ORDER

1. Defendants in O.S.No.293 of 2001 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, aggrieved by the order dated 29.11.2001 in I.A.No. 777 of 2001 in the said suit, has filed the above revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Plaintiffs/respondents herein filed the said suit (O.S.No.293 of 2001) before <ORG>, Cuddalore against the defendants/petitioners herein for declaration declaring that <ORG>, Cuddalore is an independent entity outside the control of <ORG> and that the suit property belongs absolutely to <ORG>, and restraining the defendants, their men, agents or any person claiming under them by a decree of permanent injunction from in any manner interfering with the plaintiffs' possession and enjoyment of the suit property and their right to administer the affairs of <ORG>. Pending suit, the plaintiffs filed I.A.No.777 of 2001 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for an order of interim injunction restraining the second respondent therein from acting as Pastor (Presbyter) of <ORG> and the first respondent from appointing any other person as Pastor (Presbyter) of <ORG>. The learned Subordinate Judge, by an order dated 29.11.2001, after hearing the arguments of the petitioners' side and perusing the records and after holding that they made out a prima facie case, granted ad interim injunction against the second respondent therein till 20.12.2001 and ordered Notice to the respondents. Against the said order, the respondents in that application preferred the present revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as respondents.

3. Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, after drawing my attention to the relevant provisions, namely, Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by pointing out that inasmuch as the learned Subordinate Judge has not recorded any reason for the grant of interim order, the same is violative of the provisions of Order 39, Rule 3, C.P.C. and not sustainable. He also points out that in such a circumstance, the petitioners herein are entitled to seek constitutional remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by way of revision before this Court. On the other hand, Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, vehemently contended that the present revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable since the petitioners herein have effective remedy either by filing a petition for vacation of the injunction or filing an appeal before the appellate court accordingly prayed for dismissal of the revision petition.

I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

4. Since the issue arose in this Revision relates to interpretation of Order 39, Rules 1 and 3 C.P.C., it is useful to refer the same:-

"Order 39, Rule I. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.-Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise-

a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or

(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors,

(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiffs or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court thinks fit, until disposal of the suit or until further orders.

2. xx xx 2A. xx xx

3.Before granting injunction. <ORG> to direct notice to opposite party.- The <ORG> shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party.

Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object or granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant-

(a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with-

(i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application;

(ii) a copy of the plaint; and

(iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and

(b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent."

5. Before considering the fact whether the learned Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore has complied with the conditions stipulated in the above Rules, it is but proper to refer the factual aspects. According to the petitioners, <ORG> was formed by <ORG> in the year 1947. <ORG> is an unregistered body with a written constitution which governs the administration in the <ORG>. It is divided into 21 Dioceses each administered by a body called <ORG> which meets once in two/three years.

Each <ORG>s is headed by a Bishop who presides over an elected Executive Committee which acts for <ORG> in between the biennial meetings of <ORG>. Each <ORG> consists of several units called <ORG>s. A pastorate consists of one or more congregations. Each <ORG> has its own constitution which is in conformity with the constitution of <ORG> and the <ORG>. The properties of <ORG> are held by <ORG> (<ORG>) which is registered under the Companies Act , 1956. Though several civil and revenue proceedings had taken place, it is suffice to refer the filing of the suit, namely, O.S.No.293 of 2001 by the respondents herein before <ORG>, Cuddalore. In that suit, they prayed for a declaration declaring that <ORG>, Cuddalore is an independent entity outside the control of <ORG>, declaring that the suit property belongs absolutely to <ORG> and restraining the defendants, their men, agents or any person claiming under them by a decree of permanent injunction from in any manner interfering with the plaintiffs' possession and enjoyment of the suit property and their right to administer the affairs of <ORG>. The plaintiffs also filed I.A.No. 777 of 2001 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for an order of injunction against the 2nd respondent therein from acting as Pastor (Presbyter) of <ORG> and from appointing any other person as Pastor (Presbyter) of <ORG> pending suit. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore took up the injunction application and passed the following orders on 29.11.2001:-

29.11.2001 Petitioner's side arguments Heard. Perused the records. Prima facie case made out. Hence, ad-interim injunction granted against 2nd respondent till 20/12. Notice to respondents by then. Prl. Subordinate Judge.

Petition Under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 Section 151 . C.P.C.

Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the petitioners herein by drawing my attention to Order 39, Rules 1 and 3, vehemently contended that in the absence of recording the reasons for granting ad-interim injunction before hearing the other side, the interim order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained. He also contended that the plaintiffs have not enclosed any document either along with the plaint or with the injunction application; hence there is no question of "perusing the records" as stated by the learned Subordinate Judge. Any party who files a suit for necessary relief is also entitled for a temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1. The said application must be supported by affidavit stating that the property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree or that the other party threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud. In other words, if there is sufficient materials and apprehension to show that the defendant is likely to waste, damage, alienate, sell or dispossess the property in dispute or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to the property in dispute in the suit, he can ask for a temporary injunction either until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Like wise, in a suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury, the plaintiff may at any time during the pendency of the suit apply to the <ORG>, for temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of. In all these cases, the <ORG> may by order grant injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction. The power granted under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 is subject to the conditions prescribed in Rule 3. As per Rule 3, in all the injunction applications the normal rule is to issue notice of the application to the opposite party. However, if it appears to the <ORG> that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, the <ORG> shall, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. The <ORG> can grant injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party by recording the reasons for its opinion and also require the applicant to fulfill the conditions stipulated in Clauses (a) (i) (ii) and (iii) and (b) of Rule 3. In the order under challenge, the learned Subordinate Judge has no doubt stated that he heard the "petitioners' side arguments" and "perused the records.". He also stated that there is a "prima facie case". Before going further, as rightly contended by Mr. <NAME>, the plaintiffs have not produced a single document in support of their allegations along with the plaint. A perusal of the copy of the plaint filed in the typed-set of papers as well as the certified copy of the plaint produced at the time of hearing shows that the plaintiffs have not produced documents along with the plaint. Order 7, Rule 9 insists that plaintiff shall endorse on the plaint, or annex thereto, a list of the documents, if any, which he has produced along with it and if the plaint is admitted, he has to present within such time as may be fixed by the <ORG> or extended by it from time to time as many copies for the service of the defendants. If documents are enclosed along with the plaint, Sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 enables the Chief Ministerial Officer of the <ORG> to sign such list and copies of such statements regarding the correctness of the same. Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, fairly admitted that the plaint did not contain documents. However, it is stated that at the time of hearing of the injunction application I.A.No.777 of 2001, necessary documents have been placed before the <ORG> and after perusing those documents, the learned Subordinate Judge has granted ad-interim injunction. He also points out that the copies of those documents have been served on the respondents therein along with the copy of the injunction petition, affidavit, plaint etc. According to Mr. <NAME>, this shows that the plaintiffs have produced those documents at the time of hearing of the injunction application. I am unable to accept the said contention, since the injunction application I.A.No.777 of 2001 did not contain any such enclosures as claimed by Mr. <NAME>. The petition and order finds a place at pages 30 and 31 of the typed book. Absolutely there is no reference regarding details of those documents whether they were filed along with the petition or placed at the time of hearing of the injunction application. In other words, except the oral statement of Mr. <NAME>, absolutely there is no iota of evidence to show that the documents have been filed either along with the plaint or in the injunction application. In such a circumstance, as rightly contended by Mr. <NAME>, except the averments in the affidavit and plaint, no documents have been placed before the <ORG>; accordingly the statement of the learned Subordinate Judge that he "perused the records" cannot be sustained.

6. The scope of Order 39, Rule 3, particularly giving reason/reasons for granting injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party and the effect of the same has been considered in various decisions. In <ORG> v. <NAME>, , three Judge Bench of <ORG> has held that reasons to be recorded before grant of ex parte injunction under Order 39 Rule 3. This question was elaborately considered in para 38 of their judgment:-

"38. This Court had occasion to emphasise the need to give reasons before passing ex parte orders of injunction. <CITATION> , "...the court shall record the reasons' why an ex pane order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restrain against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The <ORG> has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the <ORG> shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of <NAME> v. <NAME>, 1875 (1) Ch D 426: 45 LJ Ch 373), and <CITATION> AIR 1936 PC 253(2) :63 IA 372: 37 Crl LJ 897. This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of <CITATION> , 1975(1) SCC 915.

As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed."

After saying so and after considering the merits of the case before them, Their Lordships have concluded that, (para 39) "39...As to why the respondent chose to come at the eleventh hour and where was the need to pass an urgent order of injunction, are mailers which are not discernible. Besides tested in the light of the case law set out above, the impugned order which is bereft of reason and laconic cannot stand a moment's scrutiny."

7. <CITATION> , , which is also another three Judge Bench of <ORG>, it has been held that, (para 30) "30....It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles - ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him."

8. It is clear from Rule 3 that whenever the <ORG> intends to grant ex parte injunction without notice to the opposite part, the <ORG> shall record its reason/reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay and also require the applicant to fulfil the conditions stipulated in Clause (a) and (b) therein. Though the learned Subordinate Judge has stated that he heard the arguments of the petitioners' side, perused the records and found that a prima facie case is made out in favour of the petitioners, first of all there is no question of perusing the records in the absence of any documents filed either along with the plaint or with the injunction application. The mere statement that 'there is a prima facie made out' would not be sufficient for strict compliance of Rule 3. As a matter of fact, the courts have taken a view that apart from arriving at a conclusion that a prima facie case is made out, in certain matters, the court has to satisfy the maintainability of the suit etc. It is to be noted that grant of injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the <ORG> to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The <ORG>s have to be more cautious that when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that "where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that, the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. In view of the Proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, 1 hold that without recording the reasons, the grant of ad-interim injunction cannot be sustained. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the <ORG> cannot ignore the requirements. Further, the condition so introduced .is that the court "shall record the reasons" why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of <NAME> v. <NAME>, 1875 (1) Ch D 426: 45 LJ Ch 373 and <CITATION> , AIR 1936 PC 253 (2). To make it clear that whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. It is also relevant to note the <ORG> decision of the Apex <ORG> in <CITATION> , , wherein Their Lordships have held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. In the light of the specific provision, namely, Proviso to Rule 3, in the absence of recording reasons for granting ad-interim injunction even before notice to the opposite party, I hold that the impugned order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 29.11.2001 is liable to be interfered.

9. Now I shall consider whether the impugned order can be interfered by exercising the constitutional remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or the aggrieved party has to go before the same court for vacation of the injunction order or file an appeal before the appellate court to vindicate their grievance. Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the respondents by relying on a latest decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> ., , contended that the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not appropriate and the proper course for the petitioner herein is to go before the same court or file an appeal before the appellate court. In the said decision, the power of the court to pass ex pane order of injunction with or without notice, interim or temporary or till further orders or till the disposal of the suit, and the non-compliance of Rule 3 (a) or (b) as well as interference by this <ORG> exercising Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been considered. The facts in that case are the plaintiff claims to be a lessee under one <NAME>, 6th defendant in the suit in respect of the property and on that strength he claimed to be in possession of the property. He alleged that the defendants 1 to 5 have been threatening to dispossess him. The appellant/plaintiff filed the suit on 25.6.99 for a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos. 1 to 5 from dispossessing him. Along with the institution of the suit he moved an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pass an ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents 1 to 5 or their men or agents, or their representatives or any person claiming through them or under them from evicting the petitioner from the suit property other than by due process of law. On 29.6.99 the Assistant Judge of the City Civil <ORG>, Chennai passed an ex pane order of injunction. In the order, the learned Judge has stated that he perused the documents. Rental receipt document 11 to document 47 proves that the petitioner is the statutory tenant and in prima facie possession of the suit property. The balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner. In the interest of justice, it appears that R-1 to R-5 are restrained from evicting the petitioner from the suit property; accordingly granted interim injunction till 25.8.99. The first respondent on behalf of himself and respondents 2 to 5, filed a revision petition invoking Article 227 of the Constitution before this court alleging that they purchased the property from the owners thereof its per different sale documents executed on 15.3.96, and they were in possession and enjoyment of the property. The learned Single Judge of this <ORG>, who disposed of the revision, made the observation that the trial court ought not have granted an order of injunction at the first stage itself which could operate beyond thirty days as the court had then no occasion to know of what the affected party has to say about it. Such a course is impermissible under Order 39, Rule 3-A of the Code, according to the learned Single Judge and, therefore, he set aside the injunction order. After holding that there is no documents to show that the first respondent is actually in possession and running such a business except the lease deed, he came to the conclusion that the ex parte order is unsustainable and accordingly set aside the order of the trial Judge. After holding so, the learned Single Judge directed the trial court to lake up the interlocutory application for injunction and pass orders on merits and in accordance with law. It was contended before the Supreme court that the High <ORG> should not have entertained a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution when the respondent had two remedies statutorily available to him first is that the respondent could have approached the trial court for vacating, if not for any modification, of the interim ex parte order passed. Second is that an appeal could have been preferred by him against the said order. It was also stated that it is open to the respondent to opt either of the two remedies. After referring to Rule 3 of Order 39, the Supreme <ORG> has arrived at the following conclusion:- (para 12 of L.W) " 12. What would be the position if a court which passed the order granting interim ex parte injunction did not record reasons thereof or did not require the applicant to perform the duties enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 3 of Order 39. In our view, such an order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. But if a party, in whose favour an order was passed ex pane, fails to comply with the duties which he has to perform as required by the proviso quoted above, he must take the risk. Non-compliance with such requisites on his part cannot be allowed to go without any consequence and to enable him to have only the advantage of it. The consequence of the party (who secured the order) for not complying with the duties he is required to perform is that he cannot be allowed to take advantage of such order if the order is not obeyed by the other party. A disobedient beneficiary of an order cannot be heard to complain against any disobedience alleged against another party. "

It is also relevant to note the further conclusion of Their Lordships in para 18, "18. It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances, the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances, the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of <ORG> must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. In such appeal, if preferred, the appellate court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate court in complying with the provisions of Rule 3A. In appropriate cases, the appellate court, apart from granting or vacating or modifying the order of such injunction, may suggest suitable action against the erring judicial officer, including recommendation to take steps for making adverse entry in his ACRs. Failure to decide the application or vacate the ex parte temporary injunction shall, for the purposes of the appeal, be deemed to be the final order passed on the application for temporary injunction, on the date of expiry of thirty days mentioned in the Rule."

Mr. <NAME> very much relied on the conclusion of Their Lordships in para 12 and 18 extracted above. Though the said decision supports the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, the facts in that case clearly show that the learned Single Judge of <ORG> interfered in the revision filed under Article 227 of the Constitution mainly on the ground that the trial court ought not have granted an order of injunction at the first stage itself which could operate beyond 30 days and according to the learned single Judge, such a course is impermissible under Order 39, Rule 3-A of the Code. He, therefore, set aside the injunction order "for the clear transgression of the provisions of law" and noted that this is the third suit filed in reference to the suit property and hence deprecated the grant of ex parte injunction without notice. Order 39, Rule 3-A of the Code emphasises that <ORG> should dispose of the applications for injunction within 30 days. It is clear that where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the <ORG> shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within 30 days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall-record its reasons for such inability. That is not the position in the case on hand. In the present case, the learned Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, by Order dated 29.11.2001, case has granted ad-interim injunction till 20.12.2001. The Hon'ble Supreme <ORG> after holding that the said Rule does riot say that the period of injunction should be restricted by the <ORG> to 30 days at the first instance, but the court should pass final order on it within 30 days from the day on which the injunction was granted, came to the conclusion that the order does not ipso facto become illegal merely because it was not restricted to a period of 30 days or less. It is also clear that the <ORG> (Supreme <ORG>) was to consider the consequence, if any, on account of the court failing to pass the final orders within 30 days as enjoined by Rule 3-A. Only in this context, the Supreme <ORG> has held that the aggrieved party shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. This is clear from para 18 of Their Judgment. The reading of paragraph 18 of their Judgment, it is clear that the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The Hon'ble Supreme <ORG> has also expressed that in a case where the mandate of order 39 Rule 3 A of the Code is floated, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. They also observed that in such appeal, if preferred, the appellate court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate <ORG> in complying with the provisions of Rule 3A. In the present case, inasmuch as the learned Subordinate Judge has not recorded the reason for its opinion for granting ad-interim injunction without giving notice of application to the opposite party, I am of the view that the said decision is not helpful to the respondents' case as claimed by Mr. <NAME>. I am also satisfied that Their Lordships have very much considered the consequence of failure of non-compliance of Sub-rule (a) or (b) of Rule 3 and Rule 3A. Further, the earlier judgments of the Supreme <ORG>, particularly regarding Proviso to Rule 3 have not been cited or referred to in <CITATION> ., 2001 (1) L.W. 429. I have already referred to the decisions reported in <CITATION> , and <CITATION> , , wherein the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme <ORG> after considering the Proviso to Rule 3, have held in categorical terms that ex parte injunction without recording reasons for its opinion cannot be sustained and this <ORG> can interfere by exercising the constitutional power under Article 227. For these reasons, I am of the view that the two Judge Bench decision reported in <CITATION> ., 2001 (1) L.W. 429 relied on by Mr. <NAME> is not helpful and applicable to the case on hand.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also very much relied on a Judgment of <NAME>, J., the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of this <ORG> in <CITATION> ., 1996 (2) L.W. 834. No doubt, in similar circumstance, the Hon'ble Judge in para 4 of the Judgment has held that, "4. Even assuming for a moment that what is passed is only an ad-interim injunction, ignoring the provisions contained in Rule 3 of Order 39 of Civil Procedure Code, the only appropriate course for the party against whom an order of injunction is issued, is to file objections immediately without waiting for service of notice, and seek vacation of the same. Rule 3-A of Order 39, C.P.C. specifically provides that where an injunction has been granted without giving a notice to the opposite party the <ORG> shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within 30 days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. Therefore, it becomes incumbent on the part of the <ORG> granting an injunction without giving a notice to the opposite party to decide the application within four weeks. That being the position, the practice of filing a Civil Revision Petition against the ad-interim injunction and entertaining of the same by this <ORG> cannot be encouraged, rather it should be deprecated, and discontinued...."

Though Mr. <NAME> heavily relied on the above passage of the conclusion of the Hon'ble Judge, it is to be noted that the said conclusion had been arrived at in a revision filed under Section 115 , C.P.C. against the ex parte order of injunction passed under Order 39, Rules t and 3. Admittedly, it seems that the decisions of <ORG> reported in <CITATION> , and <CITATION> , were not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judge. Apart from this, the learned Judge had no occasion to consider the power of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. I have already stated that the case before the learned Judge relates to revision filed under Section 115 , C.P.C. In such a circumstance, I am of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge is to be confined to the revision petitions filed under Section 115 , C.P.C., accordingly the same is also not helpful to the present case.

11. It is relevant to refer a decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> , , wherein their lordships have held that rigid and inflexible view of jurisdiction under Article 227 should not be taken. Their Lordships have also held that " Article 227 or Article 226 was devised to advance justice and not to thwart it. Even as early as in 1954 <ORG> of <ORG> in <CITATION> , had held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep subordinate <ORG> within the bounds of their authority apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on <ORG>. It is also relevant to note the latest decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> , regarding the revisional jurisdiction of this <ORG> under Article 227 of the Constitution. In the said decision, Their Lordships have held in para 26 that "when there is error of jurisdiction or flagrant violation of the law laid down by this <ORG>, by exercising the revisional powers, the court can set aside the order passed by the <ORG> to do justice between the parties." It is clear that error of jurisdiction or flagrant violation of the law laid down by <ORG> can be set aside by this <ORG> under Article 227 of the Constitution. As already referred to by me, in the case of granting injunction without hearing the opposite party, it is mandatory on the part of the trial court to record the reasons for its opinion for granting such injunction. When the said condition is violated, I am of the view that in order to do justice between the parties, this <ORG> can interfere by exercising the revisional powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The impugned order which is bereft of reason and laconic cannot stand a moment's scrutiny as ruled in <CITATION> , . If it is held that the compliance with the proviso in Rule 3 is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the <ORG> shall be a futile exercise. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme <ORG>, Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. Inasmuch as this condition has been violated by the learned Subordinate Judge, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

12. Net result, the order dated 29.11.2001 of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore in I.A.No. 777 of 2001 in O.S.No.293 of 2001 is set aside. Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. This is a tenant defendant's second appeal in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment, on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. This appeal had come up before me earlier on 7th May, 1987, and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the case was remanded back to the first appellate court for recording additional evidence, on the ground of subsequent event to show that the landlord has acquired alternative accommodation where his son is carrying on his business of auto repairs. The first appellate court has recorded the additional evidence and has submitted the same to this court. Now, this case has come up for final disposal at the admission stage.

2. The plaintiff respondent had filed the suit out of which the present appeal has come up, on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity, on 4-1-1973. The trial court decreed the suit on 15-4-1975. During the pendency of appeal, because of amendment in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act , 1950, here in after referred to as the Rent Control Act,' the case was remanded to the trial court for recording evidence on the point of comparative hardship The trial court decreed the suit again. The appeal was also dismissed. An appeal, being S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 103/1979 filed by the tenant was admitted and the following substantial questions of law were framed:

(1) Whether, the learned courts below mis-construed the material part of the statement of the plaintiff relating to his admission that he filed suit for the defendant refused to advance loan of Rs. 11,000/-against mortgage?

(2) Whether, the learned courts below made a substantial error of law when it did not give due importance to the aforementioned admission of the plaintiff for the same had not been pleaded by the defendant?

(3) Whether, law of pleadings required that the above admission, which was in the nature of evidence, ought to have been pleaded in the written statement?

(4) Whether, the learned courts below made a substantial error of law when they held that notice to <NAME> alone was sufficient?.

Ultimately, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate couitwas set aside and the case was remanded to the first appellate court to give an opportunity to the parties to re-examine the plaintiff on the question of his admission, and to decide the appeal afresh. The first appellate court dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment dated 26-7-1986 and it is against that judgment, that the present appeal has been filed.

3. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant had filed an application under Order 41. Rule 27, CPC which was allowed by this court by order dated May 7. 1987 and the case was remanded back to the first appellate court for recording additional evidence.

4. The defendant examined himself as DW 1 and also <NAME> as DW 2. They have stated that <NAME> son of <NAME> plaintiff has started working in another shop in the name of <ORG> and have also produced a photograph of the shop. The plaintiff, in rebuttal, examined himself as PW 1 and also examined his son <NAME> as PW 2. They have also admitted that <NAME> son of the plaintiff has taken a shop on rent at rate of Rs. 300/- per month and is carrying on his business of motor cycle repairs in the said shop.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has very vehemently argued that subsequent events should be looked into and no decree of eviction could be passed if the need of the plaintiff stands satisfied before passing the decree even during the pendency of appeal, and has cited a number of decisions on this point which is not necessary to deal with because this proposition cannot be doubted and that is why the case was remanded for recording additional evidence. On facts also, it is clear that the need of the plaintiff for a shop for doing the business of motor cycle repairs by his son <NAME> has been satisfied as he is carrying on this business in a rented shop which he took on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- during the pendency of this appeal. But it is yet to be seen when a landlord takes another premises on rent and he or his son starts business, whether it can be said that the rent of the plaintiff landlord is satisfied and decree of eviction on that ground should, not be passed or confirmed. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a decision of this court in Heera Lal v. Panna Lal 1974 WLN (UC) 365 wherein it has been held that if a landlord is occupying another premises on rent, it cannot be said that his requirement is not reasonable or bonafide. He has also placed reliance on another decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> 1978(1) RCJ 17) wherein the same view was taken I am also of the same view that if during pendency of the suit or appeal, the landlord acquires another premises on rent, it cannot be said that the need of the landlord has been satisfied and that he does not require the premises reasonably and bonafide. On the other hand, taking another shop on rent by the landlord during the pendency of litigation, shows the bonafide of the landlord and genuineness of his use that the suit premises were required by him reasonable and bonafide for carrying on business by his son. If that were not so, a landlord after having filed a suit on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity for doing business in his own shop will have to sit idle and wait for an indefinite period when the litigation is pending in the courts.

6. The only question that now remains to be seen is as to whether after having obtained another premises on rent of Rs 300/- per month by the plaintiff landlord it can be said that the tenant will suffer greater hardship than the ladlord if he is asked to vacate the suit premises. I am afraid in this case, this question cannot be examined because the parties have led no evidence on this point and I do not see any reason as to why the case should be remanded again for the purpose. If the parties wanted to lead evidence on this point, they could have led evidence after the remand of the case by order dt. 7-5-87. More over in the present case, the finding with regard to the bonafide necesrity as comparative hardship could not be challenged even in civil second appeal No. 103/79 because in that case, the only substantial question of law framed (which have already been quoted in the earlier part of this judgment) was that at the stage of admission of second appeal No. 103/79 or at the time of hearing when the appeal was accepted and case remanded, the only point remained to be seen was about the malafide in filing the suit by the plaintiff. After disposal of evil second appeal No. 103/79, the learned counsel for the tenant did not seriously challenge the finding regarding reasonable and bonafide necessity and compirative hardship before the learned District Judge who decided the appeal after the remand in civil second appeal No. 103/79. More over, in this case, there is evidence on record that the appellant has got another accommodation as well in his possession where he is carrying on his business So it cannot be said that greater hardship would be caused to the appellant.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant has also challenged before me


JUDGMENT

1. The respondent does not appear to contest the finding.

2. We accept the finding, set aside the decree of the lower <ORG> and dismiss the application for restitution, with costs here and in the <ORG> below.


PETITIONER: DR. SMT. KUNTESH GUPTA Vs. RESPONDENT: MANAGEMENT OF <NAME>, SITAPUR (U.P) &ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1987 BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME>) BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME>) MISRA RANGNATH CITATION: 1987 AIR 2186 1988 SCR (1) 357 1987 SCC (4) 525 JT 1987 (3) 670 1987 SCALE (2)667 ACT: Constitution of India- Art. 226 When an authority acts wholly without jurisdiction, <ORG> should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. Administrative Law-A quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order unless power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. U.P. State Universities Act, 1973-The Vice Chancellor in considering an order of dismissal of a principal acts as a quasi-judicial authority. HEADNOTE: The appellant was the principal of an institution, the management of which had been entrusted to an Authorised Controller under s. 58 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. Following upon certain disputes and differences with regard to the management of the institution, the appellant was suspended by the Controller but the order of suspension was stayed by the Vice Chancellor. The Controller, after holding an ex-parte inquiry, dismissed the appellant from service in exercise of the power vested in him by the University Statute 17.06 which provided the giving of an opportunity of being heard to the teacher concerned and prescribed a procedure for inquiry. The Vice Chancellor, on the ground that the charges against the appellant did not warrant her dismissal, disapproved the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of the appellant, granting liberty to the Controller to impose a lesser punishment on her. The Controller passed an order allowing the appellant to function as the Principal but at the same time imposing various restraints and constraints on her powers and duties, which was challenged by her in a petition filed under Art. 226. <ORG> quashed the said order with liberty to the Controller to impose a minor penalty on the appellant in accordance with the order of the Vice Chancellor. Three days before <ORG> delivered its judgment, the Vice Chancellor had reviewed her earlier order at the instance of H 358 the appellant, and, on the basis of two reports of the Joint Director of Higher Education alleging that the appellant had committed grave financial irregularities, had approved the order of dismissal passed earlier by the Controller; but the Controller, who was a party to the writ petition did not bring it to the notice of <ORG>. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order of the Vice Chancellor passed in review by a petition under Art. 226 which was dismissed by <ORG> on the around of existence of an alternative remedy under s. 68 of the U.P. State l Universities Act . Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, <ORG> should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. [362C-D] In the instant case, the Vice Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order could surely be challenged before <ORG> by a petition under Art. 226 and, in our opinion, <ORG> was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under s. 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. [362D-E] 2. It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi-judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. [361H; 362A-B] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2468 of From the Judgment and order dated 13.5.1987 of <ORG> in W.P. No. 1822 of 1987.

<NAME> and <NAME> for the Appellant.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. Both the parties have made elaborate submissions at the preliminary hearing of the special leave petition filed by the appellant Dr. <NAME>. The special leave is granted and we proceed to dispose of the appeal on merit.

The appeal is directed against the judgment of <ORG> dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973.

The appellant, Dr. Smt. <NAME>, was appointed the Principal of <ORG>, Sitapur, U.P., on June 4, 1984 and was confirmed in the said post on May 4, 1985. In view of existence of two unrecognised rival Committees of Management <ORG>, in exercise of its power under section 58 of the U.P. State Universities Act, appointed one of the Additional District Magistrates of the District the Authorised Controller of the Institution. The Authorised Controller was entitled to exercise all the powers of <ORG>.

It appears that the appellant, as the Principal of the Institution, and the Authorised Controller could not see eye to eye with each other and there were disputes and differences between them in regard to the management of the Institution. The differences between them reached to such a degree that the Authorised Controller by his order dated January 27, 1986 suspended the appellant. The order of suspension was, however, stayed by the Vice-Chancellor of the University on January 29, 1986. After hearing the appellant and the Authorised Controller, the Vice-Chancellor maintained the stay order. Thereafter, the Authorised Controller held an ex parte enquiry and by his order dated April 21, 1986 dismissed the appellant from service in exercise of the powers of the Managing Committee vested in him by Statute 17.06 of the Statutes of the University. Statute 17.06 provides for the giving of an opportunity of being heard to the teacher concerned and prescribes a procedure for enquiry which, according to the appellant, was not followed by the Authorised Controller. A copy of the said order of dismissal was sent to the Director of Education and to the Vice-Chancellor for approval, as required under Statute 17.06(3).

The Vice-Chancellor after hearing the parties, by her order dated January 24, 1987 disapproved the order of dismissal of the appellant on the ground that the charges against the appellant did not warrant her dismissal from service and directed that the appellant should be allowed to function as Principal of the College forthwith.

After the said order was passed by the Vice-Chancellor reinstating the appellant and granting liberty to the Authorised Controller to impose lesser punishment on the appellant, if deemed necessary, the Authorised Controller without passing any lesser punishment, by his order dated January 27, 1987 allowed the appellant to function as the Principal, but put various restraints and constraints on her powers and duties as Principal and directed her to vacate the quarters in which she was residing. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant moved <ORG> under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the imposition of such restraints and constraints on her powers and duties as the Principal of the College. <ORG>, after considering the fact and circumstances of the case, by its judgment dated March 10, 1987 quashed the said order dated January 27, 1987 of the Authorised Controller and directed him to allow the appellant to function as the full-fledged Principal of the Institution in accordance with law. <ORG> further granted liberty to the Authorised Controller to go ahead with the imposition of minor penalty on the appellant in accordance with law and as provided in the said order of the Vice-Chancellor.

It appears that while the matter was pending before <ORG>, at the instance of the appellant, the Vice- Chancellor passed an order dated March 7, 1987, that is to say, three days before the date of the judgment of <ORG>, reviewing her earlier order disapproving the dismissal of the appellant from service. By the order dated March 7, 1987 passed on review, the Vice-Chancellor approved the order of the Authorised Controller dismissing the appellant from service on the basis of two reports of the Joint Director of Higher Education, U.P., one dated August 1, 1986 and the other dated July 18, 1986, alleging great financial irregularities committed by the appellant. Although the said order dated March 7, 1987 was passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review three days before the delivery of the judgment by <ORG>, no steps were taken by the Authorised Controller, who was a party in the writ petition, to bring to the notice of <ORG> the said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 It is alleged by the appellant that the said order was passed by the Vice-Chancellor in collusion with the Authorised Controller with a view to rendering the writ petition of the appellant and also the judgment of <ORG> infructuous. While we reject the allegation of the appellant that the said order was passed by the Vice- Chancellor in collusion with the Authorised Controller, for there is no material whatsoever in support of that allegation, we are of the view that the Authorised Controller should have brought to the notice of <ORG> the order of the Vice-Chancellor passed on review.

Be that as it may, the appellant again filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the said order dated March 7, 1987 of the Vice- Chancellor passed on review. <ORG>, however, took the view that the impugned order could be challenged on a reference to the Chancellor of University under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 and, accordingly, dismissed the writ petition on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. Hence this appeal.

It has been strenuously urged by Mr. <NAME>, learned. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the Vice- chancellor had no power of review under the Statutes of the University or under the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 and, as such, the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in entertaining an application for review filed by the Authorised Controller. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. <NAME>, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor, that as the two reports dated August 1, 1986 and July 18, 1986 of the Joint Director of Higher Education, U.P., alleging certain grave financial irregularities, were not before the Vice-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor was entitled to review her order and after considering the said reports reviewed her order and approved the order of dismissal of the appellant from service. Further, it is submitted by the learned Counsel that the High Court was justified in not entertaining the writ petition of the appellant, as there was an alternative remedy under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act and the impugned order could be challenged before the Chancellor of the University on a reference of the question to the Chancellor under the provision of section 68 .

It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice- Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The R said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity.

The next question that falls for our consideration is whether <ORG> was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Chancellor under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, <ORG> should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case., the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order could surely be challenged before <ORG> by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and, in our opinion, <ORG> was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act.

As the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor is a nullity, it would be a useless formality to send the matter back to <ORG> for disposal of the writ petition on merits. We would, accordingly, quash the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 and direct the reinstatement of the appellant forthwith to the post of Principal of the Institution. The judgment of <ORG> is set aside and the appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

We, however, make it clear that the respondents will be at liberty to initiate a departmental proceeding against the appellant, if they so think fit and proper, on the basis of the allegations as made in the said reports of the Joint Director of Higher Education, U.P.

H.L.C. Appeal allowed.


PETITIONER: STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. RESPONDENT: MAHI TRADERS & ORS. ETC. ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT03/02/1989 BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) CITATION: 1989 AIR 1167 1989 SCR (1) 445 1989 SCC (1) 724 JT 1989 (1) 196 1989 SCALE (1)267 ACT: Central Sales Tax Act , 1956: Sections 14(1)(iii) & 15- -'Leather splits', 'Coloured leather'--Whether hides and skins--Eligibility for special treatment under the Act. Statutory construction--Contemporaneous exposition--Opinion rendered on meaning of statutory expres- sions by the <ORG> concerned--The terms of the statute can be construed by reference to such exposition--In the absence of anything in the statute to indicate the contrary. Words & phrases: 'Leather splits'--Meaning of. HEADNOTE: The respondents are dealers in hides and skins. They deal among other things in splits and coloured leather. The splits are the cut pieces, small and irregular, obtained in the process of cutting raw or tanned hides and skins either with a view to reduce their thickness or to give them a regular shape. Coloured leather is obtained when the tanned hides and skins are dyed with various colours. The claim of the respondents is that these two items fail in the list of "goods of special importance in inter-State trade and com- merce" set out in s. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act and, therefore, entitled to the concessions available under s. 15 of the Act, namely the benefits of single point taxation and of a smaller rate of tax. Such claims were allowed by the assessing authority in respect of coloured leather and in respect of splits he disallowed the claims. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the order of the assessing authority. <ORG> negativated the contention that leather splits continued to be dressed skins under declared goods of inter-State importance and held that these splits are to be treated as 'scraps' or to be taxed at the multiple rates. As regards coloured leather the <ORG> held that these are commercially different products and that the exemption granted was not correct. The tribunal, in certain cases, had held that the assessee was entitled to the con- cessions claimed in respect of both items. The respondents moved <ORG> by way of Writ Peti- tions 446 and tax revision cases and <ORG> upheld the claim of the respondents, holding that 'splits' and 'coloured leather' continue to be hides and skins eligible for special treatment under the Central Sales Tax Act . The present appeals by special leave are against those judgments of <ORG>. The contentions of the appellant-State were that the leather splits or cuttings are "scrap" and do not qualify any longer to be described merely as hides and skins and that coloured leather is a totally new and sophisticated product known as leather and can no longer be described merely as hides and skins and as such cannot qualify for exemption. On behalf of the respondents, a reference was made to certain circulars of the authorities which contain a contem- poraneous exposition of the meaning of the entry in question and contended that, to say that one item being called scraps and the other as leather would not be sufficient to take them out of the description "hides and skins, in a raw or dressed state" and cuttings of hides and skins would not cease to be hides and skins merely because they are small pieces and can be loosely described as "scraps". As for coloured leather, it was contended that the exact scope of the expression used in entry (iii) of s. 14(1) which re- ferred to 'hides and skins whether in a raw or dressed state' would have to be looked into. Dismissing the appeals, HELD: 1.1. <ORG> was right in holding that 'splits' and 'coloured leather' continue to be hides and skins eligible for special treatment under the Central Sales Tax Act . [456E] 1.2 A contemporaneous exposition by the administrative authorities is a very useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expressions used in a statute. Consid- ering that the clarification was sought for from <ORG> at the earliest point of time when a doubt arose as to the scope of the expression used by the statute and given after considering the technicalities of the proc- esses employed in the manufacture of finished leather by the department fully conversant with this branch of trade and in the context of the provisions of this very statute, the terms of the statute can well be construed by reference to such exposition, in the absence of anything in the statute to indicate the contrary. Indeed, such interpretation should be shown to 447 be clearly wrong before it is overturned. The view of the <ORG> was that the expression 'hides and skins in the raw or dressed State' refers at one end to the raw material obtained from the slaughtered or dead animals and at the other end to the tanned and finished material; the expres- sion, therefore, seems to include the other intermediate stages as well. 'Dressing' according to the authoritative interpretations, would mean the conversion of tanned hides and skins by further suitable processing into leathers of different types which are ready for use. [452F-H; 452B- <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 565; Verghese v. I.T.O.,  131 ITR 597, relied on. <CITATION> ,  45 STC 327, approved. 2. Definitions in this regard show that hides and skins acquire the name of 'leather' even if the hair or wool has not been removed therefrom, as soon as they receive some treatment which prevents them from putrefaction after treat- ment with water. 'Dressing' is a stage much later than tanning. Indeed, from the definitions it is clear that it is practically the same as giving finishing touches to the leather and making it suitable for the manufacture of par- ticular types of goods. The findings of the <ORG> in this regard in an earlier case, which had not been appealed against by the <ORG>, that under the Central Sales Tax Act , the appellant is in a much better position, because all the hides and skins are brought together in one entry, and whether raw or dressed, the product falls under the same entry, seems to be the correct view of the scope of the entry in question. [454B-D; 455E] Glossary of terms relating to hides, skins and leather published by <ORG> in 1960: Dictionary of Leather Terminology published by <ORG>. Encyclopedia Britannica Vol. 7 and, 'Wealth of India'. Part V, a publica- tion of <ORG>, 1966, relied on. 3. Hides and skins are termed 'leather' even as soon as the process of tanning is over and the danger of their putrefaction is put an end to. The entry in the Central Sales Tax Act , however, includes within its scope hides and skins until they are 'dressed'. This represents the stage when they undergo the process of finishing and assume a form in which they can be readily utilised for manufacture of various commercial articles. In this view, it is hardly material that coloured leather may be a form of leather or may even be said to represent a different commer- 448 cial commodity. The statutory entry is comprehensive enough to include the products emerging from hides and skins until the process of dressing or finishing is done. [456C-E] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2665-72 (NT) of 1981 etc. etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 9.1.1980 of <ORG> in Tax Case Nos. 894, 895 of 1977, 591, 942,968, 975 of 1979 and W.P. Nos. 4951 and 4952 of 1978. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Appel- lant.

<NAME>, <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, <NAME> All these civil appeals and special leave petitions raise a common question as to the interpre- tation of an expression used in the Central Sales Tax Act . Some of these matters arise out of judgments of <ORG> in Tax Revision cases and some out of judgments in writ petitions but the point involved is the same. 1n view of the pendency of the appeals, we grant leave in the spe- cial leave petitions after condoning the delay in filing some of them and proceed to dispose of all the appeals by a common order.

The respondents are all dealers in hides and skins carrying on business in the State of Tamil Nadu. As is well known, raw hides and skins undergo various processes such as cutting, tanning, dyeing, dressing and finishing before they get converted into finished leather and assume a condition fit for the manufacture of various kinds of leather arti- cles. The dispute in these appeals is in regard to two items of goods that are sold by these assessees viz. leather splits and coloured leather. The splits are the cut pieces, often small and irregular, obtained in the process of cut- ting raw of tanned hides and skins either with a view to reduce their thickness or with a view to give them a regular shape. Coloured leather is obtained when the tanned hides and skins are dyed with various colours. The assessee, inter alia, deal in these two items, their manner of such dealing varying from case to case. Some of them obtain the leather splits in the process of cutting and sell them while some purchase the cuttings and sell them as such. So also, the coloured leather is obtained by some of the assessees in the process of finishing and they sell them while others purchase the coloured leather and sell them as such. The assessees' claim is that these two items fall in the list of "goods of special importance in inter-State trade and com- merce" set out in S. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (the ' CST Act ') and that, therefore, the assessee is enti- tled, in respect of their sales, to the concessions avail- able under s. 15 of the CST Act viz. the benefits of single point taxation and of a smaller rate of tax. The sole ques- tion in these appeals is whether <ORG> was right in upholding this claim. The principal judgment of <ORG> on this point has been reported as <CITATION> ,  45 S.T.C. 327.

The relevant entry in s. 14 of the CST Act reads: "14(1)(iii) hides and skins, whether in a raw or dressed state. "

The short case of the department is: (a) that leather splits or cuttings are "scrap" and do not qualify any longer to be described as hides and skins; and (b) that coloured leather is a totally new and sophisticated product known as leather and can no longer be described merely as hides and skins. The department's case is best explained in a passage from the order of <ORG> which accepted the depart- ment's contention. It observed:

"The contentions have been examined with reference to the connected records. The splits are only pieces of leather obtained in the process of getting leather of uniform thick- ness from dressed skins. Such splits cannot be treated as dressed hides and declared goods. The expression "raw or dressed skin" in sec- tion 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act has a distinct connotation and it cannot be extended to leather bits obtained in a process. These splits are of much lesser value and cannot be equated to dressed skins. In 27 S.T.C. page 385 <ORG> has held that if steel plates are cut to sizes, they cease to be the original product. What should be con- sidered is whether those leather splits are commercially understood as dressed hides and skins. If they are understood only as just skins as claimed, there is no need to call them as splits in commercial parlance. The Courts have repeatedly ruled that the entries in the Act should be treated only as understood by the <ORG>. These splits were produced before the <ORG> at the time of hearing. They were found to be thin pieces which can be utilised only for miscellaneous purposes. The contention that these leather splits continue to be dressed skins and are declared goods of inter- state importance, is untenable. The assessing officer was therefore right in treating these splits as scraps and taxing them at the multi- point rate, and in the absence of 'C' forms, at 10%.

As regards the coloured skins, once the dressed skins bought are split and the upper layer of uniform size is coloured or dyed, such coloured skins become different products. They are finished leather sold as coloured skins and not as dressed skins. They are commercially different, and are treated and dealt with in trade circles as different products. The process of dyeing or colouring changes the commercial nature of the dressed skins. There are different patterns of dyeing and colouring. The complete piece may be dyed or coloured uniformly with a single colour or with a pattern of colours, depending upon the requirements of the prospective consumers in the market. As the dressed skins are subjected to process, first by splitting and secondly by colouring they become different products. Pieces of coloured and dyed leather were produced before the <ORG> at the time of hearing. Some pieces were coloured With a single colour on one side and dyed on the reverse. They can be used straightaway for manufacturing leather goods. They were also in patterns. The contention that no change is involved has therefore no force. Both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Assessing Officer were not therefore correct in allowing exemption."

On the other hand, on behalf of the assessees, refer-

ence is made to certain circulars of the authorities which contain a contemporaneous exposition of the meaning of the entry in question, reliance is placed on the decision of <ORG> to the contrary and it is emphasised that, to say that the one item is called scraps and the other is called leather is not sufficient to take them out of the description "hides and skins, in a raw or dressed state". It is submitted that cuttings of hides and skins do not cease to be hides and skins merely because they are small pieces and can be loosely described as "scraps". So far as coloured leather is concerned, according to the assessee, the question is not whether the coloured skin is described as leather or whether it is a new product different from hides and skins, as understood generally, but what exactly is the scope of the expression used in entry

(iii) of s. 14(1) . The submission is that hides and skins are generally described as leather even as soon as tanning is done but the entry in the statute goes much beyond this stage. It takes in all categories of hides and skins right from their raw condition, through various stages of their tanning and other processing, right upto the stage when they receive the final finishing touches.

We have heard learned counsel on both sides at length and come to the conclusion that the assessees are entitled to the benefit of Ss. 14 and 15 of the CST Act in respect of the two items in question. As far as the first item is concerned, it is common ground that leather splits are nothing but cut pieces of hides and skins. We fail to see how they cease to be hides and skins. It is no doubt true that they are cheaper and have a separate name but the name only indicates that they are cut pieces. It is not because they have ceased to be hides and skins and constitute a different commercial commodity that they are called 'scraps'. Some of the dealers purchase and sell such splits and such turnover is considerable. There is no material to suggest that they are useless or worthless articles. A loose description of them as 'scrap' cannot deprive them of the benefit of s. 14 of the Act.

Turning to coloured leather, we may, at the outset, refer to a very important circumstances referred to by the respondents. When the CST Act came into force on 1.4.1957, a question was raised regarding the meaning of the expression 'hides and skins in dressed state' used in s. 14 . The matter was referred to the leather development wing of <ORG> which gave the following opinion:

"Hides and Skins are obtained from either slaughtered or dead animals. The raw hides and skins thus obtained are known to be in the Green State. These are easily putrescible; if proper precautions are not taken they would easily rot and decay. Since tanneries are not always located very near the source of raw hides and skins, the question of preserving them for a temporary period till they reach a tanning centre assumes importance. Raw hides and skins are 'cured' by either wet salting, dry salting or drying. In the 'cured state' the raw materials can be preserved for a temporary period. In the third state of tempo- rary preserva-

tion, the hides and skins are 'picked'. During the next stage they are tanned in which state they can be preserved almost indefinitely. These tanned hides and skins are processed further to yield Dressed Hides and Skins which are ready for use. 'Dressed' or finished material could also be preserved almost indef- initely.

From the above, it will be seen that the expression 'Hides and Skins in the raw or dressed State' refers at one end to the raw material obtained from the slaughtered or dead animals and at the other end to the tanned and finished material; the expression, therefore, seems to include the other intermediate stages indicated in the previous paragraphs. Dress- ing, according to the authoritative interpre- tations, would mean the conversion of tanned hides and skins by further suitable processing into leathers of different types which are ready for use" (vide SBT/ . 18(495/14) of November 11, 1957).

It would seem though this is not quite clear from the record, that this opinion held the field for quite some time until the assessments presently in question were made. Even here, as pointed out by <ORG>, the departmental view was not quite consistent. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, in some of the cases, was willing to concede that coloured leather, notwithstanding the colouring, continued to be dressed hides and skins but thought that leather splits should be brought to multipoint tax. The Assistant Commissioner, on the contrary, took the view that splits would continue to be hides and skins. It was <ORG> that decided that both items would fall outside the purview of item (iii) in section 14(1) .

It has been pointed out by this court in <CITATION> ,  4 SCC 565, and <CITATION> ,  131 ITR 597 that a contemporane- ous exposition by the administrative authorities is a very useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expressions' used in a statute. Considering that the above clarification was sought for at the earliest point of time when a doubt arose as to the scope of the expression used by the statute and given after considering the technicalities of the processes employed in the manufacture of finished leather by the department fully conversant with this branch of trade and in the context of the provisions of this very statute, the terms of the statute can well be construed by reference to such exposition, in the absence of anything in the statute to indicate the contrary. Indeed, "such interpretation should be shown to be clearly wrong before it is overturned."

Can it then be said that the view expressed above is clearly wrong? We think not; on the contrary, it is seen to be quite correct. The statutory expression refers to "hides and skins in a dressed state". The guidelines issued for identification of 'finished' leather for exports by <ORG> (ISI) refer to as many as 19 operations or processes undergone during manufacture of 'finished leather' but 'dressing' is not one of them. A glossary of terms relating to hides, skins and leather published by the <ORG> in 1960 contains the following definitions:

CRUSTS: (Crust Leather)--Tanned hides and skins without any finish.

CURRYING: A series of dressing and finishing processes applied to leather after tanning in the course of which appropriate amounts of oils and greases are incorporated in the leather to give it increased tensile strength, flexibility and resisting properties. DRESSED RIDES: Tanned hides, curried or other- wise finished, for various purposes, such as belting, harness and saddlery, travel goods and for upholstery.

DRESSING LEATHER: Vegetable tanned hides which may be dressed to suit the purpose for which they are to be used, such as for harness, saddlery and other mechanical purposes. LEATHER: The skin or hide of animals prepared by tanning, which still retains its original fibrous structure more or less intact, but from which hair or wool may or may not have been removed and which has been treated so as to be imputrescible even after treatment with water.

The earlier glossary of such terms published by <ORG> defines 'dressing' as a "general term for the series of processes employed to con- vert certain rough tanned hides and skins and/or crust leather into leather ready for use." Also, "Leather" is defined as "a general term for hide or skin which still retains its original fibrous structure more or less intact, and which has been treated so as to be imputrescible even after treatment with water." The hair or wool may or may not have been removed. Certain skins, similarly treated or dressed, and without the hair removed, are termed 'fur'. The Dictionary of Leather Terminology published by <ORG>, describes leather as "the hide and skin of any animal or any portion of such skin, when tanned, tawed or otherwise dressed for use."

The above definitions show that hides and skins acquire the name of 'leather', even if the hair or wool has not been removed therefrom, as soon as they receive some treatment which prevents them from putrefaction after treatment with water. Dressing is a stage much later than tanning. Indeed, from the definitions quoted above, it will be seen that it is practically the same as giving finishing touches to the leather and making it suitable for the manufacture of par- ticular types of goods.

<NAME> invited our attention, apart from the contempo- raneous exposition by the <ORG>, to the findings of the <ORG> in this regard in an earlier case which had not been appealed against by the <ORG>. The <ORG> had said:

"We have carefully considered the records as well as the arguments. We have seen the speci- mens of the articles sold. Bits of the same are also on record. We have carefully scruti- nised the same. We are unable to say that what the appellants had sold is not leather or in other words dressed hides and skins. The fact that the appellant has done some more finish- ing would not take away the resultant product from the classification. We do find that the clarification issued by <ORG>, Madras and <ORG> supports the appellants case. The expert opinion which only says that the resultant product has undergone some chemical changes observed as under: It is, surely a different product, because it is a finished leather. It however, retains the leathery properties of the dressed leather.

Hence the expert opinion also fully supports the appellants case inasmuch as it concedes that the resultant product is 'finished leath- er'. It is because the issue in appellant's case is not whether the appellant was selling a different product from the one it purchased, but whether the appellant was selling tanned leather. In this case, we do not find any factual basis even to cast any doubt upon the appellant's claim. It is a pity that the assessing authority should have followed the audit objections without the application of his own mind. Leather from the stage of raw skins to the stage of dressed hides and skins may undergo various stages of changes. Under the classification for the purposes of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, the various stages are irrelevant. For the purposes of <ORG>, 1959, only two stages that are rele- vant are the skins at the raw stage and the skins in the form of dressed hides and skins (or tanned hides and skins). The appellant purchases semifinished leather and undertakes further process of finishing with a view to colour the hides and skins for certain uses of skins. He says that he purchased the same tanned hides and skins and sold the tanned hides and skins. According to him the products purchased and sold are not different even under the classification by way of the dichot- omy between raw and dressed hides and skins under the <ORG>. Under the Central Sales Tax Act , the appellant is in a much better position, because all the hides and skins are brought together in one entry. Whether raw or dressed, the product falls under the same entry."

We are of opinion that this represents the correct view of the scope of the entry in question.

The same conclusion is further borne but by the litera- ture referred to before us by <NAME>. Vol. 7 of <ORG>, under the word "dress", ex- plains that the verb has various applications which can be deduced from its original meaning and that "it is thus used not only of the putting on of the clothing but of the pre- paring and finishing of leather ....... "Vol. 17, under the head "leather" details the various processes applied in the treatment of hides and skins at all stages, pre-tanning, tanning and post-tanning. Dyeing or colouring is a process which follows tanning but precedes "finishing" (i.e. dress- ing) in order to make it suitable for the purpose for which it is required in commercial usage. Part V of the "Wealth of India", a publication of <ORG> (1966), dealing with leather under "Industrial Products" explains that "hides and skins are liable to putrefaction and loss unless suitably treated and converted into leather." Structurally, hides and skins have a thick middle layer called corium, which is converted to leather by tanning. The operations involved in leather manufacture however fall into three groups. Pre-tanning operations include soaking, liming, deliming, bating and pickling, and post tanning operations are splitting and shaving, neutralising, bleaching, dyeing, fat-liquoring and stuffing, setting out, samming, drying, staking and finishing. These operations bring about chemical changes in the leather substance and influence the physical characteristics of the leather, and different varieties of commercial leather are obtained by suitably adjusting the manufacturing operations. These processes need not be gone into in detail but the passages relied upon clearly show that hides and skins are termed 'leather' even as soon as the process of tanning is over and the danger of their putrefaction is put an end to. The entry in the CST Act , however, includes within its scope hides and skins until they are 'dressed'. This, as we have seen, represents the stage when they undergo the process of finishing and assume a form in which they can be readily utilised for manufacture of various commercial articles. In this view, it is hardly material that coloured leather may be a form of leather or may even be said to represent a different commercial commod- ity. The statutory entry is comprehensive enough to include the products emerging from hides and skins until the process of dressing or finishing is done.

We are, therefore, of the view that <ORG> was right in holding that 'splits' and 'coloured leather' con- tinue to be hides and skins eligible for special treatment under the CST Act . All the appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. We however make no order as to costs.

G.N. Appeals dis- missed.