PETITIONER: THE PANIPAT CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS Vs. RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT06/11/1972 BENCH: <NAME>, J.M. BENCH: <NAME>, J.M. GROVER, A.N. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN MUKHERJEA, B.K. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. CITATION: 1973 AIR 537 1973 SCR (1) 860 1973 SCC (1) 129 CITATOR INFO : F 1973 SC 734 (3,22) D 1974 SC 366 (62) RF 1975 SC 460 (13,15) RF 1978 SC1296 (33,64) RF 1983 SC1019 (34) R 1987 SC1802 (9) F 1987 SC2351 (9,12) RF 1990 SC 334 (103) 1990 SC1277 (5,6,12,13,14,23,26,30,40,42,4 RF 1990 SC1851 (55) R 1991 SC 724 (13) ACT: Essential Commodities Act , s-3 (3C) cls. (a) to (d)-Scope of. HEADNOTE: From 1958 and even earlier, ex-factory prices of sugar were worked out on the basis of cost-schedules prepared by expert bodies appointed for that purpose. The prices in the cost schedules were prepared in respect of the entire production of sugar and not in relation only to that part of it which was required to be sold to government (referred to as levy sugar), although, partial control in one form or another was in vogue. Such cost-schedules were prepared on the basis of average duration and recovery, the minimum price of cane, the average cost of production in the various zones, taxes and a fair return on the capital employed in the industry. In 1967, <ORG> was confronted with the two problems : (a) the deterioration in the sugar industry, and (b) the conflicting interests of the manufacturer, the consumer and the cane grower. Accordingly <ORG> announced its policy of partial control under which 60% of the output of sugar would be acquired and the balance of 40%would be left for free sale. To implement this policy sub-s.3 (3C) was enacted in the Essential Commodities Act , 1955. Under the sub-section there must be an order under <CITATION> (f) whereby a producer is required to sell sugar to the <ORG>. There shall then be paid to the producer an amount there or, that is, for such stock of sugar as is required to be sold; and such amount shall be calculated with reference to such price of sugar as <ORG> may, by order determine, having regard to the four factors set out in cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of <CITATION> . Clause (a) provides for the minimum price, if any, fixed for sugar cane by <ORG> under <CITATION> ; Cl. (b) refers to the manufacturing cost of sugar, Cf. (c) to the duty or tax, if any or payable thereon; and Cl. (d) to the securing of a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar. The words 'notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s.(3) suggests that the amount payable to the person required to sell the stock of sugar would be with reference to the price fixed under sub-s (3C). [865 E; 868 F-H; 870 D-G; 874B] In pursuance of the power reserved to it under s.3(2)(f) and s.3(3C) <ORG> required sugar factories, including the appellant companies to sell to it 60% of their production during 1970-71 at prices fixed by it under the Sugar (Price Determination) Order, 1971. The prices were fixed on the principles laid down by <ORG> and other expert bodies. The appellants filed writ petitions in <ORG> for quashing the Order and for refixation of the ex-factory price for 1970-71 in respect of the sugar required to be sold to the <ORG> under s.3(2)(f). <ORG> dismissed the writ petitions. In appeal to this <ORG> it was contended by the appellants that sub-section (3C), and its cl. (d) must be construed to be dealing with levy sugar only, that a reasonable return under cl. (d) should be assured unitwise, and that the profit on the free sale of sugar should not be taken into 861 account in considering whether a reasonable return has been allowed on the capital employed. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : On the construction of sub-s. (3C) and on the evidence produced there is no case for quashing the Sugar (Price Determination) Order, nor, for refixation of the price fixed by the <ORG> under the sub-section. [881 D] (a) The sub-section provides two things, (1) the determination by the <ORG> of a fair price during the process of which regard shall be had to the four matters set out therein, and (2) payment to the manufacturer, part of whose stock is levied, an 'amount therefor', calculated with reference to 'such price' as <ORG> may determine. The words 'amount therefor' mean the amount to be paid to the manufacturer in respect of such quantity of stock as is required to be sold Linder an order made with reference to sub-s. (2) (f). That amount is therefore referable to the stock of sugar specified in such order, that is to say, the levy sugar. The words 'such price of sugar' relate to the price which the Central government has to determine having regard to cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d). Though the payment would of course be for the- stock required to be sold to <ORG>, there is nothing in sub- s. (3C) to suggest that the price to be determined is to be with respect to that part of the stock of a particular manufacturer which is required to be sold to the <ORG>. [871.A-E] (b) A fair price for sugar had to be such that would harmonise and satisfy at least to a reasonable extent all the conflicting interests. It could not mean the actual cost and return of every individual unit because, (i) it would be impracticable and (ii) because it would be rewarding the inefficient and the uneconomic. The basis of a fair price would be cost schedules worked out with respect to a reasonable, efficient and economic representative cross-section of the industry. A claim that such a price had to be determined unitwise and a reasonable return is to be ensured to each unit or that such a price with such a return should only be in respect of that part of its stock required to be sold under sub-s. 3(2)(f) would be inconsistent with the concept of partial control, the background in which it was evolved, and the objects which it attempted to secure. Such a policy meant determination of a fair price on the basis of which a producer would be paid for part of stock required to be sold to <ORG>. The fair price would have to be determined having regard to the four factors set out in the subsection. Though factors (a) and (c) would be static, factor (b) would largely depend on variables, such as duration and recovery. the prices of fuel, labour etc. differing from zone to zone or even within the same zone, necessitating the averaging and costing of ,a representative cross-section of units. Therefore, fair price could only mean securing a reasonable return to the industry as a whole and not to each unit, or in respect of only the stock required to be sold compulsorily to the <ORG>. [873 H; 874 G-H; 875 A-F] (c) This does not however mean that <ORG> can fix any arbitrary price, or on extraneous considerations, or a price which does not secure a reasonable return on the capital employed in the industry. Such a fixation would evoke a challenge, both on the grounds of its being inconsistent with the guidelines built in the subsection and its being in contravention of Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g) and 31 of the Constitution. [875 F-H] 862 [on the materials placed before it the <ORG> found that the price fixed with respect to the appellants ensured a reasonable return on the capital employed and that there was no necessity for its refixation.] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1357 to 1359 of 1972.

Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1972 of <ORG> at New Delhi in Civil Writ petitions Nos. 405, 381 and 486 of 1971. <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellants (in all the appeals).

<NAME>, Solicitor-General of India, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <ORG> These three appeals, by certificate, arise out of three writ petitions filed in he <ORG> of Delhi for quashing the Sugar (Price Determination) Order, 1971 made under <CITATION> of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955, and for a direction requiring <ORG> to refix the ex-factory price for 1970-71 in respect of sugar required to be sold to <ORG> under <CITATION> (2) (f) of the Act. The <ORG> dismissed the writ petitions and hence these appeals.

The appellants are three public limited companies having factories in Haryana State where they carry on the business of manufacturing and selling sugar, an essential commodity within the meaning of the Act. The Act empowers <ORG> to control the production and distribution inter alia of sugar with the object of maintaining its supply and its equitable distribution.

Under sec. 3, <ORG> has been authorised to require a manufacturer of sugar to sell to it or to <ORG> or any other authorised person either the whole of his stock or part of it at a fair price fixed by it. In pursuance of power reserved to it under <CITATION> (2) (f) and <CITATION> (3C), <ORG> required the sugar factories, including the appellant companies to sell to it 60% of their production during the year 1970-71 at prices fixed by it, the price fixed for the factories in Haryana zone under the impugned order being Rs. 124.63 per quintal. The principal questions arise in these appeals : (1) what is the true interpretation of <CITATION> , and (2) whether the price of Rs. 124.63 was in accordance with the provisions of s. 3(3C) ?

Before we proceed to consider these questions it would, we think, be better to set out briefly the history of control over sugar production and its distribution and the method followed in the fixation by <ORG>, or what has for brevity's sake been named, the levy price of sugar. The concept of statutory control over sugarcane is as old as 1934 when the Central Sugar Cane Act , 1934 was enacted, Under that Act and orders passed thereunder Government used to fix the minimum price for cane. Since 1950 and later on under the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1955, such minimum price for cane used to be fixed having regard to (a) the cost of production of cane, (b) the return to the growers from alternative crops, and (c) fair price of sugar to the consumer.

So far as sugar is concerned, statutory control over it was first imposed in 1942 under the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1942. The Sugar Controller thereunder regulated production, distribution and prices of sugar. From May 1, 1942, no sugar factory was permitted to effect sales except to authorised persons. This position continued until December 8, 1947 when sugar was decontrolled. In 1949, statutory control was once more imposed under which ex-factory price of Rs. 76.35 per quintal for D-24 grade was fixed, as during that year sugar production declined. There was also a substantial diversion of cane to gur and khandsari industry. Control over sugar was relaxed in 1950 in that production over 90% of the total production of each factory was allowed free sale. This policy was subsequently modified and 95% of the average production of each factory during the two preceding years was fixed as basic quota and half of the production in excess of that quota was allowed free sale, while the other half together with the basic quota was reserved for sale at controlled prices.- Since conditions appeared to improve, control was taken off in 1952-1953, except that a small portion of production was reserved for sale at controlled prices. But as prices spiraled, <ORG> in April 1954 requisitioned 25% of the stock for distribution on a tender basis. During 1954-55 to 1956-57 no controlled prices were fixed. By 1958 the prices began to soar and the <ORG> once more decided to impose control.

During, 1958 <ORG> requested <ORG> to examine the cost structure of sugar and fair price which should be paid to the sugar industry. Such an exercise was not new, for, as early as 1947, and in 1951 and 1955 these questions had been gone through, in 1947 by one Dr. <NAME>, and in later years by expert committees appointed by <ORG>. These committees worked out cost schedules and fair price to be paid to the industry but on an <ORG> basis. These cost-schedules were not fair as they did not take into account disparities existing from region to region in :the matter of price of cane, percentage of recovery and duration of the crushing season. <ORG> in 1959 did away with the all-India cost-schedule and instead constructed four zonal cost schedules having regard to their respective duration and recovery percentage on which a fair price could be fixed. <ORG> then requisitioned the stock of sugar, and distributed sugar at fixed. prices. In September 1961, the <ORG> ff.-moved control as the situation had improved. But the next two years witnessed a substantial fall in production and rise in prices. <ORG> then passed the Sugar (Control) Order, 1963 under which it fixed ex-factory prices for different regions and regulated distribution according to quotas fixed for each State. <ORG> in the meantime had worked out cost-schedules for as many as 22 zones, according to which, it fixed ex-factory prices ranging from Rs. 116 to Rs. 125 per quintal.

On August 3, 1964, <ORG> appointed <ORG>. The <ORG> in its Report deprecated the <ORG>'s practice of increasing the number of zones to 20 and more and recommended only five zones. The <ORG> worked out the cost-schedules for these five zones on the basis of duration and recovery percentage in each of the zones and on the basis of minimum cane price, cess or tax, commission of co-operative societies, transport charges, driage and other expenses, packing, grade differential and. selling expenses. The <ORG> recommended that while working out the ex-factory prices for each year on the basis of these cost-schedules <ORG> should make adjustments whenever any escalation took place in cost elements such as wages, taxes, packing charges, etc. On the question of return, the <ORG> observed as follows :

"<ORG>, in its last inquiry (1958) recommended a return at 12 per cent on capital employed. In doing so, it took into consideration factors such as the dependence of the industry on an agricultural raw material, the supply of which is aff ected by several imponderables, e.g., weather and pests and diseases. A number of factories located in favorable regions have made ample profits. In fact, the sample factories earned as much as 15.69 per cent in 1963-64-Sizeable expansions in capacity have taken place. The <ORG> is satisfied that the rate of return of 12 per cent is not unreasonable and should encourage expansion of the industry. The <ORG> is aware that the rate of return indicated will not be realised by each individual unit in each zone. Majority of the units in a zone, however, should be able to earn this return if they maintain a reasonable degree of efficiency. The method adopted and followed by the <ORG> in assessing the working capital is the same as was adopted by the Tariff <ORG> in its 1959 Inquiry."

There were two criteria for fixation of ex-factory prices; (1) estimated cost of production determined according to the cost schedules prepared by <ORG> in 1959 and adjusted from time to time to provide for increase in any of the elements of costs, and (2)average of prices at which sugar was sold in an area during two to three months immediately before April 1, 1963. From 1964-65 to 1966-67 Government fixed ex-factory prices on the basis of the cost- schedules worked out by <ORG>. But the year 1966-67 turned out to be- the worst year in the decade owing to draught. Production of cane fell by 22% and that of sugar by 40 % as compared to 1965-66. It was felt that the outlook for 1967-68 would be gloomier still as a further fall in the area under cane plantation would be by about 11 %.

To avoid such a prospect some steps had to be taken providing incentives for maximising sugar production and increasing the competitiveness of sugar factories, vis-a-vis gur and khandsari factories in securing cane by offering prices higher than the, floor prices.. Accordingly, <ORG> announced in August 1967 its policy of partial control under which 60% of the output of sugar would be acquired and the balance of 40% would be left for free sale. To, implement this policy, <ORG> secured the passage of sub-s. 3 C in <CITATION> of the Act through <ORG>. Having done that, it fixed the ex-factory prices on December 8,1967 which as finalised in May 1968 varied from Rs. 145 to Rs.169.50 per quintal. These were fixed on the principles laid down by <ORG> and <ORG> earlier, viz., on, the basis of (a) floor price of cane fixed by <ORG>, (b) cess or tax payable thereon, (c) the manufacturing cost, and (d) a reasonable return on capital employed. Since the cost- schedules worked out by <ORG> had by now become obsolete,, <ORG> in 1968 requested <ORG> to construct fresh cost schedules. The <ORG> selected 68 out of 200 working units in the industry for a. detailed cost study. For the rest, it sent out elaborate cost forms for submitting the, requisite data pertaining to 1966-67. For Haryana, out of the three units, one was selected for the detailed cost Study. The <ORG> first worked out actual cost of production state-wise, by taking into account a number of units in each State, their installed average crushing capacity, the cane actually crushed per day, and the average yield of sugar. In this way the ex-factory cost per quintal of sugar came to Rs. 104.43. This figure took into account the actual price paid for cane, which was often higher than the minimum price fixed by <ORG>, harvesting charges where incurred,. transport, cess/purchase tax, and factory conversion charges which included salaries/wages, power, fuel, stores, repairs, maintenance, packing and other overheads. These average costs represented the average costs of sugar covering all grades. But the factories in different States had different durations depending on the availability of sugar cane in adequate supplies and different recoveries of sugar differ- ing from factory to factory. A direct comparison of actual costs between factories or States would, therefore, have led to unrealistic results. These differing factors had, therefore, to be reduced to a common measure. For these purposes the <ORG> took into account five years average recovery and duration of a region as the base. Having regard to the wide disparity in duration and recovery of sugar, the costs were initially reduced to a standard duration of 120 days (of 22 hours each) with a uniform recovery of 10 per cent so as to have a comparison of costs as between units in a zone. Also the differential relating to different grades of sugar produced by the units was adjusted and a common schedule for D-29 grade was evolved. On this basis the conversion charges for each State were worked out. These did not include, transport charges on cane, selling expenses and return. On such calculation, the conversion charges for Haryana, including depreciation, at the rate permissible under the Income Tax Act came to Rs. 19-58 as against the All-India weighted average of Rs. 25.20 per quintal. For salaries/'wages, the recommendations of <ORG> formed the base. For stores and repairs the cost and variations therein from State to State were based on the index of wholesale figures published by the Economic Adviser to <ORG>. For future an incidence of increase of 3% per annum was taken into account, i.e., for the years 1968-69 to 1970-71. The minimum bonus at the statutorily payable and managerial expenses were included in the costs of conversion; so also the transport charges from the factories to railway stations and the loading and unloading charges. For this, the base was the actual charges in 1966-67 which came to 15 paise per quintal for most of the States. For rehabilitation, the <ORG> suggested Rs. 2 per quintal.

Owing to the wide ranging differences in the capital costs of various units as also differences from <ORG> to <ORG>, the <ORG> did not think it realistic to recommend return worked out according to the conventional method. A calculation of return of a uniform percentage on the basis of such widely varying capital costs from unit to unit and <ORG> to <ORG> would tend to vary the portion of the return margin substantially and confer an unwarranted benefit on the low cost units. At the same time, a reasonable return was indispensable if expansion was to be encouraged and fresh capital investment in the industry attracted, which according to <ORG> industry-wise study, showed the lowest profit percentage in sugar industry of all other industries. The <ORG>, therefore, suggested a uniform amount per quintal as a margin to be added to the other costs in arriving at the fair price of sugar. The <ORG> for the reasons aforesaid was of the view that 'an amount of Rs. 10.50 would be a fair return which would be equivalent to 12.5 % on the zonal averages of capital employed. According to Appendix 37 to the report, the average return at 12.5% on capital employed on the units in Haryana worked out at Rs. 10.40 per quintal to be added to the fair price worked out for that region. By adopting the standardised figure of Rs. 10.50 per quintal the range of variations from region to region was expected to be narrowed down from Rs. 11.88 in the case of South Bihar to Rs. 16.94 in the case of Orissa, Kerala, Assam and West Bengal. It is quite clear that what the <ORG> did was to con- struct cost schedules and fair price of the entire production and not merely of the levy sugar. The return and rehabilitation also were worked out on the basis of the capital employed in the entire production and not the capital employed for the production of levy sugar. Thus, in Table 9.6 at page 80 of its report, the <ORG> included Rs. 12.50 (being return and rehabilitation) in the ex-works price of sugar. There is nothing in that table which would suggest that it was confined to levy sugar. Indeed Ch. 9 in which this table appears is headed "Cost Structure and Price Fixation", that is the ex-works price In calculating the ex- factory price, the <ORG> took the minimum price of cane fixed by <ORG> and not the actual price paid by the manufacturer as was, also done by the <ORG> in 1959 and by the Sugar Enquiry <ORG> in 1955. On this basis, the ex-factory price for Haryana worked out to Rs. 128.69 per quintal (i.e., cost of cane Rs. 89.73, conversion charges Rs. 26.46, return and rehabilitation Rs. 12.50) for' the year 1966-67 on the basis of the average of the past five years' duration and recovery. The cost of cane would of course depend on the minimum price fixed for each year by <ORG>. The figure of Rs. 69.73 was the minimum price fixed for 1966-67. It also did not include the co-operative society's commission, if any, the purchase tax or cess and the margin' for cane driage.

4--L521Sup.CI/73 These were expected to be worked out by the authority fixing the fair price for each zone for a particular year. The cost schedule for conversion in the light of duration and recovery for each zone was made up of expenses classified as constants, variables, semi-variables and fixed expenses. For Haryana, it worked out to Rs. 26.46 per quintal on the basis of average duration of 125 days (of 22 hours) and 8.70 recovery. The cost schedule made up of the aforesaid expenses did not include (i) price of cane, (ii) commission to cooperative society, if any, (iii) purchase tax or cess and (iv) driage of cane, as these would be taken into account while fixing the minimum cane price. The constants comprise packing and grade differentials which would be static. The variables comprise seasonalexpenses, i.e.other than those incurred normally when crushingdoes not take place, such as wages of seasonal recruits excluding allowances for retainers, relevant parts of stores, repairs, transporton cane, shift depreciation, overheads and credit for recoveries.Semi-variables would comprise power and fuel and retainer allowances which would vary with duration and recovery. Fixed charges would be expenses other than those covered by the three aforesaid expenses and which are of a fixed nature irrespective of duration and recovery. The sum total of these classified expenses would make up the conversion costs. To these and the minimum price of cane would be added Rs. 2 for rehabilitation and Rs. 10.50 as return on capital employed and excise duty. The <ORG> did not accept the recommendation as to rehabilitation and deferred its decision thereon for reasons stated in its resolution dated February 20, 1970, by which it accepted the other recommendations as also the cost-schedules worked out by the <ORG>, the number of zones, return of a fixed sum of Rs. 10.50, etc. The history of control over sugar set out above shows that right from 1958 and even earlier, ex-factory prices of sugar were worked out on the basis of cost-schedules prepared by expert bodies appointed for that purpose, that such prices and cost schedules were prepared in respect of the entire production and not in relation only to that part of it which was required to be sold to <ORG>, although partial control in one form or the other was in vogue for some periods before 1967, that such cost schedules were prepared on the basis of average duration and recovery,, the minimum price of cane, the averaged cost of production in the various zones, taxes, and lastly, a return on the capital employed, which as stated above was fixed at the static figure of Rs. 10.50 per quintal, that being the amount considered a fair return on capital employed in the industry. Both the Central <ORG> and <ORG> were aware of the methods followed by these expert bodies in framing cost-schedules on the basis of which ex-factory prices were fixed, the problems which the <ORG> was faced with in securing adequate supply of sugar and its equitable distribution at reasonable price to remedy which sub-s. 3C was enacted. It is in the light of this background that the provisions of that sub-section can be properly understood. The Act , as its long title suggests, was enacted to provide for the control of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities, sugar being one of such commodities. Sec. 3 empowers the Central <ORG>, if it is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, to provide by an order for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution thereof. Under its sub-section (2) cl.

(f), such an order in may require any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of it to the <ORG> or <ORG> or an authorised person and in such circumstances as may be specified therein. Sub-s. 3 requires that where any person sells any essential commodity in compliance with an order made under sub-s. 2 cl. (f), there shall be paid to him the price therefore (a) where the price can, consistently with the controlled price, if any, fixed under this section, be agreed upon, the a agreed price; (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the price calculated with reference to the controlled price, if any, or (c) where neither cl. (a), nor cl. (b) applies, the price calculated at the market price prevailing in the locality at the date of sale. Payment at market price would have to be made under this sub-section only when there is no agreed or controlled price. Sub-secs. 3A and 3B then make provisions with regard to sale of foodstuffs and food-grains. Under sub-sec. 3A, the <ORG> Government is empowered, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for controlling the rise in prices or preventing the hoarding of any foodstuff in any locality, to direct by a notification that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-se-,. (3), the price at which the foodstuff shall be sold in the locality in compliance with an order made under sub-sec. 2(f) shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section. When after the issue of a notification under this subsection, any person sells foodstuff of the kind and in the locality specified therein, in compliance with an order made with reference to sub-sec. 2 cl. (f), there shall be paid to the seller as the price therefore (a) the agreed price consistently with the controlled price, if any, (b) the price calculated with reference to the controlled price, if any, where no such agreement can be reached, or (c) where neither cl. (a), nor cl. (b) applies, the price calculated with reference to the average market rate as provided therein. Under sub-sec. 3B, where a person is required to sell any food-grains, edible oilseeds, or edible oils to the <ORG> or <ORG>, or to a person authorised in that behalf, and no notification in respect of such food-grains, oilseeds or oils has been issued under sub-sec. 3A or is in force, there shall be paid as the price for such food-grains, oilseeds or oils, (i) the controlled price, if any, or (ii) where no such price is fixed the price prevailing or likely to prevail during the postharvest period in the area to which the order applies. Both under sub-sec. 3A and 3B, the question of market price can only arise where there is no controlled or fixed price or price agreed consistently with the controlled price, if any. Each of these sub-sections makes a separate provision for tile price at which the commodities therein dealt with is to be paid. Sub-sec. 3C, with which we are presently concerned was in- serted in sec. 3 by sec. 3 of Act 36 of 1967. The sub- section lays down two conditions which must exist before it applies. The first is that there must be an order made with reference to subsec. 2 cl. (f), and the second is that there is no notification under sub-sec. 3A or if any such notification has been issued it is no longer in force owing to efflux of time. Next, the words "notwithstanding anything contained in. sub-section" suggest that the amount payable to the person required to sell his stock of sugar would be with reference to the price fixed under the subsection and not the agreed price or the market price in the absence of any controlled price under sub-sec. 3A. The sub-section then lays down two things; firstly, that where a producer is required by an order with reference to sub-sec. 2(f) to sell any kind of sugar, there shall be paid to that producer an amount therefore, that is for such stock of sugar as is required to be sold, and secondly, that such amount shall be calculated with reference to such price of sugar as the <ORG> Government may, by order, determine, having regard to the four factors set out in cls. (a), (b),

(c) and (d) Unlike the preceding three subsections under which tile amount payable is either the agreed price, or the controlled price, or where, neither of these prices is applicable at the market or average market price, the amount in respect of sugar required to be sold is to be calculated at the price determined by <ORG>. The last words of the sub-section empower <ORG> to determine price either from time to time or for different areas, which means that it may determine zonal or regional prices, or for different factories, i.e., unit-wise, or for different kinds of grades of sugar.

The two concepts, viz., the amount payable to the producer and the price to be determined by <ORG> are distinct and much of the confusion in interpreting the sub-section would be dispelled if they were seen distinctly. The words "amount therefore" mean the amount to be paid to the manufacturer in respect of such quantity of his stock as is required to be sold under an order made with reference to sub-sec. 2(f). That amount is, therefore, referable to the stock of sugar specified in such order, that is to say, the levy sugar. The words "such price of sugar", relate to the price which the Central <ORG> has to determine having regard to cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d). The price to be so determined is not relatable or confined to the stock required to be sold, for the words are "such price of sugar" and not "the price for such sugar". This construction is fortified by the penultimate part of The sub-section which authorises the Central <ORG> to determine zonal or unit-wise prices or prices for different kinds of sugar. The price to be determined by the Central <ORG> is to be the rate at which the amount payable to the producer of such of his stock as is :required to be sold is to be calculated. There is thus a clear distinction between the amount payable to the producer whose stock is either wholly or in part required to be sold under an order made under sub.-sec. 2(f), and the price of sugar to be determined by the <ORG> having regard to the minimum price of cane fixed by it, the manufacturing cost of sugar, the duty and tax paid or payable thereon and securing a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar. In order to appreciate the meaning of cls. (a), (b), (c) and

(d), it must be remembered that ever since control on sugar was imposed, <ORG> had set up expert committees to work out cost-schedules and fair prices. Starting in the beginning with an All-India cost-schedule worked out on the basis of the total production of sugar, the factories were later grouped together into zones or regions and different cost-schedules for different zones or regions were constructed on the basis of which fair prices were worked out at which sugar was distributed and sold. <ORG> in 1958 and <ORG> in 1965 had worked out the zonal cost-schedules on the basis of averaged recovery and duration, the minimum and not the actual price of cane, the averaged conversion costs and recommended a reasonable return on the capital employed by the industry in the business of manufacturing sugar. This experience was before the legislature at the time when sub- sec. 3C was inserted in the Act. The legislature therefore incorporated the same formula in the new sub-section as the basis for working out the price. The purpose behind enacting the new sub-section was three-fold, to provide an incentive to increase production of sugar, encourage ex- pansion of the industry, to devise a means by which the cane producer could get a share in the profits of the industry through prices for his cane higher than the minimum price fixed and secure to the consumer distribution of at least a reasonable quantity of sugar at a fair price.-' Whether these objectives have, through, the working of the new sub- section, been realised or not is a different, matter. But there can be no doubt that these were the objectives, for which the sub-section was passed. The incentive to secure, increased production and expansion of the industry was to leave a certain portion of the stock free for sale in the open market, the assumption being that the industry would get a better price in such market than the price determined under the formula incorporated in sub- section 3C . The fair price, therefore, has to be determined on the mini- mum price of cane fixed by <ORG>, the manufacturing cost. on the basis of zonal cost-schedules, the tax or duty applicable in the zones and must be so structured as to leave in the ultimate result to the industry a reasonable return on the capital employed by it in the business of manufacturing sugar. It is clear from the reports of <ORG> that a reasonable return recommended by that body at a fixed amount of Rs. 10.50'per quintal which worked out in 1966-67 at 12.5% per annum was not in respect of levy sugar only but on the whole, so that even if such a return was not obtainable on levy sugar but was obtainable on the whole, it would meet The requirement of cl. (d). In, this conclusion we derive a two-fold support, firstly, from the language used in cl. (d) itself, viz., a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar, which must mean the business as a whole and not the business of manufacturing levy sugar only, and secondly, from the fact of the <ORG> having all along used the, same phraseology while recommending Rs. 10.50 per quintal as an addition by way of a reasonable return on the capital employed in the industry. The cost-schedules prepared by these bodies were for determining a fair price in relation to the entire sugar produced by the industry and the return which should be granted to it on the capital employed in the industry and not with respect to that stock only required to be sold under sub-sec. 2(f). This is clear from the heading of Ch. 9 of <ORG>'s report, 1969, "Cost. Structure and Price Fixation". Counsel for the appellants and for the several interveners, however, contended (1) that since sub-sec. 3C was enacted after the policy of partial control leaving a part of the stock for free market was decided upon, the sub-section must be held to deal with levy sugar only, and (2) that the language of the sub-section as also of its cls. (a), (b) and

(c) shows that it dealt with and was concerned with levy sugar only and that therefore cl. (d) must also be construed to be dealing. with levy sugar. It was urged that besides the necessity of giving to cl. (d) the same meaning as one would have to give to cls. (a), (b) and (c), if cl. (d) were to be construed to mean return on the whole of the capital employed, there would ensue a contradictory and even an anomalous result. For purposes of cl. (a), one would have to take the floor price of cane fixed by <ORG>, but for cl. (d), the actual price of cane paid by a unit would have to be' taken into account for purposes of arriving at a figure which would leave a reasonable return to the producer, part of whose stock is required to be sold. Counsel also urged that if cl. (d) were construed to mean reasonable return on tile production of the entire stock and not levy sugar only, it would mean negativing the entire scheme of partial control which was intended to leave a reasonable return on that part of the stock which was required thereunder to be sold irrespective of the return obtained by sale of the rest of- his stock in a free market. 'Therefore, it would be contrary to that concept if the profits made in respect of free sugar were to be taken into account as a cushion if the fair price fixed for levy sugar was not equivalent to the actual cost of pro- duction and were to result in a return less than the reasonable return on that part of the stock, or even a deficit. Such a construction would, they argued, permit the <ORG> to fix a price which would not leave such a return on the ground that sale of free sugar would bring in sufficient surplus to make up the deficit, if any, on the levy sugar. Counsel further urged that such a construction would also defeat the very object (if Partial control, in that, if a reasonable return was not assured to the manufacturer, <ORG> was hardly likely to buy cane at a price higher thin the minimum fixed by <ORG>, a purpose for which the partial control policy was evolved. To bring, in the return on free sugar for purposes of deciding whether a return guaranteed under cl. (d) was obtainable or not from the price fixed by <ORG> would also be ushering a factor wholly extraneous to the sub-section. It would not be, therefore, right to bring into consideration free sugar which is not the subject-matter of sub-see. 3C. To accept these contentions would in our view mean dis- regarding (1) the language of the sub-section, and (2) the entire background in which it was enacted and the mischief it was intended- to remedy. As explained ear<ORG>r, the sub- section provides two things: (a) the determination by <ORG> of a fair price during the process of which regard shall be had to the four matters set out therein, and

(b) payment to the manufacturer part of whose stock is levied, an amount "therefore" calculated with reference to "such price" as <ORG> may determine. Though the payment would of course be for the stock required to be sold to <ORG>, there is nothing in the sub-section to suggest that the price to be determined is to be with respect of that part of the stock of a particular manufacturer which is required to be sold to <ORG>.

In deciding upon the policy of partial control and in having it incorporated in sub-sec. 3, <ORG> was contronted with two main problems (a) deterioration in the sugar industry, and (b) the conflicting interests of the manufacturer, the consumer and the cane grower. The report of <ORG> 1965 and that of <ORG> highlighted the difficulties that plagued the industry and the necessity of harmonising the triple conflicting interests. The cane acreage was dwindling, as the incentives for that plantation were not as attractive as those for cereals and other agricultural pro- ducts. Part of that production was diverted towards production of gur and khandsari, leaving no scope for greater production of sugar, the necessity for which was being accentuated as the consumers' demand was rapidly increasing. The floor price of cane fixed by <ORG> was intended to protect the farmer from exploitation, but that was found not to be an incentive enough to induce him to increase his acreage. A device had to be found under which a price higher than the minimum could be paid by the manufacturer of sugar. The consumer, on the other hand, had also to be. protected against the spiraling of sugar price and his needs, growing as they were, had to satisfied at some reasonable price. Both these and a larger production of sugar would not be possible unless there was a reasonable return which would ensure expansion, which again would not be possible unless new machinery for such expansion was brought in and factories, particularly in U.P. and Bihar, were modernised and renovated. A fair price for sugar, therefore, had to be such as would harmonise and satisfy at least to a reasonable extent these conflicting interests. The concept of fair price was not unknown, for, it had been worked upon from as early a time as 1937. That concept did not by any account mean the actual cost of production of every individual manufacturer. It had to be arrived at by the process of costing of a representative cross-section of manufacturing units. The history of the industry shows that such a process was being practiced through various formulas, in the beginning by working out an All-India cost-schedule, and when that was found to be unrealistic by working out zonal cost-schedules beginning with four and by 1969 with 15 such zonal cost-schedules. A fair price would not thus mean the actual cost and return of every individual unit, firstly, because it would be impracticable, and secondly, because it would be rewarding the inefficient and the uneconomic. An extreme example of such a unit is to be found in the compilation prepared by Dr. <NAME> where the duration of season of that unit was only seven days, and therefore, its cost came to over Rs. 600 per quintal. If such a product were left to the mercy of a total free market and the impact of free competitiveness in it, such a unit would hardly survive. The object of the policy of partial control cannot, therefore, mean to reward such units. The basis of a fair price would have to be built on a reasonably efficient and economic representative cross- section on whose workings cost-schedules would have been worked out and the price to be determined by <ORG> under sub-sec. 3C would have to be built. A claim that such a price has to be determined unit-wise and a reasonable return has to be ensured to each unit or that such a price with such a return would be in respect of that part of its stock required to be sold under sub-sec. 2(f) would appear to be inconsistent with the concept of partial control, the background in which it was evolved and the objects which it attempted to secure. Such a policy meant determination of a fair price on the basis of which a producer would be paid for part of his stock required to be sold to <ORG>. Such a price would have to be determined having regard to the four factors set out in the sub-section. Though factors

(a) and (c) would be static, factor (b) would largely depend on variables, such as duration and recovery, the prices of fuel, labour etc. differing from zone to zone and sometimes within the zone, necessitating averaging and costing by selecting a representative cross-section of units for that purpose and arriving at a cost-schedule which would do justice to the weak and the strong alike. If this be the true meaning of cl. (b), it must mean securing a reasonable return to the industry and not to each unit, irrespective of whether it is economic or reasonably efficient or not, or only in respect of its stock required to be compulsorily sold to <ORG>. A unit-wise fixation of price as suggested by counsel, and payment on the basis of a price so worked out would mean perpetuating inefficiency and mismanagement, and depriving the partial control policy of the incentives for economy and efficiency inherent in it. We are, therefore, satisfied both on the language of the sub-section, the background in which it was enacted and the mischief the legislature sought to remedy through its working that the true, construction is that a fair price has to be determined in respect of the entire produce, ensuring to the industry a reasonable return on the capital employed in the .business of manufacturing sugar. But this does not mean that <ORG> can fix any arbitrary price, or a price fixed on extraneous considerations or such that it does not secure a reasonable return on the capital employed in the industry. Such a fixation would at once evoke a challenge, both on the ground of its being inconsistent with the guidelines built in the sub-section and its being in contravention of Arts. 19(1)(f) and (g), and 31.

The constitutionality of the sub-section not being under challenge. in these appeals, the only question left for consideration is whether the price fixed under the impugned order, i.e., Rs. 124.63, is in consonance with <CITATION> ? The ex-works price worked out in <ORG> 1969 for Haryana zone for the next three years, i.e., 1969-70 to 1971-72, based on the average recovery and average duration of the past five years (1963-64 to 1967-

68), i.e., 8.70% and 125 days, was Rs. 128.69 per quintal. That figure was made up of the following :

1. Wages and salaries Rs. 11.70: (2) stores, fuel and power Rs. 8.49: (3) repairs and maintenance Rs. 2.63: (4) packing charges Rs. 2.57: (5) overheads Rs. 0.75: (6) cane centre and cane .development Rs. 1.36: (7) depreciation (Income Tax Act rates) Rs. 3.60:

(8) transport of cane Rs. 1.53: (9) less--Credits Rs. 0.75: (10) grade differential Rs.1.07: (11) return and rehabilitation Rs. 12.50: (12) selling expenses Rs. 0.15: (13) bonus Rs. 0.60-Total conversion charges Rs. 38.96: (14) cane and related costs Rs. 89.73: (15) ex-works price Rs. 128.69.

The figure of Rs. 89.73 arrived at on the basis of driage being Rs. 9.86and average recovery of 8.70% was worked out as follows :

(1) Minimum price of cane fixed by Government Rs. 7.37: (2) Co-operative society's commission Rs. 0.13 and (3) Cess/purchase tax Rs. 0.24, Total Rs. 7.74=Rs. 89.73 per quintal sugar, (vide Table 9.6 and Appendices 35 and 36 at pages 89 and 212-214; Report 1969).

The ex-works price of Rs. 128.69 included Rs. 2 per quintal for rehabilitation. That amount was not included by <ORG> when it fixed the price of Rs. 124.63 on January 8, 1971 as the <ORG>, while accepting the cost- schedules and other recommendations of <ORG>, had deferred its decision on rehabilitation pending consultation with the concerned interests. (Vide <ORG> Resolution, <ORG>, dated February 20, 1970). Deducting Rs. 2 from the ex-works price worked out by the <ORG>, the <ORG>'s ex- works price would be Rs. 126.69 on the basis of 8.70% and 125 days" as average recovery and duration. It would appear that barring the statement in the impugned order that <ORG> had fixed the price at Rs. 124.63, the <ORG> had not disclosed even in its return how it had worked out that price. At the instance of the appellants, <ORG>, therefore, by its order dated September 14, 1971 called upon the <ORG> to show the basis on which it had fixed the, price. The <ORG> thereupon filed an additional affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to <ORG> dated September 14, 1971 according to which on the available data before it the price would come to Rs. 126.93. This figure took note of the, increase in the purchase tax by Haryana <ORG> from 24 to 50 paise per quintal of cane. That was how the <ORG> mentioned Rs. 8.003 as the price of cane per quintal instead of Rs. 7.37 which was the floor price fixed by <ORG> for the year. <ORG> also added Rs. 1.05 being the estimated impact of increase in wages recommended by <ORG>, the added depreciation allowed through changes, in the Income Tax Act and increased cost in packing materials, the total of all the three having been worked out at Rs. 2.81 per: quintal of sugar. According to this affidavit, when <ORG> was considering the fixation of price for 1970-71, it had before it the actuals as to recovery and duration for 1969-70 as also the. estimates supplied by the factories for 1970-71. From these, the <ORG> came to the conclusion that there would not be any material difference in recovery and duration between the two years and that was why it decided to continue the ex-factory price for 1969-70 for the year 1970-71 also. The incidence of purchase tax for 1970-71 was placed at Rs. 2.06, higher than during the preceding year, because for 1969-70 it was from April 1, 1969, while in 1970-71 it was for the whole year. The estimates for recovery and duration for 1970-71 were on the actual recovery and duration for the preceding year which came to 8.76% and 187 days, as against the estimates given for that year by the factories, viz., 9.04% and 157 days. These were accepted for 1970-71 as, the only actuals available to the <ORG> on January 8, 1971 were in respect of the month of November 1970, which obviously were too meagre for acceptance for the whole year. Annexures It and III to this affidavit show that as against the levy price of Rs. 124.63 fixed by <ORG>, free sugar was sold during 1969-70 at prices ranging from Rs. 126.21 to Rs. 138.01, exclusive of excise duty, and from October 1970 to May 25, 1971 when sugar was totally decontrolled at rates ranging from Rs. 132.30 to Rs. 151.38. It is undisputed that during the period of six weeks when the stay order granted by <ORG> operated the appellants sold sugar at about Rs. 150.

These figures were not accepted by the appellants, for, according to them, they sold free sugar during January 1971 to May 24, 1971 at prices ranging from Rs. 135.19 to Rs. 160.47, the average rate being Rs. 139.70 less Rs.1.07 differential-Rs. 138.63. As against the levy price worked out by <ORG> at Rs. 126.93, the appellants' case was that on the actuals worked out for the year 1970-71, the price would be Rs. 129.42, thus causing to them a loss of Rs. 5.20 per quintal on levy sugar. The difference between the price calculated by the appellants and that calculated by the <ORG> (Rs. 126.93) arises because of certain disparities in their respective figures, as also the percentage in recovery and duration. To the figure of Rs. 129.42, the appellants add additional cost of interest, increase in freightage by road and rail during the year, deterioration in quality, thus bringing the cost to Rs. 138.93. The loss on this calculation, according to them, would come to Rs. 3 lacs and odd on levy sugar which totaled 65,741 quintals. On <ORG>'s calculations based on the returns filed by the appellants, the Haryana factories realised Rs. 126.50 per quintal on levy sugar taking into account the different grades produced by them and Rs. 139.70 per quintal on free sugar upto May 25, 1971 when sugar was decontrolled. If levy sugar alone were to be taken into consideration, the loan per quintal of levy sugar would be the difference between Rs. 124.63 and Rs. 129.42, i.e., Rs. 6.20, and nearly double if the additional costs claimed by the appellants were to be admissible, which would raise their cost of production to Rs. 133.98. This calculation is of course on the basis that the return of Rs. 10.50 per quintal was altogether met, in the sense that-it was not expected to absorb items such as interest and the profits on free sugar were not to be taken into consideration for ascertaining whether a reasonable return on the ,capital employed was actually obtained or not by the industry.

<ORG>, no doubt, did not hold the price of Rs. 124.63 as realistic and in view of the changes which had taken place during the year added in all Rs. 3.22, that is, Rs.1.16 increase in wages, Rs. 56 additional depreciation and Rs.1.20 as additional packing charges, totaling Rs. 2.92 and presumably Rs. 0.30 for increase in purchase tax. Adding Rs. 3.28 to the Government price, <ORG> worked out the fair price at Rs. 127.85 instead of Rs. 124.63. We need not examine the correctness or otherwise of this addition as the Solicitor General told us that he did not ,challenge the correctness of this addition. On the basis of Rs127.85 being the correct price, the appellants would lose Rs. 3.22 per quintal on levy sugar, if the price realised on levy sugar alone were to be taken into consideration. The Solicitor General also conceded that purchase tax on cane in Haryana was increased during the year 1970-71 from 24 paise to 50 paise per quintal with effect from April 1, 1970 and that increase according to para 1 1 of the return, dated May 1971 was not taken into account as the Government was of the opinion that the price of 1969-70, which was adopted for 1970-71, contained sufficient cushion to absorb the impact of this increase. This opinion was based on the fact that the working results for the year 1969-70 turned out to be actually very much better than estimated. Counsel for the appellants, however, expressed his dissatisfaction with the increase by <ORG> of Rs. 3.22 only on the ground that <ORG> did not take cognizance of three items, viz., increase in purchase tax, increase in the rate of interest and increase in road and rail freightage. As already stated, the increase so in purchase tax appears to be included in Rs. 3.22, granted by <ORG> for otherwise the three increases stated in the judgment, viz., increase in wages, increase in depreciation and increase in packing charges, would make the total of Rs. 2.22 only.

The largest addition in the price claimed by the appellants was Rs. 2.29 per quintal by way of additional interest. The basis for the claim was that owing to the production of sugar in 1969-70 being the all time highest, there were larger stocks lying unreleased with the factories both in the case of levy as well as free sugar, with the result that the factories had to bear additional interest on the working capital involved in such unreleased stocks. The usual period of six months for the release of stock on the basis of which the return on capital at the static figure of Rs. 10.50 a quintal had actually become unrealistic. The result, therefore, was that the factories could not expect to get the said return on the capital employed. Since the question was an important one we called upon the <ORG> to disclose the correspondence, if any, which it had in this connection with <ORG>. Thereupon the <ORG> produced the relevant correspondence. It appears from that correspondence that on March 26, 1970 <ORG> had made a representation for addition in the return of Rs. 10.50 on the ground that the 1969-70 year's production had come to 42 lac tonnes, an all time record and in addition thereto there was already at hand a large stock lying undisposed of resulting in the component of working capital being very much higher than that calculated by <ORG> while fixing Rs. 10.60 as the return. On June 5, 1970, the <ORG> referred this representation to the <ORG>. By its letter dated July 29, 1970, the <ORG> recommended that the question of accumulation of stocks as represented by the association required sympathetic consideration and suggested an increase in lieu of interest at 9% on the additional working capital represented by the accumulated stock.

In considering this claim however two facts need to be borne in mind. The production in 1970-71 was not as high as that in 1969-70 and in fact had considerably declined. So far as the ,Haryana factories were concerned, none of them had purchased cane at a price higher than the minimum fixed by <ORG>, although the assumption behind the policy of partial control leaving 40% of the stock for free market and the unconventional method ,of granting a fixed return of Rs. 10.50 was that these two factors would enable the manufacturer to pay a higher cane price. The figures supplied to us by <ORG> called out from the returns filed by the factories would also suggest that the claim for Rs. 2.29 per quintal was not warranted. The total production by the Haryana factories during 1970-71 was of the tune of 82,756 tonnes. Despatches upto May 24, 1971, when sugar was decontrolled, of free sugar were 7,065 tonnes at Rs. 139.70 per quintal. Despatches of levy sugar, upto the date of the interim order of stay dated April 8, 1971 were 2,380 tonnes and from April 8, 1971 to May 24, 1971, 4,194 tonnes at Rs. 158.02 per quintal. The balance of stock lying with the factories as on June 1, 1971 was 6911.7 tonnes. Despatches during the decontrol period, i.e., from June 1, 1971 to December 31, 1971 were 63,023 tonnes at the rate of Rs. 151.39 per quintal, leaving a balance in hand of 6094 tonnes. It may be mentioned that on June 30, 1972 the stock lying on hand came to 427 tonnes. only. Since this was the position, the claim for additional interest at Rs. 2.29 per quintal does not appear to be sustainable, nor also the claim for deterioration of stock owing to the stock lying stored up beyond the normal period, the loss by way of deterioration during such period being the normal incidence of the trade which the manufacturer must anticipate. Regarding the claim of 63 paise owing to increase in freightage (i.e., of 54 paise by road and 9 paise by rail), <ORG> refused to concede that claim. Even before us there are no adequate materials to come to any precise conclusion as to the ,extra burden which the appellants had actually to bear, though increase in freightage during the year is admitted.

Have the Haryana factories then not received in fact during 1970-71 the reasonable return as envisaged by sub-s. 3C? The actual figures of the year for duration and recovery were not in dispute. They were 162 days and 8.69% respectively. On that basis; the cost, according to the cost-schedule worked out for Haryana by the <ORG>, would come to Rs. 126.61, including Rs.10.50. To that amout may be added the following, even assuming that they are all allowable : (1) increase in wages, Rs.1.05, (2) increase in depreciation, 56 paise, (3) deterioration in quality, 19 paise, (4) insurance and godown costs, 7 paise, (5) increase in cost of consumable stores, 19 paise, (6) increase in cost of gunny bags, Re.1.20, (7) increase in freightage by road and rail, 63 paise, (8) interest on longer storage, Rs. 2.84 and (9) selling expenses, 45 paise (total Rs. 7.18=Rs. 133.79). But for the reasons given above, items 3, 7 and 8 (total Rs. 3.66) must go and therefore the figure would come to Rs. 130.13. As against this, the realisations for levy and free sugar upto the date of decontrol, i.e., May 24, 1971 were as follows : 63,741 quintals at the average rate of Rs. 124.63 and 70,650 quintals at the average rate of Rs. 136.49. The average price thus realised comes to Rs. 130.77. There is no doubt that if the sales after May 24, 1971 which were all in free market were to be taken into account, the average realised would come to much more than Rs. 130.77. There is, therefore, no doubt that taking the picture as a whole the Haryana factories got in any event a reasonable return on the capital employed.

On the construction of sub- section 3C adopted by us and such of the materials produced before us, we are of the opinion that no case for quashing the impugned order has been made out, nor has the price fixed by <ORG> been shown to be inconsistent with the sub-section.

In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. In view of the somewhat complicated questions as to the meaning and interpretation of sec. 3(3C) of the Act, we direct that the parties will bear their own costs althroughout. Liberty to the parties to file applications for directions in respect of the Bank Guarantees furnished by them in pursuance of stay orders passed by this Court.

V.P.S. Appeals dismissed.


PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. RESPONDENT: RANOJIRAO SHINDE & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/03/1968 BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME>: <NAME>, K.S. HIDAYATULLAH, <NAME>, R.S. <NAME>, C.A. GROVER, A.N. CITATION: 1968 AIR 1053 1968 SCR (3) 489 CITATOR INFO : R 1970 SC 564 (55,97,112,176) R 1970 SC1292 (10) RF 1971 SC 530 (54,329) RF 1971 SC1409 (33) RF 1973 SC1461 (12,19) RF 1974 SC2364 (4) D 1975 SC1058 (8) RF 1977 SC1361 (192) R 1978 SC 597 (58) O 1978 SC 803 (30,31,32,33,34,37) RF 1986 SC1126 (48) RF 1989 SC1741 (10) ACT: Constitution of India, Arts, 19(1)(f), (5) and 31-Enactment abolishing cash grant-If violative of Art. 19(1)(f) and 31(2)- Choses in action and money, if could be acquired under Art. 31(2). Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act (M.P. 16 of 1963)-If violates Art. 19(1)(f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. HEADNOTE: The appellant-<ORG> abolished by an executive order cash grants payable by it. This order was quashed by this Court. Thereupon the <ORG> passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963 to abolish the cash grants, but provided for the payment of certain compensation to the grantees-respondents. the respondents challenged the vires of the Act before <ORG>. <ORG> held the Act to be ultra vires of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and not saved by sub- Art. (5) thereof. In appeals by certificate, this Court, HELD: The Act is either violative of 31(2) or, in the alternative, Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. [490 F] Choses in action and money could not be acquired under Art. 31(2). If it is held that <ORG> by the exercise of its power of eminent domain can acquire choses in action and money belonging to its citizens, by paying a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) would be deprived of all its contents and that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose. Article 31(2) must be construed harmoniously with Art. 19(1) (f). If so construed, it is obvious that the public purpose contemplated by the Article does not include enrichment of the coffers of the <ORG>. Further the compensation referred to in Art. 31(2) is the just equivalent of the value of the property taken. [495 E-H] A law which authorises the <ORG> to deprive a person of his property must be a valid law. it must not violate Art. 19(1) (f) which means that it must satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5). The word "law" used in- Art. 31(1) indicates its limitations and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it impose& are reasonable and in the interest of general public. The Act which empowers the <ORG> to appropriate some one else'& property for itself solely with a view to augment the resources of the <ORG> cannot be considered as a reasonable restriction-in the interest of the general public.., If Art. 19(5) is interpreted to mean that the <ORG> can take by authority of law anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the guarantee given by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory (496 - <CITATION>  1 S.C.R. 957, <CITATION> , A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1166, <CITATION> ,  S.C.R. 889, <CITATION> ',  3 -S.C.R. 887, followed. <CITATION> ,  S.C.R. 1122, referred to. 490 JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1730 and 1731 of 1966.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 18, 1964 of <ORG> in Misc. Petition Nos. 21 and 22 of 1963 (G.).

<NAME>, for the appellant (in both the appeals). <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondent (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. In these connected appeals by certificates the question that arises for decision is whether the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act of 1963 (Act No. XVI of 1963) is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. The respondents in these appeals were entitled to receive cash grants from <ORG>. The impugned Act abolished such grants but provided for the payment of certain compensation to the grantees. The respondents challenged the vires of the Act before <ORG> in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 21 and 22 of 1963, on various grounds. <ORG> rejected all the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents excepting one, namely that the Act is ultra vires of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and is not saved by sub- Art. (5) thereof. After obtaining from the <ORG> Certificates under Art. 133(1)(c ), the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed these appeals. The State is challenging the correctness of the decision of the <ORG> to the extent it went against it. The respondents on their part, in addition to supporting the findings of the <ORG> which are in their favour, relied also on the other pleas taken by them before the <ORG>. As we are of the opinion that the impugned Act is either violative of Art. 31(2) or, in the alternative, Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution, we have not thought it necessary to go into the other contentions taken on behalf of the respondents. Before the impugned Act was enacted, the State of Madhya Bharat which forms part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, purported to abolish -the cash grants payable by it by means of an executive order. That order was unsuccessfully challenged by <NAME> and others before the <ORG>. But in apPeal this Court in <CITATION> (') quashed the order in question, holding that the grants in question were recognised by the kalambandis of 1912 and 1935 issued by the Rulers of Gwalior and those' kalambandis are existing laws within the meaning of Art. 372 of the Constitution and consequently the same could not be abrogated by means of an executive order. It may be noted that in that appeal, the appellant challenged (1)  1 S.C.R.957.

the order in question on two grounds, namely- (1) that as his right to receive the cash grant had been statutorily recognised by the State of Gwalior, it was not open to <ORG> to exiting that right merely by an executive order, and (2) that that right being property the same could not be divested ,without payment of compensation under Art 31 of the Constitution. This Court allowed the appeal on the first ground and consequently it did not deal with the second. After the decision of this Court in that case, the impugned Act was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh legislature on April, 5, 1963. It received the assent of the President on July 25, 1963 and was published in <ORG> on August 2, 1963. The Act comes into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint. Even before that notification was issued, the petitions from which these appeals arise were instituted in <ORG>. We are given to under stand that in view of those petitions, the Act has' yet been brought into force.

The long title of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for the discontinuance of cash grants in Madhya Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith. It contains twelve sections. Section 11 sets out their short title, extent and commencement of the Act. Section 2 defines some, of the expressions found in the Act. Section 3 is the most important section. it purports to abolish certain cash grants. Section 4 provides for statement of claims by the grantees. Section 5 provides the manner of determining the compensation payable. Section 6 prescribes that appeal, revision and review under the Act to be in accordance with Madhya Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1959. Section 7 provides for the determination of disputes as regards the title of any grantee. Section 8 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to issue an injunction against any person in respect of any proceedings pending before the competent authority under s. 5 which shall have the effect of staying the proceedings. Section 9 prescribes the quantum of compensation payable. Section 10 deals with the mode of payment of compensation. Section 1  1 empowers <ORG> to make rules for carrying out all or any of the purpose of the Act. Section 12 says that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of -the Act, the 'State Government May by order make such provisions not inconsistent with the purposes Of this Act as appears to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty. In these aPpeals we are mainly conceded with the vires of s. 3 read with the definition of "cash grant" in s. 2(1) .If section 3 read with s. 2(1) is held to be ultra vires of the Constitution, then the whole Act falls to the ground the remaining sections of the Act are merely subsidiary or incidental provisions. Section L7Sup.C.1/68-7 3:(*) provides that notwithstanding anything' contained in any law custom, usage, sanad or a decree or order of a court or other authority whatsoever, all cash grants shall be discontinued and cease to have effect from the commencement of this Act. But the pro thereto makes certain exceptions with which we am not -concerned in this case. The case of the respondents falls within the main-part. They do not have the benefit of the proviso A cash grant as defined in S. 2(1) (**) includes a grant of

"3. Abolition of certain cash grants-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, usage, sanad or a decree or order of a court or other authority whatsoever, all cash grants shall be discontinued and cease to have effect from the commencement of this Act : Provided that where the grantee is a person specified in column (1) of the Table below the cash grant may, at the option of the grantee exercised in such manner, within such period and in such form as may be prescribed, be continued subject to the conditions and during the period mentioned in the corresponding entry in column (2) of the said Table.

TABLE

(1) (2)

(i) A widow . . . So lone as she remains a widow.

(ii) A minor

(a) in the case of a male . Till the date he attains 21 years of age.

(b) in the case of a female Till the date of her marriage or till she attains 21 years of age, which ever is earlier.

(iii) A Person above the age of 60 years During his life time.

(iv)A person subject to phys-

ical disability or mental in- During his life time. firmety owing to which he is incapable of earning his livelihood.

(2) Upon the discontinuance - of a cash grant under sub- section (I not be, obligatory on the grantee to perform the function or discharge t any attached to such grant". (**) "2(1)-Cash grant' means a grant of money which is enforceable by the grantee against <ORG> on the date -of the coming into force of this Act but does not include-

(i) a grant of money for-

(a) services of Public temples, mosque or church; or

(b) worship of public temples, mosque or church; or (c) public temples;

(ii)a grant of money to charitable or religious institutions;

(iii)a grant of money or Pension or annuity or special or Perpetual annuity sanctioned under-

(a) S. 5 .of the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 (XXXVII of 1948);

(b) S. 77 or S. 81-A of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 ;

(c) S. 41 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952 (XI of 1952);

(d) the orders relating to Jagirs in Bhopal' 'Ihekam Khusravi, 1949, para 30 read with s.-45-A of the Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (No. X of 1953); and

(e) sub.S. (2) of S. 160 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, (20 of 1959);"

money which is enforceable by the grantee against <ORG> on the date of the coming into force of the Act but does This not include those ,,rants which are specifically excluded. definition takes in all the cash grants whatever may be the nature or origin of those grants. The definitiOn of a cash grant is wide enough to include cash grants sanctioned by ex-Rulers in lieu of <NAME> or other properties resumed or even, en payments agreed to be made in lieu of loans given to the Rulers. Different considerations may arise if the grants abolished are Gratuitous payments, grants in lieu of services to be rendered or other resumable grants. But as mentioned earlier, the definition of cash grants in s. 2(1) does not make, any distinction between the various types of cash grants. Hence, the said definition will have to stand or fall as a whole, there being no basis for severing some out of the several grants included therein. It is impermissible for this <ORG> to rewrite that clause and confine the definition only to such of the cash grants which the legislature might be competent to abolish. The doctrine of severability is applicable only if it is possible to separate the legal from the unconstitutional portion of the Provision. If it is not possible to do so, the entire provision has to be struck down as unconstitutional. see <CITATION> (').

<ORG> has come to the conclusion that a "cash grants is property within the meaning of that expression in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. This conclusion was not challenged before us. It is obvious that a right to a sum of money is property.

There was controversy before <ORG> whether the abolition of cash grants under the Act can be considered as acquisition under Art. 31 (2). It was urged before that Court on behalf of the <ORG> that that abolition of cash grant amounted to compulsory acquisition of property for public purpose and as the Act has prescribed the compensation payable to grantees the acquisition in question is completely protected by Art. 31(2). <ORG> replied this contention opining that as the law in question cannot be considered as having transferred the rights of the grantees as provided in Art. 31 (2A) the <ORG> cannot seek the protection of Art. 31 (2). Ibis I conclusion is debatable,. It is possible to view the discontinuance of the payment of cash grants under s. 3 as a statutory transfer of rights of the grantees to the <ORG>. But there is no need to pursue this line' of reasoning for reasons to be stated presently. Though the language of Art.31 (2) prima facie comprehends movable properties including choses in action and money there are valid grounds to hold that choses in action and money are outside the reach of Art. 31 (2). In the United <ORG>s of America, opinion is divided among the (1) A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1166.

jurists whether money and choses in action can be acquired in the exercise of the power of eminent domain though the preponderance of opinion appears to be that it is impermissible , But so far as we are concerned, this question is concluded by the decisions of this Court. <CITATION> (') this Court held that under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, money and choses in action could not be acquired. <NAME>, (as he then was ), speaking for the majority -after quoting with approval certain passages from <NAME>'s Constitutional Limitations observed (at pp. 943 44 of the Report) "It was not necessary to decide in this case whether under the compulsory acquisition power the <ORG> has the power to acquire choses in action or money, but it cannot be seriously disputed that such an acquisition amounts to a forced loan and that the desired result can be more appositely obtained in, exercise of the police power of the <ORG> than of the power of eminent domain or compulsory acquisitions of property and that compensation in suc h a case is the same amount of money that is being taken and in the case of a chose in action the amount of money that it would produce.. In this situation it cannot be held that fifty per cent of the outstanding arrears was compensation in any sense of that expression for is acquisition. The true position is that the <ORG> tool over all the arrears and decided to refund fifty per cent of them and forfeit the rest. The validity of this acquisition has to be decided independently of the acquisition of the, estates. It has no connection with land reform or with any public purpose It stands on the same footing as- other debts due to zamindars or their other movable properties, which it was not the object of the Act to acquire. As already stated, the only purpose to support this acquisition is to raise revenue to pay compensation to some of the zamindars whose estates are being taken. This purpose does not fill within any definition, however wide, of the phrase public purpose' and the law therefore to this extent is unconstitutional." In the same case, <NAME> (as he then was) observed:

"Taking money under the tight of eminent domain when it must be compensated by money afterwards, could be nothing more or less than a forced loan and it is difficult to say that it comes under the head of acquisi-

(1) [1952] S.C.R. 889.

tion or requisitioning of property...and is embraced within its ordinary connotation." <NAME>, in that very case held that though money and choses in action are movable property and would prima facie come under the power of compulsory acquisition the power under Art. 31 (2) could not be used to support such acquisition on the ground that generally speaking there would be no public purpose, in their acquisition". The majority view in that case was followed by this.-Court - <CITATION> ('). That lease considered the validity of S. 3 (1) of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act which provided that there should be constituted a fund called <ORG> and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the same specified in sub-s. (2) thereof shall be paid into the fund. Section 3 (2) provided inter alia:

"The Fund shall consist of

(a) all fines realised from the employees;

(b) all unpaid accumulation."

The <ORG> held following the decision of this <ORG> in <CITATION> (2) that the provision in question is invalid -and is not protected by Art. 31 (2). From the above decisions it follows that -choses in action and money could not be acquired under Art. 31 (2). If it is held that',, <ORG> by the exercise of its power of eminent domain can acquire choses in action and money belonging 'to its citizens, by paying' a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamentals. right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) would be deprived of all its contents and that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose. The power conferred under Art'. 31 (2) is not a taxing power. That power cannot be utilised for enriching the coffers of the <ORG>. It is true that the abolition of the cash grants would argument the resources of the <ORG> but that cannot be considered as a public purpose under Art. 31 (2). If it is otherwise it would be permissible for the legislatures to enact laws acquiring the public debts due from the <ORG>, t he annuity deposits returnable by it and provident fund payable by it by providing for the payment of some nominal compensation, to the persons whose rights are acquired as the acquisitions in question would augment the resources of the <ORG>. But nothing so bad can be said to be within contemplation of Art. 31(2). That Article must be construed harmoniously with Art. 19(1)(f). If so construed, it is obviously that the public purpose contemplated by that Article does not include enrichment of the coffers of the <ORG>. Further the compensation referred to in Art. 31(2) is, as held by this <ORG> in various (1)  S.C.R. 1122.

(2) (1952) S.C.R. 889.

decisions, is the just equivalent of the value of the property taken. If for every rupee acquired fifty paisas or less is made -payable as compensation the violation of - Art. 31 (2) would be patent and in those circumstances the exercise of the powers by the legislature would be considered as a fraud on its powers and consequently the legislation 'will be struck down as a colourable piece of legislation.

It is true that in <CITATION> () and in <CITATION> ('), this <ORG> was considering the question of taking of money 'by the <ORG> that was in the hands of others, but in this case we are concerned with the abrogation of the liability of the <ORG> But we fail to see any difference in principle in these two sets of cases. In the former case the <ORG> was compulsorily taking others' property and in the latter it seeks to appropriate to itself the property of others which is in its hands. It was next urged that the impugned Act, even if it is held not to be protected by Art. 31(2) is still valid under Art. 31(1). The said Article says that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. A law Which authorises the <ORG> to, deprive a person of his property must be a valid law. It must not violate Art. 19(1) (f) which means that it must satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5).  <CITATION> (-3) this <ORG> laid down that the word "law" used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitations and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31 (1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public, The Act which empowers the <ORG> to, appropriate some one else's property for itself solely with a view to augment the resources of the <ORG>, cannot be considered as a reasonable restriction- in the interest of the general public. That conclusion of ours receives support from the ratio of the decisions of this <ORG> in <CITATION> () and in <CITATION> (2) wherein <NAME>, J. speaking for the <ORG>, observed "Assuming that the correct position is what the respondents contend it is that the case falls within Art. 19(1)(f ), the question that has still to be determined is whether the impugned Act could be supported under Art. 19(5). There was some discussion before us as to the scope of this provision, the point of the debate being whether the words 'imposing reasonable restriction' (1)  S.C.R. 889. (2)  S.C.R. 1122. (3)  3 S.C.R. 887.

would cover a legislation, which not merely regulated the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(f) but totally extinguished them, and whether a law like the present one which deprived the owner of his properties could be held to fall within that provision. It was argued that a law authorising the <ORG> to seize and destroy diseased cattle, noxious drugs and the like, could not be brought within Art. 19(5) if the word 'restriction' was to be narrowly construed, and that accordingly the power to restrict must be held to include, in appropriate cases, the power to prohibit the exercise of the right. That view does find support in the observations of Lord <NAME> in <ORG> v. <ORG>(') : but the present legislation cannot be sustained even on the above interpretation of the word "restriction " as s. 3 ( 1 ) of the Act deals with moneys and money cannot be likened to diseased cattle or noxious drugs so as to attract the exercise of police power under Art. 19 (5). It appears to us that whether we apply under Art. 31(2) or Art. 19(5 ), the impugned Act cannot be upheld and it must be struck down."

If Article 19(5) is interpreted to mean that <ORG> can take by authority of law anyone's property for the. purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the guarantee given by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory, a proposition to which this <ORG> cannot subscribe.

For the reasons mentioned above we are unable to uphold the validity of Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act. These appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with 'Costs with one set of hearing fee.

<ORG> dissmissed.

(1) [1950] A.C. 235.