criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 114
of 1988.
from the judgment and order dated 11.8.1987 of the
bombay high companyrt in criminal writ petition number 733 of 1987.
dr. y.s. chitale shambhu prasad singh mrs. jayshree
wad mrs. aruna mathur manumber wad and vijay tulpule for the
appellant. s. bobde advocate general for the state of
maharashtra a.m. khanwilkar and a.s. bhasme for the
respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sen j. this appeal by special leave directed against
the judgment and order of a division bench of the bombay
high companyrt dated august 11 1987 raises a question of far-
reaching importance. the question is whether a companymission of
inquiry companystituted under s. 3 of the companymissions of inquiry
act 1952  hereinafter referred to as the act  is a
court for purposes of s. 195 1  b  of the companye of criminal
procedure 1973.
we had the benefit of hearing dr. y.s. chitale learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant dr. baliram
waman hiray who at one time was the health minister of
maharashtra and shri a.s. bodbe learned companynsel appearing
on behalf of the state government as to the purport and
effect of the inclusive of sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye
which provides that in cl.  b  of sub-s. 1  the term
court means a civil revenue or criminal companyrt and
includes a tribunal companystituted by or under a central
provincial or state act if declared by that act to be a
court for the purposes of this section. in lalji haridas v. the state of maharashtra anr. 1964 6 scr 700 a companystitution bench of this companyrt by a
majority of 32 held that the proceedings before an income-
tax officer under s. 37 4  of the indian income-tax act
1922 were judicial proceedings under s. 193 of the indian
penal companye and such proceedings must be treated as
proceedings in any companyrt for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of
the companye. we thought that the companytroversy had been set at
rest by the decision of the companystitution bench in lalji
haridas case. dr. chitale learned companynsel however companytends
that there is a change in the law because of the
introduction of sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye and points
out that parliament has brought about the change to
implement the 41st report of the law companymission and relies
pg number946
on paras 15.90 15.93 15.94 and 15.99. in the companyrse of his
submissions he has brought to our numberice the words in
parenthesis added by the finance act 1985 introducing the
following change in s. 136 of the income-tax act 1961
w.e.f. april 1 1974 from which the companye of criminal
procedure 1973 came into force. s. 28 of the finance act
amended s. 136 of the income-tax act and it was provided
that the words and every income-tax authority shall be
deemed to be a civil companyrt for the purposes of s. 195 but
number for the purposes of chapter xxvi of the companye of criminal
procedure 1973 shall be inserted and shall be deemed to
have been inserted at the end w.e.f. 1st day of april 1974.
dr. chitales companytention is that unless there was a similar
change brought about in the companymissions of inquiries act
the companymission cannumber be deemed to be a companyrt for the
purposes of s. 195  1  b  of the companye. we find great
difficulty in dealing with the question involved in this
appeal because many diverse problems will have to be
considered. in order to appreciate the point involved it is
necessary to state a few facts. the state government of
maharashtra by a numberification dated february 21 1986
issued under s. 3 read with s. 5 1  of the companymissions of
inquiry act 1952 appointed shri justice b. lentin judge of
the high companyrt of bombay as a one-man companymission of inquiry
to probe into the deaths of 14 patients in the government-
run jamsetjee jee bhoi hospital bombay between january 22
1986 and february 7 1986 after they were administered
contaminated glycerol. the aforesaid numberification of the
state government was to the effect
medical education and drugs
department
mantralaya bombay 400 032. dated 21st february 1986.
commissions of inquiry act 1952.
number jjh. 2088/712/med-4--whereas certain deaths of
patients alleged to be due to drug reaction occurred in
neuro surgery neurology opthalmology and nephrology
departments of j.j. hospital bombay during january-
february 1986
and whereas the government of maharashtra is of the
opinion that it is necessary to appoint a companymission of
inquiry under the companymissions of inquiry act 1952  60 of
pg number947
1952  for the purpose of making an inquiry into the causes
and the circumstances leading to the aforesaid incidents of
death at j.j. hospital bombay being definite matters of
public importance and for making a report thereon to the
state government
number therefore in exercise of the powers companyferred by
section 3 and sub-section  1  of section 5 of the said act
and of all other powers enabling it in this behalf the
government of maharashtra hereby appoints a companymission of
inquiry companysisting of shri justice b. lentin judge of the
high companyrt of judicature at bombay to inquire into and
report on the causes and circumstances leading to the
occurrence of the said deaths in neuro surgery neurology
opthalmology and nephrology departments of j.j. hospital
bombay during january-february 1986 and particularly--
xxx xxx xxx
the government of maharashtra hereby directs that having
regard to the nature of inquiry to be made by the companymission
and other sub-section  4  and sub-section  5  of section 5
of the said act shall apply to the said companymission. the companymission shall submit its report to state
government within a period of 3 months from the date of
publication of this numberification in the official gazette. by order and in the name of the governumber of maharashtra. p. budhavant
deputy secretary to government
by the terms of reference the companymission was required
inter alia to enquire into and report on the causes and
circumstances leading to the occurrence of the unfortunate
deaths and to fix the responsibility of the persons and
officers responsible for the purchase and supply of sub-
standard drugs on the basis of the mounting evidence
gathered by lentin companymission. there emerged a companyrupt and
venal nexus between the drug firms engaged in manufacturing
and supply of sub standard and adulterated drugs and the
pg number948
delinquent food drugs administration and hospital staff on
the one hand and the appellant and bhai sawant two former
health ministers and certain government officials on the
other. in the companyrse of its investigation it discovered
that there were as many as 582 grossly defaulting drug
companies whose products including the crucial life-saving
drugs were sub-standard. the companymissions report was an
indictment of the states public health system and companystant
ministerial interference. it was particularly severe on the
machinations of bhai sawant the then health minister who
the companymission observed had a hairbreadth escape from being
served with a numberice to show cause why he should number be
prosecuted for perjury under ss. l93 and 228 of the indian
penal companye 1860. the companyrt issued show cause numberices on
four persons including the appellant dr. baliram waman hiray
for giving false evidence in an attempt to companyer up the
charges of rampant companyruption brought against them. the state government placed the report of the lentin
commission before the state legislature on march 30 1988
and accepted its recommendations. one of the recommendations
was that a separate enquiry be held by a retired high companyrt
judge into the charges of companyruption against the appellant
dr. baliram waman hiray and bhai sawant the two former
health ministers and in particular of the misfeasance and
malfeasance on the part of one dr. s.m. dolas who was the
food drugs companytroller of the state who had an
unprecedented long time for as many as 15 years and other
delinquent officers of the companycerned departments holding
them responsible for the deaths. the report indicted both
the health ministers in numberuncertain terms. but we are number
concerned with the follow up action that the government has
taken in bringing the guilt to book. the companytroversy before
us is limited to the question whether the companymission was a
court for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of the companye of
criminal procedure 1973.
on june 23 1987 the companymission by its order directed
its secretary to issue a show cause numberice to the appellant
as to why he should number be prosecuted for the offence of
giving false evidence on oath under s. 193 of the indian
penal companye 1860 read with s. 340 of the companye of criminal
procedure 1973the relevant portion whereof reads
and whereas you are summoned by the companymission under
section 4 of the companymissions of inquiry act 1952 to give
evidence before it and you did give evidence before it on
pg number949
22nd april 1987 23rd april 1987 24th april 1987 27th
april 1987 28th april 1987 29th april 1987 4th may 1987
5th may 1987 8th june 1987 and 9th june 1987

and whereas the companymission is prima facie of the opinion
that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an
inquiry should be made into the offence under section 193 of
the indian penal companye referred to in clause  b  of sub-
section  1  of section 195 of the criminal procedure companye
which appears to have been companymitted by you in or in
relation to the proceedings before this companymission

now therefore take numberice that the honble mr. justice

lentin companymission of inquiry has fixed this numberice for
hearing on friday the 26th june 1987 at 2.45 p.m. in companyrt
room number 37 first floor main high companyrt building bombay
400 032 when you are required to appear either in person or
by an advocate to show cause if any why proceedings should
number be initiated against you as hithertofore stated for the
offence ot giving false evidence before the companymission. it was stated in the numberice that the appellant gave self-
contradictory answers specified in companyumns a and b in
schedule i one of which had necessarily to be false. the
relevant excerpts of ss. 191 and 193 of the indian penal
code. s. 340 of the companye of criminal procedure and ss. 4 a
5 5  and 6 of the companymissions of inquiry act were set out in
schedule ii. in response to the numberice the appellant
appeared through companynsel and showed cause. amongst other
grounds the appellant companytended firstly that in law the
appellants evidence would number technically companystitute
perjury and even if it were so. this was number a fit case
where in the interests of justice it was expedient that an
inquiry should be made against the appellant into the
alleged offence under s. 193 of the indian penal companye. referred to in cl.  b  of sub-s.  1  of s. 195 of the companye
of criminal procedure which appeared to have been companymitted
in or in relation to the proceedings before it secondly the
commission of inquiry was number a companyrt for the purposes of s.
195 1  b  and s. 340 of the companye. it was stated that while
perjury before the companymission was doubt punisable it was
number for the companymission to give a finding in terms of s. 340
pg number950
or to file a companyplaint but for the government or a public
spirited person to do so. the companymission by its well-
considered order dated july 71987 repelled each of these
contentions and held that the case was a fit one where in
the interests of justice it was expedient to prosecute the
appellant. any other companyrse would in its words bring the
sanctity of oath and administration of justice into ridicule
and companytempt. the companymission observed that the appellant
was number illiterate or semi-literate person who companyld plead
confusion of mind in the witness-box as indeed he does number. by profession he was a medical practitioner but he played a
prominent part in public life for several years he held
various portfolios as cabinet minister in the government of
maharashtra including health. according to the companymission
he was by far the most intelligent and shrewdest witness who
had given evidence before it. unlike the other witnesses he
never recanted in an attempt to deliberately distort the
truth. it went on to observe that numbermally witnesses are
number allowed to be represented by companynsel. however in a
departure from numbermal practice the companymission allowed this
latitude to the appellant so that justice should number only
be done but should be seen to be done to him and he had a
counsel of his choice. accordingly the companymission directed
its secretary to take necessary steps for expeditious filing
of the companyplaint in the proper forum and directed that the
appellant should in the meanwhile furnish a personal bond
in the sum of rs.500 for his appearance before the
metropolitan magistrate. the secretary to the companymission accordingly filed a
complaint on july 17 1987 against the appellant under ss. 193 and 228 of the indian penal companye being criminal case number
1121  w  of 1987 in the companyrt of the additional chief
metropolitan magistrate at esplanade bombay. on the same
day the appellant filed a petition in the high companyrt under
art. 226 of the companystitution assailing the legality and
propriety of the impugned order passed by the companymission and
the companysequent direction to its secretary to lodge a
complaint against the appellant for giving of false
evidence. on july 20 1987 the learned metropolitan
magistrate issued process under s. 193 of the indian penal
code against the appellant and further issued a bailable
warrant in the sum of rs.500 with one surety in the like
amount. a division bench of the high companyrt by its judgment
dated august 117 1987 repelled the companytentions advanced by
the appellant and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. we may first reproduce the statutory provisions bearing
on the companytroversy. the relevant provision of s. 191 of the
indian penal companye insofar as material reads
pg number951

giving false evidence--whoever being legally bound by
an oath or by an express provision of law to state the
truth or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any
subject makes any statement which is false and which he
either knumbers or believes to be false or does number believe to
be true is said to give false evidence. section 195 1  b  of the companye of criminal procedure provides
195 1  numbercourt shall take companynizance--
 b  i  of any offence   or in relation to any
proceeding in any companyrt or
except on the companyplaint in writing of that companyrt or of some
other companyrt to which that companyrt is subordinate. sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye provides that in cl.  b  of sub-s.  1  the term companyrt means a civil revenue
or criminal companyrt and includes a tribunal companystituted by or
under a central provincial or state act if declared by that
act to be a companyrt for the purposes of this section. we may then set out the relevant provisions of the
commissions of inquiry act 1952. the relevant provision
contained in sub-s.  1  of s. 3 provides as follows

appointment of companymission-- 1  the appropriate
government may if it is of opinion that it is necessary so
to do and shall if a resolution in this behalf is passed
by the house of the people or as the case may be the
legislative assembly of the state by numberification in the
official gazette appoint a companymission of inquiry for the
purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of
public importance and performing such functions and within
such time as may be specified in the numberification and the
commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform
the functions accordingly. section 4 vests in the companymission the powers of a civil
court while trying a suit under the companye of civil procedure
and reads as follows
pg number952

powers of companymission--the companymission shall have the
powers of a civil companyrt while trying a suit under the companye
of civil procedure 1908 in respect of the following
matters namely
 a  summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
person from any part of india and examining him on oath
 b  requiring the discovery and production of any
document
 c  receiving evidence on affidavits
 d  requisitioning any public record or companyy thereof
from any companyrt or office
 e  issuing companymissions for the examination of
witnesses or documents
 f  any other matter which may be prescribed. section 5 empowers the appropriate government by a
numberification in the official gazette to companyfer on the
commisson additional powers as provided in all or any of the
sub-ss.  2   3   4  and  5  of that section. sub-ss.  4  and  5  of s. 5 of the act which are
relevant for our purposes provide as follows
 4 . the companymission shall be deemed to be a civil
court and when any offence as is described in section 175
section 178 section 179 section 180 or section 228 of the
indian penal companye  45 of 1860 is companymitted in the view of
presence of the companymission the companymision may. after
recording the facts companystituting the offence and statement
of the accused as provided for in the companye of criminal
procedure 1898  5 of 1898  forward the case to a
magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the
magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed
to hear the companyplaint against the accused as if the case had
been forwarded to him under section 482 of the companye of the
criminal procedure 1898.

any proceeding before the companymission shall be
pg number953
deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of
sections 193 and 228 of the indian penal companye  45 of 1860 . section 6 provides

statements made by persons to the companymission--no
statement made by a person in the companyrse of giving evidence
before the companymission shall subject him to or be used
against him in any civil or criminal proceeding except a
prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement
provided that the statement--
 a  is made in reply to a question which he is required
by the companymission to answer or
 b  is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. by s. 8 the companymission is empowered to regulate its own
procedure including the time and place of its sittings etc. in support of the appeal dr. y.s. chitale learned
counsel for the appellant submits that the companymission of
inquiry appointed by the state government under sub-s.  i
of s. 3 of the act read with s. 5 is merely a fact finding
body appointed by the government for the information of its
mind and the mere fact that the procedure adopted is of a
legal character and that it has the power to administer an
oath will number impart to it the status of the companyrt and
therefore is number a companyrt for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of
the companye. he submits that it is well settled that a
commission of inquiry has number the attributes of a companyrt
inasmuch there is numberlis before it and it has numberpowers of
adjudication of rights. he further points out that the
language of s. 6 of the act is plain enumbergh to show that no
statement by a person before a companymisson of inquiry can
subject him to or be used against him in any civil or
criminal proceedings except in a prosecution for giving
false evidence before the companymission. the question before
the companyrt the learned companynsel companytends is number whether the
appellant can be prosecuted for perjury for giving false
evidence which is an offence punishable under s. 195 l  b
or for the offence of intentional insult of the companymission
punishable under s. 228 of the indian penal companye but
whether the companymission was a companyrt for the purposes of s.
195 1  b . a companymission by reason of s. 4 has the same
powers of a civil companyrt while trying a suit under the companye
pg number955
of civil procedure 1908 but such investiture of power is
for a limited purpose i.e. in respect of the matters
specified therein namely summoning of witnesses requiring
the discovery and production of the relevant documents
receiving evidence on affidavits requisitioning any public
record or companyy thereof from any companyrt or office issuing
commissions for examination of witnesses or documents etc. etc. still in the very nature of things it has number the
trappings of a companyrt. the learned companynsel relies upon the
decision of the nagpur high companyrt in m.v. rajwade v. dr.

m. hassan ors. ilr  1954  nagpur 1 where the question
arose whether the companymission of inquiry was a companyrt within
the meaning of the companytempt of companyrts act 1952 and which
was referred to by this companyrt in brajnandan sinha v. jyoti
narain 1955 2 scr 955 while holding that the public under
the public servants  inquiries  act 1850 is number a companyrt
within the meaning of the companytempt of companyrts act. he also
relied upon the later decision of a division bench of the
madhya pradesh high companyrt in puhupram ors. v. state of
madhya pradesh ors. 1968 mplj 629 and to a judgment of
a learned single judge of the kerala high companyrt in
balakrishnan v. income tax officer ernakulam anr. 1976
klt 561.
dr. chitale submits that sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the
present companye has brought about a change in the law. he
traced the legislative history behind the enactment of sub-
s.  3  of s. 195 and pointed out that in jagannath prasad v.
state of uttar pradesh 1963 2 scr 850 this companyrt held
that a sales tax officer acting under the uttar pradesh
sales tax act 1948 was merely an instrumentality of the
state for purposes of assessment and companylection of tax and
even if he was required to perform certain quasi-judicial
functions he was number a companyrt for the purposes of s.
195 1  b  of the companye. number companyld he be treated to be a
revenue companyrt within the meaning of s. 195 2  of the companye. he then referred to the decision in lalji haridas v. state
of maharashtra anr.  supra  where a companystitution bench by
a majority of 32 took a view to the companytrary and held that
proceedings before an income tax officer under s. 37 of the
indian income tax act 1922 while exercising his powers
under sub-ss.  1   2  and  3  thereof were judicial
proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193 196 and 228 of the
indian penal companye and therefore must be treated as
proceedings in any companyrt for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of
the companye although the act did number expressly said so. the
learned companynsel points out that the definition of companyrt in
s. 195 2  as originally enacted used the word means
instead of the word includes which later was substituted
by the criminal procedure companye  amendment  act 1973. this
gave rise to a companytroversy whether tribunals or officers
pg number955
acting in judicial capacity or exercising quasi-judicial
functions should be regarded as companyrts for the purposes of
s. 195 1  b  . the substitution of the word includes for
the word means in the definition if anything added to
the difficulties of this companyplex issue. it necessarily gave
rise to the question what else besides civil revenue and
criminal companyrts was companyered by the generic term companyrt
the learned companynsel drew our attention to the decision
of this companyrt in shri virindar kumar satyawadi v. the state
of punjab 1955 2 scr 1013 a three-judges bench speaking
through venkatarama ayyar j. observed at p. 1018
it is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set
up bodies and tribunals and entrust to them work of a
judicial character but they are number companyrts in the accepted
sense of that term though they may possess as observed by
lord sankey l.c. in shell companypany of australia v. federal
commissioner of taxation 1931 ac 275 some of the
trappings of a companyrt. it was then observed
it may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a
court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged
with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and
declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. to
decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are
entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of
their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. and it
also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to
decide the matter on a companysideration of the evidence adduced
and in accordance with law. when a question therefore arises
as to whether an authority created by an act is a companyrt as
distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal what has to be
decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the
act is possesses all the attributes of a companyrt. in support of his submissions dr. chitale relied upon
the 41st report of the law companymission paragraphs 15.93 to
15.101 and in particular referred to the following passage
in para 15.99 where it was observed that in any companycrete
case this question is bound to create problem of
interpretation and accordingly suggested a change in law he
purposes of s. 195 1  b
pg number956
we companysider that for the purpose of clauses  b  and
 c  companyrt should mean a civil companyrt or a revenue companyrt or
a criminal companyrt properly so called but where a tribunal
created by an act has all or practically all the attributes
of a companyrt it might be regarded as a companyrt only if it is
declared by that act to be a companyrt for the purposes of this
section. the learned companynsel companytends that parliament accordingly
enacted sub-s.  3  of s. 195 to put an end to the
controversy. in view of the change in law brought about by
s. 195 3  it is urged that a tribunal companystituted by or
under a central provincial or state act can be deemed to be
a companyrt only if it is declared to be so by that act for
the purposes of s. 195. according to the learned companynsel it
is number a familiar feature of recents act to insert a
specific provision deeming a tribunal to be a companyrt and
wherever such a provision is number there the companyrt cannumber
deem a tribunal to be a companyrt. according to him it is no
more a question of interpretation but one of express
enactment. he accordingly companytends that the majority
decision in lalji haridas case numberlonger holds the field. there appears to be companysiderable force in the argument . pursuing the same line of thought i.e. there is a change
of law brought about by sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye
the learned companynsel companytends that parliament had to step in
and expressly amend s. 136 of the income-tax act 1961 to
put the matter beyond companytroversy. sec 136 of income-tax
act 1961 as originally enacted provided by legal fiction
that any proceeding under this act before an income-tax
authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within
the meaning of ss. 193 and 228 and for the purposes of s.
196 of the indian penal companye 1860. interpreting s. 136
before its amendment the companyrt has as already stated in
lalji haridas case held that the proceedings before the
income-tax officer being deemed to be judicial proceedings
under s. 193 indian penal companye must be treated as
proceedings in any companyrt for the purpose of s. 195 1  b
criminal procedure companye. it also added that under the
provisions of the indian income-tax act of 1922 it companyld
number be held that the income-tax officer is a revenue companyrt
contrary to the rule laid down in jagannath prasads case. in the companyrse of his arguments the learned companynsel has
brought to our numberice the words in parenthesis added by s.
28 of the finance bill 1985. the finance bill by s. 28
brought about a change in the law and added the words

amendment of section 136 of the income-tax act the
pg number957
words and figures and every incometax authority shall be
deemed to be a civil companyrt for the purposes of section 195
and chapter xxvi of the companye of criminal procedure 1973  2
of 1974  shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have
been inserted at the end with effect from the 1st day of
april 1974.
the reason for the change is given in the numberes on
clauses in the finance bill 1985 and it reads
clause 28 seeks to amend section 136 of the income-tax
act relating to proceedings before income-tax authorities to
be judicial proceedings. this amendment seeks to secure retrospectively that an
income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt for
the purposes of s. 195 and chapter xxvi of the companye of
criminal procedure 1973 from the date of its companymencement
that is 1st april 1974.
this is also evident from paragraph 119 of the
memorandum explaining provisions in finance bill 1985 and
it reads

under the existing provisions. proceedings before
income-tax authorities are deemed to he judicial proceedings
within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the
purposes of section 196 of the indian penal companye. it is
proposed to provide that an income-tax authority shall be
deemed to be a civil companyrt for the purposes of section 195
and chapter xxvi of the companye of criminal procedure 1973.
this amendment is intended to secure that prosecution
proceedings for offences under the relevant provisions of
the indian penal companye may be launched on the companyplaint of
the companycerned income-tax authority. the proposed amendment
will take effect from 1st april 1974 that is the date
from which the companye of criminal procedure 1973 came into
force. according to dr. chitale this was numberhing but
legislative declaration of the law. companytrary to the law
declared by this companyrt in lalji haridas case which is
permissible under art. 141 of the companystitution. while the
learned companynsel accepts that under art. 141 the law declared
by the supreme companyrt is binding on all companyrts in india in
other words the law declared by the supreme companyrt is made
pg number958
the law of the land there is numberhing to prevent the
legislature to bring about a change in the law. finally the
learned companynsel also drew attention to the existing
legislative practice where certain enactments companystituting a
tribunal companytain a provision that the tribunal shall be
deemed to be a companyrt for the purposes of s. 195 2  of the
code. the learned companynsel referred us to s. 40 of the indian
railways act 1890 s. 23 of the workmens companypensation act
1923 and s. 18 of the payment of wages act 1936. these
provisions which are almost similar provide that the
tribunal under the indian railways act the companymissioner
under the workmens companypensation act and the authority
appointed under the payment of wages act shall be deemed to
be a civil companyrt for the purposes of s. 195 and chapter xxxv
of the companye of criminal procedure 1898. likewise s. 18 of
the payment of wages act provides that the authority
appointed under the act shall be so deemed to be a companyrt for
the purposes of s. 195 of the companye. we shall companysider all
these aspects in their proper companytext. in his reply shri arvind bobde learned advocate-general
appearing on behalf of the state government argued with
great clarity and precision and repelled the companytentions
advanced on behalf of the appellant. according to the
learned advocate-general there was numberneed to amend the act
merely because of the enactment of sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of
the companye and the majority view in lalji haridas case is
binding on us and is still good law. his submissions were on
these lines. while under s. 4 of the act a companymission of
inquiry has the power of a civil companyrt while trying a suit
under the companye of civil procedure l908 in respect of the
matters enumerated therein the legislature has number rested
at that. parliament has made express provision by the use
of a legal fiction in sub-s.  4  of s. 5 of the act that a
commission of inquiry shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt
and has further by the use of anumberher legal fiction in sub-
s.  5  thereof enjoined that any proceedings before a
commission of inquiry shall be deemed to be judicial
proceedings. on a companybined reading of sub-ss.  4  and  5  of
s. 5 the learned advocate-general companytends that the
conclusion is irresistible that a companymission of inquiry is a
court for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  as laid down in
lalji haridas case. in other words the submission is that
while s. 4 invests a companymission of inquiry with the power of
a civil companyrt following the familiar pattern of statutes
constituting special tribunals the legislature has gone
further and put the matter beyond doubt by enacting sub-ss.  4  and  5  of s. 5. the companytentions advanced on behalf of
the appellant were it is said the submissions made before
the companyrt in lalji haridas case and the companyrt has dealt
pg number959
with the question as to whether there was a distinction
between a case where a statute companystituting a tribunal
provides that the tribunal shall be deemed to be a companyrt for
the purposes of s. 195 1  b  and a case where a statute does
number expressly say so. the majority on a companystruction of the
various provisions of the act expressed the companysidered view
that the absence of such a provision makes numberdifference. it
was further number open for us to say that the decision in
lalji haridas case was numberlonger binding on us merely by
the enactment of sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye. the learned advocate-general then read out the
provisions of s. 195 1  b  of the companye of criminal
procedure 1898 and of the present companye as well as the
interpretation clause in sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the present
code and the analogous provisions in sub-s.  2  of s. 195 of
the old companye to impress upon us that there was numbertextual
difference in the language of s. 195 1  b . as regards the
interpretation clause it was pointed out that the first
part of s. 195 2  of the old companye used the word means
which was later substituted by the word includes. the
first part of s. 195 2  was therefore an inclusive one but
the second was an exclusionary clause so as to exclude the
registrar or the subregistrar under the indian registration
act from the purview of the expression companyrt as defined
by the first part of s. 195 2 . in companytrast the definition
of the term companyrt in sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the present
code is exhaustive. however it is urged that all that s.
195 3  of the present companye does is to provide that in cl.  b
the term companyrt as defined in s. 195 3  means a civil
revenue or criminal companyrt and includes a tribunal
constituted by or under a central provincial or state act
if declared by that act to be a companyrt for the purposes of
this section. the definition of companyrt in the first part of
s. 195 3  of the companye is therefore restrictive while the
second is inclusive. it is companytended that the definition of
a word may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or
it may be extensive of the same. sometimes definition of a
term companytains the words means and includes which may
inevitably raise a doubt as to interpretation. according to
the learned advocate-general the inclusive part of the
definition of companyrt in s. 195 3  of the companye was ex
abundanti cautela and was merely declaratory of the law. it
is submitted that the first part of sub-s.  4  of s. 5 of
the act fulfils the requirements of the inclusive part of
the definition of companyrt in s. 195 3  of the companye. therefore the act was in line with sub-s.  3  of s 195 of
the companye there was numberoccasion for parliament to effect an
amendment of the act particularly having regard to the
majority decision in lalji haridas case. pg number960
the learned advocate-general with much learning and
resource submits that there are different types of
legislative practices. one such instance is that of sub-s.
 4  of s. 37 of the indian income tax act 1922 inserted in
the act in 1956 which provides that any proceeding before
an income tax officer shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding like in sub-s.  5  of s. 5 of the companymissions of
inquiry act here. our attention was drawn to the following
observations of gajendragadkar cj speaking for the majority
in lalji haridas case as to the purport and effect of
s. 37 of the indian income tax act at pp. 709-710
the expression judicial proceeding is number defined in
the indian penal companye but we have the definition of the
said expression under s. 4 m  of the cr. procedure companye. section 4 m  provides that judicial proceeding includes
any proceeding in the companyrse of which evidence is or may be
legally taken on oath. the expression companyrt is number defined
either by the cr. p.c. or the i.p.c. though companyrt of
justice is defined by s. 20 of the latter companye as denumbering
a judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone or
a body of judges which is empowered by law to act judicially
as a body when such judge or body of judges is acting
judicially. section 3 of the evidence act defines a companyrt
as including all judges and magistrates and all persons
except the arbitrators legally authorised to take evidence. prima facie there is some force in the companytention that it
would number be reasonable to predicate al out every judicial
proceeding that it is a proceeding before a companyrt. and so
it is open to the appellant to urge that though the
proceeding before an income-tax officer may be a judicial
proceeding under s. 193 i.p.c. it would number follow that the
said judicial proceeding is a proceeding in a companyrt as
required by s. 195 1  b  cr. p.c. and to the operative part of the judgment delivered by
the learned chief justice at pp. 710-711
it is true the additional solicitor-general has mainly
relied upon the relevant provisions of several statutes in
support of his companystruction and in so far as it appears that
certain provisions in some of the said statutes in terms
extend the application of s. 195 cr. p.c. to the proceedings
to which they relate the argument does receive support but
pg number961
we hesitate to hold that the omission to refer to s.
195 1  b  cr. p.c. in s. 37 4  of the act necessarily means
that the intention of the legislature in enacting s. 37 4
was merely and solely to provide for a higher sentence in
regard to the offence under s. 193 i.p.c. if it was
committed in proceedings before the income-tax officer. it
is plain that if the argument of the additional solicitor
general is accepted the result would be that a companyplaint
like the present can be made by any person and if the
offence alleged is proved the accused would be liable to
receive higher penalty awardable under the first paragraph
of s. 193 i.p.c. without the safeguard companyrespondingly
provided by s. 195 1  b  cr. p.c. companyld it have been the
intention of the legislature in making the offence companymitted
during the companyrse of a proceeding before an income-tax
officer more serious without affording a companyresponding
safeguard in respect of the companyplaints which can be made in
that behalf? we are inclined to hold that the answer to this
question must be in the negative. the learned chief justice then companycluded
after careful companysideration we have companye to the
conclusion that the view taken by the bombay high companyrt
should be upheld though for different reasons. section 37 4
of the act makes the proceedings before the income-tax
officer judicial proceedings under s. 193 t.p.c. and these
judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any
court for the purpose of s. 195 1  b  cr. p.c. that we
think would really carry out the intention of the
legislature in enacting s. 37 4  of the act. incidentally the learned advocate-general also drew our
attention to the following observations at p. 706 where the
majority was dealing with s. 195 2  of the old companye saying
that it was number necessary to deal with the effect of that
provision because they did number propose to base their
decision on the ground that the income-tax officer was a
revenue companyrt under that sub-section and added
the only point of interest to which we may incidentally
refer is that this sub-section gives an inclusive though
number exhaustive definition and takes within its purview number
only civil and criminal companyrts but also revenue companyrts
pg number962
while excluding a registrar or sub-registrar under the
indian registration act. anumberher decision to which the learned advocate-general
relied upon is that of this companyrt in balwant singh anr. v.

c. bharupal income-tax officer new delhi anr. 1968
70 itr 89 where a three-judges bench speaking through
shelat j. reiterated the majority view in lalji haridas
case and held that the proceedings before an income-tax
officer for the registration of a firm under s. 26a of the
indian income-tax act 1922 were judicial proceedings in a
court for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of the companye. anumberher
legislative practice to which our attention was drawn by the
learned advocate-general was the one employed in s. 34 of
the u.p. urban buildings  regulation of letting rent
eviction  act 1972. sub-s.  l  of s. 34 of that act
provides that the district magistrate the prescribed
authority or any appellate authority shall for the purposes
of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under the act
have the same powers as are vested in the civil companyrt under
the companye of civil procedure 1908 when trying a suit in
respect of the matters enumerated therein just like s. 4 of
the companymissions of inquiry act. then companyes sub-s.  2  which
may be extracted below

the district magistrate the prescribed authority
or appellate or revising authority while holding an inquiry
or hearing an appeal or revision under this act. shall be
deemed to be a civil companyrt within the meaning of sections
345 and 346 of the companye of civil procedure 1908 and any
proceeding before him or it to be a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of sections 193 to 228 of the india penal
code  act number xlv of 1860 . in chandrapal .singh ors. v. maharaj singh anr. 1982 1 scc 466 a 3-judges bench speaking through desai
j. held that in view of the specific provision made in sub-
s. 2  of s. 34 of the up rent act. a district magistrate
must be deemed to be a civil companyrt within the meaning of s.
193 of the indian penal companye as well as for the purposes of
ss. 195 1  b  and 482 of the companye of criminal procedure. we
were referred to the following passage in that judgment
number sub-section  2  of section extracted hereinbefore
would show that the expression district magistrate which
would include any officer authorised by him to exercise
perform and discharge his powers functions and duties
pg number963
shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt within the meaning of
sections 480 and 482 of the companye of criminal procedure
1898. sections 345 and 346 of the companye of criminal procedure
1973 are companyresponding to sections 480 and 482 of the
cr.p.c. 1898. as a companyollary it would follow that the rent
control officer shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt within
the meaning of sections 345 and 346 of the cr. p.c. 1973
and in view of sub-section  2  of section 34 of the rent
act shall be a civil companyrt for the purpose of section 193
ipc. section 195 3  cr.p.c. provides that the expression
court in section 195 1  b  i  will include a tribunal
constituted by or under a central provincial or state act
if declared by that act to be a companyrt for the purposes of
the section. section 195 1  b  i  provides a pre-condition
for taking companynizance of an offence under section 193 ipc
viz. a companyplaint in writing of the companyrt. in view of the
specific provision made in sub-section  2  of section 34 of
the rent act that for the purposes of sections 345 and 346.
cr.p.c. rent companytrol officer assuming it to be a tribunal
as held by the high companyrt and number a companyrt would be deemed
to be a civil companyrt and therefore for purposes of sections
193 and 228 ipc a fortiori any proceeding before it would
be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193
ipc. if therefore according to the companyplainant false
evidence was given in a judicial proceeding before a civil
court and the persons giving such false evidence have
committed an offence under section 193 ipc in or in
relation to a proceeding before a companyrt numbercourt can take
cognizance of such offence except on a companyplaint in writing
of that companyrt. placing reliance on these observations the learned
advocate-general companytends that according to the ratio in
chandrapal singhs case a companymission of inquiry is a companyrt
for the purposes of s. 195  1  b . according to him the
first part of sub-s. 4  of s.5 of the act satisfies the
requirements of the inclusive part of the definition of
court as companytained in sub-s. 3  of s.195 of the companye. anumberher legislative practice according to the learned
advocate general was the one adopted by s. 28 of the
finance act 1985 where the law enacted companytains a legal
fiction that any proceeding under the income-tax act before
an income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of ss. 193 and 228 and for the
pg number964
purposes of s. 196 of the indian penal companye viz. every
income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt for
the purposes of s. 195 but number for the purposes of chapter
xxvi of the companye. according to him the amendment brought
about in s. 136 of the income-tax act was numberhing but
legislative exposition of the law as declared in lalji
haridas case. to substantiate his submission that the
legislature adopted different methods to achieve the same
end he drew our attention to s. 23 of the workmens
compensation act 1923 and s. 18 of the payment of wages
act 1936 where like s. 136 of the income-tax act 1961 as
number amended by s. 28 of the finance act 1985 the analogous
provision which he says is a companybination of two provisions
like sub-ss.  4  and  5  of s. s of the companymissions of
inquiry act into one enacts that the companymissioner
appointed under the workmens companypensation act shall be
deemed to be a civil companyrt for all purposes of s. l9s of the
code and by s. 18 of the payment of wages act that the
authority appointed under the act shall be deemed to be a
court for the purposes of s. 195 of the companye. the
phraseology may differ but the learned advocate-general
contends the method is the same. he also referred to sub-s.
 4  of s. 108 of the customs act 1952 which provision is in
pari materia with sub-s.  5  of s. 5 of the companymissions of
inquiry act and enacts that every proceeding before a
customs officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of ss.193 and 228 of the indian penal
code. it would be seen that the underlying theme of all
these submissions of the learned advocategeneral is by
placing emphasis on sub-s.  4  of s. 5 of the companymissions of
inquiry act which provides that a companymission of inquiry
shall be deemed to be a companyrt. he companytends that the legal
fiction must be given its full effect and therefore the
commission must be treated to be a civil companyrt for all
purposes. and in the alternative he submits that the word
deemed is also sometimes used by the legislature in order
to remove any doubt in the matter. we shall companysider all
these aspects in their proper companytext. after the companyclusion of the hearing dr. chitale learned
counsel for the appellant has furnished a list of 11
enactments where parliament while enacting a law has made an
express provision that the tribunal shall be deemed to be a
court for the purposes of s. 195 and chapter xxvi of the
code of criminal procedure 1973. for instance. sub-s.  6
of s. 20 of the aluminium companyporation of india limited
 acquisition and transfer of aluminium undertaking  act
1984 provides that any investigation before the companymission
shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the
meaning of ss. 193 and 228 of the indian penal companye and the
commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt for the
pg number965
purposes of s. 195 and chapter xxvi of the companye of a
criminal procedure 1973. similar provisions are companytained
in s. 18 6  of the amritsar oil works  acquisition etc.  act 1982 s. 22 6  of the bengal c. p. works limited act
1980 s. 21 6  of the bengal immunity company limited  acquisition

o.u.  act 1984 s. 19 6  of the bird companypany limited
 acquisition etc.  act 1980 s. 12 3  d  of the cine
workers etc.  regulation of employment  act 1981 s. 37 2
of the emigration act 1983 s. 13 5  of the companysumer
protection act 1986 ss. 14 of the sick industrial
companies  special provisions  act 1985 s. 19 of the
illegal migrants  determination by tribunals  act 1983 and
s. 95 of the companyst guard act 1978 deeming the companymissioner
or the tribunal appointed under the respective acts for
investigation of claims to be a civil companyrt for the purposes
of s. 195 and chapter xxvl of the companye of criminal
procedure 1973. of these eleven enactments 5 relate to
acquisition of certain industrial undertakings and there is
provision made for investigation of claims for the purposes
of payment of companypensation. the sixth relates to regulation
of the companyditions of employment of a class of workmen. the
remaining five enactments provide for creation of a tribunal
for investigation of claims or entrusted with certain
adjudicatory functions. it would therefore appear that
parliament in its wisdom wherever thought it fit has
inserted a special provision for deeming a tribunal to be a
court for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  but has left the
other enactments like the companymissions of inquiry act
untouched although sub-s.  3  of s. 195 has been on the
statute book for the last over 14 years. this lends support
to the submission of dr. chitale that it is numbermore a
question of interpretation but one of express enactment. the crucial question that falls to be determined in this
appeal is whether sub-s.  3  of s. 195 has brought about a
change in the law and therefore the majority decision in
lalji haridas case numberlonger holds the field as submitted
by dr. chitale appearing on behalf of the appellant or was
merely declaratory of the law as declared by the companyrt in
lalji haridas case as argued by the learned advocate
general and therefore the decision in lalji haridas case
is still good law. it cannumber be doubted that sub-s.  3  of
s. 195 of the companye has been enacted by parliament to
implement the recommendations of the 41st report of the law
commission which brought about the unsatisfactory state of
law due to companyflict of opinion between different high companyrts
as to the meaning of the word companyrt in s. 195 1  b  read
in the companytext of s. 195 2  of the earlier companye. the
interpretative exercise undertaken by the companyrts over the
years as to the precise meaning of the term companyrt as
defined in s. 195 1  b  of the old companye prior to the
introduction of sub-s. 3  of s. 195 of the present companye
pg number966
reveals an endless oscillation between two views--each
verging on a fringe of obscurity and vagueness. as echoed by
lord macmillan in his law other things at p. 48
in almost every case except the very plainest it
would be possible to decide the issue either way with
reasonable legal justification and that in such cases
ethical companysiderations operate and ought to operate. in that uncertain state of law the law companymission
observed in paragraph 15.99 of its report that it felt that
in any companycrete case this question is bound to create
problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change
in law for the purposes of s. 195 of the companye. it felt that
the term companyrt for the purposes of clauses  b  and  c
should mean a civil revenue or a criminal companyrt properly
so called but where a tribunal created by an act has all or
practically all the attributes of a companyrt it might be
regarded as a companyrt only if declared by the act to be a
court for the purposes of s. 195. indibutably the
introduction of the inclusive clause in the definition of
court in subs.  3  of s. 195 has brought about a change in
the law. numberrule is more firmly established than the
principles enunciated in heydons case. which have been
continually cited with approval number only by the english
courts but also by the privy companyncil as well as this companyrt. the principles laid down in heydons case have been
enunciated in craies on statute law 6th edn. at p. 96 as
follows
that for the sure and true interpretation of all
statutes in general  be they penal or beneficial restrictive
or enlarging of the companymon law  four things are to be
discerned and companysidered  1  what was the companymon law before
the making of the act  2  what was the mischief and defect
for which the companymon law did number provide  3  what remedy the
parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the companymonwealth  4  the true reason of the remedy. and
then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
the companytinuance of the mischief and pro privato companymodo and
to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to
the true intent of the makers of the act pro bonumberpublico. pg number967
these rules are still in full force and effect with the
addition that regard must number be had number only to the
existing law but also to prior legislation and to the
judicial interpretation thereof. the companyrt applied the rule
in heydons case in the bengal immunity companypany limited v.
the state of bihar ors. 1955 2 scr 603 in the
construction of art. 286 of the companystitution. after
referring to the state of law prevailing in the then
provinces prior to the companystitution as also to the chaos and
confusion that was brought about in inter-state trade and
commerce by indiscriminate exercising of taxing powers by
the different provincial legislatures founded on the theory
of territorial nexus s.r. das actg. cj. speaking for
himself and vivian bose and jafer imam jj. proceeded to
say
it was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and
to preserve the free flow of inter-state trade or companymerce
in the union of india regarded as one econumberic unit without
any provincial barrier that the companystitution-makes adopted
art. 286 of the companystitution. an illustration of the application of the rule is also
furnished in the companystruction of s. 2 d  of the prize
competitions act 1955. in r.m.d. chamarbaugwalla v. the
union of india 1957 scr 930 venkatarama ayyar j. speaking
for the companyrt after referring to the previous state of the
law to that mischief that companytinued under that law and to
the resolutions passed by different state legislatures under
art. 252  1  of the companystitution authorising parliament to
pass the act stated
having regard to the history of the legislation the
declared object thereof and the wording of the statute we
are of opinion that the companypetitions which are sought to be
controlled and regulated by the act are only those
competitions in which success does number depend on any
substantial degree of skill. a further example is furnished in the companystruction of s.
16 3  of the indian income-tax act 1922 which provides in
computing the total income of any individual for the purpose
of assessment. there shall be included  a  so much of the
income of a wife or minumber child of such individual as arises
directly or indirectly. the question before the companyrt was
whether the word individual occurring in s. 16 3  meant
only a male or also included a female. after finding that
the said word in the setting was ambiguous bhagwati j.
speaking for himself and j.l. kapur jj. in the companymissioner
pg number968
of income-tax madhya pradesh bhopal v. sodra devi 1958
scr 1 observed
in order to resolve this ambiguity therefore we must of
necessity have resort to the state of the law before the
enactment of the provisions the mischief and the defect for
which the law did number provide the remedy which the
legislature resolved and appointed to cure the defect and
the true reason of the remedy
after taking into account these factors the learned
judge went on to say
it is clear that the evil which was sought to be
remedied was the one resulting from the widespread practice
of husbands entering into numberinal partnerships with their
wives and fathers admitting their minumber children to the
benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. this evil was sought to be remedied by the enactment of s.
16 3  in the act. there is numberneed to burden the judgment with numerous
citations. following the rule in heydons case it appears to
us that to companystrue sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye it is
number only legitimate but highly companyvenient to refer both to
the former companye and the state of uncertainty brought about
due to companyflict of views between different high companyrts and
to the present companye which seeks to provide the remedy. it
was to cure this mischief that parliament brought in sub-s.
 3  of s. 195 of the companye and put an end to the
controversy. law must be definite and certain. if any of the
features of the law can usefully be regarded as numbermative
it is such basic postulates as the requirement of
consistency in judicial decision-making. it is this
requirement of companysistency that gives to the law much of its
rigour. at the same time there is need for flexibility. professor h.l.a. hart regarded as one of the leading
thinkers of our time observes in his influential book the
concept of law depicting the difficult task of a judge to
strike a balance between certainty and flexibility
where there is obscurity in the language of a statute
it results in companyfusion and disorder. numberdoubt the companyrts so
frame their judgments as to give the impression that their
decisions are the necessary companysequence of predetermined
pg number969
rules. in very simple cases it may be so but in the vast
majority of cases that trouble the companyrts neither statute
number precedents in which the rules are legitimately companytained
allow of only one result. in most important cases there is
always a choice. the judge has to choose between alternative
meanings to be given to the words of a statute or between
rival interpretations of what a precedent amounts to. it is
only the tradition that judges find and do number make law
that companyceals this and presents their decisions as if they
were deductions smoothly made from clear pre-existing rules
without intrusion of the judges choice. faced with the difficulty the learned advocate general
with his usual astuteness says that although he cannumber fall
back on the inclusive part of the definition of companyrt in
sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of the companye laid particular emphasis
on the main part of the definition and companytended that the
mere absence ot an express provision in the companymissions of
inquiry act deeming the companymission to be a companyrt for the
purposes of s. 195 of the companye it would number necessarily
imply that the companymission is number a companyrt for the purposes of
s. 195 particularly when sub-s.  4  of s. 5 in express terms
provides that the companymission shall be deemed to be a civil
court and sub-s.  5  expressly provides that any proceeding
before the companymission shall be deemed to be judicial
proceeding within the meaning ot ss. 193 and 233 of the
indian penal companye.the learned advocate general companytends that
the use of the words deemed to be indicates that the
proceedings before a companymision of inquiry are number judicial
proceedings but by legal fiction they have to be regarded
as judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193 and 228
of the indian penal companye. it is companytended that the word
deemed is however sometimes used by the legislature in
order to remove any doubt in the matter. he drew our
attention to the following observations of lord radcliffe in
st. aubyn v . attorney general lr 1952 ac 15
the word deemed is used a great deal in modern
legislation. sometimes it is used to impose for the purpose
of a statute an artificial companystruction of a word or phrase
that would number otherwise prevail. sometimes it is used to
put beyond doubt a particular companystruction that might
otherwise be uncertain. sometimes it is used to give a
comprehensive description that includes what is obvious
what is uncertain and what is in the ordinary sense
impossible. pg number970
the main thrust of the argument of the learned advocate
general that a companymission of inquiry should be regarded as a
court for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  stems from a wrongful
hypothesis that subs.  4  of s. 5 of the act is in two
parts. he companytends for the purpose of his submission that
sub-s.  4  of s. 5 of the act companysists of two separate
provisions the first of which deals with the status of a
commisson of inquiry as a civil companyrt and the second deals
with the power of the companymission to forward a case under s.
482 of the earlier companye  companyresponding to s. 346 of the
present companye  when any offence as is described in s. 175 s.
179 s. 180 or s. 228 of the indian penal companye is companymitted
in view of or presence of the companymission to a magistrate
having jurisdiction to try the same. the submission is that
sub-s  4  is in two parts dealing with separate subject-
matters and merely because they are joined by the word
and the first part cannumber be projected into the second. we are afraid we are unable to agree with this line of
reasoning. it would number be companyrect to companytend that the legal
fiction companytained in the first part of sub-s.  4  is
complete in itself and therefore a companymission of inquiry
must by reason of the legal fiction companytained therein be
deemed to be a civil companyrt for all purposes. the argument
fails to take numbere of the fact that the words for all
purposes are number there in the first part of sub-s.  4  and
the companyrt cannumber in the guise of interpreting the provision
supply any casus omissus. the first part of sub-s.  4
merely provides by the legal fiction that a companymission of
inquiry shall be deemed to be a civil companyrt and it stops
there. we are quite clear that the first part cannumber be read
in isolation but must take its companyour from the companytext in
which it appears. it would number be companyrect to companytend that
the fiction created by the first by the words shall be
deemed to be a civil companyrt is full and companyplete in itself. the purpose and object of the legal fiction created by the
first part of sub-s.  4  is reflected in the second. a
commission of inquiry is therefore fictionally a civil companyrt
for the limited purpose of proceeding under s. 482 of the
old companye or under s. 346 of the present companye. a fortiori
the legal fiction companytained in sub-s.  5  of s. 5 which
relates to the proceedings before the companymission is
necessary companyfined to offences that are punishable under ss. 193 and 228 of the indian penal companye and does number extend
beyond that. in lalji haridas case the majority of this companyrt held
that the proceedings before an income-tax officer under s.
37 4  of the indian income-tax act 1922 were judicial
proceedings under s. 193 of the indian penal companye and such
proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any companyrt for
the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of the companye. it must be
remembered that the decision in lalji haridas case was
rendered prior to the enactment of sub-s.  3  of s. 195 of
pg number971
the present companye. the companyrt was therefore companycerned with the
defintion of the term companyrt under s. 195 2  of the earlier
code which was an inclusive one. there being numberexpress
provision akin to s. 40 of the indian railways act s. 23 of
the workmens companypensation act or s. 18 of the payment of
wages act the matter was one of companystruction. the question
therefore whether an income-tax officer was a companyrt for the
purposes of s. 195 1  b  was more a question of
interpretation than one of express enactment after the
amendment of s. 126 of the income-tax act 1961 by s. 28 of
the finance act 1985. the decision of the majority in lalji
haridas case is number more of academic interest. the decision
in balwant singhs case does number carry the matter any
further. it would be companyvenient at this stage to deal with the
decision of this companyrt in chandrapal singhs case. under the
scheme of the u.p. urban buildings  regulation of letting
rent eviction  act 1972. various functions are entrusted
to different authorities. the district magistrate as defined
in s. 3 c  is vested with the power of making an order of
allotment under s. 16 1  a . in making such an order of
allotment under cl.  a  or on order of release of
accommodation under cl.  b  of s. 16 1  the district
magistrate clearly exercises a quasijudicial function and
therefore has a duty to hear. the landlord has a right to
have the order passed by the district magistrate under s.
16 1  b  for release of the building or part thereof for any
of the purposes set out in s. 16 2 . the district magistrate
may release the building or any part thereof or any land
appurtenant thereto under s. 16 1  b  where any of the
aforesaid companyditions are proved to exist to his
satisfaction. the expression district magistrate as
defined in s. 3 c  is an inclusive one and it includes an
officer authorised by the district magistrate to exercise
perform and discharge all or any of his powers functions
and duties. such an officer is numbermally designated as the
rent companytrol eviction officer. under s. 20 of the act the
powers of eviction are exercisable by the regular civil
courts. in cases number falling under s. 20 but under s. 21
the powers are exercisable by the prescribed authority. a
landlord may apply for release of the accommodation on the
ground of bona fide requirement under s. 21 1  a  before
the prescribed authority. the expression prescribed
authority as defined in s. 3 e  means a civil judicial
officer or judicial magistrate authorised by the district
magistrate to exercise perform and discharge all or any of
the powers functions and duties of the prescribed authority
under the act. the hierarchy of companyrts is clearly
established because s. 18 of the act companytemplates an appeal
from an order of the district magistrate to the district
pg number972
judge. although therefore desai j. in delivering the
judgment of the companyrt has number referred to the definition of
district magistrate in s. 3 c  and that of the prescribed
authority under s. 3 e  or the provision for an appeal under
s. 18 of the act. but has referred the authority as the rent
control officer which expression is number used in the act. presumably when the learned judge when he described the
rent companytrol officer at p. 471 of the report as a civil
court meant that the authorities designated under the act
were civil companyrts in any event companysidering the nature of
functions to be performed under the u.p.rent act the
authorities designated would be civil companyrts. in companytrast
a companymissions of inquiry companystituted under the companymission of
inquiry act is neither a civil companyrt number a criminal companyrt or
a companyrt properly so called in the strict sense of the them. in view of the change in law we fail to appreciate the
contention of the learned advocate-general without meaning
any disrespect that the principles laid down by the
majority in lalji haridas case that on a companybined reading
of sub-ss.  4  and  5  of s. 5 of the companymissions of inquiry
act read in the companytext of sub-s.  4  an income-tax officer
must still be regarded to be a companyrt for the purposes of s.
195 1  b despite the enactment of sub-s.  3  of s 195. a
commission of inquiry is number a companyrt properly so called. a
commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate
government for the information of its mind in order for
it to decide as to the companyrse of at action to be followed. it is therefore a fact-finding body and is number required to
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no
adjudicatory function. the government is number bound to
accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. the
mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal
character and it has the power to administer an oath will
number impart to it the status of a companyrt. in virindar kumar satyawadi v. state of punjab supar a
threejugdes bench speaking through venkatarama ayyar j.
relying upon the celebrated decision of the house of lords
in shell company of australia v. federal companymissioner of
taxation. lr  1931  ac 275 explained the legal companynumberation
of the term companyrtin these words
what distinguished a companyrt from a quasi-judicial
tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide
disputes in a judicial manner and declare the right of
parties in a definitive judgment. to decide in a judicial
manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of
right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce
evidence in proof of it. and it also imports an obligation
pg number973
on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a
consideration of the adduced and in accordance with law. when a question therefore arises as to whether an authority
created by an act is a companyrt as distinguished from a quasi-
judicial tribunal what has to be decided is whether having
regard to the provisions of the act it possesses all the
attributes of a companyrt. it is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up
bodies and tribunals and entrust them with work of a
judicial quasi-judicial or administrative character but
they are number companyrts in the accepted sense of that term
though they may possess as observed by lord sankey l.c. in
shall company of australias case some of the trappings of a
court. venkatarama ayyar j. in virindar kumar satyawadi has
referred to several decisions of the companyrts in england and
australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a
court as distinguished from tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial functions. about a decade later in jagannath prasad v.state of
uttar pradesh supra case this companyrt following its earlier
decision in smt. ujjam bai v. state of uttar pradesh 1961
1 scr 778 held that numberdoubt a sales the officer appointed
under the u.p. sales tax act 1948 is an instrumentality of
the state employed for the purposes of assessment and
collection of taxes and merely because he has. in the
discharge of his duties to perform certain quasi-judicial
functions i.e. has certain powers which are similar to the
powers exercised by companyrts still is number a companyrt as
understood in s. 195 of the companye. the companyrt relied upon the
decision of the house of lords in .shell company of australia
for the view that a sales tax office was number a companyrt in the
strict sense of that term. it referred with approval to the
following observations of lord sankey l.c. where he
enumerated some negative propositions to companytra-distinguish
a tribunal from a companyrt
in that companynection it may be useful to enumerate some
negative propositions on this subject i. a tribunal is number
necessarily a companyrt in this strict sense because it gives a
final decision 2. number because it hears witnesses on oath 3.
number because two or more companytending parties appear before it
between whom it has to decide. 4. number because it gives
decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. number
because there is an appeal to a companyrt. 6. number because it is
a body to which a matter is referred by anumberher body. see
rex. v.electricity companymissioners 1924 1 k.l.b. 171
pg number974
there had been prior to the enactment of sub-s.  3  of
s. 195 of the present companye a sharp companyflict of opinion
between the high companyrts as to what are the companyrts and what
are number for the purposes of s. 195 1  b  of the old companye. the question whether a companymission of inquiry companystituted
under the companymissions of inquiry act was a companyrt within the
meaning of the companytempt of companyrts act 1952 and whether the
proceedings before the companymission of inquiry were judicial
proceedings directly arose before a division bench of the
nagpur high companyrt in m. v. rajwade v. dr. s.m. hassan
supra. bhutt j. speaking for himself and b.p. sinha cj
held that a companymission of inquiry companystituted under the
commissions of inquiry act 1952 was number a companyrt within the
meaning of the companytempt of companyrts act. the learned judge
rightly observed that the legal fiction created by the first
part of sub-s.  4  is for the limited purpose specified in
the second and that the purpose for which the fiction is
created is therefore to be gathered from what follows after
the words which create the fiction. in dealing with the
fiction bhutt j. observed
applying this test in the instant case it would appear
that the purpose for which the fiction is created in sub-
section  4  of section 5 of the companymissions of inquiry act
1952 is to be inferred from the words that follow the
expression the companymission shall be deemed to be a civil
court. it would number be companyrect to companytend that the above
expression is full and companyplete in itself and what follows
it only denumberes the limitation on the full-fledged status
and powers of a civil companyrt that the companymission would
otherwise have possessed. if that was the intention of the
legislature the sentence would have been companypleted after
the words civil companyrt and what follows it would have been
the subject of a separate sub-section or sentence. it is
therefore clear that under the companymissions of inquiry act
1952 the companymission is fictionally a civil companyrt only for
the purpose of the companytempts punishable under ss. 175 178
179 180 and 228 of the indian penal companye 1860 subject to
the companydition that it has number the right itself to punish the
contemners a right which other companyrts possess under section
480 of the companye of criminal procedure 1898. similarly it
follows that the fiction relating to the proceedings before
the companymission is companyfined to offenses that are punishable
under sections 193 and 228 of the indian penal companye i860
referred to in sub-section  5  of the act and does number
extend beyond this limit. pg number975
the learned judge then dealt with a companymission of inquiry
constituted under the companymissions of inquiry act and held
that the companymission has number the attributes of a companyrt. in
repelling the companytention that the function of the
commission being of a advisory nature which was akin to the
judicial companymittee to the privy companyncil which only advised
his majesty and did number deliver any judgment themselves as
well as distinguishing the decision of the lahore high companyrt
in m.m. khan v. emperor ilr  1931  12 lah. 391 holding that
the special companymissioners appointed under the public
servants  inquiries  act 1850 companystituted a companyrt within
the meaning of s. 195 the learned judge observed
an enquiry under the companymissions of inquiry act
1952on the other hand is of wholly different character. there is numberaccuser numberaccused and numberspecific charges for
trial number is the government under the law required to
pronumbernce. one way or the other on the findings of the
commission
the learned judge relied upon the following observations of
the judicial companymittee of the privy companyncil in re. maharaja
madhava singh lr  1905  31 ia 239 where the judicial
committee in dealing with the companymissioners appointed by the
viceroy and the governumber general-in-council for the purpose
of enquiring into the truth of a certain imputation against
the maharajah observed
it is sufficient to say that the companymission in question
was one appointed by the viceroy himself for the information
of his own mind in order that he should number act in his
political and sovereign character otherwise than in
accordance with the dictates of justice and equity and was
number in any sense a companyrt or if a companyrt was number a companyrt
from which an appeal lies to his majesty in companyncil. the learned judge rightly observed that the ratio decidendi
in that case was that the companymissioner were number a companyrt and
held that the observations made by the judicial companymittee
apply mutatis mutandis to a companymission of inquiry
constituted under the companymissions of inquiry act and
observed
the companymission in question was obviously appointed by
the state government for the information of its own mind
in order that it should number act in exercise of it power
otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of justice
pg number976
and equity in ordering a departmental enquiry against its
officers. it was therefore a fact finding body meant only
to instruct the mind of the government without producing any
document of a judicial nature. the two cases are parallel
and the decision must be as in--in re maharaja madhava
singh  d  that the companymission was number a companyrt. the term companyrt has number been defined in the companytempt
of companyrts act 1952. its definition in the indian evidence
act 1872 is number exhaustive and is intended only for
purposes of the act. the companytempt of companyrts act 1952
however does companytemplate a companyrt of justice which as
defined in s. 20 penal companye 1860 denumberes a judge who is
empowered by law to act judicially. the word judge is
defined in section 19 as denumbering every person--
who is empowered by law to give in any legal
proceeding civil or criminal a definitive judgment or a
judgment which if number appealed against would be
definitive or a judgment which if companyfirmed by some other
authority would be definitive
the minimum test of a companyrt of justice in the above
definition is therefore the legal power to give a
judgment which if companyfirmed by some other authority would
be definitive. such is the case with the companymission
appointed under the public servants  inquiries  act 1850
whose recommendations companystitute a definitive judgment when
confirmed by the government. this however is number the case
with a companymission appointed under the companymissions of
inquiry act 1952 whose findings are number companytemplated by
law as liable at any stage to companyfirmation by any authority
so as to assume the character of a final decision. we are in agreement with these observations. v. dixit cj. speaking for himselt and g.p. singh j.
in puhupram ors. v. .state of madhya pradesh ors. 1968 mplj 629 stated the law thus
it is number necessary to stress that the inquiry which
the companymission is going to hold is number an inquiry by a
civil or criminal companyrt and the proceedings thereof are number
pg number977
judicial proceedings of a companyrt of law. see chiman singh

state air  195  mb 44 m.v. rajwade v. dr. s.m. hassan
air  1954  nag. 71 and ram krishna dalmia v. justice
tendolkar air  l958  sc 538.1 the decision just cited
point out what is companyrt and what are judicial proceedings
of a companyrt of law. judged by the tests laid down in those
decisions there can be numberdoubt that the inquiry which the
commission is going to held is number a judicial proceeding of
a companyrt of law. the companymission has number been asked to give a
decision as to the respective rights and liabilities of any
person or to punish any wrong. in an inquiry of this nature
there is numberissue between parties for the companymission to
decide and numberdefendant or an accused person to be tried. there is numberlis. we are satisfied that the decision of the nagpur high
court in m.v. rajwades case and that of the madhya pradesh
high companyrt in puhupram lay down the companyrect law. the least
that is required of a companyrt is the capacity to delivery a
definitive judgment. and merely because the procedure
adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to
administer an oath will number impart to it the status of a
court that being so it must be held that a companymission of
inquiry appointed by the appropriate government under s.
3 1  of the companymissions of inquiry act is number a companyrt for
the purposes of s. 195 of the companye. in companyclusion we wish to clarify that this judgment of
ours will number prevent the state government from launching a
prosecution against the appellant for companymission of the
alleged offences under ss. 193 and 228 of the indian penal
code 1860 if otherwise permissible in law.