We present a game-theoretic model of bargaining over a metaphor in the context of political communication , find its equilibrium , and use it to rationalize observed linguistic behavior . We argue that game theory is well suited for modeling discourse as a dynamic resulting from a number of conflicting pressures , and suggest applications of interest to computational linguists . A 13 Dec 1992 article in The Times starts thus : The European train chugged out of the station last night ; for most of the day it looked as if it might be stalled there for some time . It managed to pull away at around 10:30 pm only after the Spanish prime minister , Felipe Gonzalez , forced the passengers in the first class carriages into a last minute whip round to sweeten the trip for the European Community 's poor four : Spain , Portugal , Greece and Ireland . The fat controller , Helmut Kohl , beamed with satisfaction as the deal was done . The elegantlysuited Francois Mitterrand was equally satisfied . But nobody was as pleased as John Major , stationmaster for the UK presidency , for whom the agreement marked a scarce high point in a battered premiership . The departure had actually been delayed by seven months by Danes on the line . Just when that problem was solved , there was the voluble outbreak , orchestrated by Spain , from the poor four passengers demanding that they should travel free and be given spending money , too . The coupling of the carriages may not be reliably secure but the pan-European express is in motion . That few seem to agree the destination suggests that future arguments are inevitable at every set of points . Next stop : Copenhagen . Apart from an entertaining read , the extended metaphor provides an elaborate conceptual correspondence between a familiar domain of train journeys and the unfolding process of European integration . Carriages are likened to nation states ; passengers to their peoples ; treaties to stations ; politicians to responsible rail company employees . In a compact form , the metaphor gives expression to both the small and the large scale of the process . It provides for the recent history : Denmark 's failure to ratify the 1992 Maastricht treaty until opt-outs were negotiated later that year is compared to dissenters sabotaging the journey by laying on the tracks ( Danes on the line ) ; negotiations over the Cohesion Fund that would provide less developed regions with financial aid to help them comply with convergence criteria are likened to second class carriages with poor passengers for whom the journey had to be subsidized . At a more general level , the European integration is a purposeful movement towards some destination according to a worked out plan , getting safely through negotiation and implementation from one treaty to another , as a train moving on its rails through subsequent stations , with each nation being separate yet tied with everyone else . Numerous inferences regarding speed , timetables , stations , passengers , different classes of tickets , temporary obstacles on the tracks , and so on can be made by the reader based on the knowledge of train journeys , giving him or her a feeling of an enhanced understanding1 of the highly complex process of European integration . So apt was the metaphor that political fights were waged over its details ( Musolff , 2000 ) . Worries about destination were given an eloquent expression by Margaret Thatcher ( Sunday Times , 20 Sept 1992 ): She warned EC leaders to stop their endless round of summits and take notice of their own people . " There is a fear that the European train will thunder forward , laden with its customary cargo of gravy , towards a destination neither wished for nor understood by electorates . But the train can be stopped , " she said . The metaphor proved flexible enough for further elaboration . John Major , a Conservative PM of Britain , spoke on June 1st , 1994 about his vision of the decision making at the EU level , saying that he had never believed that Europe must act as one on every issue , and advocating " a sensible new approach , varying when it needs to , multitrack , multi-speed , multi-layered . " He attempted to turn a largely negative Conservative take on the European train ( see Thatcher above ) into a tenable positive vision -each nation-carriage is now presumably a rather autonomous entity , waiting on a side track for the right locomotive , in a huge yet smoothly operating railroad system . Major 's political opponents offered their counter-frames . In both cases , the imagery of a large transportation system was taken up , yet turned around to suggest that " multi , for everyone " amounts to Britain being in " the slow lane , " and a different image was suggested that makes the negative evaluation of Britain 's opt-outs more poignant -a football metaphor , where relegation to the second division is a sign of a weak performance , and a school metaphor , where Britain is portrayed as an under-achiever : John Cunningham , Labour He has admitted that his Government would let Britain fall behind in Europe . He is apparently willing to offer voluntary relegation to the second division in Europe , and he is n't even prepared to put up a fight . I believe that in any two-speed Europe , Britain must be up with those in the fast lane . Clearly Mr Major does not . Paddy Ashdown , Liberal Democrat Are you really saying that the best that Britain can hope for under your leadership is ... the slow lane of a two-speed Europe ? Most people in this country will want to aim higher , and will reject your view of a ' drop-out ' Britain . The pro-European camp rallied around the " Britain in the slow lane " version as a critical stance towards the government 's European policy . Of the alternative metaphors , the school metaphor has some traction in the Euro discourse , where the European ( mainly German ) financial officers are compared to school authorities , and governments struggling to meet the strict convergence criteria to enter the Euro are compared to pupils that barely make the grade with Britain as a ' drop-out ' who gave up even trying ( Musolff , 2000 ) . The fact that European policy is being communicated and negotiated via a metaphor is not surprising ; after all , " there is always someone willing to help us think by providing us with a metaphor that accords with HIS views . " 2 From the point of view of the dynamics of political discourse , the puzzle is rather the apparent tendency of politicians to be compelled by the rival 's metaphorical framework . Thatcher tries to turn the train metaphor used by the pro-EU camp around . Yet , assuming metaphors are matters of choice , why should Thatcher feel constrained by her rival 's choice , why does n't she ignore it and merely suggest a new metaphor of her own design ? As the evidence above suggests , this is not Thatcher 's idiosyncrasy , as Major and his rivals acted similarly . Can this dynamic be explained ? In this article , we use the explanatory framework of game theory , seeking to rationalize the observed behavior by designing a game that would produce , at equilibrium , the observed dynamics . Specifically , we formalize the notion that the price of " locking " the public into a metaphorical frame of reference is that a politician is coerced into staying within the metaphor as well , even if he or she is at the receiving end of a rival 's rhetorical move . Since the use of game theory is not common in computational linguistics , we first explain its main attributes , justify our decision to make use of it , and draw connections to research questions that can benefit from its application ( section 2 ) . Next , we design the game of bargaining over a metaphor , and find its equilibrium ( section 3 ) , followed by a discussion ( section 4 ) . This article addressed a specific communicative setting ( rival politicians trying to " sell " to the public their versions of the unfolding realities and necessary policies ) and a specific linguistic tool ( an extended metaphor ) , showing that the particular use made of metaphor in such setting can be rationalized based on the characteristics of the setting . Various questions now arise . Given the central role played by the public gratification constraint in our model , would conversational situations without the need to persuade the public , such as meetings of small groups of peers or phone conversations between friends , tend less to the use of extended metaphor ? Conversely , does the use of extended metaphor in other settings testify to the existence of presumed onlookers who need to be " captured " in a particular version of reality -as in pedagogic or poetic context ? Considerations of the participants ' agendas and their impact on the ensuing dynamics of the exchange would we believe lead to further interest in game theoretic models when addressing complex social dynamics in situations like collaborative authoring , debates , or dating , and will augment the existing mostly statistical approaches with a broader picture of the relevant communication .
Metaphors used in political arguments provide elaborate conceptual correspondences with a tendency of politicians to be compelled by the rival's metaphorical framework to be explained.
They propose a game-theoric model of bargaining over a metaphor which is suitable to model its dynamics and use to rationalize observed linguistic behavior.
They show that the proposed framework can rationalize political communications with the use of extended metaphors based on the characteristics of the setting.