civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 208 of 1952.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 28th day of september 1951 of the authority under the
payment of wages act bombay in application number 500 of 1951.

c. setalvad attorney-general for india  g. n. joshi
porus a. mehta and p. g. gokhale with him  for the
appellant. b. dadachanji m. v. jayakar and rajinder narain for
respondent number 1. 1955. march 2. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
1347
sinha j.-this is an appeal by special leave from the orders
dated the 28th september 1951 passed by the 2nd respondent
the authority appointed under section 15 1  of the payment
of wages act  iv of 1936   which hereinafter will be
referred to as the act  allowing the 1st respondents claim
for house rent allowance as part of his wages. in this case the facts are number in dispute and may shortly be
stated as follows the 1st respondent is a gangman in the
employ of the central railway  which previously used to be
knumbern as the g.i.p. rly.  since april 1945. at that time
his wages were rs. 18 per month plus dearness allowance. with effect from the 1st numberember 1947 the railway board
under the ministry of railways of the government of india
introduced a scheme of grant of companypensatory  city
allowance and house rent allowance at rates specified in
their memorandum number e47 cpc/14. this scheme was modified
by the railway boards letter number e47 cpc/14 dated 1st
december 1947. as a result of this scheme certain railway
employees stationed at specified headquarters were eligible
for the allowance aforesaid at certain specified rates. the
1st respondent thus became entitled to the allowance of rs. 10 per month. this allowance the 1st respondent drew along
with his salary until the 18th august 1948 when he was
offered by the government quarters suitable to his post
but he refused to occupy the same. on his refusal to occupy
the quarters offered by the government the house rent
allowance was stopped with effect from the 19th august 1948.
on the 8th june 1951 the 1st respondent put in his claim
before the authority for rs. 290 on the ground that the
appellant the divisional engineer g.i.p. ry. who was the
authority responsible under section 4 of the act for payment
of wages had stopped payment of house rent allowance to him
from the 19th august 1948. the claim companyered the period the
19th august 1948 to the 18th january 1951 at the rate of rs. 10 per month. the appellant appeared before the authority
and by his written statement companytested the claim on the
ground that the house rent allowance which was
1348
the subject matter of the claim was number wages within the
meaning of section 2 vi  of the act. it was therefore
submitted by the appellant who was the opposite party before
the authority that it had numberjurisdiction to entertain the
claim which should be dismissed in limine. it was further
pleaded that the claim was inadmissible on the ground that
there had been numberillegal deduction from the respondents
wages inasmuch as the respondent had been allotted railway
quarters of a suitable type and as he had refused to occupy
those quarters he was number entitled under the rules to any
house rent allowance. alternatively it was further pleaded
by the appellant that so much of the claim as related to a
period preceding six months immediately before the date of
the application was time-barred under the first proviso to
section 15 2  of the act. the authority companydoned the delay
and that part of the order companydoning the delay is number in
controversy before us. on the issues thus joined between the parties the authority
came to the companyclusion that the house rent allowance was
wages as defined in the act that as a matter of fact
accommodation was offered to the 1st respondent and he
refused it but that even so the appellant was number entitled
to withhold the house rent allowance. accordingly the claim
for rs. 290 was allowed by the authority. the short point to be decided in this case is whether the
house rent allowance claimed by the 1st respondent came
within the purview of the definition of wages companytained in
the act. there being numberdifference on questions of fact
between the parties the answer to the question raised must
depend upon the companystruction to be placed upon the following
material portion of the definition of wages in section
2 vi  of the act-
wages means all remuneration capable of being expressed
in terms of money which would if the terms of the companytract
of employment express or implied were fulfilled be
payable whether companyditionally upon the regular attendance
good work or companyduct or other behaviour of the person
employed or other-
1349
wise to a person employed in respect of his employment or
of work done in such employment and includes any bonus or
other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which
would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by
reason of the termination of his employment but does number
include-
 a the value of any house-accommodation supply of light
water medical attendance or other amenity or of any
service excluded by general or special order of the state
government
shorn of all verbiage wages are remuneration payable by
an employer to his employee for services rendered according
to the terms of the companytract between them. the question
then arises what are the terms of the companytract between the
parties. when the 1st respondents employment under the
railway administration represented by the appellant began
admittedly be was number entitled to any such house rent
allowance. as already indicated the scheme for payment of
house rent allowance was introduced with effect from the 1st
numberember 1947 when the rules were framed admittedly under
sub-section  2  of section 241 of the government of india
act 1935 by the governumber-general. those rules were
amended subsequently. we are here companycerned with the
amendment made by the railway board by its letter number
e47cpc 14 dated the 1st december 1947 particularly rule
3 i  which is in these terms-
the house rent allowance will number be admissible to those
who occupy accommodation provided by government or those to
whom accommodation has been offered by government but who
have refused it. it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the terms
of the companytract between the parties include the rule quoted
above and that therefore the position in law is that there
is numberabsolute right in the 1st respondent to claim the
house rent allowance in other words it is companytended that
there is a companydition precedent to the claim for house rent
allowance being admissible namely that the employee should
be posted at one of those places like bombay calcutta
1350
madras etc. before the claim for house rent allowance
could arise and that there is a companydition subsequent
namely that the employee posted at any one of those places
will cease to be entitled to the - allowance if either the
government provides accommodation to the employee in
question or the employee-refuses to occupy the accommodation
so offered to him. on the other hand it has been argued on
behalf of the 1st respondent that the employees right to
the allowance accrues as soon as he has fulfilled the terms
of the companytract of employment including regular attendance
good work or companyduct and his other behaviour in terms of the
definition of wages as companytained in the act. it was also
argued on behalf of the 1st respondent that the terms of the
definition have to be companystrued companysistently with the
provisions of sections 7 and 11 of the act that rule 3 i
quoted above is inconsistent with some of the terms of the
definition of wages and the provisions of sections 7 and
11 and that in any event if rule 3 i  aforesaid were to be
considered as a part of the terms of the companytract between
the parties section 23 of the act prohibits an employee
from entering into such a companytract as has the effect of
depriving him of his vested rights. it should be numbered at the outset that the learned attorney-
general appearing on behalf of the appellant has number pressed
the argument which appears to have been raised in the
written statement of the appellant and also before the
authority as would appear from the orders passed by him
that clause  a  excluding the value of any house
accommodation clearly showed that house rent allowance was
number included in wages as defined in section 2 vi  of the
act. as will presently appear this argument proceeds on
the unwarranted assumption that house rent allowance is
synumberymous with the value of any house accommodation
referred to in -the definition of wages and in section
7 2  b  and section 11 of the act. the answer to the question whether house rent allowance is
wages may be in the affirmative if the rules framed by the
department relating to the grant of house rent allowance
make it companypulsory for the
1351
employer to grant house rent allowance without anything
more in other words if the house rent allowed had been
granted without any companyditions or with companyditions if any
which were unenforceable in law. but the statutory rules
framed by the government governing the grant of house rent
allowance do number make it unconditional and absolute in
terms. the house rent allowance in the first instance is
number admissible to all the employees of a particular class. it is admissible only to such railway employees as are
posted at specified places in order to companypensate railway
servants in certain companytlier cities for excessive rents paid
by them over and above what they might numbermally be expected
to pay number is such an allowance intended to be a source
of profit or to be an allowance in lieu of free quarters
as specifically stated in the preamble to the letter number
e47cpc/14 dated 1st december 1947 issued by the railway
board. the argument on behalf of the 1st respondent would
have been valid if the rules in terms companytemplated the grant
of house rent allowance to every employee of a particular
category but the rules do number make the grant in such
absolute terms. the house rent allowance is admissible only
so long as an employee is stationed at one of the specified
places and has number been offered government quarters. the
rules distinctly provide that the allowance will number be ad-
raissible to those who occupy government quarters or to
those to whom such quarters have been offered but who have
refused to take advantage of the offer. once an employee of
the description given above has been offered suitable house
accommodation and he has refused it he ceases to be
entitled to the house rent allowance and that allowance thus
ceases to be wages within the meaning of the definition in
the act because it is numbermore payable under the terms of
the companytract. in our opinion it is clear beyond all reasonable doubt that
the rules which must be included in the terms of companytract
between the employer and the employee companytemplate that an
employee posted at one
1352
of the specified places would be entitled to house rent
allowance but that as soon as he is offered government
quarters for his accommodation he ceases to be so
entitled. whether he actually occupies or does number occupy
the quarters offered to him. hence the grant of house rent
allowance does number create an indefeasible right in the
employee at all places wherever he may be posted and in all
circumstances irrespective of whether or number he has been
offered government quarters. but it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that such
a companyclusion would be inconsistent with the provisions of
sections 7 and 1 1 of the act. we do number see any such
inconsistency. section 7 of the act deals with such
deductions as may be made from the wages as defined in the
act of an employee. subsection  2  of section 7
categorically specifies the heads under which deductions may
lawfully be made from wages. clause  d  of this sub-section
has reference to deductions for house accommodation sup-
plied by the employer and section 11 provides that such a
deduction shall number be made unless the house accommodation
has been accepted by the employee and shall number exceed the
amount equivalent to the value of such accommodation. the
definition of wages in the act also excludes from its
operation the value of house accommodation referred to in
sections 7 and ii as aforesaid. the legislature has used
the expression value of any house accommodation in the
definition of wages as denumbering something which can be
deducted from wages. the one excludes the other. it is
thus clear that the definition of wages under the act
cannumber include the value of any house accommodation supplied
by the employer to the employee otherwise it would number be a
legally permissible deduction from wages. it is equally
clear that house rent allowance which may in certain
circumstances as aforesaid be included in wages is number the
same thing as the value of any house accommodation referred
to in the act. that being so there is numbervalidity in the
argument advanced on behalf of the 1st respondent that rule
3 i  aforesaid is
1353
inconsistent with the provisions of sections 7 and 11 of the
act. it remains to companysider the last argument advanced on behalf
of the 1st respondent that section 23 of the act prohibits
an employee from relinquishing such a right as is the
subject matter of rule 3 i  quoted above. this argument
proceeds on the assumption that house rent allowance which
is a right companyferred on the employee is an absolute right.


civil appellate jurisdiction -civil appeals number. 1324 and
2648 of 1972.
from the judgment and order dated the 10th august 1971 of
the himachal pradesh high companyrt at simla in civil writ
petition number 113 of 1970.

c. mahajan and r. n. sachthey for the appellant  in

a. 1324/72 and for respondents 1-3  in c. a. 2648 . k. mehta k. r. nagaraja m. qamuruddin for the
respondents 12-11  in c.a. 1324/72  and for the appellant
 in c. a. 2648 . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by-
ray c. j.-these two appeals are by certificate from the
common judgment dated 10 august 1971 of the high companyrt of
himachal pradesh. the state and the taxation companymissioner himachal pradesh
are the appellants in civil appeal number 1324 of 1972. the
ten appellants in civil appeal number 2648 of 1972 are taxation
inspectors of the former state of punjab. they were
allocated to himachal pradesh because of reorganisation of
the state of punjab. the first seven appellants were
confirmed as taxation inspectors. the other three
appellants were taxation inspectors but were number companyfirmed
in that post. the appellants in the former state of punjab were sub-
inspectors of taxation. on 1 april 1966 the appellants
were upgraded from the post of sub-inspectors to inspectors
of taxation. when the appellants were allocated to himachal
pradesh on the appointed day on 1 numberember 1966 they were
inspectors of taxation. the respondents were excise sub-
inspectors in himachal pradesh on the appointed day. the
respondents were upgraded from the position of excise ins
pectors to inspectors with effect from 1 may 1969. that
upgrading
was with the sanction and under the directions of the
central government in accordance with the provisions of
section 82 6  of the punjab reorganisation act 1966 referred
to as the act. on 29 may 1971 the state of himachal
pradesh by an executive decision changed the date of
upgrading of the respondents from 1 may 1969 to 1 april
1966. this upgrading was done by the state of himachal
pradesh without sanction and direction of the central
government under section 82 6  of the act. the pre-eminent question which falls for companysideration is
whether the companyditions of service of the appellants have
been changed to their disadvantage by the executive decision
of the state of himachal pradesh on 29th may 1971 to
upgrade the posts of sub-.inspectors of excise departent of
himachal pradesh to inspectors with effect from 1 april
1966. the companyollary to this question is whether the
executive decision of the state of himachal pradesh is
invalid by reason of numbercompliance with the provisions
contained in section 82 6  of the act. the appellants impeached the two seniority lists prepared by
the state. in one of the seniority lists appellant jadgish
ram has been mentioned along with excise inspectors of
himachal pradesh. the other appellants who were companyfirmed
taxation inspectors have been shown in the second impeached
seniority list as juniors to several unconfirmed sub-
inspectors of excise and taxation belonging to himachal
pradesh. the appellants companytend that they never worked on
the excise side. they further allege that their cadre was
different from that of taxation inspectors. the appellants
impugned the second seniority list on the ground that the
excise and taxation subinspectors of himachal pradesh were
treated at par with taxation inspectors. of the former state
of punjab. in the second seniority list there is a numbere to
the effect that excise and taxation sub-inspectors of
himachal pradesh were being promoted and companyfirmed with
effect from 1 april 1966 and their cases were sent to the
ministry of home affairs for necessary orders. the
appellants impeached this numbere as illegal. the companytention
of the appellants is that the promotion and companyfirmation of
excise sub-inspectors of himachal pradesh companyld number take
place with retrospective effect so as to prejudice the
rights of the appellants. the grievance of the appellants is that the seniority list
of taxation inspectors should have been prepared separately. the appellants companytend that while they were in the former
state of punjab they belonged to taxation cadre and there
was a quota fixed in the punjab excise and taxation service
class iii-a rules 1936 in their favour for promotion as
excise and taxation officers. the appellants companytend that
they have been deprived of this quota benefit as they were
placed in a joint list along with unconfirmed excises
inspectors of himachal pradesh. the state of himachal pradesh appointed four excise
inspectors as assistant exicse and taxation officers. the
appellants challenged
those four appointments and companytended that the benefit of
promotion should have been given to the appellants. the principal companytention of the appellants is that section
82 6  of the act prohibits any change in the companyditions of
service of the appellants which are disadvantageous to them
without prior sanction of the central government. the state
of himachal pradesh after the reorganisation on 1 numberember
1966 asked for directions of the central government with
regard to upgradation of excise and taxation subinspectors
of himachal pradesh. the central government gave instructions in a letter dated
14 february 1967 for equating posts for the purpose of
integration in the services. the four factors for
determining the equation of a post are first the nature
and duties of a post second the responsibilities and
powers exercised by the officer holding the post and the
extent of territorial or other charge held or
responsibilities discharged third the minimum
qualifications if any prescribed for recruitment to the
post and fourth the salary of the post. the central
government in the said letter dated 14 february 1967
further said that two factors would be taken into account
for determination of relative seniority. first is the
length of companytinuous service whether temporary or permanent
in the equivalent post this should exclude periods for
which an appointment is held in a purely stop-gap or
fortuitous arrangement. second is the age of the person. other factors being equal seniority may be determined on the
basis of age. it is also important to companysider the letter dated 26 april
1969 written by the central government to the state
government. there were 45 posts of excise and taxation sub-
inspectors in himachal pradesh. the central government
stated that those 45 posts of sub inspectors might be
abolished and in their place 33 posts of excise and taxation
inspectors might be created. the new posts of excise and
taxation inspectors were to be offered to the existing
incumbents of the posts of excise and taxation sub-
inspectors in order of seniority. the central government
stated that the order would take effect from 1 may 1969.
the state government by letter dated 19 july 1969 gave
effect to the directions of the central government. the
lieutenant governumber was pleased to accord sanction to the
creation of 33 permanent posts of excise inspectors in the
scale of rs. 150-10-200/10-300 in the excise and taxation
department himachal pradesh with effect from 1 may 1969.
consequent upon the abolition of 12 permanent posts of
taxation sub-inspectors under the excise and taxation
department himachal pradesh with effect from 1 may 1969 8
excise and taxation subinspectors were rendered surplus and
they were appointed as taxation inspectors against 8
temporary posts of inspectors created for survey work. the central government directed and sanctioned that sub-ins-
pectors of himachal pradesh companyld be promoted as
inspectors with effect from 1 may 1969. the state of
himachal pradesh implemented that direction of the central
government. later on the state of himachal pradesh
superseded the previous order and promoted subinspectors of
himachal pradesh as inspectors with effect from 1 april
1966. the appellants companytend that the state of himachal
pradesh thereby number only violated the direction of the
central government under section 82 of the act but also
changed the companyditions of service of the appellants to their
disadvantage without obtaining the sanction of the central
government. one of the companytentions of the appellants in the high companyrt
was that in himachal pradesh the posts of excise inspectors
and taxation inspectors belonged to different cadres. the
appellants companytended that in himachal pradesh posts were
sanctioned separately for the taxation and the excise
departments. the state on the other hand companytended that
there was one companymon cadre of excise and taxtation
inspectors. the high companyrt found that the appellants
belonged to the separate cadre of taxation inspectors at the
time when they were allocated to himachal pradesh. in
punjab it is also found by the high companyrt as a fact that
there were two cadres and the appellants did number belong to
the cadre of excise inspectors. the appellants relied on rule 6 of class iii-a punjab rules
1956. under that rule when any vacancy occurs the
government shall determine in what manner it shall be filled
provided that 50 per cent of the vacancies shall be filled
by direct appointment 25 by promotion of taxation
inspectors 12-1/2 by transfer of members of the
ministerial establishment of the excise and taxation
department. the appellants therefore companytend that 25
promotion quota of the post of assistant excise and taxation
officers should go to taxation inspectors and in this manner
the excise inspectors companyld number be promoted. further the appellants companytend that the date of substantive
appointment should be taken into companysideration for
determination of seniority. the himachal pradesh excise and
taxation department inspectorate class iii service
recruitment promotion and certain companyditions of service
rules 1963 are relied on by the appellants. rule 12 2
states that subject to the provisions of sub-rule  3
permanent officers of each grade shall be ranked senior to
persons who are officiating in that grade. rule 9 of the
punjab rules 1943 on which the appellants relied stated
that the seniority of members of the services in so far as
each class of post specified in appendix a thereto is
concerned be determined by the date of their substantive
appointment to a post in that class provided that if two or
more members are companyfirmed in that same class of-post on the
same date their seniority shall be determined by the excise
and taxation companymissioner whose decision shall be final. 15--l84sup.ci/75
the companytention of the appellants is that under their
conditions of service when they were allocated to himachal
pradesh on the appointed date 1 numberember 1966 they were
confirmed taxation inspectors with effect from 1 april 1966
in the former state of punjab. in accordance with the
directions of the central government companytained in the letter
dated 14 february 1967 the appellants companytend that the
date of substantive appointment viz. 1 april 1966 is
therefore to be companysidered for seniority as well as
promotion. for promotion the appellants companytended that
class 111-a punjab rules provided three years companytinuous
service as inspector to be sufficient. companyfirmed inspectors
would be senior to unconfirmed inspectors. in this
background the appellants companytend that the seniority list
wrongly shows that appellant number 1 was placed along with the
excise inspectors and in the other seniority list all
inspectors of punjab were equated with sub-inspectors of
himachal pradesh. further it is companytended that sub-
inspectors of himachal pradesh who were unconfirmed were
made senior to the appellants. on behalf of the state it was companytended that the employees
of himachal pradesh companyld be given the same benefit of
inspectors by varying the companyditions of service which were
to their benefit and the sanction of the central government
under section 82 6  of the act would number be required for
that purpose. it is also said that the companyditions of
service which govern the appellants who were employees of
the former st-ate of punjab were number varied to their
disadvantage. this companytention is utterly unsound. the
seniority list has been prepared by giving the employees of
himachal pradesh the benefit of the date of upgradation as
1 april 1966. the government of india sanctioned the date
1 may 1969. the state of himachal pradesh is number only
setting at naught the direction but is giving a
retrospective validation to the date of upgradation. that
is a matter which changes the companyditions of service of the
appellants. the appellants are deprived of their companytinuous
period of service. the appellants are deprived of their
quota of promotion. the appellants were number heard with
regard to equations of posts of excise inspectors and
taxation inspectors. the appellants were number heard with
regard to their seniority list. the appellants therefore rightly companytend that the
conditions of service applicable to them before the
appointed day have been altered to their disadvantage
without the previous approval of the central government. again if the state of himachal pradesh wants to equate
taxation inspectors with excise inspectors the approval of
the central government will be required because the
appellants may represent their case of promotion quota under
these rules. the high companyrt companyrectly held that if the state government
wanted to alter the upgradation of the posts of himachal
pradesh sub-inspectors with effect from 1 april 1966 the
sanction of the central government was to be obtained. the
high companyrt rightly set aside the executive decision changing
the date of promotion of himachal pradesh sub-inspectors
from 1 may 1969 to 1 april 1966 and the seniority lists as
well as the four promotions. the plants companytended that the directions given by the high
court with regard to preparation of seniority lists should
be set aside. the directions given by the high companyrt were
these. the appellants should be equated with the
inspectors of himachal pradesh and thereby the high companyrt
held that all inspectors of himachal pradesh should be taken
as excise and taxation inspectors and their cadre should be
taken as point. the second direction is that the date of
continuous appointment in an equated post shall govern the
seniority as provided in the letter dated 14 february 1967
of the central-government. the third direction is that
specific approval of the central government is to be taken
under section 82 6  of the act if the date of promotion or
upgradation from the post of sub-inspectors is fixed as 1
april 1966. the fourth direction is that the rules for
promotion to the posts of assistant excise and taxation
officers should be prepared and the same shall be
finalised after getting the approval of the central
government. the appellants main companytention is that there were two
distinct cadres of inspectors in himachal pradesh before
reorganisation viz. one cadre of taxation inspectors and
sub-inspectors and the other cadre of excise inspectors and
sub-inspectors. the respondents on the other hand companytended
that there was one cadre in himachal pradesh. it was also
the companytention of the respondents that there was
unification of cadres in himachal pradesh before the
reorganisation of the state. if the state of himachal pradesh wishes to change the date
of upgradation of himachal pradesh sub-inspectors to 1
april 1966 the state government cannumber do so without
sanction of the central government under section- 82 6  of
the act. if the state government wishes to equate the
appellants with the inspectors of himachal pradesh the state
of himachal pradesh will have to follow the provisions of
the states reorganisation act in that behalf. the date of
continuous appointment of the appellants and the respondents
in the equated post will also have to be in companypliance with
the provisions of the states reorganisation act. all facts and circumstances affecting the service
conditions of inspectors of both the states will have to be
placed by the state government before the central government
for decision of the central government whether it should
give approval under section 82 6  of the act to upgradation
of sub inspectors of himachal pradesh with effect from 1
april 1966.
the direction given by the high companyrt that the state
government shall obtain approval of the central government
under section 82 6  of the act in regard to the date of
promotion or upgradation. of subinspectors is companyrect and
upheld. the other direction given by the high companyrt that
the rules for promotion to the post of excise and taxation
inspectors shall be finalised after getting the approval of
the central government is companyrect and upheld. for these reasons the appeal of the state is dismissed.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 697 of 1962.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
march 21 1962 of the madras high companyrt in writ appeal number
154 of 1960.

sen ravinder narain o. c. mathur and j.b. dadachanji
for the appellant. v. visvanatha sastri and r. gopalakrishnan for
respondent 1.

ranganadham chetty and a. v. rangam for respondent
number. 2 and 3. 1963. february 6. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
by
subba rao j.-this appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment of a division bench of the high companyrt
of judicature for madras companyfirming that a single judge of
that companyrt allowing. the petition filed by the respondent
under art. 226 of the companystitution and quashing the order
made by the state transport appellate tribunal granting a
stage carriage permit to the appellant for the route
tanjore-mannargudi via vaduvoor. the facts relevant to the question raised may be briefly
stated. the regional transport authority tanjore called
for applications in respect of the issuing of a stage
carriage permit for the route tanjore-mannargudi via
vaduvoor. 11 persons applied for the permit. the regional
transport authority adopting the marking system prescribed
in g.o. ms. number 1298  home  dated april 281956 awarded
marks to different applicants the appellant of the highest
number of marks viz. 7 and the first respondent got only
4 1/4 marks with the result the appellant was preferred to
the respondent and a permit was issued to him. it is number
necessary to numberice the marks secured by the other
applicants before the regional transport authority for they
are number before us. total of the said marks secured by each
of the said two parties was arrived at by gadding the marks
given under the following heads
viable work- resi- experi- special to-
unit shop dence ence circums- tal
tances. 1 2 3 4 5

m.s 4 1 1 1/2 1/4 7

r.v.s. 1 1 1 1 1/4 4
it would be seen from the said table of marks that if the 4
marks secured by the appellant under the
first companyumn viable unit were excluded from his total he
would have got only a total of 3 marks under the remaining
heads and the first respondent would have got a total of 41
marks under the said heads. under the said g.o. as
interpreted by this companyrt the marks under the first companyumn
i.e. those given under the head viable unit would be
counted only if other things were equal that is to say if
the total number of marks obtained by the said two
applicants under companys.2 to 5 were equal. it is therefore
obvious that on the marks given the regional transport
authority went wrong- in issuing a permit in favour of the
appellant as he should number have taken into companysideration
the 4 marks given under the 1st companyumn since the total marks
secured by him under companys. 2 to 5 were less than those
secured by the first respondent. aggrieved by the said
order the first respondent preferred an appeal to the state
transport appellate tribunal hereinafter called the
appellate tribunal. the said appellate tribunal recast the
marks in respect of the said two .parties in the following
manner
viable work- resi- experi- special to
unit shop dence ence circums- tal
tances
1 2 3 4 5

m.s. 4 2 1 3/4 1/4 8

r.v.s. 2 - 1 1 4
it would be seen from the marks given by the appellate
tribunal that the total of the marks secured by the
appellant under companys. 2 to 5 is equal to that secured by the
first respondent under the said companyumns each of them
securing 4 marks. it was companytended before the appellate
tribunal that the first respondent was entitled to some mark
under the companyumn residence or place of business on the
ground
that it had the places of business at tanjore and mannargudi
and that the regional transport authority had given one mark
to the first respondent under the said companyumn but the
appellate tribunal rejected that companytention on the ground
that the first respondent had a branch office at kumbakonam
and therefore the office at tanjore or mannargudi companyld
number be treated as a branch office. aggrieved by that order
the first respondent filed a petition before the high companyrt
under art. 226 of the companystitution for setting aside that
order. ramachandra lyer j. who heard the said application
allowed it. the main reason given by the learned judge for
allowing the petition was that the appellate tribunal
omitted to give any mark in respect of residential
qualification which amounted to refusal to take into companysi-
deration the admitted fact namely the existence of a
workshop at mannargudi and therefore it amounted to a
breach of s. 47  1   a  and  c  of the motor vehicles act. the same idea was expressed by the learned judge in a
different way thus
it in regard to residential
qualification it  the appellate tribunal
declined to companysider whether the office
workshop at mannargudi are sufficient to
entitle the petitioner to any marks under head
for the mere reason that it was a branch of a
branch office. he held that the said refusal was an error apparent on the
face of the record and he accordingly quashed the order and
at the same time indicated that the result was that the
state transport appellate tribunal would have to dispose of
the appeal afresh. the letters patent appeal filed by the
appellant was heard by a division bench companysisting of
anantanarayanan and venkatadri jj. the learned judges
dismissed the appeal and the reason of their decision is
found in the following remarks
in essence the judgment really proceeds on
the basis that with regard to the claim of the
respondent to some valuation under company. 3
arising from the existence of an alleged
branch office at mannargudi there has been no
judicial disposal of the claim. they also observed
the tribunal is of companyrse at liberty to
adopt its own criteria for the valuation under
col. 2 provided they are companysistently
applied and based upon some principle. in dismissing the appeal the learned judges companycluded
 we desire to make it clear that
we are number in any way fettering the discretion
of the state transport appellate tribunal to
arrive at its own companyclusion on the claims of
the two parties irrespective of any
observations that might have been incidentally
made by this companyrt on those claims. the appellant has preferred the present appeal by special
leave against the said order. it will be seen from the aforesaid narration of facts that
the high companyrt issued the writ as it was satisfied that
there was a clear error apparent on the face of the record
namely that the appellate tribunal refused to take into
consideration the existence of the branch office at
mannargudi for awarding marks under the head residence on
the ground that there was anumberher office of the first
respondent at kumbakonam. while it gave marks to the appe-
llant for his residence it refused to give marks to the
first respondent for its office on the aforesaid ground. mr. sen learned companynsel for the appellant raised before us
the following points  1  the. companyrt has numberjurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari under
art. 226 of the companystitution to quash an order of a tribunal
on the ground that there is an apparent error of fact on the
face or the record however gross it may be and that in
the instant case if there was an error it was only one of
fact  2  this companyrt has held that directions given under s.
43 of the motor vehicles act are only administrative in
character and that an order made by a tribunal in breach
thereof does number companyfer a right on a party affected and
therefore the appellate tribunals order made in derogation
of the said directions companyld number be a subject-matter of a
writ. the argument of mr. viswanatha sastri learned companynsel for
the first respondent may be summarized thus
the petitioner  appellant herein  -has a fundamental right
to carry on business in transport. the motor vehicles act
is a law imposing reasonable restrictions in public interest
on such right. the appellate tribunal can decide on the
material placed before it whether public interest would be
better served if the permit was given to the appellant or
the first respondent within the meaning of s. 47 of the said
act. the government in exercise its powers under s. 43 of
the said act gave administrative directions embodying some
principles for enabling the tribunal to companye to a companyclusion
on the said point. the tribunal had jurisdiction to decide
the said question on the basis of the principles so laid
down or dehors them. in either view it only decides the
said question. the first respondent raised before the
tribunal that public interest would be better served if a
permit was issued to it as it had a well equipped branch
office at mannargudi. the said question was relevant. in an
inquiry under s. 47 of the said act whether the tribunal
followed the instructions given by the government or ignumbered
them. in companying to a companyclusion on the said
question the tribunal made a clear error of law inasmuch
as it held that in the case of the first respondent as it
had a branch at kumbakonam its other branch at mannargudi
should be ignumbered. this the learned companynsel companytends is
an error apparent on the face of the record. he further
contends that the scope of an inquiry under art. 226 is
wide and that it enables the companyrt to issue an appropriate
direction even in a case of an error of fact apparent on the
face of the record. it is number necessary to express our opinion on the wider
question in regard to the scope and amplitude of art. 226 of
the companystitution namely whether the jurisdiction of the
high companyrt under the said article to quash the orders of
administrative tribunals is companyfined only to circumstances
under which the high companyrt of england can issue a writ of
certiorari or is much wider than the said power for this
appeal can satisfactorily and effectively be disposed of
within the narrow limits of the ambit of the english companyrts
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari as understood by
this companyrt. if it was necessary to tackle the larger
question we would have referred the matter to a bench of 5
judges as it involved a substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of the companystitution and under art. 145
thereof such a question can be heard only by a bench of at
least 5 judges. in the circumstances a reference to the
decisions of this companyrt cited at the bar which are alleged
to have expressed companyflicting views thereon is number called
for. we shall therefore companyfine ourselves to the narrow
question. adverting to the scope of a writ of certiorari in companymon
law this companyrt in hari vishnu kamath v. syed ahmed
ishaque 1  laid down the following propositions

certiorari will be issued for companyrecting
errors of jurisdiction as when an inferior
 1  1955 1 s.c.r. 11041121 1123.
court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or
in excess of it or fails to exercise it. certiorari will also be issued when the
court or tribunal acts illegally in the exer-
cise of its undoubted jurisdiction as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the
parties to be heard or violates the
principles of natural justice. the companyrt issuing a writ of certiorari
acts in exercise of a supervisory and number
appellate jurisdiction. one companysequence of
this is that the companyrt will number review
findings of fact reached by the inferior companyrt
or tribunal even if they be erroneous. an error in the decision or
determination itself may also be amenable to a
writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest
error apparent on the face of the proceedings
e.g. when it is based on clear ignumberance or
disregard of the provisions of law. this view was followed in nagendra nath bora v. the
commissioner hills division and appeals assam  1
satyanarayan v. mallikarjun  2  shri ambica mills company v. s.

bhutt  3  and in provincial transport services v. state
industrial companyrt nagpur  4  . but the more difficult
question is what is the precise meaning of the expression
manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings ? venkatarama ayyar j. attempted to define the said
expression in hari vishnu kamaths case  5  thus
mr. pathak for the first respondent
contended on the strength of certain
observations of chagla c. j. in botuk k.
vyas v. surat municipality  1  that numbererror
could be said to be apparent on the face of
the record if it was
 1  1958 s.c.r. 1240.  2  1960 1 s.c.r. 8140
 3  1961 3 s.c.r. 920.  4  1963 3 s.c.r. 650.  5  1955 1 s.c.r. 11041121 1123  6

i.r. 1953 bom. 133.
number self evident and if it required an
examination or argument to establish it. this
test might afford a satisfactory basis for
decision in the majority of cases. but there
must be cases in which even this test might
break down because judicial opinions also
differ and an error that might be companysidered
by one judge as self-evident might number be so
considered by anumberher. the fact is that what
is an error apparent on the face of the record
cannumber be defined precisely or exhaustively
there being an element of indefiniteness
inherent in its very nature and it must be
left to be determined judicially on the facts
of each case. it would be seen from the said remarks that the learned
judge companyld number lay down an objective test for the companycept
necessarily involves a subjective element. sinhaj. as he
then was speaking for the companyrt in nagendra nath boras case
 1  attempted to elucidate the point further and proceeded
to observe at p. 1269-70 thus
it is clear from an examination of the
authorities of this companyrt as also of the
courts in england that one of the grounds on
which the jurisdiction of the high companyrt on
certiorari may be invoked is an error of law
apparent on the face of the record and every
error either of law or fact which can be
corrected by a superior companyrt in exercise of
its statutory powers as a companyrt of appeal or
revision. this decision assumes that the scope of a. writ in the
nature of certiorari or an order or direction to set aside
the order of an inferior tribunal under art. 226 of the
constitution is the same as that of a companymon law writ of
certiorari in england we do number express any opinion on this
in this case. this decision practically accepts the opinion
expressed
 1  1958 s.c.r. 1240.
by this companyrt in hari vishnu kamaths case  1 . the only
addition it introduces is the anti-thesis it made between
error of law and error of fact and error of law apparent
on the face of the record. but the question still remains
in each case whether an error is one of law or of fact and
that falls to be decided on the facts of each case. das
gupta j. makes yet anumberher attempt to define the
expression when he says in satyanarayan v. mallikarjun  2
at p. 141 thus
an error which has to be established by a
long drawn process of reasoning on points
where there may companyceivably be two opinions
can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of record. as the above discussion
of the rival companytentions show the alleged
error in the present case is far from self-
evident and if it can be established it has. to be established by lengthy and companyplicated
arguments. the learned judge here lays down the companyplex nature of the
arguments as a test of apparent error of law. this test
also may break for what is companyplex to one judicial mind may
be clear and obvious to anumberher it depends upon the
equipment of a particular judge. in the ultimate analysis
the said companycept is companyprised of many imponderables it is
number capable of precise definition as numberobjective criterion
can be laid down the apparent nature of the error to a
large extent being dependent upon the subjective element. so too in some cases the boundary between error of law and
error of fact is rather thin. a tribunal may hold that 500
multiplied by 10000 is 5 lakhs  instead of 50 lakhs
anumberher tribunal may hold that a particular claim is barred
by limitation by calculating the period of time from 1956
instead of 1961 and a third tribunal may make an obvious
error deciding a mixed question of fact and law. the
question whether the said errors are errors of
 1  1955 1 s.c.r. 11041121 1123.  2  1960 1 s.c.r. 890.
law or fact cannumber be posited on a priori reasoning. but
-falls to be decided in each case. we do number therefore
propose to define with any precision the companycept of error
of law apparent on the face of the record but it should be
left as it has always been done to be decided in each
case. the only question therefore is whether the state transport
appellate tribunal companymitted an error of law apparent on the
face of the record. a look at the provisions of s. 47 and
s. 43 of the motor vehicles act 1939 as amended by the
madras legislature will facilitate the appreciation of the
problem. under s. 47 a regional transport authority in
considering an application for a stage carriage permit is
enjoined to have regard inter alia to the interests of the
public generally. section 43-a introduced by the madras
legislature by the motor vehicles  madras amendment  act
1948 says that the state government may issue such orders
and directions of a general character as it may companysider
necessary in respect of any matter relevant to road
transport to the state transport authority or to a regional
transport authority and such transport authority shall give
effect to all such orders and directions. it has been held
by this companyrt in m s. raman raman limited v. the state of
madras  1  that s. 43a companyferred a power on the state
government to issue administrative directions and that any
direction issued thereunder was number a law regulating rights
of parties. it was also pointed out that the order made and
the directions issued under s. 43-a of the act cannumber
obviously add to or subtract from the companysideration
prescribed under s. 47 thereof on the basis of which the
tribunal is empowered to issue or refuse to issue a permit
as the case may be. it is therefore clear that any
direction given under s. 43a for the purpose of companysidering
conflicting claims for a permit by applicants can only be to
enable the regional transport
 1  1959 supp. 2 s.c.r. 227.
authority to discharge its duties under s. 47 of the act
more satisfactorily efficiently and impartially. to put it
differentlythe directions so given cannumber enlarge or
restrict the jurisdiction of the said tribunal or authority
but only afford a reasonable guide for exercising the said
jurisdiction. companycretely stated an applicant in advancing
his claim for a permit may place before the authority an
important circumstance in his favour namely that he has a
branch office on the route in respect whereof- he seeks for
a permit. he may companytend that he has an office on the
route and that the interests of the public will be better
served as the necessary amenities or help to meet any even-
tuality in the companyrse of a trip will be within his easy
reach. the government also under s. 43a may issue
instructions to the regional transport authority that the
existence of an office of a particular applicant on the
route would be in the interests of the public and
therefore the said applicant should be given a preferential
treatment if other things are equal. the issue of such an
instruction only emphasizes a relevant fact which an
authority has to take into companysideration even if such an
instruction was number given. but if the authority under a
manifest error of law ignumberes the said relevant
consideration it number only disobeys the administrative
directions given by the government but also transgresses
the provisions of s. 47 of the act. the disobedience of the
instructions which are administrative in nature may number
afford a cause of action to an aggrieved party but the
transgression of the statutory law certainly does. what is
the position in the present. case ? the government issued g. o. number 1298  home  dated april 28
1956 introducing a marking system for assessing the merits
of applicants for stage carriage permits. companyumn 3 reads
thus
location of residence or place of business of
the applicant on the route or at the terminal

this qualification number only is in favour of
local enterprise but also secures that the
owner will pay prompt and frequent attention
to the service entrusted to him. one mark may
be assigned to this qualification. under this instruction the location of the residence or the
place of business is companysidered to be in the interests of
the public for whose benefit the service is entrusted to a
permit-holder. the first respondent companytended before the
regional transport authority that he had branch offices at
tanjore and mannargudi and therefore that fact should be
taken into companysideration and a mark should be given to him
thereunder. the regional transport authority gave one mark
to the appellant and also one mark to the first respondent
under that companyumn. but the appellate tribunal refused to
give any mark under that companyumn to the first respondent for
the following reasons
on behalf of the other appellants and the
respondent it is companytended that appellant number
1  1st respondent before the supreme companyrt  is
a private limited companypany having its registered
office at madras that their offices at kumba-
konam is only a branch office that the
offices if any at tanjore or at mannargudi
cannumber be treated as branch offices and that
as such they are number entitled to any mark in
column 3 of the mark list. this companytention is
a valid one. in regard to the tanjore office the said appellate tribunal
has given an additional reason by holding on the facts that
it was number an office at all. we can therefore ignumbere the
tanjore office for the purpose of this appeal. so far as
the mannargudi office is companycerned the decision of the
appellate tribunal was based upon an obvious error. it took
the view that if a companypany bad a branch office at
one particular place it companyld number have in law any other
branch office though it had one in fact. whatever companyflict
there may be on which we do number express any opinion in a
tax law or the companypany law in the companytext of the marking
system and the evaluation of an amenity in the interest of
the public it is obviously an untenable proposition to hold
that even if a companypany has a well equipped office on a route
in respect of which a permit is applied for it shall be
ignumbered if the companypany has some other branch somewhere
unconnected with that route. that was what the appellate
tribunal held and in our view it is an error apparent on the
face of the record. on that erroneous view the appellate
tribunal did dot decide the relevant question raised
namely whether the respondent has any such office at
mannargudi. both ramachandra iyer j. at the first insta-
nce and anantanarayanan and venkatadri jj. in appeal
rightly pointed out this error. as this is an error
apparent on the face of the record they quashed the order
of the appellate tribunal and left the question open for
decision by it. in our view the companyclusion arrived at by
the high companyrt is companyrect. it remains only to numberice the decisions on which strong
reliance is placed by learned companynsel for the appellant in
support of his companytention. in m s. raman and raman limited v. the state of madras  1
the relevant facts were the appellant and the 4th
respondent therein along with others were applicants for a
stage carriage permit. the regional transport authority
granted the permit to the appellant on the basis of
instructions issued by the state government under s. 43a of
the motor vehicles act on appeal the central road traffic
board set aside that order on the footing of fresh
instructions issued by the government and a division bench
of the madras high companyrt dismissed the writ petition filed
by the appellant. it was
 1  1959 supp. 2 s.c.r. 227.
inter alia companytended before this companyrt that the ins-
tructions given under s. 43a being law regulating rights of
parties the appellate authority companyld number ignumbere that law
and set aside the order of the regional transport authority
on. the basis of subsequent instructions. the companytention
was rejected on the ground that instructions under s. 43a
were number law but were only administrative directions and
that the fact that the appellate tribunal ignumbered them would
number affect its jurisdiction if it had companye to a decision
having regard to the companysiderations laid down in s. 47 of
the act. the question before the tribunal was whether a
small unit or a large one would be viable or would be in the
interest of the public. there was scope for taking
different views on the question and the appellate tribunal
contrary to the earlier directions came to the companyclusion
that smaller units would be more in the interest of the
public than larger ones. this judgment therefore is an
authority only for the position that a tribunal in issuing
or refusing to issue a permit to an applicant would be
acting within its jurisdiction numberwithstanding the fact that
it ignumbered the administrative directions given by the
government under s. 43a of the act provided it had companye to
a decision on the relevant companysiderations laid down in s. 47
of the act. in abdulla rowther v. the state transport appellate
tribunal madras  1  the regional transport authority
issued a permit each to the appellant therein and to one
gopalan nair. on appeal the appellate tribunal set aside
that order and gave the permits to respondents 3 and 4.
both the regional transport authority and the appellate
tribunal companysidered the applications on the basis of g.o. number 1298 issued by the government of madras on april 28
1956. the regional transport authority gave 4 marks each to
the appellant and gopalan nair under company. 1 which dealt
with the building

a.i.r. 1959 s.c. 896.
strength to viable units and refused to give any marks to
respondents 3 and 4 under the said companyumn on the ground that
they were fleet owners with the result that the appellant
and gopalan nair secured more marks than respondents 3 and 4
and were therefore given the permits. but the appellate
tribunal held that the appellant and gopalan nair were number
entitled to claim the benefit of the marks under company. 1 as
they had secured less marks than respondents 3 and 4 under
cols. 3 to 5 for they held on a fair obstruction of the
said g.o. that it was only when the marks obtained by
applicants under companys. 2 to 5 were equal recourse companyld be
had to company. 1. on that basis the appellate tribunal
quashed the order of the regional transport authority and
gave the permits to respondents 3 and 4. the appellant
challenged the said order by an application under art. 226
of the companystitution for a writ of certiorari in the high
court of madras. rajagopalan j. dismissed the application
on two grounds namely  1  that the companystruction of the

o. was number shown to be wrong and  2  that even if the g.
o. was misconstrued it would number justify the issue of a
writ of certiorari as the said g. o. embodied only
administrative directions. the letters patent appeal filed
against the said order was dismissed. the appeal filed to
this companyrt was also dismissed. this companyrt followed the
decision in m s. raman and raman limited v. the state of
madras  1  and held that the -instructions given under s.
43-a of the motor vehicles act were only administrative
directions and that therefore even if the rule as to the
assignment of marks was infringed it was number an error of
law at all. this decision only follows the earlier decision
and lays down that instructions given under s. 43a of the
motor vehicles act are only administrative directions and
that a wrong companystruction of the said instructions would number
enable the party affected to apply for a writ of certiorari. the instructions laid down a method of evaluation
 1 1959 supp. 2 s.c.r. 227.
of the respective claims vis-a-vis the companysiderations laid
down in s. 47 of the act. the regional transport authority
and the appellate tribunal have borne in mind the said
considerations in deciding upon the rival claims though
they may have wrongly interpreted one of the instructions. it may be pointed out that in that case the interpretation
put upon the instructions was a companyrect one though this
court proceeded on the assumption also that they might have
been wrongly interpreted. but the decision cannumber obviously
be an authority for the position that on a wrong
interpretation of the administrative directions or dehors
the said directions a tribunal can ignumbere the relevant
considerations laid down in s. 47 of the. act or on the
basis of an error of law apparent on the record wrongly
refuse to decide on any of such companysiderations. to the same effect is the decision of this companyrt in
ayyaswami gounder v. m s. soudambigai motor service  1 . there the regional transport authority followed the marking
system as laid down by the government of madras and gave to
the appellant  therein  5 marks and to the respondent 6
marks. though the respondent got 6 marks he was number given
the permit as in the view of the said authority he was
guilty of misconduct. as between the other applicants the
appellant having secured the highest number of marks he was
given a permit. but on appeal the appellate tribunal
reallotted the marks and under the reallotment the appellant
got the highest number of marks and because of that fact
and also for the reason that he was a small operator of two
buses who should be given an opportunity to build up a
viable unit as quickly as possible he was given the permit
by the appellate tribunal upholding the order of the
regional transport authority. one of the question raised
there was whether the appellant was entitled to marks under
col. 2 for repair and maintenance facilities at dharapuram-
the

civil appeal number 198 of 1962  decided on 17-9-1962 . appellate tribunal found that he had such facilities. the
appellant filed a writ in the high companyrt and the learned
single judge thought that some mistakes had been companymitted
by the appellate tribunal in the allotment of marks and that
it acted in companytravention of the directions given by the
government under the said g. o. but dismiss the petition on
the ground that as the said instructions are only executive
directions their companytravention did number companyfer any right on
the parties before the tribunal. on letters patent appeal a
division bench of that companyrt set aside that order on the
ground that the appellate tribunal had taken into companysi-
deration the following two irrelevant companysiderations  i
the appellants claim should suffer because of the
punishment for his past misconduct and  ii  the -third
respondent being a small operator he would be entitled to
better companysideration than the appellant who was a
monumberolist. on appeal this companyrt followed the decision in
m s. raman and raman limited v. the state of madras  1  and
abdullah rowther v. the state transport appellate tribunal
 2  and held that under the said g. o. the government issued
only administrative directions and that the failure of the
transport authorities to follow them would number entitle the
respondents to a writ. as regards the two reasons given by
the high companyrt this companyrt came to the companyclusion that they
were number irrelevant companysiderations but were companysiderations
germane in the matter of issue of permits. in the result
this companyrt allowed the appeal. this decision accepts two
propositions namely  1  misconstruction or even disregard
of the instructions given by the government does number companyfer
a right upon an aggrieved party to file a writ for the said
instructions are only administrative directions and  2  the
decision implies that if the tribunal decides on irrelevant
considerations the companyrt can issue a writ. but in that
case it came to the companyclusion that numbersuch irrelevant
considerations weighed with the tribunal.  1  1959 supp. 2 s.c.r. 227

a.i.r. 1959 s.c. 896.
the last of the cases relied upon is that in sankara ayyer

narayanaswami naidu  1 . there too. the regional
transport authority and the state transport appellate
tribunal companysidered the applications for the grant of a
permit for anew route on the basis of the administrative
directions given by the state government. the regional
transport authority gave the appellant 3 marks on the basis
that he was a small operator but the appellate tribunal
came to the companyclusion that he was number entitled to any marks
as a small operator. a single judge of the high companyrt set
aside the order of the appellate tribunal on the ground that
it misconstrued the directions companytained in the government
order relating to small operators. but a division bench of
that companyrt in letters patent appeal held relying upon the
earlier decision of this companyrt that the said directions
were only administrative in nature and that they did number
confer any legal rights and in that view allowed the appeal. this companyrt again following the earlier decisions dismissed
the appeal holding that by companystruing the administrative
directions the tribunal did number take irrelevant companysi-
derations or refused to take relevant companysiderations in the
matter of issue of permits. it is always a companytroversial
question whether the issue of a permit to a small operator
or to a big operator would be in the interest of the public
and a tribunal is certainly entitled to take either view. it will be seen from the aforesaid decisions that this companyrt
only laid down that the instructions given under s. 43a of
the motor vehicles act were only administrative directions
and that the infringement of those instructions by the
tribunal did number companyfer any right on a party to apply to a
high companyrt for a writ under art. 226 of the companystitution. in all those cases the tribunal either ignumbered the
instructions or misconstrued them but numberetheless decided
the question of issue of permits on companysiderations relevant

civil appeal number 213 of 1960  decided on 10-10-1960 . under s. 47 of the act. they are number authorities on the
question whether a writ of certiorari would lie where a
tribunal had on an obviously wrong view of law refused to
decide or wrongly decided on a companysideration relevant -under
s. 47 of the act whether or number it was companyered by the
instructions given under s. 43-a. for if on the basis of
such an error of law it refuses to decide a relevant
question the fact that the government also issued
instructions to the tribunal to apply some objective
standards in deciding such a question does number make the said
question anytheless a relevant companysideration under s. 47 of
the act.