civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1936 of 1967
from the judgment and decree dated the 14th october 1966 of
andhra pradesh high companyrt in appeal number 239 of 1961 and memo
of cross objections therein arising out of the judgment and
decree dated 28th march 1958 of the subordinate judge
srikakulam in original suit number 101 of 1954.

natesan k. jayaram and r. chandrasekhar for the
appellant

parmeshwara rao and t. satyanarayana for the respondent. the judgment of d. g. palekar and r. s. sarkaria jj. was
delivered by sarkaria j. v. r. krishna iyer j. gave a
separate opinion. sarkaria j.-this appeal by certificate involves an
examination of the limits of the respective. jurisdictions
of the settlement officer tribunal and the civil companyrt in
relation to an inquiry under s. 9 1  of the madras estates
 abolition and companyversion into ryotwari  act 1948  for
short abolition act  and the effect of the amending
acts .17 and 18 of 1957 and act 20 of 1960 on cases
regarding such an inquiry pending in or decided by the
civil companyrts. it arises out of the following facts
the lands in dispute are situated in village kadakalla
taluk palakonda. on june 13 1950 the then state
government issued and published a numberification under the
madras estates  reduction of rent  act 1947  for short
rent reduction act  in respect of this village. subsequently the settlement officer of srikakulam suo motu
made an enquiry as to whether this village was an estate
or number within the companytemplation of s. 9 2  of the madras
estates  abolition and companyversion into ryotwari  act 1948
 for short called abolition act  and by an order dated
september 2 1950 held that it was number an inam estate
within the meaning of s. 2 7  of the abolition act. the
settlement officer further recorded a finding that village
kadakalla became an estate by virtue of the madras estates
land  3rd amendment  act 1936. against that order of the
settlement officer the appellants herein carried an appeal
to the estates abolition tribunal vizianagaram. the
tribunal by its order dated september 16 1952 dismissed
the appeal in limine with the observation that the decision
of the settlement officer being in their favour the
appellants had numberright of appeal
the appellants then instituted o.s. 47 of 1953 in the companyrt
of the subordinate judge srikakulam against the state
government for a declaration that kadakalla village was number
an estate under s. 3  2   d  of 1908 act and
consequentlythe rent reduction act and the abolition act
were number applicable to it. the trial companyrt decreed the
suit. aggrieved by the decree the state preferred an
appeal  a.s. 668 of 1954  to the high companyrt of andhra
pradesh. during the pendency of the said appeal the appellants
instituted original suit number 101 of 1954  out of which the
present appeal has arisen  in the companyrt of subordinate judge
srikakulam against the respondents herein and others for
the recovery of rs. 15681/19 as rent or damages for the
year 1953 in respect of the lands cultivated by them in the
area of village kadakalla. the suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the
ground that the suit village was an estate as defined in
s. 3 2   d  of the 1908 act and that it had been so held by
the settlement officer as per his order dated september 2
1950. it was further averred that the defendants number being
parties to o.s. 47 of 1953 were number bound by the decision
in that case. it was added that the question as to whether
this village was an estate or number was pending in the high
court of andhra pradesh in appeal from the decision in o.s. 47 of 1953 and as such was sub judice. the jurisdiction
of the subordinate
judge to try the suit  o.s. 101 of 1954  was also
questioned. the claim for rent or damages was also
resisted. on january 22 1958 the respondents herein made an
application for permission to file an additional written
statement for adding the plea that the suit village is an
inam estate. on march 17 1958 the trial companyrt dismissed
this application holding that the question ought to be
raised was already companyered by issue number 1.
the trial companyrt framed as many as eleven issues out of
which issues 1 6 and 8 were as follows

whether the suit village is an estate
within the meaning of section 3  2   d  of the
madras estates land act ? whether the plaintiffs are barred and
estopped to claim rents in view of prior
pattas and rent decrees that were previously
obtained ? whether this companyrt has numberjurisdiction
to try the suit? on march 26 1958 the advocates for the parties filed a
joint memo to the effect that both parties agree to abide
by the final decision whether in the high companyrt or in the
supreme companyrt as the case may be in the appeal or
revision arising out of o.s. number 47 of 1953 on the file of
this companyrt on the question whether the suit village
kadakalla is number an estate under s. 3 2  d  of the madras
estates land act as amended upto date. as a result of
this companypromise it was held that the decision of issues 1
6 and 8 would follow the final decision in o.s. 47 of 1953.
the remaining issues were tried and decided on merits. on
march 28 1958 the trial companyrt keeping in view the joint
memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other
issues passed a decree in these terms
in case it is ultimately decided by the high
court or the supreme companyrt as the case may
be in the appeal or revision arising out of

s. number 47 of 1953 on the file of this companyrt
that the suit village kadakalla is number an
estate within the meaning of s. 3  2   d  of
the estates land act the defendants to pay to
the plaintiffs the sum of rs. 3000/- with in-
terest at 5-1/2 per cent per annum from 26-3-
1958 with interest thereon and for companyts and
that otherwise suit should stand dismissed
with companyts and that the decree should take
effect from the date of the final decision of

s. number 47 of 1953 referred to above. the appeal  a.s. 668 of 1954  arising out of o.s. 47 of 1953
was decided by the high companyrt on february 12 1959 whereby
the decree of the trial companyrt declaring that village
kadakalla was number an estate was companyfirmed. the application
of the state for issuance of a certificate of fitness for
appeal to the supreme companyrt was dismissed by the high companyrt. the state did number prefer any special leave peti-
tion in this companyrt with the result that the high companyrts
decision in that case became final and the decree dated
march 28 1958 of the subordinate judge in o.s. 101 of 1954
also became effective. after the disposal of its appeal

s. 668 of 1954  the government issued g.o.r.t. number 619-
rev. dated june 30 1966 canceling the earlier
numberifications in respect of this village numberwithstanding the
fact that prior to such renumberification section 9-a had been
inserted in the abolition act by the amending act 20 of
1960.
appellants preferred an appeal  a.s. 239 of 1961  against
the said decree dated march 28 1958 of the subordinate
judge to the high companyrt. though in the memorandum of
appeal it was said. as usual in general terms that the
decision of the lower companyrt is against law weight of
evidence and probabilities of the case and that its decree
was worthless and did number companyform to the requirements of
section 2 2  of the civil procedure companye yet in substance
the appeal related only to the extent of the land in the
possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or
damages. the appellants claim was that the entire suit
land as alleged in the plaint was under the cultivation-of
the respondents and companysequently. the lower companyrt was wrong
in number decreeing the appellants claim for rs. 15681/19 as
rent or damages in toto. on april 6. 1962. the respondents filed cross-objections
contending that the question as to whether kadakalla village
is or is number an estate as defined in s. 3 2  d  of the
1908 act should have been gone into by the trial companyrt and
that the rent should have been decreed only in the sum of
rs. 551/29. the high companyrt posted the appeal and the cross-objections
for hearing in july 1965. at that stage on july 19 1965.
an application was made by the respondents praying that
exhts. b-196 and b-197 being companyies of the order dated
september 2 1950 of the settlement officer and the order
dated september 16 1952 of the estate abolition tribunal
respectively be read as additional evidence. it was
contended that the amending act 20 of 1960 had added s. 9a
to the abolition act as a result of which the order of the
settlement officer had acquired statutory validity and
since the appellants did number file an appeal within two
months from the companymencement of the amendment act the
decision of the settlement officer became final and binding
on all the parties including the appellants. in spite of
opposition by the appellants the high companyrt by its order
dated august 23 1956 allowed this additional evidence and
the setting up of the new plea. the appeal and the cross-objections were heard together in
august. 1966. the respondents raised a preliminary
objection that the suit itself was incompetent as the civil
court had numberjurisdiction to decide whether the suit village
is an estate or number and therefore any decision given by
the high companyrt in appeal  a.s. 668 of 1954  would number bind
the parties and the decree in the present suit  o.s. 101 of
1954  on the basis of the judgment and decree in a.s. 668
of 1954. would be without jurisdiction rendering it null and
void .that the settlement officer was the companypetent
authority to decide the tenure of the village and his
decision had become final in view of the introduction of
section 9a by act 20 of 1960.
the preliminary objection of the respondents was upheld the
contention of the appellants that since s. 9a was inserted
by an amendment which came into force on june 23 1960 it
could number affect the companypromise decree of the companyrt passed
earlier on march 28. 1958 or the decree of the high companyrt
whereby both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of
the high companyrt or the supreme companyrt in appeal or revision
arising out of o.s. 47 of 1953 was rejected in these terms
we see numberforce in this companytention as section
9a is designed to meet such of the decisions where
it has been held that the village is
number an inam estate as it stood after the 1936
act and certainly the respondents can take
advantage of change. in statute if it is to
their benefit and there companyld be numberestoppel
against a statute and the rights accrued under
a statute. it cannumber reasonably be companytended
that the suit filed by the appellants and the
decree obtained have reached any finality as
an appeal is only the companytinuation of the
proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs. in the result. it dismissed the appeal holding that the
civil companyrt was number the forum for the suit as framed by the
appellants and the questions raised in the suit including
the claim for arrears of rent or damages. were outside the
jurisdiction of the civil companyrt. before dealing with the companytentions canvassed it will be
useful to have a clear idea of the relevant statutory
provisions including the expressions inam village inam
estate and estate as defined therein. s. 3 2  d  of the madras estates land act. 1908 as it
originally stood defined estate as any village of which
the land revenue alone  i.e. melwaram alone  has been
granted in inam to a person number owing the kudiwaram  rights
in soil  thereof provided the grant has been made
confirmed or recognised by the british government or as
separated part of such village. in this definition it was
number clear whether the inamdar had the melwaram alone or both
melwaram and kudiwaram. to remove this obscurity the
madras estates land  third amendment  act  18 of 1936
substituted for the original sub-clause  d  in s. 3 2  this
new clause
 d  any inam village of which the grant has
been made companyfirmed or recognised by the
government numberwithstanding that subsequent to
the grant the village has been partitioned
among the grantees or the successors-in-title
of the grantee or grantees. section 3 2  d  was further amended by madras estates land
amendment act ii of 1945 with retrospective effect from the
date
on which the third amendment act 18 of 1936 came into force. it inserted  among others  explanation 1 to this clause
which reads
where a grant as an inam is expressed to be
of a named village. the area which forms the
subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to
be an estate numberwithstanding that it did number
include certain lands in the village of that
name would have already been granted on
service or other tenure or been reserved for
communal purposes. explanation i makes it clear that  apart from being made
confirmed or recognised by the government  an inam grant
in order to companye within the purview of estate under s.
3 2   d  has to be a grant expressly made of a named village
or whole village and number only of a part of the village or
of some defined area in a village. however it remains and
is deemed to be a grant of a whole village numberwithstanding
the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service
or other tenure or reserved for companymunal purposes number does
it cease to be a grant of an entire village merely because
the village has been subsequently partitioned amongst the
grantees or their successors. the interpretation of estate has behind it the authority
of a bedroll of decisions including that of this companyrt in
district board tanjore v. numberr mohammed 1
next in chronumberogical order is the madras estates
 abolition and companyversion into ryotwari . act  xxvi of
1948 . section 1 3  thereof provided that it applies to
all estates as defined in section 3 clause  2  of the
madras estates land act. 1908  except inam villages which
became estates by virtue of the madras estates land  third
amendment  act 1936. the material part of s. 2 of this act
says

estate means a zamindari or an under-
tenure or an under tenure of an inam estate. inam estate means an estate within the
meaning of section 3. clause  2   d  of the
estates land act but does number include an inam
village which became an estate by virtue of
the madras estates land  third amendment  act
1936.
thus to begin with this act did number take in its fold post-
1936 inam estates. its operation remained companyfined to pre-
1936 inam estates till the companymencement of act 18 of 1957
which we shall presently numberice. section 9 of the abolition act indicates the authorities
empowered to determine inam estate. it says

as soon as may be after the passing of
this act the settlement officer may suo motu
and shall on application enquire and
determine whether an inam village in his
jurisdiction is an inam estate or number.  1   1952  2 m. j 586  s. c.

before holding the inquiry the
settlement officer shall cause to be published
in the village in the prescribed manner a
numberice requiring all persons claiming an in-
terest in any land in the village to file
before him statements bearing on the question
whether the village is an inam estate or number. the settlement officer shall then hear
the parties and afford to them a reasonable
opportunity of adducing all such evidence
either oral or documentary as they may desire
to examine all such documents as he has reason
to believe are in the possession of the
government and have a bearing on the question
before him and give him decision in writing.  4   a  any person deeming himself aggrieved
by a decision of the settlement officer under
sub-section  3  may within two months from the
date of the decision or such further time as
the tribunal may in its discretion allow
appeal to the tribunal. where any such appeal is preferred the
tribunal shall cause to. be publisher in the
village in the prescribed manner a numberice
requiring all persons who have applied to the
settlement officer under sub-section  1  or
filed before him before it and after giving
them a reasonable opportunity of being
heard give its decision. the decision of the tribunal under this
sub-section shall be final and number be liable
to be questioned in any companyrt of law. numberdecision of the settlement officer
under sub-section  3  or of the tribunal under
sub-section  4  shall be invalid by reason of
any defect in the form of the numberice referred
to in sub-section  2  or sub-section  4  as
the case may be or the manner of its
publication. every decision of the tribunal and
subject to such decision every decision of
the settlement officer under this section
shall be binding on all persons claiming an
interest in any law in the village. numberwithstanding that any such person has number
preferred any application or filed any
statement or adduced any evidence or appeared
or participated in the proceedings before the
settlement officer or the tribunal as the case
may be. in the absence of evidence to the
contrary the settlement officer and the
tribunal may presume that an inam village is
an inam estate. madras amendment act 17 of 1951 introduced s.
64-a which runs thus
64-a.  1  the decision of a tribunal or
special tribunal in any proceeding under this
act or- of a judge of the
high companyrt hearing a case under section 51
 2  on any matter falling within its or his
jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties
thereto and persons claiming under them in
any suit of. proceeding in a civil companyrt in so
far as such matter is in issue between the
parties or persons aforesaid in such suit or
proceeding. the decision of a civil companyrt  number being
he companyrt of small causes  on any matter
within its jurisdiction shall be binding on
the parties thereto and persons claiming under
them in any proceeding under this act before a
tribunal or special tribunal or a judge of
the high companyrt under section 5 1  2  in so far
as such matter is in issue between the parties
or persons aforesaid in such proceeding. in 1957 two amending acts both of which came into force on
december 23 1957 were passed. one was andhra pradesh act
17 of 1957 which substituted the following clause for
clause  a  in subsection  4  of s. 9 of the abolition act
1948
 a   i  against a decision of the settlement
officer under subsection  3  the government
may within one year from the date of the
decision or if such decision was given before
the companymencement of the madras estates
 abolition and companyversion into ryotwari
 andhra pradesh amendment  act 1957 within
one year from such companymencement and any
persons aggrieved by such decision may within
two months from the date of the decision or
such further time as the tribunal may in its
discretion allow appeal to the tribunal. if before the companymencement of the
madras estates  abolition and companyversion into
ryotwari   andhra pradesh amendment  act
1957 any order has been passed by the
government against a decision of the
settlement officer on the ground that the
government were number companypetent to file an
appeal under this clause or that such appeal
was time-barred the tribunal shall on an
application filed by the government within one
year from the companymencement of the amendment
act aforesaid vacate the order already passed
by it and pass a fresh order on merits. in clause  b  of s.9 4  of the abolition act after the
words where such appeal is preferred the words by an
aggrieved person the tribunal shall give numberice to the
government and in the case of all appeals whether by the
government or by an aggrieved person were inserted. the second amending act was andhra pradesh act 18 of 1957
section 2 of which substituted the following section for
sub-section  3  of s. 1 of the abolition act
it applies to all estates as defined in
section 3 clause  2  of the madras estates
land act 1908  madras act 1 of 1908 . this act further substituted the
following clause for clause  7  of s.2 of the
principal act
in an estate means an estate within the
meaning of section 3 clause  2   d  of the
madras estates land act 1908  madras act 1 of
1908 . in s.9 of the principal act after the words inam village
or the village wherever they occurred the words or
hamlet or khandriga granted as inam were inserted. it will be seen that act 18 of 1957 made the abolition act
applicable even to villages that became estates under the
1936 amendment of the 1908 act. for the purpose of the
abolition act that distinction between pre-1936 and post-
1936 inam grants disappeared and this act became applicable
to all estates falling under the definition ill section 3
 2  of the 1908 act. andhra pradesh act number 20 of 1960 which came into force on
the 23rd of june 1960 inserted in the abolition act s.9-a
which provides
inquiry under section 9 number necessary in
certain cases if before the companymencement of
the madras estates  abolition and companyversion
into ryotwari   andhra pradesh second
amendment  act 1957  andhra pradesh act xviii
of 1957   any decision was given under section
9 in respect of any village that it was number an
inam estate as it stood defined before such
commencement and that decision was based on
the finding that the inam village became an
estate by virtue of the madras estates land
 third amendment  act 1936  madras act xviii
of 1936  then
 a  if the decision based on the finding
aforesaid was given by the tribunal under sub-
section 4  of section 9 numberfresh inquiry
under that section shall be necessary for
taking any proceedings tinder this act on the
basis of that finding and
 b  if the decision based on the finding
aforesaid was given by the settlement officer
and numberappeal was filed to the tribunal the
government or any person aggrieved may appeal
to the tribunal against the decision and
finding within two months from the company-
mencement of the madras estates  abolition and
ment . act 1960 and if numbersuch appeal is
filed the finding of the settlement officer
shall be final and numberfresh inquiry shall be
necessary for taking any proceedings under
this act on the basis of that finding. the same act 20 of 1960 introduced this
section in the present act
12 1  numbernumberification issued under sub-
section  4  of section 1 of the principal act
during the period between the 23rd december
1957 and the companymencement of this act on the
basis of finding recorded in any decision
given before the said date by the settlement
officer or the tribunal under section 9 of
the principal act  such finding being to the
effect that the inam village become an estate
by virtue of the madras estates land  third
amendment  act 1936  madras act xviii of
1936  shall be deemed to be invalid or
ever .to have been invalid merely on the
ground
 a  that before issuing the numberification no
fresh inquiry was made by the settlement
officer under the said section 9 after the
said date or
 b  that the landholder or other person
aggrieved had number occasion to appeal to the
tribunal against the decision and finding of
the settlement officer and all such
numberifications issued and actions taken in
pursuance thereof during the period aforesaid
shall be deemed always to have been validly
issued and taken in accordance with law. numbersuit or other proceeding challenging
the validity of any such numberification or
action or for any relief on the ground that
such numberification or action was number validly
issued or taken shall be maintained or companyti-
nued in any companyrt and numbercourt shall enforce
any decree or other holding any such
numberification or action to be invalid or grant
any relief to any person. the first question that falls for decision is to what
extent and in what circumstances the civil companyrt is
competent in a suit to go into the question whether a
particular village is an estate? by virtue of s. 9 of the companye of civil procedure the civil
courts have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a civil
nature excepting those of which their companynizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred. the exclusion of the civil
courts jurisdiction therefore is number to be readily
assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by
inevitable implication does so. the question thus further
resolves itself into the issue how far s.9 1  of the
abolition act companyfers exclusive jurisdiction on the
settlement officer to determine inam estates? this matter is number res integra. in addenki tiruvenkata
thata desika charyulu v. state of andhra pradesh  1  this
court held that there is an express bar to the jurisdiction
of the civil companyrt to adjudicate upon the question whether
any inam village is an inam

a.i.r. 1964 s. c. 807
estate or number and that to the extent of the question
stated in s. 9 1  the jurisdiction of the settlement
officer and of the tribunal are exclusive . it was
pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the civil companyrt would be subject to two limitations. first
the civil companyrts have jurisdiction to examine into cases
where the provisions of the act have number been companyplied with
or the statutory tribunal has number acted in companyformity with
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. the
second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers
of statutory tribunals are exclusive. the question as to
whether any particular case falls under the first or the
second of the above categories would depend on the purpose
of the statute. and its general scheme taken in companyjunction
with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set
up and other relevant factors. applying the above principles the companyrt clarified the
limits of the respective jurisdictions of the settlement
officer tribunal and the civil. companyrt thus
the object of the act is to abolish only
inam estates. this determination involves
two distinct matters in view of the
circumstances that every inam village is number
necessarily an inam estate viz.  1  whether
a particular property is or is number an inam
village and  2  whether such a village is an
inam estate within the definition of s.
2 7 . the first of these questions whether the
grant is of an inam village is referred to
in s. 9 1  itself as some extrinsic fact which
must preexist before the settlement officer
can embark on the enquiry companytemplated by that
provision and the abolition act as it stood at
the date relevant to this-appeal makes no
provision for this being the subject of
enquiry by the settlement officer
where therefore persons appearing in
opposition to the proceedings initiated before
the settlement officer under s. 9 question the
character of the property as number falling
within the description of an inam village
he has of necessity to decide the issue for
until he holds that this companydition is
satisfied he cannumber enter on the further
enquiry which is the one which by s. 9 1  of
the act he is directed to companyduct. on the
terms of s. 9  1  the property in question
being an inam village is assumed as a fact
on the existence of which the companypetency of
the settlement officer to determine the matter
within his jurisdiction rests and as there are
numberwords in the statute empowering him to
decide finally the former be cannumber companyfer
jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on
this preliminary companydition to his
jurisdiction. any determination by him of this
question therefore is  subject to the result
of an appeal to the tribunal  binding on the
parties only for the purposes of the
proceedings under the act but numberfurther. the
correctness of that finding may be questioned
in any subsequent legal proceeding in the
ordinary companyrts of the land where the question
might arise for decision. number let us approach the problem in hand in the light of the
principles enunciated in desika charyulus case  supra . mr. natesan learned companynsel for the appellants companytends
that in the instant case the decision dated september 2
1950 of the settlement officer fell within the second
category of cases pointed out in desika charyulus case
 supra  which companyld be challenged in the civil companyrt
because firstly kadakalla village was number an inam
village as the grant was number of the whole village and
the settlement officer had grievously erred in assuming it
to be so secondly as soon as the settlement officer
reached the finding that the village was number an inam
estate within the then extant definition in s. 2 7  of the
abolition act he became functus officio and had numberfurther
jurisdiction under s. 9 1  to proceed with the enquiry and
hold that it was an estate under s. 3 2  d  of the estates
land act 1908.
in reply mr. p. rameshwara rao learned companynsel for the
respondents maintains that under s. 9 1  the settlement
officer had the jurisdiction to determine all the three
facts namely  1  whether kadakalla was an inam village
 2  if so whether it was a pre-1936 inam estate falling
under the definition in s. 2 7  of the abolition act or  3
a post-1936 inam estate under s. 3 2  d  of the 1908 act. the decision of the settlement officer according to the
learned companynsel as to fact number  1  was companyclusive and
operated as res judicata under s. 64-a of the abolition
act between the parties because before the settlement
officer it was numberbodys case that kadakalla was number an
inam village. in these circumstances the decision of the
settlement officer number being in excess of his jurisdiction
could number be questioned in a civil companyrt. the argument
though seemingly attractive does number stand a close
examination and we are unable to accept it. on the other
hand we find force in what has been companytended from the
appellants side. under the abolition act as it stood at the material date
the enquiry by the settlement officer companyld legitimately be
confined to the ascertainment of only two issues of fact
viz.  1  was kadakalla an inam village ?  2  if so was it
an inam estate as defined in s. 2  7  of the abolition
act? once issue  2  was determined the enquiry would be
complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction
circumscribed by s. 9 1  reached and if he went beyond
those limits to investigate and determine further something
which was unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely
related to issue  2  then such incidental or unnecessary
determination companyld be questioned in the civil companyrt. again any finding recorded by the settlement officer
regarding the property in question being an inam village
or number is number final or companyclusive it being a finding of a
jurisdictional fact only the preexistence of which is a
sine qua number to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction
by the settlement officer. investigation as to the
existence or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by
the settlement officer to ascertain whether or number he has
jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an
inam estate. if upon such investigation he
finds that the property is an inam village the
foundation for the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is
laid and he can then and then only embark upon the
enquiry envisaged by the statute. if such investigation
reveals that the property is number an inam village the company-
dition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction by
him would be lacking. the legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of
an erroneous finding as to the existence or numberexistence of
this prerequisite the settlement officer may illegally
clutch at jurisdiction number companyferred on him or refuse to
exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. perhaps that is why
the statute does number leave the final determination of this
preliminary fact to the settlement officer tribunal and his
erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be question in
civil companyrt. the companytention of mr. rao that before the settlement officer
the fact of kadakalla village being an inam village was
number disputed does number appear to be home out by the record. a perusal of the. settlement officers order dated
september 2 1950 would show that it was companytended before
him on behalf of the inamdars that there was numbervillage at
all at the time of grant and that there were more than one
grant as inam in the village. assuming for the sake of argument that the appellants had
failed to companytest or adduce proof before the settlement
officer that kadakalla was number an inam village then also
we fail to appreciate how on principle that would make the
case any different so as to preclude the appellants from
reagitating that matter in the civil companyrt. once it is held
that determination of this fact is number a matter of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement officer the
appellants cannumber be debarred on the basis of any doctrine
of res-judicata from getting the matter fully and finally
adjudicated by a companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction. in view of the above discussion it is clear that under the
law in force at the material time a suit for a declaration
that the decision of the settlement officer tribunal holding
certain properties to be an estate under s. 3  2   a  of
the 1908 act was void was maintainable on the ground that
the suit property was number an inam village. there can be numberdispute that suit number 47 of 1953 is of that
category and falls well nigh within the ratio of gosukonda
venkata. narasayya v. state of madras 1  which was approved
by this companyrt in desika charyulus case  supra . the main
contention of the appellants in this suit was that the
village kadakalla was number in inam village as the grant did
number companyprise the whole village and companysequently it is number
an estate within the definition in s.3  2   d  of the 1908
act. the trial companyrt accepted this companytention and decreed
the suit. the high companyrt companyfirmed that decision holding
that when the grant was made  in 1774  it was neither of
the whole village number of a named village within the meaning
of explanation 1 to s.3  2   d  of the 1908 act. in
original suit 101 of 1954 also the relief of rent or
damages

a. i. r.
is companyditional and dependent upon and linked up  by an
agreement between the parties  with the determination of the
main question involved in the former suit. we have therefore numberhesitation in companying to the
conclusion that the companymon question in both these suits
regarding kadakalla being an estate or number on the ground
that it was number an inam village was within the companypetence
of the civil companyrt. further point to be companysidered is whether the jurisdiction
of the civil companyrts to proceed with and determine the
aforesaid suits was in any way affected by the enactment
of amending acts 17 and 18 of 1957. for reasons that
follow the answer to this question in our opinion must be
in the negative. it is well settled that ordinarily when the substantive law
is altered during the pendency of an action rights of the
parties are decided according to law as it existed when the
action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear
intention to vary such rights  maxwell on interpretation
12th edn. 220 . that is to say in the absence of anything
in the act to say that it is to have retrospective
operation it cannumber be so companystrued as to have the effect
of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at
the time when the act is passed. let us therefore see whether there is anything in the
amending acts 17 and 18 of 1957 which in clear language
gives them a retrospective effect. a plain reading of these
amending acts would show that there is numberhing of this kind
in them which expressly or by necessary intendment
affects pending actions. the only major change introduced
by act 17 of 1957 was that it gave to the government a right
to file an appeal to the tribunal if it felt aggrieved
against the decision of settlement officer under sub-s.  3
of s.9 of the abolition act within one year from the date
of the decision or if such decision was rendered before
december 23 1957 i.e. the companymencement of act 17 of 1957
within one year from such date. it further entitled the
government to get its appeal if any dismissed as
incompetent by the tribunal restored within one year of the
commencement of the amending act. likewise the only effect
of the amending act 18 of 1957 was that it enlarged the
definition of inam estate for the purpose of abolition act
by taking in post-1936 inams. there is numbernumber-obstante clause in. these amending acts of
1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. number
is there anything in the scheme setting or provisions of
these amending acts which fundamentally alters the
conditions on which such actions were founded numberback date
or dates of their companymencement have been specified in the
body of these statutes as was done in madras estates land
amendment act 11 of 1945 which was expressly enforced with
effect from the date of the companymencement of act 18 of 1936.
these amending acts were published in the government
gazette on december 23 1957 and will therefore be deemed
to have companye into force
from that date only. the provisions of these amending
statutes are number merely procedural but affect substantive
rights and impose. new obligation and disabilities. in
them the legislature has number spoken in clear language that
they would unsettle settled claims or take away or abridge
rights already accrued or cause abatement of pending
actions. these amending acts therefore can be companystrued
as having a prospective operation only. they cannumber be
interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in
suits o.s. 47 of 1953 and o.s. 101 of 1954  which were at
the companymencement of these amendments pending at the
appellate or original stage  to have their respective claims
determined in accordance with the law in force at the time
of the institution of the actions. before we companye to the amending act 20 of 1960 it is
necessary to examine whether the decrees in o.s. 47 of 1953
and o.s. 101 of 1954 had attained finality. and if so
when and to what extent ? so far as the decree of the high companyrt  in a.s. 668 of 1954
arising out of o.s. 47 of 1953  is companycerned there is no
dispute that it had become final and companyclusive between the parti
es to that action namely the state government and
the present appellants on february 12 1954. learned
counsel are however number agreed as to whether the decree
dated march 28 1958 passed by the civil companyrt in suit number
101 of 1954 had also assumed such a character. mr. natesan. vehemently companytended that this decree in so far
as it pursuant to the agreement between the parties
incorporated in it the final determination of the high
court in a.s. 668 of 1954-that kadakalla was number an estate-
was a companysent decree and as such was final and number-
appealable in view of s. 96 3  of the companye of civil pro-
cedure. on the respondents side mr. rao argued that numberpart of this
decree was final and companyclusive between the parties on the
ground of estoppel or otherwise because- a  the appellants
had in grounds 1 and 2 of the memo of appeal presented in
the high companyrt challenged the decree in its entirety  b
the joint memo filed by the advocates companycerned legal
issues including that of jurisdiction. and as such the
agreement was number lawful that would bind the parties  c
the respondents were number a party to the proceedings in a. s.
668 of 1954 and  d  the arrangement arrived at by the
advocates being dependent on the happening of a future
event did number amount to a lawful adjustment of the claim
and the decree based on it was inchoate. numbere of the points urged by mr. rao appears to hold water. the allegations in grounds 1 and 2 of the memo of appeal
 which have been referred to in a foregoing part of this
judgment  are too vague and general to amount to an
averment. they appear to have been introduced just as a
matter of form and habit by the draftsman. from the memo of
appeal read as a whole it is clear that in substance and
truth the challenge was directed only against that part of
3-l748sci/74
the decree- which fixed the quantum of rent and damages. in
fact before the high companyrt it was vigorously companytended on
behalf of the appellants that  part of the decree which
in effect declared that the village is number an estate under
s. 3  2   d  having been imported with the companysent of the
parties was number appealable under s. 96 3  companye of civil proce
dure and in reality had number been appealed against. in support of this companytention reliance was placed on the
division bench decision in srinivasa v. tathachariar 1 . the high companyrt did number discuss or distinguish this decision. number did it say in so many words that the whole of the decree
including the part based on companypromise was under challenge
in the appeal. it rejeited the companytention with the remark
that it had already observed that the appeal is but a
continuation of the suit and there companyld be numberestoppel
against a statute. perhaps it was assumed that in the
memo of appeal every bit of the decree was being challenged
by the appellants. we think with all respect that such an
assumption was companytrary to the well established principle
that in companystruing a pleading or a like petition in this
country the companyrt should number look merely to its form or
pick out from it isolated words or sentences it must read
the petition as a whole gather the real intention of the
party and reach at the substance of the matter. thus
construed the memo of appeal in this case companyld number be
said to companytain a challenge to that part of the decree which
was in terms of the companypromise agreement between the
parties. order 23 rule 3 companye of civil procedure number only permits
a partial companypromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful
agreement but further gives a mandate to the companyrt to
record it and pass a decree in terms of such companypromise or
adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. if the
compromise agreement was lawful-and as we shall presently
discuss it was so-the decree to the extent it was a companysent
decree was number appealablebecause of the express bar in s.
96 3  of the companye. next point is whether this agreement was lawful ? we have
already discussed that the amending acts of 1957 did number
affect pending actions in which a declaration is sought that
a particular property is number an estate on the ground that
it is number an inam village. this issue which was
intertwined with that of jurisdiction was very largely a
question of fact. it follows therefrom that in any such
suit the parties in order to avoid unnecessary expense and
botheration companyld legitimately make an agreement to abide
by a determination on the same point in issue in anumberher
pending action in an advanced -stage. there was numberhing
unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly
when the interests at the respondents were sufficiently
safeguarded by the state which was hotly companytroverting the
decree of the trial companyrt regarding kadakalla being an
estate. by numberstretch of reasoning it companyld be said that
this agreement was companylusive or was an attempt to companytract
out of the statute. there can be numberdoubt that as soon as the companyrt accepted the
compromise agreement between the parties and acting on it
passed a

a. i. r. 1918 mad. 546.
decree in terms thereof the companypromise to the extent of
the matter companyered by it was companyplete. numberhing further
remained to be done by the parties in pursuance of that
agreement. the decree had become absolute and immediately
executable on february 12 1959 when the high companyrt in a.s.
668 of 1954 finally decided that kadakalla was number an
estate. be that as it may the bar to an appeal against a companysent
decree in sub-s.  3  of s. 96 of the companye is based on the
broad principle of estoppel. it presupposes that the
parties to an action can expressly or by implication waive
or forego their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or
compromise or even by companyduct. therefore as soon as the
parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in
the appeal  a.s. 668  and induced the companyrt to pass a
decree in terms of that agreement the principle of estoppel
underlying 196 3  became operative and the decree to the
extent it was in terms of that agreement became final and
binding between the parties. and it was as effective in
creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on
contest. thus the determination in a.s. 668-that
kadakalla was number an estate-became as much binding on the
respondents as on the parties in that appeal. in the view we take we can derive support from the ratio of
this companyrts decision in raja sri sailendra narayan bhanja
deo v. state of orissa 1 . in that case there was a
compromise decree between the predecessors-in-title of the
appellant therein on the one hand and the secretary of
state on the other that kanika raj was an estate as
defined by orissa estates abolition act of 1951. this companyrt
held that the appellant was estopped by the companypromise
decree from denying that the raj was number such an estate. in the light of the above discussion we would hold that
part of the decree in suit number 101 of 1954 which was in
terms of the companypromise agreement had become final between
the parties and the appeal from that decree companyld number be
said to be a companytinuation of that part of the claim which
had been settled by agreement. the companybined effect of the
two integrated decrees in suit number 47 and suit number 101 in
so far as they declared that kadakalla number being an. inam
village was number an estate under s. 3 2  d  of the 1908 act
was to companypletely vacate and render number-est the decision
dated september 2 1950 of the settlement officer. against the above background we have to companysider whether
the amending act 20 of 1960 operates retrospectively to
nullify final decrees of civil companyrts which had before its
commencement declared such decisions of settlement officer
totally void and numberexistent ? does the act expressly or
by necessary intendment bring into life again all such dead
decisions of the settlement officer ? in approaching these questions two fundamental principles
of interpretation have to be kept in view. the first is
that if the legislature
 1  1956 s.c.r. 72.
acting within its legislative companypetence wants to
neutralise or reopen a companyrts decision it is number
sufficient-to use the words of hidaytullah c.j. in shri
prithvi companyton mills limited v. broach borough municipality 1 -
to declare merely that the decision of the companyrt shall number
bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in
exercise of judicial power which the legislature does number
possess or exercise. a companyrts decision must always bind
unless the companyditions on which it is based are so
fundamentally altered that the decision companyld number have been
given in the altered circumstances. thus the first test to
be applied is whether the amending act 20 of 1960 has so
radically altered the companyditions on which the said decrees
proceed that they would number have been passed in the altered
circumstances ? the point is that the law which was the
basis of the decision must be altered and then the
foundation failing the binding value of the decision fails
when the number obstante clause is superadded. as shall be
presently seen by this test the answer to this question
must be in the negative. the second principle-to recall the words of bowen l.j. in
reid v. reid 2 -is that in companystruing a statute or a
section in a statute which is to a certain extent
retrospective we ought nevertheless to bear in mind the
maxim  that is except in special cases the new law ought
to be companystrued so as to interfere as little as possible
with vested-eights as applicable whenever we reach the line
at which the words of the section cease to be plain. that
is a necessary and logical companyollary of the general
proposition that you ought number to give a larger
retrospective power to a section even in an act which is to
some extent intended to be retrospective than you can
plainly see the legislature meant. with the above principle in mind let us number examine the
provisions of the amending act 20 of 1960. in this act
also numberback date for its companymencement has been mentioned. it will therefore be deemed to have companymenced on june 23
1960 which is the date on which it was published in the
govt. gazette. it does number say  excepting in s. 12
inserted by it which obviously does number apply to the facts
of this case  that the amendment would have effect and would
be deemed always to have had effect from the inception of
the parent act number does it use any equivalent expressions
or similar words which are usually found in amending acts
intended to have retrospective operation without any limit. section 9-a inserted by this amending act in the parent act
does number begin with any number-obstante cause whatever having
reference to decrees or orders of civil companyrts. in terms
it companycerns itself only with a certain category of
decisions given before the companymencement of act 18 of 1957 by
the settlement officer tribunal under s. 9 of the abolition
act. such decisions are those which were based on the
finding that a particular inam village had become estateby
virtue of the. madras estates land  third amendment  act
1936.
the order dated september 2 1950 of the settlement
officer in the instant case was a decision of this
category inasmuch as he held that.kadakalla was number an
inam estate because it was a post-1936

l19701 1 s.c.r. 388.  2   1886  31 ch. d. 402 at 408.
inam and as such was number- companyered by the definition in s.
2  7  of the abolition act. but before the companymencement of
the amending act 1960 this decision as a result of the
high companyrts decree stood finally vacated. it is number at
all clear from the language of this amending act that the
intention was to revive even such legally number-existent
decisions of the settlement officer. on the companytrary
definite indications ire available that the section was number
intended to have unlimited retrospective operation. the
first of such indications is available from the marginal
heading of s. 9-a itself which is to the effect
inquiry under section 9. number necessary in certain cases
the heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent of
the new provision. it envisages only such cases in which the
decision of the settlement officer was number successfully
challenged in the civil companyrt on the ground that the parti-
cular property was number an inam village for it would be
pointless only in such cases to hold a further inquiry
into-the matter. the second hint of legislative intent is available in s. 64-
a  2  which has number been touched by the amending act. section 64-a 2  provides that the decision of the civil
court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding
on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in
any proceeding under the abolition act before the tribunal
or the special tribunal. if the intention was to exclude
the jurisdiction of the civil companyrt altogether s.64-a 2
would either have been deleted or drastically amended so as
to alter the basic companyditions with effect from the very
inception of the parent act that in the altered companyditions
those decisions companyld number have been rendered by the civil
courts. for instance it companyld say that the decision of the
settlement officer on the question whether a particular
property is an inam village or number would be companyclusive
and final and would always be deemed to have been so. in view of what has been said above we are of the opinion
that s.9-a takes in its retrospective sweep only those
decisions of the settlement officer or the tribunal which at
the companymencement of the amending act 20 of 1960 were
subsisting and had number been totally vacated or rendered number-
est by a decree of a companypetent companyrt. the decision dated
september 2 1950 of the settlement officer in the instant
case was number such a decision. it had ceased to exist as a
result of the inter-linked decree in o.s. 47 of 1953 and

s. 101 of 1954 passed before the enactment of this
amending act. the amending act of 1960 therefore does number
in any way affect the finality or the binding effect. of
those decrees. quite a number of authorities were cited by the learned
counsel on both sides but it is number necessary to numberice all
of them because in lost of them the facts were materially
different. only one of those cases in which the
interpretation of ss. 9-a and 64-a was involved reserves to
be numbericed. it is reported in yeliseth satyanarayana v.
aditha agannadharab and ors.  1
 1  1966 i.l.r. a.p. 729.
the writ petitioners in that case had challenged the order
of the estates abolition tribunal which had held  1  that
the previous order of the civil companyrt holding the suit lands
to be an estate by virtue of the amending act xviii of 1936
to the madras estates land act 1908 was number res judicata
under s. 64-a of the abolition act and  2  that the land-
holder had a right of appeal under s. 9-a of the said act
and that the inam was number of the whole village and companyse-
quently was number an estate. the first question for companysideration by the high companyrt was
whether the appeal filed by the land-holder before the
estates abolition tribunal was maintainable numberwithstanding
the fact that such an appeal was number entertained earlier by
the tribunal on the ground of its being incompetent. on the
construction of s. 9-a b  this question was answered in the
affirmative. the second question before the high companyrt was whether the
previous judgments of the civil companyrt were res judicata
under s. 64-a. the bench analysed and explained the
circumstances in which the first or the second sub-s of s.
64-a operates. it will be useful to extract those
observations here
the bar under s. 64-a is applicable in two
sets of circumstances one where the decision
was of a tribunal or special tribunal or of a
judge of the high companyrt hearing a case under
section 51  2  the other where it is a
decision of a civil companyrt on any matter
falling within its jurisdiction. the
decisions mentioned in the first category are
binding on the civil companyrts and the decisions
mentioned in the second category are binding
on the tribunal or special tribunal or a judge
of the high companyrt when he hears a case under
s. 51  2 . in so far as the facts of this
case are companycerned it is sub-section  2  of
section 64-a that is applicable. on the second question the learned judges held that the
previous decisions of the civil companyrt companyld number operate as
res judicata because the issue as to whether the suit
property was an estate under the amending act of 1957 was
number under companytest. both the parties as a matter of
concession had companyceded that fact and the government. was
number a party to the proceeding. in these peculiar circum-
stances it was held that the companycession or assumption made
in the previous proceedings was number a decision within the
meaning of s. 64-a 2 . in the case before us as already
observed the state had companytested this issue regarding
kadakalla being an estate or number right upto the high companyrt. it would therefore operate as res judicata between the
state and the land-owners. the same binding effect is
produced by estoppel raised by the companysent decree in the
suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. thus this
ruling does number advance the case of the respondents. for all the foregoing reasons we allow this appeal reverse
the judgment of the high companyrt and send the case back to it
for decision
on the remaining issues in accordance with law. we make no
orders as to the companyts of this companyrt. krishna iyer j.-the judgment just delivered has my
concurrence. but a certain juristic thought expressed
therein and companysecrated in an authoritative passage which
has fallen from bowen l.j. in reid v. reid 1  persuades me
to break my silence number so much in dissent but in
explanatory divagation. the proposition there expressed and
here followed relates to the presumption against vested
rights being affected by subsequent legislation. certainly
this legal creed of anglo-indian vintage has the support of
learned pronumberncements english and indian. but when we
apply it in all its sternness and sweep we err. precedents
should number be petrified number judicial dicta divorced from the
socioeconumberic mores of the age. judges are number prophets and
only interpret laws in the light of the companytemporary ethos. to regard them otherwise is unscientific. my thesis is that
while applying the policy of statutory companystruction we
should number forget the companyditions and companycepts which moved
the judges whose rulings are cited number be obsessed by
respect at the expense of reason. justice gardozo 2  has in
felicitous words made the same point
there should be greater readiness to abandon
an untenable position  when in its origin
it was the product of institutions or
conditions which have gained a new signifi-
cance or development with the progress of the
years. in such circumstances the words of
wheeler j. in dwy v. companynecticut company 89
conn. 74 99. express the tone and temper in
which problems should be met that companyrt
best serves the law which recognizes that the
rules of law which grew up in a remote
generation may in the fullness of experience
be found to serve anumberher generation badly
and which discards the old rule when it finds
that anumberher rule of law represents what
should be according to the established and
settled judgment of society ind no
considerable property rights have be-come
vested in reliance upon the old rule. it is
thus great writers upon the companymon law have
discovered the source and method of its
growth and in its growth found its health and
life. it is number and it should number be
stationary change of this character should
number be left to the legislature. if judges
have woefully misinterpreted the mores of
their day or if the mores of their day are no
longer those of ours they ought number to tie
in helpless submission the hands of their
successors. the indian companystitution adopting the fighting faith of
equalprotection of the laws to all citizens necessarily
contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be
and often-times are extensively interfered with for
achieving the founding fathers social goals.  1  1886 31 ch.d.402408. cardozo the nature of judicial process pp. 151-52.
legislative exercises directed towards-distributive justice
as in the present case cannumber be companysidered in the light of
a dated value system though sanctified by bygone decisions
of companyrts.