JUDGMENT

1. For the purposes of the questions we have to consider in this appeal, the material facts are as follows:

In July 1890 the father of the plaintiffs mortgaged certain lands to certain parties whose interest is now vested in the defendants. In July 1895 the father executed and registered a sale deed by which he purported to sell the lands in question to the plaintiffs, the lands being in possession of the defendants under the mortgage of July 1890. In Original Suit No. 407 of 1895, a suit against the father, the lands were attached. The plaintiffs preferred a claim to the attached property. This claim was rejected by an order dated the 22nd February 1896 made under Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In July 1898 the father purported to sell the lands to the defendants. In October 1893 when the property was put up for sale in execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 407 of 1895, the late first defendant paid off the amount due under the decree and the attachment was raised.

2. The present suit is a suit by the plaintiffs to redeem the lands in question.

3. <ORG> held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by Article 11 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act , the plaintiffs) not having brought a suit to establish their right to the property in dispute within one year from the date of the order made under Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. <ORG> was of opinion that the claim was not barred inasmuch as there had been no "investigation" of the plaintiff's claim within the meaning of that word as used in the Code. We do not think the judgment of <ORG> can be supported upon the ground that there has been no "investigation" of the plaintiff's claim. The actual order was The sale seems to be collusive. Claim rejected. The District Judge observes : "The sale in question was one by a father to his daughters and the <NAME> may have thought from a glance at the sale deed that it was probably collusive."

4. Assuming this to have been so, we think it must be taken that there was an "investigation" within the meaning of this word used in the sections.

5. It is not possible to define the amount of inquiry which constitutes an "investigation." If the order purports to deal with the claim on the merits, we think it must be taken that there has been an investigation.

6. In the case of <NAME> v. <NAME> I.L.R. 15 Calc. 521 <ORG> observe : "...The Code does not prescribe the extent to which the investigation should go and though in some cases it may be very proper that there should be as full an investigation as if a suit were instituted for the very purpose of trying the question, in other cases it may also be the most prudent and proper course to deliver un opinion on such facts as are before the Subordinate Judge at the time, leaving the aggrieved party to bring the suit which the law allows to him."

7. In the case of <CITATION> . 18 Mad. 265 in which the <ORG> held there has been no investigation and consequently no order within the meaning of the section, the claim was "practically withdrawn." In the case of <CITATION> . 18 Mad. 316 the order was "there is nothing to show that the petitioner's land have been attached," and it was held there was no order within the meaning of the section. In that case the <ORG> held, in effect, that there was no occasion to investigate since there was nothing to show the lands had been attached. There does not appear to be any case in which <ORG> order which purports to be an adjudication on the merits of the case has been hold to be not an order made after investigation within the moaning of the section.

8. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the decree of <ORG> could be upheld upon the ground that the property not having been sold in execution of the decree, and the decree having been satisfied, the order was not conclusive as between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The argument was that the decree having been eventually satisfied there was no reason for the plaintiffs to bring a suit, and the fact that it was not satisfied until after the expiration of a year from the date of the order was immaterial. The contention was that the order was only conclusive against the plaintiffs, if they failed to bring a suit so as to bar them from denying the right of the judgment-creditor to sell the land which ho had attached and the right of a purchaser claiming under a sale in execution proceedings. The respondents relied on the observation in the judgment in the case of <CITATION> . 8 Calc. 279 observation is as follows:

The finding of the <ORG> in the execution department that the sale was invalid, only meant that the sale was invalid as against the judgment-creditor, and as against any purchaser who might purchase at a sale held in execution following that attachment. "When the judgment creditor was paid off, he had no further claim."

9. This observation must, of course, be read by the light of the facts of the case with which the learned Judges were dealing secundum subject am materiam. The facts in that case are distinguishable from those in the present case first, on the ground that in the Calcutta case the decree amount was paid off by the judgment-debtor in the suit in which the decree was obtained and not, as in the case before us, by a third party to whom the lands were subsequently conveyed. Further there is nothing to show that in the Calcutta case the payment off was not made within a year from the date of the order dismissing the claim.

10. Our attention was called to other cases where an order under Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissing a claim has been held to be not conclusive against the claimant. It seems to us that all these cases are distinguishable.

11. In the case of <CITATION> . 31 Calc. 228 certain lands of which the plaintiff was in possession were attached under a decree. He preferred a claim in the execution proceedings under Section 278 and the claim was dismissed by an order under Section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure, He at once paid off the decree amount and the attachment was raised. It was held that when the attachment was removed after the payment of the decrial amount there was no longer any attachment or proceeding in execution in which the order could operate to the prejudice of the plaintiff, and therefore there was no necessity for him to bring a suit to sot aside the order. In that case the plaintiff by his own act, within a year from the making of the order, got the attachment removed. This being so, he could not be held to be under any obligation to bring a suit to secure the object which he had already secured by paying off the amount of the decree. The principle of that decision is not applicable to the present case. In the case of <CITATION> . 13 Bom. 72 the amount of the decree was paid off by the judgment-debtor. In the case of <NAME> v. Bai Divali I.L.R. 18 Bom. 241 the attachment was removed by the act of the judgment-creditor who was the plaintiff in the suit. Having removed the attachment by his own act, he could not be hoard to say as against the claimant - (the defendant in the suit) - because you did not bring a suit when your claim was dismissed you are concluded from setting up a title as against me.

12. In the three cases just referred to, it is clear that the decree amount was paid off within a year from the making of the order under Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the first case <CITATION> . 8 Calc. 279 the report does not state when the decree amount was paid off, though there is nothing to suggest it was paid off more than a year after the making of the order. In all the cases the decree was paid off by a party to the execution proceedings - not as in the case before us, by a third party. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the fact of the money having been paid off by a third party, would be a good ground for distinguishing the present case from the cases to which we have referred. We are of opinion, however, that the payment off not having boon made within a year after the date of the order, the order is conclusive as between the claimants (the plaintiffs) and the defendants. To hold otherwise would lead to uncertainty of title and would be inconsistent with the policy of the legislature in prescribing a short period of limitation for suit by parties against whom an order has been made in claim proceedings. To hold that the right of an unsuccessful claimant to bring a suit remains in a state of suspended animation for an indefinite period after the expiration of a year from the date of the order against him liable to be revived at any moment by the payment off of the amount of the decree, would lead to great inconvenience. On the facts of the case we are of opinion that the order under Section 283 was conclusive as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and the order of the lower <ORG> cannot be supported on the ground that it was not.

13. There remains the question of res judicata. If the plaintiffs' claim in the present suit is res judicata we fire of course precluded from giving effect to the view indicated above and we must dismiss the appeal. The respondents (plaintiffs) say that their claim in the present suit is res judicata by reason of the decree in Original Suit No. 39 of 1899. As regards this question, the view of the District Judge was that the claim in the present suit was res judicata in the plaintiffs' favour but <NAME> did not discuss the question at any length as it was unnecessary for him to go into it since <NAME> allowed the appeal on other grounds. The parties to Original Suit No. 39 of 1899 were the present plaintiffs and the present first and second defendants. The first defendant is dead. The present third defendant is the adopted son and the present fourth defendant is a party w<NAME> claims as alience from the third defendant. For the purpose of the question of ret judicata we are of opinion that the parties are the same. In Original Suit No. 9 of 1899 the plaintiffs obtained a decree for redemption of plaint items Nos. 1 and 2 in that suit. As regards items Nos. 3 to 5 in that suit, the suit was dismissed on the ground that on the construction of the mortgage deed the plaintiffs were not entitle to redeem these lands before the 18th July 1900. Items Nos. 3 to 5 in the suit of 1890 are the items which the plaintiffs seek to redeem in the present case. The appellants contend that the decree in Original Suit No. 39 of 1899 does not operate as res judicata since it is an erroneous decision on a point of law, they rely on the judgment of this Court in the case of <NAME> v. Chinna Krishna I.L.R. 5 Mad. 304 at p. 309. It seems to us that that case may be distinguished on the ground that the parties were not the same in the two suits but, <NAME>wever this may be, the judgment in that case appears to have been proceeded on the ground that the decree relied on as res judicata was based on a misapprehension as to a general rule of law.

14. In giving the plaintiffs a decree in Original Suit No. 39 of 1899 as regards items Nos. 1 and 2 of the lands in question we do not think it can be said that the District Munsif was under any misapprehension as to any general rule of law applicable to the case. The question he had to determine was a question of mixed law and fact as in the case of <CITATION> . 28 Calc. 318 The question was, on the facts, whether there had been an "investigation" within the meaning of the word as used in Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He was of opinion that there had not been and because he was of this opinion he gave a decree for the plaintiffs. The investigation was with reference to the lands amongst others which the plaintiffs seek to redeem in the present suit. We are of opinion that the question of the plaintiffs' right to redeem the lands which they seek to redeem in the present suit is res judicata by reason of the decree in Original Suit No. 39 of 1899.

15. The appellants have contended that if the respondents are entitled to redeem the lands in question they can only do so on payment, in addition to the amount duo under the mortgage, of a sum of Rs. 187-15-7. This was a sum paid by the appellants (defendant) in order to raise the attachment in Original Suit No. 407 of 1895. This payment was made by the defendants after the alleged sale to them and it was made for the purpose of clearing their title under the sale deed to them. It was a voluntary payment and was not made on behalf of or for the benefit of the plaintiffs. We are of opinion that the plaintiffs cannot be called upon to pay this amount in their suit to redeem. We dismiss the appeal but without costs.


PETITIONER: RANDHIR SINGH Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT22/02/1982 BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) ISLAM, <NAME> (J) CITATION: 1982 AIR 879 1982 SCR (3) 298 1982 SCC (1) 618 1982 SCALE (1)110 CITATOR INFO : F 1983 SC 130 (32,60) F 1984 SC 541 (17) D 1984 SC1901 (12) F 1985 SC1124 (12,15) RF 1986 SC 431 (5) R 1986 SC 584 (1) R 1987 SC 490 (10) RF 1987 SC2086 (18) D 1988 SC1291 (8) R 1988 SC1504 (7) R 1989 SC 19 (13,21,23,28) RF 1989 SC 30 (3) F 1989 SC1256 (4) C 1989 SC1308 (8,10) F 1990 SC 334 (37) F 1990 SC 883 (4,6,7) RF 1991 SC1173 (6) F 1992 SC 126 (7) ACT: Constitution of India, Articles 14,19 and 39(d) "Equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. HEADNOTE: The petitioner is a driver constable in <ORG> under <ORG>. The scale of pay in <ORG> is for non-matriculate drivers Rs. 210-270 and for matriculate drivers 225-308. The scale of pay of a driver in <ORG> is Rs. 260-400. The scale of pay of driver in the non-secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326-EB-8-350, while that of <ORG> offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-290-EB-6-326-8- 366-EB-8-8-8-390-10 400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of <ORG> is Rs. 260-300 while the drivers of heavy vehicles in <ORG> and <ORG> is Rs. 330-480. The petitioner and other driver constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by <ORG> and that their pay scales should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with success, the present application has been filed by the petitioner for the issue of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution. Allowing the petition, the <ORG> ^ HELD: 1:1. The petitioner was appointed as a driver in <ORG>. After his discharge from the army question of his employment as a driver in <ORG> was considered, he was asked to appear for a test of proficiency in driving, directed to produce a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence, selected thereafter as a driver in <ORG> under the category "Employment of Ex- serviceman in <ORG> as N.T. Driver (Constable)." He was designated as Constable, because for the purposes of the discipline of the <ORG> and appointment as driver in <ORG> he had to be made a member of <ORG> and had to be assigned a rank in the <ORG>. The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the <ORG>. [302 H, 303 A- C] 1:2. The petitioner and other drivers in <ORG> perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in the service of <ORG> and <ORG>. If anything, by reason of their investiture with the "power, functions and privileges of a police Officer", their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. The clarification that the drivers of the 299 <ORG> and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon is irrational. [306 A, B, C, D] 2:1. No doubt, equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for <ORG> and expert bodies and not for the courts, but where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same. [303 G-H, 304 A] 3:1. The principle "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. There can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them. [304 C-E] 3:2. It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men aud women" as a Directive Principle of <ORG> Policy. "Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" means equal pay for equal work for every one and as between the sexes. Directive Principles have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the <ORG> not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the <ORG>. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work'. [304 E-H, 305 A-D] 3:3. From a construction of Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d ), it is clear that the principle "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal 300 scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. [305 G-H, 306 A] <NAME> v. <ORG>, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1139, distinguished. JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 4676 of 1978, (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) <NAME> for the Petitioner.

<NAME>, <NAME> and Miss <NAME>, for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the <ORG> was delivered by <NAME>, J. 'Equal pay for equal work' is not a mere demagogic slogan. It is a constitutional goal capable of attainment through constitutional remedies by the enforcement of constitutional rights. So the petitioner claims; so the petitioner asserts. Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims, as a Directive Principle, the Constitutional goal of 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women'. Articles 14 and 19 guarantee respectively the fundamental rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment and Art. 32 provides the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. So the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this <ORG> under Art. 32 and has asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the same as they have given others like him. True, he is the merest microbe in the mighty organism of the <ORG>, a little clog in a giant wheel. But, the glory of our Constitution is that it enables him to a directly approach the highest <ORG> in the land for redress. It is a matter of no little pride and satisfaction to us that he has done so. Hitherto the equality clauses of the Constitution, as other articles of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were most often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and advancement and for a 'fair and satisfactory' distribution of the buttered leaves amongst themselves. Now, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a consequence, and the forward- looking posture of this <ORG>, the underprivileged also are clamouring for their rights and are seeking intervention of the <ORG> with touching faith and confidence in the <ORG>. The judges of the <ORG> have a duty to redeem their constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller than to the guest of the five star hotel.

The petitioner is a Driver-Constable in <ORG> under <ORG> and he demands that his scale of pay should atleast be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of <ORG>. The scale of pay of a Driver-Constable in <ORG> is Rs. 210-270 in the case of non- matriculates and Rs. 225-308 in the case of matriculates. The scale of pay of a Driver in <ORG> is Rs. 260-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the <ORG> offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-326.E-B-8-350. The scale of pay of drivers in the <ORG> offices in Delhi is Rs. 260-6-290-EB-6-326-8-366-EB-8-8-8-390-10-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of <ORG> is Rs. 260-350. The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in <ORG> and <ORG> is Rs. 330-480. The case of the petitioner is that he discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claims that he discharges more onerous duties than the others. He complains that there is no reason whatsoever to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver Constables merely because he and his ilk happen to be described as constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to <ORG>.

It appears that <ORG> considered the claims of all drivers as a common category under the head "the pay scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads. After considering the qualifications etc. possessed by drivers the <ORG> proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles, drivers employed in organisations with large fleet of vehicles, drivers of staff cars etc. The pay scales were professed to be fixed with reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the arduousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non-availability of adequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations. The Pay <ORG>, however, while considering the question of the scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable-drivers on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel. The grievance of the petitioner is that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay <ORG> failed to consider the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations which prevailed in the case of drivers in other departments and which should have, therefore, prevailed in the case of driver-constables also.

The drivers-constables were not only required to possess heavy transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as driver constables in the police force. Their duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities no less heavy than the duties and responsibilities of drivers in other departments. Their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was constant exposure to security risks. The petitioner and other driver-constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by <ORG> and that their scales of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the present application has been filed for the issue of a Writ under Art, 32 of the Constitution.

Among the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it was suggested that the petitioner was no more and no less than a constable of <ORG> and that there was no such category of Drivers in <ORG>. The hollowness of this submission is exposed by a reference to the facts relating to the individual petitioner. The petitioner who was an ex-gunner (driver) in the artiliary corps of <ORG> and who was experienced in the driving, operation and maintenance of jeeps, trucks and heavy armoured vehicles was allowed to retire from the <ORG> on compassionate grounds. He held an <ORG> driving licence as also a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence. After he was discharged from the <ORG> his nominal roll was forwarded by <ORG>, <ORG> to the Commandant, <ORG>, Delhi. The question of his employment as a driver in <ORG> was considered and he was informed that a test of proficiency in driving would be held. He was required to produce his Civil Heavy transport driving licence at the time of the test. It is of interest to note that the subject of the communication sent by <ORG> establishment to the petitioner was "Employment of ex-servicemen in <ORG> as N.T. Driver (Const)". He appeared at the test. By a communication dated March 29, 1968, he was informed by the Commandant, <ORG>, Delhi that his name had been "approved for enlistment as driver in <ORG>". Thereafter a certificate in the prescribed form was issued to him vesting him with the powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer. It is clear and it cannot be seriously disputed that the petitioner was appointed as a driver in <ORG>. He was designated as constable, because, for the purposes of the discipline of the <ORG> and appointment as driver in <ORG>, he had to be made a member of <ORG> and had to be assigned a rank in the <ORG>. The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the <ORG>.

The main defence taken by the respondents is, in the words of the deponent of the counter-affidavit, as follows :

"It is submitted that there can be no comparison between the different departments of <ORG> for the purpose of fixation of pay scale. A pay scale has been fixed upon consideration of various factors. The pay scales of the drivers of <ORG> has been fixed after duly considering all the circumstances. The drivers in the other departments are not similarly situated as the petitioner and there is no question of any hostile discrimination. It is, however, denied that the drivers have been treated as a separate class. It is also denied that the designation of the petitioner is N. T. Driver (Constable)' The counter-affidavit does not explain how the case of the drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them. Apparently in the view of the respondents, the circumstance that persons belong to different departments of the <ORG> is itself a sufficient circumstance to justify different scales of pay irrespective of their identity of their powers duties and responsibilities. We cannot accept this view. If this view is to be stretched to its logical conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in <ORG> may vary from department to department notwithstanding that their powers duties and responsibilities are identical. We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive <ORG> and expert bodies like <ORG> and not for <ORG> but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.

Our attention was drawn to <NAME> v.

<ORG>, <NAME> v. <ORG> & Ors. where reference was made to the observations of this Court in <CITATION> describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Art. 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. <CITATION> is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be applied to them.

It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of <ORG> Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this <ORG> have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the <ORG>. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some thing to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the <ORG>, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'To each according to his need', it must atleast mean 'equal pay for equal work'. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g, Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour. Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western labour codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance (vide: International Labour Law by <NAME> p. 265). The preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art. 39(d) we are of the view that the principle 'Equal pay for Equal work' is deducible from those Article and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing the different scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in <ORG> perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of <ORG> and <ORG>. If anything, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileges of a police officer', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver-constables of <ORG> perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of <ORG> were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of <ORG> and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the <ORG> may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the Writ Petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the drivers-constables of <ORG> atleast on a par with that of the drivers of <ORG>. The scale of pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of <ORG> were given effect.

S.R. Petition allowed.


PETITIONER: STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. RESPONDENT: HIND STONE ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT05/02/1981 BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) PATHAK, R.S. CITATION: 1981 AIR 711 1981 SCR (2) 742 1981 SCC (2) 205 1981 SCALE (1)237 CITATOR INFO : F 1985 SC 660 (24) RF 1986 SC1323 (49) D 1988 SC1301 (11) F 1990 SC 820 (31) ACT: Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957-Section 15-Rule 8-C of Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1959-Scope of-Rule if ultra vires the rule making power of <ORG>-Whether violative of Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution. Interpretation-"Regulation" whether includes "prohibition". HEADNOTE: The Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act , 1957 (Central Act ) was enacted in the public interest to enable the <ORG> to take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. Exercising its power under this Act, <ORG> declared by a notification that black granite was a minor mineral. Exercising power vested in it by section 15 of the Act, <ORG> made the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. Rule 8 of the Rules prescribes the procedure for lease of quarries to private persons. By rule 8-C, introduced in 1977, leases for quarrying black granite in favour of private persons were banned. Sub-rule (2) of this rule enacts that <ORG> themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by <ORG>. Several applications for the grant of fresh leases as well as for the renewal of leases for quarrying black granite belonging to <ORG> were submitted to <ORG>, some prior to the introduction of rule 8C and some after the rule came into force. <ORG> considered all the applications and rejected all of them in view of rule 8C. The respondents filed writ petition questioning the vires of Rule 8-C on various grounds. <ORG> struck down Rule 8-C on the ground that it exceeded the rule making power given to <ORG> and held that it was not open to the appellant <ORG> to keep the applications pending for a long time and then to dispose them of on the basis of a rule which had come into force later. As a result all the applications were disposed of without reference to rule 8-C. The appellant contended that: (I) The approach of <ORG> was vitiated by its failure to notice the crucial circumstance that the minerals belonged to the <ORG>, (II) The respondents had no vested or indefeasible right to obtain a lease or a renewal to quarry the minerals, (III) There were good reasons for banning the grant of lease to quarry black granite to private parties and (IV) The <ORG> could not be compelled to grant leases which would result in the destruction of the mineral resources of the country. On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that (I) the question of ownership of the minerals was irrelevant, (II) It was not open to the appellant 743 to exercise its subordinate legislative function in a manner to benefit itself as owner of the minerals, nor was it open to the appellant to create monopoly by such means, (III) There was violation of articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution, (IV) Rule 8-C had no application to renewals and (V) That in any event it would not have the effect of affecting applications made more than 60 days before it came into force. Accepting the appeals, it was ^ HELD: Rule 8-C was made in bonafide exercise of the rule making power of the Appellant <ORG> and not in its misuse to advance its own self interest. Making a rule which is perfectly in order is not to be considered a misuse of the rule making power, if it advances the interest of <ORG>, which really means the people of the <ORG>. Rivers, forests, minerals and as such other resources constitute a nation's natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop & conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the Nation. It is recognised by <ORG>. <ORG> has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the <ORG> should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. [751C-D, 753G-H] 2. The Public interest which induced <ORG> to make the declaration contained in S.2 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957 has naturally to be the paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of Mines & Minerals. <ORG>'s Policy is clearly discernible from the provisions of the Act. It is the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community. There are clear sign posts to lead and guide the subordinate legislating authority in the matter of the making of rules. [751G-H] 3. The other provisions of the Act, particularly sections 4A , 17 and 18 , indicate that the rule making authority under S.15 has not exceeded its powers in banning leases for carrying black granite in favour of private parties and in stipulating that <ORG> themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by <ORG>. To view such a rule made by the Subordinate legislating body as a rule made to benefit itself merely because <ORG> happens to be the subordinate legislating body is, but, to take too narrow a view of the functions of that body. [751H, 752A- <CITATION> .  3 SCR 742 @ 745, 752-753 referred to. 5. Whenever there is a switch over from 'private sector' to 'public sector' it does not necessarily follow that a change of policy requiring express legislative sanction is involved. It depends on the subject and the statute. But if a decision is taken to ban private mining of a single minor mineral for the purpose of conserving it, such a ban, if it is otherwise within the bounds of the authority given to the <ORG> by the Statute, cannot be said to involve any change of policy. The policy of the Act remains the same and it is, the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of 744 minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community. Exploitation of minerals by the private and/or the public sector is contemplated. If in the pursuit of the avowed policy of the Act, it is thought exploitation by the public sector is best and wisest in the case of a particular mineral and, in consequence, the authority competent to make the subordinate legislation makes a rule banning private exploitation of such mineral, which was hitherto permitted. There is no change of policy merely because that was previously permitted is no longer permitted. [756A-D] <ORG> v. Virgo  A.C. 88, Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion and <ORG>, A.C. 348, <CITATION> .,  3 SCR 709, <NAME> etc. v. The <ORG> of Tamil Nadu and Anr. etc.  2 SCR 715 @ 721, <ORG> v. <ORG>  A.C. 235 referred to. 6. The restrictions, freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301 would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow or movement of trade. The Act and the rules properly made thereunder are, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 301. Even otherwise Art. 302 which enables <ORG>, by law, to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one <ORG> and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest also furnishes an answer to the claim based on the alleged contravention of Art. 301. [757F-H, 758A-B] 7. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is a law enacted by <ORG> and declared by <ORG> to be expedient in the public interest. Rule 8-C has been made by the appellant <ORG>. by notification in the official <ORG>, pursuant to the power conferred upon it by sec. 15 of the Act. A statutory rule, while ever subordinate to the parent statute, is, otherwise, to be treated as part of the statute and as effective. "Rules made under the Statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. [758B- <CITATION> .  1 SCR 809 <CITATION> .  1 SCR 491 and <CITATION>  2 SCR 679, referred to. 8. Rule 9 makes it clear that a renewal is not to be obtained automatically, for the mere asking. The applicant for the renewal has, particularly, to satisfy the <ORG> that the renewal is in the interests of mineral development and that the lease amount is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. These conditions have to be fulfilled in addition to whatever criteria is applicable at the time of the grant of lease in the first instance, suitably adapted, of course, to grant of renewal. Not to apply the criteria applicable in the first instance may lead to absurd results. Therefore rule 8-C is attracted in considering applications for renewal of leases also. [759A-D] 9. While the applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed 745 of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in any one, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. [759G-H, 760A] 10. The language of Rule 8-C is clear that it can not have any application to lands in which the right to minerals belongs to the applicants themselves. In the case of lands in which the right to minerals belongs to private owners and those owners seek permission to quarry black granite the applications will have to be dealt with under the relevant rules in Sec. III of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral concession Rules. Rule 8-C does not impose a general ban on quarrying black granite but only imposes a bar on the grant of leases for quarrying black granite. [760D-F] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2602- 2604 of 1980.

Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20-6-1980 of <ORG> in Writ Petition Nos. 4467 of 1977, 2933 and 4793 of 1978.

<NAME> Genl. of India for the Appellant in CA 2602/80.

<NAME> for the Appellant in CA 2603/80. <NAME> for the appellant in CA 2604/80.

<NAME> and <NAME> for the Appellant in all the matters.

<NAME> (Dr.), Mrs. <NAME> and <NAME> for Respondent Nos. 11 and 42.

<NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the interveners.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for Respondent No. 45.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J.-Entry 23 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is, "Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the <ORG>". Entry 54 of List of the Seventh Schedule is "Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the <ORG> is declared by <ORG> by law to be expedient in the public interest". Thus while 'regulation of mines and mineral development' is ordinarily a subject for <ORG> legislation. <ORG> may, by law, declare the extent to which control of such regulation and development by the <ORG> is expedient in the public interest, and, to that extent, it becomes a subject for <ORG>ary legislation. <ORG> has accordingly enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957. By S. 2 of the Act it is declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the <ORG> should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent thereafter provided. It is now common ground between the parties that as a result of the declaration made by <ORG>, by S. 2 of the Act, the <ORG> legislatures are denuded of the whole of their legislative power with respect to regulation of mines and mineral development and that the entire legislative field has been taken over by <ORG>. That this is the true position in law is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in <CITATION> v. <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG> v. <ORG> of Bihar & Ors. S. 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957, defines various expressions occurring in the Act. S. 3 (a) defines 'minor minerals' and it includes any mineral declared to be a minor mineral by <ORG> by a notification in <ORG>. 'Black granite' has been so notified by <ORG> as a minor mineral. Section 4 to 9A are grouped under the heading 'General Restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining operations'. These provisions as well as Sections 10 to 13 are made inapplicable to 'minor minerals' by S. 14 . S. 4 prohibits all prospecting or mining operations except under a licence or a lease granted under the Act and the rules made thereunder. S.4A(1) enables the <ORG> <ORG> on a request made by <ORG> in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development to terminate a mining lease pre-maturely and grant a fresh mining lease in favour of a <ORG> Company or <ORG> owned or controlled by <ORG>. Perhaps because s.4A(1) is inapplicable to minor minerals because of the provisions of S.14, S.4A(2) has been expressly enacted making somewhat similar provision, as in S.4A(1), in respect of 'minor minerals' also. S.4A(2) enables the <ORG> <ORG>, after consultation with <ORG>, if it is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development so to do, to prematurely terminate a mining lease in respect of any minor mineral and grant a fresh lease in respect of such mineral in favour of a <ORG> Company or <ORG> owned or controlled by <ORG>. S.5 imposes certain restrictions on the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases. S.6 prescribes the maximum area for which a prospecting licence or mining lease may be granted. S.7 prescribes the period for which prospecting licences may be granted or renewed. S.8 prescribes the period for which mining leases may be granted or renewed. S.9 provides for the payment of royalty and S.9A for the payment of dead rent. Sections 10 , 11 and 12 constitute a group of sections under the title 'Procedure for obtaining prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the <ORG>'. S.10 provides for making applications for prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of any land in which the minerals vest in the <ORG>. S.11 provides for certain preferential rights in favour of certain persons in the matter of grant of mining leases. S. 12 prescribes the Register of prospecting licences and mining leases to be maintained by the <ORG> <ORG>. S.13 empowers <ORG> to make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases. In particular we may mention that S.13(2) (a) empowers <ORG> to make rules providing for 'the persons by whom, and the manner in which, applications for prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the <ORG> may be made and the fees to be paid therefor". S.13(2) (f), we may add, empowers <ORG> to make rules providing for 'the procedure for obtaining a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of any land in which the minerals vest in a person other than the <ORG> and the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which, such a licence or lease may be granted or renewed'. S.14 makes the provisions of Sections 4 to 13 inapplicable to minor minerals. S.15 empowers the <ORG> <ORG> to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases and other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and purposes connected therewith. S.15(3) provides for the payment of royalty in respect of minor minerals at the rate prescribed by the rules framed by the <ORG> <ORG>. S.16 provides for the modification of mining leases granted before October 25, 1949. S.17 enables <ORG>, after consultation with the <ORG> <ORG> to undertake prospecting or mining operations in any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease, in which event <ORG> shall publish a notification in the official <ORG> giving the prescribed particulars. The Central <ORG> may also declare that no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted in respect of any land specified in the notification. S.18 casts a special duty on <ORG> to take all necessary steps for the conservation and development of minerals in India. Sections 19 to 33 are various miscellaneous provisions with which we are not now concerned.

Pursuant to the power vested in it under S.15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957, <ORG> has made the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. Section II of the rules consisting of rules 3 to 16 is entitled "Government lands in which the minerals belong to the Government". Rule 8 prescribes the procedure for the lease of quarries to private persons. The ordinary procedure is to publish a notice in <ORG> inviting applications, thereafter to hold an auction and finally to grant a lease to the highest bidder. Rule 8A which was introduced by way of an amendment in 1972, provides for a special procedure for the sanctioning of leases in favour of applicants who require the minerals for their existing industries or who have an industrial programme for the utilisation of the mineral in their own industry. Rule 8B was introduced in 1975 making special provision for the grant of leases for quarrying black granite. The rule is as follows:

"8-B. Lease of quarries in respect of black granite to private persons (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in rules 8 and 8A, the authority competent to grant leases in respect of quarrying black granite shall be <ORG>. (2) An application for the grant of a quarrying lease in respect of any land shall be made to the Collector of the District concerned in the prescribed form in triplicate and shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 100/-. The Collector shall after scrutiny, forward the application along with his remarks to the Director of <ORG> who shall technically scrutinise the industrial programme given by the applicant and forward the application with his remarks to the <ORG>."

"(G. O. Ms. No. 993 Industries dt. 25-8-1975". Rule 8-C was introduced by <ORG> dated December 2, 1977. By this rule leases for quarrying black granite in favour of private persons are banned. Leases can only be granted in favour of a <ORG> wholly owned by the State Government. It is the vires of this rule which was under challenge before <ORG> and is also under challenge now. It will be useful to extract the same. It is as follows:

"8-C Lease of quarries in respect of black granite to <ORG>, etc. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, on and from 7th December, 1977 no lease for quarrying black granite shall be granted to private persons.

(2) The State Government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by <ORG>.

Provided that in respect of any land belonging to any private person, the consent of such person shall be obtained for such quarrying or lease".

Rule 9 provides for renewal of leases and it is in the following terms:

"9. Renewal of lease.-(1) The Collector may on application renew for a further period not exceeding the period for which the lease was originally granted in each case if he is satisfied that-

(i) such renewal is in the interests of mineral development, and

(ii) the lease amount is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

(2) Every application for renewal shall be made to Collector, sixty days prior to the date of expiry of the lease:

Provided that a lease, the period of which exceeds ten years shall not be renewed except with the sanction of the Director of Industries and Commerce". A proviso was added to rule 9(2) in 1975 and it said: "provided also that the renewal for quarrying black granite shall be made by the Government".

Several persons who held leases for quarrying black granite belonging to <ORG> and whose leases were about to expire, applied to <ORG> for renewal of their leases. In some of the cases applications were made long prior to the date of G. O. Ms. No. 1312 by which Rule 8 C was introduced. Some applications were made after Rule 8 C came into force. There were also some applications for the grant of fresh leases for quarrying black granite. All the applications were dealt with after Rule 8 C came into force and all of them were rejected in view of Rule 8C. Several Writ Petitions were filed in <ORG> questioning the vires of Rule 8C on various grounds. Apart from canvassing the vires of Rule 8C, it was contended that Rule 8C did not apply to grant of renewals of lease at all. It was also argued that in any event, in those cases in which the applications for renewal had been made prior to the coming into force of Rule 8C, their applications should have been dealt with without reference to Rule 8C. <ORG> while not accepting some of the contentions raised on behalf of the applicants, struck down Rule 8C on the ground that it exceeded the rule making power given to <ORG> under S.15 which, it was said, was only to regulate and not to prohibit the grant of mining leases. As a consequence all the applications were directed to be disposed of without reference to Rule 8C. It was also observed that even if Rule 8C was valid it applied only to the grant of fresh leases and not to renewals. It was also held that it was not open to the Government to keep the applications pending for a long time and then to dispose them of on the basis of a rule which had come into force later. <ORG> has come in appeal against the judgment of <ORG> while the respondent- applicants have tried to sustain the judgment of <ORG> on grounds which were decided against them by <ORG>.

The learned Attorney General who appeared for <ORG> submitted that the approach of <ORG> was vitiated by its failure to notice the crucial circumstance that the minerals belonged to the <ORG> and the applicants had no vested or indefeasible right to obtain a lease or a renewal to quarry the minerals. There were good reasons for banning the grant of leases to quarry black granite to private parties and in the light of those reasons the <ORG> could not be compelled to grant leases which would result in the destruction of the mineral resources of the country. <NAME>, learned counsel who led the argument for the respondents submitted that the question of ownership of the minerals was irrelevant. In making the rules the <ORG> <ORG> was acting as a delegate and not as the owner of the minerals. He submitted that it was not open to the <ORG> <ORG> to exercise its subordinate legislative function in a manner to benefit itself as owner of the minerals, nor was it open to the <ORG> <ORG> to create a monopoly by such means According to <NAME> creation of a monopoly in the <ORG> was essentially a legislative function and was incapable of delegation. It was claimed that there was violation of Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution. It was further claimed that S. 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957, enabled the <ORG> <ORG> to make rules to regulate the grant of leases and not to prohibit them. In any case it was said that Rule 8G had no application to renewals and that in any event it would not have the effect of affecting applications made more than 60 days before it came into force.

Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a nation's natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the Nation. It is recognised by <ORG>. <ORG> has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the <ORG> should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. It has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957. We have already referred to its salient provisions. S. 18, we have noticed, casts a special duty on <ORG> to take necessary steps for the conservation and development of minerals in India. S. 17 authorises <ORG> itself to undertake prospecting or mining operations in any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease. S.4A empowers <ORG> on the request of <ORG>, in the case of minerals other than minor minerals, to prematurely terminate existing mining leases and grant fresh leases in favour of a <ORG> Company or <ORG> owned or controlled by <ORG>, if it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development to do so. In the case of minor minerals, <ORG> is similarly empowered, after consultation with <ORG>. The public interest which induced <ORG> to make the declaration contained in S. 2 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957. has naturally to be the paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. <ORG>'s policy is clearly discernible from the provisions of the Act. It is the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community. There are clear sign posts to lead and guide the subordinate legislating authority in the matter of the making of rules. Viewed in the light shed by the other provisions of the Act, particularly sections 4A , 17 and 18  752 it cannot be said that the rule making authority under S. 15 has exceeded its powers in banning leases for quarrying black granite in favour of private parties and in stipulating that <ORG> themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by <ORG>. To view such a rule made by the Subordinate legislating body as a rule made to benefit itself merely because <ORG> happens to be the subordinate legislating body, is, but, to take too narrow a view of the functions of that body. The reasons that prompted <ORG> to make Rule 8-C were explained at great length in the common counter affidavit filed on behalf of <ORG> before <ORG>. We find no good reason for not accepting the statements made in the counter affidavit. It was said there:

"I submit that the leases for black granite are governed by the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1959 under which originally there was scope for auctioning of quarries of minor minerals. In amendment issued in the G.O. dated 6-12-1972. under Rule 8-A it was indicated that the Collector may sanction leases in favour of applicants who are having an industrial programme to utilise the minerals in their own industry. This provision is applicable to all minerals including black granites. However, it was found that there were several cases where lessees who obtained the black granite areas on lease by auction were not quarrying in a systematic and planned manner taking into consideration the welfare and safety measures of the workers as well as the conservation of minerals. Even after the introduction of the amendment under Rule 8-A in most cases, the industry set up was of a flimsy nature more to circumvent the rule than to really introduce industry including mechanised cutting and polishing. The lessees were also interested only in obtaining the maximum profit in the shortest period of time without taking into consideration the proper mining and development of the mineral. There was also considerable wastage of new materials due to wasteful mining. Therefore, <ORG> issued a further amendment as Rule 8-B wherein the competent authority to grant leases in respect of the quarrying black granite was transferred from the Collector to the <ORG> level. They also prescribed a standard form and an application fee to be paid with the application. The amendment states that the Director of Industries and Commerce shall technically scrutinise the industrial programme given by the applicant while forwarding the same to <ORG>. At the same time, in the G.O. issued along with amendment, it was stated that if any of the <ORG> Organisations like <ORG>, Tamil Nadu small Industries Development Corporation Limited, <ORG> is interested to obtain a lease for black granite in a particular area, preference will be given to <ORG> undertaking over other private entrepreneurs for granting the leases applied for by them. However, in spite of these amendments to regulate the grant of mining lease, there were a large number of lessees (exceeding 140), who were engaged in mining without proper technical guidance or safety measures etc. for the workers. These lessees made a strong representation to the then <ORG> in 1976 expressing that though they had given assurance to set up industries to use the granites they were not able to do so far various reasons. They also represented that they should be allowed to export the raw blocks of black granites. Therefore, <ORG> had issued a <ORG> Order dated 15-2-1977 relating to relaxation of the ban of export of raw blocks and provision for setting up a polishing or finishing unit was not made a pre- requisite. They have also stated that the terms and conditions for the existing losses would remain in force. However, on an examination of the performance of the lessees over the past several years, it has been found that excepting in a very few cases, none of the lessees had set up proper industries or developed systematic mining of the quarries. The exports continue to be mainly on the raw black granite materials and not out and polished slabs. A large number of the leases were not operating either due to speculation or lack of finance from the lessees. Therefore, <ORG> decided that there should be no further grant of lease to private entrepreneurs for black granite. This was mentioned in <ORG> dated 2-12- 1977.

We are satisfied that Rule 8C was made in bonafide exercise of the rule making power of <ORG> and not in its misuse to advance its own self-interest. We however guard ourselves against being understood that we have accepted the position that making a rule which is perfectly in order to be considered a misuse of the rule making power, if it advances the interest of a <ORG>, which really means the people of the <ORG>.

One of the submissions on behalf of the respondents was that monopoly was a distinct legislative subject under entry 21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and therefore monopoly, even in favour of a <ORG> Government can only be created by plenary and not subordinate legislation. <ORG> not having chosen to exercise its plenary power it was not open to the subordinate legislating body to create a monopoly by making a rule. Our attention was invited to <CITATION> .(1) where it was held that the expression 'Commercial and industrial monopolies' in entry 21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was not confined to legislation to control of monopolies but was wide enough to include grant or creation of commercial or industrial monopolies in favour of <ORG>, also We are unable to agree with <NAME> submission. The very decision cited by him furnishes the answer. The validity of a scheme for nationalisation of certain routes made pursuant to the powers conferred by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act was under attack in that case. One of the grounds of attack was that "by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, "<ORG> had merely attempted to regulate the procedure for entry by the <ORG>s into the business of motor transport in the <ORG>, and in the absence of legislation expressly undertaken by the <ORG> of Mysore in that behalf, that <ORG> was incompetent to enter into the arena of motor transport business to the exclusion of private operators;"

Sustenance for the submission was sought to be drawn from the language of Art. 19(6) (ii) which provides that nothing in Art. 19(1) (g) shall 'prevent the <ORG> from making any law relating to' 'the carrying on by the <ORG>, or by a <ORG> owned or controlled by the <ORG>, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise'. The argument was that the <ORG> or a <ORG> owned or controlled by the <ORG> could carry on a trade, business, industry or service to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens, only if the <ORG> made a law relating to it. The argument was repelled by the <ORG> in these words:

"The plea sought to be founded on the phraseology used in Art. 19(6) that the State intending to carry on trade or business must itself enact the law authorising it to carry on trade or business is equally devoid of force. The expression 'the State' as defined in Art. 12 is inclusive of the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legisla-

ture of each of the <ORG>s. Under entry No. 21 of the Concurrent List, the <ORG> being competent to legislate for creating commercial or trading monopolies, there is nothing in the Constitution which deprives it of the power to create a commercial or trading monopoly in the constituent <ORG>s. Article 19(6) is a mere saving provision: its function is not to create a Power but to immunise from attack the exercise of legislative power falling within its ambit. The right of the <ORG> to carry on trade or business to the exclusion of others does not arise by virtue of Art. 19(6). The right of the <ORG> to carry on trade or business is recognised by Art. 298; authority to exclude competitors in the field of such trade or business is conferred on the <ORG> by entrusting power to enact laws under entry 21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, and the exercise of that power in the context of fundamental rights is secured from attack by Art. 19(6).

In any event; the expression 'law' as defined in Art. 13(3) (a) includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom, etc., and the scheme framed under s.68C may properly be regarded as 'law' within the meaning of Art. 19(6) made by the <ORG> excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g)".

Earlier in <CITATION> , before the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution by which the present Article 298 was substituted for the old Article, the question arose whether it was beyond the competence of the executive Government to carry on a business without specific legislature sanction. The answer was that it was not. What was said by the <ORG> in that case was incorporated in the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. In that case the facts were that the State of Punjab, by a series of executive orders had established for itself a monopoly in the business of printing and selling textbooks for use in schools. The argument that legislative sanction was necessary to enable <ORG> to carry on the business of printing and publishing text books was repelled and it was held that no fundamental right of the petitioners who had invoked the jurisdiction of the <ORG> had been infringed.

Another of the submissions of the learned counsel was that G.O.Ms No. 1312 dated December 2, 1977 involved a major change of policy, which was a legislative function and therefore beyond the competence of a subordinate legislating body. We do not agree with the submission. Whenever there is a switch over from private sector' to 'public sector' it does not necessarily follow that a change of policy requiring express legislative sanction is involved. It depends on the subject and the statute. For example, if a decision is taken to impose a general and complete ban on private mining of all minor minerals, such a ban may involve the reversal of a major policy and so it may require Legislative sanction. But if a decision is taken to ban private mining of a single minor mineral for the purpose of conserving it, such a ban, if it is otherwise within the bounds of the authority given to the Government by the Statute, cannot be said to involve any change of policy. The policy of the Act remains the same and it is, as we said, the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals, with a view to secure maximum benefit to the community. Exploitation of minerals by the private and/or the public sector is contemplated. If in the pursuit of the avowed policy of the Act, it is thought exploitation by the public sector is best and wisest in the case of a particular mineral and, in consequence, the authority competent to make the subordinate legislation makes a rule banning private exploitation of such mineral, which was hitherto permitted we are unable to see any change of policy merely because what was previously permitted is no longer permitted.

One of the arguments pressed before us was that Sec. 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act authorised the making of rules for regulating the grant of mining leases and not for prohibiting them as Rule 8-C sought to do, and, therefore, Rule 8-C was ultra vires Act, S. 15. Well known cases on the subject right from <ORG> v. <NAME> and Attorney General for the Dominion General for the Dominion and <ORG> upto <CITATION> ., were brought to our attention. We do not think that 'Regulation' has the rigidity of meaning as never to take in Prohibition'. Much depends on the context in which the expression is used in the Statute and the object sought to be achieved by the contemplated regulation. It was observed by <NAME> in <NAME> etc. etc. v. The <ORG> of Tamil Nadu & Anr. etc., "the word 'regulation has no fixed connotation. Its meaning differs according to the nature of the thing to which it is applied". In modern statutes concerned as they are with economic and social activities, 'regulation' must, of necessity, receive so wide an interpretation that in certain situations, it must exclude competition to the public sector from the private sector. More so in a welfare <ORG>. It was pointed out by <ORG> in <ORG> v. <ORG> we agree with what was stated therein-that the problem whether an enactment was regulatory or something more or whether a restriction was direct or only remote or only incidental involved, not so much legal as political, social or economic consideration and that it could not be laid down in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly, either in a <ORG> or <ORG> agency, to be justified. Each case, it was said, must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstances and it might be that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development, prohibition with a view to <ORG> monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation. The statute with which we are concerned, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act , is aimed, as we have already said more than once, at the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals. Surely, in the case of a scarce mineral, to permit exploitation by the <ORG> or its agency and to prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation and prudent exploitation. If you want to conserve for the future, you must prohibit in the present. We have no doubt that the prohibiting of leases in certain cases is part of the regulation contemplated by Sec. 15 of the Act.

The submission of the learned counsel that the impugned rule contravened Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution is equally without force. Now, 'the restrictions freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301 would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow or movement of trade" ( <CITATION> .).(2) And, "regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of restrictions contemplated by Art. 301". "They are excluded from the purview of the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution for the simple reason that they do not hamper, trade, commerce or inter-course but rather facilitate them" <CITATION> .(3). The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is, without doubt a regulatory measure, <ORG> having enacted it for the express purpose of "the regulation of mines and the development of minerals". The Act and the rules properly made thereunder are, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 301. Even otherwise Art. 302 which enables <ORG>, by law, to impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest also furnishes an answer to the claim based on the alleged contravention of Art. 301. The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is a low enacted by <ORG> and declared by <ORG> to be expedient in the public interest. Rule 8C has been made by the State Government by notification in the official <ORG>, pursuant to the power conferred upon it by Sec. 15 of the Act. A statutory rule, while ever subordinate to the parent statute, is, otherwise, to be treated as part of the statute and as effective. "Rules made under the Statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation.. ( <CITATION> )(1); (See also <NAME>; Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. pp. 49-50). So, Statutory rules made pursuant to the power entrusted by <ORG> are law made by <ORG> within the meaning of Art. 302 of the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the complex demands made upon modern legislation which necessitate the plenary legislating body to discharge its legislative function by laying down broad guidelines and standards, to lead and guide as it were, leaving it to the subordinate legislating body to fill up the details by making necessary rules and to amended the rules from time to time to meet unforeseen and unpredictable situations, an within the framework of the power entrusted to it by the plenary legislating body. <CITATION> (2) was cited to us to show that rules did not become part of the statute. This was case where by reference to Sec. 77 of the Mysore Forest Act which declared the effect of the rules, it was held that the rules when made did not become part of the Act. That was apparently because of the specific provisions of Sec. 77 which while declaring that the rules would have the force of law stopped short of declaring that they would become part of the Act. In the absence of any express provision, as now, the ordinary rule as enunciated in <CITATION> (supra) would perforce apply.

The next question for consideration is whether Rule 8C is attracted when applications for renewal of leases are dealt with. The argument was that Rule 9 itself laid down the criteria for grant of renewal of leases and therefore rule 8C should be confined, in its application, to grant of leases in the first instance. We are unable to see the force of the submission. Rule 9 makes it clear that a renewal is not to be obtained automatically, for the mere asking. The applicant for the renewal has, particularly, to satisfy the <ORG> that the renewal is in the interests of mineral development and that the lease amount is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. These conditions have to be fulfilled in addition to whatever criteria is applicable at the time of the grant of lease in the first instance, suitably adapted, of course, to grant of renewal. Not to apply the criteria applicable in the first instance may lead to absurd results. If as a result of experience gained after watching the performance of private entrepreneurs in the mining of minor minerals it is decided to stop grant of leases in the private sector in the interest of conservation of the particular mineral resource, attainment of the object sought will be frustrated if renewal is to be granted to private entrepreneurs without regard to the changed outlook. In fact, some of the applicants for renewal of leases may themselves be the persons who are responsible for the changed outlook. To renew leases in favour of such persons would make the making of Rule 8C a mere exercise in futility. It must be remembered that an application for the renewal of a lease is, in essence an application for the grant of a lease for a fresh period. We are, therefore, of the view that Rule 8C is attracted in considering applications for renewal of leases also.

Another submission of the learned counsel in connection with the consideration of applications for renewal was that applications made sixty days or more before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 (2-12-1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. It was also contended that even applications for grant of leases made long before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the <ORG> to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule 8C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable tune clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. None has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C did not exist.

In the view that we have taken on the several questions argued before us all the appeals arising out of applications for the grant or renewal of leases for quarrying black granite in <ORG> lands are allowed and the Writ Petitions filed in <ORG> are dismissed. Special leave is granted in cases in which leave had not been previously granted. The appeals are allowed and disposed of in the same manner.

There are, however, a few appeals in which the applications were not for the grant or renewal of leases to quarry black granite in <ORG> lands but were for permission to quarry black granite in Patta lands in which the right to minerals belonged to the applicants- private owners themselves. Apart from the fact that Rule 8C occurs in a group of Rules in Section II, which bears the head "<ORG> lands in which the minerals belong to the <ORG>" while the rules relating to lands in which the right to minerals belongs to private owners are dealt with in Section III. The language of Rule 8C is clear that it cannot have any application to lands in which the right to minerals belongs to the applicants themselves. Rule 8C is only concerned with leases for quarrying black granite and it cannot, therefore, have any application to cases where no lease is sought from the <ORG>. In the case of lands in which the right to minerals belongs to private owners and those owners seek permission to quarry black granite the applications will have to be dealt with under the relevant rules in Sec. III of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules. Rule 8C, it may be noted, does not impose a general ban on quarrying black granite but only imposes a bar on the grant of leases of quarrying black granite. Appeals and Special Leave Petitions which arise out of applications for the grant of permission to quarry black granite in the Patta lands belonging to the applicants themselves, have therefore, to be dismissed. The result is, Special Leave Petition Nos. 9257, 9259, 9260, 9271, 9273 to 9282 and 9284 of 1980 are dismissed and Special Leave Petition Nos 9234 to 9248, 9250 to 9256, 9258, 9261 to 9270,9272,9283,9285,9286,9288,9289 and 9290 of 1980 are granted and Appeals allowed. Civil Appeal Nos. 2602 to 2604 of 1980 are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

N.K.A. Ordered accordingly.