<NAME>, J.

1. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of <ORG> dated July 2, 1964, in Writ Appeal No. 25 of 1963 whereby the judgment of the learned single judge allowing a petition tinder Article 226 of the Constitution was confirmed.

2. The facts briefly are these. <NAME> of Hyderabad had, by a deed of trust dated August 6, 1950, created a trust known as " <NAME>'s Miscellaneous Trust" for the benefit of his family and dependants. One of the beneficiaries was <NAME>, a stepsister of the <NAME>, to whom an annuity of Rs. 12,000 had to be given. She died on November 10, 1955. The property passing on her death became liable to estate duty under the Estate Duty Act , 1953 (XXXIV of 1953), hereinafter called "the Act". The trust fund consisted of three items one of which was a loan deposited with <ORG> bearing interest at 11/4%. The main dispute before the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty related to the correct valuation of the aforesaid loan. He valued it at Rs. 2,01,30,000 and, after making the other necessary calculations, the net market value of the estate of the deceased was assessed at Rs. 6,61,347 on which demand was created at Rs. 83,519.40. The trustees preferred an appeal before <ORG> disputing the correctness of the valuation of the estate of the deceased (<NAME>) made by the Assistant Controller. <ORG> in its order dated August 6, 1959, expressed the view that the securities in question had not been overvalued but had been undervalued. According to the <ORG> the correct valuation should have been Rs. 3,06,83,760; in other words, its opinion was that the face value of the securities being Rs. 4.5 crores, the market value should have been at the rate of 78% whereas the basis adopted by the Assistant Controller came to 52%. He proceeded to say towards the concluding portion of his order : " However I find that there is some force in the argument advanced by the appellant's representative against any enhancement being made by the <ORG> in appeal proceedings. I refrain therefore from making the proposed enhancement in the value of the securities and confirm the value adopted by the Assistant Controller. "

3. The Act was amended by the Estate Duty (Amendment) Act , 1958, hereinafter called "the amendment Act." By Section 21 of the amendment Act, Sections 56 to 65 of the principal Act were substituted by the new sections. The new Section 59 for the first time gave power to the Controller of Estate Duty to assess or reassess property escaping assessment. It is common ground that the amendment Act came into force on July 1, 1960. The Assistant Controller issued a notice on August 12, 1960, to the trustees in exercise of the powers conferred by the new Section 59 of the Act. In that notice it was stated that he had reasons to believe that property chargeable under the Act to estate duty had escaped assessment by reason of under valuation and, therefore, a statement of account was called for in respect of the market value of the securities of Rs. 4.5 crores.

On September 20, 1960, the present respondents filed a writ petition in <ORG> challenging the validity and legality of the notice issued under Section 59 of the Act and praying that it be quashed. In the writ petition two main points were raised : the first was that Section 59 had been introduced by the Amendment Act and it could not be made applicable to assessments which had become final before July 1, 1960, the date on which the amendment Act came into force. Secondly, the conditions laid down in Section 59 had not been fulfilled. It had not been stated what information had been received or was in the possession of the Assistant Controller in consequence of which he had reason to believe that property had been undervalued. It was contended that mere change of opinion would not justify the reopening of assessment. The present appellant in the return filed to the writ petition in <ORG> claimed that, Section 5959 as introduced by the Amendment Act was applicable and that <ORG> had expressed the opinion that the correct value of the securities should be 78% of the face value as against 52% as adopted in the assessment order and the appellate order had been received on August 15, 1959, and therefore, the appellant was fully justified in issuing the notice as he had reason to believe by virtue of information which had come into his possession that the securities had been undervalued. The learned single judge held that the appellant had no jurisdiction under Section 59 , as newly introduced by the Amendment Act , to reopen a matter which had been completed and which had became final before July 1, 1960. On the second point he was of the view that the opinion of <ORG> did not amount to " information " within the meaning of Section 59(b) of the Act, The writ petition, consequently, was allowed. The appellant preferred an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which was disposed of by <ORG> on July 2, 1964. The Bench did riot decide the first point, namely, whether Section 59 as newly introduced by the Amendment Act was applicable or not and rested its decision on the second point. It was held that a mere expression of opinion by <ORG> did not amount to "information " within the meaning of Section 59(b) of the Act.

4. The learned Solicitor-General has argued on behalf of the appellant that the decision of <ORG> on the second point was erroneous. According to him any matter of fact or law which may come to the notice of the appellant after the making of assessment including a finding by a higher authority would be "information " for the purpose and within the meaning of Section 59 . It is urged that the appellant had not taken action on mere change of his opinion. The predecessor in office of the appellant had adopted a wrong mode of valuation and the opinion expressed by <ORG> about the correct mode was " information " which led to the appellant entertaining a reasonable belief that the property assessed to estate duty had been undervalued. Reliance has been placed on a number of decisions in which the meaning of the word "information" in parallel provisions in the Income-tax Act , 1922, and other enactments came up for consideration <CITATION> ,  35 I.T.E. 1, 6 (S.C.) it was held that the word " information " in Section 34(i)(b) included information as to the true and correct state of law, and so would cover information as to relevant judicial decisions. The following observation may be reproduced with advantage : " If the word ' information ' used in any other provision of the Act denotes information as to facts or particulars, that would not necessarily determine the meaning of the said word in Section 34(1)(b) . The denotation of the said word would naturally depend on the context of the particular provisions in which it is used. It is then contended that Sections 33B and 35 confer ample powers on the specified authorities to revise the. Income-tax Officer's orders and to rectify mistakes respectively and so it would be legitimate to construe the word 'information' in Section 34(1)(b) strictly and to confine it to information in regard to facts or particulars. This argument also is not valid. If the word ' information' in its plain grammatical meaning includes information as to facts as well as information as to the state of the law, it would be unreasonable to limit to information as to the facts on the extraneous consideration that some cases of assessment which need to be revised or rectified on the ground of mistake of law may conceivably be covered by Sections 33B and 35 ."

5. <CITATION> ., it was said that the expression " information " in the context of Section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, must mean instruction or knowledge derived from extraneous sources concerning facts or particulars or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment. <ORG>, in a recent decision <CITATION> ,  68 I.T.R. 594 after a discussion of the relevant case law, came to the conclusion that "information" within the meaning of Section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, may consist of a different view taken of the facts on the record by a higher <ORG> on appeal from the Income-tax Officer's decision. In that case it was held that the decision of the Income-tax Appellate <ORG> constituted " information " to the Income-tax Officer as to which of the assessable parties was chargeable for a particular item of income. In the latest decision of this court in <CITATION> , when the first assessment of the assessee's income was made by the Income-tax Officer the latter's information was that the assessee was a partner in another concern known as <ORG> and that the interest had been received from that concern in the capacity of a partner. It was only after the <ORG> and <ORG> gave their decision in the proceedings for assessment to tax of <ORG> that the Income-tax Officer came to know that the interest was not being received by the assessee-firm in the capacity of a partner but in its capacity of a financier advancing monies to <ORG> as a banker. It was held that the Income-tax Officer had not acted on his own initiative or on the change of his own opinion when he took proceedings under Section 34(1)(b) . The correct position had been brought to his notice by the decision of the <ORG> and <ORG> and that must be held to be " information " as a consequence of which he came to believe that the provisions of Section 34(1)(b) were attracted.

6. The learned counsel for the respondents in the presence of the above state of law, as settled by this court, sought to contend that the question of valuation of the securities was neither purely one of fact nor of law and was a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, it could not fall within the rule laid down in the aforesaid decisions. We are unable to agree. When the expression " information " is understood in the sense of instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars or as to law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment, it is difficult to see how determination of valuation for the purpose of assessment of estate duty would not squarely fall within the meaning of the expression " information " in the context in which it occurs in Section 59 of the Act. It has not been disputed, and can indeed not be disputed, that the provisions of Section 59 are in pari materia with Section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The opinion expressed by <ORG>, in the present case, as to valuation, was clearly " information " in the sense in which that expression has been held to have been used in these enactments. The view of <ORG> on this point cannot be sustained for the aforesaid reasons.

7. <ORG> did not decide the first point which related to the applicability of Section 59 to assessments completed before the amendment Act came into force. This matter will have to go back for decision of that question. The appeal is allowed and the order of <ORG> is set aside. The case is remanded to <ORG> for disposal in accordance with law. Costs shall be costs in <ORG>.


PETITIONER: STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: SHIVA BHIKSHUK MISHRA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/09/1970 BENCH: <NAME>, A.N. BENCH: <NAME>, A.N. SHAH, J.C. <NAME>, K.S. CITATION: 1971 AIR 1011 1971 SCR (2) 197 1970 SCC (2) 871 CITATOR INFO : R 1974 SC 423 (19) RF 1974 SC1317 (10) F 1974 SC2192 (67) RF 1976 SC1766 (12) RF 1976 SC2547 (16,21) D 1978 SC 363 (11) R 1979 SC 684 (7) D 1980 SC1459 (7) R 1984 SC 636 (11) RF 1986 SC1626 (24) R 1986 SC1790 (10) ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 311- Reversion and -dismissal of civil servant-Order of reversion not containing express words casting stigma-Entirety of circumstances must be seen to determine whether order was one by way of punishment though not expressly so-Dismissal by officer subordinate to appointing authority invalid. HEADNOTE: The respondent was holding the substantive post of Sergeant in <ORG> till July 31, 1946. On August 1, 1946 he was promoted to officiate in the higher post of Subedar. In January 1948, while still holding the substantive post of Sergeant he was promoted to officiate temporarily as Subedar Major. In October 1950 the Commandant of <ORG>, Muzaffarpur wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of <ORG> suggesting that the respondent should be censured for having assaulted an orderly. The Deputy Inspector General recommended to the Inspector General that in view of the aforesaid incident the respondent be reverted to his substantive post of- Sergeant pending the result of the departmental enquiry for misconduct which was already going on against him. In November 1950 the Inspector General reverted the respondent to the post of Sergeant. After the conclusion of the department enquiry the respondent was dismissed from service in April 1953 by an order of the Deputy Inspector General. In February 1954 the respondent filed a suit for declaration that his demotion to the post of Sergeant and subsequent dismissal from service were wrongful, illegal and inoperative. The trial court dismissed the suit. <ORG> on appeal reversed the decision of the trial court on the finding that the 'reversion was not in the usual course or for administrative reasons but it was after the finding on an inquiry about some complaint against the plaintiff in, by way of punishment to him.' The order of dismissal was set aside on the ground that it had been made by the Deputy Inspector General while the appointing authority in the case of the post of Subedar-Major was the Inspector General so that there was a violation of Art. 31 1 ( 1 ). In appeal to this Court against the judgment of <ORG> the question that fell for consideration was was whether the reversion of the respondent from the post of officiating Subedar-Major was made in circumstances which would attract the appli- cability of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. HELD : <NAME>'s case is not an authority for the proposition that so long as there are no express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of a <ORG> officer in the impugned order it cannot be held to have been made by way of punishment. The form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature and it might merely be a cloak and camouflage for an order founded on misconduct. It may be that an order which is innocuous on the face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine. But the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must 192 be examined and the overriding test will aways be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order. 1196 C-E] In the present case <ORG> found that the order of reversion was made owing to the note of the Deputy Inspector General of Police following the report of the Commandant. The order of reversion was directly and proximately founded on what the Commandant and the Deputy Inspector General of Police said relating to the respondent's conduct generally and in particular with reference to the incident of assault by him on the orderly. There was no reason to disagree with <ORG> that the order of reversion wits void. In that situation it was not disputed that the order of dismissal which was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police violated Art. 311(1) of the Constitution and had been rightly set aside by <ORG>. [196 F-G] State of Punjab & Ant-. v. Shri Sugh Rai Bahadur,  3 S.C.R. 234 and S. R. Tiwari v. Distriction Boarad Aqra & Anr.  3 S.C.R. 55, applied. <CITATION> .0. Hosliiarpur, C.A. No 882/66 dt. 7-4-69, distinguished and explained, JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1363 of 1966.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 25, 1965 of <ORG> in First Appeal No. 257 of 1960. <NAME> and <NAME>, for tile respondent, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. This is ,in appeal by certificate from a judgment of <ORG>. The respondent was holding the substantive post of a Sergeant in the police force till July 31, 1946 in the State of Bihar. Oil August 1, 1946 lie was promoted to officiate in the higher post of Subedar. Oil January 9, 1948 while he was still holding the substantive post of a Sergeant he was promoted to officiate temporarily as a Subedar-Major. It appears that on October 3, 1950 the Commandant of <ORG>, Muzaffarpur wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed Forces, mentioning ,in incident between the respondent and his orderly on the night of September 22, 1950. The incident involved a physical assault by the respondent on the orderly. The Commandant made an inquiry in the matter and expressed the opinion that the respondent had actually assaulted his orderly by taking the law into his own hand instead of bringing any complaint which existed against the orderly to the notice of the higher authorities for proper action. In the penultimate paragraph of his letter the Commandant wrote, "to drop the above incident without taking action, in order to prevent any reoccurrence of the Subedar Major's gross misconduct, I suggest he be censured for his unsatisfactory behaviour where he failed to maintain the required discipline". The Deputy Inspector General wrote a note to the Inspector General as follows :-

"Kindly see pp. 15-12 which relate to the notorious Subedar Major S. B. Missir, of B.M.P. VI whose conduct is already under enquiry by a Board to be presided over by the I.G. himself.

In this particular case Subedar Major Missir appears to have tripped up very badly and I feel that transfer, as recommended by D.I.G.A.F. is no cure.

It is indeed strange that our Board accepted the Subedar Major for promotion to the rank of Sergeant Major although he has not yet undergone training of a Sergeant. In a similar case the then <ORG> recommended that a temporary Sgt. must undergo the Sergeant's course before his case was considered for promotion. The Subedar Major, is perhaps, too old to learn and in any case cannot be posted as a Sergeant Major in view of the fact that he was never trained as a Sergeant and has never worked in a district. He was originally appointed in the R.P.P. by Mr. <NAME>'s Board.

I recommend that the officiating Subedar Major should be reverted to his substantive rank of Sergeant and posted to Hazaribagh. The question whether he should be retained in service will be decided after <ORG> concludes its labour. I am purposely suggesting his posting to Hazaribagh because he will be ,far away from the witnesses and would not be able to tamper with the evidence recorded of each witness. Even the present charge against Subedar Major <NAME> is serious but the order of reversion would meet with the- case, as it is obvious that he is not likely to make either a suitable Subedar Major or Sergeant Major." The Inspector-General made an order on November 2, 1950, " as proposed". In the first week of November 1950 the respondent was asked to attend a Board of enquiry for answering, charges of misconduct. On November 14, 1950 the respondent was reverted to his substantive post of Sergeant. On April 7, 1953 an order was made by the Deputy-Inspector- General dismissing, the respondent from service. In February 1954 the respondent filed a suit for a declaration that his demotion from the rank of a Subedar Major to that of Sergeant and dismissal from service were wrongful, illegal and inoperative and that he had all along remained a Subedar-Major. He further claimed a decree for a sum of Rs. 3118/- on account of arrears of pay as detailed in Schedule I attached to the plaint with future interest. <ORG> dismissed the suit on the view that the order of reversion did not contain any stigma on the competence and character of the respondent and that it had not been made by way of punishment. <ORG> on appeal reversed the decision of the trial court on the finding that the "reversion was not in the usual course or for administrative reasons but it was after a finding on an inquiry about some complaint against the plaintiff and by way of punishment to him". The order of dismissal was set aside on the short ground that if the respondent continued to remain in the post of Subedar-Major even in an offi- ciating capacity on the date with effect from which the order of dismissal was passed the provisions of Art. 311(1) had not been complied with. The Deputy Inspector General who had passed the order of dismissal was subordinate to the authority by which he had been appointed to officiate in the post of Subedar Major, that authority being the Inspector General of Police. The dismissal order was, therefore, invalid and not binding on the respondent. He was granted the declaration asked for by him together with a decree for Rs. 3,118/- with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

The sole point which falls for determination is whether the reversion of the respondent from the post of officiating Subedar Major was made in the circumstances which would attract the applicability of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Mitter J., delivering the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab & anr. v. <NAME>) stated the following propositions on a consideration of the numerous decisions on the point --

"1. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Art. 31.1 of the Constituion.

2.The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial.

3.If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or-integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant.

4.An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service does not attract the operation of Art. 311 of the Constitution. (1)  3 S.C.R. 234.

5.It there be, a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Art. 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and con- sidered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article".

The argument sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant is that the order of reversion of the respondent to his substantive post casts no aspersion against his character or integrity. Even if the motive behind the making of the order was the report of the Deputy Inspector General dated November 1, 1950 consequent on the communication received from the Commandant dated October 3, 1950 arising out of the incident involving an assault by the respondent on his orderly it would not be a case of reversion by way of punishment. A great deal of stress is laid on the fact that no departmental enquiry as envisaged by Art. 311 was made into the abovementioned incident before reversion was ordered. Our attention has been invited to this Court's decision in the <CITATION> (1) in which Mr. <NAME> the then Commissioner of Income tax had said that the officer concerned should be reverted because of the the large number of complaints which the department had received against his integrity and the bad reports received by him from his superiors. The successor of Mr. <NAME> Mr. <NAME> made an order on May 22, 1.964 to the effect that <NAME> officiating Income tax Officer Class 11 had been found unsuitable, after trial, to hold that post; and his reversion was ordered as Officiating Inspector, Income tax. It was held by this Court that the order of reversion had said that the officer concerned should be reverted because (<ORG> to the contrary was set aside. A large measure of support is sought to be derived from this decision because of the previous opinion of the Commissioner of Income tax which was highly prejudicial to <NAME> and the argument raised there was that the reversion of <NAME> was the direct result of the note of Mr. <NAME>. This is what was observed by this Court in that case:-

"The test for attracting Art. 31 1 (2) of the Constitution in such a case is whether the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination of. service of the temporary employee (see the decision of this Court in <CITATION>  5 S.C.R. 190. In the present case, however, the order of reversion does not contain any express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of the respondent and, therefore, (1).C. A. 882/66 cit. 7th April 1969.

it cannot 'be held that the order of reversion was made by way of punishment and the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution are consequently attracted".

We are unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the ratio of the above decision is that so long as there are no express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of a Government Officer in the impugned order it cannot be held to have been made by way of punishment. The test as previously laid and which 'was relied on was whether the misconduct or negligence was a mere motive for the order of reversion or whether it was the very foundation of that order. In Dhaba's(1) case it was not found that the order of reversion was based on misconduct or negligence of the officer. So far as we are aware no such rigid principle has ever been laiddown by this Court that one has only to look to the order and if it does not contain any imputation of misconduct or words attaching a stigma to the character or reputation of a Government Officer it must be held to have been made in the ordinary course of administrative routine and the court is debarred from looking at all the attendant circumstances to discover whether tile order had been made by way of punishment. The form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature and it might merely be a cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct (see <CITATION> . ( 2 ). It may be that an order which is innocuous on the face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine. But the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order.

In the present case <ORG> found that the order of reversion was made owing to the note of the- Deputy Inspector-General of Police following the report of the Commandant. The order of reversion was directly and proximately founded oil what the Commandant and the Deputy Inspector General said relating. to the respondent's conduct generally and in particular with reference to the incident of assault by him on his orderly. We find no reason to disagree with the view of <ORG>. It is not dis- puted that if the order of reversion was void the subsequent order of dismissal which was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police would be violative of Art. 3 1 1 (1 ) of the Constitution.

The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. <ORG> dismissed.

[1] C.A. 882 of 1966 dt. 7-4-69. (2). (1964) 3 S.C.R.55. L235 Sup. CI/71--2500-17-11-71 --GIPF.