JUDGMENT <NAME>, C.J.

1. This is an appeal by the accused against his conviction on two charges under Sections 454 and 380, <ORG> . On February 13, 1935, a theft was committed at a house in Dadyseth Agiary Lane. The <ORG> were called to the house, and they found the complainant, a woman named <NAME>, there. She was asked to sleep somewhere else during the ensuing night, and the <ORG> then locked up the room in which the theft had taken place, and the next day they attended with the fingerprint bureau expert, who took the impressions of certain fingerprints. He found a right thumb impression on a glass jar, and the imprint of a right index finger on a box of jewellery. There was also on a glass door of the cupboard an impression of the palm of a hand, but that has not been identified. A photograph was subsequently taken of the thumb impression on the glass jar and of the impression of the right index finger on the jewellery box, and those photographs are Exs. B and C, which have been enlarged--the enlargements are Ex. F-1-A and F-2-A. On February 25, a room in Bazar Gate Street was also burgled. The <ORG> were fetched, and as in the previous case, they brought the fingerprint expert, who found certain impressions. He found a left-thumb impression, which is Ex. D, on the glass of a cupboard door, and a palm impression on a drawer. On the evidence, and apart from that of the fingerprint expert, it would have been possible for persons who had been in the room after the theft to have left these impressions. As the procedure under the two offences appeared to be similar, a search was made amongst the fingerprint records of the <ORG>, and it was discovered that the impressions taken on these two occasions corresponded with the fingerprints of the present accused, which had been taken by the <ORG> on the occasion of a previous conviction, and accordingly the accused was arrested, and was tried by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, and convicted on both charges.

2. The peculiarity of the case is that there is absolutely no evidence to connect the accused with either of the offences except the evidence of the fingerprints. A witness named <NAME> was called on behalf of the prosecution, who said that he was a fingerprint expert attached to the fingerprint bureau, and had been there for 12 years. He then descibed to the Court how he took the photographs of the impressions to which I have referred and which were found on the scene of these two offences, and then he produced fingerprints of the accused which had been taken on the occasion of the accused's previous conviction, and also fresh fingerprints which were taken after the accused was arrested on this occasion, the latter being Ex. L, and the former. Ex. K. The witness then said that there were eighteen identical ridge characteristics in nature and sequence between the left thumb impression taken in the room where the second offence was committed and the impression of the left thumb of the accused taken by the Police after his arrest, and the witness further said that it is impossible to find so many as eighteen characteristics identical in the fingerprints of two persons, that is to say, his' evidence is that having regard to the similarities which he found between the fingerprints found in the place of offence and the fingerprint of the accused, it was impossible that anybody but the accused could have made the fingerprints in the place of the second offence. The witness also stated with reference to the right thumb impression and the impression of the right index finger, taken on the occasion of the first offence, that there were fifteen points of similarity between the right thumb, and seven in respect of the right index finger, and the fingerprints of the accused, and that it must have been the accused who made the marks found on the scene of the first offence. From that evidence it appears that the accused was present in both of these rooms at about the time of the respective offences, from which I think that it follows as a necessary inference that he is the person who committed the offences. It is not suggested that he had an innocent object in being in either of those two rooms.

3. Now it is argued by Mr. <NAME> on behalf of the accused that the <ORG> ought not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of fingerprint experts, and in support of that contention he has referred us to a good many cases. He relies particularly on <CITATION> 1 Pat. 242 : 68 Ind. Cas. 958 : A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 73 : 23 Cr. I.J. 638 : 3 P L T 526 : (1926) Pat. 46 : 4 U P L R Pat. 1 : 3 P L T 526 and <NAME> v. Emperor 4 Lah. 246 : 77 Ind. Cas. 423 : A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 622 : 25 Cr. L J 375. It is, in my opinion, going too far to say that the <ORG> must insist upon corroboration of the evidence of a fingerprint expert. On the other hand the <ORG> must be careful not to delegate its authority to a third party. The <ORG> has to be satisfied that the accused is guilty, and the <ORG> cannot hold him guilty merely because an expert comes forward and says that in his opinion the accused must be guilty. The <ORG> must satisfy itself as to the value of the evidence of the expert in the same way as it must satisfy itself of the value of the other evidence. In the present case I am not sure how far the learned Magistrate himself went into the question of the similarity between the different marks, although he refers to that question having been gone into in cross-examination. But we have examined the photographs in evidence, which give very clear impressions. The finger and thumb marks are not smudged, and I am satisfied that there are a very large number of points of similarity between the thumb and finger impressions found in the rooms where the offences were committed, and in the impressions of the corresponding thumbs and fingers of the accused. The <ORG>, in a case of this sort, has to rely on the expert upon two distinct points, first of all, on the question of similarity between the marks, which is a question of fact on which the <ORG> can, and should, with the assistance of the expert satisfy itself; and secondly, on the point, which is one for expert opinion, whether it is possible to find the fingerprints or thumb impressions of two individuals corresponding in as many points of resemblance as are shown to exist between the impressions found in the case before the <ORG> and those of the accused. In the present case, I think, the witness might have been invited to go rather than he does go. I think he might have been asked to say how much experience he had had in the way of comparison of fingerprints, and how much literature on the subject he had studied. However this science is not a new one, and when the expert tells the <ORG> that it is impossible to find so many characteristics idential in the fingerprints of two persons as are found in this case, and when that statement entirely agrees with what one has read On the subject in scientific books, I do not think the <ORG> need hesitate in accepting the opinion. If the science were a new one, it might have been necessary for the evidence to go rather further. As it is, I think the evidence here is sufficient to satisfy the <ORG> that the accused must have been present in the two rooms where these offences were committed, and as I have said, from that it must follow that he was the offender. I think, therefore, the conviction was right, and the appeal should be dismissed.

Macklin, J.

4. I agree. No particular number of witnesses shall be required for the proof of any fact according to the Evidence Act , and I take it that the evidence of experts is subject to the same principle. It is of course necessary in the case of fingerprint experts as in the case of every other witness, whether expert or not, that the <ORG> should exercise its own judgment upon the evidence and not merely accept the evidence without consideration; and if the evidence of a fingerprint expert is given in such a way that the <ORG> is able to follow it and make up its own mind as to the accuracy of that evidence and as to the accuracy of the opinions, given by the expert, I can see no reason why it should not be open to the <ORG> to convict solely upon the evidence of that witness. Reliance has been placed by the appellant upon <CITATION> 1 Pat. 242 : 68 Ind. Cas. 958 : A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 73 : 23 Cr. I. J 638 : 3 P L T 526 : (1926) Pat. 46 : 4 U P L R Pat. 1 : 3 P L T 526 and <NAME> v. Emperor 4 Lah. 246 : 77 Ind. Cas. 423 : A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 622 : 25 Cr. L J 375. But in so far as they decide that a <ORG> ought not to rely upon the evidence of an expert alone, those cases, in my opinion, go further than is necessary; and other authorities, in particular Public Prosecutor v. Virammal A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 178 : 69 Ind. Cas. 374 : 23 Cr. L J 694 : 46 M 715 have been quoted to us by the <ORG> to show that the opinion given in the two cases relied upon has not been universally followed. I agree that, in the circumstances of the present case, the evidence of the fingerprint expert was such that it was open to the Magistrate to convict on his evidence alone having made up his mind judicially that that evidence was reliable. I agree, therefore, that the appeal must be dismissed in each case.


PETITIONER: <NAME> & <ORG> Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/04/1969 BENCH: ACT: Natural Justice-Applicability of principles to Administrative proceedings-Violation of principles by first authority-Effect on ultimate decision. HEADNOTE: In pursuance of <ORG> (Initial Recruitment) Regulation, 1966, framed under r. 4(1) of <ORG> (Recruitment) Rules made under the All India Services Act , 1951, <ORG> was constituted for selecting officers to <ORG> in the senior and junior scales from officers serving in the forest department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. One of the members of the <ORG> was the Chief Conservator of Forests of the State, as )required by the Regulations. He was a Conservator of forests appointed as Acting Chief Conservator superseding another Conservator of Forests whose appeal to <ORG> against his supersession was pending at the time the selections by the <ORG> were made. The Act ing Chief Conservator was also one of the candidates seeking to be selected to <ORG>. The <ORG> made the 'selection of officers in the senior and junior scales. The Act ing Chief Conservator's name was at the top of the list of selected officers, while the names of three conservators, (including the officer who was superseded), who were the Acting Chief Conservator's rivals, were omitted. The Act ing Chief Conservator did not sit in the Selection <ORG> at the time his name was considered, but participated in the deliberations when the names of his rivals were considered. He -also participated in the <ORG>'s deliberations while preparing the list of selected candidates in order of preference. The list and the records were sent to <ORG> and <ORG> forwarded the list with its observations to <ORG>, as required by the Regulations, and the <ORG> examined the records of the officers afresh and made its recommendations. <ORG> thereafter notified the list. The three conservators, whose names were not included in the list, and other aggrieved officers filed a petition in this Court under Art. 32 for quashing the notification. On the questions : (1) Assuming that the proceedings in the present case were administrative proceedings, whether principles of natural justice applied to them; (2) Whether there was a violation of such principles of natural justice in the present case; (3) Since the recommendations of the <ORG> were first considered by <ORG> and the final recommendations were made by the <ORG>, whether there was any basis for the petitioners' grievances; (4) Whether there were grounds for setting aside the selection of all the officers including those in the junior scales, HELD : (1) The rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law validly made, that is, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is their purpose, there is no reason why they should not be made applicable to administrative proceeding also, especially when it is not easy to draw the line that 458 demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial ones, and an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have a more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. [468F-G; 469B- <CITATION> ,  1 S.C.R. 317, <CITATION>  2 S.C.R. 625 and In re : H. K. (An Infant)  2 Q.B. 617, 630, referred to. (2) The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the <ORG> or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened, the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. The rule that enquiries must be held in good faith and without bias, and not arbitrarily or unreasonably, is now included among the principles of natural justice. [468G-H; 469D-L-] In the present case. at the time of selection, the other members of the <ORG> did not know that the appeal of the superseded conservator was pending before <ORG> and hence there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion of the Acting Chief Conservator. There was a conflict between his interest and duty and he was a judge in his own cause. Taking into consideration human probabilities and the ordinary course of human conduct, there was reasonable ground for believing that the Acting Chief Conservator was likely to have been biased. He did not participate in some of the deliberations of the <ORG>, but the facts that he was a member of the <ORG> and that he participated in the deliberations when the claims of his rivals were considered and in the preparation of the list, must have had its impact on the selection, as the <ORG>, in making the selection, must necessarily have given weight to his opinion. In judging the suitability of the candidates the members of the <ORG> must have had mutual discussions and though the other members filed affidavits stating that the Acting Chief Conservator in no manner influenced their decision, in group discussions, each member was bound to influence the others in a subtle manner and without their being aware of such influence. [466D-G; 467A-D] In the circumstances of the case, the selection by the <ORG>, could not be considered to have been taken fairly and justly as it was influenced by a member who was biased. [470 C-E] (3) The Selection <ORG> was undoubtedly a high powered body, and its recommendations must have had considerable weight with the <ORG> The recommendation made by the <ORG> could not be dissociated from the selection made by the Selection <ORG> which was the foundation for the recommendations of the <ORG> Therefore, if the selection by the Selection <ORG> was held to be vitiated, the final recommendation by the U.P.S.C, must also be held to have been vitiated. [462 G-H; 469G-H] <NAME> v. Criminal Injuries Compensation <ORG>, Ex Parte Lain,  2 Q.B. 864, 881, applied. <NAME> v. <ORG> W.P. No. 237 of 1966, dated 4-5-1967, distinguished. 459 (4) The selections to both senior and junior scales were made from the same pool and so, it was not possible to separate the two sets of Officers. Therefore, it was not sufficient to merely direct the Selection <ORG> to consider the cases of the three conservators who were excluded, but all the selections had to be set aside. [470 G-H; 471A] JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 173 to 175 of 1967.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental rights.

<NAME> -and <NAME>, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 173 of 1967).

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 174 of 1967).

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the petitioners (in W.P. No. 175 of 1967).

<NAME>, Attorney-General, <NAME> and <NAME>, for respondents Nos. 1 to 6 (in all the petitions). <NAME> and <NAME>, for respondents Nos. 7 and 26 (in all the petitions).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by <NAME>, J. These petitions are brought by some of the Gazet- ted Officers serving in the forest department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of them are serving as Conservators of Forests, some as Divisional Forest Officers and others as Assistant Conservators of Forests. All of them feel aggrieved by the selections made from among the officers serving in the forest department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to <ORG>, a service constituted in 1966 under s. 3(1) of the All India Services Act, 1951 and the rules framed thereunder. Hence they have moved this Court to quash notification No. 3/24/66-A-15(IV) dated the 29th July 1967 issued by <ORG>, <ORG>, as according to them the selections notified in the said notification are violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and on the further ground that the selections in question are vitiated by the contravention of the principles of natural justice. They are also challenging the vires of s. 3 of the All India Services Act, rule 4 of the rules framed under that Act and Regulation 5 of <ORG> (Initial Recruitment) Regulations 1966, framed under the aforementioned rule 4.

Section 2(A) of the <ORG> Act, 1951 authorises <ORG> to constitute three new <ORG> including <ORG>. Section 3 provides that <ORG> shall after consulting the Government of the States concerned including that of the State of -Jammu and Kashmir to make rules for the regulation of recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to those <ORG>. Sub-s. (2) of S. 2 prescribes that all rules made under that section "shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before <ORG> as soon as possible after -they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as <ORG> may make on a motion made during the session in which they are so laid."

In pursuance of the power given under S. 3 , rules for the recruitment to <ORG> were made in 1966- Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966. The only rule relevant for our present purpose is rule 4(1) which reads :

"As soon as may be, after the commencement of these rules, the Central Governme nt 'May recruit to the service any person from amongst the members of <ORG> adjudged suitable in accordance with such Regulations as <ORG> may make in consultation with the State Governments and the <ORG>."

The <ORG> referred to in the above rule is the Union Public Service <ORG>. The Proviso to that sub-rufe is not relevant for our present purpose. We may next come to the Regulations framed under rule 4(1). Those Regulations are known as the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966. They are deemed to have come into force on July 1, 1966. Regulation 2 defines certain expressions. Regulation 3 provides for the constitution of a special selection board. It says that the purpose of making selection to State cadre, <ORG> shall constitute a special selection board consisting of the Chairman of the Union Public Service <ORG> or his nominee, the Inspector General of Forests of <ORG>, ad officer of <ORG> not below the rank of Joint Secretary, the Chief Secretary to the State Government concerned or the Secretary of that Government dealing with the forests and the Chief Conservator of Forests of the State Government concerned. Regulation 4 prescribes the conditions of eligibility. That Regulation contemplates the formation of a service in the senior scale and a service in the junior scale. Regulation 5 is important for our present purpose. It deals with the

-preparation of the list of suitable candidates. It reads :

"(1) The <ORG> shall prepare, in the order of preference, a list of such officers of <ORG> who satisfy the conditions specified in regulation 4 and who are adjudged by the <ORG> suitable for appointment to posts in the senior and junior scales of the <ORG>.

(2) The list prepared in accordance with sub-regulation (1) shall then be referred to the Commission for advice, by <ORG> along with :-

(a) the records of all officers of <ORG> included in the list;

(b) the records of all other eligible officers of <ORG> who are not adjudged suitable for inclusion in the list, together with the reasons as recorded by the <ORG> for their non-inclusion in the list; and

(c) the observations, if any, of <ORG> on the recommendations of the Board.

3. On receipt of the list, along with the other documents received from <ORG> the <ORG> shall forward its recommendations to that Government."

Regulation 6 stipulates that the officers recommended by the <ORG> under sub-r. (3) of Regulation 5 shall be appointed to the service by <ORG> subject to the availability of vacancies in the <ORG> cadre concerned.

In pursuance of the Regulation mentioned above, <ORG> constituted a special selection board for select- ing officers to <ORG> in the senior scale as well as in the junior scale from those serving in the forest department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The nominee of the Chairman of <ORG>, one <NAME> was the Chairman of the board. The other members of the board were the Inspector General of Forests of <ORG>, one of the Joint Secretaries in <ORG>, the Chief Secretary to <ORG> and <NAME>, the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests of Jammu and Kashmir.

The selection board met at Srinagar in May, 1967 and se- lected respondents 7 to 31 in Writ Petition No. 173 of 1967. The cases of respondents Nos. 32 to 37 were reserved for further consideration. The selections in question are said to have been made solely on the basis of the records -of officers. Their suitability was not tested by any examination, written or oral., Nor were they interviewed. For several years before that selection the adverse entries made in the character rolls of the officers had not been communicated to them and their explanation called for. In doing so quite clearly the authorities concerned had contravened the instructions issued by the Chief Secretary of the State. Sometime after the afore-mentioned selections were made, at the instance of <ORG>, the adverse remarks made in the course of years against those officers who had not been selected were communicated to them and their explanations called for. Those explanations were considered by <ORG> and on the basis of the same, some of the adverse remarks made against some of the officers were removed. Thereafter the selection board reviewed the cases of officers not selected earlier as a result of which a few more officers were selected. The selections as finally made by the board were accepted by the <ORG>. On the basis of the recommendations of the <ORG>, the impugned list was published. Even after the review <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> were not selected. It may also be noted that <NAME>'s name is placed at the top of the

-list of selected officers.

<NAME> had been promoted as Chief Conservator of Forests in the year 1964. He is not yet confirmed in that post. <NAME>, Conservator of Forests in the Kashmir Forest Ser- vice who is admittedly senior to <NAME> had appealed to <ORG> against his supersession and that appeal was pending with <ORG> at the time the impugned selections were made. <NAME> and <NAME> Conservators of Forests also claim that they are seniors to <NAME> but that fact is denied by <NAME>. <NAME> had also appealed against his alleged supersession but it is alleged that appeal had been rejected by <ORG>.

<NAME> was also one of the candidates seeking to be selected to <ORG>. We were told and we take it to be correct that he did not sit in the selection board at the time his name was considered for selection but admittedly he did sit in the board and participate in its deliberations when the names of <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, his rivals, were considered for selection. It is further admitted that he did participate in the deliberations of the board while preparing the list of selected candidates in order of preference, as required by Regulation 5.

The selection board was undoubtedly a high powered body. That much was conceded by the learned Attorney-General who appeared for <ORG> as well as <ORG>. It is true that the list prepared by the selection board was not the last word in the matter of the selection -in -question. That list along with the records of the officers in the concerned cadre selected as well as not selected had to be sent to the Minis-

try of Home Affairs. We shall assume that as required by Regulation 5, <ORG> had forwarded that list with its observations to the <ORG> and the <ORG> had examined the records of all the officers afresh before making its recommendation. But it is obvious that the recommendations made by the selection board should have weighed with the <ORG>. Undoubtedly the adjudging of the merits of the candidates by the selection board was an extremely important step in the process. It was contended before us that s. 3 of the All India Services Act, rule 4 of the rules framed thereunder and Regulation 5 of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations 1966 are void as those provisions confer unguided, uncontrolled and uncanalised power on the concerned delegates. So far as the vires of s. 3 of the Indian Administrative Act is concerned, the question is no more res integra. It is concluded by the decision of this Court in <CITATION> .(1) We have not thought it necessary to go into the question of the vires of rule 4 and Regulation 5, as we have come to the conclusion that the impugned selections must be struck down for the reasons to be presently stated.

There was considerable controversy before us as to the nature of the power conferred on the selection board under rule 4 read with Regulation 5. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that that power was a quasi-judicial power whereas the case for the contesting respondents was that it was a purely administrative power. In support of the contention that the power in question was a quasi-judicial power emphasis was laid on the language of rule 4 as well as Regulation 5 which prescribe that the selections should be made after adjudging the suitability of the officers belonging to the <ORG> service. The word 'adjudge' we were told means "to judge or decide". It was contended that such a power is essentially a judicial power and the same had to be exercised in accordance with the well accepted rules relating to the exercise of such a power. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that the power in question was exercised by a statutory body and a wrong exercise of that power is likely to affect adversely the careers of the officers not selected. On the other hand it was contended by the learned Attorney-General that though the selection board was a statutory body, as it was not required to decide about any right, the proceedings before it cannot be considered quasi- judicial; its duty was merely to select officers who in its opinion were suitable for being absorbed in <ORG>. According to him the word 'adjudge' in rule 4 as well as Regulation 5 means "found worthy of selection". (1) [1959] 1 Supp. S.C.R. 792.

The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the <ORG> under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare <ORG> like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the <ORG> are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbi- trarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power. 'Me following observations of Lord <NAME> in <NAME> v. <ORG>, Ex. Parte Lain(1) are instructive.

"With regard to Mr. <NAME>'s second point I cannot think that <ORG> intended to confine his principle to cases in which the determination affected rights in the sense of enforceable rights. Indeed, in the <ORG> case, the rights determined were at any rate not immediately enforceable rights since the scheme laid down by the commissioners had to be approved by the Minister of Transport and by resolutions of <ORG>. The commissioners nevertheless were held amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, as can be seen from Rex. v. Postmaster-General, Ex-parte Carmichael (2 ) and Rex. v. Boycott Ex parte Keasley(3) the remedy is available even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected. The position as I see it is that the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined. They have varied (1) [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, 881.

(2) [1928] 1 K.B.291.

(3) [1939] 2 K.B. 651.

from time to time being extended to meet changing conditions. At one time the writ only went to an inferior court. Later its ambit was extended to statutory tribunals determining a lis inter parties. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word but where immediate or subsequent rights of a citizen were affected. The only constant limits throughout were that it was performing -a public duty. Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is, from the agree- ment of the parties concerned.

Finally, it is to be observed that the remedy has now been extended, see Reg. v. <ORG>, Ex parte R. A. Brand & Co. Ltd.(1) to cases in which the decision of an administrative officer is only arrived at after an inquiry or process of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. In such a case this court has jurisdiction to supervise that process.

We have as it seems to me reached the position when the ambit of certiorari can be said to cover every case in which a body of persons of a public as opposed to a purely private or domestic character has to determine matters affecting subjects provided always that it has a duty to act judicially. Looked at in this way the board in my judgment comes fairly and squarely, within the jurisdiction of this court. It is as Mr. <NAME> said, 'a servant of the <ORG> charged by the <ORG>, by execu-

tive instruction, with the duty of distributing the bounty of the Crown. ' It is

clearly, therefore, performing public duties."

<ORG> has held that the power to make a zoning order under Dairy Factory Supply Regulation 1936 has to be exercised judicially, see New Zealand and <ORG> v. <ORG> (2). This Court in <CITATION> .(3) held that the power to alter the area reserved under the Sugar Cane (Control) Order 1966 is a quasi-judicial power. With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving (1)  2 Q.B. 413;

(2) [1953] New Zealand Law Reports p. 366.

(3) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 807.

the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall ,assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis. It is unfortunate that <NAME> was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most -appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to <ORG> is entitled to great weight. But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included <NAME> as a member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of <NAME> was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of this participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It was in the interest of <NAME> to keen out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates.

The members of the selection board other than <NAME>, each one of them separately, have filed affidavits in this Court swearing that <NAME> in no manner influenced their decision in making the selections. In a group deliberation each member of the group is bound to influence the others, more so, if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge. Ms <NAME> is likely to operate in a subtle manner. It is no wonder that the other members of the selection board are unaware of the extent to which his opinion influenced their conclusions. We are unable to accept the contention that in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers. At this stage it may also be noted that at the time the selections were made, the members of the selection board other than <NAME> were not likely to have known that <NAME> had appealed against his supersession and that his appeal was pending before <ORG>. Therefore there was no occasion for them to distrust the opinion expressed by <NAME>. Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily have given weight to the opinion expressed by <NAME>.

This takes us to the question whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings similar to that with which we are concerned in these cases. According to the learned Attorney General those principles have no bearing in determining the validity of the impugned selections. In support of his contention he read to us several decisions. It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constanlty expanding. The question how far the principles of natural justice govern administrative enquiries came up for consideration before <ORG> in In re : H. K. (An Infant) (1). Therein the validity of the action taken by an Immigration Officer came up for consideration. In the course of his judgment Lord <NAME>, C.J. observed thus :

"But at the same time, I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the subsection, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative frame work under (1) [1967] 2 Q.B. 617, 630.

which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. I appreciate that in saying that it may be said that one is going further than is permitted on the decided cases because heretofore at any rate the decisions of the courts do seem to have drawn a strict line in these matters according to whether there is or is not a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially." In the same case <NAME>, <NAME> observed thus "I would only say that an immigration officer having assumed the jurisdiction granted by those provisions is in a position where it is his duty to exercise that assumed jurisdiction whether it be administrative, executive or quasi-judicial, fairly, by which I mean applying his mind dispassionately to a fair analysis of the particular problem and the information available to him in analysing it. If in any hypothetical case, and in any real case, this court was satisfied that an immigration officer was not so doing, then in my view mandamus would lie."

<CITATION> .(1) <NAME>, J. speaking for the Court, dealing with an enquiry made as regards the correct age of a government servant, observed thus "We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character,but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.-The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon there- after a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily (1)  2 S.C.R. 625.

or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasijudicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decison in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in <CITATION> .(1) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the <ORG> or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a cornplaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the obser- vance of that was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.

It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that after all the selection board was only a recommendatory body. Its recommendations had first to be considered by <ORG> and *.hereafter by the U.P.S.C. The final recommendations were made by the U.P.S.C. Hence grievances of the petitioners have no real basis. According to him while considering the validity of administrative actions taken, all that we have to see is whether the ultimate decision is just or not. We are unable to agree with the learned Attorney-General that the recommendations made by the selection board were of little consequence. Looking at the composition of the board and the nature of the duties entrusted to it we have no doubt that its recommendations should have carried considerable weight with the U.P.S.C. If the decision of the selection board is held to have been vitiated, it is -clear to our mind that the final recommendation made by the <ORG> must also be held to have been vitiated. The recommendations made by the Union Public Service <ORG> cannot be disassociated from the selections made by the selection board which (1) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 317.

is the foundation for the recommendations of <ORG>. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision in <NAME> v. <ORG> Ex. Parte Lain(1). It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that the mere fact that one of the members of the Board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the entire proceedings. In this connection he invited our attention to the decision of this Court in <NAME> v. <ORG> and another(2). Therein the Court repelled the contention that the proceedings of a departmental promotion committee were vitiated as one of the members of that committee was favourably disposed towards one of the selected candidates. The question before the Court was whether the plea of mala fides was established. The Court came to the conclusion that on the material on record it was unable to uphold that plea. In that case there was no question of any conflict between duty and interest nor any members of the departmental promotion committee was a judge in his own case. The only thing complained of was that one of the members of the promotion committee was favourably disposed towards one of the competitors. As mentioned earlier in this case we are essentially concerned with the question whether the decision taken by the board can be considered as having been taken fairly and justly. One more argument of the learned Attorney-General remains to be considered. He urged that even if we are to hold that <ORG> should not have participated in the deliberations of the selection board while it considered the suitability of <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, there is no ground to set aside the selection of other officers. According to him it will be sufficient in the interest of justice if we direct that the cases of <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> be reconsidered by a Board of which <ORG> is not a member. Proceeding further he urged that under any circumstance no case is made out for disturbing the selection of the officers in the junior scale. We are unable to accept either of these contentions. As seen earlier <ORG> was a party to the preparation of the select list in order of preference and that he is shown as No. 1 in the list. To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice. Now coming to the selection of the officers in the. junior scale service, the selections to both senior scale service as well as junior scale service were made from the same pool. Every officer who had put in a service of 8 years or more, even if he was holding the post of an Assistant Conservator of Forests was eligible for being selected for the senior scale service. In fact some (1) [1967] 2 Q.B. 864.

(2) Writ Petition No. 237/1966 decided on 4-5-1967.

Assistant Conservators have been selected for the senior scale service. At the same time some of the officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for the junior scale service. Hence it is not possible to separate the two sets of officers. For the reasons mentioned above these petitions are allowed and the impugned selections set aside. <ORG> and <ORG> shall pay the costs of the petitioners.

V.P.S. Petitions allowed.

<NAME>


PETITIONER: JAI NARAIN & ORS. ETC. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT29/11/1995 BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) CITATION: 1996 AIR 697 1996 SCC (1) 9 JT 1995 (9) 323 1995 SCALE (6)664 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T <NAME>, J.

These transfer cases are the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which were filed before <ORG>. The petitioners have challenged the notifications dated January 6, 1995 and March 9, 1995 under Sections 4 , 6 and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) relating to the revenue estate of village Nilothi, National Capital territory (NCT) of Delhi.

This Court is monitoring the constructions of Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) in various parts of Delhi in the public interest proceedings in write petition (civil) No.4677/ <CITATION> . under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in <NAME> case the <ORG>

- Administration has issued the notifications dated January 6, 1995 and March 9, 1995 under the Act which have been impugned in the transferred cases. Since this <ORG> is seized of the matter relating to the construction of STP at Keshopur on the land in dispute, it was deemed appropriate to transfer the writ petitions from the file of the Delhi High <ORG> to this <ORG>.

The land in dispute is being acquired for a public purpose namely for setting up of pumping station/sewerage treatment plant in villages Jasola, Nilothi and Shaffipur Ranola for the planned development of Delhi. The provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the Act have been made applicable and as such the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act has been dispensed with. The relevant part of the notification dated January 6< 1995 is as under:-

"No. F. >(46)/94-L&B/LA/298: Whereas it appears to the Lt. Governor, of Delhi that the land is likely to be required to be taken by Government at public expense for a public purpose; namely for setting up of pumping station/sewerage Treatment plant in village Jasola for the planned development of Delhi,it is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is likely to be required for the above purpose..........The Lt. Governor being of opinion that provisions of sub- section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to this land, is further pleased under sub- section 4 of the said section to direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply."

Section 4 of the Act to the relevant-extent is reproduced:-

"4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.-(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] that land in any locality [is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose........."

Mr. <NAME>, learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the acquisition proceedings on the following grounds:-

[1] The notification under Section 4 of the Act uses the expression "likely to be needed" which means there was no existing need and the land was required some time in the future. There was, thus, no urgency and as such the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act could not be invoked and the right of the land owners to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act could not be taken away. It further indicates that there was no application of mind on the part of the Lt. Governor of <ORG>;  The land in dispute is shown in the Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan as agricultural green whereas it is being acquired for the public purpose of setting up the STP. The acquisition is contrary to the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan.

The first contention raised by the learned counsel is based on the language of Section 4 of the Act. The power under Section 4 of the Act can be exercised when it appears to the <ORG> that the "land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose". It is no doubt correct that the expression "is needed" indicates the existing need whereas the expression "is likely to be needed" refers to the future need. When the later expression is used in the notification under Section 4 of the Act it may be suggestive of the fact that there may not be emergency to acquire the land, but the question of urgency cannot be determined solely by the expressions used in the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The emergency must be reflected in the need of the acquisition. The existence of urgency is a matter which is entirely based on the subjective satisfaction of the <ORG>. The courts do not interfere unless the reasons given are wholly irrelevant and there is no application of mind. When a notification under Section 4 of the Act uses the expression "is likely to be needed" it may be necessary, in a given case, to examine the records or the attendant circumstances to satisfy that there was material before the <ORG> justifying the Order under Section 17 , dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act. If the public purpose on the face of it shows that the land is needed urgently,that by itself is a relevant circumstance for justifying the action under Section 17(4) of the Act. This Court in <CITATION> , etc.etc. AIR 1986 SC 2025 - where urgency provisions were invoked to acquire the land for housing schemes - held as under:-

"In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the decision of <ORG> in resorting to S. 17(1) of the Act was unwarranted. The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke S.17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with S. 5-A of the Act."

The land in dispute is being acquired for the construction of STP. This <ORG> in <NAME> case (supra), while directing the closure of the stone crushers in the city of Delhi, on May 15,1992 observed as under:

"We are conscious that environmental changes are the inevitable consequence of industrial development in our country, but at the same time the quality of environment cannot be permitted to be damaged by polluting the Air, Water and Land to such an extent that it becomes a health-hazard for the residents of the area. We are constrained to record that <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG> have been wholly re-miss in the performance of their statutory duties and have failed to protect the environments and control air-pollution in the Union Territory of Delhi. Utter disregard to environment has placed Delhi in an unenviable position of being the world's third grubbiest, most polluted and unhealthy city as per a study conducted by <ORG>. Needless to say that every citizen has a right to fresh air and to live in pollution-free environment.

While dealing with the construction of STP's in Delhi, this <ORG> in <NAME>'s case passed the following order on April 22, 1994:

"<ORG> has filed an affidavit through its Secretary Mr. <NAME>. It is stated that the <ORG> is ready and willing to provide land to the <ORG> for setting up of the Sewage Treatment tanks. Keeping in view the urgency of the matter, we request Mr. <NAME>, Commissioner, <ORG>, Mr. <NAME>. Vice Chairman, <ORG>, Mr. <NAME>, Additional Commissioner, <ORG> and Mr. <NAME>, Chief Engineer of the Delhi <ORG> Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking to be present in <ORG> on May 6, 1994. We are requesting the officers to be present in <ORG> so that we can have their view points for taking appropriate decisions on the spot. Needless to say that with the increase of population in Delhi it is of utmost urgency to set up the sewage Treatment Plants within the time-bound Schedule."

Thereafter, on May 13, 1994 this Court issued various directions regarding the transfer of land to the Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking (the Undertaking) for the STP's in Delhi and finally directed as under:

"We direct the <ORG> through <NAME>, Commissioner. Lands to hand over the possession of the vacant land available for setting up of the Sewage Treatment Plants in various colonies within four weeks from today. We further direct the <ORG> to make payment in respect of these lands simultaneously. Mr. <NAME>, Engineer-in-Chief will be responsible for taking over the land and also for making payment to the <ORG>. on behalf of the <ORG> The work for setting up of Sewage Treatment Plants shall be completed at war-footing."

This <ORG> on August 1,1994, noticed the progress made in the construction of the <ORG>'s in the following words:

"Mr. <NAME>, learned senior counsel appearing for <ORG> has produced before us a chart showing tentative schedule of completion and commissioning of Sewage Treatment Plants in various areas in Delhi. It is stated that the first appraisal is the soil investigation. The soil investigation is to be done by the Investigating team of the <ORG> within four weeks from today. In any case, we direct the <ORG> to complete it within four weeks. Thereafter, the <ORG> shall float and finalise the tenders within 6 weeks.

The progress report and the name of the company/person whose tender would be accepted shall be submitted to this Court by 24.10.94. List it on 24.10.94."

Regarding the STP in Okhla area it was found that the dispossession, of the landowners, in respect of large area of land under acquisition was stayed by <ORG> in the writ petitions filed by them. This Court in <NAME> case passed the following order on December 14,1994:

"We directed the <ORG> to issue notices through Newspapers consecutively for two days stating therein that the parsons who have obtained stay orders from various courts be present in this Court at 2.00 p.m. on December 14, 1994. The notices were published by the <ORG> as directed by us. In response to the notices, Mr. <NAME>, Dr. <NAME>, Mr. <NAME> and <NAME>, Advocates are present on behalf of the land owners. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for various land owners is that the Notification under sections 4 and 6 were issued in the year 1964 and 1966 respectively. According to them, the possession of land is still with them. It is further stated by the learned counsel that they are entitled to compensation at the rate of market value of the land today....

Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct that 13 writ petitions mentioned in the public notice published in <ORG> dated November 30, 1994, be transferred from <ORG> to the file of this <ORG>. These petitions be listed for final disposal in the 2nd week of February, 1995.

Meanwhile, we vacate the stay orders granted by <ORG> in all these writ petitions and direct <ORG> to take over the possession of the land and hand over to <ORG>."

Further directions were issued to <ORG> on December 14, 1994 to take over the land from <ORG> and acquire where necessary for the STPs at various place in Delhi.

This Court has been issuing time-bound directions for the procurement of land for the STP's in various parts of Delhi. The impugned notifications regarding Keshopur STP were issued under the directions of this Court. On January 23, 1995 this Court passed the following order regarding the land in dispute:-

"A very grim picture emerges regarding increase of pollution in the city of Delhi from the two affidavits filed by <NAME>, Secretary (Environment), <ORG> of Delhi. He has pointed out that the population of Delhi which was about 17 lakh in 1951 has gone up to more than 94 lakhs as per the 1991 census. In fact, more than 4 lakh people are being added to the population of Delhi every year out of which about 3 lakh are migrants. Delhi has been categorised as the fourth most polluted city in world with respect to concentration of Suspended Particular Metal (SPM) in the ambient atmosphere as per <ORG>, 1989. From <ORG>'s annul report 1991 it is obvious that the major contributions, so far as air pollution is concerned, is of the vehicular traffic but the industries in the city are also contributing about 30% of the air pollution. So far as the discharge of effluent in Yamuna is concerned, the industries are the prime contributors apart from the <ORG> and <ORG> which are also discharging sewage directly into the river Yamuna. We are dealing with the sewage problems in separate proceedings."

Thereafter, on April 21, 1995 this <ORG>, regarding the construction of STP's observed as under:

"Treatment of sewage is of utmost importance for health and for supply of pure water to the citizens of Delhi. Any delay in this respect is health-hazard and cannot be tolerated."

The land for Keshav Pur STP was not being made available. There was considerable delay in completing the acquisition proceeding order:

"So far as Keshavpur is concerned, land has to be acquired by the State Govt. Mr. <NAME>, learned senior counsel states that although he is not appearing for <ORG>, yet he has information that some steps have already been taken by the State Govt. There is nobody in the <ORG> to assist us on behalf of <ORG>. We are told that Mrs. <NAME> is the Secretary, In- charge of <ORG>. We are prima facie of the view that there is obvious inaction on the part of the <ORG>. in complying with our orders. Before we take any action in this respect we direct Ms. <NAME> to file an affidavit in this <ORG> within one week giving over-all action the Govt. has initiated in respect of acquiring land in setting up of Sewage Treatment Plant in Keshavpur. The affidavit be filed by 1 PM on 11th August, 1995. List the matter on 11th August, 1995 at 2 PM."

Thereafter, on August 11, 1995 this Court issued following directions regarding the STP at Keshavpur:

"Pursuant to this Court's order dated August 4, 1995 Ms. <NAME>, <ORG>, <ORG> has filed an affidavit. Ms. <NAME>, learned counsel appearing for the Secretary, <ORG> states that the necessary procedure for acquiring 106 Hectares of land in Keshavpur for the purpose of setting up of Sewage Treatment Plant has already been completed. She further states that the advance compensation is to be disbursed to the land-owners. Mr. <NAME>. Learned counsel states that the <ORG> shall hand-over the compensation amount to the administration within three days from today. Learned counsel further states that about 30 Hectares of acquired land is under the authorised/unauthorised possession of various persons. According to her, the remaining 76 Hectares of land can be handed over to the Undertaking with immediate effect. We request the Committee consisting of Mr. <NAME>, Mr. <NAME> and Mr. <NAME> to visit the area and identify the 76 Hectares of land which can be immediately surrendered to the Undertaking. This may be done within one week. We direct the Secretary, <ORG> <ORG> to send <ORG>'s representative/representatives with the team for the purpose of identification of 76 Hectares of land (as at present). Mr. <NAME> shall file an additional affidavit in this Court within three weeks from today indicating the progress made in this matter."

Finally, on September 8, 1995 this Court issued the following directions regarding the STP at Keshavpur:-

"So far as the requirement of land for setting up STP in Keshopur is concerned, this Court issued directions to <ORG> on December 14, 1994 to initiate proceedings within two weeks thereafter and hand over the possession to the Undertaking as early as possible. We are constrained to say that till date the possession of the whole of the land (106 hectares) has not been handed over to the Undertaking. As mentioned above, formal possession of 75 hectares has been handed over to the Undertaking. Ms. <NAME> is the Secretary Incharge of <ORG> and also of <ORG> of <ORG>. We direct Ms. <NAME> to have the proceedings such as the assessment of the value of the structures on the spot etc. completely within four weeds from September 11,1995. Thereafter, she would made a formal request to the <ORG> to demolish the structures and hand over the possession so that the <ORG> gets the land from <ORG> on payment and thereafter hand over the same to the Undertaking. Ms. <NAME> shall file an affidavit indicating the compliance of our order before October 16, 1995."

Various orders and directions issued by this Court from time to time in <NAME>'s case clearly show that the land in dispute - for Keshavpur STP - is being acquired under the directions of this Court. Even the impugned notifications under Section 4 read with 17 and Section 6 of the Act have been issued under the directions of this Court. This Court repeatedly indicated in the orders-directions that there was urgency in taking over the possession of the land, under acquisition, for the construction of STP at Keshopur. The authorities were directed to take up the work of land acquisition and construction of STP's on war-footing. "Likely" in the background of this Court's orders passed from time to time for a time bound programme for setting up the STPs means, for purposes of this case, "certainly" and "urgently".

Delhi - the capital of India - one of the world's great and historic cities has come to be listed as third/fourth most polluted and grubbiest city in the world. Apart from air-pollution, the waters of river Yamuna are wholly contaminated. It is a paradox that the Delhi tes - despite river Yamuna being the primary source of water supply - are discharging almost totality of untreated sewage into the river. There are eighteen drains including Najafgarh drain which carry industrial and domestic waste including sewage to river Yamuna. Thirty eight smaller drains fall into Najafgarh drain. The Najafgarh drain basin is the biggest polluter to river Yamuna. Eight of the drains including Najafgarh drain are untrapped, four fully trapped and remaining six are partially trapped. All these eighteen drains, by and large, carry untreated industrial and domestic wastes and fall into river Yamuna. The river Yamuna enters Delhi at Wazirabad in the North and leaves at South after travelling a distance of about twenty five kilometers. The water of river Yamuna till it enters Najafgarh is fit for drinking after treatment, but the confluence of Najafgarh drain and seventeen other drains make the water heavily polluted. The water quality of Yamuna, in Delhi stretch, is neither fit for drinking nor for bathing. The Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) level in the river has gone so high that no flora or fauna can survive. It is of utmost importance and urgency to complete the construction of the STP's in the city of Delhi. The project is of Great public importance. It is indeed of national importance. We take judicial notice of the fact that there was utmost urgency to acquire the land in dispute and as such the emergency provisions of the Act were rightly invoked. We reject the first contention raised by the learned counsel.

So far as the second contention raised by Mr. <NAME>, the same is mentioned to be rejected.

Whatever may be the user of the land under the Mastor Plan and the Zonal Development Plan the State can always acquire the same for public purpose in accordance with the law of the land. In any case the object and purpose of constructing the STP's is to protect the environment, control pollution and in the process maintain and develop the agricultural green.

We see no force in any of the contentions raised by Mr. <NAME>. We, therefore, dismiss the Transfer cases (writ petitions) with costs. We quantify the costs as Rs.10,000/- to be paid by each of the petitioners in these cases.


PETITIONER: SMT. SAIYADA MOSSARRAT Vs. RESPONDENT: <ORG>: <NAME> STEEL PLANT,<NAME> (M.P.) & OR DATE OF JUDGMENT31/10/1988 BENCH: <NAME>, M.P. (J) BENCH: <NAME>, M.P. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J) CITATION: 1989 AIR 406 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 690 1989 SCC (1) 272 JT 1988 (4) 243 1988 SCALE (2)1208 CITATOR INFO : E&F 1991 SC 855 (48) ACT: Constitution of India, 1950: Article 32 and Seventh Schedule List I Entry 32, 43, 95 and 97--Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971-- Constitutional validity of--Fresh consideration on different ground. % Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971: Constitutional validity of Speedy eviction of unauthorized occupants from property of Union <ORG> in the <ORG>--Necessity for. HEADNOTE: The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence by the respondent-company. The licence was cancelled on the allegation that the petitioner had illegally made encroachment on further land and had illegally raised a structure on the land granted on licence. Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Act, and the competent authority passed an order of eviction. <ORG> dismissed the appeal, <ORG> dismissed the petitioner's petition, and this court refused to grant him special leave. The petitioner then filed a Civil Suit which was dismissed for default of appearance. His special leave against this order too was dismissed by this Court for default of appearance. In the present petition under Art. 32 , the petitioner has6 challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on the ground that <ORG> does not have the legislative competence to legislate on the subject. The Solicitor-General raising a preliminary objection. It was contended that the Constitution Bench of this Court had already upheld the constitutionality of the Act, in <CITATION> , [ 1973] l SCR 515, relled upon. Dismissing the writ petition, it was, HELD: (1) In the present petition the petitioner has contended that since the subject matter falls squarely under PG NO 690 PG NO 691 Entry 18 of List II (<ORG> List) and it does not fall under any Entry under List I or List III, the <ORG> has no competence to legislate in respect of the subject matter. Since this specific aspect was not debated before the Constitution Bench, it would not be proper to shut out the petitioner from raising the plea by recourse to the argument that the point was concluded in <NAME> case. [695H 696A-B] (2) The Public Premises Act is concerned with the eviction of those persons who have no authority in law to remain in possession of the land belonging to the Union of India. The unauthorised persons may be squatters, persons having no rights whatsoever, or persons who were in occupation by virtue of any agreement but whose right under the agreement had come to an end. [699F-G] (3) In order to ascertain under which entry the Act in question would fall, it is necessary to ascertain what is the subject matter of legislation applying the 'pitch and substance' test. [696C] (4) The subject matter of the legislation. as pronounced in <NAME> case, is "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises." [696D] (5) On an analysis of Entry 32 of List 1 it inter alia emerges that while the <ORG> can legislate in respect of Union property situated in a <ORG>, with regard to such legislation in respect of the Union property <ORG> can enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging to the Union of India and the revenue therefrom and in that event the legislation enacted by <ORG> will prevail as against the law enacted by the <ORG>. 1697G-H; 698A] (6) Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislation pertaining to the property of the Union of India including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of India. Once the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under Entry 32 of List 1, it is unnecessary to examine the scope of Entry 18 of List III. [699B-C ] (7) In so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises" is concerned, it is not shown that there is any legislation enacted by the <ORG> legislature which deals with this subject in so far as the property belonging to the Union of India is concerned. Since there is no such legislation, the legislation enacted by the <ORG> under the PG NO 692 authority of entry 32 of List 1 cannot be successfully assailed. Even if there was such a legislation, the Act enacted by the <ORG> would prevail. [698B-D] (8) The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, does not pertain to the subject-matter of providing a speedy remedy for eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public premises belonging to the Union of India. It only deals with eviction of tenants from premises owned by landlords other than the <ORG>. Therefore, there is no question of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act prevailing vis-a- vis the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act . [698G-H: 699A ] (9) A legislation pertaining to a <ORG> Company including one pertaining to eviction of trespassers, or unlawful occupants of properties belonging to <ORG> Companies can be enacted by the <ORG>. <ORG> Companies are governed by the Indian Companies Act which has itself been enacted in exercise of the legislative authority conferred by Entry 43 of the Union List (List 1) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. [701A-B] (10) The need to speedily evict trespassers or unauthorised occupants of such properties is self evident. The <ORG>s cannot legislate for such properties in respect of properties situated in more than one <ORG> or <ORG> companies situated in different states all over India. Surely, the <ORG>, in obeisance of its obligation to protect and safeguard the national and overall public interest, can legislate in this respect under the residuary all-pervasive entry--Entry 97 of the Union List [List 1] of the Constitution of lndia-which clothes the <ORG> with the requisite legislative authority in regard to "any other matter not enumerated in List II or List Ill including any tax not mentioned in either of these lists." The source of authority can thus in any case be traced to Entry 97 read with Entry 95 of List I of the Constitution of India. [701C- D; <CITATION> .l.R. 1980, Madhya Pradesh 106 concurred. <NAME> v. <NAME>, A.1.R. 1970 SC 228. JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTlON: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3615 of 1978.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

PG NO 693 Altemesh Rein for the Petitioner.

<NAME>, Solicitor General, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and Miss. <NAME> for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the <ORG> was delivered by <NAME>, J. A Seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision in <CITATION> .,  1 SCR, 515 upholding the constitutionality of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 Act 40 of 1971 Act notwithstanding, the petitioner has renewed the challenge by way of this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. Of course the epicentre of the present challenge has shifted and is now located in the plea that <ORG> does not have the legislative competence to legislate on the subject of the impugned legislation which dimension was not in focus in <NAME> case. The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence by the Respondents. The licence was cancelled on the allegation that petitioner had illegally made encroachment on further land and had illegally raised a structure on the land granted on licence. The respondent terminated the licence. Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Act. The competent authority passed an order of eviction against the petitioner. Petitioner's appeal to the appellate authority under the Act was dismissed. <ORG> also dismissed the petition preferred by the petitioner. This <ORG> refused to grant special leave and dismissed petitioner's Special Leave Petition. Petitioner even so filed a Civil Suit which came to be dismissed for default of appearance. Meanwhile the petitioner had approached this court by way of a Special Leave Petition against an interlocutory order passed by <ORG>. The said special leave petition also came to be dismissed for default of appearance. And thereafter the present Writ Petition has been instituted under Art. 32 ot the Constitution of India. In the petition as originally framed the constitutionality of the Act was not challenged. The said challenge was incorporated by amending the petition. When the matter came up for hearing this <ORG> issued a Rule Nisi limited to the question of constitutionality of the Act as is evident from the relevant part of the order extracted hereinbelow:

Application for amendment allowed. Rule <NAME> on the PG NO 694 question of constitutional validity of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act , 1971. Notice to the Attorney General and <ORG> ordered."

Thus the only question before the court presently is as regards the constitutional validity of the Act. The scheme of the Act as set out in <NAME> case is as under:

"The scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers power on Estate Officer to issue notice to persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. 'Unauthorised occupation' under the Act in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the Public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. 'Premises' are defined to mean any land or any building or part of a building and includes the garden, grounds and outhouses, appertaining to such building or part of a building and fitting affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Public premises means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of <ORG> as enumerated in Section 2(e) of the Act. The notice to show cause against order of eviction shall specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The Estate Officers under the Act are appointed by <ORG>. The Estate Officers are Gazetted Officers or officers of equivalent rank. 'Corporate authority' under the Act means any company or <ORG> or any committee or the <ORG> as mentioned in the Act. The Estate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit, in respect of matters mentioned in Sec. 8 of the Act. These matters are summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; secondly, requiring the discovery and production of document; and thirdly, any other matter which may be prescribed. Sec. 10 of the Act provides for finality of PG NO 695 orders in circumstances mentioned in Sec. tO of the Act therein."

The learned Solicitor General has raised a preliminary objection on the threshold. It is contended that <ORG> in <NAME> case has already pronounced that the legislature had the legislative competence to enact the impugned Act. Reliance in this context is placed-on the following passage from the Majority Judgment of Ray, J:

"Therefore, a validating law is upheld first by finding out whether the legislature possesses competence over the subject matter, and, secondly, whether by validation the legislature has removed the defect which the courts had found in previous law.

The legislature had legislative competence to enact the 1971 Act. It means that it could legislate on the subject of providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises."

(Emphasis added) Now a perusal of the judgment reveals that the debate centred on the issue as to whether Sec. 15 of the Act provided only one procedure for ejectment of all persons in unauthorised occupation of the public premises or whether there was the further option to make recourse to the ordinary law. This court has concluded that Sec. 15 of the Act provides only one procedure for ejectment of persons in unauthorised occupation of the premises for public purposes, unlike Sec. 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 which was held to be unconstitutional in Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd., [ L967] 3 SCR 399. Debate did not at all centre around the issue of legislative competence. While it is true that in <NAME> case it has in terms been stated that the concerned legislature, that is to say the <ORG>, has legislative competence to enact the impuged Act, as is evident from the passage extracted hereinabove, it is equally true that the legislative competence of the <ORG> to enact the Act does not appear to have been debated at all before the court as is evident from the circumstances that there is no discussion whatsoever as to under which entry of which List the subject matter of the Act would fall. In the present matter the petitioner has contended that the subject matter does not fall under any entry either in List I (union list) or List III (Concurrent List), but it squarely falls under entry 18 of the List Il, PG NO 696 that is to say, the State List. It has been argued that since the subject matter falls squarely under the State List (List II) and it does not fall under any entry under List I or List III, the <ORG> has no competence to legislate in respect of the subject matter. Since this specific aspect was not debated before <ORG>, it would not be proper to shut out the petitioner from raising the plea by recourse to the argument that the point was concluded in <NAME> case regardless of whether the matter was debated or not. Accordingly we will deal with this point in the light of the submissions urged before us bearing in mind that <ORG> has categorically observed that the <ORG> has legislative competence to enact the Act, albeit in the absence of any debate on this point. Before turning to the entries in List I, List Il and List III, with a view to ascertain under which entry the Act in question would fall, it is necessary to ascertain what is the subject matter of legislation applying the 'pith and substance' test. Now so far as this question is concerned, <ORG> in <NAME> case has in clear and unequivocal terms pronounced that the subject matter of the legislation is "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises." As is evident from the passage extracted earlier. Apart from the name of the Act, the preamble to the Act itself makes it abundantly clear that the Act is designed to 'provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises and for certain incidental matters. The scheme of the Act also indicates that the central theme of the legislation is to provide for speedy procedure in order to evict persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises. The scheme of the Act shows that apart from the dictionary of terms and expressions used in the Act, the vital provisions of the Act pertain to eviction of unauthorised occupants in exercise of powers conferred by Section 5 after following the procedure under Section 4 . The incidental provisions are: ( 1) with regard to the disposal of the property left in the public premises by the unauthorised occupants and (2) recovery of arrears referable to the point of time prior to the occupation becoming unauthorised and damages in respect of the period of unauthorised occupation as provided in Section 7 . Section 8 pertains to the incidental powers of summoning witnesses etc. And Section 9 provides for the appeals. Section l5 excludes the jurisdiction of <ORG>. There are similar provisions in regard to incidental and ancillary matters. It is, therefore, evident that the whole Act revolves around the issue of eviction of unauthorised occupants and incidental matters. In any view of the matter PG NO 697 it is not open to contend that the subject-matter of the legislation is other than the designing of speedy procedure for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises and incidental matters in view of the law declared by <ORG> of this Court in <NAME> case. It is in the light of this perspective that the question as to under 'which entry' of `which list' the subject matter falls, will have to be examined. It has to be realised that if the subject matter of the legislation falls under List I, <ORG> will have jurisdiction to legislate on the subject, having regard to the mandate embodied in Article 246(1) 1 of the Constitution of India which provides that the <ORG> has exclusive power to make, laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule. We must, therefore, address ourselves to the issue as to whether the subject matter of the legislation falls in any of the entries in the Union List (List I).

[ "[1] Art. 26(1)--" Notwithstanding anything in clauses  and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union List")." ] A scrutiny of the contents of entry 32 of List I is essential in this connection. The entry is in the following terms:

"Property of the <ORG> and the revenue therefrom, but as regards property situated in a <ORG> subject to legislation by the <ORG>, save in so far as <ORG> by law otherwise provides."

On an analysis of the entry, it emerges that: (1) The <ORG> can legislate in respect of property of the Union and revenue therefrom regardless of whether the property is situated in Union Territory or in a State. (2) But as regards the property situated in a State the property will be subject to legislation made by the State subject to the rider which follows.

(3) While the <ORG> can legislate in respect of <ORG> property situated in a <ORG>, with regard to such legislation in respect of the <ORG> property <ORG> can enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging to the <ORG> of India and the revenue therefrom and in that PG NO 698 event the legislation enacted by the <ORG> will prevail as against the law enacted by the <ORG>.

In so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises" is concerned, it is not shown that there is any legislation enacted by <ORG> which deals with this subject in so far as the property belonging to the Union of India is concerned. When the challenge to the Act came up for scrutiny in <ORG> in <CITATION> .l.R. 1980 Madhya Pradesh 106 it was not the basis of the challenge that there was any State legislation in regard to this subject matter. Nor has it been contended before us that there is any legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants enacted by <ORG> which deals with the aforesaid subject matter, or that the properties belonging to the Union of India are covered of any such State Act . Since there is no such legislation, the legislation enacted by the <ORG> under the authority of Entry 32 of List I cannot be successfully assailed. What is more. even if there was such a legislation, the Act enacted by the <ORG> would prevail as per proposition Nos. 2 and 3 which have emerged on the analysis of Entry 32 made a short while ago. It may be mentioned that in <NAME> case it was contended before <ORG> that the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1961 would prevail as against the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1971 enacted by the <ORG> inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act was enacted later. <ORG> rightly repulsed the plea. In the first place, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act has an altogether different perspective It is an act for the Regulation and Control of letting on rent accommodation in respect of tenants as revealed by the Preamble. In the second place the Act does not apply to property which is the property of the Government having regard to the provision contained in Section 3(1)(a) 1 . Since the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act does not apply to the property of the Government, there is no question of the said Act prevailing vis-a-vis the Central Act . What is more the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act does not pertain to the subject- matter of providing a speedy remedy for eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public premises belonging to the Union of India. It deals merely with eviction of tenants from premises owned by landlords other than the Government Under the circumstances, there is no question of the Madhya

1. "3. Act not to apply certain accommodation [1] Nothing in this Act shall apply to-

[a] accommodation which is the property of the Government:"

PG NO 699 Pradesh Accommodation Control Act prevailing vis-a-vis the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act . It cannot be gain-said that even if both the legislations pertain to the same subject-matter, the legislation enacted by the <ORG> in regard to the property belonging to <ORG> would prevail having regard to the mandate contained in Entry 32 as has been discussed earlier. Under the circumstances it is futile to contend that the <ORG> has no legislative competence to legislate in respect of providing for a speedy remedy for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the <ORG>. Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislations pertaining to the property of the <ORG> including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of lndia. Once the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under Entry 32, of List I, it is unnecessary to examine the scope of Entry 18 of List III, pertaining to land that is to say rights in or over land tenures including the relationship of land-lord-tenant and the collection of rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement, agricultural lands and acquisitions. Again, as explained by this Court in <CITATION> .l.R. 1970 SC 228 "the relation of landlord and tenant' as mentioned in this Entry, is with reference to land tenures which would not appropriately cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation and that the expression is only used with reference to relationship between Iandlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands.

At the cost of repetition it may be stated that the pith and substance' of the legislation under scrutiny viz. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1961 is eviction of unauthorised occupants from properties belonging to the Union of India and incidental and ancillary matters. It does not pertain to any matter relating to rights in relation to landlord and tenants for eviction of tenants from lands which have been leased. The Public Premises Act is concerned with the eviction of those persons who have no authority law to remain in possession of the land belonging to the Union of India. The unauthorised persons may be squatters. persons having no rights whatsoever, or persons who were in occupation by virtue of any agreement but whose right under the agreement had come to an end Thus, there is no substance in the contention that the <ORG> had no legislative competence to enact Public Premises Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has however urged an argument in the context of the definition of 'Public Premises' as embodied in Section 2(e) ( I)(i) of the Act. The PG NO 700 definition envelops premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any Company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act of 1956 in which not less than 51 per of the paid-up capital is held by <ORG>. This contention was raised before <ORG> in <NAME> case and has been repulsed by <ORG> on the reasoning unfolded in the passage extracted from paragraph 4 of the judgment:

"The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Act in so far as it includes in the definition of public premises "any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any company as defined in S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than 51% of the paid-up share capital is held by <ORG>," is ultra vires and void, as to that extent the Act is beyond the legislative competence of <ORG>. The argument of the learned counsel is that the Act was enacted under Entry 32, List I of the VII Schedule to the Constitution, which relates to "property of the <ORG> and he revenue therefrom", and that this entry cannot be construed to include the property of a <ORG> company which is a different and distinct legal entity from the <ORG>. It may be conceded that the expression "property of the <ORG>", as used in Entry 32, List 1, cannot be Construed to include the property of a <ORG> Company. But if Entry 32 gives jurisdiction to <ORG> to enact the Act in respect of <ORG> premises, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Entry 43 which relates to incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading jurisdictions read with Entry 95 which relates to jurisdiction and powers of all courts except <ORG>, with respect to any of the matters in List 1, can be construed to confer power on <ORG> to enact the Act in respect of premises belonging to a <ORG> company. It seems however, more appropriate that in so far as the Act deals with a lessee or licensee of premises belonging to a <ORG> company, the subject- matter of the Act would be covered by Entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III. These entries broadly deal with transfer of property, contracts and jurisdiction and powers of <ORG> with respect to any of the matters in List III. Taking either view in our opinion it is not correct to say that the Act in so far as it relates to premises belonging to a <ORG> company suffers from want of legislative competence."

PG NO 701 Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to show that there is any infirmity in the reasoning of <ORG>. Besides, a legislation pertaining to a <ORG> Company including one pertaining to eviction of trespassers, or unlawful occupants of properties belonging to <ORG> Companies speedily can be enacted by the <ORG>. <ORG> Companies are governed by the Indian Companies Act which has itself been enacted in exercise of the legislative authority conferred by Art. 43 of the Union List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It is idle to contend and it has accordingly not been contended, that a <ORG> can legislate under the authority to legislate conferred by the <ORG> List (List 11) in regard to properties of a <ORG> Company which may have properties in more than one <ORG> and even in Union Territories. The need to speedily evict trespassers or unauthorised occupants of such properties is self evident. The <ORG>s cannot legislate for such properties in respect of properties situated in more than one <ORG> or <ORG> companies situated in different states all over India. Surely, the <ORG>, in obeisance to its obligation to protect and safeguard the National and overall public interest, can legislate in this respect under the residuary all-pervasive entry Entry 97 of the Union List (List 1) of Constitution of India which clothes the <ORG> with the requisite legislative authority in regard to "any other matter not enumerated in List 11 or List 111 including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists". It has not been shown that any of the entries in List 11 or List 111 would be attracted to the subject-matter of speedy eviction of unauthorised occupations from properties belonging to a <ORG> Company wherein Central <ORG> has more than 51% of the paid-up share capital. The source of authority can thus in any case be traced to Entry 97 read with Entry 95 of the Constitution of India.

In any view of the matter therefore it is futile to contend that <ORG> had no legislative competence in this behalf. We therefore concur with the conclusion reached by <ORG> in <NAME> case (supra) and repel the challenge unhesitatingly.

The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. The interim order will stand vacated. No costs.

R.S.S. Petition dismissed.