JUDGMENT

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of <ORG> in Second Appeal No. 25 of 1986 where-under the concurrent findings of <ORG> and <ORG> have been reversed and the suit for eviction filed by the appellant (landlord) dismissed.

2. The appellant sought the eviction of the respondent on four grounds but the two grounds which found favour with <ORG> and <ORG> are that the respondent had sublet the premises to his brother without the consent of the appellant and, secondly, the appellant bona fide required the leased portion of the house for use and occupation of the members of his family. These concurrent findings, though pertaining to facts have been interfered with and reversed by <ORG> and, if we may say so even at the outset by a process of reasoning which is at once in-apposite and unconvincing.

3. Now for some of the facts. The appellant is the owner of the. premises No. 30, Sambhu Nath Pandit Street, Calcutta. It is common ground that the appellant is living in the said house with his wife, his four sons, one of them being married and the other three unmarried though aged 34, 29 and 27 years respectively and a daughter. The appellant had leased out a portion of the premises to the respondent and subsequently gave him on lease another room also. The appellant's case was that the respondent had unauthorisedly sublet the premises to his brother and shifted his residence to another place and he had ceased to live in the portion leased out to him. His further case was that there was only one bed-room, one store-room, one kitchen and another small room (<NAME>) in his occupation, and on account of want of adequate accommodation in the house, he is not able to get his sons married. Since the respondent contended that the house consists of more rooms and that appellant had sufficient accommodation, <ORG> appointed an Advocate-Commissioner to inspect the premises and submit a report regarding the nature and extent of accommodation available in the house. The Commissioner, after inspecting the house, submitted a report stating that the appellant was in possession of three rooms, one kitchen, two <NAME>s, one junk-room and verandahs. <ORG> accepted the Commissioner's report but held that even if three rooms were available, accommodation was not adequate for the appellant because one room was being occupied by him and his wife, another room by the married son and his wife and as such there was only one room left for all the three grown-up sons of the appellant to occupy and therefore additional accommodation was bona fide required especially if the sons were to get married. <ORG> further held that there was no reason to disbelieve the appellant's statement that for want of accommodation in the house, he was not able to arrange for the marriages of his unmarried sons. In so far as the charge of subletting is concerned, <ORG> found that on his own admission the respondent had ceased occupying the rooms given to him and he had given the rooms to his brother <NAME> and had shifted his residence elsewhere viz. first in a house at Indra Roy Road, then in a house in Chandi Ghosh Road and lastly in the house of his wife at Banerjee Para Road. <ORG> therefore found no difficulty in holding that the evidence decisively proved that the appellant had permanently surrendered possession of the leased rooms to his brother and he had no intention of re-occupying the portion leased out to him. Consequently, <ORG> sustained the appellant's case for eviction on both the grounds viz., unauthorised subletting and bona fide requirement of additional accommodation by the appellant and decreed the suit for eviction. <ORG> after independently assessing the evidence concurred with the findings of <ORG> and dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent.

4. In the Second Appeal filed by the respondent, <ORG> was fully alive to its limitations to interfere with concurrent findings of fact but nevertheless set aside the findings of the Courts below on the ground they were perverse in character. We must frankly state that the reasons given by <ORG> for allowing the appeal are of a curious nature. <ORG> has held that the appellant's requirement of additional accommodation cannot be held a bona fide requirement because the appellant had failed to disclose fully in the plaint the number of rooms that were in his occupation. The view taken by <ORG> suffers from two patent errOrs. In the first ' place, <ORG> failed to see that <ORG> had appointed a Commissioner and obtained a report and it is only after taking into consideration the full extent of accommodation available in the house, <ORG> sustained the appellant's claim for additional accommodation. It is not, therefore, as if <ORG> and <ORG> had in any way misdirected themselves in rendering their findings on the question of bona fide requirement of additional accommodation by the appellant's failure to state correctly the exact number of rooms in his occupation. Secondly, <ORG> filed to see that inspite of the house consisting of more rooms than what the appellant had set out in the plaint, the rooms were all of very small size. The size of the rooms in the occupation of the appellant have been set out by the Commissioner as under:

two bed-rooms in the first floor measuring 13 ft. inches x 12 ft. 2 inches and 13 ft. 4 inches x 9 ft. 10 inches, one room in the 2nd floor measuring 10 ft. 4 inches x 7 ft. 1 inch and a small room besides that measuring 7 ft. 4 inches x 2 ft. 4 inches and one room in the ground floor measuring 12 ft. 10 inches x 8 ft. 11 inches and a small room measuring 5 ft. 10 inches x 4 ft. 8 inches.

<ORG> has held that four rooms in the possession of the appellant can be used as bed-rooms and that the room in the second floor can be used as <NAME>. <ORG> has further held that so long as the three major sons of the appellant remain unmarried, they can all occupy one room as they have been doing hitherto. It is indeed strange that <ORG> should think that three grown-up sons aged 34, 29 and 27 years could be asked to huddle themselves in a small room and live there without reference to factors of privacy and convenience. <ORG> has also observed that the evidence on record did not show that there was any prospect of the three sons getting married in the foreseeable future. When the members of the family are not having adequate living space for themselves, it is futile for <ORG> to expect the appellant to adduce tangible evidence to show that there were imminent prospects of the celebration of the marriages of the three sons. Moreover, <ORG> has nowhere taken into consideration the case of the appellant that, besides his married son and unmarried sons, he has also a grown-up daughter living in the house. Having regard to the evidence in the case and the concurrent findings rendered by <ORG> and <ORG>, we are clearly of the opinion that <ORG> was not justified in attributing perversity to the findings of the <ORG> below and setting them aside.

5. Now coming to the question of subletting, once again we find that the <ORG> below had adequate material to conclude that the respondent had sublet the premises, albeit to his own brother and quit the place and the subletting was without the consent of the appellant. Admittedly, the respondent was living elsewhere and it is his brother <NAME> who was in occupation of the rooms taken on lease by the respondent. <ORG> has taken the view that because <NAME> is the brother of the respondent, he will only be a licencee and not a sub-tenant. There is absolutely no warrant for this reasoning. It is not as if the respondent is still occupying the rooms and he has permitted his brother also to reside with him in the rooms. On the contrary, the respondent has permanently shifted his residence to another place and left the rooms completely to his brother for his occupation without obtaining the consent of the appellant. There is therefore no question of the respondent's brother being only a licencee and not a sub-tenant. Hence it follows that <ORG> was not justified in setting aside the concurrent findings of the <ORG> below on the ground of subletting also.

6. learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant has another house situate in Ismail Madan Lane and, therefore, the appellant was not left without alternate accommodation and, as such the appellant has not satisfied the requirements of Section 13(ff) for seeking possession of the leased portion for his own occupation. The house situate in Ismail Madan Lane is said to be more than three miles away from the suit house as per statement of counsel made at the bar. Moreover, the house is not lying vacant. The appellant's witness <NAME> examined as PW 2 has deposed that he is a tenant in the house in Ismail Madan Lane and that the entire house is in the occupation of tenants and no portion is lying vacant. Apart from this, it has also to be pointed out that this is a case where the appellant's is occupying a portion of the house and wants possession of the leased portion only by way of additional accommodation. To such a case the condition imposed by Section 13 that "a landlord should not be in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation" may not be strictly attracted. Otherwise, it would lead to a landlord being asked to disrupt the family and providing accommodation for the members of his family at different places. The respondent's counsel submitted that since no issue has been raised on the question of alternative accommodation being available, the appeal may be remanded to <ORG> for evidence being taken and a finding rendered on the question whether the house in Ismail Madan Lane would meet the requirement of the appellant. We do not find any merit in this submission. Though formally no issue was framed, the parties went to trial and adduced evidence with this issue in mind and have drawn the attention of the <ORG> to the existence of another house belonging to the appellant in Ismail Madan Lane and the said house being not vacant. There is, therefore no need for the appeal being remanded for a finding on the question whether alternate suitable accommodation is available for the appellant.

7. In the result, the appeal succeeds and will stand allowed. The judgment and decree of <ORG> and <ORG> will stand restored. However, taking into consideration the time factor that will be required by the respondent to find alternate accommodation for his brother, he is given time till 30th June 1988 to vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession subject to the condition the respondent files the usual undertaking before this <ORG> on or before 31.1.1988 agreeing to pay the rent, past as well as future and to vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession within the time given and also not to induct anyone else into possession in the leased portion. There will be no order as to cost.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. These appeals are at the instance of importers of old synthetic rags. They claimed clearance without licence under Para 5.3 (a) (iv) of Hand Book of Procedure Vol. I to Exim Policy 1997-2002. The above provision permitted import of Synthetic Rags/Woollen Rags/Shoddy Wool without licence subject to the condition that the mutilation conforms to the requirements specified by the <ORG> Authorities. On examination of the goods it was found that the mutilation did not conform to the norms specified through the Public Notice No. 86/94 issued by the <ORG> House. The importers were direct to mutilate the goods further as per Public Notice 86/94. Since they refuse to do so the <ORG> Authorities proceeded to confiscate the goods under Section 111(d) of the <ORG> Act, 1962 read with Section 3 of Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act , 1992. It was also proposed to impose penalty under Section 112(a) of the <ORG> Act. Show cause notices were issued. Ultimately after protracted proceedings before <ORG> and <ORG> the adjudicating authority passed the impugned orders dated 6.8.1999 and 4.9.2000. The goods were ordered to be confiscated and the importers were granted an option to redeem the goods on payment of fine after mutilation of the goods by the importer at his own cost in terms of Public Notice No. 86/94. Penalty was also imposed under Section 112faJ of the <ORG> Act.

2. In these appeals challenging the adjudication order several contentions were taken. But, at the time of hearing <ORG> appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the appellants are restricting their contentions to those directed against the quantum of redemption fine and penalty. In view of the above submission, we are not going into the other contentions raised in these appeals. The value of the goods ordered to be confiscated, quantum of redemption fine and penalty imposed in each case are given below in the form of a chart.

S.No.

Appeal No. Value of Goods confiscated Redemption Fine Penalty C/447/99 2,29,131 6,00,000 1,15,000 C/448/99 2,52,161 7,00,000 1,25,000 C/449/99 2,73,635 7,00,000 70,000 C/450/99 2,53,290 7,00,000 1,25,000 C/451/99 5,34,576 14,00,000 1,40,000 C/452/99 2,48,289 7,00,000 1,20,000 C/453/99 3,23,700 8,00,000 1,60,000 C/454/99 3,30,895 8,50,000 90,000 C/455/99 2,27,079 6,00,000 60,000 C/456/99 2,26,402 6,00,000 1,20,000 C/13/2000 21,74,012 6,00,000 1,00,000 Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the quantum of redemption fine and penalty imposed in each case is unreasonably high. In support of the above contention he placed reliance on certain orders passed by this <ORG> as well as Commissioner of <ORG> under similar circumstances including the very same Commissioner who passed the impugned orders. In Final Order Nos. 1574-75/99-A dated 5.11.99 disposing of Appeal No. C/70 and 253/99-A (U. Prints v. <ORG>, Cochin), this <ORG> had occasion to consider similar contention. In that case, the imported goods were declared as pre-mutilated old synthetic/woollen rags. However, on examination of the consignment it was found that part of the goods were serviceable garments. Value of the total consignment covered by Appeal No. C/70/99-A was approximately Rs. 26 lakhs. Out of the above goods valued at Rs. 15 lakhs were found to be not tallying with the declaration. But the entire consignment was confiscated with a redemption line of Rs. 2.5 lakhs and penalty of Rs. 1.5 lakhs. The <ORG> reduced the redemption fine to Rs. 1.5 lakhs and penalty to Rs. 1 lakh. In Appeal No. C/253/99-A the entire consignment valued at Rs. 22 lakhs was confiscated with a redemption fine of Rs. 2.5 lakhs and a penalty of Rs. 1.5 lakhs. The offending goods was assessed at Rs. 12 lakhs. The <ORG> therefore reduced the redemption fine to Rs. 1.2 lakhs and penalty to Rs. 1 lakh. While arriving at the above decision, the <ORG> followed its own earlier order (Final Order No. 1256/99-A dated 31.8.99). The learned Counsel points out that the redemption fine upheld by this <ORG> would come to about 10% of the value of the offending goods. Reference is also made to order dated 26.10.98 passed by the very same Commissioner of <ORG> who had passed the impugned orders, In the above case, the value of the impugned goods was about Rs. 22.15 lakhs. Redemption fine imposed was only Rs. 2.5 lakhs and penalty Rs. 1.5 lakhs.

3. In another order dated 25.4.2001 passed by the Additional Commissioner of <ORG>, Cochin where the value of similar offending goods was about Rs. 6.1 lakhs the redemption fine imposed was Rs. 65,000 and penalty Rs. 13,000. The same officer had passed another order dated 25.4.2001 where value of the similar offending goods was assessed at Rs. 4.55 lakhs. Redemption fine imposed was Rs. 50.000 and penalty Rs. 10,000. In the light of the above, the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the quantum of redemption fine and penalty should be reduced in these appeals.

4. Learned DR, on the other hand, would submit that in these cases under each consignment the entire goods were offending goods. Therefore, the redemption fine and penalty are not liable to be reduced as prayed by the appellants. He also pointed out that the Commissioner has also referred in some of the orders that the importers have committed similar offence on earlier occasion also.

5. Taking into consideration the entire circumstances of the case including the earlier orders passed by this <ORG> referred above, we are of the view that the quantum of redemption fine and penalty has to be reduced even though not to the extent as pleaded by the appellant. We are therefore inclined to reduce the redemption fine at the rate of 20% and penalty to 10% of the value of the goods confiscated. We may record that the learned Counsel for the appellants did not raise objection to the above course. In the result, we modify the orders impugned in these appeals except the one in C/13/2000 by reducing redemption fine as 20% and penalty as 10% of the value of the goods confiscated. In C/13/2000 the quantum of redemption fine is reduced as 20% of the value of the goods confiscated.

The quantum of penalty is not modified as the amount imposed in the impugned order is less than 10% of the value of the goods confiscated.

6. The appeals stand partly allowed.


PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: <NAME>, <NAME> & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT19/12/1975 BENCH: SARKARIA, <NAME> BENCH: SARKARIA, <NAME> RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, <NAME>, P.N. CITATION: 1976 AIR 578 1976 SCR (3) 58 1976 SCC (1) 671 CITATOR INFO : R 1977 SC 276 (9) R 1978 SC 327 (11) F 1980 SC 517 (10,11) RF 1981 SC 116 (20) R 1982 SC 149 (15,965) R 1992 SC 443 (7) ACT: Constitution of India- Art. 226- Scope of the power of writ of "certiorari". Rule of practice-Usefulness of English decisions and when can be considered. "Aggrieved persons"-Tests for deciding. HEADNOTE: "Locus standi"-Whether a rival in trade and an owner of an existing cinema theatre is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of s. 8A of the Bombay Cinema Rules. 1954 entitling him to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction "ex- debito justitiae ' of <ORG> for quashing the order granting a "no objection certificate" under rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954. Damnum sine injuria-Principle of. Under the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954, the District Magistrate, after inviting the objections under r. 4 from the public and also the opinions of the District Superintendent of Police, Chairman <NAME> and the Executive Engineer (<ORG>), and after considering them. may grant under rule 5 a "no objection certificate'' to the appellants for the location of a cinema theatre under his jurisdiction, or in case of his not granting the certificate, he must refer under s. 6 of the Rules, the matter to <ORG> with his reasons therefor. In respect of the application of the respondents, not being satisfied of the opinions of the District Superintendent of Police, <NAME> Chairman, Executive Engineer (<ORG>) favouring the grant of certificate to the appellants herein, the District Magistrate personally visited the site and submitted a report to <ORG> to the effect that the proposed site was not fit for the location of a cinema house. On the directions of <ORG>, which did not agree with the report submitted by him, the District Magistrate granted the certificate to the respondents. The appellant being a rival in the cinema trade, though he did not prefer any objections at the time when they were called for, filed a writ petition in <ORG> alleging that (i) the impugned certificate issued by the District Magistrate was not in the exercise of his own discretion and with due regard to the principles in the Bombay Cinematographic Act, 1918 and the Rules and (ii) Since as <ORG>, the power has not be objectively exercised in a quasi judicial manner, the grant of the certificate suffered from lack of jurisdiction. <ORG>, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no right vested in the appellant, had been infringed or prejudiced or adversely affected as direct consequence of the order impugned by him, and as such, he was not an "aggrieved person" having a locus standi in the matter. On appeal by special leave to this <ORG>, the appellant contended that (i) apart from a right in common with the general public to object to the grant before the District Magistrate, the appellant being a rival in the same trade had a particular commercial interest to see that the permission was not granted to another in contravention of law to start the same business, entitling him to a writ of certiorari ex-debito justitiae; and (ii) The concept of "aggrieved person's being wide, any one who is personally interested and genuinely grieved by an act of usurpation of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction on the part of an administrative tribunal or body would fall within the category of an "aggrieved 59 person" even if such usurpation or lack of jurisdiction had not resulted in infringement of a legal right or legal interest vested in him; nor would such a person be denied "locus standi"' for me purpose of "certiorari" merely because he had not lodged any objection or joined the proceedings before the tribunal. Dismissing the appeal, the <ORG>, ^ HELD: (1) The founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched Article 226 in comprehensive Phraseology to enable <ORG> to reach injustice, wherever it is found. In a sense, the scope and nature of the power conferred by the Article is wider than that exercised by the writ courts in England. <CITATION>  3 SCR 563, referred to. (2) The adoption of the nomenclature of English writs with the prefix "nature of" superadded, indicates that the general principles grown over the years in the English courts, can shorn of unnecessary technical procedural restrictions, and adapted to the special conditions of this vast country, in so far as they do met conflict with any provision of the Constitution, or the law declared by this court be usefully considered in directing the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with well recognised rules of practice. [64 D-F] (3) According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person", and in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner shall be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course,, but if he does not fulfil that character and is a "stranger" the court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in exceptional circumstances. [64 F-G] (4) The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic and to an extent an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent` of the statute of which contravention is alleged the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression, "aggrieved person". [64 H. 65 Al (5) In order to have the 'locus standi' to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto, this rule is relaxed or modified. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no propriety or even a fiduciary interest in the subject matter. That apart in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. [10 A, C-D] (6) In the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved. (ii) stranger. (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories inasmuch as they interfere in things which do not concern them, masquerading as crusaders for justice in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect The distinction between the first and second categories though real, is not always well demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of "persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category 60 from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be "persons aggrieved". [71 A-C, D-E] (7) To distinguish such applicants from "strangers" among them, some broad tests may be deduced from case law, the efficacy of which varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: (1) Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? (2) Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest recognised by law has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority complained of ? (3) Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something ? (4) Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? (5) Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action ? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority ? (6) Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a special welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? (7) or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ? [71 E-H, 72 A] <NAME> v. Taunton St. Mary (1815) 3 M & S 465, King v: Groom & Others Ex parte  2 K.B. 157, King v. Richmond Confirming Authority Ex parte Howitt  1 K.B. 157. R. Thomas Magistrates <ORG> Ex Parte Green Baum (1957) 55 LCR. 129, 135, 135-136 in Yardley's Book of English Administrative Law 2nd Edition p. 228; <NAME> v. <ORG>  2 QBD 413. <CITATION> 's <NAME>  A.C. 617. <NAME> v. <ORG>  QB 362, 378. <NAME> v. <ORG>  (2) QB 299; <NAME> v. Paddington Valuation Officer Ex parte Peachy Property Corporation Ltd.  1 QB 860; <CITATION>  1 SCR p. 306 <NAME> v. Butt I Another Ex parte Brooke vol. xxxviii (1921-22) Times Law Reports 537; <NAME> v. Brighton Borough Justices Ex parte Jarvia (1954) 1 Weekly Law Reports 203. <NAME> & others v. Minister of Housing & Local Government  1 QBD 278. In re Side bottom (1880) 14 ChD. 458 @ 465; Ex parte Scott  1 KB 7; King v. Middllesex Justices (1832) 37 FR 594-(1832) 3 B & AD 938; R. Bradford an Avan Urban Dt. Council Ex parte Balton  2 All ER 492; <NAME> v. <ORG> (1966) WLR 899; R. v. <ORG>  2 K.B. 508; <NAME> v. Cardiff Justices Ex parte Cardiff Corporation  2 Q.B. 436; <CITATION>  SCR 28. <ORG> v. The State of West Bengal  Supp. 3 SCR l; <NAME> v. Member, <ORG>  2 SCR 172; State of Orissa v. <NAME> AIR 1972 S.C. 2114. <CITATION> .  1 SCR 615; <NAME> v. <NAME>  307 Q.B. 433. <NAME> v. <ORG> 338 U.S. 621, American Jurisprudence Vol. 2 Ld. at 575 p. 334 <ORG> v. <NAME> 341 U.S. 123; United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Asson. v. <NAME> 138 F 2nd 116: 158 ALR 849; United States v. <ORG> 351 U.S. 192 and <ORG> v. <NAME> 350 U.S. 884, considered. (8) The Bombay Cinematographic Act and the Rules are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof and hence, the expression "person aggrieved" must receive a strict construction. The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option in common with the rest of the public to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. Section 8A of the Act confers a right of appeal to <ORG>, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a licence or revoking or suspending any licence under s 8. [72B,C-E] 61 Section 8B of the Act provides that <ORG> may either of its A own motion or upon an application made by "an aggrieved person" call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act and passes such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. [72 F-G] (9) Such harm or loss in business arising out of setting up of a rival cinema house adversely affecting the monopolistic, commercial' interest of the applicant is not wrongful in the eye of law because, it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. juridically harm of this typed is called "damnum sine injuria" the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on mother without holding him accountable for it is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. [73 E-F] Salmondon jurisprudence referred to. (10) In the instant case, none of the appellant's rights orinterests recognised by the general law has been infringed as a result of the grant of 'No Objection certificate'. He has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a, legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justicable claim to hang on. Therefore, he is not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of s. 8A or 8B of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the 'No objection certificate'. [73 C, F-G] D Rice & Flour Mills case  3 S.C.R. 846 applied. (11) Assuming that the appellant is a stranger, and not a busybody, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in business which is so essential to raise commercial morality. it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town. and above all, it will seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2 which they have under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on trade or business subject to "reasonable restrictions imposed by law". [74 C-D] (12) It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in <ORG>s by the thousand many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated coupled with other well established, self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc., can go a long way to help the <ORG>s in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money. While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule, the court should not interfere at the instance of a "stranger" unless there are exceptional circumstance involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. [73H, 74 A-B] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 2035 of 1971.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 11th November, 1971 of <ORG> in S.F.A. No. 158484 of 1 970.

<NAME> and Mrs. <NAME> for the Appellant.

<NAME> and Miss <NAME> for Respondents 1-2. <NAME> and <NAME> and <NAME> for Respondent Nos. 3-4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.-Whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a 'No-objection Certificate', granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short, the Rules) by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction, is the principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave.

The circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as follows:

Respondents 1 and 2 are owners of a site, bearing Survey No. 98 in the town of Mehmadabad. They made an application under Rule 3 of the Rules to the District Magistrate, Kaira, for the grant of a Certificate that there was no objection to the location of a cinema theatre at this site. The District Magistrate then notified in the prescribed Form, the substance of the application by publication in newspapers, inviting objections to the grant of a No-objection Certificate. In response thereto, several persons lodged objections, but the appellants, who are the proprietors of a cinema house, situated on Station Road, Mehmadabad, were not among those objectors. Some of the objections were that a Muslim graveyard, a Durgah, a compost depot, a school and public latrines were situated in the vicinity of the proposed site.

The District Magistrate (Res. 3 herein) invited the opinions of the Chairman of <ORG>, Executive Engineer <ORG>, and the District Superintendent of Police. These three authorities opined that they had no objection to the grant of the Certificate applied for. The District Magistrate visited the site on 27-7-1970 Thereafter he submitted a report to <ORG> (Res. 4) 'that the proposed site was not fit for 'the location of a cinema house. He recommended that the 'No-objection Certificate' should be refused. The State Government did not agree with the recommendation of the District Magistrate and directed the latter to grant the Certificate. Accordingly, the District Magistrate granted the 'No-objection Certificate' on 27-11-1970 to Res. 1 and 2.

On 16-12-1970, the appellants filed a writ petition in <ORG> under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, mandamus, or any other appropriate writ or order directing the Respondents to treat the No-objection Certificate granted to Respondents 1 and 2 as illegal, void and ineffectual They further asked for an injunction restraining Respondents 1 and 2 from utilising the certificate for the purpose of building a cinema theatre.

The main grounds of challenge were: that the impugned Certificate had been issued by the District Magistrate, not in the exercise of his own discretion with due regard to the principles indicated in the Bombay Cinematograph Act, 1918 (for short, the Act) and the Rules, but mechanically at the dictates of the State Government; that Rules S and 6, according to an earlier judgment of <ORG> being ultra vires and void, the Government had no power to grant or refuse A the No-Objection Certificate; that such power belonged to the District Magistrate who was <ORG>, and had to be exercised by him objectively, in a quasi judicial manner in accordance with the statutory principles; since it was not so exercised, the grant of the Certificate in question suffers from lack of jurisdiction.

In the affidavit filed in reply, by the District Magistrate (on behalf of Respondents 3 and 4) a preliminary objection was taken that the appellants had no locus standi to file the writ petition because their ,. rights were not in any manner affected by the grant of the 'No-objection Certificate'. It was stated that the deponent had reported the case and submitted the records to <ORG> under Rule S, recommending that on account of the location of a graveyard, a church, a temple, a mosque and a school near the proposed site, the no-objection certificate be refused. It was admitted that on receipt of the order of <ORG> he granted the No-Objection Certificate to Respondents 1 and 2 in compliance with the Government's directive. .

<ORG>, purporting to rely on this Court's decision in <CITATION> (1) and an earlier decision of its own in <NAME> v. State of Gujarat("), held that Rule 5(2) in its entirety, and the words "the previous permission of the <ORG> obtained under Rule S" in Rule 6 being ultra vires and invalid, have to be ignored as non est, with the result that the District Magistrate had to come to his own conclusion on relevant considerations and objective norms whether a No objection Certificate should be granted or refused; that under the Act the District Magistrate and not the <ORG>-is <ORG>, and he was bound to exercise this power, which is an integral part of the process of licensing, in a quasi judicial manner, that since the District Magistrate exercised this power not on his own in accordance with objective principles, but solely at the dictates of the <ORG>, his act in granting the No- Objection Certificate suffers from a patent lack of jurisdiction.

<ORG>, however, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no right vested in the appellant had been infringed, or prejudiced or adversely affected as a direct consequence of the order impugned by him, and as such, he was not an aggrieved person' having a locus standi in the matter.

Mr. <NAME> appearing for the appellant, assails the finding of <ORG> in regard to the locus standi of the appellant to maintain the writ petition. The burden of his arguments is that apart from a right in common with the general public to object to the grant before the District Magistrate, the appellant was a rival in the same trade and, as such, had a particular interest to see that permission was not granted to another, in contravention of law, to start the same business; consequently, the illegal grant of the No-objection Certificate had prejudicially affected the commercial interest of the appellant who stood in the ll (1) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 110.

(2)Special Civil Application No. 912 of 1970, decided by Gujarat High Court on 25/27th Nov. 1 970.

category of an "aggrieved person' entitled to a writ of certiorari ex debito justitiae. It is submitted that so far as certiorari is concerned, the concept of 'aggrieved person' is very wide and is not confined to a person who is grieved by an invasion of a legal right vested in him. Anyone-says Mr. <NAME>-who is personally interested and genuinely grieved by an act of usurpation of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction on the part of an administrative tribunal or body, would fall within the category of an 'aggrieved person', even if such usurpation or lack of jurisdiction had not resulted in infringement of a illegal right or legal interest vested in him; nor would such a person be denied locus standi for the purpose of certiorari merely because he had not lodged any objection or joined the proceedings before the tribunal (District Magistrate, in the present case). In these premises, it is maintained, <ORG> was not justified in denying the remedy of certiorari to the appellant. Counsel has cited a number of decisions, mostly of <ORG>, in support of his contentions.

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers <ORG> to issue to any person or authority, including the <ORG>, within its territorial jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.

As explained by this <ORG> in <CITATION> officer, Kanpur(1) the founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched the Article in comprehensive phraseology to enable <ORG> to reach injustice wherever it is found. In a sense, the scope and nature of the power conferred by the Article is wider than that exercised by the writ courts in England. However, the adoption of the nomenclature of English writs, with the prefix "nature of" superadded, indicates that the general principles grown over the years in <ORG>, can, shorn of unnecessary technical procedural restrictions, and adapted to the special conditions of this vast country, in so far as they do not conflict with any provision of the Constitution, or the law declared by this <ORG>, be usefully considered in directing the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with well-recognised rules of practice.

According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and, in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character, and is a "stranger", the <ORG> will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances.

This takes us to the further question: Who is an "aggrieved per son" and what are the qualifications requisite for such a status ? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad, tentative manner. Its scope and meaning (1) [19965] 3 S.C.R. 536.

depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or 'standing' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. ,, We will first take up that line of cases in which an "aggrieved person" has been held to be one who has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public, in seeing that the law is properly administered. The leading case in this line in <NAME> v. Justices of Surrey(1) decided as far back as 1870. There, on the application by the highway board the Justices made certificates that certain portions of three roads were unnecessary. As a result, it was ordered that the roads should cease to be repaired by the parishes.

E, an inhabitant of one of the parishes, and living in the neighbourhood of the roads, obtained a rule for a certiorari to bring up the orders and certificates for the purpose of quashing them on the ground that they were void by reason of the notices not having been affixed at the places required by law. On the point of locus standi (following an earlier decision <NAME> v. <ORG>), the Court held that though a certiorari is not a writ of course, yet as the applicant had by reason of his local situation a peculiar grievance of his own, and was not merely applying as one of the public, he was entitled to the writ ex debito justitiae.

It is to be noted that in this case was living in the neighbourhood of the roads were to be abandoned as a result of the certificates issued by the Justices. He would have suffered special inconvenience by the abandonment. Thus had shown a particular grievance of his own beyond some inconvenience suffered by the general public. He had a right to object to the grant of the Certificate. Non-publication of the notice at all the places in accordance with law, had seriously prejudiced him in the exercise of that legal right.

The ratio of the decision in <NAME> v. Justices of Surrey (supra) was followed in King v. <NAME> and ors. Ex Parte(3). There, the parties were rivals in the liquor trade. The applicants (brewers) had persistently objected to the jurisdiction of the justices to grant the ` license to one <NAME> in a particular month. It was held that the applicants had a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

A distinguishing feature of this case was that unlike the appellants in the present case who did not, despite public notice, raise any objection before the District Magistrate to the grant of the No-objection Certificate, the brewers were persistently raising objections in proceedings before the Justices at every stage. The law gave them a right to (1) [1870] S B. 466. (2) [1815] 3 M & S 465.

(3) [1901] 2 K. B. 157.

object and to see that the licensing was done in accordance with law. They were seriously prejudiced in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of the jurisdiction on the part of the Justices.

The rule in <NAME>'s case was followed in The King v. <ORG>, Ex parte Howitt(1). There, also, the applicant for a certiorari was a rival in the liquor trade. It is significant that in coming to the conclusion that the applicant was a 'person aggrieved', Earl of Reading C.J. laid stress on the fact that he had appeared and objected before the Justices and joined issue with them, though unsuccessfully, "in the sense that they said they had jurisdiction when he said they had not".

In <NAME> Magistrate Court Ex parte <NAME>(2) there were two traders in Goulston St., Stepney. One of them was <NAME> who held a license to trade on pitch No. 4 for S days in the week an pitch No. 8 for the other two days. The other was <NAME>, who held a licence to sell on Pitch No. 8 for two days of the week, and pitch No. 10 for the other days of the week. A much better pitch, pitch No. 2, in Gulston St. became vacant. Thereupon, both <NAME> and <NAME> applied for the grant of a licence, each wanted o to give up his own existing licence and get a new licence for pitch No. 2. <ORG> considered and decided in favour of <NAME> and refused <NAME> who was left with his pitches 4 and 8.

<NAME> appealed to the magistrate. He could not appeal against the grant of a licence to <NAME>, but only against the refusal to grant a licence to himself. Before the magistrate, <ORG> opposed him. The magistrate held that the <ORG> were wrong to refuse the licence of pitch No. 2 to <NAME>. The <ORG> thereupon made out a licence for <NAME> for pitch No. 2 and wrote to <NAME> saying that his licence had been wrongly issued. <NAME> made an application for certiorari to court . The court held that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. An objection was taken that <NAME> had no locus standi. Rejecting the contention, Lord <NAME> observed:

"I should have thought that in this case <NAME> was certainly a person aggrieved, and not a stranger. He was affected by the magistrate's orders because the magistrate ordered another person to be put on his pitch. It is a proper case for the intervention of the court by means of certiorari."

It is to be noted that the <ORG> had duly allotted pitch No. 2 to <NAME> in the exercise of their administrative power. The Magistrate's order pursuant to which the <ORG> cancelled the allotment. and re-allotted that pitch to <NAME>, was without jurisdiction By this illegal cancellation and reallotment <NAME>'s interest to trade on pitch No. 2, which had been duly licensed out to him was directly and prejudically affected by the impugned action.

(1) [1921] I K.B. 248.

(2)[1957] 55 L.G.R. 129-135, 135-136 extracted in <NAME>'s book of English Administrative Law. 2nd Edn. at p. 228.

<NAME> v. <ORG>), is another case belonging to this group. <ORG> was held that the applicants therein were "persons aggrieved" because they were grieved by the failure of <ORG> to give them prior notice and hearing to which they were entitled under Regulation 15(2). Thus it could be said that they had suffered a legal wrong.

In <NAME> v. <ORG>, Ex parte <ORG>("), <ORG> in exercise of its powers under the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, limited the number of licences to be issued for hackney carriages to 300. The <ORG> gave an undertaking to the associations representing the 300 existing licence holders not to increase the number of such licence holders above 300 for a certain period. The <ORG>, disregarding this undertaking, resolved to increase the number. An <ORG> representing the existing licence-holders moved <ORG> for leave to apply for orders of Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari. The Division Bench refused. In <ORG>, allowing the <ORG>'s appeal, Lord <NAME> ar pp. 308, 309:

"The taxicab owners' association come to this Court for relief and I think we should give it to them. The writs of prohibition and certiorari lie on behalf of any person who is a "person aggrieved" and that includes any person whose interests may be pre judicially affected by what is taking place. It does not include a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but it includes any person who has a genuine grievance because something has been done or may be done which affects him: <CITATION>  A.C. 617 and Maurice v. London County Council  2 Q.B. 362,

378. The taxicab owners' association here have certainly a locus standi to apply for relief."

It may be noted that in this case, the whole question turned on the effect in law of the undertaking, and whether the applicants had been treated fairly.

Emphasising the "very special circumstances" of the case, the court read into the statute, a duty to act fairly in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Thus, a corresponding right to be treated fairly was also imported, by implication, in favour of the' applicants. Viewed from this standpoint, the applicants had an interest recognised in law, which was adversely affected by the impugned action. They had suffered a wrong as a result of the unfair treatment on the part of the corporation.

In <NAME> v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex Parte Peachy Property Corporation Ltd.,(3), ratepayers were held to have the locus standi to apply for certiorari, notwithstanding the fact that it could not be said that the actual burdens to be borne by the applicants fell more heavily on them than on other members of the local community. Hl (1) (1952) 2 W.B.D. 413. (2) [1972] 2 Q.B.299. (3)[1966]1 Q.B. 880.

<CITATION> (1), Bench of seven learned Judges of this <ORG> considered the question whether <ORG> of a State was a 'person aggrieved' to maintain an appeal under s. 38 of the Advocates' Act, 1961. Answering the question in the affirmative, this <ORG>, speaking through <NAME>, indicated how the expression "person aggrieved" is to be interpreted in the context of a statute, thus:

"The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the back ground of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of <ORG> under the Advocates' Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words "person aggrieved" in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted inter pretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests.

In <NAME> v. <NAME> and anr. Ex Parte Brooke(2), a person who was merely a resident of the town, was held entitled to apply for certiorari. Similar is the decision in <NAME> v. <ORG> Just ices Ex Parte Jarvis(3).

Typical of the cases in which a strict construction was put on the expression "person aggrieved", is <NAME> and ors. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government(4). There, an appeal by a <ORG> against the refusal of <ORG> of permission to develop land owned by the <ORG> by digging chalk, was allowed by the Minister. Owners of adjacent property applied to <ORG> under s. 31(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 to quash the decision of the Minister on the ground that the proposed operations by the company would injure their land, and that they were 'persons aggrieved' by the action of the Minister. It was held that the expression 'person aggrieved' in a statute meant a person who had suffered a legal grievance; anyone given the right under s. 37 of the Act of 1959 to have his representation considered by the Minister was a person aggrieved, thus section 31 applied, if those rights were infringed; but the applicants had no right under the statute, and (1) 1 S.C.R. 306.

(2) Vol. XXXVIII(1921-22) Times Law Reports 537. (3) (1954)1,Weekly Law Reports 203.

(4) [1961] 1 Q.B.D. 278.

no legal rights had been infringed and therefore they were not entitled to challenge the Minister's decision. <NAME> quoted with approval these observations of <NAME> in In Re Sidebothem(1).

"The words 'person aggrieved' do not really means a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance,`a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrong fully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something."

Ex Parte Stott(2), is another illustration of a person who had no legal grievance, nor had he sufficient interest in the matter. A licensing authority under the Cinematography Act, 1901, granted to a theatre proprietor a licence for the exhibition of cinematograph films at his theatre. The licence was subject to the condition that the licensee should not exhibit any film if, he had notice that the licensing authority objected to it. A firm who had acquired the sole right of 1 exhibition of a certain film in the district in which the theatre was situated entered into an agreement with the licensee for the exhibition of the film at his theatre. The licensing authority having given notice to the licensee that it objected to the exhibition of the film, the film applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up the notice to be quash ed on the ground that the condition attached to the licence was unreasonable and void, and that they were aggrieved by the notice as 'being destructive of their property. It was held that whether the condition was unreasonable or not, the applicants were not persons who were aggrieved by the notice and had no locus standi to maintain the application.

Similarly, King v. Middlesex Justices(3), it was held that the words "person who shall think himself aggrieved" appearing in the statute governing the grant of licences to innkeepers mean a person immediately aggrieved as by refusal of a licence to himself, and not one who is consequently aggrieved, and that though the Justices had granted a licence to a party to open a public house, not before licensed, within a very short distance of a licensed public house, the occupier of the latter house could not appeal against such grant.

Other instances of a restricted interpretation of the expression "person aggrieved" are furnished by R. v. Bradford on-Avon Urban District Council Ex Parte Boulton(4); <NAME> v. Camden London (1) [1880] 14Ch.D.458,at p.465. (2) [1916] 1K B.7 (3) (1832) 37 R. R. 594-(1832) 3 & Ad. 938.

(4) (1964) 2 All. E. R. 492.

<ORG>); <NAME> v. <ORG>); <NAME> v. <ORG>).

This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 , an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though (1) the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, in fringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter see The State of orissa v. <NAME>); Calcutta . <CITATION> (5); <NAME> v. Member, <ORG>, orissa(6); <CITATION> (7); State of orissa v. <NAME>); <CITATION> .(9)].

The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, r even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject- matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.

In the United States of America, also, the law on the point is substantially the same. "No matter how seriously infringement of the Constitution may be called into question, "said Justice <NAME> in <NAME> v. Miller(10) "this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate apart from a political concern which belongs to all". To have a "standing to sue", which means locus standi to ask for relief in a court independently of a statutory remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is, subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded(11). "Legal wrong" requires a judicially enforceable right and the touch stone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse affect(12) on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the "standing to sue" for judicial review of administrative action(18). Again the (1) (1966) 1 W. L. R.899 (2) [1951] 2K.B. 508. (3) [1962] 2 QB 436.

(4) [1952] S.C.R.28.

(5) [1962] Supp.3 S.C.R. 1.

(6) [1967] 1, S.C. Appeals 413.

(7) A.I.R. 1966 S.C.828-[1966] 2 S.C.R.172. (8) A.T.R.1972 S.C.2112.

(9) A.I.R.1973 S.C.2720-(1974) I S.C.R 615. (10)(1939) 307 U.S. 433.

(11)Chapman v. <ORG> 338 U. S.621. (12)American Jurisprudence Vol. 2 d ss. 575 . p. 334 <ORG> v. <NAME> 341 U.S.123.

(13)United States Cane Sugar Refiners. Assoen. v. <NAME> 138 2nd 116: 1518 A.L.R.849.

"adverse affect" requisite for "standing to sue" must be an "illegal effect''(l). Thus, in the undermentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition, not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a "standing to sue" for judicial relief(2).

It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved';

(ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of <NAME>, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. <ORG> should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.

The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the. bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be "persons aggrieved.

To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law. has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something" ? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on (1) United States v.<ORG> U.S.192. (2) <ORG> v. <NAME> 350 U. S.

884. 6-390SCr/76 the part of the authority ? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of-the words "person aggrieved" is being considered. a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community ? or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ?

Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular busness on his property. In this context, the expression "person aggrieved" must receive a strict construction.

Did the appellant have a Legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law, which has been subjected to or threatened with injury. ? The answer in the circumstances of the case must necessarily be in the negative.

The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellant did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publication of which was not denied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the Objection Certificate before the District Magistrate or the <ORG>. Even if he had objected before the District Magistrate and failed, the Act would not give him a right of appeal. Section 8A of the Act confers a right of appeal to the State <ORG>, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license, or revoking or suspending any licence under section 8 . Obviously, the appellant was not a "person aggrieved" within the contemplation of Section 8A Section 8B of the Act provides that the State <ORG> may either of its own motion, or upon an application made by "an aggrieved person", call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act, and pass such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. Assuming that the scope of the words "aggrieved person" in Section 8B is wider than the ambit of the same words as used in Sec. 8A, then also, the appellant cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as a "person aggrieved' having. the requisite legal capacity to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

The Act and the Rules recognise a special interest of persons residing, or concerned with any institution such as a school, temple, mosque etc. located within a distance of 200 yards of the site on which a cinema house is proposed to be constructed. The appellant does not fall within the category of such persons having a special interest in the locality. It is not his case that his cinema house is situated anywhere near the site in question, or that he has any peculiar interest in his personal, fiduciary or representative capacity in any school, temple etc. situated in the vicinity of the said site. It cannot therefore be said that the appellant is "a person aggrieved" on account of his having a particular and substantial interest of his own in the subject matter of the litigation, beyond the general interest of the public. Moreover the appellant could not be said to have been, in fact, aggrieved. As already noticed, he, despite adequate opportunity, never lodged any objection with the District Magistrate, nor went in revision before <ORG>. Thus the present case is not in line with the decisions which are within the ratio of Queen v, Justices of Surrey (supra).

Having seen that the appellant has no standing to complain of injury, actual or potential, to any statutory right or interest, we pass on to consider whether any of his rights or interests, recognised by the general law, has been infringed as a result of the grant of No-objection Certificate to the respondents ? Here, again, the answer must be in the negative.

In Paragraph 7 of the writ petition, he has stated his cause of action, thus:

"The petitioner submits that .. he owns a cinema theatre in Mehmadabad which has about a small population of 15000 persons as stated above and there is no scope for more than one cinema theatre in the town. He has, there fore, a commercial interest in seeing to it that other persons are not granted a no- objection certificate in violation of law."

Thus, in substance, the appellant's stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or Loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called demnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law(1). The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large.

In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He 'has no legal peg for' a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No-objection Certificate.

lt is true that, in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular, is discretionary. But (1) Salmond on Jurisprudence by Fitz-Gerald. p. 357 para 85.

in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in <ORG> by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guide lines indicated by us, coupled with other well established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc., can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money.

While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the <ORG> should not interfere at the instance of a 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger', and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions' imposed by law.

The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this <ORG>'s decision in <CITATION> (1), wherein it was held that a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226 , the setting up of a new rice-mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of s. 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed.

For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment, in the negative, and on that ground, without entering upon the merits of the case, dismiss this appeal with costs.

S.R. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1970] S.C.R. 846.


PETITIONER: <NAME> AND <NAME>. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/02/1966 BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: <CITATION> : 1966 AIR 1775 1966 SCR (3) 636 ACT: Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195-Facts disclosing offences under ss. 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code --Prosecution for offence under s. 353 without written complaint of public servant Maintainability. HEADNOTE: The appellants were charged with offences under s. 143 / 402 , 186 and 353 ,-Indian Penal Code for having obstructed and assaulted two public servant in the discharge of their public duty of executing the decree of <ORG>. They were acquitted by the trial Court, but on appeal, <ORG> convicted them under s. 353 , acquitted them under ss. 143 / 402 and held that the prosecution under s. 186-was barred by a. 195, Criminal Procedure Code , which requires a complaint in writing by the public servant before a court could take cognizance of the offence. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that the prosecution under s. 353, Indian Penal Code , was also barred by s. 195 Criminal Procedure Code. HELD : Sections 186 and 353 , Indian Penal Code , relate to two distinct offences and s. 353 is not referred to in s. 195 . Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code , does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts, but which is not within the ambit of that section, when there is no camouflage or evasion to circumvent the Section. Therefore the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under s. 353 was not barred though it was based practically on the same facts as for the prosecution under s. 186 , and <ORG> was justified, on the evidence, in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court in regard to that charge. [640 E, G; 641 <CITATION>  3. S.C.R. 120 and <NAME> and Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 200, followed. <NAME> V. State of West Bengal , S.C.R. 836 and <NAME> v. The Crown,  F.C.R. 159, referred to. JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 2, 1964 of <ORG> in Government Appeal No. 49 of 1963.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellants.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent., The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of <ORG> dated March 2, 1964 in Government Appeal No. 49 of 1963 by which <ORG> set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge of Puri and convicted the appellants under s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to 4 months' rigorous imprisonment.

The decree-holders <NAME> and <NAME> levied execution of the decree (Ex. Case No. 125/62) in <ORG>, Puri against the appellants and a writ of attachment of the moveables of the judgment-debtor was issued for execution through P.W. 2, <NAME>, a peon of <ORG>, Puri, returnable by August 10, 1962. P.W. 2 reached the village of the judgment-debtors on August 10, 1962 at 10 a.m. with the warrant of attachment and asked the judgment-debtors to pay the decretal dues of Rs. 952 - 10 nP, and when he was going to seize some of the moveables, the appellants came there with lathis and resisted him. P.W. 2 sent a report-Ex. 4-to the <ORG> through <NAME> requesting the <ORG> to give necessary police help. Accor- dingly on the same day the <NAME> wrote a letter, Ex. 2, requesting <NAME>, Puri to direct the Officer-in-charge, <ORG>, to give immediate police help to the process server. In pursuance of this letter, P.W. 1, the Assistant Sub.Inspector, <ORG>, Puri was deputed along with two constables including P.W. 3, Constable no. 613. They went to the village Sanua where the writ of attachment was to be executed ' P.W. 6 the Naib Sarpanch and P.W. 8 the Chowkidar of the village Chhaitna also accompanied them. On reaching the spot, they found P.W. 2 sitting in front of the house of <NAME>-One of the judgment-debtors. The <ORG> then called out <NAME>, father of <NAME> one of the judgment-debtors, who opened the door and paid Rs. 952 - 10 nP to the process server, <NAME> and obtained a receipt from him. After the money was paid, all of them left the village and at about 7 p.m. while they were crossing a river nearby in a boat, <NAME> saw the appellant <NAME> with 10 or 12 persons coming from the opposite direction. On seeing them, <NAME> apprehended some trouble and directed P.W. 2 to hand over the money to the chowkidar, P.W. 8. When all of them got down from the boat, appellant <NAME> forcibly dragged the <ORG> A number of other persons including the other appellants assembled at the spot. <NAME> threatened to assault the <ORG> if he did not return the money. <NAME> also searched hi pockets and <NAME> threatened the <ORG> by saying that he would not leave the place until the money was returned. When <NAME> wanted to write a report to his police station, <NAME> MllSup.Cl/66-9 obstructed him by holding his right hand. <NAME> and <NAME> caught hold of the hands of P.W. 2 and took him to the river bank and demanded return of the money. Then at the intervention of some outsiders the appellants left the spot. <NAME> lodged the first information report at the police station next morning and after investigation the appellants were charge sheeted and committed to the court of Sessions. The appellants were charged under ss. 143 / 402 , Indian Penal Code on the allegation that they formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing dacoity. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> along with three others were further charged under s. 186 , Indian Penal Code for having voluntarily obstructed P.Ws I and 2 in the discharge of their public duty. <NAME> and <NAME> were also charged under s. 353, Indian Penal Code for having used criminal force against <NAME> and <NAME> Charan and <NAME> were similarly charged under s. 353, Indian Penal Code for having used criminal force against P.W. 2 while both of them were dis- charging their duty as public servants. The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants of all the charges. The State Government took the matter in appeal to <ORG> High <ORG> which set aside the order of acquittal with regard to the 4 appellants and convicted them under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code . The High <ORG>, however, held that there was no satisfactory evidence to convict the appellants under ss. 143/402, Indian Penal Code . As regards the charge under s. 186, Indian Penal Code , the High <ORG> expressed the view that the prosecution was barred under the provisions of s. 195 , Criminal Procedure Code .

In support of this appeal Mr. <NAME> submitted, in the first place, that <ORG> had no justification for interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and that 'it has not applied the correct principle in a matter of this description. Learned Counsel took us through the judgments of <ORG> and of the trial court and stressed the argument that there was no evidence upon which <ORG> reached the finding that the appellants used criminal force against P.Ws I and

2. We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. <NAME> as correct. <ORG> has mainly relied upon the evidence of P.Ws 1, 2 and 3 and P.Ws 9 to 13 for holding that the appellants used criminal force against P.Ws I and 2. <ORG> has also observed that P.W. 2 was entrusted with the execution of the writ of attachment. He was also entrusted with the official cheque book (Ex. 5) to give the receipt in token of payment of the decretal dues. In the course of his official business P.W. 2 was carrying the money realised from the judgment-debtors for necessary deposit in <ORG>. So far as P.W. I was concerned, he was deputed to render assistance to P.W. 2 in executing the writ of attachment. It is manifest that both P.Ws. I and 2 were assaulted by the appellants when they were discharging their duties as public servants. <ORG> has also accepted the evidence of P.W. I that <NAME> caught hold of his hands and demanded money on the threat of assault. P.W. 2, the process server stated that <NAME> and <NAME> caught hold of his hands and <NAME> told him that he would not let anybody go unless the money was returned. P.W. 2 added that <NAME> and <NAME> also snatched away his bag. <ORG> analysed the evidence of P.Ws 9 to 13 and reached the conclusion that the appellants used criminal force against P.Ws I and 2 in the course of the performance of their duties. <ORG> has also dealt with the reasoning of the trial court and has pointed out that the order of acquittal of the appellants with regard to s. 353 , Indian Penal Code was not justified. <CITATION> (1) it was pointed out by this <ORG> that an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and that the principles laid down by <ORG> in <NAME> case (2) afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case disposing of such an appeal. It was further observed that different phraseology used in the judgments of this <ORG>, such as "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficiently cogent reasons" and "strong reasons" are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate <ORG> in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, but in doing so should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the <ORG> below in support of its order of acquittal in arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should express the reasons in its judgment, which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. The same opinion has been expressed by this <ORG> in a later decision in <CITATION> (3). It was pointed out in that case that there is no doubt that the power conferred by cl. (a) of s. 423(1) which deals with an appeal against an order of acquittal is as wide as the power conferred by el. (b) which deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, and so, it is obvious that the High <ORG>'s powers in dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the appeal in question is one against acquittal or against conviction. It was observed that the test suggested by the expression "substantial and compelling reasons" for reversing a judgment of acquittal, should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case, and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High <ORG> must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse. Tested in the light of these principles laid down by those authorities, we are satisfied that the High <ORG> was justified, in the present case, in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by (1)  3 S.C.R. 120. (2) 61 I.A. 398.

(3) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 200.

the Additional Sessions Judge with regard to the charge under S. 353 , Indian Penal Code and the judgment of <ORG> is not vitiated by any error of law. We accordingly hold that Mr. <NAME> is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.

We pass on to consider the next contention of the appellants that the conviction of the appellants under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code is illegal because there is a contravention of s.195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which requires a complaint in writing by the process server or the A.S.I. It was submitted that the charge under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code is based upon the same facts as the charge under s. 186 , Indian Penal Code and no cognizance could be taken of the offence under S. 186 , Indian Penal Code unless there was a complaint in writing as required by s. 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was argued that the conviction under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code is tantamount, in the circumstances of this case, to a circumvention of the requirement of s. 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the conviction of the appellants under S. 353 , Indian Penal Code by <ORG> was, therefore, vitiated in law. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those constituting the charge under s. 186 , Indian Penal Code but it cannot be ignored that ss. 186 and 353 , Indian Penal Code relate to two distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186 , Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while s. 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well-established that s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section. <CITATION> (1) it was held by <ORG> of the Calcutta High Court that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under s. 21  1 , Indian Penal Code , which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under S. 499 , wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court (1) 24 C.W.N. 982.

for taking cognizance of that offence. It was said that the two offences being fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of. That they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that the former is made non-compoundable, while the latter remains compoundable; in one for the initiation of the proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the court under S. 195 , Criminal Procedure Code , while in the other, cognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the person defamed. It is pointed out in the <ORG> case that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complainant to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision of the Calcutta case has been quoted with approval by this Court in <CITATION> (1) in which it was held that if the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code , from seeking redress for the offence committed against him.

In the present case, therefore, we are of the opinion that S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code, though it is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution under s. 186 , Indian Penal Code .

Reference may be made, in this connection, to the decision of <ORG> in <NAME> v. The Crown (2). The appellant in that case was charged with offences under ss. 409 and 477-A, <ORG> . The offence under s. 477-A could not be taken cognizance of without the previous consent of the Governor under s. 270(1) of the Constitution Act, while the consent of the Governor was not required for the institution of the proceedings under s. 409 , <ORG> . The charge was that the accused dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use certain medicines entrusted to him in his official capacity as a sub-assistant surgeon in <ORG>. He was further charged that being a public servant, he wilfully and with intent to defraud omitted to record certain entries in a stock book of medicines belonging to the hospital where he was employed and in his possession. The proceedings under s. 477-A were quashed by <ORG> for want of jurisdiction, the consent of the Governor not having been obtained, but the case was sent back to the sessions judge for hearing on the merits as regards the charge under s. 409 , Indian Penal (1)  F.C.R. 159.

(2) [1939] F.C.R. 159.

Code, and the order of acquittal passed by the sessions judge under that charge was set aside. Two distinct offences having been committed in the same transaction, one an offence of misappropriation under s. 409 and the other an offence under s. 477-A which required the sanction of the Governor, the circumstance that cognizance could not be taken of the latter offence without such consent was not considered by <ORG> as a bar to the trial of the appellant with respect to the offence under s. 409 . We have expressed the view that s. 195 , Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same or slightly different set of facts and which is not included within the ambit of the section, but we must point out that the provisions of S. 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflage. For instance, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor one of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code , though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in s. 195 , Criminal Procedure Code . Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of s. 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it. On behalf of the appellants Mr. <NAME> suggested that the prosecution of the appellants under s. 353 , Indian Penal Code was by way of evasion of the requirements of s. 195 , Criminal Procedure Code . But we are satisfied that there is no substance in this argument and there is no camouflage or evasion in the present case.

For these reasons we hold that the judgment of <ORG> dated March 2, 1964 must be affirmed and this appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.