PETITIONER: S.KHADER SHERIFF Vs. RESPONDENT: MUNNUSWAMI GOUNDER AND OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/1955 BENCH: <NAME>, T.L. VENKATARAMA BENCH: <NAME>, T.L. VENKATARAMA DAS, SUDHI RANJAN CITATION: 1955 AIR 775 1955 SCR (2) 469 ACT: Election Dispute-Non-disclosure by returned candidate of sums paid to party funds in his return of election expenses- Such sums, if spent for purposes of election-Commencement of candidature--Expense in excess of the prescribed limit- Election declared void by <ORG>-Resulting disqualification-Finding, if must be after notice- Representation of the People Act (No. XLIII of 1951), ss. 79(b) , 99 proviso, 123(7), 140. HEADNOTE: The appellant, who fought and won the election as a <ORG> candidate, had applied to the Tamil Nad <ORG> Committee on 12-9-51 for party nomination stating his desire "to contest as a <ORG> candidate in the forthcoming election'? and paid a sum of Rs. 500 of which Rs. 100 was subscription for membership and Rs. 400 a deposit, liable to he refunded in case the application was refused. On 23-9-51 he paid another gum of Rs. 500 as donation to the District <ORG> Committee. On 13-11-51 he was adopted by the <ORG> as its candidate. His nomination paper for the election was filed on 16-11-51. The charge against him in the election petition was that he had failed to include these two sums in his return of election expenses and with the addition of these sums the maximum limit of election expenses prescribed for the constituency would be exceeded. The <ORG> found that both these sums were paid for election purposes and the maximum prescribed had been exceeded and, therefore, s. 123(7) had been contravened and declared the election void under s. 100(2)(b) of the Act. The <ORG> also recorded a _finding that the appellant was liable to the disqualifications specified in s. 140 , clauses (1)(a) and (2). Held, affirming the decision of the <ORG>, that the exact point of time from which a person must be deemed to be a candidate within the meaning of s. 79(b) of the Representation of the People Act is the time when, with the election in prospect, he himself decides to stand as a candidate and communicates such decision to others leaving no manner of doubt as to his intention. This must be an met of his own volition and not that of other persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate. The Lichfield case,  5 p.m. & H. 1, referred to. That the applicant was a candidate from the date of his application to the Tamil Nad <ORG> Committee and the two sums were election expenses incurred by him and should have been shown in his return. 470 That the commencement of candidature in a particular case is. a question of fact to be determined by the <ORG> and its decision in this regard is not liable to be reviewed by <ORG> in an appeal by special leave. That whether a particular sum paid at the time or on the eve of the election was a donation, an act of charity or an election expense must depend on whether or not such payment was open to the charge of having been made in order to induce the voters to vote in favour of the donor. This again is a question of fact to be decided by the <ORG>. The <NAME> case,  4 O'M. & H. 1, and The <NAME> case  6 O'M. & H. 274, relied on. The <NAME> case, (1886] 4 O'M. & H. 93, held inapplicable. That it was not necessary for the <ORG> to 'serve a notice under the proviso to s. 99 of the Act on the appellant, a party to the election petition, to enable the <ORG> to record his liability to disqualification under s. 140 of the Act in respect of the chargelevelled against him. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1955.

Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 28th February, 1953, of <ORG>, Vellore, in Election Petition No. 84 of 1954.

<NAME>, (<NAME>, with him), for the appellant.

<NAME>, for respondent No. 1.

1955. September, 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME> is an appeal by special leave against the order of <ORG>, Vellore, declaring the election of the appellant to <ORG> void on the ground that there had been a violation of section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act No. XLIII of 1951. Under that section, it, is a major corrupt practice for a candidate or his agent to incur or authorise the incurring of expenditure in contravention of the Act or any rule made thereunder. Rule 117 provides that:

"No expense shall be incurred or authorised by a candidate or his election agent on account of or in respect of the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency in a State in excess of the maximum amount specified in respect of that Constituency in Schedule V". Under Schedule V, the maximum expense specified for election to <ORG> from a single- member constituency, such as Ranipet, is Rs. 8,000. The return of the expenses lodged by the appellant showed that he had spent in all Rs. 7,063 for the election, and that was within the limit allowed. The charge against him in the petition was that he had failed to disclose in his return two sums of Rs. 500 each, spent for election purposes, and that with the addition of those amounts, the maximum speci- fied had been exceeded. As regards the first amount, the facts found are that on 12-9-1951 the appellant applied to <ORG> for permission to contest the election as a <ORG> candidate, and along with his application he paid Rs. 500 out of which Rs. 100 was subscription for membership and Rs. 400 deposit, which was liable to be returned under the rules, in case the applicant was not adopted as the candidate, but not otherwise. In fact, the appellant was adopted as the <ORG> candidate, and it was on that ticket that he fought and won the election. The second payment of Rs. 500 was on 23-9-1951 to the North Arcot District <ORG> Committee, which was in charge of the Ranipet Constituency. The Tribunal held that both these sums were paid for purposes of election and should have been included in the return made by the appellant, that if they were so included, the maximum prescribed was exceeded, and that therefore section 123(7) had been contravened, and accordingly declared the election void under section 100(2) (b) of the Act. The appellant disputes the correctness of this order. The Tribunal also recorded as part of the order a finding that the appellant had become subject to the disqualifications specified in section 140 , sub-clauses (1) (a) and (2). The appellant attacks this finding on  the ground that it was given without notice to him, as required by the proviso to section 99 .

The points that arise for decision in this appeal are (1) whether on the facts found, there was a contravention of section 123(7) of Act No. XLIII of 1951and (2) whether the finding that the appellant had become disqualified under section 140 is bad for want of notice under the proviso to section 99 of the Act.

(1) Taking first the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant to <ORG> on 12-9-1951, the contention of the appellant is that section 123(7) and Rule 117 have reference only to expenses incurred by a candidate or his agent, that the appellant was nominated as a candidate only on 16-11-1951, and that as the payment in question was made long prior to the filing of the nomination paper, the provisions aforesaid had no application. That raises the question as to when the appellant became a 'candidate' for purposes of section 123(7) . Section 79(b) of Act No. XLIII of 1951. defines a candidate thus: "Candidate" means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate". Under this definition which applies to section 123(7) , all election expenses incurred by a candidate from the time when, with the election in prospect, he holds himself out as a prospective candidate and not merely from the date when he is nominated, will have to enter into the reckoning 'under Rule 117 read with Schedule V. That the election was in prospect when the amount of Rs. 500 was paid is clear from the very application of the appellant dated 12-9-1951

-wherein he states that he desires "to contest as a '<ORG> candidate in the forthcoming election". That is not disputed by the appellant. What he contends is that though the election was in prospect, he bad not become a prospective candidate at that time, and that he became so only when the <ORG> adopted him as its candidate on 13-11-1951. It was argued that it was open to the <ORG> Committee either to adopt him as its candidate or not, that if it did not adopt him, he could not, under the rules to which he had subscribed, stand for election at all, that until he was actually adopted therefor, his candidature was nebulous and uncertain, and that the application was consequently nothing more than a preliminary step-in-aid of his becoming a prospective candidate.

The question when a person becomes a candidate must be decided on the language of section 79(b) . Under that section, the candidature commences when the person begins to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. The determining factor therefore is the decision of the candidate himself, not the act of other persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate.

In The Lichfield, case(1) at page 36, Baron <NAME> observed:

"I think the proper mode of judging a question of this kind is to take it from the point of view of the candidate himself. Every man must judge when he will throw himself into the arena. But it is his own choice when he throws down the glove and commences his candidature". When, therefore, a question arises under section 79(b) whether a person had become a candidate at a given point of time, what has to be seen is whether at that time he had clearly and unambiguously declared his intention to stand as a candidate, so that it could be said of him that he held himself out as a prospective candidate. That he has merely formed an intention to stand for election is not sufficient to make him a prospective candidate, because it is of the essence of the matter that he should bold himself out as a prospective candidate. That can only be if he communicates that intention to the outside world by declaration or conduct from which it could be inferred that he intends to stand as a candidate. Has that been established in this case? When the appellant made the payment of Rs. 500 to (1) 5 O'M. & H. 1.

<ORG>, did he merely evince an intention to stand as a candidate, or did he hold himself out as a prospective candidate? The application contains a clear declaration of his intention to contest the election, and that declaration is backed by the solemn act of payment of Rs. 500. The appellant had thus clearly and unambiguously conveyed to the <ORG> his intention to stand as a candidate, and he thereby became a prospective candidate within the meaning of section 79(b) . The possi- bility that the <ORG> might not adopt him as its ,candidate does not, as already mentioned, affect the position, as the section has regard only to the volition and conduct of the candidate. It is true that if the <ORG> did not adopt him, the appellant might not be able to stand for election. But such a result is implicit in the very notion of a prospective candidate, and does not militate against-his becoming one from the date of his application. It was also urged for the appellant that the declaration was made not to the constituency in the North Arcot District but to <ORG> at Madras, and that unless there was proof of holding out to the electorate, the requirements of section 79(b) were not satisfied. It may be that the holding out which is contemplated by that section is to the Constituency; but if it is <ORG> that has to decide who shall be adopted for election from the concerned constituency, any declaration made to the <ORG> is, in effect, addressed to the constituency through its accredited representative. The question when a candidature commences is, as has been held over and over again, one of fact, and a decision of the <ORG> on that question is not liable to be reviewed by this <ORG> in special appeal. In the present case, the <ORG> has, in a well-considered judgment, formulated the correct principles to be applied in determining when a candidature commences, examined the evidence in the light of those principles, and recorded a finding that the appellant was a prospective candidate when he made the payment of Rs. 500 on 12-9-1951, and we do not find any ground for differing from it.

Then, there is the payment of Rs. 500 made to <ORG> on 23-9-1951. The contention of Mr. <NAME> with reference to this payment is that unlike the payment dated 12-9-1951, this was not spent for purposes of election but was donation made to the <ORG> out of philanthropic motives. It has been frequently pointed out that while it is meritorious to make a donation for charitable purposes, if that is made at the time or on the eve of an election, it is open to the charge that its real object was to induce the electors to vote in favour of the particular candidate, and that it should therefore be treated as election expense. In The Wigan Case(1), <ORG> observed:

"........ I wish to answer the suggestion that this was merely charity. Charity at election times ought to be kept by politicians in the background........ In truth, I think, it will generally be found that the feeling which distributes relief to the poor at election time, though those who are the distributors may not be aware of it, is really not charity, but party feeling following in the steps of charity, wearing the dress of charity, and mimicking her gait".

In The <NAME> Case(2), <NAME>, J. said:

"Now assume for the moment that a man forms a design, which at the time is in prospect, for that is the point; yet if circumstances alter, and an election becomes imminent, he will go on with that design at his risk".

It would again be a question of fact whether the payment of Rs. 500 by the appellant on 23-9-1951 was a pure act of charity or was an expense incurred for election purposes. It was admitted by the Secretary -of <ORG> that it was usual for <ORG> to consult the local <ORG> in the matter of adoption of candidates, and that at the time the payment was made, it was known that the appellant had ap- plied to be adopted by the <ORG>. Exhibit A(7) (1) 4 O.M. & H. 1, (2) 6 O'M. & H. 374, which is a statement of receipts and payments of <ORG> for the period 24-9-1951 to 24-5-1952 shows that the <ORG> started with an opening balance of Rs. 7-12-2, and that various amounts were collected including the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant and utilised for election expenses. The <ORG> held on a consideration of these facts that the payment in question could not be regarded as innocent, and "not motivated by the desire to obtain the recommendations of <ORG> for candidature of the first respondent". No ground has been shown for differing from this conclusion.

It was finally contended for the appellant that the two payments dated 12-9-1951 and 23-9-1951 could not be said to be expenses incurred on account of the conduct and management of an election, and reliance was placed on the decision in The Kennington Ca8e(1), where it was held that payments made for the running of a newspaper started for supporting a candidate were not expenses incurred in the conduct and management of an election. The facts of the present case have no resemblance to those found in that case, and the following comment on that decision in Parker's Election Agent and Returning Officer, Fifth Edition, page 241 is instructive:

"But this decision could not be safely followed except where the facts are precisely similar".

On the findings recorded above, the expenses incurred by the appellant come to Rs. 8,063, and the corrupt practice specified in section 123(7) has been committed. The election was therefore rightly set aside under section 100(2)(b) of Act No. XLIII of 1951.

(2) It is next contended for the appellant that the <ORG> was in error in recording as part of the order a finding that by reason of the contravention of section 123(7) , the appellant had become subject to the disqualification specified in section 140 , without giving notice to him as required by the proviso to section (1) 4 O'M. & H, 93

99. The question whether a party to an election petition is entitled to a notice under the proviso in respect of the very charges which were the subject-matter of enquiry in the petition itself, has been considered by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1955, and it has been held therein that if the party had opportunity given to him in the hearing of the petition to meet the very charge in respect of which a finding is to be recorded under section 99 (1) (a), then he is not entitled to a further notice in respect of the same matter, under the proviso. In the present case, the finding under section 99(1) (a) relates to the very payments which were the subject-matter of enquiry in the election petition, and therefore no notice was required to be given to the appellant under the proviso. This objection also fails, and the appeal must accordingly be dismissed. The respondent has stated through his counsel <NAME> that he does not propose to contest the appeal. There will accordingly be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.


CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 271 of 1989 PETITIONER: COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, GUNTUR RESPONDENT: ARUNA STRAW BOARDS (P) LTD. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/08/1999 BENCH: K. VENKATASWAMI & M. JAGANNADHA RAO JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT 1999 Supp(1) SCR 529 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. This appeal by the <ORG> is preferred against an order dated 19.4.88 of <ORG>, New Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as `the Tribunal').

The question that arises for consideration is whether the duty of excise is leviable under the provisions of the Central Excise Act on the quantities of single ply straw board manufactured and cleared without payment of duty for manufacture of multiple ply straw board/straw board of higher D.G. in the same factory of production.

Briefly stated, the facts are the following:-

The respondents are the manufacturers of paper boards falling under T.I. 17 of the Central Excise Tariff. They manufactured single ply straw boards and a major portion of the single ply boards was cleared on payment of duty at the factory gate. A portion of the single ply boards was used in the manufacture of multiple ply straw boards within the factory of production and the multiple ply straw boards are removed from the factory after payment of duty. A show-cause notice was issued by the <ORG> calling upon the respondent why the duty should not be levied on single ply straw boards used for the manufacture of multiple ply boards within the factory. The period for which the payment was demanded was from 20.2.83 to 22.7.83. The respondent replied to the show-cause notice denying the liability and the Assistant Collector, after perusing the reply, found that there was no essential difference in identity between the original commodity, namely, single ply straw board, and the processed article, namely, multiple ply straw boards, and the mere joining of two or three single ply straw boards by means of an adhesive would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that a commercially different and distinct commodity came into existence. The Assistant Collector also gave other reasons to come to the conclusion that the single ply straw board cleared for manufacture of multiple ply straw board in the same factory cannot be subjected to the duty of excise. Accordingly, by this order dated 6.2.84 he dropped all further proceedings initiated against the respondent pursuant to the show-cause notice issued for the period mentioned above.

The <ORG>, aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector, preferred an appeal to the Collector of <ORG> (Appeals), Madras. <ORG> by its order dated 11.6.84 gave a finding as follows:-

`During the relevant time the tariff description under Entry No. 17 of Central Excise Tariff was as under:

`Paper and paper board, all sorts (including paste board, mill board, straw board, a carboard and corrugated board) and...' From the above description, it is clear that all sorts of paper boards including straw boards would fall under T.I. 17 and specifically would fall under sub-item (1) (unless such straw board is elsewhere specified, which is not the case). Therefore the tariff description does not distinguish between single ply and multiple ply straw boards and does not prescribe any standard of thickness, before a board could be called a straw board. Therefore, straw board whether it is single ply or double ply or triple ply or multiple ply would continue to be described as straw board and would fall under the same sub-item (10) of T.I. 17 during the relevant period. Hence, charging single ply straw board to duty and again charging multiple ply straw board manufactured out of such single ply straw board sheets within the same factory to duty would clearly amount to double levy.

On this short ground, application merits rejection.' <ORG> also gave additional reasons in support of the above conclusion. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed.

Still aggrieved, the <ORG> preferred a further appeal to the <ORG>. The <ORG> by its order dated 19.4.88 dismissed the appeal.

A three-member Bench of the Tribunal, consisting of Vice President and two Technical Members, considered the matter. One Technical Member (Shri <NAME>), who has written a detailed order, found as follows:-

`We observe that both the single ply and multiple ply straw boards answer to the description straw boards and multiple straw boards cannot be considered as paste boards even in terms of the definition given in the <ORG> cited by the <ORG>'.

Thereafter, a discussion on the decision of a five-member Bench of the <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> ., (1986) 24 ELT 542 and also on the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> , reported in (1988) 33 ELT 292, was made. The conclusion reached by him was to the effect that in view of the decision of <ORG> (supra), the five-member Bench decision of the <ORG> (supra) cannot be followed. Apart from this reference to Rule 49(4) read with Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules was also made and discussed. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed. The Vice President (J) (<NAME>), in his separate order, has observed as follows:-

`From Brother <NAME>'s order I observe that single ply and multiple ply boards are both straw boards. In view of this I would not for the present like to say that effect of the <ORG> decision in <CITATION> , (1988) 33 ELT 292 (Bombay) is to unsettle the <ORG> decision in <ORG>, case (1986) 24 ELT 542. The product in two stages not being distinct in name, character or use there could be no question of demanding duty at both the stages. In this view of the matter the applicability of Rule 49(4) and Rule 9 discussed by Brother <NAME> in para 3 of his order is also in my view of academic importance. With these words I agree with Brother <NAME> that the appeal should be dismissed.' Another Member (Technical) (<NAME>) concurred with the order of the Vice President (J). It is clear from the above that the majority decision of the <ORG> was dehors the <ORG> judgment and also the five-member Bench decision of the <ORG>. It rested on the scope and interpretation of Tariff Item 17.

The learned counsel appearing for the <ORG>, however, argued before us mainly inviting our attention to the fact that the judgment of <ORG> (supra) relied on in the detailed order of the <ORG> has since been overruled by this Court in <CITATION> .  Supp 2 SCC 348. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the decision of the <ORG> has to be set aside. No argument was addressed before us challenging the conclusion of the Assistant Collector, the Collector (Appeals) and the <ORG> on the scope of Tariff Item 17 as well as the finding that single ply and multiple ply boards are both straw boards as enumerated in the said Item.

The respondent is not represented before us. Therefore, we have ourselives gone through the orders of the Assistant Collector, the Collector (Appeals) and the <ORG>, in particular, the order of the Collector (Appeals) and the order of the Vice President (J) We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Collector (Appeals) on the interpretation of T.I. 17, which has been approved by the Vice President (J), with whom the Member (Technical) has concurred. That being the position, the reversal of the decision of <ORG> (supra) by this <ORG> in <NAME> (supra), is not relevant and the same cannot be pressed into service to upset the decision of the <ORG>.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs.


PETITIONER: U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND <NAME>. Vs. RESPONDENT: HARI SHANKER JAIN AND <NAME>. DATE OF JUDGMENT28/08/1978 BENCH: <NAME>, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: <NAME>, O. CHINNAPPA (J) KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. CITATION: 1980 AIR 65 1979 SCR (2) 355 1978 SCC (4) 16 ACT: Industrial Employment (Standing Order), 1946 (Act 20. S. 138 Scope of- Whether the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act , 1948 prevails over the provision of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act or vice versa- Scope of rule of ejusdem generis explained Maxim Generalis specialibus non derogant, applicability of. HEADNOTE: Respondents were two workmen originally employed by <ORG> Seth lam Gopal and Partners, who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the Electricity Act , 1910. There were certified Standing orders for the industrial establishment of the said licensees; but they did not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees with the result the workmen could continue to hours long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties Pursuant to The purchase by the appellant with effect from 1-12-1964 of the electricity undertaking of <ORG> <NAME>, the employees in their industrial establishment including the respondents became the employee of the appellant. I he appellant board which ii admittedly an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders Act. 1946 applies neither made nor got certified any standing orders as it was bound so to do under hat Act. The <ORG> however considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment <NAME> as applicable to their employees even after the purchase of the undertaking by the <ORG>. However. On lay 2. 1970 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified under Section 13-B o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946. a regulation made by the U.P. State Electricity <ORG> under Section 79(c) of the electricity Suppl. Act, 1948 fixing the age of superannuation as S and 60 on a par with the other <ORG>. employees. Action in pursuance of the regulation as notified by the Governor the appellant sought to retire the respondents on July 2, 1972 and July 7. 1972 respectively. On their attaining the age of 58 years. The respondents filed a Writ Petition in <ORG> challenging the regulation male by the <ORG> and its notification by the Governor which was dismissed. But <ORG> which heard the special appeal preferred by then. Referred three questions to a Full Bench The Full Bench answered the questions as follows: ``(l) The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders 1946 applies to the industrial establishment of the State Electricity <ORG>. (2) The Standing Orders framed, in an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking, do not cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the <ORG> or on framing of the Regulations under Section 79(c) of the electricity (Supply) Act 1918 and (3) Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders Act. 1946. applies only to the industrial establishments of the <ORG> and to no other establishments. 356 Following the opinion of <ORG>, <ORG> allowed the special Appeal and issued a writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 197) and directing the appellant not to enforce the regulation against the respondents. he appellant obtained a certificate under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution and has preferred the appeal. Allowing the appeal, the <ORG> ^ HELD : 1. The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. 1946 (Act 20) is a special law in regard to the matters enumerate(l in the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity <ORG> with respect to my of those matters are of no effect, unless such regulations are either notified by the <ORG> under- Section 13-B or certified by the certifying officer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946. In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the <ORG> have not been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the <ORG> the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders Act shall continue to apply. In the present case, the regulation made 1. the <ORG> with retired to the age of superannuation having been duly notified by the government , the regulation shall have effect. notwithstanding the fact that it is a matter- which could be the subject matters of Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act . The respondents were, therefore, properly retired when they attained the are of 58 years. [371A-F] 2. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial establishment, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi- judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness. It is an Act giving recognition and hard-won and precious right of workmen. It is a Special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule- enumerated conditions of service or workmen in industrial establishment. [364E- <CITATION> , [196(] 2 S.C.R. 974; Rohtak Hissar district <CITATION> . an(l ors.,  2 S.C.R. 863; <CITATION> ,  1 S.C.R. 434; referred to. 3. The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of State Electricity <ORG>. It is an act to regulate the coordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special act in regard to the subject of conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments. If section 79 of he Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making o regulations providing for the conditions of service of the employees of the <ORG>, it can only be regarded as a general provision which must yield o the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter. Act. [365D-F] 4. The reason for the rule "Generalis specialibus non derogant", that a general provision should yield to specific provision is this: In passing a special Act, <ORG> devotes its entire consideration to a. particulars subject. When a 357 General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that <ORG> has A not repealed or modified the former special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again levied consideration from <ORG> [366-D] The provisions of the Standing orders Acts therefore, must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act in regard to matters to which the Standing (Orders Act applies. It is impossible to conceive that <ORG> sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, embodying as they do hard-won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. lt is obvious that <ORG> did not have before it the Standing orders Act, when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and <ORG> never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand pr alto repealed by Section 79 (c of the Electricity Supply Act . [366F- <CITATION> ,  3 S.C.R. 619; Rajasthan Electricity <ORG> n. Mohan Lal,  3 S.C.R. 277; held inapplicable. 5. The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be so construed as limited t things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution aud not pushed too far". It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily limit general and comprehensive words. If a broad-based genus could consistently be discovered there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be. [369 A-B] It is true that in Section 1  3-B the specie specifically mentioned happen to be <ORG> servants. But they also possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status and governed by statutory rules and regulations. If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Section I 3-B to industrial undertakings employing government servants only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specially and following it up with a general expression like the one in the instant case. [369B-D] 6. The words 'rules and regulations' have come to acquire a. special meaning when used in statutes. They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function. The words can have MV other meaning in Sec. 1 3-B. Therefore, the expression "workmen . whom .. any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in the context of Sec. 13-B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of service the relevant statute authorises the making of rules or regulations. The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean <ORG> servants only; nor can not be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever including private employers, so long as their conditions of service are notified by the <ORG>. under Sec. 13-B [369D-F] The words 'nothing in this Act shall apply' are not to be interpreted to literally as to lead to absurd results. The only reasonable construction that an be put upon the language of Section 13-B is that a rule of regulation, it 358 notified by the <ORG>, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation covers the field. To that extent and to that extent only "nothing in the Act shall apply". [307 <CITATION>  1 L.L.J. 252 and <CITATION> ,  1 L.L.J. 361 explained. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 1977.

From the Judgment and Decree dated 29-11- 1976 of <ORG> in Special Appeal No. 378 of 1974.

<NAME> and <NAME> for the Appellant.

<NAME>, <NAME>) , <NAME>, <NAME> and Mrs. <NAME>, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

<NAME> and Miss <NAME> for the Intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. The case is primarily concerned with the age of retirement of two obscure workmen but it raises question of general importance concerning workmen employed by most statutory bodies and corporations. It is on such chances that the development of our law depends.

The two workmen were originally employed by Messrs <NAME> and Partners who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the Indian Electricity Act , 1910. There were certified Standing orders for the industrial establishment of M/s. <NAME> and partners. The certified Standing orders did not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees. I ht, according to the workmen meant that they could continue to work as long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties. The electricity undertaking of Ms. <NAME> and Partners was purchased br <ORG>, with effect from 15-12-1964, under The provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act , 1948. The employees of <NAME> and Partners became the employees of the U.P. <ORG>. <ORG> which it is no longer disputed is an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies, neither made nor got certified any Standing orders as it was bound so to do under that Act. But it is evident, though no admitted from two letters, one from the Superintending Engineer in reply to a letter dated 31-12-166 from the Executive Engineer and the other from the Certifying officer for Standing orders and Labour Commissioner to the General Secretary of <ORG> that the <ORG> and the workmen considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment of <ORG> as applicable to them even after the purchase of the undertaking by the <ORG>. This, however, is not very material. The <ORG>, as we said earlier, made and not certified no standing orders either in regard to age or superannuation or in regard to any other matter Mentioned in the schedule to the Standing orders Act. We may mention here that by reason of a notification dated 17-1-1959 "age of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or ally other facility which the employers may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties' is one of` the matters in respect of which an employer to whom the Standing orders Act applies is bound to make Standing orders and get them certified. However, on May 28, 1970. the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified. under Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946. a regulation made by the U.P. State: Electricity <ORG> under Section 7(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, ]948. The notification was as Follows.

"No. 3822-2/70/XXIII-PB-15EH-67 May 28, 1970.

In pursuance of the provision of Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 (Act No. 20 of 1946), the Governor is pleased to notify in the official Gazette that <ORG> has made the following Regulations under sub- section (c) of Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply Act, 1948) (Act No. 54 of 1948)-

``Notwithstanding any rule if one order or practice hitherto followed, the date of compulsory retirement of an employee of the <ORG> will be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years; provided that-

(i) in the case of the inferior servants of the <ORG>, whose counterparts under State Government are at present entitled to serve upto the age of 60 years, the age of compulsory retirement will be the date on Which they attain the age of 60 years.

(ii) the <ORG> or its subordinate appointing authority may require an employee to retire after he attains or has attained the age of 55 years on three months'' notice or three months' salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reason".

Acting in pursuance of this regulation as notified by the Governor, the <ORG> sought to retire the two respondents on July 2, 1972 and July 7, 1972 respectively on their attaining the age of 58 years. The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in <ORG> challenging the regulation mad by the <ORG> and its notification by the Governor. Their contention was that the <ORG> was not competent to make a regulation in respect of a matter covered by the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. The writ petition as dismissed by a learned Single Judge. The respondents preferred a special appeal and <ORG> which heard the Special Appeal in the first instance referred the following three questions tc a Full Bench:

" (1) Whether the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 applies to the Industrial establishments of <ORG> ? (2) Whether the standing orders framed for an Industrial establishment of an electrical undertaking cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the <ORG> or on the framing of regulations under section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948?

(3) Whether section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies only to industrial establishments of the <ORG> or also to other industrial establishments ?

"l. The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946 applies to the industrial establishments of <ORG>.

2. The Standing Orders framed in an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking do not cease to b operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the <ORG> or on framing of the regulations under section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.

3. Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, applies only to the industrial establishments of the government and to no other establishments".

Following the opinion of the Full Bench, <ORG> allowed the Special Appeal and issued a Writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 1970 and directing <ORG> not to enforce the regulation against the appellants before them. <ORG>, having obtained a Certificate from <ORG> under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, has preferred this appeal.

<NAME> learned Counsel for the appellant did not canvass A the correctness of the answer of the Full Bench to the first question referred to it. He confined his attack to the answers to the second and third questions. Relying upon the decisions of this <ORG> in <CITATION> (1), and <CITATION> (2), <NAME> argued that <ORG> was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and that the regulations made b the <ORG> under Section 79(c) of the Act had the 'full force and effect of the statute and the force of law" so as to displace, over-ride or supersede Standing Orders made and certified under the Industrial Employment (Stanching orders) Act. which, he submitted wee mere contractual conditions of service subjected to a quasi-judicial process and which, therefore, could not take precedence over legislative processed regulations. The learned Counsel further submitted that Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act was a special law and that it prevailed over the provisions of the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act. Alternately, he submitted, the notifying of the regulation regarding age of superannuation under Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act excluded the applicability of that Act in regard to the subject of age of superannuation. He urged that Section 13-B was no confined in its application to Government undertakings only or to cases where there were comprehensive sets of rules, as was thought by the High <ORG>.

<NAME>, for the Workmen contended that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act was an act specially designed to define and secure reasonable conditions of service for workmen in industrial establishments employing one hundred or more workmen and to that end to compel employers to make Standing orders and to et them certified by a quasi-judicial authority. It was, therefore, a special Act with reference to its subject matter. The Electricity Supply Act , on the other hand, was intended "to provide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development.'' It was not specially designed to define the conditions of service of employees of <ORG> or to displace the Standing orders Act. The power given to an <ORG> under Section 79(c) to make regulations providing for "the duties of officers and servants of the <ORG> and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service" was no more than the usual, general power possessed by every (1)  3 SCR 619.

(2) [1967] 3 SCR 377.

employer. <NAME> argued that the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act was a special Act which dealt with the special subject of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments and, therefore, in the matter of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments, it prevailed over the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act . He urged that under Section 13-B of the Standing orders Act, Government undertakings which had a comprehensive set of rules alone could be excluded from the applicability of the Act. He submitted that to permit a single rule or regulation made for limited purpose to be notified under Sec. 13-B would have the disastrous effect of excluding the applicability of the whole of the Standing Orders Act .

Before examining the rival contentions, we remind ourselves that the Constitution has expressed a deep concern for the welfare of workers and has provided in Art, 42 that the <ORG> shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and in Art. 43 that the <ORG> shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment or leisure etc. These are among the "Directive Principles of <ORG> Policy". The mandate of Article 37 of the Constitution is that while the Directive Principles of <ORG> Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, the principles are `nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country' and `it shall be the duty of the <ORG> to apply these principles in making laws'. Addressed to <ORG>, what the injunction means is that while <ORG> are not free to direct the making of legislation, <ORG> are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goal set out in the Directive Principle of St Policy. This command or the Constitution must be over present n the minds of judges when interpreting statutes which council them selves directly or indirectly with matters et out in the Directive principles of <ORG> Policy Let us now examine the various provisions their proper contact with a view to resolve the problem before us. l the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act , 194(. Before the passing of the Act conditions or service of industrial employees s were invariably ill defined and were hardly over know with even a slight Degree of precision to the employees. There was no uniformity of conditions of service f(hr employees discharging identical duties in fl the same establishment. Conditions of service were generally e and the result of oral arrangements which left the employees t Te mercy of the employer. With the growth of the trade union move ment and the right of collective bargaining, employees started putting A forth their demands to end this sad and confusing state of affairs. Recognising the rough deal that was being given to workers 1 employers who would not define their conditions of service and he inevitability f industrial strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act . It was stated in the statement of objects and reasons;

"Experience has shown that "Standing orders" defining the conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action, holidays, leave etc., go a long way towards minimising, friction between the management and workers ill industrial undertakings. Discussion on the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour Conferences revealed a consensus of opinion in favour of legislation. The Bill accordingly seeks to pr vide for the framing of "Standing orders" in all industrial establishments employing one hundred and more workers".

It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble "expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them". The scheme or the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it now stands, requires every employer of an industrial establishment as defined in the Act to submit to the Certifying officer draft Standing orders, that is, "Rules relating to matters set out in the schedule", proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment. This is mandatory. It has to be done within six months after the commencement of the Act. 'Failure to do so is punishable and is further made a continuing offence. The draft Standing orders are required to cover every matter set out in the schedule. The schedule enumerates the matters to be provided in the Standing orders and they include classification of workmen, Shift working, attendance and late coming. Leave and holidays, termination of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of redress for wronged workmen etc. Item No. 11 of the Schedule IS "Any other matter which may be prescribed". By a notification dated 17 1959 <ORG> has prescribed "Age o superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other facility which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties" as a matter requiring to be provided in the Standing orders. On receipt o the draft Standing Orders from the employee, the Certifying officer is required to forward a copy of the same to the trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to prefer objections, if any. Thereafter the Certifying officer is required to give a hearing to the employer and the trade union or workmen as the case may be 7-526SCI/78 and to decide "whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft Standing orders certifiable under the Act'. Standing orders are certifiable under the Act only if provision i made therein for every matter set out in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the provisions of the Act and if the Certifying officer adjudicates them as fair and reason 3 able. The Certifying officer is invested with the powers of <ORG> for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc. etc. The order of the Certifying Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed appellate authority. The Standing orders as finally certified are required to be entered in a Register maintained by the Certifying officer. The employer is required to prominently post the Certified Standing orders on special boards in. maintained for that purpose. This is the broad scheme of the Act. The Act also provides for exemptions. About that, later. The Act , as originally enacted, precluded the Certifying officer from adjudicating upon the fairness or reasonableness of the draft Standing orders submitted by the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now casts a duty upon the Certifying officer to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing orders. The Scheme of the Act has ben sufficiently explained by this Court in <ORG>. v. f. D. Vyas(l), <ORG>. v. State of U.P. & Ors.(2), and Western dia <CITATION> . The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is thus seen he an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workman in industrial establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi-judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness. It is ar Act giving recognition and form to hard-won and precious rights of workman. We have no hesitation in saying that it is a Special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule-enumerated conditions (hf service of workmen in industrial establishments.

Turning net to the Electricity Supply Act , it is, as its preamble says. An Act to provide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development". The statement of objects and reasons and a lance at the various provisions of the Act show that the primary object (1)  2 SCR 974 (2)  2 SCR 863 (3)  I SCR 434  Of the Act is to provide for the coordinated, efficient and economic development of electricity in India on a regional basis consistent with the needs of the entire region including semi-urban and rural areas. Chapter II of the Act provides for the constitution of <ORG> and Chapter III for the constitution of state <ORG>. Chapter IV prescribes the powers and duties of state <ORG>, and Chapter V the <ORG>' works and trading procedure. n Chapter VI deals with the <ORG>'s finance, Accounts and Audit. Chapter VII (from S, 70 to S. 83 ) which is headed "Miscellaneous" contains various miscellaneous provisions amongst Which are S. 78 which empowers the <ORG> to make rules and S. 79 which empowers the <ORG> to make regulations in respect of matters specific in clauses (a) to (k) of that Section. Clause (c) of S. 79 is "the duties of officers and servants of the <ORG>, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of` service". This, of course is no more than the ordinary general power, with which every employer is invested in the first instance, to regulate the conditions of service of his employees. It is an ancillary or incidental power of every employer, The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of state <ORG>. It is an act to regulate the coordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act in reread to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special Act in regard to the subject of Conditions of Service of workmen in industrial establishments. If Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making of regulations providing for the conditions of service of tile employees of the <ORG>, it can only be regarded as a general provides which must yield to the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter Act.

The maim "Generalia specialibus non derogant" is quite well known. The rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in <NAME> v. The owner of the "Vera Cruz"(l) as follows:

"Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general worlds without any indication of a particular intention to do so".

(1) [1884] 10 AC 59 at 68.

The question in <NAME> v. <NAME> was whether Sec. 7 of the Admiralty <ORG> Act of 1861, which gave jurisdiction to that <ORG>-over "any claim for damage done by any ship" also gave jurisdiction over claims for loss of life which would otherwise come under the Fatal Accidents Act . It was held that the general words o Sec. 7 of the Admiralty <ORG> Act did not exclude the applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act and therefore, the Admiralty <ORG> had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages for loss of life.

The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act , <ORG> devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that <ORG> has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from <ORG>. Vide <ORG> v. <ORG>) and <ORG> v. Adams(2). In <ORG> v. state f Uttar Pradesh(3), this Court observed (at p. 1174):

"The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and an other to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards us the rest the earlier direction should have effect".

We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that <ORG> sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act embodying as they do hard- won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act . It is obvious that <ORG> did not have before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and <ORG> never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand protanto re pealed by Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act . We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders Act must prevail over S. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders Act applies.

(1) 26 L. J. Ch. 164 = 69 E.R. 1048.

(2) (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 125 (3) A. r. R. 1961 S. C. 1170 .

<NAME>, relying on what was said in the Rajasthan state <ORG> case and <ORG> case argued that the regulations made under Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act being statutory in nature stood on so high a pedestal as to override, by their very nature, the Standing orders made under the Standing orders Act. The observations on which he relied are, in the <ORG> case:

"The state, as defined in Art. 12 , is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The <ORG>, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Art. 298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstance that the <ORG> under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the <ORG> must be excluded from the scope of the word "state" as used in Art. 12. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly Show that the powers conferred on the <ORG> include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. <NAME> to urge before us that the <ORG> cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the <ORG>. The <ORG> was clearly an authority to which the provisions o Part III of the Constitution were applicable".

and in <NAME> case (at p. 627):

"Rules, regulations, schemes, Bye-laws, orders made under statutory powers are all comprised in delegated legislation"

at p. 628) "Subordinate legislation has, if validly made, the full force and effect of a. statute"

and (at p. 684-685) "Rules and Regulations of the oil and Natural Gas Commission, <ORG>, <ORG> have the force of law. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to a declaration o being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions.

These statutory bodies are authorities within the meaning of Art. 12 o the Constitution".

The proposition that statutory Bodies are 'authorities' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, that the employees of these bodies have a statutory status and that regulations made under the statutes creating these bodies have the force of law are not in dispute before us. The question is not whether the employees and the <ORG> have a statutory status; they undoubtedly have. The question is not whether the regulations made under Sec. 79 have the force of law; again, they undoubtedly have. The question is whether Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act is a general law and therfore regulations cannot be made under it in respect of matters covered by the Industrial employment (Standing order) Act, a special law. That question we have answered and the answer to that question makes irrelevant the submissions based on the statutory status of the employees and the statutory force of the regulations.

Next, we turn to the submission based on the notification made under Sec. 13-B of the Standing orders Act. Section 13-B reads as follows:

"13B. Nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence, Service (Classiffication, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate <ORG> in the official <ORG>, apply".

The notification made by the <ORG> has already been extracted by us. Some doubts were expressed whether <ORG> had in fact made the regulation and whether the <ORG> merely notified the relation without applying its mind. The learned counsel appearing for the <ORG> and the <ORG> placed before us the relevant records and note-files and we are satisfied that the <ORG> did make the regulation and the <ORG> did apply its mind.

<ORG> expressed the views that the expression any other rules or regulations" should be read ejusdem generis with the expressions "Fundamental and Supplementary Rules", "Civil Services, Control, Classification and Appeal Rules" etc. So read, it was said, the provisions of Section 13-B could only be applied to industrial establish ments in which the workmen employed could properly be described as <ORG> servants. We are unable to agree that the application of the ejusdem generis rule leads to any such result. The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far". It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or unnecessarily limit general and comprehensive words. If a broad-based genus could consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be. It is true that in Sec. 13-B the specie specie spacifically mentioned happen to be <ORG> servants. But they also possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status, and governed by statutory rules and regulations. If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Sec. 13-B to industrial undertakings employing <ORG> servants only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specifically and following it up with a general expression like the one before us. The words 'rules and regulations' have come to acquire a special meaning when used in statutes. They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function. Te words can have no other meaning in Sec. 1 3-B. Therefore, the expression "workmen .. t whom.. any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in the context of Sec. 13-B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of, service the relevant statute authorities the making of rules or regulations. The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean <ORG> servants only; nor can it be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever including private employers, so long a their conditions of service are notified by the <ORG> under Sec. 13-B.

<NAME> relied on certain observations of <ORG> in <CITATION> (l), and <CITATION> (). In <NAME> case it was held that the mere fact that <ORG> had adopted the rules and regulations if <ORG> a its transitory rules and regulations did not bring the workmen employed in industrial establishments under the <ORG> within the mischief of Sec. 1 3-P. Of the Industrial Establishment's (Standing order) ct. In <NAME>'. ca it was held that rules made by the <ORG> fl (1)  I L.L.J. 252.

(2) [1968] I L.L.J. 361 under the District Municipalities Act could not be considered to he rules notified under Se. 13-B of the Standing orders Act merely because the rules were made by the <ORG> and published in the <ORG> Gazette. We agree with the conclusion in. both case. In <NAME> case <NAME>, also observed that the industrial employment (Standing order) Act was a special act relating exclusively to the service conditions of persons employed in industrial establishments, and, therefore, its provisions prevailed over The provisions of the District Municipalities Act. We entirely agree. But, the learned judge went on to say "S. 13-B cannot be availed of for purposes of framing rules to govern the relationships in an industrial establishment under private management or in a statutory <ORG>. This rule can apply only to industrial establishments in respect of which the <ORG> is authorised to frame rules and regulations relating to the conditions of employment in industrial establishments". There we disagree. Our disagreement is only in regard to industrial establishment in statutory <ORG>s and not those under private management. Our reasons are mentioned in the previous paragraph.

<NAME> suggested that the rules, and regulations specific mention of which has been made in Sec. 13-B were all comprehensive sets of rules., and, therefore, "any other rules or regulations" that might be notified by the <ORG> should also satisfy the test of eomprehensiveness. He argued that a single rule or regulation could not be notified under Sec. 13-B as it would be too much to say, he said, that the notifying of a single rule or regulation would exclude the applicability of all the provisions of the Standing orders Act. We do not think that the notifying of one or many regulations has the effect that <NAME> apprehends it has. The words 'Nothing in this Act shall apply' are not to be interpreted too literally as to lead to absurd results and to what the legislature never intended. In our view the only reasonable construction that we can put upon the language of Sec. 13-B is that a rule or regulation, if notified by the <ORG>, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation corse the field. To that extent and to that extend only 'nothing in the Act shall apply'. To understand Sec. 13B in by other manner will lead to unjust and uncontemplated results. For instance, most of the Service Rules and Regulations expressly mentioned in Sec. 13-B do no deal with a large number of the matters enumerated in the schedule such as 'Manner of intimating to workman periods and hour 11 of work, holidays, pay-days and wage rates', 'shift working', 'Attendance and late coming', 'conditions o, procedure in applying for, and e authority which may grant leave and holidays'. 'Closing and reopening of Sections of the industrial establishments and temporary stoppages of work and the rights and liabilities of he employer and workman arising therefrom' etc. To exclude the applicability of Standing orders relating to all these matters because the Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service Rules or the Civil Services Control, Classification an Appeal Rules provide for a few. matters like 'Classification of workmen' or 'suspension or dismissal for misconduct' would be to reverse the processes of history, apart from leading to unjust and untoward results. It will place workmen once again at the mercy of the employer be he ever so benign and it will certainly promote industrial strife. We have indicated what according to us is h proper construction of Sec. 13-B. That is the only construction which gives meaning and sense to Sec. 13-B and that is a construction which can legitimately be said to conform to the Directive Principles of state Policy proclaimed in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution.

We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the schedule and the regulations made by <ORG> with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the <ORG> under Sec. 13-B or certified by The Certifying officer under Sec. 5 o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the <ORG> have not been notified by the Governor or in respect o which n regulations have been made by the <ORG>, the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act shall continue to apply. In the present case the regulation made by the <ORG> with regard to age o superannuation having been duly notified by the <ORG>, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact hat it is a matter which could be the subject matter s) Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. The respondents were therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of is years. the appeal is, therefore, allowed. The Writ Petition field in <ORG> is dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents as directed by this Court on 28-9- 1977. The costs are quantified at Rs. 3,500/-..

S.R. Appeal allowed.