CASE NO.: Writ Petition (crl.) 15 of 1994 PETITIONER: DHANANJAY SHARMA RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/05/1995 BENCH: DR. A.S. ANAND & <NAME> JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT 1995 (3) SCR 964 The Judgment of the Court were delivered by DR. <NAME>, J. On 17.1.1994, <NAME> of <ORG> filed a petition seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for the release of <NAME> from illegal and unauthorised custody of <ORG> and for his production in Court. It is alleged in the writ petition that on account of some civil disputes between <ORG> Bhanu Iron and Steel Company Limited (in short <ORG>) of New Delhi, with a factory at Indore, which is owned by Respondent No. 7, <NAME>, son-in-law of <NAME>, Chief Minister of Haryana and <ORG> <ORG>, a case under Sections 406 / 420  was got registered by Respondent No. 6 <NAME>, the Commercial Manager of <ORG>, being FIR No. 663/93 at Police Station Sadar, <NAME> against <NAME> and others. On 17.1.1994, a team of police party, headed by Additional Superintendent of Police, <NAME>, respondent No. 4, went to the residence of <NAME> at Diamond Harbour Road, Calcutta, to arrest <NAME>, on the authority of non- bailable warrants of arrest issued against him by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, <NAME>. <NAME> was arrested and on 7.1.1994 itself produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, Calcutta, who released him on bail till 15.1.1994, with a direction to appear before the competent court at <NAME>. On 15.1.1994 Shri <NAME>, the detenu, who is an employee of <ORG>, a sister concern of <ORG> <ORG>, along with <NAME>, advocate went to <NAME> in a taxi (van) bearing registration no. DAE-3668 driven by <NAME>. They appeared in the court of the Addl. CJM <NAME> and filed an application seeking exemption from per-sonal appearance of <NAME> on medical grounds. After filing the application and obtaining the next date from the court, the detenu, Shri <NAME> along with bis lawyer <NAME>, left for Delhi in the same taxi car (van) driven by <NAME>. A team of Haryana police officers, riding in six police Gypsy jeeps, way-laid them on <NAME>-Delhi road and while, after some arguments <NAME>, Advocate, was allowed to go, the detenu and <NAME> alongwith the taxi car were whisked away by the personnel on 15.1.94 and were being illegally detained by <ORG> and their whereabouts were not known and that they had not returned to Delhi. <NAME>, Advocate filed on affidavit in support of the writ petition, wherein it was inter alia stated:

That after obtaining the date, the deponent came to his car waiting outside the court premises and advised Mr. <NAME> to direct the driver to take us back immediately to Delhi.

That we hardly travelled one or two kilometers that a number of fully armed police gypsies of Haryana Police appeared at the site and surrounded the <ORG> Van in which we were travelling. One of the police officers ordered the driver to show him the papers relating to the vehicle which were handed over to him by the driver. The deponent immediately came down from the van. However, Mr. <NAME> and the driver wore not allowed to come out of the van and remained surrounded by the fully armed Police Officers. They also wanted the deponent to sit in the <ORG> Van or even in their own vehicle to which the deponent resisted strong-ly. On persistent enquiries from the deponent, one of the police officers had a talk with some of his superiors on wireless set and after completing the conversation, Mr. Dhanjay <NAME> and the driver of the said vehicle were taken away by <ORG> towards city side leaving the deponent on the road. The deponent boarded a three-wheeler and came to a nearby market. The deponent contacted <NAME>, Senior Advocate and narrated him the whole incident from a shop having STD facility. Thereafter, the deponent boarded a bus and reached Delhi at about 4.30 p.m."

On 18.1.1994 after perusing the affidavit of <NAME> and the writ petition, this Court issued notice to the respondents. Miss <NAME>, Advocate, Standing Counsel for the State of Haryana, accepted the notice on behalf of respondents 1 to 5. Copies of the petition and the affidavit had already been handed- over to her by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A direction was issued by us to respondent No. 3 to produce the detenu <NAME> and the taxi driver <NAME>, if in detention, in this Court on 19.1.1994. Respondents 3 to 5 were also directed to file an affidavit indicating the circumstances under which they took the detenu and the driver of the taxi car, <NAME>, into custody, as alleged in the petition and in the affidavit of <NAME>. Notices by ordinary means were issued to respondents 6 and 7. On 19.1.1994 respondents 3 to 5 filed their affidavits. <NAME>, Addl. Superintendent of Police, Hissar respondent No. 4 in his affidavit denied the allegations made in the writ petition as well as in the affidavit of <NAME>, Advocate. In para 1 of the affidavit he stated:

"That in reply to para No. 1 of the petition it is submitted that neither of the alleged detenues, namely, <NAME> or <NAME> are/were wanted in any case of Hissar District, nor they were over detained or confined by any police officer/official as alleged, it is also wrong and hence denied that the said alleged detenues are or over were in the unlawful, illegal and unauthorised custody of the official respondents, as alleged."

In paras 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 15 (there are no paragraphs numbered as 5 to 8) the details of the case leading to the registration of the FIR against <NAME> and others and the investigation of the case, registered on the statement of <NAME>, respondent No. 6 were given. It was asserted that the dispute between the parties was not of a civil nature. In para 12 it was admitted that an Advocate had appeared in the court of Addl. CJM, Hissar on 15.1.1994 and had filed an application for exemption from personal appearance of <NAME> and that the court had adjourned the case to 12.2.1994. Rest of the allegations were denied.

<NAME>, SHO, <ORG> Sadar Hissar, respondent No. 5, in his affidavit stated that he had been wrongly implicated in the petition and asserted that the incident as alleged in the writ petition never took place. He went on to say :

"I submit that on the relevant date i.e. 15th Jan., 1994. I was present on duty in <ORG> in the morning at about 11 am and remained in the court premises till late afternoon. .On the said date the deponent was present in court when the application was filed on behalf of <NAME>. The deponent also submitted an Application for the issuance of fresh warrants against <NAME> & <NAME> since the earlier warrants were only valid till 15.1.1994. At the time of presentation of the application the learned Magistrate directed that photocopies of the FIR & other relevant documents be also filed alongwith the application. Consequently after the departure of the petitioner & his Advocate, the deponent remained within the court premises to prepare the photocopies which were thereafter submitted to the court of the learned Magistrate on the same day. Thereafter the deponent also went to the office of the Asstt. District Attorney in connection with the scrutinising of certain challans. It is consequently submitted that the deponent could not be involved in the incident as alleged in the writ petition nor does he have any knowledge that any other police officer working in the Sadar Hissar Police Station has indulged in such activity."

Respondent No. 3, <NAME>, Superintendent of Police, in his affidavit asserted:

"That in reply to para No. 1 of the petition it is submitted that neither of the alleged detenues namely <NAME> or <NAME> are/were wanted in any case of Hissar District, nor they were ever detained or confined by any police officer/official as alleged. It is also wrong & hence denied that the said alleged detenues are or ever were in the unlawful, illegal and unauthorised custody of the official respondents, as alleged."

Thereafter, respondent No. 3 referred to the investigation in connection with the FIR registered at the instance of respondent No. 6 <NAME> and maintained that the dispute between the parties was not of a civil nature and went on to say:

"It is submitted that the petitioner has levelled these false allegations against <ORG> with ulterior motives in order to win the sympathy of <ORG>. In fact the deponent or any other police officer working under his command have never resorted to any such illegal activities as alleged by the petitioner in this para. The deponent is a staunch believer of rule of law and as such he cannot over think of flouting the rule of law. As already submitted in the proceeding paras of this affidavit neither <NAME> nor taxi driver <NAME> was ever wanted by <ORG> in any criminal case or were they over whisked away by the police personnel of <ORG> with the help of any police gypsy as alleged."

Thus, respondents 3 to 5 in their affidavits denied the allegations levelled against Haryana Police with regard to the whisking away of <NAME> and driver <NAME> on 15.1.94 and their sub-sequent detention, thereby refuting the assertions made in the affidavit of <NAME>, Advocate, and the petitioner. Since the allegations made by <NAME>, Advocate, were of a serious nature and if true they disclosed a rather disquitening state of affairs, on 19.1.1994, before proceeding further in the matter, we deemed it proper and necessary, in the first instance, to direct the Home Secretary, Government of Haryana, respondent No. 1, through his learned Advocate <NAME>, to have a search made for the detenues <NAME> and the taxi driver <NAME> and have them produced in this Court. In the course of our order, we said :

The Home Secretary, <ORG>, may if he finds it necessary take assistance from <ORG>, and on such request being made the Commissioner of Police, Delhi shall afford all assistance to him. We are issuing the directions in the name of the Home Secretary, <ORG>, to avoid any possibility of a plea being raised that respondents No. 3 to 5 are unable to trace out the taxi or the petitioner and Sushil not hailing from areas falling within their jurisdiction in Hissar.

We expect that the needful shall be done and all efforts shall be made to produce <NAME> and <NAME> in this Court tomorrow. An affidavit disclosing from where they have been brought and the whereabouts of the taxi as men-tioned above shall also be filed on behalf of Respondent No. 1."

On 20.1.1994, inspite of our specific directions (supra) no affidavit was filed by the Home Secretary, respondent No. 1. However, one more affidavit was filed by <NAME>, Superintendent of Police, respondent No. 3, "on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to. In the said affidavit it was stated that respondents 3 to 5 with the help of Delhi Police had been able to identify the taxi stand form where taxi No. DEA-3668 operated and that they were also able to ascertain the whereabouts of driver <NAME> and had contacted him. Respondent No. 3 further deposed:

"On enquiries from said taxi driver <NAME> <ORG> were told that he returned to Delhi alongwith <NAME> from Hissar on 15th January 1994 itself and left them at Daryaganj, New Delhi. The Incharge of <ORG>, Church Mission Road, <NAME>, has assured the presence of said Shri <NAME> and the concerned vehicle in the court premises today.

Further I submit that the respondents are still making efforts to trace <NAME> but as yet has no information of his whereabout specially since the police does not have any means of identifying him."

On 20.1.94, <NAME> was produced by <ORG> and the detenu <NAME> on his own also appeared in the <ORG>. Their statements were recorded on oath.

<NAME> in his statement deposed about the manner in which he had been way-laid, along with others and whisked away by <ORG> form the Delhi-Hissar Road on 15.1.94. He then stated that the police party took him and <NAME> to the Hissar Police Station where <NAME>, called them to his room and made enquiries from him regarding the case against <NAME> and others. He further stated that whereas they were kept during the day at the police station on Saturday, during the night intervening Saturday and Sunday, they (<NAME> and himself) were kept in a police 'residential quarter' behind the police station. They were let off on 17.1.1994 at about 6 or 6.30 p.m. and the taxi car was also released. They left Hissar at about 7.30 p.m. and arrived at Delhi at about 11.30 p.m. on 17.1.94. He further stated that the police officers at Hissar had told him before leaving the police station that <NAME> be told to meet and talk to the police officers, at Hissar. He went on to say that while in the police custody at Hissar, under instructions of <NAME>, they were provided with food. He went on to depose that since some personnel of <ORG> had visited his residence the previous evening and had met his sister, leaving directions for him to appear in the court, he had come to the court on his own.

<NAME> taxi driver, in his statement in the court however, gave a totally different version. He admitted that on 15.1.94, he had gone to Hissar alongwith <NAME> and <NAME> in his taxi to the court of Addl. CJM at Hissar. He then stated that after leaving the court premises, at about 12.00 or 1.00, in the afternoon on 15.1.94, all of them returned to old Delhi, reaching there at about 7 p.m. on 15.1.1994 itself. He denied that he or <NAME> were either whisked away or kept in illegal detention by <ORG>, as alleged in the petition and in the affidavit of <NAME>, Advocate. He further stated that <ORG> had contacted him at the taxi stand and that <ORG> had directed him to appear in the court and that he had been brought to the court from the taxi stand by sub-inspector, <NAME>, of <ORG>.

After recording the statements of M/s. <NAME> and <NAME> and going through the affidavits filed by the parties, we found that two diametrically opposite versions had been given and that the truth had not come out and that either of the two versions was false. Both <NAME> and Shri <NAME> also filed their affidavits on 22.1.1994. In his affidavit while Shri <NAME> reiterated the statement made by him in Court, Shri <NAME>, reiterated his case as disclosed by him in his statement in the Court. He further deposed in the affidavit that when they were whisked away, the police party, was accompanied by 'two employees of <ORG>, Hissar" and that at the Hissar Police Station. <NAME> Superintendent of Police alongwith <NAME> and other police officials had questioned him and repeatedly enquired from him about the whereabouts of <NAME>. He went on to say that on 17.1.94, when both he and the driver, were in the room of the SHO Hissar, there was a lot of activity and "we were directed to leave the police station immediately at about 6.30 p.m."

Respondent No. 6, <NAME> and Respondent No. 7, <NAME>, who appeared through their counsel, were given an opportunity to file their affidavits in view of the assertions made in the affidavit of <NAME> on 22.1.94. Both <NAME> Respondent No. 6 and <NAME> Respondent No. 7 filed their affidavits. Apart from dealing with the dispute between <ORG> and <ORG> in general and with <NAME> in particular, (with which case we are not concerned at this stage) it is stated in their affidavits that <NAME> or the taxi driver <NAME> were never in their custody and that they had no knowledge about the allegations made in the petition with regard to the incident of 15.1.94. Both Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 further stated that they could say with some amount of responsibility, after making enquiries from their staff, that neither the respondents nor any of the employees of their company were present in the court or at the alleged site along with police on the Hissar-Delhi Road on 15.1.94 as alleged.

On 1.2.94 after scrutinising the affidavits on the record and the statements of <NAME> and <NAME> we found that it was not possible to reconcile the two versions. We felt that it was a matter of concern that in the Highest Court of the land, false version by way of affidavits or statements had been made. In our order dated 1.2.94, we observed:

"Though the petition for Habeas Corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of the case which have come on record, does not survive, as at the time of the return, the detenu was not, on his own showing under any illegal detention and technically, therefore, the writ petition does not survive but keeping in view the developments which have taken place during the proceedings of this case, we cannot let the matters rest there........

The matter requires to be taken to the logical conclusion. In the womb of every conclusion lies the seed of detection. We have to get the truth detected which lies buried somewhere under the debris of falsehood in this case. Before we proceed further in this matter, it appears appropriate to us that we should have this matter enquired into and get a report as to which of the two versions, above mentioned, is prima facie correct."

We, accordingly, directed the <ORG> to have the matter enquired into under the supervision of an officer, not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, and submit a report to this Court within seven weeks. We directed that the <ORG> shall confine the enquiry and its report to find out as to which of the two versions regarding the alleged incident of 15.1.94 on the Hissar- Delhi Road and the subsequent detention of the detenu and <NAME> was correct. We clarified that the <ORG> would not be required to go into the truthfulness or merits of the criminal case arising out of FIR No. 663/93, <ORG> Sadar Hissar but shall restrict its enquiry to the determination of the correctness of the two versions as noticed above.

In obedience to our directions, the <ORG> conduced an enquiry, recorded evidence, and submitted its report under the signatures of <NAME>, DIC, <ORG>. Copies of the report and other documents were permitted to be obtained by the parties.

The <ORG> inter alia in its report submitted :

"Based on the facts and evidence discussed above, the picture emerges that on 15.1.1994, <NAME> while travelling back to Delhi after attending <ORG>, <NAME>, alongwith <NAME>, Advocate, in Taxi No. DAE-3668 (maruti van) driven by <NAME>, was intercepted by Haryana <ORG> near <NAME> Cantt., at about 12.30 p.m. <NAME>, Advocate, was let off by the <ORG> after 'arguments'. <NAME> alongwith <NAME> were taken to <ORG> Station, Sadar and confined there in a quarter behind the <ORG> Station from 15th January, 1994 to 17th January, 1994 afternoon. This is borne out by the statements of <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocate. <NAME> after being let off by the <ORG>, made a call to <NAME>, Sr. Advocate, <ORG>, New Delhi from a PCO Tel. No. 63318 and thereafter came back to Delhi by bus. This finds support form the printout of PCO No. 63318 as also from the Ticket No. 68648 DN/6-93 which he has produced in the course of enquiry. The plea of ignorance about the incident by <NAME>, SSP, <NAME>, <NAME>, Addl. SP. <NAME> and <NAME>, SHO, <ORG>, <NAME>, ex facie does not appear to be correct. The aforesaid three officers have taken special interest in the investigation of case FIR No. 663/93, registered at <ORG>, <NAME>..........

The <ORG> then concluded :

"According to the enquiry conducted by the <ORG>, the version given by <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocate, in <ORG> is prima facie correct. <NAME>, Taxi Driver, has corroborated this version in his statement made to the <ORG>. Other evidence viz. telephone call by <NAME>, Advocate on 15.1.94, Bus ticket produced by him, Statement of taxi owner <NAME>, the sketch map drawn by <NAME> corroborates the version submitted by them to <ORG>." (emphasis supplied) The report of the <ORG> was accepted by the <ORG>, after hearing learned counsel for the parties.

The report of the <ORG>, clearly indicates that the version given by respondents 3 to 5 and <NAME> in his first affidavit and in his deposition in this Court is palpably false. The description of the place of detention i.e. the malkhana of the Police Station, and identification of the constables who were guarding the detenues at the police station, by the detenu has satisfied us that the version given by <NAME> regarding his illegal detention is correct. The evidence collected by the <ORG> unmistakably supports the version contained in the affidavit of <NAME>, Advocate. These three respondents denied the allegations made by <NAME>, <NAME>, Advocate and the petitioner in the writ petition. It is interesting to note that <NAME>, respondent No. 3 in his affidavit desposed that he had "examined the records of Police Station Hissar" to find out about the correctness of allegations of detention and came to know that the said allegations were false. Since, the detenu and <NAME>, taxi driver had been illegally detained at the police station no record could have revealed, their detention. Therefore, the exercise conducted by <NAME> respondent No. 3 of examining the record of the police station was obviously a comaflogue and a cover up. That apart, neither <NAME> nor <NAME> or <NAME> stated in their affidavits that <NAME> had not been called to the office of <NAME>, respondent No. 3 during the detention of <NAME> and the taxi driver nor did respondent No. 3 refute the allegations of <NAME> that when he was released form custody he was advised to tell <NAME> to meet the police officials. None of the respondents in the counter affidavit have even stated that they had not seen the detenu in the police station between 15.1.1994 to 17.1.1994. They have remained silent on this aspect. Nothing has been brought to our notice from which the correctness of the contents of the affidavit of <NAME> or <NAME> about the illegal detention may be doubted. From a critical analysis of the material collected by the <ORG>, as Commissioners of this Court, and hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion, that <NAME> and <NAME> Taxi Driver were way laid on 15.1.94 on the Hissar Delhi Road which they were returning to Delhi in the taxi along with <NAME>, Advocate and while <NAME> was let off after some arguments with the police personnel, the detenu and <NAME> taxi driver were illegally detained by respondent 3 to 5 at the Hissar Police Station till 17.1.94. The counters filed by respondents 3 to 5 denying the allegations made by the petitioner and in the affidavit of <NAME>, Puri are palpably false and incorrect.

The <ORG> examined <NAME>, Incharge <ORG> Post Fatehpuri, PS Lahori Gate on 7.4.94, who stated before the <ORG> that after receiving a wireless message from <ORG> for immediate search of <NAME> and <NAME>, he made efforts to locate them. He located <NAME> along with vehicle No. DAE-3668 and brought him to <ORG> Outpost Fatehpuri. The information was passed on to his senior officers as well as to the SSP <NAME> camping at Haryana Bhavan. <NAME> further told the <ORG> that at about 8.30 p.m. on 19.1.94 Shri S.L. Goel Addl. S.P. <NAME> along with <NAME> <ORG> Station Sadar, <NAME>, reached police-post and made inquiries from <NAME> separately. They took away <NAME> along with the taxi for producing him in <ORG>. <NAME> informed his senior officers about it and also made an entry to this effect in the Roznamacha of the <ORG> Station vide Entry No. 22 at 10.10 p.m. on 19.1.94. The Roznamacha entry was checked by the <ORG> and it tallied with the statement made by <NAME>, who also stated before the <ORG> that on 20.1.94 <NAME> reported to him at the <ORG>-post Church Mission Road and he produced him in <ORG> and that Shri <NAME> had met <NAME> in the outpost on 20th morning also. According to the statement of <NAME>, taxi driver, before the <ORG>, respondents 4 and 5 had pressurised him to make a false statement in this Court and deny the allegations contained in the petition and in the affidavit of <NAME>, Advocate, and that he had acted accordingly for fear of the Haryana <ORG>.

The <ORG> in its report dealt with this aspect of the matter and stated:

"From the enquiry, it also emerges that <NAME>, Driver of Taxi No. DAE-3668 was contacted by the Haryana Police and briefed by them to make a false statement in <ORG> on 20.1.1994 denying the incident of way-laying of 15.1.94, Shri <NAME>, originally hailing form U.P. is semi-literate and simple person who has been living in Delhi for the last 6/7 years for making a living. Because of the inconsistent posture adopted by him, he was cau-tioned to make a correct statement before the <ORG>. He was firm that he was making a correct statement before the <ORG> and regrets having made a false statement in <ORG> earlier on the advice of Haryana Police. He also agreed to have his statement taperecorded in presence of independent witnesses. This lends assurance to the conclusion that the statement being made by him now is a correct version of facts and this finds corroboration in the statement of <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocate. <NAME>, Advocate, is a professional and despite the fact of his having been engaged by the petitioner in the impugned criminal case, he appears to have no axe to grid with any party and as such there appears to be no reason for his making a false statement before <ORG> and the <ORG>. In fact, his version finds support from the statement of Shri <NAME>, Sr. Advo-cate....................

However, the version of <NAME> that <NAME> and Shri <NAME> of <ORG>, were present on 15.1.94 at the time of his way-laying seems to be suspect."

We are of the opinion that the findings of the <ORG> as noticed above are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and are supported by the material on the record. Since, prima facie, we found that respondents 3 to 5 and <NAME>, taxi driver have made false statements and filed false affidavits in this court and have thus committed the offence of perjury, therefore with a view to eradicate the evil of perjury, we put them on notice to show cause as to why they should not be prosecuted for the said offence in a competent court.

As already noticed the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94 had been filed "on behalf of respondents 1 to 5". That affidavit as per the report of the <ORG> and our finding has been found to be false. Respondent No. 1, despite the directions issued by this <ORG> on 19.1.94, had not filed any affidavit. Notices were, therefore, issued to respondents 1 to 5 and <NAME> also to show cause why they should not be punished for having committed contempt of this <ORG>.

<NAME> SHO respondent No. 5 in his reply to the show cause notice in the contempt proceedings tendered an unconditional and unqualified apology and further deposed :

"In view of what I have stated above, while in no way seeking to diminish my role in the events that have transpired so far, I submit that I have only acted as a diligent subordinate officer of <ORG>. I unequivocally apologise to <ORG> for my mistakes and seek leniency and pardon and pray that no further action be taken against me. 1 undertake to <ORG> that I shall in future be very careful and cautious and ensure that such events do not recur in my professional life."

It is, thus, seen that respondent No. 5 has taken shelter under the plea that he had "only acted as a diligent subordinate officer of <ORG>". <NAME>, respondent No. 3 who possesses the degrees of LL.B. and LL.M. from <ORG> and had practised law for about four years before joining the service, in response to the show cause notice in the contempt proceedings also tendered an unqualified apology. He gave an account of his duties during his service career and filed copies of various commendation and appreciation certificates received by him from various quarters. He then went on to say that "the instant case, in my humble submission:

"is just an inadvert mishap of my life resulting into present unsavory situation".

Respondent No. 4 <NAME>, Additional Superintendent of Police in his affidavit filed on 21.10.1994 in the contempt proceedings first assorted that his role in the investigation of the case was restricted to a period of six days only i.e. from 4.1.1994 to 9.1.1994 and that the Superintendent of Police, <NAME>, was concerned with the investigation and being his superior officer, he had acted under his directions. He then again stated that "the answering respondent was not connected with the incidents of way laid (sic) and detaining of <NAME> or <NAME> in any manner", and that he had no hand in the filing of the affidavit by Respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94. He went on to add:

"On 18.1.94 the answering respondent received a message, to contact <NAME>, Superintendent Police of <ORG> in New Delhi in respect of a <ORG> case. On this the answering respondent rushed to Delhi and came to know at <ORG> that <NAME> is with the standing counsel. Smt. <NAME> at her residence. The answering respondent thereafter went to the residence-cum-office of Smt <NAME> in the evening where <NAME> and <NAME> were present. <NAME> apprises, the answering respondent about the writ petition in the <ORG> and instructed him to sign an affidavit, which had already been prepared by the counsel on the instructions of <NAME>. <NAME>, the Super-intendent of Police said to the answering respondent that he had already verified the facts regarding the writ petition on 17.1.94 by personally visiting the Police Station Sadar Hissar and making enquiries from <ORG> Staff. The answering respondent was told that his affidavit has also been prepared on the basis of the aforesaid enquiry. It may be noted that this fact is borne out by the statement of <NAME> to the <ORG>. This fact is also written by <NAME> in Daily Diary 26 dated 17.1.94 in police station Sadar Hissar in his own hand. The answering respondent therefore signed this affidavit of his on the assurance of the correctness of the facts by <NAME> and Shri <NAME>. The answering respondent had perused the concerned papers and the case diaries shown to him by Shri <NAME>."

<NAME>, IAS, Commissioner and Secretary to <ORG>, <ORG>, respondent No. 1 in response to the notice in the contempt proceedings filed his affidavit on 21.10.94 in which he expressed his regret and tendered an unqualified apology for all that had transpired in this <ORG> in this case. He thereafter proceeded to give an explanation "for the purpose of showing that if any lapse has occurred, it could either be on account of a bonafide misunderstanding or on account of deficiencies in the system which are being rectified to ensure that they do not recur". Respondent No. 1 then stated that the order of the <ORG> dated 19.1.94 was received by him by Fax for the first time on 20.1.94 and that he had then contested <NAME>, the then Director General of Police, Haryana, and discussed the matter with him on telephone. He also wrote a D.O. letter to <NAME> and that after 20.1.94, he had asked <ORG> and the senior counsel as to whether any further action was required to be taken by him and in particular whether in view of the fact that the detenues had appeared before the court on 20.1.94, any affidavit was required to be filed by him and that he was "advised by senior counsel that on his reading of the order no affidavit needed to be filed by him as the State had not produced the detenues". Respondent No. 1 then explained the procedure which was being followed by the State of Haryana in connection with petitions for habeas corpus and stated that :

"Although the <ORG> of Haryana is impleaded in criminal writs in the name of Home Secretary, the practice so far has been that in matter which are directly within the knowledge of the local police, it is they who depose an affidavit on behalf of the <ORG>. The system was evolved since it obviates a lot of delay which would necessarily occur in information being passed from one centre to another. It is for this reason that the officers directly dealing with the matter and who are themselves a part of the law enforcement agency directly depose about the facts in their direct knowledge. Keeping in view the facts which have transpired in the present case, it has now been decided to create an independent cell at the police headquarters in Chandigarh as well as in <ORG> (who would report to the Home Secretary) to monitor all cases where writs of habeas corpus are sought by citizens either from <ORG> or from <ORG>."

<NAME>, IPS, the then Director General of Police, respon-dent No. 2, in his affidavit filed on 20.10.94 in response to the show cause notice after tendering his unconditional apology corroborated the aver- ments contained in the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 in all material particulars. Both the affidavits were, however, silent about the contents of the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 "on behalf of respondents 1 to 5" on 20.1.94. Both respondents 1 and 2 were directed by us to explain their stand vis-a-vis the contents of the affidavit filed by <NAME>, respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94 on behalf of respondents 1 to 5, which has been found by us to be incorrect.

Further affidavits were therefore filed by both, respondents 1 and 2, to explain their position vis-a-vis the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94 on behalf of "respondents 1 to 5". In his affidavit <NAME>, respondent No. 1, stated that he had not seen the affidavit of <NAME> dated 20.1.94, before the same had been filed in this Court and that he came to know about the said affidavit subsequently and saw the copy of the affidavit for the first time only on 21.1.94. He went on to state that after going through that affidavit, which he had no occasion to see before it was filed as well as perusing the report and the evidence marshalled by the <ORG> he had no reason to differ from the opinion given by the <ORG>, and went on to specifically say:

"As regards that part of the affidavit where <NAME> has suggested that <NAME> and <NAME> were not in the custody of <ORG>, the <ORG> has prima facie for otherwise and I have no reason to differ form the view expressed by the <ORG>."

<NAME>, IPS, respondent No. 2 also in his additional affidavit besides once again tendering unqualified apology stated that he had not seen the affidavit of <NAME> before it was filed in this Court on 20.1.94 and that it was only upon a request made by him, that the copy of the affidavit was later on sent to him at Chandigarh. He then went on to refer to some of the evidence recorded by the <ORG> and its report and stated :

"I am to state that I have not conduced any enquiry, nor examined any witnesses or documents, in this case. I have, however, no reason whatsoever to differ from the prima facie conclusions arrived at by the <ORG> on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence mar-shalled by them."

Respondent No. 2 thereafter dealt specifically with the statement made by <NAME> in his affidavit dated 19.1.94 and 20.1.94 denying the allegations made in the petition and deposed:

"The <ORG> enquiries on the other hand have shown that this version does not appear to be correct. I would, therefore, respectfully submit that this part of the affidavit of <NAME>, which is contrary to facts found through examination of witnesses and other enquiries by the <ORG>, is not accepted by me. "

In his affidavit dated 21.10.94, in the proceedings for perjury, <NAME> respondent No. 3, once again denied the allegations contained in the petition regarding the way-laying and detention of the petitioner and <NAME> and then went on to say that the allegations "had not been proved even from the evidence recorded by the <ORG>", Explaining the contents of his affidavit dated 20.1.94, he stated that the same had been filed "on the basis of the relevant record and as per legal advice and sanction". He assorted that:

"the deponent did not pressurise or induce <NAME> directly or indirectly to give any false statement".

We are at a loss to understand as to how respondent No. 3 could have deposed about the facts in his affidavit "as per legal advice and sanction". Since, we have already held the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 19.1.94 and 20.1.94 to be false, we need not detain ourselves to make any further observations in that behalf.

<NAME>, taxi driver, in his affidavit filed on 18.10.94, after tendering his unqualified apology and reiterating that he had earlier also tendered his unconditional apology at the hearing through his counsel and sought pardon from this <ORG> and placing himself at the mercy of the <ORG> went on to depose:

The deponent reiterates that the false statement and subsequently the supporting false affidavit made on 20.1.94 and 22.1.94 respectively were made on account of fear as the deponent along with the petitioner had been detained at Hissar for two days i.e. 15.1.94 to 17.1.94. Thereafter the deponent was approached by the respon-dents No. 4 and 5 at the Feteh Puri Police Chowki on 19.1.94, where the deponent was brought, so as to appear on the next day before <ORG>. At that point of time the deponent was told to state before <ORG> that he had not been detained at Hissar on 15th January 1994 or thereafter. Out of fear of the police the deponent made a false statement before <ORG> on 20.1.94 that he had not been detained at Hissar on the said date."

<NAME>, respondent No. 4, in his reply affidavit in proceedings for perjury inter alia stated :

That the conclusion of the <ORG> report attributing the charge that <NAME> was taken away from <ORG>, Church Mission Road, Fatehpuri, Delhi by the answering respondent and SHO <NAME> is erroneous. The true facts in this regard are revealed by <NAME> himself in the statement before the <ORG>, as well as in his statement through counsel before <ORG> during the course of hearing that he was not taken away any where by the answering respondent on 19.1.94. <NAME> has stated in unequivocal term that Shri <NAME> SHO alone had tutored him to make a false statement before the court on the 19.1.94 and again on the morning of 20.1.94. The answering respon-dent had visited <ORG>, Church Mission Road, Fatehpuri, Delhi under the orders of <NAME>, Superintendent of Police only to verify that <NAME> has been traced out so that his presence before the <ORG> on 20.1.94 had been ensured. After verify-ing the facts, the answering respondent conveyed the facts to <NAME> <NAME>. Thereafter the answering respondent returned to his room in Haryana Bbawan, where he was staying separately and he had no communication either with <NAME> or the SHO during that night. The answering respondent has not influenced or tried to influence <NAME> in any manner to make a false statement. The answering respondent has unfortunately been bracketed alongwith respondents 3 and 5 only because of his being a subordinate to <NAME> and happened to be present at Haryana Bhawan New Delhi on the night of 19th January 1994, on the direction of <NAME>."

<NAME> SHO respondent No. 5 also apart form tendering an unqualified apology denied the allegation that he had tutored <NAME> or induced him to file a false affidavit or make a false statement in this Court.

We have minutely considered the affidavits referred to above and the report of the <ORG>. The evidence of <NAME> of <ORG>, which is supported by the <NAME> entries of <ORG> and the statement of <NAME> as recorded by the <ORG> and his affidavit in <ORG> establish that respondents 4 and 5 had pressurised <NAME> to give false evidence in this <ORG> and that both of them have, thus, tampered with the evidence during the pendency of the proceedings in this <ORG>. The denial of respondents 4 and 5 to have tutored <NAME> carries no conviction and does not appeal to us. The denial is, obviously, false.

After carefully perusing the material on the record, including the evidence both documentary and oral as recorded by the <ORG> and hearing learned counsel for the parties, the following irresistible conclusions there-fore arise:

(a) That the detenu <NAME>, driver <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocate, were way-laid by <ORG> on the Hissar-Delhi road on 15.1.94, though they were not wanted in any case by <ORG>.

(b) That while <NAME>, <NAME> was allowed to leave after some arguments, the police personnel took <NAME> and <NAME> to the police station and detained them there till the evening of 17th January 1994, Neither respondent 6 or 7 nor any of their employees was present with the police on 15.1.94 when <NAME> and others were way laid on the Hissar- Delhi border. The affidavit filed by <NAME>, <NAME> contains a true and correct account of the incident.

(c) That respondents 3 to 5 were taking 'special interest in the investigation of case FIR No. 663/93 registered at the Police Station Sadar, Hissar' on the complaint of respondent No. 6.

(d) That the affidavit filed in reply to the habeas corpus petition by respondent No. 3 on behalf of respondents 1 to 5 on 20.1.1994 denying the allegations is false.

(e) That the affidavits filed by respondents 3 to 5 denying the way-laying of the detenu and others on 15.1.94 and their subsequent detention at the police station are false.

(f) That the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94 on behalf of respondents 1 to 5 was filed by him without the express knowledge of respondents 1 and 2 and both of them had not seen the said affidavit till its copy was supplied to them by the counsel for the State of Haryana.

(g) That both the statements made by <NAME> driver in the court on 20.1.94 and his affidavit dated 22.1.1994 supporting the version of respondents 3 to 5 are false.

(h) That respondents 4 and 5 had met <NAME> driver at Delhi and pressurised him to give a tutored false version in this Court.

(i) That the false statement and affidavit were made by <NAME> on being tutored by respondents 4 and 5 and on account of the fear of <ORG> on 20.1.94 and 22.1.94 respectively.

(j) That respondents 6 and 7 are not concerned either with the filing of the false affidavits by respondent No. 3 to 5 or for tutoring of <NAME>, by respondents 4 and 5, to make a false statement and file a false affidavit in this Court.

(k) That respondents 1 and 2 did not file any reply to the rule nisi and inspite of the directions issued by this Court on 19.1.94 respondent No. 1 did not file any reply affidavit and dealt with the case in a rather causal manner.

The question, therefore, which now requires our consideration is as to what action, is required to be taken against the respondents.

Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (for short the Act) defines criminal contempt as "the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or visible representation or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever to (1) scandalised or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of any court; (2) prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or (3) interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. Thus, any conduct which has the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or the due course of judicial proceedings amounts to the commission of criminal contempt. The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings in any court of law exposes the intention of the concerned party in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even while appearing as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the filing of false evidence, commits criminal contempt of the court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act. Filing of false affidavits or making false statement on oath in Courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law and no court can ignore such conduct which has the tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions because the very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law. The stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly so that the message perculates loud and clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or the administration of justice. <CITATION> ,  1 SCC 421, the respondent produced a false and fabricated certificate to defeat the claim of the respondent for transfer of a case. This action was found to be an act amounting to interference with the administration of justice. Brother <NAME>, J. speaking for the Bench observed :

"the stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the <ORG>. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the ad-ministration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice."

The actions of respondents 3 to 5 in filing false affidavits and denying that the detenu and <NAME> had been whisked away and detained illegally in their custody between 15th January 1994 and 17th of January 1994 is not only reprehensible and condemnable but also requires to be dealt with rather sternly. The belated apologies offered by them, though still maintaining that the detenu and <NAME> had not been detained by them, even in the face of the evidence recorded by the <ORG>, as commissioner of this <ORG>, and its report are not apologies of a truly repentent person but made obviously with a view to escape punishment. Had respon-dents 3 to 5 been sincere in their apologies and had they realised their mistake, there was no reason why respondents 4 and 5 should have sub-sequently indulged in acts which have the effect of aggravating their contumacious conduct. During the pendency of the proceedings in this <ORG>, as already observed, respondent No. 4 <NAME> and respon-dent No. 5 <NAME>, SHO 'tutored' <NAME> taxi driver and 'forced' him to make a false statement and filed a false affidavit in this court and to falsely assert that he had never been way laid by <ORG> and that the story of detention as put forward by <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocate, was false. Subsequently, not only before the <ORG> but also in this <ORG> <NAME> realised his mistake and gave the correct version of the occurrence and also disclosed as to how and why he had made the false statement. It is a matter not only of regret and concern but also causes us great anguish to notice that the police officials, respondents 4 and 5, should have indulged in tutoring <NAME> and forced him to give false evidence while proceedings were pending in this <ORG>. They have aggravated their contumacious acts. Their action was deliberate and an attempt to over reach the due process of law without compunction. Their action is an affront to the Majesty of Law. Under the circumstances, the question of accepting their belated apology for which a very strong plea was made by their learned counsel, Mr. <NAME>, Mr. <NAME> and Mr. <NAME> does not arise and we have no hesitation whatsoever in rejecting the belated apologies tendered by respondents 3 to 5, which we do not find to be genuine, bonafide or expression of true repentance.

From the facts set out above and the findings recorded by the <ORG>, respondents 3 to 5 have, thus committed a grave contempt of this <ORG> by not only interfering with the due course of justice but also making calculated and deliberate attempts to obstruct the administration of justice.

Besides respondents 4 and 5, as already noticed, have aggravated their contumacious acts by tampering with the evidence during the pen-dency of proceedings in this court. They have deflected the course of judicial proceedings. Both of them, therefore, deserve to be punished properly not only for the wrong done by them but also to give a proper signal and deter others from indulging in similar type of activities. In our opinion, the interest of public justice demands a deterrent sentence to be imposed upon them.

Though, respondent No. 3 was present in Haryana Bhavan on 19.1.94 and 20.1.94, but there is no material on the record to show that he was also a party to the tampering of evidence of <NAME>. Indeed, he must have been kept informed by his subordinates but in the absence of any positive material on the record, we cannot fasten the liability on him for forcing <NAME> to give false evidence in this Court.

We, sentence respondent No. 3 to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months for committing contempt of court by filing false affidavits denying the allegations made in the writ petition and in the affidavit of <NAME>.

So far as respondents 4 and 5 are concerned, instead of showing any real contriteness and regret for their wrongful action of filing false affidavits in this Court they have compounded their offence by tutoring <NAME> to give false evidence in this Court and have tampered with the evidence during the pendency of proceedings in this Court, we, there-fore, sentence each one of them to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months each and to pay a fine of Rs. 1500 each and in default to further undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days each.

So far as respondents 6 and 7 are concerned, there is no material to show that they are either responsible for the filing of the false affidavits by respondents 3 to 5 or for tampering of evidence during the pendency of proceedings in this Court. May be respondents 3 to 5, acted in the objectionable and high-handed manner to way lay and detain Shri <NAME> and <NAME> during the investigation of the case FIR No. 663/93 registered on the statement of respondent No. 6 at <NAME>, Hissar, to please someone but this is only in the realm of suspicion and it cannot be said with any amount of certainty whether it was over-zealous- ness on the part of respondents 3 to 5 during the investigation of the case or they were trying to prove themselves 'to be more loyal than the king' or were acting under any extrneous pressure. We are satisfied that neither respondents 6 and 7 nor any of their employees was present with the police on 15.1.94 on the Hissar-Delhi Road.

But be that as it may, respondent 6 and 7 cannot be held responsible for or privy to the actions of respondents 3 to 5 and they cannot be said to have committed any contempt of this Court. The rule against them is accordingly discharged.

So far as respondent No. 1 Mr. <NAME>, Commissioner and Secretary to <ORG>, <ORG> is concerned, he did not file any counter affidavit to the rule nisi issued by this <ORG>. Even in response to the specific directions of this <ORG> dated 19.1.94, he chose not to file a counter affidavit. Complaints regarding detention of citizens cannot be permitted to be treated in such a casual manner by the <ORG>. Whenever a question is raised regarding the illegal detention of a citizen in a writ of Habeas Corpus and the court issues the rule nisi, a duty is cast on the <ORG>, through its functionaries and particularly those who are arrayed as respondents to the writ petition, to satisfy the court that the detention of the citizen was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory requirements of the law but also with the requirements implicit in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. It is obligatory on the part of the respondent <ORG> to place before the <ORG> all relevant facts relating to the impugned detention truly, clearly and with utmost fairness through an affidavit. An affidavit in reply is required to be filed by the respondents not as a mere formality but to truly assist the court in drawing permissible inferences from the rival contentions. The right of personal liberty of a citizen is all too precious and no one can be permitted to interfere with it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The <ORG> owes an obligation to the courts to place all relevant facts before the court in all cases where interference is alleged by a citizen with his fundamental rights. Respondents 1 and 2 were, therefore, under a legal obligation to inform this <ORG> of the facts regarding the alleged detention of <NAME> and <NAME>, since notice had been issued to them in the writ petition. Even after this <ORG> gave specific directions to respondent No. 1 to file an affidavit about the steps taken by the <ORG> to trace and produce the detenues in the <ORG>, he failed to file the affidavit. We cannot but disapprove the manner in which respondent No. 1 acted even after being apprised of the directions of this court to file his counter affidavit. In his affidavit dated 21.10.94 filed in response to the notice to show cause in the contempt proceedings, respondent No. 1 stated :

"After 20th January, 1994, I made further enquiries from our legal department including Senior Counsel as to whether, any further action was required to be taken by me in this matter and in particular whether in view of the fact that detenues had appeared before <ORG> on 20th January, 1994. My understanding of the Order of this Hon'ble Court was that I should trace out the detenues and inform this Court on affidavit as to the location form where they were found. Since Mr. <NAME> himself appeared in Court while <NAME> had been produced by <ORG>, and was not produced by the Haryana Police/Govern-ment. I had a bonafide and genuine doubt as to what precise course of action was to be adopted by me. On this, I was advised by Senior Counsel that on his reading of the order no affidavit needed to be filed by me as the <ORG> had not "produced" the detenues."

We do not think that there was any scope for not understanding the import of our order dated 19.1.94, wherein a specific direction had been given to respondent No. 1 to file his affidavit. Admittedly, the <ORG> officials respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had traced the taxi and had met <NAME> before he was produced in <ORG>. Respondent No. 1 was therefore duty bound to place this information before the court and to obey the directions of this <ORG> and file his affidavit. We fail to understand why any advice was required by him from a senior counsel as to whether or not to comply with the order of this <ORG>. The directions of this <ORG> are meant to be complied with and punctually obeyed by all concerned. We have no reason to doubt that a senior IAS Officer of the status of the Home Secretary of a <ORG> would not be aware of the provisions of Article 144 of the Constitution which mandates that "all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme <ORG>". These authorities are legally obliged not only to act in aid of the Supreme <ORG> for the enforcement of the law declared by the Supreme <ORG> but also in aid of all its orders, decrees or directions. Respondents No. 1, by not filing the reply affidavit acted in a casual manner.

Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit dated 21.10.94 has detailed the system and procedure which was being followed by <ORG> in cases of complaints of detention by the citizens. He deposed that the procedure hithertofore being followed had been that the local police authorities file affidavits in courts even where <ORG> is impleaded in the name of the Home Secretary and the officers directly dealing with the matters, file affidavits depose about the facts in response to the rule nisi. He has then averred that a decision has now been taken by the <ORG> to create an independent Cell at the Police Headquarters at Chandigarh as well as in <ORG> to monitor all cases where writs of Habeas Corpus are sought by citizens either from <ORG>, or from this Court so that without delay the requisite information can be placed before the courts by the appropriate authority and no lapses occur on the part of the <ORG> in that behalf in future. Respondent No. 1 has then stated in his affidavit:

"I respectfully reiterate that my actions in the present case have been purely motivated by my bonafide understanding of situation and also on advice received by me. They have not at all emanated from any sense of casualness as, I submit with great respect, that as Home Secretary I would never ever be casual in relation to matters pending in <ORG> or in any other court.

I respectfully once again tender my unqualified apology for any lapse that might have Occurred and respectfully pray that the notice for contempt may be discharged."

In his further affidavit dated 10.11.94 which was filed in continuation of the affidavit dated 21.10.94, Respondent No. 1 has stated that he had not seen the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94 before it was tendered in this court and that he had not even seen the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 19.1.94 or on 20.1.94 and that after carefully perusing the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 on 20.1.94 and the report of the <ORG>, he found no reason to differ from the opinion given by the <ORG>, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, that <NAME> and <NAME> had been way laid on 15.1.94 and kept in illegal detention from the afternoon of 15.1.94 to 17.1.94 by <ORG>. Mr. <NAME>, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 very frankly conceded that there was lapse on the part of the Home Secretary in not filing the affidavit in response to the rule nisi and the directions given by this <ORG> but he submitted that the lapse had occurred on account of a wrong understanding of the import of the order of the <ORG> and faulty advice given to him. He submitted that Respondent No. 1 was truly sorry for his lapses and requested for his apology to be accepted.

From a consideration of the material on the record, we find that respondent No. 1 appears to have followed a faulty system, which was prevailing in the State of Haryana in cases involving detention of the citizens in the matter of filing of counter affidavit in petitions for habeas corpus and on a wrong understanding of the import of the order of this Court. We are, however, satisfied that the unqualified apology tendered by him is genuine and an expression of real contriteness and repentance. Therefore, while cautioning him to be careful in future, we accept his unqualified apology and the contempt proceedings initiated against him are allowed to rest here. The rule issued against him is discharged. We hope that such lapses shall not occur in the future, since the system, we have been assured, has now been revamped.

So far as respondent No. 2 is concerned, he also failed to appreciate his obligations and did not file a counter affidavit although notice was issued to him also in the habeas corpus petition. While dealing with the case of respondent No. 1, we have highlighted the obligations of the <ORG> and its functionaries, when a rule nisi is issued by a court in a habeas corpus petition and those observations apply to him also and we need not repeat the same. Respondent No. 2 has also filed two affidavits and in each one of them he has explained the steps taken by him after he was apprised of the pendency of the writ petition in this Court. He has corroborated the version given by Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit. After giving the explanation, he has also tendered an unqualified apology. It appears to us that respondent No. 2 is also truly respondent for the lapses committed by him and the unqualified apology tendered by him is genuine and bonafide and not made with a view to escape punishment. We, therefore, accept his unqualified apology and discharge the rule against him though warning him to be careful and not to be casual in such like matters in future.

So far as <NAME> taxi driver is concerned, he on his own showing has made a false statement in this Court. He has also filed a false affidavit. He has on his own showing, thus, committed a grave contempt of this Court, besides committing perjury. However, he disclosed the correct facts to the <ORG> and reiterated the same subsequently in this Court through his affidavit. He has placed himself at the mercy of the court, after tendering an unconditional and unqualified apology, which has been reiterated at the bar both by him personally and through his Advocate <NAME>. From the report of the <ORG> and the other material on the record, we are satisfied that the false statements made by him in this court, both orally and through his affidavit, were not voluntary and that he was acting under pressure of respondents 4 and 5. It is, however, no defence for him to say that he so acted on account of the fear of the police of Haryana and that he had been 'tutored' by respondents 4 and 5 to make a false statement and file a false affidavit in this Court. He should have known better. Though, we are of the opinion that he his now repentant but he cannot be allowed to go scot free for the falsehood indulged into by him in this Court and for his attempt to poison the stream of justice. However, taking the mitigating circumstances also into consideration, we sentence him to one days' simple imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment, for commit- ting contempt of this Court.

Since, from the report of the <ORG> and our own independent appraisal of the evidence recorded bv the <ORG>, we have come to the conclusion that <NAME> and <NAME> had been illegally detained by respondents 3 to 5 from the afternoon of 15.1.94 to 17.1.94, the <ORG> must be held responsible for the unlawful acts of its officers and it must repair the damage done to the citizens by its officers for violating their indivisible fundamental right of personal liberty without any authority of law in an absolutely high-handed manner. We would have been, therefore, inclined to direct the <ORG> Government of Haryana to compensate <NAME> and <NAME> but since <NAME> has indulged in false-hood in this Court and <NAME>, has also exaggerated the incident by stating that on 15.1.94 when he was way laid along with <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocate, two employees of respondents 6 and 7 were also present with the police party, which version has not been found to be correct by the <ORG>, they both have disentitled themselves from receiving any compensation, as monetary amends for the wrong done by respondents 3 to 5, in detaining them. We, therefore do not direct the payment of any compensation to them.

Since, we have held respondents 3 to 5 and <NAME>, guilty of committing contempt of this Court and have punished them in the manner indicated above, we. drop the proceedings in so far as commission of perjury is concerned.

<NAME>, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment written by my learned brother Dr. <NAME>, J., and I entirely endorse what has been said by him, the orders passed and the directions given by my learned brother. Learned brother has in his judgment elaborately set out the relevant facts in details as well as the circumstances under which the unfortunate situation has been brought about by the concerned police officials and in fact it is not necessary for me to add anything further. But with profound respect to my learned brother I propose to express a few concurring observations of my own as I cannot remain without expressing my anguish and grave displeasure on the undesirable conduct with which the said police officials have projected themselves. It is perhaps one of the most unpleasant episode in the history of the force which has bene exposed in the portals of the highest court of land which has plunged the members of the force and its reputation to a new low probably out of a frenetic zeal to please some one best known to the officials concerned.

In the present case before us it appears the concerned police officials deliberately clogged their mind and shut their eyes to the realities and the fact that the primary duties and function of the members of the police force is to prevent and detect the crime, to take such measures to ensure the safety of the life, property and liberty of the citizens and accord such protection in that behalf as may be necessary and thereby serve the community and at the same time obey the orders issued to them by the competent authorities with regard to prevention of commission of offences and public nuisance etc. It was this object for which the police force was conceived and it was this purpose for which it exists. But to our dismay, it is distressing to note that quite often when every morning one opens the newspapers and goes through its various columns, one feels very much anguished and depressed in reading reports of custodial rapes and deaths, kidnapping, abduction and faked police encounters and all sorts of other offences and lawlessness by the police personnel, of which countless glaring and concrete examples are not lacking.

It is in common knowledge that in recent times our administrative system is passing through a most practical phase, particularly, the policing system which is not as effective as it ought to be and unless some practical correctional steps and measures are taken without further delay, the danger looms large when the whole orderly society may be in jeopardy. It would, indeed, be a sad day if the general public starts entertaining an impression that the police force does not exist for the protection of society's benefits but it operates mainly for its own benefit and. once such an impression conies to prevail, it would lead to disastrous consequences.

In the instant case before us as noticed and high-lighted by my learned brother at the Bench, we express our grave displeasure over the whole episode. The police officials, respondents Nos. 3 to 5 herein, namely, the Superintendent of Police <NAME>, Addl. Superintendent of Police <NAME> and SHO <NAME>, totally misdirected themselves by not allowing the truth to come out before this Court. They had the audacity to make false affidavits in the apex Court to cover up their illegal acts. It is a matter of concern that even senior police officials of the status of SSP and DSP should not realise their obligations to the courts and indulge in blatant falsehood with a view to mislead the court. We cannot but strongly condemn this attitude on their part. Not only this but the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 even went to the extent of forcing the Taxi Driver <NAME> to make a false affidavit and false statement on oath before this Court by denying the allegations contained in the petition, with a view to misguide this Court and hamper the course of justice. They had not only chosen a wrong path for themselves, contrary to the principles of the institution to which they belong, but they also tried to detract the Taxi driver from divulging the truth to mislead this Court which was concerned with the liberty of a citizen. They went on to reiterate their false stand till after the <ORG> enquiry report was received and wisdom dawned upon them to tender apology only when they found themselves in a tight corner and had no way out to escape. In such circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said to be a real repentence of what they have done.

By indulging in such disruptionery manner as indicated herein above by my learned brother in the preceding paragraphs, the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 acted in most irresponsible manner giving an impression that they were not the defenders of truth and protectors of the citizens but violators of the law and justice and thereby defaced the name of the force to which they belong. They acted with gross impropriety and intentionally committed serious and grevious wrong of clearly unredeeming nature, while it was expected from the seniors of the rank of SSP and Addl. SP that they atleast would observe the high standards in maintaining impartiality and promote public confidence in the force. The <ORG> expects condour and frankness from the parties to the litigation before it. We cannot allow the court proceedings to be triffled with. In the facts and circumstances of the case respondent Nos. 3 to 5 do deserve the punishment awarded to them to serve as a deterent to others in future.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. The applicants are plaintiffs in a suit that was filed against the opponents in <ORG> for a sum of Rs. 1,725, being the alleged balance due at the foot of an account in regard to certain contracts for the sale and purchase of ground nut seeds. The opponents in their written statement, in addition to objecting to the plaintiffs' claim on its merits, took the point that the suit should be stayed, and the matters in dispute be referred to the arbitration of <ORG>, as the parties were members of that <ORG>, and the contracts in dispute contained a provision that they were executed according to the Rules of <ORG>, by which each party was bound. Evidence was given to support this last contention, and the learned Judge decided that arbitration was compulsory under a certain rule passed by the Managing Committee of the <ORG>. He, therefore, stayed the suit to enable the parties to comply with that rule. The applicants contend that this decision is wrong in law and ask us to interfere in revision, <ORG>, it may be mentioned, decided that it had no jurisdiction to interfere.

2. The first question that has been discussed before us is whether, in any case, <ORG> had jurisdiction to stay the suit either under Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act, or under paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. <NAME> for the applicants has cited the decision of <NAME> in <CITATION> (1906) I.L.R. 31 Bom. 236, s.c. 8 Bom. L.R. 955 where ha held that the word "<ORG>" in Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act meant in Bombay this High <ORG> in view of the definition of the words "the <ORG>" in Clause (a) of Section 4 of the Act, and he relies-upon this as establishing that a Judge of the Small Causes <ORG> has no power to stay the suit that was before him. It is however, to be noted that <NAME> in In re <NAME> (1919) I.L.R. 45 Bom. I, s.c. 22 Bom. L.R. 842 differed from <NAME>'s construction of the word "<ORG>" in Section 19 . He pointed out that the definition of "the <ORG>" in Section 4(a) is subject to a proviso of repugnancy in the subject or context, and he held that the provisions of Section 19 , and the decisions under the corresponding law in England, clearly showed that the <ORG> contemplated in this section is the <ORG> before which a suit is pending, provided that the suit is one to which the Act would apply under Section 2 , namely, that it is a suit which could, whether with leave or otherwise, be instituted in a Presidency town in respect of its subject-matter, In regard to the words ins. 19 "a submission to which this Act applies" he held that those words are intended to provide for the case of a suit filed in an up-country <ORG> in an area to which the Act has not been applied, though part of the cause of action has arisen in a Presidency town. The same point has been considered by the Allahabad High <ORG> in <NAME> v. <NAME> and Co. (1921) I.L.R. 43 All. 553. It was there held that "the <ORG> mentioned in Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act is not necessarily the <ORG> as defined in Section 4(a) of the Act, but means the <ORG> before which the suit or other legal proceeding which it is sought to refer to arbitation is instituted. The learned Judges in the judgment say (p. 554) :

Section 19 is a mere repetition of Section 4 of the English Arbitration Act, and it is in our view idle to contend, looking at the language of the section itself, a fortiori looking at the long course of decisions in <ORG> under the corresponding section, that the <ORG> spoken of in that section is not the <ORG> before whom the legal proceedings or other attempt to bring a suit are in fact instituted. The definition in Section 4(a) of the Act only applies where there 13 nothing repugnant to it in the context. The contest of 3. 19 is repugnant to the interpretation of the word court ' therein being confined to the District <ORG>.

3. In that case <ORG> was the one referred to because that was a case not arising in a Presidency town. We agree with the views of <ORG> and of <ORG> as just mentioned. Therefore, if Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act is applicable to a suit in <ORG> at Bombay, in our opinion the Judge before whom that suit is pending has jurisdiction to stay the suit under that section.

4. But a further point arises. This is whether paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code should not be the law applicable to such a suit rather than Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act. This paragraph 18 is one of the provisions in the Second Schedule, which apply by virtue of Section 89 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of that section says:-

Save in so far as is otherwise provided by the Indian Arbitration Act , 1899, or by any other law for the time being in force, all references to arbitration whether by an order in a suit ox otherwise, and all proceedings there under, shall be governed by the provisions contained in the Second Schedule.

5. Both this Section 89 and the Second Schedule of the Code, with certain omissions which do not touch paragraph 18, have been prescribed as part of the procedure to be followed by <ORG> under the Rules that were framed by this Court in 1895 under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act , 1882, is subsequently amended. This is under the power conferred by Section 9 of the Act just mentioned, as amended by Act I of 1895, and the second proviso to Section 8 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1808 enacts that:-

All rules heretofore made by any of the said <ORG> under Section 9 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, shall be deemed to have been validly made.

6. In view of that enactment the objection that has been taken by Mr. <NAME> that this extension of paragraph 18 to <ORG> is opposed to the saving of special or local laws in Section 4 of the Code, falls, in my opinion, to the ground.

7. The question, however, remains, whether the words "save in so far as is otherwise provided by the Indian Arbitration Act , 1899", in Section 89 of the Code, operate to prevent paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule applying to <ORG> in preference to the provisions of Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act. In my opinion the answer is in the negative. There is, in the first place nothing contained in Section 19 which is in substantial opposition to the provisions in paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule. There is a minor difference as to the stage when an application to stay the suit may be made, namely, that under Section 19 it may be made "at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings", whereas under paragraph 18 it may be made "at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement." The principle underlying both these phrases is practically the same, and, in my opinion, this difference is not important enough to make the provisions of Section 19 inconsistent with paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule. This paragraph has been directly extended to <ORG> under powers conferred upon <ORG>, and, in ray opinion, its provisions should, therefore, be considered applicable in preference to the provisions of Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act.

8. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the first paragraph of Section 3 of the Indian Arbitration Act, which says that Sections 523 to 526 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, "shall not apply to any submission or arbitration to which the provisions of this Act for the time being apply", does not cover this particular paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule, because there was no corresponding provision in the Code of 1882, and the paragraph was newly enacted in the Code of 1908. Therefore, in my opinion, paragraph 18 of the Second Schedule of the Code authorized the Judge to stay the suit, provided the conditions conferring upon him the power to stay are satisfied in the present case.

9. On this question there have been three points raised before us by Mr. <NAME>. He first of all said that the application to stay the suit was made too late, and cited rulings that refer to oases under Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Paragraph 18, however, merely says "at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement". In the present case, the objection to the suit being proceeded with was raised in the opponent's written statement, which was put in on the first date on which the suit was fixed for hearing, namely, September 22, 1926. In these circumstances I do not think that the provisions in paragraph 18 that I have mentioned have been contravened. It was the earliest opportunity possible, unless the opponents were to go to the Judge on a date upon which the suit was not on the board, and I do not think that paragraph 18 contemplates that this should be done.

10. The next point is that the suit was in relation to cross-eon-tracts, and the decision in <NAME> v. <NAME> (1919) 14 Sind L.R. 18 was cited that, where cross-contracts have been made for the purpose of fixing the liability of the earlier contract, the rights and liabilities of the parties were determined, and there is no matter in dispute in regard to those contracts which could be referred to arbitration. The opponents in their written statement said that there were two additional contracts which were not cross-contracts, and the plaintiffs said that those were not included in the suit, because no loss had been incurred in regard to those contracts. The point has not been specifically gone into the judgment of the lower Court, and, as we can decide this application upon another ground, I think that it is one on which 1928 we had better abstain from expressing any opinion.

11. The third point is that in fact there is no submission to arbitration by the contrasts m suit, it la pointed out by Mr. <NAME> that the objects of the <ORG> are stated in the Rules of the Grain Merchants <ORG>. Rule 1(ja) only specifies optional arbitration and not compulsory arbitration. The actual words used (as translated) are "If and when any Member or Members refer their disputes to the arbitration of this <ORG>, and if they agree to accept the award, then they should decide." That this merely gives an option to refer to arbitration is not disputed before us, and that has also been held in the judgment of the <ORG> below. This is supported by a Resolution of <ORG> dated October 15, 1911, which has been put in evidence. This says :-"The <ORG> does not take in hand matters relating to difference, but if the parties wish to appoint arbitrators, that can be done." Reliance, however, is placed by Mr. <NAME> for the opponent on a Resolution of <ORG> dated July 5, 1924, which was communicated to members of the <ORG> by a circular. As translated, this Resolution runs as follows :

The paying and getting of difference (according) to the Vaidu delivery Rules and the Bazar Rules should be made within S days after the due date. If any one has an objection to the same a request should be made to the <ORG>, And a foe of Rs. 2 should be charged for every such request. And the guilty party shall have to pay that fee.

12. The learned Judge says :-

The powers of <ORG> to pass such a rule as the one relied upon by Mr. <NAME> are not shown to me but I am sure of this that the rule passed by them does not touch in any way on the powers of the <ORG>. Because the <ORG> has got the powers to arbitrate and the Rule says to members that the powers being there you have now to go to the <ORG> and it will exercise the powers it possesses.

13. Against this view is the fact that the objects of the <ORG>, as I have already mentioned, do not contemplate compulsory arbitration but optional arbitration. And in those circumstances, there clearly is a legitimate doubt whether even the <ORG> itself could make a rule imposing compulsory arbitration upon all its members in regard to contracts to be made under the rules of the <ORG>. Far more is there the gravest doubt as to the powers of <ORG> of the <ORG> to make arbitration compulsory, aa it is said it did, in 1924. The learned Judge says that the powers of <ORG> to pass such a rule had not been shown to him, and the onus clearly lies upon the opponent to satisfy the <ORG> that it is a valid rule. In oar opinion that has not been done. Further-more, the Resolution in itself is very vague, and it is certainly open to question whether it really has the meaning that is put upon it by the opponent, If. it was intended that in all cases a dispute about differences should be referred to arbitration by the <ORG>, then that should have been clearly stated in a way FawcM J. that would leave no doubt about that being the meaning of the ~~~ rule or resolution. Furthermore, there should in such a case obviously be some provision made as to the manner in which arbitrators should be appointed and so on, because as stated in paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule of the Code, the manner of appointment of arbitrators is a matter to be settled by agreement between the parties, and it is only when difficulties arise about appointment according to the agreement that a <ORG> exercises its power of appointment. The view of the lower <ORG> that there was in fact a submission by the applicants to arbitration is, in our opinion, on the existing materials, entirely unjustified; and the case is one in which we think we should interfere under a 115, Civil Procedure Code, as in this view the <ORG> had no jurisdiction to pass the order it did.

14. Accordingly, we set aside the order staying the suit and direct the Court concerned to dispose of the suit according to law. The applicants to have the costs of this application from the opponent.

Mirza, J.

15. I agree, The context in which the words "the <ORG>" are used in Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act makes its clear that by those words the <ORG> before which the suit is pending is intended, The <ORG> of Small Causes would, therefore, have jurisdiction to stay the suit.

16. With regard to the point of delay, it may be noted that this was a <ORG> suit to which the rules and practice relating to suits on the Original Side of the High <ORG> would not necessarily apply. It was not necessary in this suit to have filed a written statement or to have raised issues. The suit reached a hearing for the first time on September 22, 1926, when, it is stated, in the notes of the learned Judge, that defences were filed, These defences were nine in number. The very first defence related to the question of arbitration. Up to this point, in my opinion, the objection with regard to delay would not hold good. The case was argued on September 22 and adjourned to the 23rd without taking any evidence. On September 23 the only evidence taken before the learned Judge related to the question of arbitration. The case was again adjourned to September 24. On that day, the <ORG> took some further evidence, upheld the defendant's preliminary objection and stayed the suit. Under these circumstances it must be held that the defendant applied for stay of the suit "at the earliest possible opportunity."

17. On the interpretation, however, of the rules of <ORG>, in my judgment, the plaintiffs could not 1 be compelled to go to any arbitration. The Resolution passed by <ORG> purporting to enact a rule making a reference to arbitration in such matters compulsory cannot, in my opinion, bind the plaintiffs in this case.

18. I am of opinion, therefore, that the order of stay should be set aside and the <ORG> should be directed to proceed with the hearing of the suit.