JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. This is an application filed by nine petitioners, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. These petitioners were members of the first party in a proceeding Under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was pending before a Magistrate, 1st Class, at Jahanabad, in case No. 175 M/81 of 1958. About 40 bighss of land of village Kalu within the jurisdiction of Arwal police-station was in dispute between the petitioners and the members of the opposite party. The learned Magistrate by an order dated the 9th of February, 1959, attached the disputed lands Under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the parties to appear before <ORG> at Jahanabad on the 24th of February, 1959, for the decision of the question as to which of the parties was in possession over the disputed land. The matter thereafter went before the Munsif of Jahanabad in Miscellaneous Case No. 32 of 1959.

The proceeding before the learned <NAME> of Jahanabad was covered by Sub-sections (1A) and 1(B) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, by a judgment and order dated the 18th of September, 1959,' the learned <NAME> held that the. members of <ORG> were in possession of the disputed property from the year 1953 and that the members of the first party were not in possession. The record of the case was returned to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, for passing necessary orders under Sub-section (IB) of Section 146 of the Code. The present petitioners have come up to this <ORG> complaining of the order passed by. the learned <NAME> on the 18th of September, 1959. It may be stated here that further proceedings in the <ORG> below have been stayed by this <ORG> by an order dated the 28th of September, 1959, while admitting this application.

2. learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted, mainly, that the order of the learned <NAME> dated the 18th of September, 1959, is not in accordance with law,' inasmuch as the learned <NAME> has not complied with the specific requirements of Sub-section (1A) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal, Procedure. This argument of the learned Counsel is based on the fact that the petitioners; who were the first party in the proceeding Under Section 145 of the Code, had filed -affidavits of 29 persons two were before the learned Magistrate when he had passed the order on the 9th of February, 1959, and which affidavits were on the record before the learned <NAME> when he was dealing with the case. It has been mentioned in paragraph 5 of the petition filed in this Court, that the petitioners had filed affidavits of 29 persons which had been sent to the learned <NAME> with the record of the case.

It appears from paragraph 6, that the petitioners had filed various other documents also before the learned Magistrate but that they had withdrawn those other documents, for the purpose of filing them before <ORG>. It is, therefore, urged that the order of the learned <NAME>, dated the 18th of September, is vitiated on the ground that the learned <NAME> has not considered the several affidavits that had been filed by the first party and which were on the record of the case. It is argued that the learned <NAME> has specifically mentioned that he found no documents filed on behalf of the first party and that this conclusion of the learned <NAME>, so far as this case is concerned, is wrong, inasmuch as the affidavits which were already on record, should have been perused and considered as part of the evidence in the case. Substantially, upon these arguments it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the order of the learned <NAME> should be quashed.

3. The history of this unnecessarily protracted litigation appears to be as follows. At the time when the proceeding Under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was pending before the learned Magistrate, the parties had filed a large number of documents including a large number of affidavits of many persons. Under the amended Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,' the learned Magistrate had to peruse the statements of the parties, the documents and affidavits filed by them, hear the parties and conclude the enquiry by deciding the question as to which of the parties was in possession. The order of the learned Magistrate in this case, dated the Seth of February, 1959, hardly indicates that the learned Magistrate took the trouble of coming to his decision, upon considering the materials before him. The learned Magistrate has stated thus;

Both the parties are armed with volumes of documents which are contradictory and highly confusing and do not lead to definite finding on fact of possession. Both the parties have also filed affidavits of many persons which appear to be oaths against oaths and does not help in determining the fact of possession. So I am unable to decide as to which of the parties is in possession over the disputed lands and so I consider It necessary to refer the matter to <ORG> Under Section 146 CrIPC to give a finding on the fact of possession.

It is apparent to me that the learned Magistrate made no serious effort to consider the affidavits mentioned by him in his order. Disposal of cases Under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal ProceduTe, where affidavits have been filed by both the parties, stating that these affidavits appear to be oaths against oaths, has not been approved by this Court in a large number of decisions. Reference may be made to a decision of this Court, in the case of <CITATION> . It was stated in this case that the Magistrate should consider the affidavit of each deponent and should give his reasons for accepting or not accepting it. The order in this case was set aside on the ground that the Judgment of the learned Magistrate was vitiated for the consideration of a the affidavits fifed on behalf of the parties. Again, in the case of <NAME> v. <NAME> , the judgment the learned Magistrate was set aside on the ground that he had not considered the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties at all. It was mentioned in this decision that the affidavits cannot be brushed aside by saying that they are oath against oath. It was held that the Magistrate should consider the affidavits in the same manner in which oak evidence is considered.

In another decision of this Court, in the case of <CITATION> , it was again held that the Magistrate had to consider the affidavits and give reasons for accepting the affidavits of one or the other of the parties. Our attention has also been drawn to a recent decision of <ORG> of this Court in the case of <NAME>, Criminal Revn. No. 625 of 1958 D/-17-10-1960 (Pat), in which it was stated thus:

Sub-section (1) of Section 146 lays down that a Magistrate can make a reference to <ORG>, (1) if he is of opinion that none of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the proceeding, or (2) if he is unable to decide as to which of then was then in such possession. As I have already said,1 the Magistrate did not, in this case, make any attempt whatever to consider or discuss the evidence in order to find whether one or the other party was in possession or none of the parties was in possession. A Magistrate cannot take recourse to Section 146 (1) merely for the purpose of shifting his own responsibility. It is only when either of the two contingencies mentioned in the sub-section arises that he can refer the case to <ORG>.

From the exposition of law made by this <ORG>, subsequent to the orders passed in the instant case, it is clear that the order of reference made by the learned Magistrate on the 9th of February, 1959, was not a proper order "at all.

4. Coming to the decision of the learned <NAME>, after reference to him Under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it appears that the learned <NAME> did make an effort to come to a conclusion on the materials that were placed before him. But, unfortunately, his attention was not drawn to Sub-section (1-A) of Section I4fr of the Code, under which it was his duty, also, to peruse the evidence that had already come on the record on be half of the first party. What-happened in the Court of the learned <NAME> was this. On the 12th of September, 1959, a petition for time was filed by the first party/This petition was rejected by the learned <NAME> on the ground that the case was an old one. The parties were ordered to be ready with the case at once. When the case was teen up, it appears that the first party did not co-operate and the learned <NAME> proceeded to hear the case ex. parte. The last two witnesses of the second party were examined and' argument on behalf of the second, party was made and 18th of September was fixed for delivering judgment in the case. The first two .witnesses had already been examined on the 5th of June, 1959. On the 14tn of September, however, the first party filed another petition praying that a date may be fixed for argument it behalf of the first party. This petition was rejected by the learned <NAME> and, in due course, on the 18th of September Judgment was delivered: m his judgment and order, the learned <NAME> has mentioned the case of the first party: He has also mentioned the case of the second party and. thereafter the learned <NAME> has considered in detail the oral and documentary evidence, adduced on behalf of the second party. He has mentioned that there-was no oral evidence on behalf of the first party and he-found' no documentary evidence of the first party as well-On a consideration of the materials that were placed before him, the learned <NAME> held that the second party were in possession of the disputed property from the year 1953.

5. It is contended by the learned Counsel for ' the petitioners that having stated the ease of the first party and the second party, in his order, the learned <ORG> was bound to consider the affidavits which were already on the record. Reliance is placed on Section 146 (1A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where it is mentioned that on receipt of any reference, <ORG> shall peruse the evidence on record and take such further evidence as may be produced by the parties respectively, consider .the effect of all such evidence, and after hearing the parties,' decide the question so referred to it. It is urged that under the provision of law, even if no further evidence was adduced by the first party before the learned <NAME>, and even if no arguments were advanced before him, the learned <NAME> had to peruse the several affidavits which had already been filed before the learned Magistrate and which, on reference, formed part of the record before the learned <NAME>.

Our attention is drawn to the case of <CITATION> , wherein it has been held that, after a reference is made to <ORG>, when the Magistrate finds it difficult to decide the question of possession on the materials as required by Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is always some, evidence of possession on the facts and circumstances of this case, the learned <NAME> was bound to consider the affidavits filed by the first party, before holding that the members of the second party were in possession since 1953 and that the members of the first party were not in possession. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners based on Sub-section (1A) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be accepted, in my opinion, the decision in <NAME> case, so far as it has held that in a reference to <ORG> Under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, trireme is always same evidence on record for consideration by <ORG>; is correct.

As a matter of fact, in this case, the order of the learned Magistrate itself makes it clear that there were evidence on record. I have already mentioned that of the voluminous documents mentioned by the learned Magistrate, at least, the affidavits of 29 persons which had been filed by the members of the first party were still on the record when the case had reached the Court of the learned <NAME>. It is clear, therefore, that the learned <NAME> had to consider these affidavits on record, before coming to an adverse conclusion against the members of the first party. It is rather unfortunate that the course adopted by the: learned <NAME>, although inadvertently, has resulted in protracting this litigation, after the learned <NAME> had rejected the first party's petition for time with a view to an expeditious disposal of the case. But the amendment of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has put upon <ORG> a statutory duty, in the discharge of which the learned <NAME> failed altogether. There is no other alternative but to quash the order of the learned <NAME>, for tote reasons given above.

6. The order of the learned <NAME> of Jahanabad, dated the J8tti of September, 1959, passed in Miscellaneous Case Ho. 32 of 1959, is, therefore, quashed. The case is remanded to <ORG> for reconsideration.' .In this connection, learned Counsel for the opposite party has submitted that a direction should be given that <ORG> will now proceed to decide the case only on the materials that are already on the record. In my opinion, however, this Court ought not to make such an order, thereby restricting the discretion of <ORG> in disposing of the reference in accordance with law. I, therefore, remand the case with a direction that the case should now be disposed of in accordance with law and as quickly as possible.

<NAME>, J.

7. I agree.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, <NAME>

1. This case has been placed before us pursuant to my order of reference dated 14-11-1967 which may be read as a part of the present order. The only question requiring authoritative determination is whether the amendment made in Rule 1 of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure by <ORG> is still operative in the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of 1st Class in the Union Territory of Delhi The submission eloquently pressed by <NAME> on behalf of the defendant-petitioner is that under section 7 of <ORG> Act No. 26 of 1966, <ORG> alone has the power to make rules and orders with respect to practice and procedure and all rules made by <ORG> with respect to such practice and procedure in relation to the subordinate Courts at Delhi must cease to have effect as soon as <ORG> ceased to have jurisdiction over such subordinate Courts.

2. In support of his submission. Shri <NAME> has cited a Single Bench decision of <ORG> by <NAME> J, in <CITATION> , . The question arising for decision in the reported case was whether the rules made by <ORG> at Nagpur in exercise of the powers conferred under section 122 , Civil P, C., and which were in force in the former State of Madhya Pradesh as it existed before the Reorganisation of States on 1-11-1956, were enforceable in that territory of the new Madhya Pradesh which up to 21-10-1950 was called the Part B State of Madhya Bharat. Section 54 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 falling in Part V of that Act was held nto to apply to the Rules made under section 122 , Civil P. C, because that section referred to only those laws, rules and orders which dealt with the practice and procedure "in <ORG>" and nto those which deal with practice and procedure "in all Courts". A rule made by <ORG> under section 122 , Civil P. C., was, according to the reported decision, a piece of delegated or subordinate legislation and was governed by section 119 and nto by section 54 of the States Reorganisation Act. It is obvious that the reported case does nto support Shri <NAME>'s submission. I may here reproduce the following observations from the reported judgment: "It is obvious enough that any of the rules in the first schedule of the Code could be annulled, altered or added to by such rules as <ORG> made under that power. Rules made in exercise of that power became a part and parcel of the First Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code so far as that State was concerned. In that view of the matter, the rules made by <ORG> of the 'corresponding State' of Madhya Pradesh (that is, the former M. P. which existed prior to November 1, 1956) continued to be operative in those territories of the new Madhya Pradesh State even after November 1, 1956. But since they have nto yet been adapted under section 120 of the States Reorganisation Act for the other territories of the 'corresponding new State' (that is, the present State of Madhya Pradesh) they are nto operative and cannto regulate the procedure of <ORG> there. The territories of the former State of Madhya Bharat are, therefore, outside the operation of those rules."

The observations just reproduced, if I may say so, run counter to the counsel's submission. The learned counsel then attempted to seek some assistance by way of analogy from the High Courts (Punjab) Order, 1947 made by the Governor-General at the time of the unfortunate partition of the Punjab in 1947 when India became independent, but that analogy, in our view, is of little guidance because the two situations are far from parallel.

2. Rule 1 of Order 37, Civil P. C. was originally amended by <ORG> in 1923 and 1932. According to the amendment, as it stood at the time of the partition of the country, Order 37 was applicable to the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of the First Class of Delhi Province and the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of First Class in the civil Districts of Lahore and Amritsar in the Province of Punjab. On the partition of the country in 1947, Lahore was included in Pakistan and Delhi and Amritsar in India. These two latter towns fell within the jurisdiction of <ORG> created by the High Courts (Punjab) Order, 1947. Later, <ORG> took action under section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure and amended, among other rules contained in the First Schedule of the Code, Rule 1 of Order 37. The amended rule so far as relevant for our purpose, reads as under:

"Order 37, Rule 1. Summary Procedure on Negotiable Instruments-- This order shall apply only to - (a)* * * * * (b)* * * * * (c)* * * * *

(d) the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of the First Class of the Union Territory of Delhi and the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of the First Class in the civil district of Amritsar in the State of the Punjab."

(See pp. 39 & 40 of Chapter 21 of Vol. I of the Rules & Orders of <ORG>). This statutory amendment of Order 37, Rule 1, was lawfully effected by <ORG> by virtue of the power delegated to it under section 122 of the Code. Indeed, the validity of the amendment has nto been challenged on the ground of want of power in <ORG> or on any other ground. In the referring order dated 14-11-1967, reference has been made to a Bench decision of <ORG> in <NAME> case, 2nd 8 Lah 156 = (AIR 1927 Lah 174) upholding the validity of the rule made by <ORG>. The ratio of that decision fully applies to the rule in question as altered by <ORG> after partition.

3. Turning now to the scheme of Part X of the Code dealing with the Rules, section 121 lays down that the rules in the First Schedule shall have effect as if enacted in the body of the Code of Civil Procedure until annulled or altered in accordance with the provisions of that Part. Section 127 lays down that the rules made and approved as provided in sections 122 to 126 , shall be published in <ORG> and, from the date of publication or from such other date as may be specified, have the same force and effect within the local limits of the jurisdiction of <ORG> which made them as if they had been contained in the First Schedule.

In <NAME> v. <NAME>, Air 1942 Lah 201, a Division Bench of <ORG> (<NAME> and <NAME>.), while upholding the validity of Rule 23-A of Order 41, Civil P. C., as amended by <ORG>, relied on the observations of Lord <NAME> in <CITATION> , 2nd 4 Cal 172 (PC) that when power is given to a subordinate authority to "legislate conditionally" and "the conditions have been fulfillled, the legislation becomes absolute." The ratio of the decision in Dr. <NAME>'s case, Air 1942 Lah 201 fully applies to the case in hand and the validity of Rule 1 of Order 37, as amended by <ORG>, has rightly been nto assailed.

4. It is undoubtedly true that S. 127 of the Code lays down that the rules made, approved and published have the same force and effect within the local limits of the jurisdiction of <ORG> which made them. Section 122 also empowers <ORG>s mentioned therein to make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of the civil <ORG> subject to their superintendence. But even without this clause, the rules made by <ORG>s could nto possibly operate beyond their territorial jurisdiction.

The question requiring determination in the present case is that when Rule 1 of Order 37 has been validly amended by <ORG> so as to apply the summary procedure on negotiable instruments to the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of the First Class of the Union Territory of Delhi, can this amendment be held automatically nullified merely because a separate <ORG> has been set up for such Union Territory? In other words, do sections 122 and 127 of the Code have this effect? Nothing has been said at the bar in support of this proposition. All that has been argued is that these rules relate to practice and procedure in Courts subordinate to the <ORG> and, therefore, section 7 of the Delhi <ORG> Act does nto continue them. This section, according to the argument saves from discontinuance only the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure of the <ORG> of Punjab and nto the law so in force with respect to practice and procedure in Courts subordinate to the <ORG>. This argument, though prima facie attractive, seems to me to be difficult to sustain.

Section 7 appears to have been intended to apply, the 'law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in <ORG> with necessary modifications, to <ORG>, to which obviously such rules were not, and could nto be, applicable before the. appointed day, for the simple reason that <ORG> did nto exist before the appointed day. This section, on its plain reading, does nto seem to contemplate the negative by ex-eluding the applicability of the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the Courts of the District Judges and Subordinate Judges of the First Class in the Union Territory of Delhi. The <ORG>, in my view, did nto intend by enacting section 7 that Rule 1 of Order 37, as indisputably applicable in express terms to the subordinate Courts in the Union territory of Delhi, would cease to apply to them with effect from the appointed day. The Courts of the District Judges and of Subordinate Judges of the First Class in the Union territory of Delhi having been expressly included in the amendment made by <ORG> in Rule 1 of 6. 37, nothing contained in sections 121 and 127 , in my view, would automatically repeal this part of Rule 1 or render this part of the amendment ineffectual or inoperative with effect from the appointed day.

Section 127 , prescribing publication of the rules, emphasises the initial enforcement of the rules within the local limits of the jurisdiction of <ORG> making them. I am nto inclined to construe this section to lay down that as soon as <ORG> making the rule is replaced by <ORG>, the rule validly made and applied to the proceedings in certain specified <ORG> in a given locality, would lose its vitality in regard to them. In the absence of clear indication, I find it difficult to impute such intendment to the <ORG>. No principle has been brought to our notice and no precedent has been cited in support of the submission pressed by <NAME>. <ORG> having validly exercised its legislative power as a delegate in suitably adding to Rule 1 of Order 37 so as to make it applicable to certain specified <ORG> in the Union territory of Delhi, in my view, this rule as amended continues to apply to the relevant legal proceedings in those <ORG> in just the same way as the main body of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to them, the creation of <ORG> notwithstanding. Of course it is open to <ORG> at any time to again annul, alter or add to the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 37, but so long as this <ORG> does nto choose to take action under section 122 of the Code, the existing Rule 1 must continue to appl to the <ORG> specified therein.

5. As a result of the foregoing discussion, I am inclined, as at present advised, to hold that Rule 1 of Order 37, as amended by <ORG>, would continue to apply to the Courts of the District Judges and of Subordinate Judges of the First Class in the <ORG> territory of Delhi. The case will now go back to <ORG> for final disposal of the revision.

<NAME>, J.

6. I agree.

7. Reference answered.


PETITIONER: <ORG> & <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1989 BENCH: <NAME>, K.N. (J) BENCH: <NAME>, K.N. (J) KANIA, M.H. SHARMA, L.M. (J) CITATION: 1989 SCR (2)1005 1989 SCC (3) 151 JT 1989 Supl. 203 1989 SCALE (1)1421 ACT: Constitution of India, 1950: Article 141-- <ORG>'s deci- sion-Binding effect of--Does not depend on whether a partic- ular argument was considered or not. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Sections 3, 13 and Notification dated September 24, 1974 Constitu- tional validity of-Exemption granted to new buildings in urban area of Chandigarh for five years--Jurisdiction of <ORG> to pass eviction decree. HEADNOTE: The appellants/petitioners are tenants of buildings situate within the Urban Territory of Chandigarh. The build- ings occupied by them as tenants were exempted from the operation of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Re- striction Act 1949 for a period of five years under the notification dated September 24, 1974 issued under Section 3 of the Act. The landlords of these buildings had filed in the <ORG> suits for eviction against the tenants. During the pendency of those suits, the five years period expired. Thereupon the tenants raised objections on the ground that (a) the suits could not be decreed in view of the provisions of section 13 of the Act, which had placed an embargo on the landlord's right to get his tenant evicted or to obtain possession of the building except in accordance with the provisions of section 13, and (b) the civil court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction or to execute the same against a tenant. The validity of section 3 of the Act as well as the validity of the notification dated 24th September, 1974 were assailed before this <ORG> earlier on two occasions. <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 922 this <ORG> had upheld the notification granting exemption and had further held that if the suit was instituted within the period of exemption, decree could be passed even after the expiry of the period of five years, and the same could be executed. <CITATION> .,  1 SCR 428 this <ORG> had held that the notification granting exemption advanced the scheme, object and purposes of the Act, and It did 'not violate any of the provisions of the Act and was not discriminatory, 1006 arbitrary or unreasonable. In the instant cases, another attempt has been made to challenge the validity of section 3 and the notification on some additional grounds. The submissions made by the counsel are: (i) Section 3 is unconstitutional as it delegates essential legislative function to <ORG> without laying down any guidelines for exercise of the power of exemption; (ii) the notification enlarges the period of exemption for an indefinite period, tends to amend section 13 of the Act, and is contrary to the object and purpose of the Act; rather it defeats the protection granted to a tenant by the Act; (iii) the notification is discriminatory as it creates two class of tenants; tenants of old buildings which never enjoyed the exemption from the provisions of the Act, and the tenants of the newly constructed buildings which are denied the protection of the Act. Dismissing the appeals and the writ petitions, this <ORG>, HELD: (1) Some of the tenants in the instant cases were parties before this <ORG> in <ORG>, case. The petitions by such tenants are not maintainable as the same are barred by principles of res-judicata. Finality in litigation and public policy both require that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge the validity of the provisions of the Act or Notification at different times on different grounds. Once petitioners' challenge to section 3 and the notification had been considered by the <ORG> and the validity of the same upheld, it must be presumed that all grounds which could validly have been raised were raised and considered by the <ORG>. [1015G-H; 1016A] (2) The binding effect of a decision of this <ORG> does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the argument is advanced subsequently was actually decided in the earlier decision. [1016C] <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 774; <CITATION> ,  1 SCC 336 and <CITATION> ,  2 SCC 587, referred to. (3) On the principles of res-judicata, and also in view of Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by this <ORG> in <ORG> case is binding on the petitioners. [1016E] (4) Section 3 of the Act does not suffer from any vice Of constitu- 1007 tional infirmity and it is a valid provision. [1017B] <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 169; <CITATION> . 2594/66 decided on 29.10.1968 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kan- haiyalal,  15 MPLJ 973, referred to. (5) The notification does not enlarge the period of exemption nor it destroys the protection granted to tenants under the Act. Instead, it safeguards the rights of the parties which crystallise on the date of institution of the suit. [1019B] (6) Once the landlord institutes a suit before the expiry of the period of exemption, the decree even if passed after the period of five years will not be subject to the provisions of section 13 of the Act, and the civil court will have jurisdiction to pass decree even after the expiry of the period of exemption and to execute the same notwith- standing the provisions of section 13 of the Act in view of the Notification dated September 24, 1974. [1018H; 1019A; 1022F] <CITATION> ,  3 SCC 352; <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 763; <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 491; <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 382 and <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 284, referred to. (7) While considering the interpretation and validity of the provisions granting exemption, either by statutory provision made in the Act or by notification issued under the Act, it is necessary to bear in mind the object and purpose of exemption. The paramount object and purpose of exemption is to provide incentive for construction of new buildings, to meet the shortage of accommodation which would ultimately result in benefitting the tenants. The notifica- tion granting exemption is, therefore, not contrary to the object and purpose of the Act. ]1018A-B] (8) The shackles of the rent control legislation had chilling effect on the landlords and they were reluctant to invest their capital in making new constructions. By grant- ing holiday from the restrictions of regulations of rent control laws, impetus was given to the landlords to con- struct new buildings so that after the expiry of period of exemption the building so constructed are available for needy tenants controlled by the Act. [1019E-F] 1008 (9) Section 3 which provides for granting exemption from the provisions of the Act is by way of an exception to section 13 and therefore the two provisions need not be consistent in their effect. The object of having a proviso or exemption is to neutralise the effect of the main provi- sion. If that is not so, it would not be necessary to have an exemption. Public purpose as well as larger interest of tenants require availability of more and more accommodation in the shape of new buildings, and for that purpose exemp- tion is necessary to be provided. In ultimate analysis provisions of section 3 and 13 both seem to achieve the same result. [1019B-D] (10) It is a settled rule of harmonious construction of statutes that a construction which would advance the object and purpose of the legislation should be followed and a construction which would result in reducing a provision of the Act to a dead letter or to defeat the object' and pur- pose of the statute should be avoided without doing any violence to the language. [1020F-G] (11) Classification of buildings with reference to the date of completion for the purpose of regulating the rent and eviction of tenants from such buildings has a rational basis and has a clear nexus with the object to be achieved. Classification is rounded on intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object of the Act. [1022C] <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 221, followed. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONS: Civil Appeal Nos. 342 1,264-65, 4540 of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.8.84, 4.1.84 and 17.10.84 of the Punjab and. Haryana <ORG> in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 3672, 31 and 4723 of 1984 respectively.

WITH Writ Petition Nos. 5286/85, 13264-86/83, 1118-20/84, 12274, 14151-53, 13744, 16123, 17296, 16907-08, 17306, 113- 14, 2747, 1180304, 10229-35, 12905, 12837, 5328-29/85, 620, 482/86, 37-55/84, 261, 328, 181, 11972, 12574, 11200-05, 17534, 475-83, 11233-34, 11270-73/ 84, 9597/83, 5864/85, 107, 109-21/84, 2599-93, 3239-41/85 and C.M.P. Nos. 17551/87, W.P. Nos. 1276/87, 2584/85, 1490/86, SLP (C) Nos. 7794/83 and CMP No. 10886/88 in (W.P. No. 1490/86), W.P. No. 937/88, with W.P. No. 388 of 87, 1212/87 and 1487/87.) (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Ms. <NAME>, Ms. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME><NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the appearing parties. The Judgme<NAME> of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, <NAME> In this batch of Civil Appeals, Special Leave Petitions and Writ Petitions, under Article 32 of the Con- stitution, Validity of Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Re<NAME> Restriction Act 1949 and the Notification No. 3205- LD74/3614 dated September 24, 1974 issued thereunder by the Chief Commissioner, <ORG>, gra<NAME>ing exemption from Section 13 of the Act to buildings construct- ed in the urban area of Chandigarh for a period of five years have been challenged.

The appellants in the appeals as well as the petitioners in the Special Leave Petitions and Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, are tenants of buildings situate within the Urban Territory of Chandigarh. The buildings occupied by the appellants/petitioners as tenants were exempted from the operation of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for a period of five years under the impugned Notification dated 24.9.1974. The landlords of these buildings filed suits for eviction in <ORG>, against the tenants. During the pendency of suits five years period expired, thereupon, the tenants raised objection that the suits could not be decreed in view of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. Some of the tenants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Con-

stitution before <ORG> challenging the jurisdiction of the civil court to proceed with the suits or to pass decree of eviction against them on the ground that on expiry of five years period of exemption Section 13 of the Act became applicable and the civil court ceased to have juris- diction. <ORG> repelled the tenants' contentions and dismissed their petitions. The tenants filed Civil Appeals, Special Leave Petitions in this Court challenging the correctness of the order of <ORG>. Some of the tenants against whom suit is pending before the trial court approached this Court by means of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the proceed- ings taken by the landlords for their eviction. Since all these cases involve common questions the same are being disposed of by a common order.

The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 seeks to regulate and restrict the increase of rent of premises situate within the urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom. No landlord of a building situate in an urban area to which the provisions of the Act apply is free to charge rent from the tenants according to his sweet will, or to evict a tenant by filing suit by terminating tenancy, in view of the provisions of the Act placing restrictions on the landlord's rights. The provisions of the Act were ap- plied and extended to the urban area of the Union Territory of Chandigarh by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act 1974. On such extension all buildings situate in the urban area of Chandigarh, became subject to the provisions of the said Act, with the result landlords' right to charge rent or to evict tenants at their sweet will are curtailed and regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The object of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is to provide safeguards to tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation. The provisions of the Act provide for fixation of fair rent and prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants. Sections 4 to 9 provide for fixation of rent, its recovery, enhancement and other allied matters relating to rent. Section 10 en- joins the landlords not to interfere with the amenities enjoyed by the tenants. Section 11 prohibits conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building except with the written permission of the Controller appointed under the Act. Section 12 mandates a landlord to make neces- sary repairs in the building let out to a tenant, and on his failure, it is open to the tenant to carry out repairs with the permission of the Controller and the cost thereof may be deducted from the rent payable to the landlord. Section 13 places an embargo on the landlord's right to get his tenant evicted or to obtain possession of the building. No decree for eviction against a tenant can be executed except in accordance with the provisions of the Section. A landlord seeking to evict a tenant is required to apply to the Controller appointed under the Act, and if the Controller after giving opportuni- ty to the tenant is satisfied that the grounds set out in Section 13(2) and (3) are made out, he may make order di- recting the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The remaining provisions of the Act deal with appeals, revisions, and <ORG> powers to appoint <ORG> and other allied matters. Under the scheme of the Act a tenant of a building in urban area to which the Act applies, cannot be evicted from the rented building or land except in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and the civil court has no jurisdic- tion to pass a decree of eviction or to execute the same against a tenant.

Section 3 of the Act as amended by the Extension Act 1974 reads as under:

"3. <ORG> may direct that all or any of the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any particular building or rented land or any class of buildings or rented lands."

The Chief Commissioner of <ORG> exercising powers of <ORG> published a Notification dated January 31, 1973 exempting buildings referred to therein from the operation of the Act. It reads as under:

"No. 352-LD-73/602 dated January 31, 1973.--1n exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (Punjab Act No. III of 1949), as applica- ble to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, is pleased to direct that the provisions of the said Act shall not apply to buildings, constructed in the urban area of Chandigarh, for a period of five years with effect from the date of sewer- age connection is granted in respect of such buildings by the competent authority under rule 112 of the Punjab Capital (D evelopment and Regulation) Building Rules, 1952."

The aforesaid Notification was followed by another Notification dated September 24, 1973 issued by the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, setting out the manner and method for computing period of five years of exemption, granted to the buildings con- structed in the urban areas of Chandigarh. On September 24, 1974, the Chief Commissioner, issued another Notification, which reads as under:

"No. 3205-LD-74/3614.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the Chief Commissioner, Chandi- garh, is pleased to direct that the provisions of Section 13 of the said Act shall not apply to buildings, exempted from the provisions of the Act for a period of five years vide Chand- igarh Administration Notification No. 352-LD- 73/602 dated the 31st January, 1973 in respect of decrees passed by Civil Courts in suits for ejectment of tenants in possession of these buildings instituted by the landlords against such tenants during the period of exemption whether such decrees were or are passed during the period of exemption or at anytime thereaf- ter."

The effect of the Notification dated January 31, 1973 was that all newly constructed buildings in the urban area of Chandigarh were granted exemption from the provisions of the Act for a period of five years. The Notification also set out the method of computing the period of five years. But the Notification dated 24th September, 1974 directed that the provisions of Section 13 of the Act shall not apply to buildings situate in the urban area of Chandigarh for a period of five years, in respect of decrees passed by civil courts in suits for ejectment of tenants, instituted during the period of exemption notwithstanding the fact that such decrees are passed during the period of exemption or at any time thereafter. The effect of the Notification is that protection granted to tenants against eviction under Section 13 of the Act is not available to them for a period of five years and if the landlord institutes a suit for eviction against the tenant within the aforesaid period of five years, the restrictions contained in Section 13 of the Act shall not apply to such suits and the civil court has juris- diction to pass decree of eviction and to execute the same, even though five years period of exemption expired during the pendency of the suit. The tenants have assailed validity of Section 3 of the Act and the Notification dated 24.9.1974.

This is the third round of litigation initiated by tenants in challenging Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 and Notifications issued thereunder for the purpose of granting exemption to the newly constructed buildings in the urban areas for a period of five years from the operation of the provisions of the Act. <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 922 this Court considered the validity of Notification dated 30.7.1965 issued in exercise of the power conferred under Section 3 of the Act granting exemp- tion to buildings constructed during the years 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 from all the provisions of the Act for a period of five years, and the provisions of Section 13 of the Act were not to apply in respect of decrees for eject- ment of tenants in possession of buildings provided the suit was instituted in civil court by the landlord against the tenant during the period of exemption. This Court upheld the Notification granting exemption and it further held that if the suit was instituted within the period of exemption, decree could be passed even after the expiry of the period of five years, and the same could be executed. The second round of litigation came up to this Court in <ORG> Chandigarh etc. v. <ORG>.,  1 SCR 428 where the validity of Section 3 of the Act as well as the validity of the impugned Notification date 24th September 1974 were assailed on a number of grounds. On an elaborate discussion this Court upheld the validity of Section 3 of the Act and the impugned Notification. The Court held that the Notification granting exemption advanced the scheme, object and purposes of the Act and it did not violate any of the provisions of the Act and it was not discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable. In the instant cases, another attempt has been made to challenge the valid- ity of Section 3 and the Notification dated 24.9. 1974. Most of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appel- lants and petitioners are the same which have already been considered and rejected by this Court in the aforesaid cases but learned counsel made attempts to raise some additional submissions in assailing the validity of the Notification to which we shall refer at the appropriate stage. Sh. <NAME> and other counsel appearing for the tenants in the instant cases made several submissions in challenging the validity of Section 3 of the Act and Notification dated 24th September, 1974. When the earlier decision of this Court in <ORG>'s case (supra) was brought to their notice where the impugned Notification itself had been held valid, the learned counsel made an effort to challenge the validity of the Notification on additional grounds. These submissions are directed against the second part of the impugned Notification which states; whether such decrees were or are passed during the period of exemption or "at any time thereafter"

<NAME>

(emphasis supplied). They urged that the Notification grant- ed exemption to newly constructed buildings from the opera- tion of Section 13 of the Act for a period of five years but the second part of the Notification as extracted, and par- ticularly the expression "at any time thereafter" enlarged the exemption for an indefinite period and it tends to amend Section 13 of the Act not permissible under the law. The submissions made by the counsels are: (i) Section 3 is unconstitutional as it delegates essential legislative function to <ORG> without laying down any guidelines for exercise of the power of exemption; (ii) the impugned Notification enlarges the period of exemption for an indefinite period and it tends to amend Section 13 of the Act, and it is contrary to the object and purpose of the Act rather it defeats the protection granted to a tenant by the Act, (iii) the Notification is discriminatory as it creates two class of tenants; tenants of old buildings which never enjoyed the exemption from the provisions of the Act and the tenants of the newly constructed buildings which are denied the protection of the Act.

Some of the learned counsels appearing for the tenants submitted that we should refer these cases to <ORG> in view of the observations made by a three-Judges Bench of this Court in <NAME> case (<NAME> v. Srnt. <NAME>, C.A. No. 3994 of 1982). While granting leave a Bench of three-Judges passed the following order on November 9, 1983:

"After hearing the counsel for both the par- ties at some length, it seems to us that the correctness of the decisions in <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 922, is open to doubt. It appears that the interpretation placed by the <ORG> as to the scope and effect of the exemption in Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which is pari-materia with Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, (as extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh) with which we are concerned in this appeal, requires reconsideration. We do feel that the second part of the impugned notification issued by the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh dated September 24, 1974, under Section 3 of the Act, in effect, permits the Civil <ORG>s to pass decrees in suits for ejectment of tenants instituted by the land- lords even after the expiry of the period of exemption, contrary to the statutory bar contained in Section 13 of the Act and there- fore it could not be upheld.

<NAME>

Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Jus-

tice of India for placing the matter before a larger Bench." On 23rd April, 1986, <NAME>, C.J. (as he then was) presid- ing over a three-Judges Bench held that reference to a larger Bench was only in respect of suits for ejectment of tenants instituted by the landlords after the expiry of period of exemption and it did not cover cases where suits were instituted by the landlords prior to the expiry of the period of exemption although decrees were passed subsequent to the period of exemption. In this view <NAME> case wherein suit had been instituted during the period of exemption was not referred to a Constitution Bench. Another Bench consisting of Hon'ble <NAME> and Hon'- ble <NAME>, JJ. took the same view and directed that the case of <NAME> is not covered by the order of reference.

Ultimately, <NAME> case was heard by a Bench of two Judges consisting of Hon'ble <NAME> and Hon'ble <NAME>, JJ. and it was dismissed on merits on September 24, 1987. It appears that during the pendency of <NAME> case the tenants encouraged by the observations made in the order dated 9.11.1983 approached this Court again to challenge the validity of the Notifica- tion by means of the present batch of petitions. In our view, observations made in <NAME> case by a Bench of three-Judges do not pertain to suits filed by the landlords during the period of exemption although decree may have been passed after the expiry of exemption. In the instant cases none of the cases fall into that category, there is therefore no justification for referring these cases to a larger Bench.

Before we consider the submissions made on behalf of the tenants we would like to point out that some of the tenants who were unsucessful before this court in <ORG> case, have again filed petitions challenging the validity of Section 3 and the impugned Notification on additional grounds. In our opinion the petitions by such tenants are not maintainable as the same are barred by principles of res-judicata. Once the petitioners challenged the validity of the impugned Notification dated 24.9.1974 in earlier proceedings they ought to have raised all the grounds which could have been raised in impugning the valid- ity of Section 3 and the Notification, if they failed to raise a ground in earlier petition they cannot raise that ground now in the present proceedings. Finality in litiga- tion and public policy both require that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge validity of the provisions of the Act or Notification at different times on different grounds. Once petitioners challenge to Section 3 and the impugned Notification was considered by the <ORG> and the validity of the same was upheld it must be presumed that all grounds which could validly be raised were raised and considered by the <ORG>. Learned counsel for the peti- tioners urged that the questions which are being raised in the present proceedings were neither raised nor considered by this <ORG> in <ORG> case, therefore it is open to them to question the validity of Section 3 and the Notification dated 24.9.1974. This submission is con- trary to the principles of res judicata and it further ignores the binding effect of a decision of this <ORG> under Article 141 of the Constitution. The binding effect of a decision of this <ORG> does not depend upon whether a par- ticular argument was considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the argument is advanced subse- quentiy was actually decided in the earlier decision, <CITATION> .,  2 SCR 774; <NAME> etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,  1 SCC 336 and <CITATION> ,  2 SCC 587. It is therefore no longer open to the petitioner-tenants to challenge the validity of Section 3 of the Act and the impugned Notifica- tion dated 24.9.1974 on the ground that some points had not been urged or considered in <ORG> case. On the principles of res judicata, and also in view of Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by this <ORG> in <ORG> case is binding on the petitioners. But even otherwise the submissions made on their behalf in impugning the validity of Section 3 and the Notification dated 24.9.1974 are devoid of any merit as we shall presently discuss the same.

The challenge to the validity of Section 3 of the Act on the ground that it suffers from the vice of excessive dele- gation of legislative power need not detain us long in view of a number of decisions of this Court. Similar provision contained in Section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1949 was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court in <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 169. <CITATION> . 2594/66 (decided on 29th October, 1968) this Court held that Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 does not suffer from the vice of exces- sive delegation of legislative power nor it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 Conferring power on the <ORG> to exempt certain accommodations from all Or any of the provisions of the Act was upheld in the State of Madhya Pradesh v.

<NAME>

<NAME>, [1978] (15) MPLJ 973. In fact validity of Section 3 of the Act was again upheld by this Court, holding that it does not suffer from the vice of excessive delega- tion of legislative power in <ORG> <ORG>'s case (supra). We find no good reason to take a different view; we therefore hold that Section 3 of the Act does not suffer from vice of constitutional infirmity and it is a valid provision.

As regards the validity of the impugned Notification dated 24.9.1974 is concerned, it is necessary to examine the object and purpose of the exemption granted by the Notifica- tion. The paramount object of the Act, like and other rent control legislations is to safeguard the interest of tenants against their exploitation by landlords. After the Second World War there has been movement of population from rural areas to urban areas as a result of which the problem of accommodation became acute in cities. Landlords of the buildings took full advantage of the situation and they charged exhorbitant rent from tenants and very often evicted them by terminating tenancy under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act . The tenants were helpless as the suits once filed by the landlord after terminating the tenancy were bound to succeed. The <ORG> of different States took cognizance of the situation and enacted rent control legis- lations providing safeguards for tenants by making provision for fixation of reasonable rent and also placing restric- tions on the landlords' right to evict tenants. Generally the rent control legislation of various States exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain a suit or pass a decree of eviction against a tenant; instead the jurisdic- tion to evict a tenant is conferred on Rent Controller or some designated authority and the statutory grounds for eviction of a tenant have been laid down. The multiple restrictions placed on the landlords' right to charge rent from tenants or to evict them from buildings resulted into shortage of accommodation because those who had money and capacity to build new houses were discouraged from investing money in constructing buildings on account of the restric- tions placed by rent control legislations. The <ORG> stepped in, to meet the situation, in making provision for granting exemption to newly constructed buildings for cer- tain number of years from the operation of the restrictions of the rent control legislations. These steps were taken to meet the acute scarcity of accommodation and to encourage landlords to construct buildings which would ultimately ease the situation of shortage of accommodation to a large ex- tent. Provisions for exempting the newly constructed build- ings from the restrictions of the rent control legislations for a limited period have been enacted by the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh legislature. While considering the interpretation and validity of the provi- sions granting exemption, either by statutory provision made in the Act or by a Notification issued under the Act, it is necessary to bear in mind the object and purpose of exemp- tion to newly constructed buildings. The paramount object and purpose of exemption is to provide incentive for con- struction of new buildings, to meet the shortage of accommo- dation which would ultimately result in benefitting the tenants.

Learned counsel urged that the impugned Notification enlarged the period of exemption for an indefinite period and it tends to amend Section 13 of the Act and it is con- trary to the object and purpose of the Act. Developing the argument it was submitted that the Notification granted exemption to newly constructed buildings in the urban area of Chandigarh for a period of five years only from the operation of Section 13 of the Act, therefore, no exemption could be available to newly constructed buildings after the expiry of five years. A suit if instituted during the period of exemption could not be decreed, nor such decree could be executed after the expiry of five years period but the last portion of the Notification which states that Section 13 of the Act shall not apply to decree of civil courts whether such decree was passed during the period of exemption or "at any time thereafter" enlarged the period of exemption for an indefinite period of time, and it seeks to amend Section 13 of the Act. We do not find merit in the submission. As noticed earlier Section 13(1) imposes a complete ban against the eviction of a tenant in execution of a decree passed by a civil court before or after the commencement of the Act and it further lays down that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 or an order made in pursuance of the provisions of the Act. SubSection (2) of Section 13 sets out statutory grounds on which the Controller, an authority constituted under the Act has power to pass order of eviction against a tenant. Section 13 takes away the jurisdiction of civil court to pass a decree of eviction or execution thereof against a tenant in respect of a building which is subject to the provisions of the Act. The impugned Notification grants immunity to newly con- structed buildings from the shackles of Section 13 of the Act for a period of five years. While doing so, the Notifi- cation has taken care to make the exemption effective by providing that the exemption shall be available to the building even if the decree is passed after the expiry of the period of five years provided the suit is instituted during the period of exemption. The emphasis is on the institution of the suit within the period of exemption of five years. Once the landlord institutes a suit before the expiry of the period of exemption, the decree even if passed after the period of five years will not be subject to the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. This is the true meaning of the Notification. The Notification does not enlarge the period of exemption instead it safeguards the rights of the parties which crystallise on the date of institution of the suit.

Section 3 which provides for granting exemption from the provisions of the Act is by way of an exception to Section 13 and therefore the two provisions need not be consistent in their effect. The object of having a proviso or exemption is to neutralise the effect of the main provision. If that is not so it would not be necessary to have an exemption since public purpose as well as larger interest of tenants require availability of more and more accommodation in the shape' of new buildings, and for that purpose exemption is necessary to be provided. In ultimate analysis provisions of Sections 3 and 13 both seem to achieve the same result. The submission that the Notification granting exemption to newly constructed buildings is contrary to the object and purpose of the Act ignores the resultant effect of exemption. The object and policy of the Act is to mitigate hardship of tenants. This can be done in several ways and one of them being to provide incentive to persons having resources to invest money in the construction of new buildings. As dis- cussed, the shackles of the rent control legislation had chilling effect on the landlords and they were reluctant to invest their capital in making new constructions. By grant- ing holiday from the restrictions of regulations of rent control laws, impetus was given to the landlords to con- struct new buildings so that after the expiry of period of exemption the building so constructed are available for needy tenants controlled by the Act. In <ORG> case (supra) similar argument raised on behalf of the tenants was repelled and the Court held that the Notifi- cation granting exemption was not contrary to the object and purpose of the Act instead it advanced the ultimate purpose of the Act to provide accommodation to tenants. Similarly in <NAME> v. <ORG>.,  4 SCC 221 provisions of the Haryana Act granting exemption to newly constructed buildings for a period of ten years was held to advance the purpose of rent control legislation. In our opinion the impugned Notification granting exemption is not contrary to the object and purpose of the Act nor it destroys protection granted to tenants under the Act. The exemption is for a limited period and after the expiry of the period of exemption the building would fall within the purview of the Act and it would be regulated by the provi- sions contained therein, subject to the impugned notifica- tion.

In <NAME> case (supra) the Notification granting exemption did not direct that the decree passed after the expiry of period of exemption would also be exempted from the operation of Section 13 of the Act. In that case similar argument was raised that not only the suit should be filed during the period of exemption but the decree of eviction must also be obtained within the period of five years. This Court rejected the submission saying that the contention on the very face of it, if accepted would lead to incongruity and shall nullify the purpose for which exemption was grant- ed. The Court held that while considering the purpose of exemption of building from operation of Section 13 , the Notification granting exemption must be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of exemption and if the contention that both the suit and the decree should be passed within the period of exemption is accepted that would defeat and nullify the purpose of exemption. It is a matter of common knowledge that final disposal of suits before the civil court are time consuming in view of the heavy work load of cases and dilatory tactics adopted by the interested party. Having regard to time normally consumed for adjudica- tion of a suit by the civil court, it is too much to expect that a suit filed within the period of exemption of five years can be disposed of finally within the period of exemp- tion. The exemption contemplated by the Notification permits the institution of a suit within the period of exemption taking into account the delay caused in disposal Of the suit, it further protects the jurisdiction of the civil court in passing decree of eviction with a view to make the exemption effective and meaningful. In this view if the submission made on behalf of the tenants is accepted it would render the exemption illusory, as in reality, it will be impossible for a landlord to get the suit decreed within the period of exemption even if he instituted the suit within the period of exemption. Interpretation of the Act and the impugned notification as suggested on behalf of the tenants if accepted would defeat the purpose of the benefi- cial social legislation. It is a settled rule of harmonious construction of statute that a construction which would advance the object and purpose of the legislation should be followed and a construction which would result in reducing a provision of the Act to a dead letter or to defeat the object and purpose of the statute should be avoided without doing any violence to the language. We therefore reject the submission made on behalf of tenants.

Learned counsel for the tenants placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in <CITATION> ,  3 SCC 352 and <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 763 in support of their submission that once five years period of exemption expired during the pendency of the suit, the civil court ceased to have jurisdiction to pass decree of eviction or to execute the same. In these decisions Section 2(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic- tion) Act 1972, granting immunity to newly constructed buildings for a period of 10 years from the operation of the Act was considered and interpreted. In both of these deci- sions a Bench of two Judges held that on the expiry of 10 years period of exemption during the pendency of the suit, the provisions of the Act would apply and the tenant is entitled to the protection of Section 39 of the Act and no decree of eviction could be passed against him. On behalf of the landlords it was urged that the view taken in the afore- said two cases is incorrect and contrary to the observations made by a larger Bench of this Court in <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 491 and also against the decision in <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 382. It was further urged that Section 39 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 protects the tenant from eviction provid- ed the suit was pending on the date of commencement of the Act and not to a suit instituted thereafter. In the afore- said decisions it was held that a suit for eviction insti- tuted within period of exemption of 10 years could be de- creed by the civil court even if during the pendency of the litigation 10 years' period of exemption expired. The coun- sel for the landlords further placed reliance on the deci- sion of this Court in <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 284 wherein Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973 granting exemption to newly constructed building for a period of 10 years was considered. The Court held that a suit instituted within the period of exemption for eviction of the tenant, could legal- ly be decreed even if the period of exemption expired during the pendency of the suit. These decisions no doubt support the view we are taking but we do not consider it necessary to consider these decisions in detail as the provisions of the Rent Control Legislation, which were considered in those decisions were quite different which did not expressly preserve the jurisdiction of the civil court to decree the suit after expiry of the period of exemption, while the impugned <ORG> in express terms, maintains the juris- diction of the civil court to decree a suit for eviction, even if the period of exemption expires during the pendency of the suit. There is no provision under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 or the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973 containing similar provision as contained in the im- pugned <ORG>. We therefore do not consider it neces- sary to discuss the aforesaid decisions in detail or to express any final opinion about the correctness of the same.

It was then urged that the impugned Notification prac- ticed discrimination between two class of tenants in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The two class of tenants are:

(i) the tenants of old buildings which were never exempted from the provisions of the act, the tenants of the buildings entitled to protection of the Act, and (ii) the tenants ,of newly constructed buildings exempted from the protection of the Act, who are liable to be evicted at any time at the mercy of the landlord. <CITATION> ., (supra), this Court considering a similar challenge to the validity of Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973 held that the classification of buildings with reference to the date of completion for the purposes of regulating the rent and eviction of tenants from such buildings has a rational basis and has a clear nexus with the object to be achieved. Classification is rounded on intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object of the Act. It does not practice any invidious discrimination between two classes of tenants, the classification is reasonable and it does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to discuss the question further as we are in full agreement with the view taken in <NAME> case (supra). The object and purpose of the exemption as discussed earlier is to effectuate the purpose of the Act, to ensure availability of more and more accommodation to meet the need of tenants. In view of the above discussion we hold that Section 3 as well as the impugned Notification are valid and the same do not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity. We further hold that civil court has jurisdiction to pass decree even after the expiry of period of exemption, in suits instituted during the period of exemption, and to execute the same notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. In the result the civil appeals, special leave petitions, and the writ petitions fails and are ac- cordingly dismissed with costs and all interim orders stand discharged.

R.S.S. Petitions dismissed.


ORDER

1. Two questions have been raised for consideration in this group of cases. One question is whether the processes of bleaching, dyeing, printing, mercerising, etc., carried on by a processor on job work basis in respect of grey cotton fabrics and man made fabrics belonging to the customer and entrusted by him for processing amount to 'manufacture' within the meaning of the Central Excises and Salt Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the Central Excises and Salt and Additional Duty of Excise (Amendment) Act 1980 so as to attract levy of excise duty on the processed fabrics and whether, in any event, after the Amendment Act , these processes amount to manufacture and excise duty is leviable on the processed fabrics. The other question is whether, even if the processed fabrics are assessable to excise duty in the hands of the processor who carries on these processes on job work basis, what is the value on the basis of which the processed fabrics are liable to be assessed. So far as the first question is concerned, it was agitated before this <ORG> in <CITATION> . and this <ORG> held that the processes of bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, etc., carried out by the processors on job work basis amount to manufacture both under the Act as it stood prior to the amendment as also under the Act subsequent to the amendment and the processed fabrics are liable to be assessed to excise duty in the hands of what may be called 'jobbers'. Since this was a decision given by a Bench of three-Judges, the petitioners and appellants who are carrying on business of processing on job work basis could not contend that these processes do not amount to manufacture and that the processed fabrics are not liable to be assessed to excise duty in the hands of the jobbers. But, it was the second question which provoked serious controversy before us. So far as this question is concerned, it was also incidentally argued in <ORG> case (supra) and <NAME>,' J. speaking on behalf of the <ORG> observed as follows (at pp 678-79 of <ORG>):

When the textile fabrics are subjected to the processes like bleaching, dyeing and printing, etc., by independent processes, whether on their own account or on job charges basis, the value for the purposes of assessment under Section 4 , Central Excises Act will not be the processing charges alone but the intrinsic value of the processed fabrics which is the price at which such fabrics are sold for the first time in the wholesale market. That is the effect of Section 4 of the Act. The value would naturally include the value of grey fabrics supplied to the independent processors to be utilised for the payment on the processed fabrics in accordance with Rule 56-A or 96-D of the Central Excises Rules, as the case may be.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners and the appellants contended that these observations did not represent the correct law on the subject and that this question was required to be reconsidered in some depth because it vitally affected the processors who were carrying on processing of cotton and man made fabrics on job work basis.

2. It was common ground between the , parties that the procedure followed by the excise authorities was that the trader, who entrusted cotton or man made fabrics to the processor for processing on job work basis, would give a declaration to the processor as to what would be the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market . and that would be taken by the excise authorities as the assessable value of the processed fabrics and excise duty would be charged to the processor on that basis. This may be illustrated by giving the following example:

(1) Value of grey cloth in the hands of the processor Rs. 20,00 (2) Value of job work done Rs. 5.00 Value of finished cloth return- ed to the trader (1 + 2) Rs. 25,00 (3) Trader's selling price inclusive of his selling profits, etc. Rs. 30.00 The assessable value in the case given in this example would be taken by the Excise authorities at Rs. 30/- which was the sale price of the trader. There were also instances where, on finding that the trader had sold the processed fabrics in the market at a higher rate than that mentioned in the declaration; the excise authorities raised a further demand against the processor for excise duty on the basis of such higher price. This, contended the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of . the petitioners and the appellants, was clearly not justified under the provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel urged that since the processor is doing only job work of processing in respect of gray fabric cloth which does not belong to him but belongs to the trader who has commissioned him to do the job work and the processed fabric is returned to the trader, levy of excise duty could only be on the value of the job work done and no other elements could be loaded into this value. It was also contended in the alternative by the learned Counsel that in any event the assessable value of the processed fabric could not possibly include the profit at which the trader sold the processed fabric since the processor was concerned only with the processing of the gray fabric and was not concerned with the sale which the trader might effect after the processing was done and the manufacture of processed fabric was completed. We do not agree with the first contention of the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants but the alternative contention urged by him is certainly well founded.

3. It is clear from the decision of this Court in <CITATION> . that under the Central Excises and Salt Act and the Rules made thereunder the assessable value of the manufactured goods is to be determined at the factory gate that is at the stage when the manufactured goods leave the factory and enter the main stream. We may assume and indeed in view of the decision of this Court in <ORG> case (supra) we must so assume, that processing of grey fabric involves manufacture and that when the processor carries out processing on the grey fabric he manufactures the processed fabric. But the assessable value of the processed fabric must obviously be taken to be the wholesale cash price of the processed fabric at the factory gate that is when the processed fabric leaves the factory of the processor and it cannot possibly include the selling profit of the trader who subsequently sells the processed fabric. It is at the point when the processed fabric leaves the factory of the processor that is assessable value has to be determined and that assessable value cannot include the selling profit of the trader.

4. We cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants that the value of the grey cloth which is processed by the processor should not be included in the assessable value of the processed fabric since the grey cloth is one of the raw materials which goes into the manufacture of the processed fabric and the value of the processed fabric cannot be computed without including the value of the raw material that goes into its manufacture. The assessable value of the processed fabric cannot therefore be limited merely to the value of the job work done but it must be determined by reference to the wholesale cash price of the processed fabric at the gate of the factory of the processor. Thus in the example given above the assessable value of the processed fabric must be taken to be Rs. 20 + 5 that is Rs. 25/- and the profit of Rs. 5/- which the trader may make by selling the processed fabric cannot be included in the assessable value. The element of selling profit of the trader would be entirely an extraneous element and it cannot be taken into account for the purpose of determining the assessable value of the processed fabric which would comprise the value of the grey cloth and the job work charges but exclude the profit at which the trader may subsequently sell the processed fabric.

5. This according to us is the correct mode of determination of the assessable value of the processed fabric in the hands of the processor who does job work in respect of grey cloth supplied by the manufacturer or trader. We would have proceeded to decide these writ petitions and appellants (appeals?) on the basis of this view which we are inclined-to take but we find that in <ORG> case (supra) <NAME>, <NAME> speaking on behalf of a Bench of three Judges has expressed a view which is different from the one we are taking and though that view has been expressed by <NAME>, <NAME> incidentally we do not think it would be right for us to ignore what <NAME>, <NAME> has said and to proceed to take a view different from that taken by him on behalf of the Bench. Judicial discipline requires that a Bench of two Judges should not disregard the decision of a Bench of three Judges but if the Bench of two Judges is inclined to disagree with what has been said by the Bench of three Judges on the ground that it does not represent the correct law on the subject, the case should be referred by the Bench of two Judges to a larger Bench.

6. We accordingly refer these writ petitions and appeals to a larger Bench of five Judges. Of course, when these writ petitions and appeals are referred to the larger Bench it will be open to the larger Bench to consider not only the question of determination of the assessable value but also the other question, namely, whether processing of grey fabric by a processor on | job work basis constitutes manufacture, because the judgment in <ORG> case (supra) which has decided this question in favour of the Revenue and against the processor is a judgment of a Bench of only three Judges and now the present writ petitions and appeals will be heard by a Bench of five Judges.