PETITIONER: <NAME>, ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: <ORG>. AND <ORG> DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1984 BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. ERADI, V. <NAME> (J) <NAME>, V. (J) CITATION: 1984 AIR 1870 1985 SCR (1) 787 1984 SCC (4) 516 1984 SCALE (2)518 ACT: U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964, Secs. 2 (a) and 2 (t) & State Government Notification dated January 20, 1982. Legume' notified-'Specified agricultural Produce-Dwi Daliya Utpadan-Whether comprehends both the whole grain of legumes and its split part that is dal. Words and Phrases 'Legume'-'Dwi Daliya Utpadan'-'Such items of produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule'- Meaning of Secs. 2 (a) and 2 (t) U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964. Practice and Procedure: Disputed question of fact- Decision by <ORG>-When permissible. HEADNOTE: <ORG> levied market fee on the transaction of sale of dal of various legumes by the respondents, on the ground that they were 'specified agricultural produce' and the transactions of sale in respect of them by the respondents in the Market Area would be exigible to the levy of market fee. The respondents opposed the aforesaid levy contending that they were manufacturing in their factory dal from various legumes and therefore, not only they were not producers of agricultural commodities, but in view of the description of legumes set out in the Schedule of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964, the dal of such legumes in the Processed form was not a specified agricultural produce and therefore, a transaction of sale in respect of them at the hands of the respondents even if it takes place in the Market Area would not permit <ORG> to levy market fee on such transaction and that they were not liable to buy the same. It was further contended that unless the agricultural produce specified in the Schedule to the Act was notified as a specified agricultural produce in respect of a particular Market Area, <ORG> having jurisdiction in the Market Area would not be entitled to levy market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. The respondents approached <ORG> by filing writ petitions under Art. 226 contending that <ORG> continue to levy fee on the transaction of dal and that it had no authority to do so. 788 <ORG> held that lengume in its split form was not the same thing as legume specified in the Schedule and therefore, in the absence of a specification, dal of any of the legumes enumerated in the Schedule cannot be said to be specified agricultural produce and therefore, any transaction of sale in respect of them was not exigible to the levy of market fee. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions <ORG> issued in exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 4 A of the Act , a notification dated 20th January, 1982 which substituted the split form of legume for the legume whole grain as specified agricultural produce. After the issuance of the aforesaid notification, a fresh batch of writ petitions were filed challenging both the validity of the notification as also the eligibility of <ORG> to levy market fee on the transaction of sale in respect of dal of legumes. It was contended in the writ petitions that merely amending or adding to the list of agricultural produce set out in the Schedule by itself without any thing more would not enable <ORG> to levy market fee on the sale of such agricultural produce because before levying market fee the agricultural produce has to be notified as specified agricultural produce by issuing either a notification under Sec. 6 or addition or alteration in exercise of the power under Sec. 8 of the Act. It was further contended that after the amendment of the Schedule by the impugned notification, fresh notification either under Sec 6 or Sec. 8 having not been issued, the agricultural produce introduced in the Schedule namely, dal of various legumes have not become specified agricultural produce and therefore any sale in respect of such agricultural produce even in the Market Area will not enable <ORG> to levy market fee nor would it oblige persons or parties to the transaction of sale to pay the same. The aforesaid contentions found favour with <ORG> which allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notice issued by <ORG> raising the demand for market fee. It further held that till the agricultural produce under the heading 'II Legumes' set out in the Schedule since the amendment of January 20, 1982 are notified as specified agricultural produce, <ORG> was not entitled to levy and collect market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. In the appeals to this Court, on the question : whether legume, whole grain were notified as a specified agricultural produce within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 2 (t) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 would also comprehend its split folds or parts, commercially called dal so as to enable <ORG> to levy market fee under Sec. 17 of the Act on the transaction of sale of dal of legumes specified in the Schedule to the Act. Allowing the Appeals: ^ HELD : 1. <ORG> was in error in holding that the legume whole grain as set out in the Schedule does not include its split form i.e. dal and therefore, no market fee was leviable on the transaction of sale of legume in split form. [805D] 789 Rumesh Chandra etc. v. State of U.P. etc.,  3 SCR 109, <CITATION> .,  3 SCR 1217 and <CITATION> ,  19 STC 24, referred to. <ORG> Karnal etc. etc. v. State of Haryana & Anr. etc., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1362 and <NAME> & Co. etc. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors. etc. etc.,  3 SCR 952, in applicable. <ORG>, <ORG> etc. v. State of U.P. & Anr.,  All. L.J. 1137, reversed. 2. The entries under the heading 'legumes' in the Schedule of Sec. 2 (a) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 as it stood prior to the amendment of January 20, 1982 through the notification issued under Sec 4-A comprehend both the whole grain of legumes and its split part that is dal. What was implicit has been made explicit and therefore no fresh notification under Sec. 8 was necessary. [798 D-E] 3. It is an indisputable canon of construction that where an expression is defined in the statute, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the expression has to be construed as having the same meaning assigned to it in the dictionary clause of the statute. [798G] 4. The definition of the expression 'agricultural produce' as set out in Sec. 2 (a) of the Act cannot be construed by resort to decisions under entirely different statutes such as the Sales Tax Laws to find out whether the whole grain and split folds constitute the same product or two different and independent products commercially so recognised. Analysing the definition of the expression it would mean not only those items of produce of agriculture as specified in the Schedule but will also include the admixture of two or more of such items as also any such item in its processed form. [798 F; H] 5. 'Agricultural produce' mean a produce of agriculture such as Gram as specified in the Schedule and would also include Gram in its processed form. Therefore, not only Gram is an agricultural produce but Gram in its processed form is equally and agricultural produce. [799B] 6. When it is said in the definition 'such items of produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule', it means that not only all those items of agricultural produce which are set out in the Schedule will constitute agricultural produce but also the admixture of two or more of such items of produce of agriculture as set out in the Schedule as well as any such items of agriculture produce in their processed form. [799B-C] 7. Legislative enactments in the State of Uttar Pradesh are enacted in the Hindi language and its official and authentic translation in English is primarily simultaneously published. The notification dated April 11, 1978 specified the legumes therein enumerated as specified agricultural produce for various 790 Market Areas. The heading under which various legumes are enumerated is 'Dwi Daliya Utpadan.' This tongue-twister was explained to mean that legume itself is Dwi Daliya Utpadan i.e. the whole grain is made of two folds. Ek daliya grain is without a fold. Dwi Daliya is a grain composed of two folds and certainly not many folds. On a strict construction, the two dals i.e. two parts forming the whole grain both are comprehended in the expression 'Dwi Daliya Utpadan'. [799G-H; 800A] 8. While enumerating legumes in the Schedule and reproduced in the 1978 notification to make them specified agricultural produce, the farmers intended to include both the grain as a whole and its split parts the dal. And when the agricultural produce enumerated in the Schedule such as Gram including its processed part is reproduced in the notification as Dwi Daliya Utpadan, the dal of each of the legumes therein mentioned became specified agricultural produce. [800D-E] In the instant case, it cannot be said that the respondents-factory owners not being agricultural producers and not being in search of any protection of <ORG> could not be subjected to the levy of market fee. In fact, the primary object of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 as far as the State of U.P. was concerned was regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce irrespective of the character of the party to the transaction save and except that as set out in sub-clauses (1) to (4) of Sec. 17 (iii) (b). It is not a relevant consideration whether the factory owners need any protection but the real question is whether people dealing with them need protection. [802F-H] 9. Redress of a grievance depending upon deciding a disputed question of fact cannot be rendered in this Court when there is want of a pleading in this behalf and want of a decision by <ORG> on the point. <NAME> etc. v. State of U.P. etc.,  3 SCR 104, referred to. Writ Petitions remitted to <ORG> for examining contentions other than those dealt with by this Court. [807E] JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 10072- 73 of 1983, 2283/84, 10074-76/83, 2281-82 of 1984, 2284-87 & 2525-27 of 1984 Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 28th January, 9th September, 20th December, 19th Dec. 1983 & 23rd February, 28th March, 1984 of <ORG> in C.M.W. Nos. 4275, 4523, 10343, 10228 of 1981, 6758/83, 2066/81, 12388, 12785, 12400, 12874, 1470, 6681, 1490 of 1983, 68 & 1475 of 1984.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> & <NAME> for the Appellants.

Dr. <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents in C.A. Nos. 10072-73/84.

<NAME> and <NAME> for Respondents in CAs. 2286, 3919 & 5342/84.

<NAME> and <NAME> for Respondent in CA. 2283/84.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, Ms. <NAME> and <NAME>, for Respondents in CA. 10076/84.

<NAME> and Ms. <NAME> for RR. in CA. 2581 of 1984.

<NAME> and Ms. <NAME> for RR. in CA. 2525/84. <NAME> for Respondent in CAs. 10074-75/83. Mrs. <NAME> for the State of U.P.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <ORG>, J. Whether the whole includes the parts is the core question. Whether legume, whole grain, when notified as a 'specified agricultural produce' within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 2(t) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 ('Act' for short) would also comprehend its split folds or parts, commercially called dal so as to enable <ORG> (<ORG> for convenience of reference) to levy market fee under Sec. 17 of the Act on the transaction of sale of dal of legumes specified in the schedule to the Act, is the narrow question that falls to be determined in this group of appeals.

<ORG> levied market fee on the transaction of sale of dal of various legumes by the respondents, asserting that they were specified agricultural produce and the transactions of sale in respect of them by the respondents in the Market Area would be exigible to the levy of market fee. The respondents contended that they were manufacturing in their factory dal from various legumes and therefore, not only they were not producers of agricultural commodity but in view of the description of legumes set out in the Schedule, the dal of such legumes in the processed form is not a specified agricultural produce and therefore, a transaction of sale in respect of them at the hands of the respondents even if it takes place in the Market Area would not permit the appellant to levy market fee on such transaction and they were not liable to pay the same. The respondents contend that unless the agricultural produce specified in the Schedule to the Act is notified as a specified agricultural produce in respect of a particular Market Area, <ORG> having jurisdiction in the Market Area will not be entitled to levy market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. In short they say that even if legumes set out in the Schedule are specified agricultural produce, the dal processed therefrom in the factory could not become specified agricultural produce unless it is so specified and therefore, <ORG> had no authority to levy market fee on the transaction of sale of dal. The respondents approached <ORG> by filing writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution raising myriad contentions including the one as herein set out.

<ORG> by its judgment dated January 28, 1983 held that legume in its split form was not the same thing as legume specified in the Schedule and therefore, in the absence of a specification, dal of any of the legumes enumerated in the Schedule cannot be said to be specified agricultural produce and therefore, any transaction of sale in respect of them was not exigible to the levy of market fee. In reaching this conclusion, <ORG> took note of the fact that apart from anything else the subsequent conduct of <ORG> in issuing Notification No. 383/12-5-600 (401)/81 dated January 20, 1982 substituting the entry under the heading 'II Legumes' a description in the bracket against the name of each legume (Saboot Aur Dala Hua) dispelled doubt, if any, lingering on the subject.

During the pendency of the writ petitions in <ORG>, it appears that the Govt. of U.P. probably out of panic or as contended before us out of abundant caution issued in exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 4 A of the Act the Notification No. 383/12-

5-600(401)/81 dated January 20, 1982 which reads as under:

"In exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Section 4A of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act No. 25 of 1964) the Governor is hereby pleased to notify that with effect from the date of publication in gazette of this Notification, in place of items mentioned under column (1) under the Heading (legume) in the Schedule of <CITATION> the following items shall be substituted, namely- Legumes Amended Krishi Utpadan Legume

1. Chana 1. Chana (Saboot Aur Dala Hua)

2. <NAME> 2. <NAME> (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

3. Arhar 3. Arhar (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

4. <NAME> 4. <NAME> (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

5. <NAME> 5. <NAME> (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

6. <NAME> 6. <NAME> (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

7. <NAME> (seeds) 7. <NAME> (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

8. Soyabeen 8. Soyabeen

9. Khosari 9. Khosari (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

10. Sanai (seeds) 10. Sanai (seeds)

11. Dhencha (seeds) 11. Dhencha (seeds)

12. <NAME> 12. <NAME>

13. Moth 13. Moth (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)

14. Kulthi 14. Kulthi."

After taking note of this notification, <ORG> observed that by the amendment of the relevant part of the Schedule to the Act, the Government recognised and almost admitted that legumes whole and legumes split two different commodities and as now by the notification both have become specified agricultural produce, earlier only the legume whole grain and not in the split form was the specified agricultural produce and therefore, till the issue of the notification <ORG> was not entitled to levy market fee on the transaction of sale of dal of various legumes.

After the notification dated January 20, 1982 was issued, a fresh batch of writ petitions were filed challenging both the validity of the notification as also the eligibility of <ORG> to levy market fee on the transaction of sale in respect of dal of legumes. It was contended that merely amending or adding to the list of agricultural produce set out in the Schedule by itself without anything more would not enable <ORG> to levy market fee on the sale of such agricultural produce because before levying market fee the agricultural produce has to be notified as specified agricultural produce by issuing either a notification under Sec. 6 or addition or alteration in exercise of power under Sec. 8 of the Act. It was contended that after the amendment of the Schedule by the impugned notification fresh notification either under Sec. 6 or Sec. 8 having not been issued the agricultural produce introduced in the Schedule, namely, dal of various legumes have not become specified agricultural produce since the amendment of the Schedule and therefore, any sale in respect of such agricultural produce even in the Market Area will not enable <ORG> to levy market fee nor would it oblige persons or parties to the transaction of sale to pay the same. This contention equally found favour with <ORG>. It was held that till the agricultural produce under the heading 'II Legumes' set out in the Schedule since the amendment of January 20, 1982 are notified as specified agricultural produce, <ORG> was not entitled to levy and collect market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. <ORG> accordingly allowed the petitions and quashed the notice issued by <ORG> raising the demand for market fee.

Hence these appeals by special leave.

If the contention raised on behalf of the appellant in the first batch of appeals is accepted, the judgment of <ORG> in the second batch of appeals will have to be quashed and set aside without anything more. In view of this inter-connection between the two batches of appeals, they were heard together though one after the other and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

To appreciate the very narrow contention arising in these appeals, a glance at the relevant provisions of the Act is indispensable.

The Act was enacted as its long title shows 'to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefore in Uttar Pradesh.' 'Agricultural produce' is defined in Sec. 2(a) as under:

""agricultural produce" means such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule, and includes admixture of two or more of such items, and also includes any such item in processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery;"

'Market Area' is defined in Sec. 2(k) to mean 'an area notified as such under Section 6 , or as modified under Section 8 .' 'Specified agricultural produce' is defined in Sec. 2(t) to mean 'agricultural produce specified in the notification under Sec. 6 or as modified under Section 8 .' 'Sub-Market Yard' is defined in Sec. 2(w) to mean 'a portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section 7 .' Sec. 4- A which was introduced in the Act by U.P. Act 10 of 1970 conferred power on the State <ORG>. to amend the Schedule. It reads as under:

"4-A. The State Government may by notification in the Gazette, add to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule, and thereupon the Schedule shall stand amended accordingly."

Sec. 5 provides that a declaration of intention to regulate and control sale and purchase of agricultural produce in any area. Where the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to regulate the sale and purchase of any agricultural produce in any area, and for that purpose to declare that area as a Market Area it may, by notification in the <ORG>, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, declare its intention so to do, and invite objections against the proposed declaration. Sec. 6 provides for the declaration of Market Area in respect of agricultural produce set out in the notification issued under Sec. 5 after considering the objections. A combined reading of Section 5 and 6 would show that in order to be an effective declaration, the notification must set out the Market Area that is its geographical boundaries as also the agricultural produce in respect of which the Market Area is so declared. Sec. 7 confers power to carve out Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards in a Market Area.

Sec. 8 confers power on <ORG> to alter Market Area as also modification of the list of agricultural produce in respect of each Market Area. If a change in the geographical limits of a Market Area becomes necessary or addition or omission in the list of agricultural produce in respect of a Market Area is desired, Sec. 8 confers power on <ORG> by a notification to that effect in the <ORG> to so alter the Market Area or modify the list of agricultural produce. Every agricultural produce set out in notification declaring a Market Area under Sec. 6 or alterations made under Sec. 8 becomes specified agricultural produce for the purposes of the Act. Sec. 9 sets out the effects of a declaration of a Market Area, the principal being that no one within the Market Area can set up, establish or continue or allowed to be set up, established or continue, any place for the sale-purchase, storage etc. of the specified agricultural produce, except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted by the <ORG>. Sub-sec. (2) confers power on the Market <ORG> to give licence to carry on business as a trader etc. in the Principal Market Yard or Sub-Market Yard. Sec. 17 enumerates the powers of the Market <ORG> which has to be set up for each Market Area as required by Sec. 12, which inter alia includes the power to levy and collect market fee in the circumstances therein mentioned. The relevant portion of it reads as under:

"17. A Committee shall, for the Purposes of the Act, have the power to-

(iii) levy and collect:

(a)..........................................

(b) market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one per centum and not more than one and half percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner:-

(1) If the produce is sold through a commission agent the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the <ORG> if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the <ORG>;

(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the <ORG>; and (4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the <ORG>;

Provided that no market fee shall be levied or collected on the retail sale of any specified agricultural produce where such sale is made to the consumer;............"

The schedule appended to the Act enumerates various species of agricultural produce as required by Sec. (2) (a). Under the heading "II Legumes' in the Schedule 14 different legumes such as (1) Gram (2) Peas (3) Arhar (4) Urad etc. are specified for the purpose of Sec. 2(a) and Sec. 4A.

On the date on which the first batch of writ petitions were filed in <ORG>, the relevant notification under Sec. 5 read with Sec. 6 provided that with effect from May 1, 1978 the agricultural produce mention in the Schedule 'kha' shall be included in the list of agricultural produce of the Market Area mentioned in Schedule 'ka'. Amongst others at plecitum (2) following entries are to be found:

"(2) Dwi Daliya Utpadan:

(1) Channa (2) Matar (3) Arhar (4) Urad (5) <NAME> (6) Masoor (7) Lobhia (seed) (8) Soyabeen (9) <NAME> (seed) (10) <NAME> (seed) (11) <NAME>."

set out in the Schedule which became specified agricultural produce by being included in the notification dated April 11, 1978 could only be legume whole grain and not its split portions which is the end product of a manufacturing process. It was said that the dal which is obtained by applying a process of manufacture to the whole grain of legumes is neither an agricultural produce and at any rate it is not a specified agricultural produce. <ORG> charted an easy course by merely referring to the subsequent notification dated January 20, 1982 which substituted entry under heading 'II Legumes' in the Schedule by putting into bracket words 'Saboot Aur Dala Hua' and concluded that if an amendment by a notification became necessary to bring split folds of legume in the Schedule, by necessary implication they could not have been included or deemed ever to have been included in the Schedule "II Legumes' prior to the amendment and therefore market fee could not be levied on the transaction of sale of split folds of legume dal in a Market Area. We propose for the time being to ignore this notification and concentrate on the entry in the Schedule as it stood prior to the notification dated January 20, 1982 and the definition of the expression 'agricultural produce' to ascertain whether any of the enumerated legumes in the condition of whole grain or in the split folds were specified agricultural produce comprehended with the terminological exactitude described as Gram, Peas, Arhar Urad etc. In other words, if Gram, Peas, Arhar Urad etc. is mentioned as specified agricultural produce in the notification either under Sec. 5 read with Sec. 6 or under Sec. 8, would it mean only its whole grain or would it also taken in the product known as dal obtained by splitting the whole grain into its two folds.

To resolve this controversy, one will have to seek light from the definition of expression 'agricultural produce' as set out in Sec. 2(a) of the Act and not by a resort to decisions under entirely different statutes such as the <ORG> laws to find out whether the whole grain and its split folds constitute the same product or two different and independent products commercially so recognised. It is an indisputable can-on of construction that where an expression is defined in the statute, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the expression has to be construed as having the same meaning assigned to it in the dictionary clause of the statute. This canon of construction is to well-recognised to necessitate any reference to precedent.

Analysing the definition of the expression 'agricultural produce', it would mean not only those items of produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule, but will also include the admixture of two or more of such items as also any such item in its processed form. Let us re-write the definition by substituting one of the items in the Schedule to make explicit what is implicit therein. Agricultural produce' means a produce of agriculture such as Gram as specified in the Schedule and would also include Gram in its processed form. Therefore, not only Gram is an agricultural produce but Gram in its processed form is equally an agricultural produce. When it is said in the definition 'such items of produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule, it means that not only all those items of agricultural produce which are set out in the Schedule will constitute agricultural produce but also the admixture of two or more of such items of produce of agriculture as set out in the Schedule as well as any such items of agriculture produce in their processed form. Suppose a producer sells neither Gram nor Peas each by itself but mixes Gram and Peas, according to the contention canvassed on behalf of the respondents, this mixture would be not an agricultural produce. The contention can be negatived by referring to the definition which says agricultural produce means such items of produce of agriculture (omitting the words which are not necessary for the present purpose)... as are specified in the Schedule such as Gram and Peas as also an admixture of two or more of such items i.e. admixture of Gram and Peas. A further step can be taken as flowing from the definition itself. Agricultural produce means such items of agricultural produce namely, Gram as specified in the Schedule and it shall include any such items i.e. Gram in its processed form. Even the respondents did not contend, on the contrary it was the sheet anchor of their submission that a split legume is obtained by a manufacturing process of whole grain of legumes, 'Saboot' as it is now described, and that dal i. e. the whole grain split into two folds is its processed form acquired by manufacturing process. Even on their own submission dal of legume enumerated in the Schedule is any agricultural produce.

This very conclusion can be reached by a slightly different route. As is well-known, the legislative enactments in the State of U.P. are enacted primarily in Hindi language and its official and authentic translation in English is simultaneously published. Bearing this in mind, we turn to the notification dated April 11, 1978 specifying legumes therein enumerated as specified agricultural produce for various Market Areas. The heading under which various legumes are enumerated is Dwi Daliya Utpadan.' This tongue twister was explained to us to mean that legume itself is Dwi Daliya Utpadan i.e. the whole grain is made of two folds. Ek daliya grain is without a fold. Dwi Daliya is a grain composed of two folds and certainly not many folds, Concise Oxford Dictionary specifies the meaning of legume to be fruit, edible part pode, of leguminous plant; vegetable used for food, 'and leguminous' to mean' like of the botanical family of pulse. And in common parlance 'pulse' connotes legume and denotes dal of legume. Reverting however, to the heading under which legumes are enumerated in 1978 notification, it must be confessed that it clearly connotes the meaning to be given to the whole grain and denotes dal i.e. split folds as specified agricultural produce. The Hindi protagonists used the expression 'Dwi Dalia Utpadan' meaning thereby double folded grain called Gram, Peas, Arhar, moong, etc. On a strict construction, the two dals i.e. two parts forming the whole grain both are comprehended in the expression 'Dwi Dalia Utpadan'. Therefore, it is crystal clear that while enumerating legumes in the Schedule and reproduced in the 1978 notification to make them specified agricultural produce, the framers intended to include both the grain as a whole and its splits parts the dal. And when the agricultural produce enumerated in the Schedule such as Gram including its processed part is reproduced in the notification as Dwi Dalia Utpadan, the dal of each of the legumes therein mentioned became specified agricultural produce.

It was however, urged that if the legume in the split form is the same as legume as a whole grain, <ORG> would not be entitled to levy any market fee on the transaction of sale of legume in split form because market fee already having been once levied in the form of the whole grain, a second levy on the product is not contemplated by the Act. Reference in this connection was made to the decision in <NAME> v. State of U.P. etc. in which levy of market fee under the Act by various <ORG> was challenged on diverse grounds, on such being that if market fee is paid on the transaction of sale of paddy though rice is separately enumerated in the Schedule, no market fee could be livied on the transaction of sale of rice. This Court has observed at page 130 that, if paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and the same paddy is converted into rice and sold then the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist-producer under sub-clause (2) of section 17 (iii) (b). He cannot be asked to pay market fee over again under sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction of rice. Nor will it be open to <ORG> to choose between either of the two in the example just given above. Market fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of paddy alone. <ORG> was also placed on the observation at page 132 where the court observed 'if Catechu is a product of khar trees by some processing, as prima facie it appears to us to be so, then it is plain that market fee can be charged only on the purchase of khar wood and not on the sale of Catechu.' <ORG> was also placed on M/s Ashok Industries and Ors v. State of Bihar and Ors(1) where similar view appears to have been taken. We fail to see the significance of this submission in these appeals because this contention was not canvassed before <ORG> and the respondents merely invited <ORG> to decide that dal of legumes enumerated in the Schedule are not specified agricultural produce. If the respondents are entitled to any relief on the view of the matter taken in <NAME> case they may obtain appropriate relief, but as has been rightly observed by this Court that redress of the grievance in this behalf depending upon deciding a disputed question of fact cannot be rendered here for want of pleading in this behalf and for want of a decision by <ORG> on this point. But on this account it is not possible to accept the submission of the respondent that legume in the split form is not comprehended in the Schedule to the Act as well as in the notification dated April 11, 1978.

Mr. <NAME> for some of the respondents urged that the respondents have set up their factory for processing whole grain of legumes into its split folds and the commodity known as dal is a well recognised identifiable commercial commodity distinct from the legume whole grain from which it is derived by a manufacturing process and as the Act was enacted for protecting the interest of producers of agricultural produce, the factory owners being in no need of such protection cannot be subjected to the levy of market fee on the transaction of sale of legume in split form. The submission does not commend to us because it proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the Act was primarily enacted for the protection of producers of scheduled agricultural produce. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the Act was enacted primarily for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor. In the Statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Act, it is in terms stated that the proposed measure to regulate the market in the State has been designed with a view to achieving the objects therein enumerated, only one of them being to ensure that the agricultural producer has his say in the utilisation of market funds for the improvement of the market as a whole. Agricultural produce has nowhere been mentioned in the nine objects set out therein except as mentioned above. On the other hand, <ORG> in <NAME> case noticed that the 'Act was enacted for the development of new market areas and for efficient data collection and processing of arrivals in the Mandis to enable <ORG> to give a substantial help for the establishment of various markets in the State of U.P.' The Act was compared with similar statutes in force in different States and a distinguishing feature was pointed out that in other States the Act is mainly meant to protect the agriculturist producer from being exploited when he comes to the Mandis for selling his agricultural produce. This Court observed in agreement with <ORG> that certain other transactions also have been roped in the levy of market fee in which both sides are traders and neither side is an agriculturist and this has been done for the effective implementation of the scheme of establishments of markets mainly for the benefit of producers. Approving the observation in <CITATION> .(1) the Court further observed that the fee realised from the payer has by and large to be spent for his special benefits and for the benefit of other persons connected with the transaction of purchase and sale in various Mandis. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents-factory owners not being agricultural producers and not being in search of any protection of <ORG> could not be subjected to the levy of market fee. In fact, the primary object of the Act as far as the State of U.P. is concerned is regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce irrespective of the character of the party to the transaction save and except that character is relevant as set out in sub-clauses (1) to (4) of Sec. 17 (iii) (b). It is not a relevant consideration whether the factory owners need any protection but the real question is whether people dealing with them need pro-

tection. Viewed from either angle, we find no merit in the submission.

Dr. <NAME> referred to <ORG> etc. etc. v. <ORG> etc., <ORG> and Co. etc. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors. etc. etc. <CITATION> etc. and <CITATION> of sales Tax. M.P. and urged that dehusked paddy which is rice has been held to be not the same or identical goods but to distinct commercially known commodities and they are separately enumerated and therefore, one does not include the other. In all the four judgments, the question arose under the relevant Sales Tax law. The contention raised was whether paddy and rice can be considered as identical goods for the purpose of imposition of sales tax ? Under the relevant Sale Tax Act exemption from payment of sales tax is provided if the very paddy in respect of which purchase tax was levied was sold and not if that paddy is converted into rice and sold. The contention was that paddy and rice are identical goods and therefore, when the law grants an exemption in respect of paddy that exemption is also available to rice. It was urged that rice is nothing but dehusked paddy and when the paddy is dehusked, there is no change in the identity of the goods. This contention was negatived in all the four cases depending upon provisions of the relevant Sales Tax Law. It was however said that the ratio of the decision would assist us in understanding what is the processed form of a particular agricultural produce. Approaching the matter from this angle, it was urged that though rice is produced out of paddy, this <ORG> held that it is not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking, and they are two different things in ordinary parlance. This ratio cannot assist us at all for a very good reason. It was not pointed out to us that the various provisions of the relevant Sales Tax Law which came for consideration of this <ORG> in those four decisions did or did not have a definition such as we have of 'agricultural produce' in Sec. 2(a) of the Act.

In this connection, however specific reliance was placed on the decision of <ORG> Modi-

nagar & Ors. etc. v. State of U.P. & <ORG>. wherein in the context of the Act, it was held that 'cotton ginned and unginned, 'and therefore, it was held that no market fee was leviable on the transaction of sale of cotton waste. In reaching this conclusion, a Division Bench of <ORG> held that if 'cotton ginned and unginned' was specified as an agricultural produce yet cotton waste which is a processed form of cotton was not so specified, the <ORG> indicated not to include the same in the specified agricultural produce. The <ORG> posed to itself a question: whether cotton waste is processed from of cotton while posing to itself another question: is cotton processed for manufacture of cotton waste ? The <ORG> than proceeded to observe that in Sec. 2(b) of the Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factories Act, 1925 'cotton' is defined as "cotton ginned or unginned or cotton waste". While in Sec. 2(b) of the Cotton Transport Act , 1923, 'cotton' has been defined to mean every kind of unmanufactured cotton, ginned and unginned cotton, cotton waste and cotton seed. After referring to these definitions, the <ORG> held that cotton waste is not included in 'cotton ginned or unginned.' In our opinion, the court has strained the language to reach an unsustainable conclusion, holding that cotton waste is not the processed form of cotton but it is a by-product quite different form of cotton though containing cotton fibre which cannot be used as ordinary cotton. As its name indicates, cotton waste appears to be droppings, stripping and other waste product while ginning cotton. It cannot be said to be a bye-product of cotton but it is cotton none- the-less minus the removed seed. In other words it is residue of ginned cotton. We therefore, find it difficult to agree with the view of the High <ORG> that cotton waste is not comprehended in the item 'cotton ginned and unginned.' Lastly a reference was made to the <CITATION> .(2) The question that came up for consideration before this <ORG> was: whether Sales tax was payable in respect of sales of patasa, narda and alchidana? The contention arose in the context of the provision contained in Sec. 5(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 in its application to the State of Gujarat which provided that 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, but subject to the conditions or exceptions (if any) set out against each of the goods specified in column 3 of Schedule A, no tax shall be payable on the sales or purchases of any goods specified in the Schedule.' The relevant entry is the 'sugar as defined in Item No. 8 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act , 1944.' Affirming the decision of the Gujarat High <ORG> this <ORG> held that patasa, harda and alchidana were exempt from any tax payable under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 because they are comprehended in the expression 'sugar' in the entry granting exemption. This conclusion was reached holding that the expression 'sugar' in Entry 47 granting exemption will comprehend within its ambit all forms of sugar that is to say, sugar of any shape or texture, colour or density and by whatever name it is called. If this line of reasoning is adopted, legume whole grain will necessary comprehend both folds of the whole grain. But we do not propose to rest our decision on the approach to various commodities commercially recognised distinct under relevant Sales Tax Law.

To sum up, for the reasons herein stated, <ORG> was in error in holding that the legume whole grain as set out in the Schedule does not include its split form i,e. dal and therefore, no market fee was leviable on the transaction of sale of legume in split form. This conclusion disposes of first batch of appeals arising from writ petitions filed prior to the issue of notification dated January 20, 1982.

In the other batch of petitions which came to be filed after the notification of January 20, 1982, Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel appearing in C.A. No. 2286/84 urged that even if under Sec. 4- A of the Act , <ORG> had the power to add to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule and if by the notification dated January 20, 1982, <ORG> purported to substitute the Schedule under the Heading 'legumes' by putting into bracket by the side of each enumerated legume 'Saboot or Dala Hua', that by itself would not make such agricultural produce 'specified agricultural produce'. It was urged and in our opinion, rightly that before a transaction of sale, as set out in Sec. 17(iii)(b) of the Act, of an agricultural produce becomes exigible for the levy of market fee, the agricultural produce has to be a 'specified agricultural produce' and that can be done by an appropriate notification under Sec. 5 read with Sec. 6 or under Sec. 8 of the Act and until that is done the agricultural produce even if it is so enumerated in the Schedule does not become 'specified agricultural produce' and no market fee can be levied on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. It was urged that for steps have to be taken before an agricultural produce becomes a 'specified agricultural produce' in respect of a Market Area. Undoubtedly, when in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 5 <ORG> publishes its intention to set up a Market Area by a notification in the Official Gazette, <ORG> is simultaneously under an obligation to specify not only the Market Area that is its geographical limits or boundaries but must specify the agricultural produce quay such Market Area. After inviting objections both in respect of the Market Area and the agricultural produce, a further notification is required to be issued under Sec. 6 making the requisite declaration both in respect of the Market Area as well as the agricultural produce. When these two steps are taken, the agricultural produce set out in the notification issued under Sec. 6 becomes specified agricultural produce in relation to Market Area notified in the notification. Sec. 8 confers power to alter the Market Area or the agricultural produce in respect of the altered Market Area. When these steps are taken then alone those agricultural produces enumerated in the notification under Sec. 6 or under Sec. 8 would assume and acquire the mark or character of 'specified agricultural produce,' on the sale transaction of which market fee can be levied by <ORG>. Proceeding along it was urged that even though a notification was issued under Sec. 4-A on January 20, 1982 amending the Schedule in respect of legumes, in the absence of a notification under Sec. 8 making the agricultural produce so introduced in the Schedule as specified agricultural produce, those agricultural produces would not acquire the character of specified agricultural produces qua-Market Area and therefore, the respondents are not liable to pay any market fee thereon. If the amended Schedule introduced by the notification dated January 20, 1982 introduces fresh agricultural produces in the Schedule, the contention of Mr. <NAME> must carry conviction because it was conceded that a fresh notification under Sec. 8 in respect of the legumes has not been issued. But the view which we have taken is that the entries under the heading 'legumes' in the Schedule as it stood prior to the amendment of January 20, 1982 comprehended both the whole grain of legumes and its split part that is dal. What was implicit has been made explicit and therefore, no fresh notification under Sec. 8 was necessary. Therefore, the contention has to be negatived. As that was the only contention canvassed before this Court in the second batch of appeals as we find no merit in it, the second batch of appeals will also have to be allowed.

<NAME>

Lastly, the respondents contended that if the view taken by <ORG> on the question that split grain of legume, that is dal was not comprehended in the whole grain of legume as set out in the Schedule and therefore, the same was not a specified agricultural is held not to be correct and accordingly the judgment of <ORG> would have to be upset, all the matters may be remitted to <ORG> for disposing of other contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondents who were petitioners in <ORG> as <ORG> declined to examine them, as the writ petitions were allowed on this one narrow contention which according to <ORG> went to the root of the matter.

Before <ORG>, the respondents raised various contentions. Most of them were repelled by <ORG>, but the petitioners succeeded on the narrow contention as herein set out. It was said by Mr. <NAME> referring to the writ petition in which he appeared that there were other contentions which the respondents wanted to canvass but which <ORG> declined to examine. It may be that there might be some other contentions which the respondents wanted <ORG> to examine and <ORG> having held in favour of the respondents on one point may have declined to examine the same. Therefore, while allowing the appeals, all the matters are remitted to <ORG>. <ORG> may examine contentions other than those which were dealt with in the judgment from which the present batches of appeals were preferred. All those contentions which have been negatived by <ORG> and in respect of each one of them no attempt was made to support the judgment of <ORG> before this Court those contentions may not be permitted to be reopened. The remand is limited to those questions which find their place in the writ petitions and which <ORG> declined to examine.

But as the respondents have failed on almost all major contentions, they need not have the benefit of a discretionary order of any stay against levy of market fee any more. With these limitations the matters are remitted to <ORG>.

All the appeals accordingly succeed and are allowed to the extent herein indicated with costs <ORG> allowed.

<NAME>


PETITIONER: ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE CHANDAN NAGAR, WEST BE Vs. RESPONDENT: <ORG> AND ORS . DATE OF JUDGMENT30/11/1984 BENCH: <NAME>, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: <NAME>, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) CITATION: 1985 AIR 330 1985 SCR (2) 190 1985 SCC (1) 260 1984 SCALE (2)819 CITATOR INFO : F 1985 SC1289 (10) R 1986 SC 614 (5,6) RF 1988 SC2010 (12) ACT: Constitution of India 1950 Articles 226 and 141 Interim orders in writ petition-Grant OF-Situations and circumstances-What are-Matters involving public revenue-Not sufficient showing a prima facie case-Furnishing of bank guarantee not a circumstance-Balance of convenience to be in favour of grant of interim order-Likelihood of prejudice to public interest to be shown. <ORG> decisions binding on all courts-Judgment per incuriam Principle of-<ORG> not entitled to disregard judgment of <ORG> labeling It per incuriam. HEADNOTE: The Government of India by a notification dated April 6,1984, exempted tyres from a certain percentage of Excise Duty to the extent that the manufacturers had not availed themselves of the exemption granted under certain other earlier notifications. <ORG> was of the view that the Respondent-company who was a manufacturer of Tyres, Tubes and various other rubber products was not entitled to the aforesaid exemption as it had cleared the goods earlier without paying Central Excise Duty but on furnishing Bank Guarantees under various interim-orders of courts. The Company claimed the benefit of exemption to the tune of about Rs. 6 crores and filed a Writ Petition in the- <ORG> and sought an interim order restraining <ORG> from the levy and collection of excise duty. The <ORG> held that a prima facie case had been made out in favour of the company and by an interim order allowed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of about Rs. 2 crores and directed that the goods be released on furnishing a Bank Guarantee. In the <ORG>'s appeal, <ORG> confirmed the above order with a slight modification to the effect that the Collector of Central Excise could encash 30 per cent of the Bank Guarantee. Allowing the appeals by the <ORG>, this <ORG>, ^ HELD: 1. The orders of the Single Judge as well as <ORG> are wholly unsustainable and should never have been made, Even assuming the 191 company had established a prima facie case, it was not a sufficient justification A for granting the said interim orders. There was no question of any balance of convenience being in favour of the respondent-Company, it was certainly in favour of the Government of India. [201B-C] 2. Governments are not run on mere Bank Guarantees. Very often some courts act as if furnishing a Bank Guarantee would meet the ends of justice. No Governmental business, for that matter no business of any kind can be run on mere Bank Guarantees. Liquid cash is necessary for the running of a Government as indeed any enterprise. [201C] 3. Where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost importance that interim orders are not to be granted merely because prima facie case has been shown. More is required. The balance of convenience must be clearly in favour of the making of an interim order and there should not be the slightest indication of a likelihood of prejudice to the public interest. [201D1 4. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it, that recourse may be had to Art. 226. The <ORG> must also have good and sufficient reason to by- pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. The vast majority of the petitions under Art. 226 are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter to prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. This practice needs to be strongly discouraged. [194F-H; 195A] E 5. There are, cases which demand that interim orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustices are about to be, or are perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury, or shake a citizen's faith in the impartiality of public administration, a court may well be justified in granting interim relief against public authority. <CITATION> .,  2 S.C.R. 24, <CITATION> ,  2 SCC 436, <CITATION> ,  2 SCC 433, <CITATION> .,  2 SCC 646 and <ORG> v. <ORG>, C.A. No. 11450 of 1983; referred to. 6. In India, under Art. 141 , the law declared by the <ORG> shall be binding on all courts and under Art. 144 all authorities civil and judicial shall act in aid of the <ORG>. [200B] 7. In the hierarchical system of <ORG>s which exists in our country it is 192 necessary for each lower tier, including the <ORG>s to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers. The better wisdom of the <ORG> below must yield to the higher wisdom of the <ORG> above. [199E-F] 8. The label per incuriam is relevant only to the right of an appellate court to decline to follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of a higher appellate court or to the right of a judge of the <ORG> to disregard a decision of the <ORG>. [199H; 200A] <ORG> v. <NAME>,  A C. 1027 and <NAME> v. <NAME>,  A.C. 1129, referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4742-43 of 1984.

a Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 9th August, 1984 of <ORG> in FMAT No. 2139 of 1984 and 2023 of 1984.

<NAME>, Attorney General, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and Miss <NAME> for the Appellant.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. It is indeed a great pity-and, we wish we did not have to say it but we are afraid;we will be signally failing in our duty if we do not do so -some courts, of late, appear to have developed an unwarranted tendency to grant interim orders-interim orders with a great potential for public mischief-for the mere asking. We feel greatly disturbed. We find it more distressing that such interim orders, often ex-parte and non-speaking, are made even by <ORG> while entertaining writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and in <ORG>, on oral application too. Recently in <CITATION> (l). we had occasion to condemn and prohibit this practice of entertaining oral applications under Art. 226 and passing interim orders thereon. In several other cases, <CITATION> (2), <ORG> State of Orissa,(3) Union (1)  2 S.C R. 24.

(2) [1983] 2 S.C.C 436 (3) [1983] 2 S.C.C 433  <CITATION> (l)., Union of India v. <ORG>), this Court was forced to point out how wrong it was to make interim orders so soon as an application was but presented, when a second thought (or a second's thought) would expose the impairment of the public interest and often enough the existence of a suitable alternative remedy. Despite the fact that we have set our 8 face against interfering with interim orders passed by the High Courts and made it practically a rigid rule not to so interfere, we were constrained to interfere in those cases.

<CITATION> , (supra) <NAME> and <NAME>, JJ. had to deal with an interlocutory order passed by <ORG> restraining the Siliguri Municipality from recovering a graduated consolidate rate on the annual value of buildings in terms of the amended provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act. We reiterate the following observations made therein: "We are constrained to make the observations which follows as we do feel dismayed at the tendency on the part of some of <ORG> to grant interlocutory orders for the mere asking. Normally, <ORG> should not, as a rule, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution grant any stay of recovery of tax save under very exceptional circumstances. The grant to stay in such matters, should be an exception and not a rule.

"It is needless to stress that a levy or impost does not become bad as soon as a writ petition is instituted in order to assail the validity of the levy. So also there is no warrant for presuming the levy to be bad at the very threshold of the proceedings. The only consideration at that juncture is to ensure that no prejudice is occasioned to the rate payers in case they ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the proceedings. This object can be attained by requiring the body or authority levying the impost to give an undertaking to refund or adjust against future dues, the levy of tax or rate or a part thereof, as the case may be, in the event of the entire levy or a part thereof being ultimately held

(l) [1984l 1.2 S.C.C. 646 t (2) C, A. No. 11420 of 1983 to be invalid by the court without obliging the tax- payers to institute a civil suit in order to claim the amount already recovered from them. On the other hand, the <ORG> cannot be unmindful of the need to protect the authority levying the tax, for, at that stage the <ORG> has to proceed on the hypothesis that the challenge may or may not succeed. The <ORG> has to show awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a municipality cannot function or meet its financial obligations if its source of revenue is blocked by an interim order restraining the municipality from recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And that the municipality has to maintain essential civic services like water supply, street lighting and public streets etc., apart from cunning public institutions like schools, dispensaries, libraries etc. What is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to paid. The grant of an interlocutory order of This nature would paralyze the administration and dislocate the entire working of the municipality. It seems that these serious ramifications of the matter were lost sight of while making the impugned order". In <ORG> v. S/ate of Orissa A. P. Sen <NAME> and <NAME>, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to <ORG>, a second appeal to the <ORG> and there after to have the case stated to the High <ORG>, it was not for the High <ORG> to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statuary machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, to as to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit of circumvent statutory procedures. It is only were statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of thee statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art. 226 of the Constitution. But then the <ORG> must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Art. 226 o the Constitution are filed . solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and there after prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly couraged.

<CITATION> ., we had occasion to consider an interim order passed by <ORG> in regard to a matter no part of the cause of action relating to which appeared to arise within the jurisdiction of <ORG>. In that case the interim order practically granted the very prayers in the writ petition. We were forced to observe, "It is obvious that the interim order is of a drastic character with a great potential for mischief. The principal prayer in the writ petition is the challenge to the order made or proposed to be made under Clause 8 of the Import Control order. The interim order in terms of prayers (j) and (k) has the effect of practically allowing the writ petition at the stage of admission without hearing the opposite parties. While we do not wish to say that a drastic interim order may never be passed without hearing the opposite parties even if the circumstances justify it, we are very firmly of the opinion that a statutory order such as the one made in the present case under Clause 8-B of the Import Control order ought not to have been stayed without at least hearing those that made the order. Such a stay may lead to devastating consequences leaving no way of undoing the mischief. Where a plentitude of power is given under a statute, designed to meet a dire situation, it is no answer to say that the very nature of the power and the consequences which may ensue is itself a sufficient justification for the grant of a stay of that order, unless, of course, there are sufficient circumstances to justify a strong Prima facie inference that the order was made in abuse of the power conferred by the statute. A statutory order such as the one under Clause 8-B purports to be made in the public interest and unless there are even stronger grounds of public interest an expert interim order will not be justified. The only appropriate order to make in such cases is to issue notice to the respondent and make it returnable within a short period. This should particularly be so where the offices of the principals respondents and relevant records lie outside the ordinary jurisdiction of the court. To grant interim relief straightaway and leave it to the respondents to move the court to vacate the interim order may jeopardise the public interest. It is notorious how if an interim order is once made by a court, parties employ every device and tactic to ward off the final hearing of the application. It is, therefore, necessary for the courts to be circumspect in the matter of granting interim relief, more particularly so where the interim relief is directed against orders or actions of public officials acting in discharge of their public duty and in exercise of statutory powers. On the facts and circumstance of the present case, we are satisfied that no interim relief should have been granted by <ORG> in the terms in which it was done", We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim order which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other relevant considerations. Regarding the practice of some clever litigants of resorting to filing writ petitions in the far-away courts having doubtful jurisdiction, we had this to observe:

"..... Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the <ORG> is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in <ORG> and Haryana or p in <ORG>. The writ petitioners however, have chosen <ORG> as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port. An inevitable result of the filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in <ORG> when the office of the <ORG> is in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi. But we do feel disturbed that such writ petitions are of ten deliberately filed in distant <ORG>, as part of a manoeuvre in a A legal battle, so as to render it difficult for the officials at Delhi to move applications to vacate stay where it becomes necessary to file such applications". In <ORG> v. <ORG> (supra), <NAME>, CJ., <NAME>, <NAME>, JJ. allowed an appeal against an interim order making the following observations:

"After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties, we are of the opinion that the interim order passed by <ORG> on November 29, 1983 is not warranted since it virtually grants to the respondents a substantial part of the relief claimed by them in their writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside the said order".

We have come across cases where the collection of public revenue has been seriously jeopardised and budgets of Governments and <ORG> affirmatively prejudiced to the point of precariousness consequent upon interim orders made by courts. In fact instances have come to our knowledge where Governments have been forced to explore further sources for raising revenue, sources which they would rather well leave alone in the public interest, because of the stays granted by courts. We have come across cases where an entire Service is left in a stay of flutter and unrest because of interim orders passed by courts, leaving the work they are supposed to do in a state of suspended animation. We have come across cases where buses and lorries are being run under orders of court though they were either denied permits or their permits had been canceled or suspended by <ORG>. We have come across cases where liquor shops are being run under interim orders of court. We have come across cases where the collection of monthly rentals payable by Excise Contractors has been stayed with the result that at the and of the year the contractor has paid nothing but made his profits from the shop and walked out. We have come across cases where dealers in food grains and essential commodities have been allowed to take back the stocks seized from them as if to permit them to continue to indulge in the very practices which were to be prevented by the seizure. We have come across cases where land reform and important welfare legislations have been stayed by courts. Incalculable harm has been done by such interim orders. All this is not to say that interim orders may never be made against public authorities. There are, of course, cases which demand that interim orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about to be perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizen's faith in the impartiality of public administration, a <ORG> may well be justified in granting interim relief against public authority. But since the law presumes that public authorities function properly and bonafide with due regard to the public interest, a court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative, burdensome inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that the parties have come to the <ORG> alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of a prima facia case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of the public interest There are many such factors worthy of consideration. We often wonder why in the case indirect taxation where the burden has already been passed on to the consumer, any interim relief should at all be given to the manufacturer, dealer and the like ! There is just one more thing that we wish to say. <CITATION> , the <ORG> was put to the necessity of pointing out the following:

"We will be failing in our duty if we do not advert to feature which causes us dismay and distress. On a previous occasion, <ORG> had vacated an interim order passed by a learned single Judge on similar facts in a similar situation. Even so when a similar matter giving rise to the present appeal came up again, the same learned judge whose order had been reversed earlier, granted a non-speaking interlocutory order of the aforesaid nature. This order was in turn confirmed by <ORG> without a speaking order articulating reasons for granting a stay when the earlier Bench had vacated the stay. We mean no disrespect to <ORG> in emphasizing the necessity for self-imposed discipline in such matters in obeisance to such weighty institutional considerations like the need to maintain decorum and comity. So also we mean no disrespect to <ORG> in stressing the need for self-discipline on the part of <ORG> in passing interim orders without entering into the question of amplitude and width of the powers of <ORG> to grant interim relief. The main purpose of passing an interim order is to evolve a workable formula or a workable arrangement to the extent called for by the demands of the situation keeping in mind the presumption regarding the constitutionality of the legislation and the vulnerability of the challenge, only in order that no irreparable injury is occasioned. The <ORG> has therefore to strike a delicate balance after considering the pros and cons of the matter lest larger public interest is not jeopardized and institutional embarrassment is eschewed".

We desire to add and as was said in <ORG> v. Broome(l) we hope it will never be necessary for us to say so again that 'in the hierarchical system of <ORG>' which exists in our country, 'it is necessary for each lower tier', including <ORG>, 'to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers'. "It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of <ORG> that there are decisions 11 of the <ORG> appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary...............

But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted"(2). The better wisdom of the <ORG> below must yield to the higher wisdom of the <ORG> above. That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system. In <NAME> v. <NAME>, commenting on the <ORG> of Appeal's comment that <NAME> v. Barnard(3) was rendered per incuriam Lord <NAME> observed,-

"<ORG> found themselves able to disregard the decision of this <ORG> in <NAME> v. <NAME> by applying to it the label per incuriam That label is relevant only to the right of an appellate court to decline to (1) [1972] AC 1027 (2) (See observations of Lord <NAME> and Lord <NAME> in <NAME> v. <NAME>).

(3) [1984] A.C. 1129.

follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right to disregard a decision of a higher appellate court or to the right of a judge of <ORG> to disregard a decision of <ORG>." It is needless to add that in India under Act. 141 of the Constitution the law declared by <ORG> shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India and under Art. 144 all authorities, civil and judicial in the territory of India shall act in aid of <ORG>.

Now coming to the facts of the present case, the respondent, <ORG> is a manufacturer of types, tubes and various other rubber products. By a notification dated April 6, 1984 issued by <ORG>, <ORG> (<ORG>) in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 8 (1) of the <ORG> Rules, 1944, types, falling under item No. 16 of the First Schedule to the <ORG> and Salt Act , 1944, were exempt from a certain percentage of excise duty to the extent that the manufacturers had not availed themselves of the exemption granted under certain other earlier notifications The <ORG> was of the view that the <ORG> was not entitled to the exemption as it had cleared the goods earlier without paying central excise duty, but on furnishing Bank Guarantees under various interim orders of courts. The <ORG> claimed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of Rs. 6.05 crores and filed a writ petition in <ORG> and sought an interim order restraining the central excise authorities from the levy and collection of excise duty. The learned single judge took the view that a prima facie case had been made out in favour of the <ORG> and by an interim order allowed the benefit of the exemption to the tune of Rs. two crores ninety three lakhs and eighty five thousand for which amount the company was directed to furnish a Bank Guarantee, that is to say, the goods were directed to be released on the Bank Guarantee being furnished. An appeal was preferred by the Assistant Collector of <ORG> under clause 10 of the Letters Patent and a <ORG> of <ORG> confirmed the order of the learned single Judge, but made a slight modification in that the Collector of <ORG> was given the liberty to encash 30% of the Bank Guarantee. The Assistant Collector of <ORG> has preferred this appeal by special leaue. By our interim order dated November 15, 1984, we vacated the orders granted by the learned single Judge as well as by the <ORG>. We gave two weeks' time to the A respondent <ORG> to file a counter No. counter has, however been filed. <NAME>, learned counsel, however appeared for the respondent. We do not have the slightest doubt that the orders of the learned single judge as well as <ORG> are wholly unsustainable and should never been made. Even assuming that the company had established a prima facie case, about which we do not express any opinion, we do not think that it was sufficient justification for granting the interim orders as was done by <ORG>. There was no question of any balance of convenience being in favour of the respondent-<ORG>. The balance of convenience was certainly in favour of <ORG>. Governments are not run on mere Bank Guarantees. We notice that very often some courts act as if furnishing a Bank Guarantee would meet the ends of justice. No governmental business or for that matter no business of any kind can be run on mere Bank Guarantees. Liquid cash is necessary for the running of a Government as indeed any other enterprise. We consider that where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost importance to reales that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie case has been shown. More is required. The balance of convenience must be clearly in favour of the making of an interim order and there should not be the slightest indication of a likelihood of prejudice to the public interest. We are very sorry to remark that these considerations have not been borne in mind by the <ORG> and interim order of this magnitude had been granted for the mere asking. The appeal is allowed with costs. E N.V.K. Appeal allowed.