JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. This appeal raises a single question of fact, upon which the <ORG> in India have differed. The suit was brought on the 29th August 1896 and the object of the suit was to recover the share to which the plaintiff (the first respondent) claimed to be entitled in the estate of her father <NAME>, a Mahomedan of the <NAME> sect. Her title was disputed upon many grounds not now in question. The only controversy left is as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. It was undoubtedly barred unless the plaintiff is entitled to the extension of time allowed by Section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. The plaintiff during her minority was under the guardianship of her mother, whereby the period of minority was extended; to twenty-one years; and the section just referred to gave her three years from the date at which she attained her full age, within which to bring her suit. The question therefore is whether she has shown by sufficiently trustworthy evidence that she came of age within three years before commencing her suit. And that is the question on which the <ORG> in India differed.

2. There are a few facts and some dates, about which there is no doubt. The plaintiffs mother <NAME> lived for some years under <NAME> marriage with <NAME>, but on the 11th September 1874 he married her by <NAME>. Before the latter date she bore him a number of children, of whom some are said to have died in infancy, whilst three, a son and two daughters, survived, the plaintiff being the youngest of the three. <NAME> died on the 14th December 1876.

3. On the 21st of June 1871 <NAME> executed a codicil to his will, by which he showed that he had already made provision in the will for the son of <NAME>, <NAME> by name and now made provision for <NAME>, the elder of the two daughters; and the will is framed in terms which have been rightly held to show that at that time the plaintiff was not yet born.

4. On the 29th May 1875 <NAME> made another will, in which he made provision for the plaintiff as well as for her brother and sister. Thus it is clear that the birth of the plaintiff took place between the 21st June 1871 and the 29th May 1875. But, unfortunately, that is almost the only thing that is clear. The plaintiff's case, as stated in paragraph 7 of her plaint, was that she attained her age of twenty one years on the 1st January 1894, which would make the date of her birth to be the 1st January 1873 and that is the date of birth sworn to by all her witnesses.

5. Her witnesses were three in number, her mother <NAME>, her brother of the whole blood <NAME> and her half brother <NAME>, a son of <NAME> by a previous husband. The mother said that the plaintiff was in her twenty sixth year at the date when she gave her evidence. She said that the plaintiff was born on the first of the month Zikad ; she added " on the 1st Zikad of every year I tie a knot in a thread to celebrate her birthday.... I have already tied 25 knots in that thread."

6. In cross examination, she said that at the date of the <NAME> the plaintiff was in her second year, but almost immediately afterwards she said that at that date the plaintiff "was in the ourth year, a month less, it may be; three knots had already been tied." The examination of this witness was taken before a Commissioner and it appears that an interval of several hours occurred before her re-examination and then she sought to explain the contradiction in her previous evidence by saying When my <NAME> took place she was in her second year and she was about four at the time of <NAME> death." <NAME> declared that at the time he was speaking the plaintiff was aged twenty five years and five months. He followed his mother in saying that the last knot tied on the plaintiff's thread was the 25th and in saying that the plaintiff was about four years old at the death of their father. He further confirmed his mother in saying that a thread with knots was kept to show his own age, similar to that of his sister. <NAME> repeated the story about the practice of tying knots and also said the plaintiff was about two years old at the time of the <NAME>. That is the whole of the plaintiff's evidence.

7. Their Lordships fully recognise that in India it is difficult to prove such facts as the date of birth after a lapse of many years and that it would be reasonable to require such a class of evidence as would justly be demanded in this country. But the evidence must be such as to carry reasonable conviction to the mind. The evidence for the plaintiff is not only extremely scanty in amount but extremely unsatisfactory in character. <NAME> directly contradicted herself as to the age of the plaintiff at the date of the <NAME>. The story about the knots on the thread, indicating the plaintiff's age, broke down, because both mother and son said the knots tied were 25 in number, whereas if the birth took place at the time alleged, they ought to have been 26. A like story was told about the knots on <NAME> thread indicating his present age. That story is entirely inconsistent with the statement of his age in his petition for cancellation of the certificate of guardianship, dated the 1st and 2nd November 1887.

8. The case on the other side was, that the plaintiff was born in the latter end of 1871. In support of that case there were also three witnesses called, of whom it is enough to say that their evidence is as unsatisfactory as that of the plaintiffs witnesses.

9. The Subordinate Judge, who tried the case, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove her story as to the date of her birth. He further thought that it was shown that the birth took place at the end of 1871 and he dismissed the suit. <ORG> on appeal reversed that decision and thought that on the evidence the plaintiff's suit was shown to be in time. But the <ORG> came to that conclusion by adopting a suggestion, apparently made for the first time in that <ORG>, that confusion had been made between the 1st Zikadi 1289, corresponding to the 1st January 1873 and the first Zikad of the next Mahomedan year, corresponding to a later date in the same English year 1873.

10. This point is purely one of fact and there is no evidence to support it. If it had been put forward by the witnesses, and they had said that they had been thus misled, it might have carried weight; on the other hand it might have been displaced by cross-examination. It appears to their Lordships very dangerous to adopt such a conclusion in a Court of appeal, merely on the suggestion of the legal gentlemen representing one of the parties. <ORG> further considered that some of the witnesses for the defence tended to support the plaintiff's case, but it appears to their Lordships that that evidence is too vague and unsatisfactory to lend material support to either case. Their Lordships agree with the Subordinate Judge, to the extent of holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that she attained her full age within three years before the commencement of the suit.

11. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of <ORG> should be discharged with costs. The first respondent will pay the costs of the appeal.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. The dispute in this case relates to the Shebaitship of a Hindu temple belonging to the Bullavacharya Gossains situated at a place called Jatipura in the Muttra District of the United Provinces of India.

2. The <NAME> cult, in reality an offshoot of Vaishnavism, was founded in the 16th century of the Christian Era by one <NAME> who is usually designated among his followers and disciples as <NAME>. He and his descendants, who constitute the <NAME> Gossain Kul, are held in great veneration by the members of the sect and regarded as the incarnation of the famous and favour Hindu deity <NAME>, whom in common with other Vaishnaus (Vishnuvites) they worship. The cult established by <NAME> differed in the several particulars from the practices in vogue among other votaries of <NAME>, the principal point of difference consisting in the fact that he repudiated the practice of celibacy and asceticism practised by the other Gossains.

3. The <NAME>acharya Gossains, in other words the descendants of <NAME>, possess several principal temples, each of which is presided over by a member of his <ORG> or family, who is styled a Tikait.

4. The defendant <NAME> is in possession of one of the most important of these temples, if not the most important, which is situated at Nathdwara in Odeypore State.

5. In order to make the contentions of the parties intelligible, it is necessary to state in this' connection certain admitted facts relating to the customs and usages in vogue among the Bullavacharya Kul.

6. In the first place the Bullavacharyas do not intermarry in their own <ORG>, as the members belong to the same gotra. They take wives from among the Bharts, a well-known Brahmanical caste, and marry their daughters to Bhats.

7. In the <NAME> temples besides the principal image, which is directly or indirectly a presentment of <NAME>, there are subsidiary images not enjoying the same worship or veneration but nevertheless regarded as representations of <NAME>. They are almost invariably images of one or other of the descendants of <NAME>.

8. Another fact necessary to bear in mind is that the ministrations in the Bullavacharya temples are entirely in the hands of the direct descendants of the founder, and the Gossains of the Kul are the preceptors of the cult taught by him.

9. The temple which forms the subject-matter of dispute in the present case is stated to have been built about the time of the Indian Mutiny, by one <NAME>, a descendant of <NAME> and thus a member of his <NAME>. The worship he set up in this new temple was of the image of Sri <NAME>, which is proved to have been brought from the <NAME> defendant's temple at Nathdwara. This was one of the subsidiary images that were worshipped there along with the principal deity.

10. <NAME> remained in possession of the temple built by him and of the worship performed there until his death in 1883. He left a widow, <NAME>, and two daughters, <NAME> and <NAME>. After the death of <NAME>, his widow, <NAME>, carried on the worship until 1888 when she died, and the charge of the temple devolved on <NAME> and <NAME>. <NAME> died in 1896 and <NAME> in 1903. Both <NAME> and <NAME> were married, according to the custom of the sect, to <NAME> husbands-and their sons are accordingly called Bhats. The plaintiffs, <NAME> and <NAME>, are the sons of <NAME>, whilst the defendant, <NAME>, is the surviving son of <NAME>, and <NAME> is her husband.

11. On the death of <NAME>, these two, together with <NAME>, another of her sons, who was alive at the time, appear to have taken possession of the temple. In 1904 a suit was instituted by the defendant, <NAME>, against <NAME> and his two sons to establish his title to the <NAME>-ship, and for possession of the temple. This suit was referred to arbitration, and an award was made in his favour under which he obtained possession.

12. During the pendency of that suit, the plaintiffs, the sons of <NAME>, brought the present action against <NAME> and his two sons for joint possession of the temple and its appurtenances. On the 25th of August 1905, <NAME> was added a9 a defendant to the suit of Mussamat <NAME>'s sons.

13. The plaintiffs' claim against <NAME> is for ejectment; whilst against the other defendants it is for joint possession. They allege that <NAME>, their maternal grandfather, was the owner of the temple with all its appurtenances ; that on his death his widow came into possession of the same by right of inheritance ; and that upon her death their mother and their aunt " became the owners of the temple." And they claim to be entitled on the death of <NAME> to joint possession with her husband and sons to an equal share as " owners." It will be noted that they base their right on the ordinary right of inheritance under the Hindu Law.

14. The <NAME>, the real contesting defendant, denied the title put forward by the plaintiffs. He urged that the temple was not the personal property of <NAME> and that the right of inheritance did not attach to it. He further alleged that according to the custom in force among the Bullavacharyas daughters, sons did not belong to their <ORG> and were debarred from taking part in the ministrations at the temple for the benefit of the worshippers; and he claimed that as a collateral relative of <NAME> in the male line he was entitled to succeed him ' as <NAME>.

15. He also alleged that the temple was built by <NAME> on land belonging to his (the defendant's) father with his permission, and that on <NAME>'s death without leaving any lawful heir the right to the possession devolved on him by virtue of an agreement executed by <NAME>.

16. On these respective allegations of the parties the Trial Judge framed a number of issues, only four of which need attention. The second and third put in issue the incapacity alleged by the defendant of daughters' sons succeeding to their maternal grandfathers or taking part in the worship at a Bullav temple. The fourth raised the question whether the property was debuttur. The fifth dealt with the claim of the defendant to succeed to the <ORG> by right of heirship to <NAME>.

17. The Subordinate Judge, on an exhaustive review of the evidence, held on all the issues against the plaintiffs and accordingly dismissed the suit. His decision has been affirmed on appeal by <ORG>.

18. From the decree of <ORG> the plaintiffs have appealed to His Majesty in Council. They, or rather their advisers, abandoned, if not in <ORG> certainly in <ORG>, their contention that the temple in suit with the appurtenances formed the private property of Muttuji subject to the ordinary law of inheritance. In <ORG> the case was discussed and decided on the admission of the plaintiffs' counsel that the property in suit was debuttur. In fact, in their Lordships' judgment, the evidence left no room for the opposite contention, for, apart from positive testimony directly bearing on the point, the performance of the worship in accordance with the rites of the sect for whose benefit it was held may be treated as good evidence of dedication. That being so, the ordinary rule of Hindu Law relating to the in descent of private property is not applicable to the particular right in controversy in this case.

19. Stress, however, is laid on the principle enunciated in <NAME> v. Rumanlolljee Gossamer (1889) L.R. 16 I.A. 137, where Lord <NAME>, delivering the judgment of this <ORG>, said as follows (p. 144):-

According to Hindu Law, when the worship of a thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution.

20. This rule must, from the very nature of the right, be subject to the condition that the devolution in the ordinary line of descent is not inconsistent with or opposed to the purpose the founder had in view in establishing the worship. This qualification is in fact covered by the words used by Lord <NAME>.

21. Starting from this point, the first question to determine is whether the plaintiffs, suing for the joint exercise of the right of Shebaitship to the temple in suit, have established their competency for the office. The duties which are imposed on the person in charge of the temple and of its worship are to be found very comprehensively set forth in Professor <NAME> in Religious Sects of the Hindoos." Both the Courts in India have found that the plaintiffs, being Bhats, and not belonging to <ORG>, cannot perform the diurnal rites for the deity worshipped by the sect; they cannot wash, dress or adorn the image or perform the arti (one of the most important rites) which seems to consist in waving the light before the image of the deity. They cannot touch the food offerings placed before the idols, which are afterwards distributed among the Vaishnav votaries. Nor can they communicate the Mantras to the disciples for purposes of initiation. It is to be noted in this connection, that whilst the daughters of the Bullav Gossains married to Bhart husbands continue to live in their fathers' houses and remain within their fathers' <ORG>, their sons do not acquire that status; as sons of Bhats they are Bhats, and not Bullavacharya Gossains- who are by virtue of their descent entitled to act as ministers of the cult established by <NAME>.

22. Another fact is equally clear on the evidence that Bhart girls married into the Gossain I receive the Mantras and become thenceforth members of the Kid. It is not surprising, therefore, that after <NAME>'s death his widow and daughters remained in charge of the temple and its worship. But to allow the plaintiffs' claim to an admittedly Bullav temple, where the rites are performed according to Bullav ritual which, it is clearly established they cannot perform, would, in their Lordships' judgment, defeat the purpose for which the worship was established.

23. In an action of ejectment the conclusion at which their Lordships have arrived would be sufficient for the affirmance of the decree appealed against dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.

24. But their Lordships are of opinion that the <NAME> defendant has succeeded in establishing an independent title of his own to the temple in suit. He appears to be the nearest male relative of <NAME>, both being descendants of two full brothers; there can be little doubt, also, that the image installed at <ORG> was brought from his temple at <ORG>, and that the worship founded by <NAME> was an offshoot of the worship in <ORG>. The temple, again, was built on land belonging to the <NAME> defendant, with the permission of his ancestors, who held the office of <NAME> at the time.

25. It seems to their Lordships that apart from the statements Contained in <NAME>'s letter, on which the relied in his written statement, he has a clear title, according to the customs and usages of the Bullav Kul, to the Shebaitship of the temple in suit.

26. On the whole their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment and decree of <ORG> are right, and that this appeal must be dismissed. And they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

27. The appellants will pay the costs.


JUDGMENT

1. The assessees are the sons of the Maharajah of Pithapuram, the proprietor of the Zemindari of Pithapur which was permanently settled under the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation (Madras Regulation XXV of 1802). They are the joint proprietors of an estate settled upon them by their father, The estate which formed part of the Zamindari of Pithapur includes certain forests from which the assessees derive income by the sale of wood, bark, leaves, other usufruct of trees, minor forest produce and license fees. They supplement this income by the sale of trees in non-forest areas of the estate held by them. It is admitted that the trees in the forest and non-forest areas have grown wild and that agricul.

2. Rural operations are not carried on in any of the areas.- For the year of account, 1941-42, the income from these sourcesamounted to Rs. 7,612 and the assessees were taxed on this sum for the year 1942-43. They maintained that they were exempt from taxation for two reasons. In the first place they said that the income was derived from the produce of a permanently settled estate which was free from all taxation, other than that imposed by way of peishkush, by reason of the provisions of the Madras Regulation. In the second place they contended that the income was agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and as such is exempt from income-tax by reason of Section 4(3) (viii). The Income-tax Officer rejected both these pleas. His decision was upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and by <ORG>. At the request of the assessees, the <ORG> has, under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, referred for the opinion of this <ORG> two questions. The tribunal has worded them as follows:

(1) Whether the imposition of income-tax in respect of income derived from a permanently settled estate would be a breach of Regulation XXV of 1802 relating to Permanent Settlement.

(2) Whether the income of Rs. 7,612 derived from the sale of wood etc. (as detailed herein above) is exempt under Section 4(3)(viii) read with Section 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

3. The words " as detailed herein above " mean of course as detailed in the order of reference.

4. In Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. <NAME> of Singampatti (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 518 (F.B.) a Special Bench of three Judges of this Court held that income from a permanently settled estate was exempt from all taxation beyond the peishkush payable to <ORG>. The precise question in that case was whether the income from forests and fisheries was agricultural income and therefore not chargeable to income-tax. The Court did not decide whether such income came within the definition of agricultural income, although it would appear that the learned Judges were inclined to the view that it was. They based their decision on the broad ground that the Madras Regulation and the sanad issued to the Zamindar precluded further taxation by the <ORG>. The sanad followed the provisions of the Regulation. In the present case, the sanad has not been produced, but it may be taken that it was also in accordance with the Regulation.

5. If the decision in <CITATION> (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 518 (F.B.) stood alone we should be bound to answer the first question referred in favour of the assessee; but it does not stand alone. There is a judgment of <ORG> of later date which has direct bearing. It was delivered in <NAME> v. King-Emperor (1930) 59 M.L.J. 814 : L.R. 57 I.A. 228. I.L.R. 58 Cal. 430 (P.C.) where the same question arose with reference to the Bengal Permanent Settlement Regulation (Bengal Regulation I of 1793). Their Lordships pointed out that while that Regulation contains assurances against any claim to an increase of the jama, based on an increase of the zamindari income, no promise is given in it that a zamindar shall in respect of the income which he derives from his zamindari be exempt from liability to any future general scheme of property taxation, or that the income of the zamindari shall not be subjected with other incomes to any future general taxation of incomes.

6. The Bengal Regulation is differently worded from the Madras Regulation, but they are both to the same effect. Article 4 of the Bengal Regulation reads as follows:

The Governor-General in <ORG> accordingly declares to the zamindars, independent talook-dars and other actual proprietors of land with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been concluded under the Regulations abovementioned, that at the expiration of the term of the settlement no alteration will be made in the assessment which they have respectively engaged to pay, but that they and their heirs and lawful successors, will be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever.

7. The Madras Regulation opens with this statement:

Whereas it is known to the zamindars, mirasdars, raiyats and cultivators of land in the territories subject to <ORG> that from the earliest until the present period of time the public assessment of the land-revenue has never been fixed; but that, according to the practice of Asiatic Governments, the assessment of the land-revenue has fluctuated without any fixed principles for the determination of the amount and without any security to the zamindars or other persons for the continuance of a moderate land-tax; that, on the contrary, frequent inquiries have been instituted by the ruling power, whether Hindu <NAME>, for the purpose of augmenting the assessment of the land revenue; that it has been customary to regulate such augmentations by the inquiries and opinions of the local officers appointed by the ruling power for the time being; and that in the attainment of an increased revenue on such foundations, it has been usual for the Government to deprive the zamindars and to appoint persons on its own behalf to the management of the zamindaris, thereby reserving to the ruling power the implied right and the actual exercise of the proprietary possession of all lands whatever; and whereas it is obvious to the said zamindars, mirasdars, raiyats and cultivators of land that such a mode of administration must be injurious to the permanent prosperity of the country by obstructing the progress of agriculture, population and wealth and destructive of the comfort of individual persons by diminishing the security of personal freedom and of private property; wherefore, the British Government, impressed with a deep sense of the injuries arising to the <ORG> and to its subjects from the operation of such principles, has resolved to remove from its administration so fruitful a source of uncertainty and disquietude, to grant to zamindars and other landholders, their heirs and successors, a permanent property in their land in all time to come and to fix for ever a moderate assessment of public revenue on such lands, the amount of which shall never be liable to be increased under any circumstances.

8. In the clauses which follow effect is given to this declaration.

9. In <NAME> v. King-Emperor (1930) 59 M.L.J. 814 : L.R. 57 I.A. 228 : I.L.R. 58 Cal. 430 (P.C) <ORG> held that the zamindar of a permanently settled estate is assessable to Indian income tax in respect of the income, profits and gains derived from his zamindari, subject to the exemptions provided in Section 4(3) of the Act. The assessment should be computed after making proper allowance under Section 12(2) in respect of the jama assessed and paid. Their Lordships affirmed the decision of the. Calcutta <ORG> that the following items of the income derived by the appellant from his zamindari were not agricultural income and therefore not exempt from income-tax by section

10. 4(3)(VIII):

(i) Jalkar or rents received from fisheries.

(ii) Ground-rent from land used for potteries.

(iii) Ground-rent from land used as brickfields.

(iv) Fees received from the tying up of boats against the assessee's land.

(v) Fees received from land used for storing purchases of crops (paliali).

(vi) Fees received from cart-stands.

(vii) Punyaha nazar or nazar paid by tenants of agricultural holdings at the beginning of the zamindari year.

(viii) <NAME> for petition presented to the zamindar, dealing with questions of succession, settlement and partition of agricultural holdings.

(ix) Ground-rent for permanent shops at hauls and bazars.

(x) Stall fees paid by temporary (daily) sellers at hauts and bazars.

11. The learned Counsel for the assessees has not been able to advance any reason why this Court should not apply the decision in <NAME> v. King-Emperor (1930) 59 M.L.J. 814 : L.R. 57 I.A. 228 : I.L.R. 58 Cal. 430 (P.C) to the Madras Regulation. If the Bengal Regulation permits of the profits and gains of a zamindari, other than those derived from agriculture, being assessed to income-tax, the same considerations must apply to the Madras Regulation. We hold that their Lordships' judgment impliedly overrules the judgment of this Court in <CITATION> (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 518 (F.B.) and accordingly we answer the first question by saying that the imposition of income-tax in respect of income other than agricultural income derived from a permanently settled estate would not be a breach of the Madras Regulation.

12. We have now to decide whether the income derived from forests of spontaneous growth and from trees which have grown wild in non-forest areas represents agricultural income within the meaning of the definition given in Section 2(1) of the Income-tax Act. As we have indicated, the learned Judges who decided <CITATION> (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 518 (F.B.) were inclined to the view that income from forests and fisheries would be agricultural income, although they did not decide this question. It is very difficult to see how income from fisheries could be classified as agricultural income. In fact the decision of <ORG> in <NAME> v. King-Emperor (1930) 59 M.L.J. 814 : L.R. 57 I.A. 228 : I.L.R. 58 Cal. 430 (P.C.) shows clearly that it cannot be so classified. Their Lordships did not, however, have to consider whether income from forests or individual trees of spontaneous growth comes within the definition and therefore it is necessary to examine the question for ourselves in the light of the reported cases which have bearing on it.

13. <CITATION> (1941) I.L.R. 20 Pat. 699 (S.B.) <ORG> held, that the income derived from wild jungle fruits was not income derived from land used for agriculture or from agriculture and therefore was not assessable to income-tax under the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1938.

14. In <NAME> v. Salig Rams A.I.R. 1919 Lah. 222 2 <ORG> held that a stretch of natural forest which did not lie within a village site was exempt from pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905, as it was not agricultural land or land used for purposes subservient to agriculture and this decision was upheld by <ORG> in <NAME> v. Salig Ram (1923) 46 M.L.J. 536: L.R. 51 I.A. 11 I.L.R. 5 Lah. 50 (P.C.) Of course, what is agriculture within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act may not be agriculture within the meaning of another Act, as my learned brother pointed out when delivering the judgment of this Court in <NAME> v. <NAME> I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 61 : (1944) l M.L.J. 361 but we think that the Lahore case does render material assistance in deciding the question now before us.

15. Another judgment of <ORG> which has bearing is that delivered in <CITATION> (1924)47 M.L.J. 824: L.R. 51 I.A. 381 : I.L.R. 46 All. 831 (P.C.). The question there was whether a mango grove was land used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of Section 79 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901 and it was held that it was not.

16. The Oxford Dictionary defines " agriculture " as " the science and art of cultivating the soil, including the allied pursuits of gathering in the crops and rearing live-stock, tillage, husbandry, farming (in the widest sense)." The word " agriculture " implies something which is achieved with the aid of human agency. In our judgment, income derived from trees which have grown wild cannot legitimately be described as agricultural income. In inclining to the opinion that income from forests was agricultural income, the learned Judges who decided <CITATION> (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 518 (F.B.) were obviously influenced by the opinion which they had formed on the main question, namely, that no other tax beyond that involved in the payment of peishkush could be levied on income derived from a permanently settled estate. There is ample authority for holding that income derived from trees which have grown wild is not agricultural income, but without the aid of authority, we should have no hesitation in saying that to describe it as such would involve a distortion of the meaning of the word " agriculture".

17. We answer the second question referred by saying that the Rs. 7,612 does not represent agricultural income and is taxable.

18. As both the questions have been answered against the assessees, they must pay the costs of the reference which we fix at Rs. 250.