<NAME>, J.

1. This application by the first party is directed against a final order passed in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of 58.48 acres, equivalent to 93 Bighas 11 ka-thas 7 dhurs of land. I will refrain from mentioning the respective claims of the three parties involved in this case except for such part of their claim as becomes necessary to mention. I will also refrain from referring to the merits of the parties' cases because I feel, after hearing both the parties, that this is a case which should be remanded.

2. Appearing on behalf of the first party-petitioners, the first point which Dr. <NAME> has taken is that the appointment of a pleader commissioner in this case by the Magistrate was illegal and that, in any case, the pleader commissioner's report should not have been considered inasmuch as it was not legally put in evidence on being formally proved in accordance with law. In my judgment there is no substance in this point. Dr. <NAME> has drawn my attention to section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrate may depute any magistrate subordinate to him to make a local enquiry in a case under Chapter XII (which includes Section 145 } and that the report of the Magistrate so deputed would be read as evidence in the case.

He has contended that, there being no provision for appointment of a pleader commissioner, the only person who can be deputed to hold local enquiry is a subordinate Magistrate under Section 148 . It seems to me, however, that this contention is misconceived. If a Magistrate feels that it is necessary to get some one to report upon the physical features of the land in dispute between the parties or the measurements of those lands, I do not see why he cannot depute a pleader commissioner for the purpose.

The only difference is that the report of a Magistrate deputed under Section 148 can be read in evidence without formal proof whereas the report of a pleader commissioner could not, under the Code of Criminal Procedure as it stood before the amendments made by Act XXVI of 1955, be read in evidence without such proof. This is supported by the decision of <ORG> of this Court in <CITATION> 1 Pat 75 : (AIR 1922 Pat 224).

3. Dr. <NAME> has argued that even under Section 145 , as it stands after the amendments made by Act XXVI of 1955, the report of a pleader commissioner cannot be considered by the Magistrate unless and until it is put in evidence by giving formal proof. He has also argued that a report of a pleader commissioner is not a document within the meaning of Section 145 at all. There seems to be no substance in either of these arguments. The only provision under Section 145 , as it stood before the last amendment, for consideration of materials was made in Sub-section (4), which laid down that the Magistrate should "peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them respectively, consider the effect of such evidence, take such further evidence (if any) as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject".

4. Under Act XXVI of 1955, the following words have been added to Sub-section (1) of Section 145 ; "and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims." Sub-section (4), as amended, provides that the Magistrate should "peruse the statements, documents and affidavits, if any, so put in, hear the parties and conclude the inquiry, as far as may be practicable, within a period" of two months from the date of the appearance of the parties before him and, if possible, decide the question whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order before mentioned in such possession of the said subject."

The first point that is absolutely clear from the amendments made is that the intention of the legislature was that a proceeding under Section 145 should be concluded as expeditiously as possible. This is the reason why the proceeding is to be concluded, if possible, within two months from the date of appearance of the parties and this is also the reason why the taking of oral evidence, with the delays consequent upon taking of such evidence, has been done away with unless, as provided in the first proviso to Sub-section (4), the Magistrate himself thinks that he should summon and examine any person whose affidavit has been put in.

5. As the taking of oral evidence even on the question of possession has become optional, the <ORG> could not have possibly contemplated that all private documents should be formally proved before the <ORG>. This also appears to follow from the amendments. There are two points which support this conclusion. Firstly, the provision in Sub-section (1) is that the parties are to 'put in' their written statements and also to 'put in' such documents as they rely upon. It is only with respect to affidavits that Sub-section (1) lays down that the parties may be called upon to adduce the evidence of persons upon whom they rely by putting in their affidavits.

Secondly, the provision in Sub-section (4) is that the Magistrate has to peruse the written statement, documents and affidavits. There is nothing in this sub-section to show that the Magistrate can only peruse a document put in by a party if it is for-

mally proved, nor is there anything in it to show that the document must be gut in evidence by getting it formally proved.

6. It seems to me to be manifest, therefore, that a document put in by a party in a case under Section 145 need not be formally proved before it is considered by the Magistrate. The argument of Dr. <NAME> that a report is not a document is obviously wrong, because I do not see how a written report can be described otherwise.

7. Another point which Dr. <NAME> has raised is that the learned Magistrate was wrong in taking into consideration the opinion of the pleader commissioner as to the possession of the parties. This contention appears to me to be well-founded. While the report of the pleader Commissioner relating to the physical features of the lands and/or measurements can well be taken into consideration by a Magistrate, his opinion as to the possession of any party is not based upon his personal knowledge and, that being so, cannot be taken into consideration.

8. The first party's case is that <NAME> of the second party was in possession of the disputed lands as his agent up to a few years before the date on which the proceeding was started. The learned Magistrate has observed in this connection:

"That <NAME> continued in possession not as agent but as lessee, is also proved from the fact that in the show cause petition filed by the first party in Section 144 proceeding out of which the present proceeding sprang up it was clearly stated by the first party in para 19 of the written statement that <NAME> and others 2nd party were never agent and servants of the 2nd party''.

Dr. <NAME> has urged that, while the learned Magistrate has correctly quoted paragraph 19, he has failed to notice that the word 'never' in that paragraph was a mistake for the word 'mere' and that this would have been clear to him if he had only perused paragraph 22 of the same written statement. I have looked into paragraphs 19 and 22 of the written statement. In paragraph 19, the first party have stated that the claim of the second and third parties was false and frivolous and that as a matter of fact they were never the tenants of the lands in question. Thereafter, the sentence is, "Indeed they were never agents and servants of the first party". Paragraph 22 is as follows :

"That is a settled principle of law that the possession of an agent or servant, if any, is possession of the master and as such also the 1st party remained in continuous possession".

Reading the "two paragraphs together, it is obvious that Dr. <NAME>'s argument is correct that the word 'never' in paragraph 19 is a mistake for the word 'mere'. The learned Magistrate has wrongly relied upon this paragraph as showing that the first party admitted that <NAME> and others were not their agents and servants.

9. The last point which Dr. <NAME> has urged is that the learned Magistrate has attached no importance to the affidavits filed on behalt of the parties and has, in fact, made mistakes even in mentioning the number of persons who swore affidavits on behalf of each party. This is correct. Although the affidavits of 19 persons were filed on behalf of the first party, the learned Magistrate has mentioned in his judgment that affidavits of only four persons were filed on their behalf. Again, although the affidavits of ten persons were filed on behalf of the second party the learned Magistrate has mentioned that those of 18 persons were filed on their behalf. In fact, the learned Magistrate has considered the evidence of five witnesses on behalf of the first party though he has said that the affidavits of only four persons were filed on their behalf,

10. Appearing on behalf of the second party, Mr. <NAME> has urged that the learned Magistrate has decided the case upon the important materials before him and he has considered the affidavits of only those persons whose affidavits he considered to be worth discussing. I do find that the learned Magistrate has considered the documentary evidence but it is obvious that he has not attached any importance to the affidavits at all. Had he done so, he could not have made mistakes in mentioning the number of persons whose affidavits were filed on behalf of each party.

In view of the latest amendment of Section 145 , it is not necessary to examine witnesses in Court. The learned Magistrate is entirely wrong, however, in thinking that it is not necessary even to consider the affidavits which now take the place of oral evidence given by witnesses. Sometimes, I find that Magistrate dispose of all the affidavits on behalf of both the parties merely by saying that they are oath against oath even that is improper. The Magistrate should consider the affidavit of each deponent and should give his reasons for accepting or not accepting it.

Even when witnesses are examined and cross-examined in Court, it is possible for a trial Court to say that there is oath against oath. It should be obvious that that would be hardly a consideration of the oral evidence. The same rule should apply in the case of affidavits. In my judgment the learned Magistrate's judgment is vitiated for non-consideration of all the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties. He was obviously not even aware of the number of affidavits filed on behalf of each party.

11. In view of non-consideration of the affidavits, I allow the application, set aside the judgment of the learned Magistrate and remand the case for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observation which I have made above. The case will now be placed for disposal before another Magistrate in accordance with the directions of the Sessions Judge. The Magistrate before whom this case is placed will proceed to dispose of it on the materials which are already on record. He will not allow any party to put in further materials.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. A complaint under sections 276c-277 of the Income-tax Act , 1961 (for short "the Act"), and under sections 193 / 196 , IPC , was made by Shri <NAME>, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Assessment), Range XIV, New Delhi, against the present petitioner, Dr. <NAME>, in respect of the assessment of the petitioner for the assessment year 1980-81 alleging that the petitioner had willfully attempted to evade tax, interest and penalty and had made a statement in verification, delivered an account and statement which are false, which he knew or believed to be false or did not believe the same to be true and had also fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same in the course of income-tax proceedings and that he dishonestly and fraudulently used that evidence in the course of the assessment proceedings which are judicial proceedings. It is alleged that after investigation, the assessment of the petitioner was completed for the assessment year 1980-81 and the net income of the petitioner was assessed at Rs. 1,77,433, vide assessment order dated March 21, 1983. It was also asserted that in the aforesaid assessment order, the petitioner had shown gross profit of Rs. 30,254 on the sales of Rs. 1,45,016 but, however, after the completion of the assessment proceedings, the gross profit of the accused was assessed at Rs. 1,12,500 resulting in an addition of Rs. 82,246.

2. The petitioner was summoned as an accused person in the complaint.

3. An application dated April 25, 1986, was made by the petitioner in the court of Smt. <NAME>, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, praying for dropping of the proceedings against him for the reason that in the order passed on March 3, 1986, by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on appeal, it had been declared that the petitioner had not concealed his income and that the case had been remanded for that purpose. That application was, however, dismissed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, vide her order dated July 23, 1986. The order dated March 3, 1986, passed in appeal by <NAME>, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-IV, New Delhi, is a brief one and is reproduced in its entirety below :

"The appeal is against the order under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appellant along with <NAME> appeared. The only ground is against the addition of Rs. 82,246 in the trading account. As against the receipt shown of Rs. 96,000, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner enhanced the receipt to Rs. 2,25,000. He also estimated the gross profit at 50% on the above and added the difference between the gross profit estimated and the gross profit returned amounting to Rs. 82,246. It is pointed out by learned counsel that, first of all, there was no basis for enhancement in receipt and, secondly, the gross profit rate applied is very arbitrary and high. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner went through the books of account and could not find the accounts fully maintained. He went through the circumstantial evidence as well as the papers available at that time with him. The appellant has produced documents now which show complete variation with the determination of the profit by the learned Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. It will be proper that these documents are looked into by the assessing authority to formulate and calculate the income accordingly. The case is set aside and referred back to him for the purpose.

4. It is pointed out by Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the only thing against him (the petitioner) in the complaint was set at naught by the aforesaid order dated March 3, 1986, as a result of which the assessment for the year 1080-81 stood set aside in view of certain new documents produced by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as the same showed complete variation with the determination of the profit by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who was directed to look into those documents and to formulate and calculate the income accordingly. This order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (appeals) appears to have been passed under section 251(1)(a) of the Act which reads as follows :

"In an appeal against an order of assessment, he may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; or he may set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals) and after making such further enquiry as may be necessary, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine, where necessary, the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment."

5. This order is in contradistinction to the order contemplated by subsection (4) of section 250 of the Act which reads as follows :

"The Appellate Assistant Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals) may, before disposing of any appeal, make such further enquiry as he thinks fit, or may direct the Income-tax Officer to make further enquiry and report the result of the same to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)."

6. The order dated March 3, 1986, does not call for the report of the result of the further enquiry from the Income-tax Officer. The distinction between the two provisions of law is that whereas under section 251(1)(a) , the initial assessment is set aside and is no longer alive till it is made afresh by the Income-tax Officer after compliance with the directions given by the appellate authority, under sub-section (4) of section 250 , the initial assessment is not set aside and is kept alive and only the result of further enquiry is called for by the appellate authority from the assessing authority.

7. So, in the case on hand, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) set aside the assessment and directed the assessing authority to formulate and calculate the income of the petitioner afresh after taking into consideration the new documents produced by the petitioner before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

8. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate order dated March 3, 1986, set aside the entire assessment of the petitioner for the year 1980-81 whereas, according to Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel representing the respondent, that order set aside only the determination of the profit of Rs. 82,246 by the assessing authority and not the entire assessment which included the other additions.

9. Learned counsel for the revisionist has filed a copy of the income-tax assessment/refund from (annexure "E") for the relevant year 1980-81, prepared on March 20, 1986, and which shows on the last page (page 4) thereof that the assessment had been set aside, vide Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-IV, New Delhi's letter dated March 3, 1986. This order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was passed on March 3, 1986, as a result of which the aforesaid document showed the balance tax chargeable from the petitioner as "nil" and this could happen only when the entire assessment against the petitioner was set aside. This confirms the contention of the petitioner and sets at naught that of Mr. <NAME> representing the respondent.

10. When the entire assessment order pertaining to the petitioner which contained objectionable items on the basis of which the complaint was lodged by the respondent against the petitioner was set aside in its entirety, vide order date March 3, 1986, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-IV, New Delhi, the respondent is now left with no basis or material on the basis of which he can prosecute the petitioner regarding that complaint. It is an entirely different proposition that when the fresh assessment regarding the income of the petitioner is made in compliance with the directions made in the order dated March 3, 1986, and if something objectionable pertaining to the same against the petitioner is detected, there would be no impediment in the way of the respondent in filing a fresh complaint, if so advised, against the petitioner, but as at present, the entire substratum of the present complaint having been taken away by the setting aside of the assessment order, the present complaint cannot continue and has to be quashed and in this view of the matter, the impugned order dated July 23, 1986, passed by Smt. <NAME>, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, being erroneous cannot be allowed to stand. If, in support of this proposition, any authority is needed, the same is furnished by a decision of this court in <CITATION>  152 ITR 154.

11. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order dated July 23, 1986, of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is set aside and the complaint at present pending against the petitioner as also all the subsequent proceedings therein are quashed.

12. Petition allowed.


<NAME>, J.

1. The appellant appeals from a judgment of the High (Court of Judicature at Patna on a reference under Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question for decision may be stated to be whether the appellant is assessable to income-tax and super-tax in respect of an annual sum of Rs. 2,40,000 payable to him during his life pursuant to a covenant contained in the indenture hereinafter mentioned.

2. The appellant was the owner of an estate in British India known as <ORG>. He had a daughter who had married a son of <NAME> (hereinafter referred to as the <NAME>).

3. By an indenture, dated March 29, 1930, and made between the appellant of the one part and the <NAME> of the other part, the appellant conveyed the greater portion of his said estate to the <NAME> for the valuable consideration therein appearing. The indenture recites among other facts that the appellant was absolute owner of the estate, and that, for the purpose of discharging certain of his debts and of obtaining for himself an adequate income, he had agreed with the <NAME> for the absolute sale and transfer to her of that portion of his said estate described in the first schedule, in consideration of the <NAME> covenanting to pay the said debts (which amounted in fact to a sum of over Rs. 10,00,000) and to pay to him a sum of Rs. 4,73,063 in cash to meet the expenses of his daughter's marriage and other urgent necessities, and further covenanting to pay him annual sums during his lifetime of Rs. 2,40,000 in manner thereinafter appearing, such payment being secured by a charge upon the property thereby transferred. By the operative part of the indenture it was witnessed that in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the sum of Rs. 4,73,063, paid to the appellant, and in further consideration of the covenant by the <NAME> for payment to the appellant during his lifetime of the annual sum of Rs. 2,40,000 by six instalments, and also in consideration of the covenant to pay and indemnify the appellant in respect of the said debts, the appellant assigned the hereditaments therein described unto the <NAME> absolutely. The indenture contained a covenant by the <NAME> with the appellant for payment to him, during his lifetime, of the yearly sum of Rs. 2,40,000 by six equal instalments, with interest at twelve per cent, per annum on any overdue instalment, and to pay the said debts and to keep the appellant indemnified against all suits, actions and proceedings whatsoever in respect of the said debts or any of them.

4. This indenture does not itself contain any charge on the estate of the annual sums covenanted to be paid ; but their Lordships were informed and the case proceeded upon the footing that the stipulated security had been given by a separate document.

5. The taxing authorities in assessing the appellant in respect of the year 1931-1932 included in his assessable income the following item :-" Other sources, annuity, Rs. 2,40,000," being the sum received by him in pursuance of the <NAME>'s covenant. The appellant contends that no part of this receipt should be included, (1) because, being merely an instalment of the purchase price payable on the sale of his estate, it is not an annuity but a capital sum ; alternatively (2) because even if it be an annuity it is not taxable, because it does not fall within the description of what is taxable under the Act; and in the further alternative (3) because even if it would otherwise fall within such description, it is " agricultural income " and as such specifically excepted from the operation of the Act.

6. The relevant provisions of the Act are the following :-

2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

(1) 'agricultural income' means-

(a) any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land-revenue in British India or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of Government as such ;....

3. Where any Act of <ORG> enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates applicable to the total income of an assessee, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of all income, profits and gains of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company, firm and other association of individuals.

4. (i) Save as hereinafter provided, this Act shall apply to all income, profits or gains, as described or comprised in section 6 , from whatever source derived, accruing, or arising, or received in British India, or to be deemed under the provisions of this Act to accrue, or arise, or to be received in British India.

(2) .

(3) This Act shall not apply to the following classes of income :

(viii) Agricultural income.

6. Save as otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads of income, profits and gains, shall be chargeable to income-tax in the manner hereinafter appearing, namely ;-

(i) Salaries.

(ii) Interest on securities.

(iii) Property.

(iv) Business.

(v) Professional earnings.

(vi) Other sources.

7. (1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head 'Salaries' in respect of any salary or wages, any annuity, pension or gratuity, and any fees, commissions, perquisites, or profits received by him in lieu of, or in addition to, any salary or wages, which are paid by or on behalf of Government, a local authority, a company, or any other public body or association, or by or on behalf of any private employer :..

12. (1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head ' Other sources' in respect of income, profits and gains of every kind and from every source to which this Act applies (if not included under any of the preceding heads).

(2) Such income, profits and gains shall be computed after making allowance for any expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning such income, profits or gains, provided that no allowance shall be made on account of any personal expenses of the assessee.

7. In their Lordships' opinion it is impossible to hold that this annual payment is " agricultural income " within the meaning of the Act. It is not rent or revenue derived from land ; it is money payable under a contract imposing a personal liability on the covenantor, the discharge of which is secured by a charge on land. The covenantor is at liberty to make the payments out of any of her moneys, and is bound to make them whether the land is sufficiently productive or not. Their Lordships are in agreement with the opinion of the Judges, in India, which upon this point was unanimous.

8. Upon the remaining questions there has been a division of opinion among those Judges. The Chief Justice and <NAME> were of opinion that the sum in question was not a capital sum, but was " income " within the meaning of that word as used in Section 12 (I) of the Act, and therefore taxable. On the other hand <NAME> took the view that the transaction was a sale of the estate for a capital sum or price of an amount dependent on the duration of the appellant's life, and that each annual payment was an instalment of that capital sum and therefore not taxable as income.

9. Their Lordships find themselves in agreement with the Chief Justice and <NAME> Indeed but for the elaborate argument addressed to the <ORG>, they might well have contented themselves with adopting the careful judgment of the Chief Justice which covers the whole ground. It is impossible, without ignoring the plain language of the indenture of March 29, 1930, to treat the annual payments as instalments of a capital sum. To say that they are part of " the price " of the sale does not make them necessarily capital payments. It is only to say that they are part of the consideration for the transfer of the property, and that consideration may well take the form of annual sums which will be income in the hands of the payee. In this indenture the intention of the appellant is made clear. He was absolute owner of the estate ; he could have given it away, What he does, and what he states in the document he wishes to do, is to part with the estate in order to get rid of his debts, and to obtain for himself an adequate income. He accordingly transfers the estate to the <NAME> and obtains from her in exchange (1) a covenant to pay the debts in the second schedule, (2) a sum of cash to meet the expenses of his daughter's marriage, and (3) a covenant to pay him a life annuity. This is clearly no ordinary bargain and sale by a vendor and purchaser at arm's length, for the money consideration bears no relation to the actual value of the property. The amount ultimately payable by the purchaser depends upon the life of the vendor. It is, their Lordships think, clearly a case where the owner of the estate has exchanged a capital asset for (inter alia) a life annuity which is income in his hands. It is not a case in which he has exchanged his estate for a capital sum payable in instalments.

10. But it was argued that even though the life annuity be income, as distinct from capital, it still is not income taxable under the Act, because the words " income, profits and gains " in Section 12 (I) of the Act must be construed as including only such income as constitutes or provides a profit or gain to the recipient; i.e., that the word " income " is in some way limited by its association with the words " profits " and " gains." This being so, it is said that in view of (a) the true value of the estate (alleged to be about two crores of rupees) and (b) the age of the appellant (alleged to be about forty-seven at the date of the transaction), the annuity could never constitute or provide a "profit" or " gain " to him, and therefore cannot be " income " which is taxable under the Act.

11. Their Lordships agree with the opinion expressed by the Chief Justice upon this point. The word " income " is not limited by the words " profits " and " gains." Anything which can properly be described as income, is taxable under the Act unless expressly exempted. In their Lordships' view the life annuity in the present case is " income " within the words used in the judgment of this Board which was delivered in the case of <CITATION> . (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 206 : S.C. 34 Bom. L.R. 1033, 1038, viz. (p. 212):-

Income, their Lordships think, in this Act connotes a periodical monetary return ' coming in' with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. Thus income has been likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree, or the crop of a field. It is essentially the produce of something which is often loosely spoken of as ' capital.' But capital, though possibly the source in the case of income from securities, is in most cases hafdly more than an element in the process of production.

Here the source of the life annuity is the covenant. The life annuity is the produce of one of the items (viz., the covenant) which the appellant has. taken in exchange for the estate.

12. Reference was made before their Lordships to various decisions upon the taxing Acts of other countries, Acts which are couched in different terms and framed upon different lines. So far as those decisions had any relevance to the points under consideration, they appear to have been suitably considered and dealt with in the judgments of the Chief Justice and <NAME> Their Lordships think it unnecessary to discuss them further. They content themselves with repeating the view expressed in the judgment of the <ORG> above referred to, that little can be gained by trying to construe an Income-tax Act of one country in the light a decision upon the meaning of the income-tax legislation of another.

13. For the reasons above appearing their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

14. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal.