PETITIONER: <NAME> AND ANOTHER Vs. RESPONDENT: AMARNATH AND ANOTHER. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/01/1954 BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) MUKHERJEA, <NAME>, VIVIAN HASAN, <NAME> CITATION: 1954 AIR 215 1954 SCR 565 CITATOR INFO : R 1955 SC 233 (20) R 1958 SC 321 (6) R 1958 SC 398 (30) F 1965 SC1994 (18) F 1972 SC1598 (12) R 1975 SC1297 (7) R 1978 SC 45 (5) RF 1979 SC 1 (11) RF 1986 SC1272 (102) F 1987 SC 117 (17) ACT: Constitution of India, arts. 227 and 241-<ORG>-Whether conferred power of judicial superintendence-Rent Controllerand District Judge-Whether Tribunals within the meaning of art. 227- East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949 as extended to Himachal Pradesh, s. 13(2)(i), Proviso Non-payment of arrears of rent on first hearing of application for ejectment-Legal effect thereof. HEADNOTE: <ORG> of Himachal Pradesh exercises jurisdiction in relation to the whole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising juris. diction under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act,,1949, are certainly tribunals it not courts within the meaning of art. 227 of the Constitution and they function within the territories of 566 Himachal Pradesh. Therefore art. 227(1) read with art. 241 confers on <ORG> power of superintendence over such tribunals. The words "in relation to which" in art. 227(1) qualify the word "territories" and not the words "courts and tribunals". There is no force in the contention that cl. (2) of art. 227 only confers on the <ORG> administrative superintendence over the subordinate courts and tribunals because cl. (2) of the article is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in cl. (1). The power of superintendence conferred by art. 227 should be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. In view of the admitted failure by the tenants to pay the rent as provided by the rent deed or at the first hearing of the court under the proviso to s. 13(2)(1) the lower courts had acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for ejectment against the tenants who had not done what was incumbent on them to do under the law and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law and it was a case which called for interference by <ORG> and it acted quite properly in doing so. <CITATION> through <NAME> (I.L.R.  1 All. 558 at p. 567) and <CITATION> (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193) referred to. JUDGMENT:

CiviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1953. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Decree, dated the 29th November, 1951, of <ORG> for Himachal Pradesh at Simla in Civil Revision No. 52 of 1951.

<NAME> for the appellants.

<NAME> (<NAME>, with him) for the respondents.

1954. January 19. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME> is an appeal by special leave against the order made on the 20th November, 1951, by the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh in proceedings instituted by the respondents under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

There is no substantial dispute as to the facts leading up to the present appeal. The 'appellants were tenants of a certain shop premises situate in Solan Bazar in the district of Mahasu in Himachal Pradesh. On the llth October, 1947, they had executed a rent deed by which they agreed to pay an annual rent of Rs. 175 payable as to Rs. 50 on the last of Baisakh and as to the balance of Rs. 125 in the month of October, in default of which payment,% the respondents, as landlords, would be entitled to recover the whole of the said rent in one lump sum. The tenancy created by the rent deed was only for one year in the first instance but it provided that if the tenants desired to continue in occupation they must execute a further rent deed before the expiration of the said term. The appellants never executed any further rent deed but held over and continued in occupation of the demised premises. The appellants fell into arrears with the payments of rents due for the years 1948 and 1949 and the respondents made applications to the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellants under section 13 (2) (i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as extended to Himachal Pradesh. The appellants, however, paid up the arrears of rent into court and claimed the benefit of the proviso to section 13 (2) (i). The claim was allowed and the said applications were dismissed accordingly on the 18th December, 1950.

The appellants again fell into arrears with the pay- ment of rent due for the year 1950. On the 26th December, 1950, the respondents served on the appellants a notice c alling upon the latter to pay whole of the said rent forthwith but the appellants failed to do so. The respondents thereupon, on the 2nd January, 1951, filed an application under section 13 (2) (i) for the eviction of the appellants on the ground of nonpayment of rent. Thereafter, on the 10th January, 1951, the appellants made an application to the Rent Controller for the fixation of a fair rent under section 4 of the said Act. On the 25th January, 1951, the appellants filed their written statements in the proceedings under section 13 (2) (i) admitting the nonpayment of rent and the receipt of the notice but pleaded (i) that the respondents' application was barred by reason of the rejection of the previous applications for eviction made by the respondents and (ii) that the present application could not be entertained in view of the pendency of their application for fixation of a fair rent under section 4 of the said Act.

On the 20th February, 1951, the Rent Controller framed the following issues:-

(1) Whether the application in question was not entertainable in view of the judgment of the District Judge, dated the 18th December, 1950 Onus on defendants. (2) If issue No. I is not proved, had the opposite party (tenants) not paid the rent and as such were they liable to be ejected? Onus on plaintiffs.

(3) Have the opposite party already filed an application in the said court for the fixation of rent and are they, therefore, not liable for ejectment pending the decision on the application and what is its effect on the said application? Onus on defendants.

By his judgment, dated the 29th May, 1951, the Rent Controller held that as the previous applications related to non-payment of rents for the years 1948 and 1949 the present application which was founded on non-payment of rent for 1950 was not barred under section 14 of the said Act but, although the fact of rent being in arrears was admitted, the Rent Controller did not think fit to make an order directing the appellants to put the respondents in possession of the demised premises. The reasons given by him were as follows:-

" Regarding the non-payment of the rent when the plea of the tenant is only that he is waiting for the fixation of fair rent by the Rent Controller there is not enough ground for ejectment. A civil suit for the recovery of the rent would have been a more appropriate method of obtaining that rent. I therefore dismiss the suit.' The parties should bear their own The respondents preferred an appeal to the District Judge of Mahasu under section 15 of the said Act. The learned District Judge dismissed the appeal observing- "On behalf of the landlord it was urged that under section 13 (2) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himachal Pradesh, the Controller, if it came to the finding that rent had not been paid, had no option but to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession. Undoubtedly, that is the correct legal position, but in the present case the non-payment of rent was due to a misapprehension of the legal position created by the tenant filing an application for fixing fair rent. 1, therefore, think that this case can be distinguished and does not fall within section 13 (2), Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act." The respondents moved the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the order of the District Judge. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that in view of the admitted failure to pay the rent as provided by the rent deed or at the first hearing of the court under the proviso to section 13 (2) (i) the courts below had acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for ejectment against the tenants who had not done what was incumbent on them to do under the law and that such a situation called for inter- ference by the court of the Judicial Commissioner in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. He accordingly set aside the orders of the courts below and allowed the application for ejectment but gave the appelants three months' time for vacating the premises. The appellants have now come up before this court on appeal by special leave obtained from this court. Learned advocate appearing in support of this appeal urges that the learned Judicial Commissioner acted wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as (1) the Rent Controller or the District Judge exercising powers under the Act was not amenable to the jurisdiction of <ORG> and, therefore, article 227 confers no power on the court of the Judicial Commissioner over the Rent Controller or the District Judge, and (2) that article 227 read with article 241 confers no power of judicial superintendence on the court of the Judicial Commissioner. Re. l.-The court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercises jurisdiction in relation to the whole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are certainly tribunals, if not courts, and they function within the territories of Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, article 297 (1) read with article 241 confers on the court of the Judicial Commissioner power of superintendence over such tribunals. The words " in relation to which " obviously qualify the word " territories " and not the words "courts and tribunals".

Re. 2.The material part of article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the article also to tribunals. That the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are tribunals cannot and has not been controverted. The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the article. Reference is made to clause (2) of the article in support of the contention that this article only confers on the <ORG> administrative superintendence over the subordinate courts and tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because clause ( 2) is, expressed to be without prejudice to the.generality of the provisions in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that section 107 which was similar in terms to section 15 of the <ORG>s Act, 1861, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the <ORG> apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the <ORG>. In this connection it has to be remembered that section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, was reproduced in the Government of India Act, 1935, as section 224 . Section 224 of the 1935 Act, however, introduced sub-section (2), which was new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the <ORG> any jurisdiction to,question any judgment of any inferior court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. The idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the decisions of the different <ORG>s referred to above. Section 224 of the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certain modifications in article 227 of the Constitution. It is significant to note that sub-section (2) to section 224 , of the 1935 Act has been omitted from article 227. This significant omission has been regarded by all <ORG>s in India before whom this question has arisen As having restored to the <ORG> the power of judicial superintendence it had under section 15 of the <ORG>s Act, 186 1, and section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. See the cases referred to in - <CITATION> through <NAME>). Our attention has not been drawn to any case which has taken a different view and, as at present advised, we see no reason to take a different view.

This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by <NAME>, in <CITATION> (2), to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep <ORG> within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us the lower courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by section 13 (2) (i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It. was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted (1) I.L.R.  1 All. 558 at p. 567, (2) A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193.

quite properly in doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on which in an appeal by special leave under article 136 we should interfere. The appeal, therefore, must stand dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Agent for the appellants: <NAME>. Agent for the respondent: <NAME>.


JUDGMENT

1. This is a Rule calling upon the District Magistrate of Mymensingh to show cause why the orders of the District Judge of Mymensingh, dated the 28th October 1925, and 11th November 1925, should not be set aside or such other or farther order made as to this Court may seam fit and proper on the ground that the District Judge had no, jurisdiction whatever to dismiss the appeal of the petitioners, under Section 123 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, without looking into the record and considering the same. In order to understand the precise significance of the ground taken in this Rule, it will be necessary to set out briefly the facts giving rise to the appeal, the dismissal of which has led to the present application being made to us. The facts are as follows:

It appears that the Additional Munsif, Sadar, in the district of Mymensingh, decreed a suit in, ejectment brought by <NAME> against the petitioner. Thereafter, the learned Munsif, at the instance of the plaintiff, filed a complaint b if ore the Magistrate against the said petitioners - <NAME> and <NAME> - or having committed certain offences punishable under Sections 193 , 465 , 467 and 471 of the I.P.C. This complaint was one which was marla under Section 476 of the Criminal P.C. Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the District Judge against the order of the Munsif making or filing the said complaint. It was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal 280 of 1924. The appeal was admitted by the District Judge on the 24th September 1924, and it cams on for hearing, after service of notice on the respondents, and after the record had been called for, before the District Judge on the 5th December 1924, when, it appears, the pleader for the appellants, after arguing the appeal for some time, stated that he could not proceed further with the appeal on that date as he was engaged otherwise and as the arguments would take some time.

2. The hearing of the appeal was adjourned, and it appears that the matter did not come on again before the District Judge till the 22nd December 1924, when it was thought desirable that the appeal, which the appellants, that is, <NAME> and <NAME>, had filed against the decree of the <NAME> in tli8 said suit, should be heard along with the appeal against the order of the <NAME> filing or making the complaint under the provisions of Section 476 of the Criminal P.C. The hearing of this appeal, that is to say, the appeal against the order of the <NAME> filing or making the complaint, was accordingly a learned. It next came on for hearing on 28th October 1925, before the District Judge, when the pleaders for the appellants were absent and the pleader for the respondent was present. The District Judge, after looking into the record, found that the hearing by the Magistrate of the complaint made by the <NAME> had been delayed for more than a year; he came to the conclusion that no further time could be allowed, and he thereupon dismissed the appeal.

3. An application for revival of the appeal was filed, and that came on for hearing before the District Judge on 11th November 1925. The District Judge, after hearing the parties, was of opinion that <ORG> was unable to re-admit the appeal, and he, accordingly, affirmed the order w<ORG>ch had been previously made by <ORG>m and rejected the application for rivival of the appeal. Against the two last-mentioned orders the present petition was filed and the present Rule obtained.

4. Mr. <NAME>, who appears for the <ORG>, argues that by the terms of Section 476B , the appeal against the order of the Munsif filing or making the complaint under Section 476 of the Criminal P.C., lay to the <ORG> to which the <ORG> making the order or filing the complaint was subordinate within the meaning of Section 195(3) ; in other words, Mr. <NAME>'s contention is that the appeal from the order of the Munsif making or filing the complaint lay to the District Judge, and the appeal was one which was governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not by the Coda of Criminal Procedure. Mr. <NAME>, who appears in support of the Rule, argues that the appeal is one which is allowed by and under a section of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely, section 476B , and that there is nothing whatsoever in the Code of Criminal Procedure negativing the contention that the appeal is governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the second place, he argues that the Coda of Civil Procedure has no application, and that, having regard to Chapter 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must follow that the appeal is one governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, if that is so, then, under Section 423 of the Criminal P.C., the learned Judge who disposed of the appeal was in error in disposing of the same without considering the matters on the record in the appeal.

5. These being the respective contentions of the parties, it is now our duty to examine the same. No doubt the appeal in this case is one which is given by Section 476B of the Criminal P.C., but the very words used in Section 476B of the Criminal P.C. indicate with sufficient clearness that the <ORG> to which the appeal lies is one to which the <ORG> making or filing the complaint is subordinate; in other words, if it is <ORG> which has made an order under Section 476 of the Criminal P.C., the appeal against such an order must lie to and be heard by the authority or tribunal to which such civil <ORG> is subordinate. It follows, therefore, that the original order, having been made by a <ORG> in a civil suit, the appeal against an order by the <ORG> under Section 476 of the Criminal P.C. lay to the District Judge to whom the <ORG> was subordinate. Therefore, it would follow that, although the appeal itself is one which is allowed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appeal must be heard by the District Judge to whom the <ORG> is subordinate, i.e., by an appellate <ORG> exercising civil appellate jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that the procedure governing an appeal of this description is one which is to be sought for within the four corners of the Code of Civil Procedure. It follows also that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure being applicable to an appeal of this nature, the District Judge was in out opinion fully competent in making the orders which he did on the two date referred to above.

6. The relative provisions governing appeals in matters of this description are to be found in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was a part-hoard appeal. The appeal was admitted in September 1924. It came on for hearing for the first time in December 1924. It stood over from time to time till it was reached on the 22nd June 1925. It stood over for a further period, and was not reached till the 28th December 1925, when as stated above, the learned pleaders who had bean engaged to appear in support of the appeal were found to be absent. Under these circumstances, the District Judge was in our opinion fully entitled to consider that the appeal had been abandoned by and on behalf of the appellants. Under these circumstances, we do not see that the District Judge has been guilty of any illegality or of any material irregularity within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil P.C., nor doss it seem to us that there has been anything done by the District Judge to which exception can be taken, and in respect of which our powers of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act can be invoked.

7. The result, therefore, is that there is absolutely no substance in the present Rule, and it must be discharged.


CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (civil) 15178 of 1999 PETITIONER: <ORG> WORKERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: THE MANAGEMENT OF <ORG> & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/01/2002 BENCH: D.P. Mohapatra & P. Venkatarama Reddi JUDGMENT:

<NAME>, J.

Leave granted and appeal taken up for hearing.

The first appellant which seems to be a representative body of the retired workmen of <ORG> of <ORG> and the second appellant who is a member thereof, have assailed the legality of the judgment of <ORG> in C.W.J.C. No. 5693 of 1995 dated 10.11.1997. By that judgment <ORG> upheld the award passed by <ORG>, Patna, in Reference No.3/92, following the earlier decision of <ORG> reported in 1997 (1) PLJ 934, wherein the identical issues were decided against the workmen. The Writ Petition out of which the appeal arises was filed by the second appellant herein challenging the award passed by <ORG> on 13.12.1994.

The 1st appellant sought leave of this <ORG> to file the SLP as it was not a party in the Writ Petition out of which this SLP arises. Leave has been granted by us. It may also be noticed that by an order of this <ORG> dated 31.08.2001 on IA 3 of 2001 the 2nd appellant herein, who was respondent No.3 in SLP, has been transposed as petitioner in the SLP.

At the outset, it may be stated that the present SLP was filed with a delay of 460 days. The delay in filing the SLP is sought to be explained in a very casual manner, the only ground stated being "paucity of funds" which on the face of it is as vague as it could be. In the normal course, we should have dismissed the <ORG> for condonation of delay and rejected the SLP summarily. However, as arguments have been advanced at length on the merits and as the grievance of retired employees is being projected, we do not consider it appropriate to dismiss the SLP on the ground of delay. Hence, leave has been granted and appeal decided on merits.

The following dispute between <ORG> Basudevpur, Munger and their workmen represented by <ORG> which is a recognised union was referred for adjudication by <ORG>:

"Whether to enforce Platinum Jubilee Scheme Pension Plan for the workers who retired from service on or after 24.8.1986 and to enforce other pension scheme for the workers retired before the 24.8.1986 and to give two types of benefits to both types of workers by the Management of I.T.C.

Ltd., <ORG> is legal and justified? If not, whether the workers who retired before 24.8.1986 from I.T.C. Ltd. <ORG> are also entitled for the benefits under Platinum Jubilee Pension Plan?"

The learned Presiding Officer answered the reference in favour of the Management and against the Union, having held that the workmen who retired before 24.8.1986 were not entitled to the benefits under <ORG>. By that scheme, the workmen who retired on or after the date afore-mentioned were made eligible to get life pension. It was the contention of the workers'-Union before the <ORG> and it is also the contention of the appellants that the benefits should be extended to all those workmen who retired during and after 1977 when the pension scheme was first introduced in this industrial establishment.

To have a proper background of the dispute, it is necessary to refer briefly to the pension scheme prevalent prior to the introduction of <ORG>. A settlement entered into on 27.6.1977 paved the way for the introduction of pension scheme for the first time. It applied to the permanent workmen on the rolls of the company who retired on or after 1.6.1977. Under that scheme, the pension was payable for a period of 10 years. By a subsequent settlement dated 22.4.1982, though the period of drawal of pension remained the same, the formula was revised and the maximum pension payable was enhanced to Rs.225/- per month. This benefit under the settlement dated 22.4.1982 governed the workmen who were on the Company's pay roll on the date of signing of the settlement. On the eve of commemoration of platinum jubilee of <ORG>, the Management decided to introduce a scheme known as Platinum Jubilee Pension Scheme. Under this scheme, eligible workmen will get the pensionary benefits till their life time and on their demise, part of the benefits go to their nominees or legal heirs. In order to implement the pension scheme, a fund named "Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund" was created under a trust deed dated 27.5.1987. As a follow up thereto, <ORG> scheme Rules were framed in the year 1988. While so, pursuant to discussions and negotiations held in the course of conciliation proceedings, there was a settlement under Section 12(3) of Industrial Disputes Act on 10.4.1988. As it was agreed that <ORG> should be made part of the service conditions of employees, the following provisions were incorporated in the settlement dated 10.4.1988 :-

"PENSION SCHEME In supersession of clause 14 Part I read with Annexure VII of Memorandum of Settlement dated 28.4.82, the following Pension Scheme shall apply :-

(i) The company has by a Deed of Trust dated 27.5.87 setup a Trust Fund entitled <ORG> for payment of pension to its workmen. With effect from the date of signing of this Memorandum of Settlement, all workmen on the rolls of the company as at 24th August, 1986 and thereafter will be eligible to become members of the aforesaid <ORG> and will be eligible to receive benefits in accordance with the aforesaid Trust Deed and <ORG> rules. A copy of the said Trust Deed and Rules is attached herewith as Annexure XII.

(ii) With effect from 1.4.88, the ITC Workmen's Pension Fund Scheme as contained in clause 14, Part I and Annexure VII of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 28.4.82 will cease to be applicable to workmen on the rolls of the company as at 24.8.86 and thereafter. It is expressly agreed and understood that such workmen will be governed only by the ITC Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund Deed and Rules.

(iii) It is clarified that workmen who were on the rolls of the company prior to 24.8.86 and who are in receipt of pension under the <ORG> workmen's Pension Scheme as contained in clause 14, Part I and Annexure VII of the Settlement dated 28.4.82 will continue to be governed by the rules of the <ORG> Workmen's Pension Scheme. The <ORG> Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund Deed and Rules will not be applicable to them."

Under the Trust Deed dated 27.5.1987, <ORG> constituted the ITC Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund to be administered by the trustees who are required to hold the fund in trust for the benefit of the members or other persons set forth in the Rules. The Fund shall be vested in the trustees who shall have the entire control of the funds. The Deed enjoins that no money belonging to the members in the hands of the trustees shall be recovered by the <ORG> nor shall the <ORG> have any lien or charge on the same. The trustees are required to arrange for the investment of the funds and payment of pension due to the members in accordance with the Rules. Clause 6 stipulates that the funds of the Trust shall consist of accumulations from the contributions received by the trustees in accordance with the Rules, securities or other investments, interest and other accretion arising out of the funds as reduced by payments and disbursements. The Trust Deed also provides for possible contingencies.

Let us now advert to ITC Platinum Jubilee Pension Fund Rules. As already noticed, the fund shall be deemed to have come into operation on or from 24.8.1986 notwithstanding the date of the Trust Deed. Under the caption 'Membership', it is provided by Rule 8(a) that all confirmed and regular workmen of the <ORG> as defined in Rule 2(h) shall be eligible for membership of the fund. An employee who is eligible for the membership of the fund may make an application in the prescribed form and furnish the particulars of the nominees in another form to the trustees through the <ORG>. The <ORG>, on scrutiny of such application, has to forward the same to the trustees with whose approval the employee shall be admitted as a member. Under the heading 'Contribution', it is provided that the <ORG> may pay to the trustees in respect of the members an initial contribution as may be certified by the Actuary subject to Rule 88 of the Income Tax Rules. Under clause (b) of Rule 9, it is enjoined that the <ORG> shall pay to the trustee in respect of each member an ordinary annual contribution as may be certified by the Actuary subject to I.T. Rules 87 and 88. Under clause 11(b), the pension admissible as per the Rules shall be payable through out the life time of the member and shall be computed at the rate of 1/180 part of the pensionable salary for each year of pensionable service. The maximum pension payable shall be Rs.400/- per month and the minimum shall be Rs.100/- per month. Provisions for payment of pension to the widow for her life time in the event of demise of the member and for the payment of pension for a period of 10 years to his nominee if the member is unmarried or widower are also made.

Thus the salient features of <ORG> are that a separate fund is created for the purpose of payment of pension and the same is vested and controlled by the trustees; the eligible person should become member of the fund on an application submitted by him, the pension is payable during the life time of the member and in the event of demise of the member (retired workman), the pension at a stipulated rate is payable to the widow or to a beneficiary nominated by member in case of an unmarried or widower person. The ceiling limit has been raised to Rs.400/- per month. Thus, <ORG> is undoubtedly much more beneficial to the retired workmen. At this juncture, we may notice that there has been a controversy on the question whether the pension scheme introduced in 1988 is in substance a new scheme or it is a revised or liberalized scheme. But, it is unnecessary to resolve that issue.

The learned counsel for the appellants has reiterated the contentions advanced before <ORG> and <ORG> in the connected matter. While accepting that Article 14 as such has no application because <ORG> is not a 'State' or 'other <ORG>', the counsel, however, urged that on the analogy of Article 14 , the relevant clauses in the settlement are to be held to be arbitrary, unjust and irrational, that the prescription of cut-off date i.e. 24.8.1986 which has the effect of denying greater benefits under the scheme to the workmen who retired before that date is equally arbitrary, discriminatory and unjust and therefore the settlement entered into on 10.4.1988 cannot defeat the legitimate rights of the workmen who retired before 24.8.1986. It is further submitted that all the workmen drawing pension under the Company's Rules settlements belong to one class and there cannot be sub-classification amongst them by treating the workmen who retired between 24.8.1986 and 10.4.1988 as a different class. It is argued that when the benefit is given to the workmen who retired within the two dates afore-mentioned, the same benefit ought to have been extended at least to those who retired after the date of the settlement of 1982 i.e. 28.4.1982. It is then contended that the date 24.8.1986 has been fixed arbitrarily and the Management's contention that it coincided with the date of completion of 75 years of Company's existence is factually incorrect, in as much as 75 years would expire by 24.8.1985, the Company having been incorporated on 24.8.1910. It is also submitted that notwithstanding the settlement which according to the appellant's counsel is unjust and discriminatory, all the workmen retiring after 24th April, 1982, are entitled to the benefit of <ORG>.

The learned Senior counsel for the respondent-Company while drawing support from the reasoning and conclusions of <ORG> in the case reported in 1997 1 PLJR 934, has laid considerable stress on the fact that the employees of the Company existing or retired cannot invoke Article 14 and they as well as the Management and other workmen are only governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act . The settlement which was entered into under Section 12(3) as a result of conciliation proceeding was binding on all the workmen and no workman much less any individual workman or group of workmen can challenge the same, especially after the recognised <ORG> which espoused the cause of workmen and participated in the proceedings before the <ORG>, chose to accept the award. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the second petitioner is also a member of the recognised <ORG> and it is not open to him to assail the settlement or the award. He was not even the person who filed the Writ Petition in <ORG>. The present SLP filed after the delay of 460 days is liable to be dismissed in limine on the ground of unsatisfactory explanation for the delay. On the facts of the case highlighted by the <ORG>, there is no basis to hold that settlement is ex facie, unjust or arbitrary. Giving the benefit to the employees who retired about two years prior to the date of settlement does not invalidate the settlement on any ground known to law, but on the other hand, it is the concession shown by the Management on the occasion of celebrating Platinum Jubilee. It is further submitted that one clause in the settlement cannot be legitimately assailed and the settlement has to be viewed as a whole. When the settlement as a whole, has not been attacked as unfair or mala fide, it is not open to the <ORG> much less to the individual workmen who are not parties to assail one clause in the settlement dealing with the pension. It is submitted that an overall view has to be taken when the question of validity of settlement is put in issue.

Before proceeding further, we shall advert to the findings of <ORG>. At the outset, the <ORG> overruled the contention of the <ORG> that the reference was without jurisdiction for the reason that the retired employees on whose behalf the dispute was raised are not workmen. The learned Presiding Officer of the <ORG> then observed that all the issues including the one relating to life time pension with effect from the particular date were discussed threadbare by the office-bearers of the Union, <ORG>, the <ORG> representatives and the Joint Labour Commissioner and then the settlement was arrived at. The cut-off date i.e. 24.8.1986 was not picked up arbitrarily. It was the date on which the Company completed 75 years of its existence. The <ORG> after having referred to the various pronouncements of this Court then observed that the cut-off date was introduced after due deliberations and no material has been placed by the Union to show that the fixation of cut-off date was arbitrary or mala fide. Earlier the <ORG> clarified that the letter addressed by the Conciliation Officer-cum-Labour Commissioner subsequent to the settlement cannot be considered to be a binding direction but it was only an appeal to the <ORG> to take a compassionate view in the matter of extending benefits to other retired persons.

As already noticed, the learned single Judge affirmed the award of <ORG> and dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the 1st Petitioner herein following the earlier <ORG> judgment reported in <ORG> (1997 1 PLJR 934). To complete the narration, it is necessary to refer to the views expressed by the <ORG> in that case. The learned Judges concentrated on the issue whether the fixation of cut-off date was irrational and arbitrary, and answered the question in the negative. In reaching such conclusion, <ORG> inter alia took into account the fact that the scheme emanating from the settlement dated 10.4.1988 was entirely a new scheme and therefore, the ratio of the decision in Nakara's case has no application. "The present case is not one of liberalization of the existing pension scheme, but one of the introduction of a new scheme", <ORG> observed. Treating the Platinum Jubilee day as the cut-off date was held to be not an arbitrary decision.

In answering the reference the industrial adjudicator has to keep in the forefront of his mind the settlement reached under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once it is found that the terms of the settlement operate in respect of the dispute raised before it, it is not open to <ORG> to ignore the settlement or even belittle its effect by applying its mind independent of the settlement unless the settlement is found to be contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Act or unless it is found that there is non-conformance to the norms by which the settlement could be subjected to limited judicial scrutiny. This is infact the approach of the <ORG> in the instant case. <ORG> which examined the issue from a different angle as well was, in our view, justified in affirming the award of the <ORG>.

As the settlement entered into in the course of conciliation proceedings assumes crucial importance in the present case, it is necessary for us to recapitulate the fairly well settled legal position and principles concerning the binding effect of the settlement and the grounds on which the settlement is vulnerable to attack in an industrial adjudication. Analysing the relative scope of various clauses of Section 18 , this <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> . (1991 (1) SCC 4) succinctly summarized the position thus:-

"Settlements are divided into two categories, namely, (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings ( Section 18(i) and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings ( Section 18(3) ). A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement. But a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement. There is an underlying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the settlement but also on the others. That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an award made by an adjudicatory authority."

<CITATION> (AIR 1986 SC 954), E.S. Venkataramiah, J. Speaking for the Court explained the rationale behind Section 18(3) thus :-

"Even though a Conciliation Officer is not competent to adjudicate upon the disputes between the management and its workmen he is expected to assist them to arrive at a fair and just settlement. He has to play the role of an adviser and friend of both the parties and should see that neither party takes undue advantage of the situation. Any settlement arrived at should be a just and fair one. It is on account of this special feature of the settlement sub-sec. (3) of S.18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding under that Act shall be binding on (i) all parties to the industrial dispute, (ii) where a party referred to in clause (i) is an employer, his heirs, successors, or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates and (iii) where a party referred to in clause (i) is comprised of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment as the case may be to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. Law thus attaches importance and sanctity to settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding since it carries a presumption that it is just and fair and makes it binding on all the parties as well as the other workmen in the establishment or the part of it to which it relates as stated above."

Admittedly, the settlement arrived at in the instant case was in the course of conciliation proceedings and therefore it carries a presumption that it is just and fair. It becomes binding on all the parties to the dispute as well as the other workmen in the establishment to which the dispute relates and all other persons who may be subsequently employed in that establishment. An individual employee cannot seek to wriggle out of the settlement merely because it does not suit him.

The next principle to be borne in mind is that in a case where the validity of the settlement is assailed, the limited scope of enquiry would be, whether the settlement arrived at in accordance with sub-section (1) to (3) of S.12, is on the whole just and fair and reached bonafide. An unjust, unfair or malafide settlement militates against the spirit and basic postulate of the agreement reached as a result of conciliation and, therefore, such settlement will not be given effect to while deciding an industrial dispute. Of course, the issue has to be examined keeping in view the presumption that is attached to the settlement under Section 12(3) .

<CITATION> (1976 (4) SCC

736), this Court called for a finding on the point whether the settlement was fair and just and it is in the light of the findings of the <ORG> that the appeal was disposed of. <NAME>, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench made it clear that the settlement cannot be judged on the touch stone of the principles which are relevant for adjudication of an industrial dispute. It was observed that the <ORG> fell into an error in invoking the principles that should govern the adjudication of a dispute regarding dearness allowance in judging whether the settlement was just and fair. The rationale of this principle was explained thus:-

"There may be several factors that may influence parties to come to a settlement as a phased endeavour in the course of collective bargaining. Once cordiality is established between the employer and labour in arriving at a settlement which operates well for the period that is in force, there is always a likelihood of further advances in the shape of improved emoluments by voluntary settlement avoiding friction and unhealthy litigation. This is the quintessence of settlement which courts and tribunals should endeavour to encourage. It is in that spirit the settlement has to be judged and not by the yardstick adopted in scrutinizing an award in adjudication."

The line of enquiry whether settlement was unfair and unjust in <ORG> Vs. Presiding Officer and others (1996 (10) SCC 446), was adopted by a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through <NAME>, J. It was observed at paragraph 21 that "under these circumstances, respondents 3 to 14 also would be ordinarily bound by this settlement entered into by their representative <ORG> unless it is shown that the said settlement was ex facie, unfair, unjust or mala fide". The Court came to the conclusion that the settlement cannot be characterised to be unfair or unjust. It was further observed that "once this conclusion is reached it is obvious that another industrial dispute should have been disposed of in the light of this settlement". It was reiterated in the case of <ORG> Vs. Their Workmen (AIR 1981 SC 2163), that "a settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication". Earlier, it was observed :-

"If the settlement had been arrived at by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored while deciding the reference merely because a small number of workers (in this case 71, i.e., 11.18 per cent) were not parties to it or refused to accept it, or because the <ORG> was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emoluments than they themselves thought they did."

Another principle which deserves notice is the one firmly laid down in <NAME> case (supra). It was emphasised that the settlement has to be taken as a package deal and it should not be scanned 'in bits and pieces' to hold some parts good and acceptable and others bad. Then, it was observed "unless it can be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that it completely outweighs all the other advantages gained, the Court will be slow to hold a settlement as unfair and unjust. The settlement has to be accepted or rejected as a whole and we are unable to reject it as a whole as unfair or unjust."

Having noted that the only objectionable feature of the settlement as found by the <ORG> was reduction of dearness allowance from cent per cent to 85 per cent, it was held that, that part of the settlement cannot be held to be invalid or inoperative. This proposition laid down in <NAME> case was reiterated in <ORG> case (supra), approvingly citing the said decision. The passages in <NAME> case were quoted in extenso and approved by the three-Judge Bench in <ORG> case (supra) as well.

What follows from a conspectus of these decisions is that a settlement which is a product of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration, more so when a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding. The settlement can only be ignored in exceptional circumstances viz. if it is demonstrably unjust, unfair or the result of mala fides such as corrupt motives on the part of those who were instrumental in effecting the settlement. That apart, the settlement has to be judged as a whole, taking an overall view. The various terms and clauses of settlement cannot be examined in piecemeal and in vacuum.

Viewed in the light of these principles, it cannot be said that the settlement in the present case which is otherwise valid and just suffers from any legal infirmity merely for the reason that one of the clauses in the settlement extends the benefits of life pension scheme only to the employees retiring after a particular date i.e. 24.8.1986. Exclusion of workmen retiring before that date is no ground to characterise the settlement as unjust or unfair. Of course, the allegations of mala fides such as corrupt motives have not been levelled against anyone and that aspect becomes irrelevant here.

<ORG> proceeded to consider whether even that particular clause in the settlement dealing with the pension is per se arbitrary or discriminatory and reached a conclusion that it is not so for the reason that a new scheme for pension has been introduced by the impugned settlement and that the question of arbitrariness in fixing the cut-off date does not therefore arise. <ORG> further held that the fixation of cut-off date for the purpose of entitlement of life pension cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational as such fixation becomes imperative from financial point of view and moreover the date coincided with the Platinum Jubilee Celebrations of the Company. The date was not 'picked up from the hat', <ORG> observed. <ORG> approached the issue more from the angle of Article 14 and referred to the decisions in which the State's action in making the classification for the purpose of extending the pensionary benefits or additional benefits fell for consideration of this Court. Strictly speaking, such approach is not apt and appropriate. The present case is one where Article 14 cannot be applied as the respondent is not 'State' or 'other Authority'. On this, there is practically no dispute. If so, the approach should be as we indicated earlier; that is to say, whether the settlement can be said to be unjust, unfair or vitiated by mala fides. No mala fides is imputed to anyone. What remains to be considered is whether it is fair and just, viewed from a broader angle and taking a holistic view of the matter. It is true that certain considerations germane to Article 14 may also be germane while deciding the issue whether the settlement is just and fair. But, it does not follow that the doctrine of classification and the principles associated with it should be projected wholesale into the process of consideration of justness and fairness of the settlement. There may be some overlapping and there may be some facets which apply in common to determine the crucial issue whether the settlement on the whole is just and fair, but that is not to say that the settlement is liable to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 , more so when it has no application in the instant case. Keeping this distinction in mind and considering the grounds of attack on the particular clause of settlement, we are unable to hold that it is vulnerable to challenge on any well- recognised grounds. The facts on record do not establish that the settlement which was reached was palpably unjust or unfair from the point of view of the entire body of workmen. The preponderence of circumstances and the material on record do not in our view, displace the presumption attached to the settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation.

Firstly, it is to be borne in mind that there was no challenge at any time to any of the terms of the settlement other than the clause relating to pension in so far as it confines the benefit of life-long pension only to those who retire on or after 24.08.1986. Secondly, we must give due weight to the fact that the settlement was reached as a result of collective bargaining and with the assistance of <ORG> officer. Invariably, there would be an element of give and take in the deal leading to the settlement. Granting the benefit of life-long pension prospectively or with limited retro-active effect does not make the settlement unjust or unfair. It is certainly beneficial to the workmen in service and those who retired few months earlier. The mere fact that the <ORG> did not go the whole hog to extend the benefit to all the retired employees does not impart an element of unjustness or unreasonableness to the settlement. Financial implications apart, the benefits granted to workmen under various other clauses of settlement have to be kept in view. This particular clause relating to pension cannot be considered in isolation. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners argued that there was no justification in making a sub-classification amongst the retired employees by giving the benefit to those who retired only between 24.08.1986 and the date of settlement. In our view, conferment of such additional benefit to workmen who retired after the date of platinum jubilee celebration and before the date of culmination of settlement, far from making it unjust or irrational, tantamounts to extending benefit to some more workmen who would not have got it otherwise, if the decision was implemented prospectively. Apparently, such decision was taken to arrive at an amicable settlement and to comply with the demands of the workmen to the extent feasible and practicable. The argument that either all the retired employees should be given the benefit or none at all cannot cut ice if the principles of collective bargaining and justness of the settlement viewed as a whole is kept in view. There is nothing which is palpably unjust or irrational in giving the benefit only to those who retired during and after the platinum jubilee year. Though there was some dispute as to the correctness of the date on which the platinum jubilee falls, no material has been placed before us excepting the date of incorporation of the <ORG> to establish the version of the appellants in this regard. Picking up that date by going a little backwards from the date of settlement cannot be regarded as a whimsical or arbitrary step, more so when it was done with the consent of large majority of workmen. The <ORG> while adjudicating the dispute and <ORG> while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 /227 should be circumspect and cautious in disturbing the terms of settlement founded on collective bargaining and conciliation. The adjudicator of industrial dispute could not have directed the benefit to be extended to all the retired employees by substituting its own views to those reflected in the settlement, on an application of the usual principles governing industrial adjudication.

Another factor to be taken into account is that the recognised union of workmen which espoused the cause of the retired employees and contested the issue before <ORG> did not pursue the matter further obviously because they felt that in the larger interests of maintaining industrial harmony and peace, the matter should be left off at that stage. A member of that recognised union had taken up the issue before <ORG>.

Considering all these factors, we find no legal infirmity in the award of the <ORG> which has been affirmed by <ORG> and we say so without going into the subtle question whether the scheme is a new one for all practical purposes or only a revision or liberalization of the pre-existing pensionary benefits.

In the view we have taken it is not necessary to dwell on the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondent regarding the maintainability of the writ petition and SLP at the instance of the appellants.

We see no merit in the appeal and it is hereby dismissed. No costs.

<NAME>

(<NAME>) .J.

(<NAME>) January 29, 2002.


PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR GENERAL, <NAME> & <NAME>. DATE OF JUDGMENT28/09/1988 BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> (J) BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> (J) KANIA, <NAME>, S. CITATION: 1989 AIR 157 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 282 1989 SCC (1) 89 JT 1988 (4) 50 1988 SCALE (2)1079 ACT: Articles 226/136 of the Constitution--T.V.Serial--<NAME>-Selection of-Whether discriminatory--Scope and exercise of authority by <NAME>--Whether proper and in accordance with principle of fair-play. HEADNOTE: With a view to produce T.V. Serials based on themes e.g. national integration, Communal harmony, against exploitation of child labour, equal status for women etc., <NAME> invited proposals from producers sponsors. The last date for submitting such projects was 7th May, 1986 and it was also made obligatory by <NAME> that projects should comply with the guidelines prescribed by it. Clause (2) of the guidelines inter alia required that the proposals for sponsored programs should consist of break up of the story in episodes; complete synopsis of each episode; detailed scenario, script of at least one episode etc. As per clause (3) of the guidelines the proposals on receipt by <NAME> were to be given a reference No. and acknowledged. The guidelines also prescribed that if any proposal is not accompanied by any of the documents required by the guidelines, that deficiency was to be pointed out to the producer of the proposal and was to be treated complete only when all the requirements contained in the guidelines referred to above are complied with. On the theme of national integration the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 had submitted projects on the life and history of the great urdu poet <NAME>. The projects submitted by the Petitioner and by another person were not approved/selected for telecast as the same were not found to be either attractive or interesting but the one sent by Respondent <NAME>--was selected. The Petitioner challenged the said action of <NAME> as arbitrary and based on malice by filing writ petition in <ORG> u/a 226 of the Constitution praying for a direction to <ORG> and the <NAME> to accept the script of the Petitioner and eventually to give him the contract. His contention before <ORG> was mainly that Respondent No. 2-<NAME>-had been preferred over the Petitioner by practising discrimination PG NO 282 PG NO 283 nation in the matter of selection of T.V. Serial even though the Petitioner had submitted his project on 7th May 1986 whilst Respondent No. 2 had not. <ORG> did not f~nd substance in any of the contentions raised by the Petitioner and dismissed the Writ Petition. Against the order of <ORG> of 13th July, 1988 dismissing the Writ Petition the Petitioner filed a petition for special leave to appeal u/a 136 of the Constitution. Dismissing the petition for Special leave, this Court, HELD: That Respondent No. 2--Gulzar had by a letter dated the 4th February, 1986 submitted the theme of the matter and <NAME> had asked him to furnish further details to make the proposal complete and after the proposal was so made complete, the same alongwith others was placed for consideration 'before the <ORG>. Though the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with the order of precedence yet they were considered fairly or reasonably. [285C; 286F-G] That there was obJectivity in the actual consideration of the different proposals and that there was fairness in the decision and that no malice or ill-will coloured the decision-making process in the case. The Petitioner was not refused proper consideration because Respondent 2 described the petitioner as one who is a ~'maverick", on the contrary the serial submitted by the Petitioner was neither found to be attractive nor interesting. [287A-B] Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [l985] 3, SCC 267 at pp. 268 and 269 <CITATION> , AIR 1988 SC 157 at p. 161, referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9814 of 1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.7.1988 of <ORG> in C.W.P. No. 3423 of 1987.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Petitioner.

<NAME>, Additional Solicitor General, Mrs. <NAME>, Ms. <NAME>, <NAME> and Ms. <NAME> for the Respondents.

PG NO 284 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. This petition is for special leave to appeal from the decision of <ORG>, dated 13th July, 1988. By the said Order <ORG> dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner. In the said writ petition, the petitioner had asked for a direction to <ORG> and/or the <ORG> to accept the script of the petitioner and eventually to give him the contract. <ORG> in its order recorded that there was no substance in the allegation that <NAME>, respondent No. Z herein, had been preferred over the petitioner by practising discrimination. There was a proposal to produce T.V. serials based on national integration, communal harmony, against exploitation of child labour, equal status for women etc. etc. and the last date for submitting such projects was 7th May, 1986. It was further announced by the <ORG> that the project should be completed in terms of the guidelines issued by the <ORG>, respondent No. 1. The said guidelines for sponsored programme to be produced by sponsor indicate certain requirement for the proposals. The guidelines, inter alia, state in clause (2) that the proposals for sponsored programmes should consist of the following:

(a) break-up of the story in episodes and broadline of treatment;

(b) complete synopsis of each episode;

(c) detailed scenario script of at least one episodes; and

(d) confirmed names and addresses of Director, Camera- man, Music Director, Script/Dialogue Writer, Main Artists etc.

Clause (3) of the said guidelines indicated further that all proposals received by the <ORG> will be given a reference number and acknowledge. In case proposals not accompanied by any of the foregoing documents mentioned aforesaid are received, a suitable indication would be given by the <ORG> to the Producer along with the acknowledgment. It further indicated that a proposal would be considered "complete" only after the required number of copies of the documents mentioned aforesaid were supplied. It appears, therefore,that a proposal though not containing all the particulars would still be a Proposal but not a "complete" proposal but the proposal will be complete only PG NO 285 after the required number of copies of all the documents mentioned hereinbefore are supplied. The theme with which the petitioner was concerned and with which also the proposal of respondent No. 2 was concerned, was the life and history of the great Urdu poet <NAME>. It was the case of the petitioner that before the last date for the submission of the project on 7th May, 1986 though the petitioner had submitted his project, respondent No. 2 had not.

<ORG> did not accept the aforesaid allegation. We have examined the records and the acknowledgment sheets in original which were produced in the <ORG> for our satisfaction and it appears to us that the High <ORG> was right on this point and the petitioner was not. Respondent No. 2 submitted, it appears, the theme of the matter by a letter dated 4th February, 1986. This was not undoubtedly a complete project. It was only on the theme of the project, namely. the life and history of the great poet <NAME>. The petitioner, however, by a letter dated 13th March, 1986 submitted the proposal with 13 episodes giving the entire idea of his project depicting the life of <NAME> and his contribution to the national integration. The final decision to award the project to respondent No. 2 was taken, it appears, some time in November 1986 after considering three complete proposals on the project. It appears to us from the records that the <ORG> authorities found that the project submitted by the petitioner was not "attractive or interesting". It appears further from the letter that the <ORG> authorities did not find the proposal of the petitioner to be "attractive or interesting" enough. There was one more proposal given by another person apart from the petitioner and respondent No. 2. It is, however, not clear what that proposal was. It appears that the <ORG> authorities did not find the proposal of that person to be any more attractive or interesting than that of the petitioner. In the meantime, respondent No. 2 had submitted his proposal and the <ORG>, though the proposal was not complete, asked respondent No.2 to give further details and after they were submitted by respondent No. 2,it was examined by the <ORG>. It was asserted on behalf of respondent No. 2, and it appears to be corroborated by the records that before the proposal of respondent No. 2 was considered, the script and the proposal of the petitioner as well as that of the other person were considered and not found to be "attractive or interesting" enough. Therefore, it appears that though the idea was presented by respondent No.2 by a letter but the matter was decided only after the entire proposal had been submitted by respondent No. 2. It appears, therefore, that all the proposals were duly considered by the <ORG>. It further appears that PG NO 286 respondent No. 2 had submitted his proposal before his was respondent No. 2 had submitted his proposal before his was accepted by the <ORG> authorities. The conduct of the <ORG> in awarding the opportunity of serialising the script to respondent No. 2 was challenged as arbitrary and mala fide. It is well-settled that there should be fair-play in action in a situation like the present one, as was observed by this <ORG> in <CITATION> .,  3 SCC 267 at pages 268-269. It is also well-settled that the authorities like the <ORG> should act fairly and their action should be legitimate and fair and transaction should be without any aversion, malice or affection. Nothing should be done which gives the impression of favouritism or nepotism. See the observations of this <ORG> in <CITATION> ., AIR 1988 SC 157 at page 161.

While, as mentioned hereinbefore, fair-play in action in matters like the present one is an essential requirement, similarly, however, free play in the joints' is also a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere as the present one. Judged from that stand point of view, though all the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with order of precedence, it appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively and without any malice or ill-will.

Respondent No. '2, it further appears. has a long record of steady and successful performance in direction, script- writing recognised by the conventional yardstick of the society. Ii' having regard to such a record, certain latitude in taking up for consideration was shown to the proposal submitted by the respondent No. 2, in our opinion, respondent No. 1 did not transgress the limits of fair-play in action. All the proposals were, as mentioned hereinbefore, duly considered. These were considered by a <ORG> of eminent persons. Our attention was drawn to the names of the members of the <ORG>. As mentioned hereinbefore, the <ORG> did not find the proposal of the petitioner and the other person either attractive or interesting enough in awarding the TV serial on the aspect of national integration of the lifetime of <NAME>. After it was so found, the idea of respondent No. 2 was considered and the proposal was duly considered. We have satisfied ourselves from the records produced at the time of the hearing and from the affidavits filed before us that there was objectivity in the actual consideration of the PG NO 287 different proposals and that there was fairness in the decision and that no malice or ill-will coloured the decision-making process in this case. The petitioner was not refused proper consideration because what respondent No. ' described the petitioner as one who is a 'maverick'. In the aforesaid light and in the facts of this case and the principles of law that are applicable, we are satisfied that <ORG> was right and the decision of the respondent No. 1 does not call for any interference. The Special Leave Petition must fail and is, therefore dismissed accordingly.

<NAME> Petition dismissed.