PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: CHANAN MAL ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT18/03/1976 BENCH: <NAME>, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: <NAME>, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SHINGAL, P.N. CITATION: 1976 AIR 1654 1976 SCR (3) 688 1977 SCC (1) 390 CITATOR INFO : RF 1980 SC1955 (41) F 1982 SC 697 (28) RF 1991 SC1676 (46,47,48,50) ACT: Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 67 of 1957- Section 16(1)(b) -Scope of. Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973-If repugnant to the provisions of Central Act . Mandamus-Issue of-Petitioner should first call upon the authority to discharge legal obligation. <ORG>ment of Objects and Reasons-When could be used in interpretation New questions-When could be raised. HEADNOTE: On the strength of entries in the (wajib-ul-arz) (village administration papers) of some villages <ORG> considered itself to be the owner of saltpetre deposits. By a notification it declared saltpetre as a minor mineral and auctioned the mines in accordance with the Punjab Minor Minerals Con Cessions Rules, 1964 made under the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 67 of 1957. In a writ petition <ORG> held that, unless the mineral deposits were specifically mentioned in the Wajib-ul-arz of a village, as having vested in the <ORG>, their ownership would still remain vested in the former proprietors according to the record of rights. To meet this situation, the <ORG> legislature passed the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973. Since the owners of the lands had haphazardly created lessee rights in contravention of the Punjab Rules, 1964, two notifications were issued with the object of the conservation as well as of scientific exploitation of mineral resources. By one notification <ORG> purported to acquire rights to saltpetre in the lands and by the second it announced that certain saltpetre bearing areas would be auctioned. In a writ petition under Art. 226 , <ORG> held (i) that in view of the declaration contained in s. 2 of the Central Act the field covered by the impugned Act was already fully occupied by the Central legislation so that the <ORG> Act was inoperative and void for repugnancy and quashed the two notifications; and (ii) that rights in such lands had continued to vest in the former owners of estates despite acquisitions of other parts of their estates. The respondents in the appeals containded that the declaration in s. 2 of the Central Act that it was expedient in the public interest that the <ORG> should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals would become unworkable if the provisions of the <ORG> Act were permitted to operate. While the appeals were pending writ petitions were filed in this <ORG> under Article 32. The petitioners in the first batch of writ petitions have asserted rights as holders of mining lesses granted by persons who had been entered as proprietors of estates in the record of rights and that the <ORG> under the <ORG> Act had wrongly acquired the right to mineral deposits in their former lands. It was contended that the effect of the <ORG> Act was only to change the ownership without interfering with the regulation of leasehold or licensee rights in minerals under the Central Act . Allowing the appeals of the <ORG> and dismissing the writ petitions, ^ HELD: (i) The Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act. 1973, is valid, as it is not, in any way, repugnant to the provisions of the Mines and 689 Minerals (Regulation of Development) Act 67 of 1957, made by <ORG>. Ownership rights could be and have been validly acquired by <ORG> under the <ORG> Act . [710G] (ii) No rights are shown by any petitioner to have been conferred upon him under any lease or licence executed in accordance with the provisions of the Central Act , but, any petitioner, either before <ORG> or in this <ORG>, who can establish any such right governed by the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957 may take such proceedings before an appropriate court, as may still be open to him under the law, against any such action or Government notification as is alleged to infringe that right. [710H] (iii) Any petitioner who applied for a writ or order in the nature of a mandamus should, in compliance with a well- known rule of practice, ordinarily, first call upon the authority concerned to discharge its legal obligation and show that it had refused or neglected to carry it out within a reasonable time before applying to a court for such an order even where the alleged obligation is established. [711B] 1. (a) It is difficult to sustain the respondents' contention that the provisions of the Central Act would be really unworkable by mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits were found. The character of the <ORG> Act has to be judged by the substance and effect of its provisions and not merely by the purpose given in the <ORG>ment of Objects and Reasons. [706C] (b) The provisions of the Central Act show that subject to the overall supervision of <ORG> <ORG> has a sphere of its own powers and can take legally specified actions under the Central Act and rules. Thus, the whole field of control and regulation under the provisions of the Central Act cannot be said to be reserved for <ORG>. [698B] (c) The stated objects and reasons of the <ORG> Act showed that the acquisition was to be made to protect the mineral potentialities of the land and to ensure their proper development and exploitation on scientific lines. If this was the actual purpose behind the Act it did not materially differ from that which could be said to lie behind the Central Act . [692E] (d) The provisions contained in s. 16(1)(b) show that <ORG> itself contemplated state legislation for vesting of lands containing mineral deposits in <ORG>. It only required that rights to mining granted in such land should be regulated by the provisions of Act 67 of 1957 as amended in 1972. This feature could only be explained on the assumption that <ORG> did not intend to trench upon powers of <ORG> legislatures under entry 18 of List II read with entry 42 of List III. Again, s. 17 of the Central Act shows that there was no intention to interfere with vesting of lands in the <ORG>s by the provisions of the Central Act . [707B-C] (e) There is no force in the contention of the respondents that the vesting contemplated by s. 16(1)(b) as it now stands must be of "estates" of proprietors or lands of tenureholders under some legislation for agrarian reform. Agrarian 31A of the Constitution is not confined to legislation for agrarian reform. Agrarian reform is only one of the possible or alternative objects of such acquisition. It need not be the exclusive or only purpose of <ORG> legislation contemplated by s. 16(1)(b) of the Central Act. Power to legislate for the acquisition of the whole of an estate or 'tenure' would include the power to legislate for any part of it. [707 <CITATION> ., 2 S.C.R. 537; <CITATION> , 1 S.C.R. 371; <CITATION> ., (4) S.C.R. 461 & <CITATION> , 2 S.C.R. 100, held inapplicable. (2) The lessee and licensee rights governed by the Central Act or rules are not covered by the <ORG> Act . It is clear from s. 3(2) of the <ORG> Act that the provisions of this Act were to be read subject to the provisions made by or under the Central Act . The <ORG> Act did not and could not upso facto 690 terminate either lessee or licensee rights which were subsisting on the date when the <ORG> Act came into force. On the other hand. s. 9 of the Central Act 56 of 1972, which amended s. 16 of the principal Act, made it imperative for such lessee rights as existed in estates (which had vested in a <ORG> Government) to be brought into conformity with the Central Act . Therefore, if there were no lessee or licensee rights of mining in minor minerals on land which were actually regulated by the provisions of the Central Act they would continue. [708H] In the instant case, however. it was not shown how the notification of auctions of mining rights affected any subsisting rights of any alleged lessee or licensee. It has not been shown that any lessee or licensee asked <ORG> to carry out any statutory or contractual obligation before he invoked the writ jurisdiction of <ORG> or this <ORG>. The essential averments to disclose subsisting rights or the locus standi of the petitioners were wanting in these petitions. [709A] (3) In the second batch of petitions, the only dispute between the parties related to the vesting of ownership rights in minor minerals in those plots. The petitioners have come to this <ORG> as lessees and not as owners. Rights of former owners have been validly terminated by the <ORG> Act . It is difficult to make out from these petitions how any lessee rights acquired by the petitioners themselves under any law subsisted or were affected by the notifications. [710E-F] (4) The statement of objects and reasons is relevant when the object or purpose of an enactment is in dispute or uncertain. It can never override the effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provisions. Such effect is the best evidence of intention. A statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the statute, and, therefore, it is not even relevant in a case in which the language of the operative parts of the Act leaves no room whatsoever, to doubt what was meant by the legislators. [706D-E] In the instant case it is not disputed that the object and effect of the <ORG> Act was to acquire proprietary rights to mineral deposits in "land". Its provisions however, do not mention leasehold or licensee rights. This is so because these rights were governed by the Central Act 67 of 1957. (5) It is not correct to say that any new question was allowed to be raised simply because the parties were permitted to place their points of view on the same question after taking into account the changes brought about in Act 67 of 1957 by Act 56 of 1972 and how earlier decisions of this <ORG>, which were given before the amendments came into force, could be at all helpful in deciding the questions. The <ORG> is bound to take judicial notice of the law as it exists and not the law as it once was. [706G] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 840 to 860 of 1975.

From the Judgments and orders dated 7-5-74, 27-8-74, 2- 9-74 and 10-9-74 of <ORG> in Civil Writ Nos. 1133, 1118, 1180, 1208, 1225, 1226, 1231, 1238, 1277, 1251,1352/74 and 1188, 1198, 1221/74 and L.P.As. Nos. 395 and 399 of 1974 respectively and Writ Petitions 1309-1318 and 1371-1373/75 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) <NAME>, (In Case 844-860/75) and <NAME> (In all Writ Petitions) and <NAME> for the Appellant and Respondents.

<NAME> and <NAME> for the Petitioners in W.P. 1371-73/75.

<NAME> for the Petitioners in W.P. 1371- 73/75.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents excepting C.As. 852, 853 and 855/75.

<NAME> for the Intervener in C.A. 845/75 <NAME> etc. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. The seventeen appeals before us by the <ORG> and by the Director of Industries of Haryana, after certification under Article 133 (1) (a) (b) of the constitution, are directed against a Judgment of <ORG> and Haryana on Writ Petition of owners of lands and lessees of mineral rights in land seeking reliefs in the nature of Mandamus to enforce fundamental rights conferred by Article 31 (2) and to restrain the Government of Haryana from taking any action to implement two notifications void: (i) No. 1217-2-1-B-II-74/7622 dated the 20th February, 1974, and, (ii) No. GIG/SP/Auc/ 1173/3075-C, dated the 22nd February, 1974, after declaring the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Haryana Act').

Under the notification of 20th February, 1974, <ORG> purported to acquire rights to Saltpetre, a minor mineral in the land described in a schedule appended to the notification issued in exercise of power conferred by Section 3 , sub. section (i) of the Haryana Act. By the notification of 22nd February, 1974, <ORG> announced to the general public that certain saltpetre bearing areas in the <ORG> of Haryana, mentioned therein, would be auctioned on the dates given there. The notifications have not been placed before us. But, from the averments in the statements on behalf of the <ORG> and on behalf of some of the respondents in the affidavits supporting their respective cases in proceedings for a stay of the operation of <ORG> judgment, it appears that the intention of the <ORG> was to acquire Saltpetre deposits in lands whose owners had granted mining leases claimed by petitioners in <ORG> to be subsisting. The auctions advertised were probably of fresh lessee rights. Whether the auctions were to be of ownership or lessee rights in lands, the result was that one owner or one lessee was to be substituted by another in each case as a result of acquisition and sale. The <ORG> was to get the difference between the price of acquisition and amount realised on sale of each part sold. The apparent effect of mere change of owners or lessees was that the <ORG> of Haryana would benefit financially from the acquisitions and sales, although the object of the Haryana Act was said to include conservation as well as "scientific exploitation" of mineral resources. The case of the appellant <ORG> also seemed to be that the owners of lands had "haphazardly" created lessee rights in contravention of the Punjab Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1954, made under the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation of Development) Act 67 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act '). Learned Counsel for the appellant <ORG> contended that the Haryana Act was only meant to supplement and not supplant the Central Act . The <ORG> claimed to be dealing with lessee rights under the Central Act and not under the Haryana Act at all.

The case of the petitioners in <ORG> was: Firstly, that the Haryana Act was beyond the competence of <ORG> inasmuch as the field in which this Act operated was necessarily occupied already by the provisions of the Central Act enacted under entry No. 54 of the Union List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which reads as follows:

"54, Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the <ORG> is declared by <ORG> by law to be expedient in the public interest".

Secondly, that the purported acquisition under the Haryana Act offended the provisions of Article 31(2) inasmuch as it was neither for a public purpose nor for adequate compensation, the provision for compensation in the Act being, according to the petitioners, illusory.

A Division Bench of <ORG> allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the impugned notifications after declaring the Act to be ultra-vires. It also held that the Haryana Act violated Article 31(2). It found the compensation provided by the Haryana Act to be grossly low and illusory, although its view was that, judging from the statement of reasons and objects of the Haryana Act, a public purpose was made out. The stated reasons and objects of the Haryana Act showed that the acquisition was to be made to protect the mineral potentialities of the land and to ensure their proper development and exploitation on scientific lines. If this was the actual purpose behind the Haryana Act it did not materially differ from that which could be said to lie behind the Central Act .

The real question, however, was not whether any of the purposes of the two Acts were common but whether the provisions of the Central Act so operated as necessarily to exclude, in carrying out their objects, the operation of the State Act . <ORG> had held that, in view of the declaration contained in Section 2 of the Central Act, and decisions of this Court in the <CITATION> v. <CITATION> ., and <CITATION> , the field covered by the impugned Act was already fully occupied by the Central Legislation so that the State Act had to be held to be inoperative and void for repugnancy.

Section 2 of the Central Act lays down:

"It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the <ORG> should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided".

<CITATION> of this Act says:

" 'minerals' includes all minerals except mineral oils;"

<CITATION> reads:

"'mining lease' means a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations, and includes a sub-lease granted for such purpose";

Section 3(d) enacts:

"'mining operations' means any operations undertaken for the purpose of mining any mineral;" Section 3(e) elucidates:

" 'Minor minerals' means building stones, gravel ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which <ORG> may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral";

Section 3 (g) indicates:

"'prospecting licence' means a licence granted for the purpose of undertaking prospecting operations;" Section 3(h) enacts:

"'prospecting operations' means any operations under taken for the purpose of exploring locating or proving mineral deposits;"

<CITATION> lays down:

"the expressions, 'mine' and 'owner', have the meanings assigned to them in the Mines Act , 1952".

Sections 4 to 9 of the Central Act deal with General Restrictions on Prospecting and Mining operations. Section 4 indicates that all prospecting and mining operations will be governed by the Central Act . But, Section 4A , introduced by Section 2 of the Central Act 56 of 1972, lays down:

"4A(1) Where <ORG> after consultation with <ORG>, is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development so to do, it may request <ORG> to make a premature termination of a mining lease in respect of any mineral, other than a minor mineral, and, on receipt of such request, <ORG> shall make an order making a premature termination of such mining lease and granting a fresh mining lease in favour of such Government company or corporation owned or controlled by Government as it may think fit".

Section 5 concerns restrictions on the grant of prospecting licences or mining leases. It shows that these will be granted by <ORG> and <ORG> was to give its approval in certain specified cases only. Section 6 indicates areas for which a prospecting licence or mining lease or more than one licence or lease may be granted in any one State. <ORG> could make exceptions to this rule. Section 7 limits duration of a prospecting licence, which is evidently to be granted by <ORG>, to one year for mica and two years for other minerals, subject to renewal, and, in the case of scheduled minerals, subject to approval by <ORG> for each grant or renewal. Similarly, Section 8 provides periods of grant and renewal of leases by <ORG>. Section 9 deals with Royalties in respect of mining leases. Section 9A is concerned with the Dead rent to be paid by the lessee to <ORG> subject to the regulation of it by <ORG>.

Sections 10 to 12 of the Central Act contain procedure for obtaining prospecting licences or mining leases in land in which mineral rights vest in the <ORG>. It is true that it is not specified here in which <ORG> rights to minerals in any land vest. But, the machinery provided for applications and for maintaining the registers of applications for prospecting licences and mining leases shows that it is the State <ORG> which will be concerned with this matter subject to the provisions of Sections 10 to 12 of the Act.

Rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases are to be made by <ORG> according to the detailed provisions of Section 13 and Section 13A . Section 14 , however, lays down:

"14. The provisions of Sections 4 to 13 (inclusive) shall not apply to quarry leases, mining leases, or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals".

Section 15 makes it clear that it is <ORG> which has the power to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases, or other mineral concessions in respect of "minor minerals" and for purposes connected therewith.

Section 16(1) of the Central Act enacts: "16(1)(a) All mining leases granted before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972, if in force at such commencement, shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, within six months from such commencement, or such further time as <ORG> may, by general or special order, specify in this behalf

(b) Where the rights under any mining lease, granted by the proprietor of an estate or tenure before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972, have vested, on or after the 25th day of October, 1949, in <ORG> in pursuance of the provisions of any Act of any Provincial or State Legislature which provides for the acquisition of estates or tenures or provides for agrarian reform, such mining lease shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder within six months from the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972, or within such further time as <ORG> may, by general or special order, specify in this behalf". Section 16(2) provides for rules to be made by <ORG> to carry out the purposes of Section 16(1) .

Special powers of <ORG> in respect of mining operations in certain lands are provided for in Section 17 . Clause (1) of this Section reads:-

"17(1) The provisions of this Section shall apply in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the Government of a State or any other person".

Clause (2) of Section 17 provides for undertakings by <ORG>, in consultation with <ORG>, of prospecting or mining operations "in any area not already held under any prospecting licence or mining lease....". Section 17(3) makes <ORG> liable in such cases to pay <ORG> prospecting fee, royalty, surface rent, or dead rent, as the case may be, at the same rate at which it would have been payable under this Act, if such prospecting or mining operations had been undertaken by a private person under a prospecting licence or mining lease. Section 17(4) contains powers of <ORG>, in consultation with <ORG>, to prohibit grant of prospecting or mining leases in any area specified in a notification.

Section 18 , dealing with the development of minerals enacts:

"18(1) It shall be the duty of <ORG> to take all such steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India, and for that purpose <ORG> may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as it thinks fit.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(a) the opening of new mines and the regulation of mining operations in any area;

(b) the regulation of the excavation or collection of minerals from any mine;

(c) the measures to be taken by owners of mines for the purpose of beneficiation of ores, including the provision of suitable contrivances for such purpose;

(d) the development of mineral resources in any area;

(e) the notification of all new borings and shaft sinkings and the preservation of bore-hole records, and specimens of cores of all new bore-holes;

(f) the regulation of the arrangements for the storage of minerals and the stocks thereof that may be kept by any person;

(g) the submission of samples of minerals from any mine by the owner thereof and the manner in which and the authority to which such samples shall be submitted; and the taking of samples of any minerals from any mine by <ORG> or any authority specified by it in that behalf; and

(h) the submission by owners of mines of such special or periodical returns and reports as may be specified, and the form in which and the authority to which such returns and reports shall be submitted.

(3) All rules made under this section shall be binding on the Government".

It should be noted that Section 18 set out above empowers <ORG> to make rules for the "conservation and development of minerals in any part of India". <ORG> is not even entitled under Central Act to be consulted about this subject, but it is bound by the rules made on it by <ORG>. The term "Government", according to <CITATION> of the General Clauses Act, includes both <ORG> and <ORG>.

Section 18A , sub-section (1) inserted by Section 11 of the Act of 56 of 1972, does, however, require consultation with <ORG> on one matter. It says:

"18.A(1) Where <ORG> is of opinion that for the conservation and development of minerals in India, it is necessary to collect as precise information as possible with regard to any mineral available in or under any land in relation to which any prospecting licence or mining lease has been granted, whether by the State Government or by any other person, <ORG> may authority or <ORG>, or such other authority or agency as it may specify in this behalf, to carry out such detailed investigations for the purpose of obtaining such information as may be necessary: Provided that in the cases of prospecting licences or mining leases granted by a State Government, no such authorisation shall be made except after consultation with the State Government".

The remaining clauses (2) to (6) of Section 18A deal with the consequences of the authorisation of investigation by <ORG> and matters connected therewith. The proviso to clause (6) dealing with the costs of investigation enacts:-

"Provided that where the State Government or other person in whom the minerals are vested or the holder of any prospecting licence or mining lease applies to <ORG> to furnish to it or him a copy of the report submitted under sub-section (5), that State Government or other person or the holder of a prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, shall bear such reasonable part of the costs of investigation as <ORG> may specify in this behalf and shall, on payment of such part of the costs of investigation, be entitled to receive from <ORG> a true copy of the report submitted to it under sub-section (5)".

Miscellaneous provisions are contained in Sections 19 to 33 of the Central Act. Here, Section 19 lays down:

"19. Any prospecting licence or mining lease granted renewed or acquired in contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rules or orders made thereunder shall be void and of no effect".

Section 20 enacts:

"20. The provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply in relation to the renewal after the commencement of this Act of any prospecting licence or mining lease granted before such commencement as they apply in relation to the renewal of a prospecting licence or mining lease granted after such commencement".

Section 21 provides for penalties for anyone who contravenes the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act. Among these miscellaneous provisions is Section 25 recast by Section 14 of Act 56 of 1972. It lays down that:

"Any rent, royalty, tax, fee or other sum due to the Government under this Act or the rules made thereunder or under the terms and conditions of any prospecting licence or mining lease may, on a certificate of such officer as may be specified by <ORG> in this behalf by general or special order, be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue".

Section 25 , sub-section (2) shows that these dues are to be specified either by the Act or by the Rules made thereunder or under the terms and conditions of any prospective licence or mining lease. The control however, is of officers appointed by <ORG>.

Section 26 provides for delegation of the powers of <ORG> by notification in the official <ORG> to either <ORG> or any officer or authority either subordinate to <ORG> or <ORG>. Section 30 shows that the orders made by <ORG> or other authority in exercise of powers by or under the Central Act are revisable by <ORG>. Hence, the provisions of the Central Act show that, subject to the overall supervision of <ORG>, <ORG> has a sphere of its own powers and can take legally specified actions under the Central Act and rules made thereunder. Thus, the whole field of control and regulation under the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957 cannot be said to be reserved for <ORG>.

As indicated above, there have been some very significant changes by the Central Act 56 of 1972. These seem to us to make it necessary to reconsider the effect of the declaration contained in Section 2 of the Central Act as interpreted by the decisions of this Court so far. Before outlining the provisions of Haryana Act, we may indicate the position resulting from the four decisions mentioned above relied upon by <ORG>.

In <ORG> case (supra), the validity of the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952, was questioned on the ground that it authorised the State of Orissa to impose a cess on the valuation of the minerals. The State of Orissa had relied upon entries 23 and 66 of the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 23 of List II is:

"Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the <ORG>".

And entry 66 of List II is:

"Fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any court". The petitioning <ORG> had relied on entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule empowering the <ORG> alone to impose excise duty on tobacco and other manufactured goods with the exception of Alcoholic liquor, opium, Indian hemp, and other narcotics. It had also cited, in support of its case, entry 52 of List I of "Industries, the control of which by the <ORG> is declared by <ORG> by law to be expedient in the public interest". Furthermore, <ORG> relied on entry 54 of List I relating to Mines and mineral development, already set out above. This Court held that the imposition of the cess under the State enactment was really a fee falling within entries 23 and 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. It held that the State Act was neither hit by entry 54, read with Mines and Minerals Development Act 3 of 1948, nor by entry 52 of List I. The decision in that case turned on an interpretation of Article 372 of the Constitution. It was held that a declaration in the Act of 1948 could not be equated with a declaration made by the <ORG> in a post-Constitution enactment in terms of entry 54 of List I. It was, therefore, not really a decision on the effect of Section 2 of the Central Act 67 of 1957.

<CITATION> (supra) was the case of a suit filed by the State of West Bengal against the Union. It was contended, on behalf of West Bengal State, that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act , 1957, enacted by <ORG>, proposing to acquire certain coal bearing areas in the State, did not apply to areas owned by the State itself, and, in the alternative, that, even if it did so apply to areas owned by the State of West Bengal, it was beyond the legislative competence of <ORG> because entry 42 in the Concurrent List (List III) did not authorise an acquisition of property already vested in the State although this entry in the Concurrent List merely reads: "acquisition and requisitioning of property". It was urged there that, without a constitutional amendment, <ORG> could not acquire the property of the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the impugned Act. It was held there (at p. 417):

"... the power of the <ORG> to legislate in respect of property situate in the <ORG>s even if the <ORG>s are regarded qua the union as Sovereign, remains unrestricted, and the <ORG> property is not immune from its operation. Exercising powers under the diverse entries which have been referred to earlier, the <ORG> Parliament could legislate so as to trench upon the rights of the <ORG> in the property vested in them. If exclusion of <ORG> property from the purview of <ORG> legislation is regarded as implicit in those entries in List I, it would be difficult if not impossible for the <ORG> Government to carry out its obligations in respect of matters of national importance".

Learned Counsel for the appellant State before us has relied upon the case of State of West Bengal (supra) for contending that the powers of the State of Haryana to acquire land are not impaired by the declaration contained in the Central Act . He cited the rule of construction stated there as follows (at p. 393):

"Unless a law expressly or by necessary implication so provides, a <ORG> is not bound thereby. This well recognised rule applies to the interpretation of the Constitution. There fore, in the absence of any provision express or necessarily implying that the property of the <ORG> could be acquired by the <ORG>, the rights claimed by the <ORG> to legislate for acquisition of <ORG> property must be negatived."

Applying this rule, he contends that the powers of <ORG> to acquire land are left intact by the Central Act 67 of 1957.

Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, relied on another passage in the State of West Bengal's case (supra) to submit that legislative power for acquisition of minerals for their development and conservation must be deemed to be vested in <ORG> now even if the mineral resources are situated in the State. He quoted (at p. 436):-

"By making the requisite declarations under Entries 54 of List I, <ORG> assumed power to regulate mines and minerals and thereby to deny to all agencies not under the control of the <ORG>, authority to work the mines. It could scarcely be imagined that the Constitution makers while intending to confer an exclusive power to work mines and minerals under the control of the <ORG>, still prevented effective exercise of that power by making it impossible compulsorily to acquire the land vested in the <ORG>s containing minerals. The effective exercise of the power would depend-if such an argument is accepted-not upon the exercise of the power to undertake regulation and control by issuing a notification under Entry 54, but upon the will of the <ORG> in the territory of which mineral bearing land is situate. Power to legislate for regulation and development of mines and minerals under the control of the <ORG>, would by necessary implication include the power to acquire mines and minerals. Power to legislate for acquisition of property vested in the <ORG>s cannot therefore be denied to the <ORG> if it be exercised consistently with the protection afforded by Art. 31."

In the two cases discussed above no provision of the Central Act 67 of 1957 was under consideration by this Court. Moreover, power to acquire for purposes of development and regulation has not been exercised by Act 67 of 1957. The existence of power of <ORG> to legislate on this topic as an incident of exercise of legislative power on another subject is one thing. Its actual exercise is another. It is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become occupied by a Central Act in the same way as it had been in the West Bengal's case (supra) even before <ORG> legislates to acquire land in a State. Atleast until <ORG> has so legislated as it was shewn to have done by the statute considered by this Court in the case from West Bengal, the field is free foe State legislation falling under the express provisions of entry 42 of List III.

<CITATION> . (supra) the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957 were considered by this Court directly. In this case, the legality of certain demands as fee under the Orissa Act 27 of 1952, the validity of which had been upheld by this Court in <ORG>'s case (supra), came up for consideration again in the light of the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957. It was contended on behalf of the State of Orissa that the objects and purposes of the Orissa Act and of the Central Act were entirely distinct and different so that they could validly co-exist since neither trespassed into the field of the other. It was pointed out there that this Court had indicated, in the <ORG>'s case (supra) that, if the declaration in the 1948 Act relied upon by the petitioner in that case had been made after our Constitution became operative, the position would have been different. Reliance was placed upon the provisions of Section 18 of the Central Act to hold (at p. 477):

"Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two <ORG>s collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one <ORG> has superiority over the other than to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation. In the present case, having regard to the terms of S. 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of <ORG> was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no supersession of the State Act ".

It was also held there (at p. 478):

"If by reason of the declaration by <ORG> the entire subject-matter of conservation and development of minerals' has been taken over for being dealt with by <ORG>, thus depriving the <ORG> of the power which it therefore possessed, it would follow that the 'matter' in the <ORG> List is to the extent of the declaration, subtracted from the scope and ambit of Entry 23 of the <ORG> List. There would, therefore, after the Central Act of 1957 be 'no matter in the List' to which the fee could be related in order to render it valid".

In <NAME> case (supra), the proviso (2) to Section 10(2) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Bihar Act 4 of 1965) and a sub-rule of Rule 20, added on December 10, 1964, by a notification of the Governor to the Bihar Minor Mineral Rules, 1961, came up for consideration. Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the former landlords had ceased to have any interest from the date of vesting so that their rights as lessors under the mining leases granted by them in their "estates" became vested in the State of Bihar under Section 19(1) of the Land Reforms Act; and, by Section 10(2) of that Act, the terms on which the lands were held on leases between the original lessors and lessees became binding on <ORG> under the impugned proviso to Section 10(2) , amounting to alteration of the terms of the leases executed by the original lessors, the former landlords, additional demands were made upon lessees. <ORG> had also relied upon a sub-rule added to Rule 20 framed under Section 15 of the Central Act 67 of 1957. This <ORG>, after examining the relevant provisions of the  Central Act , held, relying on <ORG>'s case (supra) and <ORG>'s case (supra), as follows (at p. 113):

"The declaration is contained in s. 2 of Act 67 of 1957 and speaks of the taking and the control of <ORG> the regulation of mines and development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act itself. We have thus not to look outside Act 67 of 1957, to determine what is left within the competence of <ORG> but have to work it out from the terms of that Act".

After referring to what was decided in the earlier cases, this Court said (at p. 114):

"These two cases bind us and apply here. Since <ORG> amended the Land Reforms Act after the coming into force of Act 67 of 1957, the declaration in the latter Act would carve out a field to the extent provided in that Act and to that extent entry 23 would stand cut down. To sustain the amendment the <ORG> must show that the matter is not covered by the Central Act . The other side must, of course, show that the matter is already covered and there is no room for legislation".

It added (at p. 114-115):

"We have already analysed Act 67 of 1957. The Act takes over the control of regulation of mines and development of minerals to the <ORG>; of course, to the extent provided. It deals with minor minerals separately from the other minerals. In respect of minor minerals it provides in s. 14 that ss. 4-13 of the Act do not apply to prospecting licences and mining leases. It goes on to state in s. 15 that <ORG> may, by notification in the official <ORG>, make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith, and that until rules are made, any rules made by <ORG> regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals which were in force immediately before the commencement of the Act would continue in force. It is admitted that no such rules were made by <ORG>. It follows that the subject of legislation is covered in respect of minor minerals by the express words of s. 15(1) . <ORG> has undertaken legislation and laid down that regulation of the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith must be by rules made by <ORG>. Whether the rules are made or not the topic is covered by <ORG>ary legislation and to that extent the powers of <ORG> are wanting. Therefore, there is no room for State Legislation".

In <NAME> case (supra), this <ORG> also said (at p. 116):

"We have already held that the whole of the legislative field was covered by the <ORG>ary declaration read with provisions of Act 67 of 1957, particularly s. 15 We have also held that entry 23 of List II was to that extent cut down by entry 54 of List I. The whole of the topic of minor minerals became a <ORG> subject. The <ORG> <ORG> allowed rules to be made but that did not recreate a scope for legislation at the State level. Therefore, if the old leases were to be modified a legislative enactment by <ORG> on the lines of s. 16 of Act 67 of 1957 was necessary. The place of such a law could not be taken by legislation by <ORG> as it purported to do by enacting the second Proviso to s. 10 of the Land Reforms Act. It will further be seen that <ORG> in s. 4 of the Act 67 of 1957 created an express bar although s. 4 was not applicable to minor minerals. Whether s. 4 was intended to apply to minor minerals as well or any part of it applies to minor minerals are questions we cannot consider in view of the clear declaration in s. 14 of Act 67 of 1957 that the provisions of ss. 4-13 (inclusive) do not apply. Therefore, there does not exist any prohibition such as is to be found in s. 4(1) Proviso in respect of minor minerals. Although s. 16 applies to minor minerals it only permits modification of mining leases granted before October 25, 1949. In regard to leases of minor minerals executed between this date and December 1964 when Rule 20(1) was enacted, there is no provision of law which enables the terms of existing leases to be altered. A mere rule is not sufficient".

Again, referring to the earlier decisions it said (at p.

"On the basis of those rulings we have held that the entire legislative field in relation to minor minerals had been withdrawn from <ORG>. We have also held that vested rights could only be taken away by law made by a competent legislature. Mere rule-making power of <ORG> was not able to reach them. The authority to do so must, therefore, have emanated from <ORG>. The existing provision related to regulation of leases and matters connected therewith to be granted in future and not for alteration of the terms of leases which were in existence before Act 67 of 1957. For that special legislative provision was necessary. As no such parliamentary law had been passed by the second sub- rule to Rule 20 was ineffective. It could not derive sustenance from the second Proviso to s. 10(2) of the Land Reforms Act since that proviso was not validly enacted."

The question which arises before us now is whether, possibly as a result of the decision of this <ORG> in <NAME> case (supra), the <ORG> had not amended the law, as we find it in the present  Section 16 of the Act 67 of 1957, as amended by Act 56 of 1972, so as to undo its effect. If that amendment is in response to the need pointed out in <NAME> case (supra) would it not cover the provisions of the Haryana Act now before us ?

The preamble to the Haryana Act states that it is: " An Act to vest the mineral rights in the State <ORG>. and to provide for payment of amount to the owners of minerals and for other matters connected therewith."

The crucial section is S. 3 of the Haryana Act which runs as follows:

"S. 3 Vesting of minerals in State Government.-(1) The State Government may, from time to time, by notification, acquire the right to any minerals in any land and the right to the minerals specified in the notification shall, from the date of its publication, vest in <ORG>.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, on the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), the right to the minerals in the land specified in the notification shall vest absolutely in <ORG> and <ORG> shall, subject to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act , 1957, have all the powers necessary for the proper enjoyment or disposal of such right.

(3) The right to the minerals in the land includes the right of access to land for the purpose of prospecting and working mines and for the purposes subsidiary thereto including the sinking of pits and shafts, erection of plants and machinery, construction of roads, stacking of minerals and deposits of refuse, quarrying and obtaining building and road materials, using water and taking timber and any other purpose which <ORG> may declare to be subsidiary to mining.

(4) If the State Government has assigned to any person its right over any minerals, and if for the proper enjoyment of such right, it is necessary that all or any of the powers specified in subsection (2) and (3) should be exercised, the Collector may, by an order in writing subject to such conditions and reservations as he may specify, delegate such powers to the person to whom the right has been assigned". Other provisions of the Haryana Act are not material.

Section 1 merely gives the Act its title and Section 2 deals with definitions. Section 4 relates to compensation. Section 5 provides for references or disputes about compensation to Civil Courts. Section 6 applies Civil procedure to compensation proceedings. Section 7 provides for appeals. Section 8 contains the necessary powers of the State Government to frame rules. These provisions exhaust the Act.

Saltpetre was declared a minor mineral by notification No. 1(31) 65-MII on 21st January, 1967. Its deposits are said to have been found in 638 villages of Haryana. It appears that the <ORG> of Haryana considered itself to be the owner of these deposits on the strength of entries in the records of rights (Wajib-ul-arz) of these villages and used to auction them in accordance with the Punjab Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1964. But, on 25th May, 1971, <ORG> held on a Writ Petition (C.W. No. 1221 of 1971), that unless the mineral deposits are specifically mentioned in the Wajib-ul-arz of a village as having vested in the <ORG>, their ownership would still remain vested in the former proprietors mentioned as owners of their lands in a Wajib-ul-arz. As a result of this decision, the right to Saltpetre deposits was found to be vested in individual proprietors of their estates and <ORG> in about 600 out of 638 villages. It is stated that, in order to meet this situation, the Haryana Act No. 48 of 1973 was framed and passed. The President of India gave his assent to it on 6th December, 1973. It was thus a logical corollary of land reforms. Apparently, there was no conflict between the <ORG> and <ORG> on the policy underlying the Act.

The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant State were:

Firstly, that the Central Act does not purport to cover or operate upon the power to acquire ownership in minerals which are part of "land". The relevant entry for exercise of legislative power to acquire property is entry 42 in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule. The Central Act purports to have been made in exercise of the power under entry 54 of List I for regulation and development of mines, whereas the Haryana Act operates in the distinct and separate field of acquisition of property.

Secondly, minerals being part of "land" in the State, within the competence of <ORG> to legislate upon, under entry 18 of the State List (List II), legislation falling substantially under this head, read with entry 23 of the State List and entry 42 of the Concurrent List (List III), should not be invalidated unless we are compelled to do so.

Thirdly, entry 54 of List I, set out above would naturally cover only those parts of the field of acquisition, in accordance with rules of interpretation indicated in State of West Bengal's case (supra), which are expressly excluded from this special field by the Central Act . Particularly, as acquisition belongs to a different head in the concurrent field, on which there is neither a Central Act for acquiring ownership of mineral deposits nor any express provision for it in Act 67 of 1957, there could be no question of the exclusion of the power of <ORG> to pass the impugned Act. There was thus no unavoidable conflict between it and the State Act .

Fourthly, the impugned Act is protected from any challenge on the ground of inadequacy of compensation or the unreasonableness of the principles contained in Section 4(1) of the Haryana Act, as the acquisition of parts of estates of former proprietors of land falls under Article 31A.

On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that the cases before us are covered completely by the decisions of this Court discussed above, and, in particular by those in <ORG>., case (supra) and <ORG> case (supra). It is urged that, when acquisition is only a means of conservation or development of mineral resources, even this field must be held to be necessarily excluded by the declaration in Section 2 and other provisions of Central Act 67 of 1957 which will become unworkable if the provisions of the Haryana Act were permitted to operate.

It seems difficult to sustain the case that the provisions of the Central Act would be really unworkable by mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits are found. We have to judge the character of the Haryana Act by the substance and effect of its provisions and not merely by the purpose given in the statement of reasons and objects behind it. Such statements of reasons are relevant when the object or purpose of an enactment is in dispute or uncertain. They can never override the effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provisions. Such effect is the best evidence of intention. A statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the statute, and, therefore, not even relevant in a case in which the language of the operative parts of the Act leaves no room whatsoever, as it does not in the Haryana Act, to doubt what was meant by the legislators. It is not disputed here that the object and effect of the Haryana Act was to acquire proprietary right to mineral deposits' in "land". Its provisions, however, do not mention leasehold or licensee rights. Obviously, this is so because these rights are governed by the Central Act 67 of 1957.

As we found nothing in the judgment under appeal or in the arguments advanced by either side to indicate that the effect of Act 56 of 1972 which had amended Act 67 of 1957 had been specifically noticed, we considered it necessary to hear further arguments with a view to giving parties an opportunity of showing us how earlier decisions, when the provisions introduced by Act 56 of 1972 were not there, could be at all helpful in deciding the question now before us. One of the objections taken before us, at the further hearing given to the parties, was that we should not allow a new point to be argued. We do not think that any new question was allowed by us to be raised simply because we have permitted parties to place their points of view on the same question after taking into account some changes in the Central Act . Indeed, we are bound to take judicial notice of the law as it exists after its amendment. We can only apply the law as it exists and not the law as it once was. No party could justifiably complain that it was given an additional opportunity to meet what follows from the amended law even if the effect of the amendment was not noticed earlier.

We are particularly impressed by the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 as they now stand. A glance at section 16(1)(b) shows that the  Central Act 67 of 1957 itself contemplates vesting of lands, which had belonged to any proprietor of an estate or tenure holder either on or after 25th October, 1949, in a State Government under a State enactment providing for the acquisition of estates or tenures in land or for agrarian reforms. The provisions lay down that mining leases granted in such land must be brought into conformity with the amended law introduced by Act 56 of 1972. It seems to us that this clearly means that <ORG> itself contemplated State legislation for vesting of lands containing mineral deposits in the State <ORG>. It only required that rights to mining granted in such land should be regulated by the provisions of Act 67 of 1957 as amended. This feature could only be explained on the assumption that <ORG> did not intend to trench upon powers of State Legislatures under entry 18 of List II, read with entry 42 of List III. Again, Section 17 of the Central Act 67 of 1957 shows that there was no intention to interfere with vesting of lands in the States by the provisions of the Central Act .

The only answer given on behalf of the respondents to this contention is that such vesting as it contemplated by Section 16(1)(b) of the Central Act, as it now stands, must be of "estates" of proprietors or lands of tenure holders under some legislation for agrarian reform. We are unable to find any force in this contention. Article 31 A of the Constitution is not confined to legislation for agrarian reform. Agrarian reform is only one of the possible or alternative objects of such acquisition. It need not be the exclusive or only purpose of <ORG> legislation contemplated by Section 16(1) (b) of the Central Act . And, power to legislate for the acquisition of the whole of an estate or "tenure" would include the power to legislate for any part of it.

Writ Petition Nos. 1309 to 1318 and 1371 to 1373 of 1975, directed against the provisions of this Act, have also been placed before us for arguments and appropriate orders. The petitioners in these cases assert rights as holders of mining leases granted by persons who had been entered as proprietors of estates in the records of rights in various villages. The rights of persons so entered (in a "Wajib-ul- arz") to mineral deposits in their former lands have been acquired by the State under the Haryana Act. According to the Haryana State, the Act was passed so as to, inter-alia, change the law as declared by <ORG> in the case reported in AIR 1972 P&H p. 50. According to the view of <ORG>, rights in such lands had continued to vest in former owners of estates despite acquisitions of other parts of their "estate". The effect of the Haryana Act was, it was urged, only to change the ownership without interfering with the regulation of leasehold or licensee rights in minerals under the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957. The Haryana Act expressly states that it operates subject to the overriding provisions of Act 67 of 1957.

Dr. <NAME>, appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana, in the Writ Petitions under Article 32 , submits: Firstly, that the legislative competence of <ORG>, under entry 23 of List II is subjected to entry No. 54 of List I only "to the extent to which"

<ORG> chooses to take upon itself the regulation of mines and minerals and no more. Secondly, in arriving at a decision on the extent to which <ORG> has removed regulation and development of mines from <ORG> control, strict construction ought to be adopted so that, without a specific and clear declaration by <ORG>, ousting the power of <ORG> Legislature to deal with vesting of land in the <ORG> Government, it should not be assumed that the legislative power of the <ORG> to acquire what is "land" had been taken away. Thirdly, <ORG> having legislated specifically only in order to regulate the grant of mining leases and concessions, irrespective of the ownership of the lands in which mining leases and concessions are granted, the clear legislative intent of <ORG>, gathered from the Central Act 67 of 1957 itself, also was to exclude the topic of acquisition of ownership and other rights in land, apart from those of holders of mining leases and licences, from its purview. Fourthly, the majority view in the <ORG> of West Bengal's case (supra) should be read in the context of the particular Act considered there under which <ORG>. had been given powers of acquiring lands belonging to the <ORG> of West Bengal. No such Central Act is before us for interpretation. Even if the power was vested in the <ORG> to acquire land as an incident of regulation and development of minerals, that power not having been exercised at all by Act is of 1957, it was not permissible to assume any conflict between the Central Act 67 of 1957 and the Haryana Act. Fifthly, <ORG> v. <ORG>, following 66 C.W.N. p. 304=AIR 1960 Cal. 646, could be relied upon to urge that <ORG>s had not lost their legislative competence altogether to acquire lands in which mineral rights could be granted. Examples of such acquisitions were: section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Section 5(2) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (as amended by Act 22 of 1964) Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act , 1957: Coaking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1972, and Coal Mines, (Nationalisation) Act , 1973. In any case, until <ORG> legislates to acquire ownership of mineral deposits in a <ORG>, this field cannot be said to be occupied merely because of the declaration in Act 67 of 1957 which contains nothing whatsoever about the ownership of minerals. Sixthly, the provisions of Act 67 of 1957 also show that the power of granting leases and concessions in respect of mineral deposits is left largely to <ORG> Government.

There is, however, one argument advanced on behalf of holders of leases or licences of mining rights which must be upheld. It is that lessee and licensee rights, governed by the provisions of Act 67 of 1957 or rules made thereunder, are not covered by the Haryana Act. It is clear from Section 3(2) of the Haryana Act itself that the provisions of this Act are to be read subject to the provisions made by or under the Central Act . Moreover, the Haryana Act does not and cannot ipso facto terminate either lessee or licensee rights which were subsisting on the date when the Haryana Act came into force. On the other hand, section 9 of the Central Act 56 of 1972, which amended section 16 of the Principal Act (Central Act 67 of 1957), made it imperative for such lessee rights as existed in estates, (which had vested in a State Government) to be brought into conformity with the Central Act . Obviously, therefore, if there are any lessee or licensee rights of mining in minor minerals on land which were actually regulated by the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957, they will continue. Although, this is a legally correct contention, it was not shewn to us how the notification of auctions of mining rights affected any subsisting rights of any alleged lessee or licensee. The facts of no individual case were placed before us. We do not know which respondent in the appeal or which petitioner in Writ Petitions before us has any subsisting rights governed by any of the provisions of the Central Act or rules made thereunder. It has also not been shewn to us that any lessee or licensee asked <ORG> to carry out any statutory or contractual obligation before he invoked the Writ jurisdiction of <ORG> or of this <ORG>. Thus, essential averments to disclose subsisting rights or the locus standi of the petitioners are wanting here.

In Writ Petitions No. 1309-1318 and 1371-1373 of 1975, the petitioners only assert that they are lessees of minor minerals holding rights under registered leases executed by the owners of minor minerals. But, they do not state whether their leases are governed by or have been brought into conformity with the provisions of the Central Act .

Annexure 'A' is the notification, dated 10th April, 1974, assailed by petitioner in this Court. Its purpose is stated in the following terms:

"In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Haryana Mineral (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, the Governor of Haryana hereby acquires the right to the minerals, mentioned in column 6 of the schedule given below in the land specified in column 5 thereof".

The schedule contains a large number of khasra numbers of plots in various villages covered by the notification Another notification of 11th September, 1975, challenged by the petitioners in this Court says:

'It is hereby notified for the general public that Minor Mineral quarries of Gurgaon District, as per particulars given below, will be put to auction on 1- 10-1975 in the office of Senior-District Industries Officer, Faridabad, at 10 A.M.".

Thereafter, follows the names of 139 villages in Tehsil Gurgaon under the heading "Name of Quarry". Under the next heading. "Name of the Minor Mineral", occur the words "Road metal and stone."

The notification then proceeds to say:

"The terms and conditions of the auction are given below :-

(i) Each bidder shall be required to deposit a sum of Rs. 200 in cash as earnest money, with the Presiding Officer before participating in the auction.

(ii) The period of contract shall commence from the date of execution of the agreement to the 21st March, 1977.

(iii)Other terms and conditions of auction shall be the same as contained in the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, as adopted by Haryana Government.

(iv) The highest bidder shall be entitled to obtain short term permits from the date of auction till the date of acceptance of his bid by the competent authority. Therefore, he will not have any right to revoke his officer.

Any other information he had from the Senior District Industries Officer. Faridabad.

(<NAME>) Director of <ORG>, Haryana".

Some of the numbers given in the first notification correspond with the number of plots in respect of which the petitioners allege to be lease-holders. A perusal of the petitions and the counter-affidavits filed in reply on behalf of the State of Haryana shows that the only dispute between the parties relates to the vesting of ownership rights in a minor mineral in these plots. But, the petitioners have come before us as lessees and not as owners. Rights of former owners have been validity terminated by the Haryana Act. We are unable to make out, from these petitions how any lessee rights acquired by the petitioners themselves, under any law subsist or are affected by the notifications mentioned above.

We proceed to record our conclusions as follows:

1. The Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, is valid, as it is not, in any way, repugnant to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation of Development) Act 67 of 1957, made by <ORG>. Ownership rights could be and have been validity acquired by <ORG>. under the Haryana Act.

2. No rights are shewn by any petitioner before us to have been conferred upon him under any lease or licence executed or brought in accordance with the provision of the Central Act 67 of 1957, but, any petitioner, either before <ORG> or in this <ORG>, now before us, who can establish any such right governed by the provisions of the Central Act 67 of 1957 may take such proceedings before an appropriate <ORG>, if so advised, as may still be open to him under the law, against any such action or <ORG>. notification as is alleged to infringe that right. We are unable to find any such right in any writ petition, as framed, now before us.

3. Any petitioner who applies for a writ or order in the nature of a mandamus should, in compliance with a well known rule of practice, ordinarily, first call upon the authority concerned to discharge its legal obligation and show that it has refused or neglected to carry it out within a reasonable time before applying to a <ORG> for such an order even where the alleged obligation is established.

Accordingly, subject to the observations made above, we allow Civil Appeals Nos. 844-860 of 1975, and set aside the judgment and orders of <ORG> and Haryana and dismiss the Writ petitions.

We also dismiss the Writ Petitions Nos. 1309-1318 and 1371-1373 of 1975, subject to the observations made above, filed in this Court.

Parties will bear their own costs.

P.B.R. Appeal allowed & Petitions dismissed.


JUDGMENT <NAME> J.

1. In this reference made at the instance of the assessee <ORG> (hereinafter called "the Tribunal") has referred the following questions of law for the opinion of this Court under section 69 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

"(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Vitablend AD 3 and Vitablend AD 3 Forte are covered by entry 21 of Schedule I to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, for the year 1969 ?

(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Vitablend AB 2 D 3 and Vitablend WM Forte are covered by entry 25 of Schedule I to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, for the year 1969 ?"

2. In order to appreciate the points in controversy, a few facts may be set out.

3. The assessee is a public limited company. It is carrying on the business of manufacturing pharmaceutical and nutritional products and antibiotic and other products. Those products are meant not only for human beings but also for cattle and poultry. With a view to supplementing the deficiency of vitamins in the normal diet given to cattle and poultry, the assessee manufactures and markets different products. We are concerned herein with four of such products. They are : (1) Vitablend AD 3, (2) Vitablend AD 3 Forte, (3) Vitablent AB 2 D 3, and (4) Vitablend WM Forte. The products at serial Nos. (1) and (2) are meant for cattle and the products at serial Nos. (3) and (4) are meant for poultry. The assessee was desirous of ascertaining whether the sales of the above-mentioned products were exigible to tax under the Act. An application was, therefore, made by the assessee under section 62 of the Act to the Commissioner of Sales Tax for the determination of the question whether on the sales of those products it was liable to pay any tax and, if so, the rate of tax. The application was heard by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. The contention of the assessee before the said authority was that the products at serial Nos. (1) and (2) were cattle-feed within the meaning of entry 21 of Schedule I and that the products at serial Nos. (3) and (4) were poultry-feed within the meaning of entry 25 of Schedule I and that, therefore, they were goods the sale or purchase of which was free from all taxes. The alternative contention of the assessee was that all the aforesaid products were drugs and medicines meant for cattle or poultry, as the case may be, and that, therefore, they were covered by entry 26(1) of Schedule II, Part A. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax held that none of the entries on which the assessee relied was attracted in relation to the products in question and that those products were covered by the residuary entry, that is to say, entry 13 of Schedule III and their sales were taxable at the rate mentioned in the said entry. The assessee, feeling aggrieved by the said determination, preferred an appeal before the <ORG>. At the hearing of the said appeal, the assessee confined its case only to entry 21 and entry 25 of Schedule I and no argument based on entry 26(1) of Schedule II, Part A, was advanced. The <ORG>, following its earlier decision in the case of <ORG> v. State of Gujarat (Appeal No. 21 of 1972 decided on 9th February, 1973), held that the products in question were neither cattle-feed nor poultry-feed and that, therefore, they were not covered by entry 21 or entry 25, as the case may be, of Schedule I. The <ORG>, therefore, confirmed the determination of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. It is under these circumstances that the questions set out above have come to be referred to this Court.

4. Let us first read the entries which are the subject-matter of the reference. Entry 21 of Schedule I reads as follows :

"21. Cattle-feed (other than mechanically produced cattle-feed) including fodder and concentrates but excluding cotton-seeds, oilcakse and de-oiled cakes."

5. Entry 25 of Schedule I reads as under :

"Poultry-feed."

6. Entry 13 of Schedule III reads as under :

"All goods other than those specified from Six paise Three paise time to time in section 18 and in in the in the Schedules I and II and in the preceding rupee. rupee. entries.

7. It is apparent that if entries 21 and 25 of Schedule I apply, then the sales of the products in question would be free from all taxes in view of the exemption granted under section 5. If those entries are not attracted, however, the question as to in which entry in the appropriate schedule the products in question are included would arise. However, the subsequent question, though it is decided by the <ORG>, has not been specifically referred to this Court and we are, therefore, not immediately and directly concerned with the same.

8. To be covered by entry 21, the products in question, in the first place, must be cattle-feed. Cattle-feed, which is mechanically produced is, however, specifically excluded from the coverage of the said entry by the words of exclusion contained in the bracketed portion. The other important aspect, which requires to be borne in mind, is that whereas fodder and concentrates are specifically included, cotton-seeds, oilcakes and de-oiled cakes are in terms excluded. On an integral reading of the said entry, it would appear, therefore, that cattle-feed, including fodder and concentrates, which is not mechanically produced, but excluding cotton-seeds oilcakes and de-oiled cakes, is covered by the entry. The legislative intention, which is made manifest accordingly, is that (i) mechanically produced cattle-feed and (ii) cotton-seeds, oilcakes and de-oiled cakes are not to be exempted from the levy of tax.

9. Entry 25 is simpler when compared with entry 21. Anything which can be properly called poultry-feed is covered by the said entry.

10. Having read and analysed the entries, we must ascertain the true meaning of the principal words in the two entries, namely, cattle-feed and poultry-feed. Let us first ascertain the primary meaning of the common word appearing in both the entries, namely, "feed".

11. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 36, page 631, the said word "as a noun is used as referring to articles to be fed to animals, particularly domestic animals". In <NAME>'s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Unabridged) at page 671, several meanings of the word "feed", when used as a noun, are given. The appropriate meanings, as applicable in the context of the use of the said noun in the entries in question, however, are as follows : "(1) food given to animals; fodder; pasture; (2) the customary amount of fodder given at one time; as, to carry on a journey two feeds of oats; and (6) a meal." In the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume IV, at page 130, various meanings of the word "feed" are given and out of them only the following meanings appear to be relevant : "(3) Food (for cattle); fodder, provender; (4) A meal; a sumptuous meal; a feast." It would thus appear that etymologically the word "feed" means animal food or fodder.

12. In the two entries in question, the word "feed" is used in conjunction with another word, namely, "cattle" in entry 21 and "poultry" in entry 25. Besides, in entry 21 there are words of inclusion as well as of exclusion following upon the word "cattle-feed". Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the correct way of approaching the matter would be to read the expressions "cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed" as a whole and to read the former expression in the context of the words which follow. When so read, one thing at least is clear that the goods which are intended to be covered by both these expressions are those which are meant for consumption by animals or birds, as the case may be, which are more often than not reared for commercial purposes.

13. The word "cattle-feed" has acquired a precise meaning in the field of live-stock farming and so also has the word "concentrates". In the book entitled "Nutritive Values of Indian Cattle Feeds and the Feeding of Animals" by <NAME>, which has been published by <ORG>, New Delhi, Chapter I, entitled "Nutrition of Animals", deals with the feeding stuffs of animals. It is there pointed out that food is essential for the maintenance of life. The nutrients in a feeding stuff enable the animal body to maintain energy, to perform the vital processes of life and provide the material to replace the essential tissues breakdown which occurs in the body continuously. Food also provides the constituents and the energy required for body growth. All feeding stuffs are composed of water, and organic and mineral matter. Organic matter is composed of proteins, fats, crude fibre and soluble carbohydrates. Besides the above, there are certain substances known as vitamins, which are considered to be essential for the proper nutrition of farm stock. Of these, the more important ones, from the point of view of cattle nutrition, are vitamins A and D, because these have to be supplied to the animals through their feed; but vitamins B and C can be synthesized in the ruminant body. The learned author proceeds to point out that the ration of an animal may be divided for convenience into two parts, one for maintenance ration is that portion of the diet which just enable the animal at rest to carry on the essential processes of life, such as breathing and circulation of blood, without either gain or loss of weight. As however, no animal is kept in a farm in a state of non-production, the requirements for maintenance form only a convenient basis for the calculation of rations for productive purposes. Whatever is supplied to the animal over and above its maintenance requirement is available for production, such as for growth or fattening, for production of calf, for production of milk of for output of work. There observations contained in a standard book published by <ORG> establish two things : first, that in the context of live-stock, which is not intended to be kept in a state of non-production, food consists not only of that constituent which is essential for the maintenance of life but also of the other constituents which provide the energy required for production, be it the production of calf, or milk or output of work and, secondly, that vitamins are considered essential for the proper nutrition of farm stock and some of the vitamins like vitamins A and D have to be supplied to the animals through their feed. If this concept of cattle-feed is borne in mind, it would become immediately clear that the said expression is not understood by the people conversant with the rearing of live-stock as merely consisting of ration for maintenance but also as comprehending ration for production purposes.

14. Reference may also be made in this connection to <ORG>, Volume 9, page 144, where the subject "Feeds Animal" has been dealt with. It has been observed there that the materials on which animals are fed differ widely in chemical composition and nutritive value. For convenience they are divided into two general classes; concentrates and roughages. Concentrates include a large variety of feeds that have a high value because they are rich in easily digested nutrients, such as starch, fat and protein, and are low in fibre, or woody material, which is not well-digested. Roughages have a much lower value because they are relatively high in fibre and contain less of the more digestible nutrients. Good nutrition is necessary if animals are to be able to maintain health and produce satisfactory amounts of milk, eggs, meat, wool or work. Animals require each day food furnishing sufficient amounts of protein; energy, chiefly supplied by the carbohydrates and fat; essential minerals; and vitamins. Plenty of water and air are also needed. Dealing in detail with the role of vitamins in animal feed, the learned authors have pointed out that the numerous scientific discoveries concerning vitamins had a profound effect upon live-stock farming by increasing the efficiency of animal production and preventing serious nutritional diseases. Vitamin A, which is required for growth, reproduction, milk production and even for the maintenance of mature animals, is most apt to be lacking in live-stock feeds. A serious deficiency of this vitamin makes animal especially subject to diseases of the respiratory tract and they often die of pneumonia. Next to vitamin A, attention is given to vitamin D in live-stock feeding. This vitamin is needed to enable animals to assimilate and use the minerals, calcium and phosphorus. A deficiency of this vitamin causes serious bone diseases such as rickets in young growing animals. Because poultry have especially high vitamin D requirements, special vitamin D supplements are included in their rations, particularly under winter conditions, or when they are confined away from the direct sunlight. This analysis of animal feeds also establishes two things; first, that amongst the materials on which animals are fed are included concentrates which include a wide variety of feeds that have a high value and, secondly, that in order that animals are able to maintain health and produce satisfactory amounts of milk, eggs, meat, wool or work, they require sufficient amounts inter alia of vitamins including vitamins A and D, some of which are lacking in the traditional live-stock feed.

15. Reference may be made next to McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, Volume 1, page 457. Under the heading "Animal-feed Composition", it has been there pointed out that the chemical composition of animal feeds can be considered as falling into three categories; water content (moisture), certain groups of natural organic compounds and inorganic or mineral elements. A group of essential but unrelated organic compounds, occurring in smaller concentration, consists of vitamins. At page 458, under the heading "Feed Supplements" it has been observed that the manufacture of commercial mixed feeds has become a very important industry in the United States. Prior to 1949, the principal feed additives used in these mixed feed were minerals and protein concentrates. Since that date, there has been enormous expansion in large scale manufacture of vitamins, antibiotics, hormones and essential amino acids. These substances have been added to mixed feeds as supplements having either direct action on metabolism and growth or indirect action through control of bacterial growth and infection. Although an ample supply of all vitamin requirements of live-stock usually can be made up through the use of common feeds, vitamins are becoming move general as feed additives in commercial feeds. Various kinds of vitamins are added to commercially mixed feeds for poultry, swine, and to a limited extent, for calves. Increasing amounts of fat-soluble vitamin A are being produced for all types of live-stock. This vitamin, which formerly was supplied as a fish liver oil to be fed separately because of the rapid destruction of the vitamin on oxidation, is available in a stabilized form with small particles of the covering of a synthetic wax, gelatin, or other material. The antirachitic vitamin (vitamin D) in the form of irradiated ergosterol is also included as an additive in some mixed feeds for poultry, swine and young calves. This study of animal feed composition and feed supplements brings into clear limelight the fact that in the manufacture of commercially mixed feeds, several feed additives are used and that amongst them are included vitamins A and D. These two vitamins are added as supplements in mixed feed for cattle, poultry, swine and young calves.

16. At this stage, it would be convenient to deal with poultry-feed as well. The word "poultry" has many meanings. The one which is relevant for us is to be found at item No. 3 under the heading "poultry" at page 1199 of the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VII. Accordingly, "poultry" means "domestic fowls collectively; those tame birds which are commonly reared for their flesh, eggs or feathers, and kept in a yard or similar enclosure, as barn-door fowls, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea-fowls (excluding pigeons, pheasants, etc.); sometimes restricted to the barn-door fowl with it varieties; also applied to the birds as dressed for the market or prepared for food". In <NAME>'s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Unabridged), the following meaning is given to the word "poultry" at page 1411 : "Domestic fowls which are propagated and fattened for the table, and for their eggs, feathers, etc., such as chickens, turkeys, ducks, guinea-fowls and geese." These meanings assigned to the word "poultry" in the ordinary English usage make it clear that poultry refers to the rearing of birds for specific purposes, namely, for their meat, eggs, feathers, etc. When we construe the words "poultry feed", therefore, we cannot overlook that the ration to be supplied to the birds must consist of two constituents, namely, that for maintenance and that for production, that is to say, for growth or fattening and for production of eggs, meat or feathers.

17. In this context, reference may be made on Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 18, where the subject "Poultry and Poultry Farming" is dealt with at page 396. It has been there pointed out that within each country, egg and chicken production is by far the most important aspect of the poultry farming industry, which has as its object the production of meat and eggs for table use. In some areas each farmer raises a few chicken that live on table scraps and what food they can find about the house and in the neighbourhood; such eggs and live birds are usually consumed by the farmer and his family or sold on the local market. At the other extreme are large commercial operations, raising thousands of birds and employing the most modern of food marketing and distribution systems. These observations clearly indicate that poultry farming has assumed the proportion of an important industry and that apart from the chicken, which are raised domestically to meet one's own requirements, there are large scale commercial operations of poultry raising in which the most modern of food marketing and distribution systems are involved. Obviously, in the context of such large scale raising of birds in poultry farms, poultry-feed is something more than food essential for survival. It would consist of feed which is scientifically prepared and which aims at procuring the best yield of meat, eggs and feathers.

18. The foregoing discussion would show that on a true and correct inter-pretation of the words "cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed", those terms must included not only that food which is supplied to domestic animals or birds as an essential ration for the maintenance of life but also that feed which is supplied over and above the maintenance requirements for growth or fattening and for production purposes, such as for reproduction, for production of milk, eggs, meat, wool or feathers and, in the case of animals, also for efficient output of work. In modern times, "cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed" include a large variety of concentrates, in addition to roughages, that have a high value because they are rich in easily digested nutrients and feed supplement. Amongst the feeds which are considered essential for the proper nutrition of animals and birds, which are to be kept in a state of efficient production, are included vitamins and, more particularly, vitamins A and D, which have been found to have a profound effect upon live-stock farming by increasing the efficiency of animal production and preventing serious nutritional diseases. Vitamin A, which is required for growth, reproduction, production and even for maintenance and vitamin D, which is needed to enable the animal to assimilate and use other important elements of its feed, are most apt to be lacking in natural live-stock feeds and that they are included as additives in mixed feeds so as to make good the deficiency.

19. Whichever way one looks at the matter, therefore, whether one looks at it from the angle of the etymological meaning of the word in the context in which it is used here along with fodder and concentrates, or whether one looks as it from the angle of a person conversant with the industry or trade of live-stock farming or poultry raising, the words "cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed" cannot any longer be considered as meaning only that conventional food which is necessary for the bare maintenance of cattle or birds, as the case may be. Such feed must consist of both the elements, namely, ration for maintenance and ration for production purpose.

20. Against this background, let us now turn to the products in question and ascertain what their properties are. At serial Nos. (1) and (2) are items of cattle-feed. According to the literature pertaining to those products, which is on record, Vitablend AD 3 [serial No. (1)] consists of vitamins A and D3 enveloped in a protective gelatin-glucose matrix as uniform beadlets. It is used in cattle-breeding programme for cows and buffaloes. It is also used to preserve the reproductibe efficacy of the bulls and as essential feed for calves. Vitablend AD 3 Forte [serial No. (1)] is the same thing as Vitablend AD 3, but in more concentrated form. Products Nos. (3) and (4) are items of poultry-feed. According to the literature pertaining to these products, which is on record, Vitablend AB 2 D 3 consists of vitamins A, B2 and D3 enveloped in a gelatin-glucose matrix in the form of minute beadlets and it is used as a carefully blended and properly balanced feed for growth of healthy profitable birds. It has to be mixed in the feeds, either mechanically or manually and thereupon the granules will disperse easily and evenly. Vitablend WM Forte is the liquid feed supplement of vitamin A. It is mixed with drinking water for increasing resistance through better nutrition, improved health, increased production and to avoid production slumps and blood spots in the eggs. It consists of vitamin A only in a concentrated form. In our opinion, having regard to the meaning which we have assigned to the words "cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed", these products would necessarily fall within the coverage of the concerned appropriate terms.

21. Before the <ORG>, it appears to have been stated on behalf of the assessee that these various products have to be mixed in small proportions with the other feed given to cattle or poultry, as the case may be, and that the products can also be given in the same form without being mixed with any other feed. It also appears to have been stated that the products do not constitute food in the conventional sense of ration for maintenance and that they constitute ration for production in the sense that they supply nutrients for nourishing the body. The <ORG>, upon taking these submissions into account and relying upon its earlier decision in the case of <ORG> (Appeal No. 21 of 1972 decided on 9th February, 1973), held that the products cannot be classified as cattle-feed or poultry-feed, as the case may be. It requires to be noted at this stage that the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax has observed that on studying the literature in respect of all the four items, it clearly appeared that the products in question were not such as could be given to cattle or poultry without any addition. In terms, the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax found that the products in question have to be added to the feed given to the animals or birds and that, therefore, those products are not "original food but they are supplements". We have ourselves also looked at the literature and we find that the products at items Nos. (2) and (3) are required to be added to the feed and that the product at item No. (4) is required to be added to drinking water to ensure uniform dispersion. It would thus appear that the products in question cannot possibly be administered directly to cattle or poultry without being mixed with any other feed. That, however, is not a circumstance which can make any difference, for, as explained earlier, ration for production is usually supplement or additive to normal feed and it can still be treated as cattle-feed or poultry-feed, as the case may be, in the true sense of the word.

22. As regards the <ORG>'s reliance upon its decision in the case of <ORG>, it may be pointed out that two products, namely, <ORG> Mineral Mixture for cattle and <ORG> Mineral Mixture for poultry, were involved in that matter. The <ORG> had there taken the view that those two products supplied mineral deficiencies in the normal feed for animals and poultry and that they promoted growth, production, health and breeding. Those products, therefore, were meant to serve as tonics for the animal or poultry. According to the view of the <ORG> in that case, the word "feed" meant "the food especially for live-stock or a mixture or preparation used for feeding live-stock". Having regard to the said meaning of the word "feed", according to the <ORG>, the two products in question could not be said to be cattle-feed or poultry-feed, as the case may be. This view of the <ORG> was based on the narrow meaning which it assigned to the word "feed" which, according to it, meant, in substance, ration for maintenance. This view, as earlier pointed out, is not correct.

23. It should be mentioned that, in assigning to the word "feed" the restricted meaning that it did, the Tribunal relied upon the decision of this Court in <CITATION> ( 27 S.T.C. 170). In that case, this Court has held that "Limical", a product manufactured and sold in the form of biscuits and powder with different flavours and used for a limited period for the purpose of reducing obesity and sustaining proper health, was not an article of foodstuff or food provision within the meaning of entry 6 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon the decisions of <ORG> in <CITATION> ( 12 S.T.C. 286 ( <CITATION> ( 19 S.T.C. 469 (S.C.)). In both these decisions, <ORG> had applied what has come to be known as "the meaning according to common parlance" principle. That principle, which is borrowed from the decision in <NAME> (1951 C.L.R. (Ex.) 122), is to the effect that for the purposes of statutes intended to raise revenue, the substance concerned must be classified "according to the general usage and known denominations of trade". <ORG> observed that the principle deducible was that goods which were the subject-matter of taxation "must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance". It was in terms observed as under :

"It (the word) has not been defined in the Act and being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it".

24. Applying this test in the interpretation of the words "foodstuff" or "food provision", this Court took the view in those terms because when one demands foodstuff or food provision, what one really demands is the satisfaction which one gets from eating a particular food article. A person demanding food does not generally demand a particular quantity of vitamins, proteins, fat and carbohydrates. Limical could not be offered as "food" to a normal person who is found to be hungry or to a guest who is required to be entertained. It was, therefore, found that Limical was not "foodstuff" or "food provision" within the meaning of the relevant entry.

25. It is true that the common parlance test was applied in the said decision and that to that extent the decision is in point. However, beyond that no assistance can be derived from this decision for determining the meaning of the word "cattle-feed" or "poultry-feed". Foodstuff or food provision for human beings has a definite meaning in common parlance and it cannot possibly include articles like Limical which have special use and properties. One cannot possibly serve as foodstuff or food provision Limical to a guest at dinner or lunch. "Cattle-feed" and "poultry-feed", however, are words which are used in the context of the mixed feed of live-stock and poultry, both of which are reared for production purposes not only domestically but also commercially. From what has been stated above, it becomes clear that even in its popular sense, that is to say, the sense in which people conversant with live-stock farming and poultry raising and those dealing in cattle-feed or poultry-feed would attribute to those words, ration for production, such as feed additives or supplements like proteins, minerals, vitamins, etc., would truly constitute "cattle-feed" or "poultry-feed", as the case may be. In such a context and in view of the setting of the word "cattle-feed" in the company of the word "concentrates", it would be difficult to reach the conclusion at which the <ORG> arrived. The <ORG>'s decision as to the true scope of the entries in question in the instant case, relying upon its earlier decision, therefore, is obviously not correct in law.

26. We must now turn to the questions which have been referred to us. Ordinarily, on the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, both the questions would have been answered in favour of the assessee. We find, however, that that course cannot be adopted so far as the first question is concerned. We have pointed out earlier that cattle-feed, which is mechanically produced, is specifically excluded from the coverage of entry 21 of Schedule I. The essential question, which will require to be determined in each case concerning the said entry, therefore, is whether the goods in question, even if they be cattle-feed, are mechanically produced. We find, in the instant case, that the <ORG> has not at all applied its mind to this aspect of the case presumably because it was of the view that the products in question are not "cattle-feed". In the view which we have taken however, the determination of the subsidiary question is not only relevant but also necessary. Under these circumstances, we would have ordinarily declined to answer the first question and left it to the <ORG> to adjust its decision under section 69(4), after having considered the aforesaid aspect. That exercise, however, is not necessary in the present case because, on behalf of the assessee, it has been specifically stated to us that the products at serial Nos. (1) and (2) are mechanically produced. Having regard to this concession made on behalf of the assessee, no useful purpose will be served by declining to answer the question and leaving it to the <ORG> to adjust its decision after determining the said question. We must hold accordingly that the products at serial Nos. (1) and (2) are not covered by entry 21 of Schedule I, though for reasons different from those which appealed to the <ORG>.

27. As regards the second question, entry 25 of Schedule I has no words of limitation. It covers poultry-feed without any qualification. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we must hold that the products at serial Nos. (3) and (4) are covered by the said entry.

28. In the result, the questions referred to us are answered as follows :

Question No. (1) : In the negative, that is to say, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.

Question No. (2) : In the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

29. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this reference.

30. Reference answered accordingly.