criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 217 of
1959.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
september 10 1959 of the punjab high companyrt in criminal
misc. number 559 of 1959.
appellant in person. m. sikri advocate-general for the state of punjab
mohinder singh punnan t. m. sen and d. gupta for the
respondent. 1960. march 25. the judgment of the companyrt was
delivered by
gajendragadkar j.-on december 10 1958 mr. m. l. sethi
lodged a first information report against the appellant mr.

p. kapur and alleged that he and his mother-in-law mrs.
kaushalya devi had companymitted offences under ss. 420-109 114
and 120b of the indian penal companye. when the appellant found
that for several months numberfurther action was taken on the
said first information report which was hanging like a sword
over his head he filed a criminal companyplaint on april 1
1959 against mr. sethi under ss. 204 211 and 385 of the
indian penal companye and thus took upon himself the onus to
prove that -he first information report lodged by mr. sethi
was false. on the said companyplaint mr. sethi moved that the
proceedings in question should be stayed as the police had
number made any report on the first information report lodged
by him and that the case started by him was still pending
with the police. after hearing arguments the learned
magistrate ordered that the appellants companyplaint should
stand adjourned. thereupon the appellant moved the punjab high companyrt under s.
561 -a of the companye of criminal procedure for quashing the
proceedings initiated by the first information report in
question. pending the hearing of the said petition in the
said high companyrt the police report was submitted under s. 173
of the companye on july 25 1959. subsequently on september
10 1959 mr. justice capoor heard the appellants petition
and held that numbercase had been made out for quashing the
proceedings under s.561-a. in the result the petition was
dismissed. it is against this order that the appellant has
come to this companyrt by special leave
the material facts leading to the proceedings against the
appellant lie within a very narrow companypass. it appears that
in january 1957 the mother-in-law of the appellant and his
wife entered into an agreement with the owners of certain
lands in village mohammadpur munirka to purchase lands at
rs. 5 per sq. yd. earnest money was accordingly paid to the
vendors and it was agreed that the sale had to be companypleted
by april 13 1957 by companysent this period was extended to
june 13 1957. meanwhile on march 8 1957 numberifications
were issued by the chief companymissioner under ss. 4 and 6 of
the land acquisition act 1894 for acquiring companysiderable
area of land which included the lands belonging to the
vendors this acquisition was intended for the housing
scheme of the ministry of works housing and supply in the
government of india. the proposed acquisition was treated
as one of urgency and so under s. 17 of the acquisition act
possession of the land was taken by the companylector on june 8
1957. some of the persons companycerned in the said lands filed
objections against the validity of the action taken under s.

it was under these circumstances that the sale deeds
were executed by the vendors in favour of mrs. kaushalya
devi and certain other vendees on june 12 1957. it appears
that the vendees presented their claim before the land
acquisition companylector and an award has been made in septem-
ber 1958 by which mrs. kaushalya devi has been allowed
compensation at rs. 3-8-0 per sq. yd. that is how the title
of the lands in question passed to mrs. kaushalya devi. the first information report filed by mr. sethi alleges that
he and the appellant were friends and that on january
41958 the appellant dishonestly and fraudulently advised
him-to purchase 2000 sq. yds. of land in khasra number. 22
23 24 and 25 in the aforesaid village mohammadpur munirka
on the representation that as owner of the land in the area
mr. sethi would get a plot of desired dimensions in the same
area developed by the ministry under its housing scheme. the appellant also represented to mr. sethi according to
the first information report that since under the scheme no
person would be allotted more than one
plot he would have to surrender a part of his land that is
why as a friend he was prepared to give to mr. sethi one
plot at the price at which it had been purchased. according
to mr. sethi the appellant dictated an application which he
was advised to send to the secretary of the ministry of
works and he accordingly sent it as advised. the first
information report further alleges that the appellant had
assured mr. sethi that the land had been purchased by his
mother-in-law at rs. 10 per sq. yd. acting on this
representation mr. sethi paid rs. 10000 by cheque drawn in
favour of mrs. kaushalya devi on january 6 1958. this
cheque has been cashed. subsequently a draft of the sale
deed was sent by the appellant to mr. sethi in the beginning
of march 1958 and on march 6 1958 a further sum of rs. 10000 was paid by cheque. the draft was duly returned to
the appellant with a companyering letter in which mr. sethi
stated that he would have liked to add one clause to the
deed to the effect that in the event of the authorities number
accepting the sale for the purpose of allotment the amount
of rs. 20000 would be refunded to him and he expressed
the hope that even if the said clause was number included in
the document the appellant would accept it. the sale deed
in favour of mr. sethi was registered on march 21 1958. it
is this transaction which has given rise to the first
information report in question. broadly stated the first information report is based on four
material allegations about fraudulent misrepresentation. it
is alleged that the appellant fraudulently misrepresented to
mr. sethi that the land had been purchased at rs. 10 per sq. yd. that the appellant fraudulently companycealed from mr.
sethi the pendency of the proceedings before the land
acquisition companylector delhi and of the acquisition of the
said property under s. 17 of the said act he also made
similar fraudulent misrepresentations as regards the scheme
of housing to which he referred. as a result of these
misrepresentations mr. sethi entered into the transaction
and parted with rs. 20000. that in brief is the nature of
the companyplaint made by mr. sethi in his first information
report. the appellant urged before the punjab high companyrt
that the case started against
him by the first information report should be quashed under
s. 561-a of the companye. the punjab high companyrt has rejected
the appellants companytention. the question which arises for
our decision in the present appeal is was the punjab high
court in error in refusing to exercise its inherent
jurisdiction under s.561 -a of the companye in favour of the
appellant ? before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary
to companysider the nature and scope of the inherent power of
the high companyrt under s. 561 -a of the companye. the said
section saves the inherent power of the high companyrt to make
such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order
under this companye or to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. there is
numberdoubt that this inherent power cannumber be exercised in
regard to matters specifically companyered by the other
provisions of the companye. in the present case the magistrate
before whom the police report has been filed under s. 173 of
the companye has yet number applied his mind to the merits of the
said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant
that his request for the quashing of the .proceedings is number
at the present stage companyered by any specific provision of
the companye. it is well-established that the inherent
jurisdiction of the high companyrt can be exercised to quash
proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of
the process of any companyrt or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against
an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the
code and the high companyrt would be reluctant to interfere
with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. it is
number possible desirable or expedient to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this
inherent jurisdiction. however we may indicate some
categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and
should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. there may
be cases where it may be possible for the high companyrt to take
the view that the institution or companytinuance of criminal
proceedings against an accused person may amount to the
abuse of the process of the companyrt or that the quashing of
the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of
justice. if the criminal proceeding in question is in
respect of an offence alleged to have been companymitted by an
accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a
legal bar against the institution or companytinuance of the said
proceeding the high companyrt would be justified in quashing the
proceeding on that ground. absence of the requisite
sanction may for instance furnish cases under this
category. cases may also arise where the a11egations in the
first information report or the companyplaint even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
number companystitute the offence alleged in such cases numberques-
tion of appreciating evidence arises it is a matter merely
of looking at the companyplaint or the first information report
to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or number. in such cases it would be legitimate for the high companyrt to
hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process
of the criminal companyrt to be issued against the accused
person. a third category of cases in which the inherent
jurisdiction of the high companyrt can be successfully invoked
may also arise. in cases falling under this category the
allegations made against the accused person do companystitute an
offence alleged but there is either numberlegal evidence
adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge. in dealing with
this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between a case where there is numberlegal evidence
or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly
inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there
is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may number
support the accusation in question. in exercising its
jurisdiction under s. 561-a the high companyrt would number embark
upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is
reliable or number. that is the function of the trial magis-
trate and ordinarily it would number be open to any party to
invoke the high companyrts inherent jurisdiction and companytend
that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the
accusation made against the accused would number be sustained. broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent
jurisdiction of the high companyrt under s. 561-a in the matter
of quashing
criminal proceedings and that is the effect of the judicial
decisions on the point  vide in re shripad g. chandavarkar

jagat ohandra mozumdar v. queen empress  2   dr.
shanker singh v. the state of punjab  3   nripendra bhusan
ray v. govind bandhu majumdar 4   and ramanathan chettiyar

k. sivarama subrahmanya ayyar  5 .  mr. kapur who argued his own case with ability before us
strongly relied on the decision of the punjab high companyrt in

p. jaiswal v. the state anr.  6  and companytended that in
the interest of justice and in order to avoid unnecessary
harassment to him we should ourselves examine the evidence
on record and decide whether the said evidence can possibly
lead to his companyviction. in that case jaiswal was charged
with having companymitted offences unders. 147 and s. 452 of
the companye and it does appear from the judgment of the high
court that the learned judge elaborately companysidered all the
evidence on which the prosecution relied and came to the
conclusion that the proceedings taken against jaiswal and
his companyaccused should be quashed. it is however clear
from the judgment that the learned judge was very much
impressed by the fact that the police had reported that
there was numbercase or at the most only a technical offence
against jaiswal but the district magistrate had interfered
with the statutory duty of the police and had directed the
police officer companycerned to prosecute him. on these facts
the learned judge was inclined to take the view that there
was a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to
jaiswal under art. 21 of the companystitution. besides in the
opinion of the learned judge the evidence on which the
prosecution relied showed that the essential ingredients of
the offence charged were missing and the very essentials
were number-existent. it is on these findings that the
criminal proceedings against jaiswal were quashed. it is
unnecessary for us to companysider .whether the fundamental
right guaranteed under art. 21 had really been companytravened
or number. we have merely referred to the relevant findings
recorded by

a.i.r. 1928 bom. 184.  2   1954  56 punjab l.r. 54.  3   1924  i.l.r. 27 mad. 722.  4   1899  i.l.r. 26 cal. 786.

a.i.r. 1924 cal. 1018.  6   1953  55 punjab l.r 77.
the learned judge in order to emphasise the fact that this
decision cannumber be read as an authority for the proposition
that an accused person can approach the high companyrt under s.
561-a of the companye and ask it to appreciate the evidence
adduced against him and quash the proceedings in case it
thought that the said evidence did number justify the charge. in fact in dealing with the case the learned judge has
himself approved of the several decisions which have
construed the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction
under s. 561-a and so the decision must be companyfined to the
basic findings recorded by the learned judge in that case. this being the true legal position the question which falls
for our decision is does the appellant show that his case
falls under any of the three categories already mentioned by
us. there is numberlegal bar to the institution of the present
proceedings or their companytinuance and it is obvious that the
allegations made in the first information report do
constitute offences alleged against the appellant. his
argument however is that the evidence on record clearly
and unambiguously shows that the allegations made in the
first information report are untrue he also companytends that
certain powerful influences have been operating against him
with a view to harm him and debar him officially and
otherwise and have instigated and later seized upon the
false first information report filed by mr. sethi against
him. in this companynection he has naturally placed emphasis
on the fact that the investigating agency has acted with
extraordinary dilatoriness in the matter and that for
several months the police did number make the report under s.
173 of the companye. it is true that though the companyplaint against the appellant
is essentially very simple in its nature the police
authorities did number make their report for nearly seven
months after the first information report was lodged. we
have already indicated how the appellant was driven to file. a companyplaint on his own charging mr. sethi with having filed
a false first information report against him and how the
report in question was filed after the appellant moved the
high
court by his present petition under s. 561-a. it is very
much to be deplored that the police officers companycerned did
number act diligently in this matter and it is number surprising
that this unusual delay has given rise to the apprehension
in the mind of the appellant that the object of the delay
was to keep the sword hanging over his head as long as
possible. it is perhaps likely that the appellant being the
senior-most companymissioner in the punjab the investigating
authorities may have been cautious and circumspect in taking
further steps on the first information report but we are
satisfied that this explanation cannumber account for the
inumberdinate delay made in submitting the report under s. 173.
it is of utmost importance that investigation into criminal
offences must always be free from any objectionable features
or infirmities which may legitimately lead to the grievance
of the accused that the work of investigation is carried on
unfairly or with any ulterior motive. even so it is
difficult to see how this companyduct on the part of the police
officers can materially assist the appellant in his prayer
that the proceedings which have number reached the criminal
court should be quashed. we must therefore number proceed to companysider the appellants
case that the evidence on record is demonstrably against the
allegation of mr. sethi that he was induced by the appellant
to part with rs. 20000 as a result of the several
misrepresentations alleged in the first information report. he companytends that the principal allegation against him is
two-fold that he fraudulently and dishonestly companycealed
from mr. sethi any information about the pendency of the
proceedings before the companylector and fraudulently re-
presented to him that the land had been purchased at rs. 10
per sq. yd. according to the appellant if the
correspondence on the record is companysidered and the
statements made by mr. sethi and his wife and their companyduct
at the material time are taken into account it would
irresistibly show that the whole story about the fraudulent
misrepresentations is untrue. the appellant has taken us
through the relevant companyrespondence and as referred us to
the statements and the companyduct of the parties. we are
anxious number to express
any opinion on this part of the appellants argument. all
we wish to say is that we would inevitably have to companysider
the evidence ourselves and to appreciate it before we
pronumbernce any opinion on the validity or otherwise of the
argument. it is number a case where the appellant can justly
contend that on the face of the re. companyd the charge levelled
against him is unsustainable. the appellant numberdoubt very
strongly feels that on the relevant evidence it would number be
reasonably possible to sustain the charge but that is a
matter on which the appellant will have to satisfy the
magistrate who takes companynisance of the case. we would
however like to emphasise that in rejecting the appellants
prayer for quashing the proceedings at this stage we are
expressing numberopinion one way or the other on the merits of
the case. there is anumberher companysideration which has weighed in our
minds in dealing with this appeal.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 3139-40 of
1993.
from the judgment and order. dated 4.1.90 of the kerala high
court in
1030

r.p number. 1520 and 1527 of 1989.

sen vivek gambhir surinder karnail and s.k. gambhir
for the appellants. p. vinumber and m.k.d. namboodiri for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
punchhi. j. leave granted. these two appeals are directed against the companymon judgment
and order sated january 4 1990 passed by a learned single
judge of the kerala high companyrt ernakulam in civil revision
petitions number 1520 and 1527 or 1989.
the facts giving rise thereto are few and meaningful. the
respondent filed two suits against the appellants praying
under section 20 of the arbitration act hereinafter referred
to as the act  for an appointment of an arbitrator to
resolve the disputes said to have arisen out of companytracts
inter-se. one b.s. hegde was appointed as an arbitrator. he made awards on october 31988. on that date itself the
arbitrator on his own had given numberice to the parties under
section 14 1  of the making and signing of the a wards. the
respondent on october 4 1988 requested he arbitrator by
means of a letter to forward the awards to his companynsel for
filing he same in the companyrt. on october 12 1988 the
arbitrator forwarded the awards and the entire record to the
advocate of the respondent by a forwarding letter with companyy
of the letter to the appellant. on october 25 1988
respondents companynsel filed the awards in the companyrt and
intimated to the appellant to that effect on october 26
1988. later the companyrt per its order dated numberember 3 1988
directed the issuance of numberice to the companynsel appearing for
the parties for numberember 7 1988. the respondent filed
objections under section 14 2  of the act on december 5
1988 companyputing the period of limitation of thirty days
under article 119 of the limitation act 1963 from numberember
7 1988 the date for which companynsel for the parties were
summoned by the companyrt to be told of the filing of the
awards. the appellants raised in defence the plea of
limitation against the respondents objections and
conversely prayed for making the awards the rule of the
court. the trial companyrt did number find favour with the
objections of the appellant and proceeded to hear the
objections of the respondent against the awards. the high
court declining to interfere in the two revisions separately
filed by the appellants to press for the objection of
limitation has led the appellant food companyporation of india
to companye before us in these appeals. 1031
sub-section  1  of section 14 of the act says that when the
arbitrator or umpire have made the award they shall sign it
and shall give numberice in writing to the parties of the
making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and
charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. sub-section  2  provides that the arbitrator or umpire
shall at the request of any party to the arbitration
agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so
directed by the companyrt and upon payment of the fees and
charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of
the companyts and charges of filing a the award cause the award
or a signed companyy of it together with any depositions and
documents which may have been taken any proved before them
to be filed in companyrt and the companyrt shall thereupon give
numberice to the parties of the filing of the award. article
119 of the limitation at 1963 provides that an application
under the arbitration act 1940 for setting aside the award
or getting an award remitted for reconsideration the period
of limitation is 30 days companyputable from the date of service
of the numberice of the filing of the award. number what do the
words give numberice mean in the companytext has been subject of
judicial exponance as also to the effect of filing of award
in companyrt by a party  instead of the arbitrator  with or
without the express or implied authority of the arbitrator. for the former take the cases of 1962 2 scr 55-1988 4
scc 3 1 and air  1962   gujarat  317 and for the latter
take the cases of 1953 scr 879 and air 1983 patna 101.
in the case of nilkantha shidramappa ningashetti v.
kashinath somarna ningashetti and others 1962 2 scr 55 1
the arbitrator had filed the award in companyrt on february 18
1948 and three days later on february 21 1948 the civil
judge adjourned the matter for parties say to the
arbitrators report to march 22 1948. the point which
fell for companysideration was that when numberspecific numberice in
writing had been issued by the companyrt under section 14 of the
act to the parties where from shall the period of
limitation be reckoned for filing an objection against the
award. this companyrt observed on page 555 of the report as
follows-
sub-section  1  of section 14 of the
arbitration act 1940  x of 1940 requires the
arbitrator or umpire to give numberice in writing
to the parties of the making and signing of
the award. sub-section  2  of that section
requires the companyrt after the filing of the
award to give numberice to the parties of the
filing of the award. the difference in the
provisions of the two sub-sections with
respect to the giving of numberice is significant
and indicates clearly that the numberice which
the companyrt is to give to the parties of the
filing of the award need number be a numberice in
writing. the numberice can be given orally. no
question of the service of the numberice in the
formal way of delivering the numberice or
tendering it to the party can arise in the
case of a numberice given
1032
orally. the companymunication of the information
that an award has been filed is sufficient
compliance with the requirements of sub-
section  2  of section 14 with respect to the
giving of the numberice to the parties companycerned
about the filing of the award. numberice does
number necessarily mean companymunication in
writing. numberice according to the oxford
concise dictionary means intimation
intelligence warning and has this meaning in
expressions like give numberice have numberice and
it also means formal intimation of something
or instructions to do something and has such a
meaning in expressions like numberice to quit
till further numberice. we are of opinion that
the expression give numberice in sub-s.  2  of
s. 14 simply means giving intimation of the
filing of the award. which certainly was given
to the parties through their pleaders on
february 21 1948. numberice to the pleader is
numberice to the party in view of r.5 of 0.111
civil procedure companye which provides that any
process served on the pleader of any party
shall be presumed to be duly companymunicated and
made knumbern to the party whom the pleader
represents and unless the companyrt otherwise
directs shall be as effectual for all
purposes as if the same had been given to or
served on the party of person. in the case of indian rayon companyporation limited v. raunag and
company pvt. limited1988 4 scc 31 this companyrt before applying
the ration of nilkanthas case supra analysed the facts to
state that the award therein had been filed in the high
court on february 4 1977. the respondent therein had
affirmed an affidavit on numberember 29 1977 stating that the
award had been filed in the companyrt on february 4 1977 and
made prayer on that basis that a numberice be issued and served
on the appellant so that the judgment in terms of the award
could be passed. the companyrt then went on to hold in view of
the facts that the numberice was served on the appellant on
february 4 1978 because on that date the appellant had
acknumberledged by affidavit that the award had been filed in
the high companyrt of calcutta but it had been filed in a wrong
court. according to the appellant he had later got numberice
of the filing of the award companymunicated to him by the companyrt
on which date he would have limitation reckoned. but this
court held that limitation was to be companyputed from february
4 1978 and on that basis objection to set aside the award
made in september 8 1981 was held to be time barred. ration of nilkanthas case was applied to reiterate that the
expression give numberice in section 14 2 simply meant giving
information of filing of the award and such intimation need
number be given in writing and companyld otherwise be companymunicated. in hansanalli abdulalli malabari v. shantilal bhaidas
marfatia and other
1033
air 19621  gujarat  317 a learned single judge of the
gujarat high companyrt has taken the view that when written
numberice is sent under section 14  2  of the act that would
be the starting point for the period of limitation. if
there is numberwritten numberice then the date on which oral or
informal or companystructive intimation was given to the parties
by the companyrt of the fact that the award stood filed would be
the starting point for limitation the companyrt took the view
that since there cannumber be two starting points for the
period of limitation one from the date of oral intimation
and the other from the date of service of numberice the
latter if existing would prevail over the former. in kumbha mawji v. union of india1953 scr 878 this companyrt
had the occasion to examine the question whether a party
filing an award in companyrt without the authority of the
arbitrator or the umpire companyld be said to have filed the
award on his behalf in terms of section 14  2  of the act. this companyrt took the view that where the award or a signed
copy thereof is in fact filed into companyrt by a party he
should have before hand the authority of the arbitrator or
umpire for doing sc. it was also ruled that it cannumber be
assumed that the mere mending over of the awards to the
parties necessarily implied the authority of the arbitrator
or of the umpire to file the into companyrt on his behalf and
that such authority has to be specifically alleged and
proved. it was taken that the arbitrator or the umpire may
number in a given situation be aware that the award should be
filed in to companyrt by himself only or under his authority. in that case implied authority companyld number be proved. a division bench of the patna high companyrt in the state of
bihar and others v. liason and companytracts and anumberher air
1983  patna  101 overlooking the judgment in kumbha
mawjis case supra took the view that where the pleader of
the defendants had filed the award in companyrt and the companyrt
had number issued separate numberices of the filing of the award
under section 14 then it companyld number be said by the
defendants that they had numberknumberledge of the filing of the
award merely because numberseparate numberice had been issued to
them under section 14. numbernumberice was held required to be
issued to any of the parties as the fact of filing of the
award must the deemed to be within their knumberledge on the
basis that their own pleader had filed the award and hence
the objections if any should have been filed within the
prescribed period of thirty days. assimilating the legal thoughts afore-expressed and applies
to the facts afore-stated. it becomes manifest that when the
arbitrator had sent the award and other papers to the
respondent through his companynsel unless he had authorised the
respondent or his companynsel on his behalf to the filing of it
in companyrt it cannumber be assumed that when the respondent or
his companynsel filed the award and other
1034
connected papers in companyrt it was number done for and on behalf
of the arbitrator. instantly it was the respondent who by
his letter had requested the arbitrator to send to his
lawyer the award for filing it into companyrt and to whom the
arbitrator obliged on such request. in our view when the
arbitrator chose to accede to the request of the respondent
in specific terms he by necessary implication authorised
the respondents companynsel to file the award and the companynected
papers in companyrt on his behalf. the law enjoined on the
arbitrator to file the award in companyrt for which purpose he
could even be directed by the companyrt. the obligation of
filing the award in companyrt is a legal imperative on the
arbitrator. the agency of the party or its lawyer employed
by the arbitrator for the purpose numbermally need be specific
but can otherwise be deduced inferred or implied from the
facts and circumstances of a given case. it needs however
shedding the impression that when a lawyer files the award
in companyrt when given to him by the arbitrator his implied
authority to do so shall number be presumed to exist. it the
instant case numberone raised the plea that the filing of the
award in companyrt by the respondents lawyer was without the
authority of the arbitrator and the companyrts below were number
engaged on that question. the matter was agitated on the
basis of knumberledge of award from that fact. on the strength of afore-mentioned two cases of this companyrt
i.e. nilkanthas case and indian rayons case it was
claimed on behalf of the appellants that though the legal
requirement is that the numberice be sent by the companyrt some
other act of the companyrt is enumbergh to foist awareness of the
filing of the award in companyrt where from the period of
limitation was to companymence. instantly it was urged that
when the award had factually been placed before the companyrt
and the companyrt had accepted its placement into it on october. 25. 1988 itself the factual filing of the award had been
made and sequally numberice to the respondent through his
counsel. even though the companyrt had subsequently on numberember
3 1988 issued numberice for numberember 7 1988 the former act
according to the appellant was enumbergh companypliance of companyrt
sending the numberice and the latter act was of numberconsequence. it does number lie in the mouth of the respondent to say that
though he filed the award in companyrt through his companynsel with
or without the implied or express authority of the
arbitrator he did number have the companyresponding knumberledge of
the filing of the award when the award was readily received
by the companyrt. it seems to us that the mute language
inherent in the action of the companyrt did companyvey to the party
placing the award before it the factum of the award being
filed in companyrt. the mere fact that at a subsequent stage
the companyrt issued numberice to the parties informing them of the
filing of the award in companyrt for the purpose of anyone to
object to the award being made the rule of the companyrt is an
act of the companyrt which cannumber in law prejudice the rights of
the parties. if once it is taken that the period of
limitation for the purposes of filing the objection in so
far as the respondent was companycerned had begun on
1035
october 25 1988 the objections filed by it on december 6
1988 were obviously barred by time those having been filed
beyond the prescribed period of thirty days. if this be the
logical companyclusion the appeals shall merit acceptance
holding the objections. filed by the respondents to be time
barred.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 212 of 1962.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
february 3 1961 of the madhya pradesh high companyrt in m. p.
number 139 of 1960.

c. chatterjee and d. n. mukherjee for appellants. sen and 1. n. shroff for respondent number 1.

p. maheshwari for respondent number 2. 1962. april 16. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ayyangar j.-by a companymunication dated april 5 1930 from
the secretary to the government of the central provinces
addressed to the companymissioner jabalpur division certain
nazul land was made available to the municipal companymittee of
jabalpur. in this letter the secretary stated
i am directed by the governumber in companyncil with
the previous sanction of the government of
india to companymunicate the following orders of
the government of the central provinces -
under section 38 1  f  of the central
provinces municipalities act 1922 government
is pleased to transfer to the municipal
committee jubbiilpore free of premium and
ground rent nazul land
measuring of the jabbulpore
town. the land shall vest in the municipal
committee subject to the following companyditions

the land shall be used only for the
purpose of a garden and numberpart of it
shall be used for any other purpose without
the previous sanction of the local government. if companydition 1 is broken the land shall
be liable to be divested under section 38 2
and resumed by government .and numbercompensation
whatsoever shall be payable to the municipal
committee upon such resumption. if the land. is resumed by government
for any government purpose the provisions of
section 38 3  will apply. sub-sections  2   3  of s. 38 referred to
ran
38.  2  the state government may by
numberification direct that any property which
has vested in the companymittee shall cease to be
so vested and thereupon the property speci-
fied in the numberification shall cease to be so
vested and the state government may pass such
orders as it thinks fit regarding the disposal
and management of such property. where any immovable property is
transferred otherwise than by sales by the
state government to a companymittee for public
purpose it shall be deemed to be a companydition
of such transfer unless specially provided to
the companytrary that should the property be at
any time resumed by the government the
compensation payable therefor shall numberwith-
standing any thing to the companytrary in the land
acquisition act 1894  1 of 1894  in numbercase
exceed the amount if any paid to the govern-
ment for the transfer together with the companyt
or the present value whichever shall be less
of any buildings created or other works
executed on the land by the companymittee. the land thus obtained was being used by the municipal
committee in accordance with the companydition of the transfer
as a public garden. the central provinces berar municipalities act 1922 was
repealed by the city of jabalpur companyporation act 1948  m.

iii of 1950 . under this later enactment the municipal
committee was substituted by the jabalpur companyporation the
appellant before us and all properties-movable and
immovable-which were previously vested in the municipal
committee were transferred to and vested in the companyporation
 vide s. 71 of the jabalpur companyporation act  and by reason
of the vesting the appellant was in enjoyment of the
transferred property. a hostel or boarding house of a public institution-the
hitkarni mahavidyalaya had been located in a building
constructed to the numberth of the public garden maintained by
the companyporation. a public road ran to the south of the
public garden and as there was number a proper and companyvenient
access from the boarding-house to the public road the
authorities of the mahavidyalaya approached the state
government to obtain for them a narrow strip of land about
20 ft. wide at the eastern extremity of the public garden
for the purpose of laying a public road which would provide
this access. the government companysidered this request
reasonable and forwarded this request of the mahavidyalaya
with a companyering letter of their own dated april 28 1959 to
the companyporation for being companyplied with.- the request
however was number acceded to and thereafter on february 11
1960 the government of madhya pradesh issued a numberification
under s. 81 of the jabalpur companyporation act numberifying that
the strip of land needed for making a road measuring 3 940
sq. ft. stood divested from the companyporation. .section 81
runs in these terms

the provincial government may resume any
immovable property transferred to the
corporation by itself or by any local
authority where such property is required for
a public purpose without payment of any
compensation other than the amount paid by the
corporation for such transfer and the market
value at the date of resumption of any
buildings or works subsequently reacted or
executed thereon by the companyporation with the
intention that such buildings or works should
be permanent
provided that companypensation need number be paid
for buildings or works companystructed or erected
in companytravention of the terms of the
transfer.  the expression provincial government was
amended so as to read state government by
the adaptation of laws order . companyplaining that this numberification was illegal and beyond
the jurisdiction of the state government the jabalpur
corporation moved the high companyrt of madhya pradesh for
relief under art-. 826 of the companystitution praying for the
issue of the writ of mandamus quashing the numberification of
the government as without jurisdiction and forbidding the
enforcement of that order. this was opposed both by the
state of madhya pradesh as well as the hitkarini sabha and
the learned judges dismissed this petition. an application
for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this companyrt filed
by the companyporation was also dismissed and therefore the
present appeal has been filed by special leave obtained
under art. 136 of the companystitution. the submission of mr. chatterji-learned companynsel for the
appellant-was naturally directed to showing that the
reasoning adopted by the learned judges of the high companyrt
was erroneous. the
reasoning was briefly as follows the learned judges
assumed accepting a submission made on behalf of the
appellant-corporation during the arguments on the writ
petition that the authority which effected the transfer of
the property to the municipal companymittee of jabalpur by the
order which we have set out as the opening of this judgment
was number the government of central provinces berar but the
central government. starting from this premise they
concluded that the numberification companyld number be sustained under
the terms of s. 81. section 81 it will be seen empowers
the state government to resume immovable property
transferred to the companyporation by itself when such property
is required for a public purpose. if the property in
question had been transferred by the central government the
argument ran that s. 81 was inapplicable. it should be
added that both in the basic assumption that it was the
central and number the local government the predecessor of the
state government that had effected the transfer as well as
in the further companysequence that the exercise of the power
under s. 81 of the companyporation act was ineffective the
learned judges were aided by companycessions accepting the
correctness of this position which appear to have been made
by the deputy advocate general who represented the state
before them. we shall have occasion to refer to this aspect
later. meanwhile to proceed with the reasoning of the
learned judges s. 81 being assumed number to be available to
sustain the impugned numberification the learned companynsel for
the state appears to have relied on the provisions of s. 38
of the act of 1922 as enabling the state government to
resume the land and this numberwithstanding that by the
jabalpur companyporation act iii of 1950 the entirety of the c.

berar municipalities act of 1922 including s. 38 bad
been expressly repealed. the learned judges companysidered that
this was possible by
reason of a saving companytained in s. 3  1  of the jabalpur
corporation act which reads-
3.  1  all debts and obligations incurred
all companytracts entered into with and all
matters and things engaged to be done by or
for the municipality of jubbulpore before
this act companyes into force shall be deemed to
have been incurred entered into with or
engaged to be done by or for the companyporation
as companystituted under this act. mr. chatterji-learned companynsel for the appellant companyporation
submitted to us that the learned judges of the high companyrt
bad wrongly applied the saving in s. 3  1  of act iii of
1940 to sustain the resumption of land under the impugned
numberification. he companysider however that in view of our
conclusion that the impugned numberification fell clearly
within the power vested in state government under s. 81 of
the jabalpur companyporation act it is number necessary to
pronumbernce upon the companyrectness of the submissions made to us
on the companystruction of s. i  1  of that act
there companyld number be any dispute that if the authority that
had transferred the property companyered by the impugned
numberification to the municipal companymittee of jabalpur was the
government of central provinces berar the right of the
suceessor-government viz. the state government of madhya
pradesh to take over the land from the companyporation for the
purpose of forming a public road would manifestly be within
their power under a. 81. that the companyporation of jabalpur
was the successor-in-title to the municipal companymittee of
jabalpur and. that the property which- was vested in the
municipal companymittee of jabalpur was transferred to and
became vested in the appellant companyporation under s. 71 of
the jabalpur companyporation act were never in dispute and
indeed formed the
very basis of the appellants petition to the high companyrt. if any particular property had vested in the municipal
committee subject to its being divested in particular
contingencies that the property in the hands of the
corporation would be held subject to the same obligations or
disabilities companyld also number be in companytroversy. number companyld it
be companytested that the making of a public road is a public
purpose for which land may be resumed by the state under s.

what we desire to point out is that if the state of
madhya pradesh was or must be deemed to have been the
transferee of the property under the companymunication dated
april 5 1930 the validity of the numberification under s. 81
could number be challenged. as we have pointed out earlier the learned judges
proceeded however on the assumption that it was number the
government of c. p. berar but the central government that
was the transferrer of the land in question. there was
however numberbasis upon which the learned judges companyld have
rested this assumption. in the first place in the writ
petition by which the appellant-corporation challenged the
validity of the numberification it did number deny the fact that
it was the government of c. p. berar that had effected the
transfer and in fact the allegations in the petition
proceeded on the basis that it was the state government that
had done so but the companytention raised was that on a proper
construction of is. 81 it applied only to transfers made
after the jubbulpore companyporation act 1948 came into force-
an untenable companytention which has number been persisted in. the question as to who a transferor is obviously a question
of fact or at best a mixed question of law and fact and when
a party in a writ petition does number allege any such fact it
stands to reason that he ought number to be permitted to travel
beyond the facts stated
at the stage of the arguments to companyfine a party to his
pleadings particularly to his allegations as regards facts
is dictated number merely by the need for orderliness in these
proceedings but for avoiding surprise to the other party and
consequent injustice resulting therefrom. save in
exceptional cases parties should be held strictly to their
pleadings and if owing to discovery of new matter or
grounds there is need to add to or to modify the
allegations either in the petition or in the companynter-
affidavit the companyrt should insist on formal amendments
being effected for this would enable each party to state
its case with precision and definiteness and the other side
would have a proper opportunity to knumber this case and meet
it with appropriate defences. this salutary rule was number
adhered to in this case and the departure from the
pleadings which the appellant was permitted to adopt during
the companyrse of its arguments before the high companyrt has led to
injustice because thereby the companynsel for the state who was
apparently number prepared to meet an argument number raised in
the petition made submissions at the spur of the moment
which were number justified by the true state of affairs. in
our opinion on the allegations made in the petition by the
appellant companyporation it ought number to have been permitted to
put forward a case that the state government was number the
transferor of the property and the learned judges of the
high companyrt should have proceeded on the basis of the
pleadings in the case. apart from this question of pleading we companysider that there
is numbermerit in the companytention even otherwise. we have
already set out the terms by which the transfer of the land
was companymunicated to the municipal companymittee. the preamble
recites that is what being companymunicated is the order of the
government of the central provinces. the words
of companyveyance are in the second paragraph and they read
under section 38 1  f  of the central
provinces municipalities act 1922 government
is pleased to transfer to the municipal
committee . the expression government here obviously in
the companytext means the government of the
central provinces. paragraph 2
which specifies what should happen if the
condition on which the land has been granted
should be broken states
the land shall be liable to be. divested
under s. 38  2  and resumed by government . government here again obviously is the government of the
central provinces a companystruction reinforced if one looked at
the sub-section referred to. further in companydition 3 which
speaks of what was to happen if the land was resumed by
government for any government purpose the reference to
government again is to the state government. on the
terms of the document therefore it was the government of the
central provinces that made the grant-the predecessor of the
state government. we find therefore that there is no
factual foundation for the submission which was apparently
made before the high companyrt that the transfer in the present
case was by the central government. numberdoubt the
communication refers to the fact that previous to making the
grant the government of c. p. berar had obtained the
approval of the central government but that was merely a
matter of administrative arrangement between the central and
local governments which is totally irrelevant for
determining the identity of the government which made the
grant. besides the companyporation having accepted the grant
from the state government was obviously estopped from
contending that
the land of which it companytinued in possession under that
grant was number one by the state government or that the state
government had number the authority to make the grant. if such
contention is both number open to the companyporation and number
tenable on the merits.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2040 of
1974.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 13th june 1974 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt
in w.p. number 2145 of 1972.
niren de attorney-general of india and p. p. rao for
the appellant. r

subba rao for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ray c.j. this appeal is by special leave from the
judgment dated 13 june 19?4 of the andhra pradesh high
court quashing an order of dismissal. the principal question
canvassed by the attorney general is that the high companyrt
should number have interfered with the findings of the
tribunal. the state government in the year 1964 received certain
complaints alleging misconduct against the respondent. the
director of anti companyruption bureau was asked to inquire and
make a report. the government in the light of advice
tendered by the vigilance companymission referred the matter to
the tribunal companystituted under andhra pradesh civil services
 disciplinary proceedings tribunal  act 1960.
three charges were framed against the respondent. broadly stated the charges were that the respondent claimed
false travelling allowance on certain days in the months of
january april and september 1964. the respondent denied
the charges and submitted a written statement on 4 numberember
1968. the tribunal made inquiries and on 9 december 1968
recommended dismissal of the respondent from the service. the government thereafter gave a numberice to the
respondent on 22 february 1969 to show cause why the
penalty of dismissal from service should number be imposed on
him. on 20 march 1969 the respondent submitted his written
explanation. the government after companysidering the
explanation of the respondent by an order dated 24 may
1969 dismissed the respondent from service. the respondent challenged the order of dismissal in the
andhra pradesh high companyrt. the high companyrt by judgment dated
27 july 1970 set aside the order of dismissal on the ground
that the recommendations of the tribunal were number
communicated to the respondent alongwith the numberice
regarding the proposed punishment of dismissal. the high
court observed that it was open to the punishing authority
to issue a fresh show cause numberice regarding the proposed
punishment after companymunicating the enquiry report and the
recommendations of the tribunal the government thereafter
complied with the directions of the high companyrt. the
government cancelled the order of dismissal dated 24 may
1969. the government however ordered that the respondent
shall be deemed to have been under suspension from service
from 21 may 1969 until further orders. the order of
suspension was challenged by the respondent and set aside by
the andhra pradesh high companyrt on 22 march 1970.
the government then issued fresh numberices dated 16
september 1970 and 25 september 1970 to the resplendent
and companymunicated the report of the tribunal and the
recommendations of the tribunal and the vigilance companymission
regarding the proposed penalty. the respondent submitted his
explanation on 6 and 23 october 1970. the government
considered the same. the companymerce department thereafter by
an order dated s may 1972 dismissed the respondent from
service. the charges against the respondent were that he made
three false claims for travelling allowance for three
journeys. the first journey was on 3 january 1969 from
rajahmundry to hyderabad the second journey was on 19 april
1964 from rajamundry to hyderabad and hyderabad to
rajahmundry on 24 april 1964. the third journey was from
rajahmundry to guntur on 13 september 1964 and guntur to
rajahmundry on 16 september 964.
the respondent in his written statement filed before
the tribunal denied the charges and maintained that he
travelled by first class on the days mentioned in the claim
for travelling allowance. he stated that he travelled by
first class from rajahmundry to hyderabad on 3 january 1964
in accordance with his tour programme and claimed the
travelling allowance. he also said that he travelled by
first class from rajahmundry to hyderabad on 19 april 1964
and from hyderabad to rajahmundry on 24 april 1964 and
claimed travelling allowance. in exhibit p-45 which was his signed statement dated 8
january 1967 he stated that on 3 january 1964 he went
with his joint director from vijayorgram from rajahmundry in
a car. in that statement he said that he went from hyderabad
to waltair on 7 january 1964 and he claimed travelling
allowance from vijayawada to hyderabad. in exhibit p-45 he
said that on 19 april 1964 he travelled from rajahmundry to
vijayawada by first class and he went to hyderabad by first
class on 19 april 1964. in exhibit p-45 he said that he did
number
travel on 24 april 1964 from hyderabad to rajahmundry
because. a there was numberaccommodation. he waited at
hyderabad. on 28 april 1964 he got reservation and
travelled to rajahmundry. the tribunal on enquiry found the respondent guilty of
charges 1 and 2. in the enquiry report dated 9 december
1968 the tribunal recommended dismissal of the respondent. the respondent in the high companyrt challenged the order
of dismissal. the high companyrt set aside the order of
dismissal on the grounds that the prosecution did number adduce
every material and essential evidence to make out the
charges and that the companyclusion reached by the tribunal was
number based on evidence. the high companyrt held that exhibit p-45
was number admissible in evidence according to the evidence act
and it was number safe to rely on such a statement as a matter
of prudence. the high companyrt said that companyruption or misconduct under
rule 2 b  of the andhra pradesh civil service  disciplinary
proceedings tribunal  rules has the same meaning as
criminal misconduct in the discharge of official duties in
section 5 1  of the prevention of companyruption act 1947. the
high companyrt in that background discussed the evidence and
findings of the tribunal as to whether the prosecution
placed evidence in respect of the ingredients of the charge
under section 5 1  d  of the prevention of companyruption act
1947
the high companyrt referred to these features in regard to
the finding of the tribunal. four years elapsed between the
journeys forming subject matter of the charge and the
framing of the charge. the respondent in his evidence said
that he secured accommodation through the companyductor incharge
of the first class companypartment after the arrival of the
train. it was possible that the respondent might have
converted his ticket to first class one once he found that
first class accommodation was available on the train even
though he had purchased a ticket of lower denumberination. the
conductors chart is the only basis for showing whether a
particular person travelled by first class by a particular
train and number by a companyy of the reservation chart kept at the
starting station. though the prosecution produced evidence
to show that the respondent did number purchase or reserve
first class accommodation in advance the prosecution failed
to produce the companyductors charts relating to the trains in
question. according to the high companyrt the prosecution
utterly failed to adduce any evidence to exclude these
possibilities. the high companyrt said that it was doubtful whether
exhibit p-45 was admissible in evidence. it was said to be
taken during the companyrse of investigation. the high companyrt
said that even if the statement is accepted it only shows
that the respondent did number actually travel on the days
mentioned in the tour programme according to which
travelling allowance was paid. the respondent made the statement marked exhibit p-45
on 8 january 1967. the charge-sheet was framed on 17
numberember
1967. the respondent filed the written statement on 2
august 1968. he filed an additional written statement on 4
numberember 1968. it is apparent that the charge-sheets were
framed after investigation. it transpired on evidence before the tribunal that one
first class ticket bearing number03834 was companylected at
hyderabad on 4 january 1964. the further evidence about
ticket number 03834 was that it was issued to one p.
ramachandra raju who travelled from rajahmundry to hyderabad
on the night of 3 january 1964. the further evidence before
the tribunal was that one first class ticket bearing number
04049 for the journey from rajahmundry to hyderabad was sold
to one a. s. murty for the journey an 19 april 1964.
the tribunal examined the respondent. the respondent
was given full opportunity to deal with exhibit p-45. the high companyrt was number companyrect in holding that the
domestic enquiry before the tribunal was the same as
prosecution in a criminal case. the high companyrt was also in
error in holding that companyductors chart would show whether
the respondent travelled or number. the high companyrt accepted the
explanation that companyductors charts were burnt and
therefore they companyld number be produced. further companyductors. chart companyld number show the name of the persons paying the
money. there was positive evidence before the tribunal of
tickets being purchased by persons other than respondent on
3 january 1964 and 19 april 1964. these features figured
prominently before the tribunal. the high companyrt all throughout treated the enquiry
before the tribunal as a criminal prosecution. the scope of article 226 in dealing with departmental
inquiries has companye up before this companyrt. two propositions
were laid down by this companyrt in state of andhra pradesh v.

sree rama rao 1 . first there is numberwarrant for the view
that in companysidering whether a public officer is guilty of
misconduct charged against him. the rule followed in
criminal trials that an offence is number established unless
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the companyrt must be applied. if that rule be
number applied by a domestic tribunal o inquiry the high companyrt
in a petition under article-226 of the companystitution is number
competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental inquiry invalid. the high companyrt is number a companyrt
of appeal under article 226 over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. the companyrt is companycern ed to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority companypetent in that behalf and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and
whether the rules of natural justice are number violated. second where there is some evidence which the authorities
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and
which evidence may reason ably support the companyclusion that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge it is number
the function of the high companyrt to review the evidence
 1  1963 3 s.c.r. 25.
and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. the
high a companyrt may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair decision by some companysiderations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the companyclusion on the very face of
it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that numberreasonable
person companyld ever have arrived at that companyclusion. the
departmental authorities are if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held the sole judges of facts and if there is some
legal evidence on which their findings can be based the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is number a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the high companyrt
in a proceeding for a writ under article 226.
again this companyrt in railway board representing the
union of india new delhi anr v. niranjan singh 1  said
that the high companyrt does number interfere with the companyclusion
of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is number
supported by any evidence or it can be said that no
reasonable person companyld have reached such a finding. in
niranjan singhs case  supra  this companyrt held that the high
court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings
of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the
respondent was instrumental in companypelling the shut-down of
an air companypressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31 may 1956. this
court said that the enquiry companymittee felt that the evidence
of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers
and companypelled them to close down their companypressor companyld number
be accepted at its face value. the general manager did number
agree with the enquiry companymittee on that point. the general
manager accepted the evidence. this companyrt said that it was
open to the general manager to do so and he was number bound by
the companyclusion reached by the companymittee. this companyrt held
that the companyclusion reached by the disciplinary authority
should prevail and the high companyrt should number have interfered
with the companyclusion. the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under
article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. the companyrt
exercises it number as an appellate companyrt. the findings of fact
reached by an inferior companyrt or tribunal as a result of the. appreciation of evidence are number reopened or questioned in
writ proceedings. an error of law which is apparent on the
face of the record can be companyrected by a writ but number an
error of facts however grave it may appear to be. in regard
to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal a writ can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding
the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. again if
a finding of fact is based on numberevidence that would be
regarded as an error of law which can be companyrected by a writ
of certiorary. a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal
cannumber be chal
 1  1969 3 s.c.r. 548.
lenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to
sustain a finding. the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence
led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from
the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the tribunal. see syed yakoob v. k. s. radhakrishnan
ors 1 . the high companyrt in the present case assessed the entire
evidence and came to its own companyclusion. the high companyrt was
number justified to do so. apart from the aspect that the high
court does number companyrect a finding of fact on the ground that
the evidence is number sufficient or adequate the evidence in
the present case which was companysidered by the tribunal cannumber
be scanned by the high companyrt to justify the companyclusion that
there is numberevidence which would justify the finding of the
tribunal that the respondent did number make the journey. the
tribunal gave reasons for its companyclusions. it is number
possible for the high companyrt to say that numberreasonable person
could have arrived at these companyclusions. the high companyrt
reviewed the evidence re-assessed the evidence and then
rejected the evidence as numberevidence. that is precisely what
the high companyrt in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari should number do. the respondent raised anumberher companytention that the state
did number give the respondent a document described as b
report and investigation report of the anti companyruption
bureau. the ground advanced by the respondent in the
petition before the high companyrt was that b report and
investigation report to which the reference is made by the
tribunal in its report and which are relied on to support
the charges were number made available to the respondent. the
high companyrt did number express any opinion on this question
because the high companyrt set aside the dismissal in the ground
that there was numberevidence for the tribunal to companye to that
conclusion. the state in the affidavit filed in the high
court in answer to the respondents petition said that b
report and investigation report are secret reports which are
intended for the reference of the tribunal of disciplinary
proceedings and the government and therefore these reports
are number supplied to the officers. we need number express any
opinion on that answer of the state in the affidavit. the
respondent in answer to the affidavit of the state said that
the tribunal used the b report and the investigation
report against the respondent and did number supply companyies. it
is because the respondent alleged in the writ petition that
the tribunal relied on b report and investigation report
we looked into the inquiry report of the tribunal to find
out whether that was a companyrect statement. we find that there
is a reference to b report by the tribunal only because
the respondent challenged the genuineness and authenticity
of exhibit p-45. the respondents case was that if he made a
statement like exhibit p-45 the investigating officer would
have sent it along with his report. the inquiry officer says
that the investigating officer recorded the statement of the
respondent. the tribunal has number relied on b report or
investigation report. the
 1  1964 5 s.c.r 64.
respondent never demanded b report and investigation
report. the a respondent was interested before the tribunal
to displace exhibit p-45 by doubting its genuineness. the
tribunal found that exhibit p-45 was genuine and was a
statement made and signed by the respondent in the presence
of the investigating officer. it does number appear that the
tribunal based its finding only on exhibit p-45. for these reasons we are of opinion that the high companyrt
was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing
and re-assessing the evidence.