JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. We have before us a group of nine writ petitions whereby the several petitioners, who are carrying on business in agricultural commodities in what were recently constituted as Market Areas, under the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, (No. 38 of 1961), hereinafter to be referred as the "Act", seek writs in the nature of prohibition against the <ORG> and other respondents restraining them from making any interference with their right to carry on their business unhampered as before. They also ask for a writ or an appropriate direction for quashing the various provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-laws framed thereunder on the ground that they were null and void. As the writ petitions present some common features, they can conveniently be disposed of together.

2. Before we come to enumerate the several grounds of attack taken in the various writ petitions we think it convenient to refer to the salient features of the Act.

3. The Act which was passed by <ORG> received the assent of the President on 3-11-61, and is designed to provide for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan. The Act is divided in five chapters.

4. Chapter I is the preliminary Chapter and Section 2 thereof contains the various definitions. The following definitions may be noted :

"Section 2 (1) (i)--"agricultural produce" includes all produce whether of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule."

"Section 2 (1) (iv)--"bye-laws" means bye-laws made under Section 37 or Section 38."

"Section 2 (1) (vii)--"market" means a regulated market established under and for the purposes of this Act for a market area and includes a market proper as well as a principal market yard or a sub-market yard."

"Section 2 (1) (viii)--"market area" means any area declared to be a market area under Section 4."

"Section 2 (1) (ix)--"market committee" means a market committee established under section 6."

"Section 2 (1)(x)--"market proper" means the area, including all lands with the building thereon, within such distance of a principal market yard or a sub-market yard as <ORG> may declare to be a market proper."

"Section 2 (1) (xiii)--"principal market yard" means an enclosure, building or locality declared to be a principal market yard under Section 5."

"Section 2 (1) (xvii)--"sub-market yard" means an enclosure, building or locality declared to be a sub-market yard under Section 5."

5. Chapter II provides for constitution of markets. For this two necessary steps are required to be taken. Section 3 provides for the issuing of a notification of the intention of <ORG> of regulating purchase and sale of agricultural produce in an area as may be specified in the notification, and it also provides for inviting objections which when received are required to be considered by the Government. This section runs as under :

" Section 3. Notification of intention of exercising control over purchase and sale of agricultural produce in specified area-

(1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce and in such area as may be specified in the notification :

Provided that no area within the limits of a municipality shall be included in the area specified in such notification except after consultation with <ORG> or <ORG> concerned, as the case may be.

(2) A notification under Sub-section (1) shall state that any objection or suggestion which may be received by <ORG> within a period of not less than one month, to be specified in the notification, shall be considered by <ORG>."

6. Section 4 provides for declaration of a market area and this has to be done in accordance with the provisions of that section, which runs as follows :

"Section 4. Declaration of market area :

(1) After the expiry of the period specified in the notification issued under Section 3 and after considering such objections and suggestions as may be received before such expiry and after holding such inquiry as may be necessary the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare the area specified in the notification under Section 3 or any portion thereof to be a market area for the purposes of this Act in respect of all or any of the kinds of agricultural produce specified in the said notification.

(2) On and after the date on which any area is declared to be a market area under Sub-section (1), no place in the said area shall, subject to the provisions of Section 14, be used for the purchase or sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification issued thereunder :

Provided that, pending the establishment of a market in such area under Section 9, <ORG> may grant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, a licence to any person to use any place in the said area for the purchase or sale of any such agricultural produce.

(3) On and after the date of the notification issued under Sub-section (1) or such later date as may be specified therein, no local authority, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, and no other person, shall within the market area or within a distance thereof to be notified in the official <ORG> in this behalf in each case by <ORG>, set up, establish or continue or allow to be set up, established or continued any place for the purchase or sale of any agricultural produce so notified.

(4) <ORG> may, on the report of the Collector or of the Director or of <ORG> or an officer appointed in this behalf and after such inquiry as it deems fit to make, suspend or cancel any licence granted under Sub-section (2).

(5) The State Government may, at any time by notification in the official <ORG>, exclude from a market area any area or include in any market area any other area."

7. Section 5 makes provision for dividing a market into yards and it runs as" under :--

"Section 5. Division of market into yards :--

(1) For each market area there shall be one principal market yard and one or more sub-market yeards as may be necessary.

(2) <ORG> may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to be a principal market yard for the area and other enclosures, buildings or localities to be one or more sub-market yards."

8. Chapter III of the Act provides for constitution of market committees (<ORG>) which are the principal administrative instruments for giving effect to the scheme of marketing as adumbrated in the Act. Section 6 runs as under :--

"Section 6. Establishment of market committees.-

<ORG> shall establish a market committee for every market area in respect of the agricultural produce for which it is declared to be a market area under Section 4."

9. Section 7 provides for the manner of constituting market committees and the material portions thereof run as follows :

"Section 7. Constitution of market committees.-

(1) Every market committee shall be constituted as prescribed and shall consist of the following 15 members, namely :

(i) Seven shall be persons elected by such recognised organisation of agriculturists in the market area for which it is established as <ORG> may prescribe and, where no such organisations exist, by the agriculturists paying not less than ten rupees per year by way of rent or revenue and residing in the market area, in the manner prescribed;

(ii) two shall be persons elected by the traders licensed by the market committee in the prescribed manner;

(iii) two shall be representatives of <ORG> and <ORG> in the market area for which it is established as <ORG> may prescribe;

(iv) elected by local authorities as follows :

(a) one person shall be elected from amongst its own members by <ORG> having jurisdiction over the largest portion of the market area;

(b) If in a market area the principal market yard is wholly situated within the limits of a municipal council or a municipal board or a panchayat, one person shall be elected by the councillors of such municipal council or by the members of such municipal board or by the panchas (including the sarpanch) of such panchayat, as the case may be;

(c) if in a market area the principal market yard and the sub-market yard or yards are situated within the limits of more than one municipal council or municipal board or of more than one panchayat, one person shall be elected by the councillors of the municipal council or members of the municipal board or panchas (including the sarpanch) of the panchayat, as the case may be, within the local limits of which the major portion of the principal market yard is situated, and one person shall be elected in the prescribed manner by the other municipal councils or boards or by the other panchayats, as the case may be, within the local limits of which the remaining portion of the principal market yard and sub-market yard is situated;

Provided that a person to whom a licence has been granted under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 or under Section 14 shall not be eligible to become a member of the market committee under Clause (iii) or Clause (iv);

(v) nominated as follows :

(a) where in the circumstances mentioned in Clause (iv) the number of persons to be elected by local authorities is two, two persons shall be nominated by the State Government;

(b) where in the circumstances mentioned in Clause (iv) the number of persons to be so elected is three, one person shall be nominated by the State Government:

Provided that <ORG> may, at any time, reduce the number of nominated members for any market committee and in their place increase the number of members to be elected under Clause (i) or Clause (ii), as it thinks fit."

(2) to (8)...................... ............

(9) No act done by a market committee shall be questioned on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of, the committee."

10. The market committee is a body corporate and has a perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue 'and may be sued in its corporate name and is competent to acquire and hold property. Section 9 enumerates the several functions and duties of a market committee and it runs as follows :

"Section 9. Functions and duties of a market committee.--(1) A market committee shall-

(a) manage the market proper, the principal market yard and sub-market yards in the market area for which it is constituted;

(b) control and regulate-

(i) the running of the market in the interest of agriculturists and traders operating in the market;

(ii) the making of transactions in the market;

(iii) the admission and entry of persons to the market and the use thereof; and

(iv) the behaviour of those who enter the market for transacting business;

(c) take steps for the prevention of adulteration of agricultural produce;

(d) provide for the grading and standardisation of agricultural produce;

(e) act as a mediator or arbitrator in all matters of differences and disputes between licensees inter se or between them and agriculturists making use of the market as sellers of agricultural produce;

(f) bring, prosecute or defend or aid in bringing, prosecuting or defending any suit, action, proceeding, application or arbitration on behalf of the market committee or otherwise, when so directed by the State Government or the Director; and

(g) do such other things as might be required for the purpose of achieving the objects and requirements of this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder and facilitating the working of the market committee.

(2) It shall be the duty of the market committee-

(a) enforce the provisions of this Act, the rules and bye-law made thereunder and the terms and conditions of a licence granted under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 in the market area for which such committee is constituted and within the distance thereof notified under Sub-section (3) of Section 4, and

(b) when so required by <ORG> to establish a market in such market area providing for such facilities as <ORG> may direct from time to time in connection with the purchase and sale of the agricultural produce concerned :

Provided that <ORG> may, on the application of a co-operative marketing society made through the registrar of <ORG>, permit such society to establish such a market in any market area."

11. Section 14 makes provision for issuing of licences by a market committee and it originally stood as follows :

"Section 14. Power of market committee to issue licences.--Where a market is established under (Section 8) the market committee may issue and renew licences, in accordance with rules and bye-laws, to traders, brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons to operate in the market on payment of the prescribed fees :

Provided that no such licence shall be necessary in the case of a person to whom a licence has been granted under Sub-section (2) of Section 4."

12. This provision was, however, amended by the Rajasthan Laws Repealing and Amending Act , 1962, published in <ORG> dated 15-12-62, and in the above section for the word and figure '' Section 6 ", the words letter figures and brackets "Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 9 " were substituted.

13. Then, there are provisions about suspension or cancellation of licences granted under Section 14 , and with them we are not concerned at the moment.

14. Section 17 empowers a market committee to levy cess and it runs as under :

" Section 17 . Power to levy cess.--The market committee may, subject to the provisions of rules and subject to such maxima as may be prescribed, levy a cess on the agricultural produce bought and sold by the licencees in the market."

15. Section 18 provides that all moneys received by a market committee shall be paid into a fund to be called ''market committee fund" and all expenditure incurred by the market committee under or for this purposes of this Act shall be defrayed out of the said fund. It is authorised to invest the surplus in such manner as may be prescribed.

16. Section 19 provides for the several purposes for which the fund is to be expended and it runs as under :

" Section 19 , Purposes for which the fund shall be expended.--Subject to the provisions of Section 18 , the market committee fund shall be expended for the following purposes, namely:

(1) the acquisition of a site or sites for the market;

(2) the maintenance and improvement of the market ;

(3) the construction and repair of buildings necessary for the purposes of such market and for the health, convenience and safety of the persons using it;

(4) the provision and maintenance of standard weights and measures ;

(5) the pay, pensions, leave allowances, gratuities, compensation for injuries resulting from accident, compassionate allowance and contributions towards leave allowances, pensions or provident funds of the officers and servants employed by it ;

(6) the expenses of and incidental to elections ;

(7) the payment of interest on the loans that may be raised for the purposes of the market committee and the provision of sinking fund in respect of such loans;

(8) the collection and dissemination of information regarding matters relating to crop statistics and marketing in respect of the agricultural produce notified under Section 4 ;

(9) the payment of the cost referred to in Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 18 ;

(10) any propaganda in favour of agricultural improvement ; and (11) the carrying out of the purposes and provisions of this Act and the rules and bye laws made thereunder"."

17. Section 38 provides for making of rules by the Government and the relevant portions thereof run as under :

" Section 36 . Rules.--(1) The State Government may, either generally or specially for any market area or market areas make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision such rules may provide for or regulate-

(f) the issue of licences to traders, brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons operating in the market, the form in which and the conditions subject to which such licences shall be issued or renewed and the fee to be charged therefor.

18. Section 37 enacts how bye-laws are to ha framed by the market committee and Section 38 contains the power of the Director to make the bye-laws. Sections 37 and 38 run as under :

" Section 37 . Bye-laws.--(1) Subject to any rules made by <ORG> under Section 36 and with the previous sanction of the Director or any other officer specially empowered in this behalf by <ORG>, <ORG> may, in respect of the market area under its management, make bye-laws for the regulation of business and conditions of trading therein.

(2) Any bye-law made under this section may provide that any contravention thereof shall, on conviction, be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees."

'' Section 38 . Power of Director to make bye-laws.--(1) If a market committee fails to make, in respect of the market area under its management, the necessary bye-laws under Section 37 within a period of six months from the date of its constitution, the Director may make such bye-laws and may also provide punishment for the contravention thereof in accordance with Sub-section (2) of Section 37 .

(2) Such bye-laws shall remain in force until superseded by fresh bye-laws made by the market committee under Section 37 ."

19. In exercise of the powers conferred on the <ORG>, the <ORG> framed the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1963, hereinafter to be referred as the "Rules". These rules provide for various matters. Rule 58 provides for market cess and runs as under :

"Rule-58. Market Cess.--(1) A market committee shall levy and collect cess on agricultural produce bought and sold in market at such rates as may be specified in the bye-laws of the committee so however that the amount of cess levied as aforesaid does not exceed two rupees per head of cattle, sheep or goat and 0.50 nP. at the maximum for every Rs. 100/-worth of any other agricultural produce.

Explanation--(a) For the purpose of this rule a sale of agricultural produce shall be deemed to have taken place in a market if it has been weighed or measured or surveyed by a licensed weighman, measurer or surveyor in the market for the purpose of sale, notwithstanding the fact that the property in the agricultural produce has bv reason of such sale, passed to a person in a place outside the market.

(b) Further for the purpose of this rule, all notified agricultural produce taken out or proposed to be taken out of the market shall, unless the contrary is proved be presumed to be bought and sold within such market.

(2) The cess levied as per Sub-rule (1) shall not be levied more than once on agricultural produce bought or sold in the market.

(3) The market committee shall also levy and collect licence fee from traders, brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons operating in the market as provided in the bye-laws.

(4) No cess shall be levied on agricultural produce brought from outside the market into the market for use therein by the industrial concerns situated in the market or for export and in respect of which a declaration has been made and a certificate has been obtained in Form--V :

Provided that if such agricultural produce brought into the market for export is not exported or removed therefrom before the expiry of twenty days from the date on which it was so brought, the market committee shall levy and collect cess on such agricultural produce from the person bringing the produce into the market at such rates as may be specified in the bye-laws :

Provided further that if the industrial concerns that brought the agricultural produce from outside the market into the market for the purpose of use by them, and who do not make any declaration and do not obtain a certificate in Form-V as prescribed above, shall be deemed to be responsible for the contravention of this rule, and shall, on conviction be punished under Sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the Act with a fine which may extend to Rupees two hundred.

(5) The seller who is himself the producer of the Agricultural produce offered for sale and the buyer who buys such produce for his own private and/or household use, shall be exempted from payment of any cess under this rule."

20. Rule 59 provides for recovery of cess and fees and runs as under :

"Rule 59. Recovery of Cess & Fees. (1) The cess on agricultural produce shall be payable as soon as it is bought and sold in the market as may be specified in the bye-laws.

(2) The cess referred to in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 58 shall be paid by the purchaser of the notified agricultural produce concerned :

Provided that where the purchaser of a notified agricultural produce cannot be identified, the cess shall be paid by the seller.

(3) (a) At any time, when so required by any officer or servant of market committee the driver or any other person in charge of any vehicle, boat or other conveyance, shall not remove such vehicle, boat or other conveyance, as the case may be and keep it stationary as long as may reasonably be necessary, and allow the officer, servant empowered as aforesaid to examine the contents in vehicle, boat or other conveyance and inspect all records relating the notified agricultural produce carried, which are in possession of such driver or other person-in-charge, who shall, if so required, give his name and address and name and address of the owner of the vehicle, or other conveyance.

(b) The officer or servant of the market committee empowered as aforesaid shall keep any notified agricultural produce stationary which is taken or proposed to be taken out of the market in any vehicle, boat or other conveyance, if such officer, or servant has reason to believe that any cess, fee or other amount due under this Act and rules in respect of such notified agricultural produce has not been paid; he shall allow the produce to be taken out after making enquiry, and shall report the matter to the market committee, which will proceed to take action against the concerned licenced trader or broker or any other such licenced functionary who has tried to evade the market cess. Such a trader or broker or licenced functionary shall be punished as prescribed under Rule 63.

(4) The licence fees shall be paid along with the application for licence but in case the market committee refuses the grant of a licence, the fees recovered shall be refunded to the applicant.

(5) The market committee may levy a subscription for collecting and disseminating among the subscribers, information as to any matter relating to statistics or marketing in respect of the notified agricultural produce."

21. Rule 89 provides for taking of licences by traders and brokers and runs as under :

"Rule 69. Licenced Traders and 'A' class brokers.--(1) No person shall do business as a trader or an 'A' class broker in agricultural produce except under a licence granted by market committee under this rule.

(2) Any person desiring to hold such licence shall make a written application for a licence to the market committee and shall pay such a fee as may be specified in the bye-laws subject to the maximum of Rs. 100.

(3) On receipt of such application together with the proper amount of the fee the market committee may, after making such enquiries as may be considered necessary for the efficient conduct of the market grant him the licence applied for. On the grant of such licence the applicant shall execute an agreement in such form as the market committee may determine in accordance with the rules and bye-laws and such other conditions as may be laid down by the market committee for holding the licence.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rule (3), the market committee may refuse to grant a licence to any person, who in its opinion, is not solvent or in the case of renewal of licence whose operations in the market area are not likely to further efficient working of a market under the control of the market committee or who directly or indirectly or indirectly participated in strikes and boycotts.

(5) The licence shall remain in force from the date on which it is granted until the 31st of March following and may be renewed for each succeeding year on a written application and after such enquiries as are referred to in Sub-rule (3), as may be considered necessary and on payment of fees specified in the bye-laws.

(6) The names of all such traders and 'A' class brokers shall be entered in a register to be maintained for the purpose.

(7) Whoever does business as a trader or an 'A' class broker in agricultural produce in any market without a licence granted under this rule or otherwise contravenes any of the provisions of this rule shall on conviction be punishable with fine, which may extend to Rs. 200/- and in case of a continued contravention with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every day during which the contravention continues after the date of the first conviction."

22. Rule 72 provides for licences to 'B' class brokers and is a replica of Rule 69, already quoted, and it only makes a change in the fee.

23. Then, we are told that the Director of Agriculture sent model bye-laws of identical nature to all the <ORG> (Market Committees) by a circular letter which is reproduced hereunder :

"Model Bye-laws are sent herewith as approved by me. You will please frame bye-laws of true <ORG> accordingly."

The letter purports to have been signed by somebody on behalf of the Director. The model bye-laws were then considered by the various market committees and they purported to pass them accordingly and then sought the approval of the <ORG>. A survey of the relevant provisions of the Act, the Rules and bye-laws shows that a scheme of marketing in agricultural commodities specified in the Act is sought to be operated for better regulation of the-trade of buying and selling of agricultural commodities by introducing control of the various trading activities in specified areas and by introduction of compulsory licencing of the trade in the commodities. The broad features of the Act are that, as a first step the <ORG> is required to declare any area to be a market area and this is to be done by first issuing a preliminary notification under Section 3 of the Act and inviting objections after the issuing of the preliminary notification and the objections that may be received are required to be considered by the <ORG> and then a notification under Section 4 is issued. As soon as a notification under Section 4 , declaring a specified area to be a market area is issued, no place within the area is to be used for the purchase or sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification and this prohibition is subject to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. Then for the transition period pending constitution of market committees <ORG> have been authorised to grant the licences. Then the next step is about the establishment of market committees who are the chief administrative organs created for the purpose of implementing the scheme operated by the statute. The first committee is to be nominated by the <ORG> and thereafter this body has to be elected, in the manner, laid down in the Rules. The market committee is to be a body corporate and has been assigned certain functions for managing the market proper, the principal market yard and sub-market yards, in the market area for which it is constituted. It has been given the powers to control and regulate the trading activities both in the interests of agriculturists and the traders operating in the market. It is authorised to establish markets in the market area, but when it is required to do so by the <ORG> it is bound to establish the markets. The market committee is empowered to impose a cess, subject to the maxima prescribed by the Rules on the agricultural produce bought and sold by the licensees in the market. Section 19 enumerates the several purposes for which the funds of the committee can be expended. Then, we have the Rules made by the <ORG> and the bye-laws framed by the market committees to find out, how the scheme of control and regulation of trade is to be carried out.

24-25. Now, we may briefly enumerate the several grounds taken in the various writ petitions.

(1) That the Act was violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioners as enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on their trade in the agricultural commodities in the market areas unhampered in any manner;

(2) That the preliminary notifications that were issued by the Government under Section 3 of the Act suffer from two fatal defects :

(i) That the proper opportunity to make objections against the notification was wholly denied to the petitioners for the simple reason that while the objections were required to be filed within one month from the date of the notification, the notification itself was published after the expiry of the period fixed for filing objections;

(ii) That whereas under Section 3 of the Act, a period of not less than one month was to be specified in the notification for the filing of objections, the notification fixed a period which was "within one month from the date of the notification." It is contended that what was provided in the notification was thus materially different from the requirement of the notification.

(3) The bye-laws framed by the committees were bad, as they were not made with the previous sanction of the Director of Agriculture as required by Section 37 of the Act;

(4) Market was not declared in accordance with Section 9 (2) (b) of the Act, with the result that the market committee could not have issued any licence. It is submitted that the creation of a proper market and a market area was a condition precedent for the issuance of licences;

(5) Under Section 36 (2) (f) the fee has to be prescribed by the <ORG> in the Rules and it is not to be left to the market committee to prescribe any fee in bye-laws. The <ORG> having not done this, the fee imposed by the market committees by their bye-laws was bad. It is contended that Section 37 of the Act did not contain the power to fix the fee for the licences. If at all, this has got to be done by the <ORG> in the Rules under Section 36 (2) of the Act;

(6) There was excessive delegation by the Government of its powers to impose licence fee to the marketing committee;

(7) The Collector was implementing Section 4 (2) of the Act and he had asked the marketing committee to entertain applications for licences and this he was not entitled to do;

(8) The cess imposed by the market committees on sale of cotton and oilseeds was in contravention of Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act and Article 286(3) of the Constitution as they were essential commodities declared by the <ORG> for purposes of the Central sales tax and, as the <ORG> had already imposed a sales tax of 2 per cent. under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act on these commodities, and for that matter the market committees could not subject these two commodities to a further levy by way of cess, as it could not exceed the maximum of 2 per cent prescribed by Central Sales Tax Act ; and (9) About the nomination of two members on the Gajsinghpur marketing committee grievance is made in Civil Writ Petn. No. 1791 of 1964 Messrs. <NAME> v. <ORG>, that the nomination of <NAME> and <NAME> was bad, as they were not qualified to be members of the market committees for want of the requisite qualification about residence,

26. The writ petitions have been contested by the <ORG>. We propose to deal with the reply of the <ORG>, to the several contentions raised, at appropriate place in the judgment in the course of our discussion. We immediately proceed to deal with the several grounds narrated above in a serial order.

27. Re : (1) Though the petitioners raised this contention in their writ petitions, they did not press this ground in their arguments and this was rightly done, as, to our mind, the matter stands concluded by two decisions of <ORG> dealing with similar pieces of legislation.

28. <CITATION> , AIR 1959 S C 300, their Lordships of <ORG> had occasion to examine the validity of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, in the light of the alleged infringement of fundamental right of the traders under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Their Lordships observed that in order to be reasonable, a restriction must have a rational relation to the object which the <ORG> seeks to achieve and must not go in excess of that object. As regards the test of reasonableness, however their Lordships observed that no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into judicial verdict. Having adverted to this test their Lordships observed as follows :--

"The Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 20 of 1933, was the result of a long exploratory investigation by experts in the field, conceived and enacted to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by providing suitable and regulated market by eliminating middlemen and bringing face to face the producer and the buyer so that they may meet on equal terms, thereby eradicating or at any rate reducing the scope for exploitation in dealings. Such a statute cannot be said to create unreasonable restrictions on the citizens right to do business unless it is clearly established that the provisions are too drastic, unnecessarily harsh and overreach the scope of the object to achieve which it is enacted."

" The Act , Rules and the Bye-laws framed thereunder have a long-term target of providing a net work of markets wherein facilities for correct weighment are ensured, storage accommodation is provided, and equal powers of bargaining ensured, so that the growers may bring their commercial crops to the market and sell them at reasonable prices. Till such markets are established, the said provisions, by imposing licensing restrictions, enable the buyers and sellers to meet in licenced premises, ensure correct weighment, make available to them reliable market information and provide for them a simple machinery for settlement of disputes. After the markets are built or opened by the marketing committees, within a reasonable radius from the market, as prescribed by the Rules, no licence is issued; thereafter all growers will have to resort to the market for vending their goods. The result of the implementation of the Act would be to eliminate, as far as possible, the middlemen and to give reasonable facilities for the growers of commercial crops to secure best prices for their commodities."

''Having regard to the entire scheme of the Act, the provisions of the Act including Section 5 constitute reasonable restrictions on a citizen's right to do business, and therefore, they are valid."

29. Their Lordships took the same view in examining the validity of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, and came to the conclusion that the Act was valid.

30. Thus, we do not find any force in the first ground.

31. Turning now to the second ground of attack we may reproduce the notification issued in one case, by way of illustration in dealing with the contention, as the notification about other market areas are featured similarly.

"Jaipur, August 9, 1963.

No. F. 10 (19) Agr. V/63--In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1981, <ORG> hereby declares its intention to regulate the purchase and sale of the following Agricultural produce in the area falling within the limits of 22 Panchayats of Panchayat Samiti, Karanpur (District Ganganagar) as shown in Appendix 'A' including the Municipal limits of <ORG> :--

1. Cereals : Wheat and Barley 2. Legumes: Gram 3. Oilseeds : Sarson and Taramira 4. Fibres : Cotton (Ginned and Unginned) 5. Special : Sugarcane and Gur. Any objection or suggestion which may be received by <ORG>, within one month from the date of notification, shall be considered by <ORG>."

32. The above notification, though dated 9-8-63, was published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 26-9-63, that is long after a period of one month from 9-8-63. As already observed by us, the attack on the validity of this notification is twofold : (1) that the notification was just a bare farce and it did not afford any real opportunity to the petitioners to file their objection as they were required to be filed "within one month from the date of the notification", which date had already passed when the notification saw the light of the day on 26-9-63; and (2), That, whereas Section 3 required that the period during which objections are to be filed is to be "not less than one month to be specified in the notification", it is submitted, that the words "within one month from the date of the notification", as contained in the notification, do not conform to the language of the section namely, "not less than one month".

33. The learned Advocate General has contested the correctness of the submission on both these grounds. <NAME> submits that the term "date of the notification" according to Section 32 (48) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act , will mean the date when a <ORG> order becomes, in the eye of law, a notification and this it so becomes only when it is published in the gazette under proper authority. He also invited our attention to the Hindi notification which was simultaneously published with the English version of the notification and in the notification, as published in Hindi, the words are that the objections are to be filed within one month of the date of the publication. In answer to the submission of the learned Advocate-General about the Hindi version of the notification, which, if it is authoritative in law, would meet the requirements of Section 3 , the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that under the relevant constitutional provisions and the Rajasthan Official Language Act, it is only the English version of the notification that has to be taken to be authoritative. Before embarking on the consideration of the legal aspect we would like to refer to the factual aspect as to which was the notification issued, as a matter of fact, by the <ORG>.

As the reply of the <ORG> was not clear on the point, we called upon the learned Advocate-General to obtain the necessary files and then make his submission before us. The learned Advocate-General candidly submitted that while the Marketing Officer had sent to the Government two separate drafts of the notification, one in English and, another in Hindi, and in the two there was no discrepancy, the notification that was signed by the Secretary to the Government was the same as we have reproduced already and indeed the Hindi version had not been signed by the Secretary or any other duly authorised officer at all. Consequently Hindi version can only be taken to be a translation of the English version and even the authorship of the Hindi translation is not at all free from doubt. Apart from this, according to the provisions of Article 348 of the Constitution, the authoritative text of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under the Constitution or under any law made by Parliament of the Legislature of a <ORG>, shall be in the English language. This Article is reproduced below for ready reference :

" Article 348. Language to be used in <ORG> and in the High Courts and for Acts, Bills, etc.---(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until <ORG> by law otherwise provides-

(a) all proceedings in <ORG> and is <ORG>,

(b) the authoritative texts-

(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either <ORG> or in the <ORG> or either <ORG> of the Legislature of a State,

(ii) of all Acts passed by <ORG> or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor of a State, and

(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by <ORG> or <ORG>, shall be in the English language.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1), the Governor of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any official purposes o£ the State, in proceedings in <ORG> having its principal seat in that State :

Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or order passed or made by such High Court.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-clause (b) of Clause (1), where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in para, (iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article." Clause (3) of this Article permits <ORG> to introduce in other language an Act, but in that event a translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor in the State Gazette shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article. Thus, where a notification is published in English, whether as originally made in that language or by way of an authorised translation it alone is to rank as authoritative text of the notification.

34. The Rajasthan Official Language Act, 1956 (Act No. 47 of 1956), provides as to what is to be the language to be used for various official purposes of the <ORG> of Rajasthan. Section 3 declares that Hindi shall be the official language for certain purposes of the <ORG>, and Section 4 enacts that :

"Subject to the provisions of Article 348 of the Constitution of India and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3 , the language of :

(i) all Bills introduced in <ORG>,

(ii) all Acts passed by <ORG>,

(iii) all Ordinances promulgated under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, and

(iv) all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued by the State Government under the Constitution of India or under any Central or State law, shall be either Hindi written in Devnagri script or English :

Provided that in every such case where the English language is used, there shall be published, under the authority of <ORG>, as soon as may be, a translation thereof in the Hindi language written in Devnagri script."

Thus, Section 4 again shows that while Hindi has been permitted to be the official language for bills and statutory orders, English has not been done away with the official language. The only requirement, when English is used, as language, is that <ORG> is required to publish a translation of the notification in the Hindi language written in Devnagri script. Consequently, we have no doubt that English version of the notification alone has to be treated as the authorised version of the notification. We are fortified in the view that we are taking by a Full Bench decision of <ORG> reported as <ORG>, Meerut v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (III) U. P. Allahabad, A I R 1962 All 240 (FB), cited by <NAME>, learned counsel for one of the petitioners. <ORG> followed this view in a later decision reported as <NAME> v. State of U. P., A I R 1965 All 151. We have therefore, to consider the matter further on this footing.

35. On first blush we were inclined to accept the contention made by the learned counsel of the petitioner that, as the notification is dated 9-8-1963, and was published more than a month thereafter, proper opportunity of making objections cannot be held to have been given to the concerning people. The learned Advocate General, taking his stand on the plain language of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act , 1955 (Act No. 8 of 1955), however submitted that this Act will apply for the construction of all Rajasthan laws (vide Section 4 of this Act). Section 32 , which contains the general definitions, provides that unless there be anything repugnant in the subject or context or unless the contrary intention appears, the following expressions shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them hereby, namely,--

"............. (48) "notification" or "public notification" shall mean a notification published under proper authority in the <ORG> ;........"

36. On the language of this clause it is argued that there is a marked distinction between a <ORG> order simpliciter and a <ORG> order which matures into a notification on publication. It is strenuously contended that a <ORG> order matures into a notification within the meaning of the Act, only on its first publication and prior to that, in law, it is not a notification, but only a <ORG> order. Thus, it is pointed out that an order of the <ORG> to become a notification requires : (i) that it is published in the gazette, and (ii) that it is so published under proper authority. Accordingly it is argued that the so-called notification dated 9-8-63, extracted above, became a notification only on 26 9-63, and not on an earlier date and since the petitioners were free to file objections within a period of one month commencing from 26-9-63, it cannot be said that there has been any non-compliance of the law.

37. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submit that the interpretation suggested by the learned Advocate General and supported by the learned Government Advocate goes counter to the language of the notification itself. It is dated 9-8-63, and we must take that as the date of the commencement of the period, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is also urged on behalf of the petitioners that in construing a notification which results in putting fetters on the fundamental rights of a citizen, we should prefer an interpretation which will advance the right of making objections rather than one which would result in contraction of that right. As in the first instance we ourselves were inclined to accept the submission advanced by the petitioners, we have naturally devoted anxious considerations to both the points of view. To our mind, taking the date of publication of the notification as the date of a notification will enlarge the scope for tiling objections rather than narrow it clown. Let us take an illustration.

38. Supposing this notification were published, say 15 days after 9-8-63, then, if the construction suggested by the petitioners were to be accepted, the objections could be filed within a period of not less than one month from 9-8-63. In other words, the period will stand curtailed by 15 days, because prior to the publication of the notification the prospective objectors may not be in a position to know about the notification.

39. Now, if we prefer the interpretation suggested by the petitioners then, the period would stand reduced by 15 days, that is the lag between the date on which the Government passed the order, and the date when that order was published in the gazette. We asked ourselves the question as to whether in a case like that taken by us for illustration a certain objector were to file his objections within one month from the date of the publication of the notification, could the Government legitimately refute to consider those objections and supposing they were to do so, could not the objector ask for a writ of mandamus from this Court to compel the Government to consider the objections? Our answer to that question which we have put to ourselves is, that every thing being equal we will be inclined to issue a writ of mandamus against the Government. What is of substance in the matter of inviting objections is the period that the objector should get i.e. the minimum period prescribed by the statute has to be ensured. If we take the interpretation that is suggested on behalf of the petitioners then, we are afraid that in some cases it is bound to result in the reduction of that period which could not possibly be the intention of the law-makers or the authors of the notification.

Having considered the matter pro and con we are induced to hold that the term "notification" has to be considered in the light of the statutory dictionary of words provided by the Rajasthan General Clauses Act and a Government order will, in law, become a notification when it fulfils the two requisite conditions, namely : (i) its publication in the gazette, and (ii) its publication under proper authority. These conditions can be fulfilled only when the notification is published and not when it is drafted and approved in the <ORG>, hidden from public-gazette and when the date is put by some officer of the Government. In these circumstances we are not inclined to accept the criticism of the learned counsel for the petitioners and we hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case the date of the notification should be taken to be 26-9-63, when it was published in the gazette for the first time. What we have said above applies to other cases in which there is only the difference about the date of the so-called notification and the date of its publication.

40. Turning now to the second ground under this head : Their Lordships of <ORG> had occasion to construe the words "not later than 14 days" as occurring in Rule 119 of the Rules framed under the Representation of the People Act , 1951, in <CITATION> ) AIR 1957 S C 271. Rule 119 runs as under :

"Rule 119. Time within which an election petition shall be presented : An election petition calling in question an election may,--

(a) in the case where such petition is against a returned candidate, be presented under Section 81 at any time after the date of publication of the name of such candidate under Section 67 but not later than fourteen days from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under Rule 113 that the return of election expenses of such candidate and the declaration made in respect thereof have been lodged with the Returning Officer."

41. In construing these words their Lordships resorted to the provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. The argument that fell for consideration was as to, what was the period which can be said to be 'not later that 14 days from the date of the publication' of the notice. When <ORG> examined the matter it noted as follows :

"The petition was filed on 18-5-54. But for the fact that 16-5-54 and 17-5-54 were holidays, the petition would have been time-barred. Admit."

The argument of the non-petitioners in that case was that the petition was not filed "not later than 14 days." <ORG> overruled this plea. Their Lordships examined the difference between the words "not later than 14 days" and the words "within a period of 14 days", and their Lordships were pleased to hold that they mean the same thing. We may reproduce the observations made by their Lordships in this behalf:

"This argument proceeds on an interpretation of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act which, in our opinion, is erroneous. Broadly stated, the object of the section is, to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a <ORG> or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the section the act should be considered to nave been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the <ORG> or office is open. For that section to apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday. Now, it cannot be denied that the period of fourteen days provided in Rule 119 (a) for presentation of an election petition is a period prescribed, and that is its true character, whether the words used are "within fourteen days" or "not later than fourteen days". That the distinction sought to be made by the appellant between these two expressions is without substance will be clear beyond all doubt, when regard is had to Section 81 of the Act. Section 81 (1) enacts that the election petition may be presented "within such time as may be prescribed", and it is under this section that Rule 119 has been framed. It is obvious that the rule-making authority could not have intended to go further than what the section itself had enacted, and if the language of the Rule is construed in conjunction with and under the coverage of the section under which it is framed, the words "not later than fourteen days" must be held to mean the same thing as "within a period of fourteen days". Reference in this connection should be made to the heading of Rule 119 which is, "Time within which an election petition shall be presented." We entertain no doubt that the <ORG> has used both the expressions as meaning the same thing, and there are accordingly no grounds for holding that Section 10 is not applicable to petitions falling within Rule 119."

42. <CITATION> , AIR 1957 Pepsu 14, the question was about the payment of court-fee in pursuance of the order of a <ORG> dated 15-5-53, wherein the payment of court-fee was required to be paid within a month of that date. The question that fell for consideration was whether in computing the time of one month, 15-5-53 was or was not to be excluded. Applying Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the learned Judges held that the day on which the order was made, that is, 15-5-53 had to be excluded.

43. <CITATION> , AIR 1964 All 418 a learned Judge of <ORG>, in construing the words "within 30 days" in contradistinction to the words "thirty days time is given" held that they mean the same thing.

44. Since we have a <ORG> decision to guide us, it is not necessary to deal with the other cases on the subject. Their Lordships considered the relevant provisions of the statute, in the first instance, and then reached the conclusion that in the context of the statute the expressions "not less than 14 days" and "within 14 days" did not make any difference.

45. In the present case the requirement of the expression "within a period of not less than one month" as used in <CITATION> (2) of the Act, will be amply met, in our view, if the period for filing objections is exactly one month. In other words, the discretion was left with the <ORG> to fix a period for the inviting of objections which could be one month or more, but it could not be less than one month. But, where the period provided is exactly one month it cannot be said to be less than one month within the meaning of <CITATION> (2) of the Act.

46. Now, turning to the language of the notification reproduced above, it permitted the filing of objections within one month. One would exclude the first day, according to Section 10 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, which corresponds to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act of <ORG>. It is further evident that the first day, that is, the date of the notification has alone to be excluded. Viewed thus, and particularly in the 'coverage' of the parent provision of the Act, namely, <CITATION> , we are unable to hold that the notification that was issued suffered on the ground urged by the petitioners. Thus, we are unable to accept any of the two aforementioned contentions about the invalidity of the notification issued under <CITATION> of the Act.

47. The cases of this <ORG> dealing with the provisions of Panchayat Act and Rules, cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, are, to our mind, distinguishable and we may make a brief reference to them.

48. The first case is <NAME> v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Writ Petn. No. 893 of 1964, D/-18-8-1964 (Raj). The judgment in that case was based on an earlier Bench decision of this Court reported as <NAME> v. Chief Panchayat Officer, Rajasthan, ILR (1956) 6 Raj 1044 : (AIR 1957 Raj 388). The provisions of Rule 4 of the Panchayat Rules, which fell for consideration, were to the following effect :

"The Returning Officer shall, at least seven days before the date of election, announce for the information of the Panchayat Circle by notice and in such other manner as the Chief Panchayat Officer may direct the number and names of wards, if any, the number of panchas to be elected from each ward and from the entire Panchayat Circle and the date, time and place of election."

49. The words used "at least seven days before the date of election" were held to mean that seven clear days should intervene between the date of the notification and the date of the election. The words of the Act 'not less than one month' and the words 'at least seven days', as used in the above passage, are not exactly alike. The cases are thus of no help in considering the present matter.

50. Re. No. 3.--As we have already observed, Section 37 of the Act requires that the marketing committee can frame bye-laws "with the previous sanction of the Director or any other officer specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government". As to what is the requirement of a previous sanction has been dealt with by this Court exhaustively in <CITATION> , 1958 Raj L W 448 : (A I R 1959 Raj 75) <NAME>, as he then was, dealt with the provisions of section 64 (j) of the Rajasthan Panchayats Act, which were quite similar to the provisions of Section 37 of the Act, in this behalf, and observed as follows:

"There is a well understood distinction in law between cases where a tax is imposed with the "sanction" of Government and cases where the tax has to be imposed with "previous sanction". Where the imposition of the tax is with the "sanction" of Government, all that is required is that after the necessary procedure has been followed by the body imposing the tax, it sends the final proposal to Government for sanction. Where, however, "previous sanction" is required for the imposition of a tax, the matter has to be submitted to Government twice for sanction. In the first instance, the body, as soon as it wishes to impose a tax which requires "previous sanction", communicates its wishes to Government and must get the sanction of Government to proceed to take steps for the imposition of the tax and follow the procedure provided for such imposition. It is only when this sanction of Government is received that the body imposing the tax is authorised to take steps for publication of the tax intended to be imposed and for inviting objections to the tax. Thereafter it has to consider the objections and finally decide whether it would impose the tax and at what rate. When this is decided, the final proposal is again submitted to Government, for sanction and on receipt of the second sanction, the tax can be imposed from such date as may be fixed under the law."

"Whatever may be said as to the imposition of tax from Clauses (a) to (i) of Section 64 (1), so far as a tax included in Clause (j) is concerned, the procedure relating to previous sanction is absolutely essential. Under Clause (j), the <ORG> selects a tax which it is not specifically empowered to impose under Clauses (a) to (i). In such a case, the repetition of the words "previous sanction' of <ORG> in that clause makes it clear that before the <ORG> goes forward to notify its intention to impose such a tax on the inhabitants and calls for their objections, it must obtain the sanction of the <ORG>, to impose the tax which is not within its specific power to impose."

51. On an earlier occasion too a question arose whether in framing bye-laws under the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, only final sanction of such bye-laws will meet the requirements of that law and in that case reported as <CITATION> , 1955 Raj L W 454 to which one of us was a party, it was held by this Court that the previous sanction of the <ORG> must be obtained to the very introduction of the consideration of the bye-laws, that is before they are moved in and considered by the Board. It was also observed in that case that the obtaining of the previous sanction of the <ORG> is a condition precedent to the passing of bye-laws in question and the law is well established that such a condition must strictly be fulfilled before the bye-laws can be held to have been duly passed.

52. In the present case the letter of the Director of Agriculture, quoted by us above, only purports to send the Model Bye-laws to the various <ORG> and the model bye-laws had been approved by the Director. This, to our mind, will not do away with the necessity on the part of the several marketing committees to first apply their mind to the model bye-laws and, after making changes wherever they considered it necessary, to seek the previous sanction of the competent authority for the consideration of the bye-laws. Thereafter, on receipt of the sanction, it was for the marketing committees to again consider and pass the bye-laws in the light of the previous sanction that they might have received. Thereafter, the bye-laws, as passed, have again to be submitted to the competent authority for approval. What was done in the present case by the Director of Agriculture does not fulfil the requirements of law. There is an obvious purpose in insisting upon the requirements of a previous sanction. Each marketing committee will consider the bye-laws in the light of its own requirements and those that may differ from area to area. After they have applied their mind and framed the draft bye-laws they are to receive a proper attention at the hands of the competent authority before it gives the sanction to the introduction of the bye-laws. It is then that the bye-laws have to be passed by the marketing committee concerned and they will acquire the force of law only after they are approved by the competent authority the second time. This obviously having not been done in any of the cases before us we have no choice, but to hold that the bye-laws made are null and void.

52A. Re. No. 4: To our mind, this submission has no substance, as notification Ex. 3, produced in writ petition No. 1603 of 1964 at page 38 of the paper-book shows that the Government of Rajasthan called upon <ORG>, Sri Karanpur to establish a market for the market area already declared and in consequence of that the market committee had established a market for the said market area. It was in the light of the action taken by the market committee that the Government issued a notification under Section 5 of the Act, which was published in <ORG> dated 23-7-64, at page 454 (2). There are analogous notifications in other cases. In the circumstances we are unable to find any substance in this contention.

53. Re Nos. 5 & 6: It is not necessary to give any decision on these points, as we have already held that the bye-laws were invalid for want of previous sanction as enjoined by Section 37 of the Act. Suffice it to say that a maximum fee is prescribed by the Rules framed under Section 36 (2) (f) of the Act, vide Rule 69 and kindred rules referred to above. Since the rule making authority, namely, the <ORG> has fixed the maximum fee that could be charged by the marketing committees, there is no excessive delegation if thereby each market committee is left with the discretion to fix the fees at a lower figure in each individual case. This, therefore, cannot amount to any excessive delegation as may impinge on the validity of the relevant rules. We are unable to accept the argument that Section 37 of the Act does not contain any authority for the marketing committees to prescribe the proper fee within the maximum limit indicated by the <ORG> in the Rules. In the very nature of things the bye-laws have been made, subject to the Rules made by the <ORG> under Section 36 of the Act and, if any bye-law is framed about the levy of fees within the framework of the Rules, that wilt not be ultra vires of the powers of the market committee.

54. Re. No. 7. Now, so far as the issuing of licences is concerned, after a market is established it is the market committee who is to issue and renew licences in accordance with Rules and bye laws (vide Section 14 of the Act). As we have already held that the bye-laws are not valid, it will not be competent for the committee to issue any licences Section 4(2) permits <ORG> to grant licences, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, to use any place in the market area for the purchase and sale of any agricultural produce- Section 35 of the Act permits <ORG> to delegate to any officer, any of the powers conferred on it, by or under this Act, except the powers exercisable by it under Clause iv) of Sub-section (1), or under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 or under Section 36 or under Section 40 of the Act The orders of delegation of powers under Section 4(2) proviso has not been placed before us. It is not right on the part of the Collector to ask the marketing committee to issue licences, as the latter had failed to frame bye-laws which can be said to be valid in the eye of law. In these circumstances it is mandatory for <ORG> to make suitable arrangements for the issue of licences for the interim period pending completion of the machinery envisaged by the Act for the issuing of licences. As, soon after the declaration of a market area under sub Section (1) of Section 4 , no place in the said area could be used for the purchase and sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification, except in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 or the proviso to Section 4 (2), it is the bounden duty of the Government to provide a machinery for the issuance of licences for the interim period.

55. Re. No. 8: We are not persuaded to go into this question, as the cess has been prescribed by the bye-laws which we have already held to be invalid for went of fulfilment with the requirements of Section 37 of the Act.

56. Re. No. 9: We are not persuaded to accept the contention raised by the petitioners as valid for more than one reason. In the first instance, the <ORG> had issued a corrigendum on 21-4-65, whereby the name of <NAME> which was stated to be as son of <NAME> was changed. Secondly, these the two persons, about whose nomination grievance is, made, have not been impleaded as parties to the writ petition and we do not think we will be justified in making a declaration about their nomination in their absence. Lastly, Sub-section (2) of Section 7 , which enables the <ORG> to constitute a market committee, for the first time, does not lay down any particular limitation for the nomination of a particular person. Sub-section (1) lays down the qualification for members of the marketing committee, but Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception for the nomination of the first marketing committee by the <ORG> and it reads like this :--

" Section 7(2) . Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1)-

(a) on the failure of any organisation, persons or authority to elect a member under Sub-section (1) within a period of three months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy, <ORG> shall give notice in writing to the organisation, persons or authority concerned to elect a member within a month from the date of such notice and, on the failure of the organisation, persons or authority again to elect a member within the said period, <ORG> shall nominate a person on behalf of such organisation, persons or authority as a member of the market committee; and

(b) when a market committee is constituted for the first time all the members of the market committee shall be persons nominated by <ORG>." Thus, we are unable to accept this last contention as one of any substance.

57. In the light of our discussion we declare : (1) That the bye-laws framed by the various market committees in the cases before us are invalid;

(2) That the respondents are hereby restrained from giving effect to the bye-laws as framed;

(3) That they are further restrained from realising any cess or fee from the petitioners under the bye-laws; and (4) We hereby direct <ORG> to provide a proper machinery for the issuance of licences in accordance with Section 4(2) of the Act, till the market committees are in a position to issue licences in accordance with the rules and bye-laws. In that event it will be for the Government to prescribe by Rules a definite fee to be charged for each market area pending completion of the machinery for the issuance of licences under Section 14 of the Act.

58. The result is that we hereby allow the writ petitions in part in the above terms and order parties to bear their own costs.


PETITIONER: NAGAR RICE & FLOUR MIILLS & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: N. TEEKAPPA GOWDA & BROS. & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/02/1970 BENCH: <NAME>, J.C. BENCH: <NAME>, J.C. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N. CITATION: 1971 AIR 246 1970 SCR (3) 846 1970 SCC (1) 575 CITATOR INFO : F 1976 SC 578 (50) R 1992 SC 443 (8) ACT: Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act , 1958 - Shifting of existing rice mill to new site-Prior permission under s. 8 (3) (c) how far necessary-Considerations in giving such permission-Another mill situated near new site objecting that its business would be adversely affected- Objection whether sustainable under Art. 19(1)(g) of Constitution--Locus standi of party making such objection. HEADNOTE: According to s. 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, no owner of a rice mill "shall without the previous permission of <ORG>, change the location of the whole or any part of that rice mill in respect of which licence has been granted under s. 6 ". The lands and buildings of the appellants' rice mill in the <ORG> of Mysore were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the award expressly recited that the appellants were entitled to remove the machinery of the mill. The appellants were allotted a new site by the Mysore Gov- ernment. After obtaining sanction from the Tehsildar the appellant shifted their machinery to the new site. Thereafter the Director of Food and Civil Supplies in purported exercise, of the delegated powers of <ORG> passed an order under s. 8(3)(c) sanctioning a change in the location of the appellants' rice mill. He overruled the objection of the respondents whose rice mill was situated near the new site. The, respondents challenged the order before <ORG> in a writ petition. <ORG> having allowed the same the appellant obtained special leave and appealed to this Court. The questions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether the shifting of the appellants' rice mill to the new site without prior permission of <ORG> as required by s. 8(3) (c) of the Act,- was legal, and if not whether it affected the respondents' right under Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution; (ii) whether the order under s. 8 (3) (c) was bad for the reason that it did not take into consideration the relevant factors such as mentioned in s. 5(4) of the Act. HELD : (i) Section 8(3) (c) is merely regulatory : if it was not complied with the appellants may probably be exposed to a penalty, but a competitor in the business could not seek to prevent the appellants from exercising their right to carry on business, because of the default, nor could the rice mill of the appellants be regarded as a new rice mill. Competition in the trade or business may be subject to such restrictions as are permissible and are imposed by the <ORG> by a law enacted in the interests of the general public under Art. 19(6 ), but a person cannot claim independently of such restriction that another person shall not carry on business or trade so as to affect his trade or business adversely. The appellants ,complied with the statutory requirements for carrying on rice milling operations in the building on the new site. Even assuming that no previous permission was obtained, the respondents would have no locus standi for challenging the grant of the permission, because no right vested in the respondents was infringed. [851 G-H] (ii) The considerations which arc prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 5 only apply to the grant of a permit in respect of a new rice mill or a defunct 84 7 rice mill. They have no application in considering the shifting the location of an existing -rice mill. In respect of a new or defunct mill a permit and a licence are both required : in respect of an existing rice mill only a licence is required. The conditions prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 5 only apply to the grant of a permit and not a licence. By s. 8 (3) (c) it is made one of the conditions of the licence that the location of the rice mill shall not be shifted without the previous permission of <ORG>. It is true that the appropriate authority clothed with the power must consider the expediency of permitting a change of location. But there is no statutory obligation imposed upon him to take into consideration the matters prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 5 in granting the permission to change the location. [852 E-G] On the facts of the present case the permission granted under s. 8 (3) (c) could not be said to be granted without considering the relevant circumstances. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2228 of1969. Appeal by special leave from the judgment, and order dated September 26, 1969 of <ORG> in Writ Petition No. 496 of 1969.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellants.

<NAME>, <NAME> <NAME>, and <NAME>, for respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. This appeal is filed with special leave against the judgment of <ORG> setting aside the order dated January 20, 1969, of the Director of Food & Civil Supplies of the State of Mysore under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act 21 of 1958.

The appellants established a rice mill many years ago in village Mudugoppa, District Shimoga, in the former Indian State of Mysore and carried on milling operations. The respondents-<ORG>-established in 1963 a rice mill in village Kelandur at a distance of about 11/2 miles from the site of the appellant's mill. A notification under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was issued in March 1966 for compulsory acquisition of the land and buildings on the site of the appellants' rice mill for use in <ORG>. In October 1967 an award acquiring the land and buildings was made. The award expressly recited that the appellants were entitled to remove the machinery of the rice Mill.

The appellants in the meanwhile applied to the Special Officer for Rehabilitation of the State of Mysore to allot them a suitable new site in which their rice mill may be located. The Special Tehsildar for Rehabilitation sanctioned that the rice mill building may be shifted to a site in Survey No. 233 of Mudugoppa granted to the appellants by the State of Mysore. By order dated January 20, 1969, the Director of <ORG> passed an order sanctioing the change in the location of the appellants' rice mill from its original site to the new site "as per the provisions contained in section 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958", and rejected the objection raised by the respondents.

The respondents then moved a petition in -the High Court of Mysore for a direction quashing the order dated January 20, 1969 passed by the Director of <ORG> on the plea that the appellant' s mill was moved to a place in the vicinity of their rice mill in the kelandur village in contravention of ss. 5 and 8 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, and in consequence of the removal of the appellants' mill "their business was likely to. be adversely affected".

<ORG> held that permission under S. 9 (3) (c) was a condition precedent to the shifting of the location of the rice mill, and since the appellants did not obtain the previous permission to shift the mill, the order of the Director was liable to be "struck down as ultra vires". In the view of the Court, by the shifting of the appellants' rice mill the respondents' business was directly affected and they had a right to challenge the legality of the order. <ORG> upheld the claim of the respondents on the sole ground, that the order of the Director was made in violation of the mandatory in junction of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act 21 of 1958 and it prejudicially affected the business of the respondents as rice-millers. The <ORG> enacted the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act 21 of 1958 to regulate rice milling. By s. 3(a) a "defunct rice-mill" is defined as meaning "a rice- mill in existence at the commencement of this Act but in which rice-Milling operations have not been carried on for a period exceeding one year prior to such commencement". By S. 3(b) "existing rice-mill" means cc a rice mill carrying on rice-milling operations at the commencement of this Act, and includes a rice-mill in existence at such commencement which is not carrying on rice-milling operations but in which rice-milling operations have been carried on at -any time within a period of one year prior to such commence- ment". By s. 2(e) "new rice-mill" means "a rice will other than an existing rice mill or a defunct rice mill". By s. 2 (f ) "rice mill" is defined as meaning "the plant and Machinery with which and the premises, including the precincts thereof in which or in any part of which, rice- milling operations is carried on." By S. 5 provision is made for grant of permits in respect of new or defunct rice mill. By sub-s. (1) of S. 5 it is provided that any person or authority may make an application to <ORG> for the grant of permit for the establishment of a new rice mill,, and any owner of a defunct rice mill may, make a like application for the grant of a permit for re- commencing rice-milling operation in such mill. By sub-s. (3) if, on receipt of any such application for the grant of'

-a permit, <ORG> is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for ensuring adequate supply of rice, it may, subject to the provisions of sub-s. (4) and sub-s. (5) grant the permit specifying therein the period within which the mill is to be established. Subsection (4) provides -

"Before granting any permit under sub-section (3), <ORG> shall cause a full and complete investigation to be made in the prescribed manner in respect of the application -and shall have due regard to-

(a) the number of rice mills operating in the locality;

(b) the availability of paddy in the locality;

(c) the availability of power 'and water supply for the. rice mill in respect of which a permit is applied for;

(d) whether the rice mill in respect of which a permit is -applied for will, be of the huller type, sheller type or combined sheller- huller type;

(e) Whether the functioning of the rice mill in respect of which a permit is applied for would cause substantial unemployment in the locality;

(f) such other particulars as may be prescribed."

By sub-s. (6) a permit granted under s. 5 is effective for the period specified therein or for such extended period as <ORG> may think fit to allow in any case. Section 6 provides for grant of licences. Any owner of an existing rice mill or of a rice mill in respect of which a permit has been granted under S. 5 may make an application to the licensing officer for the giant of a licence for carrying on rice-milling operations in that rice mill. By sub-s. (3) of s. 6 the licensing officer is obliged to grant the licence on payment of the fee and on deposit of such sum as may be prescribed.' -as security for due performance of the conditions. By sub-s. (4) a licence granted under s. 6 is valid for the period specified therein, and may be renewed from time to time for such period and on, payment of such fees and on conditions as may be prescribed.

Section 7 provides for revocation, suspension and amendment of licences. By S. 8 restrictions are placed on rice mills. Under Sub-s. (1) no person or authority shall, after the commencement of the Act, establish any new rice mill except under and in accordance with 'a permit granted under S. 5 . By sub-s. (2) no owner of a rice mill shall, after the comencement of the Act, carry on rice-milling operation excent under and in accordance with a licence.granted under S. 6. By sub-s. (3), insofar as it is relevant, it is provided "No owner of a rice mill,(a)

(b)

(c) shall, without the previous permissions of <ORG>, change the location of the whole or any part of the rice mill in respect of which a licence has been granted under section 6 ;

' Section 13 provides for penalties for contravention or attempts to contravene or abetting the contravention of any of the provisions, inter alia, of s. 8 . Power of the Central Government to issue a permit under s. 5 and under s. 8 (3)

(c) to change the location of Tice mill is delegated to the Director of <ORG>.

The Director of <ORG> sanctioned, in exercise of the power under s. 8 (3) (c) of the Act that the location of the rice mill of the appellants may be shifted. <ORG> declared the order invalid on the ground that the previous sanction had not been obtained. The Court observed that "where an officer granting a licence or passing an administrative order exceeds his powers and makes an order in violation of the provision which ,clothes him with that power, his order is liable to be struck down", and since S. 8 (3) (c) contemplated grant of permission for change of location before the plant and the machinery were actually shifted to a new site, the Director of <ORG> had no power to grant permission after the machinery and plant had been shifted.

The rice mills for the purpose of the Act were divided into three classes : defunct rice-mills, existing rice-mills and new rice-mills. Defunct rice mills are those which had ceased functioning for a period exceeding one year prior to the commencement of the Act; existing rice mills 'are 'those which carry on rice milling operations -at the commencement of tile Act or had carried on rice milling 8 51 operations within one year prior to the commencement of the Act; and new rice-mills are those which are other than existing rice mills or defunct rice mills. In respect of all rice mills a licence for carrying on rice milling operations under S. 6 must be obtained. In respect of a rice mill new or defunct a permit under s. 5 has first to be obtained. No permit is required by and existing rice mill. In granting the permit the authority has to take into consi- deration matters which are specified in sub-s. (4) of s. 5 . The licensing authority must on application issue a licence to an existing rice mill or a rice mill in respect of which a permit has been granted under s. 5 . For change in the location of any rice mill in respect of which a licence hasbeen granted under s. 6 the previous permission of <ORG> is necessary under S. 8 (3) (c). The <ORG> has by the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act , 1958, prescribed limitations that an existing rice mill shall carry on business only after obtaining a licence and if the rice mill is to be shifted from its existing location, previous permission of <ORG> shall be obtained. Permission for shiftng their rice mill was obtained by the appellants from the Director of <ORG>. The appellants had not started rice milling operations before the sanction of the Director of <ORG> was obtained. Even if it be assumed that the previous sanction has to be obtained from the authorities before the machinery is moved from its existing site, we fail to appreciate what grievance the respondents may raise against the grant of, permission by the authority permitting the installation of machinery on a new site. The right to carry on business being a fundamental right under Art. 19(1 ) (g) of the Constitution, its exercise is subject only to the restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the general public under Art. 19 (6) (i).

Section 8 (3) (c) is merely regulatory : if it is not complied with the appellants may probably be exposed to a penalty, but a competitor in the business cannot seek to prevent the appellants from exercising their right to carry on business, because of the default, nor can the rice mill of the appellants be regard as a new rice mill. Competition in the trade or business may be subject to such restrictions as are permissible and are imposed by the <ORG> by a law enacted in the interests of the general public under Art. 19 (6 ), but a person cannot claim independently of such restriction that another person shall not carry on business or trade so as to affect his trade or business adversely. The appellants complied with the statutory requirements for carrying on rice milling operations in the building on the new site. Even assuming that no previous permission was obtained, the respondents would have no locus standi for challeng-

But Mr. <NAME> for the respondents contended that in granting the permission under s. 8 (3 ) (c) the authority was bound to take into account matters which -govern the issue of a permit under s. 5 (4) of the Act. Counsel submitted that sub-s. (3) (c) of s. 8 was enacted with a view to ensure adequate mining facilities and to prevent unfair competition and on that account it is provided that when the location of an, existing rice mill has to be shifted, the authority had to take into consideration the number of rice mills operating in the locality; the availability of power and water supply for the rice mill in respect of which a permit is applied for; whether the functioning of the rice mill in respect of which a permit is applied for would cause substantial unemployment in the locality; and such other particulars as may be prescribed. According to counsel, since the Act was intended to regulate the carrying on of business of rice mills in the country, it was implicit in s. 8 (3) (c) that the authority sanctioning the change of location of a rice mill shall consider whether ' another person was by the shifting likely to be prejudiced thereby. 'This counsel says, the Director did not consider, and on that account the order is liable to be set aside because the right of the respondents is infringed. This argument was not advanced before <ORG>, and, in our judgment, has no substance. The considerations which are prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 5 only apply to the grant of

-a permit in respect of a new rice mill or a defunct rice mill. They have no application in considering the shifting the location of an existing rice mill. In respect of a new or defunct rice mill a permit and a licence are both required : in respect of an existing rice mill only a licence is required. The conditions prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 5 only apply to the grant of -a permit and not to a licence. By s. 8 (3) (c) it is made one of the conditions of the licence that the location of the rice mill shall not be shifted without the previous permission of <ORG>. It is true that the appropriate authority clothed with the power must consider the expediency of permitting a change of location. But there is no statutory obligation imposed upon him to take into consideration the matters prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 5 in granting' the permission to change the location.

The appellants had been carrying on business in milling rice for more than 30 years and the mill was by reason of the proposal to submerge the site in <ORG> had to be shifted from its location. The State allotted another piece of land to the appellants and did not acquire their machinery and permitted erection of their rice mill building on the new location. This was done with a view to cause minimum hardship to the appel-

lants arising in consequence of the proposed construction of the dam resulting in submergence of their land. The State also granted permission to the appellants to change the location under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act , 1958. The permission cannot be said to be granted without consideration of the relevant circumstances. The appeal is allowed, -and the petition filed by the respondent <ORG> is ordered to be dismissed with costs throughout in favour of the appellants.

<ORG> Appeal allowed. 85 4