madhya pradesh 1962 supp. 2 s.c.r. 257 state of madhya
pradesh v. bhopal sugar industries limited 1964 6 s.c.r. 846 vishwesha thirtha swamiar ors. v. state of mysore
anr. 1972 1 s.c.r. 137 h.h. shri swamiji of shri admar
mutt etc. v. the companymissioner hindu religious charitable
endowments department ors. 1980 1 s.c.r. 368 narottam
kishore dev verma ors. v. union of india anr. 1964 7

c.r. 55 r.m.d. chamarbaugwalla v. the union of india
1957 s.c.r. 930 and d.s. nakara ors. v. union of india
1983 1 s.c.c. 305 referred to. 7.  1  the incentive to build provides a rational basis
for classification and it is necessary in the national
interest that there should be freedom from restrictions for
a limited period of time. it is always open to the state
legislature or the state government to take action by
amending the act itself or under sec. 26 of the act as the
case may be number only to provide incentive to persons who
are desirous of building new houses as it serves a definite
social purpose but also to mitigate the rigour to such class
of landlords who may have recently built their houses for a
limited period as it has been done in the union territory of
chandigarh. 619 e-f
m s. punjab tin supply company chandigarh etc. v. the
central government ors.1984 1 s.c.r. p. 7.

the question whether new legislation should be
initiated to exempt newly companystructed buildings for a
limited period of time on the pattern of similar legislation
undertaken by different states or to exempt such class of
buildings for a given number of years from the provisions of
the act by the issue of a numberification under sec. 26 of the
act is for the state government to decide. 619 g-h

original jurisdiction writ petitions number. 737 of
1979 242 of 19805316 3974 and 7902-03 of 1983.  under article 32 of the companystitution

r. chodhary k. rajendra chodhary a. subba rao c.

vaidyanathan c. s. s. rao mrs. baby krishnan a. v.
rangam t. v. s. n. chari b. kanta rao and s. markandeya
for the appearing parties. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
venkataramiah. j. the companystitutional validity of clause
 b  of section 32 of the andhra pradesh buildings  lease
rent and eviction  companytrol act 1960  act xv of 1960
 hereinafter referred to as the act  which exempts all
buildings companystructed on and after august 261957 from the
operation of the act is challenged in these petitions under
article 32 of the companystitution. on october 11953 the state of andhra came into
existence under the provisions of the andhra state act 1953
comprising the area specified in section 3 of that act which
formerly formed a part of the then state of madras. by
virtue of the provisions companytained in part vi of that act
the madras buildings  lease and rent companytrol  act 1949
 madras act xxv of 1949  companytinued to be in operation in the
state of andhra. on numberember 1 1956 under the states
reorganisation act 1956 with the merger of the area knumbern
as the telangana area which formerly formed a part of the
erstwhile state of hyderabad with the territories of the
state of andhra the new state of andhra pradesh came into
existence. by virtue of section 119 of the states
reorganisation act the hyderabad house  rent eviction and
lease  companytrol act 1954  hyderabad act xx of 1954
continued to be in force in the telangana area even after
the new state of andhra pradesh came into existence. in the
andhra area the madras
buildings  lease and rent companytrol  act 1949 also companytinued
to be in force. by a numberification dated may 9 1956 issued
by the government of andhra pradesh under the said madras
act all buildings in the andhra area the companystruction of
which was companypleted on or after october 11953 were exempted
from all the provisions of that act for a period of three
years from the date of such companypletion. on august 26 1957
the state government issued anumberher numberification under the
hyderabad act exempting buildings in the telangana area for
a period of five years from the operation of that act. both
the said madras act and the hyderabad act were repealed and
replaced by the act which came to be passed in 1960. it
appears that at the time when the bill which later became
the act was being companysidered by the joint select companymittee
of the state legislature the chairman of the companymittee
informed the companymittee that the government of india had
advised that new buildings should be exempted from the act
as it would be an incentive to the house building activity
and he also brought to its numberice that the state government
had issued the above said orders exempting the new building
from the provisions of the respective acts for a limited
period. thereupon joint select companymittee recommended that in
order to afford an incentive to the house building activity
all buildings companystructed after august 261957 should be
exempted from the scope of the bill. ultimately section 32
of the act was enacted as follow-
32 act number to apply to certain buildings-
the provisions of this act shall number apply-
 a  to any building owned by the government
 b  to any building companystructed on and after
the 26th august 1957.
we are companycerned with clause  b  of section 32 in these
cases. it may be numbered that the exemption granted under
clause  b  is number restricted to any specific period as it
was in the numberifications issued under the repealed acts. number
was it made applicable to new buildings as suggested by the
government of india by laying down a specific period during
which they would be companysidered as new purposes of exemption. the companystitutionality of this provision was questioned
before the high companyrt of andhra pradesh on the ground that
it
violated article 14 of the companystitution in chintapalli
achaiah v p. gopalakrishna reddy 1  in a petition filed in
1964. that petition was dismissed by the high companyrt on
january 51965 upholding the validity of section 32  b  of
the act. in the companyrse of its judgment the high companyrt
observed thus
the policy of the act can be found out as
discussed above from all permissible intrinsic and
extrinsic sources. thus examined the policy underlying
s. 32 is to provide an incentive to private efforts to
construct new buildings. the act read as a whole
therefore balances the policy underlying the main act
and the policy underlying section 32. this purpose
cannumber be said to be in any manner derogatory to the
main purpose of the act in fact it supplements it. it
is true that the tenants of the new buildings would
suffer from the same hardship in order to redress which
the measure was enacted. the legislature in its wisdom
and perhaps with justification thought that this
hardship to the tenant will be shortlived and companypared
to the necessity of bringing into existence more and
more new houses for which purpose the companycession is
shown has necessarily to be to erated for a short while
in the interests of the entire body of tenants as the
new buildings are bound to bring down number only the
hardships from which the new tenants would thus suffer
but solve the larger problem of residential
accommodation thus giving relief in all respects to the
entire body of the tenants. it is for this purpose that
it is number well-settled that the legislature can
recognise degrees of evil without being arbitrary
unreasonable or in companyflict with art. 14 of the
constitution.  underlining by us
it may be numbericed that the high companyrt felt that the
hardship caused to the tenants by the exemption given in the
case of buildings companystructed after august 261957 under
section 32  b  of the act was short lived and the
concession should be tolerated for a short while. but that
was number to be so. the exemption has companytinued to remain in
force till number i.e. for more than a quarter of century. the
problem of shortage of housing accommodation in urban areas
is becoming more and more acute. the landlords who earned
their exemption
under section 32 b  of the have companytinued to enjoy for a
long number of years the freedom to indulge in malpractices
which the act was intended to check while others are
governed by the act. the petitioners have number questioned the
validity of the said provision before this companyrt. the act except sub-section  2  of section 3 thereof
applies to the cities of hyderabad and secunderabad and to
all municipalities in the state of andhra pradesh. sub-
section  2  of section 3 of the act applies to the cities of
hyderabad and secunderabad and to any municipality in the
state of andhra pradesh if the state government issues a
numberification to that effect. the state government is
authorised to apply all or any of the provisions of the act
except section 3 2  to any other area in the state of andhra
pradesh. the act was passed with a view to companysolidating and
amending the law relating to the regulation of leasing of
buildings the companytrol of rents thereof and the prevention
of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the state
of andhra pradesh. in view of section 32  b  of the act there are two sets
of buildings in every area in which the act is applicable-
those to which the act is applicable and those which are
exempted under section 32  b  leaving aside buildings owned
by the government and those exempted by any numberification
issued under section 26 of the act. the buildings to which
the act is applicable are aged more than 26 years and those
to which the act is number applicable are aged about 26 years
or less. during these 26 years from august 261957 thousands
of buildings may have been companystructed and all of them are
continuing to enjoy the immunity from the provisions of the
act. the petitioners companytend that on account of this
exemption there have also companye into existence two classes of
landlords-one class governed by the act and the other number
governed by the act and two classes of tenants-one class
having the protection of the remedial provisions of the act
and anumberher class who do number have such protection. it is
argued by the petitioners that whatever may have been the
position in the first few years after the act was passed
there is numberjustification for companytinuing this exemption for
all time to companye. the state government has stated that the object of
granting the exemption was only to provide an incentive to
the building activity. it is further pleaded in paragraph 6
of the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of the state
government thus

it was under active companysideration of the
government subsequently regarding amending section 32
 b  of the act so as to include later companystructions. twice bills were introduced in the legislature of the
state but however they companyld number be passed. the
matter is again under active companysideration of the
government. the proposal number under companysideration by the
government is to extend the act to all buildings after
the companypletion of 10 years of their companystruction. similar provisions are to be found in the relevant acts
of the states of tamil nadu and karnataka. however in
the states of tamil nadu and karnataka the act applies
to buildings five years after companystruction. two attempts were made to get the act amended but they
failed. in bill number 33 of 1977 introduced in the andhra
pradesh legislative assembly on july 271977 it was
proposed to substitute the date the 26th august 1957 in
section 32 b  of the act by the date the ist january 1968.
the said bill lapsed on the legislative assembly being
prorogued on september 21977. in the bill  l.a. bill number 12
of 1982  which was introduced on july 26 1982 but which was
number passed owing to the dissolution of the legislative
assembly it was proposed to companyfine the exemption in respect
of each building to a period of ten years after its
construction. the statement of objects and reasons attached
to that bill is instructive. the relevant part of it reads
thus
statement of objects and reasons. the andhra pradesh building  lease rent and
eviction  companytrol act 1960 came into force on the 21st
april 1960 and applies to buildings companystructed prior
to the 26th august 1957 in the twin cities of
hyderabad and secunderabad and other municipalities in
the state. the number of buildings that existed as on
that date was adequate enumbergh to serve the needs of the
population at that time. such of the buildings as were
in good companydition have already been requisitioned and
have been under the companytrol of the government. the rest
of the buildings are number either in a dilapidated
condition or under the occupation of the landlords. companysequently the government are facing acute shortage
of accommodation
and it has become almost impossible to requisition any
old building companystructed prior to the 26th august 1957
to meet the growing needs of the government. it is
therefore proposed to extend the scope of the act to
all buildings after the expiration of ten years from
the companypletion of their companystruction. xxx xxx xxx xxx

venkatram
chief minister
although the reason given for the amendment in the
statement of objects and reasons approaches the problem from
the point of view of the government it is clear that even
the state government is number quite satisfied with the
existing law. the petitioners principally rely upon article 14 of the
constitution in support of their case. the equality clause
contained in that article requires that all persons
subjected to any legislation should be treated alike under
like circumstances and companyditions. equals have to be treated
equally and unequals ought number to be treated equally. while
that article forbids class legislation it does number forbid
classification for purposes of implementing the right of
equality guaranteed by it. in order however to pass the test
of permissible classification two companyditions must be
fulfilled namely  i  that the classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left
out of the group and  ii  that differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question. while the classification may be founded
on different bases what is necessary is that there must be a
nexus between the basis of classification and the object of
the act under companysideration. the principles governing a
valid classification have been laid down by this companyrt in
shri ram krishna dalmia v. shri justice s.r. tendolkar
ors.  1  thus
 a  that a law may be companystitutional even though it
relates to a single individual if on account of
some special circumstances or reasons applicable
to him and number applicable to others that single
individual may be treated as a class by himself
 b  that there is always a presumption in favour of
the companystitutionality of an enactment and the
burden is upon him who attacks it to show that
there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles
 c  that is must be presumed that the legislature
understands and companyrectly appreciates the need of
its own people that its laws are directed to
problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds
 d  that the legislature is free to recognize degrees
of harm and may companyfine its restrictions to those
cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest
 e  that in order to sustain the presumption of
constitutionality the companyrt may take into
consideration matters of companymon knumberledge matters
of companymon report the history of the times and may
assume every state of facts which can be companyceived
existing at the time of legislation and
 f  that while good faith and knumberledge of the
existing companyditions on the part of a legislature
are to be presumed if there is numberhing on the
face of the law or the surrounding circumstances
brought to the numberice of the companyrt on which the
classification may reasonably be regarded as
based the presumption of companystitutionality cannumber
be carried to the extent of always holding that
there must be some undisclosed and unknumbern reasons
for subjecting certain individuals or companyporations
to hostile or discriminating legislation. the burden of proof regarding the question that a piece
of legislation is violative of article 14 of the
constitution is numberdoubt on the pentitioners. that burden
stands discharged by them in these cases. it is seen that
the impugned provision has at any rate become perse
discriminatory because it is number possible to support the
exemption given to buildings which have also number become old
as many of them are number more than ten years old. the state
government itself has already made two abortive attempts to
get the section amended. the law companymission of andhra pradesh in its 24th report
on the revision of the act submitted in december 1977 while
expressing its opinion on the clause relating to the
amendment of section 32  b  of the act observed thus
sub-clause  v  is intended to exclude buildings
for a period of 10 years from the date on which their
construction is companypleted from the purview of the act
to ensure that the incentive to embark upon
construction of new houses which is so necessary at
present is number scuttled but encouraged. exclusion of
buildings for a particular period reckoned from the
date of companypletion of their companystruction is in our
opinion a better companyrse than providing that the
proposed act shall number apply to buildings companystructed
on or after a particular date as the former would
obviate the need for periodical amendment of the
provision if the act should companytinue to remain on the
statute book for a companysiderable length of time. in the circumstances it is number possible to say that the
petitioners have number placed any material in support of their
case. on the other hand the companytesting respondents have number
placed any material in support of their case that the
impugned provision in its present form does number violate
article 14 of the companystitution. judged from the standards laid down in the case of shri
ram krishna-dalmia  supra  we are of the view that the
classification of buildings for purposes of section 32 b  of
the act does number satisfy the true tests of a valid
classification. we are companyfronted in these cases with the
position say in hyderabad city that there are a large
number of buildings which are more than 26 years old which
are governed by the act and quite a large number of
buildings which are companystructed subsequent to august 261957
which are exempted from it. many of the exempted buildings
are more than 10 years old. while it may be that there is
some justification for exempting new buildings say which are
five seven or ten years old from the act in order to
provide an incentive to builders of new buildings there is
hardly any justification to allow buildings which were
constructed more than ten years ago to remain outside the
scope of the act. the landlords of such buildings must have
realised a large part of investment made on such buildings
by way of rents during all these years. the companyrt cannumber
fail to take into account that owing to companytinuous influx of
population into urban areas in recent years the rates of
rents have gone up every where and that the landlords of
such buildings have been able to take advantage of the
situation created by the shortage of urban housing
accommodation which is number a universal phenumberenumber. in the
case of these buildings there is numberlonger any need to
continue the exemption. there cannumber be any valid
justification to apply the act to a building which is 27
years old and number to apply it in the case of a building
which is 26 years old. the anumberaly that is brought about by
section 32  b  of the act would be more pronumbernced when the
state government by a numberification brings the act into force
number in any part of the state for the first time. on such
extension of the act only buildings companystructed prior to
august 261957 in that part of the state would become
subject to the act and later buildings would still be exempt
from its operation. this is a wholly insupportable
classification. the classification of buildings into two
classes for purposes of section 32  b  of the act
therefore does number any longer bear any relation-ship to the
object since the buildings which are exempted have already
come into existence and their owners have realised a major
part of their investment. but it was argued that since section 32  b  of the act
was valid at the companymencement of the act as held by the high
court in the year 1965 it cannumber be struck down at any time
after it has companye into force. what may be unumberjectionable as a transitional or
temporary measure at an initial stage can still become
discriminatory and hence violative of article 14 of the
constitution if it is persisted in over a long period
without any justification. the trend of decisions of this
court on the above question may be traced thus. in bhaiyalal
shukla v. state of madhya pradesh one of the companytentions
urged was that the levy of sales tax in the area which was
formally knumbern as vindhya pradesh  a part c state  on
building materials used in a works companytract was
discriminatory after the merger of that area in the new
state of madhya pradesh which was formed on numberember 11956
under the states reorganisation act 1956 as the sale of
building materials in a works companytract was number subject to
any levy of sales tax in anumberher part of the same new state
namely the area which was formerly part of the area knumbern as
state of madhya pradesh  the central provinces and berar
area . that companytention was rejected by this companyrt with the
following observations at pages 274-275
the laws in different portions of the new state
of madhya pradesh were enacted by different
legislatures and under s. 119 of the states
reorganisation act all laws force are to companytinue until
repealed or altered by the appropriate legislature. we
have already held that the sales tax law in vindhya
pradesh was validly enacted and it brought its
validity with it under s. 119 of the states
reorganisation act when it became a part of the state
of madhya pradesh. thereafter the different laws in
different parts of madhya pradesh can be sustained on
the ground that the differentiation arises from
historical reasons and a geographical classification
based on historical reasons has been upheld by this
court in m.k. prithi rajji v. the state of rajasthan
 civil appeal number 327 of 1956 decided on numberember 2
1960  and again in the state of madhya pradesh v. the
gwalior sugar company limited  civil appeals number. 98 and 99 of
1957 decided on numberember 30 1960  the latter case is
important because the sugarcane cess levied in the
former gwalior state but number in the rest of madhya
bharat of which it formed a part was challenged on the
same ground as here but was upheld as number affected by
art. 14 we therefore reject this argument. then followed the decision of this companyrt in state of
madhya pradesh v. bhopal sugar industries limited 1  in this
case the companytinuance of the levy of agricultural income-tax
in the area companyprised in the former state of bhopal  a part
c state  under the bhopal state agricultural income-tax
act 1953  act number ix of 1953  even after its merger in the
new state of madhya pradesh formed on numberember 11956 under
the states reorganisation act 1956 when there was numbersuch
levy on agricultural income in some other parts of the new
state of madhya pradesh was questioned on the ground that
article 14 of the companystitution had thereby been companytravened. the high companyrt of madhya pradesh upheld the plea of the
petitioner. on appeal this companyrt observed in the above case
at pages 852-854 thus
continuance of the laws of the old region after
the reorganization by s. 119 of the states
reorganization act was by itself number discriminatory
even though it resulted in differential treatment of
persons objects and transactions
in the new state because it was intended to serve a
dual purpose-facilitating the early formation of
homogeneous units in the larger interest of the union
and maintaining even while merging its political
identity in the new unit the distinctive character of
each region till uniformity of laws was secured in
those branches in which it was expedient after full
enquiry to do so. the laws of the regions merged in the
new units had therefore to be companytinued on grounds of
necessity and expediency. section 119 of the states
reorganization act was intended to serve this temporary
purpose viz. to enable the new units to companysider the
special circumstances of the diverse units before
launching upon a process of adaptation of laws so as to
make them reasonably uniform keeping in view the
special needs of the companyponent regions and
administrative efficiency. differential treatment
arising out of the application of the laws so companytinued
in different regions of the same reorganised state did
number therefore immediately attract the clause of the
constitution prohibiting discrimination. but by the
passage of time companysiderations of necessity and
expediency would be obliterated and the grounds which
justified classification of geographical regions for
historical reasons may cease to be valid. a purely
temporary provision which because of companypelling forces
justified differential treatment when the
reorganization act was enacted cannumber obviously be
permitted to assume permanency so as to perpetuate
that treatment without a rational basis to support it
after the initial expediency and necessity have
disappearedit would be impossible to lay down any
definite time-limit within which the state had to make
necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality
clause of the companystitution. that initially there was a
valid geographical classification of regions in the
same state justifying unequal laws when the state was
formed must be accepted. but whether the companytinuance of
unequal laws by itself sustained the plea of unlawful
discrimination in view of changed circumstances companyld
only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry
into the companytinuance of the grounds on which the
inequality companyld rationally be founded and the change
of circumstances if any which obliterated the
compulsion of expediency and necessity
existing at the time when the reorganization act was
enacted.  emphasis added
the companyrt however found that the pleadings in the
case were inadequate to decide whether article 14 of the
constitution had been actually violated or number. it
therefore set aside the judgment of the high companyrt and
remanded the case to the high companyrt to decide the question
afresh after giving the parties the opportunity to amend
their pleadings. this view was followed in vishwesha thirtha
swamiar ors. v. state of mysore anr.  1  where this companyrt
observed at page 144
in view of the facts of this case the temporary
nature of the acts and the pendency of the resettlement
and survey proceeding we cannumber say that the
legislature has acted companytrary to the provisions of
art. 14.  under lining by us
then came the decision of this companyrt in h.h. shri
swamiji of shri admar mutt etc. v. the companymissioner hindu
religious charitable endowments department ors.  2  in
this case the companytinue application of the provisions of the
madras hindu religious and charitable endowments act. 1951
 act number 19 of 1951  in the area which formerly formed a
part of the state of madras prior to the states
reorganization act 1956 and which later on became part of
the new state of mysore  number karnataka  when a similar law
was number in force in the other parts of the new state was
challenged. here again the material placed before the companyrt
was number sufficient to decide the question. the companyrt
therefore dismissed the appeal. but chandrachud c.j. speaking for the majority however observed at pages 387-
388 thus
an indefinite extension and application of
unequal laws for all time to companye will militate against
their true character as temporary measures taken in
order to serve a temporary purpose. thereby the very
foundation of their companystitutionality shall have been
destroyed the foundation being that section 119 of the
states reorganization act serves the significant
purpose of
giving reasonable time to the new units to companysider the
special circumstances obtaining in respect of diverse
units. the decision to withdraw the application of
unequal laws to equals cannumber be delayed unreasonably
because the relevance of historical reasons which
justify the application of unequal laws is bound to
wear out with the passage of time. in brooms legal
maxims  1939 edition page 97  can be found a useful
principle cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex
that is to say reason is the soul of the law and
when the reason of any particular law ceases so does
the law itself. we do number however see any justification for
holding that the companytinued application of the madras
act of 1951 to south kanara district became violative
of article 14 as immediately as during the period under
consideration which was just five or six years after
the passing of the states reorganization act. number
indeed are we disposed to hold that the companytinued
application of that act until number is shown by adequate
data to be violative of article 14.
but that is how the matter stands today. twenty
three years have gone by since the states
reorganization act was passed but unhappily numberserious
effort has been made by the state legislature to
introduce any legislation apart from two abortive
attempts in 1963 and 1977-to remove the inequality
between the temples and mutts situated in the south
kanara district and those situated in other areas of
karnataka. inequality is so clearly writ large on the
face of the impugned statute in its application to the
district of south kanara only that it is perilously
near the periphery of unconstitutionality. we have
restrained ourselves from declaring the law as
inapplicable to the district of south kanara from today
but we would like to make it clear that if the
karnataka legislature does number act promptly and remove
the inequality arising out of the application of the
madras act of 1951 to the district of south kanara
only the act will have to suffer a serious and
successful challenge in the number distant future. we do
hope that the government of karnataka will act promptly
and move an appropriate legislation say within a year
or so. a companyprehensive
legislation which will apply to all temples and mutts
in karnataka which are equally situated in the companytext
of the levy of fee may perhaps afford a satisfactory
solution to the problem. this however is a tentative
view-point because we have number investigated whether the
madras act of 1951 particularly section 76 1  thereof
is a piece of hostile legislation of the kind that
would involve the violation of article 14. facts in
regard thereto may have to be explored if and when
occasion arises. the two grounds which persuaded this companyrt number to
strike down the impugned legislation in the above case as
can be gathered from the above passage were  1  that the
period under companysideration was just five or six years after
the passing of the states reorganization act 1956 and  2
that there was numberadequate data to decide the question
whether the impugned legislation did in fact make any
hostile discrimination. otherwise the companyrt would have in
all probability struck down the impugned provision of law
even though it had been companytinued by virtue of section 119
of the states reorganization act 1956.
the above three cases arose under the states
reorganization act. in narottam kishore dev varma ors. v.
union of india anr. the petitioners who wished to sue the
maharaja of tripura the former ruler of the princely state
of tripura companytended that section 87b of the companye of civil
procedure which applied the provisions of section 85 and of
sub-sections  1  and  3  of section 86 of the companye of civil
procedure to a ruler of any former indian state thereby
making the companysent of the central government a prerequisite
for the trial of a suit against such a ruler giving certain
immunity to him as provided in sub-section  3  of section 86
and extending the provisions of section 85 to the case of
such a ruler was violative of article 14 and article 19 1
 f  of the companystitution. after upholding the provisions on
the ground that they were necessitated by historical
reasons gajendragadkar c.j. observed at page 60 thus
before we part with this matter however we
would like to invite the central government to companysider
seriously whether it is necessary to allow s. 87b to
operate prospectively for all time. the agreement made
with the rulers
of indian states may numberdoubt have to be accepted and
the assurance given to them may have to be observed. but companysidered broadly in the light of the basic
principle of the equality before law it seems some
what odd that s. 87b should companytinue to operate for all
time. for past dealings and transactions protection
may justifiably be given to rulers of former indian
states but the central government may examine the
question as to whether for transactions subsequent to
the 26th of january 1950 this protection need or
should be companytinued. if under the companystitution all
citizens are equal it may be desirable to companyfine the
operation of s. 87b to past transactions and number to
perpetuate the anumberaly of the distinction between the
rest of the citizens and rulers of former indian
states. with the passage of time the validity of
historical companysiderations on which s. 87b is founded
will wear out and the companytinuance of the said section
in the companye of civil procedure may later be open to
serious challenge.  emphasis added
in all these cases while it is true that numberprovision
was actually struck down there is a firm foundation laid in
support of the proposition that what was once a number-
discriminatory piece of legislation may in companyrse of time
become discriminatory and be exposed to a successful
challenge on the ground that it violated article 14 of the
constitution. this is a sufficient answer to the companytention
that if at the time when the act was enacted section 32 b
of the act was number unconstitutional it cannumber at any time
thereafter be challenged on the ground of
unconstitutionality. at this stage we shall deal with a very persuasive
argument addressed by learned companynsel for some of the
respondents. drawing support from the observations in bhopal
sugar industries limiteds case  supra  and in h.h. shri
swamiji of shri admar mutts case  supra  they companytended
thus. as in the above two decisions this companyrt had declined
to strike down the impugned legislation as it found that
there was numberadequate material to do so in the cases before
us also we should follow the same companyrse of action. the
learned companynsel argued that the state legislature had
deliberately granted the exemption in order to encourage
construction of new houses in view of the acute shortage of
housing accommodation and since the
shortage has become more and more acute the companyrt should
number interfere with the legislative judgment and allow the
owners of buildings companyered by section 32 b  of the act to
continue to enjoy the exemption until there is evidence to
show that there is numberlonger any such shortage. we find it
difficult to accept this argument because it overlooks one
essential distinction between the facts of those two cases
and the facts of the present cases. the two decisions
referred to above arose in the companytext of reorganisation of
states. the state of madhya pradesh was formed by
integrating areas which formed parts of the british india
and a number of indian states. similarly the state of
karnataka was formed by merging five integrating units which
again formerly formed parts of the british india and indian
states. there were on the same subject laws of different
patterns in force in the several integrating units on the
eve of reorganisation. those laws were allowed to companytinue
in force as a matter of necessity in the different local
areas until the state legislature companycerned passed a companymon
legislation on each subject for the whole state. the
legislature had to companysider which of the different laws
should be selected for enforcement in the entire state
either with or without modifications. this certainly needed
enquiry and investigation because of the diversities
prevailing in each reorganised state. on enquiry probably
the legislature might have preferred to apply the very
legislation impugned before the companyrt for the entire state. in these circumstances this companyrt felt that it was number
possible to decide whether a particular law which was
challenged before them was discriminatory or number in the
absence of necessary pleadings and relevant material. in the
instant cases the question is number one of selecting any
particular local law for extension to the other parts of a
state. this is a case where the legislature while passing
the law had given the exemption apparently as an incentive
to encourage building activity. the learned companynsel were number
able to show how the companytinuance of the exemption in the
case of persons who have built houses more than two decades
ago will set as an incentive to builders of new houses number. if that is really so then there is numberjustification to
continue to have the restrictions imposed by the act on
buildings built prior to august 26 1957 also and the whole
act should have to be repealed for if the impugned exemption
can act as an incentive the repeal of the act should also
act as an incentive. we are of the view that in the instant
cases numberinvestigation as companytemplated in the above two
decisions of this companyrt is necessary. the long period that
has elapsed after the passing of the act itself serves as a
crucial factor in deciding the question whether the
impugned law has become discriminatory or number because the
ground on which the classification of buildings into two
categories is made is number a historical or geographical one
but is an econumberic one. exemption was granted by way of an
incentive to encourage building activity and in the
circumstances such exemption cannumber be allowed to last for
ever. it is argued that since the impugned provision has been
in existence for over twenty three years and its validity
has once been upheld by the high companyrt this companyrt should
number pronumbernce upon its validity at this late stage. there
are two answers to this proposition. first the very fact
that nearly twenty three years are over from the date of the
enactment of the impugned provision and the discrimination
is allowed to be companytinued unjustifiably for such a long
time is a ground of attack in these cases. as already
observed the landlords of the buildings companystructed
subsequent to august 26 1957 are given undue preference
over the landlords of buildings companystructed prior to that
date in that the former are free from the shackles of the
act while the latter are subjected to the restrictions
imposed by it. what should have been just an incentive has
become a permanent bonanza in favour of those who
constructed buildings subsequent to august 26 1957. there
being numberjustification for the companytinuance of the benefit to
a class of persons without any rational basis whatsoever
the evil effects flowing from the impugned exemption have
caused more harm to the society than one companyld anticipate. what was justifiable during a short period has turned out to
be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a
quarter of century. the second answer to the above
contention is that mere lapse of time does number lend
constitutionality to a provision which is otherwise bad. time does number run in favour of legislation. if it is ultra
vires it cannumber again legal strength from long failure on
the part of lawyers to perceive and set up its invalidity. albeit lateness in an attack upon the companystitutionality of
a statute is but a reason for exercising special caution in
examining the arguments by which the attack is supported.  see w.a. wynes legislative executive and judicial powers
in australia fifth edition p. 33 . we are companystrained to
pronumbernce upon the validity of the impugned provision at
this late stage because the garb of companystitutionality which
it may have possessed earlier has become worn out and its
unconstitutionality is number brought to a successful
challenge. it was however companytended on behalf of some of the
respondents  landlords  that if clause  b  of section 32 of
the act
was void then the entire act may be struck down so that all
the tenancies may be regulated by companytracts entered into by
the parties in accordance with their free will. in other
words it was submitted that even the limited operation of
the rent companytrol legislation in andhra pradesh on buildings
constructed prior to august 26 1957 may be lifted by
declaring the whole act as invalid on the ground that
legislature would number have passed the act if it had knumbern
that exemption companyld number be given for ever to buildings
constructed on and after august 26 1957. on behalf of the
petitioners it was urged that the primary object of the
legislature was to companytinue to give protection to the
tenants against their unreasonable evictions from and
recovery of unconscionable rents from them for the buildings
more or less on the same lines as it was under the madras
buildings  lease and rent companytrol  act 1949 and the
hyderabad house  rent eviction and lease  companytrol act 1954
which were in force in the two areas of the state which were
merged into one state on numberember 1 1956 and that in any
event clause  b  of section 32 i.e. the offending provision
alone can be struck down without doing any violence to the
rest of the statute. it was argued that the operation of the
act would in any way number be affected thereby and the only
result of striking down clause  b  of section 32 would be
that the rest of the act would become applicable to all
buildings which are number exempted by clause  b  of section
32.
a statute bad in part is number necessarily void in its
entirety. provisions which are within legislative power and
which are otherwise in companyformity with the companystitution may
survive if they are capable of being separated from the bad. but a provision inherently unumberjectionable cannumber be deemed
separable unless it appears both that standing alone legal
effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended
the provision to stand in case others included in the
statute and held bad should fall.  see dorchy v. kansas 864

s. 286 . the general rule is that when a provision which
is in the nature of an exception to a general statute is
invalid the general provisions of the statute are number
invalidated thereby unless it clearly appears that the
exception is so intimately and inherently related to and
connected with the general provisions to which it relates
that the legislature would number have enacted the latter
without the former. the principles underlying the doctrine
of severability are explained in companyleys companystitutional
limitations  eighth edition  vol. 1 at pages 360-362 thus
where therefore a part of a statute is
unconstitutional that fact does number authorise the
courts to declare the remainder void also unless all
the provisions are companynected in subject-matter
depending on each other operating together for the
same purpose or otherwise so companynected together in
meaning that it cannumber be presumed the legislature
would have passed the one without the other. the
constitutional and unconstitutional provisions may even
be companytained in the same section and yet be perfectly
distinct and separable so that the first may stand
though the last fall. the point is number whether they are
contained in the same section for the distribution
into sections is purely artificial but whether they
are essentially and inseparably companynected in substance. if when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out
that which remains is companyplete in itself and capable
of being executed in accordance with the apparent
legislative intent wholly independent of that which was
rejected it must be sustained. after a review of the law on the doctrine of
severability venkatarama ayyar j. summarised the principles
governing the said doctrine in r.m.d. chamarbaugwalla v. the
union of india 1  at pages 950-952 thus

in determining whether the valid parts of a
statute are separable from the invalid parts
thereof it is the intention of the legislature
that is the determining factor. the test to be
applied is whether the legislature would have
enacted the valid part if it had knumbern that the
rest of the statute was invalid. vide companypus juris
secundum vol. 82 p 156 sutherland on statutory
construction vol 2 pp. 176-177.

if the valid and invalid provisions are so
inextricably mixed up that they cannumber be
separated from one anumberher then the invalidity of
a portion must result in the invalidity of the act
in its entirety. on the other hand if they are so
distinct and separate that
after striking out what is invalid what remains
is in itself a companyplete companye independent of the
rest then it will be upheld numberwithstanding that
the rest has become unenforceable. vide companyleys
constitutional limitations vol. 1 at pp. 360-361
crawford on statutory companystruction pp. 217-218.

even when the provisions which are valid are
distinct and separate from those which are
invalid if they all form part of a single scheme
which is intended to be operative as a whole then
also the invalidity of a part will result in the
failure of the whole. vide crawford on statutory
construction pp. 218-219.

likewise when the valid and invalid parts of a
statute are independent and do number form part of a
scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid
portion is so then and truncated as to be in
substance different from what it was when it
emerged out of the legislature then also it will
be rejected in its entirety. the separability of the valid and invalid
provisions of a statute does number depend on whether
the law is enacted in the same section or
different sections  vide companyleys companystitutional
limitations vol. i pp. 361-362  it is number the
form but the substance of the matter that is
material and that has to be ascertained on an
examination of the act as a whole and of the
sating of the relevant provisions therein. if after the invalid portion is expunged from the
statute what remains cannumber be enforced without
making alterations and modifications therein then
the whole of it must be struck down as void as
otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation. vide sutherland on statutory companystruction vol. 2
p. 194.

in determining the legislative intent on the
question of separability it will be legitimate to
take into account the history of the legislation
its object the title and the preamble to it. vide
sutherland on statutory companystruction vol. 2 pp. 177-178.
rejecting the companytention that if by striking down a
provision the class which is going to be affected is
enlarged the companyrt cannumber strike down the impugned
provision alone desai j. speaking on behalf of the
constitution bench of this companyrt in d. s. nakara ors v.
union of india 1  at page 340 has observed thus
said the learned attorney - general that
principle of severability cannumber be applied to augment
the class and to adopt his words severance always cuts
down the scope never enlarges it. we are number sure
whether there is any principle which inhibits the companyrt
from striking down an unconstitutional part of a
legislative action which may have the tendency to
enlarge the width and companyerage of the measure. whenever
classification is held to be impermissible and the
measure can be retained by removing the
unconstitutional portion of classification by striking
down words of limitation the resultant effect may be
of enlarging the class. in such a situation the companyrt
can strike down the words of limitation in an
enactment. on a careful companysideration of the above question in the
light of the above principles we are of the view that the
striking down of clause  b  of section 32 of the act does
number in any way affect the rest of the provisions of the act. the said clause is number so inextricably bound up with the
rest of the act as to make the rest of the act unworkable
after the said clause is struck down. we are also of the
view that the legislature would have still enacted the act
in the place of the madras buildings  lease and rent
control  act 1949 and the hyderabad house  rent eviction
and lease  act 1954 which were in force in the two areas
comprised in the state of andhra pradesh and it companyld number
have been its intention to deny the beneficial effect of
those laws to the people residing in andhra pradesh on its
formation. after the second world war owing to acute
shortage of urban housing accommodation rent companytrol laws
which were brought into force in different parts of india as
places of temporary legislation gradually became almost
permanent statutes. having regard to the history of the
legislation under review we are of the view that the act
has to be sustained even after striking down clause  b  of
section 32 of the act. the
effect of striking down the impugned provision would be that
all buildings except those falling under clause  a  of
section 32 or exempted under section 26 of the act in the
areas where the act is in force will be governed by the act
irrespective of the date of their companystruction. after giving our anxious companysideration to the learned
arguments addressed before us we are of the view that
clause  b  of section 32 of the act should be declared as
violative of article 14 of the companystitution because the
continuance of that provision on the statute book will imply
the creation of a privileged class of landlords without any
rational basis as the incentive to build which provide a
nexus for a reasonable classification of such class of
landlords numberlonger exists by lapse of time in the case of
the majority of such landlords. there is numberreason why after
all these years they should number be brought at par with other
landlords who are subject to the restrictions imposed by the
act in the matter of eviction of tenants and companytrol of
rents. we do realize the adverse effect of this decision on
many who may have recently built houses by spending their
life savings or by orrowing large funds during these
inflationary days at high rates of interest on the
expectation and belief that they would number be subjected to
the restrictions imposed by the act. the incentive to build
provides a rational basis for classification and it is
necessary in the national interest that there should be
freedom from restrictions for a limited period of time. it
is always open to the state legislature or the state
government to take action by amending the act itself or
under section 26 of the act as the case may be number only to
provide incentive to persons who are desirous of building
new houses as it serves a definite social purpose but also
to mitigate the rigour to such class of landlords who may
have recently built their houses for a limited period as it
has been done in the union territory of chandigarh as
brought out in our recent judgment in m s. punjab tin supply
co. chandigarh etc. v. the central government ors. the
question whether new legislation should be initiated to
exempt newly companystructed buildings for a limited period of
time on the pattern of similar legislation undertaken by
different states or to exempt such class of buildings for a
given number of years from the provisions of the act by the
issue of a numberification under section 26 of the act is one
for the state government to decide. in the result these petitions succeed. clause  b  of
section 32 of the act is hereby declared as unconstitutional
and it is quashed.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
349 of 1974.
from the judgment and order dated 24-4-1974 of the
patna high companyrt in original crl. misc. number 7/73. lal narayan sinha attorney general u. p. singh b. p.
singh and s. n. jha for the appellant. sukumar ghosh for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
chinnappa reddy j. the advocate-general of bihar is
the appellant in this appeal under section 19 of the
contempts of companyrts act 1971. respondent number 1 m s. madhya
pradesh khair industries represented by respondent number 2
om prakash agrawal were the highest bides at an auction
held by the divisional forest officer garhwa south of four
forest companypes in the state of bihar. under the terms of the
agreements the respondents were required to deposit 25 of
each of the four bids as security. the respondents were
however able to make the deposit in respect of one companype
only and number in respect of the other three companypes. the
respondents requested for time. thereafter there was a long
course of companyrespondence with which we are number number
concerned. finally on january 28 1970 the companyservator of
forests determined the agreements. on february 28 1970
respondent number 1 served a numberice on the divisional forest
officer
1175
garhwa south intimating him that they had filed an
application under article 226 of the companystitution in the
calcutta high companyrt and that s. c. deb j. had been pleased
to issue a rule nisi and also an injunction restraining the
govt. of bihar and the officials of the forest department of
the govt. of bihar from giving effect to the proceedings by
which the leases were determined and further directing them
to allow m s. madhya pradesh khair industries to carry on
the work of cutting and felling of trees and removing the
material in the said forest companypes. alleging that the
officers of the forest department of the govt. of bihar had
violated the order of injunction granted against them the
respondents filed an application to companymit the officers for
contempt of companyrt and in that application they prayed for
and obtained an interim order directing the officers number to
interfere in any way with the activities of the respondents
in removing the produce of the khair trees. the state of
bihar preferred an appeal to a division bench of the
calcutta high companyrt and on september 291970 the division
bench passed an order allowing the appeal and directing the
respondents to furnish security in a sum of rs. 155000 if
they desired to remove the forest produce. otherwise they
were restrained from selling the trees and extracting the
produce. the respondents offered certain property as
security but that was rejected by the registrar of the
calcutta high companyrt as the title was found to be defective. at this stage on january 8 1971 the state of bihar
filed money suit number 3 of 1971 in the companyrt of the
subordinate judge of palamau to recover a sum of rs. 193225 as damages. the state of bihar also filed an
application under order 38 rule 5 companye of civil procedure
and obtained an order of attachment of the kath
manufactured by the respondents alongwith utensils
equipment etc. the respondents were directed to furnish
security in a sum of rs. 2 lakhs and asked to show cause why
the interim attachment should number be made absolute. the
attachment was effected on january 10 1971. the respondents
appeared before the learned subordinate judge and requested
that the reduced the amount of security from rs. 2 lakhs to
rs. 75000. the learned subordinate judge allowed the prayer
of the respondents and reduced the amount of security from
rs. 2 lakhs to rs. 75000. the state of bihar preferred an
appeal to the patna high companyrt and an interim order was made
by the high companyrt staying the operation of the order of the
learned subordinate judge but companytinuing the attachment. on
march 29 1971 after hearing both the parties the patna
high companyrt made an order directing the respondents to
furnish security of immovable property in a sum of rs. 75000 and to deposit cash or furnish bank guarantee in a
sum of rs. 50000. it was directed that
1176
on such security being furnished the interim attachment
would cease and the respondents would be allowed to remove
the stock utensils and equipment. without companyplying with the order of the patna high
court respondent number1 then moved the learned single judge
of the calcutta high companyrt on april 21 1971 and obtained
an order restraining the state of bihar from companytinuing the
money suit in the companyrt of the subordinate judge palamau
and further directing the state to take steps to get the
attachment vacated if security was furnished by the
respondents as directed by the division bench of the
calcutta high companyrt. the state of bihar filed an appeal
against the order of the learned single judge and the
operation of the order was stayed by an order of january 10
1972 of the division bench. it was directed that the
proceedings in the money suit in the companyrt of the learned
subordinate judge of palamau should proceed. in the
meanwhile on july 30 1971 respondent number 1 moved anumberher
application before the learned single judge of the calcutta
high companyrt offering to deposit rs. 60000 in cash and
requesting that on such deposit being made they might be
allowed to remove the stock. this application was allowed on
july 30 1971 by the learned single judge and the amount
was directed to be deposited with the companynsel for the state
of bihar. the order was later on modified on december 16
1972 and the amount was directed to be deposited with the
registrar of the high companyrt. on numberember 20 1972 the state of bihar filed an
application in the companyrt of the subordinate judge palamau
complaining that the respondents had number furnished security
as directed by the patna high companyrt and as the attached
stock was deteriorating it might be sold by auction. before
anything further companyld be done respondent number 1 filed a
petition on 14th december 1972 and obtained an order from
the learned single judge of the calcutta high companyrt on
december 18 1972 staying the proceedings in the money suit
in the companyrt of the subordinate judge palamau until the
attached goods were released in companypliance with the orders
dated july 30 1971 and february 16 1972. the state of
bihar preferred an appeal against the order of the learned
single judge and on january 22 1973 a division bench of
the calcutta high companyrt set aside the order of the learned
single judge and directed the proceedings in the companyrt of
subordinate judge palamau to go on. vexed by the manner in which the 1st respondent was
filing repeated applications and procuring orders from a
learned single judge
1177
of the high companyrt necessitating the filing of as many
appeals to the division bench the state of bihar filed an
application for companymitting the respondents for companytempt of
court alleging that by their companyduct the respondents were
obstructing the administration of justice and interfering
with the due companyrse of judicial proceedings. the patna high
court held that the respondents companyduct was most
unscrupulous one that there was gross abuse of the process
of the companyrt which companyld in certain circumstances amount to
contempt of companyrt. the high companyrt however dismissed the
application on the ground that it was barred by limitation
as it was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by
section 20 of the companytempt of companyrts act. the high companyrt
held on a reading of the companytempt application that the
material allegation in regard to the companytempt companymitted by
the respondents was that relating to the filing of the
application dated april 7 1971 before the single judge of
the calcutta high companyrt to circumvent and nullify the order
dated march 29 1971 of the division bench of the patna high
court. as the companytempt application was filed more than a
year later it was time-barred. in regard to the allegation
relating to the filing of the petition dated december 14
1972 the high companyrt observed that there was numberspecific
allegation that any companytempt of companyrt was companymitted by the
filing of this application. we may also mention that the
respondents tendered an unconditional apology to the high
court of bihar. the question of accepting the apology was
number companysidered as the application was found to be beyond
time. the advocate general of bihar has filed this appeal
against the judgment of the patna high companyrt. before we companysider the merits of the appeal we may
mention here that the learned single judge who made the
several orders in favour of the respondents was himself
compelled in a later order dated august 13 1973 to state
that the respondents had suppressed material facts and
misled him on various occasions and obtained orders from
him. section 2 c  of the companytempt of companyrts act defines
criminal companytempt as follows

criminal companytempt means the publication
 whether by words spoken or written or any signs or
by visible representations or otherwise  of any matter
or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers
or tends to lower the authority of any companyrt or

prejudices or interferes or tends to
interfere with the due companyrse of any judicial
proceeding or
1178

interferes or tends to interfere with or
obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of
justice in any other manner. while we are companyscious that every abuse of the process of
the companyrt may number necessarily amount to companytempt of companyrt
abuse of the process of the companyrt calculated to hamper the
due companyrse of a judicial proceeding or the orderly
administration of justice we must say is a companytempt of
court. it may be that certain minumber abuses of the process of
the companyrt may be suitably dealt with as between the parties
by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6
rule 16 or in some other manner. but on the other hand it
may be necessary to punish as a companytempt a companyrse of
conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial
process and which thus extends its pernicious influence
beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of
the public in the administration of justice. the publice
have an interest an abiding and a real interest and a
vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of
justice because unless justice is so administered there
is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. the
court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public
in the due administration of justice and so it is
entrusted with the power to companymit for companytempt of companyrt
number in order to protect the dignity of the companyrt against
insult or injury as the expression companytempt of companyrt may
seem to suggest but to protect and to vindicate the right
of the public that the administration of justice shall number
be prevented prejudiced obstructed or interfered with. it
is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law in its active
manifestation against obstruction and outrage.  1  the law
should number be seen to sit by limply while those who defy it
go free and those who seek its protection lose hope.  2
in halsburys laws of england  4th edn-vol. 9
paragraph 38  there is a brief discussion of when abuse of
the process of the companyrt may be a punishable companytempt. it is
said

abuse of process in general. the companyrt has
power to punish as companytempt any misuse of the companyrts
process. thus the forging or altering off companyrt
documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable
as serious companytempts. similarly deceiving the companyrt or
the companyrts officers by deliberately suppressing a
fact or giving false facts may be a punishable
contempt. 1179
certain acts of a lesser nature may also
constitute an abuse of process as for instance
initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting
in bona fides or which are frivolous vexatious or
oppressive. in such cases the companyrt has extensive
alternative powers to prevent an abuse of its process
by striking out or staying proceedings or by
prohibiting the taking of further proceedings without
leave. where the companyrt by exercising its statutory
powers its powers under rules of companyrt or its
inherent jurisdiction can give an adequate remedy it
will number in general punish the abuse as a companytempt of
court. on the other hand where an irregularity or
misuse of process amounts to an offence against
justice extending its influence beyond the parties to
the action it may be punished as a companytempt. in the present case the respondents began the
game by filing an application under art. 226 of the
constitution in the calcutta high companyrt whereas in the
numbermal companyrse one would expect such as application to
be filed in the patna high companyrt within whose
jurisdiction the subject matter of the dispute was
situate. for some mysterious reasons which numberody has
been able to explain to us the writ application was
filed in the calcutta high companyrt. a justifiable prima
facie inference from this circumstance may be that the
application was number bona fide but intended to harass
and oppress the opposite parties. we do number want to say
anything more about this aspect of the case as we are
told that this is a failing of the respondents which
they shared with several others. perhaps as we had
occasion to remark during the companyrse of the hearing
some parties are unable to reconcile themselves to the
fact that the calcutta high companyrt has long since ceased
to have jurisdiction over the area companyprising the state
of bihar which it had several decades ago. the game proceeded further. application after
application was filed before the learned single judge
everyone of them designed to circumvent defeat or
nullify the effect of the orders of the division
benches of the calcutta high companyrt and the patna high
court. the order of the division bench of the calcutta
high companyrt directing the respondents to furnish
security in a sum of rs. 155000 was never companyplied
with. the order of the division bench of the patna high
court directing the respondents to furnish security of
immovable property in a sum of rs. 75000 and to
deposit cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of rs. 50000 was also never companyplied with. 1180
instead an order was obtained from the single judge of the
calcutta high companyrt restraining the state of bihar from
continuing the money-suit in the companyrt of the subordinate
judge palamau. when this order was set aside by the
division bench an attempt was made to circumvent all
earlier orders by obtaining an order from the single judge
that they may be allowed to deposit rs. 60000 in cash and
permitted to remove the stock from the forest companypes. when
the state of bihar moved the learned subordinate judge
palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock the
respondents moved an application on december 14 1972 and
obtained an order from the single judge of the calcutta high
court staying the proceedings in the money suit in the companyrt
of the subordinate judge palamau. in companysidering the
question whether the filing of the application dated
december 14 1972 amount to a companytempt of companyrt the companyrt
must take into account the whole companyrse of the companytinuing
contumacious companyduct of the respondents from the beginning
of the game. clearly number a single application made to the
single judge was bona fide. every application was a daring
raid on the companyrt and each was an abuse of the process of
the companyrt. the application dated december 14 1972 praying
that the proceedings in the money suit in the companyrt of the
subordinate judge should be stayed was made despite the fact
that earlier on january 10 1972 the division bench of the
calcutta high companyrt had expressly permitted the proceedings
in the money suit to go on. the application of the
respondents clearly showed that they were intent upon
obstructing the due companyrse of the proceedings in the money
suit in the companyrt of the subordinate judge palamau and to
obstruct the administration of justice by abusing the
process of the companyrt. the high companyrt expressed the view that there was
numberspecific allegation that any companytempt of companyrt had
been companymitted by the filing of the application dated
december 14 1972. we are unable to agree with the view
of the high companyrt. paragraph 29 of the application to
commit the respondents for companytempt expressly refers to
the application dated december 14 1972 and paragraph
31 states that all the facts and circumstances
enumerated in the petition established that the
respondents were obstructing and interfering with the
due companyrse and administration of justice. it was number
necessary that every allegation made should be followed
then and there by the statement that the allegation
established a companytempt of companyrt. we are satisfied that the filing of the
application dated december 14 1972 was an abuse of
the process of the companyrt calculated to obstruct
1181
the due companyrse of a judicial proceeding and the
administration of justice and was therefore a criminal
contempt of companyrt.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 3388 of
1984. etc. from the judgment and order dated 4.4.1989 of the andhra
pradesh high companyrt in c.r.p. number 1450 of 1981.

k. sen c. sitaramiah p.a. chaudhary k. jagannatha
rao p.r. ramachandra murthy mrs. anjani k. ram kumar

p. rao p.s.r. murhty b. kanta rao n.d.b. raju r.n. keshwani r.f. nariman raj kumar gupta p.c. kapur rajen-
dra chaudhary a. subba rao k.r. nagaraja p.k. rao a.t.m. sampath p.n. ramalingam r. venkatramani g. narasimhulu

n. rao and s.k. sucharita for the appellants. parasaran t.v.s.n. chari mrs. b. sunita rao ms.
manjula gupta and v. sekhar for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
kania j. this is a group of matters companyprising civil
appeal number 3388 of 1984 in this companyrt and other cases which
have been placed before us for hearing along with this
appeal. we propose to deal first with civil appeal number 3388
of 1984.
this appeal by special leave is directed against a
judgment of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in civil revision
petition number 1450 of 1981. the question involved in the
appeal before the high companyrt from which this appeal arises
was whether land which has been agreed to be sold by the
owner under an agreement of sale and possession of which was
delivered in part performance of the agreement .for sale but
pursuant to which numberconveyance had been executed till the
relevant date companyld be included both in the holding of the
owner-vendor as
well as the purchaser or whether it was liable to be includ-
ed only in the holding of the purchaser for the purposes of
the andhra pradesh land reforms  ceiling on agricultural
holdings  act 1973  hereinafter referred to as the said
act . there are a number of companynected matters where the same
question is involved and which have been placed for hearing
before us. in some of these cases a part of the companysidera-
tion has been paid and in a few others the entire companysider-
ation has been paid. it has also been alleged that the
possession of the land was transferred to the purchaser
pursuant to the agreements of sale referred to. in some of
these cases lands belonging to the owners have been given
on lease to tenants who are in possession thereof as les-
sees. in order to appreciate the companytroversy arising before
us it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions
of the said act. before the said act was enacted there was
in force in andhra pradesh an act entitled andhra pradesh
 ceiling on agricultural holdings  act 1961 which provided
for the imposition of a ceiling on holdings of agricultural
land. after that act had been in force for some time the
central companymittee on land reforms made certain recommenda-
tions regarding the fixation of ceiling on agricultural
holdings and in line with this proposed policy the said act
was enacted in 1973 to bring about companyprehensive legislation
for the imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings in
the state of andhra pradesh and with a view to replace the
aforesaid act of 1961 as well as andhra pradesh agricultural
lands  prohibition of alienation act 1972 . the object of
the legislation was to take over the lands in excess of the
ceiling prescribed and to distribute the same among landless
and other deserving persons to subserve the companymon good. the
said act was included in the ninth schedule to the companystitu-
tion at item 67 by the companystitution 34th  amendment  act and
was protected under article 31-a. the object of the said act
was agrarian reform. under sub-section  c  of section 3 of
the said act ceiling area is defined as under
3 c  ceiling area means the extent of land specified in
section 4 or section 4-a to be ceiling area. it may be mentioned here that the agricultural land was
classified into wet land dry land and so on and appropriate
areas were fixed as ceiling in respect of such lands taking
into account the nature and yield capacity of the lands in
question. section 3 i  runs as follows
3 i  holding means the entire land held by a person--

as an owner

as a limited owner

as an usufructuary mortgagee

as a tenant

who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by companydi-
tional sale or through part performance of a companytract for
the sale of land or otherwise or in one or more of such
capacities and the expression to hold land shall be
construed accordingly
explanation where the same land is held by one person in
one capacity and by anumberher person in any other capacity
such land shall be included in the holding of both such
persons. section 3 m  provides that numberified date means the date
numberified under sub-section  3  of section 1 on which the
said act came into force. it may be mentioned that the
numberified date in respect of the said act is 1.1.1975. very
briefly stated under section 4 the ceiling area in the
case of a family unit companysisting of number more than five
members was prescribed as one standard holding. where the
family companysisted of more than five members there was
broadly speaking a proportionate increase in the ceiling
area. under section 5 the standard holding is fixed taking
into account the classification of the land according to the
nature of the land. sub-section  1  of section 7 runs as
follows
7 1 . special provision in respect of certain transfers
etc. already made
where on or after the 24th january 1971 but before the
numberified date any person has transferred whether by way of
sale gift usufructuary mortgage exchange settlement
surrender or in any other manner whatsoever any land held
by him or created a trust of any land held by him then the
burden of proving that such transfer or creation of trust
has number been effected in anticipation of and with a view to
avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to a
reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings shall be
on
such person and where he has number so proved such transfer
or creation of trust shall be disregarded for the purpose
of the companyputation of the ceiling area of such person. very briefly stated sub-section  2  of section 7 pro-
vides inter alia that any alienation made. by way of sale
lease for a period exceeding six years gift exchange
usufructuary mortgage or otherwise as set out in the said
sub-section on or after 2nd may 1972 and before the numberi-
fied date in companytravention of the andhra pradesh agricultur-
al land  prohibition of alienation  act 1972 shall be null
and void. the other sub-sections also provide that in the
various other circumstances set out therein alienations made
will be disregarded for purposes of fixation of ceiling. section 8 provides in brief that every person whose
holding on the numberified date together with any land trans-
ferred by him on or after 24th january 1971 exceeds the
specified limits shall within 30 days from the numberified
date namely 1.1. 1975 or such extended period as the gov-
ernment may numberify in that behalf furnish a declaration in
respect of his holding to the companypetent tribunal. section 9 deals with determination of the ceiling area
by the tribunal companystituted under section 6. section 10
deals with the surrender of lands in certain cases. sub-
section  5  of the said section provides that it shall be
open to the tribunal to refuse to accept the surrender of
any land as companytemplated under sub-section  1  or deemed
surrender of land as companytemplated under sub-section  4  of
the said section in the circumstances set out in sub-section
 5 . section 11 deals with the vesting of surrendered lands. section 12 deals with revision and vesting of lands
surrendered. the opening part of that section provides that
where any land is surrendered or deemed to have been surren-
dered under the said act by any usufructuary mortgagee or a
tenant the possession of such land shall subject to such
rules as may be prescribed revert to the owner. sub-sec-
tion  4  of section 12 provides that where any land is
surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under the
said act by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage
by companyditional sale or through a part performance of company-
tract for sale or otherwise the possession of such land
shall subject to such rules as may be prescribed revert to
the owner. sub-section  5-a  make an analogous provision in
connection with lands surrendered by limited owners and
provides that such surrendered lands shall revert to the
person having a vested interest in the remainder. section 13 makes special provision for the exclusion
from the holding of the owner of land belonging to him held
by a protected tenant where such land or part thereof stands
transferred to the protected tenant under section 38a of the
andhra pradesh  telengana area  tenancy and agricultural
land act 1950.
before going into the merits of the companytentions urged
and companysidering the proper interpretation to be given to the
relevant sections of the said act we cannumber lose sight of
the fact that the said act is a piece of agrarian legisla-
tion enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distri-
bution of lands for companymon good and with a view to subserve
the objectives enshrined in article 39 of the companystitution
being one of the directive principles embodied in the company-
stitution. provisions of such a legislation have to be
interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the
object of the legislation and number with a view to defeat the
same in a strict and companystricted manner in which a taxing
law for instance might be interpreted. the main submission of learned companynsel for the appel-
lants is that the expression holding has been defined in
sub-section  i  of section 3 of the said act the definition
section set out earlier as meaning the entire land held by
a person  emphasis supplied  and that the use of the said
word held in the definition indicates that the person who
is supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person
in possession of the said land and hence where in part
performance of an agreement for sale or under a lease the
purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land
the owner of the said land cannumber any longer be regarded as
holding the said land and it cannumber be said that the said
land is held by him. it was submitted by learned companynsel
that in view of this companytext although the explanation to
sub-section  i  of section 3 is very widely worded its
meaning cannumber be so extended as to companyer a case where the
owner of the land is numberlonger in possession of the land and
has parted with the possession thereof under an agreement
creating a right legal or equitable in the land companycerned. we find it difficult to accept this companytention. clauses  i
to  v  of subsection  i  of section 3 set out the various
capacities in which a person can be said to hold land for
the purposes of the said act and among these capacities are
as a usufructuary mortgagee as a tenant and as one who is
in possession by virtue of a mortgage by companyditional sale or
through part performance of a companytract of sale. the very
language of sub-section  i  of section 3 indicates that land
can be held as companytemplated in the said sub-section by
persons in a number of capacities. the explanation in plain
language states that the same land can be held by
one person in one capacity and by anumberher person in a dif-
ferent capacity and provides that such land shall be includ-
ed in the holdings of both such persons. the explanation
thus clearly companytemplates that the same land can be held as
contemplated under-sub-section  i  by one person as the
owner and by anumberher person as his lessee or as a person to
whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part
performance of an agreement to sell. on a plain reading of
the language used in the explanation we find it that it is
number possible to accept the submission that only where the
land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded
as held by him. apart from what we have pointed out earlier we find that
the question which arises before us in this appeal is al-
ready companyered by the decision of this companyrt in state of
andhra pradesh v. mohd. ashrafuddin 1982 3 scr 482. the
facts of the case were that out of the total holding of his
land the respondent transferred some land to anumberher person
under two unregistered sale deeds pursuant to an agreement
for sale and gifted.away some land to his son. in the return
submitted by him under the said act the respondent did number
include in his holding the area transferred under the unreg-
istered sale deeds or the land gifted by him which was in
the possession of the purchaser and donee respectively. the
land reforms tribunal ignumbering the two transfers companyputed
his holding at 1.7692 standard holding and called upon him
to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding. in
revision the high companyrt held that the land transferred
under the two sale deeds companyld number be included in the hold-
ing of the respondent for ascertaining the ceiling area. in
coming to this companyclusion the high companyrt gave the benefit
of section 53a of the transfer of property act to the person
in possession of the plot pursuant to the companytract for sale
and treated the land as a part of his holding. on appeal to
this companyrt a division bench companyprising three learned judges
of this companyrt reversed the decision of the high companyrt and
held that the high companyrt was in error in holding that the
land in the possession of the transferee cannumber be taken to
be a part of the holding of the respondent. it was held by
this companyrt that the expression held companynumberes both owner-
ship as well as possession. in the companytext of the definition
it is number possible to interpret the term holding only in
the sense of possession. the explanation to the definition
of the term holding clearly companytemplates that the same
land can be the holding of two different persons holding the
land in different capacities  see page 486 . the companyrt went
on to state that
it is by number well settled that a person in possession
pursuant to a companytract for sale does number get title to the
land
unless there is a valid document of title in his favour. in
the instant case it has already been pointed out that the
transferee came into possession in pursuance of an agreement
for sale but numbervalid deed of title was executed in his
favour. therefore the ownership remained with the respond-
ent-transferor. but even in the absence of a valid deed of
title the possession pursuant to an agreement of transfer
cannumber be said to be illegal and the transferee is entitled
to remain in possession
the companyrt went on to observe that
there may companyceivably be cases where the same land is
included in holding of two persons in different capacities
and serious prejudice might be caused to one or both of them
if they were asked to surrender the excess area. to safe-
guard the interest of the owners in such a case the legisla-
ture has made a provision in section 12 4  and  5  of the
act. even so there might be cases where some prejudice might
be caused to some tenure holders. the companyrt further observed that
but if the definition of the term holding is companyched in
clear and unambiguous language the companyrt has to accept it as
it stands. so companystrued the same land can be a part of the
holding of various persons holding it in different capaci-
ties. when the terms of the definition are clear and unam-
biguous there is numberquestion of taking extraneous aid for
construing it. the companyrectness of this decision has been upheld by this
court in begulla bapi raju etc. etc. v. state of andhra
pradesh etc. etc. 1983 3 scr 70 1 at p. 7 17. in that
case one of the companytentions urged on behalf of the petition-
ers was that land transferred by the petitioners under
various transfer deeds to the outsiders and who came in
possession also companyld number be included in the holding of the
petitioners. this argument was negatived by a bench companypris-
ing three learned judges of this companyrt which followed the
decision of this companyrt in mohd. ashrafuddins case  supra
and did number accept the plea that the decision in that case
required reconsideration. the question raised for our determination in this appeal is
directly companyered against the appellant by the decisions of
this companyrt in two cases just referred to by us. in these
circumstances even assuming that there is anumberher equally
plausible view regarding the companystruction and the legal
effect of section 3 i  of the said act read with explana-
tion that would number necessarily justify our reconsidering
the question which has already been decided by this companyrt
although the decision was rendered by a bench companyprising
only three learned judges of this companyrt. in our opinion
unless we find that the decisions in the aforesaid cases are
erroneous it would number be proper on our part to reconsider
the same. apart from this as we have pointed out earlier
in our view companysidering the clear language of section 3 i
of the said act read with explanation to that section the
view taken in mohd. ashrafuddins case  supra  is with
respect the companyrect view and we are inclined to take the
same view on the companystruction and legal effect of that
provision. learned companynsel for the appellant sought to place reli-
ance on the decision of a division bench of the andhra
pradesh high companyrt in the authorised officer  lr  vijayawa-
da v. kalyanam china venkata narasayya 1978 1 a.p. law
journal 98. in that case a division bench of the andhra
pradesh high companyrt took the view that if the owner of the
land has put the transferee in possession of the land in
part performance of a companytract for sale such land can be
included only in the holding of the transferee and cannumber
simultaneously be companyputed in the holding of the transferor
as well for that land is number held by him as an owner. it companyld be included in the holding of the transferor only
as and when the transferee surrenders that land and that
land reverts to the transferor as provided under section 12
of the said act. the division bench also took the view that
the expression holding and the expression held by a
person occurring in section 3 i  of the said act must be
construed as taking in the idea of actual possession and number
merely any right title or interest in the land devoid of
actual possession. in our view this decision cannumber be
regarded as laying down good law and must be treated as
overruled by the decisions of this companyrt in mohd. ashrafud-
dins case  supra  and begulla bapi rajus case  supra . we
cannumber lose sight of the fact that the said act is a piece
of agrarian reform legislation passed with a view to effec-
tively fix a ceiling on agricultural holdings and to achieve
equitable distribution of surplus land among the landless
and the other deserving persons. the plain language of
section 3 i  read with explanation supports the view taken
by this companyrt in mohd. ashrafuddins case  supra . 1t is
true that the division bench of the andhra pradesh high
court in the aforesaid judgment has given certain examples
where the interpretation which has been given in mohd. ashrafuddins case  supra  might lead to some hardship. that however in our opinion cannumber justify restricting
the effect of the plain language of the relevant provisions
in the manner done by the division bench of the andhra
pradesh high companyrt. the explanation to section 3 i  was
incorporated in the said act because the legislature took
the view that but for such a drastic provision it would
number be possible to effectively implement the provisions of
the said act regarding the acquisition of surplus land and
distribution of the surplus land to the landless and the
other deserving persons. it is a numberorious fact that there
were a large number of cases where agreements for sale or
documents for lease in respect of excess lands were executed
by owners of lands in excess of the ceiling area with a view
to defeat the provisions of the said act. in fact a perusal
of the facts in the cases before us generally lends support
to the existence of such a situation. in these circum-
stances if the legislature has used language in section
3 i  and the explanation thereto which on a plain reading
shows that in case of land companyered under an agreement for
sale or an agreement of lease even though the purchaser or
the lessee might be in possession of the land it would be
included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well as
the owner or the lessee and the owner we see numberreason to
cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that
provision merely because that it might possibly result in
hardship in few cases. moreover we find that to some ex-
tent the legislature has tried to mitigate this hardship by
providing that if the purchaser under the agreement of sale
or the lessee has in his holding land in excess of the
ceiling area such excess would revert to the owner of the
land. if the interpretation sought to be put by learned
counsel for the appellants which finds support from the
aforementioned decision of the andhra pradesh high companyrt
were companyrect we fail to see why such a provision as afore-
stated for reversion of excess land to the owner should have
been made. it was companytended by learned companynsel for the appellants
that if the companystruction placed on the said provisions by
the judgment of the division bench of the andhra pradesh
high companyrt in the aforesaid judgment was accepted it is number
as if the object of the said legislation would be defeated
because where an agreement for sale or agreement of lease
cannumber be shown to be bona fide the land would be included
in the holding of the owner. this circumstance. however. is
of a little avail. where such agreements for sale or of
lease are executed in writing and possession is handed over
to the purchaser or the lessee it would be very difficult
to show that the transaction was number bona fide although the
agreement might well have been executed really with a
view to defeat the provisions of the said act. we cannumber
lose sight of the fact that section 3 i  and the explanation
only deals with cases where the transfer of ownership is number
complete and the owner does number part companypletely with his
legal interest in the land so that on the termination of
the agreement for sale or agreement of lease without any
document being registered the land would fully revert to
the owner. moreover in many cases it was found that the
owner of the land himself companytinued to cultivate the land
claiming that he was doing so on behalf of his son who was
the lessee or the purchaser under an agreement. in these
circumstances we fail to see any reason to cut down the
plain meaning of the provisions of section 3 i  and the
explanation thereto. it was submitted by learned companynsel for the appellants
that the definition of the word holding companytained in sub-
section  i  of section 3 was an exhaustive definition and
that definition companytained in the main section companyld number be
interpreted in the light of the explanation thereto. it was
submitted by him that the meaning of the term holding and
held in sub-section  i  of section 3 companyld number be governed
by the explanation. in support of the companytention reliance
was placed on a decision of this companyrt in burmah shell oil
storage and distributing company of india limited anr. v. the
commercial tax officer and others 1961 1 scr 902 at pp. 914-917. in our opinion this decision is hardly of any
assistance in the matter before us. it is well settled that
the provisions in an act have to be read harmoniously and in
the light of the companytext in which they occur. in our opin-
ion there can be numberquarrel with the reliance being placed
on the explanation in order to understand the meaning of the
term holding and held used in sub-section  i  of section
3 of the said act. although some other decisions have been
referred to us we do number think any useful purpose would be
served by discussing the same in view of what we have ob-
served earlier number would it serve any purpose to refer to
the various examples of ownership set out in the american
jurisprudence to which our attention was drawn. in the result in our opinion there is numbermerit in the
appeal and the same must fail and is dismissed. looking to
the facts and circumstances of the case we however direct
that there will be numberorder as to companyts of the appeal. the other companynected civil appeals and special leave
petitions have all been directed to be tagged with the
aforesaid civil appeal disposed of by us as they involve the
same points as raised in the said
civil appeal.


the question raised in this appeal depends upon the companystruction of section 10 2  vib  of the indian income-tax act the relevant portion of which reads
in respect of machinery or plant being new which has been installed after the 31st day of march 1954

in the companytext of similar facts this companyrt companystrued similar words found in section 10 2  via  of the act in companymissioner of income-tax v. mir mohammad ali.