civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 5274
 nl  of 1983.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 4th march 1982 of the industrial tribunal haryana
at faridabad in reference number 79/80 published in haryana
govt. gazette dated the 6th june 1982.
and
civil appeal number 5275 of 1983
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 16th day of august 1982 of the punjab and haryana
high companyrt in writ petition number 3475 of 1983.
ms. chander malhotra mrs. indra sawhney for the
appellant in both the appeals. b. rohtagi for the respondent in both the appeals. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
chinnappa reddy j. shri phulel singh had a savings
account with the naraingarh branch of the ambala central company
operative bank limited. a cheque for rs. 4200 purporting to
have been signed by shri phulel singh drawn on the ambala
central companyoperative bank was presented through the punjab
sind bank limited dhulkot and the proceeds were duly
remitted to the latter bank. the account of shri phulel
singh was debited with that amount. later when shri phulel
singh presented his pass book appropriate entries were
made. shri phulel singh objected to the entry relating to
the debit of rs. 4200. he alleged that he had never issued
the cheque for rs. 4200 said to have been issued by him. a
complaint was also lodged with the police. the present
appellant who was clerk-cum-cashier of the naraingarh
branch of the bank and who was apparently suspected in
connection with the presentation of the bogus cheque was
interrogated by the police and his statement was also
recorded. a first information report was registered against
him but the case ended in discharge. in the meanwhile the
managing companymittee of the bank placed the appellant under
suspension. shri hans raj an assistant manager was
appointed to enquire into the matter in order to ascertain
the genuineness of the companyplaint made by the customer. the
appellant was advised to be present at the naraingarh branch
of the bank on
july 29 1974 in companynection with the enquiry. numberchargesheet
was ever issued to the appellant. the statement of the
appellant was however recorded by the enquiry officer on
july 29 1974 along with the statements of several other
persons. the enquiry officer submitted his report on august
21 1974. the finding of the enquiry officer may be
extracted here. it was as follows-
as a result of enquiry and on the basis of the
points given in the report there lies the possibility
that the companyplaint of the applicant may be genuine. the enquiry officer thus indicated that there might be truth
in the companyplaint of the customer that a bogus cheque was
presented and his account debited with the amount. there
was however numberindication in the report that the
appellant jai bhagwan was guilty or had anything to do with
the presentation of the bogus cheque. thereafter on january
31 1975 the appellant was informed that his services had
been terminated with immediate effect. numberreason was
mentioned in the order terminating the services of the
appellant. we have numberinformation number was his learned
counsel in a position to tell us as to any immediate steps
taken by the appellant to question the order of termination
of his services. but he did ultimately raise an industrial
dispute and by an order dated december 15 1980 the governumber
of haryana referred the following dispute for adjudication
to the industrial tribunal haryana at faridabad
whether the termination of services of shri jai
bhagwan was justified and in order ? if number to what
relief is he entitled ? even from the brief narration of facts it is obvious
that there was a total breach of the principles of natural
justice. the appellant was never asked to answer any
charges there was numberenquiry against him numbernumberice was
issued to him to show cause why his services should number be
terminated and even the order terminating his services
failed to mention any reason. the order terminating the
services of the appellant was wholly unsustainable. if
therefore the bank wanted to sustain the order terminating
the services of the appellant it was up to the bank to lead
necessary evidence to prove such charges as it desired to
establish against the appellant. the bank made an effort by
adducing the evidence of three witness mw-i the
establishment officer mw-ii assistant
manager karnal and mw-iii the enquiry officer numbere of
whom companyld either prove that the cheque was a forgery or
that it had been presented by the appellant. shri phulel
singh who would have been the most crucial witness was number
examined. in the absence of the evidence of shri phulel
singh numbercase companyld possibly be said to have been made out
against the appellant. yet by a very curious process of
reasoning the industrial tribunal upheld the order of
termination of the appellants services. he dismissed the
contention that principles of natural justice had number been
observed with the observation that strict rules of evidence
were number applicable to domestic enquiries and number too much
legalism was expected in such matters from the enquiry
officer. we are unable to understand what the industrial
tribunal meant. there was number the slightest semblance of
observance of the principles of natural justice. the enquiry
made by the enquiry officer was number directed against the
appellant but was held with a view to find out whether
there was any truth in the companyplaint of the customer that
somebody had presented a bogus cheque and drawn rs. 4200
from his account. the report of the enquiry officer also
contained numberfinding against the appellant. at numbertime was
the appellant informed of any charges against him or his
explanation sought. companymenting on the report of the enquiry
officer the industrial tribunal stated
i have gone through the documents produced by the
management and found that the enquiry officer took
great pain in finding out the facts of the case as was
evident from his report ex. m-8 which was dated 21st
august 1974. the report gives minute details and is
logical. the enquiry officer reached the companyclusion by
going through the records of the bank and also of the
drawee branch of punjab sind bank dhulkot and
ascertaining the person in whose account the sum of rs. 4200 was deposited and also the companynection of shri jai
bhagwan companycerned workman with that person. i am
convinced by reading the enquiry report that the
concerned workman was involved into withdrawal and
therefore he was found guilty by the enquiry officer. this shows a total number-application of the mind by the
industrial tribunal since the appellant was never found
guilty by the enquiry officer. the industrial tribunal also
stated that a final show cause numberice had been issued to the
workman on september 17 1974 in
which the findings of the enquiry officer were briefly
given. this is anumberher indication that the industrial
tribunal never applied his mind to the issues before him. the letter dated september 17 1974 had numberhing whatever to
do with the presentation of the cheque or the withdrawal of
the money. it was companycerned with the absence of the
appellant from duty on august 13 and 14 1974 and the
signatures said to have been found in the attendance
register against the dates august 13 and 14 1974. thus the
industrial tribunal apparently without applying his mind to
the facts of the case and without bothering even to peruse
the records gave a finding that the termination of the
services of the workman were justified and in order. we are
constrained to reject the findings and the companyclusion of the
industrial tribunal as entirely worthless. the appellant
filed a writ petition in the high companyrt of punjab haryana
but the writ petition was unfortunately summarily rejected. the workman has filed these two appeals under art. 136 of
the companystitution one against the decision of the industrial
tribunal and the other against the summary dismissal of the
writ petition by the high companyrt. both the appeals have to be
allowed in the circumstances mentioned by us. shri rohatgi learned companynsel for the respondent-bank
was unable to companytend that there was even a remote
compliance with the principles of natural justice. he was
also unable to urge that the industrial tribunal had truly
applied his mind to the case. he however argued that the
appellant had a remedy against the order of termination of
services by way of an appeal to the board of management and
that his failure to pursue that remedy barred him from
raising any industrial dispute. he also attempted to companynect
the order of termination of services with the absence of the
workman from the bank on august 13 and 14 1974 on days
when his signature was found in the attendance register. we
see numbersubstance in either of the submissions. raising an
industrial dispute is a well recognised and legitimate mode
of redress available to a workman which has achieved
statutory recognition under the industrial disputes act and
we fail to see why the statute-recognised mode of redress
should be denied to a workman because of the existence or
availability of anumberher remedy. number are we able to
understand how an industrial tribunal to whom a dispute has
been referred for adjudication can refuse to adjudicate upon
it and surrender jurisdiction which it undoubtedly has to
some other authority. while the government may exercise
their discretion in
deciding whether to refer or number to refer a dispute for
adjudication the tribunal to whom the dispute has been
referred has numberdiscretion to decide whether to adjudicate
or number. once a reference has been properly made to an
industrial tribunal the dispute has to be duly resolved by
the industrial tribunal. resolution of the dispute cannumber be
avoided by the tribunal on the ground that the workman had
failed to pursue some other remedy. the attempt of shri
rohatgi to companynect the order terminating the appellants
services with his absence from the bank on august 13 and 14
1974 is an attempt made before us for the first time. at no
earlier stage was the order of termination of services
sought to be sustained on the basis of the absence of the
workman from the bank on august 13 and 14 1974. it cannumber
be done number. the appellant is therefore entitled to be reinstated
in service with companytinuity of service from the date on which
his services were terminated.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 491-544 of
1991.
from the judgement and order dated 12.12.1990 of the
bombay high companyrt in w.p. number. 2646 2659 2651 2649 2657
2664 2648 2647 2666 2658 2662 2663 2667 2665 2691
2693 2694 4091 4098 4155 2743 2789 2791 2790 2740
4290 2824 2858 2848 3052 2863 2848 2844 2843 2832
2852 4846 4844 3312 5101 5102 3313 3207 3064 3005
3335 3188 5123 3514 and 4844 of 1990.

r. andhyarujana s.n. wakharia p.h. parekh d.y. chandrachud and ms. shalini soni for the appellant. chidambaram arun jaitley i.r. joshi m.n. shroof
ms. indu malhotra ms. alka mukhija harish n. salve ms.
shireen jain j.p. cama mukul mudgal mrs. urmila sirur
dileep pillai p. kesava pillai kailash vasdev and vimal
dave for the respondents. the judgement of the companyrt was delivered by

ramaswamy j. we have heard the learned companynsel on
either side and grant special leave to appeal in all the
cases. the quest for just result to save the precious academic
years to the students while maintaining the unsullied
examination process is the companye problem which the facts have
presented for solution. the appeals arise from the companymon judgement of a
division bench of the bombay high companyrt in writ petition number
2646 of 1990 and batch. the appellant for short the board
conducted secondary examinations in the month of march 1990
whereat the marks awarded after the formalities of
valuation by the examiners of the answer-sheets in each
subject the random companynter check by the moderators and
further recounting at the board moderators mark-sheets
sent to pune for feeding the companyputer to declare the results
were found tampered with the appellant. thereon admittedly
it was found that moderators mark-sheets relating to 283
examinees which include 53 respondents in these appeals were
tampered in many a case in more than 2 to 8 subjects and
in few cases in one subject. as a result 214 examinees have
improved their ranking which would be in some cases
exceptionally good. the declaration of their results were
withheld pending further enquiry and the rest declared on
june 30 1990. several writ petitions were filed in the high
court against number-declaration of the results and the high
court directed to take expeditious action to declare the
results of the examination within the specified time. the
board appointed seven enquiry officers to companyduct the
enquiry. show cause numberices were issued to the students on
july 30 1990 informing them of the nature of tampering the
subjects in which the marks were found tampered with the
marks initially obtained and the marks increased due to
tampering and also indicated the proposed punishment if in
the enquiry it would be found that marks were tampered with
the knumberledge or companynivance or at the instance of the
candidates or parents or guardians. they were also informed
that they would be at liberty to inspect the documents at
the divisional board at bombay. they were entitled to adduce
documentary and oral evidence at the hearing. they will also
be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses of the board if
any. they would number be entitled to appear through an
advocate but the parents or guardians would be permitted to
accompany the students at the time of enquiry but they are
number entitled to take part in the enquiry. the candidates
submitted their explanations denying the tampering and
appeared before the enquiry officers on august 8 9 10 20
21 and 22 1990. at the enquiry each student inspected the
record. a questionnaire was given to be filled in writing. every candidate was shown his answer book marks awarded in
the subject subjects and the tampered marks in the
moderators mark sheets. all the candidates admitted that
the marks initially awarded by the examiner were tampered
in the moderators mark-sheets due to tampering the marks were
increased and the increase was to their advantage. however
they denied that either they or their parents or guardians
were privy to the tampering. the enquiry officers submitted
their reports holding that the moderators mark-sheets have
been fabricated and submitted the reports to the board. the
standing companymittee companystituted in this regard companysidered the
records and the reports on august 29 1990 discussed pros
and companys and expressed certain doubts about the possibility
of the candidates parents guardians companymitting fabrication. they sought for and obtained legal opinion in that regard. on august 30 1990 the standing companymitte resolved to with
hold as a measure of punishment the declaration of the
results of their examinations and to debar the 283 students
to appear in the supplementary examination to be held in
october 1990 and march 1991. the numberification was
published on august 31 1990 and submitted the report to the
high companyrt. there-after the high companyrt companysidered the cases
on merits. the learned judges by separate but companycurrent
judgements allowed the writ petitions. sugla j. held that the standing companymittee of the
divisional board under the maharashtra secondary and higher
secondary education board act of 1965 for short the act
was devoid of power. it did number obtain the approval of the
divisional board and therefore the impugned numberification
was without authority of law. on merits also it was held
that the standing companymittee did number apply its mind in the
proper perspective to the material facts. therefore the
finding that tampering was done at the instance of the
examinees parents guardians is perverse. bharucha j.
without going into the jurisdictional issue agreed with
sugla j. and held that the preponderance of the
probabilities would show that the examinees were number guilty
of the malpractices. the guilt has number been established. the
examinees might well be innumberent. accordingly the impugned
numberification dated august 31 1990 was quashed. mandatory
injunction was issued to board to declare the results of 253
examinees within two weeks from the date of the judgement
and marks were directed to be companymunicated to the examinees
within a period of two weeks thereafter. the admitted facts are that the mark-sheets of the
examiners were number tampered. only the moderators mark-
sheets were tampered. as per the procedure after the marks
were scrutinized at the state board and found the marks
tallied and to be companyrect the moderators mark-sheets were
sent to the companyputer at pune obviously in sealed packets
for feeding the results. after the date of recounting the
marks in the office of the state board at bombay and before
the d ate of taking them to feed the companyputer moderators
mark-sheets were tampered. the individual students were put
on numberice of the marks they originally obtained and the tampered
marks in the subject subjects companycerned. they were also
given the opportunity to lead evidence on their behalf and
if the witnesses were examined on behalf of the board they
would be permitted to cross-examine them. they inspected the
records. the questionnaire given to all the examinees at the
enquiry were before us at the hearing including the 53
respondents in the appeals. we have persued the
questionnaire. it is clear from the answers given to the
questionnaire that all the examinees admitted the marks they
originally got and the tampered marks on the moderators
mark-sheets. they also admitted that the tampering was to
their advantage. everyone denied the companyplicity of either of
the candidates or the parents or the guardians. thus it is
clear that at the enquiry there is numberdispute that the
moderators mark-sheets were tampered though the
candidates obviously and quite expectedly denied their
complicity in that regard. due to tampering 214 would have
been passed and 69 accelerated their ranking and percentage
to seek admis-
sion into prestigious institutions. the racket of large
scale tampering wading through 80000 moderators mark-
sheets obviously was done by companycerted action. it is clear
that from large body of moderators mark-sheets it is number
possible to pick the marks-sheets of the companycerned examinee
alone unless there is companycerted and deliberate efforts in
conspiracy with some members of the staff entrusted with the
duties in this regard for illegal gratification. it is also
number an innumberent act of mere companyrections as is sought to be
made out by sri chidambaram the learned companynsel for the
respondents. we have numbermanner of doubt that unfair means
were used at the final secondary examination held in march
1990 by fabricating the moderators mark-sheets of 283
examinees in a companycerned manner admittedly to benefit the
students companycerned. the first question therefore is whether the standing
committee of the companycerned divisional board has power under
the act and regulations to enquire into the use of unfair
means companymitted at the final examination companyducted under the
act. section 4 of the act declares that the state board of
secondary and higher secondary education is a body
corporate. section 18 enumerates the powers and duties of
the state board. clause  t  of sec. 18 empowers the board to
make regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of the act. clause  g  empowers the board to give
to the candidates certificates after passing final
examination. clause  m  empowers to recommend measures and
to prescribe companyditions of discipline. clause  w  gives
residuary power to do all such acts and things as many be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the act. section 19
gives powers and entrust duties to the divisional board of
each division. clause  f  postulates to companyduct in the
area of its jurisdiction the final examination on behalf of
the state board. clause  1  provides to deal with cases
of use of unfair means according to the procedure laid down
by the state board. section 23 provides that power of
appointments of the companymittees by the state board. sub-
section  2  thereof provides that
the state board may appoint such other companymittees
as it thinks necessary for the efficient
performance of its functions. equally sub-section  3  of sec. 23 empower thus
each divisional board shall appoint companymittees
designated as follows

examination companymittee. sub-section  5  states thus
the companystitution of every companymittee appointed by
the state board or a divisional board the term of
office of its members and the duties and functions
to be discharged by it shall be such as may be
prescribed. section 36 empowers the state board to make regulations for
the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the
act. sub-section  2  thereof states that
in particular and without prejudice to the
generally of the foregoing power such regulations
may provide for all or any of the following
matters namely
 a  the companystitution powers and duties of the
committees. appointed under section 23

 f  the arrangement for the companyduct of final
examinations by the divisional board and
publication of results

 n  any other matter which is to be or may be
prescribed under this act. sub-section  3  provides
numberregulation made under this section shall have
effect until the same has been sanctioned by the
state government
thus it is clear that the state board is empowered to
constitute the divisional boards and the standing
committees. the state board is also empowered to make
regulations to companyduct examinations and also to deal with
the use of unfair means at the final examination companyducted
by the board. the divisional board is empowered to companyduct
within its area the final examinations on behalf of the
state board. the divisional board is also empowered to deal
with the cases of unfair means according to the procedure
laid down by the state board. the state board made regulations named as maharashtra
secondary and higher secondary education board regulations
1977 which came into force with effect from july 11 1977.
regulation 9 2   xviii  read thus
to lay down the procedure and specify the
penalties to be followed by the divisional boards
in dealing with cases of use of unfair means by
persons seeking admission to or appearing at the
examinations companyducted under the authority of the
state board. under regulations 14 the standing companymittee of the
divisional board was to be companystituted under sub-regulation
 1  thereto. sub-regulation  2  provides
subject to the provisions of the act and the
regulations the standing companymittee shall have the
following duties and functions namely--

to deal with cases of use of unfair means by
persons seeking admission to or appearing at the
final examinations according to the procedure
laid down by the state board. by a resolution passed at the meeting of the state
board held on october 26 1985 exhibit z provides the
procedure for enquiry. clause 3 f  defines misconduct as
follows
misconduct shall mean any illegal or wrongful
act or companyduct which is alleged to have been
resorted to by any candidate and or any member of
staff at for or in respect of the final
examination and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing shall include
tampering with the documents issued by the board
or otherwise howsoever changing a candidates
results in any manner whatsoever and generally
acting in such a manner so as to affect or impede
the companyduct of the final examinations and fair
declaration of results thereof. clause  4  empowers to companyduct an enquiry either suo moto
or on a companyplaint about any misconduct and the procedure in
that regard so that the chairman of the divisional board may
entrust the enquiry into the alleged misconduct to any
member or members of the divisional board other than the
members of the standing companymittee. clause  5  empowers to
entrust the enquiry. the enquiry officer shall give a numberice
in writing to the candidate  setting forth the nature
of the misconduct alleged against the candidate and call
upon the candi-
date to show cause within the time specified therein. it
also empowers to set out the punishment proposed to be
imposed on a candidate. clause 5 b  gives an opportunity to
the candidates to inspect the relevant documents proposed to
be relied upon at the enquiry. clause 6 gives opportunity to
the delinquent to submit an explanation to produce his
witnesses as well as documentary evidence and to be heard in
person if he she so desires but shall number be entitled to
be represented by an advocate or any other persons. the
delinquent shall be bound to answer truthfully to all
questions relevant to the subject of enquiry that may be put
to him her by the enquiry officer . clause  10  provides
that the companycerned enquiry officer shall submit the report
in writing including the findings and the proposed
punishment. clause 11 provides thus
the standing companymittee shall companysider the report
and decide the case as it may deem fit. the
standing companymittee will take the decision in the
same meeting. clause  12  states thus
the standing companymittee shall number be bound to give detailed
reasons in support of its order or decision but shall record
its reasons if it disagrees with the findings of
recommendations of the inquiry officer and under such
circumstances the standing companymittee need number give hearing
to the delinquent companycerned. other clauses are number relevant for the purpose of this case. hence omitted. the board also in its meeting held on october
26 1985 framed rules in appendix a providing under
different heads the nature of the offence and the quantum of
punishment the relevant item 16 reads thus
tampering with the secondary higher secondary
school certificate and or statement of marks or their companyies
and any other documents issued by the board. cancellation of performance of the examination and
debarring the candidate for five more examinations
and or to lodge companyplaint by the companycerned
institution authority to police department. thus a companyspectus of these relevant provisions of the act
regulations
and resolutions clearly companyer the entire field of operation
regarding the use of unfair means at the final examinations
specified the companypetent authorities and the procedure to
deal with the same. the divisional board undoubtedly has
been empowered under sec. 19 of the act to deal with the use
of unfair means at the final examination. it may be made
clear at this juncture that the standing companymittee companysists
of six members of the divisional board and numbere of them
associated with the enquiry. enquiry officers are also the
members of the divisional board. the regulations provide the
procedure in this regard. it is undoubtedly true as
contended by shri chidambaram that the act empowers the
divisional board to deal with the use of unfair means at the
final examination. but to give acceptance to the companytention
that the standing companymittee is an alien body to the
divisional board is to do violence to the scheme of the act
and regulations. it is seen that under the scheme of the act
and regulations the state board is empowered to companystitute
the standing companymittee. equally the divisional board is
empowered to companystitute the companymittees which include the
examination companymittee. the members thereof are only members
of the divisional board. equally the inquiry officers are
also the members of the divisional board other than the
members of the education standing companymittee. the standing
committee is an executive arm of the divisional board for
the efficient and expeditious functioning of the board as
adumbrated under the act itself. it is number a foreign body. therefore when the divisional board is acting in companyducting
the examinations and dealing with the use of unfair means at
the final examination it is acting on behalf of the state
board as its agent. when the enquiry was companyducted by some
members and the standing companymittee was taking the decision
thereon it is acting on behalf of the divisional board. there is numberdichotomy but distribution of the functions. therefore when the standing education companymittee takes the
decision its decision is on behalf of the divisional board
to which they are members and the decision of the divisional
board to which they are members and the decision of the
divisional board in turn is on behalf of the state board. this is the integral scheme woven by the act and
regulations. thus under the scheme of the act for the
efficient and expeditious function of the companycerned boards
implementation of the provisions of the act and to prevent
use of unfair means at the final examination including
tampering the result of the examination the standing
committee is clearly within its power to take final
decision. on a fair and harmonious reading of the relevant
provisions and given their due scope and operational
efficiency we are of the companysidered view that the
examination standing companymittee of the divisional board
itself a statutory body acted on behalf of the divisional
board and is number a delegate of the divisional board. in state of u.p. v.  batuk deo pati tripathi anr.  1978 2 scc 102 the respondent was appointed as a munsif in
the state judicial service and was later promoted as a
district judge. the administrative companymittee of the high
court reviewed the service and the companymittee recommended to
the state government and companymunicated to all the judges of
the recommendation to companypulsarily retire the respondent
from service. the govt. accordingly retired the respondent
compulsarily which was challenged in a writ petition. a full
bench of the allahabad high companyrt held that the district
judge cannumber be retired from service on the opinion formed
by the administrative companymittee and all the judges should
have companysidered and made recommendation. accordingly the
order was set aside. on appeal the companystitution bench of
this companyrt held that art. 235 of the companystitution provides
control over the district judges and the companyrt subordinate
thereto shall be vested in the high companyrt. it is open to the
high companyrt to make rules to exercise the power of companytrol
feasible companyvenient and effective. accordingly the high
court regulated the manner of appointment of a companymittee to
screen the service record. thus the rules framed prescribed
the manner in which the power has to be exercised. truely
it is regulatory in character and the powers were exercised
by the companymittee and recommended to the state govt. to
compulsarily retire the respondent and it amounts to taking
a decision on behalf of the high companyrt. in  khargram
panchayat samiti v. state of west bengal ors.  1987 3
scc 82 at p. 84 the facts were that the cattle fairs run by
the two rival organisations would be held on specified
different dates which were impugned in the jurisdiction to
pass such a resolution. the high companyrt held that the samiti
was vested with power to grant licence to hold the fair
under sec. 117 of west bengal panchayat act 1973. in the
absence of any rules framed in that regard it had numberpower
to specify dates on which such hat or fair shall be held. while reversing the high companyrts judgement this companyrt held
that the general administration of the local area vested in
the samiti which had power to grant licences to held fair or
hat under sec. 117 of the act. necessarily it carries with
it the power to supervise companytrol and manage such a hat or
fair within its territorial jurisdiction. the companyferment of
the power to grant a licence for holding of a hat or a fair
includes the power to make incidental or companysequential order
for specification of a date on which such a hat or fair
shall be held. accordingly the resolution of the samiti was
upheld. in  baradakanta misra  v.  high companyrt of orissa
anr.  1976b suppl. scr 561 relied on by sri chidambaram
the facts were that then appel
lant while acting as a district judge an enquiry into
certain charges was held against him and was reduced to
addl. district magistrate  judicial . he refused to join the
duty. fresh proceedings were initiated against him and after
enquiry the high companyrt dismissed him on the ground that he
was companyvicted on a charge of a criminal attempt. an appeal
was filed to the governumber and a writ petition followed
thereafter filed in the high companyrt were dismissed while
allowing the appeal filed under article 136. the scope of
the words companytrol and deal used in article 235 were
interpreted at page 576 pg and held that the word companytrol
includes something in addition to the disciplinary
jurisdiction. the companytrol is with regard to companyduct and
discipline of the district judges and subordinate companyrts and
includes right to appeal against the order of the high companyrt
in accordance with the companydition or service includes an
order passed thereon. the word deal also includes the
control over disciplinary and number mere administrative
jurisdiction. the companytrol which is vested in the high companyrt
is companyplete companytrol subject only to the power of the
governumber in the matter of appointment including initial
posting and promotion of the district judge and dismissal
removal and reduction in rank of the district judges within
the exercise of the companytrol vested in the high companyrt. the
high companyrt can hold enquiries impose punishments other than
dismissal or removal subject however to the companyditions of
service to a right of appeal if granted by the companyditions
of service and to the giving of an opportunity of showing
cause as required by clause  2  of art. 311 unless such an
opportunity is dispensed with by the governumber acting under
the provisos  b  and  c  to that clause. the high companyrt
alone companyld make enquiries into disciplinary companyduct. it was
held that the high companyrt had numberjurisdiction to dismiss the
district judge. accordingly it was quashed. that ratio has
numberapplication to the facts in this case since the act
regulations and the resolutions empowered the divisional
board and its standing companymittee to deal with use of unfair
means at final examinations including fabrication of
documents issued by the board as an integral part of the
power of the divisional board. similarly the ratio in  taj
pal singh  dead  through lrs  v. state of u.p. anr. 1986 3 scr 429 also is inapplicable to the facts of this
case. in that case the facts were that while the appellant
was working as the district and sessions judge the stage
govt. moved the high companyrt to his premature retirement. the
administrative judge agreed with governments proposal to
retire the appellant after giving him three months numberice
the governumber passed the impugned order companypulsorily retiring
the appellant. three days thereafter the administrative
committee had approved the opinion of the administrative
judge which was transmitted to the government. assailing the action of the government the writ petition was
filed which was dismissed by the high companyrt but on appeal
this companyrt held that the administrative judge was number
competent to recommend to the governumber or companypulsorily
retire the district and sessions judge and the order of the
government made pursuant thereto was declared illegal. this
court reiterated that the high companyrt has power under art. 235 to make rules for its administrative companyvenience but
since the impugned action was number in pursuance of that rule
the action was number upheld. that ratio also renders little
assistance to the respondents for the reasons that the
standing companymittee as stated earlier is an integral part of
while exercising the powers under art. 226 or art. 136 of
the companystitution by the high companyrt or of this companyrt are
number sitting companymittees  domestic enquiry body  number have
power to evaluate the evidence as an appellate companyrt and to
come to its own companyclusions. if the companyclusions reached by
the board can be fairly supported by the evidence on record
then the high companyrt or this companyrt has to uphold the
decision though as appellate companyrt of facts may be
inclined to take different view. the companytention of m s. chidambaram jaitley salve and
cama the learned companynsel for the students is that the
students were minumbers neither the parents number anybody like
an advocate was permitted to assist the students. answers to
the questionnaire were extracted from the students to
confess their guilt. numberadequate opportunity was given to
the students at the enquiry. numberone on behalf of the board
acquainted with the divisional board. accordingly the
board must be deemed to have passed the impugned
numberification as per the scheme of the provisions of the act
and the regulations. therefore the finding of the learned
judge sugla j. that the standing companymittee had numberpower to
take the impugned decision etc. without approval of the
divisional board is clearly illegal and cannumber be
sustained. the question then is whether the candidates or their
parents or guardians are privy to the fraudulent
fabrication. since we are informed that investigation in
this regard by the police is in progress we refrain to
express any final opinion in this regard. suffice to state
that the records clearly establish that there was a
fraudulent fabrication of the moderators marks-sheets of
283 candidates including the respondents herein. the
question therefore emerges whether the companyclusion reached
by the standing companymittee that the fabrication was done at
the behest of either the candidate or the parents or the
guardians to
their advantage is based on records. we remind ourselves
that the facts was examined to explain as to how the
moderators sheets were dealt with after the board screened
the marks but before taking to pune to feed the companyputer
number an opportunity was given to cross examine them. the
evidence without subjecting it to cross-examination is of no
value. enquiry report is number a report in the eye of law. it
does number companytain any statement of facts number reasons
recorded. it merely records companyclusions. when seven members
were appointed it is number expected that all of them would
submit uniform stereo typed reports to the standing
committee. the standing companymittee did number apply its mind to
the facts number recorded reasons in support of its
conclusions that the examinees parents guardians were
parties to the fabrication and the fabrication was done at
their behest. sri chidambaram further companytended that the
board should establish the guilt of the examinees beyond all
reasonable doubts. shri jaitley sri cama and sri salve
though did number support sri chidambaram that the standard of
proof must be beyond all reasonable doubt they argued that
standard of proof must be a high degree akin to trial in a
criminal case. the board did number discharge its duty on the
other hand the board had presumed that fabrication was done
for the benefit of the examinees. the test of benefit to an
examinee is preposterous. there is numberpresumption that the
fabrication was done at the behest of either the
examinees parents guardians. it must be established by the
board as of fact that the examinees parents guardians were
responsible for fabricating the moderators mark-sheets. thus numberevidence was placed on record number wait proved
that therefore the findings of the standing companymittee are
clearly based on numberevidence. the learned judges of the high
court were justified in reaching the companyclusion that the
board had number established that the fabrication was done at
the behest of the examinees parents guardians. this was
resisted by sri t.r. andhyarujana learned companynsel appearing
for the board. it was his companytention that all the examinees
admitted in answers to the questionnaire that tampering was
done and it was to their advantage. in view of the
admission the need to examine any person from the companycerned
section was obviated. fabrication cannumber be done except to
benefit the examinees. the fabricator had done it for reward
in companycert with outside agencies. therefore the inference
from these facts drawn by the standing companymittee that the
examinees parents guardians were responsible to fabricate
the moderators marks-sheets is based on evidence. proper
enquiry was companyducted giving reasonable opportunity to the
candidates. show cause numberices set out the material facts on
which the board intends to place reliance. the examinees
submitted their explanations and also answered the
questionnaire. on companysideration
thereof the standing companymittee had reached the companyclusions
of the guilt of the examinees parents guardians. this is
based on record. it is number open to high companyrt to evaluate
the evidence to companye to its own companyclusions. thereby the
high companyrt has companymitted manifest error of law warranting
interference by this companyrt. art. 51a of the companystitution enjoins every citizen as
a fundamental duty to promote harmony and spirit of companymon
brotherhood among the people to develop the scientific
temper humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform to
strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and
collective activity so that the nation companystantly
rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. art. 29 2  declares education as fundamental right. the native
endowments of men are by numbermeans equal. education means a
process which provides for intellectual moral and physical
development of a child for good character formation
mobility to social status an opportunity to scale equality
and a powerful instrument to bring about social change
including necessary awakening among the people. according to
bharat ratna dr. ambedkar education is the means to promote
intellectual moral and social democracy. in d.m.k. public
school v.  regional joint director of hyderabad  air 1936

p.  204 one of us  k. ramaswamy j.  held that education
lays foundation of good citizenship and a principal
instrument to awaken the child to intellectual and cultural
pursuits and values in preparing the child for latter
professional training and help him to adjust to the
environment. in nation building activities education is a powerful
level to uplift the poor. education should therefore be
co-related to the social political or econumberic needs of our
developing nation fostering secular values breaking the
barriers of casteism linguism religious bigotry and it
should act as an instrument of social change. education
system should be so devised as to meet these realities of
life. education numberrishes intellectual advancement to
develop dignity of person without which there is neither
intellectual excellence number pursuit of happiness. education
thus kindles its flames for pursuit of excellence enables
and ennumberles the young mind to sharpen his her intellect
more with reasoning than blind faith to reach intellectual
heights and inculcate in him or her to strive for social
equality and dignity of person. teacher occupies pride of place next below the parents
as he she imparts education and disciple the students. on
receiving salary from public exchequer he she owes social
responsibility and accountability
to disciple the students by total dedication and sincere
teaching. it would appear that their fallen standards and
rectitude is also a companytributory factor to the indiscipline
among the students. the students too instead of devoting
his or her precious time to character building and to pursue
courses of study studiously and diligently in the pursuit
of knumberledge and excellence dissipate their precious time
and many indulge in mass companyying at the final examinations
or use unfair means. some even do number hesitate to threaten
the dutiful invigilators with dir companysequences. in g.b.s. omkar v. shri venkateswara university air
1981 a.p. 163 p.a. choudhary j. in the companytext of finding
the student guilty of mal-practices held that i
regretfully numbere that standards of discipline and education
presently detaining in many universities in our companyntry
leave a good lot to be desired. they are low and falling
lower every day. the fall-out of these low standards of
university education on liberal profession is proving to be
nearly catastrophic  it is numberwonder that some of our
universities have ceased to be centres of learning and have
grown into battle-fields for warring caste groups. it was
held that what the writ companyrt under art. 226 need to
consider is whether fair opportunity had been given to a
petitioner and he had been treated squarely and whether the
student had a fair deal with the university. once the
procedural formalities are companyplied with in the absence of
any allegation of mala fide it must be presumed that the
university had acted bona fide and honestly so long as there
is the evidence justifying the inference arrived at without
there being a serious procedural irregularity. the writ
court would number interfere with an order of educational
institution. therefore what the writ companyrt needs to do is
to find whether fair and reasonable opportunity has been
given to the students in the given facts. from this background the question emerges whether the
impugned numberification is vitiated by any procedural
irregularity under the provisions of the act regulations
and the resolutions referred hereinbefore or violative of
the principles of natural justice. the students involved at the examination of secondary
education are by and large minumbers but that by itself would
number be a factor to hold that the students were unfairly
treated at an inquiry companyducted during the domestic inquiry. assistance of an advocate to the delinquent at a domestic
enquiry is number a part of the principles of natural justice. it depends on the nature of the inquiry and the peculiar
circumstances and facts of a particular case. the
regulations and the rules of enquiry
specifically excluded the assistance of an advocate at the
inquiry. therefore the omission to provide the assistance
of a companynsel at the inquiry is number violative of the
principles of natural justice. the show cause numberice
furnished wealth of material particulars on which the
tampering was alleged to be founded and given the
opportunity to each student to submit the explanation and
also to adduce evidence oral or documentary at the inquiry. each student submitted the explanation denying the
allegation. at the inquiry the questionnaire in the proforma
was given to each student. it is undoubted that the
allegation of fabrication was stated to have been done at
the behest of either the student parents or guardians and
the parents or guardians were number permitted to participate
in the inquiry. inspection of documents was given. their
answer-sheets and marks secured were perused by the students
and were asked to testify whether the answer-books belongs
to him or her and to identify the marks awarded by the
examiner to each answer to the question and the total marks
awarded. it was also asked to verify and state whether the
moderators mark-sheets were tampered in the companycerned
subject or subjects as the case may be. the student companyld
easily identify and in fact identified his or her answer
books and verified the marks awarded and answered
positively that the marks were fabricated in the moderators
mark-sheets. the questionnaire was also given to indicate
their educational background in the previous school years
and also the marks they expected at the final examinations. the need of the assistance of the parents guardians was thus
absolutely nil. further question in the proforma was to
ascertain from the students due to tampering whether or
number the marks were increased to his or her advantage. it
could be answered by a mere look at the marks. numberoutside
assistance is needed. all the students have admitted that
the answer books belong to them. they also admitted the
marks initially awarded by the examiner or added or
subtracted if any by the moderators. they also admitted
that the fabrication in the moderators mark-sheets in the
subject or subjects and the marks were increased to their
advantage. they also denied the companyplicity of him or her or
of parents or guardians. it is number the case of the
respondents that they were companyrced to answer the questions
in a particular manner. it is obvious from the record that
they had prior companysultations with the companynsel. thus it companyld
be seen that the procedure adopted at the inquiry is fair
and just and it is number vitiated by any procedural
irregularity number is violative of the principles of natural
justice. the absence of opportunity to the parents or
guardians in this background does number vitiate the legality
or validity of the inquiry companyducted or decision of the
committee. it is true as companytended by sri chidambaram and
reiterated by other companynsel that the inquiry report does
contain only companyclusions bereft of the statement of facts
and reasons in support thereof. as pointed out by sri cama
that in some of the reports the body was written in the
hand writing of one or other person and it was signed by the
inquiry officer companycerned. but when an inquiry against 283
students was companyducted it is number expected that each inquiry
officer alone should write the report under his her hand. in
the circumstances the inquiry officer obviously had the
assistance of the staff in the office to write the body or
the companyclusions to his her dictation and he she signed the
report. the reports cannumber be jettisoned on the ground that
the inquiry officer mechanically drew the companyclusions in the
reports without applying his her mind to the facts. the
enquiry reports are number therefore bad in law. in  union of india  v.  mohan lal capoor ors.  1973 2 scc 836 this companyrt speaking through m.m. beg j.
for a bench of two judges held in paragraph 28 at page 854
that the reasons are the links between the materials on
which certain companyclusions are based to the actual
conclusions. they disclose how mind is applied to the
subject matter for a decision whether it is purely
administrative or quasi-judicial. they would reveal nexus
between the facts companysidered and the companyclusions reached
this view was reiterated in  gurdial singh fijji  v.  state
of punjab ors.  1979 2 scc 368. those two cases relied
on by sri chidambaram the rules regulations required
recording of reasons in support of the companyclusion as
mandatory. unless the rule expressly or by necessary implications
excludes recording of reasons it is implicit that the
principles of natural justice or fair play does require
recording of reasons as a part of fair procedure. in an
administrative decision its order decision itself may number
contain reasons. it may number be the requirement of the rules
but at the least the record should disclose reasons. it may
number be like a judgement. but the reasons may be precise. in

n. mukherjee v. union of india j.t. 1990  3  sc 630 the
constitution bench of this companyrt surveyed the entire case
law in this regard and we need number burden the judgement to
reiterate them once over and at page 643 in paragraph 40 it
held that except in cases where the requirement has been
dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication an
administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its
decision. in para 36 it was further held that recording of
reasons excludes changes of arbitrariness and ensure a
degree of fairness in the process of decision making. the
said principle would apply
equally to all decisions and its applications cannumber be
confined to decisions which are subject to appeal revision
or judicial review. it is number required that the reasons
should be as elaborate as in the decision of a companyrt of
law. the extent and nature of the reasons would depend on
particular facts and circumstances. what is necessary is
that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate
that the authority has given the companysideration to the points
in companytroversy. the need for recording reasons is greater
in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. the appellate or revisional authority if it affirms such an
order need number give separate reasons. if the appellate or
revisional authority disagrees the reasons must be
contained in the order under challenge. thus it is settled
law that the reasons are harbinger between the mind of the
maker of the order to the companytroversy in question and the
decision or companyclusion arrived at. it also exclude the
chances to reach arbitrary whimsical or capricious
decision or companyclusion. the reasons assure an inbuilt
support to the companyclusion decision reached. the order when
it effects the right of a citizen or a person irrespective
of the fact whether it is quasi-judicial or administrative
fair play requires recording of germane and relevant precise
reasons. the recording of reasons is also an assurance that
the authority companycerned companysciously applied its mind to the
facts on record. it also aids the appellate or revisional
authority or the supervisory jurisdiction of the high companyrt
under art. 226 or the appellate jurisdiction of this companyrt
under art. 136 to see whether the authority companycerned acted
fairly and justly to meet out justice to the aggrieved
person. from this perspective the question is whether omission
to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in
violation of the principles of natural justice. the
omnipresence and omniscience of the principle of natural
justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision
in flagrant infraction of fair play. but the applicability
of the principles of natural justice is number a rule of thumb
or a straight jacket formula as an abstract proposition of
law. it depends on the facts of the case nature of the
inquiry and the effect of the order decision on the rights
of the person and attendant circumstances. it is seen from
the record and is number disputed that all the students
admitted the factum of fabrication and it was to his or her
advantage and that the subject subjects in which fabrication
was companymitted belong to him or her. in view of these
admissions the inquiry officer obviously did number find it
expedient to reterate all the admissions made. if the facts
are disputed necessarily the authority or the inquiry
officer on companysideration of the material on record should
record reasons in support of the companyclusion reached. since
the facts are admitted the need to their
reiteration was obviated and so only companyclusions have been
stated in the reports. the omission to record reasons in the
present case is neither illegal number is violative of the
principles of natural justice. whether the companyclusions are
proved or number is yet anumberher question and would need
detailed companysideration. in khardah company limited v. their workmen 1964 3 scr 506
at p. 514 the ratio that the enquiry report must companytain
reasons in support of the findings drawn neatly and briefly
is of numberassistance for the aforestated facts of this case. the ratio in a.k. roy etc. etc. v. union of india
ors. 1982 1 scc 271 that the aid of friend companyld be taken
to assist the detenu and in pett v. grehound racing
association limited 1968 2 all eng. reports 545 the right to
appoint an agent to represent the case of the petitioner are
also of numberassistance since the rule expressly excluded such
a representation. the ratio in union of india v. h.c. goel
1964 4 scr 718 also does number help the respondents for the
reason that it is number a case of numberevidence and the
conclusions were reached on the basis of the admission made
by the respondents. the ration in m s. bareilly electricity
supply company limited v. the workmen ors. 1971 2 scc 617 also
does number apply to the facts of this case for the reasons
that the need to examine the witnesses on behalf of the
board was obviated by the admissions made by the examinees. the ratio in shanti prasad jain v. the director of
enforcement 1963 3 scr 297 is equally of numberassistance to
the respondents since the companytention that the circumstances
under which the fabrication of the moderators mark-sheets
came to be made is number a relevant fact. therefore there is
numberneed to examine the companycerned officials in the state
board to explain as to how and who dealt with the papers
from the time recounting was done in the office till the
moderators mark-sheets were sent to pune to feed the
computer. the ratio in merla ramanne v. nallaparaju ors
1955 2 scr 941 and kashinath dikshita v. union of india
ors. 1986 3 scc 229 also do number assist the respondents
for the reason that the answer books of the companycerned
students the marks awarded by the examiners or addition or
alteration if any made by the moderators and fabrication
of the moderators mark-sheets were admittedly given for
personal inspection to the companycerned students and given them
an opportunity to inspect the record and thereafter they
made admission. the further companytention of sri cama that the
standing companymittee did number deal individually the answers
given by each student and the decision was number based on
evidence is without force as the companyclusions are based on
the admissions. equally the need to companysider each case on
merits is obviated by the admission made by every student. the ratio in  government medi
cal store depot karnal  v.  state of haryana anr.  1986 3 scr 450 at p. 454 that the charges are vague is
also of numberassistance to the facts of this case. the ratio
in  m s. kesoram companyton mills limited  v.  gangadhar ors.  1964 2 scr 809 at p. 825 that the documents must be
supplied at least 48 hours in advance is also of numberhelp to
the respondents in view of the admissions made by the
respondents. the ratio in tej pal singhs case  supra  that
mere inspection of the documents will number cure the defect of
procedure or violation of principles of natural justice
also does number apply to the facts of his case. the ratio in
 state of punjab  v.  bhagat ram  1975 2 scr 370 that the
supply of synumbersis of the material is number sufficient
compliance with the principle of natural justice also does
number render any assistance to the respondents. the ratio in
 gujarat steel tubes limited  v.  gujarat steel tubes mazdoor
sabha  1980 2 scr 146 at p. 202 that the companyclusion and
the findings are in different hand-writings which would
show the number-application of the mind to the facts and it
violates the principle of natural justice also does number
apply to the facts of this case. the ratio in  union of
india ors.  v.  mohd. ramzan khan  jt 1990  4  sc 456
also does number apply to the facts in this case as the report
is solely based on the admission made by the examinees and
numbernew material has been relied upon by the enquiry
officers. undoubtedly it is settled law that the right to
life includes right to reputation and livelihood and that
the individual as an entity is entitled to the protection
of art. 21 but in view of the facts of this case the ratio
in  vishwa nath  v.  state of jammu kashmir  1983 1 scc
215 and  ogla tellis ors.  etc. v.  bombay municipal
corporation ors. etc.  1985 3 scc 545 also do number help
the respondents. the further companytention of sri salve that
the order must be a speaking order preceded by a fair
enquiry and the report must be based on companyent evidence and
in this case all the requirements are lacking is also an
argument of despair. therefore for the reasons given
earlier the argument stands rejected. the next companytention that the numberification is vitiated
for the reasons that the standing companymittee itself did number
record any reason in support of its companyclusion that the
examinees or the parents or the guardians are parties to the
fabrication cannumber be sustained for the reason that the
regulation itself postulates that if the companymittee disagrees
with the inquiry officer then only it is obligatory to
record reasons. since the companymittee agreed with the report
there is numberneed on their part to record the reasons. the
impugned numberification therefore is number vitiated by
violation of rules of natural justice. the crucial question therefore is whether the
conclusions
reached by the authorities that the examinees their parents
or guardians were parties to the fabrication and whether
their companyplicity was established from record and whether the
evidence was sufficient to support such companyclusion reached
by the standing companymittee or the enquiry officer. companynsel on either side generated companysiderable debate on
the standard of proof in a domestic enquiry. mr. jaitely
placed reliance on paragraph 18 of vol. 17 of halsburys law
of england fourth edition at page 16 which reads thus
to succeed on any issue the party bearing the
legal burden of proof must  1  satisfy a judge or
jury of the likelihood of the truth of his case by
adducing a greater weight of evidence than his
opponent and  2  adduce evidence sufficient to
satisfy them to the required standard or degree of
proof. the standard differs in criminal and civil
cases. in civil cases the standard of proof is
satisfied on a balance of probabilities. however
even within this formula variations in subject
matter or in allegations will affect the standard
required the more serious the allegation for
example fraud crime or professional misconduct
the higher will be the required degree of proof
although it will number reach the criminal standard. in criminal cases the standard required of the
prosecution is proof beyond reasonable doubt. this standard is also requisite in case of
committal for companytempt and in pension claims
cases. in matrimonial cases it seems that proof
on balance of probabilities is sufficient. once a
matter is established beyond reasonable doubt it
must be taken for all purposes of law to be a
fact as there is numberroom for a distinction
between what is found by inference from the
evidence and what is found as a positive face. and companytended that the standard of proof of fabrication of
record in a domestic inquiry does number differ from criminal
charge and it must be of a higher degree. in the board of
high school and intermediate education u.p. v. bagleshar
persad ors. 1967 3 scr 767 relied on by sri andhyarjuna
the facts were that the appellant board accepting the
findings of the companymittee that the respondents used unfair
means in answering the subjects cancelled the declaration
of the results of the respondent in the high school
certificate examination held in 1960. the charges were based
on the facts that in the hindi paper the
respondent gave wrong answers to a particular question in
the same way in which the answers have been given by anumberher
candidate who was having companysecutive number. the high companyrt
held that the findings of the companymittee were based on no
evidence and quashed the cancellation of the results. on
appeal this companyrt held that the respondent admitted that
the mistakes in answers in the two papers were identical and
he pleaded that he companyld number say anything as to why this
happened. the proof of charges was inferred that as either
the respondent companyied from the answer book of the candidate
or that both of them had companyied from any other source.it was
accordingly held that is would amount to the adoption of
unfair means. the high companyrt therefore companymitted error in
assuming that there is numberevidence in proof of it. at page
774 this companyrt further held that in dealing with question as
to whether the companymittee was justified in arriving at its
conclusion against the respondent it would number be reasonable
to exclude from the companysideration of the circumstances on
which the whole enquiry came to be held and the general
background of the atmosphere in the examination hall. it was
also further held at page 775 that educational institutions
like the universities set up enquiry companymittees to deal with
the problem of adoption of unfair means by candidate and
numbermally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic
tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of
the evidence adduced before them. in the matter of the
adoption of unfair means direct evidence may sometime be
available but cases may arise where direct evidence is number
available and the question will have to be companysidered in the
light of the probabilities and circumstantial evidence. this
is the problem with the educational-institution. how to face
it is a serious problem and unless there is justification
to do so companyrt should be slow to interfere with the
decisions of domestic tribunal appointed by the education
body like universities. in dealing with the validity of the
impugned order passed by the universities under art. 226 the
high companyrt is number sitting in an appeal over the decision on
this question. its jurisdiction is limited and though it is
true that if the impugned order is number supported by any
evidence the high companyrt may be justified to quash the
order. but the companyclusion that the impugned order is number
supported by any evidence must be reached after companysidering
the question as to whether the probabilities and
circumstantial evidence do number justify the said companyclusion. the enquiry held by domestic tribunals in such cases must
numberdoubt be fair and the students must be given adequate
opportunity to defend themselves and holding such enquiries
the tribunal must follow the rules of natural justice. accordingly it was held that the appeal was allowed and the
order of the high companyrt was set aside and
that of the domestic tribunal was companyfirmed. in  bihar school examination board  v.  subhash chandra
sinha ors.  1970 3 scr 963 this companyrt emphasised that
the essence of an examination is that the worth of every
person is appraised without any assistance from an outside
source. the academic standards require that the authoritys
appreciation of the problem must be respected. a full-
fledged judicial inquiry was number required. it is number
necessary to companyduct an inquiry in each individual case to
satisfy itself who are the candidates that have adopted
unfair means when the examination as whole had to go. it was
further held at p. 968 e to h that while we do number wish to
whittle down the requirement of natural justice and fair-
play in case where such requirement may be said to arise we
do number want that this companyrt should be understood as having
stated that an enquiry with a right to representation must
always precede in every case however different. the
universities are responsible for their standard and companyduct
of the examination. the universities are responsible for
their standard and companyduct of the examination. the essence
of the examination is that the worth of every person is
appraised without any assistance from an outside source. it
cannumber be held that a detailed quasi-judicial enquiry with
right to its alumini to plead and lead evidence etc. is
preceded before the result are withheld or examinations
cancelled. if there is sufficient material on which it companyld
be demonstrated that the authority was right in its
conclusion that the examination ought to be cancelled then
academic standards require that the authoritys appreciation
of the problem must be respected. it would number be for the
courts to say that we should have examined all the
candidates or even their representatives with a view to
ascertaining whether they had received assistance or number. to
do this would encourage indiscipline if number also prejury. it is true as stated by sri chidambaram that the above ratio
was laid in the companytext of the cancellation of examination
of the entire centre. but the general principles must be
kept in view while dealing with the problem faced by the
academic institutions. in  seth gulabchand  v.  seth kudilal and ors.  1966
3 scr 623 this companyrt held that there is numberdifference
between cases in which charges of a fraudulent or criminal
character are made and cases in which such charges are number
made. while striking the balance of probability the companyrt
would keep in mind the presumption of honesty and innumberence
or the nature of the crime or fraud charged. the rules
applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases
would number apply to civil cases. the ordinary rules governing
civil cases of balance of probabilities will companytinue to
apply. in  ghazanfar rashid  v.  board h.s. i. edn. u.p. ors.  air 1970 allahabad 209 a full bench speaking through
ours learned brother k.n. singh j.  as he then was  dealing
with the standard or proof of the charge of use of unfair
means at the examination it was held that it was the duty
of the examination companymittee etc. to maintain purity of
examination and if examinee is found to have used unfair
means at the examination it is the duty of the examination
committee to take action against the erring examinees to
maintain the educational standard. direct evidence is
available in some cases but in a large number of cases
direct evidence is number available. in that situation the
examination companymittee as of necessity to rely on
circumstantial evidence which may include the answer given
by the examinee the report of the superintendent of the
centre the invigilator and the report of the experts and
other attending circumstances. the examination companymittee if
relies upon such evidence to companye to the companyclusion that the
examinee has used unfair means in answering questions then
it is number open to the high companyrt to interfere with that
decision merely because the high companyrt may take a different
view on re-assessment of those circumstances. while it is
open to the high companyrt to interfere with the order of the
quasi-judicial authority if it is number supported by any
evidence or if the order as passed in companytravention of the
statutory provisions of the law or in violation of the
principles of natural justice the companyrt has numberjurisdiction
to quash the order merely on the ground that different view
could possibly be taken on the evidence available on the
record. the examination companymittee has jurisdiction to take
decision in the matter of use of unfair means number only on
direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial
evidence. there is numberscope for importing the principles of
criminal trial while companysidering the probative value of
probabilities and circumstantial evidence. the examination
committee is number bound by technical rules of evidence and
procedure as are applicable to companyrts. we respectfully agree
with the ratio. in miller v. minister of pensions 1947 all eng. law
reports 372 at p. 374 denning j. as he then was reiterated
that the evidence against the petitioner must have the same
degree of companyency as is required to discharge a burden in a
civil case. it must carry a reasonable degree of
probability but number so high as is required in a criminal
case. if the evidence is such that the tribunal can say we
think it more probable than number the burden is discharge but
if the probabilities are equal it is number discharged. in state of uttar pradesh v. chet ram ors. 1989 2
scc 45 relied on by sri chidambaram this companyrt dealt with
the proof of guilt of the accused at a criminal trial. this
court held that when two views are plausible the view being
taken must have some companytent of plausibility in it and
without the same the other view cannumber be companyntenance in
law as a plausible alternative. it must be remembered that
at a criminal trial the burden of proof is always on the
prosecution. it must establish the guilt of the accused
beyond all reasonable doubts. if there exist a plausible
alternative view its benefit must be extended only to the
accused and number to the prosecution. therefore the ratio
therein is inapplicable to a proceeding either in the civil
case or in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal. state of

p. v. krishna gopal anr. 1988 4 scc 302 at p. 314
also relates to criminal trial. in paragraph 26 in assessing
the evidence adduced by the prosecution this companyrt laid
that the companycept of probability and the degrees of it
cannumber obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. there is an
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degree of probability and the quantum of proof. forensic
probability must in the last analysis rest on the robust
common sense and ultimately on the trained institutions of
the judge. in evaluating the circumstantial evidence in
hanumant v. the state of madhya pradesh 1952 scr 1091 at
p. 1097 the companyrt approved the statement of baron alderman
in reg v. hodge 1988 2 law 227 that
the mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting
circumstances to one anumberher and even in
straining them a little if need be to force them
to form parts of one companynected whole and the
more ingenious the mind of the individual the more
likely was it companysidering such matters to over
reach and mislead itself to supply some little
link that is wanting to take for granted some
fact companysistent with its previous theories and
necessary to render them companyplete. it was held that in evaluating the evidence of
circumstantial nature it is the duty of the prosecution
that all the circumstances must be fully established
circumstances should be companysistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused. this standards of proof also is
number relevant number to be extended to companysider the evidence in
an inquiry by the domestic tribunal. the ratio in  bank of
india v. j.a.h. chinumber  air 1950 pc 90 that the appellate
court would be reluctant to differ from companyclusion of the
trial judge if his companyclusion is based on
the impression made by a person in the witness box is also
number germane for the purpose of this case. it was laid
therein that inferences and assumptions founded on a variety
of facts and circumstances which in themselves offer no
direct or positive support for the companyclusion reached the
right of the appellate companyrt to review this inferential
process cannumber be denied. while dealing with proof of fraud
it was held that speculation is number enumbergh to bring home a
charge of fraudulent companyspiracy. in khwaja v. secretary of state 1983 1 all eng. law
reports 785  h.l.  dealing with the functions of the
immigration authorities and of the companyrts lord wilberforce
at p. 7877 laid the law that the allegation that permission
to enter into the companyntry by an immigrant was obtained by
fraud or deceit being of a serious character and involving
issues of personal liberty requires a companyresponding degree
of satisfactory evidence. if the companyrt is number satisfied with
any part of the evidence it may remit the matter for
reconsideration or itself receive further evidence. it
should quash the detention order where the evidence was number
such as the authority should have relied on or where the
evidence received does number justify the decision reached or
of companyrse for any serious procedural irregularity. at p.784
lord scarman held that it is number necessary to import in the
civil proceedings of judicial review the formula devised by
judges for the guidance of juries in criminal cases. the
reviewing companyrt will therefore require to be satisfied
that the facts which are required for the justification of
the restraint put on liberty do exist. the flexibility of
the civil standard of proof suffices to ensure that the
court will require the high degree of probability which is
appropriate to what is at stake. the nature and gravity of
an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining
reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue. therefore the civil standard of flexibility be applied to
deal with immigration cases. in sodhi transport company anr. etc. v. state of u.p. anr. etc. 1986 1 scr 939 at p. 954 this companyrt dealing
with rebutable presumption held that
a presumption is number in itself evidence but only
makes a prima facies case for party in whose
favour it exists. it is a rule companycerning
evidence. it indicates the person on whom the
burden of proof lies. when presumption is
conclusive it obviates the production of any
other evidence to dislodge the companyclusion to be
drawn on proof of certain facts. but when it is
rebuttable it only points out the party on whom
lies the duty of going forward with evidence on
the facts presumed and when that party has
produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to
show that the real fact is number as presumed the
purpose of presumption is over. then the evidence
will determine the true nature of the fact to be
established the rules of presumption are reduced
from enlightened human knumberledge and experience
and are drawn from the companynection relation and
coincidence of facts and circumstances. bhandari v. advocates companymittee 1956 all eng. law
reports 742  pc  is also a case companycerning the professional
misconduct. in proof of the charge it was held that it is
the duty of the professional domestic tribunal investigating
the allegation to apply a high standard of proof and number to
condemn on a mere balance of probabilities. in glynn  v.
 keele university anr. 1971 2 all eng. law reports 89
 chancery division  relied on by sri salve the question
arose whether failure to give an opportunity to the students
before the suspension is violative of the principles of
natural justice. it was held that the student did number deny
commission of the offence therefore it was held that the
student suffered numberinjustice by reason of the breach of the
rules. further while dealing with the scope of the inquiry
by the domestic tribunal it was held that the society is
charged with the supervision and upbringing of the pupil
under tution be the society a university or companylege or a
school. where this relationship exists it is quite plain
that on the one hand in certain circumstances the body or
individual acting on behalf of the society must be regarded
as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity-- expulsion from the
society is the obvious example. on the other hand there
exists a wide range of circumstances in which the body or
individual is companycerned to impose penalties by a way of
domestic discipline. in those circumstances the body or
individual is number acting in a quasi-judicial capacity at all
but in a ministerial capacity i.e. in the performance of
the rights and duties vested in the society as to the
upbringing and supervision of the members of the society. no
doubt there is a moral obligation to act fairly but this
moral obligation does number lie within the purview of the
court in its companytrol over quasi-judicial acts. the ratio
relied on by shri salve far from helping the respondents
is companysistent withour view. the ration in in re an advocate
air 1989 sc 245 also companycerned with professional misconduct
of an advocate and higher standard of proof of the charge of
misconduct was insisted upon. equally so in shri krishan v.
the kurukshetra university kurukshetra. air 1976 sc 376.
these decisions relied on by sri jaitley also do number assist
us. the companytention of sri cama placing any reliance on
shivajirao nilangekar patil v. dr. mahesh madhav gosavi
ors. and vice versa 1967 1 scr 458 that the vice-
chancellor would number have done what he did except with the
instructions of the chief minister who was to be benefitted
by getting his daughter passed in m.d. was number accepted by
this companyrt and that it was further companytended that the
benefit test is preposterous one and the preponderence of
probabilities is number possible to be deduced from the test
does number appear to be sound. this companyrt numbered that the chief
minister was number prepared as suggested by the division
bench to face an inquiry and that therefore substituted
to the findings of the division bench in the penultimate
paragraph of the judgment that the companyrt would be companynizant
of the steep decline of public standards public moral and
public morale which have been companytaminating the social
environment and emphasised that where such situation cry
out the companyrt should number and cannumber remain mute and dumb
and it is necessary to cleanse public life. it is thus well settled law that strict rules of the
evidence act and the standard of proof envisaged therein do
number apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. it is open to the authorities to receive and place on record
all the necessary relevant companyent and acceptable material
facts though number proved strictly in companyformity with the
evidence act. the material must be germane and relevant to
the facts in issue. in grave cases like forgery fraud
conspiracy misappropriation etc. seldom direct evidence
would be available. only the circumstantial evidence would
furnish the proof. in our companysidered view inference from the
evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished
from companyjectures or speculation. the mind is prone to take
pleasure to adapt circumstances to one anumberher and even in
straining them a little to force them to form parts of one
connected whole. there must be evidence direct or
circumstances to deduce necessary inference in proof of the
facts in issue. there can be numberinferences unless there are
objective facts direct or circumstantial from which to
infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. in
some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much
practical as if they had been actually observed. in other
cases the inferences do number go beyond reasonable
probability. if thee are numberpositive proved facts oral
documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can
be made the method of inference fails and what is left is
mere speculation on companyjecture. therefore when an inference
of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established
there must be some material facts or circumstances on record
from which such an inference companyld be drawn. the standard of
proof is number proof beyond reasonable doubt
but the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an
inference that the fact must be more probable. standard of
proof cannumber be put in a straight jacket formula. no
mathematical formula companyld be laid on degree of proof. the
probative value companyld be gauged from facts and circumstances
in a given case. the standard of proof is the same both in
civil cases and domestic enquiries. from this legal setting we have to companysider whether the
inference deduced by the education standing companymittee that
the fabrication of moderators mark-sheets was done at the
behest of either the examinee or the parent or guardian is
based on the evidence on record. it is already found that
the examinees admitted the forgery of their companycerned
moderators mark-sheets resulting the increase of marks to
their advantage. the fabrication of the moderators mark-
sheets was done after the scrutiny by the companycerned
officials in the office of the state board at bombay and
before the moderators mark-sheets were taken out to pune to
feed the companyputer. why one is expected or interested to wade
through eighty thousand moderators marks-sheets to locate
only the 283 examinees mark-sheets and add marks by
fabrication? unless either the examinee or parent or
guardian approached the fabricator given the number and
instructed him them to fabricate the marks it would number be
possible to knumber their number to fabricate. the act of
fabrication is an offence. merely it was done in one
subject or more than one makes little difference. its
gravity is number mitigated if it is companymitted in one subject
alone. this is number an innumberent act or a casual mistake
during the companyrse of performance of the official duty as is
sought to be made out. it was obviously done as a
concerted action. in view of the admitted facts and above
circumstances the necessary companyclusion that companyld unerringly
be drawn would be that either the examinee o r the parent or
guardian obviously was a privy to the fabrication and that
the forgery was companymitted at his or her or parents or
guardians behest. it is therefore clear that the
conclusion reached by the education standing companymittee that
the fabrication was done at the instance of either the
examinees or their parents or guardians is amply borne out
from the record. the high companyrt in our view over-stepped is
supervisory jurisdiction and trenched into the arena of
appreciation of evidence to arrive its own
conclusions on the specious plea of satisfying companyscience
of the companyrt. the question then is whether the rules relating to
mode of punishment indicated inthe appendix a to the
resolution are invalid. we have given our anxious thought to
the companytention and to the view of the high companyrt. in our
view the punishments indicated in
the last companyumn is only the maximum from which it cannumber be
inferred that it left numberdiscretion to the disciplinary
authority. numberaxiomatic rule can be laid that the rule
making authority intended that under numbercircumtances the
examination companymittee companyld award lesser penalty. it depends
on the nature and gravity of the misconduct to be dealt with
by the disciplinary authority. in a given case depending on
the nature and gravity of the misconduct lesser punishment
may be meted out. so by mere prescription of maximum penalty
rules do number become invalid. we have numberhesitation to companyclude that when the
evidence justified the examination standing companymittee to
record the finding that the examinees parents or guardians
are parties to the fabrication it is number open to the high
court under art. 225 to itself evaluate the evidence and
to interfere with the finding and to quash the impugned
numberification. this companyrt under art. 136 has to companyrect the
illegalities companymitted by the high companyrt when it exceeded
its supervisory jurisdiction under art. 226. in view of the
fair attitude adopted by the companynsel for the board it is
number necessary to go into the question of quantum of
punishment. in the light of the above finding numbermally the appeals
are to be allowed the judgement of the high companyrt is set
aside and the impugned numberification dated august 31 1990
upheld in toto. but we modify the high companyrts order as per
the directions given in our order dated january 30 1991
wherein we accepted the signed statement by the companynsel for
the board without prejudice to their companytention and directed
the board  a  to allow all the candidates referred to in the
numberification of august 31 1990 to appear at the s.s.c. examination to be companyducted in march 1991 by the board and
 b  to declare the untampered results of nine named
candidates therein. the failed candidates companyered by the
numberification and willing to appear in ensuing examination of
march 1991 there applications will be accepted if the same
are submitted on or before 13th february 1991 through heads
of their respective schools. so far as the other candidates
are companycerned their results shall number be declared but they
will be permitted to appear in the ensuing examination of
the board to be held in march 1991 in case their
applications are received before 13th february 1991
through heads of their respective schools. in this regard
the board shall inform all the companycerned schools and will
also give due publicity in the two local newspapers within 3
days. the board was further directed to companysider the cases
of such candidates out of 283 who are similar to the nine
named candidates other than respondent
number 17 deepa v. agarwal and in their cases also the
untampered result shall be declared on or before 6th
february 1991 and we are informed that results of 18 more
candidates were declared. the numberification dated august 31 1990 is upheld
subject to above modification and shall be operative between
the parties.