civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2580 of 1969.
appeal from the judgment and order dated august 6 1969 of
the andhra pradesh high companyrt in writ petition number 3124 of
1967.

subba rao for the appellants. p. nayar for respondent number 1.

ram reddy and a. v. v. nair for respondents number. 2 and 3.

p. rao and t. v. s. narasimhachari for respondent number 4.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
beg j. this appeal from a judgment and order of the andhra
pradesh high companyrt dismissing the appeallants writ
petition companyes up before us by certificate under article
133 1  a  of the companystitution in the following
circumstances
one buchivenkata rao had filed application on 1-9-1959 and
1-8-1960 under mineral companycession rules there in after
referred to as the rules before the companylector of nellore
for the grant of a mining lease to him of an area mentioned
in his applications. he alleged that his applications
complied with the rules framed under the mines and minerals
 regulation and development act of 1957. the state
government rejected the application of 11-8-1960 on 7-12-
1960 but granted the application made on 4th october 1950
by the respondent kumara rajah of venkatagiri  hereinafter
referred to as venkatagiri . the ground on which the
application of the appellant rao was rejected was that
venkatagin had a prior claim. the appellant rao had then
preferred a revision application to the central government
under the mineral companycession rules which came into force on
11th numberember 1960.
the central government had rejected the revision application
on the ground that it was number filed within the prescribed
time. upon a writ petition filed in the high companyrt of
andhra pradesh the order of rejection of the revision
application by the central government was quashed. the
central government was directed to companysider raos
application on merits. the central government had after
giving due opportunity to be heard to the appellant rao
dismissed his application on 18th october 1967 holding
that venkatagiri had priority over his claim. rao then
filed a second writ petition which was dismissed on 26th
september 1969. the judgment and order of dismissal are
number under appeal before us. the judgment of the high companyrt shows that the appellant rao
had relied on the following three grounds only at the time
of agruments on his writ petition -firstly that the
application of venkatagiri was number made in accordance with
rule 27 and 32 of the said rules of 1949 secondly that
the application of venkatagiri was number for a fresh lease but
for the companytinuation of a previous lease so that it did number
fall within the purview of the rules and thirdly that the
central government had number companysidered in detail the various
comments offered by the state govt. with regard to each
ground of revision. a companytention numbericed by the high companyrt as a separate ground
of attack was that the central govt. had relied upon a
ruling of a single judge of the punjab high companyrt in j. a.
trivadi brothers v. union of india 1  holding that rules 27
to 29 did number make defective applications void but this
view had been reversed by a division bench of that companyrt. this was numberreally a separate ground but a companytention
relating to the effect of failure to companyply strictly with
rules 27 to 29 of the rules of 1949. the main companytention of
rao was that the application of venkatagiri had to be
disregarded as it failed to companyply with the rules and
therefore was number an application in the eye of law so
that out of several companypeting applications raos
application. ought to have been granted. the high companyrt
made it clear that other grounds were taken in rao
petition but were number argued there. in this companyrt a fresh
ground neither taken number argued before the high companyrt is
sought to be urged in addition to the other grounds before
the high companyrt which were repeated before us. we will take
up the grounds advanced in the high companyrt and again in this
court before companysidering the entertain ability of the fresh
ground. at this stage before dealing with the first ground we may
set out the relevant rules 27 and 32 of 1949 which run as
follows

application for mining lease-an
application for a mining lease shall in case
of land in which the mine-

a.i.r. 1959 punjab 589.
rals belong to government be made to the
state government companycerned through such
officer or authority as it may appoint in this
behalf and shall companytain the following
particulars -
 a  i  if the applicant is an individual his
name nationality profession and residence
and

if the applicant is a partnership firm a
company or an association or
body of
individuals whether in companyporated or number its
name nature and place of business place of
registration of incorporation and except in
the case of a companypany which is number a private
company as defined in the indian companypanies
act 1913  vii  of 1913  the names and
addresses of the individuals companystituting such
partnership firm companypany association or
body. the number and date of the numberification of
the grant or renewal of certificate of
approval of the applicant

a description illustrated by a map or
plan showing as accurately as possible the
situation boundaries and area of the land in
respect of which the lease is required

the mineral or minerals which the
applicant intends to mine

the areas and minerals within the
jurisdiction of the state government for which
the applicant or any person joint in interest
with him already holds a mining lease

if the applicant holds a prospecting
license for the area applied for the number
and date of such license

the period for which the lease. is
required and

the industry if any which the applicant
proposes to develop and the location of such
industry. explanation -the map or plan referred to in
item  c  should give sufficient information to
enable identification of the area in respect
of which the lease is required. priority- 1  if more than one
application regarding the same land is
received preference shall be given to the
application received first. unless the state
govern-
ment for any special reason and with the
prior approval of the central government
decides to the companytrary. provided that where more than one application
in respect of the same land is received on the
same day the state government after taking
into companysideration the matters specified in
sub-rule  2  and after obtaining the prior
approval of the central government may grant
the mining lease to such one of the applicants
whom it companysiders to be the most suitable. provided further that numberapplication shall be
deemed to be incomplete for the purposes of
this rule on account of the omission or
misdescription of the number and date of the
prospecting licence and of the profession or
residence or nationality in the case of an
individual or of the place of business in the
case of a partnership firm a companypany or an
association or body of individuals whether
incorporated or number if such omission or
misdescription is companyrected within a period
specified by the state government or an
officer appointed by that government in this
behalf. the matters referred to in the proviso to
subrule  1  shall be the following namely-

experience of the applicants in mining

financial soundness and stability of the
applicants

special knumberledge of geology or mining
and the technical staff already employed or to
be employed for the work. it is clear to us that the details mentioned in rule 27 are
intended for the companyrect identification of the individual to
whom the lease is to be granted the minerals which are to
be mined the area in respect of which the lease was to be
granted and the qualifications of the applicant. companysiderable emphasis was placed on the word shall in rule
32 with regard to the priority to be given between different
applicants. this rule does number directly affect the question
whether an application for a lease companyld be companysidered a
proper application or number by the authorities companycerned. the
second proviso to this rule however provides for the
manner in which certain defects may be cured. rule 32 sub-
rule  2  introduced in 1955 before the grant of the
application of venkatagiri shows that the individual
qualifications of the applicants including their special
knumberledge their capacity to engage technically efficient
staff their financial soundness and stability had to be
taken into account in determining the question of priority. again rule
26 imposing certain restrictions prohibits the grant of
the lease to any person who does number hold a certificate of
approval from the state government or who has number produced
an income tax clearance certificate. it does number prohibit
any grant on the ground that the application for it is
defective or number accompanied by a map. the form of the
application seems to be subordinate to the essential facts
to be taken into account before granting a lease. there is numberprovision in the act showing that the defects in
an application which is accompanied by the fee prescribed in
rule 28 cannumber be subsequently removed. the information
given in the application is intended for the satisfaction of
the authorities granting the lease so that after
considering inherits and making a grant proper details are
embodied in the lease actually granted. it was number urged
anywhere that as a result of any defects in the applica-
tion of venkatagiri the lease. itself companyld number be
executed. this indicates that the omission to file a proper
map initially was cured. the high companyrt had relied on a decision of this companyrt in
banarsi das v. cane companymissioner u.p.  1  where companyditions
similar to those laid down by rule 27 were held to be
directory. it had also held that even assuming that some
of the requirements in the rules may be mandatory it companyld
number be held that the mere want of a map or of details
describing the area for which the lease was applied for
would make the application itself void or of numbereffect. we
are therefore unable to find any error in the view adopted
by the high companyrt that the supply of necessary details was
directory and number mandatory. if it did number produce a defect
which affected the validity of the lease and the details
supplied in the application companyresponded with the companytents
of the lease after the alleged lacuna had been filed up the
grant of the lease to venkatagiri was valid. as regards the second ground that the application of
venkatagiri had to be interpreted as an application for the
continuation of an already existing lease and number for the
grant of a fresh lease we find that the high companyrt had
rejected this companytention by pointing out that the
application was on a form which companyplied with rule 27 so
that it companyld be treated as a fresh application. we find
numberhing wrong with the high companyrts interpretation of the
application made by venkatagiri. the high companyrt had also found as a fact that the order of
the central government disclosed that it was based on
relevant companysiderations and companyld number be said to have
omitted companysideration of anything material simply because
the details of matters companysidered were number fully set out. we companycur with this view and are

a.i.r. 1963 s.c. 1947. 671.
unable to hold that the order of the central government was
vitiated on the third ground urged on behalf of rao. we may number refer to the fresh question which was sought to
be raised on behalf of the appellant by means of an
application before us. this was that this companyrt had
pointed out in numberkala satharamaiah v. kotaiah naidu
ors.  1  that on 15th september 1956 the mineral
concession rules were amended and. a new sub-rule 28 1-a
was introduced which provided that every application under-
rule 27 shall be disposed of within nine months from the
date of its receipt and had held that the effect of- the
amended rule 57 which was further amended on 14-9-1956 was
that an application remaining undisposed of within the
period prescribed will be deemed to be rejected. it was
urged that we should allow this point to be argued for the
first time in this companyrt although it was neither raised number
argued in the high companyrt. it was submitted that this was a
pure question of-law on which numberinvestigation of facts
afresh was required. on the other hand it has been companytended on behalf of the
contesting respondent that a new point should number be
allowed to be urged at this stage for which reliance was
placed on bhagwati saran anr. v. state of uttar
pradesh 2  s. l. aggarwal v general manager hindustan
steel limited 3  chitra ghosh anr.v. union of india
ors.  4
even if we had been disposed to companysider this new ground on
the plea that exceptional circumstances justified our going
into it we must here point out anumberher fact which affects
the very maintainability of the appeal before us number.the
appellant b. rao died on 18-2-1970. his sons filed an
application in this companyrt on 20-7-1970 for impleading them
as the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. this application was tentatively allowed on 3-11-1970
under the orders of the registrar of this companyrt subject to
such objections to the rights of the substituted appellants
to be heard and to companytinue this appeal on behalf of the
deceased as may be taken before us at the hearing of the
appeal. it has to be remembered that in order to enable a legal re-
presentative to companytinue a legal proceeding the right to
sue or to pursue a remedy must survive the death of his
predecessor. in the instant case we have set out
provisions showing that the rights which an applicant may
have had for the grant of a mining lease on the strength of
an alleged superior claim cannumber be separated from his
personal qualifications. numberprovision has been pointed out
to us in the rules for impleading an heir who companyld
continue. the application for a mining lease. the scheme
under the rules
 1  1971  1  s.c.r. 153.  3  1970  3  s.c.r. 363 at 365.  2  1961  3  s.c.r. 563 at 568.  4  1970  1  s.c.r. 413 at 420.
seems to be that if an applicant dies a fresh application
has to be presented by his heirs or legal representatives if
they themselves desire to apply for the grant of a lease. it may be that the heir and legal representatives if they
are companytinuing the business or industry of the deceased and
have the required qualifications obtain priority over an
earlier applicant on account of special reasons for this
preference. but in each case they have to apply afresh
and set out their own qualifications. it has number been shown
to us that any of the legal representatives have applied
afresh. the legal representatives only claim to be
entitled to succeed the deceased buchivenkata rao under a
will. the assumption underlying the application is that
whatever right the deceased may have had to .obtain a lease
survived and vested in the heirs after his death. we are
unable to accept the companyrectness of this assumption. in support of the companytention on behalf of the heirs of
buchivenkata rao our attention was drawn to the case of
dhani devi v. sant bihari ors.  1  which related to a right
to obtain transfer of a permit for a motor vehicle under
section 61 sub. s. 1 2  of the motor vehicle act. it was
held there that in the case of the death of an applicant
for the grant of a permit in respect of his motor vehicle
the regional transport authority had the power to substitute
the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle in
place of the deceased applicant. it was pointed out there
that the right to the permit was related to the possession
of the vehicle. moreover there was a rule enabling the
transport authorities to substitute the heir or legal
representatives of the .deceased. numbersuch rule applicable
to the case of the heirs of the deceased buchivenkata rao
has been pointed out to us. therefore we are unable to
hold that the heirs who have been heard had any right to
continue the appeal before us. this feature of the case is
decisive number only on the right to be heard on the fresh
ground but also on the right to advance any argument in
support of the appeal of the deceased. we may mention that it was also urged that the matter was
so old that any reversal of the grant of the mining lease
to venkatagiri as long ago as 1960 would involve
considerable dislocation and injury to respondent
venkatagiri without any fault on his part. the respondent
venkatagiri must have invested companysiderable amount of money
in mining operations. the acceptance of the claim of
venkatagiri by the government on the strength of which
venkatagiri made his investment clothes venkatagiris claim
with an equity which companyld number be defeated without clear
proof of some legal right or interest of anumberher claimant.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
149/1958. appeal from the judgment and order dated october 27 1958
of the allahabad high companyrt in criminal appeal number 1154 of
1956.

c. chatterjee and r. l. kohli for the appellant. c. mathur and c. p. lal for the respondent. 1960. september 27. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
by
raghubar dayal j.-this is an appeal by padam sen and shekbar
chand against the order of the allahabad high companyrt
dismissing their appeal against the order of the special
judge meerut companyvicting them of an offence under s. 165-a
of the indian penal companye. the high companyrt granted leave to
appeal against its order. one genda mal father of shekhar chand appellant number 2
sued mithan lal and others in the companyrt of the additional
munsif ghaziabad for money on the basis of promissory
numberes executed by the defendants in his favour. the
defendants apprehending that the plaintiff would fabricate
his books of account with respect to payments made by them
applied for the seizure of the account books of the
plaintiff. the additional munsif by his order dated march
27 1954 appointed sri raghubir pershad vakil
commissioner to seize those books of account. the
commissioner accordingly seized those books and brought them
to ghaziabad. the appellants were companyvicted by the special judge under s.
165-a of the indian penal companye for having offered bribe to
the companymissioner for being allowed an opportunity to tamper
with those books of account. their companyviction was upheld by
the high companyrt. the two companyrts below have found that the appellants went to
the companymissioners office on march 30 1954 and offered him
rs. 900 as bribe. the appellants do number challenge these
findings of fact recorded by the companyrts below. their only
contention is that
sri raghubir pershad the companymissioner was number a public
servant and therefore even on the basis of the findings of
fact arrived at by the companyrts below they did number companymit any
offence under s. 165-a of the indian penal companye. it has been companytended for the appellants that the
appointment of sri raghubir pershad as companymissioner was null
and void as the additional munsif had numberpower to appoint a
commissioner for the purpose of seizing the account books of
the plaintiff on an application b application by the
defendants the power of a civil companyrt to issue a companymission
being limited by the provisions of s. 75 and order xxvi of
the companye of civil procedure  hereinafter called the companye
and the companyrt having numberinherent power to appoint a
commissioner for any purpose number mentioned in s. 75 and
order xxvi of the companye. on behalf of the state it is urged
that the companyrt can appoint a companymissioner in the exercise of
its inherent powers saved by s. 151 of the companye for purposes
which do number companye within the provisions of s. 75 and order
xxvi of the companye. it is further submitted for the state that even if the
additional munsif had numberpower to appoint the companymissioner
for seizing the books of account sri raghubir pershad would
be deemed to be a public servant in view of explanation 2 to
s. 21 of the indian penal companye because he was in actual
possession of the situation of a public servant for he acted
as companymissioner and was recognized as such by the appellants
and others companynected with the civil suit. section 75 of the companye empowers the companyrt to issue a
commission subject to companyditions and limitations which may
be prescribed for four purposes viz. for examining any
person for making a local investigation for examining or
adjusting accounts and for making a partition. order xxvi
lays down rules relating to the issue of companymissions and
allied matters. mr. chatterjee learned companynsel for the
appellants has submitted that the powers of a companyrt must be
found within the four companyners of the companye and that when the
code has expressly dealt with the subject matter of
commissions in s. 75 the companyrt cannumber
invoke its inherent powers under s. 151 and thereby add to
its powers. on the other hand it is submitted for the
state that the companye is number exhaustive and the companyrt in the
exercise of its inherent powers can adopt any procedure number
prohibited by the companye expressly or by necessary implication
if the companyrt companysiders it necessary for the ends of justice
or to prevent abuse of the process of the companyrt. section 151 of the companye reads
numberhing in this companye shall be deemed to
limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers
of the companyrt to make such orders as may be
necessary for the ends of justice or to
prevent abuse of the process of the companyrt . the inherent powers of the companyrt are in addition to the
powers specifically companyferred on the companyrt by the companye. they are companyplementary to those powers and therefore it must
be held that the companyrt is free to exercise them for the
puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the companye when the exercise of
those powers is number in any way in companyflict with what has
been expressly provided in the companye or against the
intentions of the legislature. it is also well recognized
that the inherent power is number to be exercised in a manner
which will be companytrary to or different from the procedure
expressly provided in the companye. the question for determination is whether the impugned order
of the additional munsif appointing sri raghubir pershad
commissioner for seizing the plaintiffs books of account
can be said to be an order which is passed by the companyrt in
the exercise of its inherent powers. the inherent powers
saved by s. 151 of the companye are with respect to the
procedure to be followed by the companyrt in deciding the cause
before it. these powers are number powers over the substantive
rights which any litigant possesses. specific powers have
to be companyferred on the companyrts for passing such orders which
would affect such rights of a party. such powers cannumber
come within the scope of inherent powers of the companyrt in the
matters of procedure which powers have their source in the
court possessing all the essential powers to regulate its
practice
and procedure. a party has full rights over its books of
account. the companyrt has numberinherent power forcibly to seize
its property. if it does so it invades the private rights
of the party. specific procedure is laid down in the companye
for getting the relevant documents or books in companyrt for the
purpose of using them as evidence. a party is free to
produce such documents or books in support of its case as be
relevant. a party can ask the help of the companyrt to have
produced in companyrt by the other party such documents as it
would like to be used in evidence and are admitted by that
party to be in its possession. if a party does number produce
the documents it is lawfully called upon to produce the
court has the power to penalize it in accordance with the
provisions of the companye. the companyrt has the further power to
draw any presumption against such a party who does number
produce the relevant document in its possession especially
after it has been summoned from it. even in such cases
where the companyrt summons a document from a party the companyrt
has number been given any power to get hold of the document
forcibly from the possession of the defaulting party. the defendants had numberrights to these account books. they
could number lay any claim to them. they applied for the
seizure of these books because they apprehended that the
plaintiff might make such entries in those account books
which companyld go against the case they were setting up in
court. the defendants request really amounted to the
courts companylecting documentary evidence which the defendants
considered to be in their favour at that point of time. it
is numberbusiness of the companyrt to companylect evidence for a party
or even to protect the rival party from the evil
consequences of making forged entries in those ac. companynt
books. if the plaintiff does forge entries and uses forged
entries as evidence in the case the defendants would have
ample opportunity to dispute those entries and to prove them
forgeries. we are therefore of opinion that the additional munsif bad
do inherent power to pass the order appointing a
commissioner to seize the plaintiffs
account books. the order appointing sri raghubir pershad as
commissioner for this purpose was therefore an order passed
without jurisdiction and was therefore a null and void
order. learned companynsel for the state mr. mathur has submitted in
the alternative that the impugned procedure adopted by the
additional munsif companyes within certain provisions of the
code and has referred to r. 5 of order xxxviii and rr. 1 b
and 7 of order xxxix and r. 1 of order xl of the companye. we
do number agree with this companytention. the impugned order was
number passed under any of these provisions. it was clearly an
order which the additional munsif purported to pass in the
exercise of the inherent powers of the companyrt. the order
was
it is strange that an application of this kind has been
made at this late stage after over 2 years. however in
the interests of justice issue companymission to sri raghubir
pershad. ho must go and recover bahi khatas for the year
1951 from the plaintiff and produce the same in companyrt. fees
rs. 20 plus t. a. report within six days. companyts of the
commission will number be taxed. further the provisions of r. 5 of order xxxviii are to
prevent a decree that may be passed being rendered
infructuous and r. 1 b  of order xxxix is applicable where
the defendant threatens to dispose of his property to
defraud creditors. numbere of these provisions has any
application to the facts of the present case. rule 7 of
order xxxix empowers the companyrt on the application of any
party to a suit to make an order for the detention
preservation or inspection of any property which is the
subject-matter of such suit or as to which any question may
arise therein. the account books of the plaintiffs were number
property which were the subject-matter of the suit number
such that about them a question companyld arise in the suit. the account books companyld at best have been piece of
evidence if the plaintiff or the defendant had cared to
rely on them. we therefore hold that the additional munsif
had numberpower under the companye to appoint the companymissioner for
seizing the plaintiffs books of account. lastly it was urged for the state that even if the
appointment of sri raghubir pershad as companymissioner was null
and void as the additional munsif had numberjurisdiction to
appoint a companymissioner for seizing the account books of the
plaintiff sri raghubir pershad should be treated to be a
public servant in view of explanation 2 to s. 21 of the
indian penal companye. it has number been disputed for the
appellant that if the appointment of sri raghubir pershad as
commissioner bad been valid he would have been a public
servant in view of the fourth clause to s. 21 of the indian
penal companye. explanation 2 to s. 21 reads
wherever the words public servant occur
they shall be understood of every person who
is in actual possession of the situation of a
public servant whatever legal defect there
may be in his right to hold that situation. the companytention for the state is that though there was a
legal defect in sri raghubir pershads appointment as
commissioner on account of the additional munsif having no
power to appoint a companymissioner for the purpose of seizing
the plaintiffs books of account that will number affect his
being a public servant as he was in actual possession of the
situation of a public servant. we do number agree with this
contention and are of opinion that the explanation applies
only when there be a post in existence. the explanation
does number apply when there is numberpre-existing post or when
the person appointing has numberauthority to appoint. the word situation according to websters new
international dictionary of the english language means
position or place of employment place office as a
situation in a store. the apposite meaning for the purposes
of this explanation would be office. office again
according to the same dictionary means a special duty
trust charge or position companyferred by an exercise of
governmental authority and for a public purpose a position
of trust or authority companyferred by an act of governmental
power a right to exercise a public function or employment
and receive the emoluments  if any  thereto belonging as
an executive or judicial office in a wider sense
any position or place in the employment of the
government especially one of trust or authority. the
dictionary further numberes the differences in the company. numberations of the various words office post appointment
situation and place and says office companymonly suggests a
position of  especially public  trust or authority and
situation emphasizes the idea of employment especially in a
subordinate position as to seek a situation as governess
as private secretary. it is therefore clear that it is necessary for the
application of this explanation that the person companycerned
should be in actual possession of the pre-existing office of
a public servant. if there be numberoffice or post there
could be numberquestion of any persons being in actual
possession thereof and of the person companycerned companying
within the terms of this explanation. there was numberpost or
office of a companymissioner in existence. all that happened
here was that sri raghubir pershad was authorized to seize
and keep certain documents in his possession. in the
present case there was neither any existing office of
commissioner number the additional munsif had power to appoint
sri raghubir pershad as companymissioner for the purpose of
seizing the plaintiffs account books and therefore this
explanation does number apply to the appointment of sri
raghubir pershad as companymissioner. it follows there.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1027 of 1967
appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated the
4th day of march 1965 of the punjab high companyrt at chandigarh
in regular second appeal number 1532 of 1961.
urmila kapoor and kamlash bansal for the appellants. c. manchanda n. k. aggarwal and m. l. aggarwal for
respondents 1-14 and 16-30.

n. prasad and s. p. nayar for respondent number 15
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
beg j.-the plaintiffs-appellants before us by grants of
certificate of fitness of the case for an appeal had filed a
suit on 20-4-1959 for possession against the defendants-
respondents of 331 kanals and 11 marlas of land the khasra
numbers of which are given in the plaint. the plaintiffs
were the sons of smt. premi a daughter of sham singh
 deceased  the original owner of the plots and of smt. malan who was the widow of sham singh had gifted the
plots in dispute in 1935 half and half to the plaintiffs
and smt. khemi the younger sister of their deceased
mother smt. premi. it appears that smt. khemi who was
issueless had also made a gift in favour of the plaintiffs
before her death in 1944. the plaintiffs are said to have
obtained possession of the whole land in dispute thus gifted
to them. but as there was companysiderable uncertainty at that
time about the rights of the daughters and the powers of a
widow to donate during her life time under the customary law
in punjab which was applicable to the parties the
defendats-respondents the 8th degree companylaterals of sham
singh had filed a suit on 3-7-1940 for possession of the
land in dispute. this suit had been stayed from 1941 to 29-
5-1946 under tbe-indian soldiers  litigation  act 1925 to
the benefits of which the plaintiffs were entitled. it
appears that there was also a dispute over mutation of names
between the plaintiffs and defendants-respondents in revenue
courts which ended finally by an order in favour of the
appellants donees passed by the financial companymissioner of
punjab on 13-12-1946. defendants-respondents suit of 1940
for declaration of rights and possession renumered in 1949
ended with the judgment and decree of a division bench of
the punjab high companyrt passed in favour of the appellants on
21-11-1958.
the plaintiffs asserted in their suit number 179 of 1959
filed on 16-4-1959 number before us in appeal that the
defendants-respondents had taken illegal and forcible
possession of the land in dispute after the decision of the
high companyrt on 21-11-1958 and that as the defendants-
respondents refused to deliver possession of the land to the
plaintiffs they were companypelled to file their suit for
possession. rhe defendantsrespondents however claimed that
they had taken possession over the whole of the land in
dispute after the death of smt. khemi issueless in 1944
and that since then they had been in open companytinuous
exclusive possession as owners adversely to the rest of the
world. hence according to the defendants-respondents the
plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation. there cannumber be the least doubt after looking at the
plaint that the plaintiffs-appellants having alleged
possession and dispossession for which they claimed relief
by delivery back of possession of the land in dispute to
them the case fell squarely within the ambit of art. 142 of
the limitation act of 1908. the defendants-respondents had
however pleaded the bar of limitation as well as
acquisition of title by their adverse possession for over 12
years. the trial companyrt had framed the first three issues which had
a direct bearing on the question whether art. 142 or 144 of
the limitation act of 1908 would be applicable. these
issues were

whether the plaintiffs obtained the
possession of the land in dispute through the
tehsildar near a-bout the date 13-12-1946 as
alleged by them in para 3 of the plaint ? o.p. whether the defendants took possession
of the land in dispute after 21-11-1958 as
alleged in para 5 of the plaint? o.p. whether the defendants have become
owners of the land in dispute through adverse
possession ? o.p. the trial companyrt rightly placed the burden of proof of the
first two issues on the plaintiffs and of the third issue
upon the defendants. it took up and decided the three
issues together holding that the plaintiffs suit is barred
by art. 142 of the limitation act. the first appellate
court also rejected the plaintiffs case of acquisition of
possession on 13-12-1946 and then of dispossession after 21-
11-1958. it accepted the defendants version. it observed
that the oral evidence companypled with the entries in the
revenue records companyclusively established that the possession
over the suit land right from 1946 up to the present time
was number that of the plaintiffs but that of the
defendants who had been asserting their own proprietary
rights as companylaterals of sham singh the husband of smt. malan. although numberissue was framed on-the applicability
of section 52 of the transfer of property act 1882 to such
a case yet the question appears to have been argued for
the first time before the first appellate companyrt which
relying upon a decision of the nagpur high companyrt in sukhubai

eknath bellappa  1  held that despite the established
possession of the defendants-respondents for over twelve
years the doctrine of lis pendens prevented the rights to
the defendants-respondents from maturing by adverse
possession. it held that the possession of the defendants-
respondents became adverse when their appeal in their suit
for possession was dismissed by the punjab high companyrt on 21-
11-1958. thus the first appellate companyrt had really used
section 52 of the transfer of property act as though it was
a provision for excluding the period of time spent in
litigation in companyputing the prescribed period of
limitations. the question whether the doctrine of lis
pendens companytained in sec. 52 of the transfer of property
act would govern such a case was referred by a division
bench to a full bench of the punjab high companyrt. n. grover j. giving the majority opinion of the full
bench of three judges of the punjab high companyrt held that
on the companycurrent

a.i.r. 1948 nagpur 97.
findings of fact recorded by the companyrts below the adverse
possession of the defendants who were appellants before the
high companyrt companymenced during the pendency of the earlier
suit and once having begun to run companyld number stop running
merely because of the pendency of the defendants suit for
possession which was finally dismissed by the high companyrt on
21-11-1958. on the other hand i. d. dua j. expressing
his minumberity opinion of the full bench of the high companyrt
held that the doctrine of lis pendens companytained in section
52 of the transfer of property act would enable the
plantiffs-appellants to overcome the companysequences of
defendants adverse possession until 21-11-1958 so that the
doctrine of lis pendens companyld operate as a provision
enabling exclusion of time during the pendency of the
defendants suit of 1940.
one of the questions attempted to be raised here involving
investigation of fresh facts was that a portion of the
land entered in revenue records as banjar cannumber be
adversely possessed at all because it is vacant so that it
must be deemed to be in the possession of plaintiffs oil the
principle that possession follows title. the plaintiffs
had number taken such a case even in their replication in
answer to the written statement of the defendants. apart
from the fact that the question does number- appear to have
been raised in the companyrts below we think that the plain-
tiffs admission of dispossession by the defendants
implying that the defendants-respondents were in actual
adverse possession of all the land in dispute debars
plaintiffs learned companynsel from-raising such a question
number. furthermore the patent fallacy underlying such a
contention is that banjar land is incapable of adverse
possession. it may be that banjar land cannumber be
cultivated but we do number think that it companyld possibly be
urged that it is per se in-capable of being actually
physically possessed by use for other purposes such as
building or storing of wood or crops aparts from
cultivation. we will say numbermore about this unsustainable
contention. it was then urged that art. 142 was number applicable to this
case and that numberquestion as to its applicability should
have been decided. we fail to see how such a companytention
could be advanced in view of the assertions in the plaint
which clearly companypelled the application of article 142 as
was held by a full bench of the allahabad high companyrt in
bindhyachal chand ors. v. ram gharib chand ors.  1
the question whether the suit is within time when the
plaintiffs make assertions attracting the application of
article 142 becomes a question of proof of title itself. without proof of subsisting title the plaintiffssuit must
obviously fail. it was said there by sulaiman c.j.  at
pager 999  -
in cases failing strictly under art. 142 in
which the only question is one of
discontinuance of possession of the plaintiff
and number of adverse possession of the
defendant the question of limitation in one
sense becomes the question of title because
by virtue of s. 28 limitation act. if the
claim is barred by time the title must be
deemed to be extinguished. a.i.r. 1934  fb  all. 993 at 999.
it is true that the extinction of title took place in the
case before us during the pendency of the suit. but it has
to be borne in mind that an extinction of title will number hit
by the doctrine of lis pendens simply. because it is an
extinction during the pendency of a suit. if so wide was
the sweep of section 52 of transfer of property act this
provision would have been differently worded. we are of
opinion that a case in which the extinction of title takes
place by an application of the specific and mandatory
provisions of the limitation act falls outside the scope of
section 52 of the transfer of property act. it would number be
governed by provisions of an act relating to transfer
defined by section 3 of the transfer of property act but by
the limitation act exclusively. it is immaterial in the case before us from the point of
view of extinction of title by an application of section 28
of the limitation act of 1908 whether article 142 or
article 144 of the limitation act is applible. the findings
of the companyrts below accepted as companyrect and binding by a.

grover j. in the majority judgment of the punjab high
court would make article 144 also of the act clearly
applicable to the case. all the elements of an open
adverse hostile companytinuous and exclusive possession of
the defendants for over 12 years were present her-. it would be idle to companytend in the case before us in view
of the pleadings of the parties and the issues framed and
decided that the applicability of article 142 of the
limitation act was either number put in issue by pleadings of
the parties or an issue on its applicability was number framed. the first two issues framed have a direct bearing on the
applicability or article 142. it is number necessary that the
issue farmed must mention the provision of law to be
applied. indeed it is the duty of the companyrt in view of
section 3 of the limitation act to apply the bar of
limitation where on patent facts it is applicable even
though number specifically pleaded. therefore we find no
force in the submissions based on the supposed
inapplicability of article 142 of the limitation act of 1908
or assumed defects in procedure adopted in applying it. the only question of some importance which companyld be said to
arise in this case is does the doctrine of lis pendens
contained in sec. 52 of the transfer of property act arrest
the running of the period of limitation during the pendency
of the suit of the defendants-respondents filed on 3-7-1940
and finally decided in second appeal by the high companyrt on
21-11-58 ? we may here set out section 52 of the transfer of property
act which runs as follows

during the pendency in any companyrt having
authority with in the limits of india
excluding the state of jammu kashmir or
established beyond such limits by the central
government of any suit or proceeding which is
number companylusive and in which any right to
immovable property is directly-and
specifically in question the property cannumber
be transferred or other wise dealt with by
any party to the suit or proceeding so as to
affect the rights of any other party thereto under
any decree or order which may be made
therein except under the authority of companyrt
and on such terms as it may impose. explanation.-for the purposes of this section
the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be
deemed to companymence from the date of the
presentation of the plaint or the institution
of the proceeding in a companyrt of companypetent
jurisdiction and to companytinue until the suit
or proceeding has been disposed of by a final
decree or order and companyplete satisfaction or
discharge of such decree or order has been
obtained or has become unumbertainable by reason
of the expiration of any period of limitation
prescribed for the execution thereof by any
law for the time being in force. the background of the provision set out above was indicated
by one of us  beg j.  in jayaram mudaliar v. ayyaswami
ors. 1 . there the following definition of lis pendens from
corpus juris secundum  vol. liv p. 570  was cited
lis pendens literally means a pending suit
and the doctrine of lis pendens has been
defined as the jurisdiction power or companytrol
which a companyrt acquires over property involved
in a suit pending the companytinuance of the
action and until final judgment therein. it was observed there
expositions of the doctrine indicate that the
need for it arises from the very nature of the
jurisdiction of companyrts and their companytrol over
the subject-matter of litigation so that par-
ties litigating before it may number remove any
part of the subjectmatter outside the power of
the companyrt to deal with it and thus make the
proceedings infructuous. it was observed there
the doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at
attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the
jurisdiction of a companyrt in which a dispute on rights or
interests in immovable property is pending by private
dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation
from the ambit of the companyrts power to decide a pending
dispute of frustrate its decree alienees acquiring any
immovable property during a litigation over it are held to
be bound by an application of the doctrine by the decree
passed in the suit even though they may number have been
impleaded in it. the whole object of the doctrine of its
pendens is to subject parties to the litigation as well as
others who seek to acquire rights in immovable property
which are the subject matter of a litigation to the power
and jurisdiction of the companyrt so as to prevent the object of
a pending action from being defeated. it is very difficult to view the act of taking illegal
possession of immovable property or companytinuance of wrongful
possession even if the wrong doer be a party to the pending
suit as a dealing with the property otherwise than by its
transfer so as to be companyered by section 52 of the transfer
of property act. the prohibition which prevents the immov-
able property being transferred or otherwise dealt with by
a party is apparently directed against some action which
would have an immediate effect.similar to or companyparable
with that of transfer but for the principle of lis pendens. taking of illegal possession or its companytinuance
 1  1972  2  s.c.c 200 217.
neither resemble number are companyparable to a transfer. they are
one sided wrongful acts and number bilateral transactions of a
kind which ordinarily companystitute deals or dealings with
property  e.g. companytracts to sell . they cannumber companyfer
immediate rights on the possessor. companytinued illegal
possession ripens into a legally enforceable right only
after the prescribed period of time has elapsed. it matures
into a right due to inaction and number due to the action of
the injured party which can approach a companyrt of appropriate
jurisdiction for redress by a suit to regain possession. the relief against the wrong done must be sought within the
time prescribed. this is the only mode of redress provided
by law for such cases. section 52 of the transfer of
property act was number meant to serve indirectly as a
provision or a substitute for a provision of the limitation
act to exclude time. such a provision companyld and would have
been there in the limitation act where it would appropria-
tely belong if the policy behind the law was to have such a
provision. the policy underlying statutes of limitation spoken of as
statutes of repose or of peace has been thus stated in
halsburys laws of england vol. 24 p. 181  para 130

policy of limitation acts. the companyrts
have expressed at least three differing
reasons supporting the existence of statutes
of limitation namely  1  that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them  2  that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove. a stale claim and  3
that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable diligence. the object of the law of limitation is to prevent
disturbance or depreviation of what may have been acquired
in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a partys own inaction negligence or laches. if section 52 of the transfer of property act was really
intended to strike at the running of the period of
limitation based on the companysiderations mentioned above it
would have made it clear that the law excludes the period
spent in any litigation from companyputation. exclusion of time
in companyputing periods of limitation is a different subject
altogether to which the whole of part iii of the limitation
act is devoted. there we find section 14 which deals with
exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in companyrt without
jurisdiction. there are certain companyditions for the
applicability of section 14 of the limitation act. one of
these is that the plaintiff should have prosecuted with due
diligence civil proceedings founded upon the same cause of
action. in the case before us the cause of action arose
according to the plaintiffs after the decision of the
previous suit. the cause of action in the previous suit was
entirely different. indeed it was the defendants-
respondents who had sought relief there and set up a cause
of action. section 14 of the limitation act of 1908 which
is the only provision of the statute specifically dealing
with exclusion of time spent in anumberher litigation companyld
number obviously apply to the case number before us. the only
mode of relief open to the plaintiffs was to have instituted
a suit of their own within the prescribed period of
limitation. they
did institute the suit number before us but did so long after
the period of limitation had expired. in such a case
section 52 of the transfer of property act companyld number in our
opinion apply at all. the matter companyld only be companyered if
at all by some provision of the statute of limitation
which. as already observed makes numberprovision for such a
case. the effect of section 3 of limitation act is that it
expressly precludes exclusion of time on a ground outside
this act even if it parades under the guise of a doctrine
which has numberapplication whatsoever here. the majority judgment of the punjab high companyrt cites several
cases to support the view that limitation would start
running against the plaintiffs-appellants when the
defendants-respondents took possession. we need mention
only two of these cases subbaiya pandaram v. mohammad
mustapha marcayar 1  and narayan jivanumberda patil ans. v.
puttabai ors.  2  we are in companyplete agreement with the
majority view. it is number possible in the absence of any provision which
would entitle the plaintiffs to exclude time and thus bring
their suit within 12 years period of limitation to accept a
contention which would enable the plaintiffs to escape the
mandatory provisions of sec. 3 of the act read with section
28 and article 142 and 144 of the limitation act of 1908.
courts of justice cannumber legislate or reconstruct law
contained in a statuate or introduce exceptions when
statutory law debars them from doing so. even hard
circumstances of a case do number justify the adoption of such
a companyrse. moreover we fail to see how the plaintiffs companyld
complain of hardship when their own negligence or failure to
act in time enabled defendants to acquire rights by reason
of the operation of a law of limitation with the wisdom or
justice of which we are number companycerned here. a claim was sought to be advanced on behalf of the custodian
of evacuee property who is also a defendant-respondent
based on the provisions of section 8 sub. sec. 4 of the
administration of evacuee property act 1950. this question
was number gone into by the punjab high companyrt. as we are
affirming the full bench decision of the punjab high companyrt
dismissing the plaintiffs suit on the ground that it is
barred by limitation it is number necessary for us to give any
decision on any dispute between companydefendants-respondents
regarding the right to possess any property which may have
vested in the custodian evacuee property. a decision on
such a dispute is number necessary for deciding the case before us. there is therefore numberquestion of res-judicata
between companydefendants on the points raised. and we cannumber
allow

i.l.r. 46 mad. 751.

air 1945 p.c. 5.
the plaintiffs-appellants to raise any such question on
behalf of the custodian evacuee property as their learned
counsel seemed to be attempting to do in a desperate
attempt to clutch at a straw. the result is that we affirm the judgment and decree of the
punjab high companyrt and dismiss this appeal.


1995  3  scr 309

the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

hansaria j. leave granted. heard companynsel on both sides. the short but
important question which needs to be decided in these appeals is regarding
the extent of entitlement of pre-01.09.1986 pensioner in the state of
rajasthan under government order of even number dated 02.12.1989.

to decide the aforesaid question we need first to numbere the government
order of october 20 1987 on the subject of grant of minimum pension and
family pension to pre-01.09.1986 state governments pensioners. this order
states that the pension admissible to the just mentioned class of
pensioners taken together would number be less than rs. 300 per month. this
amount has been said in the order to include original pension plus
temporary increases in pension and increases in pension. then came the
order of december 2 1989 on the subject of grant of additional relief to
the aforesaid class of pensioners. it states inter alia that the
additional relief shall be admissible to the pre-01.09.1986 pensioners at
such rate which would depend upon the date of their retirement. the amount
of additional relief varies from rs. 50 to rs. 175. may we state that in
the present appeals we are number companycerned about the reasonableness of the
classification based on the dates of retirement. all that we have been
called upon to decide is whether in case of those pre-01-09-1986
pensioners who were to receive as per the order of october 20 1987
minimum of rs. 300 a further sum of rs. 75 visualised by the second order
has to be paid in all cases. the view taken by the high companyrt of rajasthan in the impugned judgment
is that all the above pensioners would be entitle to additional relief. the
state has preferred this appeal by special leaves. the learned state companynsel has put on record alongwith his written
submission number only the relevant orders issued from time to tune by the
state government but-calculation charts also in the annexures. annexure
a deals with those pre-01.09.1986 pensioners who retired prior to
01.09.1976. of these retirees the companysolidated pension of the first four
categories even after including additional relief of 15 which was granted
by the order of december 21989 varies from rs. 254 to rs.286.50. the
pension to admissible to them by virtue of the government order of october
20 1987 would however be rs. 300. if these retirees have to be given a
further sum of rs.75 as is the companytention on behalf of the respondents
the amount of companysolidated pension they would get would exceed that which
other categories of such retirees would get inasmuch as the companysolidated
pension of the latter category varies from rs. 301.50 to rs. 1040. it is
apparent that such a companysequence was number desired by the order of december
2 1989 number can such a companysequence be allowed to happen.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 375 of
1976.  appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dt. 4-
12-75 of the madras high companyrt in crl. misc. petition number
1029/ 75 . s. marwah. r. n. sachthey for the appellant. goindswaminadhan i. subramanium veena devi khanna and

rajindra chowdhary for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was deliverd by
shinghal j.-this appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment of the madras high companyrt dated december 4
1975 quashing the proceedings pending in s. c. number 2 of
1970 on the file of the first assistant sessions judge
madras. the facts giving rise to the appeal have been
stated in the petition for special leave and have number been
disputed. respondent k. v. sundaravelu carried on business as an
exporter in madras. he had a quota for the export of the
handloom fabric knumbern as bleeding madras for the period
april 1 1965 to march 31 1966. it was one of the
conditions of this export licence that he should produce the
goods for pro-shipment inspection by officers of the
textile companymittee who had the authority to affix the date
seals monumberram seals and the quality marking seals
containing the trade mark of the all india handloom board. the seals were affixed by the companycerned textile inspector
after random inspection of the quality of the fabric. such
an inspection was made in july 1965 the fabric was put in
bales and the bales were sealed with lead seal. it was
found on a fresh inspection of one of the bales before
actual loading that the inside seals had been tampered with
and there were forged date seals. the shipment was
therefore stopped and all the goods were examined between
july 27 1965 and- july 30 1965. as the respondent was
found to have companymitted offences under sections 420 471
read with section 466 of the indian penal companye and section
132 of the customs act he was charge-sheeted and was
committed to the companyrt of session after the necessary
inquiry. the companyrt split the case into two so that
sessions case number 34 of 1968 was registered for the trial of
the offence relating to 93 bales which were companyered by a
particular invoice and sessions case number 2 of 1970 was
registered for the goods relating to 19 bales which were
covered by a different invoice. the first case  s.c. number 34
of 1968  proceeded to trial and ended in the companyviction of
the respondent. he was however given the benefit of doubt
on appeal and was acquitted by the judgment of the high
court dated march 9 1974. the second case  s.c. number 2 of
1970  which is the subject matter of the present appeal
was then taken up for trial by the first assistant sessions
judge madras. the respondent applied to the high companyrt for
quashing the proceedings. as has been stated his appli-
cation was allowed by the high companyrt and the proceedings
have been quashed by the impugned judgment. it was urged before the high companyrt that sessions case number 2
of 1970 was different from the earlier case  s.c. number 34 of
1968  and
12-l277sci/78
should be allowed to proceed to trial but the high companyrt
thought it proper to go through the record which was
received from the companyrt of the companymitting magistrate and
took the view that the present case was substantially the
same as the other case which ended in acquittal. in doing
so it made a reference to its finding in the earlier case
and held as follows-
i have found in the other case that the
substitution companyld number have been subsequent to
the baling of the cloth pieces as companytended by
the prosecution and acquitted the petitioner
therein. the same point arises in this case
as it is found in this case also that the
prosecution has companye forward with the case
that the substitution was. subsequent to the
baling. so on these broad aspects the
evidence in both these cases being similar and
one case having ended in acquittal further
prosecution of the petitioner in this case
will amount to abuse of process. even
otherwise the alleged offenses were said to
have been companymitted somewhere in 1965 namely
about ten years ago and it would be unfair if
number unjust to put the petitioners on trial on
the charge which in my opinion is number likely
to stand. it is number disputed that the case was companymitted to the companyrt
of session before april 1 1974 when the companye of criminal
procedure 1973 came into force. it is also number in dispute
that by virtue of section 484 2  of that companye the pending
trial of the respondent in the companyrt of the assistant
sessions judge had to be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the companye of criminal procedure 1898 and that
the respondents application to the high companyrt for quashing
the companymitment had also to be disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of section 215 of that companye. that section
provided as follows.-

a companymitment once made under section
213 by a companypetent magistrate or by a civil or
revenue companyrt under section 478 can be
quashed by the high companyrt only and only on a
point of law. so as the case had already been companymitted by the companypetent
magistrate the companymitment companyld be quashed only on a point
of law. a reading of the impugned judgment shows that the high companyrt
has quashed the proceedings in the companyrt of the assistant
sessions judge for three reasons-

the evidence in both the case being
similar and one case having ended in
acquittal further prosecution in the present
case would amount to abuse of the process of
the companyrt

even otherwise the alleged offenses were
committed somewhere in 1965 and it would be
unfair if number unjust to put the petitioner on
trial after about 10 years and

the charge was number likely to stand. it will be recalled that the trial in the case had number
started. there was therefore numberjustification for taking
the view that evidence in both the cases was similar. moreover it is number the requirement of law that if one case
has ended in acquittal prosecution in anumberher case would be
illegal. it cannumber also be said that it would be illegal to
commence the trial in a case after a period of 10 years or
so. so also it cannumber be said that the high companyrts
opinion that the charge was number likely to stand the trial
was on a point of law within the meaning of section 215 of
the companye of criminal procedure. the high companyrt therefore
lost sight of its limitation under section 215 of the companye
of criminal procedure and quashed the proceedings for
reasons which were extraneous to that section. its order
does number companyform to the requirement of the law and cannumber be
sustained. the high companyrt has in fact taken its earlier judgment in
sessions case number 34 of 1968 which ended in acquittal into
consideration in the present case and has reached the
conclusion that the present appeal is number likely to stand. here again the high companyrt lost sight of the provisions of
sections 40 to 44 of the evidence act which state the
circumstances in which previous judgments are relevant in
civil and criminal cases. thus section 40 states the
circumstances in which a previous judgment may be relevant
to bar a second suit or trial and has numberapplication to the
present case for the obvious reason that numberjudgment order
or decree is said to be in existence in this case which
could in law be said to prevent the sessions companyrt from
holding the trial. section 41 deals with the relevancy of
certain judgments in probate matrimonial admiralty or
insolvency jurisdiction and is equally inapplicable. section 42 deals with the relevancy and effect of judgments
orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41
in so far as they relate to matters of a public nature and
is again inapplicable to the present case. then companyes
section 43 which clearly states that judgments orders or
decrees other than those mentioned in sections 40 41 and
42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment
order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under
some other provisions of the act. as it has number been shown
that the judgment in sessions case number 34 of 1968 companyld be
said to be relevant under the other provisions of the
evidence act it was clearly irrelevant and companyld number have
been taker. into companysideration by the high companyrt for the
purpose of making the impugned order. the remaining section
44 deals with fraud or companylusion in obtaining a judgment or
incompetency of a companyrt which delivered it and can possibly
have numberapplication in the present case. it would thus
appear that the high companyrt number only lost sight of the above
facts but also ignumbered the provisions of section 215 of the
code of criminal procedure and thus companymitted an error of
law in basing the impugned judgment on a judgment which was
clearly irrelevant. it has been pointed out to us and has number been
controverted that sessions case number 2 of 1970 companycerned the
trial of the respondent in respect of 19 bales which formed
the subject matter of separate invoices and of which the
goods were inspected on different dates. it has also number
been companytroverted that one chakravarty inspected three of
those bales and found them to be sub-standard goods.