PETITIONER: <NAME> & SONS, JEW TOWN, COCHIN, ETC. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: <NAME>, ETC. ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT04/02/1988 BENCH: <NAME>, S. (J) BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> (J) RANGNATHAN, S. CITATION: 1988 AIR 812 1988 SCR (2) 871 1988 SCC (1) 722 JT 1988 (1) 329 1988 SCALE (1)243 CITATOR INFO : R 1989 SC 922 (10) ACT: Whether against an order of <ORG> in Revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965, a further Revision lies to <ORG> under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure- Determination of-Landlord-Tenant dispute-In the matter of. HEADNOTE: % These appeals together with a petition for special leave raised a common question of law-whether against an order of <ORG> in revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965, a further revision would lie to <ORG> under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the question was not res integra in view of the decision of this <ORG> in <CITATION> ,  1 S.C.C. 133-A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 203, the matters were listed for consideration, by a Bench of three Judges, of the very same question in order to see whether there was any conflict between the views taken in <NAME> case above-said and a later decision of this <ORG> in <CITATION> .,  3 J.T. 663, and whether the view taken in the earlier case required reconsideration. <NAME> case arose under the Kerala Act afore-mentioned, and <NAME> case was under the karnataka Rent Control Act, and there were essential differences between the two Acts. The scope and effect of section 20(1) read with section 18(5) of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench of <ORG> in <CITATION> , A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 103, which held that a decision of <ORG> under section 20 of the Kerala Act was undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of <ORG> under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question decided by the full Bench of <ORG> as above- mentioned, came to be considered by this <ORG> (a Bench of two Hon. Judges) in <NAME> case (supra), and the <ORG> held that the ratio laid down by <ORG> in <NAME>'s case (supra) could not be approved because <ORG> had not properly construed the sections 18(5) 872 and 20 of the Kerala Act, and was in error. So far as the Karnataka Act was concerned, this <ORG> held in <NAME> case (supra) that an order of a District Judge under section 50(2), though it conferred finality under the Act, was nevertheless open to challenge before <ORG> by revision under section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party. What fell for consideration in the present cases was whether there was any conflict between the decisions in <NAME> case (supra) and <NAME> case (supra) and whether the ratio in the former case required reconsideration. Disposing of the Appeals and the Petition for Special Leave, the <ORG>, ^ HELD: Per <NAME> & <NAME>, JJ. After examining the differences between the two Acts in detail, the <ORG> concluded that there was really no conflict between the two decisions of this <ORG> in <NAME> case (supra) and <NAME> case (supra), because the provisions in the two Acts were materially different. As to the question whether a fresh thinking was called for on the scope of section 20 read with section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, the <ORG> did not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in the <NAME> case; on the contrary, the renewed discussion by the <ORG> of the matter called for a reiteration of the view expressed in <NAME> case. [889C-D] The <ORG> was unable to conntenance in the circumstances of the case, the argument advanced that since the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> aforementioned had been a good law for a number of years in the Kerala State and since <ORG> had been entertaining revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C. against the revisional orders of the District <ORG>s under sections 20(1) of the Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this <ORG>, and the reason therefore, the <ORG> observed, could be set out by referring to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein, in <ORG> v. <ORG>, 13 1908 AC 1 at 4; <CITATION> i.e. <ORG>, 12 1937 2 All ER 298, affirmed in 1938 (2) All E.R. 79. These decisions had been followed in Brownsee Haven Proper 873 ties <CITATION> ,  1 All ER, 205. On similar lines, this <ORG> deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in <CITATION> (supra), as the decision suffered from miscontruction of the relevant sections in the Act, and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this <ORG> such as in <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 32 = 1980 2 SCC 378 = AIR 1980 SC 892.[889E-F; 890A-C] In the light of the conclusion of the <ORG>, all the appeals succeeded in so far as the challenge to the right of <ORG> to entertain revision petitions under section 115, C.P.C., was concerned. In Civil Appeals Nos. 626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985, <ORG> allowed the revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C., and ordered the eviction of the tenants. In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981, the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but <ORG> restored the order of eviction. In the Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986, the District Judge allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and <ORG> confirmed the said order in revisions. In the Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983, the District Judge reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and <ORG> and ordered eviction and <ORG> confirmed the order of the District Judge. In the petition for special leave listed with the appeals, <ORG> sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Controller for deciding the question whether the tenant was entitled to resist the claim for eviction. The District <ORG> and <ORG> confirmed the order of remand.[890D-G] In accordance with the pronouncement of the <ORG>, the order of <ORG> under section 115 C.P.C., in each of the appeals above-mentioned was set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case, restored to become operative. The appeals were directed only against the orders of <ORG> passed in revision, and they were disposed of with the pronouncement of the <ORG> on the above lines. [890G-H; 891A] In the petition for special leave also, the order of <ORG> under section 115 C.P.C., was not sustainable, but even so, the <ORG> did not find any merit in the petition, because the finding of <ORG> and the order of remand passed by it had been confirmed by the District <ORG> 'and as such, there were no merits in the petition. [891B] 874 Per S. Ranganathan, J. (dissenting) While a number of enactments of various States on rent control confer specific jurisdiction on the State High <ORG>s, some others are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments. Though the <ORG> was concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these matters, a similar question might well arise under the corresponding enactments of some other States as well.[891C- D] The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders. The question in these matters was whether the jurisdiction of <ORG> under section 115 C.P.C., could be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District Judge. This question was answered in the negative in <CITATION> ,  1 SCC 133 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in <CITATION> ,  3 J.T. 663 (a decision under the Karnataka Act), and hence this reference to a larger Bench.[891E-F] Normally, a revision lies to <ORG> under section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/<ORG>. The fact that the order might have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contained expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District Judge/<ORG> or a subordinate authority or <ORG>, had been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction. This was the effect of the decisions in <CITATION> ,  2 S.C.R. 871 and <NAME> v. <NAME>, S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and <NAME>'s case (supra), which were direct decisions under the Karnataka Act. In the opinion of his Lordship, there was no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also. [891G-H; 892A-B] Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendments in 1975, the rent control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent Controller. There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision. This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between <ORG> and the District <ORG>. The High <ORG> is empowered to revise the order of the Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff. Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order of the District Judge under this provision is final. The Kerala pattern is the same except that section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller 875 to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank. Section 20 provides for revision. The revisional power is to be exercised by the District <ORG> where the appellate authority is the subordinate Judge, and <ORG>, in other cases. Section 20 does not provide, as does section 50 of the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge would be final. The much wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of <ORG> under s. 115 of the C.P.C., as had been held in the two cases referred to above, and it was difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act. [892C-H] This led to the question of a choice between the two views of this <ORG>-one in <NAME> and the other, in <NAME>. <NAME> followed the earlier decisions of this <ORG> in <CITATION> , AIR 1977 SC 1955 and <NAME> v. A.S. <NAME>, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February 13, 1978. The only other decision of this <ORG>, having relevance in the present context, was <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 32, relied upon in <NAME>. His Lordship was in agreement with the view in <NAME> that <NAME> was rendered in a totally statutory context. That decision turned largely on legislative history of s. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes <ORG>s Act, in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. His Lordship was, therefore, inclined to lean in favour of the view that had commended itself to this <ORG> as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act, and to hold that <ORG> had a power of revision over the order of the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well. The result of applying <NAME> would be to completely exclude <ORG> in the Rent Control matters, and, this, as the two Acts were in pari materia according to his Lordship's view, would leave the litigant in Karnataka only a right of revision to the District <ORG>. It was doubtful whether, in the absence of clear language, the <ORG> could be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of <ORG> in such an important Branch of law. The provisions did not and could not, in his Lordship's view, preclude the applicability of s. 115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District <ORG>, not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the land. Section 18 and 20 had a vital role to pay but their effect was not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of <ORG> under section 115 . [893A-F; 894B-C] As a result of the various decisions of the <ORG>s, the position had been that right through in the State of Karnataka and for at least a 876 period of 20 years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view had been in favour of the maintainability of a second revision by <ORG>. In a matter of procedure, such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication was quite clear to the contrary. [894F] The revision petitions before <ORG> were maintainable.[894G] <CITATION> ,  1 S.C.C. 133; <CITATION> .,  3 J.T. 663; <NAME> v. T.V. Peter,  K.L.T. 845; <CITATION> , AIR 1969 103; <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 32; <NAME> v. <NAME>., ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585; <CITATION> , Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1555; <NAME> v. A.S. <NAME>, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February 13, 1978; <CITATION> ., AIR 1987 Karnataka 186; <CITATION> , AIR 1954 S.C. 497; <ORG> v. <ORG>, 13 1908 A.C. 1 at 4; <ORG> v. Honghton & Chester_ie_<ORG>, 12 1937 2 All E.R. 298 and 1938 2 All E.R. 79 and <ORG> v. <ORG>,  1 All ER, 205 referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 626 of 1981 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.1980 of <ORG> in Civil Revision Petition No. 2939 of 1978.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Miss <NAME> and <NAME> for the appearing parties.

The following Judgments of the Court were delivered: NATARAJAN, J. These appeals by special leave and the special leave petition have been clubbed together and listed for consideration of a common question of law involved in them, viz. whether against an order of <ORG> in revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965 (for short the Kerala Act), a further revision would lie to <ORG> under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Though the question is not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in <CITATION> ,  1 SCC 133: AIR 1987 SC 203, the appeals have been listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the very same question in order to see whether there is any conflict between the views taken in <NAME> case (supra) and a later decision of this Court in <NAME> v. <NAME> & Ors.,  3 J.T. 663 and whether the view taken in the earlier case requires reconsideration.

Even at the threshold of the judgment it has to be mentioned that <NAME> case arose under the Kerala Act whereas <NAME> case (supra) pertained to the Karnataka Rent Control Act. Since there are essential differences between the two Acts, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the circumstances in which the decision pertaining to each Act came to be rendered by this Court.

As per section 20(5) of the Kerala Act "<ORG>" means a Court constituted under Section 3 . Under Section 3(1) "the Government may, by Notification in the Gazette appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed, a <ORG> to be <ORG> for such local areas as may be specified therein." Section 11 of the Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant only by making an application to <ORG> and it also sets out the grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant. Section 18 of the Act provides for an Appeal being preferred by an aggrieved person to <ORG>. The relevant portions of Section 18 are as under:

"18. Appeal:(1)(a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the <ORG>, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.

(b) ........

(2) ........

(3) ........

Explanation .....

(4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of <ORG> including the fixing of arrears or rent.

(5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of <ORG> shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in section 20 ." (Emphasis supplied).

Then comes Section 20 which provides for Revisions and it reads as follows:

"20. Revision:(1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a subordinate Judge, <ORG>, and in other cases <ORG> may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before <ORG> or <ORG> under sub-section (1) shall be in it discretion.

20A. Power to remand: In disposing of an appeal or application for revision under this Act, the appellate authority, or the revising authority, as the case may be, may remand the case for fresh disposal according to such directions as it may give."

The scope and effect of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a Full Bench of <ORG> in <CITATION> , AIR 1969 Kerala

103. The Full Bench held that since the District <ORG> exercising revisional powers under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act functions as a <ORG> and not as a persona designata, the ordinary incidence of the procedure of that <ORG> including any right of appeal or revision will be inhered to the decision rendered by the District <ORG>. In that view of the matter <ORG> held that a decision of a District <ORG> under Section 20 of the Kerala Act is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High <ORG> especially when there is no provision in the Act providing for an appeal against an order of the District <ORG> under Section 20 or in the alternative any express provision declaring the finality of the said order. The decision of <ORG> held the field for a number of years in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases where the competence of the High <ORG> to entertain a revision under Section 115 C.P.C. against an order of a District <ORG> passed under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act was challenged the contention was repelled by reference to the judgment of <ORG>. One such case in point is <NAME> v. <NAME>, KLT 845.

The question decided by <ORG>, however, came to be raised before this Court, in <NAME> case (supra). A Bench consisting of <NAME>, J. and one of us (<NAME>, J.) held that the ratio laid down by <ORG> in <NAME>'s case (supra) cannot be approved because <ORG> had not properly construed Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act. The relevant passage in the judgment is in the following terms:

"In our opinion, <ORG> misconstrued the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to <ORG> when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law" except in the manner provided under Section 20 , it cannot be said that <ORG> which is a court of law and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Produce could revise an order once again after revision under Section 20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality with quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The courts must so construe."

The Bench drew support for its conclusion from an earlier decision of this Court in <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 32: 1980(2) SCC 378: AIR 1980 SC 892. In that case the two questions that case the two questions that fell for consideration were:

"(1) Whether <ORG> possesses revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 , Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of <ORG> under s. 115 disposing of a revision petition? (2) Whether <ORG> possesses revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 against an order of <ORG> under s. 25 , Provisional Small Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision petition?"

Answering both the questions in the negative, it was held in so far as question no. 1 is concerned, as follows:

"........ In determining whether the <ORG> intended a further revision petition to <ORG>, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in <ORG> over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction- to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in <ORG>-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to <ORG> against the revisional order of <ORG> arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs.20,000, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between <ORG> and <ORG>, for <ORG> would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs.20,000. That was never intended at all."

The second question was answered as under:

"The question before us arises in those cases only where the District Judge has exercised revisional power under s.

25. Is an order so made open to revision by <ORG> under s. 115 . Code of Civil Procedure? An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient code so far as the present enquiry is concerned. For the purpose of correcting decrees or orders made by <ORG> the Act provides for an appeal and a revision in cases falling under s. 24 and s. 25 respectively. Cases in which the District Judge and <ORG> respectively exercise revisional power, revisional powers are specifically mentioned. A complete set of superior remedies has been incorporated in the Act. Moreover, s. 27 of the Act provides:

"27. Finality of decrees and orders. Save as provided by this Act, a decree or order made under the foregoing provisions of this Act by <ORG> shall be final."

The <ORG> clearly intended that a decree or order made by <ORG> should be final subject only to correction by the remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act . It is a point for consideration that had s. 25 , in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh continued in its original form <ORG> would have exercised the revisional power under s. 25 , and no question could have arisen of invoking the revisional power of <ORG> under s. 115 of the Code. All the indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. By way of abundant caution s. 7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of ss. 96 to 112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act . Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act . Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take effect. No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under s. 25 , before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District Judge. It must be remembered that the legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve <ORG> of the burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act . We are of firm opinion that the central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in s. 25 , that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute."

Taking the same view of the Kerala Act, which is also a selfcontained Act it was held in <NAME> case (supra) that "the Full Bench of <ORG> was in error and <ORG> in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 CPC."

Coming now to the Karnataka Act and the decisions of <ORG> and of this Court pertaining to Section 50 read with Section 48(6) of the said Act, it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood before and after the amendments effected by the Amendment Act 31 of 1975. The relevant portions of Section 48 and 50 , as they stood before the amendment and after the amendment are as under:

Before the Amendment After the Amendment

48. 48.

Appeals:-(1)Notwithstanding Appeals:-(1) omitted. anything contained in any law for the time being in force, every person aggrieved by an order under section 14 , Section 16 , Section 17 or section 21 , passed by the Controller or the <ORG> may within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisd-

iction over the area in which the premises are situate.

2............ 2.............. 3............ 3.............. 4............ 4.............. 5. The appellate authority 5. The appllate authority

shall send for the records shall send for the records of of the case from the <NAME> case from the Controller and or the Controller, as the caseafter giving the parties an oppor- may be, and after giving thetunity of being heard and if parties an opportunity of beingnecessary after making such further heard and if necessary afterenquiry as it thinks fit either itself making such further enquiry asor through the Controller shall it thinks fit, either itself ordecide the appeal. through the Court or the Contro-

<ORG>, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal.

Explanation .............

6. Subject to any decision of the6. An order of the court or <ORG> under section 50 theController shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge shalldecision of the District Judge or th e be final, and an order of <ORG> under section 50 or of or the Controller shall, subject tothe relevant appellate authority the decision of the relevant appel-under this Act be final and shall late authority under this Act or ofnot be liable to be called in questio n <ORG> under section 50 ,in any court of law whether in a be final and shall not be liable tosuit or other proceeding or by way be called in question in any courtof appeal or revision. of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision.

50. Revision by <ORG>. Revision.

1. <ORG> may, at any(1).<ORG> may,at any time, call for and examine-time,call for examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the

(i) the records relating to anycourt of Civil Judge under this Act decision given or proceedingsor any order passed by the Con- taken by the District Judge.troller under sections 14 , 15  16 ,or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself

(ii) any order passed or proceed-as to the legality or correctness of ing taken by the Court under thissuch order or proceeding and may Act or any order passed by thepass such order in reference Controller under section 14 ,thereto as it thinks fit. section 15 or section 16 .

for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such decision, order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it think fit;

2. The costs of, and incidental2. The District Judge may, at any all proceedings before the <NAME>, call for and examine any order <ORG> shall be in its distretion.passed or proceeding taken by the <ORG> of Munsiff referred to in sub-clause(iii)of clause (d) of section(3)for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit.

the order of the District Judge shall be final.

3. The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before <ORG> or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of <ORG> or the District Judge, as the case may be."

On a reading of the provisions it may be seen that under Section 48 as it stood prior to the amendment, an appeal lay to the District Judge against an order passed under Sections 14 , 16 , 17 or 21 by the Rent Controller or the <ORG> and thereafter a revision lay to the High <ORG> under Section 50 of the Act. Sub-section (6) of Section 48 further provided that the decision of the District Judge shall, subject to the decision of the High <ORG> under Section 50 , be final and the order of the <ORG> or the Controller shall subject to the decision of the relevant Appellate Authoirty under the Act or of the High <ORG> under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision. One of the changes effected by the Amending Act was to confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges in the place of District Munsifs in respect of house rent control cases arising in the city of Mangalore. Another change effected was to take away the right of appeal to the District Judge against a decision of a Rent Control <ORG> by deleting sub-section (1) of Section 48 . The third change effected is of a two-fold nature. The first is to restrict the High <ORG>'s powers of revision under Section 50 to only those cases decided by the city Civil Judges and the second is to confer revisional powers on District Judges in respect of cases decided by the Munsifs exercising jurisdiction in areas outside the city of Bangalore. Thus what the legislature had done was to do away with the remedy of an appeal so as to save the litigants from "a large segment of time and much expenses". The resultant position is that as against the orders of District Munsifs acting as Rent Controllers a right of appeal to the District Judge and a further revision to the High <ORG> has been taken away and instead only a right of revision to the District <ORG> is provided. In so far as the cases disposed of by the Civil Judges in the city of Bangalore are concerned, a right of revision is provided to the High <ORG>. Notwithstanding the changes effected,  Section 48(6) inter alia provided that an order of the <ORG> or the Controller shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge or the High <ORG> under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision.

In the background of the changes made by the legislature, a Full Bench of <ORG> went into the question in <NAME> v. <NAME> & Others, ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585 whether by reason of Section 48(6) a further revision against a revisional order passed by the District Judge under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act would lie or not to <ORG> under Section 115 of <NAME>, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Full Bench held that in the light of the decisions of <ORG> in <CITATION> , AIR 1977 SC 1555 and Krishnadass Bhatija v. <NAME>, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th February 1978 the jurisdiction of <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. to revise an order of the District Judge passed under Section 50(2) will stand unaffected.

The correctness of this view was questioned before another Full Bench of <ORG> in <CITATION> , AIR 1987 Karnataka 186. The Full Bench took the view that in the light of the decisions of <ORG> in two subsequent cases, viz. <NAME> case (supra) and <NAME> case (supra), the law laid down in <NAME>'s case (supra) cannot be considered good law any longer and as such a further revision to <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. will not lie against an order passed by a District Judge in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act.

The correctness of the view taken by the <ORG> in <NAME>'s case (supra) fell for consideration by this Court in <NAME>'s case (supra). A Bench of this Court held that in so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned, the relevant provisions warranted invoking the ratio in <NAME>'s case (supra) and <NAME> (supra) and therefore the view taken by the earlier <ORG> in <NAME>'s case (supra) is the correct one and not the view taken in <NAME>'s case (supra). The position, therefore, is that so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned an order of a District Judge under Section 50(2) , though conferred finality under the Act is nevertheless open to challenge before <ORG> by means of a further revision under Section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.

What now falls for consideration is whether there is any conflict between the decision in <NAME> case (supra) and <NAME> case (supra) and whether the ratio in the former case requires reconsideration.

Even without any discussion it may be seen from the narrative given above that there is really no conflict between the two decisions because the provisions in the two Acts are materially different. However, to clarify matters further we may point out the differences between the two Acts in greater detail and clarity. Under the Kerala Act, against an order passed by <ORG> presided over by a District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred a right of appeal under Section 18 . <ORG> has to be a judicial officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. <ORG> has been conferred powers co-extensive with those of <ORG> but having over-riding effect. Having these factors in mind, the <ORG> has declared that in so far as an order of <ORG> is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or revision by <ORG>; and in so far as <ORG> is concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any <ORG> of law except as provided in section 20 . As regards Section 20 , a division of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been made between <ORG> and <ORG>. In all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of <ORG> of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section 18 , the District Judge has been constituted the revisional authority. It is only in other cases i.e. where the decision sought to be revised is that of a judicial officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge, <ORG> has been constituted the Revisional authority. The revisional powers conferred under Section 20 , whether it be on the District Judge or <ORG> as the case may be are of greater amplitude than the powers of revision exercisable by <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. Under Section 20 <ORG> is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or propriety of the orders sought to be revised. Not only that, <ORG> and <ORG> have been expressly conferred powers of remand under Section 20A of the Act. Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his case before <ORG> and then before <ORG> and thereafter if need be before <ORG> viz. <ORG> if <ORG> is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The <ORG> in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before three courts, viz. <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG>, there was no need to make the revisional order of <ORG> subject to further scrutiny by <ORG> by means of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code. It has been pointed out in <NAME> case (supra) that <ORG> of the Keral<ORG> had failed to construe the terms of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) in their proper perspective and this failing had affected its conclusion. According to <ORG>, a revisional order of <ORG> under Section 20 laid itself open for further challenge to <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. because of two factors viz. (1) there was no mention in the Act that the order would be final and (2) there was no provision in the Act for an appeal being filed against a revisional order under Section 20 . <ORG> failed to notice certain crucial factors. In the first place, Section 20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge as well as by <ORG>. Such being the case if it is to be taken that an order passed by <ORG> under Section 20 will not have finality because the Section does not specifically say so, then it will follow that a revisional order passed by <ORG> under Section 20(1) also will not have finality. Surely it cannot be contended by anyone that an order passed by <ORG> in exercise of its powers of revision under Section 20(1) can be subjected to further revision because Section 20(1) has not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under that Section. Secondly, the terms of Section 20(1) have to be read in conjunction with Section 18(5) . Section 18(5) , as already seen, declares that an order of <ORG> shall be final subject to the decision of <ORG> and an order of <ORG> shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20 . When the <ORG> has declared that even an order of <ORG> and the decision of <ORG> shall be final at their respective states unless the order is modified by <ORG> or <ORG> as the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under Section 20(1) by the District Judge or <ORG> as the case may be will also have the seal of finality. The third aspect is that the <ORG> has not merely conferred finality to the decision of <ORG> but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20 . These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 C.P.C. to <ORG> against a revisional order passed by <ORG> under Section 20 of the Act. This position has been succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in <NAME> case (supra). As was noticed in <NAME> case, the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in <ORG> and for determining the legislative intent, the <ORG> must as far as possible construe a statute in such a manner as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.

A thought may occur to some whether by a rigid construction of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5) , <ORG> power of superintendence over <ORG>, even when it functions as a revisional court under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act, will not stand forfeited. We may only state that legislative history would indicate that the superintending and visitorial powers exercisable by <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. appear to have been conferred and vested "because the supervisory jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition over Subordinate Courts in the mofussil could not be exercised, (and hence) it would be reasonable to hold that it was intended ......... to be analogous with the jurisdiction to issue the high prerogative writs and the power of supervision under the Charter Act and its successor provisions in the Constitution Act s." vide para 10 <CITATION> , AIR 1964 SC 497.

Incidentally, we may also point out that the <ORG> has not taken away and indeed it cannot take away the power of superintendence of <ORG> under Article 227 of the Constitution over all courts and tribunals which are within the territories in relation to which <ORG> exercise its jurisdiction.

Having said so much it is really not necessary for us to dwell at length about the decision in <NAME>'s case restoring the ratio in <NAME>'s case and disapproving the decision in <NAME>'s case. Even so we cannot but refer to the fact that in the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has been completely taken away and the entire proceedings are sought to be limited to a two tier system viz. <ORG> and <ORG>, whereas under the Kerala Act there is a three tier system viz. <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG>. Though Section 48(6) of the Karnataka Act (as amended) also speaks of the finality of the order of <ORG>, subject to the decision of <ORG> under Section 50 in more or less the same terms as in Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, the force underlying the words "shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question" etc. has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions present distinctly different perspections. It is in that situation it was found in <NAME>'s case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in <NAME>'s case and <NAME> case rather than the ratio in <NAME> case and <NAME> case. In fact, it is worthy of notice that <NAME>, J. who spoke for the <ORG> in <NAME>'s case was a party to the judgment in <NAME> case and the learned judge, while concurring with <NAME>, who spoke for the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the <ORG> decision in <NAME>'s case.

There is, therefore, no conflict between the decision rendered in <NAME> case (supra) and <NAME>'s case (supra). As to the question whether a fresh thinking is called for on the scope of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, we do not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in <NAME> case and on the contrary our renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a reiteration of the view expressed in <NAME> case.

An argument was advanced that since the decision in <CITATION> had been good law for a number of years in Kerala State and since <ORG> had been entertaining revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. against the revisional orders of District Courts under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this Court. We are unable to countenance this argument in the circumstances of the case and the reason therefore can be set out by refering to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein. In <ORG> v. <ORG>, 13 1908 A.C. 1 at page 4 Lord Loreburn, L.C. spoke as under:

"Great importance is to be attached to old authorities, on the strength of which many transactions may have been adjusted and rights determined. But where they are plainly wrong, and especially where the subsequent course of judicial decisions has disclosed weakness in the reasoning on which they were based, and practical injustice in the consequences that must flow from them, I consider it is the duty of this <ORG> to overrule them, if it has not lost the right to do so by itself expressly affirming them."

In <ORG> v. <ORG>, 12 1937 2 All E.R. 298, affirmed in 1938 2 All E.R. 79, the members of the <ORG>, having concluded that a decision on a question of rating pronounced some forty years previously by a Divisional <ORG> was plainly wrong, overruled it accordingly, although the earlier decision had, without doubt, been frequently acted on in rating matters in the meantime, and although no judicial doubt had previously been cast on its correctness. These decisions have been referred to and followed in <ORG> v. <ORG>, All E.R. 1958 1205. On similar lines this <ORG> deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in <CITATION> , (supra) as the decision suffered from misconstruction of the relevant Sections in the Act and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this <ORG> such as in <NAME> (supra).

In the light of our conclusion all the appeals must succeed in so far as the challenge to the right of <ORG> to entertain revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. is concerned. In Civil Appeal Nos. 626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985, <ORG> allowed the revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. and ordered the eviction of the tenant. In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981 the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but <ORG> restored the order of eviction. In Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986 <ORG> allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and <ORG> has confirmed the said order in the revision preferred to it. In Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983 <ORG> reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and <ORG> and ordered eviction and order of <ORG> has been confirmed by <ORG>. In Special Leave Petition No. 4311 of 1985 <ORG> sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to <ORG> for deciding the question whether the tenant is entitled to resist the claim for eviction on the basis of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The order of remand was confirmed by <ORG> and <ORG>.

In accordance with our pronouncement it follows that the order of <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. in each of the appeals concerned, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 626 of 1981, 624 of 1985, 2079 of 1981, 1619 of 1986 and 7505 of 1983 will stand set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case will stand restored and become operative. As the appeals are directed only against the order of <ORG> passed in revision the appeals will stand disposed of with the said pronouncement on the above lines.

In Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4311 of 1985 also the order of <ORG> under Section 115 C.P.C. is not sustainable but even so we do not find any merit in the petition because the finding of <ORG> and the order of remand passed by it have been confirmed by <ORG> and as such, there are no merits in the petition, accordingly it is dismissed. Interim orders, if any, passed in the appeals and the special leave petition will stand vacated. The parties in all the cases are directed to bear their respective costs.

<NAME>, J. 1. I find on a cursory perusal of various <ORG> enactments on rent control that, while a number of them do confer s . cific jurisdiction on the <ORG> High Court, some others are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments. Thus, though we are concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these cases, a similar question might well arise under the corresponding enactments of some other <ORG>s as well. It is in view of this importance of the question raised that I have considered it necessary to state my views in a separate order.

2. The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest a power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders. The question in these matters is whether the jurisdiction of <ORG> under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) can be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District Judge. This question has been answered in the negative in <CITATION> ,  3 SCC 83 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in <CITATION> ,  3 J.T. 663 (a decision under the Karnataka Act) and hence this reference to a larger Bench. My learned brothers are of the view that there is no conflict between the above two decisions as the two enactments are not in pari materia and that, so far as the Kerala Act is concerned, <NAME> should be followed. With respect, I am unable to agree.

3. Normally, a revision lies to <ORG> under section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/<ORG>. The fact that the order may have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contains expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District Judge/<ORG> or a subordinate authority or <ORG> have been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction. This is the effect of the decisions in <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 871, a case under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act and in <NAME> v. <NAME>, SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and <NAME>'s case (supra), which are direct decisions under the Karnataka Act. In my opinion, there is no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also.

4. The relevant provisions of the two enactments have been extracted in the order of <NAME> and need not be set out again, Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendment in 1975, rent control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent Controller, according as the case arises outside or inside the city of Bangalore. There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision. This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between <ORG> and the District Judge. <ORG> is empowered to revise the order of the Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff. Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order of the District Judge under this provision is final. The Kerala pattern is the same except that an appeal intervenes before the revision. Section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank. Section 20 provides for revision. The revisional power is to be exercised by <ORG> where the appellate authority is the Subordinate Judge and <ORG> in other cases. Section 20 does not provide, as does Section 50 of the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge shall be final. It is true that section 18(5) of the Kerala Act lays down that the order of the Rent Control court or, where there is an appeal, the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court of law except as provided in section 20 but the language of section 48(5) of the Karnataka Act is even stronger. It provides that the order of the <ORG> or the Rent Controller shall (subject to the decision in appeal or of the District Judge or <ORG> in revision under section 50 ) be final and "shall not be liable to be called into question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision." If the much wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of <ORG> under S. 115 , as has been held in the two cases referred to above, it is difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act.

5. This poses then the question of a choice between the two views of this court: the one in <ORG> and the one in <NAME>. As has already been pointed out, <ORG> follows the earlier decisions of this Court in <NAME> and <NAME>. The only other decision of this Court, which has relevance in the present context, is <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 32 which has been relied upon in <NAME>. I am in agreement with the view expressed in <ORG> that <NAME> was rendered in a totally different statutory context. That decision turned largely on the legislative history of S. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. I am therefore inclined to lean in favour of the view that has commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act and to hold that <ORG> has a power of revision over the order of the the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well.

6. <NAME> has pointed out that such an interpretation would enable parties to have recourse to four courts under the Kerala Rent Control Act viz: the court of the first instance, the appellate court, the district court and then <ORG> whereas under the Karnataka Act there are only three courts, viz: the court of the first instance, the district court by way of revision and <ORG> by way of further revision. This is no doubt true but can this alone be a reason why identical statutory language should be given different interpretation under the two enactments? I think not. That apart, the result of applying <NAME> would be to completely exclude <ORG> in rent control matters and this, if I am right in thinking that the two Acts are pari materia, will leave the litigant in Karnataka with only a right of revision to <ORG>. I venture to doubt whether in the absence of clear language the <ORG> can be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of <ORG> in such an important branch of the law. Moreover to exclude the revisional jurisdiction of <ORG> under S. 115 would only encourage the recourse, by aggrieved parties, to articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the conclusion may not even result in reducing the spate of litigation under the Rent Control Acts in <ORG>s and <ORG>. I am, therefore, not inclined to attach muct importance to this circumstance as a guide to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute.

7. The above interpretation will not render the language and scheme of section 18(5) read with section 20 totally redundant as was suggested in arguments before us. Section 20 is necessary because though, at present, Subordinate Judges have been constituted as the appellate authorities under the Act, the appellate authority need not necessarily be a regular civil court and, but for such a specific statutory provision, there would be no remedy to a party aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority. Section 18(5) is a provision of a general nature intended to prevent the orders of the Rent Controller from being challenged in the courts. These provisions, in my opinion, do not and cannot preclude the applicability of s. 115 of the <ORG> to an order passed by <ORG>, not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the land. In this view of the matter, sections 18 and 20 have a vital part to play but their effect is not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of <ORG> under section 115 .

8. One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on the interpretation to be placed on this procedural problem is this. In the State of Kerala, as early as in <CITATION> , AIR 1969 Ker. 101, a view was taken that <ORG> can entertain a second revision and, though <NAME> suggested that this view has been often challenged, the above <ORG> decision hold the field till <NAME> was decided. In Karnataka, the maintainability of a second revision appears to have been taken for granted untill a doubt was raised in view of certain observations made in a decision under the Cooperative Societies Act . This doubt was dispelled and it was held in <NAME>'s case (ILR 1978 Kar. 1585) that <ORG> could maintain a second revision. This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent <ORG> in <NAME>'s case, in the light of the decision in <NAME>, but that attempt was overruled in <NAME>'s case. In the result, the position has been that, right through in the State of Karnataka and for atleast for a period of almost twenty years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view has been in favour, of the maintainability of a second revision by <ORG>. I think that in a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication is quite clear to the contrary.

9. I would, therefore, hold that the revision petitions before <ORG> were maintainable and that the matters before us should be disposed of accordingly. However, the petitions and appeals will stand disposed of in accordance with the majority view of my learned brothers.

S.L. Appeals and petitions disposed of.