PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: <NAME>, ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE & DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/1968 BENCH: <NAME>, V. BENCH: <NAME>, V. SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N. CITATION: 1970 AIR 755 1969 SCR (2) 343 CITATOR INFO : R 1982 SC 149 (225) D 1985 SC 537 (11) R 1991 SC 772 (15) E&D 1991 SC2049 (6) E&D 1992 SC2014 (23) ACT: Central Excises & Salt Act 1944--Rules made under--Rule 8 giving power to <ORG> to exempt excisable goods from duty--Exemptions under Notifications dated july 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 whether apply only to goods produced by a cooperative society for itself and not for others--Taxing statutes--interpretation of--Relevance of object of giving exemption from duty. HEADNOTE: The appellant who was a dealer in textiles in Bombay entered into an agreement with a registered cooperative society for weaving yarn supplied by him into cotton fabrics on powerlooms owned by its members. The <ORG> had obtained L-4 licence as required by the Central Excises and Salt Act . 1944. Under Rule 8 of the Rules made under the Act. the <ORG> was empowered to exempt any excisable goods from the whole or any part of duty payable on such goods. In exercise of the power under Rule 8, the <ORG> by a notification dated July 31, 1959' granted exemption to "cotton fabrics produced by any Cooperative <ORG>/formed of owners of cotton powerlooms which is .registered or which may be registered on or before March 31, 1961" subject to certain conditions set out in the notification. A subsequent notification dated April 30, 1960 granted exemption to "cotton fabrics produced on powerlooms owned by any Cooperative <ORG> or owned by or allotted to the members of the <ORG> which is registered on or before March 31, 1961". On the strength of these notifications the appellant sought exemption from excise duty in respect of' the cotton fabrics which were manufactured for it on powerlooms by the Cooperative <ORG>. The excise authorities did not accept the claim for exemption and in a writ petition filed by the appellant, <ORG> gave only partial relief. In appeal before this Court the question was whether the exemption granted under the; notifications in question could be claimed only when the cotton fabrics were manufactured by a Cooperative <ORG> 'for itself. HELD: On a true construction of the language of the notifications dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960, it is clear that all that is required for claiming exemption is that the cotton fabrics must be produced on powerlooms owned by the Cooperative <ORG>. There is no further requirement under the two notifications that the cotton fabrics must be produced by the cooperative society on powerlooms "for itself'. The appellant was therefore entitled to the exemption claimed. [259 D-E] It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the dear meaning of words. A statutory notification may not be extended so as to meet a casus omissus. It could be that the object behind the two notifications in question was to encourage the actual manufacturers of handloom cloth to switch over, to powerlooms by constituting themselves into Cooperative Societies. But, the. operation of the notifications had to be judged not by the object which 254 the rule, making authority had in mind but by the words which it had employed to effectuate the legislative intent. Applying this principle, the case of the appellant was covered by the language of the: two notifications and the appellant was entitled to exemption from excise duty for the cotton fabrics. [259 E; 260 A-D)] Salomon v. <ORG>  A.C. 22, 38 and <NAME> v. <NAME>, 6 Moo P.C.C. 8, referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1049 of 1965.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 31, 1964 of <ORG> in Special Civil Application No. 1054 of 1963.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondents.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for intervener No. 1.

<NAME>, for interveners Nos. 2 and 3. <NAME>, J. This appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment of <ORG>, dated July 31, 1964 in Special Civil Application No. 1054 of 1963. The appellant is the sole proprietor of Messrs <NAME> and Co. carrying on business as a dealer in textiles in Bombay. Under an agreement between the appellant on the one hand and <ORG> (hereinafter referred to as the '<ORG>') the <ORG> manufactured cotton fabrics during the period between June, 1959 and September 1959 and from October 1, 1959 to January 31, 1961 for the appellant on certain terms and conditions which were later reduced to writing on October 12, 1959. Under these terms, the <ORG> agreed to carry out weaving work on behalf of the appellant on payment of weaving charges fixed at 19 nP. per yard which included expenses the <ORG> would have to incur in transporting yarn from Bombay and cotton fabrics woven by the <ORG> to Bombay. The appellant was to supply yarn to be delivered at Bombay to the <ORG> and the <ORG> was to made its own arrangement to bring the yarn to its factory at Gandevi. Clause 11 provided that the yarn supplied by the appellant, remaining either in stock or in process or in the form of ready-made pieces would be in the absolute ownership of the appellant and the <ORG>, as the bailee of the yarn, undertook to take such care of it as it would normally take if the yarn belonged to it. The <ORG> also undertook to have the yam insured against fire, theft and all other risks including transit risks and further undertook to reimburse the appellant in case it failed to do so. The terms of the agreement though recorded on October 12, 1959 were to be deemed to be effective as from April 21, 1959 and the agreement was terminable by either party by giving one month's notice.

The <ORG> was a cooperative society carrying on its work at Gandevi and was registered on or before May 31, 1961 and consisted of members who owned powerlooms. The <ORG> started the weaving work for the appellant some time in May or June 1959 and supplied to the appellant between June 1, 1959 and January 3, 1961 cotton fabrics measuring 3,19,460 yards. The <ORG> had obtained L-4 licence as required by the Central Excises and Salt Act , 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). By letters, dated August 29, 1959 and October 27, 1961 <ORG> had granted exemption from excise duty payable on cotton fabrics manufactured by the <ORG> under the notification issued by <ORG>. On November 10, 1961 the excise authorities issued a notice. to. the appellant demanding a sum of Rs. 1,69,263.44 payable as excise duty. It was alleged that the duty was. payable by the appellant as it had got the goods manufactured through the <ORG> and had got them removed from the <ORG>'s factory at Gandevi without payment of duty. On January 10, 1962 the Superintendent of Central Excise:, <NAME> sent another notice to show cause why penalty should not be imposed upon the appellant for contravention of rule 9 and why duty should not be charged for the cotton fabrics so removed by the appellant. The appellant showed cause and on November 26, 1962 the Assistant Collector of <ORG>, Surat held that the appellant was liable to pay excise duty to. the extent of Rs.. 2,20,574.74, being the total amount of basic duty and a penalty of Rs. 250 was levied for contravention of rule 9. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Collector of <ORG> but the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the appellant moved <ORG> for grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. <ORG> dismissed the writ petition by its judgment, dated July 31, 1964 but gave a direction that the: respondent was to work out the excise duty on the footing that the appellant was entitled to exemption from duty altogether in respect of goods supplied for the period from June 1, 1959 to September 30, 1959. As regards the two other periods i,e., October 1, 1959 to April 30, 1960 and from May 1, 1960 to January 31, 1961, <ORG> dismissed the writ petition and directed the respondent to charge duty at the rate of 29.3 nP per square meter.

Clause (d) of s. 2 of the Act defines "excisable goods" as meaning goods specified in the First Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise. Item 19 in the First Schedule provides for excise duty at different rates depending upon the variety of cotton fabrics. Section 3 which is the charging section, provides for the levy. and collection of duties specified in the First Schedule on all excisable goods which are produced or manufactured in India. Rule 8 authorises <ORG> to exempt any excisable goods from the whole or any part of duty payable on such goods. Clause (1) of rule 9 provides that no excisable goods shall be removed from any place where they are produced, cured or manufactured or any premises appurtenant thereto, which may be specified by the Collector in this behalf, whether for consumption, export or manufacture of any other commodity in or outside such place, until the excise duty leviable thereon has been paid at such place and in such manner as is prescribed. Clause (2) of that rule provides that if any excisable goods are, in contravention of sub-rule (1 ), deposited in, or removed from any place specified therein, the producer or manufacturer thereof shall pay the duty leviable on such goods upon written demand made by the proper officer and shall also be liable to a penalty which may extend to two thousand rupees and such goods shall be liable to confiscation. In pursuance of the power under rule 8, <ORG> issued notifications from time to time granting exemptions on cotton fabrics, though such goods were excisable goods under tariff item 19. The first relevant notification is dated January 5, 1957. By this notification certain classes of cotton fabrics were exempt from payment of excise duty. of the items exempted the seventh item is as follows:

"Cotton fabrics manufactured by or on behalf of the same person in one or more factories commonly known as powerlooms (without spinning plants) in which less than 5 powerlooms in all are installed;"

The next relevant notification is notification No. 74/59, dated July 31, 1959 which reads. as follows:

"G.S.R. 899 In pursuance of sub-rule (1) of rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as in force in India and as applied to the State of Pondicherry,' <ORG> hereby exempted cotton fabrics produced by any cooperative society formed of owners of cotton powerlooms, which is registered or which may be registered on or before the 31st March, 1961 under any law relating to co-operative societies from the whole of the duty leviable thereon, subject to the following conditions :--

(a) that every member of the co-operative society has been exempt from excise duty for- three years immediately preceding the date of his joining such society;

(b) that the total number of cotton powerlooms owned by the co.-operative society is not more than four times the number of members forming such society;

(c) that a certificate is produced by each member of the co-operative society from <ORG> concerned or such officer as may be nominated by <ORG> that he is a bona fide member of the society and that the number of cotton powerlooms in his ownership and actually operated by him does not exceed four and did not exceed four at any time during the three years immediately preceding the date of his joining the society, and that he would have been exempt from excise duty even if he had not joined the co-operative society;................

<ORG> issued another notification, dated April 30, 1960 by which the earlier notification, dated July 31, 1959 was superseded. By this notification <ORG> exempted cotton fabrics produced on power-looms owned by any co-operative society or owned by or allotted to the members of the society from the whole of the duty leviable thereon subject .to the four conditions. therein set out. The notification,dated April 30, 1960 is to the following effect:

"In pursuance of sub rule (1 ) of rule 8 of the Central. Excise Rules, 1944, as in force in India and as applied to the State of Pondicherry, and in supersession of the Notification of the Govt. of India, <ORG> (Department of Revenue) No. 74/59 Central Excise, dated the 31st July 1959, <ORG> hereby exempts cotton fabrics produced on powerlooms owned by any cooperative society or owned by or allotted to the members of the society, which is registered or which may be registered on or before the 31st March, 1961 under any law relating to cooperative societies, from the whole of the duty leviable thereon subject to the following conditions :-

(a) that every member of the cooperative society who has been a manufacturer of cotton fabrics on powerlooms, has been exempt from excise duty for three years immediately preceding the date of his joining such society.

(b) that the total No. of cotton powerlooms owned by the cooperative society or owned by or allotted to its members is not more than four times the number of members forming such society.

(c) that each member of the cooperative society produces a certificate from <ORG> concerned or such officer as. may be nominated by <ORG> that he is a bona fide member of the society and that the number of cotton power-looms owned by or allotted to him and actually operated by him does not exceed four and did not exceed four at .any time during that three years immediately preceding the date of his joining the society and that he would have been exempt from excise duty even if he had not joined the cooperative society and....................... "

The main contention on behalf of the appellant is. that the ,case fell within the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 and the appellant was entitled to ,exemption from payment of excise duty on the cotton fabrics. The argument was stressed that the exemption applied to. all cotton fabrics which were produced on power- looms owned by <ORG> or on powerlooms. allotted to its members and it was not a relevant consideration as to who. produced or manufactured such fabrics, whether it was the <ORG> itself or its members or even outsiders. It was conceded by the appellant that it was the owner of the cotton fabrics. But even upon that assumption the claim of the appellant is that it was entitled to exemption from excise duty as it was covered by the language of the two notifications already referred to. In our opinion, the argument of the appellant is well- founded and must be accepted as. correct. The notification, dated July 31, 1959 grants exemption to "cotton fabrics produced by any Co-operative <ORG> formed of owners ,of cotton powerlooms which is registered or which may be registered on or before March 31, 1961" subject to four conditions set out in the notification. In the next notification, dated April 30, 1960 exemption was granted to "cotton fabrics. produced on powerlooms owned by any cooperative society or owned by or allotted to the members of the society, which is registered or which may be registered on or before March 31, 1961" subject to, the conditions specified in the notification. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that under the contract between the appellant and the '<ORG> there was no relationship of master and servant but. the appellant supplied raw material and the contractor i.e., the <ORG> produced the goods. But even on the assumption that the appellant had manufactured the goods by employing hired labour and was therefore a manufacturer, still the appellant was entitled to exemption from excise duty since the case fell within the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960, and the cotton fabrics. were produced on power-looms owned by the co-operative society and there is nothing in the notifications to suggest that the cotton fabrics should be produced by <ORG> "for itself" and not for a third party before it was entitled to claim exemption from excise duty. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the object of granting exemption was to encourage the formation of co-operative societies which not only produced cotton fabrics but which also consisted of members, not only owning but having actually operated not more than four power-looms during the three years immediately preceding their having joined the society. The policy was that instead of each such member operating his looms on his own, he should combine with others by forming a society which, through the cooperative effort should produce cloth. The intention was that the goods produced for which exemption could be claimed must be goods produced on its own behalf by the society. We are unable to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the respondents as correct. On a true construction of the language of the notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 it is clear that all that is. required for claiming exemption is that the cotton fabrics must be produced on power-looms owned by the cooperative society. There is no further requirement under the two notifications that the cotton fabrics must be produced by the Co-operative <ORG> on the powerlooms "for itself". It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notificatlon. If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom, the matter is different, but that is not the case here. In this connection we may refer to the observations of Lord <NAME> in <NAME> v. <NAME> & Co.(1):

"Intentlon of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In <ORG>, what the <ORG> intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words o.r by reasonable and necessary implication."

(1) [1897] A.C. 22, 38.

It is an application of this principle that a statutory notification may not be extended so as to meet a casus omissus. As appears in the judgment of <ORG> in <NAME> v. Spooner(1).

"....we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of the Act, we cannot add, and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there."

<ORG> for the respondents is possibly right in his submission that the object behind the two notifications is to encourage the actual manufacturers of handloom cloth to switch over to power-looms by constituting themselves into Cooperative Societies. But the operation of the notifications has to be judged not by the object which the rule-making authority had in mind but by the words which it has employed to effectuate the legislative intent. Applying this principle we are of opinion that the case of the appellant is covered by the language of the two notifications, dated July 31, 1959 and April 30, 1960 and the appellant is entitled to exemption from excise duty for the cotton fabrics produced for the period between October 1, 1959 to April 30, 1960 and from May 1, 1960 to January 3, 1961. It follows therefore that the appellant is entitled to the grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of <ORG>, dated November 26, 1962 and the appellate order of the Collector of Central Excise, dated November 12, 1963. For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of <ORG>, dated July 31, 1964 should be set aside, that Special Civil Application No. 1054 of 1963 should be allowed and that a writ in the nature of certiorari should be granted to quash the order of the Assistant Collector of Excise and Customs dated November 26, 1962 and the order of the Collector of Excise dated November 12, 1963. This appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.

R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed. (1) 6 Moo. P.C.C. 8.


JUDGMENT

1. The preliminary objection that no appeal lay from the District Munsifs order must be upheld (and hence also no second appeal lies to this Court), as a person who purchases property which is not directly mentioned in and affected by the decree is not the legal representative of the judgment-debtor and his claim petition cannot be treated as a petition under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The case of <CITATION> 29 C. 813 referred to by the Subordinate Judge and the case of <NAME> v. <NAME> 24 C. 62 : 1 C.W.N. 36 followed in the case of <CITATION> 29 C. 813 were cases whore the decrees directly affected the property sold, as they were mortgage-decrees for sale of those properties.

2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.


PETITIONER: FIRM MADANLAL ROSHANLAL MAHAJAN Vs. RESPONDENT: <ORG>, INDORE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/08/1966 BENCH: <NAME>, R.S. BENCH: <NAME>, R.S. WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1967 AIR 1030 1967 SCR (1) 105 CITATOR INFO : F 1967 SC1032 (6) R 1972 SC1507 (31,32) RF 1988 SC 734 (1,18) D 1988 SC1520 (18) R 1988 SC2018 (9) R 1988 SC2045 (2) RF 1990 SC1340 (8,3,16) R 1990 SC1426 (22) E 1992 SC 732 (10,24,26,30,33) ACT: Indian Arbitration Act , 1940 (Act 10 of 1940)-Arbitrator, powers of--Lump sum award-Amendment of issue-Interest pendente lite. HEADNOTE: The respondent filed a suit against the appellant claiming two sums as losses in respect of two items and interest on the same. The disputes were referred to an arbitrator, before whom the respondent did not press for interest prior to the institution of the suit, but pressed its claim for the two sums and interests from the date of the institution of the suit till recovery. At the time of writing of the award, the arbitrator corrected one of the issues to show that the claim was for the price of the items. The arbitrator passed a lump sum award in respect of both items, and awarded interest on that sum from the date of the award till the date of payment. The award was filed in <ORG>,, and the appellants application for setting aside the award was dismissed by the District Judge. This was confirmed by the High <ORG>. In appeal, this <ORG>, HELD : (i) The arbitrator could give a lump sum award. He was not bound to, give a separate award for each claim. He award on both fact and law is final. There is no appeal from his verdict. The court cannot review his award and correct any mistake in his adjudication, unless an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it. [107 <CITATION> . 50 I.A. 324, referred to. In the present case the arbitrator gave no reasons for the award There is no legal proposition which is the basis of the award, far less a legal proposition which is erroneous. [108 B] (ii) By amending an issue behind the back of the appellant, the arbitrator was not guilty of misconduct. By this amendment the appellant suffered no prejudice. [108 C-D] (iii) In an arbitration in a suit, the arbitrator has power to award pendente lite interest. Though, in terms, s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does apply to arbitrations, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the <ORG> could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by the arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act , 1940. In the present case, all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator and one of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent was entitled to pendent lite interest. [109 D] Case law referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 878 of 1964. up CI/66 - 8 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 30, 1960 of <ORG> in Civil First Appeal No. 41 of 1960.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant.. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <ORG> The appellant and the respondent entered into three contracts whereby the appellant agreed to buy and the respondent agreed to sell 352 bales of cloth. Originally, the contracts provided for delivery of the goods in May/June, 1948. The parties, subsequently agreed that part of the goods would be delivered in June, 1948 and the balance goods would be delivered in July, 1948. The dispute between the parties concerns an item of 176 bales and another item of 46-1/2 bales. The respondent claimed from the appellant a sum of Rs. 1,72,856/- made up of (1) Rs. 84,006/2/for loss in respect of 176 bales resold by the respondent with the consent of the appellant and (2) Rs. 88,849/14/- for the balance of the price of 46-1/2 bales bargained and sold but not taken delivery of by the appellant. On February 6, 1950, the respondent instituted against the appellant Civil Suit No. 10-A of 1950 in <ORG>, Indore claiming the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,72,856/-, interest thereon from July 1, 1948 up to January 30, 1950, godown rent, interest from the date of the institution of the suit and costs. On or about May 15, 1950, the disputes in the suit were referred to the sole arbitration of Sri <NAME>, advocate. Before the arbitrator, the respondent did not press its claim for godown rent and for interest prior to the institution of the suit, but pressed its claim for the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,72,856/and for interest from the date of the institution of the suit till recovery of the amount and costs. One of the submissions of the appellant -before the arbitrator was that in view of a certain control order, it could not take delivery of 46-1/2 bales, and in case it was held liable for the contract price, it should be allowed a rebate for the current market price on its giving up its claim to the bales. After hearing the parties, the arbitrator made his award on November 30, 1961. The award recited the disputes between the parties and their respective contentions and submissions and then directed that "the defendant should pay Rs. 1,17,108-7-9 in all to the plaintiff and to give up claim to 46-1/2 bales. The defendant should pay interest on the above sum to the plaintiff at the rate of six annas per cent per month from this day till the day of payment. Both the parties to bear their own costs. The plaintiff to deposit arbitration fees which amount to Rs. 1740/- and to recover half of its amount, Rs. 870/from the defendant." The award was filed in Court. The appellant filed an application to set aside the award. By its order dated December 22, 1952, the District Judge, Indore, dismissed the application, and passed a decree on the award. An appeal from this order preferred by the appellant was dismissed by <ORG> of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur. The correctness of the judgment of <ORG> is challenged in this appeal by special leave. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the award should be set aside for three reasons: He submitted, firstly, that there were errors of law apparent on the face of the award. Now, the claim of the respondent consisted of two items. The first item of claim was 84,006/2/- for loss on resale of 176 bales. The respondent's case was that 176 bales were resold with the consent of the appellant and under the authority given by it in a letter dated July 10, 1948. The appellant's case was that no authority for the resale of all the 176 bales was given by the letter and the resale was not made with its consent. The second item of claim was for Rs. 88,849/14/- on account of the price of 46 bales. The respondent's case was that 46-1/2 bales were sold and the property in the goods had passed to the appellant on June 30, 1948 and yet the appellant had not taken delivery of the bales. The appellant's case was that the contract in respect of 461 bales remained executory and it stoo cancelled on the passing of the freezing order dated July 30, 1948 by the Textile Commissioner, Indore under el. 25(b) of the Indore Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, whereby the respondent was directed not to deliver any cloth or yarn from the Mills'premises. The appellant submitted that, in any event, having regard to this. freezing order it should not be held liable for the full price of 46-1/2 bales and on its giving up its claim to the bales, should be made liable for only the difference between the contract price and the market price. On a consideration of the contentions and submissions of the parties, the arbitrator directed the appellant to pay Rs. 1,17,108/7/9 and to give up its claim to 46-1/2 bales. As the respondent was allowed to retain the bales, the arbitrator passed a lump sum award for Rs. 1,17,108/7/9 only in respect of both items of the respondent's claim. The arbitrator could give a lump sum award.He was not bound to give a separate award for each claim.His award on both fact and law is final. There is no appeal from his verdict. The Court cannot review his award and correct any mistake in his adjudication, unless an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it. <CITATION> .(1), <ORG> stated:

"An error in law on the face of the award means, in their Lordship's view, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance a note (1) L. R. 50 1. A. 324.

appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous."

In the present case, the arbitrator gave no reason for the award. We do not find in the award any legal proposition which is the basis of the award, far less a legal proposition which is erroneous. It is not possible to say from the award that the arbitrator was under a misconception of law. The contention that there are errors of law on the face of the award is rejected.

Counsel then submitted that by amending an issue behind the back of the appellant, the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct, This contention has no force. The arbitrator had raised two issues. The second issue referred to the respondent's claim in respect of 46-1/2 bales -s a claim for loss in respect of the bales. At the time of the writing of the award, the arbitrator corrected this issue so as to show that the claim was for the price of the bales. By this amendment, the appellant suffered no prejudice. The parties well knew that the respondent claimed the price of 46-1/2 bales and fought the case before the arbitrator on that footing.

The last objection to the award is that the arbitrator had no power to award interest during the pendency of the suit. In support of this objection, counsel for the appellant relied upon the following observations of <NAME>, J. in <CITATION> (1):

"It was suggested that at least interest from the date of suit' could be awarded on the analogy of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. But section 34 does not apply because an arbitrator is not a 'court' within the meaning of the Code nor does the Code apply to arbitrators, and, but for section 34 , even a <ORG> would not have the power to give interest after the suit. This was, therefore, also rightly struck out from the award."

These observations divorced from their context, lend colour to the argument that the arbitrator has no power to award pendente lite interest. But, in later cases, this Court has pointed out that the observations in <NAME> case (1) were not intended to lay down such a broad and unqualified proposition, see <CITATION> (2), <CITATION> (3). The relevant facts regarding the claim for interest in <NAME> case(1) will be found at pp. 64 to 66 of the Report and in paragraphs 2, 17 and 24 of the judgment of <ORG> reported in <CITATION> (4). The arbitrator awarded on unliquidated damages for a (1)  2 S. C. R. 48,65.

(3) [1951] 3 S. C. R. 676, 695.

(2) [1960] 2 S. C. R. 209, 238.

(4) A. I. R. 1951 Pat. 201, 204-205.

period before the reference to arbitration and also for a period subsequent to the reference. <ORG> set aside the award regarding interest on the ground that the claim for interest was not referred to arbitration and the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In this <ORG>, counsel for the claimant contended that the arbitrator had statutory power under the Interest Act of 1839 to award the interest and, in any event, he had power to award interest during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings under s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. <NAME>, J. rejected this contention. It will be noticed that the judgment of this <ORG> in <NAME> case(1) is silent on the question whether the arbitrator can award interest during the pendency of arbitration proceedings if the claim regarding interest is referred to arbitration. In the present case, all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. One of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent was entitled to pendente lite interest. The arbitrator could decide the dispute and he could award pendente lite interest just as a <ORG> could do so under s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though, in terms, s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitrations, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the <ORG> could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by the arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act , 1940. The contention that in an arbitration in a suit the arbitrator had no power to award pendente lite interest must be rejected. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Y. P. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R.48,65.


PETITIONER: BAR COUNClL OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. RESPONDENT: M. V. DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT13/08/1975 BENCH: <NAME>, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: <NAME>, A.N. (CJ) KHANNA, HANS RAJ MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA CITATION: 1975 AIR 2092 1976 SCR (1) 306 CITATOR INFO : RF 1976 SC 578 (27) RF 1976 SC2602 (20) E 1980 SC 856 (14) RF 1981 SC 116 (17) R 1981 SC 344 (48) RF 1981 SC 477 (3,5) R 1982 SC 149 (606,963) RF 1985 SC 28 (30) ACT: Advocates Act , 1961-Sections 37 and 38 Scope of-"Pelson aggrieved" if <ORG> could be a "person aggrieved". HEADNOTE: <ORG> created by the Advocates Act , 1961 have been entrusted with the functions inter alia of entertaining and determining cases of misconduct against advocates on their rolls and to safeguard their rights, privileges and interests. <ORG> which is a national body created by the Act is entrusted with the work of laying down standards of professional conduct and etiquette and overseeing the functioning of <ORG>. Under s. 35 of the Act, if <ORG>, either on receipt of a complaint or otherwise has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case to its <ORG> which, after due inquiry may impose certain penalties. An appeal from the decision of <ORG> lies to <ORG>. Any "person aggrieved" by an order of the <ORG> of <ORG> may, under s. 38 , appeal to <ORG>. In exercise of the Powers conferred by the Act <ORG> framed rules relating to professional conduct and etiquette, r. 36 of which says that advocates shall not solicit work or advertise themselves. <ORG>, in the present case, issued notices to the respondents suo motu alleging that they stood at the entrance of the court house at the Presidency Magistrate's Court, Fort Bombay and solicited work etc., and that the said act amounted to professional and/or other misconduct. 'the <ORG> of <ORG> found the respondents guilty of conduct which absolutely lowered the reputation of the <ORG> in the eyes of the public and suspended them from practising as advocates. The respondents' appeal to <ORG> having been allowed, <ORG> has come up in appeal to this Court under s. 38 . Before <ORG> <ORG> had not appeared. F On the question whether <ORG> is a "person aggrieved," Allowing the appeals, Held: ^ [By the full Court], <ORG> is an "aggrieved person" to maintain an appeal under the Act. per <NAME>, C.J., <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, JJ): (1) The <ORG> Council is a "person aggrieved" because (i) the words "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. In disciplinary proceedings before the <ORG> there is no lis and there are no parties. The word 'person' will embrace the <ORG> Council which represents the <ORG> of the State; (ii) the <ORG> Council represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The <ORG> Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession; (iii) the function of the <ORG> Council in entertaining complaints against advocates indicates that the <ORG> Council is interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline. dignity and decorum of the profession; (iv) when the <ORG> Council ini- 307 tiates proceedings by referring eases of misconduct to the <ORG>, the <ORG> Council, in the performance of its function under the Act, is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain proper standards and etiquette of the profession and (v) the <ORG> Council is vitally concerned with the decision, in the context of its functions. The <ORG> Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics. [315G: 316D-G] (2) (a) The <ORG> Council acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession. [316A-B] (b) The grievance of the <ORG> Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. If any decision of the <ORG> of <ORG> is according to <ORG> such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession <ORG> is an "aggrieved person" to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the <ORG>. [316B-C] (3) The most significant feature in the matter of initiation of proceedings before the <ORG> is that no litigant and no member of the public can straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings against an advocate It is the <ORG> Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings. There is no lis in proceedings before the <ORG> The <ORG> Council, in placing a matteu. before the <ORG>, does not act as a prosecutor in a criminal case. A complainant who prefers a complaint against an advocate is not like a plaintiff in a civil suit. The <ORG> Council may act on its own initiative on information which has come to its notice in the course of its duties. There is no party to the disciplinary proceedings because the <ORG> Council, the Attorney General, the Advocate General act in protecting the interests of advocates and the interests of' the public. In so acting there is no conflict between the advocate and any other person because it is professional conduct, professional etiquette, professional ethics, professional morality, which are to be upheld. transgression of which results in reprimanding the advocate or suspending him from practice or removing his name from the roll. [314B- <CITATION> . Bombay  I S.C.R. 863, referred to Beg J. (concurring): (1) There is no objection to a participation of <ORG> in its executive capacity in a disciplinary proceeding against an advocate on its roll either at the initial or at the appellate stages. Before it can become a "person aggrieved" by an order against which it could appeal, there must have been a lis or a dispute to be decided which gives rise to the order complained of. To such a "lis" <ORG>, in its executive capacity, must be deemed to be a party. There seems to be no legal obstacles in the way of its separate representation even before its own <ORG>. Its right to appeal as a "person aggrieved" is squarely covered by the provisions of ss. 37 and 38 of the Act. In the present case the respondents themselves treated the <ORG> Council as a party interested in the lis when they impleaded <ORG> as a respondent in their appeals to <ORG>. Its statutory right to appeal under s. 38 is not affected by the mere fact that it did not put in appearance before <ORG>. [319D-G] (2) <ORG> operates through its committees. Each committee has distinct and separable functions. Each could be said to have a "persona" and an identity of its own, which is distinguishable from that of the <ORG> Council as a whole [317G] 3 (a) If the <ORG> Council has a separable interest as a guardian of the rights and privileges of the members of the <ORG>, specifically mentioned by s. 6(1)(d) of the Act. there is no reason why a right to represent this interest before its 308 own <ORG> as well as before <ORG>, on an A appeal under s. 37 of the Act, or., on further appeal to this Court under s. 38 of the Act should be denied to it. [318C-D] 4(a) When <ORG> can have locus standi and rights of a "person aggrieved" affected by the results of such proceedings there is no reason why it should not be in the position of a party lo a lis or dispute' between itself and the allegedly delinquent advocate. [318D-E] (b) The term 'lis' is not confined to litigation by means of a suit in a court of law. [318E] Butler v. <NAME> 7 H.L. Ca. 641 and B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) v. Minister of Health  2 All. E.R. 395 399, referred to. 5. <ORG> in its executive capacity acts as the prosecutor through its <ORG>. There is no incongruity in its <ORG> representing its judicial wing, functioning as an impartial judge whose decisions are binding upon <ORG>. It is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of that expression used in ss. 37 and 38 of the Act. [318G-H] <NAME>, J. (concurring): (1) The <ORG> is not a private guild, like that of 'barbers, butchers and candlestick-makers' but, a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service. The grant of a monopoly licence to practice law is based on three assumptions; (i) there is a socially useful function for the lawyer to perform; (ii ) the lawyer is a professional person who will perform that function; and (iii) his performance as a professional person is regulated by himself and more formally, by the profession as a whole. The central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice. [322G-H] (2) In a developing country the pattern of public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is to rule close to the rule of life. The <ORG> Council clearly comes within this category of organisations when a lawyer is involved. (3) A case of professional misconduct is not a lis in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American meaning. It is a public investigation about misconduct by one belonging to a public profession where every member of the <ORG> with a reputation to lose has a stake and everyone concerned with the justice administration is interested. 'the <ORG> has a share in being the sentinel on the qui vive when the legal dykes of right and justice are breached by authoritarianism or citizen wrongdoing. [323F-Gl (4) The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system. In this case to grant an exclusionary windfall on the respondents is to cripple the <ORG> Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards. [326B] <CITATION> ,  1 S.C.R. refered to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1461 to 1468 of 1 974.

From the Judgment and order dated the 14th April, 1974 of <ORG>, New Delhi. in C. Appeals Nos. 15 to 19, 21, 22 and 25 of 1973 respectively. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant (in all the appeals).

<NAME>, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1461/74).

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent (In C. A. Nos. 1462-64/74) . <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1465/74).

<NAME>, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1466/74).

<NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent (In C.A. No. 1467/ 74).

<NAME>, for the respondent (In C.A. No. 1468/74).

<NAME> and <NAME>, for <ORG>.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for <ORG>.

The Judgment of <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> AND <NAME>, was delivered by <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, <NAME>. gave separate opinions.

RAY, C.J.-These appeals were placed before this Bench for consideration of the question whether <ORG> is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act.

<ORG> on 8 August, 1964 considered a complaint received from <ORG> against the respondents and resolved that the complaint received from <ORG> against the respondents be referred to the disciplinary committee. Another resolution was passed by <ORG> on the same day whereby Messrs <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> were elected as members of the disciplinary committee to enquire into the complaints.

The aforesaid disciplinary committee met on 19 March, 1965 and heard the advocates for <ORG> of the State of Maharashtra. After considering the papers placed before the committee, it directed the Registrar to issue notices under section 35(2) of the Act to the "parties concerned including the Advocate-General". The committee also expressed the opinion that "there is a prima facie case of professional misconduct".

<ORG> on 18 May, 1965 issued notices under section 35 of the Act to the respondents. The notice was described as a suo motu inquiry against the respondents. The notice proceeded with the recital that it came to the notice of <ORG> that the respondents stood at the entrance of the Court House at the Presidency Magistrate's Court, Esplanade, Fort Bombay and solicited work and generally behaved at that place in an undignified manner and the said acts amounted to professional and/or other misconduct and <ORG> constituted disciplinary committee and the inquiry was entrusted to the committee consisting of Messrs <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>.

The said disciplinary committee heard evidence upto 31 August, 1968. On 14 June, 1969, <ORG> passed a resolution requesting the aforesaid disciplinary committee to proceed with the inquiry which was pending before them prior to 31 March, 1969.

The disciplinary committee of <ORG> on 27 June, 1973 found the respondents guilty of conduct which seriously lowered the reputation of the <ORG> in the eyes of the public. The disciplinary committee directed that the respondents would stand suspended from practising as advocates for a period of three years. The suspension orders were to be operative from 1 August 1973.

The respondents preferred appeals before <ORG>. In these appeals, the respondents impleaded <ORG> as respondents. The disciplinary committee of <ORG> on 14 April, 1974 allowed the appeals and set aside the orders of the disciplinary committee of <ORG>. While setting aside the orders of the disciplinary committee of <ORG>, the disciplinary committee of <ORG> stated as follows:-

"<ORG> has not appeared even though they started the proceedings suo motu and we do not pass any orders as to costs and we direct each party will bear their costs. However, we have gone through the evidence ourselves and also the same has been placed in detail by the appellants. All that we can say is that we expected <ORG> to be represented in the ap- peal because proceedings were started suo motu"

These statements of the disciplinary committee of <ORG> indicate that <ORG> should have appeared before the disciplinary committee of <ORG>.

The scheme of the Advocates Act in short is as follows: There are <ORG>. There is <ORG> <ORG> is a body corporate.

The functions of <ORG> are inter alia to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll and to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of advocates on its roll.

The functions of <ORG> are inter alia to lay down standards of professional conduct and etiquette, to lay down the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee of <ORG>, to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of advocates and to exercise general supervision and control over <ORG> Disciplinary committees are constituted by <ORG>. <ORG> is required to constitute one or more disciplinary committees each of which shall consist of three persons of whom two shall be persons elected by the <ORG> from amongst its members and the other shall be A person co-opted by the <ORG> from amongst advocates who possesss the qualifications specified in the proviso to section 3(2) of the Act and are not members of the <ORG>, and the senior most advocate amongst the members of a disciplinary committee shall be its Chairman.

When <ORG> of <ORG> and of <ORG> and <ORG> of <ORG> and the legal education committee of <ORG> are to consist of members erected by the <ORG> from amongst its members, it is noticeable that the disciplinary committees of Bar <ORG> of State as well as of Bar <ORG> of India shall consist of three persons of whom two shall be elected by the <ORG> from amongst its members and the other shall be a person co-opted by the <ORG> from advocates who are not otherwise members of the <ORG>.

Chapter V of the Act relates to the Conduct of Advocates. Chap ter V contains sections 35 to 44 . Section 35 states that where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise <ORG> has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. <ORG> may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct that inquiry to be made by another disciplinary committee of <ORG>. The disciplinary committee of <ORG> shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice to be given. to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate- General of the <ORG>. The disciplinary committee of <ORG> may make any of the following orders namely, (a) dismiss the complaint, or where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of <ORG>, direct that the proceedings be filed, (b) reprimand the advocate, (c) suspend the advocate for such period as it may deem fit, (d) remove the name of the advocate from the state roll of advocates.

Section 36 speaks of disciplinary powers of <ORG> and provides that where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise <ORG> has reason to believe that any advocate whose name is not entered on any <ORG> roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. The disciplinary committee of <ORG> may either of its own motion or on a report by any <ORG> Bar Council or on an application made to it by any person interested, withdraw for inquiry before itself any proceeding for disciplinary action against any advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any <ORG> Bar Council and dispose of the same.

Section 37 speaks of appeal to <ORG>. This section states that any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of <ORG> or the Advocate-General of the state may, within sixty days of the date of communication of the order, prefer an appeal to <ORG>.

Section 38 provides for appeal to <ORG>. Section 38 states that any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of <ORG> under section 36 or section 37 or the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the <ORG>, as the case may be, may prefer an appeal to <ORG>.

Section 49 of the Act provides that <ORG> may make rules for discharging its functions under the Act and in particular such rules may prescribe inter alia the standards of professional conduct and etiquette to be observed by advocates. <ORG> in exercise of the rule making power under section 49(c) of the Act on 10 and l l July, 1954, approved the rules of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The standards of professional conduct and etiquette are described in five sections. The first section deals with duty of advocates to the <ORG>. The second section speaks of duty of advocates to the clients. The third section consists of rules regarding duty of advocates to opponent. The fourth section prescribes duties of advocates to colleagues. The fifth section lays down restrictions on advocates on other employments.

The present appeals touch on Rule 36 of the Rules of the Bar Council of India. Rule 36 is in fourth section under the heading "duty to colleagues Rule 36 speaks that "an advocate shall not solicit work or advertise either directly or indirectly, whether by circular, advertisements, touts, personal communications, interviews not warranted by personal relations furnishing newspaper comments or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with cases in which he has been engaged or concerned.

The question for consideration is the meaning of the words any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of <ORG>" occurring in section 38 of the Act. It is noticeable that in section 37 , the Advocate-General of the State and in section 38 , the Attorney-General or the Advocate-General of the State, as the case may be, have been given specific rights of appeal. These rights were introduced into the Act by amendments made in the year 1974 by Amending Act 60 of 1973.

<CITATION> (1), the question which fell for consideration was whether the appeal filed by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra before <ORG> was competent. The majority view was that the Advocate-General of the State was not competent to file an appeal to <ORG>. In the Maharashtra case (supra), the disciplinary committee of <ORG> was satisfied that that there was no reason to hold <NAME> guilty of professional misconduct or other misconduct. The Advocate-General (1)  1 S. C. R. 863.

of Maharashtra filed an appeal before <ORG>. The appellant objected to the locus standi of Advocate-General before <ORG>. That objection was overruled and the appeal filed by the Advocate-General was accepted by the disciplinary committee of <ORG>. The disciplinary committee of <ORG> held the advocate, <NAME> guilty of misconduct and suspended him from practice for one year. The advocate preferred an appeal under section 38 of the Act to this Court. In view or majority decision, the appeal filed by <NAME> was accepted by this Court on the ground that the Advocate-General of Maharashtra was incompetent to file an appeal. It is in this background that amendments have been introduced into sections 37 and 38 of the Act conferring right of appeal on the Advocate-General of <ORG> and the Attorney-General of India under sections 37 and 38 respectively.

The respondents contended on the ruling of this Court in <NAME> case (supra) that <ORG> is not a person aggrieved to maintain an appeal against a decision of its disciplinary committee for these reasons. First, <ORG> is not an aggrieved person because <ORG> has not suffered ally legal grievance, and the decision of the <ORG> of India has not deprived <ORG> of anything. Second, the allegation that order of the disciplinary committee of the <ORG> of India is wrongfully made does not by itself give any grievance to <ORG>. The person must be aggrieved by the order and not by the consequences which ensue. Third, it is not the duty of the State <ORG> to attempt to set right any alleged error of the disciplinary committee of the <ORG> of India. The reason is that no such duty has been imposed or cast by law on <ORG>. Fourth, a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. Fifth, <ORG> is subordinate to <ORG> of India and is, therefore, not competent to appeal against any orders of the superior body. Finally, an appeal could have been filed by the Advocate-General or the Attorney-General of India who have the right to appeal but they have chosen not to do so.

The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicates that the constitution of <ORG> and <ORG> is for one of the principal purposes to see that the standards of professional conduct and etiquette laid down by the <ORG> are observed and preserved. <ORG> therefore entertain cases of misconduct against advocates. <ORG> are to safeguard the rights, privilege and interests of advocates. <ORG> is a body corporate. The disciplinary committees are constituted by <ORG>. <ORG> is not the same body as its disciplinary committee. One of the principal functions of <ORG> in regard to standards of professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is to receive complaints against advocates and if <ORG> has reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. <ORG>

cil of a <ORG> may also of its own motion if it has reason to believe that any advocate has been gui<ORG>y of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. It is apparent that a <ORG> Bar Council not only receives a complaint but is required to apply its mind to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has ben gui<ORG>y of professional or other misconduct. <ORG> of a <ORG> acts on that reasoned belief. <ORG> has a very important part to play first, in the reception complaints, second, in forming reasonable belief of gui<ORG> of professional or other misconduct and finally in making reference of the case to its disciplinary committee. The initiation of the proceedings before the disciplinary committee is by the Bar Council of a <ORG>. A most Significant feature is that no litigant and no member of the public can straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings against an advocate. <ORG> is the Bar Council of a <ORG> which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.

In finding out the meaning of the words "person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of <ORG>", two features are to be kept in the fore-front. First, there is no lis in proceedings before the disciplinary committee. When the disciplinary committee exercises the power to reprimand the advocate, or suspend the advocate from practice or remove the name of the advocate, the committee does not decide a suit between the parties. <ORG> in placing a matter before the disciplinary committee does not act as prosecutor in a criminal case. A complainant who prefers a complaint against an advocate is not like a plaintiff in a civil suit. The complaint is examined by <ORG> in order to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of misconduct. '<ORG> may act on its own initiative on information which has come to its notice in the course of its duties. Second, there is no party to the disciplinary proceedings. It is because <ORG>, the Attorney-General, the Advocate-General, as the case may be, all act in protecting the interests of advocates, the interests of the public. In so acting there is no conflict between the advocate and another person. The reason is that it is professional conduct, professional etiquette, professional ethics, professional morality, which are to be upheld, transgression of which results in reprimanding the advocate of suspending him from practice or removing his name from the roll.

With regard to the conduct of the advocates, <ORG> plays an important part, vis-a-vis the disciplinary committee constituted by <ORG>. First, under section 35(1A) of the Act <ORG> may either of its own motion or on an application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry to be made by ant other disciplinary committee of <ORG>. This indicates the watch that <ORG> has to keep. Its task does not cease on placing a matter before the disciplinary committee. This provision shows on one hand the abiding interest of <ORG> in the matter and on the other the duty of guarding the professional ethics with which it is entrusted. Second, under section 36(2) of the Act, <ORG> may make a report to <ORG> to withdraw before the disciplinary committee of <ORG> any proceeding for disciplinary action against any advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of <ORG>. These provisions indicate that after <ORG> has placed the matter before its disciplinary committee, <ORG> continues its check on the proceedings. These courses of action are procedural. These steps do not give <ORG> any power to deal with the decisions of the disciplinary committee. The reason why <ORG> is empowered under the Act to withdraw proceedings from one disciplinary committee and give it to another or to have the disciplinary proceedings withdrawn from the <ORG> for determination by the disciplinary committee of <ORG> is that <ORG> is all the time interested in the task of preserving the profession against impurities in the standards of conduct. <ORG> is the collective representative of the lawyers, the public, in regard lo the observance of professional ethics by persons belonging to the noble profession.

The words `person aggrieved" are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words "person aggrieved" will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Some times, it is said that the words "person aggrieved" correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies.

Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the con text of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been 'denied or deprieved of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved". Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words a "person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of <ORG> under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words "persons aggrieved" in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import add should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words "person aggrieved" include "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests". It has therefore, to be found out whether <ORG> has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette.

The pre-eminent question is: what are the interests of <ORG>? The interests of <ORG> are the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. <ORG> has no personal or pecuniary interest. <ORG> has the statutory A duty and interest to see that the rules laid down by <ORG> of India in relation to professional conduct and etiquette are upheld and not violated. <ORG> acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession.

The interest of <ORG> is to uphold standards of professional conduct and etiquette in the profession, which is founded upon integrity and mutual trust. <ORG> acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession. The grievance of <ORG> is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. If any decision of the disciplinary committee of <ORG> of India is according to <ORG> such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession, <ORG> is an aggrieved person to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the <ORG> <ORG> is "a person aggrieved" for these reasons First, the words "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute. In disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary committee there is no lis and there are no parties. therefore, the word "person" will embrace <ORG> which represents the <ORG> of the State. Second, <ORG> is "a person aggrieved" because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. <ORG> acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Third, the function of <ORG> in entertaining complaints against advocates is whn <ORG> has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted with such inquiry. Once an inquiry starts, <ORG> has no control over its decision. <ORG> may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or <ORG> may make a report to <ORG> of India. This indicates that <ORG> is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. Fourth, a decision of a disciplinary committee can only be corrected by appeals as provided under the Act. When <ORG> initiates proceedings by referring cases of misconduct to disciplinary committee, <ORG> in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain the proper standards an(l etiquette of the profession. Fifth, <ORG> is vitally concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of <ORG>. <ORG> will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics.

For these reasons we hold that <ORG> is an aggrieved person to maintain an appeal under the Act.

The appeals will now be heard on merits by <ORG>.

<NAME>, J.-I not only concur with the conclusion reached by My Lord the Chief Justice and the reasons given to support it. but I think that we can and should hold that there was actually a "lis" between <ORG> and the allegedly delinquent Advocates who were hauled up before its <ORG>, on complaints sent by <ORG> of <ORG>, for what were said to be acts of professional misconduct, The learned Chief Justice has very clearly and succinctly set out the reasons why <ORG> is a "person aggrieved" entitled to appeal against orders in disciplinary proceedings against members of <ORG>. It represents <ORG>. It is the "keeper of the conscience" and the guardian of the interests of members of the <ORG>. It acts "as the protector of the purity and dignity of the (` profession." Its function in relation to disciplinary proceedings, is to entertain complaints against Advocates, and, when there is a prima facie case of misconduct, to initiate proceedings by sending the complaint to its <ORG>. It has an interest in seeing that correct decisions are given upon matters involving allegations of misconduct against members of <ORG>. My learned brother <NAME> has indicated the wide range and the social significance and dimensions of this interest.

<ORG> is composed primarily of members elected from amongst Advocates of a State. Its statutory functions are given in Section 6 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Amongst these, we are especially concerned here with clauses (c) and (d) of Section 6(t) of the Act, which read as follows:

(c) to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll;

(d) to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests; of advocate on its roll;"

Under Section 9 of the Act, <ORG> constitutes its <ORG> consisting of "three persons of whom two shall be persons elected by <ORG> from amongst its members and the other shall be a person elected by the <ORG> from amongst Advocates who possess the qualifications specified....". Under Section 10 it elects <ORG> of five members and <ORG> of three members. Thus, <ORG> operates through its <ORG>s. Each <ORG> has distinct and separable functions. Each could, therefore, be said to have a "persona" and an identity of its own which is distinguishable from that of the Bar <ORG> as a whole. Each <ORG>, no doubt, acts for the Bar <ORG>, but its members are likely to be different although this is not necessarily so. In any case, when <ORG> has sent a case to its <ORG>, under Section 35 of the Act, that <ORG> proceeds as an independent and impartial authority which tries a complaint and either dismisses lt or directs proceedings to be filed, or, upon finding an advocate guilty, punishes him by either reprimanding him, suspending him from practice for a specified period, or orders removal of his name 7-L 839 Sup CI/75 from its roll of advocates. Indeed, Section 42(1) of the Act gives the <ORG> the powers of <ORG> under the Civil Procedure Code; and, Section 42(2) enacts that its proceedings shall be "deemed" to be judicial proceedings for the purposes mentioned there.

At the trial of a complaint, opportunities to be heard must be given to the Advocate General and to the Advocate who is tried by it. This has to be done because there are disputes and conflicting interests and points of view on which <ORG> has to give its decisions. Tho Advocate General can appear either personally or through an Advocate representing him. He presumably represents public interest as well as the interests of the legal profession of which he is the formal head in the <ORG>. It is true that there is no provision in Section 35 of the Act for impleading the <ORG> <ORG> Council which, on its executive side, initiates the proceedings by sending the case to its <ORG>. But, if <ORG> has a separable interest, as a guardian of the rights and privileges of the members of the <ORG> specifically mentioned by Section 6(1)(d) of the Act, there is no reason why I right to represent this interest before its on <ORG> well as before <ORG> of India, on an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, or, on the further appeal to this Court under Section 38 of the Act, should be denied to it. Neither Section 37 nor Section 38 of the Act mention the <ORG> <ORG> Council as a separate entity. Nevertheless if, as we are holding, it can have the locus standi and rights of "person aggrieved", affected by the results of such proceedings, I see no reason why we should not say that in tho position of a party to a "lis" or a dispute between itself and the allegedly delinquent Advocate towards the decision of which the proceedings are directed.

The term "lis" is not confined to litigation by means of a suit in a Court of law. In <NAME> v. <NAME> it was held that a "suit is not necessary to constitute lis". It was pointed out there that "a family ..controversy capable of being litigated is a lis mota'. In <ORG> (Builders) v. Minister of Health(2), Lord <NAME>, M.R. said: `"Lis implies the conception of an issue joined between two parties, The decision of a lis.. is the decision of that issue".

If <ORG>, acting through its through it <ORG>, has found a prima facie case to be send and tried by its <ORG>, it performs the functions of a prosecuting agency. <ORG> does so i the discharge of its duty to safeguard '`the rights, privileges and interests' of advocates as a whole on its roll which are affected by the misconduct of an advocate. There arc, therefore, triable issues between it and the; (, individual Advocate accused of misconduct. <ORG> seems to mc that we could and should, therefore, hold that <ORG>, in its executive capacity, act as the prosecutor through its <ORG> There is no incongruity in its <ORG>, representing is judicial want" functioning as an impartial Judge whose decisions ar.. binding upon <ORG>. If are were holding that <ORG>, dissatisfied with a decision of its <ORG>, can appeal against it, we her to, I think, as its logical corollary, also hold that it is (1) 7 H. L. Ca. 641. (2) [1947] 2 All.E. R. 39; At 399.

a party to a "lis". Our` opinion that it is a 'person aggrieved", within the meaning of that expression as used in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act, necessarily implies that.

The point of view stated above rests upon the distinction between the two different capacities of <ORG>; an executive capacity, in which it acts as the prosecutor through its <ORG>, and a quasi-judicial function, which it performs through s <ORG>. If we can make this distinction, as I think we can, there is no merger between the prosecutor and the Judge here. If one may illustrate from another sphere, when the <ORG> itself gets through it executive agencies to prosecute and then though its judicial wing to decide a case there is no breach of a rule of natural justice. The prosecutor and the Judge could not be said to have the some personality or approach just because both of them represents different aspects or functions of the same <ORG>.

For the reasons given above, I do not see any objection to a participation of <ORG> in its executive capacity, in a disciplinary proceeding against an Advocate on its roll, either at the initial or the appellate stages. Before it can become a person aggrieved" by an order against which it could appeal, there must have been a "lis" or a dispute to be decided which gives rise to the order complained of. To such a "lis" the <ORG>, in its executive capacity must be deemed to be a party. Apparently, its interests are presumed to be sufficiently represented by the Advocate General. Hence, it was not considered necessary to provide for its separate representation by a notice to be given by its <ORG>; is provided for in the case of the Advocate General But, their seems to me to be no legal obstacle in the way of its separate representation, if. it so desires, even before its own <ORG>. It certainly has notice of every complaint whenever it send it to its <ORG>. Its right to appeal in any event, as a "person aggrieved", seems squarely covered by the provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act. It may be mentioned here that the respondents themselves treated <ORG> as a party interested in a "list", so that it could become a "person" aggrieved" by the setting aside of the orders against respondents, when they impleaded the <ORG> as a respondent in their appeals to <ORG> India. Its statutory right to appeal to this Court under Section 38 is not affected by the mere fact that it did not put in appearance before <ORG> of India.

<NAME>, J.- My concurrence the opinion which has been handed down by the learned Chief Justice is ordinarily dissuasive of a separated long note, save when a fresh perspective is to be presented or new frontiers are to be drawn by doing so. Partially, my supplementary has this apology.

The tow-day long arguments in this case have been devoted to a construction of two simple words in common use forming the expression 'person aggrieved'. Precedential erudition and traditional approaches not withstanding, the key to tho meaning of the expression in question lies in plain English plus the social fell of the Status and the public commitment of the legal profession, the regulation on which has been achieved by the Advocates Act , 1961 (for short, the Act) wherein the above words occur. Legal scholarship, to be fruitful, must focus on the life-style of the law without getting lost in mere logomachy.

The short question is as to whether <ORG> is a person aggrieved' within the meaning of s. 38 so that it has locus standi to appeal to this Court against a decision of <ORG> of <ORG> which, it claims, is embarrassingly erroneous and, if left unchallenged, may frustrate the high obligation of maintaining standards of probity and purity and canons of correct professional conduct among the members of the <ORG> on its rolls.

I skip the facts as they have been 5 out in the judgment of the armed Chief Justice, except to state. that a number of advocates, who are ranged as respondents, had been found guilty by <ORG> of unseemly soliciting but,. On appeal. the disciplinary body of <ORG>, exonerated them on certain view of 'professional conduct' which disturbed <ORG> and even the <ORG>, with the result that the former came upto this <ORG> in appeal and. the latter activity supported this stand.

The hackneyed phrase, 'person aggrieved is not merely of frequent occurrence m statutes and in the writ jurisdiction but has come up for judicial consideration in Anglo American and India courts in a variety of situations and legislative settings. Notwithstanding the slippery semantics of such legalese, the Indian legislative draftsmen have continued to use them, out of linguistic allegiance to the British art, and Indian Judges have frequently sought interpretative light from English authorities of ancient vintage. These 'borrowed' drafting and interpretative exercises arc sometimes inept when time and country change and the context and text of the statute vary. I stress this aspect since much of the time of the <ORG> in India is consumed by massive, and sometimes mechanical, reliance on exotic constructions and default in evolving legislative simplicity and avoiding interpretative complexity. At a time when our <ORG> are on trial for delayed disposals and mystifying processes, this desideratum becomes all the more urgent. Otherwise, why should decoding a single expression- 'person aggrieved' take two days of learned length ?

Even. in England, so well-known a Parliamentary draftsman as <NAME> has recently pleaded in <ORG> against incomprensible law forgetting 'that it is fundamentally important in a free society that the law should be readily ascertainable and reasonably clear, and that otherwise it is oppressive and deprives the citizen of one of his basic rights'. It is also needlessly expensive and wasteful. <NAME>, the famous American Draftsman. said: 'lt cost the <ORG> and the public many millions of dollars annually'. <ORG>, in England, has reported on drafting reform but it is unfortunate that India is unaware of this problem and in a post-Independence statute like the Advocates Act legislators should still get entangled in these drafting mystiques and judges forced lo play a linguistic game when the country has an illiterate laity as consumers of law and the rule of law is basic to our constitutional order.

Back to the issue. Is <ORG> a 'person aggrieved'? No narrow. pedantic, technical or centenarian construction can be blindly applied. On the other hand, a spacious construction, functionally informed by the social conscience and the salutary purpose of the enactment must illumine the judicial effort. So viewed, the ample. import and breath of meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' will . embrace <ORG>,for reasons which 1 shall presently set out.

Each statute has a personality and a message. Judicial interpretation is not bloodless and sterile exercise in spinning subtle webs sometimes cobwebs, out of words and phrases otherwise simples. but to unfold the scheme of the Legislation insightfully, sense its social setting and read the plain intendment. This living approach can do justice to law, We arc here concerned with a legislative outfit for a national <ORG>, organising and prescribing its statutory autonomy, elective structure, public functions, internal regulation and ultimate appeal to <ORG> where canons of good conduct have been allegedly breached by delinquent lawyers. This conspectus will show what a vibrant and responsible role the <ORG> Council has to play at the <ORG> and national levels and any interpretation which will detract from this supervisory status of the <ORG> Council will be incongruous with the founding creed of the institution. The paramount concern of the <ORG> Councils is the lawyer, the public and professional responsibility. Anything that hurts the health of this system is a social trauma, a legal grievance, a special injury, for them. After all, 'lawyer- power' lasts not through peak incomes of a few and security of statutory monopoly, but by the high comport and ethics of the many, screening and weeding deviants and delinquents.

Let us get a glimpse of the great expectations about The legal profession in society. Long ago, <NAME> trenchantly remarked that the profession of law.

"is the only aristrocratic element which can be amalgamated without violence with natural elements of democracy.... I cannot believe that a Republic could subsist if the influence of lawyers in public business did not increase in proportion to the power of the people.

" He rightly stressed that 'lawyers belong to the people by birth an. interest, to the aristocracy by habit and taste'. Thus the profession is the connecting link between the community and the <ORG> given an enlightened, goal-oriented group outgrowing its elitist mores indeed today lawyers are recruited also from the lower brackets. India has huge number of law men who can be a force. What Prof. <NAME> observed about <ORG> has some, only some though, relevance to India, and I quote:

"The sheer size of the legal community, strongly organised into bar associations and closely allied with equally strong courts has not only been a major source for the diffusion and regeneration of norms generally, but by weight of numbers has enabled the courts to remain strong and has prevented the rise of administrative lawlessness. There is s curious anomaly here. The legal community, while often antagonistic to government and constraining executive action, is nevertheless closely identified normatively and culturally with the bureaucratic elite. This identification curiously coupled with health antagonism actually enhances the strength of the legal community. It derives popular support from its ostensible opposition to Government and at the same time elicits bureaucratic support in the community at large. It has a net work of relationships in rural areas and the cities.. In short, the legal community is a force to be, reckoned with. It has challenged the executive during and after martial law, it has defined efforts to restrict court jurisdiction, it has compelled justiciability of fundamental rights, it has forced abrogation of several restrictive enactments. Is this law as an impendiment to political development ? Is this misallocation of scarce resources in the system? Is this unproductive use of non productive man-power ? On the contrary, it seems to us that this is the Very genius of political development."

<NAME>, after quoting Prof. <NAME>, comments (in his article in <ORG>, January 1972, Vol. 58, on .The Role of Lawyers in Developing Countries') "The legal profession has a unique opportunity to effect change from within the political elite, to exert pressure from without and to win over the general public to development policies. And as <NAME> and <NAME> observed with respect to legal education, 'law graduates usually fan out not only into legal practice but also into responsible positions in business, government and politics'."

The <ORG> is not a private guild, like that of 'barbers butchers and candlestick-makers' but, by bold contrast, a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service. The grant of monoply licence to practice law is based on three assumptions There is a socially useful function for The lawyer to perform. (2) The lawyer is a professional person who will perform that function, and (3) His performance as a professional person is regulated by himself and more normally, by the profession as a whole. The central function That the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice ('The Practice of Law is, a Public Utility' `The Lawyer, The Public and Professional Responsibility' by F. Raymond Marks et al-Chicago American <ORG> Foundation, 1972, p.288-289). A glance at The functions of the <ORG> Council, and it will be apparent that a rainbow of public utility duties, including legal aid to the pour, is cast on these bodies in the national hope that the members of this monopoly will serve society and keep to canons of ethics befitting an honourable order. If pathological cases of member misbehaviour occur, the reputation and credibility of the <ORG> suffer a mayhem and who, out the <ORG> Council, is more concerned with and sensitive to this potential disrepute The few black sheep bring about? The official heads of the <ORG> i.e., the Attorney General and the Advocates-General too are distressed if a lawyer 'stoops to conquer' by resort to soliciting, touting and other corrupt practices.

I may now refer to <CITATION> (1) where diver gent opinions were delivered but all concurred in treating <ORG> as an 'aggrieved person'. The earlier decision in <NAME> (2) strikes a note in consonance with this view. No hesitancy inhibits me from hazarding the opinion that the social canvas must be spread wide when making out the profile of a statute like the Advocates Act for the good reason that the <ORG> has a share in being the sentinel on the qui vive when the legal dykes of Right and justice are breached by authoritarianism or citizen-wrong- doing. Nor do I conceal my halfhorror at any professional tribunal glossing over 'snatching briefs' and 'dragging clients'-provided they are proved-as less than gross misconduct. If the salt lose their savour, wherewith shall they be salted ? However, I hasten to make it plain, to avoid prejudice to the parties. that I totally desist from pronouncing on the merits of tho evidence in this case.

One more point. A case of professional misconduct is not a lis in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American meaning. It is a public investigation about misconduct by one belonging to public profession where every member of the <ORG> with a reputation to lose has a stake and every one concerned with the justice administration is interested. Traditionally used to the adversary system, we search for individual persons aggrieved. But a new class of litigation public interest litigation-where a section or whole of the community is involved (such as consumers' organisations or <ORG>-National Association for Advancement of Coloured People-in America), emerges. In a developing country like ours, this pattern of public-oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is to run close to the rule of life. The <ORG> Council clearly comes within this category of organisations When a lawyer is involved.

I derive support for this philosophy of approach from academic and judicial opinion in England and America. A question arose whether a railroad company-BAR (<ORG> bring an action against the stockholders for having drained BAR (1) [197] I S C. R. 863. (2) [1955] 1 S. C. R.

improperly. Although an academic critic took the view that <ORG> was incorrect in its view that <ORG> was the 'sole beneficiary', he went on to state that the public's interest in the financial health of <ORG> provided a separate interest in bringing the action. The learned author wrote:

"It would seem to be incontestable that the public has a very n real interest in rail roads. Railroads have been found vital to a healthy national economy; any such factor must. a priori, be deemed a potent component of the public welfare. As such, it is evident that a financially healthy railroad is of concern not only to its stockholders, but to the public as well Finding that the management of a railroad has obligations running to the public as well as fiduciary duties owing to the corporation's stockholders, the <ORG> concluded that, of these two responsibilities, tho public interest is paramount. "It must be remembered," the <ORG> cautioned, "that railways are public corporations organized for public purposes....They all primarily owe duties to the public of a higher nature even than that of earning large dividends for their shareholders."

(Review by <NAME> 1;. Simon of <ORG> R. R v. <ORG> (<ORG>), 482 F.2d 865 (<ORG> 1973), cert. granted, 94 S.Ct. 863 (1974) <ORG> Vol. 74 No. 3, April 197 p. 528 at pp. 531-532).

Similarly, <ORG> relaxed from the restrictive attitude towards 'standing' in public action in <NAME> v. <NAME> (369 U.S. 186 (1962), vide <ORG> p.506:

"In <NAME>, voters challenged the failure of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion itself since 1901; the plaintiffs lived l. in countries which had become under-represented under the old law. <ORG> held that these voters had the requisite standing to challenge the inaction of the legislature The Court expanded the notion cf direct injury to include mere 'debasement' of a vote, rather than the total deprivation which had previously been required."

American jurisprudence has recognised, for instance, the expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer organisations to initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of 'locus standi', such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807-<ORG>.

46. 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have recently been Campaigning for using legal actions for protection of community interest, broadening the scope of 'standing' in legal proceedings (see p.403-Boston University Law Review, Vol. 51, 1971).

In the well-known case of Attorney,General of the Gambia v. <NAME>), Lord <NAME> observed about the Attorney-General's standing thus:

"...The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering. in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests. Has the Attorney- General a sufficient interest for this purpose ? Their Lordships think that he has. The Attorney General in a colony represents the <ORG> as the guardian of the public interest. It is his duty to bring before the judge any mis conduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action."

<NAME>, J (as he then was) crystallised this ratio in <NAME> (supra) thus:

"<ORG> construed the words 'person aggrieved' to include the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest."

(p.927) "The profession touches the public on the one hand and the courts on the other. On no other basis could the presence of J., the Advocate General be explained."

(p.928) Although not strictly confined to 'standing' with reference to suits jurists have thrown some light on this subject. Professor <NAME> has observed:

"All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public interest-the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him." (Quoted ill 'Standing Justifiability' by <NAME> Journal of the Indian Law Institute-April-

June 1971- Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 174) Professor <NAME> has observed:

"In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio (1) [1961] A, C. 617.

popularis.This is because it looks beyond the personal rights A of tho applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by presenting inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their powers."

(Standing and Justiciability bid, p. 175) The possible apprehension that widening legal standing With a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system. In this very case, to grant an exclusionary windfall on the respondents is to cripple <ORG> in its search for justice and insistence on standards.

I have been long on a short point, but brevity, where there is some thing to speak, is not the soul of wit but a sign of something different.

<NAME>