PETITIONER: <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY NORTH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/1965 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S. CITATION: 1965 AIR 1636 1965 SCR (2) 908 CITATOR INFO : R 1966 SC1466 (7) RF 1967 SC1643 (120) R 1968 SC 779 (12) R 1970 SC2067 (14) R 1972 SC 236 (5) F 1972 SC1880 (3,27,49) RF 1972 SC1982 (91) R 1976 SC1141 (5) RF 1980 SC2056 (61) F 1989 SC1298 (7) R 1989 SC1933 (24) ACT: Indian Income-tax Act , s. 66(4) -Power of High <ORG> to ask <ORG> to submit supplementary statement of case after further investigation of facts-Stare decisis- Power of Supreme <ORG> to review and revise earlier judgments-When should be exercised. HEADNOTE: The appellant was a company registered in the erstwhile Baroda State. In connection with the assessment year 1942- 43 the Income-tax Officer Ahemdabad held that certain sale proceeds were received by the appellant in British India and the profit thereon was taxable under the Indian income-tax Act, 1922. One of the items in dispute related to the sale- proceeds collected by collecting cheques on British India <ORG>. In respect of the said item the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Appellate <ORG> decided against the appellant, and thereafter, reference was made to <ORG>. <ORG> felt that it required further facts to decide the reference and twice remanded the case to the <ORG> for investigation of those facts. The <ORG> after taking evidence submitted a supplementary Statement of Case on each occasion. Finally <ORG> decided the question against the appellant, but granted it a certificate of fitness to appeal to <ORG>. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that <ORG> had no jurisdiction to direct the <ORG> to collect additional material and make it a part of the supplementary Statement of Case under s. 66(4) as had been decided by this <ORG> in the cases of <ORG> and <ORG>. On behalf of the <ORG> it was contended that these two cases required reconsideration. The <ORG> therefore had to consider whether it should review and revise its earlier view taken in the said two cases. HELD : (i) The view contended for on behalf of the <ORG> namely, that <ORG> had power to ask the <ORG> to investigate further facts and submit a supplementary Statement of Case was a reasonably possible view. But on the other hand the opposite view taken by this <ORG> in <ORG> case and the <ORG> case was also reasonably possible. The latter view had been followed by this <ORG> on several occasions and it had regulated the procedure in reference proceedings in <ORG>s ever since the decision in <ORG> case was pronounced. Besides, no reported decision had been cited at the bar where the question about the constitution of s. 66(4) was considered and decided in favour of the view con- tended for by the <ORG>. No case therefore was made out for a revision or review of the <ORG>'s decisions in <ORG> and <ORG> cases. [928 C-F] Case law discussed. The New jahangir <CITATION> - tax, Bombay North,  1 S.C.R. 249 and' The Petlad Turkey Red Dye 909 <CITATION> ,  Supp. 1 S.C.R. 871, affirmed. (ii) The principle of stare decisis cannot be pressed into service in cases where the power of this <ORG> to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions is invoked, because that power is inherent in this <ORG>; but nevertheless the normal principle that judgments pronounced by this <ORG> would be final cannot be ignored. Unless considerations of a subs- tantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so this <ORG> should and would be reluctant to review and revise its earlier decisions. [923 B-D] Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar  2 S.C.R. 603, distinguished. (iii) If the <ORG> is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should not hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the <ORG> must be satis- fied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the <ORG> in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations-What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based ? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the <ORG> not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this <ORG> bearing on the point not noticed ? Is the <ORG> hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good ? Has the earlier decision been followed on subquent occasions either by this <ORG> or by <ORG>s ? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief ? These considerations become still more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of five learned Judges of this <ORG> [922 B-F] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1017 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 30th and 31st, 1960 of <ORG> in Income-tax Reference No. 2 of 1949.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant. <NAME>, Attorney-General, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, C.J. When this appeal was argued before a Division Bench of this Court on October 23, 1964, it was urged on behalf of the appellant, <ORG>, that in view of the present decisions of this Court in <CITATION> and. Saurashtra(1), and <CITATION> - tax, Bombay, Ahmedabad (2), the appeal must be allowed and the case sent back to <ORG> for disposal in accordance with the principles laid down in the latter decision. At that stage, the learned Attorney-General for the respondent, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad, urged that he wanted this Court to reconsider the said two decisions. He fairly conceded that if the said two decisions were to be followed, the appeal would have to be allowed and sent back as suggested by the appellant. The learned Judges constituting <ORG> took the view that an opportunity should be given to the learned Attorney-General to press his contention, and so, they directed that the appeal be placed before a Bench of five Judges. Thereafter, this appeal came on for hearing before <ORG> on November 5, 1964. On this occasion again, the same contentions were raised on behalf of the appellant and the respondent respectively Mr. <NAME> for the appellant urged that it would be inappropriate to reconsider the recent decisions on which he relied, and he argued that on the merits, the view taken by this Court in the said two decisions was sound and correct. On the other hand, the learned Attorney-General contended that he wanted this Court to reconsider the said two decisions, and he pointed out that the matter was of importance, and so, the appeal should be referred to a larger Bench in view of the fact that the decision in the case of <ORG> (2) was a unanimous decision of a Bench consisting of five Judges of this Court. It was under these circumstances that the Court directed that the appeal should be placed before <ORG> of seven Judges. 'Mat is how it has come on for a final decision before a Bench of seven Judges; and the only point which has been raised for the decision of the Special Bench is whether the two decisions in question should be reviewed and revised. Let us begin by stating the relevant facts leading up to the main point of controversy between the parties. The appellant is a company registered in the Baroda State as it then was. The assessment year with which the proceedings giving rise to this appeal are concerned is 1942-43 (the accounting year being calendar year 1941). During the said year, the appellant was a 'non-resident'. It carried on business of manufacturing and (1)  1 S. C. R. 249. (2)  Supp. 1 S. C. R.

871. selling textile goods in the Baroda State. The operations in relation to all sales of goods manufactured by the appellant's Mills were completed at the appellant's premises at Petlad on the footing of ex-Mill delivery in every case. It appears that on March 22, 1947, the Income-tax Officer, E.P.T. Circle, Ward B, Ahmedabad, passed an order under sec- tions 23 (3) and 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act , 1. 922 (No. 11 of 1922) (hereinafter called 'the Act) and held that sale proceeds in respect of the sales aggregating each of the following three items were received by the appellant in British India. These items were :

(i) Sale-proceeds actually received in the accounting Year through <ORG>

Rs. 12,68,460

(ii) Sale-proceeds through British Indian Banks through Drafts:

Rs, 4,40,878

(iii) Sale proceeds collected by collecting cheques on British Indian Banks and Hundis onBritish Indian Shorff and Merchants Rs. 6,71,735 It is with this last item that the present appeal is concerned.

Aggrieved by the order thus passed by <ORG>, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad Range. <ORG> held that <ORG> was in error in not excluding items (i) and (iii) respectively from computation of the taxable profits of the appellant. Thus, the appellant succeeded before the appellate authority in respect of the item in dispute. This decision of the appellate authority led to two cross-- appeals, one by <ORG> and the other by the appellant before <ORG>-hereafter called the <ORG>. The <ORG> dismissed the appellant's appeal in respect of Rs. 4,40,878/- and allowed the Income- tax Officer's appeal in part and held that the item of Rs. 12,68,460/had been wrongly excluded by <ORG>. In respect of item (iii) relating to Rs. 6,71,735/-, the <ORG> held that in the circumstances of the case the sale proceeds represented by the said item were not received in British India but in the State itself. This decision of the <ORG> led to two cross-applications by the appellant and <ORG> for raising the questions of law before it in relation to the items in respect of which they had respectively failed. As a result of these proceedings, the <ORG> drew up the statement of the case on November 5, 1948, and raised' the following question to <ORG> :-

"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sums of Rs. 12,68,460/-, Rs. 4,40,878/and Rs. 6,71,735/- , or any of them, which represents receipts by the assessee company of its sale-proceeds in British India, include any portion of its income in British India ?"

In other words, all the three items in dispute between the appeal]ant and the Income-tax Officer formed the subject- matter of the question raised by the <ORG> before <ORG>. This reference was registered as Income- tax Reference No. 2 of 1949.

By its judgment and order delivered on the 14th/15th Sep- tember, 1949, in relation to items (i) and (ii) <ORG> held that the two sums in question were not debts due from British Indian Merchants but sale proceeds of the goods sold by the appellant to merchants in British India and that such sale proceeds were received by the appellant in British India. In other words, the answers rendered by <ORG> in respect of the said two items were against the appellant. The appellant came to this Court in appeal against the decision of <ORG>, but its appeal failed and the view taken by <ORG> was affirmed (vide <CITATION> )(). In the result, the controversy between the appellant and the Income-tax Officer in respect of the said items has been finally decided against the appellant. Reverting then to item (iii) with which the present appeal is concerned, <ORG> took the view that before it could render an answer to the question in relation to the said item, it would like the <ORG> to furnish to <ORG> further facts. Accordingly, <ORG> directed that the <ORG> should submit a supplementary statement of case and state therein as to whether there was any arrangement or agreement between the Assessee and the merchants that the giving of cheques or hundis by the merchants to the Assessee would result in an unconditional discharge of the liability of the merchants. <ORG> also issued some other directions asking the <ORG> to clarify (1) [19531 S. C. R. 950.

<NAME>

some of its relevant findings which appeared to <ORG> to be somewhat confused.

As a result of this order, the case went back to the <ORG> which in turn remanded it to the Income-tax Officer for getting the requisite information. On receiving the report of the Income-tax Officer, the <ORG> submitted its Supplementary Statement of Case to <ORG> on August 13, 1954.

Whilst these proceedings were thus pending in <ORG>, the decision of this Court in <CITATION> . <ORG>, Ogale Wadi(1) was pronounced. In that case, one of the points which arose for decision was whether <ORG> which takes the cheque from the sender to the addressee is the agent of the sender or the addressee; and on this point, the Court held that as between the sender and the addressee, it is the request of the addressee that makes the <ORG>-office, the agent of the addressee and after such request, the addressee cannot be heard to say that the <ORG>- office was not his agent. On the other hand, if there is no such request by the addressee, express or implied, then on delivery of the letter or the cheque to <ORG> by the sender, the <ORG>-office acts as the agent of the sender. This decision had a significant impact on the further progress of the present dispute.

After receiving the Supplementary Statement of Case from the <ORG>, the matter was argued before <ORG> on the 15th February, 1955. On this occasion, <ORG> referred the matter back again to the <ORG> with the direction : "that the <ORG> will determine on the evidence led by both parties whether the sum in question was paid by various merchants by sending drafts, hundis or cheques by post and that if the <ORG> found that in some cases the amount was not sent by post, then the <ORG> should determine what amount was sent otherwise than by post and the <ORG> should then submit a Supplementary Statement of the Case". It would be noticed that this direction was given by <ORG> obviously because <ORG> wanted to deal with the question referred to it in the light of the decision of this Court in the case of <ORG>" In fact, in giving this second direction, <ORG> observed that when it had called for the first Supplementary Statement of the Case, it did not have the benefit of the decision of this Court in the case of <ORG>,(1) and that after the said decision was pronounced, the position with regard' (1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 185.

to receipt of the cheque by the appellant had been considerably simplified.

Pursuant to the second order of remand made by <ORG>, the <ORG> submitted its second Supplementary Statement of the Case on the 26th October, 1959. After receipt of the second Supplementary Statement, the Reference again came up for hearing before the high <ORG>. After hearing the parties, <ORG> has rendered its answer against the appellant on the question in relation to the item in dispute. It is against this order passed by <ORG> on the 30th and 31St March, 1960, that the appellant has come to this <ORG> with a certificate granted by <ORG>; and on its behalf, Mr. <NAME> has urged that in view of the decisions of this <ORG> in the <ORG>) case and <ORG>) case, the appeal must be allowed and the case remitted to <ORG> to be dealt with in accordance with the principles laid down by this <ORG> in the latter case.

It is common ground that as a result of the two orders of remand passed by <ORG> in the present Reference proceedings, some material evidence which was not on the record when the question was framed by the <ORG> and sent to <ORG> under s. 66(1) of the Act, has been collected and made a part of the Supplementary Statement of the Case; and basing himself on this fact, Mr. <NAME> contends that <ORG> had no jurisdiction to direct the <ORG> to collect additional material and form it a part of the Supplementary Statement under s. 66(4) of the Act. It is in support of this contention that reliance is placed on the two decisions in question. Before addressing ourselves to the problem as to whether the view taken by this <ORG> in the said two decisions needs to be reconsidered and revised, it is necessary that we should refer to the said two decisions as well as other decisions on which both the parties have relied before us in the course of the arguments.

The first decision on which Mr. <NAME> relies is the New Jehangir Mills(1) case. In that case, the question which was referred by the <ORG> to <ORG> was whether the receipt of the cheques in Bhavnagar amounted to receipt of sale proceeds in Bhavnagar. Before rendering its answer to this question, <ORG> had directed the <ORG> to furnish a Supplementary Statement of the Case on the following points "On the finding of the <ORG> that all the cheques were received in Bhavnagar, the <ORG> should find (1) [1960] S. C. R. 249.

(2) [1963] SUPP. S. C. R. 871.

what portion of these cheques were received by post, whether there was any request by the assessee, express or implied, that the amounts which are the subject-matter of these cheques should be remitted to Bhavnagar by post".

It would be noticed that as a result of this direction, the question which would really have to be considered by <ORG> would be whether the posting of the cheques in British India at the. request, express or implied, of the appellant, amounted to. receipt of sale-proceeds in British India. It was urged by the appellant in that case that as a result of the direction issued by <ORG> calling for a supplementary,.statement of the case, the nature of the question formulated by the <ORG> had been altered, and that was beyond the competence of <ORG> under s. 66(4) . In substance, this plea was upheld by this Court and it was held that in calling for the supplementary statement of the case, <ORG> had misconceived its powers. under s. 66(4) of the Act. According to this decision, S. 66(4) must be read with S. 66(1) and S. 66(2) , and so read, it did not empower <ORG> to raise a new question of law which did not arise out of the <ORG>'s order or direct the, <ORG> to investigate new and further facts necessary to determine the new question which had not been referred to it under S. 66(1) or s. 66(2) of the Act and direct the <ORG> to submit, supplementary statement of case. The additions and alterations in the statement of case which can be directed under S. 66(4) could, in the opinion of this Court relate only to such facts as already formed part of the record but were not included by the. <ORG> in the statement of the case. Mr. <NAME> contends that in the light of the decision, we ought to hold that in so far as the two orders of remand passed by <ORG> in the present Reference proceedings have led to the collection of' additional material and evidence and their inclusion in the supplementary statements of the case, <ORG> has exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 66(4) . The other case on which Mr. <NAME> strongly relies is the decision of this Court in <ORG> (1). In that case, one of the points decided by this Court had reference to the extent of the powers and authority of <ORG> under s. 66(4) . It was held that though <ORG> had power to direct a supplemental statement to be made, it was beyond its competence to direct additional evidence to be taken. In other (1)  Supp. 1 S. C. R. 871.

words, this Court took the view that when <ORG> makes an order of remand under S. 66(4) and directs the <ORG> to furnish a supplemental statement of the case, it can require the <ORG> to include in such supplemental statement material and evidence which may. already be on the record, but which had not been included in the statement of the case initially made under Is. 66(1). The result of this decision is that S. 66(4) does not confer on <ORG> power to require the <ORG> to take additional evidence before it renders its answers on the questions formulated under S. 66(1) or s. 66(2) . In accordance with the view thus taken by this Court, the direction issued by <ORG> to submit a supplemental statement of the case after taking additional evidence was reversed, and following the precedent in the New Jehangir Mills(1) case, an order was passed that the appeals should be allowed and the matter remitted to <ORG> to give its decision on the question of law referred to it as required under s. 66(5) of the Act.

Before the decision of this Court in <ORG> (2 was pronounced, a similar point had been raised in the case of <CITATION> (now Madhya Pradesh(2). In this latter case, the question referred to <ORG> for its decision was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the profits and gains in respect of the sales made to <ORG> were received by the assessee in the taxable territories ? While dealing with this question, <ORG> thought it necessary to remand the case to the <ORG> for a supplemental statement of the case calling for a finding on the question whether the cheques were sent to the assessee firm by post or by hand and what directions, if any, had the assessee firm given to the department in the matter ? The validity and correctness of this direction was challenged by the appellant before this Court in view of the decision of this Court in the care of <NAME>). While dealing with this objection raised by the appellant, this Court held that the question as it was framed, was wide enough to include an enquiry as to whether there was any request, express or implied, that the amount of the bills be paid by cheques so as to bring the matter within the dicta of this Court in the <ORG> Works(4) case or in <CITATION> (5) and since it did not appear (1)  1 S. C. R. 249.

(2) [1963] Supp. 1 S. C. R. 871.

(3) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 210.

(4) [1955] 1 S. C. IL 185.

(5) [1960] 1 S. C. R. 236.

from the order of remand passed by <ORG> that <ORG> intended that the <ORG> should admit fresh evidence before submitting its supplemental statement, the impugned direction could not be said to be invalid. This decision shows that when a question is framed for the decision of <ORG> in wide terms, and <ORG> finds that before rendering its answer on the said question some new aspects have to be considered and it feels that for dealing with the said new aspects of the matter, a supplemental statement of the case should be called for, <ORG> is authorised to call such a supplemental statement, provided, of course, <ORG> does not require the <ORG> to collect additional material or evidence before submitting its supplemental statement. The same view has been expressed by this Court in the case of <CITATION> - liar(1). According to this decision, a supplementary statement of case may contain such alterations or additions as <ORG> may direct, but the statement must necessarily be based on facts which are already on the record. While exercising its jurisdiction under S. 66(4) , <ORG> has no power to ask for a fresh statement of case with a direction that the <ORG> should go into the matter again and record further evidence. There is one more decision to which reference may inciden- tally be made before we part with the series of decisions on which Mr. <NAME> relies. <CITATION> ., (2) this Court had occasion to consider the scope and denotation of the expression "any question of law arising out of such order' occurring in S. 66(1) of the Act. The majority decision has summed up the result of the discussion as to the scope and effect of the provisions of s. 66 in these words :

(1) When a question is raised before the <ORG> and is dealt with by it is clearly one arising out of its order. (2) When a question of law is raised before the <ORG> but the <ORG> fails to deal with it must be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is, therefore, one arising out of its order.

(3) When a question is not raised before the <ORG> but the <ORG> deals with it, that will also be a question arising out of its order.

(4) When a question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it will not be a question arising (1) [1964] 53 1 I.T.R. 623.

(2) [1962] 1 S. C. R. 788, out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it.

In substance, these propositions mean that it is only a question that has been raised before or decided by the <ORG> that could be held to arise out of its order. Let us now refer to the decisions on which the learned Attorney-General has relied in support of his contention that <ORG> has power under s. 66(4) to call for new additional evidence if it takes the view that such additional evidence is necessary to enable it to determine the question raised for its decision satisfactorily. The learned Attorney-General has fairly conceded that he has not been able to find any decision where this question has been answered in favour of the view for which he contends after construing the relevant provisions of S. 66(4) of the Act. He, however, urges that there is high authority in support of the practice for which he contends inasmuch as <ORG> appears to have assumed that <ORG> can, in exercise of its powers under S. 66(4) , call for additional evidence. The first decision of <ORG> on which he relies is in the case of ( <CITATION> .(1). In that case, two of the questions which arose were : whether the steps taken by the assessee to vest in his wife and sons an interest in the immovable assets of the business were not legally effective, e.g., for want of a registered instrument of transfer; and if the factory, land and buildings in question were joint family property, whether it was shown that a partition at the hands of the father of the said properties could not be effected without a written instrument ? The question of law formulated for the decision of <ORG> was : "In all the circumstances of the case, having regard to the personal law governing the assessee and the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) and the Stamp Act , has the deed of partnership dated February 12, 1933, brought into existence a genuine firm entitled to registration under the provisions of s. 26- A of the Act ?" While answering this question, one of the points which had to be decided was whether the immovable properties were the self-acquisitions of the father or not. <ORG> took the view that before a satisfactory answer could be rendered on the question framed, several facts had to be ascertained, and in its judgment <ORG> has indicated the nature of these facts. "It is necessary to know", says the judgment, "as regards (a) the business, machinery, plant (1)  10 I.T.R. 457.

and other movables; (b) the factory buildings and land whether they were before 1931 the self-acquired property of the father or his ancestral property or joint family property or whether they fall into some other and what category according to the customary law". The judgment also points out that the rights of the members of the family in respect of the said property would have to be ascertained and the conduct of the parties considered. Then, in regard to the agreement in question, <ORG> pointed out that it would be necessary to enquire what agreement, if any, was made prior to February 12, 1933, and when as to a partnership being constituted to carry on the sugar factory and as to the assets which it was to have as a firm. "None of these essential facts", says the judgment, "have been found and stated by the Commissioner, with the result that the question referred cannot be answered until <ORG> has exercised its powers under sub-section (4) of section 66 of the Act". Having made these observations, <ORG> left it to the discretion of <ORG> to specify the particular additions and alterations which the Commissioner should be directed to make. In the result, the advice tendered by <ORG> was "that the case be remanded to <ORG> for disposal after taking such action under sub-section (4) of s. 66 of the Act as <ORG> may think fit in the light of this judgment". The argument is that the facts which <ORG> thought it necessary to ascertain before answering the question, indicate that they could not have been on the record at the time when the question was originally framed by the Commissioner, and so, the suggestion is that inasmuch as <ORG> indicated that <ORG> should call for a supplemental statement in regard to facts which were apparently not already on the record, this decision should be taken to support the contention that s. 66(4) authorised <ORG> to call for new additional material before it renders its answers to the questions formulated under s. 66(1) or s. 66(2) .

A similar argument is based on another decision of <ORG> in Trustees of <ORG>, Lahore v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, Lahore(1). In that case, the questions which were referred to <ORG> were : "(1) whether the income of <ORG> was liable to be assessed in the hands of the Trustees under the provisions of the Income-tax Act ?; and (2) if it was, whether it was not exempt under s. 4(3) (1) of the Act?" In <ORG>, there was a sharp difference of opinion between the Judges who heard the reference; but ultimately the 4 Sup./65-13 answers went against the <ORG>, and so, the dispute was taken to <ORG> by the Trustees of <ORG>. At the first hearing of the said appeal before <ORG>, it was considered by the <ORG> to be desirable that the powers conferred by sub-s. 4 of s. 66 of the Act should be employed to obtain further information. Accordingly, by an Order in Council, dated July 29, 1937, it was directed in accordance with the advice tendered by the <ORG> that the case ought to be remitted to <ORG> of Judicature at Lahore with a direction that the said <ORG> shall refer the case back to the Commissioner under s. 66(4) , first for the addition of such facts during the life- time of the testator <NAME> as may bear upon the proper interpretation of the expression 'keeping up the liberal policy of the said newspaper in clause XXI of the will of the said testator dated the 15th Day of June, 1895, and secondly, for the addition of such facts as to a compromise dated the 1st day of December, 1906, as may show whether the said compromise is binding on all parties interested in the estate of the said testator. Thereafter, a supplementary statement made by the Commissioner was filed and it appears that before he made the said statement, the Commissioner "carefully assembled considerable material explanatory of the direction given by the testator in the phrase 'keeping up the liberal policy of the said newspaper, and showing as their Lordships think, very fairly, the nature and purpose of the trust". After considering the said material, <ORG> allowed the appeal preferred by the Trustees, because in its opinion the second question framed for the decision of <ORG> had to be answered in favour of the assessee. It is urged that this decision also shows that <ORG> called for additional material and evidence by requiring <ORG> to exercise its powers in that behalf under s. 66(4) of the Act.

The learned Attorney-General also stated that there were some other decisions of <ORG> in India where similar additional evidence had been called for by <ORG> under s. 66(4) , and by way of illustration, he cited before us the decision of <ORG> in Messrs. <NAME> <CITATION> (1). It is, however, clear that in none of the decisions on which the learned Attorney-General relies has the question about the construction of S. 66(4) been argued, considered and decided. That, broadly stated, is the position disclosed by the judicial decisions bearing on the point with which we are concerned in the present appeal. (1) 14 I.T.R. 764.

In dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions of this <ORG> in the <ORG>) case, and the <ORG>) case should be reconsidered and revised by us, we ought to be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases. Mr. <NAME> has not disputed the fact that in a proper case, this <ORG> has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, and so, the abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this <ORG> or not need not detain us. In exercising this inherent power, however, this <ORG> would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making is often very difficult and delicate. When this <ORG> hears appeals against decisions of the High <ORG>s and is required to consider the propriety or correctness of the view taken by the High <ORG>s on any point of law, it would be open to this <ORG> to hold that though the view taken by the High <ORG> is reasonably possible, the alternative view which is also reasonably possible is better and should be preferred. In such a case, the choice is between the view taken by the High <ORG> whose judgment is under appeal, and the alternative view which appears to this <ORG> to be more reasonable; and in accept- ing its own view in preference to that of the High <ORG>, this <ORG> would be discharging its duty as a <ORG> of Appeal. But different considerations must inevitably arise where a previous decision of this <ORG> has taken a particular view as to the construction of a statutory provision as, for instance, s. 66(4) of the Act. When it is urged that the view already taken by this <ORG> should be reviewed and revised, it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this <ORG> should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this <ORG> decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Art. 141 , binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of (1)  1 S.C.R. 249.

(2) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 871.

A Sup./65-14 this <ORG> to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this <ORG> of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the <ORG> to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the <ORG> is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the <ORG> must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the <ORG> in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations :What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based ? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the <ORG> not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this <ORG> bearing on the point not noticed ? Is the <ORG> hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view ? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good ? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this <ORG> or by the High <ORG>s ? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief ? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this <ORG> is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions. These considerations become still more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of five learned Judges of this <ORG>. It is true that in the case of the <CITATION> . (1) this <ORG> by a majority of 4 : 3 reversed its earlier majority decision (4 : 1) in the <CITATION> . (2); but that course was adopted by the majority of Judges in that case, because they were persuaded to take the view that there were several circumstances which made it necessary to adopt that course. (1)  2 S.C.R. 603.

(2) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.

On the other hand, dealing with a similar problem in the case of <NAME> etc. v. The State of Rajasthan etc.(1), this <ORG> unanimously rejected the request made on behalf of the petitioners that its earlier decision in <CITATION> (2) should be reviewed and revised. <NAME> and <NAME>, JJ. who were somewhat impressed by some of the pleas made in support of the contention that the earlier decision should be revised, in substance agreed with the ultimate decision of the <ORG> that no case had been made out for a review or revision of the said earlier decision. The principle of stare decision, no doubt, cannot be pressed into service in cases where the jurisdiction of this <ORG> to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions is invoked; but nevertheless, the normal principle that judgments pronounced by this <ORG> would be final, cannot be ignored, and unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so, this <ORG> should and would be reluctant to review and revise its earlier decisions. That, broadly stated, is the approach which we propose to adopt in dealing with the point made by the learned Attorney-General that the earlier decisions of this <ORG> in the <ORG>) case, and the <ORG> (4 ) case should be reconsidered and revised. Let us then consider the question of construing S. 66(4) of the Act. Before we do so, it is necessary to read sub- section (1), (2) and (4) of s. 66 . Section 66(1) reads thus :-

"Within sixty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under sub- section (4) of section 33 , the assessee or the Commissioner may, by application in the prescribed form, accompanied where application is made by the assessee by a fee of one hundred rupees, require the appellate Tribunal to refer to <ORG> any question of law arising out of such order, and <ORG> shall within ninety days of the receipt of such application draw up a state- ment of the case and refer it to <ORG>".

There is a proviso to this sub-section which is not relevant for our purpose. Section 66(2) reads thus :

"If on any application being made under sub- section (1), <ORG> refuses to state the (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933.

(2) [1952] S.C.R. 89.

(3) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 249.

(4) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 871.

case on the ground that no question of law arises, the assessee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may, within six months from the date on which he is served with notice of the refusal, apply to <ORG>, and <ORG> may, if it is not satisfied of the correctness of the decision of <ORG>, require <ORG> to state the case and to refer it, and on receipt of any such requisition <ORG> shall state the case and refer it accordingly".

That takes us to sub-section (4) which reads thus "if <ORG> is not satisfied that the statements in a case referred under this section are sufficient to enable it to determine the question raised thereby, the <ORG> may refer the case back to <ORG> to make such additions thereto or alterations therein as the <ORG> may direct in that behalf".

Section 66(5) provides that <ORG> upon hearing of any such case shall decide the questions of law raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and shall send a copy of such judgment to <ORG> which shall pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to such judgment.

It is clear that when the <ORG> draws up a statement of the case and refers a question of law to <ORG> under s. 66(1) , the said question must arise out of its order, and the statement of the case would necessarily be limited to the statement of facts already brought on the record either before the Income-tax Officer or before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, or before the <ORG>. There is no doubt and indeed no dispute before us that the question of law must arise from the <ORG>'s order and the statement of the case must be confined to the facts already brought on the record. The same would be the position where <ORG> requires the <ORG> to state the case and refer to it under s. 66(2) . The position, therefore, is that when <ORG> is exercising its advisory jurisdiction under S. 66(4) , it is dealing with a question of law arising from the order of the <ORG> and has to answer the said question in the light of the statement of the case submitted to it by the <ORG>. in normal course, the statement of the case would refer to facts selected by the <ORG> from out of the material already on the record and it is in the light of the said statement of the case that the question has to be answered by <ORG>. Thus far, there is no controversy or dispute.

Section 66(4) , however, authorises <ORG> to refer the case back to the <ORG> to make such additions to the statement of the case or alterations therein as the <ORG> may direct in that behalf. This power can be exercised by <ORG> if it is satisfied that the statement of the case is not sufficient to enable it to determine the question raised by it. If <ORG> feels that in order to answer satisfactorily the question referred to it is necessary to have additional material included in the statement of the case, <ORG> can make an appropriate direction in that behalf. If <ORG> is satisfied that some alterations should be made in the statement of the case to enable it to determine the question satisfactorily, it can make an appropriate direction in that behalf. The question is whether in issuing appropriate directions under $. 66(4), <ORG> can ask the Tribu- nal to travel outside the record and call for and collect material which is not already produced on the record. If s. 66(4) is read along with s. 66(1) and s. 66(2) , it may tend to show that the power of <ORG> is limited to requiring the <ORG> to add to or alter the statement of the case in the light of the material and evidence already on the record. If the question that can be raised under s. 66(1) and s. 66(2) can arise only out of the order of the <ORG> and if the statement of the case required to be drawn up by the <ORG> under the said two provisions would inevitably be confined to the facts and material already on the record, it seems unlikely that s. 66(4) would authorise <ORG> to direct the <ORG> to collect additional material or evidence not on the record.

The scheme of the Act appears to be that before the Income- tax Officer all the relevant and material evidence is adduced. When the matter goes before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, he is authorised under s. 31(2) to make such further enquiry as he thinks fit, or cause further enquiry to be made by the Income-tax Officer before he disposes of the appeal filed before him. Section 31 (2) means that at the appellate stage additional evidence may be taken and further enquiry may be made in the discretion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. When the matter goes before <ORG> under s. 33 , the question about the admission of additional evidence is governed by Rule 29 of the Income (Appellate <ORG>) Rules, 1963. This Rule provides that the parties to the appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence either oral or documentary before the <ORG>, but if 4 Sup./65-15 the <ORG> requires any documents to be produced or any witness to be examined or any affidavit to be filed to enable it to pass orders or for any other substantial cause, or if the Income-tax Officer has decided the case without giving sufficient opportunity to the assessee to adduce evidence either on points specified by him or not specified by him, the <ORG> may allow such document to be produced or witness to be examined or affidavit to be filed or may allow such evidence to be adduced.

After the <ORG> has passed orders on the appeal before it, the stage is reached to take the matter by way of reference proceedings before <ORG> under s. 66 . This scheme indicates that evidence has to be led primarily before the Income-tax Officer, though additional evidence may be led before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or even before the <ORG>, subject to the provisions of s. 31(2) of the Act and Rule 29 respectively, and that means that when the <ORG> has disposed of the matter and is preparing a statement of the case either under s. 66(1) or under S. 66(2) , there is no scope for any further or additional evidence. When the matter goes to <ORG>, it has to be dealt with on the evidence which has already been brought on the record. If the statement of the case does not refer to the relevant and material facts which are already on the record, <ORG> may call for a supplementary statement under s. 66(4) , but the power of <ORG> under s. 66(4) can be exercised only in respect of material and evidence which has already been brought on the record.

There is another consideration which is relevant in dealing with the question about the scope and effect of the provisions contained in S. 66(4) . Proceedings taken for the recovery of tax under the provisions of the Act are naturally intended to be over without unnecessary delay, and so, it is the duty of the parties, both the department and the assessee, to lead all their evidence at the stage when the matter is in charge of the Income-tax Officer. Oppor- tunity is, however, given for additional evidence by s. 31(2) and Rule 29; but if further evidence is allowed to be taken under the directions of <ORG> under s. 66(4) , it is likely that tax proceedings may be prolonged interminably, and that could not be the object of the Act as it is evidenced by the relevant provisions to which we have already referred. These mainly are the grounds on which the earlier decisions of this <ORG> in the <ORG>) case and the <ORG> (2) case substantially rest.

On the other hand, it must be conceded that the words used in s. 66(4) are wide enough and they may, on a liberal construction, include the power to call for additional evidence by directing the <ORG> to file supplementary statement of the case. It is true that S. 66(4) in terms does not confer such a power and it may be that having regard to the scheme of s. 66(1) and (2), one would have expected specific and express terms conferring such power on <ORG> in s. 66(4) if the <ORG> had intended that <ORG> would be competent to call for additional evidence; but there are no terms of limitation in s. 66(4), and it would be reasonably possible to construe s. 66(4) as enabling <ORG> to call for additional evidence if it is satisfied that the material in the statement of the case is not sufficient to answer satisfactorily the question raised by the statement of the case. When <ORG> is dealing with the statement of the case under s. 66(4) , it is its duty to answer the question submitted to it. As has been held by this Court in <CITATION> (1), where the question involved is one of law and <ORG> finds it difficult to answer the question owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the statement of the case submitted by the <ORG>, the proper procedure is to call for a further statement of the case and then decide the question itself. <ORG> would be adjuring its advisory function if it merely gives some directions and orders the <ORG> to dispose of the matter according to law and in the light of the directions given by it without referring the matter again to <ORG>; and so, if <ORG> finds that in order to deal with the question referred to it satisfactorily it is necessary to ascertain some relevant and material facts, it should be open to <ORG> to direct the <ORG> to make a supplementary statement containing the said material and facts. There is no provision in s. 66(4) which prevents the exercise of such a power.

In some cases, the question of law referred to <ORG> may have to be considered in several aspects some of which may not have been appreciated by the <ORG>. There is no doubt that if a question of law is framed in general terms and in dealing with it several aspects fall to be considered, they have to be considered by <ORG> even though the <ORG> may not have considered them. In such a case, if in dealing with some aspects (1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 249.

(2) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 871.

(3)(1955] 28 I.T.R. 184 of the matter it becomes necessary to ascertain additional facts, it would be unsatisfactory to require <ORG> to answer the question without such additional facts on the ground that they have not been introduced on the record already. Refusal to recognise the jurisdiction of <ORG> to call for such additional evidence may lead to hardship in many cases, and since there are no words expressly limiting the powers of <ORG> under S. 68(4) , there is no reason why the said powers should receive a narrow and limited construction. That is the view for which the learned Attorney-General contends. It must be conceded that the view for which the learned Attorney-General contends is a reasonably possible view, though we must hasten to add that the view which has been taken by this <ORG> in its earlier decisions is also reasonably possible. The said earlier view has been followed by this <ORG> on several occasions and has regulated the procedure in reference proceedings in <ORG>s in this country ever since the decision of this <ORG> in <ORG>) was pronounced on May 12, 1959. Besides, it is somewhat remarkable that no reported decision has been cited before us where the question about the construction of S. 66(4) was considered and decided in favour of the Attorney-General's contention. Having carefully weighed the pros and cons of the controversy which have been pressed, before us on the present occasion, we are not satisfied that a case has been made out to review and revise our decisions in the case of <ORG>) and the case of <ORG> (2) . That is why we think that the contention raised by Mr. <NAME> must be upheld. In the result, the order passed by <ORG> is set aside and the matter is sent back to <ORG> with a direction that <ORG> should deal with it in the light of the two relevant decisions in <ORG>) and <ORG> (2 ). Before we part with this appeal, however, we would like to add that in the course of the debate in the present appeal, Rule 39 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules was incidentally referred to, though neither party based any argument on it. That being so, the question as to the true scope and effect of the provisions contained in the said Rule does not fall to be considered in the present proceedings and we express no opinion on it. There would be no order as to costs throughout.

Appeal allowed and remanded.

(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 249, (2) [1963] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 871,


PETITIONER: <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: <ORG>. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/09/1956 BENCH: ACT: Road Transport-Application for stage carriage Permit-Police report-Procedure-Appellate Authority, if bound to adjourn proceeding suo mctu-Failure Of natural Justice--Motor Vehicles Act (II, Of 1939), ss. 47 , 48 , 64 , 68 . HEADNOTE: Rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the legislature under which they have to act, and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. Case-law discussed. The provisions of ss. 47 , 48 , 64 and the rules framed under s. 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act make it abundantly clear that <ORG> and <ORG> in hearing an appeal, function in a quasi-judicial capacity and not as courts of law and are not required to record oral or documentary evidence and, in deciding as between the rival claims of applicants for stage carriage permits, what they are required to do is to deal with such claims in a fair and just manner. The Act , however, amply provides for the safeguarding of their interests. <CITATION> ,  S.C.R. 583, referred to, 99 Consequently, in a case where <ORG> refused to grant a permit to an applicant on account of an adverse police report and <ORG> granted the same on the basis of a further report by the police, whereby all material allegations against him were withdrawn and nothing was said against his rival which would require to be controverted by him, and the Chairman read out such report at the hearing of the appeal without any objection by any of the interested parties or any request for adjournment and a Division Bench of <ORG> in appeal, reversing the decision of a single judge made under Arts. 226 and 227 Of the Constitution, held that the rules of natural justice had been contravened by reason of the failure on the part of <ORG> to adjourn the proceeding suo motu in order to afford the rival claimant an opportunity to meet the revised police report, its decision was erroneous and must be set aside. Held, further, that the reading out of the contents of the poiice report by the Chairman at the hearing of the appeal was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice as there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of it to be furnished to any of the parties. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 74 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 22, 1955, of <ORG> in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2 of 1955.

<NAME>, Solicitor-General for India, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant.

<NAME>, Attorney-General for India and <NAME>, for respondent No. 1.

1956. September 30. The Judgment of the <ORG> was delivered by <NAME> is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated September 22, 1955, passed by <ORG> of <ORG> reversing those of a single Judge of that <ORG>, dated December 13, 1954, refusing to issue a writ in the nature of a certiorari.

The facts of this case lie in a short compass and may be stated as follows: <ORG>, which will be referred to as the first respondent in the course of this judgment, held seven permits for running buses on the Buldana-Malkapur route, as the sole operator on that route. It applied for another permit for the same route. The appellant, <ORG>, as also another party, called <ORG> (not cited in this Court) applied for a similar permit on that route. On May 26, 1953, all the three applicants aforesaid were heard by <ORG>, which is the third respondent in this Court, in connection with the permit applied for. Consideration of the several applications was postponed, but a resolution was passed to the effect that "No one service should have monopoly on Buldana-Malkapur route." On March 30, 1954, another meeting of <ORG> took place and the first respondent was granted the permit. The appellant's application was rejected on the ground that the police report was against it. The appellant preferred an appeal to <ORG> (constituted under R. 73 of the Motor - Vehicles Act ), Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, which is the second respondent to this appeal. The appellant challenged the correctness of the police report against it and applied to the District Superintendent of Police personally to verify the facts stated in the first report on the basis of which the appellant's application for permit had been rejected, as aforesaid. The police made a further report, which was placed before the second respondent. That further report by the police was read out to the parties by the Chairman of <ORG> at the time of the hearing of the appeal. At the hearing no objection appears to have been raised by any of the parties to the course adopted by the second respondent. By its order dated July 29, 1954, the second respondent set aside the order of the third respondent, allowed the appeal and ordered the permit to be issued to the appellant. The first respondent moved <ORG> at Nagpur for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution, substantially on two grounds, namely, (1) that the order passed by the second respondent was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, and (2) that it contravened the' principles of natural justice. The first ground was founded on the allegation that the second respondent had misread the police report, and the second on the allegation that the revised report by the police had not been shown to the petitioner who had been afforded no " real and effective opportunity to deal with the report or to meet any relevant allegations made therein, and to study that report and make his submissions in regard thereto before the appeal was decided." The appellant and the second respondent showed cause against the rule issued by the court. The appellant while showing cause, admitted that the third respondent had rejected its application on the basis of the police report dated March 27, 1954, which "was full of mistakes and falsehoods," that it moved the District Superintendent of Police personally to verify the contents of the said report and that the fresh report submitted by the police after due verification had absolved the appellant from the allegations of misconduct contained in the first report. It also controverted the ground that there was any mistake apparent on the face of the record. The fresh report submitted by the police after verification at the appellant's request was received by the second respondent and the Chairman read the same during the hearing of the appeal and that, therefore, it was wrong to suggest that there had been a failure of justice,. The second respondent also showed cause and corroborated the appellant's statement that the first police report had been subsequently modified by the District Superintendent of Police by the report dated May 13, 1954, which showed that the previous report was " based on some misunderstanding." It was also stated that the report was actually read out to the parties by the Chairman while the appeal was being heard.

The petition under Arts. 226 and 227 made, as aforesaid, by the first respondent was heard by a single Judge (Mr. Justice <NAME>) who by his orders dated December 13, 1954, discharged the rule with costs. In the course of his judgment the learned Judge after' referring in detail to the orders of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act , that is to say, the second and third respondents, observed that there was no substance in the contention that the procedure adopted by <ORG> was opposed to the principles of natural justice and had operated to the prejudice of the first respondent; and that there was no error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Judge also pointed out that when -the report was brought to the notice of the first respondent, it did not indicate that it wished to controvert the report.

The first respondent preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent and repeated its grounds of attack against the orders of <ORG>. The appeal was heard by <ORG> consisting of Chief Justice <NAME> and Mr. Justice <NAME>. <ORG> seemed to be inclined to negative the plea that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record and pointed out that though the language used by the second respondent was ambi- guous and not quite accurate, it was possible to take the view that it had in fact considered the subsequent police report when it observed that the police bad practically absolved the appellant from all blame except on a minor question, not necessary to be referred to in detail here. On the second ground it differed from the learned single Judge and came to the conclusion "that <ORG> erred in rushing through without giving a proper and effective chance to the appellant to state its case." In the result it granted a writ quashing the order of <ORG> and directing it to rehear the appeal in the light of the observations made in the course of the judgment.

The appellant made an application to <ORG> for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. Having been unsuccessful there, the appellant came up to this Court and obtained special leave to appeal.

The only question which requires determination by this Court is whether or not there has been a failure of natural justice in this case as a result of the procedure adopted by <ORG>. On this question there has been a marked difference of opinion in the two stages of the case in <ORG>. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the Appeal Bench of <ORG> has erred in coming to the conclusion that in the circumstances of this case, there has been a failure of justice, in disagreement with the learned single Judge who was clearly of the opposite opinion. It has also been argued that there are no well defined criteria by which this question falls to be determined. It depends upon the terms of the legislation creating the statutory body which has to function according to its obligations laid down in the statute. If it has done all that was required by the law to do, it cannot be said that it has failed in the discharge of its statutory duty. In this connection reference was made to the provisions of ss. 47 , 48 and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act read along with the relevant rules framed under s. 68 of the Act. On behalf of the respondents it was argued that it had no opportunity of studying the subsequent police report and of making submissions thereon with the result that there has been a failure of natural justice in the sense that the respondent had been deprived of a fair and full opportunity of being heard. Though <ORG> on appeal did not base its decision on the other question, namely, whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record, it was sought to be argued that there was an error in the order of the second respondent in so far as it made reference to only the first report and read into it the maatter contained in the subsequent report. At the outset we may observe that, in our opinion, there is no substance in the second ground sought to be resuscitated in this Court by the learned counsel on behalf of the res-. pondent. Error apparent on the face of the record in the context of this case must mean an assumption of facts which are not borne out by the record. We are not concerned with other grounds which may in the context of each particular case support a contention of error apparent on the face of the record. In this case if there was any such error, it was with reference to the two police reports. As observed by <ORG> of <ORG>, though the language used by- <ORG> with regard to strict grammatical construction may refer to the first police report, it was difficult to hold that the matters referred to in the order challenged before <ORG> were not contained in the subsequent report submitted by the police at the instance of the appellant. The judgment under appeal did not take the view that there was any such mistake apparent on the face of the record as was contended for on behalf of the first respondent. We have been referred to the orders of <ORG> as read by <ORG> of <ORG> and, in our opinion, no such mistake has been shown to have vitiated the orders impugned before <ORG>.

Coming back to the question whether or not there has been a failure of natural justice, we may shortly review the relevant provisions of the statute in order to find out the obligations imposed upon <ORG> while disposing of an appeal from the orders of <ORG>. The matters to be considered by <ORG> at the time of disposing of an application for a stage carriage permit are set out in s.

47. They include the interest of the public generally, the adequacy of existing road transport service and the benefits to any particular locality. The <ORG> is also enjoined to take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along the proposed route or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction the proposed route lies. Section 48 empowers a Regional Transport <ORG>, after taking into consideration matters set forth in s. 47 , to restrict the number of stage carriages and to impose conditions on stage carriage permits. Section 64 provides for right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed by the Provincial or Regional Transport <ORG> to the "prescribed authority". It also in terms provides that on an appeal being filed to the prescribed authority, it shall give the appellant and the original authority, that is to say, the authority against whose orders the appeal had been brought., "an opportunity of being heard." Section 64 which creates the right of appeal does not in terms speak of a like opportunity being given to the persons against whom the appeal had been filed. But r. 73 framed by the <ORG> in pursuance of its rule-making power conferred by s. 68 , lays down that the authority to decide' an appeal against the orders of a Regional Transport <ORG> under s. 64 of the Act shall be the Chairman and two members of the Provincial Transport <ORG>. The rule further provides that on receipt of an appeal, the Chairman shall appoint the time and place for hearing the appeal and shall give not less than thirty days notice to the appellant, the original authority, and "any other person interested in the appeal" and on such appointed or adjourned date the Appellate <ORG> "shall hear such persons as may appear and, after such further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, confirm, vary, or set aside the order against which the appeal is preferred and make any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper". It will. thus be seen that though the substantive section creating the right of appeal does not in terms create any right in a respondent to be heard, the rules framed providing for the procedure before the Appellate <ORG> contemplate that sufficient notice shall be given to " any other person interested in the appeal" which expression must include persons other than the appellant who may be interested in being heard against the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither the sections nor the rules framed under the Act contemplate anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in the usual way as in courts of law. Besides, the parties interested in the grant of stage carriage permits or those interested against it, the police authority of the locality is also entitled to be heard both at the original stage and at the appellate stage.

Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder with particular reference to <ORG> and <ORG> do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a court of justice. No elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties interested have to be  heard in connection with the question, who is to be granted a stage carriage permit. The judgment of <ORG> under appeal has made copious quotations from the decisions of <ORG> and <ORG> in support of its conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been sufficiently complied with in the present case by simply reading out the subsequent police report at the time <ORG> was hearing the appeal. The learned Judges of <ORG> have observed that the contents of a long report such as the second report was, could not be carried in one'.-, head. They also observed that in order to present its case effectively the first respondent was entitled not only to have the report read out but also to study it so that it could understand it and state its case fully and effectively before <ORG>. We have to examine those several precedents relied upon by <ORG> to see how far its conclusions are supported by authority. But before we do that, it has got to be observed that the question whether the rules of natural justice have been observed in a particular case must itself be judged in the light of the constitution of the statutory body which has to function in accordance with the rules laid down by the legislature and in that sense the rules themselves must vary. <ORG> is charged with the duty of granting or refusing a stage carriage permit, only to mention the matter with which we are immediately concerned. In that connection the statute requires that authority to have regard to the matters set forth in s. 47 of the Act, as already indicated. The police authority within whose local jurisdiction any part of the proposed route lies, has also been given the right to make representations. But the police report submitted to <ORG> or to <ORG>, if it requires the police authority to do so, is not intended to be anything more than an expression of opinion by an authority interested in the maintenance of law and order, with particular reference to the question as to whether any of the applicants for a permit had anything to its credit or discredit as supplier of transport facilities. Such a report is meant more for the use of the authority in making or refusing a grant than for the use of the several applicants or any one of them. In other words, it is in the nature of information supplied by the police in order to assist the authority in making up its mind. In the present case when the subsequent police report was read out by the Chairman, neither the appellant nor the first respondent, nor for the matter of that any of the other parties, raised any objection to the use of that document or asked for an adjournment on the ground either that it had been taken by surprise or that it had materials to offer in opposition to the report. The learned Judges of <ORG> have observed in the course of their judgment under appeal that though it is the essence of the business of tribunals like the one under the - Motor Vehicles Act to transact business expeditiously, the business of the authority would not have suffered much if a copy of the report had been given to the parties concerned and the case adjourned for a short time. It appears that

-no such adjournment had been prayed for on behalf of any of the parties who, it appears, had been represented by counsel. But then <ORG> has observed further that "the duty is laid not upon counsel who appears but upon the tribunal which administers justice. It is incumbent on every tribunal which - acts judicially to see that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, arid that the elementary rule of natural justice of giving a fair and proper hearing to every one concerned is followed. We think that <ORG> erred in rushing through without giving a proper and effective chance to the appellant to state its case." In our opinion, <ORG> has made a number of assumptions in making those observations which do not appear to be justified by the scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or by any a priori considerations of what has been characterized as "natural justice". The tribunal in question was not administering justice as a court of law, though while deciding as between the rival claims of the applicants for a permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner.

But a tribunal even acting " judicially " is not obliged to grant an adjournment suo motu without any application on behalf of any of the parties interested. We do not find that any of the parties made at that time any grievance about the procedure adopted by <ORG>. But the question appears to have been raised for the first time before <ORG> after <ORG> had decided to grant the permit to the appellant. In this connection it has also to be observed that the subsequent police report had said nothing directly against the first respondent which it would be interested in controverting. The subsequent police report had only withdrawn some of the adverse comments against the conduct of the appellant which had been found to have been made under a misunderstanding. But the subsequent report still contains some minor complaints against the appellant. Those matters were apparently considered by <ORG> not to be so serious as to stand in the way of the appellant getting the permit, especially when that authority had previously decided upon the policy that monopoly of supplying transport facility should not be allowed to continue in favour of the first respondent. Hence, in our opinion, there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of the police report to be furnished to any of the parties, nor was there any circumstance necessitating the adjournment of the hearing of the appeal, particularly when no request for such an adjournment had been made either by the first respondent or by any other party. At that time none of the parties appears to have made any grievance about the police report only being read at by the Chairman or any request for an adjournment in order to adduce evidence pro and con. The rules framed under Chapter IV for "the conduct and hearing of the appeals that may be preferred under this chapter (s. 68 (2) (b)) " do not contemplate any such facilities being granted to the parties, though it is open to <ORG> to make any such " further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary."

But the <ORG> appears to have, taken the view that, rule or no rule, request or no request for an adjournment,the rules of natural justice made it incumbent upon <ORG> to stay its hands in order that " a proper and effective chance was given to the first respondent to state its case." There was not much of a case to state because, each party applying for the permit must be presumed to have pressed its claim upon <ORG>. We have therefore to examine the precedents discussed in detail in the judgment under appeal to see how far <ORG> was justified in holding that the rules of natural justice had been contravened by <ORG>.

The earliest decision of <ORG> brought to our notice in this connection is the case of <NAME> v.<ORG> (1). In that case the question arose on a prosecution for infringement of an Act of Parliament making provision for fixing the " general line of buildings " in a road. The certificate of the superintending architect as to the general line of buildings came in for discussion as to whether the architect, before deciding as to how the general line has to be fixed, had to hear the parties concerned. In that connection the Earl of Selborne, L.C., made the following observations :- " No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons, to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no Malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. But it appears to me to be perfectly consistent with reason, that the statute may have intentionally (1) [1885] 10 A.C. 229, 240.

omitted to provide for form, because this is a, matter not of a kind requiring form, not of a kind requiring litigation at all, but requiring only that the parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. When that is done, from the nature of the case no further proceeding as to summoning the parties, or as to doing anything of that kind which a judge might have to do, is necessary." Another leading case on the subject is the decision of <ORG> in the well-known case of <ORG> v. <NAME> (1). Their Lordships in that case had to discuss the duty of the <ORG> under s. 7 of the Education Act, 1902. Lord <NAME>, L.C., in the course of his speech referred to the provisions of the Act and made the following observations as to the duty to decide certain questions relating to nonprovided schools:- " Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon department.,; or officers of <ORG> the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases the <ORG> will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything, But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view."

(1) [1911] A.C. 179,182.

How far judicial opinion may vary as to the content of the rule of natural justice is amply illustrated by the case of <NAME> v. <ORG>, Ex parte Arlidge (1), at different stages. The rule nisi for a certiorari was first heard by <NAME>, Lord <NAME> and <NAME>, JJ. The case related to the powers of the, <ORG> under the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c.

44) refusing to terminate its orders closing a dwelling- house as unfit for habitation and the procedure for hearing an appeal against such an order. Section 29 of the Act provided that such an appeal shall be heard and disposed of according to the procedure laid down by <ORG>, provided that the rules shall provide that the <ORG> shall not dismiss any, appeal without having first held a public local inquiry.., It was unanimously held by the Court discharging the rule that <ORG> was not bound to hear the appellant or any one on his behalf after the report of the inspector on the public local inquiry had been received, before dismissing the appeal. At the public local inquiry the owner of the house affected by the closing order had been represented. But at the time the appeal was finally disposed of, there was no hearing of the appellant or his representative as in a court of law. The Court repelled the argument that the appellant had a right to be heard by <ORG> and to know the contents of the report made by the inspector who had held the public local inquiry. Rely <NAME> upon the judgment of Lord <NAME>, L.C, in the case of <ORG> v. <NAME> (supra), the Court decided that the procedure indicated by the rules framed under the statute in question had been followed and that there was no other or further obligation on the <ORG> to hear the appellant either personally or through his representative or counsel, because there was no indication in the statute to that effect. The matter was taken in appeal in <NAME> v. Local Government <ORG>, Ex parte A rlidge (2), and <ORG> by a majority (<NAME> and <NAME>, <ORG>., Hamilton, L.J. dissenting (1)  1 K.B, 463.

(2) [1914] 1 K. B. 16o, allowed the appeal holding that it was contrary to the principles of natural justice that the <ORG> should have dismissed the appeal without disclosing to the appellant the contents of their inspector's report and without giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard in support of the appeal. They, therefore, quashed the order dismissing the appeal. The majority judgment pointed out that the Act and the rules framed thereunder except for certain matters were silent as to the procedure and that in the absence of such specific provisions the non-disclosure of the `nspector's report was contrary to principles of natural justice on which English law is based. It further held that the appellant before the <ORG> was entitled to a hearing and that as the appellant had not the opportunity of seeing and considering the report and the documents which the deciding authority had before it, the appellant had been denied full opportunity of being heard. It went to the length of observing that the nondisclosure of the report and the documents which were taken into consideration by the <ORG> when the disclosure had been asked for, was itself inconsistent with natural justice. <NAME>, L.J., in his dissenting judgment pointed out that the report of the inspector in the case, as in other <ORG> departments, is only a statement of facts made for the information of the officials of the department and that it could not be assumed that the legislature meant all such reports to be communicated to those interested where it does not say the contrary. He further pointed out that the practice was the other way, namely, to specify how and to whom such reports were to be communicated, (when they are intended to be communicated at all.) Dealing with the question how far the requirements of natural justice had been fulfilled, the Lord Justice observed at p. 199 that "It has often been pointed out that the expression (natural justice) is sadly lacking in precision." Then he referred to a number of precedents dealing with the question of natural justice as to how the connotation of the expression differed in different contexts. He further observed at pp. 201 & 202: -

" <ORG> here is a statutory tribunal, anomalous as compared with common law <ORG>, created by the <ORG> for a special class of appeals and endowed by it with the power of formulating its own procedure." He also adopted the dictum of Loreburn, L.C., in <ORG> v. <NAME> (supra) that the <ORG> must " act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides."

Against the judgment of the majority of the <ORG> quashing the determination of the appeal by the <ORG> there was an appeal to <ORG>. <ORG> unanimously adopted the opinion of <NAME>, L.J. (later Lord <NAME>), allowed the appeal and set aside the majority decision. [Vide Local Government <ORG> v. <NAME> (1)]. In the course of his speech Viscount <NAME>, L.C., made the following observations:-

" My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. , They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same."

His Lordship adopted the dictum of Lord <NAME>, L.C., in the leading case of <ORG> v. <NAME> (supra). Lord <NAME> in his speech made the following observations which are very apposite to the facts and circumstances of this case:-

" The judgments of the majority of the <ORG> below appear to me, if I may say so with respect, to be dominated by the idea that the analogy of judicial methods or procedure should apply to departmental action. Judicial methods may, in many points of administration, be entirely unsuitable, and produce delays, expense, and public and private injury. The department must obey the statute."

(1) [1915] A.C. 120, 132.

He further observed at p. 138 as follows " And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of Courts of justice is wholly unfounded. This is expressly applicable to steps of procedure or forms of pleading. In so far as the term 'natural justice' means that a result or process should be just, it is a harmless though it may be a high-sounding expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old jus naturale it is a confused and unwarranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed for other distinctions; and, in so far as it is resorted to for other purposes, it is vacuous."

Lord <NAME> in his speech also reiterated the principle governing the procedure of a quasi judicial tribunal in these words:-

" Where, however, the question of the propriety of procedure is raised in a hearing before some tribunal other than a Court of law there is no obligation to adopt the regular forms of legal procedure. It is sufficient that the case has been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice."

Another recent decision of <ORG> in the case of <ORG> v. <NAME> (1) was relied upon by <ORG> in the judgment under appeal. In that case the <ORG>, which had been constituted a domestic forum to determine whether a case had been made out for striking off the name of a medical practitioner from the medical register " for infamous conduct in a professional respect," was the appellant before their Lordships, and the respondent had been found guilty by <ORG> of having committed adultery. In the proceedings before <ORG> the medical practitioner proceeded against desired to call fresh evidence on the issue of adultery and requested the <ORG> to rehear that issue. The <ORG> declined to reopen the issue and to hear fresh evidence and directed his name to be erased from the register. <ORG> unanimously affirmed the view of the dissenting Judge in <ORG> instance that there had been no (1) [1943] A.C. 827.

" due inquiry " as required by s. 29 of the Medical Act, 1858. <ORG> set aside the majority decision of Viscount <NAME>, C.J., and <NAME>, J., who had held that the requirements of the law had been satisfied by adopting the judgment and decree of <ORG>. On appeal by <ORG> to <ORG>, the <ORG> unanimously agreed with the unanimous decision of <ORG> and held that the requirement of due inquiry enjoined by the Act creating the Tribunal had not been satisfied. Viscount <NAME>, L.C., examined the provisions of the Act and the relevant rules and pointed out that they require the practitioner proceeded against " to state his case, and to produce the evidence in support of it." The Lord Chancellor in the course of his speech observed that <ORG> was not a judicial body in the ordinary sense, was master of its own procedure and was not bound by strict rules of evidence. It was bound to satisfy the requirements of the law and the rules made thereunder. The <ORG> had to decide on sworn testimony after due inquiry. He also adopted the language of Lord <NAME>, L.C., in the aforesaid case of <ORG> v. <NAME> (supra). Lord <NAME> in the course of his speech pointed out that the rules under the Act provided that the <ORG> was bound, if requested, to hear all the evidence that the practitioner charged wished to bring before them. He also pointed out the antithesis between convenience and justice by saying " convenience and justice are often not on speakin- terms." His Lordship further pointed out the difference between the procedure which may be prescribed in respect of different tribunals which were creations of statutes, in these words:-

" Some analogy exists, no doubt, between the various procedures of this and other not strictly judicial bodies, but I cannot think that the procedure which may be very just in deciding whether to close a ,school or an insanitary house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of infamous conduct against a professional man. I would, therefore, demur to any suggestion that the words of Lord <NAME>, L.C., in -Board of Education v. <NAME> (supra) afford a complete guide to <ORG> in the exercise of their duties. As I have said, it is not correct that I they need not examine witnesses.' They must examine witnesses if tendered, and their own rules rightly provide for this. Further it appears to me very doubtful whether it is true that 'they have no power to administer an oath'."

It may be noticed that the Lords who sat on that case particularly emphasized the requirements of the law as laid down in the statute and the rules framed thereunder. In view of those statutory provisions they found it necessary to uphold the decision of <ORG> which had set aside the judgment and orders of <ORG> which had taken the con tarry view, to the effect that the decree in <ORG> was conclusive evidence on which <ORG> could act. The case is therefore authority for the proposition that the rules of natural justice have to be inferred from the nature of the tribunal, the scope of its enquiry and the statutory rules of procedure laid down by the law for carrying out the objectives of the statute.

There is another class of cases which lay down that if a person is to be deprived of his professional status, he must be heard and be given effective opportunity of meeting any allegation made against him on the question of his fitness to pursue his profession. If the tribunal constituted by the statute in question to decide about the fitness of an individual to pursue that profession, decides against him without giving him an opportunity of meeting any allegations against him bearing on his capacity or qualification for the profefession to which he claims admission, it has been held that it was improper for the tribunal acting in a quasi- judicial capacity to act to his prejudice upon evidence or adverse report without his having an opportunity of meeting such relevant allegations made against him. To that class belongs the case of <NAME> v. <ORG> (1). In that case <ORG> issued an order of certiorari to, quash (1) [1945] 2 A.E.<NAME> 131.

117 the tribunal's decision refusing an application for registration as an architect.

The cases of <NAME> v. <ORG> (1), and <NAME> v. <ORG> (2) also belong to that category. They deal with the power of <ORG> under the Medical Act (21 & 22 Viet. c.

90) to strike off a medical practitioner for unprofessional conduct. Those were cases in which <ORG> had to function as a quasi-judicial body and had to proceed according to the procedure laid down in the rules framed under the Act aforesaid. They had therefore to function, not exactly as courts of law, but as domestic tribunals created by the statute to function according to the statutory rules in a fair and just manner, that is to say, that they should have no personal interest in the con;, troversy and should have given a full and fair opportunity to the person proceeded against to place his case before the tribunal.

Another class of cases is illustrated by the decision of <ORG> in R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury(3). In that case the Archbishop of Canterbury reviewing the order of the Bishop refused to approve the clerk presented by the patron to a benefice. Acting under s. 3 of the Benefices (Exercise of the Rights of Presentation) Measure, 1931, the <ORG> repelled the argument on behalf of the disappointed patron that as the decision involved a deprivation of property rights there was an obligation upon the Archbishop to act in a quasijudicial manner. <NAME>, M.R., who delivered the judgment of the <ORG>, observed that there was no " justification for regarding the matter when it comes before the Archbishop as in any sense, or by any remote analogy, a his inter parties". Hence the <ORG> on a true construction of a. 3 of the Measure came to the conclusion that the Archbishop was not required to arrive at his decision by conducting a quasi-judicial enquiry. This case, therefore, is an authority for the (1) [1890] 43 Ch. D. 366.

(2) [1894] 1 Q.B. 750.

(3) [1944] 1 A.E.R. 179.

proposition that simply because property rights are involved, the authorities charged with the duty of deciding claims to such rights are not necessarily, apart from the provisions of the statute, required to function as quasi- judicial tribunals.

As already pointed out, <ORG> had to function in a quasi-judicial capacity in accordance with the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act . That Act has made ample provisions for safeguarding the interests of rival claimants for permits. The provisions of the Act were examined in detail by a Bench of five Judges of this Court in the case of <CITATION> . (1). This Court examined elaborately the provisions of the Act vis-a-vis the authorities created by the Act to administer its provisions relating to the grant of stage carriage permits. It also examined how far <ORG> exercising its special powers to issue writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution could interfere with the orders made by those authorities. In the course of its judgment this Court made the following observations at page 596, which are very relevant to the present purpose :-

" Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must Generally be bad." Keeping in view the observations of this <ORG> quoted above and the principles of natural justice discussed in the several authorities of the highest <ORG>s in England, we have to see how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder justify the criticism of the High <ORG> that <ORG> did not give full and effective opportunity to the first respondent to present his point of view before it. As already indicated, the statutory (1)  S. C. R. 583.

provisions do not contemplate that either <ORG> or <ORG> had to record evidence or to proceed as if they were functioning as a court of law. They had to decide between a number of applicants as to which of them was suitable for the grant of the fresh permit applied for. They took into consideration all the relevant matters and came to their decision which has not been attacked as partial or perverse. The only ground which survived before the Appellate Bench of <ORG> was that the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied. The only question that we have to determine is whether <ORG> was justified in using the second report made by the police, though it had not been placed into the hands of the parties. That report did not directly contain any allegations against the first respondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it could be called upon to meet. The only effect of the report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that <ORG> had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out that no grievance was made at the time <ORG> was hearing the appeal by any of the parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to have a further opportunity of looking into that report and to controvert any matter contained therein. They did not move <ORG> for an adjournment of the hearing in order to enable it to meet any of the statements made in that report. But the learned counsel for the respondent suggested that the requirements of natural justice could not be waived by any of the parties and that it was incumbent upon <ORG> to observe the so-called rules of natural justice. In our opinion, there is no warrant for such a proposition. Even in a court of law a party is not entitled to raise the question at the appellate stage that he should have been granted an adjournment which he did not pray for in the court of first instance. Far less, such a claim can be entertained in an appeal from a tribunal which is not a court of justice, but a statutory body functioning in a quasi judicial way.

For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view of the legal position. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.