JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. The petitioner, a firm, runs an oil and tin factory. The financial year of the firm runs from Asarh Sudi 2 to Asarh Sudi 1. For the year 1965, the accounts were closed in July, 1965. In the accounts provision for payment of bonus was made and a reserve for bonus was created, and the amount debited to the profit and loss account. The amounts debited were to the extent of 20% for bonus and 20% as reserve for bonus. This method was followed from the accounting year 1966 to.1972-73. In accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act , 1965, amounts credited to the bonus reserve account were transferred back to the profit and loss account after four years. The Income-tax Officer accepted the method of accounting aforesaid for the assessment years 1966-67 to 1973-74.

2. By circular letter dated 18th August, 1973, <ORG> issued instructions to the effect that deduction for the bonus reserve should not be allowed. Subsequent to this circular letter, <ORG> issued a notice under Section 154 of the Act on October 18, 1973, for the assessment years 1969-70 to 1972-73 requiring the petitioner to show cause why the assessment should not be rectified as double allowance for bonus had been allowed. Objections to this notice were filed by the petitioner on November 26, 1973. Another notice was sent by <ORG> stating that the balance-sheet filed by the firm disclosed that the bonus debited to the profit and loss account relevant for the assessment years 1969-70 to 1972-73 had not been paid, and consequently in exercise of powers under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, he proposed to add these sums. By this letter, he also invited objections to the action proposed to be taken by him. The petitioner filed objections to these notices. Subsequently, <ORG> issued notice under Sections 148 / 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dated February 18, 1974, for the assessment years 1969-70 to 1972-73. The petitioner filed objection to the aforesaid notice challenging the jurisdiction of <ORG> to reopen the assessment under Section 147(b) of the Act. The plea taken was that there was no subsequent information on the basis of which <ORG> could issue the impugned notices. The petitioner has now impugned these notices under Section 148 of the Act as also the <ORG>'s circular letter and has prayed for the quashing of both, and for a writ of prohibition restraining <ORG> from reassessing the petitioner-firm for the years 1969-70 to the assessment year 1972-73.

3. The question that arises for decision in the present writ petition is as to whether the Income-tax Officer acting under Sections 147-148 of the Act could reopen the assessment on the basis of the circular issued by <ORG>. Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the circular issued by <ORG> was not information of such nature as warranted action under Sections 147-148 of the Act. It was urged that all relevant information in respect of the assessment years was already on the record and the present proceedings taken by the Income-tax Officer in effect are mere change of opinion formed by him on the matter, and as such the proceedings are without jurisdiction.

4. It is well-settled that the Income-tax Officer cannot reopen an assessment only on a change of opinion. The assessment can be reopened under Section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, only in case the Income-tax Officer has, in consequence of the information in his possession, reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The question that arises is as to whether the circular sent bv <ORG> is information as contemplated by the statute.

5. Now, the circular sent by <ORG> was as respects the point of law. It hardly admits of doubt after the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION>  35 ITR 1 ( <CITATION> .  61 ITR 461 (SC) and <NAME> v.

Commissioner of Income-tax [1970] 75 ITR 373 (SC) and the recent decision in the case of <CITATION>  102 ITR 287 (SC) that the word "information" as used in the Section embraces both information as to fact and information as to law. We are tempted to quote here a passage from the decision of <ORG> in <NAME>'s case  102 ITR 287, 294 (SC) which is apposite to the present case:

"Another pertinent fact which may be mentioned here is that although Section 34 was the subject of several amendments, yet the word 'information' which was introduced in 1939 has not been defined at all. Since the word 'information' has not been defined, it is difficult to lay down any rule of universal application. At the same time it cannot be disputed that the object of the Act was to see that the tax collecting machinery is made as perfect and effective as possible so that the taxpayer is not allowed to get away with escaped income-tax. The fact that the adjective 'definite' qualified the word 'information' and the word 'discovers' which were introduced in the Income-tax (Amendment) Act 1939, were deleted by the Amendment Act of 1948, would lead to the irresistible inference that the word 'information' is of the widest amplitude and comprehends a variety of factors. Nevertheless, the power under Section 34(1)(b) , however wide it may be, is not plenary, because the discretion of the Income-tax Officer is controlled by the words 'reason to believe'. It was so held by this court in <CITATION>  41 ITR 221 (SC) while affirming the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION>  32 ITR 289 (Pat). This legal proposition, however, is not disputed. It, therefore, follows that information may come from external sources or even from materials already on the record or may be derived from the discovery of new and important matter or fresh facts. The word 'information' will also include true and correct state of the law derived from relevant judicial decisions either of the income-tax authorities or other courts of law which decide income-tax matters. Where the ground on which the original assessment is based is held to be erroneous by a superior court in some other case, that will also amount to a fresh information which comes into existence subsequent to the original assessment. A subsequent <ORG> decision is also included in the word 'information'. Thus, it is very difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule."

6. This being the correct position of law, we fail to see how a circular sent by <ORG> on a point of law would not constitute information as contemplated by the Section. As we read the decision of <ORG>, the only restriction is that the information must be of such a nature that the Income-tax Officer must have reason to believe that the income has escaped assessment. Now the belief which the Income-tax Officer has to form on the information received by him is the conviction which a reasonable and prudent man would form on the basis of the objective information received by him that the income has escaped assessment. Inasmuch as the statute does not restrict the sources from which the information as to a question of law can be derived by the Income-tax Officer, we find it difficult to understand as to how any restriction as respects the source of information could be read into the statute. The only restriction, as we have already indicated earlier, is that the information must be from such a source as would lead a prudent man to form the belief that the information is, prima facie, correct and, if believed, it will lead to the inference that the assessee has evaded payment of income-tax on some income. Although, it is not feasible nor possible to lay down exhaustively the sources of such information, we may by way of illustration narrate some of these sources, e.g., treatise on law on the subject, articles on the subject by jurists or lawyers, information from other authoritative source, judicial decisions and the like. Counsel for the petitioner objects to such wide view of the source from which the information is received being taken. It would, he contends, give unbridled power to the Income-tax Officer to change his view on a question of law, even if such information is received from some lay man. The contention as put is not correct. We have already seen that the word 'information' is controlled by the words 'reason to believe'. This means that information must come from such source as would instil confidence in the Income-tax Officer and, as a prudent man, he would have reason to believe that the income has escaped assessment. Information from a layman as respects the question of law, cannot lead a prudent man to form opinion that that information is, prima facie, correct, for the layman concerned not being versed in the law could hardly be in a position to give a correct exposition of the law. This, however, cannot be said of <ORG> for the members constituting the <ORG> are individuals who are well-versed in the income-tax law. If the Income-tax Officer, acting on the circular letter of the <ORG> of Direct Taxes, entertains the belief that there has been a misapplication of the law as a result of which the income has escaped assessment, it cannot be said that he acted arbitrarily in the matter or without any subsequent information. Counsel for the petitioner contended by reference to certain decisions that <ORG> cannot issue directions in respect of a quasi-judicial function performed by the Income-tax Officer while making an assessment. One cannot doubt this. The Central <ORG> of Direct Taxes does not have statutory authority to give directions to the Income-tax Officer to decide a particular matter in accordance with the view of law which it takes. However, we see no impediment in <ORG> in issuing a circular informing the Income-

tax Officer of the correct position of law on a disputed matter. Thus, the circular sent by <ORG> constitutes information as contemplated by the statute, and the Income-tax Officer can form a prima facie belief that the income has escaped assessment on account of misapplication of law.

7. Counsel for both sides cited a large number of cases but we do not propose to refer to all of them except the following as, in our view, they do not help in resolving the controversy.

8. Counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied on a decision by <ORG> in <CITATION>  80 ITR 188 (Guj). There the question arose as to whether information given on a question of law by the audit department would constitute information on which reassessment could be made. <ORG> took the view that, although it is not possible to formulate a precise definition as regards the source from which information on a question of law would entitle the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment, in their view opinion about the state of law must be from some person, body or authority competent and authorised to pronounce upon the law so that the information was invested with some definiteness and authority. It took the view that the audit department was not the authority competent and authorised to declare the correct state of law or to pronounce upon it and as such the assessment could not be reopened on the information of the audit department. A contrary view was taken by <ORG> in the case of <CITATION>  84 ITR 584 (Delhi) as also by <ORG> in the case of <CITATION>  90 ITR 503 (Ker). <ORG>, in the case of <CITATION>  99 ITR 148 (Delhi), after referring to the test laid down by <ORG>, held that the test laid down by that court was, if narrowly construed, not very appropriate. It held that the information coming from the audit department or <ORG> would amount to "information "within the meaning of Section 147 . We are in respectful agreement with that law. There is nothing in the statute which curtails the source of information to the effect that it must come from some person who was authorised to pronounce upon the law. If such a test was applied then it might lead to the result that only judicial decisions would answer the test, We are not prepared to accept this test in view of the phraseology of the Section. All that is required is that the information must come from some external source and must be of such a nature as would lead a prudent man to believe that it is correct. We have already indicated some of the sources of information which could lead the Income-tax Officer to form the belief that the information was prima facie correct and that the income has escaped assessment. <ORG> being an authority conversant with the tax laws, would be such a source.

9. In view of these conclusions, the challenge to the notice issued under Sections 148 / 147 must fail. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. On 24-3-1950, <NAME>, the permanent hereditary karnam of the village of Thadikombu in Dindigul taluk died leaving him surviving a widow by name <NAME> and a minor son, <NAME>, aged about 12 years. By an order made on 4-9-1950, the Sub-Collector;

Dindigul, registered <NAME> as the permanent karnam and appointed one <NAME> to be his deputy during the period of his minority.

Against this order of appointing <NAME> as Deputy, <NAME>, preferred an appeal to the District Collector, Madurai. Her prayer to the Sub-Collector appears to have been that one <NAME>, a relation of hers, should be appointed deputy, By an order dated 28-10-1950 the District Collector set aside the appointment of <NAME> on the ground that it was undesirable to appoint a Muslim as deputy of a Hindu minor. As <NAME> had intimated that she was willing to nominate <NAME> the District Collector directed the Sub-Collector to examine the qualifications of the nominee and to appoint him if he was found suitable.

<NAME>, thereupon filed a revision petition to <ORG>. <ORG> appeared by counsel before the Board and raised the objection that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Collector. But by its order dated 25-4-1951 the Board overruled the objection of <ORG> to its jurisdiction and set aside the order of the Collector and confirmed the appointment of <NAME> as deputy. <ORG> then preferred a revision petition to the <ORG>, and the <ORG> allowed the petition without notice to <NAME> who thereupon came to this Court by a writ petition No. 173 of 1952 calling in question the order of the <ORG> on the ground that it was passed without notice to him & therefore in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The writ petition was allowed on that ground and the matter remitted to <ORG> for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

2. When the matter thus went back to the Government, they took the view that they had no revisional powers and declined to interfere. The result was that the order of the <ORG> appointing <NAME> as deputy stood. <ORG> has therefore come to this court with this petition to quash the order of the <ORG> on the ground, that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the District Collector. That petition came on in the first instance before one of us, namely, <NAME> He observed:

"The question, therefore, is whether <ORG> have or have not the power of revision which they have purported to exercise in their order now impugned dated 25-4-1951. There are two decisions of this court both of them of <ORG>es which have a bearing upon this question, the first one being -- " <CITATION> ) and the other which is still unreported being one rendered in L. P. A. No. 225 of 1952 (Mad) (B). In the earlier decision the learned Chief Justice and <NAME> have taken the view that <ORG> have no revisional powers over Collectors in respect of their Judicial or quasi-judicial functions like the latter case a directly opposite conclusion was reached by <NAME> and <NAME>. It is possible that there might be some small points of difference or distinction between the present case and those dealt with by the two judgments but I do not think that without preferring the one decision to the other the "present writ can be disposed of. The proper course, it appears to me, to follow, is to place the papers before my Lord the Chief Justice for directions either to refer the case to a <ORG> or to a Full <ORG> for resolving the conflict between these two <ORG> decisions and there will be a direction accordingly."

3. That is how the matter now conies before us. The question we have to decide is whether <ORG> has power to interfere with an order made by the District Collector under Section 10(5) of Madras Act 3 of 1895 -- the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895 -- appointing a deputy to a post registered in the name of a minor. To answer this question it is necessary pt the outset to examine the statutes that have a bearing on the powers of the <ORG> and the Collector. The earliest of these is Regulation I of 1803. Up to that time the <ORG> had a considerable amount of judicial authority in the determination of certain cases of a civil nature. The regulation" formally abrogated this judicial authority of <ORG> in those districts where <ORG> had been established. Thereafter the preamble proceeds to state the further object of the Regulation:

"and whereas it is important .... that the powers and authorities entrusted to the said <ORG> in respect of the executive administration of the revenues, should be defined and published;"

These words make it plain that the intention of the Regulation was to define the power of the <ORG> in so far as it related to the executive administration of the revenues. Section 4 of the Regulation specifies the duties of the <ORG> to be "the general superintendence of the revenues from whatever source they may arise." Section 5 runs: "The <ORG> of Revenue have had, and are here by declared, to have authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue .... as far as the said superintendence and control may relate to the executive administration of the revenue under the regulations now enacted, or to be hereafter enacted."

It will be noticed that the section, though it confers on the <ORG> power and authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenues, imposes one important qualification thereon, and it is this: the power of superintendence and control is limited to the executive administration of the re venue. In other words, under the guise of superintendence and control of persons employed in the executive administration of the revenue, the <ORG> cannot give instructions to them in respect of other matters; as for instance the spread of literacy.

Section 33 of the Regulation explicitly places on <ORG> the responsibility of seeing that the executive officers employed under it discharge their duties diligently. The section runs:

"<ORG> shall be responsible that the executive officers employed under them discharge the duties of their respective stations with assiduity, and shall require them to pay a ready and implicit obedience to all orders and regulations, and shall punish neglect in the subordinate officers of revenue, at their; discretion, according to the powers vested in them for that purpose."

While fixing responsibility on the <ORG> for maintaining discipline among the officers subordinate to it, the requisite power to discharge the responsibility is also conferred on the <ORG> by empowering it to punish the officers, subordinate to it. The limitation on this power is the requirement that it shall be exercised "according to the powers vested in them for that purpose which might be by statute or rule or otherwise.

4. We have next Regulation 2 of 1803. The preamble recites: "and whereas the said system (the system of internal government established for the administration of the public revenue) further requires that the power and authority heretofore vested in the immediate collectors of the revenue should be curtailed; wherefore the following Regulation '- has been passed for the purpose of defining the authority committed to Collectors, and for describing the modes of procedure, required in the discharge of their duty." Section 5 states: "Collectors shall be under the immediate control of <ORG>, and shall obey all orders communicated to them by the authority of that <ORG>." Section 9 enacts:

"Collectors have had, and are hereby declared to have, authority to superintend and control, under the orders of <ORG>, all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue ...... as far as the said superintendence and control may relate to the executive administration of the revenue under the regulations now enacted, or to be hereafter enacted."

It will be noticed that this section is practically the same as Section 5 of Regulation 1 of 1803 with the "Collectors" taking the place of the "<ORG>,"

5. The next regulation that has to be referred to is Regulation 7 of 1828. It is headed:

"A regulation for declaring the powers of Subordinate and Assistant Collectors in charge of particular divisions' of districts and for facilitating proceedings under Regulation 9, 1822."

The preamble runs:

"Whereas the efficient discharge of the functions of Collectors requires that subordinate and Assistant Collectors should be empowered to exercise within their divisions all the powers of the Collector, but subject, nevertheless, to their revision and correction."

Paragraph 1 of Section 3 states:

"A subordinate or Assistant Collector in charge of a particular division of a district shall 'ex officio' have authority to exercise within the division under his charge all the powers granted to Collectors by the Regulation now in force, or that may be hereafter enacted unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation."

We would emphasise the last words of the section: "unless the contrary shall be expressly declared in any Regulation"; which mean that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, all the powers conferred by any statute on a Collector may be exercised within the limits of his territorial jurisdiction by a Sub-Collector or Assistant Collector in charge of a division. But the powers so granted are subject to the control of the District Collector -- a control very comprehensive in its scope. Paragraph 3 of Section 3 makes this unmistakably plain:

"The proceedings of subordinate and Assistant Collectors . acting under the preceding clauses shall be subject, in all cases, and in the fullest manner, to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector, who shall have power either to direct, generally, that the proceedings of any of his subordinates or Assistants shall be regularly submitted to himself before the decision, order or sentence is earned into execution, and to confirm, modify or annul them, or issue any further orders in the cases, as he may see fit; or in any particular case to direct that the decision, order or sentence of any of his subordinates, or Assistants shall not be carried into execution and to pass such further orders as he may see fit,"

It will be appreciated that the scheme of these Regulations is this the duty and the responsibility for the executive administration of the revenue is placed squarely on the Board, and it is given the power to discharge that responsibility by punishing those who neglect their duties. In / like manner, so far as his district is concerned, the responsibility is placed on the Collector; but in order to enable him to discharge his duties, he is given a plenary 'power of control' and superintendence over his subordinate and 'assistant Collectors'. It will be notice that para. 3 of Section 3 of Regulation 7 of 1828 states that the proceedings of the Subordinate and Assistant Collectors shall be subject, in all cases, and in the 'fullest' manner to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector. He has been given power to require Sub-Collectors and Assistant Collectors, to submit to him their proceedings before they are given effect to and he is given power to confirm, modify or annul their decisions.

6. At the bottom of the revenue hierarchy are the village officers. So far as they are concerned their appointment, removal etc. are governed by two statutes. One is Act 2 of 1894 which deals, generally speaking, with village establishments in zamindaries. With that Act we are not here concerned. The other is Act 3 of 1895 which deals with village establishments in ryotwari areas. Section 3 of this Act enumerates the village offices to which it applies, and the enumeration includes village munsifs and karnams. Para 1 of Section 10 provides:

"When a vacancy occurs in any of the village officers forming class (1) in Section 3 , the Collector shall fill up the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the following sub-sections.";

One of these is Sub-section (2) which says:

"The succession shall devolve on a single heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zamindaries in Southern India."

Sub-section (5) provides:

"When the person who would otherwise be entitled to succeed to an office is a minor, the Colletor shall register the minor as the heir of the last holder and appoint some other person qualified under Sub-section (1) to discharge the duties of the office until the person registered as heir, on attaining majority, or within three years thereafter, is qualified under Sub-section (1), to discharge the duties of the office himself, when he shall be appointed thereto."

7. Under Section 13 any person who considers that he is entitled to any of the offices specified in Section 3 may sue before the Collector to establish his right to the office. Under Section 23 , an appeal lies to the District Collector from every decision given by the Collector under Section 13 and to <ORG> if the decree was made by the District Collector. In certain cases a second appeal is also provided for. Under <CITATION> , the Collector is given power to fine, suspend, dismiss or remove village officers. Under Sub-section (2) the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar is also given certain punitive powers though they are of a more limited kind. In respect of every punishment imposed under Section 7 by the Collector, an appeal lies to the District Collector, and, in certain cases, to <ORG>. But what has to be noticed, -- arid that is the point we desire to emphasise here, --is that no appeal is provided for from an order made under Section 10(5) .

8. Village Officers in the State fall into two broad categories: those in respect of whom there is specific statutory provision and those for whom there is no such provision. In the case of certain specified, village offices in ryotwari areas, claims to them by way of hereditary right are recognised by statute, which confers "some special rights on the claimants to and incumbents of such offices. If the claim which such a person thinks he has to a particular office is not conceded, he can maintain a suit before the Collector to establish his claim. From the decision of the Collector, an appeal and in certain cases, a second appeal lies. Village officers who are not governed by these statutes have no such right. A village officer to whom Act 2 of 1894 or Act 3 of 1893 applies cannot be punished except in the manner provided for by the Acts; and when he Is punished, he has got a right of appeal as provided in the Acts. To put it in another way, holders of offices governed by Act 2 of 1894 or Act 3 of 1895 cannot in relation to their offices be dealt with except in the manner provided by the relevant statute. Neither the Revenue Divisional Officer nor the District Collector nor the <ORG> can touch them except in the manner that the statute permits. The other village officers, that is to say, village officers hot governed by either of those Acts are not in so fortified "a position. They are under the superintendence and control of the District Collector, the <ORG> and the <ORG> just like other <ORG> servants.

9. We will next examine the case law on the subject. The earliest of the decisions cited before us is -- ' <CITATION> ', AIR 1930 Mad 349(2) (C). The facts there were these:

"The plaintiff was a karnam of the ryotwari village of Voonagatla. On 4-10-1921, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ellore, dismissed him. He appealed to the District Collector who modified the order into one of suspension for one year. He preferred a second appeal to <ORG>, the result of which was that the <ORG> on 8-7-1922, restored the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dismissing him. The plaintiff maintained that that order was 'ultra vires' and invalid. The above proceedings were then taken under Act 3 of 1895. The original dismissal was under Section 7 and the appeals were under Section 23 ."

<NAME> observed:

"It is quite clear, I think, that no second appeal lay in this case .... The learned Government Pleader, however, contends that the order was passed in the exercise of powers of revision possessed, by the <ORG>. He claims that the <ORG> could have acted, and, therefore, must be presumed to have acted either in the exercise of revisional powers under Section 23 or in the exercise of inherent executive powers outside the scope of Act 3 of 1895. As to the powers of revision under Section 23 , the statute itself does not confer on the <ORG> any power of revision. But it is argued that as the <ORG> is constituted the superior appellate authority, it follows that it has a general power of revision. Reliance is placed on, a sentence quoted from the ruling in -- "In re Palanikumara Chinnayya Goundan', AIR 1922 Mad 337 (D), which states the well-known proposition that appellate jurisdiction includes the power to interfere in revision, But in order that that proposition may apply, a revisional power must have been conferred by the statute on the tribunal. If revisional power has been conferred, then it is exercisable over all tribunals against whose orders an appeal is provided. I am not referred to any authority which lays down that, where a statute confers a right of appeal and is silent about a right of revision, it has conferred a right of revision; apparently unlimited in extent and absolute in authority, so that, for example, as in this case, the mere con-ferment of a right of appeal on the <ORG> 'ipso facto' confers on it a right to enhance the sentence of a lower tribunal without notice to the party affected. Such a contention is tantamount to saying that, where a statute provides a right of appeal and also provides a power of revision, the latter provision is not an enabling provision but is a restricting provision limiting the unlimited powers of revision otherwise possessed by the <ORG>."

The learned Judge then went on to examine the history of the legislation on the subject and at pp. 351-352 observed as follows:

"In all this history I see no room for the contention that <ORG> possesses some powers outside this legislation. It has all along derived what power it possessed from the legislating authority, and not being itself the sovereign authority it has not inherent in it the powers of the Sovereign. Such a theory really implies that although the statute says by Section 23 that a dismissal of an appeal to the District Collector in a case where the order on appeal is not one of dismissal, shall be final, yet that order is not final, because the <ORG> possesses undefined and unrestricted inherent powers to interfere with it."

On p. 352, the learned Judge expressed is conclusion :

"I am not, therefore, prepared to support the learned Government Pleader in his argument that the <ORG> has an inherent power outside the Acts and Regulations to interfere with and enhance the order of suspension passed by the District Collector."

We are in full agreement with this reasoning and conclusion.

10. There was an appeal from the decision of <ORG> which was dismissed. The decision is reported in -- 'Secy. of <CITATION> ', AIR 1933 Mad 618 (E). <NAME> who delivered the judgment of the Bench observed: " It is however contended by the learned Government Pleader that the <ORG> was in fact acting in the exercise of its revisional powers, though it did not in any way indicate that it was so doing, and that it got such powers from Section 5 of Regulation 1 of 1803 which section has never been abolished. <ORG> has dealt with that contention in his judgment and 1 would with all respect, express myself as in entire agreement both with the conclusion which he has come to and the reasons that he has given therefor."

The next case on the point appears in -- 'Dorai swami <CITATION> ', AIR 1939 Mad 648 (P). The facts there were as follows: The plaintiff was appointed headman of a village by the Revenue Divisional Officer; and that order was confirmed by the District Collector. Against the Collector's order, defendant 2 preferred what was called a second appeal to <ORG>. The <ORG> took the view that defendant 2's claims should be preferred to those of the plaintiff, and proceeded to appoint him to the office. The plaintiff then filed a suit for a declaration, that he was the legal holder of the office of headman and the appointment of defendant 2 made by the <ORG> was illegal. At p. 649 <NAME> formulated the question for determination in these terms:

"The only question therefore is whether the order of <ORG> on this so-called second appeal by defendant 2 is a legal order which would have the effect of putting the plaintiff in the position of one seeking to establish his right to succeed to an office, or is it an unlawful attempt to invade the established rights which the plaintiff has already acquired?"

At p. 650 the learned Judge stated:

"The only power which can be claimed by <ORG> is based on Section 5 , <ORG> of Revenue Regulation , whereby, the <ORG> is given authority to superintend and control all persons employed in the executive administration of the public revenue. . . I do not wish to say anything which might be taken as indicating that in no circumstances can <ORG> by virtue of its powers under Section 5 , <ORG> of Revenue Regulation set aside a statutory order of its subordinate in the case of a gross error attended by serious consequences for which no other remedy is provided by law. But I am emphatically of opinion that these general powers of superintendence did not authorise <ORG> to arrogate to itself a power of interference in revision or in second appeal from a statutory order, when machinery of the statute itself confers no such power and contemplates the utilisation of another remedy which is accessible to the person aggrieved, more specially in a case in which the consequences of any error are purely personal to the rival claimants."

11. We next have the case in (A). The facts there were as follows: In 1935, one <NAME>, who was then a minor, was registered as the village headman of a village in Itchapuram Taluk, and one <NAME> was appointed as his deputy under Section 10(5) of Madras Act 3 of 1895. In 1948 <NAME> was removed from his office, as he had failed to pass the requisite tests and qualify himself. In the vacancy that thus arose one <NAME> was registered as the office holder. He too was a minor, and <NAME> was again appointed as his deputy. Subsequently the mother of the minor complained to <ORG> and by an order, made on 9-11-1949 the Divisional Officer removed <NAME> from office and appointed one <NAME> in his stead. Against the order of the Divisional Officer, <NAME> appealed to the District Collector who set aside the order of <ORG> and restored <NAME> to the position which he had been occupying. <NAME> then carried the matter to <ORG>, but the Board refused to interfere. <NAME> then petitioned the Government, who, by their order dated 17-1-1951, directed that <NAME> be restored as deputy, ousting <NAME>. <NAME> thereupon came to this court for the issue of a writ. That Case was heard by the learned Chief Justice and <NAME> and in the course of his judgment, the learned Chief Justice observed:

"We have no hesitation in holding that the Government had no power whatever to pass any order in this matter. . . There is no provision in that Act (Act 3 of 1895) conferring any power on the Government to interfere with the orders of any of the Subordinate revenue authorities entrusted with specified powers by the provisions of that Act. . . We do not desire to say anything about the powers of the Government to interfere with the orders of <ORG> generally because we are convinced that <ORG> itself had no power to interfere with the order passed by the District Collector in a case like the present.......

In this case the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer removing the petitioner and appointing another as the person to discharge the duties of the office during the minority of the registered heir was liable to be revised by the District Collector. The District Collector in the exercise of this power set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and restored the petitioner to his original position. This order of the District Collector was not subject to any appeal or revision and we are unable to discover any statutory power under which either <ORG> or the <ORG> could interfere with his order."

12. The legal position appears to be plain. Where a statute takes over and occupies a field previously not regulated by legislation, the rights and powers conferred and the obligations imposed by the statute must be worked out within the statutory frame-work. It a statute confers a particular right and prescribes a particular mode for its enforcement, the enforcement of the right must be sought in that mode. If it is to be enforced by a suit, then a suit must be filed; it it is to be vindicated by an appeal, then an appeal must be preferred to the specified authority. It no appeal is provided for but only a right of revision, then that remedy must be sought in aid. Conversely, it no appeal or revision is provided for, then the order of the original authority cannot be interfered with and that order would be the his and final order. It has been noticed that under Act 3 of 1895 a right to sue is given to establish title to certain offices. A right of appeal and in some cases a right of second appeal are given in respect of certain punitive orders. Only a single right of appeal is given in respect of certain other punishments. In respect of an appointment made under Section 10(5) , neither a right of appeal nor a right of revision is provided for; the order of the District Collector cannot therefore be interfered with by any higher authority. The question maybe asked: has the District Collector power to interfere with an order passed by the Divisional Officer, i.e., the 'Collector', under Section 10(5) . The decision in --' <CITATION> ', 1938-2 Mad LJ 488: AIR 1938 Mad 903 (G), helps in answering this question. The facts of that case are set out at p. 489 of the report. There was a vacancy in the office of village munsif. The Revenue Divisional Officer at first registered defendant 1 (then a minor) in the vacancy. That registration was subsequently cancelled, and the plaintiff was permanently appointed under Section 10(3) . Defendant 1 then filed what purported to be an appeal before the District Collector. The Collector himself was under an erroneous impression, that there was a right of appeal and he reversed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and appointed defendant I in his place. The question was raised whether the order of the District Collector which was certainly 'ultra vires' as an appellate order, could be treated as 'intra vires', as an order in revision. The Court observed;

"Paragraph 1 of Section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 expressly states that it applies to 'all the powers granted to Collectors by the Regulation now in force or 'that may hereafter be enacted'.

It is only by virtue of this Regulation that a Revenue Divisional Officer gets authority to exercises the powers of 'Collector' under Act 3 of 1895, Consequently the District Collector's power of Revision created by the same Regulation, unless it is expressly taken away must be held to continue."

They, therefore, held that the Collector had power to interfere.

13. The next case we would refer to is in --' <CITATION> ). The facts there may be thus summarised. On 21-4-1932 X, who was the hereditary village munsif, was dismissed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, who thereafter registered Y, a son of X to the office. Following the procedure laid down in Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, the Divisional Officer appointed a Muslim to be the deputy of Y. In 1937 Y attained majority and qualified himself by passing all the prescribed tests. He then applied to the Deputy Collector for permission to enter upon his duties. The Revenue Divisional Officer sought the advice of the District Collector, who felt that the officer who dismissed X from service should have given a direction under Sub-section (4) of Section 10 and should not have registered the minor as entitled to the office. Ultimately the Collector made an order on 27-11-1937, cancelling the order registering Y. Y exhausted all his remedies by way of appeal and otherwise and eventually on 20-11-1943, -Y filed a suit for a declaration that the orders of the District Collector were illegal and 'ultra vires'. <NAME> held that the Collector had no jurisdiction to make the order cancelling the registration of Y under Section 10 (5) of the Act. With the actual decision itself one can have no quarrel; but with the reasons which the learned Judge gave we find it difficult to agree. Dealing with para. 3 of Section 3 of Regulation 7 of 1828, the learned Judge observed:

"The power conferred under this paragraph is of a twofold character. The Collector under this clause may direct generally that the proceedings of any of his subordinates or Assistants shall be regularly submitted to himself before the decision, order or sentence is carried into execution and if so, submitted he is empowered to confirm, modify or annul those proceedings or even may issue any further orders in the case as he may think fit. Instead of making a general direction he may require that in a particular case the decision, order or sentence of any of his subordinates or Assistants shall not be carried into execution and ha may pass such further orders as he may think fit. In either case, it should be noticed that the power is conferred to interfere with the order in the manner provided by the section only before the order is carried into execution. If once an order is carried into execution, it is but natural that the Collector should not undo what has been done by his subordinate. The power, therefore, cannot obviously be exercised after the order of his Subordinate has been carried into execution whether the proceedings come to his notice by virtue of a general direction or a particular direction."

14. With all respect to the learned Judge we do not think that this reasoning is correct. The preamble to the Regulation states that the powers of Collectors are conferred on Sub-Collectors and Assistant Collectors subject to revision and correction by Collectors. As already mentioned, para. 3 of Section 3 states in unmistakable terms that the proceedings of Sub-Collectors and Assistant Collectors shall be subject, 'in all cases', and 'in the fullest manner', to the superintendence, control and revision of the Collector. The expressions "in all cases" and "in the fullest manner" seem to be designed and are sufficient to confer on the District Collector plenary powers of supervision and control. The clauses that follow, instead of being intended to limit the power conferred by the earlier part of the paragraph, seem to be intended to emphasise it. Under that paragraph the Collector is given power not merely to revise an order already made but also to see in advance an order intended to be issued before it actually goes out. The Collector is given power not merely to correct a mistake which a Sub Collector or an Assistant Collector may have made but to step in before he makes a mistake. Sub Collectors and Assistant Collectors would be generally recent entrants to Government service, and, at the time this Regulation was passed, would have been all of them foreigners with little or no knowledge of local conditions. Power was conferred in the amplest manner on collectors to prevent the consequence of mistakes which their inexperience might produce. To say that, when once the orders of a Sub Collector have been put into effect, the District Collector will have no more power in relation to those orders, would be drastically to curtail the power of the District Collector and to emasculate the section.

One illustration will suffice. Supposing in a taluk the collection of land revenue is not proceeding as fast as it normally does; and the Sub Collector thinks that the process should be speeded up. To attain that object he might issue instructions to <NAME> and other subordinate officers to effect distraints of moveables or to attach immoveables and also to arrest defaulters under Act 2 of 1864. Would it be right to say that because those orders of the Sub Collector have been given effect to that is to say, the distraints have been made, immoveable properties have been attached and persons arrested, the District Collector has no power to interfere, even if he considered the Sub Collector's orders to be unduly harsh and oppressive. In fact, one would have thought that it was exactly in such a situation that the District Collector had authority to interfere. As we have already stated, the actual decision of <NAME> was right because since more than five years had elapsed after the original order of the Revenue Divisional Officer it would be hardly right to say that the order passed by the Collector in November 1937 was in the exercise of any powers of revision.

15. Of the cases cited, one more may be referred to here. That is reported in --- ' <CITATION> ). That decision proceeds on the basis, that where a statute or rule framed thereunder vest a discretion in an officer subordinate to the Government, then that discretion must be exercised by the officer and cannot be exercised by the Government. In other words, the power of superintendence which the Government may claim cannot be invoked to justify interference with the statutory discretion of its subordinate officers, a view which confirms what we have already set out.

16. We shall deal next with the decision of <NAME> and <NAME> in L. P. a. No. 225 of 1952 (Mad) (B).

17. '<NAME> v. Commr. of Land Revenue, <ORG>, Madras (B)', as it has been specifically referred to in the order of reference made by <NAME> we have to observe even . at the outset that that case fell outside the scope of Act 3 of 1895 and the rules framed thereunder and on that ground it is clearly distinguishable from (A).

18. The facts in <NAME>'s case (B)' were as follows. <NAME> was appointed to act as the village munsif of Madakkal, when that post fell vacant on the resignation of the permanent village munsif The office was not governed by the provisions of Madras Act 3 of 1895. Subsequent to his appointment, there were complaints against Veerabadra, and the Sub Collector of Hosur terminated his appointment. Veerabadra appealed to the" District Collector who confirmed the order of the Sub Collector. On second appeal to <ORG>, the order of termination of service was modified to one of suspension till 31-10-1951. When the Sub Collector directed the removal of Veerabadra, he appointed <NAME> to the office of the village munsif. Against that appointment of <NAME>, Veerabadra preferred an appeal to the Collector who dismissed the appeal. Veerabadra then moved <ORG> 'in revision'. By this time the <ORG> had modified the punishment imposed upon Veerabadra to one of suspension till 31-10-1951. The <ORG> set aside the order of the Sub Collector appointing <NAME> which was con-firmed by the Collector, and the <ORG> ordered the appointment of <NAME> to the post of village munsif. <NAME> moved this court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the <ORG>. That was dismissed, and it was against that dismissal that <NAME> preferred L. P. A. No. 225 of 1952 Mad (B).

19. The learned Judge dismissed the appeal preferred by <NAME>. They rejected the contention that <NAME> could not invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court, because he had submitted to the adjudication of the dispute between himself and Veerabadra by the tribunal that is, <ORG>, the jurisdiction of which he challenged in this court. The learned Judge observed:

"In our opinion, the petitioner's submission to the jurisdiction of the <ORG> is not the kind of acquiescence which would debar him from raising the question before a superior tribunal. If the petitioner had moved the <ORG> of Revenue for an order in his favour and after having failed in such proceedings had come up to this court challenging the <ORG>'s jurisdiction to entertain his application, then the matter would have been different."

The learned Judges further held that <NAME>'s appointment was justified in the circumstances of that case. They observed:

"When the appellant <NAME> was appointed to the office by the Sub Collector, respondent 3 <NAME> was under a bar, having been removed from the office for misconduct. This bar continued so long as his removal was in force. But when the Board modified the punishment of removal into one of suspension upto 31-10-1951, <NAME> must be deemed to have been restored to the office from 1-11-1951 onwards, Therefore <NAME>'s appointment can ensure only so long as the disqualification of <NAME> continued. It cannot be disputed that <NAME>'s appointment was subject to defeasance as a result of a second appeal by <NAME> and such being the case <NAME> cannot be said to have been removed and <NAME> appointed in a vacancy."

Neither of these findings really affected the consideration of the other question which the learned Judges posed, viz., had the <ORG> jurisdiction to entertain revision petitions from the orders passed by the authorities, immediately subordinate to it, which question the learned Judges answered, "In our opinion there can be no doubt that the <ORG> possessed such a power." With all deference to the learned Judges, we regret our inability to accept that as correct statement of law.

20. The learned Judges referred to Section 5 of Madras Regulation 1 of 1803 and also to Section 5 of Madras Regulation 2 of 1803, and observed:

"Therefore, it is open to <ORG> to provide the rules and act in the nature of a supervisory authority over subordinate revenue collectors,"

We respectfully agree with that observation. The provision for appeals in para. 4 of B. S. O. 156 was thus well within the powers of superintendence of the <ORG> conferred on them by these regulations. Paragraph 4 of B. S. O. 156 runs:

"Appeals against punitive orders: No appeal will be allowed against an order imposing a petty fine on the holder of a non-hereditary village office. An appeal will be allowed against an order imposing any other punishment on such officer. An appeal will be allowed to <ORG> against an order passed by the Collector on appeal by a holder of non-hereditary village office of karnam or headman enhancing the punishment imposed by the original order to removal or dismissal and a second appeal against an order passed by the Collector on appeal confirming the punishment of removal or dismissal imposed by the original order."

21. The learned Judges rightly pointed out that the rules did not specifically provide for the exercise of any revisional jurisdiction by the <ORG>. They observed:

"All that paras. 3 and 4 of the Standing Order 156 lay down is that in particular cases an aggrieved party will have a right of appeal and second appeal. But the specific grant of a right of appeal would not take away from the <ORG> the statutory right which it has of superintendence under Section 5 of Regulation 1 of 1803 and the reciprocal subservience of the Collector under Section 5 of Regulation 2 of 1803." The learned Judges further observed: "...... .if the <ORG> today makes a specific pro vision for revision on the same lines as paras. 3 and 4 of Standing Order No. 156, then nothing can be said against the interference". What, however, we have to say is that the power to frame a rule or to amend it should not cloud the real issue. Was not the jurisdiction of the <ORG> of Revenue limited in <NAME>'s case to decide the questions before it in accordance with the rules as they stood then? 22. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided <NAME>'s case, we have to observe that they appear to have been under a misapprehension as regards the true scope and legal effect of the standing orders of the <ORG>. They stated: "After all, the standing orders of the <ORG> of Revenue are merely collections of resolutions made by the <ORG> for its own conduct of business as well as for regulating the procedure in the matter of collection of revenue by subordinate revenue tribunals and executive functionaries," They observed further: "As we have already remarked, standing orders of the <ORG> are merely executive instructions by the <ORG> to its subordinate officers whereby they lay down the procedure to be adopted in certain cases."

Actually, however, that is not so. The Standing Orders of <ORG> consist of at least three categories of rules: (1) Rules framed either by the <ORG> or by the <ORG> itself in pursuance of a statutory power. Thus, for instance, Section 20 of Madras Act, 8 of 1895 confers on the <ORG> power to make rules on various matters with the approval of the <ORG> after previous publication. Such rules are incorporated in the <ORG> Standing Orders, We have mentioned Madras Act, 3 of 1895 only by way of illustration. There are several other statutory provisions incorporated in the <ORG>'s Standing Orders. (2} The <ORG>'s Standing Orders next consist of a large number of orders issued by the <ORG>, (3). The third category consists "of orders issued by the <ORG> itself with the approval and very often with the previous sanction of the <ORG>. All these have been arranged in the <ORG> Standing Orders in a manner that should make reference to them easy. It is not therefore entirely correct to say that the orders of the <ORG> are all merely executory instructions devoid of statutory force.

23. In the course of their judgment, the learned Judges observed:

"The fact that there is no executive order enabling a party to come by way of revision would not take away from the <ORG> the statutory right conferred upon it under Section 5 of Madras Regulation, 1 of 1803. The mere fact that the <ORG> has thought fit under its superintending powers to interfere is itself an instance of the issue of an executive instruction."

We do not suppose that in making these observations the learned Judges intended to refer to matters for which statutory provisions exist; for example, Madras Act, 3 of 1895 and the rules framed thereunder. As we have already pointed out, the case which the learned Judges had to decide was not governed by any statute. But even with reference to matters not governed by statutory provisions or rules but governed only by the Standing Orders of the <ORG> of Revenue, the passage we have extracted above is liable to be misunderstood. We are unable to subscribe to the view that where a rule already exists and provides for any specific matter, still when an individual case comes up before the <ORG>, it is open to the <ORG>, notwithstanding the existence of that rule, to decide that case in any manner it thinks fit, even in contravention of the existing rule. In other words, the <ORG> cannot ignore the existing rule by treating the order made in that particular case, as an amendment of the rule. That the <ORG> or the <ORG> has- the power to amend the rule should make no difference; both are bound to dispose of the matters that come up before them in accordance with the rules at the time in force on the subject.

We doubt whether the learned Judges anticipated that such a construction would be placed on their observations. We only want to make it clear that such a construction would not be right. The <ORG> possesses both the powers to frame rules and the power to pass orders in individual cases. But when a case comes up, for which provision already exists under the rules in force, that case must be disposed of in accordance with the rules. No doubt, it is open to the <ORG> to revise or amend the rules it has framed. But till the rules are revised or amended, the existing rules must be honoured and given effect to. We wish to emphasise the position, that the decision in any given case must be in accordance with the rules in force on the date of the decision. Otherwise the difference between what may be by way of analogy be called legislative (rule-making functions of the <ORG>) and its judicial and quasijudicial functions would be blurred and the door thrown open to charges of arbitrariness. What we have said about the <ORG> also applies to the Government.

24. Thus, "while the <ORG> has undoubted power to superintend and a power to frame rules and amend them from time to time in exercise of that power of superintendence, the <ORG> is bound by those very rules when it acts as quasi-judicial tribunal and adjudicates on rights of parties founded on those rules. The rights of the parties before the <ORG> & the corresponding liability of the <ORG> to decide questions before it in accordance with the rules, no doubt issued by the <ORG> itself, should not be confused with the right of the <ORG> to frame or to amend rules. The distinction is real and that, if we may say so with respect, appears to have been lost sight of by the learned Judges who decided '<NAME>'s case (B).

25. Before parting with this rule, we might refer to the judgments in W. P. No. 696 of 1953 (Mad) (J) and 473 of 1954 (Mad) (K), rendered by one of us on 21-9-1954, which appear to sustain the powers of the <ORG> to interfere with appointments to a non-hereditary office of village munsif. We understand that a Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against one of these judgments, which is pending. While not desiring to say anything which might embarrass the learned Judges who might dispose of the appeal, we deem fit and proper to state that the attention of the <ORG> was not then drawn either to the terms of B. S. O. No. 156, nor to the decision in L. P. A. No. 225 of 1952 (Mad) (B), in which the relevant Standing Order and its legal effects were dealt with.

26. In this connection we can usefully refer to --'Blackpool <ORG> v. <NAME>', 1948-1 KB 349 (L). Under certain wartime Regulations and enactments, the Minister of Health in Great Britain 'enacted' a considerable measure of delegated legislation under which power was given to local authorities to requisition premises. <ORG> requisitioned a house in contravention of the rules. The action of the <ORG> was challenged. But it was contended for the local authority that subsequent to the original attempt at requisition of the house, the Minister had either himself requisitioned the house or ratified the act of the local authority. The Minister was stated to have done so in the exercise of his original statutory authority. The <ORG> held that in fact the Minister did not requisition or purport to requisition the house. What is germane to the case before us is the observation made by <NAME> and <NAME>.

"The Minister only retained those powers which in his 'sub-delegated legislation' he had expressly or impliedly reserved for himself and since he had not in his sub-delegated legislation reserved to himself the power of requisition, he could not himself then requisition the house."

The point of the case is this: that the possession of what may be called legislative authority does not necessarily carry with it the power to interfere in particular cases, if the rules on that topic issued in the exercise of legislative authority do not provide for such interference.

27. That the rule-making power cannot be invoked to give a particular decision in a particular case will be apparent from one example. Section 5(vi) , General Sales-tax Act empowers the <ORG> to fix a single point for the levy of tax on hides and skins. After having issued a rule on the point fixing the liability on, let us say, the last purchaser the <ORG> cannot, -- assuming for our purpose that the <ORG> have been given the power by the Act to frame rules,--give final decisions in individual cases of assessment that the liability shall not be on the last purchaser but on his vendor.

28. The principles laid down by <NAME> and <NAME>. should, in our opinion, govern also the rules framed by <ORG> with reference to non-hereditary officers, though appointments and punishments of those officers are not governed by any statute. The powers of superintendence of the <ORG> are statutory and are traceable to Section 5 of Regulation 1 of 1803.

29. In support of his contention that the <ORG> had the power to interfere in the manner that it did, the learned Advocate-General referred to the case in -- 'Secy. of <ORG> v. <NAME>', AIR 1931 Mad 607 (M). The facts there were as follows: The Sub-Collector of Ongole dismissed the village munsif of Chimakurti village in the Guntur district whose office was governed by Act 3 of 1895, Acting under Section 10(4) of the Act, he appointed one <NAME> to the office. This was in December 1922. On 30-3-1923, the Collector of Guntur removed <NAME> from the post to which he had been appointed by the Sub-Collector. <NAME> exhausted his remedies by way. of petitions to the <ORG> authorities and finally brought a suit for a declaration that his removal was illegal. The District Munsif dismissed the suit. In appeal the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. The matter was brought in appeal to this court. <NAME> in allowing the appeal observed:

''The person put in to do the duties of the dismissed officer is not appointed to an office governed by the Act. He is put in to do the duties of the office which is a different thing. The Act does not provide for a subsidiary class of hereditary officers other than those for whom the Act is intended, consisting of their substitutes and their heirs......... A person appointed under Section 10(4) is a person appointed only to do the duties of the office and when the section says that the Collector may direct that until the death or return to duty of such last holder, the duties of the holder shall be performed by some person, it only prescribes the period of time during which that provision has to be made but does not mean that the person who is appointed is to hold for that period . . . ."

And finally:

"The act does not govern the case and the respondent has no grievance."

We consider that the view taken by the learned Judge about the position of an appointee under Section 10(4) namely, that he is a person to whom the Act does not apply is not correct.

30. Of the various other arguments urged by the learned Advocate-General only this one need be noticed. He said: Act 3 of 1895 confers a right to certain offices on certain individuals who stand in a particular relationship to the last office holder; the order of appointment made by the Revenue Divisional Officer in respect of these persons amounted only to a formal recognition of this right which is really antecedent to the order o appointment; a person appointed under Section 10(5) has no such antecedent right; he derives his right to the office only from and by virtue of the order of appointment made by the Revenue Divisional Officer. In relation to persons possessing or claiming to possess antecedent rights, the power exercised by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the authorities superior to the Revenue Divisional Officer would be in the nature of a judicial or quasijudicial process, and it would be right to say that so far as such persons are concerned, the requirements of the statute must be complied with; but persons who have no such antecedent rights would be amenable to the general superintending power possessed by Collectors and the <ORG> and the <ORG>; therefore, and by virtue of this power, the <ORG> and the <ORG> can interfere. He went on: All the administrative and executive acts of any authority under the <ORG> are subject to the overall control of the <ORG>; the power of the <ORG> to interfere and revise the orders of these subordinate authorities is derived from the power of the <ORG> to govern. Where the power exercised by the authorities subordinate to the <ORG> may be described as judicial or quasi-judicial process, <ORG> may not have power to intervene. But where it is not of such a nature but is purely administrative in character, the <ORG> have power to interfere.

31. We are unable to accept this distinction. That in the past an argument of this kind does not appear to have been put forward, -- at least the cases cited before us do not show that it was done -- is, of course, not a reason for declining to entertain the argument of the learned Advocate General. There is no interdict on fresh or new ideas. But for drawing a distinction between persons with antecedent rights and those without antecedent rights, when provision as regards both these categories of persons are made in the statute, there is no warrant whatsoever. The contention is opposed to what seems to us to be a sound rule, that where the statute has made provision in respect of particular matters, it is -to the statute that we must look for the determination of the rights of individuals and not to the vague and indefinite background of the overall powers of the <ORG>. Whatever validity the argument may have had at a time when the <ORG> constituted both the executive and the legislative authority of the <ORG>, it can have none at a time when the <ORG> is really only the executive organ of the <ORG>.

32. The conclusion we have reached is that neither the <ORG> nor the <ORG> have power to interfere with the order made by the District Collector. A writ will, therefore, issue quashing the order of the <ORG>. The petitioner will have her costs from respondent 1. Advocate's fee Rs. 150.