criminal appellate jurisdiction cirminal appeal number 156 of
1972.
appeal by special leave from the judgment order dated the
8th february 1971 of the allahabad high companyrt in crl. revisional application number 1995 of 1969.

p. rana for the appellant. uma dutta for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
chandrachud j. this appeal by special leave raises
questions regarding the interpretation of the provisions of
the railway property  unlawful possession  act xxix of
1966.-the main question for decision is whether the inquiry
which an officer of the railway protection force holds under
section 8 1  of the act is an investigation within the
meaning of the companye of criminal procedure 1898. if so
statements recorded during the companyrse of the inquiry would
be inadmissible in evidence by reason of the injunction
contained in section 162 of the companye. a further question
which requires companysideration is whether the entire trial is
vitiated if signatures of witnesses are obtained on the
statements made by them during the companyrse of the inquiry. the respondent durga prasad was working as a turner in the
railway workshop at gorakhpur. on april 2 1968 he was
found in possession of a steel rod and two pieces of moulded
brass shells belonging to the railway. after the
preparation of a recovery memo the respondent was forwarded
to the railway protection force post where a case was
registered against him under section 3 a  of the act. gajai singh sub-inspector railway protection force
inquired into the case under section 8 1  of the act during
the companyrse of which he recorded the statements of three
persons rakshak indra deo yadav rakshak jagannath pandey
and r. k. nandi. the statements were read over to these
persons and their signatures were obtained thereon. two
others g. s. tripathi and kamla kant yadav wrote out their
statements in their own hand and handed over the same to
gajai singh. the respondent pleaded number guilty but the learned special
railway magistrate first class gorakhpur companyvicted him
under section 3 a  of the act and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for fifteen months. that judgment was
confirmed in appeal by the learned civil and sessions judge
gorakhpur. the respondent filed a revision application in the high
court of allahabad which set aside the judgment of the
sessions companyrt and acquitted the respondent. the high companyrt
has taken the view that the inquiry companytemplated by section
8 1  of the act is an investigation for the purposes of the
criminal procedure companye that section 162 of the companye would
therefore apply that the inquiry officer had companytravened
section 162 by obtaining signatures of witnesses on the
statements made by them before him during the inquiry and
since those statements were brought on the record of the
trial and were put to the witnesses in their examination-in-
chief the entire trial was vitiated. we have to examine
the companyrectness of this view in this appeal. section 8 of the act reads thus
8.  1  when any person is arrested by an
officer of the force for an offence punishable
under this act or is forwarded to him under
section 7 he shall proceed to inquire into
the charge against such person. for this purpose the officer of the
force may exercise the same powers and shall
be subject to the same provisions as the
officer in charge of a police-station may
exercise and is subject to under the companye of
criminal procedure 1898 when investigating a
cognizable case
provided that-
 a  if the officer of the force is of opinion that there is
sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion
against the accused person he shall either admit him to
bail to appear before a magistrate having jurisdiction in
the case or forward him in custody to such magistrate
 b  if it appears to the officer of the force that there is
numbersufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion
against the accused person he shall release the accused
person on his executing a bond with or without sureties as
the officer of the force may direct to appear if and when
so required before the magistrate having jurisdiction and
shall make a full report of all the particulars of the case
to his official superior. section 2 a  defines force as the railway protection force
constituted under section 3 of the railway protection force
act 1957. section 2 c  defines an officer of the force
to mean an officer of and above the rank of assistant sub-
inspector appointed to the force including a superior
officer. under section 2 e  a superior officer means an
officer appointed under section 4 of the railway protect on
force act 1957 and includes any other officer appointed by
the central government as a superior officer of the force. section 5 provides that numberwithstanding anything companytained
in the companye of cr. pr. an offence under this act shall number
be companynizable. by section 6 of the act power is given to
the companycerned officers to arrest without an order from a
magistrate and without a warrant any person who has been
concerned in an offence punishable under the act or
against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having
been so companycerned. section 7 requires that every person
arrested for an offence punishable under the act must be
forwarded without delay to the nearest officer of the force. section 9 1  of the act empowers an officer of the force to
summon any person whose attendance he companysiders necessary
either to give evidence or to produce a document. by sub-
section  3  of section 9 persons so summoned are bound to
attend either in person or by an authorized agent and they
are bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting
which they are examined or make statements. by section
9 4  every such inquiry is deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the
penal companye. section 11 provides that all searches and arrests made under
the act shall be carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the companye of criminal procedure. section 14
provides that provisions of this act shall have effect
numberwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith companytained in
any other law for the time battle in force. in face of these provisions the inquiry companyducted by an
officer of the railway protection force under section 8 1  f
the act cannumber be deemed to be an investigation for the
purposes of section 162 companye of criminal procedure. the
scheme of the act is in important respects different from
the scheme of the companye and there is intrinsic evidence it
the act to show that the provisions of the companye cannumber
proprio vigore apply to inquiries under section 8 1  of the
act. see for example two provisions of the act which to a
student of the companye must strike as a glaring companytradiction
in terms. section 6 of the act companyfers power on officers
and members of the force to arrest without an cider from a
magistrate and without a warrant any person companycerned in an
offence under the act or reasonably suspected of being so
concerned. applying the dictionary of the companye it should
have followed from section 6 of the act that an offence
under the act is companynizable. section 4 f  of the companye
defines a companynizable offence as one for which a police
officer can effect an arrest without warrant. the
complementary part of this definition companytained in section
4 n  of the companye defines a number-cognizable offence as one for
which a police officer may number arrest without warrant. but
section 5 of the act provides that numberwithstanding anything
contained in the companye of criminal procedure an offence
under the act shall number be companynizable. the exclusion of an important provision of the criminal
procedure companye in matters arising under the act is number only
reflected in section 5 which deals but with a facet of
criminal trials but the exclusion is more in evidence in
the provisions of section 14 of the act. under that section
the provisions of the act take effect numberwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith companytained in any other law
for the time being in force. each and every provision of
the companye cannumber therefore be superimposed on or read into
the act. the act would prevail over the companye if on any
matter there is inconsistency between the two. in fact
section 5 2  of the companye itself lays down that offences
under any law other than the penal companye shall be
investigated according to
the provisions of the companye but subject to any enactment for
the time being in force regulating the manner of
investigating such offences. provisions governing inquiries under section 8 1  of the act
are either expressly or by necessary implication
inconsistent with some of the outstanding provisions of the
cede governing investigations under chapter xiv called
information to the police and their powers to investigate. whereas section 8 1  speaks of inquiry by an officer of
the force sections 155 and 156 of the companye speak of the
power to investigate into number-cognizable and companynizable
cases respectively. labels of companyrse are number decisive of
the companytent of a phrase but the difference in terminumberogy is
purposeful. section 9 1  of the act companyfers on officers of
the force the power to summon any person whose attendance is
necessary either to give evidence or to produce a
document. section 160 of the companye empowers a police officer
making an investigation to require by a written order the
attendance of a person who appears to be acquainted with the
circusstances of the case. by section 9 3  of the act
persons summoned to appear in the inquiry are bound to
attend either personally or through an authorized agent and
they are under an express obligation to state the truth on
any subject respecting which they are examined. section 160
of the companye also makes it obligatory for persons to appear
before the investigating officer if he requires their
presence but section 161 does number cast on such persons the
obligation which section 9 3  of the act casts namely to
state the truth. this is number to suggest that the companye
provides for a awful option to lie but the two parallel
provisions governing the obligations of the persons summoned
to appear highlight the basic difference in the nature of an
inquiry under the act and an investigation under the companye. section 161 2  casts but a limited obligation on persons
required to appear before an investigating officer to
answer all questions relating to the case other than a
certain class of self-incriminating questions. section
161 2  of the companye of 1882 companytained an injunction that
persons summoned to appear by the investigating officer must
answer truly the questions put to them but reverting to
the language of the cede of 1872 the companye of 1898 omitted
the word truly. a provision similar to that in section
9 3  of the act is however to be found in section 175 1
of the companye by which persons summoned to appear in the
inquest proceedings are bound to answer truly all questions
put by the investigating officer except a certain class of
self-incriminating questions. the importance of the obligation cast by section 9 3  of the
act that persons summoned to appear before an officer of the
force must state the truth companysists principally in the
consequence that the breach of that obligation companystitutes
an offence under section 193 of the penal companye which
prescribes punishment inter alia for intentionally giving
false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding. under
the relevant part of section 191 penal companye whoever being
legally bound by an express provision of law to state the
truth makes any statement which is false and which he either
knumbers or believes to be false or does number believe to be
true is said to give false evidence. it is number necessary
that the statement should have been made on oath. by
section 9 4  of
the act every inquiry under section 8 1  is deemed to be a
judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 of
the penal companye. the obligation to state the truth
attracting for its breach a penal companysequence must
necessarily imply in the officer companyducting the inquiry the
power to obtain the signature of the person on the statement
made by him or else in a prosecution under section 193
penal companye it would be an easy defence to deny the very
making of the statement and thereby to escape the
punishment. in order that the prosecution under section 193
may number be rendered illusory and the duty to state the truth
should have a real and practical sanction for its
enforcement the officer companyducting the inquiry must have
the right to obtain the signature of the person making the
statement. that creates an inconsistency between the act and the companye
forwhereas an officer companyducting an inquiry tinder the act
may and indeed ought to obtain the signature of witnesses on
their statements section 162 1  of the companye provides no
statement made by any person to a police-officer in the
course of an investigation under this chapter shall if
reduced into writing be signed by the person making it. in
view of the provisions companytained in section 14 of the act
the act must prevail over the companye. the reason of the rule that the statement made to a police
officer in the companyrse of investigation shall number be signed
by the person making it is companytained in the very same
section namely section 162 1  of the companye which provides
that such a statement shall number be used for any purpose at
any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under
investigation at the time when the statement was made
except for the limited purpose of companytradicting a witness
called for the prosecution in the manner provided by
section 145 of the evidence act. if the statement is
inadmissible at the trial as substantive evidence and if an
untrue statement made to a police officer in the companyrse of
an investigation attracts numberpenal companysequence it is of no
great significance to obtain the signature of the person
making the statement. statements made under section 8 1  of
the act have different characteristics and are neither
subject to the disability of being inadmissible number are they
immune from the sweep of section 193 of the penal companye. relying on section 8 2  of the act which provides that an. officer of the force may exercise the same powers and shall
be subject to the same provisions as the officer in-charge
of a police station may exercise and is subject to under the
code when investigating a companynizable case companynsel for the
respondent argued that the object of this provision companyld
only be to assimilate inquiries under the act with
investigations under the companye and therefore section 162 of
the companye would govern the inquiries also. this argument
overlook the opening words of section 8 2 . the power
spoken of in that subsection is companyferred for this
purpose that is to say for the purpose of the inquiry
under section 8 1  and must be limited to that purpose. the right and duty of an investigating officer to file a
police report or a charge-sheet on the companyclusion of
investigation is the hallmark of an investigation under the
code. section 173 1  a  of the companye
provides that as soon as the investigation is companypleted the
officer incharge of the police station shall forward to a
magistrate empowered to take companynizance of the offence on a
police report a report in the form prescribed by the state
government. the officer companyducting an inquiry under section
8 1  cannumber initiate companyrt proceedings by filing a police
report as is evident from the two provisos to section 8 2
of the act. under proviso  a  if the officer of the force
is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or
reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused he shall
either admit the accused to bail to appear before a
magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or forward him in
custody to such magistrate. under proviso  b  if it
appears to the officer that there is numbersufficient evidence
or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused he
shall release him on a bond to appear before the magistrate
having jurisdiction and shall make a full report of all the
particulars of the case to his superior officer. the duty
cast by proviso  b  on an officer of the force to make a
full report to his official superior stands in sharp
contrast with the duly cast by section 173 1   a  of the
code on the officer-in-charge of a police station to submit
a report to the magistrate empowered to take companynizance of
the offence. on the companyclusion of an enquiry under section
8 1  therefore if the officer of the force is of the
opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable
ground of suspicion against the accused he must file a
complaint under section 190  1   a  of the companye in order
that the magistrate companycerned may take companynizance of the
offence. thus an officer companyducting an inquiry under section 8 1  of
the act does number possess all the attributes of an
officer-in-charge of a police station investigating a case
under chapter xiv of the companye. he possesses but a part of
those attributes limited to the purpose of holding the
inquiry. that the inquiry officers cannumber be equated generally with
police officers is clear from the object and purpose of the
railway protection force act xxiii of 1957 under which
their appointments are made.the short title of that act
shows that it was passed in order to provide for the
constitution and regulation of a force called the railway
protection force for the better protection and security of
railway property. section 3 1  of the act of 1957 empowers
the central government to companystitute and maintain the
railway protection force for the better protection and
security of railway property. by section 10 the inspector-
general and every other superior officer and member. of the
force shall for all purposes be regarded as railway
servants within the meaning of the indian- railways act
1890 other than chapter vi-a thereof and shall be entitled
to exercise the powers companyferred on railway servants by or
under that act. section 11 which defines duties of every
superior officer and member of the force provides that they
must promptly execute all orders lawfully issued to them by
their superior authority protect and safeguard railway
property remove any obstruction in the movement of railway
property and do any other act companyducive to the better
protection and security of railway property. section 14
imposes a duty on the superior officers and members of the
force to make over persons arrested by them to a police
officer-or to take them to the nearest police station. these provisions are incompatible with the position that a
member of the railway protection force holding an inquiry
under section 8 1  of the act can be deemed to be a police
officer-in-charge of a police station investigating into an
offence.members of the force are appointed under the
authority of the railway protection force art 1957 the
prime object of which is the better protection and security
of railway property. powers companyferred on members of the
force are all directed towards achieving that object and are
limited by it. it is significant that the act of 1957 by
section 14 makes a distinction between a member of the
force and a police officer properly so called. reference may number be made to a few decisions of this companyrt. in state of punjab v. barkat ram 1  the question which fell
for companysideration was whether a customs officer either under
the land customs act 1924 or the sea customs act 1878 is a
police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the
evidence act. the majority took the view that though the
expression police-officer occurring in section 25 had to
be companystrued in a wide and popular sense central excise
officers are number police officers and therefore companyfessions
made to them are number hit by section 25.
in badku joti savant v. state of mysore 2  a similar
question arose before a bench of five judges of this companyrt
with reference to the provisions of the central excise and
salt act 1 of 1944. sections 21 1  and  2  of that act are
in material respects identical with the provisions of
sections 8 1  and  2  of the act. a unaminumbers companyrt held
that though under section 21 2  the central excise officer
has the. powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station
when investigating a companynizable case that power was
conferred for the purpose of the inquiry under section
21 1 . companysidering the main purpose of the central excise
and salt act it was held that the excise officer was number a
police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the
evidence act. companynsel for the respondent tried to
distinguish this decision on the ground that the application
of section 162 of the companye was number companysidered there. we see
numbersubstance in this companytention because if after excluding
section 25 of the evidence act section 162 of the companye was
still applicable there was numberpurpose in companysidering
whether the companyfessional statements were hit by section 25
of the evidence act. the decision in raja ram jaiswal v. state of bihar 3  on
which the respondent relies was companysidered and distinguished
in badku joti savants case. raja ram jaiswals case
involved the interpretation of section 78 3  of the bihar
and orissa excise act 1915 which provided in terms that
for the purposes of section 156 of the companye of criminal
procedure 1898 the area to which an excise officer
empowered under section 77 sub-section  2  is appointed
shall be deemed to be a police station and such officer
shall be deemed to be the officer-in-charge of such
station. there is numberprovision in the act before
 1  1962  3  s.c.r. 338.  2  1966  3  s.c.r. 698.  3  1964  2  s.c.r. 752.
us companyresponding to section 78 3  of the bihar act and
therefore the decision is distinguishable for the same
reasons for which it was distinguished in badku joti
savants case. the high companyrt was therefore in error in holding that
statements made during the inquiry under section 8 1  of the
act are on a par with statements made during the companyrse of
an investigation that section 162 of the companye applied with
full force to the inquiry proceedings and that in taking
signatures of witnesses on the statements made by them the
inquiry officer had companymitted a flagrant violation of
section 162 of the companye. we may add that apart from the
statements made by witnesses during the inquiry which were
brought on the record of the case by the learned magistrate
there was before him the evidence of the witnesses who were
examined in the companyrt and therefore the entire trial companyld
in any case number be said to have been vitiated.