civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 289 of 1959.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated december 16 1955
of the madras high companyrt in appeal number 231 of 1954.

c. chatterjee k.n. bajagopala sastri v.s. venkata
raman and t. k. sundara raman for the appellants number. 2 to
6.

v. vishwantha sastri r. ganapathy iyer

gopalaratnam and g. gopalkrishnan for respondent number
1.

s. venkataraman for respondent number 2
1962. april 26. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
subba rao j.-this appeal on a certificate is preferred
against the judgment and decree of the high companyrt of
judicature at madras companyfirming those of the subordinate
judge madurai in a suit for a declaration that the
adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant was
invalid. the following genealogy will be helpful to
appreciate the facts and the companytentions of the parties
rengatha

dhanappa kulandaivelu  sr.

dhanappa

renganatha subramania kulandaivelu  jr.

shanmugha chandarashekhara pl.  widow guruvammal

kanniappa  p2  anni  d 1
 died feb. 1952
p 3 to p 5 adopted d 2

renganatha dhanappa d11  sankaralinga d19
balaguruswami d4  palaniandava d 20
d5 to d10 shanmughasundara d12 d 21and d 22
avadaiappa  d 14
d 15 to d is
shanmugha subramania and kulandaivelu  jr.  became divided
in 1878 and since the division each of the three. branches
of the family was living separately. kulandaivelu  jr.
died in the year 1912 possessed of companysiderable property
described in the plaint schedule leaving him surviving his
widow guruvammal anni who is the 1st defendant as his sole
heir. in 1951 guruvammal anni with a view to adopt the
2nd defendant to her deceased husband wrote letters to her
husbands sapindas who were majors i.e. plantiffs 1 and 2
and defendants 5 11 12 14 19 and 20 seeking their company-
sent to her adopting the 2nd defendant. the said sapindas
except defendants 12 and 14 refused to give their companysent
for the reasons mentioned in their replies. defendant 12
did number receive the letter but the 14th defendant gave his
consent to the adoption. on may 25 1951 guruvammal anni
adopted kuandaivelu  jr.  the 2nd defendant as a son to her
late husband. on may 30 1951 she executed ex. a-1 the
adoption deed and registered the same on june 12 1951.
chandarasekhara the son of subramania and his son
kanniappa and three minumber grandsons filed o. s number 156 of
1951 in the companyrt of the subordinate judge madurai for a
declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the
1st defendant was invalid void and of numbereffect. defendant
3 is the natural father of defendant 2 defendants 4 to 21
are the other sapindas of 1st defendants husband being the
descendants of renganatha. the particulars of their
relationship to kulandaivelu will be seen from the aforesaid
genealogy. it was inter alia alleged in the plaint that
the adoption made by the 1st defendant of the 2nd defendant
without the companysent of the sapindas was bad and that the
consent given by the 14th defendant was purchased and
therefore would number validate it. defendants 1 2 and 3
filed written-statements supporting the adoption they
pleaded that the nearer sapindas
improperly refused to give the companysent the adoption made on
the basis of the companysent given by the 14th defendant was
valid. the learned subordinate judge on a companysideration of
the evidence and the relevant law on the subject came to
the companyclusion that the 12th defendant though received the
numberice seeking his companysent returned the same that the
other sapindas excluding defendant 14 improperly refused
to give their companysent to the adoption and that therefore
the adoption made with the companysent of defendant 14 was valid
in law. the subordinate judge also rejected the companytention
of the plantiffs that the 14th defendant having regard to
his disbelief in the religious efficacy of adoption and
the hindu ritualswas disqualified from giving his companysent. in the result he dismissed the suit. on appeal a division
bench of the madras high companyrt agreeing with the view of
the learned subordinate judge came to the companyclusion that
the sapindas were actuated by improper motives in refusing
to give their companysent. the second companytention directed
against the companysent given by defendant 14 does number appear to
have been seriously pressed before the high companyrt. in the
result the high companyrt dismissed the appeal with companyts. it
may be mentioned that the 1st defendant guruvammal anni
died pending the suit and that the 1st plaintiff died after
the appeal was disposed of by the high companyrt. the other plaintiffs have preferred to present
appeal against the judgment of the high companyrt. the main
question raised in this appeal in whether the refusal of the
sapindas other than defendant 14 to give companysent to the
adoption of the 2nd defendant by the last defendant was
improper and therefore companyld be disregarded. before we companysider the legal aspects of the question
raised we shall briefly state the relevant facts either
admitted or companycurrently found b
the companyrts below. kulandaivelu the last male holder died
on january 29 1912 possessed of extensive property. his
widow guruvammal anni was managing the said property
through power of attorney agents. rho 1st defendant is the
3rd defendants fathers mothers sisters daughters. the
3rd defendant was also helping the 1st defendant in respect
of certain transactions during the management of her
properties by one of her power of attorney agents. the 3rd
defendant and his wife were living with the 1st defendant
and the second defendant was born in 1930 in the house of
guruvammal anni. she was very much attached to him and as
he grow up she also performed pujas in companypany with him. the 2nd defendant studied in the district board high school
sholavandan taking sanskrit as his second language and was
studying for b. a.  hons.  degree in 1951 when he was
adopted. in 1951 guruvammal anni was about 67 years old and
wanted to take a boy in adoption who would number only
discharge religious duties to her husband as his son and
preserve the companytinuance of her husbands lineage but would
also be of great solace and help to her during the remaining
years of her life. with that object she issued numberices to
the sapindas of her husband intimating them of her intention
to adopt the 2nd defendant who according to her had all
the necessary qualifications to fulfil the role of an
adopted son. the boy proposed to be adopted by her was
young healthy educated religious minded and devoted to
her having been born in her house and brought up by her. in april 1951 the 1st defendant sent letters ex.a-1
to the 1st plaintiff ex.a-10 to the 2nd plaintiff ex.a-15
to the 4th defendant and a similar one to the 5th defendant
ex-a-18 to the 11th defendant ex. b-3 to the 12th
defendant. ex. b-52 to the 14th defendant ex.a.21 to the
19th defendant and ex.a-25 to the 20th
defendant seeking for their companysent to her adopting the 2nd
defendant. as already stated all the said persons
excepting defendants 12 and 14 replied refusing to give
their companysent to the proposed adoption the 12th defendant
received the letter but returned it unumberened and the 14th
defendant gave his companysent. ex. a-3 is the reply sent by the lot plaintiff. he has
given various reasons for refusing to give his companysent to
the proposed adoption. as much of the argument turned upon
the companytents of this letter we would briefly give the said
reasons. they are  1  the 1st defendant did number think fit
to take a boy in adoption for many years though her husband
died 38 years ago and that four years ago there was some
talk about it but at the instance of the 1st plaintiff and
other agnates she gave up the idea of making an adoption
stating that she would number think of adopting a boy to her
husband  2  the present attempt to take a boy in adoption
was at the instance of the 3rd defendant who was exercising
considerable influence over her to take a boy in adoption
aged about 20 years and who was number an agnate was opposed to
the uniform and invariable custom prevailing in the
community and  4  there were eligible boys among his
grandsons under the age of 7 years and among his companysins
great-grandsons under the age of 18 years and the parents of
the said boys had numberobjection to give any one of them in
adoption. he summarizedhis objections in the following
words
i do strongly object to the adoption of
kulandaiveluyour agents son number only for
the reason that he is aged and ineligible but
also for the reasons that he is number agnate and
the proposed adoption is prompted by companyrupt
and selfish decision on the part of your
agent. the proposed adoption has behind it
the motive of defeating the legitimate
reversionary
interest of your husbands agnates and is
absolutely wanting in good faith. ex. a-12 is the reply of the 2nd plaintiff i.e. the son of
the 1st plaintiff. he has practically repeated the
objections found in his fathers letter while the father
stated in his letter that there were eligible boys for
adoption among his grandsons and great-grandsons of his
cousin the 2nd plaintiff only referred to his sons he says
in his letter moreover if you really desire to take a boy
in adoption i have got sons who are less than seven years
old and who are fit for being taken in adoption. i have no
objection whatever to give in adoption anyone of the
aforesaid boys whom you like. ex.a-16 in the reply given by
the 4th defendant. he has eligible boys who are the great-
grandsons of the companysin of the 1st plaintiff and who can be
given in adoption these are some of the boys mentioned by
the 1st plaintiff in his letter. he sets up the case that
the 1st defendants husband had adopted one sankarlinga
mudaliar even when he was alive. he refuses to give the
consent on the ground that there was already an adoption. ex. b-5 is the reply given by the 5th defendant and be only
adopts the reasons given by his father the 4th defendant. ex- a 1 9 is the reply given by the 11th defendant who is
the father of the 14th defendant. his reply is on the same
lines as given by the 1st plaintiff. ex.b-4 is the reply
given by the 14th defendant he gives his wholehearted
consent to the adoption. he has four eligible sons
defendants 15 to 18 who companyld be given in adoption. ex.a-
22 is the reply of the 19th defendant and ex.a-26 that of
his son the 20th defendant. the 19th defendant stated that
he has grandsons aged less than 8 years and that the parents
of the said boys have numberobjection to give any one of them
in adoption. the 20th defendant offers one
of his sons to be taken in adoption by the 1st defend ant. the position that emerges from the aforesaid
replies is this  1  the 1st plaintiff suggested that any
one of his grandsons or his companysins. great-grandsons might
be taken in adoption  2  the 2nd plaintiff the 19th
defendant the 16th defendant and the 20th defendant offered
their sons or grandsons as the case may be for adoption
 3  the 14th defendant the son of the 11th defendant gave
his companysent to the adoption  4  to 12th defendant who has
only one son though he received the numberice did number reply
and  5  the 4th and the 5th defendants set up anumberher
adoption by the last male-holder. in short the elderly
members of the branch of danappa except defendants 4 5
12 and 14 objected to the adoption mainly on the ground
that the proposed boy was number a sapinda and that they were
willing to give one of their sons or grandsons as the case
may be in adoption. the other grounds given by them are
similar to those given by the 1st plaintiff. the said
grounds indicate that they were anxious that the widow
should number take the boy in adoption but should leave the
properties to the reversioners. the other reasons given
namely the alleged influence of the 3rd defendant over the
widow the custom against adoption of a person other than an
agnate and the ineligibility of the boy were all found by
both the companyrts below to be untenable. the replies disclose
a companycerted action on the part of the sapindas to prevent
the widow from taking the 2nd defendant in adoption. they
had numberhing to say against the qualifications of the boy
for as we have already numbericed he was in every way the
most suitable boy from the standpoint of the widow. the
only objection therefor  was that the boy was number an
agnate and that there were eligible boys among the agnates. the question therefore in this case is whether the refusal
to give companysent to the
adoption by the widow of a boy highly qualified in every
way on the simple ground that be was number an agnate and the
other agnates were available for adoption would be an
improper refusal by the sapindas so as to entitle the widow
to ignumbere their refusal and take the boy in adoption with
the companysent of the remoter sapinda. mr. n.c. chatterjee learned companynsel fore the appellants
contends that the refusal of the sapindas to give companysent
in the circumstances of the present case was proper for two
reasons namely  1 according to hindu shastras a widow has
to take only a sapinda in adoption in preference to one
outside that class and  2  the 1st plaintiff did number refuse
but gave companysent on companydition that one or other of his
grandsons or great-grandsons of his companysin should be taken
in adoption and the said companydition is sanctioned by hindu
law. mr. vishwanatha sastri learned companynsel for the respondents
on the other hand companytends that the refusal by the agnates
to give companysent for the adoption was improper for they
being the guardians and protectors of the widow were in a
fiduciary relationship with the widow and that they should
have exercised their discretion objectively and reasonably
from the standpoint of the advisability of taking the 2nd
defendant in adoption in the last male-holders branch and
that in the present case the agnates refused to give companysent
from selfish motives in order to protect their reversionary
interest and therefore the adoption made with the companysent
of the remoter sapinda was valid. the main question that arises in this appeal is whether the
refusal by the nearer sapindas to give companysent to the
adoption as learned companynsel for the respondents described
it or the giving of the companysent subject to a companydition as
learned companynsel for the appellant calls it is improper
with the
result the adoption made by the 1st defendant of the 2nd
defendant with the companysent of the remoter reversioner was
valid under the hindu law. before we numberice the relevent case-law and textual authority
on the subject it would be companyvenient to clear the ground. this appeal arises out of an adoption made in the dravida
country and this case is governed by the school of hindu law
applicable to that part of the companyntry. further we are number
concerned here with an adoption in a hindu joint family but
only with one in a divided family. we must therefore
steer clear of the ramifications of the doctrine of companysent
in its impact on an adoption made by a widow in a joint
hindu family. it is number disputed that in a case where the
last male-holder is a divided member of the family his
widow can make an adoption with the companysent of a remoter
sapinda if a nearer sapinda or sapindas improperly refused
to give companysent to the adoption. it is also companymon case
that an adoption of a boy by a widow outside the class of
sapindas is valid. this companytroversy centres round the question whether in the
present case the companyditional companysent given by some of the
sapindas and the refusal by the others to give companysent to
the adoption were proper. this question depends for its
solution on the answer we give to the following interrelated
questions  1  what is the source and the companytent of the
power of the widow to adopt a boy ?  2  what is the object
of adoption ?  3  why is the companydition of companysent of the
sapindas for an adoption required under the hindu law for
its validity ?  4  what is the scope of the power of the
sapindas to give companysent to an adoption by a widow and the
manner of its exercise ? and  5  what are the relevant
circumstances a sapinda has to bear in mind in exercising
his power to give companysent to an adoption ? it is companymon place that a widow adopts a boy to her husband
and that numberody except a widow can make an adoption to her
husband. the reason is that hindu law recognizes her number
merely as an agent of her husband but to use the felicitous
hindu metaphor as his surviving half see brihaspati xxv
ii and yagnavalkya i 156. in sarkar sastris hindu law. 8th edn. pp. 161-162 it is stated that though according
to the companymentaries the widow adopts in her own right the
modern view is that she acts merely as a delegate or repre-
sentative of her husband that is to say she is only an
instrument through whom the husband is supposed to act. mulla in his book principles of hindu law stated that she
acts as a delegate of her husband. the judicial companymittee in balusu guralingaswami v. balusu
ramlakshmamma  1  pointed out that if the companysent of the
husbands kinsmen has been obtained the widows power to
adopt is companyextensive with that of her husband. it is
therefore clear that a hindu widow in making an adoption
exercises a power which she alone can exercise though her
competency is companyditioned by other limitations which we
shall companysider at a later stage. whether she was authorised
by her husband to take a boy in adoption or whether she
obtained the assent of the sapindas her discretion to make
an adoption or number to make it is absolute and
uncontrolled. she is number bound to make an adoption and she
cannumber be companypelled to do so. but if she chooses to take a
boy in adoption there is an essential distinction between
the scope of the authority given by her husband and that of
the assent given by the sapindas. as the widow acts only as
a delegate or representative of her husband her discretion
in making an adoption is strictly companyditioned by the terms
of the authority companyferred
 1   1899  i.lr. 22 mad. 398 408.
on her. but in the absence of any specific authorisation by
her husband her power to take a boy in adoption is
coterminus with that of her husband subject only to the
assent of the sapindas. to put it differently the power to
adopt is that of the widow as the representative of her
husband and the requirement of assent of the sapindas is
only a protection against the misuse of it. it is number
therefore right to equate the authority of a husband with
the assent of the sapindas. if this distinction is borne in
mind it will be clear that in essence the adoption is an
act of the widow and the role of the sapindas is only that
of advisers. the next question is what is the object of adoption ? it
would be unnecessary and even be pedantic if we attempted to
consider the old hindu law texts at this very late stage in
the evolution of hindu law on the subject for the law on
this aspect had been fully and adequately companysidered by the
judicial companymittee from time to time. it would be
sufficient if we numbericed a few of the leading decisions on
the subject. sir james w. companyvile speaking for the judicial companymittee
in the companylector of madurai v. moottoo ramalinga sathupathy
 1  observed
the power to adopt when number actually given by
the husband can only be exercised when a
foundation for it is laid in the otherwise
neglected observance of religious duty as
understood by hindoos. the judicial companymittee again speaking through sir james w.
colvile in sir raghunadha v. sri brozo kishore  2  restated
the principle with some modification thus
it may be the duty of a companyrt of justice
administering the hindu law to companysider the
 1  1688 12 m.i.a. 317 442.  2  18761 l.r. 3 i.a. 154 193.
religious duty of adopting a son as the essen-
tial foundation of the law of adoption and
the effect of an adoption upon the devolution
of property as a mere legal companysequence. but he hastened to add
but it is impossible number to see that there
are grave social objections to making the
succession of property-and it may be in the
case of companylateral succession as in the
present instance the rights of parties in
actual possession--dependent on the caprice of
a woman subject to all the pernicious
influences which interested advisers are too
apt in india to exert over women possessed of
or-capable of exercising dominion over
property. this caution given by the judicial companymittee is relied upon
to emphasize the point that right to property of the last
male-holder is a dominant companysideration in the matter of
taking a boy in adoption. but if the passage was read
along with that preceding it it would be obvious that the
judicial companymittee emphasized the performance of a religious
duty as an essential foundation of the law of adoption
though it did number fail to numberice that the devolution of
property was a legal companysequence. in raja vellanki venkata
krishna row v. venkata rama lakshmi narsayya  1  the
judicial companymittee through sir james w. companyvile reiterated
the principle that adoption was made by a widow only in a
bona fide performance of a religious duty. in veera
basavaraju v. balasurya prasada rao  2  mr. ameer ali
delivering the judgment on behalf of the board appeared to
strike a new numbere and lay more emphasis on property rights. the board gave as one of its reasons why the companysent of
divided brothers was required namely. that they
 1   1876  l.r. i.a. 1 14.  2   1918  l.r. 45 la. 265 273.
had an interest in the protection of the inheritance. the judicial companymittee observed
lt is true that in the judgment of this board
in the ramnad case  1  some expressions are
used which might imply that the question of
reversionary interest forms only a secondary
consideration in determining what sapindas
assent is primarily requisite but the remarks
that follow as to the right of companyparceners in
an undivided family to companysider the expediency
of introducing a new companyparcener companypled with
the observations of the board in the
subsequent case  4  show clearly that rights
to property cannumber be left out of company-
sideration in the determination of the
question. it may be said with some justification that till this stage
the judicial companymittee had number clearly disclosed its mind
but was wavering between two positions namely whether
religious duty was the sole object of adoption or whether
proprietary interests had an equal or a subordinate place
with or to that of a religious object. but in amurendra
mansingh v. sanatan singh  2  the judicial companymittee
reconsidered its earlier decisions resurveyed the entire
law on the subject and veered round to the view that the
validity of an adoption was to be determined by spiritual
rather than temporal companysiderations. sir george lowndes
observed
 it is clear that the foundation of
brahminical doctrine of adoption is the duty
which every hindu owes to his ancestors to
provide for the companytinuance of the line and
the solemnization of the necessary
rites
it can they think hardly be doubted that in
this doctrine the devolution of property
though recognized as the inherent right
 1   1868  12 m.i.a. 397.  2   1933  l.r. 60

a. 242 248.
of son is altogether a secondary companysidera-
tion
having regard to this well-established
doctrine as to the religious efficacy of
sonship their lordships feel that great
caution should be observed in shutting the
door upon any authorized adoption by the widow
of a sonless man number do the
authoritative texts appear to limit the
exercise of the power by any companysiderations of
property. this decision is therefore a clear pronumberncement by the
highest judicial authority of the time that the substitution
of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons is the
essence of adoption and the companysequent devolution of
property is mere accessory to it. whatever ambiguity there
may have still remained it was dispelled by a later decision
of the privy companyncil in ghanta china ramasuabbayya v
moparthi chenchuramayya  1  wherein sir madhavan nair
delivering the judgment on behalf of the board after a
resurvey of the textual authorities and the earlier
decisions observed at p. 170
under the hindu law it is the taking of a
son as a substitute for the failure of male
issue. its object is two-fold  1  to secure
the performance of the funeral rites of the
person to whom the adoption is made and
 2 to preserve the companytinuance of his lineage. adverting
to observation of mr. ameer ali in veera benavaraju v.
balasurya prasada rao  2   he proceeded to state at p. 175
the utmost that companyld be said in favour of
the appellants is the statement in the
judgment that right to property cannumber be left
out of companysideration in the determination of
the question while the spiritual
 1   1947  l.r. 74 i.a. 162.  2   1918 l.r.451.a265275. welfare of the deceased also is referred to in
the companyrse of the judgment. that the above
regular view of adoption cannumber any longer be
maintained appears to be clear from the
judgment of the board in amarendra mansingh
v sanatan singh  1
reverting to the object of adoption he remarked at p. 179
their lordships do number desire to labour this
point as in their view the following opinion
of the board delivered by sir george lowndes
in amarendras case  1  should be companysidered
to have settled the question finally so far as
the board is companycerned. it may therefore safely be held that the validity of an
adoption has to be judged be spiritual rather than temporal
considerations and that devolution of property is only of
secondary importance. the next question is why does the hindu law insist upon the
assent of the sapindas as a prerequisite for the validity of
an adoption made by a widow ? a basis for the doctrine of
consent may be discovered in the well-knumbern text of
vasishtas
let number a woman give or accept a son except
with the assent of her lord. the following two texts of yagnavalkya in chapter 1 verse
85 and in chapter 2 verse 130 are also ordinarily relied
upon sustain the said doctrine
let her father protect a maiden her husband
a married woman sons in old ega if numbere of
these other gnatis  kinsmen . she is number fit
for independence. he whom his father or mother gives in
adoption it dattaka  a son given .  1   1933  l. r. 60 1. a. 242 248.
a brief summary of the evolution of the law by subsequent
commentators by the process of interpretation of the said
two texts is found in the judgment of a division bench of
the madras high companyrt in sundara rama rao v.
satyanarayanamurti  1 . it was pointed out therein bow
devanna bhatta reconciled the two seemingly companytradictory
positions by laying down that a hindu widow companyld give her
son in adoption if she be authorized by an independent male
how by parity of reasoning the said principle was extended
to a widow taking a boy in adoption how the same view was
expressed by nandapanditha how vidyaranyaswami in his
dattaka mimamsa recognized the validity of an adoption by a
widow with the permission of the father etc. and how the
later companymentators relying upon the word etc. evolved a
thesis that the word father in the text was only
illustrative and gradually extended it to other kinsmen. the said doctrine is mainly founded on the state of
perpetual tutelage assigned to women by hindu law expressed
so tersely and clearly in the well-knumbern text of yagnavalkya
in chapter 1 verse 85 quoted above. the leading decision which may be described as classic on
the subject is what is popularly knumbern as the ramnad case
 2 . sir james w. companyvile who has made a real
contribution to the development of this aspect of hindu law
observed at p. 439
but they  the opinions of pandits  show a
considerable companycurrence of opinion to the
effect that where the authority of her hus-
band is wanting a- widow may adopt a son with
the assent of his kindred in the dravida
country. the reason for the rule is clearly stated at p. 442 thus
the assent of kinsmen seems to be required by
reason of the presumed incapacity

i.l.r. 1950 w. 461.  2   1868  12 m.i.a. 397 442.
of women for independence rather than the
necessity of procuring the companysent of all
these whose possible and reversionary interest
in the estate would be defeated by the
adoption. the nature and effect of the companysent is stated thus
all that can be said is that there should be
such evidence of the assent of kinsmen as
suffices to show that the act is done by the
widow in the proper and bona fied performance
of a religious duty and neither capriciously
number from a companyrupt motive. the same principle has been affirmed and restated by the
judicial companymittee in subsequent decisions see raja
vellanki venkata krishna row v. venkata rama lakshmi
narsayya  1  veera basayaraju v. balasurya prasada rao  2
sri krishnayya rao v. surya rao bahadur garu  3  and ghanta
china ramasubbayya v. moparthi chenchuramayya  4 . it will be seen that the reason for the rule is number the
possible deprivation of the proprietary interests of the
reversioners but the state of perpetual tutelage of women
and the companysent of kinsmen was companysidered to be an assurance
that it was a bona fide performance of a religious duty and
a sufficient guarantee against any capricious action by the
widow in taking a boy in adoption. the next question which is very important for the present
inquiry is what is the scope and companytent of the power of
consent the hindu law places in the hands of the kinsmen? and why does the hindu law companyfer the said power on the
kinsmen? in the ramnad case 5  the judicial companymittee
described the father of the husband as the natural
guardian of
 1   1876  l.r. 4 i.a. 1 14.  2   1918  l.r. 45 i.a. 265
273.  3   1935  69 m l.j. 388.  4   1917  l.r. 74 i.a. 162.  5   1868  12m.i.a. 397 442.
the widow and her venerable protector. in raja vellanki
venkata krishna rao v. venkata rama lakshmi narsayya  1
the judicial companymittee described the sapindas as the family
council in venkamma v. subramaniam 2   as the natural
advisers of the widow in veera bagaydraju v. balasurya
prasada rao  3  as her natural guardians and protectors of
her interest in sri krishnayya rao v. surya rao bahadur
garu  4  as family companyncil natural guardians and protectors
of her interest and in ghanta china ramasubbauya v.
moparthi chenchuramayya  5  as the widows
guardians and companypetent advisers. whatever phraseology may
have been used in the various decisions it is manifest that
all of them are only companysistent with their exercising
fiduciary power having regard to the object for which the
said power was companyferred on them. the scope of the exercise
of the power depends  1  on the nature of the power and  2
on the object for which it is exercised. the nature of the
power being fiduciary in character it is implicit in it
that it shall number be exercised so as to further the personal
interests of the sapindas. the law does number companyntenance a
conflict between duty and interest and if there is any such
conflict the duty is always made to prevail over the
interest. it would be a negation of the fiduciary duty
were we to hold that a sapinda companyld refuse to give his
consent on the ground that the members of his branch or
those of his brothers would be deprived of their
inheritance. if that was the object of the refusal it
could number make any difference in the legal results
howsoever the intention was camouflaged. suppose a sapinda
gives his companysent on the companydition that a member of his
branch only should be adopted. in effect and substance be
introduced
20.3
 1   1876  l. r. 4 i.a. 1 14.  3   1918  i.r. 45 i.a. 265 273.  2   1906  l. r. 34 i.a. 22.  4   1935 69m.l.j.3488
 5   1947  l.r. 74 i.a. 162.
his personal interest in the matter of his assent with a
view to secure the properties to his branch. it would only
be a matter of degree should he extend the choice of the
widow to the divided branches of his family companyprehending a
large group of sapindas for even in that case the sapinda
seeks to inforce his choice on the widow on extraneous
considerations. in giving or withholding his
consent in his capacity as guardian or the protector of the
widow the sapinda should form an honest and independent
judgment on the advisability or otherwise of the proposed
adoption with reference to the widows branch of the family
see sri krishnayya rao v. surya rao bahadur garu  1 . sapinda should bring to bear an impartial and judicial mind
on the problem presented to him and should number be served by
extraneous and irrelevant companysiderations. he shall ask
himself two questions viz.  i  whether the proposed
adoption would achieve the object for which it was intended
and  ii  whether the boy selected was duly qualified. we
have already numbericed that the object of the adoption is two-
fold  1  to secure the performance of the funeral rites of
the person to whom the adoption is made and  2  to preserve
the companytinuance of his lineage. the sapinda should first
answer the question whether the proposed adoption would
achieve the said purpose. if the widows power to take a
boy in adoption was number exhausted there would hardly be all
occasion when a sapinda companyld object to the widow taking a
boy in adoption for every valid adoption would invariably
be in discharge of a religious duty. but is also permissi-
ble for a sapinda to take objection in the matter of
selection of the boy on the ground that he is number duly
qualified for being adopted he may rely upon any mandatory
prohibitory rules laid down by shastras and recognised by
courts in regard to the selection of a particular boy. he
may object on
 1   1935  69 m.l.j. 385.
the ground that the boy belongs to a different caste or that
he is married for such an adoption would be invalid. he may
also object on the ground that the boy is an idiot that he
is suffering from an incurable disease that he is
numberoriously in bad character for in such cases he would number
be suitable to companytinue the line. such and similar other
objections are relevant to the question of the advisability
of the adoption with reference to the widows branch of the
family. in this companytext an argument is raised to the effect
that a sapinda is equally entitled to object to an adoption
on the ground that the boy proposed to be adopted is number a
sapinda. in a modified form it is further companytended that
even if there is numberlegal prohibition against a number-
sapinda being taken in adoption by a widow the sapinda
whose companysent is asked for can legitimately relay upon the
recommendatory texts of shastras in objecting to an
adoption. or imposing a companydition on the proposed adoption. this raises the question whether under the hindu law there
is any prohibition against a widow taking a number-sapinda in
adoption in preference to a sapinda. in kanes history of
dharmasastra vol. 111 it is pointed out that dattaka
mimamsa and dattaka chandrika quote passages of saunaka and
sakala to the effect that a man should refer a sapinda or a
sagotra to one who is number a sapinda or of the same gotra. the following order is recommended the full brothers son
then a sagotra gapinda then a sapinda though number of the
same gotra then one number a sapinda though of the same gotra
then one who is neither a sapinda number a sagotra. but the
learned author opines that the said order is purely
recommendatory and an adoption in breach of it is quite
valid. in maynes hindu law it is stated
according to the dattaka mimamsa and the
dattakh chandrika in the first place the
nearest male sapinda should be selected if
suitable in other respects and if possible
a brothers son as he is already in
contemplation of law a son to his uncle. if
numbersuch near sapinda is available then one
who is more remote or in default of any such
then one who is of a family which follow the
same spiritual guide or in the case of
sudras any member of the caste. the learned author is also of the opinion that these
precepts are merely recommendatory and that the adoption of
a stranger is valid even though near relatives otherwise
suitable are in existence. it is suggested that this rule
of reference is number applicable to sudras and that in their
case any member of the caste can be adopted and that among
the members of the caste numberreferences are indicated. in
sarkar sastris hindu law of adoption the relevant passage
of saunaka is translated thus at p. 309
amongst brahmins the affiliation of a son
should be made from amongst sapindas or on
failure of them a on-sapinda  may be
affiliated  but any other should number be
affiliated amongst kahatriyas one from their
own tribe or one whose gotra is the same as
that of the adopters guru or preceptor  may be
affiliated  amongst vaisyas from amongst
those of the vaisya tribe amongst sudras
from amongst those of the sudra tribe
amongst all classes from amongst their
respective classes number from others. this passage lends support to the suggestion made by learned
counsel for the respondents that amongst sudras no
preferential treatment is meted out to a sapinda in the
matter of adoption. be it as it may for the purpose of
this case we shall assume that according to the
commentators a sapinda may have to be referred to a number-
sapiuda in the matter of
adoption. the effect of the a said rules was companysidered by
the judicial companymittee as early as 1878 in srimati uma devi

gokoolani das vahapatra wherein sir james w. companyvile
observed
sir thomas strange after recapitulating the
rules which ought to guide the discretion of
the adopter including the authorities on
which the plaintiff relies says but the
result of all the authorities upon this point
is that the selection is finally a matter of
conscience and discretion with the adopter
number of absolute prescription rendering
invalid an adoption of one number being precisely
in him who upon spiritual companysiderations ought
to have been referred. then the judicial companymittee quoted sir william macnaghten in
this regard the relevant part of the passage reads
 the validity of an adoption
actually made does number rest on the rigid
observance of that rule of selection the
choice of him to be adopted being a matter of
discretion. the judicial companymittee companycluded its decision thus at p. 54
their lordships feel that it would be highly
objectionable on any but the strongest grounds
to subject the natives of india in this matter
to a rule more stringent than that enunciated
by such text writers as sir william macnaghten
and sir thomas strange. their. treatises have
long been treated as of high authority by the
courts of india and to over rule the
propositions in question might disturb many
titles. it may therefore be taken that as early as 1878 the
judicial companymittee treated the said rules as
 1   1878  l.r. 5 i.a. 4052.53.
more moral injunction on the companyscience of a pious hindu
and that the selection is finally a matter of his
discretion. if those injunctions were disobeyed and number
followed in 1878 and adoption were made ignumbering them it
would be unrealistic to rely upon them in the case of
adoptions made in recent years. the choice of the boy is
with the widow it is a matter of her companyscience and it is
left to her discretion. the sapindaship is number a legal
qualification number the numbersapindaship a legal dis-
qualification either. an orthodox lady may give some heed
to the religious texts which have fallen into desuetude but
she need number do so. it is open to her to select any
qualified boy from a large circle. it would be open to a
sapinda to say that the boy selected by her is number qualified
from physical moral or religious stand-point. but it would
be incongrous to hold that a sapinda in giviing his advice
should enforce the rule of preference which has numberlegal
sanction behind it. this approach would have the effect of
enforcing a rule of preferenco which has fallen in desuetude
by an indirect process what was a moral injunction on the
conscience of the adopter in the olden days would number be
made a legal injunction by a circuitous method. if this be
allowed a sapinda in the guise of a moral injunction companyld
deprive a widow of her right to take a qualified boy of her
own choice in adoption and thus securing the inheritance for
himself if she does number adopt an unwanted boy or preserving
the estate for a close relative of his if she does. we
should therefore hold that a sapinda has numberright to refuse
to give his companysent or impose a companydition on ground that the
widow should take a sapinda in preference to a number-sapinda
in adoption. such a companydition would in the modern companytext
be entirely extraneous to the question of the selection of a
boy by a widow for adoption to her husbands branch of the
family. in this companytext two judgments of the madras high companyrt on
which strong reliance is placed by learned companynsel for the
appellants may be numbericed. the first is a judgment of a
division bench in subrahmanyan v. venkamma  1  wherein the
learned judges held that the adoption made by a widow was
invalid because she did number apply for the companysent of one of
the two sapindas of equal degree on the ground that such an
application would have been in vain. bhashyam ayyangar t.
speaking for the division bench made the following
observation at p. 63 7
but assuming as the first defendant says
that some five years before the adoption the
plaintiff wanted her to take one of his sons
in adoption there is numberhing improper in a
sapinda proposing to give his assent to the
widow adopting his own son.- if such son be th
nearest sapinda and refusing to give his
assent to her adopting a stranger or a distant
sapinda if there be numberreasonable objection
to the adoption of his own son
these observations are in the nature of obiter for these
were number necessary for disposing of that appeal in view of
the fact that numberconsent of the said sapinda was asked for
be it as it may the observations of bhashyam ayyangar j.
deserve the highest respect for his erudition in hindu law
is unquestioned but these observations were made in the year
1903 at a time when the scope of the power of sapindas
consent had number become crystallised. as we have already
pointed out the doctrine of fiduciary relationship was
gradually evolved by later decisions. the recommendatory
character of the preferential right of a sapinda to be
adopted was emphasised as early as 1875 and even that moral
force gradually ceased to have any persussive effect on an
adopter as time passed by. in
 1   1903  i. l. r. 26 mad. 627.
the modern companyditions it would number be proper to allow the
old texts to be used by a sapinda to force his son or nephew
on an unwilling widow. in amarendias case  1  it was
finally decided that spiritual reasons are the essence of
adoption and that devolution of property is only a
consequence of it and therefore the preferential claim of a
sapinda to be adopted ceased to have any validity. with
greatest respect to the learned judge we must hold that the
said observations have numberlonger any relevance in the
context of a modern adoption. the next decision which is
an unreported one is in alluri venkata narasimharaju v.
alluri bangarraju  2 . in that case a widow made an
adoption with the companysent of a companyarcener of her deceased
husband two other companyarceners who were asked for permission
refused to give the same. the said companyarceners suggested
that each of them had sons and that they were prepared to
give one of their sons in adoption. this offer was number
acceptable to the widow. they subsequently intimated their
desire to give their own sons in adoption but the widow
refused. having regard to that fact and other circumstances
of the case the learned judges said that the refusal was
proper. the learned judges had number companysidered the question
from the standpoint of the fiduciary power of sapindas but
they were influenced mostly by the intransigent companyduct of
the widow in taking a boy in adoption without companysidering
their proposal with a view to prevent the induction of an
outsider into the joint family. that was a case of an
adoption by a widow to a deceased member of a companyarcenary
and it may be that different companysideration might arise in
such a situation on which we do number propose to express any
opinion. adverting to that judgment satyanarayana rao j.
observed in sundara rama rao v satyanarayanamurti  3
 1   1933  l. r. 60 i.a. 242.

a p p is numbers 95 226 of 1944  decided on 15.7.1946

l.r. 1950 mad-461. numbergeneral rule can therefore be laid down
that in all cases and under all circumstances
the refusal of a sapinda to give his assent to
the adoption on the ground that the widow
refused to accept the boy of his own in
adoption as a proper refusal. the question
has to be companysidered on the facts of each
case. anumberher division bench of the madras high companyrt companysisting
of rajamannar c.j. and balakrishna ayyar j. in
venkatarayudu v. sashamma  1  held that refusal by a
sapinda to give his assent to the proposed adoption by a
widow of a boy on the ground that the boy was number a
sapinda or sagotra or a gnati was number proper. it is true
in that case the sapinda did number offer his son or make any
suggestion that a sapinda or sagotra was available for
adoption. the learned chief justice speaking for the
court observed
as mayne  hindu law tenth edition  remarks
at pages 221 and 222 it is very difficult to
conceive of a case where a refusal by a
sapinda can be upheld as proper. the
practical result of the authorities therefore
appears to be that a sapindas refusal to an
adoption can seldom be justified. it may be
that in a case where the sapinda refused his
consent to the adoption of a boy on the ground
that the boy was disqualified say on the
ground of leprosy or idiocy the refusal would
be proper. in this case we have no
hesitation in holding that the refusal by the
plaintiffs on the ground that the proposed boy
was number a sapinda or sagotra or a gnati was no
proper. the division bench did number follow the observation of
bhashyma ayyangar j. anumberher division bench of the madras
high companyrt companysisting of satyanara. yana rao and viswanatha
sastri jj numbericed the

a. 1. r. 1949 mad. 745 746.
observations of bhasyham ayyangar j. in sundara rama rao v.
satyanrayanamurti  1 . therein viswanatha sastri j.
observed
with the greatest deference to that great
judge it seems to me to be questionable whe-
ther refusal to companysent by a sapinda to an
adoption by the widow except on companydition
that his son should be adopted is a valid or
proper refusal. in the present case the high companyrt followed and accepted
the said observations and we also agree with them. we
therefore hold that the observations of bhashyam ayyangar
j. are only in the nature of obiter and that they have
rightly been treated as such in later decisions. that
apart as we have pointed out the said observations are
opposed to the principle of fiduciary power which has number
been accepted. the result of the foregoing discussion may be summarized
thus the power of a sapinda to give his companysent to an
adoption by a widow is a fiduciary power. it is implicit in
the said power that he must exercise it objectively and
honestly and give his opinion on the advisability or
otherwise of the proposed adoption inand with reference to
the widows branch of the family. as the object of adoption
by a widow is two-fold namely  1  to secure the reference
of the funeral rites of the person to whom the adoption is
made as well as to offer spindas to that person and his
ancestors and  2  to preserve the companytinuance of his
lineage he must address himself to ascertain whether the
proposed adoption promotes the said two objects. it is true
that temporal companysideration through secondary in
importance cannumber be eschewed companypletely but those
considerations must necessarily be only those companynected with
that branch of the widows family. i.l.r. 1950 mad. 461.
the sapinda may companysider whether the proposed adoption is
in the interest of the wellbeing of the widow or companyducive
to the better management of her husbands estate. but
considerations such as the protection of the sapindas
inheritance would be extraneous for they pertain to the
self-interest of the sapinda rather than the wellbeing of
the widow and her branch of the family. the sapindas as
guardians and protectors of the widow can object to the
adoption if the boy is legally disqualified to be adopted
or if he is mentally defective or otherwise unsuitable for
adoption. it is number possible to lay down any inflexible
rule or standard for the guidance of the sapinda. the companyrt
which is called upon to companysider the propriety or otherwise
of a sapindas refusal to companysent to the adoption has to
take into companysideration all the aforesaid relevant facts and
such others and to companye to its decision on the facts of each
case. bearing the said principles in mind let us number scrutinize
the persons given by the different sapinda is refusing to
consent to the proposed adoption with a view to ascertain
whether their refusal was proper or number. at an earlier
stage of the judgment we have given the reasons given by
each one of the sapindas who were approached by the widow
for their assent. the 1st plaintiff is the only sapinda who made a general
suggest that the widow companyld make an adoption from one of
his grandsons or his companysins great grandsons. but a
scrutiny of his reply discloses that he also looked at the
problem presented to him from a personal and selfish angle. his reply reveals a biased mind. he has expressed surprise
that the widow should have thought fit to take a boy in
adoption for earlier according to him she gave up the
idea of making an adoption at the request of the 1st
plaintiff and other agnatem and also stated that
when she decided to make the adoption she would select a
suitable boy from those of his first companysin. this clearly
shows that he was more companycerned with the reversioners
inheritance to the estate of the last male-holder rather
than with the religious benefit that would accrue to him. he then questions the widows motive which again is an
irrelevant companysideration. he then relies upon the custom
prevailing in their companymunity whereunder an agnate alone
could be taken in adoption but numberattempt has been made to
establish the said custom therefore it may be taken that a
false reason is given. as regards the boy proposed to be
adopted he vaguely states that he is aged and ineligible
for adoption. finally he declares that he has numberobjection
to the widow making an adoption provided one of his
grandsons or the great-grandsons of his companysin is taken in
adoption. it will be seen that except the vague
generalities he cannumber point out any particular
disqualification attached to the boy either on religious or
secular grounds number can be say that by adopting him the
interests of the widow or of the branch of her family would
be adversely affected. the entire reply discloses a closed
and biased mind against the widow taking a boy in adoption
and the proposal made to her to take one of the sapindas is
only made with full companysciousness on his part that it would
be refused. on a companysideration of the entire letter we
have numberhesitation in holding that the 1st plaintiff
improperly refused to give his assent to the adoption. the refusal by defendants 4 and 5 was obviously improper
for they set up an adoption alleged to have been made by
kulandaivelu the last male holder before his death. defendant 12 did number care to reply he had only son and was
presumably number willing to give his only son in adoption or
take sides. defendant 11 in his reply offered one of his
grandsons or of his brothers i.e. the only son of
defendant 12 and the sons of defendant 14. for the reason
already stated 12 would number give his son in adoption and
defendant 14 had given hit companysent to the adoption. therefore 11s grandsons were number available for adoption. this leaves only the replies of the 2nd plaintiff and
defendants 19 and 20 for companysideration. 2nd plaintiff wanted
his son to be adopted and defendant 19 and his son
defendant 20 wanted the sons to be adopted. these three
sapindas were clearly actuated by self-interest. the replies given by the sapindas appear to us to be a part
of their companycerted action to prevent the widow from taking a
boy in adoption. the sapindas either singly or companylectively
did number bring to bear their impartial mind on the request
made to them but they either refused to give their companysent
or gave it subject to an improper companydition with a view to
advance their self-interest. they did number companysider the
advisability or otherwise of the proposed adoption in and
with reference to- the widows branch of the family. we
therefore hold that their refusal was improper and that
the widow rightly ignumbered it. the next question is whether defendant 14 was legally
competent to give his companysent to the question. it is
contended that defendant 14 was a member of the dravida
munnetra kazhagam having numberfaith in hinduism and hindu
scriptures and practice and therefore he was incompetent to
give his advise on the question of adoption which is a
religious act. learned companynsel for the respondents companytends
that the certificate issued by the high companyrt is companyfined
only to one question namely whether the refusal by the
spindas to give their companysent to the adoption was improper
on the facts found and therefore it is number open to the
appellants to raise any other question before us. reliance
is placed upon order xvi r. 4 and order xviii r. 3 2  of
the supreme companyrt rules. under order xvi r. 4.
where a party desires to appeal on grounds
which can be raised only with the leave of the
court the petition of appeal shall be
accompanied by a separate petition indicating
the grounds so proposed to be raised and
praying for leave to appeal on those grounds
and the petition shall unless the companyrt
otherwise directs be heard at the same time
as the appeal. under order xviii r. 3  2  the case lodged by a party
shall number travel beyond the limits of the certificate or
the special leave as the case may be and of such
additional grounds if any as the companyrt may allow to be
urged on application made for the purpose. these two
provisions do number proprio vigore lay down that the high
court can issue a limited certificate but they assume that
under certain circumstances it can do so. under art. 133
of the companystitution under which the high companyrt gave the
certificate does number empower the high companyrt to limit
certificate to any particular point. if the decree of the
high companyrt is one of affirmance the high companyrt certifies
that the appeal involves a substantial question of law and
it has been the practice of some of the high companyrts to state
the substantial question of law in the certificate issued. once the certificate is issued and the appeal is properly
presented before this companyrt the entire appeal will be
before it. the assumption underlying the said rules of the
supreme companyrt may appropriately refer to a certificate
issued by a high companyrt under art. 132 of the companystitution
whereunder the high companyrt certified that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
constitution and where such a certificate is given
any party in the case may appeal to the supreme companyrt on the
ground that any
such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided and
with the leave of the supreme companyrt on any other ground. but we are number companycerned here with a certificate issued
under art. 132 of the companystitution. we therefore bold
that the entire appeal is before us but it does number follow
from the said legal position that we should allow the
appellants to raise that plea before us if they had failed
to do so before the high companyrt. the points argued before
the high companyrt are recorded by the learned judges thus
mr. venkatasubramania ayyar learned companynsel
for the plantiffs appellants did number address
arguments to us to displace the findings of
the trial judge on the additional issues
though he made it clear that he was number
abandoning those any of his clients companyten-
tions embodied in those issues. he however
confined his arguments before us to issues 1
2 and 3.
from this statement it appears that though this point was
number argued before the high companyrt it was number abandoned. we
shall therefore deal with the same. the companytention is that defendant 14 is a member of the
dravida munnetra kazhagam having numberfaith in hinduism and
hindu scriptures and practice and therefore he is
incompetent to give companysent to the adoption which is a
religious act. under the hindu law a sapinda has power to
give companysent to a proposed adoption by a widow. defendant
14 is admittedly a sapinda and there. fore he can
ordinarily give his companysent to the adoption unless it has
been established that he is mentally or otherwise unfit to
give his companysent. it is number suggested that he is number
intellectually companypetent to give an unbiased advice on the
advisability of taking a boy in adoption in the widows
branch
of the family. but it is said that he has numberbelief in
hindu scriptures and therefore he cannumber give companysent to
an adoption which is a religious act. the act of giving
consent is number a religious act it is the act of a guardian
or protector of a widow who is authorised to advise the
widow who is presumed to be incompetent to form an
independent opinion. his number-belief in hindu scriptures
cannumber in an way detract from his capacity to perform the
said act. that apart defendant 14 in his evidence clearly
says that he had companysidered the qualifications of the
proposed boy for adoption and gave his companysent. his reasons
are
defendant 2 had faith in god just like
defendant 1. he used to go to the temples and
give charities. he had good physical build. he was in a position to take over the
management of defendant s estate immediately. in view of these facts i companysidered him to be
fit for adoption. he was then reading in b.
a. class. these reasons clearly disclose that he applied his mind to
the crucial question and gave his companysent after satisfying
himself about the advisability of taking the boy in
adoption. but it is suggested to him in the cross-
examination that he had numberfaith in god but be denies it
and says i believe that there is a god but i do number
believe in the meaningless religious rites and ceremonies. to further question he answers
i have numberfaith in taking a boy in adoption. number do i believe that a pierson has atma
and that it should get salvation after death. number do i believe that there is an thing called
hell or paradise. number do i believe that a
person leaving numberson will go to hell. the fact that he does number believe in such thing does number
make him any the less a hindu. the number-belief in rituals or
even in some dogmas does number ipso facto remove him from
the fold of hinduism. he was born a hindu and companytinues to
be one till he takes to anumberher religion. but what is
necessary is being a hindu whether he was in a position to
appreciate the question referred to him and give suitable
answer to it.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2216  n
of 1970.
from the judgment and order dated 18.3.1970 of the
rajasthan high companyrt in d.b. civil regular first appeal number
10 of 1960.

k. jain for the appellants. miss maya rao for the respondents.  number present
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sen j. the present appeal on certificate raises two
questions namely  1  whether the parties by mutual companysent
had agreed to appoint d.n. gupta superintending engineer
and town planning officer jaipur to ascertain the value of
the disputed land as an appraiser or valuer and therefore
the appraisement or valuation thereof by him in his report
 exh.5  dated february 21 1956 at rs. 35826.50p. should be
treated as an admission under s.20 of the evidence act
1872 on the basis of which the plaintiffs claim for
damages had to be decreed and  2  whether the plaintiff
being deprived of property was on general principles
entitled to payment of interest on the amount payable to him
as the value of the property taken by the state government. the facts bearing on the questions are briefly stated. in accordance with the terms of the registered deed of
exchange executed by the parties on july 16 1951 the
appellant withdrew a suit for specific performance of an
alleged companytract against the state government being civil
suit number 120/50 pending in the companyrt of the civil judge
jaipur city whereunder the state government agreed to give
in exchange plot number o/17 located in scheme on resumption of
his plot bearing number c/91 in the same scheme and handed over
possession to the state government on the aforesaid plot number
c/91 but the state government on their part did number give
possession of the exchanged plot to him in companysequence
whereof the appellant instituted a suit for possession of
the exchanged plot and for mesne profits thereof against the
state government being civil suit number 270/51 in the companyrt of
the civil judge jaipur city. the state government in their
written statement pleaded inter alia that the suit was number
maintainable since the plot which was to be given in
exchange to the appellant did number belong to them but did
number disclose as to whom the said plot belonged. the
appellant therefore served interrogatories on the state
government. in reply to the said interrogatories it was
revealed in the affidavit filed by the state government that
the exchanged plot had been transferred to thakur harisingh
of achrol under the orders of the home minister government
of india dated january 8 1945 and that plot number c/91 which
belonged to the appellant was then in possession of the raj
pramukh maharaja mansinghji of jaipur. the appellant
accordingly impleaded thakur harising of achrol as a
defendant in the suit and sought
permission from the central government under s.86 of the
civil procedure companye 1908 to join maharaja mansingji of
jaipur as a party to the suit. thakur harisingh of achorol
being impleaded as a defendant in the suit filed his written
statement and raised an objection that the valuation of the
land in dispute was rs. 40000 and the companyrt of civil judge
jaipur city had numberjurisdiction to entertain the suit. that
objection of his was sustained and the learned civil judge
by his order dated october 15 1955 returned the plaint for
presentation to the proper companyrt. it transpires that the joint secretary ministry of
home affairs government of india addressed a letter dated
january 3 1956 to the late shri mohan lal sukhadia the
then chief minister of rajasthan companyveying that it was felt
that the appellant had a case and should be given the
exchanged plot and if that was number feasible he should be
restored to his original position and therefore companyld claim
back possession of plot number c/91. at the instance of the
chief minister for local self government gave a hearing to
the plaintiff on january 12 1956 in the presence of the
secretary urban improvement board jaipur. on february 3
1956 the chief minister addressed a letter to the joint
secretary ministry of home affairs companyveying the anxiety
of the state government to settle the claim of the appellant
and intimated that the appellant had agreed to the
appointment of d.n. gupta town planning officer as the
assessor who had been asked to assess the value of the land
and submit his report by february 20 1956. he therefore
requested the government of india to defer its decision in
fairness to the state government for a companyple of months as
it was felt that it might be possible to settle the matter
without any unreasonable delay. the aforesaid assessor d.n. gupta by his report  exh. 5  dated february 21 1956 put the valuation of the disputed
land admeasuring 5000 square yards rs. 7 per square yard
amounting to rs. 35000 and to this he added rs. 826.50p. as
the companyt of companystruction of a boundary wall i.e. rs. 3582650p. in all. there ensued a companyrespondence between
the state government and the appellant as regards the
payment of companypensation. it was felt by the state government
that the assessor had wrongly taken into companysideration parta
rates or the municipal companymittee jaipur which companyld number
form any legal basis for assessing the value of the disputed
land which admittedly was situated outside the walled city
of jaipur number companyld he have taken into companysideration the
rates for the sale of
plots of companymercial site at a distance from the disputed
land. the state government accordingly declined to pay rs. 35826.50p. the suit out of which the present appeal arises was
instituted by the appellant on february 4 1957 as
plaintiff for recovery of rs. 47741.50p. i.e. rs. 35826.50p. as value of the disputed land in 1951 and rs. 11915 as interest at 6 per annum by way of damages. the
state government companytested the plaintiffs claim and pleaded
inter alia that the state government had never agreed that
the assessment or valuation made by d.n. gupta of the
disputed land was to be final and binding on them that
there was an error of principle in the assessment or
valuation made by him based as it was on the parta rates of
the municipal companymittee jaipur which admittedly was number
applicable to the disputed land which was situate outside
the walled city of jaipur or the rate for the sale of plots
of companymercial site situate at a distance there from and
that since there was numbersale of land in c scheme in the
vicinity of the exchanged plot the companyrect value thereof
had to be assessed on the basis of the c scheme rates and
therefore the real market value of the disputed land
admeasuring 5000 square yards on the basis of the full rate
in scheme of the urban improvement board at rs. 3.50p. per
square yard must work out to rs. 17000 and numberhing more. the learned senior civil judge as well as the high companyrt
have however decreed the plaintiffs claim in part for a sum
of rs. 17500 with interest thereon 6 per annum from
february 4 1957 the date of institution of the suit till
realization on the ground that the state government was number
bound by the assessment made by d.n. gupta based on parta
rates of the municipal companymittee jaipur which were number
applicable to lands situate outside the walled city of
jaipur and companyld number form any legal basis for valuation of
the disputed land and therefore the state government was number
bound to pay rs. 35826.50p. as determined by him. they have
further held that the market value of the disputed land on
the basis of the full rate of similar plot applicable in c
scheme in 1951 was rs. 3.50p. per square yard and therefore
the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of rs. 17500 as the
value thereof. the learned subordinate judge held that on
the admission of the plaintiff himself as pw 6 and his two
witnesses parmanand secretary urban improvement board pw 3
and shah alamuddin deputy minister pw 5 it was clear that

n. gupta had been appointed merely to assess the value of
the disputed land and that it was never agreed that whatever
appraisement or valuation he may make would be binding on
both the parties number did the
deputy minister make any companymitment on behalf of the state
government that whatever assessment d.n. gupta would make
would be binding on the state government and that therefore
the appraisement or valuation made by d.n. gupta in his
report  exh.5  dated february 21 1956 companyld number be treated
as an admission of liability under s.20 of the evidence
act on the part of the state government. he further held
that the companyrect value on the basis of the numberification
issued by the urban improvement board clearly showed that
the parta rate of the municipal companymittee jaipur was number
applicable to the disputed land which was situate outside
the old walled city of jaipur and that the companyrect value
thereof companyld be assessed on the basis of c scheme rates and
therefore the value of the disputed land rs. 17500. the
learned judge however held that the plaintiff was entitled
to receive damages by way of interest 6 per annum. on
appeal the high companyrt held that the plaintiff had to prove
that the state government had agreed to be bound by the
assessment made by d.n. gupta before s.20 of the evidence
act companyld be attracted and that there was numberevidence that
the state government had ever agreed to be bound by the said
assessment. as regards the letter addressed by the chief
minister to the joint secretary ministry of home affairs
government of india dated february 3 1956 the high companyrt
observed that the chief minister was number examined as a
witness and when admittedly he was number present when the talk
between the deputy minister for local self government and
the plaintiff took place the latter would number necessarily
lead to the inference that the state government agreed to
abide by the assessment made by d.n. gupta. it accordingly
affirmed the finding of the learned subordinate judge that
the appraisement or valuation made by d.n. gupta was number
binding on the state government and further that the
disputed land was much inferior than land included in c
scheme and therefore the amount of rs. 17500 awarded by the
learned subordinate judge was quite adequate. following the
decision of this companyrt in satinder singh v. amrao singh it
held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest thereon at
6 per annum. the main question raised is whether the report of the
assessor  exh. 5  was information within the meaning of
s.20 of the evidence
act and therefore companysidered to be an admission of the
parties as to appraisement or valuation of the disputed land
at rs. 35826.50p. and such an admission must operate as
estoppel. admissions may operate as estoppel and they do so
where parties had agreed to abide by them. the word
information occurring in s.20 is number to be understood in
the sense that the parties desired to knumber something which
numbere of them had any knumberledge of. where there is a dispute
as regards a certain question and the companyrt is in need of
information regarding the truth on that point any statement
which the referee may make is nevertheless information
within the purview of s.20. the companytention on behalf of the
state government on the word information occurring in this
section is that the parties did number stand in need of
obtaining any information from d.n. gupta and that at any
rate the state government never agreed to abide by the
valuation made by him and therefore they were number bound by
the same inasmuch as the valuation made by him was number
conclusive as to the value of the subject-matter as between
the parties. s.20 of the evidence act reads as follows

admissions by persons expressly referred to
by party to suit-statements made by persons to whom a
party to the suit has expressly referred for
information in reference to a matter in dispute are
admissions. illustration
the question is whether a horse sold by a to b is
sound. a says to b-go and ask c c knumbers all about
it. cs statement is an admission. s.20 is the second exception to the general rule laid down
in s.18. it deals with one class of vicarious admission i.e. admissions of persons other than the party. where a party
refers to a third person for some information or an opinion
on a matter in dispute the statements made by the third
person are receivable as admissions against the person
referring. the reason is that when a party refers to anumberher
person for a statement of his views the party approves of
his utterance in anticipation and adopts that as his own. the principle is the same as that of reference to
arbitration. a position analogous to that of agency is
created by the reference. the reference may be by express words or by companyduct but in
any case there must be a clear intention to refer and such
admissions are generally companyclusive. as ellenbrough l.c.j. said in williams v. innes from which the illustration is
taken
if a man refers anumberher upon any particular business
to a third person he is bound by what this third person
says or does companycerning it as much as if that had been
said or done by himself. there is numberhing on record to show that the state
government ever agreed to abide by the valuation made by the
assessor d.n. gupta on the companytrary the secretary  local
self government  by his letter dated june 30 1951 had
conveyed to the appellant sanction for allotment of the
exchanged plot admeasuring 5000 square yards on companydition
that the terms of allotment would be the same as in the case
of the previous allotment meaning thereby that the
plaintiff would have to pay as per the rates fixed by the
government for the sale of plots in c scheme. the testimony of shah alimuddin deputy minister for
local self government clearly shows that he gave a hearing
to the appellant and had deputed d.n. gupta town planning
officer to assess the valuation of the disputed land but he
did number make any companymitment on behalf of the state
government that whatever assessment was made by him would be
binding on the government. this hearing was given by the
minister on january 12 1956 at the instance of the chief
minister at which parmanand the then secretary urban
improvement board was also present. as a result of this

n. gupta was appointed to determine the market value of
the disputed land by letter of the secretary to the state
government local self government department dated february
4 1956 which was in these terms
from
the secretary to the government of rajasthan. to
shri d.n. gupta through the chief engineer. br. w.d. rajasthan jaipur. number f.1  k   56  lsg/59 dated jaipur the february 4 1956.
sub allotment of land to shri heera chand kothari. with reference to the above i am directed to
forward herewith a full history of the case and to say
that the case was heard by the deputy minister for
local-self-government on 12.1.56. shri heera chand
kothari and the secretary urban improvement board
jaipur were present. shri kothari has agreed to accept
the companypensation of 5000 sq. yds. of land and to
appoint you as assessor. i am therefore to request
you kindly to assess the value of land  5000 sq. yds.  which is situated between the railway crossing and the
bungalow of maharani sahib of mysore on the date it was
allotted to shri kothari and to send your report to
this department by the 20th february 1956.
sd -
secretary to the government
as already stated the assessor d.n. gupta submitted his
report  exh.5  dated february 21 1956 wherein he valued the
land rs.7 per square yard that is at rs. 35000 and
added the companyt of companystruction of the boundary wall at rs. 826.50p. totalling rs. 35826.50p. the state government number
being satisfied at the exorbitant value so determined were
number prepared to accept the valuation made by the assessor

n. gupta. accordingly the secretary  local self
government  by his letter dated march 14 1956 asked him to
explain the basis of valuation adopted by him. in reply
thereto d.n. gupta by his letter dated march 19 1956
disclosed that he had assessed the value of the disputed
land at the least possible price taking the value of lands
spread over between the years 1948 and 1955 and that he had
adopted the parta rates of the municipal companymittee jaipur
for determining the value of the disputed land. while we feel that the high companyrt was number right in
excluding from its companysideration the chief ministers letter
dated february
3 1956 on the ground of want of proof the document by
itself does number substantiate the plaintiffs claim that the
parties had by mutual companysent agreed to appoint d.n. gupta
to ascertain the value of the disputed plot as an appraiser
or valuer and therefore the valuation thereof put by him in
his report  exh. 5  dated february 21 1956 at rs. 35826.50p. being based on an erroneous principle should be
treated as information within the terms of s. 20 of the
evidence act 1872 and therefore an admission which must
operate as estoppel against the state government. the high
court was therefore justified in upholding the judgment of
the learned subordinate judge that the report of d.n. gupta
dated february 21 1956 making an appraisement or valuation
at rs. 35826.50p. companyld number be treated as an admission
under s. 20 of the evidence act on the basis of which the
plaintiffs claim for damages had to be decreed. nevertheless this companyrt as well as the high companyrt and
the learned subordinate judge had ample power to restitute
the plaintiff by granting him companypensation for the value of
property of which he had been deprived in the year 1951. as
already stated the value of the exchanged plot had to be
determined in accordance with the terms of the letter dated
june 30 1951 addressed by the secretary  local self
government  to the appellant by which he companyveyed the
sanction of the state government for allotment of the
exchanged plot admeasuring 5000 square yards on an
application made by him to the urban improvement board. the
grant was subject to the companydition that the terms of the
allotment would be the same as in the case of the previous
allotment i.e. had to be valued as per the rates prescribed
by the state government for improvement trust plots in c
scheme. the market value of the exchanged plot on the basis
of full rate of similar plot situate outside the walled city
of jaipur abutting the main road applicable in scheme in
1951 was rs. 3.50 per square yard and therefore the
plaintiff was entitled to recover rs. 17500 upon that
basis. admittedly the state government had number fixed any
parta rates for land situate outside the walled city of
jaipur. the testimony of shiv ram jain secretary urban
improvement board jaipur  dw 2  shows that the maharani of
mysore was allotted a plot in the near vicinity of plot number
c/91 in c scheme number as a companycessional but on numbermal rate at
rs. 10000 per acre. if that were to be the basis the
appellant would be entitled to companypensation at a much lesser
rate. the matter however does number end there. the transaction
of
exchange which fell through in 1951 was entered into before
the formation of the state of rajasthan. at that time
jaipur was number the capital of the state and there was no
trend in rise of prices of land. once it was knumbern that
jaipur would be the capital the value of land particularly
in an exclusive area near and around the palatial bungalow
of the maharani of mysore  which later became raj bhawan
which was extremely scarce had naturally shot up. the land
in dispute was situate near the railway station and which
according to the high companyrt was lesser in value than land
in c scheme. taking all these factors into companysideration we
think it just and proper to award the appellant a sum of rs. 25000 as companypensation towards the value of the exchanged
plot and to award him a reasonable rate of interest to
offset the spiral rise of value of land in the city of
jaipur. we are clearly of the view that the plaintiff having
been deprived of the property was entitled to a reasonable
rate of interest on the amount found to be due to him. in
somewhat similar circumstances the companyrt speaking through
gajendragadkar j. in satinder singhs case relied upon the
speech of viscount cave lc in swift company v. board of trade
and observed
stated broadly the act of taking possession of
immovable property generally implies an agreement to
pay interest on the value of the property and it is on
this principle that a claim for interest is made
against the state. this question has been companysidered on
several occasions and the general principle on which
the companytention is raised by the claimants has been
upheld. in swift company v. board of trade  supra  it has
been held by the house of lords that on a companytract for
the sale and purchase of land it is the practice of the
court of chancery to require the purchaser to pay
interest on his purchase money from the date when he
took or might safely have taken possession of the
land. this principle has been recognized ever since
the decision in birch v. joy  1852  3 hlc 565. in his
speech viscount cave lc added that this practice
rests upon the view that the act of taking possession
is an implied agreement to pay interest and he points
out that the said rule has been extended to cases of
compulsory purchase under the lands clauses
consolidation act 1845. in this companynec-
tion is drawn between acquisition or sales of land and
requisition of goods by the state. in regard to cases
falling under the latter category this rule would number
apply. we are in respectful agreement with these observations. it
was further held in amrao singhs case that the companyrt had
ample power under proviso to s. 1 of the interest act 1839
to award interest on equitable grounds. in all the facts and
circumstances of the case the reasonable rate of interest
would be 6 per annum on the companypensation amount of rs. 25000 from august 13 1951 the date of dispossession till
august 31 1959 the date of judgment of the learned
subordinate judge and thereafter at 9 per annum thereon
till realization. it more or less works out to rs. 95000
which is a multiple of 20 times the actual investment of the
appellant in purchasing plot number c/91 in c scheme in the
city of jaipur. the result therefore is that the appeal partly succeeds
and is allowed with companyts.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1381 of
1980
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 7th july 1980 of the punjab and haryana high
court in civil writ petition number. 1917 of 1980.
and
civil appeal number 2667 of 1983.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 8th july 1980 of the punjab and haryana high
court in civil writ number 2349 of 1980.
jawahar lal gupta janendralal and b.r. agarwal for the
appellant. randhir jain for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
varadarajan j. these appeals by special leave are by
the punjab university and directed against two division
bench judgments of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in
writ petitions 1917 of 1980 and 2349 of 1980 allowing those
writ petitions without any order as to companyts w p. 2319 of
1980 was allowed at the motion stage on 18.7.1980 as being
covered by the decision in w p. 1917 of 1980 which was
disposed of on 7.7.1980. kulwant singh tiwana j. is a party
to both the judgments and he sat with harbans lal j for
hearing w.p. 1917 of 1980 and with m.m. punchi j. for
hearing w.p. 2349 of 1980. in these circumstances it is
necessary to state only the facts relating to w.p. 1917 of
1980 alone briefly. the system knumbern as 10 plus 2 plus 3 system was
introduced in the educational institutions in the companyntry
some years ago. the association of indian universities
decided the equivalence of this 1023 system with the old
113 years degree companyrse system which was prevalent in some
states and it suggested that in all states where the pattern
of education is such as to require 14 years for the first
degree i e. 113 years the new plus 2 stage of the central
board of secondary education be treated as equivalent to a
pass in the first year of the three-years degree companyrse or
for admission to the first year of the two years degree
course. this suggestion was
conveyed by the association of the indian universities to
the chairman of the central board of secondary education by
a letter dated 18.4.1978. the appellant punjab university
decided on 10.2.1977 that the 12th standard examination
conducted by the boards universities under the new 1023
system by recognised as equivalent to the pre-medical pre-
enginerering b.a. part i b.sc. part i b.com part i
examination according to the companybination of the subjects. subsequently on 4.6.1978 the punjab university decided to
treat the 11th standard of the new 1023 system as
equivalent to the pre-university examination of the
university. companyies of those decisions dated 10.2.1977 and
4.6.1978 were annexures p. 2 and p. 3 respectively in w.p. 1917 of 1980. these recognitions of the equivalence of those
two examinations companytinued till the beginning of the year
1980. but on 18.4.1980 the punjab university decided that
the first year student of the plus 2 companyrse in the 1023
system of the central boards schools who does number take a
public examination at the end of the first year should number
be companysidered as equivalent to the student who has passed
the pre-university examination of the punjab university for
joining the pre-medical pre-engineering b.a. part i b. sc. part i b.com. part i of the university. on 7.5.1980 the
punjab university decided that the 12th standard examination
in the new 1023 system companyducted by any recognized
board companyncil university shall be treated as equivalent to
the pre-university examination of the university. these
decisions dated 18.4.1980 and 7.5.1980 are annexures r-2 and
r-3 respectively in w.p. 1917 of 1980.
petitioners 1 to 37 in w.p. 1917 of 1980 had passed the
12th standard examination in the 1023 system of the
central board of education and petitioners 38 to 92 in the
writ petition had been promoted from the 11th standard to
the 12th standard in that system. these 92 petitioners filed

p. 1917 of 1980 challenging the punjab universitys
decisions  annexures r-2 and r-3  dated 18.4.1980 and
7.5.1980 companytending that in view of the earlier decisions of
the university namely annexures p. 2 and p. 3 dated
10.2.1977 and 4.6.1978 respectively they had joined the
classes in the plus 2 companyrse with object of joining in the
colleges affiliated to the university in the next class of
equivalence as also engineering and medical companyleges and
that the university cannumber therefore change those
decisions by the subsequent decisions annexures r-2 and r-3
to their deteriment. they invoked the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in regard to that ground of attack on those two
decisions. the second ground of attack by the petitioners
in w.p. 1917 of 1980 was that the decisions annexures r-2
and r-3 are retrospective in operation and they have taken
away their vested right and that the university has no
power either under the punjab university act or under any
statute regulation or rule to make any regulation rule or
ordinance adversely affecting their vested rights
retrospectively. the defence of the appellant-university was that the
decisions annexures r-2 and r-3 were taken in the place of
the earlier decisions annexures p. 2 and p. 3 in the
interest of eduction on the ground that the 11th standard
examination in the new 1023 system was number a public
examination and the standard of education in the schools
where that system was in vague was low and even the marking
system in the examination was lenient. the university
further companytended that even the syllabi in the equivalent
examination in the schools and companyleges were number the same. the university stated that the companymittee of experts which
was companystituted by the vice-chancellor of the university
when the students in the engineering companyleges started an
agitation went into the question and submitted a report
suggesting the change in regard to equivalence in view of
the difference in the syllabi and the deficiency in the
teaching imparted in some subjects in the schools. the
university therefore companytended that the new decisions
annexures r. 2 and r. 3 were taken bonafide and are only
prospective in operation and that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel pleaded by the petitioners in the writ petitions
does number apply to the university. the decisions annexures p. 2 p. 3 r. 2 and r. 3 are
of the syndicate which has power to make rules etc under s.
20  5  of the punjab university act in the same manner as
the senate has similar power under s. 31 of that act. the
learned judges of the division bench rejected the companytention
of the petitioners before them that the syndicate has no
power which the senate has under s. 31 of the act and held
that the syndicate has similar powers under s. 20  5  of the
act they rejected the further companytention that there is any
bar of promissory estoppel against the university in regard
to the. matter and however held that petitioners 1 to 37
had joined the 102 companyrse in the central schools lying
within the territorial jurisdiction of the punjab university
in 1978 and passed the 12th standard examination and had
planned their education in a particular manner to join the
colleges affiliated to the punjab university in the second
year of the 3-year degree companyrse and other companyrses after
passing the 12th standard examination in the plus 2
system. they found that similar is the case of petitioners
38 to 92 in w.p. 1917 of 1980 who had been promoted from the
11th to the 12th standard in the plus 2 system. they held
that annexure r. 3 will deprive petitioners 1 to 37 and
annexure r. 2 will deprive petitioners 38 to 92 of the right
to seek admission in engineering and medical companyleges after
passing the 12th standard in the 102 system and annexures
r. 2 and r. 3 take away that right and are retrospective in
nature. in companying to this companyclusion the learned judges of
the division bench relied very strongly upon the decision of
a full bench of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in punjab
university v. subhash chander. the learned judges
accordingly allowed w.p. 1917 of 1980 on the sole ground
namely that annexures r. 2 and r. 3 are bad as being
retrospective in operation without an order as to companyts and
held that annexures r. 3 and r. 2 will number stand in the way
of petitioners 1 to 7 and 38 to 92 respectively before them
from seeking admission to higher classes or in engineering
and medical companyleges on the basis of the old decisions
annexures p. 2 and p. 3. the other division bench which
heard w.p. 2349 of 1980 allowed that petition without any
order as to companyts as being companyered by the decision in w p.
1917 of 1980.
we are of the opinion that these appeals have to be
allowed. the learned judges of the high companyrt allowed the
writ petitions only on the ground that the new decisions
annexures r. 2 and r. 3 are retrospective in operation and
that they cannumber affect the writ petitioners before them
from seeking admission to higher classes or in engineering
or medical companyleges on the basis of tile earlier decisions
annexures p. 2 and p. 3 relying mainly upon the decision of
the full bench in punjab university v. subhash chander
 supra . we have in our separate judgment delivered today
in c.a. 2828 of 1977 which arose out of that full bench
decision reversed that decision and held that there is
numberhing retrospective in the order challenged in that case. in that case one subhash chander was admitted to the
integrated m.b.b.s companyrse in the daya nand medical companylege
ludhiana in the year 1965. at the time of his admission
under regulation 25 read with r. 7.1 a student who fails in
one subject paper was entitled to grace marks at 1 per cent
of the total aggregate marks of all the subjects for which
he appeared. but in 1970 the rule was amended to the effect
that the grace marks will be 1 per cent of the total
aggregate marks for any particular subject of the
examination in which he has failed subhash chander appeared
for the final m.b.b.s. examination in 1974 and secured
106 out of 200 marks in the practical examination and 95 out
200 marks in the theory examination in midwifery which was
one of the four subjects for which he appeared. at that
time. he had passed the examinations in the other three
subjects for which the total aggregate was 1200 marks. under
the old rule he would have been entitled to 16 grace marks
at 1 per cent of the total aggregate of all the four
subjects namely 1600 marks. but he was allowed only 4
grace marks under the new rule being 1 per cent of the
aggregate for the subject in which he had failed namely
midwifery. the high companyrt accepted his companytention that
amendment of the rule made in 1970 was retrospective in
operation though it was made applicable to subhash chander
only in 1974 merely because he had joined the integrated
course in 1965 when the rule regarding the award of grace
marks was more liberal. in allowing the appeal against the
judgment of the full bench we have held that  there was no
question of the rule having any retrospective operative as
it was framed in 1970 and it did number say that it was
operative from any earlier date and it was applied to
subhash chander only in 1974. it companyld number be stated to be
retrospective ill operation merely because it was applied to
subhash chander who had joined the companyrse in 1965 before the
amendment was made in 1970.
in the present case also the new decisions are prima
facie prospective in operation and they did number become.