PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/04/1965 BENCH: <NAME>, M. BENCH: <NAME>, M. SUBBARAO, K. <NAME>, K.N. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. CITATION: 1965 AIR 1827 1965 SCR (3) 743 ACT: Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, (Act 8 of 1949) s. 2(1) and States Reorganisation Act , ss. 65, 119 and 121-Applicability of Madras Act in Telangana area of Andhra Pradesh State. HEADNOTE: By s. 2(1) of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act 1949, <ORG> was competent to issue an order against any person that no proceedings shall be instituted by him in any court (i) in the Presidency-town without the leave of <ORG>, and (ii) 'elsewhere without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge. On the application of the Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh ordered that no proceeding should be instituted by the appellant in the City of Hyderabad without leave of <ORG>, in the City of Secunderabad without leave of the Chief City Civil ;Judge and elsewhere, without leave of the concerned District and Sessions Judge. In his appeal to this <ORG>, the appellant contended that: (i) <ORG> had no jurisdiction to take action under the Act as its provisions were not extended to the Telangana area of the State, which formed part of the former State of Hyderabad; and (ii) the Act was unconstitutional because it prevented some citizens from approaching the <ORG>, which everyone is entitled to in a State governed by the rule of law. HELD: (i) (Per <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, J5.) <ORG> was in error in holding that the Act merely created a procedural jurisdiction to put persons who indulge habitually in vexatious litigation under a procedural restraint in the former <ORG>, which jurisdiction, on its division into the two <ORG> of Madras and Andhra Pradesh inhered in both <ORG>s and continued to inhere in <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh even for the purposes of those areas to which the Act had not been extended. [752 D-F] The Act was passed by <ORG>,and conferred jurisdiction upon <ORG> to deal with habitual litigants indulging in vexatious litigation. It was not an inherent jurisdiction of <ORG>. By ss. 30 and 53 of the Andhra State Act, 1953, the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act continued to be in force in the Andhra State, and <ORG> possessed the same jurisdiction as the former Madras <ORG>. But the Act is unworkable in the State of Andhra Pradesh which is formed under the States Reorganisation Act , 1956, by adding the Telangana area of the former Hyderabad State to the State of Andhra; and s. 65 of the States Reorganisation Act does not alter the position. [753-H] 744 All laws are intended to operate territorially and no Provincial <ORG> in India, possesses extra-territorial jurisdiction. What the Madras <ORG> enacted was to operate in its own territory and it said so in the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act. In its operative part also, the order under the Act was to be made with a territorial distinction between the Presidency town and the rest of the Presidency of Madras. The Act vested a jurisdiction in <ORG> to deal with a particular type of litigant, but the Act made <ORG> deal with the matter territorially and if new territories we're to be governed by it had to be extended to the new territories and till so extended, the Act can only operate within the old territories. Under s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, no law of one of the amalgamating States is to be extended to the area of the other amalgamating States, except by a competent legislative or other competent authority, and further, the law shall be construed as restricted to the territories within each State immediately before the reorganisation. Since the Act has not been extended to the Telangana area, the application of the Act in that area is made impossible by s. 119 , and it cannot be extended by judicial construction. No doubt, the <ORG> possesses a power, under s. 121 of the States Reorganisation Act, to construe laws by adapting them in such a manner as to facilitate their application to the newly formed State, but the power is of adaptation and not legislation. An increase in the territories in which an Act is to apply is dependent on legislation such as is contemplated by s. 119 . [753 F-H; 754 A-C] Moreover, there being no Presidency town in the State of Andhra Pradesh, s. 2(1)(i) of the Act is inapplicable in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The mention of the Presidency town in the sub-section was not with a view to indicate the seat of <ORG>, but because <ORG>, possessed original jurisdiction in the Presidency town. Therefore, the distinction between the City of Hyderabad and other parts of Andhra Pradesh, drawn by <ORG> as if the City of Hyderabad was a Presidency town, was an artificial distinction which should not have been drawn by <ORG>. Section 2(1)(ii) is also inapplicable because, the contention that the entire State may be taken to be governed by that sub-clause would lead to the strange result that the District and Sessions Judge would decide whether a particular litigant should be allowed to move <ORG> in, appeal, revision or in an original proceeding. [754 E-H] Per <NAME>, J. (Dissenting): <ORG> having by the Andhra State Act invested <ORG> of Andhra with authority to exercise all jurisdiction which <ORG> possessed, within the territories of the State of Andhra, and thereafter, having by s. 65(1)(a) of the States Reorganisation Act extended the exercise of that authority over the entire territory of Andhra Pradesh, it would be impossible to accept the argument that in respect of the jurisdiction conferred by the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh was incompetent to pass the order which it did against the appellant. [759 A-C] The Andhra <ORG> was a successor of <ORG> and exercised all the powers and administered the same law which the latter exercised in the territories comprised in the Andhra State. Since <ORG> expressly provided by s. 55 of the Andhra State Act, that a court may construe a law which it has to enforce, with such alterations not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper to adapt it to the matter before the court, the expression "Presidency town" must, in the context of the constitution of a separate Andhra <ORG>, mean the town of the State in which the 745 <ORG> was located. If it be granted that <ORG> of: Andhra had jurisdiction to pass orders under the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, it would be difficult to hold that s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act restricts the exercise of the power by <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh to prevent a vexatious litigant from instituting proceedings in 'and from Certain areas of the Andhra Pradesh and not elsewhere. Section 65(1) of the States Reorganisation Act which must be read harmoniously with s. 119 authoring <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh to exercise all jurisdiction, which <ORG> of Andhra could exercise, over all the territories transferred to the State of Andhra Pradesh from the existing State of Hyderabad. The Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, does not require that the person to be restrained must be residing in or have a domicile within the jurisdiction of the <ORG>, nor has the order contemplated to be passed, any direct territorial operation. It is a personal direction which imposes restrictions upon the person restrained. Once <ORG> pronounces an order, it may be removed in appropriate cases only by <ORG>, where the proceeding is to be instituted in any court in the town in which <ORG> is located, and elsewhere, by order of the District and Sessions <ORG>; and so, there is no conflict of jurisdiction between <ORG> and the District <ORG>. [756 D-H] z (ii) (By Full <ORG>): The Act is not unconstitutional. The litigants who are prevented from approaching the court without proper sanction are persons who habitually file vexatious actions. Even they are not deprived of their right to go to a court in genuine and bona fide actions, but the Act only creates a check. The object of the Act is to promote public good, because, it cannot be claimed that it is an inviolable right of any citizen to bring vexatious actions without control. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL AppELLATE JURISDICTION / ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1963.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 21, 1961 of <ORG> in C.M.P. No. 239 of 1950.

WITH Writ Petition No. 146 of 1961.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. AND Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 186 of 1962. Appeal against the order of the Registrar dated November 21, 1961 refusing to receive the petitioner's application for refund of <ORG>-fees.

The appellant appeared in person.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 900/63 and W.P. No. 146/1961).

The Judgment of <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, <NAME>. was delivered by <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> delivered a separate Opinion.

<NAME> On January 11, 1960, the Advocate General applied to <ORG> Hyderabad for action against the appellant <NAME> under s. 2 of the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act 1949 (Madras Act VIII of 1949), on the allegation that <NAME> had been "habitually" and without any reasonable ground instituting "vexatious proceedings" in the courts within the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and also in <ORG> and appearing in the cases in person; that he was responsible for a considerable amount of litigation or, in other words, that he was a vexatious and habitual litigant. In support of the petition for the invocation of the punitive provisions of the Act, the Advocate-General referred to the following cases:--

(1) In C.R.P. No. 176.5/58 Mawle described the judgment of the lower court as: " .................. shocking to the sense of justice, a grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and the natural justice, full with errors patent on the face, showing a gross manifest injustice done through the tyrannical arbitrary acts."

It was stated that <NAME> apologised to <ORG> to escape proceedings for contempt of court.

(ii) He filed a writ petition No. 1369/18 after the above Civil Revision Petition was dismissed and then preferred an appeal CCCA 42/59.'

(iii) He filed a stay petition against an intended execution before steps were taken and when the petition was dismissed he filed an appeal C.M.A. 86/59 and obtained stay.

(iv) He filed an appeal against the dismissal of the writ petition 1369/58. He was thus said to have asked for five remedies in one suit (O.S. 200 of 1958).

(v) In an appeal filed on 3-6-1959 he did not pay court fee of Rs. 995 as stamps were not available undertaking to pay the balance which he did not pay.

(vi) In S.R. 38516 and S.C.C.M.P. Mawle stated that as he had appeared in person-

"without any weightage to his submissions though of law, for in the ends of justice, as against the professional privileges claimed by both these veteran advocates (Mr. <NAME> and Mr. <NAME>) even though they had taken the role of a party, sole witnesses, swearing false affidavits ............ ".

(vii) In S.R. 12409/59 against decree in O.S. 109/1958, though himself the sole defendant, <NAME> caused to be preferred an appeal in forma pauperis by his wife and children, getting the judgments under appeal privately printed and certifying them as true.

(viii) C.R.P. No. 1094/59 against the judgment in suit No. 198/2 dismissed against his tenant he filed a revision petition which was dismissed in limini.

(ix) C.R.P. No. 988/1959 filed against I.A. 230/58 in O.S. 99/2 of 1957 of <ORG>, Hyderabad was dismissed in limini.

(x) He has filed S.R. 31845/59 as L.P.A. against an order refusing to review C.R.P. against a Small Cause Suit and S.R. No. 27605/59 as a L.P.A. against an order in a petition refusing to condone the delay in filing a review petition in a C.R.P.

(xi) C.R.P. 954/1959 filed against an order in L.R. petition in a Small Cause Suit, originally attempted to be filed as an appeal, C.M.P. 55-18 filed and stay ordered on condition that <ORG> should deposit the decretal amount. He then withdrew the C.M.P.

(xii) Several criminal matters in <ORG>. Complaint in Cr. App. 406/58 and Crl. R.C. 506/59.

(xiii) C.M.P. 1858/57 for taking action against the respondent for alleged contempt of court.

(xiv) S.R. No. 43198/59, a L.P. Appeal.

The Advocate General claimed that though the Act was not extended to the area covered by the former Hyderabad State, it must be treated as the law in force there by reason of the States Reorganisation Act , 1956.

<NAME> was heard on notice and, as was to be expected from a litigant of his sort, flied a fairly long statement in reply denying each accusation and explaining his conduct. He questioned the jurisdiction of <ORG> to take action under the Act as its provisions were not extended to the area comprised in the former State of Hyderabad. He challenged the Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional on the ground that it abridged the right of citizens to seek redress in a court of law. He stated that he was a businessman and a landlord and owned considerable properties in the city of Hyderabad and other cities in the District and the State. He produced a certificate from the District Magistrate. He explained that owing to unpleasant experience he had L/P(D)5SCI--9 to take away his work from advocates and since 1952 he had started conducting his own cases. He alleged that he had to recover a couple of lakhs of rupees from his clients/tenants etc. and had, therefore to file a large number of cases. He attempted an explanation of the cases to which the Advocate General had referred in his petition.

<ORG> by its judgment dated April 21, 1961, now under appeal, held that the Act was both constitutional and intra vires, that <ORG> had jurisdiction to make the order and that action under the Act was called for. <ORG> ordered that no proceeding, civil or criminal, should be instituted by <NAME> in the City of Hyderabad without the leave of <ORG>, in the city of Secunderabad, without the leave of the Chief City Civil Judge and elsewhere without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge concerned. A copy of the order of <ORG> was published in <ORG> as required by the Act. <NAME> sought a certificate under Articles 132, 133, or 134 of the Constitution but the certificate was refused on the ground that no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or otherwise was involved. The petitioner then applied for and obtained special leave from this Court and filed the present appeal.

The Act with which we are concerned, though a copy substantially of 16 and 17 Vict. Ch. 30 (now replaced by section 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Consolidation Act, 1925:15 & 16 Geo V c. 49) is perhaps the only one of its kind in India. Its provisions are extremely brief and they may be read here:

"1. Short title, extent and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949. (2) It extends to the whole of the State of Madras.

(3) It shall come into force at once.

2. Leave of court necessary for vexatious litigant to institute proceedings. (1) If, on an application made by the Advocate-General, <ORG> is satisfied that any person has habitually and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in any <ORG> or <ORG>s, <ORG> may, after giving that person an opportunity of being heard. order that no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any <ORG>-

(i) in the Presidency-town, without the leave of <ORG>; and

(ii) elsewhere, without the leave of the <ORG> Judge.

(2) If it appears to <ORG> that the person against whom an application is made under subsection (1) is unable, on account of poverty, to engage a pleader, <ORG> may engage- a pleader to appear for him. Explanation---For the purpose of this section 'pleader' has the same meaning as in section 2 , clause (15) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

3. Leave to be granted only if prima facie ground exits The leave referred to in section 2 , sub-sect=on (1), shall not be given in respect of any proceedings unless <ORG> or, as the case may be, the District and Sessions Judge, is satisfied that there is prima facie ground for such proceedings.

4. Proceedings instituted without leave to be dismissed.

Any proceedings instituted by a person against whom an order under section 2 , sub-section (IL has been made, without obtaining the leave referred to in that sub-section shall be dismissed:

Provided that this section shall not apply to any proceedings instituted for the purpose of obtaining such leave. (5) Publication of orders.

A copy of every order made under section 2 , sub-

section (1) shall be published in <ORG>."

<ORG> of Andhra Pradesh has held that it enjoys all the jurisdiction of the former <ORG> of Madras and thus the provisions of the Act create a jurisdiction in the <ORG> capable of being exercised in Telangana area even though the Act as such, 'has not been extended to this part of the territory of the State. <ORG> also holds that the Act is perfectly valid.

In this appeal in addition to questioning the order on the above ground and also merits the appellant contends that the Madras Act itself was invalid inasmuch as it was not covered by any Entry in List II or III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and had not received the assent of the Governor-General. This argument is without substance. The Act had received the assent of the Governor-General and the subject of the legislation was covered by Entries 2 of List II and 2 and 4 of List III of the Government of India Act, 1935. The next argument of the appellant be- fore us is that this Act is unconstitutional because it prevents some citizens from approaching the court and obtaining relief to which everyone is entitled in a <ORG> governed by Rule of Law. This argument really invokes Art. 19 and Art. 14. The latter Article is invoked because the Act, according to the appellant, seeks to create an unreasonable distinction between litigant and litigant. This argument is also not acceptable to us because the litigants who are to be prevented from approaching the court, without the sanction of <ORG> etc., are in a class by themselves. They are described in the Act as persons who 'habitually' and 'without reasonable cause' file vexatious actions, civil or criminal. The Act is not intended to deprive such a person of his right to go to a court. It only creates a check so that the court may examine the bona fides of any claim before the opposite party is harassed. A similar Act, passed in England, has been applied in several cases to prevent an abuse of the process of court. In its object the Act promotes public good because it cannot be claimed that it is an inviolable right of any citizen to bring vexatious actions without control, either legislative or administrative. The Act subserves public interest and the restraint which it creates, is designed to promote public good. The Act does not prevent a person declared to be habitual litigant from bringing genuine and bona fide actions. It only seeks to cut short attempts to be vexatious. In our judgment, the Act cannot be described as unconstitutional or offending either Art. 19 or Art. 14. The next contention of the appellant is that the Act has not been extended to the area of the former <ORG> of Hyderabad and <ORG> cannot exercise jurisdiction in that area. This contention merits close scrutiny. <ORG> has given a history of the evolution of the <ORG> and of <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh. It is common knowledge that <ORG> of Madras was rounded by Letters Patent of 1865 and exercised all original, appellate and other jurisdictions conferred by that Letters Patent. The Act , which was passed by <ORG> in 1949 conferred jurisdiction upon <ORG> to deal with cases of habitual litigants who were persistently filing vexatious actions and were guilty of an abuse of the process of court. This jurisdiction belonged to <ORG> of Madras by virtue of the Act and was not an inherent jurisdiction whether as a Court of Record or otherwise. When the <ORG> of Andhra was formed in 1953 by the Andhra <ORG> Act of 1953, <ORG> of Madras ceased to exercise jurisdiction over the territory of the <ORG> of Andhra. This jurisdiction was then to be exercised by <ORG> of Andhra from a date to be appointed by the President. The jurisdiction of <ORG> was to be the' same as that of <ORG>. Section 30 of the Andhra <ORG> Act read as follows:--

"30. Jurisdiction of <ORG>. <ORG> shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the State of Andhra, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the prescribed day, is exercisable in respect of the said territories or any part thereof by <ORG> at Madras."

By virtue of this section the new <ORG> possessed the same powers and jurisdiction as the original Madras <ORG> in its territory. But by s. 53 of the Andhra Act no change was effected in the territorial extent of the laws and references in all laws to the State of Madras were to be adapted to refer to the new State in its application to the new State of Andhra. In other words, the Act continued to be an Act in force in the Andhra State and the Andhra <ORG> possessed the same jurisdiction as the former Madras <ORG>. So far no difficulty can be seen, but it is obvious that the original jurisdiction of the <ORG> of Madras in the Presidency Town could not be exercised at Guntur and did not follow the <ORG>.

The next change came in 1956 by the States Reorganisation Act , 1956. By that Act certain territories were amalgamated with the State of Andhra and prominent among those territories was the former Hyderabad State which for convenience may be referred to here as 'the Telangana Area'. The city of Hyderabad and the city of Secunderabad are in that area. The States Reorganisation Act , 1956 contained a special provision to limit the territorial extent of the laws in force in the different areas which were combined to form the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act provided as follows:-

" 119. Territorial extent of laws. The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies. and territorial reference in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent <ORG> or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day."

The appellant relies upon this provision to state that the area of operation of the Act can only be the former territories of the State of Andhra and the Act is not applicable in the territory comprised in the Telangana Area. The other side contends that by virtue of s. 65 <ORG> acquires all the jurisdiction of <ORG> of the State of Andhra and therefore it acquires the jurisdiction invested by the Act in the former <ORG>. Section 65 of the States Reorganisation Act 1956 reads as follows:-

"65. <ORG>.

(1) As from the appointed day,--

(a) the jurisdiction of <ORG> of the existing State of Andhra. shall extend to the whole of the territories transferred to that State from the existing State of Hyderabad;

(b) the said <ORG> shall be known as the <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh; and The question that arises is whether the application of the Act in the Telangana area-is made impossible by s. 119 of the Act of 1956 or depends upon s. 65 of that Act. If the Act under which action is purported to be taken can be said to have operated territorially then it is obvious that the extent of territory in which it was to apply was not only not enlarged by the States Reorganisation Act but under s. 119 was kept rigid by limiting it to the territory of the former Andhra State. If, however, that Act created a jurisdiction in the <ORG> to deal with a particular class of litigants, who were habitually bringing vexatious suits it may be then possible to contend that jurisdiction continues to vest in the <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh. The <ORG> has viewed this matter from the latter angle and come to the conclusion that s. 65 and not s. 119 controls the matter.

The argument of <ORG> is that the Act controls litigation and creates a new procedure in respect of persons who indulge habitually in vexatious litigation. The Act confers a jurisdiction to put such persons under a procedural restraint and this jurisdiction, <ORG> holds. inhered in the former <ORG> and later in the Madras and <ORG> separately and now it inheres in <ORG>. In the opinion of <ORG>, the jurisdiction can be exercised within all the territories subject to <ORG> including the Telangana Area, Mr. <NAME> in supplementing this reasoning points out that <ORG> of Madras could take action against any person who acted in a manner to attract the provisions of the Act, irrespective of where the person came from. He contends that a vexatious litigant from Bengal or Bombay could be visited with the punitive provisions of the Act and submits that there is no reason why <ORG> cannot control the practice and procedure in the courts of the Telangana area in the same way. According to him, the Act must be treated as extended to the Telangana area as <ORG> continues to possess all the jurisdiction of the former <ORG>. This was also the original plea of the Advocate- General in his petition in <ORG>, though not apparently accepted by <ORG>.

We do not accept the argument of Mr. <NAME>. The Madras Act was applied by the legislature only to the Madras Presidency. Suppose it had been applied to one district only. Could <ORG> have said that notwithstanding the limited application, it would take action in the other districts of the Madras Presidency? If it could not have extended the territorial limits of the application of the Act in Madras Presidency, the position is not any different now, in view of the provisions of s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act which clearly lay down that no law of one of the amalgamating States is to be extended to the area of the other amalgamating States except by a competent legislative or other competent authority and further that the law shall be construed as restricted to the territories within each State immediately before the Reorganisation. The territorial area is thus not only not enlarged but is frozen. We may now consider whether s. 65 of the States Reorganisation Act makes any difference to this position.

The Act was designed to control vexatious litigation and it created for the purpose, a new procedure which applied to persons whose visits to courts, as litigants, were not only frequent but were also habitually vexatious. The Act enabled the Advocate-General to apply to <ORG> and <ORG> on being satisfied that a person had been acting in this manner, could make an order that no proceeding there forward was to be filed by that person in the Presidency town without the leave of <ORG> and elsewhere without the leave of the <ORG>. The Act was intended to apply in the whole of the Presidency of Madras including the area carved away from the Presidency of Madras and made into the State of Andhra in 1953 and which is now a part of the State of Andhra Pradesh after 1956. The Act was intended to operate territorially as indeed the clause dealing with the extent of application of the Act itself shows. In its operative part also the order was to be made with a territorial distinction between the Presidency Town and the rest of the Presidency of Madras. The order to be passed under the Act contemplated leave of <ORG> before a suit was filed in the Presidency Town and the leave of the <ORG> elsewhere. It is plain that on its terms the Act cannot apply in the State of Andhra Pradesh atleast in so far as the Presidency Town mentioned in s. 2(1)(i) is concerned. That Presidency Town was the city of Madras and therefore s. 2(1)(i) of the Act cannot apply in Andhra Pradesh, because there is no Presidency Town in Andhra Pradesh to which s. 2(1)(i) can now refer. The distinction between the city of Hyderabad and other parts of the State of Andhra Pradesh has been artificially brought into existence by <ORG> by making the order in respect of the city of Hyderabad as if it was a Presidency Town. This is legislation pure and simple and it cannot be undertaken by <ORG>. Section 2(1)(i) of the Act can no longer apply without a proper amendment. It may, however, be contended that s. 2(1)(ii) can apply and the whole of the new State of Andhra Pradesh may be taken to be governed by sub-cl. (ii). It would, however, be somewhat strange to make the <ORG> decide whether a particular litigant should be allowed to move <ORG> in appeal, revision or in an original proceeding. The Act is unworkable in the State of Andhra Pradesh without substantial modifications to it.

This is not a question merely of procedural jurisdiction as <ORG> has reasoned. No doubt the Act as it stood, vested a jurisdiction in <ORG> to deal with a particular type of litigant but the Act made <ORG> to deal with the matter territorially. It ,is because the territory has changed that the question arises whether the old jurisdiction of <ORG> can now' take in new territory. All laws are intended to operate territorially and <ORG> in India possessed extra- territorial jurisdiction. That <ORG> enacted was to operate in its own territory and it said so in the Act. If new territories are to be governed by the Act it must be extended to the new territories and till it is extended the Act can only operate within the old territories and this is the obvious result of s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act.

Thus there are two difficulties in the way of holding that this Act is operative in the TeIangana area of the new State of Andhra Pradesh. To begin with it has not been extended to the area known as the TeIangana area and, till extended, s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act expressly prohibits an extension to the Telangana area by judicial construction. Secondly, there being no Presidency Town as such in the new State of Andhra Pradesh, s. 2(1)(i) cannot now be made applicable to the new State of Andhra Pradesh, until some other town is substituted by the <ORG> in its place. The mention of the Presidency Town in s. 2(1)(i) was not with a view to indicate the seat of <ORG> but was so made because <ORG> possessed original jurisdiction in that area. The words 'Presidency Town' might, of course, have been amended to read Hyderabad, the seat of <ORG>, but this has not been done. No doubt the court under s. 121 of the States Reorganisation Act possesses a power to construe laws by adapting them in such a manner as to facilitate their application to the newly formed State, but the power which is exercisable is only a power of simple adaptation and not a power of legislation. An increase in the territories in which an Act is to apply is dependent on legislation such as is contemplated by s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. What <ORG> has done is more than an adaptation. It has not only substituted the city of Hyderabad for the Presidency town but it has also made the law applicable to Telangana courts contrary to the intendment of s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. Formerly the seat of <ORG> was different and the Act must, on the same reasoning have applied there, so that the words 'Presidency Town' must have read as Guntur at first and now they read Hyderabad. In our opinion, <ORG> was in error in holding that the Act merely created a procedural jurisdiction in <ORG> of Madras which on its division into two <ORG>, inhered in both <ORG>s and continues to inhere in <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh even for purposes of areas to which the Act has not been extended. In this view of the matter the order made by <ORG> cannot be sustained and it must be discharged.

We have not gone into the merits and there is much that justified action against <NAME>. He has filed dozens of cases and has flooded courts with litigation often by way of repeated petitions on the same matter. As we find that the Act is not available against him we say nothing more. We may place on record that <NAME> expressed his willingness before us to be restrained in his litigation and we hope that he will now make amends for his past conduct. We expect him to behave properly in future.

The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order about costs.

<NAME>, J. <ORG> exercising power under the Government of India Act, 1935 enacted the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act 8 of 1949, The material provisions of the Act are:-

"2. (1) If, on an application made by the Advocate-General, <ORG> is satisfied that any person has habitually and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings civil or criminal, in any <ORG> or <ORG>s, <ORG> may, after giving that person an opportunity of being heard, order that no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any <ORG>-

(ii) elsewhere, without the leave of the <ORG> Judge.

(2) * * * 3. The leave referred to in section 2 ,

sub-section (1), shall not be given in respect of any proceedings unless <ORG> or, as the case may be, the <ORG>, is satisfied that there is prima facie ground for such proceedings.

4. Any proceedings instituted by a person against whom an order under section 2 , sub- section (1), has been made, without obtaining the leave referred to in that subsection shall be dismissed:

5. A copy of every order made under section 2 , subsection (1), shall be published in <ORG>."

By this Act <ORG> was invested with power to place restrictions upon vexatious litigants. The principle of this legislation, it appears, was borrowed from statute 16 & 17 Vict. Ch. 30 enacted by <ORG>. By Art. 225 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of <ORG>, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate <ORG> remained the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. On September 14. 1953 the State of Andhra was carved out of the territories of the State of Madras by the Andhra State Act 30 of 1953. Section 28 of that Act provided: "(1) As from the 1st day of January, 1956, or such earlier date as may be appointed under sub-section (2) there shall be a separate <ORG> for the State of Andhra." <ORG> which was constituted by a notification issued by the President had by s. 30 , in respect of the territories included in the State of Andhra, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the prescribed day was exercisable in respect of the territories or any part thereof by <ORG> at Madras. <ORG> was therefore a successor of <ORG> and exercised all the powers and administered the same law which <ORG> exercised in the territories comprised in the Andhra State. By s. 2(1) of Act 8 of 1949 <ORG> was competent to issue an order against any person that no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any Court (i) in the Presidency-town without the leave of <ORG>, and (ii) elsewhere, without the leave of the D:strict and Sessions Judge; and this power, by virtue of s. 30 of Act 30 of 1953 became exercisable by <ORG>. The expression "Presidency-town" means by the General Clauses Act , 1897 (s. 3(44)). the local limits of ordinary original jurisdiction of <ORG> of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras or Bombay ,as the case may be, and there was no Presidency-town within the area of the Andhra State as constituted by Act 30 of 1953. The <ORG> had. however, with a view to meet anomalies of the present nature expressly provided by s. 55 that "Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision had been made under s. 54 for the adaptation of a law made before the appointed day, any court, required or empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to the State of Andhra. * * construe the law with such alterations not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper to adapt it to the matter before the court * *." The expression "Presidency town" must in the context of the constitution of a separate <ORG> for Andhra, after the State of Andhra was formed, mean the Capital town of the State in which <ORG> was located Such an adaptation does not affect the substance of the Act, and it would facilitate application thereof to the changed circumstances..

The new State of Andhra Pradesh was constituted under the States Reorganisation Act 37 of 1956 by incorporating certain areas specified in s. 3 to the territory of the old State of Andhra. By s. 65(1)(a) from the appointed day i,e. November 1, 1956 'the jurisdiction of <ORG> of the existing State of Andhra was,, it was declared, to extend to the whole of the territories transferred to that State from the existing State of Hyderabad, <ORG> was to be known as <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh, and the principal seat of' <ORG> was to be at Hyderabad. The jurisdiction of <ORG> of Andhra was by the express provision made in s. 65(1)(a) exercisable over the whole of the territory transferred to that State from the existing State of Hyderabad. The phraseology used by the <ORG>, in my judgment, authorises the new <ORG> to exercise all jurisdiction which <ORG> of Andhra could exercise before the appointed day. The <ORG> made an order against the appellant on April 21, 1961 that no proceedings, civil or criminal shall be instituted by the appellant in the city of Hyderabad without the leave of <ORG>; in the city of Secunderabad without the leave of the Chief City Civil Judge; and elsewhere without the leave of the <ORG> Judge concerned. This was manifestly a personal direction 'which imposed restrictions upon the appellant. The power to impose a ban under s. 2 , it may be noticed, vests only in <ORG>: the power to remove the ban in specific cases is exercisable by <ORG>, or a Judge of the <ORG> <ORG> according as the proceeding is to be instituted in a <ORG> in the capital of the State where <ORG> is located, or in any <ORG> in the mofussil. There can therefore be no question of conflict of jurisdiction between <ORG> and <ORG>. Once <ORG> pronounces an order under s. 2 , it may be removed in appropriate cases only by <ORG> where the proceeding is to be instituted in any <ORG> in the Capital town in which <ORG> is located and elsewhere by order of the <ORG> COurt. The Act confers jurisdiction upon <ORG> and does not as a condition of its exercise require that the person to be restrained must be residing or have a domicile in any area within the jurisdiction of the <ORG> invested with jurisdiction. Nor has the order contemplated to be passed any direct territorial operation: it is issued against a person individually and restrains him from instituting proceedings without leave of the <ORG> specified in that behalf. A person wherever residing or domiciled may' therefore be restrained ,by an order under s. 2 .

But it is said that notwithstanding the comprehensive phraseology used by the <ORG> in s. 65 , because of s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act 37 of 1956 a somewhat anomalous situation has resulted. It is claimed that the power with which <ORG> is invested to prevent a litigant from instituting proceedings -which are vexatious may be exercised in respect of proceedings to be instituted in courts within the limits of the former State of Andhra or which arise from proceedings decided by Courts in that area. The upshot of the argument is that a litigant may be treated as vexatious only in respect of proceedings to be instituted by him in the Courts of the Districts within the former State of Andhra and in respect of proceedings sought to be brought before <ORG> exercise of its appellate, revisional or superintending jurisdiction from orders made by Courts within the territory of the former State of Andhra: he 'may therefore be subjected to a disability in respect of proceedings to be instituted in some districts in the State and also in respect of proceedings reaching <ORG> from cases instituted in those districts, and not in respect of the rest. What the effect of such a view may be upon the exercise of <ORG>'s jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. or the original jurisdiction, for instance, under the Companies Act or the Banking Companies Act , the appellant who has argued his case personally did not attempt to tackle. Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 provides:

"The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent <ORG> or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day."

By that section the territorial extent of the laws in operation prior to the appointed day, until amended by a competent <ORG> or other competent authority, continues. But s. 119 must be read harmoniously with s. 65(1)(a) . The latter clause declares in unambiguous terms that the jurisdiction of <ORG> of the existing State of Andhra shall extend to the whole of the territories transferred to that State from the existing State of Hyderabad. If it be granted that <ORG> of the State of Andhra had jurisdiction to pass orders under the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, it would be difficult to hold that s. 119 of Act 37 of 1956 still restricts the exercise of the power by <ORG> to prevent a vexatious litigant from instituting proceedings in certain areas in the mofussil and not in others or from instituting proceedings by way of appeals or revisions from orders and decrees in proceedings instituted in the Courts in the area within the former State of Andhra and not elsewhere. The <ORG> having by Act 30 of 1953 invested <ORG> of Andhra with authority to exercise all jurisdiction which <ORG> of Madras possessed within the territories of the State of Andhra as constituted and thereafter having by s. 65(1)(a) of Act 37 of 1956 extended the exercise of that authority over the entire territory of Andhra Pradesh, and in my judgment, it would be impossible to accept the argument that in respect of the jurisdiction conferred by the Vexatious Litigation (Prevent;on), Act 8 of 1949 <ORG> was incompetent to pass the order which it did against the appellant.

I need not add anything to what <NAME>, J., has said in upholding the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, for 1 agree with him that the Act is not unconstitutional as offending either Art. 19 or Art. 14 of the Constitution.

On the merits, however, I am of the opinion that the cases which the appellant had instituted in the various Courts did not justify a drastic order of the nature passed against him. The appellant claims that he is the owner of a large estate in the city of Hyderabad, and that is not denied: he also carries on an extensive business and in the course of carrying on his business and managing his estate, he has often to seek recourse to courts of law. The appellant says that because of certain reasons (which need not be set out) he conducts his litigation before the Courts without any professional assistance. Assuming that the appellant has in instituting and prosecuting cases which he had instituted shown less objectivity and more enthusiasm than a lawyer may in similar cases show, and had attempted to obtain benefit of what he thought were lacunas in the law, imposition of a blanket restriction against him of the nature imposed by <ORG> may not seem to be warranted. I am unable to agree having carefully considered the nature of the Various cases filed by the appellant or from the general progress of those cases as set out in the list of cases filed in this Court and the orders passed therein that those proceedings are vexatious or frivolous. I would therefore allow the appeal, but not on the grounds which are set out by <NAME>, J. Appeal allowed.


PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: A. K. SRIVASTAVA DATE OF JUDGMENT14/02/1975 BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH CITATION: 1975 AIR 968 1975 SCR (3) 552 1975 SCC (3) 788 CITATOR INFO : F 1975 SC1788 (6) F 1976 SC2169 (7,9,18) RF 1991 SC1557 (25) ACT: Representation of the People Act  Section 83 and 123 and Conduct of Election Rules, r. 94A--Proviso to s. 83(1) --Scope of. HEADNOTE: In the election to <ORG> the respondent was declared elected and the appellant, the congress candidate filed an election petition challenging the election on various grounds, one of which was that the respondent was guilty of corrupt practice under s. 123(4) 'of the Representation of the People Act , 1951, in that certain pamphlets were published by him or with his consent. The petition was dismissed by <ORG>, Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD : I (a) There is no substance in the preliminary objection of the respondent that the election petition should have been dismissed on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements of s. 83 of the Act and that the evidence of printing the pamphlets, in any event, should not have been admitted. [553D-F] The charge against the respondent in the election petition was that the respondent was responsible for the publication of the pamphlets and not their printing. Evidence regarding printing was only relied upon to corroborate the evidence regarding distribution of the pamphlets. )"en s. 123(4) speaks of publication it means distribution. Therefore, failure to give particulars of the printing in the affidavit in support of the election petition cannot lead to the dismissal of the petition; nor could evidence regarding it be shut out. The proviso to s. 83(1) lays down that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice the petition should also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particular,-, thereof. It does not say that the allegation of corrupt practice and particulars thereof should be given in the affidavit. The election petition contains the ,allegations of corrupt practice and particulars thereof. The Form 25, which is the one prescribed under r. 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules also show.,; that this was the intention of the <ORG>. In the present case the affidavit filed in support of the election petition is in accordance with that prescribed form. [553F-H] Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. <NAME>,  1 SCC 826 and <CITATION> ,  2 SCC 789, referred to. (b) Furthermore, according to s. 86 of the Act only petitions which do not comply with the provisions of ss. 81 , 82 and 117 are liable to be dismissed. [555C] (2) The High Court was wrong in rejecting wholesale every bit of evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant. Even taking the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant of only non-congress witnesses. that evidence establishes that the people who got printed the various pamphlets are close supporters of the respondent. Those persons had no special grievance against the appellant but all the pamphlets have been printed with the definite purpose of harming the chances of the appellant in the election and thereby aiding those of the respondent. The plan and the direction could therefore have come only from one source and that is the respondent. Hence, it must be held that the respondent was guilty of the corrupt practice under s. 123(4) in respect of the pamphlets. [561D-E, G; 562C] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1174 of 1973.

From the judgment and order dated the 5th April, 1973 of <ORG> in Election Petition No. 29 of 1972.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. In the election held on 11th March, 1972 to <ORG> from Damoh constituency the respondent, an independent candidate, was declared elected. The appellant, the <ORG> candidate filed an election petition for declaring the election of the respondent void on various grounds all of which were found not proved by the learned Judge of <ORG> who tried the petition. The petition was consequently dismissed and this appeal is against that dismissal.

We are concerned only with the charge of corrupt practices under section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act in respect of five pamphlets marked Exs. P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6 and P-8 and two public meetings held on 4-3-1972 and 8-3- 1972.

At the beginning of the arguments an objection wag raised on behalf of the respondent that the election petition should have been dismissed on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements of section 83 of the Representation of the People Act. This was on the basis that the affidavit filed in support of the election petition did not give details as to the material particulars in respect of the various corrupt practices with which the respondent was charged. It was argued in the alternative that in any case no evidence should have been admitted. As far as this appeal is concerned both amount to the same thing because charges with which we are concerned are charges under section 123(4) . We do not think that there is any substance in this contention on behalf of the respondent. On behalf of the appellant it was made clear that the only charge made in the petition was the charge of publication of the pamphlets and not their printing and evidence regarding the printing was relied upon only to corroborate the evidence regarding distribution of the pamphlets. It is obvious that when section 123 (4) speaks of publication it means distribution. Mere printing of the pamphlets would not fall under section 123 (4). Therefore the failure to give particulars of the printing cannot lead to the dismissal of the petition. Nor could evidence regarding it be shut out. The proviso to section 83(1) lays down that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. It does not say that the allegation of corrupt practice and particulars thereof should be given in the affidavit. The election petition contains the allegation of corrupt practices and particulars thereof. That this is the intention of the <ORG> is also clear from a perusal of Form 25, which is the one prescribed under Rule 94A of the Conduct of Elections Rules. The affidavit filed in support of the election petition is in accordance with that form.

Reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent on the decision of this Court in <NAME> v. <NAME>). In that case Rule 9 of <ORG> Rules in respect of election petitions, which states that the rules of <ORG> shall apply in so tar as they are not inconsistent with the Representation of the People Act , 1951 or other rules, if any made thereunder or the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of all matters including inter alia affidavits, was referred to. On the basis of that rule Rule 7 of <ORG> Rules which-states that every affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement made on information or belief and must also state the source of or grounds of information or belief with sufficient particularity, was stated to mean that grounds or sources of information are to be set out in the affidavit. This would really mean that the allegations found in the body of the election petition would have to be repeated in the affidavit. However, in that case the failure to conform to Rule 9 and Rule 7 of <ORG> Rules was not held to be fatal to the. election petition. What was said was that it would be helpful in assessing the value of the evidence. But that purpose is served by the allegations in the election petition itself. Moreover, it appears to us that the provisions of Rule 9 of <ORG> Rules regarding the election petitions framed by <ORG> by reference to Rule 7 of <ORG> Rules found in Chapter III regarding affidavits cannot be made use of for this purpose. The former set of rules are made under Article 225 of the Constitution and cannot make any substantive law and the rules themselves on a perusal of them would show that they relate merely to procedural matters unlike rules made under section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

<CITATION> (2) it was pointed out that :

"When there are specific Rules made under the Act which govern the election petitions, no other Rules are applicable. Nor is disclosure of the source of information a requisite under Order- 6, Rule 15 (2), C.P.C. Decisions rendered under Order 6, Rule 15 and Order 19, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure have no relevance and do not support the submission that if the affidavit in support of the petition does not state the source of information on which the several allegations in the petition are based, those allegations cannot be deemed to have been made.

The provision for setting out the sources of information where the allegations have been verified as having been made on information and knowledge of the petitioner is not a requisite prescribed under Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, which are applicable to the filing of an election petition.

The affidavit in support of an election petition need not itself disclose the sources of information. The election petition under Section 83 (1) (b) itself must contain all the (1)  1 SCC 826.

(2) [1973]2 SCC 759.

particulars that are necessary and in the affidavit in support of the petition( the petitioner is required to say which of the allegations made in various paragraphs of the petition are true to his knowledge, and which of them are true to his information. If any source of information has not been set out and the respondent cannot answer them without particulars, he can always apply for better.

particulars. If the petition and the affidavit conform to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, it cannot be said that because the sources of the information have not been given, the allegations made in the petition have to be ignored.

This accords with the view which we have taken. Furthermore, according to section 86 of the Representation of the People Act only petitions which do not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 are liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection.

With respect to these five documents there is no dispute that they fall within the mischief of section 123 (4) and it is there fore unnecessary to set out the contents of these pamphlets, nor was it seriously contended except in the case of Ex. P-8 that they were not circulated. The only question is whether the circulation was made by the respondent or with his consent. In considering this question it is important to bear in mind that all the persons who admit that they printed these pamphlets are workers of the respondent. We will deal with the evidence in due course. It is necessary to go into the question of the printing of these pamphlets because evidence regarding it will have a bearing on their distribution either by the respondent or by his supporters with his consent. Though as many as 67 witnesses were examined and 28 of them with regard to publication, the learned trial Judge has rejected all of them. Where the question of publication and distribution is a matter to be decided on the basis of oral evidence, it is easy to dispose of them by saying that it is of persons interested in the appellant. That is why a discussion of the question regarding the printing should provide a satisfactory method of assuring oneself as to whether the distribution was made as alleged by the appellant.

We shall now take up the question regarding Ex.P-3 first. It has admittedly been printed by <NAME>. It was printed at <ORG>. This <NAME> was polling agent of the respondent. <ORG> was next to the residence of the respondent. P.W.66, the son of the owner of the printing press gave evidence that the manuscript for the pamphlet was given to <NAME> for correction and the respondent himself made the correction. P.W.67 gave evidence that <NAME> placed the order for Ex.P-3 and produced the Order Book, Ex.P-19. He also gave evidence that the manuscript was given to him by the respondent who was accompanied by <NAME> and one <NAME>. Exs. R.9 and R.10 are the declarations in respect of the pamphlet given by <NAME>. Admittedly also the respondent bad placed other orders with <ORG>. Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-52 show that one of the payments out of the total sum of Rs. 130 mentioned in these receipts corresponds to a sum of Rs. 50 said to bave been paid for this printing. Ex.P-52 was filed by the respondent along with the account of his election expenses. P.W.1 gave evidence that <NAME> worked for the respondent in the election and he and <NAME>, who is responsible for the printing of Ex.P-4, accompained the respondent on his election propaganda. Respondent's witness, <NAME>, R.W. 3, also admits that <NAME> worked for the respondent. Therefore, even if that part of the evidence of P.Ws.66 and 67, where they speak to the respondent's part in the printing of this pamphlet is not accepted, it is obvious that <NAME> is a person very much interested in the respondent and there is no particular reason why he should print a defamatory pamphlet against the appellant. We are led to believe that inspiration for printing that pamphlet must have come from the respondent. We are not impressed with the evidence of <NAME> that the pamphlets were not handed over to him before 11.3.72 and so it was not distributed. It was merely an attempt indirectly to deny distribution. He even went to the extent of saying that he did not work for the respondent.

The next pamphlet is Ex. P-4. It was got printed by one <NAME>, a mere boy of 14 or 15 years. It was printed at <ORG> where his father's paper was printed. According to <NAME>, who was examined as R.W.18, he got this Ex.P-4 printed because Ex.R-24 contained the merits of the appellant and the demerits of the respondent. But Ex.R-24 does not say anything about the merits of the appellant. He says that he gave the order for printing it at 8.30 p.m. and he got it at 11.30 p.m. and he distributed it to any person who met him in the bazar and went home thereafter. We are unable to accept this part of the evidence. This is merely an attempt to belittle the distribution. Though he also gives as a reason for his printing Ex.P-4 that his father was called to the police station, that was nearly four years earlier and that is hardly likely to be a reason for his printing it. He went to the extent of saying that he did not work for the respondent in the election and he did not support the respondent in the election. A reading of the pamphlet clearly shows that it could not be his handiwork, that the brain behind it is some body else's, whether it is <NAME> to whom he took it or not. He is one of the persons whose name prominently appears among those who worked for the respondent in the election. He is also a young boy of 14 or 15. Here again we are led to believe that Ex.P-4 was not printed by <NAME> on his own but that it should have been done at somebody else's instance and that being incompatible with any other author, could only be the respondent.

Exhibit P.5 was printed by one <NAME>. It was printed at <ORG> on 18-2-72. This <NAME> was a very prominent worker of the respondent. The respondent did not even dare to put <NAME> on the witness stand to deny the fact that he printed Ex.P-5 with the consent of the respondent. He was so deeply committed to the respondent that it would have been very difficult for him to explain why he printed it. In the circumstances we do not think that the learned judge was correct in rejecting the evidence of P.Ws. 66 and 67 who speak to the respondent's part in it and the payment made by him. We see no improbability in the receipt for the payment being dated 27.2.1972 and the payment being made on 18.2.1972. This expenditure, also is shown in respondent's account of the election expenses.

Then we come to Ex.P-6. This purports to have been published by a certain <NAME>. Whether there was such a Parishad or not, there was <ORG> and that <NAME> was supporting the respondent. It consisted of almost all <ORG> parties. The declaration in respect of this document was given by one <NAME> who also is an active worker of the respondent. His brother and father also were respondent's partisans. Our conclusion about this document is the same as in respect of the other documents. The last document for consideration is Ex.P-8. It was printed in <ORG> and the son of the proprietor was examined as P.W.64. He spoke to the respondent's part in the printing of this document. One of the reasons for disbelieving him was that his father also gave evidence. But his father did not give any evidence prejudicial to the respondent. The printing of this pamphlet was admitted by R.W.2, <NAME>, an advocate, who got it printed along with <NAME>, a cousin of the respondent. But their case was that it was printed in order to present it to the Chief Minister, Mr. <NAME> when he was expected to visit Damoh on 28-2-1972 and as he did not do so the pamphlets were destroyed.- It is an impossible story and we refuse to believe it. If they wanted-to make any representation it was not necessary to print 2000 copies. We do not believe those would have been destroyed. This again is an attempt to meet the case of distribution. Both <NAME> and <NAME> are very strong partisans and workers for the respondent and here again we are satisfied that they should have been printed with the consent of the respondent.

The learned Judge has, as we have already observed, disbelieved all the evidence on behalf of the appellant. If the witness was a <ORG> man he was not to be believed as he was a <ORG> man. The respondent would not have been foolish enough to hangover the pamphlets to the witness. If he was a non-<ORG> man he was a tenant of a <ORG> man or a tenant of a relative of a <ORG> man and therefore could not be believed. In certain cases he has disbelieved the evidence of witnesses on the ground that they were not on visiting terms with the respondent. But elections being what they are no candidate could afford to ignore a voter on the ground that the voter had not visited him nor he could be disbelieved on the ground that he had not gone to the voter earlier. Elections take the candidates to all sorts of places. If a witness said that he did not tell the appellant about his having received the pamphlet a doubt is raised as to how the appellant knew about the distribution of the pamphlet. Many of the criticism are very unsubstantial. However we would discuss this question solely on the evidence of non-<ORG> witnesses and show how the evidence regarding distribution is quite acceptable.

<NAME> is a member of <ORG>. He is the Vice President of <ORG> of Damoh. The respondent had the support of <ORG> Bhartiya Kranti Dal and <ORG> (0). He had gone along with <NAME> for canvassing for the respondent. <NAME> and <NAME> also accompained him. According to this witness <NAME>, father of <NAME>, who printed Ex.P-6, <NAME> father of <NAME>, and <NAME> were workers of the respondent. <NAME> was an active canvasser in the election campaign of the respondent. The only criticism against him was that he is a tenant of <NAME>, a good <ORG> worker. <NAME> is an active member of <ORG>. We see no reason why his evidence as far as it goes cannot be accepted. It helps to fix the role of many of the persons who played an important part in the publication of the pamphlets.

<NAME> is a doctor holding a M.B.B.S. degree, who has been practising in Damoh since 1936. He is a member of <ORG>. He was also the President of <ORG> at Damoh and a Secretary of <ORG>. He speaks to having attended the meeting dated 4th March, 1972 and of <NAME>, <NAME>, and <NAME> father of <NAME>, being present on the dais and to the respondent proposing <NAME> to the Chair. <NAME> also spoke at that meeting. He also speaks to the respondent having given him Exs.P-3, P-4 and P-5 on 10th March, 1972. It was elicited from him that he was a tenant of a cousin of the appellant. To a question by the <ORG> he said that he had no visiting terms with the respondent but he added that the respondent must have come to his house as he was distributing the leaflets. We see no reason why this witness should not be believed. The learned judge's criticism regarding this witness and the rejection of his evidence cannot be supported. <NAME> is a kirana shopkeeper. He had taken no interest in the election of any candidate. He speaks about the meeting presided over by <NAME> who was proposed by the respondent as the president. He speaks to <NAME> speaking at that meeting as also to <NAME>'s speech. He speaks to the presence of <NAME> at that meeting. <NAME> is a retired Sub-Inspector of Police. He speaks to his having attended the meeting on 4-3-1972 and refers-to the speech made by <NAME>, <NAME> and the respondent. He also speaks to the respondent having given him Exs.P-3, P-4 & P-5 on 10th March. He was not working for any candidate in the election. A suggestion made to him was that his brother was sentenced to death in a murder case and the murdered man was a relative of the respondent.

P.W.6 does not belong to any political party nor did be work for any of the candidates in the election. He speaks to the meeting held on 4th March 1972 to support the respondent addressed by <NAME>; <NAME> and also to the respondent giving him pamphlets Exs.P-3 and P-4.

<NAME>

<NAME> is a retired Assistant Conservator of Forest and belongs to no political party and he did not work for any body in the election. He speaks to the respondent giving him Exs.P-3 and P-4.

P.W. 11 speaks to respondent having given him Ex.P-3. He is not shown to belong to, any party.

<NAME> is a member of <ORG> and he publishes-a news- paper '<ORG>'. He speaks to <NAME> and <NAME> working for respondent, as also <NAME> and his sons <NAME> and <NAME>, <NAME> and his son <NAME> as well as <NAME>, respondent's cousin.

<NAME> is a member of the <ORG> party who worked for the respondent in his election. He speaks to respondent giving him Exs. P-3 and P-4. He speaks to <NAME> being present along with the respondent at that time. He speaks to respondent giving him 10 or 11 leaflets for distribution.

<NAME> worked for the respondent in his election. He speaks to respondent accompanied by <NAME> having come to his Mohalla and his being given leaflets for distribution. He also speaks of having gone to the respondent's house and having seen <NAME> there. <NAME> is another witness who was engaged by the respondent to distribute the pamphlets.

It is unnecessary to go on multiplying the evidence. We have deliberately excluded the evidence of <ORG>men, <ORG> sympathisers or people who had worked for the <ORG> candidate. It is interesting to see the way that the learned Judge has dealt with this question of distribution He says that the respondent is a practicing lawyer and had contested three elections and it does not look probable that he would have gone with <NAME> and <NAME> to the printing press for getting Ex.P-3 printed. <NAME>'s evidence is not believed on the sole ground that if the respondent had been careful ,'enough to have Ex.P-3 printed through a worker he would not himself go on distributing the pamphlet. There is also a factual mistake in that the learned Judge seems to proceed on the basis that <NAME> is a <ORG>man which he is not. P.W.5's evidence is not accepted because he had not told anybody about the distribution of the pamphlet. P.W.6 is taken to be an interested witness because he had shown the pamphlet to the appellant. But immediately thereafter the learn-,-,-' Judge goes on to say that it is worthy of note that no one amongst the witnesses, although they were local and some of them were very much interested in the appellant, either gave the pamphlets said to be received by them to the appellant himself or to his brothers. We lo not see the interest for them to give the pamphlets to the appellant is the distribution seems to have been well-known. P.W.7 is said to be an interested witness because he said he only received two pamphets and that he was not aware whether any pamphlets on behalf of the <ORG> candidate was distributed or not. P.W. 11 is disbelieved on the basis that the respondent would not have had time to distribute it at Damoh having been present at village Bhuri some time earlier and in Bilai some time later. It appears one has to pass through Damoh on way from Bhuri to Bilai. Nor could we agree that because this witness's brother, who is an advocate was not given a pamphlet it is surprising that the respondent would himself distribute the Newspaper and the pamphlet to the witness in the presence of his brother lawyer and involve himself in a corrupt practice. The substance of the learned Judge's criticism about most of the evidence regarding distribution is that the respondent an advocate a person well seasoned in election matters would not himself distribute the pamphlets. The evidence of P.Ws.38 and 39 is not believed, one of the reasons for that being that respondent had engaged P.Ws. 26 and 65 for distribution, he himself would not do so. We consider that the evidence of P.Ws.26 and 65 has been rejected on unsubstantial grounds.

We should mention, however, that we do not place any reliance upon the evidence of <NAME>, R.W.5 about the distribution of the pamphlets. We are thus satisfied that the distribution has been made by the respondent himself in some cases as also through P.Ws.26 and

65. The part played by his storng supporters and relatives in bringing into existence the various pamphlets goes to probabilise the distribution of the pamphlets either by the respondent or at his instance.

We shall now see how the learned Judge deals with the question of printing. The learned Judge considers that P.W.66 has been brought in simply to connect the respondent with Ex.P-3. <NAME> says that <NAME> of the B.K.D. as well as <NAME> used to attend sometime the meetings of <ORG>. <NAME> is the proprietor of <ORG>. He gives the names of <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> the election agent of the respondent as respondent's supporters. He also says that whatever election campaign was done for the respondent by <ORG> it was by occasional consultation with the respondent that he is not able to say whether each worker and supporter of the respondent did every thing in connection with the election in consultation with the respondent. He speaks of <NAME> working for the respondent. <NAME>, <NAME>, gives the name of <NAME>, <NAME> father as one of the members of <ORG>, In the face of this evidence it is difficult to accept the respondent's evidence that <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> were not his agents; so also the assertion that <NAME> had never accompanied him in his election campaign. Similarly his denial that he was not financed by <ORG> and he himself did not finance it. He however had to accept that <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> worked for him. He went to the length of denying that the cash memo Ex.P.5 1, which bears the name of his own election agent, <NAME> relates to his election expenses and he does not know who is that person. He has filed Exs.P-52 and P-53 along with his election expenses and admits that Ex.P-52 is the original of Ex.P-23 and Ex.P-53 is the original of Ex.P-

51. Only thereafter was he compelled to admit that he had got some printing done from <ORG>. He even pretended- that he did not know that <NAME> signature is found it Ex.P-53 and could not say whether he was the son of his election agent <NAME> or not. <NAME> as well as <NAME> son <NAME> were his polling agents. He had to admit that Ex.P-68 bears the signature of Om Prakash Rai, which is a declaration for Fx.P-5. He had also. to admit that Ex.P-69 and Ex.R-21 bear Om Prakash Rai's signatures. He had to admit that Ex.P-71, the declaration from for Ex.P-70, which' was printed by him, bears his signature and one of the identifying witness is <NAME>. His extensive prevarication during the course of his evidence clearly shows that he is not a person on whose evidence much reliance can be placed. See paras 38 to 40 and 43 to 47 of his evidence.

It is difficult to accept the assertion of <NAME> who says that cc did not work for the election of the respondent. He was his polling agent and a person who gets a pamphlet like Ex-P-3 printed is certainly not a disinterested person.

After a thorough and anxious examination of the evidence in this case we have come to the conclusion that the people who got printed Exs.P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6 and P-8 are close supporters of the respondent. They have no special grievance against the appellant, certainly not enough to make them go to the extent of having them printed of their own. Two of them, <NAME> and <NAME> are mere boys of 14 and 15. They have merely been made use of by somebody and that somebody in the proved circumstances of this case could only be the respondent. We are not able to accept the evidence of <NAME> that he got the pamphlets at 11.30 p.m. on the night of the 10th March and he distributed it to a few people. Nor are we able to accept the evidence of <NAME> that though he gave the matter- for printing on the 10th he got the pamphlets only on the 1 1 th and so he did not distribute them. We find the evidence of P.Ws.66 and 67 that it was given for printing on the 9th more acceptable. We are unable to accept the assertion of <NAME> that he got Ex. P-8 printed in order to band it over to the Chief Minister- when he was due to arrive at Damoh on he 28th of February but that he destroyed them because the Chief Minister did not turn up. AR these pamphlets have been printed with a definite purpose that is of harming the chances of the appellant in the election and thereby aiding the respondent. The plan and the direction could have come only from one source that is the respondent. He has made use of his supporters, two of them young boys of 14 and 15, to get the pamphlets printed in their names so that they could take the responsibility and he may disown the responsibility for them. We have discussed the evidence of only <NAME> witnesses and we can see no reason to reject them. We do not agree with the learned Judge who rejected wholesale every bit of evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant. Whether the evidence of P.Ws. 66 and 67 about the part played by the respondent with regard to the pamphlets printed in <ORG> and of <NAME> with regard to the pamphlets printed in <ORG> are correct or not, we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent is the ,guiding brain and hand behind all of them. He and his supporters must have planned all these things together. He has made his witnesses admit just enough so that a red herring might be drawn across the trail and blame may attach to them and not to him. The fact that 'be is an advocate or that it is the third election in which he is standing is no guarantee against his being responsible for this.

Then there is the question of two meetings dated 4.3.1972 and 8.3.1972. We do not think it necessary to examine this branch of the case in view of the earlier findings. In the result therefore we hold that the respondent is guilty of a ,corrupt practice under section 123(4) in respect of the pamphlets Exs.P-3, P-5, P-6 and P-8. The appeal is allowed and the respondent's election is declared to be void. The respondent will pay the appellant's costs.

Appeal allowed.

V.P.S.