PETITIONER: <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: BAGLESHWAR PRASAD & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/08/1962 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS DAYAL, <NAME> CITATION: 1966 AIR 875 1963 SCR (3) 767 CITATOR INFO : E 1969 SC 198 (14) ACT: Domestic Tribunal-Educational body-Disciplinary action -Interference by High Court-Constitution of India, Art.226. HEADNOTE: The appellant Board cancelled the declaration of the result of the respondent in the High School Certificate Examination held in 1960 accepting the findings of the subcommittee appointed by it to enquire into the charges made against the respondent and another candidate of having used unfair means in answering the English, Mathematics and Hindi papers. The charges were based upon the fact that in the Hindi 3rd paper set at the said examination, the respondent gave wrong answers to Question No. 4 in precisely the same form in which the answers had been given by the candidate whose Roll number was consecutive with that of the respondent. <ORG> interpreting the charge as confined to that the respondent had copied either from the answer book of the candidate bearing the consecutive Roll Number or from a common source held that the findings of the enquiry committee were based on no evidence and quashed the cancellation of the result.On appeal by special leave. Held, that in the circumstances of the case, the identity of the wrong answers given by the respondent with that of the other candidate bearing the consecutive Roll Number rendered the charge of the respondent having employed unfair means highly probable and that the findings of the enquiry committee based upon such probabilities and circumstantial evidence could not be said to be based on no evidence as in such matters direct evidence quite often cannot be available. Held, further, that in dealing with cases like those of educational institutions dealing with matters of discipline like employing unfair means, the problem faced by the educational institutions should be appreciated by <ORG> and so long as the enquiry held is fair and affords the candidate an opportunity to defend himself, the matter should 768 not be examined with the same strictness as applicable to criminal trials in the ordinary courts of law. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 328 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 4, 1961, of <ORG> in Civil Misc. writ No. 3469 of 1960.

<NAME>, Advocate-General for the State of U. P., <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellants.

<NAME> and <NAME>, for respondent No. 1. 1962. August 27. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.<ORG>This appeal by special leave arises out of a Writ Petition filed by the respondent <NAME> against <ORG>, U. P., Allahabad, and its Secretary, appellants 1 & 2, and another. By his petition, the respondent challenged the validity of the order passed by appellant No. 1 on December 5, 1960, cancelling the respondent's result at the <ORG> Examination held in 1960. It appears that the respondent appeared for the said examination from <ORG>, Bindki. He was declared to have passed the said examination in the 11 Division with distinction in Art. Thereafter, he joined Intermediate first year class in <ORG> at Allahabad. On the 3rd September, 1960, he received a letter from the Principal, <ORG>, Kora Jahanabad, from where he had appeared for the <ORG> examination, calling upon him to appear before <ORG> to answer the charge of having used unfair means in English, Mathematics and Hindi papers. Accordingly, he appeared before the said <ORG><ORG><ORG>. A charge was given to him and his explanation was obtained on the said charge. This charge was based on the fact that in Hindi 3rd paper set at the said examination, the respondent had given wrong answers to Question No. 4 in precisely the same firm in which the said answers had been given by a candidate whose Roll No. was 91733. The respondont's Roll No. was 91731. The respondent was shown the identical wrong answers to the said Question which were found in the two papers, and he was asked to explaining about the said identity of the wrong answers. He admitted that the wrong answers appeared to be identical, but he denied that he had used any unfair means. The <ORG><ORG><ORG> however, was not satisfied with the explanation and reported that both the respondent and the candidate whose Roll No. was 94733 had used unfair means. As a result of the report made by the <ORG><ORG><ORG>, the first appellant passed an order cancelling the results of both the candidates. Both the said candidates disputed the validity of the said order, in <ORG>. The petition filed by the candidate whose Roll No. was 94733 was dismissed, but that of the respondent was allowed, and the impugned order passed by appellant No<ORG>1 cancelling, the result of the respondent in the <ORG> examination for 1960, has been set aside. It is against this order that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. From the petition field by <ORG> (W. P. No. 3469 of 1960) it appears that he challenged the validity of the impugned order on several grounds. The principal contentions raised by the petitioner against the competence and the authority of appellant No.1 and against the regularity and fairness of the enquiry held, srose for decision<ORG> before <ORG> in the companion W. P. No. 3196 of 1960 also. <ORG> rejected the said contentions of law in that W. P. and for the reasons recorded in the judgment in that petition, the said contentions were rejected even in the present petition. Thus, the challenge to the validity of the order made on points of law was not sustained. <ORG> then proceeded to examine the narrow ground of attack against the validity of the order which was made on the basis that the impugned order was not supported by any evidence at all. It appears from the judgment of <ORG> that the High court was inclined to accept this argument and it has set aside the order on the ground that it is not supported by any evidence. The correctness of this finding is seriously disputed before us by the learned Advocate<ORG>General who appears for the appellants. It is common ground that the proceed in taken against the respondent in respect of the unfair means alleged to have been adopted by him at the examination, are in the nature of quasi<ORG>judicial proceedings, and as such, in a proper case, orders passed as a result of the said proceedings would be liable to be challenged under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is also common ground that <ORG> would be justified in quashing the impugned order if it is satisfied that the said order is not based on any evidence at all. An order passed by a <ORG> holding a quasi<ORG>judicial enquiry which is not supported by any evidence, is an order which is erroneous on the face of it and as such, is liable to be quashed by <ORG> in exercise of its high prerogative jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226. In the present case, <ORG> has found that the conclusion of the enquiry <ORG> that the respondent had copied either from the answer book of the candidate bearing Roll No<ORG>947 3 or from a common source, was not supported by any evidence In coming to this conclusion, <ORG> has assumed that the charge against the respondent was that he had copied from the candidate bearing Roll No. 94733. Having made this assumption, <ORG> has observed that there was no charge against the respondent that he connived in the act of copying by the other candidate ,from his answer<ORG>book, and it has added that there is no evidence in proof of such connivance. <ORG> has also stated that no evidence had been shown to justify the allegations that any outsider had helped the candidate, including the respondent. That, in brief, is the genesis of the final conclusion of <ORG>.

It appears that <ORG> was in error in assuming that the only charge against the respondent was that he had copied from the paper of the candidate bearing Roll No. 94733 and this error is basically responsible for the other observations made by <ORG>. The translation of the charge as it has been printed in the record before us, no doubt, seems to support the assumption made by <ORG> in regard to the nature of the charge' But the charge was framed in Hindi and it is common ground before us that the Hindi charge has not been properly translated from the record when it seems to show that what was alleged against the respondent was only that he had copied out from candidate bearing Roll No. 94733. The charge, in terms, was that having regard to the identity of the mistaken answers, the apprehension was that there had been copying, and that is very different from saying that the only charge was that the respondent had copied from the other candidate. This position is made very clear when we consider the explanation given by the respondent. In his explanation, the respondent bad stated that he had not copied out from the answer-, book of any candidate, nor had he allowed anyone to copy out from his answer-book, so far as he could. He admitted that the mistaken answers in the two papers were identical and he pleaded 'that he could not say any thing as to why this happened. He was also asked whether he had got any help from outside and he gave an answer in the negative. It would thus be seen that at the enquiry, the charge against the respondent was, either that he copied from candidate bearing Roll No. 94733, or that he connived at the said candidate copying from his answer-book, or that both of them had copied from a common source. In either case, 'it would amount to the adoption, of unfair means. Therefore, in our opinion, <ORG> was in error in assuming that the charge was very narrow and did not include the two other alternatives on which the adoption of unfair means was sought to be established.

There is another circumstance which is relevant and significant and that has been ignored by <ORG> in dealing with this petition: It appears that at the examination held at Bindki Centre, unfair means were adopted on a very large scale by a large number of students and the examination appears to have been conducted in an atmosphere which was not at all congenial to the enforcement of the discipline which has to be observed in conducting examinations. It appears that there are rivalries and party politics in <ORG> that runs the institution at which this examination was held, and there are rivalries and party politics even amongst the members of the staff. The members of <ORG> and other influential people of the locality bring undue pressure on the Principal and the Invigilators to help their wards or the wards of their friends and relatives in the <ORG>'s Examination. As a result of this unhealthy atmosphere, <ORG> examination had been abolished for some years, but on account of public pressure it was re- started in 1960, and the result was very unfortunate. It also appears that on the day of English paper, while students were answering the paper in Room No. 3, an answer paper by some outsider was dropped into the room 15 minutes before the time to answer questions was over.' This paper was thrown in room No. 3 from room No. 18. It was a typed paper giving answers to all the Questions. The Assistant teacher, <NAME>, who was one of the Invigilators, complained that the Parcha was typed in the office of the Superintendent of the Centre, but this allegation was denied. Indeed, from the reports made by the invigilators and the findings made by <ORG>, it appears that the Invigilators themselves were so much frightened by the prevailing rowdyism and by pressure from influential people that they found themselves powerless to maintain discipline in the examination hall. It is, therefore, not surprising that some invigilators could not prevent copying and in fact, six of them had to be warned to be careful in future.

The report of the enquiry committee also shows that the complaints which they were to investigate referred to copying on a large scale in several papers besides Hindi, and it is after examining all the complaints in the light of the evidence available to them that the <ORG> made its final report; and in that report, it held that the respondent and candidate bearing Roll No. 94733 were guilty of having used unfair means.

In dealing with the question as to whether the Committee was justified in coming to this conclusion against the respondent, it would not be reasonable to exclude from consideration the circumstances under which the whole enquiry came to be hold and the general background of the prevailing disturbed and riotous atmosphere in the Examination Hall during the days that the High School Examination was held at the Centre in 1960. Unfortunately, <ORG> has ignored this background altogether. Before <ORG>, a statement was filed showing the seating arrangement in Room No. 10 where the respondent was sitting for writing his answers. It appears that he was No. 3 in the 3rd row, whereas the other candidate with Roll No. 94733 was No. 4 in the second row. <ORG> was very much impressed by the fact that the respondent could not have looked back and copied from the answer. book of the other candidate, and <ORG> did not think that there was any evidence to show that the other candidate could have copied from the respondents paper with his connivance. We have looked at the incorrect answers ourselves and we are not prepared to hold that the identical incorrect answers were given by the two candidates either by accident or by coincidence. Some of the incorrect answers, and, particularly, the manner in which they have been given, clearly suggest that they were the result of either one candidate copying from the other, or both candidates copying from a common source. The significance of this fact has been completely missed by <ORG>. The question before <ORG> had to be decided by it in the light of the nature of the incorrect answers themselves, and that is what <ORG> has done. It would, we think be inappropriate in such a case to require direct evidence to show that the respondent could have looked back and copied from the answer written by the other candidate who was sitting behind him. There was still the alternative possibility that the candidate sitting behind may have copied from the respondent with his connivance. It is also not unlikely that the two candidates may have talked to each other. The atmosphere prevailing in the Examination Hall does not rule out this possibility. These are all matters which <ORG> had to consider, and the fact. that <ORG> did not write an elaborate report, does not mean that it did not consider all the relevant facts before it came to the conclusion that the respondent had used unfair' means.

In dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the <ORG> or appellant No. 1 set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic <ORG> to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious- problem and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic <ORG> appointed by educational bodies like the <ORG>. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by <ORG> under Art. 226 , <ORG> is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though, it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence, at all, <ORG> would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic <ORG> in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves and in holding such enquiries, the <ORG>, must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal trials in ordinary courts of law. In the present case, no animus is suggested and no malafides have been pleaded. The enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an opportunity of making his defence. That being so, we think <ORG> was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondent.

We ought, however, to add that though we are inclined to accept the argument raised by the learned Advocate-General against the decision of <ORG>, we do not propose to make any consequential order is favour of the appellants, because the learned Advocate General has fairly conceded that he does not want any such order in the present appeal. It appears that the respondent has, in June, 1962, passed his Intermediate Examination and it has been fairly conceded that there is no intention to disturb his career under the present circumstances. The learned Advocate-General wanted a decision from us in this appeal because he apprehended that the reasoning adopted by <ORG> in setting aside the order passed against the respondent may be construed to mean that under Art. 226 , <ORG> can examine the merits of the order passed by appellant No. 1 in such cases. The result is, though we agree with the appellants that the order passed by <ORG> was not justified, we refrain from setting it aside for the reasons just explained. There would be no order as to costs.


JUDGMENT <NAME> and <NAME>, <NAME>.

1. In this case the plaintiff sued for a four-anna share of the rent of a certain jote on the allegation that the jote in question had been purchased by the defendants 1 to 3 in the name of defendant No. 4. The defendants 1 to 3, who are co-sharers in the mouza with the plaintiff, deny the purchase of the jote. The defendant No. 4 in his written statement alleged that the defendants 2 and 3 had purchased the jote, benami, in his name, and that defendants 2 and 3 were in possession.

2. The first Court found that the defendants 1 and 2 had purchased the jote in the name of defendant No. 4, and were in possession of the jote, and decreed the suit against the defendants 1 to 4. This decree was reversed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that under Section 20, Sub-section (7), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the defendants must be presumed to be ryots with a right of occupancy, and therefore under Section 22, Sub-section (2), the right had merged in their superior right as proprietors, and that no rent could be claimed by the plaintiff therefor, and he accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

3. It is contended in second appeal that <ORG> is wrong in law in its interpretation of Sections 20 and 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and in reply to that the respondent has endeavoured to support the decree of <ORG> by showing that there is no legal evidence of the purchase of the jote, by the defendants and of their possession in pursuance of it.

4. We think it is impossible to say that there is absolutely no evidence of the purchase, although in our opinion that evidence is extremely slight, and had we to decide the point upon the evidence, we might have come to a different conclusion, but there being some sort of evidence, the lower <ORG> were justified in finding as a fact that the defendants had purchased the jote, and we cannot interfere with that finding of fact.

5. Then as regards the other point raised by the appellant, it appears to us that, whether or not the jote was an occupancy holding, Section 22, Sub-section (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not operate to prevent the landlord from recovering the rent of the holding. Sub-section (2) runs as follows: "If the occupancy right in land is transferred to a person jointly interested in the land as proprietor or permanent tenure-holder, it shall cease to exist; but nothing in this sub-section shall prejudicially affect the rights of any third person." That is to say, the occupancy right will cease to exist, but it does not follow that the tenancy will be altogether extinguished. The third person mentioned in the clause must be held to include every person interested other than the transferor and transferee. So that the acquisition of an occupancy right by a proprietor would not affect the right of a co-sharer landlord to receive his share of the rent of the tenancy.

6. That being so, the decree of <ORG> must be reversed, and that of the first <ORG> restored with costs in both the Appellate <ORG>s. The finding of the Appellate <ORG> being that the defendants 1 to 3 purchased the jote the decree will be against them, and the suit will be dismissed as against defendant No. 4.