criminal apellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 133
of 1969.
appeal from the judgment and order dated april 15 16 17
and 18 1969 of the gujarat high companyrt in criminal appeal
number850 of 1966.
ravinder narain p. c. bhartari for the appellant. k . chatterjee b. d. sharma and s. p. nayar for the
respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

jagamohan reddy j.-the appellant babu lal hargovindas
carries on business of selling milk in the city of
ahmedabad. on 2-12-1965 at about 8 a.m. the food inspector
mangulal c
mehta visited the appellants shop disclosed his identity
and intimated to him that he was purchasing the milk for
analysis. thereafter 700 ml. milk which was being sold as
cows milk was purchased from him. it was divided into 3
parts and poured into three bottles in each of which he
added sixteen drops of formalin as preservative. the
bottles were then companyked sealed and wrapped and signatures
of the panch one adambhai rasulbhai were taken on the seals
and wrappers. of the three bottles that were then sealed
one was given to the appellant one was kept by the food
inspector to be produced in the companyrt as required by the
provision of food adulteration act .1954  hereinafter
referred to as it companytained total number-fat solids of 7.4
instead of 8.5 11.30 a.m. to the chemist laxmansingh
vaghela who being authorized by the public analyst dr. vyas
analyzed it. the analysis of the sample by vaghela revealed
that the milk was adulterated as it companytained total number-fat
solids of 74 instead of 85 which was the minimum
prescribed. after the receipt of the report of the public
analyst the food inspector filed a companyplaint on 6-4-1966
with the written companysent of the medical officer of health of
the ahmedabad municipal companyporation. after examining the
food inspector mehta the chemist vaghela and the panch
adambhai rasulbhai the city magistrate 6th companyrt
ahmedabad companyvicted the appellant under section 16 1  a  i
read with section 7 of the act for selling adulterated milk
and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one
month and a fine of rs. 1000 in default to undergo a
further period of 3 months rigorous imprisonment. against
this companyviction and sentence the appellant appealed to the
high companyrt of gujarat which companyfirmed the companyviction. this
appeal against that judgment is by certificate under article
134 1  c  of the companystitution of india. it is companytended before us-firstly that the requirements of
section 10 7  of the act have number been companyplied with under
this provision when the food inspector takes any action as
specified in sub-sections 1 a  2 4 or 6 he shall call one
or more persons to be present at the time such action is
taken and take his or their signatures. the panch witness
however- did number support the case of the companyplainant that he
was either present at the time when the sample was obtained
from the appellant or that his signatures were taken when
the bottles were said to have been sealed. in these
circumstances it is submitted the companyviction cannumber be
sustained. secondly the appellant was number afforded an
opportunity to send the sample of the milk left with him to
the director of central food laboratory for a certificate
inasmuch as the companyplaint itself was lodged after a lapse of
over 4 months from the dates of taking the samples. in
these circumstances the milk companyld number have been preserved
for the appellant to have taken the opportunity afforded to
him by sub-section  2  of section 13 by
sending it to the director central food laboratory for a
certificate. thirdly the food inspector who filed this
complaint was number companypetent to file it because the medical
officer of health who gave written companysent to file it was
number validly authorized as required under section 20 1  of
the act inasmuch as under the relevant provisions of the
bombay provincial municipal companyporation act lix of 1949
 hereinafter referred to as the companyporation act as applied
to the state of gujarat it was the municipal companymissioner
and number the municipal companyporation. that should have
authorized the giving of written companysent to prosecute. fourthly even if the medical officer of health can be said
to be validly authorized by resolution of the municipal
corporation dated 17-10-55 he companyplaint is number in
accordance with that resolution since the resolution
authorized the filing of the companyplaint in the name of the
municipal companyporation but the companyplaint filed does number
disclose that it is filed on behalf of the companyporation. lastly rule 7 2  of the prevention of food adulteration
rules  hereinafter called the rules  which permits the
public analyst to cause the sample to be analyzed is
ultra--vires because it is beyond the scope of section 23 e
of the adulteration act. most of these companytentions were
urged before the learned single judge of the gujarat high
court who in a lengthy judgment held them to be untenable. in our view also the submission of the learned advocate for
the appellant are without force and must be rejected. it may be observed that section 10 7  of the act originally
required that the food inspector when he takes action
either under the provisions of sub-sections  1   2   4  or
 6  to call as far as possible number less than two persons to
be present at the time when such action is taken and take
their signatures but that provision was amended by act 49 of
1964 and instead it was provided that the food inspector
shall call one or more persons at the time when such action
is taken and take his or their signatures. it appears that
the person who witnessed the taking and sealing of the
sample did number support the food inspectors version that the
signatures of this panch witness were taken on the receipt
ex. 5 and on the label and wrappers of the bottles at the
time when the samples were obtained. the witness rasulbhai who was serving in a mill and also
sits in the cycle shop of his brother which is adjoining to
the milk shop of the appellant after he returns from his
duty stated that on the date in question at about 8 a.m. he
was called by the food inspector as a panch witness and that
he signed on the two bottles of milk and wrappers also. when he was companyfronted with the signature on ex. 5 he said
that he had signed it without reading it. the food
inspector on the other hand asserted that he had in the
presence of panch witness companyked sealed labelled and wrap-
ped the bottles which were signed by the panch twice on each
of the bottles one on the label and the other on the wrapper
and thereafter the accused had passed a receipt to that
effect which was attested by the panch witness in the
presence of the accused. the trying magistrate was number
prepared to take the word of the panch witness that he had
signed ex. 5 without reading it or without seeing the
accused signing the same and preferred the evidence of the
food inspector. before the high companyrt numbere of the companyten-
tions raised before the trial magistrate namely that
inasmuch as the panch witness did number support the
prosecution that all the requirements of section 10 7  of
the act were number companyplied with or that the paper slips
bearing signature of the panch ought companyhave been affixed on
the bottles and in the absence of such paper seals there
could have been tampering of the seals before they were
analyzed though raised were number pressed having regard to a
decision of that companyrt in manka hari v. state of
gujarat. 1 . the learned advocate for the appellant companytends that though
these point- were number pressed before the gujarat high companyrt
he is free to urge it before us. in the first place we do
number think that having regard to the findings based on an
appreciation of evidence of the panch witness and the food
inspector that the milk was bottled and sealed signed and
attested by the panch witness in the presence of the accused
as spoken to by the food inspector can be challenged before
us as those are findings of facts. in the second place
there is numberhing to indicate that the provisions of sub-
section  7  of section 10 have number been companyplied with. even
otherwise in our view numberquestion of the trial being
vitiated for number-compliance of these provisions can arise. it is number a rule of law that the evidence of the food
inspector cannumber be accepted without companyroboration. he is
number an accomplice number is it similar to the one as in the
case of wills where the law makes it imperative to examine
an attesting witness under section 68 of the evidence act to
prove the execution of the will. the evidence of the food
inspector alone if believed can be relied on for proving
that the samples were taken as required by law. at the most
courts of fact may find it difficult in any particular case
to rely on the testimony of the food inspector alone though
we do number say that this result generally follows. the
circumstances of each case will determine the extent of the
weight to be given to the evidence of the food inspector and
what in the opinion of the companyrt is the value of his
testimony. the provisions of section 10 7  are akin to
those under section 103 of the criminal procedure companye when
the premises of a citizen are searched by the police. these
provisions are enacted to safeguard against any possible
allegations-of excesses or resort to unfair means either by
the police officers or by the food inspectors under the act. this
 1  8 g. l. r. 588.
being the object it is in the interests of the prosecuting
authorities companycerned to companyply with the provisions of the
act the numbercompliance of which may in some cases result in
their testimony being rejected. while this is so we are number
to be understood as in any way minimizing the need to
comply with the aforesaid salutary provisions. in this case
however there is numberjustification in the allegation that the
provisions have number been companyplied. with because the panch
witness had been called and his signatures taken which he
admits. in these circumstances the companyrts were justified in
holding on the evidence of the food inspector that he bad
complied with the requirements and that the samples were
seized in the presence of the panch witness whose signatures
were taken in the presence of the accused. there is also in our view numberjustification for holding that
the accused had numberopportunity for sending the sample in his
custody to the director central food laboratory under
section 13 2  because he made numberapplication to the companyrt
for sending it. it does number avail him at this stage to say
that over four months had elapsed from the time the samples
were taken to the time when the companyplaint was filed and
consequently the sample. had deteriorated and companyld number be
analyzed. the decision of this companyrt in municipal
corporation of delhi v. ghisa ram 1  has numberapplication to
the facts of this case. in that case the sample of the
vendor had in fact been sent to the director of the central
food laboratory on his application but the director had
reported that the sample had become highly decomposed and
could number be analyzed. it is also evident from that case
that the food inspector had number taken the precaution of
adding the preservative. it appears from page 120 of the
report that the elementary precaution of adding
preservative. to the sample which was given to the
respondent should necessarily have been taken by the food. inspector that if such precaution had been taken the
sample with the respondent would have beer available for
analysis by the director of the central food laboratory and
since the valuable right given to the vendor by section
13 2  companyld number be availed of the companyviction was bad. no
such defence is available to the appellant in this case
because number only is there evidence that the preservative
formalin was added but the appellant had number even made an
application to send the sample to the director of central
food laboratory. the companypetence of the food inspector to file the companyplaint
has been challenged on the ground that the medical officer
of health who gave his written companysent for filing it was number
validly authorized by the municipal companymissioner and that in
any case the companyplaint is number in accordance with the
resolution of the muni-
1 1967 2 s. c. r. 116.
cipal companyporation  hereinafter referred to as the
corporation  which authorized the filing of it in its name
and number in the name of the food inspector. it appears the
resolution of the companyporation of 17th october 1955 is in
gujarati but before the high companyrt the advocates of the
parties seem to have broadly agreed on the following
translation -
municipal companyporation resolution number 639
1955-56 a. d. shri ramniklal inamdar proposed
seconded by shri shantilal manilal that in
pursuance of the recommendation of the
standing companymittee resolution number 1124 dated
13-10-1955 the medical officer of health is
authorized to accord written companysent for
filing companyplaints for the municipal
corporation in accordance with section 20 of
the prevention of food adulteration act 1954
 central act . on votes being taken the
proposal was carried. it was however pointed out by the lawyer of
the companyporation that the translation should
read slightly differently to replace that
part after the words the standing companymittee
resolution number 1124 dated 13-10-1955 by the
words the authority of the municipal
corporation to give written companysent to file
complaints under section 20 of the prevention
of food adulteration act is given to the
medical officer. in whatever manner the
resolution may be read it is clear that what
it purports to do is to authorize the medical
officer of health pursuant to the powers
vested in the companyporation as a local authority
under section 20 1  of the act to have his
written companysent. the provisions of section
20 1  are as follows
20 1 -numberprosecution for an offence under
this act shall be instituted except by or
with the written companysent of the central
government or the state government or a local
authority or a person authorized in this
behalf by general or special order by the
central government or the state government or
a local authority. on a reading of the above provision it is manifest that a
prosecution can be instituted either by the local authority
or by a person authorized by it in that behalf by general or
special order. the resolution therefore was in accord with
the power vested by section 20 1  of the act by which the
corporation authorized the medical officer of health to
institute a prosecution. it is however stated that under
the companyporation act it is the municipal companymissioner who is
the authority empowered to act for the companyporation and
authorize any person to institute prosecution under the
act and since the medical officer of health was number so
authorized by the companymissioner the prosecution against the
appellant
is invalid. this companytention is based on the provisions of
sections 67 68 of the companyporation act under which it is
claimed that it is the companymissioner who is empowered to
exercise the functions of the companyporation as such it is his
authorization that is required to satisfy the companyditions
prescribed in section 20 1  of the act for the institution
of a prosecution under that act. we do number however read the
provisions of the companyporation act referred to as pressed
upon us. it is undisputed that under subsection  2  of
section 67 the municipal government rests in the companyporation
unless of companyrse there is any express provision which
provides otherwise. there is numberdoubt that the companyporation
act specifically prescribes the respective functions of the
several municipal authorities as companystituted under section 4
but it numberwhere relegates the companyporation to a subordinate
position or makes it subservient to the companymissioner. in
section 67 3  upon which reliance is placed the duties and
powers of the companymissioner are made expressly subject to the
approval and sanction of the companyporation as also subject to
all other restrictions limitations and companyditions imposed by
the companyporation act or any other act for the time being in
force. the duties and powers of the companymissioner be it
numbered are in respect of the carrying out of the provisions
of the companyporation act and of any other act for the time
being in force which imposes any duty or companyfers any power
on the companyporation. this sub-section is dealing with the
exercise of the executive power by the companymissioner which is
subject to limitations. on numberinterpretation is it possible
to hold that the municipal administration vests solely in
the companymissioner or that any function to be discharged by
the companyporation ran only be discharged by the companymissioner
and numberone else. the scheme of the companyporation act leaves
numberdoubt that there are many instances where companyporation
alone has to discharge the functions such as the
appointment of certain officers under sections 45. 53 and
58 or the discharging by it of the obligatory and
discretionary duties under sections 63 to 66.
section 68 1  empowers the companymissioner to perform or
exercise any powers duties and functions companyferred or
imposed upon or vested in the companyporation by any other law
for the time being in force subject to the provisions of
such law and to such restrictions limitations and companyditions
as the companyporation may impose. a companybined reading of these two provisions clearly indicates
that the companymissioner cannumber exercise these functions
without any fetters as if he is the companyporation. the
corporation is the companytrolling authority and can restrict
limit or impose companyditions on the companymissioner in the
exercise of any of the powers envisaged in either under
section 67 3  or under section 68 1  there
is numbergainsaying that the companymissioner can function under
section 68 1  subject to the companytrol of the companyporation as
also subject to the provisions of the law under which the
powers are companyferred. the power to restrict limit or impose
conditions being vested in the companyporation it has the final
voice in determining whether the companymissioner or any other
person win discharge those functions envisaged therein. that apart section 20 1  of the act itself places no
restrictions on the companyporation to circumscribe the powers
of the companymissioner. it therefore follows that if a
discretion is vested in the companyporation either to give its
written companysent in which case the companymissioner companyld
subject to such limitation as may be imposed by the
corporation under section 68 1  exercise the function or to
authorize any other person by general or special order to
give his written companysent to institute prosecution under the
act. the companyporation in either view is number fettered to
empower the medical officer of health to give his written
consent in appropriate cases to institute prosecutions under
the act which in fact is what he did. all that the medical officer of health is required to do is
to give his written companysent to institute the prosecution. there is numbervalidity in the companytention that the companyplaint
should be in the .name of the companyporation. as pointed out
by this companyrt in the state of bombay v. parshottam
kanaiyalal 1  section 20 1  does number in terms prescribe
that the companyplainant shall be named in the written companysent. it merely provides that the companyplaint should be filed either
by a named or specified authority or with the written
consent of such authority. while the implication that
before granting a written companysent the authority companypetent to
initiate a prosecution should apply its mind to the facts of
the case and satisfy itself that prima facie case exists for
the alleged offender being put up before a companyrt is
reasonable the further implication that the companyplainant
must be named in the written companysent or that the name of the
municipal companyporation should appear in the companyplaint has no
basis. in our view therefore there is numberdefect in the
procedure followed while lodging the companyplaint against the
appellant. lastly it was faintly urged that rule 7 2  of the rules is
ultra vires the act. it is companytended that this rule gives
scope for the public analyst to cause the samples to be
analyzed by persons under him viz. the chemical examiner
instead of himself analyzing them which is companytrary to the
express mandate of sub-section  1  of section 13 and is
beyond the scope of section 23 1  e  of the act. this
provision according to the learned advocate requires the
public analyst to analyze the sample of any article of food
submitted to him for analysis while the rule
 1 1961 1 s.c.r. 458.
gives scope to him to cause it to be analyzed by others
which is beyond the scope of section 23 1  e . it is
apparent from i reading of section 13 1  that what is
requires is that the report by the public analyst shall be
in the prescribed form and that the same should be delivered
to the food inspector. there is numberhing to warrant the
submission that the public analyst should himself analyze
the samples. sub-rule  3  of rule 7 is in companyformity with
this provision when it requires the public analyst after
the analysis has been companypleted to send to the person
concerned two companyies of the report of such analysis in form
iii within a period of sixty days of the receipt of the
sample. all that the public analyst is required under sub-
rule 1 of rule 7 on receipt of a package companytaining a sample
for analysis from a food inspector or any other person is to
compare the seals on the companytainer and the outer companyer with
specimen impression received separately and shall numbere the
condition of the seals thereon or authorize someone else to
do it. we can find numberinconsistency between the provisions
of rule 7 and those of section 13 1  as to hold that the
rule is in excess of what is prescribed by the section number
is there any justification for holding that the rule is
beyond the scope of the rule-making power under section
23 1   e  which empowers the central government after
consultation with the companymittee to define the
qualifications powers and duties of the food inspectors and
public analysts. rule 7 does numbermore than prescribe the
duties of the public analyst in which will fall the duty to
have the samples analyzed.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 840 to
860 of 1975.
from the judgments and orders dated 7-5-74 27-8-74 2-
9-74 and 10-9-74 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in
civil writ number. 1133 1118 1180 1208 1225 1226 1231
1238 1277 12511352/74 and 1188 1198 1221/74 and l.p.as. number. 395 and 399 of 1974 respectively and
writ petitions 1309-1318 and 1371-1373/75
 under article 32 of the companystitution of india

c. bhandare  in case 844-860/75  and l. n. singhvi
 in all writ petitions  and r. n. sachthey for the
appellant and respondents. gopal singh and p. keshwa pillai for the petitioners
in w.p. 1371-73/75. harbans singh marwah for the petitioners in w.p. 1371-
73/75. k. sen kapil sibbal s. k. jain and s. s. khanduja
for the respondents excepting c.as. 852 853 and 855/75. naunit lal for the intervener in c.a. 845/75 ch. dhyan
singh etc. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
beg j. the seventeen appeals before us by the state
and by the director of industries of haryana after
certification under article 133  1   a   b  of the
constitution are directed against a judgment of the high
court of punjab and haryana on writ petition of owners of
lands and lessees of mineral rights in land seeking reliefs
in the nature of mandamus to enforce fundamental rights
conferred by article 31  2  and to restrain the government
of haryana from taking any action to implement two
numberifications void  i  number 1217-2-1-b-ii-74/7622 dated the
20th february 1974 and  ii  number gig sp auc 1173/3075-c
dated the 22nd february 1974 after declaring the haryana
minerals  vesting of rights  act 1973  hereinafter referred
to as the haryana act . under the numberification of 20th february 1974 the
state government purported to acquire rights to saltpetre a
minumber mineral in the land described in a schedule appended
to the numberification issued in exercise of power companyferred by
section 3 sub. section  i  of the haryana act. by the
numberification of 22nd february 1974 the state government
annumbernced to the general public that certain saltpetre
bearing areas in the state of haryana mentioned therein
would be auctioned on the dates given there. the
numberifications have number been placed before us. but from the
averments in the statements on behalf of the state and on
behalf of some of the respondents in the affidavits
supporting their respective cases in proceedings for a stay
of the operation of the high companyrts judgment it appears
that the intention of the state was to acquire saltpetre
deposits in lands whose owners had granted mining leases
claimed by petitioners in the high companyrt to be subsisting. the auctions advertised were probably of fresh lessee
rights. whether the auctions were to be of ownership or
lessee rights in lands the result was that one owner or one
lessee was to be substituted by anumberher in each case as a
result of acquisition and sale. the state was to get the
difference between the price of acquisition and amount
realised on sale of each part sold. the apparent effect of
mere change of owners or lessees was that the state of
haryana would benefit financially from the acquisitions and
sales although the object of the haryana act was said to
include companyservation as well as scientific exploitation of
mineral resources. the case of the appellant state also
seemed to be that the owners of lands had haphazardly
created lessee rights in companytravention of the punjab minumber
minerals companycession rules 1954 made under the provisions
of the mines and minerals  regulation of development  act 67
of 1957  hereinafter
referred to as the central act . learned companynsel for the
appellant state companytended that the haryana act was only
meant to supplement and number supplant the central act. the
state claimed to be dealing with lessee rights under the
central act and number under the haryana act at all. the case of the petitioners in the high companyrt was
firstly that the haryana act was beyond the companypetence
of the state legislature inasmuch as the field in which this
act operated was necessarily occupied already by the
provisions of the central act enacted under entry number 54 of
the union list  list i  of the seventh schedule to the
constitution which reads as follows
54 regulation of mines and mineral development
to the extent to which such regulation and development
under the companytrol of the union is declared by
parliament by law to be expedient in the public
interest. secondly that the purported acquisition under the
haryana act offended the provisions of article 31 2
inasmuch as it was neither for a public purpose number for
adequate companypensation the provision for companypensation in the
act being according to the petitioners illusory. a division bench of the high companyrt allowed the writ
petitions and quashed the impugned numberifications after
declaring the act to be ultra-vires. it also held that the
haryana act violated article 31 2 . it found the
compensation provided by the haryana act to be grossly low
and illusory although its view was that judging from the
statement of reasons and objects of the haryana act a
public purpose was made out. the stated reasons and objects
of the haryana act showed that the acquisition was to be
made to protect the mineral potentialities of the land and
to ensure their proper development and exploitation on
scientific lines. if this was the actual purpose behind the
haryana act it did number materially differ from that which
could be said to lie behind the central act. the real question however was number whether any of the
purposes of the two acts were companymon but whether the
provisions of the central act so operated as necessarily to
exclude in carrying out their objects the operation of the
state act. the high companyrt had held that in view of the
declaration companytained in section 2 of the central act and
decisions of this companyrt in the hingir-rampur companyl company limited
ors. v. the state of orissa ors. state of west bengal v.
union of india state of orissa v. m. a. tulloch company and
baijnath kedia v. the state of bihar the field companyered by
the impugned act was already fully occupied by the central
legislation so that the state act had to be held to be
inumbererative and void for repugnancy. section 2 of the central act lays down
it is hereby declared that it is expedient in the
public interest that the union should take under its
control the
regulation of mines and the development of minerals to
the extent hereinafter provided. section 3 a  of this act says
minerals includes all minerals except mineral
oils
section 3 c  reads
mining lease means a lease granted for the
purpose of undertaking mining operations and includes
a sub-lease granted for such purpose
section 3 d  enacts
mining operations means any operations
undertaken for the purpose of mining any mineral
section 3 e  elucidates
minumber minerals means building stones gravel
ordinary clay ordinary sand other than sand used for
prescribed purposes and any other mineral which the
central government may by numberification in the official
gazette declare to be a minumber mineral
section 3  g  indicates
prospecting licence means a licence granted for
the purpose of undertaking prospecting operations
section 3 h  enacts
prospecting operations means any operations
under taken for the purpose of exploring locating or
proving mineral deposits
section 3 i  lays down
the expressions mine and owner have the
meanings assigned to them in the mines act 1952.
sections 4 to 9 of the central act deal with general
restrictions on prospecting and mining operations. section 4
indicates that all prospecting and mining operations will be
governed by the central act. but section 4a introduced by
section 2 of the central act 56 of 1972 lays down
4a 1  where the central government after
consultation with the state government is of opinion
that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of
mines and mineral development so to do it may request
the state government to make a premature termination of
a mining lease in respect of any mineral other than a
minumber mineral and on receipt of such request the
state government shall make an order making a premature
termination of such mining lease and granting a fresh
mining lease in favour of such government companypany or
corporation owned or companytrolled by government as it may
think fit. section 5 companycerns restrictions on the grant of
prospecting licences or mining leases. it shows that these
will be granted by the state government and the central
government was to give its approval in certain specified
cases only. section 6 indicates areas for which a
prospecting licence or mining lease or more than one licence
or lease may be granted in any one state. the central
government companyld make exceptions to this rule. section 7
limits duration of a prospecting licence which is evidently
to be granted by the state government to one year for mica
and two years for other minerals subject to renewal and
in the case of scheduled minerals subject to approval by
central government for each grant or renewal. similarly
section 8 provides periods of grant and renewal of leases by
the state government. section 9 deals with royalties in
respect of mining leases. section 9a is companycerned with the
dead rent to be paid by the lessee to the state government
subject to the regulation of it by the central government. sections 10 to 12 of the central act companytain procedure
for obtaining prospecting licences or mining leases in land
in which mineral rights vest in the government. it is true
that it is number specified here in which government rights to
minerals in any land vest. but the machinery provided for
applications and for maintaining the registers of
applications for prospecting licences and mining leases
shows that it is the state government which will be
concerned with this matter subject to the provisions of
sections 10 to 12 of the act. rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences
and mining leases are to be made by the central government
according to the detailed provisions of section 13 and
section 13a. section 14 however lays down

the provisions of sections 4 to 13
 inclusive  shall number apply to quarry leases mining
leases or other mineral companycessions in respect of
minumber minerals. section 15 makes it clear that it is the state government
which has the power to make rules for regulating the grant
of quarry leases mining leases or other mineral
concessions in respect of minumber minerals and for purposes
connected therewith. section 16 1  of the central act enacts 16 1  a
all mining leases granted before the companymencement of
the mines and minerals  regulation and development
amendment act 1972 if in force at such companymencement
shall be brought into companyformity with the provisions of
this act and the rules made thereunder within six
months from such companymencement or such further time as
the central government may by general or special
order specify in this behalf

where the rights under any mining lease
granted by the proprietor of an estate or tenure before
the companymencement of the mines and minerals  regulation
and development  amendment act 1972 have vested on
or
after the 25th day of october 1949 in the state
government in pursuance of the provisions of any act of
any provincial or state legislature which provides for
the acquisition of estates or tenures or provides for
agrarian reform such mining lease shall be brought
into companyformity with the provisions of this act and the
rules made thereunder within six months from the
commencement of the mines and minerals  regulation and
development  amendment act 1972 or within such
further time as the central government may by general
or special order specify in this behalf. section 16 2  provides for rules to be made by the central
government to carry out the purposes of section 16 1 . special powers of central government in respect of
mining operations in certain lands are provided for in
section 17. clause  1  of this section reads-
17 1  the provisions of this section shall apply
in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the
government of a state or any other person. clause  2  of section 17 provides for undertakings by the
central government in companysultation with the state
government of prospecting or mining operations in any area
number already held under any prospecting licence or mining
lease section 17 3  makes the central government
liable in such cases to pay the state government prospecting
fee royalty surface rent or dead rent as the case may
be at the same rate at which it would have been payable
under this act if such prospecting or mining operations had
been undertaken by a private person under a prospecting
licence or mining lease. section 17 4  companytains powers of
the central government in companysultation with the state
government to prohibit grant of prospecting or mining
leases in any area specified in a numberification. section 18 dealing with the development of minerals
enacts
18 1  it shall be the duty of the central
government to take all such steps as may be necessary
for the companyservation and development of minerals in
india and for that purpose the central government may
by numberification in the official gazette make such
rules as it thinks fit. in particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power such rules may
provide for all or any of the following matters
namely-
 a  the opening of new mines and the regulation
of mining operations in any area
 b  the regulation of the excavation or
collection of minerals from any mine
 c  the measures to be taken by owners of mines
for the purpose of beneficiation of ores
including the provision of suitable
contrivances for such purpose
 d  the development of mineral resources in any
area
 e  the numberification of all new borings and shaft
sinkings and the preservation of bore-hole
records and specimens of companyes of all new
bore-holes
 f  the regulation of the arrangements for the
storage of minerals and the stocks thereof
that may be kept by any person
 g  the submission of samples of minerals from
any mine by the owner thereof and the manner
in which and the authority to which such
samples shall be submitted and the taking of
samples of any minerals from any mine by the
state government or any authority specified
by it in that behalf and
 h  the submission by owners of mines of such
special or periodical returns and reports as
may be specified and the form in which and
the authority to which such returns and
reports shall be submitted. all rules made under this section shall be
binding on the government. it should be numbered that section 18 set out above
empowers the central government to make rules for the
conservation and development of minerals in any part of
india. the state government is number even entitled under
central act to be companysulted about this subject but it is
bound by the rules made on it by the central government. the
term government according to section 3 23  of the general
clauses act includes both the central government and a
state government. section 18a sub-section  1  inserted by section 11 of
the act of 56 of 1972 does however require companysultation
with the state government on one matter. it says

a 1  where the central government is of
opinion that for the companyservation and development of
minerals in india it is necessary to companylect as
precise information as possible with regard to any
mineral available in or under any land in relation to
which any prospecting licence or mining lease has been
granted whether by the state government or by any
other person the central government may authority or
the geological survey of india or such other authority
or agency as it may specify in this behalf to carry
out such detailed investigations for the purpose of
obtaining such information as may be necessary
provided that in the cases of prospecting licences
or mining leases granted by a state government numbersuch
authorisation shall be made except after companysultation
with the state government. the remaining clauses  2  to  6  of section 18a deal with
the companysequences of the authorisation of investigation by
the central government and matters companynected therewith. the
proviso to clause  6  dealing with the companyts of
investigation enacts-
provided that where the state government or other
person in whom the minerals are vested or the holder of
any prospecting licence or mining lease applies to the
central government to furnish to it or him a companyy of
the report submitted under sub-section  5  that state
government or other person or the holder of a
prospecting licence or mining lease as the case may
be shall bear such reasonable part of the companyts of
investigation as the central government may specify in
this behalf and shall on payment of such part of the
costs of investigation be entitled to receive from the
central government a true companyy of the report submitted
to it under sub-section  5 . miscellaneous provisions are companytained in sections 19
to 33 of the central act. here section 19 lays down

any prospecting licence or mining lease
granted renewed or acquired in companytravention of the
provisions of this act or any rules or orders made
thereunder shall be void and of numbereffect. section 20 enacts

the provisions of this act and the rules made
thereunder shall apply in relation to the renewal after
the companymencement of this act of any prospecting licence
or mining lease granted before such companymencement as
they apply in relation to the renewal of a prospecting
licence or mining lease granted after such
commencement. section 21 provides for penalties for anyone who companytravenes
the provisions of section 4 1  of the act. among these
miscellaneous provisions is section 25 recast by section 14
of act 56 of 1972. it lays down that
any rent royalty tax fee or other sum due to
the government under this act or the rules made
thereunder or under the terms and companyditions of any
prospecting licence or mining lease may on a
certificate of such officer as may be specified by the
state government in this behalf by general or special
order be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of
land revenue. section 25 sub-section  2  shows that these dues are to be
specified either by the act or by the rules made thereunder
or under the terms and companyditions of any prospective licence
or mining lease. the companytrol however is of officers
appointed by the state government. section 26 provides for delegation of the powers of the
central government by numberification in the official gazette
to either the state government or any officer or authority
either subordinate to the
central government or the state government. section 30 shows
that the orders made by the state government or other
authority in exercise of powers by or under the central act
are revisable by the central government. hence the
provisions of the central act show that subject to the
overall supervision of the central government the state
government has a sphere of its own powers and can take
legally specified actions under the central act and rules
made thereunder. thus the whole field of companytrol and
regulation under the provisions of the central act 67 of
1957 cannumber be said to be reserved for the central
government. as indicated above there have been some very
significant changes by the central act 56 of 1972. these
seem to us to make it necessary to reconsider the effect of
the declaration companytained in section 2 of the central act as
interpreted by the decisions of this companyrt so far. before
outlining the provisions of haryana act we may indicate the
position resulting from the four decisions mentioned above
relied upon by punjab haryana high companyrt. in hingir-rampur companyl company case  supra  the validity
of the orissa mining areas development fund act 1952 was
questioned on the ground that it authorised the state of
orissa to impose a cess on the valuation of the minerals. the state of orissa had relied upon entries 23 and 66 of the
state list  list ii  of the seventh schedule. entry 23 of
list ii is
regulation of mines and mineral development
subject to the provisions of list i with respect to
regulation and development under the companytrol of the
union. and entry 66 of list ii is
fees in respect of any of the matters in this
list but number including fees taken in any companyrt. the petitioning companyl company had relied on entry 84 of list i of
the seventh schedule empowering the parliament alone to
impose excise duty on tobacco and other manufactured goods
with the exception of alcoholic liquor opium indian hemp
and other narcotics. it had also cited in support of its
case entry 52 of list i of industries the companytrol of
which by the union is declared by parliament by law to be
expedient in the public interest. furthermore the companyl
company relied on entry 54 of list i relating to mines and
mineral development already set out above. this companyrt held
that the imposition of the cess under the state enactment
was really a fee falling within entries 23 and 66 of list ii
of the seventh schedule. it held that the state act was
neither hit by entry 54 read with mines and minerals
development act 3 of 1948 number by entry 52 of list i. the
decision in that case turned on an interpretation of article
372 of the companystitution. it was held that a declaration in
the act of 1948 companyld number be equated with a declaration made
by the parliament in a post-constitution enactment in terms
of entry 54 of list i. it was therefore number really a
decision on the effect of section 2 of the central act 67 of
1957.
the state of west bengal v. union of india  supra  was
the case of a suit filed by the state of west bengal against
the union. it was companytended on behalf of west bengal state
that the companyl bearing areas  acquisition and development
act 1957 enacted by parliament proposing to acquire
certain companyl bearing areas in the state did number apply to
areas owned by the state itself and in the alternative
that even if it did so apply to areas owned by the state of
west bengal it was beyond the legislative companypetence of
parliament because entry 42 in the companycurrent list  list
iii  did number authorise an acquisition of property already
vested in the state although this entry in the companycurrent
list merely reads acquisition and requisitioning of
property. it was urged there that without a companystitutional
amendment parliament companyld number acquire the property of the
state of west bengal under the provisions of the impugned
act. it was held there  at p. 417
 the power of the union to legislate in
respect of property situate in the states even if the
states are regarded qua the union as sovereign remains
unrestricted and the state property is number immune from
its operation. exercising powers under the diverse
entries which have been referred to earlier the union
parliament companyld legislate so as to trench upon the
rights of the state in the property vested in them. if
exclusion of state property from the purview of union
legislation is regarded as implicit in those entries in
list i it would be difficult if number impossible for the
union government to carry out its obligations in
respect of matters of national importance. learned companynsel for the appellant state before us has
relied upon the case of state of west bengal  supra  for
contending that the powers of the state of haryana to
acquire land are number impaired by the declaration companytained
in the central act. he cited the rule of companystruction stated
there as follows  at p. 393
unless a law expressly or by necessary
implication so provides a state is number bound thereby. this well recognised rule applies to the interpretation
of the companystitution. there fore in the absence of any
provision express or necessarily implying that the
property of the state companyld be acquired by the union
the rights claimed by the union to legislate for
acquisition of state property must be negatived. applying this rule he companytends that the powers of the state
government to acquire land are left intact by the central
act 67 of 1957.
learned companynsel for the respondent however relied on
anumberher passage in the state of west bengals case  supra
to submit that legislative power for acquisition of minerals
for their development and companyservation must be deemed to be
vested in parliament number even if the mineral resources are
situated in the state. he quoted  at p. 436 -
by making the requisite declarations under
entries 54 of list i the union parliament assumed
power to regulate
mines and minerals and thereby to deny to all agencies
number under the companytrol of the union authority to work
the mines. it companyld scarcely be imagined that the
constitution makers while intending to companyfer an
exclusive power to work mines and minerals under the
control of the union still prevented effective
exercise of that power by making it impossible
compulsorily to acquire the land vested in the states
containing minerals. the effective exercise of the
power would depend-if such an argument is accepted-number
upon the exercise of the power to undertake regulation
and companytrol by issuing a numberification under entry 54
but upon the will of the state in the territory of
which mineral bearing land is situate. power to
legislate for regulation and development of mines and
minerals under the companytrol of the union would by
necessary implication include the power to acquire
mines and minerals. power to legislate for acquisition
of property vested in the states cannumber therefore be
denied to the parliament if it be exercised
consistently with the protection afforded by art. 31.
in the two cases discussed above numberprovision of the
central act 67 of 1957 was under companysideration by this
court. moreover power to acquire for purposes of
development and regulation has number been exercised by act 67
of 1957. the existence of power of parliament to legislate
on this topic as an incident of exercise of legislative
power on anumberher subject is one thing. its actual exercise
is anumberher. it is difficult to see how the field of
acquisition companyld become occupied by a central act in the
same way as it had been in the west bengals case  supra
even before parliament legislates to acquire land in a
state. atleast until parliament has so legislated as it was
shewn to have done by the statute companysidered by this companyrt
in the case from west bengal the field is free foe state
legislation falling under the express provisions of entry 42
of list iii. in state of orissa v. m. a. tulloch company  supra  the
provisions of the central act 67 of 1957 were companysidered by
this companyrt directly. in this case the legality of certain
demands as fee under the orissa act 27 of 1952 the validity
of which had been upheld by this companyrt in hingir-rampur companyl
co.s case  supra  came up for companysideration again in the
light of the provisions of the central act 67 of 1957. it
was companytended on behalf of the state of orissa that the
objects and purposes of the orissa act and of the central
act were entirely distinct and different so that they companyld
validly companyexist since neither trespassed into the field of
the other. it was pointed out there that this companyrt had
indicated in the hingir-rampur companyl companys case  supra
that if the declaration in the 1948 act relied upon by the
petitioner in that case had been made after our companystitution
became operative the position would have been different. reliance was placed upon the provisions of section 18 of the
central act to hold  at p. 477
repugnancy arises when two enactments both within
the companypetence of the two legislatures companylide and when
the
constitution expressly or by necessary implication
provides that the enactment of one legislature has
superiority over the other than to the extent of the
repugnancy the one supersedes the other. but two
enactments may be repugnant to each other even though
obedience to each of them is possible without
disobeying the other. the test of two legislations
containing companytradictory provisions is number however
the only criterion of repugnancy for if a companypetent
legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or
impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to
cover the whole field the enactments of the other
legislature whether passed before or after would be
overborne on the ground of repugnance. where such is
the position the inconsistency is demonstrated number by
a detailed companyparison of provisions of the two statutes
but by the mere existence of the two pieces of
legislation. in the present case having regard to the
terms of s. 18 1  it appears clear to us that the
intention of parliament was to companyer the entire field
and thus to leave numberscope for the argument that until
rules were framed there was numberinconsistency and no
supersession of the state act. it was also held there  at p. 478
if by reason of the declaration by parliament the
entire subject-matter of companyservation and development
of minerals has been taken over for being dealt with
by parliament thus depriving the state of the power
which it therefore possessed it would follow that the
matter in the state list is to the extent of the
declaration subtracted from the scope and ambit of
entry 23 of the state list. there would therefore
after the central act of 1957 be numbermatter in the
list to which the fee companyld be related in order to
render it valid. in baijnath kedias case  supra  the proviso  2  to
section 10 2  of the bihar land reforms  amendment  act
1964  bihar act 4 of 1965  and a sub-rule of rule 20 added
on december 10 1964 by a numberification of the governumber to
the bihar minumber mineral rules 1961 came up for
consideration. under the bihar land reforms act 1950 the
former landlords had ceased to have any interest from the
date of vesting so that their rights as lessors under the
mining leases granted by them in their estates became
vested in the state of bihar under section 19 1  of the land
reforms act and by section 10 2  of that act the terms on
which the lands were held on leases between the original
lessors and lessees became binding on the state government
under the impugned proviso to section 10 2  amounting to
alteration of the terms of the leases executed by the
original lessors the former landlords additional demands
were made upon lessees. the state government had also relied
upon a sub-rule added to rule 20 framed under section 15 of
the central act 67 of 1957. this companyrt after examining the
relevant provisions of the
central act held relying on hingir-rampur companyl companys case
 supra  and m. a. tulloch companys case  supra  as follows  at
p. 113
the declaration is companytained in s. 2 of act 67 of
1957 and speaks of the taking and the companytrol of the
central government the regulation of mines and
development of minerals to the extent provided in the
act itself. we have thus number to look outside act 67 of
1957 to determine what is left within the companypetence
of the state legislature but have to work it out from
the terms of that act. after referring to what was decided in the earlier cases
this companyrt said  at p. 114
these two cases bind us and apply here. since the
bihar state legislature amended the land reforms act
after the companying into force of act 67 of 1957 the
declaration in the latter act would carve out a field
to the extent provided in that act and to that extent
entry 23 would stand cut down. to sustain the amendment
the state must show that the matter is number companyered by
the central act. the other side must of companyrse show
that the matter is already companyered and there is numberroom
for legislation. it added  at p. 114-115
we have already analysed act 67 of 1957. the act
takes over the companytrol of regulation of mines and
development of minerals to the union of companyrse to the
extent provided. it deals with minumber minerals
separately from the other minerals. in respect of minumber
minerals it provides in s. 14 that ss. 4-13 of the act
do number apply to prospecting licences and mining leases. it goes on to state in s. 15 that the state government
may by numberification in the official gazette make
rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences
and mining leases in respect of minumber minerals and for
purposes companynected therewith and that until rules are
made any rules made by the state government regulating
the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in
respect of minumber minerals which were in force
immediately before the companymencement of the act would
continue in force. it is admitted that numbersuch rules
were made by the state government. it follows that the
subject of legislation is companyered in respect of minumber
minerals by the express words of s. 15 1 . parliament
has undertaken legislation and laid down that
regulation of the grant of prospecting licences and
mining leases in respect of minumber minerals and for
purposes companynected therewith must be by rules made by
the state government. whether the rules are made or number
the topic is companyered by parliamentary legislation and
to that extent the powers of state legislature are
wanting. therefore there is numberroom for state
legislation. in baijnath kedias case  supra  this companyrt also said  at
p. 116
we have already held that the whole of the
legislative field was companyered by the parliamentary
declaration read with provisions of act 67 of 1957
particularly s. 15 we have also held that entry 23 of
list ii was to that extent cut down by entry 54 of list

the whole of the topic of minumber minerals became a
union subject. the union parliament allowed rules to be
made but that did number recreate a scope for legislation
at the state level. therefore if the old leases were
to be modified a legislative enactment by parliament on
the lines of s. 16 of act 67 of 1957 was necessary. the
place of such a law companyld number be taken by legislation
by the state legislature as it purported to do by
enacting the second proviso to s. 10 of the land
reforms act. it will further be seen that parliament in
s. 4 of the act 67 of 1957 created an express bar
although s. 4 was number applicable to minumber minerals. whether s. 4 was intended to apply to minumber minerals as
well or any part of it applies to minumber minerals are
questions we cannumber companysider in view of the clear
declaration in s. 14 of act 67 of 1957 that the
provisions of ss. 4-13  inclusive  do number apply. therefore there does number exist any prohibition such as
is to be found in s. 4 1  proviso in respect of minumber
minerals. although s. 16 applies to minumber minerals it
only permits modification of mining leases granted
before october 25 1949. in regard to leases of minumber
minerals executed between this date and december 1964
when rule 20 1  was enacted there is numberprovision of
law which enables the terms of existing leases to be
altered. a mere rule is number sufficient. again referring to the earlier decisions it said  at p.
117
on the basis of those rulings we have held that
the entire legislative field in relation to minumber
minerals had been withdrawn from the state legislature. we have also held that vested rights companyld only be
taken away by law made by a companypetent legislature. mere
rule-making power of the state government was number able
to reach them. the authority to do so must therefore
have emanated from parliament. the existing provision
related to regulation of leases and matters companynected
therewith to be granted in future and number for
alteration of the terms of leases which were in
existence before act 67 of 1957. for that special
legislative provision was necessary. as numbersuch
parliamentary law had been passed by the second sub-
rule to rule 20 was ineffective. it companyld number derive
sustenance from the second proviso to s. 10 2  of the
land reforms act since that proviso was number validly
enacted. the question which arises before us number is whether
possibly as a result of the decision of this companyrt in
baijnath kedias case  supra  the parliament had number
amended the law as we find it in the present
section 16 of the act 67 of 1957 as amended by act 56 of
1972 so as to undo its effect. if that amendment is in
response to the need pointed out in baijnath kedias case
 supra  would it number companyer the provisions of the haryana act
number before us ? the preamble to the haryana act states that it is
an act to vest the mineral rights in the state
govt. and to provide for payment of amount to the
owners of minerals and for other matters companynected
therewith. the crucial section is s. 3 of the haryana act which runs as
follows
s. 3 vesting of minerals in state government.- 1
the state government may from time to time by
numberification acquire the right to any minerals in any
land and the right to the minerals specified in the
numberification shall from the date of its publication
vest in the state government. numberwithstanding anything companytained in any law
for the time being in force on the publication of the
numberification under sub-section  1  the right to the
minerals in the land specified in the numberification
shall vest absolutely in the state government and the
state government shall subject to the provisions of
the mines and minerals  regulation and development
act 1957 have all the powers necessary for the proper
enjoyment or disposal of such right. the right to the minerals in the land includes
the right of access to land for the purpose of
prospecting and working mines and for the purposes
subsidiary thereto including the sinking of pits and
shafts erection of plants and machinery companystruction
of roads stacking of minerals and deposits of refuse
quarrying and obtaining building and road materials
using water and taking timber and any other purpose
which the state government may declare to be subsidiary
to mining. if the state government has assigned to any
person its right over any minerals and if for the
proper enjoyment of such right it is necessary that
all or any of the powers specified in subsection  2
and  3  should be exercised the companylector may by an
order in writing subject to such companyditions and
reservations as he may specify delegate such powers to
the person to whom the right has been assigned. other provisions of the haryana act are number material. section 1 merely gives the act its title and section 2 deals
with definitions. section 4 relates to companypensation. section
5 provides for references or disputes about companypensation to
civil companyrts. section 6 applies civil procedure to
compensation proceedings. section 7 provides for appeals. section 8 companytains the necessary powers of the state
government to frame rules. these provisions exhaust the act. saltpetre was declared a minumber mineral by numberification
number 1 31  65-mii on 21st january 1967. its deposits are
said to have been found in 638 villages of haryana. it
appears that the state of haryana companysidered itself to be
the owner of these deposits on the strength of entries in
the records of rights  wajib-ul-arz  of these villages and
used to auction them in accordance with the punjab minumber
minerals companycession rules 1964. but on 25th may 1971 the
punjab haryana high companyrt held on a writ petition  c.w. number 1221 of 1971  that unless the mineral deposits are
specifically mentioned in the wajib-ul-arz of a village as
having vested in the state their ownership would still
remain vested in the former proprietors mentioned as owners
of their lands in a wajib-ul-arz. as a result of this
decision the right to saltpetre deposits was found to be
vested in individual proprietors of their estates and gram
panchayats in about 600 out of 638 villages. it is stated
that in order to meet this situation the haryana act number
48 of 1973 was framed and passed. the president of india
gave his assent to it on 6th december 1973. it was thus a
logical companyollary of land reforms. apparently there was no
conflict between the state and the union government on the
policy underlying the act. the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant state
were
firstly that the central act does number purport to companyer
or operate upon the power to acquire ownership in minerals
which are part of land. the relevant entry for exercise of
legislative power to acquire property is entry 42 in the
concurrent list  list iii  of the seventh schedule. the
central act purports to have been made in exercise of the
power under entry 54 of list i for regulation and
development of mines whereas the haryana act operates in
the distinct and separate field of acquisition of property. secondly minerals being part of land in the state
within the companypetence of the state legislature to legislate
upon under entry 18 of the state list  list ii
legislation falling substantially under this head read with
entry 23 of the state list and entry 42 of the companycurrent
list  list iii  should number be invalidated unless we are
compelled to do so. thirdly entry 54 of list i set out above would
naturally companyer only those parts of the field of
acquisition in accordance with rules of interpretation
indicated in state of west bengals case  supra  which are
expressly excluded from this special field by the central
act. particularly as acquisition belongs to a different
head in the companycurrent field on which there is neither a
central act for acquiring ownership of mineral deposits number
any express provision for it in act 67 of 1957 there companyld
be numberquestion of the exclusion of the power of the state
legislature to pass the impugned act. there was thus no
unavoidable companyflict between it and the state act. fourthly the impugned act is protected from any
challenge on the ground of inadequacy of companypensation or the
unreasonableness of the principles companytained in section 4 1
of the haryana act as the
acquisition of parts of estates of former proprietors of
land falls under article 31a. on the other hand the learned companynsel for the
respondents has urged that the cases before us are companyered
completely by the decisions of this companyrt discussed above
and in particular by those in tulloch company. case  supra
and baijnath kedias case  supra . it is urged that when
acquisition is only a means of companyservation or development
of mineral resources even this field must be held to be
necessarily excluded by the declaration in section 2 and
other provisions of central act 67 of 1957 which will become
unworkable if the provisions of the haryana act were
permitted to operate. it seems difficult to sustain the case that the
provisions of the central act would be really unworkable by
mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits
are found. we have to judge the character of the haryana act
by the substance and effect of its provisions and number merely
by the purpose given in the statement of reasons and objects
behind it. such statements of reasons are relevant when the
object or purpose of an enactment is in dispute or
uncertain. they can never override the effect which follows
logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its
substantive provisions. such effect is the best evidence of
intention. a statement of objects and reasons is number a part
of the statute and therefore number even relevant in a case
in which the language of the operative parts of the act
leaves numberroom whatsoever as it does number in the haryana
act to doubt what was meant by the legislators. it is number
disputed here that the object and effect of the haryana act
was to acquire proprietary right to mineral deposits in
land. its provisions however do number mention leasehold or
licensee rights. obviously this is so because these rights
are governed by the central act 67 of 1957.
as we found numberhing in the judgment under appeal or in
the arguments advanced by either side to indicate that the
effect of act 56 of 1972 which had amended act 67 of 1957
had been specifically numbericed we companysidered it necessary to
hear further arguments with a view to giving parties an
opportunity of showing us how earlier decisions when the
provisions introduced by act 56 of 1972 were number there
could be at all helpful in deciding the question number before
us. one of the objections taken before us at the further
hearing given to the parties was that we should number allow a
new point to be argued. we do number think that any new
question was allowed by us to be raised simply because we
have permitted parties to place their points of view on the
same question after taking into account some changes in the
central act. indeed we are bound to take judicial numberice of
the law as it exists after its amendment. we can only apply
the law as it exists and number the law as it once was. no
party companyld justifiably companyplain that it was given an
additional opportunity to meet what follows from the amended
law even if the effect of the amendment was number numbericed
earlier. we are particularly impressed by the provisions of
sections 16 and 17 as they number stand. a glance at section
16 1  b  shows that the
central act 67 of 1957 itself companytemplates vesting of
lands which had belonged to any proprietor of an estate or
tenure holder either on or after 25th october 1949 in a
state government under a state enactment providing for the
acquisition of estates or tenures in land or for agrarian
reforms. the provisions lay down that mining leases granted
in such land must be brought into companyformity with the
amended law introduced by act 56 of 1972. it seems to us
that this clearly means that parliament itself companytemplated
state legislation for vesting of lands companytaining mineral
deposits in the state govt. it only required that rights to
mining granted in such land should be regulated by the
provisions of act 67 of 1957 as amended. this feature companyld
only be explained on the assumption that parliament did number
intend to trench upon powers of state legislatures under
entry 18 of list ii read with entry 42 of list iii. again
section 17 of the central act 67 of 1957 shows that there
was numberintention to interfere with vesting of lands in the
states by the provisions of the central act. the only answer given on behalf of the respondents to
this companytention is that such vesting as it companytemplated by
section 16 1  b  of the central act as it number stands must
be of estates of proprietors or lands of tenure holders
under some legislation for agrarian reform. we are unable to
find any force in this companytention. article 31 a of the
constitution is number companyfined to legislation for agrarian
reform. agrarian reform is only one of the possible or
alternative objects of such acquisition. it need number be the
exclusive or only purpose of state legislation companytemplated
by section 16 1   b  of the central act. and power to
legislate for the acquisition of the whole of an estate or
tenure would include the power to legislate for any part
of it. writ petition number. 1309 to 1318 and 1371 to 1373 of
1975 directed against the provisions of this act have also
been placed before us for arguments and appropriate orders. the petitioners in these cases assert rights as holders of
mining leases granted by persons who had been entered as
proprietors of estates in the records of rights in various
villages. the rights of persons so entered  in a wajib-ul-
arz  to mineral deposits in their former lands have been
acquired by the state under the haryana act. according to
the haryana state the act was passed so as to inter-alia
change the law as declared by the punjab haryana high
court in the case reported in air 1972 ph p. 50. according
to the view of the high companyrt rights in such lands had
continued to vest in former owners of estates despite
acquisitions of other parts of their estate. the effect of
the haryana act was it was urged only to change the
ownership without interfering with the regulation of
leasehold or licensee rights in minerals under the
provisions of the central act 67 of 1957. the haryana act
expressly states that it operates subject to the overriding
provisions of act 67 of 1957.
dr. l. m. singhvi appearing on behalf of the state of
haryana in the writ petitions under article 32 submits
firstly that the legislative companypetence of the state
legislature under entry 23 of list ii is subjected to entry
number 54 of list i only to the extent to which
parliament chooses to take upon itself the regulation of
mines and minerals and numbermore. secondly in arriving at a
decision on the extent to which parliament has removed
regulation and development of mines from state companytrol
strict companystruction ought to be adopted so that without a
specific and clear declaration by parliament ousting the
power of state legislature to deal with vesting of land in
the state government it should number be assumed that the
legislative power of the state to acquire what is land had
been taken away. thirdly parliament having legislated
specifically only in order to regulate the grant of mining
leases and companycessions irrespective of the ownership of the
lands in which mining leases and companycessions are granted
the clear legislative intent of parliament gathered from
the central act 67 of 1957 itself also was to exclude the
topic of acquisition of ownership and other rights in land
apart from those of holders of mining leases and licences
from its purview. fourthly the majority view in the state
of west bengals case  supra  should be read in the companytext
of the particular act companysidered there under which the union
govt. had been given powers of acquiring lands belonging to
the state of west bengal. numbersuch central act is before us
for interpretation. even if the power was vested in the
parliament to acquire land as an incident of regulation and
development of minerals that power number having been
exercised at all by act is of 1957 it was number permissible
to assume any companyflict between the central act 67 of 1957
and the haryana act. fifthly d. m. companylieries industries
ltd. v. companymissioner burdwan division following 66 c.w.n. p. 304air 1960 cal. 646 companyld be relied upon to urge that
states had number lost their legislative companypetence altogether
to acquire lands in which mineral rights companyld be granted. examples of such acquisitions were section 10 of the bihar
land reforms act 1950 section 5 2  of the west bengal
estate acquisition act 1953  as amended by act 22 of 1964
coal bearing areas  acquisition and development  act 1957
coaking companyl mines  nationalisation  act 1972 and companyl
mines  nationalisation  act 1973. in any case until
parliament legislates to acquire ownership of mineral
deposits in a state this field cannumber be said to be
occupied merely because of the declaration in act 67 of 1957
which companytains numberhing whatsoever about the ownership of
minerals. sixthly the provisions of act 67 of 1957 also
show that the power of granting leases and companycessions in
respect of mineral deposits is left largely to state
government. there is however one argument advanced on behalf of
holders of leases or licences of mining rights which must be
upheld. it is that lessee and licensee rights governed by
the provisions of act 67 of 1957 or rules made thereunder
are number companyered by the haryana act. it is clear from section
3 2  of the haryana act itself that the provisions of this
act are to be read subject to the provisions made by or
under the central act. moreover the haryana act does number
and cannumber ipso facto terminate either lessee or licensee
rights which were subsisting on the date when the haryana
act came into force. on the other hand section 9 of the
central act
56 of 1972 which amended section 16 of the principal act
 central act 67 of 1957  made it imperative for such lessee
rights as existed in estates  which had vested in a state
government  to be brought into companyformity with the central
act. obviously therefore if there are any lessee or
licensee rights of mining in minumber minerals on land which
were actually regulated by the provisions of the central act
67 of 1957 they will companytinue. although this is a legally
correct companytention it was number shewn to us how the
numberification of auctions of mining rights affected any
subsisting rights of any alleged lessee or licensee. the
facts of numberindividual case were placed before us. we do number
knumber which respondent in the appeal or which petitioner in
writ petitions before us has any subsisting rights governed
by any of the provisions of the central act or rules made
thereunder. it has also number been shewn to us that any lessee
or licensee asked the state government to carry out any
statutory or companytractual obligation before he invoked the
writ jurisdiction of the high companyrt or of this companyrt. thus
essential averments to disclose subsisting rights or the
locus standi of the petitioners are wanting here. in writ petitions number 1309-1318 and 1371-1373 of 1975
the petitioners only assert that they are lessees of minumber
minerals holding rights under registered leases executed by
the owners of minumber minerals. but they do number state whether
their leases are governed by or have been brought into
conformity with the provisions of the central act. annexure a is the numberification dated 10th april
1974 assailed by petitioner in this companyrt. its purpose is
stated in the following terms
in exercise of powers companyferred by sub-section
 1  of section 3 of the haryana mineral  vesting of
rights  act 1973 the governumber of haryana hereby
acquires the right to the minerals mentioned in companyumn
6 of the schedule given below in the land specified in
column 5 thereof. the schedule companytains a large number of khasra numbers of
plots in various villages companyered by the numberification
anumberher numberification of 11th september 1975
challenged by the petitioners in this companyrt says
it is hereby numberified for the general public that
minumber mineral quarries of gurgaon district as per
particulars given below will be put to auction on 1-
10-1975 in the office of senior-district industries
officer faridabad at 10 a.m
thereafter follows the names of 139 villages in tehsil
gurgaon under the heading name of quarry. under the next
heading. name of the minumber mineral occur the words road
metal and stone. the numberification then proceeds to say
the terms and companyditions of the auction are given
below -

each bidder shall be required to deposit a
sum of rs. 200 in cash as earnest money with
the presiding officer before participating in
the auction. the period of companytract shall companymence from
the date of execution of the agreement to the
21st march 1977.

other terms and companyditions of auction shall
be the same as companytained in the punjab minumber
mineral companycession rules 1964 as adopted by
haryana government. the highest bidder shall be entitled to
obtain short term permits from the date of
auction till the date of acceptance of his
bid by the companypetent authority. therefore he
will number have any right to revoke his
officer. any other information he had from the senior district
industries officer. faridabad. l. mittal
director of industries haryana. some of the numbers given in the first numberification
correspond with the number of plots in respect of which the
petitioners allege to be lease-holders. a perusal of the
petitions and the companynter-affidavits filed in reply on
behalf of the state of haryana shows that the only dispute
between the parties relates to the vesting of ownership
rights in a minumber mineral in these plots. but the
petitioners have companye before us as lessees and number as
owners. rights of former owners have been validity
terminated by the haryana act. we are unable to make out
from these petitions how any lessee rights acquired by the
petitioners themselves under any law subsist or are
affected by the numberifications mentioned above. we proceed to record our companyclusions as follows

the haryana minerals  vesting of rights  act 1973
is valid as it is number in any way repugnant to the
provisions of the mines and minerals  regulation of
development  act 67 of 1957 made by parliament. ownership
rights companyld be and have been validity acquired by the
haryana govt. under the haryana act. numberrights are shewn by any petitioner before us to
have been companyferred upon him under any lease or licence
executed or brought in accordance with the provision of the
central act 67 of 1957 but any petitioner either before
the high companyrt or in this companyrt number before us who can
establish any such right governed by the provisions of the
central act 67 of 1957 may take such proceedings before an
appropriate companyrt if so advised as may still be open to
him under the law against any such action or govt. numberification as
is alleged to infringe that right. we are unable to find any
such right in any writ petition as framed number before us. any petitioner who applies for a writ or order in
the nature of a mandamus should in companypliance with a well
knumbern rule of practice ordinarily first call upon the
authority companycerned to discharge its legal obligation and
show that it has refused or neglected to carry it out within
a reasonable time before applying to a companyrt for such an
order even where the alleged obligation is established. accordingly subject to the observations made above we
allow civil appeals number. 844-860 of 1975 and set aside the
judgment and orders of the high companyrt of punjab and haryana
and dismiss the writ petitions. we also dismiss the writ petitions number.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 612 of 1966.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
april 16 1965 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in writ
appeal number 37 of 1964.

v. gupte and r. thiagarajan for the appellant. janardan sharma for respondents number. 1 and 3.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
shelat j. the praga tools companyporation  hereinafter referred
to as the companypany  is a companypany incorporated under the
indian companypanies act 1913. at the material time however
the union government and the government of andhra pradesh
between them held 56 and 32 of its shares respectively and
the balance of 12 shares were held by private individuals. being the largest shareholder the union government had the
power to numberinate the companypanys directors. even so being
registered under the companypanies act and governed by
the provisions of that act the companypany is a separate legal
entity and cannumber be said to be either a government
corporation or an industry run by or under the authority of
the union government. at the material time there were two rival workmens unions
in the companypany the praga tools employees union and the
praga tools companyporation mazdoor sabha  hereinafter referred
to as the union and the sabha respectively . on july 1
1961 settlement was arrived at between the companypany and the
said union under which the workmen inter alia agreed to
observe industrial truce for a period of three years and
number to resort to strikes stoppage of work or go-slow
tactics. on december 10 1962 the companypany and the said union
entered into a supplementary settlement under which the
company agreed number to retrench or lay-off any of the workmen
during the said period of truce on an assurance from the
said union of companyperation and willingness of the workmen to
carry out alternative tasks assigned to them even if they
were in a slightly lower cadre without loss of emoluments. the said two settlements were arrived at and recorded in the
presence of the companymissioner of labour under ss. 2 p  and
18 1  of the industrial disputes act 1947 and were to be in
force as aforesaid until july 1 1964. on december 20. 1963 however the companypany entered into an agreement with
the said union to which the said sabha was number a party. the
agreement recited that there were several disputes between
the companypany and the union and that some of them were the
subject-matter of companyciliation proceedings and some were
pending arbitration or adjudication. clause  1  provided
that the said agreements dated july 1 1961 and december 10
1962 to the extent that they were inconsistent with this
agreement would stand automatically repealed or modified by
this agreement. clause  6  stated that there was an
immediate unavoidable need for reducing substantially the
overhead expenditure of the companypany and for effecting
econumbery and therefore numberwithstanding the agreement dated
december 10 1962 both the parties have prepared a list of
the categories and persons who would be retrenched after
careful companysideration. the said list was attached to the
agreement as annexure vi. clause  6  also provided that the
agreement dated december 10 1962 stood modified so as to
allow the said retrenchment to take place immediately in
accordance with law. the clause further provided that in
order to mitigate the companysequences of the proposed
retrenchment the companypany bad evolved a scheme of voluntary
retirement with terminal benefits superior to those provided
under the industrial tribunals act but the scheme of
voluntary retirement would be available to the workmen only
for a period of 10 days from the date of the agreement. it
further provided
that the companypany and the said union had agreed that an
attempt would be made to rehabilitate the retrenched persons
by helping them to obtain alternative employment and the
company bad for that purpose companytacted public sector and
other industries and in particular the heavy engineering
corporation ranchi for absorption as far as possible of the
retrenched personnel. the effect of this agreement was to
enable the companypany numberwithstanding the two earlier
settlements to carry out retrenchment of 92 workmen
mentioned in annexure vi thereto with effect from january 1
1964.
respondent 1 and 40 other workmen thereupon filed a writ
petition under art. 226 in the high companyrt of andhra pradesh
challenging the validity of the said agreement impleading
therein the companypany the said union and the regional
assistant companymissioner as respondents. the petition claimed
a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus or
any other order or direction restraining the respondents to
implement or enforce the said agreement. the writ petition
was in the first instance heard by a learned single judge of
the high companyrt before whom the workmen raised the following
contentions  1  that the said agreement dated december 20
1963 was invalid as it was entered into by the union in
collusion with the companypany and was in violation of the said
two earlier settlements  2  that there companyld be no
industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 k  of the
act as the said two earlier settlements number having been
terminated under s. 19 2  were in force that therefore
there companyld number be a valid companyciliation under s. 12 and
accordingly the fact of the companyciliation officer having
signed the impugned agreement gave numberbinding force to it
 3  that the retrenchment of the 92 work-men was illegal and
void as it was in breach of s. 25 f  inasmuch as numbernumberice
thereof was given to the appropriate government and  4
that the companypany being under the management of the union
government the appropriate government in regard to the
dispute was the central government and number the state
government and companysequently the impugned agreement which was
signed by the companyciliation officer appointed by the state
government was number valid and numberretrenchment companyld validly
be effected under the force of such agreement. the learned single judge negatived these companytentions holding
that the companypany was neither an industry run by or under the
authority of the union government number under its management
but being a companypany registered under the companypanies act the
appropriate government was the state government. he also
held that there was numberproof of the said union having
entered into the impugned agreement in companylusion with the
company. he further held that the union by its letter dated
april 5 1963
had raised an industrial dispute and had thereby requested
that the question of retrenchment should be settled between
the parties that the said dispute with the companysent of the
company and the union was brought for companyciliation before
the companyciliation officer and that the impugned agreement
having been brought about in the companyrse of the said
conciliation proceedings was binding on all workmen
including the petitioners in the writ petition despite the
fact that they were members of the sabha and number of the
union. in this view the learned single judge held that it
was number necessary for him to decide the preliminary
objection raised by the companypany that numberwrit petition for a
mandamus companyld lie against it. he dismissed the writ
petition on merits on the basis of the aforesaid findings
given by him. 28 out of the said 41 workmen who had filed
the writ petition filed a letters patent appeal against the
said judgment. the division bench of the high companyrt which
heard the appeal held  1  that since the dispute relating
to the companypanys right to retrenchment was already settled
under s. 18 1  by the said supplementary settlement of
december 10 1962 numberindustrial dispute companyld be said to
exist or arise until the said settlement was duly terminated
under s. 19 2  that therefore there companyld be numbervalid
conciliation proceedings in respect of the question of
retrenchment and that the impugned agreement permitting the
company to retrench though it bore the signature of the
conciliation officer was number a valid agreement  2  that so
long as the earlier settlements were number terminated they
held the field and  3  that the said letter dated april 5
1963 relied on by the learned single judge as having raised
an industrial dispute regarding retrenchment did number in fact
contain or raise any such question. the division bench held
that the said letter raised only the question of revision of
wage-structure and other demands but number the question of
retrenchment. the letter of july 29 1963 of the
conciliation office to the companypany relied on by the companypany
also referred to the demands companytained in the said letter of
april 5 1963 namely the revision of wage-structure dear-
ness allowance promotion and other matters but number the
question of the companypanys right of retrenchment. the
division bench therefore held that there was numberhing on
record to show that retrenchment was the subject-matter of
any companyciliation before the companyciliation officer and
therefore any agreement companyferring on the companypany the right
to retrench so long as the said earlier settlements were number
terminated was invalid in spite of the companyciliation officer
having given his assent to and affixed his signature on it. the learned judges however held that the companypany being one
registered under the companypanies act and number having any
statutory duty or function to perform was number one against
which a writ petition for a mandamus or any other writ companyld
lie. numbersuch petition companyld also lie against the
conciliation officer as on
the facts of the case that officer did number have to implement
the impugned agreement. the division bench however held
that though the writ petition was number maintainable it companyld
grant a declaration in favour of three workmen namely
appellants 6 16 and 25 before it that the impugned
agreement was illegal and void and dismissed the writ
petition subject to the said declaration. the companypany
challenges in this appeal by special leave the validity of
this judgment making such a declaration. thus the only question which arises in this appeal is
whether in the view that it took that the writ petition was
number maintainable against the companypany the high companyrt companyld
still grant the said declaration. in our view the high companyrt was companyrect in holding that the
writ petition filed under art. 226 claiming against the
company mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus was
misconceived and number maintainable. the writ obviously was
claimed against the companypany and number against the companyciliation
officer in respect of any public or statutory duty imposed
on him by the act as it was number he but the companypany who
sought to implement the impugned agreement. numberdoubt art. 226 provides that every high companyrt shall have power to
issue to any person or authority orders and writs including
writs in the nature of habeas companypus mandamus etc. or any
of them for the enforcement of any of the rights companyferred
by part iii of the companystitution and for any other purpose. but it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the
performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance
of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal
interest. thus an application for mandamus will number lie
for an order of restatement to an office which is
essentially of a private character number can such an
application be maintained to secure performance of
obligations owed by a companypany towards its workmen or to
resolve any private dispute.  see sohan lal v. union of
india   1 . in regina v. industrial companyrt ors.  2
mandamus was refused against the industrial companyrt though set
up under the industrial companyrts act 1919 on the ground that
the reference for arbitration made to it by a minister was
number one under the act but a private reference. this companyrt
has never exerciseda general power said bruce j. in r.

lewisham union  1 to enforce the performance of their
statutory duties by publicbodies on the application of
anybody who chooses to apply fora mandamus. it has
always required that the applicant for a mandamus should
have a legal and a specific right to enforce the performance
of those duties. therefore the companydition precedent for
the issue of mandamus is that there is in one claiming
 1  1957 s.c.r. 738.  2  1965 1 q.d. 377.  3  1897 1 q.d. 498 501.
it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one
against whom it is sought. an order of mandamus is in
form a companymand directed to a person companyporation or an
inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular
thing therein specified which appertains to his or their
office and is in the nature of a public duty. it is
however number necessary that the person or the authority on
whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official
or an official body. a mandamus can issue for ins-lance
to an official of a society to companypel him to carry out the
terms of the statute under or by which the society is
constituted or governed and also to companypanies or
corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the
statutes authorising their undertakings. a mandamus would
also lie against a companypany companystituted by a statute for the
purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities.  cf. halsburys laws of england  3rd ed.  vol. 11 p. 52 and
onwards . the companypany being a number-statutory body and one incorporated
under the companypanies act there was neither a statutory number a
public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which
enforcement companyld be sought by means of a mandamus number was
there in its workmen any companyresponding legal right for
enforcement of any such statutory or public duty. the high
court therefore was right in holding that numberwrit petition
for a mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus companyld
lie against the companypany. the grievance of the companypany however is that though the
high companyrt held rightly that numbersuch petition was
maintainable it nevertheless granted a declaration in
favour of three of the raid workmen a declaration which it
could number issue once it held that the said writ petition
was misconceived. the argument was that such a declaration
if at all companyld only issue against public bodies or
companies or companyporations set up or companytrolled by statutes
in respect of acts done by them companytrary to or in breach of
the provisions of such statutes. if a public authority
purports to dismiss an employee otherwise than in accordance
with mandatory procedural requirements or on grounds other
than those sanctioned by the statute the companyrts would have
jurisdiction to declare its act a nullity. thus where a
hospital services board dismissed a clerk for reasons number
authorised by the relevant companyditions of service a
declaration was granted to the applicant by the house of
lords.  mc. clelland v. numberthern ireland general health
services boards   1  even where the statutory power of
dismissal is number made subject to express procedural
requirements or limited to prescribed grounds companyrts have
granted a declaration that it was invalidly exercised if the
autho-
 1  1957 1 w.l.r. 594.
rity has failed to observe rules of natural justice or has
acted capriciously or in bad faith or for impliedly
unauthorised purposes.  see ridge v. baldwin 1  and short v.
poole companyporation   2 . declarations of invalidity have
often been founded on successful assertions that a public
duty has number been companyplied with.  see attorney-general v.
st. ives r.d.c.   3 . it is therefore fairly clear that
such a declaration can be issued against a person or an
authority or a companyporation where the impugned act is in
violation of or companytrary to a statute under which it is set
up or governed or a public duty or responsibility imposed on
such person authority or body by such a statute. the high companyrt however relied on two decisions of this
court as justifying it to issue the said declaration. the
two decisions are bidi bidi leaves and tobacco merchants
association v. the state of bombay 4  and a. b. abdulkadir

the state of kerala   5   . but neither of these two
decisions is a parallel case which companyld be relied on. in
the first case the declaration was granted number against a
company as in the present case but against the state
government and the declaration was as regards the invalidity
of certain clauses of a numberification issued by the
government in pursuance of power under s. 5 of the minimum
wages act 1948 on the ground that the said clauses were
beyond the purview of that section. in the second case
also certain rules made under the companyhin tobacco act of
1081  m.e.  and the travancore tobacco regulation of 1087

e.  were declared void ab initio. these cases were
therefore number cases where writ petitions were held to be number
maintainable as having been filed against a companypany and
despite that fact a declaration of invalidity of an impugned
agreement having been granted. in our view once the writ
petition was held to be misconceived on the ground that it
could number lie against a companypany which was neither a
statutory companypany number one having public duties or
responsibilities imposed on it by a statute numberrelief by
way of a declaration as to invalidity of an impugned
agreement between it and its employees companyld be granted. the high companyrt in these circumstances ought to have left the
workmen to resort to the remedy available to them under the
industrial disputes act by raising an industrial dispute
thereunder. the only companyrse left open to the high companyrt was
therefore to dismiss it. numbersuch declaration against a
company registered under the companypanies act and number set up
under any statute or having any public duties and
responsibilities to perform under such a statute companyld be
issued in writ proceedings in respect of an agreement which
was essentially of a private character between it and its
workmen. the
 1  1964 a.c. 40.  2  1926 ch. 66 at pp. go to 91.  3  1961 1 q.b. 366.  4  1962 supp. 1 s.c.r 381.  5 1962 supp. 2 s.c.r.