UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

YITSCHAK EBERT, a/k/a Isaac, d/b/a
                                                                     No. 99-4877
M&I Distributors, Incorporated,
a/k/a Isaac Ebert, a/k/a Issac Ebert,
a/k/a Yitzchok Ebert,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-84-BR)

Submitted: August 2, 2000

Decided: September 21, 2000

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

David I. Schoen, Montgomery, Alabama, for Appellant. Janice
McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant
United States Attorney, John Stuart Bruce, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Yitschak Ebert was convicted of one count of conspiracy to com-
mit money laundering and to receive stolen property, and several sub-
stantive counts. On appeal, we affirmed the conspiracy conviction but
vacated the substantive convictions on venue grounds. We remanded
for dismissal of the vacated charges and resentencing on the conspir-
acy conviction. United States v. Ebert, No. 96-4871 (4th Cir. May 3,
1999) (unpublished). The district court resentenced Ebert to fifty-two
months imprisonment followed by three years supervised release.
Ebert appeals.

On appeal, Ebert asserts that the district court did not comply with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. We review a district court's application of Rule
32 to ensure it is not clearly erroneous. United States v. Souther, ___
F.3d ___, No. 99-4582 (4th Cir. July 18, 2000). Having reviewed the
record on resentencing, we find no such error.

Ebert also asserts that the district court erred in using U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guideline § 2S1.1 (1998), governing money laundering, rather
than U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (1998), regarding receipt of stolen property, to
determine the offense level for his sentence. Having considered all of
Ebert's arguments on this issue, we conclude that, to the extent this
issue is not foreclosed by the mandate rule, United States v. Bell, 5
F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993), the district court correctly followed the
guidelines in determining Ebert's offense level. In addition, that the
district court departed downward from the guidelines range in a code-
fendant's sentence is irrelevant to Ebert's sentence, see United States
v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 864 (4th Cir. 1992), and the district court used
an appropriate dollar amount in computing the sentence. Therefore,
these claims lack merit.

We reject Ebert's claim that the jury's calculation of the amount
forfeited should have been recalculated. Section 982(a)(l) (West

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2000) authorizes forfeiture of property involved in an offense in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 2000). Section 1956(h) pro-
vides that conspiracy to commit money laundering offenses is subject
to the same penalties as the substantive offense. The jury's forfeiture
verdict specified both the money laundering conspiracy charge and
the substantive counts of money laundering. Therefore, when the sub-
stantive counts were vacated, the forfeiture verdict remained valid.

Ebert's final claim, that the case should be remanded for a hearing
on his motion for disclosure of evidence, also lacks merit. Nothing in
the record suggests that Kazinec supplied inaccurate information
about Ebert to the Government. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion.

We affirm the sentence imposed by the district court on remand.
We deny Ebert's motion for oral argument. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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