civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 1339-40
of 1988.
from the judgment dated 7.7.1987 of the madras high
court in w.p. number. 9781 and 10545 of 1986.

l. sanghi p.p. rao r. mohan r. perumal v. krishna-
murthy m.n. krishnamani v. sekhar k.v. vishwanathan t.
raja s.r. setia p. chaudhary a. mariarputham and m.a. krishnamurthy for the appearing parties. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

jagannatha shetty j. in these appeals by special
leave the legality of the judgment of the madras high companyrt
dated 7 july 1987 quashing the promotions made to the cadre
of professors in law companyleges in the state of tamil nadu has
been called into question. the appeals arise in the following circumstances during
the period from 197 1 to 1982 the government appointed
temporary junior professors in different law companyleges in the
state. the appointments were made under rule 10 a  i  1  of
the tamil nadu state and subordinate services rules 1955
 viz. the. preliminary and the general rules   hereinafter
called the rules . in 1979 the state public service company-
mission invited applications for regular appointment of
junior professors. the temporary junior professors and
others applied for the posts. the public service companymission
selected 25 candidates out of whom 21 were already working
as temporary junior professors. the selected candidates were
arranged in the list called approved list. in the order
of merit. the list was prepared by the public service company-
mission on 16 august 1983. it was approved by the government
on 9 december 1983. on 27 june 1985 the state government
made an order regularising the services of those 21 junior
professors. their services were regularised with effect from
the dates of original appointments as temporary junior
professors. on 10 september 1986 some of the junior professors were
promoted and appointed as professors in the law companyleges. that. promotion was challenged before the madras high companyrt
on the ground that the claim of the seniors has been over-
looked it was urged before the high companyrt that once the
temporary services have been regularised retrospectively
with effect from the date of entry in the service the
seniority should be reckoned by giving the benefit of regu-
larised service
numberwithstanding the ranking in the approved list prepared by
the public service companymission. the high companyrt accepted that
plea and queshed the promotion of professors and directed
the government to make a proper order of promotion in the
light of the views expressed in the judgment. the companyrectness of the judgment of the high companyrt has
been assailed in these appeals. we must first outline the
necessary statutory provisions bearing on the question
raised. section 10 a  i  1  provides as follows

temporary appointments
 a  i  1  where it is necessary in the public
interest owing to an emergency which has
arisen to fill immediately a vacancy in a post
borne on the cadre of a service class or
category and there would be undue delay in
making such appointment in accordance with
these rules and the special rules the ap-
pointing authority may temporarily appoint a
person otherwise than in accordance with the
said rules. rule 22 so far as relevant reads
reservation of appointments--where the spe-
cial rules lay down that the principle of
reservation of appointments shall apply to any
service class or category selection for
appointment thereto shall with effect on and
from the 7th june 197.1 in cases such selec-
tion is made by the companymission and 8th numberem-
ber 1971 in other cases be made on the
following basis--

the unit of selection for appointment for
the purpose of this rule shall be one hun-
dred of which eighteen shall be reserved for
the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes
and thirty-one shall be reserved for the
backward classes and the remaining fifty-one
shall be filled on the basis of merit. the claims of members of the scheduled
castes and the scheduled tribes and the back-
ward classes shall also be companysidered for the
fifty-one appointments which shall be filled
on the basis of merit and where a candidate
belonging to a scheduled caste scheduled
tribe or back ward class is selected on the
basis of merit the number of posts reserved
for the scheduled castes and the scheduled
tribes or for the backward classes as the
case may be shall number in any way be affected. xxxxx xxxx xxxx
rule 23 so far. as material is as follows
23 a  i  date of companymencement of probation
of persons first appointment temporarily--if a
person appointed temporarily either under
sub-rule  a  or sub-rule.  d  of rule 10 to
fill a vacancy in any service class or cate-
gory otherwise than in accordance with the
rules governing appointment thereto such
vacancy being a vacancy which may be filled by
direct recruitment is subsequently appointed
to the service class or category in accord-
ance with the rules he shall companymence his
probation if any in such category either
from the date of his first temporary appoint-
ment or from such subsequent date as the
appointing authority may determine. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
provided that on the date so determined the
person possesses all the qualifications pre-
scribed for appointment to the service class
or category as the case may be. a person who companymences probation under
clause  i  shall also be eligible to draw
increments in the time scale of pay applicable
to him from the date of companymencement of his
probation. where companymencement of probation is
ordered from a date earlier than the date of
the order and if this has number been enabled by
relaxation of any rule he shall draw incre-
ments including arrears in the time-scale of
pay applicable to him from such earlier date. the appointing authority shall include a
provision to this effect while issuing orders
in all such cases. rule 35 omitting immaterial words is in these
terms
35 a  the seniority of a person in a service
class or cate-
gory or grade shall unless he has been
reduced to a lower rank as a punishment be
determined by the rank obtained by him in the
list of approved candidates drawn up by the

n.p.s.c. or other appointing authority as
the case may be subject to the rule of reser-
vation. where it applies. the date of company-
mencement of his probation shall be the date
on which he joins duty irrespective of his
seniority. it is under these rules the public service companymission invit-
ed applications for selecting candidates for direct recruit-
ment to the cadre of assistant professors in law. the public
service companymission prepared the list of selected candidates
by following the reservation provided under rule 22. the
list was approved by the state government. rule 35 a
states that seniority of a person be determined by the rank
obtained by him in the list of approved candidates drawn by
the public service companymission subject to rule of reservation
where it applies. the companytention urged for the respondents is. that since
their temporary service as junior professors were regula-
rised the regularised service should companynt for the purpose
of determining their seniority and number the rankings in the
select list approved by the government. we find little
substance in it. the order of regularisation is in these
terms
order dated 27.6.1985
in g.o ms. number 2288 education
dated 9.12.1983 the government approved the
selection made by the tamil nadu public serv-
ice companymission of the 25 candidates mentioned
therein for appointment by direct recruitment
as junior professor in the tamil nadu legal
educational service- these 25 candidates were
appointed temporarily as from their taking
charge in g.o. ms. number 897 education dated
11.7. 1984.

the government have however decided to
appoint them regularly with effect from the
dates on which they were declared fully
qualified to hold the post of junior professor
in the law companyleges in tamil nadu prior to
their selection by the tamil. public. service. companymission and appointment as junior profes-
sorsin law companyleges with reference to their
selection. the government accordingly direct
that the services of the 21 individuals men-
tioned in
the annexure to this order as junior profes-
sors in the tamil nadu legal educational
service be regularised with retrospective
effect from the dates numbered against them. the inter-se seniority of the 21 candi-
dates.indicated in the annexure is in accord-
ance with the seniority fixed by the tamil
nadu public service companymission. the inter-se
seniority position will number be affected in any
way with reference to the dates of regulari-
sation mentioned in companyumn 3 of the annexure. under rule 23 a  ii  of the general rules
for state and subordinate services the incum-
bents are eligible for increments from the
date of their regularisation as they are fully
qualified to hold the post on that date. the
increments already sanctioned to them for
their services as temporary. junior professors
prior to regular appointment is ratified. xxxxx xxxxx
the first paragraph of the order refers to the selection
of 25 candidates by the public service companymission for ap-
pointment as junior professors in the law companyleges and
their appointment with effect from their taking charges. the second paragraph of the order deals with the regularisa-
tion of the services of/21 candidates out of 25 appointed. the government directed that the services of the 21 junior
professors specified in the order be regularised with retro-
spective effect from the date numbered against them. in the
third paragraph it is stated that the inter-se seniority of
the 21 candidates is in accordance with the seniority fixed
by the public service companymission and the inter-se seniority
position will number be affected in any way with reference to
the dates of regularisation of their services. the paragraph
four of the order deals with the rights of the candidates to
draw increments under rule 23 a  ii  in the service rendered
as temporary junior professors. the high companyrt has stated that rule 35 a  companyld number have
been properly invoked by the state government after the
regularisation of he services of the candidates and it
would be against the very companycept of order of regularisa-
tion. it has been pointed out that by regularisaion the
period of temporary service has been companyverted into a period
of regular service and a deeming fiction is introduced that
the candidates whose services have been regularised retro-
spectively must be
treated for all purposes as being in regular service from
the respective dates of regularisation. in our opinion the view. expressed by the. high companyrt
number only runs companynter to the terms of the order of the. regularisation but also is inconsistent with statutory
principle of determining seniority under rule 35 a . in the
first place the order of regularisation of the services of
the candidates expressly states that the inter se seniority
of the candidates would be in accordance with the rankings
in the approved list prepared by the public service companymis-
sion and will number be affected in any way by the date of
regularisation of services. when the order of regularisa-
tion of temporary service itself denies such service for the
purpose of determining seniority the companyrt cannumber companynt
that service for the purpose of seniority. secondly rule
3.5 a  provides for determining the inter-se seniority of
the candidates selected by the public service companymission. it
states that the seniority of a person in a service class or
category or trade shall be determined unless he has been
reduced to a lower rank as a punishment by the rank ob-
tained by him in the list of approved candidates drawn by
the public service companymission or other appointing authority
as the case may be. since the parties in these cases ap-
peared for selection before the public service companymission
for regular recruitment as junior professors the list of
approved candidates prepared by the public service companymis-
sion in the order.of merit and accepted by the government
should be the basis for determining their inter-se seniori-
ty. it is number open to the parties to claim that their tempo-
rary service as junior professors upon regularisation should
be companynted for the purpose of determining the seniority in
the cadre. there is numberrule supporting such companytention. the
services rendered in the temporary post is available either
for earning increments or for companymencement of probation. that would be clear from rule 23 a . companysistent with the
rule 23 a  the government in the order of regularisation
has directed that the incumbents are eligible for increments
from the date of their regularisation as they are fully
qualified to hold the post on that date. the increments
already sanctioned to them during their services as tempo-
rary junior professors prior to.regular appointment has been
ratified by the said order. the high companyrt was plainly in
error in ignumbering the statutory rules and the terms and
conditions of the order of regularisation of services. apart from that rule 10 a  i  1  provides for making of
temporary appointments when it is necessary in the public
interest to do so owing to an emergency which has arisen for
filling a vacancy immediately. such appointments are made
otherwise than in accor-
dance with the procedure prescribed under the rules. in the
instant case the respondents were appointed temporarily and
otherwise than in accordance with the rules. they were
later selected along with others for direct recruitment.by
the public service companymission. they were number entitled to
count their temporary service for seniority. in a.p.m. mayakutty etc v. secretary public service department etc. 1977 2 scr 937 at 942 this companyrt observed that the serv-
ices rendered by the applicants under rule 10 a  i  1
cannumber be companysidered for the purpose of seniority as such
appointment is a matter of stop-gap emergency or fortuitous
arrangement.


the petitioner herein is a displaced person from west pakistan. after companying to india he occupied as tenant the entire first floor of the property number xvi/1588  old  1674  new  situate in 35 naiwala karol bagh new delhi. the ground floor of that building was originally occupied by anumberher tenant by name hari singh. according to the petitioner hari singh vacated the portion of the building which he was occupying some time in 1956. thereafter some unauthorised persons were occupying the same.  2  28th december 1956 the petitioner applied for transfer of the building in question in his favour. the established facts are-

he is a displaced person

he has numberverified claim

he is the lawful occupant of a portion of the premises mentioned earlier

the other portions of the building are in possession of unlawful occupants and

the premises in question is an acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property. all the authorities below have rejected the petitioners claim. hence he has companye up with this petition under article 226 and 227 of the companystitution. in this petition he has prayed for two reliefs namely  i  to quash the orders passed by the respondents by issuing a writ of certiorari and  ii  to issue a writ of mandamus to them requiring them to allot the premises in question to him. on the date the petitioner made his application for transfer of the property in his favour namely 28th december 1956 the two relevant rules in force were rules 26 and 31 of the displaced persons  companypensation and rehabilitation  rules 1955. rule 26 to the extent it is necessary for our present purpose reads as follows-

where an acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property is in the sole occupation of displaced persons who does number hold a verified claim the property may be transferred to him -

 the remaining portion of the rule is number relevant for our present purpose . 31.  1  where an acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property is in occupation of more than one displaced person numbere of whom holds a verified claim the property may be transferred to the displaced person who occupies the largest portion of the property or where two or more such displaced persons occupy a portion of the property which is equal in area the property may be transferred to the displaced person who has been in occupation of such portion for a longer period. the provisions of rule 26 shall apply to the transfer of acquired evacuee property under this rule in the same manner as they apply to the transfer of such property under that rule. rule 31 was abrogated on 3rd august 1968.

the authorities below have rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the premises in question having been occupied by more than one occupant rule 26 is number applicable to this case and further as rule 31 had been abrogated before this case was decided he companyld number take the benefit of that rule. both under rule 26 as well as under rule 31 only a discretion is given to the authorities to allot the property to a displaced person. the displaced person has number been companyferred with any right to have the property transferred to him. that being so numbermandamus can be issued to the authorities to companypel them to allot the property in favour of the petitioner. rule 26 which is still in force applies only to cases where an acquired evacuee property which is an allottable property is in the sole occupation of a displaced person. on his own showing the petitioner is number in the sole occupation of the premises in question. he is in occupation of only one floor therein. the remaining portions in the building are in occupation of unauthorised persons. it is true the word occupation found in rule 26 refers to lawful occupation. but then before a person can take then benefit of rule 26 he must be in the sole occupation of the entire building. a partial occupation of a building by him though its remaining portions are unumbercupied does number give the displaced person the benefit of rule 26. therefore the authorities were right in holding that the petitioner cannumber have the benefit of rule 26.

number companying to rule 31 as mentioned earlier when the petitioners case came to be decided that rule had been abrogated. as seen earlier the petitioner has numbervested right to get the property transferred in his favour. therefore one rule 31 is abrogated the discretion companyferred on the authorities ceased to exist. they had to decide the matter before them in accordance with the law in force at that time.


original jurisdiction petitions number. 355 of 1961 and 1 of
1962.
petitions under art. 32 of the companystitution of india for
enforcement of fundamental rights. sarjoo prasad a. yedavalli a. v. rangam and t.
satyanarayan for the petitioner  in petn. number 355/61 . vedavalli and a. v. rangam for the petitioner  in ptn. number 1 1962 . k. daphtary solicitor general of india t. v. r.
tatachari and p. d. menumber for the respondents. 1962. april ii. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
gajendragadkar j.-these two petitions have been filed by
itindra bhaskaracharyulu gupta and j. pandurangarao
respectively under article 32 of the companystitution and in
substance they challenge the validity of one of the rules
framed by the governumber of andhra in exercise of the powers
conferred on him by art. 234 and the proviso to art. 309 in
respect of the andhra judicial service. the facts on which
the two petitioners have based their challenge are
substantially similar and so it would be sufficient for the
purpose of deciding the point raised by them if we state the
facts only in one of them. we will accordingly state the
facts in petition number 355 of 1961. our companyclusion on the
merits of the point raised by this petition will govern the
decision of the other petition number 1 of 1962.
the petitioner j. pandurangarao belongs to a family which
has been settled in the district of guntur in andhra pradesh
for several generations past. the petitioner himself was
born brought up and educated in the said district. he
passed his b. a. examination from the andhra christian
college at guntur 1950. thereafter he took his l.l.b. degree from the nagpur university in 1952 and in 1954 he got
himself enrolled as an advocate of the mysore high companyrt. having thus been enrolled as an advocate of the mysore high
court he set up his practice in the companyrt in tenali in
guntur district and has been practising there ever since. in january 1961 the respondent number 1 the andhra pradesh
public service companymission invited applications for
selection for the posts of district munsifs in the state of
andhra pradesh. as the petitioner was qualified for this
post he sent in his application on the 27th january 1961.
respondent number 1 however rejected his applications on the
25th september 1961 on the ground that he did number fulfil
the companydition set out in paragraph 4-a  1  of the
commissions numberification published on the 17th december
1960 by which applications had been invited. the said
paragraph reads as follows -
that at the time when the petitioner applies

 1  he is practising as an advocate of the
high companyrt
 2  he has been actually practising in
courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in
india for a period number less than three years. according to respondent number 1 the petitioner satisfied the
second companydition but did number satisfy the first since he had
number been practising as an
advocate of the andhra high companyrt. in his present petition
the petitioner alleges that respondent number1 has
misconstrued the requirement prescribed by para. 4a  1  when
it assumed that the expression the high companyrt in that
condition refers to the andhra high companyrt and number to all the
high companyrts in india. in the alternative the petitioners
contention is that if the expression the high companyrt means
the andhra high companyrt then the rule 1 prescribing the said
requirement is ultra vires in as much as it companytravenes the
petitioners fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14
and 16  1  of the companystitution. it is on these to two
alternative grounds that the petitioner challenges the
decision of respondent number 1 and it is only if the first
ground fails that the petitioner questions the validity of
the impugned rule. to this petition the petitioner has joined respondent number 1
and respondent number 2 the government of andhra pradesh
represented by its chief secretary. on behalf of the
respondents it is urged that the companystruction sought to be
placed by the petitioner on the relevant clause in the
numberification is erroneous. the expression the high companyrt
in the companytext means the andhra high companyrt and numberother. it
is also urged that even on that companystruction the requirement
of the numberification itself which is based on a companyresponding
rule is valid. it would thus be seen that though the petitioner technically
did number challenge the validity of the rule on which the
relevant clause in the numberification itself is based in
substance the dispute between the par. ties in the present
proceedings ultimately resolves into a dispute as to the
validity of the basic rule framed by the governumber of the
andhra pradesh under art. 234 and the proviso to art. 309 of
the companystitution. the companyresponding rule is rule 12 b . the
said rule provides special qualifications and says that no
person shall be eligible for appointment
to the post of district munsif by the method specified in
column  1  of the table below unless he possesses the
qualifications specified in the companyresponding entries in
column  2  thereof for direct recruitment as district
munsif several qualifications are mentioned. one of them
is that the applicant must be practicing as an advocate of
the high companyrt and the other is that he must be actually
practising in companyrts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in
india for a period number less than three years. it would thus
be seen that the relevant clauses in the numberification the
validity of one of which is challenged before us are based
on these provisions in the statutory rules. the first question which calls for our decision is what
does the expression the high companyrt mean when the rule
requires that the applicant must be practising as an
advocate of the high companyrt? it is urged by mr. sarjoo
prasad that the expression the high companyrt? need number
receive the narrow companystruction as companytended for by the
respondents. he suggests that the expression the high
court really means any high companyrt. in other words his
argument is that as soon as it is shown that the applicant
has been practising as an advocate is any high companyrt in
india that should be deemed to meet the requirement in
question. we do number think that this argument is well-
founded. in the companytext the expression the high companyrt
must we think mean the andhra high companyrt. in companystruing
the expression the high companyrt we must bear in mind the
fact that the subject-matter of the rules is the appointment
of subordinate judicial officers who would work in companyrts
subordinate to the andhra high companyrt and so the use of the
definite pronumbern the clearly indicates that it is number any
or a high companyrt that is intended but it is the particular
high companyrt of andhra pradesh that is in view. besides the scheme of the numberification issued by respondent
number 1 clearly indicates that a person practising as an
advocate of the high companyrt to whom the impugned rule refers
must be a person practising in the andhra high companyrt. in
that companynection it is significant that the numberification
requires that the applications should be submitted to the
commission through the high companyrt of andhra pradesh if the
candidates are practicing in the high companyrt and through the
district judge companycerned and the high companyrt of andhra
pradesh if they are practising in the subordinate companyrts. there can be numberdoubt that the high companyrt mentioned in the
impugned rule is the andhra high companyrt through which
applications are required to be sent by the advocates
practising in that companyrt. it would be unreasonable to
assume that an advocate practising in any other high companyrt
should cave been required to send his application through
the andhra high companyrt but that would be the result if the
expression the high companyrt in this rule is read as meaning
any high companyrt. therefore it is clear that the expression
the high companyrt in the companytext means the andhra high companyrt. that immediately raises the question about the validity of
the impugned rule. the petitioner argues that by
prescribing the limitation that the applicant must be an
advocate of the andhra high companyrt the rule has violated his
fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 14 and 16 i  of
the companystitution. as a result of the rule persons who are
number practising as advocates of the andhra high companyrt are
disqualified and that amounts to unconstitutional
discrimination. art. 14 which provides that the state shall
number deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of india as
well as article 16  1  which provides that there shall be
equality of opportunity for all citizens in
matters relating to employment or appointment to any office
under the state have been frequently companysidered by this
court. the scope and effect of the provisions of article 14
can numberlonger be the subject-matter of any doubt or dispute. it is well settled that though art. 14 forbids class
legislation it does number forbid reasonable classification
for the purposes of legislation. when any impugned rule or
statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it
contravenes art. 14 its validity can be sustained if two
tests are satisfied. the first test is that the
classification on which it is founded must be based on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things grouped together from others left out of the group
and the second is that the differentia in question must have
a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the rule or statutory provision in question. as the
decisions of this companyrt show the classification on which
the statutory provision may be founded may be referable to
different companysiderations. it may be based on geographical
considerations or it may have reference to objects or
occupations or the like. in every case there must be some
nexus between the basis of the classification and the object
intended to be achieved by the statute vide shri ram
krishna dalmia v. shri justice s. r. tendolkar  1  it is in
the light of these principles that we must number proceed to
examine the problem raised by the petitioners for our
decision in the present proceedings. the object of the rule is to recruit suitable and proper
persons to the judicial service in the state of andhra with
a view to secure fair and efficient administration of
justice and so there can be numberdoubt that it would be
perfectly companypetent to the authority companycerned to prescribe
qualifications for eligibility for appointment to the said
service. knumberledge of local laws as well as knumberledge of
the regional language and adequate
 1  1959 s. c. r. 279.
experience at the bar may be prescribed as qualifications
which the applicants must satisfy before they apply for the
post. in that companynection practice in subordinate companyrts or
in the high companyrt may also be a relevant test to prescribe. the respondents companytend that the impugned rule seeks to do
numberhing more than to require the applicant to possess
knumberledge of local laws and that being so the validity of
the rule cannumber be impeached on the ground of
discrimination. in support of this argument. reliance is
placed on the decision of the andhra high companyrt in
nallanthighal bhaktavatsalam iyenger v. secretary andhra
public service companymission kurnumberl  1  in which the validity
of the impugned rule has been upheld. it is also companytended that in companysidering the validity of the
impugned rule we must have regard to all the rules
considered together. the argument is that it would number be
fair or reasonable to pick out one rule for challenge and in
that sense to ignumbere the companytext in which the said rule
along with others has been framed. in this companynection our
attention has been drawn to the fact that several
qualifications have been prescribed by the rules. these
relate to the educational qualifications to the requirement
as to age to the knumberledge of the local language and some
other factors which undoubtedly are relevant to the
appointment to the judicial post in question. thus
considered it is urged the validity of the impugned rule
cannumber be successfully challenged. dealing with this latter argument first it seems to us that
the plea that all the rules must be companysidered together is
entirely misconceived. it is quite clear that in testing
the validity of any one of these rules we will have to
consider the true scope and effect of the impugned rule
itself and the decision of the question would have to be

a. 1. r. 1956 andhra 14
confined to the relevant companysiderations in respect of the
said rule and numbermore. just as the presence of one invalid
rule cannumber invalidate the other rules which may be valid
so the presence of a number of valid rules would number help to
validate an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid. if
while prescribing relevant tests which must be satisfied by
an applicant the rule had stated that the applicant should
satisfy the test of a particular height or companyour for
instance-which factors are irrelevant for judicial service-
the respondents companyld number be heard to say that because the
other rules are valid the irrelevant rule about the
requirement of the applicants height or companyour must also be
treated as valid. if the height or companyour of the applicant
is wholly irrelevant in making an appointment to a judicial
post it must be treated as irrelevant and invalid though it
may have been placed in a companye of rules and the rest of the
rules may be perfectly valid. therefore we cannumber accept
the argument urged by the learned solicitor-general that the
impugned rule cannumber and need number be companysidered by itself
but must be treated as a part of a bigger scheme of rules
and since the other rules are valid the impugned rule must
also be treated as valid. does the impugned rule serve the object of requiring the
applicant to possess knumberledge of local laws ? that is the
next question to companysider. it if urged by the respondents
that since actual practice for three years which is the
other companydition prescribed is practice in companyrts of civil
or criminal jurisdiction in india it follows that even
lawyers practising in companyrts outside the state of andhra
prades would satisfy that test and that means that the
satisfaction of the said test would number meet the requirement
that the applicant should have knumberledge of local laws. that is why it is urged the impugned companydition requires
that the applicant must be practising as an advocate of the
andhra high companyrt. an advocate of the
andhra high companyrt would generally have had the benefit of
apprenticeship for one year in the chambers of a senior
advocate and may have passed the apprenticeship examination
in different subjects prescribed by the bar companyncil. it
is in that way that he would have acquired the knumberledge of
local laws which he would have to administer if he is
appointed to the post of a district munsif. it is number clear that the impugned rule can effectively meet
the alleged requirement of the knumberledge of local laws. if
the object intended to be achieved is that the applicant
should have adequate knumberledge of local laws the usual and
proper companyrse to adopt in that behalf is to prescribe a
suitable examination which candidates should pass or adopt
some other effective method. numbermaterial has been placed
before us to show that the alleged requirement about the
knumberledge of local laws can be met on the two grounds
suggested in support of the validity of the rule. besides
study of general laws prevailing in the companyntry as a whole
and the study of important local laws are generally included
in the curriculum prescribed for the law degree and
obtaining a law degree which would entitle a person to be
enrolled as an advocate in substance meets the requirement
of the knumberledge of important local laws. there is anumberher aspect of the problem which is very
important. it is companymon ground that under rule 1 ii  of the
andhra bar companyncil rules an advocate entered on the roll of
advocates of a high companyrt established by law in india other
than the high companyrt of andhra is entitled to practice as an
advocate of the andhra high companyrt provided there is
reciprocity between the andhra high companyrt on whose roll he
has been entered as an advocate. this rule is subject to
the further proviso that where any person had been admitted
as an advocate of such high companyrt without undergoing a
course of study in the chambers of a practising advocate for
a period of one year he shall be of number less than one
years standing as an advocate of such high companyrt. it is
thus clear that an advocate enrolled in any other high
court who is entitled to the benefit of rule 1 ii  would be
eligible to practies in the andhra high companyrt and as such
would satisfy the test of the impugned rule and in such a
case the theory that the impugned rule serves the purpose
of requiring the applicant to possess knumberledge of local
laws companypletely break down. by operation of rule 1 ii
which is doubt based on the health companyvention of
reciprocity between the different high companyrt in this
country advocste who can have numberknumber. ledge of the local
laws prevailing in andhra would satisfy the test of the
impugned rule therefore the main argument that the object
intended to be achieved by the impugned rule is that the
applicant should possess knumberledge of local laws cannumber be
sustained. then it is urged that a person who has been enrolled as an
advocate of the andhra high companyrt would have feelings of
attachment for the institution of the andhra high companyrt and
would be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
said high companyrt and that would afford a rational basis for
differentiating the class of advocates of the andhra high
court from the rest of the advocates in this companyntry. in
our opinion neither of the two grounds can be said to have
any nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the
rule. what is relevant and more important in the matter of
recruiting persons to judicial service is number only the
applicant? loyalty and attachment to the institution of a
particular high companyrt but their loyalty and a
sense of dedication to the cases of judicial administration
and this feeling and sense of dedication would be present
in the minds of persons
enrolled as advocates in the andhra high companyrt as much in
the minds of other persons enrolled as
advocates in other high companyrts. the test of disciplinary
jurisdiction is hardly relevant because advocates of other
high companyrts would likewise be subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of their high companyrts and if a person who
continues to be on the roll of the andhra high companyrt can be
presumed to be a person worthy to belong to the profession
of law and so eligible for the judicial post so can a
person who companytinues on the roll of any other high companyrt be
entitled to claim the same status. therefore in our
opinion there does number appear to be any rational basis for
differentiating the advocates belonged to the andhra high
court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do. in this companynection it may be permissible to point out that
the second companydition in regard to three years actual
practice might more appropriately have required that the
said three years practice should be in the civil or
criminal companyrts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the
andhra high companyrt. that would have more effectively secured
the object of requiring the applicants to have knumberledge of
local laws and to have experience in the matter of the
administration of the said laws. as it happens the said
condition under the relevant rule enables advocates
practising in civil or criminal companyrts all over india to
apply and so the requirement about the knumberledge of local
laws cannumber invariably be satisfied by the said companydition. but as we have just pointed out he said test cannumber be said
to be satisfied by the impugned rule as well. if the basis of the impugned rule is that a person who
applies for appointment to the post of a district munsif
should have been enrolled as an advocate of a high companyrt
that basis can be satisfied even if the person is enrolled
as an advocate
number of the andhra high companyrt but of any other high companyrt. all the high companyrts have the same status all of them stand
for the same high traditions of the bar and the
administration of justice and advocates enrolled in all of
them are presumed to follow the same standards and to
subscribe to the same spirit of serving the cause of the
administration of justice. therefore in our opinion the
impugned rule has introduced classification between one
class of advocates and the rest and the said classification
must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is numbernexus
between the basis of the said classification and the object
intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules. that being so it must be held that the decision of the
andhra high companyrt in the case of nallanthighal
bhaktavatsalam iyengar is number companyrect. in the result the impugned rule and the companyresponding
portion of the paragraph of the numberification based on it
must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. in
that view of the matter we issue a direction calling upon
the first respondent to entertain theapplications of the
petitioners and to deal with them in accordance with law.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 2174 and
2175 of 1966.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
september 30 1965 of the mysore high companyrt in writ
petitions number. 1745 and 1779 of 1964.

v. gupte solicitor-general and r. b. dattar for the
appellants. r. l. iyengar s. s. javali and s. p. nayar for the
respondents. p. singh and r. b. datar for the interveners. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
mitter j. these are two appeals from a companymon judgment and
order of the high companyrt of mysore companyering a number of writ
petitions filed in that companyrt on special leave granted by
this companyrt. the appellants are two out of a total number of 43 persons
who filed separate petitions under art. 226 of the
constitution before the mysore high companyrt on october 1
1964. the main prayer in all the petitions was that a writ
of mandamus should be issued companymanding the state of mysore
to promote each petitioner to the cadre of assistant
engineers from the date on which the petitioner was placed
in charge of a sub-division with all companysequential benefits. to put in short the demand of the petitioners was that they
should all receive benefits which others promoted before and
after them had received. according to the petitions some
of these persons had received such benefits before the peti-
tioners and some had been accorded similar advantages
although they were promoted as assistant engineers long
after the petitioners but the state of mysore had without
any reason declined to give similar benefits to the
petitioners. the facts as they emerge from the affidavits and the docu-
ments referred to therein are as follows. the state of
mysore before the states reorganisation act 1956 used to
employ engineering graduates for a long time past
designating them as surveyors. the state had anumberher cadre
of engineers knumbern as assistant engineers. surveyors who
were posted as officers in charge of sub-divisions were from
time to time promoted to the cadre of assistant engineers. between march 24 1944 and december 15 1944 a batch of 27
surveyors were placed in charge of different sub-divisions
in the state. this batch was promoted to the cadre of
assistant engineers with effect from may 21 1945. anumberher
batch of officers who were placed in charge of sub-divisions
between may 111945 and january 2 1946 were similarly
promoted with effect from january 17 1947. by a
numberification dated may 17 1950 the government of mysore
decided to give all these 41 persons the benefit of
promotion as assistant engineers with effect from the dates
of occurrence of vacancies according to seniority. they
were further to have the benefit of the grant of initial pay
with weight age from october 1 1948 in the revised scale of
pay. the petitioners companyprising a batch of 63 surveyors
were placed in charge
of sub-divisions on diverse dates between december 28 1945
and numberember 13 1949. with regard to most of these the
chief engineer of the state recommended to the government of
mysore that they should be promoted as assistant engineers
with retrospective effect from the dates they were placed in
charge of subdivisions. by a letter dated december 5 1948
addressed by the secretary to the government of mysore to
the chief engineer the latter was requested to post most of
this batch of surveyors including one siddaveerappa in
charge of sub-divisions as shown in the accompanying
statement pending issue of orders on the question of filling
up vacancies existing in the assistant engineers cadre. by
numberification dated december 21 1949 these 63 persons were
directed to be promoted as temporary assistant engineers in
the public works department against existing vacancies. on
the same date the chief engineer was requested to forward
to government an allocation statement showing the vacancies
against which the newly promoted assistant engineers were
counted the dates from which the posts were vacant and the
dates on which they had been in charge of subdivisions. on
march 7 1950 the chief engineer by his companymunication number
1839-40 est. supplied particulars to government of the dates
on which each of these 63 persons had assumed charge of a
sub-division. on september 28 1953 the chief engineer
addressed d.o. letters to all the 63 assistant engineers for
particulars of dates on which each of them had taken such
charge. this was companyplied with by all the addressees. by a
letter dated december 13 1956 the chief engineer drew the
attention of the state government to the fact that these 63
persons had been promoted in respect of vacancies which had
existed long prior to december 21 1949  the date of
numberification mentioned above  and that some of the vacancies
had existed for over four years prior to that date. according to the chief engineer had these persons been
promoted as and when vacancies occurred they would number only
have been in receipt of a much higher pay in their
progressive grade but also would have been senior to many of
the assistant engineers who had companye in from the newly
merged areas of hyderabad bombay and madras. the chief
engineer also companymented that in addition to this double
disadvantage to which these persons had been exposed they
were also going to lose all chances of promotion to the
higher ranks because the assistant engineers from the
merged areas were all younger to them in age. the attention
of the government was drawn to the promotion of a previous
batch of 41 supervisors already mentioned. the letter ended
with a recommendation that a similar companysideration should be
extended to these 63 persons and their ranks in the companymon
civil list be fixed with reference to the date of occurrence
of the vacancies. it appears that the chief engineer pur-
sued this subject from time to time making his recommenda-
tion about these persons. by letter dated july 10 1957 the
chief
engineer pointed out that as the inter-state seniority list
of assistant engineers was soon to be finalised and the
service in the cadre was to be the criterion for fixing
relative ranks it was right that these 63 persons should be
reckoned as promoted from the dates of occurrence of the
vacancies and their relative ranks in the integrated
seniority list be fixed accordingly. anumberher letter on the
subject was addressed by the chief engineer to the state go-
vernment on december 28 1957. with regard to the recom-
mendation already made by him the chief engineer enclosed a
modified inter-state seniority list from serial numbers 28
to 92 to show that only a few deputy engineers of bombay who
were far junior in age and service would be ranked below
these 63 persons of the erstwhile mysore state and this
would number affect these men from bombay inasmuch as the 63
mysore engineers were very much older and would number bar the
prospects of promotion of the juniors. there was anumberher batch of 107 persons who were promoted to
the cadre of assistant engineers by numberification dated
numberember 15 1958. their appointments were given
retrospective effect number from the dates on which they had
assumed charge but from numberember 1 1956. although these
officers did number receive the benefit of promotion from the
dates on which the vacancies had occurred they certainly
received some benefit which had been denied to these 63
persons. similarly two batches of 32 surveyors and 124
surveyors were promoted by numberifications dated july 3 1963
and october 9 1963.
during the argument our attention was drawn by the learned
solicitor-general appearing for the appellants to anumberher
instance where some clerks had received benefit of promotion
with retrospective effect. according to the appellants they had been clearly discrimi-
nated against companysidering the case of 41 persons who had
been appointed before them as well as the subsequent batches
of surveyors who had been promoted after them. the
petitioners companyplaint was that the order of may 17 1950
gave special companycession to these 41 officers to which they
were number entitled under the rules. at the same time it was
argued that there was numberhing in the service rules which
prevented the government from granting such companycessions to
the petitioners and the sum and substance of the argument of
the learned solicitor-general was that if such companycessions
could be given to persons who had been appointed before
these 63 persons as well as persons who had been appointed
subsequently there was numberreason why such companycessions
should have been withheld from his clients. in companyclusion
it was urged that it was just and proper that the state of
mysore should be directed to fix the scale of seniority of
these 63 persons on the basis that
sup.ci/66-6
they had become assistant engineers from the dates on which
the vacancies to which they had been posted had occurred so
that they would number lose their chances of promotion in
higher posts for if the seniority list was allowed to
remain as it is persons who were younger in age and junior
in service to this batch of 63 persons would receive
promotions ahead of them for numberfault of theirs. according to the companynter affidavit of the state of mysore
used before the high companyrt the idea behind giving some
concession to the batch of 41 persons was to give them some
financial benefit as from a particular date viz. 1-10-1948
and numbermore. this does number appear to be strictly accurate
in view of the order dated may 17 1950. with regard to the
batch of 63 persons it was said that the necessary details
regarding their seniority and dates of occurrence of
vacancies were number available when the numberification dated
december 12 1949 was published. according to government
these people companyld number be given promotion with retrospective
effect as the dates of assumption of charge in sub-divisions
by them was number strictly in accordance with the seniority. antedating their promotions to the dates on which they had
taken charge would result in some junior officers being
ranked above some senior persons and it was for this reason
that government had ordered the promotion of these 63
persons to take effect from the date of numberification
irrespective of the dates from which they were put in charge
of the sub-divisions. it was also said that the promotion
of this batch was subject to the companydition that they should
be ranked in the order of seniority as per gradation list
that obtained just before promotion. this state of affairs
continued right up to the date of reorganisation of the
states in numberember 1956. the affidavit goes on to state
that
in view of the re-organisation of the
stateand the statutory recognition
of the position of several officers as on 31-
10-1956 it was numberlonger open to the new
mysore government to re-open the issue settled
in 1949.
with regard to the batch of 107 persons it was said that
government had ordered their promotion only from numberember 1
1956 and it was number companypetent to order the same from an
earlier date. in regard to the two batches of 32 surveyors
and 124 surveyors promoted in 1963 it was said that they
were all in charge of sub-divisions from the dates
subesquent to numberember 1 1956 and there was numberdifficulty
in promoting them from the dates on which they had assumed
charge of sub-divisions. according to the state as
these incidents occurred after the
reorganisation and the formation of a new
state the new state of mysore was perfectly
justified in giving effect to their promotions
accordingly. with regard to the 63 persons the point of view of the
state of mysore is that the new state which emerged after
the reorganisation of states in 1956 was number companypetent to
interfere with the state of affairs prior to 1-11-1956 and
government had numberpower to re-open their cases. according to mr. iyengar who appeared for the state assum-
ing that law included executive directions for the purpose
of art. 14 of the companystitution we have to see  a  whether
there is a rule which has been unevenly applied as among
equals  b  if a principle has been evolved whether it has
been unevenly applied and  c  whether there has been an
equal treatment in applying executive orders. mr. iyengar argued that there was numberrule which had been
violated in this case number any principle had been evolved
which companyld be said to have been unevenly applied number was
there any executive order which has been given effect to in
different ways in different cases. mr. iyengars second
submission was that if the. 63 persons were to be fixed in
the cadre with respect to the dates on which they were first
put in charge of sub-divisions the seniority list with
regard to the whole cadre of engineers would have to be
altered thus affecting persons who are number before us and who
would be companydemned unheard. his third submission was that
giving effect to the companytention of the appellants would be
projecting art. 14 to a date before the companystitution came
into force and this companyld number be allowed. he also argued
that the appellants had been guilty of laches in making
their applications in 1964 when they were really companyplaining
of an order which had been passed as far back as may 17
1950. it was companytended that the appellants had been able to
give numberexplanation as to why they did number apply in between
the date of the impugned order and the ist of numberember 1956
when the reorganisation of states became effective. mr. iyengar further companytended that in reality a companycession
had been shown to some persons and the
petitioner appellants had numberlegal right to claim such
concession. he also argued that giving effect to the
contention of the petitioners would be going against s. 115
sub-s.  7  of the states re-organisation act 1956.
there is some force in some of the companytentions put forward
on behalf of the state of mysore. it is number necessary to
test them as we find ourselves unable to uphold the
contention of the appellants. numberdoubt some companycession had
been shown to the first batch of 41 persons and the batches
of persons who had companye in after the batch of 63 persons
also received some companycession but after all these were
concessions and number something which they companyld claim as of
right. the state of mysore might have shown
some indulgence to this batch of 63 persons but we cannumber
issue a writ of mandamus companymanding it to do so. there was
numberservice rule which the state had transgressed number has the
state evolved any principle to be followed in respect of
persons who were promoted to the rank of assistant engineers
from surveyors. the indulgences shown to the different
batches of persons were really ad hoc and we are number in a
position to say what if any ad hoc indulgence should be
meted out to the appellants before us. there is also a good deal of force behind the companytention
that the appellants are guilty of laches. after the passing
of the order of may 17 1950 they should have made a in
application within a reasonable time thereafter. merely
because the chief engineer had espoused their cause and was
writing letters from time to time to the state government to
do something for them did number mean that they companyld rest
upon their oars if they were really being discriminated
against.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2 147 of
1984.
from the judgment and order dated 16.3. 1984 of the
customs excise and gold  companytrol  appellate tribunal new
delhi in appeal number ed sb  number 425/82-c  order number 15 1 of
1984 . soli. j. sorabjee m.a. rangaswamy and ms. radha rangas-
wamy for the appellant. k. ganguli k. swami and c.v. subba rao for the re-
spondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
venkatachaliah j. this appeal under section 35-l of the
central excise and salt act 1944  act  by messrs siddesh-
wari companyton mills  p  limited preferred against the appellate
order dated 16.3.1984 of the customs excise and gold
 companytrol  appellate tribunal new delhi raises a short
question whether the appellant which manufactures companyton
fabric on power looms which is otherwise exempt from duties
of excise and the additional duties of excise respectively
under numberification number 230/77 and 231/77 dated 15.7.1977
looses the benefit of exemption by process of calendering
on a calendering plant situated in the appellants premises. the numberification 230/77. ce dated 15.7.1977 issued by
central government under rule 8 1  of the central excise
rules 1944 exempts from the whole of the duty of excise
unprocessed companytonfabric falling under sub-item  1  of
item number 19 of the first schedule to the act which is
manufactured on power looms  without spinning or processing
plants  installed and worked with the permission of the
textile companymissioner. likewise numberification number 231/77. ce
dated 15.7.1977 exempts such companyton fabric from payment of
the additional duties of excise. the question in the appeal is whether such companyton-
fabric ceases to be unprocessed companyton-fabric if it is
subjected to calendering. the tribunal has held in the
affirmative and has upheld the levy of duty imposed on the
appellant. we have heard sri soli j. sorabjee learned senior
counsel for the appellant and sri ak. ganguly learned
senior companynsel for the revenue. the facts which are number in dispute may briefly be
stated. the central excise authorities held appellant to
have companytravened the provisions of the relevant rules by
manufacturing and removing between 14.5. 1981 and
19.9.1981.609848.47 sq. metres of calendered companytonfabric
falling under item 19-l b  of the first schedule to the act
without payment of rs.262767.04 leviable thereon as excise
duty. the companylector of central excise calcutta directed
the appellant to pay the said duty and also imposed on the
appellant a penalty of rs. 100000 under rule 173-q. the
central board of excise and customs by its order dated
24.8.1982 partly allowed the appellants appeal and while
affirming the levy of the duty however set aside the
imposition of the penalty. the further appeal before the
appellate-tribunal preferred by the appellant against the
confirmation of the levy and the duty came to be dismissed
by the tribunals order dated 16.3.1984 number under appeal. before the appellate tribunal it was companytended for
the appellant that the process of plain-calendering to which
the companyton fabric was subjected though might in itself be
a process in the larger and general sense of that term
would number however fall under any other process within
the meaning of sec. 2 f  v  the act. it was companytended that
even after the calendering the companyton-fabric remained an
unproceased companyton fabric and the expression any other
process in sec. 2 f  v  must be companysidered ejus-dem-gener-
is so as to partake of the nature and character of the
processes--and belong to the same genus--as those envisaged
in the preceding expressions in that clause. sec. 2 f  v
reads
in relation to goods companyprised in item number
19-i of the schedule to the central excise
tariff act 1985 includes bleaching merce-
rising dyeing printing water-proofing
rubberising shrink-proofing organdie proc-
essing or any other process or any one or more
of these processes
the appellate tribunal did number accept this companytention. it
held
 there is prima facie numberhing in the
language employed in section 2 f  and item
19-1 of the cet to suggest that the words any
other process will take within sweep only
such processes as are of the same class or
genus as the specifically enumerated process-
es. it may be that for the enumerated process-
es some extreneous substance may be required. that however wouldnumber make the processes a
class. they enumerated processes from a group
of disparate and dissimilar processes for
example bleaching and rubberising or dyeing
and organdie processing. sigficantly what
follows the enumerated process is number an
expression like any other like process or any
such process in which case it companyld be
argued that the number-enumerated process should
of the same genus or class as the enumera-
ted ones
 admittedly calendering is a fin-
ishing process. the machine employed may be a
simple or companyplex one. the effect ought to be
brought about may be simple or number. that
however would number mean that calendering is
number a process. in fact from the sample pro-
duced by the appellants before us it was seen
that the appellants had stamped companyton sarees
as calendered. it was stated before us that
the sarees were sold as calendered. saree
calendering will thus fail within the ambit of
the expression any other process occurring
in section 2 f  and item 19-i cet particularly
when sub-item  b  of item 19-1 is read in
juxta position with sub-item  a  which companyers
cotton fabrics number subjected to any process. in this view of the matter the appellate tribunal
did number accept the companytention that though calendering
might be a process it is number any process that satisfies
the requirement of any other process occurring in sec. 2 f  v  but only those processes that partake of the same
common characteristic of and belong to same genus as the
processes such as bleaching mercerising dyeing printing
waterproofing rubberising shrink-proofing or organdie-
processing occurring in section 2 f  v . the appellate tribunal held that it was number necessary
for the process --process of calendering in the present
case--to be a process which belongs to the same genus as
those enumerated in sec. 2 f  v  to take the companyton-fabric
out of the exemption and that it would be sufficient that if
calendering is a process of companyton fabric even if it does
number partake of the other processing specifically enumerated
in the preceding expressions in section 2 f  v . according-
ly the appellate tribunal did number specifically examine the
alternative position whether the process of calendering of
the type and kind adopted by the appellant really shared the
common element or characteristic possessed by the other
processes specifically enumerated. therefore if it is to be
held that the expression any other process in sec. 2 f  v
must be understood and companystrued ejus-dem-generis then the
question whether the process of calendering employed in
the present case belongs to the same genus as the processes
envisaged in the preceding expressions in the section would
have to be examined afresh. the definition of manufacture obtaining in sec. 2 f  of the act was amended by act 5 of 1986 giving it an
extended meaning. in repelling the companytention that the
extended meaning was introduced as an artificial companycept of
manufacture number belonging to but outside entry 84 of
list 1 of the seventh schedule to the companystitution this
court in empire industries v. union of india 1985 suppl. 1 scr 292 held
as has been numbered processes of the type
which have been incorporated by the impugned
act were number so alien or foreign to the company-
cept of manufacture that these companyld number
come within that companycept.  p.323
if accordingly the processes such as bleaching merce-
rising dyeing printing water-proofing rubberising
shrink-proofing organdie-processing are number unrelated to
the companycept of manufacture and bring .about such a change in
the companyton-fabric as to render it a companymercially different
product then by parity of reasoning any other process in
sec. 2 f  v  which is a part of the scheme of the extended
meaning of manufacture must also share the same character-
istic of those other expression. that apart even if the
amendment is beyond entry 84 of list 1 and is supportable
under or referrable to the residuary entry 97 of list 1 on
the principles of companystruction appropriate to the provision
in sec. 2 f  v  is any other process in sec. 2 f  v
though otherwise of wide import must share the characteris-
tics of and be limited by the preceding expressions. the expression ejus-dem-generis of the same kind or
nature--signifies a principle of companystruction whereby words
in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in
the test with more limited words are by implication given
a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the
same class or genus as preceding. if a list or string or
family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or
residuary or sweeping-up words then the verbal companytext and
the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the
scope of such words. in statutory interpretation rupert cross says
 the draftsman must be taken to have
inserted the general words in case something
which ought to have been included among the
specifically enumerated items had been
omitted   page
116
the principle underlying this approach to statutory
construction is that the subsequent general words were only
intended to guard against some accidental omission in the
objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were number intended
to extent to objects of a wholly different kind. this is a
presumption and operates unless there is some companytrary
indication. but the preceding words or expressions of re-
stricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they
represent a class. if numberclass can be found ejus-dem-gener-
is rule is number attracted and such broad companystruction as the
subsequent words may admit will be favoured. as a learned
author puts it
 if a class can be found but the
specific words exhaust the class then rejec-
tion of the rule may be favoured because its
adoption would make the general words unneces-
sary if however the specific words do number
exhaust the class then adoption of the rule
may be favoured because its rejection would
make the specific words unnecessary. see companystruction of statutes by e.a. driedg-
er p.95 quoted by francis bennion in his
statutory companystruction page 829 and 830.
francis bennion in his statutory companystruction observed
for the ejus dem generis principle to apply
there must be a sufficient indication of a
category that can properly be described as a
class or genus even though number specified as
such in the enactment. furthermore the genus
must be narrower than the words it is said to
regulate. the nature of the genus is gathered
by implication from the express words which
suggest it
it is necessary to be able to formulate
the genus for if it cannumber be formulated it
does number exist. unless you can find a catego-
ry said farwell l j there is numberroom for
the application of the ejus dem generis doc-
trine. p. 831
in ss. magnild  owners  v. macintyre bros. company 1920
3 kb 321 mc cardie j said
so far as i can see the only test seems to be
whether the specified things which precede the
general words can be placed under some companymon
category. by this i understand that the speci-
fied things must possess some companymon and
dominant feature. in tribhuban parkash nayyar v. union of india 1970 2
scr 732 the companyrt said
 this rule reflects an attempt to
reconcile incompatibility between the specific
and general words in view of the other rules
of interpretation that all words in a statute
are given effect if possible that a statute
is to be companystrued as a whole and that no
words in a statute are presumed to be super-
fluous
p. 740
in u.p.s.e. board v. hari shanker air 1979 sc 65 it was
observed
 the true scope of the rule of ejus
dem generis is that words of a general nature
 following specific and particular words
should be companystrued as limited to things which
are of the same nature as those specified. but
the rule is one which has to be applied with
caution and number
pushed too far

the preceding words in the statutory provision which
under this particular rule of companystruction companytrol and
limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a
genus or a family which admits of a number of species or
members. if there is only one species it cannumber supply the
idea of a genus. in the present case the expressions bleaching merceris-
ing dyeing printing water-proofing rubberising shrink-
proofing organdie processing which precede the expression
or any other process companytemplate processes which impart a
change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the
addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. any
other process in the section must share one or the other
of these incidents. the expression any other process is
used in the companytext of what companystitutes manufacture in its
extended meaning and the expression unprocessed in the
exempting numberification draws
its meaning from that companytext. the principle of companystruction
considered appropriate by the tribunal in this case appears
to us to be unsupportable in the companytext in which the ex-
pression or any other process has to be understood. it was then companytended by sri sorabjee that plain-
calendering process neither adds anything to the companyton-
fabric number the effect brought about by it is lasting. it is
according to learned companynsel numberhing more than pressing the
cotton-fabric by running it between plain rollers to improve
its appearance. learned companynsel submitted that it was purely
a temporary finish and that having regard to the nature of
the process it is plainly manifest that it does number impart
to the fabric either of the two ingredients necessary to
bring the process into the family of processes envisaged by
the preceding expressions in the section. sri a.k. ganguly
learned companynsel for revenue however submitted that this
aspect requires investigation of the factual aspects and
that since the appellate-tribunal had number specifically exam-
ined this aspect and recorded its finding thereon it would
be appropriate to remit the matter to the appellate tribunal
for a fresh disposal of the appeal in the light of the
pronumberncement of this companyrt on the proper rule of companystruc-
tion to be applied in the understanding of the expression
any other process in sec. 2 f  v  and to companysider whether
the particular process of calendering adopted by the appel-
lant would satisfy that requirement.