PETITIONER: <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: <NAME> OF BOMBAY & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT26/08/1975 BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. GOSWAMI, P.K. CITATION: 1975 AIR 2238 1976 SCR (1) 427 1976 SCC (1) 496 CITATOR INFO : F 1976 SC 425 (28) R 1980 SC 16 (3) RF 1980 SC2181 (104) RF 1988 SC 752 (10) ACT: Industrial Disputes Act , 1947-S. 18(1)-Agreement under- Dispute between employer and employee in relation thereto- Whether could be decided by <ORG>. Jurisdiction of <ORG> in relation to an industrial dispute-Principles. Industrial Disputes, Act, s. 10A -Suit for enforcement of arbitration-Jurisdiction of <ORG> to try. HEADNOTE: The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted to make provision for the investigation and settlement of the industrial disputes. The Act envisages collective bargaining, contracts between the workers' unions and management and the like which are matters outside the realm of the common law or the law of contracts. The Act defines an industrial dispute and what the term "settlement" means. Different authorities have been created at different levels for settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes, conferring on them varied and extensive powers. Where a dispute between the workers and management cannot be resolved by the conciliation procedure envisaged under the Act, the dispute is referred by the <ORG> to <ORG> or a <ORG>, the award of which becomes final and cannot be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever. Under s. 18(1) a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen, otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding, shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. In one of the departments of the appellant there were three groups of workers: One, the workers' union which was earlier recognised as a "trade union, and was derecognised by the appellant, and secondly another union which was recognised in its place and thirdly workmen who were members of neither union. As a result of a settlement entered into with the derecognised union an incentive scheme was in force in this department of the appellant. After the derecognition of the union. because of the increase in the strength of the workmen it became necessary for the company to revise the target figures of the incentive scheme. The company, therefore, entered into a settlement with the union recognised later. This led to protests from the derecognised union. Respondents 1 and 2 who were members of the derecognised union, instituted a suit in the <ORG> under O. I r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a representative capacity alleging that the earlier settlement was a contract of service and that the new settlement would bring about a change in their service conditions, that the new settlement was arrived at without following the mandatory requirements of s. 9A of the Act and have prayed for a permanent injunction to restrain the appellant from implementing the later settlement. During the trial the plaintiffs stated that they did not wish to enforce the first agreement as it would not be binding upon the workmen who were the members of the derecognised union. This led to dropping the issue relating to non-compliance with s. 9A of the Act also. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit as it was a suit of a civil nature for enforcement of rights of common and general law and consequently there was no question of reliefs being claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act . Treating the incentive payments made during the years when the first agreement was in force as implied terms of conditions of service and trial court granted a conditional decree of injunction. On appeal, <ORG> upheld the view of the trial court. On further appeal to this Court it was contended by the respondents that the remedy provided under the Industrial Disputes Act was a misnomer in that reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication to a tribunal 428 would depend upon the exercise of the power by the <ORG> under s. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Act did not confer any right on the suitor. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD : The suit for a decree for permanent injunction was not maintainable in the civil court as it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief or even a temporary relief. [448C-D] (1) The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute are, (i) if the dispute is not an industrial dispute nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court; (ii) if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy; (iii) if the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act; (iv) if the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either s. 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. [446A-D] Doe v. Bridges (1831) 1 B. & Ad. 847: Pasmore and others v. <ORG> (1898) Appeal Cases, 387; <NAME> v. <ORG> (1949) Appeal Cases 398; <ORG> v. <NAME> (1859) 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336; <NAME> v. <ORG> Newspaper Ltd. (1919) Appeal Cases 368; <NAME> v. <ORG> (1897) 1 Queen's Bench, 625; <NAME> v. <NAME> and others (1897) Appeal Cases, 615; Solomons v. <ORG> and others (1954) 2 Weekly Law Reports, 823; <ORG> v. <NAME> and another (1971) 1 Chancery, 734; <NAME> v. <NAME> (1901) 1 Chancery, 894; Emperor of Austria v. <NAME> (1861) 3 D.F. & J. 217, 253; Carlton Illustrators and another v. <ORG> (1911) 1 King's Bench 771; <ORG> v. Ministry of Housing and Local <ORG> and others (1960) Appeal Cases 260; Duchess of Aroyll v. Duke of Argyll and others (1967) 1 Chancery, 302; Polland v. Photographic Company (1889) 40 Chancery Division 345. <CITATION>  1 S.C.R. 227 and <CITATION> .  6 S.C.R. 22; <CITATION>  2 S.C.R. 229; Secretary of State Represented by the <CITATION> 67 Indian Appeals, 222; Raleigh Investment Coy. <CITATION> in Council, 74 Indian Appeals 50; <CITATION>  1 S.C.R. 752; Firm Sethi Radha Kishan (deceased represented by <CITATION>  2 S.C.R. 273; <CITATION>  3 S.C.R. 499; <CITATION>  1 S.C.R. 64; <CITATION>  3 S.C.R. 582; Pab-bojan Tea Co. Ltd. etc. v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur etc.  1 S.C.R. 260; <CITATION>  3 S.C.R. 662 and <CITATION>  2 S.C.R. 145. referred to. (2) In the present case it is clear that what the plaintiff, respondents wanted to prevent was the threatened breach of their right which flowed from the agreement entered into between the derecognised union and the company. Such a collective agreement is recognised and creates a right in favour of the members of the Union only under s. 18(1) of the Act and not under the general law of contract. Withdrawal of the claim based upon the said agreement from the trial court had no effect on the question of its jurisdiction to try the suit. In so far as the suit was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the members of the derecognised <ORG> by two of its members under O. I r. 8 of the Code it was clearly a suit in relation to the exercise of right created under the Act. In their case it was not permissible to fall back upon the alleged implied terms and conditions of service. The source of their right was that agreement. Even the workmen who were not members of the derecognised union but were given the benefit of incentive payments under the said agreement were so given because they tacitly agreed to be bound by the agreement. Even accepting that in their case it had assumed the character of an implied term of contract of service, the alternative claim made in paragraph 8 of the plaint as being a condition of service otherwise, can be referable to the claim of the non-members only. The source of their right in that event was different and a representative suit on their behalf by the two plaintiffs could not be maintained. The numerous persons must have the same interest in one suit instituted under O. I r. 8 of the Code. Persons having different interests cannot be so represented. The better and more reasonable view therefore, is that all workmen represented by the two plaintiffs sought an order of injunction in the civil court to prevent an injury which was proposed to be caused to them in relation to their right under the Act. [447E-H, 448AB] (3) The dispute could well be decided from all aspects in a reference under the Act. Although the issue as to the non-compliance with the requirements of s. 9A of the Act was dropped, the trial court seems to have found that the proposed change in the conditions of service was adverse to the interests of the workmen. Whether it was so or not is a matter of debate. But it is apparent that both the agreements could not be simultaneously given effect to. The result of the order of injunction made by the trial court was that the workmen represented by the two plaintiffs were to get incentive payments in accordance with the scheme embodied in the earlier agreement ignoring the addition to the strength of the workmen. On the other hand, the members of the recognised union who had entered into the second agreement were to get their incentive payments in accordance with that agreement taking into account the contribution made in the matter of production by the newly added workmen. This leads to an impracticable result. [448C-G] (4) Section 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act says that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Section 42 providing an exception to this is not attracted in this case. Section 14(1)(c) says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. The contract in question embodied in the earlier agreement was in its nature determinable under s. 19(2) of the Act or could be varied by following the procedure under s. 9A . The decree or order of injunction made therein, is not sustainable on this account too. [448H, 449AB] (5) It cannot be said that remedy provided under the Industrial Disputes Act is a misnomer. Reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of the <ORG> under s. 10(1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act. The enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act, the remedy provided uno flatu in it is the exclusive remedy. The legislature in its wisdom did not think it fit and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the rights and obligations created under the Act. Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wanting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The possibility that the <ORG> may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under s. 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard. [439C-F] (6) The principle of separate remedy only for the purpose of injunction available in a court of Chancery, which was kept intact even after the judicature Act of 1873 is not applicable in India. In India, under s. 9 C.P.C. courts have, subject to certain restrictions, jurisdiction to try suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. If a suit in relation to an industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right created under the Act by necessary intendment, the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. That being so. in India, it is barred for all purposes and a suit for in- 430 junction only would not lie. The jurisdiction of the civil court in India to grant a relief of injunction is limited to cases in which there is a right at law. that is to say, a right to be pursued in such court. [440C- <CITATION> (1964) 1 <ORG> 217; <CITATION> (1967) 2 <ORG> 397; <ORG> (by its director, <CITATION> (1969) 1 <ORG> 268; <CITATION> 71 <ORG> 452, and <CITATION> (1970) 1 <ORG> 272. referred to. <CITATION> for <ORG> (1970) 2 <ORG>, 148, over ruled. (7) (a) The manner of voluntary reference of industrial disputes to arbitration is provided in s. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reference to arbitration has to be on the basis of a written agreement between the employer and the workmen. As provided in s. 10A(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, nothing in the Arbitration Act , 1940 shall apply to arbitrations under s. 10A of the Act. [449H, 450A] (b) Where a written agreement was executed, according to which the parties agreed to refer a dispute regarding dismissal of certain workmen to <ORG> consisting of three persons and the employer terminates the settlement under s. 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and later withdraws its nominee from <ORG>, a suit filed in a civil court by the employees challenging the action of the employer and for direction to restrain the employer from committing a breach of the agreement and to a point its nominee in the place of the one who had withdrawn, such a suit is in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Act. In such a case the remedy in civil court is barred. The only remedy available to the workmen concerned was the raising of an industrial dispute. [450BCD] <CITATION>  5 S.C.R. 625, referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 922 of 1973.

Appeal by special leave form the judgment and order dated the 13th and 15th, February, 1973 of <ORG> in L.P.A. No. 74 of 1972. and Civil Appeal No. 2317 of 1972.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 27th and 28th September, 1972 of <ORG> in Civil Revision Application No. 451 of 1972.

In C. A. 922 of 1973.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant.

<NAME> <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for respondents Nos. 1-2.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for respondents 3-6.

<NAME>, for Respondent/Intervenor. In C. A. No. 2317/1972.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <ORG>, J. These two appeals filed by special leave of this Court have been heard together because an important question of law as to the jurisdiction of <ORG> to entertain the suits of the kinds filed in the two cases is common. Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the appellant company in Civil Appeal No. 922 of 1973 followed by Mr. <NAME>, appearing for respondents 3 to 6 and Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the appellant company in Civil Appeal No. 2317 of 1972 argued in support of the ouster of the jurisdiction of <ORG>, Mr. <NAME>, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff respondents 1 and 2 vehemently combated the proposition. He was followed by Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the respondent <ORG> in Civil Appeal 2317 of 1972. We shall proceed to state the facts of Civil Appeal No. 922 of 1973 first, discuss the point of jurisdiction as also the other points involved in that appeal and then briefly refer to the facts of the other case.

The appellant company carries on a big industry and owns several plants. One such plant is situated at Kurla, Bombay. In this plant there is a department known as <ORG>. The dispute relates to the workmen of this department. There seems to be three groups of workmen in the. department aforesaid. One group was represented by <ORG>-hereinafter called <ORG> which is a registered Trade Union and was once a recognized union of the workmen of the appellant company. Respondents 1 and 2 who instituted the suit in question in <ORG> at Bombay are members of this Union. Later on <ORG> was derecognized and' another registered Trade Union known as <ORG> hereinafter called <ORG>-was recognized by the appellant company. <ORG>, respondent No, 3, was implead as defendant No. 2 in the action. Beside the members of these two unions, there are certain workmen who are members of neither.

An incentive scheme providing for certain incentive payments to the workmen of <ORG> was introduced by the appellant company in pursuance of agreements entered from time to time between the company and <ORG>. The last of such agreement executed between them was dated the 31st December, 1966. It appears that at the time of the execution of the last agreement there were 425 workmen in the department. Broadly speaking the incentive scheme was to make extra payments at the rate of 3.5% over the basic production of 650 units upto the target of 900 on every extra production of 25 units. In other words, who workmen were to get 35% more if they produced 900 units in a month of 25 working days. The next target fixed was 1250 units payable at the rate of 4% per 25 units. In other words, the workmen were to get 35% + 56% total 91% more if they reached the production target of 1250 per month. It further appears that after the recognition of <ORG>, 27 more persons who were previously learners were taken in as regular temporary employees in <ORG> on and from 1st September, 1970. The strength of the workmen thus according to the case of the appellant and respondent no. 3 went up from 425 to 452, naturally necessitating the revision of the norm and target figures of the incentive scheme. Some sort of arrangement was arrived at between the company and <ORG> which led to a protest by <ORG> in October, 1970. Eventually a definite settlement in writing was arrived at between the appellant and respondent no. 3 on the 9th of January, 1971 making the settlement effective from 1-9-1970. The norm figure of 650 units was raised to 725 and the first and the second target figures were raised from 900 to 975 and 1250 to 1325 respectively. The rates of incentive payment at 3.5% in the first target and 4% in the second target were retained. Thus the maximum incentive payment of 91% was kept unaltered. Broadly speaking, therefore, the increase of 75 units at every stage of the production was attributable to the addition of the strength of 27 workmen in <ORG>. The members of <ORG>, however, felt aggrieved by this, because, they thought the 27 newly added workmen were merely learners and could not be eligible for being taken in the pool of the incentive scheme. It would adversely affect the incentive payments which were to be made to the existing 425 workmen. According to the case of respondents 1 and 2 they for the first time learnt about the intention of the company to bring about a change in the service conditions when the altered scheme was put on <ORG> on the 15th March, 71. The two workmen who were the members of <ORG> rushed to the court and instituted their plaint on the 8th April, 1971 in <ORG> at Bombay seeking the permission of the court to institute the suit in a representative capacity under order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure-hereinafter called the Code representing the workmen who were members of <ORG> as also those who were neither its members nor members of <ORG>. On an objection being raised consequently respondents 4 to 6 were added as defendants 3 to 5 to represent the 27 disputed workmen.

Respondents 1 and 2 in their plaint chiefly based their claim on the Memorandum of Settlement dated the 31st December, 1966 which on being acted upon had become a condition of service not only of the members of <ORG> but also of others who were not its members. Their assertion was that the other settlement arrived at between the company and <ORG> under section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-hereinafter referred to as the Act, was not binding on those workmen who were not its members. They attacked the second agreement as having been arrived at without following the mandatory requirement of section 9A of the Act. The first relief claimed in the suit was that the settlement dated the 9th January, 1971 was not binding on the plaintiff and other concerned daily rated and monthly rated workmen of <ORG> who were not members of <ORG>. The second relief was to ask for a decree of permanent injuction to restrain the appellant from enforcing or implementing the terms of the impugned settlement dated the 9th January, 1971. The appellant company and the other defendant respondents filed their written statements and contested the suit. They asserted that all the workmen of <ORG> had impliedly accepted and acted upon the new settlement. They challenged the jurisdiction of <ORG> to entertain the suit in relation to the dispute which was an industrial dispute and further asserted that in any view of the matter no decree for permanent injunction could be made.

<ORG> framed several issues for trial but curiously enough dropped many issues as not surviving in view of the stand taken on behalf of the plaintiffs' counsel at the time of the trial of the suit. It was conceded on their behalf, and rightly too, that the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 was a settlement under section 18(1) of the Act. It could be binding only on the members of <ORG> and not on others. But since the suit was filed on behalf of the non-members also who were not members of either <ORG> and in a representative capacity the main basis of the suit being the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 was given up, and it was stated on behalf of the plaintiffs that they did not wish to enforce that agreement. Hence many issues, according to the learned Trial Judge did not survive for discussion and were dropped. One such issue was issue no. 7 in relation to the requirement of the notice under section 9A of the Act for effecting any change in the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966. Treating the incentive payments made on and from the year 1966 till 1970 as implied terms of conditions of service, the Trial Judge seems to have come to the conclusion that the change effected in January, 1971 was detrimental to and against the interests of the workmen. Due to some technical reasons the first relief of declaration was not granted. But holding that the court had jurisdiction to try the suit as it was a suit of a "Civil nature for enforcement of rights of common and general law and consequently there is no question of the reliefs being claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act ", it granted a sort of conditional decree of injuction restraining the appellant from enforcing or implementing the terms of agreement of the 9th January, 1971 against the workmen of its <ORG> who are not members of the Association <ORG>. The injunction, however, was not to operate in regard to any workmen who in writing accepted the terms of the impugned agreement or after the appellant took steps in accordance with law to make the agreement binding on workmen other than those who are not members of the Association <ORG>. The decree for injunction was also to cease to be operative if the appellant gave any notice of change under section 9A of the Act on expiry of 3 months after the expiry of 21 days notice given under the said provisions of law.

The company filed an appeal in <ORG> to challenge the decision of <ORG>. The learned single Judge of <ORG> who heard the appeal following his decision in <ORG> filed by the other company which is appellant in the other appeal, sustained the jurisdiction of <ORG> to entertain the suit and did not feel persuaded to interfere with it on merits. The company took the matter in a letters patent but it met the same fate before <ORG> of <ORG>. On grant of special leave, the present appeal was filed.

The foremost and perhaps the only point, undoubtedly a vexed one, which falls for our determination is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case <ORG> had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 against the appellant and respondents 3 to 6. Various English and Indian authorities were cited on the point on either side at the <ORG> and we shall endeavour to answer the question of law on appreciation of many such authorities. It may not be necessary to refer to all. Before we do so, we may very briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the Act.

The object of the Act, as its preamble indicates, is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, which means adjudication of such disputes also. The Act envisages collective bargaining, contracts between <ORG> representing the workmen and the management, a matter which is outside the realm of the common law or the Indian law of contract. The expression "industrial dispute" is defined in section 2(k) to say that:

" "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;"

Section 2(p) gives the definition of the word "settlement" thus:

"settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer;"

Chapter II provides for the authorities under the Act, namely for constitution of <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG> and National <ORG> as also for appointment of <ORG> officers. Different kinds of authorities having very varied and extensive powers in the matter of settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes have been constituted. Since the time of the earliest decisions of <ORG> and <ORG> it has been recognized fully well that the powers of the authorities deciding industrial disputes under the Act are very extensive-

much wider than the power of, <ORG> while adjudicating a dispute which may be an industrial dispute. The labour Courts and the Tribunals to whom industrial disputes are referred by the appropriate governments under section 10 can create new contracts, lay down new industrial policy for industrial peace, order reinstatement of dismissed workmen which ordinarily <ORG> could not do. The procedure of raising an industrial dispute starts with the submission of a charter of demands by the workmen concerned. The Conciliation officer can be and is often made to intervene in the matter first. He starts conciliation proceeding under section 12 . If a settlement is arrived at during the course of the conciliation proceeding, it becomes binding on all workmen under section 18(3) of the Act. If there is a failure of conciliation, the appropriate government is required to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act. The award published under section 17(1) becomes final and cannot be called in question by any court in any manner whatsoever as provided in sub-section (2). Section 18(1) of the Act says:

"A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement."

Section 19(2) makes provision for terminating a settlement and provides that it shall continue to be binding until then. Section 29 provides for penalty for breach of settlement or award. The residuary punishing section for contravention of any provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder is section 31(2) . The conditions of service applicable to workmen cannot be changed to their prejudice in regard to any matter connected with the dispute during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before <ORG> or the <ORG> as provided in section 33(1)(a) . Section 33C(1) provides for recovery of money due from an employer. The scope of sub- section (2) as to the power of <ORG> for the purpose of determination of the amount due is much wider than the power of <ORG> under sub-section (1).

It would thus be seen that through the intervention of the appropriate government, of course not directly, a very extensive machinery has been provided for settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes. But since individual aggrieved cannot approach the <ORG> or <ORG> directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the Government, it is legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under he Acts is not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction of <ORG> for trial of industrial disputes. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(K) or within the meaning of section 2A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for adjudication of such disputes under the Act. <ORG>s will be the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability under the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach <ORG>. It is plain that he can't have both. He has to choose the one or the other. But we shall presently show that <ORG> will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event <ORG> will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged- breach of contract is the contract if one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Act alone.

In Dos v. Bridges (1) at page 859 are the famous and oft quoted words of Lord <NAME>, C. J. saying:

"where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner".

This passage was cited with approval by the Earl of Halsbury, L.C. in Pasmore and others v. <ORG> and by Lord <NAME> at page 407 in the case of <NAME> v. <ORG> classic enunciation of the law and classification of the cases in three classes was done by <NAME>, J "with the precision which distinguished the utterances of that most accomplished lawyer, in the case of <ORG> v. <NAME>) (vide the speech of Viscount <NAME> at page 391 in the case of <NAME> v. <ORG>) The classes are enumerated thus:

"There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute. There is that class where there is a liability existing at common law, and which is only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy; there, unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the common-law remedy, the plaintiff has his election of proceeding either under the statute or at common law. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created a liability, but has given no special remedy for it; there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. The third class is where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it .. "With respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute."

The judgment of <ORG> which was affirmed by <ORG> in Pasmore's case (supra) is reported in <NAME> v. <ORG>. It was pointed out that the duty of a local authority, under section 15 of the Public Health Act, 1875 to make such sewers as may be necessary for effectually draining their district for the purposes of the Act, cannot be enforced by action for a mandamus, the only remedy for neglect of the duty being that given by s. 299 of the Act by complaint to <ORG>. Lord <NAME> pointed out that the liability to make sewers was imposed by the statute. There was no such liability before it. The case, therefore, comes within the canon of construction that if a new obligation is imposed by statute. and in the same statute a remedy is provided for nonfulfillment of the obligation, that is the only remedy. <NAME>, <NAME> further succinctly pointed out that section 15 did not create any duty towards any particular individual, and section 299 gives a specific remedy for the benefit of the locality at large. Thus, it should be noticed, that the obligation imposed by the statute did not result in creation of any right in favour of any particular individual. Earl of Halsbury, L.C. pointed out in his speech at page 394:

"The principle that where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very familiar and which runs through the law."

The matter would be different if the obligation imposed under the statute brings into existence a right in favour of an individual but provides no remedy for its enforcement. Supposing after providing for awarding of certain compensation in Chapter VA of the Act there was no provision made in it like section 10 or section 33C . the mere penal provision for violation of the obligation engrafted in section 29 or section 31 would not have been sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of <ORG> for enforcement of individual right created under Chapter VA.

The decision of <ORG> in the case of <NAME> v. <NAME> and other(1) is very much to the point. The special statute under consideration there gave a right to recover expenses in a court of Summary Jurisdiction from a person who was not otherwise liable at common law. It was held that there was no right to come to <ORG> for a declaration that the applicant had a right to recover the expenses in a court of Summary Jurisdiction. He could take proceedings only in the latter court. Lord <NAME> after referring to the right conferred under the statue "to recover such expenses from the owner of such vessel in a court of summary Jurisdiction" said at page 620.

"I do not think the appellant can claim to recover by virtue of the statute, and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right."

Lord Watson said at page 622:

"The right and the remedy are given uno flatu, and the one cannot be dissociated from the other."

In other words if a statute confers a right and in the same breach provides for a remedy for enforcement of such right the remedy provided by the statute is an exclusive one. But as noticed by Lord <NAME> in <NAME> v. <ORG> (supra) at page 408 from the earlier English cases, the scope and purpose of a statute and in particular for whose benefit it is intended has got to be considered. If a statute:

"intended to compel mine owners to make due provision for the safety of the man working in their mines, and the persons for whose benefit all these rules are to be enforced are the persons exposed to danger,"

there arises at common law:

"a co-relative right in those persons who may be injured by its contravention."

Such a type of case was under consideration before Lord <NAME>, C.J. in the case of <NAME> v. <ORG> and other vide page 831. Lord <NAME> relied upon the principles enunciated by Lord <NAME> in <NAME> v. <NAME> approved in <NAME>'s case (supra) at page 743 in the case of <ORG> v. <NAME> and another(2). The celebrated and learned Master of the Rolls said at page 743.

"Likewise here in the case of temporary accommodation for those in need. It cannot have been intended by <ORG> that every person who was in need of temporary accommodation should be able to sue the local authority for it: or to take the law into his own hands for the purpose."

Mr. <NAME> endeavoured to take his case out of the well established and succinctly enunciated principles of law by the English courts on two grounds :-

(1) That the remedy provided under the Act is no remedy in the eye of law. It is a misnomer. Reference to <ORG> or <ORG> for adjudication of the Industrial dispute was dependant upon the exercise of the power of the <ORG> under section 10(1) , it did not confer any right on the suitor.

(2) Even if <ORG> had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for enforcement of a right created under the Act, as in England, Courts in India also could make an order or decree for injunction to prevent the threatened injury on breach of the right.

We do not find much force in either of the contentions.

It is no doubt true that the remedy provided under the Act under section 33C , on the facts and in the circumstances of this case involving disputes in relation to the two settlements arrived at between the management and the workmen, was not the appropriate remedy. It is also true that it was not open to the workmen concerned to approach <ORG> or the <ORG> directly for adjudication of the dispute. It is further well-established on the authorities of this Court that the <ORG> under certain circumstances even on the ground of expediency (vide <CITATION> and <CITATION> . can refuse to make a reference. If the refusal is not sustainable in law, appropriate directions can be issued by <ORG> in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But it does not follow from all this that the remedy provided under the Act is a misnomer Reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of the <ORG> under section 10(1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act. The remedy suffers from some handicap but is well compensated on the making of the reference by the wide powers of <ORG> or the <ORG>. The handicap leads only to this conclusion that for adjudication of an industrial dispute in connection with a right or obligation under the general or common law and not created under the Act, the remedy is not exclusive. It is alternative. But surely for the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act the remedy provided uno flatu in it is the exclusive remedy. The legislature in its wisdom did not think it fit and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the rights and obligations created under the Act. Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wanting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The possibility that the <ORG> may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under section 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard.

Mr. <NAME> very emphatically relied upon the judgment of <ORG> in the case of <NAME> v. <NAME> in support of his submission that even if a suit could not lie in a civil court for enforcement of the right, still the remedy of injunction by a suit was not lost. The learned Judge at page 903 in the first instance pointed out that the case before him fell within the first of the three classes enumerated by <NAME>, J in the case of <NAME> (supra). On the true construction of the Act under consideration it was opined that it had simply reenacted the old common law right to the market. But then the learned Judge proceeded to say at page 904 that the remedy in chancery, as a separate remedy, was wider than the old common law remedy. Says the learned Judge further at page 904:

"In my opinion, there was nothing to prevent the old <ORG> from granting an injunction to restrain the infringement of a newly created statutory right, unless the Act of Parliament creating the right provided a remedy. which it enacted should be the only remedy-subject only to this that the right so created was such a right as the <ORG> under its original jurisdiction would take cognizance of."

On a close scrutiny, however, it would be noticed that the principle of separate remedy only for the purpose of injunction available in a court of Chancery, which was kept intact even after the Judicature Act of 1873 is not applicable in India. Historically <ORG> had assumed certain special jurisdiction under its original jurisdiction to take cognizance of a special kind of right even though the common law court may not have such jurisdiction In India under section 9 of the Code, the <ORG> have subject to certain restrictions, jurisdiction to try suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. There are no different systems of civil courts for enforcement of different kinds of rights. In the instant case taking cognizance of a suit in relation to an industrial dispute for the enforcement of any kind of right is not expressly barred. But if it relates to the enforcement of a right created under the Act, as stated above by necessary intendment, the jurisdiction of the Civil <ORG> is barred. That being so, in India, it is barred for all purposes, except in regard to matters which will be alluded to hereinafter. The position will be further clear on reference to the quotation from the decision of Lord <NAME> in the judgment of <NAME>, J at pages 904 and 905 from the case of Emperor of Austria v. Day(1). The great Master of Equity in relation to the remedy in <ORG> said:

"I do not agree to the proposition, that there is no remedy in this <ORG> if there be no remedy at law, and still less do I agree to the proposition that this <ORG> is bound to send a matter of this description to be tried at law ...... It is plain therefore, that, in the opinion of Lord <NAME>, who was pre-eminently distinguished for his knowledge of the principles of this <ORG>, the jurisdiction of the <ORG> is not limited to cases in which there is a right at law."

It will bear repetition to say that the jurisdiction of <ORG> in India is limited to cases in which there is a right at law, that is to say a right to be pursued in such Court.

The distinction aforementioned also finds ample support from the speech of Lord <NAME> in <NAME> v. <NAME> and others (supra). At page 623 the noble and learned Lord has pointed out that the power of the <ORG> or <ORG> to make declarations of right without giving consequential relief was introduced by section 50 of the <ORG> Procedure Act 1852. After some decisions of the English courts some additional words were introduced in order to "enlarge the power of the <ORG> to make declarations in cases where from the nature or the circumstances of the case no substantive relief could be given by the <ORG>." When we proceed to deal with certain decisions of <ORG> and of this <ORG> in relation to a taxing statute it will be pointed out under what circumstances an action in a Civil <ORG> can lie to challenge the decisions of the taxing authorities. If the proposed action of the taxing authority is of a kind which when taken would be amenable to be challenged in a Civil <ORG> the remedy for the relief of injunction to prevent the action would also lie but not otherwise. As for example, in accordance with the majority decision of this <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> if tax is imposed under a provision of the statute which is ultra vires, the imposition can only be challenged by pursuing a remedy in a Civil <ORG> or in High <ORG>. Suppose a case where a proceeding is initiated by issuance of a notice for imposing a tax on person under a provision of law which is ultra vires, a suit for injunction would lie to prevent the threatened action. But a suit, unlike the remedy in a <ORG> <ORG>, merely for the purpose of injunction would not lie to prevent an action which when completed cannot be challenged in a Civil <ORG>.

Reliance was placed on behalf of the contesting respondents on the case of <ORG> and another v. <ORG>. This case merely illustrates the distinction already made by us. <ORG> has said at page 782 :

"The plaintiff also asks for an injunction to prevent the future commission of breaches of this statutory enactment. It was argued, though not very strenuously, that the only remedy was the recovery of the penalty. I think that this case comes within the rule that, where there is a statutory enactment in favour of a person, and there is a penalty for the breach of the statutory enactment which goes to the person aggrieved, in such a case the penalty is the only remedy for the breach. That principle, however, only applies to remedies for the breach which has been committed, and an injunction is not a remedy for the past breach, but is a means for preventing further breaches."

Reliance was also placed on behalf of the contesting respondents on the decision of <ORG> in <ORG> v. <ORG> and others(3) but the decision is of no help to them. Viscount <NAME> at pages 286 and 287 has said with reference to the Act of 1947 which was under consideration before the <ORG> that the Act provides a person with another remedy and then the question posed is-"Is it, then, an alternative or an exclusive remedy ?" Answer given is :

"There is nothing in the Act to suggest that, while a new remedy, perhaps cheap and expeditious, is given, the old and, as we like to call it, the inalienable remedy of Her Majesty's subjects to seek redress in her courts is taken away. And it appears to me that the case would be unarguable but for the fact that in <NAME> v. <NAME> (supra) upon a consideration of the statute there under review it was held that the new statutory remedy was exclusive. But that case differs vitally from the present case."

The well-known distinction is brought about in these terms :

"The appellant company are given no new right of quarrying by the Act of 1947. Their right is a common law right and the only question is how for it has been taken away. They do not uno flatu claim under the Act and seek a remedy elsewhere. On the contrary, they deny that they come within its purview and seek a declaration to that effect. There is, in my opinion, nothing in <ORG> (supra) which denies them that remedy, if it is otherwise appropriate." Mr. <NAME> cited the case of <ORG> v.

Duke of Argyll and others(1) to strengthen his argument further in support of the dicta of <NAME>, J in the case of <NAME> v. <NAME> (supra). But we think the very relevant and pertinent distinction pointed out by us above has again been missed by the learned counsel. The special jurisdiction of <ORG> is further emphasised in a passage quoted with approval at page 345 of the report from the judgment of <ORG> in the case of <NAME> v. <ORG>). It is worthwhile to quote a portion of that passage which reads thus :

"But it is quite clear that, independently of any question as to the right at law, <ORG> always had an original and independent jurisdiction to prevent what that court considered and treated as a wrong, whether arising from a violation of an unquestionable right or from breach of contract or confidence, as was pointed out by Lord <NAME> in Prince Albert v. Strage-1 H. & T. 1".

<ORG> has thereafter said at page 345 : "But these were cases dealing not with interlocutory injunctions but with final injunctions and it was the practice of <ORG> to exercise a jurisdiction, which was not limited to the considerations governing final injunctions, for the purpose of granting interlocutory injunctions pending the trial of a legal right."

No such thing is permissible in India. As far back as 1952 it was pointed out by this Court in the case of <CITATION> that <ORG> cannot make a direction under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of granting interim relief only pending the institution of a suit merely because the suit could not be instituted until after the expiry of 60 days from the date of a notice under section 80 of the Code. Much less it can be so done by <ORG>.

Mr. <NAME> very strongly relied upon the Full Bench decision of <ORG> in <ORG>, <NAME> v. Master <NAME>) in support of the plaintiff-respondents' right to have an order of injunction in this case. But a passage occurring at page 380 column I negatives his contentions and squarely supports the distinction drawn by us above. The passage runs thus :

"If therefore a demand made by a <ORG> is not authorised by the Act and the person affected thereby objects to the payment on the ground that in making the demand the <ORG> was exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, it can, by no stretch of language, be said that he is objecting to his liability to be taxed under the Act. Any special piece of legislation may provide special remedies arising therefrom and may debar a subject from having recourse to any other remedies, but that bar will be confined to matters covered by the legislation and not to any extraneous matter."

We now proceed to consider the cases creating special liability, mostly tax liability, and providing for procedures and remedies for determination of the amount of tax and relief against the assessment of such liability. In the well-known decision of <ORG> in Secretary of <ORG>, Represented by the <CITATION> (3) Lord Thankerton delivering the judgment of the <ORG> alluded to the third class of cases to be found in the judgment of <NAME>, J in <NAME>'s case. The order of the Collector of <ORG> passed on the appeal under section 188 of the Sea <ORG> Act, 1878 was held to be an order within his exclusive jurisdiction excluding the jurisdiction of the Court to challenge it. The other well- known decision of <ORG> is the case of <ORG>. <CITATION> in <ORG>. Both the decisions aforesaid were noticed by <NAME> as he then was, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Constitution Bench of this Court in <CITATION> . At page 763 the circumstances under which the decision of the taxing authority under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 could be challenged in <ORG> were pointed out in these terms :

Non-compliance with the provisions of the statute to which reference is made by <ORG> must, we think, be non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate authority has acted in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, that may also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void and this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is cases of this character where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a provision to the contrary contained in the relevant statute. In what cases such a plea would succeed it is unnecessary for us to decide in the present appeal because we have no doubt that the contention of the appellant that on the merits the decision of the assessing authority was wrong, cannot be the subject-matter of a suit because s. 18-A clearly bars such a claim in the civil courts."

It would be noticed on appreciation of the above dicta that the issue to be tried in the suit instituted in a civil court to challenge the decision of the taxing authorities is quite distinct and different from the one which is within their exclusive jurisdiction. The issues in the two proceedings are different and exclusive in their respective spheres. Many authorities were reviewed by <NAME> as he then was, in the case of Firm <NAME> (deceased) represented by <CITATION> including the principles enunciated by <NAME>, J in <ORG>'s case. The decision of <ORG> of <ORG> (supra) was also referred, and the final principle enunciated is to be found at page 284 in these terms :

"Under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the <ORG> shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore, expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of civil <ORG>s in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of civil <ORG>s. The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil <ORG>s; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the said remedy could be had. Even in such cases, the Civil <ORG>'s jurisdiction is not completely ousted. A suit in a civil court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions."

The principles aforesaid were reiterated in the decision of this Court in <CITATION> albeit the learned Judges by 3 : 2 differed in the application of the principle to the facts of the case.

The unanimous decision of a Bench of 7 Judges of this Court was given by <NAME>, C.J. in the case of <CITATION> . The decision of <ORG> in the case of <ORG> (supra) was referred to at page 81 after referring to the decisions of <ORG> in the case of <ORG> and the principles were reiterated at page 82. A doubt which was being cast in the full application of the ratio of <ORG> in <ORG>'s case was crystalised in the majority decision of <NAME> in the case of <CITATION> (supra). The minority decision of <NAME>, J was to the contrary. The majority view made a departure from the dicta of <ORG> in case of a challenge to assessment of tax made under ultra vires provisions of the law. The decision of this Court in <CITATION> is again in connection with the challenge to sales tax assessment by institution of a suit in civil court. <NAME>, J reviewed many decisions of this Court in the case of <ORG> The Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur etc.-a case arising out of a challenge to the orders of the authority under the Minimum Wages Act . Sub- section 6 of section 20 of the Act was held not to exclude the jurisdiction of <ORG> when the order of the authority is challenged on the ground of non- applicability of the Act to a certain class of workers. <NAME>, C. J. delivering the judgment on behalf of <ORG> of this Court took pains to discuss many authorities in the case of <CITATION> , called out as many as 7 propositions of law at pages 682 and 683. But the principles enunciated were relevant to find out the jurisdiction of <ORG> and its scope to challenge the assessments made under a taxing statute. Nothing contrary to what we have said above is to be found in any of the 7 principles enunciated by the learned Chief Justice. The case of <CITATION> was again in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court in a suit to challenge an order under section 188 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.

To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of <ORG> in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus :

(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court.

(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of <ORG> is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in particular remedy.

(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.

(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.

We may, however, in relation to principle 2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in Section 2A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be convered by principle 3 stated above.

Some of the decisions of <ORG> in India cited at the <ORG> may now be briefly noticed. They fell in one category or the other and have expressed divergent views. Those which have taken any view contrary to the one expressed by us above must be deemed to have been over-ruled in that regard and those falling in line with our views are being affirmed.

In the case of <CITATION> (1), the learned single Judge of <ORG> has held that the jurisdiction of <ORG> is ousted impliedly to try a case which could form subject matter of an industrial dispute collectively between the workmen and their employer. One of us (<NAME>, J) as a Judge of <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> has pointed out that the Act creates a special machinery under section 33C(2) to enforce specially created rights. The parties could not, therefore, approach the ordinary civil court. We affirm the aforesaid two decisions of <ORG>. A single Judge of <ORG> took the same view in the case of <ORG>, (by its director, <CITATION> and a Bench of <ORG> in <CITATION> held that the jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with matters mentioned in Chapter VA read with schedules 2 to 4 to the Act is impliedly barred. Similar opinion was expressed by a learned single Judge of <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> . A learned single Judge of <ORG> seems to have taken a somewhat different view in the case of <NAME> and others v. Commissioners for <ORG>. The ratio of the case in so far as it goes against the principles enunciated by us is not correct. We approve what has been said by a Bench of <ORG> in the case of <ORG> <ORG> v. <NAME> that a suit for recovery of damages for wrongful dismissal, on the grounds which are clearly entertainable in <ORG>, would lie in that court even though a special remedy is provided in the Act in respect of that matter. This would be so on the footing that the dismissal was in violation of the contract of service recognized under the general law. More or less to the same effect is the view taken by a learned single Judge of <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> . It is not necessary to refer to some unreported decisions of <ORG> taking one view or the other.

Applying the principles aforementioned to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that what the plaintiff- respondents wanted to prevent was, by and large, threatened breach of their right which flowed from the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 entered into between <ORG> and the <ORG>. Such a collective agreement is recognized and creates a right in favour of the members of the <ORG> only under section 18(1) of the Act and not under the general law of contract. Withdrawal of the claim based upon the said agreement by their learned counsel in <ORG> had no effect on the question of its jurisdiction to try the suit. In so far as the suit was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the members of the <ORG>. <ORG> by two of its members under Order I, Rule 8 of the Code it was clearly a suit in relation to the exercise of right created under the Act. In their case it was not permissible to fall back upon the allegedly implied terms and conditions of service. The source of their right was the agreement entered from time to time under section 18(1) of the Act culminating in the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966. It is reasonable to take the view that even the workmen who were not members of <ORG> but were given the benefit of incentive payments under the said agreement were so given because they tacitly agreed to be bound by the said agreement. Even accepting that in their case it had assumed the character of an implied term of contract of service, the alternative claim made in paragraph 8 of the plaint as being a condition of service otherwise, can be referable to the claim of the non-members only. The source of their right in that event was different and a representative suit on their behalf by the two plaintiffs could not be maintained. The numerous persons must have the same interest in one suit instituted under Order I, Rule 8 of the Code. Persons having different interests cannot be so represented. The better and more reasonable view, therefore, to take is that all workmen represented by the two plaintiffs sought an order of injunction in the civil court to prevent an injury which was proposed to be caused to them in relation to their right under the Act. Hence a suit for a decree for permanent injunction was not maintainable in the civil court as it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief or even a temporary relief.

Although the issue as to the non-compliance with the requirements of section 9A of the Act was dropped, the learned Trial Judge seems to have found that the proposed change in the conditions of service was adverse to the interests of the workmen. Whether it was so or not is a matter of debate. But one thing was apparent that both the agreements could not be simultaneously given effect to. It was impracticable-almost impossible to do so. The result of the order of injunction made by <ORG> was that the workmen represented by the two plaintiffs were to get incentive payments in accordance with the scheme embodied in the agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 ignoring the addition to the strength of the workmen of <ORG> in the shape of the 27 persons. On the other hand the members of <ORG> who had entered into the second agreement dated the 9th January, 1971 were to get their incentive payments in accordance with that agreement taking into account the contribution made in the matter of production by the newly added 27 persons. On the face of it, it was an attempt to put two swords in one sheath. That it was not only difficult but almost impossible to do so was conceded on all hands, including Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents. Apart from the question of jurisdiction the decree for injunction was not sustainable on this account too. The dispute could well be decided from all aspects in a reference under the Act.

One more difficulty in the way of the sustainability of the order of injunction may also be indicated. Temporary injunction can be granted under sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but a decree for perpetual injunction is made under sub-section (2). Grant of perpetual injunction is subject to the provision contained in Chapter 8. Under section 38(1) a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour irrespective of the fact whether the obligation arises at common law, under a contract or under a special statute (subject to the point of jurisdiction). But sub-section (2) provides that when any such obligation arises out of contract the courts shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter 2. Section 14(1) (c) occurring in that Chapter says that a contract which is in its nature determinable cannot be specifically enforced. The contract in question embodied in the written agreement dated the 31st December, 1966 was in its nature determinable under section 19(2) of the Act or could be varied by following the procedure under section 9A . Section 41(a) of the Specific Relief Act says that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Section 42 providing an exception to this is not attracted in this case. The decree or order of injunction made therein, therefore, is not sustainable on this account too.

We now proceed to briefly state the facts of Civil Appeal No. 2317/1972. During the pendency of an industrial dispute in I.T. No. 139 of 1965, 46 workmen of the appellant company were sought to be dismissed and an application for according approval to the dismissal was made under section 33(2) of the Act. On 14.3.1968 a settlement was reached between <ORG>, plaintiff no. 1, the same <ORG>, as in the other case, and the company. A written agreement was executed according to which the parties agreed to refer their cases to <ORG> consisting of 3 persons. During the pendency of the arbitration the 46 workmen were to remain suspended from work till its decision. They were to be paid from the date of resumption of work by the other workmen, 50% of their wages which they would have normally earned had they not been so suspended. On 14.11.1971 the appellant company served a notice on the union, plaintiff no. 1 in writing seeking to terminate the settlement in accordance with section 19(2) of the Act. Thereupon the union, and two of their members instituted the suit on 14.12.1971 challenging the action of the company on several grounds and praying for an order of injunction to restrain the company from committing a breach of the agreement dated the 14th March, 1968 including the breach as regards the payment of 50% wages to the 46 workmen. It may be stated that the company's nominee on <ORG> had withdrawn. A prayer, therefore, was made in the plaint to direct the company to appoint its nominee in place of Mr. <NAME> who had withdrawn. The company asked <ORG>, where the suit was instituted, to decide the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit as a preliminary issue. The court held against the company. It went up in revision before <ORG>. The same learned Judge sitting singly who later on decided the other case upheld the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit. The company filed this appeal by special leave.

On the facts of this case it is all the more clear that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try it. The manner of voluntary reference of industrial disputes to arbitration is provided in section 10A of the Act. The reference to arbitration has to be on the basis of a written agreement between the employer and the workman. As provided in sub-

section (5) nothing in the Arbitration Act , 1940 shall apply to arbitrations under section 10A of the Act. There is no provision in the Act to compel a party to the agreement to nominate another arbitrator if its nominee has withdrawn from arbitration. The company had terminated the agreement dated the 14th March, 1968 under section 19(2) of the Act. On the authority of this <ORG> in <CITATION> endeavoured to argue that in spite of the termination of the agreement it still continued to be in force. Apart from the fact that the decision of this <ORG> was with reference to the termination of the award under section 19 , it is clear that the termination of the agreement in this case was accepted by the union. It sought to challenge it by the institution of a suit. It is clear that the suit was in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Act. The remedy in Civil <ORG> was barred. The only remedy available to the workmen concerned was the raising of an industrial dispute. It was actually raised, and, as a matter of fact, shortly after the institution of the suit the disputes were referred by the <ORG> to the Industrial Tribunal in I.T. No. 33 of 1972 on the 25th January, 1972.

For the reasons stated above both the appeals are allowed, the judgments and orders of the courts below are set aside. But in the circumstances we shall make no order as to costs in either of the appeals.

P.B.R. Appeals allowed.


PETITIONER: THE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI Vs. RESPONDENT: RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/03/1964 BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1964 AIR 1166 1964 SCR (6) 947 CITATOR INFO : R 1964 SC1172 (12) R 1964 SC1903 (32) D 1978 SC1803 (9) RF 1990 SC1927 (42) E&F 1991 SC 274 (2,3) RF 1991 SC1676 (59) ACT: Terminal Tax-Imposition of terminal tax by Municipality on silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery and precious stones in 1960-These taxes not levied before by Municipality-Whether saved by Art. 277 of the Constitution- "Continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes"-Meaning of-C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, s. 55-Government of India Act, 1935, s. 143(2) - Constitution of India, Art. 277. 948 HEADNOTE: A terminal tax on goods imported by road or rail was imposed by the Amravati Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10, 1916. This notification exempted silver, bullion and coins from the operation of this tax. When terminal taxes on goods imported by rail were assigned exclusively to <ORG> under the Government of India Act, 1935, the municipality was authorised by s. 143 to continue to levy the terminal taxes which were actually levied before the enforcement of the Act. Likewise, the terminal taxes imposed by the pre- Constitution notification were allowed to be levied and collected even after the Constitution came into force by virtue of Art. 277 of the Constitution. In 1960, the Municipality levied terminal taxes on three new items, viz., silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery and precious stones. In a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the newly imposed terminal tax was challenged by the respondent who was carrying on business, within the limits of the Municipality, in gold, silver and precious stones on the ground of legislative incompetence. The writ petition was granted by <ORG> and the appellant came to this court after obtaining a certificate of fitness from <ORG>. Dismissing the appeal: Held: The newly imposed terminal taxes on silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery and precious stones had never been imposed by the Municipality and hence it could not be said that those were "being lawfully levied" by the Municipality and "applied to the same purposes" before the commencement of the Constitution as required by Art. 277 of the Constitution. Art. 277 was not intended to confer an unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect were new taxes, though of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution. <CITATION> ,  Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70 and <NAME> v. <NAME> and <NAME>, I.L.R.  M.B. 339. referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 18, 1961 of <ORG> (<ORG>) at Nagpur in Special Civil Application No. 30 of 1960.

WITH Civil Appeals Nos. 695 and 700 of 1962.

Appeals from the judgment and orders dated October 12, 1961 and March 18, 1961 of <ORG> in Misc. Petitions Nos. 122 of 1961 and 319 of 1960 respectively.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 598/62).

<NAME> and <NAME>, for respondent <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 695/62).

<NAME>, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 695/ 62).

1<NAME>, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 695/62). <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 700/62).

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 9 (in C.A. No. 700/62).

1. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 10 (in C.A. No. 700/62). March 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-These three appeals which are on certificates of fitness granted by <ORG>-the first by <ORG> at Nagpur and the two others by <ORG>-raise a common question as regards the construction of Art. 277 of the Constitution and the validity of certain terminal taxes imposed by the respective appellant-municipal authorities under notifications issued under Ch. IX of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution, and so have been heard together.

Civil Appeal 598 of 1962 is an appeal from <ORG> and has been filed by <ORG> against a decision of <ORG> allowing the 1st respondent's petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. <ORG> has been established under the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (C.P. & Berar Act II of 1922) hereinafter referred to as the Act. Chapter IX of the Act deals with the imposition, assessment and collection of taxes which might be imposed by <ORG>. Section 66 specifies the taxes which, subject to the provisions of the Chapter, the <ORG> may from time to time impose. Its first sub-section specifies in its several clauses 15 varieties of taxes and among them is cl. (o) which reads:

"The terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of the municipality provided that terminal tax under this clause and an octroi under cl. (e) shall not be in force in any municipality at the same time-,' The other sub-clauses which are relevant for the considera-

tion of the question arising in the appeal are sub-cls. (2),(3) and (4) of s. 66 and they read :

(2) The State Government may, by rules made under this Act, regulate the imposition of taxes under this section, and impose maximum amounts of rates for any tax.

(3) The first imposition of any tax specified in subsection (1) shall be subject to the previous sanction of <ORG>.

(4) Subject to the control of <ORG>, a committee may abolish any tax already imposed and specified in sub-section (1) clauses (a) to (in) inclusive, or may, within the limits imposed under sub-section (2), vary the amount or rate of any such tax : Provided that in the case of any municipality indebted to the Government, the abolition of any tax or a reduction in the amount or rate thereof shall be subject to the previous sanction of <ORG>."

Section 67 lays down the procedure for the imposition of taxes and it provides :

"67. (1) A committee may, at a special meeting, pass a resolution to propose the imposition of any tax under section 66 . (2) When such a resolution has been passed, the committee shall publish, in accordance with rules made under this Act, a notice defining the class of persons or description of property proposed to be taxed, the amount or rate of the tax to be imposed and the system of assessment to be adopted.

(5) <ORG>, on receiving such proposals, may sanction or refuse to sanction the same, or sanction them subject to such modifications as it may think fit, or return them to the committee for further consideration.

(6) No modification affecting the substance shall be made under sub-section (5), unless and until the modification has been accepted by the committee at a special meeting.

(8) A notification of the imposition of a tax under this section shall be conclusive evidence that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of this Act." The procedure for the variation of the taxes is to be found in s. 68 and it reads "68. (1) A committee may, at a special meeting, pass a resolution to propose the abolition of any tax already imposed, or a variation in the amount or rate thereof.

(3) If the proposal is to increase the amount or rate of any tax, the committee shall publish, in the manner prescribed by rules made under this Act, a notice showing in detail the effects of the proposal. (4) Any inhabitant of the municipality objecting to the proposed increase may, within thirty days from the publication of the notice, submit his objection in writing to the committee.

(5) The committee shall take the proposal and all objections received thereto )into consideration at a special meeting, and may modify the proposals as it may think fit, and may pass a final resolution on the proposal. (6) If the proposal requires the previous sanction of <ORG> under the provisions of section 66 , sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), the committee shall forward it to <ORG> and it shall be dealt with in the manner provided in section 67 , sub-sections (4), (5) and (6).

(9) The publication in the manner prescribed of the abolition or variation of any tax under this section shall be conclusive proof that such abolition or variation has been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act." From even before the constitution of the municipality under the Act and at a time when the municipal committee was governed by the Berar Municipal Law of 1886 which was in force prior to the Act and whose taxation provisions were continued by the Act of 1922, a terminal tax on goods imported by road or rail had been imposed by the Munici- pality by virtue of a notification dated August 10, 1916 on several specified kinds of goods. This notification exempted silver, bullion and coin from the operation of this tax. This was superseded by a notification of June 2, 1921 under which the Schedules were modified and the terminal tax imposed was confined to goods imported into or exported out of the Municipal area by rail. The notification of June 1921 was amended from time to time by other items being added and the rates being increased but no change was effected in the taxes imposed after 1936. Under the scheme of the distribution of taxing powers between the provinces and the Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1935 terminal taxes on goods carried by rail were assigned exclusively to <ORG> under item 58 of List I to Sch. VII, but the validity of the levy and collection of the terminal tax in force, before the 1st April, 1937 was continued by s. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and it was by virtue of this continuance that these taxes were continued to be levied after April 1, 1937 Their continuance after January 26, 1950 when after the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Consti- tution came into force with the same scheme of distribution of taxing power on the relevant item identical with that under the Government of India Act, was by reason of Art. 277 which was practically in the same terms as s. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The taxes imposed by the pre-Constitution notification could, therefore, be legally levied and collected even after the Constitution came into force.

Subsequent to January 26, 1950 there was a notification on December 1, 1959, under which to the list of goods liable to terminal tax imported into or exported out of the Municipal area, not merely by rail, but also by road were added three new items-silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery, and precious stones, and these three specified items were subjected to the tax at the same rates as had been imposed on other articles by the notifications which were in force from before the Constitution. Before the notification was issued the procedure indicated by s. 67 was gone through and the Government accorded their sanction to the rules made by <ORG> for the imposition of the tax on the newly added articles. The validity of the tax imposed by this notification was challenged by the 1st respondent who was carrying on business within Amravati municipality in gold, silver and precious stones, on the ground of legislative incompetency which had not been saved by Article 277 of the Constitution, in a petition under Article 226. The learned Judges of <ORG> by a majority accepted the contention raised by the respondent and allowed the petition but granted a certificate of fitness and hence this appeal. The facts of the other two appeals are nearly similar but we shall refer to them after dealing with the, common question which arises in these appeals.

It is common ground that the right to levy a terminal tax is now vested in <ORG> under Entry 89 of the Union List which reads :

"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights", so that if the levy by the appellant of the terminal tax on the newly added items, and the same principle would apply to an increase in the rate of the duty, had to rest on the independent taxing power of the <ORG>, the same would have to be struck down for want of legislative competence.

Besides it is necessary to add that whereas under the notifications in force prior to 1st April 1937-when Part III of the Government of India Act was brought into force, articles imported into or exported out of the municipal area by road were not subject to the tax, and that state of affairs continued till long after the Constitution came into force, a terminal tax was imposed by the impugned notification of December 1959 on goods imported or exported by road- a tax which it was not open to the State to impose even with the aid of Art. 277. But ignoring this feature of the impugned notification, insofar as it brought in goods carried by road within the scope of the terminal tax, it is admitted that the validity of the imposition cannot be justified if it was a fresh imposition. What is, however, urged in support of the validity of the imposition is that the same is saved by Art. 277 which runs:

"277. Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the Government of any <ORG> or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the <ORG>, municipality, district or other local area may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List. continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by <ORG> by law."

If learned Counsel for the appellant is right in his contention 'that the impugned tax which he is now seeking to sustain, 'was the tax which "was being lawfully levied" by the municipality before the commencement of the Constitution he would certainly be well-founded in the submission that the fact that the terminal taxes are under the distribution ,of taxing powers under the Constitution assigned to the Union would make no difference for the valid continuance of the levy. The question, therefore, is whether this was -the tax which was being levied by the municipal authority before the Constitution and for whose continuance the Article provides.

The first submission of Mr. <NAME> for the appellants was that this condition would be satisfied whenever a ,terminal tax (without reference either to the article on which it was levied or the rate) was being lawfully levied by the municipality prior to the commencement of the ,Constitution and as in this case admittedly a terminal tax was being levied on certain articles that condition was satisfied. His argument was that the words 'tax or duty' in the opening part of Art. 277 should be read as meaning a tax or duty under a specified legislative Entry, and if such a tax or duty was being levied before the commencement ,of the Constitution other duties of the same type or falling within the same category might be imposed after the Constitution notwithstanding that such duties or taxes were mentioned in the Union List by reason of the words "shall continue to be levied". Secondly, he said that the word 'levy' meant not merely the ascertainment, i.e., assessment and collection of the tax but included its imposition, i.e., also the charging and if that expression were understood in that wide sense it would comprehend a case where other items than those originally specified were brought into the fold of the taxing provision. The learned Attorney-General who appeared for the <ORG> and supported Mr. <NAME>, however, went a step further and submitted that it was not even necessary that a terminal tax should be actually imposed and was being collected prior to the Constitution, but that it was sufficient if the <ORG> enactment had vested in the municipality a power to levy such a tax. The argu- ment of the learned Attorney-General has to be rejected as lacking any substance, for on no construction, wide or narrow, of the expression 'levy' in the phrase 'continue top be levied' can such a case be comprehended. From the mere fact that a <ORG> enactment has authorised a municipality to levy a tax it cannot be said that a tax which had never been imposed was "being lawfully levied" by the municipality, not to speak of the tax etc. collected being "applied to the same purposes" before the commencement of the Constitution as contemplated by the concluding portion of the Article. Coming next to what one might term the narrower submission of Mr. <NAME> we do not find it possible to agree with it either. His first submission may be expanded thus : The expression "taxes, duties, cesses" with which Art. 277 opens, has to be read in the context of Part XII in which the Article occurs and so read has to be understood as referring to the class or category of taxes which were levied and collected by the <ORG>, municipality etc. before the commencement of the Constitution. In other words, the reference here is to the entries in the legislative lists which permit such taxes to be levied, and so read and taken in conjunction with the circumstance that the Article is one designed to prevent the dislocation of the finances of the <ORG> or other local authorities, the terms of the Article would be satisfied and the legislative power to continue to levy the tax would be conferred "notwithstanding that the tax, etc. are mentioned in the Union List". This argument, in our opinion, proceeds on ignoring the terms of Art. 277. If, as is admitted, the sole object sought to be achieved by this provision for "continuance" is to avoid dislocation of the finances of the <ORG> and local authorities, by depriving them of the revenues which they were deriving at the commencement of the Constitution, it would mean -that the intention was to permit the existing range of taxes to be continued, not that the Article conferred on them authority to expand the range of their taxation by subjecting new items to taxation or by increasing the rates of duty. This consideration apart, it is not possible to read the words "notwithstanding that the taxes etc. are mentioned in the Union List" as conferring an unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect the argument involves new taxes, though of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution. The question of the proper construction of s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is for all practical purposes identical with Art. 277 came up for consideration before this Court in <NAME> v. <ORG>, <NAME>). There it was submitted on behalf of the respondent-local authority that by virtue of s. 143 (2) of the Government of India Act <ORG> was vested with a plenary power to legislate in respect of every tax which was being lawfully levied by local authorities prior to the commencement of the Government of India Act. This Court rejected that contention and observed " Section 143 (2) which is a saving clause and obviously designed to prevent a dislocation of the finances of Local Governments and of local authorities by reason of the coming into force of the provisions of the Government of India Act distributing heads of taxation on lines different from those which prevailed before that date, cannot be construed as one conferring a plenary power to legislate on those topics till such time as <ORG> intervened. Such a construction would necessarily involve a power in <ORG> to enhance the rates of taxation-a result we must say from which Mr. <NAME> did not shrink, but having regard to the language of the section (1)  Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70.

providing for a mere continuity and its manifest purpose this construction must be rejected."

No doubt, even the words "continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes" might import and imply a limited legislative power in the State. The scope of this limited power was also examined by this Court in the same case and it was stated :

"In the context the relevant words of the sub- section could only mean 'may continue to be levied if so desired by <ORG>' which is indicated by or is implicit in the use of the expression 'may' in the clause 'may be continued until provision to the contrary is made by <ORG>.' This would therefore posit a limited legislative power in the Province to indicate or express a desire to continue or not to continue the levy. If in the exercise of this limited power the Province desires to discontinue the tax and effects a repeal of the relevant statute the repeal would be effective. Of course, in the absence of legislation indicating a desire to discontinue the tax, the effect of the provision of the Constitution would be to enable the continu- ance of the power to levy the tax but this does not alter the fact that the provision by its implication confers a limited legislative power to desire or not to desire the continuance of the levy subject to the overriding power of <ORG> to put an end to its continuance and it is on the basis of the existence of this limited legislative power that the right of <ORG> to repeal the taxation provision under the Act of 1920 could be rested. Suppose for instance, <ORG> desires the continuance of the tax but considers the rate too high and wishes it to be reduced and passes an enactment for that purpose, it cannot be that the legislation is incompetent and that <ORG> must permit the local authority to levy tax at the same rate as prevailed on April 1, 1937 if the latter desired the continuance of the tax. If such a legislation were enacted to achieve a reduction of the rate of the duty, its legislative competence must obviously be traceable to the power contained in words 'may continue to be levied' in s. 143 (2) of the Government of India Act."

Dealing next with the import of the words 'may continue to be levied' the same was summarised in these terms : (1) The tax must be one which was lawfully levied by a local authority for the purpose of a local area, (2) the identity of the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax is to be utilised 'and the purposes for which the utilization is to take place continue to be the same, and (3) the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor its incidence in any manner altered, so that it continues to be the same tax. It is obvious that if these tests were applied the submission on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.

But authority apart, we cannot, even if this decision were put aside, accede to the construction for which Mr. <NAME> contends. It is not disputed that in ultimate analysis the answer to the question raised should turn on the meaning of the word 'levied' in the phrase 'continue to be levied' which is the operative word conferring a power. Mr. <NAME> submits that 'levied' is a word of wide and varying import and includes in its denotation not merely the actual collection of the tax, but the imposition in the sense of the creation of the charge by the statute, as well as the ascertainment of the amount due from the tax payer. Mr. <NAME> is right, for before a tax can be collected from any tax payer, its quantum must be ascertained and assessed, and for this to be lawfully done there must be legislative sanction-in other words an imposition of the charge -because it is the charge under the Statute that is quantified' by the authorities acting under the taxing enactment. The acceptance of this construction however does not lead to the result desired, for what can "continue to be levied" is what "was being lawfully levied" in the same sense of the, word "levied", prior to the Constitution. Admittedly, there was no imposition of the charge now sought to be recovered prior to the Constitution, i.e., the Act did not impose the charge by s. 66 but merely enabled <ORG> by appropriate procedure to impose the tax. If, of course, this power had been availed of and a charge had been imposed it would be a different matter. So long as <ORG> did not pass the necessary resolutions and impose the tax there was no charge levied on the commodity, so that it could not be said that the tax "was being lawfully levied" before the commencement of the Constitution. The words "was being lawfully levied' obviously mean "was actually levied" and it would not be sufficient to satisfy those words that the Municipal authority could lawfully levy the tax, but had not availed itself of that power. There is another circumstance to which also reference may be made. The last portion of Art. 277 uses the words "continue to be levied" and "to be applied to the same "purposes". By reason of this collocation between the concept of the levy and of application of the proceeds of the tax-, the Constitution makers obviously intended the word 'levy' to be understood as including the collection of the ,tax, for it is only when a tax is collected that any question of its application to a particular purpose would arise. It is apparent that if the word "levied" were understood in the sense which Mr. <NAME> contends, there could be no "application" of the proceeds of the tax to the same pur- poses as at the commencement of the Constitution. For ex concessis at that date there were no proceeds to be applied. In this connection learned Counsel for the respondent referred us to the decision in <NAME> v. <NAME> and <NAME>) where the relationship between the levy and the application of the tax has been referred to as an aid to the construction of the expression "continue to be levied" in Art. 277. We find ourselves in agreement with the views there expressed.

The decision of <ORG> is, therefore, correct and "the appeal fails.

(1) I.L.R. [1956] Madhya Bharat 339.

CIVIL APPEAL No. 695 OF 1962.

In this appeal a notification was issued under sub-ss. (5) and (7) of s. 67 of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, on December 9, 1960 imposing a terminal tax on gun- powder imported into or exported out of the municipal area by rail. It is admitted that previous to the Constitution there was no tax imposed on gun-powder. The position in this case is, therefore, identical with that in Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1962 which we have just disposed of and it follows that this appeal also fails and should be dismissed. CIVIL APPEAL No. 700 OF 1962.

In Civil Appeal 700 of 1962 the original notification imposing terminal taxes in respect of goods coming into or going out of the municipal area by rail was one dated March 17, 1926 which was operative from April 1, 1926. This was amended by a notification under s. 67 (5) of the C.P. Berar Municipal Act, 1922 dated September 23, 1960 by which new articles were included to the list of items imported into or exported from the municipal area by rail subject to the terminal tax and besides the rate of tax on the previously existing items was also increased. It was this inclusion of new articles for the levy of terminal tax by the notification of 1960 and the increase in the rate of duty on articles, already subjected to tax, that was impugned in the writ petition filed by the respondent before <ORG>. On our reasoning on the basis of which we have dismissed Civil Appeal 598 of 1962 it would follow that this appeal should also fail. We can see no difference between the inclusion of new items and the increase in the rate of duty because if there is an increase it would not be a mere continuance of the duty which had been lawfully levied which is the only purpose and function of Art. 277. The judgment of <ORG> allowing the writ petition of the respondent was therefore correct.

In the result, ;all the three appeals fail and are dismissed with costs of the contesting respondent or respondents. in each appeal.

Appeals dismissed.

134-159 S. C.-61