PETITIONER: M/s. <ORG>, LTD. Vs. RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (And connected petition) DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/02/1961 BENCH: <NAME>, J.R. BENCH: <NAME>, J.R. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA CITATION: 1961 AIR 954 1962 SCR (1) 44 CITATOR INFO : R 1965 SC 632 (11) RF 1969 SC 125 (8) RF 1973 SC1461 (90) ACT: Coal Mines-Law Providing for respecting for coal and ac- quisition-Validity-"Unworked land", meaning of-"To undertake any operation in the land", meaning of-Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act , 1957., ss. 4 , 5 , 6 , 7  8 , 13 , 14-Constitution of India, Arts. 31A(1)(e), 31(2). HEADNOTE: The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act , 1957, was enacted, as indicated in the preamble, for providing for the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits, and under S. 4(1) of the Act,-<ORG> was empowered to issue a notification with reference to its intention to prospect for coal from land in any locality. By s. 5(b) any mining lease granted to a person and in respect of which a notification had been issued shall cease to have effect, and under s. 7 <ORG> was entitled to acquire the mining rights within a period of two or three years from the date of the notification. On July 29, 1960, <ORG> published a notification under s, 4(1) of the Act in respect of an area included in the colliery in which the petitioners had acquired mining rights. Between the year 1932 and the month of May, 1960, the colliery was not worked because it was uneconomical to work it, but the petitioners made an application on December 3, 1959, to <ORG> for permission to reopen the Colliery and though no reply was received from the Board, the petitioners commenced drilling operations in May, 1960, but discontinued them from August 12, 1960, in view of the notification. The petitioners challenged the validity of the notification on the ground that the preamble of the Act and ss. 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 and 8 show that the Act was applicable only to unworked mines which must mean virgin lands,, and not to those which were being worked at the time of notification or which were worked in the past, whereas the petitioners' coal field had been worked and the working had ceased for some time only due to the unremunerative market for the produce. The petitioners also contended that the Act contravened Arts. 19(1)(g) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India on the grounds (1) that the effect of a notification under the Act was to prevent an owner or lessee of a mine from working for two or three years, which was too long a period and, therefore, the restrictions could not be regarded as 45 reasonable, (2) that the Act did not contain any provision for compensation for the deprivation of the petitioners' right to carry on their business for two or three years, and (3) that s. 13 of the Act, though it dealt with the payment of compensation, did not provide for compensation for mineral rights. Held: (1) that the expression "unworked land" occurring in the preamble of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act , 1957, means land-which was not being worked at the time of the notification issued under the Act and includes dormant mines. Where the object or meaning of a enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it. In re the Kerala Educatiion Bill, 1957,  S.C.R. 995. referred. (2) that the Act is applicable not only to virgin lands but also to dormant collieries or unworked lands, including mines which were worked in the past but mining operations therein are not being carried on at present. (3) that the expression "to undertake any operation in the land" in S. 5(b) of the Act refers to the undertaking of an operation on land not for the first time only but at the resumption of an operation which had been abandoned or discontinued. The resumption of the working of a mine after a casual closure or a closure in the ordinary course of the working of a mine would not fall within the bar created by s. 5(b). (4) that the restrictions imposed upon an owner or lessee of a mine by which he is prevented from working his mine for a certain period of time under ss.4 and 5 of the Act are not unreasonable and that the Act does not contravene Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. (5) that such restrictions amount to a modification of his rights within the meaning of Art. 31A(1)(e) of the Constitution; and that the validity Of ss. 4 and 5 Of the Act cannot be challenged on the ground that they infringe Art. 31(2) in view of the provisions of Art. 31A(1)(e). <NAME> v. <ORG>, Ajmer,  S.C.R. 1049, explained. <CITATION> ,  Supp. 1 S. C. R. 489, <CITATION> ,  Supp. r S.C.R. 748 and In re Delhi Laws Act , 1912,  S.C.R. 793, relied on. (6) that the Act cannot be challenged on the ground that ss. 5(a) and 13 do not provide for payment of compensation for mineral rights, because ss. 13 and 14 lay down the principles on which compensation is to be determined, and under Art- 31(2) such a law cannot be called in question on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation provided. 46 JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 241 and 242 of 1960. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the petitioners.

<NAME>, Attorney-General of India, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondents.

1961. February 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR, J.-The petitioner in W. P. 241 of 1960, Messrs. <ORG>, and the petitioner in W. P. 242 of 1960, Messrs. <ORG>, claim to have acquired mining rights in two blocks in Mouza Sudamdih and Mouza Sutikdih respectively situated in Dhanbad district in the State of Bihar. On July 28, 1960, <ORG> published a notification bearing no. S. 0 . 1927 under s. 4 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act , 1957 (no. 20 of 1957), stating its intention to prospect for coal in an area approximately five sq. miles which includes Sudamdih colliery aud Sutikdih colliery. The petitioners have stated in their respective petitions that in consequence of the issue of the aforesaid notification they are precluded from carrying on any mining operations in the respective collieries and that <ORG> is entitled to acquire mining rights in the area covered by the notification within a period of two years from the date of notification or within such further period not exceeding one year as <ORG> may specify by notification in the Official Gazette. The petitioners have come up to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution contending that the aforesaid notification is ultra vires and illegal inasmuch as it interfere,% with their fundamental right to own property and to carry on business. Assuming that an incorporated company is a citizen we may point out that the <ORG> is incorporated in the United Kingdom while the <ORG> is incorporated in India. Therefore, in so far as the rights conferred by Art. 19 are concerned it may only be the latter which is entitled to the protection of the Constitution but not the former company. Both the petitioners, however, contend that the right conferred by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution is also infringed by the aforesaid notification and if their contention is correct they will be entitled to protection in respect of that right inasmuch as it is not limited to the citizens of India as is the case with regard to the rights enumerated in Art. 19. Both the petitions were argued together though the arguments were addressed mainly with reference to the case of <ORG> and, therefore, it is that case with which we will deal fully. After dealing with the arguments advanced with reference to that case we will deal briefly with the other case.

The challenge to the notification rests on two grounds, firstly that the notification is ultra vire8 the Act and secondly that the Act is itself ultra vires the Constitution.

The petitioner's learned counsel Mr. <NAME> contends that the Act applies to "unworked" coal mines which according to him, mean virgin lands-and not to those which are being worked at present or which were worked in the past. In support of this contention he strongly relies upon the preamble to the Act.The preamble runs thus:

" An Act to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or likely to contain, coal deposits or of rights in or over such land, for the extinguishment, or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise. and for matters connected therewith."

His argument proceeds to the length of saying that even abandoned mines are not touched by the Act. According to him, however, the Sudamdih colliery was not an abandoned mine nor could it be regarded as abandoned because, though it was not actually worked between the year 1932 and the month of May. 1960. the petitioner had purchased it for a large consideration amounting to over Rs. 1,46,000 and thereafter it paid annually the minimum rent and royalty which totals upto over Rs. 1,23,000 from May 1, 1939, to June 30, 1960. According to the petitioner the mine was not actually worked during this period because in the petitioner's opinion it was uneconomical to work it. The petitioner in fact made' an application on December 3, 1959, to <ORG> as required by the provisions of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act , 1952 (XII of 1952), for permission to reopen the colliery but it did not receive any reply from <ORG>. Even so, the petitioner commenced drilling operations in the beginning of May, 1960 and carried them on till August 12, 1960, during which a depth of 235 ft. was reached at one point. The petitioner, however, stopped these operations consequent upon the publication of the impugned notification in the Gazette of August 6, 1960. We are mentioning. these facts because on their basis a further argument is raised by Mr. <NAME> to the effect that prior to the issue of the notification the mine was being actually worked. Before, however, we deal with that argument we must consider the main contention of Mr. <NAME> which is to the effect that the Act applies only to virgin land. Mr. <NAME> contended that the preamble to an Act is a key to understanding the provisions of the Act and referred us in this connection to the advisory opinion of this <ORG> in re the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 In that case <NAME>, C. J., who delivered the opinion of the <ORG> has observed:

"The long title of the said Bill (The Kerala Education Bill, 1957) describes it as A Bill to provide for the better organisation and development of educational institutions in the State'. Its preamble recites thus: 'Whereas it is deemed necessary to provide for the better organisation and development of educational institutions in the State provid- ing a varied and comprehensive educational service (1) [1959] S.C.R. 995, 1022.

throughout the <ORG>'. We must, therefore, approach the substantive provisions of the said Bill in the light of the policy and purpose deducible from the terms of the aforesaid long title and the preamble and so construe the clauses of the said Bill as will subserve the said policy and purpose".

While. holding that it is permissible to look at the preamble for understanding the import of the various clauses contained in the Bill this <ORG> has not said that full effect should not be given to the express provisions of the Bill even though they appear to go beyond the terms of the preamble. It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded. Though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply (1).. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we would be justified in resorting to it, nay, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by <ORG> is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact <ORG> intended that it should have a limited application.

Mr. <NAME> then contended that the various provisions of the Act clearly show that <ORG> intended the Act to apply only to virgin land. In support of this contention he referred to the provisions of as. 4,5,6, 7 and 8 of the Act. He pointed out that whenever it appears to <ORG> that coal is likely to be obtained from land in any locality it is empowered by sub-a. (1) of s. 4 to give notice of its intention to prospect for coal therein. According to him, where a mine has been worked at some time- in the past all the necessary information would be available in the working plan of the mine, and, by way of illustration pointed out that the fullest information (1) Craies-Interprotation of Statutes, 5th Edn., pp. 188,

189. was available in the working plan, Annexure B1 of the Sudamdih colliery. He further pointed out that this information was in fact in the possession of the <ORG> as would appear from Annexure B which was appended to the notification of July 20, 1960. We may point out that this annexure sets out that this is a statement of percentage of worked and unworked areas in different coal mines and. after setting out the various seams which have been proved, the percentages of worked and unworked areas have been specified therein. Prospecting, according to Mr. <NAME>, would be necessary only if nothing is known about an area and therefore there can possibly be no need for prospecting when a mine has been worked. Admittedly, sub-s. (1) of a. 4 does not specifically say that it applies to unworked land. All the same, according to Mr. <NAME>, it must be so construed as to apply to unworked land only; for, there would be no need for the <ORG> to undertake prospecting for coal in worked land on which there is a colliery.

We cannot accept the argument of Mr. <NAME>. The bulk of the coal in a mine is underground and even though the existence of some seems may have been proved in particular areas it is impossible to say that the information obtained when it was prospected once or when it was being worked, as to the quality and quantity of coal or the dimensions of the seams is complete. The seams are not necessarily horizontal and more often are inclined and sometimes even folded. Then again there may be faulting in the strata of coal as a result of which an impression may be created that a seam has disappeared at a particular place though further borings or drilling may show that even. beyond that point but at greater depths the same seam reappears. So where a mine was worked in the past but mining operations therein were stopped either because the coal therein was thought to have been exhausted or because it was not thought to be of a sufficiently good quality such as to make the working of the mine economic, further prospecting may well reveal the existence of additional coal bearing strata or of a better type of coal than that found earlier. On the plain language of sub-a. (1) of s. 4 <ORG> has been empowered to issue a notification with reference to its intention of prospecting any land in a locality and not only such land as is virgin in the sense in which Mr. <NAME> uses that expression. Then Mr. <NAME> referred sub-s. (3) of a. 4 and said that the whole of the country has been subjected to a geological survey of a very detailed kind and all known coal fields are mentioned in one report or the other of the department of <ORG>. Collieries which have been worked at some time in the past must have been mentioned in one of these reports and., therefore, it would be wholly unnecessary for the legislature to confer upon the Government the power as is done by cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 4 to enter upon and survey any land in the locality in which such colliery is situate. The very fact that power has been given to <ORG> to enter upon and survey land for' the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any coal in that land shows that the legislature had in mind only that land which has not been mentioned as coal bearing in any of the reports of the <ORG>. Here again we may point out that the object of survey of land is to enable the Government to satisfy itself not merely about the fact that any coal exists in that land but also about the quality and quantity of coal therein and whether it would be an economical proposition to work the mines already existing on that land.

Indeed a perusal of the provisions of sub-a. (4) of s. 4 would show that the Act is not restricted to unworked lands only but applies equally to those lands on which there are existing mines but those mines are not being worked. That sub.section reads as follows:

"In issuing a notification under this section <ORG> shall exclude therefrom that portion of any land in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on in conformity with the provisions of any enactment, rule or order for the time being in force or any premises on which any process ancillary to the getting, dressing or preparation for sale of coal obtained as a result of such operations is being carried on are situate".

Under this provision <ORG> is required to exclude that portion of any land in which coal mining operations are being carried on "in conformity with any enactment, rule or order". This would indicate that the language of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 was understood as applying also to that land in which coal mining operations were actually being carried on. Unless we hold so, the whole of sub-s. (4) would be rendered otiose. Mr. <NAME>, however, says that sub-s. (4) enacts a "rule of exclusion" and that it had been enacted by way of abundant caution. We cannot accede to this argument for the simple reason that if the language of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 is capable of being interpreted as applying to any land in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on, then there is all the greater reason why that provision should be held also to apply to land in which coal mining operations were carried on in the past, though they are not being carried on at present. If <ORG> was cautious enough to exclude land in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on why did it stop there and not exercise the same caution with respect to land in which coal mining operations were once being carried on but have now ceased? For, on the plain meaning of the word "unworked" such lands would more readily fall within the terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 than land in which coal mining operations were actually being carried on, that is to say, "worked lands".

Then Mr. <NAME> referred to cl.-(b) of s. 5 which runs thus:

"any mining lease in so far as it authorises the lessee or any person claiming through him to undertake any operation in the laid, shall cease to have effect for so long as the notification under that sub. section is in force".

He contended that what this provision prohibits is the undertaking of any operation in the land and not carrying on of an operation. Undertaking of an operation, according to himself 'relates to the- initial working of the mine and riot to the resumption of work on the mine after work thereon had stopped nor to carrying on work on a mine the working of which had not been stopped. As a consequence of the issue of a notification under sub-s. (1) or s. 4 what the lessee of a mining lease is prohibited from doing is undertaking any operation on land-on which no operations were being carried on. But he is not prohibited from continuing to carry on operations which he was carrying on at the date of the notification. We cannot, however, accede to the contention that the resumption of mining operations on a land is outside the bar created by this pro- vision. The words used in the section are "to undertake any operations in the land" which, according to <ORG> mean "to enter upon (work, enterprise, responsibility)". The meaning of the provision, therefore, is that what the lessee is prohibited from doing is something which he was not doing at the date of the notification though he was authorised to do it under his lease. Thus if a colliery was not functioning at the date of the notification then by virtue of the provisions of a. 5(b) he would not be permitted to work it. Undoubtedly the provision has to be interpreted reasonably and it does not mean that if the notification came into force on the Monday and the mine was not worked on Sunday because of a holiday, the lessee was prohibited by the notification from working it. The resumption of working of a mine after a casual closure or a closure in the ordinary course of working a mine would not fall within the bar created by s. 5(b) . In this connection we may refer to r. 7 of the Coal Mines Regulations of 1957, which provides that when it is intended to reopen a mine after abandonment for a period exceeding 60 days not less than 30 days notice before resumption of mining operations must be given to certain authorities. The Coal Mines Regulations of 1957 have been framed under s. 57 of the Mines Act of 1952, s. 16 of which provides for the giving of notice before commencement of mining operations. It is in the light of these provisions that we must interpret the provisions of s. 5(b) of the Act. So what must be said to have been prohibited would be the undertaking of an operation on land not for the first time only but also the resumption of an operation which had been abandoned or discontinued. Mr. <NAME> then contended that a mining area is always extensive and it is not possible to work on every bit of it simultaneously and, therefore, if work is carried on at one point in a colliery the whole colliery must be deemed to be working, that is to say, coal mining operations must be deemed to have been carried on over the entire area on which the colliery is situate. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision of <ORG> in <NAME> v. Bengal Coal Co., Ltd. (1), and upon a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England(2). Both the decision of <ORG> as well as the passage in Halsbury deal with the question of possession and state the law to be that a person can be said to be in possession of minerals contained in a well-defined mining area even though his actual physical possession is confined to a small portion, that is, to the mine which is being actually worked. The decision of <ORG> as well as the passage in Halsbury are nus not in point. Further it is difficult to see how an exemption under s. 4(4) is admissible in the case of the Sudamdih colliery or Sutkidih colliery unless it is shown that they were actually being worked at the date of the notification in conformity with the provisions of "any enactment, rule or order for the time being in force". It is an admitted fact that though a notice was given under s. 16 of the Mines Act, 1952, by <ORG>, the petitioners in W.P. 242 of 1960, it aid not actually start working the colliery in view of the impugned notification. As we have al. ready pointed out <ORG> did commence working the Sudamdih Colliery in May, 1960, even though it had not obtained the permission of the appropriate authorities.

We must, therefore, examine here the argument of Mr. <NAME> that every colliery must be held to be exempted under sub-s. (4) of S. 4 . We have already referred (1) (1930) L.R. 58 I-A. 29.

(2)..3rd Edn., Vol. 26, p. 630.

to s. 16 of the Mines Act, 1952, and regulation 7 of Mining Regulations, 1957. In addition, there is Regulation 3 of 1957 which requires that the notice contemplated by s. 16 should be submitted in Form I.. No doubt the petitioner had given notice as required by these provisions. No doubt also that it was necessary for the authorities concerned to take appropriate action on the notice. But it is difficult to say that the inaction of the authorities can be availed of by the petitioner. We must give effect to the plain lan- guage of sub-s. (4) of s. 4 . That provision in clear terms makes an exclusion or exemption only with regard to that portion of the land in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on in conformity with the provisions of any enactment, rule or order. Therefore, it is clear that <ORG> was exempting only such collieries as were being worked in consonance 'with the provisions of law. Mr. <NAME>'s argument, however, is that the Act prescribes penal- ties for the breach of its provisions and of those of the regulations and so the petitioner could well be visited with an appropriate penalty but that its right to run the mine could not be affected. We are not here concerned with the question whether the failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements of the Coal Mines Act or of the Regulations of 1957 precludes the petitioner under that Act or under those regulations from carrying on mining operations. We are concerned here only with one point, and that is whether the petitioner could be said in point of fact to have been carrying on mining operations in accord- ance with law. That the petitioner was not doing so is not even denied by Mr. <NAME> and in the circumstances it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of sub-s. (4) of s. 4 . We should have dealt with this part of Mr. <NAME>'s argument elsewhere but in order to avoid repetition we have thought it convenient to deal with it here. Adverting to s. 6(1) of the. Act which deals with compensation for any necessary damage done under s. 4 of the Act, learned counsel contended that <ORG> plainly intended the Act to apply to virgin land.

If the section was intended to apply to worked mines there would have been provision, according to learned counsel, for payment of compensation to the owner or lessee of the mine, for being deprived of his right to work the mine consequent upon the-. issue of the notification. It is sufficient to point out that s. 4 does not contemplate entering upon any land which is actually being worked and there will thus be no deprivation in fact of the owner's or lessee's right of working the mine. The Act applies only to "unworked lands". This expression would include not only virgin lands but also lands on which mines may have been opened and worked sometime in the past but working on those mines was either discontinued or abandoned. Of course, it is possible to say that the action of the <ORG> would interfere with the potential right of the owner or the lessee to work the mines and this would interfere with his right to hold property and carry on his business. When we deal with the other part of Mr. <NAME>'s argument we shall deal with this question. It was next contended that s. 7 which deals with the power of the Central <ORG> to acquire land or rights in or over land notified under s. 4 also indicates the limited operation of the Act. Sub-section (1) of s. 7 runs thus:

"If <ORG> is satisfied that coal is obtainable in the whole or any part of the land notified under sub-section (1) o f section 4 , it may, within a period of two years from the date of the said notification or within such further period not exceeding one year in the aggregate as <ORG> may specify in this behalf, by notification in the official <ORG>, give notice of its intention to acquire the whole or any part of the land or of any rights in or over such land, as the case may be".

The argument was that in respect of mines which have already been worked at some time in the past all the relevant material would be at the disposal of the <ORG> even previous to the issuing of a notification under sub-s. (1) of S. 4 and, therefore, there could be no necessity for the <ORG> to enter on and prospect the land for being satisfied that coal is obtainable therefrom. Therefore, the argument proceeds, the provision could not have been intended to apply to land other than virgin land. This is really a repetition of the argument which was addressed to us in connection with sub. (1) of s. 4 and what we have said with regard to that sub- section would equally apply here.

Sub-section (1) of s. 7 provides for a period of two years within which a notice of acquisition could be given by <ORG>. It is argued that this period is too long for keeping out an owner or lessee of land, the mines on which had been worked in the past and that <ORG> could not have intended this effect. Therefore, the argument proceeds, this provision also points to the conclusion that the word "land" wherever it occurs in the Act should be read as virgin land. Prospecting operations are necessarily prolonged because what lies under the surface of land cannot be easily ascertained except by undertaking drilling or other appropriate operations at a number of places. Such operations are bound to be prolonged. <ORG> apparently thought that it would be reasonable to allow a period of two years to the <ORG> for carrying on the necessary operations and for, making up its mind. The mere length of the period so allowed to the <ORG> cannot be regarded as indicative of the intention of <ORG> to give to the word 'land' the -meaning 'virgin land'.

Reliance was placed on the explanation to sub-a. (1) of s.. 8. That sub-section and the explanation are as follows:

"Any person interested in any land in respect of which a notification under section 7 has been issued may, within ' thirty days of the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the whole or any part of the land or of any rights in or over such land. Explanation.-It shall not be an objection within the meaning of this section for any person to say that he himself desires to undertake mining operations in the land for the production of coal and that such operations should not be undertaken by <ORG> or by any other person".

It was argued that in the explanation the words used are "to undertake mining operations" and not "to carry on mining operations" and therefore the Act could not be intended to apply to worked mines. Here again the argument is similar to that advanced on the basis of cl. (b) of s. 5 and what we have said regarding it would equally apply here. Adverting to s. 13 of the Act which deals with compensation for prospecting licences ceasing to have effect and rights under mining leases being acquired, it was contended that as there is no provision for compensation in respect of the minerals lying underground, <ORG> could not be deemed to have enacted this law for the purpose of acquiring mines which have been worked in the past. According to Mr. <NAME> if we have understood him right, when a person has acquired land either as an owner or as a lessee carrying with it the rights to win minerals and has opened in that land mines which he worked for sometime, there takes place a severance between the right to the surface and right to the minerals and that consequently such person will thereafter be holding the minerals as separate tenement, that is, something apart from the land demised and this separate tenement cannot be acquired under the terms of the present Act or, if it can be so acquired, it has to be specifically compensated for. Reference to the several provisions of the Act and in particular to those of s. 13 indicates, according to learned counsel, the limited scope of the Act. It is difficult to appreciate the contention that merely because the owner or the lessee of a land had opened mines on that land, a severance is effected between the surface and the underground minerals. It may be that a trespasser by adverse possession for the statutory period can acquire rights to underground minerals. It may also be that if that happens the surface rights would become severed from the mineral rights as a result of which the minerals underground would form a separate tenement. It is, however, difficult to see how the owner or the lessee of land who has right to win minerals can effect such a severance between the mineral rights and surface rights by opening and operating the mines of that land. For, even while he is carrying on mining operations he continues to enjoy the surface rights also. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that there was any severance of the mineral rights and surface rights in either of these two cases. It is no doubt true that s. 13 does not make any specific provision for compensation in respect of minerals, but on the other hand it provides in the explanation to el. (a) of sub-s. (5) that the value of minerals lying in the land shall not be taken into consideration in assessing compensation. Whether the absence of a provision for compensation' would make the Act ultra vire8 in so far as it contemplates acquisition of land will be considered presently. We may, however, point out that the Act does not make provision for compensation for minerals in respect of even virgin land and the argument of Mr. <NAME> would equally apply to such land. Therefore, no point can be made from the absence of a provision for compensation for minerals that the Act was applicable only to virgin lands. For all these reasons it is clear that the notification is not ultra vires the Act because, in our view the Act applies not only to virgin lands but also to dormant collieries or unworked lands.

To sum up, in our view, the preamble of this Act need not be resolved to for construing its provisions and in particular for understanding the meaning of the word "land" used in the Act; that even if the preamble is taken into consideration the expression "unworked land" occurring in the preamble should be given its ordinary meaning, that is to say, land which was not being worked at the time of the notification issued under the Act, which would include dormant mines; that the provisions of the Act and in particular those of sub-s. (4) of s. 4 and s. 5(b) clearly militate against the contention that the Act was intended to apply only to virgin lands, to the exclusion of land on which there are dormant mines, and that the absence of a provision in s. 13 of the Act providing for compensation for mineral rights cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the Act was intended to apply to virgin land only. Now we come to the second part of the argument. It is contended that ss. 4 , 5 and 6 invade the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution because under s. 5 , a mining lease ceases to have effect for two years and possibly for three years. Mr. <NAME> concedes that reasonable restrictions can be placed by the <ORG> upon the rights enumerated in this article in the interests of the general public but he contends that the period of two to three years is too long and, therefore, the restrictions cannot be regarded as reasonable. We have already indicated that prospecting operations, in their very nature, must take a long time to complete and presumably <ORG> had fixed this period after bearing in mind this factor and also on the basis of expert advice. Of course, there are no pleadings to that effect in the affidavit of the <ORG>. But in our opinion the petitioner cannot be permitted to complain of the absence of pleadings because it has not itself stated in the petition what would be reasonable time for conducting prospecting operations. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the argument.

The next attack, and that is a more formidable one, is based upon the ground that the Act does not contain any provision for compensation for the deprivation of the petitioners right to carry on its business for two to three years and that consequently one of its fundamental rights is infringed. It is no doubt true that in a. 13(4) which deals with the question of compensation there is no provision for payment of compensation for the deprivation of the right of a mine owner or a lessee to carry on his business for a period of two or three years, but the petitioner cannot complain about it. In Art. 31A , cl. (1), sub-el. (e), of the Constitution, which was inserted by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951, it is provided that "notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 13 , no law providing for............... the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on :the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art. 14 , Art. 19 or Art 31." Then follows a proviso with which we are not concerned. The effect of a notification under s. 4(1) of the Act read with s. 5(b) is to prevent an owner or lessee of a mine from working his mine far a certain period of time. His rights are thus modified by the notification. According to Mr. <NAME>, however, the effect of the notification is to suspend the rights of a mine-owner or lessee of the mine for a certain period and that such suspension is not modification. In this connection he relied upon the observations of <NAME>, J., (as he then was), in <NAME> v. <ORG>, Ajmer (1). That was a case where, in connection with a notification issued under the <ORG> Act, the learned Judge observed that the word "modification" used in the aforesaid provision of the Constitution does not include suspension of a right. The observations made in that case fell for consideration by this <ORG> in <CITATION> (2) and <CITATION> . (3). Explaining them this <ORG> observed in the latter case:

"Those observations must be strictly limited to the facts of the case, and cannot possibly be extended to the provisions of Acts wholly dissimilar to those of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, XLII of 1950, which was the subject-matter of the challenge in the case then before this Court. This Court held, on a construction of the provision of that Act, that they only suspended the right of management but did not amount to any extinguishment or modification of any proprietary rights (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049,1053.

(2) [1959] Supp. S.C.R. 489, 519 (3) [1959] SUPP. S.C.R. 748, 767.

in an estate. The provisions of the Act then under consideration of this <ORG>, have absolutely no resemblance to those of the Act now before us, and it is impossible to put a similar interpretation on these provisions.

In the recent decision of this Court (not yet reported) this Court had been invited to apply the observations of this Court referred t o above, to the provisions of the Bombay Act. It was pointed out in that case that those observations of <NAME>, J., (as he then was), must be read as limited to an Act which only brings about a suspension of the right of management of an estate, and could not be extended to the provisions of an Act which either extinguishes or modifies certain rights of a proprietor in an estate or a portion thereof".

This Court did not intend to lay down as law in <NAME> v. Court of Wards, Ajmer (1) that Art. 1A(i)(e) is inapplicable to a case where the property rights of a person are kept in abeyance for a certain period. The meaning of the word "modify" fell to be considered, in re The Delhi Laws Act , 1912 As pointed out in the -opinion of <NAME>, C. J., the word "modify" means, according to Oxford Dictionary, to limit, restrain, to assuage, to make less severe, rigorous, or decisive; to tone down". It also means "to make partial changes in; to alter without radical transformation". In Rowland Burrows"'Words and Phrases', the word "modify" has, however, been defined as meaning "vary, extend or enlarge, limit or restrict". According to the learned Chief Justice "It has been held that modification implies an alteration. it may narrow or enlarge the provisions of the former Act".

Bearing in mind the principle that a constitutional enactment must be construed liberally we would be right in according the dictionary meaning to the word " modification" occurring in the aforesaid provision. Mr. <NAME>, however, contends that for a thing to amount to a modification of a right it must be of a permanent character and not of a temporary duration. We see no ground whatsoever for holding that for a (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049,1053.

(2) [1951] S.C.R. 793-4.

thing to be a modification it must be of a permanent duration. A right may well be modified for all time or for a limited duration and in either case the right must be regarded as having been modified. For these reasons we hold that the provisions of Art. 31A , cl. (1)(e), debar the petitioners from challenging the validity of ss. 4 and 5 of the Act on the ground that they infringe the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.

What remains to be considered is whether the provisions permitting acquisition of land are ultra vires the Constitution because they offend Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. According to the learned Attorney-General the petitioners have no present grievance on that score because the notification in question empowers the <ORG> only to prospect for coal in the petitioner's land and not to acquire it. We cannot accept this contention. The whole object of <ORG> in enacting the law was to empower the <ORG> to acquire coal bearing lands. Prospecting on a piece of land for coal is merely a stage preceding the actual acquisition of that land. If, therefore, those provisions of the law which deal with the question 'of acquisition are unconstitutional the whole Act will be rendered unconstitutional.

Article 31(2) of the Constitution, as amended by the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955, runs thus:

"No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate".

Mr. <NAME> pointed out that s. 13 of the Act, though it deals with the payment of compensation, does not contain any provision for payment of compensation for mineral rights. Not only that, but the explanation to cl. (a) of s. 5 clearly lays down that in computing the compensation for the land the value of minerals will not be taken into account. The acquisition of mineral rights would, therefore, according to him, be impermissible under Art. 31(2) without payment of compensation. The learned Attorney-General quite rightly pointed out that s. 13 deals with the whole subject of payment of compensation to the owner or lessee of the mine for his entire interest in the land including the rights to minerals and even though that section specifically says that the value of the minerals cannot be taken into account in determining the amount of compensation, the concluding words of Art. 31(2) preclude the petitioners from challenging the law. Mr. <NAME> pointed out that the only ground on which <ORG> in their affidavit have tried to sustain the validity of the provisions relating to the acquisition of land under the Act is that a challenge to the validity of the law is barred by the provisions of Art. 3lA(1)(e) and that it is not now open to <ORG> to say that the law can be sustained on another ground. We cannot accept this contention. Where the validity of a law made by a competent legislature is challenged in a Court of law that Court is bound to presume in favour of its validity. Further, while considering the validity of the law the court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the <ORG> and would be free to satisfy itself whether under any provision of the Constitution the law can be sustained. There is no doubt that the entire Act cannot be sustained by resorting only to Art. 31A(1)(e) or to Art. 31(2A) of the Constitution because these provisions do not deal with the question of acquisition and the Attorney-General fairly admitted that it could not be so sustained. The opening words of sub-s. (2) of s. 13 read thus:

"Where the rights under a mining lease are acquired under this-Act, there shall be paid to the person interested compensation, the amount of which shall be a sum made up of the following items, namely............

Then follow the items which have to be added up Undoubtedly they are items of expenditure and interest on such expenditure. Sub-section (3) deals with the procedure to be adopted where the rights acquired under s. 9 relate only to part of the land covered by the mining lease. Sub-section (4) deals with the compensation to be paid where the mining lease ceases to have effect for any period under cl. (b) of s. 5 . Subsection (5) provides for payment of compensation for any land acquired under s. 9 and lays down the principles to be followed in computing the compensation. Sub-section (6) provides for payment of com- pensation for damage done to the surface of any land or any works thereon and in respect whereof no provision for compensation is made elsewhere in the Act. Sub-section (7) deals with the question of compensation for maps, charts and other documents. Section 14 of the Act deals with the method of determining the compensation. It will be clear from these provisions that the Act specifies the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation should be determined and given. This is all that is required of a law relating to the acquisition of property by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Where provisions of this kind exist in a law that Article lays down that such law cannot be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate. Here compensation is specifically provided for the land which is to be acquired under the Act. The land includes all that lies beneath the surface or, as Mr. <NAME> put it, all that is "locked up " in the land. <ORG> has laid down in sub-B. (5) of s. 13 how the value of this land is to be calculated. The contention that the provisions made by <ORG> for computing the amount of compensation for the land do not take into account the value of the minerals is in effect a challenge to the adequacy of the compensation payable under the Act. The concluding words of Art. 31(2) preclude such a challenge being made.

But Mr. <NAME> contended that the minerals are separate tenement and have to be separately compensated for. We have already dealt with the contention of Mr. <NAME> that the minerals underlying the surface are a separate tenement and we need not repeat here all that we have said before. In our opinion the minerals cannot be regarded as a separate tenement except perhaps in a case of a trespass and, therefore, there is no question of the law providing for a separate compensation for them. Apart from that if minerals have become a separate tenement then the present Act may not apply to such a tenement at all. As we have pointed out the coal contained in the two collieries in question is not held by the respective petitioners as a tenement separate from the surface. In the circumstances the challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground that it offends Art. 31(4) of the Constitution fails, and we dismiss the petition with costs. We must say a few words about W. P. 242 of 1960. Out of 737 bighas of land held by the petitioner in that writ petition, we are informed that 321 bighas have been worked. The working,of this mine was closed in the year 1928 on the ground that the mine was flooded. An application Was made by the petitioner for reopening the mine on June 5, 1957. Repeated reminders were sent subsequently but there was no reply to any of them either. In its application the petitioner, it may be stated, did not apply for opening new mines. Since the necessary permission was not received, it did not commence any operations. We are informed that over a million tons of coal was extracted by the petitioner from its colliery in the past. Even so, we do not think that any different considerations could apply to the petitioner's case from those which apply to the case of <ORG> The petitioner's colliery was also dormant for too long a period and was thus an "unworked mine". The impugned Act and the notification made thereunder both apply to it in the same way as they apply to the Sudamdih colliery belonging to <ORG> The writ petition thus fails and is dismissed with costs.

Cost of the hearing be paid half and half by the two petitioners. There will be only one hearing fee, to be divided equally between the two petitioners. Petitions dismissed.


JUDGMENT

1. These writ appeals have been referred to a Full Bench for considering the question whether the existing holders of stage carriage permits are entitled to submit representations and are also entitled to be heard before <ORG> (hereinafter referred to as <ORG>) when it is considering fresh applications filed after 1-7-1989. under Section 70 read with Sections 71 , 72 and 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Incidentally the question has arisen whether the said existing operators are entitled to copies of the applications filed by new applicants under Rule 166 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). As the points arising in all the writ appeals are common it will be sufficient to refer to the facts in W.A. No. 795 of 1990 arising out of W.P. No. 14987 of 1989. The writ petitioner therein (respondent in the writ appeal) is holding a pucca stage carriage permit on the town service route in Gutur town from Syamalanagar to Sivareddipalem via Pattabhipuram, Kanakaragunta Gate, <ORG> and old Bus Stand, the distance of which is 8 K.Ms., is running 24 single trips per day. The petitioner states that there is one more bus in his route making 24 single trips per day, that there are 22 buses having 7 K.Ms. of common sector from Syamalanagar to <ORG> bus stand, in all making 440 single trips per day and that there are about 100 buses belonging to the <ORG> covering the above route fully. According to, the petitioner there is no existing need to provide any additional transport facilities in the above route or on its sector and that even the existing transport facilities are more than the need and he states that he is suffering heavy loss for want of passengers in his bus. He also states that he is the oldest operator on the said route. Coming to know that certain fresh applications have been made for grant of pucca stage carriage permits on certain routes in Guntur town covering his route, the writ petitioner filed an application dated 17-10-1989 before the Secretary, <ORG>, Guntur (1st appellant), requesting him to furnish him certified copies of various new applications filed, covering the petitioner's route with a view to enable him "to file representation against the (sic) end to approach higher authorities if necessary". The 1st appellant refused to grant the same by endorsement dated 21-10-1989 stating that it is not possible to comply with the request as there are a number of applications received for grant of stage carriage permits on various sectors of the town. It was further stated that the writ petitioner may as well ascertain the information from the copy of the agenda published in the notice board of the office of the <ORG> Then the petitioner filed the present writ petition stating that under Rule 166 of the Rules he is entitled to certified copies of the said applications. The petitioner also contended that there is no need to grant any permit on the route, that no traffic survey was conducted to find out the need, that there are no representations from the public for additional transport facilities and that no permit can legally be granted unless such need is first established. Thus the very receipt of applications is illegal. According to the petitioner, the agenda of the meeting will be published only on the date of consideration of the applications by the <ORG> that the agenda does not contain all the particulars mentioned in the various applications and that therefore the writ petitioner cannot make any effective representation. The meeting was proposed to take place on 27-10-1989 and the permits were to be granted on the routes overlapping the writ petitioner's route, he would suffer irreparable loss and hardship. The petitioner therefore prays for the issue of a writ of Certiorari for quashing the orders of the 1st appellant dated 21-10-1989, refusing to grant certified copies and for a positive direction for furnishing certified copies of all applications filed for grant of pucca stage carriage permits on the town service route. Pending the writ petition he prayed for stay of consideration of the applications by the <ORG> on 27-10-1989 as also to the subsequent grant of pucca stage carriage permits or temporary permits. In W. A. No. 796/90 (arising out of W.P. 14969/89 the writ petitioner asked for certified copies of other applications for representing to higher authorities also.

2. The learned single Judge by his order dated 29-3-1989 allowed the writ petitions partly holding that the existing operators were entitled to have certified copies of the applications filed by third parties before the 1st or 2nd appellant if there was common sector between the route granted to the writ petitioner and the route for which fresh applications are made for grant of stage carriage permits and the impugned order was quashed. The <ORG> was further directed before taking a decision to grant fresh permits to consider the representations of the existing operators who are likely to be affected by reason of the grant of fresh permit. The learned single Judge referred to the provisions of Sections 47(1) and 57(3) , (4), (5) of the old Motor Vehicles Act , 1939 and Sections 70 , 71(1) , (2), (3) and 90 of the new Motor Vehicles Act as also Rules 132, 166 and 179 of the new Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and came to the conclusion that the procedure contemplated by the new Act for grant of stage carriage permits did not result in a total exclusion of principles of natural justice. The provisions of Rule 132, according to him, clearly negated such an assumption inasmuch as the proviso to the said rule unequivocally laid down that the <ORG> shall give adequate notice of the meetings and of the business to be transacted at the meetings, "for the information of such persons who being interested in the particular business to be transacted." He held that it was not the intention of the Rule making authority that the information relating to the transaction of the business should be confined only to the applicants for the stage carriage permits. If that were the intention, the rule could have mentioned that the information was to be given to "such persons being interested in the particular business". Under the new Rule 179, the <ORG> has to-bear in mind several guiding principles including whether the new operators are financially sound and whether their performance has been satisfactory. The existing operators, the learned Judge said, cannot make a representation unless they could know the contents of the applications filed by the fresh applicants. Any increase in the permits or in the change of timings would affect their business and if so they would be entitled to prefer revision petitions under Sec. 90 of the new Act before <ORG>. An existing operator will not be able to file an effective revision if he could not file a representation before the <ORG> The business transacted under Rule 132 cannot be said to be purely administrative in character without any likelihood of the interest of others being affected. Even in respect of administrative actions the principles of natural justice apply. The learned Judge referred to <CITATION> , ; <CITATION> , for the aforesaid proposition. He also relied upon the prevailing practice even after the commencement of the New Act, of representations being called for from existing operators. According to him, the words "other relevant documents" in Rule 166 include the applications made by new applicants for grant of permits which might partly or wholly cover the routes of the existing operators. At the pre-decisional stage before <ORG> there could be enquiry into the question whether the existing operators are "interested in an appeal or revision" within the meaning of the said words in Rule 166. The principle of natural justice was clearly embodied in Rule 132. According to the learned Judge, it is possible that grant of copies might be cumbersome if a large number of applications are filed but the <ORG> can evolve its own procedure by fixing some time limit for making representations and quoted <CITATION> , .

3. It is against the above said judgment of the learned single Judge that the present batch of writ appeals have been preferred and have later been referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench of this Court.

4. The case for the appellants has been argued by the learned Advocate General. <NAME>, Sri <NAME>, Smt. Vinobha Devi who appeared for the new applicants supported his contention. For the writ petitioners (respondents in appeals) arguments were submitted by <NAME> and <NAME>.

5. The point arising before <ORG> can be stated as follows: Whether the existing operators on a route are entitled to file representations before <ORG> while the said <ORG> is dealing with grant of stage carriage permits to fresh applicants under Section 72 read with Ss. 70, 71 and 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act , 1988 and whether the existing operators can also claim a right to be heard before the <ORG> and claim, for the aforesaid purposes, a right under Rule 166 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules for grant of certified copies of the applications made by fresh applicants?

6. The Motor Vehicles Act , 1988 has been brought into force with effect from 1-7-1989. It is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. The Statement of Objects and Reasons mentions that the Act is passed after taking into account the changes in the said transport technology, pattern of passengers and freight movements, development of the road net-work in the country and particularly the improved techniques in the motor vehicles management. Various committees like <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG>-mission have gone into different aspects of the road transport and have recommended the updating, simplification and rationalisation of the law. A working group constituted in January, 1984 submitted proposals for a comprehensive new legislation. The said working group took into account the suggestions made by various bodies and institutions like <ORG>, <ORG> and other transport organisation as also manufacturers and.general public, besides, the said group obtained the comments of the State Governments and discussed the same at a meeting of the Transport Ministers of all the States and of the Union Territories. Some of the factors suggested for consideration therein are as follows:-- (a) The fast increasing number of both commercial vehicles and personal vehicles in the country; (b) the need for encouraging adoption of higher technology in automotive sector; (c) the greater flow-of passengers and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances; (d) concern for road safety standard and pollution control measures, standards for transportation of hazardous and explosive material; (e) simplification of procedure and policy liberalisations for private sector operations in the road transport field; and (f) the need for effective ways of tracking down traffic offenders. It is further mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the legislation has been prepared in the light of the above background and among the various items provided therein include, liberalised schemes for grant of stage carriage permits on non-nationalised rules, <ORG> permits also national permits for goods carriages.

7. Though the contentions of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners covered a large ground, we wish to make it clear even at the outset, that we do not propose to decide by hypothetical questions. It is neither necessary nor desirable for us to go into every aspect of the changes brought about by the new Act. We have therefore confined our decision to a very narrow compass consisting of only three inter-related questions concerning stage carriage permits, firstly, whether the existing operators have a legal right to file representations opposing the applications of new applicants after the commencement of the new Act; secondly, whether the existing operators have a right to be heard before fresh stage-carriage permits are granted; and thirdly whether, at the stage of grant of new stage carriage permits, the existing operators can claim a legal right, under R. 166, for grant of copies of the applications filed by the new applicants, for the limited purpose of enabling the existing operators to file representations. We are here concerned with the city town route services in Guntur, whose population is not more than five lakhs.

8. Under the old Act, the procedure contained in S. 47(1) required the factors stated in sub-clauses (a) to (f) thereof to be taken into account by the R.T.A. and it was further specifically provided in S. 47(1) that the R.T.A.:

"Shall also take into consideration any representation made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provisions of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by <ORG>, or by any local authority, or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies."

That would mean that existing operators, or recognised associations local or police authorities could file representations before the <ORG> objecting to grant of permit to new applicants. S. 47(3) further permitted the <ORG> to 'limit' the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. Adverting to S. 47(3) , <ORG> has, however, pointed out in <CITATION> , that while fixing the limit of the number of stage carriages under S.47(3) by the <ORG>, the said authority need not take into consideration any representation of the nature men-tioned in S. 47(1) nor hear the existing operators. <ORG> further pointed out tbat representations mentioned in S.47(l) are referable to representations contemplated by S. 57(3) of the Act. These representations are those made by existing operators to the <ORG>, after the publication of an application for a stage carriage permit. <ORG> further observed that representations contemplated by S. 47(1) and S. 57(3) are representations by existing operators made subsequent to the application for grant of permit and therefore, these representations do not however enter the field of determination of number of stage carriages under S. 47(3) of the (old) Act. The deliberations decision under S. 47(3) as to the number of permits are confined to the <ORG>'s administrative policy based on factors mentioned in S.47(1) and at the stage of S.47(3), there is no question of hearing the existing operators. Thus, even under the old Act, at the stage of limiting the number of permits under S. 47(3) there was no legal right vested in the existing operators either to file representations or to a right of hearing. A right to send representations and to a hearing was given before the <ORG> under S.57(3) only at the stage of actual grant of permit to the new operators.

9. Under the old Act, S. 57(3) provided that if any person filed an application for a permit, the same should be available for inspection, that <ORG> should publish the application and contents thereof and further state that representations (by existing operators) would be received, if sent, within particular time. If the grant of new applications was to result in exceeding the number of permits limited by Sec. 47(3), the applications were to be 'summarily' rejected. In other cases, the existing operators so representing should, under S. 57(5) be heard in the public hearing of the applications of the applicant.

10. The above procedure is changed under the New Act. We shall therefore compare Sec. 47(1) of the old Act and Sec. 71(1) of the new Act; and again Sec. 57(3) & (5) of the old Act and Sec. 80(2) of the new Act.

(A) "Sec. 47(1) (old Act) : Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit:-- (1) <ORG> shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely: --

(a) the interests of the public generally;

(b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken;

(c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served;

(d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service;

(e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending;

(f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area;

and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provisions of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by <ORG>, or by any local authority, or police authority within whose juris,-diction any part of the proposed route or area lies:

Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a co-operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owner."

"Sec. 71(1) (new Act):-- Procedure of <ORG> in considering application for stage carriage permit:-- (1) A <ORG> shall, while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the objects of this Act :

Provided that such permit for a route of fifty Kilometres or less shall be granted only to an individual or a <ORG> undertaking."

Note:-- (S.71(3) indicates procedure for limiting the number of permits in town with population not less than S lakhs).

(B) Sec. 57 (old Act):-- Procedure in applying for and granting permits:-- (3) On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit <ORG> shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the <ORG> and shall publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which and the time and place at which the application and any representations received will be considered;

Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with the modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region or in any area or on any route within the region under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-sec. (3) of S. 47 or sub-sec. (2) of S. 55 , as the case may be, <ORG> may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in this subsection.

(5) When any representation such as is referred to in sub-sec. (3) is made, <ORG> shall dispose of the application at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representative."

"S. 80(2) (new Act):-- Procedure in applying for and granting permits:-- (2) <ORG> shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act Provided that <ORG> may summarily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (3) of S.71 or of contract carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under cl.(a) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 74 :

Provided further that where <ORG> refuses an application for the grant of permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter."

11. It is important to note that there is no reference to any representation in S.7(1) of the New Act, which corresponds to S. 47(1) of the old Act. All that S. 71(1) states is that the <ORG> shall, while considering the applications for stage carriage permit, have regard to "the objects of the Act". While S. 47(3) of the old Act permitted the <ORG> to limit permits in all routes without reference to the extent of population, the new S. 71(3) permits such a limit to number of permits to be imposed only in towns with population of not less than 5 lakhs, that too provided <ORG> and <ORG>

ment so direct, as stated in S. 71(3) of the new Act. There is also no reference to the factors (a) to (f) referred to in S. 47(3) or to the filing of any representations by the existing operators of associations, local authority or police authorities. Nor is there any reference to submission of representations in S. 80(2) of the new Act which corresponds to S. 57(3) of the old Act. Further, under the first proviso to S. 80(2) , the applications for permits are liable for summary rejection if the grant thereof will result in exceeding the number of permits limited under S. 71(3) for city routes in towns with population of not less than five lakhs. Under the second proviso to S. 80(2) , a right of hearing is limited to the applicant alone and if the permit is to be refused, reasons shall have to be given.

12. So far as the right of existing operators to send representations and seek a right of hearing are concerned, identical questions arose in the <ORG> of Uttar Pradesh after the <ORG> amendment in <ORG> Act 25 of 1972. By that amendment, S.47(1) was amended by omitting the right of representation to existing operators given under the Central Act . However that right in so far as local and police authorities were/concerned was retained. It was held by a Division Bench of <ORG> in <NAME> v. <ORG> that, after the <ORG> amendment, the right of representation by existing operators has ceased to exist as the said provision is dropped.

13. The said U.P. amendment omitting the right of representation by existing operators, came up for consideration before <ORG> in <CITATION> . . Adverting to the right of a rival operator to object to the grant of the application of other persons, <ORG> referred to Art. 19(l)(g) and (6) of the Constitution of India and held that rival operators have no right to represent against the grant of permit to other persons. Such a right to represent, if it has to be conferred on an existing operator, it can be done only by way of a law made under Art. 19(6) in the interests of the general public. <ORG> observed (in para 8) :

"The fact that some others have also been enabled to obtain permits for running buses cannot constitute a violation of the appellants' rights under the above two cls. ((f) and (g)) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The above provisions are not intended to grant a monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons. No right guaranteed to any private party by Art. 19 of the Constitution of carrying on trade and business without competition from other eligible persons. Cl. (g) of Art. 19(1) gives a right to all citizens subject to Art. 19(6 ), to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It is an enabling provision and does not confer a right on those already practising a profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants from practising that profession or from carrying on that occupation, trade or business. The said provision is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons."

The aforesaid judgment of <ORG>, therefore, makes it clear that an existing operator has no fundamental right to a monopoly of the trade, business or occupa tion and after the omission by the U.P. amending Act of 1972 of the right of representation by existing operators, no such right could be claimed. We may add that viewing the matter from the point of view of the new applicant's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g ), the said right can be fettered only to the extent specified by law made under Art. 19(6). Under the old Act, the fetters on this fundamental right of the new applicant included a right conferred on existing operators and others under Ss.47(1), 57(3), (5) to represent. Those fetters have now been removed under S.71(1) and S.80(2) of the new Act of 1988. An existing operator, in our view, cannot, therefore, claim a right of representation or a right to be heard before the <ORG> These rights have been specifically omitted in the new Act by <ORG>.

14. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners (respondents) however relied upon a later decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> . to contend that the decision in <CITATION> . no longer holds the field. In view of the subsequent statutory changes in <ORG> we are of the view that this contention cannot be accepted. What happened in <ORG> was that, after the <ORG> Amendment of 1972 to the Motor Vehicles Act , 1939 it was found that certain anomalies had arisen in the working thereof, particularly in regard to the provision allowing an unrestricted number of stage carriage permits to be granted. With a view to remedy the situation, the <ORG> Legislature amended the Act again by the <ORG> Act 15 of 1976 permitting restriction of the number of permits. Thereafter the Central Act was also amended by <ORG> in certain respects by Act 47 of 1978. Even so the State Government had issued certain notifications dated 10-1-1981 and 23-1-1981 permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit. <ORG> held that these notifications were inconsistent with the limitations as to number of permits introduced afresh by the <ORG> Amending Act, 1976 and were bad. Their Lordships referred to the earlier judgment in <CITATION> . and said that the judgment was good as the law stood before the <ORG> Amendment Act , 1976 and that once the <ORG> Legislature had itself changed the law in 1976, the State Government could not have issued notifications inconsistent with the amending Act of 1976. It is, therefore, clear from the judgment in <CITATION> . that <ORG> nowhere-doubted the correctness of its earlier judgment in <CITATION> fact, it stated (at para 19) :

"Without saying anything more on the point, it may be stated that whatever this <ORG> may have observed while considering that provision would not apply now as there is a clear departure made by the <ORG> from that policy when it enacted the new sub-sec. (2) of S.43-A."

We may point out that <ORG> nowhere said in <CITATION> . that even after the U.P. Amendment of 1972, (which are similar to the provisions of the present Act of 1988) omitting the provisions relating to the right of representation and right of hearing to existing operators, the existing operators have a right to represent or a right to be heard before the R.T.A. Hence, this latter decision, far from supporting the writ petitioners, supports the appellants as it reiterates the correctness of <NAME> v. State of U.P. according to the law as it stood before the U.P. Amendment of 1976.

15. We may, in the context of Article 19(1)(g) and (6) also refer to four other rulings of <ORG>. In <NAME> v. R.T.A. Calcutta Region , smaller taxis at cheaper rates were introduced by orders of the R.T.A. and the same was questioned by taxi-owners who were to charge higher rates, on the ground that their business would be affected. The contention was rejected by <ORG> holding that if other persons were also allowed the right to carry on the same occupation and an element of competition was introduced in the business, that did not amount to violation of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). In another case in <CITATION> relating to change of location of existing rice-mill which adversely affected the business of another miller in the locality, it was held that a compelitor in the business (owner of another rice-mill), could have no grievance against the grant of permission to another under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act , 1958 and the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) was subject only to such restrictions as are imposed under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution of India. A similar question arose again under the Bombay <ORG> Regulation Act, 1953 and the Bombay <ORG> Rules (1954) in <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578. It was held, on an elaborate consideration of the case-law, that the said Act and Rules did not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trader to lodge an objection in response to a notice published under R.4. The proprietor of a <ORG> theatre holding a licence for exhibiting films had no legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which could be subjected to or threatened with injury as a result of the grant of no objection certificate' to the rival trader. After elaborately discussing the meaning of the words 'aggrieved person' in various laws, <ORG> observed (see para 46):

"Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. by <NAME>, p. 357, para 85). The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it is that such harm done to an individual is again to society at large."

and again stated (para 49):

".......the result of the exercise of discretionary powers, in his (existing licence) favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema * business in the town, and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental right of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions imposed by law'."

Again, in <CITATION> . the question arose under the M.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act and <NAME> case AIR 1976 SC 578 above referred to, was followed.

16. Viewing therefore from the perspective of Art. 19( 1 )(g)  & (6) of the Constitution of India, it is clear that the existing operators have no 'legal right'to object to the grant of a permit to rival operators. Any injury by way of loss of business to the existing operators cannot, in law, be treated as a 'legal injury'. There would be no legal injury if such injury was the result of exercise of a fundamental right by another person.

17. Learned counsel for the writ peti-

tioners while accepting that there is no express provision in the new Act either in S. 71(1) or S. 80(2) conferring on the existing operators a legal right to file representations or for being heard have, however, contended that such a right has to be 'implied' by law. We shall now refer to this aspect of the matter.

18. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners (respondents) Sri. T. Venkataramana and Sri M. V. Ramana Reddy, referred to <CITATION> (AIR 1967 SC 1267); <CITATION> . ; <CITATION> ;_ National Textile Workers' Union v. <NAME> Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India <NAME> v. State of H.P. ; <CITATION> ; <CITATION> ; <ORG> v. Govt. of A.P. and Re Liverpool Taxi Owners' Assn. (1972) 2 All ER 589 for the proposition that 'whenever an order is passed by any authority which is likely to affect the rights of another person, such person must be given a reasonable opportunity to submit his objections. It is also stated in these decisions that principles of natural justice are to be implied and that there can also be a post-decisional opportunity in certain cases. On the other hand the learned Advocate General has referred to <CITATION> and <CITATION> . to contend that principles of natural justice can be expressly excluded and that such exclusion can be necessarily implied in certain cases.

19. In our view, there can be no quarrel with the general propositions of law referred to above by the learned counsel. No doubt, principles of natural justice can normally be implied even if there is no express provision therefore whenever the rights of a party are affected. But, at the same time, it is equally true that they can be excluded by the statute expressly or by necessary implication. This depends again on the intendment of the legislature, the provisions of the particular statute and the facts and circumstances of the case. We, therefore, once again come back to the question as to what is the position under the new Act of 1988?

20. We have noticed that under the old Act, there were provisions in Sec. 47(1) as well as S. 57(3) and (5) enabling existing operators to submit their representations and for a hearing to be given to them. But under the new Act, 1988 these provisions have been deliberately dropped by <ORG>. The Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly states that the new Act proposes to liberalise the grant of permits. In such a situation, it is, in our opinion, not open to this Court to imply and read into the new Act, the same provisions which have been deliberately and expressly omitted. The new applicants for grant of stage carriage permits are obviously exercising their fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) to carry on their occupation, trade or business. Such a fundamental right can, no doubt, be restricted by an existing law or a new law, by the imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public under Art. 19(6). It is for <ORG> from time to time to define the limits up to which the said fundamental right unde'r Art. 19(1)(g) can be reasonably restricted. Under the old Motor Vehicles Act , 1939 the restrictions included one which enabled-an existing operator to represent and also to be heard in opposition. That restriction has now been deliberately removed and thereby the fundamental right of the applicant is not now as restricted as it was before the new Act. Further an existing operator cannot be said to suffer any legal injury (vide <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578) if a new rival operator is proposed to be introduced. These being the factors governing the situation, we are of the view that <ORG> intended to negative any right to the existing operators either to submit their representations or to a right to a hearing under S. 71(1) or S. 80(2) of the new Act. It is therefore not open to the Court to imply principles of natural justice and add further restrictions than what <ORG> considered sufficient, according to its new legislative policy. A similar change in the legislative policy brought about by <ORG> in 1972 has already had the approval of <ORG> and <ORG> as stated in detail earlier.

21. The decision in Re Liver Pool Taxi Owners' Association (1972-2 All ER 589) relied upon by Sri <NAME> for the writ petitioners turned, as stated by <ORG> in <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578 on the peculiar facts therein and in particular on the assurance or undertaking given by the officials of <ORG> and cannot help the writ petitioners. There, the number of taxi-cabs had been limited since 1948 to 300 by the licensing authority namely <ORG>. In 1970, after learning that the <ORG> proposed to increase the number of licences, the taxi-cab owners' association took up the matter with the '<ORG>. On 24th July, 1970 and 28th October 1970 the town-clerk of the <ORG> wrote to the solicitors of the association that the interested parties and the association would be fully consulted and heard before any decision was taken. In July, 1971, the matter came up before a sub-committee of the <ORG>, the association was heard and the limits proposed by the Committee were approved by the council and finally on 4th August, the Chairman of the sub-Committee gave an undertaking that no licences additional to the existing 300 licences would be issued until the proposed legislation, which was under consideration, had come into force. But this undertaking was not adhered to later on the ground that it had no legal basis and the <ORG> unilaterally resolved on 22nd December, 1971 to increase the number of licences. <ORG> held that the undertaking that was given was compatible with the <ORG>'s statutory duties and that it could be prohibited from acting contrary to the said undertaking. It is important to notice that under S. 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, the <ORG> had a right to 'limit' the number of licences. Further, there was an undertaking given on behalf of the <ORG>. Adverting to this decision, it was observed in J. M.

<CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578, by <NAME> as follows (see paras 24, 25):

"It may be noted that in this case, the whole question turned on the effect in law of the , undertaking and whether the applicants had been treated fairly.

Emphasising the 'very special circumstances' of the case, the <ORG> read into the statute, a duty to act fairly in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Thus, a corresponding right to be treated fairly was also imported by implication in favour of the applicants. Viewed from this standpoint, the" applicants had an interest recognised in law which was adversely affected by the impugned action. They had suffered a wrong as a result of the unfair treatment on the part of the <ORG>."

The abovesaid English decision is therefore clearly distinguishable. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners attempted to argue that the above English case was not based on the undertaking alone. We are unable to agree with this contention particularly in view of the observations of <ORG>. So far as the decision in <CITATION> . is concerned, that decision related to the locus standi of the petitioner tenant therein to file a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India questioning an exemption granted by the <ORG> under S. 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act , 1976 to the owner of the premises. It was held that though the petitioner had locus standi to file a writ petition, the petitioner's legal rights as such were not affected and also that it had no right to be heard. While locus standi occupied a 'larger area' governing the right to approach the <ORG> under Art. 226 , every such person could not claim a legal right to be heard before the <ORG> under S. 20(1) of the said Act. For the purposes of application of principles of natural justice, the question according to the learned Judges was merely whether 'any legal power has been exercised over a person affecting his legal rights and not whether he has some legal right to move the <ORG>s. For that purpose, the <ORG> relied upon the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578.

22. It was then argued for the respondents by Sri M. V, <NAME> that the <ORG>, was a quasi-judicial tribunal and that it was a body exercising powers in 'public interest' and therefore it ought to receive representations from existing operators and give them a right of hearing. In our view, the provisions of S. 71 and S. 80 in the new Act as compared with Ss. 47 and 57 of the old Act clearly define the limits of the restrictions to be imposed in 'public interest' under Art. 19(6) and therefore, the <ORG>. while exercising powers under the new Act has necessarily to bear in mind those restrictions and cannot impose any other restrictions in the context of Art. 19(6 ), that were statutorily imposed earlier by Ss. 47 and 57 of the old Act.

23. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that when the <ORG> is dealing with new applications for grant of stage carriage permits, existing operators cannot claim any legal right to file representations or a right for being heard.

24. We shall next refer to the right of the existing operators to obtain copies of the applications filed by new applicants under Rule 166 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 166 reads thus:

"166. Levy of fees for supply of copies of documents:-- The Secretary, <ORG>, and Secretary, <ORG>, <ORG> or any authority specified by the said Tribunal may in its discretion give any person interested in an appeal or revision a certified copy of the decision or an order or of any other relevant documents on payment of a fee of Rupees two, such payment being made by means of <ORG> fee stamps affixed to the application for each such copy of the decision, orders, petition or documents."

It will be noticed that, under the said Rule, the <ORG> may, in its discretion, give any person interested in an appeal or revision, a certified copy of the decision or an order or of any other relevant documents on payment of the fee. In the present case, the applications filed by the writ petitioners before the <ORG> do not anywhere say that the applicants are interested in filing an appeal or revision. On the other hand, they merely say that they, as existing operators, require the certified copies of the applications filed by other applicants with a view to file 'representations' and that unless such certified copies are granted, they will not be in a position to file effective representations. Hence the applications of the writ petitioners do not, in our view, satisfy the requirements of R. 166. Further, we are of the view that the question of filing any application for a certified copies of the orders, decisions, petition or documents referred to in R. 166 arises only after the <ORG> disposes of the application for grant of stage carriage permit and not before that stage.

25. So far as W.A, No. 796/90 (arising out of W.P. No. 14969/89) is concerned, where copies are asked also for purpose of submission of representation to higher authorities, we may state that R. 166 does not cover such a situation.

26. We may point out that even after the grant of such permits, the existing operators, have, as conceded before us, no right of appeal under S. 89 of the Act. There is no provision for appeal by existing operators.

27. It is no doubt argued by Sri <NAME> and Sri. M, V. Ramana Reddi that the existing operators are, however, entitled to file revisions under Sec. 90 as 'persons aggrieved'. Reliance for that purpose is placed upon the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> . wherein it was held, with reference to S. 64-A of the old Act, that though the existing operators had no right to represent at the stage of Sec. 47(3) when the public need is gone into and the <ORG> decides to open a new route, the existing operators could file a revision under Sec. 64-A. It is argued, on the said anology, that even if existing operators have no right to represent or right to be heard at the stage of Ss. 71 and 80, they could still file revisions under S. 90 . We do not think it necessary for the purpose of the cases before us to decide the question whether existing operators could file revisions under S.90 against orders granting stage carriage permit to applicants inasmuch as the matter in these writ petitions is still at the stage of grant of permits by the <ORG> and also because the question whether they had a right of revision will depend upon the scheme of the Act.

28. There was also some argument before us as to whether under S. 89(2) of the new Act permits for stage carriage ought to be ordinarily granted as a matter of course in cases not covered by S. 71(3) . While for the appellants and for some of the new applicants it was argued that was the positional was argued for the writ petitioners (respondents) and for some of the other new-applicants, that even in cases not covered by S. 71 (3) of the new Act, it is incumbent on the <ORG> to bear in mind the guidelines referred to in R. 179 of the new A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (corresponding to Rule 212 of the old Rules). We do not think it necessary to decide this question either.

29. The only and limited question therefore decided by us is that whenever fresh applications are filed under S.72 read with Ss. 70, 71 and 80 of the new Motor Vehicles Act , 1988, existing operators have no legal right !o file representations before the <ORG> Nor can they claim any right to be heard by the <ORG> It may however be open to them to send whatever representations they may like to send, as a matter of information, to the <ORG> but this they cannot claim as of right. If any representations are so sent, it is open to the <ORG> to consider them if there is anything relevant in the said representations. But the <ORG> may or may not consider every such representation sent by the existing operators. Nor can the existing operators claim any legal right to be heard before the <ORG> under any circumstances. They cannot also claim a right to be given certified copies under R. 166 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, of any applications filed by fresh applicants (who are seeking stage carriage permits) on the ground that such copies are necessary 'for filing effective representations' before the <ORG> We do not decide any other question or questions which may have been incidentally referred to during the arguments, as it is not relevant for the question being decided by us.

30. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeals are allowed, the orders of the learned single Judge are set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 330/- in each case.

31. Appeals allowed.