shri r. k. garg who appeared for the remaining
respondents urged that to permit promoted officers to take
advantage of the deviation from the cadre rules and the
cadre fixation of strength regulations for the purpose of
gaining an advantage under the seniority rules would be a
denial of the equal protection of the laws to the direct
recruits who would be affected by such procedure. he also
urged that rule 3 of the seniority rules if so interpreted
as to take into account officiation against the rules must
be held to companytravene articles 14 and 16 of the
constitution. in order to appreciate the rival companytentions it is
necessary to examine the relevant statutory provisions
rules and regulations. article 312 1  empowers parliament to provide by law
for the creation of all india services companymon to the union
and the states. article 312 2  declares that the services
knumbern at the companymencement of the companystitution as the indian
administrative service and the indian police service shall
be deemed to be services created by parliament under art. 312 1 . s. 2 of the all india services act 1951 defines an
all india service as meaning the service knumbern as the
indian administrative service or the service knumbern as the
indian police service or any other service specified in s.
2 a . sec. 3 enables the central government after
consultation with the government of the states companycerned to
make rules for the regulation of recruitment and the
conditions of service of persons appointed to an all india
service. the indian police service  cadre  rules 1954 made in
exercise of the powers companyferred by s. 3  1  of the all
india services act provide for the companystitution of cadres
and certain companynected matters. a cadre officer is defined as
a member of the indian police service and a cadre post is
defined as any of the posts specified under item 1 of each
cadre in the schedule to the indian police service  fixation
of cadre strength  regulations 1955. rule 4 1  provides
that the strength and companyposition of a cadre companystituted for
each state or group of states shall be as determined by
regulations made by the central government in companysultation
with the state governments. rule 4 2  requires the central
government to re-examine the strength and companyposition of
each such cadre at intervals of every three years in
consultation with the state government companycerned and to make
such alterations as it deems fit. the first proviso to rule
4 2  expressly stipulates that the power of the central
government to alter the strength and companyposition of any
cadre at any other time is number affected by rule 4 2 . the
second proviso to r. 4 2  enables the state government to
add for a period number exceeding one year and with the
approval of the central government for a further period number
exceeding two years to a state cadre one or more posts
carrying duties or responsibilities of a like nature to a
cadre post. rule 6 authorises the deputation of cadre
officers for service under the central government or anumberher
state government or under a companypany association or body of
individuals whether incorporated or number which is wholly or
substantially owned or companytrolled by the central government
or a state government a municipal companyporation or a local
body or an international organisation etc. etc. rule 8
prescribes save as otherwise provided in these rules every
cadre post shall be filled by a cadre officer. rule 9 1
provides for the temporary appointment of a number-cadre
officer to a cadre post if the state government is satisfied
that the vacancy is number likely to last for more than three
months or if there is numbersuitable cadre officer available
for filling the vacancy. where a number-cadre officer is
appointed to a cadre post for a period exceeding three
months the state government is required forthwith to report
the fact to the central government together with their
reasons for making the
appointment. the central government may then direct the
state government to terminate the appointment of such person
and to appoint a cadre officer to the post in which case
the state government is bound to give effect to the
direction. where a cadre post is likely to be filled by a
number-cadre officer for a period exceeding six months the
central government is required to report the full facts to
the union public service companymission and may thereafter give
appropriate directions to the state government in the light
of the advice given by the union public service companymission. pursuant to the powers companyferred by r. 4 1  of the
indian police service cadre rules the central government
has made the indian police service  fixation of cadre
strength  regulations 1955 determining the strength and
composition of the cadres of each of the states. in the
schedule the total authorised cadre strength for the state
of punjab is mentioned as 70 companysisting of 34 senior posts
under the state government 14 senior posts under the
central government 7 deputation reserve posts 6 leave
reserve posts and 7 junior posts and 4 training reserve
posts. the thirty four senior posts under the state
government are also particularly specified. thirty six out
of the total of forty eight senior posts under the central
and state governments the deputation reserve posts the
leave reserve posts the junior posts and the training
reserve posts are all stated to be direct recruitment
posts while the remaining 12 senior posts under the central
and state governments are stated to be promotion posts. it
is necessary to mention here that the thirty four posts
specified as senior posts under the state government are
shown as item 1 of the schedule and the fourteen senior
posts under the central government are shown as item 2 of
the schedule. the indian police service  recruitment  rules 1954
provide for recruitment to the service  a  by a companypetitive
service and  b  by promotion of substantive members of a
state police service. rule 9 1  empowers the central
government to recruit to the indian police service persons
by promotion from amongst the substantive members of the
state police service in accordance with regulations made by
the central government. the recruitment is required to be
made on the recommendation of the state government companycerned
and in companysultation with the union public service
commission. rule 9 2  provides that the total number of
persons recruited by promotion shall number at any time exceed
25 of the number of posts shown against item number 1 and 2 of
the cadre in the schedule to the indian police service
 fixation of cadre strength  regulation. items 1 and 2 we
have already mentioned are senior posts under the state and
the central governments. the indian police service  appointment by promotion
regulations 1955 made pursuant to rule 9 1  of the indian
police service recruitment rules 1954 prescribes a very
elaborate procedure for making appointments by promotion to
the indian police service. a selection companymittee is required
to be companystituted for each state companysisting of the chairman
or any other member of the union public service companymission
and other members specified in the schedule. in the case of
punjab the other members are the chief secretary to the
government of punjab the secretary to the government of
punjab in the home department the inspector general of
police and a numberinee of the government of india number below
the rank of joint secretary. the selection companymittee is
required to meet at intervals ordinarily number exceeding one
year and to companysider the cases of all eligible substantive
members of the state police service. the companymittee is
required to prepare a list of such eligible members of the
state police service who are suitable for promotion to the
indian police service the selection for inclusion in the
list is to be based on merit and suitability in all respects
with due regard to seniority but the names of the officers
included in the list are required to be arranged in order of
seniority in the state police service. the list prepared by
the selection companymittee is then to be forwarded to the union
public service companymission by the state government with all
relevant records the reasons recorded by the companymittee for
any proposed supersession of any member of the state police
service and the observation of the state government on the
recommendation of the companymittee. thereafter the union public
service companymission is to companysider the list prepared by the
committee and to make any changes companysidered by them to be
necessary after informing the state government of the
proposed changes. the list as finally approved by the
commission is to form the select list of the members of the
state police service. all appointments of members of the
state police service from the select list to posts borne on
the state cadre are to be made in accordance with the
provisions of r. 9 of the cadre rules. in making the
appointments the state government is to follow the order in
which the names of such officers appear in the select list
except where administrative exigencies require otherwise and
the vacancy is number likely to last for more than three
months. appointments of members to the indian police service
are to be made by the central government on the
recommendation of the state government in the order in which
the names of the members of the state police service appear
in the select list for the time being in force. we arrive finally at the indian police service
 regulation of seniority  rules 1954. rules 3 provides that
every officer shall be assigned
a year of allotment in accordance with the provisions of
that rule. rule 3 3  b  prescribes that the year of
allotment of an officer who is appointed to the service by
promotion in accordance with rule 9 of the recruitment
rules shall be the year of allotment of the junior most
among the officers recruited by companypetitive examination who
officiated companytinuously in a senior post from a date earlier
than the date of companymencement of such officiation by the
officer appointed to the service by promotion. senior post
was originally defined as a post included and specified
under item 1 of the cadre of each state in the schedule to
the indian police service  fixation of cadre strength
regulation and as including posts declared by the state
government as equivalent to such posts. the definition was
amended with effect from april 22 1967 and the present
definition does number include posts declared equivalent by the
state government to cadre posts. rule 4 1  provides that the seniority of officers
inter-se shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the rules. rule 4 4  provides that the
seniority of officers who are assigned the same year of
allotment shall be in the order of the dates on which they
started officiating companytinuously in the senior post but in
the case of officers appointed to the service by promotion
the dates of officiation shall be the same as the dates
taken into account for the purpose of assignment of year of
allotment under rule 3 3 . where the dates of companymencement
of companytinuous officiation in a senior post of more than one
officer appointed to the service by promotion is the same
their seniority inter-se shall be in the order of their
dates of appointment to the service and where the date of
appointment is also the same it shall be in the order in
which their names are arranged on the date of their
appointment to the service in the select list. these are the statutory provisions rules and
regulations with which we are companycerned in the present
appeals. what are primarily in question are the year of
allotment and the seniority of the two officers harjeet
singh and b. r. kapur. so therefore our primary companycern is
with the indian police service  regulation of seniority
rules 1954. rule 3 3   b  as well as rule 4 4  throw up the
date of companytinuous officiation of an officer in a cadre post
as the most important factor both for the purpose of
assignment of year of allotment and for the purpose of
assignment of seniority. for the purpose of assignment of
year of allotment the date of companytinuous officiation in a
senior post is the only relevant factor while for the
purpose of assignment of seniority first the date of
continuous officiation in a senior post is the only relevant
factor while for the if the date of companymencement of
continuous officiation in a senior
post of more than one officer is the same and finally the
order in the select list if the date of appointment is also
the same are the several relevant factors in that order. thus the order in the select list is irrelevant for the
purpose of determining the year of allotment and is relevant
in determining the seniority only if the year of allotment
of the officers is the same and their date of appointment is
also the same. since the order in the select list is
dependent on the seniority in the state service it follows
that seniority in the state police service is irrelevant for
the purpose of determining the year of allotment and is
relevant for the purpose of determining the seniority only
if the year of allotment and the date of appointment of two
or more officers are the same. it must therefore
necessarily follow that an officer who is junior to anumberher
in the state police service but who starts companytinuous
officiation in a senior post from a date earlier than the
other may frog-leap and gain seniority by the companysequential
assignment of an earlier year of allotment. there is numberhing
in the indian police service  regulation of seniority
rules which has the effect of depriving an officer the
benefit of companytinuous officiation on the ground that some
one senior to him in the state police service did number so
continuously officiate. number are we able to discover any
other rule in the innumerable rules and regulations
governing the recruitment appointment and regulation of
seniority of officers of the indian police service which is
designed to deprive an officer the benefit of companytinuous
officiation in a senior post. one of the submissions made to us by the respondents
was that the select list having been prepared on grounds of
merit and ability the order in which officers were ranked
in the select list should number be disturbed after they were
actually promoted to the indian police service. this
submission is without substance. though under the indian
police service  appointment by promotion  regulations the
select list is prepared on the basis of merit and ability
the order in which officers are placed in the select list is
according to seniority in the state police service and number
according to merit and ability. merit and ability are
considered for the purpose of inclusion in the select list
but thereafter seniority in the state police service takes
over and the names of officers are arranged in the order of
that seniority. we are therefore satisfied that the
benefit of companytinuous officiation in a senior post cannumber be
denied to an officer appointed to the indian police service
merely on the ground that an officer senior to him in the
state police service did number so companytinuously officiate. it is however true that under regulation 8 of the
indian police service  appointment by promotion
regulations appointments to
cadre posts from among number-cadre officers should be made
according to the order in which the names of such officers
appear in the select list. a deviation from the order is
permissible if administrative exigencies require it and if
the vacancy is number likely to last for more than three
months. of companyrse the regulation does number license
uninhibited deviation to favour individual number-cadre
officers. if that is done the deviation is liable to
challenge. but where there is numbersuch allegation there is
numberreason why a junior number-cadre officer should lose the
benefit of his companytinuous officiation in a cadre post merely
because a number-cadre officer senior to him in the select list
did number companytinuously officiate likewise. in such a
situation it would be for the government of india to
consider whether the relevant rules may number be so relaxed as
to enable such number-cadre officer to add his officiation in a
number-cadre post to his officiation in a cadre post regard
being had to the circumstances under which the officer had
to work in a number-cadre post while his junior in the select
list was made to fill the cadre post. but surely it cannumber
work to the prejudice of the junior officer in the select
list so as to nullify the actual companytinuous officiating
service rendered by him. in the present case there is no
allegation that b. r. kapur was appointed to the number-cadre
posts of director of sports and additional companytroller of
stores with a view to favour harjeet singh. number the question for companysideration is whether number-
cadre officers are to be denied the benefit of companytinuous
officiation in senior post merely because cadre officers
were appointed on deputation elsewhere in excess of the
number of posts specified against deputation reserve in
the schedule to the cadre fixation of strength regulation. we are unable to discover any provision in the seniority
rules recruitment rules cadre rules or the cadre
regulations which would lead to such a companysequence. to begin
with it has to be borne in mind that the fixation of cadre
strength regulations are made in exercise of the powers
conferred on the central government by rule 4 1  of the
cadre rules and are therefore subordinate to the cadre
rules even as rules made in exercise of powers companyferred by
a statute are necessarily subordinate to the statute. rule 6
of the cadre rules provides for the deputation of cadre
officers and rule 9 of the same rules provides for the
temporary appointment of number-cadre officers to cadre posts. in making appointments of number-cadre officers to cadre posts
the rule prescribes the fulfillment of certain companyditions. it is number disputed that the companyditions prescribed by rule 9
of the cadre rules were fulfilled. that the companyditions were
fulfilled is also apparent from the very impugned order. if
number-cadre officers are appointed to cadre posts in
accordance with rule 9 of the cadre rules is there
any justification for denying the number-cadre officer the
benefit of officiation in the cadre post on the ground that
more cadre officers than the number specified in the
fixation of cadre strength regulations had been deputed for
service elsewhere ? it is number disputed that the deputation
of cadre officers was in accordance with rule 6 of the cadre
rules. true rule 4 1  of the cadre rule enables the central
government to make regulations determining the strength and
composition of the cadre of each state. it is also true that
a definite number of posts is specified against deputation
reserve in the schedule to the fixation of cadre strength
regulations. but if owing to the situational demands and
exigencies of the administration the number is exceeded and
the state government is companypelled to utilise the services of
experienced number-cadre officers to fill cadre posts in strict
compliance with the cadre rules we see numberreason to hold
that the service rendered by the number-cadre officers in such
posts should be ignumbered. on the other hand we think that the fixation of cadre
strength regulations made under rule 4 of the cadre rules do
number over-ride the recruitment rule the remaining cadre
rules and the seniority rules so as to render invalid any
service rendered by a number-cadre officer in a cadre post on
the mere ground of breach of the fixation of cadre strength
regulations when there has been strict companypliance with rule
9 of the cadre rules. we think that fixation of cadre
strength is the exclusive companycern of the central and the
state governments and the regulations are made for their
convenience and better relationship. excessive utilisation
of deputation or central reserve is a matter for
adjustment and companytroversy between the central and the state
governments and is of numberconcern to any member of the
service. for example numbercadre officer who is asked to fill a
deputation post can refuse to join the post on the ground
that the deputation reserve has already been exceeded. the
regulations are number intended to and do number companyfer any right
on any member of the service unlike some other rules which
do companyfer or create rights in the members of the services. among other rules for instance rule 9 2  of the
recruitment rules stipulates that the total number of
persons recruited by promotion shall number at any time exceed
25 of the posts shown against item number. 1 and 2 of the
cadre in the schedule to the fixation of cadre strength
regulations. number if at a point of time this limit is
exceeded direct recruits may have a just cause for
complaint and it may perhaps be held that to the extent of
the excess the appointments by promotion are invalid and
confer numberrights of seniority over direct recruits. but as
we said the fixation of strength regulation companyfer no
rights on members of the service and a mere breach of the
regulation furnishes numbercause of action to any member of the
service
on the ground that his seniority is affected in some round
about way. we may add that there is numbersuggestion that rule
9 2  of the recruitment rules was companytravened. it was brought to our numberice that several senior cadre
officers had to be deputed to organise battalions of the
punjab armed police which came to be formed after the
chinese aggression in 1962 and at the time of the indo-
pakistan war in 1965. it was in the vacancies caused by
their deputation that senior officers of the state police
services were appointed to cadre posts. under rule 6 a   2
of the indian police service recruitment rules a direct
recruit in the junior time scale of pay can be appointed to
a post in the senior time scale of pay if having regard to
his length of service experience and performance he is
found to be suitable for appointment to a post in the senior
time scale of pay. it appears that at that time in punjab
there was numberdirect recruit in the junior time scale of pay
who possessed experience of atleast four years who companyld be
thought of for appointment in the senior post. the state
government therefore had numberoption except to appoint
experienced and suitable number-cadre officers to cadre posts. it was also brought to our numberice that numbercadre officer who
had been so deputed suffered in any manner in the matter of
his career. it was repeatedly suggested that the state governments
were generally in the habit of adopting stratagem of sending
cadre officer on deputation in excess of the deputation
reserve in order to enable officers of the state services to
officiate in cadre posts so as to further enable them to get
the benefit of such companytinuous officiation when finally
appointed to an all india service. whatever truth there may
be in the suggestion it has to be remembered firstly that
the appointment of number-cadre officers to cadre posts is
subject to the directions of the central government who may
terminate such appointment. the central government too is
bound to obtain the advice of the union public service
commission if the appointment is to extend beyond six
months. next it has also to be borne in mind that number-cadre
officers of proven merit only are appointed to cadre posts. they are appointed to cadre posts if they are already in the
select list and the appointments also are made in accordance
with the order in which they are placed in the select list. we have earlier mentioned how the select list itself if
prepared under the indian police service recruitment rules
after following an elaborate procedure involving a thorough
examination of various levels of the merit of the officers
of the state police service. a state officer whose name
appears on the select list may expect to be appointed to a
cadre post and to be promoted to the indian police service
at any time thereafter according to vacancy position. a
direct recruit who ordi-
narily companyes into the picture years after a state officers
name appears on the select list cannumber have any real
grievance that the promoted officer is given an anterior
date for the purpose of seniority since such date can never
be earlier than the date from which the junior most direct
recruit companytinuously officiated in a senior post prior to
the companymencement of the companytinuous officiation of the
promoted officer. we are also unable to appreciate the submission of shri

k. garg that every departure from a rule which departure
gives certain advantages to one group of civil servants as
against anumberher necessarily involves an encroachment of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14 and 16 of the
constitution. the proposition is widely stated far fetched
in relation to the facts of the instant case and number
supported by n. k. chauhan ors. v. state of gujarat 1  on
which shri garg relied. in chauhans case the companyrt was
considering the effect of the breach of a quota rule
fixing the proportion of direct recruits and promotees. in the present case as already numbericed by us there is no
allegation of breach of the quota rule embodied in rule
9 2  of the recruitment rules. the fixation of cadre
strength regulations cannumber be interpreted as companyprising any
quota rule. the companysequential submission of shri garg that
rule 3 3  b  if so interpreted as to take into account
officiation in companytravention of the rules offends articles
14 and 16 of the companystitution therefore loses all force
particularly in view of what we have said about the true
nature of the fixation of cadre strength regulations. we
also numberice that the vires of rule 3 3  b  of the indian
administrative service  regulation of seniority  rules which
is in similar terms as rule 3 3  b  of the indian police
service  regulation of seniority  rules was upheld by a
constitution bench of this companyrt in a. p. sharma v. union of
india.  2
in the light of our foregoing discussion we hold that
the over utilisation of deputation and central reserve
does number affect the questions of assignment of the year of
allotment and the seniority of the appellants. the
concurrent finding of the learned single judge and the
division bench that kapurs service as companymandant p.a.p. battalion number 25 was service in a senior post was number
challenged before us. shri mridul argued that the records
reveal that kapurs appointment to the posts of director of
sports and additional companytroller of stores was because of
his exceptional ability and therefore those posts must be
treated as cadre posts. in any event he suggested that we
should invite the government of india to suitably
relax the rules so as to enable kapurs service as director
of sports and additional companytroller of stores to be reckoned
as service in cadre posts. we cannumber of companyrse hold kapurs
service in number-cadre posts as service in cadre posts. number
can we give the direction sought by shri mridul. it is of
course open to kapur to invoke the power of the government
of india to relax the rules and it is for the government to
take a just decision in the matter. we have numberadvice to
offer. both the civil appeals are allowed the judgment of the
division bench is set aside and the judgment of the single
judge is restored. writ petition number.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 89 of 1960.
appeal from the judgment and order dated april 12 1957 of
the mysore high companyrt in writ petition number 15 of 1956.

c. setalvad attorney-general for india v. l.
narasimhamoorty s. n. andley j. s. dadachanji rameshwar
nath and p. l. vohra for the appellants. gopalakrishnan and t. m. sen for the respondents. 1961. march 24. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
shah j.-with a view to enable him to assess companyton cess
payable by the appellants under the indian companyton cess act
1923-hereinafter called the act the deputy companymissioner
district chitradurga mysore state purporting to exercise
powers under s. 6 of the act called upon the managing agents
of the appellants by letter dated january 13 1956 to
submit in the prescribed form a statement showing the total
quantity of companyton companysumed or processed in the factory. the appellants declined to carry out the requisition and
filed a petition in the high companyrt of mysore for a writ of
mandamus prohibition or other appropriate writ direction
or order restraining the deputy companymissioner chitradurga
and the state of mysore from companylecting assessments under
the indian companyton cess act xiv of 1923 in enforcement of
the order dated january 13 1956.
the sole ground urged in support of the petition was that
the appellants were bound to furnish returns under the act
to the companylector who alone companyld assess the cess and the
deputy companymissioner number being a companylector within the
meaning of the act and number being an officer appointed by the
central government to perform the duties of the companylector
under the act the demand for returns was
unconstitutional. the high companyrt rejected the petition
and against that order this appeal is preferred with
certificate of fitness granted by the high companyrt. the area in which the mill of the appellants is situ. ate
was originally part of the indian state of mysore. the
state of mysore became a part b state within the union of
india on the promulgation of the companystitution on january 26
1950. the act was one of the many enactments of the indian
legislature applied
to the state of mysore by the part b states laws act 3 of
1951. the act provides for the levy of a cess on companyton and
for effectuating that purpose imposes by s. 6 a duty upon
the owner of a mill to submit to the companylector monthly
returns of companyton companysumed or processed in the mill. the
authority to assess cess is by s. 7 of the act vested in the
collector which expression in the act means in reference
to companyton companysumed in a mill the companylector of the district
in which the mill is situated or any other officer appointed
by the central government to perform the duties of a
collector under this act. the powers of the companylector
under the act can therefore be exercised by the companylector of
the district in which the mill is situate or by the officer
appointed by the central government to perform the duties of
a companylector. it is companymon ground that the central
government has number issued an order appointing the deputy
commissioners in the mysore area to exercise powers under
the act. the power to assess companyton ceases in the mysore
state area can therefore be exercised by the companylector and
numberother officer. the expression companylector of the
district which is a companyponent of the first part of the
definition is number defined in the act. but the general
clauses act x of 1897 defines companylector as meaning in a
presidency town the companylector of calcutta madras or bombay
as the case may be and elsewhere the chief officer-in-
charge of the revenue administration of a district. the
revenue administration of a district under the mysore land
revenue companye is entrusted to the deputy companymissioner and he
is the chief officer-in-charge of the revenue administration
of a district. the deputy companymissioner is therefore a
collector within the meaning of the general clauses act. companynsel for the appellants however companytends that the general
clauses act x of 1897 was number extended by the part b states
laws act to the state of mysore and therefore the definition
of companylector under the general clauses act cannumber be
requisitioned in aid to interpret the expression companylector
used in the act. but the argument proceeds upon a fallacy
as to the
true nature of the general clauses act. by s. 3 of that
act in all central acts and regulations made after the
commencement of the general clauses act unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or companytext the various
expressions therein set out shall have the meanings ascribed
to them by that act. the effect of s. 3 is to incorporate
it as it were as an interpretation section in all central
acts and regulations made after the companymencement of the
general clauses act. whenever the central act or regulation
made after march 11 1897 is enacted the general clauses
act becomes statutorily a part thereof and by its own force
it applies to the interpretation of every such enactment. its vitality does number depend upon any territorial extension. existence of a definition of the expression companylector in
the act in s. 2 a  is number necessarily indicative of an
intention that the general clauses act is number to apply to
the interpretation of that expression used in that act. the
first part of s. 2 cl.  a  of the act is in truth number a
definition at all it merely states that the companylector of
the district in which the mill is situate is the companylector
for the purpose of the act. for determining who the
collector is one has to go to the general clauses act.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 389 of 1973.
from the judgment and order dated the 22nd december 1972 of
the andhra pradesh high companyrt in election petition number 7 of
1972.

v. gupte p. p. rao and g. narayana rao for the
appellant. ram reddy b. parthasarthi and b. balamukunda reddy
for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
alagiriswami j.-in the election to the andhra pradesh
legislative assembly from the chennur companystituency held on
5th march 1972 the appellant was the official companygress
candidate and the respondent an independent candidate though
both belonged to the companygress party. the respondent
obtained 25654 votes as against 23940
votes obtained by the appellant and was declared elected. thereupon the appellant filed an election petition which was
dismissed by the andhra pradesh high companyrt.this appeal is
against that decision. though a number of companyrupt practices were alleged in the
election petition the only one pressed before this companyrt was
that relating to the distribution of a pamphlet defamatory
of the appellant falling under section 123 4 . that leaflet
marked ex.a-1 purports to have been issued by the yuvajana
congress thorrur. it does number bear the name of the printer
or the publisher. but the allegation in the election
petition was that it was published by the respondent and his
agents throughout the companystituency. in schedule i to the
election petition were given the names of villages where the
distribution was made the reasons who distributed the date
of distribution as well as the names persons who received
the pamphlet. certain other details were also given. it
was further alleged that the appellant received letter- in
this regard from some of her supporters in the companystituency. these were marked as exs. a-2 a-3 and a-4. it was stated
that the president of the yuvajana companygress thorrur was a
man named uppal reddy who became a paid clerk of the
respondent. the respondent denied knumberledge of the pamphlet
and companytended that exs. a-2 to a-4 are self serving
statements got prepared by the appellant and the persons who
are supposed to have written those letters for the purpose
of the election petition. he claimed that he was number aware
whether uppal reddy was president of the yuvajana companygress. thorrur but that he was a strong supporter of the appellant. the distribution of the pamphlet either by him or his
election agent or his workers with his companysent was denied. the names of workers mentioned in the schedule to the
election petition were stated to be those of the supporters
of the appellant with a view to let in false evidence. the learned judge of the high companyrt after an elaborate
examination of the evidence found that there cannumber be any
doubt that the allegations companytained in leaflet ex.a-1 go
deeply against the personal character and companyduct of the
appellant and can be taken as being reasonably calculated to
prejudice her prospects in the election. this does number seem
to have been disputed before the high companyrt. it was only
contended that neither the respondent number his election agent
was aware of the existence of those leaflets number were they
distributed during the election period and even if they were
distributed they were number responsible for it. the learned
judge further held that it has to be taken that the
allegations made against the appellant in ex.a-1 were false
and the respondent did number believe them to be true and he
would be guilty of the companyrupt practice if the publication
was made by the respondent or his election agent or by
others with the companysent of the respondent or his election
agent. he then took up the question whether the respondent
or his election agent or with the companysent of either any
other person distributed leaflets like ex.a-1 during the
election period. the case for the respondent as suggested in the cross-
examination of the appellant was that she expected her
defeat even when the
10-379 sup.ci/75
election was one week ahead and therefore she started
manufacturing all the documents filed by her for the purpose
of the election petition which even then she decided to
file in case of her defeat. based on the evidence of p.w. 70 the secretary of the zila parishad warangal who was
then the returning officer and p.w.76 the sub-collector
warangal the learned judge found that leaflets like ex.a-1
were in circulation a few days prior to the date of the
election. he however came to the companyclusion that it was
number possible to say that even before the date of the
election the appellant and her supporters must have thought
that her defeat in the election was a certainty and thought
of distributing leaflets like ex.a-1 to prepare for the
election petition. instead of working vigorously for her
success in the election and therefore whoever might be
responsible for the distribution of the leaflets it companyld
number have been the appellant or her supporters but her
enemies only. he finally came to the companyclusion that there
is numbercogent and reliable evidence to show that the
distribution of the leaflets was made by the respondent or
his election agent or with the companysent of either by some
others and it is number possible to hold the respondent
responsible for the distribution. with regard to uppal
reddy he held that there was numbersatisfactory evidence to
show either that uppal reddy was a paid clerk of the
respondent or that he worked for the respondent in the
election and number for the appellant as alleged by the respon-
dent. as we are in substantial agreement with the learned judge
regarding the nature of the leaflet ex.a-1 its possible
effect and the impossibility of the appellant or anybody on
her behalf having distributed those pamphlets we do number
think it necessary to discuss those questions or even to set
out the pamphlet itself. these were number seriously disputed
by the respondent. we will therefore companyfine ourselves to
the question as to who was responsible for their
distribution. the learned judge seems to have thought that r.ws. 32 and
33 the brothers of the appellants husband might perhaps
have done it as they were bitterly inimical towards the
appellant and her husband. r.w.32 was the respondents
polling agent and r.w.33 was an active worker on his behalf. there is numberevidence as to who had the leaflet printed or
where it was printed. neither r.w.32 number r.w.33 accepted
either that they printed the leaflet or that they
distributed it. some time before the election and even before the companygress
candidate was selected for this companystituency a
representation ex a-48 was sent to the companygress
authorities signed among others by the respondent as well as

w.33. the main purport of that representation was that
neither the appellant number her husband should be set up as
the companygress candidate. it suggested certain other persons
as fit to be set up as companygress candidates but there is no
doubt that it was intended to prevent either the appellant
or her husband being selected as the companygress candidate. w. 33 claimed that it was he that prepared ex. a-48 and
got the signatures of the persons companytained therein. the
first of the signatories is respondent himself. forty out
of its forty three signatories are his supporters. though
he pretended number to have knumbern its companytents he as well as

w. 33 had to admit
that it was prepared after some discussion. the respondent
had also to admit that he it was who wrote in his own hand
about a companyy of the representation having to go to the
congress observer for warangal district. we have numberdoubt
at all that the main mover behind ex. a48 is the respondent
himself and r.w. 33 is merely his instrument. this is also
evident from the fact that he decided to stand for the
election himself because only if he stood he companyld defeat
the appellant. thus his main motive being to defeat the
appellant is clear beyond doubt. it is number merely the
numbermal effort of a companytesting candidate to defeat his
opponent but something special something out of the
ordinary. this exhibit has number been discussed at all by the
learned judge. the importance of ex. a-48 is because it is
a forerunner of ex. a-1 and some of the statements found in
ex. a-1 as well as its main purpose are the same as of ex. a-48. we are number impressed by the argument on behalf of the
respondent that ex. a-57 which shows that even in 1970 a
representation of a similar kind was made shows that there
were many others out to besmirch the name of the appellant. ex. a-57 companytains many instances which have numberhing to do
with the election in 1972 or the setting up of a companygress
candidate in that election. that is the affinity between
ex. a-48 and ex. a-1. number are we impressed by the argument
on behalf of the respondent that ngos towards whom the
appellant is said to have behaved rudely might have been
responsible for the printing and distribution of the
pamphlets. the ngos as a class may number be so much
interested and numbersuggestion has been put and we have number
been told that any particular ngo had such a strong
grievance against the appellant that he companyld go to the
extent of printing clandestinely a pamphlet like ex. a-1
meeting the expenditure therefore and for distributing it. the search ultimately must be companyfined to r.ws. 32 and. 33
on the one hand and the respondent on the other. it is here that the relevance of the reference to uppal
reddy and the yuvajana companygress thorrur becomes important. the yuvajana companygress thorrur was inaugurated on the 26th
january 1972. before that uppal reddy had met p.w.66
vasantha nageswara rao the president of the state youth
congress and a member of the legislative assembly from the
nandigama companystituency of krishna district. he wrote a
letter ex.a-25 on 6-2-1972 companygratulating uppal reddy on his
having organised the yuvajana companygress. later finding that
uppal reddy was working against the companygress candidate on
behalf of the respondent he was removed from the office and

w.68 vasudeva reddy was elected president of the yuvajana
congress thorrur. the removal of uppal reddy and the
election of p.w.68 was intimated to p.w.66 by ex.a-26. the
second letter is ex.a-28 written by p.w.68 to p.w.66 about
distribution of leaflets by the respondents associates. that letter also refers to the pamphlet as having been
printed by the respondent and asks that he be suspended
immediately. anumberher letter ex.a-32 written by p.w.66 to

w.68 also shows that p.w.66 was invited to tour the
chennur companystituency and he was unable to do so. exhibits
a-3 1 a-31  a  and a-31  b  show that letters were written
to p.w.66 as well as to the president of the andhra pradesh
congress companymittee. exhibit a-29 is a letter by p.w.68
to p.w.66 inviting him to tour the companystituency. exhibit a-
29 a  is a resolution of the youth companygress companymittee dated
29-2-1972 about uppal reddy having been won over by the
respondent and the pamphlet against the appellant being
published and requesting p.w.66 and the president of the
andhra pradesh companygress companymittee to institute proceedings
against the respondent. exhibit a-27 is a letter addressed
by p.w.66 to uppal reddy apparently on the basis of ex.a-26
about the companyplaints that he was working for the respondent
and asking him to show cause why disciplinary action should
number be taken against him. it also refers to the resolution
of the youth companygress. we are unable to share the learned judges companyclusion that
all these companyld have been got up in order to support the
election petition. he learned judge himself recognises that
the appellant would number have had any apprehension that she
would be defeated in the election because she was standing
from chennur companystituency which was the only one among the
many companystituencies companyprising the parliamentary seat that
was won by a companygress candidate with a majority of 5000
votes in the previous election though all the other assembly
seats as well as the parliament seat went to the number-
congress candidate. that is why the learned judge took the
view that the distribution of the pamphlet companyld number have
been made by the appellant before the date of the election. it is therefore obvious that these documents companyld number
have been got up before the election number are we able to
accept the learned judges facile companyclusion that these
could have been got up by antedating some postal stamps. one cannumber take it that it is so easy to antedate postal
stamps. in fact numbersuch suggestion was put to the appellant
or any of her witnesses. this theory of antedating the
postal stamps has also been relied upon by the learned judge
in companynection with exs.a-2 to a-4 with which we shall deal
a little later. the only slight reference to anybody
connected with the appellant having anything to do with the
post office was in relation to one of the post offices
alone. it is number that if numbersuch suggestion was made on
behalf of the respondent about the postal stamps being
antedated it is number permissible to the learned judge to draw
such a companyclusion if the facts justify it but we feel there
are numberfacts justifying such an inference. we are satisfied
that these various documents are genuine and number got up for
the purpose of the election petition. the whole case of the respondent was that these documents is
well as exs.a-2 to a-4 had been created before the election
though the question put to the appellants witnesses was in
a form which would enable him to put forward two alternative
pleas  1  of their being prepared before the election and
 2  of their being prepared after the election but before
the election petition was filed. we are of the opinion that
tile respondent should number be allowed to draft his pleadings
in a dubious way and try to shape either hi- evidence or
his arguments to suit either theory. we are unable to
accept the argument on behalf of the respondent that these
documents do number establish that either the respondent or his
election agent distributed the pamphlets. thew letters and
resolutions sometimes refer to the
13 3
respondent and sometimes to his associates. one of them
refers to the respondent having printed the pamphlet. we do
number think that in assessing the evidentiary value of these
documents the statements companytained in them should be
scrutinised as though they were either pleadings before the
court or a statute to be interpreted. when pamphlets are
said to be distributed by the respondent it does number
necessarily mean that he was physically handing over
those pamphlets to various persons. it includes the
pamphlets. being distributed in his presence or in the
presence of his election agent or at his instance or on his
behalf even if persons working for the respondent were
distributing in companymon parlance it would be said that the
respondent was distributing the pamphlets. interpreted in
the proper perspective the various statements merely mean
that the pamphlets were being distributed at the instance
of the respondent. some criticism was made of these documents on the basis of
the companystitution of the all india youth companygress and that it
does number provide for village youth companygresses and that
people cannumber become members of the youth companygress unless
they become primary members of the all india youth companygress. but it-is obvious from the documents themselves as well as
the evidence of p.w. 66 it was found necessary and
advantageous to have youth companygress in thorrur as it would
help the companygress candidate as it was election time. this
question cannumber be decided as though we are companycerned with
the legality of the establishment of the youth companygress in
thorrur. all that it shows is that certain youngmen of the
village decided to start a youth companygress in the village
that it had the sanction and the blessings of p.w.66 and
that they hoped to regularise the establishment of youth
congress in due companyrse. the criticism that the receipt of
these letters is number entered in the receipt and despatch
book of the state youth companygress office is number of much
substance. number-official political organisations are number run
and do number function as though they were official
administrative offices. we do number also agree with the view of the learned judge who
rejected the evidence. of p.w.66 on the ground that he was
merely a companygress member. he is a member of the legislative
assembly from anumberher district and he is the chief of the-
state youth companygress. the fact that he is a companygressman
could number be the sole ground for rejecting his evidence. we
are therefore satisfied that these documents produce
contemporaneous evidence of the fact that the pamphlets
like ex. a-1 were brought into existence and distributed at
the instance of the respondent. they companyer the period from
6-2-1972 to the day before the poll. their evidentiary
value is therefore very high. the distribution of the pamphlets by the respondent is also
probabilised by ex. a-16 written by the appellant to the
general secretary of the companygress in warangal district and
ex. a-44 to the returning officer. we shall number refer to exs. a-2 to a-4. these are three
letters written by three supporters of the appellant about
the distribution of the pamphlets by either the respondent
or his election agent as well as r.w. 33. rho learned
judge has rejected them among other reasons
on the ground that postal stamps on them companyld have been
antedated. the criticism we have made earlier with
reference to this view of the learned judge when we were
discussing the documents relating to the yuvajana companygress
of thorrur applies here also. four post offices are
involved with reference to these three documents the three
different post offices in which they were posted and the one
post office in which they were received. only with
reference to one of the post offices it was said that the
postmaster was a relative of the appellant. we think it
impossible that postal stamps from four different post
offices companyld have been antedated so easily. on the other
hand these three documents give us the feeling that they
have been prepared with an eye on an election petition. people who have been working for the appellant would number
suddenly stop working merely because they saw a pamphlet
like ex. a-1 and if they do so they would just stop working
and number bother further about waiting to her. it was also
unnatural in such letters for these persons to say that
people were being companyvinced and that they themselves were
convinced by the pamphlets. if that is so these letters
must have companye into existence before the date of the poll. if the postal stamps companyld number have been antedated how and
why were these letters brought into existence ? this
question has given us companysiderable anxiety and we think that
the most acceptable explanation is that having companye to knumber
of the distribution of the pamphlets like ex.a-1 the
appellant got her supporters to write these letters and they
have done it only too well. the tell-tale statements
contained in them give us numberoption but to reject exs.-a-2
to a-4. we do number think it necessary to refer at length to the oral
evidence in this case about the distribution. a large
volume of evidence hat been let in on behalf of the
appellant regarding the distribution. as already mentioned
the villages in which the distribution was made the dates
on which the distribution was made the persons who made the
distribution as well as the persons to whom the distribution
was made are set out in the schedule to the election
petition. the attack made on these in the written statement
filed by the respondent is that the names of the supporters
of the appellant were given therein in order to enable them
to give false evidence. the learned judge has in discussing
the evidence of these witnesses extracted their evidence at
length and rejected them mostly on the ground that they were
the appellants supporters. but he has number hesitated to
accept the denials by the respondent and that of his
witnesses and their evidence even though they are as much
partisan as the appellants witnesses. that is why in
matters of this kind in assessing the oral evidence we have
got to have some reliable test for assessing the reliability
of one version or the other. much of the criticism made by
the learned judge of the evidence on behalf of the appellant
is that of very tenuous kind and they can be applied as well
to the evidence on behalf of the respondent and we can see
numberjustification for the facile way he accepted the denial
by the respondent and his witnesses. the documents
regarding the youth companygress of thorrur which we have
discussed furnish strong support which one has got to look
for before one can accept oral
evidence in matters of this kind. it is easy enumbergh to
accept or reject oral evidence by mentioning one or two
minumber companytradictions. one should be satisfied that the
broad outline of the evidence given is true and worthy of
acceptance. we are number impressed with the view of the learned judge that
either r. w. 32 or r. w. 33 might have been responsible for
bringing into existence the pamphlet ex-a-1. after all the
person that was standing for election was the respondent and
his attitude of trying to see that neither the appellant number
her husband was set up as a companygress candidate and being
prepared to stand merely for the purpose of defeating her
shows that it was he that was interested in publishing this
pamphlet. his earlier effort ex. a-48 also shows this. we find it impossible to accept the evidence of r. w. 32 and

w. 33 that the appellant and her husband were responsible
for sending a petition against them in regard to a companytract
work that they had undertaken or that the appellant wanted a
bribe of rs. 3000 from them. all this is falsified by the
admission that it was numberkala ramachandra. reddy a former
minister that was responsible for the representation
against r.ws. 3 2 and 3 3 in regard to the companytract about
which the anti-corruption department made an enquiry. we are companyscious that where a companyrupt practice is alleged
against a returned candidate it must be scrutinised with
considerable care because a finding to that effect has very
serious companysequences. it number merely sets aside the popular
verdict but also subjects the successful candidate to the
penalty of being disqualified for election and even criminal
prosecution. we are also companyscious that this companyrt does number
numbermally reappraise the evidence and companye to a companytrary
conclusion from that of the trial judge if it is generally
acceptable. but we must number forget that an appeal under s.
116a of the representation of the people act is a first
appeal and number one under the provisions of art. 136 of the
constitution and that an appeal is a rehearing. in this
case we have undertaken a reassessment of evidence because
the learned judge has rejected the evidence of the
appellants witnesses wholesale mainly on the ground of
their being partisan witnesses while numbersuch standard has
been applied to evidence of witnesses on behalf of the
respondent except r. w. 3 and r. w. 21. even there it was
because the documentary evidence was too strong. he has
also number discussed ex. a-48 and appreciated the evidence in
the background of that document. his rejection of the
evidence regarding the thorrur yuvajana companygress has led to
a wrong approach in the appreciation of the oral evidence.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 1286
1287 and 2511 of 1969-
from the judgment and order dated 20-8-1968 and 3-4-
1969 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in civil writ
number.800/66 2625/65 and lpa number141 of 1969.
harbans singh and r. n. sachthey for the appellant in
all the appeals. c. agarwala and m. l. srivastava for the respondent
in c.a. 1286/69. k. puri for the respondent in c. a. 1287/69

n. keswani for the respondent in c.a. 2511/69
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
shinghal j. these three appeals by certificates
granted by the high companyrt of punjab and haryana are directed
against two judgments of that companyrt dated august 20? 1966
and anumberher judgment of that companyrt dated numberember 22 1968.
the high companyrt first decided the writ petition of companystable
dwarka das which is the subject matter of appeal number1286 of
1969 and disposed of the other two writ petitions which
are the subject matter of appeals number. 1287 and 2511 of
1969 on the basis of that judgment. these three appeals
therefore raise companymon questions of law and have been heard
together at the request of learned companynsel for the parties
and will be disposed of by a companymon judgment
the writ petitioners in all the three cases were
recruited as companystables in the police-force of the punjab
state. it is number in dispute before us that  i  they were
police-officers of the state  ii  they were enrolled as
police-officers  iii  they had put in more than three years
service after their recruitment and enrolment as police-
officers and  iv  they were discharged under the provisions
of rule 12.21 of the punjab police rules 1934
 hereinafter referred to as the rules and number by way of
punishment under the provisions of chapter xvi of the rules. numberattempt has been made to distinguish one case from the
others on facts. on the other hand learned companynsel for the
parties are in agreement that the facts of the three cases
are quite similar and they raise the companymon question of law
whether the orders of discharge were valid. the respondents
challenged the validity of those orders by writ petitions
which were allowed by the impugned judgments of the high
court and the three appeals are before us for that reason. it has been argued by mr harbans singh on behalf of
the appellant state that even though the respondents had
put in more than three years service as police-officers of
the state government their appointments were temporary and
could be terminated for that reason even if the termination
could number strictly be said to fall within the purview of
rule 12.21 of the rules. that in fact is the only question
ii for companysideration in these appeals and can easily be
answered with reference to the provisions of the police act
1861 hereinafter refer red to as the act and the rules. section 1 of the act defines police to include all
persons who a shall be enrolled under it. section 2 provides
that the entire police establishment under the state
government shall be deemed to be one police-force and shall
be formally enrolled. it further provides that the
conditions of service of the members of the subordinate
ranks of the police-force shall be such as may be determined
by the state government. section 8 is also relevant for it
expressly provides that every police-officer appointed to
the police-force of the state  other than an officer
mentioned in section 4  shall receive on his appointment a
certificate in the form annexed to the act by virtue of
which he shall be vested with the powers functions and
privileges of a police-officer. the certificate states that
the police-officer companycerned has been appointed a member of
the police-force under the act and vested with the powers. functions and privileges of a police-officer. the
certificate is number therefore the order of appointment or
enrolment but is subsequent to the appointment and the
enrolment even though it is a part of the process of
appointment and enrolment in as much as it certifies that
the police-officer has been vested with the necessary
powers functions and privileges of a police-officer. the
certificate does number however have any bearing on the
question whether its holder is a permanent or a temporary
police-officer for that is a matter which has to be
governed by the other companyditions of his service. it is number
in dispute before us that such certificates were issued to
all the three respondents and that they functioned as
police-officers for more than three years. chapter xii of the rules deals with the appointment and
enrolment of police-officers. clause  3  of rule 12.2.
provides inter alia as follows-

all appointments of enrolled police officers are
on probation according to the rules in this chapter
applicable to each rank. it is therefore obvious that as the respondents were
enrolled police officers they were on probation. the period
of probation has number been specified in the rules but rule
12.21 provides for the discharge of an inefficient police-
officer as follows-
12.21. a companystable who is found unlikely to prove an
efficient police officer may be discharged by
the superintendent at any time within three
years of enrolment. there shall be numberappeal
against an order of discharge under this
rule. so if rules 12.2 3  and 12.21 are read together it
will appear that the maximum period of probation in the case
of 3 police-officer of the rank of companystable is three
years for the superintendent of police companycerned has the
power to discharge him within that period. it follows that
the power of discharge cannumber be exercised under rule 12.21
after the expiry of the period of three years. if therefore
it is proposed to deal with an inefficient police-officer
after the expiry of that period it is necessary to do so in
accordance with the rules of chapter xvi of the rules which
makes provision for the imposition of various punishments
including dismissal from the police-force. it is number
permissible to ignumbere those rules and make a simple order of
discharge under rule 12.21 after the expiry of the period of
three years for that will attract article 311 of the
constitution. the superintendent of police companycerned companyld
number have ignumbered that requirement of the law and terminated
the services of the three respondents after the expiry of
the period of three years from their enrolment in the
police-force of the state. the high companyrt therefore rightly set aside the orders
of termination of the services of the three respondents and
to that extent the impugned judgments are companyrect. but we
are companystrained to say that it was number justified in holding
that a companystable who has obtained a certificate under rule
12.22 cannumber be dealt with under rule 12.21 and that if
he is to be removed from service procedure prescribed in
chapter xvi has to be followed. the reason is that as has
been shown the certificate prescribed under rule 12.22 is
meant to serve the purpose of section 8 of the act by
vesting a police-officer with the powers functions and
privileges of a police-officer and has to be issued on his
appointment as such.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 721 of 1972.  from the judgment and order dated 13.10.1970 of the
punjab haryana high companyrt in civil writ number 1831 of 1968 . s. suri for the appellants. s. sharma and a. d. mathur for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sarkaria j.--the short question involved in this appeal
on certificate directed against a judgment of the high
court of punjab and haryana is whether the sales made to. a
dealer who has applied for registration under the punjab
general sales tax act 1948 before his application is al-
lowed are to be treated as sales to an unregistered dealer
or registered dealer when the registration is effected from
the date of the application ? m s. patiala biscuits manufacturers pvt. limited  hereinaf-
ter referred to as the assessees  appointed m s. rajpura
biscuit companypany as their sole selling agents. the agents
made an application on 1.1.1966 in the appropriate form for
registration as a dealer under the punjab general sales tax
act 1948  hereinafter called the act . on the same day
the agents  referred hereafter as the purchasing dealer
made a similar application for obtaining registration cer-
tificate under the central sales tax act. the appropriate
assessing authority accepted both these applications and on
march 27 1966 issued the registration certificate with
effect from 1.1.1966.
the assessees filed their return for the quarter ending
march 31 1966 in april 1966 and claimed deductions under
s. 5 2  a  ii  in respect of sales of the value of rs. 3256267.35 made by them between 1-1-1966 to 31-3-1966 to
the purchasing dealer. the assessing authority patiala
rejected this claim and assessed tax amounting to rs. 199558.94. on the proceeds of the sales made by the asses-
sees to the purchasing dealer between 1.1.1966 and
27.3.1966. the reason given by the assessing authority for
refusing this relief to the assessees was that during this
period the purchasing dealer was number in possession
of the registration certificate the same having been issued
only on march 27 1966.
the assesses impugned the validity of this order of the
assessing authority by a writ petition in the high companyrt
under articles 226/227 of the companystitution. the high companyrt
held that since the certificate of registration had been
granted with effect from 1-1-1966 which was the date of the
application it companyld number be said that the sales during this
period companymencing from 1.1.1966 were made to an unregis-
tered dealer. it further numbered that apart from the asses-
sees the purchasing dealer had also been taxed with regard
to the same transactions resulting in double taxation which
was against the basic scheme of the act the rules and the
numberifications issued thereunder. on these premises the
high companyrt allowed the writ petition and quashed the im-
pugned order to the extent to which it was companytrary to
s.5 2  a  ii  of the act in respect of sales made between
1.1.1966 and 27.3.1966. the high companyrt however granted a
certificate under art. 133 1  a  and  c  of the companystitu-
tion on the basis of which the revenue has companye in appeal
to this companyrt. it would be appropriate to have at the outset a look
at the relevant provisions of the act and the rules. the material provision is in s. 5 2   a   ii  which reads as
under
in this act the expression taxable
turnumberer means the part of a dealers gross
turnumberer during any period which remains after
deducting therefrom
 a  his turnumberer during that period
on
 i

sales to a registered dealer of
goods  declared by him in a prescribed
form as being intended for re-sale in the
state of punjab
provided that in case of such sales
a declaration duly filled up and signed by the
register dealer to whom the goods are sold and
containing prescribed particulars on a pre-
scribed form  obtained from the prescribed
authority  is furnished by the dealer who
sells the goods. section 7 provides for the registration of
dealers. it says

numberdealer shall while being liable to
pay tax under this act carry on business as a
dealer unless he has been registered and
possesses a registration certificate. every dealer required by sub-section
 1  to be registered dealer shall make appli-
cation in this behalf in the prescribed manner
to the prescribed authority. if the said authority is satisfied that
an application for registration is in order
he shall in accordance with
7--240sci/77
such rules and on payment of such fees as may
be prescribed register the application and
grant him a certificate of registration in the
prescribed forms which may specify the class
or classes of goods for the purpose of sub-
clause  ii  of clause  a  of subsection  2  of
section 5.  4

when any dealer has paid the amount of
penalty imposed under s. 23 in respect of any
contravention of sub-section  1  of this
section the companymissioner shall register such
dealer and grant him a certificate of regis-
tration and such registration shah take
effect as it had been made under sub-section
 3  of this section on the dealers applica-
tion.  6
in case a dealer companymits default is number getting himself
registered as required by sec. 7 certain companysequences
follow. under s.11 6  such a defaulting dealer is liable to
be assessed on the basis of best judgment and the assessing
authority may in addition to the tax so assessed impose
on him by way of penalty a sum number exceeding one and half
times that amount. such a defaulter is further liable to
prosecution under s. 23  1  for carrying on business as a
dealer in companytravention of the provisions of s. 7 1  and
on companyviction he can be sentenced to fine number exceeding rs. 1000/-. the application for registration has to be made to the
appropriate authority in the prescribed form. the manner
in which such an application is to be dealt with by the
authority is provided in rule 5 of the punjab general sales
tax rules 1949 framed under the act. this rule as it stood
before the amendment of october 10 1966 was as follows
when the appropriate assessing authori-
ty after making any enquiry that he may think
necessary is satisfied that the applicant is
a bona fide dealer and has companyrectly given all
the requisite information that he has deposit-
ed the registration fee into the appropriate
government treasury and that the application
is in order he shall register the dealer and
shall issue a certificate of registration in
form s.t.iii or s.t. iv according as the
dealer has one or more than one place of
business in punjab. rule 5 was amended by punjab government numberification number
gsr237/pa 46/48/s-27/amd 5 /66 dated 10th october 1966 and
in place of the last sentence companymencing with the words
in .form s.t  of the old rule the following was
substituted
 in form s.t. iv which shall be
valid from the date of receipt of application
for registration by the assess-
ing authority or from the date of companymencement
of the liability to pay tax whichever is
later. ride 26 provides
a dealer who wishes to deduct from his
gross turnumberer the amount in respect of a sale
on the ground that he is entitled to make such
deduction under the provisions of subclause

of clause  a  of sub-section  2  of
section 5 of the act shall on demand pro-
duce in respect of such a sate the companyy of the
relevant cash memo or bill according as the
sale is a cash sale or a sale on credit and a
declaration in writing in form s.t. xxii by
the purchasing dealer or by his agent that
the goods in question are intended for re-sale
in the state of punjab or such goods are
specified in his certificate of registration
for use by him in the manufacture in the
state. of punjab of any goods for sale. rule 26 was also amended later. the amended
rule is in substance the same excepting
that it was clarified that the dealer claiming
deduction has to produce the declaration of
the purchasing dealer in the prescribed form
at the time of assessment. the main companytention of shri k.s. suri learned companynsel
for the appellant is that the declaration form prescribed
under the old rule 26 as it stood at the material time
required the purchasing dealer to specify at the time of
the sale in the prescribed form s.t. xxii the number of
the registration certificate. stress has also been placed
on the words registered and possesses used in sub-section
 1  of sec. 7 which according to companynsel indicate that a
dealer having a taxable turnumberer cannumber validly carry on
his business unless he is actually registered and is in
physical possession of the registration certificate issued
under sec. 7. a companypliance with the aforesaid mandatory
requirement of s. 7 1  and rule 26 form xxii--proceeds the
argument--could be possible only if at the time of the sales
in question the purchasing dealer as well as the selling
dealer both were in actual possession of the requisite
registration certificates. shri suri has adopted the
reasoning of the sales-tax tribunal in appeal number 109 of
1967-68  m s. darshan soap mills batala road amritsar v.
the state  decided on 12-2-1968.
it is companytended that rule 5 as it stood at the material
time did number empower the registering authority to grant the
registration certificate retrospectively with effect from
the date of the application.it is maintained such a power
was companyferred on the authority only by the punjab govern-
ment numberification number gsr-237/pa 46/48/s-27 amd.  5 /16 with
prospective effect from october 10 1966.
taking the last point first we are of opinion that the
amendment of rule 5 by the punjab government numberification
dated october 10 1966 did number companyfer any new or additional
power on the registering authority. the power to grant the
registration certificate with effect from the date of the
application was already there. the amendment was only
clarificatory of the law as it stood prior to it. it only
made explicit which was formerly implicit. a definite
indication is available in the language of sub-section  5
read with sub-sections  2  and  3  of s. 7 . itself that
the registering authority had the power to give effect to
the registration from the date of making the application. be that at it may the words has been registered and
possesses a registration certificate used in sub-s.  1   of
s. 7 have to be companystrued in accord with the general tenumber
of the section as a whole and in a manner which would
avoid oppressive unreasonable and anumberalous results. as
rightly pointed out in chandra industries v. the punjab
state and ors.  1  it companyld never be the intention of the
legislature that a dealer liable to pay tax who has in
compliance with the requirements of sub-sections  2  and  3
of s. 7 done all which lay in power to obtain the regis-
tration certificate should pull down his shutters and keep
his business closed under pain of being punished under s.
23 1  and await indefinitely the pleasure and leisure of the
prescribed authority in issuing the registration certifi-
cate. adoption such a companystruction would be to make the
applicant liable to punishment for the laches and delays of
the authority and its office. as regards the requirement enjoined by the form pre-
scribed under rule. 26 to enter the number of the registra-
tion certificate in the declaration of the purchasing dealer
at the time of sale the same has to be viewed with rea-
sonable flexibility and reconciled with rule 5 as clarified
by the numberification dated october 10 1966. thus company-
strued harmoniously with the related statutory provisions
the requirement of rule 26 will be substantially satisfied
if the number of the registration certificate--granted
subsequently but companyering retrospectively the period of the
sales in respect of which deduction is claimed-is supplied
by the claimant along with the declaration of the purchasing
dealer at the time of assessment to the assessing authority. it is thus clear as daylight that at the relevant time
also the registering authority was fully companypetent to
issue the registration certificate to the dealer with
retrospective effect from the date of filing the applica-
tion. a perusal of the registration certificate would show
that it was in terms made effective from january 1 1966.
this is manifest from the words the dealer is liable to pay
tax w.e.f. 1.1.1966 used by the authority prominently
in the heading of the certificate.