civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. 2331 32
of 1987.
from the judgment and order dated .4.1986 of the
bombay high companyrt in review petition number 837 of 1986.
dr. y.s. chitale and ranjit kumar for the appellant. s. krishnamoorthy iyer d.m. nargolkar a.m.
khanwilkar and a.s. bhasme for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

c. ray j. special leave granted. arguments heard. the subject matter of challenge in this appeal is the
order dated 7th april 1986 made by the high companyrt of bombay
allowing the writ petition number 189 of 1986 quashing the
permission granted in favour of the petitioner by the
government by its order dated 24.12.1985 permitting the
shifting of the companyntry liquor shop from mouza sawli to
mouza narsi chaurasta as well as the order of the high companyrt
dated 17.7.1986 rejecting the review petition number 837 of
1986. the petitioners father had a licence to run the
country liquor shop in village narsi in taluka biloli
district nanded maharashtra. in 1983 the said licence was
transferred in the name of the petitioner  respondent number 5
in this appeal . the appellant was granted a licence
commonly knumbern as c.l. iii licence for vending companyntry
liquor in village sawli taluka biloli district nanded. in
numberember 1984 the appellant was permitted to join one
ataullah as his partner to run the said companyntry liquor shop
in village sawli. the appellant found companysiderable
difficulty in running the shop in village sawli as there was
very little demand for companyntry liquor in the said village
having small population of about 1800 and as such the
appellant sustained heavy loss. the appellant therefore
applied on 2.2.1985 before the district companylector nanded
for permission to shift his shop from village sawli to
village narsi chaurasta situated within the same taluka. the
collector of nanded after making necessary enquiries in
accordance with the guidelines of the circular dated
27.4.1984 regarding the shifting of the shops recommended
the transfer of the shop of the appellant from village sawli
to village narsi chaurasta. the government of maharashtra
however by order dated 25.7.1985 rejected the application
of the appellant for shifting the shop. the appellant again
made a representation against the said order of rejection. this representation was duly companysidered by the government
and permission was granted to the appellant to transfer his
country liquor shop c.l. iil from village sawli to village
narsi chaurasta. in accordance with the said permission
granted to the appellant the appellant shifted his shop on
17.2.1986 to village narsi chaurasta. the respondent number 5
who has got a companyntry liquor shop in that village
questioned the permission granted by the governmment in
favour of the appellant by writ petition number 189 of 1986 and
prayed for quashing of the said order granting permission on
the ground that there has been a violation of the circular
number clr. 1173 iii  gen k dated 27th february 1973 in as
much as the total population of the said village did number
exceed l00000 and as such the permission for shifting the
said shop of the appellant to the village narsi chaurasta
was illegal and bad. the writ petition number 189/86 was heard by the high
court bombay and it was allowed by holding that without
duly companysidering the criteria laid down in the circular
dated 18.3.1982 i.e. econumberic viability of the proposed shop
and the likely volume of companysumption of companyntry liquor the
purported permission for shifting the shop was granted. accordingly the rule was made absolute and the order
granting permission by the government was quashed. an
application for review of the said order was filed by the
appellant and the same was rejected by order dated july 17
1986 in review petition number 837 of 1986. aggrieved by the
said two orders the special leave petition was filed out of
which this appeal has arisen. the only question that falls for companysideration in this
appeal is whether the permission granted by the state of
maharashtra i.e. respondent number 1 for shifting of c.l. iil
liquor shop of the appellant from village sawli to village
narsi chaurasta is in accordance with the guidelines laid
down by the latest circular dated 27th april 1984 which is
annexed as annexure p-7 to this appeal. it has been urged on
behalf of respondent number 5 by drawing the numberice of the
court to the circular
dated 27.2.1973  annexure p-2  that the permission that was
accorded for shifting of the appellants shop from mouza
sawli to mouza narsi is in infringement of the aforesaid
circular in as much as the total population of mouza narsi
did number exceed l0000 and as such numberadditional shop companyld
be permitted in the said mouza number any permission companyld be
accorded for shifting of the appellants liquor shop in the
said mouza. this argument advanced on behalf of respondent
number 5 is devoid of merit in as much as the aforesaid
circular was superseded by the guidelines laid down by the
government as is evident from the order number clr
1480/1101/pro-3 dated 2nd october 1980 wherein it has been
stated in clauses 4 and s that permission for additional
shop can be granted only if it would be econumberically viable. it is also evident from the circular dated march 18 1982
that rules 23 and 24 of the maharashtra companyntry liquor
rules 1973 were amended by government numberification dated
26th february 1982 and guidelines have been laid down for
grant of a licence for shops for the retail sale of companyntry
liquor. one of the guidelines to be companysidered is that due
consideration has to be given to the likely volume of
consumption of companyntry liquor and econumberic viability of the
proposed shop before granting any permission for a new shop. this circular was followed by anumberher circular dated
september 16 1983 wherein it has been mentioned that in
granting additional licences for companyntry liquor shop the
collector should use the discretion and propose shops at
such places taking into companysideration the likely volume of
consumption econumberic viability menace of illicit
distillation etc. this circular is annexed as annexure p-5
to the appeal. by the latest circular dated april 27 1984
the government in supersession of the guidelines in the
previous circulars had laid down certain guidelines of which
clause 6 is relevant for our companysideration which is to the
following effect
whether additional shop at the new place would be
econumberically feasible. in the instant case the district companylector of nanded
made due enquiries in accordance with the guidelines
contained in circular dated april 27 1984  annexure p-7 to
this appeal  with regard to the shifting of companyntry liquor
shop of the appellant and recommended the permission for
shifting the shop stating that the population of mouza narsi
is about 3738 and it is a companymercial place. there is a lot
of crowd of people at this place and as such if the companyntry
liquor shop is shifted from mouza sawli to mouza narsi the
financial companydition of the licence-holder would improve
resulting in his being able to pay the licence fee and incur
the other expenses of the shop. it has been
further stated that the sale of companyntry liquor at mouza
narsi is 1300 litres and starting of anumberher shop at this
place is feasible. this report was forwarded to the
secretary home department government of maharashtra a
copy of which is annexed as p-1 to this appeal. the
government of maharashtra had first rejected the application
of the appellant for the shifting of the shop on 25.7.1985
and on representation being made by the appellant had re-
considered its earlier decision and accorded sanction to the
proposal of shifting of companyntry liquor shop of the appellant
from village sawli to village narsi chaurasta taluka
biloli. this order according permission cannumber be assailed
as arbitraty or in breach of the latest circular issued by
the government laying down the guidelines in 1984. the
government duly companysidered the guidelines laid down in the
said circular namely the econumberic viability and also the
volume of companysumption of liquor in the particular mouza as
is evident from the report of the companylector nanded. it is
also pertinent to mention in this companynection that the state
of maharashtra respondent number 1 filed a return to this
appeal wherefrom it is manifest that the respondent number 1
duly companysidered the report of the companylector recommending
permission to transfer the companyntry liquor shop of the
appellant. it has also been stated in. the said companynter that
the guidelines companytained in the circular dated february 27
1973 are in respect of the grant of new companyntry liquor
licence. these guidelines cannumber be made applicable in
respect of the shifting of any companyntry liquor shop existing
already in one village to anumberher village. it has further
been stated that after the permission was granted the
appellant shifted his companyntry liquor shop to village narsi
chaurasta and he has been running the companyntry liquor shop
there since february 1986. the sanction accorded to the
shifting of the shop of the appellant is number in breach of
the latest circular dated april 27 1984 annexed as p-7 to
this appeal. for the reasons aforesaid there is numbermerit in the
submissions made on behalf of respondent number s and the same
cannumber be sustained.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 186 of
1966.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated numberember 4 1965 of the punjab high companyrt in criminal
revision number 263 of 1965 and criminal misc. number. 224 of
1965.
pritam singh safeer for the appellants. harbans singh and r.n. sachthey for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ramaswami j. this appeal is brought by special leave from
the judgment of the punjab high companyrt dated numberember 4. 1965
by which criminal revision petition number 263 of 1965 and
criminal miscellaneous case number 224 of 1965 were dismissed. the case of the prosecution is that on october 19 1961
sub inspector banarasi lal of food and supplies department
was present at smalkha barrier along with head companystable
badan singh and others. the appellant malkiat singh then
came driving truck number p.n.u. 967. babu singh was the
cleaner of that truck. the truck carried 75 bags of paddy
weighing about 140 maunds. as the export of paddy was
contrary to law the sub inspector took into possession the
truck as also the bags of paddy. it is alleged that the
consignment of paddy was booked from lakerkotla on october
18 1961 by qimat rai on behalf of messrs sawan ram
chiranji lal. the companysignee of the paddy was messrs devi
dayal brij lal of delhi. it is alleged that qimat rai also
gave a letter ex. p-3 addressed to the companysignee sawan ram
and chiranji lal were partners of messrs. sawan ram
chiranji lal and they were also prosecuted. in the trial
court malkiat singh admitted that he was driving the truck
which was loaded with 75 bags of paddy and the truck was
intercepted at samalkha barrier. according to mallfiat
singh he was given the paddy by the transport companypany at
malerkotla for being transported to delhi. the transport
company also gave him a letter assuring him that it was an
authority for transporting the paddy. but it later
transpired that it was a personal letter from qimat rai to
the companymission agents at delhi and that it was number a letter
of authority. babu singh admitted that he was sitting in
the truck as a cleaner. the trial companyrt companyvicted all the
accused persons but on appeal the additional sessions
judge set aside the companyviction of sawan ram and chiranji lal
and affirmed the companyviction of qimat rai and of the two
appellants. the appellants took the matter in revision to
the high companyrt but the revision petition was dismissed on
numberember 4 1965.
it is necessary at this stage to reproduce the relevant
provisions of the essential companymodities act 1955  act 10 of
1955 . section 3  1   is to the following effect
3.  1  if the central government is of
opinion that it is necessary or expedient so
to do for maintaining or increasing supplies
of any essential companymodity or for securing
their equitable distribution and
availability at fair prices it may by order
provide for regulating or prohibiting the
production supply and distribution thereof
and trade and companymerce therein. section 7 states
7.  1   if any person companytravenes any
order made under section 3--
 a  he shall be punishable--

in the ease of an order made with
reference to clause  h  or clause  i  of sub-
section  2  of that
665.
section with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one year and shall also be
liable to fine and

in the case of any other order
with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to
fine
provided that if the companyrt is of
opinion that a sentence of fine only will meet
the ends of justice it may for reasons to be
recorded refrain from imposing a sentence of
imprisonment and
 b  any property in respect of which
the order has been companytravened or such part
thereof as the companyrt may deem fit including
in the case of an order relating to
foodgrains any packages companyerings or
receptacles in which they are found and any
animal vehicle vessel or other companyveyance
used in carrying foodgrains shall be forfeited
to the government
provided that if the companyrt is of
opinion that it is number necessary to direct
forfeiture in respect of the whole or as the
case may be any part of the property or any
packages companyerings or receptacles or any
animal vehicle vessel or other companyveyance
it may for reasons to be recorded refrain
from doing so.  2   if any person to whom a direction
is given under clause  b  of sub-section  4
of section 3 fails to companyply with the
direction he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years or with fine or with both. by section 2 of punjab act number 34 of
1959 the punjab legislature added a new
section s. 7-a in the central act number 10 of
1955 which reads as follows
forfeiture of certain property used
in the companymission of the offence.--whenever
any offence relating to foodstuffs which is
punishable under section 7 has been companymitted
the companyrt shall direct that all the packages
coverings or receptacles in which any
property liable to be forfeited under the said
section is found and all the animals
vehicles vessels or other companyveyances used
in carrying the said property shall be
forfeited to the government. on january 3 1959 the central
government promulgated the punjab paddy
 export companytrol  order. 1959 in exercise of
the powers companyferred by s. 3 of the essential
commodities act. 1955. para 2 of this order
states

definitions.--in this order
unless the companytext otherwise requires--
 a  export means to take or cause to be
taken out of any place within the state of
punjab to any place outside the state.  b  paddy means rice in husk

state government means the
government of the state of punjab. para 3 of the order provides as follows
restrictions on export of paddy.--no
person shall export or attempt to export or
abet the export of paddy except under and in
accordance with a permit issued by the state
government or any officer authorised by the
state government in this behalf
provided that numberhing companytained herein
shall apply to the export of paddy--

number exceeding five seers in weight by
a bona fide traveler as part of his luggage
or

on government account or

under and in accordance with military
credit numberes. the question to be companysidered in this appeal is whether
upon the facts found by the lower companyrts any offence has
been companymitted by the appellants. it is number disputed that
the truck carrying the paddy was stopped at samalkha barrier
which is 32 miles from delhi. it is also number disputed that
the delhi-punjab boundary was at the relevant point of
time at about the 18th mile from delhi. it is therefore
evident that there has been numberexport of paddy outside the
state of punjab in this case. the truck with the loaded
paddy was seized at samalkha well inside the punjab
boundary. it follows therefore that there was numberexport of
paddy within the meaning of para 2 a  of the punjab paddy
 export companytrol  order 1959. it was however argued on
behalf of the respondent that there was an attempt on the
part of the appellants to transport paddy to delhi and so
there was an attempt to companymit the offence of export. in
our opinion there is numbersubstance in this argument. on the
facts found there was numberattempt on the part of the
appellants to companymit the offence of export. it was merely a
preparation on the part of the appellants and as a matter of
law a preparation for companymitting an offence is different
from attempt to companymit it. the preparation companysists in
devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for
the companymission of the offence. on the other hand an
attempt to companymit the offence is a direct movement towards
the companymission after preparations are made. in order that a
person may be companyvicted of an attempt to companymit a crime he
must be shown first to have
had an intention to companymit the offence and secondly to have
done an act which companystitutes the actus reus of a criminal
attempt. the sufficiency of the actus reus is a question of
law which had led to difficulty because of the necessity of
distinguishing between acts which are merely preparatory to
the companymission of a crime and those which are sufficiently
proximate to it to amount to an attempt to companymit it. if
a man buys a box of matches he cannumber be companyvicted of
attempted arson however clearly it may be proved that he
intended to set fire to a haystack at the time of the
purchase. number can he be companyvicted of this offence if he
approaches the stack with the matches in his pocket but if
he bends down near the stack and lights a match which he
extinguishes on perceiving that he is being watched he may
be guilty of an attempt to burn it. sir james stephen in
his digest of criminal law art. 50 defines an attempt as
follows
an act done with intent to companymit
that crime and forming part of a series of
acts which would companystitute its actual
commission if it were number interrupted. the
point at which such a series of acts begins
cannumber be defined but depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. the test for determining whether the act of the appellants
constituted an attempt or preparation is whether the overt
acts already done are such that if the offender changes his
mind and does number proceed further in its progress the acts
already done would be companypletely harmless. in the present
case it is quite possible that the appellants may have been
warned that they had numberlicence to carry the paddy and they
may have changed their mind at any place between samalkha
barrier and the delhi-punjab boundary and number have proceeded
further in their journey. section 8 of the essential
commodities act states that any person who attempts to
contravene or abets a companytravention of any order made
under section 3 shall be deemed to have companytravened that
order. but there is numberprovision in the act which makes a
preparation to companymit an offence punishable. it follows
therefore that the appellants should number have been companyvicted
under s. 7 of the essential companymodities act.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 66 of
1962.
appeal from the judgment and order dated september 11 1961
of the high companyrt of calcutta in criminal revision number 362
of 1961.

n. ghosh nuthehari mukherjee and sukumar ghose for
the appellant. b. bagchi b. n. kirpal for p. k. bose for the
respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
mudholkar j. the only point urged in this appeal from a
decision of the high companyrt at calcutta is whether the
occupier of a factory is liable to penalty under s. 92 of
the factories act 1948  hereafter referred to as the act
for the companytravention of the provisions of s. 52 of the act. the appellant is the managing director of jardine henderson
ltd. calcutta who are the managing agents of the howrah
mills company limited of ramkristopur district howrah and as such
occupiers of the mills within the definition of the term
contained in s. 2 n  of the act. one j. p. bell was the
manager of the mills in june 1957. both the appellant and
bell were charged with an offence under s. 92 of the act
read with s. 52. it would appear however that during the
pendency of the trial the manager was permitted to proceed
to england and the prosecution companytinued against the
appellant alone. he was companyvicted of the offence and
sentenced to pay a fine of rs. 400/- by the sub-divisional
magistrate howrah. his appeal therefrom was dismissed by
the sessions judge howrah. similarly the revision
application preferred by him before the high companyrt was also
dismissed. however the high companyrt granted him a
certificate to the effect that the case was fit for appeal
to this companyrt and that is how the matter has companye up before
us. reliance was placed before us on behalf of the appellant
upon the decision in state government of madhya pradesh v.
maganbhai desaibhai 1  to which i was a party in support of
the companytention that where a duty is cast upon a manager of a
factory to perform a particular act his omission to do so
will number render the occupier. according to learned companynsel
the omission of the appellant is that under cl.  b  of sub-
s.  1  of s. 52 of the act a duty is cast upon the manager
of the factory to give a numberice to the appropriate authority
of a change in the weekly holiday from the first day of the
week to any other day and number upon the occupier. according
to learned companynsel the omission of the manager to give such
numberice would number render the occupier liable in any way
unless it is shown that there was any companynivance on his part
of a breach of duty by the manager. this it is companytended
must necessarily imply that unless the occupier had the mens
rea to companytravene the provisions of s. 52 1  of the act he
would number be liable for the companytravention. in the absence
of any evidence to the effect that the appellant knew of the
omission and

a.i.r. 1954 nag. 41.
yet companynived at it his companyviction and sentence ought
therefore to be quashed. sub-section  1  of s. 52 reads thus
numberadult worker shall be required or allowed
to work in a factory on the first day of the
week  hereinafter referred to as the said
day  unless-
 a  he has or will have a holiday for a
whole day on one of the three days immediately
before or after the said day and
 b  the manager of the factory has before
the said day or the substituted day under
clause  a  whichever is earlier-

delivered a numberice at the office of the
inspector of his intention to require the
worker to work on the .said day and of the day
which is to be substituted and

displayed a numberice to that effect in the
factory
provided that numbersubstitution shall be made
which will result in any worker working for
more than ten days companysecutively without a
holiday for a whole day. the opening words of this sub-section indicate a prohibition
from requiring or permitting an adult worker to work in a
factory on the first day of the week. the prohibition is
however lifted if steps are taken under cls.  a  and  b  of
that section. a perusal of cl.  b  makes it abundantly
clear that what is required to be done thereunder that is
to say to give and display a numberice is only for the purpose
of securing an exemption from the prohibition companytained in
the opening part of s. 52 of the act. clause  b  cannumber
therefore be likened to some other provisions of the act
which impose a positive duty upon the manager to do
something. the prohibition companytained in the opening words
of this subsection is general and is number companyfined to the
manager. it would therefore follow that where something
is done in breach of the prohibition enacted by sub-s.  1
of s. 52 both the manager as well as the occupier will be
liable to the penalties prescribed in that section. we may also point out that exemption from companypliance with
the provisions of s. 52 was refused by the chief inspector
of factories as would be clear from the second para of his
reply dated april 8 1957 to the manager. it runs thus
it is however pointed out that instead of
employing workers of c shift from sunday
evenings it
would be advisable to employ them on saturday
evenings. the work done by these workers
after midnight on saturdays which would be
continued up to the following morning will be
considered towards the work done on saturdays. in that case submission of numberice under
section 52 of the act would number be necessary. that being the position we would have had an occasion to
consider maganbhais case   if it were the appellants case
that the weekly holiday had been altered without his
knumberledge or companysent. but that is number so. moreover there
is ample material to show that what the manager did was
within the full knumberledge of the appellant and presumably
was also with his companysent. in this companynection we may point
out that on january 18 1957 the manager of the mills sent a
letter to the chief inspector of factories which runs thus
howrah mills companypany limited
howrah west bengal
18th january 1957.
ref. number g.12/4968
the chief inspector of factories
new secretariat building calcutta. dear sir
we request you permission to operate the batching lo
winding departments in number 1 mill as shown on the attached
sheet with effect from sunday the 27th january 1957.
an early reply would be appreciated. it will be numbered that all shifts will then work 48 hours per
week. yours faithfully
sd - j. p. bell
mill manager. a companyy of this letter was sent to m s. jardine henderson
ltd. calcutta of which the appellant is admittedly the
managing director. from the letter of the same date
addressed to the manager by the general secretary of howrah
jute mills karmachari sangha it would appear that the
workers categorically refused to work according to the
schedule proposed by the mill

a.i.r. 1954 nag. 41.
manager. the sangh however proposed alternative working
hours for the c shift and there it is suggested that the
workers would work on sunday from 8.30 p.m. to 6.00 a.m.
this schedule was also accepted by the national union of
jute workers to which some of the workmen in the mills
belong. this would appear from the letter of its joint
secretary dated january 21 1957. on february 5 1957 the
mill manager wrote anumberher letter to the chief inspector of
factories requesting for approval of the new schedule of
working hours. it may be mentioned that oven in the
original schedule of working hours which is appended to the
letter of january 18 1957 by the mill manager the starting
time of the first shift was also 8.30 p.m. on sunday. on
february 9 1957 the chief inspector of factories asked the
mill manager to forward the resolution of the works
committee of the factory or other documents to show that the
workers had agreed to work in the factory at 8.30 p.m. on
sundays. the managers reply to it was as follows -
dear sir
re treble shift working in number1
mill
with reference to your letter number 818 dated
9th february 1957 we forward herewith as
desired by you two original letters with one
true companyy of each from the general secretary
of howrah  jute  mills karmachari sangha and
joint secretary of national union of jute
workers requesting the management to adopt the
existing working hours of the c shift in number
1 mill. we trust this will be found to be in order and
would request you to kindly return the
original letters after your perusal. yours faithfully

p. bell
mill manager
a companyy of this letter was also sent to m s. jardine
henderson limited the fact that companyies of letters of january
18 1957 and february 18 1957 were sent to jardine
henderson limited would fix the occupier i.e. the appellant
before us with the knumberledge of what the manager had
proposed to do. therefore quite apart from the fact that
as the managing director of jardine henderson
ltd. who were themselves the managing agents of the howrah
mills the appellant must be deemed to have knumbern what was
being done by the manager of the mills. we have positive
evidence of the fact that the manager had apprised him of
what he was proposing to do. the appellant took numbersteps to
restrain the manager from putting the new schedule in
operation which was in itself in violation of the opening
words of s. 52. we may further point out that what the
provisions of s. 52 1   a  and  b  permit is to grant
exemptions to specified workmen from the operation of the
prohibition enacted in s. 52 from working in factories on
weekly holidays. numbergeneral permission can be granted under
cls.  a  and  b  of sub-s.  1  of s. 52 for altering the day
of the weekly holiday so as to companyer all the workmen. therefore -upon the proper companystruction of the provisions
it is clear that whenever workers are required  or are
permitted  to work on a weekly holiday the specific
permission of the chief inspector of factories in respect of
each and every worker who is required to work on such a day
should be obtained.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1639 of
1990.
from the judgment and order dated 24.5.1989 of the punjab
and haryana high companyrt in civil revision number 124 of 1989.
dr. gouri shankar vipin sanghi and c.v. subba rao for the
appellant. harbans lal and sarva mitter  for m s. mitter and mitter
co.  for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
kasliwal j. the short companytroversy raised in the above
appeal is whether the union of india through the deputy
inspector general national security guard is a necessary
and proper party to be impleaded when the land in question
was acquired by the state of haryana for the purpose of
national security guard as desired by the union of india. the state of haryana acquired some land situated in
district gurgaon for the purposes of national security guard
in 1985 as desired by the union of india. the land owners
being number satisfied with the companypensation awarded by the
land acquisition companylector submitted reference petitions
under section 18 of the land acquisition act 1894
 hereinafter referred to as the act . during the pendency
of the reference application before the additional district
judge gurgaon an application was moved by the union of
india for being impleaded in the array of the respondents on
the ground that the land had been acquired for the purpose
of national security guard being companytrolled by the union of
india. it was submitted that any order enhancing the
compensation would adversely affect the union of india and
it would be deprived of an opportunity to file an appeal in
case it is number impleaded as a party. the additional
district judge by his order dated 28.11.1988 dismissed the
application filed by the union of india. it may be numbered
that some of the land owners had impleaded union of india as
a party but in 25 cases including the present case the
union of india was number impleaded as a party. the union of
india aggrieved against the order of the additional district
judge filed a revision before the high companyrt. the high
court of punjab and haryana by its order dated 24.5.1989
dismissed the revision placing reliance upon the full bench
decision of the same companyrt in m s. kulbhushan kumar
company v. state of punjab anumberher air 1984 punjab and
haryana 55. this full bench decision in turn relied on the
decision of the full bench of the same companyrt in m s. indo
swiss time limited dundahera v. umrao and others air 1981
punjab haryana 213.
in order to resolve the companytroversy and to decide the
question raised in this appeal by grant of special leave we
would refer to the cases decided by this companyrt and the full
bench decisions of the punjab haryana high companyrt relied in
the impugned order. in the municipal companyporation of the
city of ahemdabad v. chandulal shamaldas patel ors. 1970 1 scw r
183 decided on 8.1.1970 a division bench of two judges of
this companyrt held that the land was numberified for acquisition
by the state government for the use of the municipal
corporation but that did number companyfer any interest in the
municipal companyporation so as to enable it to file an appeal
against the order of the high companyrt allowing the petition. in the said case certain lands belonging to chandulal
shamaldas patel the respondents were numberified for
acquisition under section 4 of the act by the government of
bombay by a numberification dated february 19 1959. the area
in which the land was situated was subsequently allotted to
the state of gujarat on the bifurcation of the state of
bombay under the states reorganization act 1960 as such
the divisional companymissioner of the state of gujarat issued a
numberification under section 6 on may 2 1961. both the
numberifications were challenged in the high companyrt of gujarat
on various grounds and the petition was allowed by the high
court. the municipal companyporation of the city of ahemdabad
being the fourth respondent in the writ petition in the high
court filed an appeal before this companyrt against the order of
the high companyrt. a preliminary objection was raised against
the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the
corporation was number aggrieved by the order of the high
court. this companyrt allowed the preliminary objection on a
short ground that though the property was numberified for
acquisition by the state government for the use of the
municipal companyporation after it was acquired by the
government but that did number companyfer any interest in the
municipal companyporation so as to enable it to file an appeal
against the order of the high companyrt. it was further
observed that substantially the grounds on which the writ
petition was filed were that the numberifications were invalid
on account of diverse reasons. some of these reasons had
been upheld and some had number been upheld but all those
grounds related to the validity of the numberifications issued
by the government of bombay and the government of gujarat. this companyrt further observed as under
number even an order of companyts has been passed
against the municipal companyporation of the city
of ahemdabad. we fail to see what interest
the municipal companyporation has which would
sustain an appeal by it against the order of
the high companyrt allowing the writ petition
filed by the first respondent. the appeal is dismissed as number maintainable. a perusal of the above order shows that this companyrt did number
examine any provisions of the land acquisition act number
applied its mind on the question of any person interested
under the provisions of the act having a right to challenge
the order of the enhanced companypensation passed by the companyrt
in a reference under section 18 of the act. the preliminary
objection was allowed simply on the ground that the impugned
numberifications in that case were issued by the government of
bombay and the government of gujarat and the challenge was
relating to the validity of such numberifications and numberorder
had been passed against the municipal companyporation of the
city of ahemdabad. a division bench of this companyrt of two judges in himalayan
tiles marbles  p  limited v. francis victor companytinho  dead
by lrs. others 1980 3 scr 235 examined the question of
person interested under the land acquisition proceedings
in detail and categorically held that the appellant
himalayan tiles marbles being a private companypany for which
the land was acquired was undoubtedly a person interested
as companytemplated by section 18  1  of the act. it was held
that the definition of a person interested given in
section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally
construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly
or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or
in the quantum of companypensation. it was further held that
the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the
company and once the land vested in the government after
acquisition it stood transferred to the companypany under the
agreement entered into between the companypany and the
government. thus it cannumber be said that the companypany had no
claim or title to the land at all. secondly since under
the agreement the companypany had to pay the companypensation it
was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper
quantum of companypensation was fixed so that the companypany may
number have to pay a very heavy amount of money. this companyrt
categorically held that the view taken by the orrisa high
court or even by the calcutta high companyrt that a companypany
local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is
acquired is number an interested person is number companyrect. in the
above case this companyrt further held that the preponderance of
judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the
definition of person interested must be liberally companystrued
so as to include a body local authority or a companypany for
whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an
agreement to pay the companypensation. this view accords with
the principles of equity justice and good companyscience. it
may be further important to numbere that this companyrt in the
above
case approved the case of punjab haryana high companyrt in the
hindustan sanitaryware and industries limited bahadurgarh
anr. v. the state of harayana ors. air 1972 punjab
haryana 59.
the point came up for companysideration before a full bench
of three judges of punjab haryana high companyrt in the case
of m s indo swiss time limited  supra . s.s. sandhawalia
cj followed the view taken in himnalayan tiles marbless
case  supra  and did number follow the view of this companyrt in
the municipal companyporation of the city of ahemdabads case
 supra . sandhawalia cj held that in the case of the
municipal companyporation of the city of ahemdabad a short
order was passed upholding a preliminary objection against
the maintainability of the appeal. in that case their
lordships of the supreme companyrt observed that the municipal
corporation of the city of ahemdabad for whose benefit the
land had been acquired companyld number maintain an appeal in the
supreme companyrt against the judgment of the high companyrt setting
aside that numberification. it is evident from the brief order
that the matter was disposed of at the very threshold
without any elaborate reference to either principle or by
diverting to any authority. the appeal was held to be number
maintainable on the short ground that their lordships failed
to see what interest the municipality had which would
sustain an appeal by it against the order of the high companyrt
allowing the writ petition filed by the land owners. sandhawalia cj as such held that a companypany for whose
benefit the land is acquired can be impleaded as a party in
the companyrt of the district judge in a reference preferred
under section 18 of the land acquisition act 1894. it was
further held that there was numberconflict or inconsistency
between order 1 rule 10 of the civil procedure companye and
section 50 2  of the act. the two provisions can be
construed harmoniously and the provisions of order 1 rule 10
of the civil procedure companye would apply within the companyfines
of section 50  2  and the petitioner companypany  indo swiss
time limited  was entitled to be impleaded as a party
thereunder. on the other hand p.c. jain and j.m. tandon jj
holding a majority view followed the view propounded in the
municipal companyporation of the city of ahemdabads case
 supra  and did number agree with the view enunciated in
himalayan tiles marbless case  supra . the majority view
wag that an application under order 1 rule 10 of the civil
procedure companye for being impleaded as a party by the companypany
is number legally maintainable. the companypany is number an
interested person so as to give it a right to become a party
to the proceedings in reference before the district judge. the only right under the act available to the companypany is to
appear and adduce evidence for the determination of the
amount of companypensation and the companypany by itself would have
numberright to file an appeal. it was also held that when a
company has numberright to file an appeal then a fortiori it
follows that an application under order 1 rule 10 of the
civil procedure companye by a companypany to become a party in the
proceedings would number be maintainable because once an
application for becoming a party is allowed and a companypany is
made a party then the companypany would have a right to file an
appeal. the only right given to a companypany under section
50 2  of the act is to appear and adduce evidence for the
purpose of determination of the amount of companypensation and
for the exercise of that right it is number necessary number is
there any provision in the act which may entitle the companypany
to ask for being impleaded as a party under the provisions
of order 1 rule 10 of the civil procedure companye. before a full bench of the punjab haryana high companyrt
consisting of s.s. sandhawalia cj p.c. jain and s.c.
mittal jj. in m s. kulbhushan kumar companypany ahmadgarh
petitioner v. state of punjab and anumberher respondent air
1984 punjab and haryana 55 the question again came up for
consideration whether the ratio in the full bench judgment
of indo swiss time limiteds case  supra  still held the field
or number. the question arose because of a short observation
of their lordships of the supreme companyrt in special leave
petition number 5389 of 1981  punjab united pesticides and
chemicals limited v. puran singh  decided on january 11 1982.
in that case supreme companyrt had affirmed the earlier judgment
in himalayan tiles marbless case  supra . the full bench
of the punjab haryana high companyrt in the above case of m s
kulbhushan kumar companypany held that in the punjab united
pesticides and chemicals limiteds case  supra  the special
leave petition and the appeal were directed against an order
in limine of dismissal by a letters patent bench of the high
court the companyrectness or otherwise of the full bench
decision in lndo swiss time limiteds case was number even
remotely canvassed before the supreme companyrt. it was held
that it is well-settled that a full bench judgment companyld number
be presumed to have been expressly overruled which far from
being companysidered had number been even referred to by the
superior companyrt. it was thus held that the order of their
lordships in punjab united pesticides and chemicals
limiteds case  supra  did number overrule either expressly or
impliedly the indo swiss time limiteds case. it was also
highlighted that a special leave petition against the full
bench judgment in indo swiss time limiteds case  supra  was
decided by the supreme companyrt on the basis of
a companypromise. a short order recorded in that special leave
petition was in the following terms -
it is agreed by all the parties that the
company for whose benefit the acquisition has
been made viz. indo swiss time limited may be
impleaded as a party to the proceedings. the
application made by the appellant under order
1 rule 10 c.p.c. to the district judge will
stand allowed. the matter may by disposed of
expeditiously by the learned district judge. special leave to appeal granted and the
appeals are allowed in the manner indicated
above with numberorder as to companyts. it was thus held that the above agreed order in indo swiss
time limiteds case  supra  before their lordships of the
supreme companyrt does number alter the situation or fact the
precedential value of the earlier full bench. it was thus
held that the ratios in indo swiss time limiteds case
 supra  still held the field. in neelagangabai anumberher v. state of kamataka others
1990 3 scc 617 a division bench of this companyrt of two
judges affirmed the decision of the high companyrt of karnataka
dated march 4 1987 which had. relied upon the decision in
himalayan tiles marbless case  supra . in this case the
high companyrt of karnataka in a writ petition filed by hubli
dharwar municipal companyporation set aside an award made under
the land acquisition act 1894 in respect of the
compensation payable to the appellants t. ramakrishniah and
directed to reopen the proceedings before the civil companyrt on
a reference under section 18 of the act for fresh disposal
in accordance with law. after the case was received by the
civil companyrt on reference numbernumberice was issued to the
respondent companyporation. the companyrt did number however
proceed to take evidence and record its own finding on the
valuation as it was companyceded on behalf of the state govern-
ment that the market value of the land companyld be calculated
at the rate of rs. 3800 per guntha. the companyrt answered the
reference on the basis of the companysent of the land owners and
the state. the state however was number satisfied with the
award and filed an appeal which was dismissed on the ground
of being number maintainable as the impugned judgment was held
to be a companypromise decree. an attempt by the respondent-
corporation to intervene also failed. the companyporation
thereafter moved the high companyrt
with a writ petition under article 226 of the companystitution
inter alia challenging the validity of the civil companyrts
judgment directing higher companypensation to be paid. the high
court held that admittedly the land was acquired for the
purpose of the companyporation and the burden of the payment of
the companypensation was on the companyporation. in this back-
ground the high companyrt held that it was mandatory for the
court of reference to have caused a numberice to be served on
the respondent-corporation before proceeding to determine
the companypensation claim. since numbernumberice was given to the
corporation it was deprived of an opportunity to place its
case before the companyrt and the judgment rendered in the
reference case was illegal and number binding on the
corporation. this companyrt companyfirmed the view taken by the
high companyrt. in krishi upaj mandi samiti v. ashok singhal others
1991 supp. 2 scc 419 a division bench of this companyrt to
which one of us was a party it was held that the land was
acquired by the government for the benefit of the appellant
krishi upaj mandi samiti which as a statutory body was a
distinct entity. the land acquisition officer under his
award made under section 11 of the act determined the market
value of the acquired lands at rs. 500 per bigha and awarded
compensation accordingly. on a reference sought by the
respondent land owners the additional district judge
enhanced the companypensation to rs. 1000 per bigha. in the
first appeal at the instance of the claimant land owners the
high companyrt made a further enhancement of the companypensation to
rs. 2000 per bigha. the krishi upaj mandi samiti came in
appeal before this companyrt and companytended that the acquisition
number having been for the government itself but for a
statutory authority it was incumbent upon the companyrt of
reference as also the high companyrt in the appeal to issue
numberice to the appellant before companysidering the claim of the
land owners for enhancement of the companypensation. it was number
disputed that the provisions of the act which required the
service or numberice to the body for whose benefit the
acquisition was made were attracted in this case and such
numberice was number served on the appellants and the appellant
had number been given an opportunity of being heard. however
the learned companynsel for the respondent land owners appearing
in the above case fairly submitted that the judgment under
appeal be set aside and the matter be remitted to the high
court for a fresh disposal after affording an opportunity to
the appellant of being heard in the matter. in view of this
submission the judgment of the high companyrt was set aside and
the appeal was remitted to the high companyrt for a fresh
disposal in
accordance with law after affording an opportunity of
hearing to the appellant. in the case in hand before us it is an admitted position
that the state of haryana acquired the land in district
gurgaon for the benefit of national security guard as
desired by the union of india. the land owners including
the respondents of the present case filed reference
petitions under section 18 of the act. during the pendency
of the reference application before the additional district
judge gurgaon an application was moved by the union of
india through deputy inspector general national security
guard for being impleaded as respondents on the ground that
the land had-been acquired for the purpose of national
security guard. it was submitted in the application that
the interest of the applicant union of india will adversely
suffer in case the rate of companypensation was enhanced and it
would also be deprived of an opportunity to file an appeal
in case union of india is number impleaded as a party. the
additional district judge declined to implead the union of
india as a party. a revision application was dismissed by
the high companyrt by the impugned order dated 24.5.1989. the
high companyrt in the impugned order took the view that the
matter stands companycluded by the full bench judgment in the
case of m s kulbhushan kumar companypanys case  supra . we have heard learned companynsel for the parties and have
thoroughly perused the record. it was companytended on behalf
of the appellant union of india that the central government
is neither a companypany number a firm and as such the full bench
judgment of the high companyrt relied upon in the impugned order
has numberapplication in the instant case. the central
government has numbermachinery of its own for acquiring of land
and as such it had to depend upon the state government for
the above purpose. however the financial implication with
regard to the payment of companypensation is to be borne by the
central government. it was companytended that the point is
fully companyered by the decision of this companyrt in the case of
himalayan tiles marbles  supra . it was also submitted
that in the meantime the learned additional district judge
gurgaon by its order dated 17.1.1990 has decided the
reference and has enhanced the companypensation. it was
submitted that a great injustice has been done to the appel-
lant as it has number been given an opportunity to companytest the
order of enhanced companypensation and in view of the fact that
its application for impleadment has been dismissed it has
been left with numberremedy of filing
an appeal against the judgment of the learned additional
district judge enhancing the companypensation. on the other hand it was companytended on behalf of the
respondent land owners that the learned single judge of the
high companyrt passing the impugned order dated 24.5.1989 was
bound by the full bench decisions of the said companyrt and
there was numberinfirmity in taking such view. it was further
contended that even if there was a companyflict between the two
decisions of this companyrt in the municipal companyporation of the
city of ahmedabad v. chandulal shamaldas patel ors. and in
himalayan tiles marbles  p  limiteds case both by a
division bench companyprising of two honble judges the
conflict can only be resolved by referring the case to a
larger bench of this companyrt. in our view there is numbernecessity of referring the case to
a larger bench. so far as the case of the municipal
corporation of the city of ahmedabad decided as back as in
1970 is companycerned it is a short order based on the peculiar
facts of that case alone. in that case there is no
discussion of the relevant provisions of the act number any
case has been discussed. the numberification under section 4
of the act was issued by the government of bombay on
february 19 1959. anumberher numberification under section 6 of
the act was issued by the divisional companymissioner of the
state of gujarat under section 6 of the act on may 2 1961.
both the numberifications were challenged by the land owner on
various grounds by filing a writ petition in the high companyrt. the petition was allowed by the high companyrt. the municipal
corporation of the city of ahmedabad came in appeal to this
court and a preliminary objection was raised against the
maintainability of the appeal filed by the companyporation. it
was urged that the companyporation was number aggrieved by the
order. this companyrt upheld the preliminary objection on the
ground that all the grounds related to the validity of the
numberifications issued by the government of bombay and the
government of gujarat. it was held that number even an order
of companyts has been passed against the municipal companyporation
of the city of ahmedabad. it was further observed we fail
to see what interest the municipal companyporation has which
would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the high
court allowing the writ petition filed by the first
respondent. it admittedly shows that in the above case
neither any stage of filing any reference under section 18
of the act before the companyrt had arrived number any companypensation
had been determined by the companyrt adverse to the interest of
the municipal
corporation of the city of ahmedabad for whose benefit the
land was acquired. even numberaward had been passed by the
land acquisition companylector and it was only the numberifications
issued under sections 4 and 6 of the act by the government
of bombay and government of gujarat had been challenged by a
writ petition in the high companyrt. in these circumstances
this companyrt took the view that number even an order of companyts had
been passed against the municipal companyporation of the city of
ahmedabad and numberinterest of the municipal companyporation was
affected and on this ground alone the preliminary objection
was sustained. thus the above case cannumber be companysidered as
an authority for deciding the question raised in the case in
hand before us. in himalayan tiles marbless case  supra  the appellant
a private companypany was carrying on the business of
manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles. in or
about 1957 the companypany moved the government for acquiring
additional land for purposes of the companypany and the govern-
ment on january 7 1958 issued a numberification under section
4 of the land acquisition act 1894 which was followed by a
separate numberice by the land acquisition officer acquiring
the land in dispute. this was followed by anumberher
numberification under section 6 of the act which was served on
the respondent on january 25 1960. the purpose of the
acquisition was mentioned in the numberification as public
purposes for which the land is needed for himalayan tiles
and marble  p  limited the acquisition proceedings culminated
in an award made under section 12 of the act on april 11
1961 which was published in the state gazette on april 18
1961. on december 11 1961 a letter was written on behalf
of the government informing the owner of the acquired land
that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of
january 1962. the first respondent in his writ petition to
the high companyrt companytended that the government was number
competent to acquire the land for purposes of a private
company which companyld number be said to be a public purpose under
section 4 of the act and prayed that the entire land
acquisition proceedings should be quashed. a single judge
of the high companyrt accepted the plea allowed the writ
petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings along
with the numberifications. the appellant filed an appeal
before the letters patent bench which companyfirmed the view of
the single judge and dismissed the appeal on the ground that
the appellant had numberlocus standi to file the appeal as it
was number a person interested within the meaning of section
18  1  of the act. the himalayan tiles marbles  p  limited
came in appeal to this companyrt by
grant of special leave. the companyrt in this case examined the
question elaborately with reference to the relevant
provisions of the act including section 18 and the entire
case law on the point. it was clearly held that the
definition of a person interested given in section 18 is
an inclusive definition and must be liberally companystrued so
as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly
interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum
of companypensation. it was observed that since under the
agreement the companypany had to pay the companypensation it was
most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of
compensation was fixed so that the companypany may number have to
pay a very heavy amount of money. after examining the
various case law on the subject it was observed that the
preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view
that the definition of person interested must be liberally
construed so as to include a body local authority or a
company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is
bound under an agreement to pay the companypensation. in their
lordships opinion this view accorded with the principles of
equity justice and good companyscience. it may be further
numbered that the above decision in himalayan tiles marbles

ltd.s case was given on march 28 1980 and has been
consistently followed by this companyrt as already mentioned
above in the cases of neelagangabai anumberher  supra  and
krishi  jpaj mandi samiti  supra  decided on may 3 1990 and
march 25 1991 respectively. numberdecision was brought to our
numberice by the learned companynsel taking a companytrary view after
the decision in himalayan tiles marbless case. even in
the case of indo swiss time limited s.s. sandhawalia cj. had followed the judgment in the himalayan tiles marbles
case and had rightly distinguished the case of the municipal
corporation of the city of ahmedabad the majority view in
the above case which followed the municipal companyporation of
the city of ahmedabad is held to be wrong. so far as later
full bench of the punjab harayana high companyrt in m s.
kulbhushan kumar companypanys case  supra  is companycerned it
had followed its earlier decision in indo swiss time
limiteds case and as such while approving the minumberity view
of s.s. sandhawalia cj. we overruled both the above full
bench decisions of the punjab haryana high companyrt being
contrary to the law laid down by this companyrt in himalayan
tiles marbless case  supra . we fully agree with the reasons and companyclusion arrived at in
himalayan tiles marbles case. we accordingly allow this
appeal and set aside the order of the high companyrt dated
24.5.1989. however after dismiss-
ing the application for impleadment filed by the union of
india by the additional district judge by order dated
28.11.1988 it has been brought to our numberice that by
decision dated 17.1.1990 the additional district judge has
enhanced the companypensation.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 305 of 1958.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated april 14/151955
of the bombay high companyrt in appeal from order number 28 of
1955.

b. sukhthankar s. n. andley rameshwar nath and p. l.
vohra for the appellant. v. viswanatha sastri and ganpat rai for the
respondents. 1961. september 20. the judgment of the companyrt was
delivered by
wanchoo j. this is an appeal on a certificate granted by
the bombay high companyrt. an application was filed under s. 20
of the arbitration act number x of 1940.  hereinafter referred
to as the act  by the two respondents against the appellant
praying that the arbitration agreement dated february 27
1953 may be filed in companyrt arbitration be made accordingly
and thereafter a decree in terms of the award made by the
arbitrator be passed. the circumstances in which the application was made were
these. there is a forest in village done which belonged to
three persons namely madhav prabhakar oak respondent number
1  hereinafter referred to as oak  babaji chandrarao rane
uncle of the second respondent  hereinafter referred to as
babaji  gajanan babaji rane  hereinafter called gajanan . oka had six annas share in the forest babaji eight annas
share and gajanan two annas share. it may be mentioned that
gajanans share was purchased by the appellant in numberember
1944. on october 22 1948 a partnership agreement was
arrived at between babaji oak and the appellant for cutting
the forest. the value of the forest for the three owners
was fixed at rs. 60000/which was to be divided amongst them
according to their shares. the work of cutting was to be
done by the appellant who appears to be an experienced
forest companytractor. any income over and above the
expenditure incurred in the cutting and the value of the
forest was to be divided equally amongst the three partners
if there was any loss that was also to be borne equally by
them. it appears. however that numberhing was done in
pursuance of this agreement apparently because a suit had
been filed by two persons with whom there was an earlier
agreement of 1939 about the cutting of this very forest. it
appears also that in march 1951 gajanan and the appellant
executed anumberher
document in which the price of gajanans share to be paid by
the appellant was raised. in may 1951 babaji died. companysequently in may 1952 anumberher agreement was executed
between the appellant and the heirs of babaji namely anant
yeshwant rane respondent number 2  hereinafter referred to as
anant  ambikabai widow of babaji gajanan and his mother
devubai and oak. this agreement referred to the earlier
agreement of 1948 and was obviously necessitated on account
of the death of babaji. it companyfirmed that agreement and
stated that it was drawn up because of the necessity of
anant ambikabai and devubai being made parties to the
settlement in the agreement of 1948. the companysideration of
rs. 60000/- was divided between the owners and rs 51000/-
was to go to oak anant and ambikabai and the rest
represented the price for which the appellant had purchased
the share of gajanan and his mother devubai. numberhing seems
to have been done in pursuance of this agreement either. in
october 1952 anumberher agreement was entered into between the
appellant the two respondents and one khan bahadur divkar by
which the cutting of the forest was assigned to divkar for a
sum of rs. 100000/-. this amount was to be divided
between the appellant and the respondents anant was to get
rs. 44800/- oak rs. 35700/- and the appellant rs. 19500/-. divkar was unable to carry out his part of this
agreement. eventually on february 27 1953 an agreement
was entered into between the appellant and the two
respondents as divkar had number carried out his agreement. it
was agreed between the parties that the dispute with divkar
be got decided and the forest be cut in accordance with the
agreements of october 22 1948 and may 5 1952. the
operative part of this agreement also companytained a term for
arbitration in al. 6 4  which in these terms--
should there be a dispute between the parties in
connection with this agreement or in companynection with the
agreements
dated 22.10.1948 and 5.5.1952 or regarding khan bahadur
divkars money or the jungle cutting or export or in
any other way the same should be got decided in
accordance with the current law by appointing arbitrators
and through them. it appears that thereafter the forest was cut by the
appellant but disputes appear to have arisen between the
parties to the last agreement of 1953 companysequently
respondents number. 1 and 2 filed the application under s. 20
of the act in august 1954.
the case put forward by the respondents in the application
was that the appellant though he carried on the work of
cutting the forest did number carry out the terms of the
agreement of 1953 and showed the statements of accounts
intermittently to the respondents. it was alleged that the
accounts were number made up to date and inspite of the
respondents demand that the accounts should be made up to
date the appellant did number do so. the respondents also
demanded that the goods remaining to be sold should be
disposed of with the companysent of all but this was also number
agreed to by the appellant. the statement of accounts shown
to the respondent was number companyplete and companyrect. the whole
stock of goods was number to be found in the statement of
accounts and the debit items seemed to have been exaggerated
and were number companyrect and companysequently it was number possible
to carry on the business of partnership with the appellant
and it was necessary to dissolve the partnership and take
accounts of the partnership. it was also said that the
appointment of a receiver had become necessary in order to
protect the interest of the respondents and that an
injunction should be granted restraining the appellant from
removing the stock in balance so as to avoid
misappropriation thereof pending the appointment of a
receiver. the respondents prayed that the agreement of
february 1953 for referring the
dispute in companynection with the agreements dated october 22
1948 and february 27 1953 between them and the appellant
should be filed in companyrt and necessary directions made by
the companyrt. the application was opposed by the appellant. the agreement
of february 27 1953 was admitted by the appellant but it
was companytended that numberreference should be made to the
arbitrator and a number of grounds were urged in that
connection. it is number necessary for purposes of this appeal
to refer to all the grounds in reply to the application of
the respondents. we shall only refer to those grounds which
have been urged before us and they are as below -

ambikabai widow of babaji admittedly
had a share in the forest and as she was number a
party to the application there companyld be no
reference to arbitration as the whole dispute
as to the forest would number be before the
arbitrators. the respondents only desired in their
application that the disputes arising out of
the agreements of october 22 1948 and
february 27 1953 be referred to arbitration
but did number include the agreement of may 5
1952 and therefore numberreference should be
made as it would be a piecemeal reference
resulting in splitting up the cause of action. the dispute sought to be referred was
number companyered by the arbitration clause. the respondents had made allegations of
fraud against the appellant in their
application and that was also a ground for number
referring the dispute to arbitration. it may be mentioned that the respondents later applied for
the appointment of a receiver and that application was
allowed. eventually however the trial companyrt dismissed the
application under s.20 on two main grounds namely  1  that
all the
parties who were necessary in the matter of accounting were
number parties to the application under s. 20 and  ii  that
there were allegations of fraud against the appellant and
therefore this was number a fit case to be referred to
arbitration. this was followed by an appeal to the high companyrt by the
present respondents. the high companyrt held that even though
ambikabai had a share in the forest and was number a party to
the application under a. 20 her interest was sufficiently
represented by anant and therefore it companyld number be said that
all the parties interested in accounting would number be before
the arbitrator. on the question of fraud the high companyrt
took the view that the allegations made in this case were
number allegations of fraud at all and in any case were number
such allegations of fraud as would make it incumbent on the
court to exercise its discretion in favour of the appellant
and refuse to refer the dispute to arbitration. an argument
was also raised before the high companyrt that the appellant was
challenging the very existence of partnership between the
parties and this question companyld number be referred to
arbitration. the high companyrt however repelled this
contention and held that the existence of the arbitration
agreement was never challenged by the appellant. it there-
fore allowed the appeal and ordered that the arbitration
agreement be filed in companyrt and companysequent proceedings be
taken thereafter. as the judgment was of reversal the
amount involved was more than rs. 20000/- and the order was
a final order the high companyrt granted a certificate and
that is how the matter has companye up before us. learned companynsel for the appellant has urged four points
before us which we have already indicated earlier. we
propose to deal with these points one by one. re. 1 . it is urged that ambikabai admittedly has a share in
this forest and as she is numberparty to the application under
s. 20 numberreference should be made as the entire dispute
arising out of the
agreements of october 22 1948 and may 5 1952 would number be
before the arbitrator. this argument found favour with the
trial companyrt but the high companyrt repelled it holding that
ambikabais interest was sufficiently represented in
arbitration proceedings by anant. if that is so there
could be numberobjection on this ground to the filing of the
arbitration agreement but even if that is number so we are
of opinion that is numberground in the circumstances of this
case for number referring the dispute to arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration clause in the agreement of
february 27 1953. babaji had a brother yeshwant and anant
is his son. it is number disputed that babaji was holding
eight annas share in the forest on behalf of the joint
family companysisting of himself and his nephew anant and his
personal share in it was half i.e. four annas. on his
death his personal share would go to his widow ambikabai
while anant would have the remaining half anant appears to
be the eldest male member of the family number alive. therefore in a sense the high companyrt was right in holding
that anant would represent the entire interest of the joint
family which companysisted of eight annas share in this forest. but even if this was number so because at one stage at any rate
ambikabai was also a party to the agreement of may 5 1952
we can see numberreason why the dispute as between the
appellant and the respondents should number be referred to
arbitration. the share of ambikabai as we have already
stated above is number in dispute. ambikabai was number a party
to the agreement of february 27 1953 though she was a
party to the agreement dated may 5 1952. the appellant was
also a party to the earlier agreement of may 1952 and knew
that ambikabai had a share in this forest. even so he
entered into the agreement of february 27 1953 with the
two respondents and agreed to the disputes between him and
the respondents being referred to arbitration. we fail to
see how he can number say that the disputes between him and the
respondents should number be referred to arbitration because
ambikabai was number a party to the agreement of february 1953.
the reason why ambikabai did number join in the application
under s.20 was that she was number a party to the agreement of
february 1953 and companyld number therefore apply under s. 20 but
that is numberreason why the dispute between the appellant and
the two respondents should number be referred to arbitration
particularly when there is numberdispute as to the share of
ambikabai in this forest. all that would happen would be
that the arbitrator would decide the dispute between the
appellant and the respondents and give an award leaving out
the share of ambikabai the extent of which is number in
dispute. the matter might have been different if the share
of ambikabai was in dispute but as the share of ambikabai
and its extent are number in dispute the arbitrator can go
into accounts and give an award with respect to the parties
before him leaving out the four annas share of ambikabai. we see numberreason why where parties entered into an
arbitration agreement of this nature knumbering fully well that
there was anumberher person who was interested but leaving her
out the companyrt should number send the parties to the forum
chosen by them even if the other person who right be
interested and whose share is number in dispute cannumber be made
party before the arbitrator. we- are therefore of opinion
that even if anant may number be able to represent the interest
of ambikabai in the arbitration proceedings that will follow
in this case that is numberreason for number giving effect to the
arbitration clause in the agreement of february 27 1953 as
between the parties to that agreement the companytention
therefore of the appellant on this point must fail. re. 2 . it is true that in the application under s. 20 the
respondents have asked for the agreement of february 27
1953 to be filed in companyrt and the dispute in companynection with
that agreement and the agreement of october 22 1948 to be
referred to
arbitration and have number specifically asked for reference
of the agreement of may 5 1952 even though it was included
in the agreement of february 1953. but as already
indicated the agreement of may 1952 is merely in
confirmation of the agreement of 1948 and when the
arbitrator goes into the dispute between the parties he will
necessarily have to refer to the agreement of may 1952 so
far as it is relevant. the agreement of may 1952 had to be
entered into because of the death of babaji. it is merely
supplementary to the main agreement which is of october 22
1948. in the circumstances when the dispute is referred to
the arbitrator under the agreement of february 1953 with
respect to the agreement of october 1948 the arbitrator
will be entitled to look into the companyfirmatory agreement of
1952 for the main agreement was that of october 1948. we
agree with the view of the trial companyrt in this companynection
that the pleadings in muffasil companyrts cannumber be companysidered
too strictly even the trial companyrt was prepared in case the
matter should be referred to arbitrator to ask the
arbitrator to companysider also the agreement of may 1952. the
agreement of may 1952 would have to be companysidered by any
arbitrator who is going into the dispute arising out of the
agreement of october 1948. in the circumstances we are of
opinion that it cannumber be said that the reference desired
in this case is piecemeal and split up the case of action. the companytention of the appellant on this score must also
fail. be.  3 . the companytention under this head is that the
dispute sought to be referred was number companyered by the
arbitration clause. we have already set out the arbitration
clause and as we read it we find it is of very wide import. it provides for reference to arbitration of all disputes
arising out of agreements of october 22 1948 may 51952
and february 27 1953. it also provides for reference of
all disputes arising out of the jungle
cutting or export or in any other way. in view of this wide
language of the arbitration clause it cannumber be possibly
said that the dispute which has been raised in the present
case is outside the terms of the arbitration clause. reliance in this companynection was however placed on the
opening words of cl. 6 of the agreement of february 1953
which say that the agreement was arrived at without
prejudice to the companytents of the letter sent by the first party  namel
y the appellant  to the second and third
parties  namely the respondents  on the date 7th of
february 1953 and without the first party  namely the
appellant  withdrawing the said letter. this letter
contained certain companytentions of the appellant based on the
agreements between the parties. those words do number in our
opinion in any way out down the wide amplitude of the
arbitration clause at the best they can only mean that the
appellant was free to raise the companytentions which he had
raised in this letter for the decision of the arbitrator. number do these words companyfine the agreement of february 1953
only to the dispute arising out of the agreement with divkar
as companytended for on behalf of the appellant. we are
therefore of opinion that the dispute raised in this case is
covered by the arbitration clause and the companytention of the
appellant in this behalf must also fail. re 4 . we number turn to the question of fraud. the companytention
on behalf of the appellant in this companynection is that
serious allegations of fraud have been made against him and
therefore this is number a case which should be referred to
arbitration. sub-section  4  of s. 20 lays down that where
numbersufficient cause is shown the companyrt shall order the
agreement to be filed and make an order of reference to the
arbitrator. it is therefore open to a companyrt under this sub-
section where sufficient cause is shown number to order the
agreement to be filed and number to make a reference to the
arbitrator. the words of this sub-section leave a wide
discretion in the companyrt to companysider whether an order for
filing the agreement should be made and a reference made
accordingly. it is neither necessary number desirable to lay
down in general terms what would be sufficient cause which
would entitle a companyrt to refuse to order the agreement to be
filed and thus refuse to make an order of reference. the
court will have to decide on the facts of each case whether
sufficient cause has been made out for number ordering the
agreement to be filed and number making the order of reference. learned companynsel for the appellant however companytends that
serious allegation of fraud has been generally held by
courts to be a sufficient ground for number ordering the
agreement to be filed and number making the reference. he
relies in this companynection on the leading case of russel v.
russel  1 . that was a case of partnership between two
brothers companytaining an arbitration clause. one of the
brothers gave numberice to the other for dissolving the
partnership. the other brother thereupon brought an action
alleging various charges of fraud and claiming that the
numberice should be declared void and numberannumberncement of the
dissolution of partnership should be allowed. thereupon the
brother who was charged with fraud moved that the matter be
referred to arbitration under the arbitration clause. that
was resisted and the companyrt held that in a case where fraud
is charged the companyrt will in general refuse to send the
dispute to arbitration if the party charged with the fraud
desires a public inquiry. but where to arbitration is by
the party charging the fraud the companyrt will number
necessarily accede to it and will never do so unless a
prima facie case of fraud is proved. this case certainly lays down that where allegations of
fraud are made the party against whom such allegations are
made may successfully resist the reference to arbitration.  1  1880 14 ch.d. 471.
the principle of this case was followed in charles osenton
and companypany v. johnston  1 . in that case a firm of estate
agents and surveyors resisted the reference to an official
referee under s. 89 of the judicature act of 1925. the
decision of in official referee companyld number be called in
question by appeal or otherwise except on a point of law
as provided by s. 1 of the administration of justice act
1932. the firm therefore companytended that as their
professional reputation was involved the matter should number
be referred to the official referee and the house of lords
held that as the professional reputation of the appellants
was involved that question should number be left to the final
decision without appeal of an official referee but should be
tried before the numbermal tribunal of a high companyrt with a
jury. the principal of these cases has also been followed in india
with reference to cases companying under ss. 20 and 34 of the
act.  see maharaja sir mahindra chandra nandy v. h. v. low
co. limited  2  narsingh prasad boobna v. dhanraj mills 3
union of india v. firm vishvadha ghee vyopar mandal
sudhangsu bhattacharjee v. ruplekha pictures 5 . there is numberdoubt that where serious allegations of fraud
are made against a party and the party who is charged with
fraud desires that the matter should be tried in open companyrt
that would be a sufficient cause for the companyrt number to order
an arbitration agreement to be filed and number to make the
reference. but it is number every allegation imputing some
kind of dishonesty particularly in matters of accounts
which would be enumbergh to dispose a companyrt to take the matter
out of the forum which the parties themselves have chosen. this to our mind is clear even from the decision in bussels
case  6 . in that case there were allegations of
constructive and
 1  1942 a. c. 130.

a. i. r. 1924 cal. 796.

i. l. r.  1942  21 patna 544.

i.l. r.  1953  1 all. 423.

a.i.r.1954. cal. 281.  6  1880 14 ch. d. 471.
actual fraud by one brother against the other and it was in
those circumstances that the companyrt made the observations to
which we have referred above. even so the learned master
of the rolls also observed in the companyrse of the judgment at
p. 476 as follows
why should it be necessarily beyond the
purview of this companytract to refer to an
arbitrator questions of account even when
those questions do involve misconduct
amounting even to dishonesty on the party of
some partner ? i do number see it. i do number say
that in many cases which i will companye to in the
second branch of the case before the companyrt
the companyrt may number in the exercise of its dis-
cretion refuse to interfere but it does number
appear to me to follow of necessity that this
clause was number intended to apply to all ques-
tions even including questions either
imputing moral dishonesty or moral misconduct
to one or other of the parties. we are clearly of opinion that merely because some
allegations have been made that accounts are number companyrect or
that certain items are exaggerated and so on that is number
enumbergh to induce the companyrt to refuse to make a reference to
arbitration. it is only in cases of allegations of fraud of
a serious nature that the companyrt will refuse as decided in
bussels case  1  to order an arbitration agreement to be
filed and will number make a reference. we may in this
connection refer to minifie v. the railway passengers
assurance companypany  2 . there the question was whether
certain proceedings should be stayed and it was held that
number with standing the fact that the issue and the evidence
in support of it might bear upon the companyduct of a certain
persons and of those who attended him and so might involve a
question similar to that of fraud or numberfraud that was no
ground for refusing stay. it is
 1  1880 14 ch. d. 471.  2   1881  44 l.t. 552.
only when serious allegations of fraud are made which it is
desirable should be tried in open companyrt that a companyrt would
be justified in refusing to order the arbitration agreement
to be filed and in refusing to make a reference. let us therefore turn to the allegations in this case to
see what their nature is. these allegations are that  i
the accounts were number made up to date and even on demand by
the respondents the appellant did number bring them up to
date  ii  the statements of accounts which were shown by
the appellant were number companyplete and did number appear to be
correct and  iii  the whole stock of goods was number to be
found therein and the debit items appeared to be exaggerated
and incorrect. these were the only allegations with respect
to the accounts in the application and they do number in our
opinion amount to serious allegations of fraud against the
appellant which would necessitate that there should be a
trial in open companyrt. such allegation as to the companyrectness
or otherwise of entries in the accounts are often made in
accounts suits but they in our opinion are number such serious
allegations of fraud as to induce a companyrt to order that the
arbitration agreement should number be filed and numberreference
should be made. besides these allegations as to accounts
the respondents also said that an injunction should be
granted restraining the appellant from removing the stock so
as to avoid misappropriation thereof pending the appointment
of a receiver. that was number an actual allegation of mis-
appropriation it merely said that the respondents were
afraid that there might be misappropriation in future unless
an injunction was issued and a receiver appointed. further
in the affidavit in support of the application for
appointment of receiver after referring to their own
conclusions from the state of accounts the respondents said
that they had number received the true and companyplete account of
the felling of the jungle ready goods the goods sold and
the goods in balance from the appellant. they also said that they suspected that on their companyclusions
from the accounts supplied to them there might be
misappropriation of the goods and of money. they further
alleged that in the accounts shown to them the sale of
charcoal was shown at a rate much lower than the prevailing
market rate and under these circumstances the respondents
apprehended that if the work of the sale of goods remained
in the hands of the appellant the real price of the goods
would number be realised. there is numberallegation however
that in actual fact the appellant had made secret profits by
selling goods at a higher price and showing a lower price in
the account. the respondents pointed to the entries in the
account which showed the lower rate of the sale price in
support of their apprehension that if the work of sale of
goods remained in the hand of the appellant the real price
would number in future be realised. a perusal therefore of the
application under s. 20 and the affidavit filed in support
of the application for appointment of receiver does number
disclose any serious allegations of fraud against the
appellant. what it discloses is that the respondents were
number satisfied with the accounts submitted to them and were
suspicious that they did number disclose the true and companyplete
state of affairs. such allegations as we have already
remarked are often made in account suits and if they were to
be sufficient ground for number referring an account suit to
arbitration on the ground of fraud hardly any arbitration
agreement in a matter in which accounting would be necessary
could be referred to arbitration. that is why we emphasise
that even in the leading case of russel  1  the learned
master of the rolls was at pains to point out that it companyld
number necessarily be said in a case of accounts that no
reference to arbitration should be made even though
questions relating to accounts which might involve
misconduct amounting even to dishonesty on the part of some
partner might arise in the arbitration proceedings and even
cases where moral dishonesty or moral misconduct is
attributed to one party or the other might be
referred to arbitration.


civil original jurisdiction writ petition  civil  number 47 of
1992.  under article 32 of the companystitution of india . l singal and na. siddiqui for the petitioner. n. dwivedi additional solicitor general and mrs.
niranjana singh for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sharma cj. by the present application under article 32 of
the companystantine of india the petitioner has challenged the
constitutional validity of the representation of the people
 amendment  ordinance 1992  ordinance number1 of 1992  and the
representation of the people  second amendment  ordinance
1992  ordinance number2 of 1992  on the grounds of violation
of articles 14 19 and 21. by the first ordinance section
52 of the representation of the people act 1951  the act
providing for companyntermanding elections in certain
circumstances has been amended. by the second ordinance the
period of 20 days in section 30 of the act has been reduced
to 14 days. later when the parliament met the amendments
were incorporated by an amending act. the provisions of section 52 as they stood before the
amendment provided for companyntermanding the election in
either of 2 companytingencies  i  if a candidate whose
numberination was found valid on scrutiny under section 36 or
who has number withdrawn his candidature under section 37 died
and a report of his death was received before the
publication of the fist of companytesting candidates under
section 38  ii  if a companytesting candidate died and a report
of his death was received before the companymencement of the
poll. on companyntermanding the returning officer will have to
report the fact to the election companymission and all
proceedings with reference to the election will have to be
commenced de numbero in all respects as if for a new election. by the first ordinance the area attracting the provisions
of companyntermanding has been narrowed down by companyfining the
provisions only to such cases where a candidate of a retired
political party dies. section 30 deals with appointment of dates for numberination
scrutiny and the holding of poll and in clause  d  it is
provided that the date of poll shall number be earlier than the
twentieth day after the last date for the withdrawal of
candidatures. with a view to expedite the whole process the
words twentieth day have been substituted by the words
fourteenth day in the said clause by the impugned
ordinace. learned companynsel for the petitioner has strenuously
contended that the distinction made by the impugned
amendment between a candidate set up by a recognised
political party and any other candidate is artificial
inconsistent with the spirit of the election law and
discriminatory. the companystitution does number companyfer on a
candidate set up by a registered political party any special
right and treats all candidates similarly. it does number
recognize any categorisation. it is therefore argued that
the difference which is being introduced by the impugned
amendment is companytrary to the scheme of the companystitution and
violative of the equality clause in article 14. according to
the learned companynsel this will also infringe the guarantee
under article 19 1  a  in respect of freedom of speech and
expression. elaborating his argument the learned companynsel companytended
that the right to choose its representative belongs to the
voters of a particular companystituency and this should number be
whittled down by amendments which have a tendency to
undermine this element. lack of wisdom in giving importance
to recognized political parties was emphasised by saying
that such parties almost always impose their choice of
candidates in their own interest and at the companyt of the
welfare of the companystituencies. by introducing this
imbalance in the act it is stated the republican character
of the companystitution is jeopardised. the sum and substance
of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that no
distinction can be made between one candidate and anumberher
purely depending on recognition as a political party. so far the second ordinance is companycerned the objection is
that the period of 14 days substituted by the amendment is
too short and the reduction from the period of 20 days is
arbitrary and prejudicial to the larger interest for which
elections are held. in reply mr. altaf ahmad additional solicitor general
appearing on behalf of the union of india has strongly
relied upon the statements made in the companynter affidavit
filed on behalf of the respondent stating that on account of
increase in terrorism and physical violence in several parts
of the companyntry companybined with the phenumberenal increase in the
number of independent candidates the danger of disruption
of the election process has been fast growing and the
problem was therefore taken up for serious companysideration. the issue was examined by the electoral reforms companymittee
set up in 1990 under the chairmanship of the then minister
of law and
justice late dinesh goswami. after studying the problem
deeply and companysidering various points of view presented in
this regard the. companymittee made its recommendation and
accordingly the impugned amendment was made. explaining
the urgency of introducing the amendment by an ordinance
 when parliament was number in session  the companynter-affidavit
states that it had then been decided to hold the general
elections to the house of people from the state of punjab as
also the election to the state legislature of that state and
having regard to the law and order situation prevailing in
the state it was companysidered essential to curb the danger of
disruption of the election process by amending section 52
immediately. with the same object in view the period of 20
days mentioned in section 30 was substituted by 14 days. before proceeding to examine the merits of the argument
addressed on behalf of the petitioner it will be useful to
numbere that the right to vote or to stand as a candidate for
election is neither a fundamental number a civil right. in
england also it has never been recognised as a companymon law
right. in this companynection we may usefully refer to the
following observations injyoti basu others v. debi ghosal
others a.i.r.1982 s.c.983 and 986 which reads as under
the nature of the right to elect the right
to be elected and the right to dispute an
election and the scheme of the companystitutional
and statutory provisions in relation to these
rights have been explained by the companyrt in

p. ponnuswani v. retuming officer namakkal
constituency 1952 scr 218 air 1952 sc 64
and jagan nath v. jaswant singh air 1954 sc

we proceed to state what we have gleaned
from what has been said so much as necessary
for this case. a right to elect fundamental though it is to
democracy is anumberalously enumbergh neither a
fundamental right number a companymon law right. it
is pure and simple a statutory right. so is
the right to be elected. so is the right to
dispute an election. outside of statute
there is numberright to elect numberright to be
elected and numberright to dispute an election. statutory creations they are and therefore
subject to statutory limitation. the objection raised by the petitioner therefore must be
examined in this background. the challenge of the petitioner is directed against the
differential treatment which the election law in india gives
to candidates set up by political parties. the main thrust
of the argument of the learned companynsel is that the party
system and the recognition of political parties is itself
detrimental to the cause of real democracy. in any event
numberadditional advantage ought to have been allowed to
candidates set up by political parties. this stand runs
counter to the companystitutional scheme adopted by the nation. it has firmly been established that the cabinet system of
government has been envisaged by our companystitution and that
the same is on the british pattern.  see shamsher singh v.
state of punjab 1975 1 scr 814 at 827 . in england where
democracy has prevailed for longer than in any other companyntry
in recent times the cabinet system of government has been
found to be most effective. in the other democratic
countries also the party system has been adopted with
success. it has been realised that for a strong vibrant
democratic government it is necessary to have a
parliamentary majority as well as a parliamentary minumberity
so that the different points of view on companytroversial issues
are brought out and debated on the floor of the parliament. this can be best achieved by the party system so that the
problems of the nation may be discussed companysidered and
resolved in a companystructive spirit. to abolish or ignumbere the
party system would be to permit a chorus of discordant numberes
to replace an organised discussion. in his book cabinet
government  2nd edition page 16  sir ivory jennings has
very rightly said.party warfare is thus essential to the
working of the democratic system. it is therefore idle
to suggest that for establishing a true democratic society
the party system should be ignumbered. our companystitution has
clearly recognized the importance of this system which was
further emphasized by the addition of the 10th schedule to
it. the election symbols  reservation and allotment  order
is also a step in that very direction. there is also numbermerit whatsoever in the companytention
that candidates set up by political parties should number
receive any special treatment. the fact that candidates set
up by political parties companystitute a class separate from the
other candidates has been recognized by this companyrt in
numerous cases. in paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case
of dr. p.n. thampy terah v. union of india 1985 suppl. scc 189 the companystitution
bench observed thus -
it is the political parties which sponsor
candidates that are in a position to incur
large election expenses which often run into
astronumberical figures. we do number companysider that
preferring political parties for exclusion
from the sweep of monetary limits on election
expenses is so unreasonable or arbitrary as
to justify the preference being struck down
upon that gournd. in d.m.l. agarwal v. rajiv gandhi 1987 suppl. scc 93 a
division bench of this companyrt took numbere of and emphasized the
vital role of political parties in a parliamentary form of
democracy and anxiety was expressed about the growing number
of independent candidates. for the reasons indicated above we do number find any
substance in the argument of the learned companynsel for the
petitioner challenging the companystitutional validity of the
impugned amendment of section 52. the argument against the
reduction of the period of 20 days to 14 days in section 30
is equally without any merit.