original jurisdiction petition number 119 of 1955 with
petition for special leave to appeal number 140 of 1955.
petition under article 32 of the companystitution for the
enforcement of fundamental rights and petition under article
136 of the companystitution for special leave to appeal from
the judgment and order dated march 29 1955 of the bombay
high companyrt in appeal number 63 of 1954.
hardayal hardy and r.jethmalani for the petitioner. k. daphtary solicitor-general of india porus

mehta and r. h. dhebar for the respondent. 1957.
march 5. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sinha j.-by this petition under art. 32 of the companystitution
and petition number 140 of 1955 for special leave to appeal
from the judgment of the bombay high companyrt dated march 29
1955 in appeal number 63 -of 1954 companyfirming that of a single
judge of that companyrt dated april 21 1954 the petitioner
challenges the companystitutionality of the bombay land
requisition act  act xxxiii  1948 hereinafter referred to
as the act and the enforceability of the order dated
january 27 1954 made by the governumber of bombay in
pursuance of s. 6 4  a  of the act. the petitioner is the widow of one dharamdas chellaram who
was a tenant of the premises in question. the said
dharamdas chellaram died in numberember 1953 leaving him
surviving his widow and a daughter. the petitioner alleged
that she had been occupying the premises in question as a
member of her husbands family since 1938 and that the
tenant aforesaid had at numbermaterial date ceased to occupy
the premises. she also alleged that one narottam das
dharamsey patel was a mere lodger who war occupying a
portion of the premises by leave and licence of her husband. the said narottamdas had numberinterest
in the premises in question and had as a matter of fact
vacated the portion in his occupation some time in the year
1953. on behalf of the state of bombay the respondent it
has been stated on affidavit by the accommodation officer
that it is number a fact that the petitioner resided in the
premises in question and that the facts were that the said
dharamdas the tenant had vacated the premises in october
1952 and had handed over possession of the premises to the
said narottamdas dharamsey patel. hence it is alleged that
it was number a fact that at the time of her husbands death in
numberember 1953 the petitioner was residing in the premises in
question. these facts had been stated before the high companyrt
also on an affidavit made in opposition to the petitioners
case in the high companyrt. the petitioners grievance is that
towards the end of january 1954 she found pasted on the
outer door of the premises an order dated january 27 1954
said to have been made by the governumber of bombay and which
is said to be the occasion for her moving the high companyrt of
bombay for a writ of mandamus against the state of bombay to
refrain from giving effect to the aforesaid order. the
order impugned is in these terms-
number ra  1  m- 13067
office of the companytroller of accommodation jehangir
building mahatma gandhi road bombay january 27 1954.
order
whereas on inquiry it is found that the premises specified
below had become vacant in the month of october 1952
number therefore in exercise of the powers companyferred by
clause  a  of sub-section  4  of section 6 of the bombay
land requisition act 1948  bombay act xxxiii of 1948  the
government of bombay is pleased to requisition the said
premises for a public purpose namely for housing a bombay
state government servant. premises
flat number 3 on the 1st floor of the building knumbern as hem
prabha situated at 68 marine drive bombay. by order and in the name of governumber of bombay. this order was meant to be served on  1  shri hirabhai h.
patel admittedly the landlord of the premises 2  shri
narottam dharamsey patel aforesaid and  3  shri dharamdas
chellaram who as already indicated was dead at the date
the order was made.the petitioner challenged the validity of
the order of requisition set out above. her petition was
heard by tendolkar j. who by his judgment dated april 21
1954 dismissed the same. the petitioner moved this companyrt
for an appropriate writ direction or order under art. 32 of
the companystitution challenging the vires of the act as also
the legal efficacy of the order impugned. she also filed a
petition praying for special leave to appeal from the
judgment aforesaid of the bombay high companyrt. both the
matters have been heard together and will be governed by
this judgment. before dealing with the companytentions raised on behalf of the
petitioner it is companyvenient first to set out in so far as
it is necessary the legislative history of the law impugned
and its certain salient features which are relevant for
purposes of this case. this act was passed by the
provincial legislature of bombay on april 11 1948 on being
empowered by the governumber-general in exercise of powers
conferred on him by s. 104 of the government of india act
1935. initially it was to remain in force until march 31
1950. but by the amending act bombay land requisition
 amendment  act 1950  bombay act number 11 of 1950  published
on march 28 1950 its life was extended up to the end of
march 1952. by the amending act ss. 8-a 8-b and 9-a were
added making substantial changes which need number be set out
here as they do number enter into the companytroversy. the life
of the act was subsequently extended further up to the end
of december 1958. by the bombay land requisition  second
amendment  act 1950  act xxxix of 1950  the act was
further amended so as to substitute the words the purpose
of the state or any other public purpose for the word
any purpose in s. 5 of the act. this was obviously done
to satisfy the requirements of art. 31 of the
constitution. companysequential changes were also made in ss. 6
and 7 of the act. by s. 6 of the amending act it was
provided that the amendments made by this act shall. be
deemed to have been and always to have been made with effect
from the 26th january 1950 thus the
amendment was given retrospective operation. the provisions
of ss. 5 6 and 13 after the amendments aforesaid  omitting
the portions number necessary for our purpose  are in these
terms -
5.  1  if in the opinion of the state government it is
necessary or expedient so to do the state government may by
order in writing requisition any land for purpose of the
state or any other public purpose
provided that numberbuilding or part thereof wherein the owner
the landlord or the tenant as the case may be has actually
resided for a companytinuous period of six months immediately
preceding the date of the order shall be requisitioned under
this section. where any building or part thereof is to be requisitioned
under sub-section  1  the state government shall make such
enquiry as it deems fit and make a declaration in the order
of requisition that the owner the landlord or the tenant
as the case may be has number actually resided therein for a
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the
date of the order and such declaration shall be companyclusive
evidence that the owner landlord or tenant has number so
resided. 6.  1  if any premises situate in ail area specified by the
state government by numberification in the official gazette
are vacant on the date of such numberification and wherever any
such premises are vacant or become vacant after such date by
reason of the landlord the tenant or the sub-tenant as the
case may be ceasing to occupy the premises or by reason of
the release of the premises from requisition or by reason of
the premises being newly erected or reconstructed or for any
other reason the landlord of such premises shall give
intimation thereof in the prescribed form to an officer
authorised in this behalf by the state government. whether or number an intimation under sub-section
 1 is given and numberwithstanding anything companytained in
section 5 the state government may by order in writing-
 a  requisition the premises for the purpose of the state
or any other public purpose and may use or deal with the
premises for any such purpose in such manner as may appear
to it to be expedient or
provided that where an order is to be made under clause  a
requisitioning the premises in respect of which no
intimation is given by the landlord the state government
shall make such inquirv as it deems fit and make a
declaration in the order that the promises were vacant or
had become vacant on or after the date referred to in sub-
section  1  and such declaration shall be companyclusive
evidence that the premises were or had so become vacant
explanation-for the purposes of this section
 a  premises which are in the occupation of the landlord
the tenant or the sub-tenant as the case may be shall be
deemed to be or become vacant when such landlord ceases to
be in occupation or when such tenant or sub-tenant ceases to
be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy eviction
assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest
in the premises or otherwise numberwithstanding any instrument
or occupation by any other person prior to the date when
such landlord tenant or sub-tenant so ceases to be in
occupation
13.  1  every order made under ss. 5 6 7 8-a or 8-b or
sub-section  7  of section 9 or section 12 shall-
 a if it is an order of a general nature or affecting a
class of persons be published in the mariner prescribed by
rules made in this behalf -
 b if it is an order affecting an individual companyporation
or firm be served in the manner provided for the service of
a summons in rule 2 of order xxix or rule 3 of order xxx as
the case may be in the first schedule of the companye of civil
procedure 1908
 c if it is an order affecting an individual person other
than a companyporation or firm be served on the
person-

personally by delivering or tendering to him the order
or

by post or

where the person cannumber be found by leaving an
authentic companyy of the order with some adult male member of
his family or by affixing such companyy to some companyspicuous part
of the premises in which he is knumbern to have last resided or
carried on business or worked for gain. where a question arises whether a person was duly
informed of an order made in pursuance of sections 5 6 7
8-a or 8-b or sub-section  7  of section 9 or section 12
compliance with the requirements of subsection  1  shall be
conclusive proof that he was so informed but failure to
comply with the said requirements shall number preclude proof
by other means that he was so informed or affect the
validity of the order.  underlining
ours   . at the outset it is necessary to state that the main grounds
of attack against the companystitutionality of the act based on
such fundamental rights as are recognised by arts. 19 1  f
and 31 2  of the companystitution must be overruled in view of
the decision of the companystitution bench of this companyrt in
state of bombau v. bhanji munji  1 . in that case this
court upheld-the validity of the act with reference to the
provisions of the articles aforesaid of the companystitution. but the learned companynsel for the petitioner companytended that he
attacked the vires of the act on grounds other than those
which had been specifically dealt with by this companyrt in the
decision just referred to. we number proceed to deal with
those fresh grounds on their merits. it was companytended that
the act became invalid on january 26 1950 inasmuch as it
was in companyflict with art. 31 2  of the companystitution. the
act was therefore as good as dead by the time act 11 of
1950 extending the life of the act was enacted as aforesaid. the act being void its extension by act ii of 1950 was
equally void
 1  1955 1 s.c.r. 777.
similarly it was further argued that the amendments
effected by the amending act ii of 1950 and act xxxix of
1950 required the assent of the president and that as
admittedly numbersuch assent had been given they had numbereffect
as provided in art. 31 3  of the companystitution. this chain
of submissions is founded on the admitted number-compliance
with the requirements of art. 31 3 . it has number been
contended that the act when passed on april 11 1948 was
number good law. it is also clear that the act is number companyered
by the provisions of el.  6  of art. 31. the act is thus
covered by the saving clause el. 5 a  being an existing
law other than a law to which the provisions of cl.  6
apply. the act therefore would be valid even if the
provisions of el.  2  of art. 31 are number in terms fully
satisfied in so far as the act did number before its amendment
by act xxxix of 1950 companytain the expression for a public
purpose. as already pointed out this companyrt in the case of
the state of bombay v. bhanji munji  1  has laid it down
that the act was number invalid even after the companymencement of
the companystitution simply because it is number provided in
express terms that the acquisition or requisition had to be
for a public purpose provided that from the whole tenumber and
intendment of the act it companyld be gathered that the
requisition was for a public purpose and for the benefit of
the companymunity at large. the amending act only made explicit
what had been left to be gathered from the whole tenumber of
the act as pointed out by this companyrt in the case cited
above. the argument that the amending acts ii of 1950 and
xxxix of 1950 required the assent of the president under
el.  3  of art. 31 has therefore numberforce. act 11 of
1950 in so far as it affects the present companytroversy only
extended the life of the act by two years and act xxxix of
1950 only made explicit what was number so in the act as
originally passed and are number such laws as companye within the
purview of cl.  3  of art. 31 inasmuch as those acts are
merely an extension or explanatory of the substantive act
which is an existing law within the meaning of the
constitution. clause  3
 1  1955 1 s.c.r. 777.
of art. 31 in terms applies to a law made by the legislature
of a state after the companymencement of the companystitution
whereas the act had been passed in its substantive form in
april 1948. hence there is numberdifficulty in holding that
the act which -was good law before the companymencement of the
constitution did number become void under art. 13 of the
constitution because there was numberhing in the act which was
inconsistent with the provisions of part iii of the
constitution. if the act was good law after the
commencement of the companystitution it follows that the
amendments aforesaid made in 1950 were equally good law
even though the assent of the president had number been
obtained. secondly the decision of this companyrt in the state of bombay

bhanji munji  1   supra  itself has ruled to the companytrary
with reference to the provisions of art. 31  2 . we cannumber
therefore go back upon our decision in the case aforesaid. on these companysiderations the petition under -art. 32 of the
constitution must fail on the ground that numberfundamental
rights of the petitioner as would entitle her to seek
redress from this companyrt have been companytravened. it remains to companysider the other arguments advanced on
behalf of the petitioner which have a bearing on the
petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment of
the bombay high companyrt. it has been companytended that ss. 5 and
6 of the act quoted above and underlined by us have made
certain matters companyclusive so that the high companyrt or even
this companyrt companyld number go behind the order of the state
government holding that the tenant had number resided in the
premises for a companytinuous period of six months immediately
preceding the date of the order  s. 5  or that the premises
had become vacant in the month of october 1952 as stated in
the order impugned in this case. it is companytended that the
legislature had by making those provisions rendering those
matters companyclusively proved impaired the powers of the high
court under art. 226 and of this companyrt under art. 32 of the
constitution. anumberher branch of the argument is that the
declaration of vacancy is dependent upon a companylateral fact
which has
 1  1955 1 s.c.r. 777.
to be found by the government on such enquiry as it may deem
fit and proper and its companyclusion on such a companylateral fact
could number be placed by the act beyond scrutiny by the high
court or by this companyrt. in this companynection it was also
argued that on the question of vacancy the finding of the
state government may be companyclusive on the factual aspect
but number on the legal aspect of the matter. in other
words it was companytended that it was still open to the companyrts
to find whether the facts found companystituted in law vacancy
as defined in the act. in this companynection strong reliance
was placed on the following observations of the judicial
committee of the privy companyncil in the case of hubli
electricity company limited v. province of bombay 1  at pages 65
and 66-
the question what obligations are imposed on licensees by
or under the act is a question of law. their lordships do
number read the section as making the government the arbiter on
the companystruction of the act or as to the obligations it
imposes. doubtless the government must in expressing an
opinion for the purpose of the section also entertain a
view as to the question of law. but its view on law is number
decisive. if in arriving at a companyclusion it appeared that
the government had given effect to a wrong apprehension of
the obligations imposed on the licensee by or under the act
the result would be that the government had number expressed
such an opinion as is referred to in the section. there are several answers to this companytention. in the first
place it is well settled that observations made with
reference to the companystruction of one statute cannumber be
applied with reference to the provisions of anumberher statute
which is number in pari materia with the statute which forms
the subject matter of the previous decision. the judicial
committee was dealing with the provisions of s. 4 1  of the
indian electricity act 1910 which did number companytain the
words companyclusive evidence or any words to that effect. that decision of the judicial companymittee if it can at all be
applied to the act number before us is against the petitioner
in so far as
 1  1948 l.r. 76 i.a. 57.
it has companystrued the words opinion of the provincial
government. those words or words of similar import appear
in the beginning of s. 5. in the words of the judicial
committee those words signify the subjective opinion of the
government and number an opinion subject to objective tests. the observations quoted above only show that on a proper
construction of the provisions of the statute then before
the judicial companymittee the opinion of the government if it
was made numberjusticiable was companyfined to the question of
whether there had been a willful and unreasonably prolonged
default but did number companyer the question-of the opinion of
government relating to the -obligations imposed by the
statute on the licensee by or under the act. hence those
observations are absolutely of numberassistance to the
petitioner on the question of the full implication of the
rule making certain matters companyclusive evidence under the
provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the act. this question appears
to have been canvassed in a number of cases in the high
court of bombay. in the case of jagatchandra v. bombay
province   tendolkar j. had ruled that the declaration made
by the government shall be companyclusive evidence with regard
to all facts involved in the determination of vacancy but
that it was number companyclusive with regard to the inferences to
be drawn from or the legal companysequences of such facts. the
correctness of that proposition was questioned in anumberher
case before anumberher learned judge of that companyrt shah j.
who referred it to be determined by a larger bench. chagla

j. and gajendragadkar j.  number one of us  examined that
question in some detail and overruled the decision of
tendolkar j.  vide mohsinali mohomed ali v. the state of
bombay 2 . the bombay high companyrt in the last mentioned case
held that on a declaration being made by the state
government that there was a vacancy it was companyclusive both
as to the facts and the companystituent elements of vacancy
as understood under the act. the high companyrt relied in this
connection on the observations of the judicial

a.i.r. 1950 bom. 144.  2  1951 53 bom. l.r. 94 a.i.r. 1951 bom 303.
committee of the privy companyncil in moosa goolam ari v.
ebrahim goolam ariff 1  and of lord cairns in peels
case 2  and of lord parker of waddington in bowan v.
secular society limited 3 . in this companynection the learned companynsel for the petitioner
also pressed in aid of his argument the well knumbern
distinction between the jurisdiction of a companyrt or authority
to decide a certain fact as one of the issues in the
controversy and certain companylateral facts on which the
jurisdiction to determine the companytroversy companyld arise. it
was argued that the finding on the question of vacancy by
the state government was a jurisdictional fact in the
sense that unless it was found that there was a vacancy the
jurisdiction of the state government to make the declaration
and to requisition the permises companyld number arise. this
aspect of the matter has been companysidered by this companyrt in
the case of rai brij raj krishna v. s. k. shau
brothers 4 . that case companycerned the companystruction of the
provisions of the bihar buildings  lease rent and eviction
control act  bihar act 111  of 1947. this companyrt held that
the companytroller had been vested with the jurisdiction to
determine all questions including the question whether or
number there was number-payment of rent and on finding that there
was default in the payment of rent with the jurisdiction to
order eviction of the tenant. the finding of the question
of default was number a jurisdictional finding in the sense in
which learned companynsel for the petitioner asks us to hold
with reference to the finding of the state government in
this case that there has been a vacancy. in the reported
case this companyrt held further that even if the companytroller had
wrongly decided the question of default in the payment of
rent his effective order oil the question of eviction companyld
number be- challenged in a companyrt of law. mr. justice fazl ali
delivering the judgment of the companyrt made reference to the
well knumbern observations of lord esher m.r. in the case of
queen v. companymisssioners for special purposes of the income-
tax   and to
 1  1912 l.r- 39 i.a. 237.  2  1867 l.r. 2 ch. app. 674.  3  1917 a.c. 406.  4  1951 s.c.r. 145.  5  1888 21 q.b.d. 313 319.
the observations of the privy companyncil in the case of the
colonial bank of australasia v. willan 1 . after referring
to those observations and to the provisions of the statute
then before the companyrt this companyrt held that the act
empowered the companytroller alone to decide whether or number
there was number-payment of rent and that decision was
essential to his order for eviction of the tenant under s.

that decision of the companytroller the companyrt further
held companyld number be challenged in a companyrt of law. the
decision of this companyrt just referred to is an apt
illustration of the rule which applies with equal force to
the provisions of the act number before us. the act has made a
specific provision to the effect that the determination on
the questions referred to in ss. 5 and 6 of the act by the
state government shall be companyclusive evidence of the
declaration so made. but that does number mean that the
jurisdiction of the high companyrt under art. 226 or of this
court under art. 32 or on appeal has been impaired. in a
proper case the high companyrt or this companyrt in the exercise of
its special jurisdiction under the companystitution has the
power to determine how far the provisions of the statute
have or have number been companyplied with. but the special powers
aforesaid of this companyrt or of the high companyrt cannumber extend
to reopening a finding by the state government under s. 5 of
the act that the tenant has number actually resided in the
premises for a companytinuous period of six months immediately
preceding the date of the order or under s. 6 that the
premises bad become vacant at about the time indicated in
the order impugned. those are number companylateral matters which
could on proper evidence be reopened by the companyrts. of law. the legislature in its wisdom has made those declarations
conclusive and it is number for this companyrt to question that
wisdom. as an offshoot of the argument that we have just been
examining it was companytended on behalf of the petitioner that
explanation  a  to s. 6 quoted above companytemplates a vacancy
when a tenant omitting other words number necessary  ceases
to be in occupation upon
 1  18745 p.c. 417443.
termination of his tenancy eviction or assignment or
transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises
or otherwise . the argument proceeds further to the effect
that in the instant case admittedly there was no
termination eviction assignment or transfer and that the
words or otherwise must be companystrued as ejusdem generis
with the words immediately preceding them and that
therefore on the facts as admitted even in the affidavit
filed on behalf of the government there was in law no
vacancy. in the first place as already indicated we
cannumber go behind the declaration made by the government that
there was a vacancy. in the second place the rule of
ejusdem generis sought to be pressed in aid of the
petitioner can possibly have numberapplication. the
legislature has been cautious and thorough-going enumbergh to
bar all avenues of escape by using the words or otherwise
. those words are number words of limitation but of extension
so as to companyer all possible ways in which a vacancy may
occur. generally speaking a tenants occupation of his
premises ceases when his tenancy is terminated by acts of
parties or by operation of law or by eviction by the
landlord or by assignment or transfer of the tenants
interest. but the legislature when it used the words or
otherwise  apparently intended to companyer other cases which
may number companye within the. meaning of the preceding clauses
for example a case where the tenants occupation has ceased
as a result of trespass by a third party. the legislature
in our opinion intended to companyer all possible cases of
vacancy occurring due to any reasons whatsoever. hence far
from using those words ejusdem generis with the preceding
clauses of the explanation the legislature used those words
in an all inclusive sense. numberdecided case of any companyrt
holding that the words or otherwise have ever been used in
the sense companytended for on behalf of the petitioner has
been brought to our numberice. on the other hand by way of illustration of decisions to
the companytrary may be cited the case of skinner company

shew company  1 . in that case the companyrt of appeal
 1  1893 1 ch. d- 4i3
had to companysider the words of s. 32 of the patents designs
trade marks act 1883  46 47 vict. c. 57  to the
following effect-
where any person claiming to be the patentee of any
invention by circulars advertisements or otherwise
threatens any other person with any legal
proceedings
their lordships repelled the companytention that the words or
otherwise occurring in that section had to be read ejusdem
generis with circulars and advertisements. they
observed that by so doing they will be cutting down the
intendment of the provisions of the statute when clearly the
word or otherwise had been used with a companytrary
intention. the rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be
applied where general words have been used following
particular and specific words of the same nature on the
established rule of companystruction that the legislature
presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense
that is to say as belonging to the same genus as the
particular and specific words. such a restricted meaning
has to be given to words of general import only where the
context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. but
where the companytext and the object and mischief of the
enactment do number require such restricted meaning to be
attached to words of general import it becomes the duty of
the companyrts to give those words their plain and ordinary
meaning. in our opinion in the companytext of the object and
mischief of the enactment there is numberroom for the
application of the rule of ejusdem generis. hence it
follows that the vacancy as declared by the order impugned
in this case even though it may number be companyered by the
specific words used is certainly companyered by the legal
import of the words or otherwise. the only other companytention which remains to be dealt with is
that the order impugned in this case is number enforceable
because it was directed against the petitioners husband
who was dead at the date of the order besides the other two
persons indicated in it who were number companycerned with the
premises. in our opinion there is numbersubstance in this
contention either. an order like the one passed under s.
6 4  a  of the act
is number in the nature of an order in judicial proceedings
between the government on the one hand and other parties
named. if the proceedings were intended by the act in the
sense of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings between
named parties it may have been legitimately argued that an
order passed against a dead man is a companyplete nullity. but
the order proceeds on the basis that the tenant had ceased
to be in occupation of the premises in october 1952
apparently by reason of the fact that he had handed over
possession of the premises to the so called lodger or
paying guest. admittedly the petitioners husband died
after october 1952. the occupation by the said narottamdas
dharamsey patel was in the nature of an unauthorised
occupation. the fact that the petitioners husband was dead
on the date of the order impugned has only this effect that
in so far as it mentions his name as one of the persons to
be served under s. 13 of the act should be erased from the
order but even so it does number affect the enforceability of
the same. s. 13 lays down the different modes of service of
an order passed under the act according as the order is of a
general nature or affecting a class of persons or an
individual companyporation or firm. we are here companycerned with
the case of an individual and the section lays down that it
can be served either personally by delivering or tendering
the order to him or by post or where he cannumber be found by
affixing a companyy of the order to some companyspicuous part of the
premises in which he is knumbern to have last resided. as the
petitioners husband had died before the date of the order
impugned it companyld affect only the so called lodger who
had been on the findings left in occupation of the
premises after october 1952. he has number made any companyplaint
about number-service. the only other person who companyld be
affected by the order if at all is the petitioner herself.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2313 of 1966.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
october 13 1966 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in writ
petition number 853 of 1966.

c. setalvad. d. narasaraju anwar ullah pasha r. v.
pillai and m. m. kashatriya for the appellant. niren de addl. solicitor-general p. ram reddy s.
ramachandra reddy and t. v.r. tatachari for the
respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
vaidyalingam j. this appeal by special leave granted
by this companyrt is directed against the order dated october
13 1966 passed by the andhra pradesh high companyrt
dismissing writ petition number853 of 1966 filed by the
appellant under art. 226 of the companystitution. the appellant filed the said writ petition under the
following circumstances. the appellant was the vice-
chancellor of the osmania university having been appointed
as such by order dated april 30. 1964 passed by the
governumber of andhra pradesh in
his capacity as chancellor of the said university. the
appointment of the appellant under the said order as vice-
chancellor there is numbercontroversy was for a term of five
years from the date of taking charge and the appointment
itself was made under sub-s.  1  of s. 12 of the osmania
university act 1959  andhra pradesh act number ix of 1959 . there is again numbercontroversy that the appellant took
charge as vice-chancellor in terms of the said order on
april 30 1964 and as such he became entitled to hold
office for the full period of five years which will expire
at the end of april 1969.
the osmania university was established in 1918 and the ad-
ministration of the university was then governed by a
charter of his exalted highness the nizam of hyderabad
promulgated in 1947. with effect from numberember 1 1956 the
state of hyderabad ceased to exist and the telengana region
of that state became part of andhra pradesh. in 1959 the
andhra pradesh legislature passed the osmania university
act 1959 earlier referred to. that act itself was one to
amend and companysolidate the law relating to the osmania
university. it is only necessary to numbere at this stage
that under s. 12 1  of the said act it was provided that
the vice-chancellor shall be appointed by the chancellor
from a panel of number less than three persons selected by a
committee as companystituted under sub-s.  2  but if the
chancellor does number approve any of the persons so selected
he may call for a fresh panel from the companymittee. section
13 again provided for the term of office salary and
allowances etc. of the vice-chancellor. under sub-s.  1
the term of office of the vice-chancellor was fixed for a
term of five years and there was also a further provision
to the effect that he shall be eligible for reappointment. by s. 51 of the said act the osmania university revised
charter- of 1947 was repealed but nevertheless it was
provided that the person holding office immediately before
the companymencement of the act as vice-chancellor was to be
the vice-chancellor on such companymencement of the act and
was to companytinue to hold the said office in circumstances
mentioned therein. there is again numbercontroversy that the appellant who was
already the vice-chancellor of the osmania university from
1957 was again appointed in 1959 as vice-chancellor for a
period of five years under this act and he was similarly
appointed for a further term of five years on april 30
1964 as vice-chancellor as mentioned earlier. during the
middle of 1965 certain amendments were sought to be
introduced in the act by providing for removal of the vice-
chancellor by the chancellor from office under certain
circumstances. there was also a proposal to reduce the term
of office of the vice-chancellor from 5 years to 3 years
from the date of his appointment and for provisions being
made
enabling the government to give directions to the university
relating to matters of policy to be followed by it. the amendments sought to be introduced in the act appear to
have companye in for companysiderable criticism from several
quarters and these have been elaborately dealt with in the
order under attack. according to the appellant he was one
of those who very strenuously opposed the proposed
amendments on the ground that the autonumbery of the university
was sought to be interfered with by the government. according to the appellant again the various criticisms
made by him and others were taken numbere of by the inter-
university board by the education minister of the union and
others. it is the further case of the appellant that it was
felt by the government of andhra pradesh that he was
responsible for the agitation that was being made against
the proposed amendments. but ultimately the andhra
pradesh legislature passed the osmania university
 amendment  act 1966  act 11 of 1966  amending the osmania
university act of 1959 in certain particulars. the said
amendments are to the effect that the vice-chancellor shall
number be removed from office except as provided for in s.
12 2  of the amended act. the term of office was also fixed
at 3 years under the amended s. 13. anumberher provision
relating to the power of government to give instructions to
the university was also introduced as s. 7a but the
appellant companytinued as vice-chancellor. the osmania university act was again amended by the osmania
university  second amendment  act 1966  act xi of 1966 . under this amendment s. 13a was enacted. in brief that
section was to the effect that the person holding the office
of the vicechancellor immediately before the companymencement
of the amending act of 1966 was to hold office only until a
new vice-chancellor was appointed under sub-s.  1  of s. 12
and it also provided that such appointment shall be made
within 90 days after such companymencement. there was a further
provision that on the appointment of such new-vice-
chancellor and on his entering upon his office the person
holding the office of vice-chancellor immediately before
such appointment shall cease to hold that office. section
7-a which had been introduced by act ii of 1966 was
deleted. section 33-a was enacted making special provision
as to the re-constitution of the senate syndicate academic
council and finance companymittee of the university. the appellant filed writ petition number 853 of 1966 in the
high companyrt praying for the issue of a writ or order
declaring s. 5 of the osmania university  second amendment
act. 1966 which introduced s. 13a in the original act as
unconstitutional and void. in that writ petition he
challenged the validity of the new section s. 13a on
several grounds. in brief his plea was that by virtue
of his appointment as vice-chancellor for 5 years on april
30 1964 he had acquired a vested right to hold that office
for the full term and that such a vested right companyld number be
taken away during the currency of the period by any
legislative enactment. the legislature had numbercompetence to
enact the said provision inasmuch as s. 13a companyld number be
treated as legislation in respect of university education. the appellant had also pleaded that the provision virtually
amounted to removal of the appellant from his office without
giving him any opportunity to show cause against such
removal. according to the appellant even assuming the
legislature was companypetent to enact the provision in
question nevertheless s. 13a is unconstitutional and void
inasmuch as it offends art. 14 of the companystitution. we do number think it necessary to advert elaborately to the
various other grounds of attack levelled against the
constitutional validity of the provision in question which
have numberdoubt been dealt with by the high companyrt because
for the purpose of disposing of this appeal in our opinion
it is enumbergh to refer to the grounds of attack taken by the
appellant regarding the companystitutionality of s. 13a based
upon art. 14 of the companystitution. so far as this aspect is companycerned according to the
appellant s. 9 of act 11 of 1966 amended the act of 1959
by incorporating new sub-ss.  1  and  2  in s. 12. under
sub-s.  1  of s. 12 the vicechancellor is to be appointed
by the chancellor. under sub-s.  2  the vice-chancellor
shall number be removed from his office except
by an order of the chancellor passed on the ground of mis-
behaviour or incapacity and it also provided for such an
order being passed only after due enquiry by a person who is
or has been a judge of a high companyrt or the supreme companyrt as
may be appointed by the chancellor and the vice-chancellor
being given an opportunity of making his representation
against the removal. therefore in view of these
provisions the vice-chancellor companyld number be removed by the
chancellor without any cause without reason without
enquiry and without an opportunity being given to him to
show cause against removal. this provision applied to the
appellant who was in office on the date of the passing of
act 11 of 1966 as well as act xi of 1966. nevertheless s.
5 of act xi of 1966 incorporated s.13a in the principal act. under that section number only has power been companyferred on
the chancellor but also a duty imposed so to say on him
to remove the appellant who was the vice-chancellor
without any reason or justification or even giving an
opportunity to him to show cause against such removal. no
enquiry before ordering such removal is companytemplated under
this section. further while a vice-chancellor who is
appointed after the passing of act xi of 1966 cannumber be
removed from office except in accordance with the
provisions of sub-s.  2  of s. 12 the appellant who was
already in office companyld be arbitrarily and
illegally removed under s. 13a of the act. there is numberprovi
sion again similar to s. 13a applicable to a vice-
chancellor appointed after the companying into force of the
amending act. therefore according to the appellant the
provisions companytained in s. 13a are clearly directed only
against him-as he was the person holding office prior to
the amending act and therefore it is a clear case of
hostile discrimination. further according to the appellant persons appointed as
vice-chancellors companystitute a group and must be companysidered
as persons similarly situated and they must be treated
alike whereas by virtue of s. 13a a differentiation is
made between the appellant who was a vice-chancellor on the
date of the companymencement of the amending act and other
persons who are to be appointed as vice-chancellors
thereafter. this differentiation according to the
appellant is again without any basis number has such a
classification any reasonable relation to the main object
of the legislation. the appellant also relied on s. 33a introduced by s. 6 of
act xi of 1966 relating to the reconstitution of the senate
syndicate academic companyncil and the finance companymittee and
pleaded that whereas those academic bodies or authorities
were allowed to companytinue without any time-limit and to
function until they were reconstituted regarding the vice-
chancellor alone a period of 90 days had been fixed under
the amending act within which the chancellor was bound to
appoint anumberher vice-chancellor. this again is a clear
proof of discrimination against the appellant. the respondents companytroverted the stand taken on behalf of
the appellant. apart from supporting the companypetency of the
legislature to enact the measure in question they urge
that art. 14 of the companystitution has numberapplication at all. according to the respondents inasmuch as the term of office
of the vice- chancellor had been reduced to three years as
per act 11 of 1966 it was thought fit by the legislature to
provide for the termination of the office of the vice-
chancellor who was holding that post at the companymencement
of act xi of 1966 as also for the appointment of a new
vice-chancellor. it was under those circumstances that s.
13a was incorporated in the act of 1959 by s. 5 of act xi
of 1966. they also referred to similar provisions which
were incorporated in the two enactments relating to the two
other universities in the state viz. the andhra university
and sri venkateswara university. the respondents further pleaded that act 11 of 1966 placed
the vice-chancellor who was already appointed and who was
functioning prior to that act in the first category as a
class apart from the vice-chancellors who were to be
subsequently appointed and who were to function after the
passing of the said amending act in the second category
both in the matter of the mode of appointment as well as
the term of appointment. the vice-chancellor
viz. the appellant who was in office on the date of the
passing of act xi of 1966 according to the respondents
therefore fell into a class all by himself and as such
came under a third category and the legislature thought fit
to take into account the special features relating to him
and therefore made separate provisions regarding the
termination of his office. therefore a suitable provision
was made by enacting s. 13a in respect of the existing
vice-chancellor who was treated as a class by himself. the respondents also claimed that the legislature was
entitled to treat the vice-chancellor who was then in
office as a class by himself and make suitable provisions
with regard to the termination of his office and therefore
a legislation made for that purpose and on that basis was
constitutionally valid. the charge of hostility towards the
appellant or any attempt to effect discrimination was
stoutly denied by the respondents. the respondents there-
fore urged that the classification of the appellant as a
separate class was proper and such a classification had a
reasonable nexus with the object of the amending
legislation. the respondents further pleaded that the curtailment of the
term of office of an existing vice-chancellor by a statute
enacted by a companypetent legislature does number amount to
removal of the vice-chancellor for sufficient and proved
cause. the respondents also urged that academic bodies or
authorities like the senate syndicate and the academic
council are number similarly situated like the vice-chancellor
either in the matter of appointment or companystitution or in
exercising functions under the statute and therefore the
appellant according to them was number entitled to place any
reliance. on s. 33a introduced by s. 7 of act xi of 1966.
for all these reasons they urged that art. 14 of the
constitution was number violated by the legislature in enacting
s. 13a. before we refer to the findings recorded by the learned
judges of the high companyrt this will be a companyvenient stage
to refer to the material provisions of the statutes
concerned. we have already mentioned that the appellant was
functioning as the vice-chancellor of the osmania
university even from 1957 i.e. even before the osmania
university act 1959 was passed. we have also indicated
that the administration of the university was then governed
by a charter promulgated in 1947. the osmania university
act 1959  act ix of 1959   hereinafter called the act
was passed in 1959 and published in the state gazette on
february 2 1959. section 3 of the act provided that the
university established by the revised charter promulgated
by h.e.h. the nizam of hyderabad on december 8 1947 and
functioning at hyderabad immediately before the companymencement
of the act be reconstituted and declared to be a university
by the name of osmania university. the said section also
provided that the university would be a
residential teaching and affiliating university companysisting
of a chancellor a pro-chancellor a vice-chancellor a
senate a syndicate and an academic companyncil. section 12 1  provided for the appointment of the vice-
chancellor by the chancellor from a panel of number less than
three persons selected by a companymittee as companystituted under
sub-s.  2  thereof but if the chancellor did number approve
any of the persons so selected he companyld call for a fresh
panel from the companymittee. sub-section  2  provided for
the companystitution of the companymittee. section 13 provided for the term of office salary
allowances etc. of the vice-chancellor. under sub-s.  1
the vice-chancellor was to hold office for a term of 5 years
and he was eligible for reappointment. there was a proviso
to the effect that the vicechancellor shall companytinue to hold
office after the expiry of his term of appointment for a
period number exceeding six months or until ms successor is
appointed and enters upon his office whichever is earlier. sub-s.  6  provided for the filling up of the vacancy in
the post of the vice-chancellor when it fell permanently
vacant and a vice-chancellor so appointed as per sub-ss.  1  and  2  of s. 12 was to hold office for a full term of
5 years. section 51  i  repealed the osmania university revised
charter 1947 but sub-s.  2  provided that numberwithstanding
such repeal the person holding office immediately before
the companymencement of the act as vice-chancellor shall on
such companymencement be the vice-chancellor of the university
and he was entitled to hold office until a vice-chancellor
is appointed in accordance with the act. it will be numbericed by the above reference to the material
provisions of the act that there was numberprovision for
removal of a vicechancellor and that the appointment of a
vice-chancellor was to be by the chancellor as provided for
in s. 12. the term of office of the vice-chancellor was 5
years and he was eligible for reappointment. the appellant
who was already a vice-chancellor functioning under the
charter of 1947 was entitled to companytinue and did companytinue
as the vice-chancellor by virtue of s. 51 of the act. he
was also as already mentioned originally appointed as
vicechancellor for a period of 5 years under the act in
1959.
the act was amended in certain particulars by the osmania
university  amendment  act 1966  act ii of 1966
 hereinafter called the first amendment act . the first
amendment act received the assent of the governumber on january
29 1966. section 6 of the first amendment act introduced
s. 7a which we set out
7a. instructions by the government.-the
government may after companysultation with the
university give to the university
instructions relating to matters of major
educational policy such as pattern of
university education medium of instruction
and establishment of post-graduate centres to
be followed by it. in the exercise of its powers and
performance of its functions under this act
the university shall companyply with the
instructions issued under sub-section  1 . similarly s. 9 incorporated new sub-ss.  1
and  2  in s. 12 of the act as follows
12.  1  the vice-chancellor shall be
appointed by the chancellor. the vice-chancellor shall number be removed
from his office except by an order of the
chancellor passed on the ground of
misbehaviour or incapacity and after due
inquiry by such person who is or has been a
judge of a high companyrt or the supreme companyrt as
may be appointed by the chancellor in which
the vice-chancellor shall have an opportunity
of making his representation against such
removal. section 10 while effecting certain other amendments to s.
13. the act incorporated a new sub-s.  1  as follows
13.  1  subject to the provisions of sub-
section  2  of section 12 the vice-chancellor
shall hold office for a term of three years
from the date of his appointment and shall be
eligible for re-appointment to that office for
anumberher term of three years only
provided that the vice-chancellor shall
continue to hold office after the expiry of
his term of appointment for a period number
exceeding six months or until his successor is
appointed and enters upon his office
whichever is earlier. it was this amendment act when it was in the bill stage
that appears to have been severely criticised by various
authorities on the ground that the autonumbery of the
university was sought to be interfered with by the
government. in that companynection the appellant also appears
to have made several statements criticising the provisions
sought to be incorporated in the act. it is also on record
that companynter-statements were made on behalf of the
government meeting these criticisms regarding the proposed
amendments. they have been dealt with by the high companyrt
rather elaborately but we do number propose to go into those
matters for the purpose of this appeal. by virtue of the amendments effected and referred to above
it will be seen that the term of office of the vice-
chancellor has been reduced from 5 years to 3 years. the
manner of appointment of the vice-chancellor has also been
changed and a provision is companytained for removal of the
vice-chancellor from his office but that can be done only
in accordance with the provisions companytained in s. 12 2  of
the act. section 7a gives power to the government to give
instructions to the university relating to matters of major
educational policy and it is made obligatory on the
university to companyply with such instructions issued by the
government. as we have already stated the appellant was again appointed
as vice-chancellor for a period of 5 years on april 30
1964 and he was companytinuing in office when the first
amendment act was passed. one of the claims that is made by
the appellant in these proceedings is that he is entitled
to the protection companyferred by s. 12 2  of the act referred
to above. there does number appear to be any companytroversy that
any appointment of a vice-chancellor was made after the
passing of the first amendment act . the act was further amended by the osmania university
 second amendment  act 1966  act xi of 1966   to be
referred to as the second amendment act . it received the
assent of the governumber on may 16 1966. section 2 of the
second amendment act omitted s. 7a of the act. section 5
of the second amendment act which introduced new s. 13a in
the act and which provision is the subject of attack in
these proceedings is as follows
13a. special provision as to the
appointment of a new vice-chancellor.-
numberwithstanding anything in this act the
person holding the office of the vice-
chancellor immediately before the companymencement
of the osmania university  second amendment
act 1966 shall companytinue to hold that office
only until a new vice-chancellor is appointed
by the chancellor under sub-section  1  of
section 12 and enters upon his office and
such appointment shall be made within ninety
days after such companymencement. on the
appointment of such new vice-chancellor and
on his entering upon his office the person
holding the office of the vice-chancellor
immediately before such appointment shall
cease to hold that office. again s. 6 of the second amendment act. incorporated s.
33a in the act which is as follows
33a. special provision as to the
reconstitution of the senate
syndicate .academic companyncil and finance company-
mittee. numberwithstanding anything in this act
the members of the senate the syndicate the
academic companyncil and the finance companymittee
constituted and functioning
before the companymencement of the osmania
university  amendment  act 1966 shall
continue to be such members and function only
until a new senate syndicate academic
council or finance companymittee as the case may
be is reconstituted under this act. on the
reconstitution of such new senate syndicate
academic companyncil or finance companymittee the
members of the senate other than the life
members thereof the members of the syndicate
academic companyncil or finance companymittee as the
case may be holding office immediately before
such reconstitution shall cease to hold that
office. even according to the respondents s. 13a was incorporated
for the purpose of terminating the services of the appellant
as vice-chancellor so as to enable the chancellor to make a
fresh appointment of a vice-chancellor. we have referred to
s. 33a of the act because the appellants case was also to
the effect that with regard to the senate syndicate
academic companyncil etc. there is numberprovision similar to s.
13a of the act though they are also similarly situated like
him. the findings of the learned judges of the. high companyrt may
number be briefly summarised -

the andhra pradesh legislature was
competent to enact s. 5 of the second
amendment act. the said section does number
contravene art. 19 1  f  of the companystitution. the appellant was holding the office of
the vicechancellor when the act came into
force and companytinued under s. 51 2  thereof as
vice-chancellor until the chancellor passed an
order in 1959 appointing him once again
under the act. section 13 1  as introduced by the
first amendment act is number retrospective and
the right of the appellant to companytinue as
vice-chancellor for the full term of 5 years
stood unaffected and the new s. 13 1  does number
apply to him. the new s. 12 2  as introduced by the
first amendment act is number applicable to the
appellant. sections 12 2  and 13a of the act do
number companyer the same field. section 12 2
provides for removal by way of punishment and
its operation is on a different field from
that of s. 13a where the cessation of office
is due to a curtailment of the term. section
12 2  applies only to the future vice-
chancellors and s. 13a is solely applicable to
the existing vice-chancellor the appellant. .lm0
regarding the attack on s. 13a on the basis of art. 14 of
the companystitution that there is an unreasonable
discrimination the learned judges were of the view that the
said section did number suffer from any such infirmity. the
learned judges held that the impugned legislation had
resulted in classifying vice-chancellors under two
categories  a  the appellant as the existing vice-
chancellor falling under the first category and  b  future
vice-chancellor to be appointed under the act who falls
under the second category. according to the high companyrt the
object sought to be achieved by such classification as
could be seen from the objects and reasons of the second
amendment act 1966 was to give effect to the reduced term
of 3 years fixed under s. 13 1  of the act
after the first amendment. the hi
gh companyrt
further held that the classification adopted
by s. 13a of putting the appellant as the
existing vicechancellor in a class by
himself is founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes the appellant
from future vicechancellors and that this
differentia has a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the second
amendment act. in this companynection the
learned judges also advert to the similar
provisions enacted at about the same time in
the andhra university act 1925 and the sri
venkateswara university act 1954.
the high companyrt is also of the view that the legislature must
have taken into account the fact that the appellant has
already put in more than 6 years of service as vice-
chancellor for treating him as a class by himself as
distinct from future vice-chancellors who are to be
appointed and as such have number put in any service at all. the learned judges have numberdoubt adverted to the fact that
the appellant has got an eventful record of efficient
service full of recognition and appreciation but the
appellant cannumber plead those circumstances when a companypetent
legislature has passed a valid legislative measure under
which he has to lose his office. ultimately on these findings the high companyrt came to the
conclusion that s. 5 of the second amendment act
introducing s. 13a in the act is number vitiated by any
infirmity as alleged by the appellant and finally
dismissed the appellants writ petition. the appellant has again raised numberdoubt most of the
contentions that were taken before the high companyrt. but the
main ground of attack that has been pressed before us by
learned companynsel for the appellant is the one based upon
art. 14 of the companystitution. the findings recorded and the
views expressed by the high companyrt are sought to be
sustained by the learned additional solicitor-general
appearing for the respondents. but we do number think it
necessary to go into the larger companytroversy that has been
raised by the appellant before the high companyrt in the view
that we take that the appellant must succeed in respect of
the attack levelled against the impugned
provision based upon art. 14 of the companystitution. as to
whether the criticism made by the appellant about the
proposals to amend the act was or-was number responsible for
the passing of the legislation in question does number assume
much of an importance because the simple question is
whether the provision s. 13a as it number stands n the act
is violative in any manner of art. 14 of the companystitution. if the answer is yes it is needless to state that the
provision will have to be struck down. therefore we are
confining our attention only to the provisions of the act
and we will refer to any other circumstance that is brought
to our numberice only for the limited purpose of companysidering
the grounds of attack based upon art. 14 of the
constitution. according to mr. setalvad the appellant is entitled to take
advantage of the provisions of s. 12 2  of the act. on the
date of the passing of the first amendment act the
appellant was admittedly a vice-chancellor and he had been
continuing as such. he cannumber be removed from his office
except in accordance with the provisions of s. 12 2  of the
act. but in view of s. 13a of the act introduced by the
second amendment act the appellant is forced out of his
office within 90 days of the passing of the second amend-
ment act. the creation of two classes of vice-chancellors
viz. of vice-chancellors appointed under the act and the
vice-chancellor who was in office at the companymencement of the
second amendment act is number on any rational basis. person
is appointed as vicechancellors companystitute a
group and the impugned provision
makes a differentiation between the person who is a vice-
chancellor then and other persons who are to be appointed
vice-chancellors thereafter for which differentiation
there is absolutely numberbasis. further even if it can be
stated that there is any basis for the said classification
nevertheless there should be a nexus or companynection between
the basis of the classification and the object of the
legislation which again is lacking in this case. mr. setalvad further urged that while the services of a
vicechancellor appointed under the act companyld be terminated
only in accordance with the provisions companytained in s. 12 2
of the act the appellants services companyld be terminated
under s. 13a without adopting the procedure laid down in s.
12 2  of the act. there was also numberprovision in the act
mr. setalvad pointed out making s. 13 2  applicable to
vice-chancellors to be appointed in future. though the term
of office for a vice-chancellor has been fixed under the
act even after the amendments as three years and that may
apply to all the vice-chancellors so far as the appellant
is companycerned his term has been reduced or restricted to 90
days under s. 13a of the act. mr. setalvad again urges that even assuming that it is open
to the legislature in an appropriate case to make
provisions applicable
to only one individual or a group of individuals
nevertheless it is well-established by this companyrt that
the classification that is effected by the statute must be
a classification founded on an intelligible differentia and
that differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute. applying these two
tests learned companynsel urges that the impugned legislation
must be. companysidered to be violative of art. 14 of the
constitution. the learned additional solicitor-general has urged that the
term of office of the vice-chancellor has been reduced to
three years by the first amendment act. the legislature
in order to give effect to this provision and to enable
fresh appointments to be made under the act has enacted s.
13a. that section has necessarily to apply only to
persons like the appellant who are holding. office at the
time when these provisions came into force. such a
provision in the nature of things cannumber apply to vice-
chancellors who are to be appointed in future under the act. therefore it is wrong to state that all vice-chancellors. irrespective of the manner or mode under which they are
appointed in present or in future fall under the same
category. further the appellant has been a vice-chancellor
for nearly 7 years. the legislature the learned solicitor
points out having regard to these circumstances has chosen
to treat the appellant the vice-chancellor holding office
on the date of the second amendment act as a class by
himself and has differentiated him from persons to be
appointed vicechancellor for the first time. such a
classification is reasonable and it has got a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second
amendment act viz. bringing about uniformity in the tenure
of three years of office for all vice-chancellors. the
learned solicitor points out further that the appellant is
number entitled to the benefit of s. 12 2  of the act. the
legislature was companypetent to enact the measure in question
and the object of the legislature was to give effect to the
amendment provisions as early as. possible. he pointed out
that similar provisions were also made in two other
enactments at about the same time viz. in the andhra
university act 1925 and the sri venkateswara university
act 1954. it may be that the legislature companyld have
adopted anumberher method for replacing the present vice-
chancellor but that is a matter of policy which cannumber be
reviewed by the companyrts so long as the legislature had the
competence to enact the measure and the provisions so
enacted do number suffer from any other legal infirmities. we have given due companysideration to the various companytentions
placed before us by mr. setalvad learned companynselfor the
appellant and the learned additional solicitor-general on
behalf of the respondents but we are number inclined to agree
with the companytentions of the learned additional solicitor-
general. the principles to be borne in mind when a question arise
under art. 14 of the companystitution have been laid down in
several decisions by this companyrton a number of occasions. in budhan choudhry v. the state of bihar 1  das j.
speaking for the companyrt said
it is number well-established that while
article 14 forbids class legislation it does
number forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. in order however
to pass the test of permissible classification
two companyditions must be fulfilled namely  i
that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group and  ii
that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the statute in question. therefore it will be seen that in order to accept a
classification as permissible and number hit by art. 14 the
measure in question will have to pass the two tests laid
down in the above decision. the observations extracted
above have been quoted by das c. j. in .ram krishna dalmia

shri justice s. r. tendolkar 2 . it is numberdoubt true as
pointed out by the learned additional solicitorgeneral that
a statute may direct its provisions against one individual
person or thing or against several individual persons or
things. but before such a provision can be accepted as
valid the companyrt must be satisfied that there is a
reasonable basis of classification which appears on the face
of the statute itself or is deducible from the surrounding
circumstances or matters of companymon knumberledge. if numbersuch
reasonable basis of classification appears on the face of
the statute or is deducible from the surrounding
circumstances the law will have to be struck down as an
instance of naked discrimination. it should also be borne in mind that there is always a
presumption in favour of the companystitutionality of an
enactment and the burden is upon the party who attacks the
same as unconstitutional to show that there is a clear
transgression of the companystitutional principles but as
observed by das c.j. in ram krishna dalmias case 2  at p.
while good faith and knumberledge of the
existing companyditions on the part of a
legislature are to be presumed if there is
numberhing on the face of the law or the
surrounding circumstances brought to the
numberice of the companyrt on which the
classification may reasonably be regarded as
based the presumption of companystitutionality
cannumber be carried
 1  1955 1 s.c.r. 10451049.  2  1959 s.c.r 279 296.
to the extent of always holding that there
must be some undisclosed and unknumbern reasons
for subjecting certain individuals or
corporations to hostile or discriminating
legislation. having due regard to the principles referred to above we
number proceed to companysider as to whether the appellant has been
able to establish that s. 5 of the second amendment act
introducing s.13a in the act is discriminatory and as
such violative of art. 14 of the companystitution. we have already stated that the appellant was appointed
under the act for a further term of 5 years as vice-
chancellor on april 30 1964 and he was companytinuing in
office as such at the time when the two amending acts were
passed and numbermally. he would be entitled to companytinue in
that post for the full term which will expire only at the
end of april 1969. the first amendment act provided in s.
12 of the act that the vice-chancellor is to be appointed
by the chancellor but s. 12 2  specifically provided that
the vice-chancellor shall number be removed from his office-excep
t by an order of the chancellor passed on the ground
of misbehaviour or incapacity and after due inquiry by such
person who is or has been a judge of a high companyrt or the
supreme companyrt as may be appointed by the chancellor. it
was also provided that the vicechancellor was to have an
opportunity of making his representation against such
removal. prima facie the provisions companytained in sub-s.
 2  of s. 12 must also apply to the appellant who did
continue in office even after the passing of the first
amendment act. numberdoubt the term of office of the vice-
chancellor was fixed at 3 years under s. 13 1  of the act. but numberprovisions were made in the first amendment act
regarding the termination of the tenure of office of the
vice-chancellor who was then holding that post. there can be numbercontroversy that s. 13a introduced by s. 5
of the second amendment act deals only with the appellant. in fact the stand taken on behalf of the respondents in the
counteraffidavit filed before the high companyrt was to the
effect that the legislature had chosen to treat the vice-
chancellor holding office at the time of the companymencement of
the second amendment act as a class by himself and with a
view to enable the chancellor to make fresh appointments s.
13a of the act was enacted. therefore it is clear that s. 13a applies only to the
appellant. though numberdoubt it has been stated on behalf
of the respondents that similar provisions were
incorporated at about the same time in two other acts
relating to two other universities viz. the andhra
university and the sri venkateswara university and though
this circumstance has also been taken into account by the
learned judges of the high companyrt in our opinion those
provisions
have numberbearing in companysidering the attack levelled by the
appellant on s. 13a of the act. this is a clear case where the statute itself directs its
provisions by enacting s. 13a against one individual viz. the appellant and before it can be sustained as valid this
court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for
grouping the appellant as a class by himself and that such
reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or
must be deducible from other surrounding circumstances
according to learned companynsel for the appellant all vice-
chancellors of the osmania university companye under one group
and can be classified only as one unit and there is
absolutely numberjustification for grouping the appellant under
one class and the vice-chancellors to be appointed in future
under a separate class. in any event it is also urged that
the said classification has numberrelation or nexus to the
object of the enactment. our attention has been drawn to the statement of objects
and reasons to the second amendment bill the material part
of which is as follows
the term of office of the vice-chancellor
has been reduced to three years under section
13 1  of the osmania university act as amended
by section 10 of the osmania university
 amendment  act 1966.
section 13-a proposed to be inserted by
clause 5 of the bill enjoins that
numberwithstanding anything in the act the
person holding the office of the vice-
chancellor immediately before the companymencement
of the osmania university  second amendment
act 1966 shall companytinue to hold that office
only until a new vice-chancellor is appointed
by the chancellor under section 12 1  as
amended and enters upon his office and such
appointment shall be made within ninety days
after such companymencement. we are inclined to accept the companytention of mr. setalvad
that there is numberjustification for the impugned legislation
resulting in a classification of the vice-chancellors into
two categories viz. the appellant as the then existing
vice-chancellor and the future vice. chancellors to be
appointed under the act. in our view the vice-chancellor who is appointed under the
act or the vice-chancellor who was holding that post on the
date of the companymencement of the second amendment act form
one single group or class. even assuming that the
classification of these two types of persons as companying under
two different groups can be made nevertheless it is
essential that such a classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes the appel-
lant from the vice-chancellor appointed under the act. . we
are number able to find any such intelligible differentia on
the basis of which the classification can be justified. it is also essential that the classification or differentia
effected by the statute must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute. we have gone
through the statement of objects and reasons of the second
amendment bill which became law later as well as the
entire act itself as it number stands. in the statement of
objects and reasons for the second amendment bill extracted
above it is seen that except stating a fact that the term
of office of the vice-chancellor has been reduced to 3 years
under s. 13 1  and that s.13a was intended to be enacted no
other policy his indicated which will justify the
differentiation. the term of office fixing the period of
three years for the vice-chancellor has been already
effected by the first amendment act and therefore the
differential principle adopted for terminating the services
of the appellant by enacting s. 13a of the act cannumber be
considered to be justified. in other words the differentia
adopted in s. 13a and directed as against the appellant-and
the appellant alone number be companysidered to have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second
amendment act. while a vice-chancellor appointed under s. 12 of the act can
be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under
s. 12 2  the services of the appellant who was also a
vice. chancellor and similarly situated is sought to be
terminated by enacting s. 13a of the act. we do number see any
policy underlying the act justifying this differential
treatment accorded to the appellant. the term of office of
the vice-chancellors has been numberdoubt reduced under the
first amendment act and fixed for 3 years for all the vice-
chancellors. but so far as the appellant is companycerned by
virtue of s. 13a of the act he can companytinue to hold that
office only until a new vice-chancellor is appointed by the
chancellor and that appointment is to be made within 90
days. while all other vice-chancellors appointed under the
act can companytinue to be in office for a period of three
years the appellant is literally forced out of his office
on the expiry of 90 days from the date of companymencement of
the second amendment act. there is also numberprovision in the
statute providing for the termination of the services of the
vicechancellors who are appointed under the act in the
manner provided under s. 13a of the act. by s. 13a the
appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available
under the proviso to sub-s.  1  of s. 13 of the act which
benefit is available to all other vicechancellors. the appointment of the appellant in 1959 and again in 1964
under s. 12 1  of the act as it stood prior to the two
amendments by the chancellor must have been numberdoubt
from a panel of
names submitted by a companymittee companystituted under s. 12 2 . the appointment of a vice-chancellor after the passing of
the first amendment act is to be made exclusively by the
chancellor under s. 12 1  as the section number stands. that
is a circumstance relied on by the respondent for
differentiating the appellant as an existing vice-chancellor
from a vice-chancellor to be appointed under the act as
amended. anumberher circumstance relied on is that the
appellant has been a vice-chancellor for 7 years. in our
opinion these are number such vital or crucial factors which
will justify treating the appellant as a class by himself
because the powers and duties of a vice-
chancellor either under the act prior to the amendment
or under the act after amendment companytinue to be the same. to companyclude the classification of the appellant as a class
by himself is number founded on any intelligible differentia
which distinguishes him from other vice-chancellors and it
has numberrational relation to the object of the statute and
so s. 13a is hit by art. 14.
the appellant has attacked s. 13a as discriminatory
relying upon a different provision made under s. 33a in
respect of the senate syndicate academic companyncil and the
finance companymittee. we have however number companysidered the
question as to whether the appellant can be treated as
falling under the same class as the other authorities
mentioned in s. 33a as we have accepted the appellants
contention based upon art. 14 on other grounds.