CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 9927 of 1996 PETITIONER: STATE OF KARNATAKA RESPONDENT: VISHWABHARATHI HOUSE BUILDING COOPERATIVE SOCIETY AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/01/2003 BENCH: V.N. KHARE CJ & K.G. BALAKRISHNAN & S.B. SINHA JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT 2003(1) SCR 397 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. The primal question involved in this batch of appeals and the Writ Petitions is the constitutionality of the Consumer Protection Act , 1986 (hereinafter called "the Act").

Civil Appeals No. 4613 and 4614 of 1999 filed by <ORG> arise out of a judgment and order dated 18.12.1998 passed by a division bench of <ORG> upholding the vires of the Consumer Protection Act , 1986 (the Act). State of Karnataka has filed the Appeal being C.A. No. 9927 of 1996 against the judgment and order of <ORG> questioning certain observations made therein as regards interpretation of Section 25 of the Act.

Dr <NAME> and <NAME> and others filed the Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.

The contentions raised on behalf of Appellants Petitioners are as under:

(1) (a) The <ORG> is not empowered to establish hierarchy of Courts like <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG> parallel to the hierarchy of Courts established under the Constitution, namely, District Courts, <ORG> and <ORG> in the absence of a suitable amendment made in the Constitution of India in terms of Article 368 thereof.

(b) Such hierarchy of consumer courts established under the Act would result in conflict of decisions with the hierarchy of courts established under the Constitution dealing with similar matters.

(2) The <ORG> having regard to the provisions of Article 323-A  & 323-B of the Constitution of India could not enact the Act by establishing forums which are substitutes of <ORG> including <ORG>.

(3) The provisions of the said Act strike at the independence of the judiciary.

(4) As the Act does not contain any provision to transfer a case from one consumer court to another and furthermore the forum and the <ORG> having no power to pass interim orders, the functioning thereof is unworkable.

(5) The <ORG> can only establish courts which may deal with special subjects specified therefor but not a court which will run parallel to civil courts.

Before adverting to the question as regard the competence of the <ORG> to enact the said Act, we may notice the history of legislation leading to enactment of the said Act.

The Secretary General, <ORG> submitted draft guidelines for consumer protection to <ORG> (<ORG>) in 1983. <ORG> of the <ORG> upon extensive discussions and negotiations among governments on this scope and content thereof adopted the guidelines which inter alia provide for the following:

"Taking into account the interests and needs of consumers in all countries, particularly those in developing countries, recognizing that consumers often face imbalances in economic terms, educational level, and bargaining power, and bearing in mind that consumer should have the right of access to non-hazardous products, as well as the importance of promoting just, equitable and sustainable economic and social development, these guidelines for consumer protection have the following objectives:

(a) To assist countries in achieving or maintaining adequate protection for their population as consumers;

(b) To facilitate production and distribution patterns responsive to the needs and desires of consumers;

(c) To encourage high levels of ethical conduct for those engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services to consumers;

(d) To assist countries in curbing abusive business practices by all enterprises at the national and international levels which adversely affect consumers;

(e) To facilitate the development of independent consumer groups;

(f) To further international cooperation in the field of consumer protection;

(g) To encourage the development of market conditions which provide consumers with greater choice at lower prices."

The framework for the Consumer Act was provided by a Resolution, dated 9-4-1985 of <ORG> of <ORG>. This is known as 'Consumer Protection Resolution No. 39/248.' India is a signatory to the said Resolution.

The said Act was enacted having regard to aforementioned resolution.

It seeks to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for the said purpose, to make provision for the establishment of Consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and for matters connected therewith, as would appear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act.

It further seeks inter alia to promote and protect the rights of consumers such as-

(a) the right to be protected against marketing of goods which are hazardous to life and property;

(b) the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices:

(c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to an authority of goods at competitive prices;

(d) the right to be heard and to be assured that consumers interests will receive the consideration at appropriate forums;

(e) the right to seek, redressal against unfair trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation of consumers; and (f) right to consumer education.

The legislative competence of the <ORG> and <ORG> respectively to provide for creation of courts and tribunals as envisaged in different lists contained in the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India are as under:

Item 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule:

Constitution, organization, jurisdiction and powers of <ORG> (including contempt of such <ORG>), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before <ORG>.

Item 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.

Constitution and organization (including vacations) of <ORG> except provisions as to officers and servants of <ORG>; persons entitled to practise before <ORG>.

Item 79 of List I of the Seventh Schedule:

Extension of the jurisdiction of <ORG> to, and exclusion of the jurisdiction of <ORG> from, any Union Territory.

Item 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule:

Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except <ORG>, with respect to any of the matters in the List: admiralty jurisdiction.

Item 11A of List III of the Seventh Schedule:

Administration of justice: constitution and organisation of all courts, except <ORG> and <ORG>.

Item 46 of List III of the Seventh Schedule:

Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except <ORG>, with respect to any of the matters in this List.

A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions does not leave any manner of doubt as regard the legislative competence of <ORG> to provide for creation of special courts and tribunals. Administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts, except <ORG> and <ORG> is squarely covered by entry 11A of List III of the Constitution of India. The said entry was originally a part of Entry 3 of List II. By reason of Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 and by Section 57(a)(vi) thereof it was inserted into List HI as item 11A.

By virtue of Clause 2 of Article 246 of the Constitution, the <ORG> has the requisite power to make laws with respect of constitution of organization of all courts except <ORG> and <ORG>.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners could not seriously dispute the plenary power of the <ORG> to make a law as regard constitution of courts but as noticed, supra, merely urged that it did not have the competence to create parallel civil courts.

The said submission has been made purported to be relying on or on the basis of the following observations made by <NAME>, J. while delivering a partially dissenting judgment in In Re: the Special Courts Bill 1978 reported in [1979] 1 SCC 380 at page 455;

"The Constitution has thus made ample and effective provision for the establishment of a strong, independent and impartial judicial administration in the country, with the necessary complement of civil and criminal courts. It is not permissible for <ORG> or <ORG> to ignore or bypass that Scheme of the Constitution by providing for the establishment of a civil or criminal court parallel to <ORG> in a State, or by way of an additional or extra or a second <ORG>, or a court other than a court subordinate to the <ORG>. Any such attempt would be unconstitutional and will strike at the independence of the judiciary which has so nobly been enshrined in the Constitution and so carefully nursed over the years."

The argument of the learned counsel is fallacious inasmuch as the provisions of the said Act are in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and not in derogation thereof as is evident from Section 3 thereof.

The provisions of the said Act clearly demonstrate that it was enacted keeping in view the long felt necessity of protecting the common man from wrongs wherefore the ordinary law for all intent and purport had become illusory. In terms of the said Act, a consumer is entitled to participate in the proceedings directly as a result whereof his helplessness against a powerful business house may be taken care of.

This <ORG> in a large number of decisions considered the purport and object of the said Act. By reason of the said statue quasi-judicial authorities have been created at the District. State and <ORG> levels so as to enable a consumer to ventilate his grievances before a forum where justice can be done without any procedural wrangles and hyper-technicalities. One of the objects of the said Act is to provide momentum to the consumer movement. <ORG> Consumer Protection Council is also to be constituted in terms of Section 4 of the Act to promote and protect the rights of the consumers as noticed hereinbefore.

Before proceeding further to advert to the questions raised herein, it is necessary to consider some of the provisions of the said Act.

Section 2 is the interpretation clause. Some of the provisions contained therein defining the meaning of words relevant for this case are as under:

(b) "Complainant" means,-(i) a consumer, or

(ii) any voluntary consumer association registered under The Companies Act , 1956 or under any other law for the time being in force; or

(iii) the Central Government or any State Government, who or which makes a complaint;

(iv) one or more consumers where there are numerous consumers having the same interest.

(c) "complaint" means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that,-

(i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice has been adopted by any trader;

(ii) the goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him suffer from one or more defects;

(iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect;

(iv) a trader has charged for the goods mentioned in the complaint a price in excess of the price fixed by or under any law for the time being in force or displayed on the goods or any package containing such goods;

(v) goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used, are being offered for sale to the public in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force requiring traders to display information in regard to the contents, manner and effect of use of such goods; with a view to obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act;

(d) "consumer" means any person who-

(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or party paid and partly promised or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such persons but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or

(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person;

Explanation:- For the purposes of sub-clause (i) "commercial purpose" does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning, his livelihood, by means of self-employment";

(e) "consumer dispute" means a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint;

(g) "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection, short coming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;

(r) "unfair trade practice" means a trade practice which, for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provisions of any service, adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including any of the following practices, namely;

Section 7 of the said Act provides for constitution of <ORG> to promote and protect within the <ORG> the rights of the consumers with the objects ad quoted supra.

Section 9 provides for establishment of Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies. <ORG> to be known as "District Forum" will be established by <ORG> in each district. <ORG> to be known as "<ORG> will be established by <ORG> in the State and <ORG> by <ORG>.

In terms of Section 10 , the President of <ORG> shall be a person who is or has been, or is qualified to be a District Judge and the forum shall also consist of two other members who are required to be persons of ability, integrity and standing and have adequate knowledge or experience of, or have shown capacity in dealing with, problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration and one of them shall be a woman. The tenure of the members of <ORG> is fixed.

Section 13 of the said Act lays down a detailed procedure as regards the mode and manner in which the complaints received by the District Forum are required to be dealt with. Section 14 provides for the directions which can be issued by the District forum on arriving at a satisfaction that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified in the complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the deficiencies in services have been proved.

Section 15 provides for an appeal from the order made by <ORG> to <ORG>.

Section 16 provides for composition of <ORG> which reads thus:

(1) Each State Commission shall consist of-

(a) a person who is or has been a Judge of <ORG>, appointed by the State Government who shall be its President:

Provided that no appointment under this clause shall be made except after consulation with the Chief Justice of <ORG>.

(b) two other members, who shall be persons of ability, integrity and standing and have adequate knowledge or experience of, or have shown capacity in dealing with, problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration, one of whom shall be a woman;

Provided that every appointment under this clause shall be made by <ORG> on the recommendation of <ORG> consisting of the following namely (1) President of <ORG>:

Chairman (ii) Secretary of <ORG>: Member

(iii) Secretary in charge of the Department dealing with consumer affairs in the <ORG>: Member (2) The salary or honorarium and other allowances payable to and the other terms and conditions of service of the members of the <ORG> Commission shall be such as may be prescribed by the <ORG> Government;

(3) Every member of <ORG> shall hold office for a term of five years or up to age of sixty-seven years, whichever is earlier and shall not be eligible for reappointment.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), a person appointed as a President or as a member before the commencement of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act , 1993, shall continue to hold such office as President or member, as the case may be, till the completion of his term.

The members of <ORG> are to be selected by <ORG>, the Chairman whereof would be the President of <ORG>.

Section 19 provides for an appeal from a decision of <ORG> to <ORG>. Section 20 deals with the composition of <ORG>, the President whereof would be a person who is or has been a Judge of <ORG> and such appointment shall be made only upon consulation with the Chief Justice of India. So far as the members of <ORG> are concerned, the same are also to be made on the recommendation of <ORG>, the Chairman whereof would be a person who is a Judge of <ORG> to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India. The tenure of the Office of <ORG> is also fixed by reason of sub-section (3) of Section 20 .

By reason of the provisions of the said Act, therefore, independent authorities have been created.

Sections 15 , 19 and 23 provide for the hierarchy of appeals. By reason of sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 <ORG> shall have the same powers as are vested in the civil Courts for the purposes mentioned therein. Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 14 mandate that the proceedings shall be conducted by the President of <ORG> and at least one member thereof sitting together. Only in the event of any difference between them on any point or points, the same is to be referred to the other member for hearing thereon and the opinion of the majority shall be the order of <ORG>. By reason of Section 18 , the provisions of Section 12 , 13 and 14 and rules made thereunder would mutatis mutandis be applicable to the disposal of disputes by <ORG>.

Section 23 provides for a limited appeal to <ORG> from an order made by <ORG> i.e., when the same is made in exercise of its original power as conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section

21. Section 25 provides for the enforcement of the orders by <ORG>, <ORG> or <ORG> which is in the following terms:

Enforcement of orders by <ORG>, <ORG> or <ORG>: Every order made by <ORG>, <ORG> or <ORG> may be enforced by <ORG>, <ORG> or <ORG>, as the case may be, in the same manner as if it were a decree or order made by a <ORG> in a suit pending therein and it shall be lawful for <ORG>, <ORG> or <ORG> to send, in the event of its inability to execute it, such order to the <ORG> within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, and thereupon, the <ORG> to which the order is so sent, shall execute the order as if it were a decree or order sent to it for execution.

Section 26 empowers <ORG>, <ORG> or as the case may be <ORG> to dismiss the complaint and make an order that the complainant shall pay to the opposite party such costs not exceeding Rs. 10,000 in the event it is found that the complaint was frivolous or vexatious one.

Section 27 provides for penalties.

In view of the constitutional scheme relating to legislative competence of the <ORG> and <ORG> there cannot be any doubt or dispute that the <ORG> has the requisite legislative competence to enact the said Act.

The question as regard legislative competence of the <ORG> to create such special tribunals as also the effect of Article 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution is no longer res Integra having regard to the recent decision of this <ORG> in <CITATION> <ORG> Bar Association and Ors.,  4 SCC 275, wherein it was held:

"9. We will first deal with the question as to whether <ORG> has the competence to enact a law for establishing such Banking Tribunals. In order to examine the question of the competence of <ORG> to enact such a law, it is pertinent to bear in mind the observations of this <ORG> in <NAME> v. C1T, SCR [1955] 1 SCR 829 at p. 836 which are as follows:

As pointed out by <NAME>, <NAME> In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, FCR [1940] FCR 110 at p. 134 none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. It is, therefore, clear and it is acknowledged by Chief Justice <NAME>-that in construing an entry in a list conferring legislative powers the widest possible construction according to their ordinary meaning must be put upon the words used therein..... The cardinal rule of interpretation, however, is that words should be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to this rider that in construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude.

(emphasis added)

10. Again in <CITATION>  2 SCR

33. at p. 51 it was observed as follows: SCC pp. 791-92 para 21.

21. It seems to us that the function of Article 246(1 ), read with Entries 1-96 List I, is to give positive power to <ORG> to legislate in respect of these entries. Object is not to debar <ORG> from legislating on a matter, even if other provisions of the Constitution enable it to do so.

11. In <ORG> decision it was held that what one has to ask is whether the matter sought to be legislated is included in List II or in List III and no question has to be asked about List I. If the answer is in the negative, then it follows that <ORG> has power to make laws with respect to that matter or text.

12. It has thus been clearly enunciated that the power of <ORG> to enact a law, which is not covered by an entry in List II and List HI, is absolute. While Article 323-A and 323-B specifically enable the legislatures to enact laws for the establishment of tribunals in relation to the matters specified therein, the power of <ORG> to enact a law constituting a <ORG>, like the Banking <ORG>, which is not covered by any of the matters specified in Article 323-A or 323-B, is not taken away. With regard to any of the entries specified in List 1, the exclusive jurisdiction to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I is with <ORG>. The power conferred by Article 246(1) can be exercised notwithstanding the existence of Article 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution.

13. Articles 323-A and 323-B are enabling provisions which specifically enable the setting up of tribunals contemplated by the said articles. These articles, however, cannot be interpreted to mean that they prohibit the legislature from establishing tribunals not covered by these articles, as long as there is legislative competence under an appropriate entry in the Seventh Schedule. Articles 323-A and 323-B do not take away that legislative competence. The contrary view expressed by <ORG> in <NAME> case does not lay down the correct law and we expressly disapprove of the same."

Once it is held that the <ORG> had the legislative competence to enact the said Act, the submissions of the learned counsel that the relevant provisions of the Constitution required amendments must be neglected.

The scope and object of the said legislation came up for consideration before this Court in Common Cause. <CITATION> reported in  10 SCC 729. It was held:

"The object of the legislation, as the Preamble of the Act proclaims, is "for better protection of the interests of consumers". During the last few years preceding the enactment there was in this country a marked awareness among the consumers of goods that they were not getting their money's worth and were being exploited by both traders and manufacturers of consumer goods. The need for consumer redressal fora was, therefore, increasingly felt. Undrestandably, therefore, legislation was introduced and enacted with considerable enthusiasm and fanfare as a path-breaking benevolent legislation intended to protect the consumer from exploitation by unscrupulous manufacturers and traders of consumer goods. A three-tier fora comprising the District Forum, <ORG> and <ORG> came to be envisaged under the Act for redressal of grievances of consumers".

The rights of the parties have adequately been safeguarded by reason of the provisions of the said Act inasmuch as although it provides for an alternative system of consumer jurisdiction on summary trial, they are required to arrive at a conclusion based on reasons. Even when quantifying damages, they are required to make an attempt to serve the ends of justice aiming not only at recompensing the individual but also to bring about a qualitative change in the attitude of the service provider. Assignment of reasons excludes or at any rate minimizes the chances of arbitrariness and the higher forums created under the Act can test the correctness thereof.

<ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG> are not manned by lay persons. The President would be a person having judicial background and other members are required to have the expertise in the subjects such as economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs, administration etc. It may be true that by reason of sub-section (2-A) of Section 14 of the Act, in a case of difference of opinion between two members, the matter has to be referred to a third member and, in rare cases, the majority opinion of the members may prevail over the President. But, such eventuality alone is insufficient for striking down the Act as unconstitutional, particularly, when provisions have been made therein for appeal there against to a higher forum.

By reason of the provisions of the said Act, the power of judicial review of <ORG>, which is a basic feature of the Constitution, has not been nor could be taken away.

We may in this connection also notice that in <CITATION> ,  3 SCC 583, this Court held:

"A review of the provisions of the Act discloses that the quasi-judicial bodies/authorities/ agencies created by the Act known as District <ORG>s, <ORG> and <ORG> are not <ORG>s though invested with some of the powers of <ORG>. They are quasi-judicial Tribunals brought into existence to render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers. It is equally clear that these <ORG> were not supposed to supplant but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide an additional <ORG> providing inexpensive and speedy resolution of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and services. The <ORG> so created is uninhibited by the requirement of <ORG> fee or the formal procedures of a <ORG>. Any consumer can go and file a complaint. Complaint need not necessarily be filed by the complainant himself; any recognized consumers' association can espouse his cause. Where a large number of consumers have a similar complaint, one or more can file a complaint on behalf of all. Even the <ORG> and State Governments can act on his/their behalf. The idea was to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in the matter of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. Indeed, the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect his interest. The Act provides for "business-to- consumer" disputes and not for "business-to-business" disputes. This scheme of the Act, in our opinion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting the words that fall for consideration in this appeal". <CITATION> .,  7 SCC 668 this <ORG> observed:

"11. The Consumer Protection Act is one of the benevolent pieces of legislation intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation. The Act provides for an alternative system of consumer justice by summary trial. The authorities under the Act exercise quasi- judicial powers for redressal of consumer disputes and it is one of the postulates of such a body that it should arrive at a conclusion based on reason. The necessity to provide reasons, howsoever, brief in support of its conclusion by such a forum, is too obvious to be reiterated and needs no emphasizing. Obligation to give reasons not only introduces clarity but it also excludes, or at any rate minimizes, the chances of arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the correctness of those reasons. Unfortunately we have not been able to find from the impugned order any reasons in support of the conclusion that the claim of the appellant is "unrealistic" or "exaggerated" or "excessive". Loss of salary is not the sole factor which was required to be taken into consideration.

12. While quantifying damages, <ORG> are required to make an attempt to serve the ends of justice so that compensation is awarded, in an established case, which not only serves the purpose of recompensing the individual but which also at the same time, aims to bring about a qualitative change in the attitude of the service provider. Indeed, calculation of damages depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal application. While awarding compensation, <ORG> has to take into account all relevant factors and assess compensation on the basis of accepted legal principles, on moderation. It is for the consumer forum to grant compensation to the extent it finds it reasonable, fair and proper in the facts and circumstances of a given case according to the established judicial standards where the claimant is able to establish his charge."

<CITATION> ,  1 SCC 243 this Court held:

"The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which he faces against powerful business, described as, 'a network of rackets' or a society in which, 'producers have secured power' to 'rob the rest' and the might of public bodies which are degenerating into store house of inaction where papers do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and shocked."

It has further been held:

" The Act thus aims to protect the economic interest of a consumer as understood in commercial sense as a purchaser of goods and in the larger sense of user of services. It is a milestone in history of socio-economic legislation and is directed towards achieving public benefit."

Yet again in <ORG> v. V.P. Shantha, [1996] 5 SCC 651 this Court held:

".........It is no doubt true that the decisions of <ORG> as well as <ORG> and <ORG> have to be taken by majority and it may be possible in some cases that the President may be in minority. But the presence of a person well versed in law as the President will have a bearing on the deliberations of these Agencies and their decisions. As regards the absence of requirement about a member having adequate knowledge or experience in dealing with the problems relating to medicine it may be stated that the persons to be chosen as members are required to have knowledge and experience in dealing with problems relating to various fields connected with the object and purpose of the Act, viz., protection and interest of the consumers. The said knowledge and experience would enable them to handle the consumer disputes coming up before them for settlement in consonance with the requirement of the Act. To say that the members must have adequate knowledge or experience in the field to which the goods or services, in respect of which the complaint is made, are related would lead to impossible situations."

See also <CITATION> , reported in JT (2002) 6 SC 1 and <CITATION> ., reported in  2 SCC I.

By reason of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, it is evident that remedies provided thereunder are not in derogation of those provided under other laws. The said Act supplements and not supplants the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other statutory authorities.

The said Act provides for a further safeguard to the effect that in the event a complaint involves complicated issues requiring recording of evidence of experts, the complainant would be at liberty approach the civil court for appropriate relief. The right of the consumer to approach the civil court for necessary relief has, therefore, been provided under the Act itself.

The provisions of the said Act are required to be interpreted as broadly as possible. It has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint espite the fact that other forums/courts would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. <CITATION> , reported in  6 SCC 385 and <CITATION> reported in  5 SCC 696.

The question as regards the applicability or otherwise of Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution in the matter of constitution of such Tribunals came up for consideration before this Court in <CITATION> ., reported in  3 SCC 261. This Court therein clearly held that the constitutional provisions vest <ORG> and <ORG>, as the case may be, with powers to divest the traditional courts of a considerable portion of their judicial work. It was observed that the <ORG> and <ORG> possess legislative competence to effect changes in the original jurisdiction of <ORG> and <ORG> apart from the authorization that flows Articles 323-A and 323-B in terms of Entries 77, 78, 79 and 95 of List I so far as the <ORG> is concerned and in terms of Entry 65 of List II and Entry 46 of List III so far as <ORG> are concerned. It was further held that power of judicial review being the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be taken away.

We, therefore, are clearly of the opinion that the said Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional.

It may be true that there does not exist any provision for transfer of case from one forum to the other or there does not exist any provision to grant injunction. Absence of such provisions in our opinion would not render the statute ultra vires the Constitution or unworkable.

The very fact that in a given case a party under the said Act may approach upto this Court and/or may otherwise take recourse to the remedy of judicial review, the interests of the parties must be held to have been sufficiently safeguarded.

The provisions relating to power to approach appellate court by a.party aggrieved by a decision of the forums/State Commissions as also the power of <ORG> and this Court under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India and Article 32 of this Court apart from Section 23 of the Act provide for adequate safeguards. Furthermore, primarily the jurisdiction of the forum/ commissions is to grant damages. In the event, a complainant feels that he will have a better and effective remedy in a civil court as he may have to seek for an order of injunction, he indisputably may file a suit in an appropriate civil court or may take recourse to some other remedies as provided for in other statutes.

We, therefore, agree with the judgment of <ORG>.

However, we are not in a position to agree with the observations of <ORG> as regard the interpretation of Section 25 of the Act.

<ORG> interpreting the said provision has made the following observations, which is impugned herein in Civil Appeal No. 9927 of 1996:

"On reading Section 25 of the Act, in our view, it does not empower <ORG> to pass such an order. If at all the <ORG> wants to enforce the order, it has to send the order to the concerned <ORG> which has jurisdiction over the area, which is not done here. So, without entering into the other points raised in this, in our view, it suffices to set aside the impugned order as Annexure 'D' accordingly."

A bare perusal of the Section 25 of the Act clearly shows that thereby a legal fiction has been created to the effect that an order made by <ORG> or <ORG> will be deemed to be a decree or order made by a civil court in a suit. Legal fiction so created has a specific purpose, i.e., for the purpose of execution of the order passed by the <ORG> or <ORG>. Only in the event the <ORG>/State <ORG> or the <ORG> is unable to execute its order, the same may be sent to the civil court for its execution. <ORG>, therefore was not correct to hold that in each and every case the order passed by the Districts <ORG>/ State <ORG> <ORG> are required to be sent to the civil courts for execution thereof.

Furthermore, Section 27 of the Act also confers an additional power upon the <ORG> and the <ORG> to execute its order. The said provision is akin to Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions of the Contempt of Courts, Act or Section 51 read with Order 21 Rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 25 should be read in conjunction with Section 27 . A Parliamentary statute indisputably can create a tribunal and might say that non-compliance of its order would be punishable by way of imprisonment of fine, which can be in addition to any other mode or recovery.

It is well settled that the cardinal principle of interpretation of statute is that courts or tribunals must be held to posses power to execute their own order.

It is also well settled that a statutory <ORG> which has been conferred with the power to adjudicate a dispute and pass necessary order has also the power to implement its order. Further, the Act which is a self- contained Code, even if it has not been specifically spelt out, must be deemed to have conferred upon the <ORG> all powers in order to make its order effective.

<CITATION> , AIR (1986) SC 984, it has been held as follows:-

"Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its order effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim 'ubi aliquied conceditured in since quo res ipsa isse non potest" (where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist) (Vide Earl Jowitt's Dictionary of English law, 1959 Edn., P. 1797). Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant who may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties......"

<CITATION> ., AIR (1981) Gauhati 18 F.B., it has been held as follows:-

"We are of firm opinion that where a statute gives a power, such power implies that all legitimate steps may be taken to exercise that power even though these steps may not be clearly spelt in the statute. Where the rule making authority gives power to certain authority to do anything of public character, such authority should get the power to take intermediate steps in order to give effect to the exercise of the power in its final step, otherwise the ultimate power would become illusory, ridiculous and inoperative which could not be the intention of the rule making authority.

In determining whether a power claimed by the statutory authority can be held to be incidental or ancillary to the powers expressly conferred by the statute, the court must not only see whether the power may be derived by reasonable implication from the provisions of the statute, but also whether such powers are necessary for carrying out the purpose of the provisions of the statute which confers power on the authority in its exercise of such power."

The terminology used in Section 25 of the Act to the effect "in the event of its inability to execute it" is of great significance. Section 25 , on a plain reading, goes to show that the provision contained therein presuppose that the <ORG> or the <ORG> would be entitled to execute its order. It however, may send the matter for its execution to a court only in the event it is unable to do so. Such a contingency may arise only in a given situation but in our considered opinion the same does not lead to the conclusion that <ORG> cannot execute its own order and by compulsion it has to send all its orders for execution to the civil courts. Such construction of Section 25 in our opinion would violate the plain language used therein and, thus, must be held to be untenable.

It is now well settled principle of interpretation of statute that plain language employed in a Section must be given its ordinary meaning.

For the reasons aforesaid in Writ Petition 417 of 1996, Writ Petition 12 of 2002, Civil Appeal 4613 and Civil Appeal 4614 of 1999 are dismissed and Civil Appeal 9927 of 1996 is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.


<NAME>, J.

1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate Writ for cancellation of an order dated the 25th February 1958 terminating the employment of the petitioner as an Inspector of <ORG> and for directing the opposite parties to forbear from giving effect to that order.

2. On 30th July 1946 the petitioner was appointed as a temporary Inspector in <ORG>, Calcutta, having its jurisdiction over West Bengal and Orissa. On 1st May 1951 the petitioner was allowed to cross the probationary stage in the prescribed time scale of pay with effect from 1st January 1950 and the petitioner was warned that if the petitioner failed to pass the departmental examination for Inspectors within the next permissible chances his increment in the time scale of pay would be stopped until further orders, and he would be liable to be discharged or reverted as the case might be. The prescribed time scale of pay at the time was Rs. 80-Prob-100-5-120 E.B.-8-200-10/2-220. The petitioner appeared for the first time in the departmental examination in May 1953 but he passed only in three out of the five papers and on account of this failure of the petitioner to pass the departmental examination completely, the petitioner's increment in the time scale of pay was stopped with effect from 1st August 1953. The petitioner was thereafter called upon to appear in the two papers in which he had failed, at the departmental examination which was to be held at Calcutta on 13th May 1954, while he was at Banamalipur in Puri district, having been transferred there on 9th May 1954. The petitioner received intimation about the examination on 12th May 1954 and he at once made arrangements for coming down to Calcutta but in-spite of his efforts he missed the examination in paper No. i and appeared only in Paper II. On 3rd May 1955 the petitioner received an order under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Departmental Examination Rules 1049 discharging the petitioner from service with effect from the date of service of the Order. On 10th May 1955 the Order was served on the petitioner and he was relieved from Government service on the same date.

3. The petitioner thereupon sent several representations to <ORG> on 12th May 1955, 4th July 1955 and 12th September 1905. On 7th October 1955 the petitioner was reappointed as a temporary <ORG> Cleric. The petitioner made repeated representations against this order and after some correspondence the petitioner was informed on 7th January 1956 that tile petitioner had been removed from his service as Inspector for failure to pass the departmental examination and he was appointed as a <ORG> Clerk as a special case on compassionate grounds. On 28th June 1956 the petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and <NAME>, J. issued a rule on the opposite parties to show cause why the order dated 3rd May 1955 should not be cancelled or quashed. On 7th January 1957 during the pendency of the Rule the order of discharge elated the 3rd May .1955 was cancelled and the petitioner was reinstated in service in the grade of Inspector of Central Excise, with effect from the date of his discharge, and was posted to Kalimpong division. The petitioner joined his post at Kalimpong on 31st January 1957. Sometime thereafter he was transferred to Kurseong. The petitioner after his reinstatement made several representations for payment of his arrears of salary but no reply was received to such representations. The petitioner however was given another chance after his reinstatement to pass the departmental examination in Papers I and II held on 6th July 1957 and 8th July 1957 in which the petitioner appeared but he failed in both the papers. Before appearing in the examinations the petitioner by his letter dated the 27th May 1957 asked for supply of some books from the department of <ORG> and the books were supplied to him on 3rd June 1957. After his failure in the July examination the petitioner was asked to be in readiness for the Departmental examination to be held in November 1957 but as ultimately <ORG> did not condescend to give the petitioner any further permission to appear in the examination the petitioner's services were terminated by an order dated the 25th February 1958 with effect from 6th April 1958 in accordance with R. 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1949 upon one month's notice being given to the petitioner. The said order dated the 25th February 1958 may be set out hereunder :

"<NAME>. a temporary Inspector of <ORG> is hereby informed that his services are no longer required in this Collectorate. Under R. 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules he is accordingly hereby given one month's notice of termination of his service. This notice will take effect from the date on which it is served on Sri <NAME> and his services will accordingly stand terminated at the expiry of the period of one calendar month from that date.

Sd/- <NAME> Collector of <ORG>, Calcutta.

4. The first contention raised by Mr. <NAME>, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, is that the petitioner having been appointed on 30-7-1946, the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules which came into force in 1949 cannot have any retrospective application to his case. But it has been pointed out in previous decisions of this Court, that under Section 241(2) of the <ORG> of India Act 1935 the <ORG> had the power to frame rules so as to affect services of persons in the employment of the <ORG>--no matter whether such service commenced before the coming into force of the <ORG> of India Act 1935 or after it came into operation. The Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1949 were framed under this rule-making power, and the petitioner's employment being a continuing one and it having continued after the framing of the Rules, the Rules operated prospectively in the case of petitioner's service. In my view there is no substance in this contention of the petitioner. In fact in the case of <CITATION> , (2nd column top) no such point was even attempted to be raised and it was conceded that these Rules were the relevant Rules which governed the conditions of the service of the appellant who was appointed on 1-5-1946.

5. The next point that has been argued by Mr. <NAME> is that the petitioner being in the service of the <ORG> from 30-7-1946 to 25-2-1948 the petitioner must be deemed to be in the quasi-permanent service of the <ORG> and hence Rule 5 of the Central Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1949 has no application to his case.

6. Now the expression "Quasi-permanent service" has been defined in Rule 2t,b) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1949 as follows:

" 'Quasi-permanent service' means temporary service commencing from the date on which a declaration issued tinder Rule 3 takes effect and consisting of periods of duty and leave (other than extraordinary leave) after that date".

7. So according to this definition a declaration has contemplated in Rule 3 is essential before a service can be regarded as quasi-permanent service.

8. Rule 3 as appearing in the <ORG> publications (Except <ORG>) reads as follows:

"A Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service:

(i) if he has been in continuous Government service for more than three years, and (ii) if the appointing authority being satisfied as to his suitability in respect of age, qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect in accordance with such instructions as the Governor-General may issue from time to time".

9. It will also be convenient at this stage to set out the relevant portions of Rule 5 and Rule 6 on which reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner:

"Rule 5 (a)--The service of a temporary <ORG> servant who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the <ORG> servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the <ORG> servant.

(b) The period of such notice shall be one month, unless otherwise agreed to by the <ORG> and by the <ORG> servant.

Rule 6 -- The service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination:

(i) in the same circumstances and in the same manner as a Government servant in permanent service, or

(ii) * * *

10. The argument of Mr. <NAME> is that the conjunction "and" appearing in the <ORG> publications between Rule 3(i) and Rule 3(ii) is a misprint as the <ORG> publication shows that the word "and" is not there, and consequently a <ORG> servant who is in continuous <ORG> service for more than three years shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service and as under Rule 6(i) the services of such an employee can be terminated only in the manner in which services of permanent <ORG> servant can be terminated, such a servant is entitled to the protection and benefits of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. As the petitioner is in <ORG> service for about 12 years he must be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service and so his services cannot be terminated under Rule 5 but only under Rule 6(i) and as that has not been done, and no opportunity as required under Article 311(2) has been given to him to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, the order dated 25-2-1958 is invalid and inoperative.

11. Reliance is placed on the decision of <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> , where after laying down the proposition that a person appointed substantively to a permanent post and a person appointed to a temporary post for a fixed term of years, in <ORG> service, have a right to their post and are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Article 311(2) when their services are sought to be terminated for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications, <NAME> proceeded to observe as follows: (page 48) "Further, take the case of a person who having been appointed temporarily to a post has been in continuous service for more than three years or has been certified by the appointing authority as fit for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, such person under Rule 3 of the 1949 Temporary Service Rules, is to be deemed in quasi-permanent service which under Rule 6 of those Rules can be terminated (i) in the circumstances and in the manner in which the employment of a <ORG> servant in a permanent service can be terminated or (ii) when the appointing authority certifies that a reduction has occurred in the number of posts available for <ORG> servant not in permanent service. <NAME> when the service of a <ORG> servant holding a post temporarily ripens into a quasi-permanent service as defined in the 1949 Temporary Service Rules, he acquires a right to the post although his appointment was initially temporary and therefore the termination of his employment otherwise than in accordance with Rule 6 of those Rules will deprive him of his right to that post which he acquired under the rules and will prima facie be a punishment and regarded as a dismissal or removal from service so as to attract the application of Article 311. Except in the three cases just mentioned a <ORG> servant has no right to his post and the termination of service of a <ORG> servant does not except in those cases amount to a dismissal or removal by way of punishment".

12. It is clear from the above observations of the learned Chief Justice of India that it was the Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 as published in <ORG>, without the conjunction "and", which had been placed before <ORG>, and the learned Chief Justice was construing such rule. According to such construction the petitioner before me who has put in a continuous service for a period of about twelve years is to be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service and so Rule 5 has no application to his case and the order dated 25-2-1958 which purports to terminate the employment of the petitioner in terms of Rule 5 is bad.

13. It may be pointed out however that in the latter case before <ORG> reported in AIR 1958 SC 418 at p. 424 to which I have already referred, in an earlier part of this judgment, Rule 3 with the conjunction "and" was placed for consideration before <ORG> and <NAME> has set out this Rule in his judgment at page 424 (2nd column bottom). Now if the conjunction "and" was in fact in Rule 3 as framed by the Rule-making authority, then the petitioner cannot be regarded as being in quasi-permanent service by reason of his merely putting in a continuous service of more than three years. There has to be further a declaration, as contemplated in Rule 3(ii) in order to convert the service of the petitioner into a quasi-permanent service.

14. Mr. <NAME> on behalf of the respondents has however argued that whether the disputed conjunction "and" is there in Rule 3 or not, is immaterial, inasmuch as the definition of the expression "quasi-permanent service" as given in Rule 2 (b) clinches the matter in issue. According to Mr. <NAME>, this definition makes it clear that a declaration as contemplated in Rule 3(ii) is an essential ingredient of a quasi-permanent service or status. In other words according to Mr. '<NAME>, before the petitioner can be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service it is incumbent on him to show, not only that he has been in continuous Government service for more than three years but also that the appointing authority has issued a declaration as contemplated in Rule 3(ii).

15. In my view the contention of Mr. <NAME> is correct. It appears to me that Rule 2(b) and Rule 3 should be read together, and Rule 3 is a further amplification and clarification of the definition Clause 2(b). Even if the conjunction "and" is not there in Rule 3 the definition clause indicates that a declaration as contemplated in Rule 3 is the sine qua non of a "quasi-permanent service". There is nothing repugnant in Rule 3 which excludes the operation of the definition clause. The first <ORG> judgment in <NAME>'s case, , did not lay due stress on the definition clause 2(b), and construed Rule 3 in an isolated manner. The later case of "Srinivasan" considered the definition clause--Rule 2(b) together with Rule 3 which had the conjunction "and" between Sub-rules (i) and (ii) of this Rule, and held that declaration is essential for a quasi-permanent service.

16. In my view this later decision has put the correct interpretation on Rule 3 and the interpretation will be the same whether the conjunction 'and" is there or not.

17. So the petitioner not being in quasi-permanent service his services were validly terminated by giving notice under Rule 5. It has been held by <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> ) that termination of employment according to the conditions of service contained in the service rules does not amount to dismissal or removal from service so as to attract Article 311 of the Constitution. It is clear that in the present case the petitioner's services were terminated by giving one month's notice under Rule 5 because he failed to pass the departmental examination and was found to be unsuitable for the post. It is not a case of removal or dismissal from service.

18. It was further contended by Mr. <NAME> that the petitioner is to be regarded as a Probationer if he is found not to be in quasi-permanent service, and the termination of his service on the ground of inefficiency is a punishment and amounts to removal or dismissal of service and as he was not given the opportunity envisaged in Article 311(2) of the Constitution the order of termination of service is invalid- But <ORG> has pointed out in the case of that a probationer has no right to the post and termination of the service of a probationer is not prima facie and per se a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Article 311. But if the Government takes the view that a simple termination of service is not enough and the conduct of the probationer servant has been such that he deserves a punishment entailing penal consequences, in such a case, the Government may choose to proceed against the servant On the basis of his misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or the like and inflict on him the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction carrying with it the penal consequences. In such a case the servant will be entitled to the protection of Article 311(2). There is however nothing in this case to indicate that the opposite parties have proceeded to inflict any of the punishments contemplated in Article 311. Rule 13 Explanation VIII (b) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1957 makes it clear that termination in accordance with Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules 1949 is not a penalty. Moreover the petitioner had already been allowed to cross the probationary stage before his services were finally terminated by the order dated 28-2-1958. So he was not a probationer when his services were terminated. So this contention of Mr. <NAME> has no force.

19. The next point urged by Mr. <NAME> is that under Rule 55B of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1930 the petitioner should have been apprised of the grounds of the proposal for termination of his employment and opportunity should have been given to him to show cause before passing any order terminating his employment. But no case is made in the petition that the petitioner was a probationer at the time his employment was terminated and no ground is taken in the petition that Rule 55B applies to his case. If a specific ground had been taken or any such specific case had been made, the opposite parties might have stated facts in their affidavit in opposition to controvert the allegations. The case made in the petition is as I have already pointed out that the petitioner was allowed to cross the probationary stag by an order dated 1-5-1951 with effect from 1-1-1950. This contention of Mr. <NAME> is therefore rejected.

20. It has been suggested in the petition that the order terminating the employment is a mala fide one but this point has not been seriously pressed at the hearing. I am however unable to come to the conclusion that the order was prompted by any improper motive or bad faith.

21. The petitioner had several chances to pass the departmental examination as appears from paragraph 9 of the affidavit in opposition, but he did not deliberately avail himself of these chances; and in the chances that he did avail of before the first Order of discharge was served on him on 10-5-1955, he failed to pass in all the papers. It is true that in respect of the examination held in May 1954 he was not given sufficient notice of the examination but after he had moved <ORG> under Article 226 on 28-6-1956 the authorities apparently felt the reasonableness of the petitioner's complaint with regard to the May examination and so proceeded to reinstate him with effect from the date of discharge. Thereafter further chance was given to him to sit for the papers in which he had failed, but the petitioner failed to come out successful.

22. In my view no ground has been made out for interference under Article 220. The Rule is accordingly discharged. But there will be no order as to costs.