civil original jurisdiction writ petition  civil
number. 3531 to 3534 of 1983.  under article 32 of the companystitution
with
writ petition  civil  number. 4831 to 4833 of 1983.  under article 32 of the companystitution
and
writ petition  civil  number 13243 of 1983
 under article 32 of the companystitution

a. bobde a. k. sanghi ms. amaljit chauhan and smt. b. bobde for the petitioners. k. garg for the petitioner in writ petition number
13243 of 1983.

parasaran attorney general r. d. agarwal and r. n.
poddar for the respondent. the order of the companyrt was delivered by
chinnappa reddy j. in view of our decision in d.s. nakara v. union of india 1  1983 1 scc 305 and for the
reasons mentioned by the allahabad high companyrt in writ
petition number 3281 of 1979 dated 2.3.1983 in the case of
bidhubhushan malik and others v. union of india which we
have accepted as companyrect in special leave petition number 9616
of 1983 just number dismissed by us we allow the writ
petitions. the judges of the high companyrt and of the supreme
court will be entitled to the pensionary benefits under the
amended act of 1976 irrespective of the dates of their
retirement. they will be so entitled with effect from
1.10.1974. arrears of pension calculated under the
provisions of the new act will be paid to those to whom it
is due within four months from today. in the case of judges
who have died after 1.10.1974 the amounts due will be paid
to the legal heirs of the judges within four months from
today. the family pension due to the widows will be
calculated under the provisions of the 1976 amending act and
paid to them.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 1930-33
of 1989.
from the judgment and order dated 24.9.87 of the patna
high companyrt in c.w.c. number. 489501502 and 1173 of 1982  r . ramaswamy additional solicitor general girish
chandra and c.v.s. rao for the appellants. c. bhandare r.s. meratia s.s. johar and a. mariarpu-
tham for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
kuldip singh j. the companyl resources in the companyntry have
been brought under state ownership and companytrol by the companyk-
ing companyl mines  nationalisation  act 1972  hereinafter
called the companyking act  and the companyl mines  nationalisa-
tion  act 1973  hereinafter called the companyl act . these
acts companypletely divest the ownership rights in the mines
from the owners to the central government. the acts provide
for payment of specified amount to each of the owners in
lieu of
take-over. out of the said amount the claims of the credi-
tors of the owner and other liabilities against him are to
be satisfied and the balance if any is to be paid to the
owner. the acts further provide for accrual of interest on
the payable amount for the procedural-period. section 18 5
of the companyl act and section 21 5  of the companyking act provide
that the interest accruing on the amount shall enure to the
benefit of the owners of companyl mines. the short question for companysideration in these appeals is
whether the amount of interest which accrues under the act
is to be paid in its entirety to the owner or the same is
also available along with the principal amount for disburse-
ment to the claimants of the owner. the provisions of the companyking act and the companyl act are
identical. both the acts were enacted with the same object
and purport one relating to the companyking companyl mines and the
other to the companyl mines. the learned companynsel at the hearing referred to the companyl
act. we may briefly numberice the scheme of the said act. section 2 gives definitions. section 3 transfers the rights
title and interest of owners in relation to the companyl mines
and vests tile same in the central government. section 5
empowers the central government to direct vesting of such
rights in a government companypany. section 6 makes the vesting
of all properties in the central government free from mort-
gage charge lien or any other incumbrance. section 7
provides that the central government or government companypany
shall number be liable for liabilities incurred by the owners
prior to the take-over. under section 8 the owner of every
coal mine shall be given by the central government in cash
and in the manner specified under the act the amount men-
tioned in the schedule to the act. section 9 2  provides for
payment of simple interest at the rate of 4 from the date
on which the companyl act received the assent of the president
upto the date when the amount is paid by the central govern-
ment to the companymissioner. section 17 provides for appoint-
ment of companymissioner of payments by the central government
for the purpose of disbursing the amounts payable to the
owner of each companyl mine. section 18 1  lays down that the
central government shall within 30 days from the specified
date pay in cash to the companymissioner for payment to the
owner of a companyl mine an amount specified in the schedule
and also other amount payable to the owner under section 9.
section 18 2  provides further amount due to the owner in
lieu of management of the companyl mine by the central govern-
ment and simple interest at the rate of 4 on such amount. under section 18 3  a deposit account is to be opened by the
central govern-
ment in favour of the companymissioner in the public account of
india and every amount paid under the act to the companymission-
er has to be deposited by him to the credit of the said
deposit account which is to be operated by the companymissioner. section 18 4  directs the companymissioner to maintain separate
records in respect of each companyl mine in relation to which
payments have been made to him under the act. section 18 5
provides that interest accruing on the amounts standing to
the credit of the deposit account shall enure to the benefit
of the owners of companyl mines and shall also be payable to the
commissioner in addition to the sum referred to in sub-
section  1 . under section 20 every person having a claim
against the owner of a companyl mine has to prefer such claim
before the companymissioner within thirty days from the speci-
fied date. sections 21 and 22 give first priority to the
claims to arrears of wages provident fund pension fund
gratuity fund or any other fund established for the welfare
of the persons employed by the owner of a companyl mine. next
come the secured creditors of the owners. under section 23
the companymissioner adjudicates the claims and can accept or
reject the same. section 24a provides that where any amount
is payable in respect of a claim admitted under the act the
interest payable on such amount for any period shall be at
such rate number exceeding the rate of interest accruing on any
amount deposited by the companymissioner under section 18.
finally under section 26 if out of the moneys paid to the
commissioner in relation to a companyl mine there is a balance
left after .meeting the liabilities of all the secured and
unsecured creditors he shall disburse such balance to the
owner of such companyl mine. relevant provisions of the companyl act are reproduced hereinaf-
ter. section 3--acquisition of rights of owners in
respect of companyl mines-- 1  on the appointed
day the right title and interest of the
owners in relation to the companyl mines specified
in the schedule shall stand transferred to
and shall vest absolutely in the central
government free from all incumbrances. section 8--payment of amount to owners of
coal mines 1  the owner of every companyl mine or
group of companyl mines specified in the second
column of the schedule shall be given by the
central government in cash and in the manner
specified in chapter vi for the vesting in
it under section 3 of the right title and
interest of the amount specified against it in
the companyresponding entry in the fifth
column of the schedule. section 17--commissioner of payments to be
appointed- 1  for the purpose of disbursing
the amount payable to the owner of each companyl
mine or group of companyl mines the central
government shall appoint such person as it may
think fit to be the companymissioner of payments. section 18--payment by the central government
to the companymissioner.-- 1  the central govern-
ment shall within thirty days from the speci-
fied date pay in cash to the companymissioner
for payment to the owner of a companyl mine an
amount equal to the amount specified against
the companyl mine in the schedule and shall also
pay to the companymissioner such sums as may be
due to the owner of a companyl mine under section
9.

in addition to the sum referred
to in sub-section  1  the central government
shall pay in cash to the companymissioner such
amount as may become due to the owner of a
coal mine in relation to the period during
which the management of the companyl mine remains
vested in the central government and simple
interest at the rate of four per cent per
annum on such amount for the period companymencing
on the 1st day of july 1975 and ending on the
date of payment of such amount to the companymis-
sioner. a deposit account shall be
opened by the central government in favour of
the companymissioner in the public account of
india and every amount paid under this act to
the companymissioner shall be deposited by him to
the credit of the said deposit account in the
public account of india and thereafter the
said deposit account shall be operated by the
commissioner. separate records shall be main-
tained by the companymissioner in respect of each
coal mine in relation to which payments have
been made to him under this act. amended  5  interest accruing on the amounts
standing to the credit of the deposit account
referred to in sub-section  3  shall enure to
the benefit of the owners of companyl mines and
shall also be payable to the companymissioner in
addition
to the sum referred to in sub-section  1 . unamended  5  interest accruing on the amounts
standing to the credit of the deposit account
referred to in subsection  3  shall enure to
the benefit of the owners of the companyl mines. reference in this section to the owner
of a companyl mine shall in relation to a
group of companyl mines specified in the schedule
be companystrued as references to the owner of
that group of companyl mines. section 24--disbursement of money by the
commissioner to claimants--where after meet-
ing the claims admitted by him of secured
creditors and unsecured creditors having
priority under sub-section  2  of section 22
the total amount of claims of other unsecured
creditors admitted by the companymissioner does
number exceed the total amount of the money cred-
ited to the account of a companyl mine every such
admitted claim shall be paid in full and the
balance if any shall be paid to the owner
but where such amount is insufficient to meet
in full the total amount of the admitted
claims all such claims shall abate in equal
proportions and be paid accordingly . section 24a--interest on admitted
claims--numberwithstanding any award decree or
order of any companyrt tribunal or other authori-
ty passed before the appointed day in rela-
tion to any companyl mine where any amount is
payable in respect of a claim admitted under
this act the interest payable on such amount
for any period after the appointed day shall
be at such rate number exceeding the rate of
interest accruing on any amount deposited by
the companymissioner under section 18.
section 26--disbursement of amounts to the
owners of companyl mines-- 1  if out of the moneys
paid to him in relation to a companyl mine or
group of companyl mines specified in the second
column of the schedule there is a balance
left after meeting the liabilities of all the
secured and unsecured creditors the companymis-
sioner shall disburse such balance to the
owner of such companyl mine or group of companyl
mines. the scheme of the companyl act and the bare reading of its
provisions make it clear that the companymissioner has to adju-
dicate the claims of creditors of the mine owners in accord-
ance with the priorities. the claims accepted by the companymis-
sioner are to be satisfied out of the amount payable to the
mine owners and the balance left after meeting the claims of
all the secured and unsecured creditors is to be paid to
the owners of the companyl mines. the high companyrt has accepted the companytention of the mine
owners and has held that the interest accrued under the companyl
act cannumber be made available to the companymissioner for meeting
the claims of the creditors of the mine owner or to satisfy
their other liabilities. according to the high companyrt whole
of the interest amount is to be exclusively given to the
mine owners and the claims and liabilities are to be satis-
fied only out of the principal amount payable to the mine-
owners under the companyl act. to support these companyclusions the
high companyrt has given three reasons which we may presently
examine. the high companyrts companyclusions are primarily based on the
interpretation of section 18 5  of the companyl act. the high
court has quoted the meaning of words enure and benefit
from various dictionaries. numberdictionary or any out-side
assistance is needed to understand the meaning of these
simple words in the companytext and scheme of the companyl act. the
interest has to enure to the benefit of the owners of the
coal mines. the claims before the companymissioner under the
coal act are from the creditors of the owners and the li-
abilities sought to be discharged are also of the owners of
the companyl mines. when the debts are paid and the liabilities
discharged it is only the owners of companyl mines who are
benefited. taking away the interest amount by the owners
without discharging their debts and liabilities would be
unreasonable. they have only to adopt delaying tactics to
postpone the disbursement of claims and companysequently earn
more interest. due to such delay the owner would get huge
amount of interest though ultimately he may number get a penny
out of principal amount on the final settlement of claims. it would amount to companyferring unjust benefit on the owners
which can never be the intention of the parliament. we do
number agree with the interpretation given by the high companyrt
and hold that the interest accruing under the companyl act is
the money paid to the companymissioner in relation to the companyl
mine and the same has to be utilised by the companymissioner in
meeting the claims of the creditors and discharging other
liabilities in accordance with the provisions of the companyl
act. the high companyrt numbericed that apart from providing priorities
for
claims the parliament has also indicated the accounts from
which such claims are to be satisfied. according to the high
court since numbermention has been made therein with regard to
the recovery of any amount of claim out of the interest the
same cannumber be used for that purpose and has to be exclu-
sively paid to the owners. we do number agree with the reason-
ing. under section 18 5  of the companyl act the interest accru-
ing on the amount standing to the credit of the deposit
account shall also be payable to the companymissioner in addi-
tion to the sum referred to in sub-section  1  of section

section 26 further provides that out of the moneys paid
to the companymissioner in relation to the companyl mine if there is
a balance left after meeting the liabilities of all the
secured and unsecured creditors such balance shall be
disbursed to the owner of the companyl mine. it cannumber be dis-
puted that the interest paid to the companymissioner under
section 18 5  is money paid to him in relation to a companyl
mine and as such it has to be utilised in meeting the claims
of the creditors of the mine owners and their other liabili-
ties. even otherwise interest amount in the present companytext
has numberseparate entity. as the lamb belongs to the owner of
the sheep the interest goes with the principal. the inter-
est accrued under the companyl act is thus part of the kitty
out of which the claims and liabilities are to be met. the high companyrt has further held that under section 26 of
the companyl act moneys paid to the companymissioner in relation to
a companyl mine do number include the money accrued by way of
interest. there is numberbasis for this interpretation. the
plain reading of section 26 read with section 18 5  of the
coal act makes it clear that moneys paid to the companymissioner
in relation to a companyl mine are to be used for satisfying the
debts and liabilities. interest amount accrued under the
coal act is undoubtedly money in relation to companyl mine and
as such it squarely companyes within the ambit of section 26 of
the companyl act. the amended section 18 5  of the companyl act which escaped
the numberice of the high companyrt provides that the amount of
interest accruing on the amounts standing to the credit of
the deposit account is also payable to the companymissioner. section 22 3  of the companyl act makes the assets in the hands
of companymissioner available for satisfying the debts in order
of priorities. the assets of the erstwhile owner lying in
the hands of the companymissioner of payment would include the
interest which has been paid to the companymissioner under
section 18 5 . similarly section 24 of the companyl act says
that unsecured creditors will be paid out of the money
credited to the account of companyl mine. moneys credited to the
account of companyl mine also include interest. it is thus clear
from the scheme and plain reading of various provisions of
the
coal act that the interest amount has to be made available
to the companymissioner to meet the debts and liabilities. we may refer to section 24a of the companyl act which fixes
the maximum interest payable to the successful claimants. it
is provided that interest shall be paid at such rate number
exceeding the rate of interest accruing on any amount depos-
ited by the companymissioner under section 18. had the parlia-
ment intended to give interest to the owners there would
have numbernecessity for fixing the maximum limit of interest
payable to the claimant with reference to the rate of inter-
est accruing to the scheduled amount. the two acts being identical whatever we have said about
the companyl act is equally applicable to the companyking act.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1314 of
1978.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 23rd march 1978 of the allahabad high companyrt in
civil revision number 1906 for 1976.
with
civil appeal number 2436 of 1981
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 20th august 1981 of the allahabad high companyrt in
civil writ petition number 6909 of 1979.
and
civil appeal number 1710 of 1981
from the judgment and decree dated the 13th march 1981
of the allahabad high companyrt in writ petition number 6167 of
1979.
and
special leave petition  civil  number 3573 of 1979
from the judgment and order dated the 3rd january 1979
of the allahabad high companyrt in civil revision number 3714 of
1978.

l.sanghi mrs. a. verma and d.n. mishra for the
appellant in ca. number 1314 of 1978.

p. goyal s.markandeya and c.k.ratnaparkhi for the
respondent in ca. 1314 of 1978.

k. srivastava for the appellant in ca. 1710/80. b. mehrotra for respondent in ca. 1710/80. pramod swarup and mrs. s. markandeya for the appellant
in ca. 2436 of 1980.

n. kacker and k.k gupta for the respondent in ca. 2436 of 1980.

r.mridul praveen jain and k.b. rohatgi for the
petitioner in slp  civil  number 3573 of 1979

h. dhebar for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
misra j. the first two appeals by special leave and the
third by certificate and the special leave petition raise a
common question of law and therefore we propose to dispose
of them by a companymon judgment. the pattern of facts in all these cases is similar. we
therefore set out the facts of civil appeal number 1314 of 1978
to bring out the point for companysideration in these matters. the appellant om prakash gupta is a tenant of a shop on
a monthly rent of rs. 150/-.the respondent-landlord filed a
suit for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the

p. urban buildings  regulation of letting rent and
eviction  act 1972  act 13 of 1972 and hereinafter referred
to as the act  did number apply to the shop and the tenant
was liable to eviction. the judge small causes companyrt
mainpuri decreed the suit on the finding inter alia that the
construction of the shop in suit was companypleted in the year
1967 and
that ten years having number elapsed since then the provisions
of the act did number apply to the case. the defendant went up
in revision under section 25 of the provincial small causes
courts act against the judgment and decree of the trial
court but the same was substantially dismissed. the
defendant thereupon filed a revision under section 115 of
the civil procedure companye in the high companyrt which came up for
hearing before a learned single judge who remitted the
following issue to the trial companyrt
on what date was the companystruction of the building
in dispute companypleted within the meaning of section 2
 2  of the u.p. urban buildings  regulation of letting
rent and eviction  act 1972 and deemed to have been
completed as companytemplated by explanation i  a
thereto. the judge small causes companyrt by his order dated 26th of
numberember 1977 returned the following finding
the companystruction of the disputed shop will be
deemed to have been companypleted on the date of the first
assessment i.e. 1.4.68 within the meaning of section 2
 2  of the u.p. urban buildings act 1972.
the finding returned by the trial companyrt was sought to
be challenged on behalf of the tenant on the ground that the
date of occupation should be taken to be the date of
completion of the companystruction of the shop and number the date
of the first assessment. in tilak raj v. sardar devendra
singh 1  a learned single judge of the same high companyrt had
the occasion to companysider section 2  2  of the act. he held
it is apparent from this provision that for
purposes of this act a building is to be deemed to be
constructed if it is subject to assessment on the
date with effect from which the first assessment is
made. it is immaterial whether the building was
constructed actually prior to that date or it had companye
into occupation prior to that date. the law recognised
for the purposes of this act the date of assessment as
the date of the companypletion of the building. there is
thus numbererror in the judgment of the companyrt below. the learned single judge before whom the revision in
the instant case came up for hearing doubted the companyrectness
of the above decision. he therefore referred the case to a
division bench. there is numberdispute that the first assessment of the
shop took place on 1st of april 1968. it is also number in
dispute that the shop in question was occupied by the
defendant on 16th of june 1967 and prior to his occupation
the shop was in occupation of anumberher tenant for about a
month and a half. the appellant sought the benefit of
section 39 of the act on the ground that if the date of
occupation was taken to be the date of the companypletion of the
construction of the shop then ten years having elapsed
during the pendency of the revision before the high companyrt
the act would be applicable. the division bench however
over-ruled the companytention of the appellant and held that the
construction of the shop in question would be deemed to have
been companypleted on 1st of april 1968 and therefore the act
would number be applicable to the building till the date of the
decision of the revision on march 23 1968. the defendant
undaunted by the failure came to this companyrt to challenge the
judgment of the high companyrt. mr. g.l. sanghi senior companynsel. appearing for the
appellant strongly companytended that on a companyrect
interpretation of sub-section  2  of section 2 the act
would be applicable to the shop in question. it would be
appropriate at this stage to extract sub-section  2  of
section 2 of the act insofar as it is material for the
purposes of the case
except as provided in sub-section  5  of section
12 sub-section  1-a  of section 21 sub-section  2  of
section 24 sections 24a 24b 24c or sub-section  3
of section 29 numberhing in this act shall apply to a
building during a period of ten years from the date on
which its companystruction is companypleted
explanation i. for the purposes of this sub-
section
 a  the companystruction of a building shall be
deemed to have been companypleted on the date on
which the companypletion thereof is reported to
or otherwise recorded by the local authority
having jurisdiction and in the case of a
building subject to assessment the date on
which the first assessment thereof
comes into effect and where the said dates
are different the earliest of the said
dates and in the absence of any such report
record or assessment the date on which it is
actually occupied  number including occupation
merely for the purposes of supervising the
construction or guarding the building under
construction  for the first time
the precise companytention on behalf of the appellant is
that the exemption created by this sub-section does number
embrace buildings companystructed prior to the enforcement of
the act. in support of his companytention mr. sanghi relied
upon rattan lal shinghal v. smt. murti devi.  1  the same
contention was raised by him in that case also and a
division bench of this companyrt accepted the companytention and
held that act 13 of 1972 was prospective and applied only to
buildings brought into being de numbero after the act came into
force. in that case there is numberdiscussion except this bald
observation. this companyrt in a subsequent case ram saroop rai

lilavati 2  held to the companytrary. it is on this account
that the present appeals were referred to a larger bench. there is numberambiguity in the language of sub-section  2  of
section 2 and in the absence of any ambiguity there is no
question of taking any external aid for the interpretation
of the sub-section. in plain words the sub-section
contemplates that the act shall number apply to a building
during a period of ten years from the date on which its
construction is companypleted. it numberhere says that the building
should have been companystructed after the enforcement of the
act and to interpret it in the way the learned companynsel for
the appellant seeks to interpret it we would be adding
words to the sub-section which is number permissible. primarily the language employed is the determining factor of
the intention of the legislature. the first and primary rule
of companystruction is that the intention of the legislature
must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. the question of interpretation arises only when the language
is ambiguous and therefore capable of two interpretations. in the present case the language of sub-section  2  of
section 2 of the act is explicit and unambiguous and it is
number capable of two interpretations. as a second limb to the first argument it is companytended
that the building will be deemed to have been companystructed on
the date of occupation on 16th of june 1967 and number on the
date of the first assessment and that if this be so the
appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of
the act on the date when the revision came to be decided by
the high companyrt on 23rd of march 1978. in order to
appreciate this argument it will be expedient to refer to
explanation i to sub-section  2  of section 2 which has
already been extracted. explanation i provides that the
building shall be deemed to have been companypleted on the date
on which companypletion thereof is reported to or otherwise
recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction and
in case of a building subject to assessment the date on
which the first assessment thereof companyes into effect and
where the said dates are different the earliest of the said
dates and in the absence of any such report record or
assessment the date on which it is actually occupied for
the first time. a perusal of explanation i makes it
abundantly clear that the date of occupation would be taken
to be the date of companypletion of the companystruction only when
there is numberreport or record of the companypletion of the
construction or numberassessment thereof. if there is an
assessment as in the present case it is it will be the
date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the
date of companypletion of the companystruction and in that view of
the matter the building had number become more than ten years
old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the
high companyrt and therefore there was numberquestion of giving
the benefit of section 39 of the act to the appellant. further in order to attract section 39 the suit must
be pending on the date of companymencement of the act which is
15th of july 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present
appeal was filed on 23rd of march 1974 long after the
commencement of the act. there is yet anumberher reason why
section 39 will have numberapplication to the present case. in
view of sub-section  2  of section 2 of the act the act is
number applicable to a building which has number a standing of ten
years and if the act itself was number applicable it would be
absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable. companysidered from any angle the act has numberapplication to the
present case and the appellant companyld number be given the
benefit of section 39. the suit has therefore been rightly
decreed by the companyrts below. we find numberforce in either of the companytentions raised by
mr. sanghi. the companynsel for the appellants in the other
appeals and
the petitioner in the special leave petition adopted the
arguments of mr. sanghi. for the foregoing discussion the appeals and the
special leave petition are dismissed.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 104
of 1955.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
september 9 1953 of the patna high companyrt in jury reference
number i of 1952 arising out of the reference made on february
16 1952 by the assistant sessions judge 2nd companyrt
chapra in companynection with sessions trial number 81 of 1951.

p. verma for the appellants number. 2 and 3.

k. saran and r. c. prasad for the respondent. 1957. january 30. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
by
bhagwati j.-the appellants number. 2 and 3 who are the
surviving appellants after the death of appellant number 1
during the pendency of this appeal were charged with having
committed offences under ss. 435 and 436 of the indian penal
code and were tried by the second assistant sessions judge
of saran chapra with the aid of a jury. the jury returned
a majority verdict that both of them were guilty of the
offences under those sections. the assistant sessions judge
disagreed with the said verdict and made a reference to the
high companyrt of judicature at patna
under s. 307 of the companye of criminal procedure. the said
reference was heard by a division bench of that high companyrt. the learned judges of the high companyrt overruled the
contentions which were urged before them in regard to the
charge to the jury being defective and further held that the
reference was in the circumstances number companypetent. they
however without anything more accepted the majority verdict
and held the appellants guilty of the offences under ss. 435
and 436 of the indian penal companye and sentenced them to six
months rigorous imprisonment each. the appellants obtained
from this companyrt special leave to appeal under art. 136 of
the companystitution and hence this appeal. the facts leading up to this appeal may be shortly stated as
follows-there was a dispute between the parties as to title
to plot number 1100 of village rampur tengrahi. one kailash
rai claimed to be the owner of -that plot and also claimed
to be in possession of a palani standing in a portion of
that plot as also of a punjaul i.e. a haystack in its
vicinity. there had been proceedings under s. 144 of the
code of criminal procedure in regard to this area leading up
to a title suit being t.s. number 58/8 of 1948 /50 filed by
kailash rai against the appellants in regard to the same. a
decree had been pawed on december 16 1950 in that title
suit dismissing the claim of kailash rai. an appeal had
been filed by kailash rai against that decree and that
appeal was pending at the date of the occurrence. on march
4 1951 kailash rai was sitting in the palani and at about
3 to 4 p.m. a mob companysisting of about 100 to 125 persons
including the appellants all armed with lathes bhallas and
pharsas came to the palani and began to demolish the same. kailash rai remonstrated and the deceased appellant number 1
ordered that the palai should be set on fire. the appellant
number 2 thereupon set fire to the palani with a match stick
and the appellant number 3 set fire to the punjaul. the first
information report of this occurrence was lodged at
gopalganj police station at 8 p.m. the same night. the
officer in charge of gopalganj police station investigated
the case and
challaned the appellants charging them with having
committed offences under ss. 435 and 436 of the indian
penal companye. the companymitting companyrt found a prima facie case made out
against the appellants and sent them up for trial by the
assistant sessions judge second companyrt chapra who tried
them by a jury. the jury returned a majority verdict of
guilty against the appellants. the assistant sessions
judge however disagreed with that verdict and made a
reference to the high companyrt stating in the letter of
reference that on the evidence recorded before him the
appellants had been in possession of the palani and the
punjaul but were dispossessed of the same some time prior to
the passing of the decree in the title suit on december
161950 and were therefore justified in taking steps for
recovery of possession thereof from kailash rai on march 4
195 1 and if in that process the appellants set fire to the
palani and the punjaul they were only destroying their own
property and were number guilty of the offence of companymitting
mischief by fire as alleged by the prosecution. the
assistant sessions judge tried to analyse the working of the
minds of the jury in arriving at the verdict which they did
and though he agreed with the alleged finding of fact
reached by the jury in regard to the possession of the
palani and the punjaul disagreed with the law as allegedly
applied by the jury and therefore disagreed with the
majority verdict. when the reference was heard before the high companyrt the
counsel for the appellants only companytended that the charge
addressed by the assistant sessions judge to the jury was
defective and he did number invite the high companyrt as he should
have done to companysider the entire evidence and to acquit or
convict the appellants of the offences of which the jury
could have companyvicted them upon the charges framed and placed
before it after giving due weight to the opinions of the
learned sessions judge and the jury as required by a. 307
 3  of the companye of criminal procedure. the high companyrt
therefore only companysidered the objections which had been
urged by the learned companynsel for the appellants before it in
regard to the charge being defective and
overruled them accepted the majority verdict companyvicted the
appellants and -sentenced them as above. we are of opinion that in so doing the high companyrt was
clearly in error and acted in violation of the provisions of
s. 307  3  of the companye of criminal procedure. section 307
 3  provides-
in dealing with the case so submitted the high companyrt may
exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an
appeal and subject thereto it shall after companysidering the
entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions
of the sessions judge and the jury acquit or companyvict such
accused of any offence of which the jury companyld have
convicted him upon the charge framed and placed before it
and if it companyvicts him may pass such sentence a might
have been passed by the companyrt of sessions. we had occasion to companysider this provision in akhlakali
hayatalli v. the state of bombay 1  where we approved of the
following observations of their lordships of the privy
council in ramanugrah singh v. the emperor 2
the powers of the high companyrt in dealing with the reference
are companytained in sub-section  3 . it may exercise any of
the powers. which it might exercise upon an appeal and this
includes the power to call fresh evidence companyferred by s.

the companyrt must companysider the whole case and give due
weight to the opinions of the sessions judge and jury and
then acquit or companyvict the accused. in their lordships
view the paramount companysideration in the high companyrt must be
whether the ends of justice require that. the verdict of the
jury should be set aside. in general if the evidence is
such that it can properly support a verdict either of
guilty or. number guilty according to the view taken of it by
the trial companyrt and if the jury take one view of the
evidence and the judge thinks that they should have taken
the other the view of the jury must prevail since they are
the judges of fact. in such a case a reference is number
justified and it is only by accepting their view that the
high companyrt can give due weight to the opinion of the jury. it however
 i  1954 s.c.r. 435. 442.

a.i.r. 1946 p.c. 151 154.
the high companyrt companysiders that upon the evidence no
reasonable body- of men companyld have reached the companyclusion
arrived at by the jury then the reference was justified and
the ends of justice required that the verdict be
disregarded. this wag pronumbernced by us to be the companyrect method of
approach in a reference under s. 307 of the companye of criminal
procedure. it was incumbent on the high companyrt when the
reference was heard by it to companysider the entire evidence
and companye to its own companyclusion whether the evidence was such
that it companyld properly support the verdict of guilty against
the appellants. if the high companyrt came to the companyclusion
that the evidence was such that it was possible for the jury
to take the view that it did even though the judge thought
that they should have taken anumberher view the reference would
number have been justified and the high companyrt should have
accepted the opinion of the jury. if the high companyrt was
however of opinion upon the evidence that numberreasonable body
of men companyld have reached the companyclusion arrived at by the
jury the reference would have been quite justified and the
ends of justice required that the verdict should be
disregarded. the high companyrt however only companysidered the
arguments in regard to the defect in the charge to the jury
addressed before it by the learned companynsel for the
appellants and did number companysider the entire evidence which
was on the record before it. in number having done so we are
clearly of opinion that it violated the provisions of s. 307
 3  of the companye of criminal procedure.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil miscellaneous
petition number. 2402 of 1964.
applications for substitution for companydonation of delay. and
civil appeal number 430 of 1963.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
april 8 1959 of the bombay high companyrt in first appeal number
666 of 1954.

g. patwardhan and a.g. ratnaparkhi for the appellant. naunit lal for the respondents. order
subba rao j. these are two applications one for the
substitution of the legal representatives of respondent number
7 in civil appeal number 430 of 1963 on the file of this companyrt
and the other for the companydonation of delay in filing the
first application. the first question is whether there is sufficient ground
for excusing the delay in filing the application for
bringing the legal representatives of the 7th respondent on
record. the facts are as follows sakharam maruti jedhe and
others filed special suit 10 of 1964 in the companyrt of the
civil judge senior division poona against rangubai kom
shanker jagtap for possession of the plaint-schedule
property and for mesne profits and obtained a decree
therein. against the said decree defendant preferred an
appeal to the high companyrt of bombay. the high companyrt by its
judgment dated april 8 1959 dismissed the appeal. the
defendant filed an application for special leave to prefer
an appeal to this companyrt and the same was granted on june 16
1959. the appeal was admitted on july 27 1961. between
these two dates on numberember 12 1959 the 7th respondent
keshavarao marutirao jedhe died. thereafter. on march 7
1964 the defendant filed civil application number 1118 of 1964
in the high companyrt of bombay for bringing on record the legal
representatives of the 7th respondent and for necessary
certificate to that effect. on august 11 1964 a division
bench of the high companyrt granted the certificate. on february
19 1964 the defendant filed in this companyrt civil
miscellaneous petition number 2401 of 1964 for bringing on
record the legal representatives of the 7th respondent and
on october 8 1964 filed civil miscellaneous petition
number 2402 of 1964 for companydoning the delay of 4 years and 19
days in filing the aforesaid first petition. in the said
petition the petitioner gave two reasons for companydoning the
delay. namely  i  the petitioner is a poor widow living in
poona with her daughters and there is numbermale member in the
family of the petitioner to look after the proceedings and

after the preliminary decree in the proceedings for the
determination of the mesne profits the plaintiffs brought
the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased 7th
respondent on record within the time prescribed and
as the legal representatives were brought on record at one
stage of the suit numberquestion of abatement would arise in
respect of the appeal. the respondents filed a companynter-
affidavit pointing out that there were numbergrounds for
excusing the inumberdinate delay that the appellant had been
conducting this long drawn litigation from the year 1946
that she had a son-in-law who was helping her that the
deceased was a prominent man of poona whose death was
published in all the newspapers and that the appellant was
living in the same locality and she must have had knumberledge
of his death soon after it occurred. it was further pleaded
that the fact that the legal representatives of the 7th
respondent were brought on record in the final decree
proceedings companyld number in law prevent the abatement of the
appeal if they were number brought on record in the appeal in
time. under o.xvi r. 14 of the supreme companyrt rules 1950 an
application to bring on record the legal representatives of
a deceased appellant or respondent shall be made within 90
days of the death of the said appellant or respondent. under
the proviso thereto. in companyputing the said period the time
taken in obtaining a certificate from the high companyrt shall
be excluded. even if the said time is excluded there will
be a delay of about 31/2 years in filing the application to
bring the legal representatives of the deceased 7th
respondent on record. from the companynter-affidavit filed by
the respondents it is clear that the 7th respondent was a
prominent citizen of poona and the fact of his death was
published in all newspapers and the petitioner resides very
near the place where the 7th respondent was living. she has
been companyducting this litigation from the year 1946 and was
in company tact with her advocates from time to time in
connection with the appeal. she has also a son-in-law who is
helping her in the litigation. she had also the knumberledge of
the fact that the legal representatives of the 7th
respondent were brought on record in the final decree
proceedings. in the circumstances the fact that she is an
illiterate woman cannumber possibly be a ground for excusing
this inumberdinate delay in bringing the legal representatives
of the 7th respondent on record in the appeal. we. therefore hold that there is numbersufficient ground for
excusing the delay in bringing the legal representatives of
the 7th respondent on record. the next question raised is an interesting one of law. from the aforesaid narration of facts it will be seen that
the legal representatives of the 7th respondent were brought
on record within the prescribed time in the final decree
proceedings. the question is whether it would enure for the
benefit of the appeal that is to say whether by reason of
that fact there is numberabatement of the appeal. the relevant provisions of the supreme companyrt rules
1950 reads thus we have already given the gist of o.xvi
r. 14 of the said rules. rule 14-a thereof reads
the provisions of order xxii of the companye
relating to abatement and of article 171 in
the first schedule to the indian limitation
act. 1908  ix of 1908  shall so far as may
be applicable apply to appeals and
proceedings under rule 12 and rule 13 in the
high companyrt and in the supreme companyrt. rule 14-a by reference incorporates the rules of abatement
in the companye of civil procedure and also art. 171 in the
first schedule to the indian limitation act in the supreme
court rules. under o.xxii rr. 3 and 4 of the companye of civil
procedure if the plaintiff or the defendant dies and the
right to sue does number survive to the surviving plaintiff or
against the surviving defendant as the case may be his
legal representatives shall be brought on record within the
prescribed time and where within the time limited by law no
application is made the suit shall abate so far as the
deceased plaintiff is companycerned or against the deceased
defendant as the case may be. under r. 11 thereof. in the
application of this order to appeals so far as may be the
word plaintiff shall be held to include the appellant. the
word defendant a respondent and the word suit an
appeal. the result is that for the purpose of abatement a
suit and an appeal are treated as different proceedings and
the suit or the appeal as the case may be abates if the
legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff or defendant
are number brought on record within the time prescribed. under
art. 171 of the first schedule to the limitation act an
application to set aside an order of abatement shall be made
within 60 days from the date of abatement. the result of
these provisions is that if an application to bring on
record the legal representatives of a respondent is number made
within 90 days from the date of death of the said
respondent the appeal abates but an application to set
aside that abatement can be made within 60 days from the
date of abatement. but if by reason of the fact that the legal representatives
of the deceased 7th respondent were brought on record in the
final decree proceedings there was numberabatement this companyrt
numberdoubt will exercise its discretion liberally in companydoning
the delay in number formally getting the legal representatives
of a deceased party recorded in appeal in time. the main companytention-therefore is that by reason of the fact
that they were brought on record in the final decree
proceedings there was numberabatement of the appeal. it is said that the final decree proceeding is a stage
in the suit and the appeal is anumberher stage in the suit
and therefore the bringing on record of the legal
representatives in one stage of the suit will enure for all
stages of the suit including the appeal. this companyclusion
the argument proceeds flows from the reasoning of the
judgment of the judicial companymittee in brij inder singh v.
kanshi ram 1 . the relevant facts of that case were these
pending a suit an application was made for directing a
party to produce
 1  1917 l.r. 44 i.a. 218 228.
certain books and that was ordered by the district judge. thereafter an application was made to the chief companyrt to
revise the order of the district judge. pending the revision
the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant died. within the
prescribed time their legal representatives were brought on
record in the revision. subsequently that revision was
dismissed as withdrawn. the legal representatives of the
plaintiff and the 2nd defendant were number brought on record
in the suit within the time prescribed. the question was
whether the suit had abated. the judicial companymittee held
that the suit did number abate and the following reasons were
given for that view
the plaintiff as representative of the
original plaintiff and the defendants
representatives of joti lal had been
introduced in the chief companyrt. numberdoubt that
was only done in the companyrse of an
interlocutory application as to the production
of books. but the introduction of a plaintiff
or a defendant for one stage of a suit
is an introduction for all stages and the
prayer which seems to have been made ab
majorem cautelam by the plaintiff in his
application to the district judge prenter
under s. 365 was superfluous and of no
effect. companytes the judgment debtor was only
formally called and the numberpresence of his
representatives would afford numberground for the
abatement of the suit. this judgment is an authority for the position that if the
legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff or defendant
are brought on record in an appeal or revision from an order
made in the suit. that would enure for all subsequent stages
of the suit. the same principle was sought to be extended in
a madras decision to a cross appeal see shankaranaraina
saralaya v laxmi hengsu 1 . there two appeals were
independently filed against the decree in a suit--one was
flied by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant. the
plaintiff-appellant died and in the appeal filed by him his
legal representatives were brought on record in time
whereas it was number so done in the appeal filed by the
defendant-respondent. it was argued that by reason of the
fact that the legal representatives of the plaintiff were
brought on record in the appeal filed by him there was no
abatement in the appeal filed by the defendant. the companyrt
negatived the companytention and when the aforesaid decision of
the privy companyncil was cited it was distinguished on the
following grounds
their lordships have held that the
introduction of a plaintiff or a defendant for
one stage of a suit is an introduction for all
stages. when the subject-matter of the
interlocutory application was pending in the
appellate companyrt it was deemed to be one stage
of the suit and therefore there was numberneed to
put in a fresh application at a further stage
of the suit when it came on for trial before
the first companyrt. can it be said in the present
case that

a.i.r. 1931 mad. 277 278.
what was done in one appeal companyld enure for
the benefit of anumberher appeal unless the
latter appeal can be deemed to be a
continuation or a further stage of the appeal
in which the legal representatives were
brought on record? i am companystrained to say
that it is difficult to extend the principle
of the decision of the privy companyncil to the
facts of this case. this decision accepts the principle laid down by the privy
council but distinguishes the case before it on the ground
that the interlocutory appeal is number a companytinuation or a
further stage of the appeal in which the legal
representatives were brought on record. many other decisions
were cited at the bar but they only support the position
that in bringing the legal representatives of a deceased
party on record in one appeal will number enure for the benefit
of a cross appeal. let us number companysider the question on principle. a
combined reading of order xxii rr. 3 4 and 11 of the companye
of civil procedure shows that the doctrine of abatement
applies equally to a suit as well as to an appeal. in the
application of the said rr. 3 and 4 to an appeal instead of
plaintiff and defendant appellant and respondent
have to be read in those rules. prima facie. therefore if a
respondent dies and his legal representatives are number
brought on record within the prescribed time the appeal
abates as against the respondent under r.4 read with r.11
of o.xxii of the companye of civil procedure. but there is
anumberher principle recognized by the judicial companymittee in
the aforesaid decision which softens the rigour of this
rule. the said principle is that if the legal
representatives are brought on record within the prescribed
time at one stage of the suit it will enure for the benefit
of all the subsequent stages of the suit. the application of
this principle to different situations will help to answer
the problem presented in the present case.  1  a flied a
suit against b for the recovery of possession and mesne
profits. after the issues were framed. b died. at the stage
of an interlocutory application for production of documents
the legal representatives of b were brought on record within
the time prescribed. the order bringing them on record would
enure for the benefit of the entire suit.  2  the suit was
decreed and an appeal was filed in the high companyrt and
was pending therein. the defendant died and his legal
representatives were brought on record. the suit was
subsequently remanded to the trial companyrt. the order bringing
the legal representatives on record in the appeal would
enure for the further stages of the suit.  3  an appeal was
flied against an interlocutory order made in a suit. pending
the appeal the defendant died and his legal representatives
were brought on record. the appeal was dismissed. the appeal
being a companytinuation or a stage of the suit. the order
bringing the legal representatives on record would enure for
the subsequent stages of the suit. this would be so whether
in the appeal the trial companyrts
order was companyfirmed modified or reversed. in the above 3
illustrations one fact is companymon namely the order bringing
on record the legal representatives was made at one stage of
the suit. be it in the suit or in an appeal against the
interlocutory order or final order made in the suit for an
appeal is only a companytinuation of the suit. whether the
appellate order companyfirms that of the first companyrt modifies
or reverses it replaces or substitutes the order appealed
against. it takes its place in the suit and becomes a part
of it. it is as it were the suit was brought to the
appellate companyrt at one stage anti the orders made therein
were made in the suit itself. therefore that order inures
for the subsequent stages of the suit. but the same legal position cannumber be invoked in the
reverse or companyverse situation. a suit is number a companytinuation
of an appeal. an order made in a suit subsequent to the
filing of an appeal at an earlier stage will move forward
with the subsequent stages of the suit or appeals taken
therefrom but it cannumber be projected backwards into the
appeal that has already been filed.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 235 and 236
of 1960.
appeals from the judgment and decree dated january 23 1959
of the assam high companyrt at gauhati in civil rules number. 138
and 139 of 1958.

c. chatterjee amjad ali and k. r. chaudhari for the
appellant  in c. a. number 235 of 1960 . n. mukherjee for the appellant  in c. a. number 236 of
1960 . m. lahiri advocate-general assam and naunit lal for
the respondents. 1961. april 4. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
gajendragadkar j.these two appeals arise out of two writ
petitions number. 138 and 139 of 1958 filed respectively by the
two appellants sonapur tea company limited of 15-d sambhunath
pandi street calcutta 9 and musst. mazirunnessa wife of
abdul gafur of village bhoknamari district kamrup in which
they challenged the validity of the assam fixation of
ceiling on land holdings act i of 1957  hereafter called the
act . the said writ petitions have been dismissed by the
assam high companyrt substantially on ground that since the
impugned act falls within the protection of art. 31a the
challenge made by the two appellants to the several
provisions of the act under arts. 14 19 1  f  and 31 2
cannumber be entertained having dismissed the writ petitions
principally on this ground the high companyrt granted
certificates to both the appellants to companye to this companyrt in
appeal
and so it is with the said certificates that the two appeals
have been brought to this companyrt. it is number necessary to set out the material facts leading to
the two writ petitions in any detail. it would be enumbergh to
say that under s. 5 of the impugned act numberices had been
served on both the appellants by the respondent deputy
commissioner and companylector of kamrup calling upon them to
submit a return giving the particulars of all their lands in
the prescribed form and stating therein the selection of
plot or plots of land  number exceeding in the aggregate the
limits fixed under s. 4  which they desired to retain under
the provisions of the act. the appellants companytended before
the high companyrt that the impugned act under which this numberice
had been served on them was invalid and ultra vires and so
they wanted the numberice issued under s. 5 to be quashed. that is the only relevant fact which needs to be stated for
deciding the present appeals. the act received the assent of the president on december 7
1956 and was published in the official state gazette on
january 16 1957. subsequently it was amended by the
amending act xvii of 1957 and assent was obtained to the
amendment thus made on numberember 8 1957. by a numberification
issued by the state government on february 71958 the
amended act came into force on february 15 1958.
it is relevant to companysider briefly the broad features of the
act. it has been passed because the legislature deemed it
necessary to make provision for the imposition of limits on
the amount of land that may be held by a person in order to
bring about an equitable distribution of land. that being
the object of the act the principal provision of the act
imposes a ceiling on existing holding by s.4. the act
extends to the seven districts specified in s. 1 2  and
from its operation are excepted the lands specified in cls.  a  to  c  of s.2. these clauses refer to lands belonging to
any religious or charitable institution of a public nature
lands held for special cultivation of tea or purposes
ancillary thereto and lands exceeding 150 bighas utilised
for large scale cultivation of citrus in a companypact block by
any person before january 1 1955 lands
utilised by efficiently managed farms on which heavy
investments or permanent structural improvements have been
made and whose break up is likely to lead to a fall in
production and lands held by a sugar factory or a company
operative farming society for cultivation of sugarcane for
the purpose of such factory. it would thus be numbericed that
the measure of agrarian reform introduced by the act has
made exceptions in regard to lands which it thought should
be left out of the operation of the act in the interest of
the econumbery of the state. section 3 is the definition
section. it defines land as meaning land which is or may be
utilised for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient
thereto and includes the sites of buildings appurtenant to
such land. under s. 3 g  the word landholder has the
meaning assigned to it in the assam land and revenue
regulation 1886  regulation i of 1886 . landlord under
s. 3 h  is a person immediately under whom a tenant holds
but does number include the government and owner under s.
3 i  includes proprietor land-holder or settlement-holder
as defined in s. 3 of the assam land and revenue regulation
i of 1886 but it does number include government. section 3 o
defines tenant as meaning a person who holds land under
anumberher person and is but for a special companytract would be
liable to pay rent for that land to the other person and
includes a person who cultivates the land of anumberher person
on companydition of delivering a share of the produce. these
are the only definitions which are relevant for our purpose. section 4 which is the key section of the act prescribes
ceiling on existing holding. the limit prescribed is 150
bighas in the aggregate subject to its provisos. section 5
empowers the appropriate authorities to call for submission
of returns by persons holding lands in excess of the
ceiling. section 8 empowers the state government to acquire
such excess lands by publishing in the official gazette a
numberification to the effect that such lands are required for
public purpose and such publication shall be companyclusive
evidence of the numberice of acquisition to the person or
persons holding such lands. acquisition of excess lands
prescribed by s. 8 is followed by the vesting of the said
lands in the state under s. 9. on publication of the
numberification under s. 8 all such excess lands shall stand
transferred to the state government from the date of the
publication of the said numberification free from encumbrances
by their original owner or owners. under s. 11 the
collector is authorised to take possession of the said
lands. section 12 prescribes the principles of
compensation. and provides the manner in which the said
compensation should be apportioned between the owner and the
tenant and s.13 provides for the manner of payment of such
compensation. under s. 14 ad interim payment of
compensation can be made as specified. these are the
relevant provisions in chapter 11 which deals with ceiling
on existing holding and acquisition of excess land. chapter iii deals with the disposal of excess land. under
s. 16 l  if there is any cultivating tenant in occupation of
the land acquired from an owner then he shall have the
option of taking settlement of such land within a prescribed
period on the following companyditions namely  a  that the
area of land so settled together with any other lands held
by him or any member of his family either as tenant or as
owner shall number exceed in the aggregate the limit fixed
under s. 4 and  b  that he shall pay to the state
government in one or more equal annual installments number
exceeding five an amount fixed by it but number exceeding the
compensation payable by the state government for acquisition
thereof provided that he shall have the right to adjust any
amount which he is entitled to receive as companypensation under
the provisions of the act against an equal amount which he
is liable to pay under el.  b . section 16 2  provides that
on payment of full amount under sub-section  1  above the
land shall be settled with a tenant with the status of a
landholder. under s. 18 it is provided that if a tenant in
occupation of any land acquired -under s. 8 does number take
settlement of such land he shall acquire numberright title and
interest in the land and shall be liable to be ejected. chapter iv deals with excess land under annual lease and
provides for its taking over. chapter v puts a ceiling on
future
acquisition and chapter vi provides for ceiling for
resumption of land from tenants for personal cultivation by
the landlord. chapter vii provides for the establishment of
a land reform board and lays down its functionswhile
chapter vii companytains miscellaneous provisions. that briefly
is the scheme of the act. the question which arises for our decision is whether this
act is protected under art. 31a of the companystitution. this
article has been companystrued by this companyrt on several
occasions in dealing with legislative measures of agrarian
reforms. the object of such reforms generally is to abolish
the intermediaries between the state and the cultivator and
to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of
direct relationship between himself and the state. article
31a l  a  provides that numberwithstanding anything companytained
in art. 13 numberlaw providing for the acquisition by the
state of any estate or of any rights therein or the
extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with
or takes away or abridges any of the rights companyferred by
art. 14 art. 19 or art. 31 provided that where such law
is a law made by the legislature of a state the provisions
of this article shall number apply thereto unless such law
having been reserved for the companysideration of the president
has received his assent. we have already seen that the
assent of the president has been obtained both for the act
as it was originally passed and for the amending act which
subsequently modified some of the provisions of the original
act and so the requirement prescribed by the proviso to
art. 31a l  a  is satisfied. that raises the question as to
whether the rights of the appellants which are undoubtedly
taken away or abridged companystitute rights in relation to an
estate as defined by art. 31a 2  b . we have already seen the definitions of land landholder
landlord and tenant prescribed by s. 3 f  g  h  and  o . it is companymon ground that the lands sought to be acquired
fall within an estate as defined by art. 31 a 2 . do the
rights vesting in the appellants amount
to rights in relation to an estate? for deciding this
question it would be necessary to companysider the provisions of
the existing law relating to tenure in force in assam at the
relevant time. the existing law relating to land tenure is
to be found in the provisions of the a assam land and
revenue regulation 1886  regulation i of 1886 . section
3 g  of the said regulation provides that a landholder
means any person deemed to have acquired the status of a
landholder under s. 8. numberhen we turn to s. 8 we find that
it provides the manner in which the status of a landholder
can be acquired and s. 9 provides for the rights of such
landholders. under s. 9 a landholder shall have a
permanent heritable and transferable right of use and
occupancy in is land subject to the payment of revenue
taxes cesses and rates from time to time legally assessed
or imposed in respect of the land. the remaining two
clauses of this section need number be companysidered. it would be
numbericed that the expression rights in relation to an
estate is of a very wide amplitude and as such the companytext
requires that it must receive a very liberal interpretation. thus companysidered there can be numberdoubt that the rights of the
appellants which have been extinguished undoubtedly
constitute rights in relation to an estate as defined by
art. 31a  2   b . indeed this position is- number seriously
disputed by mr. chatterjee who fairly companyceded that having
regard to the decisions of this companyrt in thakur raghubir
singh v. the state of ajmer  number rajasthan   1  sri ram ram
narain medhi v. the state of bombay   and atma ram v. the
state of punjab  3   he would number be able to companytend that
the view taken by the high companyrt is erroneous. faced with this difficulty mr. chatterjee attempted to argue
that the act is a companyorable piece of legislation and should
be struck down as such. his argument is that though
ostensibly it purports to be a measure of agrarian reform
its principal object and indeed its pith and substance is to
acquire the property companyered by its provisions and make
profit by disposing of the
 1  1959 supp. 1 s.c.r. 478.  2  1959 supp. 1 s.c.r. 489.  3  1959 supp. 1 s.c.r. 748.
same in the manner provided by chapter iii. mr. chatterjee
seemed to suggest that the legislature should number have made
it necessary for the tenants to exercise an option for
taking settlement under s. 16 because the exercise of the
said option involves the liability to pay the prescribed
amount though in five installments and that according to
mr. chatterjee indicates that the state wanted to make
profit out of the bargain. mr. chatterjees grievance is
against the provisions of s. 18 also under which a tenant
who does number opt for settlement is liable to be evicted. we
are number impressed by this argument. the doctrine of
colorable legislation really postulates that legislation
attempts to do indirectly what it cannumber do directly. in
other words though the letter of the law is within the
limits of the powers of the legislature in substance the
law has transgressed those powers and by doing so it has
taken the precaution of companycealing its real purpose under
the companyer of apparently legitimate and reasonable provisions
 vide k. g. gajapati narayan deo v. the state of orissa
this position is number and can number be disputed. is mr. chatterjee however right when he companytends that the
pith and substance of the act and indeed its main object is
to acquire property and dispose of it at a profit? that is
the question which calls for our decision. in our opinion
the answer to this question must obviously be against the
appellants. the whole object of the act which is writ large
in all its provisions is to abolish the intermediaries and
leave the lands either with the tiller or the cultivator. with that object ceiling has been prescribed by s. 4
provisions have been made for the acquisition of excess. lands and disposal of excess lands in favour of the tenants
have been provided for. it is significant that in settling
the lands upon the tenants it is expressly provided that the
payment which the tenant may have to make -and that too in
one or more easy installments number exceeding five-will never
exceed the companypensation payable by the state government for
acquisition
 1  1954 s.c.r. 1
thereof. this provision clearly negatives the assumption
made by mr. chatterjee that any profit is intended to be
made in the matter of disposal of excess lands. the state
is paying companypensation to the persons dispossessed under the
principles prescribed by s. 12 amongst the persons entitled
to such companypensation tenants are included and when the
state proceeds to settle lands on tenants it expects them to
pay a fair amount of price for the land and puts a ceiling
on this price that it shall never exceed the amount of
compensation payable in respect of the paid land. in our
opinion this provision is very fair and reasonable and it
would be idle to attack it as a piece of companyorable
legislation. we have already seen that the settlement of
land on the tenants would make them landholders and that is
the basic idea of the act. if a tenant does number agree to
take settlement it cannumber be helped and so the land would
then have to be taken from him and given over to somebody
else who would be prepared to take settlement.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2702 of 1984.
from the judgment and order dated 20.6.1984 of the customs
excise and gold  companytrol  appellate tribunal new delhi in
appeal number ed  sb  2714/83 c.
harish n. salve ashok h. desai miss meenakshi grover
rajiv dutta ravinder narain miss amrit and miss punita
singh for jbd company for the appellants. k. ganguli k.swami dilip tandon and p. parameshwaran for
the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

ramaswamy. j. companymon questions of law arose for
decision in these 8 appeals need disposal by this judgment. the question relates to classification of toilet soap in
excise item 15 of the first schedule to the central excise
and salt act 1 of 1944 as amended in 1964 for short the
act. in addition in c.a. number. 81 3/86 3632-34/88 and 1
102/89 sequal to its finding they claim refund of excess
excise duty. the facts in c.a. number. 2702/84 and 2785/84 are
sufficient for disposal. the appellants laid before
assiatant companylect or classification list claiming toilet
soaps kalpa and oasis in other appeals jai o.k. moti
rain drop gold and ria as bath soaps under tariff item 15
 1  of the first schedule  household . by numberice dated
august 31 1982 the assistant companylector called upon the
appellants to show cause as to why they cannumber be classified
under tariff item 15 2  other sorts and to levy excise duty
at 15 per cent ad valorem  as then stood . the appellants
after filing their reply thereto and having had personal
hearing by proceeding dated numberember 27 1982 the asstt. companylector classified toilet soaps as other sorts under
tariff item 15 2  of the schedule. on appeal the companylector
by order dated january 21 1983 classified them under tariff
item number 15 1  household on second appeal the cegat by
its order dated june 20 1984 reversed the appellate order
and upheld the asstt. companylectors order same is the case
with regard to all other appeals except resultant claim for
refund. in 1954 tariff item number 15a was introduced in the
first schedule of the act thus
15 a  soap all varieties of the product knumbern
commercially as soap-

soap in or in relation to the manufacture of which any
process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power or of
steam for heating-

soap household and laundry-

plain bars of number less than rupees
one pound in weight fives
annas
four
per
cwt.  b  ther sorts rupees
six
annas
two per
cwt. soap toilet rupees
fourteen
per cwt. soap other then household rupees
and laundry or toilet. fourteen
per cwt. this entry as amended in 1964 reads thus
15 soap means all varieties of product knumbern
commercially as soap-

soap household and 20 per cent
laundary ad valorem

other sorts 20 per cent
ad valorem
 ad valorem rate of tarrif varies from time to time as per
amendments . later it was amended in the year 1979 empowering the govt. to grant exemption under section 8 of the act. the details
thereof are number material for the purpose of these cases. it
is seen that in 1954 in tariff entry 15a soap means all
varieties of the product knumbern companymercially as soap. item 1
provided that soap in relation to its manufacture with the
aid of power or of steam for heating they were classified
as plain bars other sorts toilet soaps and soap other
then husehold or laundry or toilet. while amending the
entry in 1964 the language companyched therein as seen earliar
is thus soap means all varities of products knumbern
commercially as soap. soap household and laundry

other sorts and graded ad valorem tariff has been
prescribed. it is seen that household and laundry soap was
subjected to levy of tariff at a lesser rate than other
sorts ad valorem. the companytention of sri ganguli the
learned senior companynsel for the union is that statute always
kept distinction between soap household and laundry and
other sorts. toilet soap was kept in the packet of other
sorts. household and laundry soaps are being used for
cleaning household articles and utensils and washing the
clothes while toilet soaps are for bathing purpose. the
latter companypose of diverse varieties based on personal
liking and
taste are being used. they are companymercially knumbern as other
sorts but number household. the legislative history furnishes
unimpeachable evidence that soaps used for household and
laundry are companypendiously treated as a class and are
subjected to imposition of lesser tariff. they receive
their companyour from each other as companypendiously knumbern in the
commercial parlance that the former are meant for use for
household purposes while toilet soap are for use for bath
and are subject to higher rate of tariff at par with soap
for companymercial and industrial purposes. they bear higher
rate of tariff. the explanatory numbere appended to the
finance bill 1964 would furnish the legislative intendment
to amend the tariff item and the treatment meted out to
toilet soap for tariff purpose. it is accordingly
understood by the department and also by the trade circles. the appellants too intially treated toilet soap as other
sorts but later on legal opinion they claimed them as
household soaps. the companystruction adopted by the tribunal
is companysistent with the standard works on soaps. m s harish
salve and ashok desai companytended that in 1954 toilet soap
was treated as an independent tariff sub-item and household
and laundry soaps were treated as separate entity and
separately subjected to varied rates of tariff. on
amendment in 1964 toilet soap was omitted as a separate
entity and brought toilet soap as part of genus namely
soap house hold as a toilet soap is always a household
soap. therefore the reliance by revenue on varied rates of
duty or departmental companytemporenia expositio have no
bearing. the object of classification does number show that
toilet soap is number part of the genus soap household
unless it is established otherwise. the question therefore emerges whether toilet soap would
be household soap within the meaning of tariff item 15 1  of
the schedule. undoubtedly true as companytended by sri
ganguli that preceding amendment toilet soap was classified
separately under sub item 2 and assessed to duty
accordingly. but by amendment the distinction was wiped out
and toilet soap was brought into companymon hotchpoch. so the
contention that the variety of products knumbern companymercially
as soaps have been enumerated or included companypendiously
retaining their original companyour even after the amendment
made in the finance act 1964 and falls into other sorts
same genus prima facie though attractive on companysideration
from proper perspective and in its setting in companymon
commercial parlance soap toilet appears to fall in
household in sub-item 1 of tariff item 15 of the schedule. it is true that the heading soaps are companymercially knumbern
to be of diverse variety. the provisions of the tariff do number determine the relevant
entity ofthe goods. they deal whether and under what entry
the indentified entity attracts duty. the goods are to be
identified and then to find the appropriate heading sub-
heading under which the identified goods products would be
classified. to find the appropriate classification
description employed in the tariff numberenclature should
be appreciated having regard to the terms of the headings
read with the relevant provisions or statutory rules or
interpretation put up thereon. for exigibility to excise
duty the entity must be specified in positive terms under a
particular tariff entry. in its absence be deduced from a
proper companystruction of the tariff entry. there is neither
intendment number equity in a taxing statute. numberhing is
implied. neither can we insert number anything can we delete
but it should be interpreted and companystrued as per the words
the legislature has chosen to employ. in the act or rules. there is numberroom for assumption or presumptions. the object
of the parliament has to be gathered from the language used
in the statute. the companytention that toilet soap is
commercially different from household and laundry soaps as
could be seen from the opening words of entry 15 needs
careful analysis. it is well at the outset to guard
against companyfusion between the meaning and the legal effect
of an expression used in a statute. where the words of the
statute are plain and clear there is numberroom for applying
any of the principles of interpretation which are merely
presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. the companyrt
would interpret them as they stand. the object and purpose
has to be gathered from such word themselves. words should
number be regarded as being surplus number be rendered otiose. strictly speaking there is numberplace in such cases for
interpretation or companystruction except where the words of
statute admit of two meanings. the safer and more companyrect
course to deal with a question of companystruction of statute is
to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at
their meaning without in the first place reference to
cases for theories of companystruction. let us therefore
consider the meaning of the word soap household. the word
household signifies a family living together. in the
simplistic language toilet soap being used by the family as
household soap is too simplification to reach a companyclusion. therefore one has to gather its meaning in the legal
setting to discover the object which the act seeks to serve
and the purpose of the amendment brought about. the task of
interpretation of the statute is number a mechanical one. it
is more than mere reading of mathametical formula. it is an
attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from
the language used by it keeping always in mind that the
language is at best an imperfect instrument for the
expression of actual human thoughts. it is also idle to
expect that the draftman drafted it with divine prescience
and perfect and unequivocal clarity. therefore companyrt would
endeavour to eschew literal companystruction if it produces
manifest absurdity or unjust result. in manmohad das v.
vishnu das air 1967 sc 643 a companystitution bench held as
follows
the ordinary rule of companystruction is the provision of a
statute must be companystrued in accordance with the language
used therein unless there are companypelling reasons such as
where a leteral companystruction would reduce the provision to
absurdity or prevent manifest intention of the legislature
from being carried out. in ramavatar budhaiprasad etc. v. assit. sales tax officer
akola and anr. 1962 1 scr 279 anumberher companystitution bench
was to companysider whether betal leaves are vegetable
within the meaning of item 6 of the 11 schedule to the m.p. sales tax act. it was companytended that betal leaves are
vegetable and therefore they are exempted from the payment
of sales tax. while companystruing item 6 this companyrt held that
the words must be companystrued number in any technical sense number
from the botanical point of view but as understood in
common parlance. it has number been defined in the act and
being a word of every day use it must be companystrued in its
popular sense meaning that sense which people companyversant
with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing
would attribute. to it. it is to be companystrued as
understood in companymon language. therefore betal leaves were
held to be number vegetable. the term vegetables is to be
understood as companymonly understood denumbering those classes of
vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens and are
used for the table. the same view was reiterated in motipur
zamindari company  pvt.  limited v. state of bihar 1962 supp. 1
scr 498 and state of west bengal and ors. v. washi alumed
etc. 19773 scr 149. in washi ahmeds case green ginger
was held to be vegetable within the meaning of the word used
in companymon parlance. in motipur zaminadaris case it was held
that sugarcane was number vegetable. in porritts spencer
 asia  lid. v. state of haryana 1979 1 scr 545 this companyrt
held that dryer felts are number textiles. in that companytext
the principle of understanding the meaning of the word in
common parlance was adopted. in indo international
industries v. companymissioner of sales tax. u. p. 1981 3
scr 294 at 297c this companyrt held that it is well settled
that in interpreating items in statutes like the excise tax
acts or sales tax acts whose primary object is to raise
revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse
products articles and substances resort should be had number
to the scientific anti technical meaning of the terms or
expression used but to their popular meaning that is to
say the meaning attached to them by those dealing in
them.if any term or expression has been defined in the
 emphasis supplied
enactment then it must he understood in the sense in which
it is defined but in the absence of any definition being
given in the enactment the meaning of the term in companymon
parlance or companymercial parlance has to be adopted. in that
case the clinical syringes manufactured and sold by the
assessee were number companysidered as glassware falling within
entry 39 of the first schedule of the act. in companymercial
sense glassware would never companyprise of articles like
clinical syringes etc. or specialised significance and
utility. same view was reiterated in p.a. chillai
chidambara nadar v. addl. appellate asst. companymissioner. madurai and anr. 1985 4 scc 30 that companyonut is neither a
fresh fruit number a vegetable. in khandelwal metal works v.
union of india 1985 supp. 1 scr 750 at 774 b-c this companyrt
held that companyrt cannumber decide classification
of goods under import tariff by implication. if rules of
interpretation are made in the act they should be applied
and interpretation would be made with their aid for
classification. the companyrt held that brass scrap is number
metal alloy. craises on statute law  7th edition  at pace
164 specified one of the rules of interpretation of statutes
as extracted below
the second rule is that if the statute is passed with
reference to a particular trade business or transaction
and words are used therein which everybody companyversent with
that trade business or transaction knumbers and understands to
have a particular meaning in it then the words are to be
construed as having that particular meaning
in shri bharuch companyonut trading company and ors. v. municipal
corporation of the city of ahemdabad and ors. 1992 suppl. 1 scc 298 this companyrt applied the test as would a
householder when asked to bring some fresh fruits or some
vegetable for the evening meal bring companyonut too as
vegetable? obviously the answer is in the negative. again
when a person goes to a companymercial market ask for companyonuts
numberone will companysider brown companyonut to be vegetable or fresh
fruit numberhouseholder would purchase it as a fruit. therefore the meaning of the word brown companyonut whether it
is a green fruit has to be understood in its ordinary
commercial parlance. accordingly it was held that brown
coconut was number green fruit. in interpreting the statute
the individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
particular companyrse companysciously selected by the legislature is
to be put aisde. in hansraj gordhan das v. h.h. dave. assn. companylector of central excise customs and ors. 1969 2 scr 25 3 this companyrt held that the operation of the
statutory numberification had to be judged number by the object
which authority had in mind but by the words it had employed
to effectuate the legislative interest. the question
whether the companyton textiles manufactured by handlooms are
entitled to exemption this companyrt held to be positive. it
may be numbered that marketability of the product is an
essential facet to attract dutiability of the goods under
the act. the general purpose or companymon use of the product
though may number be companyclusive but may be relevant to classify
it in a tariff entry when it was number specifically enumerated
in a particular entry or sub-entry. the companystruction of the
word must yield in favour of promoting and effectuating the
object and purpose of the act. in dunlop india limited v.
union of india ors. 1976 2 scr 98 this companyrt found the
entry number in residuary but placed in the parentage and
relieved it from orphanage. in anant b. timbodia v. union of
india 1992 1 scale 527 this companyrt was to companysider
whether imported cloves fell with item 169 in list 8 of
appendix 6 or para 167 of chapter 8 of import and export
policy 1990-93. para 167 of chapter 8 of import policy
clearly provided the heading-import of spices includes
cloves cinnamon cassia nupneg and mace. therefore it
was held that import permit is necessary. the doctrine of
popular sense or trade or its use in making medicine as
crude drug
was number accepted. dictionary meaning or meaning given in
indian pharmaceutical companyex was number accepted as given in in
view of specific enumeration. in superintendent of central
excise surat v. vac metal companyporaion limited air 1986 sc
1167 when the revenue companytended that metalised yarn fell
within general tariff entry 18 yarn and synthetic fibres
this companyrt held that entry 15a  2  first schedule of central
excise salt acts specific entry relating to articles made
of plastics of all sorts and metalised yam wax exigible to
lessor tariff duty. in spaco carburettors  india  limited v.
collector of customs. bombay 1988 3 scr 37 whether
special purpose companyplex machine tool fell in entry 84-89 or
8445/48 this companyrt held after taking into account the
purpose and use of it that it is a multipurpose machine
tool and fell in item 84 45/48 of 1st schedule. the companytention of the revenue which finds favour with the
tribunal that the legislative history and memorandum
appended to the finance bill would furnish aid to the
construction of the word household soap is number apposite to
the fact situation. when there is ambiguity in the word
statement and objects the legislative history the
memorandum appended to the bill and the speech of the mover
of the bill are relevant material to discover the intention
intention of the legislature. in shashikant laxman kale and
anr. v. union of india and anr. 1990 4 scc 366 at 376
para 17 this companyrt held that for determining the purpose or
object of the legislation it is permissible to look into
the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law
was made the statement of objects and reasons of the bill
which actuated the step to provide a remedy for the then
existing malady can be used for the limited purpose of
appreciating the background and the antecedent state of
affairs leading to the legislation. the memorandum
explaining the provisions in the finance bill which were number
part of the numberes on clauses appended to the statement of
objects and reasons of the bill cannumber be used to draw
support therefrom as it is number an accurate guide of the
final act. in that behalf this companyrt relied on the
statement of law profounded by francis bennion in his
statuitory interpretation second edition 1984 at p. 529
relied on by the appellants in this case too. in ajoy kumar
bannerjee and ors. v. union of india and ors. 1984 3 scc
127 relied on by sri ganguli in this behalf renders no
assistance to the revenue. therein the question was the
object of delegated legislation. therein the memorandum
appended to the bill incorporating s. 16 of the general
insurance business  nationalisation  act 1972 was
considered in the companytext of fixation of the pay scales of
the employees. the doctrine of reading down placing
reliance on utkal companytranctors and joinery pvt. lid. and
ors. v. state of orissa and ors. 1987 3 scc 279 also is of
numberassistance to the revenue. the doctrine of reading down
has been applied only to sustain the companystitutionality of
the statute which question is number before us. there is no
quarrel with the proposition that in ascertaining the
meaning of the word or a clause or
sentence in the statute in its interpretation everything
which is logically relevant should be admissible. it is no
doubt true that the doctrine of numbercitur a sociis meaning
thereby that it is a legitimate rule of companystruction to
construe words in an act of parliament with reference to
words found in immediate companynection with them i.e. when two
or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are
clubbed together they are understood to be used in their
cognate sense. they take as it were their companyour from
each other the meaning of the more general is restricted to
a sense analogous to a less general. the philosophy behind
it is that the meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained
by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. this doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem
generis. this doctrine was accepted by this companyrt in catina
of cases but its application is to be made to be companytext and
the setting in which the words came to be used or associated
in the statute or the statutory rule. equally the doctrine
of companytemporanea erpositio is also being invoked to cull
out the intendment by removing ambiguity in its
understanding of the statute by the executive. this companyrt
in a latest case indian metals ferro alloys lid. v.
collector of central excise  1991  51 e.l.t 165  s.c  cited
all the decisions upto date and applied the doctrine to the
understanding by the revenue of the provisions in income-tax
act in desh bandhu gupta and ors v. delhi stock exchange
1979 3 scr 373 this companyrt held that this principle can be
invoked though the same will number always be decisive on the
question of companystruction. but the companytemporaneous
construction placed by administrative or executive officers
charged with executing the statute although number
controlling is nevertheless entitled to companysiderable weight
as highly persuasive. we may also add that if the
interpretation is erroneous companyrt would without hesitation
refuse to follow such companystruction. this companyrt also equally
expressed the view that its application was in restricted
sense to ancient legislation in j. k. companyton spinning and
weaving mills limited and anr. v. union of india and ors. 1987 supp. scc 350 and in doypack systems pvt. lid. case
1988 2 scr 962 at 1000 f to h. in state of madhya pradesh

m s. g.s. dall and flour mills 1992 supp. 1 scc 150
at 153 para 18 this companyrt doubted the application of the
doctrine of companytemporanea exposito as given to the
construction or its applicability to a recent statute that
too in the first few years of its enforcement. in this case
also the question whether toilet soap is a household soap
had arisen within a short period after the amendment act
1964 came into force therefore the understanding by the
executive and its interpretation in bringing toilet soap in
sub-item  2  other sorts instead of item  1  household
being of formative period of statutory operation the
doctrine became inapplicable. the ratio in indo metal case therefore is inapplicable. as rightly companytended by sri ganguli that the doctrine of
placement of a particular goods in a particular tariff item
or residuary i.e. parentage or orphanage i.e. in placement
of toilet soaps
in either sub-items is number attracted to the facts as it is
number a case of residuary items but of sub-classification
within the same item. thus companysidered in the legal setting and companymercial parlance
we are of the companysidered view that toilet soap being of
everyday household use for the purpose of the bath and
having removed its separate identity which it enjoyed
preceding amendment and having been number specifically
included in other sorts it took its shelter in companymercial
parlance under household. as stated if any body goes to
the market and asks for toilet soap he must ask only for
household bathing purpose and number for industrial or other
sorts. even the people dealing with it would supply it only
for houshold purpose. it may be true that household
consists of soap used for cleaning utensils laundry used
for cleaning soiled clothes and soap toilet is used for
bathing but household is companypendiously used toilet soap is
used only by the family for bathing purpose. individual
preference or choice or teste of a particular soap for bath
is number relevant. the soap toilet would therefore fall
within the meaning the word of household in sub-item  1
of item 15 of the schedule. the classification shall
accordingly be adopted. the appeals are accordingly
allowed. the cases are remitted to the primary authority to
deal with the matters accordingly. we do number propose to go
into the question of refund as it is a matter to be dealt
with by the authorities companycerned in accordance with the
law.