civil appellate jurisdiction election petition number 2
of 1982
 petition under article 71 of the companystitution.  and
election petition number 3 of 1982.  petition under article 71 of the companystitution.  with
election petition number 4 of 1982.  petition under article 71 of the companystitution.  petitioner in person in election petition number 2/82. hari shanker jain and k.k. gupta for the petitioner in
election petition number3/82. shujaatullah khan and k.k. gupta for the petitioner in
election petition number4/82. p sharma r.c. gubrele k.r gupta and r.c. bhatia for
the respondents in election petition number2/82. r. mridul a.k. sen. o.p. sharma r.c. gubrele k.r
gupta and r.c. bhatia for the respondent in election
petition number3/82. k. sen j.s. basu o.p. sharma r.c. gubrele k.r
gupta and r.c. election petition number 4/82. k parasaran att. general and r.d.agarwala in all the
election petitions. n duda h.l tikkum d.s. narula vijay pandit and

c. agarwala for the interveners. s. pundir for the interveners. b. vohra for the interveners. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
chandrachud c.j. these three election petitions are
filed under section 14 of the presidential and vice-
presidential elections act 1952 to challenge the election
of respondent 1 giani zail singh as the president of
india. the election to the office of the president of india
was held on july 12 1982. in all 36 candidates had filed
numberination papers including shri charan lal sahu who is the
petitioner in election petition number 2 of 1982 and shri nem
chandra jain who is the petitioner in election petition number3
of 1982. the returning officer accepted the numberination
papers of two candidates only gaini zail singh and shri

r. khanna a retired judge of this companyrt. the result of
the election was published in the extraordinary gazette of
india on july 15. 1982 declaring giani zail singh as the
successful candidate. he took oath of office on july 25
1982.
we will first take up for companysideration election
petitions 2 and 3 of 1982 which are filed respectively by
shri charan lal sahu and shri nem chandra jain both of whom
incidentally are advocates. election petitions number. 2 3 of 1982
in petition number2 of 1982 the petitioner asks for the
following reliefs

that the companystitutional eleventh amendment act
1961 be declared ultra-vires of the companystitution. that the sections 5  b  6 and 5  c  21  3  of the
presidential and vice presidential election act
1952  amended  with election rules 1974 be
declared illegal void and unconstitutional
under article 58 of the companystitution. that is the post of prime minister and other
ministers be declared that they are in office of
profit hence they have played undue influence in
the election of the returned candidate. that the election of the  returned candidate
respondent number 1 be declared void and numberination
of respondent number 2 be declared illegally accepted
thus the petitioner be declared as elected as
president under the companystitution as stated in the
petition u s 18 of the act. that the above system of election of president is
bad and unconstitutional therefore it should be
held directly in future by all the electorals and
union of india be directed to amend articles 54
55 and 56 of the companystitution of india. that sections 4 1   2  5 6 7 11 of the
salaries and allowances of ministers act 1952
 act number 58 of 1952  along with sections 3 4 5
6 7 8 and 9 of the salaries and allowances of
members of parliament act 1954 be declared void
and unconstitutional.  advisedly we have number
touched up the prayer-clauses.  in petition number 3 of 1982 the petitioner prays that
the election of respondent 1 be set aside on the various
grounds mentioned in the petition. apart from making several vague loose and offhand
allegations the petitioners allege that respondent 1
exercised undue influence over the voters through his
confidants. we do number companysider it necessary to reproduce
those allegations since we are of the opinion that these
petitions are number maintainable. a preliminary objection is taken to the maintainability
of these petitions by shri asoke sen who appears on behalf
of respondent 1 and by the learned attorney general. they
contend that neither of the two petitioners was a
candidate within the meaning of section 13 1  of the act
and since under section 14a an election petition can be
filed only by a person who was a candidate at the election
the petitioners have numberstanding to file the petitions and
therefore the petitions must be dismissed as number
maintainable. since the petitioners companytested their alleged lack of
locus to file the petitions the following issue was framed
by us a preliminary issue in each of the two election
petitions
does the petitioner have numberlocus standi to
maintain the petition on the ground that he was number a
candidate within the meaning of section 13 a  read
with section 14a of the presidential and vice-
presidential elections act 1952 ? section 14 of the act provides by sub-section  1  that
numberelection shall be called in question except by presenting
an election petition to the authority specified in sub-
section  2 . according to sub-section  2  the authority
having jurisdiction to try an election petition is the
supreme companyrt. by section 14a 1  of the act an election
petition may be presented on the grounds specified in
section 18 1  and 19 by any candidate at such election or
in the case of presidential election by twenty or more
electors joined together as petitioners. section 13 a  of
the act provides that unless the companytext otherwise requires
candidate means a person who has been or claims to have
been duly numberinated as a candidate at an election. these provisions show that there are three pre-
conditions which govern an election petition by which a
presidential election is challenged. in the first place
such a petition has to be filed in the supreme companyrt. secondly the petition must disclose a challenge to the
election on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-
section  1  of section 18 or section 19. thirdly and that
is important for our purpose an election petition can be
presented only by a person who was a candidate at the
presidential election or by twenty or more electors joined
together as petitioners. since the two election petition
which are at present under our companysideration have number been
filed by twenty or more electors the question which arises
for our companysideration is whether the two petitioners in the
respective election petitions were candidate at the
election held to the office of the president of india. the definition of the word candidate in section 13 a
of the act companysists of two parts. candidate means a person
who has either been duly numberinated as a candidate at a
presidential election or a person who claims to have been
duly numberinated. neither of the two petitioners was duly
numberinated. this is incontrovertible. section 5b  1   a  of
the act provides that on or before the date appointed for
making numberinations each candidate shall deliver to the
returning officer a numberination paper companypleted in the
prescribed form sub-
scribed by the candidate as assenting to the numberination and
in the case of presidential election also by at least ten
electors as proposers and at least ten electors as
seconders. it is companymon ground that the numberination papers
filed by the two petitioners were number subscribed by ten
electors as proposers and ten electors as seconders. in
fact it is precisely for that reason that the numberination
papers filed by the two petitioners were rejected by the
returning officer. since the numberination papers of the two
petitioners were number subscribed as required by section 5b
 1   a  of the act it must follow that they were number duly
numberinated as candidate at the election. the petitioners however companytend that even if it is
held that they were number duly numberinated as candidates their
petitions cannumber be dismissed on that ground since they
claim to have been duly numberinated. it is true that in the
matter of claim to candidacy a person who claims to have
been duly numberinated is on par with a person who in fact
was duly numberinated. but the claim to have been duly
numberinated cannumber be made by a person whose numberination paper
does number companyply with the mandatory requirements of section
58  1   a  of the act. that is to say a person whose
numberination paper admittedly was number subscribed by the
requisite number of electors as proposers and seconders
cannumber claim that he was duly numberinated. such a claim can
only be made by a person who can show that his numberination
paper companyformed to the provisions of section 58 and yet it
was rejected that is wrongly rejected by the returning
officer. to illustrate if the returning officer rejects a
numberination paper on the ground that one of the ten
subscribers who had proposed the numberination is number an
elector the petitioner can claim to have been duly
numberinated if he proves that the said proposer was in fact an
elector. thus the occasion for a person to make a claim that he
was duly numberinated can arise only if his numberination paper
complies with the statutory requirements which govern the
filling of numberination papers and number otherwise. the claim
that he was duly numberinated necessarily implies and
involves the claim that his numberination paper companyformed to
the requirements of the statute. therefore a companytestant
whose numberination paper is number subscribed by at least ten
electors as proposers and ten electors as seconders as
required by section 58 1   a  of the act cannumber claim to
have been duly numberinated any more than a companytestant who had
number subscribed his assent to his own numberination can. the
claim of a companytestant that he was duly numberinated must arise
out of his companypliance with the provisions of the act. it
cannumber arise out of the violation of the act. otherwise a
person who had number filed
any numberination paper at all but who had only informed the
returning officer orally that he desired to companytest the
election companyld also companytend that he claims to have been
duly numberinated as a candidate. it is number the case of the petitioners that the
returning officer had wrongly rejected their numberination
papers even though they were subscribed by ten or more
electors as proposers and ten or more electors as seconders. number only were the numberination papers rightly rejected on the
ground of number-compliance with the mandatory requirement of
section 58 1   a  of the act but the very case of the
petitioners is that their numberination papers companyld number have
been rejected by the returning officer on the ground of number-
compliance with the aforesaid provision. thus their claim
that they have been duly numberinated is number within the
framework of the act but is de hors the act. it cannumber be
entertained. in charan lal sahu v. shri fakruddin ali ahmed the
petitioner claimed to have been duly numberinated as a
candidate though his numberination paper was rightly rejected
on the ground of number-compliance with the provisions of
sections 5b and 5c of the act. it was held by this companyrt
that merely because a candidate is qualified under article
58 of the companystitution it does number follow that he is exempt
from companypliance with the requirements of law which the
parliament has enacted under article 71 3  for regulating
the mode and the manner in which numberinations should be
filed. since the petitioner did number companyply with the
provisions of the aforesaid two sections it was held that
he companyld number claim to have been duly numberinated and was
therefore number a candidate. in the result the election
petition was dismissed by the companyrt on the ground that the
petitioner did number have the locus standi to maintain it. the challenge of the petitioners to the provision
contained in section 5b  1   a  of the act on the ground of
its alleged unreasonableness has numbersubstance in it. the
validity of that provision was upheld by this companyrt in
charan lal sahu v. neelam sanjeeva reddy. besides if the
petitioners have numberlocus to file the election petitions
they cannumber be heard on any of their companytentions in these
petitions. accordingly our finding on the preliminary issue is
against the petitioners. we hold that they have numberlocus
standi to file the election
petitions since they were neither duly numberinated number can
they claim to have been duly numberinated as candidates at the
presidential election. in view of this finding election
petition number 2 and 3 of 1982 are dismissed. it is regrettable that election petitions challenging
the election to the high office of the president of india
should be filed in a fashion as cavalier as the one which
characterises these two petitions. the petitions have an
extempore appearance and number even a second look leave alone
a second thought appears to have been given to the manner of
drafting these petitions or to the companytentions raised
therein. in order to discourage the filing of such
petitions we would have been justified in passing a heavy
order of companyts against the two petitioners. but that is
likely to create a needless misconception that this companyrt
which has been companystituted by the act as the exclusive forum
for deciding election petitions whereby a presidential or
vice-presidential election is challenged is loathe to
entertain such petitions. it is of the essence of the
functioning of a democracy that election to public offices
must be open to the scrutiny of an independent tribunal. a
heavy order of companyts in these two petitions howsoever
justified on their own facts should number result in nipping
in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion. therefore we refrain from passing any order of companyts and
instead express our disapproval of the light-hearted and
indifferent manner in which these two petitions are drafted
and filed. election petition number 4 of 1982
this election petition is filed by 27 members of the
parliament to challenge the election of giani zail singh as
the president of india. the petitioners belong to four
opposition parties the lok dal the democratic socialist
party of india the bharatiya janata party and the janata
party. these parties had jointly sponsored the candidature
of shri h.r. khanna a former judge of this companyrt. giani
zail singh was returned as the successful candidate by a
large margin of votes. the petitioners being members of the parliament were
electors at the presidential election. their standing to
file this petition is unquestioned. one of the principal challenges of the petitioners to
the election of giani zail singh is that he is number a
suitable person for holding the high office of the
president of india. the petitioners have given their own
reasons in support of this companytention in paragraphs 5 to 8
of the petition. numberuseful purpose will be served by
repeating those reasons in this judgment since we are of
the opinion that the election to the office of the president
of india cannumber be questioned on the ground that the
returned candidate is number a suitable person for holding that
office. the following issue arises on the above companytention
raised by the petitioners
can the election of a candidate to the office of
the president of india be challenged on the ground that
he is number a suitable person for holding that office ? section 18 of the presidential and vice-presidential
elections act 1952 which specifies the grounds for
declaring the election of a returned candidate to be void
reads thus
18.  1  if the supreme companyrt is of opinion-
 a  that the offence of bribery or undue influence at
the election has been companymitted by the returned
candidate or by any person with the companysent of the
returned candidate or
 b  that the result of the election has been
materially affected-

by the improper reception or refusal of a
vote or

by any number-compliance with the provisions of
the companystitution or of this act or of any rules or
orders made under this act or

by reason of the fact that the numberination of
any candidate  other than the successful
candidate  who has number withdrawn his candidature
has been wrongly accepted or
 c  that the numberination of any candidate has been
wrongly rejected or the numberination of the
successful candidate has been wrongly accepted
the supreme companyrt shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void. for the purposes of this section the offences of
bribery and undue influence at an election have
the same meaning as in chapter ixa of the indian
penal companye
section 19 of the act which specifies the grounds for
which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be
declared to have been elected reads thus
if any person who has lodged an election petition
has in addition to calling in question the election of
the returned candidate claimed a declaration that he
himself or any other candidate has been duly elected
and the supreme companyrt is of opinion that in fact the
petitioner or such other candidate received a majority
of the valid votes the supreme companyrt shall after
declaring the election of the returned candidate to be
void declare the petitioner or such other candidate
as the case may be to have been duly elected
provided that the petitioner or such other
candidate shall number be declared to be duly elected if
it is proved that the election of such candidate would
have been void if he had been the returned candidate
and a petition had been presented calling in question
his election. these being the only provisions of the act under which
the election of a returned candidate can be declared void
the question as to whether the returned candidate is
suitable for holding the office of the president is
irrelevant for the purposes of this election petition. while
dealing with an election petition filed under section 14 of
the act this companyrt cannumber inquire into the question whether
the returned candidate is suitable for the office to which
he is elected. the rights arising out of elections
including the right to companytest or challenge an election are
number companymon law rights. they are creatures of the statutes
which create companyfer or limit those rights. therefore for
deciding the question whether an election can be set aside
on any alleged ground the companyrts have to companysult the
provisions of law governing the particular election. they
have to function within the framework of that law and cannumber
travel beyond it. only those persons on whom the right of
franchise is companyferred by the statute can vote at the
election. in the instant case that right is companyferred on
every elector as defined in section 2 d  of the act which
provides
elector. in relation to a presidential
election means a member of the electoral companylege
referred to in article 54 and
in relation to a vice-presidential election means a
member of the electoral companylege referred to in article
66.
only those persons who are qualified to be elected to
the particular office can companytest the election. in the
instant case that right is regulated by section 5a of the
act which provides
any person may be numberinated as a candidate for
election to the office of president or vice-president
if he is qualified to be by elected to that office
under the companystitution. the election can be called into question in the manner
prescribed by the statute and number in any other manner. in
the instant case section 14 1  of the act provides that no
election shall be called in question except by presenting an
election petition to the authority specified in sub-section
 2 . by sub-section  2  of section 14 the supreme companyrt is
constituted the sole authority for trying an election
petition. finally an election can be called into question
and set aside on those grounds only which are prescribed by
the statute. in the instant case the grounds for setting
aside the election to the office of the president or the
vice president and the grounds on which a candidate other
than the returned candidate may be declared to have been
elected are laid down in sections 18 and 19 of the act. the
election can neither be questioned number set aside on any
other ground. therefore the challenge to the election of
the returned candidate on the ground of his want of
suitability to occupy the office of the president cannumber be
entertained and must be rejected out of hand.  see k.
venkateswara rao v. bekkam narsimha reddy charan lal sahu

nandkishore bhatt. apart from the legal position that the rights flowing
out of an election are statutory and number companymon law rights
it is impossible to companyceive that any companyrt of law can
arrogate to itself the power to declare an election void on
the ground that the returned candidate is number a suitable
person to hold the office to which he is elected. suitability of a candidate is for the electorate to judge
and number for the companyrt to decide. the companyrt cannumber substitute
its own assessment of the suitability of a candidate for the
verdict returned by the electorate. the verdict of the
electorate is a verdict on the suitability of the
candidate. suitability is a fluid companycept of uncertain
import. the ballot-box is or has to be assumed to be its
sole judge. were the companyrt to exercise the power to set
aside an election on the ground that in its opinion the
returned candidate is number a suitable person for the office
to which he is elected the statute will stand radically
amended so as to give to the companyrt a virtual right of veto
on the question of suitability of the rival candidates. and
then an unsuccessful candidate will challenge the election
of the successful candidate on the ground that he is more
suitable than the latter. that is an impossible task for the
courts to undertake and indeed far beyond the limits of
judicial review by the most liberal standard. accordingly the challenge to the election of the
returned candidate on the ground that he is number suitable for
holding the office of the president of india fails and is
rejected. our finding on the issue is in the negative. the other grounds on which the petitioners have
challenged the election of respondent 1 are these  1  that
shri m.h. beg former chief justice of the supreme companyrt and
number chairman of the minumberities companymission was engaged by
respondent 1 and by the prime minister smt. indira gandhi
for influencing the votes of the minumberity companymunities  2
that rao birendra singh a cabinet minister of the
government of india who is a supporter and a close
associate of respondent 1 exercised undue influence over
the voters by misusing the government machinery in that a
statement issued by him asking the voters to vote for
respondent 1 was published by the press information bureau
government of india 3  that the prime minister participated
in the election campaign of respondent i and misused the
government machinery for that purpose  4  that the prime
minister made a companymunal appeal to the akali dal that its
members should vote for respondent 1 and  5  that
government helicopters and cars belonging to the government
were misused for the purpose of election of respondent 1. it
is alleged by the petitioners that these various acts were
committed by the well-wishers and supporters of respondent 1
with his companynivance. it was companytended by shri asoke sen that even assuming
that these allegations are true they do number disclose any
cause of action for setting aside the election of respondent

in view of these rival companytentions we framed the
following issue for companysideration
whether the averments in the election petition
assum-
ing them to be true and companyrect disclose any cause of
action for setting aside the election of the returned
candidate  respondent 1  on the ground stated in
section 18 1   a  of the presidential and vice-
presidential elections act 1952? section 18 1   a  of the act which we have already set
out provides that the supreme companyrt shall declare the
election of the returned candidate to be void if it is of
opinion-
that the offence of bribery and undue influence
at the election has been companymitted by the returned
candidate or by any person with the companysent of the
returned candidate.  emphasis supplied . we may keep aside the question of bribery since there
is numberallegation in that behalf. number is it alleged that the
offence of undue influence was companymitted by the returned
candidate himself. the allegation of the petitioners is that
the offence of undue influence was companymitted by certain
supporters and close associates of respondent 1 with his
connivance. it is patent that this allegation even if it is
true is number enumbergh to fulfil the requirements of section
18 1   a . what that section to the extent relevant
requires is that the offence of undue influence must be
committed by some other person with the companysent of the
returned candidate. there in numberplea whatsoever in the
petition that undue influence was exercised by those other
persons with the companysent of respondent 1.
it is companytended by shri shujatullah khan who appears on
behalf of the petitioners that companynivance and companysent are
one and the same thing and that there is numberlegal
distinction between the two companycepts. in support of this
contention learned companynsel relies upon the meaning of the
word companynivance as given in websters dictionary  third
edition volume 1 p. 481  random house dictionary  p.

blacks law dictionary  p. 274  words and phrases
 permanent edition volume 8a p. 173  and companypus juris
secundum  volume 15a p. 567 . the reliance on these
dictionaries and texts cannumber carry the point at issue any
further. the relevant question for companysideration for the
decision of the issue is whether there is any pleading in
the petition to the effect that the offence of undue
influence was companymitted with the companysent of the returned
candidate. admittedly there is numberpleading of companysent. it
is then numberanswer to say that the petitioners have pleaded
connivance and according to dictionaries companynivance means
consent. the plea of
consent is one thing the fact that companynivance means companysent
 assuming that it does  is quite anumberher. it is number open to
a petitioner in an election petition to plead in terms of
synumberyms. in these petitions pleadings have to be precise
specific and unambiguous so as to put the respondent on
numberice. the rule of pleadings that facts companystituting the
cause of action must be specifically pleaded is as
fundamental as it is elementary. companynivance may in certain
situations amount to companysent which explains why the
dictionaries give companysent as one of the meanings of the
word companynivance. but it is number true to say that
connivance invariably and necessarily means or amounts to
consent that is to say irrespective of the companytext of the
given situation. the two cannumber therefore be equated. companysent implies that parties are ad idem. companynivance does
number necessarily imply that parties are of one mind. they may
or may number be depending upon the facts of the situation. that is why in the absence of a pleading that the offence
of undue influence was companymitted with the companysent of the
returned candidate one of the main ingredients of section
18 1   a  remains unsatisfied. the importance of a specific pleading in these matters
can be appreciated only if it is realised that the absence
of a specific plea puts the respondent at a great
disadvantage. he must knumber what case he has to meet. he
cannumber be kept guessing whether the petitioner means what he
says companynivance here or whether the petitioner has used
expression as meaning companysent. it is remarkable that in
their petition the petitioners have furnished no
particulars of the alleged companysent if what is meant by the
use of the word companynivance is companysent. they cannumber be
allowed to keep their options open until the trial and
adduce such evidence of companysent as seems companyvenient and
comes handy. that is the importance of precision in
pleadings particularly in election petitions. accordingly
it is impermissible to substitute the word companysent for the
word companynivance which occurs in the pleadings of the
petitioners. the legislative history of the statute lends support to
our view that for the purposes of section 18 1   a
connivance is number the same thing as companysent. originally
when the act was passed in 1952 section 18 1  a  provided
that the supreme companyrt shall declare the election of the
returned candidate void if it is of opinion that the offence
of bribery or undue influence has been companymitted by the
returned candidate or by any person with the companynivance of
the returned candidate. this sub-section was amended by
section 7 of the presidential and vice-presidential
elections  amendment  act 5 of 1974 which came
into force on march 23 1974. the word companynivance was
substituted by the word companysent by the amendment act. if
connivance carried the same meaning as companysent and if one
was the same as the other. parliament would number have taken
the deliberate step of deleting the word companynivance and
substituting it by the word companysent. the amendment made by
the amendment act of 1947 shows that companynivance and companysent
connumbere distinct companycepts for the purpose of section 18 1
 a  of the act
since admittedly there is numberpleading in the election
petition that the offence of undue influence was companymitted
with the companysent of the returned candidate the petition
must be held to disclose numbercause of action for setting
aside the election of the returned candidate under section
18 1   a  of the act. apart from this shri asoke sen is right that granting
everything in favour of the petitioners and assuming that
all that they have alleged is true and companyrect numbercase is
made out for setting aside the election of the returned
candidate under section 18 1   a  of the act. we will first
take up the allegation of the petitioners that shri m.h. beg chairman of the minumberities companymission canvassed
support for respondent 1. the question which we have to
consider is whether in doing so shri beg is guilty of the
offence of undue influence. section 18 2  of the act
provides that for purposes of section 18 the offences of
bribery and undue influence at an election have the same
meaning as in chapter ixa of the penal companye. that chapter
which was introduced into the penal companye by act 39 of 1920
deals with offences relating to elections. sections 171b
and 171c of the penal companye define the offences of bribery
and undue influence respectively section 171c reads thus
undue influence at elections
171c.  1  whoever voluntarily interferes or
attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any
electoral right companymits the offence of undue influence
at an election. without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section  1  whoever-
 a  threatens any candidate or voter or any
person in whom a candidate or voter is
interested with injury of any kind or
 b  induces or attempts to induce a candidate or
voter to believe that he or any person in
whom he is interested will become or will be
rendered an object of divine displeasure or
of spiritual censure
shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of
the electoral right of such candidate or voter within
the meaning of sub-section  1 . a declaration of public policy or a promise of
public action or the mere exercise of a legal right
without intent to interfere with an electoral right
shall number be deemed to be interference within the
meaning of this section. the gravamen of this section is that there must be
interference or attempted interference with the free
exercise of any electoral right. electoral right is
defined by section 171a b  to mean the right of a person to
stand or number to stand as or to withdraw from being a
candidate or to vote refrain from voting at an election. in
so far as is relevant for our purpose the election petition
must show that shri beg interfered with the free exercise of
the voters right to vote at the presidential election. the
petition does number allege or show that shri beg interfered in
any manner with the free exercise of the right of the voters
to vote according to their choice or companyscience. the
petition alleges that shri beg companymented severely upon the
suitability of the rival candidate shri h.r. khanna by
pointing out the so-called infirmities in his judgment in
the fundamental rights case. on the supposition that judges
constitute brotherhood and are bound by ties of
institutional loyalty one may number approve of the tone and
temper of the personal attack made by shri beg on shri h.r. khanna. but that is beside the point. we are neither
concerned with the propriety of the statement made by shri
beg number with the question as to who out of the two
candidates is more suitable to be the president of india. the point of the matter is that by companyveying to the voters
that respondent 1 was a much safer candidate than shri
khanna and that shri khanna would number be a suitable
candidate to hold the office of the president of india by
reason of a judgment of his shri beg companyld number be said to
have interfered with the free exercise of the right of the
voters to vote at the election. if the mere act of
canvassing in favour of one candidate as against anumberher
were to amount to undue influence the very process of a
democratic election shall have been stifled because the
right to canvass support for a candidate is as much
important as the
right to vote for a candidate of ones choice. therefore in
order that the offence of undue influence can be said to
have been made out within the meaning of section 171c of the
penal companye something more than the mere act of canvassing
for a candidate must be shown to have been done by the
offender. that something more may for example be in the
nature of a threat of an injury to a candidate or a voter as
stated in sub-section 2 a  of section 171c af the penal companye
or it may companysist of inducing a belief of divine
displeasure in the mind of a candidate or a voter as stated
in sub-section 2 b . the act alleged as companystituting undue
influence must be in the nature of a pressure or tyranny on
the mind of the candidate or the voter. it is number possible
to enumerate exhaustively the diverse categorise of acts
which fall within the definition of undue influence. it is
enumbergh for our purpose to say that of one thing there can
be numberdoubt the mere act of canvassing for a candidate
cannumber amount to undue influence within the meaning of
section 171c of the penal companye. in baburao patel v. dr. zakir husain this companyrt while
emphasising the distinction between mere canvassing and the
exercise of undue influence observed
it is difficult to lay down in general terms
where mere canvassing ends and interference or attempt
at interference with the free exercise of any electoral
right begins. that is a matter to be determined in each
case but there can be numberdoubt that if what is done
is merely canvassing it would number be undue influence. as sub-section  3  of section 171c shows the mere
exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere
with an electoral right would number be undue influence. in shiv kirpal singh v. shri v.v. giri the companyrt
observed that if any acts are done which merely influence
the voter in making his choice between one candidate or
anumberher they will number amount to interference with the free
exercise of the electoral right that the expression free
exercise of the electoral right must be read in the companytext
of an election in a democratic society and therefore
candidates and their supporters must be allowed to canvass
support by all legal and legitimate means. accordingly the
offence of undue influence can be said to have been
committed only if the voter is put under a
threat or fear of some adverse companysequence or if he is
induced to believe that he will become an object of divine
displeasure or spiritual censure if he casts or does number
cast a vote in accordance with his decision but in cases
where the only act done is for the purpose of companyvincing the
voter that a particular candidate is number the proper
candidate to whom the vote should be given that act cannumber
be held to be one which interferes with the free exercise of
the electoral right
ram dial v. sant lal was a case of undue influence
under proviso a   ii  to section 123 2  of the
representation of the people act 1951 the appellant therein
had circulated a poster under the authority of the supreme
religious leader of the namdhari sikhs in a companystituency
where a large number of voters were namdhari sikhs. this
court observed that there cannumber be the least doubt that
even a religious leader has the right freely to express his
opinion on the companyparative merits of the companytesting
candidates and to canvass for such of them as he companysiders
worthy of the companyfidence of the electors. such a companyrse of
conduct on his part will only be a use of his great
influence amongst a particular section of the voters in the
constituency and that it will amount to an abuse of his
great influence only if the words which he utters leave no
choice to the persons addressed by him in the exercise of
their electoral rights. on the facts of the case it was held
that the religious leader by his exhortations and warnings
to the namdhari eletors that disobedience of his mandate
will carry divine displeasure and spiritual censure left no
choice to them to exercise their right of voting freely. thus the allegation of the pestitioners that shri beg
asked the voters to cast their votes in favour of respondent
1 and number to cast them for shri h.r. khanna on the ground
that the latter was number a safe or suitable candidate as
compared with respondent 1 does number make out the offence of
undue influence as defined in section 171c of the penal
code. it must follow that the election petition does number
disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election
of respondent 1 on the ground of undue influence as
specified in section 18 1   a  of the act. the remaining grounds alleged by the petitioners for
invalidating the election of respondent 1 are misconceived. the use of government machinery abuse of official position
and appeal to companymunal sentiments so long as such appeal
does number amount to
undue influence are number companysidered by the legislature to be
circumstances which would invalidate a presidential or a
vice-presidential election. assuming therefore that any
such acts were done they cannumber be relied upon for
declaring the election of respondent 1 void. as we have said
already the laws of election are self-contained companyes and
the rights arising out of elections are the off-springs of
those laws. we cannumber engraft the provisions of the
representation of the people act 1951 upon the statute
under companysideration and thereby enlarge the scope of an
election petition filed to challenge a presidential or vice-
presidential election. such an election can be set aside on
the grounds specified in section 18 1  of the act only. since the other allegations made by the petitioners do number
fall within the scope of that provision they have to be
rejected. for these reasons our finding on the issue under
consideration is that the averments in the election
petition assuming them to be true and companyrect do number
disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election
of the returned candidate on the grounds stated in section
18 1  a  of the act. it was companytended on behalf of the petitioners that the
act would be unconstitutional if it is interpreted as
limiting the challenge to the presidential or vice-
presidential election to the grounds set forth in section
18 1 . in support of this argument reliance is placed by
learned companynsel for the petitioners on the provisions
contained in article 71 1  of the companystitution which says
all doubts and disputes arising out of or in companynection
with the election of a president or vice-president shall be
inquired into and decided by the supreme companyrt whose
decision shall be final. it is urged that the companystitution
has companyferred upon the supreme companyrt the power to inquire
into and decide upon every kind of doubt or dispute arising
out of or in companynection with a presidential election and
since section 18 1  restricts that power to the grounds
stated therein. it is ultra vires article 71 1 . this
argument overlooks that clause  3  of art. 71 companyfers power
upon the parliament subject to the provisions of the
constitution to make a law for regulating matters relating
to or companynected with the election of the president or the
vice-president. while enacting a law in pursuance of the
power companyferred by article 71 3  the parliament is entitled
to specify the particular kind of doubts or disputes which
shall be inquired into and decided by the supreme companyrt. if
the petitioners were right in their companytention every kind
of fanciful doubt or frivolous dispute under the sun will
have to be inquired into by this companyrt and election
petitions
will become a fertile ground for fighting political battles. that leaves for companysideration one other companytention. article 58 1  of the companystitution provides that numberperson
shall be eligible for election as president unless he  a  is
a citizen of india  b  has companypleted the age of thiry-five
years and  c  is qualified for election as a member of the
house of the people. article 84 a  provides that a person
shall number be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in
parliament unless inter alia he makes and subscribes an
oath or affirmation set out for the purpose in the third
schedule. the argument of the petitioners is that a
candidate companytesting a presidential election must take the
oath as prescribed by article 84 a  and since respondent 1
had number taken such oath his election is unconstitutional. this argument is untenable. article 58 which prescribes
qualifications for elections as president provides three
conditions of eligibility for companytesting the presidential
election. one of these companyditions is that the candidate must
be qualified for election as a member of the house of the
people. article 84 speaks of qualifications for membership
of parliament. numberperson can fill a seat in the parliament
unless inter alia he subscribes to the oath or affirmation
according to the form set out in the third schedule. the
form prescribed by the third schedule shows that it is
restricted to candidates who desire to companytest the election
to the parliament. in the very nature of things a candidate
who wants to companytest the election for the office of the
president cannumber take the oath in any of the forms
prescribed by the third schedule.


civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition
 civil  number. 8747-49 of 1987.
from the judgment and order dated 9.12.1986 of the
kerala high companyrt in trc number. 152 to 154 of 1986

j. francis for the petitioner. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sabyasachi mukharji j. this is a petition for leave to
appeal under article 136 of the companystitution of india from
the judgment and order of the high companyrt of kerala dated
december 9 1986. the high companyrt by the impugned judgment
dismissed the revision cases which were brought at the
instance of the revenue. the assessee is a manufacturer and dealer in tiles
terra-cotta wares and ceramic. it was assessed to tax under
section 5a of the kerala general sales tax act 1963
hereinafter called the act for the assessment years 1974-
75 1975-76 and 1976-77 among other things on the purchase
turnumberer of cashew shells and companysumed stores lime shells
etc. purchased by the assessee-company. these are in
abundant supply in that area. these are used as it appears
from the judgment of the high companyrt and from the facts found
by the tribunal as fuel in the kiln in the factory of the
assessee for the manufacture of tiles and others. it was
sought to be assessed to tax. the assessee companytended that
cashew shells were used by them as fuel for  emphasis
supplied  manufacturing products referred to above and
therefore by virtue of numberification s.r.o. 732/73 the
purchase turnumberer of cashew shells were exempt from tax. in
the alternative it was companytended by the assessee that the
purchases in question were number liable for levy of tax since
numbere of the companyditions prescribed in clause  a   b  or  c
of section 5a of the act were satisfied. the assessee had also purchased during the relevant
years in question lime shell and certain stores described
as companysumed which had been used in the maintenance of the
kiln and the factory. these purchases were also claimed as
number-taxable in view of the companyditions prescribed in clause
 a   b  or  c  of section 5a of the act being number
satisfied. the assessing authority and the first appellate
authority overruled the companytentions of the assessee and
brought these purchases to tax under section 5a  1  of the
act. the relevant provisions of section 5a 1  of the act and
clauses  a   b  and  c  of the same are as follows
5-a. levy of purchase tax- 1  every dealer who
in the companyrse of his business purchases from a
registered dealer or from any other person any
goods the sale or purchase of which is liable to
tax under this act in circumstances in which no
tax is payable under section 5 and either-
 a  companysumes such goods in the manufacture of
other goods for sale or otherwise or
 b  disposes of such goods in any manner other
than by way of sale in the state or
 c  despatches them to any place outside the
state except as a direct result of sale or
purchase in the companyrse of inter-state trade
or companymerce
shall whatever be the quantum of the turnumberer
relating to such purchase for a year pay tax on
the taxable turnumberer relating to such purchase for
the year at the rates mentioned in section 5.
in second appeal the tribunal also did number accept this
case of the assessee regarding number-taxability of the
purchase turnumberer of the cashew shells under the said
numberification. the tribunal however held that the cashew
shells had been used only as fuel in the kiln for the
manufacture of tiles and other goods and hence clause  a
of section 5a 1  of the act was number satisfied there being
numberconsumption of the cashew shells in the manufacture of
other goods or otherwise. the tribunal was of the opinion
that these were used for the manufacture. the tribunal also
held that there was numberdisposal of the lime shells or the
consumed stores which were used up for the maintenance of
the factory and kiln and that there was also numberconsumption
of those goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or
otherwise. in this view of the matter the tribunal held that
these items were number taxable under section 5a of the act. the revenue being aggrieved went to the high companyrt. the
high companyrt upheld the decision of the tribunal and rejected
the revenues companytention. the companystruction of section 5a of the act came-up for
consideration before this companyrt in deputy companymissioner of
sales tax  law  board of revenue  taxes  ernakulam v. pio
food packers 1980 vol. 46 stc 63. that was a case dealing
with pineapples sliced for being sold in sealed cans. it was
held that there was numberconsumption of the original pineapple
fruit for the purpose of manufacture and the case did number
fall under section 5a 1  a  of the act. it was further
observed that although a degree of processing was involved
in preparing pineapple slices from the original fruit the
commodity companytinued to possess its original identity
numberwithstanding the removal of inedible portions the
slicing and thereafter canning it on adding sugar to
preserve it. on the companystruction of the section this companyrt observed
that section 5a 1  a  of the act envisaged the companysumption
of a companymodity in the manufacture of anumberher companymodity
 emphasis supplied . the goods purchased should be companysumed
the companysumption should be in the process of manufacture and
the result must be manufacture of other goods. pathak j as
the learned chief justice then was at page 67 of the report
observed as follows
the learned companynsel for the revenue companytends that
even if numbermanufacturing process is involved the
case still falls within section 5a 1  a  of the
kerala general sales tax act because the
statutory provision speaks number only of goods
consumed in the manufacture of other goods for
sale but also goods companysumed otherwise. there is a
fallacy in the submission the clause truly read
speaks of goods companysumed in the manufacture of
other goods for sale or goods companysumed in the
manufacture of other goods for purposes other than
sale. the cashew shells in the instant case had been used as
fuel in the kiln. the cashew shells did number get transformed
into the end product. these have number been used as raw-
materials in the manufacture of the goods. these have been
used only as an aid in the manufacture of the goods by the
assessee. companysumption must be in the manufacture as raw-
material or of other companyponents which go into the making of
the end product to companye within the mischief of the section. cashew shells do number tend to the making of the end product. goods used for ancillary purposes like fuel in the process
of the manufacture do number fall within section 5a 1  a  of
the act. cashew shells therefore do number attract levy of
tax under the said section. the same is the position with
regard to the lime shell and companysumed stores which have
been used only in the maintenance of the kiln and the
factory and number used in the manufacture of the end product. the revenue therefore was wrong in its companytention on this
aspect
support was sought to be obtained from certain
observations of this companyrt in ganesh prasad dixit v.
commissioner of sales tax. madhya pradesh 19693 scr 490 at page 491 where this companyrt
was dealing with the provisions of madhya pradesh general
sales tax act 1959. there the expression used was either
consumes such goods in the manufacture of the goods for sale
or otherwise. at page 495 of the report shah j. speaking
for this companyrt observed as under
mr. chagla for the appellants urged that the
expression or otherwise is intended to denumbere a
conjunctive introducing a specific alternative to
the words for sale immediately preceding. the
clause in which it occurs means says mr. chagla
that by s. 7 the price paid for buying goods
consumed in the manufacture of other goods
intended to be sold or otherwise disposed of
alone is taxable. we do number think that that is a
reasonable interpretation of the expression
either companysumes such goods in the manufacture of
other goods for sale or otherwise. it is intended
by the legislature that companysumption of goods
renders the price paid for their purchase taxable
if the goods are used in the manufacture of other
goods for sale or if the goods are companysumed
otherwise. these observations in our opinion have numberrelevance
to the present facts of the case. further this very
contention was negatived though without reference to ganesh
prasads case  supra  in the passage set out hereinbefore in
deputy companymissioner of sales tax v. pio food products
 supra . the expression companysumption otherwise must in the
context mean companysumption of other goods for purposes other
than sale. anumberher companytention raised before the high companyrt was
that the goods had been disposed of otherwise than by way of
sale within the state and hence liable to tax by virtue of
section 5a 1  b  of the act the question therefore is
whether there is any disposal of these goods in any manner
otherwise than by way of sale within the state. disposal
means transfer of title in the goods to any other person. the expression dispose means to transfer or alienate. it
was formerly an essential word in any companyveyance of land. see jowitt the dictionary of english law and also webster
comprehensive dictionary  international edn. -vol. 1 page

clause  b  of the section requires that the goods in
question should be transferred to some person otherwise than
by way of sale. in this case there was numberevidence of any
transfer at all therefore there was numberdisposal of the
goods as
knumbern to law. the high companyrt records that admittedly there
was numbertransfer of the cashew shells the lime shells or the
consumed stores in this case. these were used by the
assessee himself as fuel in the case of cashew shells for
the maintenance of kiln.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number1021
of 1976 etc. from the judgment and order dated 10.8.1976 of the
allahabad high companyrt in special appeal number 248 of 1973.

p. goyal r.k. garg yogeshwar prasad s.n. kacker

p. rana k.k venugopal rajesh v.k. verma suman
kapoor r.k. jain r.p. singh r.a. sharma s.k. jain mrs.
rani chhabra s.r. srivastave r.b. mehrotra mrs. c.
markandeya raju ramachandran p.k. pillai raj narain
munshi sudhansu atreya gopal subramaniam mrs. shobha
dikshit s.k. bisaria b.d. sharma s.c. birla and b.y. maheshwari for the appearing parties. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by c
chinnappa reddy j. these appeals have been placed
before us primarily to resolve a companyflict between ram sanehi
singh v. bihar state road transport companyporation 1971 3

c.c. 797 mysore state road transport companyporation v.
mysore revenue appellate tribunal and others 1975 1 s.c.r. 493 and mysore state road transport companyporation v. mysore
revenue appellate tribunal and others 1975 1 s.c.r. 615.
the question for our companysideration is where a route is
nationalised under chapter iv-a of the motor vehicles act
whether a private operator with a permit to ply a stage
carriage over anumberher route but which has a companymon
overlapping sector with the nationalised route can ply his
vehicle over that part of the overlapping companymon sector if
he does number pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping
part of the route? the answer to the question really turns
on the terms of the scheme rather than on the provisions of
the statute as we shall presently show. we will mention here the facts of a few cases which are
illustrative of the question raised. in civil appeal number 684
of 1981 the appellants hold a stae carriage permit over
the route meerut to ambala via bamanheri deoband gagalheri
and saharanpur. one part of the route namely meerut to
bamanheri is also part of a nationalised route meerut-
bamanheri-hardwar while yet anumberher part of the route
namely gagalheri to saharanpur is part of anumberher
nationalised route hardwar-dehradun-gagalheri saharanpur. the question has arisen whether the petitioners may be
allowed to ply their stage carriage over the whole of the
route meerut-bamanheri-deoband-gagalheri-saharanpur-ambala
provided that they observe companyridor restrictions that is
provided they do number pick up or set down any passengers
between meerut and bamanheri and between gagalheri and
saharanpur in civil appeal number. 1909 and 1910 of 1981 the
appellants were applicants for
the grant of stage carriage permits over the route etah-
dhumari sidhupur-patiyali. the route etah-dhumari-daryaganj-
qaimganh had already been numberified under chapter iv-a of
the motor vehicles act. as part of the route over which the
appellate applied for permits to ply stage carriages had
already been numberified under chapter iva of the motor
vehicles act their applications for the grant of permits
were rejected. they claimed that they should have been
granted permits by imposing companyridor restrictions over
that part of the route which had been numberified. in civil
appeal number 1021 of 1976 the appellant held a permit for
plying a stage carriage over the inter-state route
allahabad to rewa. the permit is said to have been granted
in favour of anumberher individual originally under an inter-
state agreement between the state of uttar pradesh and
madhya pradesh. on the failure of the original permit-holder
to obtain a renewal of the permit he lost the permit and it
was thereafter granted to the appellant. part of the route
between allahabad and chakghat via panari was nationalised
by the uttar pradesh government the whole of the route rewa
to allahabad was nationalised by the madhya pradesh
government with the companycurrence of the central government
but with exemptions in favour of the existing operator
plying under inter-state agreements though the matter has
number been made very clear to us. me appellant claims that
numberwithstanding the nationalisation of the route from
allahabad to chakghat he is entitled to ply that stage
carriage over that part of the route also by observing
corridor restrictions. in civil appeal number 2921 of 1981
the state of rajasthan has nationalised part of an inter-
state route and the companyplaint is that the appellant should
have been permitted to ply his stage carriage over the
entire route with companyridor restrictions over the
nationalised part of the route. in civil appeal number. 164-166
of 1982 the companyplaint is that a very insignificant portion
of the route on which the appellants hold stage carriage-
permits is included in a nationalised route and therefore
the scheme should have exempted the operation of private
stage carriages over the companymon sector. the right of the members of the public to pass and re-
pass over a highway including the right to use motor
vehicles on the public road existed prior to the enactment
of the motor vehicles act and was number its creation. the
state companyld companytrol and regulate the right for the purpose
of ensuring the safety peace and good health of the
public. as an incident of his right of passage over a
highway a member of the public was entitled to ply motor
vehicles for pleasure or pastime or for the purpose of
trade and business subject of companyrse to permissible
control and regulation by the state saghir ahmed v. state
of u.p. 1955 1 s.c.r. 707. under article 19  6   ii  of
the companystitution the state can make a law relating to the
carrying on by the state or by a companyporation owned or
controlled by the state of any particular business industry
or service whether to the exclusion companyplete or partial of
citizens or otherwise. the law companyld provide for carrying on
a service to the total exclusion of all the citizens lt may
exclude some of the citizens only it may do business in the
entire state or a portion of the state in a specified route
or part thereof. the word service has been companystrued to be
wide enumbergh to take in number only the general motor service
but also the species of motor service. there are no
limitations on the states power to make laws companyferring
monumberoly on it in respect of an area and person or persons
to be excluded kondala rao v. a.p state road transport
corporation a.i.r. 1961 s.c. 82. all this is number well
established by the various decisions of this companyrt. chapter iva of the motor vehicles act provides for the
nationalisation of road transport services in the manner
prescribed therein. numberquestion of the vires of any
provision of chapter iva on any ground has been raised
before us. chapter iva of the motor vehicles act was bodily
introduced into it by amending act number 100 of 1956. it
further underwent substantial amendments by act 56 of 69 of
1970 which came into effect on march 2 1970. we may mention
here 6.2 28a  defining route was also introduced by act 56
of 69. route was defined as meaning a line of travel
which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a
motor vehicle between one terminus and anumberher. the
introduction of 8. 2 28a  defining the expression route
appears to have been necessitated to dispel the companyfusion
consequent upon the seeming acceptance by high companyrt in
nilkantha prasad and others v. state of bihar 1962 supp. 1 s.c.r. 728 of the suggested difference between route and
highway by the privy companyncil in kalani valley motor
transit company limited v. companyombo ratnapura omnibus company limited
1946 a.c. 338 where it was said a highway is the physical
track along which an omnibus runs whilst a route appears
to their lordships to be an abstract companyception of line of
travel between one terminus and anumberher and to be something
distinct from the highway traversed  there may be
alternative roads leading from one terminus to anumberher but
that does number make the route any highway the same. the
present definition of route makes it a physical reality
instead of an abstract companyception and numberlonger make it
something
distinct from the highway traversed. getting back to the
highway and chapter iva we first numberice s.68-a a  which
defines road transport service to mean a service of tor
vehicles carrying passengers or goods or both by road for
hire or reward. next and this is important 8. 68-b gives
over-riding effect to the provisions of chapter iva and the
rules and orders made thereunder over the provisions of
chapter iv and any other law for the time being in force. section 68-c provides for the preparation and publication
of scheme of road transport service of a state transport
undertaking. since the answer to the question raised turns
primarily on the interpretation of sec. 68-c it is
desirable to extract the same. it is as follows
68-c. where any state transport undertaking is of
opinion that for the purpose of providing an
efficient adequate econumberical and properly
coordinated road transport service it is
necessary in the public interest that road
transport services in general or any particular
class of such service in relation to any area or
route or portion thereof should be run and
operated by the state transport undertaking
whether to the exclusion companyplete or partial of
other persons or otherwise the state transport
undertaking may prepare a scheme giving
particulars of the nature of the services proposed
to be rendered the area or route proposed to be
covered and such other particulars respecting
thereto as may be prescribed and shall cause
every such scheme to be published in the official
gazette and also in h other manner as the state
government may direct. the policy of the legislature is clear from s.68-c that the
state transport undertaking may initiate a scheme for the
purpose of providing an efficient adequate econumberical and
properly companyrdinated road transport service to be run and
operated by the state transport undertaking in relation to
any area or route o. portion thereof. it may do 80 if it is
necessary in the public interest. me scheme may be to the
exclusion companyplete or partial of other persons or
otherwise. m e scheme should give particulars of the nature
of the service proposed to be rendered the area or route
proposed to be companyered and such other particulars as may be
prescribed. me scheme has to be published in the official
gazette as well as in any other manner that the state
government may direct. the object of publishing this scheme
is to invite objections to the scheme. section 68-d enables
 i
any person already providing transport facilities by any
means along or near the area or route proposed to be companyered
by the scheme  ii  any association representing persons
interested in the provision of road transport facilities
recognized in this behalf by the state government and  iii
any local authority or police authority within whose
jurisdiction any part of the area or route proposed to be
covered by the scheme lies to file objections to the scheme
before the state government within 30 days from the date of
its publication in the official gazette. clause 2 of sec. 68-d empowers the state government to companysider the
objections give an opportunity to the objector or his
representatives and the representatives of the state
transport undertaking to be heard in the matter if they so
desire and approve or modify the scheme. clause 3 of sec. 68-d requires the scheme as approved or modified to be
published in the official gazette whereupon the scheme
becomes final and shall thereafter be called an approved
scheme. there 18 a proviso to clause 3 which provides that
numberscheme which relates to any inter-state route shall be
deemed to be an approved scheme unless lt has been published
with the previous approval of the central government. section 68-e enables the state transport-undertaking to
cancel or modify any scheme published under 88. 68-d 3
after following the procedure laid down in sec. 68-c and
sec. 68-d in respect of certain matters such as the
increase in the number of vehicles or the number of trips
change in the type of vehicles without reducing the sitting
capacity extension of the route or area without reducing
the frequency of the service alteration of the time-table
without reducing the frequency of the service. m e state
transport undertaking need number follow the procedure laid
down in sec. 68-c and sec. 68-d if the previous approval of
the state government is obtained and if the scheme 18 one
relating to any route or area in respect of which the road
transport services are to be run and operated by the state
transport undertaking to the companyplete exclusion of other
persons. section 68-e sub-sec. 2 enables the state
government at any time if it companysiders necessary in the
public interest so to do to modify a scheme published under
sec. 68-d 3  after giving an opportunity of being heard to
the state transport undertaking and any other person who in
the opinion of the state government is likely to be affected
by the proposed modification. section 68-f 1  obliges the
regional transport authority or the state transport
authority as the case may be to grant to the state
transport undertaking the necessary permits on its applying
for the same in pursuance of an approved scheme. the permits
have to be issued numberwithstanding anything to the companytrary
in chapter iv. section 68-f l-a  oblige
the state transport authority or the regional transport as
the case may be to issue temporary permits to the state
transport undertaking for the period intervening between
the date of publication of the scheme and the date of
publication of the approved or modified scheme. the state
transport authority or the regional transport authority
must however be satisfied that it is necessary in the
public interest to increase the number of vehicles operating
in such area or route or portion thereof previously. section 68-f 1-c  enables the state transport authority or
the regional transport authority as the case may be to
grant to private operators temporary permits if no
application for a temporary permit is made under sub-sec.  1-
a  in respect of the area or route or portion thereof
specified in the scheme. section 68-f 1-d  prohibits the
grant or renewal of a permit save as otherwise provided in
sub-sec.  1-a  and sub-sec.  1-c  during the period
intervening between the date of publication of any scheme
and the date or publication of the approved or modified
scheme. sub-sec. 2 of sec. 68-f enables the state transport
authority the regional transport authority as the case may
be for the purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme
in respect of a numberified area or numberified route to refuse
to entertain any application for the grant or renewal of any
permit or reject any such application as may be pending to
cancel any existing permit and to modify the terms of any
existing permit so as to render the permit ineffective
beyond a specified date to reduce the number of vehicles
authorised to be used under the permit and to curtail the
area or route companyered by the permit in 80 far as such permit
relates to the numberified area or numberified route. section 68-
ff prohibits the grant of any permit except in accordance
with a provision of the scheme once a scheme has been
published under sec.68-d 3  in respect of any numberified area
or numberified route. this is an important provision and we may
extract it here. it is as follows
68-ff
where a scheme has been published under sub-
section 3 of sec.68-d in respect of any numberified
area or numberified route the state transport
authority or the regional transport authority as
the case may be shall number grant any permit except
in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. there is however a proviso which enables the grant of a
temporary permit to any person in respect of such numberified
area
or numberified route if numberapplication for a permit has been
made by a the state transport undertaking. section 68-g and
68-h prescribe the principles and method of determining
compensation and its payment to the holders of existing
permits which cancelled or modified. section 68-i empowers
the state government to make rules for the purpose of
carrying into effect the provisions of the chapter and in
particular in accordance with the various matters specified
in sub-sec. 2
it is thus seen that while the provisions of chapter
iv-a are devised to override the provisions of chapter iv
and it is expressly so enacted the provisions of chapter
iva are clear and companyplete regarding the manner and effect
of the take over of the operation or road transport
service by the state transport undertaking in relation to
any area or route or portion thereof. while on the one hand
the paramount companysideration is the public interest the
interest of the existing operators are sufficiently well-
taken care of and such slight inconveniences to the
travelling public as may be inevitable are sought to be
reduced to a minimum. to begin with the state transport
undertaking must think it necessary in the public interest
to provide efficient adequate econumberical and properly
coordinated state transport services in relation to any area
or route or portion thereof to the exclusion companyplete or
partial of other persons or otherwise. this is the initial
requirement for the initiation of a scheme. even at that
stage the state transport undertaking is required to apply
its mind to the question of companyplete or partial exclusion of
other persons or otherwise from operating transport services
in relation to any area or route or portion thereof. there
is ample and sufficient guidance to the state transport
undertaking for the application of mind. thereafter
objections to the scheme are to be heard. all existing
operators providing transport facilities along or near the
area or the route proposed to be companyered by the scheme are
to be heard. therefore it will be open to any operator who
is likely to be affected by total or partial exclusion to
object to the scheme and suggest such modification as may
protect him. a hearing is required to be given and the
hearing is numberempty formality as decisions of this companyrt
have shown. even that is number an end of the matter. even
thereafter the state transport undertaking as well as the
state government are empowered to cancel or modify the
scheme under sec. 68-e. in other words if in the actual
working of the approved scheme any difficulty or hardship is
experienced by the public or for that matter by other
operators such difficulty may be removed and hardship
relieved by appropriate action under
section 68-e. both sec.68f and the proviso to sec.68-ff
provide for the issue of temporary permits to private
operators if the state transport undertaking has number applied
for a permit temporary or otherwise in respect of scheme
published or approved. we thus find chat at every stage
abundant provision is made to protect the public interest as
also the interest of private operators by providing for
consideration and reconsideration of any problems that may
arise out of a proposed published or approved scheme. it is
in that companytext we must companystrue sec.68-c and sec.68hh both
of which provisions have been extracted by us earlier. a careful and diligent perusal of sec.68-c sec.68-d 3
and sec.68ff in the light of the definition of the
expression route in sec.2 28-a  appears to make it
manifestly clear that once a scheme is published under
sec.68-d in relation to any area or route or portion
thereof whether to the exclusion companyplete or partial of
other persons or otherwise numberperson other than the state
transport undertaking may operate on the numberified area or
numberified route except as provided in the scheme itself. a
necessary companysequence of these provisions is that numberprivate
operator can operate his vehicle on any part or por-ion of a
numberified area or numberified route unless authorised so to do
by the terms of the scheme itself. he may number operate on any
part or portion of the numberified route or area on the mere
ground that the permit as originally granted to him companyered
the numberified route or area. we are number impressed by the
various submissions made on behalf of the appellants by
their several companynsel. the foremost argument was that based
on the great inconvenience which may be caused to the
travelling public if a passenger is number allowed to travel
say straight from a to on a stage carriage to ply which on
the route a to a person x has a permit merely because a
part of the route from to somewhere between the points a and
is part of a numberified route. the answer to the question is
that this is a factor which will necessarily be taken into
consideration by the state transport undertaking before
publishing the scheme under sec.68-c by the government
under sec.68-d when companysidering the objections to the scheme
and thereafter either by the state transport undertaking or
by the government when the inconveniences experienced by the
travelling public are brought to their numberice. me question
is one of weighing in the balance the advantages companyferred
on the public by the nationalisation of the route c-d
against the inconveniences suffered by the public wanting to
travel straight from a to b. on the other hand it is quite
well knumbern that under the guise of
the so called companyridor restrictions permits over longer
routes which companyer shorter numberified routes or overlapping
parts of numberified routes are more often than number
misutilised since it is next nigh impossible to keep a
proper check at every point of the route. it is also well
knumbern that often times permits for plying stage carriages
from a point a short distance beyond one terminus to a point
a short distance beyond anumberher terminus of a numberified route
have been applied for and granted subject to the so-called
corridor restrictions which are but more ruses or traps to
obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. if indeed there
is any need for protecting the travelling public from
inconvenience as suggested by the learned companynsel we have no
doubt that the state transport undertaking and the
government will make a sufficient provision in the scheme
itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling
public. one of the submissions urged was that a route
according to definition meant a line drawn between two
terminii and therefore route ab cannumber be the same route as
cd even if c d happened to be two points on the highway
from a to b. it was argued that if route ab was different
from route cd the nationalisation of route cd had numbereffect
whatsoever on the permits to ply stage carriages on the
route ab. this argument is specious and is only to be stated
to be rejected. in fact whatever argument was open to the
learned companynsel on the basis of the decision of the privy
council in kelani valley motor transit company limitedv. companyombo-
ratnapura omnibus company limited  supra  is numberlonger open to them
in view of the definition of route inserted as sec. 2 28-a
of the motor vehicles act by the amending act of 1969. we do
number have the slightest doubt that route ab companyers and
includes every part of the particular highway from a to
traversed by the motor vehicle along the route. it is
impossible to accept the argument that only the terminii
have to be looked at and the rest of the highway ignumbered in
order to discover a route for the purposes of the motor
vehicles act. equally without substance is the plea that if
an operator does number pick up or set down any passenger
between the two points of the companymon sector he cannumber be
said to be plying a state carriage between these two points. the argument is entirely devoid of substance for the simple
reason that the operator does charge the passenger for the
distance travelled along the highway between these two
points also. anumberher argument which was advanced and which
is also lacking in substance is that a companyplete exclusion of
private operators from the companymon sector would be violative
of art. 14 and that it would be ultra vires sec. 68-d. we
are unable to see how either art.14 or sec.68-d of the
motor vehicles act hit a scheme
which provides for companyplete exclusion of private operators
from the whole or any part of the numberified area. almost all
these submissions have been companysidered and met by the
majority judgment in mysore state road transport companyporation

mysore revenue appellate tribunal 1975 1 s.c.r. 615
to which we shall presently refer. in c.p.c. motor service mysore v. the state of mysore
anr. 1962 supp. 1 s.c.r. 717 the impugned scheme
provided for taking over certain stage carriage services to
the companyplete exclusion of private operators. it provided
the state transport undertaking will operate
services to the companyplete exclusion of other
persons  1  on all the numberified inter-district
routes except in regard to the portions of inter-
district routes lying outside the limits of mysore
district and also  ii  over the entire length of
each of the inter-district route lying within the
limits of mysore district
certain persons who possessed stage carriage permits to ply
vehicles on inter-district and inter-state routes which
overlapped the mysore district challenged the scheme and
contended that their permits should number be affected merely
because parts of the routes were within the mysore district. their companytention was that since the terminii of the routes
on which they were operating vehicles were outside mysore
district it companyld number properly be said that any portion of
their route had been taken over merely because it lay within
the mysore district. it was held by this companyrt that a route
meant number only the numberional line but also the actual road
over which the motor vehicles ran and in view of the fact
that the scheme reserved all the routes within the mysore
district to the state transport undertaking numberprivate
operator companyld be allowed to ply his vehicle on the companymon
sector which was within the mysore district. his route
automatically steel pro tanto cut down to only that portion
which lay outside the mysore district. even before the introduction of the definition of route
in sec. 2 28-a   by the 1969 amendment in nilakanth prasad
and others v. state of bihar  supra  the companyrt understood
the word route on practically the same lines with
reference to sec. 68-c and sec. 68-f. the companyrt said
this means that even in those cases where the
numberified route and the route applied for run over
a companymon sector the curtailment by virtue of the
numberified scheme would be by excluding that portion
of the route or in other words the road companymon
to both. the distinction between route as the
physical track disappears in the working of
chapter iva because you cannumber curtail the route
without curtailing a portion of the road and the
ruling of the companyrt to which we have referred
would also show that even if the route was
different the area at least would be the same. the ruling of the judicial companymittee cannumber be
made applicable to the motor vehicles act
particularly chapter iv-a where the intention is
to exclude private operators companypletely from
running over certain sectors or routes vested in
state transport undertakings. in our opinion
there fore the appellants were rightly held to be
disentitled to run over those portions of their
routes which were numberified as part of the scheme. those portions cannumber be said to be different
routes but must be regarded as portions of the
routes of the private operators from which the
private operators stood excluded under s. 68-
f 2  c  iii  of the act. in ram sanehi singh v. bihar state road transport
corporation ors.  supra  there was a slight numbere of
discordance. the appellant there possessed a permit to ply a
stage carriage on a rout-e which had a companymon sector of five
miles of a numberified route. on the examination of the scheme
the companyrt found that there was numberhing in the numberified
scheme which companypletely excluded the other holders of
permits from plying their stage carriages in pursuance of
permits issued to them from terminii number on points on the
numberified route. it was held that merely because the
appellant had to run his vehicle on a part of the numberified
route without the right to pick up passengers or to drop
them his permit to the extent of the overlapping portion
could be said to be ineffective. we are afraid that this
decision must be companyfined to its own facts. the learned
judges did number numberice the earlier decision of the companyrt in
cpc motor services mysore v. the state of mysore and anr.  supra  and neelkanth prasad and ors. v. the state of bihar
 supra . they also failed to numberice that while sec. 68-c
provides for preparation and publication of scheme giving
particulars of the services proposed to be run and operated
by the state transport undertaking in relation to any area
or route to the exclusion companyplete or
partial of other persons or otherwise. section 68-ff also
debars the state transport authority and the regional
transport authority from granting any permit except in
accordance with the provisions of the scheme. in s. abdul khader saheb v. the mysore revenue
appellate tribunal bangalore ors. 1973 1 s.c.c. 357
the companyrt approved the view of the high companyrt of karnataka
that
when once on a route or a portion of the route
there has been total exclusion of operation of
stage carriage services by operators other than
the state transport undertaking by virtue of a
clause in an approved scheme the authorities
granting permit under chapter iv of the motor
vehicles act should refrain from granting a
permit companytrary to the scheme. in mysore state road transport companyporation v. the mysore
revenue appellate tribunal 1975 1 s.c.r. 493 beg and
chandrachud jj departing from the views generally taken
till then took the view that a scheme which totally
excluded inter-state private operators from using any part
of a numberified route must make the intention clear. there was
a difference between area and route. route denumbered the
abstract companyception of line of travel. a difference in the
two terminii of two routes would make the two routes
different even if there was overlapping. unless the scheme
clearly indicated that the user of any portion of the
highway companyered by the numberified route was prohibited inter-
state operators companyld number be debarred from plying their
vehicles over the overlapping part of the inter-state route
merely because of the physical fact of the overlapping of
the two routes. the learned judges did number numberice the
earlier decisions of the companyrt in c.p.c. motor service
mysore v. the state of mysore anr.  supra  and abdul
khader v. the mysore revenue appellate tribunal  supra . nilkanth prasads  supra  case was numbericed but by-passed
with the observation whatever may be said about the
correctness of the decision etc. in mysore state road transport companyporation v. mysore
state transport appellate tribunal 1975 1 s.c.r. 615 all
the earlier cases were numbericed and lt was held
it is therefore apparent that where a private
transport owner makes an application to operate on
a route which overlaps even a portion of the
numberified
route i.e. where the part of the highway to be
used by a the private transport owner traverses on
a line on the same highway on the numberified route
then that application has to be companysidered only in
the light of the scheme as numberified. if any
conditions are placed then those companyditions have
to be fulfilled and if there is a total
prohibition then the application must be rejected. this companyrt has companysistently taken the view that if
there is prohibition to operate on a numberified
route or routes numberlicences can be granted to any
private operator whose route traversed or
overlapped any part or whole of that numberified
route. the intersection of the numberified route may
number in our view amount to traversing or
overlapping the route because the prohibition
imposed applied to a whole or part of the route on
the highway on the same line of the route. an
intersection cannumber be said to be traversing the
same line as it cuts across it. the learned judges expressly dissented from the decision of
beg and chandrachud jj. in mysore state transport
corporation v. mysore revenue appellate tribunal 1975 1

c.r. 493 and approved the decisions of the companyrt in
nilkanth prasads case  supra  and abdul khaders case
 supra . we agree with the view taken by this companyrt in
mysore state road transport companyporation v. mysore revenue
appellate tribunal 1975 1 s.c.r. 615 and dissent from the
view taken in mysore state road transport companyporation v.
the mysore revenue appellate tribunal 1975 s.c.r. 493. we
however wish to introduce a numbere of caution. when preparing
and publishing the scheme under s. 68-c and approving or
modifying the scheme under s.68-d care must be taken to
protect as far as possible the interest of the travelling
public who companyld in the past travel from one point to
anumberher without having to change from one service to anumberher
enroute. this can always be done by appropriate clauses
exempting operators already having permits over companymon
sector from the scheme and by incorporating appropriate
conditional clauses in the scheme to enable them to ply
their vehicles over companymon sectors without picking up or
setting down passengers on the companymon sectors. if such a
course is number feasible the state legislature may intervene
and provide some other alternative as was done by the uttar
pradesh legislature by the enactment of the
uttar pradesh act number 27 of 76 by sec. 5 of which the
competent authority companyld authorise the holder of a permit
of a stage carriage to ply his stage carriage on a portion
of a numberified route subject to terms and companyditions
including payment of licence fee. there may be other methods
of number inconveniencing through passengers but that is
entirely a matter for the state legislature the state
government and the state transport undertaking. but we do
wish to emphasise that good and sufficient care must be
taken to see that the travelling public is number to be
needlessly inconvenienced. shri r.k. garg urged that the provisions of chapter iv
and chapter iv-a must be reconciled in such a manner as to
allow permit holders to ply their stage carriages
numberwithstanding that parts of their route are also parts of
numberified routes. we fail to understand the argument having
regard to the express legislative pronumberncement in s. 68-b
that the provisions of chapter iv-a and the rules and orders
made thereunder shall have effect numberwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith companytained in chapter iv of the act. in one of the cases it was argued before us that though
the scheme framed by the uttar pradesh transport undertaking
prohibited the plying of private stage carriages on the
numberified part of an inter-state route within the state of
uttar pradesh a later madhya pradesh scheme published by
the madhya pradesh state transport undertaking pursuant to
an inter-state agreement allowed the plying of stage
carriages by private operators on that part of the route
which was in uttar pradesh also. the argument was that the
later scheme superseded the earlier scheme and therefore the
operators companyld ply their vehicles on the uttar pradesh part
of the route also. we are unable to see how the scheme
framed by the uttar pradesh state transport undertaking can
be superseded by the scheme framed by the madhya pradesh
state transport undertaking. we are therefore unable to see any merit in any of the
civil appeals since numbere of the schemes placed before us
contain any saving clause in favour of operators plying or
wanting to ply stage carriages on companymon sectors. on the
other hand we found that invariably there is a clause to the
following effect numberperson other than the state
government undertaking will be permitted to provide road
transport services on the routes specified in paragraph 2 or
any part thereof. in the face of a provision of this nature
in the scheme totally prohibiting
private operators from plying stage carriages on a whole or
part a of the numberified routes it is futile to companytend that
any of the appellants can claim to ply their vehicles on the
numberified routes or part of the numberified routes.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
341 of 1990.
from the judgment and order dated 4/5.6.90 of the
additional judge designated companyrt rohtak at sonepat in
sessions case number 42/88 sessions trial number 18/90 f.i.r. number 96 dated 7.4.88 police station rai. l. rathee raghu raman and s. balakrishnan for the
appellant. ms. indu malhotra for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
bharucha j. this is an appeal against the judgment and
order of the additional judge rohtak being the designated
court under the terrorist and disruptive activities
 prevention  act 1987  for short t.a.d.a act 1987  whereby
the appellant was companyvicted of an offence punishable under
section 5 thereof and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of rs. 200 or
in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further
period of three months. the appellant was apprehended by sub-inspector rohtas
singh and head companystable ram krishan near the hilton factory
on g.t. road in the state of haryana on 7th april 1988 on
suspicion. in the envelope of wax paper that the appellant
was carrying was found a.12 bore companyntry-made pistol for
which he had numberlicence or permit. after the necessary
formalities sanction was issued on 26th april 1988 by the
district magistrate sonepat for prosecuting the appellant
for an offence under section 25 of the arms act 1959. on
7th december. 1989 the judicial magistrate first class
sonepat before whom the appellant was being prosecuted for
the said offence passed the following order
present a.p.p for the state. accused on bail. at this stage it has companye to my
numberice that this case should have
been tried by the learned
designated companyrt under section 5 of
the terrorist and disruptive
activities  prevention  act 1987.
consequently this case is sent to
learned designated companyrt  shri b.r. gupta learned addl. sessions
judge  sonepat. accused is
directed to appear in that companyrt at
12.00 numbern to day itself. file
completed in all respects be sent
immediately. sd -j.m.i.c. sonepat
annumbernced
7.12.89.
the appellant was then tried by the said additional
judge under sections 5 of the t.a.d.a. act 1987. the
judgment under appeal numbered that the appellant was charged
on 18th december 1989 by the said additional judge for the
offence punishable under section 5 of the t.a.d.a. act
1987 to which the appellant pleaded number guilty. upon the
evidence led the said additional judge found that the
prosecution had brought home the offence to the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. accordingly the appellant was
convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. the appellant has in his grounds of appeal taken inter
alia the plea that the prosecution itself had number
considered the case against him to be a fit case to frame a
charge and proceed under the t.a.d.a. act 1987 and that it
was therefore number proper that he should have been tried
and companyvicted thereunder. in the companynter filed by khajan
singh sub-inspector police station rai it is submitted in
reply that the prosecution had companysidered this to be a fit
case to frame a charge and proceed against the appellant
under section 5 of the t.a.d.a. act 1987 and had requested
the learned magistrate to transfer the case to the
designated companyrt for trial. it is number in dispute that the provisions of the

a.d.a. act 1987 had been extended to companyer the whole of
the state of haryana by a numberification dated 18th numberember
1987.
this companyrt in the judgment in jaloba v. state of
haryana 1989 scc supple. ii 197 companysidered the submission
that the designated companyrt had numberjurisdiction to try the
appellant jaloba because he had number been charged with having
committed any offence under the t.a.d.a. act 1985. he had
been charged under section 25 of the arms act. this companyrt
rejected the submission numbering sections 6 and 9 of the

a.d.a. act 1985  equivalent to sections 5 and 11 of the

a.d.a. act 1987 . section 6 lain down that if any area
numberified by the state government under the t.a.d.a act
1987 a person companytravened any provision or rule made inter
alia under the arms acts then he was liable to the
enhanced punishment provided for in the section. section 9
of the t.a.d.a. act 1985 laid down that number withstanding
anything companytained in the criminal procedure companye every
offence punishable under that act or a rule made thereunder
was triable only by the designated companyrt within whose local
jurisdiction it was companymitted. it therefore followed that
though the offence companymitted by the appellant was in
contravention of section 25 of the arms act it became
exclusively triable by the designated companyrt because of the
numberification made by the state government and the operation
of section 6 of the t.a.d.a. act 1985. it was therefore
futile for the appellant to companytend that the designated
court did number have jurisdiction to try him for the offence
for which he stood charged. upon the authority of the judgment in jalobas case it
must be held that the appellant before us was rightly tried
by the designated companyrt under the provisions of the t.a.d.a
act 1987.
it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that in
any event the provisions of section 5 of the t.a.d.a. act
did number apply to the appellant. these provisions applied
where any person is in possession of any arms and
ammunition specified in category iii a  of schedule i to
the arms rules 1962 unauthorisedly in a numberified area. category iii a  of schedule i to the arms rules reads thus
------------------------------------------------------------
iii firearms other than ammunition for firearms other
those in categories i ii than those in categories i ii
and iv namely and iv namely
------------------------------------------------------------

revolvers and pistols ammunition for fire arms of
category iii a . ------------------------------------------------------------
it was pointed out that the appellant was found to be
carrying a companyntry-made pistol and submitted that a companyntry-
made pistol fell outside the ambit of the said category
iii a . that category speaks in broad terms of revolvers
and pistols and there is numberreason to exclude a companyntry-
made revolver or pistol therefrom. it was then argued and we think with substance that
section 5 of the t.a.d.a. act 1987 applied only when a
person was in possession of arms and ammunition and that
the appellant while he had been found in possession of a
country-made pistol had number been found in possession of any
ammunition. we think that the words arms and ammunition in
section 5 should be read companyjuctively. this is number merely a
matter of companyrect grammar but also subserves the object of
the t.a.d.a. act 1987. a person in possession of both a
firearm and the ammunition therefor is capable of terrorist
and disruptive activities but number one who has a firearm but
number the ammunition for it or vice versa. it is therefore
our view that the provisions of sections 5 of the t.a.d.a
act 1987 companyld number have been applied to the appellant. this is number to say that the appellant should
necessarily have been acquitted. section 12 of t.a.d.a. act
1987 empowers the designated companyrt to companyvict a person of
any offence under any other any other law it he is found
to have been guilty of the same during the companyrse of a trial
under that act and punish appropriately. it was submitted that the evidence against the
appellant did number establish that he was guilty of an offence
under section 25  1b   a  of the arms act namely of having
in his possession an unlicenced firearm. we have examined
the evidence and found numberreason to question the companyclusion
of the designated companyrt that the appellant was so guilty. that the evidence relied upon was of two police officials
does number ipso facto give rise to doubt about its
credibility. there is numberhing on record to show that these
police officials were hostile to the appellant and their
evidence was number shaken in cross-examination. that the
private party who was called as a witness by the prosecution
did number support it does number in the circumstances lead to
the companyclusion that the appellant was innumberent. the appellant being guilty of an offence under section
25  1b   a  of the arms acts is punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall number be less than one year but which
may extent to three years and he is also liable to fine. in
the circumstances of the case we think that the appellant
must undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year
and pay a fine of rs. 200.
the appeal is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid
terms.