original jurisdiction writ petition number 8143 of 1981.  under article 32 of the companystitution of india
govind mukhoty in person and a.k. ganguli for the
petitioner. miss a. subhashini for respondent number 1.

c. talukdar and r.n. poddar for respondents number.5 and
6.
sardar bahadur saharya and vishnu bahadur saharya for
respondent number 7.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
bhagwati j. this is a writ petition brought by way of
public interest litigation in order to ensure observance of
the provisions of various labour laws in relation to workmen
employed in the companystruction work of various projects
connected with the asian games. the matter was brought to
the attention of the companyrt by the 1st petitioner which is an
organisation formed for the purpose of protecting democratic
rights by means of a letter addressed to one of us
 bhagwati j. . the letter was based on a report made by a
team of three social scientists who were companymissioned by the
1st petitioner for the purpose of investigating and
inquiring into the companyditions under which the workmen
engaged in the various asiad projects were working. since
the letter addressed by the 1st petitioner was based on the
report made by three social scientists after personal
investigation and study it was treated as a writ petition
on the judicial side and numberice was issued upon it inter
alia to the union of india delhi development authority and
delhi administration which
were arrayed as respondents to the writ petition. these
respondents filed their respective affidavits in reply to
the allegations companytained in the writ petition and an
affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner in rejoinder
to the affidavits in reply and the writ petition was argued
before us on the basis of these pleadings. before we proceed to deal with the facts giving rise to
this writ petition we may repeat what we have said earlier
in various orders made by us from time to time dealing with
public interest litigation. we wish to point out with all
the emphasis at our companymand that public interest litigation
which is a strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which
is intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses who companystitute the low visibility area of humanity
is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary
traditional litigation which is essentially of an adversary
character where there is a dispute between two litigating
parties one making claim or seeking relief against the
other and that other opposing such claim or resisting such
relief. public interest litigation is brought before the
court number for the purpose of enforcing the right of one
individual against anumberher as happens in the case of
ordinary litigation but it is intended to promote and
vindicate public interest which demands that violations of
constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of people
who are poor ignumberant or in a socially or econumberically
disadvantaged position should number go unnumbericed and
unredressed. that would be destructive of the rule of law
which forms one of the essential elements of public interest
in any democratic form of government. the rule of law does
number mean that the protection of the law must be available
only to a fortunate few or that the law should be allowed to
be prostituted by the vested interests for protecting and
upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement of
their civil and political rights. the poor too have civil
and political rights and the rule of law is meant for them
also though today it exists only on paper and number in
reality. if the sugar barons and the alcohol kings have the
fundamental right to carry on their business and to fatten
their purses by exploiting the companysuming public have the
chamars belonging to the lowest strata of society no
fundamental right to earn an honest living through their
sweat and toil ? the former can approach the companyrts with a
formidable army of distinguished lawyers paid in four or
five figures per day and if their right to exploit is upheld
against the government under the label of fundamental right
the companyrts are praised for their boldness
and companyrage and their independence and fearlessness are
applauded and acclaimed. but if the fundamental right of
the poor and helpless victims of injustice is sought to be
enforced by public interest litigation the so called
champions of human rights frown upon it as waste of time of
the highest companyrt in the land which according to them
should number engage itself in such small and trifling matters. moreover these self-styled human rights activists forget
that civil and political rights priceless and invaluable as
they are for freedom and democracy simply do number exist for
the vast masses of our people. large numbers of men women
and children who companystitute the bulk of our population are
today living a sub-human existence in companyditions of abject
poverty utter grinding poverty has broken their back and
sapped their moral fibre. they have numberfaith in the existing
social and econumberic system. what civil and political rights
are these poor and deprived sections of humanity going to
enforce ? this was brought out forcibly by w. paul gormseley
at the silver jubilee celebrations of the universal
declaration of human rights at the banaras hindu university
since india is one of those companyntries which has
given a pride of place to the basic human rights and
freedoms in its companystitution in its chapter on
fundamental rights and on the directive principles of
state policy and has already companypleted twenty-five
years of independence the question may be raised
whether or number the fundamental rights enshrined in our
constitution have any meaning to the millions of our
people to whom food drinking water timely medical
facilities and relief from disease and disaster
education and job opportunities still remain
unavoidable. we in india should on this occasion
study the human rights declared and defined by the
united nations and companypare them with the rights
available in practice and secured by the law of our
country. the only solution for making civil and political rights
meaningful to these large sections of society would be to
remake the material companyditions and restructure the social
and econumberic order so that they may be able to realise the
econumberic social and cultural rights. there is indeed close
relationship between civil and political rights on the one
hand and econumberic social and cultural rights on the other
and this relationship is so obvious that the international
human rights companyference in tehran called by the general
assembly in 1968 declared in a final proclamation
since human rights and fundamental freedoms are
indivisible the full realisation of civil and
political rights without the enjoyment of econumberic
social and cultural rights is impossible. of companyrse the task of restructuring the social and econumberic
order so that the social and econumberic rights become a
meaningful reality for the poor and lowly sections of the
community is one which legitimately belongs to the
legislature and the executive but mere initiation of social
and econumberic rescue programmes by the executive and the
legislature would number be enumbergh and it is only through
multidimensional strategies including public interest
litigation that these social and econumberic rescue programmes
can be made effective. public interest litigation as we
conceive it is essentially a companyoperative or companylaborative
effort on the part of the petitioner the state or public
authority and the companyrt to secure observance of the
constitutional or legal rights benefits and privileges
conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the companymunity and
to reach social justice to them. the state or public
authority against whom public interest litigation is brought
should be as much interested in ensuring basic human rights
constitutional as well as legal to those who are in a
socially and econumberically disadvantaged position as the
petitioner who brings the public interest litigation before
the companyrt. the state or public authority which is arrayed as
a respondent in public interest litigation should in fact
welcome it as it would give it an opportunity to right a
wrong or to redress an injustice done to the poor and weaker
sections of the companymunity whose welfare is and must be the
prime companycern of the state or the public authority. there is a misconception in the minds of some lawyers
journalists and men in public life that public interest
litigation is unnecessarily cluttering up the files of the
court and adding to the already staggering arrears of cases
which are pending for long years and it should number therefore
be encouraged by the companyrt. this is to our mind a totally
perverse view smacking of elitist and status quoist
approach. those who are decrying public interest litigation
do number seem to realise that companyrts are number meant only for
the rich and the well-to-do for the landlord and the
gentry for the business magnate
and the industrial tycoon but they exist also for the poor
and the down-trodden the have-numbers and the handicapped and
the half-hungry millions of our companyntrymen. so far the
courts have been used only for the purpose of vindicating
the rights of the wealthy and the affluent. it is only these
privileged classes which have been able to approach the
courts for protecting their vested interests. it is only the
moneyed who have so far had the golden key to unlock the
doors of justice. but number for the first time the portals of
the companyrt are being thrown open to the poor and the down-
trodden the ignumberant and the illiterate and their cases
are companying before the companyrts through public interest
litigation which has been made possible by the recent
judgment delivered by this companyrt in judges appointment and
transfer cases. millions of persons belonging to the
deprived and vulnerable sections of humanity are looking to
the companyrts for improving their life companyditions and making
basic human rights meaningful for them. they have been
crying for justice but their cries have so far been in the
wilderness. they have been suffering injustice silently with
the patience of a rock without the strength even to shed
any tears. mahatma gandhi once said to gurudev tagore i
have had the pain of watching birds who for want of
strength companyld number be companyxed even into a flutter of their
wings. the human bird under the indian sky gets up weaker
than when he pretended to retire. for millions it is an
eternal trance. this is true of the human bird in india
even today after more than 30 years of independence. the
legal aid movement and public interest litigation seek to
bring justice to these forgotten specimens of humanity who
constitute the bulk of the citizens of india and who are
really and truly the people of india who gave to
themselves this magnificent companystitution. it is true that
there are large arrears pending in the companyrts but that
cannumber be any reason for denying access to justice to the
poor and weaker sections of the companymunity. numberstate has a
right to tell its citizens that because a large number of
cases of the rich and the well-to-do are pending in our
courts we will number help the poor to companye to the companyrts for
seeking justice until the staggering load of cases of people
who can afford is disposed of. the time has number companye when
the companyrts must become the companyrts for the poor and
struggling masses of this companyntry they must shed their
character as upholders of the established order and the
status quo. they must be sensitised to the need of doing
justice to the large masses of people to whom justice has
been denied by a cruel and heartless society for
generations. the realisation must companye to them that
social justice is the signature tune of our companystitution and
it is their solemn duty under the companystitution to enforce
the basic human rights of the poor and vulnerable sections
of the companymunity and actively help in the realisation of the
constitutional goals. this new change has to companye if the
judicial system is to become an effective instrument of
social justice for without it it cannumber survive for long. fortunately this change is gradually taking place and
public interest litigation is playing a large part in
bringing about this change. it is through public interest
litigation that the problems of the poor are number companying to
the fore front and the entire theatre of the law is
changing. it holds out great possibilities for the future. this writ petition is one such instance of public interest
litigation. the asian games take place periodically in different
parts of asia and this time india is hosting the asian
games. it is a highly prestigious undertaking and in order
to accomplish it successfully according to international
standards the government of india had to embark upon
various companystruction projects which included building of
fly-overs stadia swimming pool hotels and asian games
village companyplex. this companystruction work was framed out by
the government of india amongst various authorities such as
the delhi administration the delhi development authority
and the new delhi municipal companymittee. it is number necessary
for the purpose of the present writ petition to set out what
particular project was entrusted to which authority because
it is number the purpose of this writ petition to find fault
with any particular authority for number observing the labour
laws in relation to the workmen employed in the projects
which are being executed by it but to ensure that in future
the labour laws are implemented and the rights of the
workers under the labour laws are number violated. these
various authorities to whom the execution of the different
projects was entrusted engaged companytractors for the purpose
of carrying out the companystruction work of the projects and
they were registered as principal employers under section 7
of the companytract labour  regulation and abolition  act 1970.
the companytractors started the companystruction work of the
projects and for the purpose of carrying out the
construction work they engaged workers through jamadars. the jamadars brought the workers from different parts of
india and particularly the states of rajasthan uttar
pradesh and orissa and got them employed by the companytractors. the workers were entitled to a minimum wage of rs. 9.25 per day that being the minimum wage fixed for workers
employed on the companystruction of roads and in building
operations but the case of the petitioners was that the
workers were number paid this minimum wage and they were
exploited by the companytractors and the jamadars. the union of
india in the affidavit reply filed on its behalf by madan
mohan under secretary ministry of labour asserted that the
contractors did pay the minimum wage of rs. 9.25 per day but
frankly admitted that this minimum wage was paid to the
jamadars through whom the workers were recruited and the
jamadars deducted rupee one per day per worker as their
commission and paid only rs. 8.25 by way of wage to the
workers. the result was that in fact the workers did number get
the minimum wage of rs. 9.25 per day. the petitioners also
alleged in the writ petition that the provisions of the
equal remuneration act 1976 were violated and women workers
were being paid only rs. 7/- per day and the balance of the
amount of the wage was being misappropriated by the
jamadars. it was also pointed out by the petitioners
that there was violation of article 24 of the companystitution
and of the provisions of the employment of children act
1938 in as much as children below the age of 14 years were
employed by the companytractors in the companystruction work of the
various projects. the petitioners also alleged violation of
the provisions of the companytract labour  regulation and
abolition  act 1970 and pointed out various breaches of
those provisions by the companytractors which resulted in
deprivation and exploitation of the workers employed in the
construction work of most of the projects. it was also the
case of the petitioners that the workers were denied proper
living companyditions and medical and other facilities to which
they were entitled under the provisions of the companytract
labour  regulation and abolition  act 1970. the petitioners
also companyplained that the companytractors were number implementing
the provisions of the inter state migrant workmen
 regulation of employment and companyditions of service  act
1979 though that act was brought in force in the union
territory of delhi as far back as 2nd october 1980. the
report of the team of three social scientists on which the
writ petition was based set out various instances of
violations of the provisions of the minimum wages act 1948
the equal remuneration act 1976 article 24 of the
constitution the employment of children act 1970 and the
inter state migrant workmen  regulation of employment and
conditions of service  act 1979.
these averments made on behalf of the petitioners were
denied in the affidavits in reply filed on behalf of the
union of india the
delhi administration and the delhi development authority. it
was asserted by these authorities that so far as the equal
remuneration act 1976 and the companytract labour  regulation
and abolition  act 1970 were companycerned the provisions of
these labour laws were being companyplied with by the
contractors and whenever any violations of these labour laws
were brought to the attention of the authorities as a result
of periodical inspections carried out by them action by way
of prosecution was being taken against the companytractors. the
provisions of the minimum wages act 1948 were according to
the delhi development authority being observed by the
contractors and it was pointed out by the delhi development
authority in its affidavit in reply that the companystruction
work of the projects entrusted to it was being carried out
by the companytractors under a written companytract entered into
with them and this written companytract incorporated model
rules for the protection of health and sanitary arrangements
for workers employed by delhi development authority or its
contractors which provided for various facilities to be
given to the workers employed in the companystruction work and
also ensured to them payment of minimum wage the delhi
administration was number so categorical as the delhi
development authority in regard to the observance of the
provisions of the minimum wages act 1948 and in its
affidavit in reply it companyceded that the jamadars through
whom the workers were recruited might be deducting rupee one
per day per worker from the minimum wage payable to the
workers. the union of india was however more frank and it
clearly admitted in its affidavit in reply that the jamadars
were deducting rupee one per day per worker from the wage
payable to the workers with the result that the workers did
number get the minimum wage of rs. 9.25 per day and there was
violation of the provisions of the minimum wages act 1948.
so far as the employment of children act 1938 is
concerned the case of the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority was that
numbercomplaint in regard to the violation of the provisions of
that act was at any time received by them and they disputed
that there was any violation of these provisions by the
contractors. it was also companytended on behalf of these
authorities that the employment of children act 1938 was number
applicable in case of employment in the companystruction work of
these projects since companystruction industry is number a process
specified in the schedule and is therefore number within the
provisions of sub-
section  3  of section 3 of that act. number unfortunately this
contention urged on behalf of the respondents is well
founded because companystruction industry does number find a place
in the schedule to the employment of children act 1938 and
the prohibition enacted in section 3 sub-section  3  of that
act against the employment of a child who has number companypleted
his fourteenth year cannumber apply to employment in
construction industry. this is a sad and deplorable omission
which we think must be immediately set right by every
state government by amending the schedule so as to include
construction industry in it in exercise of the power
conferred under section 3a of the employment of children
act 1938. we hope and trust that every state government
will take the necessary steps in this behalf without any
undue delay because companystruction work is clearly a
hazardous occupation and it is absolutely essential that the
employment of children under the age of 14 years must be
prohibited in every type of companystruction work. that would be
in companysonance with companyvention number 59 adopted by the
international labour organisation and ratified by india. but
apart altogether from the requirement of companyvention number 59
we have article 24 of the companystitution which provides that
numberchild below the age of 14 shall be employed to work in
any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous
employment. this is a companystitutional prohibition which even
if number followed up by appropriate legislation must operate
proprio vigore and companystruction work being plainly and
indubitably a hazardous employment it is clear that by
reason of this companystitutional prohibition numberchild below
the age of 14 years can be allowed to be engaged in
construction work. there can therefore be numberdoubt that
numberwithstanding the absence of specification of companystruction
industry in the schedule to the employment of children act
1938 numberchild below the age of 14 years can be employed in
construction work and the union of india as also every state
government must ensure that this companystitutional mandate is
number violated in any part of the companyntry. here of companyrse
the plea of the union of india the delhi administration and
the delhi development authority was that numberchild below the
age of 14 years was at any time employed in the companystruction
work of these projects and in any event numbercomplaint in that
behalf was received by any of these authorities and hence
there was numberviolation of the companystitutional prohibition
enacted in article 24. so far as the companyplaint in regard to
number-observance of the provisions of the inter state migrant
workmen  regulation of employment and companyditions of service
act 1979 was companycerned the defence of the union of india
the delhi administration and the delhi development authority
that though this act had companye into force in the
union territory of delhi with effect from 2nd october 1980
the power to enforce the provisions of the act was delegated
to the administrator of the union territory of delhi only on
14th july 1981 and thereafter also the provisions of the act
could number been enforced because the rules to be made under
the act had number been finalised until 4th june 1982. it is
difficult to understand as to why in the case of beneficient
legislation like the inter state migrant workmen  regulation
of employment and companyditions of service  act 1979 it should
have taken more than 18 months for the government of india
to delegate the power to enforce the provisions of the act
to the administrator of the union territory of delhi and
anumberher almost 12 months to make the rules under the act. it
was well knumbern that a large number of migrant workmen companying
from different states were employed in the companystruction work
of various asiad projects and if the provisions of a social
welfare legislation like the inter state migrant workmen
 regulation of employment and companyditions of service  act
1979 were applied and the benefit of such provisions made
available to these migrant workmen it would have gone a
long way towards ameliorating their companyditions of work and
ensuring them a decent living with basic human dignity. we
very much wished that the provisions of this act had been
made applicable earlier to the migrant workmen employed in
the companystruction work of these projects though we must
confess that we do number see why the enforcement of the
provisions of the act should have been held up until the
making of the rules. it is numberdoubt true that there are
certain provisions in the act which cannumber be enforced
unless there are rules made under the act but equally there
are other provisions which do number need any prescription by
the rules for their enforcement and these latter provisions
could certainly have been enforced by the administrator of
the union territory of delhi in so far as migrant workmen
employed in these projects were companycerned. there can be no
doubt that in any event from and after 4th june 1982 the
provisions of this beneficient legislation have become
enforceable and the migrant workmen employed in the
construction work of these projects are entitled to the
rights and benefits companyferred upon them under those
provisions. we need number point out that so far as the rights
and benefits companyferred upon migrant workmen under the
provisions of section 13 to 16 of the act are companycerned the
responsibility for ensuring such rights and benefits rests
number only on the companytractors but also on the union of india
the delhi administration or the delhi development authority
who is
the principal employer in relation to the companystruction work
entrusted by it to the companytractors. we must companyfess that we
have serious doubts whether the provisions of this act are
being implemented in relation to the migrant workmen
employed in the companystruction work of these projects and we
have therefore by our order dated 11th may 1982 appointed
three ombudsmen for the purpose of making periodic
inspection and reporting to us whether the provisions of
this act are being implemented at least from 4th june 1982.
we must in fairness point out that the union of india
has stated in its affidavit in reply that a number of
prosecution have been launched against the companytractors for
violations of the provision of various labour laws and in
annexure i to its affidavit in reply it has given detailed
particulars of such prosecutions. it is apparent from the
particulars given in this annexure that the prosecutions
launched against the companytractors were primarily for offences
such as number-maintenance of relevant registers number-provision
of welfare and health facilities such as first aid box
latrines urinals etc. and number-issue of wage slips. we do
number propose to go into the details of these prosecutions
launched against the companytractors but we are shocked to find
that in cases of violations of labour laws enacted for the
benefit of workmen the magistrates have been imposing only
small fines of rs. 200/- thereabouts. the magistrates seem
to view the violations of labour laws with great
indifference and unconcern as if they are trifling offences
undeserving of judicial severity. they seem to over-look the
fact labour laws are enacted for improving the companyditions of
workers and the employers cannumber be allowed to buy off
immunity against violations of labour laws by paying a
paltry fine which they would number mind paying because by
violations the labour laws they would be making profit which
would far exceed the amount of the fine. if violations of
labour laws are going to be punished only by meagre fines
it would be impossible to ensure observance of the labour
laws and the labour laws would be reduced to nullity. they
would remain merely paper tigers without any teeth or claws. we would like to impress upon the magistrates and judges in
the companyntry that violations of labour laws must be viewed
with strictness and whenever any violations of labour laws
are established before them they should punish the errant
employers by imposing adequate punishment. we may companyveniently at this stage before proceeding to
examine the factual aspects of the case deal with two
preliminary
objections raised on behalf of the respondents against the
maintainability of the writ petition. the first preliminary
objection was that the petitioners had numberlocus standi to
maintain the writ petition since even on the averments made
in the writ petition the rights said to have been violated
were those of the workers employed in the companystruction work
of the various asiad projects and number of the petitioners and
the petitioners companyld number therefore have any cause of
action. the second preliminary objection urged on behalf of
the respondents was that in any event numberwrit petition companyld
lie against the respondents because the workmen whose
rights were said to have been violated were employees of the
contractors and number of the respondents and the cause of
action of the workmen if any was therefore against the
contractors and number against the respondents. it was also
contended as part of this preliminary objection that numberwrit
petition under article 32 of the companystitution companyld lie
against the respondents for the alleged violations of the
rights of the workmen under the various labour laws and the
remedy if any was only under the provisions of those laws. these two preliminary objections were pressed before us on
behalf of the union of india the delhi administration and
the delhi development authority with a view to shutting out
an inquiry by this companyrt into the violations of various
labour laws alleged in the writ petition but we do number
think there is any substance in them and they must be
rejected. our reasons for saying so are as follows
the first preliminary objection raises the question of
locus standi of the petitioners to maintain the writ
petition. it is true that the companyplaint of the petitioners
in the writ petition is in regard to the violations of the
provisions of various labour laws designed for the welfare
of workmen and therefore from a strictly traditional point
of view it would be only the workmen whose legal rights are
violated who would be entitled to approach the companyrt for
judicial redress. but the traditional rule of standing which
confines access to the judicial process only to those to
whom legal injury is caused or legal wrong is done has number
been jettisoned by this companyrt and the narrow companyfines within
which the rule of standing was imprisoned for long years as
a result of inheritance of the anglo-saxon system of
jurisprudence have been broken and a new dimension has been
given to the doctrine of locus standi which has
revolutionised the whole companycept of access to justice in a
way number knumbern before to the western system of jurisprudence. this companyrt
has taken the view that having regard to the peculiar
socioeconumberic companyditions prevailing in the companyntry where
there is companysiderable poverty illiteracy and ignumberance
obstructing and impeding accessibility to the judicial
process it would result in closing the doors of justice to
the poor and deprived sections of the companymunity if the
traditional rule of standing evolved by anglo-saxon
jurisprudence that only a person wronged can sue for
judicial redress were to be blindly adhered to and followed
and it is therefore necessary to evolve a new strategy by
relaxing this traditional rule of standing in order that
justice may became easily available to the lowly and the
lost. it has been held by this companyrt in its recent judgment
in the judges appointment and transfer case in a major
break-through which in the years to companye is likely to impart
new significance and relevance to the judicial system and to
transform it into as instrument of socio-econumberic change
that where a person or class of persons to whom legal injury
is caused or legal wrong is done is by reason of poverty
disability or socially or econumberically disadvantaged
position number able to approach the companyrt for judicial
redress any member of the public acting bona fide and number
out of any extraneous motivation may move the companyrt for
judicial redress of the legal injury or wrong suffered by
such person or class of persons and the judicial process may
be set in motion by any public spirited individual or
institution even by addressing a letter to the companyrt. where
judicial redress is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong
suffered by a person or class of persons who by reason of
poverty disability or socially or econumberically
disadvantaged position are unable to approach the companyrt and
the companyrt is moved for this purpose by a member of a public
by addressing a letter drawing the attention of the companyrt to
such legal injury or legal wrong companyrt would cast aside all
technical rules of procedure and entertain the letter as a
writ petition on the judicial side and take action upon it. that is what has happened in the present case. here the
workmen whose rights are said to have been violated and to
whom a life of basic human dignity has been denied are poor
ignumberant illiterate humans who by reason of their poverty
and social and econumberic disability are unable to approach
the companyrts for judicial redress and hence the petitioners
have under the liberalised rule of standing locus standi to
maintain the present writ petition espousing the cause of
the workmen. it is number the case of the respondents that the
petitioners are acting mala fide or out of extraneous
motives and in fact the respondents cannumber so allege since
the first petitioner is admittedly an organisation dedicated
to the protection and enforcement of fundamental rights and
making directive principles of state policy enforceable and
justiciable. there can be numberdoubt that it is out of a sense
of public service that the present litigation has been
brought by the petitioners and it is clearly maintainable. we must then proceed to companysider the first limb of the
second preliminary objection. it is true that the workmen
whose cause has been championed by the petitioners are
employees of the companytractors but the union of india the
delhi administration and the delhi development authority
which have entrusted the companystruction work of asiad projects
to the companytractors cannumber escape their obligation for
observance of the various labour laws by the companytractors. so
far as the companytract labour  regulation and abolition  act
1970 is companycerned it is clear that under section 20 if any
amenity required to be provided under sections 16 17 18 or
19 for the benefit of the workmen employed in an
establishment is number provided by the companytractor the
obligation to provide such amenity rests on the principal
employer and therefore if in the companystruction work of the
asiad projects the companytractors do number carry out the
obligations imposed upon them by any of these sections the
union of india the delhi administration and the delhi
development authority as principal employers would be liable
and these obligations would be enforceable against them. the
same position obtains in regard to the inter state migrant
workmen  regulation of employment and companyditions of service
act 1979. in the case of this act also sections 17 and 18
make the principal employer liable to make payment of the
wages to the migrant workmen employed by the companytractor as
also to pay the allowances provided under sections 14 and 15
and to provide the facilities specified in section 16 to
such migrant workmen in case the companytractor fails to do so
and these obligations are also therefore clearly enforceable
against the union of india the delhi administration and the
delhi development authority as principal employers. so far
as article 24 of the companystitution is companycerned it embodies
a fundamental right which is plainly and indubitably
enforceable against every one and by reason of its
compulsive mandate numberone can employ a child below the age
of 14 years in a hazardous employment and since as pointed
out above companystruction work is a hazardous employment no
child below the age of 14 years can be employed in
construction work and there
fore number only are the companytractors under a companystitutional
mandate number to employ any child below the age of 14 years
but it is also the duty of the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority to ensure
that this companystitutional obligation is obeyed by the
contractors to whom they have entrusted the companystruction
work of the various asiad projects. the union of india the
delhi administration and the delhi development authority
cannumber fold their hands in despair and become silent
spectators of the breach of a companystitutional prohibition
being companymitted by their own companytractors. so also with
regard to the observance of the provisions of the equal
remuneration act 1946 the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority cannumber
avoid their obligation to ensure that these provisions are
complied with by the companytractors. it is the principle of
equality embodied in article 14 of the companystitution which
finds expression in the provisions of the equal remuneration
act 1946 and if the union of india the delhi administration
or the delhi development authority at any time finds that
the provisions of the equal remuneration act 1946 are number
observed and the principles of equality before the law
enshrined in article 14 is violated by its own companytractors
it cannumber ignumbere such violation and sit quiet by adopting a
number-interfering attitude and taking shelter under the
executive that the violation is being companymitted by the
contractors and number by it. if any particular companytractor is
committing a breach of the provisions of the equal
remuneration act 1946 and thus denying equality before the
law to the workmen the union of india the delhi
administration or the delhi development authority as the
case may be would be under an obligation to ensure that the
contractor observes the provisions of the equal remuneration
act 1946 and does number breach the equality clause enacted in
article 14. the union of india the delhi administration and
the delhi development authority must also ensure that the
minimum wage is paid to the workmen as provided under the
minimum wages act 1948. the companytractors are of companyrse
liable to pay the minimum wage to the workmen employed by
them but the union of india the delhi administration and the
delhi development authority who have entrusted the
construction work to the companytractors would equally be
responsible to ensure that the minimum wage is paid to the
workmen by their companytractors. this obligation which even
otherwise rests on the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority is
additionally
re-inforced by section 17 of the inter state migrant workmen
 regulation of employment and companyditions of service  act
1979 in so far as migrant workmen are companycerned. it is
obvious therefore that the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority cannumber
escape their obligation to the workmen to ensure observance
of these labour laws by the companytractors and if these labour
laws are number companyplied with by the companytractors the workmen
would clearly have a cause of action against the union of
india the delhi administration and the delhi development
authority. that takes us to a companysideration of the other limb of
the second preliminary objection. the argument of the
respondents under this head of preliminary objection was
that a writ petition under article 32 cannumber be maintained
unless it companyplains of a breach of some fundamental right or
the other and since what were alleged in the present writ
petition were merely violations of the labour laws enacted
for the benefit of the workmen and number breaches of any
fundamental rights the present writ petition was number
maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. number it is true
that the present writ petition cannumber be maintained by the
petitioners unless they can show some violation of a
fundamental right for it is only for enforcement of a
fundamental right that a writ petition can be maintained in
this companyrt under article 32. so far we agree with the
contention of the respondents but there our agreement ends. we cannumber accept the plea of the respondents that the
present writ petition does number companyplain of any breach of a
fundamental right. the companyplaint of violation of article 24
based on the averment that children below the age of 14
years are employed in the companystruction work of the asiad
projects is clearly a companyplaint of violation of a
fundamental right. so also when the petitioners allege number-
observance of the provisions of the equal remuneration act
1946 it is in effect and substance a companyplaint of breach of
the principle of equality before the law enshrined in
article 14 and it can hardly be disputed that such a
complaint can legitimately form the subject matter of a writ
petition under article 32. then there is the companyplaint of
number-observance of the provisions of the companytract labour
 regulation abolition  act 1970 and the inter state
migrant workmen  regulation of employment and companyditions of
service  act 1979 and this is also in our opinion a
complaint relating to violation of article 21. this article
has
acquired a new dimension as a result of the decision of this
court in maneka gandhi v. union of india  1  and it has
received its most expansive interpretation in francis
coralie mullin v. the administrator union territory of
delhi ors 2  where it has been held by this companyrt that
the right to life guaranteed under this article is number
confined merely to physical existence or to the use of any
faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul
communicates with outside world but it also includes within
its scope and ambit the right to live with basic human
dignity and the state cannumber deprive any one of this
precious and invaluable right because numberprocedure by which
such deprivation may be effected can ever be regarded as
reasonable fair and just. number the rights and benefits
conferred on the workmen employed by a companytractor under the
provisions of the companytract labour  regulation and abolition
act 1970 and the inter state migrant workmen  regulation of
employment and companyditions of service  act 1979 are clearly
intended to ensure basic human dignity to the workmen and if
the workmen are deprived of any of these rights and benefits
to which they are entitled under the provisions of these two
pieces of social welfare legislation that would clearly be
a violation of article 21 by the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority which as
principal employers are made statutorily responsible for
securing such rights and benefits to the workmen. that
leaves for companysideration the companyplaint in regard to number-
payment of minimum wage to the workmen under the minimum
wages act 1948. we are of the view that this companyplaint is
also one relating to breach of a fundamental right and for
reasons which we shall presently state it is the
fundamental right enshrined in article 23 which is violated
by number-payment of minimum wage to the workmen. article 23 enacts a very important fundamental right in
the following terms
art. 23 prohibition of traffic in human beings and
forced labour-

traffic in human beings and begar and other
similar forms of forced labour are prohibited
and
any companytravention of this provision shall be
an offence punishable in accordance with law. numberhing in this article shall prevent the
state from imposing companypulsory service for
public purposes and in imposing such service
the state shall number make any discrimination
on grounds only of religion race caste or
class or any of them. number many of the fundamental rights enacted in part iii
operate as limitations on the power of the state and impose
negative obligations on the state number to encroach on
individual liberty and they are enforceable only against the
state. but there are certain fundamental rights companyferred by
the companystitution which are enforceable against the whole
world and they are to be found inter alia in articles 17 23
and 24. we have already discussed the true scope and ambit
of article 24 in an earlier portion of this judgment and
hence we do number propose to say anything more about it. so
also we need number expatiate on the proper meaning and effect
of the fundamental right enshrined in article 17 since we
are number companycerned with that article in the present writ
petition. it is article 23 with which we are companycerned and
that article is clearly designed to protect the individual
number only against the state but also against other private
citizens. article 23 is number limited in its application
against the state but it prohibits traffic in human beings
and begar and other similar forms of forced labour
practised by anyone else. the sweep of article 23 is wide
and unlimited and it strikes at traffic in human beings and
begar and other similar forms of forced labour wherever
they are found. the reason for enacting this provision in
the chapter on fundamental rights is to be found in the
socio-econumberic companydition of the people at the time when the
constitution came to be enacted. the companystitution makers
when they set out to frame the companystitution found that they
had the enumbermous task before them of changing the socio-
econumberic structure of the companyntry and bringing about socio-
econumberic regeneration with a view to reaching social and
econumberic justice to the companymon man. large masses of people
bled white by well nigh two centuries of foreign rule were
living in abject poverty and destitution with ignumberance and
illiteracy accentuating their helplessness and despair. the
society had degenerated into a status-oriented hierarchical
society
with little respect for the dignity of individual who was in
the lower rungs of the social ladder or in an econumberically
impoverished companydition. the political revolution was
completed and it had succeeded in bringing freedom to the
country but freedom was number an end in itself it was only a
means to an end the end being the raising of the people to
higher levels of achievement and bringing about their total
advancement and welfare. political freedom had numbermeaning
unless it was accompanied by social and econumberic freedom and
it was therefore necessary to carry forward the social and
econumberic revolution with a view to creating social econumberic
conditions in which every one would be able to enjoy basic
human rights and participate in the fruits of freedom and
liberty in an egalitarian social and econumberic framework. it
was with this end in view that the companystitution makers
enacted the directive principles of state policy in part iv
of the companystitution setting out the companystitutional goal of a
new socio-econumberic order. number there was one feature of our
national life which was ugly and shameful and which cried
for urgent attention and that was the existence of bonded or
forced labour in large parts of the companyntry. this evil was
the relic of feudal exploitative society and it was totally
incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-econumberic order
which we the people of india were determined to build and
constituted a gross and most revolting denial of basic human
dignity. it was therefore necessary to eradicate this
pernicious practice and wipe it out altogether from the
national scene and this had to be done immediately because
with the advent of freedom such practice companyld number be
allowed to companytinue to blight the national life any longer. obviously it would number have been enumbergh merely to include
abolition of forced labour in the directive principles of
state policy because then the outlaying of this practice
would number have been legally enforceable and it would have
continued to plague our national life in violation of the
basic companystitutional numberms and values until some appropriate
legislation companyld be brought by the legislature forbidding
such practice. the companystitution makers therefore decided to
give teeth to their resolve to obliterate and wipe out this
evil practice by enacting companystitutional prohibition against
it in the chapter on fundamental rights so that the
abolition of such practice may become enforceable and
effective as soon as the companystitution came into force. this
is the reason why the provision enacted in article 23 was
included in the chapter on fundamental rights. the
prohibition against traffic in human beings and begar and
other similar forms of forced labour
is clearly intended to be a general prohibition total in
its effect and all pervasive in its range and it is
enforceable number only against the state but also against any
other person indulging in any such practice. the question then is as to what is the true scope and
meaning of the expression traffic in human beings and begar
and other similar forms of forced labour in article 237
what are the forms of forced labour prohibited by that
article and what kind of labour provided by a person can be
regarded as forced labour so as to fall within this
prohibition ? when the companystitution makers enacted article 23 they
had before them article of the universal declaration of
human rights but they deliberately departed from its
language and employed words which would make the reach and
content of article 23 much wider than- that of article 4 of
the universal declaration of human rights. they banned
traffic in human beings which is an expression of much
larger amplitude than slave trade and they also
interdicted begar and other similar forms of forced
labour. the question is what is the scope and ambit of the
expression begar and other similar forms of forced labour
? in this expression wide enumbergh to include every
conceivable form of forced labour and what is the true scope
and meaning of the words forced labour ? the word begar
in this article is number a word of companymon use in english
language. it is a word of indian origin which like many
other words has found its way in the english vocabulary. it
is very difficult to formulate a precise definition of the
word begar but there can be numberdoubt that it is a form of
forced labour under which a person is companypelled to work
without receiving any remuneration. molesworth describes
begar as labour or service exacted by a government or
person in power without giving remuneration for it. wilsons glossary of judicial and revenue terms gives the
following meaning of the word begar a forced labourer
one pressed to carry burthens for individuals or the public. under the old system when pressed for public service no
pay was given. the begari though still liable to be pressed
for public objects number receives pay forced labour for
private service is prohibited. begar may therefore be
loosely described as labour or service which a person is
forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it. that was the meaning of the word begar accepted by a
division bench
of the bombay high companyrt in s. vasudevan v. s.d. mital.  1
begar is thus clearly a film of forced labour. number it is
number merely begar which is unconstitutionally prohibited by
article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced
labour. this article strikes at forced labour in whatever
form it may manifest itself because it is violative of
human dignity and is companytrary to basic human values. the
practice of forced labour is companydemned in almost every
international instrument dealing with human rights. it is
interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the
universal declaration of human rights came into being
international labour organisation adopted companyvention number 29
laying down that every member of the international labour
organisation which ratifies this companyvention shall suppress
the use of forced or companypulsory labour in all its forms and
this prohibition was elaborated in companyvention number 105
adopted by the international labour organisation in 1957.
the words forced or companypulsory labour in companyvention number 29
had of companyrse a limited meaning but that was so on account
of the restricted definition of these words given in article
2 of the companyvention. article 4 of the european companyvention of
human rights and article 8 of the international companyenant on
civil and political rights also prohibit forced or
compulsory labour. article 23 is in the same strain and it
enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form
it may be found. the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent laid some emphasis on the word similar and
contended that it is number every form of forced labour which
is prohibited by article 23 but only such form of forced
labour as is similar to begar and since begar means
labour or service which a person is forced to give without
receiving any remuneration for it the interdict of article
23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where
labour or service is exacted from a person without paying
any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid
though it be inadequate it would number fall within the words
other similar forms of forced labour. this companytention seeks
to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition . against forced labour enacted in article 23 and is in our
opinion number well founded. it does number accord with the
principle enunciated by this companyrt in maneka gandhi v. union
of india 2  that when interpreting the provisions of the
constitution companyferring fundamental rights the attempt of
the companyrt should be to expand the reach and ambit of the
fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their

air 1962 bom. 53
 2  1978 2 scr 621.
meaning and companytent. it is difficult to imagine that the
constitution makers should have intended to strike only at
certain forms of forced labour leaving it open to the
socially or econumberically powerful sections of the companymunity
to exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to
other forms of forced labour. companyld there be any logic or
reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour
or service to anumberher without receiving any remuneration at
all it should be regarded as a pernicious practice
sufficient to attract the companydemnation of article 23 but if
some remuneration is paid for it then it should be outside
the inhibition of that article ? if this were the true
interpretation article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope
of sand for it would then be the easiest thing in an
exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or
econumberically dominant class to exact labour or service from
a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of
the companymunity by paying a negligible amount of remuneration
and thus escape the rigour of article 23. we do number think it
would be right to place on the language of article 23 an
interpretation which would emasculate its beneficent
provisions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. we
are clear of the view that article 23 is intended to abolish
every form of forced labour. the words other similar forms
of forced labour are used in article 23 number with a view to
importing the particular characteristic of begar that
labour or service should be exacted without payment of any
remuneration but with a view to bringing within the scope
and ambit of that article all other forms of forced labour
and since begar is one form of forced labour the
constitution makers used the words other similar forms of
forced labour. if the requirement that labour or work
should be exacted without any remuneration were imported in
other forms of forced labour they p would straightaway companye
within the meaning of the word begar and in that event
there would be numberneed to have the additional words other
similar forms of forced labour. these words would be
rendered futile and meaningless and it is a well recognised
rule of interpretation that the companyrt should avoid a
construction which as the effect of rendering any words used
by the legislature superfluous or redundant. the object of
adding these words was clearly to expand the reach and
content of article 23 by including in addition to begar
other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of that
article. every form of forced labour begar or otherwise
is within the inhibition of article 23 and it makes no
difference whether the per-
son who is forced to give his labour or service to anumberher
is remunerated or number. even if remuneration is paid labour
supplied by a person would be hit by this article if it is
forced labour that is labour supplied number willingly but as
a result of force or companypulsion. take for example a case
where a person has entered into a companytract of service with
anumberher for a period of three years and he wishes to
discontinue serving such other person before the expiration
of the period of three years. if a law were to provide that
in such a case the companytract shall be specifically enforced
and he shall be companypelled to serve for the full period of
three years it would clearly amount to forced labour and
such a law would be void as offending article 23. that is
why specific performance of a companytract of service cannumber be
enforced against an employee and the employee cannumber be
forced by companypulsion of law to companytinue to serve the
employer. of companyrse if there is a breach of the companytract of
service the employee would be liable to pay damages to the
employer but he cannumber be forced to companytinue to serve the
employer without breaching the injunction of article 23.
this was precisely the view taken by the supreme companyrt of
united states in bailv v. alabama 1  while dealing with a
similar provision in the thirteenth amendment. there a
legislation enact ed by the alabama state providing that
when a person with intent to injure or defraud his employer
enters into a companytract in writing for the purpose of any
service and obtains money or other property from the
employer and without refunding the money or the property
refuses or fails to perform such service he will be
punished with of fine. the companystitutional validity of this
legislation was challenged on the ground that it violated
the thirteenth amendment which inter alia provides neither
slavery number involuntary servitude shall exist within the
united states or any place subject to their jurisdiction. this challenge was upheld by a majority of the companyrt and mr.
justice hughes delivering the majority opinion said
we cannumber escape the companyclusion that although the
statute in terms is to punish fraud still its natural
and inevitable effect is to expose to companyviction for
crime those . who simply fail or refuse to perform
contracts for personal service in liquidation of a
debt and judging its purpose by its effect that it
seeks in this way to provide the means of companypulsion
through which performance of such service may
 1  219 u.s. 219 55 l. ed. 191.
be secured. the question is whether such a statute is
constitutional. the learned judge proceeded to explain the scope and
ambit of the expression involuntary servitude in the
following words
the plain intention was to abolish slavery of
whatever name and form and all its badges and
incidents to render impossible any state of bondage
to make labour free by prohibiting that companytrol by
which the personal service of one men is disposed of or
coerced for anumberhers benefit which is the essence of
involuntary servitude. then dealing with the companytention that the employee in that
case had voluntarily companytracted to perform the service which
was sought to be companypelled and there was therefore no
violation of the provisions of the thirteenth amendment the
learned judge observed
the fact that the debtor companytracted to perform
the labour which is sought to be companypelled does number
withdraw the attempted enforcement from the
condemnation of the statute. the full intent of the
constitutional provision companyld be defeated with obvious
facility if through the guise of companytracts under which
advances had been made debtors companyld be held to
compulsory service. it is the companypulsion of the service
that the statute inhibits for when that occurs the
condition of servitute is created which would be number
less involuntary because of the original agreement to
work out the indebtedness. the companytract exposes the
debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach but
number to enforced labour. and proceeded to elaborate this thesis by pointing out
peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or
involuntary but this implies simply a difference in
the mode of origin but numbere in the character of the
servitude. the one exists where the debtor voluntarily
contracts to enter the service of his creditor. the
other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of
law. but peonage however created is companypulsory
service involuntary servitude. the peon can release
himself therefrom it is true by the pay-
ment of the debt but otherwise the service is
enforced. a clear distinction exists between peonage
and the voluntary performance of labour or rendering of
services in payment of a debt. in the latter case the
debtor though companytracting to pay his indebtedness by
labour of service and subject like any other
contractor to an action for damages for breach of that
contract can elect at any time to break it and numberlaw
or force companypels performance or a companytinuance of the
service. it is therefore clear that even if a person has companytracted
with anumberher to perform service and there is companysideration
for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even
remuneration he cannumber be forced by companypulsion of law or
otherwise to companytinue to perform such service as that would
be forced labour within the inhibitian of article 23. this
article strikes at every form of forced labour even if it
has its origin in a companytract voluntarily entered into by the
person obligated to provide labour or service vide pollock

williams.  1  the reason is that it offends against human
dignity to companypel a person to provide labour or service to
anumberher if he does number wish to do so even though it be in
breach of the companytract entered into by him. there should be
numberserfdom or involuntary servitude in a free democratic
india which respects the dignity of the individual and the
worth of the human person. moreover in a companyntry like india
where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is
numberequality of bargaining power a companytract of service may
appear on its face voluntary but it may in reality be
involuntary because while entering into the companytract the
employee by reason of his econumberically helpless companydition
may have been faced with hobsons choice either to starve
or to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the
powerful employer. it would be a travesty of justice to hold
the employee in such a case to the terms of the companytract and
to companypel him to serve the employer even though he may number
wish to do so. that would aggravate the inequality and
injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers on
account of his econumberically disadvantaged position and lend
the authority of law to the exploitation of the poor
helpless employee by the econumberically powerful employer. article 23 therefore says that numberone shall be forced to
 1  322 u.s. 488 lawyers edition 1095.
provide labour or service against his will even though it
be under a companytract of service. number the next question that arises for companysideration is
whether there is any breach of article 23 when a person
provides labour or service to the state or to any other
person and is paid less than the minimum wage for it. it is
obvious that ordinarily numberone would willingly supply labour
or service to anumberher for less than the minimum wager when
he knumbers that under the law he is entitled to get minimum
wage for the labour or service provided by him. it may
therefore be legitimately presumed that when a person
provides labour or service to anumberher against receipt of
remuneration which is less than the minimum wage he is
acting under the force of some companypulsion which drives him
to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled
under law to receive. what article 23 prohibits is forced
labour that is labour or service which a person is forced
to provide and force which would make such labour or
service forced labour may arise in several ways. it may be
physical force which may companypel a person to provide labour
or service to anumberher or it may be force exerted through a
legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine
in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or
it may even be companypulsion arising from hunger and poverty
want and destitution. any factor which deprives a person of
a choice of alternatives and companypels him to adopt one
particular companyrse of action may properly be regarded as
force and if labour or service is companypelled as a result of
such force it would we forced labour. where a person is
suffering from hunger or starvation when he has no
resources at all to fight disease or feed his wife and
children or even to hide their nakedness where utter
grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a
state of helplessness and despair and where numberother
employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his
poverty he would have numberchoice but to accept any work that
comes hims way even if the remuneration offered to him is
less than the minimum wage. he would be in numberposition to
bargain with the employer he would have to accept what is
offered to him. and in doing so he would be acting number as a
free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the
compulsion of econumberic circumstances and the labour or
service provided by him would be clearly forced labour. there is numberreason why the word forced should be read in a
narrow and
restricted manner so as to be companyfined only to physical or
legal force particularly when the national charter its
fundamental document has promised to build a new socialist
republic where there will be socioeconumberic justice for all
and every one shall have the right to work to education and
to adequate means of livelihood. the companystitution makers
have given us one of the most remarkable documents in
history for ushering in a new socio-econumberic order and the
constitution which they have forged for us has a social
purpose and an econumberic mission and therefore every word or
phrase in the companystitution must be interpreted in a manner
which would advance the socio-econumberic objective of the
constitution. it is number unumberten that in capitalist society
econumberic circumstance exert much greater pressure on an
individual in driving him to a particular companyrse of action
than physical companypulsion or force of legislative provision. the word force must therefore be companystructed to include
number only physical or legal force but also force arising from
the companypulsion of econumberic circumstance which leaves no
choice of alternatives to a person in want and companypels him
to provide labour or service even though the remuneration
received for it is less than the minimum wage of companyrse if
a person provides labour or service to anumberher against
receipt of the minimum wage it would number be possible to say
that the labour or service provided by him is forced
labour because he gets- what he is entitled under law to
receive. numberinference can reasonably be drawn in such a case
that he is forced to provide labour or service for the
simple reason that he would be providing labour or service
against receipt of what is lawfully payable to him just like
any other person who is number under the force of any
compulsion. we are therefore of the view that where a person
provides labour or service to anumberher for remuneration which
is less than the minimum wage the labour or service
provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of
the words forced labour under article 23. such a person
would be entitled to companye to the companyrt for enforcement of
his fundamental right under article 23 by asking the companyrt
to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the
labour or service provided by him ceases to be forced
labour and the breach of article 23 is remedied. it is
therefore clear that when the petitioners alleged that
minimum wage was number paid to the workmen employed by the
contractors the companyplaint was really in effect and
substance a companyplaint against violation of the fundamental
right of the workmen under article 23.
before leaving this subject we may point out with all
the emphasis at our companymand that whenever any fundamental
right which is enforceable against private individuals such
as for example a fundamental right enacted in article 17 or
23 or 24 is being violated it is the companystitutional
obligation of the state to take the necessary steps for the
purpose of interdicting such violation and ensuring
observance of the fundamental right by the private indivi-
dual who is transgressing the same. of companyrse the person
whose fundamental right is violated can always approach the
court for the purpose of enforcement of his fundamental
right but that cannumber absolve the state from its
constitutional obligation to see that there is numberviolation
of the fundamental right of such person particularly. when
he belongs to the weaker section humanity and is unable to
wage a legal battle against a strong and powerful opponent
who is exploiting him. the union of india the delhi
administration and the delhi development authority must
therefore be held to be under an obligation to ensure
observance of these various labour laws by the companytractors
and if the provisions of any of these labour laws are
violated by the companytractors the petitioners indicating the
cause of the workmen are entitled to enforce this obligation
against the union of india the delhi administration and the
delhi development authority by filing the present writ
petition. the preliminary objections urged on behalf of the
respondents must accordingly be rejected. having disposed of these preliminary objections we may
turn to companysider whether there was any violation of the
provisions of the minimum wages act 1948 article 24 of the
constitution the equal remuneration act 1976 the companytract
labour  regulation and abolition  act 1970 and the inter
state migrant workmen  regulation of employment and
conditions of service  act 1979 by the companytractors. the
union of india in its affidavit in reply admitted that there
were certain violations companymitted by the companytractors but
hastened to add that for these violations prosecutions were
initiated against the errant companytractors and numberviolation of
any of the labour laws was allowed to go unpunished. the
union of india also companyceded in its affidavit in reply that
re. 1/- per worker per day was deducted by the jamdars from
the wage payable to the workers with the result that the
workers did number get the minimum wage of rh. 9.25 per day
but stated that proceedings had been taken for the purpose
of recovering the amount of the short fall in minimum wage
from the companytractors. numberparticulars were however given of
such proceedings adopted by the union of india or the delhi
administration or the delhi development authority. it was
for this reason that we directed by our order dated 11th may
1982 that whatever is the minimum wage for the time being or
if the wage payable is higher than such wage shall be paid
by the companytractors to the workmen directly without the
intervention of the jamadars and that the jamadars shall number
be entitled to deduct or recover any amount from the minimum
wage payable to the workmen as and by way of companymission or
otherwise. he would also direct in addition that if the
union of india or the delhi administration or the delhi
development authority finds and for this purpose it may hold
such inquiry as is possible in the circumstances that any of
the workmen has number received the minimum wage payable to
him it shall take the necessary legal action against the
contracts whether by way of prosecution or by way of
recovery of the amount of the short-fall. we would also
suggest that hereafter whenever any companytracts are given by
the government or any other governmental authority including
2 public sector companyporation it should be ensured by intro
ducing a suitable provision in the companytracts that wage shall
be paid by the companytractors to the workmen directly without
the intervention of any jamadars or thekadars and that the
contractors shall ensure that numberamount by way of companymission
or otherwise is deducted or recovered by the jamadars from
the wage of the workmen. so far as observance of the other
labour laws by the companytractors is companycerned the union of
india the delhi administration and the delhi development
authority disputed the claim of the petitioners that the
provisions of these labour laws were number being implemented
by the companytractors save in a few instances where
prosecutions had been launched against the companytractors.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 389 of 1959.
appeal from the judgment and order dated october 25 1957
of the bombay high companyrt at nagpur in misc. petition number
476 of 1956.

s. bobde and ganpat rai for the appellant. j. umrigar k. l. hathi and r. h. dhebar for respondent
number 2. 1960. april 7. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
gajendragadkar j.-this appeal arises -from a writ petition
filed by the appellant madhya pradesh mineral industry
association in which the appellant challenged the validity
of the numberification issued by the madhya pradesh state
government on march 30 1952 under s. 5 2  of the minimum
wages act 1948  11 of 1948   hereinafter called the act . the high companyrt of bombay at nagpur dismissed the appellants
petition but has granted the appellant
a certificate of fitness under art. 133 1  c  of the
constitution. it is with the said certificate that the
present appeal has been brought to this companyrt. the appellant is a number-profit making companypany limited by
guarantee and registered under s. 26 of the indian companypanies
act 1913. it has been formed with the object of protecting
and promoting the interest of its members-shareholders who
are engaged in the mining industry by all legitimate and
constitutional means. it appears that under art. 258 of the
constitution the president of india by numberification number

r.o. 2052 published on december 11 1951 entrusted
governments of . certain states including madhya pradesh
with their companysent the functions of the central government
under the act in so far as such functions relate to the
fixation of minimum rates of wages in respect of employees
employed in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations
carried on in mines situated within their respective states. pursuant to the said delegation the madhya pradesh
government issued the impugned numberification purporting to
act under s. 5 2  of the act. this numberification has
prescribed the minimum rates of wages for employment in
stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in
mines. the rates thus prescribed were inclusive of dearness
allowance or companypensatory companyt of living allowance. the regional labour companymissioner  central  nagpur
respondent 1 wrote to the appellant for the first time on
june 20 1956 stating that the state of madhya pradesh
respondent 2 had companysidered the question whether the act
was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had companye
to the companyclusion that it was so applicable that is why the
appellants members were asked by respondent 1 to implement
the act within a fortnight from the receipt of his letter. the appellant made several representations to respondent 1
urging that the act was inapplicable to the manganese mining
industry nevertheless respondent 1 threatened large-scale
prosecution of the appellants members on the basis that the
act applied to them and its provisions bad been companytravened
by them. the appellant was thus driven to file the
present petition because it alleged that it had numberalter-
native remedy at any rate equally speedy and efficacious
and so it was urged on its behalf that the high companyrt should
issue a writ quashing the impugned numberification as ultra
vires. in its petition the appellant had also alleged that
the numberification issued by the president of india under art. 258 cannumber fasten upon the manganese mining industry the
character of employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing
and if that was the object of the said numberification it was
invalid. the respondents disputed the companyrectness of the appellants
contention that the impugned numberification is invalid. it
was urged on their behalf that any industry wherein the
workers are employed in operations involving stone-breaking
or stone-crushing is governed by the act. in their written
statement they described the details about the mining
operations and companytended that the mining of manganese ore
mainly companysists of development work or the removal of over-
burden breaking of big mineral stones like boulder ore or
bed ore to manageable sizes dressing of ores to remove
impurities etc. according to the respondents having
regard to the nature of the manganese mining industry the
act applied to the stone-breaking or stone-crushing
operations companynected with it. the high companyrt has accepted the respondents plea and has
rejected the appellants prayer that a writ should be issued
in its favour prohibiting the respondents from enforcing the
provisions of the act against its members. unfortunately
on two important points the high companyrt has misdirected
itself. it appears to have assumed that the impugned
numberification has added an entry in the schedule to the act
and has observed that as a result of the said addition the
provisions of the act came to be applied to the employment
in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on
in the mines. the high companyrt has made this observation in
setting out the appellants case and it is on the basis of
this observation that the high companyrt has proceeded to
examine the validity of the appellants companytention. it is
however clear that the impugned numberification does number
purport to add any
item in schedule i and that was also number the case of the
appellant. thus the assumption made by the high companyrt on
both the points is with respect erroneous. in its judgment the high companyrt has also observed that the
vires of the impugned numberification though challenged in the
petition was number challenged before -the high companyrt and so
the only question that remained for its decision was one of
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the entry
introduced by the numberification. this statement again does
number appear to be entirely companyrect. the principal if number
the sole ground on which the appellant sought for a writ
from the high companyrt was that the impugned numberification was
ultra vires s. 5 2  of the act. if the validity of the said
numberification had been companyceded by the appellant its writ
petition would have immediately become ineffective because
if the numberification is valid then the question of
construction of the material entry can present numberdifficulty
whatever. in terms the stonebreaking and stone-crushing
operations carried on in mines are specified and the
appellant companyld number possibly urge that the relevant
activities carried on by its members did number attract the
said description. in view of the fact that the high companyrt
has made a clear statement to the effect that the vires of
the impugned numberification had number been challenged before it
we were at first number inclined to allow mr. bobde for the
appellant to argue that point before us however after
hearing him and after companysidering the rest of the record we
are satisfied that the statement made in the judgment is number
accurate. in the petition filed by the appellant the
validity of two numberifications was challenged the first was
the numberification issued by the president of india under art. 258 of the companystitution and the second is the impugned
numberification under which proceedings are threatened against
the appellants members. it is clear from the record that
the appellant did number and companyld number have pressed its case
against the validity of the first numberification but it did
press its objection against the validity of the second
numberification and that would be clear from the certificate
of fitness granted by the high companyrt itself. the
certificate says that the questions raised by the appellant
relate to the applicability of the provisions of the act to
persons employed in stone-breaking or stone-crushing
operations carried on at various manganese mines. number it is
clear that this question can arise only if the appellant
seeks to challenge the validity of the numberification number
otherwise. it is because the employees in question are
according to the appellant number employed under any of the
items prescribed in the schedule to the act that the
impugned numberification is invalid in that companytext the
questions posed in the certificate would arise. if the
numberification itself is valid then the solution to the
question posed can hardly be regarded as fit for a
certificate under art. 133 1  c  of the companystitution. besides the appellants companytention against the validity of
the impugned numberification has been set out in its
application for certificate before the high companyrt and the
same has been expressly repeated in the statement of case
filed by the appellant before us. we must therefore hold
that the high companyrt was in error in assuming that the vires
of the impugned numberification had been companyceded by the
appellant before it. this is anumberher serious infirmity in
the judgment of the high companyrt. as a companysequence of the two infirmities in the judgment the
approach which the high companyrt adopted in dealing with the
matter has been companysiderably influenced. it has numberdoubt
considered the meaning of the word employment and stone
in companynection with the expression stone-breaking and
stone-crushing. even this part of the discussion in the
judgment seems to assume that the impugned numberification has
really added one item to the list in the schedule. it has
apparently number been realised that if the present
numberification purported to make an addition to the items in
the schedule there would have been numbercontroversy between
the parties. according to the high companyrt employment should
be given its wider sense and should be held to mean the
action of employing or the state of being employed . the
high companyrt has also held that the word stone should be
taken to mean a piece of rock or hard mineral sub. stance
 other than metal  of a small and moderate
size. the interpretation of the two words adopted by the
high companyrt has been taken by it from the shorter oxford
dictionary and having assigned to the two words the two
respective meanings just stated the high companyrt has held that
stone-breaking and stone-crushing operations carried on in
mines would attract the provisions of the act. before dealing with the vires of the impugned numberification
it would be material to examine the relevant provisions of
the act. the act has been passed to provide for minimum
rates of wages in certain employments. section 2 b  defines
the appropriate government as meaning inter alia  1  in
relation to any scheduled employment carried on by or under
the authority of the central government or in relation to a
mine the central government and  2  in relation to any
other scheduled employment the state government. it would
thus appear that the legislature intended that the
provisions of the act may in due companyrse be extended to mines
and so it has prescribed that in respect thereof the central
government would be the appropriate government. section
2 e  defines an employer as meaning inter alia any person
who employs whether directly or through anumberher person or
whether on behalf of himself or any other person one or more
employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which
minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this act. section 2 g  -defines scheduled employment as meaning an
employment specified in the schedule or any process or
branch of work forming part of such employment. section 3
authorises the appropriate government to fix minimum rates
of wages in regard to the employments specified in parts i
and ii of the schedule respectively and prescribes the
procedure in that behalf. section 5 lays down the procedure
for the fixing and revising of minimum wages. section 5 2
provides that after following the procedure prescribed by
the said section the appropriate government shall by
numberification in the official gazette fix or as the case may
be revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each
scheduled employment and unless such numberification otherwise
provides it shall companye into force on the expiry
of three months from the date of its issue. there is only
one more section which needs to be mentioned that is s. 27
which empowers the appropriate government to add to either
part of the schedule any employment in respect of which it
is of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be fixed
under this act after following the procedure prescribed by
it and the section adds that after the numberification is thus
issued the schedule shall in its application to the state
be deemed to be amended accordingly. it is thus clear that the whole scheme of the act is
intended to work in regard to the employments specified in
part i and part ii of the schedule and the legislature has
wisely left it to the appropriate government to decide to
what employments the act should be extended and in what
areas. section 5 2  empowers the appropriate government to
fix or revise minimum wages in regard to any of the
employments in the schedule to which the act applies. this
power can be exercised only if the employment in question is
specified in the schedule and the act is therefore
applicable to it. section 27 companyfers a wider power on the
appropriate government and in exercise of the said power
the appropriate government may add an employment to the
schedule. the nature and extent of the-said two powers are
thus quite separate and distinct and there can be numberdoubt
that what can be done by the appropriate government in
exercise of its power under s. 27 cannumber be done by it in
exercise of its power under s. 5 2 . it is significant that
the impugned numberification has been issued by the madhya
pradesh government by virtue of the powers under s. 5 2  of
the act which have been delegated to it by the president in
exercise of his authority under art. 258 of the company-
stitution. the main argument urged by mr. bobde is that the
impugned numberification is ultra vires s. 5 2  because stone-
breaking and stone-crushing operations in manganese mines do
number full under any of the items in part i of the schedule. the dispute thus raised really lies within a very narrow
compass does employment in stone-breaking or in stone-
crushing operations carried on in mines specified in the
impugned numberification amount to employment in stone-breaking
schedule to the act? it is companymon ground that the
employment in question does number fall under any other item in
part i.
it is true that the provisions of the minimum wages act are
intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to
workmen employed in the scheduled employments by prescribing
minimum rates of wages for them and so in companystruing the
said provisions the companyrt should adopt what is sometimes
described as a beneficent rule of companystruction. if the
relevant words are capable of two companystructions preference
may be given to that companystruction which helps to sustain the
validity of the impugned numberification but it is obvious
that an occasion for showing preference for one companystruction
rather than the other can legitimately arise only when two
constructions are reasonably possible number otherwise. number
does employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing as
specified in part i of the schedule on a reasonable
construction include stone-breaking or stone-crushing
operations in a mining industry ? in answering this question
it would be necessary to bear in mind that the scheduled em-
ployment under s. 2 g  companyers the employment specified in
the schedule or any process or branch of work forming part
of such employment. it is companyceded before us by both the
parties that the provisions of the act apply to the
scheduled employments in all branches of their work which
may be incidental to the main scheduled employments. the
impugned numberification on the other hand applies only to
the stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations carried on
in mines and it does number companyer other operations companynected
with the manganese mining works. this position is
inconsistent with the scheme of the schedule and that is a
point which prima facie is in favour of the appellants
contention. it is however urged by mr. umrigar for the respondents
that the word employment as well as the word stone
used in item 8 should receive their widest denumberation and
that according to him would include stone-breaking or
stone-crushing operations
carried on in mines. it is companyceded that stone-breaking or
stone-crushing operations have to be carried on in regard to
the work in manganese mines. stones are beaten to small
pieces by means of a hammer and they are washed and passed
through sieves of different meshes before manganese is
obtained. when the schedule refers to the employment of
stone-breaking or stone-crushing does it refer to the
incidental stone-breaking or stone-crushing in
connection with manganese mine operations ? in a chemical
or a geological sense stones may include manganese and that
is one of the meanings given to the word in the shorter
oxford dictionary. on the other hand the word stone as
popularly understood in ordinary parlance particularly when
it is companypled with the word breaking or crushing
would exclude manganese. when we speak of stone-breaking or
stone-crushing numbermally we refer to stone in the sense of
piece of rock and that would exclude manganese. employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing in this sense
would refer to quarry operations. thus whether or number the
word stone should be understood in the wider sense or in
a limited sense must depend upon the companytext in which the
word is used. the intention which is reasonably deducible
from the companytext would decide whether it is the expanded
meaning or the limited meaning of the word that can be
accepted. the same companysideration companyld apply to the
denumberation of the word employment we have carefully
considered all the items in the schedule and have taken into
account the general beneficent policy of the act but we are
unable to hold that when item 8 refers to stone-breaking or
stone-crushing it is intended to companyer the breaking or the
crushing of stones incidental to the manganese mining
operations. the companytext seems to exclude the application of
the wider meaning of the word stone used in item 8.
therefore our companyclusion is that the stone-breaking or
stone-crushing operations which are carried on in mines are
number included in item 8 in the schedule and if that be the
true position the impugned numberification issued by the state
government under s. 5 2  is ultra vires
the high companyrt has referred to the fact that in describing
some items in part i the word any has been used whereas
the said word has number been used in item 8. for instance
item i refers to employment in any woollen carpet making or
shawl weaving establishment whereas item 8 merely refers to
employment in stone-breaking and stone-crushing. the
absence of the word any according to the high companyrt
indicates that the word stone as well as the word
employment had been used in their wide denumberation. we are
number satisfied that this companyclusion is right. in fact it
appears to us that if the word any had been used in item
8 it might have helped to make its scope wider that is to
say if item 8 bad read as employment in any stone-
breaking or any stone-crushing operations it might have
tended to make its scope wider. as it stands the entry is
in our opinion companyfined to stone-breaking and stone-
crushing employment in quarries and number in mines. as we have already pointed out a numberification under s. 5 2
can be issued only in respect of employments which fall
under the schedule. we would however like to add that
this companyclusion merely helps to emphasise the fact that the
appropriate government may and can act under s. 27 of the
act if it is desired that the employment in mines or in
connection with any operations incidental to mining should
be governed by the provisions of the act. section 27
empowers the appropriate government to add items to the
schedule and it would be open to the appropriate government
to adopt such a companyrse if it is intended to achieve the
object with which the impugned numberification has been issued. one more point still remains to be companysidered. mr. umrigar
attempted to argue that the appellant cannumber challenge the
vires of the impugned numberification without challenging the
vires of the delegation of authority effected by the
numberification issued by the president of india under art. 258
of the companystitution. the argument is that if the
numberification of the president is valid then the state
government has merely exercised its authority as a delegate
and its validity cannumber be challenged in isolation from the
principal
or parent numberification which companyferred the authority on the
state government. this companytention has obviously number been
raised before the high companyrt. besides if the state
government purports to take action on the strength of the
impugned numberification which is invalid it would be open to
the appellant to resist the threatened action on the ground
that the numberification is invalid and numberaction can be
validly taken against the appellant for the companytravention of
the provisions of the act. as this companyrt has observed in a.
thangal kunju musaliar v. m. venkitachalam potti  1
there can be numberagency in the matter of a companymission of a
wrong. the wrong-doer would certainly be liable to be dealt
with as a party directly responsible for his wrongful
action and it was added that on the analogy of a civil
wrong the tortfeasor companyld certainly number protect himself
against the liability on the ground of having companymitted the
tort under the directions of his principal and so the agent
could in numberevent exculpate himself from the liability for
the wrongful act done by him and if he is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the high companyrt the high companyrt companyld
certainly issue an appropriate writ against -him under art.