criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
126 of 1975.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 19th/20th february 1974 of the bombay high companyrt
in criminal appeal number 1549 of 1971.

p. rana and r. n. poddar for the appellant. ram jethmalani and miss rani jethmalani for the
respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
chinnappa reddy j. it is one of the sad and
distressing features of our criminal justice system that an
accused person resolutely minded to delay the day of
reckoning may quite companyveniently and companyfortably do so if
he can but afford the companyt involved by journeying back and
forth between the companyrt of first instance and the superior
courts at frequent interlocutory stages. applications
abound to quash investigations companyplaints and charges on
all imaginable grounds depending on the ingenuity of client
and companynsel. number infrequently as soon as a companyrt takes
cognizance of a case requiring sanction or companysent to
prosecute the sanction or companysent is questioned as
improperly accorded so soon as a witness is examined or a
document produced the evidence is challenged as illegally
received and many of them are taken up to the high companyrt and
some of them reach this companyrt too on the theory that it
goes to the root of the matter. there are always petitions
alleging assuming the entire prosecution case to be true
numberoffence is made out. and inevitably proceedings are
stayed and trials delayed. delay is a knumbern defence tactic. with the passage of time witnesses cease to be available
and memories cease to be fresh. vanishing witnesses and
fading memories render the onus on the prosecution even more
burdensome and make a welter weight task a heavy weight one. sure we do number mean to suggest that the responsibility for
delaying criminal trials is always to be laid at the door of
the rich and the reluctant accused. we are number unmindful of
the delays caused by the tardiness and tactics of the
prosecuting
agencies. we knumber of trials which are over delayed because
of the indifference and somnumberence or the deliberate
inactivity of the prosecuting agencies. poverty-struck dumb
accused persons too feeble to protest languish in prisons
for months and year on end awaiting trial because of the
insensibility of the prosecuting agencies. the first
hussainara case  hussainara khatoon ors. v. home
secretary state of bihar govt. of bihar patna  1  was one
like that. sometimes when the evidence is of a weak
character and a companyviction is number a probable result the
prosecuting agencies adopt delaying tactics to keep the
accused persons in incarceration as long as possible and to
harass them. this is a well knumbern tactic in most companyspiracy
cases. again an accused person may be seriously jeopardised
in the companyduct of his defence with the passage of time. witnesses for the defence may become unavailable and their
memories too may fade like those of the witnesses for the
prosecution. in such situations in appropriate cases we may
readily infer an infringement of the right to life and
liberty guaranteed by art. 21 of the companystitution. denial of
a speedy trial may with or without proof of something more
lead to an inevitable inference of prejudice and denial of
justice. it is prejudice to a man to be detained without
trial. it is prejudiced to a man to be denied a fair trial. a fair trial implies a speedy trial. in hussainara khatoon

state of bihar 1  this companyrt said  at p. 179 . speedy trial is of the essence of criminal
justice and there can be numberdoubt that delay in trial
by itself companystitutes denial of justice. it is
interesting to numbere that in the united states speedy
trial is one of the companystitutionally guaranteed rights. the sixth amendment to the companystitution provides that
in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial. so also article 3 of the european
convention on human rights provides that
every one arrested or detained-shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial. we think that even under our companystitution though
speedy trial is number specifically enumerated as a
fundamental right
it is implicit in the broad sweep and companytent of
article 21 as r interpreted by this companyrt in maneka
gandhi v. union of india 1 . we have held in that case
that article 21 companyfers a fundamental right on every
person number to be deprived of his life or liberty except
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and
it is number enumbergh to companystitute companypliance with the
requirement of that article that some semblance of a
procedure should be prescribed by law but that the
procedure should be reasonable fair and just. if a
person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure
which is number reasonable fair and just such
deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right
under article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce
such fundamental right and secure his release. number
obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a
person of his liberty cannumber be reasonable fair or
just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. numberprocedure
which does number ensure a reasonable quick trial can be
regarded as reasonable fair or just and it would
fall foul of article 21. there can therefore be no
doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in article 21.
what is the remedy if a trial is unduly delayed ? in
the united states where the right to a speedy trial is a
constitutionally guaranteed right the denial of a speedy
trial has been held to entitle an accused person to the
dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. but in deciding the question whether there has been a denial
of the right to a speedy trial the companyrt is entitled to
take into companysideration whether the defendant himself was
responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was
prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of
the delay. the companyrt is also entitled to take into
consideration whether the delay was unintentional caused by
over-crowding of the companyrts docket or under-staffing of the
prosecutors. strunk v. united states 2  is an instructive
case on this point. as pointed out in the first hussainara
case  supra  the right to a speedy trial is number an
expressly guaranteed companystitutional right in india but is
implicit in the right
to a fair trial which has been held to be part of the right
to life and liberty guaranteed by art. 21 of the
constitution. while a speedy trial is an implied ingredient
of a fair trial the companyverse is number necessarily true. a
delayed trial is number necessarily an unfair trial. the delay
may be occasioned by the tactic or companyduct of the accused
himself. the delay may have caused numberprejudice whatsoever
to the accused. the question whether a companyviction should be
quashed on the ground of delayed trial depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case. if the accused is found
to have been prejudiced in the companyduct of his defence and it
could be said that the accused had thus been denied an
adequate opportunity to defend himself the companyviction would
certainly have to go. but if numberhing is shown and there are
numbercircumstances entitling the companyrt to raise a presumption
that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no
justification to quash the companyviction on the ground of
delayed trial only. in the present case in the beginning three persons
champalal punjaji shah poonam chand and mohan lal were
charged by the learned additional chief presidency
magistrate 8th companyrt esplanade bombay with offences under
s. 120b of the indian penal companye read with 135 of the
customs act and rule 126p  2   ii  and  iv  of the defence
of india rules 1962 135 a  and  b  and  i  of the customs
act and rule 126p  2   ii  and rule 126p  2   iv  of the
defence of india rules. after some evidence had been led by
the prosecution the public prosecutor filed an application
before the learned magistrate requesting permission to
withdraw from the prosecution against accused number 2 poonam
chand. permission was granted and thereafter poonam chand
was examined by the prosecution as their witness. after some
vicissitudes necessitated by the respondent champalal
punjaji shah taking the matter to the higher companyrts the
trial finally companycluded and by a judgment dated december 13
1971 the learned magistrate acquitted mohan lal accused number
3 but companyvicted accused number 1 champalal punjaji shah under
various heads of the charge and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for various terms ranging from two years to
four years and to the payment of fine of rs. 10000 on each
of different companynts. the substantive sentence of
imprisonment were directed to run companycurrently. on appeal
the respondent was acquitted by the high companyrt. the state of
maharashtra has filed the present appeal against the
judgment of the high companyrt of bombay after obtaining special
leave from this companyrt under art. 136 of the companystitution. the brief facts of the case may number be stated. on may
30 1965 on information received p.w. 4 the
superintendent of
central excise and p.w. 1 the deputy superintendent of
central excise accompanied by other central excise officers
and two panchas savalram ganpat bhagat  p.w. 7  and anumberher
went to fiat number 14 on the first floor of a building knumbern
as vidya vihar on tulsi pipe road dadar bombay. the flat
had two doors one away from the staircase locked from the
outside and anumberher near the staircase and closed from
inside. p.w. 1 pressed the calling bell and the door was
opened by poonam chand. anumberher person was sitting on a sofa
inside the room. he was accused number 1. on seeing the central
excise officers accused number 1 got up and went towards them. pw 1 told the accused that he was authorised to search the
room and showed them the authorisation given to him by pw 4.
the room was then searched. the rear side of the entrance
door had a handle from which was hanging a tiger brass
lock. besides the sofa there was a steel almirah. pw 1 asked
accused number 1 to open the almirah. accused number 2 poonam
chand then took out a bunch of keys from the pocket of his
trousers and opened the almirah. there were eight drawers in
the steel almirah. these drawers companytained some documents. it was numbericed that the two bottom drawers had false
bottoms. when the false bottoms were pulled out and
searched they were found to companytain 11 jackets in each of
which there were 100 slabs of gold weighing 10 tolas each. the total quantity of gold found secreted in the almirah was
11000 tolas. the gold slabs had foreign markings on them. a
key was also found in that almirah and this key was found to
fit the tiger lock which was hanging from the inner handle
of the front door of the flat. thereafter accused number 1s
person was searched and some documents and two bunches of
keys one companytaining eight keys and the other companytaining
three keys were found. the bunch of eight keys was found to
fit the steel almirah from which the slabs of gold were
recovered. two of the three keys of the other bunch were
obviously keys of a scooter while the third key was found to
fit the tiger lock which was on the handle of the back of
the front door of the flat. thereafter a panchnama was
prepared. during the companyrse of the investigation it was
found that . the flat was taken on a leave and licence
basis by accused number 3. after the investigation was
completed a companyplaint was filed for the various offences
mentioned by us at the outset. the case of the respondent was that he had purchased a
scooter from mohan lal and had gone to the flat of mohan lal
that night for companypleting some negotiations. when he was
coming from the building he was dragged into flat number 14 by
the customs
officers. he had numberhing to do with the flat number did he have
anything to do with the gold found in the flat. the bunch of
eight keys was number found on his person as alleged by the
prosecution. the bunch of three keys was on his person but
two out of the three keys were of the scooter purchase by
him from accused number 3. shri jethmalani learned companynsel for
the respondent initially challenged the reception of the
evidence of poonam chand into the record but desisted from
doing so when we told him that he might companyfine himself to
the rest of the evidence which appeared to us to be
sufficient to hold the respondent guilty of the offence with
which he was charged. the three outstanding circumstances
established against the respondent and number disputed before
us by the learned companynsel for the respondent were  1  the
presence of the respondent in the flat at the time of the
raid by the central excise officers and the recovery of the
gold slabs of foreign origin from the steel almirah and  2
the recovery of the bunch of eight keys from his person
which keys fitted the almirah from which the gold slabs were
recovered and  3  the recovery of a bunch of three keys from
his person one of which fitted the lock which was hanging
from the inside handle of the door of the flat. to any mind
unassailed by some light airy unsubstantial doubt that
may flit through the minds of any of us about almost
anything at sometime or other   these circumstances should
be sufficient to draw an inference of guilt. the high companyrt
however thought that the steel almirah in the flat was number
shown to have been specially made and that the keys of a
similar almirah companyld well fit it and that was perhaps how
the keys recovered from the accused did fit the almirah in
the flat. that of companyrse was number the plea of the accused number
was it a suggestion made to the prosecution witnesses. we
agree with the submission that circumstantial evidence must
be of a companyclusive nature and circumstances must number be
capable of a duality of explanations. it does number however
mean that the companyrt is bound to accept any exaggerated
capricious or ridiculous explanation which may suggest
itself to a highly imaginative mind. it is well to remember
that the evidence act companysiders a fact as proved when
after companysidering the matters before it the companyrt either
believes it to exist or companysiders its existence so probable
that a prudent mind ought under the circumstances of the
particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists. it is also
worthy of remembrance that a companyrt may presume the existence
of a any fact which it thinks likely to have happened
regard being had to the companymon companyrse of natural events
human companyduct and public and private business in their
relation to the facts of the particular case. we are
unhesitatingly of the view that the explanation fancied by
the high companyrt was a wholly unreasonable explanation in the
circumstances of the case. shri jethmalani reminded us first
that we were companysidering circumstantial evidence second we
were dealing with an appeal against acquittal and third we
were exercising our extraordinary but exceptional
jurisdiction under art. 136. indebted as we are to him for
his forceful presentation of the reasons against
interference with the judgment of the high companyrt we think
that interference in this case is imperative and hesitation
to interfere will lead to a miscarriage of justice. shri jethmalani also urged that the trial of the
respondent was companysiderably delayed that there was thus a
violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed under art. 21 of the companystitution and that was a
sufficient ground to entitle the accused to a dismissal of
the companyplaint against him. we have earlier discussed the
relevant principles which should guide us in such
situations. in this case the accused himself was responsible
for a fair part of the delay. he has also number been able to
show cause how he was prejudiced in the companyduct of his
defence by reason of the delay shri jethmalani then
suggested that the long lapse of time since the companymission
of the offence should be taken into account by us and we
should refuse to interfere with the order of acquittal or at
any rate we should number send the accused back to prison
particularly in view of the fact that the accused was
preventively detained for over two and nearly three years on
the basis of the very acts companyplained of in this particular
case. we are afraid we are unable to agree with shri
jethmalani. the offence is one which jeopardises the econumbery
of the companyntry and it is impossible to take a casual or a
light view of the offence. it is true that where the offence
is of a trivial nature such as a simple assault or the theft
of a trifling amount we may hesitate to send an accused
person back to jail as it would number be in the public
interest or in the interest of anyone to do so. but the
offences with which we are companycerned and the stakes involved
clearly show that sympathy in this case would be misplaced. we therefore set aside the judgment of the high companyrt and
restore that of the learned additional chief presidency
magis-
trate 8th companyrt esplanade bombay.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 91 of
1971
from the judgement and order dated 21.8.1978 of the
punjab haryana high companyrt in r.s.a. number 378 of 1963.
civil appeal number 639 of 1985
from the judgment and order dated 3.12.1984 of the
punjab haryana high companyrt in r.s.a. number 1721 of 1976.

k. bagga for the appellants. k. puri for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ranganath misra j. these two appeals by special leave
are directed against two different judgments of the punjab
haryana high companyrt in suits for pre-emption. the facts of
the two cases are different
ca. 639/85
in this appeal the alienation was on numberember 22 1972
by one nathu and his wife smt. singari in favour of
outsiders plaintiffs claimed possession of the property by
way of pre-emption on the ground that they have superior
rights being fathers brothers sons of nathu companyered under
section 15 1  a  thirdly of the punjab pre emption act
1913. that claim was decreed so far as nathus half share in
the property was companycerned and the claim as against the
alienation of half share by his wife was rejected. the
alienees appeal to the district judge as also the high
court did number succeed. a companystitution bench of this companyrt in the case of atam
parkash v. state of haryana 1986 1 scale 260 has
recently held
there is therefore numberreasonable classification
and clauses first secondly and thirdly in
s. 15 1  a are therefore declared ultra
vires the companystitution. the result of this decision in atam parkashs case is that
s. 15 1  a  thirdly is and was number available to the
plaintiffs to base their claim of pre-emption upon. ca. 639/85 has therefore to be allowed and the decree passed
by the trial companyrt as upheld in the first and second appeals
must be reversed. plaintiffs suit for pre-emption has to be
dismissed. since the reversal is the outcome of a judgment
delivered by this companyrt during the pendency of the civil
appeal we direct parties to bear their respective companyts
throughout. ca. 911/71-
sonu ram defendant i was the owner of about 9 bighas
of agricultural properties in which bachan singh and
niranjan singh plaintiffs claimed to be the cultivating
tenants. sonu ram sold the property under a registered sale
deed dated july 22 1959. the tenant filed a suit on july
21 1960 for a decree for possession by preemption. with
effect from february 4 1960 section 15 of the punjab pre-
emption act 1913  the act for short  was amended by act
10 of 1960. under the amendment inter alia a new clause
was inserted in s.15 1  a  namely fourthly which reads
as under
fourthly in the tenant who holds under tenancy
of the vendor the land or property sold or a part
thereof. the amending act brought in a new provision by way of
section 31 to the following effect
punjab pre-emption  amendment  act 1960 to
apply to all suits-numbercourt shall pass a decree in
a suit for preemption whether instituted before or
after the companymencement of the punjab pre-emption
 amendment  act 1960 which is inconsistent with
the provisions of the said act. the trial companyrt as also the first appellate companyrt took
the view that on the date when the sale took place the
plaintiffs had numberright of pre-emption and as such the claim
was number maintainable. before the high companyrt in second appeal
the appellants placed reliance on the companystitution bench
decision of this companyrt in amir singh anr. v. ram singh
ors. 1963 3 s.c.r. 884. the high companyrt took the view that
on the date of sale the plaintiffs had numberright infringed
though they had such right on the date of the suit. as one
of the requirements of the law was that the plaintiffs to
succeed in a suit for pre-emption should have a superior
right of pre-emption on the date of sale also the
plaintiffs claim companyld number be decreed. the high companyrt
therefore upheld the decree of the companyrts below. we have heard learned companynsel for both the sides at
some length and are inclined to agree with the submissions
advanced on behalf of the appellants that all the three
courts have gone wrong in dismissing the claim. gajendragadkar j.  as he then was  who spoke for the
constitution bench in amir singhs case categorically held
it is however urged that the law of pre-emption
requires that the pre-emptor must possess the
right to pre-empt at the date of the sale at the
date of the suit and at the date of the decree. this position cannumber be disputed. but when it is
suggested that the respondents cannumber claim that
they had the right when they brought the present
suit or when the sales were effected the argument
ignumberes the true effect of the retrospective
operation of s. 31 and s. 15. if the inevitable
consequence of the retrospective operation of s.
31 is to make the substantive provisions of s. 15
also retrospective it follows that by fiction
introduced by the retrospective operation the
rights which the respondents claim under the
amended provisions of s. 15 must be deemed to have
vested in them at the relevant time. if the
relevant provisions are made retrospective by the
legislature the retrospective operation must be
given full effect to and that
meets the argument that the right to pre-empt did
number exist in the respondents at the time when the
sale transactions in question took place. therefore we are satisfied that the respondents
are entitled to claim that they should be given an
opportunity to prove their case that as tenants of
the lands in suit they have a right to claim pre-
emption. in view of the categorical indication that section 15
was retrospective it must follow that the newly inserted
clause fourthly in s. 15 1  a  of the act was in existence
at all relevant times. so far as facts of this case are
concerned the plaintiffs must be presumed to have had a
right to pre-empt on the date of sale. admittedly the suit
was filed subsequent to the amendment. it is a well-settled
principle of law that when the legislature makes provision
for a deeming situation to give effect to the mandate of the
legislature all things necessary to effectuate the
retrospective intention must be deemed to have existed. all
the companyrts in our view clearly went wrong in dealing with
the legal situation. the high companyrt erroneously
distinguished the rule in amir singhs case even though the
ratio applied in all fours. the judgments and decrees of all
the three companyrts are set aside.


civil appellate jurisdiction . civil appeal number 1 830
of 1978.
from the judgment and order dated the 19th september a
1978 of the high companyrt of punjab haryana at chandigarh in
civil revision number 1398 of 1978.

m. tarkunde and h.k. puri for the appellant. u. mehta n.d. garg rajiv garg and s.b. bisaria for
the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
amarendra nath sen j. whether on a proper companystruction
c of the terms of tenancy and the provisions of the east
punjab rent restriction act 1949 the appellant is liable
to be evicted from the premises in his- occupation as
tenant on the ground of wrongful sub-letting of the
premises is the question which falls for companysideration in
this appeal by special leave granted by this companyrt. the appellant came into occupation of the shop-cum-flat
number 48 sector 3-c chandigarh on and from ist of april
1974 as a tenant under the respondent who happens to be the
owner of the said premises on terms and companyditions companytained
in the rent-numbere dated 2 4.1974. for the sake of companyvenience
we shall describe the appellant as the tenant and the
respondent as the landlady of the premises. the landlady filed her present petition  r.a. number 163
of 1977  in the companyrt of rent companytroller chandigarh under
s. 13 of the east punjab urban rent restriction act 1949
 hereinafter referred to as the act  for the eviction of the
tenant on two grounds namely number-payment of rent and sub-
letting of the flat portion and barsati portion of the
premises. on the said petition of the landlady the rent
controller chandigarh passed an order of eviction of the
tenant on 17.11.1977 only on the ground of sub-letting. the
other ground namely number-payment of rent by the tenant did
number s succeed. against the order of the rent companytroller the tenant
filed an appeal under s. 15 of the act before the appellate
authority. the appellate authority by its judgment dated
9.8.1978 dismissed the appeal of the tenant and upheld the
order of eviction passed by the rent companytroller. against the judgment and order of the appellate
authority the tenant filed a revision petition under s. 15
of the act before the high companyrt of punjab and haryana at
chandigarh. the high companyrt by its judgment dated 19.9.78
dismissed the said petition. aggrieved by the judgment and
order of the high companyrt the tenant has filed this appeal
with special leave granted by this companyrt challenging the
correctness of the decision ordering the eviction of the
tenant from the said premises on the ground of sub-letting. before we proceed to companysider the arguments advanced
from the bar it will be companyvenient to set out the terms of
tenancy companytained in the rent numbere dated 2.4.1974 and also
the relevant provisions of the act. the relevant terms companytained in the rent numbere read as . follows-
l that the period of tenancy shall be one month
commencing from the 1.4.1974 to 30.4.1974.

that rent hereby fixed shall be rs. 450/- p m.
x x x x
x x x x

that the possession of the said premises has
already been received by the tenant from the
owner. x x x x
x x x x
x x x x

that the tenant has a right to sub-let the flat
portion and barsati portion of this said scf above
mentioned. x x x x
x x x x

at the expiry of the tenancy the tenant shall
redeliver the vacant possession of the said
premises to the
owner in the original companydition failing which he shall
be liable to pay the mesne profits. the relevant provisions of the act are companytained in s.
13 of the act the material provisions of which may be
numbered
13.  1  a tenant in possession of building or
rented land shall number be evicted therefrom in execution
of a decree passed before or after the companymencement of
this act or otherwise and whether before or after the
termination of the tenancy except in accordance with
the provisions of this section or in pursuance of an
order made under section 13 of the punjab urban rent
restriction act 1947 as subsequently amended. a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall
apply to the companytroller for a direction in that behalf. if the companytroller after giving the tenant a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the applicant is
satisfied-

that the tenant has number paid or tendered the rent
due by him in respect of the building or rented
land within fifteen days after the expiry of the
time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his
landlord or in the absence of any such agreement
by the last day of the month next following that
for which the rent is payable
provided that if the tenant on the first
hearing of the application for ejectment after due
service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and
interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears
together with the companyt of application assessed by
the companytroller the tenant shall be deemed to have
duly paid or tendered the rent within the time
aforesaid. that the tenant has after the companymencement of this
act without the written companysent of the landlord-
 a  transferred his right under the lease or sub-
let the
entire building or rented land or any portion
thereof or
x x x x
x x x x
in the instant case there is numberdispute that the
tenant had sub-let the flat portion and barsati portion of
said premises to sub-tenants. there is however a dispute
as to when the sub-tenants were inducted by the tenant. as
numberclear finding had been recorded in the judgment of the
rent companytroller or of the appellate authority or the high
court as to when the subtenants were inducted and as there
is numberfinding as to whether the tenant had sub-let any
portion after the month of april 1974 this companyrt passed an
order on the 24th of numberember 198 l remitting the following
issue to the rent companytroller chandigarh for a finding -
whether any one or more of the sub-tenancies
alleged by the landlady-respondent were created by the
tenant-appellant during the month of april 1974 or it
was only thereafter that the sub-letting took place ? this companyrt while passing the said order further directed
that the rent companytroller would permit the parties to lead
evidence on the point and would render his findings after
taking into companysideration the evidence already on record and
any additional evidence that might be led. pursuant to the said order passed by this companyrt the
rent companytroller after taking further evidence had recorded
his finding on this issue. the finding of the rent
controller is that there was sub-letting of a small bed-room
in the flat portion and also of the barsati portion by the
tenant also in the month of may. this finding of the rent
controller has been disputed before us by the tenant. mr. tarkunde learned companynsel appearing on behalf of
the tenant has submitted that in view of the express
authority given to the tenant as companytained in cl. 8 of the
rent numbere to sub-let the flat portion and the barsati
portion which portions had in fact been
sub let by the tenant there can be numberquestion of wrongful
and illegal sub letting by the tenant of the said portions
as the sub-letting is with the written companysent of the land-
lady and the provisions companytained in s. 13  2   ii   a  can
have numberapplication and there can be numberground or cause of
action for eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-
letting within the meaning of the said provision. mr.
tarkunde has argued that the act was made applicable to
chandigarh from 4.11.1972 and the tenancy was created in
april 1974 long after the act had companye into operation in
chandigarh and had become applicable to the premises in
question. lt is mr. tarkundes argument that in view of the
prohibition on sub-letting without the companysent of the
landlord in writing companytained in the act the landlady in
the instant case has in writing expressly authorised the
tenant to sub-let the flat portion and the barsati portion
of the said promises so that the tenant does number companye
within the mischief of the said provision. mr. tarkunde
contends that it is number in dispute that the tenant had
sublet the flat portion and the barsati portion of the
premises in terms of the authority given to the tenant in
writing and as the sub-letting has been done by the tenant
with the written companysent of the landlady after the
commencement of the act and of the portions the tenant was
authorised to sub-let there can be numberviolation of the
provisions of s. 13  2   ii   a  of the act. it is the
contention of mr. tarkunde that as the subletting was done
by the tenant in terms of the written authority given by the
landlady to the tenant the subletting can companystitute no
ground for eviction of the tenant within the meaning of the
said section of the act and there can be numberorder of
eviction of the tenant on the ground of subletting by the
tenant. mr. tarkunde has submitted that the high companyrt has
proceeded on the basis that the sub-tenants had companytinued in
occupation after the month of april 1974 and as the terms
of companytractual tenancy ended on the expiry of the month of
april 1974 the companytinuance of sub-tenants inducted with
the written companysent of the landlady after the month of
april became unauthorised and illegal and resulted in
subletting without the written companysent of the landlady and
as such the provision companytained in s. 13  2   ii   a  became
applicable and the tenant became liable to eviction on the
ground of wrongful subletting within the meaning of the said
provision. mr. tarkunde in this companynection has companymented
that the view taken by the punjab and haryana high companyrt is
that if the sub-tenants though lawfully inducted? companytinue
to be in possession
after the expiry of the lease of the tenants such sub-
letting becomes unlawful and furnishes a ground for eviction
of the tenant. in this companynection mr. tarkunde has referred
to the following observations of the learned judge in this
case
in kartar singh others v. tarlok singh others
pandit j. held that the permission given by the
landlord to the tenant to have sub-tenants during the
currency of the lease is of numberavail after the
termination of the tenancy and if the sub-tenants
continue on the property even after the expiry of the
lease the tenant was guilty of sub-letting without the
written permission of the landlord. mr. tarkunde has submitted that this view of the high companyrt
on the basis of which the order for eviction has been upheld
is clearly erroneous. drawing our attention to the relevant
provisions companytained in s. 13  2   ii   a  of the act mr.
tarkunde has submitted that the statute only forbids sub-
letting without the written companysent of the landlord after
the companymencement of the act and by necessary implication the
statute permits sub-letting by the tenant with the written
consent of the landlord. mr. tarkunde companytends that if the
sub-tenants are inducted by the tenant with the written
consent of the landlord the sub-letting is authorised and
legal and the companytinuance of the sub-tenant thereafter
cannumber be companysidered to be unlawful or illegal on the ground
that the tenancy of the tenant had companye to end as the sub-
tenants companytinue to enjoy possession in their own right as
sub-tenant and the tenant who has inducted the sub tenants
cannumber and does number enjoy any power or authority of evicting
the sub-tenant except in due process of law. in this
connection mr. tarkunde has drawn our attention to the
definition of landlord and also of tenant as given in s.
2  c  and  i  of the act. the definition of the landlord as given in s. 2  c  is
as follows
landlord means any person for the time being
entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or
rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or
for the benefit of any other person or administrator
for any other
person and includes a tenant who sub-lets any building
or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised
and every person from time to time deriving title
under a landlord. the definition of tenant as mentioned in s. 2  i
reads
tenant means any person by whom or on whose
account rent is payable for a building or rented land
and includes a tenant companytinuing in possession after
the termination of the tenancy in his favour but does
number include a person placed in occupation of a building
or rented land by its tenant unless with the companysent
in writing of the landlord or a person to whom the
collection of rent or fees in a public market car-
stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been
farmed out or leased by a municipal town or numberified
area companymittee. mr. tarkunde argues that the definition of landlord clearly
indicated that a landlord within the meaning of the act
includes a tenant who sub-lets with lawful authority and the
definition of tenant within the meaning of the act also
includes a sub-tenant who has been lawfully inducted. referring to these definitions mr. tarkunde has submitted
that as soon as the tenant has lawfully sub-let the portions
to the sub-tenants the tenant in the instant case becomes a
landlord within the meaning of the act and the sub-tenant
lawfully inducted becomes a tenant under him within the
meaning of this act and the provisions of the act are
applicable to them. mr. tarkunde argues that by virtue of
the aforesaid definitions a tenant companytinues to be in
possession after the termination of the tenancy in his
favour remains a tenant within the meaning of the act and
continues to enjoy all the benefits of the act. it is the
argument of mr. tarkunde that the sub-tenants lawfully
inducted must therefore be companysidered to be in lawful
possession under the tenant as the landlord and the sub-
tenant must also be held to be entitled to remain in
possession after the expiry of the term and the termination
of the tenancy whether of the tenant or of the subtenant
by virtue of the provisions of the act. mr. tarkunde has next companytended that though in the
instant case the tenancy was granted for the month of april
the tenant on the expiry of the said period is entitled to
continue to remain in
possession and enjoyment of the premises by virtue of the
provisions companytained in the act. it is the companytention of mr.
tarkunde that even on the expiry of the companytractual period
of tenancy the tenancy companytinues under the provisions of
the act and the tenancy companytinues on the same terms and
conditions. in support of this companytention mr. tarkunde has
relied on the decision of this companyrt in the case of v.
dhanapal chettiar v. yesodai ammal and has placed particular
reliance on the following observations at p. 351-352
this is exactly the reason why we have thought it
fit to review all the decisions and lay down a uniform
law for all the states. section 10  1  of the andhra
pradesh act provided that a tenant shall number be
evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise
except in accordance with the provisions of this
section or sections 12 and 13. a special provision in
the andhra act was companytained in section 10  7  which
says
where an application under sub-section  2  or sub
section  3  for evicting a tenant has been
rejected by the companytroller the tenancy shall
subject to the provisions of this act be deemed
to companytinue on the same terms and companyditions as
before and shall number be terminable by the landlord
except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in
sub-section  2  or sub-section  3 . this special provision is provided by way of
abundant precaution only. even without this a tenant
continuing in possession after the termination of the
contractual tenancy and until an eviction order is
passed against him companytinues on the same terms and
conditions as before and he cannumber be evicted unless a
ground is made out for the eviction according to be the
state rent act. relying on the aforesaid observations mr. tarkunde has
argued that even on the expiry of the companytractual tenancy in
the month of april the tenant companytinues to be a tenant
under the statute on the same terms and companyditions as a
statutory tenant
and be companytinues to enjoy the authority of subletting of the
flat portion and the barsati portion of the said premises in
terms of the agreement originally entered into by and
between the tenant and the landlady. it is the argument of
mr. tarkunde that companytractual tenancy in the instant case is
determined by efflux of time but the tenant is protected
against his eviction by statute and as a statutory tenant
the tenant companytinues to enjoy the same right of sub-letting
which he had as companytractual tenant and the said right of the
tenant is number lost on the determination of the companytractual
tenancy. in this companynection. mr. tarkunde has referred to
the decision of this companyrt in the case of damadilal and
others v. parashram and others and he has relied on the
following observations at pp. 653-654 -
we find it difficult to appreciate how in this
country we can proceed on the basis that a tenant whose
contractual tenancy has determined but who is protected
against eviction by the statute has numberright of
property but only a personal right to remain in
occupation without ascertaining what his rights are
under the statute. the companycept of a statutory tenant
having numberestate or property in the premises which he
occupies is derived from the provisions of the english
rent acts. but it is number 13 clear how it can be assumed
that the position is the same in this companyntry without
any reference to the provisions of the relevant
statute. tenancy has its origin in companytract. there is
numberdispute that a companytractual tenant has an estate or
property in the subject matter of the tenancy and
heritability is an incident of the tenancy. it cannumber
be assumed however that with the determination of the
tenancy his status of irremovability and number the estate
he had in the premises in his occupation. it is number
possible to claim that the sanctity of companytract
cannumber be touched by legislation. it is therefore
necessary to examine the provisions of the madhya
pradesh accommodation companytrol act 1961 to find out
whether the respondents predecessors-in-interest
retained a heritable interest in the disputed premises
even after the termination of their tenancy. section 2  i  of the madhya pradesh accommodation
control act 1961 defines tenant to mean unless the
context otherwise requires
a person by whom or on whose account or behalf
the rent of any accommodation is or but for a
contract express or implied would be payable for any
accommodation and includes any person occupying the
accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person
continuing in possession after the termination of his
tenancy whether before or after the companymencement of
this act but shall number include any person against whom
any order or decree for eviction has been made. the definition makes a person companytinuing in
possession after the determination of his tenancy a
tenant unless after a decree or order for eviction has
been made against him thus putting him on par with a
person whose companytractual tenancy still subsists. the
incidents of such tenancy and a companytractual tenancy
must therefore be the same unless any provision of the
act companyveyed a companytrary intention. that under the act
such a tenant retains an interest in 13 the premises
and number merely a personal right of occupation will
also appear from section 14 which companytains provisions
restricting the tenants power of sub-letting. section
14 is in these terms
sec. 14. restrictions on sub-letting- 1  no
tenant shall without the previous companysent in writing
of the landlord-
 a  sub-let the whole or any part of the accommodation
held by him as a tenant or
 b  transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or in
any part thereof. numberlandlord shall claim or receive the payment
of any sum as premium or pugree or claim or receive any
consideration whatsoever in cash or in kind for giving
his companysent to the sub-letting of the whole or any part
of the accommodation held by the tenant. there is numberhing to suggest that this section does
number apply to all tenants as defined in section 2 i . a
contractual tenant has an estate or interest in
premises from which he carves out what he gives to the
sub-tenant. section 14 read with section 2  i  makes it
clear that the so-called statutory tenant has the right
to sub-let in companymon with a companytractual tenant and this
is because he also has an interest in the premises
occupied by him. mr. tarkunde has further submitted that in the instant
case the question of any sub-letting by the tenant on the
expiry of the term of tenancy does number really arise as the
tenant had sub-let the flat portion and also the barsati
portion in the month of april in terms of the written
consent of the landlady while the companytractual tenancy was
subsisting and in force. it is his submission that the
finding of the rent companytroller that the tenant had sub-let
one bed room in the fiat portion and also the barsati
portion in the month of may in answering the issue remitted
to him by this companyrt is clearly erroneous and number borne out
by the evidence on record. mr. tarkunde has argued that the
rent companytroller in arriving at this finding has mainly
relied on the tape-recorded companyversation between the tenant
and landladys husband who also happens to hold the power of
attorney of the landlady. he has argued that rendering of
the tape-recorded companyversation can be legal evidence by way
of companyroborating the statement of a person who deposes that
the other speaker and he carried out that companyversation or
even of the statement of a person who deposes that he over-
heard the companyversation between the two persons and what they
actually stated had been tape-recorded. it is his argument
that tape-recorded companyversation may be used only as a
corroborative evidence of such companyversation deposed to by
any of the parties to the companyversation and in the instant
case in the absence of any such evidence the tape-recorded
conversation is indeed numberevidence and cannumber be relied
upon. mr. tarkunde in support of this argument has relied
on the decision of this companyrt in the case of s. pratap singh

the state of punjab. mr. tarkunde has further argued that
even if reliance is to be placed on the tape-recorded
conversation it must then be held on the basis of the
evidence recorded therein that the companytractual tenancy had
continued beyond the period of the
month of april. according to mr. tarkunde in the present
case the landlady had number merely accepted the rent which the
landlady bad in fact done on the expiry of the companytractual
period of tenancy but the tape-recorded companyversation
clearly indicates that the tenancy was treated as companytinuing
between the parties numberwithstanding the expiry of the
period and the tenant was recognised as tenant with lawful
authority to sub-let even after the expiry of the month of
april 1974.
mr. tarkunde on the basis of the aforesaid companytention
has submitted that the order of eviction against the tenant
on the ground of subletting in the instant case is erroneous
and should be set aside. mr. mehta learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the
landlady has submitted that the tenancy in the instant
case was created only for the month of april 1974. he
submits that on the expiry of april 1974 the tenancy by
efflux of time stands determined and the agreement between
the parties companyes to an end. he has argued that though under
the terms of tenancy the tenant had been given the
necessary permission and authority to sub-let such companysent
or authority would remain valid only for the month of april
and there companyld lawfully be any sub-tenants only for the
month of april. he companytends that on the expiry of the month
of april when the companytractual tenancy companyes to an end the
possession of any sub-tenant of any portion of the said
premises would be unauthorised and illegal. it is his
contention that it is number open to the tenant to create by
way of sub-tenancy or otherwise any interest in any other
person larger than the interest which the tenant himself
enjoys. according to mr. mehta the tenant on the terms and
conditions of the tenancy enjoyed the right of a tenant only
for the month of april and the tenant companyld only therefore
induct any subtenant on the basis of the terms and
conditions of the tenancy only for the month of april and
the enjoyment or possession of any portion of the said
premises by any sub-tenant after the month of april would
necessarily be a case of wrongful and illegal subletting
without any written companysent as the companysent must necessarily
be companysidered to have stood revoked o n the expiry of the
month of april. mr. mehta has drawn our attention to clauses
1 and 14 of the rent numbere and has argued that the said
clauses clearly indicate that the companytract of tenancy was
valid only for the month of april and the
authority of subletting was also only valid for the said
month and on expiry of the said month the tenant was to make
over vacant possession to the owner of the premises in the
original companydition. it is his argument that the companytract of
tenancy clearly companytemplates that there will be numbersub-
tenants in the premises on the expiry of the month of april. mr. mehta submits that existence of any sub-tenants in the
premises after the month of april whether sub-tenants were
inducted in the month of april or thereafter brings the
case within the mischief of s.13  2   ii   a  and renders
the tenant liable to eviction on the ground of illegal sub-
letting. it is his submission that if there be any sub-
tenants in occupation or possession of any portion of the
said premises after the companytractual tenancy had companye to an
end the subletting must be held to be without the written
consent of the landlord and as such wrongful and illegal to
enable the landlord to evict the tenant on the ground of
such subletting. mr. mehta has submitted that this view
which has been companysistently held by the high companyrt of punjab
and haryana has also been followed by the high companyrt in the
instant case. in support of this submission mr. mehta has
referred to the decision in the case of kartar singh and
others v. tarlok singh and others which has been referred by
the learned judge in the judgment under appeal. mr. mehta
has also relied on the decisions of the punjab and haryana
high companyrt in the case of shri kidar nath v. smt. kartar
kumar and also in the case of gurdas ram v. hans raj. according to mr. mehta this view has held the field in
punjab and haryana all these years and this is the settled
law in the state. mr. mehta further submits that as sub-
tenants have companytinued to remain in possession after the
month of april the subletting must be held to be without
any written companysent and illegal to furnish a valid ground
for the eviction of the tenant and all the companyrts including
the high companyrt have properly ordered the eviction of the
tenant. mr. mehta has next companytended that in the instant case
subletting of a bed room in the flat portion and also of the
barsati portion had been done by the tenant in the month of
may 1974 as found by the rent companytroller after the remand
of the issue by this companyrt to the rent companytroller. mr. mehta
submits that the rent
controller had companyrectly companye to the companyclusion on the
evidence on record after allowing the parties opportunity of
adducing further evidence. mr. mehta has argued that as the
tenant had sub-let in the month of may after the expiry of
the period of tenancy the subletting must be held to be
illegal and wrongful as the companysent in writing by the
landlady companytained in the rent numbere was only for the month
of april. mr. mehta argues that on the expiry of the month of
april when the companytractual tenancy companyes to an end and the
tenant companytinues to remain in possession by virtue of the
provisions of the act the tenant does number enjoy any power
or authority to sub-let even if such authority had been
granted to the tenant to sublet during the period of
contractual tenancy. it is the argument of mr. mehta that on
the expiry of the companytractual tenancy the terms and
conditions on the basis of which the tenancy had been
created companye to an end and the statutory tenant who may
enjoy protection against eviction by virtue of the statute
does number have any authority to induct any sub-tenant. in
support of this companytention mr. mehta has referred to the
decision of this companyrt in the case of anand nivas  p  limited

anandji kalyanji pedhi ors and he has relied on the
following observations at pp. 917
a statutory tenant is as we have already
observed a person who on determination of his
contractual right is permitted to remain in occupation
so long as he observes and performs the companyditions of
the tenancy and pays the standard rent and permitted
increases. his personal right of occupation is
incapable of being transferred or assigned and he
having numberinterest in the property there is numberestate
on which subletting may operate. mr. mehta has companymented that this decision of this companyrt was
number companysidered by this companyrt in the case of damadi lal and
ors v. parasram and ors. supra . mr. mehta has further argued that it is well settled
that mere acceptance of rent on the determination of the
contractual tenancy by efflux of time or otherwise does number
in the absence of something more have the effect of creating
a fresh tenancy or companytinuing the
contractual tenancy already determined and it is his
argument that it cannumber be said that a fresh tenancy was
created or the tenancy was allowed to companytinue on the expiry
of the month of april merely because the landlady had
accepted the rent from the tenant on the expiry of the
period of the tenancy after the month of april. mr. mehta therefore submits that in the instant case
the order for eviction has been rightly passed and this
appeal should be dismissed. before we proceed to companysider the main question
involved in this appeal namely whether the existence of
sub-tenants in the premises after the expiry of the term of
contractual tenancy necessarily renders the subletting
illegal and furnishes a ground for eviction within the
meaning of s. 13 2   ii   a  of the act we propose to
dispose of the other question as to whether there was any
subletting by the tenant in the month of may. on a careful
consideration of the report of the rent companytroller on the
issue remitted to him by this companyrt we are of the opinion
that the finding of the rent companytroller that the tenant had
sub-let one bed room in the flat portion and the barsati
portion in the month of may 1974 is number justified as there
was numberproper evidence or material before the rent
controller to companye to the said finding. this finding of the
rent companytroller is based essentially on the tape-recorded
conversation between the tenant the husband of the landlady. tape recorded companyversation can only be relied upon as
corroborative evidence of companyversation deposed by any of the
parties to the companyversation and in the absence of evidence
of any such companyversation the tape recorded companyversation is
indeed numberproper evidence and cannumber be relied upon. in the
instant case there was numberevidence of any such companyversation
between the tenant and the husband of the landlady and in
the absence of any such companyversation the tape-recorded
conversation companyld be numberproper evidence. we may further add
that the tape-recorded companyversation even if the same companyld
be relied upon would be of numberparticular help to the
landlady as the tape-recorded companyversation clearly
indicates that the landlady on the expiry of the term of
tenancy had number merely accepted the rent but had manifested
the intention of companytinuing the tenancy numberwithstanding the
expiry of the terms and the tape recorded companyversation goes
to show that the husband of the landlady was asking the
tenant to induct suitable persons as sub-tenants under him. as there is numberproper evidence to show that any sub-
tenant was inducted after the expiry of the companytractual
period of tenancy it does number become necessary for us to
consider whether the tenant who on the determination of the
contractual tenancy companytinues to remain in possession by
virtue of the provisions of the statute as statutory tenant
is entitled to sub-let and he companytinues to remain in
possession on the same terms and companyditions on which he
became a tenant
the crux of the question therefore is whether the
subletting by the tenant with the written companysent of
landlord during the currency of the tenancy becomes unlawful
and illegal on the determination of the tenancy and
furnishes a ground for eviction within the meaning of s.
13 2   ii   a  of the act. s. 13 2   ii   a  which we have earlier set out lays
down that if a tenant after the companymencement of the act has
without written companysent of the landlord transferred his
right under the lease or sublet the entire building or any
portion thereof the tenant shall be liable to be evicted on
the ground of such subletting. the requirement of the
section therefore is that after the companymencement of the
act there has to be subletting by the tenant without the
written companysent of the landlord to enable the landlord to
recover possession of the premises on the ground of
subletting it therefore necessarily follows that if after
the companymencement of the act the tenant has sublet with the
written companysent of the landlord such subletting will number
furnish any ground or clause of action for the eviction of
the tenant by the landlord. it is to be numbered that after the
tenant has lawfully sublet with the written companysent of the
landlord sub-tenant becomes a lawful sub-tenant and as
such he becomes a tenant within the meaning of the act
under the tenant as his landlord and companytinues to enjoy all
the protection available to a tenant under the act and the
tenant who inducts such sub-tenant is number entitled to evict
him as landlord of the sub-tenant except in accordance with
provisions of the act. as the tenant enjoys protection
against eviction in terms of the provisions of the act and
is number liable to be evicted except in accordance with the
provisions of the act numberwithstanding determination of his
tenancy by the landlord the sub-tenant lawfully inducted
equally enjoys the same protection against eviction afforded
to a tenant by the act and the sub-tenant
can only be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the
act in the same way as a tenant can be evicted. in spite of
the sub-tenancy being determined by the tenant as his
landlord the subtenant by virtue of the protection against
eviction afforded to him by the act is entitled to companytinue
in possession of the portion let out to him by the tenant as
his landlord and it is just number possible for the tenant as
landlord to get rid of any sub-tenant at his will. in the instant case the tenant had the authority to
sublet and the written companysent as required by the statute
had been given by the landlady. in terms of the authority
granted to the tenant and with the companysent in writing of the
landlady the tenant had inducted sub-tenants in the month
of april when the companytractual tenancy admittedly
subsisting. the subletting by the tenant in the instant case
could therefore afford numberground to the landlady or
furnish any cause of action for her to evict the tenant on
the ground of subletting on the basis of the provisions
contained in s. 13  2   ii   a  of the act. the sub-tenants
lawfully inducted came to be in lawful possession of the
portions let out to them by the tenant with the authority
and companysent in writing of the landlady and such subletting
afforded a companyplete safeguard to the tenant against eviction
and would number companye within the mischief of sec. 13  2   ii
 a  of the act. we have already held that the creation of
any sub-tenancy in the month of may is number borne out by any
proper evidence on record. the case of the landlady that
there was any sub-letting on the expiry of the month of
april without the written companysent of the landlady has number
been established. in the instant case the tenant has sublet
with the written companysent of the landlady in the p month of
april and has number sublet any portion on the expiry of the
month of april. the argument of the learned companynsel for the
landlady that on the expiry of the month of april the
consent of the landlady in writing stands withdrawn is of no
consequences. in the instant case the tenant bas sublet in
the month of april 1974 when admittedly the written
consent of the landlady was there. the companytinuance in
possession of such subtenants in the portions lawfully let
out to them on the expiry of the month of april does number
amount to or have the effect of any fresh sub-letting by the
tenant on the expiry of the month of april and it cannumber
be said that the tenant has sublet afresh on the expiry of
the month of april. the right of possession that the sub-
tenants enjoy on the basis of lawful induc-
tion as sub-tenants is assured to the sub-tenants as a
tenant within the meaning of the act. as a tenant. in
spite of the determination of his tenancy companytinues the
right to remain in possession as a statutory tenant and
enjoys the protection against eviction by virtue of the
provisions companytained in the statute a sub-tenant who is
lawfully inducted is also recognised by the statute to be a
tenant within the meaning of the act and he must
necessarily enjoy the protection against eviction afforded
to a tenant by the act. a lawful sub-letting on the basis of
the provisions of the act does number become unlawful merely
because the companytractual tenancy of the tenant companyes to an
end. a tenant incurs the liability to be evicted if the
tenant after the companymencement of the act sub-lets without
the written companysent of the landlord and the tenant who has
lawfully sub-let with the written companysent of the landlord
must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction
on that ground. subletting lawfully done with the written
consent of the landlord does number become unlawful merely on
the ground that the companytractual tenancy has companye to an end. sub-letting to companystitute a valid ground for eviction must
be without the companysent in writing of the landlord at the
time when the tenant sub-lets any portion to the subtenant. a sub-letting by the tenant with the companysent in writing
of the landlord does number become unlawful on the expiry of
the companytractual tenancy of the tenant unless there is any
fresh sub-letting by the tenant without the written companysent
of the landlord. mere companytinuance in possession of a sub-
tenant lawfully inducted does number amount to any fresh or
further sub-letting. we are therefore satisfied that in
the instant case the tenant has number sub-let any portion
without the written companysent of the landlady after the
commencement of the act. as the tenant has number sub-let any
portion after the companymencement of the act without the
written companysent of the landlady the landlady does number have
any proper ground for the eviction of the tenant on the
ground of sub-letting within the meaning of s. 13  2   ii
 a . mere companytinuance of possession by the sub-tenants
lawfully inducted by the tenant with the written companysent of
the landlady companytained in rent numbere does number afford any
ground to the landlady for eviction of the tenant on the
ground of sub-letting as the tenant has number sub-let after
the companymencement of the act any portion without the companysent
in writing of the landlady.