PETITIONER: A.K. NIGAM Vs. RESPONDENT: SUNIL MISRA DATE OF JUDGMENT13/05/1994 BENCH: YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J) BENCH: YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J) KULDIP SINGH (J) CITATION: 1994 SCC Supl. (2) 245 JT 1994 (4) 31 1994 SCALE (2)1030 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J.- This is an appeal on behalf of appellants S/Shri A.K. Nigam, <NAME> and <NAME> against the judgment dated 5-3-1993 of <ORG>, New Delhi, in O.A. No. 1422 of 1987 filed by Respondent 1 <NAME> challenging the seniority list of <ORG> (JS/SS) Officers as on 1-3-1987. By the aforesaid order the Tribunal had accepted the application of Respondent 1 and held that the appellants herein could not be ranked senior to him.

2. For appreciating the controversy it would be necessary to refer to the facts.

3. Appellants 1 and 2 were appointed to the grade of Section Officers (Rs 650-1200) (Group 'B') in the <ORG> (<ORG>) on the basis of <ORG>, etc. Examination, 1977 and joined the service on 9-7-1979 and 21- 7-1979 respectively. Appellant 3 joined the <ORG> as Section Officer (Rs 650-1200) (Group.'B') on 10-6-1980 based on the <ORG> etc. Examination, 1978.

4. <NAME>, Respondent 1, appeared in the Civil Services Examinations held in 1980 and was selected for <ORG> (in short TRPS) as direct recruit Class 1 Officer on 12-1-1982.

5. On 25-7-1983 the appellants applied for promotion to Junior Scale, Group 'A' of IRPS from <ORG>, when options were called for from them.

6. On 15-2-1984 the appellants were found suitable for appointment to Junior Scale, Group 'A' of IRPS by a duly constituted DPC and as such were promoted to the above grade from RBBS against 50% quota reserved for Class 11 Officers. Appellants 1 and 2 were substantively appointed to the Junior Scale of IRPS on 15-2-1984 and by applying clause (a) of principle (vii) of the Principles for determining the Relative Seniority of Class 1 Officers of All Services on Indian Railways Except Officers of the Medical Department and other Misc. Categories (in short 'Principles'), reckoning the weightage for seniority, their date for increment in time-scale worked out to 15-2-1979. Appellants 1 and 2 were to get Rs 900 in Junior Scale, Grade 1 while appellant 3 Rs 940 and as such were entitled for maximum weightage of 5 years for the purpose of seniority. Taking into account the pay, the appellants were to get in Junior Scale, Grade 'A' of IRPS, the appellants were granted benefit of weightage in seniority to the maximum extent of 5 years and thus, the seniority of the appellants were reckoned from 15-2-1979 so far as appellants 1 and 2 were concerned and 24-12-1980 so far as the appellant 3 was concerned, by going 5 years backward who was substantively appointed to the Junior Scale, Grade 'A' of IRPS on 24-12- 1985.

7. Appellants 1 and 2 having completed 5 years' service on 15-2-1984 itself were posted in Senior Scale, Grade 'A' of IRPS as soon as they joined their respective railways viz., <ORG> (appellant 1) <ORG> (appellant 2). They were also promoted to Junior Administrative Grade with effect from 14-5-1987 by reckoning their services from 15-2- 1979, as one who has completed 8 years of service, is eligible for consideration for promotion to Junior Administrative Grade.

8. On 21-5-1987 <ORG> circulated a seniority list of <ORG> Officers to all the zonal railways, vide its letter dated 21-5-1987. The said seniority list did not contain the name of appellant 3 as his date for increment in time-scale was decided only during 1988.

9. Aggrieved by this seniority list, Respondent 1 made a representation to the Chief Personnel Officer, <ORG>, Kapurthala, Jullundur. However, the same was rejected and Respondent 1 was informed that the seniority to the appellants has been correctly assigned. Against the rejection of his representation by order 20-8-1987, Respondent 1 filed OA No. 1422 of 1987 before <ORG>, Principal Bench, New Delhi.

10. It will be noticed that the challenge before the <ORG> was to the grant of weightage of 5 years to the appellants for purposes of seniority as per principle (vii). There was no challenge either to grant of increments in timescale to appellants 1 and 2 to 15-2-1979 and to a similar date to appellant 3, who was to get Rs 940 whereas appellants 1 and 2 to get Rs 900 in Junior Scale, Grade 'A'.

11. One thing may.be noticed that the seniority in <ORG> is not governed by the date of joining. If one looks at the Principles, as approved by the President, principle (i) is - "the seniority of officers, appointed to various <ORG> (Class 1) shall be determined on the basis of the 'date for increment on time-scale' to be specifically determined in each case in accordance with these principles". It is not an invariable rule that seniority should be determined only on the basis of the respective dates of appointment to the post and that any departure from it would be unreasonable and illegal. It is open to the rulemaking authority to take a note of the relevant circumstances obtaining in relation to each department and determine objectively the rules that should govern the inter se seniority and ranking. The dates of increment of the appellants in time-scale having been specifically determined by the authorities before Respondent 1 joined service, he has to rank junior to the appellants. Besides, principle

(vii), which is the relevant principle, may be extracted for understanding its scope:

"Principle (vii) In the case of Class II Officers permanently promoted to Class 1 Services, if two or more than two officers are promoted on the same date their relative seniority will be in the order of selection. Subject to the aforesaid provisions the seniority of officers, permanently promoted from Class 11 to Class 1 services, shall be determined by giving weightage based on-

(a) the year of service connoted by the initial pay on permanent promotion to Class 1 Service; or

(b) half the total number of years of continuous service in Class II, both officiating and permanent; whichever is higher, subject to a maximum weightage of five years."

12. It was in accordance with principle (vii)(a) that the date of increment on time-scale for the appellants was determined. Once this position becomes clear, there is no difficulty in applying principle (vii).

13. The principle of granting seniority on the basis of weightage of past service and lower service to the category of promoting (sic promoted) officers is well known and well recognised in the service jurisprudence.

14. We may mention that the appellants were initially members of <ORG> and were thus actively associated in personnel matters and it was because of this that <ORG> thought it fit to provide avenue for promotion to these officers in <ORG>. The nature of working being done by them while working for <ORG> was similar to the work which they were required to perform in superior service, viz., <ORG>.

15. The principle for conferment of limited benefit or weightage was held to be not unreasonable or illegal by this Court in the case of <CITATION> .

16. Learned counsel for Respondent 1, however, referred us to the decision of this <ORG> in the <CITATION> 2. It will be noticed that there was no principle like principle (vii) in the service which this <ORG> was dealing with in that matter. Learned counsel then referred us to the decision of this <ORG> in <CITATION> 3. It will be noticed that there the dispute was in relation to fixation of seniority between existing employees and those taken over from an autonomous body after its dissolution. Although 1  : 1992 SCC (L&S) 539 : (1992) 20 ATC 226 2 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334: 1991 SCC (L&S) 1070: (1991) 16 ATC 936: JT (1991) 2 SC 279 3 1980 Supp SCC 341 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 250 employees of the erstwhile body were not recruited on the basis of qualification prescribed for <ORG> servants, credit or weightage given to them for their service in that body for the purpose of seniority in the <ORG> Department in which they were given fresh appointments. The Bench of this <ORG>, on facts, did not find it reasonable and thus held that it violated Article 16 of the Constitution.

17. It is settled law that the appointing authority or the appropriate <ORG> can frame rules governing seniority which are reasonable keeping in mind the divergent claims that can be put forward by the various categories of the members of the service. It is, however, necessary that there should be no discrimination, that is, persons placed in the same group must be treated similarly and, further, that any principle which is made the basis of determination of seniority should, if applicable to others, be applied to them also. In other words, if seniority is to depend purely upon the date of confirmation or the date of appointment, that rule should be applicable to all; but if the promotees and special recruits are being given weightage, the principles applicable to the members of the service should be kept in mind while determining the weightage to be given or while laying down rules for determination of seniority.

18. In the case of <CITATION> this Court considered the rules of seniority contained in the Regulation of Seniority Rules and the Special Recruitment Seniority Regulations, 1960 to be valid not offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Under Rule 3(3)(b) of the Regulation of Seniority Rules the year of allotment of a promotee was to be determined by his continuously officiating on a senior scale post included in <ORG>. Under Regulation 3(3) of the Special Recruitment Seniority Regulations, 1960, the year of allotment of special recruits was to be determined by the formula. While upholding the validity of these rules and not regarding them to be arbitrary or discriminatory, it was observed that the promotees can claim that total length of service in <ORG> be considered for determining seniority. On the other hand, the direct recruits can say that the seniority should depend upon their entry in <ORG>. This Court took the view that the rule contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 3(3) was a mean between these extreme views and was regarded to be just and fair. Similarly, the rule contained in Regulation 3(3) of the Special Recruitment Seniority Regulations, 1960 was considered to be fair and equitable.

19. There are similar principles for determination of seniority between promotees and direct recruits to <ORG>. Those rules also contemplate an order of allotment being given to a promotee which may be much earlier to his actual induction in <ORG> when he was still in <ORG> and weightage was given to the year of allotment for purposes of seniority.

20. In the present case the RBSS is in the nature of a lower grade of similar service. The appellants were promoted from Class II Service to Class 1 Service and rules having been framed for determining the seniority based on the grant of 4 AIR 1968 SC 754: (1968) 2 SCR 611 : (1969) 1 LLJ 373 increments. Having once determined the date of increment, rest follows and consequently the conferment of seniority.

21. Learned counsel for respondent 1 submitted that these very appellants had earlier appeared in the present Class 1 Service but had not qualified and were selected only for Class 11 Service and when Respondent 1 was selected for Class 1 Service, the appellants were still in Class 11 Service.

22. We are afraid this argument has no merit once we uphold first the principle of seniority and second the provision for grant of weightage. The principle for determination of seniority had not been challenged before us. Only challenge before us was the grant of weightage for past service as Class II Officers.

23. As we have noticed earlier even the order by which the date of earning increment in time-scale was determined by the appropriate <ORG> for appellants 1 to 3 was never questioned and in any case could not be questioned while challenging the seniority list which was prepared as late as in 1987.

24. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of <ORG>, Principal Bench, New Delhi, dated 5-3-1993 is set aside. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.


PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY DATE OF JUDGMENT21/08/1990 BENCH: <NAME>, K. BENCH: <NAME>, K. SAIKIA, K.N. (J) CITATION: 1991 AIR 14 1990 SCR (3) 825 1991 SCC (1) 761 JT 1990 (3) 609 1990 SCALE (2)297 CITATOR INFO : D 1992 SC1075 (7) ACT: Presidency Small Cause <ORG> Act , 1882 as amended by the Maharashtra Amendment Act 1963, Amendment Act 1976 and Amendment Act , 1984. Section 42A , 46(2) and 47- -Tenancy terminated in terms of covenant of lease by notice under Transfer of Property Act , 1882--Whether ejectment can be sought under Section 41 of Bombay Presidency Small Cause <ORG>s Act, 1882. Major <ORG>s Act , 1963: Section 29(1)(a) & (b) read with Section 133(2A) --Application to port of Bombay--Effect of repeal of the <ORG> Act, 1879--Quit notice concerning vested immovable property--Whether ejectment suit can be filed. Transfer of Property Act , 1882: Sections 106 , 109 and 111(h) quit notice issued by assistant estate manager of <ORG>--Filing of ejectment suit by <ORG>--Whether maintainable. General Clauses Act , 1897: Sections 6 and 17- -Whether there is any inconsistency between the Major <ORG>s Act , 1963 and the <ORG> Act 1879 Operation, efficacy and effectiveness of quit notice issued by assist- ant estate manager under the <ORG> Act . Indian Evidence Act , 1872: Section 115- -Promissory estoppel--Doctrine of--Applicability of plea against govern- ment and municipal body--Actions of <ORG> in exercise of legislative or statutory powers-Public authorities acting beyond scope of authority--Inapplicability of doctrine--Doctrine of executive necessity--Quit notice issued by Assistant Estate Manager--Plea of promissory estoppel by tenant-Validity of. HEADNOTE: The respondent a statutory body corporate constituted under the <ORG> Act, 1879--a ' <ORG> Act ' who had appointed an Assistant Estate Manager as their power of attorney holder to lease out its property from time to time, terminate the leases and to lay action for ejectment, etc.; leased out the suit property to the appellant. 826 The appellant was served with a notice under Section 106 read with Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 terminating the tenancy in terms of the covenants of lease and directing delivery of possession of the demised property giving one month's time from 22nd January 1975. The notice was served on the tenants on January 28, 1975 and became effective from 28th February, 1975. In the meanwhile, the Major <ORG> Act , 1963,--a ' Central Act ' was made applicable to the <ORG> by operation of Section 133(2A) thereof with effect from February 1, 1975. After the expiry of one month from the suit notice an ejectment application was filed under Section 41 of the Bombay Presidency Small Cause <ORG>s Act, 1882 as amended under the Maharashtra 1963 Amendment Act , and a direction was sought for delivery of possession. After the Maharashtra Amendment Act 19 of 1976 came into force suits were laid against the three other tenants of the demised property. The respondent pleaded in the said suit that it was a successor-ininterest of the <ORG> under the <ORG> Act , and was entitled to eject the tenants and to take possession of the demised portions. The appellant contended in his written statement that the suit was not maintainable since the <ORG> Act ceased to be operative with effect from February 1, 1975, the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act became ineffective and without determining the tenancy afresh the suit was not validly laid. It was further submit- ted that the respondent had promised that on deposit of a certain amount which the appellant-tenant did, he would be given to lease a portion in the reconstructed building, and consequently the respondent was estopped by promissory estoppel to have the tenant ejected. One suit was dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was not duly determined as per law, while the other suits were decreed. No appellate forum had been prescribed under the Maha- rashtra Amendment Act of 1963 but a substantive suit on the original side provided was available, but such a right to appeal was incorporated by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 19 of 1976. The appellant filed a writ petition in <ORG> under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the other tenants filed regular appeals to a Bench of two Judges of <ORG>, which were pending. 827 In the writ petition of the appellant-petitioner challenged the vires of sections 2,3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Amending Act, 1963 introducing Section 42(A) in Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause <ORG>s Act and deleting Sections 45 to 47 from the Principal Act and of amendment of SectiOn 49 thereof; as well as Section 46(2) of the Presidency Small Cause <ORG>s Act as amended by the Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1976 as offending Article 14 of tile Constitution. When the matter came up before the Single Judge of <ORG> it was referred to <ORG>, which upheld the constitutional validity of the said sections and remitted the matter to the Single Judge for disposal on merits. The Single Judge considered the matter and negatived the two points raised by the appellant-petitioner regarding validity of the notice terminating tile tenancy, and also the plea of promissory estoppel, and dismissed the writ petition. The appellant appealed to this <ORG> by special leave under Article 136. It was contended on behalf of the appel- lant that the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section III(h) of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid and that by issue of the said notice no right accrued to the respondents and that the termination of tenancy became operative only on expiry of one month given thereunder i.e. February 28, 1975, by which date the <ORG> Act became inop- erative, as from February 1, 1975 the Central Act had come into force; that termination of tenancy was an act inter vivos by operation of Section 106 read with Section III(h) of the Transfer of Property Act , and that under Section 109 , the respondent not being a living person, was not entitled to the benefit of the quit notice as its operation was not saved by Section 2(d) and Section 5 of the said Act. It was also contended that the respondents were estopped from ejecting the appellant and other tenants who were similarly situated on the principle of promissory estoppel, as the Estate Manager of the respondent in his letter dated April 3, 1972 directed the tenant to deposit Rs. 11,000 for grant of tenancy after reconstruction of the flats therein and placing reliance thereon the tenants having deposited the amount demanded from them and acted upon the promise to their detriment, the respondents shall be declared to be estopped from ejecting the tenants from the demised respec- tive portions leased out to them. The appeal was contested on behalf of the respondents by contending that when right, title, and interest in immovable property stood transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Section 109 of the 828 Transfer of Property Act will apply; and the successor-in- interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor and that as the Estate Manager had no authority to give a promise, and that even assuming that he had such a power, it was a conditional one, namely, approval by the <ORG>, and that the <ORG> having resolved to reject the claim, and on reconstruction decided to allot to its own employees out of administrative necessity, the principle of promissory estop- pel cannot be applied. Dismissing the appeal, this <ORG>, HELD: 1. When right, title and interest in immovable property stand transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act per force would apply and successor-ininterest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor. This is what the Single Judge of <ORG> has held and the view is approved as correct. The notice terminating the tenancy of <ORG> would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ejectment. [836H; 837A- <CITATION> , AIR 1924 Madras 908; <CITATION> .,  Suppl. 1 SCR 700; <CITATION> .,  1 SCR 493 and Lower v. <NAME>, [ 1963] 1 Queen's Bench Division 959, referred to. <CITATION> , AIR 1953 Mysore 62, over-ruled. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27, p. 193; Hill and Redman in Law of Landlord and Tenant, 17th Edition Vol. I, p. 488, p. 405; Mulla--Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, p. 676 and Chitaley's Transfer of Property Act , 4th Edn. 1969, Vol. III, Note 35, referred to. 2(i) The functionaries under both the <ORG> Act and the Central Act are the same. The notice was issued by the Assistant Estate Manager by virtue of his official function as power of attorney agent on behalf of the respondent- The <ORG> of Trustees have the right to terminate the lease under Section 26 of the <ORG> Act and these rights stood transferred and vested under Section 29(1) of the Central Act. Therefore the termination of tenancy and laying the action for ejectment are integrally connected with their official capacity. There is a reasonable connection between the impugned acts and officials duty. Thereby, they are the acts done under the Central Act . [839C-E] 829 2(ii) The notice under Section 106 and Section III(h) of the Transfer of Property Act is an act done or purported to have been done in the official capacity as Power of Attorney holder/Assistant Estate Manager on behalf of the respondent, <ORG> of Trustees; the right to lay the suit on expiry of one month's period prescribed in the notice, namely, on or after February 28, 1975 had accrued to the respondent. It is an act done or purported to have been done under the Central Act in exercise of the official function. The right to lay the suit on determination of the tenancy by notice dated January 20, 1975 under the <ORG> Act is a transfer of inter- est by operation of Section 29(1) of the Central Act, to the respondent under Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thereby the quit notice is valid. The suit laid, pursu- ant thereto, is valid and legal. Accordingly order of eject- ment passed by the Small Cause <ORG> is perfectly legal and unassailable. [840B-E] Commissioner for the <ORG> of Calcutta v. <NAME> & Co.; <CITATION> .,  3 SCR 397, referred to. 3(i) The doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established one in the field of administrative law. This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law. This doctrine would be displaced in a case where equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. But the Government must be able to show that in view of the facts as have been transpired, public interest would not be prejudiced. Where the Government is required to carry out the promise the <ORG> would have to balance, the public interest in the Government's carrying out the promise made to the citizens, which helps citizens to act upon and alter' his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promises were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. [841B; 842G-H; 843A] 3(ii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel would equally apply to a private individual as well as a public body like <ORG>. It cannot be applied in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It cannot be invoked to compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law. There may be no promissory estoppel against exercise of legislative functions. [843B-C] 3(iii) Promissory estoppel cannot be used for compelling the 830 Government or a public authority to carry out a representa- tion or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make. It being an equitable doctrine it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority, for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. [844B-D] 3(iv) Promissory estoppel should not be extended, though it may be rounded on an express or implied promise stemmed from the conduct or representation by an officer of the <ORG> or public authority when it was obtained to play fraud on the Constitution and the enforcement would defeat or tend to defeat the Constitutional goals. [844D] <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 366; <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 854; <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 641; <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 689; <CITATION> .,  Supp. 3 SCR 123 at 144; <CITATION> .,  65 STC 430 and Asstt. <CITATION> . etc. etc.,  3 SCR 946, referred to. 4. Before making the public authority responsible for act of its subordinate, it must be established that the subordinate officer did in fact make the representation and as a fact, is competent to make a binding promise on behalf of the public authority or the Government, ultra vires acts do not bind the authority and insistence to abide by the said ultra vires promise would amount to putting premium and legitimacy to ultra vires acts of subordinate officers. [847D- <CITATION> ,  AC 837 and Attorney General for Ceylon v.A.D. Silva,  AC 461, referred to. 5. The letter dated April 3, 1972 written by the Estate Manager is a conditional one, namely, that on fulfilling certain conditions indicated in that letter he would make recommendation to the <ORG> for grant of lease, condition precedent being that the tenant would deposit the required sum of about Rs. 11,000 and odd with the respondent. Un- doubtedly, the tenants completed that part of the obliga- tion. Thereafter it was placed before the <ORG>, who by resolution dated 831 September 10, 1974, considered.,it, but was rejected on the ground that after reconstruction the building would be required by its staff. [845C-E] 6. The Estate Manager is merely an intermediary to collect the material between the respondent <ORG> and its tenants and to place the material for consideration to the <ORG>. Thereby the Estate Manager is not clothed with any authority much less even ostensible authority to create a promise so as to bind the respondent, that the respondent would allot the rooms on reconstruction to the tenants. The promise of him is an ultra vires act, though conditional and, therefore. it does not bind the respondent. Though the executive necessity has not been satisfactorily established, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be extended in favour of the appellant and other tenants. [847E-G] 7. When a constitutional question has been raised and does arise for consideration, unless there is a fulldressed argument addressed by either side before this <ORG> no satisfactory resolution could be made. Mere paraphrasing the judgment of <ORG> in particular when it relates to the local laws is no proper decision making. [849A-B] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1348 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.7. 1985 of <ORG> in W.P. No. 3144 of 1981.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Appellant. <NAME>, Solicitor General, <NAME>, <NAME>. Mrs. <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respond- ents.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the State of Maharashtra.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. 1. The respondent is a statutory body corporate initially constituted under the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 (Bombay Act 6 of 1879), for short ' State Act '. Under Sec. 26 thereof, the <ORG> has power to acquire and hold movable and immovable property and also has power to lease, to sell or otherwise convey movable and immovable property which may have become vested in or acquired by them. The respondent has appointed <NAME>, Assistant Estate Manager as their power of attorney holder to lease out its properties from time to time or terminate the leases and to lay action for ejectment, etc. The re- spondent owns the Building bearing Old R.R. No. 941 known as 'Frere Land Estate" in which room No. 2 admeasuring 28.27 sq. meters was leased out to <NAME>, for short '<NAME>'. The appellants are his legal repre- sentatives. He was served with a notice under Sec. 106 read with s. 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy in terms of the covenants of lease and was asked to deliver possession of the demised property giving one month's time from 22nd January, 1975.

It was served on <ORG> on January 28, 1975. The notice of termination thereby became effective from 28th February, 1975. In the meanwhile Major Port Trust Act , 1963 (Act No. 38 of 1963), for short the " Central Act ", was made applicable to <ORG> by operation of s. 133 (2A) with effect from February 1, 1975. After the expiry of one month, ejectment application was filed under s. 41 of the Bombay Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (Act 15 of 1882) as amended under 1963 Maharashtra Amendment Act, against <ORG> and another for delivery of possession. After 1976 Amendment Act 19 of 1976 came into force suits were laid against three other tenants. It was pleaded by the respondent that it is a successor in interest of the <ORG> under the State Act and were entitled to eject the tenants and to the possession of the demised portions. The plea of <ORG> in his written statement elaborated by the learned counsel, is that the suit is not maintainable. Since the State Act ceased to be operative with effect from Febru- ary 1, 1975, the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section 111(h) of Transfer of Property Act became ineffective and without determining the tenancy afresh, the suit was not validly laid. It was also pleaded that the respondent had promised that in deposit of certain amount which the tenant did, <ORG> would be given on lease of a portion in the reconstructed building. Thereby the re- spondent is estopped by promissory estoppel to have the tenant ejected. It may be mentioned at this juncture that one suit was dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was not duly determined as per law. Other suits were decreed. No appellate forum has been prescribed under Amendment Act of 1963 but a substantive suit on original side provided was available. By Maharashtra Amendment Act 19 of 1976 to the principal Act such a right to appeal was incorporated. <ORG> filed writ petition in <ORG> under Articles 226 and 227 and others filed regular appeals to a Bench of two Judges of <ORG> and are stated to be pending.

2. In the writ petition the petitioner challenged the vires of 1963 Amendment Provisions and also 1976 Amendment Provisions to the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act . When it came up for heating before <NAME>, J., he referred it to <ORG>. <ORG> by its judgment dated January 17/18, 1982 up-held the constitutional validity of those sections and remitted to the learned Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition on merits. The learned single Judge considered and negatived two points namely, validity of the notice terminating the tenancy; promissory estoppel and dismissed the writ petition. <NAME> had leave of this Court under Art. 136.

3. The primary contention of Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the appellant, is that quit notice issued under Sec. 106 read with Sec. III(h) of the T.P. Act is invalid. By issue of quit notice no right had accrued to the respondent. Termination of tenancy became operative only on expiry of one month given thereunder, i.e. February 28, 1975, by which date the State Act became inoperative as from February 1, 1975 the Central Act came into force. The respondent under the Central Act acquired, by statutory operation, the immov- able property including the demised one in Frere Land Estate and thereby became a new landlord. Termination of tenancy is an act inter vivos by operation of Sec. 106 read with Sec. III(h) of T.P. Act . Under Sec. 109 thereof, the respondent, not being a living person, is not entitled to the benefit of the quit notice as its operation is not saved by Sec. 2(d) and Sec. 5 thereof. The suit, thereby, is not maintainable admittedly no quit notice determining the tenancy was issued after February 1, 1975. The edifice of the argument was built up on shifting sand and when it was subjected to close scrutiny it crumbled down traceless. Let us first deal with the arguments on the foot of the provisions of T.P. Act . Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides saving of the previous operation of law. It states that: " ...... nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect save as provided by Sec. 57 and Chapter IV of this Act, any transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Section 106 empowers the landlord to terminate the contract of lease of immovable property, if it is for agricultural or manufacturing purpose by giving six months notice and ter- minable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by giving fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy. Section ill(h) provides that, "on the expira- tion of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other". Section 109 is Rights of lessor's transferee: "If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transfer- ee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, sub- ject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to Provisos are not necessary, hence omitted.

4. Reading of these fascicule of provisions clearly demonstrates that a lessee of immovable property from month to month is terminable by giving fifteen days' notice or as per the terms of the contract of the lessee. (In this case the contract provides to give one month's notice). On expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the notice the lease shall stand terminated. The lessor's right on transfer of the immovable property including the lease hold rights created on the property sold, the transferee, in the absence of contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights and if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabili- ties of the lessor as to the property or part thereof so long as he is owner of it. But by mere transfer the lessor shall not cease to be subject to any liabilities imposed upon him by contract of lease unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him.

5. Undoubtedly, by issuance of notice to quit automati- cally the right created thereunder, namely, cessation of the lease, does not become effective till the period prescribed in the notice or in the statute i.e. Sec. 106 expires. On expiry thereof the lease becomes inoperative and the lessor acquires right to have the tenant ejected. When he fails to deliver vacant possession, the lessor would be entitled to have the tenant ejected and taken possession in due process of law. The successor in interest whether acquires these rights and the rights acquired by lessor would enure for his benefit is the crucial question.

6. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27, paragraph 193 discussed the right accrued to the transferee of the benefit of the notice to quit issued by the predecessor in title thus: "The notice when once given enures for the benefit of the successors in title of the landlord or tenant giving it."

<NAME> and <NAME> in "Law of Landlord and Tenant", 17th Edition, Vol. I, at page 488, paragraph 405 have stated to the similar fact thus:

"The notice when once given enures for the benefit of the successor in title of the landlord or tenant giving it."

In <NAME>'s commentary on the Transfer of Property Act , 6th Edition, at page 676 it is also stated thus: "Notice enures for the benefit of the successor in title of the lessor or lessee giving it."

In Chitaley's Transfer Property Act , 4th Edn., 1969:, Vol. III, Note 35, it is stated thus:

"Where the lessor gives notice to quit and then assigns his interest to another the assignee can take advantage of the notice."

<CITATION> , AIR ,1924 Madras 908 a Division Bench of <ORG> held that:, "English cases recognise that the person who is the landlord and entitled to possession, on the date of the notice to quit, is the proper person to give the notice and :that an assignee within the currency of that notice can take advan- tage of the notice sent by his assignor and rely upon it, when he brings a suit for recovering possession.,,

7. No doubt Mr, <NAME> placed strong reliance on the decision of <CITATION> .,  Suppl. 1 SCR 700. The facts therein are that in 1943 a lease on agricultural land for five years was created- Before the expiry thereof Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 was made applicable to the area where the land was situated and under Sec. 23(1)(b) of that Act the period of lease was statutorily extended to ten years-During the subsistence of the contractual tenancy it was statutorily extended and the Bombay Act 67 of 1948 came into force. In March 1952 notice was given to the tenant that the tenancy expired on March 31, 1953 and called upon the tenant to deliver possession. In the meanwhile the Bombay Act 33 of 1952 came into force. Its effect was that the lease automatically stood extended for ten years from time to time, unless terminated by giving one year's notice averting that the land was required bona fide by the landlord for personal cultivation and that income would be the main source of income of the landlord. It was contended that since 1952 Amending Act was not retrospec- tive, the technical requirement of notice to quit do not apply. The question was whether the landlord was entitled to eject the tenant without complying with the statutory re- quirement. In that context it was held by <ORG> that by operation of the statutory provisions the period of lease of 10 years from time to time was automati- cally extended unless the tenancy was validly terminated by giving a notice of one year or surrender was made by the tenant as specified in the statute. The ratio therein has little application to the facts of this case. <CITATION> .,  1 SCR 493 the lease was granted by the Administrator without authority under the Statute. Therefore, the lease was held to be void. The notice as required under T.P. Act was held to be mandatory, but was not done. Therefore the lease was subsisting and thereby as his land was acquired the tenant was entitled to compensation pro rata under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. We are at a loss to understand, how the ratio thereunder will be of any assistance to the appellant. In Lower v. <NAME>, [ 1963] 1 Queen's Bench Division 959 the question therein was whether the notice to quit was a valid notice. Admittedly, second notice was given before the expiry of the first notice. It was held that when such notice were issued withdrawing the first notice by issuance of the second notice, a new tenancy has been creat- ed for the tenant to remain in possession until the expiry of the later notice on September 29, 1961, to which the tenancy sections 2(1) and 23(1) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948 would apply. Accordingly it was held by <ORG> that there was no valid notice to quit. The ratio therein also is of no avail to the appellant. No doubt in <CITATION> , AIR 1953 Mysore 62 <ORG> of Mysore High Court held that the successor in interest is not entitled to avail the notice to quit given by the original landlord. In the light of the above discussion this view is not good law.

8. It is no doubt true that per se sec. 109 of T.P. Act does not apply to the facts of this case. It contemplates transfer of lessor's right inter vivos. But when right, title and interest in immovable property stand transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Sec. 109 per force would apply and successor in interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor. This is what the learned single Judge of <ORG> in the impugned judgment has held and we approve of the view as correct. We, accordingly, hold that the notice terminating the tenancy of <ORG> would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ' ejectment.

9. The matter could also be gleaned through the statuto- ry operation as well. By operation of Sec. 26 of the State Act , <ORG> acquired and held the demised property which includes lease hold interest therein. Section 29(1) of the Central Act interposed and from February 1, 1975 the appointed date, in relation to <ORG> all the movable and immovable property, assets and funds of the predecessor <ORG> shall vest in the <ORG>, i.e. the respond- ent. By operation of Clause (b) thereof all debts, obliga- tions and liabilities incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done, by with or for the Central <ORG>., or as the case may be, the other authority (i.e. predecessor <ORG> under State Act ) immedi- ately before such day, for or in connection with the pur- poses of the port, "shah be deemed to have been incurred, entered into and engaged to be done by, with or for the <ORG>." It further postulates that all rates, fees, rents and other sums of money due to the Central <ORG>., or as the case may be, the other authority (i.e. the predecessor <ORG>) in relation to the port immediately before such day shall be deemed to be due to the <ORG>, i.e. the respondent. Other clauses are not necessary. Hence omitted. Thereby by operation of Sec. 29(1)(b) the immovable properties, i.e. demised rooms and all contracts in relation thereto includ- ing the lease and the right to ejectment pursuant to quit notice stood transferred to the respondent. Sub-section 2(A) of Sec. 133 'Repeal' of the Major Port Trusts Act , 1963 states that on the application of the Central Act to <ORG>, except the provisions thereof relating to municipal assessment of the properties of the port of Bombay and matters connected therewith, shall cease to have force in relation to that port. But subclause

(c) of sub-section (2D) of Sec. 133 provides that notwith- standing anything contained in sub-section (2A) (2B) and (2C) anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken including ....... notice ........ issued ...... shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken on the corresponding provisions of this Act. By operation of Sec. 29(1)(a) & (b)read with Sec. 133(2A) the quit notice concerning the vested immovable property i.e. the demised rooms vested in the respondent shall be deemed to have been done or taken under Sec. 29(1) and Sec. 133(2A)(C) of the Central Act. There is no inconsistency between the Central and the State Act s in this regard. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 postulates the effect of repeal thus:

'Where this Act or any (Central Act ) or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a dif- ferent intention appears, the repeal shall not--

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so re- pealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder' or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so re- pealed; or .....

any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced ....... as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." Section 17(1) provides under:

"In any (Central Act ) or Regulation made after the commence- ment of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of indicating the application of a law to every person or number of persons for the time being executing the functions of an office, to mention the official title of the officer at present executing the functions of an office, or that of the officer by whom the functions are commonly executed." Section 17 of the General Clauses Act substitutes the func- tionaries under the Central Act to those of the function- aries under the State Act . Section 6 gives effect to the previous operation of anything done or subsists the right acquired or privilege accrued under the Repealed Act and the legal proceedings of remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed. There- fore, the operation, efficacy and effectiveness of the quit notice issued by the power of attorney Agent of the respond- ent i.e. the Asstt. Estate Manager has been acquired by the respondent Board. The rights and remedy accrued to the respondent under the State Act namely termination of tenancy by issue of quit notice under Sec. 106 and 111(h) of T.P. Act and on expiry of thirty days i.e. on February 28, 1975 the respondent Board became entitled to institute the proceedings in the suits to have the tenants ejected under Sec. 41 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act .

10. The contention of Mr. <NAME> that the Central Act and the General Clauses Act would apply only to the acts done under the Central Act or State Act , by exercise of the statutory power which alone have been validated and they have no application to bilateral acts under Central Act and the notice under Sec. 106 of T.P. Act is not the one either under the Central or the State Act and that the notice issued is not saved, is devoid of force. <ORG> under the State Act have merely changed their hats and stand transposed to be functionaries under the Central Act . The functionaries under both the Acts are the same. The notice was issued by the Asstt. Estate Manager by virtue of his official function as power of attorney agent on behalf of the respondent. <ORG> have the right to terminate the lease under Sec. 26 of the State Act and those rights stood transferred and vested under Sec. 29(1) of the Central Act . Therefore, the termination of tenancy and laying the action for ejectment are integrally connected with their official capacity. There is a reasonable connec- tion between the impugned acts and official duty. Thereby, they are the acts done under the Central Act . In Commission- er for <ORG> v. <NAME> & Co., Sec. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act came up for interpreta- tion. Thereunder it was contended that short delivery of the goods was an omission and not an act done under the Act and though the suit was laid beyond three months, it was not barred by limitation. Section 142 enjoins that no suit shall be brought in for anything done or purported to have been done beyond three months. It was held that after the expiry of three months from the day on which the cause of action had arisen for short delivery, which was done or purported to have been done under the Act, the suit was barred by limitation. It was further held that in order to apply any bar under Sec. 142 it was first to determine whether the act which is complained of in the suit can be said to have been within the scope of the official duty of the person or persons who are sought to be made liable. This question can be answered in the affirmative where there is a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the official duty. Once the scope of official duty is determined, Sec. 142 will protect the defendant not only from a claim based on breach of the' duty but also from a claim based upon an omission to perform such duty. The protection cannot be held to be confined to acts done in the exercise of a statutory power but also extends to acts done within the scope of an official duty. This view was upheld in <CITATION> .,  3 SCR 397 where there was short delivery of one bundle out of 153 bundles consigned from Japan and omitted to be delivered and it was held to constitute an act done within the ambit of Sec. 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 and the bar of limitation pre- scribed thereunder would apply. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the notice under Sec. 106 and Sec. 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act is an act done or purported to have been done in the official capacity as Power of Attorney holder/Asstt. Estate Manager on behalf of the respondent, <ORG>; the right to lay the suit on expiry of one month's period prescribed in the notice, namely, on or after February 28, 1975 had accrued to the respondent. It is an act done or purported to have been done under the Central Act in exercise of the official function. The right to lay the suit on determination of the tenancy by notice dated January 20, 1975 under the State Act is a transfer of inter- est by operation of Sec. 29(1) of the Central Act , to the respondent under Sec. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act . Thereby the quit notice is valid. The suit laid, pursuant thereto, is valid and legal. Accordingly order of ejectment passed by <ORG> is perfectly legal and unassailable.

11. The next contention of Mr. <NAME> is that the re- spondents are estopped from ejecting the appellant and other tenants who are similarly situated on the principle of promissory estoppel. His contention is rounded upon the fact that the Estate Manager of the respondent in his letter dated April 3, 1972 directed the tenant to deposit Rs. 11,000 and odd for grant of tenancy after reconstruction of the flats therein. The tenants placing reliance thereon have deposited the amount demanded from them and acted upon the promise to their detriment. The respondent now shall be declared to be estopped from ejecting them from the demised respective portions leased out to them. The learned Solici- tor General contended that the Estate Manager has no author- ity to give a promise. Even assuming that he has such a power, it is conditional one, namely, approval by the <ORG>. The <ORG> in its meeting resolved to reject the claim and on reconstruction decided to allot to its own employees out of administrative necessity. Therefore, the promissory estoppel cannot be applied. The principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or. intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and it is in fact so acted upon the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established one in the field of admin- istrative law. This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law. <CITATION> ., as he then was, speaking for <ORG> of this Court while upholding the application of promissory estoppel to execu- tive acts of the ,State negated the plea of executive neces- sity thus:

"We are unable to accede to the contention that the execu- tive necessity releases the <ORG> from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to theft detriment. Under our constitutional set up no person may be deprived of his right or liberty except in due course of and by if a member of the <ORG> seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or liberty otherwise than in exercise of power derived from the law common or statute--the <ORG> will be competent to and indeed would be bound to protect the rights of the aggrieved citizens."

It was further held in its summing up thus:

"Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, not claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen."

<CITATION> ,  3 SCR 854 Shah, J. again extended this doctrine of promissory estoppel against public authori- ties thus:

"This court refused to make distinction between a private individual and a public body so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned."

In <ORG> v. <ORG> of Uttar Pra- desh, [1979] 2 SCR 641 Bhagwati, J., as he then was, applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the executive action of the <ORG> Government and also denied to the <ORG> of the doctrine of executive necessity as a valid defence. It was held that in are public governed by rule of law, no-one high or low is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. The <ORG>. cannot claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estopped. Equity will, in a given case where justice and fairness demands, present a person from exercis- ing on strict legal rights even where they arise not in contract, but on his own title deed or in statute. It' is not necesary that there should be some pre-existing contrac- tual relationship between the parties. The parties need not be in any count of legal relationship before the transaction from which the promissory estoppel takes its origin. The doctrine would apply even where there is no pre-existing legal relation-ship' between the parties, but the promise is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal rela- tionship which will arise in nature. It was further held that it is indeed pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned-. The former is equally bound as the latter There- fore, the Government cannot claim any immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel and it cannot say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner i.e. fair and just or that it is not bound by the consi derations of honesty and good faith. In fact, the Government should be held to have a high standard of rectitude while dealing with its citizens. Since the doctrine Of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield where the equity so re- quires. If it can be shown by the <ORG>. that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequita- ble to hold the <ORG>. or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the <ORG> would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case. because on the facts, equity would' not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. But the <ORG>. must be able to show that in view of the fact as have been tran- spired, public interest. would not be prejudiced. Where the <ORG>.is required to carry out the promise the <ORG> would have to balance, the public interest in the Government's carrying out the promise made to the citizens, which helps citizens to act upon and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promises were required to be carried out by the Government and deter- mine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough just to say that the public interest' require that the <ORG>. should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the <ORG>. were required to honour it. In order to resist its liability the <ORG>. would disclose to the <ORG> the various events insisting its claim to be exempt from liability and it would be for the <ORG> to decide whether those events are such as to render it equita- ble and to enforce the liability against the <ORG>. There fore, we are holding that the doctrine of promissory estop- pel would equally apply to a private individual as well as a public body like <ORG>. It was held that it cannot be applied in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It cannot be invoked to compell the <ORG>. to do an act prohibited by law. There may be no promissory estoppel against exercise of legislative functions. Legisla- ture can never be precluded from exercise of its legislative functions by resorting to doctrine of promissory estoppel. The plea of executive necessity, though was rejected, its rigour was mellowed down to the above extent indicated above. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, though doubted in <NAME> v. <ORG> of Haryana, [1980] 3 SCR 689 was af- firmed and reiterated by a Bench of three Judges in <CITATION> .,  Supp. 3 SCR 123 at 144 Bhagwati, the Chief Justice, while; reiterating the law laid down in <ORG> case (supra) made it clear thus:

"there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Govt. or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is equally true that promissory estoppel Cannot be used to compel the Gov- ernment or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires; if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts: as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the <ORG> would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority."

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was reiterated by another Bench of three Judges in <CITATION> .,  (65) STC 430 and Asstt. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, <ORG>, etc. etc.,  3 SCR 946.

12. It is equally settled law that the promissory estop- pel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise-which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public author- ity to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority, for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Govern- ment or public authority to .the promise or representation made by it. The <ORG> on satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against Government or the public authority. Equally Promissory estoppel should not be extend- ed, though it may be rounded on an express or implied prom- ise stammed from the conduct or representation by an officer of the <ORG> or public authority when it was obtained play fraud on the constitution and the enforcement would defeat or tend to defeat the constitutional goals. For instance a fight to reservation either under Art. 15(4) or 16(4) in favour of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or backward classes was made with a view to ameliorate their status socially, economically and educationally so as to assimilate those sections into the main stream of the society. The persons who do not belong to those classes, but produce a certificate to mask their social status and secure an ap- pointment to an office or post under the <ORG> or public employment or admission into an educational institution maintained by the <ORG> or receiving aid from the <ORG>, on later investigation, though belated, was found that the certificate produced was false and the candidate was dis- missed from the post or office or debarred or sent out from the institution or from the balance course of the study, the plea of promissory estoppel would always be found favour with the courts and being easily extended in favour of the candidate or party that played fraud on the Constitution. It would amount not only putting a premium on the fraud on the Constitution, but also a denial to a reserved candidate and the general candidate as well. Therefore, the plea of prom- issory estoppel should not be extended to such areas.

Though Executive necessity is not always a good defence, this doctrine cannot be extended to legislative acts or to acts prohibited by the statute.

13. When it seeks to relieve itself from its application the Government or the public authority are bound to place before the <ORG> the material, the circumstances or grounds on which it seeks to resile from the promise made or obliga- tion undertaken by insistence of enforcing the promise, how the public interest would be jeopardised as against the private interest. It is well settled legal proposition that the private interest would always yield place to the public interest. The question, therefore, is whether promise, in fact, was made by the Estate Manager on behalf of the re- spondent and whether the Estate Manager is competent to make such a promise and whether it binds the respondent. The letter dated April 3, 1972 written by the Estate Manager is a conditional one, namely, that on fulfilling certain condi- tions indicated in that letter he would make recommendation to the Board for grant of lease, condition precedent being that the tenant would deposit the required sum of about Rs. 11,000 and odd with the respondent. Undoubtedly, the tenants completed that part of the obligation. Thereafter admittedly it was placed before the Board, who by resolution dated September 10, 1974 which is at page 228 to 237 of the paper book, considered it, but was rejected on the ground that after reconstruction the building would be required to its staff. Therefore, the decision has stemmed from its execu- tive necessity, but that ground by itself would not be sufficient unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the <ORG> that as against the interest of the private tenants the interest of its employees is of such as absolute impor- tance that without allotment of the quarters to the staff the work of <ORG> cannot be carried out. No such material has been placed before us. But the crucial circum- stance would be whether an unequivocal promise in fact was made and the Estate Manager was competent to make promise.

14. In <NAME> v. <ORG> [1951] A.C. 837 the facts are that ship repairers in a naval vessel carried out certain work in contravention of para 1 of the Restriction of Repairs of Ships Order, 1940, the <ORG> acting under regulation 55 of the Defence (Gener- al) Regulations, 1939 directed that repairs or alteration of ships would not be carried out except under the authority of a licence granted by the <ORG>. The defence was that work was carried out with the oral permission of the licenc- ing authority officer of the <ORG>. In <ORG> Lord <NAME>, laid the rule of promissory estoppel that whenever Government Officers in the deal-

ings with the subject, take on themselves to assume authori- ty in a matter with which he is concerned the subject is under entitlement to rely on their having the authority which they assume. He does not know and cannot be expected to know the limits of their authority and he ought not to suffer if they exceed it. On further appeal <ORG> while reversing the view, Lord <NAME> stated thus: "I know of no such principle in our law nor was any authori- ty for it cited. The illegality of an act is the same wheth- er or not the actor has been misled by an assumption of authority on the part of a <ORG> officer however high or law in the hierarchy. I do not doubt that in criminal proceedings it would be a material factor that the actor had been thus misled if knowledge was a necessary element of the offence, and in any case it would have a bearing on the sentence to be imposed. But that is not the question. The question is whether the character of an act done in face of a statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it has been induced by a misleading assumption of authority. In my opinion the answer is clearly No. Such an answer may make more difficult the task of the citizen who is anxious to walk in the narrow way, but that does not justify a differ- ent answer being given."

Lord Normand stated at page 849 thus:

"But it is certain that neither a minister nor any subordi- nate officer of the <ORG> can by any conduct or representa- tion bar the <ORG> from enforcing a statutory prohibition or entitle the subject to maintain that there has been no breach of it."

In Attorney General for Ceylon v. A.D. Silva, [1953] A.C. 461 <ORG> was called upon to consider whether the Collector of Custom was authorised to create a promise as against the crown. Considering that question at page 479 it was held that:

"All "ostensible" authority involves a representation by the principal as to the extent of the agent's authority. No representation by the agent as to the extent of his authori- ty can amount to a "holding out" by the principal. No public officer, unless he possesses some special power, can hold out on behalf of the <ORG> that he or some other public officer has the right to enter into a contract in respect of the property of the <ORG> when in fact no such right exists.. Their Lordships think, therefore that nothing done by the Principal Collector or the Chief Secretary amounted to a holding out by the <ORG> that the Principal Collector had the right to enter into a contract to sell the goods which are subject matter of this action."

In Administrative Law by Wade, 6th Edition at page 385 it is stated thus:

"If the force of law is given to a ruling from an official merely because it is wrong, the official who has not legal power is in effect substituted for the proper authority , which is forced to accept what it considers a bad decision. To legitimate ultra vires acts in this way cannot be sound policy, being a negation of the fundamental cannons of administrative law."

Thus we have no hesitation to hold that before making the public authority responsible for acts of its subordi- nate, it must be established that the subordinate officer did in fact make the representation and as a fact. is compe- tent to make a binding promise on behalf of the public authority or the <ORG>, ultra vires acts do not bind the authority and insistence to abide by the said ultra vires promise would amount to putting premium and legitimacy to ultra vires acts of subordinate, officers. It is seen from the record that the Estate Manager is merely an inter- mediary to collect the material between the respondent <ORG> and its tenants and to place the material for consid- eration .to the Board. Thereby the Estate Manager is not clothed with any authority much less even ostensible author- ity to create a promise so as to bind the respondent, that the respondent would allot the rooms on reconstruction to the tenants. The promise by him is an ultra vires act, though conditional and, therefore, it does not bind the respondent. Though the executive necessity has not been satisfactorily established, we hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the light of the above facts cannot be extended in favour of the appellant and other tenants.

16. Sri <NAME> further submitted that the tenant did not derive title, namely, lease-hold right from the respondent <ORG> under the Central Act . That the tenant disputed the title and it is a sufficient defence under the explana- tion to section 43 to non suit the respondent in the summary proceeding. It was open to the respondent to file a regular suit. <ORG> ought to have rejected the application on that ground and <ORG> would have gone into the question. It being a pure question of law, this court may permit the appellant to argue on the point for the first time in this Court. It is undoubtedly true as held by <NAME> of decisions of this Court that a pure question of law, untraveled by questions of fact, which goes to the roots of the jurisdiction. could be permitted to be raised for the first time in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. We are afraid. we cannot permit the appel- lant to raise this point for the following reasons:

Firstly, except making a bald averment in the written statement that the "suit is not maintainable" nothing has been pleaded in detail in the written statement. Admittedly this point was neither taken in the writ petition nor argued in <ORG>. It is not even raised in the grounds of appeal in this Court nor even in points raised in the synop- sis of the case, It is stated that remotely it was raised in the rejoinder. Since it is a mixed question of facts and law and not being a pure question of law, we cannot permit to raise the point for the first time, that too, when it would prejudice the respondent of their case at this stage. We accordingly decline to go into the question. We would also straighten the record and state that the appellants raised in the writ petition the vires of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Amending Act, 1963 introducing Sec. 42(A) in Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and deleting Sections 45 to 47 from the Principal Act and of an amended Sec. 49 thereof as well as Sec. 46(2) of the Presi- dency Small Cause Courts Act as amended by Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1976 as offending Art. 14 of the Constitu- tion, and unsuccessfully argued before <ORG> of <ORG> same point was raised in the grounds of appeal in this court. Though the appeal was argued for three days, Mr. <NAME> did not argue this point across the <ORG>, nor we had the advantage of hearing the learned Solicitor General. Even in a written brief running into 44 pages submitted by the counsel, he did not deal with this point. The counsel, after arguing the two points dealt with earli- er, has devoted his time on the question of jurisdiction of the trial court under Sec. 41, despite our repeatedly re- minding him that this point was neither raised, nor argued in <ORG>, At the end he stated that he had elabo- rately argued the point of vires before the Single Judge and <ORG> and except repetition of the same once over, he could do no better by-further arguing here. There- fore, this Court could go through the judgment and deal with the point. We deprecate this practice. When a constitutional question has been raised and does arise for consideration, unless there is a full-dressed argument addressed by either side before this court no satisfactory resolution could be made. Mere para- phrasing the judgment of <ORG> in particular when it relates to the local laws is no proper decision making. Therefore, after giving our anxious consideration, we, with great anguish. decline to go into the point. Except these. no other points have been argued. Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal.

17. The appeal is dismissed. but in the circumstances with- out costs.

N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.