PETITIONER: <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, GUJARAT DATE OF JUDGMENT21/07/1992 BENCH: RAY, G.N. (J) BENCH: RAY, G.N. (J) MOHAN, S. (J) CITATION: 1993 AIR 103 1992 SCR (3) 557 1992 SCC (3) 535 JT 1992 (4) 330 1992 SCALE (2)48 ACT: Income Tax Act , 1961 : Section 37 . Business expenditure-Capital or Revenue expenditure- Test to determine-Expenditure must have direct nexus with day to day running of business-Question of voluntary or involuntary payment is not relevant-Contribution of betterment charges made by the assessee towards the cost of Town Planning Scheme under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954-Expenditure held capital in nature-Not deductible from the income of the assessee. HEADNOTE: Under <ORG> the lands of different owners within the Scheme are treated in a common pool and various improvements are effected for the better enjoyment of the lands in question. Since by such improvements the value of the land increases the person getting advantage of enhancement of value of land in question is required to pay betterment fee under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The appellant-Company made payments towards betterment charges in ten instalments and claimed deduction of the said payment on the ground that it was a revenue expenditure. The Income Tax Officer disallowed the claim for deduction. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed deduction of the amount of only one installment paid by the assessee for the year of assessment. The Company preferred an appeal before <ORG> which held that the betterment charge was not revenue expenditure and therefore no deduction was allowable. On a reference to <ORG> on the question whether the <ORG> was justified in disallowing the betterment charges, <ORG> decided against <ORG>. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant-Company that because of the improvement effected under <ORG> the running of the business of <ORG> got 558 improved and thus the betterment fee required to be paid under the scheme had a direct nexus with the running of the business of assessee. Hence, such betterment charge particularly in the context that such payment was involuntary and was in the nature of compulsory exaction from the assessee should be held to be a revenue expenditure made for better running of the business. On behalf of the revenue it was contended that there must be a direct connection with the business activities and the expenditure made and a remote connection with the business activities is not relevant for the purpose of treating the expenditure as revenue expenditure. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD 1. In deciding whether an expenditure is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure the question of voluntary and/or involuntary payment becomes immaterial. It is the nature of expendure that determines the issue. The capital expenditure incurred in connection with the business activities ultimately results in efficiently carrying on the business and by that process gives aid in running of the day-to-day business more efficiently but simply on that score, the capital expenditure does not become a revenue expenditure. [566A, 565-H] 2. Under <ORG>, the lands of different owners including the land of the assessee were treated as if included in a common pool and various improvements have been effected for the better enjoyment of the lands under the scheme. For such improvement by way of laying down roads, making provision for drainage etc. under the scheme, the owner got the advantage of betterment of the land in question and there is no manner of doubt that the valuation of the land had increased because of the improvements effected on the land. Simply because by such improvement it has also resulted in providing better facilities for carrying out the business of the assessee, the betterment charge required to be paid by the assessee, does not become the revenue expenditure. Such payment has no direct nexus with the day-to-day running of the business. [565E-G] 3. <ORG> rightly held that the betterment charge on account of increase in the valuation of the land of the assessee should not be held as a revenue expenditure although general improvement of the area may have an impact on better running of the business. [566-F] 559 Mohanlal Har Govind of Jubbulpore v. Commissioner of Income Tax, C.P. & Berar, Nagpur, (1949) 17 I.T.R. p.473 and <CITATION> ., (1980) 125 I.T.R. p.293, distinguished. <CITATION> ,(1986) 161 I.T.R.p. 455 and <CITATION> ., 3 S.C.R. 341, referred to. <CITATION> ., (1976) 104 I.T.R. p.132, approved. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1836 (NT) of 1977.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9th/10.3.77 of <ORG> in Income Tax Reference No. 197 of 1976.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <ORG> for the Appellant. <NAME>, <NAME> and Ms. <NAME> for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME> This appeal arises out of a Certificate granted by <ORG> against its Judgment dated 9/10th March, 1977 in Income Tax Reference No. 197 of 1976. The appellant-<ORG> is a Company incorporated under Companies Act and running a textile mill. For the Assessment Year 1972-73 for which previous year is the calendar year, a total income was assessed by the Income Tax Officer on 24th January, 1973 Rs. 1,30,92,040. The appellant claimed a deduction of Rs.2,02,907 being the contribution made by the assessee towards to cost of <ORG> under Section 66 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The aforesaid payment made by the assessee was described as betterment charges. The Income Tax Officer disallowed the claim for deduction by his Order dated 25th January, 1974. The appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated 19th September, 1974 held inter alia that the expenditure in question was a revenue expenditure but since the assessee had paid the betterment charges in ten equal instal-ments with interest, instead of payment in lump of the entire amount of Rs. 2,02,907, a sum of Rs. 14,434 only since paid by the assessee by way of instalment in the year of assessment should be deducted from income. The contention of the assessee that since the method of accounting of the assessee was mercantile, the entire amount of Rs. 2,02,907 should be deducted and not the yearly instalment of Rs. 14,434, was not accepted. The assessee thereafter preferred a Cross Appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner before <ORG> in I.T.A. No. 133 (AHD)/74-75. The <ORG> held inter alia that the betterment charge was not revenue expenditure. Hence no deduction on account of the betterment charge was allowable. The <ORG>, however did not interfere with the deduction of Rs. 14,434 since allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

At the instance of the assessee, the following question of law was referred by the Tribunal to <ORG> :

"whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the <ORG> was justified in disallowing the betterment charges".

By the impugned judgment <ORG> relying on the decision of the said High Court in the case <CITATION> ., reported in, (1976) 104 I.T.R.p.132 decided the question against the appellant-assessee but on an oral application, <ORG> granted a Certificate to the Appellate under Section 261 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel appearing for the appellant- assessee has contended that the betterment charge payable under the Bombay Town Planning Act was a compulsory payment and the decision to effect improvement on the lands within the Town Planning Scheme did not depend upon the volition of the owner of the land. It was immaterial whether the assessee was intersted or not for the alleged improvement of the land under the Scheme but the assessee was under an obligation to make the payment of betterment charge imposed under the Bombay Town Planning Scheme. Mr. <NAME> has contended that the Scheme prepared under the Bombay Town Planning Act becomes final on publication of the Scheme under Section 51 and the effect of the final Scheme has been provided under Section 53 of the said Act. Section 54 provides for the cost of the Scheme and Section 55 provides for the calculation of the improvement. Mr. <NAME> has contended that if various provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act are referred to, it will be quite apparent that the betterment charge is nothing but a statutory exaction and in its reality such betterment charge partakes the character of imposition of levy. Mr. <NAME> has strongly relied on the decision of <ORG> in the case of <CITATION> , (1986) 161 I.T.R. p.455. The assessee-Dollar Company had to make payment towards the betterment contribution for the lands owned by the Company coming within the Madras Town planning Scheme. The assessee-Company claimed deduction of the above payment on the footing that such payment was a revenue expenditure. The Income Tax Officer, however, disallowed the claim by holding that such payment was in the nature of capital expenditure. Such decision of the Income Tax Officer was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also by <ORG>. On a reference, <ORG> held inter alia that on a reading of the various provisions of the Madras Town Planning Act, it was evident that the betterment contribution was a compulsory levy made by the <ORG> and the precondition for such levy was that consequent upon making any Town Planning Scheme, the value of the property in the Scheme has increased or is likely to increase. Hence the payment of betterment contribution did not result in any increase in the value of the property but because of the increase in the value of the property as a result of the making of the Town Planning Scheme, the owner of the property was required to make a contribution which was called a betterment contribution. Since there was no direct nexus between the expenditure incurred by the <ORG> and the increase in the value of the property, the expenditure incurred by the assessee for payment of betterment charge must be held to be revenue expenditure. It has been further held by <ORG> that commercially considered, the expenditure which has been so incurred for facilities such as roads, drainage facility etc., for the enjoyment of the property, would be laid out wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business and the payment of the betterment contribution was in the nature for a payment of such facility and only its computation was on the basis of appreciation in value. It was held that consequently the expenditure incurred by way of the betterment contribution could not be called as an expenditure of a capital nature and, therefore, such payment was deductible from the income of the assessee.

Mr. <NAME>, relying on the aforesaid decision of <ORG>, has contended that the betterment charges paid by the appellant-

assessee should also be construed as revenue expenditure because there was no direct nexus between the expenditure incurred by the <ORG> and the increase in the value of the property of the assessee. He has contended that the improvement effected on the lands included within <ORG>, resulted in more efficiently carrying out the business of the assessee and the expenditure which had been incurred for such improvement by way of betterment fee was thus directly connected with the business activities of the assessee. Since enjoyment of the property improved under <ORG> was directly linked with the carrying on of the business of the assessee and the payment of betterment contribution was for such facility in carrying out the business activities more effectively and its computation was only on the basis of appreciation in value, such betterment contribution was in reality a revenue expenditure and <ORG> erred in holding that it was in the nature of a capital expenditure. Mr.<NAME> has submitted that the various provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Scheme had been considered by this Court in the case of <CITATION> ., reported in  3 SCR p. 341. He has contended that under the Scheme, lands of various owners are treated as lands belonging to a common pool and for better enjoyment of lands by the residents certain improvements are effected and facilities are provided under the Scheme. Although by such process, the value of the land is likely to increase, the involuntary payment of betterment charge has a direct nexus with the running of the business in a better way because of the improvement effected and by the process the same becomes a revenue expenditure as indicated by <ORG>. Mr. <NAME> has referred to a decision of <ORG> in <NAME> of Jubbulpore v. Commissioner of Income Tax C.P. & Berar, Nagpur, reported in (1949) 17 I.T.R. p.

473. In consideration of certain sums payable short term licence was granted to acquire tendu leaves for manufacturing Beedi (country made cigarette). <ORG> held that such expenditure was revenue expenditure and not capital expenditure. Mr. <NAME> has also referred to a decision of this Court made in the case of <CITATION> ., reported in (1980) 125 I.T.R. p. 293. In the said case, the assessee-a private company was carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of sugar. During the relevant accounting period the assessee paid two amounts :

(i) a contribution of certain sums at the request of the Collector of the District towards the construction of the Deoni Dam Majhala Road

(ii) a contribution of Rs. 50,000 to <ORG> towards meeting the cost of construction of roads in an area round the factory under a sugarcane development scheme. Under the said scheme, one third of the cost was to be borne by <ORG>, one third by <ORG> and the remaining one third by the sugarcane growers and the owners of sugar factories in the area.

This Court held in the said decision that the first contribution at the instance of the Collector towards the construction of Deoni Dam was not deductible expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income Tax Act because the said amount was contributed long after the construction of the dam and the roads in question had also been constructed long back and there was nothing to show that the contribution of the amount had anything to do with the business of the Company or the construction of the dam or the roads was in any way advantageous to the assessee's business. So far as the second sum of Rs. 50,000 was concerned, it has been held by this Court that the said sum was deductible under Section 10(2)(xv) because the construction of the roads had facilitated the transport of the sugarcane to the factory and outflow of sugar manufacture by the factory of the assessee to the market centres. It was indicated that the construction of the roads had facilitated the business operation of the assessee and had enabled the management to carry on business more efficiently and profitably. This Court has noted that it was true that the advantage secured for the business of the assessee was of a long duration inasmuch as it would last so long as the roads continued to be motorable but it was not an advantage in the capital field because no tangible or intangible asset was acquired by the assessee nor there was any addition to an expansion of the profit making apparatus of the assessee. The amount of Rs. 50,000 was contributed by the assessee for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of the business and making it more efficient and profitable without the assessee getting an advantage of an enduring benefit to itself. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court has held that such expenditure should be held to be a revenue expenditure and was deductible.

Mr. <NAME> has contended that because of the improvement effected under the Town Planning Scheme the running of the business of the assessee got improved and thus the betterment fee required to be paid under the Scheme had a direct nexus with the running of the business of the assessee. Hence, such betterment charge particularly in the context that such payment was involuntary and was in the nature of compulsory exaction from the assessee should be held to be a revenue expenditure made for better running of the business. He has submitted that since the construction of the road in and around L.H.Sugar Factory had a nexus for the running of the business more efficiently and profitably, this Court in the said Sugar Factory's case has held that a contribution of Rs. 50,000 even when such contribution was not in the nature of a compulsory payment but a pure and simple voluntary contribution, was a revenue expenditure and as such it was deductible from the income of the assessee. Mr. <NAME> has therefore submitted that the impugned decision of Gujarat <ORG> must be held to be erroneous and the reference should be answered in favour of the assessee by allowing the betterment charges paid by the assessee-Company as a deductible expenditure.

The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has, however, contended that unless it can be demonstrated that the expenditure is exclusively for business purpose, the same cannot be held to be a revenue expenditure and as such deductible from the income of the assessee. The learned counsel has contended that there must be a direct connection with the business activities and the expenditure made and a remote connection with the business activities is also not relevant for the purpose of treating the expenditure as revenue expenditure. He has contended that in <ORG>'s case the question of capital asset did not arise because the road constructed in and around the factory did not belong to the factory. This Court has specifically held in <ORG> case that the advantage derived from the construction of the road was not in the capital field because no tangible or intangible asset was acquired by the assessee nor was there any expansion to the profit making apparatus of the assessee. The learned counsel for the respondent has stated that under the Bombay Town Planing Scheme, the lands of different owners within the Scheme are treated in a common pool and various improvements are effected for the better enjoyment of the lands in question. By such improvements, the value of the land increases and it was in consideration of such increased valuation of the land, the betterment fees are charged. He has submitted that it is immaterial whether the assessee had a desire for the improvement of the land in question. The fact remains that under the statute, such improve-

ment had been effected and the assessee getting advantage of enhancement of value of land in question is required to pay betterment fee. He has also submitted that in <NAME> case (supra) <ORG> has held the expenditure incurred for obtaining licence to procure tendu leaves as revenue expenditure because tendu leaves was essential raw material for manufacturing Beedi and as such the expenditure had a direct nexus with day-to-day running of the business of manufacturing Beedi. Hence, the said decision of <ORG> is clearly distinguishable. He has contended in the facts of this appeal, <ORG> has rightly held that the expenditure was a capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure. The learned counsel has contended that when a capital expenditure is incurred, the said capital expenditure also ultimately enure to the efficient running of the business but on that score the expenditure on capital asset does not lose the character of capital expenditure and does not become a revenue expenditure. He has submitted that <ORG> has failed to appreciate that the expenses incurred by making payment of betterment fees was in essence an expenditure on account of increase in the valuation of the land of the assessee and such expenditure has no direct nexus with the day-to-day running of the business. In the aforesaid circumstances, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that no interference is called for in this appeal and the same should be dismissed.

After considering the respective contentions of the learned counsels for the parties, it appears to us that under the Bombay Town Planning Scheme, the lands of different owners including the land of the assessee were treated as if included in a common pool and various improvements have been effected for the better enjoyment of the lands under the Scheme. For such improvement by way of laying down roads, making provision for drainage etc. under the scheme, the owner got the advantage of betterment of the land in question and there is no manner of doubt that the valuation of the land had increased because of the improvements effected on the land. Simply because by such improvement it has also resulted in providing better facilities for carrying out the business of the assessee, the betterment charge required to be paid by the assessee., does not become the revenue expenditure. Such payment has no direct nexus with the day-to-day running of the business. In our view the learned counsel for the respondent is justified in submitting that the capital expenditure incurred in connection with the business activities ultimately results in efficiently carrying on the business and by that process gives aid in running of the day-to-day business more efficiently but simply on that score, the capital expenditure does not become a revenue expenditure. In our view, the learned counsel for the respondent is also justified in his contention that in deciding whether an expenditure is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure, the question of voluntary and/or involuntary payment becomes immaterial. It is the nature of expenditure that determines the issue. In <ORG> case (supra), it has been specifically indicated by this Court that the assessee did not acquire any tangible or intangible right on the roads constructed in and around the factory but because of such roads constructed day-to-day running of the business was improved by minimising the operational cost in manufacturing sugar. In such circumstances, the expenditure incurred for improving day-to-day running of the business by way of voluntary contribution of Rs. 50,000 when such expenditure had no connection with the increase or in creation of any capital asset or acquiring any tangible or intangible right in the property in question namely the roads constructed in or around the factory, was treated as revenue expenditure. The decision of <ORG> in <NAME> case (supra) in holding that the expenditure incurred for obtaining licences for acquiring tendu leaves for manufacturing beedi was a revenue expenditure can be easily explained by indicating that such expense for obtaining licence to procure tendu leaves was an expenditure to acquire basic raw material for manufacturing beedi. Such expenditure had nothing to do with any capital asset. Hence, the expenditure having a direct nexus with day-to-day running of the business of manufacturing beedi by procuring basic raw material is certainly a revenue expenditure. But the facts in the instant appeal are quite different. The aforesaid aspect is totally absent in the instant case. In our view, <ORG> has rightly held that the betterment charge on account of increase in the valuation of the land of the assessee should not be held as a revenue expenditure although general improvement of the area may have an impact on better running of the business. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the decision of <ORG> by accepting the reasonings of <ORG> in <ORG> case (supra). The instant appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.


ORDER

1. The first petitioner <ORG>, represented by its Secretary, the other petitioners its members challenged the Notification issued by the Commissioner and Special Officer, <ORG> under S.3(1) of the A.P.Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act 33 of 1956 (hereinafter called the Act).

2. It is averred in the petition that the land was acquired for the purpose of constructing houses and the members have constructed houses at considerable cost and there are disputes about the land and in view of the disputes regarding land, proceedings under S.145 of the Cr.P.C . were initiated and the land was under attachment of the Executive Magistrate under S.146 of the Code and the notification issued by the 1st respondent is illegal as the same was issued without any notice to the petitioners and the 1st respondent has no power to issue notification under the Act and the delegation of the powers by the <ORG> to the 1st respondent is illegal and the notification declaring the land in question as slum area is also illegal and unjust and the same is liable to be set aside. The application was opposed not only by the Commissioner and <ORG> but also by some of the parties who were added as party respondents supporting the notification stating that it is highly essential to declare the land in question as slum area and that the petitioners themselves have no right to question the notification. Sr. <NAME>, the learned counsel for the petitioners mainly argued that the impugned notification is void as opposed to the principles of natural justice and declaring the area in question as a slum area without affording an opportunity is not only adequate but empty. It is also argued that the scheme of the Act does not exclude any opportunity being afforded before issuing notification under S.3(1) and the dicta of the <ORG> bench in <CITATION> has lost its efficacy in view of the subsequent pronouncements of <ORG> regarding post decisional opportunities.

3. It is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act and also notice the effect of the Full bench on this question. The Act is intended for the acquisition of lands in slum areas and the preamble declares that it was noticed that there are slum areas in almost every town in the State of A.P. which are a source of danger to public health and sanitation and it was felt that I has not been possible to provide for the basic needs of sewerage, water supply and road and side-drains in these slum areas, without causing excessive financial strain on the owners of the lands affected and hence the Act is intended to clear those lands in those areas and undertake the execution of works designed to improve those areas. The Act is made applicable in the entire State of A>P.in 1961 by Act 41 of 1961. S.1(3) enables the Government to apply the provisions of the Act in any Municipality in the State by issuing a notification on such date as the government may by such notification in the <ORG> appoint. The said section provides that a notice should be issued to the Municipality for not less than two months before issuing the notification. The 'slum area' was defined to mean any area declared to be a slum area under sub-sec.(1) of S.3, Section 3 which is crucial in the present enquiry is in the following terms:

"3.(1) Where the Government are satisfied that any area is or may be a source of danger to the public health, safety or convenience of its neighbourhood by reason of the area being low lying, insanitary, squalid or otherwise, they may by notification in the <ORG> declare such area to be a slum area.

(2) Where the Government are satisfied that it is necessary to acquire any land in a slum area for the purpose of clearing or improving the area, they may acquire the land by publishing in the <ORG> a notice to the effect that they have decided to acquire it in pursuance of this section.

Provided, that, before publishing such notice, the <ORG> shall call upon the owner of or any other person who in the opinion of the <ORG>, is interested in such land to show cause why it should not be acquired, and after considering the case, if any, shown by any person interested in the land, the <ORG> may pass such orders as they deem fit.

Explanation: Cause shown by the person interested in the land may be against the declaration of the area as a slum area under sub-sec.(1) as well as against the necessity to acquire the land for the purpose of clearing of improving the area.

(3) when a notice as aforesaid is published in the <ORG> the land shall, on and from the beginning of the day on which the notice is so published, vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.

(4) The Government may, by order, authorise any authority or officer subordinate to them to exercise all or any of the powers conferred and perform all or any of the duties imposed on them by this section, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be specified in the order."

S.4 provides that the Government may, either hold the land acquired by them under the Act or hand over to the <ORG>, S.5 and S.6 provide for right to compensation and the mode of determining the same. The jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred under S.13 S.15 provides that the provisions of the Act can be made applicable to any pending acquisition proceedings.

4. S.3(1) was construed by a Full bench of this Court when the constitutional validity of the Act was challenged in . It was held that the provisions of the Constitution. No doubt in that case the learned Judges mainly examined the validity of the Act to find out how far the provisions offend Arts.14 and 31(2) of the Constitution Adverting toS.3 (1) it was held (at P.33):-

"The explanation entitles the person interested in the land to show cause (1) against the declaration of the area as a slum area u/s. 3(1) as well as (2) against the necessity to acquire the land for the purpose of clearing or improving the area.

It is true that while proviso to sub-sec. (2) speaks both of the owner as well as of the person interested in the land, but the explanation speaks only of persons interested in the land. We have however no doubt that the expression 'the person interested' would include even the owner of the land. There appears to be no reason as to why the owner should be deprived of an opportunity of objecting both to the declaration u/s 5(1) as well as the intention to acquire the land u/s.3(2) just as a person interested in the land can object. This is just a case of accidental omission but the intention of the <ORG> is clear from the proviso itself.

A close reading of sub-sec. (2) makes it abundantly plain that before a notice under S.3920 is published, it is the statutory duty of the government to call upon the owner and the person interested in the land to show cause. Such a case shall be shown both in regard to the notification u/s.3(1) as well as the necessity to acquire the land. It thus provides opportunity to the owner and the person interested in the land to object to the declaration that it is a slum area, although such opportunity is given only after the declaration."

5. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that S.3(1) has not excluded the prior opportunity and in view of the clear dicta of <ORG> in <CITATION> post decisional opportunity must be confined in case of urgency and the court should always insist on hearing or opportunity at pre-decisional stage unless the statute excluded such hearing. He relied upon the several dictas of <ORG> in the said case and also the earlier judgment of <ORG> in <CITATION> , . It is no doubt true that <NAME> case is a landmark in the Administration Law in the area of natural justice. In that case the Passport of the petitioner was impounded by the <ORG> u/s.10(3)(c) of the Passport Act 1967 in public interest without giving any prior opportunity. However, after laying down the law when pre-decisional opportunities can be justified they did not pass any formal order setting aside the order of the <ORG> as the <ORG> has agreed to provide opportunity of being heard post-decisionally to the passport holder. <NAME>, <NAME>, emphasised the requirement of fair play irrespective of the fact whether the enquiry is administrative in character or quasi-judicial. In fact <ORG> observed in <CITATION> that the dividing line between the administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated and hence <NAME>, <NAME> observed in <NAME> case that the law must therefore be taken to be well settled that even in administrative proceedings which involves civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. This view was reiterated in <CITATION> . The learned counsel pressed the dicta in this judgment very much in his favour holding that in that case <ORG> held that the provisions of the Industries Development and Regulation Act 1951 providing post-decisional opportunity u/s 18-F is not sufficient but a pre-decisional opportunity must be afforded and such pre-decisional opportunity was not excluded by virtue of S.18-AA of the Act. The provisions of the said Act provide two alternative procedures, one u/s.18-A(1)(b) and another u/s. 18-AA(1)(b). Under the former section they can make an enquiry u/s. 15 after giving an opportunity and take over the unit if it is found that the management is highly detrimental to the public interest. But in the latter section which enables the <ORG> to take without investigation u/s. 15 where immediate preventive action becomes necessary. No doubt under S.18-F post-decisional opportunity is provided under which the <ORG> has power to cancel the order made earlier. Construing both the provisions <ORG> by majority held that the pre-decisional opportunity is not excluded. This principle of post-decisional opportunity is again considered in a recent pronouncement of <ORG> by majority held that the pre-decisional opportunity is not excluded. This principle of post-decisional opportunity is again considered in a recent pronouncement of <ORG> in <CITATION> , when that was described as abeyance order suspending an import licence was challenged. <NAME>, <NAME>, speaking for the court held "we do not think that it is permissible to interpret any statutory instrument so as to exclude natural justice, unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the court. Procedural fairness embodying natural justice is to be implied whenever action is taken affecting the rights of parties. It may be that the opportunity to be heard may not be pre-decisional it may necessarily have to be post-decisional where the danger to be averted or the act to be prevented is imminent or where the action to be taken can brook no delay." Thus this part of the law is fairly settled and the significant points one should bear in mind are:

(1) That the doctrine of natural justice applies both in administrative proceedings and quasi-judicial proceedings which involves civil consequences.

(2) Natural justice may be disregarded in an emergency situation where immediate action is necessary.

(3) In case of urgency a post-decisional hearing may be given, (4) Whether the hearing is pre-decisional or post-decisional the affected party must be given a reasonable opportunity not being employ public relations exercise.

(5) Natural justice may be excluded either by specific or necessary implication.

6. Let us apply these principles to the present case. The provisions of the Act 33 of 1956 disclose three stages before the property is vested u/s. 3 of the Act absolutely in the <ORG> free of all encumbrances. The first stage is issuing a notification u/s. 1(3) in respect of each Municipality making applicable the provisions of the Act after affording an opportunity to such Municipality. The second stage is notification u/s.3(1) declaring an area as slum area. The third and final stage is notification u/s.3(2) acquiring the land. A reading of these provisions makes it clear that opportunity should be provided both before issuing notification u/s. 1(3) and also under S.3(2). The opportunity provided u/s. 3(2) is for both the notifications u/s. 3(1) and also 3(2). The very fact that the explanation enables the person interested to show cause both against S.3(1) notification issued earlier and later notification proposed u/s. 3(2) clearly excludes any opportunity before the notification u/s. 3(1). There cannot be any doubt that if the authorities are satisfied that the earlier notification issued u/s. 3(1) is not well founded. They are bound to rescind the same as the opportunity is provided to the persons interested to show cause both against S.3(1) notification already issued and the proposed notification to be issued u/s. 3(2). Though the dicta of the Full bench in this regard is not specific, I am clearly of the opinion that the Full Bench also took the view that the opportunity is provided to the person interested to show cause against the earlier notification u/s. 3(1) and also latter proposed action u/s. 3(2) and thus if follows the authorities are bound to rescind the orders issued u/s. 3(1) declaring an area as slum area if they are satisfied that the earlier notification does not warrant such action.

7. It is argued by the learned counsel that the post-decisional opportunity is employ in this case as the authorities have already made a solemn declaration that the area in question is a slum area and the declaration u/s.3(1) has stigmatised the area of the petitioner as slum area and the civil consequences are so serious and imminent and the notification without giving an opportunity to the petitioner is illegal and opposed to the principles of natural justice and fair play. It is to be noticed that an opportunity was already provided u/s. 1(3) to the Municipality as such before making the provisions of the Act applicable. By virtue of the notification u/s.3(1) no consequences flow. It is only a preliminary step for further proceedings. It is difficult to hold that any civil consequences flow from the notification u/s. 3(1) which requires an opportunity to the petitioners. The mere declaration itself cannot be treated as a civil consequence which requires an opportunity to the petitioners. The principle laid down in <CITATION> . (AIR 1981 SC 8181) is wholly inapplicable. In that case notification u/s. 18(A)(A) completely divests the entire management of the unit and vests the same in the statutory authority. Taking into account such drastic step which beset with several civil if not evil consequences <ORG> has to hold that s.18-AA does not exclude pre-decisional opportunity and the opportunity afforded post-decisionally u/s. 18(f) of that Act was not sufficient. But in our case no consequences flow by S.3(1) notification till notification u/s.3(2) is issued and the statute provides an opportunity to show cause both against the earlier notification u/s 3(1) and the proposed notification u/s. 3(2). Hence in the absence of any civil consequences no earlier opportunity is necessary for issue of notificationu/s.3(1) which is only preliminary step though a jurisdictional and foundational for the further proceedings.

8. Thus I do not find any legal informity in the notification in question for want of opportunity before issuing the notification and it cannot be challenged on the said ground, and consequently this contention fails.

9. It is urged by the leaned counsel for the petitioner that the power of <ORG> u/s.3(1) cannot be delegated to the 1st respondent -Commissioner. For that we have to look to S.3(4) which is already extracted. It is urged that what was contemplated to be delegated is only powers and duties but not the function of the <ORG> as contemplated u/s3(2). It is urged the satisfaction to be arrived at is that of the Governemnt. Such function cannot be delegated u/s.3(4). As per G.O.ms.No.987 dt 17-11-82 the <ORG> have delegated their powers under sub-secs.(1) and (2) of S.3 of the Act to the Special Officer, <ORG> which is in the following terms:

"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec.(4) of S.3 of the A.P.Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act , 1956 the Governor of A.P. hereby authorise the Special Officer, <ORG> to exercise the powers, and perform the functions imposed on the Government under sub-sec.(1) and (2) of S.3 of the said Act in respect of the slum areas in the area comprising the <ORG>."

I do not think that this distinction between the power and function is justified. Infact power is a larger concept including all its facets of statutory functions. Exercising a statutory power on being satisfied is one of the modes of exercising the power and such power is clearly in the contemplation of sub-sec.(4) and the difference between power and function for the purposes of this question is wholly unjustified and without any substance and I hold that the delegation of power to the 1st respondent by the <ORG> is well within their jurisdiction and is valid.

10. Finally it was urged that thee is no data or material on which a declaration can be made that the area in question is a source of danger to public health, safety or convenience of its neighbourhood by reason of the area being a low lying, insanitary, squalid or otherwise requiring the area to be declared as slum area. No doubt these tests are objective in nature and in a given case this court may examine whether these requirements of objective tests are satisfied though the statute speaks of arriving at the conclusion subjectively. In this case the learned counsel ultimately agreed that this enquiry can be made in the show cause notice issued to them and the authorities are bound to go into the question whether the earlier notification declaring the area as slum area is well founded or not.

11. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed , but in the circumstances without costs.

12. Petition dismissed.


<NAME>, Kt., C.J.

1. The question in this case arises out of the following facts. At the close of 1866, the applicant having called on the opponent, as the representative of one Ardeshirji Dhanjisha, for the sum of Rs. 1,15,068-14-2 as the amount of six instalments alleged to be due on two mortgages executed in the Samvat years 1889 and 1903, the matter in dispute was submitted by the parties on the 18th October, 1866, to arbitration. The arbitrators made their award on 3rd December, 1866, and the same was filed by the First Class Subordinate Judge on 20th December, 1866. Several applications for execution of the award were subsequently made and granted. The last darkhast, however, No. 19 of 1880, was rejected by the Subordinate Judge, <NAME>, on the ground that no judgment had been passed in terms of the award, and that there was no decree to execute. The order rejecting the darkhast was confirmed by <ORG>, on appeal, on 28th September 1882. Whatever differences of opinion may have existed as to the proper mode of procedure under Section 327 of Act VIII of 1859, and the corresponding Section 526 of the Code of 1877, it must be considered to have been well settled in <ORG>, at the latest since the circular order was issued in 1880, that the proper course is to have judgment passed in terms of the award, to be followed by decree, as provided by Section 325 of Act VIII of 1859. The applicants, finding themselves arrested in their execution proceedings, applied to the Subordinate Judge to pass judgment in terms of the award, but he refused the application on the ground that all the proper parties were not before the <ORG>, and also that it was barred by Article 178 , Schedule II of the limitation Act, XV of 1877, not having been made within three years from the 20th December, 1866. With respect to this second ground of refusal, it was contended for the applicants that the application to file the award became converted into a suit by the direction contained in Section 327 of Act VIII of 1859, that the application "shall be numbered and registered as a suit between the applicant as plaintiff and the other parties as defendants." It was argued also that the provisions in Section 325 as to the <ORG> passing judgment in terms of the award and a decree following on it are incorporated in Section 327 by the words of the latter, which enable the award when filed to be "enforced as an award under the provisions of the chapter," and that it was the duty of the <ORG> to pass judgment on the award after it had been filed, or, at any rate, that it was not necessary for the <ORG> to be set in motion in order to do so, and that in either case, and whether the application was or was not converted into a suit, the application to pass judgment was not one within the contemplation of the second schedule of the Statute 'of Limitations of 1877. In <NAME>. <NAME> 490 and <NAME> v. Mallichery Kristnan Nambudri I.L.R. 3 Mad. 68 it was held that an application to file an award, under Section 525 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877, was only converted into a suit for administration purposes and for classification of business of the <ORG>, and that an order refusing to file an award was not appealable under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. In <NAME> v. <NAME> I.L.R. 2 All 471 however, an order made by the <ORG>, previous to passing judgment according to the award, was held to be not appealable, because it was only an interlocutory order in a suit, and not included in Section 588, Act X of 1877, thus showing that the <ORG> regarded the application as a suit, after it had been registered as such, for other purposes than mere classification. Both Mr. Justice <NAME>, and Mr. Justice <NAME>, in the judgments in <NAME> v. <NAME> 490, rely on the absence of similar words to those which are to be found in Section 331, viz., that the <ORG> shall "proceed to investigate the claim in the same manner and with like power as if a suit for the property had been instituted by the decree-holder against the claimant under the provisions of Chapter V." The learned Judges say that these words would have been unnecessary if the effect of the words, "shall be numbered and registered as a suit", were to convert the application into a suit to all intents and purposes. Assuming that to be so, we think that the same effect should be given to the language of Section 327 of the Code of 1859, and that of Section 526 of the Code of 1877. In both cases the object is clearly to explain the course to be pursued; and whether the <ORG> be told to proceed to investigate the claim in the same manner as if a suit had been instituted, or that it shall order the award to be filed, and that the award "shall take effect" as an award made under the provisions of this chapter"--that is, as appears by Section 522, by "judgment being passed according to the award followed by decree" (a term only applicable to a proceeding in a suit)--the effect of such directions, in construing the words "shall be numbered and registered as a suit", ought, we think, to be the same. The present case, however, arises under Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, in which the language is "that if no sufficient cause be shown against the award, the award shall be filed, and may be enforced as an award made under the provisions of this chapter." These latter words have been construed by this <ORG>, and indeed by most <ORG>s, as directing that the same procedure should follow as in, the case of an award under Section 326. The conclusion to be drawn as to the meaning of the words "shall be numbered and registered as a suit" is necessarily the same. Moreover, in construing a code of procedure, we ought, we think, to give the framers of it credit for using a particular form of words in the same sense throughout the Code, unless the context clearly shows that it was intended to be used in a different or more restricted sense. As we do not find any evidence of such intention, either in Section 327 of the Code of 1859, or in Sections 525 and526of the Code of 1877, we think that the view taken by the Allahabad High <ORG> is the correct one, and should be followed. If, then, the application be regarded as a suit, the proceedings in which, according to Section 526 of the Code of 1877, are to be identical, after the award has been filed, with those provided by Section 522, it would appear that it was the duty of the <ORG> to proceed to pass judgment according to the award as soon as it was ordered to be filed. Now, it may be that it would be usual, as a matter of practice, for the plaintiff to ask the <ORG> to pass judgment according to the award; but looking at the language of Section 325 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, and of Section 522 of the Code of 1877, we cannot think that any application would be necessary. The validity of the award had been either not disputed, or had been established--see <NAME> v. <NAME>s I.L.R. 6 Bom. 663--and all that remained to be done was to pass judgment according to the award, and an application to do so was no more necessary than it would be to ask the <ORG> to "pronounce judgment" after it has tried a suit on its merits, as it is enjoined to do by Section 198 of the Civil Procedure Code. If this be a correct view of the duty of the <ORG>, we think that any application which may be made to it to pass judgment can only be regarded is drawing the attention of the <ORG> to the provisions of the section. We agree with the ruling of the Madras <ORG> in <NAME> v. Ramasami Ayyan I.L.R. 4 Mad. 172 followed by this <ORG> in <NAME> v. Vithojirav Putlajirav I.L.R. 6 Bom. 586 that "the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to applications must be held to apply to applications for the exercise, by the authority to which the application is addressed, of powers which it would not be bound to exercise without such application", and are, therefore, of opinion that the application in this case was not one within the contemplation of the Statute. It was said, however, that the language of Section 327 of the Code, of Civil Procedure of 1859, under which this case falls, is different from that of Section 526 of the Code of 1877. We think, however, that, looking at Sections 325 , 326 and 327 , the words in question must be construed so as to agree with what is expressed by the latter words oil Section 326 , where it is said that the "provisions of the chapter should be applicable to the enforcement of the award". In other words, the expression "may be enforced" ought, we think, to be read as "shall be enforced", so far as it applies to the <ORG>, although, of course, the enforcement by execution of the decree would be permissive, as regards the plaintiff. We think, therefore, that the difference in the language of Section 327 of the Code of 1859 cannot affect the conclusion already arrived at on Sections 522 and 526 of the Code of 1877, and that the plaintiff's application, to pass judgment according to the award, was not one within the contemplation of the Statute of Limitations.

2. We have been asked to allow the defendants leave to show cause against filing the award, on the ground that they were only served with notice on 18th December, 1866, and the award was filed on the 20th December, 1866. It is not, however, denied that the 20th December was the day named in the notice; and we see no reason, and after the lapse of sixteen years during which time the above objection has never been taken, although the award has been several times executed, we should certainly not be disposed, even if we had the power which may well be doubted, to interfere with the filing of the award.

3. The Subordinate Judge must, therefore, be directed "to proceed to pass judgment according to the award" to be followed by decree, and to afterwards proceed to dispose of the plaintiff's darkhast rejected on 28th September, 1882. We do not think we ought to accede to plaintiff's application that such decree should be made nunc pro tune, as the delay cannot, we think, be said to be the exclusive act of the <ORG>.

4. Parties to pay their own costs of this application.


PETITIONER: TOTA <NAME> & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB DATE OF JUDGMENT01/04/1987 BENCH: <NAME>, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) BENCH: <NAME>, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) CITATION: 1987 AIR 1083 1987 SCR (2) 747 1987 SCC (2) 529 JT 1987 (2) 20 1987 SCALE (1)657 ACT: Criminal Procedure Code , 1973. ss. 378 and 386- -Appeal against order of acquittal--Interference by appellate court--Jurisdiction of-No interference unless approach of trial court vitiated by some manifest illegality. HEADNOTE: The appellants were tried by <ORG> on charges under section 302  read with section 34  and section 323  read with section 34 , and the Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants or' all the charges laid against them on the grounds: (i) that there was no proper explanation for the inordinate delay in reporting the crime to the police; (ii) that there was also no adequate proof of any motive; (iii) that it was not a pre-planned attack; and (iv) that the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 6 who were exam- ined as eye-witnesses to prove the occurrence, could not be safely accepted and acted upon as true. In the absence or' any independent corroboration or' the testimony given by them, since they had also been appearing as prosecution witnesses in a large number of police cases. <ORG>, however, in appeal by the respondent- State made an independent reappraisal of the evidence and set aside the acquittal, merely on the ground that as a result of such reappreciation it was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the Sessions Judge. Allowing the appeal by the appellants, this <ORG>, HELD: 1. The approach made by <ORG> to a con- sideration of the appeal was wholly vitiated by a manifest illegality inasmuch as <ORG> has acted in total disregard of the principles repeatedly laid down by <ORG> delineating the restricted grounds on which alone interference may be made by a court of appeal with an order of acquittal passed by a lower <ORG>. [751D] <ORG> in the instant case, has not found that the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of P.W. 2 and 748 P.W. 6 were either unreasonable or perverse. [751B] 2.1 The mere fact that <ORG> is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the <ORG> below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. [751C] 2.2 The jurisdiction of <ORG> in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circum- scribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower <ORG> to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the <ORG> below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. [751D-E] 3. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the <ORG> below has taken a view which is a plausible one, <ORG> cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous. [751E] JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 225 of 1978.

From the Judgment and order dated 19.4.1978 of <ORG> in Criminal Appeal No. 1106 of 1974.

<NAME>, Mrs. <NAME>, Mrs. <NAME> and Ms. <NAME> for the Appellants.

<NAME> for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. After hearing <NAME>, Sr. Advocate for appellants and <NAME>, Counsel appear- ing on behalf of the respondent and having carefully exam- ined all aspects of the case in the light of the submissions made at the <ORG>, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclu- sion that this appeal has to be allowed.

The four appellants before us--<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> were tried by <ORG>, Faridkot on charges under Section 302  read with Section 34  and Section 323  read with Section 34 . After detailed consideration of the entire evidence adduced in the case, the learned <ORG> Judge by his judgment dated May 30, 1974 acquitted the appellants of all the charges laid against them. Against the said decision of the <ORG> Judge, the State of Punjab preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1106 of 1974 in <ORG> and Haryana. A Division Bench of <ORG> by its judgment dated April 9, 1978 allowed the State's appeal, set aside the order of the <ORG> acquitting the appellants and convicted the appellants under Section 302  read with Section 34  as well as under Section 323  1PC read with Section 34 . On the first count all the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and on the second account they were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each with a further direction that the substantive sentence of imprisonment in respect of all the appellants shall run concurrently.

We do not propose to set out in extenso the facts of the case nor to discuss in detail the oral and documentary evidence adduced. We say this for the reason that we are fully satisfied that the approach made by <ORG> to a consideration of the appeal was wholly vitiated by a manifest illegality inasmuch as <ORG> has acted in total disregard of the principles repeatedly laid down by this Court delineating the restricted grounds on which alone interference may be made by a Court of appeal with an order of acquittal passed by a lower Court.

The occurrence that led to the prosecution took place on July 19, 1973 at about 4 P.M. in village Bishmandi, Police Station Jaitu in District Faridkot. The case of the prosecu- tion is that the deceased <NAME> accompained by <NAME> 2 and <NAME> 6 was going from the house of <NAME> to the house of the deceased on that fateful day. While they were approaching the house of one <NAME>, the four appellants, all carrying a gandasa each, suddenly besieged them from behind the Cheli- anwali Street raising a "lalkara" proclaiming that they were going to take their revenge for outraging the modesty of <NAME> and they attacked the deacased as well as <NAME> and <NAME> by inflicting gandasa blows on them. It was alleged that this was a preplanned and concerted attack made by the appellants as a reappraisal for an inci- dent of alleged rape of one <NAME> by <NAME> (P.W. 2), <NAME> (deceased) is said to have fallen down on the spot as a result of the blows inflicted on him and P.Ws. 2 and 6 are said to have suffered simple injuries due to the attack with gandasa. According to the prosecution version on hearing the cries for help raised by P.W. 2 and P.W. 6, <NAME>, son of deceased <NAME> came to the place of occurrence and thereupon all the four appellants ran away from the spot leaving P.W. 6 near <NAME>, who was lying on the ground in an injured condition. P.W. 2 is said to have gone to the Sarpanch and the Panch of the village and informed them about the incident. Thereafter he returned to the scene of occurrence and himself along with P.W. 6 are said to have put <NAME> on a bullock cart and got him admitted in the injured condition in the hospi- tal. P.W.2 and P.W.6 were also admitted in the same hospi- tal. <NAME> was subsequently transferred to <ORG> at Ludhiana, where he succumbed to his injuries on July 30, 1973.

The learned Sessions Judge after a careful analysis of all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case came to the conclusion that the testimo- ny of <NAME> 2 and <NAME> who were examined by the prosecution as eyewitnesses to prove the occurrence could not be safely accepted and acted upon as true. The trial Judge set out in his judgment detailed and cogent grounds for arriving at the said conclusion. In his opinion there was no proper explanation for the inordinate delay in reporting the crime to the police and there was also no adequate proof of any motive. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the theory put forward by the prosecu- tion'that it was a pre-planned attack made by the appellants with a view to avenge the alleged molestation of <NAME> by <NAME> 2 by pointing out that if such had been really the case, the target of attack by the appellants would have been <NAME> to whom only simple injuries were caused and not <NAME> who had nothing to do with the alleged incident of molestation. The learned Sessions Judge was inclined to accept the defence version that the appellants being 'siris' had some trouble with P.W. 2 and P.W. 6 about the apportionment of 'batai' and this might have led to their false implication in the case. In the absence of any independent corroboration of the testimony given by the two alleged eye-witnesses (P.W. 2 and P.W. 6), the learned Sessions Judge who had seen them giving evidence in the box was not impressed by their evidence specially having regard to the fact that both of them had been appear- ing as prosecution witnesses in a large number of police cases. The testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 6 having been found to be not worthy of belief, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants on both the charges levelled against them.

<ORG> has not found in its judgment that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 6 were either unreasonable or perverse. What <ORG> has done is to make an independent reappraisal of the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on the ground that as a result of such reappreciation, <ORG> was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. This <ORG> has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that <ORG> is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the <ORG> below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of <ORG> in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower <ORG> to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the <ORG> below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any <ORG> acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the <ORG> below has taken a view which is a plausible one, <ORG> cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even it is of the opinion that the view taken by the <ORG> below on its con- sideration of the evidence is erroneous.

Tested in the light of the above principles, it must be held that the interference made in the present case by <ORG> with the order of acquittal passed by the learned <NAME> Judge was wholly unwarranted. We accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of <ORG> and restore the judgment and order of the learned <NAME> Judge acquitting the appellants of all the charges framed against them.

M.L.A. Appeal allowed.