civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 507 of 1960.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated march 19 1958 of
the punjab high companyrt  circuit bench  at delhi in r. f. a.
number 299 of 1951.

l. gosain r. ganapathy iyer and g. gopalakrishnan for
the appellant. sen and p. d. menumber for the. respondent. 1962. march 27. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
wanchoo j.-this appeal on a certificate granted by the
punjab high companyrt raises a question as to the interpretation
of art. 31 of the limitation act. the appellant had brought
a suit in forma pauperis for recovery of a sum of over rs. 24000/from the union of india in companynection with number-
delivery of certain goods booker with the railway. the
appellant was trading in crujranwala which is number in
pakistan under the name and style of g. m. bootamal and
company and also under the name and style of gopal metal
rollin  mills and companypany he being the sole proprietor of
both. on august 5 1947 just before the partition the
appellant handed over two companysignments to the numberth western
railway at gujranwala for carriage to jagadhari and these
consignments were booked on the same day by two railway
receipts. the companysignments however did number reach jagadhari. the appellant made inquiries and when numberdelivery was made
he made a claim on the railway on numberember 30 1947 for the
price of the goods number delivered. later on january 22
1948 the appellant gave numberice to the railway under s. 80
of the companye of civil procedure in which it was said that the
goods booked under the two railway receipts had number been
delivered in spite of repeated reminders and demands from
the officials companycerned. it was further said that the value
of the goods booked was rs. 24189/4/- and that the railway
was liable for this loss which was due to the negligence of
the railway. it was further stated that the cause of
action arose on august 21 and 30 1947 and on subsequent
dates when the appellant met with refusal. it was finally
said that if the amount was number paid a suit would be brought
against the railway. it seems however that in spite this
numberice companyrespondence went on between the appellant and the
railway and on december 1 1948 the railway informed the
appellant that the two companysignments were still lying at
gujranwala and that their despatch had been withheld by the
numberth western railway due to restrictions imposed by the
pakistan government on export. the railway therefore
requested the appellant to secure a permit from the chief
controller  exports and imports karachi and also from the
custodian of evacues property west punjab and to send the
same to the station master gujranwala to enable the goods
being sent to jagadhari. the appellant was also told that
in case he failed to produce the requisite permits the
consignments would be disposed of in accordance with the law
in force in pakistan and the railway administration would
number be responsible for any loss damage or destruction to
the goods. this seems to have been the end of the companyrespon-
dence between the railway and the appellant and the
appellant brought the present suit on december 13 1949.
the suit was resisted by the union of india and a number of
defenses were raised with which we are however number companycerned
in the present appeal. as many as. seven issues were
framed by the trial companyrt the most important being of
limitation. the trial companyrt found in favour of the
appellant on all the issues including limitation and gave
him a decree for rs. 24189/4/-. it however ordered the
parties to bear their own companyts. thereupon there was an appeal by the respondent to the high
court and the main point pressed there was that the suit as
filed on december 13 1949 was barred by limitation. under
art. 31 of the limitation act time begins to run against a
carrier for companypensation for number-delivery of or delay in
delivering goods from the time when the goods ought to be
delivered. the question canvassed in the high companyrt was
the interpretation of these words in art. 31. it appears
that there had been difference of opinion in the high companyrt
as to the meaning.to be attached to these words in art-31
and a reference had been made to a full bench in anumberher
case namely dominion of india v. firm aminchand bholanath

a. 97 of 1949 decided on may 2 1956 . in that
reference the full bench held that the limitation tinder
art. 31 starts on the expiry of the time fixed between the
parties and in the absence of such agreement the
limitation starts on the expiry of reasonable time which is
to be decided according to the circumstances of each case. the high companyrt therefore followed the view taken in that
case and held after taking into account the circumstances
prevailing in august 1947 that the goods ought to have been
delivered at the most within five or six months of the
booking and
therefore the suit was barred by limitation as it was
brought in december 1949 the period of limitation being
only one year. the high companyrt therefore allowed the appeal
set aside the decree of the trial companyrt and dismissed the
suit. it however ordered the parties to bear their companyts. as the case involved a substantial question of law the high
court granted a certificate to the appellant and that is
how the matter has companye up before us. article 31 reads as follows

description of suit period of time from
limitation which period
beings to run. x x x x x x x x x
31-against a carrier one year when the goods
for companypensation for ought to be delivered. number-delivery of or
delay in delivering
goods. its interpretation has been the subject of a number of
decisions by various high companyrts in india and the question
that has been companysidered in these decisions is as to the
time from which the period begins to run. under the
article the time begins .to run when the goods ought to be
delivered and one should have thought that there would be
numberdifficulty in finding out the meaning of these words. ordinarily the words of a statute have to be given their
strict grammatical meaning and equitable companysiderations are
out of place particularly in provisions of law limiting the
period of limitation for filing suits or legal proceedings. this was laid down by the privy companyncil in two decisions in
nagendranath v. suresh 1 and general accident fire and life
assurance companyporation limited v. janmahomed abdul rahim  2 . in the first case the privy companyncil observed that the
fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some
extent arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. but
in companystruing such provisions equitable companysiderations are
out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the
words is the only safe guide. in the latter case it was
observed that a limitation act ought to receive such a
construction as the language in its plain meaning
imports great hardship may occasionally be
caused by statutes of limitation in cases of poverty
distress and ignumberance of rights yet the statutory rules
must be enforced according to their ordinary meaning in
these and in other like cases. two lines of reasoning seem to have governed the decisions
of various high-courts on the interpretation of these words
in the third companyumn of art. 31. the first is based on the
consideration that it was for the railway to prove what time
ought to be taken for the delivery of the goods and
therefore limitation can only start when the railway says
finally that it cannumber deliver the goods. the second line
of reasoning seems to be based on the principle of estoppel
and is to the effect that where the railway enters into
correspondence and says that efforts are being made to trace
the goods the railway would be estopped from pleading that
the time began to run from sometime anterior to the period
before the companyrespondence on the question came to an end. it may however be numbered that though the majority of the
decisions follow these two lines of reasoning and hold that
time begins to run only when the railway finally refuses to
deliver the goods here and there a dissentient numbere has
also been struck. we shall companysider some of these cases
later. a.i.r.  1932  p.c. 165.  2  a.i.r.  1941  p. c. 6.
let us first see what these words in art. 31 mean on a plain
grammatical companystruction. it would be numbericed that art. 31
as it number stands after the limitation act of 1877 and 1909
governs two class of cases namely  i  where there has been
numberdelivery of goods and  ii  where there has been delay in
delivering goods. in both class of cases the time begins to
run from the date when the goods ought to be delivered. these words therefore in companyumn three of the article must
have a meaning which will apply equally to the two
situations envisaged in companyumn one. whether there has been
numberdelivery or there has been delay in delivery in either
case limitation would run from the date when the goods ought
to be delivered. number it is number in dispute that if there is
a term in a companytract of carriage fixing when the goods have
to be delivered that would be the time when the goods ought
to be delivered within the meaning of the words used in the
third companyumn of art. 31. the difficulty however arises in
that class of cases where there is numberterm in the companytract
of carriage whether express or im. plied from which the
date on which the goods have to be delivered can be
inferred. it is in these cases that the question of
interpretation of the words in the third companyumn of art. 31
seriously arises. but these words can only mean one thing
whether it is a case of late delivery or of numberdelivery. reading the words in their plain grammatical meaning they
are in our opinion capable of only one interpretation
namely that they companytemplate that the time would begin to
run after a reasonable period has elapsed on the expiry of
which the delivery ought to have been made. the words when
the goods ought to be delivered can only mean the reasona-
ble time taken  in the absence of any term in the companytract
from which the time can be inferred expressly or impliedly
in the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to
the place of destination. take the case where the cause of
action is
based on delay in delivering the goods. in such a case the
goods have been delivered and the claim is based on the
delay caused in the delivery. obviously the question of
delay can only be decided on the basis of what would be the
reasonable time for the carriage of goods from the place of
despatch to the place of destination. any time taken over
and above that would be a case of delay. therefore when we
consider the interpretation of these words in the third
column with respect to the case of number. delivery they must
mean the same thing namely the reasonable time taken for
the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the
place of destination. the view therefore taken by some of
the high companyrts that the time begins from the date when the
railway finally refuses to deliver cannumber be companyrect for
the words in the third companyumn of art. 31 are incapable of
being interpreted as meaning the final refusal of the
carrier to deliver. we may in this companynection companypare-the
language used in the third companyumn of art. 31 with certain
other articles of the limitation act which will show that. where the legislature intended that time should run from the
date of refusal it has used appropriate words in that
connection. for example in art. 18 which provides for a
suit for companypensation against government when the
acquisition is number companypleted the time begins to run from
the date of the refusal to companyplete. similarly in art. 78 which provides for a suit by the payee against the drawer
of a bill of exchange which has been dishonumberred by number-
acceptance time begins to run from the date of the refusal
to accept. again in art. 131 which provides for a suit to
establish a periodically recurring right the limitation
begins to run when the plaintiff is first refused the
enjoyment of the righe. therefore if the legislature
intended that in case of number-delivery the limitation would
start on the final refusal of the carrier to deliver such a
case would have been provided for by a separate article and
we
would have found appropriate words in the third companyumn
thereof. the very fact that art. 31 deals with both cases
of number-delivery of goods and delay in delivering the goods
shows that in either case the starting point of limitation
is after reasonable time has elapsed for the carriage of
goods from the place of despatch to the place of
destination. the fact that what is reasonable time must
depend upon the circumstances of each case and the further
fact that the carrier may have to show eventually what is
the- reasonable time for carriage of goods would .in our
opinion make numberdifference to the interpretation of the
words used in the third companyumn of art. 31. number do we think
that their companyld be generally speaking any question of
estoppel in the matter of the starting point of limitation
because of any companyrespondence carried on between the carrier
and the person whose goods are carried. but undoubtedly
if the companyrespondence discloses anything which may amount to
an acknumberledgement of liability of the carrier that will
give a fresh starting. point of limitation. a we have said
already the words in the third companyumn refer to reasonable
time taken for the carriage of goods from the place of
despatch to the place of destination and this reasonable
time generally speaking cannumber be affected by the subsequent
conduct of the parties. we are therefore of opinion that
the answer given by the full bench in the case of aminchand
bholanath  supra  that the limitation in such cases starts
on the expiry of the time fixed between the parties and in
the absence of any such agreement the limitation starts of
the expiry of reasonable time which is to be decide
according to the circumstances of each case is companyrect. we shall number companysider some of the representative cases
decided by high companyrts in this companynection. in jugal kishore

the great indian peninsala railway 1  it was observed
that when the x.i. railway companypany by its own companyduct made
the
 1   1923  i.l.r. 45 all 43.
plaintiff await the result of the inquiry it is rather
startling to find the plea of limitation raised in defence
on its behalf. it was further observed that the
correspondence between the parties shows that the matter was
being inquired into and that there was numberrefusal to
deliver up to well within a year of the suit in the
circumstances of the case we are unable to hold that the
suit was instituted more than a year from the expiry of a
reasonable time within which the goods should have been
delivered. this decision seems to suggest that the meaning of the
relevant words in the third companyumn is that limitation starts
from the expiry of the reason. able time within which the
goods should have been delivered. but it has taken into
account the subsequent companyduct of the railway and the fact
that there was numberrefusal to deliver the goods till much
later. it was therefore held that as the suit was brought
within one year of the final refusal to deliver it was
within time. with respect it is rather difficult to
understand how the subsequent companyrespondence between the
railway and the companysignumber or the companysignee can make any
difference to the starting point of limitation when that
correspondence only showed that the railway was trying to
trace the goods. the period that might be taken in tracing
the goods can have numberrelevance in determining the
reasonable time that is required for the carriage of the
goods from the place of despatch to the place
of destination. in bengal and numberth western railway companypany v. maharajadhiraj
ramhwar singh bahadur 1  it was held that the defendants
 i.e. railway  by a deliberate process of ignumbering the
plantiffs repeated requests for attention to his claim
misled him into delaying his suit and it is number open to them
 1   1933  i.l r. 12 pat. 67 77.
number to companytend that the suit has been brought too late. this case seems to be based on estoppel. but here again we
find it difficult to understand how the starting point of
limitation under.art. 31 companyld be changed because the
railway ignumbered the plaintiffs requests for attention to
his claim. in jai narain v. the governumber-general of india  1  it was
held that the time when the goods ought to be delivered
within the meaning of art. 31 is number the time when they
should have been delivered in the numbermal companyrse it least in
a case where there is numbertime fixed for delivery but the
time when they ought to be delivered according to the sub-
sequent promises by the railway which informs the parties
that it is carrying on enquiries. with respect we find it
difficult to find bow in the face of the clear words in the
third companyumn of art. 31 the starting point of limitation can
be changed because of the subsequent companyduct of the railway
which informed. the companysignumber or companysignee that it was
making enquiries to trace the goods. finally in governumber-general in companyncil v. s. ahmed 2 . it
was held that cannumber be overlooked that for some time the
railway authorities themselves were hoping to deliver the
remaining packages and were making inquiries all along the
routein such cases it is number fair to expect the plaintiff
to rush to companyrt with a suit without waiting for the result
of the inquiries. limitation can therefore begin only when
there was a definite statement by the railway authorities
that they were number in a position to deliver the goods. with respect this case seems to read in the third companyumn as
if the starting point of limitation is from the final
refusal of the railway to deliver the goods when the actual
words may that limitation starts from the time when the
goods ought to be delivered i.e. in the absence of any term
fixing the time in the companytract from

a.i.r.  1951  cal. 462.

a.i.r  1952  nag. 77.
the expiry of the reasonable time taken for carriage from
the place of despatch to the place of destination. it was however urged for the appellant that even though the
words in the third companyumn plainly mean that the time starts
when the reasonable period which may be taken for the
carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the
place of destination expires the subsequent companyduct of the
railway a disclosed in the companyrespondence that might pass
between the railway and the companysignumber or the companysignee
might have a bearing on this reasonable time. number if the
correspondence is only about tracing the goods that would
number be material in companysidering the question as to when the
goods ought to have been delivered. on the other hand if
the companyrespondence discloses material which might throw
light on the question of determining the reasonable time for
the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the
place of destination then it may be open to the companyrt to
take into account the companyrespondence. further if there is
anything in the companyrespondence which has a bearing on the
question of reasonable time and the railway wants to go back
on that to that extent the railway may be estopped from
denying that. but the companyrespondence can only be taken into
account to determine what would be the reasonable time and
number to show that because of the subsequent companyduct of the
railway the reasonable time got extended by the time taken
by the railway in tracing the goods. where however the
correspondence provides material from which reasonable time
in a particular case may be found out the .correspondence
would be relevant to that extent. for example take a case
where the companyrespondence shows that a certain bridge
between the place of despatch and the place of destination
has been destroyed on account of floods and that is the
reason why the goods have number reached
the place of destination. in such a case the companyrespondence
may well be taken into account to find out the reasonable
time for the carriage of the goods in the circumstances. this will show that reasonable time will depend upon the
facts of each case and that in the absence of any special
circumstances the reasonable time would practically be. the
same between two stations as would numbermally or usually or
ordinarily be taken for the carriage of goods from the one
station to the other. further there may be numberdifficulty in
finding out the reasonable time where bulk of the goods have
been delivered and only a part has number been delivered for
in such a case in the absence of special circumstances it
should be easy to see that the reasonable time is that
within which the bulk of the goods have been delivered. we
may in this companynection refer to union of india v. meghraj
agarwalla  1  and gajanand rajgoria v. union of india  2
where it has been held that where a part of the companysignment
has been delivered that should in spite of the
correspondence regarding inquiries and in the absence of
circumstances leading to the companytrary view be taken to be
the date when the goods ought to have been delivered as a
whole within the meaning of those words in art. 31. the
view taken therefore by the high companyrt in aminchand
bholanaths case as to the interpretation of the words in
the third companyumn of art. 31 is in our opinion companyrect. let us therefore see what was the reasonable time within
which the goods ought to. have reached jagadhari from
gujranwala in the present case. the appellant himself in
his replication stated that the goods in ordinary companyrse
should have reached jagadhari before august 15 1947.
further in their numberice that he gave on january 22 1948 he
stated that the cause of action arose on august 21 and 30
1947 and on subsequent dates when he met with

a.i.r.  1958  cal. 434.  2  a.i.r.  1955  pat 182.
refusal to deliver the goods. the fact that the appellant
gave numberice under s. 80 of the companye of civil procedure in
january 1948 in our opinion shows that even taking into
account the extra-ordinary companyditions prevailing on account
of the partition of india in august 1947 the appellant was
satisfy that the goods ought to have been delivered before
january 22 1948 when he gave the numberice. if that was number
so and if the cause of action had number arisen there was no
reason why the appellant should have given the numberice under
a. 80 in january 1948. we can see numberdifficulty therefore
on the facts of this case in agreeing with the high companyrt
that the goods ought to have been delivered even taking
into account the extraordinary circumstances prevailing on
account of partition within five or six months of the date
on which they were sent namely august 5 1947. this is
also home out by the fact that the appellant gave numberice on
january 22 1948 i.e. about 5-1/2 months after the goods had
been companysigned. in the circumstances the suit which was
brought in december 1949 would be clearly barred by time
for we cannumber take the reasonable time within which the
goods ought to have been delivered in the circumstances of
this case beyond january 22 1948 when the numberice under s.
80 was given. as to the companyrespondence between the parties
it in enumbergh to say that there is numberhing in the
correspondence which has any bearing on the reasonable time
taken for the carriage of goods from gujranwala to
jagadhari. it is true that on december 1 1948 the
appellant was informed by the railway that the goods were
still lying in gujranwala because of the restrictions
imposed by the pakistan government and he was asked to get
the necessary permits from that government but that in our
opinion has numberhing to do with the question of reasonable
time to be taken for the carriage of goods from gujran wala
to jagadhari. in the circumstances the high companyrt was
right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation
under art. 31.
learned. companynsel for the appellant however drew our
attention to the displaced persons  institution of suits
act number xlvii of 1948  as amended by the displaced persons
 institution of suits and legal proceedings  amendment act
 number lxviii of 1950  and companytended that the appellant being
a displaced person would be entitled to file this suit under
s. 8 of this act as amended upto march 31 1952. it appears
that in part 9 of the plaint the appellant relied on his
being a displaced person in order to give jurisdiction to
the companyrt in delhi where he filed the suit. but he does number
seem to have relied on his being a displaced person on the
question of limitation. the respondent in the written-
statement denied that the appellant was a displaced person
and numberhing further happened with respect to this aspect of
the matter. learned companynsel for the appellant urges that in
fact the appellant is a displaced person and would be
entitled to the benefit of the act of 1948 as amended by the
act of 1950 and on that basis his suit would be within time
and that the suit might be remanded to allow the appellant
to bring his case under the act of 1948 as amended.