react to their environment, but do they also act intentionally?''' Source: pixabay]]\n\n'''What is relevant to consider is that actions of agents need to be wilful, i.e. a mere act that can be seen as serendipity is not part of agency.''' Equally, non-anticipated consequences of actions based on causal chains are a problem in agency. Agency is troubled when it comes to either acknowledging serendipity, or Murphy's law. Such lucky or unlucky actions were not anticipated by the agents, and are therefore not really included in the definition of agency. There is thus a metaphysical problem when we try to differentiate the agent, their actions, and the consequences of their actions. One could claim that this can be solved by focussing on the consequences of the actions of agents alone. However, this consequentialist view is partly a theoretical consideration, as this view can create many interesting experiments, but does not really help us to solve the problem of unintentional von Forschenden und anderen Akteur*innen, die Anerkennung von [[Agency, Complexity and Emergence|Komplexität]] in Systemen und die Notwendigkeit von Machtverhältnissen in der Wissensproduktion sind prominente Beispiele für aktuelle Herausforderungen, die Methodologien bisher nicht gelöst haben. Von der Schaffung eines verfestigten Wissenskanons zur Lösung dieser Rätsel sind wir wahrscheinlich noch weit entfernt. Man könnte argumentieren, dass wir diese methodischen Probleme nie ganz lösen werden, sondern dass die gemeinsame Aktion und Interaktion bei der Arbeit an diesen Problemen die eigentliche Lösung sein wird, und dass eine wirkliche Lösung wie bei den bisherigen Methoden der Normalwissenschaft nie erreicht werden wird. Das ist bis heute unklar, aber wir müssen uns bewusst werden, dass wir, wenn refers to the the position and momentum of particles illustrates that some things cannot be approximated, observed or known. Equal claims can be made about larger phenomena, such as personal identity. Hence, as much as agency, complex systems and emergence can be boundary objects for methods, they equally highlight our (current) limitations.\n\n\n== The way forward ==\nIf we want to empirically investigate agency, we first and foremost investigate individuals, or actions of entities we consider as non-variable, or consequences of actions of individuals. All this has consequences for the methods we apply, and the questions whether we observe or test premises has in addition further methodologial ramifications. '''I can interview individuals, yet this will hardly allow me to prove agency.''' Because of this, much of our current knowledge of agency is either rooted in widely deductive experimental settings or the testing of very clear hypotheses, or questions of either logic or metaphysics, which are widely associated with philosophy. \n\nThe investigation of complex system has thrived in