PETITIONER: <ORG>, A WOMEN'S RESOURCES CENTRE, THROUGHMS. <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, DELHI POLICE HEAD-QUARTERS AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT14/12/1989 BENCH: RAY, B.C. (J) BENCH: RAY, B.C. (J) PANDIAN, S.R. (J) CITATION: 1990 AIR 513 1989 SCR 488 1990 SCC (1) 422 JT 1989 (4) 553 1989 SCALE (2)1315 ACT: Constitution of India, 1950: Article 32-- Tortious acts of employees-Responsibility of <ORG>--Death of person due to beating by police official--<ORG> directed to pay compensa- tion. HEADNOTE: Torts: Vicarious Liability--Death of child due to beat- ing by Police--<ORG> directed to pay compensation to mother. In the Writ Petitions filed on behalf of two women, who were severely beaten by the alleged landlord, in collusion with the local police, in their attempts to get the rooms occupied by them vacated, the petitioners prayed for direc- tions to the respondents to pay exemplary charges to one of the women for the death of her son but to injuries inflicted on him by the police. It was alleged that the landlord's son, accompanied by the Station House Officer and other police personnel severe- ly beat the woman, and her nine year old son, who was cling- ing to her to protect her, as a result of which the child suffered severe injuries and died in the hospital. A medico-legal case was registered. The case was inves- tigated by the Inspector of Crime Branch, who submitted his report according to which there was a high level conspiracy of the police with the accused in getting the rooms occupied by the women vacated and opposed grant of bail as it was a clear case under Section 302 / 120B I.P.C. A counter-affidavit on behalf of Respondent No. 1 was filed stating that the Station House Officer himself took part in the beatings and the minor child was also not spared and the child sustained severe injury in the left leg, which was opined as a grievous one, and that the injuries inflict- ed on the child caused fever and pneumonitis, resulting in the death of the child, and a case under Sections 308 / 34 I.P.C. which was later altered to 304/34 I.P.C . was regis- tered and one of the accused arrested. 489 Disposing of the Writ Petitions, this Court, HELD: 1.1 An action for damages lies for bodily harm which includes battery, assault, false imprisonment, physi- cal injuries and death. In cases of assault, battery and false imprisonment, the damages are large and represent a solatium for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and death. [494E] 1.2 It is well settled that the <ORG> is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. [494F] In the instant case, it is apparent, from the report of the Inspector of the Crime Branch and the counter-affidavit fried on behalf of the Commissioner of Police and also from the fact that the prosecution has been launched in connec- tion with death of the child that the child was done to death on account of the beating and assault by the agency of the sovereign power acting in violation and excess of the power vested in such agency. The mother of the child is, therefore, entitled to get compensation from respondent No. 2, which is liable for payment of compensation for the death of the child due to beating by the Police officials con- cerned. It is, therefore, just and proper to direct respond- ent No. 2 to pay compensation to the mother of the deceased child, a sum of Rs.75,000. [494C-D; 495F] [Respondent No. 2 may take appropriate steps for recov- ery of the amount paid as compensation or part thereof from the officers, who will be found responsible, if they are so advised. As the Police Officers are not parties before the Court, any observation made by the Court in justification of this order shall not have any bearing in any proceedings specially criminal prosecution pending against the police officials in connection with the death of the child. [495G] <CITATION> .,  ACJ 28 at 32 and <CITATION> . Vidhyawati and Anr.,  Supp 2 SCR 989 at 1007, relied on. JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURSIDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 250-53 of 1988.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). <NAME> and <NAME> for the Petitioners.

<NAME>

<NAME>, Ms. <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. These writ petitions have been filed by <ORG> known as <ORG>, a Women's Resources Centre on behalf of two women <NAME> and <NAME> who have been residing in one room tena- ment each on the ground floor of house No. 408/5/A L Gali No. 29 Anand Parbat and were severely beaten up by the alleged landlord in collusion with the S.H.O., <NAME> and the police of Anand Parbat Police Station. The facts of the case giving rise to these writ petitions are as follows:-

<NAME> and her husband <NAME> moved into the house No. 408/5/A L, Gali No. 29, Anand Parbat in 1974. They had three children, <NAME> 13 years old girl, <NAME> 9 years old boy (now deceased) and <NAME> 7 years old boy. They were living in one room on the ground floor of the said house which is a double storey. The other lady, <NAME> has also been living in another room of the said house on the ground floor with her husband and children. The husband of both <NAME> and <NAME> are truck drivers and they often remain away from their home. There is a dispute over the ownership of the house. In or about 1984, the old landlord, one <NAME> left the house and one <NAME> claims to be the new landlord. At present, one <NAME> and his two sons <NAME> and <NAME> claim to have bought the said property from <NAME> and they have been illegally evicting all the tenants from the said premises.In their attempt they succeeded in evicting all the tenants except the two tenants named <NAME> and <NAME>. It is because of these illegal threats of eviction, <NAME> obtained an order of stay from the Court against her forceful eviction and that said order is in force. Some time in October, 1987 the so-called landlords cut off the water and electricity supply to <NAME>'s room and the same has not been restored till this day. On November, 2, 1987 the then S.H.O. of <ORG>, <NAME> called for <NAME> and told her to vacate the room. On November 4, 1987, the said S.H.O. again called for <NAME> and when she arrived at the police station she found that the so-called landlords were already present there. In the presence of <NAME> and others, <NAME> told <NAME> to take some money and leave the room whereon <NAME> said that she should be given some time especially because her children are studying in schools. On November 12, 1987, the said S.H.O. once again called <NAME> and this time he threatened to lock her up if she refused to vacate the room. November 13, 1987, <NAME> went to <ORG> to consult her lawyer. On coming back she found her children missing and <NAME> was standing out- side, all her belongings thrown out. <NAME> told <NAME> that the Sub-Inspector of <ORG> <NAME> of <ORG> had come and had taken away her chil- dren and had thrown away <NAME> from her room. <NAME> immediately went to the <ORG> Station and met the S.H.O., <NAME> and asked him about her children. The S.H.O. said that her children had been kept locked up and she would not be allowed to see her children unless she vacated the room. <NAME> then went to <ORG> to see her lawyer. The lawyer phoned the <ORG> con- trol room and rushed back to <ORG>. With great difficulty the lawyer got the three children released from the police station.

On the same day, i.e. November 13, 1987, after <NAME> and her children had just taken their dinner, <NAME> trespassed into her room and hit <NAME> on the forehead with a brick. She rushed to the police station and reported the matter to the police. The police had her medi- cally examined but refused to take any action against the assailants.

On November 14, 1987, <NAME> was attacked by <NAME>, his brother <NAME> accompanied by <NAME> in civilian clothes and <NAME>, Sub-Inspector in uniform accompanied by two others. They beat <NAME>, tore her clothes and molested her. Her nine year old son clung to his mother to protect her when <NAME> took him away and forcibly threw him on the floor. <NAME> also asked <NAME> to beat <NAME>. <NAME> was dragged away to the police station and a criminal case was imposed upon her of trespass. She was sent to Tihar Jail and her lawyer got her released on November 16, 1987. <NAME> on her release came back and found that her child, <NAME> was in a very bad condition. The children took shel- ter at a neighbour's house and the neighbours had got local doctors to look after <NAME>. On the advice of the doctors, <NAME> was admitted to <ORG> on Novem- ber 18, 1987. However, no medical legal case was registered. <NAME>'s lawyer tried to get a medical legal case registered. At last medical legal case was registered on November 23, 1987 by the ACP, Patel Nagar at 11.30 p.m. In the FIR No. 143/87 the said ACP had written that she had said that no policeman had beaten her son although she had specifically named <NAME> and others. On November 26, 1987, <NAME> died in hospital and an inquest was carried out. This news was published in the Hindi newspapers.

On December 10, 1987, S.D.M., <NAME> called <NAME> to his office stating that he was conducting an enquiry into the facts and circumstances leading to <NAME>'s death. On December 6, 1987, <ORG> filed its report in the court opposing bail for <NAME>. In the said report, it has been stated that the details of the D.D. entries mentioned in the bail application itself show con- spiracy or connivance of the local police with the accused. This report was annexed as annexure 'C' to these petitions. <NAME> and her neighbours and lawyer on the day of <NAME>'s death sat on dharna outside the residence of the Lt. Governor and demanded that a judicial enquiry be ordered into the death of <NAME>'s son, <NAME>. The report given by the fact-finding-team of <ORG>, into the death of <NAME> was also published. The said report states that the representatives of <ORG> met the S.D.M., <NAME> who told them that he would intimate them his findings; but subsequently when they contacted him it was told that it was a sensitive report and it can be made public only by the Lt. Governor. As such the instant writ petitions were moved before this Court praying amongst others the issuance of a writ for directions directing the respondents to pay <NAME> exemplary damages for the death of her son, <NAME>. On June 13, 1988, this Court directed to implead the Medical Superintendent, <ORG>, New Delhi as respondent No. 4 and also directed the Medical Superintendent to keep the record relating to <NAME>, son of <NAME> in a sealed cover and deposit the same with the Registrar of this Court within two weeks from the date of the order. By order dated August 22, 1988 the respondents were given two weeks time to file counter-affidavit and one week's time thereafter was given to the petitioners to file rejoinder.

<NAME>, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Headquar- ters (II), Delhi, on behalf of Commissioner of Police af- firmed an affidavit in counter wherein it has been stated that:

"On the basis of the aforesaid complaint ACP/Patel Nagar got registered case FIR No. 143 dated 24.11.1987 under section 308 / 34 , <NAME>, New Delhi and entrusted investigation to Inspector, <ORG>, <ORG>, who arrested accused <NAME>, son of <NAME> on 24.11.1987. On 26.11. 1987 <NAME> expired in <ORG> and post-mortem was got conducted. The autopsy doctor opined that injuries were ante-mortem caused by blunt force impact/possible injuries were not sufficient to cause death. Death was due to pneumonitis as diagnosed clinically. Offence was changed to Section 304 / 34 ."

It has also been stated therein that Maya Devi was residing in one room adjacent to room of <NAME> for 6-7 months, the landlords did not issue any rent receipt. It was also stated that:

" ..... On 13.11.1987 the landlord forcibly got vacated the room in possession of <NAME> with the connivance of local police which is evident from the DD entry made by Asstt. Sub-Inspector, <NAME> who visited the spot on the information of quarrel between <NAME> and landlord's men." It has further been stated that on 14.11.1987, <NAME> got registered a false case under section 4448  to get the above objective and the local police arrested Smt. <NAME> the same day. She was not admitted to bail despite approach by her relatives. The S.H.O. himself took part in the beatings and the minor child (<NAME>) of Smt. <NAME> was also not spared, and was thrown away while he clung to feet of his mother, while she was being beaten merci- lessly. <NAME> sustained severe injury in his left leg and could not be attended by the doctors in absence of his parents. On 16.11.1987 only <NAME> was attended by his mother after release from jail and by then the child had suffered from old ailments. She took him to <ORG> on the advice of the local doctors. The injuries inflicted to <NAME> on 14.11.1987 caused fever and pneumoi- tis and finally resulted in his death. Later on the nature of injury on left leg of the child was opined to be grievous one."

The relevant portion of the report dated 5.12.1987 submitted by <NAME>, Inspector, <ORG>, Delhi is quoted hereunder:

"So far it seems that there is a high level conspiracy in getting the rooms of tenants got vacated by the landlord if the accused is bailed out, it will be difficult to find out the truth. Smt. <NAME> and the doctor are already under pressure. As the local police is in- volved in all this episode so bailing out the accused will definitely affect the fate of the case. The accused should not be bailed out as it is clear case u/s 304/120 B I.P.C . The details of DD entries mentioned in the bail application itself show the conspiracy or connivance of the local police with the ac- cused. Therefore the bail is opposed strongly."

The landlord, <NAME> and <NAME> and <NAME>, S.H.O. and <NAME>, Sub-Inspector have been im- pleaded as respondents by order dated September 20, 1988 in these writ petitions. They also filed counter-affidavits. It is now apparent from the report dated 5.12.1987 of the Inspector of <ORG>, Delhi as well as the counter-affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Delhi on behalf of <NAME>, Delhi and also from the fact that the prosecution has been launched in connection with the death of <NAME>, son of <NAME> showing that <NAME> was done to death on account of the beating and assault by the agency of the sovereign power acting in violation and excess of the power vested in such agency. The mother of the child, <NAME>, in our considered opinion, is so entitled to get compensation for the death of her son from the respondent <ORG>.

An action for damages lies for bodily harm which in- cludes battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical in- juries and death. In cases of assault, battery and false imprisonment the damages are at large and represent a sola- tium for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and death. As we have held hereinbefore that the son of <NAME> aged 9 years died due to beating and assault by the S.H.O., <NAME> and as such she is entitled to get the damages for the death of her son. It is well settled now that the <ORG> is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. The respondent No. 2, <ORG> is liable for payment of compensation to Smt. <NAME> for the death of her son due to beating by the S.H.O. of <ORG>, Shri <NAME>. It is convenient to refer in this connection the deci- sion in <CITATION> .,  ACJ 28 at 32 wherein it has been observed that:

"In the matter of liability of the <ORG> for the torts committed by its employees, it is now the settled law that the <ORG> is liable for tortious acts committed by its employees in the course of their employment."

<CITATION> . Vidhyawati and Anr.,  Supp 2 SCR 989 at 1007 has been held that:

"Viewing the case from the point of view of first principles, there should be no difficul- ty in holding that the State should be as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and functioning as such as any other employer. The immunity of the <ORG> in the United Kingdom, was based on the old feudalistic notions of Justice, namely, that the King was incapable of doing a wrong, and, therefore, of authorising or instigating one, and that he could not be sued in his own courts. In India, ever since the time of <ORG>, the sovereign has been held liable to be sued in tort or in contract, and the Common Law immunity never operated in India ...... "

In <ORG> through its Secretary and <ORG>. v. <ORG> Commissioner, Delhi <ORG> Headquarters and <ORG>., (Writ Petition Crl. Nos. 401-402 of 1988 orders in which were pronounced by this Court on Janu- ary 13, 1989) one of the labourers who was taken to the police station for doing some work and on demand for wages was severely beaten and ultimately succumbed to the in- juries. It was held that the State was liable to pay compen- sation and accordingly directed that the family of the deceased labourer will be paid Rs. 75,000 as compensation. On a conspectus of these decisions we deem it just and proper to direct <ORG>, respondent No. 2 to pay compensation to <NAME>, mother of the de- ceased, <NAME> a sum of Rs.75,000 within a period of four weeks from the date of this judgment. The Delhi Administra- tion may take appropriate steps for recovery of the amounts paid as compensation or part thereof from the officers who will be found responsible, if they are so advised. As the <ORG> officers are not parties before us, we state that any observation made by us in justification of this order shall not have any beating in any proceedings specially criminal prosecution pending against the police officials in connec- tion with the death of <NAME>. The writ petitions are dis- posed of accordingly.

N.P.V. Petitions dis- posed of.


PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA Vs. RESPONDENT: THE LORD <NAME> DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/04/1999 BENCH: <NAME>, S.N.PHUKAN. JUDGMENT:

<NAME> This appeal is preferred by <ORG> through the General Manager, <ORG> against the Judgment and Order dated 30th January, 1982 passed by <ORG>, Madras.

A complaint was filed under Section 41(l)(c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 by the respondent regarding the siding charges levied by the appellant at. the respondent's siding at Saharanpur and fixation of maintenance charges of the siding by the railway. The tribunal framed as many as 7 issues and after elaborate discusion held that the siding charges and maintenance charges fixed by railway w.e.f 13.03.1980 were unreasonable. Hence the present appeal.

We have heard Ms. <NAME>, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the respondent.

From the impugned judgment we find that maintenance charges were fixed at Rs. 4838/- for the period 03.10.80 to 31.03.81 and also for subsequent years.

At the time of argument it was stated before us that the siding of the respondent was closed down in the year 1996, therefore, these two questions regarding siding charges and maintenance charges have become academic. The tribunal fixed the siding charges and maintenance charges not only on the basis of All ln^ia cost incurred by the <ORG> but on the zonal basis. The tribunal had given elaborate reasons and had also relied on other decisions of the tribunal.

In view of the fact that the siding was closed down in the year 1996, both the questions have become infructuous, therefore, we don't want to interfere in the present appeal leaving the question regarding the method of calculation of siding and maintenance charges open.

In view of the above observations, appeal is disposed of. The parties to bear their own costs.


PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: SMT. PISTA DEVI & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1986 BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) KHALID, V. (J) CITATION: 1986 AIR 2025 1986 SCR (3) 743 1986 SCC (4) 251 JT 1986 420 1986 SCALE (2)423 CITATOR INFO : R 1988 SC1450 (16) ACT: Land Acquisition Act , 1894: ss. 4 , SA, 6, 17(1), (4) and 17(1A)- Acquisition for urban housing-Urgency-Inquiry dispensed with- Post-notification delay of one year in publishing declaration-Action whether vitiated-Whether <ORG> can take possession of land, other than waste and arable. Delhi Development Act, 1957: s. 21(2) - Provision of relief to those being expropriated-Principle recommended to be followed by other Development Authorities. HEADNOTE: The appellants are owners of arable land Lying on the outskirts of Meerut City. The land was sought to be acquired by <ORG> for its scheme to provide housing accommodation to the residents of the city. The Collector, recommended the acquisition of the said land on December 13, 1979, stating that in view of the acute shortage of houses in the city it was necessary that the State <ORG> invoke s. 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act , 1894. The notification under s. 4(1) of the Act dated April 29, 1980 was published in the <ORG> on July 12, 1980, stating that the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the Act were applicable to the said land and that s. 5-A shall not apply to the proposed acquisition. After publication of the notification the Collector noticed some errors in it which needed to be corrected by a corrigendum. The corrigendum and the declaration under s. 6 of the Act were issued on May 1, 1981. The possession of the land was taken and handed over to the <ORG> in July 1982. The appellants filed writ petitions in <ORG> questioning the notification under s. 4 and declaration under s. 6 of the Act alleging that the action of the <ORG> in invoking s. 17(1) and dispensing with the inquiry under s. 5A were not called for since the case of urgency put forward by the State <ORG> had been belied by the delay of nearly one year that had ensued between the date of notifica- 744 tion under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 of the Act. It was also contended that in the large extent of the land acquired there were some buildings here and there and so the acquisition was not justified since these portions were not either waste or arable lands which could be dealt with under s. 17(1). <ORG> being of the view that the failure to issue the declaration under s.6 of the Act immediately after the notification under s. 4 was fatal, held that the notification dated April 29, 1980 under s. 4 which contained a direction under s. 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under s. 5 A of the Act was invalid and, therefore, both the notification under s. 4 and the subsequent declaration made under s. 6 were liable to be quashed. In the appeals by special leave to this Court on the question: Whether in the circumstances of the case it could be said that on ac count of mere delay of nearly one year in the publication of the declaration it could be said that the order made by the State <ORG> dispensing with compliance with s. 5A at the time of publication of the notification under s. 4(1) would stand vitiated in the absence of any other material. Allowing the appeals, ^ HELD: 1.1 Having regard to the enormous growth of population in the country the provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. The schemes relating to development of residential areas in the urban centres are so urgent that it is necessary to invoke s. 17(1) of the Act to dispense with the inquiry under s. 5A . [749 F-G] 1.2 In the instant case, there is no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the <ORG> or any of the officers, nor do the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of the city during the relevant time. [749 E] 1.3 The mere fact that on account of some error on the part of the officials processing the case at the level of the <ORG> there was a post-notification delay of nearly one year in issuing declaration under s. 6 is, therefore, not by itself sufficient to hold that the decision taken by the State <ORG> under s. 17(1) and (4) of the Act at the time of the issue of the notification under s. 4(1) of the Act was either improper or illegal. [751 A-B] 745 Deepak Pahwa etc. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.,  (1) S.C.R. 588 referred to. <NAME> etc. v. State of Maharashtra,  (1) S.C.R. 768 distinguished. 2.1 Where a large extent of land is being acquired for planned development of an urban area it would not be proper to leave small portions, over which some super-structures have been constructed, out of the development scheme. In a situation where there is real urgency it would be difficult to apply section 5-A of the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its application. [751 D-E] 2.2 Whether the land in question is waste or arable land has to be judged by looking at the general nature and condition of land. [751 E-F] 3.1 Whenever power under s. 17(1) is invoked, the <ORG> automatically becomes entitled to take possession of land, other than waste and arable, by virtue of sub-s. (1-A) of s. 17 without further declaration where the acquisition is for sanitary improvement or planned development. [752 B-C] 3.2 In the instant case, the acquisition was for planned development. The mere omission to refer expressly to s. 17(1- A) of the Act in the notification cannot be considered to be fatal in this case. [752 B] 4.1 It may be that many of the persons from whom lands have been acquired are also persons without houses or shop sites and if they are to be thrown out of their lands they would be exposed to serious prejudice. Since the land is being acquired for providing residential accommodation to the people of Meerut those who are being expropriated on account of the acquisition proceedings would also be eligible for some relief at the hands of the concerned Development <ORG>. [752 D-E] 4.2 Although s. 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 which provides for such relief is not in terms applicable to the present acquisition proceedings, the provision nonetheless contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas. [753 B-C] The Meerut Development <ORG>, for whose benefit the land in 746 question has been acquired, it is hoped, will as far as practicable, provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses or shop buildings in the urban area in question. [753 C-D] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1495- 1507 and 1509-1511 of 1986 etc. From the Judgment and order dated 24.5.1985 of <ORG> in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 7729/82, 12762/81, 7810, 7865, 8408, 8409, 8407, 8410, 8872, 9527, 9439, 2482, 5170, 5122, 7903 and 7904 of 1982.

<NAME>, Attorney General, <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Appellants.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. Meerut city which is situated in a densely populated part of the State of Uttar Pradesh is growing very fast. <ORG> constituted <ORG> under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act , 1973 for the city of Meerut for the purpose of tackling the problems of town planning and urban development resolutely, since it felt that the existing local body and other authorities in spite of their best efforts had not been able to cope up with the problems to the desired extent.

<ORG> sent a proposal to the Collector of Meerut for acquisition of 662 bighas 10 biswas and 2 biswanis of land (approximately equal to 412 acres) situated at villages Mukarrabpur, Plahera, Paragana-Daurala, Tehsil Sardhana, Distt. Meerut for its housing scheme with the object of providing housing accommodation to the residents of Meerut city. After making necessary enquiries and receipt of the report from the tehsildar of Sardhana, the Collector was fully satisfied about the need for the acquisition of the land. He accordingly wrote a letter on December 13, 1979 to the Commissioner and Secretary, <ORG>, <ORG> recom- mending the acquisition of the above extent of land in the villages men tioned above and he also stated that since there was acute shortage of houses in Meerut city, it was necessary that <ORG> should invoke section 17(i) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act , 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). He also submitted a certificate as required by the Rules containing the relevant data on the basis of which the Government could take a decision. In that certificate he stated that the acquisition of the land was very necessary for the purposes of the housing scheme. The total value of the land was estimated to be about Rs.55,01,270.25 paise and the cost of trees and structures was stated to be in the order of about Rs. 1 lakh. The Secretary of <ORG> also submitted his certificate in support of the acquisition of the land in question. He stated that the proposed cost of the project was in the order of Rs. 48 crores. He also furnished the number of flats to be constructed and house sites to be allotted. The certificate further stated that the land which was proposed to be acquired was being used for cultivation and that the said land had been proposed to be used for residential purposes under the master plan of Meerut city. After taking into consideration all the material before it including the certificates of the Collector and the Secretary, <ORG>, referred to above, <ORG> published a notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the Act notifying for general information that the land mentioned in the Schedule was needed for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of residential buildings for the people of Meerut by <ORG> under a planned development scheme. The notification further stated that <ORG> being of the opinion that the provisions of subsection (1) of section 17 of the Act were applicable to the said land inasmuch as it was arable land which was urgently required for the public purpose, referred to above. The notification further directed that section 5-A of the Act shall not apply to the proposed acquisition. The above notification was published in <ORG> on July 12, 1980 and it was followed by a declaration under section 6 of the Act which was issued on May 1, 1981. The possession of the land, which had been notified for acquisition, was taken and handed over to <ORG> in July, 1982. Thereafter about 17 persons who owned in all about 40 acres of land out of the total of about 412 acres acquired, filed writ petitions in <ORG> questioning the notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the Act on the ground that the action of the Government in invoking section 17(1) of the Act and dispensing with the inquiry under section 5-A of the Act was not called for in the circumst-

<NAME>

ances of the case. <ORG> after hearing the parties held that the notification dated 29.4.1980 under section 4 of the Act which contained a direction under section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the inquiry under section 5-A of the Act was an invalid one and, therefore, both the notification under section 4 and the subsequent declaration made under section 6 of the Act were liable to be quashed. Accordingly they were quashed.

It should be stated here that while only 17 persons owning about 40 acres of land had filed the writ petitions, <ORG> set aside the acquisition of the entire extent of about 412 acres. That was the effect of quashing the notification issued under section 4(1) of the Act and all subsequent proceedings as the relief was not confined to the petitioners only. By the time the judgment of <ORG> was pronounced on May 24, 1985, it is stated, that <ORG> had spent more than Rs.4 crores on the development of the land which had been acquired. By then 854 houses had been constructed on the land and 809 plots had been allotted by it to various persons. All the landowners other than the writ petitioners before <ORG> had been paid two-thirds of the compensation due to them.

Aggrieved by the decision of <ORG>, the State of Uttar Pradesh and <ORG> have filed the above appeals by special leave.

The main ground on which <ORG> set aside the impugned notification and the declaration was that the case of urgency put forward by <ORG> for dispensing with the compliance with the provisions of section 5-A of the Act had been belied by the delay of nearly one year that had ensued between the date of the notification under section 4 and the date of declaration made under section 6 of the Act. It, however, rejected the contention of the petitioners based on the delay that had preceded the issue of the notification under section 4 of the Act. <ORG> observed that 'if the <ORG> were satisfied with the urgency it would have certainly issued declaration under section 6 of the Act immediately after the issue of the notification under section 4 of the Act.' It found that the failure to issue declaration under section 6 of the Act immediately on the part of <ORG> was fatal. That there was delay of nearly one year between the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act containing the direction dispensing with the compliance with section 5-A of the Act and the date of publication of the declaration issued under section 6 of the Act is not disputed. It is seen from the record before us that after the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act, the Collector after going through it found that there were some errors in the notification which needed to be corrected by issuing a corrigendum. Accordingly, he wrote a letter to <ORG> on 25.8.1980 pointing out the errors and requesting <ORG> to publish a corrigendum immediately. Both the corrigendum and the declaration under section 6 of the Act were issued on May 1, 1981. It is on account of some error on the part of the officials who were entrusted with the duty of processing of the case at the level of the <ORG> there was a delay of nearly one year between the publication of the notification under section 4(1) and the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act. The question for consideration is whether in the circumstances of the case it could be said that on account of the mere delay of nearly one year in the publication of the declaration it could be said that the order made by <ORG> dispensing with the compliance with section 5-A of the Act at the time of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act would stand vitiated in the absence of any other material. In this case there is no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the <ORG> or any of the officers, nor do the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of Meerut city during the relevant time. The letters and the certificates submitted by the Collector and the Secretary of <ORG> to <ORG> before the issue of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act clearly demonstrated that at that time there was a great urgency felt by them regarding the provision of housing accommodation at Meerut. The State <ORG> acted upon the said reports, certificates and other material which were before it. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the decision of <ORG> in resorting to section 17(1) of the Act was unwarranted. The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke section 17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with section 5-A of the Act. Perhaps, at the time to which the decision in <ORG> v. State of Maharashtra,  (1) S.C.R. 768 related the situation might have been that the schemes relating to development of residential areas in the urban centres were not so urgent and it was not necessary to eliminate the inquiry under  section 5-A of the Act. The acquisition proceedings which had been challenged in that case related to the year 1963. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it is no longer possible for the Court to take the view that the schemes of development of residential areas do not 'appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary inquiries under section 5-A of the Act'. In <NAME> (died) and <CITATION> ., A.I.R. 1975 A.P. 269. <NAME>, J. speaking for <ORG> of Andhra Pradesh dealing with the problem of providing housing accommodation to Harijans has observed thus:

"That the housing conditions of Harijans all over the country continue to be miserable even today is a fact of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. History has made it urgent that, among other problems, the problem of housing Harijans should be solved expeditiously. The greater the delay the more urgent becomes the problem. Therefore, one can never venture to say that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for providing house sites for Harijans is bad merely because the officials entrusted with the task of taking further action in the matter are negligent or tardy in the discharging of their duties, unless, of course, it can be established that the acquisition itself is made with an oblique motive. The urgent pressures of history are not to be undone by the inaction of the bureaucracy. I am not trying to make any pontific pronouncements. But I am at great pains to point out that provision for house sites for Harijans is an urgent and pres sing necessity and that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to be improper, in the absence of mala fides, merely because of the delay on the part of some Government officials."

(Underlining by us) What was said by the learned Judge in the context of provision of housing accommodation to Harijans is equally true about the problem of providing housing accommodation to all persons in the country today having regard to the enormous growth of population in the country. The observation made in the above decision of <ORG> is quoted with approval by this Court in <NAME> v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., [1985] (1) S.C.R. 588 even though in the above decision the Court found that it was not necessary to say anything about the post-notification delay. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case the post-notification delay of nearly one year is not by itself sufficient to hold that the decision taken by <ORG> under section 17(1) and (4) of the Act at the time of the issue of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act was either improper or illegal.

It was next contended that in the large extent of land acquired which was about 412 acres there were some buildings here and there and so the acquisition of these parts of the land on which buildings were situated was unjustified since those portions were not either waste or arable lands which could be dealt with under section 17(1) of the Act. This contention has not been considered by <ORG>. We do not, however, find any substance in it. The Government was not acquiring any property which was substantially covered by buildings. It acquired about 412 acres of land on the out-skirts of Meerut city which was described as arable land by the Collector. It may be true that here and there were a few super-structures. In a case of this nature where a large extent of land is being acquired for planned development of the urban area it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which some super-structures have been constructed out of the development scheme. In such a situation where there is real urgency it would be difficult to apply section 5-A of the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its application. Whether the land in question is waste or arable land has to be judged by looking at the general nature and condition of the land. It is not necessary in this case to consider any further the legality or the propriety of the application of section 17(1) of the Act to such portions of land proposed to be acquired, on which super-structures were standing because of the special provision which is inserted as sub-section (1-A) of section 17 of the Act by the Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment) Act  which reads thus:

"(1-A). The power to take possession under sub- section (1) may also be exercised in the case of land other than waste or arable land where the land is acquired for, in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development."

It is no doubt true that in the notification issued under section 4  752 of the Act while exempting the application of section 5-A of the Act to the proceedings, the State <ORG> had stated that the land in question was arable land and it had not specifically referred to sub section (1-A) of section 17 of the Act under which it could take possession of land other than waste and arable land by applying the urgency clause. The mere omission to refer expressly section 17 (1- A) of the Act in the notification cannot be considered to be fatal in this case as long as the <ORG> had the power in that sub-section to take lands other than waste and arable lands also by invoking the urgency clause. Whenever power under section 17(1) is invoked the <ORG> automatically becomes entitled to take possession of land other than waste and arable lands by virtue of sub-section (1-A) of section 17 without further declaration where the acquisition is for sanitary improvement or planned development. In the present case the acquisition is for planned development. We do not, therefore find any substance in the above contention.

It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that many of the persons from whom lands have been acquired are also persons without houses or shop sites and if they are to be thrown out of their land they would be exposed to serious prejudice. Since the land is being acquired for providing residential accommodation to the people of Meerut those who are being expropriated on account of the acquisition proceedings would also be eligible for some relief at the hands of <ORG>. We may at this stage refer to the provision contained in section 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 which reads as follows:

"21(2). The powers of the <ORG> or, as the case may be, the local authority concerned with respect to the disposal of land under sub-section (1) shall be so exercised as to secure, so far as practicable, that persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities on the land shall, if they desire to obtain accommodation on land belonging to the <ORG> or the local authority concerned and are willing to comply with any requirements of the <ORG> or the local authority concerned as to its development and use, have an opportunity to obtain thereon accommodation suitable to their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them:

Provided that where the <ORG> or the local au-

thority concerned proposes to dispose of by sale any land without any development having been undertaken or carried out thereon, it shall offer the land in the first instance to the persons from whom it was acquired, if they desire to purchase it subject to such requirements as to its develop- ment and use as the <ORG> or the local authority concerned may think fit to impose."

Although the said section is not in terms applicable to the pre sent acquisition proceedings, we are of the view that the above provision in the Delhi Development Act contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas. We hope and trust that <ORG>, for whose benefit the land in question has been acquired, will as far as practicable provide a house site or shop site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated persons who have no houses or shop buildings in the urban area in question.

Having regard to what we have stated above, we are of the view that the judgment of <ORG> cannot be sustained and it is liable to be set aside. We accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of <ORG> and dismiss the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents in <ORG>. There is no order as to costs.

P.S.S. Appeals allowed.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. One Smt. <NAME> died leaving some grove and agricultural plots which she had inherited from her husband. She had acquired Bhumidhari rights in respect of the agricultural plots before her death. During the consolidation proceedings <ORG>, <NAME> moved an application before <ORG> claiming that as Smt. <NAME> had died heirless her entire holding vested in <ORG>. The original petitioners <NAME> and <NAME> filed objection laying claim to the estate of the deceased widow on the basis of:--

(i) inheritance being her husband's brother's son's sons:

(ii) Will executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer on 12-10-1962 in favour of <NAME>:

(iii) Registered sale-deed dated 4-4-1963 executed by Smt. <NAME> in respect of her entire holding including groves in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners' objection was rejected and the claim of <ORG> was upheld. The appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and their revision under Section 48 of the Act was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 26-3-1966. The petitioners then moved the present writ Petition.

3. When the Writ Petition came up for hearing before <NAME>, J., he noticed that one of the questions that arose in the case was as to whether the widow was competent to transfer the whole of her agricultural holding without the prior permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as required by Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act.

4. Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act enacts that no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) previously obtained shall transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area. Full Bench of this court in <CITATION> at Hardoi, AIR 1971 All 87 (FB), has taken the view that the expression "any part of his holding" did not include the entire holding so that the ban applied only where a part of holding was transferred and not when the holding was transferred as a whole.

The learned Judge noticed the Hindi version of Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act which reads:

"NA CHAKBANDI KSHETTRA ME SAMMILIT APKI JOT ATHWA USKE KISHI BHAG KO VIKRAYA DAN ATHWA BINIMAY DWARA HASTAN-TRIT KAREGA."

According to the Hindi version the ban would apply as much to the transfer of a part of the holding as to the whole. In his opinion the words in the English version were not clear and it was possible to interpret them in accordance with the Hindi version of the enactment. He accordingly referred the matter to <ORG> and that is how this petition has come up before us.

5. To begin with, we might state that although the learned Judge has not indicated as to whether the entire case has to be decided by <ORG> or only the question relating to the interpretation of Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act, yet having regard to the fact and the circumstances of the case the intention of the learned Judge was to refer only the limited question relating to the interpretation of Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) and not the whole case, because even if the petitioners fail on this ground their alternative pleas will have to be examined. We shall accordingly restrict ourselves to the short question as to whether the ban incorporated in Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) applies to the transfer of an agricultural holding as a whole or applies only when a part of the holding is transferred. Clause (c) of Section 5 (1) was added in the Act by Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U. P. Act XXXVIII of 1958) and reads as under:--

"(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer Consolidation previously obtained shall-

(i) Use his holdings or any part thereof for purpose not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming; or

(ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area;

Provided that a tenure-holder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof, for any purpose for which it was in use prior to the date specified in the notification issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 ."

It may at once be noticed that Clause (ii) is flanked by Clause (i) and the proviso at the end of Clause (ii). Clause (i) and the proviso deal with the ban on non-agricultural use of a holding while Clause (ii) imposes a ban on the transfer of a holding. In Clause (i) the expression used is "holding or any part thereof". The same expression is used in the proviso, which in fact, is a proviso to Clause (i) so that ban on the user of agricultural holding for non-agricultural purpose extends to the holding as a whole as also to a part thereof. But when we come to Clause (ii) the expression used is "any part of his holding". Obviously the ban contemplated under Clause (i) is not co-extensive with the ban contained in Clause (ii) otherwise there is no reason why the expression "holding or any part thereof" should not have been used in Clause (ii) also. The expression "holding or any part thereof" is not synonymous with the expression "any part of the holding" if regard is had to the jurisdiction of Clause (ii). If Clause (ii) had stood alone it could be possible to interpret the expression "any part of the holding" as meaning every part of the holding. But having regard to the terminology employed in the preceding clause and the succeeding proviso, no other meaning can be assigned to it except that it means "a part" as distinguished from 'the whole': It is true that grammatically, the expression "a part" would have been more apt than the expression "any part". But when the intention of the <ORG> is clear, nothing will turn upon this grammatical error. According to the dictionary meaning also "any" is sometimes used for the adjective "a". It is not necessary, however, to dwell upon this point any further because the question has been the subject-matter of previous decisions of this court which have unanimously interpreted the expression "any part" to mean "a part". The first decision is of <NAME>, J., in <CITATION> , 1966 All WR (HC) 818 His Lordship held that the prohibition in Clause (ii) of Section 5 (1) (c) extended to the transfer of a part of the holding and not to the whole holding so that the whole holding could be transferred by a tenure-holder without the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). This decision has been affirmed on special appeal by <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, J., in <NAME> v. <NAME>, 1968 All LJ 223. The question was again considered by another <ORG> of which two of us were members in the case Smt. <NAME>, AIR 1971 All 87 (<NAME>) when the view taken in the earlier cases was affirmed. There is yet another decision of a <ORG> of this court consisting of <NAME>, <NAME>, and <NAME>, JJ., in <CITATION> , 1970 RD 130. <ORG> agreed with the view taken by the earlier <ORG> in the case of Smt. <NAME> (<NAME>). Thus so far this court is concerned, the matter stands concluded.

6. If one has regard to the object underlying the provisions in question it becomes quite clear as to why the ban in Clauses (i) and (ii) is not co-extensive. The object underlying Clause (i) is to preserve the land for agricultural purposes and that is why a complete ban has been placed on the use of the land for non-agricultural purposes. A ban on a part of the land only would not have served the purpose. Under Clause (ii) the ban was intended to prevent the fragmentation of holdings and, as such, it was placed only on a transfer of a part of the holding. There could be no objection to the transfer of the holding as a whole because if would not involve fragmentation but would involve only a change in ownership. The scheme underlying the Act was to consolidate agricultural holdings and to prevent their further fragmentation and also to preserve the land for agricultural purpose. It was not the intention to restrict the right of an owner to deal with his property by way of sale, exchange or transfer except to the extent that was necessary to carry out the objects of the Act. That is why a ban of a limited nature has been placed on transfers while a complete ban has been placed on the user of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. Having regard to all these circumstances it is not possible to take a different view.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the law having been settled by a series of decisions of this court it should not be unsettled by taking a different view as it would lead to a lot of confusion and give rise to a spate of litigation. For this he relied upon the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> , AIR 1973 SC 291 where it has been observed:

"............ to take a contrary view from the law laid down would have the effect of unsettling the law established for a number of years. In the matter of interpretation of a local statute the view taken by <ORG> over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view would not only introduce an element of an uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which might have been entered on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be invoked in such a situation."

There is a lot of force in this contention also but it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine of stare decisis, because we are of the firm view that there is no ambiguity whatsoever in the language in which this provision is couched and having regard to all the facts and the circumstances of the case it is not possible to interpret it differently.

8. It is no doubt true that the Hindi version is in conflict with the English version. The Hindi version expressly says that the ban shall apply to the holding as a whole as also to a part thereof. The question arises as to whether in such a situation we should give preference to the English version or to the Hindi version. For this purpose we have to turn to Article 348 of the Constitution. It is necessary to reproduce that Article. It enacts:--

"348 (1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until <ORG> by law otherwise provides-

(a) all proceedings in <ORG> and <ORG>,

(b) the authoritative texts-

(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either <ORG> or in the <ORG> or either <ORG> of the Legislature of a State.

(ii) of all Acts passed by <ORG> or the <ORG> of a State and of all ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a State, and (iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by <ORG> or the <ORG> of a State, shall be in the English language. (2) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) the Governor of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any official purpose of the State, in proceedings in the <ORG> having its principal seat in that State: Provided that nothing in this Clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or order passed or made by such <ORG>.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-clause (b) of Clause (1) where the <ORG> of a state has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the <ORG> of the State or in Ordinances promulgated of the Governor of the state or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this Article."

Under this Article two things have been provided. Firstly all proceedings in <ORG> and in <ORG> have to be in the English language except when under Clause (2) the Governor of a State with the previous consent of the President authorises the use of the Hindi language or any other local language in proceedings in <ORG> of that State. We are not concerned with that question in this case. Secondly the authoritative text of all Bills and Acts of the <ORG> and of <ORG> has to be in the English language. However, <ORG>s are authorised to prescribe any language other than the English language for this purpose, but, in such an event Clause (3) provides that a translation in the English language of any Bill introduced in or Act passed by <ORG> in a language other than the English language has to be published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of the state and such translation shall be deemed to be the authoritative text of such a Bill and Act.

Whenever a question arises as to what is the authoritative text of a particular Act or an Ordinance etc., of <ORG> one has to turn to its English translation if ii was enacted in a language other than the English language. The authoritative text of a Bill, Act or Ordinance of <ORG> cannot be in a language other than the English language unless the <ORG> by law otherwise provides. Thus the power to declare that the authoritative text of any Ordinance, Act etc., of a State Legislative shall, be in a language other than the English language has been vested exclusively in the <ORG>. The <ORG> has not made any such provision so far. The official language of the State of Uttar Pradesh is Hindi, so that <ORG> can pass Ordinance, Acts etc., in the Hindi Language. Thus even though the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was passed by <ORG> in Hindi, yet its translation in the English Language shall be regarded its authoritative text and shall prevail over its Hindi version.

9. The learned Counsel for the respondents referred to Articles 345, 346 and 347 of the Constitution. Article 345 makes a provision for official language of a <ORG> and provides that <ORG> may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the <ORG> or the Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes. Article 346 makes a provision about the official language for communication between one <ORG> and another or between a <ORG> and the Union. In Article 347 a provision has been made that on a demand being made the President may direct that a language other than the English language shall be officially recognised in a <ORG> or any part thereof for such purposes as may be specified. These Articles have no bearing upon the question before us. We are not concerned with the official language of a <ORG> but are concerned with the question of the language in which the Bills and Acts have to be passed by a <ORG> Legislature and that subject has been specifically dealt with in Article 348 , which provides that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this part of the Constitution, all Acts etc., shall be in the English language. It is thus clear that the provisions contained in Articles 345, 346 and 347 are subject to the provisions contained in Article 348.

10. The other argument is that in Clause (3) of Article 348 the use of words "notwithstanding anything in Sub-clause (b) of Clause (1)" suggests that this clause will override Clause (1). This interpretation is not correct. It only means that <ORG> may prescribe any language other than the English Language for use in Bills introduced in or Acts passed by <ORG> and that Clause (1) (b) shall not create an impediment in its way. As we have already indicated above, when a Bill is introduced or an Act is passed in a language other than the English language by <ORG>, an authoritative translation thereof in the English language has to be provided and that translation shall for the purposes of Clause (1) (b) be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof. Indeed, it will be beyond the competence of <ORG> to provide that the authoritative text of its Act and Ordinance etc., shall be in a language other than the English language, because such a power vests only in the <ORG>. Thus, when there is a conflict between the English version of a Statute of <ORG> and its version in a local language, the version in English language will prevail over the version in the local language. <ORG> of this court in <CITATION> ., AIR 1954 All 257 while referring to Article 348 of the Constitution has at page 278 in paragraph 83 observed:--

"In view of this provision of the Constitution the notification appearing in English must prevail over the notification appearing in Hindi."

A <ORG> of this Court in <CITATION> , AIR 1962 AH 240 (FB) has held that in U. P. after the passing of the U. P. Act s No. 1 of 1950 (U. P. Language Bills Act) and 26 of 1951 (U. P. Official Language Act) <ORG> has prescribed Hindi as the language for the official use in the <ORG>, and both, the Hindi version as also the English translation of a Bill or Act etc., published in <ORG> are valid and authorised and both of them can be looked into and put to official use. There is no competition between the two. It is only in case of conflict or divergence between the two versions that the English version may reign supreme and supersede the Hindi one. Following this <ORG> decision a learned Single Judge in <CITATION> , AIR 1965 All 170 has held that although Hindi was the official language of the <ORG> of U. P., in case of divergence between the Hindi and the English versions, of the official gazette the English version reigned supreme and superseded the Hindi version. The same view has been taken by <ORG> in <CITATION> , AIR 1966 Raj 142 and <ORG> in <NAME> v. <ORG> (Sales Tax), AIR 1958 Madh Pra 16.

11. This being the position we are clearly of the opinion that in the present case it is the English text which shall prevail over the Hindi version and according to the English text the expression "any holding" occurring in Clause (ii) of Section 5 (1) (c) of the Act does not include the "Whole holding" so that it is not necessary to obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for the transfer of the holding as a whole.

12. With this answer, we direct the writ Petition to be placed before a learned Single Judge for disposal.


PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA Vs. RESPONDENT: SUBASH CHANDER MARWAHA AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1973 BENCH: <NAME>, D.G. BENCH: <NAME>, D.G. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. CITATION: 1973 AIR 2216 1974 SCR (1) 165 1974 SCC (3) 220 CITATOR INFO : R 1977 SC 276 (9) R 1978 SC 327 (11) E&R 1984 SC 169 (2) R 1984 SC1850 (12) D 1991 SC1612 (1,7,8) ACT: Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Service Rules, Part C. rr. 8 and 10-Rules fixing 45% as qualifying marks- <ORG> fixing 550% for actual selection for appointment- If illegal. HEADNOTE: Under the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Service Rules, which were applicable in the appellant-State, <ORG> was to hold an examination and prepare a list strictly in accordance with the marks obtained by the candidates. Under s. 8 of Part C of the Rules. no candidate shall be considered to have qualified unless he obtains 45% marks in the aggregate. Under r. 10. after the list is published in the <ORG>. <ORG> was bound to make the selection of the candidates strictly in the order in the list, and intimate the selection to <ORG>. When vacancies are to be filled <ORG> will send in the names in accordance with. and in the order in, the list, for appointment. In the present case. it was advertised that <ORG> would hold an examination for recruitment of candidates for 15 vacancies. 40 candidates qualified by scoring 45% or more marks. The appellant selected the first seven who had scored more than 55% marks. The respondent, who ranked 8, 9 and 13 in the list, filed a petition for the issue of a mandamus claiming that since there were 15 vacancies, the appellant was not entitled to fill up only seven. The appellant justified their action on the ground that in the interest of maintaining-high standards of judicial competence, they were not prevented from fixing a higher standard while making the actual appointment. <ORG> allowed the petition. Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD: (1) In order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and that the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. [170E- <CITATION> ,  Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 144, followed.- (2) The advertisement that there were 15 vacancies did not give the respondent a right to be appointed. The fact that a candidate's name appeared in the list also did not entitle him to be appointed. [170A] (3) The effect of the rules is that, (a) <ORG> shall not make appointments by traveling outside the list, and (b) <ORG> shall make the selection for appointment strictly according to the order in the list. There is no other constraint or legal duty on the <ORG> to make an.appointment in the judicial service. merely because there are vacancies or a list had been prepared. [17WE] (4) There is no constraint on the <ORG> against fixing a higher score of marks for the Purpose of selection with a view to maintain a high standard. There was nothing arbitrary in fixing 55% for the purpose of selection, because, <ORG> itself intimated such a view to the Punjab <ORG>. The fact that that <ORG> later fixed a lower score was no ground for the appellant to change their mind. [171A-D] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 534 of 1973. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 31, 1973 of <ORG> at Chandigarh in C.W. No. 1541 of 1972.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellant.

<NAME>, for respondent No. 1.

<NAME> for respondent No. 2.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for respondent No. 3 <NAME>, for the intervener.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an Order of <ORG> dated January 31, 1973 passed in Civil Writ No. 1541 of 1972. That was a Writ Petition filed by respondents 1 to 3 for a mandamus. The petition was allowed and by its judgment <ORG> issued a mandamus to the appellant to select respondents 1 to 3 under Rule 1 0 (ii) of Part C of the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Services Rules so that their names are brought on <ORG> Register for appointment as Subordinate Judges in the Haryana State. The aforesaid rules had been adopted by the Haryana State after bifurcation.

On February 3, 1970 an advertisement was published in <ORG> to the effect that <ORG> will hold an examination for recruitment of candidates for 15 vacancies in <ORG> (<ORG>). In response to the advertisement a number of candidates appeared for the examination held in November, 1970. The result of the competitive examination was declared and published in <ORG> on April 6, 1971. It was a list of 40 candidates who obtained 45% or more marks in the examination. <ORG> which is the appointing authority made seven appointments in the serial order of the list according to merit. Respondents who ranked 8, 9 and 13 respectively in that list did not get an order of appointment although there were vacancies. The reason for not making the appointments was that in the view of <ORG>, which was the same as that of <ORG> previously intimated to <ORG>, candidates getting less than 55% of marks in the examination should not be appointed as Subordinate Judges in the interest of maintaining high-standards of competence in Judicial Service. Respondents 1 to 3 who expected to be appointed filed the petition claiming that since, there were 15 vacancies and they had the necessary qualifications for appointment <ORG> was not entitled to pick and choose only seven out of them for appointment, because to do so would be to prescribe a standard which was not contemplated by the rules but was against them. The appellant, on the other hand, contended that the rules did not oblige them to fill in all the vacancies and it was open to them ( the <ORG>) to appoint the first seven candidates front the list in the interest of maintaining high-standards. There was no question of picking and choosing. The rules did not prevent the <ORG> from deciding at the time of selection from the list, the minimum number of marks that a selected candidate should score for the purpose of an appointment. <ORG> agreed with the contention of the <ORG>, that merely because the advertisement was for filling 15 vacancies the first 15 candidates in the list had no right to be appointed in the posts but held that as long as there are requisite number of vacancies unfilled and qualified candidates were available, those candidates had a legal right to be selected under rule 10........ of Part C of the Rules. In the view of <ORG> <ORG> was not entitled to impose a new standard of 55% of marks for selection as that was against the rule which provided for a minimum of 45 %.

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the above finding against the <ORG> was erroneous. The submission was that under the rules the minimum of 45 % was an element to be considered for the eligibility of a candidate for selection and that while making the actual appointment by selection the <ORG> Government, in the interest of main- taining high-standards of judicial competence, were not prevented from fixing a minimum standard of a score of 55% marks, especially, as that was the view of <ORG> also previously intimated to them. In our view that submission is correct.

Elaborate rules were framed by the Punjab Government in 1951 for the purpose of recruitment of Subordinate Judges to <ORG> (Judicial Branch). After the bifurcation of the Punjab State these rules applied to the State of Haryana and the same have been published by <ORG> with appropriate amendments. Part A of these rules deals with general qualifications. Part B deals with the preparation and submission of rolls of those who are qualified under Part-A. Those who are on these rolls prepared by the District Judges become eligible for appearing in a written examination held by <ORG>. The rules with regard to this examination are in Part C. Rule 4 thereof provides that "the examination papers shall be set and marks awarded by examiners who will be appointed by <ORG>. Rule 8, which is important, is as follows : "No candidate shall be considered to have qualified unless he obtains 45 per cent marks in the aggregate of all the papers and at least 33 per cent marks in the language paper, that is, Hindi (in Devnagri script)". As we shall see immediately the final selection depends entirely on this examination. Apart from this examination there is no other hurdle except that of medical examination to be passed by the candidate. No oral interview is prescribed. Rule 10 is as follows :

(i) The result of the examination will be published in the Punjab Government Gazette.

(ii) Candidates will be selected for appointment strictly in the order in which they have been placed by <ORG> in the list of those who have qualified under rule 8 ;............

It will be seen from this that the function under the rules given to <ORG> was to hold the examination and then prepare a list strictly in accordance with merit on the basis of the marks received in the examination and this list was to be published in <ORG>. Thus it became public property and every candidate would know having regard to the vacancies whether he is likely to be appointed.

The list is of great importance. There could be no departure from the list either by <ORG>, <ORG> or <ORG>. This will be seen from Part D which relates to appointments. Rule I in this part provides that "the names of candidates selected by <ORG> for appointment as Subordinate Judges under rules 10 and 1 1 of Part C shall be entered on <ORG> Register in the order of their selection." Rule 10(ii) in Part C referred to earlier stated that the "candidates will be selected for appointment" and rule I in Part D says "that the selection was by <ORG> for appointment". Reading the two together it is clear that <ORG> was bound to make the selection strictly in the order in which the names were mentioned by <ORG> in the list and this selection was for the specific purpose of making appointments. There is no question of <ORG> making any recommendations. Once <ORG> has selected the names of the candidates strictly in accordance with the list, such selection for appointment is intimated to <ORG> and the candidates so selected by <ORG> for appointment are to be entered by <ORG> in a Register in the order of the selection. Obviously the Register is to be kept by <ORG> because <ORG> knows in its administrative capacity what vacancies have occurred and which are the courts to which the appointments have to be made. The Service Rules have been made in consultation with <ORG> and <ORG> and, therefore, they are binding on all. They show that the examination is the final test, apart from medical examination as per rule 1 1 in Part C for a candidate's appointment to the post of the Sub,ordinate Judge and once the list is prepared by <ORG><ORG> strict in order of merit, neither the <ORG> mission nor the <ORG> nor <ORG> can depart from the order of merit given in the list except where reservations have been made in favour of backward classes and Scheduled castes and tribes in accordance with rule 10(ii). In the present case it appears that about 40 candidates had passed the examination with the minimum score of 45 per cent. Their names were published in the <ORG> Gazette as required by Rule 10(1) already referred to. It is not disputed that the mere entry in this list of the name of a candidate does not give him the right to be appointed. The advertisement that there are 15 vacancies to be filled does not also give him a right to be appointed. It may happen that the <ORG> for financial or other administrative reasons may not fill up any vacancies. In such a case the candidates, even the first in the list, will not have a right to be appointed. The list is merely to help <ORG> in making the appointments showing which candidates have the minimum qualifications under the Rules. The stage for selection for appointment comes thereafter, and it is not disputed that under the Constitution it is <ORG> alone which can make the appointments. <ORG> does not come into the picture for recommending any particular candidates. After the <ORG>, <ORG> have taken a decision as to which of the candidates in accordance with the list should be appointed, the list of selected candidates for appointment is forwarded to <ORG> and <ORG> then will have to enter such candidates on a Register maintained by it. When vacancies are to be filled <ORG> will send in the names of the candidates in accordance with the select list and in the order they have been placed in that list for appointment in the vacancies. <ORG>, therefore, plays no part except to suggest to the <ORG> who in accordance with the select list is to be appointed in a particular vacancy. It appears that in the present case <ORG> had sent up the rolls of the first 15 candidates because the <ORG> had been informed that there are 15 vacancies. <ORG> also in its routine course had sent upthe first 15 names to the <ORG> for appointment. Thereuponthe Chief Secretary to <ORG>, Haryana wrote to the Registrar of<ORG> on May 4, 1971 as follows :

"I am directed to refer to <ORG> endst. No. 1678-1GS 11-71/3802, dated the 22nd April, 1971, on the subject noted above, and to say that after careful consideration of the recommendations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court for appointment of first fifteen candidates to the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch), <ORG> have taken the view that it would be appropriate that only the first seven candidates should be appointed to the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and a notification has been issued accordingly. The reason is that in the opinion of <ORG>, only those candidates who obtained 55% or more marks in the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Examination, should be appointed as that was serve to maintain a minimum standard in the appointments to the Service. It may be mentioned that the last candidate appointed against unreserved vacancies out of the merit list prepared on the basis of the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Examination held in May, 1969, secured 55.67% marks. The State Government have also received information that the Punjab and Haryana High Court themselves recommended to <ORG> that in respect of <ORG> held in 1970, candidates securing 55% marks or more should be appointed against unreserved vacancies. Thus, the decision-taken by <ORG> is in line with the recommendations which <ORG> made to <ORG> regarding recruitment to the P.C.S. (Judicial Branch) on the basis of the Examination held in 1970, and a similar policy in both the cases would be desirable for obvious reasons."

This will clearly go to show that <ORG> itself had recommended earlier to <ORG> that only candidates securing 55% marks or more should be appointed as Subordinate Judges and <ORG> in the interest of maintaining high standards in the service had agreed with that opinion. This was entirely in the interest of judicial administration.

It is rather difficult to follow the reasoning of <ORG> in this case. It agrees that the advertisement mentioning 15 vacancies did not give a right to any candidate to be appointed to the post of a Subordinate Judge. Even so it somehow persuaded itself to spell out a right in the candidates because in fact there were 15 vacancies. At one place it was stated "so long as there are the number of vacancies to be filled in and there are qualified candidates in the list forwarded by <ORG> along with their Rolls, they have got a legal right to be selected under rule 10(ii) in Part 'C'." One fails to see how the existence of vacancies gives a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for conside- ration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the <ORG> to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if <ORG> while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that <ORG> had departed from the rules in this respect. The true effect of rule 10 in Part C is that if and when <ORG> propose to make appointments of Subordinate Judges <ORG> (i) shall not make such appoint- ments by travelling outside the list arid (ii) shall make the selection for appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list published in <ORG>. In the present case neither of these two requirements is infringed by the <ORG>. They have appointed the first seven persons in the list as Subordinate Judges. Apart from these constraints on the power to make the appointments, rule 10 does not impose any other constraint. There is no constraint that the <ORG> shall make an appointment of a Subordinate Judge either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence.

It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in <CITATION> (") that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on <ORG> to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived. It was, however, contended by Dr. <NAME> on behalf of the respondents that since rule 8 of Part C makes candidates who obtained 45 per cent or more in the competitive examination eligible for appointment, <ORG> had no right to introduce a new rule by which they can restrict the appointments to only those who have scored not less than 55%. It is contended that <ORG> have acted arbitrarily in fixing 55 per cent as the minimum for selection and this is contrary to the rule referred to above. The argument has no force. Rule 8 is a step in the preparation of a list of eligible candidates with minimum qualifications who may be considered for appointment. The list is prepared in order of merit. The one higher in rank is deemed (1)  (2) Suppl. S.C.R. 144.

to be more meritorious than the one who is lower in rank. It could never be said that one who tops the list is equal in merit to the one who,, is at the bottom of the list. Except that they are all mentioned in one list, each one of them stands on a separate level of competence as compared with another. That is why rule 10(ii), Part C speaks of "selection for appointment". Even as there is no constraint on <ORG> in respect of the number of appointments to be made, there is no constraint on the <ORG> fixing a higher score of marks for the purpose of selection. In a case where appointments are made by selection from a number of eligible candidates it is open to the <ORG> with a view to maintain high-standards of competence to fix a score which is much higher than the one required for mere eligibility. As shown in the letter of the Chief Secretary already referred to, they fixed a minimum of 55% for selection as they had done on a previous occasion. There is nothing arbitrary in fixing the score of' 55% for the purpose of selection, because that was the view of <ORG> also previously intimated to the Punjab <ORG> on which the Haryana <ORG> thought fit to act. that the Punjab <ORG> later on fixed a lower score is no reason for the Haryana, <ORG> to change their mind. This is essentially a matter of administrative policy and if the Haryana State <ORG> think that in the interest of judicial competence persons securing less than 55% of marks in the competitive examination should not be selected for appointment, those who get less than 55% have no right to claim that the selections be made of also those candidates who obtained less than the minimum fixed by <ORG>. In our view <ORG> was in error in thinking. that <ORG> had somehow contravened rule 8 of Part C. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the order passed by <ORG> set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

<ORG> allowed-