<NAME>, J.

1. These are consolidated appeals from two decrees of <ORG>, both dated the 13th November, 1911, which reversed in part and modified in part two decrees, each dated the 25th October, 1909, of <ORG>.

2. The first of the two suits in which those last-mentioned decrees were made, namely, that numbered 76 of 1907, the appeal in which is No. 121 of 1913, was instituted by <NAME>, the appellant in both the present appeals to enforce a mortgage dated the 26th June, 1900, executed in his favour by the third respondent in the first appeal, namely <NAME>, in her own right, and also as guardian of her two sons, then minors, the first and second respondents in the first appeal, to secure the repayment of 20,000 rupees admittedly advanced by the mortgagee to this lady, with interest at one per cent, per <NAME>.

3. The second of these suits, namely, that numbered 51 of 1908, the appeal in which is numbered 134 of 1913, was instituted by the respondents <NAME> and <NAME>, the latter by his guardian against this same mortgagee and one <NAME>, claiming to be the stepbrother of the plaintiffs, for a declaration that a second mortgage made by the said <NAME> of his share in all the family property in this mortgagee's favour, to secure the repayment of a sum of 8,000 rupees with interest, was a nullity, on the ground that the said <NAME> was not entitled to any share in the family property, first by reason of the provisions of a certain indenture dated the 5th February, 1895, hereafter dealt with, and secondly because he was not the legitimate son of his alleged father, the grantor in the said deed. This declaration is the only specific relief prayed for, but there is a prayerr for general relief.

4. The litigation relates to the estate of <NAME>, who was the son of the Prime Minister of the last King of Oudh, and a Mahomedan of the Shia sect. He was admittedly regularly married twice. By his first wife, <NAME>, he had two sons and one daughter, who pre-deceased him, and one daughter,, <NAME>, who survived him. By his second wife, the third respondent in the first appeal, married after the death of the first wife, he had two sons, the first and second respondents in that appeal. He died on the 1st August, 1898.

5. Both these suits were tried by the same Subordinate Judge, who delivered separate judgments. <ORG> dealt with both the appeals in one judgment.

6. The appellants and the respondents in both appeals agree in stating that the principal questions for decision are (i) whether this trust indenture of the 5th February, 1895, duly executed 3 by the deceased <NAME> and registered, was a valid disposition of the properties therein comprised, and, if so, whether the above-mentioned mortgages, so far as they purport to charge these properties, and the alleged share of <NAME> in the family property respectively, are invalid; and (2) whether <NAME> was shown to be the legitimate son of <NAME>, the grantor in the trust deed. It was not, as their Lordships understood, disputed that the sum of 20,000 rupees, purported to be secured by the first mortgage, was, in fact, advanced to the <NAME>'s widow; nor that it was borrowed for the purpose of being applied in payment of certain of the settlor's debts, in order to save some of the properties comprised in the trust deed from being sold at the suit of some unsatisfied creditors; nor that it was, in fact, so applied. No question was raised as to whether the first mortgage did not, under the circumstances, capture whatever interest the three respondents might have had in the entire immovable property of <NAME>, however derived. Their Lordships therefore base their decision solely on the points raised by the parties and dealt with by the <ORG> below.

7. It was contended in the second suit by <NAME>, the mortgagee, that between the dates of the marriages of the <NAME> with the two above-mentioned ladies he contracted a marriage in the muta form with an Abyssinian slave girl, named <NAME>, who had been brought home by his father on the occasion of his making a pilgrimage to Mecca and subsequently given by the father to him, and that <NAME> was the offspring of that union. The fact that such a marriage ever took place was denied by the plaintiffs in that suit, and a vast body of evidence, oral and documentary, was adduced by both sides on the issue of <NAME>'s legitimacy.

8. Now, as to the trust deed of the 5th February, 1895, it is necessary, in order to determine the issue raised in reference to it, to consider first, its provisions; second, the circumstances under which, and the purpose for which it was apparently executed; and thirdly, the mode in which the property purporting to be conveyed by it was subsequently treated arid dealt with by those having rights over or interest in it.

9. The parties to the deed are the Nawab <NAME>, of the first part; <NAME>, described as his second wife, of the second part; and <NAME> and the K aforesaid <NAME>, described as trustees, of the third part. After reciting that the Nawab <NAME> was seized and possessed for an estate of inheritance in possession of certain undivided shares in certain Zemindari villages, and other landed properties in Lucknow, and in the districts of Lucknow, Fyzabad, and Sitapur, and also of a house in Calcutta numbered 13, Russell Street; that on the treaty of the marriage with his said wife, <NAME>, he had agreed to give her a dower of one lac of rupees, and also to settle upon her : a monthly allowance of 100 rupees; that in part performance of that agreement, and in satisfaction of this monthly allow" ance, he had by a registered instrument, dated the 14th October, 1887, transferred to her a certain house, described as yielding a monthly rent of 100 rupees which she had since enjoyed; and had, in addition, already paid to her 15,000 rupees in part payment of her dower, leaving the sum of 85,000 rupees, the balance thereof, unpaid : that he had, by gifts of jewellery and effects of the value of one lac and 50,000 rupees, and otherwise, provided for his children by his first wife; that with a view to prevent further disputes, quarrels, and litigation between his said wife, <NAME>, and her children, and the children of his first marriage, he was desirous of making the settlement thereafter appearing, it was agreed between the parties thereto that the said intended settlement 'should be in full payment and satisfaction of the dower payable by him, as therein mentioned. He, in consideration of the promises, and in payment and discharge of the balance of the dower payable by him, granted, conveyed, and assigned to the trustees and their heirs all the lands, tenements, and hereditaments in " the schedule to the deed mentioned, to hold the same, subject to a certain mortgage therein specified, to the payment of certain small annuities to the persons therein named, and to the cost of maintaining and managing the said properties, and Collecting the rents thereof, in trust to pay the income of the same' to his said wife, <NAME> Begum, during her life, for her sole and separate use, subject to the cost of maintaining and educating his Children by her, and after her death in trust for all the aforesaid children living at his, the settlor's, death, as tenants in common, in equal shares. A power of leasing for a term of six years was given to the trustees, and a provision introduced that in case one of the trustees should die, or be unable or unwilling to act, the Official Trustees of Bengal should be appointed trustees in such trustees' stead. The deed contains, in addition, the usual covenants by the settlor for good title M and quiet enjoyment. This deed is in the English language, It does not contain any formal release of <NAME> Begum's right to payment of the .unpaid balance of her dower. It is executed by the settlor alone. Mr. <NAME>, his solicitor, and <NAME>, described as a solicitor, but in fact the clerk of Mr. <NAME> (to whom the mortgage mentioned in it was made), are the witnesses to it. The lady was not examined as a witness. No proof whatever, independent of the deed, was given that any agreement such as is mentioned in it was ever entered into between the settlor and his wife, <NAME> Begum, to the effect that she would accept the provision purported to be made for her by it in satisfaction and discharge of her claim, for the unpaid balance of her dower. That agreement, however, is the only valuable consideration moving to the settlor given for the grant he makes. Unless and until this agreement is proved to have been entered into, the grant and conveyance to the trustees must be taken to be a purely voluntary gift. Though it should be merely voluntary, <NAME> Begum might, no doubt, acting with full knowledge of her rights, deliberately elect to take the benefits conferred upon her by it in lieu of the balance of her dower. If she did so elect, she would be bound by the choice thus made. But that election could not create the agreement between her and her husband; which is the sole consideration for the deed, nor could it enlarge the operation of the deed itself. Notwithstanding it, the grant to he trustees would still remain a purely voluntary gift, and the property which it passed would have to be ascertained on that footing. Subsequent election could not be held to be a substitute for the original consideration.

10. The interests granted to the children are contingent on their surviving their father. By the happening of that event, the class to take is to be ascertained. Children born after the date of the deed, but alive at the death of the settlor would be members of that class. In addition, the deed fails to provide expressly or impliedly for the payment of the income of the property held in trust on each of three different contingencies. First, the contingency of <NAME> dying childless in her husband's lifetime. Second, offer predeceasing him leaving children; none of whom survived him; and, third, of her pre-deceasing him leaving children some of whom survived him. In each of these cases a resulting trust in the settlor's favour would arise on the death of his wife. In the first case of the absolute beneficial interest in the trust property, in the second of the income of that property while any of his children lived, and of the absolute beneficial interest in it on the death of the survivor of them, and in the third case of the income of the trust property in the interval between the death of his wife and his own decease. So that the settlor has not by the provisions of this deed divested himself absolutely, but only in certain contingencies of all interest in the property granted and conveyed by it. It was contended by Sir <NAME>, on behalf of the appellants, that by reason of the conditional nature of this gift to the trustees, the contingent nature of the provision for the children, and these contingent resulting trusts in the settlor's favour, these dispositions made by the deed were void under the Mahomedan law observed by the Shia sect.

11. These are no doubt very important points. Owing, however, to the conclusions at which their Lordships have arrived on the other points raised in the case, they do not find it necessary to express any opinion on these points and, therefore, abstain from doing so. By the third section of the Oudh Laws Act (XVIII of 1876) it is enacted that between Mahomedans the Mahomedan law is to be applied to the many important matters therein enumerated, including amongst others, " wills, legacies, and gifts." <ORG> has held that the term "gifts" as here used does not include gifts in trust. Their Lordships cannot adopt such a narrow construction of the term ' gifts" as would exclude any gift where the donor's bounty passes to his intended beneficiary through the medium of a trust, so that while a gift by A. to C. direct would be governed by the Mahomedan law, a gift by A. to B. in trust for C. would be governed by some other law. So to hold would, they think, defeat the plain purpose and object of this section of the statute. The Mahomedan law in their view, therefore, applies to this deed; and the gift made by it, being voluntary, will under that law be void, unless it be accompanied by a delivery of such possession as the subject of the gilt is susceptible of.

12. <CITATION> (1906) L.R. 33 I.A. 68 : 8 Bom. L.R. 387 it is at p. 76 of the report, laid down by this Board that, according to Mahomedan law, holder of property may in his lifetime give away the whole or part of it if he complies with certain forms, but that it is incumbent on those who seek to set up such a transaction to prove that those forms have been complied D with, and this will be so whether the gift be made with or without consideration. If the latter, then unless it be accompanied by delivery of the thing given, so far as it is capable of delivery, it will be invalid. If the former, delivery of possession is not necessary, but actual payment of the consideration must be proved, and the bona fide intention of the donor to divest himself in presenti of the property, and to confer it upon the donee must also be proved. The case of <NAME> v. <NAME> (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 261 supports this statement of the law.

13. As six out of the ten hereditaments granted by the deed consist of undivided shares in certain Zemindari villages and parcels of land, physical possession is, in their case, impossible and as to them, the receipt of the appropriate portion of the rent or income issuing out of or derived from them is the only form the necessary possession could assume. The validity of the grant of these items of property would depend, therefore, upon whether the trustees of the deed, to, the exclusion of all other persons, entered into the receipt or enjoyment of .these tents or income. Mr. <NAME> contended, however, as their Lordships understood him, that the rule of law laid down by those authorities was altered or qualified by the combined operation of " The Transfer of Property Act " (Act IV of 1882) and " The Indian Trusts Act " (Act II of 1882). He insists that if the deed of gift of immovable property be duly registered, delivery of possession is not necessary to make the gift valid, or, if necessary, may be effected at any time during the donor's life, provided he be then capable of giving the property. By section 122 of the first of these statutes a gift is defined to be a transfer of existing movable or immovable property voluntarily without consideration by one person, calling himself a donor, to another, called a donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. The acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor, and while he is still capable of giving. ,If he should die before acceptance, the gift is void. If the subject of the gift be immovable property, then, by section 123 , the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument, signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. By section 125 it is provided that a gift of a thing to two or more donees, of whom one does not accept, is void as to the interest he would have taken had he t accepted.

14. Section 55 enacts that, subject to the trust, the beneficiary has a right to the rents and profits of the trust property, and section 56 that where there is only one beneficiary and he is competent to contract, or where there are several beneficiaries competent to contract and all are of one mind, he or they may require the trustee to transfer the property to him or them, or to such person as he or they may direct.

15. Both these statutes, however, were passed long before the year in which the first of the above-cited authorities was decided. The 22nd section of " The Transfer of Property Act " still requires a " transfer " to be made of the subject of the gift. This would prima fade mean a valid transfer, and would therefore require the transfer to be accompanied by delivery of possession. But it is argued that there can be no delivery without acceptance by the donee of the gift. It implies acceptance, and as acceptance may take place at any time during the donor's life, under the conditions mentioned, it follows that the required delivery of possession may take place at any time during his life under the same conditions. Their Lordships think that this line of argument is unsound, but even if it were sound it is not pretended that during the life of the donor in the present case anything was done by him which would amount to delivery of possession of the pro. parties comprised in the mortgage deed, or anything done by the trustees or by <NAME> alone, which would amount to proof of an acceptance of the gift, or of an election to take, under the deed of the 5th February, 1895, save what happened in a friendly suit instituted by the deceased Nawab against the trustees on the 10th September, 1895, to obtain permission to sell the Kothi, 13, Russell Street, Calcutta. This matter will be dealt with in its chronological order,

16. As to the circumstances under which this trust deed was executed it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the settlor was heavily indebted at its date, and that by it he purported to divest himself of almost all the property then belonging to him, that it was merely designed to protect him against the claims of ,his pressing creditors, and was never intended by him to be an operative instrument. It is clear from the entries in the day book of Mr. <NAME>, his solicitor, that <NAME> did not, at first, intend to make any disposition in trust of the property comprised in the deed, and it is equally clear that he never intended that the deed should contain any clause releasing his wife's claim for the unpaid I balance of her dower. A clause to that effect was introduced by counsel into the draft sent to him to settle. It was a natural and proper provision if the agreement mentioned in the deed between the settlor and his wife had ever in fact been entered into; but notwithstanding that the settlor was advised by his solicitor to allow this clause to be embodied in the deed, he absolutely declined to do so, and it was accordingly omitted from it. Again, while he lived no mutation of names took place as to his shares in the Zemindari villages or lands to which mutation was applicable.

17. To some of the properties comprised in the deed mutation, no doubt, did not apply. But if this was a genuine transaction, and the deed was intended to be an operative instrument, there was no reason why the names of the trustees should not have been substituted for that of the settlor on the registry in reference to these villages, and many reasons why they should have been so substituted. It would have completed the transaction, and tended to remove all doubt about its nature. That, however, was not all. The income of the trust property was never, during the lifetime of the settlor, paid to the trustees or to the wife. <NAME>, the father of <NAME>, one of the trustees, was also <NAME> of <NAME>, and at pp. 370-371 of the second record he states that <NAME>, the Thekadar, made the collections; that this man sent the income of these villages to him; and that he, as such <NAME>, brought the .money to <NAME> during the latter's life. This was a direct breach of trust if the deed was an operative instrument.

18. These facts are, no doubt, calculated to throw grave suspicion on the genuineness of the transaction of February 1895, but they do not appear to their Lordships to be sufficiently convincing to induce them to rest their judgment upon them rather than upon other points where, in their view, there is less room for doubt.

19. The written statement filed by the trustees in the friendly suit above-mentioned was most relied upon. It is dated the 16th December, 1895. In that suit Mr. <NAME> was solicitor for <ORG>. His partner was solicitor for the trustees. <NAME> gave the instructions, to this gentleman. There is no proof whatever that he ever communicated with <NAME> oh the subject

20. The plaint is a lengthy document. It sets out; amongst other things, the deed of the 5th February, 1895. ' The written statement of the trustees begins by admitting all the statements contained in the plaint, and then states that the defendants are trustees appointed under the deed of the 5th February, 1895, and as such hold the several tenements and hereditaments described in the schedule annexed to it .upon the trusts created' by it. That is all as to the contents or provisions of the deed In fact, the Nawab himself was then receiving the rents of those hereditaments and continued to do so for two years afterwards; and in the plaint it is stated the Nawab, himself had entered into a conditional contract for the sale of the Russell Street premises for 125,000 rupees. This written statement purports to be signed twice by each of the trustees and signed once by their attorney, <NAME>. Over one set of the signatures of the trustees it contains the usual declaration by the defendants that the statements contained in the document are true to their knowledge, except as to matters stated on information and belief, and as to such matters they believe them to be true. And following this is the endorsement- "Explained by me to the defendants above-named <NAME>, articled clerk to Mr. <NAME>, ' solicitor, Calcutta." That is the Nawab's solicitor. This witness was not produced, and no explanation was given for his absence. And though <NAME> (p. 257) identifies his daughter's signature to this written statement, Exh. No. 5, he says nothing about the document being read and explained either to himself or to her.

21. In their Lordships' view it is impossible under these circumstances to accept this written statement as satisfactory proof that the contents, purport or effect, of this trust deed were ever brought to the knowledge of <NAME>; that she had ever as a trustee accepted the gift purporting to be contained in it, or ever on her own behalf accepted the provision purporting to be made by it for her and her children in satisfaction of her claim for the balance of her dower. Her subsequent conduct and action up to and including the execution of the mortgage sued upon is, they think, entirely inconsistent with any such intention on her part,

22. These latter are most significant. On the 7th September, 1898, less than six weeks after her husband's death, proceedings, to which: she was a party, were instituted to obtain mutation of names in reference to his undivided share in seven Zemindari villages. She was presumably made aware of the nature and object of these proceedings and the purport and effect of the documents that bear her name. If she was then aware of the existence and provisions of the trust deed, these proceedings amount, first, to a most emphatic repudiation of it; second, to a most emphatic assertion of <NAME> legitimacy; and thirdly, a determined effort, against her own pecuniary interest, and that of her children, to confer upon him certain proprietary rights.

23. Separate applications were made, one for each village. That dealing with the lands of <NAME> (p. 237(1)) maybe taken as typical of them all, It purports to be made under the provisions of Section 61 of Act XVII of 1876 (The Oudh Land Revenue Act). Having regard to the contention of the respondents that no weight or significance is to be attached to the statements contained in documents such as those signed by her in these proceedings, unless and until it be proved affirmatively that their contents were fully understood by her, it is essential to examine some of the provisions of this statute. By Section 6 it imposes on all persons obtaining possession of land or the profits thereof, whether by succession, purchase, or other form of transfer, a statutory duty to give notice of the same, immediately after it has taken place, to the Tahsildar of the Tahsil in which the Mahal to which the land belongs is situated, or to the Deputy Commissioner of the district. If the notice be given to the former that officer is bound to report to the Deputy Commissioner. By Section 62 the Deputy Commissioner, on receiving this notice, is bound to make such enquiry as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time prescribe, in order to ascertain the fact of the alleged transmission of the property, and if the transfer appears to have taken place he must, in accordance with the rules made by the Chief Commissioner, record the same. This entry, no doubt, does not prejudice the right of any person who may claim and establish in a Court of competent jurisdiction a right to an interest in the land to which the entry refers. Section 63 enacts that if the person succeeding be a minor or under disability, the guardian or other person who shall have charge of the property, shall give the notice, and by 3.64 a fine is imposed on any person neglecting for three months to give the notice prescribed by Section 61-

24. These are the administrative duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed upon these public officials. It is scarcely conceivable that when the application is grounded upon the statement contained in a petition signed by a Purdanashin lady, both on behalf of herself and as guardian of her children, these officials would omit to take adequate steps to ascertain whether she knew the purport and effect of the document She signed. He would utterly fail in his duty if he omitted to do so, and in the absence of all evidence that he did fail in his duty |in this respect the maxim omnia presumuniur rete esse acta must, their Lordships think, be applied to the proceedings.

25. Now in the body of the petition it is stated that <NAME> died on the ist August, 1898, that the five persons named, beginning with <NAME>, described as his son, were his heirs. The undivided shares of the deceased in the several villages to which these heirs became entitled are stated, namely, two shares to each of the sons, one share to <NAME>, the surviving daughter of the first marriage, a married lady who died in the year 1904 but whose husband is still alive, and one-eighth share of the entire property to <NAME>, It is further stated that on the ist August 1898, these five persons got possession of their respective shares jointly by inheritance. As that was the date of the death of the ancestor, physical possession of an undivided share being impossible, and no rent having been received by the heirs, this can only mean that they got a right to possession by virtue of the interest in his undivided share which they took by inheritance. These five heirs of the deceased <NAME> then pray that after due enquiry his name might be expunged, and the names of the applicants, according to their legal share's may be entered on the Register of the Zamindari Chakdari in his stead. The petition purports to be signed by <NAME>, <NAME>, and <NAME>, and is endorsed thus: " <NAME>, Pleader." Upon this application an order bearing date the 30th September, 1898, was made purporting to be signed by the Pargana officer to this effect. In accordance with the reports of the <NAME> the mutation of names is sanctioned, Let this be returned for compliance."

26. In addition to this, in this application relating to the village of Ghaila, Pargana Lucknow, a consolidated statement is made by the same pleader, bearing date the 28th September, 1898, setting forth the shares of the same several heirs to the Nawab's interest in seven villages, and at p, 81 of the Record in the <NAME>'s report, dated the 28th September, is to be found. He reports that <NAME> was a shareholder in the therein mentioned villages, which were muafidar (revenue free grants); that he died on the ist August, 1898; that his heirs, whose names were given, were in possession in place of the deceased; that Proclamation was duly issued, but the time had expired and no objection had been filed. It was therefore submitted that mutation in favour of the heirs in place of the deceased be sanctioned. The names and descriptions and shares of the five heirs are set forth, the males being described as sons of the deceased. A statement in detail of the shares in the villages is then given, and the report winds up with the following passage :-

In the reports of the other cases a reference was made to this case. In all these cases orders for mutation were passed with reference to this case; all the cases are of the same nature.

27. On the same day a statement is made and signed by <NAME>, setting out the same succession to the shares of the deceased in this village, to the effect following:- " The above-named five persons (naming them) are the heirs and owners according to their legal shares, and are entitled to mutations of names. Heard and admitted." And on the 7th October, 1898, an order is made and signed by the officer in charge of the <ORG> to the effect that, the case being proceeded with that day and the <ORG>dar's report being perused, it was ordered, in accordance with the <ORG>dar's report, that the mutation slips be issued in the names of the deceased; that the fees be realised; that formal orders be issued; and that, after compliance, the files be consigned to the record room. There is nothing to show that the requirements of the Revenue Act of 1876 were not strictly complied with. In the absence of such evidence it must be assumed that they were complied with. These proceedings accordingly amount to something far more important and convincing than a mere admission by <NAME> of <NAME> legitimacy. They amount to the doing of an act by her by which an additional sharer in the property of the deceased is brought in and is given the right to receive portion of the income of that property, which property, if the deed were valid, belonged mainly to her and her children, and if invalid, belonged to them to a lesser extent. Further, the act was accompanied by a statement explaining it and setting forth the grounds on which it was based, namely, the heirship, as a legitimate son of Sultan <NAME>. It would appear to their Lordships that the more probable inference to be drawn from this treatment of Sultan <NAME> is that it is but a continuance of the recognition and treatment he received during the life-time of the, deceased <NAME>, , rather than an entire departure from the course previously pursued.

28. It would be strange indeed if the ill-begotten child of a menial servant and a frail negress, never theretofore owned as a son of the Nawab, or treated by him as such, should be at once selected for such an honour. Moreover, it was not a barren honour, for if Sultan <NAME> speaks the truth (at p. 276 of the second record), from the time of the mutation he and the other heirs " have been realising their shares of the profits separately." He does not appear to have been contradicted or even cross-examined on this point, and the husband of <NAME>, who is still alive, was not produced to prove that his wife, though excluded from all further participation in her father's assets by the trust deed, did not also receive her share of the income of these Zemindari villages.

29. On the 9th June, 1899, <NAME> applied under Section 10 of Act Bill of 1890 to the District Judge of Lucknow to be appointed guardian of the persons and property of her two minor sons. The application purports to be signed by her in both her capacities and by the same pleader, <NAME>. It contains a final passage in the usual form to the effect that she knew of her own knowledge that the entire immovable property to which the minors are entitled was of the value of 93,300 rupees, of which 60,000 rupees represent the Kothi, 13, Russell Street, Calcutta, and 15,000 rupees the property situate in; the city of Lucknow, leaving a balance of 18,300 rupees as the value of the other property; that 'they were m possession of this property; and that their relatives are, amongst others, <NAME>, brother of the minor, born of a Harem of <NAME>, deceased.

30. In the schedule to the application, also purporting to be signed by her, she sets out the shares of each of the properties contained in the trust deed belonging to the minors. For instance, their share of the <NAME>, 13, Russell Street, Calcutta, is put down at twelve twenty-sevenths estimated value 60,609 rupees; whereas, under the trust deed, if valid, they would be entitled to the entire interest in this property, subject to 1 their mother's life-estate. Every item in this schedule is inconsistent with the provisions of the trust deed.

31. On the 12th June, 1900, <NAME> made an application under Section 31 of Act. VIII of 1890, to the District Judge of Lucknow, for permission to mortgage the shares of the minors together with her own shares in the properties therein mentioned for the sum of 35m000 rupees, for the purpose of raising money to be applied in discharge of the judgment debts of the deceased <NAME>. Two statements, A. and B,, were attached to this application, the first setting out the debts o the deceased <NAME>, and the second, the properties of which he died seized or possessed. In the former the name of <NAME> appears as an encumbrancer on all the property of the deceased <NAME> for the sum of 85,000 rupees, the unpaid balance of her dower. In the second, the first number is <ORG> and seventy-eight shops and land situated in Chauk, City of Lucknow, the ancestor's share being four-ninths and the minor's two-ninths. The annual income is stated to be 1,500 rupees. The income arising out of the four-ninths share, 125 rupees per month and the charges upon it created by the ancestors are -put down at rupees 31,755-7-8, and its estimated value at 25,000 rupees, so that there is no beneficial interest whatever in it.

32. No. 17 is Machrehta, in the district of Sitapur, and No. 16 the village of Janaura, in the district of Fyzabad, in each of which the share of the deceased was four-ninths, both are stated to be included in a lease, and the estimated value of each is only 600 rupees.

33. No. 15 is <NAME>, 13, Russell Street, Calcutta, the ancestor's' share in which is stated to be sixteen annas, the minor's half the annual income 7,800 rupees, and the estimated value 55,000 rupees. The amount due upon this under Mr. <NAME>'s mortgage is stated to be rupees 20,023-2-3, and his costs rupees 5,117-13-2, The shares of the minors are set forth, they are half their father's share. If the trust deed was valid their share would be the entire of their father's share.

34. On the 26th June, 1900, the District Judge granted permission to mortgage Nos. 2 to 14 on list B. for 16,000 rupees" as per terms of the draft mortgage filed, The shops in Lucknow, and No. 13, Russell Street, Calcutta, being therefore excluded.

35. The mortgage now sued upon was executed the same day. It purports to be signed by <NAME> on her own behalf, and as guardian of her minor sons.

36. Her signature is witnessed by her brother and the other witnesses, who are described as identifying her before the Registrar, and is also signed by <NAME> <NAME>,

37. The very first recital in this deed is that <NAME> died a natural death in Lucknow on the ist August, 1898, leaving him surviving his widow, the declarant, his two minor sons, and <NAME>, his major son, and <NAME>, his major daughter, as his heirs. It is further recited that the District Judge, under the provisions of the 31st section of the Act VIII of 1890, ordered the declarant to contract a debt of 16,000 rupees on the security of the property of the minors; and that, in compliance with that order and with a view to raise money to payoff the amount due on a certain decree named, she mortgaged her own share in these properties.

38. In their Lordships' view, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from these documents and proceedings is that <NAME>, if aware of the purport and contents of this trust deed, consistently treated it as invalid, and never, with full knowledge of its purport and effect-or, indeed, at all-elected to accept the provision made by it for her and her children as a satisfaction of the unpaid balance of her dower. If she was never fully informed of its purport and contents, any election by her to accept the provision made for herself and her children by it in discharge of the unpaid balance of her dower would, of course, be of no avail. If this be so the mortgagee's rights cannot be affected, or his security invalidated, by any course of action she might have chosen to take after the execution of the mortgage. As regards the receipt of the rent or income of the property mortgaged, it must be borne in mind that <NAME> would have been entitled to an eighth share of it and her sons to their shares of it, even if the trust deed had never existed; and that she, as their guardian, would have .been entitled to be paid their share as well as her own, while under the trust deed the trustees or she herself with their permission would have been entitled to receive the entire income, so that the receipt by her of a portion of the income of any of the property comprised either in the trust deed or in the mortgage might be equally consistent with her title under the deed of independent of it, and therefore no proof at all of possession under it. In the mortgage deed of the 13th September, 1902, it is recited that a lease of the <ORG>, 13, Russell Street, in the city of Calcutta, was executed on the 19th April, 1901, ten months after the date of the appellant's mortgage. The witness, <NAME>, proves, no doubt, that he has received the rent due under this lease on behalf of the trustees since the 13th September, 1902.

39. The letters from the agents of <ORG> at Lucknow to the trustees acknowledging the receipt from the branch of their bank at Calcutta of different sums to be placed to their credit range from the 21st August, 1901, to July 1902-It is not shown precisely what was the true nature of these lodgments in the bank at Calcutta, but from their dates and amounts and the place of lodgment the inference probably would be that they were the rents of the only property belonging to the deceased Nawab situated in Calcutta. The evidence of <NAME> on this point is very unsatisfactory. At p. 377 he states that after the Nawab's death he was accustomed personally to bring from <NAME> the shares of <NAME>, and her two sons in the profits of the jagir villages. He then appears to have added that he got the profit, for <NAME> without any specification as to whose profits they were, and then, having been reminded of his former answer, he said it was true, that both answers were true. Under the trust deed <NAME> would have been entitled to all the income, her sons to none o^ it, so that this evidence is more consistent with the lady's taking against the trust deed than under it. There is no satisfactory evidence therefore, in their Lordships' opinion, that the trustees ever entered, under and by virtue of the trust deed, into receipt of the rent or income of the property comprised in the mortgage sued upon, and consequently that there is no satisfactory proof that the possession of this portion of the property, the subject of the gift, was ever delivered by the settlor to the trustees.

40. Even if the proof of the receipt of the rent of the Kothi, 13, Russell Street, Calcutta, were so satisfactory as to support the conclusion that possession of it had been delivered to the trustees at the date of the trust deed, or indeed at any time during the lifetime of the settlor, which, in their Lordships' view, it is not, the receipt of the rent of these premises, differing altogether as they do in nature and character from the property mortgaged,' separated by many miles from these jagir villages, and not forming with them one concrete whole, would furnish no proof whatever of the delivery by the settlor to the trustees of his shares in the villages mentioned in the mortgage. Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that possession of the property mortgaged not having been proved to have been delivered, the gift is, according to the Mahomedan law applicable to the case, void, and that the mortgage sued upon is therefore a valid and a1-- binding instrument, and a good security.

41. The only question remaining for consideration is the legitimacy of <NAME>. The burden of proving his illegitimacy rests, according to the pleadings in the first instance at all events, on the plaintiffs in the second suit. It would appear to their Lordships that a fallacy underlies some of the arguments addressed to them on behalf of the respondents on this point It consists in assuming that the fact, even if true, that <NAME> was treated by the <NAME>, and especially by his family, with less care, kindness, consideration, and respect than the sons of the high-born ladies to whom the <NAME> had been united by nikkai marriages, furnishes proof of <NAME>'s illegitimacy. Under the Mahomedan law and indeed under the English law, the legitimate son of the most low born, debased, and degraded woman to whom a man could be lawfully united has just the same proprietary right in his father's property as if his mother had been the most well-born and the purest. But it is rather against human nature to suppose that this equality before the law should secure equality of treatment in the domestic circle. It was also urged that the treatment which <NAME> and his mother received in the <NAME>'s family was quite inconsistent with his position as the legitimate son of the <NAME>, and of her position as the legitimate wife, through a muta marriage, of the <NAME>, The misfortune of that argument is that the position in the family of both <NAME> and his mother, and the treatment both received, especially the latter, is still more inconsistent with her being, as the respondent alleged, the mistress of a menial servant, and he the offspring of their intercourse. Even while she was pregnant with child she was permitted privileges which it is almost impossible to believe would have been accorded to her if her state being known, as it must have beep, it was attributable to her improper intimacy with a menial servant. <NAME> when he grew up, turned out to be rather a " mauvais suejt." His connection with theatres displeased the <NAME>. His mother had eloped or disappeared. If he was the illegi-timite son of the menial servant there was no reason why the <NAME> should not have turned him adrift. On the contrary he kept him on in his (the <NAME>'s)' home, undoubtedly] associated, to some extent, with him, had him about his person and, it is apparent on the evidence, had some regard for him. In their Lordships' view the reasonable, inference from all the evidence on this point is that <NAME> was, at all events, the son of <NAME> and this negress.

42. The crucial question then is, was he the Nawab's legitimate son? There is no question that the Sultan <NAME> was the son of this woman. That is admitted by all parties. Now four witnesses have proved distinctly that the Nawab acknowledged him to be his son. That prima facie means his legitimate son : <NAME> v. <NAME> (1868) 10 W.R. 469.

43. The first of these witnesses, <NAME>, the son of Prince <NAME>, belonging to the family of the Kings of Oudh, states that he knew <NAME> for thirty to thiry-five years, that he knew <NAME> and his mother; that he saw the Nawab and <NAME> treating each other like father and son, that he went to see the deceased Nawab in his last illness, and then found <NAME> attending him, that the Nawab had been displeased with <NAME> because the latter had become addicted to singing and dancing but that as far as the witness could judge the Nawab had forgiven him, that fifteen or sixteen years had elapsed since them and that the Nawab on one occasion introduced <NAME> to the witness as his son. The second witness, <NAME>, states that <NAME> told him that the negress, the sultan <NAME>'s mother, was his muta wifes that he saw <NAME> visiting the family in which <NAME> lived at Murshidabad, and that this family treated him as a son, as did also <NAME> himself.

44. The third witness, <NAME>, son of <NAME> of Bengal, states that <NAME> was married to <NAME>, son of the late King of Oudh; that the knew <NAME>; that he saw him with his father <NAME>, who told the witness that <NAME> was his son by a muta woman 5 and that he saw him once or twice visiting at Murshidabad during <NAME>'s lifetime. This witness was subjected to a cross-examination, presumably con-effective as to the time of the day at which the <NAME> made this statement to him. The last of these witnesses is <NAME>. He says that one day, about fourteen or sixteen years before he gave his evidence, he, jesting, asked <NAME> whence he got this boy <NAME>, and he replied that he was his son by an Abyssinian, his wife by muta, presented to him by his, the <NAME>'s father, that he saw <NAME> many times, and saw his father treat him as a relation, a son, or brother, and not as a servant.

45. The Subordinate Judge, at op. 530-53-, has criticised in detail the evidence in conflict with these statements, and shows conclusively, their Lordships think, that much weight cannot be attached to it.

46. Putting aside <NAME> own evidence, their Lordships cannot find anything in the case to discredit the evidence of the four witnesses above named. They have no interest to induce them to state what they do not believe to be true. The criticism passed upon their evidence was, first, that <NAME> was only introduced to each of them once, and therefore their recollection is unreliable, as if it was to be expected that a father would naturally introduce a son to a friend as his son more than once; and, second, that they speak to what took place many years ago. They profess, however, to have a clear recollection of the events they depose to; and the Subordinate Judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing them, believed them. Much reliance was placed upon two documents in addition to the trust deed, which, it was contended, contained a distinct repudiation by <NAME> of <NAME> legitimacy, namely, <ORG> and the memorandum bearing date the 15th February 1893. Both these documents were composed many years subsequent to the dates of the acknowledgments deposed to by the four witnesses mentioned. In the first he names his children by his first wife and those by <NAME>, and states that there can be no heirs to him but these that these persons are the owners of and heirs of his property; and that if any other claimant comes forward his claim should be considered invalid by the Government.

47. In the memorandum he states that one of his sons by his first marriage, having died, his three sons, one daughter, and his wife <NAME>, five persons in all, are his heirs, and he proceeds to declare that besides these he has none, and that if any added person comes forward as his heir other than a son or daughter thereafter born to him by his wife <NAME> Begum, his claim shall be considered false and unlawful.

48. It is quite evident from these documents that <NAME> was very apprehensive that some person would come forward claiming to be his heir, else it would be meaningless and purposeless to write thus. These apprehensions and fears M would have been (national if the person whose claim he desired to defeat was the well-known progeny of the negress and a menial servant. But his fears could easily be accounted for, if in fact he had had a son by a mulct, wife whom he had treated to some extent as a son, and who by reason of that treatment might be a formidable claimant, but yet whose claims he desired, not unnaturally perhaps, to discount. Their Lordships do not think that the evidence of the four witnesses above-mentioned is rebutted or discredited by these documents.

49. If this be so, the rule of the Mahomedan law applicable to the case is well established : No statement made by one man that another (proved to be illegitimate) is his son can make that other legitimate, but where no proof of that kind has been given such a statement or acknowledgment is substantive evidence that the person so acknowledged is the legitimate son of the person who makes the statement provided his legitimacy be possible : <CITATION> (1888) I.L.R. 10 All. 289, and Nawab Muhammad Azmat Ali Khan v. <NAME> (1881) L.R. 9 I.A. 8.

50. It is also well established according to Mahomedan law that if a member of a family, such as <NAME> was of her husband's family, makes statements touching the sonship or heirship of a person, such as are contained in many of the written documents she has signed, in reference to <NAME> heirship, those statements are good evidence of the family repute concerning him: <NAME> v. <NAME> (1907) L.R. 30 I.A. 94, 109.

51. On the whole case, therefore, their Lordships are of opinion that the decrees appealed from in these consolidated appeals are both erroneous and should be reversed, and the decrees of the Subordinate Judge in both should be restored, and that both appeals should be allowed with costs here and below, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

52. Their Lordships, however, do not think that they can, consistently with their duty as members of this appellate tribunal part with this case without making a few observations on some remarkable features of the litigation out of which the appeals have arisen. First, as to the question of the duration of the litigation. The first suit was instituted on the 30th April, 1907. Various applications were made by the parties K for extension of time, the issues were fixed on the 26th! August, 1907. On the 19th June, 1908, the hearing began, and judgment was delivered by the Subordinate Judge on the 25th October, 1909, two years and five months after the institution of the suit. The petition of appeal to <ORG> was lodged on the 28th January, 1910, and judgment of the <ORG> was not delivered till the 13th November, 1911.

53. An application for liberty to appeal to His Majesty in Council was lodged on the 19th December, 1911. Permission was given on the 13th December, 1912, but the notice that it had been given was not saved upon the respondents till the 23rd January, 1913. '

54. The petitions of appeal were lodged at <ORG> on the 15^1 April, 1914, but the appeals were not set down for hearing till the 27th October, 1^15, that is about eight years and six months after the institution of the suit.

55. The second suit was instituted on the 22nd February, 1908. The issues were settled on the 30th March, 1908. The, hearing apparently began on the nth June, 1908, and continued at intervals till the 27th June, 1909. It was taken up for argument early in July, 19^9, was adjourned till the 21st of that month, and judgment was not delivered till the 25th October, 1909. The petition of appeal to <ORG> was not lodged till the 21th January, 1910 and judgment was not given till the 13th December, 1911.

56. Such delays as these are discreditable to any judicial system, and their Lordships have no reason to think they are not to a large extent avoidable. They vastly increase the costs, keep litigants in a state of anxious uncertainty, and prejudice their interest in many ways. Next, the cross-examination of witnesses was so unduly prolonged by the repeated asking of frivolous aid irrelevant questions, that witnesses had to be recalled two or three times, of .en at considerable intervals, before their cross examination was concluded, and when recalled, the questions already asked and answered were often repeated. The cross-examination was thus broken up into several detached portions. If it were specially designed, as their r Lordships are confident it was not, to expose witnesses to the risk of being tampered with, and to promote the fabrication of false evidence, no better system could be devised for that end than this splitting up of the cross-examination of witnesses.

57. Again, though the application to examine <NAME> may possibly have been rightly refused in the first instance, having in regard to the time it was made, their Lordships cannot but regret that after the case had progressed, and every one saw, as they must have seen, that it was vital to obtain her evidence, the, Subordinate Judge did not announce to the parties that he was;; then ready to give permission to have her evidence taken, and v, did not impress upon the respondents in the first suit that as they sought to have declared void the solemn deed this lady had entered into, and on the faith of which she had obtained the appellant's money, it was their duty to examine her to explain the circumstances under which she entered into it. That was not done, however. The defendants did not again apply, and the case proceeded to drag slowly on without the evidence of the witness who knew all about the facts, and whose evidence would probably have put an end to the controversy one way or another in a few hours.

58. Finally, their Lordships feel bound to criticise adversely a practice followed in these two cases, which is as illegal as it is slovenly and embarrassing. By the list section of " The Civil Procedure Act , 1877," repeated in " The Civil Procedure Code of 1882," and practically re-enacted in Order XIII Rule 4, of the Rules and Orders passed under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, it is provided that a presiding Judge shall endorse with his own hand a statement that it (i.e., a document proved or admitted in evidence) was proved against or admitted by the person against whom it was used. That course was is many instances not followed at the hearing of these two cases, with the result that embarrassing and perplexing controversies arose on the hearing of these appeals as to whether or not certain documents, prints of which were bound up in the record, had been given in evidence. There is no possible excuse for the neglect, in this manner, of the duty imposed by the statutes, since so long ago as the 3rd March, 1884, a circular was addressed by the then Registrar of <ORG> to the Registrar of <ORG> calling attention to the requirements of the then existing law and the necessity of observing them. A copy of this circular was sent not only to <ORG> of Madras Bombay, and Allahabad, but, in addition, to the Judicial Commissioner of <ORG> and other Judicial Commissioners. Their Lordships, with a view of insisting on, the observant of these statutes, 'will in order to prevent future on the hearing of Indian appeals to t permit to be used any document not endorsed in the manner required.


<CITATION> .

(1) The levy and collection of excise duty on goods listed in the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act , 1944 (hereinafter) referred to as the Act) can be done only after the relevant requirements of the Act and the Rules are satisfied. In the present case, the following requirements of section 3 and 4 of the Act and Rules 9 and 49 of the Rules framed there under are relevant:-

(1)The duty can be imposed only on "goods", i.e. things which have an economic significance, that is value, utility, exchangeability, etc. (2)Since the Calcium Carbide listed under entry 14AA of the Schedule is assessable to duty ad valorem, its value would be deemed to be the cash price for which an article of the like kind and quality is sold or capable of being sold.

(3)The value has to be determined at the time of the removal of the article chargeable to duty from the factory or any other premises of manufacture or production for delivery at the place of manufacture or production.

(4)"Factory" is defined by section 2(e) to mean any premises, including the precincts thereof, wherein or in any part of which excisable goods are manufactured subject to any manufacturing process connected with their production.

(2) We are concerned with the Act and the Rules as they existed from 1-3-1970 when the goods produced by the petitioner became liable to duty on the insertion of entry 14AA in the First Schedule to the Act to 30-9-1975 when the Act was amended. The existing clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act is not, therefore, applicable to this case. Similarly, the residuary entry 68 making assessable to duty all other goods not elsewhere specified, manufactured in a factory but not excluded by the said item is also not applicable.

(3) The undisputed facts are that the petitioner used to manufacture Calcium Carbide and sell the same till 1967. In the petitioner's factory various Chemicals are manufactured by separate plants. There is an independent plant in which Calcium Carbide is manufactured. Since, 1967 however, the petitioner started using Calcium Carbide manufactured at its factory for the manufacture of acetylene gas in their acetylene gas plant. Since the whole quantity of Calcium Carbide produced by the petitioner is consumed in the manufacture of acetylene gas, the petitioner does not sell Calcium Carbide as such. The Calcium Carbide produced in the petitioner's factory is tapped from the furnace in liquid form and is placed in small trolly trays, where it is allowed to cool and solidify. The solid is then broken into cakes of desired sizes.

(4) The petitioner contends that the calcium carbide manufactured by it is only of intermediary product, which is used for the generation of acctylene gas in the same factory. This intermediary product is not known to the market as calcium carbide for the following reasons:

1.It is not "goods" as known to the market. By its very properties, calcium carbide in its naked form, turns into dust if it comes into contact with air in the atmosphere due to the reaction of the moisture in the air on it. It can become ''goods" only when it attains commercial purity and is put into containers as prescribed by the provisions of Chapter Iii of the Carbide of calcium Rules, 1937. The calcium carbide used by the petitioner for the generation of acetylene gas does not comply with these statutory provisions and is not, therefore, "goods".

2.Since It is not marketable, its assessable value cannot be found under section 4 , because no such article of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold.

3.It is not removed by the petitioner from its factory and hence the question of levy and collection of duty on it at the time of its removal does not arise.

4.The calcium carbide plant and the plant for the production of acetylene gas are both situated in one factory of the petitioner. The passage of calcium carbide from the former plant to the latter plant is not, therefore, its removal from the factory to any other place.

(5) The orders of the Superintendent, <ORG>. <ORG>, dated 5th January, 1972, that of the Appellate Collector, dated 25th November, 1972 and that of <ORG>, dated 16th September, 1975 have, however, held that Calcium Catbide manufactured by the petitioner is assessable to levy and collection of such duty on it. The petitioner, therefore, seeks by this writ petition to get these orders quashed.

(6) <ORG> has opposed the writ petition on the ground that what is manufactured by the petitioner is Calcium Carbide as mentioned in tariff entry No. 14AA of the First Schedule to the Act and as such is liable to ad valorem duty. This product was actually sold in the market till 1967 by the petitioner and even thereafter is form and is placed in small trolly trays, where it is allowed to cool and solidify. The solid is then broken into cakes of desired sizes. "goods" within the meaning of the Act. The applicability of the Calcium Carbide Rules to this product does not arise as the petitioner does not transport the calcium carbide, but uses the entire production for captive consumption in its factory. The packaging of the calcium carbide is not relevant in the present case as the entire Calcium Carbide production is used by the petitioner for the manufacture if acetylene gas. Compliance with the Carbide of Calcium Rules in respect of this product by the petitioner is not a condition precedent for the product to become excisable. At any rate, excise duty is levied on manufacture and not on sale. Calcium Carbide of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold and is, therefore, assessable to duly under section 4(b) of the Act. The use of the calcium carbide for captive consumption by the petitioner amounts to its removal in terms of Rule 9 of the Rules. Significantly, the defense is silent as to whether the Calcium Carbide is removed from the factory of the petitioner. The defense does not say that removal from one plant to the other plant, when both the plants are situated in the same factory, amounts to removal from the factory.

(7) Let us consider the contentions of the petitioner vis-a-vis the legal requirements for the levy and collection of such duty set out above seriatim. (1)Is the calcium carbide produced by the petitioner "goods"? The question has three aspects, material, economic and legal. Goods are matter. The material composition of goods shows whether the goods is in a form in which it has utility, value or exchangeability. Things which are in a raw or unfinished or an intermediate stage of formation will have to be examined with a view to see if they have reached a form of the goods as contemplated in the list of goods given in the First Schedule to the Act. What is raw. unfinished or intermediate as distinguished from a finished product may often be a question of degree, but, as Justice <NAME> has said, many distinctions in law are often distinctions of degree.

(8) Considerations of the material aspect of goods will be incomplete unless its economic aspect is examined. It is only if the term mentioned in the First Schedule is in a usable form that it can have economic significance. It will then have utility and exchangeability. In other words, it will have a meaning for the market. In economics market is no a place, but is the quality of goods which make them useful and exchangeable or saleable.

(9) Lastly, the use and exchange of goods is often regulated by law. Unless the relevant rules are complied with, an article may not be useful or exchangeable and that may be an additional reason why it may not be "goods".

(10) Applying these tests to the substance manufactured by the petitioner, we have to see if it is carbide of calcium within the meaning of entry 14AA of the Schedule. As for the material composition of the substance manufactured by the petitioner, the Standard specification of calcium carbide are given in the Indian Standard specification for Calcium Carbide Technical issued by <ORG>. The gas yield of Calcium Carbide is given at page 5 of the booklet issued by <ORG>. The respondents point out that the Calcium Carbide produced in the molten form is solidified and broken into cakes for use in the acetylene gas plant. The petitioner has four generators for acetylene gas, two of which are small and the other two are very big. The small generators are fed with Calcium Carbide of 1-80 mm size, while the bigger ones are fed with Calcium Carbide of 80-250 mm size. The petitioner points out in the rejoinder that on the pleadings of the respondents themselves 74 per cent of the production of the so-called Calcium Carbide of the petitioner is not commercially pure as per <ORG> specifications.

(11) This would mean that the substance produced by the petitioner is sub-standard judged from the <ORG> specifications. This would, however, not necessarily make it unmarketable. The marketability would itself depend on the degree by which the product falls below the standard. It is not possible to lay down a hard and fast line as to when a sub-standard product becomes marketable and when it falls below the line of marketability. For instance, a car may be marketable if it or it may not have a roof, but it may not be marketable if it has no engine or no brakes. Since the substance in the form of cakes cut to required sizes is usable by the petitioner in its acetylene gas plant, it would also be usable by someone else for the generation of acetylene gas. It would then be saleable as being useful for that purpose. In the absence of actual evidence, it cannot, however, be said if the substance manufactured by the petitioner can be called in its material and economic senses Carbide of Calcium and whether it can be saleable as such.

(12) What is decisive in the present case, however, is the law relating to the marketability of calcium carbide. Chapter Iii of the Carbide of Calcium Rules, 1937 made under the Petroleum Act , 1934, as applied to carbide of calcium prohibits the transport of Calcium Carbide its storage, its delivery or dispatch and its sale, except after complying with the safety precautions prescribed by the rules and particularly by the provisions of Chapter Iii thereof. Most of these safety requirements do not have to be complied with by the petitioner because the petitioner is not storing, transporting, dispatching, deli- vering or selling Calcium Carbide. It is particularly notable that the petitioner does not have to ensure that the calcium carbide produced by it is "commercially pure"- The significance of these statutory rules is two-fold. Firstly, they create a legal bar to the marketability of Calcium Carbide except in accordance with the rules. Secondly, the use of the expression "commercially pure" in Rule 20 in inverted commas shows that even statutory rules recognise that the calcium carbide must attain the requisite degree of purity before it can be rendered commercial or marketable. This lends substance to the view that Calcium Carbide is not "goods" unless it is marketable. Since the requirements of the Rules are not satisfied by the product of the petitioner because it has not attained the material form and purity required by the Rules, the product does not seem to be economical "goods" within the meaning of section 3 of the Act.

(13) It is significant that Chapter V of the Carbide of Calcium Rules separately deals with use of Calcium Carbide for the generation of acetylene gas. This shows that it was within the contemplation of the framers of these Rules that the Calcium Carbide which does not comply with the requirements of Chapter Iii of the Rules as to its marketability can nevertheless be used for the generation of acetylene gas. Calcium carbide is used as an intermediate product or material which may not be otherwise marketable for the generation of the acetylene gas.

(2)The second question is whether an article of the like kind and quality, as the product of the petitioner, is sold or is capable of being sold within the meaning of section 4 . Before section 4 of the Act can be applied to the product of the petitioner, it has to be seen that an article of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable being sold within the meaning of section 4 . Since the duty on this product is ad valorem, its value has to be found under s. 4 . In the present case, it cannot be done unless it is shown that the product is so or is capable of being sold. It is not disputed that after 1967 this product by the petitioner is not sold. The question is whether an article of the like kind or quality is sold or is capable of being sold. The words "of the like kind and quality" are important. They mean that it is not the calcium carbide which is actually marketable because it complies with the Carbide of Calcium Rules which is for consideration before us. On the contrary, the product under consideration is one which neither sold nor is capable of being sold- The reasons for its non marketability are already given above in dealing with the question whether it is "goods" within the meaning of section 3 . The same reasons show that the product is not capable of being sold. Firstly, it has not attamed the material form and composition which make it saleable calcium carbide. Secondly, calcium carbide which does not attain the form and composition required by the Carbide of Calcium Rules for marketability is not marketable at all in view of the prohibition imposed by the Carbide of Calcium Rules. This leads to the third result that the calcuirn carbide is not economic goods and is not, therefore, capable of being sold.

(3)The third question is as to whether assessable value of the product can be determined under section 4 . The crucial requisite of section 4 is that the value has to be determined at the time of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from the factory. The petitioner has alleged that the article manufactured by it is not removed from its factory, but is straightway used to generate acetylene gas by the transfer of the article from one plant to another in the same factory. There is no denial by the respondents of this assertion. All that is said is that removal from one plant to another is removal within the meaning of section 4 . But both the plants are situated in the same factory. The calcium carbide plant takes the first step, while the acetylene gas plant takes the second step and the two combined produce the acetylene gas. Since there is no traverse by the respondents of the pleading of the petitioner that this movement takes place within the factory, the point of time at which the value of the product is to be determined under section 4 is not reached. Consequently, the question of levy and collection of the duty does not arise.

(4)The expression "factory" is defined in section 2(e) to mean any premises including the precincts thereof, wherein or in any part of which excisable goods are manufactured. The definition covers the present case because the calcium carbide is manufactured in one part of the factory while the acetylene gas is manufactured in another part thereof. The definition of "factory" makes it clear that the meaning of factory is not restricted to only the part in which the excisable goods are manufactured. On the other hand, it includes the whole of the premises in a part of which such goods are manufactured. At any rate the case of the petitioner is that the whole of the premises which comprise both the plants making calcium carbide and acetylene gas are its factory. It is not contended by the respondents that the calcium carbide plant constitutes a separate factory and the acetylene gas plant constitutes another factory. It cannot be said, therefore, that the so-called calcium carbide made by the petitioner is removed from the factory in which it is made. A perusal of Rules 9 and 49 makes it clear that the question of collection of any excise duty cannot arise unless and until the goods are removed from the factory.

(14) We may conclude, therefore, that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that for some reason or the other the calcium carbide made by the petitioner is "goods" and is, therefore, assessable to excise duty still the actual collection of the excise duty on these goods cannot be made unless and until these goods are removed from the factory of the petitioner.

(15) For the above reasons, the writ petition succeeds, the impugned orders of the Superintendent, dated 5th January, 1972, of the appellate Collector, dated 25th November, 1972 and of <ORG>, dated 16th September, 1975 are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.