JUDGMENT This judgment will govern miscellaneous Civil Case No. 63 of 1944 and Miscellaneous Civil Cases Nos. 7, 8, 85, 91, 92 and 98 of 1945. The questions they raise are not common to all, except as regards one question, but as the others are inter linked between them it will be convenient to group the cases according to the questions referred and deal with all in one judgment.

These cases are all income-tax references made under Section 66 (1) of the Income-tax Act , as amended in 1939. In view of the contentions made before us, we think it desirable to set out the limits of our authority at the outset. It is important to emphasise that we are not a court of Appeal and accordingly are not free to debate such questions as might seem to us to arise in the case, however important they may appear to be. We are only an advisory body which is not free to tender unsolicited advice. We can only an advisory body which is not free to tender unsolicited advice. We can only advise on the questions referred and accordingly will have to confine our answers to the questions asked. We have certain other powers, and indeed it will be necessary to exercise them in one of the cases heard along with these (we shall deal separately with that), but these powers only enable us to send the matter back and compel a reference. Until that is done, we have no power to debate questions which have not been referred. This is clear from the Act, but the matter has been placed beyond controversy by their Lordships of <ORG> in <CITATION> v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa, <ORG> v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay and <ORG> v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency & Aden. It has also been so decided by this Court in <CITATION> .

The question which concerns all the cases has been referred in these terms in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 63 of 1944 :-

"Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the income of Rs. 10,835 derived from the sale of forest produce is agricultural income exempt from taxation under Section 4 (3) (viii) of the Income-tax Act ."

The point is the same in the other cases though in some of them the language is a little different, and naturally the figure differs in each case.

The question is one of mixed fact and law. So far as the facts are concerned they will be found separately in each case. So far as the law goes it will be necessary to search for some general and clear cut principle, because opinions have differed, and in the absence of principle, opinion tends to be arbitrary.

The definition given in the Act is that "agricultural Income" means :-

"(a) any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land revenue in British India or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the <ORG> as such; (b) any income derived from such land by (i) agriculture."

Clause (b) throws us back to clause (a) because of words "such land" which refer to the land described there. It is land which is (1) used for agricultural purposes and (2) either assessed to land revenue in British India or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the <ORG> as such.

It is admitted that the land in all these cases is either assessed to land revenue or is subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the <ORG> as such, and that, therefore to that extent, the income complies with the definition. But that is not enough, for, it must also either be used for agricultural purposes or for agriculture. The question, therefore, is how far does agriculture cover forests ? Opinions differ regarding this, and because of that the learned Acting Advocate-General suggested that it will be pertinent to go back to first principles and analyse the root of the word.

The dictionaries tell us that agriculture comes from ager, a field, and culture, cultivation. This implies the use of human skill and labour; and that is exactly how the dictionaries define it. <NAME>, for instance, says that agriculture is the "art or science of cultivating the ground", and includes in it the rearing and management of livestock, husbandry, farming, and so forth. Other dictionaries, including the Oxford English Dictionary, employ the same basic conception. Some include "forestry" in the term. It is to be observed, however, that the word used when forestry is included, is forestry and not forests. The distinction is important because when one turns to the definition of forestry in the dictionaries one finds that is also an art of a science. Thus, <NAME> says it is "the art of farming or cultivating forests; the management of growing timber", and the Oxford English Dictionary says much the same thing, therefore, throughout we find that the essence of agriculture, even when it is extended to include "forestry", is the application of human skill and labour. Without that it can be neither art nor a science. And that we feel must be the determining factor in this class of case.

Turning next to the cases, one of the most importants is the <ORG> court judgment in <NAME> v. <NAME> not because it deals directly with this question, though it touches an allied matter, but because it lays down certain general principles which bind us, and clears much of the ground.

The learned Judges were dealing with the expression "agricultural land" in the Constitution Act , and after pointing out that it had not been defined there said at page 61 : "It must accordingly be understood in the sense which it ordinarily bears in the English language", and again at page 62 : "As regards the connotation of the word agricultural, it may be pointed out that agriculture has been variously defined in several English and Indian status for the purposes of these statutes and it is neither useful nor legitimate to attempt to draw any inference from these statutory definitions for the purpose of determining the ordinary connotation of the word in the English language." They then referred to decisions in which the <ORG> has placed a restricted meaning on the terms "in view of the indication afforded by the particular Act which had to be considered by the <ORG>," and to others which construed the term in a more general sense. The sum and substance of it all is that it is of little avail to consider these decisions because of course, it is open to the legislature to widen or to restrict the ordinary meaning of a word, and because, if it chooses to do so for the purposes of a particular Act, it does not follow that the same result is intended in another Act framed for a different purpose, having different provisions and using other language. In the face of that we do not think it will be either profitable or proper to consider in detail the various decisions which construe the term or analogous expressions, for the purpose of some particular Act. Some of them have been referred to in the Federal <ORG>s judgment at pages 62-65, and others will be found in decisions like <CITATION> and <CITATION> will suffice to say that the following cases related to special Act, and at least part of the decisions in each is based upon matters special to those Acts : <NAME> v. <NAME> v. <NAME>, <NAME> v. <NAME>, <CITATION> , <CITATION> , <CITATION> , <NAME> v. <NAME> and <NAME> v. <NAME>. The other cases in this class, though dealing with special Acts, base the decision on general grounds and to that extent are more in point. But all they serve to show is that difference of opinion is possible, the meaning being extended in some cases and restricted in others. <CITATION> holds that the growing of casuarina trees for fuel is an agricultural purpose and <CITATION> discards what we might term the human agency test and employees instead one which determines whether the income is derived from the produce of the land and not what is the actual quantum of labour bestowed on it. Of these two the former is largely based on considerations which the Federal <ORG> state are irrelevant, namely, the meaning of the term in certain English Act s where special statutory definitions are given. With the latter we do not, with respect, agree.

As to the other cases, <ORG> state that the view taken in <NAME> v. <NAME>, <NAME> v. <NAME> and <CITATION> has not gone unchallenged and the learned judges refer to <CITATION> . So also they state that the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> , upholding <CITATION> , lays down no principle or test of general application. They are accordingly not of much value for the present purpose. The only decisions in this class which, in our opinion, lay down general rules are best referred to in the language of <ORG> in <NAME> v. <NAME> :-

"Their Lordships confirmed a decision of <ORG> to the effect that land used as a tea garden was used for agricultural purposes. In the judgment of <ORG> (which was generally approved by their Lordships) it was observed that the term agricultural land" is used in the Act of 1905 in its widest sense to denote all land which is ..... <ORG> had held that land covered by a natural forest was not agricultural land, and this view also would seem to have been confirmed by <ORG>."

We have underlined the word "tilled" because, in our opinion, that brings out the distinction which we have sought to draw between an agricultural and a non-agricultural purpose. The decisions referred to are <ORG> v. <NAME>. and <ORG> v. <NAME>.

From here we proceed to consider cases under the Income-tax Act . A large number were cited but those dealing with forests are not many. Of them <CITATION> . thought, without deciding the point, that "forestry" might be regarded as agriculture. We stress, however, the use of the word "forestry" as opposed to "forest".

<CITATION> held that income derived from pasturage was agricultural income but not that from fisheries or from land leased for stacking timber. The "pasturage" part of the decision would, at first sight, appear to offend the rule we have suggested but the point was not decided because it was not contested once the case reached <ORG> (see page 527). But that apart, nearly every rule has its exceptions and the pasturing of cattle is so closely allied to agriculture that it has become to be considered part and parcel of it and the meaning of the term is now so well established that there is no longer room for doubt. That, however, does not apply to forests or even to forestry, though we think it possible that the latter might fall within the scope of the definition.

<CITATION> holds that income from unassessed forest land is not agricultural income and unassessed forest land is not agricultural income and <CITATION> applies the same rule to uncultivated forest land, as also does Maharaja of Kapurthala v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces, Special Manager, Court of <CITATION> , U. P. & C. P. <NAME> v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P. & C. P. and <NAME> v. <NAME> v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P. & C. P.

This resume will show that so far as forests are concerned the definition we have adopted making actual cultivation with the aid of human skill and labour the dividing line, reconciles, as far as we can see, the various cases which have been cited on the matter of forests.

The other cases cited to us are not in point and do not help because they deal with other matters, such as dairy farming, Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. <ORG>, Rangoon, allowances from a zemindari to a <NAME>, Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces v. <NAME> Saltanat Begam, a money-lender who cultivates a field in lieu of a debt due to him, <CITATION> , and royalties from a coal mine, <CITATION> . All we need say with respect to them, excluding of course the judgment of <ORG>, is that in so far as their more general observations agree with the distinction we make, they support us, and in so far as they do not, then, with great respect, we differ from them. Their Lordships held that royalties from local mines were not agricultural income and nothing that their Lordships said detracts from our view.

It will be necessary, however, for us to meet certain arguments. It was suggested in some of the cases that object of exempting agricultural income from tax was that it already pays tax in another form, namely land revenue or ceases, and therefore, the idea is to avoid double taxation. This view will be found advanced in, for instance <CITATION> . But we think it is sufficiently met in Maharaja of Kapurthala v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces. The learned judges point out there that the fact that the Act requires the income not only to be subject to land revenue or ceases but also to be derived from agriculture or from land used for agricultural purposes shows that incomes from other types of land are not exempt even though they pay land revenue. And that of course is patent. Rents derived from bungalows on malik makbuza land in a town are already taxable. Nor indeed is there any reason why there should not be double taxation if the legislature chooses to impose it. That is also dealt with in the <NAME> case. The argument is also met by what their Lordships of <ORG> say in <CITATION> . Their Lordships point out that in such cases the land revenue or ceases paid are deducted from the gross receipts because the tax is not levied on gross receipts but on income. In practice, therefore, there is no double taxation.

It was also argued that this income is not taxable at all because section 6 of the Act sets out the only sources of taxable income. It cannot fall under the head "income from property" because Section 9 defines that and there is no room for forest produce there. So also Section 10 sets out what is to constitute "profits and gains of business, profession or vocation." That also excludes income from forests. And as regards "other sources", it was contended that this must be read ejusdem generis with what precedes it. It was said an important head of income such as the present could hardly have been left for inclusion under a general section. It was pointed out that forests cover a large section of India and, therefore, assume more than ordinary importance in this country.

That may be so, but the same applies to agriculture, and Sections 4 (3) (viii) and 2 (1) (a) and (b) would be otiose of agricultural income is exempt in any way. The fact that it was necessary to include these sections shows that income of this sort would be taxable but for the exemptions. But this apart, the matter has now been set at rest by their Lordships of <ORG>. In <NAME> v. Emperor at page 442 their Lordships say that the words appear to be "clear and emphatic, and expressly framed so as to make the sixth head mentioned in section 6 describe a true residuary group embracing within it all sources of income, profits and gains provided the Act applies to them, i.e., provided that they accrue or arise or are received in British India or are deemed to accrue or arise or to be received in British India, as provided by Section 4 (1), and are not exempted by virtue of Section 4 (3)." In view of that it is not necessary to say anything further.

Part of the argument on behalf of the assessees had reference to certain provisions in some of our local Acts, such as the Land Revenue Act; but we do not consider that a proper approach when construing an Act of <ORG>. Central Act s apply all over India while Provincial Act s have limited provincial application; also Acts touching the same topics can, and often do, differ from Province to Province. It would be impossible for us to conclude that the words in a Central Act have one meaning in one Province and another in another. The same assessee might have forest in this Province as well as in other Provinces. The local Acts in each might differ. It would be impossible for us to hold that his income from forests is exempt here while taxable elsewhere because the same words used in the Income Tax Act mean one thing in one place and another in another.

It is pertinent here to quote <ORG> in <NAME> v. <NAME>. The case is not in point but the observations are pertinent. At page 317 their Lordships say : "It is obvious that an enactment which is intended to apply to all the <ORG> in India, and which is also a modern enactment, ought to receive the same construction in all those <ORG>, and that no inconsistent course of practice should be allowed to spring up in any of the presidencies"; and at page 320, "unless, therefore, etc........ we must come to the absurd conclusion that the same words are to be interpreted by <ORG> in one sense when it is exercising its original jurisdiction or sitting on an appeal from a decree made under that jurisdiction, and in a different sense when it is sitting on an appeal from <ORG>; and further that the legislature has by the same form of words intended to make one law for the mofussil <ORG>, and another for those of the Presidency towns."

Another branch of this argument had relation to a possible conflict between the Provincial and Federal Legislative Lists in the Constitution Act unless the matter was decided in the way contended for by the assessees. But the basis of that argument is that agricultural income from land revenue paying estates etc. cannot be taxed. No one questions that, and if the income from these forests is agricultural income then, of course, it cannot be taxed. The whole question is whether it is such income. The other phase of this argument was only a variation of what was argued before <ORG> in <CITATION> . It would be pointless to elaborate this further.

Attempts were made to induce us to consider passages in the report of <ORG> which dealt with the Indian Income-tax Bill. Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, In re was relied on. But that passage has been much misunderstood and was explained by <NAME>, C.J., in Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act , 1937, In re. It is true this was not done in the course of a judgment but was an interjection during the arguments, but the substance of what he said accords with what <ORG> laid in <NAME> v. Attorney-General of Canada. Two other decisions of <ORG> are also apposite : Administrator-General of Bengal v. <NAME> and <CITATION> .

Mr. <NAME> stressed the difference between the words "any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes" in section 2 (1) (a) and the words "any income derived from such land by agriculture." He argued that the former was the wider and would include income from any by-produce of the land and certainly income which came directly from the land. In our judgment the first clause refers to income derived from land which is used directly for agricultural purposes and the second to by-professes, such as the selling of milk, the pasturing of cattle etc., provided the endeavour is agricultural and provided it is reasonably connected with land used for agricultural purposes. The distinction may be of importance in some cases, but here it still leaves the burden of deciding what "agriculture" means. As we have said whatever else may be necessary it is essential that the income should be derived from some activity which necessitates the employment of human skill and labour and which is not merely a product of mans neglect or inaction except for the gathering in of the spoils. Not only must be labour to reap the harvest - that of course he must do, else there could be no income - but he must also labour to produce it.

An attempt was also made to get us to take into consideration the previous practice of the department and the instructions embodied in the Income-tax Manual. This also is not permissible. It shows no more than that either certain officers of the department hold a certain view of the law, or that it was considered expedient at that time, for this reason, or that, not to tax income of this kind. The <ORG> are here to interpret the law and what departmental officers thought is not relevant. The argument is doubtless founded on certain observations of Lord <NAME> in Commissioners for Special purposes of Income-tax v. <NAME> but Lord <NAME> said in the same case at page 591 that he would prefer not to express an opinion on the point. Also a later <ORG> case, <NAME> v. <NAME>, brushed aside the continuous interpretation which <ORG> had placed on a statute for 44 years. We do not think, therefore, that it will be proper to take those matters into consideration and so will exclude them.

Having enumerated the general rule we will now proceed to examine the facts in each case separately and determine how far they conform to the rule we have enumerated.

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 63 of 1944. - The facts were agreed in this case. It appears from the order of reference, as also from the decision of <ORG> in appeal, that the forest here was not a cultivated one and was of spontaneous growth. The same remarks apply to the following items of produce, namely, harra nuts and mohua flowers. According to our definition, they are not included within the exemption and so are liable to tax.

As regards lac, it was held in <CITATION> that income from this source is taxable. On the other hand, one of us (<NAME>, J.) held in <NAME> v. <NAME> that lac cultivation is an agricultural operation. But the decision was based on the C. P. Tenancy Act and it was made clear that that Act had extended the definition of agriculture. Accordingly, what <NAME> v. <NAME> had held was not agriculture (namely lac cultivation) was considered to be "agriculture" because of the extension of the definition in the later Act for the purposes of that Act.

Now, it is clear from <NAME> v. <NAME> that "Lac is neither timber nor fruit. In the case before me, it is not the produce of the tenants labour, but of his neglect and idleness. It is the deposit of an insect upon the smaller branches of the palas trees." Again at page 110 Stanyon, <ORG> says : "Such propagation can only be developed by allowing the land to lie waste so that the palas trees can spread over it as jungle. Therefore the produce of lac involves a use of the land in a manner which is opposed to agriculture, as we understood that term in relation to village operations in this province."

In the circumstances we are of opinion that for the purposes of the Income-tax Act lac cultivation cannot be regarded as an agricultural operation. In any case it has not been shown that in this case the conditions were otherwise than as described above.

Our answer to the question referred in this case is that the Rs. 10,835 derived from the sale of forest produce is not "agricultural income" and so is not exempt from taxation.

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 7 of 1945. - Here also the facts are agreed. The forest income is derived from a sale of timber which the assessee cuts into beams, logs, poles etc.; also from the sale of tendu leaves which are used in the manufacture of bidis. The finding regarding the nature of the forest is to be to found in the <ORG> appellate order and is given in these words :-

"It is impossible that all these forest trees or tendu shrubs could have been planted or reared by any process of agriculture, that is to say, by the cultivation of the soil. It may be that at some stage in their growth the trees required to be watered or watched. But the fact is that they had been standing upon the land for a number of years during which the soil has remained untouched."

The evidence adduced by the assessee to show that he had planted the trees was disbelieved. In the circumstances, the burden being on the assessee to bring himself within the purview of the exemption, and he not having proved that the forest was "cultivated" by him in the sense that its produce was due to the skill and labour which he expended on it as opposed to produce which would come in any way from natural cause despite inaction on his part, we are of opinion that the Rs. 19,447 arising from those sources was rightly held to be taxable.

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 8 of 1945. - The forest income here was derived from leases of the forest "for the purpose of cutting and removing standing timber and fuel, and taking tendu leaves, lac and harra therefrom."

The finding regarding the nature of the forest is to this effect : "The trees in these forest lands are obviously of spontaneous growth and must have been standing for a number of years. It is impossible to say that they were either planted or reared up by any process of agriculture." We hold that the Rs. 12,373 assessed to income under this head was rightly assessed.

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 85 of 1945. - In this case Rs. 1,799 received from the sale of harra and tendu leaves has been assessed. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found here that the forest was of spontaneous growth and that "nothing is done in the nature of preparing land for the growth of the trees therein." The <ORG> has accepted this and nothing has been shown us to the contrary. Accordingly, here also, we hold the income was rightly assessed.

Miscellaneous Civil case No. 91 of 1945. - Here also the finding of the <ORG> is that the forest was "of a spontaneous growth and no process of agriculture was employed in growing the forest. It may be that at one time forest guards may have been employed but that does not make it an agricultural income. Active human agency in tilling the soil was not employed nor any process which is commonly understood as an agricultural process was used in the production of the forest trees which grow spontaneously and which were sold from time to time to clear of the overgrowth." We agree that the income under this head was rightly assessed.

Miscellaneous Civil Cases Nos. 92 and 98 of 1945. - The income in both these cases was from the sale of forest trees. The findings in each regarding the facts are the same as in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 91 of 1945, and are given in the same words. Our conclusion is, therefore, the same in these two cases as in Miscellaneous Civil case No. 91 of 1945.

We now turn to points which are not common to all the cases. A question of interest arises in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 63 of 1944, as also in Miscellaneous Civil Cases Nos 8 and 85 of 1945. We will deal with that. The question has been posed in much the same language in all three cases except for the figure. It was (we quote from Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 85 of 1945) :-

"Whether the sum of (Rs. 1,270) representing interest received by the assessee on the arrears of agricultural rents due to him from his tenants is agricultural income within the meaning of section 2 (1) (a) of the Income-tax Act ?"

This matter has been recently decided by <ORG> of this Court in <ORG>, Firm v. <ORG>, <ORG>, C. P., & <ORG>. We do not feel free to differ from this decision though, had the matter been res integra, we might have taken another view.

It was contended by the learned acting Advocate-General that the decision is distinguishable and that it is, in any event wrong. The ground of distinction is said to be that the question posed there narrows the scope of the enquiry to the Central Provinces Tenancy Act whereas here there are no such limitations. It is true the Central Provinces Tenance Act is expressly mentioned in the question referred in that case whereas it is not mentioned in the present cases but that makes no difference. We are not asked to decide whether all interest is exempt but whether interest received from tenants on the arrears of rent due from them is. These interests are received under the provisions of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act and therefore whether the Act is expressly mentioned or not the fact remains that the rent is received in the same way and for the same reasons in both sets of cases. We are unable to distinguish that case from the present ones.

As regards the contention that the decision is, in any event, wrong, we find that the matter is debatable and that it is as easy for a Judge acting judicially to reach the one conclusion as the other. In an ultimate analysis it narrows down to a question of individual preference, it being possible to advance cogent reasons on either side. That being the position, we do not fell free to differ, nor do think it proper to refer the point to <ORG>. This, we fell is one of the cases in which certainty is of more value than the doubtful satisfaction of reaching a conclusion by a mere counting of heads. The matter has been fully debated in other <ORG>. Opinions have differed and <ORG> in the former case preferred one view to the other. In our view either the legislature should step in and say which view should prevail, or we should in this Province accept the view of our own <ORG>. After all the two, the rent and the interest, are so intimately bound together that it is not unreasonable to hold that they are species of the same genus, though we realise that it is anomalous that while a man who receives his rent regularly and places the money it represents in a bank must pay tax on the interest he receives from the bank whereas another who leaves his money with the tenant and receives interest from the tenant instead of from a bank need not. But anomalies arise on the other view too. The interest is recoverable under the Central Provinces Tenancy Act in the same way and along with the rent which is in arrear. It creates the same burden on the land and subjects a defaulting tenant to the same penalty. In the circumstances, we hold, following <ORG> v. <ORG>, <ORG>, C. P., and <NAME> that the interest in these three cases is exempt from taxation, it being agricultural income.

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 7 of 1945 raises another question. We are asked to decide whether a profit of Rs. 19,447 arising from the sale of forest produce, such as timber and tendu leaves, is a receipt of a capital nature and so exempt on that score.

Their Lordships of <ORG> point out in <CITATION> , that whether a given receipt is capital receipt or income depends on circumstances, so that what is income in the hands of one man may be capital receipt in those of another. The facts here are admitted and are stated thus in the order of reference : "But it was admitted before us that the assessee sells timber annually and derives the income in question and that there has been no reduction or loss of any capital asset, that is the forest land, by the timber being cut and sold."

That places, the matter, in principle, on a par with the decision of <ORG> just cited. We hold that the Rs. 19,447 under this head is income and was rightly included in the assessment.

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 8 of 1945 raises the following additional question :-

"Whether there was any material to hold that the bazar dues and nazrana receipts of Rs. 171 and Rs. 192 respectively were items of agricultural income."

As regards this, the <ORG> said : "The learned advocate for the assessee explained that the items comprised in it were collections from persons who were permitted to erect temporary stalls on the assessees agricultural lands on weekly bazar days. The explanation itself is sufficient to reject the assessees claim to such receipts being regarded as agricultural income."

With that we agree and add that the point was abandoned before us by council for the assessee who appeared in place of Mr. <NAME> on the second day. We hold the Rs. 192 was rightly included in the assessment.

As regards the nazrana, receipts under this head can flow from sources which are not agricultural, as for example, money taken from consent to a transfer of tenancy and other lands, presents on the occasion of a marriage, and so forth. Therefore, until we know exactly what the nazrana consisted of, it is impossible for us to say whether the income is agricultural or not. The <ORG> says : "it was alleged before us that it represented the amount levied from tenants taking up vacant plots for the purpose of cultivation. But the statement was not borne out by any evidence."

We asked counsel to point out any evidence to us which would indicate the nature of the nazrana and he admitted that was none. The burden is on the assessee and as he has produced no evidence on this point his contention must fail. We hold there is no material and that the sum of Rs. 192 was rightly assessed.

The result of our findings is that the assessees have lost in all the cases and on all the points except on the question of interest in three of the cases, namely, Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 63 of 1944 and Miscellaneous Civil Cases Nos. 8 and 85 of 1945. They will, therefore, pay the costs of the Commissioner in all but these three cases. Counsels fee Rs. 100 in each case.

As regards the remaining three cases, the success of the assessee on this point in two of the cases is so negligible as compared with his failure that we think it proper that each should pay the Commissioners costs there as well. In Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 63 of 1944 the assessee lost on the item of Rs. 10,835 and succeeded only as regards Rs. 504. In Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 8 of 1945 the assessee failed as regards Rs. 12,373 and succeeded as regards Rs. 314. We, therefore, direct that each of these two assesses should pay the Commissioners costs. Councils fee Rs. 100 in each case.

That leaves Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 85 of 1945. There, the success and failure is almost equal. The assessee lost as regards Rs. 1,799 and won as regards Rs. 1,270. There will be no order as to costs in this case.

Reference answered accordingly.


JUDGMENT Wanchoo, C.J.

1. This is an application by the State of Rajasthan for leave to appeal to <ORG> under Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution of India.

2. The application has been opposed on behalf of the opposite party on two technical grounds, namely,

1. that it is barred by limitation, and

2. that it has not been properly presented. Learned counsel for the opposite party agrees that but for these two technical matters, the case is a fit one for granting leave under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.

3. The case arose on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution by <NAME> and <NAME>. That application was allowed on the 19th October, 1951. The present application was filed on the 30th of January, 1952. It is contended on behalf of the opposite party that the application is barred by limitation for two reasons

1. that the applicant is not entitled to any deduction of time taken in obtaining a copy of the judgment to be appealed from under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, and

2. that, in any case, <NAME> having been brought on the record on an application, dated 5th March, 1952, the application was barred against him.

4. Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution provide for appeal to <ORG> from any judgment, decree or final order of <ORG>. The relevant provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act in this connection are these :

"2. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.

3. Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded."

5. The contention on behalf of the opposite party is that this case is covered by Section 12 (2), arid the time taken in obtaining a copy of the judgment cannot be excluded. We have already pointed out that the judgment was delivered on the 19th October, 1951. Application for copy was made on the 15th January, 1952, and copy was delivered on the 30th January. 1952. The application for leave to appeal was presented on the same day, namely, the 30th of January, 1952. Now if the period spent in obtaining the copy is excluded", the application would be within time, on the 30th of January. The question is whether this period can be excluded under Sections 12 (2) or 12 (3) of the Limitation Act .

6. There is difference of opinion among the various <ORG> as to whether the time taken in obtaining copy of the judgment can be excluded in cases of application for leave to appeal. Some <ORG>, as for example Allahabad, have held that as Sub-section (2) expressly contains the words 'application for leave to appeal', while Sub-section (3) does not, the time spent in obtaining copy of the Judgment cannot be allowed in cases of applications for leave. Vide -- 'Gulabchand v. <NAME>', A.I.R. 1935 All. 99. Other <ORG> have held that time taken in obtaining a copy of the judgment can be allowed under Sub-section (3) Vide -- 'In re, Secy, of State', A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1241. We do not think it necessary to decide in the present case whether time for obtaining a copy of the judgment can be excluded in a case where there is a judgment as well as a decree following it. The present is a case, in our opinion, where there is no decree following the judgment of this Court. The application of the opposite party was under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and was disposed of by the judgment dated the 19th October, 1951. Both Articles 132 and 133 allow appeals from a judgment, decree or final order of <ORG>. It may be mentioned that in Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the words used were 'decree' or 'final order', and the word 'judgment' has been added by Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution.

It seems to us that the word 'judgment' has been added to provide for cases coming to <ORG> under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In cases under Article 226 , there is no decree. The application is disposed of by a judgment of the court, and it is that judgment, in our opinion, which is liable to appeal under Articles 132 and 133. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows exclusion of time for copy of a decree, sentence or order. The word 'decree' is well understood, while the word 'sentence' refers to criminal proceedings. The word 'order' used in Sub-section (2), in our opinion, must cover judgments in cases under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, otherwise it is difficult to understand what is the order a copy of which has to be filed in cases under Article 226. We are, therefore, of opinion that in cases covered by Article 226 , the Judgment itself is the order to be appealed from, and the time taken in obtaining copy of the judgment has to be excluded. Once the time taken in obtaining the copy of the judgment is excluded, it is admitted that the application for leave to appeal was filed within time.

7. As to the contention that, in any case, the application was barred by time as against Mitha-lal, it is enough to say that we accept the explanation that the name of <NAME> was left out by oversight from the application which was filed on the 30th January, 1952. We, therefore, condone the delay, under the circumstances, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

8. The next point that is urged that the application was not presented properly in so far as though it was signed by the Government Advocate, it was presented before the Registrar by his clerk and not by the Government Advocate himself. Under Order 3, Rule 1, C. P. C., any act in any court required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party may, except where otherwise expressly provided, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader on his behalf. In this case, the act that was done was the act of presentation of the application for leave to ap-

peal to <ORG>. This act should have been done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or pleader. The Government Advocate naturally represents the <ORG>, but his clerk can neither be called the recognised agent of the <ORG>, nor a pleader acting for the <ORG>.

The presentation, therefore, was not according to law in this case.

9. It appears however that there has been a practice in this Court and in <ORG> of the former State of Jodhpur that Government Advocate's clerk presents applications on behalf of the Government Advocate. That this is so also appears from the fact that in this very case, the application for amendment of the original application praying for bringing <NAME> on the record was also presented by <NAME>, clerk of the Government Advocate, and not by the Government Advocate himself. We are of opinion that this practice, unsupported as it is by any rule, must stop in future. At the same time, it would, in our opinion, be unfair to Government that it should suffer because of a wrong practice having grown up. The result of the improper presentation is that the application would not be deemed to have been presented on the 30th of January when it was actually presented. It may be taken to have been presented on the 3rd March, 1952, when the Government Advocate appeared in support of it at the preliminary hearing. Considering the peculiar circumstances of this case, we extend the time for making the presentation up to the 3rd of March, 1952, (on which date, at any rate, the application must be taken to have been properly presented,) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

10. We, therefore, reject the technical objections raised on behalf of the opposite party, and order that a certificate be granted as prayed under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. In view of the technical defects in the case, we order parties to bear their own costs of the present application.


PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT27/02/1985 BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) VARADARAJAN, A. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) CITATION: 1985 AIR 660 1985 SCR (2)1028 1985 SCC (2) 116 1985 SCALE (1)510 ACT: Constitution of India 1950, Arts 14, 19 (1) (2) (p) and 301 Essential Commodities Act , 1955, <CITATION> (1) & (2) and 5-Power under sub-s. (2)-Whether general in nature-Sub-s. (2)-Whether confers any fresh power-Whether illustrative of power conferred by sub-s (1)-Cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)-Whether contains specific power-Making of Orders by State Government under cls. (a) to (f) of sub-s. 2-Source of power-Whether flows from sub-s. (1) - Delegation of-By notification under s. 5 Essential Commodities-Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order. 1982-Cl. 3 (1A). issued by State Government under <CITATION> read with Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order, S. R. 800 dt. June 9 1978-Placing ban on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of Paddy out of certain specified are as in the Stale-Whether in excess of delegated powers -Whether violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) and 301, HEADNOTE: <CITATION> (2) (d)-Whether regulating includes in the context prohibiting. Interpretation of statutes-Whether some words may be used in different senses in the Same sentence. Words and phrases-Regulation and Prohibiting-Meaning and scope of. Due to failure of monsoon in the years 1981-82, there was a steep fall in production of paddy and it became necessary for <ORG> to build up its buffer stocks for distribution through the public distribution system throughout the State. ID the circumstances, <ORG> had no other alternative but to introduce a monopoly procurement scheme with a view to procure the maximum stock of paddy by banning purchase by traders. This was in addition to compulsory levy on dealers of paddy and rice to the extent of 50% under cl. 5 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy & Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974. 1029 In exercise of the powers conferred under <CITATION> of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with <ORG>, Ministry of Agriculture (Department or Food) Order GSR 800 dated Juno 9, 1978 issued under s. 5 of the Act with the prior concurrence of <ORG>, <ORG> accordingly promulgated the Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982 on October 22, 1982. Clause 3 (1A) of the Order prohibited transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the State by road or rail or otherwise except under and in accordance with the conditions of a permit issued by an officer authorised in that behalf. By GOMS No. 293 dated May 11, 1982 <ORG> introduced sub-cl. (IA) to cl. 3 of the Order which prohibited transport; movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside places notified by cl. 3 of the Order by road or rail or otherwise. Thereafter, on June 20, 1983, <ORG> made a further amendment to the newly inserted cl. 3 (IA) which clamped a complete ban on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the Thanjavur District, Chidambaram and Kattumannarkoil Taluks in South Arcot District and Musiri, Kulithalai, Lalgudi and Tiruchirapalli Talulks in Tiruchirapalli District. The appellant along with other traders assailed the constitutional validity of cl. 3 (IA) of the Order, as amended, which placed a complete ban on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the Thanjavur district and the aforesaid Taluks in South Arcot and Tiruchirapalli districts as being violative of Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution <ORG> repelled the contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. In the appeal, the appellant contended that the impugned cl. 3 (IA) of the Order was ultra vires <ORG> on two grounds, namely: (1) The delegation of a specific power under s 3 (2) (d) of the Act to State Government by the aforesaid notification dated June 9, 1978 issued by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act to regulate storage, transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an essential commodity, in relation to foodstuffs, does not carry with it The general power of <ORG> under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. And (2) That the word regulating' in cl. (d) of s. 3 (2) of the Act does not take in 'prohibiting' and as such there cannot be a total prohicition on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in question under (d) but only regulation of such activities in the course of trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits. Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. Sub-s (2) of <CITATION> of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 offers no fresh powers but is merely illustrative of the general poweres by sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> without exhausting the subjects in relation to such powers can be exercised. Although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> with a specific power, the general power to issue the impugned 1030 order flows from the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s.3 which stands delegated to <ORG> by virtue of the notification issued under s. S of the Act . [1042H; 1043B] <CITATION> , [I951] SCR 303, and <CITATION> ] 72 IA 241, followed. <CITATION> . AIR 1981 Guj. 87. approved. <CITATION> , AIR 1953 Cal. 548, approved. _ <NAME> v. State of West Bengal,  2 Cal. L.J. 398 and <NAME> v. State of West Bengal, [1918-89] CWN 539, approved. <CITATION> , AIR 1998 Pun, 363, <CITATION> , AIR 1972 All. 401 and <CITATION> AIR  Orr. 138, overruled. 2. The word 'regulation' cannot have any rigid or inflexible meaning as to exclude 'prohibiting'. It is difficult to define the word 'regulate' as having any precise meaning. It has different shades of meaning and must take its colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the legislation, and the <ORG> must necessarily keep in view the mischief which the legislature seeks to remedy. The question essentially is one of degree and it is impossible to fix any definite point at which 'regulation' ends and prohibition' begins. The power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to prohibit, and ordinarily the word 'regulate' is not synonymous with the word 'prohibit'. This is true in a general sense and in the sense that mere regulation is not the same as absolute prohibition. But the power to regulate carries with it full power over the thing subject to regulation and in obsence of restrictive words, the power must be regarded as plenary over the entire subject. It implies the power to rule, direct and control and- involves the adoption of a rule or guiding principle to be followed or the making of a rule with respect to the subject to be regulated. The power to regulate implies the power to check and may imply the power to prohibit under certain circumstances, as where the best or only efficatious regulation consists of suppression. [1045G-H; 1046E-F <NAME> v. Union of India,  2 SCR 361 Slaitery v. <NAME>, LR  AC 446 and <ORG> v. <NAME>, LR  AC 88, Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 76 at p. 611 and Webster s Third New International Dictionary, vol II, p 1913 and <ORG>, vol. II, 3rd edn., p. 1784, referred to <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 361, distinguish and limited. 1031 The source of power to issue an order under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of A <CITATION> of the Act being relatable to the general powers of <ORG> under sub-s. (1) of s. 3, there is no justification for giving a restricted meaning to the word 'regulating,' in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act so as not to take in 'prohibiting'. A word may be used in two different senses in the same section. [1050B-C] The Act is a piece of socio-economic legislation and its predominant object is to provide in the interests of general public, for the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain essential commodities. Such control can be exercised in a variety of ways otherwise than by placing compulsory levy on the producers, for example, by fixing a controlled price for foodstuffs, by placing a limit on the stock of foodstuffs to be held by a wholesale dealer, commission agent or retailer by placing sales except in certain specified manners etc. All these arc nothing but regulatory measures. Placing a ban on inter-State or inter-State movement or export of foodstuffs is one of the ways to regulate and control and such ban prevents the spiral rise in prices of such foodstuffs by artificial creation of shortage by unscrupulous traders. The various Control Orders issued by <ORG> under sub-s. (1) of s- 3 of the Act or by <ORG>s under <CITATION> read with s. 5 have introduced a system of checks and balances to achieve she object of the legislation i.e. to ensure equitable distribution and availability of essential commodities at fair prices. Special public interest in an industry e. g. that it is engaged in the production of a commodity vitally essential to the community, may justify the regulation of its production, supply and distribution and its trade and commerce, provided such regulation is not arbitrary and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. [1048C-D; 1047F-H; 1048A] If one part of the country or of a State is faced with a famine or even acute shortage of foodstuffs. it is not unreasonable for the Government to acquire foodstuffs from the surplus areas and distribute the same in areas where they are most needed. Since there was steep fall in production of paddy due to failure of monsoons <ORG> was justified not only to reimpose compulsory levy on the producers of paddy to the extent of 50% but also to introduce a scheme for a monopoly purchase of paddy by the Government with a view to build up its buffer stock for distribution through the public distribution system throughout: the State. [1049E- <CITATION> . [19811 2 SCC 205, <CITATION>  2 SCR 715, <NAME> & <CITATION> ., [1981 4 SCC 550, <CITATION> .,  4 SCC 554 and <CITATION> .,  1 SCR 1137, relied on. 1032 JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11417 of 1983 From the Judgment and Order dated 14. 9. 1983 of <ORG> in W. P. N. 4615 of 1983. <NAME> for the Appellant.

<NAME> for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. This appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and order of <ORG> dated September 14, 1983 raises a question of some complexity. The question is as to whether cl. 3 (IA) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982 issued by the State Government under s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act , 1955 read with <ORG>, Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order, a. s. R, 800 dated June 9, 1978, with the prior concurrence of <ORG>, was ultra vires the State Government being in excess of its delegated powers. That depends on whether the delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by <ORG> under s. 5 to regulate the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of an essential commodity, in relation to foodstuffs, carries with it the general powers of <ORG> under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein. There is a conflict OF opinion on this question between different <ORG>. Hence we thought it fit to grant special leave and heard the appeal on merits. After hearing the parties, we dismissed the appeal by an order dated December 5, 1983 for reasons to follow. The reasons therefore are set out below .

Briefly stated, the facts are these. In the State of Tamil Nadu, there has been a system of imposing levy on purchase of paddy by traders in vogue since the year 1970. This was imposed by cl. 3 (5) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Licensing, Regulation & Disposal of Stock) Order, 1968 issued by <ORG> under <CITATION> of the Act with the prior concurrence of <ORG>. Cl. 3 (5) (i) empowered <ORG> to impose A and collect upto 50% of the stocks by way of levy on purchases of paddy by traders on payment of price specified from time to time. The said Order was replaced by the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974 issued under <CITATION> of the Act with the prior concurrence of <ORG>. Cl. 5 (1) of this Order empowers <ORG> to impose and collect levy upto 50% of the purchase of paddy and rice by the dealers other than retail dealers and they are paid prices notified by the <ORG>. This clause was subsequently amended in 1976. The power to impose and collect levy on the purchase of paddy and rice was exercised by <ORG> under s. 3 of the Act with a view to procure the stock for distribution of rice to about 118 lakhs family card-holders throughout the State through nearly 17, 800 fair price shops. A review of the food situation in the latter half of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 revealed that the stock of paddy and rice with the <ORG> was not adequate to meet the requirements under the public distribution system. The State <ORG> in <ORG> accordingly, decided to enforce the levy on traders by G. O. Ms. No. 33 dated January 1, 1981 and to collect 40% levy on the purchases of paddy and rice by dealers even though it had the power to impose levy upto 50% at prices fixed by it from time to time. Thereafter, the <ORG> in <ORG> by G. O. MS. No. 765 dated October 1, 1981 increased the levy from 40% to 50% from kuruvai season 1981.

There was a failure of monsoon in the State in the years 1981-82 and the off take of rice in the fair price shops had increased from 34,000 tonnes in April to 85,000 tonnes in December 1982. Due to failure of south-west monsoon in the year 1982 and consequent poor rainfall, the storage level in the Mettur reservoir fell. As a result of this there was a steep fall in kuruvai cultivation of paddy. In Thanjavur district alone, the acreage of paddy cultivation was reduced from 4. 5 lakhs acres to 2.97 lakhs acres. Added to this, the north-east monsoon in the State also failed causing a serious fall in the production of paddy. In the circumstances, <ORG> in <ORG> had no other alternative but to introduce a monopoly procurement scheme of paddy with a view to procure the maximum stock of paddy by banning the purchases by traders.

In exercise of the powers conferred under <CITATION> of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with <ORG>, <ORG> (Department of Food) Order, G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978, with the prior concurrence of <ORG>, the State Government promulgated the Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982 on October 22, 1982. Cl. 3 (1) of the Order provides:

"No person shall transport, move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport, move or otherwise carry, or aid or abet in the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the <ORG> by road/rail or otherwise except under and in accordance with the conditions of a permit issued by an authorized officer."

On January 22, 1983, <ORG> issued G. O. MS. No. 42 for purchase of the entire marketable surplus of paddy in Thanjavur District by the <ORG> through <ORG> as an agent of the <ORG>. On February , 1982, the State <ORG> in <ORG> issued another G. O. Ms. No. 84 extending the provision made with regard to Thanjavur district of Chidambaram and Kattumannarkoil taluks in South Arcot district and Musiri, Kulithalai, Lalgudi and 7 Tiruchirapalli taluks in Tiruchirapalli district.

On May 11, 1983, <ORG> in <ORG> issued G. O. Ms. No. 293 introducing sub-cl. (1A) to cl. 3 of the Order. The newly inserted cl. (IA) is as follows:

"No person shall transport, move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport, move or otherwise carry, or aid or abet in the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the places notified under Clause 3 of the Tamil Nadu Paddy & Rice (Restriction of Rates) Order, 1974 by road/rail or otherwise."

Thereafter, on June 20, 1983, <ORG> in <ORG> by G. O. Ms. No 413 made a further amendment to the newly introduced sub-cl. (1A) of cl. 3. The amended cl. (IA) of cl. 3 is follows:

"No person shall transport, move or otherwise carry or prepare or attempt to transport, move or otherwise carry, or aid or abet in the transport, movement or other wise carrying of paddy outside the Thanjavur District, Chidambaram and Kattumannarkoil Taluks in South Arcot District and Musiri, Kulithalai, Lalgudi and Tiruchirapalli Taluks in Tiruchirapalli District."

These various orders were issued by the state Government in exercise of the powers conferred by <CITATION> of the Act read with <ORG>, Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order, G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 which is set out below: C "MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION (DEPARTMENT OF FOOD) ORDER New Delhi, the 9th June, 1978.

G. S. R. 800-In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 , and in supersession of the Order of the Government of India in the late <ORG> (Department of Food) No. G. S. R. 316 (E) dated the 20th June, 1972, <ORG> hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the said Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in cls. (a), (b), (c), (d), (e),

(f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof shall, in relation to foodstuffs be exercisable also by a State Government subject to the conditions-

(1) that such powers shall be exercised by a State Government subject to such directions, if any, as may be issued by the Central Government in this behalf;

(2) that before making an order relating to any matter specified in the said cls. (a), (c) or (f) or in regard to distribution or disposal of foodstuffs to places outside the State or in regard to regulations or transport of any foodstuffs, under the said cl (d), <ORG> shall also obtain the prior concurrence of <ORG> and (3) that in making an order relating to any of the matter specified in the said cl. (i) <ORG> shall authorize only an officer of Government.

Sd/-K. Balakrishnan, Dy. Secretary to the Government of India (No. 3 (Genl) (1)/78-D&R (1) 59)."

The appellant and various other agriculturists of Thanjavur district and the aforesaid traditionally rice growing areas of South Arcot and Thiruchirapalli districts challenge the constitutional validity of cl. 3 (1A) of the Order placing a complete ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside Thanjavur district and the aforementioned taluks of South Arcot and Thiruchirapalli districts by petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in <ORG>. There were as many as 300 writ petitions in <ORG> which were disposed of by the judgment under appeal. The validity of cl 3 (IA) of the Order was assailed on three main grounds: (1) Cl. 3 (1A) was wholly arbitrary and irrational and thus violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. (2) Cl. 3 (IA) was in excess of the delegated powers conferred on the State Government under <CITATION> of the Act by the aforesaid G. S. R 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act. And (3) The total ban on movement of paddy from out of Thanjavur district and the aforesaid taluks of South Arcot and Thiruchirapalli districts by cl. 3 (1A) of the Order was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed under Art. 19 (l) (g) and also infringes the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse under Art. 301 of the Constitution. <ORG> repelled all these contentions.

<NAME>, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued the case with much learning and resource. Learned counsel with his usual fairness did not advance some of the contentions raised before <ORG> as they were apparently misconceived. He has confined his submissions to only two grounds, namely: (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of the impugned Order issued by the State Government under <CITATION> of the Act read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act with the prior concurrence of <ORG> placing a ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy from out of Thanjavur district, the two taluks of South Arcot district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli district, was ultra vires the State Government being in excess of the delegated powers. It is urged that the delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act to regulate the storage, transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an essential commodity, in relaston to foodstuffs, does not carry with it the general power of <ORG> under sub-s. (l) of <CITATION> to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. And (2) The word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub- s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act does not take in 'prohibiting' for the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' denote two distinct and separate attributes of power and they are mutually exclusive Otherwise according to learned counsel, there was no point in the <ORG> using both the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' in sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act and the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' differently in various clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is urged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in question under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s 3 but only regulation of such activities in the course of trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel is fortified in his submissions by the decisions of the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa <ORG> in <NAME> v State of Haryana,(1) <CITATION> (2) and <CITATION> (3) and he questions the correctness of the decision of <ORG> in <NAME> of <ORG>) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are unable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.

In order to appreciate the contentions advanced, it would be convenient to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act is in these terms:

"3 (1). Power to control production, supply, distribution etc. Of essential commodities-

(1). AIR [1968] Pun. 363 (2). AIR [.972] Al]. 401 (3). AIR [1976] Orr. 138 (4). [1981] . 87 If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, (or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations) it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein."

Sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act, insofar as material, lays down:

" 3. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1), an order made thereunder may provide-

(a) * * * *

(b) * * * *

(c) * * * *

(d) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity."

S. S of the Act provides:

"5. Delegation of powers-The Central Government may, by notified order, direct that (the power to make orders or issue notifications under <CITATION> ) shall in relation to such matters, and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by-

(a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or

(b) such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government.

as may be specified in the direction."

<NAME>

The infirmity in the argument lies in the erroneous assumption A that the source of power on authority to promulgate the impugned Order was derived by <ORG> under cl.(d) of sub-s (2) of <CITATION> of the Act by virtue of the delegation of powers by the Central Governmnent by the notification No G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 under s 5 of the Act. The source of power to promulgate an order of this description is derived from sub- s. (1 of <CITATION> of the Act, According to its plain language, the aforesaid notification No. G. S. R. 800 provides that in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 5 of the Act, and in supersession of the earlier order of the Government of India in <ORG>, <ORG>, No. G. S R 316 dated June 20, 1972, <ORG> directs that 'the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act' to make orders to provide for matters specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof shall, in relation to foodstuffs, 'be exercisable also by a State Government subject to the conditions set out therein'. There must be some meaningful effect given to the words '<ORG> hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act to make orders etc.. shall be exercisable also by a State Government subject to the conditions set out therein'. On a plain construction, the first part of the aforesaid notification in specific terms provides for the delegation by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act of the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act. That power is general in its terms and authorises inter alia the promulgation of any order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar as it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. The second part of the notification directs that the power to make 'orders thereunder' i.e. the power under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act shall be exercisable also by a State Government, in relation to foodstuffs, with respect to 'such matters' viz. for the matters specified in clauses (a), (b), (c),

(d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof and subject to 'such conditions' set out therein. The aforesaid notification G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by <ORG> was strictly in conformity with s. 5 of the Act. Of the three conditions, the one that is material for our purpose is condition 2 It provides that before making an order under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act in regard to distribution or disposal of foodstuffs to places outside the State or in regard to regulations or transport of any foodstuffs, <ORG> shall also obtain the prior concurrence of <ORG>. It is manifest on a plain reading that the aforesaid notification No. G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 was strictly in conformity with the requirements of s. 5 of the Act.

Learned counsel for the appellant however strenuously con tends that the delegation of powers by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act must necessarily be in relation to 'such matters' and subject to 'such conditions' as may be specified in the notification. The whole attempt on the part of the learned counsel is to confine the scope and ambit of the impugned order to cl. (d) of sub-s ( .) of g. 3 of the Act which uses the word 'regulating' and take it out of the purview of sub-s. (1) of s. 3 which uses the words 'regulating or prohibiting'. That is not a proper way of construction of sub-ss (l) and (2) of <CITATION> of the Act in their normal setting. The restricted construction of <CITATION> contended for by learned counsel for the appellant would render the scheme of the Act wholly unworkable. As already indicated, the source of power to make an order of this description is sub-s. (l) of s 3 of the Act and sub-s. (2) merely provides illustration for the general powers conferred by sub-s. (l). Sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act commences with the words 'Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1)'. It is manifest that sub-s. (2) of s 3 of the Act confers no fresh powers but is merely illustrative of the general powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> without exhausting the subjects in relation to which such powers can be exercised.

The matter is no longer res integra. The question directly arose for consideration by this <ORG> in <CITATION> (1). There, the <ORG> was considering the validity of the Sugar and sugar Products Control Order, 1947 issued by the then <ORG> in exercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 by virtue of the delegation of powers by <ORG> to make orders in relation to foodstuffs under cl. (j) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of that Act. <NAME>, J., speaking for the <ORG> explaining the relevant functions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of <CITATION> of the Act, said:

(1) [1951] S.C.R. 303.

"It is manifest that sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> confers no fur. A the or other powers on <ORG> than what are conferred under sub-s. (1), for it is "an order made thereunder" that may provide for one or two other of the matter specifically enumerated in sub-s. (2) which are only illustrative, as such enumeration is "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1)". Seizure of an article being thus shown to fall within the purview of sub-s. (l), it must be competent for <ORG> or its delegate, <ORG>, to make an order for seizure under that sub-section apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as contemplated in cl. (j) of sub-s. (2)."

The Court drew support for this view from the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> .(') <ORG> in that case held r. 26 of the Defence of India Rules made under cl (j) of sub-s (2) of s. 3 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 to be ultra vires, which decision was reversed by <ORG>, The Court quoted with approval the following observations of Lord <NAME>, J. delivering the judgment of <ORG>:

"In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of sub s. (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-s. (1), and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub-s. (2) are the rules which are authorized by, and made under, sub-s. (1); the provisions of sub-s (2) are not restrictive of sub-s. (1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s (1)."

This accords with our view of the purport and effect of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of <CITATION> of the Act.

<CITATION> (a), the challenge was to the validity of West Bengal Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement Order, 1952 issued under s. 3 (1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 by virtue of delegation of powers by <ORG> under s. 5 of the Act which was (1) LR  72 IA 241.

(2). AIR [1953] Cal. 548.

almost in identical terms with s. 5 of the Act. <NAME>, <NAME> (as he then was) held that the powers to promulgate the levy order was derived from sub-s. (1) of s 3 of the Act; and that the power was general in terms and authorized inter alia the promulgation of any order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar as it appears necessary or expedient to <ORG> for maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. The learned Judge after referring to the <ORG> decision in <NAME> case and that of this <ORG> in <NAME> case, observed :

"Sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> , commences with the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1)....etc." This shows that sub-s. (2) confers no fresh powers but provides illustrations of the general powers conferred by sub-s. (1)......"

The learned Judge went on to observe:

"This is undoubtedly very incompetent drafting. But I think that the meaning is reasonably clear. The 'Matters Specified' in sub-s. (2), being "without prejudice" to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s (1) must be held to include such powers. Thus it cannot be said that the general powers have not been conferred upon the <ORG>, but only those specified in cls. (a) to (j) of sub-s. (2). The only limitation is with regard to the kind of essential commodity concerned. The <ORG> has been given powers limited to 'foodstuffs' only."

Quite recently, <ORG> in <NAME> v. State of West Bengal(1) and <NAME> v. State of West Bengal 12) following the dictum of <NAME>, <NAME> in <NAME> case, supra, have held that the delegation of specific powers to issue an impugned order of this nature is derived from sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> and that the provisions of sub-s. (2) thereof are merely illustrative. It has further held that the various clauses of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act cannot be made operative independently by any notification (1)  2 Cal. LJ 383 (2) [1978-9] 83 CWN 539 under s. 5 of the Act without deriving the general powers under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act. We are of the considered opinion that the view of <ORG> accords both with reason and principle. The view to the contrary taken by the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa <ORG> in <NAME>. <NAME> and <NAME> cases, supra, dose not lay down good law. It must accordingly be held that although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act deals only with a specific power, the general power to issue the impugned order flows from the provisions of sub-h. (1) of <CITATION> which stands delegated to the State Government by virtue of the notification issued under s. S of the Act .

Upon that view, the question as to the construction of the word 'regulating' occurring in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of 8.3 of the Act does not really arise. However, since the question has been raised at the <ORG> we think it proper to deal with it. As a matter of construction, <NAME>, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the words 'regulating' and prohibiting' connote two distinct and separate attributes of power which are mutually exclusive and therefore the word 'regulating' used in cl. (d) cannot be given the same meaning as 'prohibiting'. He urges that is A sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the same word occurring in different parts of an Act of <ORG>. For the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the word 'regulating' in the context of cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3, he has referred to us the different clauses of that sub-section. A perusal of the various clauses (a) to

(j) indicates that while cls. (a), (d) and (g) speak of the power to prohibit, and the remaining cls. (b), (c), (f),

(h), (i), (ii) and (j) though they do not mention that they are illustrative of the power to regulate impliedly partake of the character of that power. If the contention of the learned counsel were to be accepted, it would imply that <ORG> derives its power under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> of the Act as the power to promulgate any order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity insofar as it appears necessary or expedient so to do, for maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. If <ORG> were to make an order under sub-s. (1) in respect of the matters specified in cl.

(d), it may not only regulate or control the storage, transport, distribution etc. Of an essential commodity including the movement of such foodstuffs by grant of licenses, permits or otherwise, but also place a ban on the movement of wheat from one place to another; but <ORG> under cl. (d) has only a regulatory power in relation thereto i.e. to make an order only for regulating the movement of wheat from one place to another by issue of the permits, licenses or otherwise as provided for by cl. 3 of the impugned Order but could not have issued cl. 3 (IA) placing a ban on movement of wheat from one place to another. Although by force of logic one may be driven to that conclusion that <ORG> has power to promulgate cl 3 of the impugned Order but not cl. 3 (IA), there is no reason for us to give such a restrictive meaning to the word 'regulating' appearing in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act. it would seem that the rule of construction is clearly y-well recognized that a word may be used in two different senses in the same section of an Act.

The world 'regulation' has not that rigidity of moaning as never to take in 'prohibition'. I must depend on the context in which it is used in the statute and the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. For a time different views were expressed on the question whether the word 'regulation' in Art. 19(2) to 19(6) includes 'prohibition' till the Court in <CITATION> (1) answered it in the affirmative.

<NAME>, learned counsel for the appellant however contends that the word 'regulation' should not be confused with the expression 'reasonable restrictions' occurring in Art. 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution and therefore the view t-taken in <NAME> case is not applicable. According to him, the word 'regulation' in cl. (d) of sub-. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act does not take in 'prohibition'. He seeks to draw a distinction between prohibition or prevention o-certain activities and their regulation or governance. It is said that a power to regulate or govern would imply continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed; and to be inconsistent with absolute prohibition. He therefore submits that cl. 3 (IA) of the Order was ultra vires because the State Government had only power under cl. (d) of sub-s, (2) of <CITATION> of the Act to regulate production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities like foodstuffs by (1)  2 SCR 361.

grant of permits, licenses or otherwise, in contradistinction to the A power of <ORG> under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> to regulate or prohibit such production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities.

Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of <ORG> in <NAME> case which proceeds Upon a decision of this <ORG> in <CITATION> (1) holding that power to regulate does not include power to prohibit or restrict. In <NAME>'s case, the question arose whether two provisos framed by <ORG> under s. 37 of the Mysore Forest Act, 1900 which empowered the making of rules to regulate the transit of forest produce which placed absolute prohibition against transportation of forest produce between sunset and sunrise and a qualified prohibition in certain circumstances, was beyond the rule-making power of <ORG>. The contention on behalf of the State was. that the two provisos were regulatory and prohibitory- In repelling the contention, the <ORG> observed:

"The power which <ORG> may exercise is the power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport. Prima facie, a rule which totally prohibits movement of forest produce during the period between sunset and sunrise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce."

These observations do not lay down any rule of universal application.

The word 'regulation' cannot have any rigid or inflexible meaning as to exclude 'prohibition'. The word 'regulate' is difficult to define as having any precise meaning. It is a word of broad import, having a broad meaning, and is very comprehensive in scope. There is a diversity of opinion as to its meaning and its application to a particular state of facts, some <ORG> giving to the term a somewhat restricted, and others giving to it a liberal, construction. The different shades of meaning are brought out in Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 76 at p. 611: (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 361, "Regulate" is variously defined as meaning to adjust; to adjust; order, or govern by rule, method, or established mode; to adjust or control by rule, method, or established mode, or governing principles or laws: to govern to govern by rule; to govern by, or subject to, certain rules or restrictions; to govern or direct according to rule; to control, govern, or direct by rule or regulations.

"Regulate" is also defined as meaning to direct; to direct by rule or restriction; to direct or manage according to certain standards, laws, or rules; to rule; to conduct; to fix or establish; to restrain; to restrict."

See also: Webster's Third New International Dictionary, vol. II, p. 1913 and Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Vol. II, 3rd edn., p. 1784.

It has often been said that the power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to prohibit, and ordinarily the word 'regulate' is not synonymous with the word 'prohibit'. This is true in a general sense and in the sense that mere regulation is not the same as absolute prohibition. At the same time, the power to regulate carries with it full power over the thing subject to regulation and in absence of restrictive words, the power must be regarded as plenary over the entire subject It implies the power to rule, direct and control, and involves the adoption of a rule or guiding principle to be followed, or the making of a rule with respect to the subject to be regulated. 'the power to regulate implies the power to check and may imply the power to prohibit under certain circumstances, as where the best or only efficacious regulation consists of suppression It would therefore appear that the word 'regulation' cannot have any inflexible meaning as to exclude 'prohibition'. let has different shades of meaning and must take its colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the legislation, and the <ORG> must necessarily keep in view the mischief which the legislature seeks to remedy.

The question essentially is one of degree and it is impossible to fix any definite point at which 'regulation' ends and 'prohibition' begins. We may illustrate how different minds have differently reacted as to the meaning of the word 'regulate' depending on the context in which it is used and the purpose and object of the legislation In <NAME> v. Naylor,(l) the question arose before <ORG> whether a bye-law by reason of its prohibition internment altogether in a particular cemetry, was ultra vires because <ORG> had only power of regulating internments whereas the bye-law totally prohibited them in the cemetry in question, and it was said by Lord <NAME>, delivering the judgment of <ORG>:

"A rule or bye-law cannot be held as ultra vires merely because it prohibits where empowered to regulate, as regulation often involved prohibition."

In contrast in <ORG> v. Virgo,(2) where the question for decision was whether a section or a bye-law prohibiting hawkers from plying their trade, was competently and validity made, Lord <NAME> delivering the judgment of <ORG> while laying down that a power to make a bye law to 'regulate' and 'govern' a trade does not authorize the prohibition of such trade, and added:

"There is a marked distinction between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it, and, indeed, a power to regulate' and 'govern' seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed."

The predominant object of the Act, as reflected in the preamble is to provide, in the interests of the general public, for the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain essential commodities. It is a piece of socioeconomic legislation enacted in the national interest to secure control over the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities. The various Control Orders issued by <ORG> under sub-s (1) of s. 3 of the Act or by <ORG> under s 3 read with s. 5 have introduced a system of checks and balances to achieve the object of the legislation i.e. to ensure equitable distribution and availability of essential commodities at fair prices. Special public interest in an industry e.g. that it is engaged in the production of a commodity, (1) LR  AC 446 (2) LR  AC 88 vitally essential to the community, may justify the regulation of its production, supply and distribution and its trade and commerce, provided such regulation is not arbitrary and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

the power to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities may be exercised in innumerable ways. One of the ways in which such regulation or control over the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, an essential commodity like foodstuffs may be exercised by placing a ban on inter Slate or inter-State movement of foodstuffs to ensure that the excess stock of foodstuffs held by a wholesale dealer, commission agent or retailer is not transported to places outside the State or from one district to another with a view to maximize the procurement of such foodstuffs from the growers in the surplus areas for their equitable distribution at fair prices in the deficit areas. The placing of such ban on export of foodstuffs across the State or from one part of the State to another with a view to prevent outflow of foodstuffs from a State which is a surplus State prevents the spiral in prices of such foodstuffs by artificial creation of shortage by unscrupulous traders. But such control can be exercised in a variety of ways otherwise than by placing compulsory levy on the producers, for example, by fixing a controlled price for foodstuffs, by placing a limit on the stock of foodstuffs to be held by a wholesale dealer, commission agent, or retailer, by prohibiting sales except in certain specified manner, etc. These are nothing but regulatory measures.

We find no lawful justification for giving a restricted meaning to the word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act as not to take in prohibiting'. In State of Tamil Nadu v. M/S Hind Stone and Ors.(') <NAME>, J. referred with approval the observations of <NAME>, J. in <CITATION> (2) laying down that the word 'regulation' has no fixed connotation and that its meaning differs according to the nature of that, thing to which it is applied. The learned Judge also observed:

"In modern statutes concerned as they are with economic and social activities, 'regulation' must, of necessity, (1) [l981] 2 SCC 205 (2) [1975] 2 SCR 715 receive so wide an inter-pretation that in certain situations, A it must exclude competition to the public sector from the private sector. More so in a welfare <ORG>. It was pointed out by <ORG> in <ORG> v. <ORG> [1949] 2 All. ER 755 (PC)-and we agree with what was stated therein-that the problem whether an enactment was regulatory or something more or whether a restriction was direct or only remote or only incidental involved, not so much legal as political, social or economic consideration and that it could not be laid down that in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly, either in a <ORG> or <ORG> agency, be justified.'' <CITATION> .,(l) <NAME> <CITATION> .,(a) and <NAME> & Ors.

v. State of U.P. & Ors.(3) the Court has held that a restriction placed on movement of wheat from one State to another and/on movement of wheat from one district to another under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act, to be regulatory in character.

Surely when a part of the country is verging on conditions of acute shortage or even famine, it is expected of the government to procure foodstuffs from surplus areas and transport the same for distribution in deficit areas. [D the State of Tamil Nadu like some other States, the two things most essential for the sustenance of human life are rice and paddy. It is amply borne out from the material on record that due to the failure of the southwest and north- east monsoons in successive years, and the consequent poor rainfall, there was a steep fall in production of paddy. In the circumstances, <ORG> had no other alternative not only to reimpose compulsory levy on the producers of paddy to the extent of 50%%, but also to introduce a scheme for a monopoly purchase of paddy by the Government with a view to build up its buffer stock for distribution through the public distribution (1) 11981] 4 SCC 550 (2) [1981] 4 SCC 554 (3) [1982] I SCR 137 system throughout the State. If one part of the State is faced with a famine or even acute shortage of foodstuffs, it is not unreasonable for the Government to acquire foodstuffs from the surplus areas and distribute the same in areas where they are most needed. The source of power to issue an order under cl.. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act being relatable tot he general powers of <ORG> under sub-s. (1) of <CITATION> , there is no reason for us to give a restricted meaning to the word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of <CITATION> of the Act so as not to take in prohibiting'.

For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal must fail.

A.P.J. Appeal dismissed.