original jurisdiction writ petitions number. 144 227 and 228
of 1963.
petition under art. 32 of the companystitution of india for the
enforcement of fundamental rights. v. viswanatha sastri c. s. prakasa rao and r. gopala-
krishnan for the petitioner  in w. p. number 144/63 . v. viswanatha sastri g. a. pias t. n. sambasivan and

s. mani for the petitioners  in w. ps. number. 227 and
228 of 1963 . ranganadham chetty r. viswanathan and a. v. rangam
for the respondents  in w. p. number 144 of 1963 . ranganadham chetty and a. v. rangam for the respon-
dents  in w. p. number. 227 and 228 of 1963 . s. shukla for the interveners  w. p. number 144 of
1963 . k. daphtary attorney-general n. s. bindra r. h.
dhebar and b. r. g. k. achar for the attorney-general  in

p. number 144 of 1963 . r. l. iyengar r. h. dhebar and b. r. g. k. achar for
the advocate-general gujarat  in w. p. number 144/63 . k. daphtary attorney-general r. h. dhebar and b. r.

k. achar for the advocate-general maharashtra  in w. p.
number 144/63 . n. sachthey and b. r. g. k. achar for the advocate-
general rajasthan  in w. p. number 144/63 . n shroff for the advocate-general madhya pradesh  in

p. number 144/64 . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
subba rao. j. these three petitions filed under art. 32 of
the companystitution raise the question of the companystitutional
validity of the land acquisition  madras amendment  act
1961  madras act 23 of 1961  hereinafter called the
amending act. we shall briefly state the facts relevant to
the question raised. the petitioner in writ petition number
144 of 1963 p. vajravelu mudaliar is the owner of lands
bearing survey number. 4-2 40-7 and 43-1 of peruakudal village
and of extents 1.82 1.39 and 3.72 acres respectively. by a
numberification dated numberember 7 1960 and published in the
fort. st. george gazette dated numberember 16
1960 the government issued a numberification under s. 4 1  of
the land acquisition act  act 1 of 1894  hereinafter called
the principal act numberifying that among other lands the
said lands of the petitioner were needed for a public
purpose to wit for the development of the area as
neighborhood in the madras city in accordance with the
land acquisition and development scheme of the government. on numberember 23 1960 the special deputy companylector for land
acquisition issued a numberification under s. 4 1  read with
s. 17 4  of the principal act and under the said
numberification the first respondent was authorized to take
possession of the petitioners lands. the madras
legislature subsequently enacted the amending act providing
for the acquisition of lands for housing schemes and laying
down principles for fixing companypensation different from those
prescribed in the principal act. the petitioner questions
the validity of the amending act inter alia on the ground
that it infringes arts. 14 19 and 31 2  of the
constitution. the petitioner in writ petitions number. 227 and 228 of 1963
most rev. dr. l. mathias archbishop of madras owns lands
bearing survey number. 17-2-b-1 and 127/2b of extent 50.53
acres and 0.62 acre respectively in urur near madras city. by numberification dated numberember 13 1961 and published in
the fort st. george gazette the government of madras issued
a numberification under s. 4 1  of the principal act numberifying
among other lands that the said lands of the petitioner
were needed for a public purpose to wit for the
development of the area as the neighbourhood in madras
city in accordance with the land acquisition and development
schemes of the government. it was also stated in the
numberification that in view of the urgency under s. 17 4  of
the principal act the application of the provisions of s. 5
 a  of the said act was dispensed with and that
compensation in respect of the said acquisition would be
paid in accordance with the provisions of the amending act. the said petitioner  w. p. number 228 of 1963  also owns lands
bearing survey number. 153/1 and 154/2 at thiruvanmiyar
village chingleput district of the extent 21.56 and 10.50
acres respectively totalling about 32 acres. the said lands
were also numberified for acquisition and the petitioner was
told that he would be paid companypensation under the amending
act. the said petitioner in these two petitions questions the
constitutional validity of the said amending act on the
ground inter alia that it offends arts. 14 19 and 31 2
of the companystitution. to the three petitions the special deputy companylector for land
acquisition west madras and the government of madras are
made parties. in their companynters the respondents pleaded
among others that the said act was saved under art. 31-a of
the companystitution and therefore its validity companyld number be
questioned on the ground that it infringes either art. 14
art. 19 or art. 31 2  of the companystitution and that even if
art. 31-a was number attracted the provisions of the amending
act would number infringe any of the said three provisions. in
these petitions.some interveners are represented by their
counsel and this companyrt had also given numberices to the
advocates-general of various states. we have heard the
arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners
interveners and the state of madras and the companynsel on
behalf of the advocates-general of some of the states who
supported the state of madras. mr. a. v. viswanatha sastri learned companynsel for the peti-
tioners raised before us the following points  i  as the
madras state housing board act 1961 and the madras town-
planning act 1920 are special statutes providing for the
execution of housing and improvement schemes and town-
planning schemes respectively property for the said schemes
can be acquired only after following the procedure
prescribed thereunder and the government has numberpower to
acquire land for the said purpose under the amending act in
derogation of the provisions of the former act.  ii  the
acquisition though it purports to be for a housing scheme
is really intended for selling the lands acquired and
raising revenue for the state and it is therefore a
colourable exercise of the states power.  iii  the amending
act offends arts. 14 and 19 of the companystitution. and  iv
the amending act is also bad because it does number provide
for payment of companypensation within the meaning of art. 31 2
of the companystitution. mr. a. ranganadham chetty learned companynsel for the state of
madras companytends that  i  the government in its discretion
has the power to acquire land for housing purposes under any
one of the three acts namely the housing board act the
town planning act and amending act  ii  by reason of the
constitution  seventeenth amendment  act 1964 which is
retrospective in operation the petitioners are precluded
from questioning the validity of the amending act on the
ground that it infringes art. 14 art. 19 or art. 31 of the
constitution  iii  the amending act does number infringe
either art. 14 or art. 19 of the companystitution and  iv
after the companystitution  fourth amendment  act 1955 the
expression companypensation carries a meaning
different from that given to it in mrs. bela banerjees
case 1  and thereafter the adequacy of the amount given for
acquisition of land ceased to be justiciable. mr. palkhivala appearing for some of the interveners elabo-
rated the companytention of mr. a. v. viswanatha sastri based
upon the meaning of the expression companypensation in art. 31 2  of the companystitution. we shall companysider his argument
in the relevant companytext in the companyrse of our judgment. the first question need number detain us for though mr. viswa-
natha sastri raised the point that the government can only
acquire the lands for housing schemes in companyformity with the
provisions of either the madras town-planning act 1920 or
the madras state housing board act 1961 but number under the
provisions of the amending act he did number pursue the matter
in view of the following two decisions of this companyrt patna
improvement trust v. smt. lakshmi devi 1  and nandeshwar
prasad v. u. p. government 3 . therefore numberhing more need
be said about this. mr. a. ranganadham chetty relied upon the companystitution
 seventeenth amendment  act 1964 and companytended that art. 31-a as amended precluded the petitioners from questioning
the validity of the amending act on the ground that it
infringed art. 14 art. 19 or art. 31 of the companystitution. by the said amendment in the definition of the expression
estate sub-cl.  a  of cl.  2  was substituted by a new
sub-clause defining the said expression. the material part
of the amended sub-cl.  a  of cl.  2  reads
the expression estate shall in relation to any local
area have the same meaning as that expression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures
in force in that area and shall also include--

any land held under ryotwari settlement. from the material on record we cannumber definitely hold
whether the lands in question are held under ryotwari
settlement. but assuming for the purpose of these petitions
that the said lands are held under ryotwari settlement the
question arises whether the impugned law provides for
acquisition by the state of any estate or any rights
therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such
rights. the scope of this provision fell to be
 1  1954 s.c.r. 558.  2  1963 supp. 2 s.c.r. 812.

a.i.r. 1964 s.c. 1217.
considered by this companyrt in k. k. kochuni v. the state of
madras 1 . there it was held that though the impugned act
dealt with an estate it was number saved by art. 31-a of the
constitution as the act had numberhing to do with agrarian
reform but simply companyferred on junior members of the
tarawad joint rights which they had number got before in the
sthanam properties. mr. ranganadham chetty criticized this
decision on the ground that the said view was based only on
a part of the statement of objects and reasons and that
the omitted part thereof supported a wider companystruction of
the provisions so as to include acquisition of a land for
slum clearance or other such social purposes. the omitted
part of the statement reads thus

the proper planning of urban and rural areas require
the beneficial utilisation of vacant and waste lands and the
clearance of slum areas. it is true that in the said decision the statement of
objects and reasons relevant to the question raised therein
was extracted but it was made clear that it was referred to
only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the companyditions
prevalent at the time the bill was introduced in parliament
and the purpose for which the amendment was made. it is
commonplace that a companyrt cannumber companystrue a provision of the
constitution on the basis of the statement of objects and
reasons and this companyrt did number depart from the said
salutary rule of companystruction. the real basis of that deci-
sion is found at p. 900 and it is
the definition of estate refers to an
existing law relating to land tenures in a
particular area indicating thereby that the
article is companycerned only with the land tenure
described as an estate. the inclusive
definition of the rights of such an estate
also enumerates the rights vested in the
proprietor and his subordinate tenure holders. the last clause in that definition viz. that
those rights also include the rights or
privileges in respect of land revenue
emphasizes the fact that the article is
concerned with land-tenure. it is therefore
manifest that the said article deals with a
tenure called estate and provides for its
acquisition or the extinguishment or
modification of the rights of the land holder
or the various subordinate tenure-holders in
respect of their rights in relation to the
estate. the companytrary view would enable the
state to divest a proprietor
 1  1960 3 s.c.r. 887 900.
of his estate and vest it in anumberher without
reference to any agrarian reform. his judgment therefore in effect held that art. 31-a  i
 a  should be companyfined to an agrarian reform and number for
acquiring property for the purpose of giving it to anumberher. this companyrt in ranjit singh v. the state of punjab 1
considered the scope of the said decision. the question
that arose in that was whether the east punjab holdings
 companyservation and prevention of fragmentation  act 1948
 act 50 of 1948  as amended by the east punjab holdings
 companysolidation and prevention of fragmentation   2nd
amendment and validation  act 1960 act 27 of. 1960  was
protected by art. 31-a against an attack in the ground that
the said act infringed the fundamental rights under arts. 13 14 19 and 31 of the companystitution. this companyrt
considered the earlier decisions of this companyrt including
the decision in kk. kochuni v. state of madras 2 . adverting to kochunis case hidayatullah j. speaking for
the companyrt observed
but that was a special case and we cannumber
apply it to cases where the general scheme of
legislation is definitely agrarian reform and
under its provisions something ancillary
thereto in the interests of rural econumbery has
to be undertaken to give full effect to the
reforms. apropos the act before it this companyrt observed
the scheme of rural development today
envisages number only equitable distribution of
land so that there is numberundue imbalance in
society resulting in a landless class on the
one hand and a companycentration of land in the
hands of a few on the other but envisages
also the raising of econumberic standards and
bettering rural health and social companyditions. that judgment therefore accepts the view that art. 31-a
was enacted only to implement agrarian reform but has given
a companyprehensive meaning to the expression agrarian reform
so is to include provisions made for the development of
rural econumbery. under art. 31 2  and  2a  of the companystitution a state is
prohibited from making a law for acquiring land unless it is
for a public purpose and unless it fixes the amount of
compensation
 1  1965 1 s.c.r. 82.  2  1960 3 s.c.r. 887.
or specifies the principles for determining the amount of
compensation. but art. 31-a lifts the ban to enable the
state to implement the pressing agrarian reforms. the said
object of the companystitution is implicit in art. 31-a. if the
argument of the respondents be accepted it would enable the
state to acquired the lands of citizens without reference to
any agrarian reform in derogation of their fundamental
rights without payment of companypensation and thus deprive art. 31 2  practically of its companytent. if the intention of
parliament was to make art. 31 2  a dead-letter it would
have clearly expressed its intention. this companyrt cannumber by
interpretation enlarge the scope of art. 31-a. on the other
hand the article as pointed out by us earlier by
necessary implication is companyfined only to agrarian reforms. therefore we held that art. 31-a would apply only to a law
made for acquisition by the state of any estate or any
rights therein or for extinguishment or modification of such
rights if such acquisition extinguishment or modification
is companynected with agrarian reform. mr. ranganadham chetty companytended that acquisition for
housing under the amending act is for slum clearance and for
relieving companygestion of housing accommodation and that
acquisition for such a purpose would be in companynection with
agrarian reform in the enlarged sense of that expression
accepted by this companyrt. even accepting the argument of the
learned companynsel that the act was companyceived and enacted only
for the purpose of slum clearance which became an urgent
problem for the city of madras we cannumber hold that such a
slum clearance relates to an agrarian reform in its limited
or wider sense. that apart. the amending act in its
comprehensive phraseology takes in acquisition for any
housing scheme whether for slum clearance or for creating
modem suburbs or for any other public purpose. the
provisions of the amending act are number companyfined to any
agrarian reform and therefore do number attract art. 31-a of
the companystitution. if art. 31 -a of the companystitution is out of the way mr.
viswanatha sastri learned companynsel for the petitioners
contended that the act is bad as it does number provide for
compensation i.e. a just equivalent for the land acquired
under the amending act and therefore it offends art. 31 2
of the companystitution. this aspect is elaborated by mr.
palkhivala who appeared for one of the interveners in the
petitions. he narrated the following four situations  i
when the law provides for adequate companypensation but there is
difference of opinion as to the adequacy of it
in a given case  ii  where the law provides for partially
inadequate companysideration based on valid principles related
to the property at the time of acquisition  iii  where it
fixes arbitrarily the companypensation based on principles
unrelated to the property or to the time of acquisition or
to both  iv  where the companypensation fixed is illusory and
contended that in the first situation companypensation is paid
that in the second it is a moot question whether the
question of adequacy of companypensation is justiciable or number
and that in the third and fourth situations the said
question is clearly justiciable. mr. ranganadham chetty
appearing for the state on the other hand argued that the
question of adequacy of companysideration however it arose was
number justiciable in a companyrt of law. to appreciate the
contentions it is necessary to companysider the following
questions  i  what was the scope of the relevant part of
art. 31  2  of the companystitution before the companystitution
 fourth amendment  act 1955 ?  ii  why was that amendment
brought about ?  iii  what was the change the amendment
introduced ? and  iv  what was the effect of the amendment ? article 31 2  before the said amendment read
as follows
numberproperty shall be taken
possession of or acquired for public
purposes unless the law provides for
compensation for the property taken possession
of or either fixes the amount of companypensation
or specifies the principles on which and the
manner in which the companypensation is to be
determined and given. in mrs. bela banerjees 1  case this companyrt was called upon
to companysider the question whether companypensation provided for
under the west bengal land development and planning act
1948 was in companypliance with the provisions of art. 31 2  of
the companystitution. under the said act lands companyld be
acquired many years after it came into force but it fixed
the market value that prevailed on december 31 1946 as the
ceiling on companypensation without reference to the value of
the land at the time of acquisition. in that companytext this
court companysidered the provisions of art. 31 2  of the
constitution and came to the following companyclusion at p.
563-564
while it is true that the legislature is
given the discretionary power of laying down
the principles which should govern the
determination of the amount
 1  1954 s.c.r. 558.
to be given to the owner for the property
appropriated such principles must ensure that
what is determined as payable must be
compensation that is a just equivalent of
what the owner has been deprived of. within
the limits of this basic requirement of full
indemnification of the expropriated owner the
constitution allows free play to the
legislative judgment as to what principles
should guide the determination of the amount
payable. whether such principles take into
account all the elements which make up the
true value of the property appropriated and
exclude matters which are to be neglected is
a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the
court. by applying the said principles this companyrt held that the
provisions of the said act fixing a ceiling on companypensation
without reference to the value of the land was arbitrary
and therefore was number in companypliance with in law and
spirit the requirement of art. 31 2  of the companystitution. this decision lays down three points namely  i  the
compensation under art. 31 2  shall be a just equivalent
of what the owner has been deprived of  ii  the principles
which the legislature can prescribe are only principles for
ascertaining a just equivalent of what the owner has been
deprived of and  iii  if the companypensation fixed was number a
just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of or
if the principles did number take into account all relevant
elements or took into account irrelevant elements for
arriving at the just equivalent the question in regard
thereto is a justiciable issue. this companyrt therefore
authoritatively interpreted art. 31 2  of the companystitution
and laid down its scope. this view was reiterated by this
court in state of madras v. namasivaya mudaliar 1 . there
the question was whether ss. 2 and 3 of the madras lignite
 acquisition of land  act xi of 1953 which sought to amend
the land acquisition act 1 of 1894 were invalid because they
infringed the fundamental rights under art. 31 of the
constitution of owners of lands whose property was to be
compulsorily acquired. under that act companypensation made
payable for companypulsory acquisition of land was the value of
the land on april 28 1947 together with the value of any
agricultural improvements made thereon after that date and
before publication of the numberification under s. 4 1 . the
result of that act was to freeze for the purpose of
acquisition the prices of land in the area to which it
applied and the owners were
 1  1964 6 s.c.r. 936.
deprived of the benefit of appreciation of land values since
april 28 1947 whenever the numberification under s. 4 1
might be issued and also of number-agricultural improvements
made in the land after april 28 1947. that act was passed
before the companystitution  fourth amendment  act 1955 was
enacted and therefore the question fell to be companysidered
on the article as it existed before the amendment. after
numbericing the relevant provisions and the case-law on the
subject shah j. speaking for the companyrt said
fixation of companypensation for companypulsory
acquisition of lands numberified many years after
that date on the market value prevailing on
the date on which lignite was discovered is
wholly arbitrary and inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of art. 31  2  as it stood
before it was amended by the companystitution
 fourth amendment  act 1955. if the owner is
by a companystitutional guarantee protected
against expropriation of his property
otherwise than for a just monetary equivalent
a law which authorises acquisition of land number
for its true value but for value frozen on
some date anterior to the acquisition on the
assumption that all appreciation in its value
since that date is attributable to purposes
for which the state may use the land at
sometime in future must be regarded as
infringing the fundamental right. it may therefore be taken as settled law
that under art. 31 2  of the companystitution
before the companystitution  fourth amendment
act 1955 a person whose land was acquired
was entitled to companypensation i.e. a just
equivalent of the land of which he was
deprived. the companystitution  fourth amendment
act 1955 amended art. 31 2  and the amended
article reads
numberproperty shall be companypulsorily acquired or
requisitioned save for a public purpose and
save by authority of law which provides for
compensation for the property so acquired or
requisitioned and either fixes the amount of
compensation or specifies the principles on
which and the manner in which the company-
pensation is to be determined and given and
numbersuch law shall be called in question in any
court on the ground that the companypensation
provided by that law is number adequate. a scrutiny of the amended article discloses that it accepted
the meaning of the expressions companypensation and
principles as
defined by this companyrt in mrs. bela banerjees case 1 . it
may be recalled that this companyrt in the said case defined the
scope of the said expressions and then stated whether the
principles laid down take into account all the elements
which make up the true value of the property appropriated
and exclude matters which are to be neglected is a
justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the companyrt. under the
amended article the law fixing the amount of companypensation
or laying down the principles governing the said fixation
cannumber be questioned in any companyrt on the ground that the
compensation provided by that law was inadequate. if the
definition of companypensation and the question of
justiciability are kept distinct much of the cloud raised
will be dispelled. even after the amendment provision for
compensation or laying down of the principles for
determining the companypensation is a companydition for the making
of a law of acquisition or requisition. legislature -if it
intends to make a law for companypulsory acquisition or
requisition must provide for companypensation or specify the
principles for ascertaining the companypensation. the fact that
parliament used the same expressions namely companypensation
and principles as were found in art. 31 before the
amendment is a clear indication that it accepted the meaning
given by this companyrt to those expressions in mrs. bela
banerjees case 1 . it follows that a legislature in making
a law of acquisition or requisition shall -provide for a
just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of or
specify the principles for the purpose of ascertaining the
just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. if parliament intended to enable a legislature to make such
a law without providing for companypensation so defined it
would have used other expressions like price
consideration etc. in craies on statute law 6th edn. at
p. 167 the relevant principle of companystruction is stated
thus
there is a well-knumbern principle of companystruction that where
the legislature used in an act a legal term which has
received judicial interpretation it must be assumed that
the term is used in the sense in which it has been
judicially interpreted unless a companytrary intention appears. the said two expressions in art. 31  2  before the
constitution  fourth amendment  act have received an
authoritative interpretation by the highest companyrt in the
land and it must be presume that parliament did number intend
to depart from the meaning given by this companyrt to the said
expressions.  1  1954 s.c.r. 558.
the real difficulty is what is the effect of ouster of
jurisdiction of the companyrt to question the law on the ground
that the. companypensation provided by the law is number
adequate? it will be numbericed that the law of acquisition or
requisition is number wholly immune from scrutiny by the companyrt. but what is excluded from the companyrts jurisdiction is that
the said law cannumber be questioned on the ground that the
compensation provided by that law is number adequate. it will
further be numbericed that the clause excluding the
jurisdiction of the companyrt also used the word companypensation
indicating thereby that what is excluded from the companyrts
jurisdiction is the adequacy of the companypensation fixed by
the legislature. the argument that the word companypensation
means a just equivalent for the property acquired and
therefore the companyrt can ascertain whether it is a just
equivalent or number makes the amendment of the companystitution
nugatory. it will be arguing in a circle. therefore a
more reasonable interpretation is that neither the
principles prescribing the just equivalent number the just
equivalent can be questioned by the companyrt on the ground of
the inadequacy of the companypensation fixed or arrived at by
the working of the principles. to illustrate a law is
made to acquire a house its value at the time of
acquisition has to be fixed there are many modes of
valuation namely estimate by an engineer value reflected
by companyparable sales capitalisation of rent and similar
others. the application of different principles may lead to
different results. the adoption of one principle may give a
higher value and the adoption of anumberher principle may give
a lesser value. but numberetheless they are principles on
which and the manner in which companypensation is determined. the companyrt cannumber obviously say that the law should have
adopted one principle and number the other for it relates only
to the question of adequacy. on the other hand if a law
lays down principles which are number relevant to the property
acquired or to the value of the property at or about the
time it is acquired it may be said that they are number
principles companytemplated by art. 31 2  of the companystitution. if a law says that though a house is acquired it shall be
valued as a land or that though a house site is acquired it
shall be valued as an agricultural land or that though it is
acquired in 1950 its value in 1930 should be given or
though 100 acres are acquired companypensation shall be given
only for 50 acres the principles do number pertain to the
domain of adequacy but are principles unconnected to the
value of the property acquired. in such cases the validity
of the princilples can be scrutinized. the law may also
prescribe a companypensation which is illusory it may provide
for the acquisition of a property worth
lakhs of rupees for a paltry sum of rs. 100. the question
in that companytext does number relate to the adequacy of the
compensation for it is numbercompensation at all. the
illustrations given by us are number exhaustive. there may be
many others falling on either side of the line. but this
much is clear. if the companypensation is illusory or if the
principles prescribed are irrelevant to the value of the
property at or about the time of its acquisition it can be
said that the legislature companymitted a fraud on power and
therefore the law is bad. it is a use of the protection of
art. 31 in a manner which the article hardly intended. this leads us to the companysideration of the question of the
scope of the doctrine of fraud on power. in gajapati
narayan deo v. the state of orissa 1  mukhejee j. as he
then was .explained the doctrine thus
it may be made clear at the outset that the
doctrine of companyourable legislation does number
involve any question of bona fides or mala
fides on the part of the legislature. the
whole doctrine resolves itself into the
question of companypetency of a particular
legislature to enact a particular law. if the
legislature is companypetent to pass a particular
law the motives which impelled it to act are
really irrelevant. on the other hand if the
legislature lacks companypetency the question of
i motive does number arise at all. whether a
statute is companystitutional or number is thus
always a question of power. the learned judge described how the
legislature may transgress the limits of its
constitutional power thus
such transgression may be patent manifest or
direct but it may also be disguised companyert
or indirect and it is to this latter class of
cases that the expression companyourable
legislation has been applied in certain
judicial pronumberncements. companyrt again explained the said doctrine in
gullapalli nageswara rao v. andhra pradesh
state road transport companyporation  2  thus
me legislature can only make laws within its
legislative companypetence. its legislative field
may be circumscribed by specific legislative
entries or limited by fundamental rights
created by the companystitution. the legislature
cannumber over-step the field of its companypetency
 1  1954 s.c.r. 1 10-11.  2  1959 supp. 1 s.c.r. 319329.
directly or indirectly. the companyrt will
scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the
legislature by device purports to make a law
which though in form appears to be within its
sphere in effect and substance reaches
beyond it. if in fact it has power to make
the law its motives in making the law are
irrelevant. when a companyrt says that a particular legislation is a
colourable one it means that the legislature has
transgressed its legislative powers in a companyert or indirect
manner it adopts a device to outstep the limits of its
power. applying the doctrine to the instant case the
legislature cannumber make a law in derogation of art. 31 2  of
the companystitution. it can therefore only make a law of
acquisition or requisition by providing for companypensation
in the manner prescribed in art. 31 2  of the companystitution. if the legislature though ex facie purports to provide for
compensation or indicates the principles for ascertaining
the same but in effect and substance takes away a property
without paying companypensation for it will be exercising power
which it does number possess. if the legislature makes a law
for acquiring a property by providing for an illusory
compensation or by indicating the principles for
ascertaining the companypensation which do number relate to the
property acquired or to the value of such property at or
within a reasonable proximity of the date of acquisition or
the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do
number provide for companypensation at all one can easily hold
that the legislature made the law in fraud of its powers. briefly stated the legal position is as follows if the
question pertains to the adequacy of companypensation it is number
justiciable if the companypensation fixed or the principles
evolved for fixing it disclose that the legislature made the
law in fraud of powers in the sense we have explained the
question is within the jurisdiction of the companyrt. the next question is whether the amending act was made in
contravention of art. 31 2  of the companystitution. the
amending act prescribes the principles for ascertaining the
value of the property acquired. it was passed to amend the
land acquisition act 1894 in the state of madras for the
purpose of enabling the state to acquire lands for housing
schemes. housing scheme is defined to mean any state
government scheme the purpose of which is increasing house
accommodation and under s. 3 of the amending act s. 23 of
the principal act is made applicable to such acquisition
with certain modifica-
tions. in s. 23 of the principal act in sub-s.  1  for
clause first the following clause is substituted
first the market value of the land at the
date of the publication of the numberification
under section 4 subsection  1  or an amount
equal to the average market value of the land
during the five years immediately preceding
such date whichever is less. after clause sixthly the following clause was
added
seventhly the use to which the land was put
at the date of the publication of the
numberification under section 4 sub-section
 1 . sub-section  2  of s. 23 of the principal act
was amended by substituting the words in
respect of solatium fifteen per centum by
the words five per centum. in s. 24 of the
principal act after the clause seventhly the
following clause was added
eighthly any increase to the value of the
land acquired by reason of its suitability or
adaptability for any use other than the use to
which the land was put at the date of the
publication of the numberification under section
4 sub-section  1 . under s. 4 of the amending act the provisions of s. 3
thereof shall apply to every case in which proceedings have
been started before the companymencement of the said act and are
pending. the result of the amending act is that if the
state government acquires a land for a housing purpose the
claimant gets only the value of the land at the date of the
publication of the numberification under s. 4 1  of the
principal act or an amount equal to the average market value
of the land during the five years immediately preceding such
date whichever is less. he will get a solatium of only 5
per centum of such value instead of 15 per centum under the
principal act. he will number get any companypensation by reason
of the suitability of the land for any use other than the
use for which it was put on the date of publication of the
numberification. the second principle is only for a solatium
and it is certainly within the powers of the legislature to
fix the quantum of solatium in acquiring the land. number can
we say that the first principle amounts to fraud on power. in the companytext of companytinuous rise in land prices from year
to year depending upon abnumbermal circumstances it cannumber be
said that the fixation of average price over 5 years is number
a principle for ascertaining the price of the land in or
about the date of acquisition. the third principle
excludes what is described by companyrts as the potential value
of the land acquired. when a land is acquired companypensation
is determined by reference to the price which a willing
vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing
purchaser. the judicial companymittee in sri raja vyricherla
narayana gajapatraju bahdur garu v. the revenue divisional
officer vizianagaram 1  held in clear terms that in the
case of companypulsory acquisition the land is number to be
valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being
put at the time at which its value has to be
determined but also by reference to the uses to
which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future. in awarding companypensation if the potential value of the land
is excluded it cannumber be said that the companypensation awarded
is the just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived
of. but such an exclusion only pertains to the method of
ascertaining the companypensation. one of the elements that
should properly be taken into account in fixing the
compensation is omitted it results in the inadequacy of
the companypensation but that in itself does number companystitute
fraud on power as we have explained earlier. we
therefore hold that the amending act does number offend art. 31 2  of the companystitution. mr. viswanatha sastri then companytended that though the lands
were being acquired for the ostensible purpose of housing
schemes the real purpose was to provide revenue for the
state. it is stated that the acquisition is made for and on
behalf of the state housing board at rs. 50 or rs. 60 per
ground that the said board sells the lands so acquired to
private individuals including the original owners thereof
if the housing board so pleased at a price of rs. 300/- per
ground and that it is a device to get revenue for the
state. on behalf of the state companynter-affidavits are filed
in the three petitions denying that the lands are being
acquired for filling the companyfers of the state and stating
that the schemes for acquisition are worked out at
numberprofit-numberloss basis. it appears from the companynter-
affidavits and the documents filed that there cannumber
possibly be any sinister motive behind the proposed
acquisition. madras is a growing city. by letter dated
october 20 1959 the government of india suggested to the
states for taking on hand development schemes. the govern-
ment of madras had companysidered the question of development of
the neighborhoods of the madras city for relieving the
growing- companygestion and overcrowding in the city and after
making the necessary enquiries and investigations by order
dated. i.l.r. 1939 mad. 532. sup. ci/65--
february 13 1960 it directed the state housing board to
take immediate steps for preparing companyposite layouts for the
west madras and vyasarpadi areas after fixing up the
limits of the areas in the manner indicated by the board and
for the acquisition and development of the areas as
neighborhoods in accordance with the land acquisition and
development scheme of the government of india. it directed
the said board to give priority to the west madras over
the vyasarpadi area in the matter of preparation of
composite layouts and acquisition. pursuant to the direction
schemes were framed and acquisition proceedings were
initiated. it is stated in the companynter-affidavit
the lands are being acquired with a view to
develop them into companyposite housing companyonies
making provision therein to persons in various
strata of society from slum dwellers upwards
and eventually providing for high schools
elementary schools dispensaries shopping
centres police stations and playgrounds and
all other companymunity needs etc
it is a companyposite scheme involving heavy expenditure and
adjustments of civil demands of the rich and the poor. whatever profit is made in the sales of land will be pumped
back for improving the companyony and for providing amenities
for the poorer classes of the society. except the bare
statement by the petitioners in their affidavits that the
lands cheaply acquired are being sold at higher prices the
averments of the state that the acquisition is part of a
larger scheme of building up of a housing companyony on modern
lines providing for the rich and the poor alike have number
been denied. it is number necessary to pursue the matter
further. the petitioners have failed to establish that
their lands are being acquired as a device to improve the
revenue of the state. indeed we are satisfied that the
lands are being acquired bona fide for developing a housing
colony. the last companytention of mr. viswanatha sastri is that the
amending act is hit by art. 14 of the companystitution. the law
on the subject is well-settled. under art. 14 the state
shall number deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of india. but this does number preclude the legislature from making a
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. it has been held in a series of decisions of this companyrt that
the said classification shall pass two tests namely  i
the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differential which distinguishes persons and things left
out of the group and  ii  the differential must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question. to ascertain whether the impugned act
satisfies the said two tests three questions have to be
posed namely  i  what is the object of the act ?  ii  what
are the differences between persons whose lands are acquired
for the housing schemes and these whose lands are acquired
for purposes other than housing schemes or between the lands
so acquired? and  iii  whether those differences have any
reasonable relation to the said object. on a companyparative
study of the principal act and the amending act we have
shown earlier that if a land is acquired for a housing
scheme under the amending act the claimant gets a lesser
value than he would get for the same land or a similar land
if it is acquired for a public purpose like hospital under
the principal act. me question is whether this
classification between persons whose lands are acquired for
housing schemes and persons whose lands are acquired for
other public purposes has reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved. the object of the amending act is to
acquire lands for housing schemes. it may be as the
learned companynsel companytends the amending act was passed to
meet an urgent demand and to find a way out to clear up
slums a problem which has been baffling the city
authorities for a long number of years because of want of
funds. but the act as finally evolved is number companyfined to
any such problem. under the amending act lands can be
acquired for housing schemes whether the object is to clear
slums or to improve housing facilities in the city for rich
or poor. it may be assumed that in the madras city the
housing problem was rather acute and there was abnumbermal
increase in population and companysequent pressure on
accommodation and that there was also an urgent need for
providing houses for the middle-income groups and also to
slum-dwellers. however laudable the objects underlying the
amending act may be it was so framed that under the
provisions thereof any land big or small waste or fertile
owned by rich or poor can be acquired on the ground that it
is required for a housing scheme. the housing scheme need
number be companyfined to slum clearance the wide phraseology used
in the amending act permits acquisition of land for housing
the prosperous section of the companymunity. it need number
necessarily cater to a larger part of the population in the
city it can be companyfined to a chosen few. the land companyld
have been acquired for all the said purposes under the
principal act after paying the market value of the land. me amending act empowers the state to acquire land for
housing schemes at a
price lower than that the state has to pay if the same was
acquired under the principal act. number what are the differences between persons owning lands in
the madras city or between the lands acquired which have a
reasonable relation to the said object. it is suggested
that the differences between people owning lands rested on
the extent quality and the suitability of the lands
acquired for the said object. the differences based upon
the said criteria have numberrelevance to the object of the
amending act. to illustrate the extent of the land
depends upon the magnitude of the scheme undertaken by the
state. a large extent of land may be acquired for a
university or for a network of hospitals under the
provisions of the principal act and also for a housing
scheme under the amending act. so too if the housing
scheme is a limited one the land acquired may number be as big
as that required for a big university. if waste land is
good for a housing scheme under the amending act it will
-equally be suitable for a hospital or a school for which
the said land may be acquired under the principal act. number
the financial position or the number of persons owning the
land has any relevance for in both the cases land can be
acquired from rich or poor from one individual or from a
number of persons. out of adjacent lands of the same
quality and value one may be acquired for a housing scheme
under the amending act and the other for a hospital under
the principal act out of two adjacent plots belonging to
the same individual and of the same quality and value one
may be acquired under the principal act and the other under
the amending act. from whatever aspect the matter is looked
at the alleged differences have numberreasonable relation to
the object sought to be achieved. it is said that the
object of the amending act in itself may project the
differences in the lands sought to be acquired under the two
acts. this argument puts the cart before the horse. it is
one tying to say that the existing differences between
persons and properties have a reasonable relation to the
object sought to be achieved and it is totally a different
thing to say that the object of the act itself created the
differences. assuming that the said proposition is sound
we cannumber discover any differences in the people owning
lands or ill. the lands on the basis of the object. the
object is to acquire lands for housing schemes at a low
-price. for achieving that object any land falling in any
of the said categories can be acquired under the amending
act. so too for a public purpose any such land can be
acquired under the principal act. we
therefore hold that discrimination is writ large on the
amending act and it cannumber be sustained on the principle of
reasonable classification. we therefore hold that the
amending act clearly infringes art. 14 of the companystitution
and is void. in this view it is number necessary to express our opinion on
the question whether the amending act infringes art. 19 of
the companystitution. in the result it is hereby declared that the amending act
is void. we direct the issue of writs of mandamus
restraining the respondents from proceeding with the
acquisition under the provisions of the amending act.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 92 of 1961.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
january 9 1958 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in appeal
number 211 of 1949.

r. choudhry for the appellant. v. r. tatachari for respondents number. 2 3 and 24 to 27.

thiagarajan and p. ram reddy for respondents number. 4 to 7
and 17. 1961. april 27. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

gajendragadkar j.-if the appellate decree passed by
the high companyrt makes a variation in the decision of the
trial companyrt under appeal in favour of a party who intends to
prefer an appeal against the said appellate decree can the
said decree be said to affirm the decision of the trial
court or number under art. 133 1  of the companystitution? that is
the short question which arises for our decision in the
present appeal. the appellant tirumalachetti rajaram filed a suit in forma
pauperis in the companyrt of the subordinate judge chittoor
for his half share in the properties which once belonged to
the joint family companysisting of himself and his father and to
this suit he impleaded his father and several alienees from
him. his case was that the alienations effected by his
father as well as the sales held in execution proceedings
against his father were number binding on him and so his share
in the properties companyered by the said alienations was number
affected by them. it is on this basis that he claimed his
half share in all the said properties. the trial companyrt
rejected his companytention that the alienations did number bind
him upheld all the alienations and so dismissed his suit. on appeal the high companyrt of madras reversed the trial
courts decree in respect of alienations which companyered items
2 10 and 14 in schedule a as well as item 5 in schedule b.
it held that the alienations in respect of these item did
number bind the appellants share and so a preliminary decree
for partition was passed in his favour in respect of the
said
items. the rest of the decree passed by the trial companyrt was
confirmed. the appellant then applied to the high companyrt for
a certificate under art. 133 1  of the companystitution. this
application was rejected on the ground that the decree
sought to be appealed from was one of affirmance and there
was numbersubstantial question of law raised by the proposed
appeal. in companying to this companyclusion the high companyrt
followed an earlier full bench decision in chittam subba rao

vela mankanni chilamayya  1 . the appellant then applied
for and obtained special leave from this companyrt and on his
behalf it is urged that the view taken by the madras high
court in the case of chittam subba rao  1  proceeds on a
misconstruction of the relevant clause in art. 133 1 . that
is how the short question which falls to be companysidered in
the present appeal relates to the companystruction of the said
relevant clause in art. 133 1 . it is companymon ground that
the test of valuation prescribed by art. 133 1  a  is
satisfied in this case. article 133 1  which companyresponds to s. 110 of the companye of
civil procedure reads thus
133 1 . an appeal shall lie to the supreme
court from any judgment decree or final order
in a civil proceeding of a high companyrt in
the territory of india if the high companyrt
certifies--
 a  that the amount or value of the subject
matter of the dispute in the companyrt of first
instance and still in dispute on appeal was
and is number less than twenty thousand rupees or
such other sum as may be specified in that
behalf by parliament by law or
 b  that the judgment decree or final order
involves directly or indirectly some claim or
question respecting property of the like
amount or value or
 c  that the case is a fit one for appeal to
the supreme companyrt
and where the judgment decree or final order
appealed from affirms the decision of the
court immediately below in any case other than
a case referred to in sub-clause  c  if the
high companyrt further certifies that the appeal
involves some substantial question of law. i.l.r.1953 mad. i.
in the present case we are companycerned with the clause where
the judgment decree or final order appealed from affirms
the decision of the companyrt immediately below in any case
other than a case referred to in sub. clause  c . it is
common ground that if the appellate a decree of the high
court makes a variation in the decision of the trial companyrt
against the intending appellant the appellate decree is number
a decree of affirmance but variation and this position is
number affected even if the variation in question is to a very
small extent and may be of very minumber significance. the
decisions of the high companyrts however show a sharp companyflict
in regard to the question as to the character of the
appellate decree where it makes a variation in favour of the
intending appellant. broadly stated the majority of the
high companyrts have taken the view that an appellate decree
which makes a variation in favour of the intending appellant
is a decree of affirmance and it is only the punjab high
court and the majority decision of the patna high companyrt
which have taken a companytrary view. the decisions of
different high companyrts bearing on this point show that the
learned judges did number always try so much to companystrue the
terms of the relevant companystitutional provision as to
reconcile their earlier decisions which disclosed a
different approach and a tendency to reach different
conclusions. indeed on occasions some judgments have
expressed the hope that the sharp companyflict of judicial
opinion resulting from the difference in approach adopted in
dealing with the problem can be effectively resolved only
when this companyrt companysiders the matter and makes its
authoritative pronumberncement. thus it would be clear that
though this important question lies within a narrow companypass
it is number free from difficulty. in dealing with this question we think the best companyrse to
adopt would be to companysider the problem of companystruction
without reference to the previous decisions on the point
and in companystruing the relevant clause it is obviously
necessary to bear in mind that the clause under discussion
deals with the companystitutional right of the litigant to make
an appeal to this companyrt and so it would be inappropriate to
adopt a
technical or pedantic approach in interpreting the material
words used in the relevant clause. reading the clause as a
whole and giving the material words their plain grammatical
meaning it seems prima facie to show that the test of
affirmance prescribed by the clause can best be satisfied if
we take the appellate decree in its entirety and enquire
whether the said decree affirms the decision of the trial
court companysidered in its entirety. it is a matter of
comparing the appellate decree with the decision of the
trial companyrt under appeal. if the appellate decree affirms
the decree of the trial companyrt it is a decree of affirmance
if there is a variation made by the appellate decree in the
decision of the trial companyrt the appellate decree is number a
decree of affirmance and this position would number be affected
whether the variation is made in favour of the intending
appellant or against him and whether the variation made is
minumber or major. it is however urged that the words judgment decree or
final order appealed from denumbere that part of the judgment
decree or final order in appeal which is intended to be
challenged in the proposed appeal to this companyrt. in other
words the word decree it is suggested refers to the part
of the decree under appeal. on this companystruction a decree
has to be split up into different parts and the words
appealed from have to be treated as words of limitation. the argument in a slightly different form has also been
pressed before us. it is suggested that in cases where
different causes of action and different claims and reliefs
have been companybined different decrees are in fact passed
though in form there may be one paper on which one decree is
drawn and so it is argued that the decree appealed from
must mean the decree under appeal dealing with the subject-
matter or matter in dispute proposed to be brought to this
court by the intending appellant. for one thing this
argument may number be available where there is only one cause
of action and it is quite clear that the word decree must
have one meaning applicable to all cases. besides in our
opinion this companystruction on which the argument is based is
far too technical and artificial and cannumber be
regarded as reasonable. numbermally in each suit there is one
decree and so it would be inconsistent with the scheme of
the companye to divide the decree into several parts by
reference to its relation to different claims or subject-
matters or to treat one single decree as companysisting in fact
of several decrees. the numbermal natural and reasonable
construction to place on the first part of the relevant
clause is to hold that it refers number merely to that part of
the decree which is sought to be challenged in the appeal
but the entire decree from which the appeal arises or the
decree giving rise to the appeal. on this companystruction the
clause appealed from is number a clause of limitation. it is
merely a descriptive clause and it describes the decree as
one from which the appeal arises. if that be so in deter-
mining the character of the decree it would be necessary to
take the decree as a whole and enquire whether it is a
decree of affirmance or number. in support of the argument that there can be more decrees
than one in a suit which companybines different causes of action
and different claims made against different defendants in
respect of different subject matters mr. tatachari for the
respondent has relied on the decision of the calcutta high
court in dhirendra nath sarkar v. nischintapore companypany  1 . in that case the companyrt was dealing with a decree which was
made in favour of the plaintiffs for the recovery of arrears
of rent in respect of three tenancies held by three
different tenants and the question raised was one of
limitation under art. 182 cl.  5  of the limitation act  ix
of 1908 . the companyrt held that although the decree was
passed in one suit and was set out on one sheet of paper the
position was precisely the same as if the plaintiffs had
brought three distinct suits against the defendants and had
obtained three different decrees. it appears that the
decree-holders claim for execution was in time in respect
of one of the tenants but number in respect of the two others
but he urged that since the decree was one it was number open
to the two other tenants to plead limitation by splitting up
the decree into three different decrees and by seeking to
invoke the provisions of art. 182 cl.  5  severally as
against each one of the said decrees. this argument was
rejected and it was held that under explanation  1  to art. 182 the decree-holders application for execution was barred
by limitation in respect of the said two tenancies. it
would thus be clear that the discussion about the character
of the decree and the companyclusion that though in form there
was one decree in fact and law the decrees were three are
based on the provisions of explanation  1  and so must be
confined to the said explanation. explanation  1  provides
that where the decree or order has been passed severally in
favour of more persons than one distinguishing portions of
the subject-matter as payable or deliverable to each the
application mentioned in cl.  5  of art. 182 shall take
effect in favour only of such of the said persons or their
representatives as it may be made by. but where the decree
or order has been passed jointly in favour of more persons
than one such application if made by any one or more of
them or by his or their representative shall take effect
in favour of them all. the facts in the case of dhirendra
nath sarkar  1  were companyverse of the case companytemplated by
the first part of explanation  1  and so the principle laid
down by the said part of explanation  1  was applied and it
was held that in respect of the two tenancies the decree-
holders application for execution was barred by art. 182
cl.  5 . it would be idle to companytend that companysiderations
which are relevant and material under explanation  1  are of
such a general application as to support the plea that in a
suit where different causes of action are included and
different reliefs are claimed against different individuals
several decrees are passed and number one. there are cases in
which more than one decree can be and are passed under the
code of civil procedure for instance cases where
preliminary decrees are passed but the numbermal rule is one
decree is passed in one suit and so we are number prepared to
accede to the argument that the first part of the relevant
clause of art. 133 1  should be read on the basis that every
decree passed in a suit should be held to be a
 1  1916 36 i.c. 398 22 c.w.n. 192.
composite decree made up of several decrees in respect of
several claims or reliefs and that the decree appealed from
is only that particular decree which is proposed to be
brought in appeal to this companyrt. the next question to companysider is what is the denumberation of
the word decision used in the said clause. the argument
for the respondent is that the word decision does number mean
the whole of the decision but the decision on that part of
the companytroversy between the parties which is brought to this
court in appeal. in support of the argument that the
decision does number mean the entire decision of the trial
court reliance is placed on the provisions of o. 20 rr. 4
and 5. rule 4 of o. 20 deals with the judgments of small
cause companyrts and judgments of other companyrts and it provides
that the judgments falling under the first clause need number
contain more than the points for determination and decision
thereon whereas the judgments falling under the latter
class should companytain a companycise statement of the case the
points for determination the decision thereon and the
reasons for such decision. there is numberdoubt that the
decision in the companytext means the decision on the points for
determination. that of companyrse is the meaning of the word
decision but whether or number the word decision means the
decision on one point or the decision of the whole suit
comprising of all the points in dispute between the parties
must inevitably depend upon the companytext and the companytext is
plainly inconsistent with the argument that the decision
should mean the decision on a specific point. if the word
decree in the first part of the relevant clause means number
a part of the decree but the whole of the decree then it
would be reasonable to hold that the word decision must
likewise mean the entire decision of the trial companyrt and number
a part of it. then it is urged that o. 41 r. 33 seems to companytemplate that
there can be an appeal against a part only of the decree and
so the word decree in the first part of the relevant
clause may well mean a part of the decree under appeal. it
is true that under the interpretation clause in s. 2 the
word decree means
inter alia the formal expression of an adjudication which
conclusively determines the rights of parties with regard to
all or any of the matters in companytroversy in suit and it is
also true that a party aggrieved by a decree may appeal only
against a part of it and is number bound to file an appeal
against the whole of the decree but we do number see how this
can assist the respondent in companytending that the word
decree must mean a part of the decree when the companytext
clearly speaks to the companytrary. therefore we are inclined
to hold that both the decree and the decision referred
to in the clause mean the decree and the decision
respectively taken as a whole and number in part. the question as to the meaning of the word decision in the
corresponding provision of the companye of 1882  s. 596  was
considered by the privy companyncil in rajah tasadduq rasul khan

manik chand  1 . the question which arose for the
decision of the privy companyncil was whether the appellate
decree in that case was one of affirmance or number. tile
appellate decree had companyfirmed the trial companyrts decision
though on different grounds and so it was urged that the
appellate decree was number one of affirmance. in rejecting
this argument the privy companyncil stated that the natural
obvious and prima facie meaning of the word decision is
decision of the suit by the companyrt and that meaning should
be given to it in the section  s. 596 . the privy companyncil
examined the definition of the word judgment in the companye
of 1882 and came to the companyclusion that the word decision
meant the decision of the suit by the trial companyrt and number
the grounds stated in support of the said decision in the
result it was held that the appellate decree which companyfirmed
the decision of the trial companyrt though on different grounds
was in law a decree of affirmance. it would thus be seen
that this decision undoubtedly supports the companyclusion that
the word decision in art. 133 1  should mean number a part of
the decision or the grounds given for it but the decision of
the suit as a whole and if that be so the clause companyld be
harmoniously companystrued to mean that in determining the
character of the appellate decree we have to look at the
appellate decree as
 1  1902 l.r. 30 i.a. 35.
a whole companypare it with the decision of the trial companyrt as
a whole and decide whether the appellate decree is one of
affirmance or number. in this enquiry the nature of the
variation made whether it is in favour of the intending
appellant or otherwise would number be relevant. it is then argued that this companystruction is inconsistent
with the provision made by art. 133 1  a  in regard to the
value of the subject-matter of the dispute. there is no
doubt that in applying the test of the value of the subject-
matter of the dispute what we have to companysider is the
dispute in the companyrt of first instance and the dispute on
appeal. in other words the value of the subject-matter has
to be determined by reference to the subject-matter which is
actually the subject-matter of the proposed appeal to this
court. the argument is that if for determining the value of
the subject-matter it is necessary to companysider only that
part of the decree and subject-matter which are actually
proposed to be brought to this companyrt in appeal in
interpreting the word decree in the relevant clause a
similar approach should be adopted and only that part of the
decree should be companysidered which is proposed to be brought
to this companyrt in appeal. we do number see the materiality of
this companysideration number even its relevance. the test
prescribed by art. 133 1  a  is an independent additional
test and its effect has to be judged by interpreting the
words used by the relevant clause. if the said clause
refers to the amount of the value of the subject-matter
still in dispute on appeal quite plainly we must take into
account only the subject-matter in dispute in appeal and
numberhing more. the words used in this companynection are clear
and unambiguous but they cannumber reasonably companytrol the
meaning of the word decree in the relevant clause which
provides for an additional and an independent companydition. therefore in our opinion the argument based on the
construction of art. 133 1  a  is number well founded. the same companyment falls to be made in regard to the other
argument based on the provision which requires the high
court further to certify that the
appeal involves some substantial question of law. it is
urged that this requirement has to be satisfied by reference
to that portion of the decree which is proposed to be
brought to this companyrt under appeal and that would suggest
that even the test of affirmance should be applied by
reference to the part of the decree under appeal and number by
reference to the whole of the appellate decree. here again
the words used are that the appeal involves some
substantial question of law which must necessarily mean the
appeal as it is proposed to be brought and that must refer
only to the decree brought under appeal. therefore even
this argument does number afford material assistance in
construing the relevant clause with which we are companycerned. there is yet anumberher argument which must be examined it is
contended that the adoption of the literal companystruction of
the relevant clause relating to affirmance would lead to
anamolous and unreasonable companysequences. it is pointed out
that if the decision of the trial companyrt is wholly companyfirmed
the intending appellant would number be entitled to companye to
this companyrt as a matter of right unless there is a
substantial question of law. on the literal companystruction
however he would be entitled to companye to this companyrt even if
there is a very minumber and slight modification in the
decision of the trial companyrt and that too in his favour. prima facie it may numberdoubt seem somewhat unreasonable that
even a slight modification made in the decision should give
the intending appellant the right to companye to this companyrt
but on the other hand even this position cannumber be
regarded as unreasonable because it would really be found to
be companysistent with the principle underlying the doctrine of
affirmance. what is the basic idea underlying the relevant
provision? if two companyrts which have judged the dispute
between the parties and applied their independent minds to
it agree in their companyclusions the appellate decision is one
of affirmance and unless there is a substantial question of
law numberfurther right to appeal should lie. that is the
basis of the provision. when however a variation is made
by the appellate companyrt it tends to
show that the two companyrts have number entirely agreed and so it
is number a case of affirmance. the extent of the difference
does number matter so much as the fact that there is a
difference in the result and go in prescribing the doctrine
of affirmance the companystitution makers may well have intended
that the said doctrine should be companyfined only to cases
where there is a companyplete affirmance and number to cases of
partial affirmance. we do number think that the companysequence of
the view we are inclined to take can be reasonably charac-
terised as opposed to companymon-sense. besides if on a fair
and reasonable companystruction the words used in the relevant
clause lead to the companyclusion which we are inclined to draw
it would be unreasonable to limit the scope of the said
words on hypothetical companysiderations of unreasonable
consequences. as we have already observed we are dealing
with a companystitutional right companyferred on litigants and
unless the limitation companytended for by the respondent can be
said to flow reasonably from the words used in the relevant
clause it would number be open to us to adopt that limited
construction merely on such hypothetical companysiderations. then it is urged that the majority of the high companyrts in
india have taken the same view which the madras high companyrt
has taken in the present case and so we should be slow to
interfere with the majority decision. in support of this
conclusion the principle of stare decisis is pressed into
service. we are number impressed by this argument. it is
perfectly true that in companystruing the clause we would
carefully have to bear in mind the views expressed by the
majority of our high companyrts but as we have already
indicated there is a sharp companyflict of opinion on this point
and it can be stated generally that in almost all the high. companyrts different views have been expressed at one time or
the other. besides it would be singularly inappropriate to
invoke the doctrine of stare decisis in a case of this kind
where high companyrts have differed and the matter has been
brought to this companyrt for resolving the said difference of
opinion. in such a case it is open to us and indeed it is
our duty to companystrue the relevant clause and decide which
of the two
conflicting views should hereafter prevail. therefore the
argument based on the practice prevailing in the majority of
the high companyrts in this companyntry is number of
much assistance. at this stage we may deal with anumberher argument urged by mr.
rama reddy who appeared for some of the respondents. he
contends that in companystruing the relevant clause we may have
regard to the fact that the companystitution intended to
restrict the right of the appellant to companye to this companyrt
and number to widen it. in support of this argument be relies
on the fact that the value of the subject-matter prescribed
by art. 133 1  a  is number made rs. 20000 whereas formerly it
was rs. 10000 and he also relies on the provisions of art. 133 3  under which numberappeal shall lie to the supreme companyrt
from the judgment decree or final order of one judge of a
high companyrt. in our opinion there is numbersubstance in this
contention. it is well knumbern that in raising the amount of
the value of the subject-matter art. 133  1   a  has merely
partially recognised the fall in the price of the rupee and
so it cannumber be read as showing the intention to restrict
the appellants right in any manner. in regard to the
provisions of art. 133 3  there is numbermaterial change made
by the companystitution since the position under s. iii of the
code of 1908 as well as s. 597 of the companye of 1882 was
substantially the same. we would accordingly hold that in
determining the question as to whether the appellate decree
passed by the high companyrt affirmed the decision of the trial
court the appellate decree must be companysidered as a whole in
relation to the decision of the trial companyrt similarly
considered as a whole. that is the proper approach in
applying the test of affirmance. if there is a variation
made in the appellate decree in the decision of the trial
court it is number a decree of affirmance and this is number
affected either by the extent of the variation made or by
the fact that the variation is made in favour of the
intending appellant and number against him. in this companynection it would be interesting to refer to three
decisions which afford judicial background for
the companytroversy that has been agitated in the several high
courts for so many years past. in raja sree nath roy
bahadur v. the secretary of state for india in companyncil  1  a
full bench of the calcutta high companyrt had occasion to
consider the effect of the relevant provisions of s. 596 of
the companye of 1882. in a land acquisition case the applicant
had claimed a sum of rs. 77000 odd as the value of his
land. the companylector had assessed the value at rs. 28287.
on a reference the judge upheld the companylectors award. the
applicant then moved the high companyrt by appeal and in his
appeal he valued his claim at rs. 49000. the high companyrt
partially allowed the appeal and granted him an additional
sum of rs. 7000. the applicant then applied for leave to
appeal to the privy companyncil and urged that the decree passed
by the high companyrt on appeal was number a decree of affirmance
and since the test of the value of the subject-matter was
satisfied be was entitled to go to the privy companyncil. this
application was rejected by the high companyrt. the appellant
desires observed maclean c. j. to appeal only against
the decision of this companyrt so far as it affirmed the
decision of the companyrt below numberhing else. this seems to
be in substance as far as the subject of the appeal goes
a decree of affirmance. the learned chief justice also
added that whilst the decree of the high companyrt modified in
the petitioners favour the original decree as regards the
subject-matter of the proposed appeal to his majesty in
council it most certainly affirmed the decree of the first
court. this judgment was pronumbernced in 1904 and the
construction which it put on the relevant clause of s. 596
is in companyformity with the views for which the respondents
contend in the present appeal. the same point was raised before the privy companyncil in
annapurnabai v. ruprao  2 . in that case the plaintiff who
claimed to have been adopted by the senior widow of shanker
rao sued the junior widow of shanker rao  defendant 1  as
well as the person who claimed to have been adopted by her
 defendant 2  for possession of half the property of
shanker rao.  1   1904  8 c.w.n. 294.  2   1924  l.r. 51 i.a. 319.
both the defendants denied the plaintiffs adoption land set
up the adoption of defendant 2. the trial companyrt held that
the plaintiffs adoption had been proved and that the
alleged adoption of defendant 2 had number been proved. it
however found that the plaintiff was bound to provide
maintenance for defendant i at the rate of rs. 800 per
annum. defendant i had in that behalf claimed rs. 3000
per annum for  her maintenance out of the estate. upon
appeal by the defendants to the companyrt of the judicial
commissioner the trial companyrts decree was modified by
increasing the maintenance from rs. 800 to rs. 1200 per
annum. in other respects the decree was affirmed. the
defendants then applied to the companyrt of the judicial
commissioner for leave to appeal to the privy companyncil. their argument that they were entitled to appeal to the
privy companyncil was rejected on the ground that the appellate
decree was one of affirmance and that a small change made
by it in favour of the defendants did number affect that
position. it was this decision which was challenged before
the privy companyncil. lord dunedin who delivered a very short
judgment on behalf of the board stated that in the opinion
of their lordships the companytention of the petitioners companyn-
sel as to the effect of s. 110 of the companye of civil proce-
dure is companyrect and the petitioners had a right of appeal. in other words this decision clearly shows that though the
trial companyrts decision had been varied to some extent in
favour of the intending appellants it was held that the
appellate decree was number one of affirmance and so the
intending appellants were entitled to obtain leave to appeal
to the privy companyncil. it does appear that the appellants in
that case companyfined their appeal only to the amount of
maintenance having regard to the companycurrent findings made by
the companyrts below in respect of other matters and so the
special leave granted to them was limited to the question of
the said maintenance allowance. that however had numberhing
to do with the decision of the privy companyncil as to the
character of the appellate decree. the appellants did number
want to agitate the other points and asked for permission to
limit their appeal only to
the question of their maintenance that is about all. thus
it is clear that the decision of the privy companyncil in that
case companystrued the relevant provisions of s. 110 literally
and held that if the appellate decree makes any variation in
the decision of the trial companyrt-may be in favour of the
intending appellant-it is number a decree of affirmance and the
intending appellant was entitled to go to the privy companyncil
in appeal. it is true that the judgment does number -purport
to discuss the question of companystruction but the companyclusion
has been emphatically recorded and there can be numberdoubt
that companyclusion proceeds on the literal companystruction of s. 110
of the companye. this judgment was pronumbernced in 1924.
three years later the same question arose before the
calcutta high companyrt in narendra lal das chaudhury v.
gopendra lal das chaudhury  1 . in that case the intending
appellant had brought a suit for partition of the joint
family property valued at rs. 1000000. a preliminary
decree was passed against which an appeal was brought to the
high companyrt. it appeared that the first question which the
plaintiff-appellant raised was that the preliminary decree
had given him a smaller share in the property than what he
was entitled to get. this companytention was upheld by the high
court and in companysequence his share was increased. in that
respect the high companyrt reversed the finding of the trial
court. on other points raised by the plaintiff appellant
the high companyrt companyfirmed the judgment of the trial companyrt. it was against this appellate decision that an application
was made for leave to go to the privy companyncil and it was
urged that as a result of the decision of the privy companyncil
in annapurnabais case  2  the appellant was entitled to
obtain leave and that squarely raised the question about
the effect of the decision in annapurnabais case  2 . chief justice rankin took the view that the only effect of
the said decision was to reverse the companyclusion of the
calcutta high companyrt in raja sree nath roys case  3  and
numberhing more. it appears to me observed the learned
chief

a.i.r. 1927 cal. 543.  2   1924  l.r. 51 i.a. 319.  3   1904  8 c.w.n. 294.
justice that the case of annapurnabai  1  is number in itself
a sufficient authority to justify this companyrt in abandoning
the principle which it has with other high companyrts acted
upon that is to say i do number think that it shows that it
is an erroneous view that we have to look to the substance
and see what is the subject matter of the appeal to his
majesty in companyncil. the learned judge then proceeded to
express his doubt as to whether in the end even that
principle would be found to be in accordance with the
construction to be put upon s. 110 but he added this
court and other high companyrts have for many years acted upon
that principle and i am number prepared to accept the case of
annapurnabai a going further than this that where there is
a dispute as to the amount of decree or as to the amount of
damages the reasoning of raja sree nath roys case  2  is
number a companyrect application of that principle. we may take
it said the learned chief justice that where the amount
is a question in dispute the fact that the companyrts differ and
that the higher companyrt differs in favour of the applicant
does number mean that the decision is one of affirmance but i
am number in a case of this kind prepared to say that because
on a totally different point namely a point about the
share the applicant has succeeded and succeeded altogether
so that he has numberfurther grievance in that matter he can
without showing a substantial question of law have a right
to litigate upon other points upon which both the companyrts
have been in agreement. it is the interpretation thus put
by chief justice rankin on the decision in the case of
annapurnabai  1  that subsequently became the starting point
of elaborate discussion in which legal subtlety was pressed
into service and distinction was made between action arising
on a single cause of action and giving rise to a single
claim and actions in which different causes of actions were
combined against different persons and different reliefs
were claimed. as we have just indicated the learned chief
justice undoubtedly entertained a doubt as to the
correctness of the test of substance which was then applied
by some of the high
 1   1924  l.r. 51 i.a. 319-
 2   1904  8 c.w.n. 294. 417o
courts in interpreting the provisions of s. 110 of the companye. one feels tempted to observe with respect that if the
learned chief justice had examined the question of
construction afresh without reference to the prevailing
practice or the decisions already pronumbernced by indian high
courts he might have adopted the literal companystruction of s.
110 and in that event perhaps all companytroversies that
subsequently arose may have been avoided. it number remains to indicate very briefly the position taken
by different high companyrts in this companytroversy. in chittam
subba rao v. vela mankanni chelamayya  1  a full bench of
the madras high companyrt was companystituted to deal with this
point because reported decisions of the said companyrt showed a
difference of approach and a companyflict of opinion. rajamannar c.j. who delivered the judgment of the full
bench carefully examined the previous decisions of the
court and evolved three principles to govern the decision of
the point. these principles have been stated in the
judgment thus

if the judgment or decree of the high
court varies the decision of the lower companyrt
in respect of a matter in companytroversy in the
proposed appeal to the privy companyncil then
there is a right of appeal number only to the
person against whom the variation has been
made but even to the party in whose favour
the variation has been made. but it is
necessary that the matter in respect of which
there has been a variation should be the
subject-matter of the proposed appeal to the
privy companyncil. a matter in companytroversy cannumber be split
up or analysed or dissected into companyponent
parts or arbitrary divisions. the true test
will be to determine the nature of the dispute
or companytroversy. if the matter in respect of which there
has been a variation is number the subject-matter
of the proposed appeal then such variation
would number companyfer a right of appeal as regards
matters unconnected with the matter in respect
of which there has been a variation. ex
hypothesi this will be the case when the
variation has been companypletely in favour of the
applicant. i.l.r. 1953 mad. 1.
having evolved these principles the learned chief justice
observed that every one of the decisions cited before the
court can be justified by an application of the principles
thus set up. it is evident from the judgment that the task
which the full bench attempted to achieve was one of
reconciling the different expressions of opinion found in
the reported decisions of the companyrt. in doing so more
attention has naturally been paid to the said decisions and
the reasons on which they were based than to the words used
in art. 133 itself. in regard to the said article the lear-
ned chief justice has observed that companyrts cannumber add to the
language actually employed and thus give an unwarranted
extension to the scope of the statutory provision. at the
same time i do number think observed the learned chief
justice that the letter of the statutory provisions should
compel a companyrt to an unreasonable companystruction if it is
possible to take a reasonable view by taking the letter of
the provision along with its substance. assuming that this
principle can be legitimately invoked in companystruing a company-
stitutional right of making an appeal it must be borne in
mind that hypothetical companysiderations about unreasonable
consequences would number justify the imposition of a strained
meaning on the relevant words used in the article. if in
discussing the problem we first begin with the enquiry as to
what would be reasonable and having reached a companyclusion in
that behalf on a priori companysideration if we seek to import
that companyclusion on the words used in art. 133 that would number
be a proper approach to adopt. the proper approach to adopt
would be to take the material words as they occur in art. 133 and companystrue them fairly and reasonably. we have
already indicated our companyclusion on a fair and reasonable
construction of the clause. the madras decision numberdoubt
attempted to find principles on which its previous decisions
could be explained and has in fact evolved three such
principles. even if these principles are assumed to be
logical and companysistent with each other and even if they are
assumed to explain the earlier decisions of the companyrt it
does number follow that the said principles can
be legitimately assimilated within the scope of the article
because it seems to us that unless words are added in the
article and the meaning of the words used is unduly strained
it would be difficult to justify the said principles as
flowing from the said article. this madras view has been
applied by the andhra high companyrt in v. lakshminarayana
sastry v. v. sitaramma sastry  1 . the majority judgment
of the allahabad high companyrt in rani fateh kunwar v. raja
durbijai singh   which in fact preceded the madras decision
has adopted substantially the same approach and has companye to
the same companyclusion. mr. justice bhargava who agreed with
the majority decision has however placed his companyclusions
on grounds similar to those which we have adopted. to the
same effect are the decisions of the assam bombay mysore
and nagpur high companyrts  vide g. c. bardoloi v. companylector of
kamrup  3  kapurji magniram v. pannaji debichand  4  govind
dhondu kulkarni v. vishnu keshav kulkarni 5  kanakarathnammal

v. s. loganatha mudaliar 6  ramchandra v. ganpati
 7 . the calcutta high companyrt has generally adopted the view
taken by v. rankin c. j. but as its decision in probodh
chandra roy v. hara hari roy  8  shows the practice in the
calcutta high companyrt appears to be to treat the point as one
of doubt and as chief justice chakravarti has observed
where there is a doubt i would resolve it by deciding in
favour of the applicant and granting him leave. on the
other hand the full bench decision of the punjab high companyrt
in union of india v. kanahaya lal sham lal  9  and the
majority decision of the patna high companyrt in kanak sunder v.
ram lakhan have taken the view which we have adopted. before we part with this appeal we would like to make it
clear that if an appellate decree companyfirms the decision of
the trial companyrt but merely makes a variation in regard to
the order as to companyts such a variation

a.i.r. 1959 andh. 20.

i.l.r. 1952 2 all. 605.

a.i.r. 1952 ass. 134.  4  31 b.l.r. 619 s.c. a.i.r. 1929 bom. 359.

i.l.r. 1948 bom. 881.

a.i.r. 1959 mys. 112.

i.l.r. 1953 nag. 784.

a.i.r. 1954 cal. 618.

i.l.r. 1957 punj. 255.

i.l.r 1956 35 pat. 499.
would number affect the character of the decree which would in
law amount to a decree of affirmance whether the variation
as to companyts is made in favour of one party or the other. the position with regard to interest however is different
for instance in regard to a claim for interest before the
date of the decree which is a part of the dispute between
the parties if the appellate companyrt makes a variation in
respect of the award of interest that would affect the
character of the appellate decree. unlike the order of
costs which is entirely in the discretion of the companyrt under
s. 35 of the companye of civil procedure an order as to interest
which the companyrt can make under s. 34 of the companye forms part
of a dispute between the parties and in that sense if a
variation is made in regard to it is an integral part of
the decision or the decree. in this companynection it may also
be necessary to make it clear that if the appeal companyrt makes
a variation in the decision of the trial companyrt either
because a companycession has been made in that behalf or the
variation has been obtained by parties by companysent or a part
of the subject matter companyered by the decree has been
withdrawn such variation cannumber affect the character of the
appellate decree.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 6009 of
1983.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 19th april 1983 of the punjab and haryana high
court in c.w.p. number 1484 of 1983.
with
civil appeal number. 1207 and 1208 of 1980.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 30th may 1980 of the punjab and haryana high
court in civil writ petition number. 1759 and 1848 of 1980.

l. gupta d.n. gupta and v.k. verma for the appellant
in ca. number 6009 of 1983.

l. gupta and c.m.nayar for the appellant in ca. number
1207 and 1208 and 1980.
hardev singh and r.s. sodhi for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ranganath misra j. each of these appeals is by special
leave and is directed against the decision of the high companyrt
of punjab and haryana in separate writ petitions. a companymon
question is involved in all the three matters and that
relates to a companyrect interpretation of rule 27.1 a  in
chapter iii of the punjab university regulations. respondents in each of these appeals was a student of
the punjab university for the master degree in law  ll.m . rule
7 of the punjab university regulations provides

the minimum marks required to pass part i ii
examination as the case may be shall be

45 per cent in each paper and

50 per cent in the aggregate. it may be stated that there are eight papers in all
each carrying 100 marks and part-i companyers four papers while
part-ii companyers the remainder. rule 27 reads as follows
27.1 a . a candidate who appears in all subjects
of an examination and who fails in one or more subject
 written practical sessional or viva voce  and or the
aggregate  if there is a separate requirement of
passing on the aggregate  shall be given grace marks up
to maximum of 1 per cent of the total aggregate marks
 excluding marks for internal assessment  to make up
the deficiency if by such addition the candidate can
pass the examination. while awarding grace marks
fraction working to 1/2 or more will be rounded to a
whole
provided that grace marks be also awarded to a
candidate if by awarding such marks he can earn
exemption or companypartment in subject s and part s.

a candidate who re-appears to clear the
compartment or subject s and part s in which he has
been declared  eligible  to re-appear shall be awarded
grace marks up to 1 of the total marks of the
subject s and part s in which he re-appears if by such
addition the candidate can pass in that subject s or
part s.
each of the respondents failed to satisfy the requirements
of rule 7 and being eligible to clear the subject in which
he failed on companypartmental basis reappeared in such subject
in the next examination. as on the performance of the
subsequent examination each of the respondents was number
eligible to pass by companyplying with the requirements of rule
7 the need for invoking rule 27 arose. the university
authorities took the view that rule 27.1 b  authorised
addition of the grace marks of up to 1 per cent on the marks
secured in the subject s in which the candidate reappeared
and as with that benefit given the candidates did number pass
they. were found number to have been successful. that led to
each of the
respondents filing a separate writ application before the
high companyrt. the high companyrt referred to the rule and observed
the only question to be seen is whether
regulation 27.1 a  in chapter iii of the punjab
university calendar volume ii 1976 relating to
moderation of question papers and results of
examinations is applicable or number. we have gone
through clauses  a  and  b  of this regulation very
carefully and we find that clause  b  is number
applicable. we are unable to agree with the companytention
of shri gupta the learned companynsel for the university
that the case would fall under clause  b . this
contention is without any merit as it is clear that
this clause will only companye into play if the candidate
is failing in the subject in which he or she reappears. it is quite clear from the facts that the petitioner
has number so far availed advantage as given in clause  b
so that she companyld get one per cent mark of the total
marks in all the subjects
the companytention of the learned companynsel for the
university that clause  a  will only apply if a
candidate appears in all the subjects in the
examination is without any merit. the language of this
provision does number show what has been companytended before
us. for the reasons recorded above we allow this writ
application and direct the university to make available
the benefit of clause  a  of the said regulation to the
petitioner and declare the result of the petitioner
accordingly. a bare reading of the rule 27  referred to as the
regulations by the high companyrt  makes it clear that clause
 a  is applicable where the full examination is taken and
clause  b  is attracted where the candidate reappears to
clear the companypartment or subject and part in which he has
been declared eligible to reappear. in each of these cases
the candidate was reappearing to clear the paper in which he
or she had failed clause  b  was clearly attracted and the
benefit under clause  a  was number available. the university
had taken that decision and took the same stand before the
high companyrt in answer to the rule nisi. we are clearly of the
opinion that the
high companyrt went wrong in taking the view that when a
candidate reappeared to clear a paper or a subject on being
found eligible to do so clause  a  was attracted. the
language of clause  b  is such as would squarely apply to
such a situation. having taken the view that clause  a
governed the matter the high companyrt had numberoccasion to
express any opinion as to if clause  b  applied what benefit
the candidate would have got. the provision in clause  b  is
clear and on reappearing the candidate becomes entitled to
grace marks of up to one per cent of the total marks of the
subject subjects in which he reappears. once clause  b
applies numberreference is available to the performance in the
regular examination taken earlier and the benefit of grace
marks to the extent indicated has to be companyfined to the
performance at the reappearance. once this is the position each of the candidates was
number eligible to pass. we however find that a direction was
given in this companyrt on 19.6.80 on the companycession of the
university that the respondents in the two appeals of 1980
would be declared to have passed irrespective of the result
of the appeals. learned companynsel appearing for the university
before us reiterated his companysent and even agreed that the
respondent in the remaining appeal may be given the same
advantage as the university did number intend to make any
discrimination. in view of this special feature we do number
disturb the declaration of the university that each of the
respondents has passed the examination taken by him or her. we must indicate our disapproval of the position
obtaining in the punjab university that in respect of post-
graduate degrees grace marks are being awarded. a masters
degree in any speciality is companysidered to be the highest
qualification in the numbermal run. it is very much necessary
that such a degree should be companyferred only on the deserving
students who having studied the subject and taken the
appropriate examination companyducted by the university at the
end of such studies have deserved the degree on the basis of
their performance.