{"text": "S.Ph. Essays and Explorations 1.2 25 \"Part of that force that always wills the evil and always produces the good\" On a Devilish Incoherence Peter Baumann When Mephisto was asked by Faust, \"Well now, who are you then?\" (\"Nun gut, wer bist Du denn?\"), he gave the well-known answer, \"Part of that force that always wills the evil and always produces the good\" (\"Ein Teil von jener Kraft, die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft\": Goethe, Faust, 1334-1336). This answer raises some important questions which in turn lead to interesting answers. Let us start by looking at the content of Mephisto's utterance. 1. What Mephisto Is Saying: The First Part For simplicity's sake we may ignore the first few words of Mephisto's answer: \"part of that power\". Nothing substantial changes if we assume that Mephisto ascribes to himself, too, what he ascribes to \"that power\" (if not, then we would just have to talk about \"that power\" instead of Mephisto).1 We can assume that Mephisto also wants to make the following assertion: \"I always will the evil and always produce the good\". The expression \"will\" does not refer to wishes or even mere wishes (compare the German \"wollen\" to \"wünschen\"). To will something (e.g., evil) involves being moved towards action in a relevant way (e.g., to do evil). Apart from this, Mephisto's utterance states or at least suggests a clear connection between the attitude of willing and the production of relevant consequences. Should we go one step further and interpret \"will\" as \"intend\"? The wording of Mephisto's utterance speaks against this move. It is important to keep in mind that intending differs from willing (see Bratman 1987). Even though someone who intends to bring it about that p also wills that p, the reverse does not hold: Someone can will that p (e.g., that he gets a tan) without intending to bring it about that p. We should thus stick with the following paraphrase of Mephisto's remark: \"I always will the evil and always bring about the good\" rather than the following one \"I always intend to do evil and always bring about the good\". Baumann 26 If we went with the latter instead, then there would be a quick way of showing Mephisto to be incoherent. An intention to bring about X requires, amongst other things (like the belief that one has a good chance of bringing about X), the absence of the belief that one will fail to bring about X. However, the second conjunct above (\"I always bring about the good\") expresses just such a belief. The second part of the conjunction expresses a belief which falsifies the first part of the conjunction (interpreted as being about intentions). To be sure, it can be true of an agent that he intends to bring about X but always fail to do so. However, he cannot coherently believe this. There is a certain resemblance with Moore's Paradox (see Moore 1959, 175-176): \"It's raining but I don't believe it\" may be true but cannot be believed coherently. Let us then rather stay with the first paraphrase above: \"I always will the evil and always bring about the good\". The expression \"evil\" (or \"to do evil\") refers to the object or content of the will. Mephisto is thus not saying merely that his will is directed towards something which turns out to be evil but rather that he wills the evil as evil. Related to this is another important point. Mephisto's will is evil because he wills that bad things happen; it is not evil, say, in a Kantian sense: because the will's maxim has a certain form (see, e.g., Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten). The wording of Mephisto's assertion speaks against such a Kantian interpretation. Hence, we can paraphrase Mephisto's utterance in the following way: \"I always will that bad things happen and always bring about the good\".2 Sentences about one's will like the above can be expressions of one's will or truthapt (self-) ascriptions of a will (see, e.g., for the parallel case of intentions: Anscombe 1958). Here we are dealing with the latter case. The location and scope of \"always\" indicates this. \"I will that always p\" can be taken as an expression of a will, too, but \"I always will that p\" can only be taken as a description of a will. Mephisto is selfascribing the systematic and continuous will for bad things; he is not self-ascribing or expressing the will that bad things happens systematically and continuously. On another occasion he might be tempted to do that, too, but not on this one, when he is asked who he is. Mephisto attributes to himself what one can call an \"evil will\". We do not need to discuss the question here whether there can be an evil will for human or non-human actors. Let us suppose this is possible. We can also put aside another potential worry. Mephisto is not saying that he wills what others think is bad but rather that he wills what he himself thinks of as bad. But in what sense can one will something that one thinks is not good but bad? Doesn't – as Plato's Socrates argued a long time ago (see Plato, Meno, 77b-78b) willing that p imply that the agent holds that p is good in some important sense (and in his own lights)? And equivalently: Doesn't believing that p is Devilish Incoherence 27 bad imply that the agent doesn't will (in some important sense) that p? We can leave this problem, too, aside, because our main focus will not be \"good\" and \"evil\" or \"bad\" specifically but on contraries more generally. 2. What Mephisto Is Saying: Adding the Conjunct Apart from the self-ascription of an evil will Mephisto also asserts that he always brings about the good. He is pointing out that the actions he performs with evil will bring about unwelcome good consequences. He does not mean only to say that there are also some good consequences within the total set of the consequences of his actions: some good consequences apart from the not so good, bad or neutral consequences. Rather, we should interpret him as either characterizing the consequences of each of his actions as predominantly or overall good or, alternatively, as characterizing the consequences of each of his actions as completely good. I do find the second interpretation more plausible. The expression \"always produces the good\" (\"stets das Gute schafft\") has to be contrasted with \"always produces some good\" (\"stets etwas Gutes schafft\"); the definite article at least suggests exclusivity of good outcomes. Apart from that, the second interpretation also fits better with Mephisto's view of his own nature as one who always negates (\"der Geist, der stets verneint\": Goethe, Faust 1338). For Mephisto, there are no \"mixed\" consequences (some good, some bad, some neutral). Similarly, we shall assume that Mephisto is ascribing only a will to himself that is exclusively evil and without any component of a good or neutral will (this excludes a divided or \"mixed\" mind, as in cases of weakness of the will where the agent desires the bad while also desiring the good in some sense). It is not that unusual that in a particular case an actor's will not only does not succeed but also accomplishes something contrary to his will. That this is possible is a fundamental aspect of an agent's predicament. One can call this discrepancy between a will and a contrary consequence of the corresponding action a \"perverse condition\". Mephisto's claim is puzzling and provocative because of the claimed exceptionlessness of the perverse condition: \"I always will that bad things happen and always bring about the good\". Strictly (and pedantically) speaking Mephisto leaves it open whether there is a causal link or not (and then only a mere correlation) between his will and the outcomes of his actions. However, it is hard to see how there could not be such a causal link. Apart from that: The good, he claims, is produced by himself, that is, by his actions, which in turn are always guided by his evil will. Hence, we may assume that his evil will leads to actions which bring about or cause good outcomes. 3. Mephisto's Incoherence and the Impossibility of Extreme Perversion At this point one should really wonder whether it is even possible that an agent suffers from an exceptionless perverse condition. How could Mephisto possibly be right? Let us, again, look at the two conjuncts in Mephisto's claim \"I always will that bad things Baumann 28 happen and always bring about the good\" in separation. He makes two (sub-) claims. First: (1) I always will that bad things happen as a consequence of my actions. (Mephisto does not just wish that bad things happen in some way or other; he wills it in an \"active way\" (see above), desiring it to happen as a consequence of his own actions). Second: (2) All my actions have good consequences. (2) plus the exclusion of mixed consequences (see above) and the trivial truth that what is good cannot be bad entail (3) None of my actions has bad consequences. Now, there is no reason to assume that only when Mephisto is not acting does he believe or think that he always wills that bad things happen and always brings about the good. Rather, we may assume that he always acts in the light of this belief. So, whenever he acts he expects only good consequences. This is important because the following principle is very plausible: (P) If an agent performs some action willingly and expects it to have only a certain kind of consequences (good or non-bad ones), then the agent wills to produce this kind of consequences. To avoid misunderstandings: (P) does not claim that there are no unwanted or unintended consequences of actions; it only makes a claim about expected kinds of consequences. Now, given that Mephisto has a will and performs willful actions, it follows from (P) together with the fact that Mephisto always believes (3) that (upon brief reflection) he also believes: (4) I always will that nothing bad happens as a consequence of my actions. Thus, Mephisto is committed to the conjunction of (1) and (4): Devilish Incoherence 29 (5) I always will that bad things happen as a consequence of my actions, and I always will that nothing bad happens as a consequence of my actions. This kind of conjunction is true of any agent who has a belief like Mephisto. This conjunction is not yet a contradiction (if we don't add \"only\" to \"always\") but even if we suppose that Mephisto is not inconsistent he already shows a practical deficit. He has an ambivalent will: He is undecided and wavers between mutually incompatible motives or wills, his good will and his evil will. This is something we should not have expected, especially not from a devil. This should rather be Faust's problem: \"Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast\" (\"Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust\": Goethe, Faust, 1112). There is a contradiction \"in the vicinity\", however: The ambivalence of Mephisto's will follows from a couple of assumptions including one to the effect that Mephisto has an \"un-mixed\" will (see above). Given the latter assumption, we can sharpen (5) by adding \"only\" to \"always\": (6) I always only will that bad things happen as a consequence of my actions, and I always only will that nothing bad happens as a consequence of my actions. Given, again, that Mephisto really has a will and performs willful actions it follows from the second conjunct of (6) that (cancelling any Gricean implicatures) (7) I sometimes only will that nothing bad happens as a consequence of my actions. Given the incompatibility of only willing the bad with only willing the good, the first conjunct of (6) implies that (8) I never only will that nothing bad happens as a consequence of my actions. (7) and (8) together give us a contradiction! Mephisto is simply inconsistent: not openly but what he says entails (given reasonable interpretation) a contradiction. One wonders why Mephisto would come up with an inconsistency like that, and also why he presents himself as possessing a deeply ambivalent will. Is he being ironic? Does he want to tease, test or tempt Faust (or the rest of us)? Is he playing the devil's Baumann 30 advocate (but how that?)? And if he is serious: How could he continue acting? Or does he just want to get away with a pseudo-answer and not identify himself (which would fit with his reluctance to give his name a moment earlier: see Goethe, Faust, 13271330)? 4. Generalization: Why We Have to Be Successful at least Sometimes Whatever we might think resolves this puzzle, it is worth adding here that similar contradictions as well as ambivalences of the will can be detected in cases where the claimed consequences of one's actions are not contraries of what was willed but where the will is just not realized or not fully realized. In such cases Mephisto could say something like \"I always will the evil and always bring about what is not evil\" or \"I always will the evil and always bring about something that falls short of (complete) evil\". Perverse conditions are also not restricted to a will directed at good and evil (or bad) but can arise for wills of any content. And there can also be an inverse Mephisto who claims that he always wills the good and always brings about bad consequences. Finally, the perversity of Mephisto's condition does not depend on him always willing the same kind of thing; rather, whatever he wills, he is always in for disappointment. Hence, we can generalize the idea of an exceptionless perverse condition in the three indicated ways. Mephisto could then also assert that \"Whatever I will to happen, the consequences of my action never match my will\". An agent suffers from a general and exceptionless perverse condition just in case he never manages to bring about what he wills to bring about. Both Mephisto's original and the generalized assertion cannot be true because they each entail a contradiction, given that Mephisto believes that he suffers from the perverse condition (he doesn't even need to know this: mere belief is sufficient). No agent can be in an exceptionless perverse condition if he believes he is in such a condition. Even if the agent has no beliefs about the content of his will (and thus not about the perversity of his condition) and only has beliefs about those aspects of the consequences of his actions in general that are relevant to his will, the agent still cannot be in an exceptionless perverse condition (see the support for (4) above and what follows). In other words, given such beliefs about the consequences of one's actions in general, one cannot be in an exceptionless perverse condition: At least some of one's many particular \"wills\" have to be successful. One can only be in such a condition if one lacks beliefs about the consequences of one's actions in general. A corollary of all this says that given certain beliefs about the consequences of one's Devilish Incoherence 31 actions in general, one can infer \"in the armchair\" that some of these consequences meet one's will. 5. Going even further: Panglossian Temptations? Can we go even further? What if Mephisto said that \"Whatever I will to happen, the consequences of my action almost never (but not never) match my will\"? Can one be in such a \"less extreme\" perverse condition? Perhaps one can, even given beliefs about the consequences of one's actions in general. Perhaps then it is also possible that one finds oneself in a condition where one's will only often (but not never or even almost never) remains unfulfilled. It certainly is possible that one sometimes faces a perverse condition. However, it also seems plausible to assume that the more often one faces perverse conditions, the more one's agency erodes: the more one loses confidence and the energy to act. This would suggest that insofar as one acts consciously at all one must have a great deal of success as far as the willed consequences of one's actions are concerned. I will end with a few remarks sketching an argumentative strategy for such a moderately \"panglossian\" conclusion. Consider the possibility that whatever an agent wills to happen as a consequence of his actions, more often than not the consequences of his actions do not match his will. (I am leaving aside the thorny problem of how to individuate and count wills or acts). Suppose further that the agent has the corresponding belief about the consequences of his actions. If the agent has no way to tell cases in which he does get his will from cases in which he doesn't get his will, the agent might be entitled to use a principle of indifference and, given that he is minimally rational, assign a probability >.5 to the possibility of failure of his original will in each individual case. But since the agent performs willful actions in each individual case, we then also have to ascribe to the agent in each such case a will to bring about such failure rather than success of his original will. The same kind of ambivalence and even inconsistency as in Mephisto's exceptionless perverse condition follows in this case, too (we don't need to go through the details). If, on the other hand, the agent has a way to tell cases in which he does get his will from cases in which he doesn't get his will, then he will, as a minimally rational agent, continue to act willfully in the cases where he thinks he has a good chance of success and give up acting at all in the cases where he thinks he has no good chance of success. If his ideas about probable success are somewhat realistic, then he will only fail to get his will in a minority of cases. If his ideas are unrealistic and often false, then he will often fail to get his will. It is, however, not easy to imagine how he could not find out rather quickly that he is wrong; after correcting his ideas, he would be back with the former, better condition. So, the upshot of these final remarks is that, given certain beliefs of the agent, it cannot happen that more often than not agents don't get their will. Baumann 32 Davidson once argued that most of our beliefs must be true (and \"successful\" if truth is the aim of belief) (see Davidson 1984, 199). We can't go quite as far with respect to willful action. So, Armstrong might go a bit too far when he remarks that \"unless objectives were regularly achieved, there would be no place for the notion of objective\" (Armstrong 1968, 144). However, something a bit weaker would seem correct. One final caveat is important to keep in mind. Even if our claims about necessary success go further and beyond Mephisto's exceptionless perverse condition, and even if we can claim that agents cannot, given certain conditions, face more failure than success, this still does not mean or entail that we get our will in the most important cases. In this sense, too, we would have only reached a moderate panglossian conclusion.3 Peter Baumann Swarthmore College pbauman1@swarthmore.edu NOTES 1 One might object that the latter does not follow from the fact that Mephisto is part of a force that always wills the evil and always produces the good. The part could differ significantly from the whole in this respect. It might thus still be false that Mephisto himself, too, always wills the evil and always produces the good. However, one should reply: Could it, really? First, it is very hard to see how Mephisto could, for instance, never will the evil (perhaps even always will the good) and always produce the good, or how he could, in contrast, always will the evil and always produce it. How could he then still be \"part of that force\" from which he would be so radically different? He would then rather be a part of a very different kind of force: a divine force in the former case or a more traditional devilish force in the latter case. Second, if the difference between Mephisto and \"that force\" is only small – like in the case where Mephisto himself always wills the evil but only almost always produces the good (also see section 5 below on such cases) -, then it is hard to see why we should ascribe such a small divergence from \"that force\" to Mephisto. Apart from all this, the text of Goethe's Faust strongly suggests an identification of Mephisto and \"that force\" in the relevant respects. We can be confident that Mephisto would have mentioned any relevant difference from the force. Finally, even if Mephisto should have fallen from \"that force\", too (imagine!) we could then just switch from talk about Mephisto to talk about that force: It is an agent, too, and what matters here are problems of agency in general. Devilish Incoherence 33 2 Are we changing the topic here from \"evil\" to \"bad\"? I don't think so. The term \"evil\" serves as a characterization of the will, the term \"bad\" as a characterization of the content or object of such a will. 3 For comments and discussion I am grateful to my parents as well as to Reinhard Baule, an audience in Leipzig (Germany), and anonymous referees. REFERENCES Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958, Intention, Oxford: Blackwell. Armstrong, David Malet 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London & New York: Routledge & Humanities Press. Bratman, Michael E. 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press. Davidson, Donald 1984, \"The Method of Truth in Metaphysics\", in: Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon, 199-214. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Faust. Eine Tragödie, in: Goethes Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe (ed.: Erich Trunz), München: C.H. Beck 1982-2008, vol.III. Kant, Immanuel, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. Reimer 1902ff., vol.IV, 385-463. Moore, George Edward 1959, \"Russell's Theory of Descriptions\", in: George Edward Moore, Philosophical Papers, London/ New York: Allen & Unwin/ Macmillan, 151-195. Plato, Meno, in: Five Dialogues (tr.: G.M.A. Grube & John M. Cooper), Indianapolis: Hackett 2002.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale Nicolae Sfetcu 30.07.2019 Sfetcu, Nicolae, \"Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale\", SetThings (30 iulie 2019), URL = https://www.setthings.com/ro/unificarea-gravitatiei-cu-celalalte-fortefundamentale/ Email: nicolae@sfetcu.com Acest articol este licențiat Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International. Pentru a vedea o copie a acestei licențe, vizitați http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/. TEORII ALTERNATIVE ALE GRAVITAȚIEI CUANTICE ............................................... 2 UNIFICAREA (TEORIA FINALĂ) ......................................................................................... 4 COSMOLOGIA ........................................................................................................................... 8 BIBLIOGRAFIE ....................................................................................................................... 11 Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 2 Teorii alternative ale gravitației cuantice Gravitația bimetrică este o clasă de teorii modificate ale gravitației în care se folosesc doi tensori metrici în loc de unul,1 a doua metrică putând fi folosită la energii înalte. În cazul în care cele două metrici interacționează, apar două tipuri de gravitoni, unul masiv și unul fără masă. Setul de teorii încearcă să explice gravitația masivă.2 Astfel de teorii sunt cele ale lui Nathan Rosen, (1909-1995)3 sau Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) a lui Mordehai Milgrom. Evoluțiile gravitației masive au încurajat apariția de noi teorii consistente ale gravităției bimetrice,4 dar niciuna nu reflectat observațiile fizice mai bine decât teoria relativității generale.5 Unele dintre aceste teorii (MOND, de ex.) sunt alternative la energia întunecată. Alte teorii bimetrice nu iau în considerare gravitonii masivi și nu modifică legea lui Newton, descriind universul ca o varietate de două metrici riemanniene cuplate, unde materia interacționează prin gravitație. Unele din ele stipulează viteza variabilă a luminii la densitate energetică ridicată.6 Bigravitația lui Rosen (1940)7 propune ca în fiecare punct al spațiu-timpului să existe un tensor metric euclidian în plus față de tensorul metric riemannian. Astfel, în fiecare punct al spațiu-timpului există două valori. Primul tensor metric descrie geometria spațiu-timpului, și deci câmpul gravitațional. Al doilea tensor metric, se referă la spațiu-timpul plat și descrie forțele inerțiale. Bigravitația lui Rosen satisface principiul covarianței și echivalenței. Bigravitația lui Rosen și TGR diferă în cazul propagarea undelor electromagnetice, al câmpului extern al unei stele de înaltă densitate, și în comportamentul undelor gravitaționale intense care se propagă printrun câmp gravitational static puternic. Predicțiile radiației gravitaționale din teoria lui Rosennu fost infirmate de observațiile pulsarului binar Hulse-Taylor.8 1 N. Rosen, „General Relativity and Flat Space. I\", Physical Review 57, nr. 2 (15 ianuarie 1940): 57 (2): 147– 150, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.57.147. 2 S. F. Hassan și Rachel A. Rosen, „Bimetric Gravity from Ghost-Free Massive Gravity\", Journal of High Energy Physics 2012, nr. 2 (24 februarie 2012): 1202 (2): 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/JHEP02(2012)126. 3 Rosen, „General Relativity and Flat Space. I\", 57 (2): 147–150. 4 Lisa Zyga, „Gravitational Waves May Oscillate, Just like Neutrinos\", 2017, https://phys.org/news/2017-09gravitational-oscillate-neutrinos.html. 5 Clifford Will, The Renaissance of General Relativity, in The New Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 18. 6 J. P. Petit și G. D'Agostini, „Cosmological bimetric model with interacting positive and negative masses and two different speeds of light, in agreement with the observed acceleration of the Universe\", Modern Physics Letters A 29, nr. 34 (27 octombrie 2014): 29 (34): 1450182, https://doi.org/10.1142/S021773231450182X. 7 Rosen, „General Relativity and Flat Space. I\", 57 (2): 147–150. 8 Will, The Renaissance of General Relativity, in The New Physics, 18. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 3 Bigravitația masivă a apărut în 2010, dezvoltată de Claudia de Rham, Gregory Gabadadze și Andrew Tolley (dRGT)9 În teoria dRGT apare o \"metrică de referință\" nondinamică. Valoarea metrică de referință trebuie specificată manual. O extensie ulterioară a fost introdusă de Fawad Hassan și Rachel Rosen.10 Gravitația cuantică bohmiană încorporează configurația reală în teorie ca variabila de bază și stipulează că aceasta evoluează într-un mod natural sugerat de simetrie și de ecuația lui Schrodinger.11 Teoria rezolvă problema timpului (același rol ca în TGR), și parțial problema difeomorfismului. Nu are problemele legate de rolul observatorilor și observabilelor, deoarece aceștia nu joacă niciun rol în această teorie. Funcția de undă dependentă de timp, care satisface ecuația lui Schrodinger, nu estenecesară aici. Gravitația cuantică bohmiană implică o tranziție simplă de la mecanica cuantică, încorporând configurația reală în teorie ca variabila de bază și stipulând că aceasta evoluează într-un mod natural sugerat de simetrie și de ecuația lui Schrodinger. 9 Claudia de Rham, Gregory Gabadadze, și Andrew J. Tolley, „Resummation of Massive Gravity\", Physical Review Letters 106, nr. 23 (10 iunie 2011): 106 (23): 231101, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.231101. 10 Hassan și Rosen, „Bimetric Gravity from Ghost-Free Massive Gravity\", 1202 (2): 126. 11 Sheldon Goldstein și Stefan Teufel, „Quantum spacetime without observers: ontological clarity and the conceptual foundations of quantum gravity\", arXiv:quant-ph/9902018, 5 februarie 1999, http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9902018. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 4 Unificarea (Teoria Finală) Domeniile de aplicabilitate ale TGR și TCC sunt diferite, astfel încât cele mai multe situații necesită folosirea doar a uneia din cele două teorii.12 Suprapunerile apar în regiuni de dimensiuni extrem de mici și de masă ridicată, precum gaură neagră sau universul timpuriu (imediat după Big Bang). Acest conflict se presupune că poate fi rezolvat doar unificând gravitația cu celelalte trei interacțiuni, pentru a integra TGR și TCC într-o singură teorie. Teoria corzilor afirmă că la începutul universului (până la 10-43 secunde după Big Bang), cele patru forțe fundamentale au fost o singură forță fundamentală. Conform fizicalismului din filosofie, o TF fizică va coincide cu o teorie filosofică finală. Au fost propuse mai multe teorii unificatoare. Marea unificare presupune existența unei forțe electronucleare. Ultimul pas în unificare ar necesita o teorie care să includă atât mecanica cuantică cât și gravitația prin relativitatea generală (\"teoria finală\"). După 1990, unii fizicieni consideră că teoria M 11-dimensională, identificată adesea cu una dintre cele cinci teorii ale supercorzilor perturbative, sau uneori cu supergravitația maximal-supersimetrică 11-dimensională, este teoria finală. Ideea teoriei M13 a preluat din ideile teoriei Kaluza-Klein, în care s-a constatat că folosirea unui spațiu-timp 5-dimensional pentru relativitatea generală (cu una din dimensiuni mică) se vede, din perspectiva 4-dimensională, la fel ca relativitatea generală obișnuită împreună cu electrodynamica lui Maxwell. O proprietate importantă a teoriei corzilor este supersimetria sa (versiunea teoriei supercorzilor) care, împreună cu dimensiunile suplimentare, sunt cele două propuneri principale pentru rezolvarea problemei. Dimensiunile suplimentare ar permite gravitației să se răspândească în celelalte dimensiuni, celelalte forțe rămânând limitate într-un spațiu-timp 4-dimensional. Încercările de a folosi gravitația cuantică în bucle (GCB) într-o TF au eșuat, dar adepții acestui program continuă cercetările. 14 Există încercări de a dezvolta o teorie finală și prin alte teorii, precum teoria sistemelor de fermioni cauzală care conține cele două teorii fizice curente (relativitatea generală și teoria câmpului cuantic) drept cazuri limitative. O altă teorie este cea a 12 S. Carlip, „Quantum Gravity: a Progress Report\", Reports on Progress in Physics 64, nr. 8 (1 august 2001): 64 (8): 885–942, https://doi.org/10.1088/0034-4885/64/8/301. 13 Steven Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory: The Search for The Fundamental Laws of Nature (Random House, 2010). 14 Sundance Bilson-Thompson et al., „Particle Identifications from Symmetries of Braided Ribbon Network Invariants\", arXiv:0804.0037 [hep-th], 1 aprilie 2008, http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.0037. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 5 seturilor cauzale. Altă propunere este E8 a lui Garrett Lisi, care propune unificarea în cadrul grupului Lie.15 Modelul Strand al lui Christoph Schiller încearcă să reflecte simetria gauge a modelului standard al fizicii particulelor, iar o altă versiune implică ER=EPR, care susține că particulele inseparabile sunt legate printr-o gaură de vierme (sau podul Einstein-Rosen).16 Jürgen Schmidhuber este pentru TF, afirmând că teoremele de incompletență ale lui Gödel17 sunt irelevante pentru fizica computațională.18 Majoritatea fizicienilor susțin că teorema lui Gödel nu implică imposibilitatea unei TF.19 Unii fizicieni, inclusiv Einstein, consideră că nu trebuie confundate modelele teoretice cu adevărata natură a realității, și susțin că aproximările nu vor ajunge niciodată la o descriere completă a realității.20 O dezbatere filosofică este cu privire la dacă o teorie finală poate să fie numită legea fundamentală a universului.21 Adepții TF reducționiste afirmă că teoria reprezintă legea fundamentală. Alt punct de vedere este că legile emergente (precum a doua lege a termodinamicii și teoria selecției naturale) ar trebui considerate la fel de fundamentale, și deci independente. Numele de \"teoria finală\" este contrazis de natura probabilistică a predicțiilor mecanicii cuantice, de sensibilitatea la condițiile inițiale, limitările datorate orizonturilor evenimentelor, și alte dificultăți deterministe. Frank Close contrazice ideea de TF susținând că straturile naturii sunt ca niște straturi de ceapă, și numărul acestor straturi ar putea fi infinit,22 implicând o serie infinită de teorii fizice. Weinberg23 afirmă că devreme ce este imposibil să calculăm precis chiar și un proiectil real în atmosfera Pământului, nu putem vorbi de o TF. 15 A. Garrett Lisi, „An Exceptionally Simple Theory of Everything\", arXiv:0711.0770 [gr-qc, physics:hep-th], 6 noiembrie 2007, http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.0770. 16 Ron Cowen, „The Quantum Source of Space-Time\", Nature News 527, nr. 7578 (19 noiembrie 2015): 527 (7578): 290–293, https://doi.org/10.1038/527290a. 17 Teoremele de incompletență ale lui Gödel sunt două teoreme ale logicii matematice care stabilesc limitări inerente tuturor sistemelor axiomatice, cu excepția celor mai triviale, capabile de aritmetică. Prima teoremă afirmă că orice teorie generată efectiv, capabilă să exprime aritmetica elementară, nu poate fi atât consistentă, cât și completă. 18 Jürgen Schmidhuber, „A Computer Scientist's View of Life, the Universe, and Everything. Lecture Notes in Computer Science\", 1997, 201–208, http://people.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/. 19 Jürgen Schmidhuber, „Hierarchies of generalized kolmogorov complexities and nonenumerable universal measures computable in the limit\", International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science 13, nr. 04 (1 august 2002): 13 (4): 587–612, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0129054102001291. 20 Abraham Pais, Subtle Is the Lord: The Science and the Life of Albert Einstein (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), cap. 17. 21 Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory. 22 Frank Close, The New Cosmic Onion: Quarks and the Nature of the Universe, Revised edition (New York: CRC Press, 2006). 23 Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 6 Unificarea nu implică neapărat reducția. Teoria câmpului cuantic și relativitatea generală sunt ele însele teorii unificate. Relativitatea generală este o generalizare gravitațională a teoriei speciale a relativității care a unificat electromagnetismul cu mecanica clasică non-gravitațională, iar teoria câmpului cuantic este o combinație între relativitatea specială și mecanica cuantică. Modelul standard este deseori prezentat ca un exemplu de unificare de succes. În încercarea de unificare a gravitației cu celelalte forțe, gravitația cuantică în bucle este o versiune \"minimalistă\" (este doar o încercare de cuantizare a relativității generale). Teoria corzilor încearcă să fie \"teorie a tuturor\", în care un singur tip de interacțiune determină orice alte aspecte ale realității. Între teoria cuantică și relativitatea generală există probleme de compatibilitate conceptuală în dezvoltarea unei gravitații cuantice: independența de fundal a relativității generale datorită lipsei unui cadru de referință preferat, este opusă geometriei din teoria cuantică care implică o dependență de fond legată de existența unui cadru de referință preferat.24 Metrica în relativitatea generală determină geometria spațiu-timpului și acționează ca un potențial. Deoarece este o variabilă dinamică, rezultă că geometria însăși este dinamică. Teoria cuantică necesită o geometrie fixă, rezultă un tratament foarte diferit al spațiu-timpului față de TGR. O teorie a gravitației cuantice poate renunța la dependența de fond, sau se poate modifica teoria cuantică. Conform lui Reiner Hedrich, teoria corzilor este o construcție matematică fără niciun control empiric, care pare să transceadă din ce în ce mai mult contextul fizicii, prin creșterea autoimunizării, devenind în final o formă de metafizică a naturii de inspirație matematică.25 Întoarcerea la o metafizică a naturii trebuie văzută ca un pas retrograd. Teoria corzilor poate fi înțeleasă ca o reîntoarcere la idealului antic al unei aprofundări a naturii exclusiv prin intermediul intelectului nostru (matematic), fără observații sau dispozitive experimentale. Jeremy Butterfield și Christopher Isham subliniază că imensa auto-referință care se găsește în toate teoriile gravitației cuantice este o consecință a inexistenței datelor empirice, a semnificației metafizice a ipotezelor 24 Steven Weinstein, „Absolute Quantum Mechanics\", Preprint, 2000, 52: 67-73, http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/836/. 25 Reiner Hedrich, „The Internal and External Problems of String Theory: A Philosophical View\", Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38, nr. 2 (2006): 261–278. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 7 și predispozițiilor, și a aparatul matematic și modelului teoretic pe care sunt concepute teoriile respective.26 Baza matematică a teoriei corzilor (o versiune extinsă a aparatului teoriei câmpului cuantic) nu s-a schimbat semnificativ în timpul evoluției sale. Au mai existat încercări de unificare a gravitației cu alte forțe pe baze matematice, precum teoriile lui Einstein, Schrodinger, Misner și Wheeler de a unifica geometric gravitația și electromagnetismul, dar și acestea au eșuat.27 Toți cercetătorii, indiferent dacă sunt adepți sau critici ai Teoriei Finale, încearcă să caute un răspuns la întrebarea de ce nu s-a reușit până acum această unificare. În fond, nu există un consens nici măcar în a defini în ce constă efectiv unificarea, și în ce măsură poate reflecta ea, epistemic, această eventuală unitate ontică. Limitele noastre epistemice ar putea face imposibilă o astfel de explorare. Practic, filosofii științei sunt sceptici în ceea ce privește motivațiile filosofice ale acestei unități, și în ceea ce privește succesul ei științific.28 26 Jeremy Butterfield și Chris Isham, „Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity\", în Physics Meets Philosophy at the Panck Scale (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 33–89. 27 Robert Weingard, „A Philosopher Looks at String Theory\", PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1988): 95–106. 28 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 8 Cosmologia La nivel cosmologic, modelul cosmologic standard conține teoria gravitației lui Einstein ca parte a \"nucleului dur\". Materia întunecată, energia întunecată, și inflația au fost adăugate teoriei ca răspuns la observații. Niciuna dintre aceste ipoteze auxiliare nu a fost încă confirmată. Modelul cosmologic standard nu are predicții de succes, el este în permanență ajustat în urma observațiilor. Reproducerea spectrului fluctuațiilor de temperatură în mediul cosmic cu microunde este considerat un succes al modelului, dar a fost obținut prin modificarea forțată a parametrior modelului, cu inconsecvențe cu valorile determinate în alte moduri mai directe. David Merritt29 atrage atenția asupra unui program de cercetare alternativ, care a fost inițiat la începutul anilor 1980 și care a făcut predicții noi; programul lui Mordehai Milgrom (MOND), inițiat în 1983, a cărui principiu specific afirmă că legile gravitației și mișcării diferă de cele ale lui Newton sau Einstein în regimul de accelerare foarte scăzută (la nivel de galaxii). Programul are o lungă listă de alte predicții, evitând ipotezele materiei întunecate și a energiei întunecate. În cosmologie, metafizica implică un domeniu larg de întrebări dincolo de dovezile empirice, folosind uneori inferența speculativă. Analiza epistemologică în cosmologie ajută la evaluarea modelelor. Studiul filosofic oferă un cadru general pentru interpretarea inferențelor care depășesc știința.30 În cosmologie există câteva principii ontologice care ajută la clasificarea modelelor în funcție de caracteristici, la conceperea realității cosmice într-o descriere mai transparentă, și permit să rezolvăm ecuațiile matematice ca niște construcții centrale ale oricărui model. Aceste principii sunt: 31 1. Omogenitatea spațiului (distribuția uniformă a materiei) 2. Omogenitatea timpului (structură independentă de timpul cosmic global) 3. Izotropia spațiului (independența structurii de direcția de observare) 4. Homotetia spațiului (independența structurii de transformările scalare) 29 David Merritt, „Gravity: The Popper Problem\", IAI TV Changing how the world thinks, 2 octombrie 2017, https://iai.tv/articles/gravity-the-popper-problem-auid-899. 30 Petar V. Grujic, „Some epistemic questions of cosmology\", arXiv:0709.3191 [physics], 20 septembrie 2007, http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.3191. 31 Grujic. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 9 Astfel, modelul standard (Hot Big Bang) include modelele (a, c), modelul staționar include (a, b, c), modelul ierarhic include (c, d) ). Pentru a evalua epistemic modelele cosmologice, presupunem că legile fizice sunt valabile și aceleași peste tot în cosmos, în spațiu și timp. Izotropia spațiului este singura proprietate a cosmosului ușor de verificat. Deoarece inferența asupra proprietăților și fenomenelor fizice este întotdeauna indirectă și legată de modelele teoretice, dovezile empirice se bazează pe valabilitatea acestor construcții teoretice.32 În estimarea distanțelor cosmice luăm în considerare schimbarea de culoare a liniilor spectrale de la aceste obiecte și ne bazăm pe interpretarea acestei schimbări, atribuită efectului Doppler (cinematic), fenomenelor gravitaționale (dinamic), dilatării spațiului (geometric) etc., în funcție de modelul nostru al universului. În cadrul \"spațiului epistemic\", principiile ontologic definite (a, b, c) sunt postulate, dar a patra (d) nu mai este valabilp la scări suficient de mici. , inclusiv probabil gravitațională. O parte a cosmosului observabil, cosmografia, poate fi privită ca o structură construită pe componente particulare elementare. Modelele cosmografice încep cu galaxia ca unitate elementară. Cosmologia tratează galaxiile ca puncte fizice, dotate cu mișcări colective (coerente) și proprii (haotice). În cosmologie, predicțiile teoretice sau descrierile trebuie să fie în concordanță cu dovezile empirice, rezultă că modelele vor fi adaptate la noile situații empirice, sau se pot introduce noi elemente externe în model, cu condiția să nu contrazică structura inițială.33 Piatra de încercare pentru un model cosmologic este modul în care tratează problema Începutului, inclusiv condițiile inițiale și problema eshatologică. Abordarea abderiană este imună la aceste probleme. În general, o bună teorie include un model matematic formal și procedura de cuplare cu realitatea fizică. Hawking a propus o soluție care are ca scop formularea unui model care este autosuficient. Astfel, programul de cercetare pentru modelul cosmologic standard este un program unificator în sensul metodologiei programelor de cercetare a lui Lakatos, incluzând mai multe programe unificate (precum cel pentru Big Bang, evoluția stelară și a galaxiilor, singularitățile gravitaționale, etc.). Aceste programe unificate sunt în 32 Grujic. 33 P. Duhem, „La Théorie Physique, Son Objet Et Sa Structure\", Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 61 (1906): 324–327. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 10 același timp subprograme de cercetare ale programului unificator întrucât, chiar dacă sunt create și dezvoltate fără a fi impuse de programul unificator, trebuie să țină conte de cerințele acestuia pentru a fi validate și încadrate în el. Relativitatea generală a apărut ca un model extrem de reușit pentru gravitație și cosmologie, care a depășit până acum multe teste observaționale și experimentale neechivoce. Cu toate acestea, există indicii puternice că teoria este incompletă.34 Problema gravitației cuantice și chestiunea realității singularităților spațiu-timp rămân deschise. Datele observaționale care sunt luate ca dovadă a energiei întunecate și a materiei întunecate ar putea indica nevoia unei noi fizici. Chiar și așa cum este, relativitatea generală este bogată în posibilități de explorare ulterioară. Relativiștii matematici caută să înțeleagă natura singularităților și proprietățile fundamentale ale ecuațiilor lui Einstein,35 în timp ce relativiștii numerici rulează simulări computerizate din ce în ce mai puternice (cum ar fi cele care descriu găurile negre care fuzionează). Un secol după introducerea sa, relativitatea generală rămâne o zonă de cercetare foarte activă. 34 John Maddox, What Remains to Be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race, 1st Touchstone Ed edition (New York: Free Press, 1999), 52–59, 98–122. 35 H. Friedrich, „Is General Relativity 'Essentially Understood'?\", Annalen Der Physik 15, nr. 1–2 (2006): 15 (1– 2): 84–108, https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.200510173. Nicolae Sfetcu: Unificarea gravitației cu celalalte forțe fundamentale 11 Bibliografie Bilson-Thompson, Sundance, Jonathan Hackett, Lou Kauffman, și Lee Smolin. „Particle Identifications from Symmetries of Braided Ribbon Network Invariants\". arXiv:0804.0037 [hep-th], 1 aprilie 2008. http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.0037. Butterfield, Jeremy, și Chris Isham. „Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity\". În Physics Meets Philosophy at the Panck Scale. Cambridge University Press, 2001. Carlip, S. „Quantum Gravity: a Progress Report\". Reports on Progress in Physics 64, nr. 8 (1 august 2001): 885–942. https://doi.org/10.1088/0034-4885/64/8/301. Cartwright, Nancy. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Close, Frank. 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{"text": "Surveying the Facts Guy Longworth1 University of Warwick 19.8.13 1. Introduct ion . It seems obvious that seeing can be a way of knowing. It seems obvious, for instance, that one's seeing the cat there on the mat enables one to know that the cat is there. More generally, it seems obvious that one's sensory experience can put one in a position to know things. For instance, one's feeling the cat brush against one's leg can put one in a position to know that the cat is there. However, what seems obvious is not always so. And the claim that sensory experience can put one in a position to know things is in apparent conflict with the conjunction of some claims that philosophers have found individually plausible. It is possible to find supporters for each of the following claims: I. One's sensory experience can put one in a position to know things about one's perceptible environment. II. When one knows things, one knows truths. III. If one's sensory experience can put one in a position to know things about one's perceptible environment, one's sensory experience must be capable of determining truths about one's perceptible environment. IV. If one's sensory experience is capable of determining truths about one's perceptible environment, then what one can experience sensorily must be, or must determine, truths about one's perceptible environment. V. One cannot sensorily experience anything other than concreta-for instance, concrete particulars; in particular, one cannot experience truths. VI. Concreta do not determine truths. And yet those claims cannot all be true. If we were to accept all of II–VI, then we would be forced to reject the seemingly obvious claim in I. Alternatively, if we are 1 I'm grateful to Craig French, Mark Kalderon, Hemdat Lerman, M. G. F. Martin, François Récanati, Matthew Soteriou, Peter Sullivan, and Charles Travis for very helpful discussion. 2 to continue to accept the seemingly obvious claim in I, then we must reject at least one of claims II–VI. Much recent work about the nature of sensory experience and its role in the acquisition of knowledge has in effect been aimed at avoiding the conflict between I–VI, by arguing that one or more of claims II–VI should be rejected. A version of the conflict figures, in particular, in a recent dispute between John McDowell and Charles Travis. McDowell had argued that if sensory experience is to put one in a position to know, then one's experiences must determine that which one comes to know in a specific way: it must furnish one with decisive reasons for accepting that which one comes to know. And he proposed that sensory experience meets the condition, in part, through its directly determining truths or facts, through having those facts as components of its content. Thus, McDowell sought to preserve claims I–III by rejecting IV or V. (McDowell 1994.) In response, Travis defended claim IV and V, and rejected claim VI. (Travis 2004, 2007; Kalderon 2011.) Travis's defence of claim V draws on a discussion of Frege's: But do we not see that the sun has [set]? and do we not then also see that this is true? That the sun has [set] is not an object emitting rays that reach my eyes; it is not a visible thing like the sun itself. That the sun has [set] is recognized to be true on the basis of sense-impressions. (Frege 1918–19: 354, with parenthetical changes to the standard translation so as to accord with Travis's.) Travis develops Frege's discussion in the following way: That the sun has set is a circumstance which now obtains. It does not represent anything as so. A fortiori it requires neither an intention nor anything else to fix a way it represents things. But that the sun has set bears on representing: if it has, then there is a particular way to represent things which will be representing truly. Such is the fact one captures in saying that it is true that the sun has set. Frege insists that, in a sense in which the sun itself (or its afterglow) is visible, that it has set is not. (Travis 2011a: 232.) Travis's thought here is that the obtaining circumstances, or states of affairs, that are denoted by expressions of the form \"that S\" are objects of cognition, rather than of sensory experience. Where one sees that the sun has set, what one experiences is only the sun, and perhaps its afterglow. One's seeing that the sun has set is not a matter of one's experiencing something in addition to the sun or its afterglow. It is 3 a matter of one's recognising that the sun has set, albeit on the basis of what one then experiences. Suppose that Travis and Frege are right about that. Nonetheless, Travis's defence of V leaves open whether one should follow him in rejecting VI, or whether one should instead take one of the options remaining open to McDowell by rejecting IV. For, as McDowell points out, accepting V is consistent with holding that experience determines truths or facts even though that which one experiences does not. For holding that experiential states have propositional contents does not commit one to holding that propositional contents are the experienced objects of those, or any other, experiential states. (McDowell 2008: 265.) And if states of experience have contents in addition to their experienced objects, then those states of experience (or the fact that one occupies them) might determine truths or facts partly on the basis of their contents, rather than solely on the basis of the objects (i.e. concreta) that are experienced through occupancy of states with those contents. It's therefore crucial to Travis's overall case against McDowell that it demonstrate, not only (V) that we cannot experience anything other than concreta, but in addition (IV) that experiences do not possess any features in addition to their objects that figure essentially in determining environmental truths. In particular, part of Travis's case must be to show that experience lacks any analogue of propositional content that can figure in determining truth. (The task is attempted in Travis 2004.) However, demonstrating that wouldn't be enough to decide the issue in favour of Travis. The issue would then turn on the standing of VI. For if McDowell were right to think that concreta do not determine truths, then Travis's defence of IV and V would serve, at best, to force rejection of at least one of claims I–III, each of which is accepted by both McDowell and Travis. Alternatively, if Travis were forced to accept VI, then in order to preserve claims I–III, he would be forced to revisit his case for IV. Conversely, if Travis's case in favour of IV and V were successful, that would force McDowell either to reject VI-thereby allowing that experienced objects can determine truths-or to give up his apparently more basic commitment to claims I–III. Clearly, then, VI potentially plays a pivotal role in the dispute between McDowell and Travis. Furthermore, if Travis is right to endorse IV and V, then the standing of I–III is dependent upon the permissibility of rejecting VI. The dispute between Travis and McDowell therefore tracks-at least approximately-an earlier dispute between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. (Austin 1950, 1954ms; Strawson 1950, 1964, 1965.) The earlier dispute was ostensibly concerned with the nature of truth. To a first approximation, Austin sought to develop and defend an account on which at least some truths are 4 determined as such by relations between statements and facts, while Strawson argued that facts are not suitable to figure in such an account. However, it's plausible that Austin's aim was not to provide an account of truth per se. Rather, his aim was to consider whether, and if so how, statements made on the basis of perceptual experience can be determined to be true or false on the basis of what is experienced. Specifically, Austin sought to defend claims I–V, by providing an account of such truths that permitted the rejection of VI. Although Austin's account of truth did make appeal to relations between statements and facts, he was quite explicit that, for him, the category of facts included perceptible concreta and not-or, at least, not only-truths. In response, Strawson argued that facts are propositional elements, too close to statements to figure as truth correspondents. Furthermore, Strawson argued that facts are not \"in the world\" in the way they are required to be on Austin's account (1950: 194). That is, Strawson argued that facts are not perceptible concreta. The topic of the remainder is the dispute between Austin, Strawson, and some others, over claim VI. The main aim is to revisit an aspect of the initial dispute between Austin and Strawson in order to isolate what I take to be a core point at issue in that dispute and then to pursue some prominent arguments that have been offered in broad support of Strawson's position with respect to that point, and so against Austin's position. The arguments that I'll consider are due to Jonathan Bennett 1988 and Wolfgang Künne 2003. They derive immediately from Zeno Vendler 1967, and mediately from F. P. Ramsey 1927 and Gilbert Ryle 1932. What I'll aim to show is that those arguments are, as they stand, entirely ineffective against Austin's position. A secondary aim will be to isolate some additional claims that might be used in support of those arguments and that may reasonably be taken to be crux issues in further pursuit of the core points at issue in dispute with Austin. The upshot will be that, as things stand, and pessimistic advertising to the contrary, it is an open question whether Austin's position, and therefore the analogous part of Travis's position, is defensible. I'll proceed as follows. In §2, I'll provide a general overview of Austin's partial account of truth, and indicate the way that concreta figure in that account as amongst the facts to which true statements correspond. In §3, I'll consider in more detail Austin's category of facts and also consider briefly one of Strawson's objections. In §4, I'll consider in more detail the arguments against Austin that Bennett and Künne present and indicate various ways in which they fail to decide the central issue. 2. Aust in and truth. 5 Austin's views about truth are scattered throughout his work, but his most explicit discussion of the topic is in his 1950. Amongst the distinctive claims Austin makes about truth are the following: (A) The predicate \"is true\" has a descriptive function: in particular, it serves to characterize the obtaining of a relation between statements and facts. (1950: 117–121.) (B) The facts that figure in determining whether or not a statement is true are concreta, for example, things, features, events, and states of affairs. (1950: 121–124; 1954ms: passim.) (C) The relation between statements and facts that underwrites the truth or falsity of statements is itself underwritten by relations between sentences and types of fact, and between episodes of stating and particular facts. (1950: 121–133.) (D) Human judgment is involved in determining whether a particular fact makes true a statement. And judgment is involved in a way that is sensitive to the intents and purposes with which a statement is made. For that reason, truth is not a simple relation between types of sentences (given their meanings) and particular facts. A pair of statements made using the same sentence with respect to the same facts but on different occasions-given different intents and purposes-might differ in truth-value. (1950: 122 fn2; 1962a: 40–41, 62–77, 110–111; 1962b: 142–147.) I'll say a little more about each of these claims. However, my main focus will be on (A) and (B)-that is, on Austin's appeal to, and conception of, facts. Here, the target questions will be the following. (Q1) What are facts? (Q2) What, if anything, are the things to which true statements correspond and by virtue of which those statements are true? (Q3) Do the elements specified in answer to (Q1) overlap with the elements specified in answer to (Q2)? That is, are the things to which true statements correspond facts, or the facts? 6 (Q4) Are the elements specified in answer to (Q1) and (Q2) happily characterised-along, for example, with other perceptible concreta-as being \"in the world\"? Austin presents his account of truth as an account of truth for statements. However, 'statement' is at least two ways ambiguous, covering both historical episodes in which something is stated-what I'll refer to as statings-and also the things or propositions that are stated therein-which I'll refer to as what is stated. Austin isn't especially careful about the distinction, but it's possible to reconstruct much of what he says in a way that respects it. (For discussion of the distinction see e.g. Cartwright 1962.) Austin's primary interest appears to be the truth of statings. He writes of 'statement' that it has \"the merit of clearly referring to the historic use of a sentence by an utterer\" (1950: 121). However, statings are not ordinarily said to be true or false, except derivatively insofar as what is stated in them is true or false. Rather, statings are assessed as, for example, correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate, and so forth. Nonetheless, it is plausible that stating correctly is closely associated with making a statement that is true. To a good first approximation, they are connected by the following principle: (Correct) An act of stating is correct if and only if what is stated thereby is true. Austin's account can therefore be understood, or reconstructed, as an account of the conditions in which statings are such that what is stated in them is true. Austin presents the core of his account of truth in the following way: When is a statement true? The temptation is to answer (at least if we confine ourselves to 'straightforward' statements): 'When it corresponds to the facts'. And as a piece of standard English this can hardly be wrong. Indeed, I must confess I do not really think it is wrong at all: the theory of truth is a series of truisms. Still, it can at least be misleading. (1950: 121) The two obvious sources of potential misdirection in the formula that Austin endorses here are its appeal to correspondence and its appeal to facts. Austin attempts to prevent our being misled by explaining how those two appeals ought to be understood. Austin's focus in his 1950 is mainly on the nature of correspondence. He deals more fully with facts in his 1954ms. A third, less obvious source of misdirection is Austin's claim that a statement is true when it corresponds to the facts: it would be easy to misread this as a claim about a necessary condition 7 (\"only when\"), or necessary and sufficient conditions (when, and only when\"), for statement truth. But it is clear-at least in context-that Austin's more modest aim is to present what he takes to be a sufficient condition for statement truth. And the type of case to which his condition is apt to appear most appropriate is that involving what Austin calls \"straightforward\" statements-to a good first approximation, statements about ordinary objects of sensory perception as made on the basis of sensory perception of those objects. (Compare Austin's cursory treatment of cases that he takes not to fit his basic account in a straightforward way, including formulae in calculi and definitions. (1950: 130–132.)) In giving an account of correspondence, Austin makes appeal to two types of (what he calls) conventions (as per (C) above) (These are conventions only in the general sense that they are correlations that are both arbitrary and instituted on the basis of manifest human decision. Thus 'conventional' is employed to contrast with 'natural' in something like the way suggested in Plato's Cratylus.) Descriptive conventions. These correlate sentences with types of situation, thing, event, etc., in the world. Demonstrative conventions. These correlate statements (statings) with historic (particular, concrete) situations, things, events, etc., in the world. (1950: 121– 122) The descriptive conventions associate sentences with (types of) ways for things to be: ways for situations, things, events, etc. to be. For instance, the sentence \"The cat is on the mat\" is associated with a type of way for things to be in which the cat is on the mat. A variety of different historic situations might be of that type. For instance, one historic situation of that type might involve Logos (Derrida's cat), while a different historic situation of the same type might involve Nothing (Sartre's cat). Similarly, cat-mat pairings that took place at different times would be different historic situations or events and yet might be of the same type. The demonstrative conventions, by contrast, associate particular statings- themselves historic events-with some amongst the historic situations, things, events, etc. that are then perceptible. Consider, for example, the following simplified case. There are two perceptible situations, one of which is of the caton-mat type and one of which is of the dog-on-linoleum type. The descriptive conventions governing the English sentence \"The cat is on the mat\" do not, and cannot, determine which of the two perceptible situations a speaker aims to talk about on a particular occasion. That is, the descriptive conventions to not determine whether a speaker is using the sentence in order correctly to characterize the perceptible cat-on-mat situation or rather is using it in order to 8 mischaracterize the perceptible dog-on-linoleum situation. In order to achieve one or another such outcome, the speaker must find a way of making manifest that their goal is to select, say, the dog-on-linoleum situation. They might achieve this, for example, by pointing towards the dog and away from the cat. (1950: 121–126.) With this machinery in place, Austin continues: A statement [a stating] is said to be true [correct] when the historic state of affairs [or e.g. situation, thing, event] to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type [footnote omitted] with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions. (1950: 122) What does 'is of a type with which' mean? Austin expands on his account in the omitted footnote: 'Is of a type with which' means 'is sufficiently like those standard states of affairs with which'. Thus, for a statement to be true one state of affairs must be like certain others, which is a natural relation, but also sufficiently like to merit the same 'description', which is no longer a purely natural relation. To say 'This is red' is not the same as to say 'This is like those', nor even as to say 'This is like those which were called red'. That things are similar, or even 'exactly' similar, I may literally see, but that they are the same I cannot literally see-in calling them the same colour a convention is involved additional to the conventional choice of the name to be given to the colour which they are said to be. (1950: 122 fn.2) The English sentence \"This is red\" is correlated by the descriptive conventions with a type of way for things to be: a type instanced by all and only those historic situations or states of affairs in which a selected thing is red. According to Austin, a stating by use of that sentence would be correct if the thing selected in the stating via the demonstrative conventions were sufficiently like standard situations or states of affairs in which a selected thing is red. So, we rely on the existence of a range of standard instances that are assumed to be of the required type. We can see that the thing selected in this stating, via the demonstrative conventions, is now in various ways similar and dissimilar from those standard instances. The question we need to answer is this: Is this thing of the same type as the standard instances with respect to its colour? That is, is it the same colour as they are? According to Austin, we cannot answer that question simply by looking. In an at least attenuated sense we must make a decision as to whether the present instance is, in relevant respects, sufficiently similar to the standard instances as to mandate treating it as of the very same type. (It is because decision or judgement is required 9 in order to determine classification of the present case as e.g. red, rather than this being determined by purely natural relations of similarity, that Austin speaks here of a role for an additional convention.) The things to which statings correspond appear, then, to be quite different from facts as the latter have commonly been understood by philosophers. For facts are often thought of as proposition-like-as exhaustively captured by instances of the form \"The fact that p\". And it seems that, having selected such an element-for example, through use of the expression \"the fact that p\", or through making a judgment to the effect that p-one has thereby determined that the statement or judgment that p will be correct with respect to that element. (The alternative would be that one had failed to select such an element at all.) However, Austin nonetheless categorizes the things to which statings correspond as facts. Austin's views about facts are developed a bit more fully in his 1954ms. There, Austin makes clear that he uses 'facts' (with etymological precedent) to speak of concreta including, specifically, objects, events, conditions, situations, and what Austin called 'phenomena'-for instance, rainbows and shadows. Austin's category of facts is not, therefore, to be identified with a category of proposition-like elements. Because Austin's facts are concreta, it is possible for us to select them as objects of perception without that deciding how it would be correct to describe, characterize, or classify them in one or another type of stating. Moreover, on Austin's view, having the facts in view can leave space for human judgment or decision in mediating their correct description, characterization, or classification. And the role for judgment or decision in turn leaves open that the correct classification of facts as to types might vary depending on specific features of the occasion for so classifying them (see (D) above). It may be, for example, that for certain purposes an historic state of affairs involving a rose is sufficiently like standard situations involving red things as to warrant sameness in classification while for different purposes its likeness is outweighed by its dissimilarities from the standard cases. Moreover, what are counted as standard cases may vary with the purposes operative in attempting to classify, and may shift as new cases come to be counted as of a specific type. The precise ways in which our statings depend for their correctness or incorrectness on the facts can vary with variation in specific features of the occasion, in particular with variation in the intents and purposes of conversational participants. As Austin puts it, It seems to be fairly generally realized nowadays that, if you just take a bunch of sentences...impeccably formulated in some language or other, there can be no question of sorting them out into those that are true and 10 those that are false; for (leaving out of account so-called 'analytic' sentences) the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence is, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences as such are not either true or false. (1962a: 110– 111. See also 40–41, 65, 1962b: 142–147.) And the circumstances can matter in a variety of ways, not simply by supplying, or failing to supply, an appropriate array of facts: ...in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance and its context are important; what is judged true in a school book may not be so judged in a work of historical research. Consider ... 'Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma', remembering that Alma was a soldier's battle if ever there was one and that Lord Raglan's orders were never transmitted to some of his subordinates. Did Lord Raglan then win the battle of Alma or did he not? Of course in some contexts, perhaps in a school book, it is perfectly justifiable to say so-it is something of an exaggeration, maybe, and there would be no question of giving Raglan a medal for it...'Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma' is exaggerated and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it would be pointless to insist on its [i.e. the sentence's] truth or falsehood. (1962b: 143–144, emphasis and interpolation added.) It's important here to separate two questions. First, is the sentence 'Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma' true? Second, is what is stated in using that sentence on a particular occasion, true? In order for the first question to get an affirmative answer, every use of the sentence would have to be-or issue in a statement that is-true. But although the sentence can be used in a schoolbook to make a statement that is true, it might also be used in a work of historical research, or in support of Ragan's decoration, in making a false statement. Hence, the sentence doesn't take the same truth-value on every occasion: the sentence per se is neither true nor false. By contrast, there is no reason to deny that particular statements made on occasion in using the sentence are true: in particular, there is no reason to deny that the statement made by the schoolbook occurrence of the sentence is true. So, the second question can be given an affirmative answer, as long as we are willing to allow that a sentence can be used to make different statements on different occasions. (See also Austin's discussion of 'real' in 1962a: 62–77 for an array of relevant examples.) We should avoid a possible misunderstanding of Austin here. His argument shows, at most, that whatever combines with the facts to determine a particular truthvalue varies from occasion to occasion. That does nothing to dislodge the natural 11 view that a sentence can carry its meaning with it from occasion to occasion, and thus can possess a literal meaning. However, if we wish to retain that idea, we must, it seems, give up on the idea that sentence meaning simply combines with the facts that are being spoken about to determine truth-value: we must reject the idea that sentence meanings determine truth-conditions. Plausibly, we should also give up the idea that meaning alone determines what is stated (at least insofar as the latter determines truth-conditions). In taking this line, we would reject views of meaning according to which they are given by appeal to truth-conditions. (For sympathetic exposition of Austin on this topic, together with further development of an Austin-inspired account, see Travis 2008.) Austin makes no claims to generality for the account of truth that he sketches. (As we saw, his account presents a sufficient and not a necessary condition for statement truth.) Austin applies his account only to cases involving statements made about perceptually presented concreta. A plausible hypothesis, then, is that one of Austin's major aims in presenting his account was to provide an account of how such statements are determined as true or false on the basis of that which is perceptually presented. Austin's account is designed to help explain how what is presented in perceptual experience can figure in sustaining the truth or falsehood of statements made on that basis. On the assumption that what is perceptually presented is exhaustively concrete, any such account must help explain how perceived concreta can figure in the making of statements (and judgments) and in the evaluation of statements (and judgments) as true or false. One of Austin's major aims is to provide the bases for such an account. That aim explains the explicit lack of generality of Austin's account. It also explains what might otherwise have seemed to be a merely stubborn refusal to consider as candidates for truth correspondents anything other than perceptible concreta. 3. Aust in and the fac ts . Our opening questions about facts and truth correspondents were the following. (Q1) What are facts? (Q2) What, if anything, are the things to which true statements correspond and by virtue of which those statements are true? (For short: what, if anything, are the truth-correspondents of a true statement?) (Q3) Do the elements specified in answer to (Q1) overlap with the elements specified in answer to (Q2)? That is, are the things to which true statements correspond facts, or the facts? 12 (Q4) Are the elements specified in answer to (Q1) and (Q2) happily characterised-along, for example, with other perceptible concreta-as being \"in the world\"? Austin's account is based upon an affirmative answer to (Q3): the core of his account of truth is the claim that (the) facts are amongst the elements to which statements correspond when true. However, Austin appears not to commit to the congruence of facts and truth-correspondents. Since Austin's core account of truth provides only a sufficient condition for statement truth, and not a necessary condition, it leaves open that there might be statements that are made true by correspondence with elements other than facts. (That fits the present reading of Austin, on which his fundamental end isn't to provide a general account of truth, but rather to provide an account for the truth of judgements (or statements) based on perceptual experience.) And furthermore it seems to be consistent with Austin's account that, amongst the facts, there are some that are unsuited to figuring as truth-correspondents in his account. What, then, are the facts or truth-correspondents, on Austin's account? Here are some of the things that he says about them (some of which have already been quoted above): [A1] Suppose that we confront 'France is hexagonal' with the facts, in this case, I suppose, with France, is it true or false? (1962b: 143) Here we have that France is amongst the facts. More generally, we might predict that the facts include elements that we can think of as particular things or objects-in this case, particular regions. [A2] A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions...is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions. (1950: 122) Here we have that truth-correspondents include historic states of affairs, or perhaps those states of affairs being of the types they are. [A3] Troubles arise from the use of the word 'facts' for the historic situations, events, &c., and in general for the world. (1950: 122) Here we have that the facts that can serve as truth-correspondents include historic situations, events, and (in general) the world. 13 [A4] I can only describe the situation in which it is true to say that I feel sick by saying that it is one in which I am feeling sick (or experiencing sensations of nausea): yet between stating, however truly, that I am feeling sick and feeling sick there is a great gulf fixed. (1950: 123–4.) Here we have that the facts include the situation of Austin (or me, &c.) feeling sick, perhaps a state of Austin's (or mine, &c.) or a state of affairs involving Austin. [A5] ...[A]lthough we perhaps rarely, and perhaps only in strained senses, say that a 'thing' (e.g. the German Navy) is a fact, and perhaps never say that a person is a fact, still, things and persons are far from being all that the ordinary man, and even Strawson, would admit to be genuinely things-inthe-world whatever exactly that may mean. Phenomena, events, situations, states of affairs are commonly supposed to be genuinely-in-the-world, and even Strawson admits events are so. Yet surely of all of these we can say that they are facts. The collapse of the Germans is an event and is a fact-was an event and was a fact. (1954ms: 156.) Here we have a concession, albeit somewhat half-hearted, to an objection made by Strawson. Strawson presents the following argument (1950: 134–5): (P1) Austin's account requires that there is something that is selected by the demonstrative conventions through which a statement is made and that serves as both (i) what the statement is about and (ii) the truth-correspondent of the statement. (P2) What a statement expressed by the use of a simple subject–predicate sentence is about is the thing, person, etc., to which the sentence's subject expression refers (as so used and in accordance with the demonstrative conventions). (P3) From (P1) and (P2), the truth-correspondent for the statement so expressed is the thing, person, etc., to which the sentence's subject expression refers. However, (P4): ...while we certainly say that a statement corresponds to (fits, is borne out by, agrees with) the facts, as a variant on saying that it is true, we never say that a statement corresponds to the thing, person, etc., it is about. What 14 \"makes the statement\" that the cat has mange \"true,\" is not the cat, but the condition of the cat, i.e., the fact that the cat has mange. The only plausible candidate for the position of what (in the world) makes the statement true is the fact it states; but the fact it states is not something in the world. (Strawson, 1950: 135) Ergo, (C5) No thing, person, etc., is the truth-correspondent for a statement, or amongst the facts to which a true statement corresponds. And thus, Austin's account, as characterised in (P1), is incorrect. Austin's concession amounts, in effect, to allowing that (C5) is (or is \"perhaps\") correct. His sanguinity in the face of that concession is, of course, evidence that Austin would reject (P2). As we've seen, Austin's demonstrative conventions fix the targets of statings as wholes, rather than fixing merely the references of parts of the sentences that are used in those statings, as on Strawson's construal. And, as we've also seen, the targets so-fixed can include-in addition to things and persons-events, conditions, situations, and states of affairs. The question remains, whether Austin was right to concede so much. There are at least two reasons for thinking that he conceded too easily. The first reason is that the fact that \"we never say something\" doesn't appear immediately to entail that the thing we never say is false or nonsensical. Whether it does so would seem to depend at least on the specific reasons for our never saying that thing. However, it seems that Strawson's specific conclusion is derivable in the following way. (P6) If e is a truth correspondent for the statement p, then, necessarily, if e exists, then the statement p is true. (Plausible principle. See e.g. Armstrong 2004: 5) (P7) The cat is a truth correspondent for the statement that the cat has mange. (Assumption for purposes of reductio.) (P8) Necessarily, if the cat exists, then the statement that the cat has mange is true. (From (P6) and (P7).) (P9) Possibly, the cat exists and doesn't have mange. (Obvious.) 15 (P10) Necessarily, if the cat exists and doesn't have mange, the statement that the cat has mange is not true. (Obvious.) (P11) Possibly, the cat exists and the statement that the cat has mange is not true. (From (P9) and (P10).) (C12) It's not the case that the cat is a truth correspondent for the statement that the cat has mange. (From (P8) and (P11), via reductio.) Now one might have doubts about this argument, and in particular about the principle in (P6). For one might wonder why the capacity to serve as a truth correspondent for a statement shouldn't sometimes be possessed only contingently. However, I don't propose to pursue the issue here. Instead, let's assume that an argument to the required conclusion is available and that Strawson is right to deny that the cat is a truth correspondent for the statement that the cat has mange. The second reason for thinking that Austin conceded too easily is that arguments of the form just considered apply only in cases where analogues of (P9) hold. That is, the argument form applies only in cases in which it's possible for the putative truth correspondent for a statement to exist while failing to fit its characterisation in the statement. Thus, in cases in which the statement concerns only characteristics that the putative truth-correspondent cannot fail to have-i.e. essential properties of the correspondent-or concerns only the truth correspondent's existence, the argument form will be unavailable. For instance, on plausible assumptions, the argument leaves open that the cat is a truth correspondent both for statements to the effect that the cat is an animal and for statements to the effect that the cat exists. For all we've said, then, with respect to such pairs of statements and things, it would be open to Austin to claim that the things are truth correspondents for the statements. And as noted above, Austin only commits to presenting a sufficient condition for statement truth, so that would be enough to serve his explicit aims. Nonetheless, Austin is willing to concede to Strawson that ordinary objects-e.g. things and persons-are not truth-correspondents. And Austin anyway appears to want his account to statements other than those concerning the existence of objects and those concerning essential properties of objects. Hence, even if Austin were willing to defend the claim that objects can be truth correspondents, he would in addition want to defend the claim that there are other concrete elements that can serve as truth correspondents for those other statements. In [A5], Austin claims the following: 16 (A5.1) The following are truth correspondents: phenomena, events, situations, and states of affairs. Focusing specifically on events, Austin makes, in addition, the following two claims: (A5.2) Events are facts. (A5.3) (a) Events, and so (b) some truth correspondents, and so (c) some facts, are genuinely-in-the-world. Fairly obviously, Austin's core commitment here is A5.1. Given the hypothesis about Austin's major aim, A5.3 figures as making clear that truth correspondents are genuinely-in-the-world in the sense of being perceptible concreta. They can therefore figure in accounting for how what is presented in perceptual experience can serve to determine the truth or falsity of statements made on its basis. A5.2, and its analogues for the other elements listed in A5.1, figures only insofar as it connects Austin's developed account with what he takes to be its platitudinous source, the purportedly standard English claim that a statement is true when it corresponds to the facts. (1950: 121.) It's therefore remarkable that the main targets of critical discussion have been A5.2 and, thence, A5.3 b and c. (See especially Strawson 1950 and Zeno Vendler 1967. More recently, see Jonathan Bennett 1988: 1–12 and Wolfgang Künne 2003: 141–45.) The only reasonable explanation is that the objectors are at least implicitly committed to the claim that only facts can be truth correspondents. For given that commitment, rejection of A5.2 would entail deletion of events from the list in A5.1. And if analogous objections were available to the claims that phenomena, situations, and states of affairs are facts, then that would induce further contractions to Austin's list. Assuming further that nothing genuinely-in-the-world-no perceptible concreta-survived the onslaught, A5.3 b and c would fall, and with them the possibility of providing the type of account that Austin aimed to provide for the truth of statements made on the basis of perceptual experience. Alternatively, in the absence of the assumption, it is not clear that rejection of the claim that concreta can be facts would entail anything beyond a terminological revision to Austin's account. That is, conceding that concreta cannot be facts would leave A5.1 standing. For the most part, I shall for present purposes follow the contours of the historical dispute and so partake in the assumption that only facts can be truth correspondents. However, it is important to bear in mind that core question at issue, whether concreta can serve as truth correspondents, might be independent of the assumption. It might be that non-factual concreta can serve as 17 truth correspondents; and it might be that not every fact is apt to serve as a truth correspondent. 4. Disput ing Aust in's fac ts . In this section, the aim is to consider in some detail a prominent type of objection that has been offered to Austin's (A5.2). The type of objection that I want to consider derives from Vendler, 1967 and was prefigured in Ramsey 1927 and Ryle 1932. It has been presented more recently by Bennett 1988: 1–12 and Künne 2003: 141–45, and it's on the two more recent presentations that I'll focus. Austin doesn't simply assert (A5.2). Rather, he sketches an argument in its favour. (1954ms: 156.) One way of reconstructing his sketch is as follows. (P13) The collapse of the Germans was an event. (P14) The collapse of the Germans was a fact. (C15) There was something that was an event and was a fact. (From (P13) and (P14), by existential generalisation.) (C16) Some things that are, or were, events are, or were, facts. (From (C15) by plausible reformulation.) We can begin with two premises about a type of nominal expression that can be used in order to denote facts. (P17) Every imperfect nominal denotes a fact (or state of affairs). (P18) No imperfect nominal denotes an event. Let's begin by distinguishing between perfect and imperfect nominals. (Here I follow closely Bennett's presentation which itself tracks Vendler's. See Bennett 1988: 1–12.) Consider the following examples involving, respectively, a derived and a gerundial nominal: (1) Quisling's betrayal of Norway... (2) Quisling's betraying Norway... There are four major grammatical distinctions between these two nominals. First, in (1), and not in (2), we can replace \"Quisling's\" with an article: 18 (3) The betrayal of Norway... (4) A betrayal of Norway... (5)* The betraying Norway... (6)* A betraying Norway Second, (1) accepts adjectives in attributive position, and rejects adverbs, while (2) rejects adjectives and accepts adverbs. (7) Quisling's treacherous betrayal of Norway... (8)* Quisling's treacherously betrayal of Norway... (9)* Quisling's treacherous betraying Norway... (10) Quisling's treacherously betraying Norway... Third, in (2), and not in (1), the nominal accepts negation, tense, and modal auxiliaries: (11) Quisling's not betraying Norway... (12) Quisling's having betrayed Norway... (13) Quisling's having to betray Norway... (14)* Quisling's not betrayal of Norway... (15)* Quisling's having betrayal of Norway... (16)* Quisling's having to betrayal of Norway... Fourth, \"of\" figures essentially in (1) but not (2). The four grammatical characteristics just mentioned serve to mark out the perfect nominal, which pattern in accord with (1), and the imperfect nominals, which pattern in accord with (2). Those four grammatical characteristics correspond with more semantical characteristics. First, the following examples involving perfect nominals are all perfectly acceptable: (17) Quisling's betrayal of Norway began in June. (18) Quisling's betrayal of Norway began in this room. (19) Pieter helplessly observed Quisling's betrayal of Norway. By contrast, imperfect analogues of those examples are, at best, degraded: (20)? Quisling's betraying Norway began in June. (21)? Quisling's betraying Norway began in this room. 19 (22)? Hansen helplessly observed Quisling's betraying Norway. (These cases differ from the similar sounding non-genitives, e.g. \"Pieter helplessly observed Quisling betraying Norway.\" The latter involve small-clauses-tenseless analogues of sentences-rather than nominals.) In other cases, both patterns are acceptable, but permit a different range of interpretations. Consider, for example, the following: (23) Quisling's betrayal of Norway surprised Hansen. (24) Quisling's betraying Norway surprised Hansen. (23) is consistent with an interpretation on which Hansen was unsurprised that Quisling betrayed Norway, but was surprised by something about the way in which Quisling did it. By contrast, (24) is not consistent with the latter interpretation, but only with the former. With the distinction between perfect and imperfect nominals in hand, we are now in a position to present an argument in favour of (P17) (\"Every imperfect nominal denotes a fact (or state of affairs)\"). (P18) Every imperfect nominal of the form \"The fact that [S]\" denotes a fact. Every imperfect nominal of the form \"That [S]\" denotes a fact or denotes a state of affairs. (Obvious.) (P19) Every sentence involving an imperfect gerundial nominal is obviously necessarily equivalent with a sentence in which the gerundial is replaced with an analogous nominal of the form \"The fact that [S]\" or \"That [S] (Plausible by reflection on cases. Bennett (1988: 7) has \"synonymous\" where I have \"obviously necessarily equivalent\".) (P20) The best explanation of the fact related in (P19) is that in each case of obvious necessary equivalence, the imperfect gerundial nominal is codenotative with the analogous nominal of the form \"The fact that [S]\" or \"That [S]\" (Plausible explanatory claim.) (C21=P17) Every imperfect nominal denotes a fact or state of affairs. (From (P18) and (P20), and assuming, as adequate for present purposes, that all imperfect nominals are either gerundial, of the form \"The fact that [S]\", or of the form \"That [S]\".) 20 As presented, the argument is far from apodictic. However, I propose, for present purposes, to accept its conclusion. Our next task is to present an argument for (P18) (\"No imperfect nominals denotes an event\"). Here we can be brief, since we have already seen some of the evidence on which we'll rely. For perfect nominals are paradigmatically used in order to denote events. More generally, unlike expressions that are used to denote events, imperfect nominals don't take articles, and don't combine acceptably with predications of timing, location, or observation. For present purposes, then, we should be willing to accept (P17) and (P18). (We'll return briefly to the standing of (P18) below.) Now, the minimal function of those premises, in conjunction with some subsidiary premises, is to undermine Austin's argument that some events are facts. The key subsidiary premise is this: (P22) In any acceptable version of (P14), \"The collapse of the Germans\" is an imperfect nominal. On the basis of (P22), we can reason as follows. (P23) Since \"The collapse of the Germans\" in (P14) is an imperfect nominal, either (a) \"The collapse of the Germans\" in (P13) is also an imperfect nominal, or (b) Austin's argument is vitiated by an equivocation. (C24) If (a), then (P13) is false, since if \"The collapse of the Germans\" is an imperfect nominal, then it cannot denote an event. (From (P18).) (C25) If (b), then (P13) and (P14) can both be true, but won't conjointly determine the truth of (C16). The weak point of this first step in the argument is (P22). We have from (P17) that if \"The collapse of the Germans\" is an imperfect nominal, then it will denote a fact. It's therefore true that that would be one way in which to try to run Austin's argument. However, the alternative would be to insist that \"The collapse of the Germans\" is construed, in both premises of Austin's argument, as a perfect nominal. At that point, the objector appears to be reduced simply to denying (P14) when \"The collapse of the Germans\" is construed as a perfect nominal and, so, as denoting an event. Furthermore, Austin's presentation of the argument that we've reconstructed as (P13)–(C15) seems to provide some support for the construal. For Austin appeals not to our (P13) and (P14), but directly to the following conjunction: 21 (25) The collapse of the Germans is an event and is a fact-was an event and was a fact. (Austin 1954ms: 156.) And we can use this claim as the basis for the following argument. (P26) (25) seems to be correct. (P27) (25) is correct. (Plausible transition from (P26).) (P28) General constraints on the interpretation of conjunctive predications of the form \"is an F and is a G\" impose a uniform interpretation of subject expressions with which they combine. (C29) If (25) is correct, then \"The collapse of the Germans\" can figure only as an imperfect nominal or only as a perfect nominal. (C30) If (25) is correct, then \"The collapse of the Germans\" cannot figure only as an imperfect nominal. (From (P18), (C29), since (25) characterises what is denoted by \"The collapse of the Germans\" as an event.) (C31) If (25) is correct, then \"The collapse of the Germans\" when construed as a perfect nominal can denote a fact (and, indeed, an event). (C32) \"The collapse of the Germans\" when construed as a perfect nominal denotes a fact (and an event). (From (P27), (C31).) So, there is some apparent evidence that (P22) is false: a statement made by use of \"The collapse of the Germans is a fact\" and in the making of which \"The collapse of the Germans\" figures as a perfect nominal, can be true. At this point, Austin's opponent will want to reject the transition from (P26)-the claim that (25) seems true-to (P27)-the claim that it is true. In order to do that, they are required to do two things. First, they must provide a positive case for claiming that, if \"The collapse of the Germans is a fact\" is to be true, then the nominal must be construed as an imperfect nominal: in effect, they must make a case for the claim that only imperfect nominals, and not perfect nominals, denote facts. Second, they must explain away the appearance that (25) is true. Wolfgang Künne attempts to meet both obligations in the following passage (which I've renumbered for ease of reference). Consider 22 (P33) The collapse of the Germans is a fact (P34) The collapse of the Germans began in 1944. If the identity of the derived nominals in (P33) and (P34) were to guarantee that the very same entity is introduced into discourse, then we would have to conclude from these premises: (C35) Therefore (?), a fact began in 1944. We can avoid this slide into nonsense by treating derived nominals as systematically ambiguous. Then we can say: only in (P34) does the subjectterm designate an event, hence the displayed argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. So Austin's reply to Strawson fails: 'The collapse of the Germans is both an event and a fact' is a zeugma like 'Anna Karenina is both a beautiful woman and a great novel', forcing one expression into two conflicting services. (Künne 2003: 143) It's important to observe that Künne's claim that Austin's reply is zeugmatic (or, perhaps, sylleptic) rests entirely on the positive case for holding that it must be. Unlike the sentence about Anna Karenina, Austin's reply doesn't seem straightforwardly to be zeugmatic. It may be, since zeugma need not be transparently so, but that must be demonstrated, and cannot be read off from ordinary engagement with the sentence. (For discussion of some issues surrounding the detection of zeugma, see Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007.) For present purposes, we can allow that (C35) would follow from (P33) and (P34) if, in addition, \"The collapse of the Germans\" could be construed in both premises as a perfect nominal. Künne takes it that (C35) is nonsense and so, presumably, that it is not true. If he were right, then in order to avoid the slide into \"nonsense\" (C35), we might seek to deny either the truth of (P33) and (P34), or the validity of the transition from those claims to (C35). Since (P33) and (P34) seem obviously to admit of true readings, the favoured strategy for avoiding the slide into \"nonsense\" is to argue that there is no uniform reading of the nominals that (P33) and (P34) embed. (P34) couldn't be true if its nominal were construed as imperfect (since no imperfect denotes an event, by (P18)). So the nominal in (P34) must be construed as a perfect nominal. Hence, to enforce the charge of equivocation, the nominal in (P33), on its true reading, must be construed as imperfect. And that, in turn, supports the charge that Austin's sentence is zeugmatic. However, in the absence of independent grounds for treating the nominal on the true reading of (P33) as an imperfect nominal and so, by (P18), as 23 incapable of denoting an event, the weight of Künne's case rests on his claim that (C35) is not true. Unlike Künne, I don't find it obvious that (C35) is not true. For me, then, there are two puzzles here. First, why does Künne hold that (C35) is not true? And second, why does he find it obvious? Rather than speculate about that, let me consider a line of argument that might figure in explaining why someone would find it obvious that (C35) is not true. (P36) In \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944\", \"The collapse of the Germans\" denotes a fact. (Assumption for purposes of reductio.) (P37) If \"The collapse of the Germans\" denotes a fact, then it denotes the same fact as does \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\". (?) (P38) If \"The collapse of the Germans\" denotes a fact in \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944\", then it denotes the same fact as does \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\". (From (P37).) (P39) Inter-substitution of co-denoting expressions preserves truth-value. (?) (P40) If \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944\" is true, then \"The fact that the Germans collapsed began in 1944\" is true. (From (P38) and (P39).) (P41) \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944\" is true. (Obvious to the historically informed.) (P42) \"The fact that the Germans collapsed began in 1944\" is not true. (Obvious?) (C43) It's not the case that, in \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944\", \"The collapse of the Germans\" denotes a fact. ((P36), (P41), (P42), by reductio.) I don't myself find (P42) obvious in part because I do not find obvious any particular view about the proper treatment of constructions like \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\" that would make it obvious. If I were convinced that \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\" always denotes an abstract element (or a plurality of such elements), and in addition that no such elements begin, then I would be convinced that (P42) is correct. However, I am not convinced of either claim. 24 Austin himself suggests an alternative view, on which such expressions are used indirectly to denote truth correspondents, including events. (1950: 123–24, 1954ms: 165.) On the alternative view, \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\" is taken to denote the fact that makes true the statement that the Germans collapsed-that is, the event of the Germans' collapse. More generally, expressions of the form \"The fact that...\" are taken to be definite descriptions the descriptive matrix of which makes appeal to the relation of making true between concreta and statements (or judgments, or propositions). It's plausible that, if anything made true the statement that the German's collapsed, it was the event of the Germans' collapse. And it's plausible that the event of the Germans' collapse began in 1944. It's therefore plausible that the element that made the statement that the German's collapsed true began in 1944. So, on the alternative account of propositional fact talk, it's plausible that \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\" denotes something that began in 1944. The alternative account therefore plausibly permits us to take \"The fact that the Germans collapsed began in 1944\" to be true. (For reasons I'll turn to in a moment, the alternative account, when taken on its own, merely permits, and doesn't without supplementation require, that we take the target sentence to be true.) Since expressions of the form \"The fact that...\" are imperfect nominals, adopting such a view would require us to revisit our earlier acceptance pro tanto of (P18), the claim that no imperfect nominal can be used to denote an event. And we would therefore need to find a way of explaining away what appeared to be evidence in favour of (P18). But there is no obvious reason to think that that task cannot be completed. For present purposes, however, I'm prepared to let the first concern pass and to accept that (P42) is true. However, the idea that expressions of the form \"The fact that...\" might be used to denote events figures as background to a second concern about the argument. The second concern targets another potential weak point in the argument, (P39). The concern here is that substitutions of terms might fail to preserve truth-value for reasons other than differences in the denotations of those terms. To take one type of example, it seems to be possible for (26) and (27) to be used so that 'she' and 'her' both refer to the same individual, say Jill. (26) Jack loves her. (27) She is loved by Jack. And yet, case restrictions mean that inter-substitution of 'she' and 'her' fails to preserve grammaticality, so truth: (28)* Jacks loves she. (29)* Her is loved by Jack. 25 Now it might be argued that 'she' and 'her' as they appear in (28) and (29) cannot be used to refer, and so are cannot used to refer to the same individuals as 'she' and 'her' in (26) and (27) can be used to refer. However, even if such an argument were successful, that wouldn't rule out the possibility that broadly grammatical explanations are sometimes available for why expressions make different contributions to the truth-values of whole sentences in which both appear. And such explanations might figure even in cases in which the expressions that make different contributions nonetheless denote the same things. In case at issue, an attempt might be made to provide such an explanation for the fact that \"The fact that the Germans collapsed began in 1944\" is not true. And such an explanation might well be consistent both with the truth of \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944\" and with the co-denotation of \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\" and \"The collapse of the Germans\". For it would explain why (P42) is true in a way that is left open that \"The fact that the Germans collapsed\" as it occurs in (P42) denotes something that is capable of beginning in 1944. (For further discussion of such broadly grammatical explanations, in application to the case of the objects of psychological verbs, see King 2002. Austin hints in this direction at various points in his 1954ms, e.g.: 156–59.) Again, however, I'm prepared for present purposes to let the concern pass and to accept (P39). For a more obviously weak point in the argument is (P38). (P38) would be plausible if \"The collapse of the Germans\" occurred as an imperfect nominal in \"The collapse of the Germans began in 1944.\" For it is a plausible generalisation that imperfect nominals of that type have the same denotations as analogous imperfect nominals of the form \"The fact that...\" (or more carefully, \"That...\"). However, we know by now that \"The collapse of the Germans\" occurs in the target context only as a perfect nominal. And we thus far lack any reason to hold that if perfect nominals denote facts, then they are codenotative with imperfect nominals of the form \"The fact that...\" (The alternative account of imperfect nominals of the required form sketched above might provide a reason for expecting co-denotation, but only by rendering questionable other steps in the argument.) If the present argument to Künne's conclusion is to be forced through, what is required is reason to think that all expressions that denote facts are co-denotative with one or another imperfect nominal of the form \"The fact that...\". Let's try again to construct the missing argument. What is wanted is reason to extend plausible generalisations about the facts that are denoted by imperfect nominals in such a way as to undermine the claim that some facts are events. (More minimally, the aim might be to undermine the evidence that Austin presents in favour of the claim, by marshalling evidence that perfect nominals that denote events cannot also denote facts.) 26 To this point, we have sufficient materials to derive the following: (C44) There are facts that are not events. We could have derived (C44) from, for example, (P17) (\"Every imperfect nominal denotes a fact (or state of affairs)\") and (P18) (\"No imperfect nominal denotes an event\"). For it is would be possible to denote a fact without denoting an event only if there were facts that were not events. Similarly, we could have derived (C44) from the plausible claims (i) that constructions of the form \"The fact that...\" denote facts and (ii) that they do not also denote events. What is required, and what we have been struggling to find, is a way of progressing from (C44) to (C45): (C45) There are no facts that are events. (We haven't even managed to derive the far weaker: \"There are events that are not facts.) A premise sufficient do the required work would be the following. (P46) The metaphysical category of facts is categorially uniform. The notion of categorial uniformity embedded in (P46) is to be understood in such a way that if the predicate \"is an event\" is correctly applicable (/inapplicable) to any member of a uniform metaphysical category, then it is correctly applicable (/inapplicable) to every member of that category. On the basis of (P46), it would follow straightforwardly from the fact that some facts are not events that no facts are events. The main problems with (P46), when so construed, are the following. First, as we've seen, Austin appears explicitly to reject it, at least on the assumption that expressions of the form \"The fact that...\" cannot denote events. Second, we have, as yet, been offered no reason not to agree with him in rejecting it. The arguments that we have considered to this point seem at best to assume, rather than to support, (P46). Furthermore, third, Austin appears not to be alone in rejecting the uniformity claim. Bertrand Russell, for example, appears, at least for a moment, to agree with Austin: When I speak of a fact...I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false.... If I say 'Socrates is dead,' my statement will be true owing to a certain physiological occurrence which happened in Athens long ago. (Russell, 1918: 7.) 27 Here, it's plausible to read Russell as allowing that whatever makes a proposition true or false is a fact and, furthermore, that some occurrences-i.e. some events- are included within that category. The evidence here isn't quite decisive, since it may be possible to read the relational predicate \"is true owing to\" as expressing something other than the converse of \"makes true\". Moreover, Russell goes on to muddy the water by denying that \"any particular thing just by itself\" makes a proposition true or false. (1918: 7) However, what Russell is most keen to rule out is that things like Socrates might be truth correspondents for propositions, and it may be that Russell would deny that particular things are truth correspondents only because he would deny that occurrences are particular things. Minimally, then, Russell appears to agree with Austin that events are, or can be, facts. Moreover, the putative characterisation of facts as whatever is able to make propositions true or false strongly suggests a willingness, in principle, to allow that things other than events might be facts-for example, that there might be (non-occurrent) arithmetical facts. (Russell appears to accept the existence of arithmetical facts in the same passage. (1918:7)) Let me summarise the discussion to this point. We have that Austin includes in his category of facts a range of elements: concrete particulars, stuffs, processes, events, and states. The principle organising the category seems to be analogous to that employed by Russell: the kind of thing that can make a proposition (for Austin, a statement) true or false. We've considered a range of prominent arguments for the claim that Austin is wrong to include-in particular-events in his list of facts and found those arguments wholly unconvincing. The negative arguments that we've considered all seem ultimately to trade upon an assumption like (P45). Until a reasonable defence of that assumption is offered, no reason has been made available that precludes our endorsing Austin's system of classification. That is, we may provisionally accept Austin's (A5.2). However, before concluding this section, we should consider briefly whether events really are apt to meet the Russellian condition-whether, that is, they furnish a special case of (A5.1) by possessing the capacity to make true propositions (or statements). Let's consider, then, a permutation of the argument that we considered earlier for the claim that ordinary objects can't make true propositions, with events figuring in place of objects. (P47) If e is a truth correspondent for the statement p, then, necessarily, if e exists, then the statement p is true. (Plausible principle. See e.g. Armstrong 2004: 5) 28 (P48) The event of Germany's collapse is a truth correspondent for the statement that Germany collapsed. (Assumption for purposes of reductio.) (P49) Necessarily, if the event of Germany's collapse occurred, then the statement that Germany collapsed is true. (From (P47) and (P48).) (P50) Possibly, the event that was actually the event of Germany's collapse occurred and Germany didn't collapse. (?) (P51) Necessarily, if the event of Germany's collapse occurred and Germany didn't collapse, the statement that Germany collapsed is not true. (Obvious.) (P52) Possibly, the event of Germany's collapse occurred and the statement that Germany collapsed is not true. (From (P50) and (P51).) (C53) It's not the case that the event of Germany's collapse is a truth correspondent for the statement that Germany collapsed. (From (P49) and (P52), via reductio.) I take it that the claim (in (P50) that it is possible for the event that was actually Germany's collapse to have occurred without Germany collapsing-unlike the claim (in (P9)) that it is possible for the mangy cat to exist without having mange-is far from obviously correct. In order to defend it, one would need to demonstrate that that very event-an event in which Germany collapsed-could have occurred and yet not have been an event in which Germany collapsed. It would be a larger task than can be attempted here to argue that no such demonstration can be carried out. For present purposes, we can rest content with the fact that nothing approaching such demonstration has been carried out. For present purposes, it is therefore reasonable to accept pro tanto, not only (A5.2), but also the special case of (A5.1): events are amongst the truth correspondents. 5. Conclus ion. I began with a recent dispute between McDowell and Travis over what is made available to us in perceptual experience and how what is made available in experience can figure in underwriting our acquisition of propositional knowledge. McDowell had defended the view that in order for it to underwrite our acquisition of propositional knowledge, perceptual experience would have to make available to us some the propositional facts we thereby come to know. Travis demurs. He argues that we can acquire knowledge on the basis of perceptual experience even though, as he also argues, that experience makes available to us only what is 29 concrete and so does not make available to us propositional facts. Since knowledge is factive, so that if one knows that p, the proposition that p must be true, Travis' argument appears to depend upon the claim that concreta can determine the truth and falsity of propositions. I sought to connect the dispute between McDowell and Travis with an earlier dispute between Austin, Strawson, and others, concerning truth and the natures of truth correspondents. We saw that Austin, like Travis, wished to defend the view that perceptible concreta can serve as truth correspondents, plausibly as part of an analogous project. I sketched Austin's account and then considered in some detail some prominent objections to Austin's inclusion of events-one species of concreta-in his list of facts and so truth correspondents. Finally, I argued that none of those objections is successful as it stands and indicated two points at which further firepower might usefully be directed: (i) critical assessment of (P46), the claim that the metaphysical category of facts is categorially uniform; and (ii) critical assessment of the claim that events are sufficiently modally robust that few, if any, of their properties are essential to them. As things stand, we have seen that the claim that some concreta are facts- specifically, that some events are facts (Austin's A5.2)-has not yet been shown to be false. Moreover, we've briefly considered the standing of the more critical claim that some perceptible concreta are truth correspondents for truths about the perceptible environment (via considering Austin's A5.1), and found no reason to reject that claim. It therefore remains open that the following claims might all be true: I. One's sensory experience can put one in a position to know things about one's perceptible environment. II. When one knows things, one knows truths. III. If one's sensory experience can put one in a position to know things about one's perceptible environment, one's sensory experience must be capable of determining truths about one's perceptible environment. IV. If one's sensory experience is capable of determining truths about one's perceptible environment, then what one can experience sensorily must be, or must determine, truths about one's perceptible environment. V. One cannot sensorily experience anything other than concreta-for instance, concrete particulars; in particular, one cannot experience truths. References . 30 Austin, J. L. 1950. 'Truth', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24: 111–128. Reprinted in Austin 1979: 117–133. Austin, J. L. 1954ms, 'Unfair to Facts', in Austin 1979: 154–174. Austin, J. L., 1962a. Sense and Sensibilia, reconstructed from the manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, J. L., 1962b. How to Do Things with Words. M. Sbisà and J. O. Urmson eds., 2nd edn. 1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, J. L. 1979. Collected Papers, 3rd edn., J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cartwright, R. L., 1962. 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{"text": "Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES Comparative Philosophy Volume 7, No. 1 (2016): 1-19 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 www.comparativephilosophy.org THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-IDENTITY: AKAN AND NARRATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONHOOD COREY L. BARNES ABSTRACT: Marya Schechtman has given us reasons to think that there are different questions that compose personal identity. On the one hand, there is the question of reidentification, which concerns what makes a person the same person through different time-slices. On the other hand, there is the question of characterization, which concerns the actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, etc. that we take to be attributable to a person over time. While leaving the former question for another work, Schechtman answers the latter question by proposing what she terms the narrative selfconstitution view, whereby Schechtman claims that we account for intuitive features (moral responsibility, survival, compensation, and self-interested concern) of characterization through narratives. Still, merely having a narrative is not enough. In order to live the life of a person, an agent's narrative must sync with the narrative told about him/her in community. This paper, while in full agreement with Schechtman's claim regarding narratives and their ability to explain the intuitive features that regard the question of characterization, puts pressure on the latter claim. I argue that a person's narrative is not merely one that synchs with the narrative told in community, but one that is determined by the person's community. In focusing on Schechtman's second claim, I appeal to the Akan conception of personhood, showing that the community sets the parameters of personal identity, and by body politics and conferring social recognition, determines the traits that we take to be attributed to a given person over time. Keywords: personal identity, Akan conception of personhood, comparative philosophy Marya Schechtman has given us a very rich conception of the self that she takes to answer a fundamental question of personal identity, namely how an individual can be categorized as the same person, as opposed to the question regarding what makes a person the same persisting or perduring person at different times. According to Schechtman this question, termed the characterization question, asks \"which actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on...are to be attributed to a given person\" (Schechtman 1996, 73). Schechtman answers this question by ________________________ BARNES, COREY L.: Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis, USA. Email: clbrnes1@memphis.edu Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 2 arguing that \"a person creates his [or her] identity by forming an autobiographical narrative-a story of his [or her] life\" (Schechtman 1996, 93). One of the biggest reasons why this conception is so rich is because it accounts for the social nature of personal identity. She tells us that \"an individual's self-narrative must conform in certain crucial respects to the narrative others tell of his [or her] life\" (Schechtman 1996, 93). In short, Schechtman tells us that an individual's narrative must synch-up with the community's narrative about the individual. Still, it appears to me that Schechtman's idea does not go far enough in reporting the social nature of individual identity. Schechtman's theory promotes a narrative identity constructed by the person whose life is narrated, without being either directed or determined, which is to say strongly influenced, by his/her community (Schechtman 1996, 111). In so doing, I believe that Schechtman's view misses the strength of how communities are responsible for the parameters that our identities take and how much weight communities have on our self-images, such that forming identities is impossible without communities directing and determining the types of identities formed. In short, Schechtman's view falls short of appreciating how communities are responsible for our ability to be categorized as the same person. In this paper I would like to elucidate Schechtman's view, raising questions about it insofar as it lacks a full appreciation for the social nature of personal identity. In so doing, I would like to introduce a conception of personhood that receives very little attention in debates on personal identity in western philosophy, namely the Akan conception of personhood. In introducing this conception, I look at two Ghanaianborn thinkers, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, both of whom have written extensively on the Akan conception of personhood. Using Wiredu's account, I argue that the Akan conception of personhood shows us the full weight that our communities have on shaping our identities. The fundamental question guiding this work is: what does our communities have to do with how we are categorized? Ultimately, what I argue is that who we are, which is to say how we are categorized (to use Schechtman's division), is more strongly connected with our communities than Schechtman's view reports. I would now like to begin with an elucidation of Schechtman's view. 1. THE NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION VIEW Schechtman employs her narrative theory in order to \"explain our intuitions about the relation between personal identity and survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation\" that cannot be explained by either reductionist psychological continuity theories or reductionist bodily continuity theories (Schechtman 1996, 1). Schechtman thinks that people have strongly held ordinary opinions about these \"four features\" of characterization in relation to personal identity, and thus that they must be taken into account by complete explanations of personal identity. On Schechtman's view, both sets of reductionist theories fail insofar as they attempt to answer the question of how persons should be categorized as the same person by answering how persons reidentify as the same person. For Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 3 example, reductionist reidentification theorists will answer the question about when someone is moral responsibility for some action by asserting that a person is morally responsible for some action that occurred at t1 only if he/she is identical in the present (at t2) with that person who performed the action at t1. However, \"these 'reidentification theorists' fail to appreciate the boundaries of this [reidentification] question\" (Schechtman 1996, 2). Questions about characterization and those of reidentification are thought to be answerable by the same theory. \"As a result considerations linked to the categorization question creep into their investigation and are used (inappropriately) to guide their formulation of reidentification criteria, which undermines their project...at its very foundations\" (Schechtman 1996, 2). These theorists mistakenly think that their theories will account for the four features as reidentification theories because their theories purport to define identity and because identity is linked to the four features. Essentially, these theorists fail to recognize that the issues and questions of personal identity are not monolithic; there are two different issues at play in personal identity, namely the issue of what is necessary to have the same person at two time-slices and the issue of the four features. The former relates to the reidentification question, while the latter relates to the categorization question. On Schechtman's view, answering one question will not address issues relating to the other question.1 Now, Schechtman thinks that the two sets of reductionist theories fail to account for the four features in different ways. Schechtman thinks that even though theories concerning the continuity of bodies purport to answer the reidentification question, it as counterintuitive to think that bodily continuity theories account for the four features (Schechtman 1996, 67). Schechtman tells us that it seems intuitive to think that bodily continuity tells us something about identity, insofar as: \"Evidence that the present human body is the same as the past one is thus implicitly accepted as evidence that the present person is the same as the past one\" (Schechtman 1996, 13). However, in addition to concerns about what accounts for the continuation of our bodies into future times, we have practical concerns that a psychological theory appears more suitable to account for. So, let's take two individuals, Maria and Jane, and let us say that Maria performed some task for which she is to be compensated. Now, let us say that the day before Maria is to be compensated her psyche is placed into Jane's body and Jane's psyche into Maria's body. Schechtman thinks that we would intuitively think that the body with Maria's psyche should be the one that is compensated for performing the task, not the body that actually performed the task. Thus, in Schechtman's view, we intuitively think that psychological continuity theories are better equipped to account for the four features. Though it might appear that psychological continuity theories are better equipped to account for the four features, Schechtman thinks that they fail to account for the four features. Schechtman reasons that they are \"unable to explain the importance we attach to identity...\" (Schechtman 1996, 52). Schechtman terms this failure the 1 It is important to note that Schechtman is not committed to the view that the two questions are unrelated. Schechtman provides evidence for this note on page 68 of The Constitution of Selves. Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 4 \"extreme claim.\" The first premise of the extreme claim is that \"the four features require numerical identity-qualitative similarity will not hold\" (Schechtman 1996, 52). What Schechtman has in mind here is that the four features must refer to the same person from the past to the future, and not a future person who is similar to the person of the past. The second premise of the extreme claim states that \"the psychological continuity theory collapses the distinction between someone being me and someone being like me-that all identity amounts to on this view is psychological similarity between distinct individuals\" (Schechtman 1996, 53). Schechtman thinks that psychological continuity theories can only account for personal identity by relational parts that are both temporary and distinct, such that a person at one time (t1) is only like (because he/she is in some way distinct from) a person at another time (t2). Psychological continuity theorists cannot produce a theory that allows for the numerical identity of a person at t1 and t2, only a qualitative similarity between the two. The conclusion of the extreme claim follows naturally from these two premises: If the relation of qualitative similarity between the psychological lives of distinct individuals is insufficient to underlie the four features, and if the psychological continuity theory provides a definition of identity according to which all it is for some future person to be me is for that person to have a psychological life qualitatively like mine, then the psychological continuity theory obviously fails to account for the importance of identity (Schechtman 1996, 54). How this fails to account for the importance that we attach to identity is that we all think it is the same person who must be compensated or held morally responsible for some action; it is the same self that we are concerned about; and it is the same self that we think must survive when we talk about personal identity. Why would someone be responsible for the action of someone who he/she is like? Or, why would someone be concerned (in the way that we are concerned with ourselves) for someone that he/she is merely like? As such, Schechtman thinks it fitting to conclude that both bodily and psychological continuity theories that purport to answer the reidentification question are insufficient to account for our intuitions about these four features, which are largely what makes the question of personal identity relevant, and which are accounted for by answering a question that is different in nature-namely the characterization question. As stated in the introduction, the characterization question asks which \"actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on...are to be attributed to a given person\" (Schechtman 1996, 73). The theorist who attempts to answer the characterization question gives an account of \"which characteristics are truly those of some person...\" (Schechtman 1996, 73). The characterization question is markedly different from the reidentification question insofar as the latter involves a logical relation of identity (or similitude in the case of what these theories are actually able to accomplish) in some person over time, while the former asks what psychical properties most characterize some person over time. Schechtman thinks that the four features can be accounted for when we engage the former question, and her answer to Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 5 the former question is that we should think of personal identity in terms of a narrative. Schechtman titles this view the narrative self-constitution view. For Schechtman, personal identity is intimately linked to situating biological movements in a context that makes bodily movements more than simply mechanical or biological responses-they are actions. These actions take on a particular linear organization, or more explicitly a narrative. When I act, I take myself to be the experiencing subject, which is to say that I take myself to be an agent. Schechtman tells us that: \"Perhaps the most salient feature of narrative form in general is that the individual incidents and episodes in a narrative take their meaning from the broader context of the story in which they occur\" (Schechtman 1996, 96). It is only insofar as the movements (incidents and episodes) occur in the context of a narrative that they become meaningful. Thus, in order to explain an episode such as me reaching for a bottle of water, it must be understood that I am thirsty; and, in order to explain my being thirsty, it must be understood that I have just run five miles. Present episodes of experience are explained by past episodes. Episodes of experience that get organized into a narrative are not merely explained by past episodes, but project into the future. What this means is that current episodes of experience are also explained by anticipated episodes. For example, I stated that in order to explain the bottle-reaching episode one must understand the context in which the bottle-reaching episode occurred, namely my being thirsty, and that my being thirsty is situated in the context of my having just run five miles. Now, one might say that in order to explain the five mile-running episode one needs to understand that I desire and anticipate winning a gold medal in the Olympic Games as a successful track-and-field star. Thus, I not only understand my past actions in a particular context, but I extend my narrative to anticipated future occurrences. In short, the narrative, as a set of linearly organized episodes, is not closed. Thus, Schechtman tells us that: \"At the core of this view is the assertion that individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had experiences in the past and will continue to have experiences in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all, individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons\" (Schechtman 1996, 94). The particular content of an agent's narrative is what constitutes the characterization portion of personal identity. And with regard to this content, nothing that I conceptualize as a part of the content that makes up my identity occurs apart from the context of my story or narrative. When I speak about my life as a narrative, I am not speaking about episodes disconnected from my narrative. Thus, an event such as walking to the grocery store must refer to prior and future anticipated episodes as contexts in order to be conceptualized as occurring in my narrative. And when we speak about my self-conception as a narrative, we cannot be referring to episodes in isolation or detached from it. One must take care to notice how this theory provides an account of the four features. For the sake of time, let us look at compensation and self-interested concern. Beginning with the latter, we can acknowledge that \"what makes a particular Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 6 anticipation of the future a part of someone's narrative is precisely the influence it has on the character of his present experience\" (Schechtman 1996, 154-155). My desire to win a gold metal at the Olympic Games is a concern that has a direct bearing on my present psychological state. I worry about my future self, get excited in the present because of the anticipated future experiences and successes, and it is this worry and excitement-this concern-that motivates present action. Now certainly it is not simply this event that gives me worries and excitement, but the entirety of my future that I am concerned with, insofar as the Olympic games are not the only things in the future that concern me. By the time that I am concerned about this event in my narrative, there are innumerable anticipated events pressing me, such that I am concerned about the quality of my future as a whole, and not simply the individual future (and present) events that shape my present psychological state. \"The concept of compensation is closely tied to that of self-interested concern-it is because we care about what our futures will be like that the promise of forthcoming benefits can make up for present difficulties\" (Schechtman 1996, 157). Schechtman's theory is able to account for compensation (like self-interested concern) because it is able to explain present psychological states by appeal to future anticipations and rewards (or fears). These future states explain who we are, and thus this theory about who we are naturally accounts for them. What has just been discussed refers to one major element of Schechtman's theory, namely that individuals become persons by creating narratives. I am in complete agreement with this element of Schechtman's theory. \"The Second [major element] is a set of limitations on the form of an identity-constituting narrative\" (Schechtman 1996, 95). In order to understand Schechtman's narrative view, we cannot simply think it divorced from one's community. In fact, I think that this is one of the most impressive aspects of the theory. Schechtman tells us that: \"A view that held that any narrative self-conception was identity-constituting would be committed to the obviously false claim that persons cannot be mistaken about themselves\" (Schechtman 1996, 94). There are particular constraints on a narrative that a person can have. One of these constraints is that the person's narrative must match the narrative of the person that is told by his/her community; the two narratives must be in synch. Thus, I cannot construct a narrative as a rich and famous professional athlete when I am a mere gas-station attendant. My community must be able to affirm the narrative that I take to be mine. Schechtman's essential argument, as it relates to the social nature of personal identity, is that a person's narrative must be in synch with his/her community's understanding of his/her narrative because he/she must be able to live a life of a person. The life of a person necessarily includes social interactions and engagements, moral expectations, and future planning, which Schechtman thinks possible only if the community and the narrator have the same (or very similar) conceptions of the person's experiences. If I attempt to narrate my life as a rich and famous professional athlete when my community understands my narrative to be a gas-station attendant's, then I must do so in isolation from my community, particularly when I can only live this life by commanding the respect, signing the contracts, and being compensated as a professional athlete. Insofar as it Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 7 takes engagements with a community to do these things as a person would, my community must also understand my narrative to be that of a rich and famous professional athlete. This synching is necessary if I am to live among them. Living a social life, or the life of a person, depends on the synchronization of the narrative of the individual who identifies personally with the narrative of his/her social community. As such, a person cannot adopt any narrative or any self-concept. Thus, Schechtman gives us two basic sets of intuitions that lead to the narrative self-constitution view. She tells us \"first that in order to be a person one needs a particular kind of subjectivity and orientation towards one's life, and second, that in order to be a person one's self-conception must cohere with what might be called the 'objective' account of her life-roughly the story that those around her would tell\" (Schechtman 1996, 95). Still, one might think that there is a deeper connection between these two sets of intuitions. One might ask how the community that one's narrative must synch up with confines, sets the parameters for, and ultimately defines the possibilities of the narrative that one is able to take. Let us say that we have a person who is very much committed to gender equality. From where did this commitment derive? What social structures must be present in order for one to have a narrative that accords to any particular narrative? Further, what is the role of the body in the process of narrative-construction? If we say that the particular body of a person plays a role in the narrative that he/she constructs, and we affirm that a community's politics places a value upon that body, then we must affirm that the community's valuation of the body affects the narrative that that person can/will construct. For example, what happens when one's body is colored or gendered? How does bodypolitics affect narrative-construction? Still further, what affect does a community have on a person's motivations to construct their identities in certain sorts of ways? Given these questions, I argue that Schechtman does not go far enough in elucidating the social nature of the characterization portion of personal identity. I question whether there might be more than simply a synchronization of a person's narrative and the narrative told about the person by his/her community. In what follows I argue that a person's narrative is not merely one that must be in synch with the one told in community, but also one that is determined by the community. By appealing to the Akan conception of personhood, I show that the community sets the parameters of personal identity, and by body-politics and social recognition, the community determines what characteristics a person can/will take. 2. THE AKAN CONCEPTION OF PERSONHOOD The Akan conception of personhood is a very complicated and contentious conception that is far from settled among philosophers. Insofar as I do not want to leave the reader with the idea that there is a singular understanding of the conception, I would like to elucidate the Akan conception of personhood through two Ghanaian philosophers, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu. Both Gyekye and Wiredu have radically different views on the Akan conception of personhood. My argument is that if we take Wiredu's understanding seriously, then we can begin to more fully Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 8 appreciate the social nature of personal identity insofar as it relates to the categorization question. As such, I will elucidate the Akan conception of the human being, which is a composite of three essential elements. Afterwards, I will introduce Wiredu's argument that personhood is to be understood separately from humanity as an achievement in community that human beings strive towards. For completeness, I will follow this introduction with a brief illustration of Gyekye's response to this argument, and then Wiredu's rejoinder to Gyekye. This will lead me to my ultimate goal, which is to illustrate just how looking at personal identity through the Akan gives us a deeper appreciation of the social nature of personal identity as it relates to the characterization question. With regard to the human being, both thinkers agree that for the Akan the human being is composed of three principle parts, ōkra (which can be understood as the lifespark of a living organism, or that which answers why one thing is alive and another thing is not), sunsum (the character, or \"that which is responsible for the unique personal presence that an individual has\") (Wiredu 1992a, 112), and honam (the body of the organism). While Gyekye largely remains silent on the divisions of the honam, Wiredu points out that the honam is in part composed of the mogya (blood). For Wiredu, the mogya plays a key role in conveying the social nature of the human, even apart from the particular conception of personhood that Wiredu attributes to the Akan. As stated, these understandings diverge quite a bit. Still, engaging both thinkers' understandings will give a richer notion of each conception. For Wiredu and Gyekye, the ōkra is what is thought to be the life-spark of the human being. Both thinkers take the ōkra to be an essential part of the human being that functions (among other things) to explain the difference between living and nonliving beings. Still, for both thinkers the term unfolds in different ways, which is to say that Wiredu and Gyekye differ on the ontology of the ōkra. Gyekye models the ōkra on Western conceptions of the soul, while Wiredu cautions us not to link the ōkra too closely with Western conceptions, insofar as Western conceptions of the soul (on Wiredu's account) tend to be loaded with components such as the mind, character, and immateriality. With regard to the ōkra, Wiredu tells us that: \"There is, most visibly, the assemblage of flesh and bones that form the body. But, reason the Akans, something must make the difference between a dead, inert body, and a living one. This they attribute to an entity called okra, which they consider an actual particle of the supreme being\" (Wiredu 1997, 48). At first blush, this sounds a bit like Aristotle, who argued that the soul, which one might take to be closest to the Akan conception of ōkra, is the first-principle of a natural body that has life potentially (Aristotle On the Soul, Book II, 412a). Yet, one can see the connection between ōkra and some divinity or supernatural being or substance. Whereas Aristotle could explain the principle that separates a living body from a dead or homonymous body by appeal to nature, the Akan, on Wiredu's reading, seem to understand the principle as essentially connected to divinity. Further, Aristotle seems to promote the idea that thought is a function of the human soul, perhaps making the soul more than just a \"principle\" that explains the living-state of a particular being with a particular constitution (Aristotle On the Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 9 Soul, Book III, 427a-435b). For the Akan, ōkra is not the housing-place of the adwene, which Wiredu takes to be a capacity for some body to think thoughts, feel emotions, etc. (Wiredu 1997, 48). Now, for Wiredu, the ōkra is what grounds the basic equality of all human beings. Wiredu tells us that: \"In virtue of that element [the ōkra], absolutely everyone, regardless of race, gender, or achievement is entitled to a certain degree of respect and consideration\" (Wiredu 1992a, 112). And because such a spark is divine, it seems to promote the idea that humans are superior to other living things. Still, one may wonder whether the term is meant to explain the distinction between living and nonliving things, or merely a particular spark that separates human life from all other living things? Both Wiredu and Gyekye seem to equivocate on this point. Both theorists seem to offer an explanation of the term insofar as it answers the question, \"why is X alive?\" Still, both seem to link this principle to humanity's basic equality. Surely they are not arguing that all living things are equal and deserve equal treatment based on their having this divine spark that explains their being alive, only humans. However, if ōkra is what explains life generally, then either all living things must be equal, or merely having an ōkra does not make all humans equal. Leaving this point aside, one is licensed to infer that personal identity is not a result of having an ōkra. One's identity could not be defined by what makes him/her equal to either all other humans or living things. Thus, we must think of ōkra, as it relates to personal identity, as being a necessary but not sufficient condition for having an identity. As such, one's character and characteristics, which seems (at least on Schechtman's view) to be inextricably linked to personal identity, cannot be parts of ōkra. Gyekye diverges from Wiredu's interpretation of the essential nature of the ōkra. He thinks that the Akan conception of the ōkra is closer to a traditional Western conception of the soul than does Wiredu. Gyekye shares Wiredu's interpretation of the ōkra as a divine spark, and like Wiredu Gyekye argues that this divine spark makes all human beings equal to each other. However, on Gyekye's interpretation, the immaterial ōkra encompasses both the character (the sumsum) and the mind (the adwene) of the individual. When speaking about the relationship between the ōkra and the sumsum, Gyekye, perhaps with Leibniz in mind, tells us that \"given x and y, if whatever is asserted of x can be asserted of y, then x can be said to be identical with y. If there is at least one characteristic that x has but y does not, then x and y are not identical\" (Gyekye 1998, 63). Gyekye goes on to tell us that the sumsum is not the ōkra, yet: \"The sumsum may, more accurately, be characterized as a part––the active part––of the ōkra (soul)\" (Gyekye 1998, 63). The character traits and characteristics that make up personal identity are the active parts of the ōkra, with the passive part of the ōkra perhaps being merely the potential to actualize certain traits, which he could then rely on to ground the basic equality of all persons (if he takes the ōkra to be what explains human life specifically). Gyekye links a human's personal identity to the ōkra by the sumsum's being a part of the okra. Gyekye tells us that: \"Personality and character dispositions of a person are the function of the sumsum. The sumsum appears to be the source of dynamism of a person, the active part or force of the Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 10 human psychological system...\" (Gyekye 1998, 63). Gyekye is then able to conclude that one's individuality is both located in the ōkra, and that individuality is not lost after death, insofar as the sumsum is within the ōkra, and the ōkra is immaterial and indestructible.2 As such, Gyekye's view of personal identity needs to go no further. Personal identity is given to the human when a divine being places his/her ōkra within him/her. For Gyekye: \"The ōkra...is the principle of life of a person and the embodiment and transmitter of his or her destiny\" (Gyekye 1995, 97). Thus, whereas Wiredu endorses the communality of personhood, Gyekye rejects the notion of a socially determined and perhaps (though not necessarily) a narrative self, and could argue that the narrative is nothing more than the flowering out of the self as constructed before birth. So, we are able to see the differences between Wiredu's and Gyekye's interpretations of the ōkra in the Akan tradition. Now, while Gyekye is relatively silent as to the divisions of the honam (body), Wiredu introduces a particular aspect of the honam that may be beneficial to understanding the social nature of personal identity (as it relates to questions of characterization). Wiredu tells us that the body is thought to be composed of the mogya, or the human's blood. For the Akan, on Wiredu's interpretation, the mogya, in making up the physical blood of the human, is thought to be the matrilineal identity passed on to the human. Wiredu tells us that: \"Since the Akans are matrilineal people, it is the kinship status that situates a person in the most visceral relationships and brings him into the most existential of the networks of obligations, rights, and privileges that characterize Akan communalism\" (Wiredu 1997, 50). What Wiredu has in mind here is that the agent's mother's ancestral identity passes on to the agent, and society recognizes this identity when engaging the agent. The blood that the agent has will frame part of an agent's identity insofar as society will recognize him/her in a certain way because of his/her maternal lineage. What we can take from this is that a human has constraints placed on his/her identity even before he/she is born. Consider Wiredu again, when speaking not only of the mogya but also the sumsum: Both the maternal and paternal contributions to the person are bases of membership in specific social units. Akans are matrilineal; therefore, the blood principle [Mogya] situates a person in the important kinship units, namely, the lineage or, more extensively, the clan. Through the charisma principle [Sumsum] one belongs to a grouping on the father's side that is largely ceremonial but also a framework for much goodwill. The point now is this: on Akan showing, a person [understood here as merely a human] has a well-structured social identity even before birth (Wiredu 1992b, 85). For the Akan, identity has a social aspect to it that determines the type of identity each human will take, even before personhood is achieved. Your community will determine how you are able to construct your identity, insofar as it will set parameters 2 Perhaps a better way to think of it is that the sumsum is the capacity of the okra to think, desire, feel, imagine, etc. It would not be two different entities, but one entity with a certain power that we give a different name to (potentially to differentiate the types of existing okra). Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 11 within which identities can be constructed before your birth. These parameters situate you; they are necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of there being a \"you.\" These will be parameters that you, no matter how much you rebel, will respond to and struggle with but never get outside of. You will use them to cultivate yourself and determine other human's identities by preserving or reworking them. Here we are able to see features of identity that should not be overlooked, namely that we are born to certain people, and with certain features. Now, we as Westerners may not place very much stock on the idea that we have our identities transposed into us by our parents blood and semen. Still, I think that we can appreciate what the Akan suggest when we think consider that we do get particular proclivities and psychological traits such as predispositions to Alzheimer's, schizophrenia, mental acuities, etc. and biological makeups such as skin color, susceptibility to particular health conditions, etc. from our ancestry. These will in some sense determine the parameters of our identities, and though we may struggle with them, they of necessity participate in what we take to characterize ourselves. The person who has a history of schizophrenia in his/her family will form a particular conception of self, and a particular narrative in light of this history. He/she might set out to better understand schizophrenia by becoming a doctor, or may develop neurotic tendencies due to anxiety that he/she will be affected by schizophrenia. This history sets the parameters of this person's identity, and are woven through his/her narrative. How he/she responds to this history is to be explained by other social constraints and parameters operating around and within him/her. Moreover, we cannot ignore that who we are born to, as well as what physical features we have, matter insofar as we will be recognized in our social communities for having these features. Our communities confer a type of value to our family names, medical conditions, and basic physical features in a manner that determines our identities. For example, W.E.B. Du Bois made the famous appeal to \"double consciousness\" as what principally informs black identity at the turn of the twentiethcentury (Du Bois 2003, 9). This identity-marker is only possible if one is socially recognized for having particular physical traits that have a particular value in community that does not depend on the individual or any \"spontaneous\" acts of the will. Our bodies matter insofar as they are given a particular value in society. Thus, there seems to be a problem with Schechtman's thinking on personal identity. Schechtman argues that an answer to the characterization question requires the support of a psychological theory in which answers the reidentification question. Yet, it appears to be the case that she fails to appreciate how bodies affect psyches, and are affected by social value, such that societies determine how bodies are valued, which determines possible psychological characteristics and the potential ways in which these characteristics are developed––that is to say, which psychological characteristics a person can/will have. So, let us say that characteristics are psychological, and thus that the characterization question is answered only by being undergirded by a psychological continuity theory. However, it appears to be the case that one cannot explain psyches without appeal to bodies. We have certain psychological characteristics because of the types of bodies that we have. Now, it Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 12 would appear that a part of the reason why bodies are able to influence our psyches is because they have a certain sort of value. The value that is placed on an individual's body affects the type of psyche that the individual has. Yet, we cannot explain the value of our bodies, as they relate to our psychological development, without appeal to our communities. Communities determine the value of our bodies, and this determination is responsible for the psychological states that characterize our personal identity. As a result, we cannot explain what characterizes an individual without the determination of the community in conferring a value to the bodies that determine the physical features that we have. Who we are born to-the genes and bodies that we have-matter in determining who we are, and communities make bodies and genes meaningful insofar as they determine the value of these physical traits. This determination affects what identities we take. Thus, community is a necessary component in the determination of personal identity, insofar as it determines both the value of the bodies that we form narratives with, and the parameters of the narrative that make up individual identity. So, it would appear that our social communities, in being the sources of our biological makeups and giving value to our bodies and biological makeups, play a larger role than what must merely be synched with the individual narrative so that the individual can live the life of a person. If we take Wiredu seriously, we understand that the narratives that are our identities begin with our communities even before we are born, and that our communities value features beyond our control that will determine what characterizes us. There is one final idea expressed by the Akan that I would like to discuss, and it is this idea that I believe best illustrates the social nature of personal identity, namely the Akan conception of personhood as an achievement. Now, it would be beneficial to begin by stating that much of the controversy surrounding the human/person distinction, along with the conception of what a human being is, regards language. Among the Akan, the word for both human and person is onipa (Wiredu 1992a, 104). One might suppose, as Gyekye does, that the Akan conceptualized the person and the human as being inseparable, and thus to speak of a human is to speak of a person, and vice versa (perhaps because of the divine spark) (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). Still, like Wiredu, one might think that Gyekye fails to capture certain usages of the term that seem to add something to the ordinary conception. Considering Wiredu, who tells us the following story: In 1979, President Kaunda of Zambia gave high praise to then Prime Minister of Britain, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, for her unexpected constructiveness during the last series of negotiations that led to the termination of white minority rule in Zimbabwe. He said that she was 'truly a person,' and he immediately provided a key to this choice of words.... On this showing, the 'Iron Lady' received very high marks indeed. The semantics of personhood in the language of the Zambians is similar to the semantics of personhood accepted by the Akans of Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Wiredu 1992a, 104). Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 13 President Kaunda's use of \"person\" seems to diverge from the ordinary usage insofar as it seems to add significance to Thatcher's humanity. Why point out that Thatcher is a human being when honoring her for some achievement? President Kaunda seems to use the term in an elevated sense, suggesting that Thatcher has achieved some level of excellence or has achieved something that needed to be publicly recognized. Thus, Wiredu concludes that for the Akan, personhood is something that a human being achieves through a certain type of action in community. On Wiredu's account, personhood is achieved when an individual human being achieves certain notable successes and performs particular rights, social duties, and moral obligations that are relative to their individual starting-points. Wiredu tells us that: \"In Akan thinking, as indeed in the thinking of many other African peoples, a person in the true sense is not just any human being, but one who has attained the status of a responsible member of society\" (Wiredu 1997, 51). Further, Wiredu tells us that \"personhood is not an automatic quality of the human individual; personhood is something to be achieved, and the higher the achievement, the higher the credit\" (Wiredu 1992a, 104). So, in addition to personhood being something that humans strive towards, Wiredu thinks that for the Akan there are degrees of personhood such that an individual can achieve different levels of personhood. \"In the path of improvement, there are, theoretically, endless vistas of higher personhood\" (Wiredu 1997, 51). For Wiredu, personhood is a multileveled achievement, or a sort of honor conferred onto a human being for performing and upholding particular duties and moral obligations. One potential problem with this view is that it may lead to inequalities in treatment of individuals, such that some members of the community may not be respected. And this may create an inequality in the distribution of goods that determines one's ability to flourish economically or in abilities to act morally, and thus in the possibilities of becoming persons. If this were the case, then the conception of personhood as an achievement would be a privileged term, insofar as one would have to begin in a privileged position to have the possibility of achieving personhood. Gyekye expresses a worry like this one. For Gyekye, the Akan are fundamentally committed to human rights, and as such they cannot conceptualize there being levels of personhood, insofar as their commitment to human rights could then be called into question (Wiredu and Gyekye 1992, 152). In response to this type of objection Wiredu argues that the Akan commitment to human rights is still preserved insofar as the Akan conception of personhood as an achievement is open-ended, but only on one side. Wiredu thinks that there are levels of personhood that extend indefinitely. Still, he argues that one can never sink below the level of humanity. All humans are equal, insofar as all humans have an ōkra. In this way, all humans are entitled to respect as humans. Even still, one might be awarded a particular level of recognition in accordance with achievements and moral activity. We may better understand this difference by looking at Stephen Nathanson's division of types of desert. Nathonson tells us that there is personal desert, whereby someone deserves a certain type of treatment or level of respect because of what Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 14 he/she has done. He contrasts personal desert with human desert, whereby someone deserves treatment or a level of respect irrespective of what he/she has done (Nathanson 2001, 139). With regard to Wiredu, one would deserve a basic level of human respect because of the ōkra (or the type of ōkra) that was placed into them, and would deserve this respect irrespective of any achievements. However, once they have achieved a level of personhood, they would deserve a level of respect based on their actions in community. Now, this may or may not solve the problem. One might still think that personhood, as conceived in this way, will affect how one is treated as a human being as well as one's ability to achieve personhood, making it easier for some than for others. Moreover, one might question the political nature of this process, such that heroic actions fail to be recognized, and thus some humans might not be accorded personhood status because of the political commitments of their communities. To offer a defense of the Akan, this critique points to the very political nature of human beings and human actions. The value of our actions will always be interpreted in the light of our communities' politics. Critiquing this notion of personhood and the treatment of humans on these grounds would not carry anymore weight than critiquing how we value particular figures in history because their views express our own political commitments. In any event, the Akan conception of personhood as an achievement can be useful insofar as it allows us to more clearly see the social nature of individual identity through its depiction of the ways in which social recognition has an effect on one's self-image, and can even show us that our ability to re-identify with our past actions is possible only through social community. Wiredu's interpretation of the Akan conception of personhood allows us to see the impact that communities have on identity because it implicates the ways in which communities affect which narratives become important for us to have. What I mean here is that social recognition is what is most important to our self-images, and we will go to great lengths to obtain it. Crafting our identities (constructing our narratives) so as to be accepted socially is the primary way that we cultivate positive self-images. For the Akan, personhood is a type of social recognition that individuals strive for and are granted because of particular actions enacted and lives led in community. What we can take from this is that communities determine the value of individual actions and lives insofar as they grant this status that individuals desire as they pursue positive self-images. Because individuals strive to achieve social recognition, we can infer that individuals place a premium on being socially recognized when individuals carve out identities for themselves. An individual will not carve out an identity that is not intended to produce social recognition. It is wrong to think that we carve out identities so that we will be happy, irrespective of our communities. A community recognizing us in a certain sort of way is what makes us happy, and is the reason we are concerned to construct certain narratives. In fact, social recognition is the reason why we desire others to reconstruct (re-narrate) our lives in particular ways. In this way, we are able to see that social communities determine our identity insofar as we carve them out in order to achieve a recognition that can only be granted in community. This phenomenon does not merely regard the Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 15 Akan; it is merely the case that the Akan conception of personhood helps us to see it more clearly. It is easily noticed that for the Akan, personhood depends on social recognition; we may say that for the Akan, personhood as achievement is a type of social recognition. And because personhood depends on social recognition, one may infer that if personhood is important to an individual, then social recognition will be important to him/her. In fact personhood, as a type of recognition, cannot be unimportant to an individual because of his/her social nature. Even if personhood is not granted by those with the greatest amount of political power in the community, an agent seeks an \"equivalent\" type of recognition from a less powerful community.3 Now, if social recognition has the importance to the individual that I claim that it does, then the narrative that he/she attempts to carve out for him/herself will be for the purpose of receiving this social recognition, insofar as he/she attempts to incorporate socially accepted norms and values into the life that he/she lives. The reason for this, again, is that his/her positive self-image, in being inseparably linked to what others think or know about him/her, is linked to social recognition. Consider Wiredu when he writes about the link between social recognition, self-images, and identity: \"Indeed, one of the most agonizing moments in the life of an Akan is being constrained to ask, 'Am I ever going to become a person?' This is a supreme moment of self-questioning that can, in some cases, have a transforming effect\" (Wiredu 1992a, 108). Here we are able to see the intimate connection between one's selfimage and the achievement of personhood as a type of social recognition. And as such, we are able to see the intimate connection between identity and social recognition. Failing to receive social recognition in the form of the achievement of personhood can cause an existential crisis, and this allows us to see the impact that social recognition, as accorded to us by our communities, has on identity. Not only is the individual depicted here as having what we may term an \"identity-crisis,\" which, for Schechtman, regards the fundamental issue of characterization, but we are able to see the desire for social recognition determining what identity the individual thinks he/she ought to have in a way that affects his/her self-image, and thus has a capacity to alter features that characterize the individual. So, we are able to see the connection between narratives and social recognition. Now, if an individual's narrative is inseparably linked to social recognition, such that his/her narrative will be constructed in accordance with a desire to be recognized in a certain sort of way by his/her community, then it seems that we are licensed to infer that the individual's community determines his/her narrative. More than simply synching up with his/her narrative, and perhaps even more than simply determining the parameters of the narrative (as has been demonstrated above with the use of the components of the Akan conception of the human being), his/her community defines 3 This explains people's attempts to construct narrative identities against particular mainstream political values, leading them to become members of cliques, gangs, and terrorist groups. Thus, ultimately I am not arguing that there is a static type of social recognition conferred by a political community. As will become clear, there are different sub-communities within a larger political community that confer social recognition. Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 16 the type of narrative that he/she desires to have, and ultimately will construct because of his/her desire for recognition. In fact, it would appear that his/her community is itself responsible for him/her having a desire to for characteristics that form an identity. One may question how it is possible to ask such an existentially probing question if communities determining identity. In other words, how can this existential crisis be the result of not achieving social recognition when the desire to achieve social recognition is determining the type of narrative that I construct, and thus the type of identity-characteristics that I have? How can the individual having the existential crisis be affected by an identity that he/she ought to have, but does not have, if social recognition determines the identity that he/she does have? My answer is that, when looking at Wiredu's statement, it would appear that he is simply taking the dominant political community to be that in which confers this social recognition onto an individual. We may understand the existential (identity) crisis as a realization by the individual having the crisis that he/she has failed to accept the values of the dominant political community when constructing his/her narrative, and not that his/her identity was not constructed so as to achieve social recognition from any community whatsoever. The existential crisis is the result of realizing that the \"wrong\" community has determined who the individual is (what characterizes the individual). Thus, my argument here is not that the dominant political community, or even one community completely determines individual identity. One may think of the relationship between the individual and his/her social community as it relates to identity as a push/pull relationship, and the relationship between communities as it relates to the identity of individuals in the same light. There is social influence on identity from the very beginning, insofar as one's community determines the parameters of individual identity prior to his/her birth. As the individual grows, he/she might accept those parameters and attempt to work towards the social recognition of that community-he/she might construct a narrative in line with the values that his/her community has setup for him/her. The individual might also reject either parts or the whole of the community's values, seeking recognition from another community. However, at no time is a community not in some sense pressing on the individual in his/her narrative-construction. And at no time is the individual's identity not being defined by a community's recognition that he/she desires for a positive selfimage. Communities are crafting the individual as the individual is crafting him/herself to the liking of a community. Let's look at an example of this. Say we have person A (call him Joseph) and Person B (call him Jack). Both Joseph and Jack were born in a highly conservative (define it however you wish) community (Community1) and thus have had the parameters of their individual identities defined for them prior to birth. Joseph accepts his social community and thus attempts to be recognized by his community. In the Akan sense, Joseph seeks personhood within this community. Jack, on the other hand, rejects the conservative community (Community1) and begins to construct his identity around a liberal community (Community2). Looking at Jack's narrative, it would not be right to think that because Jack rejects Community1, a community is not Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 17 determining his identity. It would be right to think that Community1 and Community2 are determining Jack's narrative even after Jack rejects Community1. Jack is responding to (rejecting) his conservative community, which means that Jack is not simply a leaf blown in the wind insofar as the social nature of his individual identity is concerned. There is a push/pull relationship, and thus we might think that there is some \"freedom\" in his attempt to construct his identity. Still, it would be wrong to think that the conservative community does not determine Jack's identity even after he rejects it. In his rejection, he consciously attempts to act so as not to embrace the values of Community1, which evidences its determination on him.4 Further, as is evident, it would be wrong to think that no social community is determining Jack's identity after he rejects his conservative social community. He seeks recognition from a liberal community. And thus, his identity is at each moment being determined by these communities in his attempts to both distance himself from, and be recognized by, a community. Now, it is not merely the case that social communities define individuals without individuals being able to redefine the content of the parameters that will shape others within these communities. Recall that individuals' identity is socially determined from the very beginning of individuals' lives, which is to say that communities determine the parameters of individuals' identities prior to their births. Recall also that some individuals will accept their communities' values. Others from these communities will reject certain of their communal values, so long as there are no absolute constraints on the individual. What I am suggesting here is that the rejection of a community's values is contingent on there being access to different values and/or models of social life. If there is access to different values or models of social life, and individuals reject their communities' values, then these persons are able to rethink the values that do and will define other individuals. The rejection of the communal values is a response to individuals' exposure to different values and either individuals being rejected from certain of the communities' social practices/benefits or individuals' recognition that the values of the community are deficient in some way. Let us see an example of this. Recall our example of the conservatism of Jack and Joseph. Recall that Jack rejected his conservative community (Community1) in favor of a liberal community (Community2). Recall also that both communities are in some sense determining Jack even after his rejection of Community1. According to the argument that I have just set forth, Jack will have needed to be exposed to a separate set of values (those embraced by Community2) and either will have been rejected from certain of the communities social practices/benefits or will have recognized a deficiency of particular values held by those within Community1. Perhaps Jack was led to reject Community1 because he is of a particular race that was excluded from access to certain social goods because of his race, or perhaps he had a particular sexual orientation around which oppressive values were constructed. Jack may have 4 One can perhaps think of the transgendered person who no longer identifies as male. In the very statement, \"I no longer (do not) identify as male,\" masculinity is still informing her identity because it is certain that her actions are consciously made so as not to be masculine. Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 18 recognized certain sexist values within the community even if he was not a member of the sex who was harmed by those values. After having been exposed to Community2's values and having rejected Community1's values, Jack might attempt to influence the parameters set by Community1 by attempting to infuse more of Community2's values into Community1. He may feel obligated to do so from a perceived duty to his family or posterity, or perhaps he is driven by patriotism or thoughts that many of the values of the community ought to be preserved. In this way, he might attempt to preserve conservative values that are taken to be adequate and reform other conservative values that are taken to be oppressive. 3. CONCLUSION What I present here is neither a complete endorsement of the Akan conception of personhood as an achievement that is given to us by Wiredu nor the general notion of humanity that is presented by either Wiredu or Gyekye. There are many reasons to worry about these conceptions. Personally, I take them to be very rich conceptions that I do not share. However, this is not to suggest that there is nothing in Western cultures that do not liken to the Akan conceptions, particularly personhood as an achievement. Terms such as \"real woman\" (to distinguish a female achieving moral and social maturity as opposed to an immature adult female) are used in many African American communities and sang about by artists like Mary J. Blige. Conceptions like \"real woman\" seem to be comparable to the Akan conception of personhood. Moreover, I do think that by viewing them, we can begin to understand the deeply social nature of individual identity. To answer the question, \"who am I\" is to have a narrative, and to have a narrative not only involves a social community in my engagements, but involves a social community determining the value of those engagements, recognizing me in a certain way for those engagements, and providing the descriptive and normative grounds for my future projects while giving me every possible project to which I aspire. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank both Shaun Gallagher and Deborah Tollefsen for their helpful comments on this paper. Thanks also to the following individuals for their feedback and helpful suggestions: Benjamin Aguda; Josh Dohmen; Daniel Larkin; Sarah K. Marshall; John Torrey; Sarah Vincent; Stefano Vincini. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of Comparative Philosophy for their thought-provoking comments on various drafts of this paper. Comparative Philosophy 7.1 (2016) BARNES 19 REFERENCES Aristotle (1957), On the Soul, in W.S. Hett (trans.) Aristotle: On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt (2003), The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics). Gyekye, Kwame (1995), An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). - (1998), \"The Relation of Ōkra (Soul) and Honam (Body): An Akan Conception\", in Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze (ed.) African Philosophy: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc.), 59-66. Nathanson, Stephen (2001), An Eye for an Eye: The Immorality of Punishing by Death (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.). Schechtman, Marya (1996), The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Wiredu, Kwasi (1992a), \"The African Concept of Personhood\", in Harley E. Flack and Edmund D. Pellegrino (eds.) African-American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), 104-117. - (1992b) \"The Moral Foundation of African Culture\", in Harley E. Flack and Edmund D. Pellegrino (eds.) African-American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), 80-93. - (1997), \"African Philosophical Tradition: A Case Study of the Akan\", in John P. Pitman (ed.) African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions (New York: Routledge), 35-62. Wiredu, Kwasi and Kwame Gyekye (1992), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy).", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
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{"text": "Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Bachelor Thesis\u0001 Presented to the Faculty of Business\u0001 In Fulfilment\u0001 Of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Science in Business Administration (International Management) By Ellen Spinnler August 2016 Supervisor Prof. Michael Jeive FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 2 of 72 Abstract Vietnam is fierce to overcome challenges to reach the stage of an industrialized economy of lowmedium income by 2020. Thus, anyone seeking for a promising location in South-East Asia should have a closer look at this country. The Prime Minister affirmed the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment as a key policy for the upcoming five years. Overall, the country's history shows that FDI inflow does contribute to its economic development. The country's export industry strongly depends on imports, and traditionally, Vietnam shows a trade deficit. But recently, the country managed to generate a plus the third year in a row. Where exactly is Vietnam placed within the stages of development and how much does Switzerland contribute to its FDI inward flows? Moreover, competition among developing countries for inward FDI is increasing. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how a country can increase its competitiveness by assessing factors driving a country's development and, hence, its attractiveness. The author found an approach to assess a country within the limited scope of the thesis. A main source builds on the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, which annually analyses a country's strengths and weaknesses. This underlying thesis will assess those ratings of the last years by comparing the findings with experiences made by foreign managers in Vietnam. Their statements will contribute to show various challenges, as well as hurdles, foreign companies face by doing business in Vietnam. This approach will provide a comprehensive framework of the current situation in Vietnam focusing on investment flows and government measures, which dictate the business climate of the country. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 3 of 72 Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. 2 1. Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 8 1.2 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 8 1.3 Focus .................................................................................................................................... 9 1.4 Type of Analysis .................................................................................................................... 9 2. Investment and Developing Competitiveness ........................................................................... 10 2.1 Global Investment Trend ..................................................................................................... 10 2.2 Swiss Foreign Direct Investment ......................................................................................... 13 2.2.1 Swiss FDI in Emerging Markets ................................................................................... 14 2.2.2 Swiss FDI in Vietnam ................................................................................................... 16 2.2.3 Swiss Merchandise Export to Vietnam ........................................................................ 21 3. Economic Development of Nations ........................................................................................... 23 3.1 Porter's Stages of Development ......................................................................................... 23 3.1.1 Factor-Driven Stage ..................................................................................................... 23 3.1.2 Efficiency-Driven Stage\u0001 .............................................................................................. 24 3.1.3 Innovation-Driven Stage .............................................................................................. 25 3.2 Boosting a Country's Competitive Advantage ..................................................................... 26 3.3 Creation of Sustainable Competitive Performance ............................................................. 26 3.4 Requirements for Competitive Advantage .......................................................................... 27 3.4.1 Motivation .................................................................................................................... 27 3.4.2 Domestic Rivalry .......................................................................................................... 28 3.4.3 Capacity to Create New Business ............................................................................... 28 3.5 WEF Global Competitiveness Report ................................................................................. 28 3.5.1 Drivers of Competitiveness .......................................................................................... 29 3.5.2 Concept of the WEF Report ......................................................................................... 31 FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 4 of 72 4. Case Interviews Methodology ................................................................................................... 33 4.1 Approach of the Questionnaire ........................................................................................... 33 4.2 Characteristics of the Three Weakest Pillars ...................................................................... 34 4.2.1 Pillar 1: Institutions ....................................................................................................... 34 4.2.2 Pillar 5: Higher Education and Training ....................................................................... 34 4.2.3 Pillar 9: Technological Readiness ................................................................................ 34 4.3 Development of the Three Weakest Pillars ......................................................................... 35 4.4 Structure of the Questionnaire ............................................................................................ 39 4.5 Data Collection .................................................................................................................... 39 4.6 Sampling ............................................................................................................................. 40 5. Evaluation of Case and Expert Interviews ................................................................................. 42 5.1 Experiences of Companies Operating in Vietnam .............................................................. 42 5.1.1 Decisive Factors for Setting up a Business in Vietnam ............................................... 42 5.1.2 Expectations of the Swiss Companies ......................................................................... 43 5.1.3 Work Ethic of the Vietnamese Workforce .................................................................... 44 5.1.4 Challenges and Opportunities in Daily Business Live ................................................. 45 5.1.5 Key Success Factors ................................................................................................... 47 5.1.6 Recommendations to the Vietnamese Government .................................................... 49 5.2 Companies that Withdrew from Vietnam ............................................................................. 51 5.2.1 Reasons to Withdraw from Vietnam ............................................................................ 51 5.3 How Vietnam Reaches the Next Stage of Development ..................................................... 53 5.4 Vietnam's Key Industries in the Future ............................................................................... 54 5.5 Vietnam's Socio-Economic Development Strategy ............................................................. 55 6. Evaluation and Discussion ........................................................................................................ 56 6.1 Importance of FDI to Vietnam ............................................................................................. 56 6.2 Vietnam's Current Stage of Development ........................................................................... 57 6.3 Competitive Position of Vietnam ......................................................................................... 59 7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 60 7. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 61 FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 5 of 72 Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 64 I. Stakeholders ....................................................................................................................... 64 II. List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... 65 II. List of Tables ....................................................................................................................... 65 III. List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ 66 IV. Case Interviews ................................................................................................................... 67 FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 6 of 72 Statement of Authenticity I the undersigned declare that all material presented in this paper is my own work or fully and specifically acknowledged wherever adapted from other sources. I understand that if at any time it is shown that I have significantly misrepresented material presented here, any degree or credits awarded to me on the basis of that material may be revoked. I declare that all statements and information contained herein are true, correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. Date: August 4, 2016 Author: Ellen Spinnler FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 7 of 72 1. Purpose of the Study FDI has been a vital part of the Vietnamese development and restructuring since its opening in the 1980s. When Vietnam launched the doi moi or renovation in 1986, a government initiative aimed to improve the country's economic condition (Vuong, 2014). It then took more than ten years for the government to create a favourable atmosphere for foreign investors. The amended Law on Foreign Investment and the implementation of the new Enterprise Law in 2000 greatly increased FDI inflow. For the past ten years, Vietnam has joined the World Trade Organization in 2007 and has served as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ibid.). Due to its low production costs, its highly motivated labour forces and its political stability, Vietnam has recently evolved to an attractive alternative to China. Moreover, the ASEAN member state is insofar dependent on foreign direct investments, as that a big portion of it is responsible for the country's export volume (SNB, 2014). According to the statistics office of Vietnam, foreign invested capital contributes to 20% of the GDP and 60 to 70% of total exports (Weber, 2016). The first part of the thesis will illustrate global FDI trends followed by Switzerland's role as investor world-wide, in emerging markets, and in Vietnam. Statistics will show Swiss industries that have been recently exporting to Vietnam. Going a step further, a country's attractiveness can only be assessed when knowing its current stage of development, its related aspects and characteristics. According to Michael Porter (1990), a country's stage of development needs to be known, in order to place the right measures to enhance the countries productivity and thus, its overall prosperity. Vietnam's stage of development plays a vital role when evaluating the country's future prospects. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index (GCR, 2015), Vietnam is currently categorized as country in transition between factor-driven and efficiency-driven. The theoretical part will be broadened by experiences of Swiss company representatives, operating in different kinds of industries in Vietnam. Their insights will contribute to draw a comprehensive picture of the business climate of the country. The thesis will not only assess their motivation to invest in Vietnam, but also examine daily challenges and obstacles in business life. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 8 of 72 1.1 Research Questions Based on the aims of the thesis, the following research questions will be examined: • How much does Switzerland directly invest abroad and what industries are exporting to Vietnam? • What characteristics of Vietnam's current development stage can be observed? • What are the decisive factors for Swiss companies to invest in Vietnam and what opportunities and hurdles do they face? 1.2 Methodology Assessing a country's attractiveness is extensive and can not be covered within a thesis of this scope. Many studies have analysed a country's characteristics, but the factors considered are numerous and no single holistic approach could be identified. This thesis strictly focuses on the assessment of the current stage of development and the country's ability to enhance competitiveness. This thesis focuses on secondary sources and interviews to support its statements. Among the sources mentioned in the bibliography, the database of the UNCTAD, the Swiss National Bank and the Federal Customs Administration provide a key basis of statistics on FDI related topics. There are some literature and models about a country's stage of development used in the thesis to provide a sound framework for the questionnaire and the majority of the theoretical part. Another major source consists of the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forums assessing a country's competitiveness every year. The empirical part is based on interviews conducted with Swiss managers in Vietnam. This approach provides an overview of today's investment climate in Vietnam. The conclusion will be built upon the evaluation of how the policies correspond with the statements of the managers in Vietnam. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 9 of 72 1.3 Focus The thesis is built upon three main pillars. A first step constructs a theoretical framework of a review of Swiss FDI in general, hence, total outflows of investments between 2008 until 2014. This time period has been chosen to offer an accurate data set. As Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, figures and approaches of how statistics were made had changed. Hence, only data after the accession until 2014 have been taken into account. Furthermore, FDI flows to emerging markets, hence, to countries chosen by the authors, and as a last step, FDI flows to Vietnam will give an overall picture of Swiss FDI abroad. Then, the identification of recent theory on stages of development and the significance of being competitive will show the importance for a country to maintain and further attract FDI in the future. The Wealth Driven Stage (Porter, 1990), hence, the last stage of a country's development, will not be discussed in the thesis. The focus lies in the country's current stages of development. Thus, the aim of the second part of the theoretical framework is to connect competitiveness and attractiveness, providing a fundament for a country to enhance its attractiveness. For the last part, a sample of interviews will illustrate how Swiss company representatives assess the country's current phase. Their long-term experience will give practical insights into daily challenges and hurdles, and moreover, answer the questions, why companies are investing in Vietnam. A short section will discuss reasons, why companies closed down their factories and operations, and finally left Vietnam. 1.4 Type of Analysis Research methodology can either be categorized as qualitative or quantitative. As the aim of this thesis is to reveal insights into daily corporate operations, qualitative research has been chosen as a research methodology. More specifically, the empirical investigation will be based on interviews, as they allow pursuing the desired analysis of several company settings in depth. Throughout the thesis, the mentioned research questions are aimed at guiding through the research process, preserving the author from losing focus and ultimately allowing the development of the final output of this thesis – assessing the attractiveness of Vietnam to Swiss companies. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 10 of 72 2. Investment and Developing Competitiveness The first section begins with an overview of global foreign direct investment trends, followed by figures showing Swiss FDI flows to some emerging markets in Asia. As a last step, Swiss investment and capital stock in Vietnam are examined. Additionally, export of merchandise goods from Switzerland to Vietnam, will provide a comprehensive view about trade between both countries. 2.1 Global Investment Trend Based on the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2013), global foreign direct investment decreased in 2012 by 18 percent to USD 1.35 trillion. Because of the instability of the global economies and the wide-spread dominance of policy uncertainty, the recovery of this rather negative trend will remain stagnant (ibid.). Hence, with an upper range of USD 1.45 trillion, global FDI in 2013 was forecasted to remain close to the level in 2012 (ibid.). For 2014 the report estimates flows of around USD 1.6 trillion and USD 1.8 trillion in 2015 (ibid.). For the very first time, developing countries took a lead and absorbed more FDI than developed economies, accounting for 52 percent of global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2013). The reasons can be found in the falling FDI flows in developed countries, which now account for 42 percent of flows worldwide (ibid.). At the same time, developing countries were able to reach almost one third of global FDI out flows and this trend seems to be continuing. Overall, FDI flows to developing countries observed a small decline in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). FDI flows to developing economies in Asia fell 7 percent to USD 407 billion, but remained at a relative high level (ibid.). Singapore, India and Indonesia were among the largest recipient of FDI worldwide. Besides other lower-income countries, such as Cambodia and Myanmar, Vietnam emerged as attractive FDI location for labour-intensive manufacturing (UNCTAD, 2013). Moreover, governments have identified the importance of FDI inflow for their productive capacity-building and for the sustainable development of their country (ibid.). Hence, their national decisions about investment policies are increasingly driven towards new development strategies. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 11 of 72 Figure 1: Global FDI Flows, 2004-2012 Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 Figure 2: Top 20 Global Investor Economies in 2012 Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 12 of 72 Switzerland was able to position itself as one the largest FDI investors (rank 9), behind other European countries such as the UK (rank 5) and Germany (rank 6). Hence, Switzerland globally invested USD 44 billion in 2012 worldwide. The figure below shows an overview of global FDI investment by sector. It can be observed that the distinctive performances of the three sectors changed the composition of the value of the FDI projects. The global crisis affected the manufacturing sector most and thus, lost investments towards the services sector (UNCTAD, 2013). It can be assumed that the long-term trend, means larger FDI investment in the service sector, was responsible for the decline in the manufacturing sector. Regarding the primary sector, the increased downgrading trend seems to hold on. The sector declined to 4 percent, counting to half of its 2011 share and less than one fourth of its 2003 share (ibid.). Figure 3: Development of Investment Projects by Sector, 2003-2012 Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 13 of 72 2.2 Swiss Foreign Direct Investment The following figures and statements concentrate on a time frame between 2008 until 2014 and are mostly based on statistics of the Swiss National Bank and the Federal Customs Administration. According to the IMF (2015) Switzerland is one of the largest direct investors abroad, measured in capital stock and compared to other countries around the globe. The presence of many large multinationals and headquarters in Switzerland and the country's attractiveness towards foreigncontrolled holding companies support this statement (ibid.). However, countries like the US, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, still exceed Switzerland's amount of FDI (SNB, 2016). With an amount of CHF 10 billion in 2014, Asia was among all destinations, the most important for Swiss direct investment (SNB, 2016). Compared to the EU, where Swiss firms invested CHF 6 billion in the same period, but at the same withdrew CHF 9 billion from their subsidiaries in the rest of Europe (ibid.). Other withdrawals took place in North America, Central and South America, accounting for CHF 4 billion in total. Most Swiss FDI to single destinations were reported in China and Hong Kong, accounting a total of CHF 4 billion, followed by Indonesia with CHF 2 billion, and the United Arab Emirates with CHF 1 billion (ibid.). However, besides the EU and Asia, returns of flow of capital back into Switzerland, hence, disinvestment, predominated (SNB, 2014). Table 1: Swiss Capital Stock in 2014, Mio. CHF Recipient Capital Stock 2014 in Mio. CHF Change % All countries 1'056'264.61 -0.76 Asia total 107'028.68 -1.59 Vietnam total 525.12 -12.93 Source: Author, based on SNB figures FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 14 of 72 2.2.1 Swiss FDI in Emerging Markets The author received a customized evaluation from the Swiss National Bank about Swiss FDI in emerging markets between 2007 until 2015. The evaluation shows capital stock and the development of FDI by industry and services. The SNB is not allowed to provide out a more detailed split of sectors. The author decided to analyse figures of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (without Vietnam). Therefore, \"emerging markets\" will be represented in this thesis by those three countries: Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The following figure illustrates total Swiss FDI capital stock in emerging markets, including Vietnam, by the end of 2013. Figures for 2014 were not available or inconsistent as 2014 was a \"year in between\" (SNB, 2016). Swiss investments in Indonesia were among the highest, accounting for CHF 5.5 billion, followed by Malaysia (CHF 4.5 Bio.), Thailand (CHF 2.7 Bio.), the Philippines (CHF 1.2 Bio.) and Vietnam (CHF 0.5 Bio.). Figure 4: Capital Stock in Emerging Markets and Vietnam, 2013, in Mio. CHF Source: Author, based on SNB figures The total capital stock by the end of 2013 accounted for CHF 16'308 Mio., hence lower than the year before (2012: CHF 17' 316 Mio.) and higher than 2014 (CHF 13'919 Mio.). As shown in figure 5, capital stock of financialand holding associations and constructions are among the highest (SNB, 2016). 0 500 1'000 1'500 2'000 2'500 3'000 3'500 4'000 4'500 5'000 5'500 6'000 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Capital Stock in Emerging Markets 2013 in Mio. CHF FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 15 of 72 Figure 5: Capital Stock in Emerging Markets by Sector, 2013, in Mio. CHF Source: Author, based on SNB figures. Table 2: Development of Capital Stock in Emerging Markets by sector, 2007–2014, in Mio. CHF 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Industry 3'615 3'872 4'455 4'963 5'206 7'933 7'331 4'188 Textiles and clothing 105 70 111 110 114 95 85 mv Chemistry and plastics 898 821 863 983 1'092 1'222 1'157 mv Metals and machines 491 444 438 489 496 1'705 1'729 mv Electronics, energy, watches 236 330 314 387 319 348 376 mv Other industries and construction 1'885 2'206 2'729 2'994 3'185 4'563 3'984 mv Services 8'239 7'085 8'065 8'864 8'820 9'383 8'977 9'731 Financeand holding companies 6'927 6'150 7'276 7'891 7'624 7'952 7'251 7'757 Banks and insurances 435 442 428 413 753 861 877 mv Trade 800 411 282 471 379 502 775 mv Transport and communication 31 37 36 42 17 8 5 mv Other services 46 46 43 47 47 61 69 mv Total of all companies 11'854 10'957 12'520 13'827 14'026 17'316 16'308 13'919 Source: Author, based on SNB data 0 500 1'000 1'500 2'000 2'500 3'000 3'500 4'000 4'500 5'000 5'500 6'000 6'500 7'000 7'500 Textiles and clothing Chemistry and plastics Metals and machines Electronics, energy, watches Other industries and construction Financeand holding companies Banks and insurances Trade Transport and communication Other Services Capital Stock in Emerging Markets 2013 in Mio. CHF FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 16 of 72 Over the past ten years, Swiss investors focused on spending their capital into financeand holding companies and other industries and construction. Overall, the service sectors received relatively more capital than the industry. Moreover, all sectors were able to boost their FDI inflow. However, FDI flow to the textile and clothing sector, trade, transport and communication, generally decreased. 2.2.2 Swiss FDI in Vietnam Vietnam has created a competitive and dynamic environment since its reforms in 1986 (FDFA, 2015. The multi-sector economy has been enforced to develop and further mobilize all social resources for economic growth. External economic relations have been expanded and the flow of FDI increased (ibid.). This year, Vietnam and Switzerland are celebrating 45 years of diplomatic relationship. First agreements on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments and Double Taxation have been signed in 1992 (FDFA, 2015). Followed by an agreement on Protection of Intellectual Property and Cooperation in this Area in 1999 (ibid.). Clearly shown by the following figure (SNB, 2016), Swiss FDI in Vietnam has never been constant. After a sharp drop of capital transactions in 2008, FDI in Vietnam recovered and increased until 2013, then declined again. The author guesses that the sudden decrease of foreign investments was related with the world economic crisis. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 17 of 72 Figure 6: Capital Transactions in Vietnam, Mio. CHF Source: Author, based on SNB figures Figure 7: Capital Stock in Vietnam, Mio. CHF Source: Author, based on SNB figures -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Swiss FDI in Vietnam Capital\tTransactions\tin\tMio.\tCHF Industry Services Total\tNumber\tof\tCompanies 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Swiss FDI in Vietnam Capital\tStock\tin\tMio.\tCHF Industrie Dienste Total\talle\tUnternehmen FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 18 of 72 Swiss FDI in Vietnam can be divided into three main sources: Industrial manufacturing, Construction and material manufacturing and Services (S-GE, 2015). According to Switzerland Global Enterprise, total inflow of FDI between 1990 and 2014 was made by Construction and Material manufacturing 45%, followed by Manufacturing 38% and Services 17%. In other words, FDI from Switzerland to Vietnam, between 1988 until 2014, counted of around CHF 2 Billion (ibid.). In 2014, major exports from Switzerland to Vietnam constitutes of pharmaceuticals with 38%, followed by machines 34.5%, optical and medicinal goods 6.3% and watch accessories 4.8%. In total, Switzerland exported in 2014 goods and services worth CHF 421.34 Mio. (SECO, 2015). Moreover, the following sectors would have the greatest potential to enter the Vietnamese market: Service activities, Chemical / Life Science, Medical Technology, Energy Technology, Trade and Manufacturing. Regarding the different industries in Vietnam in 2014, Service Activities 21%, followed by Manufacturing 16%, Real estate 12% and Wholesale and retail 11% contributed to the biggest shares of the whole GDP (ibid.). According to Mr. Nguyen (2016a) Switzerland had 101 investment projects in Vietnam by December 15, 2014. The total registered capital reached 1.94 billion dollars and ranked 18 of 101 among all countries and territories (ibid.). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 19 of 72 The following table illustrates an overview of Swiss FDI in Vietnam by 2015. The figures were broken down by sector and cumulated from 1990 until the end of 2015. According to the MPI figures below, Swiss companies in Vietnam transacted until 2015 around 101 investment projects, generating a total amount of around USD 1.7 Billion. In 2015, Swiss companies realised 9 investment projects of a total amount of USD 75.5 Mio. (2014: USD 112.5 Mio). Table 3: Accumulated Swiss FDI in Vietnam, 1990-2015 Sector Total number of projects Number of projects in 2015 Invested capital 2015 (USD million) Total investment (USD million) 1. Industrial manufacturing 63 715 Mechanics 12 1 0.738 198 Food Processing 10 2 73.5 461 Pharmaceuticals / Chemicals 8 47 Electronics-Information (software) 28 2 0.105 6 Printing & Packaging 5 2 2. Construction material manufacturing 11 766 3. Services 35 290 Hotel / Tourism 7 225 Shipping / Forwarding / Trading 8 1 0.238 8 Consulting 20 3 0.925 56 Total 109 9 75.506 1'771 Source: Embassy of Switzerland in Hanoi based on MPI figures FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 20 of 72 According to statistics of the Ministry of Planning and Investments (Nguyen, 2016), Switzerland ranks at place 18 (0.7% share). Therefore, Switzerland is still the fourth biggest investor from Europa and before Luxembourg, Germany and Denmark, but after the Nederland's, France and the UK (ibid.). The biggest Swiss investments were in the fields of construction/mechanic/machines industry, food processing, hotel and touristic sector, in the consulting area and the pharmaceutical/agribusiness sector (FDFA, 2015). The Vietnamese government registered a total volume of investments of USD 2 Billion, whereas USD 1.4 Billion were effectively been expensed. The Swiss National Bank counts a total of CHF 525 Mio. of investments until 2014 and more than 16'000 workplaces, generated by Swiss companies in Vietnam (SNB, 2016). Furthermore, the Swiss National Bank mentions that much Swiss investment flows via foreign/Asian branch offices into Vietnam and therefore, have never been recorded as Swiss FDI. Figure 8: Structure of Accumulated Swiss FDI in Vietnam Source: Embassy of Switzerland in Hanoi based on MPI figures 40% 43% 17% Structure of Swiss FDI in Vietnam 1990-2015 1. Industrial manufacturing 2. Construction material manufacturing 3. Services FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 21 of 72 2.2.3 Swiss Merchandise Export to Vietnam The following figure shows the ratio between total trade (merchandise export) to Vietnam on total trade world-wide between 2008 until 2015. Since the Federal Customs Administration had changed the way they calculated the exports and imports, comparisons of figures between 2012 and the wished years 2014 and 2015 has not been possible (FCA, 2016). Thus, the author decided to compare figures of 2014 and 2015. More precisely, the total \"business cycle\" is shown, hence, without gold bars and other precious metals, coins, precious stones and gems, works of art and antiques (FCA, 2016). Back in 2014 the trade volume between Switzerland and Vietnam measured around CHF 1.37 Billion (without gold), offering Vietnam a surplus of CHF 532 Mio. (2013: CHF 357 Mio.) (ibid.). Total export of Switzerland to Vietnam increased in 2014 by 24.8% to CHF 421.3 Mio. (ibid.). However, latest figures below indicate a slight decrease of total traded goods in 2015 by -2.11%. Among all exported goods, pharmaceutical products and machines are the two strongest export categories. Measured as a single figure, export of machines increased in 2015 again, however, measured on total trade which decreased in 2014, export of machines also dropped in 2015. Export of chemical and pharmaceutical goods increased overall and to Vietnam as well. The same development can be seen by precision instruments, clocks, watches and jewellery. Products for the agricultural sector to Vietnam more than doubled. On the other side, where machines, appliances and electronics decreased in total, export of these goods to Vietnam increased over the analysed time period. Overall, the portion of merchandise trade to Vietnam compared with Switzerland's total merchandise trade increased steadily over the last years from 0.12% to 0.18% (cf. Table 4). However, the amount of merchandises to Vietnam remains relatively little. When looking at the statistics in detail, it needs to be mentioned that Swiss products are also imported from other countries than Switzerland. According to estimations of the Swiss Business Hubs in ASEAN, Swiss companies residing in Singapore transfer approximately CHF 65 Mio. of goods from Switzerland to Vietnam (FCA, 2016). Moreover, if other business hubs in the near region would be added into the calculation, the total export of Switzerland to Vietnam would count more than CHF 500 Mio. (ibid.). Among all trade partners of Switzerland in the ASEAN region, Vietnam holds the fourth position after Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia (ibid.). Table 4: Ratio between Merchandise Export to Vietnam on Total Trade between 2008-2015 2014 2015 Kind of Goods in % of total in CHF Mio. in % of total in CHF Mio. % change 2014/2015 01 Forestry and agricultural products, fisheries 3.46% 15 4.23% 21 9.68% 02 Energy source 0% 0 0% 0 0% 03 Textiles, clothing, shoes 1.38% 6 1.21% 6 04 Paper, articles of paper and and products of the printing industry 0% 0 0.20% 1 1.61% 05 Leather, rubber, plastics 1.52% 5 1.21% 6 1.61% 06 Products of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry 41.94% 182 45.97% 228 74% 07 Stones and earth 0.23 1 0.20% 1 08 Metals 2.07% 9 2.82% 14 8.06% 09 Machines, appliances, electronics 33.41% 145 30.64% 152 11.29% 10 Vehicles 1.84 8 2.82% 14 9.68% 11 Precision instruments, clocks and watches and jewellery 10.83% 47 10.86% 53 9.68% 12 Various goods (music instruments, home furnishings, toys, etc.) 0.69% 3 0.40% 2 -1.63% Total Trade to Vietnam 434 496 14.29% Switzerland's Total Trade in Mio. CHF 285'179 279'155 -2.11% Source: Swiss Federal Customs Administration (Accessed July 7 2016) 3. Economic Development of Nations Countries successfully reach a higher stage of economic development by going through a process of continuous upgrading, in which the nation's economic environment advances to support and encourage gradually high-level and productive ways of competing by companies situated there (HBS, 2015). Further, countries get familiar with systematic changes of different aspects of competitiveness for prosperity as they are facing different challenges at distinctive levels of development (ibid.). For policy-makers in a given country, it is vital to understand these broad patterns in order to manage the related challenges. 3.1 Porter's Stages of Development Countries at distinctive levels of development face changing dimensions of microeconomic and macroeconomic competitiveness for sustainable prosperity. As nations develop, modes of competing and nature of competitive advantages move through several characteristic stages, though rates of progress and the specific development path will vary by country. This process can be described as a sequence of stages, each with a different set of economic characteristics and challenges. Michael Porter (2008) describes these stages as follows: 3.1.1 Factor-Driven Stage The first stage of development is characterised by basic factors of production, such as abundant and semi-skilled labour and unprocessed natural resources, which form the basis of competitive advantage and sources of exports (Porter, 1990). Hence, the factor-driven stage strongly bounds the sources of competitive advantages by limiting the selection of industries in which the companies can successfully compete in international terms (ibid.). Rather low wages support this stage and companies in such an economy compete on prices in industries that require either little product or process technology or technology that is inexpensive and widely available (ibid.). FDI, imitation, supply arrangements or acquisitions of foreign capital assimilate latest technology, as countries at this stage are not able to create them by themselves (ibid.). Companies have limited roles in the value chain, focusing on assembly, labour-intensive manufacturing, and resource extraction. Most companies lack direct access to their end users and FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 24 of 72 local demand for exported goods is mostly non-existent. However, foreign companies provide most of the access to foreign markets (Porter, 2008). Factor-driven economies are highly sensitive to world economic cycles, commodity prices, and exchange rate fluctuations and almost all emerging countries are centrally planned economies at this stage (GCR, 2008). 3.1.2 Efficiency-Driven Stage\u0002 Economies entering the second stage are mostly driven by increased wages and factor costs and thus, need to start developing more efficient production processes and enhance product quality (Porter, 2008). Hence, at the efficiency-driven stage, enhanced productivity of standard products and services becomes the dominant source of competitive advantage. Competitive advantage is further drawn from improved conditions like firm strategy, and rivalry (Porter, 1990). This includes the widening from basic factor costs towards advanced factors, such as university trained graduates and the availability of well-functioning mechanisms for factor creation, like educational institutions and research institutes. Still, the country's factor pool is relatively generalised. More sophisticated and better assimilated technology and modern facilities allow the nation's pool of factors to be employed much more efficiently at this stage (ibid.). Moreover, this stage is characterised by the willingness and ability of a country and its companies to invest forcefully (Porter, 2008). This approach allows firms to compete in more sophisticated industries and to offer unique products or to produce unique processes. At this stage, firms still compete in the relatively standardized, price-sensitive segments of the market, and product designs often reflect foreign market needs (ibid.). Heavy investment in efficient infrastructure, business-friendly government administration, strong investment incentives, improving skills, and better access to investment capital allow major improvements in productivity (Porter, 1990). The products and services produced are not globally differentiated, however, with technology and designs still largely coming from abroad. Technology is accessed through licensing, joint ventures, foreign direct investment, and imitation. Nations at this stage normally assimilate foreign technology but also begin to develop the capacity to improve technology themselves (ibid.). Companies extend capabilities more widely in the value chain, and serve a wider mix of original equipment manufacturer customers and end users. An investment-driven economy is concentrated on manufactured goods and outsourced service exports (ibid.). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 25 of 72 However, in the efficiency-driven stage, the used technology is often a generation behind international leading standards, but foreign technology and methods are not just applied but also improved upon (Porter, 1990). A country's capability to absorb and improve foreign technology is essential to reach this stage of development, moreover, it is a decisive difference among factordriven and efficiency-driven economies. Means, companies start developing their own improvements including their own product models in-house (ibid.). Besides the willingness to invest, another source for competitive advantage at this stage is the role of the government. The government faces various tasks, such as channelling scarce capital into particular industries, promoting risk taking, providing temporary protection to encourage the entry of domestic rivals and the construction of efficient scale facilities, stimulating and influencing the acquisition of foreign technology, and encouraging exports (Porter, 1990). Additionally, the government must also take the lead in making investments to create and upgrade factors, though firms must begin to play a growing role as well. At this stage, discipline, tough decisions and a long time horizon, thus a political process needs to be enforced by the authorities (Porter, 1990). The government must show strong commitment to enhance factor quality and must invest in other preconditions for upgrading competitive advantage. Hence, decisions may be taken about what industries may be favoured over others. Multinational companies will address their interest towards the government. Here, authorities often need to resist ensuring local rivalry (ibid.). Hence, a politically secure government, continuity in government officials, and the ability to counteract special interests seeking favours are all highly desirable to support advancement (ibid.). 3.1.3 Innovation-Driven Stage The third stage is characterised by specific industries that reflect the nation's particular environment and history (HBS, 2015). It is called innovation-driven because firms not only improve technology and methods from other nations but create them (ibid.). People's income rises and the level of education increases which leads towards more sophisticated consumer demand side (Porter, 2008). The desire for convenience and the energizing role of local rivalry increases too. New companies enter the domestic market, trying to satisfy the increased needs of the customer and at the same time accelerate improvement and innovation (ibid.). Overall, the country's competitive strength enhances and the range of more specialised industries increases. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 26 of 72 Supporting industries on highest international level support this process. Consequently, new competitive industries emerge out of related industries (Porter, 1990). Compared to the second stage, competitive advantage due to factor costs becomes quite rare, as growing success in many industries puts upward pressure on factor costs and the value of the currency (ibid.). Instead of factor cost advantages, selective factor disadvantages stimulate innovations that advance product and process technology (ibid.). Further, the enhancement of proven universities, research facilities, and infrastructure grows. At this stage, the production of innovative goods and services by using the most superior methods becomes the dominant source of competitive advantage (Porter, 1990). Institutions and incentives supporting innovation are also well developed. Companies compete with unique strategies that are often global in scope, and invest strongly in advanced skills, the latest technology, and innovative capacity (ibid.). 3.2 Boosting a Country's Competitive Advantage A country needs to clearly understand the meaning of competitiveness in order to achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 2008). Clearness how to analyse it effectively will be crucial to create an economic environment that boosts efficiency, innovation and prosperity (ibid.). In his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter, 1990), Porter analysed how prosperity is created and sustained in the modern economy. His inputs have influenced the thinking of cities and regions and transformed their national policies. According to Porter (1990), competitiveness is based on the measure of productivity and focuses on the microeconomic fundamentals of competitive advantage. 3.3 Creation of Sustainable Competitive Performance A country's industry finds itself in constant transition. An economy can upgrade itself by moving towards higher-level sources of competitive advantage and toward positions in advanced productivity industries (Porter, 1990). Overall productivity growth reinforces such a process. National economies need to be seen in a comprehensive manner in order to provide ways of thinking about how nationwide economies progress in competitive terms (ibid.). How a country develops its path to reach new levels of enhanced competitiveness differs as each stage involves distinctive industries and segments as well as different firm strategies (Porter, FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 27 of 72 1990). Moreover, stages differ by government policies, providing a useful basis for governmental discussions of a country's policies. It is crucial for an economy to be able to upgrade their competitive positions. This can be achieved by developing capabilities to compete successfully in new, high-productivity industries and segments. Penetration of foreign markets by high productivity industries can be managed through FDI, and at the same time shifting less productive activities abroad (Porter, 1990). A country has two options, either upgrade and extend its competitive advantage or fall behind (ibid.). Hence, in case that one industry achieves a higher competitive advantage, other industries can benefit from the success and manage to upgrade more easily. Additionally, a country's companies need to successfully position itself in international competition. The ability to export and at the same time sustain position against import will further enhance national growth (ibid.). As started in the chapter of economic development, national economies show a number of stages of competitive development, but the stages do not claim to explain everything about a nation or its development process (Porter, 1990). Moreover, some concerns in development are certainly left out, and no nation will fit a stage exactly. Instead, the stages are an effort to highlight those attributes of a nation's industry most important to rising economic prosperity (ibid.). 3.4 Requirements for Competitive Advantage During the first three stages, forces are present that create the potential for superior competitive advantages and put pressure on the industry to seek and achieve them. The following conditions need to be in place that a nation is able to progress to more advanced stages (Porter, 1990): 3.4.1 Motivation Motivated workers and managers are required to reach the next higher stage. Means, the motivation to work long hours, earn higher wages, seek greater profits, start new companies, and create larger companies (Porter, 1990). To hold the high level of motivation, citizens need to believe that they will be rewarded for hard work and good ideas. At the same time, owners of capital must also be motivated to make sustained investments (ibid.). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 28 of 72 3.4.2 Domestic Rivalry In order to drive innovation and thus, to upgrade competitive advantage, active rivalry among domestic competitors in a wide range of industries is necessary (Porter, 1990). The fear of making failure leads to inertia of the rivalry. Vigorous competition among local companies leads also to an important spill over effects on other factors (ibid.). 3.4.3 Capacity to Create New Business A country reaching for an advanced stage needs to have effective mechanisms in place to create new businesses either through start-ups or internally by established firms (Porter, 1990). Healthy rivalry builds on the possibility to establish new businesses, to change into superior industries and to develop suppliers and related industries (ibid.). These forces support each other and form a virtuous circle. It is vital to have factor conditions in place that are increasingly advanced and specialized to upgrade a nation's economy (Porter, 1990). This development depends on improving demand conditions, the energy from selective disadvantages, and the presence of superior supporting industries (ibid.). However, this will not lead to an upgrade unless sustained investment and rivalry forces it. This in turn, rivalry and the development of supporting and related industries depends on active new business formation. Hence, all these forces must be present to enable mutual dependency, and thus, the process of upgrading. In other words; a nation's rate of progress is constrained by its weakest link (ibid.). 3.5 WEF Global Competitiveness Report The annually issued Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum contributes to enhance the understanding of crucial factors determining economic growth. It further tries to explain why some countries are much more successful than others in raising income levels and opportunities for their populations. The report offers people in business and governments an important tool in the formulation of improved economic policies and institutional reforms (GCR, 2008). According to the report, competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions,\u0002policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy. In other words, more competitive economies\u0002tend to be able to produce higher levels of income for\u0002their citizens. (WEF, 2008) FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 29 of 72 The author analysed all reports between 2008 until 2015, especially the country profile of Vietnam to further gain insights of the country's recent development. The report is build upon 12 pillars and measured by the Global Competitiveness Index, developed by the World Economic Forum. The index includes a weighted average of many different components, each measuring different aspects of competitiveness. The pillars are separated into three groups – the amount of stages of development – and stand for each stage's typical characteristics. Hence, a country's performance can be assessed by rating the performance of each pillar. 3.5.1 Drivers of Competitiveness If a country is able to improve their productivity, the nation will also be able to advance its prosperity (GCR, 2015). By improving productivity, the value of goods produced will increase, thus domestic income levels raise and the overall pool of demand to be met improves as well. It is crucial that the economy is capable to create an environment where companies and employees can upgrade their productivity throughout the economy (ibid.). According to the report of the World Economic Forum (2008), productivity and competitiveness is driven by many determinants; the role of institutions, openness to trade and investment, geographic location, and the quality of the business environment. Hereby, the goal is to capture all influences that allow policymakers to understand a country's strengths and weaknesses. It is vital to understand that those conditions can be separated into national and general conditions, like the quality of public institutions, which create opportunities for higher productivity in an indirect way (ibid.). Those opportunities may or may not be realised. Factors, such as the average skill level of the labour force, however, directly affect productivity. Thereby, the attitude, how these influences appear, depends largely how these policy processes are governed (ibid.). Where general conditions are more likely to be under direct control of national governments, direct productivity drivers are often the result of involvement by many parts of government, the private sector, academia, and other institutions (ibid.). In order to understand the connection between productivity and competiveness, one needs to understand that competitiveness is what actually determines the productivity with which a nation's endowments are used to create goods and services (ibid.). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 30 of 72 Both, macroeconomic and microeconomic factors are responsible for competitiveness to arise. As the thesis rather focuses on firm level analysis, only microeconomic related factors will be discussed. A country's government is one of the stakeholders that directly affects a firm's productivity. But not just the central government plays a crucial role, moreover, different agencies and administrative units at several levels of geography, with differing degrees of autonomy, are involved in decision making a policy action (WEF, 2008). In order to reach a new stage of development, countries are often forced to make many simultaneous changes across a broad number of policy areas. Hence, as long as these evolving constraints to productivity are addressed, productivity growth will not occur (ibid.). A companies' productivity depends in some part on the expertness with which firms compete and can be raised in two ways (GCR, 2015): • By improving the operational effectiveness of its activities and by assimilating global best practices • By achieving distinctive strategies and by involving unique products and innovative means of production and service delivery Conversely, in case that a company focuses on using low factor input costs at low productivity methods, little contributes toward sustainable prosperity. Although speaking about microeconomic factors, the productivity of companies is also affected by corporate governance structures (ibid.). Widespread monopoly power and government favouritism can harm productivity (ibid.). This unfavourable environment is often boosted by the presence of large, highly diversifies business groups, common in developing countries (ibid.). Additionally, one should distinguish between business groups that are an instrument of market power or preferential political access, and that can generate private profitability, but conversely, hinder public prosperity (WEF, 2008). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 31 of 72 3.5.2 Concept of the WEF Report The components that each measures different aspects of competitiveness are grouped into 12 pillars. The following figure shows pillar 1-4 that need to be of high level and thus, are key in order to be classified as factor-driven country. Further, pillar 5-10 show other factors – in addition to pillars 1-4, that have to be in place and enhanced by the government, in order to reach the status of an efficiency-driven economy. Figure 9: WEF Global Competitiveness Index Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2008 It needs to be mentioned that the pillars above will affect different economies in different ways. The best way for country A to improve its competitiveness will maybe not suit for country B, as they are most likely not at the same stage of development. The GCI, and many other economic theories, assume that to maintain the first stage of development, public and private institutions (pillar 1), a well-developed infrastructure (pillar 2), a stable macroeconomic environment (pillar 3), and a healthy workforce that has received at least a basic education (pillar 4) needs to function well (GCR, 2008). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 32 of 72 Once a country advances its competitiveness, development enhances and output will increase and wages will rise (Porter, 2008). A country will then reach the efficiency-driven stage of development. Hence, they start developing more sophisticated production processes and increase product quality. At the same time wages raise and prices can not be increased (ibid.). As a result, higher education and training (pillar 5), efficient goods markets (pillar 6), well-functioning labour markets (pillar 7), developed financial markets (pillar 8), the ability to harness the benefits of existing technologies (pillar 9), and a large domestic or foreign market (pillar 10), increasingly drives competitiveness (GCR, 2008). The last move of a country, the reach of the innovation-driven stage, is characterised by again, wages at higher level, associated with higher standards of living (Porter, 2008). The increased level of wages can only be sustained if the country is able to produce new and unique goods and services of highest quality and at internationally competitive innovative standards. Hence, at this stage, firms are forced to compete by creating new and different products using the most sophisticated production processes (pillar 11) and by innovating new ones (pillar 12) (cf. Figure 9, GCR, 2008). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 33 of 72 4. Case Interviews Methodology 4.1 Approach of the Questionnaire As a first step the author read through various models and literature in order to gain an overview. The main challenge was, based on the broad topic of the thesis, to set up a questionnaire that focuses on the word \"attractiveness\". How can attractiveness be assessed? It becomes clear that attractiveness of a country is based on prosperity, productivity and thus, is characterised by its competitiveness. Hence, the author concentrated on reading the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) in the period between 2008 and 2015. The membership of the World Trade Organization brought many changes and opportunities for Vietnam and also for its investment climate. To make sure that the characteristics of the country within the scope of analysis remained the same, the time period after the accession of the World Trade Organization in 2007 was taken into consideration. According to the latest report in 2015, Vietnam has been positioned in the transition stage between factor-driven and efficiency-driven (GCR, 2015). This raised the question about the pillars still being in need of improvement in order to boosts Vietnam's position towards efficiency-driven. The next step was to go through the reports from 2008 until 2015 and to compare all relevant figures – changes of the figures, ups and downs of the figures – to put them in an excel file and to illustrate the most notable developments over the past 10 years. By analysing the reports between 2008 and 2015, the author recognized that 1) Institutions, 5) Higher Education and Training, and 9) Technological Readiness, are among the weakest factors. Pillar 1, Institutions, is the only one that is listed as key factor for factor-driven economies. The other two pillars are key for efficiency-driven economies and thus, important to look at (cf. Figure 9, p. 31). Because Vietnam is still in need of improvement and those two pillars, Higher education and training and Technological Readiness have been decreasing during the last years. As Vietnam's goal is to enhance its investment climate and thus, its attractiveness, these two areas need much attention. Other key pillars improved over time and can be considered stable. Hence, those were not considered in the questionnaire. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 34 of 72 4.2 Characteristics of the Three Weakest Pillars 4.2.1 Pillar 1: Institutions The first pillar examines the institutional environment of a country (GCR, 2015). The climate has to be sound and fair and became more apparent during the recent economic and financial crisis. The state at the international level plays an increasing role for further consolidating the fragile recovery of a country, hit by the crisis (ibid.). Moreover, this pillar is determined by the legal and administrative framework within different individuals, companies, and governments interact to facilitate prosperity. Pillar 1 is characterised examines the following aspects (GCR, 2015): • Legal and administrative framework • Quality of institutions • Influence on investment decisions and the organization of production 4.2.2 Pillar 5: Higher Education and Training In order to move up the value chain, highest quality of higher education and training plays a crucial role (GCR, 2015). Well-educated employees who are able to perform complex tasks, understand the evolving production system, and adapt rapidly to their changing environment are highly wanted in our today's globalized economy. Hence, a country needs to be able to nurture this need and establish a pool of well-educated people. This pillar measures the quality of education as evaluated by business leaders (ibid.). Moreover, the degree of staff training is also considered within this pillar, because vocational and on-the-job training are of high importance. In many economy's, training ensures the constant upgrading of employees' skills (ibid.). 4.2.3 Pillar 9: Technological Readiness Technology is critical for companies to successfully compete and prosper (GCR, 2015). This pillar measures responsiveness of an economy to adopt existing technologies to enhance the productivity of its industries. This approach focuses on the agility to fully leverage information and communication technologies in daily activities and production processes for increased efficiency and enabling innovation for competitiveness (ibid.). The access and usage of ICT is key for an economy to enables its overall technological readiness. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 35 of 72 It is not relevant, whether the country itself has developed or only used the technology within its borders. Moreover, the companies operating in this country need to have access to advanced products and the ability to absorb and use them. FDI often plays a crucial role when it comes to sourcing foreign technology, especially countries at lower levels of technological development. Thus, the level of technology the company can benefit from needs to be separated from the country's ability to manage \"blue-sky research\" and to develop new technologies for innovation that enlarges the access to knowledge (ibid.). This is also the reason why pillar 5, technological readiness, is separated from pillar 12, innovation (ibid.). 4.3 Development of the Three Weakest Pillars Based on the latest report (GCR, 2015), Vietnam has been defined as a country in transition. Hence, since approximately two years, the country has been positioned between a factor-driven and efficiency-driven economy. The following descriptions and analysis will concentrate mostly on those two stages. Moreover, the authors' aim was not to examine how the 12 pillars are measured in detail, but rather to study how strong Vietnam has improved its performance over the last years. By doing so, the author decided to focus on those pillars that had shown the weakest improvement. The figures below show the development of first, pillar 1 to 4, thus Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic environment and Health & primary education. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 36 of 72 Figure 10: Development Basic Requirements, Pillar 1-4 (score 1-7) Source: Author based on figures from WEF reports (2008-2016) The author decided to focus on pillar 1, institutions, as among all pillars, institutions showed the weakest development and rank, behind pillar 2, infrastructure. Moreover, between 2010 until 2014, the rating of this pillar declined and since 2015 improves again. Considering that Vietnam is currently positioned in transition, pillar 1 needs most improvement. Otherwise, the country will, among other reasons, not reach the next higher stage. 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 2008-09 2010-11 2011-12 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Vietnam: Basic Requirement Enhancers, Pillar 1-4 Institutions Infrastructure Macroeconomic Environment Health & Primary Education FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 37 of 72 Figure 11: Development of Efficiency Enhancers, Pillar 5-10 (score 1-7) Source: Author based on figures from WEF reports (2008-2016) Among pillar 5-10, Higher education & training, and technological readiness, show the weakest development between 2008 until 2016. Additionally, the ranking of Financial market development is declining since 2010. However, since the author decided to focus at those with the lowest scores over the mentioned period, this pillar had not been analysed in detail. Overall, rankings of the pillar remained relatively steady. The author is convinced that Vietnam needs to focus on Higher education & training, as well as technological readiness, in order to reach the efficiency-driven stage. Companies were asked between 2008 until 2016 about the most problematic factors when doing business in Vietnam. The author analysed the ratings over this period and established the figure below (Figure 12, p. 38), showing key factors, hindering companies in executing their daily business. 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 2008-09 2010-11 2011-12 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Vietnam: Efficiency Enhancers, Pillar 5-10 Higher education & training Goods market effiicency Labour market efficiency Financial market development Technological readiness Market size FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 38 of 72 Figure 12: Most Problematic Factors of Doing Business in Vietnam Source: Author based on figures of the WEF reports (2008-2016) The higher the score, the more problematic it is for a company to do business in Vietnam. Obviously, the inefficiency of the governmental bureaucracy, has been rated as constant negative influencer. The perception of Poor work ethic in labour force declined initially, since 2012 however, increases again as problematic factor. Compared to the above figures one can conclude that the rather bad performances of pillar 1, institutions, are related with the ranking of the most problematic factors, hence, inefficiency of the administration. The same can be roughly said for pillar 5, Higher education & training, both times performing relatively low during the last eight years. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2008-09 2010-11 2011-12 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Most Problematic Factors of Doing Business Inadequately educated workforce Poor work ethic in labour force Inefficient government bureaucracy FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 39 of 72 4.4 Structure of the Questionnaire The questionnaire for the companies in Vietnam bases on the literature about competitiveness and stages of development and on personal experiences of the author. The questionnaire had been subdivided into the following topics: A) General Information 1. Contact details of the interviewee and the target company 2. Sales figures of the target company B) Accessing Vietnam • Reasons for setting up a business in Vietnam and whether governmental incentives played a crucial role • Expectations of the target country towards Vietnam C) Operating in Vietnam • Questions about challenges the company is facing today • Questions about the Vietnamese workforce: level of education and work ethic D) Conclusion • Questions about factors the company would do differently when entering Vietnam again and suggestions how other companies could successfully enter the Vietnamese market • Suggestions of how the Vietnamese government could enhance the business climate 4.5 Data Collection As defined in the methodology, data was collected through interviews. Whenever possible, interviews have been held face-to-face. However, the majority of the interviews were held via Skype call due to distance constraints of the CEOs of the company. The semi-structured face-to-face interview allowed the interviewee to share experiences and expertise, and the interviewer to react upon interesting aspects as well as asking for clarifications. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 40 of 72 4.6 Sampling The entirety of all companies was divided into two samples; companies successfully operating in Vietnam and companies that left Vietnam. For the first sample, companies had been selected holding Swiss ownership or being headquartered in Switzerland. Further, companies needed to be in Vietnam not more than 10 years (of which one company was established in 1995). The initial goal of the author was aimed at interviewing nine cases, whereof in fact seven were selected. Following the definition in the beginning, a sample of Swiss companies employing up to 1'000 employees has been selected. In order to reduce business specific biases, companies from different sectors had been chosen.\u0001As the feedback for the interviews was mostly positive – nearly eighty percent of the contacted firms agreed on support on the condition that their information is anonymised and the public version does not include interviews or transcripts. Table 5: Companies Interviewed1 Company Identifier M = Manufacturer S = Services Sector Activities Interviewee Method M1 Manufacturing Pottery/Ceramics Owner & CEO Face-to-face M2 Manufacturing Architectural Ropes CEO Face-to-face S1 Financial Services COO Skype call S2 IT Solutions General Director Skype call S3 Post Solutions CEO Skype call S4 IT Product Development Office Manager Skype call Source: Author 1\tThe real company names and interviews have been kept anonymous and are not published in the official version of the paper. The interviews have been made available to the client and supervisor. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 41 of 72 For the second sample, companies that withdrew from the Vietnamese market, the author was not able to interview them directly. Instead, an interview was held with the head of country management of DKSH. The interview with DKSH served as expert interview, as the company is focusing in Asian market expansion since the late nineteenth century. Table 6: Expert Interviewed Company Surname First name Position Date Method DKSH MartinMartinez Jorge Vice President 20.07.2016 Skype call Source: Author Besides the interview with DKSH, the author held a discussion with Dr. Nguyen Manh Quyen from the Trade Office of the Vietnam Embassy in Switzerland. He informed about future measures of the Vietnamese government. Moreover, he answered questions about key industries, the government intends to focus in the future. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 42 of 72 5. Evaluation of Case and Expert Interviews The aim of this section is to unpack the findings made during the interviews with the final goal of answering the initial research questions. The evaluation will reveal trends and patterns which appeared in the sample analysed. Although no statistically significant conclusions can be reached, tendencies are recognizable. 5.1 Experiences of Companies Operating in Vietnam Among all topics covered in the questionnaire, the author decided to focus on the following key aspects: I. Decisive Factors for Setting up a Business in Vietnam II. Expectations of the Swiss Companies III. Work Ethic of the Vietnamese Work Force IV. Challenges and Opportunities in Daily Business Live V. Key Success Factors VI. Recommendations to the Vietnamese Government As statements are kept confidentially, the author decided to provide the quotes with the company identifiers (cf. Table 5, p. 40) to show from what industry the statements are coming from. Hence, \"M1, M2\" refers to \"Manufacturer\" and \"S1, S2, S3, S4\" to \"Services\" companies. 5.1.1 Decisive Factors for Setting up a Business in Vietnam Analysis of all cases has shown that no company did proper market research before entering the Vietnamese market. Thus, one's gut feeling, other companies' success stories and personal experiences made in the country, brought them to invest in Vietnam. Governmental incentives, especially for the IT business, were known and appreciated, but were not critical for the final decision. Some mentioned that Vietnam plays more and more an alternative to China as the country is located attractively as a hub to Asian markets. (...) Vietnam offers an alternative to China (e.g. China + strategy) certainly in the manufacturing sector. (S1) In comparison to other outsourcing markets, the biggest advantage so far is labour arbitrage. (S3) FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 43 of 72 Further, living costs are relatively low and competences and knowledge is given or can be improved. Vietnam profits from the absence of a strong influence of religion and an entrepreneurial culture. No doubt, the strongest key factor to invest in Vietnam, according to all managers, is its local workforce. The Vietnamese working population seems to enjoy a good image among foreign managers and they appreciate the Vietnamese governments' interest and effort to educate them well. Vietnamese people are business minded, reliable and solution oriented. (M1) (...) the main resource is Vietnam's workforce which with its young and well educated workforce was (and remains) no doubt a strong factor in favour of Vietnam. (S1) Especially companies in the manufacture industry appreciate the hand skills of the Vietnamese people. Several managers have been convinced by the incredible agile hands of the people that even brought solutions to some companies where robots were not able to help. Several companies were looking for suitable people and thus, Vietnam, compared to other neighbour countries, offers them. Another important reason was to remain competitive by holding costs low (competitive pricing). Besides the local workforce, managers agreed that the Vietnamese government has always been keen on creating a favourable atmosphere for foreign investors, hence he had no doubt that, without any further clarifications, Vietnam fitted for their plans. The atmosphere has always been very open and flexible. Moreover, the relative high stability of the law in Vietnam and the protection of property rights are strong compared to neighbouring countries and thus, favourable indicators to establish a business. However, the stability of the country is nice to have but was again not a decisive factor. 5.1.2 Expectations of the Swiss Companies Managers have been asked for the motives to establish a business in Vietnam. They were able to choose among three factors; efficiency-driven, knowledge-driven and responsiveness-driven. The majority of the interviewees admitted that efficiency-driven factors, thus low labour costs and the advantage of economies of scale, played the most important role. However, knowledge-driven factors, such as the usage of people's idea, become more important. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 44 of 72 Roughly said, the Vietnamese labour force in general is a good value for the money for certain industries. Especially companies find lower skilled people easily and they are very competitive, hence they provide a higher competitive advantage for the country compared to Malaysia, Thailand and China. Speaking about efficiency-driven factors and in comparison to other outsourcing markets, the biggest advantage so far is labour arbitrage. Combined with government incentives, such as tax reductions for IT companies, and the country's stability, Vietnam provides an attractive place for doing business. However, the adding value is relatively low as assembling activities are wide spread. The programming sector is growing but still far below the developed stage. By looking at the knowledge-driven motives, the well-educated labour and their ambitiousness to learn, provide basic conditions to use their skills in order to create even more complex tangible and intangible values in the near future. Managers highlight, that people's enhanced involvement depends largely on how the government will implement new policies. 5.1.3 Work Ethic of the Vietnamese Workforce Overall, managers are making very good experiences when working with the local workforce – especially when communication is easy and language barriers are low, loyalty and trust incredibly increases. Some highlight that a good and respectful interconnection with employees is key and very important. Another point is that the local workforce needs to learn to take responsibility on failures and that mistakes are ok and there to learn and increase personal knowledge. Like in other Asian countries, people in Vietnam try to avoid making mistakes. As the country is embossed of communism, people listen carefully to clear instructions – especially at lower level. (S1) All managers agree that it mostly depends on the behaviour of the top management – how they treat the employees and how they live the company's values. (Company manager) points out that every manager coming to Vietnam should consider the country's history. The people had been suppressed over decades. Thus, one need to treat them – like elsewhere – with highest respect. (M1) Once you have passed the cultural gap, they are committed, professional and willing to learn. (S4) Vietnamese people seem to prefer a rather familiar atmosphere but are used to listen to clear instructions, rather at lower level. Moreover, managers mention that their companies always have actively fostered the involvement of the local management. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 45 of 72 Reasons, why an employee leaves, can either be familiar reasons, for example when moving abroad, or in case that an employee has no chance to take over a higher position within short time. Leaving the company for monetary reasons are seldom as most companies interviewed admit to pay relative high salaries and as mentioned, the atmosphere makes the company very attractive to stay. 5.1.4 Challenges and Opportunities in Daily Business Live Company representatives were asked to mention some challenges by doing business in Vietnam. They were asked to build their answers upon the three pillars, higher education and training, technological readiness and institutions. Higher Education All managers agreed that it is not a challenge to find employees, but it is quite hard to bring them on a certain level the company requires. Vietnamese people need higher education and on the job training. There is insufficient knowledge for work on international standard requirements. Moreover, there is a limited pool of highly skilled professionals, besides plenty of unskilled people. Especially the IT businesses face the challenge to keep skilled employees as competition and war for talents is very strong in Vietnam. There are plenty of unskilled workers, but well trained financial professionals are rare. (S1) Training is an ongoing process and they need to be accompanied day by day. Managers really need to accompany them and show them anew, how specific steps need to be done and also as new solutions do seldom come from the local workforce. Most companies do advanced training with selected employees e.g. workers holding a university degree, showing them how to lead and how to solve managerial functions at mid-level. Either you find people straight from the rice field or graduating from university – nothing in between, roughly said. Employees lacked from professional on-the-job experiences. (M2) One challenge is to maintain high quality as Vietnamese people sometimes do not understand new processes or the need to treat tools and equipment carefully. Instructors need to make sure that specific know-how about new licenses and permits are granted – they always need to be informed and they need to explain the importance of such permits. (M2) However, a positive aspect that points out is the entrepreneurial spirit, rooting in all those small and flexible family businesses spread over the country. This entrepreneurial thinking is shown by one's own initiative at work, especially at management level. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 46 of 72 Thus, employee contribute by being creative and thus, enhancing profitability. However, companies should not expect that local employees will come with new strategies as Vietnamese people are mostly short-term thinkers. (...) the local workforce needs to learn to take over responsibility on failures and that mistakes are ok and there to learn and increase personal knowledge. Often, Vietnamese people cannot admit mistakes. (M2) Overall, the country is still not developed and people lack on higher skills. For managerial positions, companies still focus on employing expats instead of local people. Technological Readiness Given the young population in Vietnam and a strong proficiency in Vietnam for sciences, engineering and technology, the Vietnamese workforce has proven to be fast learning and an early adopter of new technology (especially IT and communication which are both important in the financial sector). Secondary sectors are less developed as he thinks that the industrial society had somehow been jumped over and modern technologies have been forced lately. Thus, there is some gap among the development phases. (M1) Institutions Governmental bureaucracy and administrative infrastructure seem to remain a substantial hurdle when doing business in Vietnam, although to a much lesser extent today than 20 years ago. Regulations are either unclear or contradict each other, oftentimes, the implementation guidelines lack, making it difficult to know what is permissible and what not. Every company operating in Vietnam will suffer to a certain degree from such inefficiency, though the degree will depend on the sector. (...) As a rule, the closer the sector to areas of national interests of Vietnam the more challenging it gets to operate. (S1) Sure, as any company here. If there are any disputes, process of resolving those is not transparent and extremely long, with very low probability of positive outcome for the company. (S3) The governmental bureaucracy and administrative infrastructure has improved and the same can be said of the experience and skills of higher ranking government officials who nowadays are mostly foreign educated. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 47 of 72 The company had the luck that the Vietnamese employees managed to find accurate solutions to bureaucratic issues and thus, administrative steps have never been a big issue to the company. (M2) However, managers admit that the whole social insurance system and tax system is still very complex and complicated to understand. Often, this factor had been described as unpredictable aspect within the whole business environment. 5.1.5 Key Success Factors Overall, like in any other country, the company needs to properly analyse the local market. Which other competitors the company will be facing and what kind of products are already there. The financial strength needs to be strong to at least be able to survive the set up phase. Vietnam has sill a relatively closed market and the government has much control over various sectors. Hence, the company entering the country needs to know the specific conditions of the market, its regulations and special laws. The economy is widely controlled in the country and authorities have much power. The company needs to know how to maximize the effect of the product in the country and how it will reach the huge population of 95 million people. Case comparison has shown that all companies ascribe their success to lie within one or several of the following three success factor groups: Overall, managers recommend taking enough time and patience for a slow, step-by-step growth to keep the business healthy in the long run and to ensure endurance. Appropriate funding to ensure long timeframes is another aspect to focus on. All managers agreed that it is vital to have highly motivated and skilled people from Switzerland in place when opening the first branch in Vietnam. Most companies admit to rather fully control the company in case this would not be possible, the company should carefully assess how shared control will be managed. One manager mentioned that he would preferably buy an existing company instead of building up a new one. Involvement of the whole top management from the beginning is crucial and the company should not save costs by its first employees onside – rather send the best employee you have for this position or hire a very good one. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 48 of 72 The financial sector is a people's business. Hence, an entrant in our sector will need to focus on recruiting the best possible talent, then train and nurture its talent, provide it with career advancement opportunities and provide a corporate culture that makes Vietnamese staff feel home, respected and like a family. (S1) Moreover, living the same culture in Vietnam as in Switzerland can reinforce the ties between both branches. (S4) Regarding the recruitment of the local work force, it is recommended to hire staff at an early stage of their career and to provide them on the job training, job rotation and career advancement to ensure retention. Focus on the best talents during the recruiting process – and do it carefully. Then train and nurture them, provide career opportunities and a corporate culture where employees feel respected and like a family. This will give the entrant to a motivated workforce, doing some extra miles if needed. (S1) (...) the hard-working employees, their diligence – overall the extraordinary work mentality of the Vietnamese people. (M2) It is highly suggested to implement a comprehensive and well performing risk management framework to make sure that the management knows factors that can harm the business. (...) a company needs to implement a well performing risk management and needs to be aware of certain situations that can harm the business. (S2) The business environment is friendly towards foreign investors and thus, new companies should consider inputs of the foreign investor community operating in Vietnam since a while. Managers agreed that a good relationship with the government always helps to support daily business actions. Moreover, as the county provides a good climate to plan projects years ahead – predictability and the stability of the country strengthen such plans. It was further mentioned that Switzerland offers a good quality of country presence in Vietnam by the Embassy in Hanoi and the Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City. Employees of the Swiss representations are able to quickly help in unclear or difficult operational situations. As conclusion, all managers would not change their market entry process. However, it depends very much on the target of the company and the future goals. The Vietnamese market is quite open and developed, instead of jumping in take the time to consult different peoples, networks, companies. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 49 of 72 5.1.6 Recommendations to the Vietnamese Government Workforce All managers agreed that higher education needs to be improved. One key shortcoming is that whilst the quality of basic education is good the country is falling short on higher education. The present education system does not foster practice oriented thinking and acting, independent and critical thinking. Universities should implement practical management cases rather than only studying theories. Technological Readiness Overall, the current situation is satisfying and almost all applications fit well to latest technologies. Managers are mostly sure that the country will arrange itself accordingly and they have no concerns that the government will manage to bring the country towards a higher developed, technologically absorbing development. (...) is convinced that the booming country Vietnam will arrange itself accordingly and adapt new technologies step by step. (M2) I have no concerns that the country will manage further steps towards a higher developed, technologically absorbing development. Time will bring solutions and take the country on higher levels. (S2) However, some managers have concerns that the skillset of the employees will not develop fast to enough to reach a professional the level to appropriately handle new technologies, entering Vietnam in the near future. Although there are new technologies entering the country – people are still not educated enough to use them appropriately. (M1) However, the Vietnamese government could do more to encourage firm-level technology absorption by providing incentives to the private sector. At the same time, the government should also more readily adopt and use tried and tested technologies where appropriate (e.g. introduction of more financial instruments to the capital markets to allow them to widen and deepen and thus become a further source of capital to the private sector). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 50 of 72 Governmental Bureaucracy For most company representatives, this aspect needs most attention and improvement. Recommendations can be separated into three topics; policy implementation, prohibition of improper practices and the improvement of the welfare state. In an ideal world, government employees should earn a sufficiently large salary to make a reasonable living without having to resort to improper practices. However, in practice this is unlikely to happen. Hence, the next best mechanism to improve this would to force increased transparency, thereby making it increasingly difficult to continue with improper practices. (S1) The government is advised to fundamentally consider how laws and policies are issued and managed. Moreover, the government should admit that not everything can be done within little time – managers need certain time to implement policies and to find suitable solutions within the company. Thus, new policies and amended laws need to be legally guided and clearly communicated how to implement. (...) this aspect needs most considerations and improvements in the near future. The government should fundamentally consider how laws and policies are issued and managed. (S2) Most managers would welcome the idea of having one single contact person that acts like a coach and is able to give advice in unclear situations. It is difficult to get an overview among the different departments and authorities. It would be highly appreciated to have one single contact person or a coach in case a new company establishes its business in Vietnam. (M1) By analysing the answers of the manager, the author got the feeling that the most difficult area for the government to improve on is improper practices and corruption. A good mechanism to improve this would be to force increased transparency, thereby making it increasingly difficult to continue with improper practices. One manager mentioned spontaneously three points, how the Vietnamese government could increase transparency within public institutions; First, the establishment of platforms where, for example, tender processes for institutional purchases are made public would help. There, prices and companies for the government would be made public and necessary available. Hence, government officials would not have the chance to give mandates in secrecy. Another point would be to make all governmental budgets open and available for the public like a public company. As a last point: the right of having a freed press. Moreover, professional journalism could show serious shortcomings without being afraid of having to go to jail after publication of sensitive information. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 51 of 72 At last, the enforcement of the welfare state, as its current status is still far behind international standards, is another point highlighted by the managers. The social insurance and tax system is still very complex and the government should foster the equality for both, locals and expats, as this treatment is still different. 5.2 Companies that Withdrew from Vietnam In addition to the companies interviewed, the author was able to hold a discussion with the head of country management of DKSH Vietnam, asking for his opinion why companies are forced to leave the country. Besides this question, the head of country management was asked for his opinion, how Vietnam will be able to reach the next stage of development. The questionnaire from the discussion can be found in Appendix IV, p. 71. 5.2.1 Reasons to Withdraw from Vietnam Vietnam is still a relatively closed country and the macroeconomic factors seem very easy and attractive. However, the country is difficult to enter as the laws contradict often. The country is not developed; each step takes longer to be taken than in a developed country. Hence, the company needs to have the right processes to compete against all the risks, and to manage them properly. (Martin-Martinez, 2016) Managers interviewed in the first section mentioned, that rather smaller companies have difficulty to stay, not being able to finance their operations over 2-5 years without profit. It takes up to 8 months to come over the first important phases. Additionally, smaller companies are often not familiar with cultural habits and they often lack of respectful treatment towards the local workforce. Companies often fail by not finding the right people as Vietnam is still a developing country and most local employees need much training and need to be accompanied. On the other side, expats need to be able to adapt to local conditions. Moreover, the leading manager needs much patience to enter the market and to educate the local workforce in case the company needs specific tasks to be done. Companies intending to operate within the local market face much more hurdles and other difficulties than firms in the export business. Often, companies lack of having the right processes in place in order to compete against all the risks and moreover, to manage them properly. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 52 of 72 Unclear policies and corruption may cause further difficulties to establish a successful business in Vietnam. In terms of market research, Vietnam does not offer much transparency especially on data and statistics. Hence they are often wrong or not publicly accessible. Difficulty arises to analyse the market properly. Thereby need to be considered that the country is still developing, thus, each step takes longer to be taken than in a developed country. The company needs a clear understanding of all related regulations even when they have a superior product to offer – they might fail because of missed regulations and policies. (Martin-Martinez, 2016) One huge challenge, that often gets underestimated, is the ability to understand the consumer in Vietnam. Some products are regulated, like the health industry and pharmaceuticals. Some decisions are partially taken by the government and thus, the company needs to understand all related regulations even they have a superior product – they might fail because of missed regulations and policies. The author received the below table from the Embassy of Switzerland in Hanoi. Besides the reasons listed in the last column of the table, there was not more information available about those companies left. The author was not able to get any information from the companies, especially as there was no contact person or other information on the list. However, it can be seen from the table that some companies left Vietnam because of missing licences or the inability to not successfully enter the Vietnamese market. One company had been bought by another company, thus the company may still exist in Vietnam. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 53 of 72 Table 7: Examples of Swiss Companies that Withdrew from Vietnam Swiss Company Project Name Location Period Reasons given by VN Authorities Laufen JV Laufen-Thien Thanh: Ceramics Sanitary Wares B.Ria-V.Tau 1996-1998 No efficiency in operation Panoval Label JV Printing Double-Layer Labels HCMC 1996-1998 No implementation Nestlé Nestlé Dairy Ha Tay: processing of fresh dairy milk and yogourt Ha Tay province 1996-2001 Factory in Hatay (now Hanoi) closed down Farbax Group AG Farbax Vietnam: cleaning and re-filling of used toner cartridges VSIP Binh Duong 2006-2012 No import license granted for used toner cartridges Dragon Line Dragon Line VN Branch Office: Manufacturing & exporting of cotta terra & handicraft HCMC 1997-2013 No branch office license granted Secude International AG Secude Vietnam Ltd.: Security software developer HCMC 2006-2013 Bought by SAP AG Software Solutions in 2012 Source: Embassy of Switzerland in Hanoi 5.3 How Vietnam Reaches the Next Stage of Development With focus on crucial aspects of the thesis, higher education is absolutely key. As soon as technology will rise, the people need to be able to manage machines – thus, they need proper education to reach the next step the company will be looking at. Hence, as labour costs will increase, companies will substitute them by machines and thus, local people then need the appropriate education to run, manage and maintain them. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 54 of 72 5.4 Vietnam's Key Industries in the Future The author was able to reach some Vietnamese people, working for the government. They provided some insights about future measures of the Vietnamese government in order to enhance the country's economic development. Besides their inputs, the author found various literature about the government's future economic strategies. According to the Vietnamese Prime Minister's approval on June 9, 2014, decision no. 879/QD-TTg, the government pursues a strategy on the country's industrial development through 2025 (Nguyen, 2016). Additionally, they concluded a concrete vision towards 2035, including the priority of the following industrial sectors (listed according to highest priority): 1. Manufacturing and processing industry 2. Electronics and telecommunication 3. Latest energy and renewable energy Compared to the data gathered in Table 4 (p. 22), it can be seen that Switzerland is currently exporting those merchandises which will be of highest importance in the near future. However, any kind of energy has never been exported to Vietnam. The author guesses, that this sector is still under control of the Vietnamese government and thus, would require some opening towards foreign investors. It was a challenge to get accurate answers regarding future measures of the Vietnamese government in the areas of higher education and training, technological readiness and administrative bureaucracy: In terms of higher education, the Ministry of Education and Training, Ministry of Labour-Invalids and Social affairs are actively boosting some programs where managers and students are sent abroad for higher studies, such as Masters or PhD. Similar projects to foster on-the-job trainings are ongoing in cooperation between Vietnam and Japan, Korea and Russia (Nguyen, 2016). These projects are aimed to improve people's vocational training (ibid.). Talking about technological readiness, the government also fosters cooperation with foreign companies in Europe, Asia, and the US (Nguyen, 2016). They are convinced that firm-level absorption in many large scale companies and SMEs is improved and standing at middle level in comparison with other Asian economies (ibid.). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 55 of 72 Considering the last topic, administrative efficiency, the Vietnamese government has introduced programs for administrative improvement in all sectors including in education and vocational training at universities and colleges (Nguyen, 2016). 5.5 Vietnam's Socio-Economic Development Strategy Vietnam's goal is to become a developed country by 2020 (World Bank, 2016). In order to reach this ambitious goal, the government initiated several structural reforms under the umbrella of the so-called Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) 2011-2020 (ibid.). The following areas will get most attention from the government, called the \"three breakthrough areas\" (ibid.): • Promotion of human resources/skills development, particularly skills for modern industry and innovation • Improvement of market institutions • Development of the infrastructure In order to achieve the target's set in the 10-year strategy, the government acknowledges the slow progress of the reform priorities of the SED plan 2011-2016 and emphasizes the need to accelerate these reforms in the 2016-2020 plan again (World Bank, 2016). It had not been ascertainable to what degree these strategies are in process or to what extent they had successfully been implemented. According to the US Consulate in Vietnam (2013), the country is still facing development challenges that affect foreign investors. To name a few; Poorly developed infrastructure, inadequate and cumbersome legal and financial systems, an unwieldy bureaucracy, non-transparent regulations, high start-up costs, arcane land acquisition and transfer regulations and procedures, a shortage of skilled personnel and pervasive corruption. (US Consulate in Vietnam, 2013) Moreover, foreign companies speak about delays in obtaining investment licenses, and that licensing practices vary among provinces (ibid.). Further, companies regularly are confronted with policy changes related to taxes, tariffs, and administrative procedures, sometimes with little advance notice, causing difficulties to plan ahead. To summarize, the US Consulate (2013) names many challenges that had been addressed by the Swiss managers, operating in Vietnam. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 56 of 72 6. Evaluation and Discussion The following chapter aims at revising the theoretical knowledge. Based on the findings made during the case interviews, the initial concept of the WEF report shall be complemented. 6.1 Importance of FDI to Vietnam The world economic crisis had a relative delayed impact on the Vietnamese economy (SECO, 2016). For a long time, the country showed economic growth of around 7% on average, in 2010 growth slowed down. However, since 2014 economic growth increased again to 6% (5.4% in 2013). The strengthening of the Vietnamese economy had been strongly dependent on the positive development of the production sector, supported by huge FDI inflows (ibid.). For 2015 and the following periods, the IMF forecasts a constant yearly growth of 6% (SECO, 2016). One can conclude that Vietnam strongly depends on FDI. Vietnam attracted 24.1 billion USD in FDI, up 10% over the same period in 2014 and up 9.6% compared to 2015 (22 billion dollars) (SECO, 2016). In its strategy, the Vietnamese government concluded on the following policies in order to attract further FDI inflows (Nguyen, 2016): • Selective investment to improve quality of cross-border cooperation, hi-technology transfer and environmental protection • Continue to maintain of FDI into economic zones • Target setting by the Ministry of Planning and Investment maintain FDI in fields of manufacturing and processing industry, real estate, production and distribution, infrastructure and transportation, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and food processing Besides the dependency on FDI, the country's export industry relies heavily on imports. The majority of the Vietnamese industry processes imported inputs, like the textile and shoe industry, but also the mobile phone fabrication (SECO, 2016). In 2014, Vietnam registered imports of a total of USD 148 billion (2013: USD 131.3 billion). At the same time, the economy is still characterised by an underdeveloped supply industry (ibid.). Among all investing markets, China (29.6%), South Korea (14.7%), Japan (8.7%) and Taiwan (7.5%) are the most important for imports in 2014 (SECO, 2016). By counting 0.3% market share, Switzerland ranks 30th (ibid.). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 57 of 72 Related to the listed points above and to boost FDI projects in Vietnam, the governments' goal is to increase productions and exports with the help of the following measures (Nguyen, 2016): • Using advantages of foreign trade agreements with economies • Entering global supply chain systems • Implementing trade facilitation and e-business Additionally, free trade agreements, such as those with the European Free Trade Association, the agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Vietnam-Korea free trade agreements, should bring further opportunities to enhance the local as well as foreign companies to interact economically (Nguyen, 2016). 6.2 Vietnam's Current Stage of Development With an average monthly salary of USD 1'046 to USD 4'125, Vietnam has been classified lowermiddle income economy (World Bank, 2016 and United Nations, 2014). According to both organizations definition, middle-income economies are marked with a Gross National Income per capita of more than USD 1'045 but less than USD 12'746. Per definition, lowand middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies (ibid.). However, it is not the idea to suggest that all economies within this category are experiencing the same development. Based on Porter's stages of development and all information gathered during the interviews, the author likes to point out some specific arguments that underpin each stage. Arguments that Vietnam is still a factor-driven economy: • Government recognized the need for FDI and actively boosts investment policy decision making • Availability of basic factors of production, thus, semi-skilled labour (lack of practical experience) • Different kinds of industries are limited and the international success of the companies operating in them • Relatively low wages • Competition on prices (interviewee S2) • Used technology is widely available or little in need (in progress, usage of robots, M2) FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 58 of 72 • FDI companies bring in know-how and import technology if needed • Centrally planned economy (ongoing opening process) Arguments, that Vietnam is becoming an efficiency-driven economy: • Most interviewees admit that wages increase continuously • Some industries start developing products by themselves (IT programming, robot technique) • Increased efficiency in production processes and quality overall • Interviewees, operating in the IT sector admit, that rivalry increases • Availability of advanced factors, such as university graduates • Pool of factors is relatively generalised • Willingness of the government and FDI companies to invest forcefully Some points that Vietnam still needs to improve, in order to reach the efficiency-driven stage: • Acquisition of complex technology and creation of own technology • Establishment of local research institutes • Competition among more sophisticated industries, also at international level • Ability to offer unique products and the production of unique processes • Heavy investment in efficient infrastructure, business-friendly government and administration, improving skills (confirmed by all interviewees) Countries like Vietnam, finding itself in the transitions stage often have difficulties to deal with such processes and thus, find it hard to reach a higher stage of development. The author is convinced that such situations require comprehensive transformation of many interdependent aspects of competition, not just minor improvements in individual policy areas. Further, the dependency of different parts of the business environment needs to be taken into consideration. In case that one part lacks of improvement in any important area can lead to a deadlock in productivity growth and stagnant development. To give an example: when well-trained university graduates are not able to find suitable jobs because companies are still competing based on low-labour skills, a throwback against business is created. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 59 of 72 6.3 Competitive Position of Vietnam Based on the latest WEF Report (GCR, 2015), Vietnam gathered 12 places up to rank 56 of 140. Compared to other members of the ASEAN, Vietnam places itself behind Singapore (2nd) and the five largest states within the organization; Malaysia (18th), Thailand (32nd), Indonesia (37th), and the Philippines (47th). All five, except Thailand, have improved their showing since 2007, most notably the Philippines, which have jumped 17 places (ibid.). Vietnam enjoys specific key advantages in various areas (ibid.). In particular, the country profits from its relatively large market size and the functioning of its labour market (ibid.). Further, strong female participation in the labour force and a strong relationship between pay and productivity in the economy are rated positively (ibid.). However, the country's overall competitive position is eroded by weaknesses in the quality of infrastructure and institutions, as well as in higher education and training (GCR, 2015). In terms of the quality of its institutions, Vietnam suffers from burdensome government regulation and weak auditing and reporting standards (ibid.). And given the increasing importance of innovation for the country's competitiveness, its low university enrolment rate and the poor assessment of the quality of its educational system require urgent attention (ibid.). Based on the literature about requirements for competitive advantage and all information gathered during the interviews, the author likes to highlight some points that further illustrate Vietnam's competitive strengths: • High motivation of employees and managers was mentioned among all interviewees. Moreover, some company representatives admitted, that the image of the Vietnamese workforce initially brought them to invest in Vietnam. However, it is hard to clearly examine, to what degree the investment taken are sustainable. • In terms of domestic rivalry, managers of IT companies complained to some degree that war for talents has steadily been increasing. Other interviewees did not mention any concerns by dealing with local rivalry, especially both manufacturing companies, operating in the export business. Overall, the author thinks that domestic rivalry has still not developed its full power. Overall, Vietnam still lacks of superior industries and the ability to create unique products at international standard. Thus, this circumstances matches with the factors, determining Vietnam's current stage of development (cf. bullet points on p. 57-58). FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 60 of 72 7. Conclusion In order to assess a country's attractiveness, one needs to clearly define a comprehensive framework. The author is convinced that there is not one single holistic approach applicable in the context of Vietnam's attractiveness to Swiss companies. Much of the identified existing literature on a country's stage of development is either from the last decade or from the same author – Michael Porter. He has presented useful frameworks to analyse the stages by revealing different aspects and capturing certain influential factors. However, even though all models were able to interpret to some degree the stage of development of a country, none could provide a total, comprehensive framework Hence, a tentative framework for analysis has been created, based on theories and adapted through the findings of the empirical study. This study revealed that most foreign managers in Vietnam are positive about the country's future and the majority believes in the government's strengths to enforce all actions needed for prosperity. However, Vietnam can only reach next smaller steps towards a more developed country with the help of foreign investors and the efforts of foreign companies that continuously train the Vietnamese workforce by sharing their expertise. These findings confirm that being able to compete against other nations and thus, provide prosperity to the whole population depends on several factors. Because of its tentative nature, the framework presented in this paper is intended to create an impulse for further research in the Swiss-Vietnamese context. In order to develop a holistic and comprehensive as well as empirically valid model, further research and the inclusion of experiences of additional stakeholders and experts needs to be conducted. FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 61 of 72 7. Bibliography CIA. 2015. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html (Accessed July 21 2016) EIU. 2015. Country Report Vietnam 2015. London: Economist Intelligence Unit EIU. 2015. Vietnam. Economy. London: Economist Intelligence Unit Available online at: http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1033631087&Country=Vietnam&topic=Economy &subtopic=Long-term+outlook&subsubtopic=Summary (Accessed July 29 2016) FCA. 2016. Statistics. Swiss-Impex. Bern: Swiss Federal Customs Administration Available online at: https://www.swiss-impex.admin.ch/pages/bereiche/waren/result.xhtmll (Accessed July 7 2016) FDFA. 2015. Vietnam: Wirtschaftsbericht 2015. Hanoi: Embassy of Switzerland. Swiss Business Hub ASEAN/Vietnam Office, pp. 2-14 Available online at: http://www.s-ge.com/sites/default/files/WB_1605_D_WirtschaftsberichtVietnam_0.pdf (Accessed July 9 2016) HBS. 2015a. Stages of Development. Boston: Institute for Strategy & Competitiveness. Boston: Harvard Business School Available online at: http://www.isc.hbs.edu/competitiveness-economic-development/frameworks-and-keyconcepts/pages/shapes-of-development.aspx (Accessed July 9 2016) HBS. 2015b. Frameworks and Key Concepts: Understanding and Analysing Competitiveness. Boston: Harvard Business School Available online at: http://www.isc.hbs.edu/competitiveness-economicdevelopment/frameworks-and-key-concepts/Pages/default.aspx (Accessed July 9 2016) IMF. 2015. World Economic Outlook: Vietnam: Retaining Stability, Enhancing the Competitive Edge, and Reaping the Growth Potential. Washington: International Monetary Fund Available online at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/vietnam/ (Accessed July 29 2016) Martin-Martinez, J. 2016. Interview with the author over Skype on 20 July 2016. Olten/Ho Chi Minh City (Personal notes taken by the author) Nguyen, M. Q. 2016a. Author's request for Information about FDI in Vietnam and Future Measures of the Vietnamese Government. Message to Nguyen Manh Quyen 13 May 2016. (Personal communication) Nguyen, M. Q. 2016b. Doing Business in Vietnam. Power Point Presentation. Trade Office. Vietnam Embassy in Bern. Phuong Hoang Anh. 2015. Vietnam. Major Business Sectors. Hanoi: Embassy of Switzerland in Vietnam, Swiss Business Hub ASEAN/Vietnam Office Available online at: http://www.sge.com/sites/default/files/private_files/WZ_1506_E_MajorBusiness%20SectorsVietnam_0.pdf (Accessed July 9 2016) FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 62 of 72 Porter, M. E. 1990. Competitive Advantage of Nations: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: Free Press Porter, M. E. 2008. Moving to a New Global Competitiveness Index. Geneva: World Economic Forum, pp. 43. UN. 2014. World Economic Situation and Prospects: Country Classification. New York: United Nations Available online at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classi fication.pdf (Accessed July 19 2016) UNCTAD. 2013. World Investment Report 2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development. United Nations: New York and Geneva UNCTAD. 2015. World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance. United Nations: New York and Geneva US Consulate in Vietnam. 2013. Report: 2013 Investment Climate Statement Vietnam. US State Department. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Available online at: http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204760.htm (Accessed July 3 2016) SECO. 2015. Swiss Economic Development Cooperation with Vietnam 2013-2016: Enhance Productivity and Increase Competitiveness of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Hanoi: Swiss Cooperation Office for Vietnam S-GE. 2015. Vietnam at a Glance. Hanoi: Switzerland Global Enterprise, Swiss Business Hub ASEAN/Vietnam Office SNB. 2014. Press release: Foreign Direct Investment. Swiss National Bank: Zurich Available online at: http://www.snb.ch/en/system/search?q=press+release+Foreign+Direct+Investment (Accessed July 9 2016) Vuong, Q. H. 2014. Vietnam's Political Economy in Transition (1986-2016). Austin: Stratfor Available online at: https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/vietnams-political-economy-transition1986-2016 (Accessed July 7 2016) Weber, F. 2016. Vietnam. Bern: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO, pp. 1-8 GCR. 2008. Global Competitiveness Report 2008. Geneva: World Economic Forum, pp. 44-52 GCR. 2015. Global Competitiveness Report 2015. Methodology: The 12 Pillars of Competitiveness. Geneva: World Economic Forum Available online at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-20142015/methodology/ (Accessed July 9 2016) WEF. 2016. Vietnam. Key Indicators. Performance Overview. Geneva: World Economic Forum Available online at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-20142015/economies/#economy=VNM (Accessed July 10 2016) FHNW School of Business Assessing Vietnam's Attractiveness to Swiss Companies Ellen Spinnler Page 63 of 72 World Bank. 2016. Vietnam Country Overview. Hanoi: World Bank Group Country Office Available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview (Accessed May 11 2016) World Bank. 2016. Data: How the World Bank Classifies Countries. Washington: World Bank Group Available online at: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-howdoes-the-world-bank-classify-countries (Accessed July 20 2016)", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "BOOK REVIEWS thing given in advance, does the world prove to me not only that it does not belong to me alone but that I can never fully make itany more than I can make my own life-my solitary possession. On this note, Dodd concludes, the body is ultimately for Husserl, as it was for Plato, something to be overcome. This book is brimming with insights as it creatively and painstakingly reconstructs Husserl's developing ruminations on the body. While keenly attentive to the context and import of individual texts and their place in the Husserlian corpus, the author remains a critical student of them. The laudable economy of examining the phenomenon of the body as the key to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity provides a unifying framework (though more treatment of the intersection of these problems in chapters two through four might have produced an even richer and more coherent study). For anyone trying to develop a theory of corporeity and especially for those attempting to do so against the backdrop of Husserl's thinking, Dodd's work is invaluable. Daniel Dahlstrom Boston University NOTES 1. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), §44. 2. James Dodd, Idealism and Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl's Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), p. 24; subsequent citations of this work will be given in parentheses. 3. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (Boston: Kluwer, 1982), §149. 4. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Boston: Kluwer, 1989), §145. Critique and Totality, by Pierre Kerszberg. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997,274 pp. As Pierre Kerszberg retraces Kant's critical account of the human being's confounded, if not tortured, attempts to grasp totality, the reader may occasionally lose sight of the general objectives of the book. In fact, my main criticism of the book concerns Kerszoorg's somewhat cavalier approach to presenting a clear 343 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL structure of thought. Yet, regardless of the occasional confusion, Critique and Totality is rich with insight and fresh historical perspectives. To draw the reader through the complex intellectual pilgrimage to totali ty, each of the seven cha pters progressively addresses the central role that cosmology and, relatedly, the antinomies of pure reason play in Kant's philosophy-this aspect of the book is clear enough. Further, I think there can be little doubt regarding the centrality of the antinomies and cosmology in Kant's work; as a reminder, Kerszberg cites a particularly telling passage: \"the antinomy of pure reason ... that is what aroused me from my dogmatic slumber to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the ostensible contradiction of reason with itself\" (p. 100).1 As a result, although this book would prove extremely difficult for the beginning reader of Kant, the emphasis it places on the role of totality and the antinomies of pure reason may provide the keen student with an instructive general orientation. Below, rather than criticizing or lauding Kerszberg's work, I will simply summarize what I take to be the main points of the book, leaving it up to the reader to make hislher own judgment. In the opening chapter, \"Totality, Finitude and Division,\" Kerszberg briefly explains the relationship between his book and Heidegger's work on Kant. After explicating the cosmic concept of philosophy in Kant, Kerszberg sets out to follow and expand on Heidegger's claim that transcendental knowledge cannot ground the positive sciences. To set the stage for this illumination of Heideggerian thought, in the second chapter, \"The Mathematical Dream of Philosophy,\" Kerszberg discusses some of the fundamental differences between mathematical and philosophical thought in the first Critique. In particular, Kerszberg draws our attention to two of the major outcomes of the Transcendental Analytic, the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception (AI61761B202-18). From his consideration of these two outcomes, which comprise the \"mathematical principles\" of any rational thought, Kerszberg concludes that according to the first Critique, the natural world may not be transcendentally reduced to anything more than the two fundamental forces of repulsion and attraction. Thus, by way of exclusion, Kant must conclude that the natural world may not be reduced to \"origin\" and/or \"totality.\" Nor do the notions of origin and totality admit of scientific inquiry. Rather, they must be the objects of a speculative, transcendental inquiry. Yet, necessarily concomitant to this inquiry is a prolonged, if not somewhat labyrinthine, consideration of cosmology and the antinomies of pure reason-and so the 344 BOOK REVIEWS journey towards totality properly begins. In the third chapter , \"An Experiment with Concepts,\" Kerszberg defines three central notions: cosmological ideas, the Copernican revolution, and Kant's cosmological principle. The first, cosmological ideas, are \"those transcendental ideas that refer to 'the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances'\" (p. 55; A4071B434). After having underscored the dependence of the cosmological ideas on the realm of appearances, Kerszberg argues that Kant's Copernican revolution, properly understood, falls out of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Generally put, the Copernican revolution follows because things in themselves act as hypothetical proxies, which, although they are not given in experience, help to explain our world. This is similar to the original Copernican tum: we hypothesize that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than vice versa. However, although this hypothesis is not grounded by what seems to be the case-namely, by appearancesits explanatory power is extensive. As such, Kant's Copernican revolution represents a problem for the faculty of reason simply because noumena belong to the realm of reason, not to that of experience. With the explication of Kant's Copernican reversal in place, Kerszberg goes on to define Kant's cosmological principle, which reflects a dynamic, albeit structured, picture of the universe as a whole. According to this principle, the world may be viewed as the totality of an infinite series of conditions given for appearances. However, the cosmological principle is not a principle of the understanding, because it is not subject to the limited world of experience. Nor is it a principle of reason, because it does not implore us to construct knowledge through various analogies to the world of experience. \"Rather, the cosmological principle 'serves as a rule postulating what in the regress ought to happen from us, but not anticipating what is given in the object prior to all regress'''(p. 69; A5091B537; translation modified . by Kerszberg). As such, Kerszberg explains, the cosmological principle must be understood as a combination of the faculty of reason and the faculty of understanding-it is a rule that may not anticipate. However, the cosmological principle necessarily incurs illusion, simply because reason lures us beyond the limits of experience, much as, Kant explains, our speculations about the movements of planetary orbits do (pp. 77-8; A667-731B690-1). In the fourth chapter, \"Reversing the Order of Time,\" Kerszberg begins by pointing out that within the realm of the transcendental a priori, time may be suspended. As such, the imagination is free to run either backward 345 GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL or forward through a given series of events. In doing so, the imagination must surrender a certain \"givenness\" of experience, namely, the forward motion of a sequence. In tum, all appearances may now be transcendentally viewed as \"unconditioned.\" Ultimately, the imagination reaches a certain \"remotest point,\" namely, a beginning point in time. This constitutes the reversal of the order of time. After this beginning point has been reached, both transcendental thought and thought concerning appearances may proceed forward through the series. Yet as such, a certain overlap between these two kinds of thought is invoked, at which point it may be said that the \"transcendental a priori ... is forced to mix with being\" (p. 89). Further consideration of this overlap takes us to the core of the antinomies of pure reason, for Kerszberg claims: \"The arguments developed in the four antinomies are aimed at showing that the reconstruction of immediate experience remains incomplete even from an absolute origin [namely, the beginning point above]\" (p. 89). In particular, the antinomies spotlight the inextricable confusion between the phenomena and the noumena, consti~ tuting a tragic \"point of fracture between reason and the phenomenality of the world\" (p. 91). In conjunction with this claim, Kerszberg then presents a detailed, historically informed argument to show that the first antinomy is nothing more than a declaration of the uncertainty of the relation between the thing in itself and the object of experience. In the fifth and longest chapter, \"A Logic of Illusion,\" Kerszberg begins by reminding us that the notion of the world in its totality (namely, the world as a cosmological idea) may only be an idea of reason. This is the case because, while the totality of experience is limited, its limits may never be thought as such. As a result, the \"world as totality of things is, in experience, an object without [thinkable] limit\" (p. 114). Further, after the journey through the reversal of time and the first antinomy, it is clear that this distinction between the \"world of sense\" (phenomena) and the \"world of the intellect\" (noumena) has become hopelessly blurred. Yet precisely because the world of experience is part of the totality of things, we may not say that it disintegrates due to its indeterminate nature. Rather, Kerszberg explains, there is, according to Kant, a need for some kind of determination, namely, there must be a schema for this idea. All is not lost, however, since reason may hypothesize a schema for that to which no determinate object corresponds. This is done by an analogy with the world of experience, specifically, an analogy with the \"relations between appearances\" (p. 118). After an extensive discussion of this matter, Kerszberg ultimately con346 BOOK REVIEWS eludes that \"the transcendental object is the unknowable x that I come up against when digging underneath the surface of a thing to understand it as an individual\" (p. 124). After another lengthy discussion, Kerszberg explains that this transcendental object may be constituted by means of a regressive synthesis, as a \"cosmic appearance of an appearance\" (p. 150). Nevertheless, the idea of totality has no correlate in experience, and thus, the \"critical solution\" to the first antinomy is to adopt an empirical concept as the \"standard of measure\" for totality. Kerszberg concludes that this solution is not nihilistic, but instead, preparatory. In chapter six, \"A Reversal of the Reversal,\" we discover that for which this is preparatory. Here Kerszberg shifts to a discussion of the Critique of Judgment. In this work, Kant offers a potential reconciliation between philosophy (namely, reason and noumena) and experience (namely, \"common understanding\"). This reconciliation marks the beginning of moral philosophy, leading Kerszberg into a lengthy discussion of the principle of purposiveness, which helps to bring about the \"reversal of the reversal.\" As such, the focus is once again on the immediate world of phenomena. Generally put, this occurs by \"extract[ing the principle of purposiveness] from already constituted physics and metaphysics, instead of being established in anticipation of any such constitution\" (p. 189). In the final, and shortest chapter, \"Lost Illusions,\" Kerszberg very briefly discusses concepts other than the cosmos, for these may rescue the cri tical en terpri se from the \"fragility\" of the concept of purposiveness. Generally put, Kerszberg concludes that the \"solution\" lies in the human being, for the human being is a totality that may be grasped/represented with critical limits. As such, it is the \"source of freedom and moral ends\" (p. 228). NOTES Stefanie Rocknak Boston University and University of Os nab ruck 1. Kerszberg is quoting Kant's letter to Christian Garve, 1798, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 10 (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-), p. 252. All of Kerszberg's citations from the Critique of Pure Reason are taken from the Norman Kemp Smith translation (London: Macmillan, 1929) and follow the standard 'AlB' format. References to the book under review will be given parenthetically; in those instances where Kerszberg cites Kant, I will also provide a reference to Kant following the above style. Likewise, my own citations of Kant will also follow the above format.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FO L IA G E R M A N IC A 1, 1997 Aleksandra Czechowska-Blachiewicz WELCHE ROLLE SPIELEN BEI DER ENTLEHNUNG DIE GRAMMATISCHEN EIGENSCHAFTEN? GEZEIGT AM BEISPIEL DEUTSCHER ENTLEHNUNGEN IN DER POLNISCHEN GEGENW ARTSSPRACHE G egenstand folgender U ntersuchung sind deutsche E ntlehnungen1, die im Polnischen von heute lebendig sind. Es w urden ca. 800 Beispiele untersucht, die in verschiedenen Bereichen des Alltags verwendet werden und die au f unterschiedliche Weise stilistisch m otiviert und gefärbt sind. Die wichtigsten Quellen dieser Analyse waren: Słownik języka polskiego von M. Szymczak, Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego von A. Bruckner, Słownik wyrazów obcych von J. Tokarski sowie T onbandaufnahm en und selbst durchgefiihrtc Alltagsgespräche. Die letzte Quelle war auch für meine U ntersuchung in vielen Fällen die beste und sicherste, zum al hier die M ehrdeutigkeit der Schrift nicht in Frage kom m t. Innerhalb der gegenwärtig in Polen gebrauchten W örter deutscher H erkunft kann m an drei G ruppen unterscheiden2. Die erste G ruppe um fasst W örter, bei denen einerseits eine Ä hnlichkeit in der phonetischen G estalt vorlicgt, zugleich aber entsprechende graphische V eränderungen zu verzeichnen sind, z.B.: bruderszaft (Brüderschaft), bryle (Brille), fa n t (P land), glanc/glans (G lanz)1, kapsel (Kapsel), rausz (Rausch), akselbant (Achselband), kocher (Kocher), maswerk (M asswerk), preser (Presser), U nter E ntlehnung verstehen wir W örter frem der H erkunft, die in der jeweiligen Sprache in graphischer und m orphologischer Hinsicht m odifiziert worden sind. A us m einer U ntersuchung schliesse ich die Frage nach dem U nterschied zwischen den L ehnübersetzungen, L ehnprägungen und L ehnw endungen aus, d a diese einer besondern U ntersuchung bedürfen. In diesem T ext treten auch E ntlehnungen auf, die im heutigen Polnisch salopp verstanden werden und früher vorwiegend zur Sprache der H andw erker gehörten. szpunt (Spund), zecer (Setzer) u.a. Zu dieser G ruppe gehören Entlehnungen (es sind grundsätzlich Substantiva), die nach den Regeln der polnischen Flexion dekliniert werden, z.B.: fa n t, fan ta , fantow i, fa n t, fan tem , fancie oder: kapsel, kapsla, kapslowi, kapsel, kapslem, kapslu. Viele von ihnen bilden die D erivationsbasis für polnische W ortb ildungsstruk tu ren , z.B. kartofel kartoflanka (K artoffclsuppc), cukier cukiernica (Zuckcrdose), grunt gruntowny (gründlich), pech pechowy (Pechvogel), druk drukarski (D ruck ...), drukarnia (Druckerei) u.a. Die hier besprochene Lexik um fasst Entlehnungen, die au f zweierleiweise durch das Polnische angecignet worden sind. Neben den Form en, die die grösstm ögliche Ä hnlichkeit der graphischen gestalt aufweisen, z.B.: handel Handel, rekrut Rekrut, to r f T orf, fach Fach, jubel Ju bel, haben wir solche Form en, in denen die grösstm ögliche Ä hnlichkeit (der K om petenz des polnischen Lautsystems entsprechend) in der phonetischen G estalt zu verzeichnen ist, was selbstverständlich zu den entsprechenden graphischen Veränderungen geführt hat, z.B.: Kittel kitel, A kkord akord, Fehler J'eler, Schlauch szlauch, Spitz szpic, Filz file , K lotz kloc, Setzer zecer, Pfand J'ant, Wechsel weksel, M eisterstück majstersztyk, Geschäft geszeft, K nödel knedel, Schnitzel sznycel, Giesser giser, K am m erdiener kamerdyner, Regal regal, F u tte ra l fu tera ł. Es ist anzunehm en, dass im Falle der letzten vier Beispiele die graphische G estalt als Grundlage für die E ntlehnung diente. In der zweiten G ruppe befinden sich Entlehnungen, die sowohl durch Substantiva als auch durch Verben repräsentiert werden. Die M orphem konstruktionen, die sie darstellen, bestehen aus dem deutschen G rundm orphem und einem polnischen Form ans, z.B.: blokada Blockade, kombinować kom binieren, flanca Pflanze, pasować passen, rama - R ahm en, rolować rollen u.a. M orphologische Substitutionen können in dieser G ruppe folgenderm assen zusam m engefasst werden: 1. Am produktivsten ist das Form ans -a. Die F unktion dieses Form ans ist die Z uordnung des entlehnten Substantivs zum polnischen weiblichen Paradigm a. Polonisiert wurden in erster Linie deutsche weibliche Substantiva au f -e: Felge felga, Halle hala und deutsche weibliche Substantiva auf einen K onsonanten: Schicht szychta, K lam m er klamra, Muschel muszla. Seltener polonisierte m an m it Hilfe von -a deutsche m ännliche Substantiva: F ang fanga, Raspel raszpla, R iss rysa. 2. Z ur Polonisierung diente weiter das Form ans -ka, das neben der Zureihung des W ortes zum weiblichen Paradigm a auch eine dem inutive F unktion erfüllen konnte: M utter (Schraubenm utter) muterka, K lappe klapka, F ass fa ska , Spule szpulka. 3. Z ur Polonisierung der deutschen Verben diente hauptsächlich das Form ans -owa&. jodeln jodłować, putzen pucować, schlachten szlachtować, tapezieren tapetować. 4. Seltener tritt das F orm ans -ać auf: spüren szperać, stören szturać. Die dritte G ruppe um fasst W örter, die zwar ohne Zweifel aus dem D eutschen entlehnt wurden, das G rundm orphem aber schon in den meisten Fällen eine, m orphologisch gesehen, m odifizierte F orm im Polnischen angenom m en hat4, z.B.: browar Brauerei, fa lda Falte, gmina Gemeinde, rynsztok R innstein, blacha Blech, drut D rah t, lufa Lauf, ryngraf R ingkragen u.a. Auch in dieser G ruppe überwiegen Substantiva. Neue m orphologische Substitutionen (das F orm ans -a und -ka wiederholt sich in dieser G ruppe auch, z.B.: bela Ballen, szopa Schuppen, ßszb inka Fischbein, firanka F ürhang (V orhang), die in dieser G ruppe erscheinen, sind für Substantiva: a) das Form ans -arz/erz: wachlarz Fächer, stolarz Tischler, kuśnierz K ürschner. b) das Form ans -ik /y k : lufcik Luft, Oberfenster, capstrzyk Z apfenstreich. c) das F orm ans -arka: gręplarka Krem pelm aschine, cykliniarka Ziehklingemaschinc . d) das Form ans -ówka: zelówka Sohle, szpachlówka Spachtelkitt. e) das F orm ans -nia/arnia: farbiarnia Färberei. Verben, die m an in diese G ruppe einordnen kann, haben ebenfalls das Form ans -ować angenommen, z.B.: strofować strafen, cembrować zimmern, selten -ać, z.B.: szturać stören. Adjektíva, die durch das Polnische entlehnt w urden, erscheinen m it folgenden Form ans: -ny, -owy, -owny, -ski, z.B.: felerny, trafny, pluszowy, szamotowy, frajerowaty, kunsztowny, rentowny, drukarski, szlisserski usw. Die durchgeführte Analyse lässt folgende Schlussfolgerungen ziehen: 1. Bei der Ü bernahm e des deutschen W ortgutes durch das Polnische war die phonetische G estalt vielfach entscheidend. D .h. die heute vorliegende graphische G estalt entspricht den M öglichkeiten des polnischen Lautsystem s, bestimmte K onsonanten bzw. Konsonantenverbindungen und Vokale m iteinander zu kom binieren. 2. Bei der Übernahm e verschiedener W ortarten ins Polnische konnten folgende F aktoren eine Rolle gespielt haben: a) Bei Entlehnungen, die in eine bestim mte gram m atische K lasse einordnenbar waren, m achte sich die D om inanz der phonetischen G estalt deutlich ' D ie entlehnten W örter unterscheiden sich von den deutschen Lexemen, au f d ie sie zurückzuführen sind, auch in sem antischer H insicht sehr deutlich. D er Weg, a u f welchem zur B edeutungsveränderung des jeweiligen Lexems gekom m en ist, wird später anhand von D ia lek tw örterbüchern und anderen historischen Quellen näher untersuch t werden. bem erkbar: die gram m atische Bedeutung, die sich in erster Linie im G enuswechscl ausdrückte, spielte eine sekundäre Rolle, z.B. (m) bruderszaft (0 Brüderschaft, (m) kapsel - (f) Kapsel, (m) fach - (n) Fach, (m) kartojfel, - (f) K artoffel, (m) furm an - (m) Fuhrm ann, (m) stem pel - (m) Stempel. K onsonantisch auslautende W örter wurden also m eistens als M askulina im Polnischen adaptiert. Die deutsche Form wurde in jedem Falle als N om inativform im Polnischen angenomm en. b) Die deutsche G estalt des zu entlehnenden W ortes m usste im Polnischen verändert werden, da die Entlehnungen verschiedenartigen m orphologischen A daptationen unterlagen. Es können hier folgende G ruppen unterschieden werden: b,) Substantiva, bei denen die G enuskenntnis die entscheidende Rolle spielte, z.B.: deutsche Substantiva auf -e bekamen im Polnische das Form ans -a und blieben alle feminin: (f) Felge - (0 felga, (f) Blende - (f) blenda. b2) Substantiva und Adjektíva, die im Polnischen einer differenzierterer m orphologischen A dap ta tion unterlagen, da die deutsche U rform dem polnischen W ortbildungstyp nicht entsprach, z.B.: Substantiva auf: -a, -ka, -arz/erz, -ik /yk, -arka, -nia, -arnia, darunter auch zusamm engesetzte Substantiva , z.B.: gmina Gemeinde, leberka Leberwurst, kajzerka K aisersemmel, ślusarz Schlosser, pręgierz Pranger, gwintownik G ewindebohrer, placyk Platz, hafeiarka - (m hd.) haft, waltornia W aldhorn, latarnia Laterne; A djektíva auf: -ny, -owy, -owaty, -owny, -ski, z.B.: krajeowany K reuz/krcuzcn, pluszowy Plüsch, frajerow aty frei/Freier, kunsztowny K unst, szachrajski Schacherei usw. Die semantische M otivation spielte bei vielen Entlehnungen keine Rolle. D er D em otivierungsprozess, der zu vielen K ürzungen geführt hat, m acht sich bem erkbar z.B. bei: (f) firanka - (m) Fürhang/V orhang, (m) kiermasz - (f) K irchm esse u.a. c) Verben, die durch das polnische Verbsystem assimiliert werden konnten, d .h. solche, bei denen es möglich war, zum deutschen G rundm orphem die polnische E ndung -ować bzw. -ać hinzuzufügen, z.B.: packen pakować, schätzen szacować, lackieren lakierować, spachteln szpachlować usw. Die durchgeführte Analyse sollte einen Nachweis liefern, dass der Prozess der Entlehnung aus dem Deutschen als Quellensprache sich nach ganz bestim m ten M ustern im Polnischen vollzogen hat. Dabei wollte ich insbesondere Entlehnungen, die ihre spracheigene G estalt in der Zielsprache beibehalten haben, den Entlehnungen gegenüberstellen, in denen der frem dsprachige Einfluss au f das jeweilige polnische W ort nicht immer deutlich erkennbar ist. Dieses interessante Sprachphänom en w urde hier in seiner Vielschichtigkeit ansatzweise angedeutet. Eine W eiterführung dieser A rbeit sei somit angedeutet. Aleksandra Czechowska-Blachiewicz JA K Ą R O L Ę O D G R Y W A JĄ W Z A PO Ż Y C Z E N IA C H W ŁA ŚC IW O ŚC I G R A M A T Y C Z N E ? P R Z Y K Ł A D Y N IE M IE C K IC H ZA PO ŻY C ZEŃ W PO LSK IM JĘ Z Y K U W SPÓ ŁC ZESN Y M A rtyku ł trak tu je o cechach gram atycznych niem ieckich zapożyczeń we współczesnej polszczy żnie. A naliza m ateriału leksykalnego przeprow adzana jest w trzech grupach. Pierwsza grupa obejm uje zapożyczenia o najw iększym stopniu podobieństw a fonologicznego, d ru g a grupa to deryw aty z niem iecką bazą słow otw órczą i polskim form antem , a g rupa o sta tn ia zawiera słownictwo, k tórego postać m orfologiczna uległa znacznym m odyfikacjom .", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Animal Sentience 2017.049: Browning on Birch on Precautionary Principle 1 Anecdotes can be evidence too Commentary on Birch on Precautionary Principle Heather Browning School of Philosophy Australian National University Abstract: Birch's criterion for the precautionary principle imposes a high evidential standard that many cases will fail to meet. Reliable, relevant anecdotal evidence suggestive of animal sentience should also to fall within the scope of the precautionary principle. This would minimize potential suffering (as happened in the case cephalopods) while further evidence is gathered. Heather Browning is a zookeeper and PhD candidate in the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University, working on conceptual and methodological issues in the measurement of subjective animal welfare. philrsss.anu.edu.au/profile/heather-browning 1. Scope of the precautionary principle. Birch (2017) provides a formulation of the precautionary principle as a scientific criterion to make it more applicable to animal sentience and the use of animals. He divides the principle into an epistemological component (what standards should we use to judge whether we have sufficient evidence to consider an animal most likely sentient?), which he calls BAR and a practical component (what action should we take on the basis of this evidence?), which he calls ACT. The concern with Birch's specification of BAR is that it may set an unreasonably high evidential requirement that would then rule out many of the cases in which we wish to apply the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle was originally intended to apply to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty where there is a possibility of doing great harm. According to the original document of the Commission of European Communities, it should be applied \"where scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and where there are indications that the potential effects ... may be potentially dangerous\" (cited in Croney & Millman 2007, p. 559). Birch outlines the general animal sentience precautionary principle (ASPP): \"where there are threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent those outcomes\" (3). However, the cases in which we have less than full scientific certainty vary widely, from a level of confidence less than 1 all the way down to having no idea either way (Steel 2015). Many of these cases will not fall under the conditions described in BAR: \"for the purposes of formulating animal protection legislation, there is sufficient evidence that animals of a particular order are sentient if there is statistically significant evidence, obtained by experiments that meet normal scientific standards, of the presence of at least one credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of that order\" (5). Although this is intended to be a lower than normal bar Animal Sentience 2017.049: Browning on Birch on Precautionary Principle 2 for evidence, as only a single credible indicator is required, the call for statistically significant results obtained through the process of scientific experimentation is still quite rigorous. If we accept the strong formulation of BAR, there may no longer be the uncertainty that the precautionary principle is designed to address, leaving instead just the standard scientific inference-to-the-best-hypothesis to account for the available evidence. This could be too demanding for the sentience hypothesis in many cases, thereby ruling out or deferring the protection of sentient species and causing the potential harm the principle was intended to minimize. If the precautionary principle is intended to provide \"tools and guidelines for decisions in which the science is inadequate\" (deFur & Kaszuba 2002, p. 165), then BAR will fail to rule on many such cases. So, which cases should we allow? Birch rules out applying the precautionary principle in all cases where there is no evidence – a \"default presumption of sentience\" (5) that could create significant practical roadblocks to animal use, possibly without warrant, and would undermine the role of scientific work in helping determine the scope of animal protection legislation. However, there is another set of cases between those in which we have no evidence either way and those in which we have strong scientific evidence of at least one indicator of sentience. These are the cases in which we have some indications of sentience through less rigorous observational or anecdotal evidence. This fits with Birch's comment that while \"we should require some evidence ... the bar should be set at a level low enough to avoid a prolonged period of inaction that may turn out, retrospectively, to have allowed a serious and preventable harm to occur\" (3). I suggest that reliable anecdotal evidence may be sufficient to prompt us to apply the precautionary principle in these cases, as this is an indicator of the potential for significant harm and seems to be precisely the sort of case for which this principle is intended. 2. Anecdotal evidence. Anecdotal evidence has frequently been criticised as unscientific, too subjective, and prone to bias and anthropomorphism, leading to misinterpretation of the observations (Bekoff 2000, Heyes 1998, Moore & Stilgoe 2009). However, the use of carefully selected observations and anecdotes can overcome some of these issues. Bates & Byrne (2007) argue that carefully collected anecdotes can form a valuable source of information – \"the plural of anecdote can be data\" (14). Rollin (1997) argues that the use of anecdotal evidence is appropriate so long as there is a plausible link from the story to the inference made, supported by common sense and background knowledge. Use of any story from someone who has encountered a member of the species of interest is clearly insufficient, but repeated independent observations by researchers and husbandry professionals deeply familiar with the species should not be dismissed so lightly. This is the case for much work in animal cognition and behavioural ecology where rare observations of particular behaviour patterns may be all the evidence available. Russon & Galdikas (1993) used the analysis of a large collection of single observations of spontaneous behaviour in order to establish the capacity for imitation in orangutans – something that had frequently been observed but never scientifically accepted because of the 'anecdotal' nature of the reports and the inability to replicate results in a lab setting. Bates & Byrne (2007) describe the case of studies of infanticide: when researchers started looking into the cases described, they found that hunters and explorers had been witnessing the events for a century, \"but each single observation had been rejected as anecdotal and unsubstantiated\" (13). Wider sampling Animal Sentience 2017.049: Browning on Birch on Precautionary Principle 3 and observation confirmed these early observations: \"If these anecdotes had been ignored, we would still be blind to the causes and consequences of this highly significant behaviour\" (14). In cases like these, the right sort of anecdotal evidence may be the best source of evidence we have available: \"if no formal evidence can be found, then anecdotal information provides the best and only information on which to base our understanding and decisions\" (Enkin & Jadad 1998, p. 965). Anecdotal evidence is often cited as a good source of information to derive testable hypotheses and guide the direction of future study (Bekoff 2000, Burghardt 1985, Kamil 1988). This is useful precisely because well-collected anecdotal evidence often points at features that will later be confirmed through more rigorous scientific analysis. Where this is likely to be the case, we have a reason to apply the precautionary principle on the basis of reliable anecdotal evidence. 3. Lesson from the case of cephalopods. An example in which the precautionary principle could have been usefully applied in the face of long-running anecdotal evidence is the cephalopods (octopuses, squid and cuttlefish). Popular accounts and observations have long noted the cognitive abilities of octopuses (see anecdotal evidence described by Moynihan 1997, and stories collected by Linden 2002); however, underperformance in experimental settings led to these stories being ignored by researchers in favour of reductionist explanations that did not require intelligence or sentience. Godfrey-Smith (2016) suggests that the reason the experimental work failed to capture cephalopod abilities may have been the unpredictable nature of octopuses, who do not settle quietly into laboratory settings and often \"turn the apparatus around them to their own octopodean purposes\" (52). They often seem unmotivated to participate in experiments that are not interesting to them. More recent work has provided strong evidence to corroborate the earlier anecdotes and the presence of sentience (see e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2016, Catalani 2008, Vitti 2013, Ikeda 2009, Godfrey-Smith 2013, Mather 2008). Cephalopods have been widely used in scientific research for over a century (Fiorito et al. 2015). Although the UK has had animal protection legislation in place since 1876, this was not extended to cephalopods until the inclusion of Octopus vulgaris in 1993 and all cephalopods in the recent revision of European standards that took effect in 2013 (Andrews 2011). Canada included cephalopods in their 1991 regulations, New Zealand in 1999, some Australian states in 2004, Switzerland in 2008, and Norway in 2009 (Smith et al. 2013). The change to the European standards followed the examination of the evidence (Fiorito et al. 2015) from anatomy, physiology and behaviour) \"of cephalopods' ability to experience pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm\" (Smith et al. 2013). The change following this legislation was immediate and measurable. Between 2005 and 2011 (prior to the legislation), at least 370 papers on cephalopods were published by EU researchers using methods that could cause pain and suffering (Smith et al. 2013); between 2013 and 2015 no such invasive cephalopod studies were conducted (Fiorito et al. 2015). Had the precautionary principle been used earlier, based on the large body of anecdotal and observational evidence, this may have prevented much of what is now known to be pain and suffering for cephalopods. 4. Conclusion. Statistically significant experimental evidence may be the gold standard for validating the sentience of animals studied, but this may be too demanding for the application Animal Sentience 2017.049: Browning on Birch on Precautionary Principle 4 of the precautionary principle. Where we have relevant anecdotal or observational evidence that the animals are likely to be sentient, from reliable people familiar with the species, this should be accepted not only as a guide for future research, but as grounds for applying the precautionary principle and being more careful in our use of these animals until we have greater certainty. This proposal is compatible with a proportionality principle (Steel 2015) in which we scale the type of action taken to correspond to the degree of available evidence. Hence it does not necessarily entail costly action. That way we could minimise potential harm more effectively and avoid what happened with the cephalopods. References Andrews, P.L.R. (2011). Laboratory invertebrates: only spineless, or spineless and painless? ILAR Journal. 52: 121-125 Bates, L.A. & Byrne, R.W. (2007). Creative or created: Using anecdotes to investigate animal cognition. Methods. 42: 12-21 Bekoff, M. (2000). Animal emotions: Exploring passionate natures. BioScience. 50: 861-870 Birch, J. (2017). Animal sentience and the precautionary principle. Animal Sentience 16(1) Burghardt, G.M. (1985). Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective. American Psychologist. 40: 905-919 Catalani, J. (2008). Cephalopod intelligence. American Paleontologist. 16: 35-39 Croney, C.C. & Millman, S.T. (2007). The ethical and behavioural bases for farm animal welfare legislation. Journal of Animal Science. 85: 556-565 deFur, P.L. & Kaszuba, M. (2002). Implementing the precautionary principle. The Science of the Total Environment. 288: 155-165 Enkin, M.W. & Jadad, A.R. (1998). Using anecdotal information in evidence-based health care: Heresy or necessity? Annals of Oncology. 9: 963-966 Fiorito, G., Affuso, A., Basil, J., Cole, A., de Girolamo, P., D'Angelo, L., Dickel, L., Gestal, C., Grasso, F., Kuba, M. & Mark, F. (2015). Guidelines for the care and welfare of cephalopods in research – A consensus based on an initiative by CephRes, FELASA and the Boyd Group. Laboratory Animals. 49: 1-90. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2013). Cephalopods and the evolution of the mind. Pacific Conservation Biology. 19: 4-9 Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016). Other Minds: The octopus, the sea, and the deep origins of consciousness. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux Heyes, C.M. (1993). Anecdotes, training, trapping and triangulating: do animals attribute mental states? Animal Behaviour. 46: 177-188 Ikeda, Y. (2009). A perspective on the study of cognition and sociality of cephalopod mollusks, a group of intelligent marine invertebrates. Japanese Psychological Research. 51: 146-153 Kamil, A. (1987). A synthetic approach to the study of animal intelligence. Papers in Behaviour and Biological Sciences. 14: 257-308 Linden, E. (2002). The Octopus and the Orangutan. New York: Dutton Mather, J.A. (2008). Cephalopod consciousness: behavioural evidence. Consciousness and Cognition. 17: 37-48 Animal Sentience 2017.049: Browning on Birch on Precautionary Principle 5 Moore, A. & Stilgoe, J. (2009). Experts and anecdotes: the role of 'anecdotal evidence' in public scientific controversies. Science, Technology and Human Values. 34: 654-677 Moynihan, M.H. (1997). Self-awareness, with specific references to coleoid cephalopods. In R.W. Mitchell, N.S. Thompson & H.L. Miles (eds.). Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 213-219 Rollin, B.E. (1997). Anecdote, anthropomorphism, and animal behaviour. In R.W. Mitchell, N.S. Thompson & H.L. Miles (eds.). Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 125-133 Russon, A.E. & Galdikas, B.M. (1993). Imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology. 107: 147-147 Smith, J.A., Andrews, P.L., Hawkins, P., Louhimies, S., Ponte, G. & Dickel, L. (2013). Cephalopod research and EU Directive 2010/63/EU: Requirements, impacts and ethical review. Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology. 44: 31-45. Steel, D. (2015). Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Vitti, J.J. (2013). Cephalopod cognition in an evolutionary context: Implications for ethology. Biosemiotics. 6: 393-401 ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will host a conference on Animal Consciousness. This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are nonhuman mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness and vice versa? What are the best methods for assessing consciousness in nonhuman animals? Speakers and panelists include: Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology), Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience), Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 8th St). Friday sessions will include \"Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness\", \"Do fish feel pain?\", and \"Animal consciousness and ethics\". Saturday sessions will include \"Animal self-consciousness\", \"Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness\", and a panel discussion. A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. Registration is free but required. Register here. See also the conference website.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "23 Metascience ISSN 0815-0796 Volume 21 Number 2 Metascience (2012) 21:321-330 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9672-3 Sympathy for the devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's empiricism Erik C. Banks 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your work, please use the accepted author's version for posting to your own website or your institution's repository. You may further deposit the accepted author's version on a funder's repository at a funder's request, provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after publication. SURVEY REVIEW Sympathy for the devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's empiricism John Blackmore, Ryoichi Itagaki and Setsuko Tanaka (eds): Ernst Mach's Prague. Bethesda and Tokyo: Sentinel Open Press, 2010, 476pp, $40.00 HB John Blackmore, Ryoichi Itagaki and Setsuko Tanaka (eds): Ernst Mach's philosophy: Pro and Con. Bethesda and Tokyo: Sentinel Open Press, 2009, 252pp, $25.00 HB Erik C. Banks Published online: 9 March 2012 \u0002 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Aristotle claimed that the sign of an educated mind was the ability to entertain a thought without accepting it. Yet, as we all know, sometimes we encounter a position so foreign to our own ways of thinking that even entertaining it is impossible. John Blackmore, over his long career of writing about the life, work and influence of Ernst Mach, has never been able to see anything of value in Mach's philosophical writings, and what is more, his historical coverage of Mach's career is often punctuated with tirades against what Blackmore calls Mach's ''phenomenalism,'' the belief in the reality of human sense experience and literally nothing else. Blackmore reiterates that view in Ernst Mach's Philosophy Pro and Con, his first book devoted exclusively to Mach's philosophy, along with a recent offering about Ernst Mach's Prague. In previous work, Blackmore has identified as an historian and claimed to avoid taking sides in philosophical disputes, but this has never been entirely true. It seems he cannot resist promulgating an erroneous, though widely shared, reading of Mach's philosophy that has damaged Mach's reputation for more than one hundred years, and one that I have tried to set straight in my (2003) and will again in this essay. Before getting to that, I will say that Blackmore's work purely as an historian has been exemplary and does certainly demonstrate his ability to serve as a neutral judge. He has done a great deal to get all of the evidence out there and even publishes documents by Mach himself and writings by others, which do not square with Blackmore's reading of Mach's philosophy. Since his 1972 biography of Mach, Blackmore published a selection from Mach's Correspondence in 1985 (with Klaus Hentschel), an excellent collection of essays called Ernst Mach-A Deeper Look in 1992, and Ernst Mach's Vienna in 2001. A fifth volume, called Ernst E. C. Banks (&) Wright State University, 3640 Colonel Glenn Hwy, Dayton, OH 45435, USA e-mail: Erik.Banks@wright.edu 123 Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9672-3 Author's personal copy Mach's Science (2006), was published in Japan by Tokai University Press. Recently, Blackmore has been releasing self-published volumes, along with his collaborators Ryoichi Itagaki and Setsuko Tanaka. The quality of these collections is not as high as that of the other volumes, which were presumably strengthened by the peer review process. Nevertheless, there are many good things here, including detailed materials on Mach's assistants and students in Prague, with a supplemental detailed essay by Emilie Těšınská, an account of Mach's work on shock waves, citing recent work by Christoph Hoffmann, and a chapter on the relationship between Mach and the chemist František Wald, including a translation of their correspondence. Blackmore has also included a useful catalog of Mach's correspondence. The only fault I have with Blackmore the historian is his neglect of the Notizbücher, which reveal Mach's mind at work. Blackmore says that the Notebooks are misleading, since we only have them dated roughly by year, and no one has keyed them exactly to the time and place of writing. Blackmore has used this excuse to dismiss notebook entries in which Mach acknowledges elements not given in sensory observation, doubts about his opposition to atoms, and other entries that fill out and inform his published writings. It is true that these Notebooks cover a long development, with many twists and turns and changes of mind, but they are surely important documents for those who would understand Mach's philosophy. As I said, this has never been Blackmore's goal, but he has also refused to remain neutral on the matter, expressing himself on philosophical matters of epistemological realism versus empiricism, with no serious scholarly study of the positions he defends or attacks. These rumblings and fulminations would not be acceptable as professional contributions to philosophy. He simply describes his own position of indirect realism and says that all other views are absurd because they are unscientific, as if there were only one philosophy of science, a distortion he would never fall victim to if this were his area of expertise. He gives grotesque counterexamples to his strawman ''Machian phenomenalism,'' such as the fact that objects grow and shrink in the visual field, which Blackmore thinks forces Mach to believe that the objects really are of different shapes and sizes. But this is just a howler. Mach answers this objection succinctly in the Analysis of Sensations (1959) by distinguishing the sensory appearance from its cognitive interpretation as an object in space, and indeed one that appears perspectively from different points of observation, as it should. Mach also says that there are no ''sense illusions'' properly speaking because sense appearances, as they are given, do not represent anything truly or falsely; again, this is a matter of further cognitive inference from the appearance to the object it is supposed to represent. Likewise, Blackmore faults Kant's empirical realism and transcendental idealism about space because we can take photographs of objects when no one is looking and the objects are still pictured in space and time. But that's what Kant means by calling space empirically real. A spatio-temporal representation of nature is always possible and always objectively valid, not just when someone is there to observe it. Space and time are transcendentally ideal simply because this is not the only objective representation of nature; other thinking beings may use different, equally objective, representations. Space and time are thus objective, but not uniquely so. Blackmore's 322 Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 123 Author's personal copy ''subjective idealist'' reading of Kant is a beginner's error, easily corrected by studying the many fine scholarly works about the Critique. Of course, many people trained in other fields hold forth on philosophy; outsiders believe philosophy is a subject where no special training or knowledge is needed and only opinion reigns. Even brilliant scientists like Stephen Hawking or Richard Feynman never seem to get much beyond ''if a tree falls...'' In the case of Mach, this was decidedly not so. Despite his own protestations to the contrary, Mach was a major philosophical thinker and natural philosopher who devoted considerable time and effort to developing his philosophico-scientific worldview. His primary emphasis was not on sensations per se but on monism, on one philosophical and scientific conception of the world, which led him to include sensations among physical events, considering sensation as real as energy, force or a physical body, where materialists, and representative indirect realists alike, had dismissed sensations as mental, subjective and unreal. Bertrand Russell recognized Mach's ''service to philosophy'' as the idea that ''what is experienced may be part of the physical world and often is so'' (Banks 2003, 151). Sensations thus have a double interpretation, as experiences and as physical events. But Mach also thought that mind-independent elements of the physical world existed, similar to sensations, but bound up in mind-independent complexes by dynamic, functional relations with each other, governed by laws (Banks 2003). Sensations are just a special class of these general elements when they occur in the human nervous system, which is why he (1959, 16) explicitly recommends using the more general word ''element'' over the word ''sensation'' to head off the misunderstanding. Mach was thus the originator of a lesser known but important philosophical position, sometimes known as neutral monism, which influenced William James and Bertrand Russell and which has made a recent comeback in the philosophy of mind (Banks 2010). Despite these ties, and plainly realist tendencies, Mach is still associated with the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle, originally the Ernst Mach Verein. Authors from Paul Feyerabend to Friedrich Stadler to myself have fought against this reading by carefully distinguishing Mach's nuanced position from the cruder logico-linguistic positivism of Carnap and the Circle. As we have urged, Mach's philosophy deserves to be treated with far more respect than is evidenced by historians and philosophers, who still almost universally regard him as a rather simplistic positivist, phenomenalist, idealist (pick your label), forerunner of the Vienna Circle. That this is still the state of play, no thanks to Blackmore himself, even after so much work has been done to correct it, does not say much about our appreciation of such a pivotal historical figure. And Mach is indeed a major figure. Even if the subtleties did not always come across to his readers, then as now, there is no doubt that Mach's empiricism played a major role in twentieth century science by any standard: both Einstein's relativity of simultaneity and Heisenberg's representation of the atom as a matrix of ''observable quantities'' were probably influenced in some way by Mach, even while he simultaneously hindered the acceptance of the atomic theory and the kinetic interpretation of thermodynamics through his misguided belief that atoms were metaphysical Kantian things in themselves that could never be observed, not even in principle (Banks 2003, 12–13). When he was disabused of this bizarre notion, by observing scintillations on a Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 323 123 Author's personal copy screen in 1903 or thereabouts, he seems to have accepted atoms, finally, as ''not occult,'' but little objects continuous with sensory experience, although he may still have regarded his elements as more fundamental than atoms at some deeper level, perhaps in their innards (Banks 2003). Now let's do a little harmless historical comparison. Would Mach have preferred Heisenberg's matrix atoms to the billiard ball model? Mach reached his own negative appraisal of atoms in 1872, and even earlier, by reflecting that the spectral lines of the chemical elements required more degrees of freedom of vibration than simple billiard ball atoms could possibly execute in three dimensions. His correspondence with Wald in Ernst Mach's Prague indicated that he still approved of such a view, relating observable quantities in a multidimensional tabular arrangement as a substitute for atomism. Does that make Mach an actual precursor of Heisenberg and the quantum mechanical atom, a step beyond Planck and Boltzmann's indirect realism? Not by a long shot. But as my little example shows, it is easy to turn the tables by picking your period in the history of science, picking your heroes, picking your preferred philosophy of science and its triumphs, as Planck and Boltzmann are Blackmore's heroes. But should one have heroes and villains in such a complex Shakespearian story with so many reversals of fortune? In the period of Einstein and Perrin, a realist philosophy of science seems the way to go. In the period of the quantum theory and the 1927 Solvay Conference, Heisenberg's and Bohr's empiricism triumphed over Einstein's indirect realism, culminating in Bohr's refutation of EPR, not to mention the later work by J. S. Bell, which put another nail in the coffin of indirect realism, at least about hidden variables. A philosopher of science like Arthur Fine (placed in the ''pro-Mach'' camp by Blackmore), who draws his inspiration from this later period, can thus be fully informed about the facts of science and be anti-''realist.'' Lesson: science does not vindicate any one philosophical view: positivism, indirect realism, historico-constructivism, name your poison. Blackmore is just wrong to claim that the indirect realism of Planck, Boltzmann and Einstein and his other heroes is the only legitimate view. He is just not representing the philosophy of science in a professional way. I have not even mentioned what many consider Mach's greatest impact on science, the infamous Mach's Principle which played such a key role in Einstein's thinking about general relativity, but which Einstein was forced to discard. This is a whole area of study, and there are so many versions of the principle that the reader must turn to a volume like Barbour and Pfister (1995) for an overview. The coinage ''Mach's Principle'' is certainly not Mach's own, nor should he be associated with these many later formulations. As John Norton (in Barbour and Pfister 1995) pointed out, Mach never proposed that inertial effects, say on Newton's rotating bucket of water, were caused by the gravitational pull of distant bodies, through instantaneous action at a distance, as Einstein believed for a time.1 Blackmore seems not to know of Norton's essay, instead falling headlong into Einstein's reading in an essay he appends to Ernst Mach's Prague. It also never occurs to him that Mach might have 1 He only suggests the idea very vaguely: ''the natural investigator must feel the need of further insight of knowledge of the immediate connections, say of the masses of the universe. There will hover before him as an ideal an insight into the principles of the whole matter, from which accelerated motions and inertial motions result in the same way'' (1960, 296). 324 Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 123 Author's personal copy rejected this reading when Einstein communicated it to him in a letter. Blackmore thinks Mach rejected Einstein's general theory because he rejected all theories, a wildly irresponsible charge, which can be refuted with the simplest look into any of Mach's scientific books or papers. Conveniently, when one resorts to simplistic accusations, one does not have to do the hard work to examine the deeper scientific issues and arguments. On a closer read, Mach merely said that the two cases, rotating universe/still bucket and rotating bucket/still universe, were the same case described twice but only given once (1960, 284). Inertial resistance in one reference frame is replaced by a gravitational force in another reference frame, but he is silent as to why, and he certainly never says that gravity acts instantaneously at a distance from the distant bodies to the bucket. He merely thinks that there is no absolute frame of reference, or state of motion, and so the invariant physical phenomena will rearrange themselves so that the two situations are symmetrical, which Norton calls the redescription argument. Mach also wished for an elimination of space and time from physics, first by relativizing accelerated reference frames, and then by reformulating physical laws without mentioning space and time at all (Norton in Barbour and Pfister 1995; Banks 2002). Today, I prefer to think of Mach as recommending a principle of physical invariance coupled with a universal relativity of reference frames, in the tradition of Leibniz. In Specimen Dynamicum, Leibniz showed that an elastic collision, say between two billiard balls, can be relativized even to accelerated reference frames, where the elastic deformation of the ball can be viewed either as an acceleration or a deceleration and what he called the passive (inertia, elasticity) and active forces (kinetic energy) switch places accordingly. Einstein's own achievement in special relativity, of relativizing the electromagnetic field to the Lorentz transformations, follows the same strategy. The field exchanges its electric and magnetic field components depending on the relative motion of the observer, showing that the physical phenomenon of the combined electromagnetic field is indifferent to the motion of the reference frame from which it is viewed. The principle of equivalence is yet another example of an exchange between inertial resistance to acceleration in one localized reference frame and the presence of a uniform gravitational field arising out of empty space in the other. This is supposedly non-Machian because there is no source body for the fictitious uniform gravitational field (Renn 1994), and yet it conforms completely to the spirit of Mach's defense of universal physical invariance, since there is no absolute space either. There is an invariant inertial-gravitational field, as in the case of electromagnetism and the Lorentz transformations; but while this field fills space, or is space, it is not absolute, nor does it require action at a distance from distant masses or bodies, since its inertial-gravitational effects are purely local. I do not know if Mach could have accepted Einstein's much later concept of space as the field, even a field invariant in all moving reference frames. The field concept was not so well established in his day, but Mach, full of surprises as ever, was capable of speculating that the medium of space might be responsible for inertia like a kind of molasses, as long as it was reference-frame invariant molasses. He even says in the Mechanics that he is open to the concept of an inertia-producing medium, as long as it is not identified with Newton's absolute space (1960, 282–283). It now seems to me that a physically invariant inertial field would indeed have been music to his ears. Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 325 123 Author's personal copy I now want to pass to Blackmore's book Ernst Mach's Philosophy: Pro and Con. This is a collection of reactions to Mach's philosophy, which the editors have grouped into those they feel are supportive of Mach and those that are in opposition to him. Since these quotations are all available from other sources, including my own essay on functionalism that was reworked as a Synthese article (Banks 2004), I will concentrate on the three introductory essays by Blackmore specifically about Mach's philosophy. As I said, Blackmore characterizes Mach's position as ''phenomenalism,'' which is the view that only human sensations exist, that theories are nothing but economized lists of individual observations, and that the external world of mind-independent space, time and objects does not exist except as a ''thought symbol'' for groupings of human sensations. Blackmore contrasts phenomenalism with what he calls indirect realism, sometimes representative realism when he wishes to emphasize epistemology. On this view, we subscribe to a basic dualism: there is a real, mind-independent and objective external world of atoms, space and time, law and causality on which scientists can agree and of which they obtain knowledge through experiment and theorizing. On the other side are sensations, which differ from observer to observer, and are mental. We have only an indirect picture of the real world in our sensations, which, though mental, are linked somehow to external reality via a causal chain, or representative theory of perception. According to Blackmore, all scientists Descartes, Galileo, Locke, Newton, Planck, Einstein, along with all right-thinking ''practical people''(?) are partisans of indirect realism. It is true that we all fall backward into naıve realism from time to time, mistaking our sensations of objects for the real objects external to our minds, but, like Empedocles, we quickly learn that what we see and taste is different from what others see and taste in the same object, and so we learn to be indirect realists instead. So far as it goes, indirect realism does accurately describe the commonsensical epistemological starting point of most philosophers, including empiricists like Mach. So what changed? In fact, Mach tells us clearly that after reading Kant's Prolegomena at fifteen, he began to have doubts about whether nature an sich really had to be pictured in a spatio-temporal way, as little atomistic objects moving around in space and time. Kant of course had stressed the transcendental ideality of space and time when these forms of human sensibility and imagination were applied to things in themselves. That Kantian idea would always be important for Mach, who stressed that we should not naively extend our sensory imagination and intuition to nature, lest we make unconscious ''metaphysical'' or disguised sensory additions to our science, adding excess baggage and misleading us.2 Mach soon had a powerful experience of monism, which convinced him to toss out the thing in itself and embrace one undivided view of reality, in which human sensations of color or sound could be considered just as real as the physical objects in the external world, and in which there would be no dualism between the mental and the physical. At the same time, the central problem of the causal or 2 As I have written in my (2003), 'metaphysics' for Mach does not mean unobserved, or abstract, but rather refers to this error of injecting sensory imagery and visualizations into scientific results and models which the results do not sanction. 326 Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 123 Author's personal copy representative theory of perception would be solved, since there would be nothing problematic about a world where sensations interacted with objects sharing the same world, as opposed to the Cartesian problem of a causal relation bridging two utterly separate realms of the mental and the physical. Mach's monism thus made it impossible for him to accept the indirect realism or interactionism of the seventeenth century philosopher scientists. He had to find for himself a unified scientific world view in which sensations, which he studied extensively in his psychophysics (of light, color, sound, time, space and movement sensation), were just as real as the objects of the physical world. Contemporary philosophers of mind rediscovered this problem one hundred years later under the rubric of physicalism and qualia, asking whether sensations are not, after all, real and, if they are, how such things as colors and sounds can fit into a physicalist world view, which seems to have no room for them. Then, as now, this monist intuition puts pressure on orthodox physicalism, demanding a more inclusive view of the physical, which I have elsewhere called enhanced physicalism (Banks 2010). I trace the basic arguments for an enhanced physicalism back to Mach, as their originator.3 At about the same time, Mach began his researches into the history of science. He began to be suspicious of a priori knowledge and of the use of auxiliary models or picture thinking. Mach showed ruthlessly one by one, in the case of Archimedes' law of the lever, the principle of the superposition of forces, of virtual velocities, Helmholtz's purported proof of the conservation of energy, how the argument made empirical presuppositions, often of a very subtle nature, and presupposed exactly what it claimed to prove a priori. So complete was Mach's demolition of these arguments that one never hears the law of inertia or conservation of energy cited as a priori principles, as was quite common up until Mach's time. Another lesson he learned from his historical studies was that the various models scientists use to visualize and obtain their results often prove to be badly off the mark. The attempt to picture heat as an actual fluid called ''caloric'' had permitted the derivation of several results including Carnot's stunning deduction of the maximum efficiency for heat engines. And yet caloric did not exist, the model Carnot used for visualization of heat flowing ''downhill'' from hot to cold like water flowing over a mill while conserved in quantity, later had to be given up as a false picture or analogy, refuted by the experiments of Joule and Mayer. The history of science is replete with examples of subtle fluids, elastic media, billiard balls, hidden springs and gear wheels, which turn out to be misleading analogies, or picture thinking. Mach was always suspicious of those extras, trying to stick as much as possible to what he called ''phenomenological physics.'' Phenomenological physics was not a list of individual experiences, nor was it inductive, but rather could involve highly general, abstract and theoretical postulates of experience such as the first and second laws of thermodynamics, the principle of least action in mechanics, or Fermat's law of least time, independent of any realizing mechanisms, pictures, stories or model of the underlying processes. It is very wrong to say, as Blackmore does, that Mach disdained theories. No, he extolled them, and the more general and unifying the better. True, Mach failed to see that in the case of atoms the explanatory story was 3 Although Leibniz and Kant deserve some credit, as do Richard Avenarius and W. K. Clifford. Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 327 123 Author's personal copy beginning to converge on the same picture from several different quarters, although he purportedly said to Einstein that he was willing to countenance the atomic hypothesis as a unifying explanation for different ranges of phenomena, since this did not violate his view of the role of theories (Blackmore 1992, 152–153, quoting Phillip Frank). That debate still continues in some quarters, at least between those empiricists who still emphasize the explanatory unification of natural phenomena under the fewest number of laws, hypotheses and postulates, and those entityrealists who believe that science is the discovery of unobserved entities and mechanisms, the erector set of the universe. Both sides have their historical victories and embarrassing failures, and most scientists pursue both goals simultaneously. There are also more advanced empiricists, such as Bas Van Fraassen and Arthur Fine, who take a ''natural ontological attitude'' of realism about entities and models (similar to Kant's empirical realism), from the inside, or from the state of present knowledge, say about electrons, but who reject transcendental claims about the world an sich, or about future theories, God's eye views or what have you. Mach's solution to the problem of the unity of science took the form of a new kind of monism, which, as noted already, Russell later called ''neutral monism'' (Banks 2003, 2004, 2010). Materialist monism says that all is matter, making no room for mental phenomena. Idealistic monism says that all is an idea or a sensation in a mind, making matter a mere bundle of sensations and denying a mindindependent external world. Mach proposed a third option. The solution, Mach said, was to adopt elements, which started out as forceful, energetic qualities in dynamical relations to one another, and which he had found in the philosophy of J F Herbart, one of his early mentors (Banks 2003). Some of these elements came together in combination and formed human sensations, in manifolds of color, sound, sight, touch. Others of these elements formed mind-independent physical objects not dependent on minds, but causally continuous with sense experience, unlike the Ding an sich. In themselves, the elements were neutral, but became mental or physical depending on the kind of complex they were involved in. And really there is not much difference between complexes either except for the names; really, they could all be considered natural elements and complexes. In each case, as Mach insisted, we have to do with nothing but elements in various functional relations with each other. The added elements of the world independent of the mind are for Mach, not a new or foreign addition. Behind the world of observation, one simply finds more observations (figuratively speaking), more interactions, more elements of the same kind as those we encounter in experience. For Mach, there never was a line drawn between these world elements and the ego and its sensations. As Mach clarifies in his late masterpiece Knowledge and Error (1976), you get such artificial barriers between ego and world by dividing up what is really an indivisible fabric of experience-reality. I thus think of Mach's view as a kind of realism, a realistic empiricism, enhanced by the addition of realistic mind-independent elements. As I have shown in detail, Mach's position is perfectly consistent with James' radical empiricism and Russell's neutral monism, with very minor differences (Banks 2003). In his Analysis of Sensations, and in the conclusions to all of his scientific books, Mach describes laying out the contents of the universe, sensations in the mind right 328 Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 123 Author's personal copy alongside the physical elements of the brain, body and the physical environment on one giant causal network, linked together by functions of various kinds to be discovered by science. What is true in indirect realism is still true here; there is indeed an indirect causal chain between elements making up external objects and sensations in the human nervous system. These objects are continuous with perception and constructed in an empiricist way from the unobserved elements, not bundles of present sensation, as Blackmore believes. But more abstract functional relations are permitted than spatio-temporal ones, including tabular and matrix-like arrangements. We are not bound to mental images or visualizations. There is no dualism, but there is a direct experience of the natural world in sensations, which exist in their own right, and not just mentally. Everything one wanted from indirect realism is preserved and everything that is unwanted, the dualism, the interactionism, the lack of causal continuity, the picture thinking, is eliminated. It is a stunning piece of work and does induce an awesome sense of calm and contemplation. But one question remains: what are these elements? Tiny energy quanta? Event particulars, a la Russell? Leibniz's petites perceptions? Feyerabend (1984) thought Mach's elements were ''even more fundamental than atoms.'' Mach thought the question was open to future investigation, not stipulation; so, true to form, he never answered it. Predictably, others rushed into fill the void. Elements are just another word for sensations, said Lenin in Empiricism and EmpirioCriticism, mere wordplay. I suppose the majority of interpreters have done the same: read Mach, scratched their heads at this new term ''elements'' and concluded that elements are just another word for sensations for what else could they be? And they cannot be convinced otherwise, since, pace Aristotle, they cannot conceive what is inconceivable for them. Like everyone, I have my own blind spots in philosophy: I do not get medieval theology, or why Hume thinks I cannot rationally prefer the scratching of my little finger to the destruction of the world (and my little finger). So I stay away. I do not have a dog in those fights. I think Blackmore would have done better to stick to the historical work at which he has succeeded so well. Scholars of Mach's works (including the present author) have much to thank him for. Scholars of Mach as a philosopher must look elsewhere. References Banks, Erik. 2002. Ernst Mach's 'new theory of matter' and his definition of mass. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33: 605–635. Banks, Erik. 2003. Ernst Mach's world elements: a study in natural philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Banks, Erik. 2004. The philosophical roots of Ernst Mach's economy of thought. Synthese 139: 23–53. Banks, Erik. 2010. Neutral monism reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23: 173–187. Barbour, Julian, and Herbert Pfister (eds.). 1995. Mach's principle: Newton's bucket to quantum gravity. Boston: Birkhäuser. Blackmore, John (ed.). 1992. Ernst Mach: a deeper look: Documents and new perspectives. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Feyerabend, Paul. 1984. Mach's theory of research and its relation to Einstein. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 15: 1–22. Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 329 123 Author's personal copy Mach, Ernst. 1959. The analysis of sensations and the relation of the physical to the psychical. (Fifth edn.) (trans: Williams, C.M., Sidney Waterlow). New York: Dover. Mach, Ernst. 1960. The science of mechanics in its development. 6th English edition. (trans: Thomas McCormack). Chicago: Open Court. Mach, Ernst. 1976. Knowledge and error. (trans: Thomas McCormack, Paul Foulkes). Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Renn, Jürgen. 1994. The third way to general relativity. Max Planck Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, pre-print no 9. 330 Metascience (2012) 21:321–330 123 Author's personal copy", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Modal Set Theory* Christopher Menzel 1 Modal Set Theory and Traditional Modal Metaphysics Set theory is the study of sets using the tools of contemporary mathematical logic. Modal set theory draws in particular upon contemporary modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility. One simple and obvious motivation for modal set theory is the fact that, from a realist perspective that takes the existence of sets seriously, sets have philosophically interesting modal properties. For instance, perhaps the most notable and distinctive property of sets is their extensionality: sets a and b are identical if they have exactly the same members; formally, where we take variables from the lower end of the alphabet to range over sets: Ext ∀a∀b(∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ∈ b) → a = b). Intuitively, however, extensionality is not a contingent matter, a mere matter of happenstance. Rather, there simply couldn't have been distinct sets that shared all their members; there is no such possible world. That is, at a minimum, we want to be able to express that extensionality is a necessary truth: □Ext □∀a∀b(∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ∈ b) → a = b). Clearly, however, there is much more than this to the modal connection between sets and their members. For note that, for all □Ext tells us, one and the same set a could have vastly different members from one world to the next, so long as it remains the case that, in each world, no other set has exactly the same members as a in that world. Intuitively, however, the intimate connection between a set and its members is maintained across worlds; if a set has Angela Merkel, say, as a member, it could not possibly have failed to have her as a member. Sets, that is to say, have their members essentially; if x is a member of a, then it is a member of a in every world in which a * The author is grateful to Øystein Linnebo, Neil Barton, and John Wigglesworth for helpful and illuminating comments on earlier drafts of this entry. 2 exists, i.e., in every world in which something is identical to a; formally, letting E!t abbreviate ∃y y = t, for terms t: E∈ □∀a∀x(x ∈ a → □(E!a → x ∈ a)), Likewise, non-membership; a set cannot \"add\" new members in one world that it lacks in another: E∉ □∀a∀x(x ∉ a → □(E!a → x ∉ a)). A related philosophical issue is not settled by the preceding principles. Suppose x is a member of a set a here in the actual world and that a exists in some other possible world w. Then by E∈, x is a member of a in w. But nothing follows about x's existence in w. For all we know from E∈, all sets might exist necessarily, even those that have contingent members, members that might not themselves have existed. Hence, if that is so, the singleton set {Merkel}, for example, would have existed even if Merkel hadn't. However, on most conceptions of set, sets are ontologically dependent upon their members and, hence, could not themselves exist without their members existing; there could be no singleton set {Merkel} without Merkel. On such a conception, then, we are in need of a further modal principle: OD □∀a∀x(x ∈ a → □(E!a → E!x)).1 Given OD and the assumption that Merkel is a contingent being, ◇¬E!m, it now follows that the set {Merkel} too is contingent, as expected; it fails to exist at any Merkel-free possible world. Surprisingly, at first blush anyway, the assumption that there are contingent beings is neither philosophically nor mathematically trivial. Regarding the latter, it is a well-known theorem of the simplest and most straightforward system of modal predicate logic that there neither are nor could have been any contingent beings, i.e., that, necessarily, everything there is exists necessarily: NE □∀x□E!x.2 1 The three principles above are still jointly consistent with the possibility of sets a that contain members x that cannot coexist with a. This (rather perverse) possibility can be ruled out by replacing OD with a principle asserting that the membership relation is existence entailing: □∀a□∀x□(x ∈ a → (E!a ∧ E!x)). Given E∈, both E∉ and OD follow (assuming the propositional modal logic S5). 2 See (Menzel, 2018) for a formal proof of this and other controversial theorems in the simplest modal predicate logic, as well as discussion of the surrounding philosophical issues. 3 Avoiding this consequence requires choosing between restrictions (of varying severity) on one's logical system, each with its own virtues and liabilities.3 However, some philosophers - so-called necessitists - embrace NE (from which, of course, OD trivially follows) and choose instead to offer sophisticated philosophical explanations of the allegedly mistaken naïve intuition that some things might not have existed.4 The choice of a logic and the adoption of a philosophical standpoint about the metaphysics of sets are therefore interestingly interdependent. It is not our purpose here to adjudicate these issues. Rather, the point of this initial section has been to illustrate one powerful motivation for modal set theory, namely, its usefulness as a tool for exploring quite traditional lines of inquiry in modal metaphysics concerning contingency, essentiality, ontological dependence, and the like that surface naturally in connection with the existence of sets.5 The remainder of this article, however, will be devoted to recent development in modal set theory with regard to a rather more directed inquiry into both the nature and structure of sets that is motivated in particular by the attractive prospect of a satisfying explanation of Russell's Paradox. 2 ZF and Russell's Paradox6 The years 1897-1903 saw the emergence of a string of related paradoxes concerning the notions of number, set, class, property, proposition, and truth.7 Among those concerning sets, Russell's Paradox is undoubtedly the best known and arguably the one most directly responsible for subsequent developments in the foundations of mathematics. The argument is well-known. Its heart, of course, is the principle of naïve comprehension, i.e., the principle that, for any property of things, there is the set of things that have that property. More formally (and somewhat anachronistically) expressed in the language of first-order logic, it is the principle that, for any predicate\tφ(x), there is the set of things it is true of: 3 The system Q of (Prior, 1968) is the most severely restricted of well-known systems, abandoning in particular the interdefinability of □ and à and most familiar principles of propositional modal logic. For examples of less severely restricted systems, see (Kripke, 1963), (Fine, 1978), and (Menzel, 1991). 4 The term \"necessitism\" and its cognates was coined in (Williamson, 2010), although the view was in large measure anticipated and developed in detail in (Linsky & Zalta, 1994). See also (Salmon, 1987) for an influential precursor. 5 (Van Cleve, 1985) is a fine exploration of the issues raised in this section. See also (Fine, 1981) for a detailed and rather more formal study. 6 The exposition in this section is similar to that found in Sections 3-6 of (Menzel, 2017), which was written largely in parallel with the current entry, albeit toward very different ends. 7 See (Cantini, 2014) for an excellent overview. 4 NC ∃a∀x(x ∈ a ↔ φ(x)), where 'a' is not free in φ(x). Intuitively, at first sight anyway, the principle seems airtight. For a well-defined predicate unambiguously picks out some existing things (or perhaps no things at all), and what more could you need for the existence of a set than the existence of its purported members, the things that constitute it? For all its intuitive appeal, of course, NC is inconsistent: given the well-defined predicate 'x ∉ x', by NC we have the \"Russell set\" r containing exactly those things x that are not members of themselves, i.e., R ∀x(x ∈ r ↔ x ∉ x). Instantiating with r, the contradiction that r ∈ r if and only if r ∉ r follows immediately. The best known and most influential response to Russell's Paradox is of course that of Ernst Zermelo. To express Zermelo's ideas, it is useful to speak of mere pluralities of things, where such talk is to be thought of as \"ontologically innocent\". That is, talk of a plurality of things is not to be understood to refer to some additional thing over and above the things we are talking about - a set or class or mereological sum that they constitute - but, rather, simply as a convenient way of talking about those things jointly, or collectively, as we seem freely to do when we use plural noun phrases in sentences like \"It took three men to lift the piano\" and \"The fans went wild\". The lesson of Russell's Paradox, then, in these terms, is that not all pluralities of things can safely be assumed to constitute a further thing, viz., a set that contains them; in particular, to assume without qualification, as NC would have it, that the things an arbitrary predicate is true of constitute a set can be logically catastrophic. At the same time, some pluralities seem clearly safe. Zermelo's brilliantly executed idea (Zermelo, 1908)8 - implemented in his axiomatic set theory Z - was to stipulate the existence of some initial sets to get things going and then introduce a variety of sound \"set-building\" operations that lead safely from given objects or sets to new sets. We will describe Z in some detail. Zermelo begins with the extensionality axiom Ext. His next axiom, the axiom of elementary sets, is actually a combination of an existence axiom and a set-building axiom. Specifically, he postulates the existence of the empty set ∅, 8 Translated as (Zermelo, 1967); see also the informative introductory note by Felgner that accompanies the translation of this paper in the polyglot edition (Zermelo, 2010) of Zermelo's collected works, pp. 160-89. Zermelo's theory included the important but controversial axiom of Choice, though it will play no part here. 5 ES ∃a∀x x ∉ a, and introduces the axiom of Pairing, which says, in effect, that any pair of (not necessarily distinct) objects x and y are jointly safe and hence constitute a set {x, y}:9 Pr ∃a∀z(z ∈ a ↔ (z = x ∨ z = y)). Assuming extensionality, these two axioms alone already give us the power to prove the existence of the infinite series of Zermelo numbers ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, {{{∅}}}, ..., so-called because they served as Zermelo's surrogates for the natural numbers. (For convenience, abbreviate them, respectively, as ∅A, ∅B, ∅C, ∅D, ... .) However, in addition to so-called \"pure\" sets like these that are \"built up\" solely from the empty set, Zermelo also made room in his theory for the existence of arbitrarily many urelements, that is, things that are not themselves sets - persons, planets, natural numbers, etc. - and, hence, by Pr, for the existence of \"impure\" sets built up from them. And although he didn't explicitly assume it as an axiom in 1908, it is in the spirit of his theory to take the urelements to constitute a set U of their own:10 Ur ∃a∀x(x ∈ a ↔ (x ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀y y ∉ x)). Let ZU be Zermelo's theory Z with the additional axiom Ur. NC is of course absent from Zermelo's theory but a significant remnant of it remains in the form of a set-building principle, Separation. Given a predicate φ(x), NC called sets into being ex nihilo from the things of which φ(x) is true. Separation, by contrast, only vouches for the things in some previously given set b that φ(x) is true of: Sep ∃a∀x(x ∈ a ↔ (x ∈ b ∧ φ(x)), where 'a' is not free in φ(x).11 Zermelo's next two set-building axioms are Union and Powerset, which tell us, respectively, that, for a given set b, the members of the members of b as well as the subsets of b safely constitute sets of their own: 9 We will make free use of the common {xB, ... , xH} notation for finite sets without defining it formally. 10 The existence of U is not entirely unproblematic, as it could turn out to be inconsistent with the other axioms if there are \"too many\" urelements. See, e.g., (Nolan, 1996) and (Menzel, 2014). Zermelo himself wasn't sure how to work urelements into his theory until over two decades later; see (Zermelo, 1930) and Kanamori's informative introductory note to its translation in (Zermelo, 2010), pp. 390-430. 11 Sep renders ES otiose, since it is a truth of (classical first-order) logic that something x exists, ∃xE!x, from which ES follows directly from Pr and the instance of Sep where φ(x) is x ≠ x. 6 Un ∃a∀x(x ∈ a ↔ ∃c(c ∈ b ∧ x ∈ c)) Pow ∃a∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ⊆ b). Although formulated decades before the mature conception of the set theoretic universe in (Zermelo, 1930), these two axioms clearly anticipated it. For, given the initial set U of urelements - call it UA - by Pow the set ℘(UA) of all of its subsets exists. By Pr and Un, we have the set UB = UA ∪ ℘(UA)12 consisting of all the members of UA and ℘(UA). Applying Pow again we have the set ℘(UB) of all the subsets of UB which we can then join with UB itself to yield the set UC = UB ∪ ℘(UB). In general: D1 UA = U UHOB = UH ∪ ℘(UH). Even in Zermelo's early work, then, the sets are naturally taken to have a structure that is cumulative and hierarchical, advancing \"upwards\" via iterations of the powerset and (binary) union operations, from an initial stock of urelements, in an ever-expanding series of stages, or levels, each successive level UHOB consisting of everything in the preceding level together with all the sets that can be formed from them, as indicated in Figure 1. Say that one level UH is higher than another UQ just in case n > m (equivalently, in light of their cumulative nature, just in case UQ ⊂ UH) and that the level λ(x) of an object x is the first level of the hierarchy in which it occurs. Since (a) we begin with a base set UA of urelements, (b) the hierarchy grows discretely from one level to the next, and (c) a set of level UHOB is always constituted by objects in level UH, it should also be clear that the sets on this conception are all well-founded: no set can be a member of itself and, more generally, there are no infinitely descending membership chains ... ∈ aHOB ∈ aH ∈ ... ∈ aB ∈ aA. Since the axioms above do not explicitly rule out such structural impossibilities, it must be done independently by means of a separate principle; in Z, this is the axiom of Foundation, which requires every nonempty set a to have a member with which it shares no members: 12 a ∪ b is the binary union of sets a and b, and is definable as the set whose existence follows by Un from the set {a, b}, whose existence in turn follows from a and b by Pr. 7 Fnd a ≠ ∅ → ∃y(y ∈ a ∧ ∀z(z ∈ y → z ∉ a)).13 We turn now to the critical Zermelian axiom of Infinity. What is particularly important about this axiom, especially for purposes here, is that it asserts not merely the safety of an infinite plurality - Ur will have already done that on the assumption that there are infinitely many urelements - but, rather, the safety of a plurality that is finitely unbounded, i.e., unbounded (hence infinite) in our hierarchy of finite (i.e., finitely-indexed) levels UH. Consider, in particular, the Zermelo numbers ∅A, ∅B, ∅C, ... . As λ(∅V) = UVOB, for all natural numbers i, it follows that, for every finite level UH, no matter how high, there is a Zermelo number (∅H, for example) that only first occurs in a higher level still; the Zermelo numbers are thus unbounded in the hierarchy of finite levels UA, UB, UC, ... and, hence, never constitute a set in any of them. The Zermelo numbers, then, are of a rather different sort structurally than any we've encountered hitherto. But, ultimately, from the realist's standpoint, at least, there doesn't seem to be any more reason to question their safety than there is to question the safety of the urelements that we sanction in Ur that get the hierarchy going in the first place or the plurality of subsets of a given level that we sanction in Pow that enable us, at any given level, to extend the hierarchy to 13 Zermelo did not include Foundation in his 1908 axiomatization but, as non-well-founded sets were not defined and studied in any systematic way until (Mirimanoff, 1917) and the iterative conception was at most only beginning to take shape in Zermelo's mind, it seems likely that he did not at the time recognize any pressing need for the axiom. Figure 1: The finite levels of the cumulative hierarchy 8 the next level. For, just as in those cases, all of the things in question are there and hence available for collection into a set. Moreover, as the Zermelo numbers are unbounded in the hierarchy of finite levels and hence could not constitute a set at any such level, the set they would constitute would demonstrably not be a member of itself. So the assumption that they are jointly safe does not appear to raise the specter of a Russell-style paradox. Accordingly, Zermelo's Infinity axiom posits the collective safely of the Zermelo numbers the way that Ur does for the urelements and Pow does for the subsets of a given set. More exactly, it declares that there is a set that contains the Zermelo numbers: Inf ∃a(∅ ∈ a ∧ ∀x(x ∈ a → {x} ∈ a)). The set of Zermelo numbers proper - call it ζ (zeta) - can then be derived straightaway by Sep.14 So the axiom of Infinity implies, not just that there are infinite sets, but that there are infinite sets whose members occur at arbitrarily high finite levels of the hierarchy. Hence, intuitively, the cumulative hierarchy UA, UB, UC, ..., of levels must continue beyond the finite. For this to be provable, however, we must first show that they themselves form a set {UA, UB, UC, ... }. It certainly seems that they should, for exactly the same reasons that were cited for the safety of the structurally similar plurality of Zermelo numbers - they are all there and no obvious paradox arises from the assumption that they constitute a set. But Inf and the other axioms of ZU are not enough to guarantee this.15 Thus, a further principle is needed, one typically attributed to Abraham Fraenkel,16 the axiom schema of Replacement, the addition of which to Zermelo's theory Z(U) gives us ZF(U). Replacement captures the structural intuition that if the members of a given set b can be correlated one-to-one with a given plurality, then that plurality also constitutes a set. More formally, where ∃!xφ as usual means that something is uniquely φ: Rep ∀x(x ∈ b → ∃!yψ(x, y)) → ∃a∀y(y ∈ a ↔ ∃x(x ∈ b ∧ ψ(x, y))). 14 Specifically, by letting b be the set given by Inf and letting φ(x)\tbe\t∀y[]∅ ∈ y ∧ ∀z(z ∈ y → {z} ∈ y)^ → x ∈ y], i.e., the predicate \"x is in every set y that contains ∅ and the singleton of any of its members\". 15 To see this, very briefly: where Va is the set of hereditarily finite pure sets, let Wc = Va ∪ U and WHOB = WH ∪ ℘(WH), for n ∈ N, and let W = ⋃H∈NWH. It is easy to see that W is a model of ZU (recall that VaOa ⊆ W is a model of Z) and that UV ∈ W for all i ∈ N but that {UA, UB, UC, ... } ∉ W. The author thanks Noah Schweber and Joel David Hamkins for this construction. 16 Skolem independently identified the need for Replacement, and his explicitly first-order formulation of the principle is essentially the one that is mostly used today. See (Fraenkel, 1922) and (Skolem, 1922); an English translation of the latter can be found in (van Heijenoort, 1967), pp. 290-301. 9 To see how Rep enables us to show that the finite levels are jointly safe, let L(y) mean that y is a finite levels.17 Let ψ(x, y) be 'x ∈ ζ ∧ L(y) ∧ x ∈ y ∧ ∀z((L(z) ∧ x ∈ z) → y ⊆ z)', i.e., \"x is a Zermelo number and y is its level\". ψ(x, y) correlates the members of ζ one-to-one with the levels UB, UC, ... and, hence, by Rep, they constitute a set to which (by Pr and Un) we can add the initial level UA of urelements; so all the levels jointly constitute our desired set {UA, UB, UC, ... }. By Un their union is a set, so all the members of all the finite levels do indeed form a set Ua of their own, the first transfinite level of the hierarchy18 - the result, as it were, of putting a \"disk\" atop the hierarchy of finite levels depicted in Figure 1 indicating its \"completion\" in a further level. That of course is not the end of the hierarchy but simply a new starting point for iterating the powerset and binary union operations to generate yet further levels UaOB, UaOC, ..., which (by Rep) jointly form a set and hence (by Un) constitute a new limit level UaOa, and thus once again further levels UaOaOB, UaOaOC, ..., and so on, as depicted in Figure 2. In general, then, by including a limit clause representing the continual \"completion\" of these unbounded series of levels, we can define the entire transfinite cumulative hierarchy for all ordinal numbers, finite and transfinite alike: D2 UA = U UgOB = Ug ∪ ℘(Ug) Uh = ⋃gihUg,\tfor limit ordinals γ This intuitive and deeply satisfying conception of the structure of the set theoretic universe yields a compelling explanation of Russell's Paradox: a plurality safely constitutes a set if and only if it is bounded in the full cumulative hierarchy, that is, if and only if there is a level of the hierarchy at or before which the plurality \"runs out\", that is, a level Ug such that, for everything x in that plurality, λ(x) is no higher than Ug - in which case those things are \"available\" to be collected into a set at the next level UgOB. However, some predicates - notably, 'x ∉ x' - pick out absolutely unbounded pluralities, pluralities that never \"run out\" by any level.19 Accordingly, as 17 L(y) is definable without any mention of finitude as: ∀a[(U ∈ a ∧ ∀b(b ∈ a → b ∪ ℘(b) ∈ a)) → y ∈ a], i.e., \"y is in every set that contains the set U of urelements and also contains b ∪ ℘(b) whenever it contains b, for any set b\". 18 ω is the first transfinite ordinal number, i.e., the first \"counting number\" after the natural numbers. It is also the first limit ordinal, i.e., the first ordinal α > 0 such that, if β < α, then β + 1 < α. See (Devlin, 1991), Ch. 3 for a good introduction to transfinite ordinals and cardinals and their arithmetic. 19 In the cumulative hierarchy, where all sets are well-founded, no set is a member of itself so 'x ∉ x' is in fact true of everything. 10 in Russell's Paradox, the assumption that they do - i.e., the assumption that they constitute sets - leads to contradiction. 3 Modal Set Theory and the Completion Problem Unfortunately, as satisfying and illuminating as this explanation might be, a serious puzzle remains for the realist who wants to take the existence of sets seriously: the full cumulative hierarchy is itself a well-defined plurality; why is it not safe? That is, why does the hierarchy itself fail to be \"completed\" so as to constitute a set? Note the question is not: Why is there no universal set, i.e., no set containing all the urelements and all the sets? As we've just seen, the iterative conception of set provides a cogent answer to that question: only those pluralities that \"run out\" by some level of the cumulative hierarchy constitute sets at the next level and, obviously, the entire hierarchy is not such a plurality; there is no level at which the members of all the levels form a set. Rather, the question is: Why is the hierarchy only as \"high\" as it is? Why do all the urelements and sets that there actually are fail to constitute a further level that kicks off yet another series of iterations? For the same justification we had for \"completing\" the hierarchy of finite levels appears to apply no Im pu re S et sImpure Sets Pure Sets ••••• • ••••• • • • • •• • • • • • •• •• • • • •• •• Uω ••••• • • U1 U0 U2 ••• ••• ••• Un Un+1 ••••• •••• Uω+1 Uω+ω Uω+ω+1 Figure 2: The transfinite cumulative hierarchy 11 less to the full hierarchy: all of the urelements and sets in all the levels are there, as robustly as the members of the finite levels; moreover, since the set they would constitute - call it Up - would be of a higher level than its members and, hence, would not be a member of itself, just as with Ua, no obvious threat of paradox looms. Call this the completion problem. Granted, the completion problem does not appear to be as grave and immediate a threat to the coherence of set theory as Russell's Paradox. But it does raise disturbing questions for the realist: if there is no answer to the completion problem, then there is an essential element of randomness to set existence. For once we acknowledge that there are pluralities that inexplicably fail to constitute sets, it is hard to see what grounds there are for picking and choosing between those that do and those that don't: in particular, if the same reasons for accepting that the finite levels UA, UB, UC, ... constitute a set seem to hold for all the levels of the hierarchy without their constituting a set, then what reason to do we have for accepting that even the finite levels UA, UB, UC, ... do? Or that any plurality does for that matter? Without a solution to the completion problem, then, the actual structure of the hierarchy appears to be unknowable; any claims to knowledge of it would appear to be groundless, as the objects of the purported knowledge might well concern entities that simply do not exist. Putnam was the first to argue explicitly that such questions are answered by taking the principles underlying the iterative conception of set to be essentially modal and, more specifically, by suggesting that a set is not to be understood in terms of the actual existence of a finished thing but as the possibility of its formation:20 [T]here is not, from a mathematical point of view, any significant difference between the assertion that there exists a set of integers satisfying an arithmetical condition and the assertion that it is possible to select integers so as to satisfy the condition. Sets, [to parody] John Stuart Mill, are permanent possibilities of selection.21 20 (Putman, 1967), p. 12. See (Hellman, 1989) for a detailed development of Putnam's ideas and (Roberts, 2018) for a rigorous critique. 21 There are intimations of Putnam's idea in Cantor, notably in an 1897 letter to Hilbert: \"I say of a set that it can be thought of as finished ... if it is possible without contradiction (as can be done with finite sets) to think of all its elements as existing together, and so to think of the set itself as a compounded thing for itself ; or (in other words) if it is possible to imagine the set as actually existing with the totality of its elements.\" (Ewald, 1996), p. 927. The emphasis is Cantor's. 12 Parsons (1977) spells the idea out a little less metaphorically in a thesis - call it Parsons' Principle - that addresses the completion problem directly: any given plurality of things \"can constitute a set, but it is not necessary that they do.\" Thus, necessarily, no matter how many cumulative levels there might be, the absolutely unbounded pluralities that don't in fact constitute sets in any level nonetheless could have constituted sets. The answer to the completion problem on this potentialist conception of sets, then, is simply that there neither is nor could be a \"completed\" cumulative hierarchy. Rather, instead of the completed stages of the cumulative hierarchy, we have a potential hierarchy, i.e., roughly speaking, an infinite hierarchy of possibilities where, given any possible completion of the hierarchy up to a given level Ug, there is always a more expansive possibility in which some of the mere pluralities of Ug constitute sets - in the \"maximal\" case, a possibility comprising the next level UgOB. The completion problem only arises on the assumption that all the levels - hence all the sets - that there could be (relative to an initial set UA of urelements) are already actual and, hence, that the hierarchy of sets is complete, that there is no more \"collecting\" of pluralities into sets that can be done. For only under that assumption - call it actualism - is it mysterious why the hierarchy is only as high as it is, why it (or indeed any absolutely unbounded plurality) fails to constitute a further set. The potentialist rejects the actualist assumption: the unbounded pluralities of one possible world always constitute sets in further, more comprehensive worlds. What becomes of ZF on the potentialist conception? Thought of semantically, the potentialist conception suggests (roughly put) that an assertion to the effect that a certain set exists - and hence occurs at some level of the cumulative hierarchy - should be understood as the assertion that it is possible that such a set exist; likewise, assertions about all sets should be understood, not simply as assertions about the sets that in fact exist but, roughly speaking, about all the sets there could be, all the sets in any possible world.22 Formalized, this insight yields what Linnebo (2013) calls the potentialist translation φ◇ of a sentence φ of ordinary set theory, viz., the result of replacing every existential quantifier occurrence ∃ in φ with its modalized counterpart ◇∃ and every universal quantifier occurrence ∀ with □∀. The idea, then, is that, if a statement φ of ordinary ZF set theory is purportedly true in the cumulative hierarchy, its modalized counterpart φ◇ will be true in the potential hierarchy. This in turn might suggest that modal set theory will simply consist 22 The exposition from this point draws heavily upon (Linnebo, 2010; 2013) which in turn was strongly influenced by (Parsons, 1983). 13 in formulating the theory ZF◇ that results from replacing the axioms of ZF with their potentialist translations. But that would not in and of itself be terribly interesting. Instead, modal set theorists like Parsons and Linnebo opt for the far more illuminating tack of taking the potentialist conception itself as primary and, hence, by axiomatizing its fundamental principles, deriving the axioms of ZF◇. The first task toward that end is to identify the right propositional modal logic for the potentialist conception. Expressed in terms of possible worlds, the basic underlying intuition is that the universe of sets in a given world w can always be increased - for any world w there is an accessible world w′ that includes, not only everything already in w, but new sets whose members are mere pluralities in w.23 This can be captured more formally by means of several intuitive constraints on world domains D(w) and the accessibility relation R. Specifically, growth is reflected in the inclusion constraint that, if Rww′, then D(w) ⊆ D(wv).24 R itself should be a partial order (i.e., reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric) - each world w′ accessible from a world w represents a way in which some of the mere pluralities of w constitute fully-fledged sets in w′, but different pluralities of w might constitute sets in different accessible worlds. Moreover, that the formation of new sets proceeds discretely is reflected in the requirement that R be weakly well-founded.25 Finally, if wB and wC represent distinct expansions of the set theoretic universe of a world w - different \"choices\" of which mere pluralities of w to take to constitute sets - it should still be possible in each world to form the sets constituted in the other. Hence, a further natural condition is that accessibility be directed, that is, that, for any two worlds wB, wC accessible from a given world w there is a third world accessible from both and, hence, given the inclusion constraint, one whose sets include all those formed in either world. The propositional modal logic 23 For fairly obvious reasons, possible world semantics can only be considered a useful heuristic, as Kripke models are themselves by definition sets. Hence, no Kripke model could purport to represent (in a one-to-one fashion) all possible sets (over some initial collection U of urelements) without opening the door once again to Russell's Paradox. (And allowing \"class-size\" Kripke models would only give rise to a version of the completion problem if one claimed that such a model could include all possible sets - why isn't there a further world encompassing all the sets in that model?) This does, however, raise the further question of what it means for the potentialist translation of a theorem of ZF to be true, if it is not true in virtue of facts about genuinely existing sets in genuinely existing possible worlds. 24 This will of course have the consequence that, for any object x, including urelements, it will be a logical truth that x exists necessarily, □E!x. That is the right result, as the constraints in question are only meant intuitively to capture possible ways of extending the set theoretic universe of a given world w; nothing in w \"goes away\" as new sets are added in accessible worlds. 25 R is weakly well-founded if every nonempty set S of worlds contains an R-minimal world, i.e., a world w ∈ S such that, for all other u ∈ S, not-Ruw. (R is well-founded if it is a strict partial order - irreflexive and transitive - that satisfies this definition.) 14 determined by these conditions on accessibility is S4.2, the normal modal logic that includes the familiar axioms of the logic S4, viz., T □φ → φ 4 □φ → □□φ corresponding to reflexivity and transitivity, respectively, and the axiom G ◇□φ → □◇φ corresponding to directedness.26 And to S4.2 is added classical quantification theory with identity and the axiom 'x ≠ y → □x ≠ y' expressing the necessity of difference. Now, as seen above, it is useful to express the axioms of ZF informally in terms of pluralities. To characterize the potentialist conception properly with the tools of modal logic, it is essential to quantify over pluralities explicitly in order to identify the logical principles that govern their behavior. Accordingly, we introduce plural variables 'xx', 'yy', etc. and a new type of atomic formula 'y ≺ xx' to indicate that y is one of the things xx. The inference rules for plural quantifiers parallel those for first-order quantifiers exactly.27 Several principles capture the existence and nature of pluralities. First, given the ontological innocence of plural quantification, the plural counterpart to NC seems harmless:28 PC ∃xx∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ φ(y)), where 'xx' does not occur free in φ(y), that is, simply put, for any predicate φ(y), there are the things it is true of.29 Next, the modal properties of pluralities are captured in two axioms expressing the stability of the ≺ relation, that 26 There is no axiom corresponding to antisymmetry because it is not definable in propositional modal logic. See, e.g., (Blackburn, de Rijke, & Venema, 2001), §4.5. Well-foundedness can be axiomatized in a bimodal extension of propositional modal logic with both \"forward-looking\" and \"backward-looking\" necessity operators. See (Studd, 2013). 27 See (Linnebo, 2014) for a useful overview of plural quantification and (Oliver and Smiley, 2013) for a comprehensive treatment of plural logic. 28 Though see (Spencer, 2012). 29 As Linnebo points out (2013, p. 210), PC entails the existence of an \"empty\" plurality. This can be avoided at the cost of some inconvenience. As to PC's harmlessness, note that a Russell-style argument to a contradiction from PC with φ(y) = 'y ⊀ y' (assuming that construction is even permitted syntactically) breaks down, as it is in general invalid to infer from the fact that all things (distributively) have a property F, that any things (collectively) have F. Hence, from ∀yφ(y) we cannot legitimately infer φ(xx); in particular, we can't infer xx ≺ xx ↔ xx ⊀ xx from ∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ y ⊀ y). For more on distributive vs. collective quantification, see, e.g., (Scha, 1984) and (McKay, 2006). 15 is, that, for any plurality xx and object y in a given world w, y will be among the things xx in an arbitrary accessible world w′ if and only if it is among them in w: Stb≺O y ≺ xx → □(y ≺ xx) Stb≺ y ⊀ xx → □(y ⊀ xx). However, these axioms don't rule out the possibility that xx grows in a further world w′, that xx includes a new object z that only first comes to exist in w′. This possibility is ruled out by means of a schema that ensures that pluralities are inextensible: InEx≺ ∀y(y ≺ xx → □φ) → □∀y(y ≺ xx → φ).30 Let MPFO be this system of plural first-order modal logic. The next task is to extend MPFO to a basic modal set theory BMST. Like ZF, BMST axiomatizes the two fundamental structural properties of sets, viz., extensionality and foundation,31 which are captured simply by adopting the axioms Ext and Fnd (hence also their necessitations). Recall from Section 1 above, however, that sets also have their members essentially, as expressed in the principles E∈ and E∉.32 Both of these principles, as well as the inextensibility of membership, are entailed by the following: ED∈ ∃xx□∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ y ∈ a). Together with the stability and inextensibility principles for pluralities above, ED∈ says that, for any set a, one and the same plurality of things constitute a in every (accessible) possible world. 30 To understand how this works to ensure inextensibility it is useful to note that InEx≺ is just the Barcan formula (BF) - ∀y□φ → □∀yφ - restricted to pluralities xx. The semantic effect of unrestricted BF is that, so to say, existence is inextensible, i.e., that there couldn't have been anything that doesn't already exist in fact, a notoriously problematic metaphysical claim (see (Menzel, 2018), esp. sections 1 and 2). For suppose there could have been something a distinct from everything that exists in fact. Then ∀y□(y ≠ a). But then by BF, □∀y(y ≠ a), contradicting the assumption that such an a could have existed. Restricted as in InEx≺, however, the semantic effect is simply that, for a given plurality xx, there couldn't have been anything a among them that isn't already among them, i.e., that pluralities are inextensible. 31 Foundation follows semantically from the weak well-foundedness of the accessibility relation R and the fundamental potentialist assumption that the members of any set that first comes to be in any world w is constituted by objects that exist in some world u such that Ruw. See (Linnebo, 2013), pp. 216-17. 32 Since □E!a is a simple theorem of MPFO, the antecedents E!a of the conditionals in the consequents of these two principles are superfluous in the context of BMST. 16 Recall that the general intuitive motivation for the naïve comprehension principle NC was that the existence of the members of a purported set should suffice for the existence of the set, which we can now express generally, and formally, in terms of plural quantification: GNC ∀xx∃a∀y(y ∈ a ↔ y ≺ xx). Given the innocent principle PC, NC (and catastrophe) follow immediately from GNC. As we've seen, both actualist and potentialist accounts have explanations of where GNC goes wrong based intuitively on the iterative conception of set. On both accounts, in one sense or another, sets are \"constructed\" level-by-level without end, the new sets of one level constituted by the mere pluralities of previous levels. Hence, necessarily, the plurality of all the sets in all the levels, and unbounded pluralities generally, fail to constitute sets. Both accounts thus agree on where GNC gets it wrong: necessarily, there are pluralities that don't constitute sets. Additionally, however, the potentialist conception avoids the completion problem by showing that GNC almost gets it right: it's not that every plurality does constitute a set; it's that every plurality could. From the potentialist standpoint, then, GNC simply missed the implicit modality in claims of set existence; what we need is just its potentialist translation: C □∀xx◇∃a□∀y(y ∈ a ↔ y ≺ xx). That is, necessarily, any plurality of things could constitute a set consisting (necessarily) of exactly those things. This, of course, is a precise formalization of Parsons' Principle. Let BMST be the result of adding the axioms Ext, Fnd, ED∈, and C to MPFO. It is a simple matter to show that BMST proves the potentialist translations of all of the ZF axioms except Pow, Inf, and Rep.33 As these are by far the most powerful axioms of ZF, this shows that our basic intuitions about pluralities and sets as expressed in BMST - in particular, Parsons' Principle C - only get us so far. To see this with regard to Pow, suppose we have a plurality xx in some world w. By principle C there is a world u accessible from w in which they constitute a set b. Obviously, all the \"subpluralities\" of xx - all the pluralities yy such that each thing in them is among the things xx - also exist in w. But neither C nor the structure of worlds and their domains in the underlying semantics provides any guarantee that any of them (other than 33 See (Linnebo 2013, p. 221) and (Parsons 1983), Appendix 2. The addition of the urelement axiom Ur, which neither Linnebo nor Parsons includes in their discussions, would involve no significant complications. 17 xx) constitute a set in u, let alone all of them. Indeed, for all we know on the potentialist conception to this point, the subpluralities of xx might be inexhaustible in the sense that, for any world u accessible from w, there is always a further world v accessible from u in which some subplurality of xx only first constitutes a set (hence, a subset of b). If so, there is no world where all possible subsets of b exist, in which case the power set of b is impossible, contrary to Pow◇, i.e., ◇∃a□∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ⊆ b). To derive Pow◇, then, an additional principle is required that rules out this sort inexhaustibility. Intuitively, this is accomplished most naturally by assuming that worlds more directly reflect the levels of the cumulative hierarchy; that is, by assuming, not only that the newlyformed sets of a given world are mere pluralities of some preceding world, but that set formation is always maximal: that the newly-formed sets of a world are all those that can be constituted from the mere pluralities of a preceding world.34 This assumption can be expressed elegantly in a single axiom to the effect that, much like its members, the subsets of a given set a are constant across possible worlds: ED⊆ ∃xx□∀y(y ≺ xx ↔ y ⊆ a). Pow◇ now follows straightaway from BMST + ED⊆. Recall that ES and Pr alone suffice to generate the infinite plurality of Zermelo numbers ∅A, ∅B, ∅C, ... and it was left to Inf simply to sanction a set containing them. If we could prove the mere possibility that all the Zermelo numbers exist on the potentialist conception, we could immediately invoke principle C to prove the possible existence of a set containing them. However, the potentialist is in a slightly more fraught situation. For the potentialist principles to this point - the derived principles ES◇ and Pr◇ in particular - only yield a series of possible initial segments of the Zermelo numbers: by ES◇ it is possible that ∅B exists; and by iterated applications of Pr◇, it is possible that ∅A and ∅B exist and hence also that the numbers ∅A, ∅B, and ∅C exist, and so on, but without the entire series of Zermelo numbers ever being \"completed\" in a single possibility. 34 Linnebo (2013, p. 209, fn 7) suggests that maximality entails that the accessibility relation is linear but that would follow only if worlds are individuated extensionally by their domains (which is plausible if, as in (Linnebo 2013), the existence of urelements is not assumed). Linearity can be forced axiomatically by any of a variety of axioms; see (Chellas, 1980). The system resulting from adding a linearity axiom to S4 in place of G is S4.3 though, as Parsons notes (1983, pp. 319-20), S4.3 seems to add nothing over S4.2 for the purpose of deriving set-theoretic consequences. 18 To derive the possible existence of all the Zermelo numbers thus requires a further principle asserting, roughly, that whatever is true of the potential hierarchy as a whole, as expressed in the potentialist translation φ◇ of some proposition φ of set theory (hence a proposition containing no plural quantifiers35), is possible simpliciter: Ref φ◇ → ◇φ. Thus, in particular, ES◇ and Pr◇ yield a proposition φ◇ expressing the infinite series of possibilities involving larger and larger initial finite segments of the Zermelo numbers.36 By Ref that series is reflected in a single possibility containing all - hence, by PC, the entire infinite plurality of - the Zermelo numbers, and so by Parsons' Principle C it is possible that they constitute a single infinite set. Inf◇ follows immediately by some simple modal logic.37 The potentialist translation Rep◇ of the Replacement schema can be similarly proved by strengthening Ref to RefO ◇∀x(φ◇(x) → φ(x)).38 Importantly, it can be shown that the modalized quantifiers ◇∃ and □∀ \"behave prooftheoretically very much like ordinary quantifiers\" (Linnebo, 2013, p. 213), thus explaining why they are not found in ordinary set-theoretic practice - mathematicians can, in effect, talk about the potentialist hierarchy as if it were actual. Concluding Philosophical Postscript. This article has focused chiefly on the technical development of modal set theory and its intuitive motivations without any close critical attention paid to surrounding philosophical questions. In closing we note briefly that a problem parallel to the completion problem threatens to arise for the potentialist. To see this, first, instead of restricting ourselves, relative to any given possible world, only to those possibilities that represent growth of the set theoretic universe, as we do in characterizing the potentialist hierarchy, let us broaden our 35 Allowing plural quantifiers in φ without restriction would in fact lead to Russell's Paradox. 36 Specifically, φ◇ is ◇∃a∀xx ∉ a ∧ □∀x◇∃y□∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z = x) and hence ◇φ is ◇(∃a∀x x ∉ a ∧ ∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z = x)). 37 See (Wigglesworth, 2018) for an account that, unlike those of Parsons, Linnebo, and Studd, doesn't require any sort of reflection principle to prove the possibility of an infinite set. 38 Again, where φ contains no plural quantifiers. Parsons (1983, p. 323) relies on a rather different principle to derive Inf◇ and Rep◇. See (Linnebo 2013), p. 223, fn 28 for important further discussion. 19 metaphysical perspective to one where we are considering all possibilities on a par. From this standpoint, we see that, on the potentialist conception, at least the vast majority of pure sets are metaphysically contingent beings - in particular, for any given possible world w, those pure sets in any accessible world w′ whose members are mere pluralities in w. If this is in fact the sober truth about the metaphysics of sets, then set existence is metaphysically capricious - two possible worlds can be in all respects identical but for the fact that there are pure sets in one that simply and inexplicably fail to exist in the other. Though not identical to the completion problem, the apparently inexplicable contingency of set existence on the potentialist conception, taken literally, seems to raise questions parallel to those arising from the apparently inexplicably nonexistence of certain sets, as noted in the completion problem. Perhaps in response to this difficulty - though neither explicitly says so - both Parsons (1977, §IV) and Linnebo (2013, pp. 207-8) suggest that the modality of the potential hierarchy is more semantic than metaphysical: at any given time, one's conception of the \"height\" of the set theoretic universe, hence the range of one's quantifiers, is determined by one's strongest large cardinal assumptions.39 Once convinced of the existence of a larger cardinal still, pluralities that had been (relative to the earlier conception) absolutely unbounded constitute sets under the stronger assumptions and the range of one's quantifiers broadens accordingly. Thus Linnebo (p. 208): A claim is possible, in this sense, if it can be made to hold by a permissible extension of the mathematical ontology; and it is necessary if it holds under any permissible such extension. Metaphysical modality would be unsuitable for our present purposes because pure sets are taken to exist of metaphysical necessity if at all. However, if after all (pure) sets exist as a matter of metaphysical necessity (so that, in particular, any pure sets that could have existed actually exist), as Linnebo appears to suggest here, then the completion problem threatens once again to rear its head with all its original force: why are there only the pure sets there actually are? If, necessarily, all pure sets exist of metaphysical necessity, 39 See also (Fine, 2006). 20 what explains the fact that there couldn't have been more, the fact that there are pluralities of things such that it is not even metaphysically possible that they constitute sets?40 These and related metaphysical questions prompted by the potentialist conception of set point to a fertile area for exploration in the philosophical foundations modal set theory. References Blackburn, P., de Rijke, M., & Venema, Y. (2001). 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{"text": "Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 25 International Journal of Humanities & Social Science Studies (IJHSSS) A Peer-Reviewed Bi-monthly Bi-lingual Journal of Humanities & Social Science ISSN: 2349-6959 (Online), ISSN: 2349-6711 (Print) Volume-I, Issue-I, July 2014 Published by Scholar Publications, Karimganj, Assam, India, 788711 Website: http://www.ijhsss.com Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura and Manipur in the days of monarchy Memchaton Singha Assistant Professor Dept. of History Rabindrasadan Girls' College, Karimganj Abstract Manipur and Tripura are two important integral states of North east India with a long glorious history of its own. Both the states maintained cordial relationship from the very early period despite regular intervals of conflicts. Marriage alliances between the royal families of Manipur and Tripura were common phenomena which began from remote antiquity and continued till 20 th century. The instance of first marriage alliance occurred during the reign of Tripura king Taidakshin, the 43 rd Raja. However, the most notable cases of matrimonial alliances between Manipur and Tripura started towards the end of 18 th century. The distinctive feature in the marriages was that the Rajas of Tripura married not only Manipuri princesses but also many Manipuri girls belonging to plebeian family. The marriage alliances not only brought cordial relations between the two kingdoms but also there was cultural assimilation. The tradition of marrying Manipuri girls were even followed by many noblemen of the Tripura royal family. Tripura also witnessed various public welfare works that was contributed by the Manipuri Maharanis. Thus, we find that the Tripura royal house was filled with descendants from the Manipuri queens. This article focuses on providing a chronological historical account of the matrimonial alliances that occurred in the royal families of Manipur and Tripura during the period of monarchies. It also highlights the basic causes behind the arrangement of the marriages and also the cultural amalgamation between the two states. Keywords: Royal families, matrimonial alliances, monarchies, wed-lock, Meitei Queens, inter-dynastic. Tripura is one of the important seven sisters‟ states of North East India. The state in bounded on the north, west, south and south-east by Bangladesh. In the east Tripura shares boundary with the state of Assam and Mizoram. About the state of Tripura we find mention in the famous epic the „Mahabharata‟. This naturally highlight about a very ancient origin of the kingdom. Tripura was ruled by various commanding rulers who thrived in setting a landmark in the historical arena of India. According to the royal chronicle of Tripura \"Sri Rajmala\" and other ancient literatures of the state the dynasty trace their origin from the Lunar dynasty and from the great king Yayati. However, Druhyu, the son of king Yayati laid the foundation of Tripura dynasty. The kings of Tripura began to suffix the title of \"Manikya\" from the reign of Ratna Fa or Ratna Manikya. The descendents of Ratna Manikya ruled the kingdom without much interference from the British. But, in 1765 A.D. the opportunity aroused for the British and Tripura was brought under the British colonial rule. However, it was not kept under the direct control by the British authorities. The state existed as an independent princely state and maintained its integrity unless the kingdom joined in the Indian Union on Oct. 15, 1949. Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 26 Manipur like Tripura is an important state of North East India. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has called the land as „Jewel of India‟ as well as a melting pot of rich culture. Manipur is bounded by Nagaland in the North, Mizoram in the South, Cachar district of Assam in the West and Burma in the East. The state has long glorious history of its own. The land is inhabited by many tribes with different cultural identity and ethnicity. The kingdom of Manipur was developed after a struggle of conflicts between various ethnic tribes and clans or Salais in the valley. The numerous groups were later amalgamated and brought under the political sovereignty of seven leading clans namely Ningthouja (Mangang), Luwang, Angom, Khuman, Moirang, Kha Ngamba and Sarang Leisangthem or (Chenglei). These clans were powerful at some point of time but by the first half of 15 th century the Ningthoujas or Meiteis succeeded to overpower all the other clans. Thus, with this the other clans or social groups were brought within the social structure of this dynasty under the common ethnonym „Meitei‟. The first recorded king of Manipur was Nongda Lairen Pakhangba who is said to have ruled the kingdom from 33 A.D. The history of Manipur reached its glory to its zenith in the field of military, religion, culture and literature during the reign of Pamheiba alias Garib Niwaz (1709-1748 A.D.). Hinduism was adopted as state religion during his reign. The state has maintained the status of princely independent state until it became a British protectorate princely state only after the battle of AngloManipuri war or the „Khongjom war‟ of 1891 A.D. Finally, it was in 1949, after two years of Indian independence that Manipur was merged to Republic of India. The states of Manipur and Tripura thus formed two most important states of pre-colonial North East India. From antiquity both the states is said to have maintained friendly relations. During their princely regime they were neighbouring states and came into contact with each other in many occasions such as for trade, diplomacy, dwelling, matrimony etc. Moreover, an assortment of crucial political circumstances demanded the kingdoms to come in close contact with each other for political interdependence. Such as, when there were rapid incursions of Burmese in Manipur and that of Pathans and Mughals in Tripura both the kingdoms depended on each other for relief from the intruders. The political interdependence between the two states was boost up by the policy of the marriage alliances. The tradition of wed-lock between the two kingdoms began since antiquity from the time of 43 rd Tripura Raja Taidakshin and the tradition continued till 20 th century. In the early period Manipur was called by the Tripuris as Mokhali/Mekhali and to the Manipuris the kingdom of Tripura was known as Takhen/ Takhel. The word „Takhen‟ has come from the Bengali word „Dakhin‟ which means South. The people of Sylhet used to call Tripura „Dakhin‟ which was pronounced by the Manipuris as Takhen. They deviate the„d‟ sound changing to‟t‟ and that of 'i' sound changing to 'e' due to their speech habit. However, Naorem Sanajaoba, an eminent scholar of Manipur opined that perhaps, the Manipuris pronounced the unfamiliar name „Taidakhin‟ as „Takhel‟ or „Takhen'. And in the course of time, Takhen and Takhel came to stand for Tripura. The relation between the two kingdoms was filled with mutual co-operation, occasional conflicts and war fares. There were several cases of hostilities between Tripura and Manipur particularly between 16 th to 18 th centuries, they were in 1533, 1634, 1696 and 1724 A.D. The most remarkable armed clash between the two took place during the reign of Tripura king Dharma Manikya II (1717-1733 A.D.) and the Manipuri king Garib Niwaz or Pamheiba (1709-1748 A.D.). In this battle Tripuris suffered severe defeat in the hands of the Manipuri troops. In order to commemorate the glorious victory over Tripura, a book was written called \"Takhel Ngamba\" (Conqueror of Tripura). However, despite such hostilities, the traditions of wedlock between the two kingdoms were common phenomena since centuries back. In the light of history the first reference of matrimonial alliances between the royal houses of Manipur and Tripura is recorded in the royal chronicle of Tripura \"Sri Rajmala\" that Tripura Raja Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 27 Taidakshin, grandson of king Trilochana married a princess of Mekhali (modern Manipur). But, it is unfortunate that there is absence of supportive sources about the event of the marriage. Again, due to divergence in the chronology of Tripura kings an authentic date cannot be fixed. After this we do not find references of matrimonial alliances between the two kingdoms for many centuries. Scores of years later the state chronicle of Manipur \"Cheitharol Kumbaba\" recorded for the first time that in 1609 A.D. Akhoicham girl „Yangnu‟ was married to king of Takhen (modern Tripura). It can be contemplated as per the date of the marriage that the ruling monarchs of the kingdoms were perhaps Meitei king Khagemba (1597–1652 A.D) and the Tripura Raja Yosodhar Manikya (1600-1623 A.D.). In the following years there were many references about diplomatic correspondences between the two states but it was until 18 th century that we find rare mention of any interdynastic marriage alliances. But, Nalini Ranjan Roychoudhury has mentioned about sending an envoy in 1662-63 A.D. to the court of Manipur accompanied by one girl and one elephant. But no further information is provided on the issue. However, the most prominent cases of matrimonial alliances between Manipur and Tripura started towards the end of 18 th century. At the end of the 18 th century in 1785 A.D., Rajdhar Manikya II ascended the throne of Tripura and ruled up to 1804 A.D. In Manipur, his contemporary Raja was king Bhagyachandra alias Joy Singha (1759-1761 & 1763-1798 A.D.). During their rule the first historically significant marriage union took place. The old Raja Bhagyachandra of Manipur was a religious individual and after installing his eldest son Prince Labanyachandra as new king of Manipur started for pilgrimages to numerous secret holy places of India in 1798 A.D. On his journey he also visited Tripura and halted back at Agartala, the capital for some days. During his stay he gave one of his daughter princess Hariseswari in marriage to Tripura king Rajdhar Manikya II. Thus, with this the old tradition of wed-lock between the royal houses was renewed. The „Kanya Dana‟ or „Girl offering ceremony‟ of Princess Hariseswari was performed by her brother Sri Tulajit. This marriage was effective in bringing genial relations among the states. Following the wedding, Raja Joy Singha did not extend his stay for long at Agartala and started for his pilgrimage. The journey thus being through water ways the Tripura Raja helped him by supplying 15 boats for the river journey and also gave seven hundred silver coins to Raja Bhagyachandra for his travelling expenses. After the marriage alliance road connecting Tripura and Manipur were widened and easy immigration between the states became constant. It was in 1804 that the Meiteis even helped the Tripuris in suppressing raids made by the Kukis in the Tripura border. The new Queen Hariseswari brought all along the idol of \"Sri Radhamadhav\" from her parental house which was installed in the royal compound. The king brought the priest of the temple, some musicians, some noble men and maid attendants of the Queen from Manipur and gave them settlement near the royal house at a village called „Mekhlipara‟ (village of Manipuris). But, unfortunately, at present no Mekhli/Meitei inhabits in the village. When the capital of the kingdom shifted from old Agartala to the new Agartala (Nutan Haveli) during the reign of king Krishna Kishore Manikya (1829-1849 A.D.) the deity of the \"Sri Radhamadhav\" was brought to the new place and installed to the north of the royal palace. After the name of the Radhamadhav the place came to known as „Radhanagar‟. Many Hindu festivals like „Maharasa‟ (of various forms) are performed in this temple every year like an imitation as done in „Sri Sri Govindajee‟ temple of Manipur. After the death of Rajdhar Manikya his son Ram Ganga Manikya succeeded the throne of Tripura. The king did not marry any of the Meitei girls like his father. The footstep of marrying Manipuri girls by the Tripuri Rajas continued thereafter. The distinguished verity of the later marriages was that the Tripura Rajas not only married the princesses of the royal family of Manipur but also the Meitei maidens who have migrated and settled in Tripura due to political instability in their native or for economic necessity. Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 28 The major Meitei migration in the kingdom of Tripura took during the Burmese invasion of Manipur in 1819 to 1825 A.D. which is called in the history of Manipur as the „Seven Years Devastation‟, many Manipuris had to flee from their native land and took settlement in the nearby kingdoms. Among them numerous obtained shelter at Tripura and later became permanent domicile of the land. The then Raja of Tripura Kashichandra Manikya (18261829 A.D.) was fascinated by the beauty, cleanliness and plethora of health of the Manipuri girls. In 1826 A.D., being captivated by the beauty of Meitei princess Kutilakha/Kutilakshi of Manipur, the king married her. The king also married three other Manipuri girls who were from plebeian families. The Meitei Queen Kutilakshi gave birth to a son named Krishnachandra who was appointed as Barthakur in later years. But it was unfortunate that the prince Krishnachandra died at his early age. Kashichandra Manikya also had many other wives from different communities. Prince Kashichandra Manikya also married the daughter of the king of Assam named Ratnamala on 21 st December 1822. The retinue of the princess was provided settlement near „Mekhlipara‟ and was called Assam-para and to the Manipuris, it was known as Tekhao Leikai (village of Assamese). After the death of Raja Kashichandra Manikya, his son Krishna Kishore Manikya (18291849 A.D.) ascended the throne of Tripura. Similar to his forerunners, he also married many Manipuri girls and increased the number of Meitei Queens in the royal house of Tripura. Of the Queens three of them were the daughters of Manipuri king Marjit Singha, they were – princess Chandrakola, princess Vidhukola and princess Akhileswari. Queen Akhileswari gave birth to prince Nilkrishna. The three princesses were perhaps settling in Sylhet along with their father prior to commencement of the marriages. Maharaja Krishna Kishore Manikya at his old age also married a beautiful Manipuri Brahmin girl called Purnakala who was a cook in the Tripura royal kitchen. The Manipuris called the new Rani as „Bamon Leima‟ or „Brahmin Queen‟. This marriage became a matter of discussion and criticism among the subjects in the kingdom. Curved with numerous problems Raja Krishna Kishore Manikya did not take the new Maharani to the royal fortress. Therefore, he built a house at Haidra (Dholeswar) for the Rani where she was kept along with some attendants and sepoys. The place „Haidra‟ was situated 5 miles in west of modern Agartala, which was a forest area full of woods and birds and was a convenient place for hunting and games. Krishna Kishore Manikya being a lover of hunting visited the place severally. Atlast the king being fascinated and attracted towards the beauty of the place decided to shift his capital there and the construction of the new capital started in 1838 A.D. Thus, present Agartala town had its origin in the growth of Manipuri community. Again, it is very obvious that Rani Purnakala became one of the factors behind the establishment of the new capital. One notable event was that one Kumari Urmilla, daughter of Krishna Kishore Manikya was married to Kumar Tilok, son of Duljit (Daoji) who was one of the grandsons of Maharaja Bhagyachandra. In the realm of Tripura-Manipuri matrimonial alliances it was the first instance of marrying Tripuri girls by the royal descendants of the Meities. However, in future years we do not find any such references of reciprocal marriage. Ishan Chandra Manikya son of Krishna Kishore Manikya ruled Tripura from 1849 to 1862 A.D. The new king also followed the long tradition of wed-lock with the Manipuri girls. He had four Maharanis one of whom was Bengali lady named Rajlakshmi, the other three were all Manipuri khsatriyas viz. Moirangthem Chanu Muktabali, Keisam Chanu Jatiswari and Khumanthem Chanu Chandreswari. Maharaja Ishan Chandra Manikya did not have any child from his first wife Rajlakshmi. His second wife Muktabali Devi gave birth to prince Brajendrachandra. From his fourth wife Jatiswari prince Nabadwipchandra and from his third wife Chandreswari prince Rohinichandra was born. Maharani Jatiswari is mentioned to have 3 more girl child along with Nabadwipchandra. Maharani Muktabali was Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 29 a girl of Moirngthem clan who inhabited at modern Srimangal area of Bangladesh. The famous Manipuri musician of the time Babu Moirangthem Babuni was her nephew. He was one of the teachers who introduced „Rasa‟ dance in Tripura. Maharani Chandreswari, another queen of Maharaj Ishan Chandra Manikya was the daughter of Khumanthen Khirod who was a settler of Kasba (Keilashgar, Tripura). After the death of Maharaja Ishan Chandra Manikya his brother Birchandra Manikya (1862-1896 A.D.), the next king did not stay aloof from totaling Manipuri women in the regal fortress of Tripura. He is also considered as the maker of modern Tripura. The new king not only continued the tradition of marrying Manipuri girls but also encouraged the development of Manipuri culture in Tripura as the king being a patron of art, literature and music. Birchandra Manikya had many wives, of which there were three Manipuri Maharanis and one Rani. The Meitei Maharanis were Ningthem Chanu Bhanumati, Panganbam Chanu Rajeswari or Kaboklei and Khuman Chanu Manmohini. Maharani Bhanumati was most favorite Queen of Maharaja Birchandra Manikya. She was the daughter of Rajkumar Ningthem Kulendra of Kasba (Keilashgar) and sister of Rajkumar Ranadhwaj who was one of the influential ministers of Birchandra Manikya. Ningthem Kulendra was the son of Rajkumar Tilok who married Tripuri princess Urmila. Maharani Bhanumati gave birth to prince Samarendra who was appointed as Barthakur. It is said that Maharani Bhanumati had a premature death in 1882 A.D. which stricken the king with great grief. The depression and cry in the heart of raja made him to compose many narratives which was compiled and came out in the form of novel called \"Prem Marichika Kabya\". At that juncture of time the young poet Rabindranath Tagore presented the raja an anthology called \"Bhangnahriday\" (broken heart). Panganbam chanu Rajeswari alias Kaboklei was the second Maharani of the king. She was also known as „Dityo Ishwari‟. The father of Maharani Rajeswari was Panganbam Premsingha Thakur, a settler of Sylhet. Maharani Rajeswari gave birth to three sons, they were – Kumar Radha Kishore, Kumar Debendra and Kumar Nripendra. The eldest son of the Queen prince Radha Kishore succeeded the throne of Tripura after his father. The area which was at the disposal of the Queen was named as „Naran Rajeswaripur‟. The third and the youngest Queen of raja Birchandra Manikya was Khuman Chanu Manmohini alias Khuman Chanu Tharo. She was the daughter of Khumanthem Kirtidhvaja and was one of the sisters of Maharani Bhanumati. Maharani Manmohini was only 13 years and Maharaja Birchandra Manikya was at the age of 50 when the marriage was solemnized. The king gave the land Banamalipur as her share. She also established a temple and a „mandapa‟ near the present Iskon temple at Tripura. Birchandra Manikya died in 1896 A.D. After nine years of the death of her husband Manmohini also breathe her last and her shraddha ceremony was performed by her 14 years old son prince Brajanidhu. During the reign of Birchandra Manikya many development work of Manipuri culture was promoted. He encouraged his Manipuri Maharanis to construct temples and „mandapas‟. Maharani Rajeswari installed the „Sri Sri Radhamadhab‟ temple at Dholeswar and „Lainingthou Pakhangba‟ temple at Banamalipur. The temple is known to the nonManipuris of Tripura as „Pagla Debota‟ or „Mad God‟. It is also noteworthy that the Manipuri traditional festival „Lai Haraoba‟ was introduced for the first time in Tripura by Maharani Rajeswari. The third Queen of Birchandra Manikya, Maharani Khuman Leima Manmohini also installed Sri Sri Radha Gobinda at Banamalipur. After the death of Birchandra Manikya on 11 th December, 1896 A.D. he was succeeded by his son Radha Kishore Manikya (1896-1909 A.D.) whose mother was Maharani Rajeswari. Radha Kishore like his antecedents married many Manipuri girls. He had three Manipuri Maharanis and six Manipuri Ranis (total-9). The three Maharanis were – Ningthem Chanu Ratna Manjuri or „Dhaka Rani‟, Thongam Chanu Tulsibati and Thongam Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 30 Chanu Manmanjuri of Nalgaria. However, the names of the other six Meitei Ranis are not available anywhere. Maharani Ratna Manjuri was called by the Meiteis of Tripura as „Dhaka Rani‟ which means „Queen from Dhaka‟. She was the daughter of the exiled king of Manipur Maharaja Debendra Singha. He ruled the kingdom of Manipur from 1849 to 1850 A.D. The Tripura king Radha Kishore Manikya married the daughter of the exiled Meitei king ahead of his succession to the throne. During the lifespan of his father Birchandra Manikya, in 1875 A.D., the king arrived at Dhaka to meet Lord Northbrook the then Governor General to discuss on various issues. During this trip, Birchandra Mankikya also visited the palace of exiled king Debendra to congregate with the Meiteis settled there. Birchandra Manikya saw princess Ratna Manjuri, the beautiful 10 year daughter of the dethroned king. He was charmed by the beauty of the princess and decided to make her his daughter-in-law. Thereafter, he brought the princess at Agartala and arranged her marriage with his son Maharajkumar Radha Kishore. Thus, Ratna Manjuri became the first Manipuri Queen of Radha Kishore Manikya. The new Queen was accompanied by her brothers namely Damanjit Rajkumar, Chitragupta (Amusna) etc. and the king arranged their settlement at Keilashgar. The area near Bishalgarh where the relatives of Ratna Manjuri settled is at present called as „Dhakarbari‟. Maharani Ratna Manjuri was the mother of the next Tripura king Birendra Kishore Manikya. The Queen built the temple of „Lamdem Lairembi‟ at Bajalghat. In 1916 A.D. at age of 75 the Queen died at Agartala and the shraddha ceremony of the deceased Queen was performed under the initiative of her grandson Maharaja Bir Bikram. The most important and revolutionary Queen of Radha Kishore Manikya was Maharani Tulsibati. Unlike other, Tulsibati was a girl of simple cultivator family of village Tarou (Nalgoriya) situated a little far away from Agartala. Her father was Thongam Rupananda who inhabited along with his wife and five daughters at the village. After the immediate death of Rupananda the responsibility of the family fell upon Tulsibati and her mother. But, soon the misfortune was swept away and Maharaja Radha Kishore Manikya married the cultivator girl Tulsibati. The Queen made remarkable contributions in the educational history of Tripura. She was a great social activist and kindhearted person. Even today she is remembered by the people of Tripura for her various contributions for the development of the society. She is credited for initiating the spread of women education in Tripura. During the last part of 19 th century a wave for the development of women education in Tripura was initiated by the Maharani. With her effort she succeeded in establishing the first girls‟ school in Tripura called \"Maharani Tulsibati Balika Vidyalaya\" in 1894 A.D. at Agartala. Added, Maharaja Radha Kishore Manikya also established vocational training schools where handloom training was given priority. In 1905, the Maharani established a separate woman cell at the Victoria Memorial Hospital (presently known as I.G.M) at Agartala. Maharani Tulsibati also established a market and to commemorate her contribution the name of the bazaar was kept as \"Ranirbazar\" (Market of the Queen). Thought Maharani Tulsibati was an uneducated person but she was expert in compositions of songs and poems. Her composed songs related to „Holi‟ festival were very famous during the time. The temple of „Sri Sri Radhamadhad‟ at Nalgaria and „Lainingthou Puthiba‟ at Abhoynagar was installed by the Queen. Beside these, we find that in almost all the Manipuri villages of Tripura such as Bishalgarh, Bamutia, Murabari, Daccabari etc. the Manipuri Queens erected a number of temples and mandapas. The Manipuri Queens brought along with them the culture and religion of their parental state which they enriches even in the royal palace of Tripura. The next Tripura Raja Birendra Kishore Manikya (1909-1923 A.D) had six Maharanis who belonged to the Nepali community and ten (10) Manipuri Ranis. Though the king married Manipuri girls like his predecessors but he did not confer them the status of „Maharanis‟. The year 1909 A.D. was a memorable and historical moment for both Tripura Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 31 and Manipur. The then Manipuri king Churachand Singh paid a visit to Tripura on the occasion of coronation ceremony of the new Tripura king Birendra Kishore Manikya. Since years back the Manipur royal house with that of the Tipperah family had been related by marriage. It was the first occasion that the Heads of both the families met one another as relatives. The Manipuri king also visited many Manipuri villages of Tripura and rendered financial help to the settlers. Maharaja Birendra Kishore Manikya died in 1923 A.D. and the young prince Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya succeeded his father on 14 th August 1923 A.D. Bir Bikram Kishore had seven (7) wives (2 Maharanis and 5 Ranis). Among the five Ranis, three of them were Manipuris. Beside the Rajas many nobilities of the Tripura royal family also married Manipuri girls. Some of them were Maharajkumar Navadipbahadur, Brajendra Kishore alias Lalukarta, Ramendra Kishore alias Nimukarta who married Nirupama Devi, Bhadravati Devi and Jotirani Devi respectively. Maharajkumar Navadipbahadur was the son of the Manipuri Queen Jatiswari, the third wife of Ishan Chandra Manikya. Nirupama Devi was mother of famous Indian musician Sachin Deb Barman (S.D. Barman). Thus, we find that there were many cases of Manipuri girls who were taken as wives by the Tripuri Rajas and its nobilities. But, it is worth mentioning that no Manipuri king married Tripuri princess except the case of Rajkumar Tilak kumar Singha as mentioned above. Though it was alike one way in the inter-dynastic marriages between the two kingdoms but they maintained mutual and friendly relations. When Maharaja Churachand of Manipur died, many Meitei nobles from Tripura were sent to attend the shraddha ceremony and vice-versa on the death of Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya, the then Meitei king Bodhachandra visited Tripura and participated in the shraddha ceremony in 1947 A.D. M.K Binodini (daughter of Maharaja Churachand) in her introductory note for the book \"Itihaser Aaloke Tripura-Manipur, Itihaski Mityengdagi Tripura-Manipur\" by L.Biramangal Singha and Pannalal Roy has revealed that her grand-mother (in relation) Dhakarani alias Ratna Manjuri made her visit to Manipur. The Tripuri Queen being a representative of both the states made a marriage proposal for Tomal Manjuri (elder sister of M.K Binodini) with her grand-son Maharaja Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya. The then Raja of Manipur Churachand accepted the marriage proposal to hand over his daughter. But, unfortunately the marriage could not be solemnized. The sequence of Tripura Rajas of marrying Manipuri girls not only has political significance but also cultural. Meitei culture was promoted and extended in whole the kingdom to great extent. They introduced several Vaishnava festivals like Holi, Rasa Dance, Rathyatra, Jhulan etc. During the reign of Radha Kishore Manikya Manipuri „Vasanta Ras‟ dance was shown to Rabindranath Tagore in his honour. The poet was mesmerized by beauty of the dance. The Manipuri Dance form was immediately introduced at the initiative of the poet in the Institution of „Santiniketan‟. Thus, the historical evidences revealed that there were plenty of cases where matrimonial alliance occurred between the royal families of Manipur and Tripura during the rule of the monarchs. The Tripura royal house was filled with many descendents from the Manipuri Queens. The unique character of some of the marriages solemnized was that the Manipuri ladies whom the Rajas married simply belonged to plebeian families. Such instances reveal that the Tripuri Rajas were desperately charmed and fascinated by the beauty of the Meitei girls. The elegant ethnicity and tradition of the Meiteis also engrossed the members of the royal family and interested them to develop such wed-lock. But, it is also a fact that all the Manipuri ladies were not always bestowed the rank of the Chief Queen. Despite the detailing of the marriages occurred between the two kingdoms it is unfortunate that the unavailability of proper related materials regarding most of the marriages organized kept a part of history vacuum. Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 32 References: Adhikari, Udainarayan., \"Social – Cultural Relations Among States in Pre – Independence India, A Study of Tripura & Manipur\", Akansha Publishing House, New Delhi, 2010. Bhattacharyya, A.C., \"Progressive Tripura\", Tribal Research and Cultural Institute, Govt. of Tripura, 2012. Bihari, Nepram., \"The Cheitharol Kumbaba, The Royal Chronicle of Manipur\", Spectrum publications, Guwahati, 2012. Dun, Captain, E.W., \"Gazetteer of Manipur\", Vivek Publishing House, Delhi, 1981. Goswami, Dr. Dwijendra Narayan., \"Rajarshi Bhagya Chandra\", Akkhar Publication, Agartala, 2002. Goswami, Dr. D.N. & Dr. Debbarman., \"Tripura State Administration Report (1904-05, 1906-07, 1907-08)\", Tribal Research and Cultural Institute, Govt. of Tripura, 2007. Hamilton, Francis., \"An Account of Assam: With Some Notices Concerning the Neighbouring Territories. First Compiled in 1807-1814\", Government of Assam in the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Narayani Handiqui Historical Institute, 1940. Khelchandra, N., & Ibungohal, L., \"Cheitharol Kumbaba\", Sahitya Parishad, Imphal, 1989. Kabui, Gangmumei., \"History of Manipur, vol-I, Pre-Colonial Period\", National Publishing House, New Delhi, (3 rd edi.), 2011. Menon, K.D., \"Tripura District Gazetteers\", Govt. Of Tripura\". Agartala, 1975. Nath, Dr. N.C., \"Sri Rajmala\", Vol-I to IV, (Translated), Tribal Research Institute, Govt. of Tripura, Agartala, 1999. Roychoudhury, Nalini Ranjan., \"Tripura Through the Ages, A short History of Tripura from the earliest times to 1947 A.D.\", Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1983. Roy, Jyotirmoy., \"History of Manipur\", Firma KLM private Ltd., Calcutta, 1999. Sen, Sri Kaliprasanna., (edited) \"Sri Rajmala\", Vol-I, II, III, IV, Upajati Sanskriti Gobeshana Kendra, Govt. of Tripura, 2003. Singha, Sri Kailashchandra., \"Rajmala Ba Tripurar Itihas\", Akkhar Publication, Agartala, 1405 Bangabda. Singha, L. Birmangal, & Ray, Pannalal., \"Itihaser Aloke Tripura – Manipur, Itihaski Mityengdagi Tripura Manipur\", Akkhar Publication, 2007. Singh, W. Ibohal., \"The History of Manipur (An Early Period)\", Manipur Commercial Co., Imphal, 1986. Sanajaoba, Naorem., \"Manipur Past and Present\", vol-IV, Mittal publications, 2005. Singha, G.P., \"Researches into the History and Civilization of the Kiratas\", New Delhi, 2008. Singha, Rajkumar Sri Snahal., (edited) \"Chingthangkhomba Maharaja Ganga Chatpa\", Sri Noimangthem Kali Singha, Nagamapal, Imphal, 1964. Matrimonial Alliances between the royal houses of Tripura.............. Memchaton Singha Volume-I, Issue-I July 2014 33 Journals/Periodicals Singha, Sri Rajkumar Kamaljit., (edited) \"Marup, Sharat ki Echel, 1980\", 12 th Edition, Agartala, 1980. Singha, Sri Rajkumar Kamaljit., (edited) \"Marup, Sharat ki Echel, 1981\", 13 th Edition, Agartala, 1981. \"Takhel Lairang\", 14 th edition, Manipuri Sahitya Parishad, Tripura, Dec. 2011. Singha, R.K. Jhaljit., \"History of Medieval Manipur, part 3\", History section, E-Pao, now the World knows (online news paper), September 24, 2010. Website: http://www.epao.com.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
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{"text": "Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 Hard Times and Rough Rides: The Legal and Ethical Impossibilities of Researching ' Shock' Pornographies Dr Steve Jones and Dr Sharif Mowlabocus 'Extreme' pornography has recently come under intense scrutiny within the context of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act which was introduced by the British Government in 2007, and which will make the possession of extreme pornographic material a criminal offence. The Act is viewed by many as a direct response to a campaign launched following the murder of Jane Longhurst in 2003. During the trial, the prosecution drew particular attention to the defendant's (Graham Coutts) fetish for erotic asphyxia, linking Longhurst's murder to pornographic images downloaded by the defendant. The Act focuses on the representation of 'extreme' sexual behaviours, defining an 'extreme pornographic image' as one which 'appears to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal', including depictions of: (a) an act which threatens or appears to threaten a person's life, (b) an act which results in or appears to result (or be likely to result) in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, (c) an act which involves or appears to involve sexual interference with a human corpse (d) a person performing or appearing to perform an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal. The legislation poses difficulties for researchers, and it is on the methodologies and ethics of researching extreme pornographies that this paper is focused. We have chosen to focus our discussion on the issue of scholarly research only, as the effects on teaching pornography raise separate concerns and require their own detailed investigation. Those wishing to pursue this line of enquiry may wish to begin by exploring the existing literature dealing with ethical issues raised by \"porno-pedagogy\" (Austin, 1999; Curry, 1996; Driver, 2004; Jenkins, 2004; Kirkham & Skeggs, 1996; Kleinhans, 1996; Lehman, 2006; and Reading, 2005). We begin by setting the debate in context, examining the Bill in relation to the media effects model, and drawing attention to the mutable nature of extreme pornographies as a genre. This is a particularly important consideration given that extreme pornographies regularly blur boundaries between porn and horror. We demonstrate how the researcher of extreme pornographies must contend with the ambiguous interpretation of images in the legislation. We also investigate who is permitted to view extreme imagery and the motivations that justify access. This discussion necessarily underscores the methodological and ethical implications of undertaking such research in the academic context. One may seek to justify the need to study extreme material, yet defending the right for open access to the same material beyond the academy poses its own problems. Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 What is Extreme Pornography? Genre, Convention and the Challenges of Identification The focus on visual media in the Longhurst case is reminiscent of the James Bulger case of 1993, where it was rumoured that his murderers, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, had been influenced by a certificated horror film Child 's Play 3 (1991) though they were never proven to have actually seen the film in question (Kerekes & Slater, 2001: 325). Both cases demonstrate the pervasiveness of an outmoded media effects model, in which images are seen as a stimulus for behaviours (see Segal, 1993 for a critique of this model). The extreme pornography legislation responds to a campaign which argued for a connection between representation and violence. Longhurst 's murderer was said to be 'obsessed' with violent and necrophilic Internet porn, and as Longhurst's sister, Sue Barnett, argued, ' *t+he most effective strategy was always going to be to make it illegal to view *extreme+ material' (in O' Brien, 2006). The model of media effects utilized here has been widely questioned by psychologists, as well as media and film academics (Gauntlett, 2001; Baron, 1983; Zillman & Bryant, 1984). Critical focus has instead turned to a paradigm that places as much emphasis on the point of decoding as encoding. According to this model, the production of meaning is not characterized as static but as a dynamic process in which the audience produces a range of meanings and understandings from any given text based on their own cultural position (Hall, 1973). However, in the Longhurst case, the hypodermic effects model is linked with a mode of consumption that involves an aberrant decoding of images that does not correspond with the reading intended in its production. According to the legislation, the consumption of images extracted from otherwise non-pornographic classified films can become prosecutable if it is considered that they have been used 'solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal'. This would mean that the images of mutilation from a certificated film such as Saw (2004) or of asphyxiation in a film such as Rope (1948) could be deemed pornographic if they were proven to have been isolated from the rest of the text by the viewer for the purposes of sexual gratification. Pornography evades legal definition, as famously concretized in Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's declaration 'I know it when I see it' (Stewart, 1964). Much debate over categorising obscene imagery is centred on American legislation, not least in relation to the constitutional right to free speech (see Klein, 2006; McGuire & Caldeira, 1993; Miller, 2000; and Robbins, 1973, for examples). In Britain, the Obscene Publications Acts (1857, 1959 and 1964), the Protection of Children Act (1978), and the Sexual Offences Act (2003) have been invoked to cover most cases involving images that may be considered pornographic, but these benchmarks are far from indisputable. While Kieran (2002) provides a critical overview of attempts to answer the question 'what is obscenity?', defining pornography is made difficult by the wide variety of pornographies that are available: Hard-core and Soft-core; Heterosexual, Homosexual, and Bisexual; Art, Alt and Freak porn (for critical responses to this variety, see Dyer, 1985; Ellis et al., 1986; Church Gibson & Gibson, 1993; Straayer, 1996; Strossen, 1995; and Williams, 1989). Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 Additionally, in its imperative to cater as widely as possible, pornography tends to adopt and combine a host of generic conventions, often blurring boundaries. Pornographic film has a long-established tradition of appropriating narratives and motifs from other genres, as titles such as Jurassic Pork (1995), Malcolm XXX (1992), or In Diana Jones and the Temple of Poon (1996) illustrate (see Hunter, 2006; and Smith, 2009). However, films that combine hard-core sex with graphic violence, such as Porn of the Dead (2006), BoneSaw (2006), and XXXorcist (2006) move beyond parody and generic ' borrowing' to a point where the audience may become uncertain as to exactly what genre of film they are watching the film being at once 'too horrific' to be porn, and too sexually focused to be horror. As O'Toole writes, 'placing deeply tangled issues like desire and consent alongside hard-core sex is making a juxtaposition most people find simply unacceptable' (1999: 359). The Extreme Porn Act concretizes such a fear, and thus if either horror or porn texts blur their generic boundaries too far, they are deemed \"extreme\". While the BBFC (British Board of Film Classification) certificated Saw and Hostel (2005) as belonging to the horror genre, they have been dubbed ' Torture Porn' in their critical reception because of their graphic and excessive depictions of violence and mutilation (Edelstein, 2006). The labelling of a horror cycle as a type of pornography in the popular press echoes the arguments of earlier pro-censorship, anti-pornography feminists which have often coupled sex and violence (Radford & Russell, 1992: 203-19). Indeed this combination is at the root of the influential Dworkin/Mackinnon view of pornography as a degrading and violent attack upon women and women's rights (see Dworkin & MacKinnon, 1988). The horror film, The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974), has been envisaged as porn on this basis (Everywoman, 1988: 19) despite not containing a single sexual act, while the British group, Campaign Against Pornography and Censorship include 'torture, flaying, cannibalism, crushing of breasts in vices, exploding vaginas packed with hand-grenades, eyes gouged out, beatings, dismemberings, and burnings' in their discussion of what constitutes hard-core pornography (Smith, 1993: 72 81). Such confusions reveal a crisis over what the term 'porn' signifies suggesting that porn may be less concerned with images of sexual pleasure than with various attempts to expose the body. But if this is the case, then the Act is even more disconcerting, given that it hinges on an ability to identify what is both 'pornographic' and 'extreme '. Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the Act is its ambiguity, which provides the scope for a multitude of acts and practices to come under increased scrutiny and potentially face prosecution. Organisations such as Liberty, Backlash, the Libertarian Alliance, the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights, and Consenting Adult Action Network have disputed the Act, especially in regard to the potential persecution of persons engaging in consensual sadomasochistic activities (Melonfarmers, (a) n.d.). What might be considered extreme pornography under the legislation? As should have already become clear, the answer is contentious to say the least, owing to the vagaries of the law. However, it is likely that the following texts and practices will face difficulties under the new legislation. These include acts such as CBT (cock and ball torture), Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 electro-stimulation (where electrical currents are administered to specific areas of the body), fisting, rough anal and other forms of penetration that are considered violent or in some way harmful. Almost certainly (in the light of the Longhurst murder trial) breath control and erotic asphyxiation would become vulnerable to prosecution, as would fishhooking, bukkake, and BDSM. The fictitious depiction of bestiality, rape, necrophilia and humiliation found in certificated films such as Baise Moi (2002), Boy Meets Girl (1994), Snuff (1976), Irreversible (2003), Island of Death (1975), and Kissed (1996) would almost certainly have been rejected by the BBFC if the legislation had been in place prior to their classification indeed, several of these titles have previously sustained cuts or been rejected. In terms of online content, websites, which are not yet subject to such categorisation, become central to the extreme porn debate because of the relative representational freedom they have enjoyed. Necrobabes.com, Youporn.com, Dr-Weird.com, Brutal-Femdom.com, and Deepthroatgag.org feature amateur and/or professional representations of whipping, slapping, rough oral, gagging, trampling, hard restraint and (simulated) forced sex, all of which contravene the proposed legislation as well as existing BBFC guidelines at R18, and thus such sites may find themselves under scrutiny. This is by no means a definitive list such a list has yet to be published by the Government and is almost certainly impossible to produce due to the international and transient nature of cyberspace. The examples identified here should be treated as emblematic. It should also be noted that there is a distinct blurring of the line occurring between reality and fiction, and between 'practice ' and 'representation'. From a technological perspective, the issue also becomes more important when we acknowledge the fact that researchers have unprecedented access to unclassified film material via the internet. Indeed, digital technologies of networked communication seem to be the unnamed guilty party in the Longhurst murder and the shadowy figure with which the Act is set to lock horns in the future. Commercial porn from around the world is now easily viewed online, regardless of classification systems, and websites such as Xtube.com, Tube8.com and xhamster.com now provide 'amateur' pornographers with an avenue for the commercial distribution of their material (Lane, 2000), none of which is classified by the BBFC. Who Can Look at Extreme Pornography? Academics cannot remain indifferent to issues of prohibition. Film has long been subject to legal sanction. The Video Recordings Act of 1984, which was designed to restrict the distribution of sexual and violent images in the UK, was enforced by house raids to prevent uncertificated material being circulated privately (see Kerekes & Slater, 2001: 287-313). A system of classification was subsequently employed by the BBFC to determine what could and could not be supplied, and where such classified material could be sold. The law regarding unclassified material states that 'It is an offence to supply or offer to supply, or to have in possession for the purposes of supplying, an unclassified video recording. The Video Recordings Act provides for powers of entry, search and seizure and for the forfeiture of video recordings by the court' (BFI online). Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 While certification may provide a level of legal protection for researchers, much extreme material remains unclassified and researchers face obstacles both inside and outside their host institutions if they attempt to study it. Mikita Brottman managed to evade prosecution over attempts to import unclassified horror material for her book Meat is Murder! (1998) because of the 'admittedly minor ... emphasis on censorship' which legitimated her research and 'the headed notepaper of *her+ university department' at the time, she was based within the University of East London. Tellingly, she now works in 'the US Midwest' where 'they don 't require you to have a Ph.D. from Oxford to watch a low budget horror film' (Kerekes & Slater, 2001: 309). In contrast, David Flint, who was not attached to a university, was subject to several raids and threatened with criminal charges for possessing uncertificated material during the authorship of his 1999 book on mainstream porn, Babylon Blue (Kerekes & Slater, 2001: 305). In the event, Flint evaded criminal prosecution because he 'had the leverage of the press coverage behind him as well as the services of a \"heavyweight London barrister\"' (Kerekes & Slater, 2001: 306). However, whether the academy is prepared to support academics in their research or not, the legal rights of the individual citizen are beyond the remit of institutional protection. Of course, some individuals, such as those working for the BBFC, will continue to be allowed to view illegal material. Sections of the British police force also spend time categorising images of child sex abuse ( 'child porn') according to a spectrum of danger and severity. Lawyers are another group expected to view unclassified material, though solely in relation to specific criminal cases where the viewing, supplying or manufacturing of such material is being considered as a motivating force behind a crime, or is the crime itself. In these cases, the law is suspended to allow the analysis of extreme material, whereas it is not for academics unless they are part of a sponsored project, working on behalf of or with governmental agencies (see, for example, Barker, 2007). The reason lies in the motivation for the kind of analysis undertaken by censors, police and lawyers. It aims to censor or prosecute: objectives that are clear before the analysis has even begun. Officers working in the vice division, lawyers working for the CPS, and members of the BBFC's classification board will only view extreme pornography in order to restrict it and in the case of the judiciary and the law enforcers, in order to identify, blame and punish producers, distributors and consumers. Conversely, the academic engages in a project that seeks to understand such material. This need not imply support for pornography; we need only think of the work of Robin Morgan (1978), Suzanne Kappeler (1986), or John Stoltenberg (1991) to see that academic studies of pornography may be arguing against its proliferation. However, the critical lens through which such work is undertaken does not a priori suggest a punitive gaze, and does not guarantee the repression of such material, or the bringing to account of those who produce or consume it. Because of this, it is much less easy to argue for the rights of individual academics to scrutinize the same images. As named authors, researchers are made vulnerable by the process of individuation, even though they may be associated with an institution. Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 Approaching university ethics committees with a proposal to study uncertificated (and therefore illegal) material is only the first hurdle. Even if study is supported, the writing produced, once made public, may serve as evidence that the author has broken the law by viewing prohibited material. While the new legislation does have a clause allowing 'legitimate reason for being in possession ', there is a distinct lack of clarity as to what is deemed legitimate, making possession risky for any academic. In his recent analysis of pornography and masculinity in American culture, Robert Jensen suggests two benchmarks that need to be considered when discussing pornography in contemporary American culture: First, imagine what we could call the cruelty line the measure of the level of overt cruelty toward, and degradation of, women in contemporary mass-marketed pornography. That line is heading up, sharply. Second, imagine the normalization line the measure of the acceptance of pornography in the mainstream of contemporary culture. That line also is on the way up, equally sharply (Jensen, 2007: 16). Surely it is the role of the academic researcher to examine representations of degradation and humiliation, to analyse them as cultural artefacts, and explore their cultural origins and significance? When Jensen poses the question '*i+f pornography is increasingly cruel and degrading, why is it increasingly commonplace instead of more marginalized?' (2007: 16), it is up to academics to provide a critically rigorous and multi-faceted answer. Jensen does offer his own answer that America is a culture that thrives on cruelty and degradation (2007: 17, 49 & 137-149), but we argue that this is only one of many possible answers. Others might argue that violent imagery is no more prevalent than before that the graphic violence of 'torture porn' is an extension of tropes founded in the video nasty era (see Barker, 1984; and Martin, 2007) and is barely any more gratuitous, or that there is little difference between hard-core rape films of the seventies such as Forced Entry (1973), and the equally fictitious rape-porn of maniacdiaries.com, beyond the modes of dissemination and the specific practices that characterize the pornography of the moment, such as images and clips of skull-fucking, throat-gagging, bukkake, gangbanging and double anal-penetration (Jensen, 2007: 51-77). However, if we undertake that representations of humiliation have become more prominent and acceptable in Western culture (Paasonen et al., 2007), then academics should be allowed access to these materials in order to discover why this is so, and how such a trend can be understood. Any such research would be seriously flawed if it did not include a detailed analysis of its objects of study. If we are to fully understand extreme pornography, we must create an ethically rigorous framework in which such material can be viewed by researchers without fear of prosecution or institutional disciplinary action. This framework must not be organized as a punitive measure; investigation must be separated out from incrimination. And while adhering to strict codes of ethical conduct, academic research must be free to draw conclusions based not on political trends and opinion but on data, on argument, and on evidence. Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 Should Extreme Pornography be Censored? The Implications of Access While there are good grounds for contending that researchers ought to be allowed to research extreme pornography, such a suggestion poses its own problems. In a recent article on user-generated content and representations of the penis, Peter Lehman noted the shift in attitudes towards sexually explicit material caused by the advent of the photograph: The impact of literary pornography was initially limited to the literate upper and middle classes. But with the invention of photography and cheap methods of printing and distributing photographs by the late nineteenth century, the modern notion of pornography arrived. And it has never left. The wider audience prompted a particular hysteria that pornography was no longer produced just for those who presumably can \"handle it \" (due to wealth, education, and privilege) and can pay for it in a manner that does not threaten the social fabric. Photography could be cheaply distributed and enjoyed by the unwashed, illiterate masses. And thus began the fear that porn could and would be the ruin of us all (Lehman, 2007: 109). However, the dilemma at hand extends beyond the moral utopianism of freedom of speech arguments. While we may argue that socio-cultural studies of extreme pornographies are important and even necessary, we must be careful to avoid the implication that researchers are apart or above the standards set for the 'general public' , or that academics should have access to materials that others may not. To argue this would imply that persons outside of academia are incapable of understanding or appreciating the same material and its contexts with the same intellectual capacity. This kind of argument legitimates systems of class privilege which reproduce normative ideological imperatives by positioning 'the \"uneducated\"', or 'the working class ' as the Othered victims of 'media effects' (Gauntlett, 2001: 57 see also Kipnis, 1996; and Kendrick, 1987). To many this is of little consequence or concern; the ivory towers that rise out of the British academic landscape appear as secure and solid as ever before. But upholding an elitist binary between researchers and 'the common people' is snobbish and narrow-minded. It risks abstracting research and researchers from culture, and the object of research from its contexts of production and consumption. It also positions academics as sexless frigid research machines devoid of sexual desire. Of course, they must be conceptualized in this way for this system to work. If this is not maintained if it transpired that the researcher was in fact a bit turned on by the pornographic images they study then they would be no better than the masses 'outside '. The debates about whether we should study pornography may continue to rattle on but they sound more and more hollow with each round of discussion. Pornography is not only a valid area of study, it is a vital area of study. How we should study pornographies and the ethical implications of that study is an area that continues to evolve and demands our attention. The need to debate methodologies, research frameworks, and ethical dilemmas is increasingly important in the UK as a result of the new legislation. Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 We finish our discussion by identifying potential avenues for further research in order to both illustrate the importance of studying extreme pornographic representations and highlight what is at stake for such research in light of the 'Extreme Porn' Act. Firstly, if we acknowledge that extreme porn centres on revealing the body and parts of the body in tight close-up (Williams, 1989: 181-2), we must consider the relationship between scenes of 'torture porn' (in films such as Hostel for instance) and the scenes of operation, amputation and 'opening up' to be found in contemporary television drama CSI (2000-present), for example, and documentary including Gunther von Hagens' Anatomy for Beginners (2005). Multiple representations of body rupture have become immensely popular in Western culture and we should trace this theme as it runs through an otherwise diverse constellation of texts. Doing so allows us to explore the potential meanings behind this spectacle of the body a returning to the body on display, and a body at the very limits of life. These meanings cannot, as yet, be known, but may reflect an ontological crisis brought about by an increasingly cyborgian corporeality (Haraway, 1991; Kurtzweil, 2005); a fear of contamination and biohazard in the post-9/11 landscape of terrorist attack; an ongoing alienation of the body through late capitalist structures of labour (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; Newitz, 2006); or, paradoxically, a reconnection with the flesh in a time of supposed virtual disembodiment (Levidow & Robins, 1989). The theme of terror, played out on the surface of the mutilated body must also be considered in future research. The horrifying images of humiliation, torture and other dehumanising acts that emerged from Abu Ghraib prison in 2004 shocked the world and provoked international outrage and condemnation (Hooks & Mosher, 2005). Yet fictionalized accounts of terror, pain and suffering for another's gratification were at the heart of films such as Saw (2004), and Wolf Creek (2005), both of which made in excess of $25 million at the box office in the US, the latter grossing a phenomenal $103 million worldwide (The Numbers, n.d.). Thus, the second area of focus we identify is predicated on the need to understand the relationship between fictional and non-fictional representations of torture and violence within the context of George W. Bush's 'War on Terror'. Then there is the question of technology. How do technologies of mediation serve to both extend our vision of the body through 'internal ' photography such as colonoscopy and colposcopy (Warner-Marien, 2006: 42) and our ability to transmit such visions via digital imaging and networked communication systems. The internet has become the foremost arena for distributing uncertificated material and digital technologies of communication cannot be separated out from the production and consumption of extreme pornography. But the internet should not be seen only as a device for dissemination; it also provides a point of interaction between producers and consumers (an increasingly porous boundary) and between consumers themselves. Discussions that 'frame ' extreme material are likely to be just as important to the researcher as the material itself. Arguably, the employment of Bourdieu' s theory of cultural capital (1984) or Hebdige's work (1979) on subcultures would reveal that fans of extreme pornography are not a homogenous mass, but are engaged in practices and discourses that serve to create subcultural hierarchies, which both police the borders of the community and define the meaning and content of such material. The issue Originally published in: Sexualities http://sex.sagepub.com Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 12(5): 613–628 DOI: 10.1177/1363460709340371 of child sex abuse (and images of 'child pornography') would doubtless bring to the surface such practices of boundary maintenance and (self) classification. Finally, we identify the need for research to take into account the repositioning that consumers of extreme pornography face, when, overnight, their collections of videos and images might become illegal and their own sexual desires, outlawed. While it is likely that many consumers do not currently consider their consumption of extreme pornography as a political statement, halting their freedom to view such material might serve to change this. In other words, the wo/man who has previously considered their enjoyment of rape fantasy films or S&M images as something private and personal, may begin to recognize themselves as some kind of 'sexual outlaw ' following the implementation of the Act. The relationship between reader and text may be altered, making the enjoyment of extreme material a politically subversive act. The Act may produce a new category of sexually dissident people who will have to fight for the right to represent and have represented their desires, practices and identities. This short list of research questions is enough to highlight the fact that turning our back on extreme pornography (however we choose to identify this) and pretending it does not exist is not an option, let alone a solution. Punishing the individual who views images of sexualized violence or 'violent' sexual practices does not eradicate or significantly hinder the production of such material. It is disconcerting that the production of extreme pornography does not seem to be receiving anywhere near as much attention from lawmakers as has the downloading and viewing of such material. Regardless of whether we should prosecute those who view it, we should be engaged in seeking to understand its appeal and its proliferation in contemporary society. Will the police come banging on our doors the day after the legislation comes into force? Probably not. But they could, leaving us suddenly on the wrong side of the law, pleading innocence on the grounds of academic research. It is not just in the eyes of the British judiciary system that such a defence should be deemed questionable. 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{"text": "Versão pdf da entrada RegRessões ao InfInIto em metafísIca URI: da edIção de 2013 do compêndIo em LInha de pRobLemas de fILosofIa anaLítIca 2012-2015 FCT Project PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010 Editado por João Branquinho e Ricardo Santos ISBN: 978-989-8553-22-5 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Copyright © 2013 do editor Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa Alameda da Universidade, Campo Grande, 1600-214 Lisboa Regressões ao Infinito em Metafísica Copyright © 2013 dos autores João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire Todos os direitos reservados Publicado pela primeira vez em 2013 Regressões ao Infinito em Metafísica Este ensaio consiste num exame crítico da estrutura e do valor de um conjunto diverso de argumentos por regressão ao infinito que têm sido objecto de discussão recorrente na metafísica contemporânea. O seminal livro de David Armstrong Nominalism and Realism (Armstrong 1978) contém uma das mais compreensivas discussões de argumentos regressivos em metafísica, os quais variam entre argumentos que foram de facto avançados ao longo da história da disciplina (como o Argumento do Terceiro Homem, de Platão) e argumentos construídos de novo por Armstrong para fins de exame crítico. Os argumentos regressivos discutidos por Armstrong têm como alvo uma grande variedade de teorias metafísicas acerca da semelhança e da predicação, entre as quais se contam o nominalismo de predicados, o nominalismo de conceitos, o nominalismo de classes, o nominalismo de semelhança e o realismo metafísico transcendente, de inspiração platónica. Parte do presente ensaio visa contribuir para a discussão do tópico das regressões em metafísica através de uma reconstrução e reavaliação, executadas com alguma minúcia, de dois tipos de argumentos regressivos centrais e paradigmáticos, ambos discutidos por Armstrong:1 • a alegada regressão monádica ao infinito gerada pela explicação da predicação proposta pelo realismo metafísico (Armstrong 1978: 69-71); • as alegadas regressões monádicas e diádicas ao infinito geradas pela explicação da predicação propostas pelo nominalis1 Armstrong usa os termos \"regressões de objecto\" e \"regressões relacionais\" para aquilo que nós aqui preferimos designar como, respectivamente, \"regressões monádicas\" e \"regressões diádicas\". Os dois géneros de regressões são distinguidos em Armstrong 1978: 19-20. Por outro lado, a forma de realismo metafísico discutida por Armstrong é o realismo transcendente, de inspiração platónica. Todavia, discutimos neste ensaio argumentos regressivos que visam o realismo metafísico em geral, não apenas aquela versão particular. Concentramo-nos também na explicação da predicação, embora se possa generalizar razoavelmente daí para a explicação da semelhança. João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire2 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica mo de classes (Armstrong 1978: 41-2). A avaliação que Armstrong faz destes argumentos regressivos é, resumidamente, a seguinte. Relativamente ao nominalismo de classes, no caso monádico ou objectual não há sequer qualquer regressão ao infinito; todavia, no caso diádico ou relacional há uma regressão e trata-se de uma regressão viciosa. Relativamente ao realismo metafísico, Armstrong defende diagnósticos genericamente análogos aos obtidos em relação ao nominalismo de classes, embora as razões dadas e os detalhes sejam em cada caso significativamente diferentes. Queremos corrigir os diagnósticos propostos por Armstrong para aqueles dois tipos de argumentos regressivos, e, por analogia, para diversos outros géneros de argumentos regressivos. A nossa correcção é de algum modo menor, no sentido de deixar relativamente intocada a direcção geral dos diagnósticos de Armstrong. Todavia, como vamos ver, não deixa por isso de ser uma correcção de alguma maneira substantiva, já que são feitas rectificações importantes naqueles diagnósticos. Antecipando, os resultados que obtemos são da seguinte natureza: • No caso monádico, quer em relação ao nominalismo de classes quer em relação ao realismo metafísico, nem sequer há regressões ao infinito, muito menos regressões viciosas, pois nem sequer são de facto geradas séries infinitas de explicações. Este resultado não parece ter sido suficientemente notado na literatura sobre o tópico. Armstrong também defende que não há regressões nestes casos, mas com base em razões completamente diferentes das nossas e, a nosso ver, inadequadas. • No caso diádico ou relacional, quer em relação ao nominalismo de classes quer (por analogia) em relação ao realismo metafísico, é à primeira vista possível construir séries infinitas de explicações. Todavia, estas podem ser razoavelmente travadas seja qual for a teoria metafísica que se queira adoptar. Em todo o caso, também não há nestes casos regressões viciosas, o que entra em contraste com o veredicto defendido por Armstrong. Fomos, a este, respeito fortemente inspira3Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 dos pelas reflexões seminais de David Lewis (1997). É bom notar que é possível fazer generalizações razoáveis dos argumentos regressivos erguidos contra aquelas duas teorias metafísicas, bem como em especial dos diagnósticos obtidos a seu respeito, para uma vasta classe de outras teorias metafísicas explicativas dos mesmos fenómenos. Outra parte do ensaio é dedicada ao célebre argumento regressivo montado por Bertrand Russell contra o nominalismo de semelhança. O tratamento que damos a este argumento é de algum modo diferente e independente daquele que damos aos outros argumentos regressivos relacionais. De facto, utilizando uma distinção aqui muito relevante entre regressões explicativas e regressões eliminativas, concluímos que o argumento de Russell é bem sucedido se for visto como um argumento cujo alvo é exibir, no coração do nominalismo de semelhança, uma regressão ao infinito viciosa. Consideramos também diversas reacções disponíveis na literatura ao argumento de Russell, incluindo a réplica de Gonçalo Rodriguez-Pereyra e duas reacções, em sentido oposto uma da outra, desenvolvidas por Armstrong. Por uma questão de simplicidade, concentramo-nos no caso da explicação da predicação, considerando sobretudo predicações de primeira ordem. Considerações análogas podem ser feitas relativamente ao caso da explicação da semelhança, coincidência de propriedades ou identidade de natureza. A estrutura do ensaio é a seguinte. Após algumas considerações preliminares e elementares sobre regressões ao infinito em metafísica (Secção 1), examinamos a regressão monádica do Realismo Metafísico (Secção 2), a regressão monádica do Nominalismo de Classes (Secção 3), a regressão diádica do Nominalismo de Classes (Secção 4), e, por fim, a regressão diádica do Nominalismo de Semelhança (Secção 5). 1 Regressões ao infinito em metafísica Começamos com algumas considerações introdutórias acerca da noção de regressão ao infinito. O que é uma regressão ao infinito? Podemos dizer o seguinte, sem querermos ser muito precisos ou exaustivos. Uma tese, princípio, regra ou explicação conduz a uma regressão ao infinito quando gera uma série de elementos ou estádios que não pode ser parada, que não possui um ponto terminal; ou seja, para qualquer elemento ou estádio da série, é sempre possível encontrar um elemento ou estádio seguinte. Muitas das séries em questão são regressivas no sentido literal do termo, o que significa que cada elemento ou estádio dá origem a um elemento ou estádio que o precede, ad ininitum. Eis dois exemplos comummente dados de regressões. • O princípio da causalidade, o princípio de que tudo tem uma causa, ou seja, a ideia de que, para todo o acontecimento ou fenómeno, há um acontecimento ou fenómeno, diferente daquele, que o causa, é muitas vezes visto - talvez não muito correctamente - como dando origem a uma regressão ao infinito (na série de causas). • O mesmo se pode dizer do resultado da aplicação do mecanismo recursivo característico de diversos operadores frásicos, em especial do operador de verdade, captado na ideia de que prefixar o operador 'É verdade que' a uma frase qualquer S gera uma frase diferente de S. Teríamos assim uma série infinita de frases: S, É verdade que S, É verdade que é verdade que S, É verdade que é verdade que é verdade que S, e assim por diante. Como o último exemplo torna manifesto, nem toda a regressão ao infinito é uma regressão viciosa, sendo os casos em questão casos claros de regressões inócuas ou virtuosas. Poderíamos dizer, de forma aproximada, que uma tese, explicação, regra ou princípio conduz a uma regressão ao infinito viciosa2 quando, em cada novo estádio ou elemento da série infinita gerada, o facto básico a explicar reaparece, quer de forma manifesta quer de forma meramente implícita. Um exemplo usualmente aduzido de uma regressão viciosa é a teoria holista da justificação, a tese de que verdades só se deixam justificar 2 Uma caracterização de alguma maneira diferente da noção de regressão viciosa é dada em Chisholm 1996: 53. Seguimos, em essência, a caracterização de Armstrong (1989:88-9). João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire4 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica através de outras verdades. Por outras palavras, para cada proposição verdadeira p, p é justificada se e só se existe uma proposição verdadeira q tal que q é diferente de p e p é verdadeira em virtude de q ser verdadeira, ou a verdade de p depende da verdade de q (ou algo do género). Aparentemente, teríamos aqui uma série infinita de estádios explicativos em cada um dos quais reaparece o facto a explicar, o que é que justifica a verdade de uma dada proposição, acabando assim o facto por nunca vir a ser de facto explicado. Segundo Armstrong (1989: 11-17; ver também Lewis 1997: 1989), os dois problemas metafísicos tradicionalmente associados ao chamado \"problema dos universais\" são os seguintes: • O Problema da Predicação. Como deve ser em geral explicado o facto de um objecto x ter uma propriedade F. Em virtude de que é que um F particular (e.g. um certo gato) tem a propriedade F (a propriedade de ser um gato)? • O Problema da Semelhança. Como deve ser em geral explicado o facto de objectos dados serem semelhantes entre si, serem da mesma natureza ou do mesmo tipo, partilharem uma certa propriedade. Em virtude de que é que os Fs (e.g. os gatos) são Fs (são gatos)? Em virtude de que é que eles são semelhantes entre si qua gatos? Em virtude de que é que estão agrupados como estão (como gatos)? Em virtude de que é que são do mesmo tipo (o tipo Gato)? Teorias metafísicas explicativas de ambos os problemas, não apenas o realismo metafísico como também diversas formas de nominalismo, têm sido criticadas com base em argumentos regressivos, alegando- -se que as explicações dadas por tais teorias geram regressões viciosas ao infinito e devem por isso ser abandonadas. O chamado Argumento do Terceiro Homem, que se pode encontrar no diálogo Parménides de Platão (130e-133b), é um desses argumentos. Vale a pena considerá-lo, de modo a podermos instrutivamente contrastar esse argumento com os argumentos regressivos que vamos examinar depois. Trata-se de um argumento contra a explicação realista do Problema da Semelhança em termos de Formas ou Universais. A sua estrutura (reconstruída) é a seguinte. 5Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 Premissa 1: Auto-Predicação das Formas. Os universais, as Formas de Platão, têm eles próprios a propriedade universal que conferem aos particulares que os exemplificam, ou que participam das Formas. Isto justifica-se pelo facto de que, na versão platónica do realismo metafísico, as Formas são paradigmas ou exemplares perfeitos de particulares de um certo género. Ora, um paradigma de um F é ele próprio um F: um paradigma de um felino, por exemplo um tigre da Sibéria, é ele próprio um felino. Premissa 2: Considere-se a colecção de objectos que consiste em reunir todos os particulares que participam de uma dada forma, digamos F, juntamente com a própria forma F da qual eles todos participam. Se a, b, c e d são todos os particulares que participam de F, então a colecção C a formar será a seguinte: {a,b,c,d,F}. Um exemplo seria a colecção C* que consiste em todos os seres humanos juntamente com a forma ou o universal da Humanidade. Premissa 3: Todos os objectos em C têm uma propriedade em comum, são semelhantes entre si, uma vez que todos eles têm a propriedade F, são semelhantes qua Fs. Por exemplo, todos os itens em C* têm a propriedade de ser um ser humano: Platão tem- -na, Teeteto tem-na, a Humanidade também a tem (pela Premissa 1). Conclusão 1: Pela explicação proporcionada pelo realismo metafísico para qualquer caso de semelhança ou coincidência de propriedades, vamos precisar de uma nova forma ou universal, digamos F*, para explicar em virtude de que é que todos os itens na colecção C de itens, os particulares e a forma F, têm a propriedade F. Por exemplo, para além dos seres humanos particulares Platão e Teeteto, e da forma da Humanidade, vamos precisar de uma nova forma, digamos a Humanidade*, de um Terceiro Homem, para explicar porque é que aqueles seres humanos particulares e aquela forma têm todos a propriedade de ser um ser humano. Premissa 4: Forme-se agora uma nova colecção de objectos, digamos C', juntando o seguinte: (a) os particulares iniciais a, b, c, d; (b) a forma F; (c) a nova forma F*. Ficamos assim com a colecção João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire6 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica C'={a,b,c,d,F,F*}. Por exemplo, a colecção C'*= {Platão, Teeteto, Humanidade, Humanidade*}. Premissa 5: Todos os objectos em C' têm uma propriedade em comum, são semelhantes entre si, uma vez que todos eles têm a propriedade F, são semelhantes qua Fs. Todos os itens na colecção C'* têm a propriedade de ser um ser humano: Platão e Teeteto têm-na, a Humanidade tem-na, a Humanidade* também (pela Premissa 1). Conclusão 2: Pela explicação proporcionada pelo realismo metafísico para qualquer caso de semelhança ou coincidência de propriedades, vamos precisar de mais uma nova forma ou universal, digamos F**, para explicar em virtude de que é que todos os itens na colecção C' de objectos têm a propriedade F. E assim por diante, ad ininitum. Conclusão Final: Há aqui uma regressão viciosa ao infinito de formas ou universais. Esta conclusão é obtida, segundo o argumento regressivo anti-realista, colocando o seguinte género de dilema ao proponente da explicação realista: (a) ou as sucessivas formas de humanidade são todas do mesmo tipo e nesse caso há uma série infinita de explicações da mesma natureza das semelhanças verificadas, apesar de haver sempre factos novos de semelhança ou coincidência de propriedades a explicar; (b) ou então as sucessivas formas de humanidade são de tipo diferente e nesse caso há uma série infinita de explicações de diferente natureza das semelhanças verificadas e assim factos novos de semelhança ou coincidência de propriedades a explicar. Em qualquer um dos casos, o fenómeno geral a explicar reaparece em cada estádio das séries infinitas geradas, caso em que as regressões são viciosas. É hoje relativamente consensual que este tipo de argumento não colhe e não mina em geral o realismo metafísico. Na melhor das hipóteses, o argumento ameaça apenas a variedade específica de realismo metafísico de inspiração platónica, o realismo metafísico transcendente. De facto, uma réplica que se oferece naturalmente (Armstrong 1978: 71) consiste em observar que a Premissa 1 do Argumento do Terceiro Homem, a suposição de que todos os universais 7Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 são auto-predicáveis, é errada e deve ser abandonada. E, sem ela, o Argumento do Terceiro Homem não corre. Ora, essa suposição está longe de ser constitutiva da concepção geral associada ao realismo metafísico. Não é de todo necessário que os universais postulados nessa concepção sejam concebidos como paradigmas dos particulares que os exemplificam, ou como exemplares perfeitos, caso em que a motivação para a auto-predicação dos universais se desvanece. Armstrong (1978: 71) oferece o seguinte argumento no sentido de mostrar que nem todos os universais são auto-predicáveis: Premissa 1: Uma coisa só é vermelha se for colorida Premissa 2: O vermelho não é uma coisa colorida, apesar de ser uma cor Conclusão: O vermelho não é vermelho Todavia, mesmo abandonada a suposição da auto-predicação dos universais, o realismo metafísico tem sido ainda alvo de outros argumentos regressivos, bem mais ameaçadores. Examinemos agora um desses argumentos. 2 A regressão monádica do realismo metafísico Consideremos, por uma questão de simplicidade e porque tal é suficiente para a discussão subsequente, os três primeiros estádios da alegada regressão monádica ao infinito gerada pela análise da predicação proposta pelo realismo metafísico.3 No Estádio 0 temos as predicações originais a explicar, as predicações de base, proposições como Estádio 0: Teeteto é sábio Estádio 0: Teeteto tem a propriedade de ser sábio 3 Seguimos, aproximadamente, a exposição da regressão proporcionada em Loux 1998:35-9. Uma exposição semelhante pode-se encontrar em Quinton 1973: 258-9. Quinton considera que há, mesmo no caso monádico, uma regressão ao infinito viciosa que ameaça quer o realismo metafísico quer qualquer explicação da predicação que assuma a forma de uma análise. João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire8 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica No Estádio 1 temos as análises realistas dessas predicações, proposições do género Teeteto exempliica a Sabedoria, em que o termo 'a Sabedoria' designa a propriedade universal, repetível, de ser sábio e o predicado diádico 'exemplifica' designa uma certa relação que o realista metafísico postula como podendo estabelecer-se entre um particular e um universal. Representando aquela propriedade por 'lx(Sábio x)', temos Estádio 1: Teeteto exemplifica 1 a Sabedoria Estádio 1: t E 1 lx (Sábio x) E 1 é aqui a relação que se estabelece entre um particular, t (Teeteto), e um universal monádico, a Sabedoria, quando aquele é um exemplo deste. Mas, prossegue o argumento regressivo, o Estádio 1 consiste supostamente numa nova predicação, pois parece ter a forma Teeteto tem a propriedade de exemplificar 1 a Sabedoria. Ora, segundo o realismo metafísico, esta predicação tem por sua vez de ser analisada, como qualquer outra. Chegamos assim ao Estádio 2, dando a análise origem àquilo que parece ser ainda outra predicação Estádio 2: Teeteto exemplifica 2 a Exemplificação 1 da Sabedoria Estádio 2: t E 2 ly(y E 1 lx(Sábio x)) E 2 é aqui a relação que se estabelece entre um particular, Teeteto, e um universal monádico, a Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, quando aquele é um exemplo deste. Consideremos agora a suposta predicação contida no Estádio 2 Teeteto tem a propriedade de exemplificar 2 a Exemplificação 1 da Sabedoria Esta tem, por sua vez, de ser analisada, no Estádio 3, em termos daquilo que parece ser uma nova predicação Estádio 3: Teeteto exemplifica 3 a Exemplificação 2 da Exemplificação 1 da Sabedoria 9Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 Estádio 3: t E 3 ly(y E 2 lz( z E 1 lx(Sábio x))) E 3 é aqui a relação que se estabelece entre um particular, Teeteto, e um universal monádico, a Exempliicação 2 da Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, quando aquele é um exemplo deste. E assim por diante, dando aparentemente origem a uma série infinita de predicações de exemplificação. O argumento regressivo contra o Realismo Metafísico procede então do seguinte modo. Concentremo-nos nos Estádios 1 e 2, observando que considerações análogas podem ser feitas com respeito a qualquer um dos pares de estádios subsequentes da série. Suponhamos, para começar, que as relações de exemplificação presentes no Estádio 2, uma das quais é herdada do Estádio 1, são da mesma natureza, são o mesmo tipo de universal relacional. Por outras palavras, suponhamos que Exempliicação 1 (E 1 ) e Exempliicação 2 (E 2 ) são do mesmo género. Segue-se que as propriedades A Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, ly(y E 1 lx(Sábio x)), e A Exempliicação 2 da Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, lz E 2 ly(y E 1 lx(Sábio x)), são propriedades universais da mesma natureza. Mas então a análise realista é circular, pois o facto a analisar, a predicação no Estádio 1, seria analisado em termos de um facto do mesmo género, a predicação no Estádio 2. Estar-se-ia assim a explicar o mesmo em termos do mesmo, indefinidamente. Suponhamos, por outro lado, que as exemplificações em questão são de tipo diferente, que são universais relacionais distintos em género. Segue-se que as propriedades A Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, ly(y E 1 lx(Sábio x)), e A Exempliicação 2 da Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, lz E 2 ly(y E 1 lx(Sábio x)), são propriedades universais de diferente natureza. Mas então haveria uma multiplicação ao infinito de universais monádicos de exemplificação: A Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, A Exempliicação 2 da Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, A Exempliicação 3 da Exempliicação 2 da Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria, e assim por diante. O aparente dilema para o realismo metafísico é, pois, o seguinte. Ou a análise realista não peca pela falta de economia relativamente aos universais invocados (havendo um único tipo de propriedades universais de exemplificação), mas cada um dos seus estádios contém um círculo explicativo, explicando o mesmo em termos do mesmo, indefinidamente. Ou então a análise realista peca pela falta de economia relativamente aos universais invocados (há infinitamente muitos João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire10 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica universais de exemplificação), reaparecendo em todo o caso o facto geral a explicar, a predicação, em cada um dos seus estádios. Em qualquer caso, estaríamos perante uma regressão ao infinito viciosa. Como é que se deve avaliar este género de argumento regressivo? A réplica central que queremos proporcionar é a de que é fortemente plausível pensar que as sucessivas propriedades de exemplificação, mais do que serem da mesma natureza, são na realidade uma e a mesma propriedade universal. De facto, a pretensão de que se trata de relações diferentes não tem qualquer motivação. Note-se que a segunda propriedade de exemplificação da sabedoria, a que é introduzida no Estádio 2, não é atribuível, como parece ser linguisticamente sugerido, à primeira propriedade de exemplificação da sabedoria, a introduzida no Estádio 1, mas antes a particulares (aliás, precisamente aos particulares aos quais esta última é aplicável). Não se trata, pois, de uma propriedade de segunda ordem, uma propriedade de propriedades, mas de uma propriedade de primeira ordem, uma propriedade cujos exemplos são particulares ou indivíduos. Uma coisa é a propriedade que um indivíduo x tem de ser um exemplo de uma dada propriedade, da propriedade de ser um F lx(xElyFy) Esta é uma propriedade de primeira ordem. Outra coisa é a propriedade que uma propriedade de primeira ordem, a propriedade de ser um F, possui quando tem algum particular como exemplo, quando é exemplificada por algo lz( y yEz z=lxFx) Esta é uma propriedade de segunda ordem. Ora, a propriedade de exemplificar a exemplificação da sabedoria é como a primeira propriedade atrás introduzida, não como a segunda. Por conseguinte, aquela que parece ser a motivação central para distinguir entre diversas relações e diversas propriedades de exemplificação, quanto à sua natureza ou tipo, não está disponível. Mas, se assim é, então o universal monádico A Exempliicação 2 da Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria deixa-se simplesmente reduzir ao universal monádico A Exempliicação 1 da Sabedoria. E o mesmo sucederia com todos os universais monádicos de exemplificação subsequentes, os quais se 11Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 deixariam reduzir aos dos estádios imediatamente precedentes e, em última análise, àquele universal monádico de partida. De notar que, para além do facto de serem da mesma ordem, há ainda outra razão sólida para considerar tais propriedades universais de exemplificação como sendo uma e a mesma propriedade: trata-se de propriedades, não apenas co-extensivas, mas necessariamente co- -extensivas (ver Apêndice). Assim sendo, o prefixo 'A exemplificação da' tem um efeito semântico redundante (ver os detalhes no Apêndice), um efeito análogo ao do operador frásico 'É verdade que'. Tal como 'A exemplificação da exemplificação da sabedoria' se deixa simplificar como 'A exemplificação da sabedoria', também 'É verdade que é verdade que neva' se deixa simplificar como 'É verdade que neva'. Dizer que Teeteto exemplifica a Exemplificação da Sabedoria é dizer que Teeteto é um exemplo daquela propriedade universal cujos exemplos são as pessoas sábias, o que equivale afinal a dizer que Teeteto exemplifica a Sabedoria (assumindo, claro, que todas estas exemplificações são uma e a mesma coisa). Todavia, poderia ainda argumentar o proponente do argumento regressivo, o círculo explicativo torna-se, ainda assim, óbvio. A nossa pergunta no Estádio 1 era Em virtude de que é que Teeteto exemplifica a Sabedoria? A resposta realista que é dada no Estádio 2 é Em virtude de Teeteto exemplificar a exemplificação da Sabedoria Mas, como vimos, este último facto não consiste senão no facto de Teeteto exemplificar a Sabedoria. Logo, aquilo que no fundo nos está a ser dito é que Teeteto exemplifica a Sabedoria porque... exemplifica a Sabedoria! Como é que o realista metafísico poderia replicar? A melhor maneira de o fazer consiste em combinar as seguintes duas pretensões: (a) Não há qualquer círculo explicativo na progressão do Estádio 1 para o Estádio 2; (b) O prefixo 'A exemplificação de' é semanticamente redundante. O ponto é que, dada a pretensão (a), conceder (b) não traz qualquer problema. João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire12 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica Vejamos, primeiro, o que é que o realista metafísico tem em mente com (a). Só há um círculo explicativo quando existe um projecto explícito de análise de uma certa noção ou facto. Ora, as noções ou os factos envolvidos no Estádio 1 não são noções ou factos para os quais a teoria do realismo metafísico esteja obrigada a proporcionar uma análise. Com efeito, temos de distinguir entre as seguintes duas coisas. De um lado, temos predicações do género Sócrates é sábio Sócrates tem a propriedade de ser sábio Estas predicações situam-se no Estádio 0. Do outro lado, temos alegadas predicações do género Sócrates exemplifica a Sabedoria Sócrates tem a propriedade de exemplificar a Sabedoria Estas aparentes predicações situam-se no Estádio 1. As primeiras são predicações genuínas (do ponto de vista da teoria), factos que o realismo tem inegavelmente de analisar. Tal análise é justamente dada no Estádio 1, através de factos do segundo género antes descrito. Mas o realista não está de todo obrigado a reconhecer estes últimos factos como consistindo em predicações genuínas (do ponto de vista da teoria), como factos que têm o mesmo estatuto dos factos do estádio 0, não estando assim obrigado a proporcionar qualquer análise para eles. O realista está obrigado a explicar as predicações do Estádio 0, mas isso não o obriga a explicar toda e qualquer aparente predicação. Em particular, o realista é livre de se recusar a explicar aparentes predicações expressas por meio de um predicado de exemplificação que tem o estatuto de predicado primitivo na teoria por ele proposta. Deste modo, o argumento regressivo monádico contra o realismo metafísico é inócuo. E, como vamos ver a seguir, considerações análogas podem ser feitas pari passu relativamente a qualquer outra teoria metafísica explicativa da predicação, pelo menos se tal teoria assumir a forma de uma análise, ou seja, a forma de uma eliminação de factos dados, relativos a predicações ou semelhanças, em termos de factos mais primitivos do ponto de vista da teoria. (Temos vindo a supor, sem 13Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 qualquer discussão, que as teorias metafísicas da predicação e da semelhança tomam a forma de análises; uma crítica de tal suposição encontra-se em Lewis 1997). 3 A regressão monádica do nominalismo de classes É muitas vezes alegado que as explicações proporcionadas pelo nominalismo de classes para os problemas da semelhança e da predicação são fortemente suspeitas de envolver regressões viciosas ao infinito: os mesmos factos, as semelhanças ou as predicações, são sucessivamente reintroduzidos em cada estádio das séries infinitas explicativas geradas pela teoria, acabando por nunca vir a ser explicados. O nominalismo de classes é, resumidamente, o ponto de vista de que propriedades não são entidades universais, repetíveis, mas devem ser identificadas com, ou reduzidas a, certos particulares abstractos, classes ou conjuntos, entidades irrepetíveis. Consideremos o padrão geral de explicação da predicação tipicamente proporcionado pelo nominalismo de classes. (*) Um particular x tem a propriedade de ser F porque x pertence à classe dos Fs Raciocinando sobre um exemplo, comecemos com uma predicação monádica simples como Rover é um cão Rover tem a propriedade de ser um cão Este constitui, digamos, o Estádio 0 da série explicativa, o qual consiste no facto de partida, o facto para o qual a teoria metafísica é supostamente obrigada a propor uma explicação. Segundo o nominalismo de classes, factos como aquele são explicados em termos de novos factos, factos mais básicos ou mais primitivos do que aquele, como (no nosso exemplo) o seguinte Rover pertence à classe dos cães Todavia, de acordo com o proponente do argumento regressivo, temos aqui uma nova predicação monádica, um novo facto essencialmente da mesma natureza daquele que ocorre no Estádio 0, desigJoão Branquinho e Guido Imaguire14 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica nadamente Rover tem a propriedade de pertencer à classe das coisas que são cães Este constitui o Estádio 1 da série explicativa. Como se trata alegadamente de uma predicação, o nominalismo de classes parece estar obrigado a explicá-la da mesma maneira, de acordo com o mesmo padrão, em termos de um novo facto, mais básico do que o facto no Estádio 1. Esse novo facto seria então do seguinte género Rover pertence à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães Ora, o argumento regressivo prossegue olhando para este último facto como consistindo numa nova predicação, um novo facto da mesma natureza daquele que ocorre no Estádio 1, designadamente Rover tem a propriedade de pertencer à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães Este constitui o Estádio 2 da série explicativa. Como se trata alegadamente de uma predicação, o nominalismo de classes parece estar obrigado a explicá-la da mesma maneira, de acordo com o mesmo padrão, em termos de um novo facto, mais básico do que o facto no Estádio 2. Esse novo facto seria do seguinte género Rover pertence à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães Ora, o argumento regressivo prossegue olhando para este último facto como consistindo numa nova predicação, um novo facto da mesma natureza daquele que ocorre no Estádio 2, designadamente Rover tem a propriedade de pertencer à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães Este constitui o Estádio 3 da série explicativa. Como se trata alegadamente de uma predicação, o nominalismo de classes parece estar obrigado a explicá-la da mesma maneira, de acordo com o mesmo padrão, em termos de um novo facto, mais básico do que o facto no Estádio 3. Esse novo facto seria do seguinte género 15Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 Rover pertence à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães Mas, aparentemente, teríamos aqui uma nova predicação, a qual teria de ser explicada pelo nominalismo de classes em termos de um novo facto de pertença a uma classe. E assim por diante, ad ininitum. Tudo parece indicar que estamos perante uma regressão ao infinito, uma vez que é sempre possível gerar, para cada caso ou estádio, um caso ou estádio seguinte, sendo assim gerada uma série infinita de explicações. Por outro lado, a regressão ao infinito parece ser viciosa, uma vez que, em cada caso ou estádio, o conceito a analisar, a predicação, reaparece. Qualquer facto de pertença a uma classe por parte de um particular, Rover, é aparentemente uma predicação de algo, nomeadamente da propriedade de pertencer a essa classe, ao particular em questão. Por conseguinte, o conceito a analisar ou explicar, o de predicação, nunca é de facto analisado ou explicado pela teoria metafísica do nominalismo de classes. E considerações análogas valem para a análise proporcionada pelo nominalismo de classes para o problema da semelhança ou coincidência de propriedades. Como é que se deve reagir a este género de argumento regressivo? Julgo que de um modo essencialmente semelhante àquele com o qual avaliámos, na Secção 2, o argumento regressivo contra o realismo metafísico. A réplica central que queremos proporcionar é a de que é possível verificar, após alguma reflexão, que as classes de objectos introduzidas nos diversos estádios sucessivos da série de explicações se deixam na realidade reduzir, à luz do axioma da extensionalidade para classes ou conjuntos, a uma única classe de objectos, no caso simplesmente a classe das coisas que são cães. Por conseguinte, só haveria na verdade, na melhor das hipóteses, uma única predicação, que consiste no facto de Rover pertencer à classe das coisas que são cães. (Para além disso, note-se que o nominalista de classes teria o direito de se recusar a analisar mais este facto. Basta-lhe analisar o facto de partida, o facto de Rover ser um cão ou ter a propriedade de ser um cão; e isto ele certamente faz.) Consequentemente, rigorosamente falando, nem sequer estamos perante uma regressão ao infinito genuína, muito menos uma reJoão Branquinho e Guido Imaguire16 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica gressão viciosa. Isto pela simples razão de que nem sequer uma série infinita de explicações ou estádios explicativos é de facto gerada. A série tem apenas um ponto, o Estádio 1, pois todos os outros aparentes estádios se deixam reduzir ao Estádio 1. Para vermos que as classes nos diversos estádios são idênticas, basta raciocinar para o caso dos estádios 1,2 e 3 e constatar que o mesmo se aplica às classes introduzidas em quaisquer dos estádios subsequentes. De facto, a classe no Estádio 1, ou seja, a classe das coisas que são cães {x: x é um cão} é, pelo axioma da extensionalidade, a mesma classe do que a classe no Estádio 2, ou seja, a classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães {y:y {x: x é um cão}} E esta classe é por sua vez a mesma classe do que a classe introduzida no Estádio 3, ou seja, a classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que pertencem à classe das coisas que são cães {z:z {y:y {x: x é um cão}} E assim por diante. Há apenas a ilusão de as sucessivas classes de coisas serem classes distintas. Mas trata-se de uma mera ilusão linguística, causada pelas formas de expressão utilizadas. Armstrong expõe a regressão monádica ou objectual do nominalismo de classes de um modo diferente da nossa reconstrução acima (1978: 41-2). A versão de Armstrong é, a nosso ver, menos interessante e tem consequências de natureza distinta do ponto de vista do seu diagnóstico avaliativo. Consideremos o exemplo anterior e a análise proporcionada pelo nominalismo de classes para as predicações originais Rover é um cão Rover tem a propriedade de ser um cão em termos da proposição 17Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 Rover pertence à classe dos cães A regressão objectual de Armstrong é então construída da seguinte maneira. Olhemos para a classe introduzida no primeiro estádio da análise nominalista, no exemplo a classe dos cães. Armstrong introduz uma predicação aparentemente genuína acerca dessa classe, designadamente a seguinte (1) A classe dos cães é a classe dos cães (1) A classe dos cães tem a propriedade de ser a classe dos cães Esta propriedade, a de ser a classe dos cães, é certamente constitutiva da classe dos cães, algo que a classe dos cães tem em virtude da sua natureza interna. A predicação em questão deve, por conseguinte, ser objecto de análise, o que o nominalismo de classes terá de fazer em termos da proposição (2) A classe dos cães pertence à classe-unidade da classe dos cães Mas esta proposição dá por sua vez origem a uma nova predicação (3) A classe dos cães tem a propriedade de pertencer à classeunidade da classe dos cães a qual é analisável em termos da proposição (4) A classe dos cães pertence à classe-unidade da classe-unidade da classe dos cães. E assim por diante, ad ininitum. Armstrong alega que este argumento regressivo pode ser contrariado observando que a regressão aí envolvida é apenas aparente. Com efeito, a regressão não pode ser construída em virtude do facto de a propriedade introduzida em (1) não estar associada a um tipo de coisas, a uma entidade repetível, pois é uma propriedade com um único exemplo (há uma e uma só classe dos cães). Armstrong parece assim supor que uma condição necessária para haver uma regressão genuína, ou pelo menos para haver uma regressão ao infinito viciosa, João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire18 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica é haver uma reintrodução de um novo tipo de coisas em cada estádio da série infinita explicativa. A nossa reacção a esta versão de Armstrong da regressão monádica do nominalismo de classes é a seguinte. Em primeiro lugar, e em contraste com a nossa reconstrução da regressão monádica, é de facto gerada neste caso uma série infinita de entidades. Mas trata-se de uma série manifestamente não problemática e inócua do ponto de vista da habitual teoria das classes ou dos conjuntos, pois é uma série gerada por um mecanismo iterativo claro e perfeitamente em ordem. Dado um objecto, a classe dos cães, é possível formar a sua classe-unidade, a classe cujo único elemento é esse objecto, a classe-unidade da classe dos cães. E, dada esta classe, é possível formar do mesmo modo a sua classe-unidade, a classe cujo único elemento é a classe-unidade da classe dos cães, a classe- -unidade da classe-unidade da classe dos cães. E assim por diante. Não parece haver nada de problemático nestas séries. Em segundo lugar, e bem mais importante, há que observar o seguinte. Apesar de, tal como formulada por Armstrong, a regressão não ser viciosa, pois não há nela uma multiplicação de tipos (concedamos, para efeitos de argumentação, a suposição de Armstrong aqui utilizada), é no entanto possível reconstrui-la razoavelmente de modo a gerar uma regressão aparentemente viciosa. Por exemplo, poderíamos substituir (1) pela seguinte proposição (1)' A classe dos cães é uma classe que contém cães como elementos (1)' A classe dos cães tem a propriedade de ser uma classe que contém cães como elementos Esta propriedade, a de ser uma classe que contém cães como elementos, é certamente constitutiva da classe dos cães, algo que a classe tem em virtude da sua natureza interna. A predicação em questão tem, por conseguinte, de ser objecto de análise, o que o nominalismo de classes terá de fazer em termos da proposição (2)' A classe dos cães pertence à classe cujos elementos são classes que contêm cães como elementos 19Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 E esta proposição dá por sua vez origem a uma nova predicação (3)' A classe dos cães tem a propriedade de pertencer à classe cujos elementos são classes que contêm cães como elementos a qual é analisada em termos da proposição (4)' A classe dos cães pertence à classe cujos elementos são classes cujos elementos são classes que contêm cães como elementos E assim por diante, ad ininitum. Note-se agora que a propriedade introduzida em (1)' está, desta vez, associada a um tipo de coisas, a uma entidade repetível, pois é uma propriedade com mais do que dois exemplos (há muitas classes de coisas entre cujos elementos estão cães: a classe dos mamíferos, a classe dos animais domésticos, a classe dos cocker spaniel, etc.). Teríamos neste caso uma regressão viciosa de explicações: nunca nos conseguiríamos livrar de tipos de coisas. Aquilo que o nominalismo de classes é suposto explicar, tipos de coisas em termos de classes de coisas, acabaria por nunca vir a ser explicado, sendo os tipos sempre reintroduzidos em cada estádio explicativo. Julgamos que o diagnóstico apropriado para este novo argumento regressivo, a maneira mais adequada de travar a regressão, é utilizar relativamente a ele o mesmo género de avaliação que utilizámos a respeito do argumento regressivo monádico contra o realismo metafísico e que iremos utilizar em seguida para os casos das regressões relacionais ou diádicas do nominalismo de classes e, por implicação, do realismo metafísico. As noções ou os factos envolvidos em proposições como (2)' não são noções ou factos para os quais a teoria do nominalismo de classes esteja obrigada a proporcionar uma análise, pelo que não se deve olhar para (2)' como dando origem a uma nova predicação, (3)'. Com efeito, temos de distinguir entre as seguintes duas coisas. De um lado, predicações do género A classe dos cães é uma classe que contém cães como elementos João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire20 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica A classe dos cães tem a propriedade de ser uma classe que contém cães como elementos Estas predicações situam-se, suponhamos, no Estádio 0. Do outro, alegadas predicações do género A classe dos cães pertence à classe cujos elementos são as classes que contêm cães como elementos A classe dos cães tem a propriedade de pertencer à classe cujos elementos são as classes que contêm cães como elementos Estas aparentes predicações situam-se no Estádio 1. As primeiras são predicações genuínas, factos que o nominalismo de classes tem inegavelmente de analisar. Tal análise é justamente dada no Estádio 1, através de factos do segundo género antes descrito. Mas o nominalista de classes não está de todo obrigado a reconhecer estes últimos factos como consistindo em predicações genuínas (do ponto de vista da teoria), como factos que têm o mesmo estatuto dos factos do estádio 0, não estando assim obrigado a proporcionar qualquer análise para eles. O nominalista de classes está obrigado a explicar as predicações do Estádio 0, mas isso não o obriga a explicar toda e qualquer aparente predicação. Em particular, ele é livre de se recusar a explicar aparentes predicações expressas por meio de um predicado de pertença que tem o estatuto de predicado primitivo na teoria por ele proposta. Deste modo, o argumento regressivo monádico contra o nominalismo de classes, nesta reconstrução da versão proposta por Armstrong, é igualmente ineficaz. Há três maneiras de olhar para tais alegadas predicações, por exemplo as proposições do Estádio 2'. (a) Tomá-las como peudo-predicações, ou seja, como proposições que só aparentemente são predicativas mas que não o são na realidade (do ponto de vista da teoria, naturalmente). Como não se trata, no fundo, de predicações, a teoria não estaria obrigada a acomodar tais factos. Esta opção tem a desvantagem de recorrer a uma noção de pseudo-predicação, e a uma distinção entre predicações genuínas e pseudo-predicações, que pode ser vista como suspeita de não ter contornos claros. 21Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 (b) Tomá-las como predicações que não precisam de qualquer explicação, seja através de uma análise seja de qualquer outra forma. Eis alguns exemplos de predicações que muitas teorias metafísicas poderiam considerar como factos não mooreanos, factos que não exigem qualquer explicação. Neymar tem a propriedade de ser um mau jogador se 2+2=5 Neymar tem a propriedade de ser auto-idêntico Neymar tem a propriedade de não ter estado vivo em 1817 Neymar tem a propriedade de não ser um número par (c) Finalmente, tomá-las como predicações que precisam de uma explicação, mas notar que tal explicação consiste simplesmente no seu reconhecimento como factos primitivos, insusceptíveis de análise, do ponto de vista da teoria. No caso do Nominalismo de classes, exemplos são proposições expressas usando o vocabulário primitivo da própria teoria Neymar tem a propriedade de pertencer à classe dos seres humanos No caso do Realismo Metafísico Aristotélico, exemplos são dados em proposições expressas usando o vocabulário primitivo da teoria Neymar é um membro da espécie animal Homo Sapiens Sapiens 4 A regressão relacional do nominalismo de classes Consideremos agora outro género de argumento regressivo contra o nominalismo de classes, o qual se centra no caso de predicações diádicas. O género de diagnóstico negativo que iremos fazer destes argumentos estende-se por analogia aos argumentos regressivos semelhantes erguidos contra o realismo metafísico, os quais nos vamos assim dispensar de considerar. Comecemos por observar que o nominalismo de classes analisa predicações diádicas em geral, por exemplo proposições como Sócrates é amigo de Teeteto João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire22 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica Sócrates está na relação ser amigo de com Teeteto em termos de pertenças de pares ordenados de objectos a classes cujos elementos são pares ordenados de objectos. Assim, aquela predicação relacional seria analisada em termos do facto seguinte, um facto acerca da pertença de um par ordenado a uma classe de pares ordenados <Sócrates, Teeteto> {<x,y>: x é amigo de y} Posto isto, consideremos de novo os factos de partida a explicar, ou seja, as predicações monádicas que constituem o Estádio 0 das séries explicativas anteriores. Utilizemos para o efeito o exemplo anterior Rover é um cão Rover tem a propriedade de ser um cão De acordo com o nominalismo de classes, no Estádio 1 ficamos com factos mais básicos acerca da pertença de particulares a classes, factos do género antes mencionado Rover pertence à classe das coisas que são cães Todavia, o proponente do argumento regressivo relacional alega agora que o facto de um objecto pertencer a uma classe, o facto de Rover pertencer à classe dos cães, é uma predicação diádica como qualquer outra, na qual uma relação, a relação de pertença, se estabelece entre um objecto, um indivíduo, Rover, e outro objecto, uma classe de indivíduos, a classe dos cães. Exactamente como o facto de Sócrates ser amigo de Teeteto se deixa analisar como uma predicação diádica na qual uma relação, a relação de amizade, se estabelece entre um objecto, um indivíduo, Sócrates, e outro objecto, outro indivíduo, Teeteto. Teríamos assim uma proposição ou facto relacional como Rover está na relação de pertença com a classe das coisas que são cães Rover {x: x é um cão} Factos como estes constituiriam o Estádio 2 da série explicativa. Ora, como se trata supostamente de predicações, estes últimos factos, factos acerca da pertença de objectos a classes de objectos, care23Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 cem de uma explicação à luz do padrão explicativo do nominalismo de classes para predicações diádicas em geral. Segundo o nominalismo de classes, factos do género são explicados em termos de novos factos, factos mais básicos ou mais primitivos do que aquele, no nosso caso o seguinte facto (assumindo como ponto de partida um universo de indivíduos) O par ordenado de objectos <Rover, A classe dos cães> pertence à classe de todos os pares ordenados de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos4 tais que aqueles são elementos destas <Rover, A classe dos cães> {<x,y>: x é um indivíduo & y é uma classe de indivíduos & x y} Note-se que, enquanto as classes invocadas no Estádio 1 se reduzem a classes de indivíduos, no Estádio 2 temos duas classes: de um lado, um par ordenado de um indivíduo e uma classe de indivíduos, o qual é uma classe de classes de indivíduos (pois pares ordenados são classes de objectos); do outro lado, uma classe de pares ordenados de indivíduos e classes às quais eles pertencem, a qual é uma classe de classes de classes de indivíduos. Todavia, de acordo com o proponente do argumento regressivo relacional, o Estádio 2 dá origem a uma nova predicação relacional, um novo facto da mesma natureza daquele que ocorre nesse estádio, designadamente o seguinte O par ordenado <Rover, A classe dos cães> está na relação de pertença com a classe de todos os pares ordenados de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos tais que aqueles são elementos destas Estes factos constituem o Estádio 3 da série explicativa. Como se trata alegadamente de predicações diádicas, o nominalismo de classes parece estar obrigado a explicá-los da mesma maneira, de acordo com o mesmo padrão, em termos de um novo facto, mais básico do 4 Se esta restrição a classes cujos elementos são indivíduos não fosse aqui feita, nem sequer a série infinita explicativa poderia ser gerada, já que um predicado diádico irrestrito de pertença não tem, por razões conhecidas, sequer uma extensão, não havendo assim qualquer fundamento para aplicar o esquema explicativo do nominalismo de classes às aparentes predicações diádicas em questão. Estamos gratos a Dirk Greimman por nos ter alertado para este facto. João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire24 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica que o facto no Estádio 3. Esse novo facto seria do seguinte género: O par ordenado de objectos que consiste no par ordenado <Rover, A classe dos cães> e na classe de todos os pares ordenados de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos tais que aqueles são elementos destas pertence à classe de todos os pares ordenados que consistem em, de um lado, (a) pares de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos; (b) a classe de todos os pares de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos às quais eles pertencem, e, do outro lado, a classe à qual todos os pares ordenados como (a),(b) pertencem <<Rover, A classe dos cães>, {<x,y>: x é um indivíduo & y é uma classe de indivíduos & x y}> {<z,w>: z é um par ordenado de (a) pares de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos; (b)a classe de todos os pares de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos às quais eles pertencem & w é uma classe à qual todos os pares ordenados como z pertencem & z w} No Estádio 3 temos duas classes: de um lado, uma classe de pares ordenados de indivíduos e classes de indivíduos às quais eles pertencem, a qual é uma classe de classes de classes de indivíduos (esta classe vem do Estádio 2); do outro, uma classe de classes de classes de classes de indivíduos. Mas aquela proposição, argumenta-se, seria ainda uma predicação relacional de pertença que carece de análise pelo nominalismo de classes de acordo com o mesmo padrão. E assim por diante, ad ininitum. Como é que se pode avaliar este argumento? Note-se que a analogia com as réplicas dadas aos argumentos regressivos para o caso monádico perde-se parcialmente, como vamos ver, no caso relacional, pelo que as coisas são aqui um pouco mais complexas. Em primeiro lugar, estamos na verdade perante uma regressão ao infinito genuína no caso relacional. Para cada estádio explicativo, é sempre possível gerar um estádio explicativo seguinte diferente daquele, pois temos uma predicação diádica de pertença nova que parece exigir uma explicação. No caso relacional, não é difícil verificar que as alegadas predicações diádicas, as sucessivas afirmações de pertença, são diferentes entre si, pois os objectos, as classes, que 25Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 estão naquela relação são diferentes entre si nos diversos estádios da série. Por outras palavras, os relata da relação de pertença num dado estádio são sempre pares ordenados de objectos ou classes de pares ordenados de objectos distintos dos pares ou classes no estádio imediatamente precedente. Por conseguinte, a réplica que demos ao argumento regressivo monádico, de que nem sequer uma regressão infinita pode de facto ser construída, não colhe neste caso. Todavia, esta observação pode ser mitigada de duas maneiras. Por um lado, as séries infinitas de classes e predicações de pertença aí envolvidas não parecem ter muito de problemático, uma vez que são geradas através da aplicação de uma regra ou mecanismo recursivo conhecido e em ordem. Por outro lado, não é razoável supor que as predicações de pertença em cada estádio da série infinita sejam de tipos diferentes, i.e. que, à medida que se sobe de nível, a relação de pertença aí envolvida é de uma natureza diferente da que está envolvida no nível precedente.5 De facto, tal equivaleria a supor que as três proposições seguintes, por exemplo, envolvem relações de pertença de tipo diferente, o que não é de todo plausível: Sócrates {Sócrates} {Sócrates} {{Sócrates}} {{Sócrates}} {{{Sócrates}}} Em segundo lugar, a regressão ao infinito parece ser em todo o caso viciosa, uma vez que, em cada estádio, o conceito a analisar, o de predicação relacional, parece reaparecer. Aparentemente, qualquer pertença de algo, um dado par ordenado de objectos, a uma certa classe de pares ordenados de objectos, é uma predicação de uma relação, a relação de pertença, ao par ordenado de objectos que consiste no par ordenado de objectos dado e na classe de pares ordenados de objectos em questão. Não obstante, a construção da série infinita de explicações pode ser parada no Estádio 1, basicamente à luz do mesmo padrão de análise que utilizámos antes para o caso monádico, quer em relação ao 5 O resultado análogo para o caso da regressão diádica do realismo metafísico não é completamente claro, mas ignoramos aqui o problema. João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire26 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica nominalismo de classes quer em relação ao realismo metafísico. Com efeito, os factos no Estádio 1 podem ser vistos, não como mais predicações (diádicas) a explicar, mas como o terminus da explicação, como constituindo factos primitivos ou irredutíveis do ponto de vista do nominalismo de classes, no sentido de factos cuja verificação não se deve à verificação de qualquer outro tipo de factos. O nominalista de classes não está obrigado a olhar para tais factos como consistindo em predicações diádicas genuínas (do ponto de vista da teoria), como factos que têm o mesmo estatuto dos factos do estádio 0, não estando assim obrigado a proporcionar qualquer análise para eles. O nominalista de classes está obrigado a explicar as predicações diádicas do Estádio 0, mas isso não o obriga a explicar toda e qualquer aparente predicação. Em particular, ele é livre de se recusar a explicar aparentes predicações expressas por meio de um predicado de pertença que tem o estatuto de predicado primitivo na teoria por ele proposta. O nominalista de classes poderia declarar tais predicações diádicas como meramente aparentes através de uma das três maneiras antes6 identificadas aquando da discussão da alegada regressão monádica do nominalismo de classes. Deste modo, o argumento regressivo diádico contra o nominalismo de classes é igualmente ineficaz. 5 Regressão ao infinito no nominalismo de semelhança Também o nominalismo de semelhança incorre na suspeita de envolver regressões viciosas ao infinito. Essa forma de nominalismo foi sugerida por vários autores modernos, mas foi somente desenvolvida plenamente por Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Segundo a explicação do nominalismo de semelhança, um particular não se assemelha a outro particular porque ambos exemplificam a mesma propriedade, mas o oposto: eles exemplificam uma propriedade em virtude de serem semelhantes. A semelhança, nessa teoria, é considerada uma relação fundamental e primitiva. O nominalismo de semelhança tem variantes: um particular a pode ser F em virtude de se assemelhar a um outro exemplar paradigmático de F, ou em virtude de pertencer a uma classe igualitária de particulares 6 Ver a parte final da Secção 3. 27Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 semelhantes. Russell (1912) é famoso por ter acusado o nominalismo de semelhança de sucumbir a uma forma de regressão viciosa ao infinito: If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose some particular patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things; and this is the characteristic of a universal. It will be useless to say that there is a different resemblance for each pair, for then we shall have to say that these resemblances resemble each other, and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having being forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of such universals as whiteness and triangularity. A alegada regressão tem a seguinte forma. O facto original a ser explicado é o particular a exemplificar o universal F. Esse facto é explicado, num primeiro nível, em termos de semelhança: a é F em virtude de a assemelhar-se a b. Introduz-se assim um novo facto: a é semelhante a b. Mas esse novo facto também contém um universal: ser semelhante a. Se pretendemos explicar esse novo fato eliminando o universal ser semelhante a de forma coerente com o princípio do nominalismo de semelhança, temos de explicá-lo, em termos de semelhança, através de outro facto do mesmo tipo: um facto de semelhança entre, digamos, c e d. Mas, nesse novo nível, temos novamente um facto no qual ocorre um universal como constituinte, uma semelhança de segunda ordem, a qual só pode ser eliminada por meio da introdução de uma nova relação de semelhança de ordem superior, e assim por diante ad ininitum. Existe uma diferença importante entre o argumento de regressão que Russell apresenta contra o nominalismo de semelhança e as regressões apresentadas anteriormente. No caso das regressões no realismo e no nominalismo de classes, o problema consistia basicamente na impossibilidade do proponente da explicação evitar o próprio fenómeno que pretendia explicar, a predicação, o que o levava sempre a um novo nível explanatório. No caso do realismo, o facto predicativo a exempliica F era explicado em termos da nova predicação a exempliica a F-idade. No caso do nominalismo de classes, o facto João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire28 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica predicativo a exempliica F era explicado em termos da nova predicação a pertence à classe F. O ponto de Russell contra o nominalismo de semelhança é outro: na tentativa de eliminar o universal F, que é um constituinte do facto a é F, ele introduz um outro universal (não monádico, mas relacional): ser semelhante a. Assim, o projeto nominalista de eliminar universais falha. Segundo Russell, um dos vícios da controvérsia sobre universais consistia na atenção exclusiva dada a propriedades monádicas, esquecendo-se que também relações são universais. Pensou-se assim em eliminar-se o universal F, mas não se percebeu que o custo era introduzir outro universal, agora relacional. É interessante notar que esse problema atinge as outras explicações tradicionais nominalistas: o nominalista de classes introduz o universal ser elemento de, o nominalista de predicados ou de conceitos introduz o universal satisfazer ou cair sob. A única exceção é o nominalista austero, que não propõe explicação alguma. A conclusão parece ser, assim, a de que toda explicação nominalista recorreria, no seu explanans, a algum universal, e que, portanto, o realismo está correto ao afirmar que universais são inevitáveis. Com isso, deslocase a atenção do problema da explicação para o problema da eliminação ontológica. Existem várias reacções possíveis à regressão ao infinito acima exposta. Naturalmente, uma possível reacção seria simplesmente aceitar o argumento de Russell como definitivo contra o nominalismo de semelhança. De facto, pelo menos num primeiro momento, Armstrong concordou com Russell que o projecto explicativo do nominalista de semelhança permanece incompleto. Segundo Armstrong (1978: 56), na hierarquia explicativa do nominalismo de semelhança \"o nível n+1 de semelhança precisa ser postulado a fim de explicar as semelhanças do nível n\". Outra reação possível seria considerar que as relações de semelhança da hierarquia explicativa são de diferentes ordens e, por isso, a regressão não seria viciosa. Isso foi defendido, por exemplo, por Price (1953) e Küng (1967). No entanto, como Daly (1997) argumenta, a diferença de níveis hierárquicos, por si só, não é suficiente para eximir uma explicação de ser viciosa. Daly também mostra que a sugestão de Campbell (1990), de que a regressão não é viciosa por 29Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 \"subir\" em direcção a um nível de sempre maior formalidade e menor substancialidade, não colhe. Em toda a regressão ao infinito, \"subimos\" numa direcção de menor substancialidade e maior formalidade. Num texto posterior, Armstrong (1989) rejeita a regressão, ao sugerir que cada nível superior de semelhança simplesmente sobrevém em relação ao nível inferior, e, consequentemente, não representa qualquer adição ontológica. De modo semelhante argumentam Campbell (1990) e Simons (1994). De facto, se não considerarmos níveis superiores de explicação como simplesmente sobrevenientes em relação aos níveis inferiores, todas as explicações estariam sujeitas à mesma regressão. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2001) rejeita a solução sugerida por Armstrong porque o preço a pagar seria muito alto para o nominalista de semelhanças. Afinal, segundo este, se a e b são ambos F, a semelhança entre a e b sobrevém em relação à sua natureza particular. Mas isso seria justamente abdicar da intuição fundamental do nominalismo de semelhança, a saber, que a natureza dos particulares é determinada pelas suas relações de semelhança, e não vice- -versa. Para este nominalismo, a e b têm as suas naturezas em virtude de serem semelhantes. Além disso, Armstrong precisa de supor que se a semelhança sobrevém em relação às naturezas dos particulares, a semelhança não é nada adicional e diferente daquilo relativamente ao qual sobrevém - o que livraria o nominalismo de semelhança de postular a relação de semelhança como elemento adicional e, por consequência, de cair na regressão. Mas, como Rodriguez-Pereyra (2001) argumenta, nem toda superveniência é uma forma de identidade (o próprio Armstrong o reconhece noutros lados, por exemplo em 1997: 56). Outra possível solução seria considerar a relação de semelhança entre a e b não como um universal, mas como um particular, no mesmo sentido em que um teórico de tropos considera o F, em a é F, não como um universal, mas como uma propriedade particularizada. Essa sugestão, que é precisamente o alvo da crítica de Russell, é um pouco mais desenvolvida (mas depois rejeitada) por Rodriguez- -Pereyra. A solução consistiria em negar que, dados os particulares semelhantes a, b e c, o fazedor-de-verdade de 'a é semelhante a b' é Sab, que o fazedor-de-verdade de 'b é semelhante a c' é Sbc, que o fazedor-de-verdade de 'a é semelhante a c' é Sac, que o fazedor-de- -verdade de 'a semelhança entre a e b é semelhante à semelhança João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire30 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica entre b e c' é SSabSbc, etc. Bastaria um enunciado geral da forma: \"para todo x e y, se x é semelhante a y, então isso é verdade em virtude de Sxy.\" O problema dessa solução é que ela não nega, de facto, que existem infinitos fazedores de verdade para uma verdade do tipo 'a é semelhante a b', mas apenas oferece uma maneira universal de dar conta de todos os casos. Além disso, a solução apenas resolve o problema de oferecer fazedores de verdade para todas as verdades. Permanece, no entanto, o problema da hierarquia de fundamento: que a seja semelhante a b em virtude de um facto mais fundamental, o qual seria o caso em virtude de um facto ainda mais fundamental, e assim por diante ao infinito. E, finalmente, essa saída parece fazer o nominalismo de semelhança colapsar com o nominalismo de tropos. A proposta, aparentemente pouco substancial, de Rodriguez- -Pereyra (2001) é a seguinte: a é semelhante a b em virtude de a e b serem o que eles são. Essa solução é formulada em termos de fazedores de verdade: a e b são fazedores de verdade suficientes para a proposição 'a é semelhante a b'. Isso não significa, claro, que 'a existe' e 'b existe' contenham 'a é semelhante a b'. O ponto é que os particulares a e b por si só (sem a sua natureza ou propriedade alguma) são responsáveis pela semelhança. Claro, essa solução só pode colher se adotarmos o realismo modal, segundo o qual cada particular só existe num mundo possível. Assim, para qualquer propriedade F, se a é F, qualquer particular que não fosse F não seria mais a, mas, na melhor das hipóteses, uma contraparte sua. Dessa forma, a mera existência de a e de b garante que ambos sejam F. Com isso, o nominalismo de semelhança não precisa de admitir um universal relacional de semelhança, bloqueando a regressão logo no primeiro nível. Uma clara fraqueza dessa opção consiste na sua dependência do realismo modal (o que também vale, claro, para o nominalismo de classes). Outro ponto considerado fraco em todas as versões do nominalismo de semelhança é o seu carácter contra-intuitivo: dados dois objetos vermelhos, parece plausível supor que ambos são semelhantes porque são vermelhos, e não vice-versa. Dizer que um objeto é vermelho em virtude de ser semelhante a outro objeto torna uma propriedade intrínseca numa propriedade extrínseca do objeto. 31Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 Conclusão Concluímos observando que em todas as propostas de explicação da predicação surge a suspeita de haver uma regressão. Mas é preciso distinguir claramente entre dois aspectos: a regressão explicativa e a regressão eliminativa. Do ponto de vista explicativo, não parece haver nenhuma regressão quando se explica a predicação em termos de exemplificação de universais, pertença a uma classe ou semelhança. Note-se que também não há circularidade: a predicação é uma relação entre um particular e um universal, enquanto exemplificação, pertença e semelhança são relações entre particulares. A aparência de uma regressão surge porque a forma linguística de expressar a explicação no primeiro passo sugere uma nova predicação: como apenas se substitui um predicado '... é F' por outro predicado '... exemplifica a F-idade', '...pertence à classe F' e '... é semelhante a b' parece que apenas substituímos uma predicação (ou uma propriedade) por outra. Mas, como mostrámos, essas novas relações não são predicações. Quando se concebe a explicação da predicação como um procedimento que visa a eliminação de universais, como pretende o nominalismo (com excepção do nominalismo austero, de avestruz), a suspeita de uma regressão, de facto, parece mais substancial. O ponto de Russell contra o nominalismo de semelhança consistia nisso: parte-se de um explanandum que contém um universal como constituinte, mas o explanans oferecido contém igualmente um universal. Nos explanans oferecidos tanto pelo nominalismo de classes como no de semelhança temos como constituintes pertencer a e ser semelhante a, que são universais, e não particulares (segundo os critérios usuais de reconhecimento de universais: têm ocorrência múltipla, são instanciáveis, são insaturados, e fixam a aridade). Note-se que também o constituinte do explanans realista, exempliicar, é um universal; mas como não se pretende aqui eliminar universais, não há nisso qualquer problema para o realista. Aos nominalistas de classes e semelhança caberia então a tarefa de mostrar como é que, apesar das suas explicações recorrerem a tais entidades, eles não estão comprometidos com elas. João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire32 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica João Branquinho Universidade de Lisboa Guido Imaguire Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro Referências Armstrong, D.M. 1974. Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52: 191-201. Armstrong, D. M. 1980. Nominalism and Realism. Volume 1 de Universals and Scientiic Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D.M. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder-San Francisco-London: Westview Press. Armstrong, D.M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bradley, F.H. 1897. Appearance and Reality. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Chisholm, R. 1996. A Realistic Theory of the Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Daly, C. 1997. Tropes. In Properties. Editado por D. H. Mellor e A. Oliver. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140-159. Küng, G. 1967. Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Lewis, D. 1997. New Work for a Theory of Universals. Reimpresso em Properties. Editado por D. H. Mellor e A. Oliver. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 188-227. Loux, M.J. 1998. Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction. London and New York: Routledge. Moreland, J.P. 2001. Universals. Chesham: Acumen. Plato. 1934. Parmenides. Traduzido por A.E. Taylor. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Price, H.H. 1953. Thinking and Experience. London: Hutchinson's University Library. Quinton, A. 1973. The Nature of Things. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2001. Resemblance Nominalism and Russell ś Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70: 395-408. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism. A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ryle, G. 1939. Plato's Parmenides. Mind 48. Reimpresso em Collected Papers, Vol. I. London: Hutchinson. Russell, B. 1911. On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 12. Reimpresso em Logic and Knowledge. Editado por R.C. Marsh. London: Allen and Unwin, 1956. Russell, B. 1971. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Simons, P. 1994. Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 553-75. Wolterstorff, N. 1970. On Universals. Chicago, Ill: Chicago University Press. 33Regressões ao Ininito em Metafísica Edição de 2013 Apêndice A redundância do operador de exemplificação 1. A exemplificação da Sabedoria = A propriedade de ser um exemplo da Sabedoria (DF) 2. Um objecto x tem a propriedade da exemplificação da Sabedoria se e só se x é um exemplo da Sabedoria (de 1 por Abstracção) 3. A exemplificação da exemplificação da Sabedoria = A propriedade de ser um exemplo da propriedade de ser um exemplo da Sabedoria (DF) 4. Um objecto x tem a propriedade da exemplificação da exemplificação da Sabedoria se e só se x é um exemplo da propriedade de ser um exemplo da Sabedoria (de 3 por Abstracção) 5. A propriedade de ser um exemplo da Sabedoria = A propriedade de ser sábio (DF) 6. x tem a propriedade da exemplificação da exemplificação da Sabedoria se e só se x é um exemplo da propriedade de ser sábio (de 4, 5 por Substituição) 7. x tem a propriedade da exemplificação da Sabedoria se e só se x é um exemplo da propriedade de ser sábio (de 2, 5 por Substituição) 8. x tem a propriedade da exemplificação da exemplificação da Sabedoria se e só se x tem a propriedade da exemplificação da Sabedoria (de 6, 7 por Lógica) 9. A exemplificação da exemplificação da Sabedoria = A exemplificação da Sabedoria (de 8 por Identidade de Propriedades) João Branquinho e Guido Imaguire34 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosoia Analítica", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper Penultimate draft. Final version forthcoming in ​Review of Philosophy and Psychology​. Abstract: People tend to think that they know others better than others know them (Pronin et al. 2001). This phenomenon is known as the \"illusion of asymmetric insight.\" While the illusion has been well documented by a series of recent experiments, less has been done to explain it. In this paper, we argue that extant explanations are inadequate because they either get the explanatory direction wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a sufficiently nuanced way. Instead, we propose a new explanation that does not face these problems. The explanation is based on two other well-documented psychological phenomena: the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased way, and the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others. Keywords ​Illusion of asymmetric insight ∙ Interpersonal knowledge ∙ Biased evidence assimilation ∙ Cognitive bias 1. Introduction A series of recent psychological experiments suggest that people tend to think that they know others better than others know them (Pronin et al. 2001). If Alice and Ben are as people are most, Alice will tend to think that she knows Ben better than Ben knows her, and Ben will tend to think that he knows Alice better than Alice knows him. This phenomenon is known as the \"illusion of asymmetric insight.\" If people really do have a tendency to think that they know others better than others know them, it must indeed reflect an illusion, at least for many of us. Although it may be the case that some ​people have superior interpersonal insight, this clearly cannot be the case for the majority of us. Just like Alice and Ben cannot ​both be right in the example above, many of us must be wrong in taking ourselves to have superior insight into others. The aim of this paper is to investigate what ​explains the illusion of asymmetric insight. This means searching for a psychological mechanism or pattern that can be held responsible for the illusion. As it is, this explanatory challenge stands unmet. Extant 1 explanations, we argue, are inadequate because they either get the explanatory direction wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a sufficiently nuanced way. Instead, we will propose a new explanation that does not face these problems. The explanation consists of two parts. The first part posits a tendency to ​overestimate our own insight into others. This tendency, we argue, is predicted by another well-documented psychological phenomenon, namely the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased manner. Since third-personal evidence about other people's inner feelings and motives is often highly ambiguous, we will tend to take such evidence to confirm our prior beliefs about the personal characteristics of other people, thereby making us prone to overestimate our own interpersonal insight. The second part of our explanation posits a tendency to ​underestimate other people's insight into us. This tendency, we argue, is predicted by yet another well-documented psychological phenomenon, namely the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others. This might seem surprising: how could the relatively innocuous idea that we know ourselves better than we know others have the effect of making us prone to underestimate how well other people know us? We show that, when coupled with a few other well-supported auxiliary hypotheses, it can in fact have that effect. Together these two tendencies-the tendency to overestimate our own interpersonal insight, and the tendency to underestimate that of others-provide a simple and well-founded explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that can predict important details in the experimental findings. Why is it important to understand the psychological underpinnings of the illusion of asymmetric insight? One set of reasons has to do with social interaction. If we think that we know others better than others know us, it is natural to suspect that we will be inclined to invest more effort in correcting other people's perception of ​us than in correcting our own perception of ​others​. We will tend to talk when we should listen, and will become impatient or defensive when others suggest that we have misinterpreted their statements or motives. This might lead to socially undesirable outcomes, such as entrenched disagreement and conflict (Pronin et al. 2001, pp. 652-53; Kennedy and Pronin 2008). But 2 if we understand the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for these impulses, we might be in a better position to correct or alleviate them. A second set of reasons concerns how the illusion of asymmetric insight relates to various other psychological phenomena. If our explanation is correct, understanding the illusion of asymmetric insight may be of even greater importance than previously thought. On the prevalent explanation, the illusion of asymmetric insight is seen as an effect of another illusory conviction about the relative importance of introspection for knowing ourselves versus other people: we tend to think that knowing ​us requires access to inner thoughts and feelings, whereas we can know ​others quite well merely on the basis of observable behavior (Pronin et al. 2004 and 2008; Pronin 2009). This so-called \"introspection illusion\" is relevant for understanding a wide range of psychological phenomena, including people's tendency to make dispositional inferences about others, but not about themselves (Jones and Nisbett 1972), and their tendency to see others as being more susceptible to cognitive and motivational biases than they themselves are (Pronin et al. 2002 and 2004). But if we are right, the prevalent explanation gets the direction of explanation wrong: it is the illusion of asymmetric insight that gives rise to the introspection illusion, rather than ​vice versa​. As such, our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight stands to explain a much wider set of psychological phenomena related to the introspection illusion as well. We do not present new empirical findings in this article. Rather, we base our explanation on its ability to account for the available data, and on the significant amount of independent support that has been given for the auxiliary hypotheses that we invoke. However, we also highlight some interesting novel predictions of our explanation to be tested in future experimental work. The agenda for the rest of paper is as follows. After reviewing the relevant experimental findings by Pronin et al. (§2), we argue that existing explanations of the illusion of asymmetric insight are inadequate (§3). We then present our new explanation of the illusion (§4), argue that it does not suffer from the same shortcomings as the existing ones (§5), and show that it can explain a two further psychological effect unearthed by 3 Pronin et al. (§6). Finally, we describe a hitherto untested third-personal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, which may serve to test our explanation in further studies (§7). 2. The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight Pronin et al. (2001) report a group of five studies designed to test the hypothesis that people tend to think that they know others better than others know them. Below we briefly review the setup and results of each study. First study: Participants were asked to think of a close friend and rate (on a scale from 1-11) how well they felt they knew or understood their friend, and how well they felt their friend knew or understood them. The study revealed a tendency among the participants to rate their knowledge of their friend higher than their friend's knowledge of them. Second study: Pairs of same-sex college roommates were asked a number of questions about how well they felt they knew their roommate, and how well they felt their roommate knew them. For example, the participants were asked to rate (on a scale from 1-11) how well they felt they knew how shy their roommate was, and how well they felt their roommate knew how shy they were. In line with the first study, the participants tended to rate their knowledge of their roommate higher than their roommate's knowledge of them. The study also sought to determine whether the effect would be more pronounced for judgments involving knowledge about private and unobservable psychological qualities rather than public and observable ones, and more pronounced for judgments involving relatively negative qualities rather than positive or neutral ones. For both contrasts, a significantly increased effect was found. The private and unobservable qualities included in this part were: \"real\" feelings, motives for action, doing things for the purpose of fitting in, and doing things just for the purpose of pleasing others. The study also gave support to an intrapersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, whereby people tend to think that they know themselves better than others know themselves. Again, this tendency was found to be more pronounced for judgments involving knowledge about private qualities, and negative qualities. 4 Third study: ​Participants were given a questionnaire in which they were asked to describe when they were \"most like themselves\", and when their close friend was \"most like himself or herself.\" The participants tended to give more weight to privately accessible thoughts and feelings when describing themselves, while giving more weight to publicly available information about performance and behavior when describing their friends. Pronin et al. take this to reflect a tendency to think that it is harder to gain insight into oneself than it is to gain insight into others. Fourth study: ​Pairs of previously unacquainted college students engaged in brief face-to-face interaction, and were subsequently asked how much they felt they had learned about their partner, and how much they felt their partner had learned about them. In line with the third study, the reports revealed a tendency among the students to think that they had learned more about their partner during the conversation than their partner had learned about them. Fifth study: ​Participants took a projective test in which they were asked to complete a series of incomplete word fragments, such as \"g _ _ l\" and \"c _ r _ _ r.\" Afterwards, the participants were asked how revealing they felt the projective test had been of them, and how revealing they felt it had been of the other participants. In line with the third and fourth study, the participants generally found their own word fragment completions to be less revealing than those of other participants. 3. Existing Explanations Although the primary concern of Pronin et al. is to establish ​that people suffer from an illusion of asymmetric insight, they also consider three possible explanations of ​why people might suffer from this illusion. Two of the explanations are based on the so-called \"self-enhancement bias\" and the phenomenon of \"naïve realism.\" However, Pronin et al. reject these explanations because that they are unable to account for certain details in the experimental findings. Instead, they propose a third explanation, which is based on an illusory conviction about how ​knowable ​we are compared to others. Below we review 5 Pronin et al.'s discussion of all three explanations, and explain why we find their favored explanation wanting. 3.1 Explanations from Self-Enhancement Bias and Naïve Realism One line of explanation discussed and ultimately rejected by Pronin et al. (2001) sees the illusion of asymmetric insight as a special instance of the so-called \"self-enhancement bias.\" Numerous studies have shown that the majority of people take themselves to be above-average on a wide range of desirable qualities and abilities, such as intelligence, driving skills, and the like. Perhaps the claim to superior interpersonal insight should be 1 understood as just another instance of this more general tendency. However, Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) rightly observe that if we simply subsume the illusion of asymmetric insight under the self-enhancement bias, we risk overlooking important details in the experimental findings. For example, as noted above, the tendency to claim superiority in interpersonal knowledge was more pronounced for judgments involving knowledge about private and unobservable psychological qualities rather than public and observable ones, and for judgments involving negative qualities rather than positive or neutral ones (Pronin et al. 2001, p. 652). While this finding is ​consistent with the view that the illusion of asymmetric insight is an instance of the self-enhancement bias, it is not ​predicted by it. Thus, even if the illusion of asymmetric insight may be seen as an instance of the self-enhancement bias, this would still leave important nuances in the experimental findings unexplained. Another problem pointed out by Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) is that it is unclear from the experimental findings whether people primarily overestimate their own interpersonal insight, ​underestimate other people's interpersonal insight, or ​both​. Thus, given that the self-enhancement bias only covers tendencies to overestimate oneself, the illusion of asymmetric insight might not be a clear-cut instance of the self-enhancement bias. Pronin et al. also consider the possibility of understanding the illusion of asymmetric insight as a manifestation of ​naïve realism​: the tendency to assume that one's perception of 1 See Schlenker and Miller (1977), Greenwald (1980), Riess et al. (1981), Greenberg et al. (1982), and Mezulis et al. (2004) for studies and reviews of the self-enhancement bias. 6 the world accurately reflects what the world is really like. A notable consequence of naïve 2 realism is that when people make conflicting judgments on some matter, each party will tend to think that the other party's judgment is biased or otherwise flawed. One might naturally take this phenomenon to underlie the illusion of asymmetric insight: when people make conflicting assessments of the personal characteristics of themselves or others, each party will tend to think that the other party is wrong, and hence deem themselves more successful at judging the personal characteristics of the other party than ​vice versa​. However, this explanation is limited in much the same way as the explanation from the self-enhancement bias. Even if the illusion of asymmetric insight may be appropriately categorized as a manifestation of naïve realism, the explanatory value of such a categorization will be limited in the absence of more detailed predictions of the experimental results, such as the increased effect for judgments involving knowledge about private or negative qualities. 3.2 Explanations from Knowability and Introspection Illusions Consider next the explanation favoured by Proning et al. Several of the experiments reviewed in §2 indicate that people tend to think that they are less knowable or \"harder to access\" than others. For example, the participants in the first study tended to deem their own \"true self\" less \"visible\" or more \"hidden beneath the surface\" than that of their close friend. Similarly, the participants in the third study provided self-descriptions that gave more weight to inner unobservable events and feelings than did their descriptions of their close friend. Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) take these findings to suggest that the reason why 3 people take themselves to have superior interpersonal insight is that they take themselves to be less knowable than others. While we agree that the experimental findings indicate that people deem themselves less knowable than others, we have doubts about the significance of this \"knowability illusion\" in the context of explaining the illusion of asymmetric insight. The trouble is that 2 See Ichheiser (1949), Ross and Ward (1996), and Gilovich and Ross (2015) for studies and reviews of naïve realism. 3 See also Goffman (1959), Markus (1983), and Andersen and Ross (1984) for studies and discussions of people's convictions about their own and other people's knowability. 7 we risk getting the ​explanatory direction wrong. It would seem more natural to explain the knowability illusion in terms of the illusion of asymmetric insight than ​vice versa​. Here is why: if people really do suffer from an illusory conviction to the effect that they themselves are less knowable than others, this illusion is itself in need of an explanation. One plausible explanation is that people deem themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into others than ​vice versa​, and, on this basis, infer that they are generally less knowable than others. For example, people might feel misunderstood more often than they take themselves to misunderstand others, and hence eventually come to think of themselves as being harder to access than others. Thus, even if people's own explanation of their perceived superior interpersonal insight is based on a belief to the effect that they themselves are less knowable than others, the causal psychological explanation plausibly goes the other way around: the tendency to think of oneself as having superior interpersonal insight is what moves people to think that they are less knowable than other people. In subsequent work, Pronin and colleagues have refined the explanation from knowability by relating it to another well-documented illusion known as the \"introspection illusion:\" the tendency to think that observable behavior is more revealing of others than of oneself, and that access to private thoughts and feelings is more critical when it is oneself, rather than someone else, who is being interpreted (Pronin et al. 2004 and 2008; Pronin and Kugler 2007; Pronin 2009). It has been suggested that the introspection illusion may lead people to think that they are in a better position to gain insight into others than ​vice versa​, thus giving rise to an illusion of asymmetric insight. For example, Pronin et al. (2004) submit that the illusion of asymmetric insight is rooted in the conviction that \"knowing ​us ​demands that one enjoy access to our private thoughts, feelings, motives, intentions, and so forth,\" whereas \"we can know ​others ​quite well solely from paying attention to their behaviors, gestures, verbal responses, and other observable manifestations\" (Pronin et al. 2004, p. 794). A similar point is made by Pronin et al. (2008) who note that the illusion of asymmetric insight \"has been traced to people's tendency to view their own spontaneous or off-the-cuff responses to others' questions as relatively 8 unrevealing even though they view others' similar responses as meaningful\" (Pronin et al. 2008, p. 797). 4 However, by using the introspection illusion to explain the illusion of asymmetric insight, we once again run a risk of getting the explanatory direction wrong. If people indeed suffer from an introspection illusion, this is itself in need of an explanation. A plausible explanation is that people deem themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into others than ​vice versa​, and hence eventually come to conclude that the third-personal evidence that they have about others must be comparatively more revealing than the third-personal evidence that other people have about them. In other words, the reason why people are moved to think that third-personal evidence is less revealing of them than of others is that they take themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into others than ​vice versa​. If this is the correct way of understanding the direction of explanation, any explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that does not rely on the knowability and introspection illusions will thereby help explain these latter two illusions as well. Thus, since the explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that we propose in the following does not rely on the knowability and introspection illusions, it promises to provide a unified account of all three illusions. Another potential weakness of the explanations from the knowability and introspection illusions is that it is difficult to see how these explanations could be extended to the ​intrapersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight. Pronin et al. discuss the interpersonal and intrapersonal versions of the illusion of asymmetric insight under the same heading, and they seem to assume that they are equally well explained by the knowability and introspection illusions. However, it is anything but clear that they ​are​. If we think of ourselves as being less knowable than others, why should this lead us to think that we have superior intrapersonal insight? It seems odd to reason that since I am harder 4 On another possible reading of Pronin et al.'s discussion of the introspection illusions, they do no seek to explain the illusion of asymmetric insight in terms of the introspection illusion, but rather seek to explain both of these illusions in terms of the knowability illusion. However, even if this is the correct interpretation, our new explanation still provides a unified account of all three illusions, by providing an independent explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight, which in turn explains the other two. 9 to know than others, I must know myself better than others know themselves. Likewise, it seems odd to reason that since introspection is more important for knowing me than for knowing others, I must know myself better than others know themselves. While our main focus will be on the interpersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, we will also show, in §5, how our explanation provides resources for understanding the intrapersonal version. 4. A New Explanation We now move on to present a new explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight. As previously noted, it is unclear from the experimental findings whether people primarily tend to ​overestimate their own interpersonal insight, ​underestimate other people's interpersonal insight, or ​both​. But regardless of the relative significance of these tendencies, it is clear that neither tendency on its own is enough to generate an illusion of asymmetric insight. If I overestimate my own interpersonal insight, I won't suffer from an illusion of asymmetric insight if I overestimate other people's interpersonal insight to the same degree. And if I underestimate other people's interpersonal insight, I won't suffer from an illusion of asymmetric insight if I underestimate my own interpersonal insight to the same degree. Thus, at a minimum, an explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight must explain a differential assessment of how well people take themselves to know others as compared to how well others know them. We will meet this requirement by showing how a few well-founded psychological phenomena jointly predict a double tendency to ​overestimate our own interpersonal insight and ​underestimate ​the interpersonal insight of others. 4.1 Overestimating One's Own Interpersonal Insight What might explain a tendency to overestimate one's own ability to know others? We submit that this tendency is predicted by the familiar, well-supported tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence in a biased manner: Biased Assimilation of Evidence (BAE): People tend to interpret ambiguous evidence as supportive of their prior opinions. 10 This tendency has been documented by a number of experimental findings across a wide range of evidential domains. It is usually understood as an aspect of the more general confirmation bias, which is the tendency to search for, interpret, and remember evidence and information in ways that confirm one's prior beliefs, and impede the possibility of falsifying them. While early support for this general tendency came from Wason (1960), the classic study documenting the specific bias in assimilating ambiguous evidence is Lord et al. (1979). In their study, a group of participants, who were initially either for or against capital punishment, were presented with two sets of data on the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent; one set of data speaking in favor of such an effect, and another speaking against it. The studies revealed a tendency among the participants to have a more favorable opinion of the data that supported their initial opinion, while being skeptical of the data speaking against it. As Kunda (1990) notes, ambiguous evidence is particularly susceptible to biased assimilation, since reality itself to some extent constrains what one is able to conclude from a given body of evidence. One's evidence cannot speak too compellingly against one's prior opinion if it is to allow for a biased interpretation. Since mixed or ambiguous bodies of evidence do not do so, biased assimilation of such evidence becomes more likely. More generally, we might say that the degree of susceptibility for biased assimilation of evidence depends positively on the degree of ambiguity in the evidence, other things being equal. 5 We take it as relatively obvious that third-personal psychological evidence is often quite ambiguous and open to interpretation, since it often leaves us to draw relatively subtle abductive inferences about the inner feelings and motives of other people. Given this background assumption, it is not hard to see how BAE predicts a tendency to overestimate one's own reliability in judging the personal characteristics of others. The ambiguity of third-personal psychological evidence makes us prone to interpret the evidence in a way that supports our initial judgments of the personal characteristics of others. As a result, more false judgments are likely to be made and retained than we are 5 For useful overviews, see Gilovich (1991, ch. 3) and Oswald and Grosjean (2004). 11 aware of, thereby making us prone to overestimate our own ability to judge the personal characteristics of other people. To illustrate, suppose that Alice has come to regard Ben as being shy (say, based on some relatively limited experience with him in social situations). Even if he is not in fact shy, third-personal evidence of shyness is ambiguous, which means that Alice is likely to interpret evidence gained in subsequent interaction with Ben in a way that supports her initial judgment. As such, she stands to retain her initial judgment, even if a more balanced assessment of the evidence would speak against it. Being unaware of this mistake, she takes herself to know Ben better than she in fact does. Importantly, this explanation can account for the details in the experimental findings that the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and naïve realism failed to predict, namely that our tendency to think that we have superior interpersonal knowledge is particularly pronounced in cases where the knowledge concerns private and unobservable qualities, rather than public and observable ones (Pronin et al. 2001, p. 643). Our explanation predicts this effect, since evidence about private and unobservable qualities is likely to be more ambiguous than evidence about public and observable qualities, thus leaving more room for biased assimilation, which in turn will strengthen the overestimation of one's own ability to know others. 4.2 Underestimating the Interpersonal Insight of Others Given that people overestimate their ​own interpersonal knowledge, one might naturally expect them to overestimate ​other ​people's interpersonal knowledge as well, since this would mean that they ascribed to others the same general capacities for interpersonal knowledge that they find in themselves. However, if this were the case, we would not see an illusion of asymmetric insight. What is needed is thus an explanation of why people do not​ overestimate other people's interpersonal insight, despite overestimating their own. At the root of our proposal lies a claim about people's comparative assessments of people's capacity for ​self-knowledge​ versus knowledge of ​others​: 12 Overestimation of Self-Other Asymmetry (OSA): ​People tend to overestimate the degree to which people's self-knowledge is superior to their knowledge of others. This tendency differs in two important respects from the knowability and introspection illusions. First, OSA states that people overestimate how much better ​people in general are at knowing themselves compared to knowing others. By contrast, the knowability and introspection illusions are beliefs that people habour about ​themselves in particular​: that ​I am less knowable than others, and that introspection is comparatively more important for knowing ​me​. Second, OSA claims that we overestimate how much better people know themselves than ​others​, whereas the knowability and introspection illusions consist of the belief that we are in a better position to know ​others than others are to know ​us​. While this latter belief seems rather immodest (after all, why should we believe ourselves to be special?), the overestimation described by OSA is much more subtle. There is nothing obviously remarkable in thinking that we are all better placed to know ourselves than we are to know others, and it is easy to see how one could come to overestimate the extent of this difference (more on this below). It is thus also a conviction that reasonable and reflective people could easily hold. Note finally the relative weakness of OSA. The thesis does not require, for example, that people believe themselves to be ​perfectly reliable in knowing themselves. It suffices that they regard themselves as ​better at knowing themselves than at knowing others, as long as they overestimate this difference in reliability. What reason is there to think that OSA is true? That we know ourselves better than we know others, at least in important respects, seems like a core commitment of folk-psychology. Peter Carruthers (2008) goes as far as to maintain that a belief in what he calls the 'self-transparency' of key aspects of our minds is species-universal and innate. Carruthers relies mainly on theoretical considerations, including that an innate belief in self-transparency would make good sense from an evolutionary perspective, but he also notes some further explanatory virtues of this innateness hypothesis. For example, it would explain the 'near-ubiquity' of belief in self-transparency in Western philosophy prior to the writings of Sigmund Freud, and the surprised reactions of ordinary people to scientific 13 results and theorizing about the mind which undermine the belief in self-transparency. Indeed, when researchers in cognitive science present results indicating aspects of our mental lives to which the subject does ​not enjoy privileged access, these results are often presented as surprising, thus revealing that the researchers take for granted that people tend to believe in self-transparency. Carruthers (2008) notes a lack of experimental work on the degree to which people actually presume introspective access to their own minds. However, a later study by Kozuch and Nichols (2011) sought to remedy this. They distinguished two dimensions of the putative folk belief in introspective access, namely the ​power of the access, i.e. how reliable people believe their introspective access to be, and the ​domain of access, i.e. what types of mental events people believe they are able to introspect. Although they didn't find that people presume universal introspective access, they found that people do assume a high degree of introspective access, especially in certain domains (we return to these domains in a moment). Given that people think that they have a kind of access to their own minds that they do not have to the minds of others, what reason is there to suppose that they ​overestimate the superiority of this access? Here, we can distinguish two relevant sets of considerations, one to do with the ​nature​ of the access, the other to do with the ​reliability​ of the access. In a classic study, Alison Gopnik (1993) argued that while we as adults believe that our access to our own psychological states is different in nature to our access to the psychological states of others, developmental evidence suggests that it is not. We tend to believe that first-person knowledge is gained through direct perception, whereas third-person knowledge must be inferred from behavior. But developmental evidence suggests, she maintains, that both kinds of knowledge operate according to the same interpretive principles. In another discussion, Carruthers (2010) provides further reason to doubt the existence of a special form of introspective access to our own psychology, at least if introspection is understood as a kind of cognitive pathway that is distinct from the way in which we come to know psychological states of others. Carruthers advances a number of arguments for this claim, including a lack of anatomical evidence, and the unexplained 14 evolutionary extravagance that would be involved in developing a separate pathway for understanding ourselves. These claims of Gopnik and Carruthers are of course compatible with people having an accurate estimation of their relative abilities for knowing themselves and others. After all, simply by experiencing one's own behavior on a greater scale, subjects plausibly have more and better psychological evidence about themselves than they have about others. But a commitment to a false theory of self-knowledge as a matter of direct perception or introspection does seem to go hand in hand with an exaggerated sense of ​how much better we are at knowing ourselves over knowing others, which is what our thesis claims. Moving on to the second set of considerations, this conclusion is in line with the very significant body of research over the last several decades, demonstrating significant limitations and exceptions to our reliability in knowing ourselves. Numerous studies suggest that there are certain classes of attitudes, tendencies, processes, and personality traits that we are systematically bad at detecting in ourselves. Following Wilson and Dunn (2003), we can distinguish two broad categories of limitations to our self-knowledge, which they label \"motivational\" and \"non-motivational.\" Motivational limitations extend to e.g. uncomfortable memories, repressed \"Freudian\" beliefs, biases, undesirable personality traits, and similar characteristics that people tend to have motivational reasons for assessing in a skewed manner. Non-motivational limitations apply especially to much 6 of the unconscious mental processing underlying reasoning, perception, motor learning, attitude formation, decision-making, and more. As such, there might in fact be certain 7 types of psychological states and characteristics that are more reliably detectable by third-person evidence than by first-person evidence. In this connection, it is worth remarking that in the aforementioned study by Kozuch and Nichols (2011), people were particularly prone to overestimating the amount of self-access they had when it came to the motivational basis for their own decisions and behavior. With this motivation of OSA in place, we can return to our main question. How does OSA lead us to underestimate other people's ability to gain insight into us? The basic 6 See Vazire (2010) for further discussion of motivational limitations to self-knowledge. 7 See, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson (1977) for a classic study. 15 mechanism that we propose is this: sometimes we become aware of what personal or psychological traits other people ascribe to us. These ascriptions may sometimes be explicitly communicated, as when someone tells me that she thinks I am shy or prone to anger. At other times, the ascriptions may be inferred from more subtle cues, as when I become aware that someone seems overly careful not to make me angry, or appears to imply that I would be uncomfortable in some particular social situation. We will not make any substantive assumptions about the exact prevalence of these cues, but we take it that we are at least sometimes in a position to make informed comparisons of our own self-assessments with other people's assessments of us. Naturally, these assessments sometimes come into conflict. I might infer from your calming tone that you regard me as anxious, while not regarding myself as anxious. Or I might take your bantering to indicate that you regard me as a resilient person, while regarding myself as rather fragile. We will again not make any substantive assumptions about the exact prevalence of such conflicts. But a number of psychological studies indicate that people quite commonly experience a feeling of being misunderstood by others. 8 In cases of conflicting assessments, OSA predicts that we will tend to regard our own self-assessment as the one most likely to be correct on the grounds that, in general, people's self-knowledge tends to be superior to people's knowledge of others. However, since we tend to ​overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others, there will be more cases of conflicting assessments in which the other person is right about us than we think. Over time, we will thus come to regard other people as being less reliable in their judgments of our own personal characteristics than they really are. In other words, we will come to underestimate their interpersonal insight. As with the mechanism proposed in §4.1, this mechanism also predicts the details found in Study 2, that the illusion of asymmetric insight was particularly pronounced in cases where participants felt that knowledge of them would require access to private thoughts and feelings, and in cases where the knowledge concerned negative or undesirable 8 See e.g. Lun et al. (2008) and Oishi et al. (2013) for recent studies and literature reviews on people's perception of being misunderstood by others, and the importance of this for their well-being and feeling of being socially connected. 16 qualities. As previously mentioned, we are particularly prone to overestimating our own self-knowledge when it comes to these exact qualities. In fact, when finding an increased effect with respect to qualities that require access to private thoughts and feelings, Pronin et al. focused in particular on grounds and motivations for decisions and behavior (e.g.: 'motives for action, doing things just for the purpose of fitting in, and doing things just for the purpose of pleasing others' (2001: 643)). And it is with respect to these very qualities that Kozuch and Nichols (2011) found that people were most prone to overestimate their self-knowledge. For these qualities we are therefore likely to be particularly dismissive of other people's conflicting assessments of us. Putting this effect together with the one described in §4.1, we have an explanation both of the tendency to overestimate our own interpersonal insight and of the tendency to underestimate that of others. The first effect is grounded in the general tendency to accommodate evidence in a biased way, which becomes strengthened by the ambiguous nature of third-personal psychological evidence. The second effect is grounded in the exaggerated conviction that people's self-knowledge is superior to their knowledge of others, which leads us to dismiss other people's assessments of ourselves more often than we should. It is worth pointing out that our belief that we are in a better position to know ourselves than we are to know others need not be false or exaggerated for our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight to hold, although the effect will be weaker if the belief is accurate. If the belief is accurate, we will not underestimate the ability of others to know us, but rather come to a more realistic assessment of their ability. When we become aware of other people's assessments of us, and they conflict with our own self-assessments, we will still dismiss their assessments because of our belief in the superiority of self-knowledge over knowledge of others. But if our self-knowledge really is as superior as we take it to be, our dismissals of other people's assessments will be largely correct, and our assessment of their ability to know others will therefore also be more accurate. However, because of our tendency to overestimate our own ability to know others, we will still regard ourselves as better at knowing others, than others are at knowing us, thus retaining weaker version of 17 the illusion of asymmetric insight. That being said, we think that the research summarized above does give us strong reason to think that we have an exaggerated sense of our ability to know ourselves, as described by OSA. 5. Interactions of BAE and OSA We have now seen how BAE and OSA can work in tandem to generate an illusion of asymmetric insight. However, the two can also interact with each other in a more direct manner. In fact, BAE and OSA can sometimes ​counteract ​each other. To illustrate, suppose that Alice judges Ben to be shy. How will Alice react if she learns that Ben does not consider himself to be shy? If we were to focus exclusively on OSA, we should expect Alice to trust Ben's judgment because she thinks that people in general know themselves better than others know them. But if we were to focus exclusively on BAE, we should expect Alice to place greater weight on her own judgment because she tends to assimilate third-personal evidence in a biased manner. Thus, in cases like these, OSA and BEA pull in opposite directions. What should we make of this? First and most importantly, the fact that BAE and OSA can sometimes have opposite-directed effects does not undermine the explanation proposed in the previous section. Most obviously, the second part of the explanation remains intact because BAE does not generate any countereffect in those cases where OSA leads us to place too little weight on other people's judgments of us. If anything, we should expect BAE to ​bolster the effect of OSA in cases where your judgment of me conflicts with my own judgment of myself. Only a little less obviously, the first part of the explanation also remains intact because the occasional countereffect of OSA does not change the fact that BAE in general makes us prone to interpret third-personal evidence in a way that supports our prior opinions. The effect of BAE may well be ​mitigated to some extent by the interaction with OSA. But we should expect the overall pattern to be the same, namely that we are likely to make and retain more false judgments about other people's personal characteristics than we are aware of, thereby leading us to overestimate our own interpersonal insight. Hence, the 18 interaction between BAE and OSA does not undermine our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight. On the contrary, we can use the interaction between BAE and OSA to explain two further psychological effects documented by Pronin et al. The first effect is the previously mentioned ​intrapersonal illusion of asymmetric insight: the tendency to think that we know ourselves better than other people know themselves. This tendency was demonstrated by the second of the studies reviewed in §2, but was found to be overall less pronounced than the interpersonal illusion. The interaction between BAE and OSA predicts exactly that. To see why, suppose again that Alice and Ben make conflicting judgments about whether Ben is shy. The effect of OSA will be to make Alice inclined to trust Ben's judgment. However, BAE will have the countereffect of sometimes leading Alice to think that her own judgment of Ben is more accurate than Ben's judgment of himself. As a result, Alice will tend to underestimate, at least to some extent, how well Ben knows himself. By contrast, if Alice and Ben make conflicting judgments about whether Alice ​is shy, BAE will obviously not have the effect of leading Alice to underestimate how well she knows herself. On the present picture, this is why we tend to think that we know ourselves better than others know themselves. The second effect consists of a tendency to think that we know ourselves ​much ​better than others know us, whereas other people know themselves only ​slightly ​better than we know them. This tendency was also demonstrated by the second of the studies reviewed in §2, and was found to be highly sensitive to the level of external observability of the assessed trait. For example, Alice would take her knowledge of her own \"shyness\" (a low-observability trait) to be much better than Ben's knowledge of her shyness, whereas she would only take Ben's knowledge of his shyness to be slightly better than her knowledge of his shyness. By contrast, Alice would take her knowledge of her own \"messiness\" (a high-observability trait) to be only slightly better than Ben's knowledge of her messiness, whereas she would take Ben's knowledge of his messiness to no better (in fact, slightly ​worse​) than her knowledge of his messiness. These effects are exactly what we 9 9 These effects are illustrated in Figure 1 (Pronin et al. 2001: 644). 19 should expect from the interaction between BAE and OSA. In general, OSA makes us inclined to think that people know themselves better than others know them. However, BAE will have the countereffect of sometimes leading us to think that we know others better than they know themselves, especially for traits that are high in external observability. By contrast, BAE does not have the effect of sometimes leading us to think that others know us better than we know ourselves. As a result, we will tend to underestimate how well others know themselves, without underestimating how well we know ourselves. On the present picture, that is why we tend to think that we know ourselves much better than others know us, whereas other people know themselves only slightly better than we know them. 10 In sum, BAE and SOA not only jointly predict the interpersonal illusion of asymmetric insight, but allow us to explain in detail several related phenomena as well. 6. Comparisons with Existing Explanations In this section, we compare our explanation from §4 with the ones discussed in §3. We begin by revisiting the shortcomings that led us to reject the existing explanations. In relation to the explanations from the illusions of knowability and introspection, we raised the worry that they got the explanatory direction wrong. Even if people really do tend to deem themselves less knowable than others, we argued that it is more natural to explain this conviction in terms of people's tendency to deem themselves superior at knowing others, rather than letting the explanation go the other way around. Our explanation does not raise a similar worry. Although our explanation is partly based on a general belief about the comparative epistemic positions of oneself and others, the content of this belief is that subjects in general enjoy a superior access to their own mental state, which clearly cannot be explained in terms of a tendency to regard oneself as superior at knowing others. Furthermore, it is worth noting that believing oneself to enjoy superior access to one's own mental state is ​prima facie much more reasonable, and thus less in need of explanation, than believing oneself to be less knowable than others. Indeed, if Carruthers 10 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this effect to our attention. 20 (2008) is right, there is reason to think that an exaggerated belief in the superiority of self-knowledge is innate, or at least a very basic commitment of folk-psychology. Finally, since our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight does not rely on the illusions of knowability and introspection, we plausibly have an explanation of the latter two illusions as well, as argued in §3. This promises to provide us with a highly unified picture of a wide range of otherwise disparate psychological phenomena. Obviously, we have not offered anything like a complete picture of how these phenomena hang together. In particular, it may require further experimental work to establish whether the knowability and introspection illusions can indeed be explained in terms of the illusion of asymmetric insight, as we have suggested, or whether they should rather be seen as arising directly from BAE and OSA, and hence as being \"on a par\" with the illusion of asymmetric insight at the level of explanation. But we take the foregoing considerations to suggest that BAE and OSA at least provide us with the basic ingredients for a unified understanding of the knowability and introspection illusions and the illusion of asymmetric insight. In relation to the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and naïve realism, Pronin et al. pointed out that they are too general to account for specific details in the experimental findings. In particular, they failed to explain the heightened tendency to claim superior interpersonal knowledge about negative qualities and qualities that require access to private thoughts and feelings. By contrast, we have seen that our explanation predicts exactly this effect. A further potential weakness of the explanation from self-enhancement bias was that it is unclear from the experimental findings whether the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a result of a tendency to ​overestimate one's own interpersonal insight, underestimate other people's interpersonal insight, or ​both​. Thus, it remains unclear whether the illusion of asymmetric insight can indeed be categorized as an instance of the self-enhancement bias. By contrast, our account offers explanatory resources regardless of how this question is settled, since it relies both an explanation of our tendency to overestimate ourselves and of our tendency to underestimate others. 21 Finally, neither of the explanations reviewed in §3 are well-placed to account for the effects discussed in §5. Most obviously, the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and naïve realism are too general to make any detailed predictions about why the effects discussed in §5 should be sensitive to the level of external observability of the assessed trait. But the explanations from the illusions of knowability and introspection also fall short. As argued in §3.2, it is unclear how the knowability and introspection illusions would generate a tendency to think that we know ourselves better than other people know themselves. The same goes for the tendency to think that we know ourselves ​much ​better than other people know us, whereas other people know themselves only slightly better than we know them. It seems odd to reason that since I am harder to know than you, I must know myself much better than you know me, whereas you know yourself only slightly better than I know you. Likewise, it seems odd to reason that since introspection is more important for knowing me than for knowing you, I must know myself much better than you know me, whereas you know yourself only slightly better than I know you. Thus, the knowability and introspection illusions seem unable to explain the effects discussed in §5. Taken together, these considerations make what seems to us an overall strong case in favor of our explanation from §4 and against the ones reviewed in §3. 7. A Third-Personal Illusion? In this final section, we want to bring attention to a hypothesis that is related to, but importantly different from, the ones discussed in the foregoing. This is the hypothesis that people tend to think that they are better at knowing others than others are at knowing others. To illustrate, if Alice and Ben consider how well they know a third person Claire, 11 Alice will tend to think that she knows Claire better than Ben does, and Ben will likewise tend to think he knows Claire better than Alice does. Let us call this putative effect the third-personal illusion of asymmetric insight. To our knowledge, this illusion has not yet been tested by experiment. 11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to consider this. 22 Apart from its independent interest, the third-personal illusion is interesting in the present context because it may provide further assistance in adjudicating between the competing explanations of the illusion of asymmetric insight discussed so far. The illusion is predicted by our own explanation because, on this account, we will tend to overestimate our own ability to know others, while at the same time underestimating the ability of others to know us. And since this underestimation is not based on us believing ourselves to be especially hard to know, but rather on a belief about the superiority of self-knowledge in general, the resulting underestimation of others will not be restricted to their knowledge of ourselves in particular. The explanation thus predicts that people will tend to think that they are better at knowing others than others are at knowing others. The third-personal illusion is also predicted by the explanations from self-enhancement and naïve realism. If the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a manifestation of the general tendency to think that one is above-average on a wide range of desirable qualities and abilities, including the ability to know others, one will plausibly also manifest the third-person asymmetric insight illusion. Likewise, if the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a manifestation of naïve realism, which leads one to assume that those who disagree with oneself must be mistaken, one will also manifest the third-person asymmetric insight illusion. Note, however, that even if the third-personal illusion is eventually confirmed, we have already seen that our explanation remains superior to the explanations from self-enhancement and naïve realism. Interestingly, the third-personal illusion is ​not predicted by the explanations based on the illusions of knowability and introspection. According to both of these explanations, the illusion of asymmetric insight arises as a result of believing ​oneself to be especially difficult to know. But such a belief does not have any obvious implications for how one will compare the abilities of oneself and others to know ​other people. One may well regard oneself as difficult to know, while regarding oneself and others as equally good at knowing others. If it turns out to be true, the third-personal illusion will thus speak in favor of our explanation, and speak against Pronin et al.'s explanations; and ​vice versa if the hypothesis turns out to be false. 23 8. Conclusion We began this paper by reviewing a group of studies reported by Pronin et al. (2001), which suggest that people tend to think that they know others better than others know them (§2). We then argued that existing explanations of this \"illusion of asymmetric insight\" are wanting (§3), and went on to propose a new explanation of the illusion, based on two other well-documented psychological phenomena: the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased manner, and the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others (§4). Subsequently, we showed that our explanation can also account for two further psychological effects documented by Pronin et al. 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{"text": "International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 40 The General Solution for a linear Second Order Homogenous Differential Equations with Variable Coefficients Rehab A .Shaaban Dep .of Mathematics .College of Education for girls. University of Kufa . Iraq Abstract : The main goal in this work to find the general solution for some kind of linear second order homogenous differential equations with variable coefficients which have the general form 0)()(  yxQyxPy , by using the substitution  dxxZ ey )( ,which transform form the above equation to Riccati equation . Keyword :Differential equations , Riccati equation , Bernoulli equation . 1. INTRODUCTION Many researchers in this field of differential equations , may face a difficult in solving the linear second order differential equations by using known methods . Therefore ,they are trying to solve these equations by using the power series or the Frobenius method [1] . Kathem [ 2 ] gave a method for solving the above equation ,this method depends to find a function )(xZ such that  dxxZ ey )( . Kathem [ 2] only gave examples which enable to find the general soluation by using this substitution . 2Bernoulli Equation [3] The general form that of Bernoulli equation has is written as 1)()(  nnyxqyxpy where p and q are functions of, x (or constants) 3Riccati Equation [4] The general form of Riccati equation is written as )1...(2)()()( yxhyxgxfy  where gf , and h are given functions of x ( or constants) . We can solve it , if one or more particular solutions of )1( can be found by inspection or otherwise . The general solution of )1( is easy to be obtained by the following conditions iIf 1y is a known particular solution , then the general solution can be obtained by the assumption :- 1 yyU  , then )1( transformed into Bernoulli equation 2) 1 2()( hUUhygxU  , so , the general solution of )1( is given by   dxhyg exxdxxxhcyy ) 1 2( )(;)()()() 1 (     International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 41 ii-If 1y and 2y are two known particular solutions , then the general solution of )1( can be found by the assumption 1 ) 2 ( yyyyU  , then the general solution is given by :dxyyxh\n\neyyCyy ) 21 ()( ) 2 ( 1    , where C is an arbitrary constant . iiiIf 21 , yy and 3y ,are three known particular solutions, say then the general solution of equation )1( is given as : C yyyy yyyy    )()( )()( 113 231 , where C is an arbitrary constant 4How Find The General Solution for the Linear Second Order Differential Equations We can solve the equation )2...(0)()(  yxQyxPy by the following cases: iIf )(xP and )(xQ are constants say axP )( and bxQ )( then the equation )2( becomes )3...(0)()()( 2  bxaZxZxZ , and the solution of )3( is given by :a )              x a bCx a bC x a ey 4 2 sin 24 2 cos 1 2 , if 4 2a b  ,where  and  are arbitrary constants b)  Cx x a eAy    2 , if 4 2a b  ,where A and C are arbitrary constants . proof :- International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 42 a) Since 0)()(2)(  bxaZxZxZ , so                  4 2 2; 2 2 2 0 4 22 2 a bdCx d a Z dZ dx a b a Z dZ fACandfACwherex a bCx a bC x a ey g eAdxf x a eAy gx a dxf e dxd ey dcf a dxfdZCx d aZ d sin 2 cos 1 ;) 4 2 sin 24 2 cos 1 (2 );cos(2 2 )cos(ln 2 a -dx)-(ftan ; 2 )tan( 2/1tan 1                            4.1.Example:For solving the differential equation 32,032  bandayyy , since 4 2a b  Then , by using the above formula , we get the general solution which has the form ) 2 2 2 1(,) 2 2 2 1(, 3) 2 22 22 22 1 ( )2sin 2 2cos 1 ()13sin 2 13cos 1 ( i CC B i CC Awhere xBexAe i xexe C xexe Cxey ixCixCxeyxCxCxey       b) If 112 2 ; 1 2 2 1 0 2 4 CC Cx a ZxC a Z dx a Z dza b              Since International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 43   2;2 22 ln 2 1 )( C eACx x a eAy Cx a Cx ey dx a Cx ey dxxZ ey                         4.2.Example:-For solving the differential equation 4,4;044  bayyy we will use the general form in the above formula and we get )(2,)(2 BAxxeyACBBAx x a ey    ii-If 0)( xQ , then the general solution is given by :-    Bdx pdx eAy proof:Since 2020)()(2)( ZZPZZPZZQxZPxZxZ  , this is like Bernoulli equation , to solve it , let  tZ 1 1 Ptt .this equation is linear , and its integrating factor is given by:-                           1, )(1 )( ln )( )( )( )( )()( )()( )( )()( . C eABdx dxxp eA Cdx dxxp e ey dx dx dxxp e dxxp e ey dx dxxp e dxxp e Zdx dxxp et dxxp e dx dxxp edx dxxp exptdt dxxp e dxxp eFI 4.3.Example :For solving the differential equation 0 2  y x y , we use the general form in the above formula and we get International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 44    Bdx dxxp eAy )(      Bdx dx xeAy 2 31 ;3 1 ln2 AABxAyBdxxeAy  iii-If )(2)( xQxP  , then the equation )3( can be solved by the assumption )()( xQxZu  , since   0202202  QZZQQZZQPZZZ , to solve this equation , let P Q uuu P Q u P Q u Q Q uZQZu         202 2 , this is Riccati equation , with P Q xkandxgxf   )(0)(,1)( Now , there are many cases 1-If 1u is a known solution to the last equation , then the general solution is given by             dx dxu e dxxQu eAy 1 2)( 1 proof:- The assumption 1uud  transforms the equation to Bernoulli equation which has the form:\n\n20 1 22 dduddudd  , to solve it , we set 1 1 2221  tuttddtddtd , this is linear equation , and its integrating factor is given by :-   dxu eFI 1 2 . ,so the general solution of the last equation is given by :- International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 45 ceAdx dxu e dxxQu eAy CdxxQudx dxu e ey dxxQu dx dxu e dxu e ey xQu dx dxu e dxu e Zu dx dxu e dxu e xQZ u dx dxu e dxu e u dx dxu e dxu e uu dx dxu e d dxu e dx dxu et dxu e                                                                         ;1 2)( 1 )( 1 1 2 ln )( 1 1 2 1 2 )( 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 )( 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 21 2 1 2 1 2 . 2-If 1u and 2u are two known solutions , then the general solution of the last equation is given by :tconsC\n\ndxQ dxuu eC dxuu eCuu ey tan; 211 21 21                                                     proof:From Riccati equation we get   C dxuu euuCuu ;21 21            is any arbitrary constant so                                                                           dxQ dxuu eC dxuu eCuu ey dxuu eC dxuu eCuu u 211 21 21 211 21 21 International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 46 3-if 21 ,uu and 3u are three known solutions , then the general solution of the last equation is given by :tconsC\n\nuu uu xJ dxxQ xCJ uxCJu ey tan; 23 13)(; )( )(1 2 )( 1                             proof:From Riccati equation we get : C uu uu C uu uu ; 23 13 2 1              is any arbitrary constant                                                 23 13)(; )( )(1 2 )( 1 )( )(1 2 )( 1 )(1 2 )( 1 2 )()( 1 23 13 )(;)( 2 1 uu uu xJ dxxQ xCJ uxCJu ey xQ xCJ uxCJu Z xCJ uxCJu uuxJCuxJCuu uu uu xJxJC uu uu Note:Some of these equations can be transformed into variable separable equations and don't need the above formula to find the general solution 4.5. Example :For solving the differential equation 2)(,2)(;022 xxQxxPyxyxy  , by using the equation )3( we get   002 222  xZZxxZZZ , let     xCxZ CxtCxtdx t dt tt tZtxZ       tanh tanhtanh0 1 01 1 1 2 2 , since International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 47   CaeBCaeAxBxA x ey Cx ax ey axCx ey dxxCx ey dxxZ ey sinh,cosh;sinhcosh 2 2 1 )cosh( 2 2 12 2 1 coshln )tanh()(                      iv) If )(xP and )(xQ are not any one of the above cases , then the equation 0)()(2  xQZxPZZ is like Riccati equation . As a result then there are three cases : 1-If 1Z is a known solution to it, then the general solution of )1( is given by :aeAdx\n\ndxZP e dxZ eAy             ;1 2 1 Proof :- The assumption uZZ  1 transforms the equation to Bernoulli equation which has the form:-   02 21  uuZPu , to solve it , we assume tu 1   12 1  tZPt this is a linear equation , and its integrating factor (I.F) is given by :aeAdx\n\n)(tan; )(1 2 )( 1 ZZ ZZ xJandtconsC dx xJC ZxJCZ ey                    proof:From Riccati equation , we can write C ZZ ZZ C ZZ ZZ ; 23 13 2 1              be any arbitrary constant                           dx xJC ZxJCZ ey xJC ZxJCZ Z ZxJCZxJCZZ ZZ ZZ xJxJC ZZ ZZ )(1 2 )( 1 )(1 2 )( 1 2 )()( 1 23 13)(;)( 2 1 4.6..Example :For solving the differential equation 0 2 22  y x y x y , we use the general form in the above formula , which is aeAdx dxZP e dxZ eAy           ;1 2 1 , International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 49 now, let x Z 1 1  ( which is a particular solution of Riccati equation ) 1 ;2 313 3 ln4ln 41 ACBBxx A C x AxdxxexeAy dx dx xe dx xeAy                 REFERENCE [1] Soloughter ,Dan [ 2000 ,Section 8.7] http : // math .furman .edu /~ des/book/Difference Equation to Differential Equations . [2] Kathem , Athera Nema ., \" Solving special Kinds of Second Order Differential Equations by using the substitution  dxxZ ey )( \" , Msc , thesies , University of Kufa , College of Eduction , Departmant of Mathematies , 2005 . [3] Braun , M. ,\" Differential Equation and Their Application \" , 4 th ed , New York : Spering – Verlag , [1993 ]. [4] Murphy . G . M . , \" Ordinary Differential Equation and their Solutions \" , D .Van Nastr and Company , Inc . , New York , [1960] .", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
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{"text": "Walden University ScholarWorks Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection 2020 Comparison of Work-Related Values and Leadership Preferences of Mexican Immigrants and Caucasians Alonso Raul Duarte Walden University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations Part of the Cultural Resource Management and Policy Analysis Commons This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu. Walden University College of Management and Technology This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by Alonso Duarte has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects, and that any and all revisions required by the review committee have been made. Review Committee Dr. Elizabeth Thompson, Committee Chairperson, Management Faculty Dr. David Cavazos, Committee Member, Management Faculty Dr. Robert Levasseur, University Reviewer, Management Faculty Chief Academic Officer and Provost Sue Subocz, Ph.D. Walden University 2020 Abstract Comparison of Work-Related Values and Leadership Preferences of Mexican Immigrants and Caucasians by Alonso Duarte MA, University of Phoenix, 2011 BS, University of Phoenix, 2009 Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Management Walden University February 2020 Abstract Globalization has made it easier for people to migrate, thus increasing diversity within organizations. One problem with this migration is that 1st and 2nd generation immigrants may prefer different leadership styles than those of the mainstream culture. The purpose of this survey-based quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences of Mexican immigrants living in the United States. The research question that guided this study focused on the differences in work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles between 2 generations of Mexican immigrants, Mexicans, and U.S.-born Caucasians. Two hundred and forty-five participants completed the survey. The researcher used a Likert-type self-assessing questionnaire adapted from existing instruments to measure the work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles of two generations of Mexican immigrants, native Mexicans, and U.S.-born Caucasians. Statistical tools, such as correlations, Cronbach's alpha, t-test, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to test measurement reliability and to test for differences in the mean scores of the criterion variables among the 4 groups. The researcher found that, in the aggregate, Mexican immigrants did not acculturate to the mainstream values of the United States, 2nd generation Mexican immigrants' scores were similar to those of U.S.born Caucasians in work-related values, and all groups prefer the servant leadership style. Implications for social change may include raising the awareness of human resource managers of the differences and similarities in values and preferences of their staff, which may help improve the relationships between managers and the employees. Comparison of Work-Related Values and Leadership Preferences of Mexican Immigrants and Caucasians by Alonso Duarte MA, University of Phoenix, 2011 BS, University of Phoenix, 2009 Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Management Walden University February 2020 Dedication I dedicate this dissertation to my lovely wife, Joanna, and my children, Jasmine Marie, Amber Joann, and Alonso Gerard. You are my life. Your love and brutal honesty made me a better husband and father. Thank you for your love, understanding, and sacrifice. I could not have done this without your support. Acknowledgments The completion of this study was possible because of the support and guidance of several people, to whom I owe my heartfelt gratitude. Dr. Elizabeth Thompson thank you for taking over as my committee chair and guiding me through the finish line. Dr. David Cavazos, Dr. Robert Levasseur, Dr. Sunil Hazari, and Dr. Godwin O. Igein thank you for your feedback and for your time serving in my committee. Dr. Lee W. Lee thank you for believing in me and guiding me at the start of my journey. Dr. Vasyl Taras for your inspiration and advice. Dr. Fabiola Lango and Dr. Veronica Lango for being there for me in my time of need. I am very grateful for the support from Deborah McGrath, my coworkers, and my peers. To all the participants in the study, thank you for taking the time to contribute to my research. To my Parents Fernando and Elizabeth, I owe you everything. To my brothers Fernando, Goose, ad Enrique, thank you for being there. To my wife Joanna and my children Jasmine, Amber, and Alonso, thank you for the sacrifices you made to allow me to dedicate time to my studies and research. I could not have done this without your love, patience, and understanding. i Table of Contents List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ....................................................................................1 Background of Problem .................................................................................................2 Problem Statement .........................................................................................................5 Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................6 Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses ...............................................................7 Acculturation of Values .........................................................................................10 Acculturation of Values .........................................................................................11 Leadership Preferences ..........................................................................................13 Alignment of Leadership Preferences ....................................................................15 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................17 Nature of the Study ......................................................................................................17 Definitions....................................................................................................................18 Assumptions .................................................................................................................21 Scope and Delimitations ..............................................................................................21 Limitations ...................................................................................................................22 Significance of Study ...................................................................................................23 Significance to Theory ...........................................................................................24 Significance to Practice..........................................................................................24 Significance to Social Change ...............................................................................25 ii Summary ......................................................................................................................26 Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................27 Literature Search Strategy............................................................................................27 Theoretical Foundation ................................................................................................28 Bi-dimensional Model of Acculturation ................................................................29 Individual Work-Related Cultural Values Model ..................................................31 Culturally Endorsed Implicit Leadership Theory ..................................................34 Literature Review.........................................................................................................36 Overview ......................................................................................................................37 Culture Differences ......................................................................................................38 Conceptualizing Culture ........................................................................................38 Comparing Cultures ...............................................................................................40 Differences between Mexico and the United States ..............................................43 Within Country Variability ....................................................................................46 Individual-Level Cultural Values ..........................................................................47 Individual-Level, Work-Related Cultural Values ..................................................48 Culture and Leadership ................................................................................................51 Leadership Preferences ..........................................................................................52 Mexicans in the United States......................................................................................57 Acculturation................................................................................................................58 Factors Related to Acculturation ...........................................................................60 Work-related Acculturation ...................................................................................63 iii Conclusion ...................................................................................................................63 Chapter 3: Research Method ..............................................................................................67 Research Design and Rationale ...................................................................................67 Methodology ................................................................................................................68 Population ..............................................................................................................68 Sample....................................................................................................................70 Sampling Procedures .............................................................................................71 Instrumentation and Operationalization of the Constructs ..........................................73 Leadership Preferences ..........................................................................................74 Work-Related Cultural Values ...............................................................................82 Acculturation..........................................................................................................85 Independent Variables ...........................................................................................89 Pilot Study ..............................................................................................................90 Data Analysis Plan .......................................................................................................90 Hypotheses Testing ................................................................................................94 Threats to Validity .......................................................................................................95 External Validity ....................................................................................................96 Internal Validity .....................................................................................................97 Construct Validity ..................................................................................................98 Ethical Procedures .................................................................................................99 Summary ....................................................................................................................100 Chapter 4: Results ............................................................................................................101 iv Pilot Study ..................................................................................................................102 Data Collection ..........................................................................................................104 Study Results .............................................................................................................107 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................107 Measurement ........................................................................................................107 Hypotheses Testing ..............................................................................................110 Work-Related Cultural Values .............................................................................111 Acculturation of Values .......................................................................................115 Leadership Preferences ........................................................................................123 Alignment of Leadership Preferences ..................................................................125 Summary ....................................................................................................................130 Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ..........................................131 Interpretation of Findings ..........................................................................................131 Acculturation of Values .......................................................................................132 Leadership Preferences ........................................................................................140 Summary of Findings ...........................................................................................143 Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................144 Recommendations ......................................................................................................145 Implications................................................................................................................148 Conclusion .................................................................................................................150 References ........................................................................................................................152 Appendix A: Permission to Use The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale ............182 v Appendix B: Permission to Use Work Related Value Assessment .................................186 Appendix C: Permission to Use Paternalism Scale .........................................................187 Appendix D: Permission to Use Servant Leadership Scale .............................................188 Appendix E: Invitation to Participate in Survey ..............................................................190 Appendix F: Survey Questionnaire ..................................................................................192 Appendix G: Relationship between Survey Items and Research Questions....................199 Appendix H: Correlations between Servant and Paternalistic Leadership Items ............200 Appendix I: Means of Paternalistic Leadership Scale Individual Scores ........................201 vi List of Tables Table 1. Acculturation of Mexican Immigrants and their Preferred Leadership Styles ..... 8 Table 2. Breakdown of Caucasian and Mexican population between the Napa and Solano Counties .................................................................................................................... 69 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Scales in the Pilot Study ............................................ 103 Table 4. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample ..................................................... 106 Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Scales ........................................................................ 108 Table 6. Skewness and Kurtosis of the Scales ............................................................... 109 Table 7. Mann-Whitney U test for first-generation and young Mexican immigrants .... 110 Table 8. Means of Work-Related Values Acculturation between Caucasians, Mexicans, and Mexican immigrants......................................................................................... 111 Table 9. Means of Work-Related Values Acculturation between Caucasians, Mexicans, First-Generation Mexican Immigrants, and Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants. ................................................................................................................................. 113 Table 10. Means of Main Stream and Mexican Values between Caucasians, Mexicans, First-Generation Mexican Immigrants, and Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants ................................................................................................................................. 116 Table 11. Means of Main Stream and Mexican Values between Caucasians, Mexicans, and Mexican immigrants......................................................................................... 117 Table 12. Means of Leadership Preferences between Caucasians, Mexicans, and Mexican immigrants ............................................................................................... 123 vii Table 13. Means of Leadership Preferences between Caucasians, Mexicans, FirstGeneration Mexican Immigrants, and Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants .. 125 viii List of Figures Figure 1. Comparison of work-related value preferences. .............................................. 116 Figure 2. Comparison of traditional values preferences ................................................. 120 Figure 3. Comparison of familism factors and independence and self-reliance preferences. ............................................................................................................. 122 Figure 4. Comparison of leadership preferences. ........................................................... 128 Figure 5. Comparison of paternalistic leadership scale items......................................... 129 1 Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study Globalization has made it easier for people to migrate to different parts of the world, increasing diversity within organizations (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2013; Gelfand, Aycan, Erez, & Leung, 2017). Leadership preferences and work-related values depend on and vary across cultures, which complicates leading multicultural teams (Hofstede, 1993; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Migrants carry with them their native culture and seek to preserve it across generations (Choi, Kim, Pekelnicky, & Kim, 2013). The children of immigrants develop a dual set of values. They retain the core values of their parents' culture and certain particularities of the mainstream culture (Kashima, 2016; Zolfaghari, Mӧllering, Clark, & Dietz, 2016). There is a need to address differences in leadership preferences based on local, cultural differences. Immigrants may prefer leadership styles different from the locals. Despite all the research that exists linking leadership preferences to culture, there is a gap in knowledge about the relationship between the cultural values of firstand second-generation immigrants and their leadership preferences. As a starting point to addressing this gap, I investigated the differences in work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles among generations of Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. The aim was to develop leadership theories that take into account the cultural values of the various members of a multicultural society. The following sections include the background of the problem, problem statement, and purpose of the study, research questions, hypotheses, theoretical framework, and nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope, limitations, and significance of the study. 2 Background of Problem Scholars have been studying the link between culture and leadership for decades. Cultural values influence leadership significantly, in both the perception of leadership and how behavior is controlled or influenced. People's most fundamental values form during the first 10 years of life (Hofstede, 2001; Taras, Rowney, & Steel, 2013). Culture and socialization experiences form lay theories that help people understand, act, and react to situations in their environment and behave accordingly (Kashima, 2016). These experiences and settings are different across nations and even when countries neighbor each other. Cross-cultural researchers have demonstrated that leadership preferences vary from one country to another and that the meaning of leadership is rooted in, and changes according to the culture where it is used (Hofstede, 1993; Steers, Sanchez-Runde, & Nardon, 2012). Individuals who grow up in a culture-specific rich environment tend to embrace such culture and learn to interpret the world from that perspective, regardless of where they live (Fitzsimmons, 2013). As people migrate to other parts of the world, they bring with them their unique perspective and may have a hard time understanding a different view. People assume those with whom they interact will behave according to their expectation (Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001), and when that is not the case, misinterpretation and miscommunication may occur, which could lead to conflict (Kim, Yamaguchi, Kim, & Miyahara, 2015). In most of the cross-cultural research studies, researchers compared work-related values and leadership preferences across nations, assuming there is a consensus of beliefs within each nation, and often failing to consider acculturation as a factor. 3 Culture, as defined in most cross-cultural studies, relies on the notion that people within a societal group share similar values. Hofstede (2001), for example, defined culture as \"the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another\" (p. 9). In this definition, Hofstede referred to the mind as the way people feel, think, and act, resulting in attitudes, beliefs, and abilities. Culture includes a set of imperceptible values that manifest as behavior. This construct is useful for comparing culture across societies as it relies on the assumption that a consensus on the importance of values exist within societal groups and differs from other groups (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz, 2014; Zolfaghari et al., 2016). In largely diverse countries the assumed consensus of values may be nonexistent, except for culturally linked values (Venaik & Midgley, 2015). This notion indicates that to compare cultural groups within the same society requires research at the value level of the individual. Culture does not influence the values of people the same way; people form and internalize values differently according to experiences and personal goals (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). In countries with a large immigrant population, the internalized values could vary drastically among the various members of society. People from complex cultures tend to be self-reliant, independent, and self-actualizing, whereas people from non-complex cultures tend to be collectivist, follow norms, and be obedient (Triandis, 1994). When these two different cultures coexist in one country, there are bound to be differences of opinion. Immigrants tend to hold on to the culture from their country of origin after migration and pass it on to their descendants (Ward & Geeraet, 2016). This process tends to prolong the acculturation process. 4 Although research shows that the core values of immigrants change slowly over time (Taras et al., 2013), the process of acculturation is not linear, and several variables affect it such as family, length of time in host country, school and work environment, age at migration, and exposure to local and home country culture (Taras, 2008; Ward & Geeraet, 2016; Zolfaghari et al., 2016). It may take three generations for immigrants to acculturate entirely to a new country (Rumbaut, 2015). Additionally, acculturation studies revealed that acculturation is reciprocal; immigrants and natives exchange elements of their cultures with one another. Immigrants and non-immigrants unknowingly learn from one another, creating a blend of two or more cultures (Celeste, Brown, Tip, & Matera, 2014). In this study, I examined how acculturation affects the work-related values and leadership preferences of immigrants. Firstand secondgeneration immigrants may display and prefer leadership styles reflective of their cultural values, which acculturation may affect. Because followers determine leadership effectiveness and not the leader (House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 2001), managers may be using the wrong management or leadership style for the workforce they manage. Despite all the research in cross-cultural leadership, a gap in knowledge exists in the literature to explain the relationship between the cultural values of immigrants and their leadership preferences. This gap may exist because most of the research on crosscultural leadership focuses on national culture and compares the differences among countries or clusters of nations. Few researchers have examined the intranational cultural differences and their effects on leadership preferences. Most of these researchers (e.g., Chong & Thomas, 1997; Romero, 2005; Rupert, Jehn, van Engen, & de Reuver, 2010; Epitropaki, Sy, Martin, Tram-Quon, & Topakas, 2013; Jian, 2012) have overlooked the 5 contextual factors that may influence leadership preferences and the cultural values of the participants. Their studies also focused on leadership theories that align with Western views, which tend to classify leadership as either authoritarian or democratic, and often ignore paternalistic leadership as it does not neatly fall into either category (Jackson, 2016). A problem with this approach when comparing intranational cultural differences in leadership preference is that researchers leave out leadership styles that do not align with Western views. Paternalistic leadership, which many consider the ideal leadership style in collectivistic and high power distance societies (Hanges, Aiken, Park, & Su, 2016), such as Mexico, is one of the styles often not included. Organizations may benefit from understanding how to create leadership development programs that not only embrace diversity but also gain a competitive advantage by developing leaders based on the relationship between their cultural identity and leadership preferences. Problem Statement Globalization and global migration are changing the demographics of many nations, and the cultural diversity within them continues to increase. Based on the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey, the number of immigrants in the United States in 2014 was 59 million (Camarota, 2015). According to the U.S. Census (2014), the United States has the second-largest Hispanic population in the world. Hispanics accounted for 17% of the total U.S. population as of July 2013, a 2% increase from 2012. Mexicans make up the majority of the Hispanic community, accounting for more than 64% of the Latino population as of 2012. Researchers often define culture as a complex system that affects behavior through values adopted according to interactions with the environment (Zolfaghari et al., 2016). 6 Researchers measure the differences in leadership preference based on western views of leadership (Jackson, 2016), and researchers predominately describe and measure culture at a national level based on dimensions of presumed shared values (Midgley, Venaik, & Christopoulos, 2018). The current approaches to cross-cultural research in leadership do not account for the growing cultural diversity within countries, the preference for leadership styles, and the dynamics of the acculturation process (Schedlitzki, Ahonen, Wankhade, Edwards, & Gaggiotti, 2017; Shalka, 2017; Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2011). It may take three generations for immigrants to acculturate completely to a new country, as immigrants tend to retain the culture from their country of origin and pass it on to their descendants (Rumbaut, 2015). There is a gap in knowledge about the relationship between the cultural values of immigrants and their preferred leadership style. The general problem is that as the immigrant population grows, the culture of the host country transforms, and the managers of organizations face the challenge of leading employees from various cultural backgrounds with varying leadership preferences. The specific problem is that U.S.-born Caucasian managers face the challenge of understanding the differences between their leadership style and the leadership style preferences of Mexican immigrants. The U.S.born Caucasians' leadership style may be based on Western views and Mexican immigrants may prefer a leadership style reflective of their cultural values, which may vary based on their acculturation level. Purpose of the Study The purpose of this survey-based quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership 7 style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and to compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Through large-scale cross-cultural studies (see Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004), researchers have demonstrated that there is a relationship between leadership preferences and values, and that values vary from country to country, according to the national culture. As people migrate and incorporate into a different cultural environment, they retain their original cultural values, and it may take them more than two generations to acculturate fully (Rumbaut, 2015). Mexican immigrants make up 65% of the Hispanic population in the United States, which is the second-largest in the world (U.S. Census, 2014). Mexicans have been living in areas now belonging to the United States since before the United States was a country. I designed this study to investigate differences in work-related cultural values (dependent/criterion variable) and leadership preferences (dependent/criterion variables) among generations of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts (independent/predictor variable). Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses Researchers have shown that values and leadership preferences form during the early stages of human development (Frost, 2016; Huang, Calzada, Cheng, BarajasGonzalez, & Brotman, 2016), vary across nations based on culture (Hofstede, 2001), and that some immigrants retain their values and culture for decades after migration (Rumbaut, 2015; Taras, 2008). These findings lead to questions regarding what occurs to the work-related values of immigrants and their individual leadership preferences. Workrelated values are, in essence, the same as basic values: they are beliefs that guide the behavior and expectations of people in the workplace (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkiss 1999). 8 Table 1 Acculturation of Mexican Immigrants and their Preferred Leadership Styles Mexican MexicanAmerican 1st Generation Immigrants MexicanAmerican 2nd Generation (USborn) and Young 1st Generation US-born Caucasians Values and beliefs  Collectivity  Relationshipbased rewards and justice  Familyorientation  Respect for authority figures  Religiousness  Traditional gender roles differentiation  Relaxedsensitivity toward time  Recreationemphasis Carrying more Mexican values and beliefs than American ones. Carrying more American values and beliefs than Mexican ones.  Individuality  Person-based rewards and justice  Achievement oriented  Material success  Independence and selfreliance  Conscious awareness of time  Competition and personal achievement Leadership Styles (preferred) Paternalistic Leadership: an authoritarian and benevolent leader, who is father-like figure taking care of followers' wellbeing. Preferring more paternalistic leadership Preferring more servant leadership Servant Leadership: a servant, who would help followers realize their material success through accomplishment of individual and organizational goals, empowers followers to be independent and achieve. Acculturation Mexican Culture Acculturation Strategies: Separation Acculturation Strategies: Integration, Assimilation American culture 9 Brumley (2014); Doran and Littrell (2013); Espinosa-Hernández, Bissell-Havran, and Nunn (2015); Greenleaf (1977); Hofstede (2001); House et al. (2004); Morgan Consoli, Llamas and Consoli (2016); Öner (2012). Leadership preferences are culturally bound and vary across countries and from person to person according to, among other characteristics, culture and values (Ehrhart, 2012; Wong-Mingli, Kessler, Khilji, & Gopalakrishnan, 2014). Researchers found that values across national cultures vary significantly (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004), that acculturation is not a straight-line process (Berry, 1997; Taras et al., 2013), and that complete acculturation may take more than 20 years (Taras, 2008). Based on the findings mentioned above, it is reasonable to assume that there may be a difference in workrelated values and leadership preferences among generations of immigrants (in this study, Mexicans), which may differ from those of the people of the host country (in this study, U.S.-born Caucasians; see Table 1.). To help guide this study, I derived four research questions from the review of literature in the areas of acculturation, culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory, cross-cultural leadership, and cross-cultural values. Although differences between Mexican and U.S. culture regarding leadership and work-related values are clearly defined in the literature, it was important to investigate them again as part of a comparison between native Mexicans, generations of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians. The relationship between acculturation and work-related values is hypothesized below. 10 Acculturation of Values Research Question 1 (RQ1): Are there significant differences in work-related cultural values between firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians? Null hypothesis (H011): Native Mexicans (NM) and Mexican immigrants (MI) will score equal or lower on the cultural dimensions of power distance (PD), gender egalitarianism (GE), and status attribution (SA) than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts (US).  μ(PD)NM ≤ μ(PD)US, μ(PD)MI ≤ μ(PD)US  μ(GE)NM ≤ μ(GE)US, μ(GE)MI ≤ μ(GE)US  μ(SA)NM ≤ μ(SA)US, μ(SA)MI ≤ μ(SA)US Alternative hypothesis (Ha11): Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score higher on the cultural dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts.  μ(PD)NM > μ(PD)US, μ(PD)MI > μ(PD)US  μ(GE)NM > μ(GE)US, μ(GE)MI > μ(GE)US  μ(SA)NM > μ(SA)US, μ(SA)MI > μ(SA)US Null hypothesis (H012): Second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM) and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age (YI) will score equal or higher on power distance (PD), gender egalitarianism(GE), and status attribution (SA) than other first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM).  μ(PD)SM ≥ μ(PD)FM, μ(PD)YI ≥ μ(PD)FM 11  μ(GE)SM ≥ μ(GE)FM, μ(GE)YI ≥ μ(GE)FM  μ(SA)SM ≥ μ(SA)FM, μ(SA)YI ≥ μ(SA)FM Alternative hypothesis (Ha12): Second-generation Mexican immigrants and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower on power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than other first-generation Mexican immigrants.  μ(PD)SM < μ(PD)FM, μ(PD)YI < μ(PD)FM  μ(GE)SM < μ(GE)FM, μ(GE)YI < μ(GE)FM  μ(SA)SM <μ(SA)FM, μ(SA)YI <μ(SA)FM Research Question 2 (RQ2): Are the work-related cultural values of Mexican immigrants more in line with those of Mexico than with those of the United States? Acculturation of Values Null hypothesis (H021): Second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM) and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age (YI) will score equal or higher on religiosity (RG) and familism (FL), and equal or lower on material success (MS), competition and personal achievement (CPA), and independence and self-reliance (ISR) than other and first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM).  μ(RG)SM≥ μ(RG)FM, μ(RG)YI ≥ μ(RG)FM  μ(FL)SM ≥ μ(FL)FM, μ(FL)YI ≥ μ(FL)FM  μ(MS)SM ≤ μ(MS)FM, μ(MS)YI ≤ μ(MS)FM  μ(CPA)SM ≤ μ(CPA)FM, μ(CPA)YI ≤ μ(CPA)FM  μ(ISR)SM ≤ μ(ISR)FM, μ(ISR)YI ≤ μ(ISR)FM 12 Alternative hypothesis (Ha21): Second-generation Mexican immigrants and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower on religiosity and familism, and higher on material success, competition and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance than other first-generation Mexican immigrants.  μ(RG)SM < μ(RG)FM, μ(RG)YI < μ(RG)FM  μ(FL)SM < μ(FL)FM, μ(FL)YI < μ(FL)FM  μ(MS)SM > μ(MS)FM, μ(MS)YI > μ(MS)FM  μ(CPA)SM > μ(CPA)FM, μ(CPA)YI > μ(CPA)FM  μ(ISR)SM > μ(ISR)FM, μ(ISR)YI > μ(ISR)FM Null hypothesis (H022): Native Mexicans (NM) and Mexican immigrants (MI) will score equal or lower on the traditional Mexican cultural dimensions of religiosity (RG) and familism (FL), and equal or higher in the U.S. mainstream values of material success (MS), competition and personal achievement (CPA), and independence and selfreliance (ISR) than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts (US).  μ(RG)NM ≤ μ(RG)US, μ(RG)MI ≤ μ(RG)US  μ(FM)NM ≤ μ(FL)US, μ(FM)MI ≤ μ(FL)US  μ(MS)NM ≥ μ(MS)US, μ(MS)MI ≥ μ(MS)US  μ(CPA)NM ≥ μ(CPA)US, μ(CPA)MI ≥ μ(CPA)US  μ(ISR)NM ≥ μ(ISR)US, μ(ISR)MI ≥ μ(ISR)US Alternative hypothesis (Ha22): Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score higher on the traditional Mexican cultural dimensions of religiosity and familism, 13 and lower in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement and independence and self-reliance than their U.S.-Born Caucasian counterparts.  μ(RG)MN> μ(RG)US, μ(RG)MI > μ(RG)US  μ(FM)NM > μ(FL)US, μ(FM)MI > μ(FL)US  μ(MS)NM < μ(MS)US, μ(MS)MI < μ(MS)US  μ(CPA)NM < μ(CPA)US, μ(CPA)MI < μ(CPA)US  μ(ISR)NM < μ(ISR)US, μ(ISR)MI < μ(ISR)US Leadership Preferences Research Question 3 (RQ3): What are the differences in the preferred leadership styles among generations of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts? Null hypothesis (H031): Native Mexicans (NM) will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness (SO), sense of direction (SD), and feeling of empowerment (FE) and equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership (PL) scale than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts (US).  μ(PL)NM ≤ μ(PL)US  μ(SO)NM ≥ μ(SO)US  μ(SD)NM ≥ μ(SD)US  μ(FE)NM ≥ μ(FE)US Alternative hypothesis (Ha31): Native Mexicans will score higher on the paternalistic leadership scale and lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of 14 sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts.  μ(PL)NM > μ(PL)US  μ(SO)NM < μ(SO)US  μ(SD)NM < μ(SD)US  μ(FE)NM < μ(FE)US Null hypothesis (H032): Mexican immigrants (MI) will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness (SO), sense of direction (SD), and feeling of empowerment (FE) and equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership (PL) scale than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts (US).  μ(PL)MI ≤ μ(PL)US  μ(SO)MI ≥ μ(SO)US  μ(SD)MI ≥ μ(SD)US  μ(FE)MI ≥ μ(FE)US Alternative hypothesis (Ha32): Mexican immigrants will score higher on the paternalistic leadership scale and lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts.  μ(PL)MI > μ(PL)US  μ(SO)MI < μ(SO)US  μ(SD)MI < μ(SD)US  μ(FE)MI < μ(FE)US 15 Alignment of Leadership Preferences Research Question 4 (RQ4): Are the preferred leadership styles of Mexican immigrants more in line with those of Mexico than with those of the United States? Null hypothesis (H041): Second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM) and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age (YI) will score equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership (PL) than other first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM).  μ(PL)SM≤μ(PL)FM  μ(AT)YI ≤μ(PL)FM Alternative hypothesis (Ha41): Second-generation Mexican immigrants and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score higher in the leadership paternalistic leadership than other first-generation Mexican immigrants.  μ(MC)SM > μ(MC)FM  μ(MC)YI > μ(MC)FM Null hypothesis (H042): Second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM) and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age (YI) will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness (SO), sense of direction (SD), and feeling of empowerment (FE) than other first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM).  μ(SO)SM ≥ μ(SO)FM  μ(SO)YI ≥μ(SO)FM  μ(SD)SM ≥ μ(SD)FM 16  μ(SD)YI ≥ μ(SD)FM  μ(FE)SM ≥ μ(FE)FM  μ(FE)YI ≥ μ(FE)FM Alternative hypothesis (Ha42): Second-generation Mexican immigrants and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than other first-generation immigrants.  μ(SO)SM < μ(SO)FM  μ(SO)YI < μ(SO)FM  μ(SD)SM < μ(SD)FM  μ(SD)YI < μ(SD)FM  μ(FE)SM < μ(FE)FM  μ(FE)YI < μ(FE)FM Using a 5-point Likert-type scale, participants answered questions to a survey developed for this research. Participants scored their answers by not at all agreeing, agreeing a little, somewhat agreeing, very much agreeing, or completely agreeing. To either accept or reject the null hypotheses, analysis of variance, independent samples ttest, and descriptive analysis were used to test if there were differences in the mean scores of the criterion variables among generations of Mexican immigrants and American counterparts. 17 Theoretical Framework Berry's (1997) bidimensional model of acculturation, culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory (CLT; House et al., 2004), and Taras's (2008) model of individual work-related cultural values served as a theoretical framework for this dissertation. According to Berry (1997), acculturation is not linear, and it allows two cultures to coexist independently. People choose one of four strategies when acculturating based on the immigrant's need to retain cultural characteristics and identity and the need to engage and be involved with other cultural groups. House et al. developed CLT for the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project. The concept of individualized implicit leadership theories (ILTs) expanded to account for the influence of culture on leadership style preferences. CLT posits that members of a cultural group use a common frame of reference to form mental models of the ideal leader. Employees use leadership theories to help them understand, form opinions, and develop expectations about leaders by comparing the behavior or outcomes of their managers with the lay theories they have stored in memory. Taras (2008) built a model to measure, at an individual level, values within the cultural and work-related dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution. In Chapter 2, the review of the literature on the topics of implicit leadership theories, cross-cultural values, cross-cultural leadership, and acculturation, served to inform this study. Nature of the Study This survey-based quantitative comparative study was designed to investigate differences in work-related cultural values (dependent/criterion variable) and leadership preferences (dependent/criterion variables) among two generations of Mexican 18 immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts (independent/predictor variable). Using a survey was an economical way to accurately and efficiently collect data from samples of the populations and examine the differences and similarities between the variables (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Rea & Parker, 2014). Participants were selected anonymously and the instrument was easily distributed to a large population in a relatively short period of time. As the study focused on the differences and preferences among four cultural groups, a cross-sectional design allowed me to collect the data within the time constraints of this dissertation. I developed measures for the study building on the following instruments: The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale (MACVS; Knight et al., 2010), Individual Work-Related Cultural Values Questionnaire (IWoRC; Taras, 2008), Servant Leadership Scale (Ming, 2005), and Paternalism Scale (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006). The instrument contained 90 Likert-type questions on work-related values, traditional Mexican values, U.S. mainstream values, servant leadership, and paternalistic leadership. I used t-tests and ANOVA to examine if there were differences in the mean scores of the criterion variables between firstand second-generations Mexican immigrants, native Mexicans, and U.S.born Caucasian. Definitions Acculturation: A process by which members of one culture adapt their values, beliefs, and practices in response to direct contact and interactions with members of another culture (Berry, 1980; Keskin, 2013; Taras et al., 2013). Familism: The belief that the needs of the family have priority over the personal needs of any one member, and that members have an obligation toward the family 19 (Campos, Ullman, Aguilera, & Schetter, 2014; Knight et al., 2010; Morgan Consoli & Llamas, 2013). Feeling of empowerment: Given to followers when their leaders are stewards who show dedication to the growth and development of people and community (Ming, 2005). First-generation Mexican immigrant: People born in Mexico who migrated into the United States. Independence and self-reliance: The level of importance given to privacy and the belief that personal achievement comes through individual efforts and the struggle to overcome personal problems rather than expecting or seeking assistance from others. Leaders: \"Individuals who are accorded differential influence within a group over the establishment of goals, logistics of coordination, monitoring of effort, and reward and punishment\" (Rueden, Gurven, Kaplan, & Stieglitz, 2014). Leadership Preferences: \"[F]ollowers' expectations for positive and effective interactions with the leader\" (Ehrhart, 2012, pp. 231). Material success: The belief that goods owned, and financial wealth are a measurement of one's achievements in life, thus earning money takes priority (D'AnnaHernandez, Aleman, & Flores, 2015). Paternalistic leader: A leader who adopts the role of a parent to guide, care for, nurture, and protect employees as a father would protect his children (Öner, 2012). Religiousness: The level to which the internalization of faith and participation in religious activities influences individuals' decisions (Barber, 2014; Smith, 2015). 20 Respect: The importance given to intergenerational behaviors and children's submission to and acceptance of parents' mannerisms and decision-making reasoning (Knight et al., 2010). Second-generation Mexican immigrant: U.S.-born children whose parents are first-generation immigrants from Mexico. Sense of direction: The idea that followers' motivation is a result of their leader's clear vision for the organization's future, conceptualization of their perspective, and their ability to persuade followers to act (Ming, 2005). Sense of oneness: The idea that followers develop a sense of unity, a sense of oneness when leaders listen with all senses, show empathy, are self-aware, and strive to heal themselves and others (Ming, 2005). Servant leader: A leader who embodies the10 characteristics of leadership (Greenleaf, 1977; Spears, 2002) of listening, empathy, healing, awareness, persuasion, conceptualization, foresight, stewardship, commitment to the growth of people, and building community. Traditional gender roles: The belief that males and females have different roles in the family and society, and that expectations for each differ according to those beliefs (Campos et al.,2014). U.S.-born Caucasian: White people born in the United States who are from European descent. Work-related cultural values: Conceptualized beliefs that guide people's choices and evaluation of their behavior and that of others in a work environment. 21 Young immigrants. First-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated to the U.S. at the age of 6 or younger. Assumptions The central premise of this study was that the participants would be able to describe their culture, their values, and their leadership preferences. I also assumed that the participants would use integrity and honesty and require no assistance while responding to the survey. Another postulation was that the demographic composition of the participants would not significantly affect the data collected. Variation in demographics (age, occupation, education) could have affected on the average of the value priorities, as different experiences would drive people to organize their values differently (Schwartz, 1999). Last, I assumed that the mood, state of mind, environmental factors, attention span, and form of administration would not materially affect the data collected from the participants. Scope and Delimitations This study was designed to compare the work-related values and leadership preferences of Mexican immigrants, Mexicans, and U.S.-born Caucasians. It is well established in the literature that there is a difference in leadership preferences and workrelated values between Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians. However, it was important to collect data from these groups to compare it to data from firstand second-generation Mexicans immigrants living in the United States. The scope of this study was limited to firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians living the Greater San Francisco Bay Area (the Bay Area) in the United States and Mexicans living in Veracruz, Mexico. Mexicans were selected because they make up 65% of the Hispanic 22 population in the United States, which is the second-largest in the world (U.S. Census, 2014). The Bay area has a large Mexican population according to the U.S. Census (2017a, 2017b). The selection of Veracruz was because of its diversity and dense population. This study did not include other generations of Mexican immigrants because they were presumed to have already assimilated into the U.S. culture. Given the demographic and geographical delimitation, the results from this study may not be generalized to other areas of the United States or Mexico or groups of different ethnic backgrounds. In this study, the preferences for paternalistic leadership and servant leadership style were compared between the four groups. The research was based on the hypothesis that U.S.-born Caucasians prefer a servant leadership style and Mexicans who prefer a paternalistic style (Doran & Littrell, 2013; Littrell & Cruz Barba, 2013). All other leadership styles were not included. Limitations The success of the study was dependent on obtaining enough participants within the defined geographical region to measure cultural values and leadership preferences accurately. My ability to remain objective during data analysis was also critical to the study. Several factors limited the study. The first factor was the need to gather data from participants in two different countries. Distributing and collecting the survey directly from participants living in Mexico was done remotely, and it was dependent on people having access to technology. The biases of the participants and the conditions under which they completed the survey were unknown. Additionally, the data collected was 23 cross-sectional and it represents the opinions of the participants at one moment in time. Conducting a longitudinal experimental study would help remedy this limitation. The second limitation was the pool of participants. Most of the participants in Mexico and some in the U.S. came from universities. The rest of the participants in the U.S. were from a single nonprofit organization and from the clients they serve. The education level of the participants could represent a confounding variable as there is no clear understanding of the effects of education on acculturation or leadership preferences. Future studies should consider recruiting participants from a variety of sources. Last, the potential for multiple interpretations of the many generations of immigrants could present a consistency problem. Participants did not identify themselves as members of any one generation; instead, they completed a demographic questionnaire as part of the survey. Based on the responses of the participants, I assigned them to one of the four groups. The survey questions explicitly focused on gathering information about the relationship between cultural values and leadership preferences. The values portion of the survey, however, was based on the perceived cultural values of Mexican Americans living in the United States (Knight et al., 2010), which are not necessarily the views of Mexicans living in Mexico. Significance of Study In this study, I addressed a gap in knowledge on cross-cultural leadership by examining the effects of acculturation on the leadership preferences of Mexican immigrants in the United States. Organizations operating within societies enriched by multiple cultures face a benefit–challenge duality of working with a diverse workforce. The uniqueness of the knowledge, information, and perspective that each team member 24 brings to an organization presents an opportunity for a benefit (Hofstede, 2001; Ros et al., 1999). The immigrant population in the United States has a significant influence on the leadership preferences and the workforce of the country. This research is significant to the advancement of theory and practice, and positive social change. Significance to Theory This study helps address the gap in knowledge about the relationships between the cultural values of immigrants and their leadership preferences. By focusing on the differences between Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians relating to workrelated cultural values and leadership preferences, this study contributes to the literature by expanding current knowledge of cross-cultural leadership beyond comparing nations and focusing on intranational differences. Findings indicate that there is a difference in leadership preferences between Mexicans, Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians and suggest that acculturation does not affect these preferences. Results from this study can contribute to the cross-cultural literature by improving the understanding of the relationship between cultural values and the preferred leadership styles of immigrants. This research contributes to acculturation literature by supporting the theory that second-generation Mexican immigrants develop a bicultural identity (Knight et al., 2010). Findings inform current research on dual cultural adaptation of second-generation Mexican immigrants. The results from this study suggest that further research should be conducted to determine if the same differences exist between other ethnic groups. Significance to Practice The differences in values and leadership preferences between their diverse groups of employees pose a challenge to management and their employees. Organizational 25 professionals can use the findings from this study to help them understand diversity from a new perspective. This study can inform managers on how to improve their leadership style by accounting for the preferences of their staff. One of the preferences highlighted by this study is the desire for supervisory support on matters related and no-related to work. Employees who feel the support of their supervisors are more likely to stay with the organization (Basuil, Manegold, & Casper, 2016). Human resources managers can use this study to help them develop leaders who embrace diversity by acknowledging the differences and similarities in work-related values and cultural values of the workforce. By focusing on the differences in values, organizations may not only attract the right talent but also develop them into effective leaders who can give the company a sustainable competitive advantage. Accounting for the expectations of the employees can potentially improve the leader member exchange which may lead to enhance productivity and retention. Significance to Social Change Findings from this study contribute to positive social change by educating existing and potential managers on the challenges they may face when managing a diverse population that includes Mexican immigrants. More importantly, the research raises the awareness that other immigrants may also retain their cultural values. Having a greater understanding of what employees expect from their supervisors can potentially enhance the relationship between the manager and the employees and improve work productivity, efficiency, and retention (Basuil et al., 2016; Lavy, Littman-Ovadia, & Boiman-Meshita, 2017). Diversity training for supervisors based on the cultural values and expectations of employees can foster respect for the individual and promote worth 26 and dignity. Supervisors who are different than their employees may gain a different perspective and may be able to learn how to better support their staff. Summary With this survey study, I attempted to investigate differences of work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles among generations of Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. I tried to discover if a relationship exists between acculturation and leadership preferences. I developed research questions and hypotheses to help uncover any variances that may exist in work-related cultural values and leadership preferences according to the acculturation strategy that Mexican immigrants in the United States choose. In Chapter 2, I discuss the literature related to the problem statement, research questions, and hypotheses aforementioned. The literature review contains a synthesis of the principal works on paternalistic leadership and servant leadership, acculturation, cross-cultural leadership, and cross-cultural values. 27 Chapter 2: Literature Review The purpose of this survey-based quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. This chapter begins with an explanation of the search strategy I used to find appropriate literature for this study. I discuss the theories that I used to underpin the framework of this dissertation and how the models relate to the research questions of this study and how they can help to understand the findings of this study. Following is an in-depth examination of literature focusing on acculturation, work-related values, and leadership style preferences as they relate to Mexican immigrants in the United States across various generations. Although the primary purpose of the review was to identify a gap in the literature by analyzing recent scholarly work, I touch on some historical, but essential, elements of each construct. Last, I conclude the chapter describing how my study may contribute to the literature. Literature Search Strategy I used different search engines to find sources of peer-reviewed scholarly research relevant to this research study. Although the main focus was on scholarly publications from within the last 5 years, the search also included older literature containing seminal research. Google Scholar and Academic Search Complete were the primary search engines used to find appropriate research. I linked Walden University's library to Google Scholar, making Walden University the primary source of the material. I accessed publications not available through Walden University using Google Scholar 28 search engine. I also used other databases, such as Science Direct, ProQuest Central, and Crossref, with the intent to conduct a thorough search of available and relevant scholarly journals. In my queries, I used combinations of the following key terms: leadership, acculturation, immigrants, cross-cultural leadership, leadership preferences, Mexican acculturation, Mexican Leadership, servant leadership, familism, values, cultural values, and enculturation. I also referred to original publications by Hofstede (2001), House et al. (2004), Triandis (1994), Schwartz, (1992), Berry (1997), and Taras (2008) to develop an appropriate theoretical framework. It was difficult to find literature about the relationship between leadership preferences or styles and acculturation of immigrants; most of the articles I found were about expatriates. Venturing outside of the field of management and searching for material in the areas of psychology and sociology, I found some recent dissertations in the management field that addressed the topic of this research study. Searching through their reference sections helped me find relevant material. In one particular study, Taras (2008) referred to a comprehensive catalog of instruments to measure acculturation and culture that he developed for his dissertation but did not provide in the published work. I contacted Dr. Taras, and he emailed me the two catalogs he compiled and a copy of his original research. Theoretical Foundation The theory that guided this study is a combination of Berry's (1997) bidimensional model of acculturation, concepts of House et al.'s (2004) culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory (CLT), and Taras's (2008) individual work-related 29 cultural values model. The theoretical framework indicates that leadership preferences of immigrants will vary according to their cultural values that directly align with the acculturation strategy used in a given context. Bi-dimensional Model of Acculturation Berry's model of acculturation was based on the notion that acculturation is not linear and that immigrants do not have to forego their existing value system and cultural beliefs in exchange for those of the host country. Berry (1997) proposed that people choose an acculturation strategy based on the level of importance given to two issues: the need to maintain their cultural identity and characteristics and the degree of involvement they should have in other cultural groups. Berry proposed that considering these two issues at the same time, it produces four acculturation strategies: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization. Berry also proposed that, based on situation variables and person variables, immigrants may choose to use more than one strategy. Situation variables include location, political climate, economic condition, societal attitudes, and size of an ethnic group represented in the host country, while person variables include experiences of discrimination, age at migration, generation, gender, educational level, cultural distance, time since immigration, and social support. Researchers have found Berry's model of acculturation useful in explaining observed patterns when assessing differences among generations of Mexican immigrants (Nieri & Bermudez-Parsai, 2014; Nieri et al., 2016) and differences in achievement among children of Mexican immigrants (Kim, Newhill, & Lopez, 2013). I used the dynamics of the acculturation process as described by the bidimensional framework in this study to understand variations in how Mexican immigrants develop values across 30 generations. When people first encounter a new culture, they rely on their current values and lay theories about how society functions. During this first meeting, immigrants use separation as the acculturation strategy (Kim et al., 2013). As time progresses, situational factors and personal factors change and affect the evaluation of the need for cultural maintenance and the need to interact with other cultures, guiding immigrants to choose different or multiple acculturation strategies. Mexican immigrants who live in neighborhoods with high a concentration of Mexicans or other Latinos may seek cultural maintenance while at home and surrounding areas more than while at work. This scenario would necessitate the use of two strategies and possibly two sets of values. The two sets of values could become salient under the right stimuli. I used the bidimensional theory to help me understand the unique experience children of immigrants go through of enculturating and acculturating simultaneously. Unlike first-generation immigrants, children of immigrants (second-generation immigrants) may encounter two sets of values; one set of values from family teachings and possibly a different set of values from society. The uniqueness of the situation is that the two sets of values could be polar opposites, and the set of values from family teachings could change over time as family members, mainly parents, may still be acculturating. Second-generation immigrants may develop as bicultural or multicultural and may switch back and forth between values as appropriate. Children of Mexican immigrants may automatically rely on U.S. values and deliberately decide to use Mexican values as needed, while their parents may automatically rely on Mexican values and choose to use U.S. values when needed (Nieri & Bermudez-Parsai, 2014). Secondgeneration immigrants may also find the opposition of the two sets of values too 31 conflicting to adopt either one, resulting in marginalization. The marginalization option is less likely, however, as it often requires external influences, such as forced acculturation and forced separation (segregation) (Berry, 1997). Individual Work-Related Cultural Values Model Taras (2008) first developed the individual work-related cultural values model for his doctoral dissertation. The nature of Taras's research required measurements of workrelated values at the individual level. There were existing popular and well-validated models developed using national data, such as Hofstede's (1980) value survey model and the GLOBE Survey by House et al. (2004). In other studies, the dimensions measured did not closely relate to the workplace, such as the framework by Maznevski, Gomez, DiStefano, Noorderhaven, and Wu (2002) and the Schwartz Value Survey (1994). Taras dismissed these models. To develop his model, Taras invited several experts in the field of cross-cultural studies to take a survey rating the relevance of several dimensions to culture and workplace. The analysis of the 28 responses revealed that only a few aspects relate significantly to culture and work: \"gender egalitarianism, power distance, status by ascription-achievement, and universalism-particularism\" (Taras, 2008, p. 72). Gender egalitarianism refers to the perception of equality between men and women with respect to abilities, roles, responsibilities, rights, and capabilities to perform equally well on most work-related duties, including people management. Power distance refers to the levels of acceptance and expectation of inequalities among individuals and the unequal distribution of power within an organization. Status attribution is the degree that status is credited to personal achievement as opposed to basing it on who the person 32 is, such as being wealthy, royalty, or an elder. Universalism refers to the belief that rules apply to everyone equally, regardless of circumstance, as opposed to particularism, which allows exceptions based on the person or the particulars of a situation. An internal reliability test conducted on all four constructs resulted in an unacceptably low value for universalism–particularism (0.57 as measured by Cronbach alpha), and he dropped the construct from the model (Taras, 2008). Acculturation at the value level does not occur at the same speed as acculturation at the artifact level (Taras et al., 2013). Although immigrants may adopt the local language and taste for cuisine, music, and fashion, their values and implicit theories may remain the same as those of their country of origin. Taras's (2008) model emphasizes that several factors moderate the speed, level, and type of acculturation. These include length of residence, age at migration, size and composition of immigrant network, the composition of local community, and frequency of interaction with locals, education level at migration, and education level obtained at the host country. Taras's model agrees with the framework of Berry's (1997) bidimensional model of acculturation. An Internet search for literature incorporating Taras's model resulted in works citing his research and findings, yet I did not find any publications citing the direct application of his model. Hofstede (2001) and Schwartz (1992) emphasized the importance of measuring cultural values at the individual level to compare intranational differences. Taras (2008) showed through an extensive analysis of existing acculturation frameworks and instruments that there are no models, other than his own, that account for individual differences in work-related cultural values. As aforementioned, popular models such as Hofstede's (1980) value survey model and the GLOBE Survey by House 33 et al. (2004); however, use similar constructs to compare differences and similarities of work-related cultural values at a national level. Hoftede's (2001) model has five dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and longterm versus short-term orientation. The GLOBE expanded those dimensions to nine: performance orientation, assertiveness, future orientation, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance (House et al., 2004). The use of these dimensions to compare groups based on data from geographical regions segmented by similarities in cultural values is useful when the intent is to use national culture as a predictor (Steel & Taras, 2010). Comparing intranational differences based on the acculturation level of the members of the population requires measurements at the individual level. Taras's (2008) model served as a guide for measuring individual-level, workrelated values within the cultural dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians. The purpose of this study was to identify how work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences among first-generation Mexican immigrants, second-generation Mexican immigrants, and their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts differ based on the acculturation level of the immigrants. Taras is the only scholar, to my knowledge, who has published research on the effects of acculturation on work-related values at the individual level. I adapted his model to encompass some of the traditional Mexican cultural values of religiosity, traditional gender roles, familism, and respect. 34 Culturally Endorsed Implicit Leadership Theory House et al. (2004) developed the culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory by broadening the concept of individual implicit leadership theories. ILTs represent cognitive structures or schemas, specifying traits and behaviors that followers expect from leaders (Epitropaki et al., 2013). People compare the behavior, characteristics, and personality of a person with the beliefs they hold about leaders to form an opinion and decide if they should accept such a person as a leader. House et al. theorized that cultural values shape the schemas by which employees recognize and accept leaders. It was unknown in the ILT literature if culture-specific leader expectations had equal value to universally held leader expectations within the schemas people hold; thus, they decided to integrate the two disciplines (House et al., 2004). According to CLT, societal and organizational culture influences ILTs. The influence of national culture suggests that similar leadership behaviors may have different acceptance levels by members of different cultures (Ruiz, Hamlin, & Martinez, 2014). People start forming schemas from an early age based on observations and family interactions. In countries with high power distance values, such as Mexico, parents educate children to accept the father as the ultimate authority in the household, to accept that his decisions are best for the family, and to obey his direction (Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges, Dastmalchian, & House, 2012). In consequence, adults in such countries are more accepting of autocratic leadership styles. CLT has six global leader dimensions based on 112 leader attributes and 21 leadership dimensions: charismatic/value-based leadership, team-oriented leadership, participative leadership, humane-oriented leadership, autonomous leadership, and self35 protective leadership (Dorfman et al., 2012). Charismatic leadership ties inspiration, motivation, and expected high-performance to a set of core values. Team-oriented leadership highlights team building and shared goal orientation. Participative leadership indicates the level of involvement of others in decision making by managers. Humaneoriented leadership is a combination of supportive and considerate leadership and compassion and generosity. Autonomous leadership reflects independent and individualistic attributes. Self-protective leadership focuses on the safety and security of the group and its members by enhancing status and saving face. Culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory can aid in understanding the differences in preferred leadership styles among generations of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians. Although House et al. (2004) found paternalism to be strong in Mexico, CLT does not include a paternalistic leadership dimension, which, recent literature shows, is the leadership style Mexicans prefer (Brumley, 2014; Davila & Elvira, 2012; Ruiz et al., 2014). Two studies, in particular, have used CLT to investigate leadership preferences in Mexico, and their findings were in alignment with those of the GLOBE. Howell et al. (2007) used data from the GLOBE to analyze the culture and leadership preferences of Mexicans. Castaño et al. (2015) analyzed the data from the GLOBE and determined that leadership preferences and expectations vary considerably among Latin American countries. Although researchers found some universalistic leadership attributes, several characteristics were culturally contingent. As shown in these two studies, Mexicans have leadership style preferences that are unique among the Latin American cluster of countries. Although Latin American countries share, for the most part, a common language and similar colonial history, 36 Mexico has some unique characteristics that separate it from the rest of the group (Castaño et al., 2015). Similarly, Mexico is uniquely different from its neighbor, the United States. Cross-cultural research identifies Mexico as a collectivistic society and the United States an individualistic society. Hofstede (1980) indicated that Mexico has more similarities with Asian culture than with the United States. Ruby, Falk, Heine, Villa, and Silberstein (2012) demonstrated that cultural differences might exist even between seemingly similar collectivistic societies. It is important to recognize the impact of culture when comparing immigrants' leadership style preferences with those of the host country. In this study, I used the underpinnings of CLT to examine the leadership style preferences of Mexican immigrants with those of their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Literature Review The literature review for the current study falls into three broad categories: acculturation, values, and leadership. The focus of the literature review was to investigate the relationship between acculturation, work-related values, and the preferences in leadership style of Mexican immigrants. The examination of the literature starts with an overview followed by a review of the acculturation process and the uniqueness of such a process for Mexican immigrants. Subsequently, an analysis of literature related to values shows how cultural values and personal values are interconnected and influence the behaviors in the work environment. Finally, a review of the literature on implicit leadership theories and cross-cultural leadership reveals how preferences for leadership styles vary across cultures and directly relate to values. 37 Overview The increase of cross-national migration around the world has been significant during the past few decades (Taras et al., 2013). According to reports from the U.S. Census Bureau, the number of immigrants in the United States alone has neared a million every year since 2000 (Jian, 2012; Taras et al., 2013). The Hispanic population in the U.S. grew by 1.2 million people from 2014 to 2015, accounting for nearly 50% of the total increase in population in the country. Even with the recent decline in Mexican immigrants entering the United States, Mexicans make up almost 65% of the Hispanic population (U.S. Census, 2016) and 28% of the United States' foreign-born population (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015). As people migrate to a new country of residence, they begin their struggle to acculturate. They start integrating into society, building families, and seeking gainful employment. As a result, the number of foreign-born United States workers has increased. Population Census reports indicate that people born outside of the United States hold 15.6% of the United States' jobs (Jian, 2012). Researchers suggested that individuals who enter new cultural environments experience some degree of discomfort because of the cultural differences (Samnani, Boekhorst, & Harrison, 2012; Schwartz, 2014). These differences are clearly documented in large-scale research, such as Hofstede's (2001) exploration of cultural differences among 50 nations, House et al.'s (2004) comparison of cultural values and practices of 62 societies, and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner's (2012) study on the effects of culture on management across 60 countries. The relationship between acculturation and the work environment, however, has received very little attention (Taras et al., 2013). Most of the research has been in health sciences, marketing, and mass media, focusing on change at 38 the artifactual level and ignoring changes in value and behavior (Jian, 2012; Kunst, Thomsen, Sam, & Berry, 2015). Research on the acculturation experience as it relates to the workplace is limited. Existing studies center around the effects culture has on the teams being managed or on the style of existing managers, but the consequences of culture on leadership preferences are ignored. Culture Differences Culture is an essential yet complex element of society members of a defined group share, and it perpetuates through generations. Although some components of culture are readily observable, others are tacit and can only be determined through its practices. Scholars have been studying cultural differences across nations for decades. The interest varies across disciplines from political and attitudinal (Riemer, Shavitt, Koo, & Markus, 2014), to self-perception (Vignoles et al., 2016), to behavioral economics (Ahern, Daminelli, & Fracassi, 2015), to work-related (Taras et al., 2013). Given the nature of this study, I focused on cross-cultural literature related to the work environment and leadership, with particular emphasis on Mexican migrant workers. The first step to effectively comparing cultures is to conceptualize the term. Conceptualizing Culture From an anthropological standpoint, we can define culture as the shared observable characteristics of a society, such as clothing, cuisine, language, music, and rituals. Although these cultural practices are essential to differentiate one culture from another, they are only superficial and do not necessarily explain cultural behavior and beliefs, which are central to my research. From a psychological point of view, culture has definitions predominantly from two different perspectives: a shared system of values 39 (Hofstede, 2001) and a shared set of internalized conditions (Schwartz, 1999). Both views have essential elements that can contribute to my research. Hofstede (1980) popularized culture as a shared system of values. He defined culture as \"the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another\" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). This definition of culture can be depicted as an onion with rituals, heroes, and symbols layering around a nucleus of shared values. Symbols sit at the outermost layer and include language, gestures, objects, and pictures. Heroes lie just beneath symbols and include real, imaginary, living, or dead people who serve as role models. Last, just above the value system, are rituals. Rituals are public activities considered socially essential for the stability and the preservation of order within the community. Based on this perspective of culture; people from the same group share similar views on values, rituals, heroes, and symbols as other members, which differ from those of outsiders. Schwartz (2014), on the other hand, perceived culture \"as the latent, normative value system, external to the individual, which underlies and justifies the functioning of societal institutions\" (p. 6). According to Schwartz, culture is not directly observable; instead, it manifests through the rituals, symbols, beliefs, values, and practices of the members of society. According to this view, values are at the center of societal culture; they are not within the person. Values are part of the context in which people live, and they influence the way individuals think and behave. Through their policies and practices, the institutions of society promote, validate, or prevent societal values (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007). Members of the group internalize these values to 40 varying degrees, and they manifest differently, creating more considerable variation within a group than between groups (Schwartz, 2014) From a social development perspective, we can define culture as a set of lay theories developed from social and environmental interactions. Lay theories internalize as values, and they vary from person to person and change over time in relation to context. People adopt cultural schemas early in childhood, and they serve as guides to determine right from wrong (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Rossberger & Krause, 2014; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Regardless of the view, all culture definitions share three essential elements: group members share culture, culture is relatively stable, and culture develops over time (Hofstede, 2001; Taras, 2008). Comparing Cultures Although researchers have examined observable cultural differences across societies for centuries, it was not until after Hofstede (1980) published the findings of his IBM study in his book Culture Consequences that quantitative research of nonobservable differences flourished. Researchers primarily examine differences between cultures at a societal level by comparing the mean responses of individual members to opinion surveys about the degree of importance of values along societal dimensions (Hofstede, 1980, 1993, 2001; House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1999; Taras, 2008). Cultural dimensions are, therefore, the quantified attributes of societies measured at the value level. Several researchers have defined their own set of dimensions and have developed their cultural models. The most popular dimensions are those Hofstede defined (2001; Taras, 2008). Based on findings from his IBM study, and aimed at examining the perceptions and 41 attitudes about work-related issues across 50 nations, Hofstede (1980, 2001) identified and defined four cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism or collectivism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. He discovered a fifth dimension, short-and longterm orientation, in the answers to the Chinese Value Survey around 1985 (Hofstede, 2001). Recently, Beugelsdijk, Maseland, and Van Hoorn (2015) replicated Hofstede's work and determined that Hofstede's findings are stable over time. Since the publication of Hofstede's (1980) work, other scholars and researchers have made their contributions to literature through their own culture models and sets of dimensions. Building on Hofstede's (1980) work and implicit leadership theories, House et al. (2004) launched the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness project to examine the effects of culture on leadership and organizational effectiveness across 62 societies. House et al. (2004) defined nine cultural dimensions. Six of these stemmed from Hofstede's (1980) work: power distance, institutional collectivism, ingroup collectivism, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, and uncertainty avoidance. Two came from Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (House et al., 2004) dimensions: future orientation derived from the past, present, and future orientation dimension; and humane orientation derived from the human nature as good versus bad dimension. Last, performance orientation derives from the need for achievement work by McClellans (House et al., 2004). Schwartz (1992) defined his dimensions based on the analysis of surveys conducted in 25 countries about individual preferences of 56 values. Schwartz (1992) identified two bi-polar dimensions: openness to change versus conservation, and selfenhancement versus self-transcendence. The two dimensions divide further into ten 42 motivational value types organized along a circular continuum (Consiglio, Cenciotti, Borgogni, Alessandri, & Schwartz, 2016). The arrangement of the values indicates the relationship to each other; compatible values are closer to each other, and conflicting values are further apart. The ten value types are universalism, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, and benevolence. The works of Hofstede (1980, 1993, 2001), House et al. (2004), and Schwartz (1992, 1999) indicated that culture exerts significant influence on people's behavior, attitudes, social relations, and perceptions and expectations of self and others. Although their dimensions are not the only ones in the literature (i.e., Inglehart, Basáñez, DíezMedrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2012), theirs have been most significant in cross-cultural research. Notably, Hofstede's (1980, 2001) dimensions have had the most influence in the literature (Taras, 2008) progressing crosscultural research across several disciplines. Despite the significant differences reported in large-scale cross-cultural research, the effect size of the findings is challenged in recent articles. Saucier et al. (2015) conducted a global study involving 8,883 individuals across 33 countries to determine the effect size of 50 commonly tested variables in cross-cultural research. They found religiousness, hierarchical family values, ethnonationalism, and family-oriented collectivism to have the largest differences across cultures, suggesting that cross-cultural comparative researchers should focus on behaviors and values around family, religion, and ethnic nationalism. Differences in the scores along cultural dimensions show that culture influences people's perceptions of management and preferences for leadership styles (Castaño et al., 43 2015; Dickson, Castaño, Magomaeva, & Den Hartog, 2012; Hofstede, 1980, 1993, 2001; House et al., 2004; Ruiz et al., 2014; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2012). Culture also influences perception and understanding of the self and the world (Vignoles et al., 2016), and how people relate to and communicate with one another (Inglehart et al., 2004; Jack, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Jack & Schyns, 2015). Given that the purpose of this study was to identify differences in work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences between Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts, I was interested in work-related cultural differences between the United States and Mexico that may affect leadership style preferences. Differences between Mexico and the United States Cultural differences exist not only across distant countries but also between bordering countries and regionally, based on the cultural factors of the area and situational context. Research shows that Mexico is significantly dissimilar to other Latin American nations (Castaño et al., 2015; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012) and the United States (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004), even though they border each other. In comparing the results between Mexico and the United States along the Hofstedean dimensions, Mexico scored higher than the United States in power distance and collectivity, lower than the United States in uncertainty avoidance, and about equal in masculinity. The GLOBE project had similar results (House et al., 2004). Mexico scored higher than the United States in in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance. It scored lower in the gender egalitarianism, humane orientation, and assertiveness dimensions. Both countries scored equally in power distance. 44 It is important to note that although there are some apparent different results between the scores on some of the similar dimensions of Hofstede (1980) and the GLOBE (House et al., 2004), in reality, these dimensions measure different aspects. For example, Hofstede's (1980) survey measures the stress level of society toward uncertainty, and the GLOBE's (House et al., 2004) survey measures two distinct aspects: values (should be) and practice (as is; Venaik & Brewer, 2010). The results from these studies revealed that Mexican cultural values are significantly different from those of the United States. Mexicans are highly collective and have high in-group identification, which is a result of the high value placed on relationships and respect toward others. In contrast, the United States is more individualistic, indicating the need for personal achievement, independence, and material success. Mexicans expect and accept inequalities in power distribution and tolerate authoritarian-style leadership while being dependent on those with power. In the United States, equality is important, employees are involved in the decision-making process, and leaders empower subordinates to be independent. Mexicans, in contrast, seem to take each day as it comes, to be very relaxed at taking risks without much thought about tomorrow, and to have a weak work ethic, making leisure time more valuable. In the United States, leisure time is less critical, risks are calculated, and planning is essential. Last, Mexicans are willing to accept gender inequalities if men and women take on traditional roles, while in the United States, equality between the sexes is professed. Mexican Cultural Values. In addition to the universal values already discussed, typical Mexican values include religiosity (Espinosa-Hernández et al., 2015; Hoffman, Marsiglia, & Ayers, 2015), traditional gender roles (machismo, caballerismo, and 45 marianismo), respect, and familism (Morgan Consoli & Llamas, 2013). Religiosity is the belief in and worship of a greater power. Respect is showing deference toward authority figures through behaviors such as obedience, agreeableness, and self-control. Familism is the belief that family is first above all else, including self. Familism has six essential components 1) family obligation, 2) family is the main source of emotional support, 3) connections among family members are highly valued, 4) family is taken into account for important decision making, 5) uphold family honor through self-control, and 6) forego personal preferences for the good of the family (Campos et al., 2014). Traditional gender roles are clearly defined values for male and female. Machismo and caballerismo are the expected behaviors for men and boys, and marianismo are the expected behaviors for girls and women (Piña-Watson, LorenzoBlanco, Dornhecker, Martinez, & Nagoshi, 2016). Machismo represents the negative aspects of Mexican masculinity – aggressive, dominant, and chauvinistic – and caballerismo represents the positive aspects – gallant, nurturing, socially responsible, and emotionally connected to family (Ojeda, & Piña-Watson, 2014; Piña-Watson et al., 2016). Although machismo and caballerismo are opposites in value, they are not mutually exclusive (Ojeda & Piña-Watson, 2014). U.S. Cultural Values. Individualism and achievement define the United States culture. Large-scale research has identified the United States to have low power distance, suggesting an egalitarian society where social power and importance is somewhat equal among all members (Ahern et al., 2015). In addition to being egalitarian and highly individualistic, the United States culture is very concerned with the wellbeing of others in the same group and for humanity in general (Doran & Littrell, 2013). Typically, U.S. 46 values are giving importance to achieving material success, personal success, gaining independence, and seeking to competitively differentiate from one another (Morgan Consoli et al., 2016). Although these findings are significant and indicate the existence of value and cultural differences between the United States and Mexico, they are useful for global management and preparing managers for international assignments. These findings do not necessarily reflect within-country cultural differences between Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. When viewing culture as an external factor, the internalized aspects of culture become susceptible to change as the environment changes (Schwartz, 2014). The shifts in the environment for Mexican immigrants would necessitate an eventual adjustment or modification to their values to cope with the demands of the new culture. Internalization of cultural values, however, varies across individuals because of differences in personality and context. We can infer that variability of cultural values exists among Mexican immigrants and between them and other people in the United States because of their exposure to different cultural contexts. Within Country Variability Although most cross-cultural studies focus on the differences that exist between nations and the impact of these differences in various aspects of life and the workplace, researchers are starting to examine intranational differences. A recent study by de Mooij and Beniflah (2016) examined cross-cultural differences between ethnic groups of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Chinese, African, and European background in the United States using Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions. De Mooij et al. did not find any significant differences in cultural values among the measured groups. While the 47 researchers were cautious about replicating Hofstede's (2001) process by matching samples as suggested, they failed to pay attention to Hofstede and Minkov's (2013) warning against using published data for comparison. Additionally, Mooij et al. used an etic approach, which is meant to compare cultures along a common set of dimensions (Hofstede, Garibaldi de Hilal, Malvezzi, Tanure, & Vinken, 2010; Taras, 2008), and failed to account for the commonality (emic) of the U.S. context and the acculturation level of the participants. Although several studies relied on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001) and the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) to examine intranational differences, some researchers advised against this practice. Based on a meta-analysis of cross-cultural literature, Steel and Taras (2010) suggested that culture and country do not necessarily have a direct correlation, as there is greater variability within countries than across them. They concluded that researchers should not make cultural comparisons based on geographical demarcations but based on demographic and environmental characteristics that have a stronger link to cultural dimensions. Similarly, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) demonstrated that more significant variability exists within a country than between countries. Although they found that culture does indeed affect some values, such as honoring parents, members of a nation do not share most values equally. Researchers attributed this variability to the context surrounding the internalization of values by individuals. Individual-Level Cultural Values Although individual-level values are directly linked to culture by virtue of the definition of culture or causal connection (Ng, Woo, Tay, & Foster, 2016), not all values 48 are cultural in nature. Many values develop from experience, personality, and the internalized meaning of situations and the environment. According to the social development theory, people learn from their immediate surroundings, starting with family at the center and moving outwards to learning and affirming knowledge through social and institutional interactions (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998). The saliency of the influence a situation or process has on a person depends on the level of participation of the individual (Ashiabi & O'Neal, 2015). This notion implies that individuals who grow up within a culture, and who actively participate in cultural activities interacting with other members of the same culture, absorb lay theories particular to that culture, and the norms and beliefs of that culture dictate their behavior and understanding of the world. The notion also suggests that people from different societies behave, expect others to act, relate to one another, and respond to their environment differently in accordance with their own beliefs and values. Individual-level values are schemas that people adopt early in childhood from exposure to culture and through socialization and serve as a guide to determining right from wrong (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Rossberger & Krause, 2014; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Individual-Level, Work-Related Cultural Values Individual-level, work-related cultural values are values that reflect internalized culture and influence behavior in the workplace. These work-related values develop according to prior experiences, not necessarily work-related, and adapt to gain an understanding of the work environment and work-related activities (Schwartz, 2014; Zolfaghari et al., 2016). Immigrants face the challenge that the values they carry may be very different from those that others in the workplace hold. For example, Mexicans are 49 the least acculturated group of immigrants along the southern regions of the United States (Lopez, 2013; May et al., 2014). Because cultures vary widely between the United States and Mexico, Mexican immigrants are bound to have different work-related values than those of their U.S.-born counterparts. These differences may also exist for children of immigrants who grow up with influences from Mexican culture. An examination of literature revealed that several researchers emphasized the importance of the relationship between cultural values and the workplace (Consiglio et al., 2016; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Jian, 2012; Schwartz, 2014). In this review, it was also revealed that the immigrant workforce is a significant contributor to diversity in the workplace and is a competitive advantage (Weaver, 2014; Zikic, 2015). Although differences in cultural values are barriers for Latinos to adjusting to the work culture of the United States (Eggerth, DeLaney, Flynn, & Jacobson, 2012; Flynn, 2014; KanaguiMuñoz, Garriott, Flores, Cho, & Groves, 2012), most of these studies are qualitative and do not explicitly compare cultural differences between Mexicans and their U.S. counterparts. The few studies I identified with quantitative approaches to comparing the culture of Mexican immigrants and U.S. culture as it relates to the workplace used the Hofstedean values system, which is not appropriate for this type of comparison (Hofstede, 2001). Additionally, these studies grouped Mexicans with other Latinos (Guerrero & Posthuma, 2014) and ignore acculturation and contextual differences, which can have a significant influence over results (Schwartz et al., 2014). As noted previously, societal-level culture is not appropriate for comparing intranational differences based on the acculturation level of the members of the population. These measurements are more relevant at the individual level. Some 50 researchers explored the individual-level values in the workplace (Consiglio et al., 2016; Krumm, Grube, & Hertel, 2013; Schwartz, 1999). Although most of the studies used Schwartz's (1992) theory of basic values, which is applicable across cultures, the values examined have only been remotely linked to the workplace (Taras, 2008), and the researchers failed to account for acculturation. Additionally, some of the value types, such hedonism, included in Schwartz's (1992) theory are not necessarily culture driven. I found only one study that investigated the relationship between immigrant cultural values at the individual level, work culture, and acculturation. Taras's (2008) IWoRC model measured individual-level values along cultural dimensions that have strong relevance to the workplace. The dimensions of Taras's model have strong similarities to those found in popular cross-cultural research. Power distance is included among the dimensions Hofstede (1980) and the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) defined. Mexico scored 81on the power distance index in Hofstede's study, and the United States scored 40. These results are consistent with the results from the GLOBE in which Mexico had a score of 5.22 on power distance practice (as is) and 2.85 on power distance values (should be), while the United States scored 4.88 and 2.85, respectively. The differences in scores between Mexico and the United States show that Mexican people have a higher tolerance for power distance. Results from the GLOBE project indicate that Mexico and the United States seem to desire less power distance. The GLOBE researchers (House et al., 2004) directly explored gender egalitarianism. Mexico scored 3.64 in gender egalitarianism practices and 4.73 in values. The United States scored 3.34 in practices and 5.06 in values. These scores indicate that, although Mexico is traditionally high in machismo (Morgan Consoli & Llamas, 2013), 51 the United States has greater male domination. The societies in both countries, however, desire greater gender equality. Status by ascription–achievement derives from the dimensions of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012). The dimension is scored based on the level of disagreement with two statements: \"The most important thing in life is to think and act in the ways that best suit the way you really are, even if you do not get things done\" and \"The respect a person gets is highly dependent on the person's family background\" (pp. 128 & 129). Mexico scored 31 on the first and 81 on the second, indicating that Mexico is an ascriptive society yet respects people based on achievement. In contrast, the United States scored 75 on the first statement and 87 on the second, indicating that the United States places status on people based on achievement and is a culture that believes in getting things done even through self-sacrifice. Culture and Leadership In general, cross-cultural research around leadership has focused on the effectiveness of leadership styles within a culture and comparing leadership styles across countries. Cross-cultural researchers demonstrated that the meaning of leadership and the effectiveness of styles vary across countries (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Steers et al., 2012). Because of the differences in the understanding of leadership across the world, researchers have not clearly determined that culture influences leadership (Mittal & Dorfman, 2012). Culture significantly influences preferences for leadership attributes, however (House et al., 2004). 52 Leadership Preferences People develop leadership preferences based on their conceptualization of the perfect leader. One's vision of the ideal leader depends on information gathered throughout life. According to social developmental theory, individuals learn from one another through observation and socialization (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998). People learn leadership behaviors by observing their parents, teachers, public figures, and social figures, such as actors and entertainers (Harms & Spain, 2016). The stories people of influence tell, or the stories passed on from one generation to the next, help impart knowledge and develop mental models about ideal leadership (Allison & Goethals, 2014; Campbell, 2013). These mental leadership models, or implicit leadership theories, represent cognitive structures or schemas specifying traits and behaviors that followers expect from leaders (Epitropaki et al., 2013). Implicit leadership theories begin to form during early childhood and evolve through socialization and exposure to varying contexts, reaching full construct by adolescence (Frost, 2016). Starting at home, people gain exposure to different forms of leadership. Each parent has a different way to guide and educate their children, and children learn the style of their parents and begin to develop an idea of what is effective and what is not. Parental modeling helps develop leadership in adolescents (Day, Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014). As people venture out in the world, social institutions either solidify their beliefs or provide a different aspect of leadership. Teachers, police officers, other parents, and relatives represent various models for the observer. The observations become knowledge, and ILTs develop. We use ILTs to 53 compare the behavior, traits, and personality of a person with the beliefs held about leaders to form an opinion about such person and guide social interactions. Leadership preferences vary in response to context and the characteristics of the perceiver (Shondrick & Lord, 2010). Characteristics such as religious beliefs (Oliveira, 2016), cultural background (House et al., 2004), and self-perception (Ehrhart, 2012) affect ILTs. People from different cultures hold different values that influence their perception of a leader's effectiveness (Hofstede, 1993). For example, low power distance cultures tend to prefer leaders who consult subordinates about decisions; in contrast, high power distance cultures tend to prefer leaders who tell employees what to do (Hofstede, 2001). Similar contrasting leadership preferences occur with other societal values. What happens when someone from a high-power distance culture migrates to a low power distance society? Shondrick and Lord (2010) suggested that as contextual changes occur, people modify their ILTs and adjust their leadership preferences. Although ILTs are dynamic and adaptable, the changes are slow and take time (Epitropaki et al., 2013). As part of the acculturation process, which I discussed later in this paper, people make comparisons and decisions about the acceptability of new values and schemas before they adopt them or allow themselves to change the current ones. This elaborate process suggests that immigrants may take a long time to change their ILTs. Based on the stability of ILTs, first-generation immigrants are likely to have schemas consistent with those of their country of origin. Conversely, second-generation immigrants, those born in the host country to firstgeneration immigrants, may develop different leadership schemas, as they have exposure to different contexts than their parents. Based on prior cross-cultural research in 54 acculturation (Taras et al., 2013), age at migration, the length of residency, cultural environment, and engagement in cultural activities can affect the formation of ILTs and preferences for leadership style. Children of immigrants observe their parents' cultural values and leadership styles, which may differ from the preferred leadership styles of the people in the host country. Then, children gain exposure to different styles as they start to engage with society. Preferred Leadership Style of Mexico. Most research on Mexican leadership styles and preferences derives from universal values and fails to account for the effect of traditional Mexican values. Based on the findings from global studies, Mexicans find respect, collectivism, status attribution, and power distance to be important elements of leadership and Mexicans would benefit from and exhibit a paternalistic style of leadership with non-participative and autocratic behaviors (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2012). Although these findings were confirmed in recent research (Castaño et al., 2015), country-specific studies had different results. Studies conducted solely with the purpose of identifying the most effective leadership style used in Mexico indicated that Mexicans prefer a democratic over autocratic leadership style (Martínez Méndez, Muñoz, Serafín, Muñoz, & Monserrat, 2013; Michaud et al., 2019; Ruiz & Hamlin, 2018; Ruiz, Wang, & Hamlin, 2013). This finding contradicts Hofstede's (2001) and the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) views. Specifically, Hofstede indicated that employees in high power distance countries prefer directions, an autocratic, father-like supervisor, and close supervision. Similarly, the GLOBE study showed that Mexicans have a higher tolerance for non-participatory and authoritarian approaches to leadership. Ruiz et al. suggested that while paternalism 55 (father-like figure) is the prevailing style of leadership in Mexico, leaders include subordinates in decision making, suggesting a more democratic approach. Similarly, Martínez Méndez et al. (2013) indicated that effective leadership in Mexico is democratic as Mexican managers delegate authority, involve subordinates in decision making, and support the subordinates. As shown in the results of the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004), aspects not typically measured in cross-cultural studies drive preferences in leadership style in Mexico. For instance, Howell et al. (2007) found that Mexicans do not exhibit the carefree or passive attitude that many typically associate with Mexicans. Mexico's history has a strong influence on traditionalism, power distance, and assertiveness. The importance of family (familism) and respect directly affect the supervisor-subordinate relationship at work. House et al. (2004), found that supportive leadership behaviors in Mexico positively affect job performance. Littrell and Cruz Barba (2013) found managers in Mexico to be paternalistic and democratic. In paternalistic leadership, leaders adopt the role of a parent and guide, care for, nurture, and protect their employees as a father would protect his children (Öner, 2012). Littrell et al. indicated that Mexicans prefer managers who are democratic, fair, approachable, and considerate. Employees expect managers to take care of them, be supportive, promote growth and development, and lend a hand, as needed. Mexicans desire managers who express understanding and sensitivity to family needs, help with problem-solving, and make special work arrangements to assist employees in times of need. 56 Leadership in the United States. Other than comparative and cross-cultural studies, I could not find any literature that clearly identified the preferred leadership style used in the United States. Most leadership theories are developed and researched within the confines of the United States and later tested for universalism (House et al., 2004). Based on cross-cultural studies, the United States is individualistic and egalitarian. The leadership style in the United States is highly participative, visionary, and transformational, exhibiting high-performance and high-maintenance behaviors (House et al., 2004). Doran and Littrell (2013) found the United States population to have high individual self-direction while being concerned about the welfare of society as a whole. In the GLOBE Study (House et al., 2004), the United States scored high on the leadership dimensions of charismatic/value-based (6.12), team-oriented (5.80), participative (5.93), and humane oriented (5.21). These findings along with U.S. typical values, giving importance to achieving material success, personal success, gaining independence (Morgan Consoli et al., 2016), and being concerned with the well-being of others (Doran & Littrell, 2013), suggest that Americans prefer a servant leadership style. Power distance and uncertainty avoidance have a negative relationship to dimensions of servant leadership, whereas performance orientation has shown a positive one (Mittal & Dorfman 2012). Servant leaders help followers realize material success through the accomplishment of individual and organizational goals and empower followers to be independent and achieve (Parris & Peachey, 2013). Gillet, Cartwright, and Van Vugt (2011) found that the self-sacrificing behavior of servant leaders facilitated greater group success and allowed followers to earn more income than the leaders. Servant leaders believe they have the responsibility to 57 ensure the mental well-being of their subordinates and create an environment that fosters personal development (Öner, 2012). Greenleaf (1977) coined the seemingly selfcontradicting term \"servant leadership\" based on the premise that servant leaders have the desire to serve first. Servant leaders prioritize the needs of others ahead of their own, helping followers flourish and succeed through empowerment, development, and feedback and by providing resources and creating an environment in which people can grow (Liden, Wayne, Zhao, & Henderson, 2008; Mittal & Dorfman, 2012; Öner, 2012). Several aspects of servant leadership overlap dimensions of other leadership styles, such as transformational, charismatic, ethical, authentic, and spiritual (Sun, 2013). Mexicans in the United States Mexicans have been the largest source of immigrants to the United States since migration officially started in 1846 (Gutiérrez, 2017). Mexican immigrants make up nearly 65% of the Hispanic population (U.S. Census, 2016) and 28% of the United States' foreign-born population (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015). Mexicans have been migrating to and living in the United States long before the United States was a country. The region from the states of California to Florida in the United States along the borders with the states of Tamaulipas to Baja California in Mexico is known as \"Greater Mexico\" because it once belonged to Mexico and Mexican culture and migration continue to influence the area (Foley, 2014; Weber, 2015). According to the U.S. Census (2016), 54.5% of the Hispanic population of the United States lives in California, Florida, and Texas. Mexicans have been living in cities like San Francisco, California; Los Angeles, California; Santa Fe, New Mexico; El Paso, Texas; and San Antonio, Texas since their foundation and long before English speakers arrived (Foley, 2014). Although these cities 58 have been under U.S. domain for more than 200 years, Mexicans are the least acculturated group of immigrants along the southern regions of the United States (Lopez, 2013). There is a negative perception of Mexicans in the United States. Many often degrade Mexicans, assuming they present potential damage to the United States (Foley, 2014; Kim et al., 2013; Overmyer-Velázquez, 2013). The prosecution and discrimination, alongside most social institutions which were founded according to U.S. values (Greenfield & Quiroz, 2013; May et al., 2014), has halted the acculturation process (Lopez, 2013). Mexicans in the United States revert to and maintain their cultural identities and cultural values (Foley, 2014; Kim et al., 2013). Morgan Consoli and Llamas (2013) showed that Mexicans rely on their values to help them thrive. Unlike many other immigrants, Mexicans migrate to the United States with the intent to secure employment, as wages are far higher in the United States than in Mexico (Foley, 2014). Most Mexican immigrants classify as unskilled workers (Gutiérrez, 2017). Mexican immigrants reach lower education levels than U.S.-born Caucasians and are less likely to graduate with an advanced degree from a college (Kim et al., 2013; Morgan Consoli & Llamas, 2013). Because of these differences, Mexicans tend to work in labor-intensive industries. According to Gutiérrez (2017), Mexicans often gain employment in service industries, construction, agriculture, mining, and railroad construction. Acculturation Acculturation is the process by which members of one culture modify their values, beliefs, and practices in response to direct contact and interactions with members of another culture (Berry, 1980; Keskin, 2013; Taras et al., 2013). Researchers originally 59 defined and studied acculturation as a unidimensional process placing ethnic and mainstream cultures on opposite ends of a continuum, calling for the abandonment of the elements of one culture to gain the elements of the other (Gordon, 1964; Taras, 2008). Although refining the model removed the confinement of the continuum and allowed acculturation to continue beyond its extremes (Taras, 2008), the model cannot distinguish the various types of bicultural and multicultural individuals (Vuong, & Napier, 2015). The model ignores the complexities of the human experience such as values, attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors (Gupta, Leong, Valentine, & Canada, 2015), and situational and social factors such as age at migration, size and composition of network, composition and attitudes of the local community, political climate, frequency of interaction with locals, and education (Berry, 1997; Taras et al., 2013). Furthermore, this model ignores the conflict that immigrants face when confronted with the cultural differences highlighted by their cross-cultural encounter. The initial contact between the members of two cultures results in culture shock and acculturative stress and leads to disillusion (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 2014; Triandis, 1994). People face the reality of their cultural differences in acceptable behaviors, forms of interactions, cuisine, music, values, rituals, and clothing style, to name a few. Eventually, people must cope with the struggle between adapting to a new culture and maintaining their ethnic culture (Berry, 1997; Schwartz, 2014; Taras et al., 2013). The acculturation process is complex, and individuals must learn to live among those of a different culture (Triandis, 1994). People use their existing knowledge and lay theories as a reference to try to understand their new environment and the behavior of others. The decision process requires people to consider both alternatives at the same 60 time and adopt the best strategy for their situation, as they understand it. There are four possible acculturation strategies: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization (Berry, 1997; Nieri et al., 2016). According to Berry (1997), assimilation is the strategy by which individuals place greater importance on being involved in other cultural groups than maintaining their own cultural identity and characteristics. Immigrants change their behavior and abandon their culture to adopt the dominant culture (Kuo, 2014). Under the separation strategy, the individual's desire to maintain their own cultural identity, and traits is vital and the involvement in different cultural groups is unimportant. When a person has an equal desire to preserve their cultural identity and characteristics and to involve themselves in other cultural groups, integration occurs. With marginalization as a strategy, there is a lack of interest or possibility of cultural maintenance and the lack of interest or likelihood to be involved in other cultural groups. These acculturation types have their foundations in the freedom of choice by non-dominant groups and their members. When acculturation is forced, or a dominant group limits the choices, the terminology of the framework changes (Berry, 1997). Separation becomes segregation when the dominating group imposes the acculturation strategy, and forced assimilation creates a \"pressure cooker\" (Berry, 1997, p10) effect that, in combination with segregation, may lead individuals to marginalization. Factors Related to Acculturation A review of the literature indicated the requirement of specific factors for the success of acculturation. Integration may only be successful when the dominant group is willing to accept and is able to adapt to more adequately meet the needs of the various 61 groups living within the society, while the non-dominant group must be willing to adopt the core values of the dominant culture (Berry, 1997; Hofstede, 2001; Horenczky, Jasinkaja-Lahti, Sam, & Vedder, 2013; Triandis, 1994; Ward & Geeraet, 2016). Both groups must accept that they are culturally different and must be willing to live under such understanding (Berry, 1997; May et al., 2014). Several situational factors influence acculturation. Among those factors are location, political climate, economic situation, societal attitudes, and size of the ethnic group represented in the host country (Berry, 1997; Hofstede, 2001; Lopez, 2013; Taras et al., 2013; Triandis, 1994). Personal factors also moderate acculturation and guide the selection of a strategy. These factors include experiences of discrimination, age at migration, generation, gender, educational level, cultural distance, time since immigration, and social support (Hofstede, 2001; Lopez, 2013; Portes & Rumbaut, 2005; Schwartz, 2014; Taras et al., 2013). Depending on the factors that immigrants face, they may choose one or multiple acculturation strategies. A person may seek greater cultural maintenance when surrounded by family than when at work or in a public environment (Berry, 1997). Taras et al. (2013) demonstrated that environmental factors could accelerate, decelerate, or reverse acculturation. The researchers showed that although the length of residency positively affects acculturation, assimilation takes more than 20 years to complete and depends on several other factors. People who migrated at a young age acculturated faster than those who were older because factors that existed prior to migration, such as personality, gender, and socioeconomic status, affect the initial process (Kim et al., 2013). The size of their representative network and the contact frequency with locals, however, moderated acculturation. Taras et al. found that the 62 network composition of immigrants significantly contributes to acculturation. Specifically, they determined that immigrant networks composed of less than 15% of locals negatively affect the acculturation process to the point of reversal. The more constant contact a person has with those of the dominant culture, the faster they acculturate. This effect, however, was not necessarily true for immigrants from countries widely represented locally, such as Mexico. Taras et al. indicated that people from highly represented groups acculturate at a lower rate than those from underrepresented groups. Researchers discovered supporting evidence of the effects of the social environment on acculturation using Mexican-American samples. In his dissertation, Lopez (2013) examined the factors that affect the level of acculturation of Mexican immigrants in the Southwest of the United States. He analyzed secondary data from a longitudinal study by Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) on immigrants in the southern regions of Florida and California. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) found Mexicans to have the lowest levels of acculturation of the groups examined. Lopez found that the socioeconomic climate and stereotypical views about Mexicans contributed to the low levels of acculturation. They determined that racial discrimination, family cohesion, safety needs, and needs of belonging affected acculturation. These findings accentuate the need to have the proper environment, social support, and attitude toward immigrants to foment assimilation or integration. Lopez, however, did not account for the size of the Mexican community in the areas surveyed. According to the U.S. Census (2016), 54.5% of the Hispanic population in the United States lives in California, Florida, and Texas. When people mature in an environment rich in a particular culture, they embrace such culture (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Unfortunately, Lopez used the domain of English language 63 to evaluate acculturation levels, and this measurement of acculturation does not cause changes in behavior, self-identification, or values (Schwartz et al., 2014). Work-related Acculturation Many researchers have studied acculturation, yet only a few of them have directly examined the effects of acculturation on the workplace. Most of their studies were on the psychological adjustment of expatriates and the leadership styles required for success during a foreign assignment. Studies centered on immigrants tend to gauge acculturation by measuring language skills, consumption of local food, and the adaptation of clothing style. Although the domain of language can predict acculturation at the artifact level, it shows no links to modification in behavior at the workplace (Taras et al., 2013). Similarly, culinary preference and apparel choices are artifactual, and changes may relate to the availability of products within the area where immigrants live or work and are not necessarily a choice. Furthermore, research provides no direct link between artifactuallevel acculturation and work behaviors or values. Conclusion The review of the cross-cultural literature revealed that leadership preferences vary from country to country and that the meaning of leadership is rooted in and changes according to the culture where it is used (Hofstede, 1993; Steers et al., 2012). Researchers often define culture as a complex system that affects behavior through values adopted according to interactions with the environment (Zolfaghari et al., 2016). The differences in cultural values are mostly described and measured at a societal level based on dimensions of presumed shared values (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2001; Triandis, 1994), failing to account for the intranational cultural diversity and the dynamics of the 64 acculturation process (Berry, 1997). Similarly, leadership studies are mostly limited to cross-cultural comparisons of Western-based leadership theories, and the examination and comparison of effective leadership style based on cultural dimensions. Researchers found that Mexican leadership is different from that previously indicated in large-scale cross-cultural studies. Mexican leadership preferences are deeply rooted in tradition, and they differ from the United States and other Latino groups. Mexicans prefer a paternalistic leadership style with democratic behaviors (Littrell & Cruz Barba, 2013; Martínez Méndez et al., 2013; Ruiz et al., 2013), whereas U.S.-born Caucasians exhibit and prefer a servant leadership style. Although this new information helps international organizations and expatriates, it does not necessarily benefit organizations with a very culturally diverse population. Based on the American Community Survey by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Current Population Survey, the number of immigrants in the United States in 2014 was 59 million (Camarota, 2015). According to the U.S. Census (2014), the United States has the second-largest Hispanic population in the world. The immigrant population in the United States is mainly composed of Latinos, and 65% of them are of Mexican descent (U.S. Census, 2016). Although Mexican immigration to the United States officially started in 1846 (Gutiérrez, 2017), the Bracero Act from 1942 led to an influx of Mexican immigrants into the United States for the past 74 years by enhancing the labor relations between the United States and Mexico (Durand, Massey, & Pren, 2016; Massey, Durand, & Pren, 2015). With a large population of Mexicans living in the United States, particularly along the southern regions of the country, it is important to understand their preferences in 65 leadership style and how their cultural background might influence them. The literature revealed that it may take three generations for immigrants to acculturate entirely to a new country (Rumbaut, 2015) as immigrants tend to hold on to the culture from their country of origin and pass it on to their descendants (Calderón-Tena, Knight, & Carlo, 2011; Wong-Mingli et al., 2014). The acculturation level of Mexican immigrants, as typically measured with language and adoption of other artifacts (Taras et al., 2013), may not indicate their preferences in leadership style. Researchers revealed that Mexicans have a harder time acculturating than other immigrants along the southern United States (Lopez, 2013). Although the reason for low acculturation levels is beyond the scope of this research, it is a crucial factor to consider. Although parental modeling during childhood and adolescence influences ILTs (Day et al., 2014; Frost, 2016), leadership preferences develop based on social, cultural, and environmental factors (Allison & Goethals, 2014; Campbell, 2013). Lack of research in intranational differences has left a gap in the literature regarding differences in values and preferences in leadership style among firstand second-generation immigrants and the rest of the population in the host country. The particular problem identified is that U.S.-born Caucasian managers may not understand the differences between their leadership style and the preferences for leadership style of Mexican immigrants which may be reflective of Mexican values and may vary depending on generation, length of residence, age at migration, and environmental factors. Given the motivational factors for Mexican to migrate to the United States, their leadership preferences may align more closely to their work-related values, which could be more congruent with the values of their counterparts in their home country than with those of 66 U.S.-born Caucasians. At the same time, young immigrants and second-generation immigrants may develop a duality in values or merely carry more U.S. values as they gain exposure to the host country's values at school, at other social institutions, and through social media from an early age. The leadership preferences of Mexican immigrants at various stages of acculturation may challenge organizational effectiveness, perceived effectiveness of leaders by Mexican immigrants, and the interactions between Mexican employees and their leaders. In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodology and data collection strategy. 67 Chapter 3: Research Method The purpose of this survey-based quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Chapter 3 begins with the presentation of the research design and rationale for the study. Next, I discuss the methodology in which population, sampling procedures, and instrumentation. Subsequently, I present the data analysis plan, followed by how I addressed threats to validity and ethical concerns. The chapter ends with a summary. Research Design and Rationale I designed the study to investigate differences in work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles among generations of Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Prior cross-cultural researchers (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Inglehart et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1992, 1999; and Trompenaars & HampdenTurner, 2012), used a survey research method to help advance knowledge in the discipline. Survey research is the primary form of data collection in social studies (Baur, Hering, Raschke, & Thierbach, 2014) and is common in cross-cultural research. The problem that I researched in this study was that U.S.-born Caucasian Managers may not understand the differences in leadership style preferences between themselves and firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants living in the United States. Mexican immigrants may display and prefer leadership styles reflective of their cultural values, which may be different from those of U.S.-born Caucasians. The first step in addressing the problem was to compare samples of the U.S.-born Caucasians and 68 Mexican immigrants quantitatively. I used a survey design to collect multiple data points which were used to analyze the differences in values and leadership preferences between Mexican immigrants, Mexicans, and U.S.-born Caucasians. Using a standard questionnaire I collected data from participants across two countries in a limited amount of time on universally accepted work-related values, inclination toward home-country values, leadership preferences, and level of acculturation at the psychological level. The strengths of a survey design far outweigh its weaknesses. Because this study measured the preferences and perceptions of individuals, a survey was the most appropriate tool for the research. Methodology Population The target population for this study included U.S.-born Caucasians, firstgeneration Mexican immigrants, second-generation Mexican immigrants, and Mexicans 18 years of age or older. First-generation Mexican immigrants are people of Mexican descent born in Mexico and who migrated to the United States at any age. Secondgeneration Mexican immigrants are the children of one or two first-generation Mexican immigrants. U.S.-born Caucasians are White people of European descent born in the United States. Mexican are people of Mexican descent living in Mexico. According to the U.S. Census (2014), Mexicans account for nearly 64% of the Hispanic population in the United States. The Hispanic population in 2013 was about 34.6 million, of which the population of first-generation of Mexican immigrants was 11.5 million, and the population of U.S.-born Mexicans was 23.1million (Lopez, 2015). 69 The high diversity of the Greater San Francisco Bay Area in California (henceforth referred to only as the Bay Area) was ideal for my study. The Bay Area is composed of nine counties-Santa Clara, San Mateo, San Francisco, Marin, Sonoma, Napa, Solano, Contra Costa, and Alameda-and has a high concentration of immigrants, of which the majority are Hispanics or Latinos (23.5% of total population) followed closely by Asians (23.3% of total population). I selected two out of the nine counties that make up the Bay Area, Napa and Solano Counties, because of their relatively similar proportions of Mexican and non-Hispanic Caucasian residents. Approximately 52.2% (302,169) of the population is non-Hispanic Caucasian, and about 17.2% (99,347) of the population is Mexican (U.S. Census, 2017a, 2017b). Table 2 shows a breakdown of Mexican population versus Caucasian population. Table 2 Breakdown of Caucasian and Mexican population between the Napa and Solano Counties Solano Napa Combined N % N % N % Population 436,092 100% 142,456 100% 578,548 100% Caucasian 199,838 45.8% 102,331 71.8% 302,169 52% Mexican 66,944 15.4% 32,430 22.8% 99,374 17% Developed from U.S. Census data from 2010 (U.S. Census, 2017a, 2017c). According to the U.S. Census (2017d), the approximate number of firstgeneration Mexican immigrants living in Napa County who were born in Mexico is 18,095, or 55.79% of the Mexican population. The estimated number of first-generation Mexican immigrants residing in Solano County who were born in Mexico is 27,286, or 70 40.75% of the Mexican population. There are approximately 70,514 Mexicans and 251,386 Caucasians 18 years or older living in the Napa and Solano Counties. Sample Participants had to be adults of at least 18 years of age who self-identified as Mexicans or Caucasians of European descent. Because research has shown (e.g., Day et al., 2014; Frost, 2016; Harms & Spain, 2016) that leadership preferences form before employment, participants did not need to be working. There were no limitations on gender or educational attainment. A short demographic questionnaire helped identify participants based on race and ethnic background. I took special care to ensure participants were either Mexicans living in Mexico; first-generation Mexican immigrants; second-generation Mexican immigrants; or U.S.-born Caucasians. To maintain anonymity, participants did not submit signed consent forms after receiving information on the purpose of the study, including future use of the data collected. I did not collect personal identification information from participants and assured confidentiality about the responses to the questionnaires. The sampling framework was the 302,169 non-Hispanic Caucasian and 99,347 Mexicans residing in the Napa and Solano Counties of the Bay Area. Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2013), a power analysis for a one-way ANOVA with four groups, an alpha (α) of 0.05, a power of 0.80, and a .25 effect size provided a sample size of 180. That is 45 participants per group. Given that statistical significance is a function of sample size, I aimed to recruit 60 participants from each group. I drew the sample from the target population of 401,516. Although I applied probability sampling, I also examined the sample for representativeness. 71 Sampling Procedures Procedures for recruitment. I used several methods of recruitment for this study. First, to recruit participants from the Napa and Solano Counties, I obtained permission from local community colleges in the Solano and Napa counties to access their student population. I informed the research board of the colleges of the research purpose, the importance of the study, and how it may affect their particular institution. I invited students and staff to participate in the survey via their school email. About 40% of the households of Mexican immigrants in Napa County and about 33% of the families in Solano County are not fluent in English (U.S. Census, 2017e). I provided invitations as attachments in Spanish and English. To maximize the number of Mexican immigrants invited to take the survey, I obtained permission from a Head Start organization operating in Napa and Solano Counties to contact their staff and the families they serve. The nonprofit organization operates throughout both counties, servicing more than 1,000 families. I informed the directors of the program the purpose of my research, the importance of the study, and how it may affect their organization. The Head Start programs offer several services to help low-income families succeed. The majority of the families served in the Napa and Solano Counties are Hispanic. I requested the family advocates to notify their families before sending invitations. I wrote the letters to the potential participating families in English and Spanish and had the family advocates deliver them in a sealed package that contained a return envelope. To recruit Mexicans living in Mexico, I reached out to a couple of college and university professors in Veracruz, Mexico. According to the Instituto National de 72 Estadística y Geografía (2017), Veracruz is not only the third most populous state in Mexico but also the third most diverse state. I asked for permission to reach out to their students to recruit them for the study. I informed the professors and students of the purpose of my research, the importance of the study, and how it may affect them. I provided the invitation to Mexican professors for them to distribute the invitation to their students via their school email. The invitation was in Spanish. Those who chose to take the survey were able to access it directly through a link to the survey included in the email. Participation. The letter of invitation and informed consent included the purpose and goals of the study, instructions for accessing the survey, ethical and privacy particulars, details about participating and opting out, and contact information for questions (see Appendix E). Participants received a unique web link to access the webbased survey. The link was included in the invitation letter. People who did not have access to the Internet received a package; included were the invitation letter and informed consent, a preaddressed envelope with prepaid postage for the convenience of the participants, a paper version of the survey, and instructions on how to return the survey. To preserve anonymity, the participants were instructed not to sign and return the inform consent and not to write their name in any portion of the electronic or paper-based survey. Instead, they were asked to retain the invitation letter and informed consent for their records. Their participation in the web-based survey or the returning of the paper survey was acknowledgment and acceptance to participate. There was a brief demographic section in the survey. The demographic information that was requested included their city and county of residence, age, gender, race, ethnic background, and 73 country of birth, parents' country of birth, parents' ethnicity and race, number of family members in the United States, job industry, job title, and education level. The demographic information helped me select participants who met the requirements of the study. Data collection. The primary data collection tool was a web-based survey. Participants received a link via their email from their professors, institutions, or Head Start organization. A secondary data collection tool was available for participants without technological access or abilities. Institutions and Head Start organization distributed a paper survey if needed (see Appendix F). Participants submitted the survey electronically or via a self-addressed pre-stamped envelope. No further contact was required with participants after they completed and submitted their survey responses. Participants had the option to request the results of the study, which I distributed at the end of the study. Data collected were available for download to Excel to import to a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) file. I manually entered data from paper surveys into an Excel file and crosschecked for accuracy. I communicated the results from the study to the assisting institutions and organizations to finalize their involvement and inform them of the possible impacts of the findings. Instrumentation and Operationalization of the Constructs Existing instruments did not directly serve the purpose of this research. Therefore, I used several existing tools to develop a questionnaire for this study. I drew a combination of questions from existing scales to build a 5-point Likert-type scale to measure leadership preferences, work-related cultural values, and acculturation. The 74 scores represented the level of agreement that the participants had with the statements in the questionnaire. I examined the mean scores using t-tests and ANOVA. Appendix G shows the relationship between the survey items and the research questions. I conducted a pilot study to assess the reliability of the instrument before conducting the full-scale study. I assessed internal consistency reliability by calculating Cronbach's alpha, which is the most widely accepted measurement of reliability. Reliability is \"the lack of distortion or precision of a measuring instrument\" (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 643). Cronbach's alpha describes the precision of an instrument in a 0–1 scale (Cronbach, 2004). Although there is no universally accepted minimum reliability value (Bonett & Wright, 2015), I considered values far below .7 unacceptable. The items of the construct with low Cronbach's alpha were to be examined, reworded, and tested once more to ensure the construct is measured correctly. However, I was not allowed to reword or change one of the instruments I used per my agreement with the author of the scale. Leadership Preferences Leadership preferences develop according to the conceptualization of the ideal leader based on knowledge structures reflective of previous observation of patterns of leadership behavior. I adopted Erhart's (2012, p. 231) definition of leadership preference for the purpose of this study: \"followers' expectations for positive and effective interactions with the leader.\" Based on the underpinnings of culturally endorsed implicit leadership theories (House et al., 2004), I operationalized leadership preferences as the expected behaviors followers have of leaders. I examined two leadership constructs: servant leadership and paternalistic leadership. The appropriateness of the instruments was based on the hypothesis that U.S.-born Caucasians prefer a servant leadership style 75 as opposed to Mexicans who prefer a paternalistic style (Doran & Littrell, 2013; Littrell & Cruz Barba, 2013). Servant leadership. Greenleaf (1977) coined the term servant leader. Although the term may seem contradictory, the foundation of the premise is that servant leaders have the desire to serve first, prioritizing the needs of others ahead of their own, helping followers flourish and succeed through empowerment, development, and feedback and by providing resources and creating an environment in which people can grow (Greenleaf, 1977; Liden et al., 2008; Mittal & Dorfman, 2012; Öner, 2012). Values and morality guide servant leaders and they seek to build long-lasting relationships with employees, customers, and the community (Dennis & Bocarnea, 2005; Liden et al., 2008; Van Dierendonck & Nuijten, 2011). Unfortunately, Greenleaf only described but did not clearly defined servant leadership in his writings, leaving it open for interpretation. Although a full analysis was beyond the scope of this dissertation, it was essential to understand the differences between the various definitions and instruments created to measure servant leadership. Spears (2002), former executive director of the Robert K. Greenleaf Center for Servant-Leadership, identified ten characteristics of a servant leader: listening, empathy, healing, awareness, persuasion, conceptualization, foresight, stewardship, commitment to the growth of people, and building community. Russel and Stone (2002) classified nine of the ten characteristics Spears (2002) identified as functional attributes or operative characteristics: vision, honesty, integrity, trust, service, modeling, pioneering, appreciation for others, and empowerment. Additionally, they defined 11 accompanying attributes or supplemental attributes: communication, credibility, competence, 76 stewardship, visibility, influence, persuasion, listening, encouragement, teaching, and delegation. Barbuto, Jr. and Wheeler (2006) added calling as an additional and first characteristic of a servant leader and identified five dimensions of servant leadership: altruistic calling, emotional healing, wisdom, persuasive mapping, and organizational stewardship. Patterson (2003) developed a servant leadership model based on existing literature as an extension of transformational leadership. Patterson identified seven virtues of a servant leader: agapao love, humility, altruistic, visionary, trusting, empowering, and serving. Dennis and Bocarnea (2005) developed the measurement of these attributes, and three independent studies validated the constructs (Bryant, 2003; Dillman, 2004; Nelson, 2003). Similarly, based on the literature, Liden et al. (2008) identified seven dimensions of servant leadership in their model: conceptual skills, empowering subordinates, helping subordinates grow and succeed, putting subordinates first, behaving ethically, emotional healing, and creating value for the community. Van Dierendonck and Nuijten (2011) developed a model based on literature that focuses on the relationship between leader and follower and takes into account the leader's responsibility toward an organization. This model has eight characteristics: empowerment, accountability, standing back, humility, authenticity, courage, forgiveness, and stewardship. Although researchers developed several models based on Greenleaf's descriptions (1977) and Spears' (2002) characteristics and other leadership theories, there is no agreement among scholars on the definition of servant leadership theory (Parris & Peachey, 2013; Van Dierendonck, 2011). Many of the servant leader traits defined in the various models, however, seem to agree conceptually while other characteristics are not 77 exclusive of servant leaders (Grisaffe, VanMeter, & Chonko, 2016). This lack of exclusivity could be because several aspects of servant leadership overlap dimensions of other leadership styles such as transformational, charismatic, ethical, authentic, and spiritual (Sun, 2013). Instrumentation. Researchers such as Barbuto, Jr. and Wheeler (2006), Dennis and Bocarnea (2005), Liden et al. (2008), Ming (2005, and Van Dierendonck & Nuijten (2011) have developed various instruments since Greenleaf (1977) first introduced the term servant leadership. Given the lack of a commonly accepted definition, there are as many instruments as there are definitions. There is also no agreement on a measuring strategy (Parris & Peachey, 2013; Van Dierendonck, 2011). Barbuto, Jr and Wheeler (2006) developed an instrument to measure 11 characteristics within five dimensions of servant leadership. Liden et al. (2008) developed a 28-item scale (SL-28) to measures seven dimensions of servant leadership. Liden et al.(2015) later adapted it to a seven-item scale (SL-7). Dennis and Bocarnea (2005) developed an instrument to measure the seven constructs Patterson (2003) identified. Van Dierendonck and Nuijten (2011) developed a 30-item scale to measure eight dimensions of servant leaders. Other researchers developed instruments that have a particular focus: Ming (2005) focused on a religious setting; Reed, Vidar-Cohen, and Colwell (2011) concentrated on the executive levels of an organization; and Grisaffe et al. (2016) focused on a hierarchical organization. Given that leadership preferences derive from expected traits and behaviors (Epitropaki et al., 2013), I based my measure of the preference for servant leadership on the scale Ming (2005) developed. 78 Ming (2005) developed a six-point Likert-type questionnaire (SLQ-F) to capture the followers' perspective on the ten characteristics of servant leadership Spears (2002) identified. Ming grouped these characteristics into three categories: 1. Feeling of oneness/partnership: Followers develop a sense of unity when leaders listen with all senses, show empathy, are self-aware, and strive to heal themselves and others. 2. Sense of direction: Followers gain a sense of direction when they are motivated by their leader's clear vision for the organization's future, conceptualization of their perspective, and their ability to persuade followers to act. 3. Feeling of empowerment: Followers feel empowered when they have leaders who are stewards and are dedicated to the growth and development of people and community. Ming's (2005) study investigated the relationship between servant leadership and the spiritual growth of members in the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Jamaica. There were 941 valid responses to the survey. The overall Cronbach alpha for the study was.80. The 83-item instrument had five focus areas: servant leadership characteristics, intermediate servant leadership variables, pastoral leadership style indicators, spiritual experience of church members, and demographic information of respondents. A factorial analysis confirmed convergence and discriminant validity. Regression analysis demonstrated the positive relationship between the ten characteristics of servant leadership and the three intermediate categories. Although I modified the instrument, I obtained the original questionnaire and permission for its use and modification from 79 Ming (see Appendix D). For this dissertation, I focused on the intermediate servant leadership variables of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment as Ming defined. Sense of oneness. The Cronbach alpha for this variable was .90. I operationalized this variable as the level of preference for a leader who listens, is empathetic, is genuinely interested in the well-being of followers, and is self-aware. I used eight questions to assess the sense of oneness directly. Sample questions from Ming's (2005, p. 136) instrument include \"pays great attention to details when someone talks to him and remembers the details in future conversations\" and \"is aware of all the issues and problems involving his or her employees.\" Sense of direction. The Cronbach alpha for this variable was .88. I operationalized this variable as the level of preference for a leader who persuades rather than dictates, clearly articulates his vision, and communicates anticipated events. I used six questions to assess the sense of direction directly. Sample questions from Ming's (2005, p. 137) instrument include \"articulates our dream very well and offers a plan on what to do\" and \"always seeks to discuss and involve others in his thinking.\" Feeling of empowerment. The Cronbach alpha for this variable was .77. I operationalized this variable as the level of preference for a leader who is genuinely interested in developing followers, commits to giving to and supporting others and the community, and gives people control of their work. I used six questions to assess the feeling of empowerment directly. Sample questions from Ming's (2005, p. 138) instrument include \"demonstrates a strong commitment to serving the needs of members\" 80 and \"recognizes the potential values of individual members and helps them realize their potential in every possible way.\" Paternalistic leadership. Paternalistic leadership derives from the premise that leaders adopt the role of a parent and guide, care for, nurture, and protect their employees as a father would protect his children (Öner, 2012). Paternalistic leaders are often authoritarian and benevolent father-like figures who are obligated to take care of followers' well-being in exchange for devotion and respect (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). Researchers revealed that the authoritarian aspect of paternalistic leadership found in China (Cheng et al., 2013), India (Rawat & Lyndon, 2016), and Turkey (Öner, 2012) has a positive effect on the follower-leader relationship. In Mexico, however, Littrell and Cruz Barba (2013) and Martínez Méndez et al. (2013) identified that paternalistic leadership is more democratic and participative. I based my measure of the preference for paternalistic leadership on the scales Cheng, Chou, Wu, Huang, and Farh, (2004), Aycan (2006), and Pellegrini and Scandura (2006) developed. Instrumentation. Researchers have used various instruments to measure paternalism. Cheng et al.'s (2004) Paternalistic Leadership Scale is a 28-item scale that measures three dimensions of paternalism: benevolence, morality, and authoritarianism. Although the scale initially had 42 items (Chen, Eberly, Chiang, Farh, & Cheng, 2014), researchers have used abbreviated versions of the scale (Chen et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2004; Tang & Naumann, 2015), and their psychometric properties were validated. Cheng et al. developed the scale for use in China (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008), and researchers have only tested its generalizability among Asian countries (Cheng et al., 2013; Rawat & Lyndon, 2016). Cheng's et al. (2004) based the scale on a multidimensional construct that 81 includes authoritarianism, which researchers showed relates positively to fearing a supervisor (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). Mexicans prefer a democratic and paternalistic style of leadership rather than authoritarian (Littrell & Cruz Barba, 2013; Martínez Méndez et al., 2013; Ruiz et al., 2013). The Cheng et al. (2004) scale did not appear appropriate for this study. Aycan (2006) developed a scale to test the relationship between four types of leadership style: benevolent paternalism, exploitative paternalism, authoritative approach, and authoritarian approach. The scale measures five factors: family atmosphere at work, individualized relationships, involvement in employees' non-working lives, loyalty expectation, and status hierarchy and authority. Participants of the study were 177 employees from private and public organizations. The scale included 21 items with a Cronbach alpha of .85. The instrument underwent validation by testing its correlation to three existing scales. Aycan et al. (2000) used a short version of the scale to measure paternalism in a large-scale study. The study had 1,954 participants from 10 countries (Canada, the United States, Turkey, China, Pakistan, India, Germany, Romania, Israel, and Russia). Researchers tested the Cronbach alphas for each country, and they ranged from .60 to .72. Liberman (2014) used the paternalistic scale Aycan (2006) developed to examine the perception of paternalism and its effects on job satisfaction and organizational commitment based on the responses of 469 managers and employees from the United States and Chile. The Cronbach alphas reported were higher than .60 for all samples. I did not use Aycan's scale because the reliability scores were not consistently .70 or higher when tested. 82 Pellegrini and Scandura (2006) used Aycan's (2006) data to develop their own 13-item instrument to investigate the relationships between paternalism and job satisfaction (among other factors) in business organizations in Turkey. Participants were 185 full-time employees from five different Turkish companies. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was .86. Researchers designed the questions to gather the opinions of participants about leadership behavior. This scale was more appropriate for my study as the questions solicit opinions about behaviors. I obtained permission to use it in my study (see Appendix C). I prompted participants to answer the questions based on their individual-level preferences for a style of behavior rather than an evaluation of existing practices. Work-Related Cultural Values Work-related cultural values are beliefs that guide people's choices and evaluation of their behavior and that of others in a work environment. I used a 5-point Likert-type scale to measure power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution based on the IWoRC model developed by Taras (2008). Taras's model assesses individual-level values along cultural dimensions that have strong relevance to the workplace. Power distance. Power distance is the acceptable or normal degree of inequality between people within a culture. People from societies with high power distance tend to expect leaders to be authoritative, to have special privileges, and to depend on formal rules, among other characteristics (Hofstede, 2001). In contrast, in societies with low power distance, people expect leaders to rely on experience, consult with subordinates, and have no special privileges (Hofstede, 2001). Although researchers have measured 83 power distance in several cross-cultural studies, they often do so from a societal perspective as opposed to from an individual viewpoint. Results from these studies placed Mexico as a high power distance society and the United States as low power distance society (Dorfman et al., 2012; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about work-related inequalities. Sample questions from the Taras (2008, p. 262) instrument include \"In business, people in lower positions should not question decisions made by top managers\" and \"I believe it is better not to show your disagreement with your boss.\" Gender egalitarianism. Gender egalitarianism is the perception of equality among men and women in their work-related rights, capabilities, and responsibilities (Taras, 2008). People from gender-egalitarian societies expect their leaders to be democratic, self-sacrificing, collectively oriented, responsive, and informal, to be a delegator, and to have foresight and enthusiasm without being secretive, self-centered, or status-conscious (House et al., 2004, p. 388). I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about gender equality. Sample questions from the Taras (2008, p. 262) instrument include \"It is usually better to have a man in a high-level managerial position rather than a woman\" and \"Generally, a woman shouldn't focus on her career because it leaves her little time for her family.\" Status attribution. Status attribution is the ascription of status according to who the person is as opposed to their achievements and skills. According to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012), in a business environment, ascription may depend on age, professional experience and qualifications, education, or a combination of these. In 84 achievement-oriented societies, people use titles when relevant to task competence; superiors gain respect through their expertise, skills, and effectiveness at their jobs; senior management varies in age and gender, based on job proficiency; and staff challenge decisions based on functionality and technical functionality (Trompenaars & HampdenTurner, 2012, pp. 144-145). I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about status ascription. Sample questions from the Taras (2008, p. 262) instrument include \"In most cases, older and more experienced managers are much more effective than young managers with fewer years of experience\" and \"In most cases, the rank and prestige of a university is a very good predictor of the future performance of its graduates\" Instrumentation. The work-related value assessment (Taras, 2008) measures three work-related cultural dimensions: power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution. Taras developed the questionnaire for his dissertation. He used the IWoRC to collect information about individual preferences of cultural values that influence behavior in the workplace and that are likely to differ between immigrants and locals (Taras et al., 2013). The assessment is in perfect alignment with the purpose of this study. Although I modified the instrument, I obtained the original questionnaire and permission for its use and modification from Taras (see Appendix B). Taras developed the assessment to measure individual preferences as opposed to societal or organizational preferences. Taras identified the cultural dimensions through a survey of 28 leading cross-cultural management scholars. He selected the highest-scoring values that related to culture and the workplace. The IWoRC collects data at the individual level, which researchers use to evaluate the psychometric properties of the 85 instrument. Although research initially identified four value dimensions, the psychometric properties of universalism contributed to its elimination from the instrument (Taras, 2008). The population of Taras's dissertation included 1,644 immigrants and 450 Canadians. Although Taras directly measured Mexicans, he included them in the Latin American subgroup. The reported Cronbach alphas for the three included constructs are 0.73 for power distance, 0.87 for gender egalitarianism, and 0.69 for status attribution. Taras et al. (2013) used the IWoRC in another study to assess acculturation at the value level as well as the artifactual level of immigrants living in Canada. The population of the study included 1,713 immigrants and 450 Canadians. The immigrant sample included people from 28 different countries clustered into 15 subgroups. The Cronbach alphas in this study for power distance were 0.82, 0.68 for gender egalitarianism, and 0.71 for status attribution. Acculturation Acculturation is a process by which members of one culture modify their values, beliefs, and practices in response to direct contact and interactions with members of another culture. I did not evaluate acculturation based on the domain of English language and preferences for garments, media, and food as this does not have any indication of changes in values. Instead, I measured acculturation exclusively at a value level by assessing traditional Mexican values and U.S. mainstream cultural values. Traditional Mexican values include familism, respect, religiousness, and traditional gender roles. U.S. mainstream cultural values include material success, independence, and self86 reliance. I will use the scores of a Likert-type scale, self-reporting survey to measure the values. Familism is the belief that the needs of the family have priority over the personal needs of any one member, and that members have an obligation toward the family (Campos et al., 2014; Knight et al., 2010; Morgan Consoli & Llamas, 2013). Campos, Perez, and Guardino (2016) identified that familism was higher in Latinos than in people with a European or Asian background. I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about the importance of family. Sample questions from the instrument by Knight et al. (2010) include \"Parents should teach their children that the family always comes first\" and \"Family provides a sense of security because they will always be there for you.\" Respect is the importance given to the submission and acceptance by children of parents' mannerisms, decision-making reasoning, and intergenerational behaviors (Knight et al., 2010). I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about the importance of respecting elders and people of higher status. Sample questions from the instrument by Knight et al. (2010) include \"Children should respect adult relatives as if they were parents\" and \"It is important for children to understand that their parents should have the final say when decisions are made in the family.\" I will modify questions to fit the study. Religiousness is the level to which the internalization of faith and participation in religious activities influences the decisions individuals make (Barber, 2014; Smith, 2015). I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about the importance of religion. Sample questions from the instrument by 87 Knight et al. (2010) include \"Religion should be an important part of one's life\" and \"One's belief in God gives inner strength and meaning to life.\" Traditional gender roles refer to the view that males and females have different roles in the family and society, and the expectation for each differs according to those beliefs. I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about segregation of duties and responsibilities according to gender. Sample questions from the instrument by Knight et al. (2010) include \"Men should earn most of the money for the family so women can stay home and take care of the children and the home\" and \"It is important for the man to have more power in the family than the woman.\" Material success is the belief that goods owned and financial wealth are measurements of achievements in life, thus earning money takes priority (D'AnnaHernandez et al., 2015). I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about the importance of money and personal possessions. Sample questions from the instrument by Knight et al. (2010) include \"Money is the key to happiness\" and \"Owning a lot of nice things makes one very happy.\" Independence and self-reliance refer to the level of importance given to privacy and the belief that one accomplishes personal achievement through personal efforts and the struggle to overcome personal problems circumstances rather than expecting or seeking assistance from others. I operationalized this variable as the level of agreement people have with attitudes or beliefs about the importance of being able to solve problems without the assistance of others. Sample questions from the instrument by Knight et al. (2010) include \"As children get older their parents should allow them to make their own 88 decisions\" and \"When there are problems in life, a person can only count on him or herself.\" Instrumentation. Knight et al. (2010) developed the Mexican American Cultural Values Scale (MACVS) to measure the traditional Mexican values of familism, respect, religiousness, and traditional gender roles, along with U.S. mainstream cultural values of material success, independence and self-reliance, and competition and personal achievement. The researchers determined the appropriateness of the scale by the direct relationship between its measures and the research questions of their study. Although I modified the instrument, I still obtained permission from Knight (see Appendix A) for the use and restricted modification of his scale. I excluded the gender roles subscale and formed a composite measure of familism values from the subscales of familism support, familism obligation, familism referent, and respect. Knight developed the scale from information gathered from focus groups made up of Mexican immigrant adolescents and their parents. Although the 50-item scale measures nine specific values, the three familism values of familism support, familism obligations, and familism referents were combined into a single familism measurement. Knight et al. (2010) recommended not using them separately because of their low internal consistency coefficients. The reported Cronbach's alpha for the merged familism scale ranged between .79 and .80 for the three groups (adolescents, mothers, and fathers). The reliability scores for the respect subscale ranged between .68 and .75, the religion subscale ranged between .78 and .84, and the traditional gender roles ranged between .78 and .84. As for the mainstream United States values, the reliability coefficients were .77 for material success, .53 for independence and self-reliance, and .59 for competition and 89 personal achievement. Similar to the familism subscale, Knight et al. recommended using a composite of the three scales into a U.S. mainstream value scale as this produces a higher Cronbach's alpha of around .80. Several researchers used the scale in their studies. Morgan Consoli, Llamas, and Consoli (2016) used the MACVS along with a resilience and thriving scale to examine traditional Mexican values and U.S. mainstream values as predictors for thriving. The population for the study included 124 self-identified Mexican and Mexican American college students. The Cronbach's alpha for the MACVS ranged between .71 and .97. In a longitudinal study, Knight et al. (2014) examined, across seven years, variations in acculturation trajectories taken by Mexican immigrants. The MACVS version used in the study did not include the subscale of gender roles. Independent Variables There are four independent variables in this study: Mexicans, first-generation Mexican immigrants, second-generation Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians. Mexicans are people who identify as Mexican and who were born and currently live in Mexico. First-generation Mexican immigrants are individuals who identify as Mexican who migrated to the United States and who were born in Mexico. Second-generation immigrants are U.S.-born children whose parents are firstgeneration immigrants. U.S.-born Caucasians are people of European descent who were born in and currently live in the United States. 90 Pilot Study A pilot study was conducted to validate the survey instrument that was adapted from the existing survey questionnaire. The pilot study ensured that the questions were appropriate for my research situation and that all the items reliably measured what they were intended to measure for the study. Data were collected via a web-based survey and paper form surveys. With permission from the dean of research, I recruited 75 participants from a community college in California. I also recruited 25 participants from a university in Mexico. The students were at least 18 years old. They were asked for feedback after taking the initial survey to obtain face validity. I inquired about the difficulty of answering the questions, whether the items were confusing, upsetting, or contained difficult language, and I asked for suggestions of alternate ways to ask the same question. Various statistical tools (such as correlation coefficients and Cronbach's alpha, etc.) were used to test the reliability and validity of the measures. Data Analysis Plan The principal purpose of statistical analysis is to summarize and manipulate data to make inferences regarding the variables of a research problem (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). As mentioned in Chapter 1, four research questions helped guide this study. Guided by the research questions and based on literature review, I formulated eight null and alternative hypotheses. RQ1 – Are there significant differences in work-related cultural values between firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians? 91 H011: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score equal or lower on the cultural dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha11: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score higher on the cultural dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. RQ2 – Are the work-related cultural values of Mexican immigrants more in line with those of Mexico than with those of the United States? H012: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or higher on power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha12: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower on power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. H021: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or higher on religiosity and familism, and equal or lower in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement and independence and self-reliance than other and first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha21: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower on religiosity and familism, and higher in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal 92 achievement and independence and self-reliance than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. H022: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score equal or lower on the traditional Mexican cultural dimensions of religiosity and familism, and equal or higher in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement and independence and self-reliance than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha22: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score higher on the traditional Mexican cultural dimensions of religiosity and familism and lower in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement and independence and self-reliance than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. RQ3 – What are the differences in the preferred leadership styles among generations of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts? H031: Native Mexicans will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment and equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership scale than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha31: Native Mexicans will score higher on the paternalistic leadership scale and lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. H032: Mexican immigrants will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment and equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership scale than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. 93 Ha32: Mexican immigrants will score higher on the paternalistic leadership scale and lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. RQ4 – Are the preferred leadership styles of Mexican immigrants more in line with those of Mexico than with those of the United States? H041: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha41: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score higher in the leadership paternalistic leadership than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. H042: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha42: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than other first-generation immigrants. To analyze the data using SPSS, I followed a four-step process: 1) compile collected data to a database for ease of access by SPSS, 2) download the data from electronic surveys and type in the data from handwritten questionnaires, 3) review all data for completeness and errors (double entries) as I enter them into the database, and 4) 94 perform descriptive analysis, t-tests, and ANOVA to either accept or reject the null hypotheses. I maintained a journal to track the various statistical tests, coding development, database development, and completion of procedures, forms, and assessments chronologically. Hypotheses Testing The first four hypotheses are concerned with the acculturation of values. Specifically, the focus of H011 and H012 is on work-related cultural values, and Hypotheses 3 and 4 focus on traditional values. I tested Hypotheses H011 and H012 by calculating the scores on power distance (PD), gender egalitarianism (GE), and status attribution (SA) for the samples of native Mexicans (NM), Mexican immigrants (MI, FM, SM, & YI), and U.S.-born Caucasians (US) and compared to one another. In H011, the comparison was between Mexicans and the combined sample of immigrants against the United States sample. This hypothesis was put in place to help to compare the alignment of the preferences of firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants to those of native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians. In H012, the comparison was between the generations of Mexican immigrants accounting for age at migration. Consistent with Taras's (2008) IWoRC instrumentation, the coding for these variables was so that a low score indicates a preference for PD, GE, and SA and a higher degree of acculturation To test H021and H022, I calculated and compared the traditional Mexican values of familism (FL) and religiosity (RG), and U.S. mainstream values of material success (MS), competition and personal achievement (CPA), and independence and self-reliance (ISR) for all samples. In H021, the comparison was between Mexicans and the combined 95 sample of immigrants against the United States sample. This hypothesis were put in place to help to compare the alignment of the preferences of firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants to those of native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians. In H022, the comparison was between the generations of Mexican immigrants accounting for age at migration. The coding for these variables was so that a high score indicates a preference for RG, FL, MS, and ISR. A greater score in MS, CPA, and ISR indicates greater degree of acculturation. The last 4 Hypotheses deal with leadership preferences. Specifically, the hypotheses focus on the preferences by native Mexicans, Mexican immigrants, and U.S.born Caucasians for paternalistic leadership (PL) or servant leadership based on the factors of sense of oneness (SO), sense of direction (SD), and feeling of empowerment (FE). I tested the hypotheses by calculating the scores on PL and variables SO, SD, and FE for the various samples and comparing them to each other. In H031and H032, I compared leadership preferences between Mexicans and the combined sample of immigrants against the United States sample. These hypotheses were put in place to help to compare the alignment of the preferences of firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants to those of native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians. In H041and H042, I compared leadership preferences between the generations of Mexican immigrants, accounting for age at migration. The coding for these variables was so that a high score indicates a preference for either leadership style. Threats to Validity Assessing validity is ensuring the study measures components as intended. Internal factors threaten the legitimacy and precision of the research, while external 96 factors threaten its generalizability and representativeness (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). In addition to external and internal threats, validity relates to the theory behind the test. Construct validation is about the relationships between theory and the variables being measured. External Validity External validity is concerned with the generalizability of the findings to other segments of the population and the ability of other researchers to duplicate the study and reach the same conclusions. Because of money and time constraints, I did not include many possibly influencing variables in this study. I limited the design of this research to the acculturation experiences of one cultural group in a single foreign country. The acculturation experience may be different for other cultural groups as well as in other nations. Antecedents to migration have an effect on the speed of acculturation and on the strategy used. Differences in cultural attributes between the country from which people emigrate and the country to which they immigrate, as well the motive for migrating, may influence the strategy used for acculturation (Samnani, Boekhorst, & Harrison, 2013). In this study, however, I measured the similarity between the values of immigrants and those of the host and original country. By measuring acculturation positively, I reduced the threat to validity (Taras, 2008). Although I assumed representativeness with the selected sample, in reality, it is impossible to achieve. The United States is highly diverse, and cultural differences exist among all 50 states (Harrington & Gelfand, 2014). Similarly, Mexico is a highly diverse society with ecological and anthropological differences across the country that may signify intranational cultural variances. Finding representative samples that embrace 97 within-country cultural differences would be prohibitive in terms of practicality and cost. The technological limitations of the possible participants exasperate the threat. Not all potential participants may have access to computers to take the survey. I addressed this issue by allowing people to take the questionnaire via paper and pencil. I limited the generalizability of the results to Mexican immigrants living in the San Francisco Bay area. Internal Validity The mere process of answering a questionnaire may threaten internal validity, this is the interaction or reactive effect (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). When people take surveys, the knowledge that they are being tested may alter their attitudes. The participant's state of mind and their environment was unknown and beyond my control, thus affecting consistency or standardization. The biases of the participants were also unknown and could have an impact on external validity. I mitigated this threat by having subjects selfadminister the survey and by encouraging them to find a stress-free, non-distracting setting within which to answer the questionnaire. As with most cross-cultural research, history and maturation can present a threat to internal validity. History refers to what occurs during the time elapsed between measures that may affect the participants, and maturation refers to the changes of the participants over time (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Using archival data to compare to newly collected data would threaten the internal validity of the study as values and extraneous circumstances may have changed over time. Attitudes in the United States toward immigrants and the political and socio-economic climate of Mexico may have changed since previous data collection. I used primary data for all variables in my study. 98 Collecting data at the same time from the various participants across both countries helped mitigate history and maturation threats. Maturation, however, may present an additional threat as Mexicans who migrated to the United States more than a decade ago may have a different perspective, and their reason for leaving Mexico may no longer be valid. I mitigated this threat by independently assessing the positive changes in values across only two generations of immigrants and collecting data about the age of the participants, age at migration, the motive for migrating, and educational background. Construct Validity Construct validity connects psychometric design to theoretical design, a way to validate the underlying theory of the instrument (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Are the variables being measured representative of the construct being investigated? With this in mind, I based the operationalization of the variables for leadership and values on the definitions given by validated instruments used to measure such variables. Using popular and previously validated instruments ensures that the survey measures the constructs of leadership, work-related cultural values, and acculturation accurately and reliably. Although I modified the instruments, I did so to solicit individual beliefs instead of societal ones and specifically address the views of Mexican immigrants. An additional threat to construct validity is convergence. Convergence means that measurements from various sources collected differently will indicate a similarity in the meaning of the construct (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). When translating an instrument, there is a possibility that the translated instrument does not measure the same construct as the one in the original language. This problem could be due to the lack of equivalent words in the other language, in this case, Spanish. I mitigated this issue by having the questions 99 translated into Spanish by one person and then backward translating them into English. As recommended by Hofstede (2001), the translator was not only familiar with English from the United States and Spanish from Mexico, but also familiar with the context of the study to use the proper contextual transpositions: equivalents that express the intended meaning and not the apparent meaning. I compared the backward translated questionnaire to the original to ensure consistency. I discussed any discrepancy with the translator for proper selection of words. Ethical Procedures I applied for approval for this study to the Institutional Review Board of Walden University. I had verbal commitments from professors in Veracruz, Mexico, to help me distribute the survey. I also had an oral agreement from the Directors at a local nonprofit organization to have the family advocates distribute a recruitment package to families. The package included a paper survey for people with technology limitations, a return envelope, and the invitation and informed consent -this ensured the anonymity of participants. I had permission from two local community colleges to access their students via email for purposes of this study. The only risk anticipated was the stress participants might experience associated with answering questions about their personal preferences and values. There were no other anticipated risks to the study participants because I did not request any personal nor identification data from participants, and I collected data via a third party through an online survey or paper survey. Potential participants received an invitation via email or hand-delivery by either family advocates in the United States or professors in Mexico. The invitation clearly stated that the participant had the option to accept or reject participation and that any 100 information collected would be kept strictly confidential. It included details about myself and about the survey, including procedures, assessment instruments, time requirement, and contact information for the review board and myself. The invitation also indicated that completion of the questionnaire indicated acknowledgment and understanding of the terms related to participation in the study. Participants submitted electronic surveys online, and I downloaded them to a single database compatible with SPSS. Paper surveys were mailed to a PO Box, and I manually transferred them to the database once all of them were received. I stored electronic data in a password-protected external drive kept secure in a lockbox along with the paper surveys. Summary In Chapter 3, I discussed in-depth the methodology to collect data to investigate the effects of acculturation on the cultural values, work-related cultural values, and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. The chapter began with a discussion of the rationale for the use of survey design. Next, I discussed the methodology, including population, sampling procedures, recruitment, and distribution and collection of the questionnaires. In Chapter 3, I also explained how I would derive instrumentation from several existing and validated instruments. Subsequently, I presented the data analysis plan followed by how I addressed threats to validity and ethical concerns to ensure the anonymity of participants and the security of data collected. In Chapter 4, I exhibit the results of data analysis and answers to the stated research questions. 101 Chapter 4: Results The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. I designed the survey-based quantitative comparative study to investigate differences in workrelated cultural values and leadership preferences of Mexicans, first generation Mexican immigrants, second generation Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians. The study was limited to two counties in the Greater San Francisco Bay Area and Veracruz, Mexico. I hypothesized that the values and leadership preferences of first-generation Mexican immigrants would be consistent with those of Mexicans rather than with those of U.S.-born Caucasians. I also hypothesized that the personal values of secondgeneration Mexican immigrants would align with those from Mexicans and that their leadership preferences and work-related values would align with those of U.S.-born Caucasians. This chapter begins with a description of the data collection timeframe as well as actual recruitment and response rates and discrepancies in data collection from the initial plan presented in Chapter 3. Then, I report the baseline descriptive and demographic characteristics of the sample and describe the representativeness of the population of interest. Next, I present the findings of the statistical analysis, organized by research hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a summary of the four research questions 102 Pilot Study I conducted a pilot study after receiving IRB approval to validate the adapted survey instrument and to ensure the reliability of the all the items in the questionnaire. The IRB approval number for this study was 09-26-18-0311385. I distributed the survey to employees of a local nonprofit, to students of local community college, and to students of a university in Veracruz, Mexico after obtaining the appropriate approvals from officials at each institution. The survey was available in English and Spanish. To obtain face validity, participants evaluated the survey after completing it. They provided feedback about the difficulty of answering the questions and whether the questions were confusing, upsetting or contain difficult language. 103 people between the ages of 20 and 92 responded to the survey. I used four existing instruments to develop the survey, and three of them were modified. In the servant leadership scale I included two items from each of the 10 subscales for servant leadership to measure three intermediary variables. The measure of sense of oneness included the subscales for listening, healing, empathy, and selfawareness. The measure of sense of direction included the subscales for foresight, conceptualization, and persuasion. The measure of feeling of empowerment included subscales for growth of people, building community, and stewardship. I eliminated the items related to universalism and artifactual acculturation from the work-related questionnaire. I modified the Mexican American Value Scale to exclude the gender roles subscale. A composite measure of familism included the subscales of familism support, familism obligations, and familism referent. 103 The analysis of the data showed that the median age of the participants was 44 and that 32% were Caucasians, 31% were Mexicans leaving in Mexico, 13% were firstgeneration Mexican immigrants, and 24% were second-generation Mexican immigrants. They were asked to assess their agreement with items referring to their leadership preferences (paternalistic and servant leadership), their work-related values, and their cultural values (Mexican values, U.S. mainstream values). After careful review of the feedback from participants, I simplified the instructions of each section of the survey to eliminate confusion about the point of view of the respondent. Some items were reworded to eliminate gender bias by changings the pronouns him and his to a combination of him or her and his or hers. Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Scales in the Pilot Study Scale Variables Mean Std. Dev. Number of Items Alpha Leadership Oneness 3.74 .638 8 0.81 Direction 3.95 .636 6 0.77 Empowerment 4.16 .688 6 0.83 Paternalism 3.05 .664 13 0.86 Work Values Power Distance 2.20 .853 6 0.79 Gender Egalitarianism 1.57 .635 5 0.70 Status Attribution 2.12 .689 6 0.68 Cultural Values Ind. & Selfreliance 3.71 .668 5 0.62 Material Success 1.63 .717 5 0.80 Comp. & Pers. Ach. 3.07 .918 4 0.74 Familism 3.50 .652 24 0.92 Religion 3.21 1.261 7 0.95 104 The descriptive statistics and internal consistency coefficients, Cronbach's alphas, for each scale were at an acceptable level ranging from 0.77 to 0.86 for leadership, from 0.68 to 0.99 for work-related values, and from 0.62 to 0.95 for cultural values (see Table 3). The coefficients of variability were 18% for leadership, 37% for work-related values, and 28% for personal values suggesting that the pattern of responses by participants in the pilot study did not vary much from each other within each scale. The correlation coefficients of all variables within their respective scales were positive. Data Collection The data collection period for the main study ran from January 7, 2019 through April 19, 2019. I collected data primarily through a web-based survey using eSurvey Creator. A paper version of the survey was used to collect data from participants who did not have access to a computer or who did not have the ability to use a computer. To gather data in the United States, I sent 5,867 invitations to students and staff at a local community college who self-reported to be either Mexican or non-Hispanic Caucasian. Additionally, 240 invitations were sent to the employees of a local nonprofit organization and 622 invitations were sent to families the organization serves who self-identified to be Hispanic or non-Hispanic Caucasian. To gather data from Mexico, the invitations were distributed to students of a large size University in Veracruz, Mexico with a population of over 80,000 students. I monitored the eSurvey Creator website periodically to check the status of the completed surveys. Although the sample size goal for the study was established at 240 (60 participants per group), 255 surveys were completed (64 Mexican, 60 U.S.-born Caucasian, 59 first generation immigrant, and 72 second generation immigrant). Of the 105 59 first-generation immigrants, 13 immigrated at an age of 6 years of age or younger. The total number of responses to the survey were 466 of which 424 were electronic and 42 were paper surveys. Of the 466 total participants, 10 (2.15%) dropped out after registering and 58 (12.45%) respondents were filtered out because of race (33), birthplace (1), wrong generation immigrant (18), and being Caucasian -Hispanic non-Mexican (6). Of the 398 eligible participants, 61 (15.33%) dropped out of the survey after completing the demographic section and 82 (20.60%) did not complete the survey in its entirety resulting in 255 completed surveys for a response rate of 64.07%. I used a demographic survey to collect basic non-identifiable information that to ensure eligibility of participants, to describe the characteristics of the population, and to sort the data into each of the four groups. Participants answered if they were Mexican or of Mexican descent, in which country they grew up, their race, and their country of birth. The participants also provided data about their education level, job industry, and their parent's country of birth, length of time in the United States, and race. I collected additional data to determine the size of the participants' family support group, their length of time in the United States, and their age at migration. As indicated in Table 4, the sample was skewed 74.51% women and 25.49% men. A similar gender composition existed across four different groups; the U.S.-born Caucasians were 86.67% women and 13.33% men, the first-generation Mexican immigrants were 73.91% women and 26.09% men, the second-generation Mexican immigrants were 79.17% women and 20.83% men, and young immigrants were 84.62% women and 15.38% men. The composition for native Mexicans was more evenly distribute with 56.25% women and 43.75% men. 106 Table 4 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Variables ALL US NM FM SM YM Age 39.85 44.02 41.86 50.67 29.06 32.31 Male % 25.49 13.33 43.75 26.09 20.83 15.38 Female % 74.51 86.67 56.25 73.91 79.17 84.62 Grade School 8.57 1 18 1 1 High School 13.06 8 7 9 10 1 Some College 34.29 22 4 11 42 7 AA/AS Degree 13.06 12 7 3 11 1 BA/BS Degree 17.96 13 22 2 7 2 MA/MS/MBA Degree 8.57 2 16 2 1 1 Post Graduate Degree 4.49 3 7 1 - - N 255 60 64 46 72 13 US – U.S.-born Caucasians. NM – Native Mexicans. FM – First-Generation Mexican Immigrants SM – Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants. YM – Young First-Generation Mexican Immigrants. The educational attainment of the participants varied greatly between the groups. The majority of U.S.-born Caucasian (86.67%), second-generation Mexican immigrants (84.72%), and young Mexican immigrants (84.62%) had a level of education of at least some college. The majority of native Mexicans (70.31%) had an education level of at least a BA/BS degree. On the other hand, the majority of first-generation Mexican immigrants (82.61%) had at the most a level of education of some college. As a group, the first-generation Mexican immigrants had a lower level of education. The average age of the participants was 39.85. The average age for the U.S.-born Caucasians was 44.02, for native Mexicans was 41.86, for first-generation immigrants was 50.67, for secondgeneration Mexican was 29.06, and for young immigrants was 32.31. On average, the 107 participants had at least some level of college education and it was mostly consistent across the groups. The greatest difference in education was in the first-generation immigrants group that had 35.19% of the participants with a grade school education level. Study Results Descriptive Statistics The descriptive statistics and internal consistency coefficients, Cronbach's alphas, were at an acceptable level for each of the scales as illustrated in Table 5. Work-related values scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.815 with each of the subscales ranging from 0.638 to 0.858. The Leadership scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.945 with each of the subscales ranging from 0.796 to 0.890. The values scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.937 with each of the subscales ranging from 0.602 to 0.953. The coefficients of variability were 21.32% for leadership, 38.26% for work-related values, and 28.73% for personal values suggesting that the pattern of responses by participants in the study did not vary much from each other within each scale. The correlation coefficients of all variables within their respective scales were positive. Measurement To address the research questions of the study I used t-tests and ANOVAs to compare the means of the variables. The use parametric tests with Likert type scales has been debated as theses scales are ordinal and the data are not normally distributed. Recent studies demonstrate that the assumption of normality can be ignored (see Blanca, Alarcon, Arnau, Bono, & Bendayan, 2017; Norman, 2010; Sullivan & Artino Jr, 2013). 108 Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of Scales Scale Variables Mean Std. Dev. N Alpha Leadership (0.945) Oneness 3.59 0.741 8 0.844 Direction 3.81 0.752 6 0.796 Empowerment 4.03 0.826 6 0.890 Paternalism 2.99 0.755 13 0.879 Work Values (0.815) Power Distance 2.08 0.708 6 0.638 Gender Egalitarianism 1.54 0.823 5 0.858 Status Attribution 2.30 0.735 6 0.680 Cultural Values (0.937) Ind. & Self-reliance 3.69 0.681 5 0.602 Material Success 1.61 0.647 5 0.751 Comp. & Pers. Ach. 3.10 0.918 4 0.718 Familism 3.58 0.747 24 0.936 Religion 3.10 1.342 7 0.953 Table 6 displays the Skewness and Kutosis of the scales which range from -1.117 to 1.608 for Skewness and from -1.294 to 2.027 for Kurtosis. The correlations of each variable were previously analyzed by the authors of each of the scales used in this study. The leadership scales, however, were tested separately for servant leadership and paternalistic leadership. Given that both scales measure similar aspects of leadership, a strong correlation between the items of both scales was expected. The correlation between items is shown in Appendix H. By definition, all people who migrated from Mexico to the U.S., regardless of age, are first-generation Mexican immigrants. However, I hypothesized that young firstgeneration Mexican immigrants would have different preferences than older first109 generation Mexican immigrants. With that in mind, I needed to separate first-generation Mexican immigrants into two groups and determine if there was significant difference between the mean scores of the two groups. I tested for normality in SPSS using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Table 6 Skewness and Kurtosis of the Scales Scale Variables Skewness Standard Error Kurtosis Standard Error Leadership Oneness -0.403 0.156 0.169 0.31 Direction -0.943 0.156 1.294 0.31 Empowerment -1.117 0.156 1.283 0.31 Paternalism 0.175 0.156 -0.109 0.31 Work Values Power Distance 0.938 0.156 1.522 0.31 Gender Egalitarianism 1.608 0.156 2.027 0.31 Status Attribution 0.304 0.156 -0.395 0.31 Cultural Values Ind. & Self-reliance -0.343 0.156 -0.297 0.31 Material Success 1.192 0.156 1.115 0.31 Comp. & Pers. Ach. 0.103 0.156 -0.66 0.31 Familism -0.442 0.156 0.384 0.31 Religion -0.087 0.156 -1.289 0.31 As shown in Table 7, the data were not normal for the gender egalitarianism and status attribution variables (p < .05) and normal for all other variables. Because the sample of young immigrants was small (n=13) and the data were not normal, I ran a Mann-Whitney test which showed that there was only a significant difference in the mean scores for gender egalitarianism, (U = 134.5, p = .002), for status attribution (U = 98.5, p 110 = .000), and for competition (U = 176, p = .028). Therefore, I did not split the firstgeneration Mexican immigrant group to test the hypotheses. Table 7 Mann-Whitney U test for first-generation and young Mexican immigrants MannWhitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2tailed) Exact Sig. (2tailed) Exact Sig. (1tailed) Point Probability SO 290.500 381.500 -0.156 0.876 0.881 0.441 0.004 SD 272.000 363.000 -0.495 0.620 0.628 0.314 0.003 FE 257.500 348.500 -0.763 0.446 0.453 0.226 0.003 PL 224.500 315.500 -1.364 0.173 0.176 0.088 0.001 PD 203.500 294.500 -1.666 0.096 0.097 0.048 0.001 GE 134.500 225.500 -2.975 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 SA 98.500 189.500 -3.630 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ISR 280.000 371.000 -0.234 0.815 0.821 0.410 0.004 MS 227.500 318.500 -1.235 0.217 0.221 0.110 0.002 CPA 176.000 267.000 -2.184 0.029 0.028 0.014 0.000 RG 264.000 355.000 -0.533 0.594 0.601 0.301 0.003 FL 247.500 338.500 -0.839 0.401 0.408 0.204 0.003 SO – Sense of Oneness, SD – Sense of Direction, FE – Feeling of Empowerment, PL – Paternalistic Leadership, PD – Power Distance, GE – Gender Egalitarianism, SA – Status Attribution, ISR – Independence and Self-Reliance, MS – Material Success, CPA – Competition and Personal Achievement, RG – Religiosity, FL – Familism Hypotheses Testing Eight hypotheses were developed to help address the four research questions that guided this study. The first two hypotheses are based on the acculturation of work-related cultural values. The following 2 Hypotheses are based on the acculturation of traditional values. The last 4 Hypotheses are based on the preferences of native Mexicans, Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians for paternalistic leadership or servant leadership based on the factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment. 111 Work-Related Cultural Values H011: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score equal or lower on the cultural dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha11: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score higher on the cultural dimensions of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Table 8 Means of Work-Related Values Acculturation between Caucasians, Mexicans, and Mexican immigrants PD GE SA US 1.9361 1.2900 1.9789 NM 2.1140 1.6164 2.6371 MI 2.1295 1.6231 2.2913 PD – Power Distance; GE – Gender Egalitarianism; SA – Status Attribution. US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; MI – Mexican Immigrants. As shown in Table 8, the mean scores of Mexicans and Mexican immigrants in the three work-related values of power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution were higher than the scores of U.S.-born Caucasians. A lower score indicates preference for low power distance, high gender egalitarianism, and attribution based on merit. An ANOVA revealed that the mean difference between groups for power distance was not statistically significant (p = .196). The mean difference between groups for gender egalitarianism and status attribution, however, was statistically significant (p = .024 and p = .000 respectively). A Tukey HSD post Hoc test revealed that the mean difference in gender egalitarianism between the U.S.-born Caucasian group and the 112 Mexican immigrant group was significant (p = .025) and insignificant between U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans (p = .072) and between native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants (p = .998). The test also showed that the mean differences in status attribution was significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans (p = .000), between native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants (p = .004), and between U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexican immigrants (p = .013). The null hypothesis is not rejected for power distance for all groups and for gender egalitarianism between the U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexican immigrant groups and between the native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants group. The null hypothesis is rejected for status attribution for all groups and for gender egalitarianism between the U.S.-born Caucasian group and the Mexican group. H012: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or higher on power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha12: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower on power distance, gender egalitarianism, and status attribution than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. 113 Table 9 Means of Work-Related Values Acculturation between Caucasians, Mexicans, FirstGeneration Mexican Immigrants, and Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants. PD GE SA US 1.9361 1.2900 1.9789 NM 2.1140 1.6164 2.6371 FM 2.2241 1.9862 2.4575 SM 2.0532 1.3306 2.1574 Total 2.07963 1.54183 2.301984 PD – Power Distance; GE – Gender Egalitarianism; SA – Status Attribution. US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; FM – 1st-Generation Mexican Immigrants; SM – 2nd-Generation Mexican Immigrants. As shown in Table 9, the mean scores of the first-generation Mexican immigrant group, which includes first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age, were higher than the mean scores of the second-generation Mexican immigrant group. As previously mentioned, there were no significant differences between the young Mexican immigrants and all other first-generation Mexican immigrants and the group was left intact. An independent t-test revealed that equal variances were assumed for status attribution (p = .074) and not assumed for power distance and gender egalitarianism (p = .041 and p = .000 respectively). The mean difference between the two groups for power distance was not significant, t(96.653) = 1.217, p = .227. The mean differences between the groups was significant for gender egalitarianism, t(87.103) = 3.820, p = .000, and status attribution, t(128) = 2.250, p = .026. The null hypothesis is not rejected for power distance. The null hypothesis is rejected for gender egalitarianism and status attribution. Additional tests. Given the results, I performed an ANOVA and Tukey HSD post Hoc test to compare the mean scores in status attribution and gender egalitarianism 114 between U.S.-born Caucasians, native Mexicans, and first and second generation Mexican immigrants with the intent to determine if the mean scores of the two generations of Mexican immigrants are closer to the mean scores of native Mexican immigrants or U.S.-born Caucasians.. The ANOVA revealed the difference between groups to be significant at p = .000 for status attribution and gender egalitarianism. The post Hoc test revealed that the difference in scores for status attribution were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .001) and between native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .001). The difference was not significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and secondgeneration immigrants (p = .457) and between native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .491). As for gender egalitarianism, the mean differences were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000) and between native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .001). There was no significant difference between the mean scores of U.S.-born Caucasians and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .991) and between native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .050). Figure 1 illustrates that, in terms of work-related values preferences, first-generation Mexican immigrants are more like native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants are more like U.S.-born Caucasians. First-generation Mexican immigrants do not perceive the abilities of men and women to be equal or may not be able to perform equally in work-related tasks. In contrast, second-generation Mexican immigrant appear to believe in gender egalitarianism just as much as U.S.-born Caucasians. 115 Figure 1. Comparison of work-related value preferences between native Mexicans (NM), first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM), second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM), and U.S.-born Caucasians (US). PD – power distance; GE – gender egalitarianism; SA – status attribution. Acculturation of Values H021: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or higher on religiosity and familism, and equal or lower in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance than other and first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha21: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower on religiosity and familism, and higher in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. 1.0000 1.5000 2.0000 2.5000 3.0000 P D G E S A US NM FM SM 116 Table 10 Means of Main Stream and Mexican Values between Caucasians, Mexicans, FirstGeneration Mexican Immigrants, and Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants RG FL MS CPA ISR US 2.572 3.238 1.430 2.514 3.479 NM 3.113 3.438 1.699 3.488 3.787 FM 3.611 3.967 1.710 3.428 3.820 SM 3.134 3.659 1.617 3.004 3.684 RG – Religiosity; FL – Familism; MS – Material Success; CPA – Competition and Personal Achievement; ISR – Independence and Self-Reliance. US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; FM – 1st-Generation Mexican Immigrants; SM – 2nd-Generation Mexican Immigrants. As previously mentioned, there were no significant differences between the young Mexican immigrants and all other first-generation Mexican immigrants and the group was left intact. As shown in Table 10, the mean scores of the first-generation Mexican immigrant group, which includes first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age, were higher than the mean scores of the second-generation Mexican immigrant group. A lower score indicates greater acculturation level. An independent ttest revealed that equal variances were assumed for all variables (p > .05). The differences in mean scores were significant for religiosity, t(128) = 2.018, p = .046, familism, t(128) = 2.567, p = .011, and competition and personal achievement, t(128) = 2.729, p = .007. The differences in mean scores were not significant for material success, t(128) = .743), p = .459, and independence and self-reliance, t(128) = 1.099, p = .274. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the variables of material success, competition and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance as the mean scores for Secondgeneration Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated 117 at a young age were equal or significantly lower than those of other first-generation Mexican immigrants. The null hypothesis is rejected for the variables of religiosity and familism. Table 11 Means of Main Stream and Mexican Values between Caucasians, Mexicans, and Mexican immigrants RG FL MS CPA ISR US 2.572 3.238 1.430 2.514 3.479 NM 3.113 3.438 1.699 3.488 3.787 MI 3.347 3.796 1.659 3.193 3.744 RG – Religiosity; FL – Familism; MS – Material Success; CPA – Competition and Personal Achievement; ISR – Independence and Self-Reliance. US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; MI – Mexican Immigrants. H022: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score equal or lower on the traditional Mexican cultural dimensions of religiosity and familism, and equal or higher in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement and independence and self-reliance than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha22: Native Mexicans and Mexican immigrants will score higher on the traditional Mexican cultural dimensions of religiosity and familism and lower in the U.S. mainstream values of material success, competition and personal achievement and independence and self-reliance than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. As shown in Table 11, the mean scores of the native Mexican and Mexican immigrant groups were higher than the mean scores of the U.S.-born Caucasian group. An ANOVA revealed that the mean difference between groups was significant for religiosity (p = .001), familism (p = .000), material success (p = .038), competition and 118 personal achievement (p = .000) and independence and self-reliance (p = .020). A Tukey HSD post Hoc test revealed that the mean difference in scores were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexican immigrants for religiosity (p = .001), familism (p = .000), competition and personal achievement (p = .000), and independence and selfreliance (p = .033). The mean differences between these two groups were not significant for material success (p = .060). The mean differences between U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans were significant for competition and personal achievement (p = .000), and independence and self-reliance (p = .033). The difference between these two groups was not significant for religiosity (p = .061), familism (p = .270), and material success (p = .055). The null hypothesis is not rejected for the variables of material success, competition and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance as the mean scores for U.S.-born Caucasians were lower than those of Mexicans and Mexican immigrants. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the variables of religiosity and familism between native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians. The null hypothesis is rejected for the variables of religiosity and familism between U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexican immigrants. Additional tests. Given the results, I performed an ANOVA and Tukey HSD post Hoc test to compare the mean scores of religiosity, familism, competition and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance between U.S.-born Caucasians, native Mexicans, and first and second generation Mexican immigrants with the intent to determine if the mean scores of the two generations of Mexican immigrants are closer to the mean scores of native Mexican immigrants or U.S.-born Caucasians. The ANOVA 119 revealed the mean differences to be significant (p = .000, p = .000, p = .000, and p = .027 respectively). The post Hoc test revealed that the differences in means were significant for religiosity between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000) and insignificant between U.S.-born Caucasians and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .068), between native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .157) and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = 1.000), and between first and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .163). This results indicate that first-generation Mexican immigrants value religion more than native Mexicans or second-generation Mexican immigrants, who seem to value religion equally. For familism, the differences were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000) and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .004), and between native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000); the differences were not significant between native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .269), and between first and secondgeneration Mexican immigrants (p = .065). Interestingly, native Mexicans scored closer to the scores of U.S.-born Caucasians than either of the two immigrant groups (Figure 2). For competition and personal achievement, the mean differences were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000, p = .005 respectively) and between native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .006), and between first and second-generations of Mexican immigrants (p = .023). The mean differences were not significant between native Mexican and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .980). For independence and self120 reliance, the mean differences were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants (p =.032). The mean differences were not significant for independence and self-reliance between all other groups (p > .05). Figure 2. Comparison of traditional values preferences between native Mexicans (NM), first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM), second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM), and U.S.-born Caucasians (US). RG – religiosity; FL – familism; MS – material success; CPA – competition and personal achievement; ISR – independence and selfreliance. As illustrated in Figure 2, these results indicate that first-generation Mexican immigrants have cultural value preferences that closely align with those of native Mexicans. The only exception is familism, which is interesting because native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians did not differ from each other significantly. The familism measure was composed of four factors: familism obligations, familism referents, familism support, and respect. These factors measure the importance of maintaining close affective relationships with family, parental guidance and support, family and society 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 R G F L M S C P A I S R US NM FM SM 121 acceptance, and intergenerational hierarchical conduct (Knight et al., 2010). In contrast, independence and self-reliance measures the preference for independence instead of group loyalty, teamwork and cooperation, and family integration. I performed an ANOVA and Tukey HSD post Hoc test to compare the mean scores of the familism factors of familism obligations, familism referents, familism support, and respect between native Mexicans, first-generation Mexican immigrants, second-generation Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians. The ANOVA revealed the mean differences to be significant (p = .000, p = .000, p = .000, and p = .000 respectively). The results of the post Hoc test suggest that native Mexicans have individual values closer to those of U.S.-born Caucasians than either one of the generations of Mexican immigrants (Figure 3). For familism obligation, there was a significant difference between first-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians (p = .009) and native Mexicans (p = .000), and between native Mexicans and secondgeneration Mexican immigrants (p = .001). All other group differences were not significant (p > .05). For familism referent, there was a significant difference between the mean scores of first-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians (p = .000), native Mexicans (p = .001), and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .026); and between the mean scores of second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians (p = .041). For familism support, there was a significant difference between U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans (p = .011), first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000), and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .001). For Respect, there was a significant difference between the U.S.-born Caucasians and the 122 firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .000, p = .018 respectively) and between native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .025). Figure 3. Comparison of familism factors and independence and self-reliance preferences between native Mexicans (NM), first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM), secondgeneration Mexican immigrants (SM), and U.S.-born Caucasians (US). FO – familism obligation; FR – familism referent; FS – familism support; RP – respect; ISR – independence and self-reliance. Figure 3 clearly illustrates that first-generation Mexican immigrants hold stronger traditional Mexican values than native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants. Native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants have very closely aligned values with the exception of familism obligation. Interestingly, familism obligation was stronger in U.S.-born Caucasians than in native Mexicans Figure 3 also shows that independence and self-reliance is stronger value for all Mexicans than for U.S.-born Caucasians. 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 F O F R F S R P I S R U.S. NM FM SM 123 Leadership Preferences H031: Native Mexicans will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment and equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership scale than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha31: Native Mexicans will score higher on the paternalistic leadership scale and lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Table 12 Means of Leadership Preferences between Caucasians, Mexicans, and Mexican immigrants SO SD FE PL US 3.319 3.694 3.956 2.608 NM 3.612 3.787 3.945 3.171 MI 3.710 3.866 4.112 3.076 SO – Sense of Oneness; SD – Sense of Direction; FE – Feeling of Empowerment; PL – Paternalistic Leadership. US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; MI – Mexican Immigrants. As shown in Table 12, the mean scores of the Native Mexican group were equal or higher than the mean scores of the U.S.-born Caucasian group. An independent t-test revealed that equal variance were assumed (p > .05). The differences in mean scores were significant for sense of oneness, t(120) = -2.166, p =.032, and for paternalistic leadership, t(121) = -4.302, p =.000. The mean differences were insignificant for sense of direction, t(120) = -.653, p = .515, and feeling of empowerment, t(120) = -.071, p = .994. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the variables of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and 124 feeling of empowerment as the mean scores for U.S.-born Caucasians were equal or lower than those of native Mexicans. The null hypothesis is rejected for the variable of paternalistic leadership as the mean scores of native Mexicans were higher than those of U.S.-born Caucasians. H032: Mexican immigrants will score equal or higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment and equal or lower in the paternalistic leadership scale than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. Ha32: Mexican immigrants will score higher on the paternalistic leadership scale and lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than their U.S.-born Caucasian counterparts. As shown in Table 12, the mean scores of the Mexican immigrant group were higher than the mean scores of the U.S.-born Caucasian group. An independent t-test revealed that equal variances were assumed (p > .05). The differences in mean scores were significant for sense of oneness, t(189) = -3.476, p =.001, and for paternalistic leadership, t(189) = -4.277, p =.000. The mean differences were not significant for sense of direction, t(189) = -1.527, p = .129, and feeling of empowerment, t(189) = -1.214, p = .226. The null hypothesis is not rejected for the variables of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment as the mean scores for U.S.-born Caucasians were equal or lower than those of native Mexicans. The null hypothesis is rejected for the variable of paternalistic leadership as the mean scores of native Mexicans were higher than those of U.S.-born Caucasians. 125 Alignment of Leadership Preferences H041: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or higher in the paternalistic leadership than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha41: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score lower in paternalistic leadership than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Table 13 Means of Leadership Preferences between Caucasians, Mexicans, First-Generation Mexican Immigrants, and Second-Generation Mexican Immigrants SO SD FE PL US 3.319 3.694 3.956 2.608 NM 3.613 3.787 3.945 3.171 FM 3.526 3.667 3.862 3.058 SM 3.861 4.030 4.317 3.092 SO – Sense of Oneness; SD – Sense of Direction; FE – Feeling of Empowerment; PL – Paternalistic Leadership. US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; FM – 1st-Generation Mexican Immigrants; SM – 2nd-Generation Mexican Immigrants. As previously mentioned, there were no significant differences between the young Mexican immigrants and all other first-generation Mexican immigrants and the group was left intact. As shown in Table 13, the mean scores of the first-generation Mexican immigrant group, which includes first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age, were lower than the mean scores of the Second-generation Mexican immigrants for paternalistic leadership. An independent t-test revealed that equal 126 variances were assumed (p > .05). The differences in mean scores were not significant, t(129) = -.268, p =.789. The null hypothesis is not rejected. H042: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score equal or lower in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than other first-generation Mexican immigrants. Ha42: Second-generation Mexican immigrants and first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age will score higher in the servant leadership questionnaire factors of sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment than other first-generation immigrants. As shown in Table 13, the mean scores of the first-generation Mexican immigrant group, which includes first-generation Mexican immigrants who migrated at a young age, were lower than the mean scores of the Second-generation Mexican immigrants for sense of oneness, sense of direction, and feeling of empowerment. An independent t-test revealed that equal variance were not assumed (p < .05). The differences in mean scores were significant for sense of oneness, t(104.426) = -2.692, p =.008, for sense of direction, t(102.702) = -2.854, p = .005, and feeling of empowerment, t(82.843) = -3.027, p = .003. The null hypothesis is rejected. Additional tests. Given the results, I performed an ANOVA and Tukey HSD post Hoc test to compare the mean scores of sense of oneness, sense of direction, feeling of empowerment and paternalistic leadership between U.S.-born Caucasians, native Mexicans, and first and second generation Mexican immigrants with the intent to determine if the mean scores of each of the generations of Mexican immigrants is closer 127 to the mean scores of native Mexican immigrants or U.S.-born Caucasians. The ANOVA revealed that the scores between groups were different (p = .000, p = .020, p = .006, and p = .000 respectively). The post Hoc test results show that the mean differences were significant for sense of oneness between second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians (p = .000). The difference between native Mexicans and the two generations of Mexican immigrants and between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants were insignificant (p > .05) for sense of oneness. For sense of direction, the mean differences were significant between second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians (p = .05). The difference between native Mexicans and the two generations of Mexican immigrants and between U.S.-born Caucasians and firstgeneration Mexican immigrants were not significant (p > .05). For feeling of empowerment, the mean differences were significant between native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .043). The difference between U.S.-born Caucasians and the two generations of Mexican immigrants and between native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants were not significant (p > .05). For paternalism, the differences in mean scores were significant between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .005) and second-generation Mexican immigrants (p = .001); the differences were not significant (p > .05) between native Mexicans and either of the two generations of Mexican immigrants. As illustrated in Figure 4, second-generation Mexican immigrants have a greater preference for servant leadership than any of the other groups. First-generation Mexican immigrants and native Mexicans have the same level of leadership preferences. All 128 Mexican groups have greater preference for paternalistic leadership than U.S.-born Caucasians. Figure 4. Comparison of leadership preferences between native Mexicans (NM), firstgeneration Mexican immigrants (FM), second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM), and U.S.-born Caucasians (US). SO – sense of oneness; SD – sense of direction; FE – feelings of empowerment; PL – paternalistic leadership. Given the significant difference in preference for paternalistic leadership between all Mexican groups and U.S.-born Caucasians, I examined the scores on each of individual items that make up the scale (see Appendix I) to identify where the big difference was between the groups. An ANOVA and Tukey HSD post Hoc test revealed some significant differences and interesting observations, which are illustrated in figure 5. 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 S O S D F E P L U.S. NM FM SM 129 Figure 5. Comparison of paternalistic leadership scale items between native Mexicans. (NM), first-generation Mexican immigrants (FM), second-generation Mexican immigrants (SM), and U.S.-born Caucasians (US). P1 – P13 are the individual items of the paternalistic leadership scale. The ANOVA indicated that there were significant differences between groups for items 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12 (p < .05). The post Hoc test results show for item 2, that the mean differences were significant between the U.S.-born Caucasians and the native Mexicans and the first-generation Mexican immigrants. For item 3, there was a significant difference between the U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans. For items 5, 6, and 10, there was a significant difference between the U.S.-born Caucasians and all the Mexican groups. For item 8, there was a significant difference between the secondgeneration Mexican immigrants and all other groups. For item 9, there was a significant difference between U.S.-born Caucasians and second-generation Mexican immigrants. For item 12, there was a significant difference between U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants. 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 1 0 P 1 1 P 1 2 P 1 3 U.S. NM FM SM 130 Summary The purpose of this quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Eight hypotheses were tested, two were about the acculturation of workrelated values, two were about acculturation of cultural values and four were about leadership preferences. While not all the hypothesis were rejected, the results lead to additional tests to help determine the acculturation level of Mexican immigrants and the alignment of leadership preferences with either the native Mexican group or the U.S.born Caucasians group. The results of the study indicate that while second-generation Mexican immigrants have nearly fully acculturated in regard to work-related values, they have not reached the same level of acculturation for traditional values. The result also indicate that regardless of acculturation level, Mexicans prefer a paternalistic leadership style. In chapter 5, I discuss the test results of chapter 4 by interpreting the findings, making recommendations for future research, and describing the potential implications of the study. 131 Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations The purpose of this survey-based quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Specifically, I compared the values and preferences of two generations of Mexican immigrants to those of U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexicans to determine if they change after migration. Findings indicated that while the work-related values of Mexican immigrants nearly fully acculturated, their cultural values and leadership preferences did not. In this chapter, I provide an interpretation of findings, followed by discussions on the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and potential implications of the study for positive social change. Last, I conclude the research study. Interpretation of Findings According to the literature, values and leadership preferences vary across nations based on culture. These differences are noticeable even between countries that share a border. Several large international studies have reached similar conclusions. What is not necessarily clear, is what happens to these values when a person migrates to another country. In this study I surveyed Mexicans living in Mexico, first-generation Mexican immigrants, second-generation Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians to determine at an individual level, their work-related cultural values, leadership preferences, and level of agreement with traditional Mexican cultural values and U.S. mainstream cultural values. I compared and contrasted the results between each of the four groups to determine the level of acculturation of each of the Mexican immigrant 132 groups and the effects that acculturation had on the leadership preferences and workrelated values of Mexican immigrants. Acculturation of Values Most of the cross-cultural research that exists on values has been conducted at a societal level and across nations (e.g., Rodriguez & Brown, 2014; Saucier et al., 2015; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2012). While this research is essential for organizations when the intent is to send employees to work in other countries, it does not inform organizations that hire immigrants or that employ a highly culturally diverse population. People who grow up under the influence of one culture tend to develop values that closely align with the beliefs and practices of that culture (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Rossberger & Krause, 2014; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). When people migrate, they may face new environments, a new language, new customs, and their values may no longer align with the new culture. Immigrants need to acculturate and decide what values to keep, what values to discard, and what new values to adopt in addition to possibly learning a new language and getting used to new customs, behaviors, and cuisine. The acculturation process is not linear, and it may take decades to occur. Taras (2008) found that the speed of acculturation is not the same at the artifactual level than at a value level and that it may take more than 20 years for people to assimilate into a new culture. In a new country, immigrants may learn the language, adopt clothing style, and develop a taste for local food long before they change their value system. Because acculturation at the artifactual level may occur due to necessity such as language, or because of the availability of resources such as food and clothing, I assessed acculturation strictly at the value level. 133 While immigrants may acculturate at the value level at a slow pace, acculturation does not necessarily occur equally at home and work. Therefore, I used work-related values and cultural values to measure acculturation. According to Berry's (1997) model of acculturation, immigrants could use two different acculturation strategies and may develop two sets of values that could become salient under the right situation. This strategy may also be valid for the children of immigrants who grow up under a dual set of values: one set being taught to them by their parents who may still be acculturating, and another set being shown through social encounters and media exposure. The difference would be that children of immigrants may develop work-related values closer to those of the host country at the same time as they develop a second set of values that may be aligned closer to their cultural background. Work-Related Cultural Values. The results of this study confirm that children of immigrants, second-generation Mexican immigrants, develop a set of work-related values; power distance, status attribution, and gender egalitarianism; closely aligned to those of the host country. The work-related values of second-generation Mexican immigrants were not significantly different than those of U.S.-born Caucasians. The results also confirm that immigrants, in this study first-generation Mexican immigrants, retain their work-related cultural values, and value them at a higher level than native Mexicans. The work-related values of first-generation Mexican immigrants were more aligned to those of native Mexicans. For power distance, the results of the study align with findings in the literature. Power distance refers to the levels of acceptance and expectation of inequalities among individuals and the unequal distribution of power within an organization. While Mexico 134 is often viewed as a high power distance society (Dorfman et al., 2012; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004) and researchers continue to use this assumption in their studies (e.g. Karl, Peluchette, & Hall, 2016; Madlock, 2018), the individual level preference is far from it. The GLOBE researchers (House et al., 2004) found that people from Mexico and the U.S. prefer a low power distance society rather than high. A low power distance suggests an egalitarian society where social power and importance is somewhat equal among all members (Ahern et al., 2015). The scores at the individual level were 2.85 for both countries in the GLOBE study, indicating a preference for low power distance. The difference in scores in this study for all groups was insignificant, and it ranged from 1.93 to 2.22. The lower scores are supported by the findings by Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) concerning value change. Beugelsdijk et al. found that power distance decreases over time as countries modernize. Power distance has also been found to be similar between the United States and Mexico in recent studies. In a cross-cultural study by Rodriguez and Brown (2014), Mexico scored 27.5 and the United States scored 25.87 in power distance at a societal level. Findings from this study suggest that Mexican immigrants may find it easy to accept a low power distance environment, making it easier to adjust to the dynamics of the work environment that exists in the United States. For status attribution, the results aligned with the findings by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2012). Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner found that Mexico is an ascriptive society yet respects people based on achievement and that the United States places status on people based on achievement and is a culture that believes in getting things done even through self-sacrifice. The findings of this study indicate that Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants prefer an ascriptive society in which status and 135 respect given may depend on age, professional experience, and qualifications, education, or a combination of these. In contrast, U.S.-born Caucasians and second-generation Mexican immigrants were found to prefer a more achievement-oriented society in which people use titles when relevant to task competence; superiors gain respect through their expertise, skills, and effectiveness at their jobs; senior management varies in age and gender based on job proficiency; and staff challenge decisions based on functionality and technical functionality. Based on these results, first-generation Mexican immigrants may find it challenging to work under a supervisor that they do not perceive to have higher qualifications than them or who may be younger than they are. They would respect the individual because of their rank and position. For gender egalitarianism, the results were interesting. As expected, secondgeneration Mexican immigrants had scores similar to those of U.S.-born Caucasians, and first-generation Mexican immigrants had scores closer to those of Native Mexicans. While the scores of U.S.-born Caucasians were significantly lower than those of firstgeneration Mexican immigrants for gender egalitarianism, they were not significantly lower than those of native Mexicans. The closeness in scores between native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians could have two different interpretations. One, Mexicans prefer a more gender equal society. Two, the educational attainment and gender composition of the sample of native Mexicans skewed the results of the assessment. While there is a high possibility that the results of this study are skewed, the findings are in agreement with the literature. Consistent with Taras's (2008) IWoRC instrumentation, coding for the work-related cultural values were set so that a low score indicates a preference for the value. Mexicans scored 1.62, and U.S.-born Caucasians 136 scored 1.29 in gender egalitarianism. The similarity in preferences at the individual level for gender egalitarianism matches the results from the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004), in which higher scores indicated a higher preference. Mexico scored 4.73 in values, and the U.S. scored 5.06 at the individual level for gender egalitarianism. Cultural Values. The results from this study confirm that Mexican immigrants tend to retain their traditional cultural values and pass them on to their children. Acculturation of cultural values was measured by comparing the preferences of Mexican immigrants for religiosity, familism, material success, competitions and personal achievement, and independence and self-reliance, and determining if they aligned with the preferences of U.S.-born Caucasians or native Mexicans. For religiosity, first-generation Mexican immigrants were found to be more religious than any of the other groups with a score of 3.61. The scores of native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants were nearly identical (3.11 and 3.13 respectively) and not too far different than the scores of U.S.-born Caucasians (2.57). These results could be attributed to the level of education of the participants in each group. The majority of U.S.-born Caucasian (86.67%) and second-generation Mexican immigrants (84.71%) had a level of education of at least some college. The majority of native Mexicans (70.31%) had an education level of at least a BA/BS degree and nearly half (49%) of the first-generation Mexican immigrants had less than some college education. These findings are supported by the literature which indicates that higher education levels negatively affect religiosity (Hungerman, 2014; Schwadel, 2015, 2016). Given the findings, Mexican immigrants appear to retain and perpetuate their religious beliefs. 137 For familism, as a composite variable, the results were consistent with what is found in the literature. As expected, all Mexican groups scored high on familism (Campos et al., 2014). The differences between native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians were insignificant, which are attributable to the individual factors of familism. When analyzing the individual components of familism, U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans had similar preferences for familism obligation and familism referent and significantly different preferences for familism support and respect. Firstgeneration Mexican immigrants scored the highest in all the familism components and the second-generation Mexican immigrants and native Mexicans scored nearly equal on familism referent, familism support, and respect. These findings indicate that the importance of maintaining close affective relationships with family is just as crucial for native Mexicans as it is for U.S.-born Caucasians and that the concern is even more significant for firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants (Knight et al., 2010). The importance of family and society acceptance is of higher importance to firstgeneration Mexican immigrants than to native Mexicans, second-generation Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians. The scores on respect and familism support were significantly lower for U.S.-born Caucasians than for all of the Mexican groups. Between the Mexican groups, it was equally crucial for native Mexicans and second-generation Mexican immigrants, and of highest importance to first-generation Mexican immigrants. The relatively close scores between the Mexican immigrant groups are consistent with findings in the literature that indicate that Mexicans maintain and transmit traditional values throughout generations (Calderón-Tena, et al., 2011; Gonzales et al., 2008; Wong-Mingli et al., 2014). The high 138 preference for familism by Mexican immigrants may benefit them at work. Familism has been identified as a socialization process geared toward helping family members that can be applied toward other group affiliations (Knight & Carlo, 2012; Knight, Carlo, Basilo, & Jacobson, 2015). It has been found that Mexican immigrants seek social support and express a desire to help others who face similar challenges as they do (Campos et al., 2016; Gonzales et al., 2008; Morgan Consoli Morgan, Llamas, Cabrera, Noriega, & Gonzalez, 2014). In a work setting, Mexican immigrants may find it easier to thrive in cooperative environments. The low education level of first-generation Mexican immigrants could explain why the group scored the highest, low acculturation, in religiosity, familism obligation, familism referent, familism support, and respect. Sexton (1979) found that formal education accelerates acculturation because the higher potential exposure to the host culture through a variety of media. A second explanation could be that immigrants from countries that are highly represented, such as Mexico, acculturate at a slower pace (Taras et al., 2013). Another interpretation is that the cultural values in Mexicans have been slowly changing becoming more like those in the United States. There is a duality to acculturation, while new members to a society adapt to the dominant culture, the members of the dominant culture adopt some of the aspects of the new member's culture (Berry, 2005). The increase of U.S. businesses operating in Mexico (Schafran & Monkkonen, 2017), and the exposure to and propagation of American lifestyle through media (e.g. social media, movies, television) could be creating a shift in Mexican values (Ladhari, Souiden, & Choi, 2015). 139 For the mainstream values, all Mexican groups scored equally on material success and independence and self-reliance. Although the U.S.-born Caucasians scored lower than Mexicans and Mexican immigrants, the difference was not significant. Neither of the groups believes in materiality as a path to happiness, and all of them think that learning to be independent is vital for them and their children. This finding is another similarity in cultural values at the individual level between the U.S. and Mexico. The difference, however, was found in competition and personal achievement. Only native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants had similar scores. The scores of second-generation Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians were different from each other and from native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants. The U.S.-born Caucasians score the lowest while native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants score the highest, clearly showing that first-generation Mexican immigrants have maintained their cultural values in respect to this factor and second-generation Mexican immigrants have acculturated to a degree. The results from this study align with the findings by Nieri and Bermudez-Parsai (2014) that the acculturation differences between Mexican immigrants and their children were more common along the U.S. mainstream values than along the Mexican values. What is interesting is that U.S.-born Caucasians were expected to value competition and personal achievement more than Mexicans because competition is valued at a higher level in individualistic societies than in collectivistic societies (Greenfield & Quiroz, 2013), yet it was ultimately the opposite. This could be explained by a possible shift in values occurring in Mexico due to modernization or Americanization. Inglehart and Baker (2000) demonstrated that values change overtime as countries modernize. Their 140 research showed that the values of people in Mexico changed from 1981 to 1996 becoming more secular-rational and giving more importance to self-expression, suggesting that Mexico is becoming more individualistic (Basabe & Ros, 2005). During the same timeframe, people in the United States simply gave more priority to their selfexpression values, which align with egalitarianism. Leadership Preferences The results of the study confirm findings in the literature that Mexicans prefer a democratic paternalistic leadership style (Castaño et al., 2015; Ruiz et al., 2013; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2012) rather than non-participative and autocratic paternalistic style of leadership as often suggested in large cross-cultural studies (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner,, 2012). The findings of this study indicate that Mexicans have a preference for low power distance. People with this view expect their leaders to rely on experience, consult with subordinates, and have no special privileges (Hofstede, 2001). These results also align with the findings by Littrell and Cruz Barba (2013), Martínez Méndez et al. (2013), and Ruiz et al. (2013) that Mexicans prefer a paternalistic, democratic, and participative leadership style. The scores of the Mexican groups in gender egalitarianism also suggest the preference for democratic, self-sacrificing, collectively oriented, responsive, and informal leaders who have foresight and enthusiasm without being secretive, self-centered, or status-conscious (House et al., 2004). The additional test performed on the items of paternalistic leadership further confirm the findings by Ruiz et al. (2013) that Mexicans prefer a participative leadership style. In item 8, consults his/her employees on job 141 matters, first-generation Mexican immigrants scored 3.86, native Mexicans scored 3.89, and second-generation Mexican immigrants scored 4.33. In contrast, in item 11, makes decisions on behalf of his/her employees without asking for their approval, the score on the Mexican groups were 1.98, 2.60, and 1.99, respectively. The contrasting scores indicate the preference for democracy. While the preference for a paternalistic leadership style is stronger in Mexicans than U.S.-born Caucasians, Mexicans have an even stronger preference for a servant leadership style. This notion supports the recent study of Michaud et al. (2019) who found that Mexicans prefer empowering and servant leaders who use effective communication, inspire, involve the group in decision making, provide support, and motivate. The preference for servant leadership could also be attributed to the preference for low power distance as indicated by Mittal and Dorfman (2012). Of the three Mexican groups, the second-generation Mexican immigrants had the highest preference for servant leadership. Based on the findings in this study, Mexican immigrants, regardless of generation, would benefit from a servant leadership style with some aspects of paternalism; particularly around creating a family environment in the workplace, helping employees with issues outside of work, and taking personal interest in the wellbeing of the employees and their families offering advice to them as an elder in the family (Heidrich, Németh, & Chandler, 2016; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006; Ruiz & Hamlin, 2018). The strong alignment of the individual values of all Mexicans groups with those of U.S.-born Caucasians, particularly around independence and self-reliance, suggests that Mexican immigrants do not expect their leaders to solve problems for them, but instead, 142 to help them as needed. The results align with the finding by Ruiz and Hamlin (2018) that Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians have similar preferences for leadership style. The strong familism scores of firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants, particularly familism support, point to their need for leaders who have an understanding and sensitivity to family needs, help with problem-solving, and make special work arrangements to assist employees in times of need. Baeza, Gonzalez, and Wang, (2018) suggested that job flexibility would bring satisfaction to Mexican workers as it would align with their cultural beliefs and values. Acculturation did not have a significant effect on the leadership preferences of first-generation Mexican immigrants. Their preferences for each aspect of servant leadership was nearly identical to the preferences of native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians. These findings indicate that first-generation Mexican immigrants living in Solano and Napa counties can easily incorporate into the workforce in the United States as their expectations for leadership are the same as those of U.S.-born Caucasians (Ruiz & Hamlin, 2018). The effect of acculturation on second-generation Mexican immigrants was minor. The preferences of this group deviated slightly from firstand native Mexicans. Second-generation Mexican immigrants had a significantly stronger preference for all aspects of servant leadership and some elements of paternalistic leadership than U.S,-born Caucasians, indicating that they feel the need to be engaged, have a sense of purpose (Van Dierendonck, & Patterson, 2015), and prefer a family style environment (Heidrich et al., 2016). 143 Summary of Findings This study was used to examine the extent to which acculturation affects the work-related cultural values and leadership preferences of Mexican immigrants in the United States of America and compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. The findings indicated that first-generation Mexican immigrants selected separation as their acculturation strategy (Berry, 1997); they firmly hold on to traditional Mexican values and work-related cultural values while rejecting the mainstream values of the United States. The scores of second-generation Mexican immigrants in traditional Mexican values and U.S. mainstream values were not significantly different from either Native Mexicans or U.S.-born Caucasians, indicating that they are using integration as their acculturation strategy for these set of values (Nieri et al., 2016). As for work-related values, second-generation Mexican immigrants chose to assimilate into the U.S. cultural view, or simply developed such values as they grew up in the United States (Fitzsimmons, 2013). As hypothesized, second-generation Mexican immigrants, seem to display biculturalism; they seek more significant cultural maintenance when surrounded by family than when at work or in a public environment (Nieri & Bermudez-Parsai, 2014). These observations confirm the assumptions made during the literature review that second-generation Mexican would develop work-related values independent from other cultural values learned from their family members. While the acculturation strategy selected by firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants is different, it was found that there were not many differences in work-related cultural values between Mexicans, Mexican immigrants, and U.S.-born Caucasians. 144 Acculturation did not seem to have a great effect on leadership style preferences of Mexican immigrants. First-generation Mexican immigrants have preferences nearly identical to those of native Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians (Ruiz & Hamlin, 2018). The only exception being that U.S.-born Caucasians did not have as much desire for a paternalistic style leadership as the Mexican groups did. The second-generation Mexican immigrants, while maintaining the same level of preference for paternalistic leadership as native Mexicans and first-generation Mexican immigrants, had a stronger preference for all aspects of servant leadership. U.S.-born Caucasians and firstand second-generation Mexican immigrants desire to have a leader who inspires and motivates them, involves them in decision making, provides support, and is concerned about their well-being and personal development (Castaño et al., 2015; Michaud et al., 2019; & Ruiz et al., 2013). Based on this desire, organizations that employ a Mexican workforce would benefit from adopting a servant leadership style and from offering flexible schedules allowing employees to attend to family matters as they arise. Limitations of the Study There were three primary limitations of the study. The first limiting factor was data collection. I needed to collect data from participants living in the U.S. and Mexico. Data collected in Mexico was done electronically through a University and therefore was limited to people who were willing to participate and who had access to electronic media and Internet access. The questionnaire was lengthy, there was no control over the environment where the participants took the survey, and the biases of the participants are unknown. 145 A second limiting factor to the generalizability of the study was the composition of the groups. Most of the groups were between 73.91% and 86.67% female with only one group, native Mexicans, with near equal distribution. The educational level of participants was not consistent across the groups, and it was not representative of the population. The majority of native Mexicans had an education level of at least a BA/BS degree, the majority of U.S.-born Caucasians had an educational level between some college and a BA/BS degree, and the majority of Mexican immigrants had at the most some college. There could have been some confounding variables that may have skewed the results. The last limitation was resources. As a full-time employee and student researcher, I had limited time and money for this study. I was only able to gain the participation of one university in Mexico, one college in the U.S., and one employer in the U.S. to help me distribute the invitation to potential participants. With more time and more resources, I would have been able to collect data from a larger sample across a larger and more representative area. Recommendations The study was limited to the Solano and Napa counties of the Greater San Francisco Bay Area in California and a small region of the state of Veracruz in Mexico. This study compared the traditional cultural values and work-related cultural values of Mexican immigrants to those of U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexicans living in Mexico. As a comparative study, the characteristics of the groups should be similar if not equal. Future research should be conducted to include a larger geographical area in the United States and Mexico to obtain a more representative sample of the populations. As 146 indicated in the literature, there is high variability in culture within countries because of specific demographic and environmental characteristics of the different areas of a country (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2016) Values and leadership preferences could vary across the different regions of the U.S. and Mexico. I recommend securing participation and cooperation from more than academic institutions to mitigate the possibility of confounding variables. Gaining assistance from employers and social services agencies would help obtain a sample with participants who have an education level representative of the population. While assessing the culture at a societal level, regardless of the education level of the participants, individual level values and preferences may be affected by education level. Future research should be conducted to explore the impact of education on the personal level value and leadership preference. Time and resources were one of the most limiting factors to this study. I recommend that future research is not conducted by a single researcher, but by at least two researchers, one in the U.S. and one in Mexico, who can devote ample time to the collection of data from various sources. Cooperation from multiple researchers across the U.S. and Mexico would be ideal. The level and speed of acculturation are affected by many factors, including the frequency and type of relations with people of the dominant culture, exposure to their own native culture, and frequency and type of interactions with people of their native culture (Berry, 1997; Hofstede, 2001; Lopez, 2013; Taras et al., 2013; Triandis, 1994). This study did not account for the level of exposure of immigrants to either the Mexican or the American culture. The current leadership preferences and values of Mexican immigrants were compared to those of U.S.-born Caucasians and Mexican living in 147 Mexico. I recommend a longitudinal study to examine the changes in values and leadership preferences over time accounting for type and frequency of exposure to the mainstream culture of the U.S. and Mexico. Acculturation is a process by which members of one culture adapt their values, beliefs, and practices in response to direct contact and interactions with members of another culture (Berry, 1980; Keskin, 2013). Acculturation is a phenomenon that is experienced by immigrants. Immigrants who live in areas densely populated by other members of their cultural group are more likely to retain their cultural values and leadership preferences (Taras et al., 2013). The children of these immigrants grow up under the influence of their parent's culture, absorb lay theories particular to that culture, and the norms and beliefs of that culture dictate their behavior and understanding of the world. These children go through acculturation when they start interacting with society at large. I recommend that second-generation immigrants, children of immigrants, continue to be included as a specific group in future acculturation and cultural studies. The relationship between cultural values and leadership are mostly studied across countries, and they tend to ignore immigrants. This study focused on immigrants and children of immigrants, specifically Mexicans in the United States. Future research should be expanded to include immigrants from other ethnic backgrounds to assess if the effects are similar to those found in this study. The assessment of the values and preferences of different ethnic groups living in the same country should be done at the individual level and with the intent to identify commonalities rather than differences. 148 Implications The findings from this study have a practical and theoretical implication that can contribute to positive social change. From a practical standpoint, organizations that operate in areas with a high concentration of Mexicans could benefit from adopting a servant leadership style with some paternalistic aspects added. The findings in this study indicate that Mexicans immigrants prefer a servant leader who is democratic and is interested enough in their lives to be able to offer personal advice and assist on matters that extend beyond the workplace (Castaño et al., 2015; Littrell & Cruz Barba, 2013; Martínez Méndez et al., 2013). While Mexican immigrants believe to some extent that their leader knows what is best for the employees, they want to be included in the decision-making process (Michaud et al., 2019; Ruiz et al., 2013). Solely adopting a servant leadership style would be beneficial for any organization as it encourages unity, seeks to provide clear direction, and fosters employee's growth and development (Greenleaf, 1977; Liden et al., 2008; Mittal & Dorfman, 2012; Öner, 2012), and it is something that was found to be desired by all the participants in this study. Adding the paternalistic elements, specifically those that embrace the value of familism support, could enhance loyalty and retention. Human resources managers can use this knowledge to create leadership development programs that embrace diversity by accounting for the differences and similarities in leadership preferences of Mexican immigrants. Specifically, programs that educate existing and potential managers on the challenges and opportunities they may face when managing a diverse population (Saxena, 2014) that includes Mexican immigrants. Having a greater understanding of what Mexican immigrants expect from 149 their supervisors can potentially enhance the relationship between the manager and the employees and improve work productivity and efficiency. From a theoretical standpoint, the results from this study support prior research findings that indicate that more significant variability exists within a country than between countries (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; and Taras et al., 2016). Cross-cultural research tends to focus on the differences in values and their relationship to leadership preferences between countries. Finding in this study suggest that immigrants do not necessarily share the views of the host country and prefer a different leadership style. These findings support the works of Hofstede (1980, 1993, 2001), House et al. (2004), and Schwartz (1992, 1999) which indicated that culture exerts significant influence on people's social relations and perceptions and expectations of self and others. Additionally, this study supports the findings from the GLOBE (House et al., 2004) that indicated that cultural values at the individual level (as should be) are very similar between Mexico and the United States, and they do not necessarily reflect the societal level (as is) values. These individual level values influence the implicit leadership theories of immigrants, which affect their leadership style preferences. Regarding acculturation, results from this study support Taras's (2008) findings that acculturation may take more than 20 years to complete. The results from this study indicate that first-generation Mexican immigrants have not acculturated, and secondgeneration Mexican immigrants have only acculturated partially. This observation supports Berry's (1997) bidimensional model of acculturation which stated that people choose an acculturation strategy based on the immigrant's need to retain cultural characteristics and identity and the need to engage and be involved with other cultural 150 groups. Results from this study indicate that second-generation immigrants chose to maintain their traditional Mexican values while adopting the work-related values of the United States. This finding aligns with Berry's proposition that immigrants may decide to use more than one strategy given the situation and personal variables. This study also supports the theory that second-generation Mexican immigrants develop a bicultural identity adopting traditional Mexican values and U.S.-mainstream values (Knight et al., 2010). Conclusion The findings of this study contribute to the literature of cross-cultural leadership by helping understand some of the complexities of within-country cultural variability. There were significant differences between the two generations of Mexican immigrants, U.S.-born Caucasians, and native Mexicans. The most notable differences were between U.S.-born Caucasians and first-generation Mexican immigrants along religiosity, competition and personal achievement, familism support, familism referent, respect, gender egalitarianism, status attribution, and paternalistic leadership. The main differences between U.S.-born Caucasians and native Mexicans were in status attribution, gender egalitarianism, familism support, respect, and paternalistic leadership. Native Mexicans scored closer to the cultural and work-related values of U.S.-born Caucasians than to those of first-generation Mexican immigrants, except for status attribution. Second-generation Mexican immigrants had nearly identical work-related values as U.S.-born Caucasians and almost identical cultural values as Native Mexicans. While there were significant differences between the four groups, the similarities are of greater importance. All groups indicated that strong family relationships, gender equality, 151 independence and self-reliance, and low power distance are essential. They also gave no importance to materialism. As for leadership preferences, all groups had a strong preference for servant leadership. Additionally, all groups indicated a desire to be directly involved in decision making, a work environment that supports them at the individual and family level inside and outside of the workplace, and a leader who exhibits emotional reactions. Organizations need to understand that the differences in values and leadership preferences between their diverse groups of employees pose a challenge to management and their employees. 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The latter of these two ways to create a familism composite is the better of the two options. Third, one could use only the Mexican American values subscales or only the mainstream values subscales in their research. The Mexican American values subscales have been used most often and most successfully. I would definitely not support any attempts to trim items from any subscale or to modify the response alternatives or scoring procedures. Some research would like to trim items to reduce the length of the measure. However, such a strategy usually threatens the content validity of the measure. We have done extensive development and psychometric work on this measure. The original items were based on multiple focus group research with a substantial sample of Mexican American parents and adolescents (separate focus groups for parents and adolescents). This was followed by the trimming and/or revision of potential items based upon the focus group feedback. We did this to ensure that we captured the essence of the values from community embers perspective and to ensure we had items representing the breadth of the psychological constructs being assessed. This was followed by psychometric examination of participant responses to the modified item set to ensure that each items was assessing the desired subscale construct and that each item was psychometrically sound. This set of modified items was then trimmed to produce the final set of items that assessed the full breadth of the subscale constructs. This last stem in the measure construction also incorporated focus group data and psychometric analyses to ensure that we had produce a measure that demonstrated crosslanguage measurement equivalence in English and Spanish and measurement equivalence for parents and adolescents. Subsequently, we have demonstrated longitudinal measurement equivalence of these final items across 5th, 7th, 10th, and 12th grades in a representative sample of Mexican American youth. Some researcher would like to modify the response scale and scoring to create consistency with other measures being administered to participants. The one attempt to do this with our measure (that I know of) was not very successful because the resulting 183 scores had reduced variability due to the truncated scores created by a truncated set of response alternatives. The research focused on how Mexican and Mexican American participant use response scales suggest that reducing the number of response alternatives (say from a 5-point to a 4-point response scale) is particularly inconsistent with the typical usage of response alternatives in these populations. If I were to consider supporting any response scale adjustment it would only be to increase the number of response alternatives (i.e., to a 7-point response scale). However, even in this case there is a downside in that you cannot compare the subscale scores to the broader literature using the MACVS. I know this may be disheartening to you, but the acculturation literature has a long history of attempts to use measures that may display one element of good psychometrics at the expense of other elements. For example, some research have tried to measure participant's level of acculturation with a few items that assess very related features of this construct (i.e., language use). While you may be able to create a three or four item scale on the use of the English language (or Spanish language) that displays somewhat adequate internal consistence, such a measure is not likely measure the broad range of content relevant of assessing acculturation level. If the considerations I note above make your use of the MACVS impossible, I suggest that you do not use the MACVS rather than using a modified version that \"may\" threaten the full utility of the measure. I wish you the best in your research endeavor. George George P. Knight, Ph.D. Emeritus Professor From: Alonso Duarte Sent: Friday, July 20, 2018 9:12:46 AM To: George Knight Subject: Re: PhD Dissertation Using The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale Dear Dr. Knight, You gave me permission in the past to use and reproduce the The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale for Adolescents and Adults. I need to modify the instrument so I can combine it with 3 other instruments to measure acculturation and leadership preference. I 184 will be conducting a pilot to assess the psychometric properties of the combined instrument. If necessary, I may need to modify the instrument further. May I have your permission to modify the instrument and if necessary, after the pilot study, modify the instrument further? Should you agree, I will reproduce this email as an appendix to my proposal to the IRB at Walden University. Thank you for your consideration Alonso Duarte From: George Knight Date: Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 6:44 AM Subject: Re: PhD Dissertation Using The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale To: Alonso Duarte Dear Alonso, You are welcome to use our measure (see attached publication). Please let me know what you find. Best Wishes, George George P. Knight, Ph.D. Emeritus Professor From: Alonso Duarte Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2017 6:42:27 PM To: George Knight Subject: PhD Dissertation Using The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale Dr. Knight, My name is Alonso Duarte and I am a PhD candidate at Walden University in US. 185 I am in the process of writing my PhD dissertation, and I would like to use The Mexican American Cultural Values Scale for Adolescents and Adults. The purpose of my quantitative comparative study utilizing a survey is to (1) investigate the effects of acculturation on the cultural values, work-related cultural values, and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants, and (2) compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Literature indicates that Mexican have a paternalistic style leadership, which differs from US styles. Can I have your permission to use your scale in my dissertation? Thank you in advance Alonso Duarte, MBA 186 Appendix B: Permission to Use Work Related Value Assessment Vasyl Taras Fri 7/20/2018 7:19 PM To: Alonso Duarte RE: PhD dissertation using Work Related Value Assessment Dear Alonso, Yes, you have my permission to use, reproduce, and modify the instrument as needed for your study. Good luck with your research! Vas Dr. Vas Taras Associate Professor of International Business Program Director Master's of Science in International Business XCulture Project Founder and Coordinator Fellow of the Academy of International Business, Southeast USA Bryan School of Business and Economics University of North Carolina at Greensboro From: Alonso Duarte Sent: Friday, July 20, 2018 7:10 PM To: Vasyl Taras Subject: Re: PhD dissertation using Work Related Value Assessment Dear Dr. Taras, You gave me permission in the past to use and reproduce the work-related value assessment you developed a few years ago. I need to modify the instrument so I can combine it with 3 other instruments to measure acculturation and leadership preference. I will be conducting a pilot to assess the psychometric properties of the combined instrument. If necessary, I may need to modify the instrument further. May I have your permission to modify the instrument and if necessary, after the pilot study, modify the instrument further? Should you agree, I will reproduce this email as an appendix to my proposal to the IRB at Walden University. Thank you for your consideration Alonso Duarte 187 Appendix C: Permission to Use Paternalism Scale Hi Alonso, Please see the attached two papers. You may certainly use our scale. Good luck with your research! Ekin Ekin K. Pellegrini, Ph.D. | Director of Executive Education Director, Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) Program Associate Professor of Global Leadership and Management University of Missouri-St. Louis From: Alonso Date: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 at 7:37 PM To: Ekin Pellegrini Cc: Teresa Scandura Alonso Duarte Subject: Permission to use published scale. Dr. Pellegrini, My name is Alonso Duarte and I am a PhD candidate at Walden University in US. I am in the process of writing my PhD dissertation. I would like permission to use the scale you developed along with Dr. Scandura to measure paternalism in your 2006 study titled Leader–member exchange (LMX), paternalism, and delegation in the Turkish business culture: An empirical investigation. The purpose of my quantitative comparative study utilizing a survey is to (1) investigate the effects of acculturation on the cultural values, work-related cultural values, and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants, and (2) compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Literature indicates that Mexicans have a paternalistic style leadership, which differs from US styles. Can I have your permission to use your scale in my dissertation? Thank you in advance Alonso Duarte, MBA 188 Appendix D: Permission to Use Servant Leadership Scale To: Alonso Duarte Re: Instrument Dear Mr. Duarte Congratulation on your pursuit in higher education. It's with pleasure that I grant you permission to use and modify my instrument for the use of your pilot study and if necessary do further modification after the pilot study. Please do send me a copy of your findings and recommendation after your defense along with the final draft of the instrument With all best wishes. Sincerely Herman S. Ming Dr. Herman S Ming J.P., L.Inst.M.P On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Alonso Duarte wrote: Dear Dr. Ming My name is Alonso Duarte and I am a PhD candidate at Walden University in US. I am in the process of writing my PhD dissertation, and I would like to use the servant leadership scale you developed for your dissertation in 2005 here at Walden University. The purpose of my quantitative comparative study utilizing a survey is to (1) investigate the effects of acculturation on the cultural values, work-related cultural values, and leadership style preferences among generations of Mexican immigrants, and (2) compare these findings with U.S.-born Caucasians. Literature indicates that Mexicans have a paternalistic style leadership, which differs from US styles who may prefer a servant leadership style. I need to modify the instrument so I can combine it with 3 other instruments to measure acculturation and leadership preference. I will be conducting a pilot to assess the psychometric properties of the combined instrument. If necessary, I may need to modify the instrument further. 189 May I have your permission to use and modify the instrument, and if necessary, after the pilot study, modify the instrument further? Should you agree, I will reproduce this email as an appendix to my proposal to the IRB at Walden University. Thank you for your consideration Alonso Duarte 190 Appendix E: Invitation to Participate in Survey Hello, You are invited to participate in a pilot survey research study aimed at examining how the leadership preferences of Mexican immigrants compare to those of Mexicans living in Mexico and White Americans in the United States. I hope that you can contribute to the research by agreeing to answer the survey questions. The researcher conducting this study is PhD candidate Alonso R. Duarte at Walden University. You might already know the researcher as the human resources specialist at Child Start Inc. or an accounting professor at Solano Community College, but this study is separate from that role. Participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. There is no obligation to be part of in the study and you will not be treated differently if you decide not to be part of the study. If you chose to participate, now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time. If you do not wish to participate, I thank you for your time and apologize for intruding. If you agree to participate you will be asked to complete a web-based survey with a brief demographic questionnaire and 90 questions in it. It should take around 30 minutes to complete. To be eligible to participate you need to be a Mexican immigrant, or at least one of your parent s needs to be Mexican immigrant, or be White American born in the United States. You also need to be at least 18 years old and live or work in either Solano County or Napa County. Privacy: Personal or identifying information will not be collected and the raw data will not be made public nor will be seen by anyone, except the researcher. While you may know the researcher as the human resources specialist at Child Start Inc. or as an accounting professor at Solano Community College, even the researcher will not know who you are. All data collected electronically will be stored in a password protected hard drive and kept in a locked cabinet. All data collected in paper form will be transferred to electronic form by the researcher and the original form will be stored in a locked box. 191 The researcher will be the only one with the key and password. Data will be kept for a period of at least 5 years, as required by the university. Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: Participating in this study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be encountered in daily life, such as stress. Being in this study would not pose risk to your safety or wellbeing. There is no compensation for completing the questionnaire. The results of study will be presented in scholarly articles and submitted for publication in academic journals. The potential benefits of the study include having a greater understanding of what Mexican immigrants expect from their supervisors and potentially enhance the relationship between managers and the employees improving work productivity and efficiency. At the same time Mexican immigrants may have a better understanding of the challenge they may face as they enter the workforce. Questions and Concerns: If you have any questions or need clarification about the research, you may contact the researcher at (415) 713-3995 or alonso.duarte@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate at my university at (612) 312-1210 (U.S.A number 001-612-312-1210) or via email address IRB@mail.waldenu.edu. Walden University's approval number for this study is IRB will enter approval number here and it expires on IRB will enter expiration date. Please keep this consent form for your records. Obtaining Your Consent If you feel you understand the study well enough to make a decision about it, please indicate your consent by taking the survey by clicking the link below. -------LINK------ 192 Appendix F: Survey Questionnaire Demographics The demographic information will help select participants who meet the requirements of the study. Please answer the following questions about your self Gender M F Race ___________ Age _____ Country of Birth _________________ In which country did you grow up? ________________________ At what age did you migrate to the U.S.? _______ City of Residence _______________ Number of family members living in the U.S. ___ Education Level _______________ Number of years living in the U.S. ____ Job Industry _____________________ Job Title ___________________________ Parental information will help identity generational information of participants. Not required from Mexican participants. Please answer the following questions about your Mother Race _________Country of Birth ____________ Number of years living in the U.S. ___ Please answer the following questions about your Father Race __________ Country of Birth ____________ Number of years living in the U.S. ___ 193 Leadership Preferences The following 33 statements describe the leadership style of the ideal supervisor. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. Using a scale from 1 through 5, tell me how much you agree with the statements about your ideal supervisor. 1 Not at all 2 A little 3 Somewhat 4 Very Much 5 Completely Servant Leadership – Sense of Oneness 1. ______ Has many people visiting him with their problems because he listens to them 2. ______ Pays great attention to details when someone talks to him, and remembers the details in future conversations. 3. ______ Truly attempts to understand the pain and suffering which members are going through. 4. ______ Makes every effort to identify individuals who are going through difficulties. 5. ______ Continually identifies the hurt members and attempts to heal the wounds. 6. ______ Always looks after members who are hurt and offers emotional support. 7. ______ Is keenly aware of what is going on in the workplace. 8. ______ Is aware of all the issues and problems involving his or her employees Servant Leadership – Sense of Direction 9. ______ Is most effective in getting voluntary compliance and cooperation through one-onone talks 10. ______ Always seeks to discuss and involve others in his thinking. 11. ______ Is very sharp and clear in defining what we ought to do (mission). 12. ______ Articulates our dream very well and offers a plan on what to do. 13. ______ Sees beyond the day-to-day routines and suggests what to do for the future. 14. ______ Has an un-paralleled foresight to see through the time and future Servant Leadership – Feeling of Empowerment 15. ______ Is the person to be trusted? 16. ______ Demonstrates a strong commitment to serving the needs of members. 194 17. ______ Does everything in his/her power to nurture for personal and professional growth of the members 18. ______ Recognizes the potential values of individual member and helps them realize their potential in every possible way 19. ______ Strives to build a strong community, linking all employees 20. ______ Has already demonstrated the ability to build a common community which everyone loves to become part of Paternalistic Leadership 21. ______ Is interested in every aspect of his/her employees' lives. 22. ______ Creates a family environment in the workplace. 23. ______ Consults his/her employees on job matters. 24. ______ Is like an elder family member (father/mother, elder brother/sister) for his/her employees. 25. ______ Gives advice to his/her employees on different matters as if he/she were an elder family member. 26. ______ Makes decisions on behalf of his/her employees without asking for their approval. 27. ______ Knows each of his/her employees intimately (e.g., personal problems, family life, etc.). 28. ______ Exhibits emotional reactions in his/her relations with the employees; doesn't refrain from showing emotions such as joy, grief, anger. 29. ______ Participates in his/her employees' special days (e.g., weddings, funerals, etc.). 30. ______ Tries his/her best to find a way for the company to help his/her employees whenever they need help on issues outside work (e.g.. Setting up home, paying for children's tuition) 31. ______ Expects his/her employees to be devoted and loyal, in return for the attention and concern he/she shows them. 32. ______ Gives his/her employees a chance to develop themselves when they display low performance. 33. ______ Believes he/she is the only one who knows what is best for his/her employees. 195 Work Related Values The following 12 statements describe values as they relate to the work environment. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. Using a scale from 1 through 5, tell me how much you believe that... 1 Not at all 2 A little 3 Somewhat 4 Very Much 5 Completely Status Attribution 34. ______ Older and more experienced managers are more effective than young managers with less experience 35. ______ Companies should be represented by senior high-status person even if he or she is not the most knowledgeable person about the situation 36. ______ Family background (achievements of parents or relatives) is good indicator of people's work effectiveness 37. ______ The rank and prestige of a university is a very good indicators of the performance of its graduates 38. ______ People in higher position should earn more even if they do not do more than those in lower positions 39. ______ Employees with more seniority should earn more even if they do not perform better than others Power Distance 40. ______ Employees should not question the decisions of supervisors 41. ______ Managers should make decisions without having to consult with employees 42. ______ Is best not to show your disagreement with your boss 43. ______ It makes sense that managers have special privileges such as big offices or luxury business cars 44. ______ I would feel uncomfortable calling my supervisor by his or her first name 45. ______ I may feel nervous when I am around my boss Gender Egalitarianism 46. ______ Is better to have a man in a high-level managerial position than a woman 47. ______ Business meetings run more effectively when chaired by a man 196 48. ______ It is better when the man earns money and provides for his family and the woman stays home and takes care of the kids and the home 49. ______ There are some jobs in which a man can always do better than a woman 50. ______ A woman should not focus on her career because it leaves little time for her family Acculturation The next 45 statements are about what people may think or believe. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. Using a scale from 1 through 5, tell me how much you believe that . . . 1 Not at all 2 A little 3 Somewhat 4 Very Much 5 Completely Mainstream Values – Material Success 51. ______ The more money one has, the more respect they should get from others. 52. ______ Children should be taught that it is important to have a lot of money 53. ______ Owning a lot of nice things makes one very happy. 54. ______ Money is the key to happiness 55. ______ The best way for a person to feel good about him or herself is to have a lot of money. Mainstream Values – Independence and self-reliance 56. ______ The most important thing parents can teach their children is to be independent from others. 57. ______ As children get older their parents should allow them to make their own decisions. 58. ______ When there are problems in life, a person can only count on him or herself. 59. ______ Parents should encourage children to solve their own problems 60. ______ People should learn how to take care of themselves and not depend on others. Mainstream Values – Competition and personal achievement 61. ______ One must be ready to compete with others to get ahead. 62. ______ Parents should encourage children to do everything better than others. 63. ______ Parent should teach their children to compete to win 64. ______ Personal achievements are the most important things in life Traditional Mexican Values Religion 65. ______ One's belief in God gives inner strength and meaning to life. 66. ______ Parents should teach their children to pray. 197 67. ______ It is important to follow the Word of God. 68. ______ God is first; family is second. 69. ______ If everything is taken away, one still has their faith in God. 70. ______ It is important to thank God every day for all one has. 71. ______ Religion should be an important part of one's life. Traditional Mexican Values Respect 72. ______ No matter what, children should always treat their parents with respect. 73. ______ Children should respect adult relatives as if they were parents. 74. ______ Children should always honor their parents and never say bad things about them. 75. ______ It is important for children to understand that their parents should have the final say when decisions are made in the family. 76. ______ Children should never question their parents' decisions. 77. ______ Children should be on their best behavior when visiting the homes of friends or relatives. 78. ______ Children should follow their parents' rules, even if they think the rules are unfair. 79. ______ Children should always be polite when speaking to any adult. Traditional Mexican Values – Familism (support) 80. ______ Parents should teach their children that the family always comes first. 81. ______ Family provides a sense of security because they will always be there for you. 82. ______ It is always important to be united as a family. 83. ______ It is important to have close relationships with aunts/uncles, grandparents, and cousins. 84. ______ Holidays and celebrations are important because the whole family comes together. 85. ______ It is important for family members to show their love and affection to one another. Traditional Mexican Values – Familism (obligation) 86. ______ Children should be taught that it is their duty to care for their parents when their parents get old. 87. ______ Children should always do things to make their parents happy. 88. ______ If a relative is having a hard time financially, one should help them out if possible. 198 89. ______ A person should share their home with relatives if they need a place to stay. 90. ______ Older kids should take care of and be role models for their younger brothers and sisters 91. ______ Parents should be willing to make great sacrifices to make sure their children have a better life. Traditional Mexican Values – Familism (referent) 92. ______ When it comes to important decisions, the family should ask for advice from close relatives. 93. ______ Children should be taught to always be good because they represent the family. 94. ______ A person should always think about their family when making important decisions. 95. ______ It is important to work hard and do one's best because this work reflects on the family. 199 Appendix G: Relationship between Survey Items and Research Questions Research Questions Survey Items 1 Work-related cultural values differences between Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Caucasians 2 Work-related cultural values differences among generations of Mexican immigrants 4 Leadership differences among generations of Mexican immigrants 3 Preferred leadership style differences between Mexicans and U.S.-born Caucasians 34 – 45 46 – 90 46 – 90 1 – 33 200 Appendix H: Correlations between Servant and Paternalistic Leadership Items L L E E H H A A P P C C F F S S G G B B Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa Pa L Item 1 1 L Item 3 .379 ** 1 E Item 5 .435 ** .392 ** 1 E Item 6 .407 ** .451 ** .692 ** 1 H Item 2 .589 ** .400 ** .505 ** .552 ** 1 H Item 13 .468 ** .380 ** .612 ** .676 ** .529 ** 1 A Item 18 .166 ** .442 ** .237 ** .263 ** .209 ** .309 ** 1 A Item 16 .251 ** .207 ** .470 ** .433 ** .284 ** .539 ** .363 ** 1 P Item 20 .218 ** .387 ** .251 ** .340 ** .240 ** .467 ** .455 ** .239 ** 1 P Item 21 .198 ** .236 ** .398 ** .344 ** .335 ** .382 ** .447 ** .303 ** .376 ** 1 C Item 19 .221 ** .379 ** .296 ** .331 ** .163 * .443 ** .633 ** .351 ** .535 ** .377 ** 1 C Item 11 .164 * .478 ** .237 ** .267 ** .210 ** .281 ** .618 ** .234 ** .397 ** .373 ** .533 ** 1 F Item 9 .208 ** .286 ** .342 ** .304 ** .307 ** .358 ** .388 ** .457 ** .264 ** .385 ** .314 ** .351 ** 1 F Item 25 .156 * .343 ** .248 ** .286 ** .170 ** .341 ** .621 ** .285 ** .465 ** .428 ** .538 ** .559 ** .379 ** 1 S Item 22 .270 ** .451 ** .380 ** .461 ** .283 ** .494 ** .629 ** .456 ** .593 ** .513 ** .611 ** .495 ** .401 ** .542 ** 1 S Item 27 .182 ** .433 ** .272 ** .315 ** .205 ** .318 ** .496 ** .224 ** .410 ** .225 ** .536 ** .381 ** .276 ** .513 ** .469 ** 1 G Item 28 .241 ** .382 ** .408 ** .441 ** .330 ** .508 ** .500 ** .377 ** .435 ** .481 ** .477 ** .442 ** .420 ** .579 ** .612 ** .529 ** 1 G Item 31 .249 ** .429 ** .395 ** .398 ** .231 ** .409 ** .590 ** .344 ** .455 ** .498 ** .584 ** .558 ** .352 ** .652 ** .635 ** .567 ** .699 ** 1 B Item 12 .230 ** .358 ** .323 ** .386 ** .250 ** .520 ** .532 ** .352 ** .446 ** .353 ** .505 ** .580 ** .252 ** .505 ** .589 ** .446 ** .502 ** .572 ** 1 B Item 30 .211 ** .460 ** .368 ** .425 ** .346 ** .454 ** .537 ** .318 ** .453 ** .422 ** .511 ** .447 ** .322 ** .489 ** .589 ** .600 ** .624 ** .693 ** .543 ** 1 Pa Item 4 .302 ** .235 ** .533 ** .517 ** .296 ** .505 ** .150 * .304 ** .226 ** .280 ** .177 ** 0.113 .241 ** .154 * .245 ** 0.123 .285 ** .173 ** .176 ** .237 ** 1 Pa Item 7 .352 ** .206 ** .524 ** .568 ** .403 ** .618 ** .169 ** .599 ** .200 ** .250 ** .186 ** .137 * .461 ** .222 ** .308 ** .187 ** .394 ** .249 ** .289 ** .280 ** .496 ** 1 Pa Item 8 .347 ** .161 * .438 ** .440 ** .393 ** .521 ** .199 ** .539 ** .208 ** .294 ** .220 ** .128 * .473 ** .209 ** .284 ** .211 ** .348 ** .254 ** .208 ** .251 ** .396 ** .697 ** 1 Pa Item 10 .309 ** .227 ** .438 ** .394 ** .331 ** .516 ** .170 ** .416 ** .266 ** .301 ** .238 ** .160 * .423 ** .222 ** .285 ** .253 ** .387 ** .303 ** .310 ** .330 ** .417 ** .541 ** .606 ** 1 Pa Item14 .169 ** -0.044 .258 ** .194 ** .196 ** .311 ** 0.039 .361 ** -0.036 .152 * 0.081 -0.009 .302 ** 0.029 0.059 -0.036 0.078 0.009 -0.003 0.062 .318 ** .491 ** .359 ** .312 ** 1 Pa Item15 .319 ** .186 ** .451 ** .454 ** .377 ** .525 ** .141 * .567 ** .204 ** .214 ** .250 ** 0.086 .345 ** .176 ** .328 ** .228 ** .340 ** .242 ** .199 ** .290 ** .414 ** .606 ** .578 ** .551 ** .564 ** 1 Pa Item 17 .237 ** .305 ** .398 ** .418 ** .308 ** .483 ** .548 ** .370 ** .390 ** .362 ** .571 ** .390 ** .290 ** .418 ** .546 ** .469 ** .535 ** .499 ** .472 ** .472 ** .297 ** .336 ** .311 ** .260 ** .127 * .305 ** 1 Pa Item 23 .277 ** .390 ** .344 ** .462 ** .314 ** .513 ** .480 ** .395 ** .505 ** .436 ** .475 ** .399 ** .279 ** .526 ** .629 ** .423 ** .607 ** .562 ** .453 ** .428 ** .301 ** .321 ** .307 ** .241 ** 0.051 .309 ** .538 ** 1 Pa Item 24 .227 ** .165 ** .323 ** .380 ** .256 ** .424 ** .292 ** .352 ** .282 ** .347 ** .365 ** .183 ** .315 ** .405 ** .418 ** .341 ** .423 ** .348 ** .291 ** .389 ** .271 ** .399 ** .322 ** .360 ** .300 ** .469 ** .341 ** .413 ** 1 Pa Item 26 .301 ** .232 ** .461 ** .424 ** .365 ** .461 ** .159 * .457 ** .255 ** .312 ** .237 ** .139 * .406 ** .299 ** .393 ** .319 ** .443 ** .316 ** .249 ** .346 ** .329 ** .504 ** .488 ** .573 ** .388 ** .666 ** .239 ** .270 ** .448 ** 1 Pa Item 29 0.031 -0.098 -0.104 -0.072 0.011 -0.008 -0.029 0.100 -.140 * 0.002 0.034 -0.121 .193 ** -0.060 -0.108 -0.091 -0.119 -.164 * -.149 * 0.021 0.064 .151 * .221 ** 0.095 .421 ** .219 ** -0.055 -.190 ** 0.091 0.089 1 Pa Item 32 .312 ** .252 ** .429 ** .426 ** .348 ** .505 ** .292 ** .502 ** .312 ** .375 ** .327 ** .220 ** .394 ** .324 ** .433 ** .358 ** .477 ** .461 ** .332 ** .439 ** .325 ** .492 ** .399 ** .447 ** .335 ** .497 ** .420 ** .391 ** .386 ** .477 ** 0.048 1 Pa Item 33 .320 ** .379 ** .508 ** .511 ** .379 ** .565 ** .365 ** .429 ** .373 ** .398 ** .341 ** .279 ** .337 ** .394 ** .512 ** .403 ** .586 ** .537 ** .437 ** .518 ** .398 ** .490 ** .424 ** .482 ** .137 * .474 ** .443 ** .476 ** .420 ** .552 ** -0.111 .593 ** 1 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Correlations Between Servant and Paternalistic Leadership Item s Paternalistic Leadership Servant Leadership 201 Appendix I: Means of Paternalistic Leadership Scale Individual Scores P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 U.S. 3.15 2.33 2.22 2.33 1.47 1.97 3.83 3.65 3.15 2.07 1.83 2.67 3.23 NM 3.21 3.05 2.90 2.87 2.52 3.02 3.79 3.89 3.61 3.02 2.06 3.40 3.56 FM 3.33 3.07 2.48 2.64 2.58 2.91 3.78 3.86 3.49 2.73 1.98 3.14 3.75 SM 3.43 2.67 2.51 2.49 2.14 2.93 4.18 4.33 3.79 2.76 1.99 3.26 3.71 Total 3.29 2.77 2.53 2.58 2.17 2.72 3.91 3.95 3.53 2.65 1.97 3.13 3.57 US – U.S Born Caucasians; NM – Native Mexicans; FM – 1st-Generation Mexican Immigrants; SM – 2nd-Generation Mexican Immigrants. P1. Exhibits emotional reactions in his/her relations with the employees; doesn't refrain from showing emotions such as joy, grief, anger. P2. Is interested in every aspect of his/her employees' lives. P3. Knows each of his/her employees intimately (e.g., personal problems, family life, etc.). P4. Participates in his/her employees' special days (e.g., weddings, funerals, etc.). P5. Believes he/she is the only one who knows what is best for his/her employees. P6. Gives advice to his/her employees on different matters as if he/she were an elder family member. P7. Gives his/her employees a chance to develop themselves when they display low performance. P8. Consults his/her employees on job matters. P9. Expects his/her employees to be devoted and loyal, in return for the attention and concern he/she shows them. P10. Is like an elder family member (father/mother, elder brother/sister) for his/her employees. P11. Makes decisions on behalf of his/her employees without asking for their approval. P12. Tries his/her best to find a way for the company to help his/her employees whenever they need help on issues outside work (e.g. Setting up home, paying for children's tuition) P13. Creates a family environment in the workplace.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Productive Theory-Ladenness in fMRI M. Emrah Aktunc Ozyegin University We must suppose a very delicate adjustment whereby the circulation [of blood] follows the needs of cerebral activity. Blood very likely may rush to each region of the cortex according as it is most active, but of this we know nothing. I need hardly say that the activity of the nervous matter is the primary phenomenon, and the afflux of blood its secondary consequence. William James, 1890 (p.99) 1. Introduction: As the above quote from James's classic The Principles of Psychology shows, the existence of a relationship between cognitive activity and patterns of cerebral blood flow is not a new postulate. However, a century of research in diverse fields had to be conducted before the techniques that made it possible to study this relationship became available. Several developments to achieve various scientific and technical goals took place over a century and eventually gave us functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 1 Techniques such as fMRI, as well as others (e.g. positron emission tomography (PET)), gave rise to cognitive neuroscience as a new research program. However, since its beginnings, this program has not been without its skeptics. Here, I argue that the sound use of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience gives rise to a productive kind of theory-ladenness thanks to its solid foundations in the physics of magnetic resonance and the physiology of hemodynamics. As I will demonstrate with concrete examples, this productive theory-ladenness makes possible the identification and control of potential errors in fMRI experiments (e.g. the development and use of the NPAIRS framework) and gives rise to novel and data-driven models of the neural bases of cognition independently of large-scale theories of cognition (e.g. the HERA model of memory). Before moving on, a brief summary of the skeptical accounts of neuroimaging will be useful. 1 I focus on fMRI because it is the most commonly used neuroimaging method, but parallel analyses can be made about other neuroimaging methods, e.g. MEG or fNIRS, mutatis mutandis. M. Emrah Aktunc 2 Most skeptical accounts of neuroimaging conclude that hypotheses of cognitive neuroscience are underdetermined by neuroimaging data. This body of work can be broadly classified under two groups: one group raises doubts about the theoretical significance of neuroimaging results; and the other points to methodological difficulties of obtaining reliable inferences from neuroimaging data. 2 The work in the former group mostly appeals to issues of theory-ladenness and the work in the latter group emphasizes two major aspects of neuroimaging methodology: one, the highly complex nature of neuroimaging experiments; and two, the difficulty of modeling and drawing reliable inferences from neuroimaging data. In his early critical account, Uttal (2001, 2002a, 2002b) cites ladenness of neuroimaging findings in modularist theories as the most problematic aspect of cognitive neuroscience. Uttal's main issue is whether or not we can accurately define isolated modules of cognition, which can then be localized in the brain. Regardless of the localizability of cognitive processes in the brain, their inaccessibility has long been a major problem in psychological science. Uttal cites as support for his arguments a well-known discussion of this problem by MacCorquodale & Meehl (1948); many cognitive processes assumed to separately exist are in fact hypothetical constructs, which may not exist at all as described by the researcher. These criticisms may not be totally valid for contemporary neuroimaging work employing newer approaches of interpretation and analysis, e.g. multi-voxel pattern analysis, neural fields, pattern-decoding reverse inference (for a recent review and discussion please see Nathan & Del Pinal, 2017). Although Bechtel (2002a, 2002b) agrees that serious inferential problems exist in neuroimaging, he rejects Uttal's general conclusion. He reminds that cognitive neuroscience is only one of the disciplines that proposes and tests theories that decompose a complex system into its components. In this kind of program, any and all such proposals are hypothetical; many of them are found to be incorrect and consequently revised. The important question, according to Bechtel, is not about the truth or falsity of modularist versus non-modularist theories, but whether or not researchers can obtain new findings from neuroimaging that would support certain componential theories while refuting or necessitating revision in others. In contrast to Bechtel, Hardcastle and Stewart (2002) agree with Uttal's skepticism and state that cognitive neuroscientists' modularist assumptions are \"radically false\" and neuroimaging cannot provide any support for modularist theories. This is because, prior to collecting data, researchers already assume the existence of 2 The literature on the epistemology of neuroimaging includes a considerable number of works by philosophers of science and cognitive scientists. Naturally, a comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. M. Emrah Aktunc 3 specific cognitive processes localized in different parts of the brain, which is no more than a mere prejudice (ibid.). Thus, there is an inherent circularity in neuroimaging, which presumably destroys the potential of findings to support modularist theories. Cognitive scientists have also written on inferential difficulties in neuroimaging. However, similarly to the philosophers above, they have focused on questions about the validity of inferences from data to theories of cognition. The debate between Henson (2005) and Coltheart (2006, 2010) provides an illustrative example; in essence, Henson believes that neuroimaging results can be used to adjudicate between competing theories of cognition and Coltheart directly rejects this. 3 Roskies (2009, 2010b) has provided strong defenses against Coltheart and other critics of neuroimaging. The major theme in the above discussions is that the theory-ladenness of findings in neuroimaging creates serious problems of circularity in cognitive neuroscience. This theoryladenness occurs when researchers interpret neuroimaging findings in terms of theories of cognition, which come with certain ontologies and assumptions about cognitive architectures and processes. However, these are not the only theories involved in fMRI research, which can be clearly seen when one looks at the scientific foundations of fMRI. The development of fMRI includes two separate trajectories of research; one in physics and the other in physiology. Research in these trajectories had progressed unconnected for decades from the 1920s to the 1990s and eventually converged to give rise to fMRI. The trajectory in physics had led to the discovery of the phenomenon of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and its later application in the development of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The one in physiology had led to the discovery that changes in cerebral blood flow could be measured using MRI as the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response. These bodies of work had produced well-established and reliable scientific and technical knowledge which served as the foundations of fMRI. In addition, the techniques necessary for processing, filtering, and modeling raw data were provided by mathematics (e.g. Fourier transforms), advanced programming, and statistics. 4 I argue that these theoretical and technical foundations give rise to a different kind of theoryladenness in fMRI, which is productive because it enables fMRI studies to generate reliable data on the relationships between hemodynamic processes and cognitive task performance. 3 Colin Klein (2010) provides a concise review of similar works by cognitive scientists who disagree on the epistemic value of neuroimaging. 4 For a detailed account of the history of the development of fMRI see, for example, Aktunc, 2011, Le Bihan, 2014. M. Emrah Aktunc 4 2. The Two Senses of Productive Theory-Ladenness in fMRI: Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI enables researchers to: (a) identify, and control for, different types of methodological and inferential errors that may arise in the use of fMRI, and, (b) represent and investigate neural and cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data generated by fMRI as subjects perform well-defined tasks. 5 The above statements can be unpacked as follows: In an fMRI experiment: (1) Magnetic resonance phenomena, Pm , and hemodynamic phenomena, Ph , are used to investigate relationships between neural phenomena, Pn , and cognitive phenomena, Pc. (1.1) Connections between Pm, Ph, and Pn have been previously well-established by evidence from physics of magnetic resonance and physiology of hemodynamics. (1.2) Connections between Pn and Pc have been previously established by neurobiological and neuropsychological evidence. (2) Theories of magnetic resonance, Tm , and theories of hemodynamics, Th , are utilized to build the fMRI scanner that provides data on hemodynamic phenomena related to cognitive task performance. 6 (3) The terms and techniques derived from Tm and Th plus computational and statistical techniques, are used to identify, formulate, and control for errors that may potentially jeopardize inferences in an fMRI experiment. (4) Thanks to 1 3, researchers can obtain reliable experimental data on relationships between Pn and Pc. (5) Thanks to 1 4, relationships between Pn and Pc can be represented and investigated using the terms of Tm and Th in methodologically robust experiments. 5 The term 'productive theory-ladenness' is not necessarily novel; for example, Chang (2012) uses it in his discussion of Hanson. However, in that context, theories are productive in the sense that they give \"intelligibility to observations\" by providing a conceptual framework and auxiliary assumptions (p.89). I use the term in a different, more methodological sense in which the knowledge and control of potential errors are productive in establishing the reliability of findings. It is also important to note that what makes this kind of theory-ladenness productive is not interdisciplinarity per se but precisely (a) and (b) above. 6 Of course, in an fMRI experiment, theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics are complemented with computational and statistical techniques (e.g. Fourier transforms, spatial and temporal filtering, multivoxel pattern analysis, etc.) to preprocess, model and analyze data, which also constitute part of the productive theory-ladenness described here. M. Emrah Aktunc 5 Propositions (2) and (3) above refer to the foundations of fMRI coming from theories of magnetic resonance and theories of hemodynamics, which establish that fMRI findings are laden in these theories and that productive theory-ladenness is a kind of theory-ladenness. Conclusions (4) and (5) above establish this kind of theory-ladenness as a productive kind because it is generative of any robust fMRI data set before issues of inference to cognitive functioning enter the picture. Regardless of what theoretical/computational approach a cognitive scientist employs or what type of inference a researcher decides to employ on a data set (e.g. adopting different types and/or techniques of reverse inference, see Nathan & Del Pinal (2017)), the first necessity is the generation of a reliable data set free of methodological flaws. This is made possible thanks to productive theory-ladenness. Thus, all who rely on fMRI data for their research must also rely on this productive theory-ladenness, which admittedly is quite different from the classic sense of theoryladenness often cited to support skepticism of neuroimaging. So, it is necessary to delineate this concept of productive theory-ladenness in the context of previous discussions on theory-ladenness in philosophy of science. 3. Duhem, Kuhn, Hanson and Productive Theory-Ladenness: Claims to the effect that experimental data are theory-laden abound in philosophies of science since the widely influential works of Kuhn (1962/2012) and Hanson (1958), who famously stated that \"seeing is a 'theory-laden' undertaking\" (p. 19), meaning that our observations of objects are laden with our prior knowledge of those objects. Although Kuhn and Hanson discuss some examples of research that feature observations generated by scientific equipment, such as microscopes or telescopes, their arguments are mainly about observation as a perceptual process. Yet, most contemporary scientific observation is done through the use of complicated instruments, such as electron microscopes, DNA sequencers, or fMRI, which work on the well-established principles provided by experiments and theories. As such, one could say that contemporary scientific observation is more theory-laden compared to earlier times. Admittedly, the term theory-ladenness is ambiguous but Heidelberger (2003) usefully disambiguates and defines three different kinds of theory-ladenness, each of which he associates with Hanson, Duhem, or Kuhn. Heidelberger argues that, according to Hanson, apart from ladenness in human perception, theory-ladenness in science occurs when a theory is used to establish causal connections between observed phenomena. In this sense, theory-ladenness for Hanson is causality-ladenness: \"The notions behind 'the cause x' and 'the effect y' are intelligible M. Emrah Aktunc 6 only against a pattern of theory, namely one which puts guarantees on inferences from x to y.\" (Hanson, 1958; p. 64) For example, when people have difficulty recalling lists consisting of similar sounding words, namely the phonological similarity effect, this can be explained by a theory which posits that words are encoded and represented in memory in an acoustic or phonological format, which interferes with the recall of similar words (e.g. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2003). The effect of impaired recall of similar sounding words would be causally explained by the theoretical posit that these words are acoustically or phonologically encoded. Heidelberger (2003) then distinguishes Duhem's conception of theory-ladenness from Hanson's. For Duhem, theory-ladenness is not about establishing causal connections, but it occurs when the terms and relations proposed by a theory are used to state and interpret observed phenomena in an abstract and symbolic structure. However, not every field of science may be advanced enough to have produced theories with such symbolic or mathematical structures; so Heidelberger adds, when Duhem talks about theory-ladenness he seems to have in mind physics and its theories and not, for instance, physiology. 7 Following Hanson and Duhem, Heidelberger (ibid.) continues with Kuhn. Theory-ladenness, for Kuhn, is \"paradigm-ladenness\" where a researcher can make sense of experimental phenomena only in terms of the theory (or theories) in the normal-scientific tradition in which she works. To elaborate, Heidelberger asks, when do anomalies, i.e. experimental findings unexpected by the paradigm, occur? What makes them anomalies? Is it because they do not fit a theoretical and abstract structure (a la Duhem) or they require the proposition of new causal connections (a la Hanson)? In other words, where do paradigm-induced expectations regarding experimental results come from? Heidelberger argues that if we look at examples discussed by Kuhn, we see that it is theoretical interpretation, or assimilation to theory, rather than causal understanding, that takes precedence in determining whether or not a series of findings are deemed anomalous for a given paradigm. On this point, Heidelberger distinguishes yet another possible meaning of theoryladenness, which he calls \"theory-guidance.\" Put specifically, this relates to \"how the disposition to make a particular observation depends on the theoretical background [of a researcher]\" (p.144). He argues that because this disposition is irrelevant to the \"meaning of observation sentences\" it must not be understood as genuine theory-ladenness. 7 Duhem's distinction between theory-ladenness in physics and physiology will be revisited. M. Emrah Aktunc 7 Thus, left with \"theory-ladenness through appeal to causal understanding\" (Hanson) and \"theory-ladenness through theoretical interpretation\" (Duhem and Kuhn), and also having argued that theoretical interpretation goes much further than causal understanding, Heidelberger concludes that it is better to reserve the term 'theory-ladenness' to refer only to \"genuine theoretical interpretation that transcends causal understanding ...\" (ibid., p.146). Regardless of the extent to which Heidelberger's account can be criticized, productive theory-ladenness, as described in section two above, fits none of the notions of theory-ladenness Heidelberger disambiguates. This is because none of those are about methodological errors or representing phenomena in terms of theories and knowledge that provide the foundations for the instrument used by the researcher. In addition, skeptical arguments of fMRI have focused extensively on the kind of theory-ladenness through theoretical interpretation, which Heidelberger associates with Duhem and Kuhn. Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI is neither about any of the kinds of theory-ladenness Heidelberger defines nor is it involved when skeptics charge that fMRI findings are overly laden with cognitive theories. This is because theories enabling productive theory-ladenness in fMRI are obviously not theories about cognition. One crucial thing to note here is that productive theory-ladenness occurs when fMRI is used to achieve the aims of cognitive neuroscience. That is, it emerges out of the convergence of a technique built on physical and physiological knowledge and a group of researchers' motivation to investigate the neural bases of cognitive processes. When the skeptics charge fMRI research of pernicious theory-ladenness, they refer to the dangerously circular use of cognitive theories in the interpretation of findings. While, on the other hand, productive theory-ladenness arises out of the theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics; it is much less about the cognitive theoretical interpretation of findings and much more so about providing reliable findings in the first place. The themes of the skeptical accounts of fMRI discussed above remind one of the old and well-known difficulties in psychological science that have been with us since its very beginnings. The point at which they cross paths with cognitive neuroscience is when we ask whether or not neuroimaging data could be used to adjudicate between competing theories of cognition, which reflects a theory-centered approach that has not been very fruitful in expanding the philosophical discussion on neuroimaging. The question about the theoretical import of fMRI findings cannot be addressed without careful scrutiny of the methodological characteristics of this technique. Skepticism about the theoretical significance of neuroimaging is to a great extent supported by arguments claiming that inferences in neuroimaging depend on unreliable procedures. Only an M. Emrah Aktunc 8 account that specifically addresses aspects of methodological and inferential procedures in fMRI can provide satisfactory answers to the skeptics. The theory-centered approach has not done this sufficiently to shed any light on what can and what cannot be learned from neuroimaging. Another reason why the theory-centered approach has not been fruitful is that it overly limits the range of philosophical discussions on neuroimaging. If we approach neuroimaging solely as a potential source of evidence to adjudicate between theories of cognition, we may overlook important questions about the use of instruments and kinds of theory-ladenness in experiment and inference. Instead, when one expands the set of questions about fMRI to include its detailed workings, philosophical discussions on neuroimaging will be rendered richer as well as more easily connected to other philosophical discussions on the use of instruments in other fields of science, which can potentially lead to fruitful results in general philosophy of science. Indeed, Kuhn also has pointed at the significance of the use of instruments in experiments. In The Structure he wrote, \"At a level lower or more concrete than that of laws and theories, there is, for example, a multitude of commitments to preferred types of instrumentation and to the ways in which accepted instruments may legitimately be employed\" (Kuhn, 1962/2012; pp.40-41). In fact, this is related to the distinction between theory-ladenness through theoretical interpretation and theory-ladenness through causal understanding mentioned above. In an experiment, we can talk about theories of the phenomena under study and theories of the instrument used to generate measurements. Furthermore, these theories may be independent of each other. Heidelberger (2003) points to this theme in Kuhn: \"... even in Kuhn a sense turns up in which experiment can be independent of the theoretical commitments of a paradigm and dependent only on an entrenched tradition of instrumentation ...\" (p.145). In an fMRI experiment, we can talk about theories of cognition and theories of the instrument, i.e. theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics, which are independent of theories of cognition. The fMRI scanner is used as a powerful causal agent in generating data, but its workings are not embedded in theories of cognition. As Mayo (1996) and Heidelberger (2003), among others, diagnose, Kuhn's insights into normal science and experiments have not been pursued further by Kuhn or his followers. Nonetheless, the possible occurrences of productive theory-ladenness in other fields of research, especially those that rely on complex measurement and data collection techniques, can be investigated and potentially lead to significant contributions to general philosophy of science. In describing the productive theory-ladenness in fMRI, one of my aims is to contribute to the pursuance of these insights into theory-ladenness and use of instruments in experiment. M. Emrah Aktunc 9 4. The Contributions of Productive Theory-Ladenness: Productive theory-ladenness contributes in two different ways to cognitive neuroscience, namely in the senses (a) and (b) as described in section two above. Here, I illustrate these by giving concrete examples of each. 4.1. Identifying and Controlling for Errors: In the growing body of philosophical work focusing on methodology in neuroimaging, Roskies (2008, 2010a) is especially helpful in framing productive theory-ladenness. She raises a distinction between the actual versus perceived epistemic status of conclusions and suggests that the perceived epistemic status of neuroimages is higher than their real status. Roskies writes, \"determining actual epistemic status will involve a characterization of the inferential steps that mediate between observations and the phenomena they purport to provide information about\" (Roskies, 2010a; p.197). She introduces the term inferential distance to refer to the totality of these inferential steps; the more the inferential steps the bigger the inferential distance. Per Roskies's diagnosis, the problem is a mismatch between the \"actual inferential distance\" and the \"apparent inferential distance\" going from brain activity to the neuroimages presented as findings. Furthermore, she suggests that this inferential distance cannot be univocally characterized. Roskies is definitely right in saying that neuroimaging results are too often overinterpreted. However, her suggestion that the inferential distance cannot be univocally characterized can be resisted. It is certainly true that there is a great number of technical and inferential procedures in neuroimaging that have to be carried out between initial measurements of brain activation and final brain images. Because of the complexity of these procedures, Roskies suggests that the number and nature of these inferential steps cannot be sufficiently characterized, which lowers the reliability of inferences (Roskies, 2010a). I argue that Roskies's inferential distance problem can be satisfactorily addressed when we break down an experiment into its component parts from design to data collection and analysis and then assess the error probabilities associated with each component. In an fMRI experiment, if these error probabilities are high, then researchers would have to concede that we cannot obtain reliable evidence from the experiment. For example, the scanner used in the experiment may have been oversensitive and detected background noise as task-related activation. If the error probabilities associated with component parts of an experiment are low enough to rule out or minimize errors, then we can safely conclude that researchers can obtain reliable data from the experiment and make warranted inferences. This is how we can go the inferential distance, as it were, and it is made possible thanks to productive theory-ladenness, which provides the theoretical M. Emrah Aktunc 10 and technical knowledge of the workings of fMRI, errors that may occur in its use, and ways in which these errors can be formulated and controlled. I suggest that the dependence of fMRI on these complex procedures is what creates the productive theory-ladenness which enables researchers to represent and study cognitive phenomena in terms of cerebral blood flow. Findings in fMRI experiments are laden with the theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics and this reminds one of a distinction Duhem (1906/1991) had raised between physics and physiology. The physiologists make their observations using measurement techniques based on the established theories of physics, whereas physicists have to test their theories based on the theories of physics. That is, physicists do not have the bonus of relying on theories previously established by another field of research. Cognitive neuroscientists using fMRI have to rely on not only physics but also on physiology. At first look, it may seem that cognitive neuroscientists are at a yet higher degree of theory-ladenness than physiologists. However, if we remember that these theoretical bases sit on solid foundations, we can see that this kind of theory-ladenness is productive because it allows for what Hacking (1983) would call representation of and intervention in cognitive phenomena using concepts and methods provided by theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics. The above account can also be related to Hacking's explanation of how the reality of dense bodies in blood is established using different types of experimental techniques, namely, electron microscopes and fluorescent staining, which yield the same result. Specifically speaking, in both types of experiments, small dots in red blood platelets are observed. In order to argue for the reality of these findings, Hacking appeals to an argument from coincidence; it would be a highly improbable coincidence that independent procedures yield the same result unless these small dots are real entities rather than instrumental artifacts. He cites two reasons why the dense bodies are real entities: one reason is the fact that experimental instruments using different physical theories yield the same observations, and the other is that we have a clear understanding of the physical theories that are used to build those instruments. Early in the development of fMRI, experiments were done on cognitive processes of which we have a clear understanding from previous non-imaging research (e.g. perceptual or motor functions) to check for its reliability. These experiments have yielded observations that agreed with the previously established findings. For example, we know from previous biopsychological research that visual perception is related to activation in the brain area known as the occipital cortex. It was shown in experiments, in which subjects performed visual tasks, that the scanner registered high degrees of activation in the same region (e.g. see Kwong et M. Emrah Aktunc 11 al., 1992; Ogawa et al., 1992). This is an example of what is stated in proposition (1.2) in section two above. It would be a preposterous coincidence that various types of experiments using different tools and paradigms yield the same kind of artifactual result unless visual functions are indeed related to activation in the occipital cortex. The stronger reason that fMRI is a reliable tool is that we have a clear understanding of the theories on which it is built. Our scientific understanding of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics gives rise to productive theory-ladenness, which enables researchers to identify and control for the types of errors they may commit using the fMRI scanner, i.e. in the sense (a) of productive theoryladenness, which also makes possible sense (b) of productive theory-ladenness, both described in section two above. For example, scanners that use high-strength magnetic fields may lead to false positives and this can be scrutinized as an error-characteristic of the scanner. The fMRI scanner works by generating a powerful magnetic field. By applying a strong magnetic field to the chamber inside the scanner, it detects inhomogeneities in the magnetic field as the blood-oxygen-leveldependent (BOLD) response. There are two fundamental problems in this process: the first problem is that the change in the BOLD signal between experimental conditions is very small; what the scanner detects as the difference between conditions is an absolute but very small effect. The ratio of the intensity of the task-related signal and its general variability due to all sources of noise yields a very small value. The second problem has to do with variability in the signal over time, which is influenced by several factors. For example, the temperature of the subject's body, head motion, heart rate, and respiration are all factors that influence the variability of the signal in addition to the cognitive task being performed. Consequently, the task-related change in the BOLD signal is very small when compared to its total variability, so there is a danger of the task-related change in the BOLD signal being masked by other sources of variability. In other words, the signal of interest may easily be lost in the noise. Because of this, some fMRI experiments end up lacking sufficient power to detect task-related signals of interest. Researchers deal with this problem by defining the functional signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); the signal is defined as the difference between two states of brain activity hypothesized to be caused by the cognitive task performed and noise is defined as the overall variability in data over time. The functional SNR is the ratio between these two quantities (for a detailed description, see Huettel et al., 2004, 2008). The higher the functional SNR, the easier it is to detect task-related changes in data. There are several different ways of improving the functional SNR, one of which is to use scanners that generate stronger magnetic fields. The strength of a magnetic field is measured in terms of the Tesla (T) unit; as a reference point, the strength of M. Emrah Aktunc 12 the earth's magnetic field is 0.00005T. In cognitive neuroscience, scanners with magnetic field strengths from 1.5T to 7.0T are employed (Lazar, 2008; Hashemi et al., 2010). A primary factor determining functional SNR is net magnetization, which is proportional to the strength of the magnetic field, so SNR increases roughly linearly with field strength. Thus, as researchers use scanners of higher magnetic field strength, the functional SNR is improved. However, one issue with increased magnetic field strength is that at higher field strengths more noise is detected by the scanner in addition to the task-related signal. For example, physiological noise increases quadratically with field strength (Huettel et al., 2004; p.239). Consequently, as field strength is increased, there is a greater danger of the scanner detecting noise as if it is a real effect. When scanners of higher field strengths are used, task-related changes in the BOLD signal may be lost in increased physiological noise. Thus, at field strengths higher than 4.0T we may get too many cases where noise is detected as a real effect. This has been noted by Savoy (2001) as a concern about fMRI in general; he also argues that this is similar to the problem raised by Meehl (1967) who claimed that if we sufficiently increase the power of significance tests, we can reject any null hypothesis even if it is exactly true. Likewise, it appears that if we use a highstrength scanner, we may, with greater probability, find supporting evidence for hypotheses about activation-task performance mappings even if they are false. The observed activation may simply be noise and have nothing to do with the cognitive task. This is an error characteristic of a certain component of the experiment, which must be scrutinized. In general, one could argue that increasing field strength increases the probability of errors and researchers can use this knowledge as a guide in evaluating the possibility that they have a real effect as opposed to an artifact of the scanner. Naturally, there are other factors that may also lead to the detection of noise as a real effect or other types of errors, e.g. preprocessing protocols, multiple testing, thresholding, or spatial or temporal filtering problems. Potential errors stemming from these factors can be similarly identified, formulated, and minimized thanks to productive theory-ladenness. 8 For example, several groups of researchers have conducted a series of studies assessing different preprocessing protocols, which gave rise to the \"nonparametric prediction, activation, influence, and reproducibility 8 Having proper error probabilities between 0 and 1, as formulated in Mayo's error-statistical account would be a more effective way of controlling for potential errors, for details see Mayo (1996) and Mayo & Spanos (2011). These error probabilities can be calculated in a series of studies similar to those in which false positive and false negative rates of diagnostic tests are calculated. M. Emrah Aktunc 13 resampling\" or NPAIRS framework (Strother et al., 2002; LaConte et al., 2003). This framework applies cross-validation: an fMRI data set is split into two halves, one half is designated as the \"training\" data and used to estimate the parameters for a predetermined model. The estimated parameters and the model are used to make predictions to be tested on the other half of the data designated as \"test\" data. This process is repeated but with the training and test data switched, i.e. in the second application of the process test data are used for training and vice versa. In several runs, reproducibility of the experimental findings is assessed by comparing the results of statistical analyses on both halves of the data. The flexible nature of this framework allows researchers to assess the effects of different types of preprocessing protocols. In one study, LaConte et al. (2003) applied different protocols, called analysis chains, which included different levels of preprocessing of raw fMRI data. One chain included no preprocessing procedures, whereas others included normalization and different degrees of spatial filtering, i.e. one chain applied a narrow filter and another chain applied a wide filter. Then, they conducted statistical analyses on data sets that came from these different analysis chains in order to assess the effects of different preprocessing protocols on prediction accuracy and reproducibility. The results showed that spatial filtering (smoothing) was the most effective procedure for improving prediction accuracy and reproducibility. However, as LaConte and his colleagues note, there are no general pre-data guidelines for the optimal preprocessing protocol for all experiments (ibid.). The optimality of a preprocessing protocol is dependent not only on the elements of the protocol, as in how much smoothing or normalization was applied, but also on other experimental parameters such as the type of scanner used, design of the experiment, etc. As Lazar (2008) and LaConte et al. (2003) suggest, researchers can apply different preprocessing protocols to the same set of raw data, then do statistical analyses on the data sets that the different protocols yield. In this way, they can assess the effects of these protocols on the same data set. As researchers become more aware of the errors that preprocessing procedures may introduce, they can start devising methods of identifying and controlling for these errors. The NPAIRS framework is one example, among many, illustrating how productive theory-ladenness enables researchers to improve the reliability of methodologies and inferences (in sense (a) as described above). 4.2. Representing and Investigating Cognitive Phenomena: In the previous section, we have seen how productive theory-ladenness enables fMRI researchers to identify, and control for, methodological and inferential errors. I have also proposed that productive theory-ladenness in sense (a) also makes possible sense (b) of productive theory-ladenness as M. Emrah Aktunc 14 described in section two. That is, it enables researchers to represent and investigate cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data as subjects perform well-defined cognitive tasks. This can be illustrated by looking at the development of the HERA model of memory on the basis of neuroimaging findings. The hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA) model was proposed by Tulving and his colleagues in 1994 (Tulving et al., 1994). When it was first introduced, the HERA model was a straightforward description of empirical regularities obtained in PET studies of memory- although it works differently from fMRI, PET also provides measurements of cerebral blood flow. 9 Researchers had obtained differential activation patterns in left and right prefrontal cortical regions when subjects engaged in encoding and retrieval tasks of episodic memories. In the context of HERA, the terms 'semantic memory' and 'episodic memory' can be used simply to refer to the different kinds of experimental tasks without having to worry too much about the theoretical baggage they may carry. These terms denote common phenomena of memory in everyone's experience, such as remembering something or learning something new, and they need not mean anything more theoretically complex than that in the context of this discussion. 10 In 1994, when the HERA model was proposed, cognitive neuroscience was just becoming a discipline of its own and researchers were beginning to obtain new empirical regularities. In this environment, HERA was proposed in a data-driven manner on the basis of PET findings. Tulving and colleagues (1994) did a series of PET studies and also reviewed studies from different laboratories in which subjects performed three types of tasks; semantic memory retrieval, episodic memory encoding, and episodic memory retrieval. They saw some regularities in the observed patterns of brain activation and summarized these regularities in a set of hemodynamic statements: 1) Left prefrontal cortical regions are activated in semantic memory retrieval to a greater extent than right prefrontal cortical regions; 2) Left prefrontal cortical regions are activated in encoding novel features of retrieved information into episodic memory to a greater extent than the right prefrontal 9 Though on the basis of different physical knowledge, productive theory-ladenness occurs in PET, too. Indeed, it should be clear by now that productive theory-ladenness occurs in any successful use of a complex instrument of measurement or observation. 10 Nonetheless, it is still the case that experimental knowledge coming from behavioral experiments in the cognitive psychology of human memory played a major role in designing the tasks used in neuroimaging experiments. Thus, the question arises; 'to what extent does experimental knowledge from cognitive psychology provide background knowledge for neuroimaging experiments?' This question is related to issues of cognitive ontology, which I plan to address elsewhere, but it is not directly relevant to my purposes here. M. Emrah Aktunc 15 cortical regions; and, 3) Right prefrontal cortical regions are involved in episodic memory retrieval to a greater extent than left prefrontal cortical regions. Essentially, these three hemodynamic statements constituted the initial version of the model. In 1996, Nyberg, Cabeza, and Tulving published a review article reporting results from both PET and fMRI experiments. Again, the great majority of these experiments exhibited the same findings predicted by HERA with only a few exceptions (Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996). Gabrieli et al. (1998) used similar encoding tasks in which subjects were shown pictures and found a significantly high degree of activation in the right inferior frontal cortical regions as subjects performed encoding tasks. In another study, Kelley et al. (1998) found a significantly high degree of activation in the right prefrontal cortical regions in a similar encoding task. Both sets of findings contradict the model, which predicts a higher degree of activation in the left prefrontal cortex in encoding tasks. Some researchers concluded on the basis of these findings that the asymmetry of prefrontal cortex activations is due to the type of stimuli used, i.e. verbal versus non-verbal, rather than being caused by encoding versus retrieval. Unsatisfied with their explanations of the findings contradicting HERA, Habib, Nyberg, and Tulving (2003) reformulated the model to be stricter and more precise in its assertions. But also, they insisted that HERA was a set of statistical hypotheses that compared degrees of activation in the prefrontal cortical regions between encoding and retrieval tasks rather than a set of absolute hypotheses. In this reformulation, there were two specific hemodynamic hypotheses which were expressed using abbreviations: 'Enc'=encoding, 'Ret'=retrieval, 'L'=a given left prefrontal cortical region and 'R'=corresponding region in the right prefrontal cortex. Combinations of task (Enc or Ret) and regions (L or R) stood for the observed activation during a given task in a given region, e.g., 'Enc L' stood for the activation observed in a specific region in the left prefrontal cortex during an encoding task. Thus, the two hemodynamic hypotheses that constitute the model were stated: 1. (Enc L–Ret L) > (Enc R–Ret R); and 2. (Ret R–Enc R) > (Ret L–Enc L) (ibid., p. 241). Several fMRI experiments, as well as experiments that used newer neuroimaging techniques, yielded results that supported the model since its reformulation (see Babiloni et al., 2006, Cole 2006, Thimm et al., 2010, and Okamoto et al., 2011). HERA was proposed as a description of a set of hemodynamic findings showing asymmetry in patterns of brain activation between encoding and retrieval tasks in episodic memory. It is to be noted that strict interpretations of modularist theories imply that there cannot be a single model like HERA, because, for some of these theories, neuroimaging results make sense only if they talk about M. Emrah Aktunc 16 cognitive modules executing specific computations defined by the theory and located in a neuroanatomically distinct part of the brain. This is why some suggest that before we can use neuroimaging techniques to study cognition we first have to have an accurate and complete psychological theory of cognitive systems down to the most specific, separate function. Yet, all the experiments done or cited by Tulving and his colleagues in support of HERA reported activations from several cortical regions. These regions were all in the prefrontal cortex but were either adjacent to each other or a few centimeters apart. For some modularist theories, it is not clear whether or not these different regions of the prefrontal cortex would be taken to be neuroanatomically distinct to a sufficient degree. Thus, HERA will not make much sense for anyone who adheres to a strictly modularist theory. For some others, these findings may constitute a refutation of strictly modularist theories of cognition. A defense of neuroimaging against putting rigid theoretical requirements on what can be accepted as a genuine finding has been offered by Roskies (2010b). Roskies has also rightly argued that neuroimaging never truly claimed to support such strong theoretical conclusions as strict modularity or the like. Instead, it has the more pragmatic goal of revealing what it can about regularities between neural phenomena and cognitive function (ibid.). What I wish to argue is that independently of what large-scale cognitive theory one adopts, the HERA model stands as a set of robust hemodynamic findings and it is fruitful for cognitive neuroscience to talk about a wellestablished empirical regularity in observed brain activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex during encoding and retrieval tasks. In addition, HERA came out of a data-driven approach and was described mostly in terms of hemodynamic hypotheses, which did not assume too much about cognitive theories of human memory systems. For example, even if we stop using cognitive theoretic terms such as semantic or episodic memory, we can still talk about the model in terms of specific, well-defined memory tasks. The hemodynamic findings, on the basis of which HERA was developed, would still stand when theories of cognitive science change and new cognitive ontologies divide and categorize human memory differently, or exclude altogether strict categorizations, or redefine cognition to include processes and entities outside the brain. Come what may theoretically, cognitive scientists will still have to accommodate the HERA findings in terms of whatever cognitive constructs they adopt. After it was initially proposed, several groups of researchers have done various neuroimaging experiments to test the HERA model, a great majority of which yielded supporting results. Also, however, it was reformulated to be more precise in its assertions in response to some M. Emrah Aktunc 17 seemingly contradictory results. Now, HERA is a well-established model, built on hemodynamic findings, that describes a certain pattern in which the human brain works when individuals engage in memory tasks of encoding and retrieval. This model is a contribution of cognitive neuroscience to the general understanding of relationships between the human brain and cognition. Researchers were able to formulate, test, and refine HERA using neuroimaging relatively independently of large-scale theories of cognition and this was made possible, at least partially, thanks to productive theory-ladenness. 5. Conclusion: I have proposed that the scientific foundations of fMRI give rise to productive theory-ladenness in cognitive neuroscience. I have also proposed that there are two ways in which this productive theory-ladenness occurs, namely, it enables researchers to (a) identify and control for the types of methodological and inferential errors that may arise in fMRI studies, and, (b) represent and investigate neural and cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data as subjects perform well-defined tasks. We have seen how these two aspects of productive theory-ladenness can be illustrated with concrete examples; such as correcting for physiological noise and identifying the most reliable preprocessing protocol using the NPAIRS framework as examples of (a) and the discovery and development of the HERA model as an example of (b). These two aspects also reflect the two different paths of growth of experimental knowledge in cognitive neuroscience, namely, 1) the growth of knowledge improving the reliability of measurement and data analyses, and 2) the growth of knowledge of connections between patterns of neural activation and performance of cognitive tasks. The development and use of NPAIRS illustrate (1) and the evolution of HERA, as new neuroimaging data became available, illustrates (2). The arguments and examples above motivate a more pragmatic and fruitful approach in the philosophy of neuroimaging. When we look at fMRI with an eye toward appreciating the kinds of knowledge it can reliably provide, we can see it as a tool for expanding our knowledge on relationships between hemodynamic processes and cognition instead of limiting it as only a novel tool for adjudicating between existing theories of cognition. 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{"text": "Is de filosofie te links? Andreas De Block en Olivier Lemeire ANTW 109 (1): 105–122 DOI: 10.5117/ANTW2016.4.BLOC Abstract Is Philosophy too Left-wing? Ideological diversity has been on the research agenda in the social sciences for a couple of years. Yet in philosophy, the topic has not attracted much interest. This article tries to start filling this gap. We discuss a number of possible causes for the underrepresentation of right-wing and conservative philosophers in the academic profession. We also argue why this should be an important concern, not only morally, but also and primarily epistemically. Lastly, we explore whether the situation in philosophy is more problematic than the situation in other fields, and what kind of ideological diversity would be desirable for academic philosophy. Keywords: academic ideological diversity, underrepresentation of conservative philosophers, group think, Argumentative Theory of Reasoning In vele filosofische tijdschriften, maar ook op allerlei groepsblogs en workshops, denkt men uitvoerig na over het thema van diversiteit in de academische wijsbegeerte. Daarbij staat vooral de ondervertegenwoordiging van bepaalde demografische groepen centraal. Men argumenteert dat die nadelig is voor de filosofie, niet uitsluitend maar zeker ook omwille van de oorzaken van die ondervertegenwoordiging. Openlijke discriminatie van bepaalde groepen, impliciet racisme en seksisme, en traditioneel nepotisme liggen mede aan de basis van het lage aantal vrouwelijke hoogleraren, en zorgen er mede voor dat vrouwen en etnische minderheden vaak geen academische onderzoekscarrière willen of kunnen overwegen (Haslanger 2008). In het geschetste klimaat lijkt het vreemd en misschien zelfs absurd en ongevoelig om de ondervertegenwoordiging van mensen met een 'rechtse' 105VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 ideologie aan te kaarten. Dat geldt des te meer als dat gebeurt in een themanummer over diversiteit in de filosofie. Uiteindelijk stelt men immers vaak die rechtse ideologen en ideologieën verantwoordelijk voor het impliciet en soms ook expliciet seksisme, racisme en able-ism dat de filosofische gemeenschap verziekt. Toch denken wij dat deze bijdrage ook in een dergelijk klimaat relevant is, al was het maar om scherper te krijgen welk soort diversiteit de academische wijsbegeerte precies moet nastreven en welke vormen van discriminatie aanvaardbaar zijn in die academische wijsbegeerte. Het zou ook kunnen helpen om inzicht te krijgen in de (moreel) relevante verschillen tussen racisme en partyism. Tegelijk willen we vanaf het begin benadrukken dat het voor ons duidelijk is dat een eventueel pleidooi tegen de discriminatie van bepaalde ideologieën niet mag gezien worden als een poging om discriminatie op grond van geslacht, ras en seksuele oriëntatie te vergoelijken. In deze bijdrage gaan we als volgt te werk. Een eerste sectie schetst de ondervertegenwoordiging van mensen met een 'rechtse' ideologie in de academie in het algemeen en in de filosofie in het bijzonder. Daarbij wordt ook ingegaan op de mogelijke oorzaken van die ondervertegenwoordiging en vergelijken we die oorzaken met de oorzaken voor de ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen en etnische minderheden in de wijsbegeerte. In de tweede sectie onderzoeken we in welke mate de ideologische ondervertegenwoordiging een probleem kan zijn voor het feitelijke filosoferen. Zou de filosofie er met andere woorden wel bij varen als er meer rechtse filosofen zijn? In de derde sectie verkennen we welke mate van ideologische diversiteit wenselijk is. We eindigen met enkele suggesties voor verder filosofisch onderzoek. 1 Conservatieven houden niet van filosofie In de VS blijkt de overgrote meerderheid van academici hun politieke overtuiging te beschrijven als links, progressief of liberal (Gross 2013). Het electoraat in de VS is echter veeleer conservatief en christelijk. Dat zorgt ervoor dat universiteitscampussen vaak bakens van liberalisme en atheïsme worden genoemd. Het feit dat links oververtegenwoordigd is aan de universiteiten is altijd een doorn in het oog geweest van rechts Amerika, maar het kreeg relatief weinig aandacht van academici zelf. De laatste jaren zien we echter een spectaculaire stijging van die aandacht (Redding 2012; Tetlock & Mitchell 2015; Wright & DeLisi 2016). Dat is mede het werk van Jonathan Haidt, die het thema centraal op zijn onderzoeksagenda ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 106 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 plaatste en die vanwege zijn academische reputatie binnen en buiten de universiteiten meteen veel weerklank vond. Met een aantal andere academici uit heel verschillende disciplines richtte hij de Heterodox Academy op, een organisatie die streeft naar view point diversity, vooral – maar niet uitsluitend – om de kwaliteit van het academisch onderzoek te verbeteren (Crawford et al. 2015; Duarte et al. 2015). Haidt concentreert zich vooral op de ondervertegenwoordiging van conservatieve/rechtse vrouwen en mannen in de mensen sociale wetenschappen. Dat heeft te maken met zijn eigen achtergrond als psycholoog, maar ook met het feit dat hij – en met hem vele anderen (Shields & Dunn 2016) – vrezen dat die disciplines het meest gevoelig zijn voor ideologische (ver)vorming. Ook zou de ondervertegenwoordiging van rechtse en conservatieve geesten daar sterker zijn dan in de natuuren biomedische wetenschappen. In de mensen sociaalwetenschappelijke disciplines zou slechts ongeveer 5% van de Amerikaanse academici zich identificeren als conservatief of rechts (Gross & Simmons 2007), al is er heel wat variatie en is de ondervertegenwoordiging bijvoorbeeld duidelijk minder uitgesproken in de economie dan in de geschiedenis of antropologie (Klein & Stern 2009). Veel van de door Haidt en anderen gebruikte cijfers zijn oud, niet heel gedetailleerd en vooral toegespitst op de situatie in de VS. Recent poogden Inbar en Lammers (2012) daar wat aan te doen, door een brede en diepe studie te doen naar ideologische diversiteit in hun discipline, de sociale psychologie. Zij vonden dat slechts 6 % van de sociaal psychologen zichzelf beschouwt als rechts of conservatief en dat op dat punt de situatie in Europa niet erg verschilt van hoe het in de Verenigde Staten gesteld is. Uit de studie van Inbar en Lammers blijkt verder dat rechts-conservatieve academici vaak persoonlijk geconfronteerd werden met vijandige opmerkingen en vijandige attitudes. Dat sluit aan bij het meest verrassende resultaat van hun experiment, namelijk dat meer dan een derde van de progressieve respondenten bereid was om rechts-conservatieve collega's rechtstreeks te discrimineren door voor een liberal kandidaat te kiezen bij het invullen van een academische vacature, ook al is de conservatieve kandidaat even geschikt voor de positie. Dit suggereert dat de ondervertegenwoordiging wel eens (deels) te maken zou kunnen hebben met discriminatie.1 Hoewel het electoraat in West-Europa erg verschilt van het Ameri1 Tegelijk zijn de conservatieve academici Shields en Dunn (2016) van oordeel dat het leven als conservatieve professor minder moeilijk is dan vele conservatieven beweren. IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 107DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE kaanse electoraat, schijnt dus ook bij ons rechts ondervertegenwoordigd te zijn, althans in bepaalde menswetenschappen. Het verschil in situatie tussen de VS en Europa impliceert echter dat de termen 'rechts-conservatief' en 'links-progressief' in beide gevallen naar enigszins andere opvattingen verwijzen. Beide termen verwijzen naar clusters van overtuigingen op onder andere economisch, moreel, sociaal en ecologisch gebied, die afhankelijk van de context behoorlijk wat variatie kunnen tonen. Niettemin zijn er wel duidelijke tendensen. Wie zichzelf als conservatief ziet meent doorgaans – maar dus niet altijd – dat vrijhandel goed is, dat migratie van mensen problemen veroorzaakt en beter beperkt zou blijven, dat minderheidsgroepen geen speciale rechten kunnen laten gelden, en dat verdere regulering van milieuvervuilende activiteiten niet wenselijk is. Wat die verdere regulering dan inhoudt, hangt af van de bestaande regulering. Dat kan betekenen dat iemand die zich in Europa eerder aan het conservatiefrechtse deel ziet van het spectrum, zich met haar standpunten in de VS waarschijnlijk zou identificeren als liberal of progressief. Omdat deze overtuigingen geenszins perfect zijn te clusteren, passen ook niet alle stromingen goed in de opdeling 'rechts-conservatief' en 'links-progressief'. Libertariërs zijn bijvoorbeeld vaak economisch rechts, maar als het over migratie gaat links-progressief (Lakoff 2010). Verder zijn er voor zover wij weten geen erg betrouwbare en recente cijfers beschikbaar over de ideologische diversiteit in de wijsbegeerte. Toch vermoeden wij dat de situatie niet veel verschilt van hoe het er aan toe gaat in de sociale psychologie. Studies uit de jaren '60 en '70 uit de VS geven aan dat 'liberale'/linkse posities tot tien keer meer steun kregen van academische filosofen dan van het VS electoraat in het algemeen (Klein & Stern 2005). Ook een recente peiling op een van de meest invloedrijke filosofieblogs, Leiter reports, suggereerde dat de (meestendeels) Amerikaanse lezers van die blog geen goede dwarsdoorsnede van het Amerikaanse electoraat representeren. Meer dan 40% beschreef haar/zijn politieke opvattingen als sociaaldemocratisch links en 13 % zelfs als marxistisch, terwijl slechts 1% zichzelf zag als republikeins (in de Amerikaanse betekenis van het woord) en 7 % als conservatief. Deze peilingen schetsen vooral de Amerikaanse situatie binnen de wijsbegeerte. Peilingen die ons iets kunnen vertellen over de specifieke situatie van de wijsbegeerte in België en Nederland bestaan niet, maar zouden vermoedelijk een enigszins gelijkaardig resultaat opleveren. Bovendien bestaat er ook minstens anekdotische evidentie voor een vijandige klimaat in de academische filosofie jegens rechtse of conservatieve filosofen in onze contreien. Eén van de auteurs van dit essay heeft al verschillende verhalen ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 108 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 gehoord van twee Vlaamse conservatieve filosofen die zeggen te vermijden om in de aanwezigheid van hun collega's of op sociale media over politiek te spreken, omdat ze vrezen voor negatieve gevolgen voor hun carrière. Er kunnen natuurlijk verschillende relaties zijn tussen het als vijandig gepercipieerde klimaat jegens rechts-conservatieven in de academie en de ondervertegenwoordiging van rechts-conservatieven in vele disciplines (waaronder mogelijk/waarschijnlijk ook de wijsbegeerte). Rechts-conservatieven kunnen zich bijvoorbeeld minder aangetrokken voelen om te solliciteren in een milieu waarvan ze denken dat het hun opinies niet zal waarderen. Daarnaast kunnen individuen om allerlei goede en minder goede redenen ook progressief worden door te werken in een academisch milieu (Nozick 1998). Het is zeker ook denkbaar dat de ondervertegenwoordiging van rechts-conservatieven leidt tot een negatieve perceptie van rechts-conservatieven. Als vijf decennia onderzoek naar vooroordelen een robuust resultaat opleverde, dan is het immers wel dat persoonlijk contact met individuen uit een groep waartegen vooroordeel bestaat, dat vooroordeel vermindert, net zoals de afwezigheid van dergelijk contact dat vooroordeel versterkt (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Toch mag zeker ook rechtstreekse discriminatie niet worden uitgesloten. Onderzoek naar implicit bias wordt vaak aangehaald als oorzaak van de ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen en minderheden in de academische filosofie, omdat men van oordeel is dat dergelijke tendens rechtstreeks impact heeft op beslissingen tot aanwervingen. Als men benadrukt dat implicit bias al dergelijke impact heeft, dan zou het minstens vreemd zijn te ontkennen dat een explicit bias, zoals die onder meer door Inbar & Lammers (2012) gedocumenteerd is, deze invloed zou (kunnen) hebben. Nu zijn er bepaalde stemmen in het debat over ideologische diversiteit die dit soort ondervertegenwoordiging geen echt probleem vinden. Ruw geschetst komt het argument hierop neer: de ideologische bias is eigenlijk een bepaalde content bias. Die content bias is legitiem en dus is de ondervertegenwoordiging van mensen met een bepaalde ideologie ten gronde ook legitiem. Zo stelt Paul Krugman (2014), Nobelprijswinnaar economie en uitgesproken liberal, in navolging van de komiek Steve Colbert dat de werkelijkheid zelf een liberal bias heeft. Rechts-conservatieven zouden gewoon feitelijk verkeerd denken over de meeste zaken en/of minder intelligent zijn. In een afdeling evolutiebiologie kan je niets aanvangen met creationisten, dus discrimineren tegen radicaal-islamitische of radicaalchristelijke biologen is geen probleem als het gaat om een academische baan op een instituut dat macro-evolutionair onderzoek doet. Om gelijkaardige redenen zou het verantwoord zijn rechts en conservatief denken te IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 109DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE weren uit het academische onderzoek, zo stelt Krugman en met hem ook een filosoof als Pigliucci (2011). En inderdaad, conservatieven lijken wetenschap en de wetenschappelijke gemeenschap wat meer te wantrouwen dan progressieven. Dat is ten minste het geval in vele contexten. Toch zijn er ook domeinen waar precies het omgekeerde het geval is (Kahan 2012). In de VS blijken conservatieven bijvoorbeeld sceptisch te kijken naar binnen de wetenschappelijke gemeenschap niet-controversiële stellingen over evolutie en klimaatverandering, terwijl de progressieven sceptisch staan tegenover voor wetenschappers niet-controversiële stellingen over fracking en kernenergie (Nisbett, Cooper & Garrett 2015). Bovendien lijkt het argument in filosofie (nog) minder zinvol te zijn dan elders: wat zouden immers de filosofische feiten zijn en over welke filosofische stelling kan er geen legitieme controverse bestaan?2 Een andere versie van het Colbert/Krugman/Pigliucci argument luidt dat conservatieven gewoon minder in de meeste wetenschappelijke of filosofische vragen geïnteresseerd zijn. De ondervertegenwoordiging zou een kwestie van zelfselectie zijn en dus geen gevolg van discriminatie. Dat is niet uit te sluiten. Maar zelfs als dat zo zou zijn, dan nog kan men zich de vraag stellen of die zelfselectie niet zou kunnen suggereren dat de vragen die aan bod komen of de methodiek van de discipline problematisch of eenzijdig zijn. Dat zijn in ieder geval de vragen die men zou stellen, mocht blijken dat de ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen in de academische filosofie deels te maken heeft met (fallocentrische?, machistische?) vragen of methodiek. Discussies over de morele problemen met de ondervertegenwoordiging van een bepaalde groep vertrekken meestal bij een demografisch gegeven. Zo kan men beweren dat een bepaalde groep beter vertegenwoordigd zou moeten zijn omdat leden van die groep een gediscrimineerde positie hebben in onze samenleving. Men zou daarnaast kunnen argumenteren dat zelfs als een bepaalde groep niet wordt gediscrimineerd, er toch een bepaalde proportionaliteit zou moeten zijn: als de verhouding links/rechts binnen een gemeenschap 50/50 is, dan is het misschien problematisch als die verhouding in de academische wereld 80/20 is. Het zou ons in ieder geval moeten aansporen om uit te zoeken of de oorzaken van deze ondervertegenwoordiging moreel problematisch zijn. 2 We laten hier de discussie over de correlatie tussen intelligentie en ideologie buiten beschouwing, ook omdat de meeste studies een heel complex beeld geven (Kemmelmeier 2008; Rindermann et al. 2012). ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 110 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 Het is echter niet deze erkenningskwestie die van tel is bij het debat over 'rechtse' filosofen. Wij laten deze discussie over erkenning rusten omdat we menen dat zelfs als er niets immoreels is aan (de oorzaken van) die ondervertegenwoordiging, ze niettemin onwenselijk kan zijn voor de filosofie omwille van epistemische redenen. De vraag die we ons stellen in de volgende sectie is daarom in welke mate en waarom viewpoint diversity kan bijdragen aan waarheidsbevinding. De aanleiding daartoe is, zoals ondertussen duidelijk zal zijn, de vermeende ondervertegenwoordiging van 'rechtse' filosofen, maar men kan de rest van het stuk ook lezen vanuit het omgekeerde perspectief. Stel dat in de toekomst linkse academici sterk ondervertegenwoordigd zouden zijn of zich niet meer als zodanig zouden durven uiten – een toekomstperspectief dat na de recente publicatie van de professor watchlist minder vergezocht lijkt dan enkele jaren geleden – waarin zou dan net het probleem van deze ondervertegenwoordiging liggen?3 Dat betekent ook dat wanneer men gerede twijfels zouden hebben over de feitelijke ondervertegenwoordiging van rechts-conservatieven in de academische wijsbegeerte in België, Nederland, de VS, of in de wereld, de filosofische vraag nog steeds interessant blijft, wat het probleem zou zijn voor het domein van de filosofie als zou blijken dat rechtse politieke overtuigingen wel degelijk ondervertegenwoordigd zijn. 2 Kritische massa Diversiteit, zij het in geslacht, afkomst of ideologie, kan maar epistemische waarde hebben voor zover zulke kenmerken ook invloed hebben op de argumenten die men geeft en de posities die men verdedigt of aanvaardt; kortom, op hoe men redeneert. Psychologisch en experimenteel-filosofisch onderzoek heeft al uitgewezen dat geslacht en cultuur een behoorlijk effect hebben op intuïties en cognitieve stijlen (Stich & Buckwalter 2011; Nisbett et al. 2001). Stich en Buckwalter argumenteren dat dit effect mogelijk ook een oorzaak was van de ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen en minderheidsgroepen in de wijsbegeerte. Aangezien intuïties een belangrijke rol lijken te spelen in de wijsbegeerte, zouden artikelen en posities verworpen worden louter omdat deze vertrekken bij en steunen op intuïties die anders zijn dan die van de meerderheid der referenten (bij een artikel) of anders dan die van de meerderheid der academici (bij posities). 3 De professor watchlist is een webpagina, beheerd door een conservatieve organisatie, waarop intellectuelen met een linkse agenda worden 'ontmaskerd'. Zie: www.professorwatchlist.org. IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 111DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE De visie van Stich en Buckwalter op deze kwestie sluit redelijk nauw aan bij de centrale stelling van de feministische epistemologie: de standpunt theorie (Beebee 2013). Net zoals vele feministische epistemologen suggereren Stich en Buckwalter dat de intuïties en cognitieve stijlen van vrouwen en andere onderdrukte groepen deels verklaren waarom die groepen ondervertegenwoordigd zijn (Buckwalter & Stich 2010). Net zoals standpunt theoretici laten zij bovendien uitschijnen dat dit één van de redenen is waarom we demografische diversiteit in de filosofie zouden moeten nastreven. De ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen is onder meer problematisch omdat daardoor de filosofie zelf eenzijdiger of armer is dan wenselijk. Ook anderen hebben geargumenteerd dat het demografisch diverser maken van de filosofie een positieve impact zal hebben op de kwaliteit van de filosofie. Enerzijds gaat nu veel talent voor de filosofie verloren dat bestaande visies en argumenten zou kunnen verdiepen, nuanceren of bijsturen, anderzijds zijn er waarschijnlijk vele filosofische paden die onbewandeld blijven omdat die paden vertrekken bij ervaringen, denkstijlen en intuïties die minder of niet te vinden zijn bij witte westerse mannen (Saul 2013). Kortom, één van de klassieke argumenten voor een meer diverse filosofie is dat demografische diversiteit ook zou zorgen voor een grotere diversiteit aan viewpoints of standpoints. Als viewpoint diversity echter een doel is, kan dat doel ook meer direct nagestreefd worden. Je dient dan vooral mensen aan te werven uit groepen die gedefinieerd worden door hun visies, en niet alleen mensen die groepen vertegenwoordigen waarvan de definiërende karakteristieken correleren met andere visies.4 Als we aandacht vragen voor ideologische diversiteit in de filosofie, dan hangt die vraag voor ons ook samen met een bepaalde opvatting over wat filosofie is en hoe redeneren werkt. Recent hebben Hugo Mercier en Dan Sperber geargumenteerd dat het menselijk vermogen tot redeneren geëvolueerd is als middel om te overtuigen, en niet in de eerste plaats als een middel om de waarheid te vinden (Mercier & Sperber 2011). Zij stellen dat het redeneren vooral een sociale functie had, en dat het diende ommet (en tegen) anderen te argumenteren. Uiteindelijk zal dit argumenteren vaak resulteren in goede en betrouwbare conclusies, maar vooral omdat we met elkaar wedijverden om de beste argumenten te ontwikkelen, niet omdat ons redeneren uit zichzelf gericht is op het vinden van de waarheid. 4 Natuurlijk is niet alle viewpoint diversiteit ideologische diversiteit. Een optimale ideologische diversiteit is dus nog geen optimale viewpoint diversiteit. ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 112 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 Mercier en Sperber noemen hun theorie de argumentative theory of reasoning (ATR) en beweren dat deze theorie het mogelijk maakt om heel wat van onze cognitive biases functioneel te begrijpen. Ze leggen er onder meer de nadruk op dat hun theorie verklaart waarom mensen beter zijn in het vinden van redenen die hun visie ondersteunen (confirmation bias, congruence bias, expectation bias) dan in redenen die hun positie ondergraven (blind spot bias), en ook beter in het vinden van argumenten tegen een positie die zij verwerpen, dan voor een dergelijke positie. De beste argumenten voor het theïsme zal je met andere woorden niet horen van een atheïst, maar de kans is wel groot dat de atheïst het beste argument ontwikkelt tegen het theïsme. Sperber en Mercier geven aan dat hun theorie ook verklaart waarom in een groep redeneren resulteert in de beste argumenten. Dat is natuurlijk alleen maar het geval als er verschillende redeneringen en verschillende posities zijn. De beste argumenten tegen het theïsme zullen beter zijn als er ook verstandige theïsten gehoord worden die hun standpunt kunnen ontwikkelen. Zonder dergelijke variatie is er weinig brandstof voor verandering, laat staan voor vooruitgang of verbetering. Als de situatie in de wijsbegeerte zo is dat een bepaald soort (rechtse, conservatieve) argumenten grotendeels afwezig zijn, dan heeft dat vanzelfsprekend repercussies voor hoe de filosofie zich ontwikkelt. Die repercussies worden begrijpelijker binnen het door Sperber en Mercier geschetste kader. Ten eerste zal het betekenen dat de argumenten van meer centrum of linkse filosofen minder sterk zullen zijn, dan mocht men de rechtse argumenten wel horen. Ten tweede zou het kunnen dat de ondervertegenwoordiging van rechtse filosofen in de academische filosofie er – ironisch genoeg – toe leidt dat de rechtse stemmen die wél gehoord worden, niet de beste rechtse argumenten produceren. Ceteris paribus lijkt immers te gelden dat hoe minder rechtse filosofen er zijn, hoe kleiner de kans is dat er goede rechtse filosofen zijn. Ten derde wordt de filosofische bewijslast wel heel erg aan de kant van de rechtse posities gelegd. Een marginale of gemarginaliseerde positie zal veel meer tegenstand oproepen, en moet dus veel beter verdedigd worden, dan de mening die door de (machtige) meerderheid wordt gedeeld. De dynamiek tussen deze drie repercussies is bovendien van dien aard dat de uitsluiting mettertijd sterker zal worden, veeleer dan af te zwakken. De verschillende cognitive biases die we functioneel kunnen begrijpen door dit sociale ATR model van redeneren zijn natuurlijk niet enkel in de filosofie maar ook in de wetenschap aan het werk. De sociale dynamiek die ontstaat wanneer wetenschappers bijna allemaal dezelfde ideologische opIS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 113DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE vattingen delen, beïnvloedt heel sterk de onderwerpen die men bestudeert en die bestudeerd mogen worden, de interpretatie van de data, de keuze van de variabelen die men rapporteert en de conclusies die men trekt (Wright & DeLisi 2016). Dit is natuurlijk niet vreemd voor filosofen, die graag en veelvuldig benadrukken dat er niet zoiets is als waardenvrije wetenschap. De gevolgen van deze dynamiek zijn evenwel vaak problematisch. In de wetenschapsfilosofische literatuur is daar al vaak op gewezen. Zo hebben Helen Longino (1990) en Philip Kitcher er al herhaaldelijk op gewezen dat sociobiologie en evolutiepsychologie niet erg betrouwbare resultaten opleveren, en dat deze 'shortcomings result from presuppositions whose validity is grounded in a pervasive scheme of values' (Kitcher 2011: 150). Als oplossing stellen zij zelf ideologische diversiteit voor: 'Representation of a broader set of perspectives within the scientific community has the potential to expose ways in which the methods used by that community are less reliable than they are supposed, and may thus lead to improvements in certification\" (ibid.). Het gebrek aan ideologische diversiteit is er misschien voor verantwoordelijk dat dergelijke voorstellen alleen worden gedaan als de wetenschappelijke conclusies rechts lijken, bijvoorbeeld omdat de politieke repercussies gemakkelijker kunnen worden gebruikt voor (de rechtvaardiging van) een rechts-conservatief beleid. Nochtans is de hegemonie van een linksliberale ideologie, zeker binnen de mensen sociale wetenschappen, ook een bedreiging voor gedegen wetenschapsbeoefening. Dat wordt misschien wel het duidelijkst wanneer er dan toch onderzoek verschijnt dat eerder een rechts-conservatieve ideologie lijkt te ondersteunen. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de beruchte studie van Regnerus (2012), waarin die concludeerde dat kinderen van ouders die een relatie hadden gehad met een partner van hetzelfde geslacht, het in verhouding met andere kinderen later sociaal, psychologisch en emotioneel slechter deden. De methodologische (en morele) kritiek die de studie, de auteur en de redacteur van het tijdschrift dat de studie publiceerde te verwerken kreeg, was overweldigend. Of die kritiek terecht was doet hier minder ter zake. Wel de vraag of er evenveel kritiek was gekomen als een studie met een identieke methodologie het omgekeerde had aangetoond. Dat lijkt ons in ieder geval erg onwaarschijnlijk. Op vele punten was de studie van Regnerus immers methodologisch superieur aan studies die het tegendeel beweren aan te tonen (Redding 2013). In een ideologisch eenzijdig klimaat is de kans groot dat methodologische beperkingen van studies die de eigen ideologie onderALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 114 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 steunen over het hoofd worden gezien, en dat die van studies die de eigen ideologie ondermijnen worden uitvergroot. Ideologische diversiteit, ook in de (sociale) wetenschappen, lijkt ons het beste middel om dit soort groupthink te vermijden. De epistemologische nadelen van een gebrek aan ideologische diversiteit zijn waarschijnlijk groter binnen de filosofie dan in vele andere academische disciplines, vooral omdat van alle menswetenschappelijke disciplines de filosofie het redeneren in zijn meest zuivere vorm cultiveert. Zo zal zelfs de meest overtuigde naturalistische filosoof moeten toegeven dat het soort empirie dat een rol speelt in de filosofie toch wel minder hard is dan in de wetenschappen. In ieder geval worden ideeën binnen de empirische wetenschappen meer getoetst aan externe standaarden, zoals empirische data en de toepassing op buiten-academische problemen, en dus niet zomaar aan het oordeel van anderen (Sowell 2011; Nozick 1998). Binnen de filosofie wordt het succes van theorieën daarentegen vooral bepaald aan de hand van interne criteria, zoals intellectuele scherpte, innovativiteit, complexiteit, en het oordeel van andere filosofen (Sowell 2011). Hoe meer invloed interne criteria echter hebben, hoe belangrijker viewpoint diversity is (Kitcher 1993). Dit betekent natuurlijk niet dat een groot deel van het onderzoek binnen de filosofische logica beïnvloed zal zijn door de politieke ideologie van logici, maar het maakt het wel waarschijnlijk binnen de sociale en politieke filosofie. Zo werd in een recente discussie op de filosofische blog Daily Nous de vraag gesteld welke posities men als academische filosoof niet durfde te verdedigen uit angst voor professionele repercussies (Weinberg 2016). Vele van de vermelde posities hadden te maken met toegepaste ethiek en politieke filosofie (vrij wapenbezit, anti-migratie, pro-life, . . . ). Zeker binnen de praktische filosofie is er immers een voor de hand liggende invloed van politieke overtuigingen op de posities die men verdedigt. Toch zijn er zeker ook enkele 'gevoelige' wijsgerige posities die niet toegepast-ethisch of politiek-filosofisch zijn. Zo zijn er binnen de wetenschapsfilosofie een aantal goede voorbeelden van hevige discussies die in belangrijke mate ideologisch gestuurd zijn, en waarbij het gebrek aan ideologische diversiteit geleid heeft tot een consensus die misschien wel problematisch is. Men kan bijvoorbeeld denken aan de discussie over het concept heritabiliteit, een discussie die vooral in de jaren '70 en '80 hevig werd gevoerd maar die nog steeds af en toe opflakkert (Keller 2010; Sesardic 2005). De heritabiliteit van een kenmerk is de mate waarin de variatie van dat IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 115DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE kenmerk in een bepaalde populatie het resultaat is van genetische variatie, eerder dan van variatie in de omgevingsvariabelen. Als de lengte van Belgische mannen een heritabiliteitswaarde van 0.5 heeft bijvoorbeeld, betekent dit dat 50% van die variatie te wijten is aan genetische variatie. Het echte debat over dit concept begon toen Arthur Jensen in 1969 argumenteerde dat IQ een vrij hoge heritabiliteitswaarde heeft, en dat daarom het verschil in IQ tussen de blanke en zwarte populatie in de Verenigde Staten niet zomaar zou kunnen verdwijnen door allerlei sociale maatregelen, aangezien die variatie ten minste ten dele genetische oorzaken had. Hoewel er vrijwel onmiddellijk heftige kritiek kwam op Jensens' artikel, was het vooral de bioloog Lewontin die met een reeks artikelen (1970, 1974) de wetenschapsfilosofische discussie over de causale interpretatie van heritabiliteitsstudies op gang bracht. Lewontin argumenteerde dat de oorzaken van variatie niet zomaar kunnen worden onderverdeeld in genetische invloeden en omgevingsinvloeden, omdat er ook interacties en correlaties zijn tussen de twee. Verder kan je uit een heritabiliteitswaarde voor een bepaalde populatie, zo stelde Lewontin, ook geen conclusies trekken over de oorzaken van het verschil met een andere populatie, en kan je het effect van een nieuwe verandering in de omgeving niet voorspellen. Hoewel dit een zinvolle kritiek is, zijn er even goed ook antwoorden op mogelijk (Jensen 1975; Plomin et al. 1977; Sesardic 2005).5 Toch lijkt het debat onder filosofen ondertussen zo goed als beslecht, ten voordele van de interactionist consensus. Diegene die de kritiek op heritabiliteitsonderzoek niet delen worden vaak een ideologische agenda verweten, maar waarschijnlijk is het omgekeerde niet minder het geval. In ieder geval wordt Lewontins interactie-argument nooit ingeroepen om claims als zou X het gevolg zijn van discriminatie/verdrukking/kolonialisme te weerleggen. Niemand klopt in dat geval op tafel zeggende dat het onzinnig is sociale en genetische oorzaken uit elkaar te halen. De ondervertegenwoordiging van conservatieve stemmen binnen de filosofie lijkt er voor gezorgd te hebben dat de positie van Lewontin ten minste prematuur de consensus is geworden omdat die een progressief/linkse ideologie ondersteunt. Bovendien zet men de weinigen die de consensus durven uit te dagen, snel weg als racistisch of simpelweg te dom om Lewontins argumenten te begrijpen (Tabery 2014). De discussie omtrent heritabiliteit is een goed voorbeeld van alle gevaren van een gebrek aan ideologische diversiteit die we hierboven besproken hebben. 5 Voor een goed overzicht van de argumenten voor beiden posities in het debat over heritabiliteit, zie Tabery 2014. ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 116 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 Dit artikel wil geen ongenuanceerd pleidooi zijn voor positieve discriminatie van rechtse en conservatieve filosofen bij aanwervingsprocedures, maar we hebben hier in ieder geval een argument willen geven tegen negatieve discriminatie van zulke filosofen. Bovendien zou zeker een minimale vertegenwoordiging van rechts-conservatieve filosofen in grotere departementen vanuit epistemisch perspectief nastrevenswaardig zijn. Hoe dit bereikt kan worden, daar spreken we ons in deze bijdrage niet over uit. De eerste stap is waarschijnlijk de bewustwording van de positieve gevolgen van politieke diversiteit binnen de universiteit. Men kan daarbij een voorbeeld nemen aan het departement politieke economie van The University of Chicago. Dat departement trok in het begin van de 20ste eeuw Thorstein Veblen aan om voor ideologische diversiteit in het departement te zorgen. Men kan de vrije markt immers pas echt goed verdedigen, zo was de redenering, als men de beste kritieken van haar beste critici kan pareren. In dat licht is ook de recente beslissing van University of Colorado om een tijdelijke leerstoel te creëren voor conservative thought and policy (Shields & Dunn 2016) iets wat ook door progressieve academici zou moeten worden toegejuicht. 3 Hoe rechts is rechts? Evolutiebiologie heeft geen nood aan creationisten, daarover lijkt iedereen het eens. De tijd die we zouden moeten investeren in het weerleggen van creationisten gaat immers ten koste van waardevol evolutie-biologisch werk, en de kritieken die ze opwerpen zijn dermate zwak dat de evolutionaire literatuur ook niet sterker uit de confrontatie zal komen. Maar hoe zit het in de filosofie? Tot nog toe hebben we geschreven over 'rechts' en 'conservatief' zonder te specifiëren hoe rechts of conservatief dat 'rechts' of 'conservatief' precies is, en hoe ideologisch divers de filosofie precies hoort te zijn. Misschien zijn sommige lezers het met ons eens dat de filosofie ideologisch diverser dient te zijn dan ze nu is. Maar stel dat u zo een lezer bent, denkt u dan ook dat we (meer) nationaalsocialistische filosofen nodig hebben? En zouden meer anarchokapitalisten een zegen zijn voor de wijsbegeerte? Of zijn dergelijke rechtse filosofen het equivalent van creationisten in de evolutiebiologie? Een volledig antwoord op de vraag hoe divers de filosofie moet of mag zijn, zal u hier niet krijgen. Wel willen we een eerste poging doen om die vraag te verkennen. Die 'eerste poging' mag u trouwens tamelijk letterlijk opvatten: er is over de vraag wat een optimale viewpoint diversity is weinig IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 117DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE of niets geschreven. De meeste academici van de Heterodox Academy lijken het er wel over eens te zijn dat de diversiteit in de mensen sociale wetenschappen te beperkt is en dat de diversiteit ook te groot kan zijn (of minstens toch dat bepaalde vormen van viewpoint diversity onwenselijk zijn), maar nemen geen standpunt in over waar precies het epistemische optimum ligt. We zullen er hier vooral op wijzen dat het antwoord op deze vraag nog moeilijker te vinden zal zijn voor de filosofie dan voor de wetenschappen. We zouden immers kunnen denken dat een ruwe analyse van het creationisme-voorbeeld ons al wel op het spoor zou kunnen zetten van welke ideologische diversiteit onwenselijk is. Het gaat in dat geval om een visie die radicaal indruist tegen de methodes en basisinzichten van de discipline. Als we nu zouden aannemen dat dit ook als vuistregel voor andere disciplines kan gebruikt worden, wat zou het dan betekenen voor de filosofie? We vrezen dat het voor de filosofie bitter weinig zou betekenen. Ten eerste is het verre van duidelijk wat de methodes en de basisinzichten van de filosofie zijn. De filosofie is duidelijk minder cumulatief dan de (andere) wetenschappen6 en ze biedt ook ruimte aan heel verschillende methodes (analytisch, continentaal, formeel, informeel-narratief). Natuurlijk zijn er methodes die uitgesproken niet-filosofisch zijn: zo is er duidelijk geen plaats in de filosofie voor argumenten als 'We kunnen concluderen dat X enkel en alleen omdat mijn hond me verteld heeft dat X'. De voorkeur voor een dergelijke argumenteertrant lijkt echter niet heel verspreid in de filosofie, en het lijkt ook weinig waarschijnlijk dat het ideologisch zeer divers maken van de filosofie enige impact zou hebben op de populariteit van dergelijke redeneertrant. Geen pleidooi voor het diverser maken van de filosofie (of van de wetenschap) mag worden gelezen als een pleidooi voor het opgeven van de al schaarse algemeen-gedeelde intellectuele standaarden van onze discipline. Maar betekent dat dan dat elke ideologische diversiteit goed is, zolang ze maar gepaard gaat met een scherp intellect en gedegen argumentatie? Of geldt dat misschien wel nog voor anti-migratie argumenten en argumenten tegen het homohuwelijk of voor het kapitalisme, maar niet voor argumenten die concluderen dat folteren moreel aanvaardbaar en in vele gevallen zelfs moreel wenselijk is? Op dit ogenblik worden in de filosofie al bepaald vreemde standpunten verdedigd. Michael Tooley (1972) en Peter Singer (2011) verdedigden bij6 We hebben het hier dan over wetenschappen die zich in een periode bevinden van wat Kuhn normale wetenschap noemt. ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 118 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 voorbeeld al de opvatting dat het minder erg is een pasgeborene te doden dan een volwassen varken. Met betrekking tot ernstig gehandicapte kinderen schrijft Singer zelfs dat er vaak helemaal niets fout is aan het doden van die kinderen: 'Very often, it is not wrong at all.' (Singer 2011: 191) Dit gaat ons inziens redelijk ver. Tegelijk denken we dat het goed is dat deze argumenten het licht gezien hebben, vooral omdat die argumenten het nodig maken om dieper na te denken, onder meer over wat het betekent dat menselijke leven 'heilig' of 'onaantastbaar' is. Op een vergelijkbare manier zou het goed zijn dat iemand durft te verdedigen dat folterpraktijken en raciaal profileren (Schauer 2009) niet alleen moreel aanvaardbaar maar ook wenselijk zijn. Natuurlijk erkennen we dat dit risico's inhoudt: de argumenten zouden in strafzaken kunnen worden ingeroepen en zelfs mensen echt kunnen aanzetten tot infanticide/discriminatie/folteren. Het risico schatten we echter klein in, zo klein dat er geen grote voorzichtigheid geboden is. Voor zover we weten nam het aantal infanticides niet toe na Singers publicaties over dat thema, laat staan dat dit gebeurde door Singers publicaties. In vele disciplines spelen echter ook opportuniteitskosten: als evolutiebiologen bezig zijn met het weerleggen van creationisten kunnen ze zich minder verdiepen in de macro-evolutionaire tendensen. Dergelijke opportuniteitskosten spelen ook mee in de filosofie: als je bezig bent met het weerleggen van het raciaal realisme, kan je je niet buigen over het uitwerken van jouw a priori argument voor panpsychisme. Die opportuniteitskosten zijn echter minder problematisch in de filosofie dan in de (meeste andere) wetenschappen. Ten eerste is het filosofisch onderzoek meestal veel minder toegepast – of leent het zich veel minder tot toepassing – dan het onderzoek in andere disciplines. Het tijdelijk niet verder kunnen verkennen van een bepaalde piste omdat men bezig is met een andere piste, heeft dan ook weinig negatieve repercussies voor de buiten-academische wereld. Ten tweede hebben we er al op gewezen dat een groot deel van de filosofie niet cumulatief is. Als filosofie onze kennis al doet toenemen, dan is het toch vooral in de breedte. Vermits toename aan ideologische diversiteit waarschijnlijk zal resulteren in een breder worden van de filosofische onderzoeksprogramma's, dient men in de filosofie minder voorzichtig om te gaan met ideologische diversiteit dan in andere disciplines. Ten derde kan de filosofie ook dienen als een soort laboratorium voor ideeën die op het eerste gezicht aberrant lijken. Het ondervragen van ideologische en andere vooronderstellingen wordt vaak gezien als een van de kerntaken van de filosofie. Een dergelijke kerntaak kan beter uitgevoerd worden naarmate er meer IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 119DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE ideologische perspectieven een plaats vinden in de academische filosofische. Toch erkennen we ook dat extreme ideologische diversiteit problemen kan veroorzaken. Ze zou bijvoorbeeld in de weg kunnen staan van een meer inclusieve wijsbegeerte. Dat geldt voor argumenten die raciaal profileren verdedigen, maar natuurlijk net zozeer voor argumenten als die van Singer. Bepaalde groepen kunnen zich door deze argumenten onveilig voelen in de filosofie en de filosofie daarom gaan vermijden. Daarnaast zijn er met bepaalde extreme posities ook juridische problemen, die zich misschien orthogonaal verhouden tot de epistemische kwestie maar daarom niet minder relevant zouden zijn. Tot slot moet men in deze ook pragmatisch zijn: meer ideologische diversiteit in de wijsbegeerte is haalbaar, extreme ideologische diversiteit – indien ze al wenselijk zou zijn – is dat voorlopig zeker niet. Bibliografie Beebee, H. (2013) Women and Deviance in Philosophy, in: K. Hutchison & F. Jenkins (red.) Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 61-80. Buckwalter, W. & S. Stich (2010) Gender and Philosophical Intuition. Geraadpleegd op 10 september 2016: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966324. Crawford, J.T., J.L. Duarte, J. Haidt, L. Jussim, C. Stern & P.E. Tetlock (2015) It May Be Harder than We Thought, but Political Diversity Will (Still) Improve Social Psychological Science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38, e164. Duarte, J.L., J.T. Crawford, C. Stern, J. Haidt, L. Jussim & P.E. Tetlock (2015) Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38, e130. Gross, N. (2013) Why Are Professors Liberal and Why Do Conservatives Care? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gross, N. & S. Simmons (2007) The Social and Political Views of American Professors. Paper gepresenteerd op het Harvard University Symposium over Professors and Their Politics op 6 oktober, Cambridge, Ma. Haslanger, S. (2008) Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone), Hypatia 23(2), pp. 210-223. Inbar, Y. & J. Lammers (2012) Political Diversity in Social and Personality Psychology, Perspectives on Psychological Science 7(5), pp. 496-503. Jensen, A.R. (1969) How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, Harvard Educational Review 39, pp. 1-123. Jensen, A.R. (1970) Race and the Genetics of Intelligence: A Reply to Lewontin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 26(5), pp. 17-23. Jensen, A.R. (1975) The Meaning of Heritability in the Behavioral Sciences, Educational Psychologist 11(3), pp. 171-183. Kahan, D.M. (2012) Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An Experimental Study, Judgment and Decision Making 8, pp. 407-24. ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 120 VOL. 109, NO. 1, 2017 Keller, E.F. (2010) The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture. Durham: Duke University Press. Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kitcher, P. (2011) Science in a Democratic Society. New York: Prometheus Books. Klein, D.B. & C. Stern (2005) Professors and their Politics: The Policy Views of Social Scientists, Critical Review 17(3-4), pp. 257-303. Krugman, P. (2014) On the Liberal Bias of Facts. Blog geplaatst op The Opinon Pages van The New York Times op 18 april 2014, geraadpleegd op 10 september 2016: krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2014/04/18/on-the-liberal-bias-of-facts/. Lakoff, G. (2010) Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lewontin, R.C. (1970) Race and Intelligence, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 26(3), pp. 2-8. Lewontin, R.C. (1974) The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes, American Journal of Human Genetics 26(3), pp. 400-411. Longino, H.E. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mercier, H. & D. Sperber (2011) Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34(2), pp. 57-74. Nisbett, E.C., K.E. Cooper & R.K. Garrett (2015) The Partisan Brain: How Dissonant Science Messages Lead Conservatives and Liberals to (Dis)Trust Science, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 658(1), pp. 36-66. Nisbett, R.E., K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan (2001) Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic versus Analytic Cognition, Psychological review 108(2), pp. 291. Nozick, R. (1998) Why do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?, CATO Policy Report 20(1), pp. 8-11. Pettigrew, T.F. & L.R. Tropp (2006) A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90(5), pp. 751-783. Plomin, R., J.C. DeFries & J.C. Loehlin (1977) Genotype-Environment Interaction and Correlation in the Analysis of Human Behavior, Psychological Bulletin 84(2), 309-322. Pigliucci, M. (2011) Does the Academy Discriminate against Conservatives? Blog geplaatst op Rationally Speaking op 10 februari 2016, geraadpleegd op 10 september 2016: rationallyspeaking.blogspot.be/2011/02/does-academy-discriminate-against.html. Redding, R.E. (2012) Likes Attract The Sociopolitical Groupthink of (Social) Psychologists, Perspectives on Psychological Science 7(5), pp. 512-515. Redding, R.E. (2013) Politicized Science Society 50, pp. 439-446. Saul, J. (2013) Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat and Women in Philosophy, in: F. Jenkins & K. Hutchison (red.) Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39-60. Schauer, F.F. (2009) Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sesardic, N. (2005) Making Sense of Heritability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shields, J.A. & J.M. Dunn (2016) Passing on the Right: Conservative Professors in the Progressive University. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singer, P. (2011) Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sowell, T. (2012) Intellectuals and Society. New York: Basic Books. Stich, S. & W. Buckwalter (2011) Gender and the Philosophy Club, The Philosophers'Magazine 52, pp. 60-65. Tabery, J. (2014) Beyond Versus: The Struggle to Understand the Interaction of Nature and Nurture. Cambridge: MIT Press. IS DE FILOSOFIE TE LINKS? 121DE BLOCK & LEMEIRE Tetlock, P.E. & G. Mitchell (2015) Why so Few Conservatives and Should we Care? Society 52(1), pp. 28-34. Tooley, M. (1972) Abortion and Infanticide, Philosophy and Public Affairs 2(1), pp. 37-65. Weinberg, J. (2016) Which ideas are students protect from? Which are faculty fearful to defend? Blog geplaatst op Daily Nous op 30 augustus 2016, geraadpleegd op 10 september 2016: dailynous.com/2016/08/30/ideas-students-protected-from-faculty-fearful-to-defend/. Wright, J. & M. DeLisi (2016) Conservative Criminology: A Call to Restore Balance in the Social Sciences. New York: Routledge. Over de auteurs Andreas De Block (1972) studeerde filosofie en psychologie in Gent en Leuven. Van 2002 tot 2005 was hij als VENI-postdoc verbonden aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. Momenteel is hij hoogleraar aan de KU Leuven, waar hij onder meer medische filosofie en sportethiek doceert. Hij publiceert over seksualiteit, culturele evolutie en psychiatrie. Olivier Lemeire (1987) werkt momenteel als FWO-postdoc aan het Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte in Leuven, waar hij in 2015 ook zijn doctoraat behaalde. Dat doctoraat behandelde de natuurlijkheid van wetenschappelijke soortclassificaties. Hij publiceert nu voornamelijk over de verschillende manieren om te denken en spreken over soorten mensen, bijvoorbeeld door raciale onderscheidingen of psychiatrische labels. ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE 122 VOL. 109, NO. 1,", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "LIVING REVIEWS IN DEMOCRACY democracy.livingreviews.org | 2009 Property-Owning Democracy and the Demands of Justice Thad Williamson University of Richmond | Jepson School of Leadership Studies | twillia9@richmond.edu Martin O'Neill University of Manchester | Manchester Centre for Political Theory | martin.oneill@manchester.ac.uk First published: September 2009 Most recent version available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2009-5 John Rawls is arguably the most important political philosopher of the past century. His theory of justice has set the agenda for debate in mainstream political philosophy for the past forty years, and has had an important influence in economics, law, sociology, and other disciplines. However, despite the importance and popularity of Rawls's work, there is (rather surprisingly) no clear picture of what a society that met Rawls's principles of justice would actually look like. Much of the confusion arises from the frequent description of Rawls as a proponent of a redistributive welfare state regime. While Rawls's principles of justice do provide philosophical support for the redress of existing inequalities and for the substantial redistribution of resources, it is incorrect to say that he favoured welfare state regimes in anything resembling their current form. In fact, Rawls was a strong critic of what he termed \"welfare state capitalism\" and an advocate of an institutional alternative which he termed \"property-owning democracy.\" Discussion of \"property-owning democracy\" occupied only a very small part of his seminal A Theory of Justice (1971), and was passed over entirely in Political Liberalism (1993). But in his final statement of his view of social justice (Justice as Fairness, 2001) Rawls provided pointed and explicit (albeit rather brief) discussion of the essential contrasts between welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy, and explained why he believed that the welfare state could not in fact realize his two principles of justice. Nonetheless, the concept of property-owning democracy is not well understood, and is still only rarely treated as integral to Rawls's theory of justice. The aim of this review article is threefold. First, we review how Rawls and his leading interpreters have described the concept of property-owning democracy. Second, we examine how the notion of \"propertyowning democracy\" has recently been appropriated by nonRawlsian political philosophers working in the republican tradition, who have developed arguments from non-Rawlsian premises which also favour the widespread dispersion of property ownership. Third, we briefly review recent work attempting to translate the general notion of a property-owning democracy into concrete institutional and policy proposals that might be adopted by advanced industrialized nations. A Theory of Justice and Property-Owning Democracy The hugely ambitious aim of Rawls's A Theory of Justice is to specify a public understanding of justice appropriate to societies committed to both individual freedom and democratic equality. Rawls develops his theory of justice explicitly in opposition to utilitarianism, understood as a public philosophy which equates both goodness and justice with the maximization of aggregate human welfare. Rawls believed that utilitarianism provided an inadequate philosophical grounding for an array of rights commonly associated with liberal democracies (such as freedom of speech and other civil liberties) and also failed to take individuals sufficiently seriously as important in their own right: a strictly utilitarian understanding of justice, for instance, could not preclude in advance depriving a minority of citizens of their liberties or denying them basic resources in order to advance the interests of the majority. As Rawls famously put it, \"utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.\"1 Rawls also recognized, and was concerned to counteract, the force of traditional objections to the very idea of justice, exemplified by Marx and other skeptics dating back to the character Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic. In this view, \"justice\" refers simply to the norms and rules governing a particular society-norms and rules which inevitably have the purpose and effect of justifying the status quo and benefitting the ruling class of a given society. For instance, in Marx's view, under capitalism, there is no injustice, as such, involved in a laborer selling their labor time to a capitalist, who then exploits the laborer by appropriating the product of that labor and selling it for a profit. Under capitalist conceptions of justice, this is simply a voluntary transaction, even if the labourer's only other choice was living in extreme penury, or starving to death. On this view, conceptions of justice can only be internal to a given society, and cannot provide an independent standard for judging a society's institutions. Those who are in charge set the rules and then they also get to call it justice.2 Similarly, our day-to-day judgments about what is just and fair can often be shaped and distorted by our own gender, race, and class position. Highly educated college graduates may be more likely to believe that those who have the best education should be given more money and power. Men may be more likely to 1 Rawls (1971: 24). Page citations to A Theory of Justice in this article refer to the 1999 revised edition. 2 Whether Marx was as hostile to the idea of justice as some of his more dismissive comments suggest is a disputed question, and one Rawls examines at some length in his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Rawls takes the view (drawing on the work of G.A.Cohen) that Marx does have a normative conception of justice underlying his analysis of capitalism, albeit one that is not explicitly expressed. See Rawls (2007): 335-371. See also G.A. Cohen (1989). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 1 believe that the disproportionate numbers of men in positions of power are a result either of men's inherent superior fitness for such roles or the result of choices made by individual women not to pursue such positions. Middle-class people may be more likely to believe that the poor are largely to blame for their own condition, and managers at capitalist firms may be more likely to believe that they should have the right to issue orders to subordinates. Rawls's theory of justice aims both to provide an alternative to utilitarianism and an answer to skeptics who believe that impartial justice is impossible or that justice is at bottom a sort of disingenuous 'code language', designed to uphold the status quo. The principal mechanism Rawls invokes to develop his conception of justice is the idea of the Original Position (OP). In the Original Position, independent individuals come together for the purpose of selecting principles of justice that will govern their entire society. In the OP, every individual will be under a \"veil of ignorance\" with respect to their individual identity: individuals will not have any information about their race, gender, class position, educational attainment, religious beliefs, and so on. They will know that they wish to live a self-directed life and to form and pursue a rational life plan, and they will know that they need certain resources (what Rawls calls \"primary goods\") to pursue those plans; they will also be aware of certain basic principles of psychology, sociology, and economics regarding the nature of human societies and how they operate (i.e., the notion that people's behaviour is influenced by material incentives.) At the outset of A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that the governing principles that would be chosen in this initial position should be regarded as just.3 Rawls argues that two principles of justice would be selected: roughly speaking, a principle of liberty and a principle of equality. The liberty principle calls for providing each citizen with \"a fully adequate scheme of equal liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.\"4 What Rawls has in mind here principally are civil liberties and not (as in libertarian conceptions) the untrammelled right of individuals to profit from property holding or to enter into exchanges of any kind. The equality principle is twofold: all citizens are to have an equal opportunity to aspire to positions, offices and (more generally) social advancement (the \"principle of fair equality of opportunity\"); and inequalities between citizens are to be limited to those which maximally help the least well off group in society (the \"difference principle\"). Rawls accords absolute or \"lexical\" priority to the liberty principle and, within the equality principle, to the guarantee of fair equality of opportunity over the enactment of the difference principle. Thus, subject to the satisfaction of the liberty principle and the other part of the equality principle, political-economic arrangements must be organized so as to maximize the position of the least well off relative to any other possible arrangement.5 3 Rawls (1971): 10-19. It is important to recognize, however, that Rawls does not regard the OP as static. If it can be shown that in the OP the agents will reach principles of justice conflicting with our considered judgments, then the description of the OP is to be revised so as to yield a different result. In effect, the OP functions as a mechanism for testing intuitions about just principles. For useful discussion, see Kymlicka (2002): 63-70. 4 Rawls (2001): 42. We quote here from the revised statement of the two principles presented in Justice as Fairness. 5 As Samuel Freeman puts it, the difference principle calls for selecting that political-economic system which tends over time to maximize the position of the least well off; and it calls for maximizing the actual position of the least well off within that chosen system. So the difference The \"difference principle\" therefore can be seen as having a dual function. On the one hand, it sets a limit (however vaguely) on the scope of acceptable inequalities. On the other hand, given plausible assumptions about the role of incentives in stimulating productivity, it effectively mandates inequalities, so long as such inequalities maximally benefit those at the bottom of society. Rawls, in effect, endorses an affluent society with inequality and a high standard of living for the worst off as superior to a poorer society with little inequality. Here Rawls accepts the standard economist's view that there is a trade-off between strict equality and efficiency, and that material inequalities provide incentives for spurring the effort of economic producers, potentially to the benefit of all. Notably, Rawls also rejects the notion that inequality in itself is an overriding moral bad;6 what is bad are inequalities which cement the superior position of the most welloff, or which generate social harms, such as the domination of one part of society by another, or the loss of self-respect among the badly off.7 Given this set of principles, the task for Rawls is to specify a political economy that would be consistent with basic individual liberties (such as the liberty to choose one's employment and important liberties of political participation); that would provide substantially equal opportunities to all citizens; and that would limit runaway inequalities that create permanent classes or that undermine the notion that society is a joint system of cooperation aimed at a common end. By the time of writing A Theory of Justice  Rawls had already ruled out centralized state socialism as a plausible vehicle for realizing these principles; state socialism (among its other problems) systematically violated basic liberties (such as freedom of employment and political liberties). Rawls thus assumed that a just society must, in some sense, be a market society. But in A Theory of Justice, (and even more explicitly in Justice as Fairness, to which we will turn later in this discussion) Rawls left open the question as to whether the just society would be either capitalist or socialist in character. A just society based on the private control of capital, however, should take a different form than traditional or \"really existing\" capitalist societies: instead of the control of capital being highly concentrated among a narrow band of citizens, it should be dispersed as widely as possible. That idea represents the core kernel of \"property-owning democracy.\" principle regulates both the broad choice of institutional arrangements and the selection of specific policies (i.e., taxes, transfers, labor laws) within a given arrangement. Importantly, Rawls does not equate maximizing the position of the least well-off with maximizing their incomes and wealth, but rather maximizing an index of the broader bundle of primary goods that affect one's sense of self-respect and overall life chances. See Freeman (2007a): 102-109 and Freeman (2007b): 111-115. 6 Derek Parfit (1991) gives the label \"Telic egalitarianism\" to the view that inequality is in itself bad. On the rejection of \"Telic egalitarianism\" and for discussion of Rawls's views regarding the badness of inequality, see Martin O'Neill, \"What Should Egalitarians Believe?\" (2008a). G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls's theory of justice on a closely related issue, regarding Rawls's attitude to inequality (Cohen, 2008). In Cohen's view, the inequalities permitted by the difference principle may be sensible, but should not be regarded as just. Cohen argues in effect that Rawls wrongly elides justice as such with more pragmatic concerns in developing his account of social justice. Even if Cohen's critique is accepted, that does not make Rawls's ideas about property-owning democracy any less interesting or important; it simply means (to take Cohen's view) that we should regard it as an effort to specify what a real-world political economy that balanced justice against other important considerations looks like. 7 See Rawls (2001), pp. 130-2. See also Scanlon, (1996); O'Neill (2008a). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 2 Rawls on the Institutional Framework of a Just Economy Rawls did not claim to have worked out the details of a politicaleconomic regime corresponding to the idea of a propertyowning democracy; his aim was simply to indicate the general outlines of the sort of political economy that might be fully consistent with the principles of justice as fairness. Moreover, this outline is pitched at the level of ideal-type regime analysis in Rawls's writings, and it thereby self-consciously passes over detailed questions of \"political sociology\" regarding how such a regime will function in practice.8 In the broadest possible terms, a property-owning democracy will be a market economy in which holdings of capital are widely dispersed across the population. The view is that fair equality of opportunity and limited inequality can be better achieved through a more broad-based distribution of initial holdings rather than by relying on the mechanism of \"after-thefact\" redistributive taxation. A property-owning democracy would be a \"regime in which land and capital are widely though not presumably equally held,\" in which \"[s]ociety is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources,\" and which is able to \"prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.\"9 In many respects, the institutional structure Rawls proposes in A Theory of Justice for a property-owning democracy is familiar to citizens living under welfare state capitalism. Rawls assumes that there will be a political constitution providing basic liberties, a public sector that provides public goods (including an educational system that will provide \"equal chances of education and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated\"), and a market and price system with a suitable system of regulation. Rawls goes on to specify five separate branches of government oversight, dealing with regulation of markets, macro-economic policy, social transfers (with each citizen guaranteed a social minimum), the distribution of property, and the provision of non-essential public goods. The overall picture is of a mixed economy with a judicious blend of market mechanisms and government oversight, embedded within a system of basic liberties (such as freedom of career choice). 10 What, then, makes property-owning democracy distinct from welfare state capitalism? The distinction is to be found in the relative weight accorded in importance to \"after-the-fact\" social 8 The most sustained discussion of property-owning democracy offered by Rawls can found in Chapter V, of A Theory of Justice (1971), especially section 43, and again in the Preface to the French edition of A Theory of Justice (reproduced as the preface to the revised edition of TJ, see especially at pp. xiv-xvi). The most systematic discussion comes in pages 135-140 of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). (The idea is given no attention at all in Political Liberalism [1993].) Given this paucity of discussion in Rawls's formal published writings, the discussion here is particularly informed by four further sources. These include a pair of articles in 1986 and 1987 by Krouse and McPherson that pay attention to Rawls's notion of a POD and try to draw out some of its implications (Krouse and McPherson, 1986, 1987); various publications by the British economist James Meade in the 1960s and 1970s describing a \"property-owning democracy\", from which Rawls explicitly takes the name for his preferred socioeconomic regime (Meade, 1965a, 1965b, 1975, 1993); work by one of Rawls's prominent students, Joshua Cohen, specifying the problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy (especially Cohen, 1989); and finally, Rawls's own recently published lectures on Karl Marx highlighting the contrast between Rawls' conception of a just society organized as a propertyowning democracy and Marx's ideal of communism (Rawls, 2007). 9 Rawls (1971): 247, 245. 10 Rawls (1971): 242-251; quotation on education at 243. transfers relative to alterations in the distribution of property in achieving a relatively egalitarian economy. Welfare state capitalism aims at providing an economic baseline as well as certain public goods (education, health care, housing) to all citizens; this is achieved primarily through redistributive taxation (what Rawls terms transfers). Property-owning democracy also aims to provide an economic baseline to the \"least well off,\" but it has a further goal as well: preventing large concentrations of wealth and dispersing ownership of property as widely as possible. One might say that welfare state capitalism simply wants to provide a social baseline at the bottom, whereas property-owning democracy also wants to put limits on accumulation at the top, thereby narrowing overall inequality from both directions (top and bottom). Moreover, property-owning democracy is also concerned to engage in redistribution in additional dimensions: i.e., not just the redistribution of income characteristic of welfare state capitalism, but also the redistribution of wealth and capital assets (as well as ensuring a more equitable distribution of human capital).11 In terms of how such goals might be realized, Rawls points to inheritance taxes as the best mechanism for distributing property more widely and preventing large estates from being transferred in whole from one generation to another. Here Rawls cites proposals for taxation on intergenerational transfers developed by economist James Meade; persons receiving such transfers would owe progressively higher taxes on these gifts according to how many such gifts they had received over their lifetime. Rawls does not stipulate that each person must receive an inheritance, and rejects the idea that there is an inherent injustice in some persons receiving more gifts than another (so long as this takes place within the framework of an overall system that is just).12 For Rawls, inheritance taxes have a more limited, though vital function: preventing large concentrations of wealth from being transmitted inter-generationally. This aim in turn corresponds to a social ideal in which there is no permanent class of politically privileged holders of wealth and capital sufficiently powerful to extract gains for itself that do not function to benefit the least well off. Left Critiques of A Theory of Justice As noted above, Rawls's remarks describing his favoured socioeconomic regime in A Theory of Justice are rather sparse; Rawls devotes just 9 of the 514 pages of the book to discussion of \"property-owning democracy,\" and only mentions the term in the main text twice. Perhaps as a result of the lack of detail on this issue, a number of left-wing critics took Rawls to be advocating welfare state policies which would enable capitalist processes to produce as much as wealth as possible, while redistributive processes located in the state assured that the \"least well off\" received as much in the way of (compensatory) economic resources as economically feasible.13 The notion of a capitalist welfare state that could in fact maximize the position of the least well off immediately struck many critics on the left as implausible. In one of the best-developed early critiques of Rawls, Barry Clark and Herbert Gintis argued that Rawls relied 11 As subsequent commentators have noted, such equalization of wealth and assets also has implications for how work is to be organized. See Hsieh (2009). 12 Rawls (1971): 245. 13 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls admits that the distinction between welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy \"is not sufficiently noted in Theory.\" Rawls (2001): 135 n2. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 3 on citizens holding an implausibly expansive sense of social justice, in order to facilitate the redistribution required to \"correct\" the inequalities generated by capitalism, so as to meet the requirements of the difference principle.14 In a related critique, Gerald Doppelt argued that Rawls failed to appreciate the impact of relative economic position, particularly in the production process, on the generation of self-respect. Consequently, Doppelt suggested that the different ways in which Rawls treated the cases of, on the one hand, civil and personal liberties (which are to be distributed equally, as a matter of assuring the conditions of self-respect for all) and, on the other hand, positions and power in the production process (which can be distributed unequally without undermining fundamental self-respect), was normatively unjustifiable when one considered the effects of inequality on status and selfrespect.15 Likewise, David Schweickart argued that the logic of Rawls's theory of justice should have led him to embrace democratic socialism as the social system most capable of realizing his favoured principles.16 In an important response to these early critiques, Arthur DiQuattro defended Rawls against the charge that he is a supporter of traditional capitalism or of a system of social classes (understood in the Marxist sense of the term). In particular, DiQuattro argued that Rawls did not envisage a society divided between owners and non-owners of capital; in short, Rawls did not endorse capitalism, and did not assume that the allowances made for socioeconomic inequality under the second principle of justice necessitated a capitalist organization of production. In defending Rawls from these challenges from the left, DiQuattro quite properly called attention to the crucial distinction Rawls made between property-owning democracy and capitalism.17 Shortly thereafter, Richard Krouse and Michael McPherson offered the first sustained effort in the literature to engage with what Rawls meant by property-owning democracy.18 Drawing on both Rawls's writings and James Meade's efforts to describe a property-owning democracy, Krouse and McPherson show how both a concern for the fair value of the political liberties and the difference principle point in the direction of a regime that broadens property ownership directly, rather than a welfare state dependent on large-scale ex post redistributions to limit inequality. While some redistribution via taxation will be necessary even in a property-owning democracy, the fundamental mechanism for achieving an egalitarian society must be to \"[limit] the concentration of property over time.\" Krouse and McPherson then went on to pose four critical questions, quoted verbatim below: 1. What institutional means are required to preserve [an] egalitarian distribution [of property] over time (should it at some time be achieved), and indeed can adequate means be described? 2. What would life in a property-owning democracy be like? Would the combination of (relatively) egalitarian property ownership and competitive markets produce a society that was acceptably 'well-ordered', harmonious, and stable? 14 Clark and Gintis (1978) 15 Doppelt (1981) 16 Schweickart (1979) 17 DiQuattro (1983) 18 Krouse and McPherson (1986, 1987) 3. Can a theory of justice illuminate the choice between the best private property regime-property-owning democracy-and the best socialist arrangements for providing justice? 4. How can this characterization of the ideal property-owning democracy help to guide the process of reform in existing, nonideal, private property societies?19 Justice as Fairness on Property-Owning Democracy Well-developed answers to each of the questions posed by Krouse and McPherson are still lacking in the literature.20 Indeed, in the 1990s, most critical debate about Rawls's system of justice followed the agenda set by his own Political Liberalism (1993), examining the question of whether a liberal egalitarian account of justice should aspire to being \"comprehensive\" as opposed to merely \"political.\" Rawls argued that liberal principles of justice can in fact be endorsed by persons with widely varying comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines, and with varying conceptions of the good life, and need not (and, indeed, must not) involve one dominant social group imposing its own particular value commitments or comprehensive philosophical doctrine on others. Accordingly, attention to questions of distributive justice and the idea of property-owning democracy faded to the background of the debate about political liberalism. Indeed, some observers have noted an internal connection between Rawls's argumentation for political liberalism and the reduced prominence of distributive justice in his writings: a generation of debate among political theorists in the wake of A Theory of Justice, as well as the strong rightward turn in politics in both the United States and the UK in the 1980s, made it abundantly clear that the stringently egalitarian requirements of the difference principle were unlikely ever to command universal assent among philosophers, let alone among the broader public.21 That political fact in turn calls into doubt the broader project of developing principles of justice that both have \"real teeth\" and that could also be widely accepted within highly diverse modern societies. Rawls himself at times seemed to downgrade the standing of the difference principle within his account of justice in Political Liberalism.22 For instance, Rawls argued that firm principles of distributive justice need not (and ought not) be written into the political constitutions of just societies, and that application of distributive principles should be left to legislators. This aspect of Rawls's view can be explained by his understandable reluctance to see complex social policy questions settled in the courts, but nevertheless his proposed solution could be seen as giving the realization of distributive justice a status that is contingent on the decisions and preferences of legislators (who Rawls assumes 19 Krouse and McPherson (1988): 99-100. 20 A forthcoming volume edited by O'Neill and Williamson (2010) is intended to redress that gap. 21 Chambers (2006) 22 Thus Simone Chambers argues that while \"the difference principle lives on as Rawls's favored interpretation of economic justice,\" in Political Liberalism he no longer insists that \"it is the only possible candidate for a fair principle.\" Further, Chambers observes, \"In addition to demoting its status within the theory, there is a more subtle fading away of the topic. Social justice is no longer front and center. His growing concern to find a view of justice that would be compatible with pluralism came to overshadow his deep commitment to egalitarianism.\" Chambers (2006): 86. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 4 will accept and seek to implement the difference principle).23 Given that really-existing democratic politics is rarely, if ever, characterized by consensus on fundamental principles of justice, especially in the context of countries like the United States, leaving the difference principle's fate in the hands of democratic politics has struck some commentators as tantamount to abandoning it.24 That note of ambiguity in turn signalled a broader tension within Rawls's theory: whether Rawls intended his theory of justice to reflect the self-understanding of existing democratic societies (an interpretation lent support by his engagement with the tradition of American constitutional law in Political Liberalism) or whether he intended the theory to be critical of existing institutional practices as well as inegalitarian social views. One can also see this tension as embodying a broader tension between some of the different roles that Rawls identifies for political philosophy: for example, between the fundamentally progressive enterprise of identifying a \"realistic utopia\", as against the less radical, Hegelian task of offering a \"reconciliation\" to our existing social world.25 It is thus a striking fact than in his final sustained statement about justice, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls 'lays down his cards' so to speak: more than in any previous book, he makes it clear that he believes that contemporary capitalist societies, especially the United States, have veered far away from realizing liberal principles of justice. It is here as well that we find the most detailed contrast between, on the one hand, welfare state capitalism, which Rawls rejects, and, on the other hand, property-owning democracy and liberal socialism, both of which he is prepared to endorse. Rawls argues that either property-owning democracy or liberal socialism could in theory realize principles of justice, and argues that the choice between the two should be made on the basis of contingent historical and cultural factors. The implication seems here to be that in societies like the United States, with weak socialist traditions and a strong cultural emphasis on entrepreneurial individualism, property-owning democracy is the more likely vehicle for realizing the just society (with liberal socialism perhaps a more suitable option in societies with more collectivist political cultures or stronger socialist traditions). In an equally striking move, Rawls in Justice as Fairness (approvingly citing Krouse and McPherson) rests the argument for property-owning democracy not primarily in terms of the demands of the second principle of justice, but rather in terms of the first principle. Rawls argues that the widespread political inequalities generated by welfare state capitalism represent a systemic violation of the \"fair values of the political liberties.\" Unlike other liberties, the fair value of the political liberties must be distributed equally; a society in which this is not the case cannot be considered to be either self-governing or free.26 23 Rawls (1993). Importantly, however, Rawls does treat provision of a social minimum \"providing for the basic needs of all citizens\" as a constitutional essential; see Rawls (2003), pp. 228-29. 24 Thus see Thomas (2009), who argues for constitutionally guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties. Such a constitutional guarantee, in his view, would preclude democratic politics from sanctioning excessive inequalities, while avoiding the need to lock in place any particular institutional scheme designed to realize propertyowning democracy. See also J. Cohen (2003) for a critique of Rawls's supposition that consensus can be reached on the content of justice in actual democratic polities. 25 See Rawls, (2001), pp. 1-5. 26 In A Theory of Justice Rawls also connected arguments for inheritance taxes to the requirement of maintaining the fair value of political liberties, as well for realizing fair equality of opportunity. There Rawls states that \"it seems\" that \"a wide dispersal of property is a This move is important both for its own sake and because it means that Rawls's arguments for property-owning democracy are thereby not solely contingent on acceptance of the controversial difference principle. Nonetheless, as well as its falling short with regard to the first principle, Rawls also makes clear that a predictable consequence of the concentration of wealth and political power characteristic of welfare state capitalism is that such polities rarely if ever are able to enact redistributive policies sufficiently strong to establish and maintain intergenerational equality of opportunity, or to limit objectionable inequalities which serve no social purpose other than the enrichment of the already privileged. According to Justice as Fairness, one of the main aims of property-owning democracy is \"to prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well... Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality. (Rawls, 2001: 139). Rawls goes onto describe POD as a socioeconomic system with at least the three following institutional features: (1) Wide Dispersal of Capital: The sine qua non of a POD is that it would entail the wide dispersal of the ownership of the means of production, with individual citizens controlling productive capital, both in terms of human and non-human capital (and perhaps with an opportunity to control their own working conditions). (2) Blocking the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage: A POD would also involve the enactment of significant estate, inheritance and gift taxes, acting to limit the largest inequalities of wealth, especially from one generation to the next. (3) Safeguards against the Corruption of Politics: A POD would seek to limit the effects of private and corporate wealth on politics, through campaign finance reform, public funding of political parties, public provision of forums for political debate, and other measures to block the influence of wealth on politics (perhaps including publicly funded elections). Policies of type (3) should be viewed as being in place with an eye on the protection of the fair value of the political liberties, and are therefore closely connected with creating a regime that is in accord with Rawls's first principle of justice. Policies of type (1) and (2) should, in contrast, be viewed as providing the means for institutionalizing the demands of Rawls's second principle of justice. Through a combination of all three kinds of policies, Rawls aims to specify a social system that has the necessary condition . . . if the fair values of the basic liberties are to be maintained.\" Rawls (1971): 245-46. But this connection is foregrounded to a greater degree in Justice as Fairness, where he makes it the primary focus of his critique of welfare state capitalism. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 5 capacity to overcome the structural limitations of welfare state capitalism in delivering a fully just set of socioeconomic arrangements. Recent Commentary on Rawls's Conception of PropertyOwning Democracy Spurred on in part by the striking arguments of Justice as Fairness, property-owning democracy has received increasing attention in recent years from liberal egalitarian political philosophers. (To be sure, in many accounts of Rawls's social and political thought, property-owning democracy is discussed only briefly, if it is mentioned at all.) 27 Discussions of the dilemmas of contemporary liberal egalitarian politics offered by Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka each stress Rawls's critique of the welfare state and the implicit radicalism of property-owning democracy.28 In recent papers, both Ben Jackson and Amit Ron trace the intellectual origins of \"property-owning democracy\" phrase to the early 20th-century British conservative Noel Skelton; Jackson suggests that James Meade's use of the term (subsequently picked up by Rawls) was a deliberately ironic attempt to invert the meaning of what hitherto had been a conservative idiom.29 Samuel Freeman argues that Rawls's preference for property-owning democracy vis-à-vis the welfare state parallels his preference for the \"liberalism of freedom\" of Kant and J.S. Mill, in which citizens take an active role in developing their capacities, as opposed to the \"liberalism of happiness\" associated with classical utilitarians such as Bentham.30 Freeman's extremely comprehensive treatment of the full range of Rawls's thought also contains a relatively extended account of the distinction between welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy.31 In a related vein, Nien-hê Hsieh draws on Rawls to argue the case for what he terms \"workplace republicanism,\" i.e., the introduction of workplace democracy and limitation of arbitrary managerial authority; in Justice as Fairness, Rawls forwarded some suggestive though noncommittal comments about the potential importance of workplace democracy in helping to realize a just society.32 This aspect of Rawls's thought has also been picked up by Martin O'Neill, who explores, in a recent article, what he terms \"three Rawlsian routes\" for defending some form of economic democracy as a precondition for a just socioeconomic order.33 Most recently, papers by Hsieh, O'Neill, Waheed Hussain, and Thad Williamson have further developed both the basic idea of property-owning democracy and have also subjected the concept to critical scrutiny. Hsieh focuses on the role of work in a property-owning democracy; Hussain compares propertyowning democracy to what he terms democratic corporatism; O'Neill offers a partial critique of Rawls's arguments against the welfare state; and Williamson describes how a wide dispersal of real estate, cash, and capital might be actually institutionalized and sustained in a property-owned democracy.34 A forthcoming volume on property-owning democracy, edited by O'Neill and Williamson, will take the arguments of a number of these philosophers forward, as well as include the work of a number 27 See Pogge (2006); Audard (2007). 28 Chambers (2006); Kymlicka (2002). 29 Jackson (2005); Ron (2008) 30 Freeman (2007a). 31 Freeman (2007b). 32 Hsieh (2005). 33 O'Neill (2008b) 34 Hsieh (2009); Hussain (2009); O'Neill (2009); Williamson (2009). of other writers, each giving further elaborations and critiques of Rawls's ideas regarding the institutional basis of a just social order.35 Non-Rawlsian Arguments for Property-Owning Democracy Property-Owning Democracy and Market Socialism The idea of a market economy based on a wider dispersal of capital than is characteristic of contemporary capitalist societies is not unique to Rawls or to the debate he stimulated; nor is the general search for a plausible alternative to capitalism in light of the historic failure of centralized state socialism. Indeed, since the late 1980s, political economists and philosophers have detailed a variety of proposals for a market socialist society, proposals that typically offer far more specificity and attention to institutional detail than the general comments about propertyowning democracy offered by Rawls. Particularly cogent formulations are those of Joshua Cohen, David Miller, John Roemer, David Schweickart, and Gar Alperovitz.36 Typically, these proposals call for some form of community or public ownership of capital within a market model, while also allowing for broadly democratic planning of the economy as a whole. In most cases (Roemer is an exception), these proposals also call for giving workers effective democratic control of most or all enterprises. Notably, these models do not require or advocate political revolution, but assume the constitutional framework of liberal democracy; nor do they challenge the market as a mechanism of resource allocation, even when the models allow for significant degrees of government planning. What these versions of liberal democratic socialism do insist upon is changing who owns and reaps dividends from capital. To this extent, proposals for liberal democratic socialism bear a significant resemblance to Rawls's conception of a propertyowning democracy.37 Republicanism and Property-Owning Democracy Also of relevance are recent discussions by republican political theorists concerning the content of a republican political economy (or \"commercial republic\") which also point in the broad direction of dispersing capital more widely.38 The proposals of American political theorist Stephen Elkin are particular noteworthy, for two reasons: first, he specifically rejects the Rawlsian paradigm for thinking about politics and instead takes James Madison as his starting point for reasoning about the content of a commercial republic; second, he explicitly uses the language of property-owning democracy. Consequently, the following section of our discussion pays particular attention to Elkin's non-Rawlsian arguments for a POD. The core premise of republican approaches to political theory is that in thinking about politics, it is not enough only to specify the moral foundations of legitimate government, or the normative principles (including principles of social justice) to 35 O'Neill and Williamson (forthcoming, 2010). 36 Cohen (1989), Miller (1991), Roemer (1993), Schweickart (2000), Alperovitz (2004). 37 To be sure, prominent differences between the two proposals remain. In particular, unlike most forms of democratic socialism, Rawls's property-owning democracy has no role for democratic oversight or planning of major capital investments. For further discussion, see Williamson (2009). 38 Dagger (2006); Elkin (2006). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 6 which government should aspire. Rather, we must think about how to construct and maintain a regime that, despite the presence of at least partially self-interested actors, succeeds in preventing the domination of any one group of citizens by any others, via either private or public means, while also allowing all citizens meaningfully to contribute, via the political process, to influencing the social conditions which shape their lives. Constructing such a regime requires paying careful attention to institutional design; to how leaders are selected and to the incentives that they are offered; to the character and engagement of the ordinary citizens who are charged with both selecting leaders and holding them accountable; and, not least, to the regime's political economy and how it functions, including the distribution of wealth that it generates. Civic republicans, especially those who draw their inspiration from Madison and other regime theorists such as Machiavelli and Montesquieu, characteristically argue that reasoning from the original position, in the Rawlsian style, can take us only so far in telling us what a workable and tolerably just political regime might look like. More than this, such republicans reject proposals for a \"division of labour\" within political theory, such that some scholars, expert in pre-institutional political philosophy and abstract reasoning, define and specify the normative principles which should guide political life, while a second group of scholars, who look more carefully at the facts of the world, work out how to put those principles into practice. From the viewpoint of republicans such as Elkin, such a division of labour is untenable: Elkin argues that we cannot fully make sense of political concepts such as \"liberty\" and \"equality\" until we have thought through, and indeed garnered some practical experience with, what it would mean to realize such values in practice, through real political institutions. Put another way, we cannot claim that we want something unless we understand what it would truly to take to get it, in practice, given reasonable assumptions about human nature.39 One of those assumptions, in turn, is that political actors often act from mixed or selfinterested motives, as opposed to being motivated by the desire to realize justice.40 39 Thus Elkin: \"In the context of [institutional] practice, there aren't two separate judgments-one about values, the other about practices that will serve them. There is only one: how much we value something given what it takes to realize it.\" Elkin (2006): 77. 40 To be clear, Rawls also recognizes the importance of considering the institutional implications of a conception of justice before accepting it. Hence Rawls writes: \"It is important to trace out, if only in a rough and ready way, the institutional content of the two principles of justice. We need to do this before we can endorse these principles, even provisionally. This is because the idea of reflective equilibrium involves our accepting the implications of ideals and first principles in particular cases as they arise. We cannot tell solely from the content of a political conception-from its principles and ideals-whether it is reasonable for us.\" Rawls (2001): 136. This recognition on Rawls's part is important, but is not sufficient to satisfy Elkin's objection, on two grounds. First, Rawls limits his account of the institutional content of property-owning democracy to ideal-type regime analysis-even though he acknowledges the possibility that \"a basic structure may generate interests that make it work very differently than its ideal description.\" Rawls (2001): 137. Considerations of the kinds of interests a regime might generate are, according to Rawls, questions of \"political sociology\" and not something that accounts of ideal-type regimes need to consider. In Elkin's view, in contrast, careful consideration of the interests a regime is likely to produce and how they might be held in balance so as to maintain the regime and achieve its stated values over time is precisely what \"constitutional\" thinking must take up. Second, as stated in the text, Elkin rejects Rawls's view that the premise of a general agreement about the content of justice and the assumption of \"full compliance\" are useful beginning points for thinking about a workable constitutional regime. This approach to politics is exemplified in Stephen Elkin's recent book Reconstructing the Commercial Republic. Elkin describes the \"circumstances of politics\" as involving a \"large aggregation of people who 1) have conflicting purposes that engender more or less serious conflict; 2) are given to attempt to use political power to further their own purposes and those of people with whom they identify; 3) are inclined to use political power to subordinate others; and 4) are sometimes given to words and actions that suggest that they value limiting the use of political power by law and harnessing it to public purposes.\" \"These circumstances,\" Elkin adds, are not \"`the best of foreseeable conditions.' They are simply the conditions that obtain as we Americans, like others, go about our political business.\"41 Elkin argues that James Madison's theory of a \"commercial republic\"-a liberal regime characterized by government that is at once popular, limited, and active-has six central elements. The first five include preventing faction, preventing a tyranny of lawmakers, ensuring that lawmakers consider the public interest, ensuring that lawmaking has a meaningful deliberative component, and ensuring a measure of civic virtue in the populace. For purposes of the present discussion, the key element is the sixth-namely, the \"social basis for the regime,\" or in other words, who has property and thereby political influence in the society, and thereby the capacity to shape how the regime operates in practice.42 Madison's political theory rested heavily on the possibility of \"men of property and substantial community position\"-most often large landowners-coming to take a very broad view of their own interests. Suppose the public interest and the (enlightened) self-interest of these men overlapped substantially, and that these same \"men of property\" were in a position to have disproportionate political influence-for instance, by being the predominant class from which elected representatives would be chosen. If this were the case, and if the political institutions themselves were designed to give lawmakers, including the ambitious, strong reason to appeal to the public interest, then a deliberative politics that in fact served the public interest might be possible.43 As Elkin notes, this Madisonian account is a deeply unsatisfactory theory for contemporary liberal regimes. Broadminded \"men of landed property and standing\" are no longer the dominant social class; instead we have the predominance of corporate property, and corporations are themselves legally required to have quite narrow interests. Moreover, if inequalities of wealth and income become excessive, and these translate into significant political inequalities, as they in fact often do, then we face the spectre of not, as Madison feared, factional majority rule, but rather factional minority rule by the wealthy and the well-off. So the problem remains-what is to be the social basis of a political regime based on self-rule and limited but active government?44 41 Elkin (2006): 254-55. Elkin here is quoting Rawls (1993): xvii. It might be noted that Rawls, beginning in Political Liberalism, does revise his theory so as to take account of one major fact about the world, namely, the fact of reasonable pluralism. For a republican like Elkin, the question is why Rawls stops there as opposed to taking account of other prominent facts as well (such as large-scale corporate power). See Elkin (2006): 359-360, n10. For a related critique, see Sheldon Wolin's (1996) critical review of Political Liberalism. 42 Elkin (2006): 21. 43 Ekin (2006): 38-42. 44 Ekin (2006): 51-73. Elkin's argumentation on these themes is more Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 7 Elkin's answer is fourfold. First, a commercial republic should be a regime in which the middle class is the politically predominant class, and can serve as a \"pivot\" in adjudicating conflicts between business elites and the poor; in particular, it is important that the middle class have enough power to force the business elites to justify their proposals in terms of the public interest. Second, excessive inequalities of wealth are inconsistent with the maintenance of a commercial republic, precisely because they translate into inequalities of political influence and make relations of mutual respect between all citizens impossible. Third, persistent poverty as well the economic insecurity of the near-poor and much of the middle class are inconsistent with the formation of independent, selfrespecting citizens who recognize the value of deliberative politics. As Elkin puts it, \"To worry about whether you can pay your bills wonderfully concentrates your mind-but not on political life.\"45 Fourth, the interests of property-holders should be broadened to the greatest possible extent; this could be achieved by broadening the ownership of property and capital, and by fostering a politically strong middle class capable of challenging elite proposals, such that elite groups must argue on their behalf by appealing to the public interest. Consequently, Elkin writes, \"in a fully realized commercial republic, the fruits of prosperity should not be available only to a few; neither should economic production be in the service of creating an oligarchy with the status and material comforts of an aristocracy.\"46 Elkin thus proposes ensuring that work is better paid, as well as advocating the more effective use of inheritance taxes, and above all widening the distribution of capital-in short, much of the agenda of what Rawls terms \"propertyowning democracy.\"47 This focus on capital as opposed to income as the focus of redistributive efforts has in turn four further justifications: first, the link between accumulated capital and disproportionate, dangerous and factional political power; second, the observation that private relationships of domination rest on the divide between those with capital and those without, not the divide between higher-paid and lower-paid workers; third, the recognition that it is impossible to contain inequalities of income without also paying attention to inequalities in asset holdings; and fourth, the political judgment that it is all but impossible as a practical matter to allow the market to generate wide dispersions of rewards, and then to rely upon the tax system to correct the resultant inequalities to a tolerable level. The beneficiaries of socioeconomic inequality are not, and never plausibly will be, so committed to social justice that they will endorse large-scale redistributions of their own incomes on a regular basis. On the contrary, they will insist on the justice of keeping their own market-generated returns, a claim that will have strong resonance among the well-off. A regime that relies less on post-transfer taxation to achieve a tolerable measure of socio-economic equality will be more stable over the long term.48 complex and nuanced than this brief summary can do justice. 45 Elkin (2006): 134. 46 Elkin (2006): 134. 47 Elkin (2006): 292-96. Indeed, Elkin's discussion goes significantly beyond Rawls's own proposals, drawing on some of the ideas (such as universal capital grants and support for worker ownership of firms) discussed in subsequent literature (see main text, below, for a brief review). 48 To be sure, moving towards a broader distribution of capital and property also would face formidable political obstacles. The view is that if a suitably wider distribution could be achieved, this would be a more Here we have a second set of arguments for moving in the direction of property-owning democracy. Clearly, there is overlap between some of Rawls's reasoning and that of Elkin, particularly in Rawls's stress on the fair value of political liberties. What is worth noting here is simply that one need not share any commitment to the Rawlsian edifice, or to a mode of political thinking that uses the ideal conditions of the original position as a starting point for reflection, to reach the judgment that persons interested in tolerably just liberal regimes should take an interest in property-owning democracy. In short, property-owning democracy need not be regarded as a uniquely Rawlsian idea, but instead may plausibly be endorsed by adherents of a range of sophisticated theories concerning the just society. Policies to Broaden Property Ownership The idea of property-owning democracy has thus enjoyed renewed attention from multiple strands of democratic political theory in recent years. Parallel to this development has been increased interest among policy scholars and some practitioners in \"asset-based\" policy approaches to redressing poverty. The basic thought behind asset-based approaches is that social policies should not rely only on efforts to prop up low incomes amongst the poor, but should also enable the disadvantaged to gain access to productive assets that might significantly improve their long-term life chances. Examples of such assets including savings accounts, educational funds, housing, pension funds and automobiles.49 To take one prominent example of an asset-based policy, governments might establish savings funds at birth for each child and capitalize each account with (for example) $1,000, in expectation that the value of the fund will steadily grow over time and represent a significant source of funds by early adulthood; a version of this policy (the Child Trust Fund) has been implemented in the UK. Ackerman and Alstott have offered a much more ambitious proposal in the context of the United States, calling on government to provide all citizens at age 18 with an $80,000 \"stake,\" on the view that having access to such significant funds would dramatically alter the life prospects and plans of many disadvantaged, working-class, and even middle-class young Americans.50 Most of the mainstream discussion of asset-based policies focuses on individual accounts and on bolstering access to cash savings or housing. Advocates of property-owning democracy should also naturally have an interest in ways of broadening ownership of productive capital. Government support (in the form of loans, technical assistance, and in some cases capital investments) for smaller businesses represents one traditional policy approach; another possibility is the provision of funds or incentives to allow individuals to buy corporate stock. More farreaching are efforts to turn control over entire enterprises to workers or to local neighbourhood organizations. As Gar Alperovitz has documented, both employee ownership and community ownership (through vehicles such as community development corporations) of productive businesses have increased dramatically in the United States since the 1970s.51 Both approaches broaden the ownership of capital in ways stable long-term basis for limiting inequalities and broadening prosperity than relying primarily on continual, large-scale progressive taxation. 49 See Sherraden (2005) for a thorough discussion. 50 Ackerman and Alstott (1999). 51 Alperovitz (2004, 2006). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 8 consistent with property-owning democracy, as well as offering other possible benefits in addition (such as sustaining jobs in poorer or declining localities). In short, there are numerous practical mechanisms available to policymakers to attempt to broaden access to capital; most of these mechanisms are potentially politically popular and capable of winning support from a range of ideological positions. The literature lacks, however, a sustained treatment of how such policies might be broadened and ratcheted up to scale in a manner which might realize the aims of property-owning democracy. Ackerman and Alstott's stakeholder society proposal and Alperovitz's arguments on behalf of a \"pluralist commonwealth\" come the closest in this regard, though neither proposal explicitly uses the language of \"property-owning democracy.\" In short, there is ample room for further work in translating the very ambitious aims of Rawlsian (or alternative republican) conceptions of property-owning democracy into concrete political proposals. Similarly, there has been almost no serious discussion of the politics of property-owning democracy or of the question of whether and how existing \"welfare state capitalist\" societies might be changed into a form of market society more closely approximating property-owning democracy. Two observations are in order here: first, the social basis for a movement towards property-owning democracy is likely to be quite different than traditional left coalitions on behalf of socialism and social democracy; the aims of property-owning democracy are quite different in emphasis (though arguably not inconsistent with) the traditional goals of labour and labour organizations. Indeed, the more entrepreneurial, individualistic tenor of property-owning democracy coheres with Roberto Unger's call for the \"left\" to cast its lot with the \"petty bourgeoisie\" rather than declining industrial working classes.52 In practice, a workable politics of property-owning democracy would need to be blended with other policies and initiatives more oriented towards traditional labour concerns about employment stability, wage levels, and labour law. Second, while proposals to create Child Trust Funds and broaden access to homeownership are generally popular, the most crucial step towards a Rawlsian conception of propertyowning democracy-more aggressive, stringent taxation on inheritance and estates-is likely to inspire much more opposition. This is especially true in the United States, where a concerted effort by conservative ideologues over the past fifteen years has succeeded in persuading many Americans and lawmakers that inheritance taxes represent an unjust \"death tax\"53; there is also substantial opposition to inheritance tax in countries such as the UK.54 Serious arguments for full-blown property-owning democracy thus must be combined with serious and persuasive arguments regarding the legitimacy of breaking up large estates through inheritance taxes and other forms of wealth taxation.55 The argument for the justice of taxing largescale wealth in order to secure the fair value of political liberties, institute meaningful equal opportunity, and improve the lot of the least well off in turn mirrors the larger Rawlsian argument for understanding society as a system of social cooperation aimed at realizing a common life characterized by fairness, as 52 Unger (2006). 53 Shapiro and Graetz (2005). 54 See O'Neill (2007); White (2008). 55 For a promising argument along these lines, see Alperovitz and Daly (2008). opposed to a game in which the aim is to accumulate as many assets as possible within the permissible rules. The argument for breaking up large inheritances and the argument for viewing society as a fair system of cooperation are inextricably tied together. Without the prior commitment to viewing society as a fair system of social cooperation, arguments for breaking up large inheritances are dramatically weakened; without the political capacity to break up large accumulations of wealth in practice, Rawlsian aspirations for realizing a just society based on the two principles of justice will remain tantalizingly out of reach. References Ackerman, Bruce, and Anne Alstott.1999. The Stakeholder Society. New Haven: Yale University Press. Alperovitz, Gar. 2004. America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, Our Democracy. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=92iHAAAAMAAJ Alperovitz, Gar, and Lew Daly. 2008. Unjust Deserts. New York: The New Press. Arneson. Richard. 1986. Comment on Krouse and McPherson. Ethics. 97: 139-145. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381411. Catherine Audard. 2007. John Rawls. Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press. Chambers, Simone. 2006. The Politics of Equality: Rawls on the Barricades. Perspectives on Politics 4: 81-89, doi: 10.1017/S1537592706060087 Clark, Barry and Herbert Gintis. 1978. Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems. Philosophy and Public Affairs 7: 302-325. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264960 Clayton, Matthew, and Andrew Williams, eds. 2000. Ideals of Equality. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan. Cohen, G. A. 1989. History, Labour and Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Related online version (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=_KYwR1v-dlYC Cohen, G. A. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=YH6o-25BkAUC Cohen, Joshua. 1989. The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy. Social Philosophy and Policy 6: 25-50. Cohen, Joshua. 2003. For a Democratic Society. In Samuel Freeman, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=ipMVcT5R2zwC Dagger, Richard. 2006. Neo-republicanism and the Civic Economy. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5: 151-173, doi:10.1177/1470594X06064219 DiQuattro, Arthur. 1983. Rawls and Left Criticism. Political Theory 11: 53-78, doi: 10.1177/0090591783011001004 Doppelt, Gerald. 1981. Rawls's System of Justice: A Critique from the Left. Nous 15: 259-307. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215434 Elkin, Stephen L. 2006. Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design After Madison. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=7h28AY9pZtcC Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Consequentialism, Publicity, Stability and Property-Owning Democracy in Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawls. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=_OL7s6fld0YC Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. New York: Routledge. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=sxc2X6R_RrMC Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 9 Graetz, Michael J., and Ian Shapiro. 2005 Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight Over Taxing Inherited Wealth. New Haven: Yale University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=mEpReQMCgBAC Hsieh, Nien-hê. 2009. Justice at Work: Arguing for Property-Owning Democracy. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy. Hussain, Waheed. 2009. The Most Stable Just Regime. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy. Jackson, Ben. 2005. Revisionism Reconsidered: `Property-Owning Democracy' and Egalitarian Strategy in Post-war Britain. Twentieth Century British History 16: 416-440, doi:10.1093/tcbh/hwi053 Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krouse, Richard, and Michael McPherson. 1986. A Mixed Property Regime: Equality and Liberty in a Market Economy. Ethics 97: 119138.URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381410 Krouse, Richard, and Michael McPherson. 1988. Property-Owning Democracy. In Amy Gutmann, ed. Democracy and the Welfare State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=v700Y54pVuYC Meade, James. 1965. Efficiency, Equality, and the Ownership of Property. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Meade, James. 1965. Principles of Political Economy, Vol. IV: The Just Economy. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co. Meade, James. 1975. The Intelligent Radical's Guide to Economic Policy: The Mixed Economy. London: Allen & Unwin. Meade, James. 1993. Liberty, Equality, and Efficiency. New York: New York University Press. Miller, David. 1989. Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=bPgv0pVSmIgC O'Neill, Martin. 2007. 'Death and Taxes': Social Justice and the Politics of the Inheritance Tax. Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy 15: 6271. URL (cited 16 September 2009):http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martin.oneill/Death_a nd_Taxes(Renewal,15.4(2007)).pdf O'Neill, Martin. 2008a. What Should Egalitarians Believe? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36:2, 119-56. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martin.oneill/WSEB.pdf O'Neill, Martin. 2008b. Three Rawlsian Routes Towards Economic Democracy. Revue de Philosophie Economique 17. 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Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=AjrXZIlbK1cC Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=yKclZky1oUkC Roemer, John, John. 1994. A Future for Socialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=LxKkC82J9D4C Ron, Amit. 2008. Visions of Democracy in `Property-Owning Democracy': Skelton to Rawls and Beyond. History of Political Thought 29: 89-108. Scanlon,T. M. . 1996. The Diversity of Objections to Inequality. The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, reprinted in Clayton and Williams, eds., 2000, pp. 41-59. Schweickart, David. 1979. Should Rawls Be a Socialist? A Comparison of his Ideal Capitalism with Worker Controlled Socialism. Social Theory and Practice 5: 1-27. Schweickart, David. 1996. Against Capitalism. Boulder: Westview Press. Schweickart, David. 2002. After Capitalism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=KWy9JbWvjywC Sherraden, Michael, ed. 2005. Inclusion in the American Dream: Assets, Poverty, and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=jCPDfYrqmoC Thomas, Alan. 2009. Liberalism, Republicanism, and the Idea of an Egalitarian Ethos, working paper, University of Kent, 2009. See also Thomas, forthcoming in O'Neill and Williamson, eds. 2010. PropertyOwning Democracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Unger, Roberto. 2006. What Should the Left Propose? New York: Verso Books. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=9rxdQUCY6Z4C White, Stuart. 2008. How to Defend Inheritance Tax. London: Fabian Society. With Rajiv Prabhakar and Karen Rowlingson. Williamson, Thad. 2009. A Fair Stake and a Fair Shake: John Rawls's Idea of a Property-Owning Democracy and Its Political Plausibility. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy. Wolin, Sheldon. 1996. The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls's Political Liberalism. Political Theory 24: 97-119. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/192092 Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 |", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ De herhaling van het onherhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit Martijn Boven Kierkegaard in café, schets van Christian Olavius Zeuthen, 1843 De herhaling van het onhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit ⁄ 31 Is de herhaling mogelijk? Deze ogenschijnlijk simpele vraag vormt het uitgangspunt van De herhaling. Een proeve van experimenterende psychologie door Constantin Constantius (1843), een van de meest curieuze geschriften uit het oeuvre van Søren Kierkegaard. In het alledaagse taalgebruik verwijst de term 'herhaling' naar een bepaalde gebeurtenis die zich voor een tweede, derde, vierde of n-de keer voordoet. Deze betekenis zien we onder anderen terug in termen als repetitie ('herhaalde oefening om zich iets in te prenten'), recidive ('herhaling van een misdrijf') of reprise ('nieuwe opvoering van een eerder uitgevoerd toneelstuk', zie Van Dale). Doen de herhalingen zich met een zekere regelmaat voor dan spreken we al snel over gewoontes of zelfs over natuurwetten. In al deze alledaagse, niet-existentiële betekenissen verbindt de herhaling twee of meer gebeurtenissen met elkaar, waarbij de eerste gebeurtenis als model voor latere, vergelijkbare gebeurtenissen geldt. Kierkegaard heeft geen van deze alledaagse betekenissen op het oog, maar maakt van de herhaling een filosofisch begrip dat betrekking heeft op de menselijke existentie (latere filosofen als Heidegger, Deleuze en Derrida nemen dit begrip over en verwerken het in hun eigen filosofie). In dit artikel wil ik twee aspecten aan de orde stellen die De herhaling tot een nog altijd belangrijk boek maken: 1) De ongewone filosofische stijl die in dit boek ontwikkeld wordt en 2) De eigenzinnige opvatting over vrijheid en subjectiviteit die er onder de noemer 'de herhaling' in naar voren wordt gebracht. Zoals de ondertitel 'een proeve van experimenterende psychologie' al aangeeft, is De herhaling geen klassieke filosofische verhandeling waarin op systematische wijze wordt uitgelegd wat er onder de herhaling – als filosofische begrip – verstaan moet worden. Integendeel, het is een uiterst experimenteel boek waarin een nieuwe filosofische stijl wordt geïntroduceerd. Er wordt zodoende nergens een eenduidige definitie gegeven van de herhaling in filosofische zin die ik in het vervolg zal aanduiden als de 'existentiële herhaling'. Sterker nog, de twee verschijningsvormen van de herhaling – de alledaagse en de existentiële herhaling – worden telkens welbewust met elkaar verward. Pas in de afsluitende brief aan 'de echte lezer van dit boek' wordt duidelijk in welke richting we het verschil tussen deze twee vormen van herhaling moeten zoeken. 'Aan de ene kant', zo schrijft Constantin Constantius, de pseudonieme auteur van De herhaling, 'staat de uitzondering, aan de andere kant het algemene' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 96). De herhaling in alledaagse zin correspondeert met het algemene (het uiterlijke), terwijl de existentiële herhaling uitdrukking geeft aan de uitzondering (het innerlijke, de subjectiviteit). Dit klinkt nogal paradoxaal. Is de uitzondering niet bij uitstek iets eenmaligs en unieks – en dus onherhaalbaar? Hoe kan Constantius in dit verband dan toch spreken over een herhaling? Een simpel voorbeeld kan dit verduidelijken. Stel je hebt je In plaats van kennis over te dragen door middel van uitleg en beschrijving, wordt er met behulp van een reeks dramatische handelingen een effect gecreëerd waaruit de toehoorder/lezer zijn eigen conclusies moet trekken. 32 ⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief voorgenomen een 'goed mens' te worden. Om dit doel te verwezenlijken, zo suggereert Constantius, heeft het geen zin jezelf een ideaal te stellen waar je vervolgens via een stappenplan naar toewerkt. Volgens hem kan het goede alleen verwezenlijkt worden door een innerlijke keuze die slechts geldt voor het moment waarop hij gemaakt wordt. Om zijn geldigheid te behouden moet de keuze telkens opnieuw herhaald worden. Dit is geen alledaagse herhaling waarin dezelfde gebeurtenis zich nog een keer voordoet, maar het is een existentiële herhaling waarin het individu zichzelf opnieuw tot stand brengt als een onherhaalbare uitzondering. Het gaat Constantius om deze paradoxale herhaling van het onherhaalbare. Een nieuwe filosofische stijl De existentiële herhaling – als de herhaling van het onherhaalbare – kan Constantius alleen aan de orde stellen door een nieuwe filosofische stijl uit te vinden die hij zelf 'experimenterende psychologie' noemt. Hij vindt een eerste aanzet tot deze stijl in een bekende anekdote over Diogenes van Sinope: 'Toen de Eleaten de beweging ontkenden, trad, zoals iedereen weet, Diogenes op als opponent. Hij trad echt op, want hij zei geen woord, maar liep alleen een paar keer heen en weer, waarmee hij meende het bewijs van het tegendeel te hebben geleverd' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 9). Deze anekdote is veelbetekenend, omdat ze aangeeft hoe De herhaling gelezen kan worden. Evenals Diogenes probeert ook Constantius te bewijzen dat beweging bestaat ook al gaat het bij hem niet om de beweging van lichamen, maar om de beweging van de geest: de herhaling van de subjectiviteit. Ook Constantius gebruikt hiervoor een performatieve strategie. De performance van Constantius is wel iets complexer is dan dat van Diogenes, maar het principe erachter is hetzelfde. In plaats van kennis over te dragen door middel van uitleg en beschrijving, wordt met behulp van een reeks dramatische handelingen een effect gecreëerd waaruit de toehoorder/lezer zijn eigen conclusies moet trekken. Voor Diogenes gold dat het bestaan van beweging niet logisch kan worden aangetoond, omdat het niet tot het domein van de logica behoort. Om die reden was 'heen en weer lopen' de enige juiste respons. Constantius kan het bestaan van de herhaling evenmin logisch aantonen, aangezien de existentiële herhaling tot het domein van de vrijheid behoort. Daarom gaat hij op een soortgelijke wijze te werk als Diogenes. 'Op psychologische en esthetische wijze', zo schrijft Constantius hierover, 'wilde ik schilderen en aanschouwelijk maken; in Griekse zin wilde ik het begrip [de herhaling] laten ontstaan in de vorm van personages en situaties, terwijl het zich een weg voorwaarts baant door allerlei misverstanden heen' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 68). In plaats van te definiëren wat de herhaling is, voert Constantius enkele personages op die verstrikt raken in een misverstand. Op deze manier dwingt hij zijn lezer om eerst het misverstand te ontrafelen en zodoende een eigen onderscheid aan te brengen tussen de alledaagse en de existentiële herhaling. Constantius schrijft zodoende niet om te worden begrepen, maar om te worden misverstaan. In de afsluitende brief aan 'de echte lezer van dit boek' suggereert hij zo te hebben Al snel wordt duidelijk dat er een tegenspraak bestaat tussen Constantius' verspreide opmerkingen over existentiële herhaling en de manier waarop hij deze herhaling zelf probeert te voltrekken. ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ De herhaling van het onhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit ⁄ 33 willen schrijven 'dat de ketters het niet kunnen begrijpen' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 95). Met deze 'ketters' doelt hij op de oppervlakkige lezers die geen onderscheid kunnen maken tussen de misverstanden waarin de personages verstrikt raken en het begrip herhaling dat door deze misverstanden heen tot wording komt. Alleen de lezer die uit zichzelf al begrepen heeft wat de herhaling is, zal in staat blijken de misverstanden te ontmaskeren. Nu eens is de herhaling het hoogste wat er is, het volgende moment is het een banale en onbetekenende dwaasheid. Geen enkele bepaling krijgt de overhand. Hiermee wordt de verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud van het boek verlegd van de schrijver naar de lezer. Met als gevolg dat de lezer gedwongen wordt zijn eigen vrijheid te realiseren. Dit is precies het effect dat Constantius beoogt. In zijn opvatting kan hij alleen spreken over de herhaling door de subjectiviteit van zijn lezers te activeren. In De herhaling worden twee personages opgevoerd. Het eerste personage is Constantius zelf. In plaats van de herhaling theoretisch te onderzoeken, besluit hij er een demonstratie van te geven: 'Toen ik me al een poos, in elk geval bij gelegenheid, bezighield met het probleem of de herhaling mogelijk is en welke betekenis die heeft, of iets bij een herhaling wint of verliest, kwam ik opeens op het idee: je kunt toch naar Berlijn gaan, daar ben je al eerder geweest, om je ervan te overtuigen of een herhaling mogelijk is en wat die te betekenen heeft' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 9). Na vele pogingen om zijn vorige reis op exact dezelfde wijze over te doen, concludeert Constantius dat er geen herhaling mogelijk is. Hierbij tekent hij aan dat 'het leven onophoudelijk en trouweloos alles terugneemt wat het had gegeven, zonder een herhaling te bieden' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 48). Al snel wordt duidelijk dat er een tegenspraak bestaat tussen Constantius' verspreide opmerkingen over existentiële herhaling en de manier waarop hij deze herhaling zelf probeert te voltrekken. De reis naar Berlijn moet beschouwd worden als een parodie waarin er welbewust wordt aangestuurd op het volgende misverstand: dat 'het meest innerlijke probleem van de mogelijkheid van de herhaling op uiterlijke wijze wordt uitgedrukt, alsof de herhaling – als die al mogelijk is – búiten het individu te vinden is, terwijl het juist in het individu gevonden moet worden' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 23). Als tweede personage wordt een verliefde jongeman opgevoerd die in Constantius zijn vertrouweling vindt. De jongeman is een relatie begonnen met een meisje en heeft zo de liefde als idee ontdekt. 'Het jonge meisje was niet zijn beminde, zij was de aanleiding die het poëtische in hem wekte en hem tot dichter maakte' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 15). De jongeman weet zich gebonden aan het meisje. Tegelijkertijd beseft hij dat de relatie geen kans van slagen heeft omdat het meisje zelf er niet toedoet, zij heeft enkel betekenis als aanleiding. Op een dag vertrekt hij zonder nog iets van zich te laten horen. Vanaf dat moment wacht de jongeman op iets – een gebeurtenis, een goddelijke ingreep? – dat hem alsnog geschikt zal maken om echtgenoot te zijn. Echtgenoot zijn betekent voor hem: de gebeurtenis van de liefde telkens weer opnieuw kunnen herhalen alsof het de eerste keer is. Desondanks blijkt de jongeman aan het einde van het boek genoegen te nemen met een schijnbare herhaling. In de krant leest hij dat het meisje getrouwd is. Opeens zijn al zijn problemen voorbij. In tegenstelling tot zijn eerdere opvattingen over de liefde, interpreteert hij nu het terugwinnen van zijn ongebondenheid als een herhaling: 'Ik ben weer 34 ⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief mezelf, hier heb ik de herhaling' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 91). De jongeman kan nu inderdaad opnieuw beginnen met de liefde, maar moet daarvoor wel eerst een ander meisje vinden. Maar dat is juist geen herhaling. De herhaling betekent immers de liefde elk moment weer opnieuw laten beginnen in relatie tot hetzelfde meisje. De twee personages spiegelen elkaar. Constantius geeft in theorie een juiste bepaling van de existentiële herhaling, maar de banale manier waarop hij deze herhaling in praktijk tracht te brengen maakt alles alsnog tot een misverstand. Bij de verliefde jongeman is de situatie precies andersom. In de praktijk ondervindt hij het probleem van de vrijheid en zoekt zijn toevlucht in de herhaling, maar uit zijn respons op het krantenbericht blijkt dat hij dit begrip theoretisch heeft misverstaan. In beide gevallen baant het begrip herhaling zich een weg voorwaarts door allerlei misverstanden heen, zonder ooit in zijn volle vorm te verschijnen. De existentiële herhaling We zagen eerder dat Constantius zich ertoe gedwongen zag om een nieuwe filosofische stijl te vinden omdat de herhaling tot het domein van de vrijheid behoort. Deze vrijheid is nooit een gegeven, maar moet telkens weer opnieuw herhaald worden. Constantius verzet zich hiermee tegen de opvattingen waarin de mate van vrijheid van het individu wordt vastgesteld op basis van zijn uiterlijke omstandigheden. Hij bespreekt twee van deze opvattingen. De eerste is een mondain vrijheidsbegrip waarin de vrijheid wordt bepaald 'als lust of in lust' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 67). Lust kan hier worden opgevat als een onstuitbare drang om de uiterlijke omstandigheden zoveel mogelijk te veranderen. Dit vrijheidsbegrip zien we terug bij de bohemien die zich nergens aan committeert en een onconventioneel en zwervend bestaan leidt. De tweede opvatting is een artistiek vrijheidsbegrip waarin de vrijheid wordt bepaald als schranderheid. De schranderheid stelt het individu in staat om afwisseling aan te brengen in zijn uiterlijke omstandigheden door er telkens nieuwe aspecten uit af te leiden. Vrijheid wordt niet langer gezocht in voortdurende verandering, maar in de kunst om een zo groot mogelijke intensiteit te bereiken ongeacht de aanwezige middelen. Deze vorm van vrijheid wordt in praktijk gebracht door de gevangene die zich vermaakt met de drukke bezigheden van de spin of de student die een saaie lezing boeiend maakt door zich te concentreren op de zweetdruppels op het gezicht van de professor. Constantius verwerpt bovenstaande vrijheidsbegrippen – het mondaine en het artistieke – en introduceert de existentiële herhaling als alternatief. Hij ontwikkelt een opvatting waarin vrijheid niet langer wordt bepaald in relatie tot uiterlijke omstandigheden, maar in relatie tot de vrijheid zelf. Hierbij geldt: vrijheid = herhaling. Of, zoals Constantius het zelf formuleert, 'het hoogste belang van de vrijheid is nu juist om de herhaling teweeg te brengen' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 67). Het individu zal zich altijd moeten verhouden tot de buitenwereld, maar hierin ligt niet zijn vrijheid. Integendeel, de vrijheid van het individu loopt voortdurend het risico zichzelf te verliezen in het resultaat van deze verhouding. In De herhaling is een overgang van het vroegere zelf naar het huidige zelf, deze overgang laat de subjectiviteit – als onherhaalbare uitzondering – 'opnieuw in het bestaan treden'. Hierbij geldt: subjectiviteit = herhaling. ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ De herhaling van het onhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit ⁄ 35 dat geval kan de vrijheid zichzelf niet terugnemen en kan er geen herhaling plaatsvinden. 'De vrijheid', zegt Constantius, 'vreest hier niet de herhaling, maar de afwisseling; het is niet de afwisseling die ze wil, maar de herhaling' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 67). De afwisseling heeft betrekking op de uiterlijke omstandigheden en kan zodoende hoogstens een negatieve invloed uitoefenen op de vrijheid. Een moeilijke, maar noodzakelijke beslissing kan bijvoorbeeld worden vermeden als de afwisseling opeens een uitweg beidt die voorheen niet beschikbaar was. Dit kan allerlei vormen aannemen: het ene moment is de frauderende directrice bereid alles op te biechten, het volgende moment ziet ze een kans haar ondergeschikte ervoor op te laten draaien; al tien jaar lang neemt de echtgenoot genoegen met een ingeslapen huwelijk, tot er opeens een geschikte vervanger voor zijn vrouw opduikt en hij alsnog een scheiding aanvraagt. De directrice en de echtgenoot verliezen hun vrijheid omdat ze de uiterlijke omstandigheden voor hen laten beslissen, in plaats van hun eigen waarden, hun eigen individualiteit te kiezen. Hier kan geen existentiële herhaling plaatsvinden. Hoewel Constantius in het midden laat of de existentiële herhaling überhaupt wel mogelijk is, kan er uit zijn sporadische reflecties wel iets worden afgeleid over de structuur van deze herhaling. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer hij de herhaling contrasteert met de hoop en de herinnering: 'De hoop is een nieuw kledingstuk, stijf en strak en prachtig, toch heb je het nooit aan gehad en weet je daarom niet hoe het je zal staan of hoe het zit De herinnering is een afgedankt kledingstuk, dat, hoe mooi het ook is, toch niet past, omdat je er uitgegroeid bent. De herhaling is een onverslijtbaar kledingstuk dat zacht zit en precies past, niet knelt of fladdert' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 10; vertaling aangepast). De hoop kijkt uitsluitend vooruit en richt zich op of mijn toekomstige zelf (dat nog niet bestaat), de herinnering kijkt uitsluitend achterom en richt zich op mijn vroegere zelf (dat niet meer bestaat), terwijl de herhaling zich concentreert op mijn huidige zelf (dat ieder moment opnieuw tot stand moet komen als onherhaalbare uitzondering). 'Als men zegt dat het leven een herhaling is,' zo stelt Constantius, 'dan zegt men: het bestaan dat geweest is, treedt nu in het bestaan' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 26). De herhaling is een overgang van het vroegere zelf naar het huidige zelf, deze overgang laat de subjectiviteit – als onherhaalbare uitzondering – 'opnieuw in het bestaan treden'. Hierbij geldt: subjectiviteit = herhaling. In dit proces kan er gemakkelijk iets misgaan, bijvoorbeeld als iemand blijft hangen in zijn vroegere zelf ('als verzetsstrijder heb ik afdoende bewezen een goed mens te zijn') of zichzelf juist verliest in een toekomstig zelf ('als ik minister ben maak ik onmiddellijk een eind aan die politieke spelletjes, maar om die positie te kunnen veroveren moet ik er tijdelijk aan meedoen'). De herhaling vindt zodoende niet automatisch 36 ⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief plaats, maar is een taak van de vrijheid die telkens weer opnieuw moet worden gerealiseerd. De existentiële herhaling moet niet worden opgevat als een terugkeer tot en voortzetting van wat het individu in aanleg altijd al was. Integendeel, de existentiële herhaling is een vertrekpunt waarin de onherhaalbare subjectiviteit van het individu opnieuw in het bestaan moet treden. Vigilius Haufniensis, een ander pseudoniem van Kierkegaard, drukt dit in een voetnoot over De herhaling als volgt uit: 'het hele leven en het hele bestaan begint opnieuw, niet in een immanente continuïteit met wat is voorafgegaan (wat een tegenstrijdigheid zou zijn), maar door een transcendentie, die een ravijndiepe scheiding legt tussen de herhaling en het eerste bestaan' (Kierkegaard, 2009: 22). Het 'opnieuw in het bestaan treden' van het zelf veronderstelt een breuk en kan daarom niet gekarakteriseerd worden in termen van een doelgerichte zelfverwerkelijking (waarbij er juist sprake is van continuïteit en er geen breuk optreedt). 'De dialectiek van de herhaling is gemakkelijk,' zo schrijft Constantius, 'want wat wordt herhaald, is geweest, anders kon het niet herhaald worden. Maar juist het feit dat het geweest is, maakt de herhaling tot iets nieuws' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 26). Het zelf dat 'opnieuw in het bestaan treedt' is als zodanig niet nieuw, maar bestond eerder ook al. Het nieuwe is gelegen in het feit dat het vroegere zelf 'teruggehaald' wordt en opnieuw tot stand wordt gebracht als het huidige zelf. 'Er bestaat maar één pregnante herhaling,' zo stelt Constantius, 'en dat is de herhaling van de eigen individualiteit in een nieuwe potentie' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 113). Dit is volgens hem 'geen betekenisloze herhaling' (dat wil zeggen geen herhaling in alledaagse zin), 'maar een zodanige herhaling dat het nieuwe absolute betekenis heeft in verhouding tot wat eraan voorafging en er kwalitatief van verschilt' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 72). Conclusie In De herhaling introduceert Constantius een nieuwe filosofische stijl die het hem mogelijk maakt om het begrip herhaling aan de orde te stellen. In plaats van te definiëren wat de herhaling is, laat Constantius enkele personages verstrikt raken in een misverstand. Alleen de lezer die het misverstand doorziet, zal in staat blijken om vanuit zichzelf te construeren wat er onder de existentiële herhaling verstaan moet worden. In dit artikel heb ik hiertoe een eerste aanzet gegeven door de herhaling te duiden in termen van vrijheid en subjectiviteit. Dit kan worden uitgedrukt in twee formules: 'vrijheid = herhaling' en 'subjectiviteit = herhaling'. Vrijheid en subjectiviteit kunnen alleen blijven bestaan door opnieuw in het bestaan te treden. Hierbij is er sprake van een paradox: de herhaling van het onherhaalbare. Het individu dat wordt gekenmerkt door vrijheid en subjectiviteit is een onherhaalbare uitzondering. Deze uitzondering kan alleen standhouden door herhaald te worden, dat wil zeggen door opnieuw in het bestaan te treden als uitzondering. Literatuur Kierkegaard, S. (2008). De herhaling. Een proeve van experimenterende psychologie door Constantin Constantius. Budel: Damon. Kierkegaard, S. (2009). Het begrip angst. Budel: Damon. Kierkegaard, S. (2012). 'Polemik mod Heiberg'. In Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, K15. Kopenhagen: Gad (een toelichting op De herhaling; mijn vertaling).", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "ISSN 1980-8372 REVISTA ELETRÔNICA ESTUDOS HEGELIANOS Revista Semestral do Sociedade Hegel Brasileira SHB Ano 4 N.o 06 Junho de 2007 http://www.hegelbrasil.org/rev06.htm El problema del límite según Hegel. Prof. Lic. Pedro Karczmarczyk Doctorando UNLP Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP)Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Argentina peterkado@yahoo.com 47 no 1158, La Plata, CP: 1900, Pcia. de Bs. As. Argentina. En este trabajo examino la concepción hegeliana del límite intentando clarificar sus principales características. Comienzo ubicando la filosofía hegeliana en el contexto filosófico más general del idealismo alemán, entendiendo este movimiento como aquel comprometido en el proyecto de proporcionar una deducción trascendental de lo absoluto. Dado este contexto, procedo a examinar las críticas de Hegel a a la filosofía de Kant, principalmente en la \"introducción a la Fenomenología del espíritu. El artículo concluye evaluando la adecuación de la elucidación del tratamiento hegeliano del problema del límite mostrando como esta noción funciona en la interpretación del tratamiento hegeliano de la certeza sensorial en la fenomenología. The problem of limit according to Hegel. In this paper I focus Hegelian conception of limit trying to clarify its main features. I begin locating Hegel's philosophy in the broader philosophical context of German Idealism, understanding it as the intellectual movement concerned with the project of providing a transcendental deduction of the Absolute. Having this as a background, I examine Hegelian critique of Kantian philosophy, mainly in the \"Introduction\" of Phenomenology of Spirit, and I conclude the paper testing the way I elucidated the problem of limit in this paper showing how this notion can be used to interpret the treatment of \"sense certainty\" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Introducción.[1] La mejor introducción al tratamiento hegeliano del problema del límite es a través de la presentación de la problemática que dejó abierta el pensamiento de Kant, especialmente en la percepción de sus contemporáneos. Esto es, nuestra tarea inicial es ubicar a Hegel en el contexto del idealismo alemán. El idealismo alemán es un movimiento filosófico marcado por la herencia del pensamiento de Kant, en particular por intensas controversias acerca de si ciertas distinciones kantianas constituyen dualismos insuperables, por la convicción general de que tales dualismos tienen que ser superados, y de que, para superarlos, debemos mostrar que por debajo de tales dualidades hay una unidad subyacente. Entre las críticas más célebres a Kant, encontramos las realizadas por Jacobi y por Maimon. Jacobi hallaba que el dualismo entre 'cosa en sí' (nóumeno) y 'cosa para nosotros' (fenómeno) generaba una tensión cuya resolución no podía proveerse dentro del sistema kantiano. De acuerdo a Jacobi, la posición de Kant habría resultado más consistente si éste hubiera dejado abierta la posibilidad de que la realidad fuera dependiente de la mente. Si la 'cosa en sí' es aquello que no puede conocerse, justamente por ello, resulta contradictorio presentarla como la causa de nuestras representaciones. La causalidad, es una de las categorías del entendimiento que el pensamiento de Kant vino a mostrar que tienen un rango de aplicación limitado al dominio de la experiencia, es decir al dominio de los fenómenos como opuesto al dominio de la cosa en sí. En virtud de este recaudo, señalaba Jacobi, la postulación de la cosa en sí como la causa de nuestras representaciones incurre en una contradicción. Por su parte Maimon sostenía que Kant no había dado una explicación satisfactoria de la aplicabilidad de las categorías al dominio de nuestra experiencia. Maimon cuestionaba, entonces, la eficacia de la \"deducción trascendental\" de las categorías. En opinión de Maimon, a menos que se muestre la unidad subyacente de sensibilidad y entendimiento, la aplicabilidad de las categorías no puede demostrarse. La cuestión que se planteaba Kant en la deducción trascendental de las categorías era: si nuestros conceptos a priori se derivan del entendimiento, ¿cómo sabemos que se van a poder aplicar a las intuiciones de la sensibilidad, que son a posteriori? O, presentado de un modo más llano, si estos conceptos no se derivan de la experiencia ¿cómo sabemos que son válidos para ella? Maimon consideraba que la causa de esta dificultad radica en la heterogeneidad de los conceptos del entendimiento y las intuiciones de la sensibilidad. Entendimiento y sensibilidad contrastan de diferentes maneras: la facultad de la sensibilidad es receptiva y pasiva, mientras que el entendimiento es activo, los conceptos son universales y las intuiciones son particulares, los conceptos son a priori y las intuiciones a posteriori.[2] Me permito aquí hacer una presentación intuitiva de este problema. El problema que acabamos de mencionar cuestiona la inteligibilidad del vínculo entre intuiciones y conceptos en virtud de la heterogeneidad entre los mismos. Consideremos, por un lado, el vínculo del concepto 'cuervo' con sus instancias en la realidad y, por otro lado, el vínculo del concepto 'cuervo' con otros conceptos como 'pájaro', 'animal', y 'ser vivo'. Evidentemente, la relación de 'cuervo' con 'pájaro' y con 'animal' se nos presenta como una relación de una naturaleza diferente que la relación de 'cuervo' con sus instancias en la realidad. Una de las notas de la definición de 'cuervo' es 'pájaro' y una de las notas de la definición de 'pájaro' es 'animal'. En consecuencia, el vínculo de 'cuervo'con animal y con 'pajaro' puede ser entendido como un vínculo naturaleza racional, un vínculo lógico. Por su parte, el vínculo del concepto 'cuervo' con sus instancias en la realidad es mucho más problemática. Podemos conocer discursivamente que negro es un color, y que los colores son extensos, pero ¿podemos llegar a reconocer discursivamente instancias de color negro en la realidad? ¿Qué indicación podría ayudarnos para esta tarea? El problema parece ser que los conceptos, siendo puramente formales, no pueden generar su propio contenido. El propio Kant reconocía que la capacidad para hacer juicios no puede demostrarse sino que debe aprenderse por el ejercicio, a través de la práctica.[3] Dejemos por ahora estos cuestionamientos, conservándolos como un esquema del trasfondo problemático en el que se desarrolla el movimiento del idealismo alemán, para pasar a considerar algunos de los aspectos propositivos del idealismo alemán. En la década de 1790 Reinhold, Fichte y Schelling se embarcaron en diferentes intentos de sistematización del pensamiento kantiano. Estos intentos se diferencian de la filosofía de Kant, fundamentalmente, en que intentaban producir un sistema filosófico teniendo como punto de partida una proposición fundamental (Grundsatz). Es decir que los intentos de sistematización invertían el sentido regresivo[4] del pensamiento kantiano, proponiendo filosofías constructivas. El propio Kant censuró estos proyectos, considerando que se trataba de intentos indebidos de generar el contenido a partir de la pura forma. En los diferentes intentos de superación de las dificultades (dualismos) que hallaban en el pensamiento kantiano, los idealistas alemanes desarrollaron diferentes sistemas de filosofía que pueden agruparse bajo el rótulo de \"monismos evolucionarios\". El monismo evolucionario es una posición que comprende a la realidad como un todo orgánico, cuyos principios pueden comprenderse y cuya unidad puede ser articulada y expresada en un sistema filosófico. Conviene estar atento al hecho de que un intento de esta naturaleza implica una reformulación del significado de muchos términos. La más importante de estas transformaciones es, tal vez, la que se opera en el significado de la noción de 'sujeto', que no debe entenderse como haciendo referencia a un nuevo tipo de sustancia. El término 'sujeto' no va a designar para los idealistas alemanes, en sentido estricto, lo que ordinariamente entendemos por sujetos, esto es individuos humanos, sujetos individuales. Para los idealistas alemanes el significado básico de 'sujeto' hace referencia a una estructura cósmica, la realidad absoluta. Si tenemos en cuenta esta observación, la denominación 'idealismo absoluto' nos resultará más o menos transparente: en ella se expresa la idea de que la naturaleza y la mente, o espíritu finito; el objeto y el sujeto en sentido ordinario, no son en definitiva realmente distintos, esto es, la idea de que la dualidad sujeto-objeto es aparente, porque detrás de los mismos, hay una realidad unitaria que puede describirse como provista de características mentales, como un espíritu absoluto. Si bien hay innegables diferencias entre los diferentes pensadores comprendidos en este movimiento, es cuestionable que entre ellos la caracterización de la realidad última, absoluta, como 'espiritual' sea equivalente a la afirmación de la inmaterialidad de la realidad.[5] En el caso de nuestro autor, su célebre afirmación acerca de que \"todo depende de que lo verdadero no se aprehenda y se exprese como sustancia, sino también, y en la misma medida, como sujeto\" ( (Hegel 1971): 15) perdería su propósito si este 'sujeto' fuera entendido como otro tipo de sustancia, es decir, como una sustancia inmaterial. El propósito de Hegel puede apreciarse mejor en otra famosa afirmación del 'Prefacio' a la Fenomenología del espíritu[6]: \"De lo absoluto hay que decir que es esencialmente resultado, que sólo al final es lo que es en verdad, y en ello precisamente estriba su naturaleza, que es la de ser real, sujeto o devenir de sí mismo.\"[7] El núcleo de la idea de que la realidad es espíritu, sin ser inmaterial, se encuentra en la noción de propósito o finalidad. Consideremos la siguiente observación del propio Hegel: El capullo desaparece al abrirse la flor, y podría decirse que aquel es refutado por ésta; del mismo modo que el fruto hace aparecer la flor como un falso ser allí de la planta, mostrándose como la verdad de ésta en vez de aquella. Estas formas no sólo se distinguen entre sí sino que se eliminan las unas a las otras como incompatibles. Pero, en su fluir, constituyen otros tantos momentos de una unidad orgánica, en la que, lejos de contradecirse, son todos igualmente necesarios, y esta igual necesidad es cabalmente la que constituye la vida del todo. ( (Hegel 1971): 8) Presentemos esta idea a través de una analogía: juzgamos la identidad de la semilla con el árbol en virtud de la capacidad de la semilla para dar nacimiento a un árbol. No se trata de meras transformaciones, porque los distintos cambios que ocurren a una semilla no ocurren azarosamente, sino que están orientados a la producción de un árbol. Así decimos \"esta semilla dio lugar a este árbol\", pero no decimos, en cambio, \"esta casa dio lugar a este edificio\" cuando una vieja casa es demolida para construir un edificio de departamentos. Para que una vieja casa demolida \"dé lugar\" a un edificio de departamentos, hace falta la intervención de factores externos, ingenieros, albañiles, etc., cuya acción no depende, en modo alguno, de la naturaleza de la vieja casa demolida. Lo que le otorga sentido a la afirmación de que la semilla da lugar al árbol, es la presencia de un propósito en la semilla, el resultado al que está dirigida. Aquello a que \"dan lugar\" las semillas depende, de manera esencial, del tipo de semilla que se trate. Una pequeña semilla está orientada a la producción de una árbol maduro con todas sus capacidades y funciones. Por ello podemos sostener que la semilla es el árbol, que el árbol está en la semilla como un propósito. La semilla no es, en este sentido, algo distinto del árbol.[8] De esta manera, si comprendemos que la realidad toda da lugar al espíritu, y no de un modo accidental, sino como su propósito o consumación, podemos afirmar que la realidad era el espíritu incluso antes de haberlo producido efectivamente. La totalidad de la realidad no es algo distinto del espíritu en el mismo sentido en que la semilla no es algo distinto del árbol. La analogía con la semilla nos permite comprender mejor, en consecuencia, porqué los idealistas alemanes en general veían en la naturaleza inanimada el desarrollo preconsciente del espíritu. Por otra parte, en el proceso de desarrollo que lleva a un embrión a convertirse en un organismo maduro, encontramos diferentes partes del embrión cumpliendo diferentes propósitos. El corazón, por ejemplo, bombea sangre. Imaginemos ahora que dotamos al corazón de conciencia. Éste tendrá, entonces, conciencia inmediata de sus propósitos como si fueran sus intenciones. Y al tomar nota del funcionamiento de los diferentes órganos -el hígado, los pulmones, etc.-, podrá, tal vez, discernir su funcionamiento como propositivo, como dotado de una finalidad e intención, pero, sin embargo, al tomar conocimiento de esto creerá conocer algo ajeno y extraño a sí mismo. Si se le indicara que él mismo forma una unidad interrelacionada e interdependiente con los diferentes órganos, esta información poco podrá contra la evidencia de la diferencia e independencia que verifica entre sus propios propósitos –\"intenciones\"y los propósitos de los otros órganos. Si complicamos apenas nuestro cuadro imaginario y dotamos al corazón y a los otros órganos de la libertad elemental de decir sí o no a la realización de sus propósitos, resultará fácil imaginar que la evidencia de su independencia podría ocasionarle al corazón y al resto de los órganos, más de una dificultad. La experiencia hecha en estas dificultades irá generando, gradualmente, una perspectiva ensanchada de su vinculación con 'lo otro'. La adquisición de este conocimiento puede verse como una cadena de contratiempos y entusiasmos inapropiados.[9] Sin embargo, a medida que el corazón profundice su conocimiento de \"lo otro\", cobrará conciencia de la interrelación entre las funciones de los diferentes órganos y de su rol en relación con la finalidad del organismo. Es decir, al conocer \"lo otro\" adquirirá una conciencia más profunda de sí mismo. Cuando el conocimiento de lo otro sea suficientemente profundo, el propio conocimiento dará cuenta de que al conocer \"lo otro\" no conoce en realidad algo ajeno sino a sí mismo bajo un aspecto desconocido, el conocimiento de lo otro se revelará como autoconocimiento. Es decir que, al tomar conciencia de su relación de interdependencia con los otros órganos y de la existencia de un desarrollo que lo constituye como tal, el corazón se verá forzado a abandonar la concepción estrecha de sí mismo como sujeto de conocimiento independiente[10] y verá el proceso de conocimiento que tuvo lugar como una vuelta reflexiva del organismo todo sobre sí mismo. Una vez obtenido este conocimiento más profundo, podemos describir el proceso como uno en el que, el sujeto inicial de conocimiento, al conocer \"lo otro\", se conocía a sí mismo. La filosofía de Hegel es una que considera que la realidad tiende a conocerse a sí misma y en la que, en ausencia de una perspectiva externa que permita contemplar a la realidad como un todo, la realidad misma genera las condiciones, en parte a través de los intentos frustrados por obtener el conocimiento absoluto, que permiten tal comprensión.[11] Esto nos lleva a mencionar otra importante transformación en el significado de los términos: en la medida en que el acto de conocimiento no es visto como el establecimiento de una relación entre dos términos externos uno en relación al otro, términos independientes que entablan un vínculo meramente contingente en el conocimiento, sino como parte de un proceso de autodescubrimiento, el acto de conocimiento es entendido como siendo siempre, por un lado, de manera latente o manifiesta, un modo de auto-conocimiento y, por el otro, un modo de autorrealización. La pretensión de conocimiento absoluto de la realidad, rechazada por la filosofía de Kant y redimida por los idealistas alemanes, hace necesario que examinemos, con un poco más de detalle, la relación de la filosofía de los idealistas alemanes, y la de Hegel en particular, con la herencia de la filosofía kantiana. 1. La deducción trascendental de lo absoluto. Para analizar la relación de los idealistas alemanes, y de Hegel en particular, con la herencia de la filosofía kantiana, seguiremos los lineamientos trazados por Frederick Beiser en la introducción al Cambridge Companion to Hegel (ver (Beiser 1999a)). Beiser plantea una pregunta de fundamental interés para nosotros ¿Cómo justifica Hegel el intento de conocer lo absoluto frente a la crítica kantiana del conocimiento metafísico? Responder a esta pregunta implica considerar tres preguntas previas: ¿Qué quiere decir Hegel por metafísica?, ¿Qué quiere decir con \"lo absoluto\"? y ¿Por qué postula la existencia de lo absoluto? Indicar cuál es la justificación provista para la tarea del conocimiento de lo absoluto, a pesar de la crítica kantiana, nos ocupará aproximadamente toda esta sección. Comencemos, entonces, con las preguntas subsidiarias. En cuanto a la primera de las preguntas previas, la pregunta por la concepción hegeliana de la metafísica, Beiser señala que Hegel se encuentra muy próximo a Kant. Recordemos que para Kant la metafísica es el intento de conocer lo incondicionado a través de la pura razón. Hegel, lo mismo que el filósofo de Koenigsberg, entiende que la metafísica es el conocimiento racional de lo absoluto. En relación a la segunda cuestión, aunque Hegel no propone una caracterización explícita de la noción de absoluto, el intérprete puede apoyarse en el hecho de que Hegel retoma dicha noción de la presentación que Schelling hace de la misma. En consecuencia, debemos examinar brevemente qué entiende Schelling por 'absoluto'. Tarea que no puede abordarse sin considerar, siquiera mínimamente, la concepción spinociana de lo absoluto. Como vemos, no sólo en cuestiones sistemáticas, sino también en cuestiones históricas, nos enfrenta la filosofía con la posibilidad de un regreso. Aunque, afortunadamente, dados los propósitos de este trabajo, podemos detenernos en el filósofo holandés para lograr la inteligibilidad deseada. El elemento spinociano en la noción de lo absoluto consiste en el hecho de que lo absoluto es entendido como causa sui, es decir, como causa de sí mismo, como aquello cuya esencia implica su existencia. Lo absoluto es, entonces, lo que existe por si mismo y no necesita de otra cosa para existir. De esto resulta que sólo una cosa puede satisfacer esta definición: el universo. Se podría objetar que el universo no es la única respuesta posible; una respuesta alternativa sería: Dios. Sin embargo, esta idea de Dios, un Dios que no es trascendente y separado de su creación, equivale de hecho a la idea de universo. Una confirmación indirecta de esto la encontramos en las frecuentes acusaciones de ateismo a los filósofos que han propuesto este tipo de ideas de Dios inmanente o única sustancia (por ejemplo a Spinoza o Fichte). Aclarado este punto podemos decir, entonces, que otra opción resultaría en una noción contradictoria de lo absoluto: si lo absoluto fuera algo menor que el universo entero, entonces habría algo por referencia a lo cual podría ser concebido, y con ello lo absoluto dejaría de ser absoluto. Como sostienen varios intérpretes,[12] la metafísica de Schelling y Hegel no se ocupa, contrariamente a lo que muchas veces se piensa, de entidades sobrenaturales como Dios, la providencia y el alma. Lo que los intérpretes quieren señalar, a través de estas observaciones, es que el Absoluto hegeliano no es una cosa de cierta clase, sino la totalidad de la cual todas las cosas son parte. Pero la concepción de lo absoluto que Hegel retoma de Schelling contiene también un elemento antiespinociano. Este elemento consiste básicamente en que el absoluto de Schelling y Hegel no tiene las características definidamente mecanicistas e inertes que tenía para Spinoza. El rasgo diferenciador consiste en que Schelling concibió la sustancia como dotada de un elemento vitalista y finalista, a partir de lo cual lo absoluto es concebido como una totalidad viva, autogenerativa y autoorganizativa. Esta diferente concepción de lo absoluto era, a los ojos de los idealistas alemanes, una consecuencia necesaria del desarrollo de las ciencias: los descubrimientos realizados en áreas como la electricidad, el magnetismo y la biología \"imponían\", a su juicio, una concepción más dinámica de la materia. Entre otras cosas, la nueva concepción dinámica de la realidad les parecía contener la solución al problema de la distinción mente cuerpo, en la medida en que toda la realidad está más o menos viva. El espíritu es el grado de organización más alto de la materia y la materia es el desarrollo, preconsciente aún, del espíritu. En este sentido, los idealistas alemanes se insertan en la tradición del materialismo vitalista de Giordano Bruno, quien comprendía a la materia de una manera no mecánica, es decir como un organismo vivo orientado teleológicamente. Si bien es importante señalar la herencia schellingiana en el pensamiento de Hegel, fundamentalmente a través de la concepción de lo absoluto, las diferencias que Hegel mantuvo con Schelling no son menos importantes. Estas diferencias radican, básicamente, en la concepción schellingiana de la identidad de sujeto y objeto. La tesis de la unidad, en última instancia, entre sujeto y objeto, según señalamos, es un rasgo general del idealismo alemán. Hay, sin embargo, diferencias importantes en el modo de entender esta tesis. Hegel desacuerda con Schelling, fundamentalmente, en que el conocimiento de dicha unidad pueda obtenerse de modo inmediato, a través de la intuición intelectual. Este conocimiento intuitivo de lo absoluto sería esotérico, ya que quien lo posee \"asegura que quienes no se dan por satisfechos con ese modo de ver revelan con ello su incapacidad para adueñarse del punto de vista de lo absoluto\" y también vacío ya que \"hacer pasar su absoluto por la noche en la que, como suele decirse, todos los gatos son pardos, es la ingenuidad del vacío en el conocimiento.\" ( (Hegel 1971): 14-15) Podemos dotar de algún contenido a la idea de lo absoluto que acabamos de mencionar refiriéndonos a la presentación kantiana de la idea de la naturaleza como un organismo.[13] En la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar (1790) (ver (Kant 1991)), Kant examina la noción de una finalidad en la naturaleza. En su presentación, Kant desarrolla esta idea ligada al examen de la capacidad de juicio. Kant encuentra que para la facultad de juicio no podemos encontrar un principio a priori constitutivo, puesto que un principio semejante requeriría nuevamente de una capacidad de juicio para ser aplicado. ¿Significa esto que no hay ningún principio a priori para la facultad de juicio? De lo que hemos señalado se sigue que la respuesta de Kant tiene que ser que no hay tales principios si nos referimos a los mismos como principios constitutivos. Sin embargo, Kant señala que cabe aún la posibilidad de encontrar un principio regulativo. Kant distingue dos tipos de juicio y dos modos de ejercer la capacidad de juicio. Los juicios pueden ser determinantes, cuando la tarea que enfrentamos es hallar un caso de un concepto, por ejemplo cuando dispongo del concepto de árbol y debo encontrar un caso del mismo en la realidad. O bien los juicios pueden ser reflexionantes, cuando la tarea que enfrentamos es la de encontrar unidad en una multiplicidad dada, por ejemplo cuando se me presentan diferentes casos individuales, jacarandá, lapacho, olmo, roble, y debo hallar el universal que los subsume (árbol). La multiplicidad considerada puede consistir de un conjunto de casos individuales, pero puede consistir también de un conjunto de generalizaciones de cierto nivel que esperamos sistematizar bajo una generalidad de mayor nivel. Evidentemente el ejercicio de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante tiene una importancia vital para el conocimiento científico, en el que no nos conformamos con encontrar generalidades, diferentes leyes que no se conectan entre sí, sino que aspiramos a obtener un cuadro sistemático de la naturaleza. En la tarea de la reflexión nos orientamos por la idea de que la naturaleza es un organismo (tiene una finalidad); esto es, si bien no conocemos que lo sea, tenemos que proceder como si lo fuera. Kant considera que sería irracional emprender esta tarea si no pensáramos que podemos tener éxito en la misma. Y pensar que podemos tener éxito en la misma al intentar encontrar unidad para una multiplicidad dada es concebir a la naturaleza como producto de una voluntad inteligente para uso de la facultad de juzgar. Este pensamiento es un principio regulativo (y no constitutivo) de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante. Pero, si bien nos vemos obligados a representarnos la naturaleza de este modo, hay que insistir en que no podemos conocerla como tal. Kant otorga, en consecuencia, un papel meramente heurístico a la idea de una finalidad en la naturaleza. Podemos concluir, entonces, que mientras que Kant niega, Hegel afirma, que podemos conocer a la naturaleza como un organismo. Ahora bien, ¿cuáles son las razones de este movimiento? ¿Por qué postular lo absoluto?, ¿por qué otorgarle validez constitutiva a la idea de la naturaleza como un organismo? Hegel responde a esta cuestión en 1801 en Diferencia entre los sistemas de filosofía de Fichte y Schelling (ver (Hegel 1990)). Allí Hegel sostiene que sólo podemos solucionar los problemas de la filosofía de Fichte si asumimos la existencia del absoluto de Schelling, lo que quiere decir que sólo podemos trascender los problemas de la filosofía de Fichte si le damos valor constitutivo a la idea de la naturaleza como un organismo vivo. En la Doctrina de la ciencia (1794) Fichte parte de lo que considera la dificultad fundamental irresuelta en la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant: el problema de la deducción trascendental de las categorías. Este problema, como ya lo señalamos, plantea la siguiente cuestión: ¿Si nuestros conceptos a priori se derivan del entendimiento, como sabemos que se van a poder aplicar a las intuiciones de la sensibilidad que son a posteriori? Kant había sostenido que estos conceptos se aplican a la experiencia porque son su condición necesaria. Los conceptos del entendimiento determinan las condiciones generales bajo las que podemos tener representaciones. Por ello, son válidos para las representaciones, pero no más allá de ellas. Cómo ya señalamos los críticos de Kant entendían que el problema era irresoluble en virtud del dualismo kantiano. En línea con los críticos de Kant, Fichte entendía que hay que superar el dualismo porque, de otro modo, no podemos explicar cómo es posible el conocimiento y acabamos irremediablemente en el escepticismo. Fichte creía que la manera de superar este problema era postular el 'principio de la identidad entre sujeto y objeto'. Ahora bien, razonaba Fichte, el único tipo de conocimiento que satisface las demandas de la identidad sujeto-objeto es el autoconocimiento. En el autoconocimiento, o autoconciencia, -por ejemplo el cogito cartesiano-, el sujeto que conoce es idéntico al objeto conocido. El autoconocimiento, transformado en el paradigma de todo conocimiento, dota de un programa a la filosofía de Fichte. En palabras de Beiser: \"Si podemos mostrar que nuestro conocimiento de un objeto en la experiencia es, en realidad, sólo una forma de autoconocimiento, entonces podremos mostrar que el conocimiento es posible\" ((Beiser 1999a): 12) Pero, la objeción se impone inmediatamente: ¿nos conocemos a nosotros mismos conociendo objetos ordinarios? Fichte responde negativamente a esta pregunta, separándose de Berkeley. Más bien realiza un replanteo del problema. El sujeto de conocimiento, el que se conoce a sí mismo en cualquier acto de conocimiento, no son los sujetos individuales, sino el ego infinito o absoluto (un sujeto que crea sus objetos en el mismo acto de conocerlos). Sin embargo, Fichte sigue siendo lo suficientemente kantiano como para insistir en que el 'ego absoluto' debe entenderse como un principio regulativo y no como un principio constitutivo de la realidad. Es decir que el ego absoluto no debe entenderse como algo existente. Lo novedoso del planteo de Fichte es que el ego absoluto no va a concebirse meramente como un principio heurístico, sino como un postulado necesario de la moralidad. Las exigencias de la moral requieren comportamientos autónomos, actos de sujetos que se constriñan únicamente por la ley de la razón. En consecuencia, estamos tanto más cerca de cumplir con las exigencias de la moral cuanto más eliminamos nuestra naturaleza sensible, la que nos hace estar expuestos a causas externas a nosotros mismos. Cuanto más logra el hombre controlar la naturaleza, haciéndola apropiada a sus fines racionales, más se acerca el ego finito al ideal del ego infinito. Apréciese aquí un elemento pragmático en la filosofía de Fichte: el conocimiento es posible como resultado de la acción, no de la contemplación. La acción produce las condiciones que hacen posible el conocimiento. Sólo podemos disminuir el dualismo, y lograr la identidad de sujeto-objeto requerida por el conocimiento, a través de la acción, esto es, luchando por hacer que la naturaleza se conforme a nuestros fines racionales. Para Fichte, como luego para Marx, los misterios de la filosofía trascendental se disuelven en la práctica. Schelling y Hegel consideran que la solución propuesta por Fichte adolece de una debilidad insuperable en la medida en que otorga un estatus meramente regulativo a la unidad de sujeto y objeto. Se preguntan, en consecuencia: ¿Cómo es posible el conocimiento si depende de una condición que no puede cumplirse nunca? En virtud de esta objeción y de las consecuencias que la misma acarrea, Schelling y Hegel dan el paso ulterior consistente en otorgar un estatus constitutivo, y no meramente regulativo, a la idea de lo absoluto. Tenemos que presuponer que la identidad de sujeto y objeto existe, y más aún, tenemos que suponer que existe dentro de la dualidad de sujeto y objeto que encontramos en la experiencia. Como lo señala Beiser: Es necesario, en otras palabras, suponer que cuando el ego finito conoce un objeto que parece ser dado, externo, esto es, en realidad, su auto-conocimiento subconsciente como yo absoluto. En otras palabras, tenemos que concebir a lo absoluto como una sustancia infinita simple, cuya naturaleza consiste en ser una fuerza viva y cuyos atributos son lo subjetivo y lo objetivo. ((Beiser 1999b) :15) La idea subyacente es que sólo si pensamos a la naturaleza como un organismo y a los sujetos cognoscentes como partes de la misma, podemos explicar las interacciones entre sujeto y objeto. Lo que, en términos kantianos, equivale a decir que hemos realizado una deducción trascendental de la idea de la naturaleza como un organismo y de la unidad de sujeto y objeto[14]. En contra de Kant, para Schelling y Hegel, esas ideas metafísicas no son meras ficciones heurísticas, son condiciones de posibilidad de la experiencia. 2. Epistemologías de lo absoluto. El movimiento que acabamos de describir, del que resulta que lo absoluto no es concebido ya como una hipóstasis trascendente (como Dios o el alma en la metafísica tradicional), es todavía puramente intelectual, lo que hace falta para tornarlo más concreto es exhibir la manera en la que lo absoluto está enraizado en nuestra experiencia. En los 1800s Schelling desarrolló una complicada epistemología intentado proveer una respuesta para esta cuestión. Schelling reconocía, con Kant, que no podemos demostrar lo incondicionado a través del razonamiento discursivo. Pero Schelling se dedicó a enfatizar especialmente las características de la razón como un poder intuitivo. Se interesó especialmente, en consecuencia, por la manera que mostramos verdades matemáticas a través de la intuición. Por ejemplo, demostramos que dos líneas paralelas no se intersecan a través de un dibujo de dos líneas equidistantes en un pizarrón. Esto, se argumenta, pone de manifiesto que poseemos una capacidad de intuición intelectual. Ahora bien, bajo el supuesto que hay una capacidad de intuición racional o intelectual ¿Cómo obtenemos conocimiento de lo absoluto a través de la misma? De acuerdo a Schelling logramos el conocimiento de lo absoluto a través del conocimiento de lo particular. La idea de Schelling es que cuando captamos perfectamente una cosa particular (es decir, cuando la conocemos en su individualidad), llegamos al conocimiento de lo absoluto, el todo en el que todas las diferencias desaparecen. Nuevamente recurrimos a Beiser: De la misma manera que en la construcción matemática hacemos abstracción de todas las propiedades accidentales de una figura (que esta escrita con tiza, en un pizarrón) para verla como un ejemplar perfecto de una verdad universal, en la construcción filosófica abstraemos todas las propiedades específicas de un objeto para ver en él el todo absoluto. Entonces, si enfocamos en el objeto mismo, haciendo abstracción de todas sus propiedades, deberíamos ver su identidad con la totalidad del universo, puesto que las cosas sólo se distinguen por sus propiedades. ((Beiser 1999a): 17) Hegel compartió, durante algún tiempo, el método de la intuición intelectual de Schelling. Como ya señalamos, se alejó de este método fundamentalmente por considerar que la intuición intelectual es vacía, ya que identificamos los objetos aplicándoles conceptos (ver el apartado 4 de este trabajo sobre la certeza sensorial) y que es esotérica, esto es, carece de medios racionales de persuasión frente al desacuerdo, no pudiendo proponer una vía racional de acceso a lo absoluto. Es decir, en caso de desacuerdo, la propuesta schellingiana debe limitarse a constatar la diferencia y, eventualmente, afirmar que el adversario carece de la capacidad de intuición intelectual. Consecuentemente, Hegel propuso un método discursivo, la dialéctica, para mostrar cómo tenemos conocimiento de lo absoluto. En la Fenomenología, el movimiento dialéctico es motorizado al confrontar la pretensión de conocimiento de la conciencia ordinaria con su propio estándar de conocimiento. Por ello, en la Fenomenología, Hegel parte del \"saber que se manifiesta\". La conciencia que sabe algo tiene una certeza, pero aspira a un saber independiente de su certeza. Esta aspiración nos procura, de modo implícito, un criterio para confrontar, y eventualmente criticar, su certeza. Por ejemplo, la 'certeza sensorial' que consideraremos en el último apartado, consiste en la certeza de aprehender lo real, pero esta aprehensión se realiza bajo una determinada concepción. Lo real de la certeza sensible es lo inmediato, los entes concretos, individuales. Entonces, la certeza de la certeza sensorial se basa en la creencia de haber captado lo real porque ha captado entidades individuales. Pero, ¿ha captado entidades individuales?, y si no lo ha hecho ¿qué es lo que ha captado como real? La dialéctica discurre, como veremos en el apartado 4, a través de la confrontación entre certeza y concepción. 3. Más allá del límite o Hegel crítico de Kant. Hegel ha sido un crítico de Kant, tanto de su filosofía práctica como de su filosofía teórica. La importancia de esta crítica para el desarrollo de la filosofía hegeliana difícilmente pueda exagerarse, por lo menos si otorgamos crédito al comentarista que sostiene que \"la totalidad del programa y concepción de la filosofía de Hegel descansa sobre la refutación de la limitación kantiana de la razón\"[15] Las críticas de Hegel pueden clasificarse en tres grupos: (a) el tratamiento del yo y la apercepción (b) las críticas vinculadas a la deficiente explicación kantiana de la necesidad de nuestro conocimiento, y (c) la idea de que un estudio preliminar del conocimiento es un error.[16] Nos limitaremos al tercer grupo de críticas, especialmente las vinculadas con la concepción de lo absoluto presentadas en la introducción a la Fenomenología del espíritu. La \"Introducción\" a la Fenomenología del espíritu comienza con una referencia a una concepción del conocimiento que lo concibe por analogía con una herramienta. De esta analogía se desprende que el examen de la 'herramienta conocimiento' debe preceder al uso de la misma. Es sencillo reconocer a la filosofía kantiana como objetivo crítico de esta observación. Dejemos a Hegel presentar su propia posición: Es natural pensar que, en filosofía, antes de entrar en la cosa misma, es decir, en el conocimiento real de lo que es en verdad, sea necesario ponerse previamente de acuerdo sobre el conocimiento considerado como el instrumento que sirve para apoderarse de lo absoluto o como el medio a través del cual es contemplado. Parece justificada esta preocupación, ya que, de una parte, puede haber diversas clases de conocimiento, una de las cuales se preste mejor que las otras para alcanzar dicho fin último, pudiendo, por tanto, elegirse mal entre ellas; y, de otra parte, porque siendo el conocimiento una capacidad de clase y alcance determinados, sin la determinación precisa de su naturaleza y sus límites captaríamos las nubes del error en vez del cielo de la verdad. E incluso puede muy bien ocurrir que esta preocupación se trueque en el convencimiento de que todo el propósito de ganar para la conciencia por medio del conocimiento lo que es en sí sea en su concepto un contrasentido y de que entre el conocimiento y lo absoluto se alce una barrera que los separa sin más. ( (Hegel 1971): 51, el subrayado es mío) Hemos destacado dos expresiones en esta cita, la oración inicial \"Es natural pensar que...\" y \"Parece justificada esta preocupación...\", puesto que a nuestro juicio revelan la clave de la argumentación de Hegel. La primera pone de relieve que la posición considerada es, a juicio de nuestro autor, un supuesto, algo que los filósofos creen, o han llegado a creer, que va de suyo. Un supuesto contrasta con una proposición cuya verdad ha sido garantizada filosóficamente. Por ello la segunda expresión subrayada señala que la posición considerada tiene la apariencia de una proposición filosófica, es decir, parece ser, sin serlo, una proposición dotada de una justificación. Una mirada atenta no dejará de percibir una tensión entre ambas expresiones. Cuando tomamos algo como natural, lo que hacemos es, justamente, dejar de examinar y preguntar por su justificación. De esta manera, Hegel llama la atención sobre un presupuesto no justificado, aunque tal vez justificable, ubicado justamente en los inicios de cierto modo de filosofar. Este presupuesto, de acuerdo a Hegel, caracteriza a la filosofía kantiana y en general a las filosofías que adoptan lo que podríamos denominar el \"método crítico epistémico\"[17]. El método crítico epistémico se caracteriza por la convicción de que antes de enrolarnos en la empresa del conocimiento tenemos que asegurarnos si nuestro entendimiento tiene la capacidad para realizar las tareas que nos proponemos. La defensa natural, que encontramos desafiada en el párrafo inicial de la \"Introducción\", es que esta suposición nada presupone acerca de nuestra capacidad de conocer. Para clarificar la estrategia argumentativa de Hegel, vale la pena señalar que él mismo reconoce que la imposición de un límite a nuestra capacidad de conocimiento se sigue de una manera fatal una vez que adoptamos este 'supuesto natural'. En efecto: ...si el conocimiento es el instrumento para apoderarse de la esencia absoluta, inmediatamente se advierte que la aplicación de un instrumento a una cosa no deja a esta tal y como ella es para sí, sino que la modela y altera. Y si el conocimiento no es un instrumento de nuestra actividad, sino, en cierto modo, un médium pasivo a través del cual llega a nosotros la luz de la verdad, no recibiremos ésta tampoco tal y como es en sí, sino tal y como es a través de este médium y en él. ((Hegel 1971): 51) A lo que Hegel agrega: \"En ambos casos empleamos un medio que produce lo contrario a su fin, o más bien el contrasentido consiste en recurrir en general a un medio.\" Es decir que, en su opinión, el 'supuesto natural' del método crítico epistémico no sólo no esta justificado sino que, además, es absurdo. Afortunadamente, Hegel amplía sus reparos al mismo. Las críticas de Hegel a esta posición pueden agruparse bajo dos rótulos. Podemos llamarlas la \"crítica metafísica\" y la \"crítica epistemológica\". La \"crítica metafísica\" está expuesta, fundamentalmente, en la \"Introducción\" a la Fenomenología. Allí Hegel sostiene que lo que en el primer párrafo calificaba de \"preocupación aparentemente justificada\" esconde en realidad una contradicción: Da por supuestas, en efecto, representaciones acerca del conocimiento como un instrumento y un médium, así como también una diferencia entre nosotros mismos y ese conocimiento; pero, sobre todo, presupone que lo absoluto se halla de un lado y el conocimiento de otro, como algo para sí y que, separado de lo absoluto, es, sin embargo, algo real [reell]; presupone, por tanto, que el conocimiento, que al ser también fuera de lo absoluto es también fuera de la verdad, es sin embargo verdadero, hipótesis con la que lo que se llama temor a errar se da a conocer más bien como temor a la verdad. ((Hegel 1971): 52) Este fragmento puede leerse con la clave que presentamos al comentar la noción spinociana de lo absoluto. La idea misma de una realidad absoluta no puede ser satisfecha más que por el universo como un todo, ya que cualquier otra opción haría de lo absoluto algo limitado y, en consecuencia, susceptible de ser conceptualizado desde afuera.[18] Para Hegel, entonces, en primer lugar, la idea de una realidad absoluta que no incluya al conocimiento y, en segundo lugar, la concepción del conocimiento como algo real que, sin embargo, no forma parte de lo absoluto, están ambas implicadas en el \"supuesto natural\" considerado inicialmente. Estas ideas son ambas contradictorias en sus propios términos, lo que implica que aunque el supuesto natural pueda parecer justificado, es reducido al absurdo por estas consecuencias. Esta separación obstaculiza dos de los propósitos más valorados por Hegel, como señala Hyppolite: \"lo absoluto sería distinto del conocimiento: ni lo absoluto podría ser saber de sí mismo ni el saber podría ser saber de lo absoluto\" ( (Hyppolite 1998): 9) La crítica metafísica puede reelaborarse en clave epistemológica. La crítica epistemológica toma como punto de partida la afirmación del filósofo crítico acerca de que lo único que tenemos son principios de conocimiento que se aplican a las \"cosas para nosotros\" pero no a las \"cosas en sí\". De acuerdo a Hegel, esta afirmación violaría la postulada limitación de los conocimientos refutándose a sí misma. En efecto, la afirmación de la restricción de nuestro conocimiento a las 'cosas para nosotros' es una pretensión absoluta de conocimiento. Por ello, veamos la \"crítica epistemológica\" con algún detalle. La crítica epistemológica aparece delineada con más claridad en la Lógica de la Enciclopedia: Uno de los puntos de vista capitales de la filosofía crítica es que, antes de proceder al conocimiento de Dios, a la esencia de las cosas, etc., es preciso indagar la facultad de conocer para ver si es capaz de realizar semejante tarea; se debería aprender a conocer el instrumento antes de comprender la labor que por su intermedio ha de llevarse a cabo; porque si el instrumento fuese insuficiente todo esfuerzo resultaría estéril. Tal pensamiento ha parecido de tal modo plausible que ha despertado la mayor admiración y adhesión, y ha reconducido el conocer, del interés por sus objetos y del ocuparse de éstos, a sí mismo, al conocimiento formal. Pero si no queremos plagarnos de palabras, fácil es comprender que otra clase de instrumentos pueden examinarse y emplearse de otro modo que no sea el trabajo mismo a que están destinados; pero la indagación del conocimiento no puede efectuarse de otro modo que conociendo, de lo que se deduce que indagar este llamado instrumento no es otra cosa que conocerlo. Por consiguiente, querer conocer antes de conocer es absurdo, tan absurdo como el prudente propósito de aquel cierto Escolástico, de empezar a nadar antes de arriesgarse en el agua. ( (Hegel 1985): 8; § 10) Una herramienta ordinaria, un martillo por ejemplo, puede evaluarse de manera independiente, es decir, sin utilizar la propia herramienta. Podemos evaluar si un martillo sirve para golpear en determinada superficie sin tener que martillar, por ejemplo examinando la dureza relativa del acero de que está hecha la cabeza del martillo y la dureza del material que tenemos que golpear con el mismo. Sin dar un solo martillazo podríamos saber si un martillo es o no es apto para determinada tarea. La analogía entre la herramienta ordinaria y la \"herramienta conocimiento\" falla en virtud de que es justamente esta posibilidad la que no está disponible en el caso del conocimiento. La determinación de lo que puede y no puede el conocimiento consiste justamente en conocer qué puede y qué no puede el conocimiento. Cuando presentamos el problema de esta manera, vemos que nos encaminamos, no hacia la determinación segura y definitiva de los límites del conocimiento, sino hacia un regreso infinito: una vez realizado el primer paso deberíamos preguntarnos si el conocimiento tiene la capacidad de conocer sus propios límites que fue presupuesta y no examinada en el primer paso del examen y así sucesivamente. O bien, para respetar la dirección que la comparación con el \"cierto Escolástico\" le otorga a la analogía, antes de comenzar la investigación acerca de las limitaciones de nuestro conocimiento, tendríamos que investigar nuestra capacidad para llevar a cabo esta investigación y así hasta el infinito. Consideremos las posibles réplicas a estas críticas de parte del filósofo crítico.[19] Por lo que respecta la cuestionada analogía del conocimiento con una herramienta, el filósofo crítico se vería obligado a reconocer que la generalidad del alcance de la capacidad reflexiva de conocer la hace diferente de cualquier herramienta ordinaria, y por ello a conceder en parte la objeción. Pero sin embargo el filósofo crítico puede argumentar que la analogía con una herramienta no funciona en su pensamiento como un \"supuesto natural\" como pretende Hegel. Karl Ameriks argumenta que la postulación kantiana de las formas de la sensibilidad y el entendimiento no son presupuestos sino que son conclusiones de un razonamiento regresivo. De acuerdo a Ameriks, una vez que estas formas han sido descubiertas Kant se vio obligado a presentar un argumento adicional para mostrar que son formas, herramientas nuestras para captar algo que, en sí mismo, es diferente de nosotros. Este paso adicional es la demostración de la idealidad trascendetal de nuestros objetos de conocimiento, o lo que Ameriks llama la \"tesis de la restricción\" (ver (Ameriks 1985): 2, 6 y 16). De acuerdo a Ameriks, Hegel se confunde al creer que la tesis de la restricción es una consecuencia de la deducción trascendental cuando en realidad es una consecuencia de la dialéctica trascendental, que muestra, a través de las antinomias, que las formas de nuestro espíritu descubiertas en la deducción trascendental sólo tienen un uso confiable en el dominio de la experiencia posible. En consecuencia, el filósofo crítico, aún reconociendo que la facultad de conocer no es, debido a su alcance, análoga a una herramienta ordinaria, puede insistir en que esta facultad puede usar el principio de contradicción para evaluar regiones específicas de la propia capacidad. Este es el rol que desempeñan las antinomias. Como resultado de este examen podemos concluir que algunas partes de la capacidad tienen un alcance limitado y que, en ese sentido, son como medios o herramientas que cumplen su propósito dentro de determinados limites. (ver (Ameriks 1985): 17-18) Karl Ameriks ha señalado que la crítica que Hegel realiza en términos del intento de aprender a nadar antes de aventurarse en el agua, puede recibir una traducción no metafórica en términos del \"problema del criterio\" presentado por Roderik Chisholm. El \"problema del criterio\" tiene la forma de una paradoja: para poder presentar una pretensión cognitiva, uno debe saber que la misma satisface determinados criterios que la hacen un conocimiento adecuado, pero, simultáneamente, uno no puede tener una idea de los criterios que hacen que un conocimiento sea adecuado, a menos que uno conozca ya algunas cosas particulares. Chisholm clasifica las respuestas al problema del criterio en \"metodistas\" y \"particularistas\" Una respuesta \"metodista\" consiste en suspender el juicio acerca de conocimientos particulares hasta tanto no hallemos un criterio general de adecuación cognitiva. Una respuesta \"particularista\" supone que poseemos ciertos conocimientos con anterioridad a disponer de un criterio de lo que los hace conocimientos; obtenemos un criterio general a partir de la reflexión sobre estos casos. El propio Chisholm adopta una posición \"particularista\" considerando que el problema del criterio sólo afecta a las posiciones metodistas. La crítica de Hegel descansaría en la interpretación de Kant como un \"metodista\", lo que nos lleva a preguntarnos cómo es que Kant espera deducir un criterio de conocimiento sin admitir conocimientos particulares, lo que sería análogo a querer aprender a nadar sin aventurarse en el agua. Ameriks considera que la interpretación de Kant como un \"metodista\" es inadecuada a Kant, puesto que éste no está interesado en determinar cuál es el criterio de conocimiento sino que su interés es, dados ciertas enunciados aceptados (por ejemplo, que algo sucede en t), ver cuáles son sus condiciones necesarias[20]. (ver (Ameriks 1985): 15-16) Por otra parte, el filósofo crítico podría reconocer que Hegel ha sacado a la luz un presupuesto de su argumentación. Pero, acto seguido, podría pasar a argumentar a favor del mismo. Hegel ha mostrado que el método crítico fracasa cuando recorre la vía cartesiana y busca, consecuentemente, encontrar un camino que le ahorre de modo definitivo tomar las nubes del error por los cielos de la verdad (ver (Hegel 1971): 51). En esta línea el filósofo crítico aparece como alguien que encara las cosas en el orden equivocado, como sugiere la comparación con el escolástico. Pero el filósofo crítico podría apelar a otra analogía. Podría sostener, por ejemplo, que él mismo no es como quien intenta aprender a nadar antes de aventurarse al agua, sino como alguien que, habiendo aprendido a nadar y habiendo nadado ya, ha corrido el riesgo de ahogarse. Los extravíos en el agua y los riesgos de muerte se corresponden, en el plano del conocimiento, a la metafísica y la teología. En consecuencia, a través de la nueva analogía rechaza el calificativo de sobreescrupuloso, y reclama el de prudente: él quiere saber cuán lejos se puede llegar nadando, para saber qué metas es racional plantearse y cuáles deben resignarse. En relación a esta última respuesta, Hegel podría darse por satisfecho con haber presentado un argumento que derrote a la versión sobreescrupulosa, ya sea que este argumento se aplique o no a la versión prudente del filósofo crítico. En efecto, la versión prudente del filósofo crítico hace del examen previo del alcance de las facultades de conocimiento una cuestión contingente, opcional. No hay necesidad filosófica en comenzar de esta manera, se trata de un asunto de prudencia, en el que, como es sabido, siempre hay varias respuestas legítimas. Hegel, decíamos, probablemente se daría por satisfecho con mostrar que hay una pregunta escondida en el procedimiento crítico: ¿Qué garantías podemos tener de alcanzar el conocimiento de lo absoluto? y reemplazarla por otra: ¿Por qué deberíamos necesitar una garantía de este tipo al comienzo de nuestras investigaciones? ¿Por qué no comenzar y luego ver que tan lejos llegamos? (ver (Stern 2002): 39-40). En cualquier caso, Hegel considera que con el cuestionamiento del supuesto natural del filósofo crítico ha ganado el derecho a comenzar. En consecuencia, Hegel se plantea la pregunta ¿Por dónde comenzar? Hegel considera que sería infructuoso comenzar directamente por la filosofía sistemática. Si comenzáramos directamente, presentando un sistema de filosofía, entonces hallaríamos que lo que afirmamos no puede probarse frente a concepciones rivales: En efecto, la ciencia no puede rechazar un saber no verdadero sin más que considerarlo como un punto de vista vulgar de las cosas y asegurando que ella es un conocimiento completamente distinto y que aquel saber no es para ella absolutamente nada, ni puede tampoco remitirse al barrunto de un saber mejor en él mismo. Mediante aquella aseveración declararía que su fuerza se halla en su ser; pero también el saber carente de verdad remite al hecho de que es y asevera que la ciencia no es nada para él, y una aseveración escueta vale exactamente tanto como la otra. Y aún menos puede la ciencia remitirse al barrunto mejor que se daría en el conocimiento no verdadero y que en él mismo señalaría hacia ella, pues, de una manera, al hacerlo así, seguiría remitiéndose a un ser y, de otra parte, se remitiría a sí misma como al modo en que es en el conocimiento no verdadero, es decir, en un modo malo de ser y a su manifestación, y no a lo que ella es en sí y para sí. Por esta razón debemos abordar aquí la exposición del saber tal y como se manifiesta. ((Hegel 1971): 53-54). [21] El problema que presenta aquí Hegel es que la ciencia se presenta siempre como verdadera, y por ello como absoluta. En consecuencia, el hecho de que una concepción esté acompañada por la creencia de que es verdadera, de que una concepción aparezca coronada con la convicción de ser un acceso adecuado a lo absoluto, no nos permite escoger entre una posición y otra. Cualquier concepción que aspire a ser una concepción correcta, está además acompañada por la creencia de ser una concepción correcta. Por tanto, si fuéramos a presentar desde el inicio una concepción filosófica sistemática, aquella que creemos o sabemos verdadera (es decir el sistema hegeliano), deberíamos, además, presentar un criterio que nos permita demostrar la verdad de nuestra propia concepción frente a otras concepciones que aspiran a ser verdaderas. En cualquier otro caso, por las razones formales aducidas (la necesaria correlación entre \"creer que p\" y \"creer que p es verdadero\"), ambas concepciones serían equipolentes, afirmando ambas su verdad, lo que, de acuerdo a lo que venimos viendo, no se distingue de afirmar su ser: la convicción de ser verdaderas, es algo que viene con el mero hecho de ser concepciones o creencias. Notemos que esta interpretación no arroja luz sobre la frase final de la cita de Hegel: \"Por esta razón debemos abordar aquí la exposición del saber tal y como se manifiesta.\". Pero volveremos sobre esto en breve. El argumento prosigue con el cuestionamiento del propio intento de provisión de un criterio semejante: Si ahora investigamos la verdad del saber, parece que investigamos lo que este es en sí. Sin embargo, en esta investigación el saber es nuestro objeto, es para nosotros; y el en sí de lo que resultara sería más bien su ser para nosotros; lo que afirmaríamos como su esencia no sería su verdad, sino más bien solamente nuestro saber acerca de él. La esencia o la pauta estaría en nosotros, y lo que por medio de ella se midiera y acerca de lo cual hubiera de recaer por esta comparación, una decisión, no tendría porqué reconocer necesariamente esa pauta. ( (Hegel 1971): 57)[22] El examen externo del saber, que es lo que resultaría si propusiéramos nuestra propia concepción filosófica junto con un criterio para examinar las pretensiones de saber alternativas, no nos permite trascender la situación de mutua afirmación y equipolencia que tendría por misión resolver. Está en la propia naturaleza de la posición adoptada al realizar un examen externo, que implica la adopción de una posición de juez, el que la posición examinada aparezca como mera creencia y nunca como saber, ya que la verdad y la justificación de la creencia –es decir, lo que hace de la creencia un saberhan sido puestos en suspenso justamente por estar la creencia bajo la situación de examen. Pero las cosas discurren con simetría perfecta del lado de la posición examinada. Pues, recordemos, se trata de un examen externo y no de uno al que la posición examinada se aviene voluntariamente; la posición examinada es para sí misma un saber y considera a la otra posición –a la que llamamos inicialmente posición del juez o posición examinadoraque pretende conocer una verdad diferente a la suya propia, como un no saber, como una mera creencia cuya verdad está en suspenso. Así las cosas, el desarrollo lógico de la posición examinada tiende al examen de la posición examinadora. Es decir, estando ella misma convencida de su saber y quedando en suspenso el saber de la otra posición, que aparece como mera creencia, nada es más natural que acometer el examen de la misma. Este examen será también externo. Pero, lo que es más importante, esto implica trocar el rol de posición examinada por el de examinadora. De donde resulta que en la situación de examen externo no puede esperarse una resolución racional. Dada la situación de examen externo no podemos más que esperar que una afirmación se oponga a la otra. Así las cosas, parece que, luego de haber desechado la manera crítica de comenzar a filosofar, no podemos encontrar una concepción que nos permita trascender la misma. Hegel constata que por fortuna tenemos una vía de sortear esta dificultad: ...la naturaleza del objeto que investigamos rebasa esa apariencia de separación y de presuposición. La conciencia nos da en ella misma su propia pauta, razón por la cual la investigación consiste en comparar la conciencia consigo misma, ya que la distinción que se acaba de establecer recae en ella. Hay en ella un para otro, o bien tiene ella, en general, la determinabilidad del momento del saber; y, al mismo tiempo, este otro no es solamente para ella, sino que es también fuera de esta relación, es en sí, el momento de la verdad. Así, pues, en lo que la conciencia declara dentro de sí como el en sí o lo verdadero tenemos la pauta que ella misma establece para medir su saber. ( (Hegel 1971): 57) Ahora podemos comprender porqué debemos comenzar por \"el saber tal como se manifiesta\". El saber que se manifiesta está en condiciones de realizar su propio examen. La conciencia que sabe algo, tiene una certeza, pero aspira a un saber independiente de esta certeza, es decir que tiene una concepción, mayormente implícita, de porqué el objeto de su certeza es conocido adecuadamente. Por ello el filósofo no tiene que proveer un criterio para evaluar al saber que se manifiesta, sino que puede limitarse a observar el desarrollo del proceso. El proceso que denominamos \"dialéctica\" consiste, principalmente, en el proceso por el que la conciencia que levanta una pretensión de conocimiento, lleva a cabo la comparación del saber (pretensión de conocimiento) con sus propios criterios, implícitos, de adecuación. Esta comparación la lleva a cabo la conciencia misma que cree saber, ya que la misma no puede tolerar desajustes entre el objeto que conoce y su concepción de lo que conoce. Tolerar ese desajuste sería, para la conciencia, tanto como admitir que no es un saber y retractar sus pretensiones de conocimiento. El otro rasgo definitorio de la dialéctica hegeliana, y de fundamental importancia para la cuestión del límite, es la noción de \"negación determinada\". Cuando asistimos a los desajustes entre la concepción de lo verdadero y el objeto conocido no asistimos meramente a un desajuste o falta de concordancia entre la conciencia y su objeto, sino, simultáneamente, a la aparición de un nuevo objeto. El objeto se revela como no siendo así (como dictaba nuestra pauta de saber adecuado), pero \"no ser así\" es siempre, inevitablemente, \"ser asá\". En este \"ser asá\" hay implícita una nueva concepción de conocimiento adecuado, una nueva pauta. Veremos en el próximo apartado una muestra de este proceso en la primera manifestación del \"saber que se manifiesta\", la dialéctica de la certeza sensorial. 4. Certeza sensorial[23] La certeza sensorial es una forma de \"conciencia natural\"[24] que consiste en el conocimiento cierto de lo que se le da de manera inmediata. La certeza sensorial es presentada por Hegel como la manera más natural que tenemos de pensar la relación de la mente con el mundo. Es por ello que el examen del \"saber tal como se manifiesta\" comienza con la dialéctica de la certeza sensorial. La certeza sensorial pretende ser, es decir se presenta como, una forma de conocimiento inmediato. Pretende ser \"aprehensión\" y no \"comprensión\" de la realidad. De acuerdo a Hegel esta forma de saber parece natural en virtud de que se apoya en un supuesto que parece plausible, pero que es altamente problemático. Este supuesto consiste en la convicción de que la certeza sensorial nos da la forma de conocimiento más básico, el conocimiento de las entidades particulares. Este supuesto, que otorga atractivo a la certeza sensorial, es a la vez la pauta a partir de la que deberemos juzgar si la certeza sensorial se adecua a su objeto: la certeza sensorial presume que puede captar una cosa en su plena particularidad, su objeto es el individual concreto, dado a los sentidos, captado antes de operar ninguna abstracción sobre el mismo. De acuerdo al punto de vista de la certeza sensorial, la \"aprehensión\" es más básica que la \"comprensión\" porque los conceptos, en virtud de que su esencia es aplicarse a muchas cosas diferentes, no nos permiten saber nada de la cosa en tanto que individuo (los individuos, de acuerdo a la certeza sensorial, son la verdadera realidad). La dialéctica de la certeza sensible se pone en movimiento, básicamente, en función de que la certeza sensible, en la medida en que se presenta como conocimiento, tiene que poder decir qué es lo que conoce. En consecuencia, Hegel interroga a la certeza sensible qué es lo que su experiencia del objeto nos dice del mismo: Hay que preguntarle, por tanto, a ella misma [a la certeza sensible]: ¿qué es el esto? Si lo tomamos bajo la doble figura de su ser como el ahora y el aquí, la dialéctica que lleva en él cobrará una forma tan inteligible como el esto mismo. A la pregunta ¿que es el ahora? contestamos pues, por ejemplo, el ahora es la noche. Para examinar la verdad de esta certeza sensible, bastará un simple intento. Escribiremos esta verdad, una verdad nada pierde con ser puesta por escrito, como no pierde nada tampoco con ser conservada. Pero si ahora, este mediodía revisamos esta verdad escrita, no tendremos más remedio que decir que esta verdad ha quedado ya vacía. ( (Hegel 1971): 64) Tratemos de poner de manifiesto más claramente la contradicción que aparece aquí. El primer resultado de esta pregunta es que la respuesta de la certeza sensible, \"el esto es el aquí y ahora\" no señala un rasgo que sea propio de un objeto en su unicidad, ya que diferentes lugares y tiempos pueden ser \"aquí y ahora\". Cómo se señala en el fragmento citado, no tenemos ninguna dificultad en concebir que el \"ahora\" que utilizamos para señalar este momento particular podamos usarlo para señalar otros momentos. Dicho de manera llana, con 'aquí' y 'ahora' podemos referirnos a diferentes situaciones particulares. En consecuencia, si aquí y ahora son términos que puede aplicarse a muchos individuos, resulta que, finalmente, 'aquí' y 'ahora' funcionan de la misma manera en que funcionan los términos generales. Con 'vaso' no nos referimos a un individuo particular qua individuo, sino en lo que tiene de común con otros individuos. Lo mismo ocurre con \"aquí\" y \"ahora\", el medio con el que la certeza sensorial pretendía captar a los individuos en su unicidad. La dialéctica de la certeza sensorial manifiesta la contradicción de una concepción de la realidad que, por un lado, se presenta como inmediata, y, por el otro, levanta la pretensión de ser una forma de conocimiento. Pero lo que más importa para nuestro trabajo es que la dialéctica de la certeza sensorial ejemplifica perfectamente la convicción hegeliana de que, si hay un límite, hay algo más allá del límite y de que, cuando soy conciente de un límite, tengo que ser consciente de algo más allá del límite.[25] De acuerdo a Hegel, al comprender porqué una forma de conciencia se contradice en sí misma, uno se sitúa ya en la próxima etapa de la dialéctica. Por ejemplo, comprender que \"ahora\" es la noche y que no es la noche, es comprender que \"ahora\" tiene la estructura de un término general, es decir, de un término que refiere a una instancia particular sin ser idéntico con la misma. El conocimiento, (el ejemplificado por el \"ahora\" propuesto por la certeza sensible) tiene la estructura de la referencia a una instancia particular a través de un término general que puede, en principio, aplicarse a otras instancias. Esto es justamente lo que Hegel entiende por percepción, que es el próximo paso en la Fenomenología,[26] en el progreso del espíritu hacia el saber absoluto. En consecuencia, la dialéctica de la certeza sensible ilustra la concepción hegeliana del límite, en el sentido de que, cuando llegamos al límite de la certeza sensible, a la conciencia de su inadecuación como una captación de la realidad, hemos, de algún modo, al menos implícitamente, trascendido ese límite. Cuando criticamos a la certeza sensible como una captación inadecuada de la realidad confrontamos lo que cree y pretende ser con lo que en realidad es. Y es justamente en lo que la certeza sensible es en realidad donde encontramos, si sabemos mirarlo, una nueva pauta, una captación y una concepción de la realidad más rica y compleja, la que da cuenta de la misma en términos de la percepción. [27] Bibliografia. Agoglia, R. (1993) La filosofía del Derecho de Hegel, Quito, Banco Central del Ecuador, 1993 Ameriks, K.. (1985). \"Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy\". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVI:1-35. Ayer, A. (1979) \"¿Puede haber un lenguaje privado?\" en Villanueva, Ernesto (ed.) El argumento del lenguaje privado, México, UNAM, , pp. 83-97. Bauman, Z. (2002). La hermenéutica y las ciencias sociales. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión. Beiner, R. (1983). Political Judgment. London: Methuen. Beiser, F. (1999a) The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beiser, F. (1999b). \"Introduction: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics.\" En Beiser, (1999a): 1-24. Danto, A. (1997). Después del fin del arte. El arte y el linde de la historia. Barcelona: Paidós. Franks, P. (1998). \"German Idealism.\" En Craig, E., Floridi (Eds.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0. London: Routledge. Gadamer, H.-G. (1996). Verdad y método. Traducción de Ana Agud de Aparicio y Rafael de Agapito, Salamanca: Sígueme. Guyer, P. (1997). Kant and the Claims of Taste. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guyer, P. (1999). \"Thought and Being: Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy.\" En Beiser, (1999a): 171-210. Hegel, G. W. F. (1939). Phénoménologie de L'Espirit. traducción y notas de Jean Hyppolite, Paris: Aubier, 2 vol. Hegel, G. W. F. (1971). Fenomenología del espíritu. Traducción de W. Roces, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Hegel, G. W. F. (1985). Enciclopedia de las ciencias filosóficas. Traducción de E. Ovejero y Maury (revisada), México: Porrúa. Hegel, G. W. F. (1990). Diferencia entre los sistemas de filosofía de Fichte y Schelling. Traducción de María del Carmen Paredes Martín, Barcelona: Tecnos. Hegel, G. W. F. (2000). Fe y saber. O la filosofía de la reflexión de la subjetividad en la totalidad de sus formas como filosofía de Kant, Jacobi y Fichte. Traducción de Vicente Serrano, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. Heidegger, M. (1994). \"El concepto de experiencia de Hegel.\" en: Martin Heidegger Caminos del Bosque. Madrid: Alianza: 91-156. Horstmann, R.-P. (1998). \"Hegel.\" en Craig, E., Floridi, L. (eds.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0. London: Routledge. Hyppolite, J. (1998). Génesis y estructura de la 'Fenomenología del espíritu.' Barcelona: Península. Inwood, M. (1992). \"Limit, Restriction and Finitude.\" en: Inwood, M. A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Balckwell: 177-80. Kant, I. (1991). Crítica de la facultad de juzgar. Traducción de Pablo Oyarzún, Caracas: Monte Ávila. Kojève, A. (1996). La dialéctica del amo y el esclavo en Hegel. Traducción de Juan José Sebreli, Buenos Aires: Fausto. Kripke, S. (1989) Wittgenstein: reglas y lenguaje privado, México, UNAM. McDowell, John \"Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein\" en su Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1998. Malcolm, Norman (1963) \"Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations\" en su Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp. 96-129. Pipin, R. B. (1999). \"You Can't Get There From Here: Transition Problems in Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'.\" En Beiser, F. (1999a): 52-85. Rosen, M.. (2001). \"The Role of Rules\". International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (3): 369-84. Sprigge, T. (1998). \"Idealism.\" En Craig, E., Floridi (Eds.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0. London: Routledge. Stern, R. (2002). Hegel and the 'Phenomenology of Spirit.' London: Routledge. Taylor, C. (1976). \"The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology.\" En MacIntyre, A. (ed.) Hegel. A Collection of Critical Essays. Notredame-London: University of Notre Dame Press: 151-87. Taylor, C. (1997). Argumentos filosóficos. Ensayos sobre el conocimiento, el lenguaje y la modernidad. Traducción de Fina Birulés Beltrán, Barcelona: Paidós. Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Investigaciones filosóficas Traducción de García Suarez, A. y Moulines, U. , Barcelona: Altaya. [1] En esta presentación del contexto filosófico del pensamiento hegeliano hemos utilizado (Sprigge 1998), (Franks 1998) y (Horstmann 1998) [2] Si bien el propio Kant fue conciente de este problema, para lo que propuso la noción de esquema como un intento de establecer un puente entre la sensación y el entendimiento, Maimon insistió en que ninguna solución coherente podía proveerse sin superar los dualismos kantianos. La cuestión subyacente es, ¿de qué naturaleza es la mediación propuesta por los esquemas, lógica o empírica? [3] El hecho ha sido destacado por Gadamer en Verdad y método (ver (Gadamer 1996): 71). En un interesante artículo Michael Rosen ha argumentado que la problemática de las reglas es el mejor puente que podemos tender, de hecho para el autor dicho puente ya está tendido, entre la filosofía analítica y la filosofía continental. Utilizo varias de sus observaciones para la presentación del problema. (ver (Rosen 2001)). Véase también una presentación del pensamiento de Kant en una óptica afín a la propuesta de Gadamer en ((Beiner 1983) cap. 3) [4] El sentido regresivo del pensamiento kantiano consiste en la apelación a razonamientos trascendentales. Es decir, razonamientos que, partiendo de un hecho bien establecido o considerado incuestionable (por ejemplo que hay conocimiento de la naturaleza o que hay juicios sintéticos a priori en las matemáticas), se remontan hasta las condiciones necesariamente involucradas en la ocurrencia del mismo, es decir, hasta sus condiciones de posibilidad. Charles Taylor (Ver (Taylor 1997)) presenta una interesante discusión de esta noción y de su relevancia en la filosofía contemporánea. El mismo autor analiza los capítulos iniciales de la Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel (la sección 'Conciencia'), como un argumento trascendental (ver (Taylor 1976)). [5] ¿Estamos dando un paso hacia una lectura \"materializante\" del idealismo alemán y de Hegel en particular? Consideramos que la respuesta es negativa. En particular, en relación a la filosofía de Hegel, señalamos a continuación la afirmación acerca de que lo absoluto es el todo, la concepción de que el saber actualiza una posibilidad de la realidad, de manera que la realidad sería menos real (no absoluta) sin el saber acerca de sí misma y la concepción de lo absoluto como sujeto. Una versión materializante no podría dar cuenta de estas notas, como no podría hacerlo tampoco una versión inmaterialista. Acerca de este punto véase John McDowell ((1998): 306-07) [6] En adelante nos referiremos a esta obra simplemente como Fenomenología. [7] Robert Pipin desarrolla esta idea ((Pipin 1999): 59). [8] Es esta idea de propósito la que permite otorgar sentido a muchos pasajes en los que Hegel se refiere a diferentes fenómenos (entidades o procesos) como siendo lo que no son (en el sentido de contener una orientación final que va más allá de sí mismos) y no siendo lo que son (no siendo meramente lo que puede constatarse acerca de los mismos por tener la orientación a trascender las determinaciones que pueden constatarse). Esta idea, leída en clave existencialista, influyó decididamente en la filosofía del siglo XX. (Ver (Kojève 1996): 13). Se reconoce en la misma, además, la herencia de la teoría aristotélica del acto y la potencia. [9] De acuerdo a la feliz expresión de Arthur Danto: \"La temprana obra maestra de Hegel, la Fenomenología del espíritu [Phänomenologie des Geistes], tiene la forma de Bildungsroman [novela de formación], en el sentido de que su héroe, Geist [espíritu], atraviesa una serie de etapas con el fin de alcanzar el conocimiento, no solamente sobre lo que es el conocimiento mismo, sino también, de tomar conciencia que su conocimiento podría ser vacío sin esa historia de contratiempos y entusiasmos inapropiados.\" ((Danto 1997): 27) [10] En este movimiento podemos observar cómo la filosofía hegeliana se toma en serio la idea de sustancia como \"existencia independiente\". La idea tradicional de sustancia es la de algo que existe por sí mismo. La sustancia se contrapone a los accidentes o atributos, que \"existen en otros\". Nunca nos encontramos con la blancura sino con cosas que son blancas. En consecuencia, decimos que la blancura \"existe en otro\". Ese \"otro\" en el que podemos encontrar la blancura, son individuos o sustancias. Esta distinción sustancia-accidente está modelada en la distinción gramatical entre sujeto y predicado. La reflexión hegeliana muestra que si reflexionamos sobre lo que puede ser \"realmente\" sustancia, es decir sobre lo que puede realmente existir por sí mismo, nos embarcamos en un proceso de reflexión que se orienta por unas exigencias que no pueden ser satisfechas más que por la realidad toda. [11] Zygmunt Bauman señala cómo esta idea hegeliana, en términos de \"la historia que tiende a comprender la historia\", fue definitoria para el pensamiento de Marx, Weber y Manheim. (Ver (Bauman 2002)) [12] Por ejemplo, Frederick Beiser (Beiser 1999a), Robert Pipin (Pipin 1999) y Robert Stern (Stern 2002) [13] Ver ((Guyer 1997) cap. 2) [14] Véase la nota 3. [15] Ivan Soll An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 48-49, (citado por (Ameriks 1985): 1) [16] Karl Ameriks analiza de las tres clases de críticas. (ver (Ameriks 1985)) [17] Ver ((Stern 2002): 39). Hegel ubica también a Locke como un representante de esta actitud. (ver (Hegel 2000): 66-67) [18] Las concepciones contemporáneas que definen a lo real como aquello que satisface una función semántica (la posición de Quine por ejemplo: \"ser es ser el valor de una variable\"), presentan un análogo interesante de esta separación. Si lo real es lo que satisface una función semántica, uno puede preguntarse, entonces, si las propias funciones semánticas son o no reales. [19] Paul Guyer ((Guyer 1999)) toma una línea de respuesta kantiana a Hegel que consiste en sostener que Hegel no propone una \"crítica interna\" de Kant, sino una crítica \"externa\". En consecuencia, Guyer cuestiona que la crítica de Hegel a Kant se dirija al mismo problema y deba juzgarse por los mismos estándares. De acuerdo a Guyer Hegel pone sus propias ideas al leer a Kant, algo que se explica por razones históricas, especialmente la lectura de Kant por Fichte, pero que no puede sostenerse desde un punto de vista sistemático. Con todo, Guyer reconoce que hay una verdad subyacente en la filosofía de Hegel: la creencia de que los principios que Kant considera necesarios son contingentes, históricamente contingentes. En este trabajo no consideraremos la posición de Guyer, básicamente porque ello implicaría una reorientación radical en los propósitos de nuestro trabajo hacia un trabajo erudito acerca de la correcta interpretación del pensamiento de Kant. Puede argumentarse, a favor de la opción presentada en nuestro trabajo, que la omisión de menciones explícitas a Kant de parte de Hegel responde a un propósito semejante al que llevó a Wittgenstein a comenzar sus Investigaciones filosóficas con una cita de Agustín en vez de con citas de Russell o Frege. De esta manera Wittgenstein se proponía discutir no teorías particulares sino la \"proto-teoría\", es decir el conjunto de presuposiciones, la 'Weltanschauung', que subyace a múltiples formulaciones teóricas. [20] Ver nota 3. [21] Puede ser útil considerar las palabras que utiliza Heidegger para esclarecer este difícil pasaje: \"La ciencia emerge como cualquier otro saber, Cierto que puede asegurar que ella es el conocimiento absoluto ante el que las demás representaciones tienen que desaparecer. Pero con semejantes manifestaciones lo único que consigue es ponerse en el mismo plano que las manifestaciones vacías del saber. Limitarse a asegurar que están ahí es algo que ellas también pueden hacer. Una manera de aseverar es tan estéril como la otra. La mera aseveración de algo no será lo que haga brotar la savia viva del saber verdadero. Ahora bien, la ciencia puede desmarcarse de otra manera frente a la manifestación vacía del saber, Podría remitir al hecho de que es ella misma ese saber que busca dentro de sí, sin saberlo, el saber no verdadero. La ciencia podría aparecer como eso verdadero que se presiente dentro de lo no verdadero. Pero con ello la ciencia caería nuevamente en la mera aseveración. Además, se reclamaría de un modo de aparición que no se adecua en nada a ella en su calidad de conocimiento absoluto. Que lo verdadero permanezca como meramente presentido es algo bien distinto de ser lo verdadero en sí y para sí.\" ((Heidegger 1994): 108). [22] El problema presentado aquí es semejante a la discusión de problema presentado por Wittgenstein acerca del lenguaje privado. Esto es cuando menos cierto, en mi opinión, cuando se considera la discusión clásica de este problema en las versiones de Norman Malcolm y Alfred Ayer (ver (Ayer 1979) y (Malcolm 1963)). La discusión esntre estos autores giraba alrededor de las secciones § 258 y § 265 de las Investigaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1999). Al final del § 258 Wittgenstein señalaba que la propuesta de una definición ostensiva interna como medio de darle significado a un signo acababe en la dificultad de que: \"Se querría decir aquí: es correcto lo que en cualquier caso me parezca correcto. Y esto sólo quiere decir que aquí no puede hablarse de 'correcto'\" y la interpretación clásica de Malcolm entendía que la solución a esta dificultad debía buscarse en § 265 \"pero la justificación consiste en apelar a una instancia independiente\". De acuerdo a esta interpretación clásica, las observaciones de Wittgenstein apuntan al hecho de que la evidencia subjetiva (parecer correcto, creer que es correcto) no puede proveer un estándar de corrección, mientras que una instancia pública puede proveer el requerido estándar, a lo que el crítico Ayer respondía que, si se fuera a poner en cuestión la capacidad de reconocer mis sensaciones, la apelación a un objeto público no podría serme de ayuda, ya que el reconocimiento de objetos públicos presupone dicha capacidad. No es sorprendente, en consecuencia, que Saul Kripke haya planteado su versión del argumento del lenguaje privado como una crítica inmanente de la noción de estándar de corrección concebido de acuerdo a los presupuestos del realismo clásico como condiciones de verdad. En su \"solución escéptica\", la elucidación de la distinción 'correcto-incorrecto' no se realizará como algo interno a la conciencia como en el caso de Hegel, pero sí, lo que tiene un sabor hegeliano, las \"condiciones de aseverabilidad\" o \"criterios\" que reintroducen la distinción 'correcto' e 'incorrecto' sólo pueden aplicarse \"para dar cuenta de las afirmaciones mismas sobre el significado considerándolas como aseveraciones dentro de nuestro lenguaje.\" (Kripke, 1989: 77) y no ya como una instancia independiente con la que las afirmaciones deberían compararse. [23] Debo reconocer mi deuda con la exposición de Stern (Stern 2002) aunque no arribo a las mismas conclusiones que este autor. [24] La \"conciencia natural\" es para Hegel una forma de conciencia que toma por verdadero lo que representa, directamente, sin tener conciencia de su actividad representadora. El paso al modernismo en arte, caracterizado por la búsqueda de representar pictóricamente los modos de representar el mundo propios de la pintura, constituye un abandono de la \"conciencia natural\" en arte, abandono que podría ser descripto, en términos hegelianos, como \"autoconciencia\". (ver (Danto 1997): 28-29) La conciencia natural es estudiada en la sección \"Conciencia\" de la Fenomenología del espíritu. Dicha sección consta de tres apartados, I La certeza sensible o el esto y la suposición; II La percepción y la cosa y la Ilusión; III Fuerza y entendimiento, fenómeno y mundo suprasensible. [25] Ver (Inwood 1992):179 [26] Ver (Hegel 1971): 71-81 \"La percepción o la cosa y la ilusión\" [27] Deseo agradecer las observaciones del Prof. Oscar Nudler y del Prof. Julio Moran al presente trabajo, como así también a los alumnos con quienes, primero en Introducción a la filosofía y luego en Filosofía contemporánea (UNLP), compartí el desafío de leer a Hegel. También las observaciones de mi amigo Guillermo Bianchi, que me han permitido salvar no pocas imprecisiones y errores. Una versión previa, reducida, de este trabajo apareció como \"Hegel y el problema del límite\" en una publicación vinculada a la cátedra de Introducción a la Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata: Moran, Julio César Los filósofos y los días, Escritos sobre conocimiento, arte y sociedad, La Plata, de la Campana, 2006, pp. 3760. Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegeliano", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "In Defense of Realism and Selectivism from Lyons's Objections Seungbae Park Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology The Republic of Korea Published in Foundations of Science Citation Info: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09614-7 pdf: https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s10699-019-096147?author_access_token=GR1iv5ifxXDxVCYPVF0Dfe4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY5OUAHdOKBAk3Ehy2LNVqAFd1fr7D77KDnKde_Crga CRwR87TwXg31QeUMp3d-0WY-WhJY1lta2e7TbszUQvsLKVAEwldJ-G_kHIV9ZZ82rg%3D%3D Abstract Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan's objection, and then argue that Lyons's formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true. Keywords Counterexample Formulation, Modus Tollens Formulation, No-Miracles Argument, Scientific Realism, Selectivism 1. Introduction What exactly does Hilary Putnam's (1975) scientific realism say? Is it justifiable for Timothy Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) to construe Larry Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens? What counts as a miracle in Putnam's (1975) no-miracles argument (NMA)? Is the selectivist explanation (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) of the success of theories tenable? Lyons, who has been a leading participant in the realism debate since the turn of the twenty-first century, defends his answers to these questions. His answers sound so convincing that once you are exposed to them, you would be tempted to think that realism and selectivism are beyond salvage. This paper, however, criticizes his answers and defends opposing answers. In Section 2, I present textual evidence concerning the NMA to show that realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful theories in science are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that \"most successful theories are (approximately) true\" (Parka, 2018: 55). In Section 3, I present textual evidence concerning Laudan's (1981) objection to realism with the intent of showing that he has not constructed the pessimistic induction, and that he has merely presented some historical counterexamples to refute the 2 categorical hypothesis. I also argue that it is otiose for Lyons to formulate Laudan's objection as a modus tollens. In Section 4, I argue that what counts as a miracle in the NMA is not that one successful theory in science is (completely) false, but rather that most successful theories in science are (completely) false. In Section 5, I argue that selectivists would assert not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true. In Section 6, I respond to reviewers' comments. In the end, all these sections are intended to show that realism and selectivism are immune to Lyons's objections. So this paper would be useful especially to those who are interested in what exactly realism and selectivism assert, and what objections would refute them. This paper does not attempt to refute Lyons's (2003, 2017, 2018) variant of surrealism (surrogate for realism). He has put it forward as an alternative to realism and selectivism. I only bring the reader's attention to the facts that Park (2014) has constructed the pessimistic induction against Lyons's form of surrealism, that Park (2016) has exposed intrinsic problems with surrealism in general, and Park (forthcoming: Section 5) has exposed intrinsic problems with Lyons' version of surrealism in particular. 2. The No-Miracles Argument Science is a successful enterprise in that it can explain and predict many phenomena. Putnam (1975: 73) considers two rivaling hypotheses explaining the success of theories in science. The first hypothesis holds that successful theories are mostly (approximately) true, and that no miracle has occurred. The second hypothesis holds that successful theories are mostly (completely) false, and that a miracle has occurred. A miracle is not a satisfactory explanans. Therefore, the first hypothesis best explains why science is successful. This is the famous NMA. Putnam puts it as follows: The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this formulation is due to Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories – these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific description of science and its relations to its objects. (Putnam, 1975: 73) What does realism say in the NMA? It says not that successful theories are guaranteed to be (approximately) true, but rather that they are typically (approximately) true. In other words, realism is not the categorical hypothesis but rather the statistical hypothesis (Magnus and Callender, 2014: 323; Mizrahi, 2013: 3224; Park, 2017a: 71). Thus, realism is not refuted even if some successful theories are (completely) false. Even if realism is the statistical hypothesis, it is a scientific hypothesis, and it can explain why some theories in science are successful. After all, as Carl Hempel (1966: 58–59) notes, many scientific hypotheses are statistical, and yet they can explain phenomena. What counts as a miracle in the NMA? The NMA says not that the success of a scientific theory would be a miracle if it were (radically) false, but rather that the success of theories in science would be a miracle if most of them were (radically) false. Thus, what counts as a miracle in the NMA is not that a (completely) false theory is successful, but rather that most successful theories are (completely) false. To put it differently, a miracle has occurred if and only if realism is false. In the following sections, readers will see that the NMA, construed in the manner stated above, is immune to both Laudan's objection and Lyons's objection, that Lyons has 3 misconstrued the NMA, and that his version of the NMA is stronger than Putnam's version of the NMA. 3. Laudan's Objection Laudan's (1981) objection to realism is simple and clear. It says that there are many historical counterexamples to the aforementioned categorical hypothesis. Laudan (1981: 33) presents his infamous list of obsolete theories, and then contends that \"there is no necessary connection between increasing the accuracy of our deep-structural characterizations of nature and improvements at the level of phenomenological explanations, predictions and manipulations\" (1981: 35). He concludes his paper by saying that realists' \"epistemology is confronted by anomalies which seem beyond its resources to grapple with\" (Laudan, 1981: 47–48). Two things about Laudan's objection are noteworthy. First, it takes realism as asserting not that success and truth are reliably connected with each other, but rather that they are necessarily connected with each other. In other words, it takes realism to be not the statistical hypothesis but rather the categorical hypothesis. Second, his purpose of providing the infamous list is not to construct the pessimistic induction but rather to confute the categorical hypothesis. To use an analogy, he presents some black swans to refute the categorical statement that all swans are white. Laudan's objection differs significantly from the pessimistic induction. The latter claims that \"we are in the midst of an ongoing historical process in which our theoretical conceptions of nature will continue to change just as profoundly and fundamentally as they have in the past\" (Stanford, 2015: 875). Note that it predicts that present theories will be abandoned. By contrast, Laudan's objection is silent about whether they will be abandoned. Many writers, however, do not distinguish between Laudan's objection and the pessimistic induction, attributing the pessimistic induction to Laudan (1981). They are Philip Kitcher (1993: 149), Jarrett Leplin (1997: 137), Markus Eronon (2017), Peter Vickers (2017: 3221), and Jeffrey Seeman (2018: 3). To reiterate, the pessimistic induction cannot be found in Laudan (1981).1 Why is it important to distinguish between Laudan's objection and the pessimistic induction? Laudan's objection is compatible with the statistical hypothesis, while the pessimistic induction is not. Laudan's objection says that some successful theories are (radically) false, whereas the pessimistic induction says that most successful theories are (radically) false. Obviously, the latter clashes with the statistical hypothesis, whereas the former does not. To use an analogy, the statement that most swans are black conflicts with the statement that most swans are white, whereas the statement that some swans are black does not. Thus, if antirealists wish to reject realism, they should not settle for Laudan's objection, but they should rather go for the pessimistic induction. I argued above that Laudan presents some historical counterexamples to refute the categorical hypothesis. Let me call this formulation of Laudan's objection the counterexample formulation. Lyons, however, presents a different formulation of Laudan's objection. He claims that Laudan's objection can be properly formulated as the following modus tollens: 1 It can be found elsewhere, where Laudan says, \"Most of the past theories of science are already suspected of being false; there is presumably every reason to anticipate that current theories of science will suffer a similar fate\" (1977: 126). 4 1. If (a) that realist meta-hypothesis were true, then (b) we would have no successful theories that cannot be approximately true. (If we did, each would be a \"miracle,\" which no one of us accepts.) 2. However, (not-b) we do have successful theories that cannot be approximately true: the list (of \"miracles\"). 3. Therefore, (not-a) the realist meta-hypothesis is false. (And the no-miracles argument put forward to justify that meta-hypothesis is unacceptable.) (Lyons, 2016: 566) To put it simply, if realism were true, no successful theory is (completely) false. But some successful theories were (completely) false. Therefore, realism is false.2 Lyons (2003: 898, 2016: 566, 2017: 7, 2018: 146) continues to present this formulation of Laudan's objection in the literature. Let me call it the modus tollens formulation. The modus tollens formulation and the counterexample formulation mentioned above are different formulations of the same objection to realism, viz., Laudan's objection. What are we to make of the modus tollens formulation? Admittedly, it captures Laudan's objection. Such a formulation, however, is supererogatory. Laudan has presented not the modus tollens formulation but rather the counterexample formulation as we have seen above. More importantly, the counterexample formulation is shorter, simpler, and clearer than the modus tollens formulation. We should not complicate an idea beyond necessity, i.e., without a theoretical gain. Suppose that one presents some black swans to refute the categorical statement that all swans are white. Of course, this objection can be reconstructed as the following modus tollens. If all swans are white, there would be no black swans. But there are some black swans. Therefore, it is false that all swans are white. Such a reconstruction, however, is gratuitous because it is longer, more complicated, and less clear than the formulation that there are some counterexamples, viz., some black swans, to the categorical statement that all swans are white. There is no need to complicate the objection by reconstructing it as the modus tollens. Similarly, there is no need for Lyons to complicate Laudan's objection by reconstructing it as the modus tollens. Lyons might retort that the modus tollens formulation has a theoretical advantage over the pessimistic induction. The advantage is that the former gets around many realist objections to the latter. For example, many realists object that present theories are superior to their predecessors, so the former might not be abandoned, although the latter were abandoned (Musgrave, 1985; Leplin, 1997; Doppelt, 2007, 2011, 2014; Saatsi, 2009; Fahrbach, 2011a, 2011b; Devitt, 2011; Park, 2011; Mizrahi, 2013). This criticism against the pessimistic induction does not apply to the modus tollens formulation. After all, even if presently accepted theories have empirically improved upon their forerunners, their forerunners are still counterexamples to the categorical hypothesis. This defense of the modus tollens formulation, however, misses the point of my objection to it. I am saying not that the modus tollens formulation has no theoretical advantage over the pessimistic induction, but rather that the modus tollens formulation has no theoretical advantage over the counterexample formulation. Lyons (2003, 2016, 2017, 2018) does not attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the modus tollens formulation over the counterexample formulation. He merely states that the modus tollens formulation is proper, and proposes that we construe Laudan's objection as a modus tollens. Admittedly, the modus tollens formulation is proper in that it captures Laudan's objection. The counterexample 2 Since Laudan's objection can be formulated as a modus tollens, it is inadequate to call it the pessimistic metainduction (Park, 2019a: Subsection 4.3) 5 formulation, however, is also proper in that very sense. I argued above that the counterexample formulation of Laudan's objection does not confute realism. What about the modus tollens formulation? It does not refute realism either. The first premise of the modus tollens above is false. In other words, it is false that if realism were true, no successful theory is (completely) false. As we have already noted, the statistical hypothesis allows for some successful theories to be (completely) false. Since the first premise is false, the modus tollens is not sound and does not have the force to refute realism. 4. Miracles I argued above that realism is not the categorical hypothesis but rather the statistical hypothesis. Lyons, however, has anticipated this critical response to his objection to realism. He says that realists might advance what he calls the statistical meta-hypothesis that \"predictively successful theories are statistically likely to be approximately true\" (Lyons, 2016: 572). However, he objects that the statistical meta-hypothesis has the following two problems: \"Not only would a retreat to this statistical meta-hypothesis diminish (but not eliminate) the testability of the realist meta-hypothesis; it would also wholly concede to miracles and to a failure on the part of the realist to explain successful theories\" (Lyons, 2016: 572). What are we to make of these two criticisms against the statistical hypothesis? First of all, the statistical hypothesis coincides with realism in the NMA. So even if realists embrace the statistical hypothesis over the categorical hypothesis, they have not made any retreat. They are rather sticking to their original position. Lyons thinks that endorsing the statistical hypothesis is a retreat because he has stretched realism. How about Lyons's criticism that the statistical hypothesis is less testable than the categorical hypothesis? Admittedly, the statistical hypothesis is less refutable than the categorical hypothesis, given that some successful (completely) false theories do not refute the statistical hypothesis, though they refute the categorical hypothesis. This does not mean, however, that the statistical hypothesis is unfalsifiable. There are two ways for antirealists to falsify the statistical hypothesis. First, they might randomly select some successful theories from the set of past and present theories, and then show that most of the selected theories are (completely) false. If they accomplish this feat, realists would be happy to admit that realism is falsified. Of course, accomplishing this task is much more difficult than merely providing some successful theories from the history of science. This does not mean, however, that realism is not falsifiable. It only means that antirealists would have to work harder than Laudan and Lyons do. Second, antirealists might establish the pessimistic induction. If it is cogent, then past, present, and future theories are likely to be (completely) false, and hence realism is falsified. If, however, antirealists take this route to refute realism, they would have to overcome all the criticisms that realists have raised against the pessimistic induction over the past several decades.3 How about Lyons's criticism that the statistical hypothesis concedes to miracles? Evaluating this criticism requires that we ponder what counts as a miracle under Lyons's criticism. Lyons's criticism presupposes that if one successful theory is (completely) false, we have a miracle, and that if two successful theories are (completely) false, we have two miracles, and so on. This interpretation of the NMA, however, is incorrect. Putnam has never stated that the number of miracles is the same as the number of successful (completely) false theories. As we noted earlier, he rather states that a miracle has occurred when most 3 See Park (2018b: 15) for a summary of all those criticisms. 6 successful theories in science are (completely) false. Suppose that there are one hundred successful theories in science, and that ninety of them are (completely) false. In such a case, Putnam would be happy to admit that a miracle has occurred. What if ten of them are (completely) false? In such a case, he would not say that a miracle has occurred, let alone that ten miracles occurred. Therefore, it is the straw man fallacy for Lyons to say that the statistical hypothesis concedes to miracles. 5. Selectivism In this section, I introduce selectivism and Lyons's objection to it. I then argue that Lyons's objection to it fails in the way that his objection to realism fails. Selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) holds that we should be selective about different components of theories. Some components, which are called working assumptions, are deployed to generate the success of theories, while other components, which are called idle assumptions, are not. Working assumptions survive scientific revolutions while the idle assumptions do not. So the working assumptions are credible, while the idle assumptions are not. Different selectivists identify different theoretical constituents as working assumptions (Lyons, 2017: 13). Selectivism is generally regarded as a form of realism in the literature. So many readers of this paper would wonder what the differences between realism (Putnam, 1975) and selectivism are. The fundamental difference between them is that realism denies, while selectivism affirms, that successful current theories will undergo scientific revolutions (Park, 2017a: 65, 2017b: 98–99, 2018a: 60–61, 2019b: 94; Stanford, 2018: 79). In other words, realism asserts that they will at most be slightly modified, whereas selectivism asserts, as pessimism does, that they will be replaced by alternatives. Selectivists might object that it is a mistake for me to contrast realism with selectivism. As countless writers have indicated over the years, selectivism is an approach to realism, not a competitor.4 I insist, however, that selectivism is not a variant of realism. Selectivism lies somewhere between realism and pessimism. No selectivist has yet responded to Stanford's (2015) criticism that there is no substantive difference between selectivism and pessimism. What is his criticism? Selectivists claim, for example, that the oxygen theory is approximately true on the grounds that it will share working assumptions with its successor, just as the phlogiston theory shares working assumptions with the oxygen theory. By contrast, pessimists deny that the oxygen theory is approximately true on the grounds that its successor will radically and profoundly differ from it, just as the oxygen theory radically and profoundly differs from the phlogiston theory. According to Stanford, the difference between pessimism and selectivism \"is simply a difference of style or taste in applying the expression 'approximately true' rather than a substantive disagreement between them\" (Stanford, 2015: 875). This remark implies that it is a matter of taste to choose selectivism over pessimism or vice versa. Stanford proposes that realists and pessimists debate over whether there will be scientific revolutions or not, instead of debating over whether theories are approximately true or not. On his account, the substantive debate between realists and pessimists becomes merely terminological, if realists retreat to selectivism. I am persuaded of Stanford's foregoing observation of the difference between selectivism and pessimism. Let me add that many writers have developed various positions in 4 I thank a reviewer for this objection. 7 the literature under the assumption that current theories will be overturned, viz., selective realism, structural realism, and minimal realism (Saatsi, 2015), to name a few. The 'realism' label is attached to these positions. They, however, are committed so little to the claims of science that they do not deserve the label. 'Selectivism,' 'structuralism,' and 'minimalism' are more accurate names than 'selective realism,' 'structural realism,' and 'minimal realism,' respectively. In my view, only the position stated in the no-miracles argument deserves the 'realism' label, and some participants in the realism debate need to defend this old-fashioned position for the sake of a substantive debate between them and pessimists. Let me turn to Lyons's critical response to selectivism. He rejects the selectivist explanation of the success of theories by providing historical counterexamples, i.e., by providing some (completely) false working assumptions from the history of science. He formulates this objection as the following modus tollens: 1. If (a) the realist meta-hypothesis were true, then (b) none of the constituents genuinely deployed toward successes would be such that they cannot be approximately true. (If they were, on the realist's no-miracles argument, such constituents would constitute \"miracles\" which no one of us accepts.) 2. However, (not-b) we do find constituents genuinely deployed toward success that cannot be approximately true: the list (of \"miracles\"). 3. Therefore, (not-a) the realist meta-hypothesis is false. (And the no-miracles argument put forward to justify that meta-hypothesis is unacceptable.) (Lyons, 2017: 7). The second premise is a crucial one. In order to justify it, Lyons provides some historical examples of theoretical assumptions that he thinks were deployed to generate success but nonetheless were not even approximately true. For example, Newton deployed the theoretical assumption that \"objects have an innate force, that there are only two point-mass objects in the universe, the sun and a planet\" (Lyons, 2017: 3). What would selectivists say in response? They might argue that it is debatable whether the assumptions that Lyons mentions are working or idle ones, or whether they are not even approximately true or not. Lyons would probably reply that the distinction between working and idle assumptions is not clear, and that it would stretch the notion of approximate truth to apply it to those assumptions. This paper does not jump into this debate between selectivists and Lyons because it is also a matter of taste whether we apply 'approximately true' to those assumptions or not, as Stanford (2015: 875) would point out. Moreover, it would be supererogatory for selectivists to jump into the debate, provided that they contend that most working assumptions are (approximately) true. This statistical hypothesis is compatible with the existence of Lyons's historical examples. Lyons, however, anticipates this move and then says that the selectivists' statistical hypothesis competes with the opposite statistical hypothesis that working assumptions are \"statistically unlikely to be approximately true\" (Lyons, 2017: 10). Simply put, the opposite statistical hypothesis says that most working assumptions are (completely) false. Lyons is right on this count. Selectivists (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) have some historical examples supporting their statistical hypothesis. Lyons (2017), however, also has some historical examples supporting his opposite statistical hypothesis. Both selectivists and Lyons need to show that their hypothesis is more likely to be true than the other. Lyons does not attempt to show that his opposite statistical hypothesis is more likely to be true than the selectivists' statistical hypothesis. In this context, selectivists can appeal to historical optimism (Fahrbach, 2011a, 2011b; Park, 2011; Mizrahi, 2013, 2015, 2016). Historical optimism distinguishes between distant and recent past theories. To take an example, the phlogiston theory is a distant past theory, 8 and the oxygen theory is a recent past theory. The oxygen theory is a recent past theory because it was accepted in the twentieth century, although it can also be classified as a present theory. According to historical optimism, the number of recent past theories is far larger than that of distant past theories. Moti Mizrahi (2013, 2016) randomly picks some samples from the set of past theories and argues that most past theories are recent past theories and are not abandoned yet. Thus, historical optimism supports the statistical hypothesis and undercuts Lyons's opposite statistical hypothesis. 6. Objections and Replies My strategy to Laudan's (1980: 33) list of obsolete theories is different from that of Stathis Psillos (1999), Vickers (2017), and Mario Alai (2018). The differences between my strategy and their strategy need to be explicitly stated.5 Psillos, Vickers, and Alai are all selectivists. They look into the components of discarded past theories, emphasizing that their working assumptions were preserved in their successors. By contrast, I look into the ratio of discarded past theories to retained past theories, emphasizing that the ratio is low enough for realism. My strategy is incompatible with selectivists' prediction that present theories will succumb to scientific revolutions, but compatible with their historical contention that the working constituents of discarded past theories were preserved in current theories. I do not reject the latter, although I reject the former. Objectors might say that I made a big fuss about realism not asserting that successful theories are guaranteed to be true but rather asserting that they are typically true. This is, however, a well-known fact about realism even if it is occasionally forgotten. It is encapsulated in the statement that the inference from success to (approximate) truth is not deductive but rather inductive, in Laudan's statement that the success of science \"provides striking empirical confirmation for realism\" (Laudan, 1981: 21), and in his other statement that realism \"explains the fact that science is successful\" (Laudan, 1981: 22).6 This objection fails to see that the inference from \"some\" to \"all\" as well as the inference from \"some\" to \"most\" is inductive. Thus, it might be the categorical hypothesis that is encapsulated in the statement that the inference from success to (approximate) truth is not deductive but rather inductive. In addition, the observation of some red apples confirms that all apples are red as well as that most apples are red. Thus, it might be the categorical hypothesis that is encapsulated in Laudan's statement that the success of science \"provides striking empirical confirmation for realism\" (Laudan, 1981: 21). Also, an empirical fact can be explained not only by a statistical hypothesis but also by a categorical hypothesis. Thus, it might be the categorical hypothesis that is encapsulated in Laudan's statement that realism \"explains the fact that science is successful\" (Laudan, 1981: 22). In short, the three statements are neutral as to whether realism is the statistical hypothesis or the categorical hypothesis. 7. Conclusion The NMA defines realism not as the categorical hypothesis but rather as the statistical hypothesis, and states that we have a miracle not when a successful theory is (completely) false, but rather when most successful theories are (completely) false. It is otiose for Lyons to 5 I thank a reviewer for this request. 6 I thank two reviewers for this objection. 9 formulate Laudan's objection to realism as a modus tollens, given that the counterexample formulation is shorter, simpler, clearer, and closer to Laudan's language than the modus tollens formulation is. Selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true. Moreover, they can appeal to historical optimism to justify their statistical hypothesis and to undermine Lyons's opposite statistical hypothesis. In sum, realism and selectivism remain unscathed vis-à-vis Lyons's objections. Let me finish this paper with two mottos: \"Don't complicate an idea beyond necessity.\" \"Don't' stretch a target.\" References Alai, Mario (2018). \"How Deployment Realism Withstands Doppelt's Criticisms\", Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9 (1): 122– 135. Devitt, Michael (2011). \"Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?\", Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2): 285–293. Doppelt, Gerald (2007). \"Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Metainduction\", Philosophy of Science 74 (1): 96–118. ---------- (2011). \"From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism\", Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2): 295–316. ---------- (2014). \"Best Theory Scientific Realism\", European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2): 271–291. Eronen, Markus. (2017). \"Robust Realism for the Life Sciences\", Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1542-5. Fahrbach, Ludwig (2011a). \"How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change\", Synthese 180 (2): 139–155. ---------- (2011b). \"Theory Change and Degrees of Success\", Philosophy of Science 78 (5): 1283–1292. Hempel, Carl (1966). Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Kitcher, Philip (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press. Laudan, Larry (1977). Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. California: University of California Press. ---------- (1981). \"A Confutation of Convergent Realism\", Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 19– 49. Leplin, Jarrett (1997). A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 10 Lyons, Timothy (2003). \"Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory\", Philosophy of Science 70 (5): 891–901. ---------- (2016). \"Scientific Realism\", In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York: Oxford University Press: 564–584. ---------- (2017). \"Epistemic Selectivity, Historical Threats, and the Non-Epistemic Tenets of Scientific Realism\", Synthese 194 (9): 3203–3219. ---------- (2018). \"Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism\", Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9 (1): 146–150. Magnus, P. D. and Craig Callender (2004). \"Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy\", Philosophy of Science 71 (3): 320–338. Mizrahi, Moti (2013). \"The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far\", Synthese 190 (15): 3209–3226. ---------- (2015). \"Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking\", International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2): 129–148. ---------- (2016). \"The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers' Myth\", International Studies in Philosophy of Science 30 (3): 263–278. Musgrave, Alan (1985). \"Realism vs. Constructive Empiricism\", In Paul M. Churchland & Clifford A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Park, Seungbae (2011). \"A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction\", Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1): 75–84. ---------- (2014). \"A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism\", Organon F 21 (1): 3–21. ---------- (2016). \"Realism Versus Surrealism\", Foundations of Science 21 (4): 603–614. ---------- (2017a). \"On Treating Past and Present Scientific Theories Differently\", Kriterion 31 (1): 63–75. ---------- (2017b). \"Selective Realism vs. Individual Realism for Scientific Creativity\", Creativity Studies 10 (1): 97–107. ---------- (2018a). \"Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods\", Axiomathes 28 (1): 53–62. ---------- (2018b). \"The Grand Pessimistic Induction\", Review of Contemporary Philosophy 17: 7–19. ---------- (2019a). \"New Objections to the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives\", Filosofia 11 Unisinos 20 (2): (to be assigned). ---------- (2019b). \"Optimistic Realism over Selectivism\", Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 89–106. ---------- (forthcoming). \"Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism\", Acta Analytica. Psillos, Stathis (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. New York: Routledge. Putnam, Hilary (1975). Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Saatsi, Juha (2009). \"Grasping at Realist Straws\", Review Symposium, Metascience 18: 355– 362. ---------- (2015). \"Historical Inductions, Old and New\", Synthese. DOI:10.1007/s11229-0150855-5. Seeman, Jeffrey (2018). \"From 'Multiple Simultaneous Independent Discoveries' to the Theory of 'Multiple Simultaneous Independent Errors': A Conduit in Science\", Foundations of Chemistry. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-018-9304-0. Stanford, P. Kyle (2015). \"Catastrophism, Uniformitarianism, and a Scientific Realism Debate That Makes a Difference\", Philosophy of Science 82 (5): 867–878. ---------- (2018). \"A Fond Farewell to 'Approximate Truth'?\", Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9 (1): 78–91. Vickers, Peter (2017). \"Understanding the Selective Realist Defence against the PMI\", Synthese 194 (9): 3221–3232.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 1 Reformulation of Dirac's theory of electron to avoid negative energy or negative time solution Biswaranjan Dikshit Laser and Plasma Technology Division Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai-400085, INDIA Email address: bdikshit73@yahoo.co.in ABSTRACT Dirac's relativistic theory of electron generally results in two possible solutions, one with positive energy and other with negative energy. Although positive energy solutions accurately represented particles such as electrons, interpretation of negative energy solution became very much controversial in the last century. By assuming the vacuum to be completely filled with a sea of negative energy electrons, Dirac tried to avoid natural transition of electron from positive to negative energy state using Pauli's exclusion principle. However, many scientists like Bohr objected to the idea of sea of electrons as it indicates infinite density of charge and electric field and consequently infinite energy. In addition, till date, there is no experimental evidence of a particle whose total energy (kinetic plus rest) is negative. In an alternative approach, Feynman, in quantum field theory, proposed that particles with negative energy are actually positive energy particles running backwards in time. This was mathematically consistent since quantum mechanical energy operator contains time in denominator and the negative sign of energy can be absorbed in it. However, concept of negative time is logically inconsistent since in this case, effect happens before the cause. To avoid above contradictions, in this paper, we try to reformulate the Dirac's theory of electron so that neither energy needs to be negative nor the time is required to be negative. Still, in this new formulation, two different possible solutions exist for particles and antiparticles (electrons and positrons). Keywords Dirac's theory of electron, Negative energy, Negative time, Antiparticles INTRODUCTION In an effort to explain the fine (doublet) structure in hydrogen atomic spectra, Pauli introduced the idea of spin ( 2/h± ) which was just a hypothesis to explain the experimental results. Then came the Dirac's rela9vis9c theory of electron [1] in which spin of electron naturally came into picture with a solid mathematical justification and gyro-magnetic factor (g=2) could be successfully predicted. Dirac's theory however resulted in two possible solutions, one with positive total energy and other with negative total energy [2] (note that total energy here refers to kinetic plus rest energy). Although positive energy solutions accurately represented particles such as electrons, interpretation of negative energy solution became very much controversial in the last century [3-4]. By assuming the vacuum to be completely filled with a sea of negative energy electrons, Dirac tried to avoid natural transition of electron from positive to negative energy state using Pauli's exclusion principle. During pair production, an electron in sea of negative energy electrons is excited to positive energy state creating a hole in the sea. Dirac interpreted that since a hole or absence of a negative energy and negatively charged electron in space is equivalent to presence of a positive energy and positively charged particle, this hole acts as positron which was later experimentally detected. However, many scien9sts like Bohr [3] objected to the idea of sea of electrons as it indicates infinite density of charge and electric field and consequently infinite energy. In addition, till date, there is no experimental evidence of a particle whose total energy (kinetic plus IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 2 rest) is negative. In an alternative approach, Feynman while formulating quantum field theory, proposed that particles with negative energy are actually positive energy particles running backwards in 9me [5-6]. This was mathematically consistent since quantum mechanical total energy operator ( t iE ∂ ∂= h ) contains change in time in denominator and the negative sign of energy can be absorbed in it. However, concept of negative time is logically inconsistent since in this case effect has to happen before the cause violating the principle of causality. In an another recent attempt, Trubenbacher [7] assigned a new quantum mechanical operator sgn for the property \"sign of particle charge\" and assumed from beginning of derivation that energy is given by ratio of Dirac Hamiltonian operator and sgn operator. However, in our opinion, this assumption is arbitrary and also if \"sign of particle charge\" is taken to be an operator having eigen values σ = ±1, quantum mechanics must allow the electron to be in a mixed state so that in some measurement it should act as electron and sometimes it should act as positron. But this uncertainty of charge has never been experimentally observed. Although some experts working in the field for long might be habituated with these inconsistencies, a student or a new learner certainly becomes uncomfortable with the idea that energy is negative or time is negative. Therefore to avoid above contradictions, in this paper, we try to reformulate the Dirac's theory of electron so that neither energy needs to be negative nor the time is required to be negative. Still, in this new formulation, two different possible solutions exist for particles and antiparticles (electrons and positrons). A NEW APPROACH IN DIRAC'S THEORY OF ELECTRON In the Einstein's relativistic expression for total energy relating the numerical values of momentum and energy, we can just keep the positive sign before square root ( 4222 cmpcE ++= ) and ignore the negative sign due to physical impossibility of negative total energy (kinetic + rest) since neither kinetic energy nor rest energy can become negative. However, in quantum mechanics, all possible solutions of the Hamiltonian equa9on have to be considered [6, 8] as all of them together constitute a complete set generating the Hilbert space. So, numbers corresponding to each solution must be physically realizable. In this sense, when both positive and negative values for energy of electron came out in solution of Dirac equation, he had to take both the values as physically possible. This ultimately motivated him to bring the hypothesis of sea of negative energy electrons. But in this section, we will see that two possibilities don't appear for energy, rather it appears for some other property of the particle identified in this paper. In quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, we generally start from a wave representation of a particle. Interestingly, it has been pointed out by Hobson [9] that there are no par9cles in nature, there are only fields (or waves) although these fields interact with other objects at a point in space. In general, such a propagating wave can be represented as, )( Etpx i Ae − = hψ (1) In Eq. (1) we can calculate the wave velocity by, ConstantEtpx =− (for a specified point in wave pattern) So, Wave velocity = p E dt dx w == Thus, if Eq. (1) represents an electron of momentum p and positive energy E, its wave velocity 'w' is in same direction as momentum p. Now, if we want to find out the wave equation of a positron of same momentum p and energy E, then only property that can be different is the wave velocity which can be opposite to its own momentum i.e. p E dt dx w −== . In that case, propagating wave representing a positron must be, )( Etpx i Ae + = hψ (2) So, the generalized expression for propagating wave representing any particle or antiparticle (electron or positron) can be written as, )( Etpx i Ae ± = hψ Or )( μEtpx i Ae − = hψ (3) Where 1±=μ is a property of particle representing the orientation of the wave velocity with respect to its momentum. If it is +1, then wave velocity is in direc9on of momentum and if it is -1, then wave velocity is in opposite direction of momentum. We will call μ in short as \"wave velocity orientation\" and it is a constant number for a specific particle (Not an eigen value of some quantum mechanical operator). Now using Eq. (3), we can find the energy operator and momentum operator. IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 3 ψ μ ψ μ μ μ EAeE t Ae i t i Etpx i Etpx i =      = ∂       ∂ = ∂ ∂ − − )( )( h h hh Thus energy operator is, t i E ∂ ∂ μ = h (4) Similarly, we can show from Eq. (3) that momentum operator remains same as conventional expression i.e. ∇−= hip (5) Relativistic energy equation is given by, 42222 cmpcE += (6) Where, m is rest mass. If we put total energy operator ( )Ê and momentum operator ( )p in above equation, we get a differential equation which is second order in space and time. However, for a determined evolution of wave function with time, the differential equation for wave function needs to be first order in time. So, we have to write the right hand side as a perfect square so that exponent from both sides can be cancelled. This is possible by writing, 224222 ).( mcpccmpc βα +=+ rr (7) Where       = 0 0 σ σ α r r v and       − = I I 0 0 β , σr is made up of three Pauli matrix,       = 01 10 xσ ,       − = 0 0 i i yσ and       − = 10 01 zσ I is identity matrix,       = 10 01 I From Eq. (6) and (7) and since 12 =μ , we can write, 2222 ).( mcpcE βαμ += rr Or ).( 2mcpcE βαμ += rr Writing quantum mechanical operators from Eq. (4) and (5) in place of energy and momentum in above equation, Or ψβαμ ψ μ ).( 2mcci t i +∇−= ∂ ∂ r h h As 12 =μ , above equation reduces to original Dirac equation i.e. ψβαψ ).( 2mcci t i +∇−= ∂ ∂ r hh (8) Now let us solve the Dirac equation. Since the operator on right side of Eq. (8) is a 4×4 matrix, wave func9on ψ is a four-component Dirac spinor. From Eq. (3), if we separate space and time dependent part, solution should be of the form, Et i ertr μ ψψ h − = )(),( Putting the above general solu9on in Eq. (8), we get, )().()( 2 rmccirE ψβαψμ +∇−= rh (9) For a free particle of specified momentum p, wave function ψ(r) will be of the form, pr i er h      = φ χ ψ )( Where χ and φ are each two-component spinors. Putting this and values of α and β in Eq. (9), 0 . . 2 2 =            +− −− φ χ μσ σμ mcEpc pcmcE rr rr (10) Solving the above matrix equation, we get, φ μ σχ 2 . mcE pc − = rr and χ μ σφ 2 . mcE pc + = rr Using above in Eq. (10), 0).())(( 2222 =−+− χσχμμ pcmcEmcE rr Since we know, 22).( pp =σ rr IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 4 0])()[( 22222 =−− χμ pcmcE As the wave function has to be non-zero, quantity in bracket must be zero. So, we get, pcmcE 222 )( +±=μ (11) It is to be noted that in Eq. (11) we have taken both the signs i.e. positive and negative. Still, in both the cases, energy can be always positive as μ can be +1 or -1 to keep energy positive. Thus we have been able to generate two possible solutions without requirement of negative energy. In place of energy, now the property called μ i.e. \"wave velocity orientation\" with respect to the momentum has become positive or negative to account for electrons (particles) and positrons (antiparticles). Now the question comes why an antiparticle (e.g. positron) has opposite charge compared to that of particle (e.g. electron). The answer is as follows. For particle, μ = +1 and for an9par9cle, μ = -1. If we put these μ values in Eq. (3), 9me dependent part becomes Et i Ae h − for particle and Et i Ae h + for antiparticle. Because of opposite sign in time evolution part in states of particle and antiparticle, dynamics of antiparticle becomes opposite to that of particle. But, since charge of an object is conventionally inferred by its sequence of events (for example trajectory of electron or positron), we attribute the opposite dynamics of particle and antiparticle to their (assumed) opposite charges. However, it is truly due to the value of 'μ' i.e. wave velocity orienta9on which may be +1 or -1. In his original formulation, by ignoring 'μ', Dirac had unknowingly included its' value (-1) in energy of antiparticle and so, got the problem of negative energy. Feynman and quantum field theory include the value of 'μ' in time and so, problem of negative time arises. But, we have shown that we can avoid both the problems of negative energy or negative time if we recognize and retain the parameter 'μ' i.e. wave velocity orientation in generalized wave function. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have reformulated the Dirac's theory of electron so that neither total energy (i.e. kinetic plus rest) nor time becomes negative for the case of antiparticles (e.g. positrons). We have found a new parameter (μ) in wave function of the particle i.e. \"wave velocity orientation\" with respect the particle's momentum which becomes +1 or -1 genera9ng two different solutions corresponding to particles and antiparticles. By avoiding the negative energy solution in our approach, we can escape from the problems of sea of electrons hypothesized by Dirac which leads to infinite charge density. Similarly, by avoiding the idea of negative time, we can preserve the principle of causality in modern physics. REFERENCES [1] P A M Dirac, 1928, \"The Quantum Theory of the Electron\", Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A, 117, 610-624 [2] P A M Dirac, 1930, \"A Theory of Electrons and Protons\", Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A, 126, 360-365 [3] Donald Franklin Moyer, 1981, \"Evaluations of Dirac's electron, 1928-1932\", Am. J. Phys. 49 (11), 1055-1062 [4] J R Oppenheimer, 1930, \"On the Theory of Electrons and Protons\", Physical Review A, 35, 562-563 [5] R P Feynman, 1949, \"The Theory of Positrons\", Physical Review A, 76 (6), 749 [6] David Griffiths, 2008, Introduction to Elementary particles, (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag), p 230 [7] E Trubenbacher, 2010, \"Theory of Dirac Equation without negative energies\", Electronic Journal of Theoretical Physics, 7 (23), 355-382 [8] Victor F Weisskopf, 1949, \"Recent developments in the theory of the electron\", Reviews of Modern Physics, 21(2), 305-315 [9] Art Hobson, 2013, \"There are no particles, there are only fields\", Am. J. Phys., 81(3), 211-", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "SELF-MOVEMENT AND NATURAL NORMATIVITY: KEEPING AGENTS IN THE CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy By Matthew R. McAdam, B.A. Washington, DC October 16, 2007 Copyright 2007 by Matthew R. McAdam All Rights Reserved ii Self-Movement and Natural Normativity: Keeping Agents in the Causal Theory of Action Matthew R. McAdam, B.A. Thesis Advisors: Wayne A. Davis, Ph.D. & Margaret O. Little, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Most contemporary philosophers of action accept Aristotle's view that actions involve movements generated by an internal cause. This is reflected in the wide support enjoyed by the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), according to which actions are bodily movements caused by mental states. Some critics argue that CTA suffers from the Problem of Disappearing Agents (PDA), the complaint that CTA excludes agents because it reduces them to mere passive arenas in which certain events and processes take place. Extant treatments of PDA, most notably those of Michael Bratman and David Velleman, interpret the problem as a challenge to CTA's ability to capture the role of rational capacities like deliberation and reflection in the etiology of human action. I argue that PDA admits of another interpretation, one that arises when we appreciate that the exercise of higher rational capacities in action presupposes possession of a prior lower-level capacity for basic self-movement – the power to initiate and control one's bodily behavior. Bolstering CTA so that it accommodates richer exercises of practical thought – as Bratman and Velleman do iii – will not resolve PDA unless CTA already captures this basic agential power. Adequately responding to PDA, therefore, requires answering a question unaddressed by current responses: How do bodily movements caused by sub-agential items like mental states count as movements actively performed by the whole agent? I argue that CTA can answer this question by adopting a normative account of the nature of self-moving agents. On this view, self-moving agents are teleologically constituted, meaning (1) their nature and proper function derives from their characteristic ends and aims, and (2) the nature and proper function of their parts depend on these ends and aims. Basic self-movement consists of movements caused by a sub-agential part whose own proper function is to generate behavior that constitutes or contributes to the pursuit of the agent's overall proper function. After showing how this picture applies to artifactual and collective agents (i.e., robots and teams), I extend the account to organic agents (human beings) by sketching a broadly Aristotelian picture of the nature of living things. iv To Cheryl v TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 0.1 The Causal Theory of Action (CTA) 0.2 The Problem of Disappearing Agents (PDA) 0.3 An Initial Objection 0.4 A Sketch of the Argument The Causal Theory of Action ONE 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The Causal Theory of Action (CTA) 1.3 The Naturalist Background to CTA 1.4 Davidson's Defense of CTA 1.5 An Ambiguity in 'Causal Theory of Action' 1.6 The Problem of Disappearing Agents (PDA) Introduced 1.7 Conclusion The Problem of Disappearing Agents TWO 2.1 Taking An Active Part? 2.2 Two Important Distinctions 2.3 Current Approaches to PDA 2.3.1 Frankfurt 2.3.2 Bratman & Velleman 2.4 The Two Distinctions Revisited 2.5 CTA & Basic Self-Movement 2.6 Looking Forward vi Self-Movement & Constitutive Teleology THREE 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Standard Story of Self-Movement 3.3 The Proper Cause of Self-Movement 3.4 Bodily Movements vs. Behavior 3.5 Why Some Behavior Counts as Self-Movement 3.6 Constitutive Teleology & Collective Agents 3.7 Conclusion Desire & the Good FOUR 4.1 Introduction 4.2 An Aristotelian Conception of Living Things 4.2.1 Aristotelian Forms 4.2.2 Animal Form – Species & Life-Cycle 4.2.3 Aristotelian Souls & Constitutive Teleology 4.3 An Evaluative Conception of Desire 4.4 The Faculty of Desire 4.5 The Digestion Problem Revisited Bibliography vii INTRODUCTION 0.1 The Causal Theory of Action (CTA) The causal theory of action (CTA) – at least, the version of it that will concern me throughout this dissertation – is offered as an answer to the question, what happens when someone acts? This is the story it tells ('' denotes causation): Beliefs/Desires/Intentions  Bodily Movements Thus, according to CTA, when someone acts, her motivating beliefs and desires and intentions1 (what some philosophers call the agent's \"motivating reasons\") cause the agent's body to move in appropriate ways such that the movements constitute the action the agent intended. CTA arises from the belief-desire model of action explanation. An agent's wanting something and believing something is translated into talk of causally efficacious mental 1 Not all philosophers of action agree on the kinds of attitudes that need to go into CTA. For example, those who reject a Humean theory of motivation deny that desires must figure in the attitudes that move agents to act. Others deny that intentions are separate attitudes, claiming instead that an intention consists of a certain kind of belief/desire pair. I do not want to take a stand here on these issues, so my inclusion of all three mental states – beliefs, desires, and intentions – is meant to broadly illustrate the kind of mental states that could go into CTA; it should not be read as supporting any necessary conditions for CTA. 1 items, particulars endowed with the causal power to move limbs.2 There is an important question about how exactly beliefs and desires cause limbs to move. Though no particular answer is entailed by the formulation of CTA, it is generally assumed that psychological attitudes cause limb movements by virtue of the fact that they are related to underlying physical states of the agent. The idea here is that all causal efficacy ultimately derives from the causal workings of physical causes and causal processes. The term 'physical' can be understood in more or less broad ways, and on its narrowest interpretation it refers to the micro-level of fundamental entities or properties, the ultimate constituents of the physical world. A broader, and more common, understanding of the physical is captured by reference to a \"physicalist worldview\" or the point of view of the \"physical sciences\" where these are generally taken to include physics, chemistry, biology and their various off-shots. 0.2 The Problem of Disappearing Agents (PDA) CTA is sometimes accused of being guilty of the problem of disappearing agents (PDA): (PDA): In CTA the agent serves merely as an arena in which mental and physical events take place; the agent plays no active part in her movements. 2 Hornsby 2004, 180. 2 As I argue in Chapter 2, the notion of an agent \"playing an active part\" in her movements is elusive. For now we can understand PDA as a problem of accounting for how the movements caused by parts of an agent like mental states or their neuro-physiological realizers can be equivalent to movements performed by the agent of whom they are states. Thus, from this point of view, to overcome the challenge PDA poses for the causal theory, we need an answer to this question: how does the causal efficacy of certain of an agent's parts transfer to the whole agent? Or, how can bodily movements caused by mental or neuro-physiological states be movements that are actively performed by the whole human being of whom they are states? The aim of this dissertation is to provide an answer to these questions. The problem of disappearing agents results from CTA's reductionism, its exclusive focus on mental states and bodily movements in its analysis of human agency. Though these occurrences eventuate in movements of the agent's body, the fact that these movements owe their occurrence to certain inner events seems to challenge the notion that they are movements the agent herself is making. Why would a better description of the case not be that the agent is passively being moved, not that she is actively moving? The worry is that when an agent's mental states are understood as causally interacting inner items, they seem to become loci of causal powers that compete with the causal powers of the agent herself. 3 0.3 An Initial Objection Before moving on, it is important at the outset to deal with a potential objection to this project. We can begin by noting that the thought behind PDA can be expressed with the something like the following question: Are not actions instances in which agents produce their bodily movements themselves, rather than instances in which their movements are produced by their mental states? Some feel the force of this question, others do not. The objection I am considering here is from those who do not– I'll call them Ardent Causal Theorists (ACT's). ACT's think that this question is nonsense. For, according to them, what it is for an agent to act intentionally just is for her movements to be caused in the right way by certain of her beliefs and desires. In other words, CTA articulates the constitution of an action, the what it is to be an action, i.e. bodily movements caused in the right way by appropriate mental states. Thus, ACT's interpret PDA's challenge to CTA as similar to, \"How can it be that a heart attack is the sudden cessation of one's heartbeat?\"3 To ask this question is to betray a lack of understanding of the concept of a heart attack. There is nothing to say in response to this question other than, \"Well, if you have to ask, then you just do not know what a heart attack is.\" In other words, there is simply no room for such a question. Similarly, one can ask what water is; but one cannot ask why water is H2O. There is no reason why water has this chemical composition – it just does. In the same vein, actions just are bodily movements caused in the right way by beliefs and desires. ACT's think that to wonder about this is to simply not get CTA. 3 I borrow this example from Wayne Davis. 4 ACT's unfairly characterize PDA. To see why let us stick with the heart attack example. There are many platitudes that go along with the concept of a heart attack. We can call the set of these platitudes the concept's profile. Part of the profile of the concept 'heart attack' is that it is something that causes severe chest pain, is correlated with numbness in the left arm (usually just in men), and tends to afflict persons who are overweight or have high blood pressure. So when folks were going about trying to figure out what heart attacks were, what they were doing was trying to determine what goes on in people with, say, high blood pressure that causes them to experience pains in their chest and numbness in their left arm, and that often times kills them. In other words, they were looking for what it was that answered to the profile of a heart attack. The event of one's heart suddenly ceasing to pump blood fits. The following are some platitudes about human action: acting intentionally involves being in control of oneself and knowing what one's doing; acting intentionally is doing something for a reason; when we act intentionally we cause things to happen in the world; agents are responsible for their intentional actions because some of an action's results are traceable directly back to an agent. The profile of the concept of an intentional action is the general picture of intentional action that we get from these platitudes. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of our intuitive thoughts about action, but it gives us enough to work 5 with.4 So, the question to ask is, Does CTA fit the profile of the concept of an intentional action? Surely, pace ACT's, this question is not complete nonsense. The following claim by Richard Taylor, one of the proponents of agent causation, is a clear expression of PDA's doubt about CTA's claim to capture the profile of intentional action: It is plain that, whatever I am, I am never identical with any such event ... or state as is usually proposed [by CTA] as the \"real\" cause of my act.... Hence, if it is really and unmetaphorically true ... that I sometimes cause something to happen, this would seem to entail that it is false that any event ... or state not identical with myself should be the real cause of it.5 Now I am not suggesting we endorse Taylor's point (nor am I suggesting we should reject it). I do think, however, that it is a legitimate point that deserves a response. Why does not an agent have to be identical to whatever it is that causes the movements of her body that constitute her intentional actions? What is it about mental states (and/or their physical realizers) such that when they cause (in the right way) movements of agents we can say that the agent is moving herself and not just being moved by causes internal to her? How do mental-state-caused bodily movements get to count as intentional doings of the agent of whom they are states? How do we have to understand the nature of mental states in order for the movements they cause to redound to the agent? These are the questions I try to answer in this dissertation. 4 There are also probably exceptions to each one of the platitudes I mentioned. Platitudes are weaker than necessary or sufficient conditions. 5 Taylor 1966, 111. 6 0.4 A Sketch of the Argument The first, negative part of my discussion begins with the complaint that philosophers who have made previous attempts to make CTA safe from PDA have misidentified the problem. I argue that this failure to properly address PDA stems the fact that contemporary philosophers of action tend to focus their attention on those aspects of agency that are unique to human or rational agents. We can explain this by invoking the idea of human beings as rational animals. Most current philosophical thinking about human agency focuses on the rational side of our nature and largely ignores the animal side. So attention is paid to rational mental processes like deliberation, reflection, and planning that precede uniquely human actions, while the bodily processes of initiating and controlling the movements that constitute such actions is generally ignored.6 This is because the basic capacity for selfmovement – the power to initiate and control one's bodily movements – is present throughout the animal kingdom. Black bears and giraffes have the capacity just as human beings do. Thus, it seems that if our concern is with what is special about human rational agency, then we need to turn our attention to something that is come and gone once the agent's actually moving herself. This emphasis on our rationality over our animality affects the way philosophers interpret PDA's criticism that CTA leaves agents out of its story of action. For if the focus is on human beings, and if what is special about human agency is the capacity for practical rationality, then the claim the CTA fails to capture the role agents play in their actions 6 An exception to this is Frankfurt 1988. 7 becomes the claim that CTA fails to capture deliberation, reflection, planning and the like. On this view, the agent \"disappears\" because her rational powers play no role in the story of action CTA tells. But notice that this takes for granted that CTA adequately captures the exercise of our capacity for self-movement. That is, the interpretation of PDA as a challenge to CTA's ability to give our higher rational faculties the right role in the etiology of human action rests on the assumption that there is no worry about an agent \"disappearing\" when beliefs and desires cause movements constituting actions that do not involve a prior engagement of these faculties – the kind of movements that we and non-rational animals can make. So, the idea that the movements constituting our actions are caused by our mental states is fine so long as the movements constitute the kind of actions that (so-called) mere brutes can do, activities like reaching for food or walking across the street. But surely the complaint that agents in CTA fail to play an active role in their actions, i.e., that CTA describes passively being moved not actively moving, is just as plausible, if not more plausible, when applied to these simpler cases. The failure to capture exercises of practical rationality is a problem, perhaps even one adequately described in terms of an agent \"disappearing.\" However, it is a more fundamental problem, one literally describable in terms of an agent \"disappearing\" or being left out, to be unable to give an account of what happens when someone acts that does justice to the fact that active bodily movements are due to the agent herself and not to her mental states. By the end of Chapter 2, I hope to have made a convincing case for an alternative interpretation of PDA, one that emphasizes CTA's threat to what I call basic self-movement. 8 The aim of the positive part of this dissertation, Chapters 3 and 4, is to demonstrate how CTA can overcome the charge that it cannot capture basic self-movement. This essentially involves developing a view of both self-movement and the nature of things endowed with the capacity for self-movement that allows movements caused by states (or, more generally, parts) of such things to count as movements performed by the thing as a whole. I begin developing this view by illustrating that CTA is an instance of a more general account of how things move themselves, what I call the standard story of self-movement. We can trace the standard story back to Aristotle's account of action in Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he observes that action has its origin within the agent; action has an internal principle or source. Thus, the standard story's Basic Thesis (BT): (BT) Self-movement is internally caused bodily movement. BT informs more than our understanding of what happens when human agents act. I demonstrate this by initially discussing the standard story in the context of artifactual agents like robots and conventional/collective agents like teams. The standard story's generality as an account of self-movement rests on the fact that self-moving agents – artifactual, conventional, and organic – share a common structural feature, what I refer to as constitutive teleology. To say that a self-moving agent is characterized by constitutive teleology, or to say that an agent is teleologically constituted, is to say that the agent as a whole has certain characteristic ends and aims, and that the agent's parts have certain proper functions that depend on these ends and aims. The possibility of self-movement, that is, cases in which 9 certain movements caused by a thing's parts count as movements performed by the whole, arises from the congruence between an agent's nature, as revealed by the agent's overall ends, and the nature of a certain part or mechanism within the agent. As I argue in Chapter 3, we can get a grasp of the concept of constitutive teleology by looking at the collective actions of groups or institutions. Consider the following case: a quarterback throws a pass to one of his team's receivers; the receiver catches the ball and runs with it into the end zone; as a result of what these two individuals do, the entire team scores a touchdown and wins the game. Here we have a case of a complex whole (a football team) performing an action (scoring a touchdown) by virtue of parts of the team (individual players) doing certain things (throwing, catching, and running). What makes this kind of thing possible is the institution of a \"normative space\" determined the rules and standards – the constitutive norms – that determine the group's functional architecture – the various roles and offices that comprise the collective along with the varying forms of authority that go along with them. I respond to PDA by extending this picture of collective agency to individual human agents, which requires demonstrating how the concept of constitutive teleology applies to human beings.7 Here I rely on an Aristotelian account of living things. At the heart of the Aristotelian view is the idea that animals are constituted so as to attain the good endemic to its kind. This implies that the animal's parts, capacities, dispositions, tendencies to activity, 7 Though I do not emphasize it here, I argue in Chapter 3 that constitutive teleology also characterizes the constitution of artifactual agents like robots. Thus, the normative view of self-movement I develop has the virtue of applying to three paradigmatic examples of self-moving agents: robots, teams, and animals. 10 etc., are structured and organized so as to serve as instruments for the attainment of the good of whole animal they comprise. We can restate this in modern parlance, in terms that are perfectly naturalistic and consistent with evolutionary biology. For another way of speaking of an animal's form is in terms of an animal's species kind; and another way of speaking of an animal's good is in terms of the life-cycle – the process of development, selfmaintenance, and reproduction – of this kind of creature. Thus, combining Aristotelian and evolutionary language, animals have a teleological constitution determined by their life-form (species) that enables the creature to fully participate in the life-cycle of its kind, which is paradigmatically equivalent to developing into a healthy, mature, full-functioning specimen. Now here is the connection between the point about collective actions and the Aristotelian account of living things: an animal's (Aristotelian) form is akin to a political constitution or a set of rules for a game – it bestows an identity on the parts that make it up, and assigns to certain parts particular roles or functions that enable the whole to do certain things. Both group agents like teams, and, on the Aristotelian account, individual agents like human beings, have teleological constitutions. That is, they both embody a normative structure that determines the identity and function of their parts. The argument is that just as individual players on a team can do things that amount to the whole team of which they are a part doing something, so too there is an element of a human agent's teleological structure that can function in a way that amounts to the whole of which it is a part moving itself. 11 In Chapter 4, I argue that the element of the human agent endowed with this power is the faculty of desire. Desires are understood as essential to self-movement because they are understood as essentially connected to the good of the whole. The function of the desiderative capacity is to track the relevant good within the context of choice and action, and to put the agent in pursuit of it. Movements caused by the faculty of desire constitute movement of the whole agent for two reasons: first, the agent is constituted so as to attain its good; and, second, the faculty of desire is a part of an agent whose proper function is to track the good and move the agent toward it. Putting these two points together, we can say that movements caused by desires are caused by an agent's nature, that which makes the agent that embodied creature she is. So, movements caused by a part of the agent whose purpose is to track the good count as self-movement because they are movements caused by the agent's essential nature. In the end, I argue that embracing the Aristotelian account of living things makes available to us a way of understanding the nature of action-involving mental states like desires that reveals how CTA does not result in the agent's disappearance. Finally, I want to make clear the ambitions of this dissertation. In the discussion that follows, I am not aiming to provide a complete theory of agency or provide a complete defense of the causal theory of action. My more limited aim is to develop a compelling response to what I take to be the major challenge facing the causal theory. This means that I am not calling into question the truth of CTA. Rather, I am articulating a view about the nature of self-movement and self-moving agents that we must see as in the background of CTA's story about what happens when someone acts. 12 ONE The Causal Theory of Action 1.1 Introduction In this chapter I introduce the causal theory of action (CTA), discuss Davidson's influential argument in its favor, and sketch two different interpretations of the causal theory. After articulating these dual conceptions of CTA, I demonstrate how they both fall prey to the problem of disappearing agents (PDA). The overall project of this dissertation is to develop a response to PDA on CTA's behalf. I begin with a mundane example of intentional human action. While sitting at her desk Mary reaches over to the window and slides it open. She does this because she wants to let some fresh air into her office. If someone asked Mary why she opened the window she could explain it by making reference to this desire for fresh air. Given this information we could also sensibly ascribe to Mary the belief that opening the window would be a way to get some fresh air. We can also sensibly assume that had she wanted, say, to get a bowl of cereal instead of some fresh air, then she would have behaved 13 differently. Thus, her beliefs and desires exert an influence on her; they make a difference to her behavior. These italicized locutions are examples of common ways we have of talking about the relationship between mind and action, or between what people think and what they do. What this brings out is that there is a causal component to our understanding of commonsense psychological attitudes like belief and desire. In fact, we can test this. Suppose that just before reaching over to open the window Mary expresses to you her desire for some fresh air. Now imagine that you convince Mary that there is a toxic cloud of poisonous gas floating outside her window. If Mary's rational, and let us assume she is, then she clearly will not open the window now. Why? Well, your talk of the toxic cloud influenced her thinking, it led her to change her mind. Prior to talking to you she thought opening the window was perfectly safe, now she thinks it is dangerous. This change in belief led to a change in desire. Instead of wanting to open the window, Mary now wants to cover it with the plastic wrap her clever government said would come in handy in a case like this. 1.2 The Causal Theory of Action (CTA) These commonplace thoughts about the effect of our beliefs and desires on our behavior are captured in the causal theory of action (CTA). Here is David Velleman's articulation of CTA: There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which 14 in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. Provided that these causal processes take their normal course, the agent's movements consummate an action, and his motivating desire and belief constitute his reasons for action.8 Michael Smith provides a similar account: Actions are bodily movements that are caused and rationalized by an agent's desire for an end and a belief that moving her body in the relevant way will bring that end about.9 Finally, here is what Jaegwon Kim has to say about the causal theory: the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, our intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways.10 According to Kim, mental states and events bring about the movements that constitute our action. Our capacity to perform basic actions, and therefore the foundation of our agential capacities, is the power of our desires (or our beliefs and desires) to cause our limbs to move. Kim makes this explicit when he claims that having our mental states cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways ... is how we manage to navigate around the objects in our surroundings, find food and shelter, build bridges and cities, and destroy the rain forest.11 Reverting to the example of Mary opening the window, we can trace the reasoning behind CTA. We start with the claim that Mary's action of opening the window is explained by her wanting some fresh air and by her thinking she can get some by opening the window. The standard story converts the claim that Mary's attitudes are explanatorily relevant because they 8 Velleman 2000, 123. 9 Quoted in Hornsby 2005, 2. 10 Kim 1998, 31. 11 Kim 2005, 9. 15 affected her behavior into the claim that Mary's attitudes caused the bodily movements that constitute her opening the window. Mary's wanting something and her believing something is translated into talk of causally efficacious mental items, particulars endowed with the causal power to move limbs. So what happens when Mary opens the window because she wants air and thinks that the way to get some is to open the window is her desire for air and her belief that opening the window fulfills that desire jointly cause the movements of her body (her reaching) that constitute her act of reaching out and opening the window.12 There is an important question about how exactly beliefs and desires cause limbs to move. Though no particular answer is entailed by the formulation I have given of the standard story (or the causal theory more generally), it is generally assumed that the causal story will be filled out in physicalist or materialist terms, meaning that psychological attitudes cause limb movements by virtue of the fact that they are related to underlying physical states of the agent. The idea here is that all causal efficacy derives, ultimately, from the causal workings of physical causes and causal processes. The term 'physical' can be understood more or less broadly, and on its narrowest interpretation it refers to the micro-level of fundamental entities or properties, the ultimate constituents of the physical world. A broader, and more common, understanding of the physical is captured by reference to a \"physicalist worldview\" or the point of view of the \"physical sciences\" where these are 12 I am assuming here and throughout the rest of the dissertation that, unless I claim otherwise, the causal chains from attitudes to bodily movements in the examples of action I consider \"take their normal course\", thereby setting aside worries about deviant causal chains. 16 generally taken to include physics, chemistry, biology and their various off-shoots. Tyler Burge explains the basic physicalist (or materialist) intuition as follows: There is certainly reason to believe that underlying our mental states and processes are physical, chemical, biological, and neural processes that proceed according to their own laws. Some such physical processes are probably necessary if intentional (or phenomenal) mental events are to be causes of behavior.13 What it means exactly to say that the physical \"underlies\" the mental is not entirely clear, and there are various ways of understanding the relation. The minimal physicalist commitment is that the mental supervenes on the physical, meaning that there can be no change at the mental level without a lower level physical change. In other words, \"mentality is at bottom physically based ... there is no free-floating mentality unanchored in the physical nature of objects and events in which it is manifested.\"14 Most contemporary philosophers of mind and action go further and support some form of token-identity theory, according to which each mental particular (event or property instantiation) is identical to a physical particular. In the case of action, this kind of view allows for an alignment of the story of mental causation told by CTA with the underlying neuro-physiological story that can be told any time there is activity involving human bodies. Acceptance of token-identities between mental and physical particulars accounts for the tendency of many philosophers, when the topic is agency, to speak in terms of bodily movements being caused by causally interacting \"inner\" 13 Burge 1993, 103. 14 Kim 1998, 14-15. 17 states of agents, where this is meant to refer to the intra-cranial entities that are the province of the cognitive sciences.15 1.3 The Naturalist Background to CTA CTA appeals to many contemporary philosophers because it seems to naturalize agency by resolving a tension between a broadly scientific understanding of the world and our commonsense thinking. Velleman explains this as a tension between the idea of \"agential origin\" at the heart of our concept of agency, and a \"naturalistic conception of explanation\" that is endemic to a scientific worldview. \"Our concept of ... human action,\" he writes, \"requires some event or state of affairs that owes its occurrence to an agent and hence has an explanation that traces back to him.\"16 On the other hand, \"our scientific view of the world regards all events and states of affairs as caused, and hence explained, by other events and states, or by nothing at all.\"17 \"Actions,\" John Bishop concludes, \"thus seem to involve something that natural science does not recognize.\"18 This tension between the requirements of agency and a naturalistic picture of the world's causal workings sets the agenda for the project of developing a causal theory of action: Much of recent philosophy of action has been motivated by the reductionist project of finding a place for human agency in a naturalistic picture of the world. In such a 15 This literal construal of talk of \"inner\" states does not necessarily apply to all physicalists, but it is clear that this is what many philosophers of mind mean when they talk in this way. This is perhaps most evident in Fodor's work, and other philosophers similarly committed to the representational theory of mind and the concomitant language of thought thesis. See Wilson 1995, 152-53. For criticism of talk of \"inner\" states see Collins 1986 and Steward 1997. 16 Velleman 2000, 127. See Bishop 1989, 2. 17 Velleman 2000, 129. See Yaffe 2000, 121. 18 Bishop 1989, 31. 18 picture, actions are not caused by a primitive entity called \"the agent\" or \"the conscious self\", but by states and events that are amenable to a scientifically respectable description.19 CTA attempts to provide \"a psychological reduction of what happens in rational action\", an account of agency that only \"alludes to states and events occurring in the agent's mind.\"20 The causal theory reduces an agent's moving her body to an agent's mental states causing her body to move. For example, if Hoover intentionally waves to me from across the quad, CTA claims that Hoover's arm is moving back and forth because some relevant mental state of Hoover, such as his desire to say hello, is causing his arm to move that way. Note that this is a metaphysical reduction, not a conceptual or analytic one. CTA does not claim that the concept \"moving a limb\" reduces to the concept \"mental states causing the limb to move.\" Clearly these express difference thoughts. What CTA does claim, however, is that whenever it is true that an agent is intentionally \"moving a limb\" this is true by virtue of the fact that the agent's \"mental states are causing the limb to move\". Another way of expressing the reductive point is this: what it is for an agent to intentionally move a limb just is the agent's mental states causing the limb to move (in the right way); or, an agent's intentionally moving is constituted by the agent's mental states causing the movements. We can ascribe the source of an agent's movements to the agent herself, in other words, when the movements are caused in the right way by the agent's motivating beliefs and desires. I characterized the naturalistic conception of explanation in terms of a commitment to the view that states and events are the only things that can stand in causal relations, and 19 Schroeter 2004, 650. 20 Velleman 2000, 130. 19 that therefore they are the only things we can appeal to when explaining the occurrence of natural phenomena. One might reject this characterization of naturalism by appeal to the fact that we often point to things that are neither states nor events when giving explanations of natural occurrences. Vivid examples of this are when we say that an atomic bomb caused the destruction of Hiroshima; or that the planes that hit the Twin Towers caused them to collapse.21 The point is that there seems to be nothing non-naturalistic or anti-scientific about such explanations, suggesting that any form of naturalism worth taking seriously would not preclude them. This criticism is surely correct about the way we talk about events in the world. Most naturalistically-minded philosophers, however, would reply that the surface grammar of sentences that predicate causal powers of objects like bombs and planes is misleading, for it masks an underlying event-causal story that grounds the explanatory power of these statements. The naturalist does not deny that we give these sorts of explanations, or suggest that there is anything spooky about them. What the naturalist does deny is the claim that the bomb, as opposed to the event of the bomb's exploding, caused the destruction of Hiroshima. The naturalist maintains that there is something strange about this, and insists that acceptance of such a statement is not at all part of scientific naturalism. So the naturalist claim is not that we do not predicate causal powers of agents when explaining what people do: the claim is that we should not read the metaphysics of causal explanation off the surface grammar of such claims. 21 I owe this objection to Wayne Davis. 20 The naturalist's avoidance of appeals to things or substances as irreducible causes is a version of a general methodological principle that characterizes scientific investigation, namely, the method of decompositional or reductive analysis. This is the practice of reductively analyzing an entity in terms of its constitutive components, and then giving an account of its behavior that appeals to the workings of its parts. There tends to be some resistance to analyzing human agency in the same way. In his influential article \"Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It\", Hobart chides some philosophers for suffering \"a want in the analytic imagination\" when they turn their attention to human action. \"We have been accustomed,\" he writes, \"to think of [a person's] activities as the way in which, as a whole, [she] naturally and obviously behaves.\" When we exercise the \"analytic imagination\", however, we \"realiz[e] that the component parts of a thing or process, taken together, each in its place, with their relations, are identical with the thing or process itself.\"22 An example of the analytic imagination at work in contemporary philosophy of mind is Lycan and Dennett's \"homuncular functionalism\". As Lycan explains, we view a person as a sort of corporate entity which corporately performs many immensely complex functions – functions of the sort usually called \"mental\" or \"psychological\". A psychologist who adopts [this] AI-inspired methodology will describe this person by means of a flow chart, which depicts the person's subpersonal agencies and their many and various routes of \"access\" to each other ... which enable them to cooperate in carrying out the purposes of the containing \"institution\" or organism that that person is.\"23 Though CTA itself does not take the same reductive functionalist shape of the view Lycan articulates, it is still an example of the decompositional strategy. For it breaks down an 22 Hobart 1934, 2. 23 Lycan 1981, 28. 21 agent's capacity for intentional movement in its environment into a story about the causal interactions among mental states and limbs. And this is, in fact, an important step in the process of the kind of \"flow chart\" strategy characteristic of much current philosophical and scientific thinking about the mind.24 1.4 Davidson's Defense of CTA A central concern in contemporary philosophy of action has been articulating the difference between actions – things that agents do – and mere movements – things that simply happen to agents. This is the light in which most philosophers of action have read Wittgenstein's question, \"What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?\" As Velleman explains, \"the difference between my arm's rising and my raising it is supposed to illustrate the difference between a mere occurrence involving my body and an action of mine\" (1). This twofold distinction between actions and mere bodily movements has structured the context in which CTA has developed. The distinguishing mark that separates mere bodily movements from actions is that the latter, unlike the former, can be understood as active expressions of an agent's rational capacities. That is, a human action is a nexus of activity and reason. As Elizabeth Anscombe stressed in Intention, human actions are happenings \"to which a certain sense of 24 Note that CTA – the view that actions are bodily movements caused by mental states – is not necessarily wedded to this kind of reductionism. The reason for this is that it is not essential that CTA take a physicalist form. A Cartesian dualist can be a causal theorist, and surely dualism is as recalcitrant to naturalistic reduction as any. As should be clear from the discussion above, however, for the purposes of my discussion I am assuming that causal theorists are physicalists who assume that actions and the mental states that cause them are \"realized by\" or are \"identical to\" or \"supervene on\" (etc....) the physical. 22 the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer ... gives a reason for acting.\" 25 Certain rationalizing links must be in place between what an agent does and the reasons that motivated her to do it in order to properly see her behavior as action. I will call this the rationalizing links requirement. The question of whether reasons are causes, or whether rationalizing explanations are causal explanations, exercised a great many philosophers a couple of decades ago. Without question, the view that reasons are causes, that rationalizing explanations are a species of causal explanation, came out on top of this debate and it has for the most part gone unquestioned ever since. Donald Davidson's article, \"Actions, Reasons, and Causes\" is generally credited as establishing the prominent status the causal theory enjoys in contemporary philosophy.26 The rationalizing links requirement is at the heart of Davidson's argument. He argues that the rationalizing link that is in place when beliefs and desires cause actions is secured via the causal process through which actions come about, and he challenges his non-causal opponents to articulate an alternative conception of the relation between an action and the reason for which it was performed – one that does not rely on any spooky non-natural relation, but which secures the appropriate rationalizing link. Let me take a moment to give some background to Davidson's argument. Contemporary philosophy of action begins with Anscombe's Intention, and Anscombe and the many philosophers who followed in her wake were heavily influenced by what they saw 25 Anscombe 2001, 9. 26 Davidson 1980. 23 as the conceptual analysis of agential concepts in Wittgenstein's later work. 27 These writers emphasized the ways in which rational explanations of human actions differ from the kinds of causal explanations we give for other events in the natural world. Rational explanations, they argued, are normative, and they work by fitting the action being explained into a certain pattern of rule following or a broader social practice. The anti-causalists also specifically argued that the relation between psychological attitudes like intentions and desires, and the actions motivated by these attitudes is logical, not causal; rationalizing explanations of action are conducted in a different \"logical space\" from causal explanations. To explain an agent's action in terms of her reasons and psychological attitudes is simply to do something very different from picking out antecedent states and events whose occurrence resulted in the action.28 27 The Wittgensteinian view found its greatest expression in the \"sea of little red books\" to which Davidson refers in a later article. This is a reference to Routledge & Kegan Paul's series Studies in Philosophical Psychology, edited by R.F. Holland, a series that many credit as establishing the central role of philosophy of mind in contemporary philosophy. The series includes early works by Norman Malcolm (on dreaming), Anthony Kenny (on moral psychology), and Alistair ManIntyre (on the unconscious). 28 To do full justice to the anti-causalist arguments, it is important to see them in the context of mid-20thcentury debates about whether the natural sciences competed with or subsumed the so-called human or social sciences, e.g. economics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. If one could argue that such disciplines had different ways of explaining phenomena than those practiced by the natural sciences, and argue that they are none the worse for this, then one has mounted a good case for their legitimacy as sources of knowledge about human nature. Unfortunately, this context is now largely overlooked, leaving the philosophers of \"the little red books\" with hardly any sympathetic readers in contemporary philosophy. For outside this context their work can appear to be mere quibbling about what we do when we explain actions. The real nature of their concern, I think, can only be unraveled by acknowledging the many ways in which we use the concept of 'cause' and the implications that follow regarding the nature of persons when we settle on a particular sense as capturing the explanatory connection between reasons and the actions they explain. I think a charitable interpretation of the Wittgensteinian anti-causalists sees them as aimed at combating scientistic tendencies in philosophy the influence of which were just starting to be felt at the time they were writing. For recent defenses of non-causal accounts of reasons and rational explanations of action see Schueler 2003, Sehon 2005, and Wilson 1989. 24 At the heart of the anti-causal position is the \"logical connection argument\". It begins by noting one of Hume's points about causation, namely that part of the concept of causation is the notion that cause and effect exist separately, that is, that the causal connection is a contingent one. As Melden, a prominent non-causalist, explains, \"the very notion of a causal sequence logically implies that cause and effect are intelligible without any logically internal relation of the one to the other.\"29 On the other hand, the relation between intentions or desires and the actions they motivate is a non-contingent logical relation; an agent's action and the desire or intention that motivated it cannot be rendered intelligible independently of each another, for the intentional content of these mental states is about the resulting action. Therefore, so the argument goes, when we advert to an agent's intentions or desires in order to understand her action we are not pointing to antecedent conditions that are contingently connected to the action, as they would be if they were the action's causes. Rather such explanations render an agent's behavior more conspicuous by providing a meaningful interpretation or re-description of it. For example, Vivian's wild gesticulations make sense when I learn that she is dancing, just as Todd's initially odd sounding-off is heard in a whole new light when I realize he is making the Muslim call to prayer. So coming to know of someone's intentions or desires is not to discover what caused the agent's action, rather having an account of the content of these mental states allows us to see the purposes in a person's movements, to understand the pattern in their behavior. 29 Melden 1961, 82. 25 In \"Actions, Reasons, and Causes\" Davidson devastated the \"logical connection argument\" by drawing a distinction between events and their descriptions. Logical relations, he argued, are intensional; they exist between descriptions of events. What this implies is that the existence of a logical relation between a statement of the content of one's intention, belief, desire, etc., and a description of one's action does not preclude those psychological attitudes from being the action's causes. Whether event X is a cause of event Y has nothing to do with how we account for or describe the events – the latter's a linguistic, de dicto affair, while the former is an extensional, de re matter. Logical and causal relations, therefore, are perfectly compatible and can exist simultaneously between the same events. So reasons certainly can be causes, or at least the \"logical connection argument\" does nothing to preclude this. This is because there may also be true descriptions under which the reasons, understood as mental states and events, do in fact stand in causal relations to the bodily movements that constitute the resulting actions. Davidson also attacked the non-causalist's appeal to the context in which an action takes place as a way of explaining an action. We see this in Melden's example of the driver signaling a turn with his arm.30 Melden argues that we can explain why the driver raised his arm by paying attention to the situation in which he performed this action, namely, at an intersection in the midst of making a turn. He argues that in this context, and in light of a background familiarity with the social norms involved in driving a car, one can explain the driver raising his arm by coming to see it as a signaling of a turn. We can say that the 30 Melden 1961, 99. 26 driver's intention in raising her arm is to signal a turn, but when we advert to a mental item in this way in order to explain an action we are not pointing to something antecedent to the signaling that brought about the arm raising. Rather, to cite the intention is simply another way of saying what it is the driver's doing by raising her arm – she is signaling a turn. In response, Davidson begins by accepting the point about redescription: when we explain an action, by giving the reason, we do redescribe the action; redescribing the action gives the action a place in a pattern, and in this way the actions is explained.31 He argues, however, that agreeing to this settles nothing about the nature of the explanation we give when we give an agent's reason for acting. Just because giving the reason has the effect of placing the action in a wider context of, say, a certain social practice does not preclude the reason giving explanation from being causal. \"Talk of patterns and contexts,\" he writes, \"does not answer the question of how reasons explain actions, since the relevant pattern or context contains both reason and action.\"32 The suggestion here is that understanding the explanation as causal does provide an answer to the question of how the agent's reason explains her action. Davidson's complaint is that the non-causal view offers no alternative to this account of how it is that citing the right mental items – which Davidson agrees can have the effect of re-describing and contextually situating the action – actually succeed in explaining what the agent does. What the appeal to patterns and practices does is establish that in certain situations an agent has a reason to do something, e.g. raise his arm, but what the appeal does not do is establish that this reason that the agent 31Davidson 1980, 10. 32 Davidson 1980, 10. 27 has really is the reason for which the agent acted. \"Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason.\"33 And this is what Davidson thinks cannot be captured without an appeal to causality. The appeal to causation can provide the needed \"analysis of the 'because' in 'He did it because ...' where we go on to name a reason.\"34 This last point has come to be known as Davidson's \"master argument.\" One cannot overstate the influence of Davidson's master argument in turning the tide of the philosophy of action from the anti-causal view to the causal theory. Mele refers to the master argument as \"Davidson's Challenge\" to philosophers who oppose the causalist view that reasons explanations are causal: If you hold that when we act intentionally we act for reasons, provide an account of the reasons for which we act that does not treat (our having) those reasons as figuring in the causation of the relevant behavior (or, one might add, as realized in physical causes of the behavior)! 35 Though there have been some attempts, this challenge is generally regarded as still outstanding. 1.5 An Ambiguity in \"Causal Theory of Action\" At the beginning of \"Actions, Reasons, and Causes\" Davidson announces that his aim is to defend the view that explanations of actions that cite an agent's reasons (what Davidson 33 Davidson 1980, 9. 34 Davidson 1963, 11. 35 Mele 2000, 279-80 28 refers to as rationalizations) are a species of causal explanation. We can express this thesis about the nature of action explanations as (CE) Rationalization is a species of causal explanation. Soon after he identifies CE as his thesis Davidson introduces the notion of an agent's primary reason. He explains that an agent's primary reason comprises a pair of attitudes, namely, \"some sort of pro attitude toward actions of a certain kind\" and a belief that \"his action is of that kind.\"36 Relying on the notion of a primary reason Davidson restates his thesis in these terms: \"the primary reason for an action is its cause\". We can express this thesis about the nature of reasons for action as (C) Reasons are causes. CE and C are two common slogans used for expressing the causal theory of action. What is the relation between CE and C? Initially it seems that Davidson thinks C is simply a restatement of CE, another way of expressing the same thought or making the same claim. This is evident in the fact that he refers to the claim expressed in C as part of a reformulation of the view the rationalizations are causal explanations. Later on, however, Davidson distinguishes between the extensional relation of causation that obtains between particulars and the intensional relation that obtains between sentences, or the truths or facts that they express, in a true causal explanation. This distinction between causation (or causal relations) and causal explanation suggests a difference between CE and C. CE explicitly 36 Davidson 1980, 3-4. 29 makes a claim about causal explanations, while C, on the other hand, is a claim about causes or causation.37 Davidson's dual understanding of the causal theory of action is reflected in the way current philosophers express allegiance to the causal theory. It is clear from what different philosophers say that those who call themselves causal theorists do not all accept the same view. A conspicuous way of understanding their differences is in terms of the distinction between CE and C. If we look at the literature we can detect a clear difference between those philosophers who understand the causal theory of action as a thesis about reasons explanations – Davidson's rationalizations – and those who interpret the theory as a story about the events and processes that produce or bring about actions. Allow me to cite at some length a sampling of some statements regarding the causal theory of action to illustrate this point. I will start with philosophers who understand the causal theory along the lines of C. For example, Jaegwon Kim expresses his understanding of the causal theory of action in the following terms: We are agents, agents who can deliberate, form intentions and action plans, and act so as to realize what we intend. This means that in performing an action, our decisions and intentions, and our desires and beliefs, cause our limbs to move in such a way that things around us get appropriately altered and rearranged.38 John Bishop defends the causal theory in similar terms: According to the Causal Theory of Action, actions consist in behavior that is caused by appropriate mental states – mental states that make it reasonable for the agent to perform behavior of that kind. What we think of as agents doing thing, it is 37 See Strawson 1985. 38 Kim 2000, 5. 30 suggested, is actually a matter of certain of their mental states causing those things to occur.39 The latest example of a defense of this way of understanding the causal theory of action is Berent Enç's recent book How We Act. He articulates the causal theory of action as follows: [A] causal theory of action...has as its central thesis the proposition that an act consists of a behavioral output that is caused by the reasons an agent has...that consist of the beliefs and desires of the agent.... On this thesis, actions are defined as changes in the world that are caused by mental states.40 These statements by Kim, Bishop, and Enç express an understanding of the causal theory of action best captured by C. Their statements are not about what we are doing when we explain actions, but rather about how the limb movements that constitute our actions come about. While a claim about the explanations of action is about the epistemology of actions, about our knowledge and understanding of them, these statements are best interpreted as metaphysical claims about the nature of action. In other words, they are statements about the kinds of causal chains involved in the production or generation of actions, or at least the movements that constitute them. This is to interpret talk of an agent's beliefs and desires in explanations of their actions as referring to items in the realm of particulars that play a role in bringing about the event that was the agent's action. Now, Bishop and Enç go a step further than Kim does by suggesting that mention of these causal processes is part of an analysis or definition of the concept of action. But all three agree that the causal theory of action is a metaphysical view about the nature of actions, in the sense that it is a theory about the causal process involved in the generation of actions. Reasons, an agent's 39 Bishop 1989, 2. 40 Enç 2003, 2. 31 motivating beliefs and desires, are particulars that play a central role in this causal process which is why this metaphysical version of the causal theory of action can be expressed as C, i.e. reasons are causes. This is not to say that proponents of this causal theory action do not also think that we can cite these reasons in order to explain someone's action, and that when we do so we are giving a causal explanation. While a commitment to a causal theory in the form of C does not entail acceptance of CE, proponents of C do in fact tend to endorse CE as well. Some philosophers, however, only endorse CE. This is a version of the causal theory of action that does not purport to make claims that tell a causal story about what happens when someone acts. Rather, these philosophers understand the causal theory to be a view about the nature of the reason-giving explanations we rely on to understand what people do. For example, Jennifer Hornsby argues that, \"the causal reality of belief and desire is just their causal-explanatory reality\". She asks: Why should acknowledgement that we say something about what she believed and desired in causally explaining why she did what she did lead us to accept the existence of anything that 'the cause of her action' stands for?41 Hornsby is expressing skepticism about the notion that when we cite an agent's beliefs and desires in explaining her behavior what we are doing is mentioning causally efficacious particulars that caused – in the sense of produced or brought about – her action. Rather, she argues, we should \"deny that the causal-explanation view relies on the idea of discrete things 41 Hornsby 1997, 134. 32 combining (interacting?) in the production of action.\"42 So Hornsby is not saying that human actions are somehow outside of the causal domain. She is claiming that our commonsense psychological explanations of action, while they are causal explanations, do not work by identifying the items that played a role in the production of the movements that constitute an action. She argues that this misplaces that subject matter of rationalizing explanations by mistakenly focusing on the event that is the action instead of the agent who performed the action. It is to hear questions about why an agent Ø-ed as asking for an account of why a Ø-ing occurred. When we seek an 'action explanation', one question we usually want answered is 'Why did she do such and such a thing?' We may agree that actions are events without supposing that this question is equivalent to 'Why was there an event of such-and-such a kind?' Asking why a Ø-ed, we hope to learn something about a, the person; but if we asked why a's Ø-ing occurred, a might not be the subject of concern at all.43 William Child also endorses a version of the causal theory that restricts itself to the nature of reasons explanations: [A]s I am using the phrase, a causal theory of action is simply a theory which says that explaining actions by giving the agents' reasons for doing them is a mode of causal explanation.44 Child is explicit about the fact that other philosophers think there is more to the causal theory, and it is clear from his remarks that what he has in mind is the kind of view Kim and Bishop discuss. He writes: 42 Hornsby 1997, 135. 43 Hornsby 1997, 134. 44 Child 1994, 99. 33 Some causal theories of action have included other claims. In particular, some writers associate the causal theory of action with the view that S's Ø-ing was an action if and only if it was caused ... by an intention, or by a belief and desire.... But someone who claims that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation can remain neutral on that point....45 Unlike Hornsby, though, Child does think that rationalizations are a species of causal explanation because they explain why something happened or why some event occurred. In fact, he thinks that this is what makes it the case that rationalizations are causal; for what all causal explanations have in common, he argues, is \"that they are all explanations of the occurrence or persistence of particular events or circumstances, or of general types of event or circumstance.\"46 He does, however, agree with Hornsby's rejection of the need to appeal to \"causally interacting internal entities\" in order secure the causal nature of rationalizations. \"We can have a causal theory of action,\" he writes, \"without holding that propositional attitudes are causes of behavior.\"47 That is, we can say that explanations of the form \"she Ø-d because she believed that p\" are causal explanations without saying \"if S Ø-d because she believed that p, her belief that p must have been an item causally implicated in producing her behavior.\"48 45 Child 1994, 99. Thus, unlike Hornsby, Child believes that acceptance of a version of the causal theory of action that is best captured by CE – \"rationalization is a species of causal explanation\" – does not entail a stand on whether the causal theory also involves C – \"reasons are causes\". 46 Child 1994, 100. I see no reason why we cannot accept Hornsby's point while also going along with Child's view that rationalizations are causal explanations because they explain why something happened. Hornsby's right to say that we want to learn something about the agent when we request an explanation for her behavior. But, at the same time, discovering the relevant information about her just is a way of explaining why the event that was her action occurred. In other words, by finding out why she did what she did, we learn why her doing it occurred. 47 Child 1994, 125. 48 Child 1995, 125. 34 At this point I have put two different versions of the causal theory of action on the table, which correspond to Davidson's two different statements of the causal theory (C & CE). There is a metaphysical version of the causal theory that gives an account of the causal role an agent's psychological attitudes play in the generation of the movements that constitute her action. There is also an explanatory version of the causal theory of action that is silent on the metaphysical question of how actions come about, or of what happens when someone acts. This a causal theory of action explanation, one which says that rationalizations are causal explanations. These two versions of the causal theory see beliefs, desires, and other practical attitudes as playing very different roles in relation to action. On the metaphysical version, these attitudes have causal efficacy, meaning they are caught up in the processes that result in the action. On the explanatory view, these attitudes have causal explanatory relevance, meaning we can advert to them when giving a causal explanation of an agent's action. The focus of this dissertation is on what I referred in the Introduction as \"the problem of disappearing agents,\" a challenge that several prominent philosophers of action have raised against CTA. In the next section I will introduce this problem and discuss the possibility of embracing the causal explanatory version of CTA as a way of avoiding the problem. 35 1.6 The Problem of Disappearing Agents Introduced As I explained above, CTA is the result of an attempt to respond to what Velleman refers to as \"the fundamental problem in the philosophy of action,\" namely, \"finding a place for agents in the explanatory order of the world.\"49 Agency's recalcitrance to positioning within the natural explanatory order is due to the concept of \"agential origin\" inherent in our commonsense concept of action. \"Our concept of full-blooded human action,\" Velleman explains, \"requires some event or state of affairs that owes its occurrence to an agent and hence has an explanation that traces back to him.\" The problem, however, is that a \"naturalistic conception of explanation\", one dictated by \"our scientific view of the world,\" rejects the idea of tracing an explanation of the occurrence of any states or events in the world back to anything other than states and events. The result is that \"any explanation of human action [must] speak in terms of ... occurrences, because occurrences are the basic elements of explanation in general.\"50 When we remind ourselves of the obvious point that an agent is not an occurrence, a state or event, the conflict between agency and the natural world becomes evident. CTA attempts to resolve the conflict between agency and the prevailing natural scientific method of explanation by articulating a \"psychological reduction of what happens in rational action.\"51 That is, CTA offers a theory of agency that only \"alludes to states and 49 Velleman 2000, 127, 50 Velleman 2000, 130. 51 Velleman 2000, 124. 36 events occurring in the agent's mind.\"52 In this more austere picture of agency, agential origin is accounted for in terms of the occurrences that supposedly make it up. Its austerity stems from the way it proceeds without expanding the naturalist event-causal ontology, that is, without relying on a fundamental appeal to a different metaphysical kind of thing, an agent (more generally, a substance), other than the kinds recognized by naturalism. If this reductive, event-causal story can be told about human action, then apparently philosophy of action's fundamental problem has been solved. Note, however, that if CTA, in its attempt to psychologically reduce human agency, cannot produce a surrogate of agential origin out of states and events, then it fails to reconcile agency with the strictures of scientific naturalism. For if the reduction of agential origin (a phenomenon whose explanation requires appeal to something beyond mere occurrences) to the causal interactions among states and events actually amounts to its elimination, then the standard story is no longer a story about human agency. (At least, that is, so long as we accept that agential origin is an essential part of human agency.) Several recent prominent critics of CTA, e.g. Harry Frankfurt, David Velleman, Michael Bratman, have leveled this eliminitivist charge against the standard causal theory of action (CTA). Though there are differences in the particular formulations of their complaints, a point I will get to in Chapter 2, they all share the thought that there is something inadequate about CTA, that there is something important about human agency 52 Velleman 2000, 130. 37 that is gone missing. And what they all agree goes missing is the agent herself. As Enç recently put it: Conceiving of action as the result of a chain of events that are causally connected removes the agent from the picture altogether. Being the conduit for a casual chain is a passive affair; being an agent is being active. The former cannot possibly exhaust what is involved in the latter.53 The problem with CTA is that \"in this story reasons cause an intention, and an intention causes bodily movements but nobody – that is, no person – does anything.\"54 In cases of genuine agency, on the other hand, \"the agent is the source of, determines, directs, governs the action and is not merely the locus of a series of happenings, of causal pushes and pulls.\"55 When an agent acts, Velleman writes, \"an intention is formed by the agent himself, not by his reasons for acting [and] the agent then moves his limbs in execution of his intention: his intention does not move his limbs by itself.\"56 CTA, therefore, fails to capture the essential feature of agency, namely, the fact that when he acts an agent is active as opposed to passive: he is not being moved, he is moving. Instead of being seen as active beings that bring something about through their agency, Frankfurt suggests that CTA's psychological reduction transforms agents into \"locales in which certain events happen to occur.\"57 \"Psychological and physiological events take place inside a person,\" Velleman 53 Enç 2003, 3-4. 54 Velleman 2000, 123. 55 Bratman 2001, 311. 56 Velleman 2000, 122. 57 Frankfurt 1988, ix. 38 writes, \"but the person serves merely as the arena for these events: he takes no active part.\"58 This is the problem of disappearing agents (PDA).59 Now it may appear that PDA only arises for the metaphysical interpretation of CTA, what I referred to above as C. The reason for this is that C is the version of CTA committed to beliefs and desires being causally efficacious inner states of agents that bring about the movements that comprise their actions. The explanatory version of CTA (CE), on the other hand, is not committed to this view. According to CE, beliefs and desires are attitudes that figure in causal explanations of actions, but not because these attitudes played a role in bringing about an agent's movements. Beliefs and desires are causal-explanatory because they figure in certain counterfactual supporting explanations the account for why something happened, namely, an agent's action. While proponents of CE like Hornsby and Child may succeed in putting forward an interpretation of the CTA that does not demand embracing the picture of mental states that seems to result in PDA, this does not necessarily suffice for overcoming PDA. The reason for this is that we can restate PDA in a way that does not make any reference to causally efficacious mental states. For recall that PDA is the worry that the agent herself plays no 58 Velleman 2000, 123. 59 Horgan (2007) focuses on a problem that seems similar to PDA, what he calls the \"agent exclusion problem.\" Horgan's problem involves an apparent incompatibility between CTA and agency that arises from reflection of the phenomenology of acting: \"You experience your arm, hand, and fingers as being moved by you yourself – rather than experiencing their motion as ... being caused by you own mental states\" (187). PDA, on the other hand, involves an apparent incompatibility between CTA and agency that arises from reflection on the concepts of \"agential origin\" and \"mental-state-caused bodily movements.\" Thus PDA remains even if Horgan's problem is solved. For we may be satisfied in rejecting phenomenological challenges to CTA, while still hankering for an answer to the question of how bodily movements caused by mental states count as movements generated by the whole agent of whom they are states. 39 role in her movements when these movements are the result of the causal powers of subagential items. Notice, though, that we can simply skip over beliefs and desires and go straight to what, according to a broadly physicalist view of the mind, would be their neurophysiological realizers. In other words, it is not essential to PDA that the items endowed with causal powers that threaten the agent's own causal powers are mental. Rather, they can be neuro-physiological. The problem has the same structure either way – states of or parts of the agent, not the agent herself, cause the movements of an agent's body.60 And notice that, while there may be room to deny the inner-causes model of mental states as CE does, there seems to be no room – short of embracing dualism – of denying the causal role our neuro-physiology plays in generating the movement of human bodies. In the discussion that follows, I will generally interpret CTA along the lines of C – the version of CTA committed to beliefs and desires as inner items endowed with causal powers. At times, however, I will make explicit that we can also raise PDA's challenge in terms of the sub-personal neuro-physiological realizers of our mental attitudes. 1.7 Conclusion In this chapter I introduced the causal theory of action and traced two different interpretations of the theory. I also introduced the problem of disappearing agents. In the next chapter, I focus on PDA in more depth. After clarifying the various things proponents 60 Of course, there is a reading of this claim that should not be denied by anyone. This is to interpret it as the claim that in order for the agent herself to make any movements, to physically do anything, her parts must cause things to happen. The reductionist claim is that what it is for the agent to move herself is nothing other than these causal happenings among her parts. 40 of PDA could mean when they refer to an agent \"playing an active role\" in her behavior, I examine three of the most influential treatments of PDA in the work of Harry Frankfurt, Michael Bratman, and David Velleman. I argue that a version of PDA survives their responses, one that challenges CTA to answer the question of how movements caused by sub-agential items like mental states can count as movements made by the whole agent. In chapters 3 and 4 I sketch an answer to PDA's challenge that relies on embracing an Aristotelian conception of the nature of living things and a traditional conception of desire as a faculty that aims at the good. My aim is not to suggest that the view I offer is the only way for CTA to respond to PDA; rather, my goal is to make the Aristotelian view I suggest sound sufficiently plausible and compelling to warrant serious consideration as a way of thinking about the causal theory of action. 41 TWO The Problem of Disappearing Agents 2.1 Taking an Active Part? PDA claims that the problem with CTA is that agents do not play a role in the story of action the theory tells. Recall Velleman's complaint that in CTA's picture of agency, \"physiological and psychological events take place inside a person, but the person serves merely as an arena for these events: he takes no active part.\"61 A problem with understanding PDA and generating a response to it is that this notion of a person \"taking an active part\" in her action or being sufficiently \"involved\" with her behavior is elusive. What exactly does it mean to say that an agent plays an active role in her actions? We can get a handle on PDA's notion of \"taking an active part\" in our behavior by considering various categories of bodily movements, and asking what it might mean to say that the agent is or is not actively participating in them.62 In this section I articulate three different categories of bodily movements (a \"spectrum of agential involvement\") that I will use to help us understand PDA. 61 Velleman 2000, 123. 62 Let me clarify some terminology. In what follows, talk of \"playing an active role in\", \"being involved with\", \"participating in\", and other similar locutions refer to the same relation between an agent and her movements, i.e. the one PDA claims CTA fails to secure. 42 Here are the categories of agential involvement that will be my focus: 1. Robust Human Action: rationally motivated behavior that results from conscious deliberation and choice, e.g. eating a plate of veal after reflecting on the relevant moral issues. 2. Mundane Activity: intentional movement not preceded by a conscious exercise of practical reason, e.g. reaching out and opening the window because you feel warm. 3. Involuntary movement: bodily movements neither initiated nor controlled by the agent, e.g. having a seizure. Though we do not (yet) have a clear understanding of PDA's talk of \"playing an active role in\" one's behavior, it seems intuitive that these three cases represent varying degrees of this phenomenon. We can agree, I think, that as we go from 1 to 3 the agent becomes less involved in her behavior; she plays less of role in what she is doing. This spectrum of agential involvement is clearly not exhaustive, nor is it intended to be. We can easily imagine various other cases that implicate the idea of an agent's active involvement or role in her behavior that do not neatly fit into the three above categories. However, as will become clearer below, what concerns me are two specific ways in which we can understand agential involvement. The first involves the extent to which an agent's rational capacities for practical thought are involved in her behavior. The second has to do with the involvement of an agent's capacity for basic self-movement, i.e., the power to initiate and control movement one's bodily behavior. I will argue that discussions of PDA have focused 43 exclusively on the first issue, leaving the question of whether CTA tells the right story about the much more basic phenomenon of self-movement untouched. So as to forestall possible objections to my choice to focus on the three particular forms of agency I articulated above, I will start by saying a few things about various other examples of behaviors that I do not consider. First, there are ways of extending the upper and lower limits of the spectrum. Starting with the upper end, there are cases of human agency that are even more robust than the first case. For example, we may want to say that cases involving more long-term planning than that found in 1 are cases in which the agent is even more involved with her behavior. I can think of two reasons for this. First, planning is a sophisticated form of deliberation that takes time and concentration, and therefore it does not seem to be the kind of activities we can imagine going on \"off-line\", as it were, or without the agent's involvement. Second, actions that require planning, those that are more temporally extended, tend to play a greater role in our lives and our identities (a point Bratman emphasizes). At the other end of the spectrum, we may want to say an agent is even less involved in her behavior than she is in the seizure case when, say, she is blown about by the wind. The difference here is that one could at least point to an internal cause of the movements comprising the seizure, and thereby at least minimally implicate the agent's body. That is, we can at least say in the seizure case that the movements were caused by internal mechanisms inside the agent. This, of course, does not allow us to say that the movements comprising her seizure are ones she is intentionally or voluntarily performing, because the 44 mechanisms involved in their production are not those that subserve the capacity to initiate and control self-movement. So much for the upper and lower limits to the spectrum. We can also imagine intermediate cases of agential involvement that fall between the steps I articulate. For example, I do not mention a form of agency that likely falls somewhere between steps 2 and 3. I'll refer to this kind of behavior as mere voluntary movement. Here I am thinking of mindless activities like idly tapping one's foot while reading or drumming one's fingers on a table while listening to a lecture. While this kind of behavior is similar to what we find in 2, to the extent that it is voluntary movement that is not preceded by an exercise of practical reason, it does not quite rise to the level of mundane activity (as I am understanding it). One notable difference between these two forms of intentional movement involves their level of sophistication, and, concomitantly, the degree to which we can say the movements are performed without thinking about them. Mundane activity can be something like getting up off the coach and opening a window. This qualifies as more than mere voluntary movement because it involves things like competently navigating one's environment and having some awareness of, say, being warm or needing fresh air. Mere voluntary movement, on the other hand, need not involve skill or any conscious awareness. There are a couple of other interesting cases to consider.63 The first is the phenomenon of weakness of will. Where do weak willed actions fall on my spectrum? The answer is that they do not fall in any one place. The reason for this is that some weak willed 63 Maggie Little and Wayne Davis (respectively) suggested these cases. 45 actions might involve a great deal of planning and reflection, and thus qualify as more than basic self-movement. At the same time, the diminished power of self-control exhibited in instances of weak willed action surely does affect in some sense the notion of an akratic's involvement in her behavior.64 So the mundanely active agent may be less involved in her behavior than the akratic when the focus is on the engagement of some of her rational powers, such as the power to plan and deliberate, while she may be more involved in terms of other powers like self-control. That is, the agent in the midst of mundane activity may be doing something that, were she to reflect about it, she would end up endorsing as the thing to do. The akratic yet more robustly active agent is reflecting on what she is doing – hence her being more involved in her behavior in the sense of the engagement of rational capacities – but she is conflicted about her behavior and cannot fully control her execution of it. The second kind of case I do not consider involves the consequences of one's actions and the extent to which one intentionally brings them about. For example, I reach for one of two switches on the wall in an effort to turn on the light. I hit the wrong one and accidentally turn on the fan instead. Reaching for the switch is a case of mundane activity in which it seems appropriate to say I am playing an active role; that is, I am not sleepwalking, nor do I unintentionally bump into the wall. This suggests that if all had gone as planned and I had turned on the light, then I would have played an active role in bringing about the 64 Cases of weakness of will also raise questions beyond those relating to PDA's concept of \"playing an active role\", questions involving responsibility and the appropriateness of praise and blame. I take these to be separate, further questions that go beyond those about agential involvement. Consideration of these topics is beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that robust involvement, on the scale I articulate, does not entail that one qualifies for full moral responsibility or normative evaluation. 46 light's being on. When things do not go as planned, and I turn on the fan instead of the light, perhaps we can say that I did not play a fully active role in the fan's being on. The above discussion illustrates that PDA's concept of \"playing an active role\" in one's behavior is not univocal. As we have seen, an agent can be more or less actively involved in her behavior to the extent that she plans ahead, that her actions have their intended consequences, that she is not acting akratically, or that she is not mindlessly fidgeting. And, no doubt, there are other ways in which the notion of agential involvement can arise. None of these will be my concern, however. I am skipping over these cases to avoid muddying the already murky waters that talk of \"playing an active role\" in one's behavior gets us into. What is at issue between PDA and CTA can be addressed more clearly by emphasizing the two particular ways of understanding agential involvement I mentioned above – the full engagement of rational faculties and the basic capacity for selfmovement. In order to narrow in on these two understandings of agential involvement, let me now turn to the three cases of agency that comprise what I have been calling my spectrum of agential involvement. The first case, robust human action, is an example of behavior that issues from the full exercise of the agent's capacity for practical rationality. The agent conducts and guides the deliberative process prior to the behavior, and she initiates and controls the resulting movements that constitute her action. It is clear that the agent is fully involved in robust human action; there is no sense in which she is left out or fails to play a role in what she is doing. When it comes to PDA's concept of playing an active role in one's behavior, this is 47 an easy case. Notice, however, that most of the actions we perform involve little, if any, careful thought or prior deliberation. For this reason we cannot draw the lesson from the consideration of robust human action that what it is for an agent to play an active role in her behavior just is for her movements to come about via conscious thought about how to act. Otherwise, most of our voluntary behavior will not qualify as movements we actively perform. During any given stretch of time, if we are acting, it is likely we are participating in mundane activity – activities like turning on a faucet, walking a flight of stairs, steering one's car out of the driveway, or pushing a cart around the grocery store while scratching items off one's shopping list. If the agent plays less of a role or is less involved in this kind of behavior (compared to robust human action), then this must be because she does not fully exercise her powers of practical reason.65 But just like robust human action, mundane activity is initiated and controlled by the agent; and this allows us to say that here too the agent is playing an active role in what she is doing. For the absence of conscious deliberation or reflection from an agent's action does not render her a helpless bystander to the movements her body makes. Even movements we make without consciously thinking about them can be movements we perform, things we do. 65 Note that the absence of conscious practical reasoning from the immediate causal process leading to basic self-movement does not imply the complete absence of such thought from the broader causal history of our actions. There are many instances of common behavior that were not always part of one's repertoire of basic self-movement, behaviors that only become seamlessly incorporated into one's life after careful consideration of the reason (moral or otherwise) that support so acting. 48 Thus, if we want to say that the agent is not as fully involved in mundane activity (or non-robust action), we need to be clear about what it is we are claiming. We do not want to say that the lack of involvement registered at this level (when compared to robust human action) renders an agent's behavior defective or less than ideal. While stepping back and carefully considering how to act is appropriate in some situations, it is neither appropriate nor desirable much of the time. Someone who, in the regular course of things, devoted much thought to whether, for example, she should first shop for the items at the top of her list or those at the bottom, or whether she should use her left or her right hand to turn on the faucet, is not thereby functioning as an ideal agent. We may want to say that agents who never exercise their deliberative capacities are deficient as agents (though we should not assume this is even possible). But we do not want to say that there is anything deficient about having these capacities and not always (fully) exercising them. As Williams taught us, there are times when acting automatically in response to one's situation is exactly what is called for. In these situations, thinking about how to act amounts to having \"one thought too many.\" It is important to keep in mind that, in distinguishing between robust agency and mundane activity in terms of the involvement of rational faculties, I am not suggesting that, given the relative infrequency of instances of robust agency in our daily lives, we get along most of the time without the use of our rational capacities. As rational animals our lives are imbued with rationality; as Robert Brandom observes, we \"live and move and have our 49 being in the space of reasons.\"66 As a result, our reaching out and grabbing a banana, peeling it, and eating it is different from a monkey's doing so; and these differences can be cashed out in terms of the norms governing human eating and the role eating plays in a human life. Part of maturing as a human being consists in getting better at grasping these norms and structuring one's behavior in accordance with them. So while mundane activity is characterized by the lack of full engagement with one's rational faculties prior to and during action, this does not imply that this kind of workaday behavior is thereby completely divorced from these faculties. The fact that all of our behavior takes place within a structure of norms guarantees that all of our actions involve rationality. What is important for my purposes, though, is that the issue of whether one's behavior conforms to social norms does not track the issue of whether one's playing an active role in one's behavior. The explicit engagement of our rational powers does, I argue, track this difference, which is why I have focused on this. The difference between robust human action and mundane activity has to do with the extent to which an agent's practical reason plays a role in the immediate causal history of her behavior. The line separating these two cases, however, is not the line that determines whether an agent plays an active role in her bodily movements. Intuitively, it seems agents play an active role in both robust human action and mundane activity because the movements that constitute both forms of behavior result from an exercise of the agent's capacity to initiate and control her bodily movements. I will refer to this package of 66 Brandom 1994, 5. 50 capacities as an agent's capacity for basic self-movement.67 This is not to deny that the distinction between robust human action and mundane activity marks a genuine difference in forms of agency. The full engagement of practical rationality makes an important difference to the nature of the movements that result from it; and we need not have a problem describing this difference in terms of an agent being more involved in or playing a more active role in them. However, if an agent's body is moving, but these movements are not a result of an exercise of her capacity for self-movement, then what is going on with her does not qualify as agency at all. Though the agent's moving, she is not performing her movements or bringing them about herself. I am arguing that the distinction between robust human agency and mundane activity does not track the important difference between cases when agents are voluntarily moving themselves and cases in which agents are simply being moved (by either external or internal causes). In order to draw this line, the line between cases in which an agent plays an active role in her movements and those in which she does not tout court, we need to compare robust human action and mundane activity with the third form of movement in the spectrum of agential involvement, involuntary movement. The seizure case is a clear example of bodily movements in which the agent plays no role at all. This is because seizures afflict those who suffer from them. They are events that happen to someone, things one undergoes. Missing 67 In packaging the capacity to initiate movement with the capacity to control movement, I am obviously skipping over the question of whether these capacities necessarily go together. Though there may in fact be cases of creatures with only one or another of these capacities – no doubt it is possible whether or not it is actual – for the sake of my discussion I am only going to focus on those who have them both. I think the best interpretation of PDA's notion of \"playing an active role\" in one's behavior involves, at minimum, the two capacities. 51 from the causal etiology of the person's bodily movements is any engagement at all with either her reason or with her basic capacity for self-movement. What this means is that, unlike the other two cases, the third case it is not an instance of agency at all. Things are happening here, but nothing's being done. This case is aptly described in terms of the agent \"disappearing\", and not of just playing a less active role in her behavior. 2.2 Two Important Distinctions We can draw a couple of conclusions from the above considerations. By comparing robust human action and mundane activity we see that we can be actively involved in our behavior without deliberating or fully engaging our rational capacities before or while acting.68 What secures this involvement is what is common to both cases, namely, the exercise of an agent's basic capacity for self-movement, that is, the fact that the agent initiates and controls the movements that constitute her action. In other words, in both robust human action and mundane activity the agent is actively moving, not passively being moved. This is why, unlike the seizure case, the first two cases are examples of agency. They are both ways of being active instead of passive. The first two cases, though they differ in the degree to which an agent's higher-order rational faculties are involved, are both examples of activity, movements that the agent performs. In the case of involuntary movement, the person is completely passive; none of the relevant movements are traceable to her as initiator or source. Here we can say the 68 If the proponent of PDA disagrees, then her standard for what counts as agency is too high. It would imply that most of what we do fails to qualify as agency. It would also imply that only rational creatures are agents, thereby making automatons out of most of the animal kingdom. Both of these implications are implausible. 52 agent does not play any role in her bodily movements; her body's moving but she is not moving it. Thus, in order to understand PDA and the concept of 'playing a role in one's behavior' endemic to it, we must be careful not to confuse what separates robust human action and mundane activity from each other with what separates both forms of agency from involuntary movement. The examination of the three kinds of bodily movements has yielded two distinctions: 1. Activity vs. Passivity (cases 1 & 2 vs. case 3) 2. Robust Agency vs. Non-Robust Agency (case 1 vs. case 2) The first distinction drives a wedge between agency and mere bodily movements, while the second distinction drives a wedge between kinds of agency. To be an agent simpliciter is to have one's movements fall on the left-hand side of the first distinction, to have the basic capacity for self-movement – the power to initiate and control the movements of one's body. This is what allows us to say that there can be non-rational and inanimate agents. Obviously, cats and the Mars Rover are not capable of robust agency, but again this more sophisticated form of action does not set the minimal criterion for having the capacity for purposive activity. Many philosophers would reject this notion of agency as the exercise of the basic capacity for self-movement as too thin. One reason for this is that a common assumption among many philosophers of action and moral psychologists is that agency is irreducibly normative, meaning it essentially involves being sensitive to and responding to reasons. That is, one common assumption is that the two capacities mentioned above, reason and the 53 power to initiate and control action, must be one and the same. Even richer versions of this rationalistic understanding of agency claim that to be an agent is to have a status that qualifies a person as an apt candidate for praise and censure (Strawson's \"reactive attitudes\"). On this account of agency, not only must a creature be sensitive to reasons in order to be an agent, the creature must also be situated within a community of similarly endowed rational agents.69 We need not deny that this normative conception may capture one way we have of thinking about agency, an understanding that brings thoughts of autonomy and responsibility in its wake. However, we should reject it as an account of the minimal criteria of what it is to be an agent. The most compelling reason for rejecting this rationalistic conception is that it overintellectualizes agency to such an extent that it narrowly restricts the class of agents to developed, well-functioning human beings. But human beings are not the only creatures who do things. As Harry Frankfurt explains: agency is not unique to human beings or even to humans together with those various less evolved animals that may be regarded as also capable of some mode of practical reasoning. The difference between a creature that is actively in control of its own movements and a creature that is being moved passively by forces over which it has no control is familiarly instantiated even among species too primitive to engage in rational or deliberative thought. When they are active rather than passive, the members of those species function as agents even though processes of practical reasoning cannot plausibly be attributed to them.70 69 Note the requirement of communal situatedness is not to be understood as something in addition to or over and above the reasons sensitivity requirement. The reason for this is that, on this view, being reasons sensitive, i.e. being a rational being, itself necessarily requires communal situatedness. See Brandom 1994. 70 Frankfurt 2002, 90. 54 Frankfurt illustrates this with the example of a spider. If we administer an electric shock to the spider its legs will move, yet the spider will not be moving itself; the spider is simply moving, just as the limbs of a tree move when blown by the wind. In this case, Frankfurt says, the spider is \"passive with respect to the movements of its legs.\"71 When the spider is busily spinning a web or devouring its prey, on the other hand, it is active with respect to the movements – initiating and controlling them. Though this behavior lacks any connection to rational capacities, it still amounts to activity, movements that the spider performs rather than undergoes. The same reasoning applies to inanimate agents as well. There is a difference, say, between an engineer raising a robot's arm and the robot raising it.72 The fact that the thin conception of agency, which characterizes agency in terms of the basic capacity for self-movement, captures these other cases of active individuals speaks in favor of rejecting the normative, rationalist view as setting the minimal criterion of agency. Let me briefly recap at this point. The examination of PDA's notion of taking an active part or playing an active role in behavior resulted in two distinctions – the active/passive distinction and the robust/non-robust distinction – that we can use to frame our evaluation of PDA's criticism of CTA. Corresponding to the two distinctions are two senses in which an agent can play an active role in her behavior. The active/passive distinction is the basis upon which we determine whether someone's bodily movements count as agency. The criteria here are whether the agent exercised her basic capacity for selfmovement in producing the movements that constitute her action. If the agent's 71 Frankfurt 1988, 58. 72 See Hauser 1994. 55 movements arise from an exercise of this capacity, then we can say that the agent is playing an active role in the behavior. On the other hand, she is not involved in the process if her body's moving but she is not moving it. Once this determination has been made and we have movement that qualifies as agency, then the second distinction applies. In applying the robust/non-robust distinction, we ask to what extent did the movements issue from the agent's rational capacity for deliberation and reflection. If the movements are the immediate upshot of practical reasoning, then we have robust agency. What it means to say that the agent is playing an active role in her behavior here is that it is an expression of an engagement of those powers and capacities that make her rational. Thus, to say an agent's not playing an active role in non-robust agency means that the behavior does not immediately implicate the agent's rationality. The question now is, when PDA criticizes CTA for failing to allow an agent to play an active role in her behavior, is the complaint that CTA does not capture exercises of the basic capacity for self-movement? Or, is the complaint that, while CTA does capture basic self-movement, and thereby tells a sufficient story about mundane activity, it fails as an account of robust human action? As I argue in the following section, the focus in the contemporary debate over PDA has been on CTA's ability to account for robust human action. The charge is that we need more than beliefs and desires in our motivational psychology in order to get the exercise of rational capacities into CTA's picture of action. As I go on to argue, focusing on the more sophisticated forms of agency that humans are 56 capable of leaves untouched the more fundamental question of whether CTA captures the basic capacity for active self-movement. 2.3 Current Approaches to PDA We can now return to the problem of disappearing agents (PDA) and the causal theory of action (CTA). At the outset of this discussion, I turned to David Velleman for an articulation of PDA. His complaint is that if agency works the way CTA says it does, then an agent is merely an arena in which certain movement-generating events take place. As a result, the agent \"takes no active part\" in her behavior. In a similar vein, Michael Bratman notes that in cases of genuine agency \"the agent is the source of, determines, directs, governs the action,\" whereas CTA positions the agent as \"merely the locus of a series of happenings, of causal pushes and pulls.\"73 Inspired by Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical conception of the will, Bratman and Velleman have both developed sophisticated versions of CTA with an eye to repairing the shortcoming they see aptly expressed by PDA. I use the label representative reductionism to refer to the sort of theory they develop because the additional, higher-order mental states they add to CTA are meant to stand-in for the agent herself in the causal process leading to and resulting in intentional movements. In the discussion that follows, I trace the development of PDA in the contemporary literature from Frankfurt's hierarchical account of the will to Velleman and Bratman's attempts to use this account to fortify CTA against PDA. After laying out the essentials of 73 Bratman 2001, 311 57 Velleman and Bratman's views, I return to the two distinctions that fell out of the discussion of PDA's notion of playing an active role in one's behavior. I argue that while their views may enable CTA to better capture the robust/non-robust distinction, they fail to acknowledge the possibility that the PDA arises at the level of the more fundamental distinction between activity and passivity. If CTA cannot secure an agent's involvement in her behavior at this basic level, then no matter what kind of sophisticated causal theory of robust agency one develops (as Bratman and Velleman do), it will never get the agent actively involved in the story of action CTA tells. 2.3.1 Frankfurt A leitmotif of Harry Frankfurt's writings on action is the important role the capacity for critical self-evaluation plays in the lives of human agents. Frankfurt thinks this reflexive evaluative capacity is an essential characteristic of personhood.74 He describes this capacity in terms of the hierarchical structure of the human will. The structural components of the will's hierarchy are an agent's desires, and a desire's position on the hierarchy – its \"order\" – is determined by the object of the desire and by the kind of reflection that goes into its formulation and maintenance. The object of a first-order desire is the world, in the sense that it is a desire to pursue a certain course of action, to make the world a certain way. Having first-order desires seems to require no reflective capacities at all. Moving up the hierarchy, the object of a second-order desire is an agent's first-order desires; they are desires about desires. 74 Cf. Korsgaard 1997 and 2002 58 \"Someone has a desire of the second order,\" Frankfurt explains, \"when he wants a certain desire to be his will.\"75 The capacity to formulate second-order desires is constitutive of the capacity to critically monitor and exercise control over the desires that move us to action. As a result of having the power to form second-order desires, \"when a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is either the will he wants or a will he wants to be without.\"76 Having this ability opens up to a person the question of what her will is to be; that is, a person is someone for whom the nature of her will is an issue, a problem to be solved or handled, struggled with or ignored. An agent has the will she wants when she is moved to action by first-order desires that are the object of some of her second-order desires. Frankfurt illustrates his hierarchical picture of the will by considering cases of defective agency, instances in which an agent feels torn between conflicting motivational impulses and is unable to exert rational control over her behavior. He imagines an unwilling addict who \"hates his addiction and always struggles desperately, although to no avail, against its thrust\": He tries everything he thinks might enable him to overcome his desires for the drug. But these desires are too powerful for him to withstand, and invariably, in the end, they conquer him. He is an unwilling addict, helplessly violated by his own desires.77 This unfortunate agent experiences two troubling psychic conflicts, one between two firstorder desires and the other between a first and second-order desire. The first conflict results from the fact that the unwilling addict both wants to and does not want to take the drug 75 Frankfurt 1988, 16. 76 Frankfurt 1988, 19. 77 Frankfurt 1988, 17. 59 simultaneously. His first-order motivational attitudes are pulling him in two directions. The second conflict arises because the unwilling addict is not ambivalent about which of these desires he wants to be the one upon which he acts. It is the desire to avoid the drug, not the desire to take it, that the he \"wants to be effective and to provide the purpose that he will seek to realize in what he actually does.\"78 By having this second-order desire to avoid the drug the unwilling addict identifies himself with this desire, thereby disassociating himself from the urge to light up. If the force of this second-order desire does not effectively render the desire to avoid the drug motivationally efficacious, then, according to Frankfurt, the addict is alienated from the desire that moves him and from the behavior it generates. This is not to say that the unwilling addict does not get what he wants; he does, after all, desire the drug. But this is decidedly not the kind of desire he wants to be acting on. A drug addict is not the kind of person he wants to be. Acting on the desire for the drug conflicts with a conception of himself he is come to value upon reflection, one that he is struggling to attain. Reflection on the case of the unwilling addict case, and the behavior brought about by motives with which the agent does not identify herself – the phenomenon of alienated agency – leads to PDA's talk of an agent not playing an active role in her behavior. Frankfurt himself describes the unwilling addict's situation in similar terms: \"the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is ... against his will that this force moves him 78 Frankfurt 1988, 18. 60 to take it.\"79 Bratman and Velleman pick up on this language and use it as a catalyst for the development of a richer causal theory of action, one equipped with the resources to respond to cases of alienated agency. 2.3.2 Bratman and Velleman One lesson to draw from Frankfurt's view is that any adequate philosophical theory of human agency must contain the resources to account for our capacity for critical selfevaluation. Frankfurt accounts for this capacity by appeal to higher-order desires. However, as Gary Watson argues, Frankfurt's hierarchical theory does not preclude the possibility that agents will not also experience the same sense of alienation they do from some of their firstorder desires from their second-order desires as well.80 And if this is a possibility, then identification with action-motivating desires via endorsement by higher-order states cannot guarantee non-alienated action. It is this limitation of Frankfurt's hierarchical view to which Bratman and Velleman are directly responding. Unlike Frankfurt, however, they are both 79 Frankfurt 1988, 18. It is important to note that Frankfurt is not actually raising the problem of disappearing agents (PDA) here. This is because (unlike Bratman and Velleman) he is not concerned with CTA and the project of developing a reductive theory of human agency. His aim, rather, is diagnostic. The hierarchical picture of the will is offered up as an illustrative way of articulating what is distinctive about the forms of agency available to rational creatures like us, not as a complete metaphysics of agency. Therefore, the fact that, like CTA, Frankfurt's hierarchical view of the will only appeals to mental states and events is not the basis for foisting on Frankfurt the ambition of giving a naturalized theory of action. In other words, we misread Frankfurt's work if we conclude from the fact that Bratman and Velleman both rely on Frankfurt in the service of reductive naturalism that this is what Frankfurt himself was trying to do. Velleman is clearly guilty of this misreading when he claims that Frankfurt's work is \"the best sustained attempt [at] explaining how an agent's causal role supervenes on the causal network of events and states\" (Velleman 2000, 132). 80 Watson 1975. 61 explicitly concerned with how the capacity for critical reflection and the possibility of alienated agency can fit into the reductive framework of the causal theory (CTA). To examine Bratman and Velleman's work, let us return again to Velleman's characterization of CTA: There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means ... jointly cause an intention ... which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body.81 Bratman and Velleman argue that, unlike Frankfurt's hierarchical account of the will, CTA provides no way of regulating the agent's motivational psychology in a way that allows only those desires that are a proper part of the agent's self-conception to have causal efficacy. It seems, in fact, that the sole determinant of a particular desire's motivational potential is something inherent in the desire, namely its strength or intensity. This suggests that the most vivid, compelling, or gripping desires are the ones most likely to motivate our behavior at any given time. But such desires are the very ones that threaten the possibility of alienation; and, as Bratman puts it, alienated desires render an agent \"less the source of the activity than a locus of forces.\"82 So we arrive at the worry that the agent fails to participate in her action because there seems to be nothing other than motivational intensity determining the agent's behavior. This motivational intensity, by its very nature, puts the agent herself on the sidelines of the unfolding of her action. CTA does not tell an adequate story of agency because nothing in the story plays the regulatory role over the agent's desires 81 Velleman 2000, 123. 82 Bratman 2001, 312. 62 that ensures an agent's motivations are truly her own. This is not to say, however, that CTA cannot be fortified to deal with this, in particular by tinkering with the kinds of mental states go into the etiology of action. This is Bratman and Velleman's project. Bratman and Velleman attempt to improve upon Frankfurt's hierarchical picture by expanding the collection of mental states that tend to be included in the hierarchy as well as in formulations of CTA, i.e., beliefs, desires, intentions. They argue that, while Frankfurt's hierarchical strategy has the right structure, his elementary selection of psychological attitudes prevents his view from serving the purposes of keeping agents in story of their actions. At the same time, they also argue that Frankfurt's view is insufficiently naturalistic because of its reliance on the idea of an agent identifying with her motives. Recall, the issue is to give an account of an agent actively participating in her behavior (a notion we are still getting a grip on at this point), one that does not make any appeals to irreducible or non-naturalistic phenomena like agent-causation. Frankfurt's hierarchical conception of the will – the idea of an agent identifying with her motivating attitudes via the formation of higher-order desires – can be read as an attempt to pull this off. Bratman and Velleman, however, argue that Frankfurt simply substitutes one notion of agent-causation for another. That is, instead of reducing agent-causation to an event-causal story about mental states, what Frankfurt actually does is \"posit self-identification as a primitive mental phenomenon.\"83 That is, Frankfurt assumes that when endorsement occurs the agent is necessarily participating; otherwise, the hierarchical view falls victim to Watson's 83 Velleman 2000, 136. 63 regress problem – the continuation of the problem of alienation into an infinite string of higher-order desires. As a result of this assumption, they argue, Frankfurt smuggles into the attempt to reduce agent-causation another form of agent-causation in the guise of an agent's endorsing or identifying with her motivations. Bratman and Velleman extend Frankfurt's view in two ways. First, they add richer, more sophisticated attitudes to the hierarchy. Second, they purge from Frankfurt's picture any appeal to attitudes like identification that presuppose agent-causation. Since, as Velleman notes, \"substituting one instance of agent-causation for another, as the target of reduction, does not advance the reductionist project.\" Another strategy is required. He recommends the following: The way to advance the reductionist project is not to substitute one agent-causal phenomenon for another as the target of reduction, but to get the process of reduction going, by breaking agent-causation into its components. And surely, the principal component of agent-causation is the agent himself. Instead of looking for mental events and states to play the role of the agent's identifying with a motive, then, we should look for events and states to play the role of the agent.84 So the suggestion is that instead giving an account of something the agent must do in order to play an active role in her behavior (this begs the question of agent-causation), what we need to do instead is develop a reduction of the agent herself that only appeals to mental states and events. Velleman admits this sounds somewhat bizarre. \"Of course, the agent is a whole person, who is not strictly identical with any subset of the mental states and events that occur within him.\"85 He argues in response, \"a complete person qualifies as an agent by 84 Velleman 2000, 137. 85 Velleman 2000, 137-138. 64 virtue of performing some rather specific functions ... [i.e.] the deliberative processes constitutive of agency.\" He explains: the agent's role is to adjudicate conflicts of motives ... [therefore] the agent ... is that party who is always behind, never in front of, the lens of critical reflection, no matter where in the hierarchy of motives it turns.86 We reduce the agent, therefore, by identifying those mental states that can causally interact with other attitudes in such a way that they can be considered \"functionally identical\" to the agent herself. Thus, we can refer to this kind of view as representative reductionism; for it provides a reductive account of an agent actively playing a role in her behavior by appealing to a mental state that can functionally represent the agent in practical thought. Let us now take a brief look at Bratman and Velleman's specific versions of representative reductionism. Bratman's proposal begins with an assumption of a broadly Lockean conception of personal identity, wherein an agent's temporal persistence is constituted by various connections and continuities among various psychological attitudes. He argues that the way to secure an agent's role in her actions is by adding to CTA's mix certain attitudes that play a particularly important role in the cross-temporal organization of that aspect of an agent's psychology that influences action. Such attitudes, he argues, are higher-order policies to treat certain kinds of desires as reason giving in one's practical deliberation. As he explains, this seems a promising strategy in part because such higher-order intentions, plans, and policies have, as a matter of function, tight connections to the temporal 86 Velleman 2000, 139-140. 65 extension of agency. This is why they are candidates for attitudes that, because of their role in our agency, can speak for the agent.87 Thus, Bratman focuses on higher-order policies about reasons as the right representatives of the agent for whom they are policies because, given a broadly psychologically reductionist account of personal identity, they are the kind of attitude essentially connected to the agent's personal identity. Velleman, on the other hand, identifies \"the desire to act in accordance with reasons\" as the agent's mental representative: What really produces the bodily movements that you are said to produce ... is that part of you that performs the characteristic functions of agency. That part, I claim, is your desire to act in accordance with reasons.88 The characteristic functions of agency he refers to are forms of intervention in the thought process leading to decisions about how to act and in the causal process the leads from decisions to intentions to bodily movements. Velleman argues that the reason he identifies the desire to act for reasons as the attitude that can be the agent's mental proxy in these intervening exercises is that an agent cannot be alienated from this attitude and still be an agent. That is, an essential property of being an agent, on Velleman's view, is having the desire to act in accordance with reasons play a role in the mental causal processes the lead to action. [A] person's desire to act in accordance with reasons cannot operate in him without its operation's being constitutive of his agency. What it is for this motive to operate is just this: for potential determinants of behavior to be critically reviewed, to be embraced or rejected, and to be consequently reinforced or suppressed. Whatever 87 Bratman 2001, 321-322. 88 Velleman 2000, 141. 66 intervenes in these ways between motives and behavior is thereby playing the role of the agent and consequently is the agent, functionally speaking.89 To put their views in the parlance of PDA, Bratman and Velleman argue that if we restrict CTA's psychological inventory to instrumental beliefs and first-order desires, then agents do not play an active role in their behavior in CTA's story of action. If we add to CTA's mental economy, in a way that does not implicitly assume agent-causation, the theory can overcome this problem. What is needed is a richer moral psychology that recognizes mental states that can conduct \"the deliberative processes constitutive of agency.\"90 According to Bratman, if we make room for higher-order plans about which desires to treat as reason-giving and allow these plans a role in the causal etiology of an agent's movements, then the agent is active with respect to these movements. Velleman proposes we add to CTA the desire to act for reasons, an ur-desire that functions in such a way that it guarantees an agent's active role in her behavior. In both theories, the reason the particular mental states emphasized guarantee the agent's participation in her behavior is their essential connection to the agent's constitution, i.e., to her existing as an agent both at a time and through time. Thus, CTA can overcome PDA and allow the agent to play an active role in her behavior – render her more than \"an arena in which certain physical and mental events take place\" or \" a locus of a series of...causal pushes and pulls\" – by adding to its mix of causally efficacious mental states those which have an essential connection to the agent. Having this connection enables these states to represent the agent in the reductive causal theory. 89 Velleman 2000, 142. 90 Velleman 2000, 140. 67 2.4 The Two Distinctions Revisited As we saw above, PDA's concept of an agent playing an active role in her behavior can be captured in terms of two distinctions, the active/passive distinction and the robust agency/non-robust agency distinction. Now that we have the essentials of Bratman and Velleman's views on board, we can ask which of these distinctions best captures what they are after. Does the addition of the mental states they recommend correct CTA's inability to account for the basic idea of self-movement – the idea of agent initiating and guiding one's movements – or is their embellishment of CTA intended to capture the more sophisticated phenomenon of robust human action? We can answer this question by returning to case of the unwilling addict, for both Bratman and Velleman take themselves to be responding to this type of case. I suggest that the proper way of interpreting the case of the unwilling addict is as follows. Despite feeling alienated from her motivating desires, the unwilling addict is still acting intentionally when she takes the drug. This behavior is not wholehearted on her part, and for this reason we can say that an important part of the unwilling addict's character is missing from her action. She plays less of a role in the action because the values that go along with being the person she really wants to be are not making a difference to what she does. But she is not literally utterly passive in the face of her desire for the drug. The desire has not rendered her unconscious or hijacked her motor control system. The desire is not a puppet master manipulating her limbs in such a way that she ingests the drugs. Therefore, the unwilling addict's behavior may be non-robust because her rational faculties are unable to 68 get control, but this does not mean it is not activity. The fact that her movements fall on the active side of the active/passive distinction means that taking the drugs is something she is doing, not something that is happening to her. If this is right, and if Bratman and Velleman aim to allow CTA to accommodate this kind of case, then it is clear that their concern is with the robust/non-robust issue and not the activity/passivity question. We can conclude from some of their other remarks that Bratman and Velleman would agree with this. That is, they both seem to think that CTA's inability to capture more than the kind of thing that goes on with the unwilling addict does not make it a failure as a general account of activity or intentional self-movement. Velleman makes it clear that his problem with CTA is not that it precludes the agent from being active simpliciter, that the issue is robust agency: Of course, every action must be someone's doing and must therefore be such that an agent participates in it, in the sense that he does it. But this conception of agential participation does not require anything that is obviously missing from [CTA]. What is missing from that story is agential participation of a more specific kind, which may indeed be missing from doings that count as cases – albeit defective or borderline cases – of action.91 When Velleman complains that \"nobody does anything\" in CTA's story of action, it may sound as if he is claiming that CTA renders agents passive with respect to their bodily movements, but this is not what he means. What he really means to say is that there is a sense of doing something that describes cases in which \"the distinctly human feature\" is present, cases of \"human action par excellence.\"92 From Velleman's point of view, to say that 91 Velleman 2000, 124. 92 Velleman 2000, 124. 69 CTA's guilty of PDA, that it leaves the agent out of the story of action, is to say that CTA cannot capture an agent's full engagement with her rational capacities. In other words, what is missing is not the agent herself qua active being; rather what \"disappears\" is her capacity for robust human action. Bratman is somewhat less explicit. But if we look at what he says, it is clear that he too thinks that CTA is not guilty of a broader failure to capture activity – that the shortcoming articulated by PDA has to do with the issue of robustness. He writes: When a person acts because of what she desires, or intends, or the like we sometimes do not want to say simply that the pro-attitude leads to the action. In some cases we suppose, further, that the agent is the source of, determines, directs, governs the action....\"93 Bratman does not seem to deny that a person can be acting when things go as CTA says they do, when \"the pro-attitude leads to the action.\" To say that the agent disappears from CTA's story of action, or to say that she is \"merely the locus of a series of happenings\" in the story, does not mean that she is literally not being active or not exercising her capacity for self-movement. Like Velleman, what this kind of talk is really pointing to is the robustness of the kind of agency CTA can accommodate, not whether it can accommodate activity tout court. So Bratman and Velleman agree that even though alienated agency does not qualify as robust human action, it does count as activity. Thus, from their perspective, PDA is not something that afflicts CTA as an account of basic activity; it is only when we want to tell a 93 Bratman 2001, 311 (emphasis added). 70 complete story of all forms of human agency, especially those in which our unique higher faculties come into play, that the view's inadequate. Given that this is their concern, I think it is fair to say that they both get a bit carried away when they claim that because CTA does not capture robust agency, agents in CTA's story of action are reduced to \"arenas in which events take place\" or \"loc[i] of a series of happenings\". This kind of language is much more apt for raising the charge that CTA does not capture basic self-movement. Agents really would be mere sites where certain events take place in CTA's story of action if the story it tells cannot capture agency is its most basic sense, the capacity to initiate and control selfmovement. But this is not the issue they address. That is, their treatment of PDA does not have to do with the active/passive distinction, but with the robust/non-robust distinction. The fact that Bratman and Velleman raise the robustness issue in terms more suited to question about basic activity and self-movement is a problem. Given that they are two of the most prominent contemporary philosophers of action, one who is worried about CTA at the level of basic self-movement might be seduced into thinking they have offered a viable solution to this problem. Whether one is satisfied with their solution or not, it now looks as if PDA, understood as a problem about basic activity, is to be solved by tinkering with the details of the mental states upon which CTA draws. But what if the source of PDA's challenge to CTA's ability to capture basic self-movement just is the causal theory's exclusive reliance on mental states as the causes of an agent's movements? The prominence of Bratman and Velleman's accounts then seems very unfortunate. For it distracts us from a quite different question about whether CTA captures the way in which agents are active as 71 opposed to passive when the act. If this is the real issue expressed by PDA, then no matter how sophisticated one makes the motivational psychology of agents in the causal theory, CTA will never capture the agent's participation in her behavior. You cannot get to the penthouse without first making it in at the ground floor. At this point, let me briefly retrace the steps of this discussion. We saw at the outset that PDA's claim that CTA leaves agents out of the story of action, that it fails to let the agent play an active role in her behavior, is not univocal. I have been focusing on two particular ways of understanding this claim. On one interpretation of PDA, the criticism of CTA has to do with the basic distinction between activity and passivity. The charge is that CTA does not get agents into the story at all because it cannot capture basic self-movement, i.e., the capacity to initiate and control our movements. On the other interpretation, the issue is not about whether agents in CTA's story are acting; rather the issue is about the robustness of the activity agents in this story can achieve. This is to say that agents are left out of CTA's story of action in the sense that the exercise of human agents' higher rational faculties cannot be accommodated by the causal theory. Velleman and Bratman focus on the second interpretation of CTA – the issue of robustness. Unfortunately, however, their rhetoric when giving descriptions of CTA's inability to capture robustness is put in terms that make agents seem completely passive in CTA's story of action. As a result, it is easy to think they offer a solution to the activity/passivity problem with respect to CTA, when what they in fact offer is a solution to the robustness/non-robustness problem. Their views leave open the question of whether CTA is guilty of PDA in the first sense; their views even 72 distract us from trying to answer this question. In the end, if basic activity poses a problem for CTA, and if the source of the problem is the theory's exclusive focus on mental states as the causes of bodily movements, then Bratman and Velleman cannot help the causal theory.94 2.5 CTA & Basic Self-Movement The purpose of this section is to articulate a way of understanding PDA that remains when we bring to the forefront the distinction between robust rational agency and basic selfmovement. I have argued that attempts to deal with PDA have restricted it to the case of robust agency. In the discussion that follows, I bring out a version of PDA that remains an open issue. 94 Before leaving Bratman and Velleman and turning to whether CTA can capture basic self-movement, it is important to note that the failure of their views to attend to this category of activity (the capacity for selfmovement) need not be seen as a major shortcoming for their views. The reason for this is that Bratman and Velleman can both respond that basic self-movement simply is not what concerns them, that what they're after is the form of agency that is distinctively human or ideally rational. Considered on their own terms as attempts to give reductive analyses of robust human action, it is possible that Bratman and Velleman's views are perfectly adequate. What matters for my argument is not whether their views, understood as accounts of robust agency, are adequate. What concerns me is the question of whether any account of robust agency suffices as a response to PDA. I am arguing that their views do not suffice. When causal theorists (like Bratman and Velleman) turn their attention to agency by looking into \"deliberative processes\", they overlook a great deal of what goes on in our lives that deserves to be called agency. This mundane activity essentially involves the exercise of an agent's power of motility or capacity for self-movement, which involves the power to initiate and control her movements. So long as PDA's concept of \"playing an active role\" in her behavior is exclusively interpreted along the lines of robust human action, the question of whether CTA's able to capture most of what a human agent does goes unanswered. And as I noted above, sophisticated causal theories like those of Bratman and Velleman cannot even get off the ground – the question of defending or rejecting them does not even arise – unless it is shown that basic activity can be understood reductively as bodily movements caused by mental states. So, in the end, my truck with Bratman and Velleman has to do with the level at which their theories are pitched, not with the details of the theories themselves. In fact the strategy of representative reductionism strikes me as the most plausible way of achieving a fully reduced or naturalized account of agency. This is why I pursue a similar strategy later on. 73 Bratman and Velleman start with reductionist ambitions; therefore, they take for granted that our actions are caused by the mental states that motivate us. Velleman's explicit about this: \"My objection to [CTA] is not that it mentions mental occurrences in the agent instead of the agent himself ... [CTA] cannot be faulted merely for alluding to states and events occurring in the agent's mind.\"95 As we have seen, Velleman's confidence here stems from his naturalistic commitments. CTA arises from the need to show that action \"consists in some, perhaps complex, causal structure involving events, states, and processes of a sort we might appeal to within a broadly naturalistic psychology.\"96 I argued in Chapter 1 that this event-causal analysis of human action is an instance of a broader explanatory principle that characterizes scientific methodology, namely, the idea that the functions of wholes are to be explained by the workings of their parts. CTA embodies this decompositional methodology by accounting for our ability to actively bring things about in the world in terms of subagential entities like mental states (and the neurological mechanisms that realize them). Notice that CTA's reductionism does not claim that in order for us to do any thinking or acting there must be all kinds of goings on among our parts. There is nothing reductive about the idea that in order for whole embodied agents to do things their parts must do things. This is just a claim about the necessary conditions for thought and action; given that we are embodied creatures, it should not be surprising that we cannot do anything without the stuff we are made of doing things as well. The reductive naturalist claim is much 95 Velleman 2000, 125, 130. 96 Bratman 2001, 312. 74 stronger. It says what it is for whole embodied agents to do things just is for their parts to do things. For many, the kind of reductionism informing CTA is worrisome; even dyed-in-thewool reductionists should not deny that there is something jarring (at least initially) about the claim that our doings are nothing other than causal interactions among our mental states and bodily limbs. The question PDA raises is whether this reductionist view gives any role to the agent herself in the generation of her movement. To begin considering this question, let us start with an example. Mia throws the baseball to the catcher to get the runner out. Mia's throw is an action – something she does – comprising movements she actively performs. Moreover, Mia's throw is an instance of basic activity because she simply noticed the runner heading home and threw. No doubt Mia wanted to get the runner out and thought that by throwing home she could, but she did not need to actually go through this instrumental reasoning in order to act.97 As an action, Mia's throw should fall within the scope of CTA; the theory should be able to tell a reductive story about what happens when Mia throws to home – a story like this: 97 It is probably not lost on the reader that I add this sentence as a formulation of a belief-desire explanation of Mia's throw to home. I think it is fair to complain that there is something artificial about the application of this kind of explanation in all actions, and the concomitant insistence that an agent in this situation really can be credited with the distinct mental states upon which the explanation relies. This kind of criticism is starting to bear fruit in artificial intelligence and robotics research. For example, the use of centralized representational states in the effort to design a robot that can competently navigate its environment has proven far less successful than the work by those (e.g. Brooks 1991) whose robots get around by directly responding to their environments. Hubert Dreyfus's discussion of the phenomenon of \"everyday coping\" in his influential book What Computers Cannot Do (Dreyfus 1992) is commonly credited with inspiring this anti-representationalist way of thinking. My defense of CTA is limited to considering PDA, yet a fuller defense of CTA would need to respond to the criticisms from this camp. 75 (CTAMia) Mia's desire to get the runner out (D(o)) and her belief that throwing home was a way to do this (B(t)) jointly caused the arm movements that constituted her throw to home. Or, Mia's throw = D(o)/B(t)-caused arm movements.98 With this on board we can now ask PDA's question: (PDAMia) If D(o)/B(t) caused Mia's arm movements, then what role did Mia play in these movements? As I noted in Chapter 1, CTA's reductionism about agency expresses a commitment to an explanatory and methodological strategy characteristic of modern science, namely, the practice of decompositional analysis. PDA is a specific instance, therefore, of a more general worry about the compatibility of the reductionism of science and the mental and agential phenomena that are the stuff of human existence. The general worry is that the agent doing the acting or the thinker doing the thinking disintegrates into the parts, processes, states, events, etc. that make her up. Nagel nicely voices this worry in an early article: If we begin with something that anyone would describe as an action, a man's tying his shoes, for example, we can break it down bit by bit until we have passed beyond the fingers and muscles ... to the level of changes in the permeability of cell walls and in the potential gradient at nerve synapses ... to alteration in the large molecules at the nucleus of the cell ... to the sub-atomic events on which that depends. At some point it will be clear that by traveling deep enough inside the person we have lost him, and are dealing not with the means by which he ties his shoes but with the physiological and mental substructure of his actions.99 98As I noted earlier, I am assuming that the causal pathway between D(o)/B(t) and the arm movement is \"nondeviant\". 99 Nagel 1969, 453. 76 The question is, at what point do we lose the agent? PDA suggests that we lose her as soon as we try to reduce capacities that we predicate of the whole person to causal interactions among mental states and limbs. For once we go even that far we can ask the kind of question raised by (PDAMia): if Mia's mental states caused her arm movements, then what did Mia have to do with them? As one recent commentator puts it, the worry is that no causal theory can serve to capture the crucial aspect of agency, the sense in which agents are active – as opposed to passive – in the production of their actions... [I]f we analyze [action] as an event caused in some particular way by events and states of an agent, there is always room to ask for a justification for equating those particular events with [movements brought about by] the agent herself.100 Importantly, as Nagel's remarks suggest, CTA is not alone here. A similar question can be directed at other endeavors to explain human behavior. For example, we can ask cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists about how movements caused by \"motor programs\" or \"mirror neurons\" count as active movements performed by the whole agent. PDA's question arises because CTA seems to be pointing to two separate and potentially competing causes of a particular bodily movement. It says that the agent's mental states caused the movements, and it allows that the agent herself caused them. Thus, PDA challenges the compatibility of two claims about agency CTA endorses: 1. The movements that constitute intentional actions are caused by mental states. 2. The movements that constitute intentional actions are caused by agents. We can illustrate this compatibility challenge by drawing an analogy between PDA and Jaegwon Kim's \"causal exclusion argument\" against the causal efficacy of the mental. Kim 100 Yaffe 2000, 122. 77 argues that acceptance of some form of physicalism commits one to mind-body supervenience. He explains this as the view that \"what happens in our mental life is wholly dependent on, and determined by, what happens with our bodily processes.\"101 The question this raises is, given that every bodily event has a bodily cause, how is a mental cause possible? It appears that mental causes must compete with physical causes, but it is not clear how they can. The mental seems to be crowded out by the physical. Just as it appears that mental competes with (and loses to) the physical if the former supervenes on the latter, so it seems that the agent competes with her mental states if CTA tells the right story about agency.102 Now that we have a clear sense of the more basic version of PDA, the question is what CTA can say in response. I develop such a response in the second half of this dissertation, the remaining two chapters. 2.6 Looking Forward In the next two chapters I offer a way of understanding agents and their parts (including their mental states), that fills in the story those worried about PDA still see 101 Kim 2005, 14. 102 It is easy for most contemporary philosophers of mind and action to overlook this because the debate about mental causation (wherein Kim's argument finds a home) focuses on the issue of whether we can secure the causal efficacy of mental states so that we can ensure our status as agents in the natural world. (For insightful discussions that do not overlook this point see Bayne & Levy 2006 and Horgan Forthcoming.) That is, it is easy to confuse what those who defend the possibility of mental causation within a physicalist metaphysics are after with what the proponent of PDA is after. But PDA argues that even if philosophers succeed in overcoming Kim's challenge to the causal efficacy of the mental (at least within the domain of action), this still will not get us agency, for agency involves bodily movements brought about by agents, not caused by the agent's mental states. And, PDA charges, there does not seem to be a story on offer about how an agent's capacity for self-movement can be reduced to the causal powers of mental states. 78 missing from CTA. This is a story about how it is that movements caused by sub-agential things like mental states can be understood as movements initiated and controlled by the agent herself. The story I offer takes a page from Bratman and Velleman's book insofar as I too aim to tell a reductionist story. A virtue of Velleman's view, in particular, is that it emphasizes the fact that the capacity for agency should not be understood any differently than other capacities we have. Velleman claims that we predicate certain capacities of people, such as the power to digest food and fight off infections, by virtue of the fact that proper parts of us are mechanisms whose function it is to exercise these capacities for us. \"When we say that a person digests his dinner or fights an infection,\" he writes, \"we do not mean to deny that these functions actually belong to some of his parts.\" This is meant to suggest that even though it may seem odd to understand our powers for agency in terms of the capacities of some of our inner mechanisms, this is already the way we understand ascriptions of powers to whole agents. \"Similarly, a person may be an initiator of actions – and hence an agent – in the sense that there is an action-initiating system within him.\"103 In what follows I argue that once the Aristotelian conception of the nature of human agents is in place, we can take this talk of an \"action-initiating system\" in stride. I defend the view that what plays the role of this system in human agents is the faculty of desire. I argue that if we understand the notion of desire in traditional terms that connects to the good, then a case can be made for seeing desires as the agent's reductive representative in the causal process described by CTA. Combining this good-based notion of desire with the 103 Velleman 2000, 138. 79 Aristotelian point that an agent's good is a constitutive principle determining the nature and function of its parts results in a picture of desire as the kind of mental state that is essentially connected to the agent's identity. This gives us grounds to ascribe movements caused by desire to the whole agent. Finally, because the view appeals to desire, rather than higherorder attitudes, the resulting account applies to the level of basic self-movement. 80 THREE Self-Movement & Constitutive Teleology 3.1 Introduction At the end of the previous chapter I discussed a version of PDA that applies at the level of basic self-movement. The problem arises because CTA seems to be pointing to two separate and potentially competing causes of a particular bodily movement. It says that the agent's mental states caused the movements, and it allows that the agent herself brought them about. PDA challenges the compatibility of two claims about agency CTA endorses: 1. The movements that constitute intentional actions are caused by mental states. 2. The movements that constitute intentional actions are caused by agents. Interpreted in light of these two claims the question raised by PDA can be stated as follows: how can we make sense of the claim that the movements performed by the whole are caused by some of its parts while claiming that the whole itself, and not just those causally efficacious parts, is causally responsible for the movements? The answer, which I formulate in this and the next chapter, is that some parts are related to the essential nature of the whole in such a way that what they do counts as the whole itself doing it. The purpose 81 of this chapter is to lay out the conceptual groundwork for this response to PDA. At the center of the discussion is the claim that self-movement is a normative concept. Causal theorists, of course, reject the notion that there is any competition between agents and their mental states in its story of what happens when someone acts. In this chapter I argue that they can defend their view by appeal to the fact that CTA is an instance of a widely accepted picture of behavior, one that accounts for the general capacity for something to move on its own. I'll refer to this view as the standard story of self-movement. If CTA can align itself with the standard story, this puts proponents of PDA in a tough position; for it would commit them to the claim that what happens when human beings (and any other agents within CTA's explanatory scope) move themselves is a phenomenon that cannot be accounted for by a theoretical model that seems to account for the behavior of every other kind of self-mover.104 As an instance of the standard story, CTA shows human agency as continuous with the way the rest of the world works. That is a strong reason for preferring it to the kind of non-reductive view suggested by those who raise PDA. In this chapter I present a normative (Aristotelian) interpretation of the standard story of self-movement. I aim to garner support for this interpretation of the standard story by demonstrating how it allows for a unified account of the self-movement of three different types of agents: artifactual agents, conventional/collective agents, and organic agents. The particular focus in this chapter is on artifactual agents like like robots and conventional/ 104 This is not to say that by aligning itself with the standard story of self-movement CTA must be committed to the view that the explanation of human behavior is no different from that of, say, an autonomous robot or a honey bee. Surely there can be more and less sophisticated versions of a single form of explanation. 82 collective agents like teams and corporations. I leave treatment of organic agents – the class into which human agents obviously fall – for the following chapter. The reason I start by focusing on self-moving artifacts and collectives is that it is easier to make explicit an essential feature of my normative interpretation of the standard story, one that shows up in the part-whole relation that exists between self-moving agents and their parts, when considering these kinds of agents than when the focus is on organisms. This is the idea that self-moving agents are teleologically constituted – the nature and function of parts of a selfmover are essentially related to the overall ends and aims of the agent as a whole. Therefore, constitutive teleology characterizes the conditions that must be in place for us to apply the standard story of self-movement, that is, for us to be able to say, of some particular internal cause, that the movements it causes are properly counted as movements the whole agent is performing. It is this idea of constitutive teleology that is more easily made conspicuous in the case of artifacts and collectives than it is in the case of organic agents. 3.2 The Standard Story of Self-Movement At the heart of my analysis of the standard story is the idea that self-movement is a normative concept, i.e. the determination of whether or not something's movements are correctly identifiable as genuine self-movement depends on certain normative considerations. The purpose of this section is to articulate the normative elements of self-movement and identify the conditions upon which these normative elements depend. Along the way, I 83 examine, in this and the remaining sections, how these conditions are specifically instantiated in two different kinds of self-moving agent, artifacts (robots) and collectives (teams). It is important to note that it is no part of my argument that my Aristotelian interpretation of the standard story is the only way to account for what happens when agents purposively move themselves; or, that there are not cases of self-movement that seem to work differently than how the standard story says self-movement works. It is possible that there are cases of self-movement that do not involve any of the normative considerations I go on to discuss. I do think, however, that paradigmatic cases of self-movement, such as what is on display when autonomous robots or the Mars Rover or cheetahs or police officers navigate their environments, do in fact involve the normative framework I develop. There is a common structure to these core kinds of cases that is revealed by the normative analysis I present. Dretske gives a clear statement of the standard story of self-movement: \"behavior is endogenously caused movement, movement that has its causal origin within the system whose parts are moving.\"105 This seems obviously right. Just compare, for example, the difference between intentionally taking a seat on the lawn and being pushed to the ground by a strong wind. It is clear that \"the locus, internal or external, of the cause\" of movement is the salient difference between the two cases – one a case of voluntary behavior, the other a case involuntary movement. 106 Thus, we have the standard story's basic thesis: 105 Dretske 1998, 2. 106 Dretske 1998, 10. 84 (BT) Self-movement is internally caused bodily movement. I refer to this as the basic thesis to highlight the fact that, in order to arrive at a complete account of self-movement, we need to go beyond the claim that a given bodily movement counts as self-movement if it is the effect of a cause internal to the mover. We can begin adding to (BT) by attending to the difficulties that go along with trying to make sense of the notions of \"internal\" and \"external\" at work in the standard story. What exactly does it mean to say that the cause of movements comprising self-movement is internal to the agent? Dretske notes, \"internal [cannot] simply mean inside or underneath the skin, fur, fins, feathers, or whatever\" of an agent.107 Too see this imagine that Scooter, my Jack Russell Terrier, swallows an electrode that can send signals to his motor cortex resulting in the wagging of his tail. Here we have endogenously produced movement, movement with an internal cause, yet we do not want to say that the movement is something Scooter does or performs. What needs to be added to the picture is the idea that the internal cause must be \"a proper or integral part of the system exhibiting the behavior.\"108 The problem with the electrode is that it is not connected to Scooter in the right way for it to be the right kind of thing to cause self-movement. Specifying that the internal cause must be a proper part of the mover, and not just something attached to or inside of it, gives us our first addition to (BT): (BT+P) Self-movement is movement caused in the right way by a proper part of the mover. 107 Dretske 1988, 3. 108 Dretske 1988, 3. 85 There are reasons to think that, like (BT), (BT+P) also fails to specify a sufficient condition for self-movement. To see this, consider another example, a case of a self-moving artifact. We do not say that just any movement a robot, machine, or other artifact makes counts as self-movement (assuming it is the kind of thing some of whose movements we think do have this status). When a mobile robot's in good working order, it seems reasonable to say that when the mechanisms responsible for its locomotive capacities are performing their functions, the robot is moving itself. Now let us imagine a robot that is not in good working order, one that has a fault in the mechanism responsible for preventing the robot from overheating. We can imagine that this mechanism malfunctions in such a way that it disengages the motor-control mechanism and takes over the function of causing the robot to move about. We can even imagine that, at least in the short term, these randomly generated movements somehow manage to mimic the very same movements the robot would make if its movements had their usual causal origin. Here we have a case of internally caused movement by a proper part, but I do not think we should say this counts as a real case of the robot's self-movement (I will explain why in a moment). Comparing these two cases suggests that the way to further refine the basic thesis (BT) and improve upon (BT+P) is to add requirement (R): self-movement must be caused by the right part. This gives us the following: (SM) Self-movement is movement caused by the right proper part of the mover.109 109 As I noted earlier, I am assuming that that the causal chain is \"non-deviant\". Thus, the reader can attach the phrase \"in the right way\" whenever I speak of a mechanism causing movement. 86 To recap: we began with the basic thesis (BT) at the heart of the standard story, the claim that self-movement consists in bodily movement generated by an internal cause. The case of Scooter swallowing the electrode illustrated why (BT) is not sufficient. What is \"internal\" about the cause of movements that count as self-movement goes beyond being literally under the agent's skin. It also involves being connected to the agent in a certain way. Thus, we must add to (BT) the requirement (P), which states that the internal cause be a proper part of the agent. The example of the robot's malfunctioning thermostat demonstrated why even (BT+P) does not adequately account for self-movement. The lesson of the robot example is that movements that are ascribable to the whole agent, movements that qualify as self-movement, are not brought about by just any part of the agent. We need to add to (BT+P) the requirement (R): movements must be brought about by a particular part of the agent – the right part. 3.3 The Proper Cause of Self-Movement At this point we have a general picture of the standard story of self-movement. As a resource from which to generate CTA's response to PDA, however, this general picture is inadequate. Without a further story about what it means to say that mental states are the right internal causes, or about the criteria for qualifying as the proper kind of internal cause, (SM) does not tell us very much. As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, we can interpret PDA as posing the following question to CTA: Why do mental states not crowd out or compete with the agent in CTA's story of what happens when someone acts? Saying 87 that mental states are the right internal causes does not provide a substantive answer to this question. So we are left with an important question: (Q1) What makes a mechanism the right cause of self-movement? Answering this question will involve making explicit the normative underpinnings of the concept of self-movement I mentioned earlier. To begin with, it is important to note that what makes a certain mechanism the proper source of a robot's self-movement is not a matter of stipulation; it is not a matter of an arbitrary assignment of that status to one of its parts. If this were the case, then there would be no real difference between the movements caused by a malfunctioning thermostat and those brought about by a robot's motor-control mechanism. There would not be anything about the movements themselves or their causes that would distinguish the whole agent actively moving itself from the whole agent passively being moved by one of its parts. But there are differences here. For one thing, beyond being a cause of the robot's movements, being the right movement-causing mechanism involves being hooked up to other mechanisms that perform functions that assist with or benefit from the resulting movements. This is important because a mobile robot lacking connections between, say, its motor-control and its perceptual systems will not be able to reliably and effectively serve any of the purposes or perform any of the functions for which it was designed. In the robot example I have been considering, the faulty thermostat manages to cause movements of the robot that mimic the movements the motor-control mechanism would cause given the robot's environmental conditions. Unlike the motor-control 88 mechanism, however, the faulty thermostat is not connected – at least in the same direct way – to the robot's perceptual or sensory systems. This is why we can say that the fact that the movements caused by the faulty thermostat manage to get the robot around its environment successfully is an accident. For the movements' characteristics, say, their speed and direction, are not a result of the robot appropriately reacting to its surroundings. As a result, there is nothing purposive or deliberate about the movements.110 This is evident when we note that artifactual agents like mobile robots are designed to perform certain functions, to do certain jobs, to pursue certain ends. This is why they are built with functional parts designed to support capacities like perception and self-movement. Thus another way of articulating the difference between the movements caused by the faulty thermostat and those caused by the motor-control mechanism is to say the first set of movements do not contribute to the performance of the functions the robot's designed to perform – at least, that is, they do not do this in any reliable way. Though these random movements happen to mimic what the robot would be doing if the motor-control mechanism was in play at the moment in these particular conditions, it is obvious that – barring something close to a miracle – this congruence will not last for long. As a result, the robot will not do what it is designed to do. So the idea of the proper or the right cause of self-movement mentioned in (SM) and (Q1) can be made out by appealing to the overall functions a robot is designed to perform. 110 For those uncomfortable applying concepts like 'purposive' or 'deliberate' to the movements of a robot can substitute them with concepts like 'sub-purposive' or 'sub-deliberate'. This reserves the full-blown version of the concepts for the case of human or rational agency, while respecting the thought that some sophisticated self-moving robots can react to their environments. 89 These functions are essentially related to the nature and function of (at least some of) the robot's parts, including, of course, the part responsible for causing its movements. This implies that the proper cause of self-movement is the mechanism whose proper function is to generate movements that, in a reliable and non-accidental way, constitute or contribute to the performance of the robot's own proper functions. Characteristic of the mechanism with this proper function is being appropriately connected to perceptual and other systems within the robot that allow it to respond to the layout of its environment. Having this proper function and these systematic connections are the marks of the right internal cause of selfmovement. Thus, in response to Q1 we can give the following answer: (A1) The proper cause of self-movement – movement caused by the whole agent – is the mechanism whose proper function is to generate movements that characteristically constitute or contribute to the proper function(s) of the agent as a whole. 3.4 Bodily Movements vs. Behavior Before making some further refinements to the standard story of self-movement, I need to deal with a confusion engendered by (A1)'s talk of \"movements that constitute or contribute to the proper function(s) of the agent as a whole.\" This will require introducing the concept of behavior. 90 (A1) tells us what it is about a particular element within a self-moving agent's functional architecture that qualifies it as the proper cause of self-movement. The answer is problematic, however, because the property of causing movement that contributes to (supports, constitutes, etc.) an agent's proper functioning is not unique to those parts of agents – like the motor control mechanisms in mobile robots – that generate movements that would intuitively strike us as movements the agent actively performs. For example, the proper functioning of both a robot's motor control mechanism and its thermostat generate movements that support the proper functioning of the robot as a whole. To see this, let us say that the thermostat performs its proper function of regulating the robot's internal temperature by switching internal fans on and off and by moving varying amounts of coolant through a radiator. According to the criteria articulated in (A1), spinning the fan and moving the coolant count as self-movement, active performances attributable to the whole robot and not just to some of its parts. I think it is safe to say, though, that these internal goings-on caused by some of a mobile robot's sub-systems are not what we have in mind when we say a mobile robot is capable of self-movement. What we do have in mind are activities like grasping objects and navigating the environment, processes that we easily recognize as the kind of things whole robots do.111 111 This is not to say that there could not be a robot for which temperature regulation is within its capacity for self-movement. This would involve the robot's having the ability to monitor and process information about its temperature – in the way it can monitor and process information about its environment – and to switch on its internal fan in response to this information – in the way that it moves its limbs in response to information about its environment. 91 The problem with (A1) is perhaps even more striking when it comes to animal agents like cheetahs or human beings. We can see this if we allow ourselves to extend talk of proper functions to living things and their parts (an extension I develop more fully in Chapter 4). Following Aristotle, we can say that a living thing functions properly by pursuing its good, a state of flourishing that involves the full exercise of the capacities and powers characteristic of a creature of its kind. Moreover, on this view the proper function of every proper part of an organism contributes to its good. Borrowing a concept I will discuss in Chapter 4, I will refer to the proper cause of self-movement in living agents as the faculty of desire, a sub-system in animals akin to the motor control mechanism in robots. According to (A1), movements caused by the faculty of desire count as movements performed by the animal as a whole because the proper function of this faculty is to generate movements that contribute to the animal's good. If this is true, though, then every organic part of an animal is a proper cause of self-movement. For example, just like a properly functioning faculty of desire, a properly functioning digestive system generates movements that contribute to the good of a living agent. These movements include events like the contraction of muscles along the digestive tract and the release of digestive fluids within the stomach. (A1) implies that these movements of an animal's internal mechanisms count as self-movement in the same way that the movements of our arms and legs caused by the faculty of desire when we walk across the room do. That is, in terms of the agent's involvement with the movements, the agent plays just as active a role in digestion as she 92 does in intentional action. Because this example so vividly makes the point, I will refer to this problem of (A1)'s over inclusiveness as the digestion problem. In order to avoid the digestion problem, we need to constrain the concept of bodily movement in a way that allows us to hold on to the proper function criterion at the heart of (A1) while limiting the kinds of movements to which this criterion applies in a way that avoids being ad hoc. I suggest we can do this by appealing to the concept of behavior. The idea is that only those bodily movements that first qualify as behavior can also count as selfmovement. Behavior is an elusive concept, and there is no general consensus among behavioral scientists and philosophers over the types of animal movements that qualify. In light of this, I will not attempt to provide a full analysis of the concept of behavior that gives its necessary and sufficient conditions. We can begin by returning to Chapter 2. There I articulated a spectrum of bodily movements that went from robust human action, through basic self-movement, to involuntary movement. The point of this spectrum was to elucidate the notion of \"agential involvement\" at the heart of PDA, i.e., what it means to say that an agent plays a more or less active role in her movements. We can begin to understand behavior by noting that the term does not denote a form of movement that shows up at a distinct point along this spectrum. That is, it is not a category of bodily movements whose criterion is the extent to which an agent is actively involved with the initiation or control of her movements. Rather, it is a broader category that subsumes all voluntary movements and some involuntary movements as well. 93 One way to grasp behavior is to consider the concept of an ethogram, a diagnostic tool used by ethologists when studying animals in their natural habitats. An ethogram is generally defined as a catalogue of discrete movements performed by a certain kind of animal, a catalogue whose entries are the result of observation of the animal going about its everyday life in its environment. There is debate among ethologists and experimental psychologists over how the movements catalogued in an ethogram should be described. Some argue that anything beyond the barest physical description involves making unwarranted assumptions about the function of the movements being observed, while others argue that invoking functional concepts like \"grooming\", \"mating\", \"eating\", and \"fleeing\" is in fact justified after sufficient observation. Most agree, however, on an ostensive definition of behavior, such as the following: Behavior = df observable, molar-level movements that go on when an animal performs its characteristic activities; normally consists of movements responsive to environmental information an animal receives via its perceptual systems.112 I take no stand here on the debate about the degree to which, for the purposes of the science of animal behavior, we must invoke functional categories when describing these movements. It is important to see, however, that an animal need not be performing a functionally specifiable vital activity – eating, seeking shelter, mating, vocalizing, hunting, 112 Though he does not use the word 'behavior' to describe it, Aristotle would accept this definition as an apt characterization of the type of movement treated in his De Motu Animalium. Support for this comes from the fact that Aristotle does not think we find such movement in the hierarchy of living things until we move from the nutritive soul shared by plants and animals to the sensitive soul endemic to living things with perceptual capacities. 94 foraging, etc. –in order for its movements to qualify as behavior. The reason for this is that, just like most of us humans, self-moving animals may sometimes simply move for no reason at all. Just as I may mindlessly tap my finger on my desk, my cat Sam may flick his tail simply because he can. Similarly, an ape may grunt, a horse whinny, or a cheetah growl without trying to communicate in any way. Of course, idle movements like this may involve making the same movements an animal would if it was performing a vital activity. However, I see no reason to deny that, though these movements serve no vital function in this case, they still qualify as behavior.113 So behavior consists of those observable bodily movements an animal performs when it goes about its everyday activities, whether or not, on any given occasion, the movements serve a purpose like attaining nourishment or fleeing a predator. In addition to not having to be functional, movements do not need to be voluntarily brought about or actively performed by the animal when they are occurring in order to count as behavior. Dennett, for example, considers the routine involved in the egg laying behavior of the digger wasp (Sphex ichneunmoneus). When the time comes for egg laying, the Sphex builds a burrow for the purpose and seeks out a cricket which she stings in such a way as to paralyze but not kill it. She drags the cricket into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, then flies away ... [T]he wasp's routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, emerge, and then drag the cricket in. If the cricket is moved a few inches away while the wasp is inside making her preliminary inspection, the wasp, on emerging from the burrow, will bring the 113 I suspect there is a strong evolutionary argument in support of the idea that only animals capable of functionally specifiable movements that constitute the performance of vital activities can perform mindless idle movements. 95 cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will then repeat the prepatory procedure of entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp is inside, once again she will move the cricket up to the threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. On one occasion this procedure was repeated forty times, always with the same result.114 This kind of routine is what ethologists call a fixed action pattern, a series of movements that an animal either learns to perform in certain situations, or, more often, is a part of the animal's neurological hardwiring. Other examples include things like mating dances that males of various species perform in order to attract mates. It is clear from the wasp example that, perhaps to varying degrees, there can be sophisticated movements going on without the animal being in complete control of them. Once the egg laying routine gets started, or once the step where the wasp checks the burrow occurs, the wasp is programmed to move in certain ways. This is what I am calling attention to by saying that such movements are involuntary – there is no sense, even in whatever attenuated sense is appropriate to the kind of animal at hand, in which the animal has complete control over the initiation and guidance of its movements. At the same time, the movements fit the criterion for behavior. They are the kind of movements that go on when an animal is going about its normal active interaction with its environment. My discussion of behavior has focused on the way in which the concept is used by those who study animals in their natural habitat. I think this ethological conception of behavior is most intuitive and most familiar, insofar as it is situated in a practice and a point 114 Dennett 1984, 11. 96 of view familiar to us all, namely, observing how animals live while immersed in their environment. Of course, the types of animals and environments most of us are exposed to are much less exotic than those experienced by practicing animal psychologists. But the selfsame concept of behavior used to chart the comings and goings of lions on the Serengeti applies to the daily lives of squirrels in Central Park. Notice, however, that this ethological conception of behavior can also be extended to cover the activities of artifactual agents, such as the sophisticated mobile robot I have mentioned. The kind of robot I have been considering is designed to perform certain functions that involve manipulating and navigating through the environment in which it is situated. This is why the designers of these robots equip them with sensors that allow their motor control mechanisms to coordinate the robot's movements with the lay of the land. Given that this kind of robot has some kind of commerce with its environment, and has the capacity to move in ways that are responsive to this environment, its movements also meet the ethological criteria.115 We can now return to (A1). As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, (A1) is problematic as a statement of what it is to be a proper cause of self-movement because its proper function criterion is over inclusive. There are many types of bodily movements that contribute to the overall ends of an agent that we would not characterize as self-movement. The clearest examples of such movements are those like the contractions of muscles in the digestive tract or the regular and rhythmic beating of the heart caused by the autonomic 115 Returning to a point I made above, movements that are not responsive to the environment via sensors, such as a robot's internal fan turning on every thirty seconds, do not meet the ethological criteria and, therefore, do not count as behavior. I owe this point to Wayne Davis. 97 nervous system. These movements happen automatically without any participation on the agent's part. (This is why people can survive in a permanently vegetative state for years.) I have appealed to the concept of behavior in order to restrict the class of movements to which (A1) applies. Thus, we can now move from (A1) to (A1)*: (A1)* The proper cause of self-movement – movement caused by the whole agent – is the mechanism whose proper function is to generate behavior that characteristically constitutes or contributes to the proper function(s) of the agent as a whole. Thus, the response to the digestion problem is that the movements that constitute subagential processes like digestion – basically those caused by the autonomic nervous system – are not behavior. Since they are not behavior, they are not the kind of movements that can qualify as self-movement. I will return to the digestion problem again at the end of Chapter 4, where I consider it in light of the Aristotelian account of self-movement I develop in response to PDA. For now we can move on to question of how behaviors caused by the proper cause of selfmovement, given that they are still caused by a mechanism within the agent, count as movements caused by or performed by the agent herself. 3.5 Why Some Behavior Counts as Self-Movement The purpose of this chapter is to put in place a conceptual framework that will allow us to respond to PDA at the level of basic activity, i.e. the problem left standing at the end of 98 Chapter 2. I have argued that at the heart of this framework is (SM), the standard story of self-movement. The standard story's basic thesis (BM) is that self-movement consists of internally caused bodily movements. I noted that there are problems with this basic thesis, and sections 3.3 and 3.4 have been dedicated to refining this basic thesis by giving an account of the proper cause of bodily movements that count as self-movement. This discussion has yielded (A1)*. There is still another step to take, however, in order to respond to PDA. The reason for this is that PDA's skepticism about CTA's ability to capture basic activity is not directed at CTA's appeal to mental states as opposed to some other type of internal cause. If this were the issue, then (A1)* would suffice. That is, (A1)* responds to a worry of someone already convinced of the basic thesis (BT), someone who is comfortable with the idea of internal causes of self-movement in general. But a proponent of PDA is not comfortable with this. Therefore, a full response to PDA must address a further question: (Q2) Why does behavior caused by the mechanism in (A1)* count as self-movement caused by the whole agent? (Q2) asks for an explanation of how we go from the idea of a mechanism whose proper function is to cause behavior with a certain relation to the proper functioning of the whole agent to the conclusion that movements caused by such a mechanism count as movements brought about by the agent as a whole. Like (A1)*, the answer to (Q2) appeals to the idea of agents and their parts having proper functions. We can start on an answer to (Q2) by making explicit the broadly Aristotelian view of the nature of objects that is in the background of (A1)*. According to Aristotle, there is an 99 essential connection between what something is and how it functions: \"the nature of a thing is its end or purpose\" (Physics 2.2 194a). That is, an object is the kind of thing it is – it has a particular nature or identity – by virtue of what it does, i.e. its purpose, function, or characteristic activity. This is most evident in the case of artifacts. Being a house or a thermostat or an automatic transmission is not simply a matter of being composed of certain materials or being a certain size and shape; rather, it is a matter of being the kind of thing that performs certain functions for which it is designed – provide shelter, regulate ambient temperature, control the gears in a drive-train. In order to serve its purpose, an object must comprise an organized structure of functioning parts, and having this functional architecture renders an object a unified whole as opposed to, as Aristotle puts it, a mere heap. So we have two relations here: one between an object's function and its nature; the other between an object's function and the organized, unified structure of its working parts. With this brief sketch of the Aristotelian background to (A1)*, we can return to (Q2). (A1)* relies on a certain relationship between the mechanism responsible for self-movement and the overall ends and aims of the self-mover of which it is a part. The proper function of the mechanism in (A1)*, and, therefore, the material structure enabling the performance of its function, can be explained by the overall proper function of the agent. Thus, the nature and function of (some of) a self-mover's parts – what they do and how they are structured – depends on the overall aims and functions of the self-mover as a whole. We can refer to this part-whole relation as teleological constitution because the self-mover's constitution – the nature of its parts and the way they are structured – is essentially related to its telos – its proper aims 100 and functions. This relation of constitutive teleology between an agent's behavior generating mechanism and its purposes and functions is essential to what makes it appropriate to identify a particular mechanism as the proper cause of the agent's self-movement. The concept of teleological constitution allows us to explain how parts caused by the mechanism responsible for self-movement redound to the agent as whole. The explanation runs as follows. The proper function of an agent consists in the pursuit of certain aims, the achievement of certain ends, and the performance of certain activities characteristic of its kind. As my sketch of the Aristotelian view illustrated, these aims, ends, and activities that characterize the proper functioning of a given agent are intimately connected to the agent's nature and identity. Part of what it is to be an agent of a certain type is to be the kind of thing whose proper function it is to perform certain activities and pursue certain aims. Agents with proper functions are teleologically constituted, meaning they are made up of parts whose nature and proper function are essentially related to the agent's proper functioning. Teleologically constituted self-movers contain a part or mechanism whose proper function is to generate behavior that either constitutes or plays an instrumental role in the agent's proper functioning. This is the mechanism, the proper internal cause, described in (A1)*. So the mechanism described in (A1)* has its own proper function, one that is related to the proper functioning of the agent of which it is a part. Given the relation between an agent's nature and its proper function, we can say that the essential nature of the mechanism described in (A1)* is intimately tied to the nature of the whole agent. The agent's nature 101 involves pursuing certain ends and partaking in certain activities, and the mechanism's nature involves generating behavior that puts the agent in pursuit of those ends or that constitute participation in these activities. As a result of this congruence between the natures of the proper behavior generating mechanism and that of the whole agent, we can say that movements caused by this mechanism (when it is properly functioning) redound to the whole agent as cause because they are generated by something that essentially embodies what makes the agent the kind of thing it is. That is, behavior caused by the proper mechanism are movements caused by the agent's nature; and in that sense they are movements ascribable to the agent as a whole. In other words, movements caused by a mechanism whose own nature is essentially tied to the agent's nature count as movements caused by the agent itself.116 We can examine constitutive teleology further by considering an example. Imagine a self-moving robot whose job is to load and unload baggage from the hulls of commercial airplanes. Obviously, in order to do this job, the robot has to be able to move about, to go from, say, the airplane to the baggage receiving dock at the terminal. In order to do this with any success, however, the robot must have some ability to sense its environment so that it can competently navigate around the many obstacles in its path and stay out of the way of incoming and outgoing aircraft. Given its overall proper function – to move baggage from planes to the terminal – the robot must be equipped with mechanical parts that have their own proper functions. For example, our robotic baggage handler must have certain environmental sensors and a motor-control mechanism that receives input about the nature 116 I argue in Chapter 4 that this statement has to be clarified when we turn to human beings. 102 of the robot's immediate surroundings from these sensors. Providing this data about the lay of the land is the proper function of the robot's sensors, and generating movements that respond appropriately to this data is the proper function of its motor-control mechanism. We can say, then, that the robot's proper function of transporting baggage from planes to the terminal is its constitutive principle. That is, it is a principle by which we can understand the many functional parts that together make up the robot – understand why it has the parts that it does, and why these parts have the proper functions that they do. The nature and function of the parts is essentially related to the proper function of the whole agent of which they are parts. This is the heart of constitutive teleology. Notice that the introduction of the notion of constitutive teleology into the discussion brings us to the normativity of the concept of self-movement. What is normative about the concept of self-movement is that the application of the concept to a given bit of movement presupposes a normative framework inherent in the self-moving agent – constitutive teleology. This means that the concept of self-movement (at least in its paradigmatic applications) presupposes entities with ends, purposes, and proper functions. Thus, in addition to an appeal to an internal source of movement, we also need to be able to situate movements within a framework that allows us to identify certain characteristic functions or activities that the kind of thing doing the moving is supposed to do. Identifying a particular mechanism as the right inner cause or the proper source of self-movement involves showing that the proper function of the mechanism is to generate movements that serve the overall ends and purposes of the agent. 103 (Q2) asks why the behavior caused by the proper mechanism count as movements brought about by the whole agent herself. The relation of constitutive teleology that characterizes self-moving agents allows us to give this answer: (A2) Behavior caused by the mechanism described in (A1)* counts as movements caused by the whole agent (self-movement) because they are movements caused by the agent's nature. Let us return for a moment to PDA. Proponents of PDA maintain that selfmovement is not caused by internal states, events, or processes; rather it is caused by the agent herself. This is what makes it self-movement. The standard story rejects this picture because it understands movements caused by the agent herself as a subset of movements caused by internal mechanisms, states, events, or processes. What is distinctive about self-movement – what makes it the case that it is ascribable to the whole agent – is the fact that the movement plays a role in the overall life of the agent by enabling the agent to perform its proper function. So according to the standard story, what makes a bit of behavior self-movement is not that it is caused by something irreducible, something identifiable as a \"self\", but that the movements are intimately connected to the agent's proper function, the ends and aims it is designed to achieve. What makes some internal mechanism the proper cause of movement that counts as self-movement is that when it properly functions the agent behaves in ways that contribute to, enable, or constitute the performance of the whole agent's proper function(s). The agent's proper function is intimately connected to its nature – what it is to be an agent of a particular kind is to be the kind of thing with a particular proper function. 104 3.6 Constitutive Teleology & Collective Agents In this section I introduce a social practice-based account of collective agency in order to further illuminate the normative concept of constitutive teleology at the heart of the standard story of self-movement. I focus on the following question: what enables a single individual agent to act in such a way that her so acting constitutes a doing by the entire collective of which she is a member? The answer to this question will help us better understand (A2). We think that collective entities like teams, governments, and corporations can do things – score goals, fight wars, bring rivals to court – when their parts, i.e. the individuals who are their members, do something. As Rob Wilson explains: Banks can foreclose on your mortgage, city councils can raise your property taxes, and Her Majesty's Government can request the pleasure of your company. As economic, political, and legal entities, each of these agents can bring about effects, sometimes effects that matter a great deal to us. They act through the agency of individual persons, to be sure, but it is only as a representative of a bank, a council, or Her Majesty's government, that the acts of particular persons count as foreclosing our mortgage, raising our property taxes, or imprisoning us.117 The account of collective agents that I lay out is not meant to be an analysis that captures collective agency in all its forms. I limit my discussion to collective agents that arise within the context of explicitly rule-governed practices or conventions like games. We can refer to them as formal collective agents. Typical examples of formal collective agents are teams, universities, governments, and other institutions. What they all have in common as 117 Wilson 2005, 60. 105 collective agents is that they are groups comprising individuals whose coordinated behavior constitutes participating in activities, occupying certain roles or offices, and performing certain functions that would not exist but for a given set of rules or norms. Therefore, what I have to say about collective agents will not necessarily extend to, say, a group of people rioting. There are certain activities that can come about, and, likewise, certain goals that can be achieved, when people are rioting that cannot arise from a single rowdy individual. So when it comes of rioting, talk of collective agency seems appropriate. But a group of individuals rioting (or looting), is an informal collective agent because it's existence is not due to conformity with explicit rules or norms. Social practice based accounts of collective agency are an alternative to individualist accounts of collective agency. An important difference between the two forms of account is the role that the intentions of individual agents play in making collective agency possible. According to individualist accounts, a sufficient condition for collective agency is the presence in each participating agent's psychology of an intention whose content is roughly \"I intend that we Ø\" or \"I intend to do my part in our Ø-ing.\"118 On the individualist view, collective agency is a bottom-up affair, which is to say that certain conditions of the individuals that comprise the collective must be in place prior to the emergence of the collective. A social practice account denies the individualist claim about the necessary presence of certain intentions of participating agents. This is not to say that the account deems such intentions irrelevant. However, unlike the individualist account, the social 118 See Bratman 1999. 106 practice account allows collective agency to arise from a group of individuals participating in established rule-governed practices, ones in which individual agents play certain practicedependent roles or perform certain functions. The animating idea behind the social practice account is that whether an individual is playing such a role, at least at a particular time, depends on the environment or context in which the individual is situated. For example, in certain conditions a hockey player can make a shot she was actually trying to miss, thereby unintentionally making it the case that the hockey team does something, namely, wins the game. People do not accidentally get in this kind of situation, so at some point along the line prior to this particular case of collective action, the individual player's intentions were important. Nonetheless, in this example there is collective agency without an agent having the kind of intention essential for the individualist account.119 The concept of constitutive teleology can be made particularly conspicuous by examining formal collective agents because, unlike robots, formal collective agents completely owe their unity as agents to norms. That is, formal collective agents do not have the kind of physical boundedness or discreteness we see in robots and other artifactual agents, and, therefore, the existence of this type of collective agent as a unified collection of functional parts emerges solely from the ways in which these parts are normatively bounded.120 This notion of normative boundedness lies at the heart of constitutive teleology. Constitutive teleology binds the movements, functions, and processes, i.e., the general goings-on within an entity into the animated life of a self-moving agent. 119 See Stoutland 1997 and Haugeland 1998. 120 This is true of what I call below formal collective agents, but not necessarily true of non-formal collectives. 107 We can get our initial bearings on formal, practice-based collective agency more generally from the influential discussion of practices in the early work of John Rawls and John Searle. They explicate the idea of a practice in terms of rules. Rawls, for example, defines the concept of a practice as follows: I use the word \"practice\" throughout as a sort of technical term meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure.121 In order to understand the rules at the heart of a practice, it is important to recognize a distinction Searle draws between regulative and constitutive rules.122 The difference between these two kinds of rules (or norms) has to do with the way in which they are related to the activities to which they are applied. Regulative rules apply to antecedently existing forms of behavior. People were walking, for example, long before there were rules like \"do not walk on the grass\" or \"only pass on the left\". Constitutive rules, on the other hand, are \"logically prior\" to particular cases of behavior falling under them. This is because such rules create or make possible the activities to which they apply; they \"define new forms of behavior\" (Searle) and \"specify...new form[s] of activity\" (Rawls). So, for example, prior to the creation of the game of baseball people could walk from one spot to another; they could not, however, advance to first base. The rules of baseball bestow (what Searle calls) a status function that applies to certain instances of walking from one spot to another. As Searle explains, a status function is 121 Rawls 1999, 20. 122 Searle 1995, 27-29. 108 a special kind of assignment of function where the object or person [or activity] to whom the function is assigned...can perform the function only in virtue of the fact that there is a collective assignment123 of a certain status, and the object or person performs its function only in virtue of collective acceptance by the community that the object or person has the requisite status. These assignments typically take the form X counts as Y.124 We can explicate this idea with a spatial metaphor. The constitutive rules of a practice institute a kind of normative space that confers an identity on certain entities and activities that could not exist – it would be logically impossible – if it were not situated within that space. Note that constitutive rules bring into existence new normative entities and activities, not new physical entities and activities. Or rather, constitutive rules do not bring into existence new particular things; rather, constitutive rules create particular functional types. These functional types – the roles, offices, positions, etc., that exist within rule-governed practices – can be, and usually are, occupied by or instantiated by physical things. This may allow us to say, of a particular thing, that in addition to being a physical object it is also a normative entity; but this is just a way of saying that it is a physical object with the power to function in certain ways within the normative space of a practice. This is a difference expressed in the way we describe, and therefore, interpret and understand particular (physical) things. For example, on the one hand, we give a physical description of an event by describing it as \"a human 123 [Note Added] Searle here speaks of the collective assignment of a status. Though there may be circumstances in which this is an apt characterization of the source of a normative status – e.g. within the context of a new and emerging practice, or among the individuals responsible for the creation of a practice – I think it more accurate to say that status functions depend on collective recognition or acceptance by participants in the practice. Entering into most practices is a matter of training or initiation; it is a matter of, in some sense, submitting oneself to its constitutive rules. Think, for instance, of learning how to play chess: coming to understand the various permissible moves a type of piece makes certainly is not a matter of assigning these functions to the pieces. 124 Searle 2005, 7. 109 being running while carrying an object in an expanse of land from one spot to another.\" On the other hand, within the context of the game of football, we give a normative description of the same event by describing it as \"a receiver scoring a touchdown on a football field.\" All of the items mentioned in this normative description presuppose the existence of the practice of the game of football. They are all physical things, which also have identities as normative entities by having a status within a practice.125 Thus, to be a normative entity is to count as one; and to count as one is to be situated within the normative space created by a practice's constitutive rules.126 With this brief account of the nature of constitutive rules and practices on board, we can turn to collective agents. Collective agents are normative entities; they exist within the normative space of a practice. A football team, for example, is a collective agent that exists within the normative space of the practice that is the game of football. Similarly a parliament is a collective agent whose home is in the normative space of a particular (form of) government.127 When playing their assigned part within the practice the individual agents that comprise collectives are also normative entities. This is not to say they are not real 125 For a familiar example, notice this is just how it is with a language. Some physical things like sound waves and marks on paper are situated within the context of a language; thus, they are also meaningful words and sentences, or nouns and verbs, as well as commands and greetings and insults. 126 One committed to an extremely austere physicalism may conclude from the fact that normative entities exist by virtue of having a status function in a practice that there are no such things. While there may be arguments in favor of such eliminativism, I am not going to address them here. In light of the fact of how few things would pass the ontological test on such a view, I take it to be a reasonable assumption that the burden of proof is on the person who wants to deny the existence of social and normative kinds. 127 Notice that collective agents can also be considered practices themselves when compared to individual players and their teams. Like the team, the individual (types of) players – quarterback, running back, receiver, etc. – are also normative entities. They're situated within the practice of the game of football. We can also say they're situated within the more particular practice that is a team. Referees and linesmen are likewise situated within the practice of the game of football; they are not, however, parts of another practice within the game, namely, a team. 110 flesh-and-blood human beings: insofar as they act as players (quarterbacks, outfielders) or office holders (President, Chief Justice) they function in roles that arise from the constitutive norms of the practice. Like individual agents, collective agents have ends, goals the fulfillment of which is the aim of their actions. They pursue these ends, i.e. perform their actions, via the activities of the individuals who make them up. Consider the following case: a quarterback throws a pass to one of the team's receivers; the receiver catches the ball and runs with it into the end zone; as a result of what these two individuals do, the team scores a touchdown and wins the game. What is significant about this example is the way it illustrates how a (formal) collective agent functions. Here we have a case of a collective agent (a football team) performing an action (scoring a goal, winning the game) by virtue of parts of the collective (individual players) doing certain things (throwing, catching, and running). Now imagine a confused spectator who asks, \"What is all the celebrating about?\" \"The team just scored the winning touchdown,\" you explain. He furrows his brow and responds: \"What do you mean the team just scored a touchdown? I saw the same thing you did, and you know that is not what happened! The receiver scored the touchdown, not the whole team!\" This person's confused, but he does have a point. If we understand the team to consist of all the players on the field, and if that is all we focus our attention on, then there is something to be said for the complaint. He is right that only the receiver brought the ball into the end zone. That is, if we are being very charitable, then we can imagine that 111 the novice spectator could think that in order for the team to score a touchdown every member of it has to pass into the end zone.128 What our bewildered spectator fails to understand is that what it is for a team to score a touchdown just is for a particular player playing a particular position to bring the ball into the end zone. Parts of collectives, in this case a member of a team playing a particular position, can act in ways that redound to the whole in which they are embedded because, like artifactual agents, collective agents are also teleologically constituted. What it means to say collectives are teleologically constituted is that the ends of a collective are determined by the constitutive rules of the practice, and the nature and function of the collective's parts depends on the ends the collective is designed to pursue. Thus the essential nature of a part of a collective – the functional role it plays in the whole – is determined by the essential nature of the collective itself – the ends it is designed to pursue as an agent. We can sum up this idea by saying that the collective's end is the constitutive principle of its parts; it is what enables us to understand their being constituted as they are, and therefore why they function as they do.129 The constitutive connection between the ends and aims of the whole collective and the nature of the roles or positions that are its parts grounds the power of some individual 128 Obviously I am cheating a bit when I have this strange character failing to see how the team could score given only one player crossed into the end zone. I suspect that someone unable to perceive collective action like this would not grasp the concept of a team. 129 Recall that in the previous section I said that the overall end or proper function of a robot – the jobs it is designed to perform – plays the same role in determining the nature and function of the robot's parts that the overall end(s) of a collective agent plays in determining the nature and functions of its part. The fact that in the robot case we speak quite literally about the parts of the agent, while in the collective case talk of parts is short hand for talking about the positions within the collective and their occupants, does not make a difference to the way in which the overall ends of these agents are their constitutive principles. 112 members of a collective to function as the entire collective on some occasions. For example, the constitutive rules of football determine that a football team is a collective agent that plays and trys to win football games; this is the team's collective end (at least while on the field),130 which is determinative of its nature, the kind of thing it is. This top-down normative determination of essence and function is repeated at the level of particular players or positions; for what it is to occupy a certain position is to be authorized to perform certain activities that contribute to the team's collective end. The essential connection between the overall aims of the collective and the constitution of its active parts is what enables the activities of some of these parts to redound to the entire collective. As we see in the case of the confused spectator, this is not because some parts of a collective become endowed with the physical power to, say, literally move all the members of the team into the end zone. Rather it is that within the normative space of a practice, the activity of the collective and its functional parts become more than just the physical movements that comprise this activity. These movements take on a normative/functional status, which transforms them from bodily movements of individuals to moves or plays of individuals occupying norm-governed positions within a practice. So it is not that some parts of a collective have a physical power to act for the collective; rather, it is 130 I add this parenthetical remark because it is possible that the same individuals who make up a team can also comprise another collective agent off the football field. For example, perhaps the team that wins the game on Sunday afternoon consists of the same folks who put out fires as members of the volunteer fire department on Sunday evening. The football team and the fire department obviously have different ends as collective agents; thus, the selfsame individuals who make them up have different individuals ends when functioning in the normative space of the football team from the ones they have in the fire department. Brad might run the show as quarterback at the football stadium; but, as the junior most firefighter, he does yeoman's duty at the firehouse. 113 that parts of a collective have the normative authority to act on behalf of the collective. This is a matter of having the activity of the parts count as the activity of the whole within the normative space of the practice. Thus what accounts for the self-movement of a collective agent via its parts is the normative context in which this activity takes place. This is the context put in place by the constitutive norms of the practice, the norms responsible for the collective agent's existence. 3.7 Conclusion The focus of this chapter has been on the standard story of self-movement, at the heart of which is the claim that self-movement consists in movements caused by a particular part or mechanism within an agent. The part or mechanism responsible for self-movement is the one whose proper function is to generate movements that are appropriately responsive to the agent's environment and that serve or constitute the agent's proper functioning. This relation between the proper function of the self-movement mechanism and the whole agent is one of teleological constitution, which is to say that the nature and function of the agent's parts depend on the overall ends and aims of the agent as a whole. This implies that the proper functions of the agent and its self-movement mechanism converge – the agent's proper function is to pursue certain ends and perform certain activities; the mechanism's proper function is to generate movements that contribute to the pursuit and achievement of these ends and constitute the performance of these activities. This intimacy between the agent's nature and proper function and the nature and function of the mechanism 114 responsible for self-movement allows us to say that movement caused by this mechanism is movement caused by the agent's nature. For that reason, movement caused by the mechanism redounds to the whole agent. Thus, we can summarize my normative analysis of the standard story of self-movement as follows: If A is a paradigmatic self-moving agent, then: 1. A has proper function F. 2. A is teleologically constituted: the nature and proper function of A's parts – A's constitution as a unified agent – depend on F. 3. When A's parts perform their proper functions, this contributes to the performance of F. 4. A's part P has the proper function of causing behavior that contributes to or constitutes F. 5. Given the essential connection between A's proper function (to perform F) and A's nature (A's constitution as a unified agent), P's proper function (to cause behavior contributory to or constitutive of F) is essentially connected to A's nature. 6. Behavior caused (in the right way) by P counts as movements caused by A's nature. 7. Behavior caused by A's nature count as movements caused by A (selfmovement). 115 In Chapter 4 I extend this account to individual biological agents like us. In particular, the focus is on extending the concept of constitutive teleology to human beings in order to show how internally caused bodily-movements can count as movements performed by the whole agent. In order to make this case I will discuss an Aristotelian account of the nature of living things in which constitutive teleology plays an essential role. I will then identify the particular part in human agents whose nature allows it to function so that when it initiates and controls an agent's movements this is not just a case of an agent being passively moved by an internal cause; rather it counts as the agent purposively moving herself 116 FOUR Desire and the Good 4.1 Introduction In the discussion that follows I rely on insights from the previous chapters to articulate a response to PDA on behalf of CTA. I begin by retracing the path of the discussion up to this point. In Chapter 1 I introduced the causal theory of action (CTA) as a philosophical account of what happens when someone acts. I argued that CTA is a naturalist theory of action because it tells a reductive story about human agency, one that reduces the process of a human being acting to the process of an agent's motivating beliefs and desires causing (in the right way) the bodily movements that comprise an agent's action. Some critics of CTA argue that it suffers from the problem of disappearing agents (PDA). PDA consists in the charge that CTA's reductionism effectively eliminates agents from their actions. This criticism is based on the idea that the bodily movements that constitute human actions are either brought about by agents themselves or caused by parts131 of agents like mental states – not both. That is, proponents of PDA reject the idea that the phenomenon of whole agents 131 As I have done throughout the discussion, I use 'part' here loosely to refer to elements of an agent's psychological or physiological makeup. 117 moving themselves can be reduced to the process of some parts of agents causing the movements of other parts. In Chapter 2, I argued that philosophers have failed to distinguish two different ways of understanding PDA's concept of an agent playing an active role in her behavior. Following Frankfurt's influential work on the will, philosophers of action like Bratman and Velleman have interpreted PDA as a claim about CTA's ability to capture the involvement of an agent's higher rational faculties in its story of action. This interpretation of PDA takes for granted CTA's ability to capture basic self-movement that does not involve an especially robust exercise of rationality in its execution. As a result, it overlooks the fact that PDA also arises at the level of basic activity. The issue at this level is not whether CTA's belief-desire story of action can accommodate full-blooded human action – what Velleman referred to as human agency par excellence – but whether movements caused by beliefs and desires can be understood as movements performed by the agent herself. Thus, while sophisticated versions of CTA, like those defended by Bratman and Velleman, may successfully bolster CTA's ability to capture higher forms of rational agency, these accounts do not treat the more fundamental issue of how mental-state-caused bodily movements qualify as an exercise of an agent's basic capacity for self-movement. Since this issue about basic self-movement is prior to problems with CTA that arise at the level where actions involve exercises of practical rationality, the going attempts to deal with PDA are inadequate. This does not mean, however, that CTA has nothing to say in response to PDA. 118 The general shape of an answer to PDA emerges from Chapter 3's normative interpretation of the standard story of self-movement. Recall, PDA arises from the apparent incompatibility between the following two claims: 1. The movements that constitute intentional actions are caused by mental states. 2. The movements that constitute intentional actions are caused by agents. These two claims seem incompatible because the agent herself is not identical to any of her mental states; nor can she be identified with any other mechanism within her with the power to move her limbs. The way to reconcile 1 and 2, and thereby save CTA from PDA, is to show how the movement of an agent by the agent can arise from movement of the agent by one or more of her parts. My normative interpretation of the standard story of selfmovement allows for this. At the heart of this interpretation is the idea that paradigmatic self-moving agents – either artifactual, conventional/collective, or organic – are teleologically constituted. What this means is that the nature and function of the agent's constitutive parts are essentially related to the agent's overall proper function, its characteristic ends, aims, and activities. If we accept the Aristotelian point that agents derive their nature from their function, that is, if we accept the idea that (at least part of) what it is to be a particular kind of active being depends on what things of that kind characteristically do, then we can understand teleological constitution as a state in which the function and the unified structure of an agent's parts can all be explained by the agent's nature, that which gives it an identity as the kind of thing it is. The beginning of a response to PDA, therefore, is that we can count 119 some behavior caused by certain parts of a teleologically constituted agent as self-movement because they are movements generated by a mechanism whose own nature is essentially connected to the nature of the agent as a whole. So although we cannot make sense of the notion of a whole agent being identical to one of her parts, the normative Aristotelian interpretation of the standard story forges an essential connection between the nature of the whole agent and the nature and function of the part that generates her behavior. Within the naturalistic-cum-reductive constraints of CTA, I suggest this is as close as we can get to capturing the notion of \"agential origin\" at the heart of our concept of human agency within a naturalistic event-causal framework. So far the discussion has centered on artifactual and conventional agents, which is why at this point we have only the beginning of a response to PDA. The next step is to extend the account of the standard story of self-movement to organic agents like human beings. My purpose in this final chapter is to articulate an Aristotelian conception of the nature of living things, one that supports extending the concept of constitutive teleology to human agents. Where the concept of an agent's overall aims and proper functions plays a central role in understand the constitutive teleology – and, hence, the self-movement – of artifactual and conventional agents, the Aristotelian account of living agents centers on the concept of a creature's good. 120 4.2 An Aristotelian Conception of Living Things In this section I layout the essentials of an Aristotelian132 account of living things. According to the Aristotelian account, individual human agents, like their collective and artifactual counterparts, have teleological constitutions. They all embody a normative structure wherein the identity and function of their parts depend on the ends of the larger whole they comprise. 4.2.1 Aristotelian Forms At the heart of Aristotle's discussion of living things is the concept of soul. It is important to point out at the outset that the Aristotelian understanding of the concept of the soul is entirely unlike the way in which the concept is generally understood in modern and contemporary philosophy. Our current understanding of the soul comes to us from Descartes, who used the term to refer to the locus of conscious mental life, the res cogitans. Thus the Cartesian concept of soul effects a division within a person between her animal, bodily nature, and her nature as a rational being. The term applies exclusively to the latter aspects of one's existence, thereby limiting the application of the concept to human and divine beings. The Aristotelian conception of the soul, on the other hand, is something that extends throughout the animal community, extending in fact to all living things. In fact, the soul is a particular instance of the more general category of form, a concept whose application 132 It is important to keep in mind that the account of living things I develop below is Aristotelian. That is, I am not claiming that the view necessarily matches the details of Aristotle's own view. What is important for my purposes is whether the view is a plausible and compelling account of living things; not whether the details of the view match precisely what Aristotle says. In other words, this is not a work of historical scholarship. 121 extends beyond the category of the living to substances of all kinds. So before turning to the souls of animals, I will begin with a brief discussion of Aristotelian forms. According to Aristotle, substances or objects are composed of both matter and form. Something's matter consists of the material or parts out of which it is constituted. The form of a thing, on the other hand, is its structural and functional organization. As Korsgaard explains, an Aristotelian form is \"the organization or arrangement of [a thing's] parts that allows it to be what it is, to do what it does, to do its job.\"133 Implicit in this statement of form is the idea that, in addition to something's structure or architecture, form also involves the set of powers or capacities that are enabled by the nature of its material constitution. These criteria for form are most evident in the case of artifacts. Korsgaard uses the example of a house: For example the purpose of a house is to be a shelter, so the form of a house is the way the arrangement of the parts – the walls and roof – enables it to serve as a shelter. 'Join the walls at the corner, put the roof on top, and that is how we keep the weather out.' That is the form of a house.134 To be able to speak in terms of form we must be in a position to identify a particular function that is characteristic of a given object. In addition, the object itself must be composed of a complex arrangement of functioning parts that enables it to perform this function. (This means, for instance, that the concept of form does not apply to a rock or a pile of trash.) We satisfy these conditions for the application of the concept of form to a given object by situating it within the context of the kind to which it belongs. In fact, we 133 Korsgaard 1996, 149. 134 Korsgaard 1996, 107. 122 can say that something's form is what accounts for the fact that an object falls under a particular sortal like 'house'; and this just is having the material structure and functional capacities of a typical member of the kind. So talk of form and talk of kindor sortaldependence go hand-in-hand. 4.2.2 Animal Form – Species & Life-Cycles This point about the kind-dependency of form facilitates the extension of Aristotle's concept of form to living things, for organisms are paradigmatic examples of things that belong to kinds, i.e. species. The Aristotelian claim is that the species membership of a given organism is what determines the organism's function and the nature and function of its parts. As Michael Thompson – a contemporary neo-Aristotelian – has emphasized, our judgments and descriptions of individual organisms make essential reference to the nature of the species or life form to which the creature belongs. A species, that is, is a \"wider context\" in which we situate a living creature, \"a framework for interpreting the goings-on in ... individual organisms.\"135 In order to understand how this function talk is applicable to living things, 135 Thompson, in fact, suggests that what it is to be alive is to be the proper subject of the type of judgment – \"natural-historical judgment\" – that is on hand when we interpret an organism and its activities in light of its species membership. (It is not necessary for my purposes here to take a stand on this point about what suffices for being alive.) What is special about this form of judgment, according to Thompson, is evident in the peculiar logical properties of the sentences we use to express them – what he refers to as \"Aristotelian categoricals.\" For example, borrowing from Anscombe, we can make the following judgment about humans: \"Human beings have 32 teeth.\" What is distinctive about this judgment, Thompson argues, is that it is tenseless and unquantifiable. In other words, we lose the meaning of the statement if we try to put it in the past or future tense, for it is not a statement about how human beings were or how they're going to be. Rather it is a claim, made in \"a special kind of present tense\", about the nature of the species homo sapiens (Thompson 2004, 49). Not only are such judgments somehow temporally restricted, they also have a kind of logical restriction; for we cannot go from the claim that humans have 32 teeth to the universal generalization that all 123 we need to note that corresponding to any given species is a typical form of life or life-cycle that characterizes the life of its members. According to Philippa Foot – another prominent neo-Aristotelian – when we speak of the life-cycle of a given species our subject is \"how a kind of plant or animal, considered at a particular time and in its natural habitat, develops, sustains itself, defends itself, and reproduces.\"136 In the case of most animals, at least, a part of this process involves perceiving, exploring, and successfully navigating its environment so as to procure nourishment, elude predators, and secure mates and appropriate shelter.137 The concept of life-cycle, and the corresponding set of activities it comprises, is important for applying form to living things because it secures a place for talk of functions in the biological context. Notice that being familiar with a life-form and its characteristic life-cycle brings with it the ability to make evaluative judgments about whether a given member of a species is healthy and well-functioning or defective and struggling to maintain itself as a living member of the species. So, for example, knowing that a prime source of nourishment for a cheetah comes from eating gazelle – a remarkably fast land animal – supports the judgment that a humans have 32 teeth. The later claim is obviously false. It is not uncommon either to lose teeth or to be born without a full set of 32. Again, this is due to the fact that this Aristotelian categorical about the number of teeth human beings have is not a judgment of a particular member of the species; it is a judgment about the species itself. These two features of Aristotelian categoricals point to the fact that they are not descriptive statements; rather, they are expressions of norms or standards represented by the species and embodied in its typical or ideal or fully functioning members. See Thompson 1995. 136 Foot 2001, 29. 137 This is obviously an over-simplified picture of the typical life of many creatures, especially mammals and other high animals whose life-cycles involve activities like forming bounds and maintaining relations with other members of the species; learning and teaching behaviors involved in, say, grooming, hunting, and migrating; and, in the case of human beings at least, becoming appropriately initiated into and taking part in one's cultural milieu. The simpler life-cycle on which I am focusing in the text, however, is sufficient to convey the point I am making about the nature of living things. 124 cheetah that is unable to run at the speed typical of a well-functioning cheetah is deficient. For the cheetah's inability to do something that is typical of its kind – namely, run very fast – precludes it from procuring sustenance. An invalid cheetah, therefore, is not likely to last very long. Now there are likely a number of reasons why a given cheetah is unable to attain the kind of speed necessary to pursue its quarry, but they will all involve a deficiency in some element within the animal's physiology, that is, within the organized structure of its bodily organs and systems.138 This point allows us to see the connection between an animal's function and the functional organization of its parts that is at the heart of the Aristotelian concept of form. It also highlights the essential connection between the nature or identity of an animal and its proper functioning; for, as in my cheetah example, the inability to partake in the activities that are essential to the life-cycle of an animal's kind eventually results in the animal's destruction. In the discussion so far, I have attempted to trace a path from the Aristotelian concept of form to the biological notions of species and life-cycle. Before moving to an explicit statement of Aristotle's concept of animal soul, I want to draw out a number of ideas or connections among concepts that this effort has uncovered. The first is a general connection between form and kind-membership; to be enformed involves being a certain type of thing, belonging to a particular sort or class. The second connection is between being a member of a particular class and having a particular function and material structure. As we saw, to be a house, to belong to that class or category, is to be a unified collection of parts 138 This, of course, does not preclude the ultimate cause of the defect being an environmental factor. Such factors cannot deprive an animal of its ability to properly function without affecting its physiology in some way. 125 constructed in such a way that it can adequately provide shelter. These first two connections fall out of the general picture of Aristotelian form. Their application to living things involves translating talk of kinds and functions into talk of species and life-cycles. Thus, the third connection is between being a member of a given species and having a particular lifecycle, a certain active process of development and self-maintenance that characterizes the typical life of a bearer of the life-form. I claimed that we can understand the function of an organism as the successful navigation through the life-cycle endemic to its kind. I also noted that the concepts of species and the typical life-cycle of a kind of organism are connected to the normative evaluation of specific creatures, to judgments about the degree to which they are flourishing or floundering. So being a healthy, flourishing, well-functioning participant in the life-cycle of a species is performing the proper function of the species. Finally, in order for an animal to maintain its nature, to retain its identity as a member of its species, its ability to participate in its life-cycle must be on-going. The life of an animal, therefore, has an inherent circularity, for it consists in performing those activities constitutive of its life-cycle to the right degree of success such that the animal can continue to perform them.139 We can conclude from the above reflections that there is an inherent connection between form (species), function (life-cycle), goodness (proper functioning), and nature (identity). Being an animal essentially involves belonging to a certain species. Therefore, an animal's nature and identity depends on its active participation in the activities that comprise the life-cycle endemic to its kind. It is only by functioning in this way that an animal can 139 Korsgaard (1996, 49) captures this idea when she describes living things as having \"self-maintaining\" forms. 126 maintain the flourishing state of health or full-functioning that supports its continued existence. Thus, an animal performs its function, and thereby maintains itself as the kind of thing it is, by pursuing and (to the necessary degree) achieving its good. This connection between an animal's good, its proper function, and its nature or identity brings us to the doorstep of the Aristotelian concept of soul. 4.2.3 Aristotelian Souls & Constitutive Teleology We can now turn to the Aristotelian view of soul, i.e. the form of living things. Just as the form of a house is the organization of its parts that enables it to serve as an adequate shelter – to perform the proper function of a house – so too the soul of a living thing is the species-dependent functional arrangement of its parts that allows it to successfully participate in the life-cycle of its species. As I noted earlier, there is an implicit reference in this appeal to the functional arrangement of an animal's parts to the set of powers and capacities that are enabled by having this type of material constitution. In fact, many articulations of Aristotle's concept of soul emphasize these active abilities. For example, James Wallace writes, \"the psuche [i.e. soul] of an organism is conceived as the capacities and tendencies it possesses to carry on the activities characteristic of the mode of life of the creature's kind.\"140 J. L. Ackrill, on the other hand, provides an account of soul that focuses on both structure and function: 140 Wallace 1978, 25-26. 127 To say that this body is alive is, according to Aristotle, to say that it has powers of a certain kind ... To speak of soul, then, is to speak of the ability to do certain things ... [H]aving a certain kind of soul ... makes something a plant, or an animal, or a man. Having a soul is precisely what makes this collection of flesh, bones, etc. an animal – and one animal – just as the shape and structure are what makes some timber one thing, namely a table.141 Both Wallace and Ackrill make clear a point I stressed earlier, namely, that we ought not interpret Aristotle's concept of soul in traditionally Cartesian terms. This is because \"a soul is not an 'it' housed in the body, but a functional structure in and of matter.\"142 Thus, allowing a role for Aristotle's notion of soul does not entail any dualist or otherwise nonnaturalist commitments. An Aristotelian can accept that all living things are wholly composed of physical stuff, and that, therefore, for any type of thing there is a complete underlying story about what goes on at the physical level. What the view is committed to is a rejection of a form of reductionism that says that the properties and capacities of things are reductively identifiable with and completely explicable in terms of the laws governing their physical constituents, those of physics and chemistry. An Aristotelian can accept that countenancing non-material entities or properties, those whose existence would require the violation of the laws of physics, is something completely foreclosed by respect for the natural sciences without eschewing the causal-explanatory power of appeals to higher-level phenomena. As Michael Frede explains, \"to say that an object has a certain nature [i.e. form] is not to postulate a mysterious force or a mysterious kind of causation; it is to say something about how the object and its behavior have to be understood and to be 141 Ackrill 1981, 70. 142 Nussbaum and Putnam 1992, 56. 128 explained.\" The appeal to form, that is, \"adds a further level of understanding to what happens.\" 143 Recall that my purpose in articulating this Aristotelian conception of the nature of living things is to provide a basis upon which I can extend the normative account of selfmovement I developed in the last chapter to organic agents like human beings. At the heart of that account is the concept of constitutive teleology, the idea that the nature and function of the parts of (paradigmatic) self-moving agents depends on the overall aims, ends, or functions of the agent. What should now be clear is that, according to the Aristotelian view, living things are also teleologically constituted. The Aristotelian view maintains that the organic parts comprising an animal are functionally arranged so that the animal can exercise the powers and capacities needed to successfully pursue its natural ends or perform its natural functions. Now so far, I have focused on the idea of the \"functional arrangement\" of something's parts in my discussion of the Aristotelian view, but it is important to see that this notion covers more than how the parts fit together. This points to a way in which Korsgaard's house example is may be misleading when it comes to understanding the nature of animals, for she explicitly articulated the point in terms of how the walls and the roof are joined and put together. This makes it easy to overlook that the nature of the walls and the roof themselves matter to the ability of the structure to serve the function of a house. Returning to living things, talk of the functional arrangement of an animal's parts also refers to the particular parts themselves. Just as the way in which an organic part fits into the overall 143 Frede 1992, 102. 129 structure of an animal is a fact about the animal's soul, so too is the part's own nature and function related to the form of the animal. As we have seen, this translates into the claim that the nature and function of the organic parts of an animal depend on the role these parts play in the animal's performance of its proper function, i.e., in the active pursuit of its good. Therefore, like the functions a robot is designed to perform, and like the ends a collective agent is created to achieve, an animal's good is its constitutive principle. Before moving on, it is important to note that the question of the source of constitutive teleology for organic agents is an enormously difficult one. Some answers appeal to the process of evolution while others point to the intentions of an intelligent designer. It is not my purpose here to take a stand on the debates surrounding this issue, but rather to show what work can be done if we take on the Aristotelian claim that, as with other substances or objects, organic agents are teleologically constituted. 4.3 An Evaluative Conception of Desire According to the normative version of the standard story of self-movement I articulated in Chapter 3, behavior generated by an internal cause can count as the self-movement of the whole agent when the mechanism responsible for the behavior is essentially connected to the agent's nature. The Aristotelian conception of living things I have been discussing provides the groundwork for the application of this account to human agents. The next step is to identify the particular mechanism in human agents that qualifies as the proper internal cause of self-movement. Given a certain traditional picture of desire, we can understand 130 desires and the faculty of desire more generally as this proper internal cause. Thus CTA's reliance on desires in its story of what happens when someone acts, when combined with the Aristotelian view, yields a response to PDA. According to what I will call an evaluative conception of desire, desires are causally efficacious states whose proper function is to track an agent's good and put her in pursuit of it. This differs from other accounts of the nature of desire that connect desire and the good. The most prominent alternative version of an evaluative account of desire maintains that all desires are for the good, or for the appearance of the good. This is the view expressed by the claim that the ends of human action are desired sub species boni, i.e. under the guise of the good. On this view, to desire something necessarily involves seeing it as in some sense good or as in some way conducive to one's well-being. The problem with this view is that it falters in the face of our experience as agents. That is, the life of a typical agent involves many instances of irrationality in which one desires something that one knows is not good. This happens every time one reaches for that second (or third...) piece of cake, or when one pours that supposed last drink. We are all too familiar with wanting what we know we should not. The \"guise of the good\" view of desire gets the phenomenology of moral agency wrong; that is, it misidentifies the true nature of much of our experience as agents. This is Velleman's point in the following: A tendency to desire things under negative descriptions is an essential element of various emotions and moods such as silliness, self-destructiveness, or despair. A mood of playfulness is, in part, a disposition to form desires for things conceived as having no particular value; a self-destructive mood is, in part, a disposition to form desires for things conceived as harms; and so on. None of these [very common] 131 desires could retain its characteristic idleness or perversity if it involved an attempt at getting things [about the good] right.144 So it is important to keep in mind that the evaluative conception of desire that I recommend does not claim that to desire something is necessarily to see it as good or to pursue it under the guise of the good. My view is that properly functioning desires are states that track the agent's good and put her in pursuit of it. This accommodates the common cases of desiring the bad because it allows for the possibility of malfunctioning desires. 4.4 The Faculty of Desire This brings us to the crux of my argument. CTA can respond to PDA by combining the Aristotelian conception of the nature of living things with this evaluative conception of desire. According to the Aristotelian view, living agents are teleologically constituted which entails that the function of the organic parts is to promote the overall good of the organism they comprise. According to the evaluative conception of desire, desires are behaviorgenerating states whose proper function is to track the good and put her in pursuit of it. Thus the natures of both the agent herself and her faculty of desire are essentially related to the human good. This is why desire-caused bodily movements (caused in the right way) count as behavior the agent – understood as the whole living organism – causes instead of being movements only ascribable to one of the agent's parts. These behaviors are equivalent 144 Velleman 2000, 118. 132 to self-movement because they originate from an element of this active self whose essential nature and proper function is essentially connected to the agent's own nature. I need to clarify my use of the term 'desire' by drawing a distinction between two senses of the word. We can use the term 'desire(s)' to refer to the behavior-generating states that play a role in CTA's story of action; or we can use 'desire' to refer to what Aristotle calls the faculty of desire.145 CTA uses 'desire' in the first sense in its account of intentional action – desires as motivational states that proximately cause self-movement. In order to provide an account of why these states are properly considered the causes of self-movement, however, we need to bring in the broader idea of a faculty of desire in which these states originate and from which they exercise their causal powers.146 We can understand the faculty of desire as analogous to the motor-control mechanism (MC) found in the kind of robots discussed in Chapter 3. Like the robot's MC, an animal's faculty of desire is responsible for generating behavior that is appropriately responsive to the creature's environment. Thus, just as the MC is sensitive to input from its various environmental sensors, so the faculty of desire is responsive to input from the environment via sense perception. The robotic MC and the faculty of desire respond in similar ways to the data they receive. While the MC sends particular commands or signals to 145 Where I speak here of \"faculty\" of desire, one can also speak in terms of a desiderative \"power\" or \"capacity\". 146 For the purposes of this discussion we do not need a fully worked-out understanding of the faculty of desire, for that would require taking a stand on issues beyond this discussion. Following Aristotle we can say that the faculty of desire goes hand-in-hand with having the capacity to perceive one's environment; and, thus, the faculty of desire involves the power to initiate movement in response to perception. For our purposes, this will suffice as a basic idea of what I mean when I speak of the faculty of desire. As I go on to explain, the faculty of desire, as I understand it, also involves the ability to form particular desires for specific practicable goods (e.g. a desire for this drink) that derive from more general desires. 133 motors that move its arms, wheels, legs, etc., the faculty of desire generates particular motivational states (desires) responsible for causing behavior. Finally, the concept of proper function applies to both the MC and the faculty of desire. The MC functions properly when it enables the robot to effectively navigate its environment, thereby properly pursuing the ends and aims the robot as a whole is designed to achieve. The proper function of the faculty of desire is to regulate the formation of desires and the exercise of their power to cause bodily movements so the resulting behavior is aimed at the agent's good, i.e., behavior that contributes to or constitutes successful participation in the life cycle of its species. This implies that the proper function of a particular motivating desire that arises out of this faculty is to put the agent in pursuit of particular goods achievable in a given context of action that have the right contributory relation to her overall good. I suggest we understand how the faculty of desire could perform this function in the following way. At the heart of the faculty of desire is a set of fundamental desires to pursue certain kinds of ends and to participate in certain forms of activity that are instrumental to or constitutive of the animal's good (successful participation in its life cycle). These basic or fundamental desires drive the faculty of desire's operations by instilling within the agent a natural inclination toward what is good for it and by motivating and structuring the processes through which particular desires are formed and transmit their causal powers. So, while the basic desires are not for the agent's good qua good, they are desires for what in fact constitutes the agent's good. 134 To illustrate, consider a primitive animal agent – call her Prima – whose life form has a very simple life cycle, one that involves performing basic life functions like eating and drinking, resting, having sex, and eluding danger. Prima achieves her good when, through her active engagement with her environment, she partakes in these activities. Given the nature of her good, and given the fact that the proper function of her faculty of desire is to put her in pursuit of it, at the heart of Prima's faculty of desire are basic desires for sustenance, security, and reproduction. By instilling in her a basic tendency to be attracted to and to pursue ends achievement of which constitutes a flourishing condition, these basic desires effect a natural orientation of Prima's faculty of desire in the direction of her good. Prima would be severely defective if she lacked these desires because, without such tendencies towards her good, her faculty of desire cannot function properly; it cannot regulate the processes through which her particular here-and-now desires form and lead to action in a way that is appropriately sensitive to what she needs to flourish. To recap: the faculty of desire regulates the processes through which desires form and exercise their power to cause behavior. This regulative function is driven by a set of basic desires for certain ends and activities constitutive of successful participation in the life cycle of the agent's species. Of course, an agent's good just is successful participation in the life cycle of its species. Thus, the faculty of desire is functioning properly when its functioning results in the agent desiring the pursuit of a good life by desiring particular ends and activities constitutive of that life. The particular desires for these ends and activities themselves function properly when they cause (in the right way) the appropriate bodily 135 movements (behavior) whereby these good ends are achieved and good courses of action are pursued. This point about the intentional content of the desires at the heart of the faculty of desire is important; for if we could not make sense of the faculty of desire's intrinsic orientation to the good without positing a foundational desire whose content is something like \"to pursue the good\", then it would be difficult to take seriously the idea that this kind of faculty can be found in non-rational animals. Though there is much debate about the mental lives of non-linguistic or non-concept-using animals, most accept that something like the concept of desire is applicable to a broader swath of the animal kingdom. At the same time, most agree that a concept like \"goodness\" likely goes beyond the mental capacities of non-human animals. It would be fatal for my view is what I say about the faculty of desire could not be extended to non-human animals because I am arguing that CTA is an instance of the standard story of self-movement, a story that obviously accounts for more than human movement – something made evident by my discussions of robots. 147 147 This is not to say that a desire explicitly for the good qua good cannot play a role in the functioning of the faculty of desire, by, for example, motivating other behavior-generating desires. My claim is that such a desire need not be hard-wired, as it were, into the faculty of desire in order for the faculty to track the good. The reason this matters is that I do not want to give an account of the faculty of desire that restricts it simply to human or rational agents, those agents we can comfortably understand as possibly having a desire whose own content is that agent's good. In other words, while I think we can accept that the basic desires I discuss are present in some form throughout the animal kingdom (though not necessarily present in every type of animal – I am agnostic about, say, earthworms), I do not think the same can be said for the desire for one's good. 136 4.5 The Digestion Problem Revisited With this account of how the faculty of desire works and of the way in which the faculty is connected to an agent's good, I want to return to my discussion in Chapter 3 (section 3.4) of the digestion problem. Recall the problem with (A1) was that it was over inclusive; it counted some movements that agents do not actively performed as instances of selfmovement. This was due to the fact that (A1)'s \"proper function criterion\", as I called it, stated that movements that contribute to the proper function of the agent as a whole count as self-movement. This had the awkward implication that movements of an agent's digestive track, or the numerous internal goings-on inside a mobile robot, count as self-movement in the same way that movements involved in walking or eating do. I appealed to an ethological conception of behavior to overcome this worry. This resulted in a new criterion for the proper cause of self-movement: (A1)* The proper cause of self-movement is the mechanism whose proper function is to generate behavior – movements that occur when agents perform the activities that characterize their normal interactions with their environment – that constitutes or contributes to the proper function(s) of the agent as a whole. When I articulated (A1)*, I made clear that the account of behavior on which it rests was not intended as a complete analysis of the concept. This allows, therefore, for the possibility of movements counting as behavior that do not seem to be the kinds of movements that we would ascribe to the agent as a whole. I want to end this dissertation by 137 returning to the digestion problem because I think my Aristotelian account of selfmovement has the resources to say that, a least in the case of self-moving agents like us with a faculty of desire, this possibility is foreclosed. There is a direct connection between desire148 (both faculty and state) and the human good that differentiates it from other organic parts and processes. Desire is intrinsically and directly related to the agent's good by virtue of the fundamental desires that drive of the faculty of desire. Because these basic desires are intentional states, an essential feature of them is that they are directed to something beyond themselves. As I explained above, the desires driving the faculty of desire are for the basic elements (ends and activities) constitutive of the agent's good. Thus, the desires driving the faculty of desire are essentially directed to the agent's good. We cannot give a full specification of the nature of these states without explicitly invoking the good of the agent of whom they are states. This is evident in the following table: Organic System Function Digestion contributes to the animal's good by... extracting nutrients from food. Excretion contributes to the animal's good by... expelling waste. Respiration contributes to the animal's good by... oxygenating blood. 148 Unless otherwise noted, I will use the singular term 'desire' to refer to the faculty and its states as a whole. 138 Now consider the specification of the function of desire: Desire contributes to the animal's good by... causing behavior in pursuit of its good. Using this table, we can further highlight the distinctive and direct connection between desire and the human good – as opposed to the indirect connection between the good and the other elements of an agent's teleological constitution – by comparing what happens when desire malfunctions with cases in which these other organic systems fail to work properly.149 Say, for instance, I really want that sixth and final slice of pizza, so I grab it and gobble it down. I had major indigestion after the third slice, so this sixth one is bound to do me in. Let us compare how my faculty of desire and my digestive system work in this case. Given that eating six slices of pizza is unhealthy no matter how you slice it (so to speak), and given that I am already suffering from indigestion, it is clearly not good for me to eat the sixth slice. Thus, when I crave the slice and reach out and grab it my faculty of desire is not functioning properly. It is not properly tracking my good, and it causes me to move in such a way that I go after something that is obviously bad for me. This last point – that it is obviously bad for me – is important, because it points to the fact that the malfunction is not somewhere else, like in my olfactory mechanism or in my stomach. For the smell of the pizza makes me slightly nauseated, and my stomach feels like it is about to explode. So my 149 I owe the following example to Mark Lance. 139 faculty of desire is clearly malfunctioning, and this is bad for me. That is, when it comes to being a healthy, well-functioning human being I am very much off the mark. I am simply not pursuing my good, and thus I am failing to perform my function tout court. Turning to my digestive system, we can now ask how its functioning in this situation affects my good. First let us assume that my digestive system is properly functioning, and as a result I successfully digest the sixth slice of pizza. This means that I am successfully absorbing large quantities of grease and fat that will cause me to collapse in pain. What this shows is that my digestive system can perform its proper function without the results of this performance being part of my good. In fact, this is a case in which it would have been better for me had my digestive system malfunctioned. But unlike in the case of my faculty of desire, if my digestive system failed to digest the food it would be malfunctioning, but I, qua whole human animal, would not be. Malfunctions involving my digestive system, therefore, do not result in my going completely astray in the pursuit of my good. That is, they do not result in my failing to function properly tout court as a human animal. The lesson to draw from this comparison between the faculty of desire and the digestive system is the following: the proper function of the faculty of desire involves being differentially responsive to the good. The faculty of desire has the power to be differentially responsive in this way by virtue of the fact that, via the representational content of desires, it can take in information about what is at stake for the agent's good in a given context of action. In other words, the faculty of desire is differentially responsive to the good because it can track the good; and it can track the good because it can represent the good. Other 140 organic mechanisms or faculties or processes lack the power to differentially respond to the good, therefore, because they cannot intentionally represent it. What follows from this is that even if we count movements caused by other organic parts as behavior it still does not qualify as self-movement. Self-movement, movements actively performed by the entire animal, consists of behavior caused by the part of an agent whose proper function is to cause behavior differentially oriented to the agent's good. 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Nussbaum, M. and Putnam, H. 1992. \"Changing Aristotle's Mind.\" In Nussbaum and Rorty 1992. Nussbaum, M. and Rorty, A. O. (eds.). 1992. Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pavlopoulos, M. 2003. \"Aristotle's Natural Teleology and the Metaphysics of Life.\" Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24: 133-181. Rawls, J. 1999. \"Two Concepts of Rules.\" In Freeman, S. (ed.). Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Richardson, H. 1992. \"Desire and the Good in De Anima.\" In Nussbaum and Rorty 1992. Schueler, G. F. 2003. Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of 145 Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schroeter, F. 2004. \"Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.\" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 633-659. Searle, J. 2005. \"What is an Institution?\" Journal of Institutional Economics 1: 1-22. _____1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. Sehon, S. 2005. Teleological Realism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Strawson, P.F. 1985. \"Causation and Causal Explanation.\" In Vermazen, B and Hintikka, J. (eds.). Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, R. 1966. Action and Purpose. Englwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Thompson, M. 2004. \"Apprehending Human Form.\" In O'Hear, A. (ed.). Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ____ 1995. \"The Representation of Life.\" In Hursthouse, R., Lawrence, G., Quinn, W. (eds.). Virtues and Reasons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Velleman, D. 2000. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallace, J. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Wallace, R. J. 1999. \"Three Conceptions of Rational Action.\" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2: 217-242. Wilson, G. 1988. The Intentionality of Human Action. 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{"text": "Time: From the Totality to Quantum Information Vasil Penchev, vasildinev@gmail.com Bulgarian academy of Sciences: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology: Dept of Logical Systems and Models Abstract: The paper justifies the following theses: The totality can found time if the latter is axiomatically represented by its \"arrow\" as a well-ordering. Time can found choice and thus information in turn. Quantum information and its units, the quantum bits, can be interpreted as their generalization as to infinity and underlying the physical world as well as the ultimate substance of the world both subjective and objective. Thus a pathway of interpretation between the totality via time, order, choice, and information to the substance of the world is constructed. The article is based only on the well-known facts and definitions and is with no premises in this sense. Nevertheless it is naturally situated among works and ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, linked to the foundation of mathematics by the axiom of choice, to the philosophy of quantum mechanics and information. Key words: choice, order, quantum information, time, totality, well-ordering 2 The objectivity of the paper is to discuss time as if crucified on the cross figuratively situated between subject and object therefore unifying them. On the one hand, time is the foundation of consciousness. On the other hand, it is the basis shared by the physical world. Furthermore, the link between the conscious and physical realized by time is an ordering having two faces, from which the one addresses choice, and the other continuity. The unification of both represents a unit of information, which also unifies subject and object. That task comprises the research of the following questions: 1. Can the true totality found time as a well ordering? 2. How can time found choice? 3. How can choice found information? 4. Can information underlie the physical world as the general substance? 5. Is the totality the true and ultimate substance of the world both objective and subjective? Quantum mechanics, mathematics, and philosophy are the areas, in which one can search for answers. 1. Can the true totality found time as a well-ordering? Time can be exhaustedly described and thus axiomatically defined by its most essential property: the \"arrow\" of time. Indeed time serves to separate and order well the world both subjective and objective in a rigorous sequence known in mathematics as \"well-ordering\". It means that the following conditions should be satisfied: The axiom of trichotomy, if a moment of time is given, any other should be either (1) past or (2) future in relation to it or (3) coincide with it. Any period of time has a beginning, i.e. an initial moment of time. Described and defined in thus, the totality can found time as follows: The totality possesses the following paradoxical and definitive property: It contents necessarily its externality being just \"total\". However it contents its internality, the intersection of which with the externality of totality is an empty set or at least does not coincide with the internality in general. This implies that the totality should possess special elements which can be defined by the controversial property that they do not belong to its internality. Consequently, the totality generates necessarily a well-ordering such as a set of sets, any of which is a subset of another of those subsets. 3 Indeed that set satisfies the axiom of trichotomy: If an element of it is given, any other is either (1) a true subset of it or (2) contents it as a true subset, or (3) coincides with it. Any subset of that set possesses an initial, or in other words, maximal element, to which all others are subsets. The well-ordering generated in thus is equivalent to time as it has been defined above only by its arrow, i.e. as any well-ordering. In particular, this implies that the totality can be only infinite for any finite set can constitute only a finite series and reaching the empty set, which is ultimate, it cannot include its externality within itself. That totality discussed above as generating time as a well-ordering can be interpreted both subjectively (as consciousness) or objectively (as the universe) leading correspondingly to subjective time in the former case or to objective time in the latter one. However the underlying structure does not depend of whether the interpretation is subjective thinking of the totality as consciousness or objective as the universe. Thus time being the same in both cases can unify subject and object as two equivalent interpretations of the totality. There exists a fundamental philosophical invariance of subject and object expressed by time and originating from the totality. 2. How can time found choice? After time has seen as well-ordering, and any series of sequentially nested sets is a wellordering, the next questions are: Does any well-ordering imply at least one sequence of nested sets? Does choice can be represented in terms of set theory as a set nested in another, i.e. as the pair of a set and its subset? Does any sequence of nested sets and thus a well-ordering can be interpreted as an equipotent series of choices? Does well-ordering and choice are equivalent concepts in a sense? Furthermore, if these three: well-ordering, choice and a sequence of nested sets are given as equivalent, do these structures imply back time in turn and by means of it, the totality? The answers of all questions are positive and can be found as follows: Any well-ordering implies at least one sequence of nested sets because one can construct the later on the base of the former: The well-ordering is a well-ordered set, which is taken as the initial member of the searched sequence. Then any next element of it can be obtained from the previous one by removing of an element. 4 Then choice can be defined by two sets: the one is that of all possible alternatives, and the other is the subset of the chosen alternative. If that subset is a true subset of the set of all alternatives, the corresponding choice will be designated as true, too. Obviously, this definition of choice can applied for any sequence of choices therefore generating an equivalent well-ordering or a sequence of nested sets. One can generalize the definition of choice maximally as an always admissible option of choice. That generalization is well-known in mathematics as the axiom of choice, and in philosophy, too, as freewill ordinarily discussed in relation to human beings or their rights. That choice, which is always allowed, implies a well-ordering in any case, and vice versa as above. This statement is known in mathematics as the equivalence of the well-ordering theorem and the axiom of choice. It can be extended in relation to freewill coined in an abstract and generalizing sense to the being at all rather than the human being only. The cited equivalence in mathematics and eventually in philosophy can be interpreted as implying or originating from the equivalence of choice and order. The concept of information can be founded both mathematically and philosophically on that equivalence unifying these two fundamental ideas. This will be discussed a little below. At last, that generalizing choice being equivalent both to a sequence of nested sets and to a well-ordering turns out to be equivalent to time as far as it has defined axiomatically as wellordering. If the totality implies time in this sense, does the well-ordering or time implies the totality in turn? Taking an infinite series of embedded sets equivalent both to time and to choice, one can interpreted as a well-ordered set of externalities of the totality contained by it and therefore implying it. Thus a bidirectional pathway between choice and the totality is already in exploitation guaranteeing the reliable link of equivalence between them across the border between subject and object without any dependence on any of them. 3. How can choice found information? Information is order in a most general sense. After order is linked to choice as above, this connects also choice and information indirectly. However, there is another, unmediated relation between them founded on the quantity of information: Its unit is an elementary choice, a binary digit, a bit. Indeed a bit is the choice between two equiprobable alternatives and thus the quantity of information indicates the amount of choice of a set in units of elementary choice. That amount of information of a set can be also interpreted equivalently as its complexity, i.e. as that number 5 of elementary operations, by which it can be ordered beginning from an absolute chaos, or in other words, in how many of elementary steps it can be constructed from nothing, from zero, i.e. from the empty set. That foundation of information on choice (or order) refers only to finite sets and it does not require the axiom of choice (or the well-ordering theorem). However if one utilizes the latter two, the concept of information can be extended to any infinite set. Then the unit of information should be relevantly generalized as a choice among an infinite set of alternatives, which can be always enumerated once the axiom of choice is admitted. That unit might be designated as an \"init\" for an \"infinite digit\" just as a bit is for a \"binary digit\", and the term of \"information\" might be interpreted as \"infinite formation\". However they are already introduced under other names and for other reasons, which will be discussed in detail in the paragraph 4. Both the term of init and the interpretation of information as infinite formation will be kept here to be conserved the logical consequence. Furthermore, \"qubit\" and \"quantum information\", which will be introduced below, can be considered only as particular cases correspondingly of \"init\" and \"infinite information\" (or \"in-formation\") thus questioning about their eventual equivalence. After involving the axiom of choice for introducing \"init\" and \"in-formation\", some ostensibly paradoxical corollaries are inevitable. They are due to involving infinity in final analysis, which is wrongly interpreted in terms of finiteness. More exactly, infinity is able to be both universal (and thus complete) and open (and thus incomplete) unlike finiteness, which is always either complete or incomplete disjunctively. For example, a single \"init\" is equivalent to any, including infinite, number of inits. However that property is not controversial and it implies no contradictions or vagueness. A rigorous and quantitative theory of infinity can be (and has in fact already) developed under other name: quantum mechanics. Another question is yet open: How does the introduction of init and in-formation affect the understanding of time and the totality for the latter two are equivalent to choice as this is investigated above? After the choice has considered as infinite in general, does this influence somehow the concepts of time and the totality? The totality and thus time can be only infinite as this is deduced above. If the choice and thus information is finite, they cannot refer directly to the totality and time. After they have involved infinity in themselves, they are already able to represent or address the totality and time in an unmediated way. In other words, the concept of in-formation continues and thus keeps the 6 bilaterality (bidirectionality) of the pathway between information and the totality in the newly built section from choice to information. 4. Can information underlie the physical world as the general substance? The next questions are: If the \"init\" and \"in-formation\" are given correspondingly as the unit of an infinite choice and the quantity of those infinite choices necessary to be formed some structure, can the \"qubit\" and \"quantum information\" be deduced or even constructed from the former two? Do the latter and thus the former two underlie the physical world and even the world at all? However, if the pathway from the totality to quantum information and thus to the world can be continued in the section from \"in-formation\" to quantum information, is it bilateral, bidirectional, i.e. are \"in-formation\" and quantum information equivalent to each other? The answers of these new questions are also positive and can be justified as follows: The first question can be divided into two parts: The first one is: Is an element of an arbitrary set equivalent to the choice of the element of the set supplied by a metric structure? Then the next one would be: Is that choice equivalent to a qubit? If the answers of both questions would be positive, an \"init\" would be also equivalent to a qubit and the quantities measured by each of both measures, correspondingly \"in-formation\" and quantum information could always coincide. Then one can start with the second half of the question. The choice of a point in a metric space means that exist some mapping, which depicts the set of all possible choices (i.e. of all points in the metric space) into the set of real numbers, and as the concept of choice implies the axiom of choice as above, into the set of natural numbers in final analysis. In other words, the restriction of the choice to a set having some metric structure is equivalent to the fact that the set of all possible choices is countable, and this is an obvious tautology as the concept of choice implies the axiom of choice and thus the countability of any set including that of all choices possible under any additional conditions. As all those cases are equivalent to each other, one can choose one of them to represent any other. That special representative case is the choice of a point of the unit sphere (i.e. a point of the surface of a ball of radius 1) for considerations, which follow a little below. That choice of a point from the unit sphere is isomorphic to a qubit if the latter is defined as usual as follows:\n\nany division of it into any parts, to be total in fact. Consequently the relation between the totality and time, which represents well-ordering and thus choice and some division for the choice to make sense, is rather extraordinary: The totality both represents absolutely itself in the time and transcends it e.g. by its wholeness or by the doubling of time in eternity, etc.: The totality is absolutely expressed in the time, and nevertheless it includes one more thing inexplicable. All this seems to be controversial, even contradictory, and thus both unbuildable and unembeddable in any mathematical structure. In fact, Hilbert space utilized by quantum mechanics is that structure. It coincides with its dual space, which cannot be simultaneously given with it. In other words, Hilbert space is absolutely represented by any member from the pair of dual spaces, and anyway that representation excludes something inexplicable, namely the other identical \"twin\" or counterpart. This initially contradictory ostensibly structure runs through all quantum mechanics generating e.g. many alleged \"paradoxes\", \"incompleteness\", etc. All of them originate from infinity involved in the core of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics for Hilbert space is infinitely dimensional and this fact is necessary to be resolved the main problem of how quantum leaps and smooth motions to be represented uniformly. Indeed the totality is necessarily infinite, and infinity can be defined as what contains a true part of it, which is equivalent to it. Thus the complement of this true part, which is always nonempty, is an inexplicable remainder after any explication by any infinite part of. That division of infinity and thus of the totality is what is represented by the original invariance to the axiom of choice: The remainder inexplicable in principle is that, to which the axiom of choice should not be valid, and vice versa: What is explicable (in the time in final analysis) obeys the axiom of choice. The same can be thought as a special property of infinity or of the totality such as the reconciliation of universality and openness in them. All these considerations are not a rigorous deduction, but they cannot be that for any deduction, and logic in principle as well, is on the side of explication. Anyway one can generalize logic as ontology, which can involve the inexplicable in principle as above. Even more, that ontology including the inexplicable nevertheless allows a precious enough expression by a mathematical stricture such as Hilbert space, which can be thought as an extraordinary form of logic based on lattices in it. The above consideration should be a deduction within that logic. All this should found the positive answer also of the first half of the question: Any set and even any entity can be equivalently represented by some metric structure admitting some 9 inexplicable remainder, which does not decrease the exactness of that quantitative representation. The pair of the totality and time underlies ontologically that statement coinciding with it in a sense. In fact any wave function can be represented as an equivalent series of qubits and thus as a value of the quantity of quantum information. Since that is the case, it underlies the physical world for any entity in it should be a quantum state representable as a wave function (a point in Hilbert space) or some change of that according to quantum mechanics. Consequently, the substance of the physical world is only quantum information and its change. This can be equivalently represented as the statement that the physical world is a single quantum computer processing just quantum information, and all physical processes are computations in it for quantum information is a generalization of information as to infinity. A quantum computer can be thought as a quantum Turing machine, in which all bits of its tape are replaced by qubits, and all operation on a cell (a qubit in the case) are the same: \"Write!\", \"Read!\", \"Next!\", and \"End!\" Even much more, not only the physical world, but the world at all can be considered as underlain by quantum information. The reason of that generalization is the invariance to object/ subject from the viewpoint of the totality and thus of time: Both interpretations of the totality as the universe being objective and the absolute (or transcendental) subject being subjective should be identical and that identity is expresses in particular by the availability of a common or joint foundation, quantum information, though the contemporary science has not yet managed to interpreted consciousness in terms of wave function directly. If now one look at the \"pathway\" between the totality and quantum information globally, the newly built section between in-formation and quantum information involving explicitly infinity makes it to be rather extraordinary: like a Möbius strip, which is bilateral or bidirectional locally, but unilateral or unidirectional globally. In fact the Möbius strip embeds topologically the structure of a bit representing both its aspects as a single unit and as two disjunctive alternatives correspondingly globally and locally. One can imagine the totality topologically as that generalization of the Möbius strip, where infinitely many \"sides\" appear locally. Time or logic should be interpreted only locally after that visualization. That inexplicability featuring only the totality is seen by dint of the global viewpoint without complementing the \"picture\" by any additional detail: It is only a doubling completing it as a whole. 10 5. Is the totality the true and ultimate substance of the world both objective and subjective? Thus quantum information can be very well understood as the local aspect or \"hypostasis\" of the totality being the true ultimate substance of the world both subjective and objective. One can think of quantum information as matter, i.e. as the absolutely explicable meaning of the substance therefore existing always in time. Time unifying subject and object in turn is only the explicable \"part\" or \"half\" of the totality distinguishing from it or from all explicable by a \"mute\" or \"ontological difference\": The totality is always both absolutely in time and yet transcending it by something inexplicable in principle by a pure or mirror doubling of all existing in time. Conclusions: Time can be defined axiomatically by its \"arrow\" therefore generalizing and representing the directionality of the world and being. Thus it can be equated to ordering and to the mathematical concept of well-ordering. That reduction can reveal its essential connection to choice and information. As the well-ordered aspect of the world, it can be deduced from the totality involving necessarily infinity. The concept of choice and information can be relevantly generalized as to infinity and conserve their link to time even under the condition of infinity. That infinite information is equivalent to the notion of quantum information in quantum mechanics. Thus one can built a pathway between the totality and quantum information, which turns out to be locally bilateral and bidirectional but globally unilateral and unidirectional like a Möbius strip. Time can be seen as embodying this global aspect of the totality to be unidirectional and thus well-ordered, a quantum-informational structure. In that scheme, the time expresses the totality absolutely and yet the totality includes some remainder always inexplicable in principle. The same scheme is also embedded in the basic mathematical structure of quantum mechanics: Hilbert space. Then its complementarity can be interpreted as that absolute expressibility always complemented by the inexplicable remainder of the incommeasurable twin of the conjugate quantity. The totality can be interpreted as the ultimate substance of the world quantitatively representable as quantum information. Time is a unifying boundary between subject and object therefore corresponding to quantum information. 11 Time offers a global viewpoint to the totality, from which can be seen both its completeness and openness contradicting common sense as it is locally related in principle. So the concept of time in philosophy allows of the totality as its subject to be described exactly enough and even more, to be directly linked to related notions in mathematics and experimental science, among which quantum mechanics is. Any references were omitted purposely until now emphasizing the absence of premises necessary for that consideration. It can be deduced from commonly known facts and definitions mentioned where need be. That approach corresponds to the primary and initial nature both of time and the totality. Nevertheless one can explicate a series of hidden, but obvious links to all corpus of contemporary cognition, especially in philosophy, mathematics, quantum mechanics and the theory of information and computation. They should be enumerated completely enough for the present text to be able to be sited in its relevant context enriching its meaning: Those are works and ideas of Husserl (1905; 1911), Heidegger (1924; 1927; 1929a, b; 1956; 1957), and Derrida (1968). A series of works on the foundation of mathematics elucidates the connection between the mathematical concepts of infinity, well-ordering and choice (Zermelo 1904; Skolem 1922; Jech 1973; Howard and Rubin 1998; Martin-Löf 2008). Furthermore one should estimate the revealing that infinity can unify universality, completeness and openness. Quantum mechanics corroborates the absence of hidden variables in its area (Neumann 1932; Kochen and Specker 1968) and therefore the validity of the axiom of choice in an experimental science. Furthermore it involves the concept of entanglement and quantum correlations (Einstein et al. 1935; Schrödinger 1935; Bell 1964; Clauser and Horn 1974; Aspect et al. 1981; 1982), and thus quantum information, which can be thought as the substance of the physical world. The theory of information clears up the close link between the concept of information (Shannon 1948; 1951) and those of choice and order (Kolmogorov 1965; 1968; Chatin 1966; 1969; 1975; 1977; 1987; Martin-Löf 1966). 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Chaitin G (1975) A Theory of Program Size Formally Identical to Information Theory. J Assoc Comput Mach 22: 329–340. Chaitin G (1977) Algorithmic information theory. IBM J Res Dev 21: 350-359. Chaitin G (1987) Algorithmic Information Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Clauser J, Horne M (1974) Experimental consequences of objective local theories. Phys Rev D 10: 526-535. Derrida J (1968) Différance. In: Derrida J. Marges – de la philosophie. Éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1972, pp. 1-29. Einstein A, Podolsky B, Rosen N (1935) Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? Phys Rev 47: 777-780. Heidegger M (1924) Der Begriff der Zeit. Gesamtausgabe (Hrsp F-W von Herrmann), Bd 64 (2004). Vittorio Klostremann, Frankfurt am Main. Heidegger M (1927) Sein und Zeit. Gesamtausgabe (Hrsp F-W von Herrmann), Bd 2 (1977). Vittorio Klostremann, Frankfurt am Main. Heidegger M (1929a) Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. 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{"text": "Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 1 Transfiguring Love David McPherson 1. Introduction In this essay I want to build on John Cottingham's suggestion that we need an epistemology of involvement (or receptivity), as opposed to an epistemology of detachment, if we are to properly understand the world in religious terms.1 I will also refer to these as 'engaged' and 'disengaged' stances.2 I will seek to show how the spiritual practice of an 'active' or 'engaged' love is integral to the sort of epistemology of involvement through which we come to a religious understanding of the world.3 Such an understanding is one that gives proper recognition to the sacred or reverence-worthy character of the world. I will discuss how a religiously-inflected language of love and the practice it informs can transfigure the world for us and enable its sacred or reverence-worthy character to come into view (supposing it is there in any case). I will also seek to show how this is connected to a process of spiritual formation (or Bildung). 2. Love Seeking Understanding To help illustrate what is at issue here, I want to begin with a discussion of two main characters in Fyodor Dostoevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov: viz., Ivan Karamazov, the rationalistic atheist, and Father Zosima, an Elder in the local Orthodox monastery and the spiritual mentor to the youngest Karamazov brother, Alyosha. The difference between the two epistemologies is depicted well in the contrast between these two characters: Ivan represents an epistemology of detachment, while Zosima represents an epistemology of involvement or receptivity. It would be a mistake to say that Ivan represents a stance of pure detachment as he is in fact pulled between engaged and disengaged stances. Consider this beginning portion of his conversation with Alyosha, which is part of the philosophical core of the novel: \"[...] Though I do not believe in the order of things, still the sticky little leaves that come out in the spring are dear to me, the blue sky is dear to me, some people are dear to me, whom one loves sometimes, would you believe it, without even knowing why; some human deeds are dear to me, which one has perhaps long ceased believing in, but still honors with one's heart, out of old habit. [...] Such things you love not with your mind, not with logic, but with your insides, your guts [...]. Do you understand any of this blather, Aloshka, or not?\" Ivan suddenly laughed. \"I understand it all too well, Ivan: to want to love with your insides, your guts – you said it beautifully [...],\" Alyosha exclaimed. \"I think that everyone should love life before everything else in the world.\" \"Love life more than its meaning?\" \"Certainly, love it before logic, as you say, certainly before logic, and only then will I 1 Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 2 I borrow these terms from Charles Taylor. 3 I make no strong distinction between 'spiritual' and 'religious' and often use these terms interchangeably. For more on this see my 'Homo Religiosus: Does Spirituality Have a Place in Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?', Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 51:3 (2015): 336–7. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 2 also understand its meaning [...].\"4 The claim that we must love life 'before logic' in order to understand its meaning is a key claim that we will be exploring here. But Ivan is clearly skeptical. As mentioned, he is pulled between engaged and disengaged stances. The engaged stance is a natural mode for human beings as we live day-to-day as purposive agents engaging in activities and with objects or persons that are experienced as significant to us. We can see the naturalness of this stance in Ivan's remarks above about the things that are dear to him in spite of his doubts about an objectively meaningful order. However, the disengaged stance is also natural to human beings.5 It often arises in the face of experiences that are jarring, disconcerting, bewildering, or otherwise problematic, where we are forced to step back from our engaged mode of experience and reflect upon the nature and significance of this experience.6 This disengaged stance, it must be emphasized, is not something to be shunned. Indeed, it is an integral part of what is most admirable in our humanity. In particular, it is connected to our capacity for and inclination towards the philosophical life, which begins from this kind of stepping back in the face of puzzlement, where one then seeks out a more encompassing view of things that can hopefully make sense of his or her experience. As Aristotle famously remarked: 'It is because of wonder [or puzzlement] that human beings undertake philosophy, both now and at its origins', and they do so in order to no longer feel 'at a loss' in the world.7 As becomes clear, Ivan is certainly someone who is 'at a loss' in the world. The most significant problematic experience that Ivan encounters is that of horrendous evil and suffering. More specifically, Ivan is deeply moved by the terrible suffering inflicted upon innocent children by adults, and he goes on to describe to Alyosha a number of such cases, which are from actual newspaper stories collected by Dostoevsky. Ivan remarks: I want to see with my own eyes the [deer] lie down with the lion, and the murdered man rise up and embrace his murderer. I want to be there when everyone suddenly finds out what it was all for. All religions in the world are based on this desire, and I am a believer. But then there are the children, and what am I going to do about them? That is the question I cannot resolve [...]. [If] everyone must suffer, in order to buy eternal harmony with their suffering, pray tell me what have children got to do with it? It's quite incomprehensible why they should have to suffer, and why they should buy harmony with their suffering. [...] [If] the suffering of children goes to make up the sum of suffering needed to buy truth, then I assert beforehand that the whole of truth is not worth such a price. [...] [They] have put too high a price on harmony; we can't afford to pay so much for admission. And therefore I hasten to return my ticket.8 Here Ivan can be seen as challenging standard theodicies (i.e., defenses of God's ways in the face of evil and suffering), such as the 'free will defense' and the 'soul-making defense', by questioning whether free will, soul-making, or some higher harmony is really worth the price of 4 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky (New York: Everyman's Library, 1990 [1880]), 230-1. 5 I am using 'natural' here in a 'second nature' sense of the term; see discussion of this below. 6 See Heidegger's distinction between 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-to-hand' in Being and Time. 7 Metaphysics II, 982b12–18; this translation is from Martha Nussbaum in The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1986]), 259. 8 The Brothers Karamazov, 244–5. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 3 the horrendous suffering inflicted upon innocent children. Dostoevsky himself thought this challenge is unanswerable in detached, rationalistic terms alone, and so instead he sought to address it, as we will see, on an engaged, existential plane through a depiction of the life and teachings of Father Zosima.9 What is important to observe at this point is that Ivan's own response is that of recoiling from evil and suffering and separating himself from involvement with the world, i.e., 'returning his ticket'. Accepting for argument's sake that there is a God, Ivan remarks: 'It's not God that I do not accept, you understand, it is this world of God's, created by God, that I do not accept and cannot agree to accept'.10 Without being able to understand the justifying 'logic' of the world, Ivan is unable to love and embrace it fully. In other words, the failure to comprehend this justifying logic or meaning from a detached, rationalistic scrutinizing standpoint (combined with a deep sense of injustice) has an undermining effect on what he loves and on what he might love.11 Thus, he ultimately sides with the disengaged stance in putting 'logic' before love. Zosima takes the opposite stance. His two fundamental teaching are that 'life is paradise', even in the face of great evil and suffering, and we are 'responsible to all for all', which requires an engaged or 'active' love – i.e., affective identification with others, a profound appreciation of their intrinsic love-worthiness, and wishing and, where appropriate, pursuing good for them – that both helps us to see how life already is paradise and enables us to more fully realize this paradise. Thus, whereas Ivan recoils from evil and suffering and ultimately privileges a disengaged stance, Zosima privileges an engaged stance through exemplifying a path of reengagement as the only route to living meaningfully in the face of evil and suffering, even if one is not able to fully make sense of it.12 I speak of privileging an engaged stance, but it is important that there should be an ongoing dialectic between engagement and disengagement. While philosophy begins with reflective disengagement from our pre-reflective mode of engagement with the world, it should not remain in the disengaged stance but should return to an engaged mode in a more reflective way by attending to the 'space of reasons' (or domain of meaning) that arises for us in our purposive engagement with the world and which is enriched by a more nuanced conceptual framework (I will return later to discuss the role of language in opening our eyes to this domain of meaning). Here we try to articulate the nature and significance of this engaged experience and what seems required for making sense of it. For instance, we can attend to our experience of 9 See the letters appended to The Brothers Karamazov, trans. C. Garnett, rev. R. E. Matlaw (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976 [1880]), esp. at 757–62. 10 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 235. 11 With regard to what Ivan says he loves (the sticky leaves, some people, etc.), Alyosha asks: 'How will you live, what will you love them with? [...] Is it possible, with such hell in your heart and in your head?' (The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 263). 12 Charles Taylor writes: '[One] of Dostoyevsky's crucial insights turns on the way in which we close or open ourselves to grace. The ultimate sin is to close oneself [...]. We are closed to grace, because we close ourselves to the world in which it circulates; and we do that out of loathing for ourselves and for this world. [...] Dostoyevsky [...] gives an acute understanding of how loathing and self-loathing, inspired by the very real evils of the world, fuel a projection of evil outward, a polarization between self and world, where all the evil is now seen to reside. [...] Dostoyevsky's rejectors [such as Ivan] are \"schismatics\" [...], cut off from the world and hence grace. [...] What will transform us is an ability to love the world and ourselves, to see it as good in spite of the wrong. But this will only come to us if we can accept being part of it, and that means accepting responsibility' (Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 451–2). See also C. Guignon, 'Introduction', The Grand Inquisitor: with related chapters from The Brothers Karamazov (Indianapolis: Hackett 1993). Both Taylor and Guignon have influenced my interpretation of Dostoevsky here. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 4 objective moral values, i.e., moral values that stand independent of our desires as things with which we ought to be concerned. We might argue that such experience of objective moral values presupposes a moral teleology at work in the universe, and we can then inquire into whether such a worldview is ultimately believable. If it were not, then this would have a deflationary effect on our moral experience. Something similar might be said for spiritual experience. We have seen that for Ivan the perceived lack of a justifying 'logic' has a deflationary effect on what he loves. Ivan is also well-known for his view that God (or a theistic moral teleology) is needed for making sense of our experience of objective moral demands, as seen in his famous claim that if God does not exist, then everything is permissible. In the same context he also says that without belief in God and personal immortality 'there is decidedly nothing in the whole world that would make men love their fellow men'.13 Interestingly, what is less known is that Zosima (who expresses Dostoevsky's viewpoint) thinks that the relationship first goes the other way: active love is important for coming to affirm a religious worldview. He says: Try to love your neighbors actively and tirelessly. The more you succeed in loving, the more you'll be convinced of the existence of God and the immortality of your soul. And if you reach complete selflessness in the love of your neighbor, then undoubtedly you will believe, and no doubt will even be able to enter your soul. This has been tested. It is certain.14 In fact, Zosima enjoins not just love of neighbor but also love of the whole world as a path towards coming to grasp and affirm a religious worldview: Love all God's creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it. Love every leaf, every ray of God's light. Love the animals, love the plants, love everything. If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in things. Once you perceive it, you will begin to comprehend it better every day. And you will come at last to love the whole world with an all-embracing love.15 These are certainly striking claims, and it should be noted that Dostoevsky himself was never without doubt about a theistic worldview. As he said in a letter: 'I am a child of this century, a child of doubt and disbelief, I have always been and shall ever be (that I know), until they close the lid of my coffin'. And yet despite this, he says: God sends me moments of great tranquility, moments during which I love and find I am loved by others; and it was during such a moment that I formed within myself a symbol of faith in which all is clear and sacred to me. This symbol is very simple, and here is what it is: to believe that there is nothing more beautiful, more profound, more sympathetic, more reasonable, more courageous, and more perfect than Christ [...].16 13 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 69–70. 14 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 56. 15 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Garnett, rev. Matlaw, 298. 16 Selected Letters of Fyodor Dostoevsky, trans. A. MacAndrew, eds J. Frank and D. I. Goldstein (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987 [1854]), 68. Elsewhere when discussing the powerful case for atheism that he gave through Ivan, Dostoevsky says: '[It] is not like a child that I believe in Christ and confess him. My hosanna has come forth from the crucible of doubt' (quoted in H. de Lubac, The Drama of Atheistic Humanism, trans. A. E. Nash, E. M. Riley, and M. Sebanc [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995 (1944)], 296). Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 5 The key idea in these passages is that there can be epiphanic experiences, facilitated by the practice of active love, where we come to see the world in a new light, i.e., as transfigured in religious terms: the world is seen as filled with meaning, or 'Logos'17, where 'all is clear and sacred' and life is seen as 'paradise', where we 'perceive the divine mystery in things' or are convinced of God's existence (I set aside the issue of personal immortality here for reasons of space). Hence Alyosha says that we must love life 'before logic' in order to understand its meaning or its 'Logos'. There is a kind of intelligibility in the world that only comes into view when we are properly disposed and attuned to the world through an engaged standpoint of love. We miss this intelligibility if we remain at the level of detached, rationalistic scrutinizing (i.e., detached 'logic'). This is not to say that there is not a place for disengaged reasoning, especially for standing back and critically reflecting upon our engaged modes of experience and confronting challenges such as the problem of evil and suffering and seeking to make sure our beliefs are coherent. Here doubt often will be closely linked to the life of faith. As mentioned, there needs to be an ongoing dialectic between the engaged and disengaged standpoints. However, for most people it won't be merely because of disengaged reasoning that they come to affirm a religious worldview (e.g., by considering the standard philosophical arguments for and against God's existence); rather, it will involve an engaged mode of attunement and loving responsiveness. The religious path here is not just faith seeking understanding but also love seeking understanding, where such love helps to transfigure the world for us such that we can come to see the world in religious terms, i.e., where the sacred or reverence-worthy character of the world comes into view. Here we are also guided and sustained by those saintly persons or spiritual exemplars – Christ is the supreme exemplar for Dostoevsky, as we saw18 – that are further along in this path of love than we are. To better understand this religious path and the idea of a transfiguring love we need to consider now in more detail the sort of spiritual formation that makes it possible. 3. Spiritual Formation Transfiguring love is an achievement. It is a matter of coming to see, appreciate, and affectively relate to the world and others differently than one had before; i.e., it is a matter of coming to see things in a new light.19 Sometimes this happens in a sudden momentary experience, as with 17 In regard to seeing the 'Logos' (or 'Word') in all things, Zosima remarks: 'Every blade of grass, every insect, ant, and golden bee, all so amazingly know their path, though they have not intelligence, they bear witness to the mystery of God and continually accomplish it themselves. [...] All creation and all creatures, every leaf is striving to the Word' (The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Garnett, rev. Matlaw, 273–4; cf. the prologue to the Gospel of John). 18 Zosima says that we would be altogether lost without the 'precious image of Christ before us' (The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 320). The 'image of Christ', for Dostoevsky, represents the perfection of the saintly ideal of an all-embracing love and in a notebook he describes the image of Christ as an 'eternal ideal toward which man aspires and is bound to aspire according to nature's law' (Dostoevsky's Occasional Writings, trans. D. Magarshack [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997 (1864)], 305). It is in aspiring after and achieving this ideal – or at least approximating it – that our fulfillment is to be found: 'the greatest use a man can make of his personality, of the fullest development of his I, is in one way or another to destroy this I, to give himself up wholly to all and everyone, selflessly and wholeheartedly. And that is the greatest happiness' (306). 19 As Mark Wynn has pointed out, this sort of transfiguration can involve two key changes in our sensory experience of the world: (1) 'a deepened sense of the significance of the sensory order considered as a whole', i.e., a general change in 'hue', and (2) 'a deepened sense of the differentiated significance of objects', i.e., specific changes in 'salience' ('Between Heaven and Earth: Sensory Experience and the Goods of the Spiritual Life', in Spirituality and the Good Life: Philosophical Approaches, ed. D. McPherson [Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 6 Dostoevsky's own experience that he describes above. But it is often the fruit of a process of spiritual formation, which aims to effect an enduring change of being and vision. To try explain this, I will develop upon John McDowell's account of Bildung – understood by him as ethical formation – which enables the recognition of ethical demands 'which are there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them'. He writes: We are alerted to these demands by acquiring the appropriate conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons. Thereafter our appreciation of its detailed layout is indefinitely subject to refinement, in reflective scrutiny of our ethical thinking.20 In short, this is a matter of acquiring a 'second nature', i.e., cultivated forms of action, thought, and sensitivity that enable these ethical demands to come into view. So what we need to consider is how a similar process of spiritual formation can enable a religious understanding of the world, i.e., a religiously-inflected account of the space of reasons (or domain of meaning), where the principal ethical-cum-spiritual demand pertains to giving proper recognition to the sacred or reverence-worthy character of things (i.e., 'the divine mystery in things').21 I am suggesting that this is centrally a matter of achieving a transfiguring love of the world in general and other human beings in particular. But this is no easy matter. As we see in Ivan's case, love for the world can be difficult given the way it often seems tragically 'out of joint'. Moreover, just as Ivan acknowledges natural affection for particular people, he also acknowledges natural revulsion with respect to those with physical or moral imperfections: 'If we're to come to love [such] a man, the man himself should stay hidden, because as soon as he shows his face – love vanishes'.22 Alyosha responds by noting that Father Zosima has also said that 'a man's face often prevents many people, who are as yet inexperienced in love, from loving him'. For Zosima, the love of those who appear unlovable (or less lovable) – e.g., 'the sinner' – is 'the semblance of Divine Love and is the highest love on earth'.23 However, such heights of love require experience and training (askesis): Brothers, love is a teacher, but one must know how to acquire it, for it is difficult to acquire, it is dearly bought, by long work over a long time, for one ought to love not for a chance moment but for all time.24 forthcoming]; cf. M. Wynn, Renewing the Senses: A Study of the Philosophy and Theology of the Spiritual Life [Oxford University Press, 2013]). 20 J. McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 82. 21 See Fiona Ellis's God, Value, and Nature (Oxford University Press, 2014) for another attempt to develop McDowell's work in a theistic direction, especially with regard to a theistic account of second nature. She writes: 'we ourselves, qua natural beings, are already open to God. The supernatural [...] is not a spooky superstructure, extrinsic or added on to a nature which is complete in itself. Rather, it is a quality or dimension which enriches or perfects the natural world. This grants us the right to allow that man can be inwardly transformed by God. And precisely because this transformation serves to enhance his natural being [...] we avoid the implication that such divine action spells the destruction of man, severing any connection he might have with ordinary human life' (91). The account that I develop here can be seen as complimentary to Ellis's project. 22 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 236–7. 23 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Garnett, rev. Matlaw, 298. 24 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 319. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 7 [Active] love is a harsh and fearful thing compared with love in dreams. Love in dreams thirsts for immediate action, quickly performed, and with everyone watching. [...] Whereas active love is labor and perseverance, and for some people, perhaps, a whole science.25 In this 'science' of active love we are especially guided, as suggested above, by saintly persons or spiritual exemplars, who are 'saintly' in that they are further along in the path of love and better approximate the ideal of a proper relationship in feeling and in action to the sacred or the reverence-worthy. Zosima is a fictional example of a saintly person (though Dostoevsky based his depiction of him on actual spiritual exemplars).26 But we can also consider a recent nonfictional example, which is drawn from Raimond Gaita's work. In A Common Humanity, Gaita discusses the behavior and attitude of a nun who came to visit a psychiatric ward at which he worked when he was seventeen, where the patients 'appeared to have irretrievably lost everything which gives meaning to our lives' and have qualities to which one might naturally feel revulsion. But Gaita says of the nun: [Everything] in her demeanour towards them-the way she spoke to them, her facial expressions, the inflexions of her body-contrasted with and showed up the behavior of those noble psychiatrists. She showed that they were, despite their best efforts, condescending, as I too had been. She thereby revealed that such patients were, as the psychiatrists and I had sincerely and generously professed, the equals of those who want to help them; but she also revealed that in our hearts we did not believe this.27 Gaita is not religious in any conventional sense and yet he marvels at the power of the nun's love – as expressed through her demeanour – 'to reveal the full humanity of those whose affliction had made their humanity invisible'.28 He acknowledges that the disciplines of her religious vocation 'were essential to her becoming the kind of person she was' and he doubts that 'the love expressed in the nun's demeanour would have been possible for her were it not for the place which the language of parental love had in her prayers': 'The nun almost certainly believed that the patients with whom she dealt were all God's children and equally loved by him'.29 However, Gaita doesn't think that the quality of her love 'proves' her religious perspective; rather, it only 25 The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 58. 26 Dostoevsky was well aware of the sort of critiques of purportedly saintly persons that find expression in Nietzsche's later writings and more recently in the work of Susan Wolf, Martha Nussbaum, and others, which claim that there is something other-worldly, life-denying, mutilating, strained, or otherwise harmful about saintly ideals. In The Brothers Karamazov the narrator remarks that ascetic practices, which are commonly tied to saintly ideals, are 'a double-edged weapon, which may lead a person not to humility and ultimate self-control but, on the contrary, to the most satanic pride – that is, to fetters and not to freedom' (trans. Pevear and Volokhonsky, 29). Moreover, in the character Father Ferapont, the great faster and keeper of silence, Dostoevsky provides an artistic portrayal of the kind of life-denying 'ascetic ideal' that Nietzsche critiques. But for Dostoevsky there is a valid saintly ideal (which includes certain ascetic practices as important for ethical and spiritual transformation; see 314), which is depicted in Father Zosima, and also in Alyosha, who is to live the saintly path outside of a religious order and in family life. For more on this issue, see my 'Nietzsche, Cosmodicy, and the Saintly Ideal', Philosophy 91(1): 39–67. 27 A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice (New York: Routledge, 1998), 17–9. 28 A Common Humanity, 20. 29 A Common Humanity, 20–2. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 8 proves that the patients are 'rightly the objects of our non-condescending treatment, that we should do all in our power to respond in that way'.30 To expect proof of a religious perspective here certainly seems like too much ask, since it is not clear that anything could offer a strict proof in this domain. Nevertheless, the way that the nun's love helps us to see the patients in a new, transfigured light can be a part of coming to affirm a religious vision of the world. In this case, it will be a matter of coming to see and affirm all human beings as sacred and as children of God. The phenomenology of the sacred here involves an experience of a normative demand that – to recall McDowell's phrasing – is 'there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to [it]'. Sacred or holy things are worthy of reverence and as such they place upon us absolute requirements of inviolability (i.e., barriers to action that ought never to be crossed) as well as duties to render assistance where appropriate. Gaita acknowledges that there is something lacking for the person who is moved by the nun's love but cannot accept her religious perspective, since he thinks that only a religious person 'can speak seriously of the sacred', though 'such talk informs the thoughts of most of us whether or not we are religious, for it shapes our thoughts about the way in which human beings limit our will as does nothing else in nature'. However, he thinks that the non-religious person will often have to find some not fully adequate substitute for the religious language of the sacred, such as that all human beings are 'inestimably precious', 'ends in themselves', 'owed unconditional respect', or 'possess inalienable dignity'. For Gaita, 'these are ways of trying to say what we feel a need to say when we are estranged from the conceptual resources we need to say it' and none of them has 'the simple power of the religious way of speaking'.31 I don't think it is entirely right to say that only a (conventionally) religious person 'can speak seriously of the sacred', since the language of the sacred can be used to describe that which is experienced as reverence-worthy (though we might say that to have such experiences is to be religious in a broad sense). But it does have religious connotations, and it can be one way of trying to capture a sense of 'the divine mystery in things'. I also think there are questions that arise here of whether the experience of a strong normative demand that these different terms seek to capture and reveal – whether it is the 'sacredness' of all human beings or their 'inestimable preciousness' or whatever else – can be adequately made sense of in a world that is devoid of any underlying moral or spiritual purposiveness. If the world is ultimately just the result of 'blind', mechanistic causes, i.e., if we are just what the cosmic cat coughed up, then does it really make sense to speak of strong normative demands which are 'there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them'? The realization that one lacks such a justifying account (or 'logic') can have a deflationary effect. But at the same time, the fact that we do experience such strong normative demands, and that some of them seem best captured in the language of the sacred, can itself be a reason for coming to affirm a religiously purposive worldview. Two related points should be emphasized here with regard to the foregoing exploration of spiritual formation and its significance. First, Gaita's discussion shows the importance of spiritual exemplars (or saintly persons) for helping us come to see the world, especially other human beings, in a new light. And we can think of other spiritual exemplars besides Gaita's nun who can also have this effect, such as Jean Vanier, Mother Teresa, Desmond Tutu, Sister Helen Prejean, and Maximilian Kolbe, not to mention many other less famous examples.32 30 A Common Humanity, 21. 31 A Common Humanity, 23. 32 Many of these less known examples are 'ordinary' virtuous people who are not members of religious orders. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 9 Second, Gaita's discussion shows the significance of specific religious language (or 'conceptual resources') and religious practices informed by such language for how we come to see the world, particularly with regard to what we see as love-worthy. We can add that religious works of art – e.g., paintings, music, poetry, novels, scripture, traditional prayers, etc. – also play an important role in shaping the conceptual resources that inform a religious vision of the world. We always love under some description (e.g., the object of love is seen as 'sacred', 'precious', 'a child of God', 'made in the image of God', etc.), and thus Gaita says (quoting Rush Rhees): 'there would be no love without the language of love'.33 Moreover, in our culture this is related to saintly love: 'Because of the place the impartial love of saints has occupied in our culture, there has developed a language of love whose grammar has transformed our understanding of what it is for a human being to be a unique kind of limit to our will'.34 In his account of Bildung, McDowell also discusses the significance of initiation into a particular language for opening our eyes to the space of reasons (or domain of meaning), since a language 'serves as a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what'. This does not mean that we should accept everything within a tradition, since for any living tradition there is a 'standing obligation to engage in critical reflection'. But the point is that in order to have access to the space of reasons and acquire 'the capacity to think and act intentionally, at all, the first thing that needs to happen is for [one] to be initiated into a tradition as its stands'.35 The lesson for the topic at hand is that in order to come to see the world in religious terms (i.e., in terms of a religiously-inflected account of the space of reasons) one must be initiated (at some level) into a particular religious tradition, with its particular language and set of practices. We have seen that active love is itself a key religious practice. But Gaita also shows how this can be connected to one's prayer life, particularly that which expresses the language of parental love (as in the 'Our Father'). In fact, he notes that there is a close connection between parental love and saintly love. Human parental love can also reveal the intrinsic preciousness of human beings, such as when a parent unconditionally loves a child who has become vicious.36 Indeed, we can come to see other human beings, including vicious ones, in a new light when we think of them as somebody's child, and it can also be helpful to think of them as being once a vulnerable young child and to think of the particular circumstances of their upbringing (we might also think of the whole life-span, where we recognize them as fellow 'mortals'). But Gaita believes that in order to validate the idea that we should extend something like (but not exactly the same as) the partial, unconditional love of parents to all humanity we need the example of saintly love, which, at least in the theistic case, draws on the concept of parental love in seeing all of us as children of God who are equally and unconditionally loved by God.37 This allows us to speak of the 'human family' and see our fellow human beings as 'brothers' and 'sisters'. Of course, we might try to find secular equivalents, such as the idea that 'we are all in it together', but these seem to lack the resonances and power of the religious idea of being children of God.38 33 A Common Humanity, 26. 34 A Common Humanity, 24. 35 Mind and World, 125–6. For more on the 'constitutive' role of language in human life, see C. Taylor, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016). 36 To love someone 'unconditionally', as I understand it, means that this love will not be undermined by what the beloved makes of his or her life. In the words of St. Paul, such love 'never fails' (1 Corinthians 13:8). 37 A Common Humanity, 24. 38 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell's remarks about being united in our 'common doom' in 'A Free Man's Worship'; a similar idea is also expressed in Albert Camus' The Plague. Of course, we might instead have what I dub the 'Jim Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 10 I would like to mention one other, related example here of a religious practice that can help to cultivate a transfiguring love. In Marilynne Robinson's novel Gilead, the main character John Ames discusses the practice of keeping the Ten Commandments, with a particular focus on the commandment to honor one's parents. In a letter to his young son, Ames writes: There's a pattern in these Commandments of setting things apart so that their holiness will be perceived. Every day is holy, but the Sabbath is set apart so that the holiness of time can be experienced. Every human being is worthy of honor, but the conspicuous discipline of honor is learned from this setting apart of the mother and father, who usually labor and are heavy-laden, and may be cranky or stingy or ignorant or overbearing. Believe me, I know this can be a hard Commandment to keep. But I believe also that the rewards of obedience are great, because the root of real honor is always the sense of the sacredness of the person who is its object. In the particular instance of your mother, I know that if you are attentive to her in this way, you will find a very great loveliness in her. When you love someone to the degree that you love her, you see her as God sees her, and that is an instruction in the nature of God and humankind and of Being itself.39 Again, there is a kind of unconditional love enjoined here that seeks to emulate God's love, and thus to see people as God sees them. In this case, being attentive to one's mother so as to perceive her loveliness might involve, among other things, seeing her whole life context and not just her immediate role as mother, and seeing her as also a child of God. We can add that loving and honoring one's parents can be understood on analogy with love for God. Indeed, insofar as we are understood as children of God and God's love is seen as an unconditional parental love, we thus grasp God's love for us first through appreciating and responding to our parents' love for us, which at its best is unconditional, but which may in many ways be imperfect (as human love often is). So learning to love and honor our parents can train us for loving and honoring God. In other words, filial piety can also be seen as training for religious piety as one seeks to honor the sources of one's existence and appreciate the giftedness of life. As Robinson puts it through Ames, this is 'an instruction in the nature of God and humankind and of Being itself'. 4. Making Good or Making Goodness Manifest? I want to conclude by considering a potential worry about the idea of transfiguring love. At one point in Gaita's discussion of the nun's saintly love he remarks that on her view, as he understands it, 'we are sacred because God loves us, his children', which suggests that God's love makes us sacred.40 Or in Gaita's non-religious terms: we are 'inestimably precious' or 'possess inalienable dignity' because someone can love us in a 'pure' or 'unconditional' way. In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor has suggested a similar thought in his discussion of a kind of 'seeing-good' where otherwise the goodness of something or someone is not readily apparent. Taylor says that this sort of 'seeing-good' is 'a seeing which also helps effect what it sees'.41 Like Gaita, Taylor is especially concerned with the 'irremediably broken' and he thinks that Morrison response' and seek to get our 'kicks' in 'before the whole shithouse goes up in flames'; see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSlXjrxqDOE (from The Doors, The Greatest Hits, Track 7). 39 Gilead (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 139. I thank Kirstin McPherson for bringing this wonderful passage to my attention. 40 A Common Humanity, 24; my emphasis. 41 Sources of the Self, 449; my emphasis. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 11 religious sources offer a more powerful and illuminating kind of seeing-good than non-religious or 'naturalist' sources (unlike Gaita, Taylor is a theist).42 In particular, Taylor discusses the Christian idea of agape, which he says is [...] a love that God has for humans which is connected with their goodness as creatures (though we don't have to decide whether they are loved because good or good because loved). Human beings participate through grace in this love. There is a divine affirmation of the creature, which is captured in the repeated phrase in Genesis 1 about each stage of the creation, \"and God saw that it was good\". Agape is inseparable from such a \"seeinggood\".43 Earlier Taylor says with regard to Genesis 1: 'The goodness of the world is not something quite independent from God's seeing it as good. His seeing it as good, loving it, can be conceived not simply as a response to what it is, but as what makes it such'.44 What should we make of the claim that 'we don't have to decide whether [human beings] are loved because good or good because loved'? And what should we make of the more positive suggestion that a certain kind of love or seeing-good 'makes', 'effects', or 'brings about' the goodness (or sacredness) of someone or something?45 I find such remarks problematic and thus worrisome insofar as they suggest that we are merely projecting some 'goodness', 'sacredness', 'preciousness', or 'love-worthiness' onto something or someone, where such properties are not really there in any case.46 I think that we do have to take a stand on Taylor's disjunction: human beings are loved, or should be loved, because they are good, rather than being good because loved. In other words, we are responsive here to a normative demand for love that is 'there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to [it]'. This is not to deny that there is a place for a certain kind of 'making' or 'effecting', otherwise we would not speak of 'transfiguring'. What a particular religiously-inflected language of love and the practice it informs can 'effect' or 'bring about' is the revelation of goodness or sacredness. The point is epistemological rather than ontological: seeing-good here should not be understood as making good but as making manifest a goodness that is there in any case; i.e., as revealing an independent reality that is fit to be valued and loved in particular ways once we have acquired the relevant linguistic capacities and moral 42 Taylor writes: 'The question [...] is whether we are not living beyond our moral means in continuing allegiance to our standards of [universal] justice and benevolence. Do we have ways of seeing-good which are still credible to us, which are powerful enough to sustain these standards? [...] Is the naturalist affirmation conditioned on a vision of human nature in the fullness of its health and strength? Does it move us to extend help to the irremediably broken, such as the mentally handicapped, those dying without dignity, fetuses with genetic defects? Perhaps one might judge that it doesn't and that this is a point in favour of naturalism; perhaps efforts shouldn't be wasted on these unpromising cases. But the careers of Mother Teresa or Jean Vanier seem to point to a different pattern, emerging from a Christian spirituality. [...] I do think naturalist humanism defective in these respects – or, perhaps better put, that great as the power of naturalist sources might be, the potential of a certain theistic perspective is incomparably greater' (Sources of the Self, 517–8). Similarly, Gaita writes: 'reflecting on the nun's example, I came to believe that an ethics centered on the concept of human flourishing does not have the conceptual resources to keep fully amongst us, in the way the nun had revealed to be possible, people who are severely and ineradicably afflicted' (A Common Humanity, 18). 43 Sources of the Self, 516. 44 Sources of the Self, 449. 45 See Sources of the Self, 419, 448–9, 454–5, 510, 512, 516. 46 Both Gaita and Taylor seem to be otherwise committed to a realist account of value (as 'there in any case'), so their claims about making or effecting a certain kind of value seem odd in light of this. Forthcoming in Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford University Press) 12 and spiritual sensitivity. Moreover, the ontological claim regarding making or creating goodness itself seems dubious: while we can make or foster good things (e.g., a work of art, virtuous character, etc.) that instantiate or embody goodness (and such good things can be brought about through love), goodness itself does not seem to be the kind of thing that can be created, but rather it must be discovered or apprehended. It might be objected that God is a special case, since, according to traditional theism, God creates the world ex nihilo and sees it as good. So perhaps God could also create goodness itself ex nihilo. We encounter here a version of the well-known 'Euthyphro dilemma' (derived from Plato's Euthyphro): Is something good because it is loved (or willed) by God, or does God love (or will) it because it is good? On the one hand, if we say something is good simply in virtue of being loved (or willed) by God, then this seems to make goodness arbitrary, as anything (including, e.g., murder) could be good so long as it is loved (or willed) by God. God's love then loses all intelligibility as it is seen as merely a brute fact rather than a response to something or someone's love-worthiness. On the other hand, if we say that God loves (or wills) something because it is good or love-worthy, then the concern is that this makes God irrelevant for morality, as goodness is independent of God's love or willing as something to which this love or willing responds. But I think a theist can take this second approach without thereby committing him or her self to God's irrelevance for morality. There are three main reasons for this. First, God creates the world in light of a perfect understanding of the good and as ordered towards realizing this good. Second, God perfectly exemplifies the good, such that we can say that God is good (or the Good). Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, God perfectly loves the goodness that is inherent in the world, including in humanity, and in doing so helps to make manifest this goodness to us. In other words, God's agape is the perfect instance of transfiguring love, and on this theistic picture we fully come to see the world in religious terms when we come to see and love the world as God does.47 47 I thank Fiona Ellis, Jared Schumacher, and members of audiences at Heythrop College, University of London and the University of Notre Dame for helpful comments on early drafts of this essay.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Public Reason 5 (1): 3-13 © 2013 by Public Reason Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte1 University of Bristol, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich I. G A M E TH EORY A N D SOCI A L NOR MS Game-theoretic approaches to social norms have flourished in the recent years, and on first inspection theorists seem to agree on the broad lines that such accounts should follow.2 By contrast, this paper aims to show that the main two interpretations of social norms are at odds on at least one aspect of social norms, and both fail to account for another aspect. We are sympathetic to the broad project of using game theory to model social norms. Our aim is not to undermine this project or argue that no coherent framework or frameworks is possible in principle. Rather, we aim to show, with reference to two particular issues, that at this stage it is unclear if and how differing approaches can be integrated into a unified picture. The two issues we go on to discuss are, first, the role of punishment within the models and, second, how they deal with the context dependence of norm triggering. In each case it is the question of whether or not the model should be one of repeated or one-shot interactions that is the source of problems for integration. When it comes to different modelling approaches, the recent literature provides two presentations of social norms. Ken Binmore outlines a model that frames social norms in terms of repeated interactions (1994, 1998, 2005). In contrast, Cristina Bicchieri's model is of one-shot interactions and involves utility transformations, triggered by social context, that make norm conformity the rational behaviour (2006, 2008). Both of these authors repeatedly refer to each other's work as belonging to a common programme but, we argue, their difference on the question of repeated interaction models makes integration of their approaches problematic. We draw attention to the fact that differences on the question of whether we should think in terms of repeated encounters or not lie at the very foundations of the models. Such disagreement makes common approaches to punishment and context dependence deeply problematic. This is not to say that having multiple approaches is unwelcome in principle. Still, those unfamiliar with the literature could be forgiven for taking it that there are core similarities common to all game theoretic treatments of social norms. In 1] This paper stems from our earlier \"Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?,\" (Paternotte & Grose, 2012). This paper shares its overall diagnosis but adds to it by providing a deeper analysis of several points. 2] Despite their disagreements on specific issues; see for instance the issue 9 (vol. 3) of Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2006. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 4 fact, the only issue on which they unambiguously agree is that norms should be modelled as being equilibria of a game theoretic model. This leaves open the question of what is the correct game to be modelled and it is to that issue that we move in section two. II. TO R EPE AT OR NOT TO R EPE AT? First, note that it would be totally unreasonable to demand that all social interactions be modelled by the same game. Our point in this section is that a fundamental difference in the models presented by Binmore, Bicchieri and others makes it difficult to see them as compatible analyses that can sit on the shelf next to each other and be called upon depending on the strategic nature of the situation at hand. Rather, they disagree at a deep level about the way in which we should model norms and important features such as punishment. The core difference between these approaches to social norms that we consider is the type of interaction modelled. It has been common to identify the fundamental problem of social cooperation with the prisoner's dilemma (PD). For instance, it has been suggested Hobbes' Leviathan presents an informal analysis of PD interactions (1991). More recently, Brian Skyrms (2004) stresses the value of thinking about social interactions in terms of the \"Stag hunt\" game, citing Rousseau as a precursor. Previously, Skyrms (1996) devotes chapters to the PD and to Hawk-Dove / Chicken games. These studies reflect one aspect of norm-following that has been stressed in the literature, that being that norms pull us towards actions not in accordance with our narrow self-interest (Young 2008). In most of the above games the equilibrium outcome is at odds with that which is optimal from society's point of view. The exception being the stag hunt in which there is a coordination problem between two equilibria, one of which is Pareto superior to the other. Bicchieri's account of social norms is broadly in keeping with these approaches. She stresses that norms operate in \"mixed motive\" interactions. These are loosely characterised as those in which there is a conflict of interest and the potential for mutual gain. Given this loose characterisation, her definition appears to apply to a very wide class of games. Demanding that a game contains conflict to some degree can be taken as meaning that different players' payoffs are not perfectly correlated. Requiring the presence of a mutual benefit can be translated as requiring that there be a Pareto-dominant payoff profile or a Pareto undominated one, or even one which provides a better average payoff. Although her characterisation is imprecise we can see that the focus is on norms overcoming conflicts of interest. This becomes apparent when we examine the way in which the action of norms is modelled. Bicchieri is very explicit that, \"the problem that a social norm is solving in the first place is never a coordination problem.\" (Bicchieri 2006, 34; her emphasis) When a social norm exists, it changes the agents' utility functions. Preference for conformity comes about via a transformation of player i's utility function which converts a mixed-motive Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 5 game to a coordination game in which all (or, more accurately, enough) players prefer to conform. Once the players' utilities have been transformed, mutual norm compliance becomes an equilibrium of the transformed game. When the norm is triggered, agents' utilities are modified for every result of the game as a function of the highest loss caused by anyone's deviations from the norm. My being sensitive to the norm makes me consider as less valuable the consequences of actions that do not follow it (whether these actions are mine or others'), in proportion to the highest loss that this combination of actions entails (Bicchieri 2008, 199, Appendix 9.1). When it comes to reasons for this preference transformation when a norm is triggered, Bicchieri makes a number of suggestions. Agents may be motivated by the desire to please others, recognition that others normative expectations are reasonable and, most importantly for our purposes, fear of punishment (Bicchieri 2006, 29). At this point we emphasise the feature of this account on which we subsequently focus. The model is of so-called one-shot games with no modelling of repeats of the interaction. Norm-following becomes rational, equilibrium behaviour in the one-shot game once the players' utilities have been transformed. In this respect Bicchieri's model is similar to Herbert Gintis's recent model in which a \"normative disposition\" discounts non norm-following acts (2010). In contrast, Binmore's account is explicitly one of repeated interactions. For him, one-shot interactions are not those for which we are prepared by either our biological or cultural heritage. The \"game of life\" is an indefinitely repeated game. (Binmore 1994, 25) It is this focus on repeated interactions that makes Binmore concerned with a different role for norms than that of transformation of preferences. He focuses on the coordinating role of social norms that helps us to make our actions fit appropriately with each other. In game theoretic terms this fit is framed in terms of behaviours being in equilibrium with each other, where neither player would want to unilaterally change their action. The \"folk theorem\" of repeated game theory demonstrates that indefinitely repeated games have multiple equilibria, that is, multiple different ways in which actions can be mutually appropriate, and thus players face an equilibrium selection problem. (Myerson 1991, §7.5) For Binmore, social norms solve this problem by making a particular behaviour salient in a particular context. Our shared cultural heritage is what allows us to coordinate on an equilibrium. Notice that in the case of Bicchieri's (and Gintis's) norms, the coordination role of norms need not arise because the utility transformation makes norm-conformity the one rational outcome. It should also be emphasised that Binmore's focus on repeated games makes his account totally general when it comes to the base games that can be repeated. PDs, stag hunts, hawk-dove, coordination games and so on can all fall under this approach and in each case the equilibrium selection is between equilibria of the repeated game rather than what would be the equilibria if the games were played just once. At this point it appears that there need be no incompatibility between these approaches to social norms and scope for them to be integrated. Preference transformations Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 6 attempt to capture the notion of norm-following pulling people to act against their narrow self interest and their coordination role is reflected in the difficult equilibrium selection problem faced in repeated games. Integration would take the form of the Bicchieri's games forming the base games for Binmore's repeated interactions. However, we first argue, at least on the important issue of punishment, the different accounts cannot be straightforwardly integrated. We then show that they both fail to adequately describe how context-dependent social norms are, for related but different reasons. III. W H AT PL ACE FOR SA NCTIONS? There are at least three ways in which to model game theoretically the action of punishment or social sanctions. As we will see, different approaches to norms model them in different ways. In itself this is not a problem. As we stressed in section one, there is potential value in having multiple modelling approaches. The problem here is that the different ways of thinking about punishment makes them appear incompatible with each other in the sense that they cannot be integrated. This is of particular concern because punishment of non-compliance is one of the central features of any informal account of social norms. Returning to the three game theoretic models of punishment, one possibility is for the sanction to feature as a payoff alteration. For instance, if defection in a PD is punished, and payoffs following defection are reduced, mutual cooperation can become an equilibrium outcome. This payoff transformation option is certainly the one taken by Gintis. He emphasises the \"choreographing\" role of norms in (one-shot) games with multiple equilibria. However, where compliance is not already part of an equilibrium outcome, sanctions can play a formal role as an argument in the utility function, thereby tipping the balance in favour of norm-following being an equilibrium (2010). In the case of Bicchieri, punishment does not feature explicitly in her formalization. However, as raised in section two, sanctioning is cited as a reason for the utility transformation that is a central feature of her model. In fact, it is unclear precisely how punishment connects with her formal model and in this sense the role of sanctions is poorly integrated with that formal account. An obvious possibility is the payoff altering role we are considering here. In that case the discounting of payoffs associated with non-conformity with the norm would reflect punishment received. However, if we look closely at Bicchieri's formalization it seems that this cannot be a correct interpretation, something emphasised by Daniel Hausman (2008). Remember that the discounting of norm-breaking actions is a function of the negative consequences of all players' deviations from norm-following. If the discounting of my payoffs were due to potential punishment of me then we would expect such discounting to be a function only of my own deviations from the norm. So, while it is clear that, according to Bicchieri, sanctions play a role in transforming utilities, it is unclear precisely in what way this is cashed out in the model. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 7 A second formalization of sanctioning is to expand the game to make the punishment action an explicit move. This has the advantage of prompting the modeller to pay attention to the possible consequences of punishing for the punisher. In particular, punishing is very often taken to involve paying costs oneself.3 We will not expand further on this option since it is not one taken by either Bicchieri, Gintis or Binmore, to whose repeated interaction model we now move. In models of repeated interactions punishment behaviour can be modelled in a way unavailable to one-shot models. In this case some plays of the base game constitute sanctioning behaviour. Take, for instance, the indefinitely repeated PD. Permanent mutual cooperation can be the outcome of equilibrium strategies. One, but not the only, possible equilibrium strategy is the famous \"Tit-for-Tat.\"4 In this case cooperative behaviour is reciprocated but, importantly for its being an equilibrium, so is defection. Retaliatory defection is interpreted by Binmore as a punishment for breaking the cooperative norm. A less forgiving strategy is the so-called \"GRIM strategy\" (Binmore 1994, 197). This cooperates until it is defected against and then switches to the punishment of permanent defection. A strength of interpreting punishment in terms of strategies in repeated games is that it naturally makes explicit that punishment can take many forms in terms of its duration and by what it is provoked. For instance, \"Tit for two Tats\" requires two successive defections before it punishes with defection. However, a weakness is that punishment loses some of its special status found in informal accounts of social norms. What we mean by this is that there is nothing distinctive about punishing as represented by a repeated game strategy compared to any other behaviour that is conditional on ones partner's actions in previous rounds of play. Having raised some tensions in both Bicchieri and Binmore's framing of punishment we move on to the question of integrating their models since, even if the issues raised above are not fatal to their accounts, there remains a problem with bolting them together. Remember that the integration suggested at the end of section two was that the utility transformation role of norms acts on the base game and that we can then examine the coordination role for norms when repetitions of these games create, via the folk theorem result, an equilibrium selection problem. However, we have already seen that punishment plays a role in both accounts but is characterised in different ways. For Bicchieri (and Gintis), punishment triggers norm-following in a one-shot context, potentially via it being represented as altering players' payoffs. In contrast, in the repeated game framework, punishment is a constitutive part of the strategies themselves. A potential response to this difference is that the repeated game approach can be reinterpreted into the one-shot case by taking the expected payoffs of the repeated payoff 3] Something Gintis and others stress in their claims for a disposition in humans towards \"strong reciprocity\" (Gintis 2000). 4] See Binmore 1994, §3.2.5 for powerful arguments that TFT's importance as a repeated PD strategy has been overemphasised. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 8 stream as the payoffs of a new one-shot game. This approach is followed by Skyrms when he argues that the repeated PD can be rewritten as a one-shot stag hunt game (Skyrms 2004). However, this is a reframing of the repeated scenario rather than an integration of the two approaches. To reiterate, our concern is that in one case punishment features as a reason for action and in the other it is just one of the moves in the game. When attempting to apply an integrated model to actual cases of norm-following where social sanctions are present it would then be ambiguous in which of the two ways we should model those sanctions. At this point we are left with the question of whether one interpretation is to be preferred in general or in specific cases of norm-following or whether we should accept a plurality of modelling approaches. It is not our intention to adjudicate on this point here. What we stress is that such an adjudication (including agnosticism) would not be a move towards an integrated game theoretic account of social norms. Moreover, the following sections suggest that before any possible integration, both interpretations have to be completed in order to integrate the fact that norms are highly context-dependent. I V. CON TE XT DEPEN DENCE: TH E TR IGGER I NG A N D STR ATEGIC ROLES OF E X PECTATIONS Despite the striking variance in their analysis, as shown in the case of the nature and role of punishment, all accounts of social norms suffer from at least one common shortcoming, for related reasons. The basic problem is the following. A certain situation of interaction, formalised by a game (the sets of agents' actions and payoffs), may well trigger various social norms, depending on the background context of the interaction. When an interaction is repeated, should we say that the context changes so that a new social norm may appear, or that it does not since the base game describing each interaction is unchanged? In other words, when during a repeated interaction should we expect a social norm to be stable and when unstable? First, let us recall the characteristics of one-shot and repeated interaction approaches to social norms, respectively exemplified by Bicchieri's (2006) and Binmore's (1998, 2008). For Bicchieri, a social norm is cued in certain situations by the agents' beliefs about others' behaviour and expectations. As seen in section two, this triggers a change in preference that makes it rational for agents to choose certain actions. For Binmore, whether a norm is triggered depends on the similarity of the situation with a known one. Agents' actions are not explained by a preference change, but by their behaving as they are used to in a similar situation. In other words, when facing new situations in the laboratory, agents either conserve preferences or habits from their outside life (Woodward 2008). Do the starting game's characteristics constrain the existence of a social norm? Not really. Theorists usually reckon that cooperative norms can appear in any kind of cooperative dilemma, that is, of games containing an outcome that, although not an Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 9 equilibrium, Pareto-dominates an equilibrium.5 However, this expresses the theorists' interest for certain kind of games (those in which cooperative behaviour calls for an explanation) rather than a logical necessity or an empirical fact. Indeed, social norm theorists are disposed to see norms appear in almost any kind of game. Binmore does not discuss the issue, and we have seen in section two that Bicchieri holds that norms can appear in any 'mixed-motive games,' that is, games containing potential for mutual benefit and some conflict of interest; this description suits most games. Defenders of the competing 'group identity' explanation of cooperation are not any more precise. For instance, Bacharach (2006) only talks of situation of 'strong interdependence,' which is nothing else than the presence of a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium although he provides no explanation why this condition is paramount. Overall, virtually any game could cue a social norm. This makes context all the more important to social norms. The term \"context\" refers to anything that cannot be expressed by games' parameters. So the absence of constraints or payoff structures on the existence of social norms increases the importance of expectations or of the similarity with real-life situations in determining when social norms may appear.6 Of course, games still play a role in determining what social norms may appear. On this point though, somewhat unexpectedly, one-shot and repeated interaction approaches are not as separated as it seems. Expectations matter in the former, but even if they are not explicitly mentioned in the latter, their role is merely hidden. Suppose an agent is confronted with laboratory game A and deems it similar to reallife situation B, in which she would choose to do X. She will then do X in A for the same reason that she would have done so in B: because it is part of an equilibrium (she thinks mistakenly). But by definition, agents play according to an equilibrium if they believe that others will do the same. In a repeated game approach, expectations about others' behaviour and their expectations determine what an agent is going to do; the only difference is that they do not also lead to a preference change. Note that expectations also play this role in one-shot approaches, in addition to their triggering effect: once a game is transformed, expectations about others still influence a player's choice in the new game. In other words, expectations can have both a triggering role and a strategic role (this distinction will become important in the next section). One-shot and repeated interaction approaches to social norms both recognize the strategic role of expectations, but only the former also explicitly mentions their triggering role. A related reason why the two approaches are closer than it may seem is that the factors that cue norm-following behaviour are not necessarily different. In the one-shot interaction approach, certain expectations trigger preference change, but there is no 5] E.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the mutual cooperation outcome makes both players better off than the mutual defection one does, although only the latter is a Nash equilibrium. 6] An example of the effect of similarity between games on behaviour is found in Binmore 2010: when individuals had to play an Ultimatum game, \"recognised\" it as a familiar situation called \"harambee\" and then played accordingly. An example of the role of expectations can be found in Bicchieri 2008. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 10 constraint on the expectations that agents may or may not form. This reflects a widespread practice in rational choice theory: theorists determine what is the best, or rational choice for an agent given her preferences and beliefs, without asking whether those can be considered as rational or acceptable themselves. Now an agent's expectations about others may perfectly stem from the similarity of the laboratory game with a real-life situation: because A is similar to B, I may expect others to play according to B's equilibrium. So the role of game similarity could find a space even in one-shot approaches, as one possible origin of agents' expectations. In both approaches, similarity between games may cue a social norm and resulting expectations influence the agents' behaviour. What are the differences then? First, according to the one-shot interaction approach; other factors than similarity between games may trigger a social norm. However, the main difference lies in the link between the base game and the game that agents are actually playing. According to a repeated interaction approach, the laboratory game A is replaced by one representing the similar real-life situation B, in which players then play according to one of B's equilibria. According to a one-shot approach, the payoffs of laboratory game A are transformed into those of a game C. The difference is that there need not be a payoff transformation function that leads from A to B, and more precisely not one that corresponds to Bicchieri's description (2006, 52-54). In both cases, the characteristics of game A partly influence the game that players are really playing; only the way to determine the latter from the former varies. V. CON TE XT-DEPEN DENCE I N R EPE ATED G A M ES When agents interact only once, context-dependence is not deeply problematic, as it all depends on which expectations agents have or which real-life situations they deem similar to the one at hand. Surely, this makes social norm following behaviour hard to predict, as a theorist would need to know all possibly related real-life situations and all expectations linked to a social norm in a given population. Still, the analyses provided by both one-shot and repeated interaction accounts are clear. What happens to a social norm when the same game gets repeated? What makes agents keep sticking to it or start following another one along the way? On this point, the two accounts described above start to differ significantly, even if none of them provide a satisfactory answer. On the one hand, as the base game is just repeated and does not change, agents may well keep following the same norm. However, there are always multiple equilibria in a repeated game, and according to Binmore each of them could be a norm. There are also multiple ways in which the game's payoffs can be modified through preference change functions, and so just as many norms according to Bicchieri. As a game is repeated, agents observe each other's behaviour and consequently may see a change in their expectations; they may also start to understand the nature of the game they are playing and as a result adapt their behaviour to it. For these reasons, both one-shot and repeated interaction Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 11 accounts of social norms may predict that a social norm that agents follow changes as time passes. What does this change depend on? One way to put the problem is: when should observations of behaviour during repeated play lead to a change in the social norm an agent follows? It is a fact that most often, agents' behaviour varies with time when they play a repeated game. As may be expected, the repeated interaction account of social norms fits some of such cases well. For instance, the rate of cooperation in a repeated public good game tends to decrease with time (Camerer 2003, 59). In an Ultimatum game, offers can usually stabilize around one arbitrary value, although in the Dictator's game (when they cannot be refused) they get closer to zero. In these three cases, agents' strategies converge towards one of the game's Nash equilibria (no contribution in the public good game, any nonzero offer in the Ultimatum one, zero offer in the Dictator game). This is consistent with what the repeated interaction account predicts: when playing game A, agents may start to act as if they were playing game B, but as repetitions of the game accumulate, their understanding of the situation will improve and they will gradually learn to play according to A's equilibria. The effects of the context (that is, the existence of a similar real-life situation) can thus be offset by the success of an agent's strategy, in terms of its concrete payoff. Is this interpretation consistent with all experiments? It seems so. Consider Isaac and Walker's (1988) experiment (discussed by Bicchieri, 2006, 149ff.), consisting of two separated runs of ten successive public good games. Conversation between participants was allowed either only before the first sequence, only before the second sequence, or not at all. What was observed is although the level of contributions typically declines as the game is repeated, allowing conversation before a sequence led to higher, sometimes increasing contributions, and that the effect of a conversation before the first sequence carried over to the second one. The increasing effect is puzzling from a repeated interaction account, because in any equilibrium of a repeated social dilemma, there should be a decrease of the contribution level at least in the last round. If agents were slowly learning not to mistake the situation for a different one, their behaviour should converge towards such an equilibrium. It may be that the learning process needs longer than a handful of repetitions to kick in. However, such an argument threatens to render the explanation ad hoc: agents could be said to learn whenever they play according to an equilibrium (which are many in repeated games), and not to learn yet whenever they do not.7 Moreover, whenever agents do not play according to a finitely repeated game's equilibrium, such as when their contributions increase in the last period, one can always say that they are still behaving as if in real life, when it is hardly ever sure that an interaction will not be repeated some 7] Note that the carry over effect in itself need not be a problem for a repeated interaction account. There is a repeated game equilibrium in which agents make high contributions all the time, except towards the end. As long as the contribution level decreases at some point, it may stay high for a long time before, and there is no reason why this would not carry over between several sequences of games. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 12 time in the future. Any behaviour in the last repetition could thus be seen as part of an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. Even if players perfectly understand that the numbers of repetitions in an experiment is finite, they might be behaving partly intuitively, based on the similarity between laboratory and real-life situations. Put differently, to be satisfying the explanation should tell us when agents act strategically (by considering the payoffs and structure of the actual interaction) and when habitually. How does a one-shot interaction account fare? It actually faces a similar problem. Let us start with a difference: one-shot accounts based on preference transformations have no problem explaining that contribution levels in a social dilemma should not decrease in the last game. This is because the preferences of norm-following agents may be such that contributing zero is not an individually dominant strategy anymore (by contrast, without a preference change, payoffs are such that defecting is always individually beneficial). Still, it is just as difficult to say when agents should start following different social norms. The problem stems from the unknown balance between the triggering and strategic effect of expectations (as described in the previous section). When agents can have different preferences (or type) and are uncertain about others' types, a useful game-theoretic concept is that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, 231-37). When applied to repeated games for instance, it says that agents start with a prior belief about everyone's possible type, which they will then update by Bayesian conditionalisation as they observe others' action. Observations constantly modify agents' beliefs about others' types and expectations about their behaviour. These changes of beliefs are part of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium: two strategies can only be at equilibrium if when agents implement them, the change of beliefs they cause is consistent with the strategies' prescriptions. This models the strategic role of expectations, that is, the way in which they help determine the behaviour agents who maximize their expected utility. Now recall that in Bicchieri's one-shot interaction account of social norms, expectations have a triggering role, that is, they can lead to a change in preferences. So a change in expectations may well cause an agent swapping types, and in particular can lead to the appearance of new types. This cannot be made part of Bayesian Nash equilibria, in which a list of possible types is set from the beginning and cannot evolve. The problem is that the theory can then explain virtually any observed behaviour: either agents follow a well-defined norm, in which case expectations play a triggering role at the start and then only a strategic role (preferences do not change as the game is repeated); or it does not and can be explained by the fact that the expectations changed over time and so triggered another norm. Overall, both kinds of accounts seem able to fit any data, thanks to the liberal definitions of context. Expectations can be part of the context; as they routinely change during any repeated interaction, they may trigger a change in norms at any time and thus allow one to explain any behaviour. Learning processes determine when the context's influence stops overcoming benefit-related considerations; but in the absence of a precise definition of such processes, the effect of context can also be used to explain any behaviour. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 13 V I. CONCLUSION We have argued that despite surface-level similarities, game-theoretic accounts of social norms are not easily integrated. This is due to the existence of two main kinds of accounts, based on one-shot or on repeated interactions. This distinction gives rise to different treatments of the role played by punishment. Moreover, the problem is not merely to choose between them, as they both suffer similarly from difficulties to account for the context-dependence of social norms while conserving their explanatory power. jonathan.grose@bristol.ac.uk cedric.paternotte@lrz.uni-muenchen.de R EFER ENCES Bacharach, M. 2006. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Edited by N. Gold and R. Sugden. Princeton University Press. Bicchieri, C. 2006. The Grammar of Society The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---. 2008. How Expectations Affect behavior: Fairness Preferences or Fairness Norms?. In Rationality and Responsibility, edited by J. Krueger. New York: Psychology Press. Binmore, K. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 1: Playing Fair. M.I.T. Press. ---. 1998. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 2: Just Playing. M.I.T. Press. ---. 2005. Natural Justice. Oxford University Press. ---. 2006. Why do people cooperate?. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1): 81-96. ---. 2008. Do conventions need to be common knowledge?. Topoi 27: 17-27. ---. 2010. Social norms or social preferences?. Mind & Society 9 (2): 139-57. Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press. Gintis, H. 2000. Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology 206: 169-79. ---. 2010. Social Norms as Choreographer. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3): 251-64. Hausman, D. 2008. Fairness and Social Norms. Philosophy of Science 75: 850-60. Hobbes, T. 1991. Leviathan. Edited by R. Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Isaac, R., and J. Walker. 1988. Communication and Free-Riding Behaviour: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Economic Inquiry 26: 585-608. Myerson, R. 1991. Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. Osborne, M.J., and A. R. Rubinstein. 1991. A Course in Game Theory. M.I.T. Press. Paternotte, C., and J. Grose. 2012. Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or discord. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axs024. Skyrms, B. 2004. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Woodward, J. 2008. Social Preferences in Experimental Economics. Philosophy of Science 75 (5): 646-57. Young, H. P. 2008. Social Norms. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by S. Durlauf, N. and L. Blume. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Non-Archimedean Preferences Over Countable Lotteries Jeffrey Sanford Russell March 2020 Abstract We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over countably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence axiom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexicographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces. 1 Infinite Lotteries and Independence Let a (discrete) lottery over a set of outcomes X be a function λ ∶ X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈X λ(x) = 1. Let ΔX be the set of all such lotteries. Let a preference order be a total preorder ≲ on ΔX. (That is, ≲ is assumed to be transitive, reflexive, and complete in the sense that for each pair of lotteries, λ ≲ μ or μ ≲ λ.) A standard axiom of rational preference is the Independence axiom (I) For any lotteries λ, λ′, μ ∈ ΔX and any probability 0 < p ≤ 1, λ < λ′ iff p ⋅ λ + (1 − p) ⋅ μ < p ⋅ λ′ + (1 − p) ⋅ μ Let an indexed family of lotteries be a function λ ∶ I → X, for any set I. For total preorders, Independence can be equivalently restated:1 Thanks to Yoaav Isaacs for many discussions of the ideas on which this paper is based, and to Tobias Fritz and the editors of the Journal of Mathematical Economics for comments. 1Hammond's (1998) label (D) for this principle stands for \"dominance.\" But note that the principle is stronger than a natural analogous dominance principle for outcomes, since it applies generally to mixtures of lotteries. (See Buchak 2013, 162ff, for discussion of the normative import of this distinction.) 1 (D) For any finite set I of indices, any probability distribution p ∈ ΔI, and any indexed families of lotteries λ, μ ∶ I → X, if λi ≲ μi for each i ∈ I, then ∑ i p(i) ⋅ λi ≲ ∑ i p(i) ⋅ μi If furthermore λi < μi for some i such that p(i) > 0, this preference is strict. This naturally suggests a generalized principle, which simply drops the qualification \"finite\" (see Blackwell and Girshick 1954; Hammond 1998, sec. 8.4).2 (D*) For any set I of indices, any probability distribution p ∈ ΔI, and any families of lotteries λ, μ ∶ I → X, if λi ≲ μi for each i ∈ I, then ∑ i p(i) ⋅ λi ≲ ∑ i p(i) ⋅ μi If furthermore λi < μi for some i ∈ I such that p(i) > 0, this preference is strict. This very natural principle can be motivated by some of the same considerations as the original Independence principle and its close cousin, the Sure Thing Principle. For example, Savage (1954, sec. 2.7) writes: A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the next presidential election relevant to the attractiveness of the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself, he asks whether he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and decides that he would do so. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and again finds that he would do so. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains ... [E]xcept possibly for the assumption of simple ordering, I know of no other extralogical principle governing decisions that finds such ready acceptance. The principle (D*) can be similarly motivated, by generalizing to questions with more than two possible answers. Let E1,E2, ... be countably many mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive events. If you prefer to buy if E1 obtains, and you also 2Again, this label is Hammond's. Russell and Isaacs (forthcoming) call this principle \"Countable Independence,\" to distinguish it more clearly from the weaker dominance principle concerning outcomes. The qualification \"Countable\" is included just because any discrete probability distribution p ∈ ΔI must have countable support. 2 prefer to buy if E2 obtains, and so on, then this seems like a strong reason to buy, unconditionally. Suppose that you assign probability λ(x) to the hypothesis that outcome x will result from buying (for each x ∈ X). Likewise, you assign conditional probability λi(x) to the hypothesis that outcome x will result from buying if event Ei obtains. By the law of total probability, λ = ∑i pi ⋅ λi, where pi is the probability you assign to event Ei. So if your conditional and unconditional preferences between acts accord with your preferences between these associated lotteries, (D*) follows from the countable generalization of Savage's principle.3 When the set of outcomes is infinite, (D*) genuinely strengthens the finitary condition (D), and the equivalent Independence axiom (I). There are preference orderings on ΔX satisfying Independence which are representable by unbounded real utilities (see Fine 2008). But no such orderings satisfy (D*). This arises from well-known cases like the St. Petersburg paradox and the two-envelope paradox (Menger 1934; see also Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997, 44; for a striking related result see Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane 2009). One standard response to these puzzle cases is to impose the requirement that preferences can be represented by a bounded set of real numbers. But in fact, this is an overreaction. While (D*) is incompatible with preferences that are representable by unbounded real utilities, it is perfectly compatible with preferences that are not representable by bounded real utilities-because these preferences are not representable by real-valued utilities at all. A simple example is the lexicographic order on lotteries in Δ{0, 1, 2} with three possible outcomes. Preferences like these conflict with the standard Archimedean Axiom (or the Continuity axiom, which is equivalent in this context), which essentially rules out \"infinite\" or \"infinitesimal\" utilities. In the presence of the Archimedean Axiom, (D*) is indeed equivalent to representability by bounded real utilities (Blackwell and Girshick 1954; Hammond 1998, sec. 8.4 and 8.5). But while the combination of (D*) and the Archimedean Axiom is well-understood, it is also worthwhile to investigate the constraints imposed on preferences by (D*) in the general non-Archimedean case. This is for two reasons. First, while there are strong normative arguments for (D*), there are not such strong arguments in favor of the Archimedean Axiom; the latter may not be a genuine constraint on rational preference, but merely a technically convenient simplification (see for example Luce and Raiffa 1989, 27; Hájek and Nover 2008, 649ff). Second, this exploration helps us conceptually distinguish two very different kinds of \"infinity problem\" in decision theory. Some difficulties arise from unbounded utilities, like the St. Petersburg 3For a closely related \"consequentialist\" argument see Hammond (1998, sec. 8.4). For further discusssion see Russell and Isaacs (forthcoming, sec. 2). 3 puzzle and the two-envelope puzzle. Other difficulties arise from infinite utilities, like Pascal's wager (for discussion see Hájek 2003). If (D*) is a normative requirement on preferences, it turns out that this will spare rational agents the first kind of difficulty-but not the second.4 The principle (D*) imposes interesting structural constraints on preferences. In a sense we can make precise, this principle rules out unbounded finite utilities; but it is perfectly compatible with infinite utilities, and indeed, with infinitely many different \"regimes\" of infinite utilities. The structure of these \"regimes\" is highly constrained: in particular, (D*) rules out ascending chains of lotteries each of which is infinitely better than those before it. In other words, these utility \"regimes\" or dimensions have the structure of ordinals. Classic representation theorems for non-Archimedean preferences (such as Fishburn 1971) represent utilities as lexicographically ordered n-tuples of real numbers (u1, u2, ..., un), indexed by numbers up to some finite n.5 But not all preferences satisfying (D*) have utility representations given by finite sequences: in general, some preferences require infinite sequences. Moreover, they can require quite long infinite sequences. Some infinite sequences are indexed by just the finite numbers 1, 2, 3, .... Other sequences have further dimensions beyond those, and may be indexed by ordinal numbers 1, 2, ..., ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ..., 2ω, 2ω + 1, ..., ω2, ω2 + 1, ... and so on, as far as you like.6 In principle, the length of the utility sequences we'll need is only limited by the cardinality of the set of outcomes X: if this is a large infinite set, then we may require very large infinite ordinal numbers. The key structural feature of the ordinals is that they are well-ordered. This tells us that for any two distinct sequences of real numbers indexed by ordinals, there is a first index at which they differ. Thus for any ordinal α, we can lexicographically order the sequences of real numbers indexed by the ordinals before α. 4Collapsing these issues might lead one to the natural but incorrect conclusion that the difficulties raised by the St. Petersburg game could be avoided by dropping the Archimedean Axiom, as suggested by Hájek and Nover (2008). 5Fishburn (1974) and Martínez-Legaz (1998) survey prior work on lexicographic utilities. Borie (2016) proves a utility representation theorem for non-Archimedean preferences without completeness. Fishburn's and Borie's theorems apply to finite mixture spaces, without considering constraints like (D*) on preference between infinite mixtures of lotteries. 6For an introduction to ordinals see for example Hrbacek and Jech (1999) or Potter (2004). Exactly how far the ordinals go is a deep question in the foundations of mathematics: it is equivalent to the question of what \"large cardinals\" there are, andmany different answers to this question are consistent with the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC. But these axioms do tell us that for any set whatsoever (of any cardinality) there are enough ordinals to index that set. 4 Here we will give a utility representation theorem for preference orders that satisfy (D*), without assuming the Archidemean Axiom: preference orders that satisfy (D*) are precisely those that can be represented by bounded lexicographic utilities. This representation theorem extends the classic results of Hausner (1952) andHausner and Wendel (1952) concerning non-Archimedean preference orders. Hausner and Wendel's results show that any preference order on lotteries that satisfies Independence is representable by a convex subset of a lexicographically ordered vector space. Our extension of their result shows that the infinitary generalization of Independence (D*) requires, first, that this lexicographically ordered vector space takes a special concrete form-namely, the Banach space of bounded sequences l∞(α) for some ordinal α-and second, that this convex subset is itself bounded (with respect to the ∞-norm). Restricting utilities to a bounded set of sequences blocks the construction of a St. Petersburg lottery. Nonetheless, this representation permits highly non-trivial \"infinite utility\" structure, since the space of utilites can have arbitrarily high dimension. 2 Representation Theorem In this section we will take lotteries to be concrete probability distributions. In Section 3 we will consider a more general approach where \"lotteries\" are elements of a space with an abstract countable mixture operation, called a superconvex space. As it turns out, this apparent additional generality does not actually add much: any ordering of such space is equivalent to an ordering on an ordinary lottery space. We begin with some basic definitions. Definition 1. (König 1986) Let V be a Banach space. A subset C ⊆ V is called σ-convex iff C is closed under countable mixtures, in the following sense: for each p ∈ Δω and sequence x ∈ Cω, the infinite sum ∑ i<ω pi ⋅ xi is well-defined and contained in C. We will also use the more compact notation Σ(p, x) for this mixture. If C ⊆ V and C′ ⊆ V are both σ-convex sets, a function f ∶ C → C′ is mixturepreserving iff for each p ∈ Δω and x ∈ Cω, f(Σ(p, x)) = ∑ i pi ⋅ f(xi) 5 The restriction of any continuous linearmap to a σ-convex set is mixture-preserving. In particular, this holds for any contraction (a linear map f ∶ V → V′ such that ‖f(v)‖V′ ≤ ‖v‖V; equivalently, f(BV) ⊆ BV′). Example 1. For any nonempty set X, the set ΔX of discrete lotteries with outcomes in X is a σ-convex subset of the Banach space l1(X) (consisting of all functions u ∶ X → R for which the 1-norm ‖u‖ = ∑x∈X |u(x)| is finite). Example 2. Let V be a Banach space. The closed unit ball in V BV = {x ∈ V | ‖x‖ ≤ 1} is a σ-convex subset of V. In particular, let α be an ordinal, and consider the Banach space l∞(α) of length α bounded ordinal sequences of real numbers, with the ∞-norm ‖x‖ = supi<α |xi|. The closed unit ball Bl∞(α), which consists of all α-sequences of numbers in the interval [−1, 1], is a σ-convex subset of l∞(α). Definition 2. (a) A preorder on a set X is a reflexive and transitive relation ≲ on X. We say x ∼ y iff x ≲ y and y ≲ x. We say x < y iff x ≲ y but not y ≲ x. A preorder is total iff for each x, y ∈ X, either x ≲ y or y ≲ x. A partial order is a preorder which is also antisymmetric (if x ∼ y then x = y). A total order is a partial order which is also total. (b) If (X, ≲) and (X′, ≲′) are preordered sets, a function f ∶ X → X′ is monotone iff for any x ≲ y in X, f(x) ≲′ f(y) in X′. It is strictly monotone iff the converse also holds, so for any x, y ∈ X, x ≲ y iff f(x) ≲′ f(y). (c) A preorder on a vector space V is linear iff vector addition andmultiplication by positive scalars are both monotone functions. That is, for any x, y, z ∈ V and a ∈ R+, if x ≲ y then x+z ≲ y+z and ax ≲ ay. A preordered/partially ordered/totally ordered vector space is a vector space equipped with a linear preorder/partial order/total order. (d) If V and V′ are preordered vector spaces, a function f ∶ V → V′ is positive iff for each x ∈ V such that x ≳ 0, f(x) ≳ 0, and strictly positive iff additionally for each x ∈ V such that x > 0, f(x) > 0. It is straightforward to check that a linear map between preordered vector spaces is (strictly) positive iff it is (strictly) monotone. Here is the main theorem we will prove: Theorem 1. For any set X, a total preorder on the set ΔX of discrete lotteries satisfies (D*) iff for some ordinal α there is a strictly monotone mixture-preserving function from ΔX to Bl∞(α) with its lexicographic order. 6 First, we will show that the order on lotteries can be represented in a totally ordered Banach space which a certain boundedness property. Second, we will show that we can define a strictly monotone contraction from any such ordered Banach space to l∞(α). We begin by extending the order on lotteries to the surrounding Banach space l1(X). Lemma 1. For any total preorder ≲ on ΔX that satisfies the Independence axiom (I), there is a unique linear total preorder ≲∗ on l1(X) such that (a) The embedding of (ΔX, ≲) in (l1(X), ≲∗) is strictly monotone; and (b) The function h ∶ l1(X) → R such that h(u) = ∑x∈X u(x) is positive. (In particular, for each lottery λ ∈ ΔX, we have h(λ) = 1 and thus λ >∗ 0.) Proof. First, for any nonzero u ∈ l1(X) such that h(u) = 0, there exist λ, μ ∈ ΔX such that u = ‖u‖ ⋅ (λ − μ). For x ∈ X let u+(x) = { u(x) if u(x) > 0 0 otherwise and u−(x) = { −u(x) if u(x) < 0 0 otherwise We have 0 = h(u) = ‖u+‖ − ‖u−‖ and ‖u‖ = ‖u+‖ + ‖u−‖. It follows that λ = 2u+/‖u‖ and μ = 2u−/‖u‖ are elements of ΔX such that u = ‖u‖(λ − μ). Next, we define the order on l1(X) lexicographically, first using the function h, and second using the order on lotteries. For u ∈ l1(X), let u ≳∗ 0 iff either of the following cases holds: (a) h(u) > 0, or (b) h(u) = 0 and u = ‖u‖ ⋅ (λ − μ) for some λ, μ ∈ ΔX such that λ ≳ μ. (In general, v ≳∗ u iff v − u ≳∗ 0.) It is straightforward to check that (I) implies that this order is linear and satisfies the two conditions of the lemma. For uniqueness, it suffices to check that, for any linear order ≲∗ on l1(X), and any nonzero u ∈ l1(X), if h(u) = 0 and u = ‖u‖(λ − μ), then λ ≳ μ iff u ≳∗ 0. Both directions follow from linearity. 7 In order to get to a totally ordered Banach space, the natural thing to do next is quotient out the set I of vectors which are equivalent to zero. The difficulty is that in general the quotient space may not retain the structure of a Banach space: this holds only if the subspace I is closed. It does turn out that our axiom (D*) guarantees this, but this takes a little bit of showing. Lemma 2. For any preordered Banach space V, let B+V = {x ∈ BV ∣ x > 0} If (ΔX, ≲) satisfies (D*), then B+l1(X) is σ-convex (with respect to the extended order ≲∗). Proof. Let p ∈ Δω and x1, x2, ... ∈ B+l1(X). Then h(xi) ≥ 0 for each i. If h(xi) > 0 for any i, then h(Σ(p, x)) = ∑ i pi ⋅ h(xi) > 0 so in that case Σ(p, x) is positive as well. Otherwise, h(xi) = 0 for every i ∈ ω. In that case, for each i there is some λi > μi in ΔX such that xi = ‖xi‖(λi − μi). Since ‖xi‖ ≤ 1, the series ∑i pi‖xi‖ converges to some value a ∈ R+. Then ∑ i pi ⋅ xi = a( ∑ i pi‖xi‖ a ⋅ λi − ∑ i pi‖xi‖ a ⋅ μi) By (D*) and the definition of ≲∗, this is positive. The following very simple fact really contains the core idea of the main theorem. The central \"paradoxical\" feature of the St. Petersburg lottery is that it is strictly preferred over every one of its outcomes. (D*) rules out this situation. Lemma 3. Let V be a preordered Banach space such that B+V is σ-convex. There is no p ∈ Δω and x1, x2, ... ∈ B+V such that xi < Σ(p, x) for each i ∈ ω Proof. If there were such p and x1, x2, ..., then the vectors 12 (Σ(p, x) − xi) would each be in B+V. This would imply that B+V also contains the mixture ∑ i pi ⋅ ( 1 2(Σ(p, x) − xi) = 1 2(Σ(p, x) − ∑i pi ⋅ xi) = 0 8 And this is false. This means that (D*) blocks the construction of St. Petersburg lotteries. There are two different versions of this. One kind of \"improper mixture\" arises from unbounded relatively finite utilities, and another arises from infinite ascending chains of relatively infinite utilities. Both kinds are captured by the following condition. Lemma 4. Let V be a preordered Banach space such that B+V is σ-convex. Then there is no supergeometric sequence x1, x2, ... ∈ B+V such that 2xi ≲ xi+1 for each i ∈ ω. Proof. This is the St. Petersburg paradox. Suppose x1, x2, ... ∈ B+V is a supergeometric sequence, and let w = ∑ i 2−i ⋅ xi We will prove that this is an improper mixture. Consider the truncated sum wn = ∑ 0<i≤2n+n 2−ixi ≳ ∑ n<i≤2n+n 2−ixi = 2−n ∑ 0<j≤2n 2−jxn+j ≳ 2−n ∑ 0<j≤2n xn = xn using linearity together with the facts that each xi is positive and xn ≲ 2−jxn+j for each j. Furthermore, w is the sum of wn and a mixture of the remaining terms xi, each of which are positive. Let N = 2n + n. Then: w = wn + ∑ i>N 2−i ⋅ xi = wn + 2−N ∑ i 2−i ⋅ xN+i > wn The last step uses our assumption that B+V is σ-convex, which implies that the mixture of elements of B+V is positive. Here is another way of putting this consequence. 9 Definition 3. A preordered vector space V is nice iff every norm-bounded subset of V is order-bounded. Lemma 5. If V is a totally preordered Banach space and B+V is σ-convex, then every subspace of V is nice. Proof. Let U be a subspace of V. It suffices to show that B+U has an order bound in U. If not, then for each u ∈ U there is some x ∈ B+U such that 2u < x. So in particular there is a supergeometric sequence x1, x2, ... in B+U (and thus in B+V) such that 2xi < xi+1 for each i. Now we will introduce a few useful concepts for working with non-Archimedean ordered vector spaces. (See Paulsen and Tomforde 2007; Emelyanov 2014.) Definition 4. For a preordered vector space V, define I(V) = {x ∈ V ∣ x ∼ 0} N(V) = {x ∈ V ∣ for some v ∈ V, for every a ∈ R+, −av ≲ x ≲ av} Intuitively, N(V) is the set of vectors which are infinitesimally small in comparision to some other vector. V is Archimedean iff N(V) = I(V). V is trivial iff I(V) = V. For any v ∈ V, define F(v) = {x ∈ V ∣ for some a ∈ R+, −av ≲ x ≲ av } Intuitively, F(v) is the set of vectors which are finite or infinitesimal in comparison to v. A vector e ∈ V is an order unit iff F(e) = V. The following facts are straightforward. Lemma 6. (a) For each v ∈ V, I(V), N(V), and F(v) are subspaces of V. (b) V is partially ordered iff I(V) = {0}. (c) If e is an order unit for V and e ∈ N(V), then V is trivial. (d) If V is a Banach space and e is an order bound for B+V, then e is an order unit for V. Lemma 7. If V is a totally preordered Banach space and B+V is σ-convex, then I(V) is closed. 10 Proof. Suppose v ∈ V is not in I(V): that is, v ≁ 0. We will show that v is not in the closure of I(V): that is, there is some ε > 0 such that for each u ∈ I(V), ‖v − u‖ ≥ ε. Without loss of generality, assume v ≴ 0. (Otherwise we can argue similarly regarding −v.) Consider the subspace F(v). By Lemma 5, this subspace contains an order bound for BF(v). This means there is some a ∈ R+ such that x ≲ av for each x ∈ BF(v). Now suppose u ∈ I(V): that is, u ∼ 0. Then (v − u) ∼ v, which implies that v − u ∈ F(v), and (v − u)/‖v − u‖ is in BF(v). Thus: v ‖v − u‖ ∼ v − u ‖v − u‖ ≲ av Thus (1 − a‖v − u‖)v ≲ 0 By assumption v ≴ 0, so we must have ‖v − u‖ ≥ 1/a. Lemma8. For any preordered vector spaceV, there is a strictly positive contraction from V onto some partially ordered vector space iff I(V) is closed. Proof. It is a standard fact that a subset of V is a closed subspace iff it is the kernel of a continuous linear surjection, and in particular a contraction f ∶ V → V′ (see for example Conway 1994, 70). We can define a partial order ≤′ on V′ with respect to which f is strictly positive: let 0 ≤′ f(x) iff 0 ≲′ x. The fact that ker f = I(V) implies that this is a well-defined partial order. (Compare Emelyanov 2014, sec. 1) Putting this much together completes the first part. Proposition 1. If ≲ is a total preorder on ΔX that satisfies (D*), then there is a strictly monotone mixture-preserving function from ΔX to B+V for some totally ordered Banach space V such that B+V is σ-convex. For the second part, we will prove a representation theorem for totally ordered Banach spaces of this type. The main idea of this part is that we can quotient out the infinitesimals from an ordered vector space. In the case of a non-trivial totally ordered nice vector space, the resulting quotient space is in fact isomorphic to R. Thus if every subspace is nice, we can keep descending to smaller and smaller infinitesimal scales, representing each regime by real numbers, until we run out. To prove this, we will appeal to the following fact, which is a variant of the HahnBanach Theorem for ordered vector spaces. 11 Lemma 9. (Paulsen and Tomforde 2007, Corollary 2.15) Let (V, ≤) be a partially ordered vector space with order unit e. If E is a subspace of V containing e, then any positive linear functional f ∶ E → R may be extended to a positive linear functional g ∶ V → R whose restriction to E is f. Corollary 1. If (V, ≤) is a totally ordered nice vector space, then there is a positive contraction f ∶ V → R such that ker f = N(V). Proof. Let e be an upper bound for BV, and thus an order unit in V. Assume without loss of generality that ‖e‖ ≥ 1. Let E = {ae ∣ a ∈ R}, and let f(ae) = a for each element ae ∈ E. Then let g be a positive linear extension of f to V. To show that g is a contraction, it suffices to show that for each x ∈ BV, |g(x)| ≤ 1. This is clear, since in that case −e ≲ x ≲ e, g is positive, and g(e) = 1. To show ker g = N(V), first suppose x ∈ N(V). It follows that −ae ≲ x ≲ ae for every a ∈ R+ Thus since g is positive and extends f, −a ≤ g(x) ≤ a for every a ∈ R+ and thus g(x) = 0. Conversely, if x ∉ N(V), then (since V is totally ordered) for some a ∈ R+, x ≳ ae or x ≲ −ae. So either g(x) ≥ a or g(x) ≤ −a, and in either case g(x) ≠ 0. Proposition 2. Let (V, ≤) be a totally ordered Banach space such that B+V is σconvex. Then for some ordinal α, there is a contraction from V to l∞(α) which is strictly positive with respect to the lexicographic order on l∞(α). Proof. The idea is to repeatedly apply Corollary 1, descending to smaller and smaller infinitesimal subspaces until we run out. First we define a descending chain of subspaces of V by transfinite recursion, as follows. V0 = V Vi+1 = N(Vi) Vλ = ⋂ i<λ Vi In other words, Vi consists of the \"level i infinitesimals (or smaller).\" This sequence is strictly decreasing as long as Vi is non-trivial: each subspace Vi is nice, which implies 12 that it has an order unit, which implies that N(Vi) ⊊ Vi unless Vi is trivial. So there must be some least ordinal α such that Vα is trivial. We'll consider the sequence of subspaces (Vi)i<α . For each non-zero vector x ∈ V, there is some i < α such that x ∈ Vi ∖ Vi+1. Intuitively, this is the \"scale\" of x: the largest utility regime to which xmakes a noninfinitesimal contribution. (We know x ∉ Vα , since x > 0 and Vα is trivial. So there is some i < α such that x ∉ Vi+1. So there is some least ordinal i such that x ∉ Vi+1. If i is a successor ordinal, this immediately implies x ∈ Vi. If i is a limit ordinal, then Vi is the intersection of all previous successor stages, each of which contains x, and so again x ∈ Vi.) Next, we can define each component of the function f ∶ V → l∞(α). Let i < α. By Corollary 1, there is a positive contraction g ∶ Vi → R such that ker g = N(Vi) = Vi+1. By the Hahn-Banach Extension Theorem (see for example Conway 1994, Theorem 6.2, p. 78), g can be extended to a contraction fi ∶ V → R defined on the whole space. Note that this extension fi is not generally positive, but we do have fi(x) > 0 for each x ∈ Vi ∖ Vi+1 such that x > 0 (In this case we know fi(x) = g(x) ≥ 0 because g is positive, and fi(x) ≠ 0 because x ∉ ker g.) The resulting linear map f ∶ V → l∞(α) with these components is a contraction: by definition, ‖f(x)‖∞ = supi |fi(x)|, and by construction |fi(x)| ≤ ‖x‖ for each i. To show that f is strictly positive, consider any x ∈ V such that x > 0. Let i be the \"scale\" of x such that x ∈ Vi ⧵ Vi+1. Since x ∈ Vi and the sequence is nested, for all j < i we have x ∈ Vj+1 = ker fj, which means fj(x) = 0. Since x ∈ Vi ∖ Vi+1 and x > 0, we also have fi(x) > 0. Thus f(x) > 0 according to the lexicographic ordering on l∞(α). This essentially completes the proof of one direction Theorem 1. For the other direction we just need a couple additional facts, which are straightforward to check. Lemma 10. Let C and C′ be σ-convex sets. If (C′, ≲′) satisfies (D*) and there is a strictly monotone mixture-preserving function f ∶ C → C′, then (C, ≲) satisfies (D*) as well. Lemma 11. The lexicographic order on Bl∞(α) satisfies (D*). 13 Proof of Theorem 1. One direction follows from Lemma 1, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2. The converse follows from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. 3 Superconvex Spaces So far we have considered the concrete case of preference orders over lottery spaces: the space of all discrete probability distributions over a given set of outcomes. But we can alternatively consider a more abstract notion of a discrete mixture space in which the \"lotteries\" are not given as probability distributions, but rather are just some objects equipped with an abstract \"discrete mixture\" operation. This kind of structure is called a superconvex space (or superconvex module) (König 1986; Pümplun 1991; Nörtemann 2002). In general, there are superconvex spaces which are not isomorphic to σ-convex subsets of Banach spaces. Even so, it turns out that any ordering of a general superconvex space is equivalent, in a natural sense, to some ordering of a lottery space (Lemma 12). So we can still apply the same representation theorem even in this more general setting. For any set X, let δ ∶ X → ΔX be the function that takes each x ∈ X to the lottery that assigns probability one to x. Definition 5. A superconvex space is a set S together with an operation Σ ∶ Δω × Sω → S with the following properties: (a) For any sequence of elements x ∈ Sω and any index i ∈ ω, Σ(δ(i), x) = xi (b) For any probability distribution p ∈ Δω, any sequence of probability distributions q ∈ (Δω)ω, and any sequence of elements x ∈ Sω, ∑ i p(i) ⋅ ( ∑ j qi(j) ⋅ xj) = ∑ j ( ∑ i p(i) ⋅ qi(j)) ⋅ xj Principle (a) says that putting all of the weight on the ith element just gives you that same element xi. Principle (b) corresponds to simplification of compound lotteries: a mixture of mixtures of elements of S can be \"flattened\" to an equivalent single-level mixture. 14 Here is an alternative way of describing superconvex structure, which is a bit more elegant, since it eliminates the arbitrary indices. Instead of the operation Σ which takes an indexed sequence of elements and a distribution over the set of indices, we can define an operation σ ∶ ΔS → S which takes a distribution directly over the elements of the superconvex space, and mixes those elements together with the appropriate weights. Intuitively, an element of ΔS plays the role of a (discrete) random variable taking values in S, and σ plays the role of an expectation operator. For any function f ∶ X → Y, let Δf ∶ ΔX → ΔY be the obvious \"lifted\" function that preserves mixtures. (That is, for any lottery λ ∈ ΔX, the lottery Δf(λ) ∈ ΔY assigns to y ∈ Y the total probability that λ assigns to f−1(y).) Proposition 3. Let S be a superconvex space. For any distribution λ ∈ ΔS, there is a countable sequence x ∈ Sω such that λ = ∑i λ(xi) ⋅ δ(xi). Let σ ∶ ΔS → S be σ(λ) = ∑ i λ(xi) ⋅ xi This is well-defined (it does not depend on the choice of sequence x), and we have the two identities σ(δ(x)) = x for each x ∈ S σ(σ(κ)) = σ(Δσ(κ)) for each κ ∈ ΔΔS More succinctly: σ δ = 1S σ σΔS = σ Δσ (Here juxtaposition means function composition, 1S is the identity function on S, and σΔS ∶ ΔΔS → ΔS is the mixture operation on ΔS.) We can sum this up abstractly using resources from category theory (see Pümplun 1991): superconvex spaces are the Eilenberg-Moore algebras of the \"lotterymonad\" Δ.7 Any σ-convex subset of a Banach space is a superconvex space. In general, there are other kinds of superconvex spaces as well. For example, any countably complete semi-lattice is a superconvex space, with the operation Σ(p, x) = ⋁ i∶p(i)>0 xi 7This \"lottery monad\" consists of the functor that takes each set X to the set of distributions ΔX and each function f ∶ X → Y to the mixture-preserving function Δf, together with the two natural transformations δ ∶ 1 → Δ and σΔ ∶ Δ2 → Δ. (Compare the \"Giry monad\" of Giry 1982.) An Eilenberg-Moore algebra of this monad is precisely a pair of a set S and an operation σ ∶ ΔS → S satsifying the two conditions in Proposition 3. 15 (Consider, for example, a bounded set of integers with the maximum operation. This is clearly not a σ-convex subset of any Banach space.) There are also hybrid spaces that combine \"lattice-like\" and \"vector-like\" behavior (for interesting examples see Fritz 2015). Even so, we will show that any preorder on one of these general spaces can be represented perfectly well by some preorder on a lottery space. We can straightforwardly extend the idea of a mixture-preserving function to abstract superconvex spaces. (Pümplun (1991) calls such functions superaffine.) Here we require a slightly more general notion, which preserves mixtures modulo indifference. Definition 6. If S and S′ are preordered superconvex spaces, a function f ∶ S → S′ is essentially mixture-preserving iff for each p ∈ Δω and x ∈ Sω, f(Σ(p, x)) ∼ ∑ i pi ⋅ f(xi) Equivalently, f(σ(λ)) ∼ σ(Δf(λ)) for each λ ∈ ΔS Or more succinctly, fσ ∼ σ Δf (where for g, h ∶ X → S we write g ∼ h iff gx ∼ hx for each x ∈ X). Lemma 12. For any superconvex space S and any preorder ≲ on S, there is a unique preorder ≲∗ on ΔS with respect to which the function δ ∶ S → ΔS is strictly monotone and essentially mixture-preserving. Proof. For any λ, μ ∈ ΔS, define λ ≲∗ μ iff σ(λ) ≲ σ(μ) For x, y ∈ S, δ(x) ≲∗ δ(y) iff x = σ(δ(x)) ≲ σ(δ(y)) = y So δ is strictly monotone. For δ to be essentially mixture-preserving requires δσ ∼∗ σΔS Δδ. So it suffices to show: σδσ = σ σΔS Δδ Using the identities σδ = 1S and σ σΔS = σ Δσ, and the functor identities Δ(fg) = (Δf)(Δg) and Δ1S = 1ΔS, we have σδσ = σ = σ Δ(σδ) = σ Δσ Δδ = σ σΔS Δδ 16 For uniqueness, note first that in general σΔX Δδ = 1ΔX, which can be straightforwardly checked.8 Therefore, since δ is essentially mixture-preserving, 1ΔS = σΔS Δδ ∼∗ δ σ Thus, if δ is also strictly monotone, for any λ, μ ∈ ΔS we have λ ≲∗ μ iff δσ(λ) ≲∗ δσ(μ) iff σ(λ) ≲ σ(μ) Lemma 13. If (S, ≲) satisfies (D*), then so does (ΔS, ≲∗). Proof. Suppose λi ≲∗ μi for each i ∈ ω; so σλi ≲ σμi. The operation σ ∶ ΔS → S is itself mixture-preserving (this is what the identity σσΔS = σ Δσ tells us). So for any p ∈ Δω we have σΣ(p, λ) = ∑ i pi ⋅ σλi ≲ ∑ i pi ⋅ σμi = σΣ(p, μ) And thus Σ(p, λ) ≲∗ Σ(p, μ). The case where we also have strictly λi < μi for some i such that pi > 0 goes the same way. 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{"text": "Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi Grounding with Linguistics and Pedagogical Datas to the Common Encountered Problems by Students of Translation Studies in German Preparatory Class During Grammatical Lesson Merve ÇUKUROVA Öğr. Görevlisi, Sakarya Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Çeviribilim Bölümü Lecturer, Sakarya University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Translation Studies Sakarya / TURKEY mervecukurova@sakarya.edu.tr ORCID ID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2036-2952 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3463513 Makale Bilgisi | Article Information Makale Türü / Article Type: Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article Geliş Tarihi / Date Received: 26 Mart / March 2019 Kabul Tarihi / Date Accepted: 9 Mayıs / May 2019 Yayın Tarihi / Date Published: 30 Eylül / September 2019 Yayın Sezonu / Pub Date Season: Eylül / September Atıf / Citation: ÇUKUROVA, M. (2019). Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi. Mevzu: Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 2 (Eylül 2019): 11-24. İntihal: Bu makale, ienticate yazılımınca taranmıştır. İntihal tespit edilmemiştir. Plagiarism: is article has been scanned by ienticate. No plagiarism detected. web: http://dergipark.gov.tr/mevzu | mailto: mevzusbd@gmail.com Copyright © Bütün hakları saklıdır. / All right reserved. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 mevzu sosyal bilimler dergisi | journal of social sciences e-ISSN 2667-8772 mevzu, Eyül/September 2019, s.2: 11-24 Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi Öz Yabancı dil öğrenimi problemleri özellikle de dil odaklı eğitim veren bölümlerde ayrı bir sorunsal olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bunun bilişsel birtakım nedenleri vardır ancak bu nedenlerin yanı sıra uygun öğretim yöntemlerinin eğitimde uygulanmaması da bazı sorunlara yol açmaktadır. Bu sorunların ortadan kaldırılmasında bölümlere ve öğretim elemanlarına birtakım sorumluluklar düşmektedir. Öncelikle genel olarak ikinci veya üçüncü bir yabancı dil olarak öğrencilere verilen Almanca eğitiminde bazı öğretim yöntemlerinden yararlanılması etkin bir öğrenme adına önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada hazırlık sınıfı öğrencilerinin dil sorunsalına dilbilimsel ve eğitim bilimsel çözüm önerileri sunmak hedeflenmiş ve bu amaç doğrultusunda nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden yapılandırılmamış gözlem ve doküman inceleme yöntemine başvurularak betimleyici bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Almanca, hazırlık sınıfı, öğretim yöntemleri, yabancı dil, yabancı dil öğrenme problemleri. Abstract Foreign language learning problems appears especially in departments of foreign language as an another problem. It has some cognitive reason but except this reason, if suitable teaching techniques couldn't apply in education. These will cause some problems. In searching of solution for these problems lecturers and departments should take responsibility. Using some teaching methods are important in German language teaching as a secondary or third foreign language teaching. These are necessary for useful learning. In this study, it was aimed, that to offer linguistic and pedagogical solution for foreign language learning problems of students of preparatory class. In this descriptive research was used unstructured observation and documentary review methods from qualitative research. Key Words: German language, foreign language, foreign language learning problems, preparatory class, teaching methods. Mevzu, sy. 2 (Eylül 2019) | Merve ÇUKUROVA 1.Giriş Genel olarak liselerin İngilizce eğitimi veren dil bölümlerinden gelen Almanca Çeviribilim bölümü hazırlık sınıfı öğrencilerinin birçoğu ya Almanca ile ilk defa karşılaşmakta ya da Almancaya dair alt yapısı çok az bir seviyede olmaktadır. Bu bölümde okuyan gurbetçi öğrencilerin de varlığı unutulmamalıdır ancak bu öğrenciler genelde sayı itibarıyla azdır. Çeviribilim hazırlık sınıflarında öğrencilere \"okuma, yazma, dinleme, konuşma ve gramer\" olarak farklı dil becerilerinin kazandırılıp öğrencilere yabancı dil edinci sağlanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu becerileri bazı öğrenciler daha kolay edinirken bazı öğrenciler zorlanmaktadır. Bunun öğrencinin eğitim arka planı ve yaşantısıyla yakından ilgisi olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bazı öğrenciler de yabancı dili hiç sevmediği halde aile baskısı ya da puanının o bölüme yetmesi kaygısı gibi nedenlerle de dil bölümlerine gelmektedir. Örneklem grubu olarak Sakarya Üniversitesi Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca hazırlık sınıflarındaki derse devam eden öğrenciler seçilmiş olup bir güz dönemi boyunca gramer derslerinde yapılandırılmamış gözleme tabii tutulmuşlardır. Eğitimde \"öğrenciye/bireye görelilik\" ilkesinden yararlanmak gerekir (Gültekin, 2012: 73). Öğrencilerin bilişsel, duyuşsal ve devinişsel gelişim düzeyleri ayrıca hazırbulunuşluk durumları öğretim sürecini etkiler. Bu nedenle öğretime öğrencilerin gelişim ve öğrenme düzeyi dikkate alınarak başlanır. Öğrencilerin gelişim ve öğrenme düzeylerinin belirlenmesi ve gereksinimlerinin göz önünde bulundurulması etkili bir öğretimin temelini oluşturur (Hakan, 1991: 55). Genelde göz ardı edilen \"öğrenciye görelilik ve hazırbulunuşluk ilkeleri\" aslında eğitimin hangi alanında olursa olsun etkili bir eğitim için gerekli ilkelerdir. Öğretim elemanları tarafından öğrencilerin bu durumu göz önünde bulundurulmayıp herkes aynı seviyede, aynı koşullarda veyahut aynı hazırbulunuşluk seviyesindeymiş gibi yapılan öğretimlerde sorunlar kaçınılmaz olmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın çıkış noktası bu sorunsaldır. Günümüz diğer lisans bölümlerinde olduğu gibi dil bölümlerinde de öğrenci merkezli bir eğitim sürdürülmektedir. Bu eğitim sisteminde geçerli öğretim ilkeleri göz ardı edildiğinde ortaya sorunsalların çıkması da kaçınılmaz olmaktadır. Bunun dışında dil öğrenmenin bilişsel bir boyutu olduğu da unutulmamalıdır ve bununla ilgili bilinçlenmek eğitimde farkındalık sağlayacaktır. Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi 2. Çalışmanın Kapsamı ve Yöntemi Bu çalışmada Sakarya Üniversitesi Çeviribilim bölümü hazırlık sınıfında Almanca öğretiminde karşılaşılan sorunlar, gramer dersleri doğrultusunda ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Hazırlık sınıfı öğrencilerinin dil edinci sorunsalına dilbilimsel ve eğitim bilimsel çözüm önerileri sunmak hedeflenmiş ve bu amaç doğrultusunda nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden yapılandırılmamış gözlem ve doküman inceleme yöntemine başvurularak betimleyici bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden yapılandırılmamış gözlemin tercih edilme nedeni zengin veriye ulaşabilmek olmuştur. Araştırma grubu olarak Sakarya Üniversitesi Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca hazırlık sınıflarındaki derse devam eden öğrenciler tercih edilmiştir. Çalışma araştırma grubunun sürekli derse devam eden öğrencilerden seçilmesinin nedeni; sağlıklı bir veriye ulaşmak olmuştur. Araştırma grubunu birinci öğretimden 15, ikinci öğretimden 15 olmak üzere 30 kişi oluşturmuştur. Öğrencilerin yapılan gözlem esnasındaki dil seviyesi A1-A2'dir. Gözlem grubunda ana dili Türkçe olmayan dört öğrenci vardır. Ana dilleri Arapça, Rusça ve Türkmencedir. Bu araştırmada, öğrencilerin gramer derslerinde yaptığı hataları betimleyebilmek ve geçerli bir sonuca ulaşabilmek adına hata analizi (hata çalışması) tekniğinden faydalanılmıştır. Öğrencilerin, gramer derslerinde yaptıkları hatalar gözlem altında tutulmuş, bu hatalar ile dilbilimsel ve eğitim bilimsel veriler ışığında bir sonuca varılmaya çalışılmıştır. Hata analizi yapılırken belirlenen parametreler; öğrencilerin ana dili, yabancı dile ilgisi, dil öğrenmeye ve derse hazırbulunuşluk seviyeleri, dili kullanma becerileri, söz dizimindeki becerileri ve kendilerini Almancada ifade ediş şekilleri olmuştur. Bu parametreler kapsamında araştırmada aşağıdaki sorulara yanıt aranmıştır: 1. Almanca Çeviribilim bölümü hazırlık sınıfında öğrenim gören öğrencilerin Almanca dil bilgisini öğrenirken karşılaştıkları dilden kaynaklanan sorunlar nelerdir? 2. Bu sorunlara karşı neler yapılabilir? Mevzu, sy. 2 (Eylül 2019) | Merve ÇUKUROVA 3.Dil Öğrenmenin Dilbilimsel ve Bilişsel Boyutları Chomsky'e göre bütün insanlar genetik olarak (doğuştan) dil öğrenme alt yapısına (beyin ve sinir yapısına) sahiptir. İnsan beyninin belirli bölgeleri dilin öğrenilmesinden/kazanılmasından sorumludur. Bu alt yapı sayesinde belirli bir biyolojik olgunluğa erişince ve gerekli çevresel koşullar da sağlandığında dil rahatlıkla öğrenilecektir. Yani çocuklar, yürümeyi öğrendikleri gibi, biyolojik olarak belli bir olgunluğa eriştikten sonra konuşmayı da öğrenirler.1 Chomsky'nin burada daha çok kastettiği ana dildir ancak bunu yabancı dile de ayarlamak mümkündür çünkü dilin beyinde öğrenildiği bölge aynıdır. Ülkemizde çocukluktan itibaren yaygın olarak kazandırılmaya çalışılan yabancı dil evrensel bir dil olduğu kabul edilen İngilizcedir. Öğrenciler farklı bir dil ailesine mensup bir dille (öğrenciye göre değişmekle birlikte) genelde çocukluk yaşlarında karşılaşır. Bir birey, kendi ana dilinden farklı dil ailesine mensup bir yabancı dili öğrenmek istediğinde muhakkak ki dillerin yapısal farklılıkları nedeniyle o dili öğrenirken zorlanması kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Örnek olarak Çeviribilim hazırlık sınıflarındaki öğrenci profili incelendiğinde neredeyse tamamının ana dili Türkçe, yabancı dilinin ise İngilizce olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Farklı bir dil ailesine mensup bir dille karşılaşmaları ilk olarak İngilizce ile olmuştur. İngilizce çekimli, Türkçe sondan eklemeli bir dildir. Almanca da bilindiği üzere İngilizce ile aynı dil ailesinden gelmektedir. Öğrenciler yabancı dille karşılaştıklarında beyinde dil öğrenmeyi ve kullanmayı sağlayan merkezler de devreye girmekte ve bilişsel boyut devreye girmektedir. Bunları bilmek yabancı dil öğrenenlere de öğretenlere de arka plan bilgisi sağlayacaktır. Dil öğrenme sanıldığı gibi basit bir eylem değildir ve aslında beynimizde bizim bilmediğimiz birçok bilişsel süreç yaşanır. Bununla ilgili nörolinguistik alanda birtakım çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Yapılan çalışmalar beyinde dil merkezlerinin üç alanda toplandığını göstermektedir. Bu alanlar Broca alanı, Wernicke alanı ve angüler girüstür. İlk iki alan belirli bazı fonksiyonları yerine getirirken üçüncü alan daha karmaşık dil fonksiyonlarını ortaya koyar (Akt. Kurudayıoğlu, 2018: 4). 1 Civelek, M. (2014). Gelişim Psikolojisi Özet http://dushunce.az/files/documents/gelisim.psikolojisi.ozet.07.03.2014.pdf Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi \"Broca alanı seslerin oluşması ve ortaya çıkmasıyla ilgili dil, dudak, ton ve ritimle, yani konuşmanın sesletimi ile ilgili alanların hemen önünde yer alır. Bu alanın özel görevi komşu alanlar tarafından üretilen seslerin konuşulan lisan şekline dönüştürülmesidir. Wernicke alanının özel görevinin duyulanların söylenenler biçimine dönüştürülmesinde kodlama ve anlaşılması olduğu söylenebilir. Dille ilgili üçüncü özel merkez olan angüler girüs karmaşık dilsel fonksiyonların ve diğer merkezlerle ilgili işlevlerin yerine getirilmesini sağlar. Bu merkez insanın işittiğini söylemesini ve yazmasını, kendisine dokunan cismin ismini yazmasını, gördüğü şeyin ismini okumasını ve yazmasını sağlar. Bu üç özel alanın birbirleri ile olan bağlantıları da konuşma gibi dil faaliyetlerinde büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Broca ile Wernicke merkezleri arasındaki bağlantı insanların karşılıklı olarak duyma ve konuşma şeklinde kesintisiz iletişimini sağlar (Kurudayıoğlu, 2018: 4).\" Yani dil edincinin gelişmesinde aslında nörolinguistik parametreler de devreye girmekte ve beyinde çok farklı süreçler yaşanmaktadır. Broca merkezininin az gelişmesi veya sekteye uğraması zihindeki Wernicke merkezini etkilemektedir. İşin dil bilgisi boyutu ise daha çok Broca merkezi ile ilgilidir. Wernicke anlamlandırma, aktarım boyutunda devreye girmektedir. Üretimsel dönüşümlü dilbilimin öncüsü Chomsky insan dilinin ancak insan beyninin bilişsel süreçleriyle ortaya konabileceğini savunmuştur (Akt. Kurudayıoğlu, 2018: 2). Öğretim elemanlarının dil öğretirken bu zihinsel boyutların da bilincinde olması öğrencilerin neyi nasıl zihinlerinde konumlandırdıklarını yani işin arka planını bilmelerini sağlayacaktır. Bu da yapılan işte bireye farkındalık kazandıracaktır. Dil öğrenme çok farklı bir etkinliktir. Ana dilini bile doğru düzgün konuşamayanlar yabancı dille karşılaştıklarında beyinde farklı süreçler meydana gelecek ve iki dillilik edinci ile ilgili sıkıntılar doğacaktır. Bu nedenle öncelikle bir öğrencinin ana dil edinci ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ana dil edincini öne çıkaran Hönig ve Kuβmaul'a (1982: 134) göre „Her okuyucu ve her çevirmen varsaymasa da, biz varsayıyoruz ki çeviri edincini oluşturan bazı bileşenler vardır. Bu bileşenlerden en önemlisi, ana dil edincidir (Akt. Akalın, 2016: 62). Ana dil çocuklukta oluşmaya başlar ve yaş ilerledikçe bu edinç daha da gelişir. Chomsky bu konu üzerinde sıkça duran önemli bilim insanlarındandır ve yaptığı çalışmalarda hep bu konuyla ilgili olarak çocukların ana dil edincinin doğuştan gelen zihinsel bir yetenek olduğunu vurgulayarak ana dil edincine bilişsel bir anlam atfetmiştir. Ayrıca dilde derin yapı ve yüzey yapı ayrımını da yaparak bunu semantik ve sentaktik boyuta taşımıştır. Mevzu, sy. 2 (Eylül 2019) | Merve ÇUKUROVA Bazen derin yapıda kastedilen anlam yüzey yapıda bambaşka bir şekilde aktarılabilmekte ve dolayısıyla derin yapıdaki anlamın tam olarak anlaşılamamasına sebebiyet verebilmektedir. Chomsky dilde cümle ögelerinin farklı kombinasyonlarıyla anlamsız da olsa dizilen cümlenin ana dilini konuşan kişinin içsel olarak hangisinin dil bilgisel olup olmadığını bileceğini vurgulamıştır. Bu, tamamen ana dil edinciyle ve dil bilgisiyle ilgilidir ancak dil bilgisi salt özne, yüklem, nesne gibi cümle ögelerinden ibaret olmayıp fiilimsiler, isim tamlamaları, yan cümleler, anlatım bozuklukları gibi birçok parametreden oluşmaktadır. Chomsky'de bunlar daha çok basit ve temel cümle boyutunda irdelenmiştir. Bireyler çoğunlukla ana dilini konuşurken neyi nerede neden kullandığını bilmeden konuşmaktadır. Dil bilgisi dışında ana dil edinci kazanımında sözcük bilgisi de önem arz eder. Bunun bireyin yaşantısıyla ilgili olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Örnek olarak kimisi bir günde 300 kelime ile konuşurken kimisi 750 kelimeyle konuşabilmektedir. Bu ve bunun gibi birçok etmen bireyin ana dil edinciyle ilgilidir. İş çeviri boyutuna geldiğinde ise bu edinç iki dillilik edincinin alt edinçleri olan yabancı dil ve ana dil edinci ayrı bir önem kazanmaktadır. Öğrencilere çeviri edinci kazandırmanın temelleri hazırlık sınıflarından başlayarak kazandırılmaya çalışılmaktadır ancak her öğrenci aynı düzeyde bu kazanımları gerçekleştirememektedir. Öğrencinin ana dil edinci gelişmemişse yabancı dil ediminde de sıkıntılar yaşaması muhtemel bir durumdur. Bunun için dil edinci ne kadar küçük yaşta kazandırılırsa bireylerin ilerleyen yaşlarında diğer edinçleri kazanması da daha kolay olacaktır. Ne yazık ki her öğrencinin edinç kazanımları aynı boyutta olamamaktadır, bunun da öğrencinin hazırbulunuşluğuyla ilgisi olduğu düşünülmektedir. Öğrencilere farklı dil ailelerine mensup bir yabancı dili öğretmek beynin Broca merkezinde birtakım zorlanmalara neden olabilir dolayısıyla beyinde bir bocalama dönemi yaşanmakta; beyin yabancı dil öğreniminde zorlanabilmektedir. Örneğin; \"Ben annemle sinemeya gidiyorum.\" cümlesinin dizilimi Almancada aynı sırada değildir: \"Ich gehe mit meiner Mutter ins Kino.\" Türkçede sonda yer alan fiil Almancada ya da İngilizcede ikinci sırada yer alır. Bunun alımlanma süreci farklı dil ailelerine mensup diller öğrenilirken aynı dil ailelerine mensup dillere nazaran daha geç olacaktır. Bazen de öğrenciler bilgiyi alımlamakta ancak kısa süreli belleğe depolama gerçekleşince bu bilgi sonraÇeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi dan beyinde yitirilmektedir. Beyin bazen bir bilgiyi gereksiz olarak nitelendirip uzun süreli belleğe atmamaktadır. Dil öğreniminde ise bu durum şu şekilde ilerlemektedir: Belleğimizdeki kelimeler üç tür gruplama ile depolanmaktadır. Birinci tür gruplandırma kelimenin yapısal niteliğine göre yapılır. Öğrenilen kelimeler, yerine göre isimler, fiiller, zamirler, sıfatlar ve edatlar gibi değişik gruplara ayrılabilirler. İkinci tür gruplandırma kelimelerin konularına göre yapılmaktadır. Bu tür gruplamalar, yenilecek şeyler, insanlar, hayvanlar, bitkiler gibi konularda olabilir. Kelimelerin bellekte üçüncü tür gruplanması ise fonolojik (sesbilimsel) yapıya göre olmaktadır. Bu da aynı veya benzer seslerle başlayan veya biten kelimeler şeklinde olabilir (Ekmekçi, 1991: 51; Aktaran: Kurudayıoğlu, 14). İşte beyin, dil öğreniminde bile sınıflandırma yapmaktadır. Önemli olan bu verilerin sürekli tekrara tabii tutulmasını yani kalıcı öğrenme için sık tekrar yapılmasıdır. 4.Öğrencilerin Almanca Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadıkları Sorunlar Bir güz dönemi boyunca öğrenciler verilen ödevlerle, yapılan kısa sınavlarla, öğrencilerin ifade ettiği sorunlarla gözleme tabii tutulmuş, dönem boyunca öğrencilerin yaşadığı sıkıntılar not edilmiş ve bunlar betimsel analize tabii tutulmuştur. 4.1.Öğrencilerin Kendi İfade Ettiği Sorunlar ve Görüşler Bu başlık altında 10 farklı öğrencinin ağzından çıkan cümleler birebir not edilmiş. Diğer öğrenciler de benzer ifadeler kullanmıştır. Almanca gramerle ilgili görüşleri aşağıda bildirilmiştir: • \"Hocam Almanca gramer çok zor, dünyanın en zor gramerine sahip dili olabilir. Çok zorlanıyorum.\" • \"Ben yapamıyorum hocam. Tam oldu diyorum, anlamadığımı görüyorum. Siz derste anlatınca anlıyorum ama alıştırma çözerken zorlanıyorum.\" • \"Benim İngilizce gramerim çok iyidir ama Almanca biraz zorladı beni.\" • \"Hocam, ana dilim Türkçe olmadığı için ben Türkçeyi sonradan öğrendiğim için grameri anlamada zorlanmıyorum ama siz cümle çevirisi Mevzu, sy. 2 (Eylül 2019) | Merve ÇUKUROVA yaptırınca neyi nerede kullanacağımı bilemiyorum. Cümleleri her iki dilde de düzgün kullanamıyorum. Türkçe grameri de bilmiyorum sanırım ondan.\" • \"Hocam ben normalde dil bilgisi derslerinde iyi değilimdir Almanca gramer de baya karışık ama siz bazen böyle ipuçları veriyorsunuz, bir de görsel olarak da bazı şeyleri gösteriyorsunuz. Anlıyorum sanki artık soruları da yapabiliyorum. Derse devam edince ve tekrar yapınca oluyormuş hocam.\" • \"İngilizce grameri gibi neden kolay değil Almanca hocam? Sürekli kurallara uymayan yapılar, istisnalar çıkıyor Almancada kafam karışıyor.\" • \"Hocam gramerde bir konuda zorlanınca o konunun geçtiği yazma konuşma gibi derslerde de zorlanıyorum. Grameri anladığımda neyi nerede kullanacağımı bildiğim için daha kolay yapıyorum.\" • \"Gramer aynı matematik gibi hocam bir hafta derse gelemedim. Tüm dengem bozuldu. Her şeyi birbirine karıştırdım sanki. Matematikte de yaşıyordum bunu.\" • \"Hocam siz böyle derste sürekli alıştırma çözdürünce çok iyi anlıyorum.\" • \"Hani siz bazen konu anlatırken İngilizcede böyleydi hani deyip İngilizceden örnek verince ben daha iyi anlıyorum hocam.\" 4.2.Öğrencilerin Sınavda, Ders İçi Alıştırmalarda ve Ödevlerde Yaşadığı Gözlemlenmiş Sorunlar ve Bulgular • Bazı öğrenciler özellikle de İngilizce ile benzerlik barındıran kelimelerin doğru kaymalar yaşamaktadır. Örnek: Almanca \"Adjektivdeklination (Sıfat Çekimi) konusunda bir öğrenci \"Kırmızı bir araba\" yapısını Almancaya şu şekilde aktarmıştır: \"Ein redes Auto\". Burada öğrencinin İngilizcedeki \"red\" ile Almancadaki \"rot\" kelimesini karıştırdığı ve Almancaya has bir gramer kuralını İngilizce kelimeye uyarlamaya çalıştığı gözlenmiştir. Doğrusu: ein rotes Auto. Benzer bir durumla başka bir öğrencide de karşılaşılmıştır: Öğrenci \"das Haus\" yazacağı yerde \"das House\" yazmıştır. • Öğrencilerin birçoğu derste sürekli vurgulanmasına rağmen sınavlarda geçtiği cümleleri kurarken geriye ket vurma yaşamakta İngilizceye ve ödevlerde Almancada büyük harfle yazılması gereken isimleri küçük yazmaktadır. Örnek olarak; \"der Mann değil der mann ya Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi da die Frau değil die frau\". • Birkaç öğrenci kelimeleri çoğul yaparken İngilizcedeki kuralı uygulamaya çalışmıştır: Çocuk anlamına gelen \"das Kind\" kelimesini çoğul yaparken \"die Kinds\" yapmışlardır. • Almanca gramerinde önemli bir kural olan fiilin ikinci kısımda yer alması kuralını öğrenciler kimi zaman unutmaktadır. Bunu daha çok birinci yabancı dili İngilizce değil de Türkçe olanlar yani Türkçeyi sonradan öğrenen öğrenciler yapmıştır: \" Ich jetzt in die Schule gehe.\" Başka bir örnek: \"Wir einen Bleistift brauchen.\" görüldüğü gibi bu öğrenciler Türkçede cümle ögesi sıralamasını uygulamaya çalışmıştır. • Özellikle yan cümle konusuna gelindiğinde öğrencilerin çoğu Türkçede fiilimsileri bilmediği için konuyu anlamamış ve bağlantı kurmakta sıkıntı yaşamıştır. \"Havanın güzel olacağını gazetede okudum.\" cümlesini iki farklı öğrenci şu şekilde çevirmiştir: \"Dass das Wetter morgen schön wird, ich habe gelesen.\" \"Ich habe gelesen, dass das Wetter wird morgen schön.\" Cümlelere bakıldığında bir öğrenci cümle başında kullanılmayan \"dass\" bağlacını cümle başında yazmış; diğer öğrenci ise yan cümlede özneye göre çekimlenen fiili sona atması gerekirken bu kurala uymamıştır. • Diğer bir sıkıntı Almancadaki \"Modalverb\" konusunda meydana gelmiştir. Birçok öğrenci özellikle \"dürfen ve können\" fiillerindeki ayrımı yapmakta sıkıntı yaşamıştır. Bizim Türkçede \"ebilmek\" anlamıyla kullandığımız iki fiili öğrenciler Almancada birbirinden ayırt etmekte zorlanmış ve sürekli bu iki fiili birbirinin yerine kullanmıştır. Birisinin Mevzu, sy. 2 (Eylül 2019) | Merve ÇUKUROVA izin, birisinin yetenek gibi durumlarda farklı anlamlarda kullanıldığını kavramakta zorlanmışlardır. • \"Passiv Präsens (Şimdiki/Geniş Zamanda Edilgen Cümleler) konusunda \"werden\" yardımcı fiilinin özneye göre çekimlenip asıl fiilin \"Partizip 2\" haliyle yani geçmiş zamanda kullanıldıkları haliyle sona gitmesi öğrencilerin kafasında anlamsal boşluk meydana getirmiştir. Örnek: \"Araba tamir ediliyor.\" cümlesini Almancaya aktarırken bazı öğrenciler; \"Hocam bu cümlede şimdiki zaman verilmiş ama geçmiş zaman olması gerekmiyor mu? Mesela tamir edildi.\" Bu cümlenin Almancası: \"Das Auto wird repariert.\" olduğu için öğrencilerin burada kafasını karıştıran şu olmuştur; \"reparieren\" fiili aynı \"Perfekt (Geçmiş Zaman) konusundaki gibi geçmiş zaman haliyle sona gitmiştir. Ancak burada dikkat etmeleri gereken Perfekt konusunda \"haben ve sein\" yardımcı fiillerinin kullanıldığıdır. 5. Sonuç ve Öneriler Çeviribilim bölümüne ikinci veya üçüncü yabancı dil öğrenmeye gelen öğrencilerin kimisi Almancaya kolay adapte olabilmekteyken kimisi kolay adapte olamamaktadır. Özellikle gramer derslerinde zorlandıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Bunun en önemli nedenleri şu şekilde sıralanabilir: 1.İkinci yabancı dili genellikle İngilizce olan öğrencilere İngilizce gramerden sonra Almanca gramer zor ve karışık gelmektedir. Almanca gramer yapıları İngilizce gramer yapılarına göre daha karmaşıktır. 2.Öğrencilerin bazıları daha sıfatın, zarfın hatta öznenin bile ne olduğunu bilmemektedir. Dolayısıyla ana dilinde bu edince sahip olamamış öğrenciler doğal olarak yabancı dilde de zorlanmaktadır. 3.Öğrencilerin birçoğu dersle yetinmekte, ödevleri geçiştirme yapmakta ve ders tekrarı yapmamaktadır. Haliyle zor bir gramere sahip bir dil tekrar edilmeyince zorlanmalar kaçınılmaz olmaktadır. 4.Öğrenciler genel itibarıyla cümleleri yüzey yapıda algılayabilmekte ancak derin yapıda sıkıntılar çekmektedir. Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi İkinci yabancı dil dersleri yakından ele alındığında buradaki öğrencilerin yaşlarının birinci dil veya ikinci dil olarak öğrenenlere göre daha ileri olduğudur. Ancak burada öğrenme iklimi konusunda olumsuzluklar olabilir, çünkü öğrenciler meraklarını ve heyecanlarını yitirmiş olabilir. Bundan dolayı kullanılan araçlar doğrudan hedefe yönelik olmalı, otantik metinler ve medya araçları öğrencileri daha çok destekleyici olmalıdır (Krumm, 1996: 209, Akt. Arak, 2016: 16). Dil öğretiminde bu materyallerle birlikte işitsel-görsel yöntemden de yararlanılmalıdır. Dolayısıyla ister gramer dersi olsun ister diğer dil dersleri olsun öğrencilerin duyularına da mutlaka hitap etmelidir ki etkin öğrenme oluşabilsin. Helmke 'etkililik' (Effizienz) kavramıyla ilintili olarak planlanmış, amaca yönelik, duruma uygun ve hedef kitleye hitap eden yöntem seçiminin yabancı dil öğretimi için etkili bir ölçüt olduğuna vurgu yapmaktadır (Helmke 2009: 259, Akt. Karaman, 2016: 96). İşte amaca yönelik olarak ve öğrencilerin hazırbulunuşluk seviyelerini dikkate alarak gramerde yapılacak her türlü görselişitsel etkinlikler, etkin öğrenme adına önem arz etmektedir. Öğrencileri Almanca gramerde daha etkin kılmak için şu önerilerde bulunulabilir: 1.Gramer dersleri daha eğlenceli hale getirilebilir örnek olarak öğrencilere sadece kuralları vermek yerine bu kuralların bir etkinliğe dönüştürülerek verilmesi öğrencilerin derse karşı isteğini artırabilir. 2.Gramer dersleri görsel ve işitsel medya araçları ile zenginleştirilip daha etkin bir öğrenme sağlanabilir. 3.Eğitimde \"bilinenden bilinmeyene ilkesi\" tekniği uygulanabilir. Öğrencilere anlaşılması zor konularda İngilizce ile benzer örnekler varsa verilmelidir. İkinci yabancı dil olarak Almanca öğreniminde, öz yeterlik algılarını ve öz düzenleme becerilerini geliştiren öğrenciler, özerk öğrenen konumuna geldiklerinde, üst bilişsel stratejilerden yararlanabilirler. Burada öğrencinin birinci yabancı dili olan İngilizce bilgisinin, İngilizce öğrenimindeki motivasyonunun ve kullandığı stratejilerinin önemi oldukça fazladır (Akıllılar, 2013: 279). Yani öğrencilerin daha kolay öğrenmesini sağlamak adına gramer kurallarını, Almancaya göre daha çok aşina oldukları İngilizce ile karşılaştırmalı öğretmek daha etkin ve verimli öğrenmeyi sağlayabilecektir. Bu sayede öğ- Mevzu, sy. 2 (Eylül 2019) | Merve ÇUKUROVA rencinin geçmişteki bilgilerine ket vurularak daha kolay anlaşılma sağlanacaktır. 4.\"Bireye görelik ilkesi\" öğretim elemanları tarafından göz ardı edilmemelidir. Her öğrencinin hazırbulunuşluk seviyesi aynı değildir. Dolayısıyla dönem başında öğrencilere tanımaya yönelik etkinlikler yaptırılarak öğrencilerin hazırbulunuşluk seviyeleri tespit edilmeli ve ders anlatımı ona göre şekillendirilmelidir. 5. Verilebiliyorsa öğrencilere kodlama cümleleri veya kelimeleri verilmelidir. Tarafımdan \"untrennbare Verben (ayrılmayan fiiller)\" konusu anlatılırken öğrenciler ekleri aklında tutamadığını söyleyince onlara kodlama cümlesi verilmiştir: \"Ben empatiyi enteresan bulurum, Erzurumlu genç misafir Zerrin verimli.\" Bu şekilde öğrencilerin bu cümlede yer alan eklerin ayrılmayan ekler olduğunu daha kolay kavradıkları, kolay öğrendikleri ve dikkatlerini çektiği için uzun süreli belleğe attıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Dilde bu tarz kodlamalar vermek süreci daha etkin ve verimli kılabilmektedir. 6. Öğrencilerin birçoğu Türkçe dil bilgisine hakim değildir ve karşılaştırma ya da analiz yapamamakta dolayısıyla iki kat zorluk yaşamaktadır. Çeviribilim ve ilgili bölümlerin hazırlık sınıflarında müfredata ek öğrencilere Türkçe dil bilgisi dersleri de verilebilir. Böylece unutulan bilgiler tazelenmiş ve Almanca ile eş güdümlü dil yapılarında karşılaştırma yapmaları sağlanmış olur. 7.Öğrencilerin bilişsel boyutunda kalıcı öğrenmeyi sağlayabilmek için öğrenci her bir konuya sürekli maruz bırakılmalıdır. Aralıklı olarak derste genel tekrarlar ihmal edilmemelidir çünkü öğrenci bir kez duyduğu bir şeyi çabuk unutabilir ancak sürekli maruz bırakıldığında uzun süreli bellek devreye girecek öğrenmenin daha kalıcı ve etkin olması sağlanabilecektir. Kaynakça Akalın, R. (2017). Ana Dil Edincinin Derinleşmesinde Çeviri Uygulamalarının Olası Rolüne İlişkin Düşünceler International Journal of Languages Education and Teaching, Volume 5, Issue 4, p. 840-850. Çeviribilim Bölümü Almanca Hazırlık Sınıfı Öğrencilerinin Gramer Derslerinde Yaşadığı Sorunların Dilbilimsel ve Eğitim Bilimsel Veriler Işığında Temellendirilmesi Arak, H. (2016). İngilizceden Sonra İkinci Yabancı Dil Olarak Almanca, The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies, Number: 48, p. 15-25, Summer II, Doi number:http://dx.doi.org/10.9761/JASSS3491 Civelek, M. (2014). Gelişim Psikolojisi Özet (PDF) 16.02.2019 tarihinde http://dushunce.az/files/documents/gelisim.psikolojisi.ozet.07.03.2014.p df adresinden erişildi. Gültekin, M. (2012). Öğretim İlke ve Yöntemleri, Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, Eskişehir. Hakan, A. (1991). Eğitim Programı ve Öğretim Yöntemleri, Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, Eskişehir. Karaman, F. (2016). Yabancı Dil Olarak Almanca Dersinde Dilbilgisinin Dört Beceriye Aktarımı ve Kullanımına Yönelik Örnek Bir Uygulama, Diyalog Dergisi, 2.sayı, Muğla. Kurudayıoğlu, M. (2018). Kelime Hazinesinin Zihinsel Boyutu, Ana Dili Eğitimi Dergisi, http://www.anadiliegitimi.com/download/article-file/373920 Akıllılar, T. (2013). İkinci Yabancı Dil Olarak Almanca Öğreniminde Üstbilişsel Farkındalık. Uşak Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi Özel Sayı, 275-285.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNER AUTONOMY IN THE VIETNAMESE HIGHER EDUCATION CONTEXT: ENABLING FACTORS AND BARRIERS ARISING FROM ASSESSMENT PRACTICE HA THI NGOC TRAN BA, MA (University of Languages and Foreign Studies – VNU) Thesis submitted in the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Education, Faculty of Arts The University of Adelaide October 2019 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ............................................................................................................. viii Thesis declaration ............................................................................................... x Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ xi List of abbreviations ......................................................................................... xii List of tables ..................................................................................................... xiii List of figures ..................................................................................................... xv Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 Chapter overview .............................................................................................. 1 1.1. Background to the research ....................................................................... 1 1.2. Research focus ........................................................................................... 6 1.3. Research question and research objectives ................................................ 8 1.4. Significance of the study ............................................................................ 9 1.5. Key concepts in relation to learner autonomy ........................................... 9 1.6. Structure of the thesis .............................................................................. 10 Chapter 2: Context of the study ...................................................................... 13 Chapter overview ............................................................................................ 13 2.1. Broader research context ......................................................................... 13 2.1.1. Vietnam in brief ................................................................................ 13 2.1.2. Vietnamese higher education ............................................................ 18 2.1.3. History of foreign language education in Vietnam ........................... 23 2.2. Research site ............................................................................................ 27 ii 2.2.1. Brief information about the researched university ........................... 27 2.2.2. English teaching and learning at the researched university .............. 27 2.2.3. A2 level of English competency and A2 test .................................... 34 2.2.4. Assessment policies and assessment framework and practices at the researched university ........................................................................ 37 Chapter summary ............................................................................................ 40 Chapter 3: Literature review ........................................................................... 42 Chapter overview ............................................................................................ 42 3.1. Theoretical framework ............................................................................. 42 3.1.1. Sociocultural theories in brief ........................................................... 42 3.1.2. Sociocultural theories and implications for the current study .......... 44 3.2. Learner autonomy .................................................................................... 56 3.2.1. Role of learner autonomy in language learning ................................ 56 3.2.2. Feasibility of learner autonomy in Asian countries .......................... 57 3.2.3. Autonomy is a complex concept ....................................................... 59 3.2.4. Misconceptions about learner autonomy ......................................... 61 3.2.5. Definitions of learner autonomy ....................................................... 64 3.2.6. Learner autonomy in this study ........................................................ 73 3.2.7. Characteristics of autonomous language learners ............................. 74 3.2.8. Versions of learner autonomy ........................................................... 76 3.2.9. Levels of learner autonomy .............................................................. 80 3.2.10. Perceptions about learner autonomy ............................................... 83 iii 3.3. Assessment in relation to learner autonomy ............................................ 92 3.3.1. Assessment of learning ..................................................................... 93 3.3.2. Assessment for learning .................................................................... 96 Chapter Summary ......................................................................................... 117 Chapter 4: Research Design ........................................................................... 119 Chapter overview .......................................................................................... 119 4.1. Research paradigm ................................................................................. 119 4.2. Case study approach .............................................................................. 122 4.2.1. Qualitative case study ..................................................................... 122 4.2.2 Case definition and selection ........................................................... 124 4.2.3. Participant selection ........................................................................ 126 4.3. Research methods .................................................................................. 130 4.3.1. Participant observations .................................................................. 130 4.3.2. Semi-structured interviews ............................................................. 132 4.3.3. Document analysis .......................................................................... 134 4.4. Data analysis .......................................................................................... 135 4.4.1. Qualitative content analysis ............................................................ 136 4.4.2. Interview data analysis process ....................................................... 138 4.4.3. Observation data analysis process .................................................. 141 4.4.4. Document analysis process ............................................................. 152 4.5. Ensuring research quality ....................................................................... 153 4.5.1. Credibility ....................................................................................... 153 iv 4.5.2. Transferability ................................................................................. 156 4.5.3. Dependability .................................................................................. 157 4.5.4. Confirmability ................................................................................. 157 4.6. Ethical considerations and clearance ..................................................... 158 4.6.1. Level of risk .................................................................................... 158 4.6.2. Measures to minimise risks ............................................................. 159 4.6.3. Confidentiality ................................................................................ 159 4.6.4. Storage of information .................................................................... 160 Chapter summary .......................................................................................... 160 Chapter 5: Teachers' and students' interview responses............................ 162 Chapter overview .......................................................................................... 162 5.1. Background information about the three classes ................................... 162 5.1.1. Profile of the teachers ..................................................................... 162 5.1.2. Profile of the students ..................................................................... 164 5.1.3. The classroom ................................................................................. 164 5.1.4. The module ..................................................................................... 165 5.2. The teachers' and students' voices on assessment and autonomy ......... 165 5.2.1. The teachers' and students' voices on learner autonomy ............... 165 5.2.2 Teachers' and students' views on assessment ................................. 183 5.2.3. Teachers' and students' perspectives on the relationship between assessment and LA ......................................................................... 206 5.3. Students' self-reports of their English learning ..................................... 214 v 5.3.1. Demonstration of proactive autonomy ........................................... 214 5.3.2. Demonstration of reactive autonomy .............................................. 217 5.3.3. Demonstration of compliance ......................................................... 218 Chapter Summary ......................................................................................... 219 Chapter 6: Observed Assessment practices and Students' responses ....... 221 Chapter overview .......................................................................................... 221 6.1. Assessment tasks and students' responses ............................................. 222 6.1.1. Tasks for in-class learning .............................................................. 223 6.1.2. Tasks for out-of-class learning ....................................................... 233 6.2. Assessment techniques and students' responses .................................... 240 6.2.1. Questioning ..................................................................................... 241 6.2.2. Observation ..................................................................................... 242 6.2.3. Checking of individual performance/role play ............................... 243 6.2.4. Self/peer-assessment and students' responses ................................ 243 6.3. Assessment feedback and students' responses ...................................... 245 6.3.1. Mistake identification and correction ............................................. 245 6.3.2. Confirmation of students' answers ................................................. 246 6.3.3. Self/peer-feedback and students' responses ................................... 247 6.3.4. Feedback for future learning ........................................................... 249 6.3.5. Student-initiated feedback .............................................................. 249 6.4. Assessment-related communication ...................................................... 250 6.4.1. Promoting proactive autonomy ....................................................... 251 vi 6.4.2. Promoting reactive autonomy ......................................................... 251 6.4.3. Promoting compliance .................................................................... 253 Chapter summary .......................................................................................... 255 Chapter 7: Discussion ..................................................................................... 257 Chapter overview .......................................................................................... 257 7.1. Teachers' and students' understandings of learner autonomy ........... 257 7. 2. Teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment ........................ 265 7.3. Characterisation of assessment practices in Vietnamese higher education ........................................................................................ 276 7.4. Students' demonstration of learner autonomy ................................... 284 Chapter summary .......................................................................................... 290 Chapter 8: conclusion ..................................................................................... 292 Chapter overview .......................................................................................... 292 8.1. Summary of the research ................................................................... 292 8.2. Contributions ..................................................................................... 296 8.3. Limitations ......................................................................................... 300 8.4. Recommendations for future research ............................................... 301 8.5. Concluding remarks ........................................................................... 301 List of References ............................................................................................ 303 List of appendices ............................................................................................ 329 Appendix A: Interview protocols ................................................................. 329 Appendix A1: Teacher interview protocol in English and Vietnamese ... 329 Appendix A2: Student interview protocol in English and Vietnamese .... 334 vii Appendix B: Observation protocol ............................................................... 339 Appendix C: Survey questionnaire for selecting participants ...................... 341 Appendix D: Ethics approval ........................................................................ 350 Appendix E: Participant information sheets ................................................. 351 Appendix E1: Participant information sheet for teachers ......................... 351 Appendix E2: Participant information sheet for observed students ......... 358 Appendix E3: Participant information sheet for interviewed students ..... 364 Appendix F: Consent forms .......................................................................... 370 Appendix F1: Consent form for teachers .................................................. 370 Appendix F2: Consent form for observed students .................................. 374 Appendix F3: Consent form for interviewed students .............................. 378 Appendix G: Complaint forms ..................................................................... 382 Appendix H: Sample assessment grid for CEFR A2 test ............................. 384 Appendix I: Sample of assessment grid for listening skill in KNLNNVN (Vietnam Framework of Reference for English) A2 test .......... 385 viii ABSTRACT Learner autonomy has gained particular attention in Vietnamese higher education since a major education reform launched in 2005. Although a number of studies have been conducted to investigate the concept in the Vietnamese higher education context, most of them have focused on exploring teachers' and students' perceptions and beliefs around the concept of autonomy (T. V. Nguyen, 2011; Dang, 2012; Humphreys & Wyatt, 2013; T. N. Nguyen, 2014), and on the possibility of promoting it in Vietnamese universities (Trinh, 2005; L. T. C. Nguyen, 2009; Q. X. Le, 2013; Phan, 2015). There appear to be no studies on the demonstration of learner autonomy and the potential factors, including factors relating to assessment practice, that support or inhibit its demonstration in the Vietnamese higher education context. Building on a social constructivist paradigm and sociocultural theories of learning, this qualitative case study aims to investigate the demonstration of learner autonomy in the context of assessment in English as a foreign language (EFL) classes in a university in Vietnam, and the (potential) factors in assessment that facilitate or constrain the demonstration of learner autonomy in that context. The data were collected through participant observation of teachers' and students' practices in three EFL classes at the university during a complete semester, one-on-one semi-structured interviews with three teachers and sixteen students, and post-observation interviews with the three teachers and their students. Additional data which characterised the context of the study were gathered and included documents at the researched university relating to higher education policies, assessment policies, English teaching and learning policies, EFL curriculum and syllabus, test samples, and English teaching textbooks. ix The study found that students generally demonstrated a low level of autonomy in the classroom despite their positive attitude towards the concept and their awareness of its role in English learning. Primary contributing factors included negative washback of current assessment systems on teaching and learning practices, prescribed assessment practices in the class, teachers' and learners' limited and divergent understanding about the concept of learner autonomy, and their limited understanding about the role of assessment in learning in general and in learner autonomy promotion and development in particular. The study also found that students who stated that English was relevant to their personal needs were generally more autonomous outside of the classroom than inside it. Findings from this study support the view that learner autonomy reflects the relationship between learners and the learning environment, and is an emergent product of the interaction between learners and contextual factors including their teacher, their peers, the learning task, class rules and values, and university values and regulations. The study's findings are significant, as they highlight the social dimension of learner autonomy and the importance of facilitating favourable conditions for teachers to provide learner autonomy and for learners to manifest it. The study also highlights the need to reconsider assessment practices to promote learner autonomy. x THESIS DECLARATION I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree. I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University's digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time. Signed: Date: 8th October 2019 xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to show my gratitude to the following people without whom this thesis would not have been accomplished. My deepest and sincerest thanks go to my supervisors at the School of Education, the University of Adelaide – Dr Julia Miller, Associate Professor Edward Palmer, and Dr John Willison for their invaluable guidance, feedback, and support. I am grateful for their knowledge, patience, dedication, tolerance, and timely encouragement, which have made my PhD journey not only more endurable but also more enjoyable. I would like to acknowledge all the participants who have made this research possible. Thank you for sharing your thoughts with me and allowing me to have a oncein-a-lifetime experience observing your practices. I am grateful to the Vietnamese Government and the University of Adelaide for providing me with a VIED-Adelaide Scholarship to support my doctoral study. I also wish to thank all the staff at the School of Education, the University of Adelaide for their helpful support. I also want to express my thanks to Joe Miller for proofreading my thesis. Thank you for your critical comments and feedback. To my friends and colleagues in room 8.11 of the Nexus 10 building, thank you for your warm and beautiful friendship. Thank you for sharing fun moments with me, encouraging me when I got stuck in my thesis, and spending heaps of late nights with me. You are an unforgettable part of my PhD journey. To Thuy Thi Thu Hoang, thank you for being my colleague, my housemate, and my soulmate. Without you, my life and my PhD journey would have been much duller. I am especially indebted to my beloved husband Viet Dung Bui and my two dear daughters Ha Anh Bui and Ha Linh Bui. Thank you for being always by my side, putting up with me without any complaints, comforting me and cheering me up whenever I am down. You are an endless source of motivation for me to try my best. Finally, this thesis is my gift and my special thank you for my parents who have always loved me unconditionally and supported me wholeheartedly. Thank you very much Mum and Dad for bringing me into this world, raising me up, nurturing all my dreams, and making me who I am today. xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AfL Assessment for Learning AoL Assessment of Learning ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations BCE Before Common Era CD Compact Disc CE Common Era CEFR Common European Framework of Reference EFL English as a Foreign Language ESP English for Specific Purposes FA Formative Assessment GPA Grade Point Average HEI Higher Education Institution IELTS International English Language Testing System KET Key English Test KNLNNVN Khung Năng Lực Ngoại Ngữ Việt Nam (Vietnam Framework of Reference for English) LA Learner Autonomy MOET Ministry of Education and Training RU Research University SA Summative Assessment UN United Nations VHE Vietnamese Higher Education WTO World Trade Organization ZPD Zone of Proximal Development xiii LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1 The general curriculum for English at RU before 2011 ..................... 28 Table 2.2 The 'altered' curriculum for English at RU in 2011 ........................... 29 Table 2.3 New curriculum for English at RU in 2012 ........................................ 30 Table 2.4 Curriculum for English at the English centre ..................................... 31 Table 2.5 The CEFR and the RU A2 test format ................................................ 35 Table 2.6 Assessment framework for English module 1 .................................... 37 Table 2.7 Assessment framework for English module 2 .................................... 37 Table 2.8 Assessment framework for altered English module 3 (after 2011) .... 38 Table 2.9 Assessment framework for English module 1: ................................... 38 Table 2.10 Assessment framework for English module 2 .................................. 38 Table 2.11 Assessment framework for English module 3 .................................. 38 Table 3.1 Summary of perspectives on autonomy adapted from R. L. Oxford (2003) ............................................................................................... 78 Table 3.2 Nunan's model of LA (Nunan, 1997, p. 195) ..................................... 80 Table 3.3 Model of autonomy demonstrated ...................................................... 82 Table 3.4 Model for autonomy offered ............................................................... 83 Table 3.5 Spectrum of autonomy offered in language tasks ............................. 101 Table 3.6 Summary of different types of questions .......................................... 103 Table 3.7 Level of autonomy in questioning techniques .................................. 105 Table 3.8 Summary of feedback models and strategies .................................... 110 Table 3.9 Levels of autonomy offered in feedback practices ........................... 111 Table 3.10 Summary of typologies of self/peer-assessment ............................. 115 xiv Table 3.11 Levels of autonomy in self/peer-assessment techniques ................ 117 Table 4.1 Participants' average scores for use of formative assessment and autonomy-supporting activities ........................................................ 128 Table 4.2 Teacher participants and their classes ............................................... 129 Table 4.3 Interview student participants ........................................................... 130 Table 4.4 Linking research questions and objectives with data collection methods and data sources ................................................................. 135 Table 4.5 Examples of code and category development in interview data ....... 140 Table 4.6 Codes for interviews with teachers and students .............................. 140 Table 4.7 Examples of code and category development in observation data ... 143 Table 4.8 Data categorisation and category definition ..................................... 146 Table 4.9 Analytical framework for teachers' practices ................................... 147 Table 4.10 Analytical framework for students' responses ............................... 147 Table 4.11 Coding frame for teachers' assessment practices ........................... 149 Table 4.12 Coding frame for students' responses ............................................. 151 Table 4.13 Codes for observations ................................................................... 152 Table 5.1 Profiles of the students in three classes ............................................ 164 xv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 6.1 Number of prescribed tasks compared to total number of tasks in three classes .................................................................................... 223 Figure 6.2 Students' demonstration of autonomy in prescribed tasks .............. 224 Figure 6.3 Number of bounded tasks compared to the total number of tasks in three classes .................................................................................... 230 Figure 6.4 Students' responses in bounded tasks ............................................. 231 Figure 6.5 Number of prescribed tasks compared to total number of tasks for out-of-class learning ....................................................................... 235 Figure 6.6 Number of bounded tasks compared to the total number of tasks for out-of-class learning ....................................................................... 236 Figure 6.7 Assessment techniques utilised in the three classes ........................ 241 Figure 6.8 Feedback used in the three classes .................................................. 245 Figure 6.9 Levels of autonomy that assessment-related communication might have potentially promoted .............................................................. 250 1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Chapter overview This introductory chapter presents an overview of the research inquiry. The chapter starts with the background to the research, followed by the focus of the research, research question and objectives, and the introduction of some key concepts. The chapter ends with an outline of the structure of the thesis. 1.1. Background to the research English teaching and learning in Vietnam English has played an important role in Vietnam for many years, especially since 1986 when Vietnam opened its doors to the world, seeking integration and cooperation. The role of English in Vietnam is apparent in many fields, including international relations, employment and education. First, English is now deemed the global language and is used as a means of communication in a number of important international organisations and associations, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN). Therefore, English can be considered a key for Vietnam to develop and strengthen international relations and economic cooperation. Moreover, English has been recognised as the key to \"research and development in all areas of scientific, technological and commercial endeavour\" (Denham, 1992, p. 62), so it is believed that English will help Vietnam to make use of the world's advances in science and technology to catch up with other countries in the region and in the world. Secondly, since opening its doors to the world, a number of foreign investors and companies have come to Vietnam, and millions of foreign tourists have travelled to 2 Vietnam for their holidays. These factors mean that Vietnamese job seekers need to have good English competence to gain an advantage in the job market, as English has now become the passport to any well-paid job in Vietnam (Hoang, 2010; Phan, Vu, & Bao, 2014). Thirdly, the majority of sources of information on the Internet are in English, so a good command of English allows not only students but also people from all walks of life to approach these rich and invaluable sources of information. Moreover, being competent in English can help open the door for Vietnamese students to advanced education systems and prestigious universities worldwide, because the prerequisite for an offer or scholarship to study abroad in these education systems and universities is English competency (Phan et al., 2014). The importance of English in the VHE manifests itself in many ways. First, it has been highlighted in several documents issued by the Vietnamese Assembly, the Vietnamese Communist Party, the Vietnamese Government, and the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). For example, the Government's Vietnamese Education Strategies document specifies that one of the important attributes that Vietnamese students must possess is English competency (Vietnamese Government [VG], 2005). In addition, it is stated in the Vietnamese Education Law (2005) that the foreign language taught in the national education system must be \"widely used in international communication\" (Vietnamese National Assembly [VNA], 2005, p. 2). In 2008, the National Foreign Language Project specified English as the foreign language to be taught at all education levels in Vietnam, and stated that Vietnamese students need to acquire a certain level of English after completing each education level in order to be able to communicate and work in a global working environment (VG, 2008). Secondly, the prioritisation of English can also be seen in the curriculum for English at tertiary level. English is compulsory in the curriculum of all higher education programs, and the 3 time allocated to it is greater than the time allotted to any other subject 240 hours in total for general English, and from 60 to 90 hours in total for English for Specific Purposes (ESP) (H. T. Le, 2013). English is also a prerequisite in the entrance exams to master and doctoral programs in Vietnam (Ministry of Education and Training [MOET], 2014, 2017). According to the MOET (2015), students must have English competence equivalent to Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) levels A2, B1 and B2 to receive their university master and doctoral degree, respectively. Thirdly, the approval in 2008 of the national foreign language project entitled \"Teaching and Learning Foreign Languages in the National Education System, Period 2008 – 2020\" (with a budget of up to 450 million US dollars) proved that English teaching and learning is one of the priorities in the government's investment strategies and education policies. Despite all the efforts made, however, the quality of English teaching and learning at tertiary level is far from adequate (Hoang, 2010; Trinh & Mai, 2018). There is evidence to suggest that the English proficiency of a large number of students is disappointingly low (H. T. Le, 2013; Tran, 2013). For example, according to a report from a conference at Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh in 2017, 85% of tertiary students at this university did not meet the required standard for English competency (Phương Trinh, 2017). In addition, students do not seem to be confident with their English, and the majority of non-English major students cannot function properly in English despite years of studying it at school and university (Le, 2011; Tran, 2013; Vietnamese Prime Minister, 2008). As a result, graduates do not meet the English competency requirements of job recruiters. According to the Head of the Human Resources Department at Panasonic Vietnam, Vietnamese graduates' English speaking, presentation and writing skills are inadequate (Đ. Nguyen, 2016). 4 Among a series of problems blamed for the poor results of English teaching and learning at higher education levels, the most prominent are the teacher-centred teaching method, the exam-directed curriculum and summative grammar-based assessment (Hoang, 2010; Tran, 2013; Viet Toan, 2013; Trinh & Mai, 2018). The immediate consequences of teacher-centredness are students' passivity in learning and their dependence on teachers for knowledge. Both of these signal a huge lack of autonomy, influencing the effectiveness of English learning. The use of an exam-directed curriculum and summative grammar-based assessment methods also lead to a rote learning style, and the neglect of communicative language skills in English teaching (Hoang, 2010; Tran, 2013), both of which also have a negative effect on Learner Autonomy (LA). Yet autonomy in language learning is vital to the success of English learning (Dafei, 2007; Pan & Chen, 2015; Faramarzi, Elekaei, & Tabrizi, 2016). These problems suggest that key potential solutions for the current ineffectiveness of English teaching and learning may include the promotion of LA and a re-evaluation of current assessment methods. Learner autonomy and assessment in Vietnamese higher education policies LA, and innovation in assessment (which aims to promote LA), have been made the focus in the Vietnamese Higher Education (VHE) policies. In 2008, the MOET required all universities in Vietnam to adopt a credit-based system before 2010. In this system, students have to be responsible for making autonomous decisions about their own learning consonant with their learning conditions and capabilities (MOET, 2008). This system also requires innovation in the assessment regime so that students' attendance and class participation are accounted for in the final grade, and ongoing assessment criteria and practices are decided by teachers, rather than by departments or universities (MOET, 2008). In addition, the Vietnamese Communist Party's Resolution No 29- 5 NQ/TW on basic and comprehensive education and training reform emphasised that assessment practices had to be reformed because assessment and testing methods were recognised as being outdated and inauthentic (Vietnamese Communist Party [VCP], 2013) instead of flexible and varied―both criteria which the Vietnamese Communist Party regards as significant attributes of assessment. The assessment of students' learning should therefore not only be tied to one final end-of term test, but be based on \"spoken, written, essays, assignments or all these assessment methods\" (Vietnamese Communist Party, 2013, p. 6). It was thought that the assessment focus should move from summative to formative in order to develop students' initiative, awareness, creativity, self-study and sustainability (VCP, 2013). Moreover, the National Foreign Language Project approved in 2008 emphasised the need to make English teaching more student-centred, moving from language teaching as the conveying of knowledge to learning as the active construction of knowledge. LA thus became a major goal in language teaching. English assessment practices were also substantially modified. As a consequence, a number of conferences, workshops and training sessions have been held in several universities in Vietnam, aiming to include new ideas and methods in assessment practices in VHE. The relationship between learner autonomy and assessment Assessment is widely recognised as having a profound impact on LA (Falchikov & Boud, 1989; Little, 2003a; Black & Wiliam, 2009; Everhard, 2015a), depending on how and why it is used. Assessment is often perceived as serving two purposes: collecting evidence of students' achievement or level of performance against the specified standards or objectives, and supporting students' learning. These two purposes are often referred to as Summative Assessment (SA), or Assessment of Learning (AoL) (Wiliam 6 & Black, 1996; Stiggins, 2005), and Formative Assessment (FA), or Assessment for Learning (AfL) (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Assessment Reform Group, 2002). AoL is often viewed as not supporting, or even as inhibiting LA (Little, 2003a; Harland, McLean, Wass, Miller, & Sim, 2014; Benson, 2015; Everhard, 2015a; Wass, Harland, McLean, Miller, & Sim, 2015). This is because AoL is underpinned by a behaviourist theory of learning, which perceives knowledge as being transmitted from teachers to students, and characterises students as passive recipients of knowledge and outsiders in the assessment process (James, 2006; Everhard, 2015a). In contrast, AfL makes LA one of its central aims (Sadler, 1989; Assessment Reform Group, 2002; Gibbs & Simpson, 2004a; Black & Wiliam, 2009; Woods, 2015). However, AfL does not automatically lead to LA. The impacts of AfL on LA can vary depending on many factors, including how AfL is used in the class (Marshall & Drummond, 2006), types of AfL used (Pryor & Crossouard, 2008; Willis, 2011b), and the teacher-student relationship in AfL, especially the teacher-student power relationship (Gipps, 2002; Pryor & Crossouard, 2008; Willis, 2011a). According to Gipps (2002) and Marshall and Drummond (2006), the promotion of LA in the context of assessment requires the sharing of power and control with students. That is, students should be involved in making decisions about learning and assessment. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the power-dynamic that exists between teachers and learners in assessment practice in order to identify the assessmentrelated factors that enable or constrain LA. 1.2. Research focus As discussed above, innovation in teaching methodology and improvement in assessment methods that would lead to increased LA, have been the focus of the 7 education reforms in Vietnam. However, there seems to be a misalignment between the rhetoric of documents issued by the Government and the MOET and the reality of practice. 'Learner autonomy' and a 'learning society' (VG, 2005) are far-reaching targets. In a study carried out on LA in the Vietnamese University credit-based system in 2015, A. T. Tran (2015) concludes that in reality, students have yet to take the initiative in searching for knowledge. They only do what is required by the lecturers and only study what is accounted for in the final grade. Students tend not to do tasks assigned by the lecturer if the tasks are not assessed and they are not given a mark. Additionally, although LA has been emphasised in many policy documents regarding education in general and higher education in particular, there has been no specific and systematic plan for implementing LA in Vietnamese education (Phan & Hamid, 2017). It seems that the policy goal was \"dumped into local contexts\" without considering how it would be enacted by other agents involved, such as academic administrators, teachers and learners (Phan & Hamid, 2017, p. 3). The term also has not been systematically and consistently described across these documents, making it challenging for the teachers (let alone learners) to grasp what these terms entail in terms of actual behaviours. This means that these policies display limited effectiveness in practice. Moreover, assessment practices still focus more on the purposes of certification than on learning purposes (T. H. Nguyen, Warren, & Fehring, 2014; Trinh & Mai, 2018). The important functions of supporting present and future learning through assessment practices (Boud, 2000; Boud & Falchikov, 2006) and supporting students' autonomy (Sadler, 1989; Black & Wiliam, 2009; Everhard, 2015a; Woods, 2015) are often excluded. Although AfL practices have been adopted by English language teachers, they have not been as effective as expected due to the sociocultural 8 characteristics of Vietnamese students and classrooms (Ho, 2015; Pham & Renshaw, 2015; T. D. Tran, 2015). In Vietnam, only a few studies have been completed which address LA and how to promote it in higher education. These include studies on the possibility of promoting LA in Vietnamese universities (Trinh, 2005; Nguyen, 2009; Q. X. Le, 2013; Phan, 2015), and studies on the perceptions and beliefs of English language teachers and students (T. V. Nguyen, 2011; Dang, 2012; Humphreys & Wyatt, 2013; T. N. Nguyen, 2014; V. L. Nguyen, 2016). However, there appear to be no studies on assessment and autonomy in the VHE context, and nothing that addresses how the one influences the other, how they are related, and how assessment can be used to promote LA. Therefore, this study was carried out in order to explore the impacts of English as a Foreign Language (EFL) assessment on the demonstration of LA and the factors in EFL assessment that promote or hinder the demonstration of LA. 1.3. Research question and research objectives This thesis aims to investigate the following overarching research question: What are the factors in assessment that enable or constrain the demonstration of learner autonomy in learning English as a Foreign Language in the Vietnamese Higher Education context? In order to achieve this aim, the research addresses the following objectives: • Explore English language teachers' and students' understandings of the concept of LA • Examine English language teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA • Investigate the current EFL assessment practices in the VHE context 9 • Investigate students' demonstration of LA in learning English in the VHE context. 1.4. Significance of the study Although a large number of studies have been conducted on assessment and autonomy, most focus on the influences of (a) particular assessment technique(s) on promoting LA. There have been studies on self-assessment, peer-assessment and LA (e.g., Berry, 2009; Taras, 2010; Everhard, 2015b; Panadero, Jonsson, & Botella, 2017; Han & Fan, 2019); learning portfolios and LA (Kohonen, 2000; Little, 2004b, 2010; Duong, 2015; T. Q. Tran & Duong, 2018); and formative assessment and LA (Davison, 2011; Willis, 2011b). Everhard (2015a) points out that not much has been done to explore the relationship between assessment and LA in language learning, especially on how the one impacts the other. Therefore, the current research will contribute to the understanding of assessment-related factors that can support or hinder the demonstration of LA. This study is also significant because it presents an overarching view of the characterisation of both assessment and LA in practice in the VHE context. This then provides an empirical basis for policy makers and stakeholders in Vietnam to make appropriate interventions in the current assessment regime so that it can promote learning in general and LA in particular. 1.5. Key concepts in relation to learner autonomy This study distinguishes three concepts of LA, developed further in the literature review: autonomy capacity, autonomy offered, and autonomy demonstrated. Autonomy capacity is conceptualised as learners' ability to take control of their own learning 10 (Benson, 2011). This capacity is conceived as being innate, and can be inhibited or facilitated by different factors making up the learning environment. This capacity includes two components: 'ability' (knowledge and skills) and 'desire' (Benson, 2013). Autonomy offered is perceived as the level of freedom (e.g., the extent to which students are permitted to control their learning) or opportunities created for learners to exert control over their learning. Autonomy demonstrated is the extent to which students actually exercise their capacity to take control of their learning in different learning situations. Autonomy offered was categorised into three levels: prescribed, bounded and open. Prescribed refers to a situation where teachers decide all aspects of a task. Bounded refers to a situation where students decide some aspects of a task. Open refers to a situation where students decide all aspects of a task. Autonomy demonstrated was categorised into three levels: compliant, reactive, and proactive. Compliant describes students who closely followed the teacher's instruction. Reactive describes students who initiate some actions in order to follow an other-initiated learning agenda. Proactive describes students who initiate an agenda for their learning and actions in order to complete their self-determined goal. 1.6. Structure of the thesis This thesis is organised into eight chapters. This chapter outlines the background of the study, the research focus, research question, research objectives, the significance of the study, and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 describes the sociocultural and historical features of the research context. It provides brief geographical, historical and cultural information about Vietnam, the characterisation of its higher education and higher education reforms, and 11 the history of foreign language education in general and English teaching and learning in particular in Vietnam. Chapter 2 also provides information about the research site, its practice of English teaching and learning, and its practice of assessment of English. Chapter 3 presents an overview of sociocultural theories of learning that underpin this research, and discusses central concepts and their implications for conceptualising LA, assessment and the relationship between them. Fundamental issues relating to understanding and implementing LA in practice are also considered. Chapter 3 also discusses two forms of assessment-assessment of learning and assessment for learning-and their relationship with LA. Chapter 4 describes social constructivism and the relevance of its ontological and epistemological principles to the current research. The chapter then outlines the research design, which uses a qualitative case study approach, and data collection methods, which involve observations, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Participant selection, data analysis methods, measures to ensure research quality, and ethical considerations are also elucidated in this chapter. Chapter 5 reports the findings from interviews with three English language teachers and sixteen non-English major students about their understanding of LA and their perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA. This chapter also presents the students' self-report of their English learning outside of the class under the lens of 'autonomy demonstrated'. Chapter 6 presents the findings from observations of three English classes. It reports teachers' assessment practices and the students' responses to these practices in the light of 'autonomy offered' and 'autonomy demonstrated'. Chapter 7 discusses the findings from Chapters 5 and 6 in relation to the different research objectives and the overarching research question. 12 Chapter 8 draws together the conclusions, contributions, limitations, and recommendations of the study. 13 CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY Chapter overview This case study adopted a sociocultural perspective of learning to investigate the demonstration of LA in the context of assessment practices in EFL classes in VHE. Therefore, understanding the sociocultural and historical features of the research context where the practices of English teaching, learning and assessment are happening is crucial. This chapter provides information about Vietnam, its history and cultural values, VHE, and education reforms in Vietnam that offer implications for assessment and LA. It also describes the history of foreign language education in Vietnam in general, and English in particular. It then describes the research site in terms of its background information, the practices of English teaching and learning, and the practices of EFL assessment at the university. 2.1. Broader research context 2.1.1. Vietnam in brief Vietnam is located in South-eastern Asia and shares its land borders with China, Laos, and Cambodia. Vietnam has an area of 331,210 square kilometres, which makes it the fourth biggest country in this region in terms of area. According to data from the World Fact Book, in June 2018, the population of Vietnam reached approximately 97,040,334 people, making it the third most populous country in the region (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2019). Vietnam has 54 ethnic groups, among which the Kinh Group accounts for 85.7% of the population (CIA, 2019). Hanoi is the capital city, and the biggest city in the country. It is often considered the cultural, political, economic and educational centre of the country. The official language in Vietnam now is Vietnamese. 14 Brief history The history of Vietnam is characterised by a millennium of Chinese domination, which began in 111 BCE and ended in 938 CE with the victory of Bach Dang. During the next millennium, from 939-1859 CE, the country became independent and was ruled by different Vietnamese feudal dynasties, although it was at times invaded by the Chinese. The country was occupied and colonised by the French from 1858 until the August Revolution of 1945, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born. In 1946, the French reinvaded Vietnam and only withdrew their troops in 1954 when they were totally defeated at Dien Bien Phu. The next twenty years witnessed the North-South Vietnam war and the dividing of the country. In 1975, the war ended, resulting in the reunification of the North and the South and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. During the first decade after the reunification, Vietnam struggled with its centralised and subsidised mechanism of economic management in the context of war legacies and isolation, forcing the country to opt for an economic reform policy in 1986. Since 1986, Vietnam has been striving to achieve its goals through economic, political, social and educational reforms. Cultural values Vietnamese indigenous culture is heavily influenced by the Three Teachings of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2016a; Q. H. Vuong et al., 2018). Confucianism and Taoism were imported into Vietnam from China during the Chinese domination from 111 BCE to 938 CE, and Buddhism was imported into Vietnam from India under the Ly dynasty in the 11th century (London, 2011; MFA, 2016b, 2016a; Q. T. N. Nguyen, 2016). These Three Teachings were blended and adapted into Vietnamese indigenous cultures (Le, 2011; Q. H. Vuong et al., 2018), and served as the basis for the nation's governance, education, social order and moral rules (Q. T. N. Nguyen, 2016). However, among the Three Teachings, Confucianism has the 15 most significant influence on Vietnamese thoughts and culture (He et al., 2011; London, 2011; Q. T. N. Nguyen, 2016; Q. H. Vuong et al., 2018). Two legacies of Confucianism that have direct implications for the promotion and demonstration of LA in the VHE context are those of collectivism and respect for learning, teachers and knowledge (He et al., 2011). Collectivist values Vietnamese culture is a collectivist culture (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Trần, 2001; Le, 2011; N. T. Nguyen, 2016), in which the desires and needs of individuals are often considered less important than the demands and interests of groups (Wagner III, 1995), and people's actions, beliefs, and attitudes are regulated by the community they belong to (Hofstede, 1986). Collectivists prioritise well-being of the groups to which they belong, so they often respect harmony in the community and avoid confrontation among people (Hofstede, 1986; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2005). Collectivist values have significant impacts on teaching and learning in Vietnam. Collectivist students are interdependent and reliant on groups, so they are likely to be more comfortable working in groups or with peers than working individually (Wagner III, 1995; Nguyen, Terlouw, & Pilot, 2005). Therefore, in order to promote LA among students, cooperative and collaborative learning activities should be used to maximise students' engagement and participation. Additionally, teachers should pay attention to social or group autonomy rather than individual autonomy, by creating activities or situations for this collective autonomy to be manifested. As collectivist values promote the avoidance of conflicts and confrontations among members in the community, these values can prevent learners from displaying their initiative and expressing their opinions. For example, collectivist values can discourage students from providing feedback to their colleagues and carrying out peer- 16 assessment, out of a fear that such activities would create conflict with their colleagues (Pham & Gillies, 2010; Ho, 2015). As a result, collectivist values may serve to limit students' involvement in the assessment process. Additionally, due to the respect for harmony and the hierarchical orders in relationships between superiors and subordinates in a collectivist society, teachers are often considered as having authoritative power in transmitting knowledge and skills to students, making teacher-centred transmission the dominant model of teaching in Vietnamese classes (Le, 2011; Ho, 2015; Kaur & Noman, 2015). This model of teaching underestimates the active role of learners in the learning process, and hence discourages the promotion and demonstration of LA in learning (C. T. Nguyen, 2011) Face-saving is a prominent feature of collectivist culture, and is defined as \"the preserving of one's reputation, credibility, or dignity\" (Lexico dictionaries online, 2019). This value manifests in people's careful choices and thoughtful decisions about what to say to protect their image and avoid hurting others' feelings (Q. V. Tran, To, Nguyen, Lam, & Tran, 1996; Merkin, 2017). Face-saving facilitates learners' passiveness and discourages their initiative in learning (Marginson, 2011) because students might not want to risk their face by volunteering their ideas or risk others' face by criticising or offering conflicting opinions (Nguyen, Terlouw, & Pilot, 2006). In the classroom context, students might avoid questioning their teachers' knowledge or showing their disagreement with teachers' opinions. As a result, students may be overly compliant with teachers' instructions and fail to participate fully (He et al., 2011; Marginson, 2011). Respect for knowledge and teacher Vietnamese people have great respect for knowledge and teachers thanks to Confucianist legacy (Nguyen et al., 2006; He et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011; London, 17 2011). Vietnamese people believe in the strength of education and knowledge. They believe that knowledge can change people's lives, and that investment in education is the most beneficial investment. These beliefs are reflected in several Vietnamese proverbs, such as một kho vàng không bằng một nang chữ [gold is not as precious as knowledge] and người không học như ngọc không mài [people without education are like unpolished gemstones]. According to Ballard and Clanchy (1991), knowledge can be conceptualised along a continuum from conserving to extending-depending on the subject's attitudes towards, and beliefs about, knowledge, authority and teaching style. The conserving end is characterised by respect for written information and authoritative texts, and the recognition of teachers as knowledge transmitters. The extending end is characterised by the encouragement of self-inquiry for knowledge and criticising, extending, and generating knowledge. Due to Confucianist legacy, Vietnamese attitudes towards knowledge fall on the conserving end (To, 2010; Le, 2011), and students often opt for rote learning, focusing on \"repetition, recitation, and memorisation of factual information from the textbooks\" (He et al., 2011, p. 98). Within the Confucianist tradition, teachers are not only educationalists, but also role models of moral conducts (Wang, 2003; Shim, 2008). It is officially stated in the Vietnamese Education Law that teachers must study and improve themselves constantly, so as to set bright examples for learners (Education law 2005). Teachers are also considered as owners of knowledge and 'gurus' who are expected to \"satisfy learners in the search for knowledge and virtues\" (Nguyen et al., 2006, p. 74; Q. T. N. Nguyen, 2016). The importance of teachers is also reflected in Vietnamese proverbs, such as một chữ cũng là thầy, nửa chữ cũng là thầy [a person who teaches us anything, big or small, is our teacher] and không thầy đố mày làm nên [without teachers, we cannot grow up or be educated properly and successfully] (G. T. Vuong, 2018). Due to 18 the highly respected status of teachers, the teaching job is often considered the 'noblest among the nobles', and the teachers are often perceived as the 'centre' of the learning process. The respect for teachers may improve the teacher-student relationship, which is believed to be a crucial factor in the promotion of LA in the AfL context (Willis, 2011a). However, this value can make students believe that teachers own knowledge, and what teachers know is unquestionable (Q. T. N. Nguyen, 2016), hindering students' critical and independent thinking, their initiative in learning, and, in turn, their demonstration of LA. 2.1.2. Vietnamese higher education Higher education in Vietnam refers to \"academic education at junior college and universities which award diploma, bachelor, master and doctoral degrees\" (Đỗ & Đỗ, 2014, p. 46). In order to be admitted to a higher education institution in a collegiate or undergraduate program, students need to have the upper-higher secondary school graduation certificate and meet the admission requirements of that institution. Prior to 2015, students used to take the entrance exam to university and be selected on the basis of their scores (Đỗ & Đỗ, 2014). In 2015, the MOET put an end to the university entrance exam and merged it with the upper-secondary graduation exam to make one National Upper-Secondary Graduation Exam. Since then, the result from the National Upper-Secondary Graduation Exam has been used to determine admission to universities and colleges (World Education News and Reviews [WENR], 2017). The system of higher education institutions (HEIs) is categorised into public, private and foreign-owned institutions (Đỗ & Đỗ, 2014). Thanks to the Doi Moi policy and the reforms in education, Vietnamese tertiary education has expanded dramatically. The number of public institutions has increased from 103 to 170, and the number of private institutions grew from one to 65 between 1992 and 2017. The number of 19 students enrolled in HEIs also increased more than tenfold, from 162,000 students in the academic year of 1992-1993 to 1,707,025 students in the academic year of 2017-2018 (Hayden & Lam, 2010; MOET, 2018). Although the MOET is not the sole agency to take responsibility for the operation of HEIs, HEIs, excluding specialised institutions, universities and schools, are under the direct management of the MOET (Hayden & Lam, 2010; London, 2011). The MOET exerts control over many aspects of higher education. Its responsibilities include drafting education planning strategies for the country, proposing education laws and policies to the National Assembly for approval, administering the national UpperSecondary Graduation Exam, controlling the national curriculum frameworks, approving curricular frameworks for all tertiary programs, supervising and managing quality assurance, and accreditation (Hayden & Lam, 2010; London, 2011; Đỗ & Đỗ, 2014; WENR, 2017). VHE is still undergoing a reform process. The Vietnamese government is attempting to decentralise management and grant more autonomy to HEIs. HEIs can now enjoy more autonomy in terms of \"training, scientific research, organization, personnel, finance and international cooperation\" (VNA, 2012, p. 14). For example, they can now determine their curricula and admission quotas (VNA, 2012). Despite some changes and achievements, the management system of higher education in Vietnam is still characterised as 'top-down hierarchical management' (WENR, 2017). Reforms in higher education and implications for assessment practices and learner autonomy The implementation of the economic reform policy in 1986 entailed reforms in education (Harman, Hayden, & Nghi, 2010; London, 2011; Pham, 2011). Since the first reforms in education, initiated in the Seventh Congress Meeting in 1991, the government has introduced many regulations and policies to improve its education system (Bui, 2018). These regulations and policies have direct implications for 20 assessment practices and LA at tertiary level, and include the Higher Education Reform Agenda (2005); Education Law (2005); National Language Project 2020 (2008); Regulation No. 43 (2008); Higher Education Law (2012); Vietnamese Education Development Strategies for the period 2011-2020 (2012); and the Vietnamese Communist Party's Resolution No 29-NQ/TW on education reforms. The first thing to note is that the term learner autonomy is not explicitly used in education policy documents in Vietnam. Instead, it is implicitly embedded in various phrases and terms such as \"self-study\", \"self-consciousness\", \"critical thinking\", \"independent learners\", \"critical thinking\", and \"learner initiative\", which appear to describe different elements and indicators of learner autonomy as discussed in the literature (Phan, 2015; Phan & Hamid, 2017). LA has been officially declared an objective and a requirement of higher education in Vietnam since 2005, in the Vietnamese Education Law (amended and passed in 2005) and the Higher Education Reform Agenda (HERA) for the period 20062020 (Vietnamese Government, 2005; Vietnamese National Assembly, 2005). It is stated in the Vietnamese Education Law that one of the objectives of higher education is to train students so that they have capacity to work independently and creatively (có khả năng làm việc độc lập, sáng tạo). Within the Law, higher education methods were required to promote students' self-consciousness in study, self-study and selfresearching ability, and creative thinking (ý thức tự giác trong học tập, năng lực tự học, tự nghiên cứu cứu, phát triển tư duy sáng tạo\" (VNA, 2005). Promoting learner initiative (tính chủ động của người học) was also endorsed as one of the tasks in the innovation of training methods in the Higher Education Reform Agenda, which aimed to substantially and comprehensively reform tertiary education in Vietnam (VG, 2005). 21 The credit-based system put into effect in 2008 (MOET, 2008) also encourages LA. In this system, students are required to take more initiative in their learning. They have to be responsible for making decisions about their own learning in conjunction with their learning conditions and capability. For example, they must manage their time and choose the courses and lecturers that are suitable for their personal preferences, plans, learning styles and methods. All these requirements trigger students' ability to take control of their learning management, described by Benson as \"behaviours involved in the planning, organization and evaluation of learning\" (2011, p. 92). Additionally, this system officially includes self-study (tự học) as a compulsory component of the curriculum. The system requires students to spend twice as much time on self-study (giờ chuẩn bị cá nhân) as on learning inside of the class or working in the laboratory in order tolearn effectively or master a piece of knowledge (VG, 2008). The objective and requirement of developing LA in VHE was then reinforced in three education policy documents issued during 2012 – 2013: the Vietnamese Higher Education Law, Decision No. 711 regarding the Strategic Plan for Vietnamese education development in the period of 2011 – 2020, and the Vietnamese Communist Party's Resolution No 29-NQ/TW on education reforms. For example, the Vietnamese Higher Education Law reiterated that the objective of tertiary education is to train students to work independently and creatively (có khả năng làm việc độc lập, sáng tạo) (VNA, 2012). Additionally, the Strategic Plan 2012 stressed the need to renovate teaching approaches and assessment methods in order to promote students' proactivity, self-consciousness, initiative, creativity, and self-study ability (tích cực, tự giác, chủ động, sáng tạo và năng lực tự học của người học) (VG, 2012). The Communist Party's Resolution also affirmed that teaching and learning methods have to be improved substantially to foster learners' proactivity, initiative, and creativity (tính tích cực, chủ 22 động, sáng tạo), and the one-way transmission teaching approach and rote learning need to be gradually diminished in favour of an approach that encourages self-study (tự học) (VCP, 2013). In 2008, the Vietnamese Government approved the National Foreign Language Project to comprehensively reform the teaching and learning of foreign languages in the education system of the nation (đổi mới toàn diện việc dạy và học ngoại ngữ trong hệ thống giáo dục quốc dân) (VG, 2008). This project emphasised the need to create favourable conditions for autonomous language learning, and to reform current English teaching towards student-centredness. This entails moving from language teaching as the conveying of knowledge to learning as active construction of knowledge, meaning that autonomy is one of the goals in language teaching (Benson & Voller, 1997). Reforms in assessment have also been emphasised in many policy documents. The implementation of a credit-based system since 2008, for example, indicates a profound change in assessment methods at tertiary education level. In the credit-based system, assessment has become more flexible than in the traditional yearly-based system, because teachers are granted more autonomy regarding assessment practices (MOET, 2008). They can decide on the criteria and format for ongoing assessment, and use formative assessment for summative purposes (i.e., grading students). In this creditbased system, the students' attendance, homework, class participation and engagement are counted in the final grade, encouraging them to take control of their learning and make an ongoing effort if they want to achieve a good result in a subject. Also, the Vietnamese Communist Party's Resolution No 29-NQ/TW on fundamental and comprehensive education and training reform emphasises that assessment practices have to be reformed because assessment and testing methods have been recognised as outdated and inauthentic. It is stated that assessment methods should be flexible and 23 various. The assessment of students' learning should not be tied to only one final end-of term test, but be based on \"spoken assessment, written assessment, essays, assignments or all these assessment methods\" (VCP, 2013, p. 6). The Resolution proposes a movement away from summative assessment towards more formative methods of assessment in order to develop students' initiative, awareness, creativity, self-study and sustainability (VCP, 2013). The National Foreign Language Project emphasises innovation in the assessment of English competency. For example, one of the principal aims of the project is to build up a framework for consistent assessment of English competency across the national education system (VG, 2008). This framework is similar to the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), which classifies English competency into six levels and determines each level with \"can-do\" descriptors for all language skills: listening, speaking, reading and writing. These \"can-do\" descriptors are intended to help English learners to self-assess their competency and keep track of their English level, signifying that formative assessment has become a concern of the project. 2.1.3. History of foreign language education in Vietnam Throughout its history, Vietnam has witnessed the emergence, development, ascendance and also decline of many foreign languages in the country. Among the most prominent and significant of these are Chinese, French, Russian and English (Do, 1999; Phạm, 2014). Vietnamese foreign language policy is therefore closely associated with the socio-political history of the country. The changes in foreign language education mirrored the socio-economic and political changes within the country and its strategic relations with other countries (Denham, 1992; Do, 1999; Phạm, 2014; Phan & Hamid, 2017; Lam & Albright, 2018). 24 The history of foreign languages in Vietnam can be dated back to 111 BCE, which marks the start of the country's millennium of Chinese domination and the ascendency of the Chinese in Vietnam. During the Chinese occupation from 111 BCE to 938 CE, Chinese language became the official language in Vietnam (Nguyễn, 2006). In 938, Ngo Quyen defeated the Tong invaders in the battle of Bach Dang River and proclaimed the independence of the country from China. Although Vietnam was then ruled by different Vietnamese dynasties, Chinese remained the official language in Vietnamese education, examinations and administration until the thirteenth century (Nguyễn, 2006; Phạm, 2014). The thirteenth century marked a milestone in the development of language in Vietnam with the introduction of Nom-a Vietnamese version of Chinese calligraphy (London, 2011). Nom and Chinese were concurrently used in Vietnam during that time. However, the former was mainly used for Vietnamese culture, while the latter appeared to be the language of the government and law (Lam & Albright, 2018). The development of Nom signified the desire for political and cultural independence from China and for the consolidation of a national Vietnamese identity (Lam & Albright, 2018). Another milestone in the development of language in Vietnam was marked in the seventeenth century by the invention of Quoc Ngu-\"a simple Romanised Vietnamese script\" (Wright, 2002, cited in Phan et al., 2014; Lam & Albright, 2018). The development of Quoc Ngu was often accredited to Alexandre de Rhodes-a French missionary who came to Vietnam to promote Christianity (Do, 2006). In 1858, the French invaded and colonised Vietnam. There were then two dominant foreign languages in Vietnam: Chinese and French (Lam & Albright, 2018). When the French came, they banned Chinese calligraphy and replaced it with French or Quoc Ngu (Denham, 1992). However, the French did not intend to promote Quoc Ngu 25 as they only allowed it to be taught in the first grade of school (Denham, 1992; Nguyễn, 2006; Phạm, 2014). Instead, they made French the official language in education and administration (Do, 2006; Nguyễn, 2006). In 1945, Vietnam gained independence from France. The newly-established government made Quoc Ngu the national language of the country and the official language of instructions at all school levels (Do, 2006; Nguyễn, 2006). French became the second language during this short period, and it soon gained official status when the French returned to invade Vietnam again in 1946 (Phạm, 2014). The Dien Bien Phu victory in 1954 officially put an end to both the colonialism of France and the status of French as Vietnam's official language (Do, 2006; Phạm, 2014; Phan et al., 2014). After 1954, there were four major foreign languages in Vietnam: Chinese, French, Russian and English. Each foreign language enjoyed its ups and downs, depending greatly on the diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the countries where these languages are spoken. From 1954 to 1975, Vietnam was partitioned into two parts: North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The North, which followed a communist model, received a great deal of assistance from the Soviet Union and China. The South adopted a capitalist regime, and therefore received assistance from America and its allies (Denham, 1992). The separation of the country, which led North and South Vietnam in different political and diplomatic directions, had a huge impact on foreign language education in each part of the country. In the North, Russian and Chinese became the dominant foreign languages in education, while in the South, English and French dominated as foreign languages (Denham, 1992; Do, 2006; Phạm, 2014; Phan et al., 2014). After reunification in 1975, Vietnam became a communist country. The period from 1975 to 1986 saw the dominance of Russian as a foreign language in the education 26 system nationwide. This reflected the demand of the country to build up and strengthen diplomatic relations with countries in the communist bloc, especially the Soviet Union (Denham, 1992). The period witnessed the decline of English and French in the education system, because these two languages were often considered to be 'languages of the enemy' (Phan, 2008; Phạm, 2014). Chinese later joined this 'enemy list' and shrank sharply after the 1979 Northern Border War with Vietnam (Phạm, 2014). After two decades of struggling with its centralised and subsidised model of economic development under the embargo of America and its allies, the Vietnamese Communist Party decided to implement the Doi Moi (Economic Renovation) policy following the Sixth National Congress in 1986. This policy gave rise to significant changes in foreign language education in Vietnam (Denham, 1992; Do, 2006; Nguyễn, 2006; Phạm, 2014; Phan et al., 2014). The Doi Moi, or open-door policy, emphasised the expansion of diplomatic relations with the world regardless of political differences, and the adoption of a marketoriented economy (Do, 2006). This policy \"triggered the boom in English as the most important foreign language in Vietnam\" (Phạm, 2014, p. 174). The post-Doi Moi period saw the rise of a variety of foreign languages in Vietnam thanks to the influx of foreign investment in Vietnam, the return of the Chinese and French languages, and the dramatic decline of Russian in Vietnam, especially after 1989 when the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc collapsed (Do, 2006; Phạm, 2014). Foreign language education, therefore, is now more diverse than ever before. However, the ascendency of English has so far continued, and English is the main foreign language taught in higher education institutions. 27 2.2. Research site 2.2.1. Brief information about the researched university As a matter of confidentiality, the researched university is coded 'RU'. RU is a public university founded in 1959. It is under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the MOET. RU used to be a technical university which specialised in training engineers in water resources and hydropower. However, in order to meet society's increasing needs for human resources, the university has become multi-disciplinary. It is currently training students in several majors, including water resources, hydropower, mechanics, transportation, construction, water supply and sewerage, information technology, information systems, software engineering, natural resources, environment, disaster management, economics and climate change, from undergraduate to doctoral level. RU is now conducting twentyfive undergraduate programs, twenty master's programs and eleven doctoral programs. The total number of students at the university is approximately 15,000. RU has four different campuses, which cover an area of 80 hectares. The main campus is located in Hanoi. Other campuses are in Ho Chi Minh City, Ninh Thuan province and Hung Yen province. There were about 1,142 researchers, lecturers and staff working at RU at the time of this study. 2.2.2. English teaching and learning at the researched university There have been a number of changes in the English curriculum for students at RU since 2011. The time allocated for English used to be ten credits1, which accounted for approximately 8.3% of the total 120 credits required for a four-year undergraduate program. These ten credits were allocated to three modules of English. English modules 1 and 2 were worth four credits each and were intended to help students at RU acquire 1 each credit equals 12.5 hours 28 basic grammar items, vocabulary on various topics, and basic English communication skills. The textbook used for both English module 1 and 2 was New Headway preintermediate (Soars & Soars, 2007) with English module 1 covering the first six units in the book and English module 2 covering the remaining six units. English module 3 was granted two credits and focused on 'English for Water Resources', which was expected to help students of varied disciplines in the university to have basic vocabulary in their professions and equip them with comprehension and translation skills for reading in their field. The English department adopted 'self-design' materials for this module (see table 2.1). Table 2.1 The general curriculum for English at RU before 2011 No Name Number of credits Textbook/materials 1 English module 1 (TA1) 4 Unit 1-6 New Headway pre-intermediate 2 English module 2 (TA2) 4 Unit 7-12 New Headway pre-intermediate 3 English module 3 (TA3) 2 Self-designed materials by the department In 2011, the English department made alterations to its English curriculum because English module 3 proved to be ineffective, putting too much pressure on students who found it too difficult. In the 'altered' curriculum, 'English for Water Resources' was removed from the curriculum and replaced by a new English module 3. English modules 1 and 2 were then modified to cover five units each (one unit fewer) to save the last two units for the new English module 3 (see table 2.2). 29 Table 2.2 The 'altered' curriculum for English at RU in 2011 No Name Number of credits Textbook/materials 1 English module 1 (TA1) 4 Unit 15 New Headway pre-intermediate 2 English module 2 (TA2) 4 Unit 6 – 10 New Headway preintermediate 3 English module 3 (TA3) 2 Unit 11 – 12 New Headway preintermediate However, the 'altered' curriculum for English was not in use for long. In 2012, the university management decided to cut down the credits for English from 10 to 8. In addition, the National Foreign Language Project 2020, which put emphasis on foreign language (mostly English), teaching and learning in all education levels from primary to tertiary level, requested universities to set explicit standards for English competency for their undergraduates. It also required them to develop detailed pathways and curricula that could assist students in reaching the set standard. RU was no exception. Therefore, in response to these emerging requirements, the English department developed a new curriculum for English in 2012. This curriculum was designed to adjust to the decrease in credits allocated for English that the university proposed and the requirement for English competency for undergraduates proposed by 'The 2020 Project' of the Ministry of Education and Training. It was stated in the proposed curriculum that English would be taught and assessed in reference to 'Khung Nang Luc Ngoai Ngu Viet Nam' (KNLNNVN) (the Vietnam Framework of Reference for English)-an adapted version of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), which comprises six levels from A1 to C2. The requirement for English competency for RU undergraduates is A2. The new curriculum for English still consisted of three English modules. Two credits were granted for English module 1, and three credits each were granted to 30 English modules 2 and 3. English module 1 was expected to help students revise all basic grammar items needed for the A2 level, so Grammar Spectrum 1 (Paterson, 1995) was chosen as the textbook for this module. The English department thought the content knowledge covered in this book was sufficient for a 2-credit module. It was hoped that English modules 2 and 3 would equip students with language knowledge and skills so that they could, depending on their English level, either proceed straight away with the A2 competency test or take some extra courses to reach the required level. Objective KET (Capel & Sharp, 2009) was selected as the textbook used for English module 2 and 3 because this book was designed for preparation for the A2 test. The department considered the choice of this textbook as 'a stone that kills two birds', as they thought that the textbook would serve as a normal textbook with a focus on language elements (grammar, vocabulary and pronunciation) and language skills (listening, speaking, reading and writing), besides functioning as a guide specifically for the A2 test. The curriculum for English at RU in 2012 is summarised in table 2.3. Table 2.3 New curriculum for English at RU in 2012 Number Name Number of credits Textbook/materials 1 English module 1 (TA1) 2 Grammar Spectrum 1 2 English module 2 (TA2) 3 Objective KET unit 110 3 English module 3 (TA3) 3 Objective KET unit 11 20 Apart from the compulsory curriculum for English, the department also developed an optional curriculum to be used at the English centre of the university in order to help students reach the required standard for English before graduation. After learning three English modules, those who had not achieved an A2 level of English could choose to take one or more courses at the English centre. The English curriculum for the centre could be considered as the continuation of the compulsory English curriculum at the University, although students did not receive credits for attending 31 these classes. The curriculum for optional English at the English centre is presented in table 2.4. Table 2.4 Curriculum for English at the English centre No Name Courses Length of the course Time schedules Duration 1 A2\n\nA2 preparation – stage 1 A2 Advanced Skills Training 60 hours Twice a week two hours each class 30 classes = 3.5 months Twice a week 3 hour each class 20 classes = 2.5 months 2 A2\n\nA 2 – preparation – stage 2 A2 Test Techniques Training 60 hours Twice a week 2 hours each class 30 classes = 3.5 months Twice a week 3 hours each class 20 classes = 2.5 months 3 A2 1+2 A2 Intensive Course 120 hours 4 times a week 2 hours each class 60 classes = 3,5 months The decrease in the number of credits granted for English at the university and the requirement for a standard English competency for undergraduates proposed by the Ministry of Education and Training have, to some extent, forced students to take on more personal responsibility for their learning of English. It has become necessary for students to manage their own English learning both inside and outside the classroom so that they are able to achieve the required level of English competency. Textbook used The textbook used for English module 1 is Grammar Spectrum 1 (Paterson, 1995). This book reviews English grammar rules and sentence structure. The textbook used for English modules 2 and 3 is Objective KET (Capel & Sharp, 2009). In English module 2, students learn from unit 1 to unit 10, and in English module 3, students learn from unit 11 to unit 20. Objective KET is a textbook which explicitly prepares students for the A2 test, so it is very exam-oriented in its name and original purposes. Each unit is designed 32 to focus on one topic, such that the whole book covers 20 different topics. There are four focuses in each unit. The first focus is on exam skills, which equips students with step by step techniques and tips for doing the test, and provides some exam-like exercises for students to practise. The second focus is on 'Grammar', which reviews the grammar rules and structures that students of A2 English competency are supposed to be able to use. The third focus is on 'Vocabulary', in which students will revise the key vocabulary on the 20 topics provided. The last focus of Objective KET is on 'Pronunciation and Spelling', which is for strengthening students' listening and speaking skills. The practice of English teaching and learning at RU Similar to students in any other university in Vietnam, students at RU learn English as a compulsory subject in their undergraduate program. However, the English curriculum is not necessarily the same. At RU, students have to learn three modules of English. English modules 1 and 2 are supposed to be learnt in semester one and two of their first year, and English module 3 is supposed to be learnt in semester one of their second year. The plan and time schedules for compulsory English teaching and learning at RU are determined by the Department of Academic Affairs at the beginning of each academic year and can vary each year. Before 2012, students had four credits2 each for English modules 1 and 2, and two credits for English module 3. Therefore, they used to have two 100-minute classes a week for English module 1 and 2 for fifteen weeks, and one class of 150 minutes a week for English module 3 for ten weeks. Since 2012, due to the changes in the English curriculum, students have had only two credits for English module 1, and 3 credits each for English module 2 and 3. The time schedules for 2 One credit equals 12.5 hours 33 English have thus been changed accordingly. In English module 1, students have had either one class of 150 minutes a week for fifteen weeks or two 100-minute classes for seven and a half weeks. In English modules 2 and 3, students have had either one class of 150 minutes for fifteen weeks or two 150-minute classes for seven and a half weeks. Before 2012, there were around forty students in one English class. There were no classrooms specifically for English learning. Students learned English in the same classrooms as those used for other subjects, with fixed arrangements of tables and chairs, a blackboard, a projector, a computer and speakers. Since 2012, there have been fewer students in one English class-from 25 to 35 students-and classrooms have been designated exclusively to English learning. However, there is nothing special about these classrooms except for the fact that they are much smaller than other classrooms at RU, and there is no technological equipment: no computer, no projector or speaker. Teachers who use these classrooms have to bring a CD player or their own laptop (if they have one) and speakers. There are currently 22 teachers in the English department, all of whom are wellqualified. However, only nineteen teachers are currently teaching at RU, as three are doing their PhD overseas. All teachers have achieved a GPA of at least 7.5 in their English majors from prestigious public universities in Vietnam. All of them have an IELTS score of at least 7.0. Eighteen out of twenty-two teachers have a master's degree, and two are taking master's courses. However, since they started working at the University, they have not had many opportunities for professional development, such as workshops, conferences or training sections on English teaching, learning and assessment. To support English learning among students, the university and the department organise competitions such as 'English Olympics' and English speaking contests to 34 encourage and motivate students to learn and speak English. There is also an English club organised by the Student Association at the University. This club is free for all students and it organises meetings monthly. Apart from formal compulsory English learning in the class, students are encouraged to take extra courses at the English centre at the University or elsewhere so that they can at least achieve the A2 level of English required for their graduation. 2.2.3. A2 level of English competency and A2 test A2 level of English competency A2 is the second level of English competence among the six levels specified in the CEFR. In the CEFR, A2 belongs to the \"basic user\" category. A2 language users are defined in the CEFR as those who Can understand sentences and frequently use expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g., very basic personal and family information, shopping, local geography, employment). Can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters. Can describe in simple terms aspects of [their] background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need. (Little, 2006, p. 168) For each language skill, a \"can do\" descriptor was developed in the form of a self-assessment grid, so that language instructors and learners could determine the level of their learners or themselves respectively. For more information about the CEFR A2 assessment grid, see appendix H. Khung Nang Luc Ngoai Ngu Viet Nam (Vietnam Framework of Reference for English) Khung Nang Luc Ngoai Ngu Viet Nam (KNLNNVN) was developed based mainly on the CEFR, with local conditions for teaching, learning and using the English language 35 taken into account. The framework comprises three main categories-Elementary, Intermediate and Advanced-which are subdivided into six levels equivalent to the six levels of the CEFR. KNLNNVN uses the same illustrative descriptors for each language skill which are used in the CEFR, translated from English into Vietnamese. The difference between the CEFR and KNLNNVN is that KNLNNVN has descriptors for more specific situations in each skill. For example, apart from the general illustrative descriptors for listening, KNLNNVN also has descriptors for listening skills in situations including listening to announcements, instructions, and directions, listening to radio or TV programs (see appendix I for a sample of descriptors of the A2 level for listening in KNLNNVN). A2 test at RU The A2 test at RU, although it has the same name, has a number of differences from the CEFR A2 test (see table 2.5). Table 2.5 The CEFR and the RU A2 test format CEFR A2 test RU A2 test Paper 1 Reading Part 1: five matching sentences and notices Paper 1 Reading Part 1: five matching sentences and notices Part 2: five 3-option multiple choice questions Part 2: ten 4-option multiple choice questions Part 3: ten questions five 3-option multiple choice questions + five matching questions Part 3: five 4-option multiple choice questions Part 4: five 3-option multiple choice or Right/Wrong/Doesn't Say questions Part 4: five 4-option multiple choice cloze questions Part 5: eight 3-option multiple choice cloze questions Writing Part 1: five questions on identifying and spelling individual words Writing Part 1: five sentence transformation questions 36 Part 2: ten open cloze questions Part 2: write a short note/email/postcard of 35-40 words Part 3: read two input texts and complete gaps in the output text Part 4: write a short note/email/postcard of 25-30 words Paper 2 Listening Part 1: five 3-option multiple choice questions – choose the visual that best answer the question Paper 2 Listening Part 1: five 3-option multiple choice questions – choose the visual that best answers the question Part 2: five matching questions listen to a dialogue for key information and match five items Part 2: ten gap-fill questions dictation Part 3: five 3-option multiple choice questions Part 4: five gap-fill questions – listen to dialogue Part 5: five gap-fill questions – listen to monologue Paper 3 Speaking Part 1: interaction between the interlocutor and the candidate Paper 3 Speaking Part 1: interaction between the interlocutor and the candidate Part 2: candidatecandidate interaction Part 2: talk about a topic for 3-4 minutes 37 2.2.4. Assessment policies and assessment framework and practices at the researched university University's overall assessment policies for English The university has adopted a credit-based system since 2013 in response to decision No. 43 of the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET, 2008) regarding the application of a credit-based system in higher education in Vietnam. In this system, the course grade is determined based on the assessment of different elements in the course, including ongoing assessment during the course, assessment of participation and learning attitude, attendance, mid-term test, assignment and end-of term exam. The endof-term exam should weigh no less than 50 percent of the total course grade. It is explicitly stated in the decision that the format and weight of element assessment as well as the formula for calculating the course grade are proposed by the lecturers and approved by the rector, and will be specified in the detailed syllabus of the course. Department's assessment frameworks, format and guidelines Before 2011 Table 2.6 Assessment framework for English module 1 Course grade Course mark Class attendance + class participation + homework 30% 30% 2 mid-term tests 70% Final exam 70% Table 2.7 Assessment framework for English module 2 Course grade Course mark Class attendance + class participation + homework 30% 30% 2 mid-term tests 70% Final exam 70% 38 Table 2.8 Assessment framework for altered English module 3 (after 2011) Course grade Course mark (ongoing assessment) Class attendance + class participation + homework 50% 30% Mid-term speaking test 50% Final exam 70% After 2012 Table 2.9 Assessment framework for English module 1: Course grade Course mark (ongoing assessment Class participation + class attendance + homework 20 % End-ofterm exam 80% Table 2.10 Assessment framework for English module 2 Course grade Course mark (ongoing assessment) Attendance 33% 40% Participation Homework and lesson preparation Mid-term test Listening 33% Speaking 33% End-ofterm test Writing 60% Reading Table 2.11 Assessment framework for English module 3 Course grade Ongoing assessment Attendance 33% 40% Participation Homework and lesson preparation Mid-term test Listening 33% Speaking 33% End-ofterm test Writing 60% Reading Enclosed with the syllabus for every English module is a revision guide, test format and guidelines for the teacher. The revision guide contains important knowledge 39 that students are supposed to acquire by the end of the course. It focuses on grammar items, vocabulary, and language skills that students learn in different lessons in the course. The test format is the guide for teachers when designing and carrying out midterm tests and end-of-term tests for the module. General test guidelines are step-by-step instructions to ensure that all teachers design module tests of a similar level of difficulty and content knowledge. These guidelines will allow teachers to know exactly what will be tested in each question in the test, especially the questions on grammatical items which account for approximately 50% of the content in the test. Conduct of assessment of English at the university Before 2011, teachers were in charge of assessing students' participation, attendance and homework. Both mid-term and end-of-term tests were administrated by the Department of Education Testing and Quality Assurance. Teachers of English designed the tests, invigilated the exams and marked the tests. After 2011, the same mechanism was used except that in English module 3, a mid-term test was conducted within each class, and teachers teaching this class would be responsible for assessing their students' speaking skills. The topics for the mid-term speaking test were provided for students to prepare in advance and were the same for all classes. After 2012, the Department of Education Testing and Quality Assurance only administered the end-of-term test. Teachers would carry out mid-term tests and other forms of assessment in class, meaning they have more freedom in their assessment after 2012. Apart from assessment of different English modules, assessment of A2 language competency is also crucial at RU (the format of A2 test at RU is presented in table 2.5). This assessment is administered by both the Department of Academic Affairs and the Department of Education Testing and Quality Assurance. Students take reading and 40 listening tests, as well as multiple-choice questions for the writing test (on a computer). Their tests are marked automatically by the MCQ Marking software written by the Institute of Mathematics in Vietnam English teachers only interview students in the speaking test and mark their notes or postcard writing. Chapter summary This chapter has provided some brief information about Vietnam-its geography, history and culture- and its education- the characterisation of VHE, the reforms in education, and the history and development of the country's foreign language education. Information about the wider context of Vietnam and VNE indicates that, due to geographical and historical characteristics, the country is deeply influenced by Confucianism, which has strong influence on its education system. The Confucianist legacies appear to make Vietnamese students become passive and compliant, inhibiting their demonstration of LA in learning. Additionally, the country's Doi Moi policy brought about the reforms in education, which put a lot of emphasis on LA and innovation in assessment methods. Foreign language education policies in Vietnam appeared to correspond to changes in the country's history and politics. Historical changes have so far made English the dominant foreign language in Vietnam, significantly influencing the teaching and learning of this language. The chapter has also presented information about the RU, its practice of English teaching and learning, and its assessment of English. LA is not an objective in the curriculum for English at RU; the teaching and learning of English appear mainly to serve the purpose of assessment, i.e., a summative purpose concerned with certification. The choice of textbook for English, the policy for EFL assessment, and the 41 administration of different kinds of assessment at RU do not support the purpose of learning or promote the demonstration of LA. 42 CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW Chapter overview This chapter reviews current theories and practice of learner autonomy (LA) and assessment (in relation to LA) in second language learning in higher education. The first section introduces the theoretical framework for this study, presenting an overview of sociocultural theories of learning, as well as a discussion of the central concepts and their implications for conceptualising LA, assessment and their relationship in this study. The second section deals with fundamental issues relating to understanding and implementing LA in practice, including definitions, versions, levels, and perceptions of the concept. The third section presents two forms of assessment-Assessment of Learning (AoL) and Assessment for Learning (AfL), and their relationship with LA, with the focus on AfL strategies and their applications for LA. 3.1. Theoretical framework 3.1.1. Sociocultural theories in brief Sociocultural perspectives originate in cultural-historical theory, which was developed and systemised by the Russian psychologist Vygotsky and his colleagues during the 1920s and 1930s (Lantolf & Thorne, 2007). These perspectives were further developed in a series of seminal papers, including those by John-Steiner and Mahn (1996, 2013), Lantolf (2000b, 2000c, 2000a, 2003, 2006, 2009), Lantolf and Pavlenko (2001), Lantolf and Poehner (2011), Lantolf and Thorne (2007), Lave (1991), Lave and Wenger (1991), Rogoff (1990, 1995, 2003), Wenger (1999, 2000), Wertsch (1991), and Wertsch, Rio, and Alvarez (1995). Sociocultural theory is underpinned by a constructivist paradigm 43 which holds that knowledge is construed through social interaction (Wang, Bruce, & Hughes, 2011); in other words, social interaction is the foundation for learning. Sociocultural theory emphasises the dialectical relationship between human learning and development and the social context in which these two aspects are embedded and take place (Vygotsky, 1978; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wertsch, 1991; Rogoff, 1995). The central tenet of Vygotsky's theory is that human cognitive development is a socially mediated process in which language use, organisation and structure are the primary mediators (Lantolf, 2000a; Gibbons, 2003; Lantolf, 2006; Walqui, 2006; Lantolf, 2007; Turuk, 2008; Feryok, 2013; Marginson & Dang, 2017; Eun, 2019). Vygotsky argues that learning is an interactive process between the learner and other people and artefacts in the social world, and cognitive development is the appropriation and internalisation process of these interactions (Vygotsky, 1978). Sociocultural perspectives do not neglect the significance of human biological inheritance in cognitive development. Instead, they argue for the mediation of both the human brain and socially constructed artefacts in the human psychological process (Wells, 2000; Lantolf, 2006; Lantolf & Thorne, 2007; Marginson & Dang, 2017). Mediation can be perceived as the link between action and sociocultural contexts (Kalaja, Barcelos, Aro, & RuohotieLyhty, 2016). Mediation emphasises the agency of the learner within the learning process because mediation involves the tension between means provided by the sociocultural setting and the unique use of these means by individuals in particular situations (Kalaja et al., 2016). From a sociocultural perspective, learners are active constructors of their knowledge, so the role of mediators such as teachers and peers is to assist learners to develop necessary skills and abilities, and eventually help them to become self-directed learners (Kao, 2010). This viewpoint suggests that autonomy is a 44 learner attribute, and helping the learner to become autonomous is an ultimate goal for learning. Another important principle in sociocultural theory is the notion of situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991). From a sociocultural perspective, human mental functioning is embedded in social activities in which individuals interact with other people, objects, and events. Therefore, human learning and development are attached to the social, cultural and historical contexts in which they occur, and sociocultural factors making up a learning context can, in return, facilitate or inhibit human learning and development (Wenger & Lave, 1991; Jaramillo, 1996; Lantolf, 2000a; Wells, 2000). This perspective suggests that individual learning and cognitive development need to and can be understood by investigating the sociocultural contexts in which they occur (Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992; Rogoff, 2003). 3.1.2. Sociocultural theories and implications for the current study 3.1.2.1 Social interaction, learning and development According to Vygotsky, learning happens though social interaction, and learning precedes the development of knowledge, skills, and ability. Vygotsky's argument lies in his statement that \"every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first between people (interpsychological) and then inside the child (intrapsychological)\" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 48). The idea of two planes in the development of mental functioning, with an emphasis on social interaction as the root of cognitive development, has profound implications for this study. First, LA, like other mental processes, also develops from the social plane to the individual plane (Feryok, 2013). Therefore, the development and manifestation of LA depend not only on individual characteristics but also largely on the factors that characterise the specific context that an individual is embedded in and 45 interacts with. For this reason, sociocultural factors need to be investigated carefully in order to recognise the factors which both enable and constrain LA in a specific context. Secondly, because LA incorporates both individual and social dimensions (Ohara, 2013; O'Leary, 2014; Palfreyman, 2018), dependence and independence are both crucial to the concept (Hunter & Cooke, 2007; Van Lier, 2010). In other words, students may need to be dependent before they can be independent. This argument has two significant applications for understanding LA for this study: first, there are degrees of autonomy (e.g., Nunan, 1997; Sinclair, 2000); second, dependence or compliance should also be considered in any scale of autonomy demonstration (Van Lier, 2010). By autonomy demonstration, the researcher means the actual behaviours, performance, or actions of a learner that provide an indication of the capacity to take control of his or her learning. 3.1.2.2 Internalisation and learner agency In sociocultural theory, learning and development are bridged by the process of internalisation (Vygotsky, 1978) or appropriation (Rogoff, 1990, 1995). Internalisation is \"the process through which cultural artefacts, such as language, take on a psychological function\" (Lantolf & Thorne, 2007, p. 203). It is a transformative process (Vygotsky, 1978; Kozulin, 2018) because it involves \"goal-directed cognitive activity that can result in transformations of the original model\" (Lantolf & Thorne, 2007, p. 203). In other words, learners do not simply copy an event or a task, but actively construct, appropriate and transform it into their own knowledge system. The transformative quality of internalisation recognises learners as active constructors of knowledge in the process of learning (John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996; Ahn, 2016) and emphasises the crucial role of learner agency in this process (Rogoff, 1990; Wertsch, Tulviste, & Hagstrom, 1993; Rogoff, 1995; Van Lier, 1996). Viewing learners as active constructors of knowledge in the learning process results in a change of the teachers' 46 and learners' roles. Teachers are no longer the sole knowledge holders and assessment authorities in the class. Instead, they are now the creators of learning activities and an environment favourable to the students' learning and are facilitators or counsellors to help students become the owners of their learning. In a similar vein, students are no longer the receivers of knowledge or reliant on teachers for assessment. They can actively take part in this process and control their own learning by undertaking self/peer-assessment activities (Gipps, 2002). In language education, learner agency is widely defined as \"a socially-mediated capacity to act\" (Ahearn, 2001, p. 112). The concept of learner agency is significant in research about LA from a sociocultural perspective. In sociocultural theories, LA does not appear to be the central concept (Ohara, 2013). Instead, scholars in sociocultural theory often use the concept of learner agency to denote an attribute which is closely related to the concept of LA (Wertsch et al., 1993; Benson, 2007; Van Lier, 2008). However, there is a divergence in scholars' perceptions of these two concepts. Some scholars treat LA and learner agency as two distinctive concepts (Huang, 2009; Huang & Benson, 2013), while others perceive these two concepts as being the same (Toohey & Norton, 2003; Toohey, 2007; Ohara, 2013). Some perceive LA as including and resulting in learner agency; that is, they argue that LA is a systematic capacity, while learner agency involves actual actions that indicate LA (Hughes, 2003; Huang, 2009; Huang & Benson, 2013). Others conceive learner agency as a bigger concept and LA as one of the manifestations of learner agency (Van Lier, 2008, 2010). However, there is consensus about these two concepts in that both imply that learners need to have choice and control (Hughes, 2003; Duff, 2013; Huang & Benson, 2013). In this study, the researcher supports Huang and Benson (2013)'s argument that learner autonomy is the systematic capacity of a learner to take control of his or her learning, while learner 47 agency denotes observable attempts or actions of a learner who takes control of his or her learning. Taking this view as a starting point, the researcher argues that learner agency is actually the demonstration of learner autonomy in a particular learning situation within a particular context. In this study, the researcher will use the term demonstration of LA instead of learner agency to refer to actual observable behaviours, performances or actions that indicate the capacity of a learner to take control of his/her learning. The conceptualisation of learner agency as the demonstration of LA offers some insightful implications for the current study. Firstly, this conceptualisation allows the researcher to view LA as the relationship between an individual learner and their environment, and the demonstration of LA as the emergent product of the interaction between the learner and the contextual environment (e.g., teacher, peers, and sociocultural factors that define that context). This is because agency is often perceived in the literature as the relationship between individuals and the contextual environment (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Hughes, 2003; Hunter & Cooke, 2007; Toohey, 2007; Van Lier, 2008; Ahn, 2016; Kalaja et al., 2016; Muramatsu, 2018). For example, Lantolf and Pavlenko (2001, p. 148) state that \"agency is never a 'property' of a particular individual; rather, it is a relationship that is constantly co-constructed and renegotiated with those around the individual and with the society at large\". This view supports the argument for the degrees of LA and supports the proposal for stages in the construction of the relationship between a learner and the community of practice, which develops from peripheral to full participation, and from dependence to independence (Wenger & Lave, 1991; Willis, 2009). Additionally, this view allows the researcher to investigate learning environments which might support or suppress LA and its demonstration, and the interaction between the learner and that environment. In this study, the learning 48 environment is the assessment context and factors relating to that context that might contribute to the demonstration of LA. Secondly, equating learner agency with the demonstration of LA allows the researcher to look at LA with a focus on actual performance or actions-the aspect on which the concept of learner agency places greater focus (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Toohey, 2007; Van Lier, 2008; Huang & Benson, 2013). (Huang, 2011, p. 242) states that \"as the 'raw material' for autonomy, agency is more concrete, specific and observable\". Therefore, it is more related to concepts such as \"autonomous episodes\" (Dickinson, 1996, p. 52) or \"seeds of learner autonomy\" (Allwright, 1988, p. 39), which both refer to concrete behaviours or performance in a particular situation (Allwright, 1988; Dickinson, 1996). Thirdly, the equation of learner agency with the demonstration of LA supports the argument mentioned earlier that dependency is crucial in the 'autonomisation' (Little, 2003b, p. 2) process and should be seen as one level in any scale of autonomy demonstration. Van Lier (2010) supports this view when he argues that compliance is also a manifestation of learner agency, but that this manifestation is at a low level, as it happens at the behest of others. As an example, Van Lier cites cases where students required to study a foreign language at school learn it well merely in order to pass the test (Van Lier, 2010). Van Lier (2008) also proposes six levels of learner agency in the context of language learning: passive, obedient, participatory, inquisitive, autonomous and committed. According to Van Lier, the main element with which to distinguish the levels of agency is learner volition-volition is often absent in low levels of agency and evident in high levels of agency. The fourth significant implication of equating learner agency with the demonstration of LA is that the importance of personal meanings in any action is taken 49 into consideration (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Huang, 2009). As agency entails actions arising from deliberation and choice (Huang, 2009; Huang & Benson, 2013), and the motives for learner agency lie in the significance and relevance of an event or a task to the learners (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001), it is essential to help learners recognise the relevance of planned tasks to their personal needs and purposes if one aims to encourage learners to demonstrate their autonomy in learning (Benson, 2013). However, many learners have little idea about their learning needs and purposes, and this greatly influences their course of action for learning (Reinders, 2010). Additionally, not all learners have the same motives for learning, and these are subject to change according to a learner's circumstances (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001). For example, some learners may take an English course because it is a compulsory component of their degree, and therefore only learn in order to pass the exam, while others learn English because it is significant for their personal goals (e.g., studying abroad or working in a foreign company). These types of learners are unlikely to demonstrate the same level of autonomy in learning, even when they are doing the same learning task, and understanding learners' motives for learning can contribute to an understanding of how they demonstrate their autonomy. Fifth and finally, as choice and control are two core ideas in the notions of learner agency and LA, it is necessary that learners be provided with opportunities to make choices or take control of their learning. It is widely agreed in the literature that creating space for learners to demonstrate their autonomy is a prerequisite for the demonstration of autonomy and its development (Holec, 1981; Boud, 1988; Hughes, 2003; Little, 2003b, 2004a; Reinders, 2010; Tatzl, 2016). More details about conceptual space for LA will be discussed in section 3.2.5. 50 The above arguments allow the researcher to conceptualise autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated as two distinct but interrelated components of the concept of LA. The former denotes the conceptual space or opportunities that are offered for students to make choices and decisions regarding their learning, and the latter denotes the extent to which the students demonstrate their capacity to make such choices and decisions regarding their learning. It is important to note that the term autonomy offered does not imply that autonomy can be imparted to students. Rather, it means that students need to have space and freedom to demonstrate their autonomy. A key issue to address is how much space or freedom should be permitted to students, because too much autonomy offered can be counterproductive (Higgs, 1988; Vermunt & Verloop, 1999; Katz & Assor, 2007; Tin, 2012). Higgs (1988), for example, argues that allowing students to work independently when they are not ready will result in disorientation and failure in learning. Vermunt and Verloop (1999) even propose the term destructive friction to refer to the situation where a teacher's regulation and students' self-regulation are not compatible, resulting in a decrease in learning or thinking skills. They believe that the best environment for learning to happen is one that enables a congruence between the teacher's regulation and the learner's self-regulation. That is, the teacher offers a large conceptual space when learners are ready to work with high levels of autonomy, and a tighter conceptual space when they are not. From these viewpoints, the teacher's significant role in orchestrating an environment for the manifestation of autonomy is once again highlighted. 51 3.1.2.3. Zone of Proximal Development and Scaffolding Two concepts are central to the notion of mediated learning―the Zone of Proximal Development (Vygotsky, 1978) and scaffolding (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976; Bruner, 1996). Zone of Proximal Development The Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is an influential concept in Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of learning (Lantolf, 2000a; Verenikina, 2010; Holzman, 2018; Smagorinsky, 2018; Eun, 2019). It is defined as \"the distance between the actual development level as determined through interdependent problem-solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem-solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers\" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). The ZPD is seen as the primary activity space where learning happens (Walqui, 2006), and its construction depends largely on the quality of interactions between people, typically learners and teachers (Corden, 2000). The concept also denotes assisted performance (Lantolf & Thorne, 2007), but the assistance provided should be grounded in and complementary with the learner's existing ability, and it should only go slightly beyond the learner's current competence (Verenikina, 2010). Therefore, from the ZPD perspective, others (i.e., teachers, peers) play a significant role in an individual's learning and development (Jaramillo, 1996; John-Steiner & Mahn, 2013), and collaboration is the key to learning (Lantolf, 2000a). Learners can function much better when collaborating with others than when working alone (Lantolf, 2000a), but the teacher has to be very sensitive to what the students can already do and what they can potentially do with assistance from the teacher and peers in the class (Lantolf, 2006). Some scholars believe that the only fruitful collaboration is that between novices and experts, because in such situations the expert, through interaction with the novice, transmits knowledge to him/her (e.g., Wertsch, 1991). However, many scholars argue 52 that rather than limiting the interaction in the ZPD to that between the novice and the expert, this interaction should be viewed as being multilateral, with the involvement of multiple agents (Van Lier, 1996; Lantolf, 2000a; Verenikina, 2010). Van Lier, for example, argues that interaction is beneficial not only when it is between students and experts, but also when it is between students and equal and less capable peers (Van Lier, 1996). ZPD, with mediation as the underpinning concept, is useful for observing and understanding how mediational means are appropriated and internalised (John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996; Lantolf, 2000a). With this in mind, the ZPD should be viewed as a conceptual space for collaborative construction of opportunities for individuals to develop cognitive ability (Lantolf, 2000a; Verenikina, 2010). The ZPD also implies that development spans different stages, from social to individual (Vygotsky, 1978), which might not be the same for everyone, so the diversity of learners' stages of development should be recognised (Jaramillo, 1996; John-Steiner & Mahn, 2013). In order to help learners to proceed in their learning and development, assistance from others, known as scaffolding, plays a determinant role (Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 1996). Scaffolding Scaffolding is another crucial concept in sociocultural theory and is closely linked to the concept of the ZPD (Wells, 2000; Van Der Stuyf, 2002; Van de Pol, Volman, Oort, & Beishuizen, 2015). The metaphor of scaffolding was developed and introduced by Bruner to refer to the structuring of an interaction between an adult and a child based on what the child already knows and the potential of what it can do with the assistance of the adult (Kao, 2010). In the broader context of education, scaffolding refers to the assistance of teachers and colleagues offered to students so that they can do what they otherwise 53 could not. Scaffolding is temporary by its nature (Van de Pol, Volman, & Beishuizen, 2010). It is gradually withdrawn as the students' competence grows, until finally students can perform a task or master a piece of knowledge independently (Van Der Stuyf, 2002; Van de Pol et al., 2010). Therefore, the ultimate goal of scaffolding is to help students to gradually become independent in a task through the teacher's decreasing support. Another characteristic of scaffolding is its 'contingency', which is referred to as \"responsive, tailored, adjusted, differentiated, titrated, or calibrated support\" (Van de Pol et al., 2010, p. 274). This means that scaffolding must be opportune and adapted to a student's understanding (Wood et al., 1976; Van de Pol et al., 2015). In order to provide such scaffolding, the teacher must first determine the student's current level of competence. This can be done using diagnostic strategies, including dynamic assessment (Lantolf, 2009; Lantolf & Poehner, 2011) and formative assessment (Sadler, 1989; Black, 1998; Black & Wiliam, 2009). Scaffolding also denotes the transfer of responsibility (Van de Pol et al., 2010). Via contingent and pre-planned fading, the responsibility for the performance of a task is gradually transferred to the learner, meaning that they become more independent through this task (Van de Pol et al., 2010). Implications The notions of the ZPD and scaffolding provide significant insights for the current study. The first insight is that LA is associated with the level of guidance that learners need and receive for effective learning (Willison, Sabir, & Thomas, 2017). That is, the level of scaffolding is inverse to the level of autonomy demonstrated-the more scaffolding the learners receive, the less autonomy they demonstrate in the learning process. This conceptualisation of LA emphasises the role of teachers in promoting and 54 developing LA, as they are the ones who determine how much support and how much autonomy to offer their students. Secondly, the concept of the ZPD implies that the task designed for the students should be neither too easy nor too challenging for them; it should simply be challenging enough for the students to complete it with help from others. The term 'contingency' in scaffolding indicates that the teacher has to be very sensitive to the student's current and potential levels when providing assistance in order to provide just the right amount of guidance (Van Der Stuyf, 2002; Van de Pol et al., 2015). In a similar vein, teachers have to be sensitive to the level of autonomy that their students can work with so that they can create situations which best support their students' demonstration of LA. This notion also signifies that there is no optimum pre-determined level of autonomy. Instead, teachers have to be sensitive to find out which level is appropriate for their students (Willison et al., 2017). Thirdly, the concept of the ZPD has changed the way we look at assessment. The ZPD concerns an individual's current and potential levels of development, so assessment should not only measure students' actual levels of development but also indicate the potential development that students can reach with assistance from others (Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992; Lantolf & Thorne, 2007; Lantolf & Poehner, 2011). The notion of scaffolding signifies the critical role of assessment in helping teachers orchestrate a learning situation and instructions that are the most fruitful for students' learning and development. Assessment can provide teachers with information about students' current levels of understanding, so that teachers can decide, for example, what kinds of instructions are appropriate, how much support is needed, and to what extent they should allow students to work independently. This assessment is inseparable from teaching and is embedded in teaching instructions (Gipps, 1999; Pryor & Crossouard, 55 2008; Lantolf & Poehner, 2011). This point is crucial to the current study as it enables the researcher to understand assessment and its relationship with LA by investigating the design of learning tasks and the interactions between teacher and students in the classroom. 3.1.3.4. Situated learning The notion of situated learning suggests that a qualitative case study is the most suitable research design for the current study, which investigates the complex concepts of LA and assessment. A case study allows the researcher to undertake a thorough analysis of how LA is demonstrated in relation to assessment practices within a particular sociocultural and historical context of higher education in Vietnam, and factors in that context that facilitate or hinder the demonstration of LA. Secondly, the concept of situated learning requires the researcher to attend to characteristics of the Vietnamese social, cultural, and historical context in general, and of the researched university and classroom culture in particular. Thirdly, apart from being viewed as an embedded and inseparable component of the teaching and learning process (i.e., formative assessment, dynamic assessment) (Gipps, 1999; Pryor & Crossouard, 2008; Lantolf & Poehner, 2011), assessment practices (e.g., tests and exams) can also be viewed as some of the factors shaping the learning context, separate from teaching and learning. The investigation of both types of assessment practices in the higher education context of Vietnam is crucial to understanding the 'how' and 'why' of autonomy demonstration in assessment practices. 56 3.2. Learner autonomy 3.2.1. Role of learner autonomy in language learning The rationale for promoting LA can be based on three arguments: the ideological, the psychological and the economic. Ideologically, it is an individual's right to have freedom in making his/her educational choices or decisions (Scharle & Szabó, 2000). Psychologically, if we take charge of our own learning, it will be more purposeful, meaningful and permanent, leading to better learning results, higher motivation to learn and perhaps a more successful learning outcome. Economically, a society which supported its members' needs for lifelong personal instruction in every area of learning would face considerable economic challenges. Therefore, if individuals wish to obtain particular skills and knowledge, they must be able to actively seek for resources to support their own learning needs (Crabbe, 1993; R. Smith, Kuchah, & Lamb, 2018). In language education, autonomy has been long considered a desirable goal. \"Few teachers will disagree with the importance of helping language learners to become more autonomous as learners\" (Wenden, 1991, p.11 cited in Benson & Voller, 1997, p. 1). Learners who demonstrate a higher level of autonomy possess personal attributes that are likely to facilitate success in higher education (Boud, 1988). Autonomy is also thought of as a necessary condition for effective learning in the sense that when learners are able to demonstrate higher levels of autonomy in learning, it is more likely that they will become not only more proficient at learning language, but also more responsible and critical as members of the community in which they live (Benson, 2011). These ideas support the two reasons stated by Little (1997) for encouraging the development of LA in language learning: firstly, to facilitate students' ability to fully exploit their learning potential by means of critical reflection and self-evaluation; and secondly, to enable them to become adept users of the target language. In addition, learners who, at 57 times, demonstrate high levels of autonomy, display higher language learning achievement than those who have consistently low LA. This is possibly because students will be more committed to their learning when they can contribute to decisions regarding their language competence (Littlejohn, 1985), as a result of which they will be more determined and concentrated in their learning (Dam, 1995; Camilleri, 1997; Little, 1999c; Chan, 2003). Many researchers have reported a positive correlation between language achievement and level of LA (Dafei, 2007; Nguyen, 2008; Pan & Chen, 2015; Faramarzi et al., 2016), which indicates that successful and efficient language learners demonstrate higher levels of LA at times (Little, 1995; Benson, 2011). Having experience of working at higher levels of autonomy primes students for lifelong language learning endeavours after leaving formal education. Language learning cannot be solely restricted to schools or classes because no language institution or program can equip its learners with all the language skills and knowledge they need for their communication in the outside world. Therefore, in order to be successful, it is necessary that language learners continue their learning in out-of-school contexts, and be active in making their own plans for learning and making use of available resources for their learning (Everhard, 2015a). 3.2.2. Feasibility of learner autonomy in Asian countries One of the issues that researchers on autonomy have to take into consideration is whether this Western-originated construct is appropriate in other cultures. In an attempt to build up a \"cultural-free\" definition of autonomy, Littlewood (1999) suggests a model based on two forms: proactive and reactive autonomy. Proactive autonomous learners often establish the learning direction themselves and carry out all activities, such as setting learning goals, selecting methods and strategies, and evaluating their learning on their own. In contrast, reactive autonomous learners do not set up their 58 direction, but once the direction has been created, they are able to arrange their resources autonomously in order to reach their goals. In Littlewood's view, proactive autonomy belongs to Western learners, while Asian learners possess reactive autonomy. Littlewood also proposed five descriptions of East Asian students: • Students will have a high level of reactive autonomy, both individually and in groups • Groups of students will develop high levels of both reactive and proactive autonomy • Many students will have experienced few learning contexts which encourage them to exercise individual proactive autonomy • East Asian students have the same capacity for autonomy as other learners • The language classroom can provide a favourable environment for developing the capacity for autonomy (Littlewood, 1999, pp. 87,88) Empirical evidence, however, shows that successful language learners share common characteristics with autonomous learners (Little, 1999c; Dafei, 2007; Nguyen, 2009) in the sense that successful learners persistently reflect on their learning content, purposes, methods and success (Little, 1999c). Little therefore argues that LA is \"a universal human capacity\" (p. 13) that is accessible to everyone and autonomy as a capacity for self-regulation is the target of all developmental learning (Little, 1999c). He also states that autonomy is \"an appropriate pedagogical goal in all cultural settings\" (p. 15). LA has certainly been promoted among students in non-Western cultures. Littlewood (2001) carried out a survey of attitudes to classroom English learning among over two thousand students in eleven countries― eight Asian and three European. The results of his study confirm that, just like their counterparts in European countries, 59 Asian students \"wish to participate actively in exploring knowledge and have positive attitudes towards working purposefully\" (Littlewood, 2001, p. 3). Other studies also affirmed that if Asian students are provided with opportunities to get involved in their learning, and are equipped with metacognitive strategies for learning, they will not be non-autonomous and their autonomy will develop gradually (Chan, 2001b; Trinh, 2005; Nguyen, 2009). It can therefore be concluded that LA is not just a Western concept. However, researchers on autonomy in non-Western countries should attend to the cultural settings where learning occurs (Little, 1999c), as the important issue is not whether LA itself is appropriate, but how negotiated versions of LA can be best enabled in all contexts (Aioki and Smith, 1996, p. 3 cited in Littlewood, 1999). 3.2.3. Autonomy is a complex concept The concept of LA has been a theme for discussion in language education for nearly 40 years. Despite increasing interest and a huge number of research studies on the concept, various researchers still consider it to be a 'problematic', 'complicated', and 'ambiguous' construct (Voller, 1997; Little, 2003b; Everhard, 2015a; Lamb, 2017; Lin & Reinders, 2018). The complexity of the concept of LA can be recognised through the conflicts between academics regarding the semantic aspects of the terminology, which highlight the inconsistency in the use of the concept of LA itself and the use of various terms to denote LA (Oxford, 2003). There has been no consistent terminology for LA in the literature so far. In fact, a number of researchers and scholars use the same terms to refer to different things. For example, both Holec (1981) and Dickinson (1987) use the terms \"self-direction\" and \"autonomy\" to refer to different constructs. For Dickinson (1987), the former refers to learners' attitude and responsibility and the latter refers to the learning situation where 60 students demonstrate their self-direction. Holec (1981), on the other hand, defines selfdirection as the learning situation where learners manifest their autonomy, and autonomy as the ability to take responsibility for their learning. River's (2001) distinction between autonomy and self-directed language learning also contributes to the terminological conflict, as he argues that autonomy is the precondition for selfdirected language learning (Oxford, 2003). Another reason for the term's semantic complexity is that it holds different connotations from a 'traditional' perspective and from the perspective of selfdetermination theory. Within self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), autonomy refers to the demonstration of volition and the self-endorsement of one's activity, while from a 'traditional' perspective (see for example, Holec, 1981; Benson, 2011), autonomy is often referred to as the self-regulatory capacity that enables learners to take control of their learning. Self-determination theory emphasises the ownership of the action and the origin of the control of a course of action, while the traditional perspective emphasises the capacity to take self-regulatory action and the cognitive aspects that allow learners to exercise this capacity (Yashima, 2014; Hu & Zhang, 2017). Researchers tend to use a series of different terms to denote one concept of 'learner autonomy'. For example, researchers have used terms such as \"self-direction\" (Holec, 1981; Candy, 1991), \"self-instruction\" (Dickinson, 1987), \"independence\" (Benson & Voller, 1997), and \"self-regulation\" (Zimmerman & Pons, 1986). Candy (1987) identified thirty different terms which have been used in this area (Boud, 1988), and researchers in the field have still not reached a holistic definition of LA (Lin & Reinders, 2018). The lack of consensus regarding terminology testifies to the complex nature of the concept. If researchers want to distinguish between these terms, the only 61 way they can do so is to \"delve beneath the surface to what is actually meant in any particular situation\" (Candy, 1987a, p.160 cited in Boud, 1988). For example, the two concepts 'learner autonomy' and 'self-regulation' have a number of common features: they are both concerned with goal-setting, monitoring learning and control, and they both involve active engagement, goal-directed behaviour, metacognitive skills, intrinsic motivation, and learner characteristics (Murray, 2014). However, when we delve deeper into the two concepts, some differences emerge. Self-regulation is arguably a narrower concept than LA. It is especially concerned with learners' cognitive processes (Benson, 2011; Murray, 2014), while LA involves both learners' cognitive aspects and the design of the learning environment (Murray, 2014). Given that LA is a complex construct (at least at a semantic level), researchers should clarify both what they mean and what they do not mean by the concept of 'learner autonomy'. The following sections will discuss misconceptions about LA and the main themes in the literature discussing the concept. 3.2.4. Misconceptions about learner autonomy In his oft-cited 'negative' definition of LA, Little (1991, pp. 3-4) specifies five misconceptions about LA that need to be taken into account by researchers: • Autonomy is the same as self-instruction or learning without a teacher • Autonomy entails an abandoning of teachers' responsibility or initiative • Autonomy is a teaching method or something that teachers do with students • Autonomy is a single, easily described behaviour • Autonomy is a steady state achieved by learners The first misconception (that LA is the same as self-instruction, or learning without a teacher) might have arisen from the widespread development of self-access centres for learning in the eighties. The misconception involves an assumption that 62 students can carry out their learning on their own when they are provided with adequate material and equipment, and that \"self-access work will automatically lead to autonomy\" (Benson, 2011, p. 11). At that time, autonomous language learning was often considered the same as self-access language learning. However, this assumption has been challenged by a number of academics who claim that \"autonomy is not exclusively or even primarily a matter of how learning is organized\" (Little, 1991, p. 3), or a matter of physical setting for learning (Dickinson, 1994), and that learners are not automatically autonomous when they are put in situations where they have to work on their own (Nunan, 1997). Although self-instruction can help some learners obtain a high degree of autonomy, it does not inevitably lead to the development of LA. In contrast, in certain circumstances it can even impede LA (Benson, 2011). In fact, LA should involve collaboration, because education is an interactive and social process, and it should also involve interdependence, because we are social beings and \"our independence is always balanced by dependence; our essential condition is one of interdependence\" (Little, 1991, p. 5). The second fallacy is the belief that LA leads to the relinquishment of teachers' control and initiative in the classroom, making teachers redundant. Although the notion of LA does imply a level of independence from the control of others and a level of freedom (Dickinson, 1987; Candy, 1991; Macaro, 1997), this freedom should not be seen as absolute, but conditioned and constrained. LA also involves collaboration and interdependence (Little, 1999a, 2007). Therefore, teachers still play a key role in the students' process of becoming autonomous (Dam, 2003; Benson, 2011, 2013). The third false assumption is that autonomy is a new methodology or something teachers impose on their learners. While it is difficult for learners to become autonomous if their teachers do not actively engage in the process, the development of 63 LA cannot be programmed through a series of lesson plans. LA is not an innovative methodology in language education and is not automatically prompted by any program. Autonomy in learning is more of a process than a product (Candy, 1991; Dam, 2000; Paiva & Braga, 2008; Everhard, 2012). Therefore, LA cannot be taught but can only be developed through raising students' awareness (Dam, 1995; Sinclair, 2000), arranging the learning context to support LA (Stefanou, Perencevich, DiCintio, & Turner, 2004; Reeve & Jang, 2006; Assor, 2012), and creating opportunities for the students to take control of their learning (Boud, 1988; Esch, 1996; Benson, 2013; Tatzl, 2016). Additionally, as discussed earlier in this section, autonomy can take numerous forms depending on various factors. As such, there is no single correct approach to the development of LA. Little (1991) also cites the mistaken belief that LA is a single behaviour that can be easily described. However, in reality, LA is a far more complicated construct. Although it is possible to identify LA through learners' behaviours, LA is not easy to recognise because it can manifest itself in various forms depending on different factors including learners' age, needs, background and language proficiency (Little, 1991). The complexity of LA is also illustrated in Benson's statement that autonomy is a \"multidimensional capacity that will take different forms for different individuals, and even for the same individual in different contexts or at different times\" (Benson, 2011, p. 37). Finally, there is the belief that LA is something that, once achieved by certain learners, will remain steady forever. The manifestation of LA may depend on a number of variables (Little, 1991), so learners can be highly autonomous in one situation while failing to display the same level of LA in other situations. Nunan (1997) supports this argument by claiming that \"autonomy is not an all-or-nothing concept, that there are 64 degrees of autonomy, and that the extent to which autonomy can be developed will be constrained by the psychological and cognitive make-up of the learner as well as the culture, social and educational context in which the learning take place\" (p. 192). 3.2.5. Definitions of learner autonomy There have been various interpretations and understandings about LA during the last four decades of its development in language education. The following section will first discuss Holec's seminal definition of LA in language education and then review the major themes relating to the definition of LA. Autonomy in language education was first defined by Holec in a report for Europe's Modern Language Project in 1981 as \"the ability to take charge of one's own learning\" (Holec, 1981, p. 3). Holec elucidates his definition as follows: first, the 'ability' in the definition is \"not inborn but must be acquired\" (p. 3), implying that students can be taught to be autonomous. Secondly, the concept of LA only denotes a potential capacity to act, not the actual behaviour that an individual displays in a situation. Thirdly, 'to take charge of one's own learning' means \"to have, and to hold responsibility for all decisions concerning all aspects of this learning, i.e., determining the objectives; defining the contents and progressions; selecting methods and techniques to be used; monitoring the procedures of acquisition properly speaking (rhythm, time, place, etc); evaluating what has been acquired\" (p. 3). Holec's definition has received some criticism for not explicitly recognising the psychological aspect of LA and only describing a list of self-management skills without mentioning the cognitive abilities underpinning them (Little, 2007; Benson, 2011). In other words, this definition only describes \"WHAT autonomous learners are able to do\" not \"HOW they are able to do it\" (Benson, 2007, p. 23) [Benson's emphasis]. Despite this criticism, Holec's definition is still the most cited definition of LA in language education (Benson, 2007, 2011). 65 Additionally, it has sparked debates about the concept and triggered different interpretations and understandings of it. LA is a capacity or ability Holec (1981) states that LA only denotes potential capacity, not actual behaviours or performance. Therefore, the capacity to be autonomous and the behaviours indicating this capacity might be related but must be distinguished: To say of a learner that he is autonomous is therefore to say that he is capable of taking charge of his own learning and nothing more: All the practical decisions he is going to make regarding his learning can be related to this capacity he possesses but must be distinguished from it. (p. 3) This argument is echoed by Sinclair (1999)'s statement that autonomy refers to \"a capacity or ability to make informed decisions about one's learning rather than actual behaviours\" (p. 101). Viewing LA as a capacity suggests that an autonomous learner is still autonomous even when they are not displaying behaviours indicating that ability (Sinclair, 1999). However, excluding actual behaviours in the concept of LA might reduce its practicability in education, because it does not make much sense to say that a learner has autonomy but never exhibits that ability in real-life situations (Reinders, 2011; Lamb, 2017). Many researchers have advocated Holec's perspective that LA is an ability, but have also recognised behaviours as an indispensable component of LA (Little, 1991; Macaro, 1997; Scharle & Szabó, 2000; Benson, 2001). Subsequently, researchers have often replaced 'ability' with 'capacity' and 'take charge of' with 'take responsibility' or 'take control of' in their definitions (Benson, 2007; T. T. Dang, 2012). Dang (2012) states that these replacements appear to be only a matter of linguistic expression, and the meanings of the construct stay the same. However, this is not necessarily the case, 66 because subsequent definitions add more nuances, elements and dimensions to the concept, and the entailments of 'take charge of', 'take responsibility for' and 'take control of' are not the same. Little (1991)'s definition explicitly adds a psychological dimension which he considers as both a requirement and an entailment of autonomy development: Essentially autonomy is a capacity – for detachment, critical reflection, decisionmaking and independent action. It presupposes, but also entails, that the learner will develop a particular kind of psychological relation to the process and content of his learning. The capacity for autonomy will be displayed both in the way the learner learns and in the way he or she transfers what has been learned to wider contexts. (p. 4) Little also argues for the social dimension of LA when stating that humans are \"social beings\" so \"our independence is always balanced by dependence\" (p. 5), suggesting that interdependence is an essential condition of LA. He posits that the term 'autonomy' itself indicates a high degree of freedom enjoyed by the learner, but also asserts that this freedom is not absolute, but conditional and constrained. Little's later definitions (1994, 1996) appear to use Holec's definition as their basis and expand them by incorporating behaviours and adding metacognitive and affective dimensions. For example, his 1994 definition states: The essence of LA is the acceptance of responsibility for one's own learning (Holec, 1981, p. 3). This entails establishing a personal agenda for learning, taking at least some of the initiatives that shape the learning process, and developing a capacity to evaluate the extent and success of one's learning. (p. 431) 67 Little's 1996 definition reaffirmed the argument for the metacognitive and affective dimension of LA, saying \"learner autonomy has both affective/motivational and metacognitive dimensions. It presupposes positive attitude to the purpose, content and process of learning on the one hand and well-developed metacognitive skills on the other\" (1996, pp. 203-204). Benson argues that because autonomy can take various forms and manifest itself in various ways, the issue with definitions of LA does not lie in the definitions themselves, but in the description of what autonomy in learning entails (Benson, 2011, 2013; Huang & Benson, 2013). Therefore, a feasible approach is to opt for a simple definition which can accommodate different interpretations and emphases, and then interrogate and break down the main concepts in LA in order to identify its potential components and dimensions in language learning (Benson, 2011, 2013). Benson defines LA as \"the capacity to take control of one's own learning\" (2011, p 58). He posits that the construct of 'control' is more practical and open to empirical investigation than constructs like 'charge' or 'responsibility' (Benson, 2011). Benson (2013) believes that autonomy as a 'capacity' necessarily consists of three overlapping components: freedom, desire, and ability. Freedom refers to \"the degree to which learners are permitted to control their learning\" (2013, p. 4). Desire is \"the learner's intention or 'wish' to learn a language or carry out a particular learning task\" (2013, p. 4). Ability denotes the skills and knowledge involved in study and language. LA should be manifested in control over at least three levels, namely learning management, cognitive processes and learning content (Benson, 2013). According to Benson, control over learning management concerns behaviours relating to the planning, organising and evaluation of learning. All these involve the use of learning strategies such as metacognitive strategies, affective strategies, social strategies and 68 cognitive strategies. Control over cognitive processes deals with mental processes concerning attention, reflection and metacognitive knowledge building. Control over learning content concerns what to learn, why to learn, and how much to learn (Benson, 2011). Benson deserves credit for his effort to break down the construct of 'capacity' into smaller units. This helps teachers understand the abstract construct of 'capacity' in a concrete sense in order to identify where and how to exert their influence to promote LA among their students. However, while 'freedom' should be included in the conceptualisation of LA, it should not be viewed as a component making up learners' 'capacity'. This exclusion of 'freedom' in the learners' capacity is because the concept is taken in this study to be external to the learners and is determined by others rather than learners themselves. Freedom, then, is unlike 'desire' and 'ability', which remain basically internal to the learners, despite being influenced by external factors. Therefore, rather than perceiving 'freedom'3 as an integral element of 'capacity', it should be conceived as the context in which capacity can manifest itself. Apart from 'capacity', 'willingness' is also endorsed in some definitions as a significant element of LA. However, it is noteworthy that although the semantic meaning of 'willingness' may be not the same in all definitions, they all concern the affective aspect of LA. The Bergen definition4, for example, conceptualises LA as \"a readiness to take charge of one's own learning in the service of one's own needs and purposes. This entails a capacity and willingness to act independently and in cooperation with others as a social, responsible person\" (cited in Dam, 1995, pp. 1-2). In the Bergen definition, 'willingness' arises from learners' realisation of the relevance 3 This notion will be discussed again later in the section 4 A definition of learner autonomy agreed upon by a group of researchers in the third Nordic workshop on developing autonomous learning in EFL classroom at the University of Bergen from 11th to 14th August, 1989 69 of learning to their own needs and purposes. The conceptualisation of 'willingness' in the Bergen definition appears similar to the notion of 'desire' presented earlier in Benson's definition (2013, pp. 4), which is viewed by him as somewhat simpler than the construct of 'motivation' (Benson, 2013). Littlewood (1996) also includes the notion of 'willingness' in his definition as one of the two core components of LA, together with ability. He further elaborates 'ability' as consisting of the knowledge and skills necessary for learners to make and carry out choices appropriate for their learning, and 'willingness' as embracing motivation and confidence. Littlewood argues that these two elements are interrelated and interdependent on one another, and that LA cannot flourish without either of these components. Littlewood's definition works for the context of learning that happens outside of the class, where students' choices are not restricted. However, in classroom learning (where freedom of choices cannot be taken for granted, even when students do have ability and willingness), students are not always allowed to exhibit their autonomous capacity. For that reason, this definition appears to lack the crucial component of autonomy offered for LA. Autonomy offered refers to the level of freedom or opportunities created for learners to demonstrate their autonomy. This construct is explicitly recognised as the prerequisite and the condition for LA (e.g., Boud, 1988; Macaro, 1997; Scharle & Szabó, 2000; Little, 2003b; Benson, 2013). Conceptual space for LA Boud (1988) distinguishes \"individual autonomy\" (p. 18) and \"practical autonomy\" (p. 22). The former denotes the students' \"ability to make their own decisions about what they think and do\" (p. 18) and is often conceived as the goal of education, while the latter refers to the opportunities provided for students to \"exercise significant degrees of decision-making with respect to the content and organisation of courses\" (p. 22), and is 70 perceived as the approach to education. Boud emphasises that practical autonomy is the requirement for individual autonomy in education settings, and individual autonomy is relative and situational in its nature because it depends upon a particular judgemental standard; it is \"shaped by and related to the situations in which it is manifest\" (p. 19). Boud's idea of individual and practical autonomy and their relationship is supported by subsequent researchers (e.g., Macaro, 1997; Scharle & Szabó, 2000; Little, 2003b; Reinders, 2010; Benson, 2013). Some researchers explicitly conceptualise opportunities and freedom as one unified component in their definitions of LA. For example, Macaro (1997) perceives autonomy as \"an ability that must be learnt through knowing how to make decisions about self as well as being allowed to make those decisions\" (p. 168) [Macaro's emphasis], while Scharle and Szabó (2000) define autonomy as \"freedom and ability to manage one's own affairs\" (p. 4). Others recognise this aspect as an essential condition for LA. Little (2003b) states that teachers should create and maintain a learning environment where learners are given sufficient freedom and experience to control their own learning, enflame their desire and enhance their ability as autonomous learners. Reinders (2010) echoes this sentiment, saying, \"learners are unable to take control of or make choices about their learning unless they are free to do so\" (p. 41), indicating that autonomy offered is the prerequisite for the demonstration of LA. LA as neither ability nor capacity Many researchers do not conceptualise LA as an ability or capacity of learners (Dickinson, 1987; Breen & Mann, 1997; Paiva & Braga, 2008; Willis, 2011b). Dickinson, for example, perceives LA as \"the situation in which the learner is totally responsible for all the decisions concerned with his learning and the implementation of those decisions. In full autonomy, there is no involvement of a teacher or an institution. And the learner is also independent of specific prepared materials\" (Dickinson, 1987, p. 71 11). In Dickinson's definition, LA is seen as a mode of learning equating to selfinstruction or teacherless learning (Thanasoulas, 2000). This perspective was considered by Little (1991) to be a misconception, as discussed in section 3.2.4. Additionally, Breen and Mann (1997) explicitly state in their definition that LA is not an ability that needs to be acquired. Rather, it is \"a way of being in the world, a position from which to engage with the world\" and this \"way of being\" must be \"discovered or rediscovered\" (p. 134). Breen and Mann's perspective suggests that LA concerns the relationship between learners and the learning environment, and the way they adapt to or control that environment. This perspective appears to resonate with a social constructivist perspective on autonomy, which conceives of it as the relationship between learners and the learning environment (Toohey & Norton, 2003; Toohey, 2007; Van Lier, 2008). From this perspective, autonomy is seen as an innate capacity that is facilitated or supressed by the environment (Candy, 1991; Little, 1999b, 2007). Candy (1991), for example, argues that learners in constructivist perspectives are \"selfconstructing\" agents (p. 259), suggesting that they have the inclination to be autonomous. However, learners are not always able to demonstrate this innate ability in every learning situation because of constraints that might arise. Therefore, autonomy can be perceived as the product of the interaction between learners and different agents and factors in a learning environment. Little (2007) supports this view, saying: Learner autonomy is the product of an interactive process in which the teacher gradually enlarges the scope of her learners' autonomy by gradually allowing them more control of the process and content of their learning. In classroom as well as in naturalistic contexts communicative proficiency in a second or foreign language is also the product of an interactive process.\" (p. 26) 72 In order to facilitate LA, teachers should make allowances for students to get involved in decisions relating to aspects of learning and assessment and create situations in which learners can \"assert their innate drive toward acting independently\" (Candy, p. 259). Viewing LA as an inborn ability suggests that it is a \"universal human capacity\" (Little, 1999c, p. 13) that can be developed and flourish in all educational contexts as long as teachers, administrators and institutions in these contexts pave the way for it. Additionally, this perspective takes into account situational factors and emphasises the role of teachers in the development and demonstration of LA. This perspective contrasts with the perspective of Holec and his advocates (e.g., Macaro, 1997; Sinclair, 2000) that LA is not \"inborn, but must be acquired\" (p. 3), leading to the development of techniques or procedures to train learners to become autonomous (Sinclair, 2000), and posing the risk of programming LA into a series of lesson plans (Little, 1991). LA is also seen as a complex system (Paiva & Braga, 2008; Tatzl, 2016), which includes a number of different interrelated elements. Paiva, for example, uses the perspective of complexity theory to define LA as: a complex socio-cognitive system, subject to internal and external constraints, which manifests itself in different degrees of independence and control of one's own learning process. It involves capacities, abilities, attitudes, willingness, decision making, choices, planning, actions, and assessment either as a language learner or as a communicator inside or outside the classroom. As a complex system, it is dynamic, chaotic, unpredictable, non-linear, adaptive, open, selforganizing, and sensitive to initial conditions and feedback. (Paiva, 2006 cited in Paiva & Braga, 2008, p. 447) This view of LA resembles the social constructivist perspective, in that LA basically involves relationships, and can develop through interactions between learners, 73 and between learners and the learning environment (Tatzl, 2016). One advantage of this definition is that it shows a rather comprehensive picture of LA with the major elements that are discussed in the literature. However, this definition might be of little practical value to teachers or practitioners because they might be overwhelmed by so many elements making up the concept and get lost in these components. In summary, the discussion about definitions of LA in language education indicates that there are divergent interpretations and understandings about LA. The variety of interpretations of LA suggests that it may be a complicated and multidimensional construct (Little, 1991; Benson & Voller, 1997; Nunan, 1997; Benson, 2011; Lamb, 2017; Lin & Reinders, 2018). These different interpretations and understanding can help to reveal different facets of LA from various perspectives and under multiple theoretical lenses, but they can also make researchers and practitioners feel bewildered by its complicated and multifaceted nature. Therefore, it is essential for researchers that \"we know, and we are able to state, what we mean when we talk about autonomy\" and \"we are able to identify the form in which we choose to recognise it in the contexts of our own research and practice\" (Benson, 2011, pp. 58-59). 3.2.6. Learner autonomy in this study Since the sociocultural perspective views LA as the emergent product of the interaction between a learner and the learning environment in which he/she is embedded, this study focuses more on how students demonstrate their autonomy in different situations, rather than focussing on their capacity, which is viewed as being innate (Candy, 1991; Little, 1999b, 2007). When talking about LA, researchers should distinguish between LA as a capacity or ability of learners, LA as a level of freedom offered to students, and LA as demonstrating actual behaviours of taking control of learning. Such distinctions may 74 help to streamline the interpretations and understandings of LA, and consequently help to clear up confusion around concept. In this study, these three connotations of LA are referred to as autonomy capacity, autonomy offered, and autonomy demonstrated respectively. Autonomy capacity is conceptualised as learners' ability to take control of their own learning (Benson, 2011). This capacity is conceived as being innate, and can be inhibited or facilitated by different factors making up the learning environment. This capacity includes two components: ability (knowledge and skills) and desire (Benson, 2013). Autonomy offered refers to the level of freedom or opportunities created for learners to exert their control over learning. Autonomy demonstrated is the extent to which the students actually exercise their capacity to take control of their learning in different learning situations. In this study, autonomy demonstrated depends on both autonomy offered and learners' autonomy capacity. That is, students demonstrate autonomy capacity when freedom and opportunities are provided for them and when they have the ability and desire to do so. 3.2.7. Characteristics of autonomous language learners It is widely agreed that there are certain attributes that characterise autonomous learners. A number of researchers and scholars have made attempts to depict autonomous learners or to synthesise descriptions of autonomous learners in the literature (Holec, 1981; Boud, 1988; Candy, 1991; Dickinson, 1993; Cotterall, 1995; Littlewood, 1996; Breen & Mann, 1997; Little, 2003b; Cortés & Sánchez Lujan, 2005). Although they might look at autonomy from different perspectives, take different approaches, and use different language (i.e. terms, vocabulary), their descriptions all share some key common points. Firstly, autonomous learners are independent learners in the sense that they are aware that learning is their responsibility and they accept that responsibility for their 75 learning (Candy, 1991; Little, 2003b; Cortés & Sánchez Lujan, 2005). Autonomous learners are also independent in terms of language use, learning contexts and resource management. In other words, they are self-reliant in using language in situations outside the classroom, they can organise contexts for learning, and they can use different resources for their own learning purposes (Littlewood, 1996; Breen & Mann, 1997; Cortés & Sánchez Lujan, 2005). Secondly, autonomous learners take initiative in their learning, meaning that they are able to make decisions regarding their learning goals or objectives, and their plans or agenda for learning (Holec, 1981; Boud, 1988; Dickinson, 1993; Cotterall, 1995; Littlewood, 1996; Cortés & Sánchez Lujan, 2005). For example, Cotterall (1995), Holec (1981) and Little (2003b) all identify capacity for determining objectives/goals as one of the key indicators of an autonomous learner. Boud (1988) also recognises \"identifying learning needs; setting goals; planning learning activities; finding resources needed for learning\" as some of the key aspects in which learners need to take initiative in order to become autonomous (p. 23). Thirdly, autonomous learners are cognitively and metacognitively strategic learners. They know themselves well in terms of learning styles and strategies. Therefore, they are able to identify, select and implement appropriate strategies for their learning (Candy, 1991; Dickinson, 1993; Littlewood, 1996). They collaborate with others in learning and use their teachers as resources or counsellors rather than instructors (Boud, 1988). They engage in learning in a strategic way. That is, they carry out evaluation and self-reflection about their learning both before and after the process has taken place (Candy, 1991; Breen & Mann, 1997; Little, 2003b). For example, they evaluate their purposes, preferred methods and available resources before determining the goals and steps for their learning (Breen & Mann, 1997), develop evaluation criteria 76 to self-assess what has been acquired, and reflect on the effectiveness of their learning after it has taken place (Little, 2003b) in order to make the right decisions for the next steps of their learning (e.g., what, how, when, where and with whom to learn). Finally, autonomous learners have a high level of motivation (both intrinsic and instrumental) in learning (Candy, 1991; Breen & Mann, 1997; Cortés & Sánchez Lujan, 2005). They also demonstrate a positive attitude towards learning even in unfavourable learning conditions (Cortés & Sánchez Lujan, 2005), and have high self-efficacy (Breen & Mann, 1997). It seems that all the aforementioned attributes portray an ideal autonomous learner. However, in reality, it is unlikely that students possess all these qualities, and this ideal learner hardly exists (Nunan, 1997; R. Smith, 2008). In fact, learners may display these qualities and tactics to varying degrees, which depend on a range of factors including learning situation, topic, learning task, task difficulty, learner competency and motivation. Therefore, it may be more useful to recognise the indicators of LA in learners rather than trying to picture autonomous learners in terms of their characteristics or attributes. 3.2.8. Versions of learner autonomy Benson introduced three versions of autonomy in language education: technical, psychological and political (Benson, 1997, p. 19). The technical version conceptualises autonomy in terms of (a) situations where students have to learn independently and (b) the necessary skills students need to possess in order to do so. The psychological version views autonomy as a capacity including attitudes and abilities necessary for students to take charge of their learning. The political version portrays autonomy as control over learning processes and learning content (Benson, 1997). 77 Oxford argued that Benson's model of autonomy lacked sociocultural perspectives on autonomy, and she suggested two sociocultural versions: sociocultural I and sociocultural II, complementary to Benson's model (Oxford, 2003, pp. 77, 78, 79). The sociocultural I version defines autonomy as self-regulation and focuses on the interaction between students and their peers and teachers. The sociocultural II version depicts autonomy as a level of participation in the community of practice (Oxford, 2003). Expanding Benson's model, Oxford suggested an autonomy model that comprises four perspectives, each with a different focus: technical (physical situation), psychological (characteristics of learners), sociocultural (mediated learning) and political-critical (ideologies, access and power structures). Each perspective needs to cover four themes: context, agency, motivation, and learning strategies (Oxford, 2003). Researchers on LA are also encouraged to integrate as many perspectives as possible (Oxford, 2003). A summary of four perspectives on autonomy and four main themes in each perspective is presented in table 3.1. 78 Table 3.1 Summary of perspectives on autonomy adapted from R. L. Oxford (2003) Perspectives on autonomy Technical Psychological Sociocultural I Sociocultural II Political-critical Autonomy as skills for independent learning situations, such as in a self-access centre Autonomy as a combination of characteristics of the individual Autonomy as selfregulation, gained through social interaction with a more capable, mediating person in a particular setting Autonomy as participation (at first peripheral and then more complete) in the community of practice. Mediated learning occurs through cognitive apprenticeships Autonomy as gaining access to cultural alternatives and power structures; developing an articulate voice amid competing ideologies Themes Context Is viewed as literal surrounding, self-access centre Generalised environment (foreign vs second language environment) Is seen as the relationship between the learner and more capable others, as well as specific social and cultural settings Is viewed as communities of practice, as cognitive apprenticeship, and a larger social and cultural environment Is an arrangement of ideological positions, instantiated in a specific interaction, relationship, or setting Agency Is viewed as total by advocates of self-access, but as limited by critics of self-access Is a psychological characteristic of the individual Is viewed as the power to control one's learning through selfregulation Is reflected in a cognitive apprenticeship and in participating actively with expert practitioners Is power to control one's situation, be fully heard, be free from oppression, and have choices Motivation Is variable, dependent upon situational Is viewed as a relatively static characteristic of the person although Is linked to becoming a selfregulated individual Is linked to becoming part of a community of practice. It is investment Is associated with becoming free to have one's own voice, ideological position, 79 conditions and the response of the individual to those conditions self-efficacy changes through strategy construction in a 'imagined' (desired) community choice of cultural alternatives. Motivation is also from the striving for social equalities of race, gender, class, etc. Learning strategies Are viewed as tools given by the teachers to students through learner training Are seen as psychological features of the individual that can change through practice and strategy instruction. Optimal strategy use relates to task, learning style, goals, etc. Is not typically used. Metacognitive and social learning strategies are implicit in Vygotsky's work Grow out of the practices of communities. In cognitive apprenticeships, learners gain strategies from expert practitioners and from their initial communities Are hardly discussed in political-critical perspective. However, learning strategies can help to open up access within power structures and cultural alternatives for learners 80 3.2.9. Levels of learner autonomy The notion of degrees of autonomy is widely accepted in the literature about LA (Nunan, 1997; Littlewood, 1999; Sinclair, 2000; Everhard, 2012; Huang & Benson, 2013), and there have been attempts to build models of LA in terms of different levels from low to high. Nunan (1997) was the first person to attempt to classify different stages in LA development based on learners' actions regarding a learning content domain and learning process domain. In Nunan's model, there are five levels of autonomy: awareness, involvement, intervention, creation, and transcendence (see Table 3.2). Table 3.2 Nunan's model of LA (Nunan, 1997, p. 195) level Learning action Content Process 1 Awareness Learners are made aware of the pedagogical goals and content of the materials they are using Learners identify implications of pedagogical tasks and identify their own preferred learning styles and strategies 2 Involvement Learners are involved in selecting their own goals from a range of alternatives on offer Learners make choices among a range of options 3 Intervention Learners are involved in modifying and adapting the goals and content of the learning programme Learners modify/ adapt tasks 4 Creation Learners create their own goals and objectives Learners create their own tasks 5 Transcendence Learners go beyond the classroom and make links between the content of classroom learning and the world beyond Learners become teachers and researchers It is argued by Dang (2012) that Nunan's model of LA is driven by language theory, and therefore cannot comprehensively reflect the nature of LA-a socially mediated construct. For that reason, this model cannot reflect the development of LA for all students in different contexts (Dang, 2012). 81 While searching for a culture-free definition of LA, Littlewood (1999) recognises that LA is an outcome of interdependence rather than independence, and LA is most effectively facilitated in an interpersonal environment in which students are provided with help and resources, personal concern, involvement from others, opportunities for making choices, and freedom from external control. He proposes a framework of autonomy based on levels of 'self-determination' or 'self-regulation', which he refers to as the experience of self to be an agent of one's behaviour. He distinguishes two levels of autonomy: proactive and reactive autonomy. Proactive autonomy regulates both the direction of the activity and the activity itself. That is, students set up their learning agendas and direction and carry out the evaluation of their learning methods and the assessment of their learning outcomes. Reactive autonomy \"regulates the activity once the direction has been set\" (p. 75). That is, students do not create the direction for their learning, but when the direction has been initiated, reactive autonomy enables students to achieve their goals by autonomously organising their resources. Reactive autonomy can be thought of as the preliminary step towards proactive autonomy. Models of autonomy for this study This study conceptualises LA as denoting three distinct and interrelated components: autonomy offered, autonomy capacity and autonomy demonstrated. Among the three components, autonomy capacity is considered to be innate, and the main focus of the study is to investigate the demonstration of LA and its inhibiting and facilitating factors (i.e., autonomy offered) in assessment practice. Therefore, the study draws on two models of autonomy to analyse teachers' and students' practices in class. The first model is for examining the demonstration of LA (through students' behaviours), and the 82 second model is for analysing levels of autonomy offered in learning tasks and assessment strategies. The model for autonomy demonstrated is based on Littlewood's model of reactive and proactive autonomy (Littlewood, 1999). Littlewood's model was selected because it takes into consideration the interpersonal environment which fosters LA. Additionally, although it is a broad framework, it clearly indicates the relationship between teacher and students. This makes it easier to categorise students' behaviours. Compliant has also been inserted as the first level in the model because, as discussed in section 3.1.2, dependency or compliance is also significant and should be included in any scale for autonomy demonstration (Van Lier, 2010). Table 3.3 Model of autonomy demonstrated Autonomy demonstrated Definition Proactive Students initiate the agenda for their learning and initiate actions in order to complete their agenda. Reactive Students initiate some actions in order to follow other-imitated learning agenda. Compliant Students follow the teachers' instructions. The model for analysing autonomy offered is based on Willison's Research Skill Development Framework (RSD) (Willison & O'Regan, 2006), because this framework describes the levels of autonomy as \"the conceptual space that students are given or experience\" (Willison et al., 2017, p. 3), which is the most aligned with autonomy offered in this study. The RSD describes five levels of autonomy. However, out of consideration for the compatibility of the two models of autonomy, these five levels have been condensed into three levels, as presented in Table 3.4. 83 Table 3.4 Model for autonomy offered Autonomy offered Definition Open Students make all choices and decisions regarding their learning. Bounded Students make some choices and decisions regarding their learning. Prescribed Students make almost no choices or decisions regarding their learning. 3.2.10. Perceptions about learner autonomy 3.2.10.1. Teachers' perceptions about LA Beliefs that teachers hold about various issues in education vary according to their sociocultural and educational backgrounds and experiences. The beliefs that teachers hold can have a great impact on their practices, and in turn on their students' learning. In a similar vein, teachers' perceptions about autonomy (e.g., its meaning, desirability and feasibility) can influence the method and extent to which autonomy is fostered in language classrooms (Borg, 2011). A significant body of research has been done to explore teachers' beliefs, perceptions and perspectives about the concept of LA (see for example, Camilleri, 1997; Chan, 2003; Joshi, 2011; T. V. Nguyen, 2011; Borg & AlBusaidi, 2012; Al-Busaidi & Al-Maamari, 2014; T. N. Nguyen, 2014; Yasmin & Sohail, 2017). In 1997, Camilleri wrote a report on a project consisting of six separate studies and involving 328 teachers teaching different subjects, including English, at schools in Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Belorussia, Estonia and Poland. The project aimed to explore teachers' attitudes towards LA in these contexts. The findings reveal a general \"willingness of teachers to change and develop practice, in significant areas of their teaching, in the direction of LA and to try out new methods which might bring this about.\" (p. 28). Teachers in these countries tended to support students' involvement in activities, including \"deciding on position of desks\", \"deciding on seatings of students\", 84 and \"selecting realia\" (p. 29). However, they were reluctant to allow students to select textbooks and decide on the time and place of the lesson. Chan (2003) carried out a large-scale study of 508 undergraduate students and 41 English teachers at Hong Kong Polytechnic University. The study provided an abundant source of information in regard to four aspects: teachers' roles and responsibilities, their students' abilities to make decisions, autonomous learning activities, and the role of autonomy in language learning. The findings suggested that teachers in this context showed a positive disposition towards LA. However, they also had \"a well-defined view of their own role and responsibilities\", and expressed \"a strong preference for a relatively dominant role\" (p. 49). The findings suggested that from their teachers' perspective, students in Hong Kong tertiary education were not ready to take on more autonomy. T. V. Nguyen (2011) conducted a study to explore the perceptions of 47 English teachers in higher education in Vietnam regarding aspects of their responsibility and their students' ability relating to autonomous language learning. She found that LA was still a strange concept for both teachers and students in Vietnam. Teachers were not ready to let their students learn autonomously, as they still wished to assume their power over most aspects of learning. These findings were supported by another study on teachers' beliefs about autonomy in the context of higher education in Vietnam (T. N. Nguyen, 2014). T. N. Nguyen (2014) discovered that teachers did not thoroughly understand the concept. The majority of participants in her study did not express their trust in students' ability to take charge of their learning, and the majority of decisions regarding learning were perceived as the teachers' responsibility. Joshi (2011) explored teachers' perceptions of the concept of LA in Nepal. The study involved 80 master's level students and six teachers of English from the 85 Department of English Education, Tribhuvan University. The findings indicated that almost 80% of the teachers perceived themselves as being a facilitator. They thought that the factors contributing to autonomous language learning included intrinsic motivation to learn English; the prospect of a good result in the final exams; learner awareness; cultural factors; and other issues such as time and access. All the teachers believed that autonomous learning was the key to better language performance and command, and thought that autonomous learners are 'good learners'. Al-Busaidi and Al-Maamari (2014) conducted a study to explore 42 ELT teachers' beliefs about LA in Oman. The study focused on how teachers in this context defined the concept and the possible sources for their definitions. The study indicated that teachers in this context defined LA in three different ways. The first category of definitions were \"pragmatic conceptions\" (p. 2055) which focussed on issues directly relating to teachers' everyday teaching issues, such as curriculum, materials, assessment, teaching methodology or learning strategies. The second category were \"metacognitive\" definitions (p. 2055), which dealt with learning and strategies to improve learning. The third category were \"dualist conceptions\" of LA (p. 2055) in which teachers combined different notions such as control, freedom, content, process, result, responsibility, and right to describe various facets of LA. The study also revealed that teachers' perceptions of LA emerged from their language teaching, their language learning and their professional development. Another study in Oman was carried out by Borg and Al-Busaidi (2012), but this study had a different focus. It aimed to investigate teachers' understandings of LA in terms of psychological, technical, sociocultural and political dimensions, and their perceptions about a number of debated issues, including the role of the teacher in LA, factors hindering the development of LA and the contribution of LA to language learning. Borg and Al-Busaidi collected data using a 86 survey of 61 teachers and a follow-up interview of 42 volunteer teachers, and found that teachers in this context commonly perceived autonomy in terms of strategies for independent and individual learning. They expressed positive views towards the benefits of LA in language learning. They believed that autonomous learners are \"more motivated, more committed, happier, more focused and benefit more from learning opportunities outside the classroom\" (p. 15). The study also reported that teachers showed a more positive disposition to the desirability of autonomy than to the practicability of the concept, and they were not very positive about their own learners' autonomy. The findings also reported a number of barriers to the development of LA. These factors concerned learners (e.g., their reliance on the teacher, their low proficiency in English, their lack of motivation, and their insufficient of knowledge and skills for independent learning), teachers (e.g., their low autonomy and their low expectations of what their students can achieve) and the institution (e.g., prescribed curricula and limited resources). However, the teachers seemed to blame learner-related factors more often for hindering the promotion and development of LA. Following Borg and Al-Busaidi's study in 2012, a series of studies exploring teachers' perceptions and reported practices regarding autonomy were carried out in other contexts, mostly in Asian countries (Arshiyan and Pishkar (2015); Wichayathian and Reinders (2015); Haji-Othman and Wood (2016); Keuk and Heng (2016); Lengkanawati (2016); V. L. Nguyen (2016); Ranosa-Madrunio, Tarrayo, Tupas, and Valdez (2016); Stroupe, Rundle, and Tomita (2016); Tapinta (2016); Wang and Wang (2016); Borg and Alshumaimeri (2017); Field and Vane (2017)). These studies all replicated methods and instruments used in Borg and Al-Busaidi (2012), and revealed a number of significant themes about teachers' beliefs and reported practices. A number of findings in Borg and Al-Busaidi's study were also confirmed in these studies. 87 First, results highlighted that the concept of LA was perceived in a number of ways across the studied contexts, but the most commonly recorded notions were 'independence', 'control', 'responsibility' and 'freedom'. It was also suggested that autonomy was conceived of more in terms of a psychological dimension―mental features that enable autonomy (V. L. Nguyen, 2016; Wang & Wang, 2016)―and some aspects of LA were less evident and feasible in some contexts than in others. For example, Field and Vane (2017) found that teachers in New Zealand believed it was impracticable for tertiary students to manage decision-making about learning objectives and assessment, and V. L. Nguyen (2016) reported that LA regarding making choices and decisions was not common among students in the Vietnamese higher education context. Secondly, teachers in all these studies perceived themselves to be playing an important role in fostering learner autonomy, and they shared positive views towards the benefits of learner autonomy in language learning. Thirdly, perceptions of the desirability and the feasibility of promoting autonomy varied. For example, there was a mismatch between teachers' perceptions of the desirability and the feasibility of developing autonomy in Vietnam, China and Indonesia (Lengkanawati, 2016; V. L. Nguyen, 2016; Wang & Wang, 2016). Teachers seemed to be more positive about the desirability than the feasibility of the concept. However, in countries like Thailand and the Philippines, teachers showed a positive disposition towards autonomy both in theory and implementation (Duong, 2014; Ranosa-Madrunio et al., 2016), while in Cambodia, teachers were pessimistic about both these aspects (Haji-Othman & Wood, 2016). There seemed to be a consensus among all the teachers in these studies about factors adversely affecting the development of LA. These factors were mostly 88 concerned with the learner, the teacher and the institution. For example, 'prescribed' curricula, syllabus and materials were quoted as the most prominent institutional factors hindering autonomy (see for example Keuk & Heng, 2016; Ranosa-Madrunio et al., 2016), and \"lack of motivation\" (Borg & Alshumaimeri, 2017, p. 17), \"poor attitude\" and \"lack of general study skills\" (Wang & Wang, 2016, p. 33) were recognised as factors which were detrimental to learner autonomy. Cultural factors were also quoted as playing a part, but only in China, where teachers thought that the stereotype about Chinese students and teachers (e.g., that students are passive and reliant) prevented the development of autonomy (Wang & Wang, 2016). Finally, in all the aforementioned countries except for the Philippines, teachers were not positive about their students' level of autonomy. Typically, only 40 to 60 per cent of the teachers in these countries thought that their students had a 'fair degree' of autonomy (Borg & Alshumaimeri, 2017). 3.2.10.2. Learners' perceptions of learner autonomy It is crucial to know learner beliefs before planning for LA (Benson, 2001) because the beliefs or attitudes that students have about autonomy, language learning and autonomous language learning may have a great impact (either positive or negative) on their autonomous language learning behaviours (Cotterall, 1995; Chan, 2001a). A number of studies have explored students' perspectives, perceptions, beliefs and attitudes about different aspects of learning. These factors (i.e., students' perspectives, perception, etc.) can be used as indicators of students' level of readiness for autonomous learning. Cotterall is one of the pioneers of research on students' beliefs about language learning and their readiness for autonomous learning. In 1995, she conducted an empirical study to explore students' beliefs about language learning, from which she 89 made a judgement about students' readiness for autonomous learning. The study involved a survey questionnaire of 139 students learning English as a second language at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. The findings revealed that there existed six patterns of learners' beliefs about language learning: role of teacher, role of feedback, learner independence, learner confidence in study ability, experience of language learning, and approach to studying. These six patterns of beliefs set a foundation for later researchers' designs of questionnaire or interview questions to explore students' readiness for autonomous learning (see, for example, Cotterall, 1999; Chan, 2001a). The study also concluded that investigating learners' beliefs is crucial, and that these beliefs are likely to reflect learners' readiness for autonomy (Cotterall, 1995). Cotterall (1995)'s study set a basis for her follow-up studies to explore students' prospects of autonomous learning. For example, in 1999, Cotterall conducted an investigation about language learning beliefs held by students in an English learning program. Data were collected from 131 English language learners from 19 countries using a survey questionnaire developed from the findings of her previous study in 1995. The findings indicated that students in her study were willing and ready for autonomous learning. They believed that they needed to share responsibility with their teacher in language learning, and recognised that the main role of the teacher was to show them how to learn. Additionally, they accepted that there was no single way to learn a language, that success in language learning depended on their own efforts, and that \"making mistakes is a natural part of language learning\" (p.507). In 2001, Chan carried out two studies about English language students' readiness for autonomous learning and their perspectives on it in the Hong Kong higher education context (Chan, 2001a, 2001b). Both studies explored students' perceptions of the teacher's and their own role 90 in learning, their views about autonomous learning, and their learning preferences. The study about students' readiness for autonomous learning indicated that students had \"an initial awareness of the different role of the teacher and themselves\", showed positive attitudes towards autonomous learning, and appeared to be \"reasonably autonomous\" (Chan, 2001b, p. 514). However, the research also showed that students in the study were still at an early stage of learning to work autonomously (Chan, 2001b). The study on students' perspectives regarding autonomous learning showed that students still perceived the teacher to be holding a dominant role in language learning, and as being a primary decision maker (Chan, 2001a). Students also preferred group work to individual work, suggesting that they conceived autonomous learning as not only independence but also interdependence (Chan, 2001a). In 2002, Chan, Spratt and Humphreys conducted a study to investigate Hong Kong tertiary students' readiness for autonomous language learning. The study examined four different aspects, namely students' views on the responsibilities of themselves and their English teachers in the learning process; their perceptions of their decision-making abilities in English learning; their level of motivation; and the autonomous language learning activities that they carried out inside and outside the class. The study used a survey questionnaire of 508 students-356 females and 135 males-including 421 degree students and 87 higher diploma students from various academic departments and year levels. The findings showed that students in Hong Kong \"[had] definite views about the teachers' roles and their own responsibilities\" (p.13). They perceived their teacher as having greater responsibilities in areas such as course planning and classroom management, and they perceived themselves as being responsible for most of their outside-class activities. The findings also showed that while students held positive views regarding their own decision-making abilities and 91 motivation for learning English, their responses to the learning activities inside and outside class suggested a low level of autonomy. This was in opposition to the results from Cotterall's 1995 study, which found that students' beliefs about learning did indeed affect their learning behaviours. The study by Chan, Spratt, and Humphreys (2002) triggered a number of followup studies that adapted or adopted similar methods and instruments to investigate learners' perspectives on autonomy and autonomous language learning (Yıldırım, 2008; Sakai, Takagi, & Chu, 2010; T. V. Nguyen, 2011; Ahmadi, 2013; Abdel Razeq, 2014; Bekleyen & Selimoglu, 2016; Okay & Balçıkanlı, 2017). These studies presented insights into students' perceptions about autonomy and autonomous learning in various research contexts. For example, T. V. Nguyen (2011) explored the perceptions of nonEnglish major undergraduates and graduates of their responsibilities and abilities relating to autonomous learning, and inand outside-class activities for autonomous learning. The findings highlighted that LA was still an unfamiliar concept to students in Vietnam. There was a gap between students' desire to have more voice in the decisionmaking process and their actual abilities and activities, and between what they believed they could do autonomously and what they actually did autonomously. The study concluded that students were still struggling with learning autonomously. Other studies in different countries―Turkey (Yıldırım, 2008; Bekleyen & Selimoglu, 2016; Okay & Balçıkanlı, 2017), Palestine (Abdel Razeq, 2014), Iran (Ahmadi, 2013), and East Asian regions (Sakai, Chu, Takagi, & Lee, 2008) revealed similar results regarding students' perspectives on their own and their teacher's responsibilities in the learning process. Students in these countries perceived their teacher as having greater responsibility for students' language learning than the students themselves. They appeared to be reluctant to take on most in-class responsibilities and preferred to share or hand over these tasks 92 to their teacher. They only perceived themselves as being responsible for out-of-class tasks. The findings indicated that students in these countries might not be ready for autonomous learning, and they still needed a lot of support from their teachers to carry on their learning independently. 3.3. Assessment in relation to learner autonomy Assessment is generally referred to as \"a wide range of methods for evaluating pupil performance and attainment, including formal testing and examination, practical and oral assessment and classroom-based assessment carried out by teachers\" (Gipps, 2002, p. 73). It is undeniable that assessment plays an indispensable role in the process of teaching and learning. Gibbs (2006, p. 23) states that \"assessment frames learning, creates learning activity and orients all aspects of learning behaviours\". Assessment conveys the intentions of a program and implications of what is considered as most important in that program, and therefore contributes to students' perceptions of the curriculum and their engagement in the learning process (Boud & Falchikov, 2006). Therefore, assessment not only determines students' choice of learning content, learning method, learning effort and engagement in learning tasks set for them (Brown, Gibbs, & Glover, 2003; Gibbs & Simpson, 2004b; Gibbs, 2006; Gibbs & Dunbar-Goddet, 2007), but also influences students' approach to learning (Joughin, 2010). Given the significant role of assessment in students' learning, it is likely that assessment also has a profound impact on LA (Falchikov & Boud, 1989; Sadler, 1989; Gipps, 2002; Little, 2003a; Everhard, 2015a). However, the effects of assessment on LA depend largely on how assessment is used and which purposes it serves (Everhard, 2015a). Assessment is widely recognised in the literature as serving two main purposes: collecting evidence of students' achievement or level of performance against specified 93 standards or objectives, and supporting students' learning. These two purposes are often referred to as summative assessment, or assessment of learning (Wiliam & Black, 1996; Stiggins, 2005), and formative assessment, or assessment for learning (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Assessment Reform Group, 2002). The following sections will discuss the impacts of these two forms of assessment on LA. 3.3.1. Assessment of learning AoL is \"concerned with summing up or summarizing the achievement status of a student, and is geared towards reporting at the end of a course of study especially for the purpose of certification\" (Sadler, 1989, p. 120). Assessment serving this purpose is often high-stakes and teacher-directed, and typically happens at the end of a unit, program, course, project, semester or school year (Moss & Brookhart, 2009). LA and AoL are often viewed as being incompatible (Little, 2003a; Benson, 2015; Everhard, 2015a), since they are linked to different theories of learning with divergent epistemological assumptions about knowledge and how it is constructed. For example, LA is closely related to constructivist theories of learning (Candy, 1991; Benson, 1997; Little, 2007; Lamb, 2017), which emphasise the active role of learners in the construction of knowledge and the transaction and transformation of knowledge. LA denotes the active role of students in the process of teaching and learning in which they are the 'centre'. This entails students' greater involvement and participation both in the learning process itself, which includes assessment, and the decision-making around it. In contrast, AoL is often linked with behaviourist theories of learning, which arguably focus more on the product than the process of learning (James, 2006; Berry, 2009). Behaviourist perspectives of learning view knowledge as being transmitted from teachers to learners (Everhard, 2015a; Lamb, 2017). Therefore, learners are viewed as passive recipients of knowledge, and are often marginalised in the assessment process 94 because they are often not allowed to participate in the assessment of their learning outcomes. AoL is often believed to inhibit the development of LA (Little, 2003a; Harland et al., 2014; Benson, 2015; Wass et al., 2015). Little (2003a) claims that public examinations are detrimental to the development of LA because they might discourage the implementation of pedagogical measures appropriate to enhance the development of LA, and encourage the view of education as transmission of knowledge to the individual. Public examinations can also produce the washback effect that, in turn, leads to test-oriented teaching and learning, and constrains LA (Bailey, 1996, p. 257; Spratt, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Papakammenou, 2018; Tseng, You, Tsai, & Chen, 2019). Benson (2015) supports this argument. He believes that the washback effect of assessment makes it inimical to LA. He states: Once the assessment system has been put in practice, there is a natural tendency for decisions about curriculum, syllabus and lesson planning, and even day-today practices of teaching and learning, to be 'reverse engineered' so as to produce positive student outcomes within the system. Schools and teachers want their students to 'do well' and it is typically the assessment system that defines what 'doing well' means. Assessment-driven decisions often run counter to the kinds of processes that support learner autonomy. (p. viii) Testing and examinations also give rise to \"behaviour conditioning\", which has a negative effect on the development of autonomous learners (Harland et al., 2014; Wass et al., 2015, p. 1325). That is, students only learn when they have tests or exams or when they are awarded a grade or mark for their learning effort. The term 'behaviour conditioning' describes findings from an empirical study conducted in New Zealand. Harland et al. (2014) interviewed sixty-two students and teachers about their experience 95 of assessment in order to investigate the impacts of continuous, high-stakes assessment on students' learning and autonomy at a New Zealand university. They found that lecturers gave students graded assessments so frequently that students' learning became conditioned by grades. That is, if there were no grade involved in assessment, students would not study. The students' compliance to graded assessment, in turn, gave rise to an \"assessment arms race\" between lecturers who used grading to regulate student study behaviour (Harland et al., 2014, p. 7). The impact of assessment, in the form of graded tests or exams, on students' learning behaviours is so great that some teachers and students believe that these types of assessment can help to promote LA, and should be used to promote it (Harland et al., 2014; Vu & Shah, 2016). For example, Harland et al. (2014)'s findings also reveal a common view among lecturers that frequent graded assessment can move students towards autonomy because the lecturers believed that these practices can challenge students to learn regularly. This finding is supported by a study about Vietnamese students' self-directed learning ability in relation to English listening skills (Vu & Shah, 2016). Vu and Shah found that both teachers and learners blamed poor assessment methods and inadequate tests and exams for the students' poor self-directed learning, and they suggested organising more regular tests or examinations in English listening skills as a method to promote self-directed learning among students. These findings can be justified in terms of the effects of summative assessment on students' motivation to learn. It is widely accepted in the literature that summative assessment, especially graded assessment, can be a source of extrinsic motivation for learning (Harlen & Deakin Crick, 2003; Roediger III, Putnam, & Smith, 2011; Stan, 2012; Vaessen et al., 2017). In response to frequent summative assessment practices, students tend to study more regularly, make more effort to learn and build up their learning habits. Therefore, 96 on the surface, summative assessment appears to promote learning behaviours indicating LA. In this study, AoL is not perceived as being antagonistic to LA. Rather, it is viewed simply with regard to the extent to which assessment encourages or discourages students to exert their agency in learning. 3.3.2. Assessment for learning AfL, as opposed to AoL, refers to a range of assessment strategies designed to improve the quality of learning (Black & Jones, 2006). There is no single precise definition of AfL (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Assessment Reform Group, 2002). For example, Black and Wiliam (1998) identify feedback as the key element of formative assessment, and emphasise the transformational function of feedback on teaching and learning. In their view, formative assessment includes \"all those activities undertaken by teachers, and/or by their students, which provide information to be used as feedback to modify the teaching and learning activities in which they are engaged\" (pp. 7-8). Gipps (1999) focuses on the role of teachers in the formative assessment process. She defines formative assessment as \"the process of appraising, judging, or evaluating students' work or performance and using this to shape and improve their competence\" (p. 381). The Assessment Reform Group (2002, p. 2) describes AfL as \"the process of seeking and interpreting evidence for use by learners and their teachers to decide where the learners are and where they need to go and how best to get there\". This definition recognises the active role of the learners in assessment, and the signposting function of assessment information in helping teachers and learners to direct their teaching and learning towards one common goal of 'getting there'. A group of researchers at the Third International Conference on Assessment for Learning organised in New Zealand in 2009 also proposed that \"Assessment for learning is part of everyday practice by 97 students, teachers and peers that seeks, reflects and responds to information from dialogue, demonstration and observation in ways that enhance ongoing learning\" (cited in Klenowski, 2009, p. 264). This definition specifies that assessment is an everyday practice that is embedded in teaching and learning. Additionally, this definition recognises the role of students' peers in the assessment process, and emphasises that 'ongoing' learning is the prime goal that AfL promotes. In this study, the definition proposed in the Third International Conference on Assessment is adopted as the working definition for AfL. This is because such a definition resonates with a sociocultural perspective on assessment that identifies assessment as an integrated and embedded element of teaching and learning. 3.3.2.1. Relationship between AfL and learner autonomy AfL is associated with a transactional and transformational approach to teaching and learning in which students are viewed as agents who actively negotiate different aspects of learning with their teachers and other learners (Willis, 2011b; Everhard, 2015a). Therefore, LA is a significant aim of AfL (Sadler, 1989; Assessment Reform Group, 2002; Gibbs & Simpson, 2004a; Black & Wiliam, 2009; Woods, 2015). For example, the support for LA is embedded in the ten principles for AfL developed by the Assessment Reform Group (2002), because these principles indicate the significance of students becoming the assessors of their own learning and the importance of helping students to develop their ability to carry out self-assessment. Gibbs and Simpson (2004a) propose eleven conditions under which assessment supports learning. These conditions can be understood as those under which LA can be nurtured because they emphasise the role of assessment in guiding students to \"allocate sufficient time and effort to the most important aspects of the course\" (p. 14), \"engage in productive learning activity of an appropriate kind\" (p. 14), and make use of feedback for their 98 learning. Black and Wiliam (2009) propose a theory of formative assessment which identifies five key strategies, among which they identify strategies number 4- activating students as instructional resources for one another-and 5-activating students as the owners of their own learning-as \"particularly relevant to the development of students' own capacity to learn how to learn and to learner autonomy\" (p. 8) The impacts of AfL on LA can vary depending on many factors, including how AfL is used in the class, types of AfL to be used, and teacher-student relationship in AfL, especially the teacher-student power relationship. AfL does not automatically lead to LA. The application of AfL strategies can lead to different results in autonomy promotion. Marshall and Drummond (2006) distinguished between 'spirit' and 'letter' AfL lessons. Spirit AfL lessons are the ones whose underpinning principle is to promote LA. Letter AfL lessons, in contrast, only apply AfL procedures. Marshall and Drummond reported that only a fifth of the twenty-seven lessons they observed appeared to capture the 'spirit' of AfL, meaning that only one-fifth of the lessons promoted the goal of LA. Pryor and Crossouard (2008) proposed two types of formative assessment: convergent and divergent. The former refers to a teacher's attempt to determine if learners know, understand or can do some predetermined thing through the tools of closed and pseudo-open questions and tasks where the idea about what constitutes a correct answer is clear at least to the teacher. The latter refers to a teacher's attempt to establish what students know, understand and can do through the use of open questions where there is no predetermined answer. In terms of LA promotion, teachers adopting a divergent approach are more likely to achieve LA goals through 99 orchestrating a learning environment in which learning is mediated through partnership and interactions to assessment (Willis, 2011b). The teacher-student relationship in AfL is significant in promoting LA (Gipps, 2002; Pryor & Crossouard, 2008; Willis, 2011a). A supportive and trustworthy relationship can encourage students to gain affiliation with the identity of an autonomous learner, which is \"the precursor for autonomy\" (Willis, 2011a, p. 409). Willis found in her three case studies conducted in Queensland middle school classes that teachers used various methods to help students participate and find affiliation with the identity of an autonomous learner. The methods they used were (1) connecting with students; (2) sharing stories; (3) constructing socially safe and peer-supportive learning environments; (4) sharing ownership of learning; (5) leaving space for students to be experts; (6) renegotiating resistance; and (7) understanding tacit negotiation of identity (Willis, 2011a). The supportive learning relationship created by AfL practices also encourages students to engage in assessment (Cowie, 2005). This engagement helps to promote their autonomy in learning. Picón Jácome (2012) findings from an action research study indicated that students developed metacognition, critical thinking and a sense of ownership of their learning process when they took part in a teacher-student partnership writing assessment. As discussed earlier, the core tenet of AfL is the recognition of the learner's active role in learning and assessment. This requires the sharing of power and control with students within the classroom so that LA can be enabled (Gipps, 2002; Marshall & Drummond, 2006). That is, students should be involved in making decisions about different aspects of learning and assessment. Understanding the power relationship between teachers and learners in the context of assessment is important in order to identify the factors in assessment that enable or constrain LA. 100 3.3.2.2. Assessment-embedded learning tasks in relation to autonomy As discussed earlier, AfL is perceived in this study as an integrated, embedded element in the teaching and learning process, and hence it is inseparable from tasks or activities designed for teaching and learning. Therefore, when investigating the factors in assessment practice that inhibit or facilitate the demonstration of LA, it is necessary to take into consideration the design of learning tasks that teachers use in their class, especially the level of conceptual space for students' involvement and decision-making in these learning tasks. Language tasks are understood in this study as incorporating any kind of language activity, including language exercises that are designed for learning (Ellis, 2003). This study will use the framework proposed by Ellis (2003) for analysing language tasks. According to this framework, a language task necessarily consists of four main elements: • Goal: the general purpose of the task, what it aims to promote in students or what it wants the students to achieve after completing the task, e.g., to practise the ability to describe an object precisely; to provide an opportunity for the use of a relative clause. • Input: the verbal or non-verbal information supplied by the task, e.g., a picture, a map or a written text. • Conditions: the methodological procedures that students need to follow in doing the task, e.g., group work or pair work; planning time or no planning time. • Predicted outcomes, including outcomes in terms of product and process. The product is the result from completing the task. The outcomes in terms of product can be closed (i.e., allow for only one correct answer) or open (i.e., allow for multiple possibilities). The outcome in terms of process refers to the linguistic and cognitive process the task is hypothesised to generate. 101 (Ellis, 2003, p. 21) The outcome of a task and the power relationship between teacher and student in the task can indicate the level of autonomy in the task. In terms of learning outcomes, Black, Harrison, Lee, Marshall, and Wiliam (2004) argue that \"differences between learning tasks can be understood in terms of a spectrum. At one end are 'closed' tasks with a single well-defined outcome; at the other are 'open' tasks with a wide range of acceptable outcomes\" (p.18). This means that the task with closed outcomes offers less autonomy for students than the task with open outcomes. In terms of power relationships, levels of autonomy offered (see section 3.2.6) can also be judged on a spectrum with teachers at one end and students at the other (see Table 3.5). Table 3.5 Spectrum of autonomy offered in language tasks Prescribed Bounded Open Teachers decide Input Procedures Conditions Output (closed) Teacher and learners co-decide Input Procedures Conditions Output (open) Learners decide Input Procedures Conditions Output 3.3.2.3. AfL assessment techniques and implications for LA Among the AfL strategies specified in the literature, the researcher has identified the following AfL practices as being aligned with the principles of autonomous learning: • Questioning • Feedback • Self/peer-assessment (Dickinson, 1987; Sadler, 1989; Boud, 1995; Little, 2003b; Black & Wiliam, 2009; Moss & Brookhart, 2009). The following subsections will review these practices to illustrate how they are integrated in teaching and learning, and their implications for LA. 102 Questioning In classroom settings, questioning techniques can be defined as \"instructional cues or stimuli that convey to students the content elements to be learned and directions for what they are to do and how they are to do it\" (Cotton, p. 1). Questioning is one of the most common formative assessment techniques to check students' understanding (Richards & Lockhart, 1994; Black & Wiliam, 1998; Assessment Reform Group, 2002). Research has shown that questioning can constitute up to half the class time (Cotton, 1988; Galll, 1984 cited in Richards & Lockhart, 1994; Jiang, 2014), suggesting how influential this technique can be to the students' learning and development. As this study focuses on the demonstration of LA in assessment practices, the main objective of this section is to evaluate the extent of autonomy offered in different types of questioning techniques. Questioning is believed to contribute to students' critical and creative thinking, metacognitive skills, and ability to take responsibility for their learning, if it is used in the right way (Cotton, 1988; Moss & Brookhart, 2009; Lores González, 2010; Tofade, Elsner, & Haines, 2013; Davoudi & Sadeghi, 2015). Questioning techniques can be classified into two major categories: teacher-initiated and learner-initiated, and the latter is believed to better promote LA demonstration (Moss & Brookhart, 2009). This is because allowing and encouraging students to ask questions can boost intentional and active participation and encourage students to acquire knowledge on their own (Cotton, 1988). Additionally, Moss and Brookhart believe that students' participation in questioning can \"promote learner autonomy and independence and develop students' perceptions of themselves as producers of knowledge and generator of lines of inquiry and nurture students' confidence to work though difficulties themselves\" (p. 17). The impact of teacher-initiated questions on students' learning approaches and cognitive development can vary depending on the types of questions that teachers use 103 with their students. In the literature, there are various approaches to classifying teacherinitiated questions. Richards and Lockhart (1994) categorise questions into \"procedural questions\" (which deal with \"classroom procedures and routines, and classroom management\") \"convergent questions\", and \"divergent questions\" (which deal with lesson content (pp. 186-187)). What distinguishes convergent questions from divergent questions is the nature of the responses. Reponses to convergent questions are often short and in the form of 'yes' or 'no'. They do not always require high-level thinking, but focus on the recall of factual or previously presented information. By contrast, divergent questions require longer responses and a higher level of thinking (Richards & Lockhart, 1994). Teacher-initiated questions can also be classified based on Bloom's Taxonomy of cognitive complexity, which covers knowledge, comprehension, application to inference, analysis, synthesis and evaluation (Krathwohl & Anderson, 2001; Krathwohl, 2002; McComas & Abraham, 2004; Neal, 2011). Questions in this case are often classified into 'lower order' and 'higher order' (Cotton, 1988). Other question classifications include closed questions and open-ended questions (Wu, 1993; Moss & Brookhart, 2009), display questions and referential questions (Long and Sato, 1983 cited in Wu, 1993). Despite their differences, these approaches to classifying questions share common features in that they are based on the responses required and the level of cognition involved in answering the questions (see Table 3.6). Table 3.6 Summary of different types of questions Typology of questions Author Procedural Convergent Divergent (Richards & Lockhart, 1994) Display Referential Long and Sato (1983 cited in (Wu, 1993) Closed Open-ended (Wu, 1993) 104 (Moss & Brookhart, 2009) Lower level/lower cognitive Higher order/higher cognitive level (Cotton, 1988) (Krathwohl & Anderson, 2001) Lower convergent Higher convergent Lower divergent Higher convergent (McComas & Abraham, 2004) It is widely agreed in the literature that higher order, open and divergent questions can facilitate students' critical thinking and metacognitive skills and promote a deep learning approach. This is because such questions often involve reasoning, elaboration, judgement and high-level cognitive skills, elicit discussion and brainstorming ideas for solutions to a problem, and afford opportunities for learners to think outside the box (Hargreaves, 1984; Roth, 1996; Neal, 2011; Lee & Kinzie, 2012; Toni & Parse, 2013; Davoudi & Sadeghi, 2015). Davoudi and Sadeghi (2015) conducted a systematic review of empirical studies from 1974 to 2014 and concluded that \"asking higher level questions is absolutely necessary for the development of critical thinking ability\" (p. 86). In contrast, lower level, closed and convergent questions focus on recalling factual or previously presented information and produce closed responses to questions for which the answers are predefined and known to the teacher, and therefore do not promote critical thinking, high level cognitive skills and a deep learning approach (Hargreaves, 1984; Richards & Lockhart, 1994; Roth, 1996; Neal, 2011). Asking higher order questions does not necessarily ensure that students produce higher cognitive responses (Cotton, 1988). In a similar vein, asking higher cognitive, open and divergent questions does not necessarily lead to students demonstrating higher levels of autonomy. However, it is reasonable to argue that higher cognitive, open and 105 divergent questions offer more space for students to exert their agency than lower cognitive, closed and convergent questions, and therefore may support students to demonstrate higher levels of autonomy. Table 3.7 summarises the levels of autonomy offered in different questioning techniques. Table 3.7 Level of autonomy in questioning techniques Prescribed Bounded Open Teacher-initiated questions Student-initiated questions Closed questions Convergent questions Display questions Lower cognitive questions Open questions Divergent questions Referential questions Higher cognitive questions Feedback Feedback has been described as \"information provided by an agent (e.g., teacher, peer, book, parent, self, experience) regarding aspects of one's performance or understanding\" (Hattie & Timperley, 2007, p. 81). Feedback is considered the most influential component of assessment, \"the key element in formative assessment\", and \"a key link between assessment and learning\" (Sadler, 1989, p. 120; Black & Wiliam, 1998; Gipps, 2002, p. 78; Hattie & Timperley, 2007). In relation to LA, feedback is often discussed in the literature in relation to students' self-regulation, which refers to \"an active constructive process whereby learners set goals for their learning and then attempt to monitor, regulate, and control their cognition, motivation, and behaviour, guided and constrained by their goals and the contextual features in the environment\" (Pintrich, 2000, p. 453). This concept is akin to the concept of LA, because they are both concerned with aspects including goalsetting, monitoring learning and control, and they both involve active engagement, goaldirected behaviour, metacognitive skills, intrinsic motivation, and learner characteristics (Murray, 2014). 106 It is widely accepted in the literature that feedback plays a significant role in self-regulated learning, and is \"an inherent catalyst\" for all self-regulated activities, prompting students' participation in self-regulated learning (Butler & Winne, 1995, p. 246; Nicol & Macfarlane‐Dick, 2006; Chung & Yuen, 2011; Clark, 2012). Feedback is argued to be an essential component in self-regulated learning models (Butler & Winne, 1995; Nicol & Macfarlane‐Dick, 2006), suggesting that LA is an outcome of the feedback process. This is because during the learning process, learners receive external feedback from their teacher and peers, and this feedback later helps learners generate internal feedback using their knowledge, beliefs and motivation. Therefore, feedback should be positioned within a model of self-regulation because of its multiple and multifaceted roles in learning (Butler & Winne, 1995). Nicol and Macfarlane‐Dick (2006, p. 205) expanded Butler and Winne's model by answering the question of how feedback can help to promote self-regulated learning (Chung & Yuen, 2011). They proposed seven rules of feedback that can support self-regulated learning: • It helps to clarify what good performance is (goals, criteria, expected standards) • It facilitates the development of self-assessment (reflection in learning) • It delivers high quality information to students about their learning • It encourages teacher and peer dialogue around learning • It encourages positive motivational beliefs and self-esteem • It provides opportunities to close the gap between current and desired performance • It provides information to teachers that can be used to help shape teaching (Nicol & Macfarlane‐Dick, 2006, p. 205) According to Hattie (2007), feedback should help students to address three questions: 'Where am I going?', 'How am I going?', and 'Where to next?' (p. 88). He 107 contends that feedback can help students to answer these questions by focusing on four levels: task level, process level, self-regulation level and self-level. At task level, feedback is often more information focused; hence, it leads to acquiring more or different information and building more surface knowledge. Feedback focusing on process often provides strategies for error detection. This level of feedback enhances deeper levels of learning, and promotes LA better than feedback at task level. Feedback focusing on the self-regulation level can enhance students' skills in self-evaluation, provide greater confidence to engage further in the task, assist students in seeking and accepting feedback, and can enhance willingness to invest in seeking and dealing with feedback. This type of feedback can therefore promote the highest level of autonomy. Feedback focusing on self involves students' ego, and often comes in the form of praise. Hattie & Timperley (2007) argue that this type of feedback does not add value because it often \"directs attention away from the task, processes and self-regulation\" (Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Hattie, 2011, p. 7) Active learner involvement in the feedback process is the key for its effectiveness because feedback can only become effective when actions are taken to improve learning (Price, Handley, Millar, & O'donovan, 2010; Boud & Molloy, 2013; Carless & Boud, 2018). This indicates that LA is not only an end, but also a means to an end. Feedback can be analysed in terms of the power relationship between teacher and learner (Gipps, 2002), and this relationship can carry implications for LA promotion and demonstration. Feedback is generally categorised into feedback relating to a person and feedback relating to a task (Tunstall & Gipps, 1996; Hill & McNamara, 2012). Feedback relating to a person involves judgements, evaluations and affect about a learner, and is also referred to as \"evaluative feedback\" (Tunstall & Gipps, 1996, p. 108 393), or \"person-referenced\" feedback (Hill & McNamara, 2012, p. 406). It often takes the form of a reward or punishment, praise, approval or disapproval. Feedback strategies relating to a person are often teacher-controlled. Feedback about tasks relates to students' performance relative to task requirements and/or qualities and standards of performance, and is also referred to as \"descriptive feedback\" (Tunstall & Gipps, 1996, p. 393), or \"task-referenced\" feedback (Hill & McNamara, 2012, p. 406). The power relationship in this type of feedback is dependent upon the feedback strategies that the teacher uses. Tunstall and Gipps (1996, p. 393) classify descriptive feedback into \"specifying\" feedback (i.e., specifying attainment and specifying achievement) and \"constructing feedback\" (i.e., constructing achievement and constructing the way forward). In specifying feedback, teachers acknowledge specific attainment, use models for work and behaviour, use specific criteria to diagnose problems, correct and check procedures, through all of which they remain in control of the feedback process. Constructing feedback relates to \"teachers' use of both sharp and contextualised 'fuzzy' criteria; use of teacher and child work exemplars; teacher-child assessment of work; the use of strategies for self-regulation\" (p. 309). In this type of feedback, teachers share power and control with pupils. Pupils can negotiate assessment criteria and participate in the assessment process, indicating that they can enjoy and demonstrate more autonomy in constructing feedback than in other types of feedback. Hill and McNamara (2012, pp. 406-407) categorise \"task-referenced\" feedback into \"confirmatory\", \"explanatory\" and \"corrective\" feedback. Confirmatory feedback happens when a single correct response is required. Explanatory feedback is used to emphasise or explain a successful aspect of the student's performance. Corrective feedback is used to identify the gap between students' performance and expected performance. 109 Levels of student involvement in corrective feedback can vary according to different strategies used. Ferreira, Moore, and Mellish (2007) classify corrective feedback strategies into 'giving-answer' and 'prompting-answer' strategies. Givinganswer strategies are feedback in which the teacher directly corrects the mistake in the student's answer or provides the student with location of their mistake. This type of feedback includes strategies such as \"repetition\", \"recast\", \"explicit commenting\", and \"give answer\" (p. 392). Prompting-answer strategies refer to \"types of feedback moves in which the teacher pushed students to notice a language error in their response and to repair the error for themselves\", and include \"metalinguistic cues\", \"classification requests\", and \"elicitation\" (p. 392). Prompting-answer strategies appear to offer more space for students' autonomy than giving-answer strategies. Table 3.7 synthesises common types and strategies of feedback in the literature. 110 Table 3.8 Summary of feedback models and strategies Evaluation Descriptive (Tunstall & Gipps, 1996) Rewarding Punishing Approving Disapproving Specifying attainment Specifying improvement Constructing Achievement Constructing the way forward Person-referenced Task-referenced (Hill & McNamara, 2012) Confirmatory Explanatory Corrective Correctiveanswer strategies (repeat, recast, explicit correction, give answer) Promptinganswer strategies (Meta-language cue Classification requests elicitation) (Ferreira et al., 2007) Feedback about self (praise) Feedback about task (error detection and correction Feedback about process Feedback about selfregulation (selfevaluation) (Hattie, 2011) 111 Table 3.9. represents the levels of autonomy offered in different feedback types and strategies. It is based on the power relationship between teacher and student reflected in different feedback types and strategies, and levels of space for students' involvement offered in these types and strategies. Table 3.9 Levels of autonomy offered in feedback practices Prescribed Bounded Open Evaluative/personreferenced/feedback about self Praise Rewarding Punishing Approving Disapproving Confirmatory Explanatory Giving-answer strategies Feedback about process Constructing feedback Prompting-answer strategies Feedback about self-regulation Self/peer-assessment There are studies indicating that self-assessment can significantly improve students' ability to take control of and responsibility for their learning (Falchikov & Boud, 1989; Sadler, 1989; Boud, 1995; Gardner, 2000; Berry, 2009; Taras, 2010; Brown & Harris, 2013; Panadero, Brown, & Strijbos, 2016; Shelton-Strong, 2018). Self-assessment refers to the \"involvement of students in identifying standards and/or criteria to apply to their work and making judgements about the extent to which they have met these criteria and standards\" (Boud, 1991, p. 5 cited in Boud, 1995, p. 12). This definition indicates two phases in self-assessment: identifying criteria or standards and making judgements based on these criteria or standards. This definition also implies the internalisation of criteria or standards in the self/peer-assessment process, because without this, students cannot move to the next phase of controlling their progress. Self-assessment has a strong theoretical connection with LA (Holec, 1981; Dickinson, 1987; Harris, 1997; Gardner, 2000; Tholin, 2008; Panadero et al., 2017; Han & Fan, 2019). Boud (1995) argues that \"if learners were to take responsibility for their 112 own learning, then part of this process was, inevitably, their involvement in making assessments of their own learning goals, the activities in which they were to engage and the ways in which they would judge the outcomes\" (p. 5). Harris (1997) argues that selfassessment is \"rightly seen as one of the pillars of learner autonomy\" (p. 12) because this strategy allows students to monitor their progress and identify the meanings of learning in relation to their personal needs. Gardner (2000) contends that selfassessment is a crucial tool in the toolkit for autonomous learning because it can provide students with instant feedback on their progress and the effectiveness of their learning strategies. Tholin (2008) believes that self-assessment is a \"natural element of self-directed learning\" (p. 10) because it helps learners develop self-awareness of their learning in order to move forward (Boud, 1995). Little and Berry also confirm the inevitability of selfand peer-assessment in the teaching and learning process if one aims to promote LA (Little, 2004b, 2005; Berry, 2009; Little, 2009; Little & Erickson, 2015). This is because these assessment practices are central to evaluation―the \"pivot of learner autonomy\" (Dam, 1995; Dam & Legenhausen, 2011) and reflection-one of the underlying factors of LA development (Little, 1999a; Reinders, 2010) which Everhard (2015a, p. 30) considers the \"glue\" binding assessment and autonomy together. The relationship between LA and self/peer-assessment is supported by empirical studies. Berry (2009) conducted an empirical study about the relationship between selfassessment and LA in English learning in Hong Kong tertiary education. She implemented four self-assessment techniques: \"need analysis\", \"concept-mapping\", \"checklist\", and \"final reflection\" (pp. 9-10), and broke down LA into 11 attributes (p. 3) in order to measure it. The findings support the claim that self-assessment can promote LA, but on the condition that self-assessment tasks are carefully designed and 113 delivered. She states, \"being able to do self-assessment is not innate, but has to be empowered\" (Berry, 2009, pp. 13-14). This argument supports statements by Sambell, McDowell, and Sambell (2006) that self-assessment needs to be introduced to students deliberately and with sufficient support if it is to develop LA. This argument for the gradual and scaffolded introduction of self-assessment to students suggests that they can take up incremental levels of LA through self-assessment. At the initial stage, they might need a lot of support and scaffolding from the teacher in order to develop necessary skills and abilities, while in the later stage, they can demonstrate more autonomy in this respect (Sambell et al., 2006). The positive impact of self/peer-assessment and LA is also supported by findings from subsequent empirical research and meta-analysis research (Adediwura, 2012; Gholami, 2016; Panadero et al., 2016; Panadero et al., 2017; Sierra & Frodden, 2017; Shelton-Strong, 2018). For example, Sierra and Frodden (2017) carried out an action research study that aimed to develop LA through the use of self-assessment in an English course at a Colombian university. They implemented five strategies relating to self-assessment in their research: (1) discuss with students the importance of selfassessment to raise their awareness of that aspect, (2) train students to develop their capacity to self-assess, (3) negotiate with students about assessment criteria used for self-assessment, (4) allow students to carry out self-assessment of their work periodically, and (5) ask students to reflect on their own self-assessment. The findings indicated improvement in LA in terms of affective and metacognitive aspects. The study also emphasised the crucial facilitative role of teachers in students' self-assessment processes. Panadero et al. (2017) conducted a meta-analysis review of 19 studies which involved 2305 students. Their findings confirmed that self-assessment interventions have a positive impact on students' self-regulated learning strategies. Shelton-Strong 114 (2018) conducted a classroom-based intervention study on about 80 students in four English classes at tertiary level in Japan. He used assessment descriptors to engage students in self/peer-assessment of speaking tasks, performance in class, and project work over a period of one semester. Results from the self-evaluation questionnaire after the semester suggested that students developed their metacognitive skills and awareness after the intervention, affording opportunities for the demonstration of LA through reflection. There are different self/peer-assessment techniques, and there have been attempts to categorise these techniques into self-assessment typologies in the literature (e.g., Boud & Brew, 1995; Brew, 1999; Taras, 2010; Brown & Harris, 2013; Panadero & Alonso-Tapia, 2013). For example, Boud and Brew (1995) and Brew (1999) categorise self/peer-assessment based on Habermas's notion of 'knowledge constitutive interests', which consist of three different interests: technical, communicative and emancipatory. Assessment serving technical interests often involves students checking their knowledge, skills and understanding against objective criteria or standards. Assessment serving communicative interests involves communication and interpretation of assessment elements such as criteria or standards. Assessment serving emancipatory interests involves students' critical reflection about the standards or criteria used to assess their work and maybe producing their own criteria or standards for their judgement. Taras (2010) arranges self-assessment along a continuum from \"stronger\" to \"weaker\", based on students' access to power and decision making. The weaker model of self-assessment includes \"self-marking\" in which students use a model answer with criteria to compare it with their work, and \"sound standard\" in which students are provided with descriptors of medium level work and exemplars of work for reference (p. 202). The median or \"standard\" model (p. 203) requires students to judge their work 115 using provided criteria. The stronger model is \"self-assessment with integrated tutor feedback\" (p. 204) which involves the integration of tutor and peer feedback before students can self-assess. The strongest model is \"learning contract design\" (p. 205) in which self-assessment is incorporated in a learning contract where students make all decisions regarding content, methods and evaluation of learning. Brown and Harris (2013) classify self-assessment practices into three major types based on the methods associated with these practices: self-ratings, self-estimates of performance, and criteria or rubric-based assessments (p. 372). \"Self-ratings\" involve students' judging the quality and quantity of their work using a rating system. \"Self-rating\" practices can include techniques such as self-marking or grading against a marking guide or (a) model answer(s). \"Self-estimates of performance\" involve students' estimations of their level of performance or ability in a test or a task. These estimations can be in the form of a test mark or score, rank or grade. \"Criteria or rubric-based assessments\" guide students in judging their work against a description of quality from low to high. Panadero and Alonso-Tapia (2013) categorise self-assessment practices into three groups based on the presence and form of assessment criteria: \"self-grading without assessment criteria\", \"self-assessment using rubrics\", and \"self-assessment using scripts\" (p. 567). Rubrics and scripts are different, in that the former include criteria and performance standards with examples, while the latter include criteria in the form of questions for students to answer while they are doing an assessment. Table 3.10 synthesises typologies of selfassessment in the literature. Table 3.10 Summary of typologies of self/peer-assessment Typology of self/peer-assessment Author Technical interest Self-rating Self-making Communicative interest Involvement in criteria determination Emancipatory interest Critical reflection of criteria or (Boud & Brew, 1995; Brew, 1999) 116 Reflective question standards, building own criteria or standards for assessment Weaker Self-marking Sound standard Median Standard model Stronger Selfassessment with integrated tutor feedback Strongest Learning contract design (Taras, 2010) Selfassessment using rubric Self-assessment using scripts Self-grading and self-rating without criteria (Panadero & Alonso-Tapia, 2013) Self-ratings Self-estimate of performance Criteria or rubric-based assessment (Brown & Harris, 2013) As discussed earlier, the criteria for categorisation of the self-assessment typologies in Table 3.10 are not the same. However, one shared feature among these typologies involves the levels of students' involvement in different self-assessment techniques, indicating that different autonomy levels are embedded in these techniques. These differing levels suggest that not all self-assessment techniques have the same effect on LA. For example, some self-assessment practices such as self-rating, selftesting (Boud & Brew, 1995, p. 131; Brew, 1999, p. 160; Brown & Harris, 2013) and self-marking (Taras, 2010, p. 202) allow very little room for students' involvement, and, in turn, for students to demonstrate their autonomy. Students are like 'marking machines' when doing these self-assessment practices. They are not expected to engage with nor discuss the criteria or standard being used, because these are normally predefined and fixed. Other self-assessment techniques such as \"learning design contract\" (Taras, 2010, p. 205) and \"self-grading and self-rating without criteria\" (Panadero & Alonso-Tapia, 2013, p. 576) allow wider space for students to participate 117 in the process and demonstrate their autonomy. They can not only judge their work, but also participate in determining criteria and standards for their judgement and make decisions regarding their learning. In this study, it is argued that self/peer-assessments allowing different levels of conceptual space for students' involvement can contribute to the demonstration of different levels of LA. Based on the earlier description of different techniques, self/peerassessments are classified along a continuum of autonomy as illustrated in Table 3.11. Table 3.11 Levels of autonomy in self/peer-assessment techniques Prescribed Bounded Open Self/peer marking Self/peer ratings Reflective questions Self/peer-assessment using rubric Self/peer-assessment using scripts Self/peer-assessment using standard model Self-estimate of performance Involvement in determination of criteria Self/peer grading and self/peer rating without criteria Learning contract Critical reflection of criteria or standards, building own criteria or standards for assessment Chapter Summary This chapter has provided a review of literature on (a) the central concepts of sociocultural theories and their implications for the conceptualisation of LA and assessment and the relationship between the two (b) the fundamental issues relating to understanding and implementing LA, and (c) the relationship of assessment with LA. The literature review indicates that LA is a complicated, multifaceted and problematic construct (Little, 1991; Benson & Voller, 1997; Oxford, 2003; Benson, 2011; Everhard, 2015a; Lamb, 2017). The majority of academics adopting a sociocultural perspective perceive LA as being an innate capacity that can be facilitated or inhibited by the sociocultural and contextual factors making up the learning environment. From this perspective, LA is more about the relationship between learners and the learning 118 environment than a personal attribute. The emergent product of this relationship can be understood as the students' demonstration of LA in a particular situation. Such a demonstration of LA depends not only on students' innate ability for autonomy, but also on the extent to which contextual factors make allowances for autonomy to be demonstrated. This highlights a need to investigate students' demonstration of LA in a particular context, as well as the sociocultural and contextual factors in that context which support or discourage students from demonstrating LA. Under the lens of sociocultural theories, assessment can be conceptualised as being embedded in, integrated with, and inseparable from teaching and learning, and can therefore be viewed as the context in which students demonstrate their autonomy in learning. The literature review has also shown that assessment has a significant impact on LA, depending largely on how it is used and what purposes it serves. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of assessment in a particular context can help researchers to understand LA in that context and recognise the potential facilitative and inhibitive factors in relation to LA. 119 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN Chapter overview This chapter describes how the research was designed to investigate the impacts of assessment practices on the demonstration of LA. The first section discusses the paradigms underpinning the research-the ontology and epistemology- that the researcher holds about being and knowledge. The second section deals with research methodology for the study. The third section is about the case study design-the selection of the case, the research site and participants. The fourth section describes the process of data analysis. The fifth section deals with measures to ensure the quality of the research. The last section deals with ethical issues in the study. 4.1. Research paradigm The phenomena of 'language', 'learning', 'autonomy' and 'assessment' are not ontologically self-existent or epistemologically simple, but brought into being by human-to-human interactions. This research into English language learning, LA and assessment therefore adopts a constructivist perspective as the theoretical framework underpinning the study. Constructivist inquirers tend to hold a relativist ontology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Scotland, 2012). That is, they believe in the existence of multiple constructed realities rather than a single true one. According to Schwandt (1994), constructivists attend to the \"pluralistic and plastic character of reality\" (p. 236). Reality is deemed pluralistic because it is expressed through various symbol and language systems, and it is plastic in the sense that it is \"stretched and shaped to fit purposeful acts of intentional human agents\" (Schwandt, 1994, p. 236). From a constructivist perspective, reality is 120 socially constructed (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012), subjective and determined by \"the individual's experience and perceptions, the social environment, and the interaction between the individual and the researcher\" (Ponterotto, 2005, p. 130). Realities are alterable and judged in terms of their informedness or sophistication rather than their truthfulness (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Knowledge from a constructivist perspective is relative and dependent upon how individuals construct their \"unique personal meaning system on the same objective reality\" (Benson, 1997, p. 21). Candy (1991) proposes that knowledge is not the replication or the reflection of reality. Instead, \"individuals try to give meaning to, or construe, the perplexing maelstrom of events and ideas in which they find themselves caught up\" (p. 254). Knowledge has the characteristic of being \"culturally derived and historically situated\" (Scotland, 2012, p. 12) and is \"embedded in people's experiences\" (Merriam, 1998, p. 19). Therefore, knowledge of reality involves comprehension of numerous perspectives of people in a specific situation (Petty et al., 2012). Constructivist investigators advocate a transactional and subjectivist perspective which centres the dynamic interaction between the investigator and the object of investigation in order to capture and describe the participants' lived experiences (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Ponterotto, 2005). Ponterotto (2005) emphasises that deeper meaning can only be uncovered through interaction, and findings of an investigation are co-constructed through interactive dialogue and interpretation by the researcher and the participants. Among a number of constructivist perspectives, this study was explicitly informed by sociocultural theories of learning, which view learning as a social process in which students actively participate, and take into consideration all the factors involved in this process and the interactions between them (Vygotsky, 1978; Lantolf, 2006; John-Steiner & Mahn, 2013). From these perspectives, learning is situated and 121 mediated (Rogoff, 1990; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Kao, 2010; Lin, 2018). That is, learning is an internalisation process, which occurs through the social interactions of learners with other people and artefacts in a specific culture or context. In the process of interaction and internalisation, learners always play an active role, while other people (like peers and teachers) are merely the mediators who scaffold them in their development (Vygotsky, 1978; Rogoff, 1990; John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996; Rogoff, 2003; Kao, 2010; Lin, 2018). This study's methodology was devised to fulfil its primary aim: to investigate the impact of assessment practices on the demonstration of learner autonomy in the context of EFL classrooms in the Vietnamese higher education context. The study required an in-depth analysis of EFL teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment, their interpretations and understanding of learner autonomy, and the manifestations of these perspectives and understanding in practice. The study also included analysis of the context of the researched university in order to find factors in assessment practice that constrain or facilitate learner autonomy within the context of the university. The sociocultural perspective required the researcher to pay close attention to the sociocultural context of VHE while interpreting the impact of assessment practices on the demonstration of learner autonomy. The interaction between teacher and students in the learning process was also scrutinised under the lens of sociocultural theories. Additionally, it was necessary to investigate in-depth factors (e.g., relating to beliefs and attitudes) arising from the teachers and the students which might have significantly impacted their practices. Taking all these together, the researcher adopted a qualitative case study as the research methodology for this study. Justifications for this choice are presented in the next section. 122 4.2. Case study approach 4.2.1. Qualitative case study There is no single precise definition of 'case study' in the literature because case studies are often used for different purposes, in different disciplines and with different underpinning theoretical stances (Simons, 2009). However, there is consensus among scholars and researchers about the purpose and focus of case studies as in-depth explorations of a phenomenon (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Crowe et al., 2011; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Mills, Harrison, Franklin, & Birks, 2017). Case studies focus on the particularity (Stake, 1995; Merriam, 2009; Thomas, 2011), the complexity (Stake, 1995; Simons, 2009), the uniqueness (Simons, 2009) and the boundedness (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003; Punch, 2013; Ary, Jacobs, Sorensen, & Walker, 2014; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015) of a phenomenon or a system. A qualitative case study methodology was chosen because it offers several advantages. First, a qualitative case study can back up the description and exploration of a phenomenon within its context using diverse data resources and from multiple perspectives, which helps researchers to uncover and understand various facets of the issue (Yin, 2003; Baxter & Jack, 2008; Simons, 2009; Crowe et al., 2011; Mills et al., 2017). Denscombe (2010) states that a \"case study approach works best when the researcher wants to investigate an issue in-depth and provide an explanation that can cope with the complexity and subtlety of real-life situations\" (p. 55). Therefore, a case study approach is appropriate for a study on EFL learner autonomy and assessment practices because not only is autonomy complex, multifaceted and multidimensional (Dickinson, 1987; Boud, 1988; Candy, 1991; Little, 1991; Nunan, 1997; Benson, 2011), but assessment is complicated too (Berry & Adamson, 2011; Everhard, 2015a). Also, a case study facilitates in-depth explanations of social and behavioural problems and 123 apprehends behavioural conditions from the participant's viewpoint (Zainal, 2007). Researchers adopting a qualitative case study approach can achieve a holistic, comprehensive and rich understanding of the phenomenon under research (Merriam, 1988; Noor, 2008; Yazan, 2015; Mills et al., 2017; Lin, 2018). A case study approach also supports close cooperation between researcher and participants, which encourages participants to express their viewpoints and tell their stories, through which the researcher can discover the underpinning motives of participants' actions (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The approach is also flexible (Simons, 2009; Hyett, Kenny, & DicksonSwift, 2014), especially when using multiple data collection methods (Punch, 2013). Additionally, since both LA and assessment are complex and multifaceted concepts, the research design needs to combine multiple data sets so that insightful understanding of the research phenomenon can be obtained. Such a design is deemed to \"sit comfortably with the case study approach\" (Denscombe, 2010, p. 55). Qualitative case study research has received some criticisms, mostly focusing on its lack of rigour and reliability (Noor, 2008; Merriam, 2009) and the issue of generalisation (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 2001; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Zainal, 2007; Noor, 2008; Merriam, 2009; Denscombe, 2010; Yin, 2011). However, scholars in the field have attempted to respond to all of these criticisms. For example, Yin (2011) states that the issue of rigour and reliability can be addressed by adopting structured and systematic research procedures and using strategies to deal with problems relating to construct validity, internal and external validity, and reliability. These validity and reliability issues can be tackled by using techniques such as triangulation, member checking, peer debriefing, and having an audit trail (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stake, 1995; Creswell & Miller, 2000; Yin, 2011). These techniques involve 124 using multiple data sources and methods and transparent and detailed description of research procedures (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). In terms of generalisation, researchers adopting a qualitative methodology (qualitative case studies included) hold that generalisation is not the primary purpose of this type of research (Guba, 1981; Punch, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Instead, qualitative research aims to \"form working hypotheses that may be transferred from one context to another depending upon the degree of 'fit' between the contexts\" (Guba, 1981, p. 81). In fact, in qualitative research, the term 'transferability' has been commonly used instead of 'generalisation' (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1986; Stake, 1995; Ryan-Nicholls & Will, 2009; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013; Anney, 2014). The issue of transferability can be addressed by providing sufficient details about the research context, research methods and research processes so that other researchers can make an informed decision about the extent to which the findings can be transferred to other contexts (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stake, 1995; Denscombe, 2010; Houghton et al., 2013). In summary, the qualitative case study approach is appropriate for the current research. This is because it allows the researcher to gain an in-depth and holistic understanding of the current EFL assessment practices and the demonstration of learner autonomy within a specific university in the Vietnamese higher education context. 4.2.2 Case definition and selection It is difficult to give a full account of what a case is because almost anything can serve as one (Punch, 2013). However, it is important that researchers define the case for their research (Simons, 2009; Thomas, 2011). The case is often referred to as an \"integrated system\" (Stake, 1995, p. 2) or a \"bounded system\" (Yin, 2011, p. 6; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 37), which is \"separated out for research in terms of time, place or some 125 physical boundaries\" (Creswell, 2012, p. 465). Using a generally-agreed definition of a case as a person, a program, a group, an institution, a community or a specific policy (Simons, 2009; Punch, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015), the researcher defined the case for this study as a university. This university is a unit in the VHE system and is a microsystem by itself. The study primarily concerns the impacts of assessment practices on the demonstration of learner autonomy in an EFL classroom context, so the class is considered the embedded unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). Selecting the case(s) for study is crucial in case study research (Crowe et al., 2011; Mills et al., 2017). According to Stake (1995), the first rule in selecting a case is to maximise what we can learn. Secondly, the case should be easily accessible and hospitable to our investigation. Stake emphasises that when selecting the case, the opportunity to learn is of primary importance because no matter how fit the case is to our study, this selection does not make any sense if we cannot gain access to this case to conduct our inquiry. This study is a single case study with three embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2003). A single case study was chosen because single case studies are deemed to support better understanding of the subject, and they can provide a richer description of the phenomenon, and produce better theory (Gustafsson, 2017). Single case studies are also believed to be best suited to the situations where an inquirer has had access to an unknown or under-researched phenomenon (Zivkovic, 2012). Additionally, single case studies are more feasible compared to a multiple-case study design (Nock, Michel, & Photos, 2007; Baxter & Jack, 2008; Gustafsson, 2017). The selected research site of the study was a technical university in Hanoi which included approximately 10,000 students studying nine different majors in the university: Civil Engineering, Water Resources Engineering, Hydrology and Water Resources, 126 Mechanical Engineering, Energy Engineering, Economics and Management, Computer Science and Engineering, Marine and Coastal Engineering, and Environmental Engineering. The university was a public university under the management of two ministries: the MOET and the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development. In the researched university, students had to study several compulsory general subjects, including English, before they learned their major subjects. Before the researcher left Vietnam to study in Australia, she worked as an English language teacher at the university, being responsible for the English curriculum, teaching and assessment. After working in the university for 5 years, she had a good understanding of the context of the study. However, she was not aware of which teaching practices each teacher was using. Therefore, she expected to see differences in the classroom assessment practices that teachers used, and that these practices would have correspondingly varying impacts on students' demonstration of LA. 4.2.3. Participant selection This study mainly concerns EFL language teachers and students' perspectives, interpretations and practices. Therefore, participants in the study were EFL teachers and students at the selected university. Teacher participants Teacher participants were chosen on the following grounds. First, they were purposefully selected based on the result of a questionnaire about assessment practices and activities to promote LA (see appendix C). Those chosen had to be willing to take part in the project. Collectively, they needed to show divergence in assessment practices and activities to promote learner autonomy in their classes. Details about the development of the survey questionnaire and data collection and analysis for choosing teacher participants are presented later in this section. 127 In addition, the chosen teachers' timetables could not overlap, so that the researcher was able to conduct each observation separately. The teachers were then selected based on their qualifications and teaching experiences, because these two factors could have a significant impact on their teaching practices, their perception of teaching and learning, and factors relating to these two aspects. The priority was to find teachers with a bachelor's degree and teachers with a master's degree, teachers with a long teaching experience and teachers with a short teaching experience. The survey questionnaire to select teacher participants was designed based on Borg's (2011) questionnaire about English language teachers' beliefs and practices, Ürün, Demir, and Akar (2014) questionnaire about ELT teachers' practices to foster learner autonomy, and Gonzales and Aliponga (2012) questionnaire about assessment preferences for language teachers. The adapted questionnaire (Appendix C) had 35 items, which fell into three main categories: formative assessment practices, summative assessment practices, and activities to promote autonomy. The questionnaire aimed to gather information about teachers' classroom assessment practices, their activities to promote learner autonomy in class and their availability to participate in the research project. The researcher piloted the questionnaire by sending it to six PhD candidates and three staff in the School of Education where the researcher was studying. The results were then analysed using SPSS software to test the reliability and validity of all the items in the questionnaire. The reliability test result showed a Cronbach's alpha of .897, indicating high reliability. After being piloted, the questionnaire was entered into the online survey tool SurveyMonkey, and then the link of the questionnaire was sent via email to 15 permanent English language teachers who were teaching at the selected university. Thirteen out of fifteen teachers completed the survey. However, two teachers 128 did not complete all the items in the questionnaire and two did not agree to participate in the later phase of the project, so they were excluded from the list of possible subjects for the project. Factor analysis was carried out to confirm items that were conceptually related to formative assessment practices and autonomy promoting activities. Items 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 17, 26, 35 did not fall into these two categories and were excluded from descriptive analysis. The researcher then calculated the average score of each teacher for using formative assessment practices and autonomy-promoting activities based on their responses in the survey. The result of the calculation is presented in table 4.1. Table 4.1 Participants' average scores for use of formative assessment and autonomy-supporting activities Participant Average score 1 3.19 2 3.19 3 2.3 5 3.08 6 3.5 7 3.03 8 3.26 11 2.3 12 4 13 3.42 If teachers had an average score below 2.5, it meant they used a large number of formative assessment practices and activities to promote autonomy in their class (i.e., high autonomy supportive). If they had an average score between 2.5 to 3.9, this meant that their use of formative assessment activities and activities to promote learner autonomy was average compared to their counterparts in the university (i.e., medium autonomy supportive). If they had an average score between 4.0 and 5.0, this meant that they did not use many formative assessments and autonomy-supportive activities (i.e., low autonomy supportive). As can be seen from table 4.1, among nine participants eligible for the next phase of the research, there were two high autonomy supportive, 129 one low supportive, and six medium autonomy supportive teachers. The researcher intended to choose one teacher from each category. However, when she talked with teacher number 12, this teacher decided not to participate. Therefore, the researcher had to choose one high autonomy supportive and two medium autonomy supportive teachers for her project. After taking other factors (i.e., experience, qualification and timetables) into consideration, three teachers were chosen for the research, one from each score band (see table 4.2). Table 4.2 Teacher participants and their classes Teacher Bachelor's degree Master's degree Length of teaching at the university Average score Number of students Participant 3 Teacher S 2015 Completing 1 year 2.3 25 Participant 2 Teacher A 2004 2013 6 years 3.19 29 Participant 8 Teacher C 2002 2007 10 years 3.26 27 Student participants The researcher invited all students in participating teachers' classes to participate in the research by having a colleague explain the research project to them. This colleague also provided the students with a consent form and a handout containing a detailed description of the project including research purposes, research time, potential risks and benefits. With consent granted by all students in the three selected classes, the researcher could observe and record the students' practices in the class throughout the observation period. Sixteen students studying in the three classes were also selected for interviews. The student participants were chosen on a voluntary basis. The researcher intended to interview six students in each class, but only five students in Teacher A's and Teacher 130 C's class agreed to participate in the interview. Therefore, the researcher ended up with sixteen students available for interviewing: six students from Teacher S's class, five students from Teacher A's class and five students from Teacher C's class (see table 4.3). Table 4.3 Interview student participants Student interview participants Gender Years of English learning Teacher S's class SS1 Male 13 SS2 Female 12 SS3 Male 12 SS4 Male 12 SS5 Male 12 SS6 Male 13 Teacher A's class AS1 Male 12 AS2 Female 12 AS3 Male 10 AS4 Female 8 AS5 Female 13 Teacher C's class CS1 Female 9 CS2 Male 10 CS3 Male 12 CS3 Female 10 CS5 Male 9 4.3. Research methods Three methods of data collection were used in this study: participant observations, semistructured interviews and document analysis. These methods were chosen to help the researcher to achieve an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the impact of current EFL assessment practice on the demonstration of LA. 4.3.1. Participant observations This study used observation because it is deemed one of the strongest tools for understanding a phenomenon in a specific context (Simons, 2009). It is also considered the most direct way of collecting data (Gillham, 2000; Kawulich, 2005), as it permits 131 researchers to record information as it happens, to notice unusual features (Creswell, 2012, 2014; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015) and to obtain a comprehensive picture of the research site (Simons, 2009). This method also enabled the researcher to authenticate participants' information (Simons, 2009; Ary et al., 2014; Morgan, Pullon, Macdonald, McKinlay, & Gray, 2017). More specifically, this study employed participant observation. Within this type of observation, researchers interact with participants to build up a relationship, but do not become involved in the behaviours and activities of the group under study (Ary et al., 2014). Participant observation can pose the risk of observer contamination, and the researcher addressed this issue by her prolonged engagement with the observed classes (for more information, see section 4.5.1). Yin (2003) suggests that participant observation permits the researcher to understand reality from the perspective of someone internal rather than external to the case. Observation of practices and interactions in the class was a crucial method because it enabled the researcher to explore the characterisation of both EFL assessment and LA in practice-how EFL teachers carried out their assessment practices in their class and how their students responded to these practices, to what extent teachers allowed and supported student autonomy in their class, and to what extent students demonstrated their autonomy. The researcher carried out thirteen observations in Teacher S's and Teacher C's class and eleven observations in Teacher A's class during fifteen weeks of semester 2 in 2016. In the first week, there was one 60-minute observation in each class because consent had not yet been obtained from students. Therefore, the researcher only took note of teachers' communication with students about important information such as the curriculum, the course requirements, and the assessment criteria in the first week of the 132 term. After the first week, all observations were 150 minutes long, and included student observation. During the observations, the researcher adopted a running record technique to record as much as possible what was happening in the class, such as the practices carried out by the teacher and students, as well as the interactions between the teacher and students, and students and their peers. The field notes also included diagrams of the setting and movements as well as the feelings and emotions of both teacher and students and the atmosphere of the class. The researcher's initial comments and thoughts were also recorded in the field notes. The soft version of the field notes was made as soon as possible after each observation, including initial interpretations, and ideas arising. 4.3.2. Semi-structured interviews The interview method is considered one of the most significant sources of information for case studies (Gillham, 2000; Yin, 2003; Ary et al., 2014; Kallio, Pietilä, Johnson, & Kangasniemi, 2016). It is used to explore individuals' perspectives, attitudes, experiences, and motivations in relation to particular concerns (Qu & Dumay, 2011). It is believed to allow researchers to understand a social phenomenon deeply (Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008) because it allows researchers to obtain a large amount of in-depth data quickly and gain a comprehensive understanding of participants' perspectives, information about the site, the significance of events to those involved and information on unanticipated issues (Ary et al., 2014). Researchers can control interview data because \"interviews allow immediate follow-up and clarification of participants' responses\" (Ary et al., 2014, p. 467), and they can elicit information using specific questions (Creswell, 2012). This study used semi-structured interviews, an important form of interview in case study research (Gillham, 2000; Kallio et al., 2016). Semi-structured interviews 133 include some key questions, which make up the structure of the interview, but still permit flexibility for the researcher to develop follow-up questions based on interviewees' responses (Ary et al., 2014). The semi-structured interview format was chosen because according to Barriball and While (1994) it is appropriate for exploring participants' perspectives and viewpoints about complex issues and for probing for information and clarifications of answers. As such, it affords opportunities for researchers to gain \"varied professional, educational and personal histories of the sample group\" (p. 330). In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with three teachers and sixteen students. The interviews with teachers lasted for about one hour. The interviews with students lasted for around forty-five minutes. To aid interviewees' comfort and confidence in expressing their opinions, all questions were asked in the interviewees' mother tongue (Vietnamese). All interviews were recorded for later transcription and analysis. Interviews with the teachers focused on the following key points: (1) their teaching experience, (2) their interpretations and understanding of learner autonomy, (3) their perceptions about the role of teachers and students in the learning process, (4) their perspectives on assessment – role of assessment in learning, current assessment regimes, role of students in assessment, (5) their assessment practices and factors affecting their choices of assessment practices, (6) their perception of the relationship between assessment and LA, and (7) factors which they considered to enable or constrain LA (see appendix A1). The interviews with students concerned (1) their English learning experience, (2) their interpretations and understanding of learner autonomy, (3) their perceptions about the role of teachers and their own role in learning, (4) their perspective on assessment – the role of assessment in learning, current assessment regimes, their 134 perceived role in assessment, their teacher's assessment practices, (5) their perception of the relationship between assessment and LA, and (6) the factors that they thought enabled or constrained LA (see appendix A2). Apart from semi-structured interviews, the researcher also conducted postobservation interviews with teachers and students about the issues emerging from observations. This was to gain a better understanding of the motives and rationales underpinning teachers' and students' practices. The post-observation interviews lasted about five to ten minutes, and often happened at break time at teachers' and students' convenience. The questions for these interviews were not predefined but arose from real-life situations. Most of the post-observation interviews occurred during the first five observations. After this, no new issues emerged from the observations. 4.3.3. Document analysis Document analysis was used as one of the research methods for this study. It is arguably appropriate for qualitative case studies (Bowen, 2009) because it helps the researcher to \"uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem\" (Merriam, 1988, p. 118). Document analysis can also be used together with other methods as a means of triangulation (Bowen, 2009) and to complement other sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). Documents are stable sources of data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). They are useful for understanding the context of a phenomenon and the \"culture of organisations, values underlying policies, and the beliefs and attitudes of the writer\" (Simons, 2009, p. 63). Therefore, document analysis can serve as a \"precursor to observing and interviewing\" (Simons, 2009, p. 64). In this study, document analysis was used to help provide the researcher with a good understanding of the context for learner autonomy and assessment practices at 135 tertiary level in Vietnam and the contextual characteristics of the university selected for case study. The documents collected were those concerning learner autonomy and assessment practices issued by different authoritative bodies in Vietnam. Curricula, lesson plans, assessment guidelines and sample tests from the selected university were also collected for analysis. Table 4.4 Linking research questions and objectives with data collection methods and data sources Research question Research objectives Research methods and sources of data W ha t a re th e fa ct or s i n as se ss m en t t ha t e na bl e or hi nd er th e de ve lo pm en t o f l ea rn er a ut on om y in th e V ie tn am es e hi gh er e du ca tio n co nt ex t? To explore EFL teachers' and students' understandings of the concept of LA interviews with teachers and students To examine EFL teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA interviews with teachers and students To investigate the current EFL assessment practices in the VHE context participant observations interviews with teachers and students document analysis To investigate students' demonstration of LA in learning English in the VHE context participant observation interviews with teachers 4.4. Data analysis There are multiple ways of conducting data analysis so each researcher has to discover his/her own way of interpreting data even when using well-established strategies (Simons, 2009). The following sections will explain the method and procedures that the researcher used to analyse the data collected for this study. 136 4.4.1. Qualitative content analysis This study used a qualitative content analysis approach (Mayring, 2004; Schreier, 2013) to analyse its body of data, which included interview transcripts, observation field notes and text. Qualitative content analysis is defined as \"a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns\" (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). Its prime objective is to \"systematically transform a large amount of text into a highly organized and concise summary of key results\" (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017, p. 94). Therefore, this data analysis approach involves reducing a large volume of textual data and identifying and forming categories or themes with the aim of understanding the data collected (Schreier, 2013; Bengtsson, 2016). The process is characterised by iteration, reflexivity (i.e., the researchers constantly and repeatedly come back and forth to the data and steps of data analysis while reflecting on their analysis) and systematicality (i.e., data analysis follows a sequences of fixed and stable steps) (Srivastava & Hopwood, 2009; Schreier, 2013; Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017). Additionally, qualitative content analysis is flexible in using different approaches to data analysis (Schreier, 2013; Cho & Lee, 2014; Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017). Researchers can adopt an inductive (i.e., data-driven) or deductive (i.e., concept-driven) approach or a combination of both in their data analysis, depending on the purposes of their studies (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Schreier, 2013). The key difference between the inductive and deductive approaches is that the former involves generating codes, categories and themes directly from the data while the latter involves analysis that is guided by predefined codes and categories grounded in prior theories, literature or research (Mayring, 2004; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Schreier, 2013). However, it is noteworthy that even when researchers opt for inductive analysis, they tend to use the theoretical frameworks to which they subscribe, philosophical assumptions and subjective 137 perspectives to form codes, categories, themes and patterns and interpret the meaning of the data (Srivastava & Hopwood, 2009). Typically, an inductive approach is chosen when knowledge about the phenomenon under research is fragmented or inadequate, and a deductive approach is chosen when the study aims to test existing theory or retest existing data in a new context (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Cho & Lee, 2014). Schreier (2013) recommends that rather than relying on one approach, researchers should combine approaches by, for example, creating main categories using a deductive approach and then adding sub-categories using an inductive approach. Qualitative content analysis appears well-suited for studies that focus more on description than seeking to develop theory (Drisko & Maschi, 2015). Additionally, according to Kohlbacher (2006), qualitative content analysis is a useful tool for analysing data in case study research because it can flexibly combine the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative principles of data analysis. It allows researchers to examine and refine large amounts of data with ease, in a systematic way (Stemler, 2001). Qualitative content analysis is also considered \"extremely well-suited for analysing multifaceted sensitive phenomena\" (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 114) because it has the ability to deal with complexity by combining openness to data analysis and theory-guided investigation (Kohlbacher, 2006). There are no ready-made one-size-fits-all guidelines for researchers to follow in data analysis (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Simons, 2009). Each researcher has to formulate or adapt his/her own ways of analysis based on his/her interpretive skills, experiences, intuition, and the core principles of data analysis (i.e., reducing the volume of data, generating codes, building categories and themes in order to seek understanding of the data) (Simons, 2009; Schreier, 2013; Bengtsson, 2016). This researcher based her data analysis on the key principles and guidelines of qualitative content analysis proposed by 138 scholars and researchers in the field (Renner & Taylor-Powell, 2003; Mayring, 2004; Schreier, 2013; Mayring, 2014), and the general three-phase data analysis process proposed by Elo and Kyngäs (2008), which consists of a preparation phase, an organising phase and a reporting phase. The researcher also took into consideration the nature of her data and the purposes of each data set in relation to her study. The following sections describe how different sets of data were analysed. 4.4.2. Interview data analysis process Preparation The researcher's first step after collecting interview data was to organise it into different folders and groups. For example, interview data was organised for each embedded unit (i.e., class), and within each embedded unit, interview data was grouped into teacher interview and student interviews. After grouping the data, the researcher transcribed interview audio recordings using Microsoft Word. The transcriptions were in Vietnamese, as all the interviews were conducted in Vietnamese for the convenience of the participants (see section 4.3.2). The researcher coded the name of both teacher and student participants to guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of their information (see table 4.2 and 4.3). The primary purpose behind collecting interview data was to investigate teachers' and students' understanding about the concept of LA, their perspectives on assessment and their perceptions of the relationship between assessment and LA. Data was collected using semi-structured interviews, so some overarching themes were already predefined by the interview questions. After all transcriptions were completed, the student interview data was rearranged into chunks according to the questions in the semi-structured interview, in order to facilitate coding in the next phase. 139 Organising Organising data involves coding and categorising it. That is, researchers try to bring meaning to the words before they can identify patterns and organise them into logical categories (Renner & Taylor-Powell, 2003). Before coding the data, the researcher first immersed herself in the data in order to familiarise herself with it. She read and reread the data transcripts repeatedly to acquire an overall view of the data and get the gist of what the data was telling her. After discussing with her supervisors, she opted for coding in Vietnamese because this helped to reduce the risk of misinterpretation due to any possible mistranslation (Smith, Chen, & Liu, 2008; Van Nes, Abma, Jonsson, & Deeg, 2010). This approach was also effective in terms of time and cost. The researcher started with three main pre-set categories, which were determined by the study's research question and research objectives: understanding of learner autonomy, perspectives on assessment, and perceptions of the relationship between assessment and learner autonomy. The code-generating process was directed by theories of autonomy, theories of assessment and sociocultural theories of learning. The codes were then reviewed and grouped into sub-categories under the main pre-set categories. The codes that did not fit into pre-set categories were arranged into new categories. The sub-categories that were built after the coding process were: • interpretations of learner autonomy, • characteristics of autonomous learners, • role of learner autonomy in English learning, • role of teachers and students in the learning process, • role of assessment in learning, • role of students in assessment process, 140 • perceptions about current assessment regimes, and • perceptions about assessment feedback. One main category around students' demonstration of autonomy in learning English outside of the class was generated. Examples of the development of code and subcategories are presented in table 4.5. Table 4.5 Examples of code and category development in interview data Samples of raw data Coding Sub-category Main category These people (autonomous) often have a small notebook for note-taking anything they find interesting Learning method Characteristics of autonomous learners Understanding of learner autonomy These people can manage their time and have learning plan and learning schedule for each subject Learning management They are positive and open-minded but independent Personal quality They are passionate about the subject Affective aspect Autonomous students are successful students. They often have good learning results Learning result The chosen example quotes are translated into English to illustrate the findings. Codes for identification of interview data are presented in table 4.6. Table 4.6 Codes for interviews with teachers and students Data source Example Code Interview with teachers Interview with Teacher S SI Interview with Teacher A AI Interview with Teacher C CI Interview with students Interview with student 1 in Teacher S's class SS1 Interview with student 3 in Teacher A's class AS3 Interview with student 5 in Teacher C's class CS5 Post-observation interviews with teacher 1st post-observation interview with Teacher S POSI1 4th post-observation interview with teacher A POAI4 5th post-observation with Teacher C POCI5 141 Post-observation interviews with students 2nd post-observation interview with students in Teacher S's class POSSI2 4th post-observation interview with students in Teacher A's class POASI4 1st post-observation interview with students in Teacher C's class POCSI1 The findings from interview data analysis are presented in Chapter 5. 4.4.3. Observation data analysis process Preparation stage The researcher adopted a running record technique in her observation of the teachers' and the students' practices in the class, trying to record as much as possible (e.g., what the teacher said and how the students responded). The records were in both Vietnamese and English, as the teacher and the students used both these languages in the class. After each observation, the researcher entered the field notes of each class into a Word document. While entering the field notes into Word, she translated the Vietnamese texts into English. The analysis of observation data started directly after each observation and was conducted using a recursive and iterative process. The researcher also took note of her first feelings, thoughts and understanding about the data while entering data into Word. This was carried out during the observation period, helping her become familiar with the observation data and have an initial understanding about it. Organising stage The researcher constantly asked herself the three reflexive questions proposed by Srivastava and Hopwood (2009) during the analysis process of observation data: 'what are the data telling me?', 'what is it I want to know?' and 'what is the dialectical relationship between what the data are telling me and what I want to know?' (p. 77). The observation data did not tell the researcher what she wanted to know, i.e., how the teachers' assessment practices influenced the demonstration of LA in the class. For example, when did they support LA, and in which cases did they inhibit LA? In order to 142 answer this question, the researcher needed to understand the characterisation of each teacher's assessment practices and the demonstration of LA in the class. However, the observation data appeared to present two quite separate aspects: teachers' assessment practices and students' responses. In order to explore the dialectical relationship between what the researcher wanted to know and what the data was telling her, she decided to carry out the observation data analysis at two levels. The first analysis level enabled the researcher to characterise teachers' assessment practices, and the second level was for understanding the demonstration of LA by students and the impact of assessment practices on it. Level 1 analysis At this level, data analysis was completed inductively. The researcher immersed herself in the data to search for meaning units to define concepts. The process of generating code was mainly directed by the researcher's understanding about assessment theories. The codes were then reviewed, and codes of similar topics were grouped into subcategories and then categories. Examples of code generating, the building of subcategories and categories, and the summary of data categorisation and definition of categories are presented in tables 4.7 and 4.8 respectively. 143 Table 4.7 Examples of code and category development in observation data Samples of raw data Coding Sub-category Main category Teacher asked students to look at 5 pictures about 5 sports in the book on page 68 and sport equipment in exercise 2. Students had to identify what sports are these in the pictures and what equipment are needed to play these sports The teacher said that student can use dictionary to look up new words, they had 10 minutes to do the task and they could discuss with their friends. He also reminded students to note down both meaning and pronunciation of words Tasks/activities designed/used in the class Task for in-class learning Assessment tasks students are asked to do exercise 8 page 77 Task/activity designed/used for homework Task for out-ofclass learning Who volunteer? Encouraging students' engagement Questioning Assessment techniques What does \"generation\" mean\"? Checking if students know something (convergent assessment) Why do you choose 'yes'? What are the key words? Elaborating on the students' answers What does \"ceiling\" mean? Student-initiated questioning Checking what students know (divergent assessment) The teacher went around and observed while the students were completing the task. She explained kinds of adjectives for students to be use to describe Observe, supervise and assist the students while they were doing a task Observation The teacher called one student to go to the board and write his answers Checking of the students' performance – force engagement Checking of individual performance/ role play The teacher called students to role play the situations Checking of pair performance force engagement 144 The teacher collected students' work, then swap students' work, checked with the whole class and provided the students with correct answer keys so that they could mark their peer's work Create opportunity for students assess their own or their peer's work Self/peerassessment T: what is the job in picture F? S: teacher T: not correct Confirming students' answer Confirmation of students' answers Assessment feedback That's good Giving praise The teacher used red ball-point-pen to underline the mistakes, Identifying mistakes directly Mistake identification and correction T: what sport is in picture C? S: /wai surfing/ T: have you looked it up in the dictionary? S: yes T; wai? Wai? (emphasizing the students' mistakes without mentioning that it was the mistake) Identifying mistakes indirectly S: basket ball /bȏl/ T /bɔ:l/ T: to play it, what do we use? S: ball /bȏl/ T: /bɔ:l/ Correcting mistakes directly The teacher asked the students about their mistakes, and how they think they can correct the mistakes Correcting mistakes indirectly What is the problem with your speaking Hieu? Creating opportunity for students to give feedback on their own performance Self/peer feedback \"Toan, give comments for sentences 1 and 2\", \"Thanh, give comments on sentences 3,4,5\" Creating opportunity for students to give feedback on their peer's work 145 A student recognized the teacher's mistake and corrected it for him/ A student recognized and correct his own mistakes Correcting own mistakes or others' mistakes Student-initiated feedback The teacher gave comments on students' writing. She commented on some students' good writing and pointed out why they were good. She also commented on some not very good writing and why they were not good yet Identifying students' strengths and weaknesses Feedback for future learning You should know the phonetic symbols so that when you look up new words in the dictionary and look at the phonetic symbols, you will know how to pronounce it. If there are new words, you are supposed to be able to pronounce them correctly. If there are any new words you encounter, you should use the dictionary or smartphone to check the meaning and pronunciation of these words Communicating rules about independent learning Assessment rules Assessment communication I don't punish those didn't do homework today. But next time no homework means absence from class Communicating rules about homework punishment It is no problem if your answer is wrong Indicating tolerance of students' mistake Attitude These words are important because you might have to use them in the introduction part of the speaking test Relating a learning task to test/exam Assessment requirements 146 Table 4.8 Data categorisation and category definition Teacher's practices Students' responses Main category Definition Sub-category Assessment tasks Tasks/activities that the teacher designed or used to help her/him get information about the students' learning Task for in-class learning Task for out-of-class learning Assessment techniques The techniques that the teacher used the class to determine the students' performance compared to a criterion or standard Questioning Student-initiated questioning Observation Checking of individual and pair performance Self/peer-assessment Assessment feedback Information that the teacher provided the students regarding their performance or work Mistake identification and correction Student-initiated feedback Confirmation of answers Self/peer feedback Feedback for future improvement Assessment communication General information that the teacher communicated to the students regarding the requirements, rules, regulations and the teacher's attitude relating to assessment Assessment rules Assessment requirement 147 Level 2 analysis The first round of analysis helped the researcher categorise teachers' practices into categories and sub-categories in order to understand the characterisation of teachers' assessment practices. The researcher applied sociocultural perspectives to interpret teachers' assessment practices in terms of the degree to which they allow LA, and students' responses in terms of the demonstration of LA. She conceptualised teachers' assessment practices and students' responses as autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated. The former denotes the space and opportunities for students' choices and decision-making, and the latter denotes the extent to which the students demonstrate their capacity to make informed choices and decisions regarding their learning. The researcher built two analytical frameworks for autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated based on her thorough reviews of autonomy frameworks and theories in the literature and sociocultural perspectives on LA (Chapter 3). The frameworks are presented in tables 4.9 and 4.10. Table 4.9 Analytical framework for teachers' practices Teachers' practices: Autonomy offered Definition Open The students make all choices and decisions regarding their learning. Bounded The students make some choices and decisions regarding their learning. Prescribed The students make almost no choices or decisions regarding their learning. Table 4.10 Analytical framework for students' responses Students' responses: Autonomy demonstrated Definition Proactive The students initiate the agenda for their learning and initiate actions in order to complete their agenda. Reactive The students initiate some actions in order to follow other-imitated learning agenda. Compliant The students follow the teachers' instructions. 148 The researcher then combined the analytical frameworks for teachers' practices and students' responses, her understanding about assessment and the results of the firstlevel analysis to build an analytical coding framework for level 2 analysis of the data. The two coding frameworks for analysing teacher's assessment practices and students' responses are presented in table 4.11 and table 4.12 respectively. 149 Table 4.11 Coding frame for teachers' assessment practices Autonomy offered Categories Definition Prescribed Assessment tasks Teacher initiates the task Teacher decides on the goals and input of the task The outcome of the task is closed and predefined (yes/no, right/wrong, only one correct answer) Teacher decides on the procedures and division of input of the task Assessment techniques Teacher as assessor Teacher provides the standard or criteria for students to do self-/peer testing, rating and reflection Teacher uses closed, convergent questions to check students' answers/ to check if students know the answers. Teacher decides on criteria for task achievement Assessment feedback Teacher identifies mistakes and carries out mistake correction for student Teacher gives evaluations feedback for students (confirming/disconfirming) Teacher involves students in evaluation feedback relating to right/wrong/ yes/no/ correct/incorrect, but students do not have to analyse criteria and work, just compare and contrast Feedback pattern is IRE (Initiate – Response – Evaluation) Assessment communication Teacher uses external regulators (rewards, punishment, incentives, directives) as an exchange for students' engagement in the task Teacher doesn't give any rationale/justification for doing the task Bounded Assessment tasks Teacher initiates the task Teacher decides on the goals and input of the task The outcome of the task is not predefined Students can negotiate the procedures and division of input in the task (they have flexibility and choice over procedures and division of input of the task) Assessment techniques Teacher – student assessors Teacher involves students in negotiation of criteria, discussion of relationship of one element of assessment to another – what constitutes a good answer Teacher uses open-ended/divergent questions to investigate what students know about the task Assessment feedback Teacher involves students in mistake identification Teacher identifies mistakes and provides students with suggestions and/or directions for self-correction 150 Teacher involves students in specifying feedback – students use the teacher's criteria and identify the attainment, participate in analysing the work and criteria in order to judge others' work Feedback pattern is IRF (initiate – response – feedback) – involve elaboration, explanation, Assessment communication Teacher uses grade rewards for students' achievement and performance in the task Teachers emphasise the relevance of the task to a set goal/direction/requirements to engage students in the task Teacher provides some justification/rationale for doing the task Open Assessment tasks Create opportunities for learners to initiate the task Assessment techniques Teacher creates opportunities for students to be assessors Teacher allows students to set up their own or group standard or criteria to assess their own or their peers' work Assessment feedback Teacher lets students identify their mistakes Teacher identifies the mistakes for students, but students have to figure out why they make the mistakes and how to fix them Teacher involves students in discussion about what constitutes achievement and how to improve their work Teacher involves students in specifying feedback; students have to use their own criteria to make judgements about others' work. Teacher provides feedback for autonomous learning Assessment communication Teachers prompt students to be self-aware of their own set goal Teacher prompt students to internalise value of task Teacher nurtures students' confidence 151 Table 4.12 Coding frame for students' responses Autonomy demonstrated categories Definition Compliant Assessment tasks Follow teacher's instructions closely to complete teacher-initiated task Assessment techniques Carry out self/peer-testing, reflection, rating using teacher-provided answer keys Answer teacher's closed/divergent question Perform the task when requested Assessment feedback Confirming/disconfirming their own or others' answers basing on teachers' criteria and standard Task communication Do not see the value of the task but engage in the task to avoid punishment or win rewards for compliance Reactive Task design Initiate some actions to complete teacher-initiated task more effectively and easily Task assessment Discussion assessment criteria, element of task achievement etc with teacher Answering teacher's open-ended divergent question using their own thoughts Task Feedback Self-correct their mistakes when teacher identifies them Give feedback to fellow students using/based on teachers' criteria and standard Cooperate with teachers in mistake identification and correction Task engagement Engage in the task because of its relevance to the teacher-initiated learning agenda Engage in the task to win awards for good performance/achievement Proactive Task design Initiate the tasks and actions to complete their initiated tasks Task assessment Set up own criteria and standard for self-assessment Internalise teachers' assessment criteria for assessment of future tasks Task feedback Initiate feedback using own criteria Cooperate with teacher in determining elements of task achievement and ways of improvement Identify and correct own mistakes Use teachers' feedback information in self-regulated learning Analyse teachers' criteria and provide feedback for their fellow students Task engagement Engage in the task because of its relevance to own learning agenda Engage in the task to win awards for good performance/achievement 152 After developing the analytical frameworks, the researcher applied them in order to categorise observation data again. The coding was completed manually using Microsoft Excel. After all the coding was completed, the researcher used the filter function in Excel to filter codes and calculate the frequencies of sub-categories and categories for reporting. Patterns of autonomy offered and demonstrated were also revealed, which allowed the researcher to understand the impact of teachers' assessment practices on the demonstration of learner autonomy in the class. Codes for identification of observation data are presented in table 4.13. Table 4.13 Codes for observations Data source Example Code Observation 1st observation in Teacher S's class SOB1 5th observation in Teacher C's class COB5 7th observation in Teacher A's class AOB7 Findings from observation data analysis are presented in 'findings', Chapter 6. 4.4.4. Document analysis process Documents in this study are considered the secondary source of data to triangulate the observation and interview data analysis results. Additionally, document analysis helped the researcher develop a clear understanding of the context for LA and assessment practices at tertiary level in Vietnam, as well as the contextual characteristics of the university selected for study. The researcher examined the selected documents (e.g., Vietnamese Education laws, documents about the Projects 2020, documents about the credit-based system, and documents about Vietnamese education development strategies) to search for content that matched categories in the interview and observation analysis concerning LA and assessment. She also searched for content that depicted the context of VHE in general and EFL teaching and learning in VHE in particular. The findings from the document analysis are presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 8, which concern the context of the study and discussion of major findings respectively. 153 4.5. Ensuring research quality This research adopted a qualitative case study as its research design. The biggest concern with this type of research design is its potential lack of research rigour and reliability (Yin, 2003; Zainal, 2007; Noor, 2008; Simons, 2009; Yin, 2011). There have been various approaches to assess and ensure research rigour in the literature (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Creswell & Miller, 2000; Tracy, 2010) however, the most commonly and widely used approach for assessing the trustworthiness of qualitative research is the one proposed by Guba (1981) and Lincoln and Guba (1985, 1986). This approach includes four criteria: credibility, confirmability, dependability and transferability (Merriam, 1998; Houghton et al., 2013). In this study, the researcher adopted Lincoln and Guba's approach to control the quality of her research. 4.5.1. Credibility Credibility refers to \"confidence in the 'truth' of the findings\" (Guba, 1981, p. 79), or the congruence of findings with reality that is described by Guba and Lincoln (1994) as being alterable and judged in terms of their informedness or sophistication rather than their truthfulness (Merriam, 1998). Credibility is considered the most important criterion in ensuring research rigour (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004). Credibility can be ensured using various methods (see, for example, in Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1986; Shenton, 2004; Houghton et al., 2013). In this study, the researcher planned to use prolonged engagement and persistent observation, triangulation, peer-member debriefing and member checking (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004; Houghton et al., 2013) to ensure the credibility of her research. However, she could not carry out the member-checking technique because when the researcher asked the participants if they wanted to read the transcription of their interviews, no participants (students and teachers) expressed interest in reading them. 154 Therefore, the researcher could only use prolonged engagement and persistent observation, triangulation and peer debriefing to control credibility. Prolonged engagement and persistent observation. The presence of the researcher can produce distortion in participants' behaviours. To mitigate this, the researcher's prolonged engagement at the site allows the participants to adjust to the researcher's presence and to satisfy themselves that he/she does not pose any threat. It minimises the impact of their presence on the participants' behaviours (Guba, 1981). Additionally, the researcher needs to have a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, so persistent observation can help the researchers achieve this goal (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Houghton et al., 2013). In the current study, participant observation was conducted over four months at the research site. Forty observations across three classes in total-each lasting 150 minutes-allowed the researcher sufficient time to understand thoroughly the context and the phenomenon under investigation. The impact of the researcher's presence in the class was minimal, as the participants had sufficient time to get used to her presence at the site and identified by themselves that the researcher did not pose any threat to them. Triangulation can also be used to increase the credibility of the research. Triangulation refers to the use of a variety of data sources, different investigators, diverse perspectives and numerous methods compared and contrasted in order to verify data and interpretations (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Bitsch, 2005). The data collected for this study were from different sources. The research adopted semi-structured interviews, participant observations and document analysis as methods of data gathering, all of which provided adequate and accurate data for the research. Additionally, data from different sources were compared to determine if the findings could be confirmed. For instance, observations were utilised in the three 155 classes to identify the teachers' assessment practices, the students' demonstration of autonomy and the factors in teachers' assessment practices that facilitated or inhibited learner autonomy in the class. Interviewed teachers were also asked about their practices in the class and the extent to which they allowed their students to be involved and make decisions relating to various learning aspects. Interviewed students were asked about their responses to teachers' practices and the extent to which they were involved in and took control of different aspects of learning. Peer debriefing enables researchers to check their growing insights and research findings (Guba, 1981). Peer debriefing involves interaction and discussion with other professionals (e.g., faculty colleagues or members of a supervision panel) about their thinking and questions they might have during the research process, so that timely changes and adjustments can be made (Guba, 1981; Bitsch, 2005). The researcher met on a regular basis with her supervision panel to discuss the emerging issues that she identified or encountered during the data collection. Sample field notes and interpretations of the field notes were also sent to supervisors for comments and suggestions. Ideas and first impressions of data were discussed with supervisors so that adjustments to methodology during the data collection could be made in a timely way. Emerging themes were also discussed. In the wrap-up of data analysis (before the writing stage), peer debriefing was used to verify if there was consensus about the coding process. The researcher asked the principal supervisor to code observation data from one class. The results were then reviewed, compared and contrasted with the researcher's coding. In most instances, the principle supervisor's coding matched that of the researcher's coding. The researcher and her supervisor then discussed and finalised points of disagreement. Extracts of observation data that had been coded and themed by the researcher were also sent to all three supervisors in the 156 panel for independent coding. The results showed consistency in coding among the researcher and supervisors. Some minor divergences, e.g., where only one supervisor in the panel coded differently, were discussed and finalised by the whole group. 4.5.2. Transferability Transferability refers to whether or not particular findings can be applied to a similar context or situation while still preserving the meanings and inferences from the completed study (Houghton et al., 2013; Anney, 2014). According to Guba (1981), inquirers can increase the transferability of their research by carrying out theoretical/purposeful sampling, collecting rich descriptive data, and developing thick descriptions (p. 86). These are further detailed as provision of thick descriptions of the research context; detailed explanation of the methods used; instances of raw data and a rich and vigorous presentation of the findings with proper quotations, so that the reader can make informed decisions about whether or not to apply the findings to their context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stake, 1995; Houghton et al., 2013). In the current study, the researcher expected to observe divergences in teachers' assessment practices and practices implemented to support learner autonomy. Therefore, teacher participants were purposefully selected using a survey questionnaire designed to gauge their assessment practices and the practices they used to promote LA. Three teachers were chosen: one had a high score and two had a medium score, indicating the different teachers used a range of formative assessment practices and allowed different levels of autonomy in their class. The study also provides a thick description of the research context (presented in Chapter 2) and research participants (presented in Chapter 4). All the findings are illustrated with appropriate quotes or examples. 157 4.5.3. Dependability Dependability refers to the stability of the data (Guba, 1981; Houghton et al., 2013); stable research findings are consistent and could be repeated (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In order to address the issue of dependability, researchers can use the audit trail technique (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985)-the key technique in ensuring dependability (Ryan-Nicholls & Will, 2009). This technique enables the independent external researcher to track the processes of data collection, analysis, interpretation and the decisions made by the researchers throughout these processes (Guba, 1981; Houghton et al., 2013) and arrive at comparable conclusions to those reached by the original researcher (Noble & Smith, 2015). In order to do that, researchers should elucidate and document their research process throughout different stages, from research design, method development, and data collection to data analysis and reporting of findings (Shenton, 2004; Noble & Smith, 2015). In this study, dependability was attained by detailed documentation of the research process. The researcher kept a record of all the issues and questions for discussion and decisions made in every meeting with the supervision panel. This could help the auditor see the development of the research at different stages. Additionally, all the operations of the study (e.g., data collection procedures and analytical framework development for data analysis) were presented transparently and vigorously in the research. 4.5.4. Confirmability Confirmability concerns the inquirers' ability to show that \"the findings of an inquiry are a function solely of subjects (respondents) and conditions of the inquiry and not of the biases, motivations, interests, perspectives and so on of the inquirer\" (Guba, 1981, p. 80). Confirmability can be achieved by using strategies such as triangulation and practicing reflexivity (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1986). These tactics are also 158 used to assess other criteria. For example, triangulation can be used to establish credibility of the research, and practicing reflexivity can also be used to protect dependability (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). According to Noble and Smith (2015), confirmability of a piece of research is attained when credibility and transferability have been addressed. 4.6. Ethical considerations and clearance This study conforms to the ethical requirements and guidelines of the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee. Ethics approval number H-2016-147 was acquired from the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee on the 7th of July 2016. Data collection for this study was conducted in a university in Vietnam. Therefore, permission from the rector to conduct research at the selected university was also obtained before data collection was carried out. All the initial contacts with teachers and students were made by a third party (the researcher's colleague) to avoid any pressure that might arise. All the participants were provided with information and consent forms in both English and Vietnamese. Consent was obtained before any data collection was conducted. 4.6.1. Level of risk This study was considered to be low-risk research by the ethics committee, meaning that it would pose minimal risks to the participants. However, there still arose some possible potential risks to the participants as follows: • The researcher's presence in the class during the observation might make the teacher participants feel uncomfortable. • Participants would have to spend time completing the questionnaire and the interviews 159 • Teacher participants might feel reluctant to talk about issues relating to institutions • Student participants might be reluctant to talk about their teachers' activities. 4.6.2. Measures to minimise risks The researcher was aware of the potential risks to the participants and proposed the following measures to minimise the risks: • All participants were informed that they could withdraw from the project at any time they wished. • All the information about the project activities was made clear to the participants so that they could decide whether to take part in the project or not. • Teacher participants were clearly informed of the frequency of the observations, and the schedule of the observations was provided for them in advance. • Teacher participants were informed that no audio or video recordings would be made during the observation. • The time for the interviews was arranged at each participant's convenience. • Participants were informed that their identities would be kept confidential and data would be made non-identifiable before being reported. 4.6.3. Confidentiality The identity of the participants was treated with the strictest confidentiality during data collection and during the reporting of research results, so as to ensure that participants could not be identified. In the survey, only those who were willing to continue in the study had to provide their personal details. However, they were assured that their information would remain confidential, and no one except the researcher and her supervisors would have access to this piece of information. 160 In the observations, both teachers and students had been informed that the researcher would only take field notes. No audio or video recordings were made. The name of each class was coded. During the transcription of the interview data, pseudonyms were used instead of real names in order to guarantee participants' anonymity. All identifying content in the data was also removed or changed (where applicable) to guarantee the anonymity of the participants. 4.6.4. Storage of information Digital materials (records, transcripts, field notes) were stored in the researcher's computer and password-protected portable drives. Printed and analogue materials were stored in secure lockers in the researcher's office. Only the researcher and the supervisors had access to those materials. All signed consent forms were kept in a secure locker in the researcher's office during the conduct of the research, to be retained for five years after the submission of the thesis. Chapter summary This chapter has outlined the research design for the study. The constructivist research paradigm underpins the current study and a qualitative case study approach was used to probe the impacts of assessment on the demonstration of LA in the context of EFL classes at tertiary level in Vietnam. Data was collected using participant observations of teachers' and students' practices in three EFL classes at a university during a complete semester, one-on-one semi-structured interviews with three teachers and sixteen students, and postobservation interviews with three teachers and their students. The three teachers were purposefully selected based on the results of a survey questionnaire about assessment 161 practices and activities to promote LA, and interviewed students were selected on a voluntary basis. Both interview and observation data were analysed using a qualitative content analysis approach. Analysis of documents relating to higher education policies, assessment policies, English teaching and learning policies, EFL curriculum and syllabus, test samples and English teaching textbooks was conducted to provide characterisation of the context for the research. Various measures, such as prolonged engagement and persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefing, thick descriptions of the research context, and detailed documentation of the research process were implemented to ensure the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of the research. Ethical issues were taken into consideration and cleared with ethics approval from the University of Adelaide Ethics Committee (approval number H-2016-147). 162 CHAPTER 5: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' INTERVIEW RESPONSES Chapter overview This chapter presents the findings from interviews with three English teachers and sixteen non-English major students at the researched university. The chapter starts with background information about the three classes. The chapter then presents the findings on teachers' and students' understandings of LA, their perceptions of assessment and their perspectives on the relationship between assessment and LA. The chapter also presents details on the levels of autonomy demonstrated in the students' reports about their English learning. Coding principles are as follows: • Interviews with teachers have a letter indicating the teacher and 'I' for interview (e.g., 'SI' means 'interview with Teacher S'). • Interviews with students have a letter indicating the teacher, 'S' for student and a number indicating the student (e.g., 'CS2' means 'interview with student 2 in Teacher C's class'). 5.1. Background information about the three classes 5.1.1. Profile of the teachers Teacher S was a young male teacher who had around eighteen months' experience of teaching English to non-English major students in higher education in Vietnam. He graduated from university in 2015, and was completing his master's degree at the time of the interview. He had just been teaching English at the university for one year. 163 Before starting at his current university, he taught English at a university for a semester. He had also been working as a casual teacher at one other university in Hanoi since September 2016. Results from the participant selection survey questionnaire (see Chapter 4) indicated that he was a high 'autonomy-supportive' teacher. That is, he was the one to most frequently implement activities that seemed to the researcher to be designed to promote LA. Teacher C was an experienced female teacher who had around fourteen years' experience teaching English to non-English major students in VHE. She graduated from university in 2002 and received a master's degree in English teaching methodology in 2007. She had been working at the current university from 2006. Before that, she had taught English for a private university in Hanoi for three years. She had not attended many conferences, workshops or training courses for EFL teachers since she graduated from university. She had attended some training courses on teaching methodology but no courses or workshops on assessment. Results from the participant selection survey questionnaire indicated that Teacher C was a medium 'autonomy supportive' teacher. That is, she sometimes used activities and techniques that are supposed to encourage LA. Teacher A was a female teacher who had around twelve years' experience teaching English. After graduating from university in 2004, she taught English for high school students for 6 months, and then she taught English at a college from 2005 to 2010. She had been teaching in the current university since 2010. She completed her master's degree in 2013. She said she had a few chances to attend conferences and workshops on English teaching and assessment which were organised by publishers to train teachers to use their textbooks effectively. Results from the participant selection 164 survey questionnaire indicated that Teacher A was a medium 'autonomy supportive' teacher. 5.1.2. Profile of the students The profiles of the students in the three classes are summarised in table 5.1. Table 5.1 Profiles of the students in three classes Total number of students Male Female Age range >10 years' experience learning English From 5 to 9 years' experience learning English < 4 years' experience learning English From Hanoi city From other provinces Teacher S's class 25 6 19 1926 13 12 1 11 14 Teacher C's class 27 18 9 1921 21 6 0 6 21 Teacher A's class 29 11 18 1921 21 8 0 6 23 5.1.3. The classroom Teacher S was teaching in a classroom which was rectangular and had an area of about 20 square metres. It had two columns of seven rows in a fixed table-and-chair arrangement. There were no technological facilities such as computers, projectors, or speakers in the class just two ceiling fans, two wall fans and a blackboard. If teacher S wanted to use any technological facilities, he had to borrow them from the department or bring his own equipment. Teacher C's students were learning English in the same classroom as Teacher A. The classroom had an area of about 25 square metres. It had four columns of four rows of fixed table-and-chairs arrangements. The classroom was air-conditioned. The facilities in the classroom included a desktop computer, a projector, two speakers, two ceiling fans and a black board. 165 5.1.4. The module Students in all three classes were studying English module 3, the last module in the curriculum for English at the university. English module 3 was a three-credit module (equivalent to 45 periods of 50 minutes) which included 39 periods for teaching, five periods for mid-term tests and one period for revision and wrap-up. Students had one three-period class a week for 15 weeks. The textbook used for the module was Objective KET (Capel & Sharp, 2009), units 11 to 20. This is an integrated and examoriented book, preparing students for the A2 level of English competence in the CEFR. The assessment of the module consisted of ongoing assessment, a mid-term test and an end-of term test. More details about the textbook and the assessment of the module are presented in Chapter 2. 5.2. The teachers' and students' voices on assessment and autonomy 5.2.1. The teachers' and students' voices on learner autonomy 5.2.1.1. Teachers' voices Teachers' understanding of the concept of LA was explored through (a) their direct statements about LA itself, (b) their perceptions of the characteristics of an autonomous learner, (c) the role of LA in language learning, (d) the role of teachers and students in the learning process, and (e) the activities that they reported using in their class to enhance LA. Teacher S interpreted the concept of LA as follows: \"students' self-regulation and initiative in the learning process to acquire knowledge\". He explained on this definition: \"students' diligence, positive attitude towards learning, homework completion and active inquiry for teacher's clarification for something they do not understand\". In Teacher S's view, \"learner autonomy plays an extremely significant role 166 in learning, especially at the tertiary level\". He thought that LA was essential for students at tertiary level because at this level, students would have many projects, group and individual assignments. However, due to class time constraints, they would not be able to complete all of these in the class and would have to opt for doing self-study outside of the class. Teacher S's elaboration on the importance of LA in language learning indicated that for him, autonomous learning was the continuation of classroom learning and was still under the direction of the teacher. Autonomous learning from Teacher S's perspective can be understood as other directed self-regulated learning. The above findings indicate that Teacher S conceptualised LA across two different levels. His initial statement indicated an ideal level of proactive autonomy in which students take control of all aspects of their learning. However, his elaboration on the characteristics of an autonomous learner and his perception of the role of LA in language learning indicated that his conception of LA was more about reactive autonomy, in which students initiate actions while following the teacher-initiated learning agenda. Teacher S indicated a belief that the teacher should only be the facilitator or mentor who scaffolds students with difficult knowledge, while students should play the primary role in the learning process. His belief about the respective roles of teachers and students in the learning process implied an expectation that the students should be the ones to take a proactive role in their learning. That could be the reason why he stated that he would attempt all possible methods to make students more autonomous. However, his reported activities to foster LA did not seem to match his belief. The students in Teacher S's class were not English major students and their motivation to learn English might not have been as high as that of their English major counterparts. However, regarding autonomy promotion, Teacher S believed that LA 167 could be promoted irrespective of students' majors through teachers' and students' activities. He thought that LA could be enhanced by assigning various tasks to the students which they would conduct alone before he checked and corrected their work. In other words, fostering autonomy (in his view) meant putting students in situations where they had to take some action. This is more likely, however, to foster students' compliance with or reactivity to the teacher's agenda rather than their proactive autonomy. Teacher S also reported that he always allowed his students to access available resources in the class and encouraged them to work on their own before seeking help from the teacher. He also deliberately delayed his assistance for the students to allow time for them to attempt tasks on their own, and arranged pair and group work so that the students could learn from one another. He believed that his approach could develop the students' habit of self-reliance, or autonomous learning: I think autonomy is essential to university students. Thus, I will try all possible ways to help students become autonomous. Teachers normally do not allow students to use mobile phones in the class because they are afraid that students may use smartphones to play games or surf the Internet, losing attention to their lessons. However, I always allow students to use their smartphone in the class because I think they can use it to look up new words (e.g., meanings and pronunciation) instead of having to ask the teacher. For example, normally, when students do not know a word, they will ask \"what does this word mean, how to pronounce it\". In such a situation, if I answer them right away, they may remember at that time and forget right after that, but if I ask them to look it up by themselves, they might 168 remember longer. . . I also give them pair or group tasks to encourage their participation and develop their teamwork skills. (SI) Again, even though the teacher's techniques were intended to encourage students to demonstrate their autonomy in certain situations, these techniques might not result in students' autonomous learning because students in these situations were still the passive recipients of the teacher's actions. It could be argued that these activities could be used as the initial seed-planting steps to train students to carry out autonomous learning. But in order to promote LA, the teacher might have to scaffold students further so that they could demonstrate a higher level of LA. The data suggests that Teacher S's interpretations and understanding of LA covered a spectrum from compliance to reactiveness to proactivity. Data also suggests that compliance might be necessary for the students before they could demonstrate a higher level of autonomy. He appeared to hold a positive view towards LA and the feasibility of the concept in the context. The findings also suggested that there was a mismatch between his perception and his practices. He seemed to recognise the active role of the students in learning, but his reported practices indicated that he was the primary agent who orchestrated learning for the students in his class. Teacher C perceived that LA represented students' initiative in their learning, but that this initiative originated from the requirements and objectives set by the university and English department for the course or module. She thought that LA entailed students knowing the course requirements and the course objectives, and that once they were clear about these, they could display initiative in learning such as preparing vocabulary or grammar for the next lessons, completing assigned homework, and/or interacting with teachers and peers. She said: 169 Autonomy is the ability to determine learning tasks and aims based on course requirements and objectives. For example, the main objective in English modules is to help students to grasp grammar rules, right? Students, therefore, base themselves on this objective to set their aim of mainly comprehending grammar rules. ...taking initiative in learning based on the requirements and objectives set by the teacher for the course and each lesson. For example, some students display initiative in doing homework, preparing vocabulary or reviewing grammar for the upcoming lessons. (CI) This understanding of autonomy seemed to distinguish between the role of the teacher and that of the students. The teacher's role was to set up the directions while the students' role was to actively manage and navigate within this boundary. This understanding of autonomy appeared to reflect LA in a reactive sense. Teacher C's interpretation of LA was complemented by her portrait of an autonomous learner and her belief about the role of LA in language learning. She described an autonomous learner as one who had a positive attitude toward learning, by which she meant \"enthusiastically taking part in activities designated by the teacher in the class\", \"making efforts in learning\", and \"regular attendance and attentiveness in the class\". The autonomous attributes depicted related to students' abilities to respond to other-initiated agendas rather than the ability to set up their own agendas and act accordingly. Teacher C believed that LA was crucial to students, especially in learning English. She thought all that the teacher could do in the class was to guide the students in learning and provide them with basic knowledge, because time for learning in the class was not adequate, and the class was too crowded. Therefore, students had to be 170 \"autonomous both inside and outside the class\" in order to learn effectively and efficiently: Students need to initiate learning activities to have deep understanding about an issue. For example, with grammar and vocabulary, they have to learn and practice more at home because the teacher cannot cover everything in the class. (CI) Teacher C indicated a belief that teachers \"should only guide students in learning\" and the students are \"supposed to display initiative in their own learning activities\". She appeared to recognise the active role of the students and expect them to perform this active role in the learning process: Students are supposed to display initiative in their own learning activities. For example, if they think I give them too much homework when they are having exams in other subjects, they can tell me and ask me to reduce the amount of homework or discuss with me about the deadline for homework. That is what they can and should do. Students also need to actively give feedback on the Department's requirements or regimes for the subject so that these requirements and regimes become more appropriate for them. (CI) Teacher C's students, however, appeared reliant and passive in her view. They took little initiative in issues relating to learning but opted to follow any agenda established by the English department or the teacher. Even when the teacher tried to involve them in discussions about learning issues, they did not raise their voices. Despite perceiving non-English major students as being passive and reliant, Teacher C thought that it was possible to promote LA among them. She believed LA enhancement required a mechanism (e.g., assessment) to 'force' students to take on 171 more learning, especially outside of the class, and to control what they did. She also believed this mechanism would increase students' participation in the class: I think this (developing learner autonomy) depends on teachers' activities and assessment methods. For example, if teachers give students homework and do not check it, it is very likely that students will not do the homework . . . To develop learner autonomy, teachers need to, for example, frequently have tasks in the class for students to do, and frequently check students' homework. In other words, teachers need to carry out assessment frequently. (CI) Teacher C's ideas about fostering autonomy reflected her perception that LA could be the product of a stimulus-response mechanism. Within this view, the teacher is the primary agent to orchestrate the students' learning, rather than a fosterer of student agency. By contrast, Teacher A believed that the concept of LA was central to the learner-centred teaching approach: To my general understanding, learner autonomy means that learners know learning is their responsibility. In other words, learners can determine their learning purpose, learning goal, learning methods and their reflection on the effectiveness of their chosen learning methods in relation to their learning goal. (CI) Teacher A's statement about LA reflected her perception of the concept as proactive. She perceived students as having to both initiate a direction for their learning and self-regulate their learning activities to reach their goals. Teacher A's perspective on LA was complemented by her description of autonomous learners and her conception of the role of LA in language learning. In her 172 view, autonomous learners possessed specific abilities such as self-reflection and critical thinking, and qualities relating to both style and attitude, such as activeness, adaptability, seriousness, and attentiveness. These attributes appeared, from Teacher A's perspective, to contribute to the students' capacity to not only respond to otherinitiated agendas but also to initiate and carry out their own agenda. In my observation, highly autonomous students are very dynamic in style. For example, when the teacher assigns them a task, they are quickly adaptable to it. Regarding attitude, they are serious in learning, attentive and enthusiastic in the class. They pay close attention in the class in order to both acquire new knowledge and to compare what they have prepared and what the teacher is teaching to see if these are relevant and if they need to change anything. They ask the teacher to explain if there is a mismatch between what they read elsewhere and what their teacher is teaching. (AI) Teacher A believed that LA was significant in the students' English learning. She linked the importance of LA to the class time constraints and the syllabus for English at the university. She thought that learning English in the class could not be satisfactory because the number of class hours was limited, resulting in the need for the students to spend time learning outside of the class. She also added that students could only learn foundational knowledge in the class. Therefore, autonomous learning was necessary: I think autonomy is essential in all subjects, including English. This is because what students can learn in the class is only the frame of knowledge, and it is the students' responsibility to develop this frame 173 by doing self-study. I think self-study helps to make students' knowledge become complete. (AI) Additionally, she thought that the teacher should only be the facilitator, and the students should not only follow the teacher's guidance but also go beyond. This indicated her expectation that students be proactive in the learning process. The students in Teacher A's class were non-English majors, and she thought that it was very challenging to promote LA among such students. In her view, non-English major students were not aware of the importance of learning English because they were not learning it for their future profession, but only in order to become eligible for graduation. She believed that when the students were not conscious of the significance of English to their personal needs, they would not invest time and effort in studying and researching the subject, resulting in a lack of autonomy. She believed that the enhancement of LA among non-English major students would involve various agents. These included the students (e.g., their awareness of the importance of learning English and their corresponding effort in the subject), the learning content presented to the students (e.g., whether the learning content was relevant to the students' needs), the teacher (e.g., whether her teaching method could motivate the students) and the situated context (e.g., the requirement for English in the society). Regarding her practice, Teacher A admitted that her priority was not to foster LA but to help her students pass their exams. Therefore, activities that she carried out in her class were exam-oriented. She thought that the activities that she was using at that moment might result in a low level of LA demonstration, meaning that students only learned what she taught them in order to pass exams. In other words, students were learning to make themselves compliant with the system of which they were a part. 174 I do not know about other teachers, but I am always under pressure of helping my students to pass their exams, making my lessons examoriented. My priority in my class is to help my students have sufficient knowledge so that they can do well in exams. I think this may restrict students to learning only what I taught them in the class to meet my set objectives for them, and therefore, influence their learner autonomy. (AI) She reported that she paid attention to helping students take charge of their English learning only after she achieved the first goal of presenting the knowledge for the tests and exams. What she did was to provide her students with basic knowledge for communication (e.g., how to deal with real-life situations and vocabulary), and to arouse their motivation for learning English, which she believed to be central to their development of autonomy in their language learning. In her own words: My second objective other than helping the students to prepare for the tests and exams is providing them with some basic knowledge about English so that they can develop their language skills. For example, I will help my students communicate simple, basic ideas in English at A1 level and deal with some communication in real-life situations at A2 level . . . I will design my lesson plan as follows: I will focus on the knowledge for the exams first, and then I will help the students to deal with some real-life situations and provide them with vocabulary. Additionally, I organise some language games in the class so that the students can play and learn at the same time. That is what I have been doing in my class. (AI) 175 In sum, findings relating to Teacher A's perspective on LA suggested that she understood LA in a proactive sense, and she held a consistent view about the concept. These findings also indicated that from her perspective, promoting LA depended on various factors, not just on the students. This teacher also saw the challenges of fostering LA among non-English major students, and she perceived the current assessment regimes as being a barrier to her practices to promote LA in her class. The way she promoted her students' autonomy was akin to preparing the soil for the seeds of autonomy to grow. 5.2.1.2. Students' voices Of the 16 students interviewed, 11 of them, comprising four students in Teacher S's class, three students in Teacher A's class, and four students in Teacher C's class, perceived the concept of LA in a proactive sense. That is, they saw themselves as the primary agent in their learning process who had to demonstrate the ability to initiate, carry out, and monitor their learning agenda. They interpreted LA as a learner's ability to be self-reliant, self-regulated, and to display initiative in learning. All of these refer to the ability to carry out learning without a teacher or direct support from a teacher, and they were reflected in students' having learning goals, learning plans and schedules, learning methods, and learning motivation. Students further elaborated the meaning of LA as \"not depending on anyone but yourselves\" (SS1, CS5), \"without waiting to be forced or urged by others\" (SS2, AS5, CS2), and \"others do not have to urge and force you to learn\" (SS6, CS3). LA also involved the ability to self-reflect on learning. In other words, LA means that students should have the ability to recognise what they want and need. They should be able to identify their strengths and weaknesses, and the resources and 176 investments they need in order to realise their purpose, as illustrated in the following comment. I think autonomy means that you know what you need, what is important to you, what are your weaknesses. If you know what you need, then you will know how to select appropriate materials and choose an appropriate learning method. When you have the appropriate materials and learning method, you will be motivated and learn more effectively. (SS4) Students' understanding of LA appeared consistent when they self-evaluated their demonstration of autonomy. Four students in Teacher S's class thought that LA meant being self-regulated, self-reliant and displaying initiative in learning, and they believed that they were autonomous because they demonstrated these abilities in learning: I can say I am an autonomous student. I am persistent in carrying out my learning plan without being influenced by different sources of information. I spend a fixed amount of time every day to learn English, and I also use an app to assess and control my learning. (SS4) However, student SS6 thought that he was not autonomous because he was still lazy sometimes and he still needed teachers to urge him to study. This reflected his understanding of LA as being hard-working and self-regulated in everything. Student AS1 saw LA as \"the ability to study anywhere and anytime\", and he perceived himself as an autonomous student because he demonstrated this ability, as illustrated in his report: I think I am starting to be autonomous in learning English. For example, I learn about 20 new words every day. On my way to school, 177 I always listen to a conversation in English repeatedly. Before bedtime, I watch English video clips, which I find interesting and helpful. (AS1) Student AS2, in contrast, did not think she was autonomous because she did not demonstrate abilities that she believed to be significant components of LA such as \"taking control of your activities and behaviours and displaying initiative.\" One student in Teacher S's class, one student in Teacher C's class, and two students in Teacher A's class perceived the concept of LA in a reactive sense. They also conceived LA as the students' ability to self-regulate their learning, but this selfregulation was intended to meet the requirements of an other-initiated agenda (e.g., achieving an excellent course grade). In their view, LA meant the ability to manage and carry out study both inside and outside of the class, such as by actively engaging in activities in the class, completing lesson preparation and homework at home, and researching the subject matter or searching for learning resources: Autonomy in learning means you have to take the initiative in doing homework and in self-studying. In short, you have to take an active role in learning the subject. (SS5) I think autonomy means the ability to control and manage our time for learning and our everyday learning tasks, meaning staying focused in the class and being self-regulated at home. (AS4) These two students' self-evaluations of their autonomy supported their interpretations of the concept. One student perceived himself as being autonomous because he had become attentive in the class and had initiated a schedule for learning at home in order to study as well as his friends, while the other student thought that she 178 was not autonomous in learning English, as she was still lazy and she did not manage her time in order to allow for self-study outside of the class. One student in Teacher S's class perceived autonomy as something that needs to be discovered by students. That 'learner autonomy' could vary among people, but the core idea was that it originated from oneself. This student emphasised that \"once you have found that autonomy, you should not leave it, but develop it\". This student appeared to see autonomy as existing independently of human agents, believing that LA was similar to a way of being in the world. LA, to him, seemed more concerned with students' compliance or reactiveness to an initiated learning agenda rather than their level of proactivity in English learning. I am the most autonomous before the exam. At that time, I often immerse myself in studying. English is a subject at my university, so learning in the class is only one part. However, like most other students, I do not pay much attention to doing exercises and learning the subject until maybe one week before the exam when I start to revise all that I have learned and seek for help from my friends. At the moment, I think I am autonomous in learning English to meet the university requirement about English. (SS3) Findings from the interviews revealed that students depicted autonomous learners in terms of four main aspects: personal qualities, learning management and method, learning results, and affective aspects. Regarding personal quality, the majority of students (n=13) thought that autonomous learners possessed a number of good qualities, particularly diligence, perseverance, consistency and self-discipline. For instance, one student described an autonomous learner as follows: 179 Autonomous learners are diligent and perseverant. When they encounter a difficult task, they will try their best to do it. Non-autonomous learners only complete exercises that the teacher gives them, while autonomous learners study even when the teacher does not give them tasks. (CS1) It seemed that from the students' perspective, an autonomous learner very much resembled a good language learner. That may be the reason why apart from being ascribed a number of good personal qualities, autonomous learners were also described as successful learners. They were pictured as those who \"have high achievement\" (AS1), \"learn more effectively\" (CS1), \"are fast learners\" (CS4), and \"have good learning results\" (SS3). In terms of learning management and method, ten students believed that autonomous learners had a clear goal in learning. Added to this, they had a clear learning plan (n=5), learning schedule (n=2), learning method (n=5; e.g., taking note of important information, identifying sources of information on the Internet or through senior peers), and managed their time effectively (n=3). The following excerpts illustrate this finding: These people (autonomous learners) can manage their time and have a learning plan and learning schedule for each subject. They also have a clear goal and a learning method to reach their goal. (AS2) These people often have a small notebook for taking note of anything they found interesting . . . they have both long-term and short-term plans and a clear goal. (AS1) They have clear goals for their life. They stay focused on what they need to achieve their goals. (CS3) 180 Regarding the affective aspect, seven students thought that autonomous learners had a love or passion for what they were doing. It seemed that in the interviewed students' perceptions, intrinsic motivation was an important factor which made students autonomous. All students (n=16) noted that LA was important in language learning. Although the rationales for their viewpoints were divergent, these rationales implied the need for students to take a proactive role in initiating and carrying out English learning if they wanted to be successful. Ten students believed that LA was important in language learning because of the specific nature of this process. In the students' view, language was multifaceted and there were many things to learn in a language, especially vocabulary. Language learning was a time-consuming and ongoing process, not something that could be achieved overnight. Therefore, language learning required diligence and self-discipline. Additionally, when learning a language, it was necessary to carry out a lot of practice and to have authentic experiences that might not be available at school, so self-studying was crucial. For example, student SS3 said: I think autonomy is quite important in language learning because learning a foreign language is not something over one night [sic]. Even with Vietnamese, we have to learn in such a long time like from kinder to primary school. Besides, to be able to speak a language, you need to know a great amount of vocabulary, which takes a long time to grasp. It also takes time to practice and master language skills. (SS3) Five students thought that LA played an important role in language learning because of the inadequate university English syllabus. In their view, language learning included not only language systems (e.g., vocabulary and grammar), but also language 181 skills (e.g., listening and speaking), which required a lot of practice and effort. However, at university, they mainly learned grammar rules and structures, not how to communicate in the target language, and there were not many opportunities for them to practice language skills at university. Therefore, they believed that only learning English at university was insufficient. In order to be successful in learning a foreign language (English, in particular), students had to be self-directed and display initiative in their learning. Learning a language means learning skills like speaking, listening, reading and writing, which cannot be developed only in the class. You need to practice communicating in the target language a lot if you want to master these skills. However, in the context of Vietnam, you cannot communicate in the target language in the class, so you have to rely on other sources like YouTube or foreign friends. (AS1) Two students in Teacher A's class and one student in Teacher C's class linked the importance of LA in language learning to the role of teachers and their own role in the language learning process. One of them said: I think autonomy is important in foreign language learning because teachers are not always there to teach you. Besides, we will have to learn something completely new that we have not learnt before. For example, we have to learn vocabulary by ourselves; no one can teach you. (CS3) Three students considered LA crucial in language learning because they believed that they needed to possess and demonstrate metacognitive skills such as self-reflection and self-evaluation in their learning process. That is, students had to be able to evaluate the available resources and methods and select the most appropriate ones for their learning needs and styles. They had to be able to identify their very purpose in learning: 182 what they needed and what was relevant to them. They perceived that LA could help them do all of this in order to stay focused and persistent in their learning journey: I think autonomy is important in language learning because today, there are abundant sources of information on the Internet. There are so many learning methods and materials available that you can be overwhelmed and do not know which ones are suitable for you. If you are not autonomous, you may not find your own way to go. (SS4) I think autonomy is important in language learning because we need to prioritise what you need to learn. ...you need to know your weaknesses so that you know where to invest more time and efforts on. (AS2) All interviewed students appeared to appreciate the role of teachers in their learning. Three students in each class reported that they could not learn English without a teacher. The rest of the students (n=7) believed that they could learn without a teacher, but also confessed that this would be much more challenging. All interviewed students (n=16) stated that teachers should only be the facilitators who scaffolded them in their learning, showing them the methods, providing them with guidance when necessary, and orchestrating a learning environment. Students should be the owners and the primary agents in their learning process. Students' perceptions of teachers' roles and their own role in learning suggest that they were aware of their responsibility in learning, but still recognised teachers as playing a significant role in their learning process. Findings relating to students' understanding of LA indicated that they held a positive attitude towards the concept and showed a consistent understanding of it. Their views illustrate LA at various levels, from compliance to reactivity and proactivity. 183 5.2.2 Teachers' and students' views on assessment 5.2.2.1. Teachers' voices The role of assessment in students' learning Both Teacher S and Teacher A asserted that assessment should exist to serve the purpose of learning. They explained that assessment helped teachers adjust their teaching and students adjust their learning. They both cited feedback as the aspect in assessment that made it 'for learning', helping students to reflect on their learning and make corresponding decisions regarding their learning: I think assessment is for learning. For example, when we give feedback to students, we always consider what students can learn from our feedback and whether our feedback works for them. We also think of different types of feedback for different types of students so that they can adjust their learning. Therefore, for me, assessment is for learning. (SI) I think assessment is for learning. The feedback or marks that we give to the students can help them reflect on their learning. That is, they can look back at the amount of effort they invest in learning and the results they receive to determine how effective their learning is and what they need to do next. Assessment is for students to make improvement and progress in their learning. (AI) Teacher C thought that learning and assessment had a bilateral relationship. That is, assessment should serve the purpose of learning, and learning should also serve the purpose of assessment. In her view, assessment acted as a learning objective for students to pursue, and as a source of direction for the students in their learning. 184 Therefore, from Teacher C's perspective, assessment might enhance reactive autonomy among the students. She commented: Assessment implies the formulation of learning objectives. In fact, if learning is without assessment, it is challenging to specify and attain learning objectives. For example, if there were no assessment in a subject the students are learning, they might not know what content to focus on and which learning methods to use. Therefore, assessment exists to help the students to determine their learning methods and the learning content... In short, there should be a combination of both directions: assessment should serve the purpose of learning and learning should also exist for serving the purpose of assessment, right? (CI) All three teachers believed that assessment should provide students with information about their learning (i.e., their strengths and weaknesses) so that they could take action to rectify their current learning methods and make progress. In other words, assessment helped students to understand their current position in their learning journey and future directions for their learning plans. For example, Teachers S and A contended that assessment results indicated to students the extent to which they met the course requirements and helped them determine what to do next in the course. Teacher C asserted that if the students knew that they were weak at listening skills, it was likely that they would spend more time on practicing listening skills, improving their vocabulary, and acquiring techniques to best answer listening questions. She emphasised that the key to the effectiveness of assessment information in the students' learning was their action in response to this information. She added that her students lacked initiative in acting on assessment information and blamed her assessment 185 practices for not having fostered the students' independent learning outside of the class. Teacher C's perspective on the role of assessment suggested that assessment could act as a direction for the students in their learning, and it might enhance reactive autonomy among the students. The findings also indicated that current assessment practices did not fulfil the task of promoting proactive, independent learning outside of the class. The teachers' perspective on the role of assessment in learning suggested that assessment existed to help the students to proceed in their learning process, and it was supposed to encourage students to demonstrate their autonomy in learning. The finding also indicated that the teachers perceived assessment feedback as the aspect of assessment that really contributed to the demonstration of LA. Assessment regime Teachers' perspectives on the university's assessment regime indicate its negative impact on English teaching and learning and the students' demonstration of LA in learning English at the university. Teacher C believed that the current assessment regimes at the university allowed teachers more autonomy in their assessment practices. The assessment framework for English included ongoing assessment (for which teachers could determine the content and format) and an end-of-term test. Ongoing assessment accounted for 40 percent of the final course grade, so teachers could demonstrate their initiative within this scope. However, she thought that the administration of assessment for English at the university did not support and encourage LA among students. She believed that LA promotion meant encouraging students to display their initiative in learning. However, assessment methods as they stood encouraged students to remember the answer keys rather than really learning the language. 186 Both Teacher S and Teacher A stated that in the current context, \"learning is for assessment\". They blamed four factors in the current assessment regimes for prompting assessment-dependent learning: the fixed format of summative assessment, the 'passrate' pressure from the university, the detailed format and guidelines for the end-of-term English test, and the administration of the A2 test. Teacher S reported that the formats for English tests and exams were predefined and fixed, leading to a situation where \"teachers were teaching for the test, and learners were learning for the test\" in order to achieve good results in the tests or exams. Teacher A stated that teachers were always under pressure from the university regarding exam pass rates. She said: Teachers are under pressure from the university to help the students pass the exam. For example, if 50 percent of the students fail in the exam, you will be worried and have to think about how to help 70 – 80 percent of students to pass, resulting in test-oriented teaching. ... in the meeting the management board often complain about the exam failure rate among students and question the teachers about their teaching methods. (AI) Additionally, both Teacher S and Teacher A reported that the English department provided the teachers with the assessment guidelines and format for the subject at the beginning of the semester. These guidelines contained detailed information relating to the number of questions in the test papers, the contents to be tested (e.g., topics for the speaking test, vocabulary and grammar items in the multiplechoice questions and grammar structures for sentence transformation) and the weight allocated for each question and section. In their view, these guidelines encouraged the 187 teachers to adopt \"test-oriented teaching\", as this would be useful in helping the students to pass their exams and achieve good exam results. Teacher A commented: The drawback of assessment guidelines is that teachers only focus on these (i.e., the tested knowledge and skills). Although teachers are aware that they have to instruct the students to practise listening, speaking, reading and writing and help them to communicate in the target language, they have to prioritise assessment preparation purposes first. Assessment guidelines make the teachers become inclined to prioritise items specified to be tested in the exam... The current assessment regime accidentally turns the learning process into learning to serve the purpose of assessment. (AI) Teacher C agreed, stating that although the provision of assessment guidelines and formats to the students could offer some advantages to both the teachers and the students, informing them where to focus in teaching and learning, the provided assessment guidelines and format could hinder the demonstration of LA in learning English. The administration of the A2 test also created the risk of test-oriented teaching and learning at the university. All the three teachers reported that the English department did not use CEFR standard tests for A2 level. Instead, the tests were modified to focus more on grammar and vocabulary. Additionally, the university used a test bank which consisted of only 10 multiple-choice tests. They believed that these features of A2-related administration had an adverse impact on the teachers' teaching and the students' learning: Students can learn the answer keys by heart and do well in the exam without having to learn or practice language skills. (SI) 188 Findings relating to teachers' perspectives on the current assessment regime reveal that the system focused on summative and certification purposes rather than supporting students' learning. This system is likely to encourage the adoption of rote learning to achieve good results in exams, as well as promoting the students' compliance with the system and, perhaps, reactive autonomy. Within the current assessment system, the students either adhered to the teacher's instructions closely or actively managed their own learning within the direction set by others in order to do well in the exams. The students' role in assessment Teacher S reported that he did not involve his students in the determination of the classes' approach to implementing university assessment policy regarding, for example, assessment activities in class, assessment format and assessment criteria, or grading methods. This is because all these policies had been determined by the top-down system, demonstrating the passive and receptive role of the students in regard to assessment. He said: I do not involve students in deciding assessment policies because they are decided by the university and the department, so we cannot change them. However, I do involve them in determining the content and level of difficulty of the assessment tasks by asking for their opinion about the task so that I can adjust the difficulty of the task. (SI) Teacher C stated that she was willing to involve the students in discussion and decision-making regarding assessment practices (e.g., assessment criteria and assessment format), and open to students' feedback and suggestions relating to her assessment practices. However, this rarely happened: 189 I have almost never involved my students in the determination regarding assessment practices. I always communicate the assessment framework for the course and my assessment practices in the course in the first class. The students never give any feedback or make any questions on my assessment policies. I am willing to involve the students in discussion about assessment practices and can even change my assessment approaches. However, I did not do that because the students are not responsive. (CI) Teacher A believed that the students should be involved in both assessment policies and assessment practices. She believed that if the students could engage in the determination of assessment guidelines, they might become confident in their learning and in completing tests. Teacher A reported that she involved the students in determining the criteria and some regulations and rules regarding assessment (e.g., homework rules) and part of the assessment format (e.g., multiple choice or matching). I always do that [involving the students in the decision-making relating to assessment] in the first class with the students in the orientation section. I will outline the class regulations and rules for students to vote. If they all agree, we will follow the proposed regulations and rules. If they do not agree, I will give my suggestions, and the students will discuss so that we can build up common criteria. I think that people will do it best when they do what they want. If being forced, students will still follow, but the effectiveness will be limited. .....For example, I will make it clear at the beginning with the students that they have to do homework before going to class. If not, they will be punished. 190 Regarding assessment format, I will allow them to negotiate part of it. I will consider students' opinions and conduct assessment as they suggested. I normally respect students' opinions. (AI) Nevertheless, when observed, students did not appear willing to get involved in the determination of assessment policies, rules and regulations in the class. In relation to assessment practices, all three teachers reported that they implemented self/peer-assessment in their classes. However, the techniques they used were restricted to self/peer-marking. That is, students marked their own work or their colleagues' work against the answer keys that the teacher provided. Teacher S said that he opted to use peer-marking because that technique enabled students to learn from their peers, for example, by avoiding the mistakes that their colleagues had made. Therefore, he used this technique even though it was more time-consuming than assessing the students' work by himself. Teacher C reported that apart from selfand peer-marking, she also used portfolios, which she described as a collection of exercise handouts that she designed for the students to start in class and finish at home as a means to foster the students' independent learning and self-assessment. Teacher A reported that she only used self-marking in her class. She said she was not in favour of peer-marking because this technique was not effective in her big class, and the students might not be confident in showing their result to others. She also reported that she did not use self-marking in writing tasks because it might be too challenging for her students to self-assess their writing. The above findings suggest that students' involvement in assessment was still minimal in each of the three classes, and the teacher was still the primary agent in this respect. This might be due to the students' unreadiness for taking part in decisionmaking relating to assessment and the teacher's lack of confidence in the students' 191 ability to perform self/peer-assessment. This lack of confidence appeared to result in students being given a prescribed scope for involvement in assessment tasks. Assessment feedback Teacher S believed that his feedback was vital because it helped to raise students' awareness of their learning so that they could improve: For example, in writing, my students are more aware of their mistakes and make progress when I repeatedly give comments on one mistake. In speaking, I give much feedback on pronunciation and ask students to use a dictionary to look up new words, and students seem to get more autonomous in their learning. (SI) He showed his awareness of the students' English level when giving feedback to them. He thought that at the current stage, where the students' English level was low, the most critical language aspects for them were pronunciation, vocabulary and grammar. Accordingly, his feedback would focus more on these aspects. I always give students feedback when they do exercises. For example, when checking students' writing, I always correct for them the spelling, grammar and vocabulary mistakes. I think that if students can write without making grammar and vocabulary mistakes, it is ok at this level. Therefore, I don't give much feedback on the content. In the class, I focus on students' pronunciation. If they make pronunciation mistakes, I will correct for them and ask them to use the dictionary to check the pronunciation for familiar words. (SI) This finding illustrates that Teacher S attended more to task-level feedback, paying attention to the corrective aspect of the task. These types of feedback belong to the prescribed category, encouraging students' reliance and compliance. 192 Teacher C believed that feedback could provide the students with information about their learning-what they had acquired and what their weaknesses were, so that they could understand their current level of English compared to the required level. In her view, assessment feedback should include both information relating to the students' performance or work and information about the students' learning process that could help to nurture their motivation, positive feelings and attitudes. However, she reported that her feedback could only focus on the learning product, not on the learning process, due to time constraints. For example, when I give the students feedback about their writing, I will comment on writing content, language use, grammar and vocabulary. Apart from that, I think we should motivate the students by giving them praise and encouragement. For example, I can tell them that they have made a great effort, or I can draw a smiley face on their writing. However, I have not done much of that due to time constraints. My feedback now mostly focuses on mistake identification and correction, not on psychological aspects of the students. (CI) Teacher A believed that the impact of feedback on the students' learning depended on the students' attitude toward it, and their responses to the teacher's feedback. She reported that there were two groups of students in her class: the students who attended to comments and feedback, and the students who only paid attention to the mark or grade they received. From her perspective, the former group often included active and autonomous students, and feedback was most helpful to this group because they paid attention and acted on it. For example, they were not going to repeat the same mistakes that the teacher had identified and corrected for them. Teacher A did not think 193 her feedback had much influence on the learning of those who only cared for marks, as they often did not progress and made the same mistakes many times. Teacher A appeared to consider cultural factors when offering feedback to the students. She thought that the Vietnamese culture was not open to negative feedback. Therefore, in the class, she tried not to give negative feedback on the students' work or performance. Instead, she complimented the students' performance if it was good, and tried to focus on what the students could do rather than their weaknesses. Vietnamese culture is different from Western culture. I think Vietnamese people are not willing to receive comments and feedback in public, no matter if they are positive or negative. If the teacher gives negative feedback to the students during her lesson, this could bring about adverse effects. This is one of the cultural factors that teachers need to consider when giving feedback. I only give simple feedback in the class. For example, I praise the students when they do a task well. Even when they make mistakes, I will try to compliment on, for example, their efforts or attempts first and then mention their mistakes later. (AI) Cultural factors might have prompted the teacher's choice to only give more detailed feedback on individual students' work. I often give direct and detailed feedback on the students' writing. I always try to identify the mistakes in their writing ....I normally correct the mistakes for the students no matter how big or small the mistakes are. (AI) 194 5.2.2.2 Students' voices The role of assessment in learning All sixteen students thought that assessment played a crucial role in their learning. Students' perceptions of the role of assessment in their learning showed their insights into LA and the extent to which assessment can enact LA. The findings indicate that assessment was perceived by the students as being significant to their learning because it could act as a source of information about their learning, a motive for learning, a consolidation of learning, and a means to control their learning quality. Two students in Teacher C's class, three students in Teacher S's class, and three students in Teacher A's class thought that assessment activities could generate information about their learning, informing them of what they had achieved and their current position in the learning journey, and helping them plan their next actions, rectify their learning and make progress. For instance, students CS3 and SS5 said: I think assessment is very important. Its role is to help us know our current learning and which level we are in so that we can determine what to learn next. (CS3) The role of assessment is to show us our mistakes/errors, where we are doing well and where we are not. If there was no assessment, we would not be able to recognise our mistakes or errors to correct. (SS5) One student in Teacher S's class perceived the role of assessment in terms of self-assessment, which he believed to help him determine his current position in learning so that he could plan and initiate learning to meet his goals. He said: 195 The role of assessment in my learning is that I can self-assess my ability to know where I am so that I know if I need to take extracurricular activities and put more effort into learning. (SS6) Student SS6's recognition of self-assessment as an example of the role of assessment in learning indicated an emphasis on their own central role in assessment, and in turn in the learning process, signifying that student SS6 might be able to demonstrate proactive autonomy in his learning. Assessment was also perceived as being a motive for students' learning. Three students in Teacher C's class reported that teachers' comments on their work or performance, especially compliments, could rouse positive feelings and motivated them to take on more learning. For instance, student CS2 commented: Assessment, more or less, influences my motivation to learn. For example, when I perform a task correctly, my teacher will praise me and I will feel contented. In this case, I will want to try next time in order to receive similar praises. If I do not perform the task well, meaning I cannot meet my teacher's expectation, I will be sad, but still try harder so that I can do better next time. (CS2) Students in Teacher S's class thought that if there was an assessment, they would invest more time and effort in learning in order to satisfy the teacher's requirements or to get good assessment results. In other words, the teacher's assessment activities pressure students to take on more learning or condition their learning. Students in Teacher A's class shared this view. For example, one student reported that he felt motivated when his teacher regularly checked if he understood the lesson. Additionally, when the teacher frequently carried out an assessment in a subject, this student would 196 have to spend more time studying the subject (i.e., doing homework and reading materials). Another student admitted, I think assessment is a driving force for my studying. It is also the pressure for me in the sense that if I am not hard-working, I will not be able to pass the final test. Therefore, I always try to learn hard right at the beginning. (AS5). The above findings indicate that students perceived assessment as being external to them in the learning process. They were either the receivers of assessment information or the respondents to assessment regimes. They might initiate and carry out some learning activities, but they were not entirely in control of the process. This finding provides support for the idea that students in this sample held a reactive conception of LA. Students perceived the choice of assessment tasks as influencing their motivation for learning. Four students in Teacher A's class reported that assessment in the form of group work competition could stimulate them enormously: Teachers can motivate students by using assessment in the form of group-work competition. It is boring learning only by doing exercises and following the same direction all the time. This form of assessment (group work competition) can encourage the winners and stimulate the losers. (AS3) Three students admitted that the teacher's method of awarding marks could affect students' motivation. For example, two students reported that they liked it when a teacher only gave a mark to those who did well in a task. Those who did not do well in a task would only receive feedback for improvement. When a teacher carried out assessment this way, all students wanted to engage and contribute to the lesson because 197 they felt safe in terms of grading. One student emphasised that if teachers used a mark as a reward, it would stimulate students greatly. She said: I think assessment has an impact on motivation. For example, it motivates the students a lot when the teacher awards mark 10 to all members of the group that won the group work competition. If the teacher does not give any mark, I think the motivation will deteriorate significantly. Some students will not take part in the activity even when they know the answer if the teacher does not award any mark. (AS5) Assessment was also conceived as a consolidation of learning. One student in Teacher A's class believed that assessment could help refresh the students' prior knowledge and reinforce newly-learned knowledge. For example, when my teacher asks me about something that we have learned, if I do not remember, I can ask my teacher to explain again. This is consolidation. In case we have just learned something new (e.g., a grammar rule or a structure) if the teacher gives a test at the end of the lesson it can help us see how much we understood the lesson. This is also consolidation, and it is very good for the students' learning. (AS1) One student in Teacher S's class perceived assessment as a means to merely control students' learning quality. He believed that assessment existed for the purpose of determining students' level of competency in a subject after a certain learning period, and grading and certifying students' learning. This student merely talked about the summative purpose of assessment and considered this the main role of assessment in 198 students' learning. This might reflect a perception of students in the assessment process as being compliant or reactive. Findings on students' perceptions of the role of assessment in learning supported the notion that autonomy can be described along a continuum. That is, the degree of autonomy reflected in students' views seemed to be manifested at different levels: from being compliant and reactive to the system to being proactive in all aspects of learning. Assessment regime The current assessment regime at the university was a credit-based system (see Chapter 2). All the interviewed students (n=16) in the three classes believed that a credit-based system allowed the students more space and freedom for decision-making than the traditional yearly-based system, and at the same time required the students to demonstrate greater autonomy in their learning. First, the system required students to demonstrate greater autonomy in the management of their learning. The system required students to register for the number of credits they wanted to learn in a term and select subjects for the term. They also had to choose the lecturers, the schedule and the learning pace. Therefore, the students had to consider and manage their personal needs, preferences, and plans, and manage their time accordingly. They also needed to actively search for information about different courses, lecturers and their teaching methods and styles so that they could choose the most relevant courses for their needs and the most appropriate lecturers for their learning. In order to do all of this, the students needed the capacity for evaluation and reflection as well as planning and monitoring skills. The credit-based system also appeared to require the students to display initiative in learning outside of the class, because self-study was officially one of the requirements in the system. Additionally, students believed that in this assessment 199 regime, lecturers were only the facilitators or mentors for the students in their learning process, so that students had to take an active role in their learning. ...the credit-based system is a system originated from western countries and this system obviously requires the students to be more autonomous in their learning because for every hour learning in the class, we need two and a half hours learning at home in order to fully acquire the knowledge. (CS2) At the university, students mainly rely on themselves for their study; the lecturers are only the facilitators. Therefore, we have to read the materials at home and make questions to ask the lecturers to explain where we cannot understand. (AS2) The students saw the credit-based assessment regime as promoting LA and selfdiscipline. They believed that when the assessment framework was made transparent and public to them right at the beginning, they would be able to self-assess and control their learning process. Additionally, apart from end-of-term tests, the credit-based system also relied on ongoing assessment of students' learning. Students reported that ongoing assessment encouraged them to demonstrate their autonomy in learning. They believed that when their effort in learning (e.g., their attendance, their participation, their homework completion) was counted in the course Grade Point Average, they would invest more time and effort in learning in order to achieve a better result. ...For example, with the information about the proportion of class attendance, homework, participation, mid-term tests and end-of-term test in the final grade, students can control their learning, that is, selfassess the whole learning process. When you know how many times 200 you have been absent from class, whether or not you have completed your homework....you can be in control of your learning. (SS1) Findings relating to the students' viewpoints about the current assessment regimes showed that the credit-based system allowed them more freedom and scope for decision-making, and at the same time required them to demonstrate greater autonomy in aspects relating to the learning process in comparison to more traditional assessment regimes. The role of students in the assessment process All students in the three classes (n=16) believed that they could help their teacher in assessment practices by participating in assessment tasks (e.g., answering the teacher's questions and taking part in group work activities), assisting the teacher in giving feedback (e.g., identifying mistakes for colleagues), and completing self/peerassessment. The findings indicated that students considered self/peer-making to be the most prominent method through which they could help teachers with assessment. I think students can help in such things as peer-marking. That is, students swap their works and do the marking for one another. Students with better English can even do the correction for the weaker ones. (SS5) I think if there are so many students in a class, the teacher can involve the students in peer-marking in order to save the teacher's time and effort. Additionally, when we check our friends' work, we might also identify our similar mistakes. (AS5) This finding indicates that the level of autonomy that the majority of the interviewed students could demonstrate in assessment was still limited. They appeared to work more confidently within a prescribed scope. 201 Two students in Teacher S's class thought that the teacher, instead of giving feedback to students, could invite other students in the class to give feedback on their peers' work. This could not only help the teacher to see the student's work from multiple perspectives, but also provide the teacher with information about the students who gave feedback to their fellow student. I think students can help the teacher in assessment practice. After a student gave the answer, the teacher can invite one or two students to give feedback or comments instead of his giving feedback straightaway. This can not only help the teacher have the overarching and diversified perspectives about the student's work, but also help him to know the level of the students who gave feedback to their peer's work. (SS2) These two students' perspectives suggested that they were willing to be involved in giving feedback and to demonstrate a high level of autonomy in this respect. Regarding self/peer-assessment, the majority of the interviewed students showed a willingness to take part in these activities, but at the same time displayed their lack of confidence in their ability to carry them out. They were not confident in their language proficiency, so they thought that the teacher should be the one to carry out the assessment. Five interviewed students stated that they could not self-assess their work and relied entirely on teachers for assessment. Eight interviewed students reported that they could assess some specific tasks such as simple grammar tasks, but still recognised teachers as taking the primary responsibility. Only three interviewed students believed that they could perform self-assessment and often self-assessed their work, signifying their ability to carry out autonomous learning. 202 The above findings suggest that students tended to be more confident and comfortable complying with the teacher's instructions rather than having to manage the assessment process by themselves. They believed that they could help in assessment practices, but only by cooperating with the teachers. In cases where they had to carry on assessment practices by themselves, they lost their confidence. This indicated the students' lack of readiness to take responsibility for assessment. They were more ready for interdependence than independence in this respect. Assessment feedback All sixteen students in the three classes thought that feedback played a crucial role in their learning. The data indicated that the majority of students (n=12) perceived corrective feedback as playing the most significant role, believing that mistake identification and correction were the most helpful types of feedback. In other words, they focused on responding to task-specific corrections. Teacher's feedback is important because it can show us our mistakes and how to fix these mistakes so that we will not make similar mistakes in the future. Teacher's feedback can also help us perfect our work or show us how to perfect our work. (SS3) I find the teacher's feedback very important to the students. For example, when my teacher marks our writing, she often shows us the grammar mistakes that we have made, or the sentence structures that we have used incorrectly so that we can avoid similar mistakes in the future. (CS1) The teacher's feedback is beneficial because it identifies our mistakes, our weaknesses and our strengths so that we can rectify our mistakes, overcome our weaknesses and exploit our strength. (AS4) 203 The students' perceptions of the role of feedback in their learning suggested that the majority of them valued prescribed instructions, which might indicate a potential for compliance with and reliance on the teacher's instructions. The above finding was also reflected in the students' reporting about their responses to feedback. For example, four students in Teacher S's class indicated their dependence on their teacher when handling feedback. They took the teacher's feedback for granted, waited for the teacher's corrections, or just used the teacher's guidance to correct particular mistakes. For example, student SS5 perceived the role of the teacher to be that of the knowledge holder, while perceiving himself as the one to receive knowledge from his teacher: I will follow my teacher's feedback and correct my mistakes. I think my teacher's knowledge is greater, so he must be right. (SS5) All the interviewed students in Teacher A's class believed that feedback played a significant role in their learning and they all welcomed feedback irrespective of whether it was positive or negative. For example, positive feedback could build up the students' confidence in their learning, while negative feedback could identify learning weaknesses for them to improve on. One student stated that the teacher's feedback could help to build up his selfefficacy. He said: When the teacher gives me positive feedback on my performance, I will be more confident with this type of knowledge and skill. For example, when the teacher tells me that my grammar use is correct, I will be confident in using it in other situations. Now, whenever I have to use English, I feel unconfident because I do not know if I am using the right vocabulary or grammar or not, especially in situations 204 where people know English well. If I make a mistake, I will be very embarrassed. (AS1) For other students, feedback could result in a more long-term benefit to their learning. Feedback in these cases could inform the students of their current position in the learning path, indicating their strengths and their weaknesses so that they could make learning decisions. Students reported that feedback helped them \"know your current level and what to do to make progress\" (CS3), \"know where you are, and what you need to do to have better result\" (CS4), and become \"more confident\" (AS1). In addition, two students noted that teacher's feedback \"[helped them] be more autonomous in [their] learning\" (CS2). Feedback could also influence the students' motivation to learn: Feedback has effects on my learning process and my learning spirit. That is, it encourages me to make more efforts to achieve what I want. If my work is not good yet, I will try to improve it until it is good. If my work is already good, I will try to make it even better. (CS2) Students in Teacher S's and Teacher A's classes appeared to be comfortable with prescribed feedback, and they wanted to passively receive feedback from their teacher without having to take any further action: I want the teacher to suggest me the knowledge to learn. I mean, the teacher shows me where to learn so that I only need to follow at home. (AS5) I like it when the teacher gives feedback in a direct way. That means he identifies the mistakes and corrects the mistakes for students without suggesting this or that or showing how to do it. (SS3) 205 Students in Teacher C's class also cited mistake identification as the most useful form of feedback. However, only one student wanted the teacher to identify then correct the mistakes straight away for him, suggesting that he was comfortable to receive prescribed feedback from the teacher and comply with the teacher's instructions. Four students said that they did not want the teacher to give them immediate mistake corrections. Instead, the teacher, after identifying mistakes or errors, should allow students some time to think about their mistakes or errors and try to correct the mistakes by themselves. The teacher could scaffold them by providing them with some resources or guidance if necessary. The students thought this type of feedback could help them learn more effectively and retain knowledge longer. For instance, Student CS1 commented: I think teacher gives mark [sic], and then underlines the mistakes or errors. Immediate correction may be not necessary, but the teacher leaves the mistakes or errors for students to correct by themselves. When students have to figure out why they made the mistakes/errors and try to correct the mistakes/errors by themselves, they will remember better. (CS1) One student added that the teacher should decide the amount of guidance to offer to the students based on the complexity of the knowledge associated with the mistakes that they made, as illustrated in her comment: The most useful feedback to me is when the teacher identifies the mistakes for me. If the mistakes relate to simple knowledge, the teacher should let me fix them. If the mistakes relate to difficult knowledge, the teacher should correct the mistakes for me and inform 206 me of the knowledge I need to pay attention to in order to not make the mistakes in the future. (CS5) These students appeared to prefer more space and freedom than they normally had so that they could demonstrate their agency in learning. This suggested that the current feedback might be too prescribed for them. 5.2.3. Teachers' and students' perspectives on the relationship between assessment and LA 5.2.3.1. Teachers' perspectives The findings indicated that all three teachers perceived assessment as a separate component from teaching and learning which could be used as a tool to encourage students to demonstrate their autonomy in learning. The findings also suggest that assessment can influence LA at different levels. Teacher S thought that assessment (e.g., feedback) could be used to train students to be more autonomous in their learning. He reported that he often used his feedback to shape his students' thinking so that whenever they faced an issue in their learning, they had to rely on themselves before seeking help from others. Additionally, whenever his students approached him for help, he tended to delay his help so that students would have to make an effort first. He believed that this technique, at first, could make students become self-reliant in a compliant way, meaning that they only took the initiative because they were asked to do so. However, this could gradually build up students' habits of taking the initiative in solving their problems before approaching others for help, gradually making them reactive and ideally proactive in their learning. He said: I think the teacher's assessments have a direct relationship with students' attitude and autonomy in learning. For example, if our feedback can raise awareness like 'oh, you have to be self-reliant in 207 solving this problem', I think students will certainly have to be more autonomous in their learning. An example of what I often do in my class is that when my students ask me 'how is this word pronounced?' I will typically respond to them 'look it up by yourself first. If you still cannot find it, then ask me'. After using this technique for a while, I recognised that my students have had the habit of working on their own before approaching me for help and the incidences of students' asking are less frequent. (SI) It seemed to the researcher that in Teacher S's view, two separate elements determine the influence of assessment on LA. First is the feedback that promotes the idea of students taking responsibility and ownership for their learning. Second are the teacher's pedagogical techniques, which put students in situations where they have to exercise ownership and responsibility for their learning. In addition, the data carried some implications about the impact of assessment on the development of LA. Firstly, assessment may serve to move a student along a continuum of LA, ranging from compliant to reactive. Secondly, the influence of assessment on LA might not be immediate. Therefore, the process of developing LA may be a long and gradual one, requiring teachers' consistent efforts and commitment. Teacher C stated that assessment could influence the demonstration of LA. She believed that assessment could enhance LA in the sense that it could 'force' students to take on more learning, especially outside of the class, and to control what they did. She also believed that assessment could increase the students' participation in the class: I think this (developing learner autonomy) depends on teachers' activities and assessment methods. For example, if teachers give students homework and do not check it, it is very likely that students 208 will not do the homework . . . To develop learner autonomy, teachers need to, for example, frequently have tasks in the class for students to do, and frequently check students' homework. In other words, teachers need to carry out assessment frequently (CI) Teacher C's ideas about developing autonomy illustrated a stimulus-response mechanism in which assessment tasks were used to condition students' learning behaviours. This mechanism made students compliant with assessment tasks rather than encouraging autonomy. Students' learning did not come from their own volition, so if the stimulus no longer existed, the response would be very likely to stop. Teacher A perceived assessment as providing direction for the students' learning. Assessment could help the students to identify the requirements of the course and display learning initiative in order to meet these expectations. I think that students will get used to the assessment methods that their teacher often uses. They can be unfamiliar the first time, but they can be more ready in the following times. Secondly, when the teacher informs students of the assessment methods that she will be using in the next lesson, they will prepare for it in terms of both knowledge and psychological aspect. (AI) Teacher A's statements reflected her belief that assessment can foster reactive autonomy. Assessment acted as the other-initiated learning agenda for the students to follow, and the students, being aware of the direction, would actively manage their learning in this direction. In Teacher A's view, the influences of assessment on LA could be fluid, non-linear and fluctuating depending on a number of variables, including nature of feedback, students' attitude towards learning and their existing degree of autonomy. 209 Teacher A believed that feedback could contribute to LA. She stated that her comments and feedback could show her students what they had acquired and not acquired, and where they needed to improve. Those who are active in learning would make use of this information to initiate some changes. However, she thought that the key and challenging task was how to make non-autonomous students become autonomous, and in this case, the teacher's assessments could come into play by 'forcing' them to take on their learning. This teacher thought that assessment, in the initial stage, could be used as conditioning for students' behaviours. In this sense, assessment was the stimulus for students' actions. The teacher's assessments can have an impact on learner autonomy. First can be the obligatory tasks like homework that force them to take on learning if they do not want to get bad marks or be criticised or punished. (AI) Teacher A's perspective suggested that assessment influenced LA on different levels, depending on students' attitudes towards learning and their existing levels of autonomy. For those who were already autonomous to some degree and had a positive attitude towards learning, teachers' feedback and comments could help them take more initiative in their learning, as feedback could help them position themselves in their learning path and plan their future learning actions. For those who were passive, teachers' assessment could at least make them take on some learning. She thought that assessment might therefore be a good place to start in getting students to become more autonomous. 210 5.2.3.2. Students' perspectives All 16 students in the three classes believed that assessment practices have an impact on LA. However, the way they conceived these impacts varied, depending on how they understood the concepts of assessment and LA. Three students in Teacher S's class, one student in Teacher C's class, and two students in Teacher A's class believed that feedback had the most impact on LA. They conceived feedback as the awareness of their own conditions (i.e., their needs and wants, their resources, their strengths and weaknesses) and the consequential initiatives they took to make progress in their learning. They noted that the feedback they received in the assessment process could show them their strengths and weaknesses in their learning, help them look back at what they had been doing and look forward to where they needed to go, and reflect on how they could go to where they wanted. As such, they saw assessment as both the mirror that helped them to reflect on their learning process and a guideline for them in their learning. The following excerpts illustrate this finding. Teacher's feedback helps students to reflect on their learning process, on their learning method, their strengths and weaknesses. When students can do these things, they can make progress in their learning, leading to higher motivation to learn and greater learner autonomy. Teacher's assessment encourages me to put more effort on my learning and helps me identify my mistakes and then enhances my autonomy. (SS4) I think assessment influences learner autonomy because assessment helps us to know our weaknesses so that we could improve (CS1) Assessment can influence learner autonomy in the sense that it helps to identify our mistakes so that we can improve and make progress. (AS2) 211 Two students in Teacher S's class and one student in Teacher C's class perceived that assessments affected the development of LA by acting as a driving force for students to improve themselves, resulting in greater autonomy in learning. The students believed that self-and peer-assessments could encourage students to be more autonomous in their learning because the key requirement in these activities was to develop sufficient knowledge, which was, in turn, perceived as the result of autonomous learning. These students appeared to conceive of assessment as an internal part of their learning, and they were the primary agents in assessment. In this sense, assessment (self/peer-assessment) could help them to display proactive autonomy in their learning. I think assessments have an impact on the development of learner autonomy. This means students need to be able to self-assess their work or assess their friends' work. In order to be able to do so, students need to have adequate knowledge, which in turn leads to the demand to improve themselves in order to carry out assessment practices on their own. (SS2) Assessment influences learner autonomy in the sense that in order to be able to assess others' work, we need to have knowledge, so we need to be self-regulated in learning at home to have adequate knowledge to assess others' work. Teachers' assessment motivates me to be autonomous because when the teacher assesses my work, I will have a look at the assessment criteria and then at home pay more attention to these points. (CS3) One student in Teacher S's class and two students in Teacher C's class saw assessments as parameters for their learning, and autonomy as the ability to take responsibility or display initiative in learning using these parameters. In their view, assessments set the boundaries, directions, and the overall goal for their learning path/journey. Once these aspects were set, the students would actively take 212 responsibility for their learning, i.e., by making plans, managing their time and searching for materials so that they could learn effectively and achieve the best results. Therefore, assessment (in this student's perspective) that assessment influenced LA in the sense that it helped to promote the learner's ability to take the initiative in their learning within a bounded learning space. In other words, assessment can promote reactive autonomy among students. This (assessment) urges students to prepare for it in advance. This preparation depends on students' autonomy. Students normally want good results, so they will set goals and plans so that they can achieve these results, leading to greater autonomy. Ongoing assessment motivates us to take part in classroom activities such as collaborating with other students. (SS3) There are many subjects that require learner autonomy – those with a lot of exercises and assignments which cannot be completed in the class. Therefore, in order to learn these subjects effectively, we have to display initiative in searching for materials and carry out self-study at home. (CS2) Three students in Teacher A's class appeared to perceive assessment as a motive for their learning. They thought that assessment could promote LA in the sense that it could make them take on some learning actions (e.g., doing homework and doing revision). They appeared to perceive assessment in a summative sense because they tended to use the word 'test' instead of 'assessment', and they put a lot of emphasis on grading. In their view, students were passive, and assessment existed to force the students to learn. It seemed that from the students' perspective, they were like 213 clockwork dolls and assessment was the key that operated them. Only when the key was wound did the doll start to dance. The following excerpts illustrate this viewpoint. ...Second is grading. If the teacher assesses and awards a grade, we will try our best. If the teacher assesses without awarding a grade, we still try, but not our best. (AS2) Students are more keen on playing than learning, so without teachers' assessment, students will be passive. If my teacher does not assess me, I will not study and become lazy. Therefore, assessment is like the driving force for our study. My teacher's assessment makes me more hard-working. (AS4) Assessment influences learner autonomy in the sense that if my teacher carries out many assessment practices, I will learn harder. If not, I will be lazy and inattentive. (AS5) One student believed that assessment could help to develop the students' habit of taking responsibility for their learning. In other words, the teacher's assessment practices could plant seeds of LA among the students. They could be compliant at the initial stage and become reactive afterwards, as illustrated in his comment: I think teachers' assessment influences learner autonomy. For example, the checking of homework might oblige the students to complete it at first, but this obligation can build up the students' habit of doing homework or at least opening the books before going to class. I think this is part of learner autonomy. (AS1) 214 Findings relating to the students' perspectives on the relationship between assessment and autonomy illustrated that assessment could potentially encourage various autonomy levels in practice. 5.3. Students' self-reports of their English learning 5.3.1. Demonstration of proactive autonomy The findings showed that seven interviewed students appeared to demonstrate a high level of autonomy in their English learning. These students either realised intrinsic motivation for learning English or had clear goals such as learning English for their future job. These students initiated their learning agendas for English outside of the class to serve their own needs and goals, and chose the learning pathway and pace suitable for their agenda and needs. They also took the initiative in trying and adopting different methods to best follow their agendas. Additionally, they demonstrated a set of skills and strategies which indicated that they were autonomous learners. The two students in Teacher S's class, for example, had clear goals for their English learning. One student aimed to further his study overseas, while the other learned English for her future career I have two objectives in learning English. First, I want to communicate with foreigners in English. Second, I want to find a job in a foreign company when I graduate from university. (SS2). Therefore, they initiated their learning agendas, choosing their learning pathways and adopting the pace for learning which might be relevant to their agendas and needs. 215 I spend about three hours a day to learn English at home, one and a half hours in the morning, half an hour in the afternoon and one hour in the evening. (SS4) I learn English almost every day in the morning or at noon.... I do one listening topic a day, and at the end of the week, I will collect all the listening topics that I have done during the week and listen again. (SS2) When there was a conflict between their learning agenda and the teacher's learning agenda, they would accept their responsibility for actions and judgements in reference to their priorities and needs. I often do English exercises, but when I am busy, I will prioritise my English learning rather than doing homework because I think it is more useful and practical to me. (SS4). Additionally, they displayed initiative in identifying, searching for and selecting materials appropriate for their learning. Student S4 searched for materials on the Internet, on Facebook and books. Student S2, focusing on practising listening skills, searched for learning materials on the English-learning websites and YouTube, and often listened to clips on a Facebook group called 'Learning English is Easy'. Both students demonstrated an ability for self-reflection and self-evaluation in relation to learning content and learning method. They knew their strengths and weaknesses and what they needed to do to reach their goals. The student aiming to study overseas was aware that he needed to have an English certificate such as IELTS, TOEIC or TOEFL, so he established language content acquisition accordingly: 216 I focus on three main areas: pronunciation, grammar and vocabulary because I think these are the basis for such English exams as IELTS, TOEIC or TOEFL. (SS4). He also illustrated an ability to evaluate the materials and learning resources in relation to his aims: For pronunciation, I have a bedside book called Spelling Method by Nguyen Ngoc Nam which helps me to know how to speak with intonation, stress and how to link ending sounds. This book is ranked 3rd or 4th in the bestseller list. For grammar, I use the book called IELTS Handbook by Kien Tran, who is a successful IELTS learner and the admin of a page called Self-study IELTS for 8.0. For vocabulary. (SS4) The other student was aware that listening skills were her weaknesses, so she prioritised these skills in her language learning. These two students demonstrated an ability to reflect on the effectiveness of different learning approaches and then chose the one they felt was best for themselves. One student stated: After learning in several places, I have found self-studying is the most effective for foundation building period. (SS4) Both students demonstrated an ability to carry out ongoing self-assessment. They accepted responsibility for judgement of their learning and thoroughly reflected on learning outcomes and performances, trying out new tools to assess and control their learning progress. I will listen to a topic until I can comprehend everything in the listening and translate into Vietnamese, then I will move on to the next listening. (SS2) 217 I use an App on my iPhone called Memrise. I learn about 30 new words a day, and I have finished its A1 course of 1600 words. (SS4) 5.3.2. Demonstration of reactive autonomy Some students (n=6) did not initiate any agenda for learning English at the time of the interview. They followed the learning agenda initiated by teachers in order to meet the short-term need of passing the exams and then graduating from the university. They initiated and carried out some learning activities outside of the class and displayed initiative in selecting and choosing materials and learning resources, but mostly for the purpose of helping them proceed in the direction that had been initiated by teachers. For example, one student in Teacher C's class stated that his first goal in learning English was to achieve an A2 certificate. He appeared to comply with the teacher's instructions for out-of-class learning closely and initiated his own learning activities I try to finish the exercises in the handout at class and prepare for the next lesson or do exercises in the book at home. I took an English course at an English centre some months ago because I think class is not a good environment for communication in the target language. (CS2) Two interviewed students in Teacher A's class also reported that their prime goal at the time of the interview was to be able to get the A2 certificate for graduation. One student followed the teacher's syllabus, but he also initiated his own learning activities so that he could achieve his goal: I spend about 45 minutes a week to do English homework. I also spend 30 to 45 minutes every two days to practise listening or learn new vocabulary. (AS3) The other student reflected on the effectiveness of a learning course she took and made decisions regarding her learning methods, which she considered appropriate and 218 effective for her objective of getting an A2 certificate. She managed the contents of her learning and chose her own pathway and pace. I stopped learning at the English centre because they only taught simple English grammar rules such as present simple or present continuous, which I found not very useful.....Now I am only studying at the university and doing self-study English at home. At home, I review grammar and learn new vocabulary. I spend about 30 minutes to 1 hour every day. (AS5) 5.3.3. Demonstration of compliance Three interviewed students did not initiate any learning outside the class. They followed the teacher's syllabus and paid attention to the list of specific language items and skills designated in the course, in order to serve the needs identified by the English department and the university-passing the tests and getting an A2 certificate. For example, two students in Teacher S's class stated that they studied English to achieve a good course mark, to pass the English exam, and to achieve an A2 certificate for graduation. That is why they said: I only focus on the contents the teacher informed us that they would be tested/assessed in the exams. (SS3) I spend one hour a week for doing English exercises and prepare for English test – practice speaking about myself. (AS4) The data also showed that one student in Teacher S's class appeared to be aware of the benefit of English to his future, and he had some motivation to learn. However, this motivation was not strong enough to encourage him to demonstrate his agency in learning. In other words, he wanted to be proactive, but he was constrained by his current situation of working and learning to become compliant. 219 When I worked part-time as a cashier in a food shop near Hoan Kiem Lake, there were foreigner customers coming to the shop. I could understand them, but I could not talk to them. . . . Usually, I am quite confident with my communication skill, but I was embarrassed and nervous and could not talk to foreigner customers due to my lack of English vocabulary. That was why I was motivated to plan to learn English. However, I was too busy learning and working at the same time, so I have not realised my plan yet. I might spend more time learning English after I graduate from university because I cannot manage my time for English now. (SS3) It could be argued from the findings that these were compliant students. They were compliant to the requirements of the university, and therefore compliant with the syllabus and teacher's instructions. Chapter Summary This chapter has presented findings from interviews with teachers and students about their understandings of LA, their perceptions of assessment, and their perspectives on the relationship between assessment and LA. The chapter has also reported levels of autonomy demonstrated, which were reflected in the students' reports about their learning English. The findings indicate that the teachers had limited understanding of LA, and appeared to perceive the concept at different levels. The findings also show that the students appeared to hold a positive view of LA. They conceived the concept at different levels and showcased a consistent understanding about the concept. 220 The findings about perceptions of assessment suggest that assessment, especially assessment feedback, played a significant role in teaching and learning and the demonstration of LA. There was a divergence in findings about teachers' and students' views about the current assessment regime. From the teachers' perspective, the current assessment regime appeared to have a negative impact on teaching and learning, and inhibited the promotion and demonstration of LA. From the students' perspective, however, the current assessment system appeared to both empower them to display more autonomy and require them to demonstrate a higher level of autonomy. The findings also showed that teachers did not allow much space for students to demonstrate their autonomy in assessment, and students' involvement in decision-making regarding assessment practices was limited. Concerning perspectives on the relationship between assessment and LA, the findings indicated that both teachers and students thought that assessment had a significant impact on the demonstration of LA. Teachers appeared to perceive assessment as external to students' learning, while students appeared to view assessment as both external and internal to their own learning. This illustrates that assessment could potentially encourage various levels of autonomy. The findings also indicated that students appeared to demonstrate higher levels of autonomy outside of the class context than during formal classroom learning. 221 CHAPTER 6: OBSERVED ASSESSMENT PRACTICES AND STUDENTS' RESPONSES Chapter overview This chapter presents the findings from participant observations in three English classes. The observations focussed on the teachers' assessment practices and the students' responses to these practices. Teachers' assessment practices were categorised into assessment tasks, assessment techniques, assessment feedback and assessment-related communication. All these practices were viewed in terms of levels of autonomy offered ranked from prescribed to bounded to open. Students' responses in these assessment practices were viewed in terms of levels of autonomy demonstrated, ranked from compliant to reactive to proactive. Coding principles for data recognition are as follows: • Observation data includes a letter representing the class teacher, 'OB' (abbreviating 'observation'), and a number at the end representing the number of the observation (e.g., 'SOB2' would mean 'the second observation in Teacher S's class'). • Post-observation interviews with teachers include 'PO' (abbreviating 'post observation'), a letter indicating the teacher, 'I' for 'interview', and a number indicating the number of observation (e.g., 'POSI2' means 'post-observation interview with teacher S after the second observation)'. • Post-observation interviews with students include 'PO', a letter indicating the teacher, S for 'student', 'I' for 'interview', and a number indicating the number 222 of the observation (e.g., 'POCSI3' means 'post observation with Teacher C's students after observation number 3'). • Interviews with a teacher have a letter indicating the teacher and 'I' for 'interview' (e.g., 'SI' means 'interview with Teacher S'). • Interviews with students have a letter indicating the teacher, 'S' for student and a number indicating the student (e.g., 'CS2' means 'interview with student 2 in Teacher C's class'). 6.1. Assessment tasks and students' responses In this section, assessment tasks were first analysed using Ellis's (2003) framework5, in which a task is subdivided into goal, input, condition, procedure, and output. The tasks were also investigated in relation to the level of students' decision-making in a task. If the teacher decided all aspects of the task, it was termed prescribed. If the students could determine some aspects such as the output or the procedures, then the task was regarded as bounded. If the students determined all the aspects of the task, then the task was described as open. The students' responses to the tasks were also analysed in terms of the levels of autonomy demonstrated. If the students closely followed the teacher's instruction, they were considered to be compliant. If they initiated some actions to complete the assigned tasks, they were viewed as demonstrating reactive autonomy. If they initiated some action in order to complete the tasks they initiated, they were viewed as demonstrating proactive autonomy. In cases where students in one class had different responses to the teacher's assessment practices, their responses would be analysed as representing mixed autonomy. 5 Ellis's (2003) framework is described in detail in section 3.3.2.2 of Chapter 3 223 6.1.1. Tasks for in-class learning Prescribed tasks Figure 6.1 Number of prescribed tasks compared to total number of tasks in three classes Data analysis showed that the majority of tasks designated for in-class learning in the three classes belonged to the prescribed category (see figure 6.1). The teachers initiated these tasks for particular purposes, but in most cases, they did not communicate these purposes to the students. They decided on the input of the task (i.e., the verbal or non-verbal information supplied for the task, such as pictures, a map, and a written text). They also determined the time needed to complete the task and how the task should be carried out (i.e., individually, in pairs or in groups). The outcomes of the tasks were often pre-defined and limited to one correct answer, as in example 1. Example 1. Reading task: the teacher asked the students to read a passage about a family and underline new words and structures in the passage in seven minutes. The teacher told the students that if they did not know any words, they should ask their colleagues or the teacher, rather than looking them up in the dictionary. (SOB3) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Teacher S's class Teacher A's class Teacher C's class Prescribed tasks Total number of tasks 224 This reading task was initiated by the teacher. He did not explain to the students the purpose of underlining the new words and structures in the text. He decided on the amount of time needed for the reading task and the way to deal with new vocabulary. Therefore, students had little room for their own decision making. Students' responses in prescribed tasks The students' responses in prescribed tasks varied. In some cases, the students were compliant. In other cases, they demonstrated their reactivity in completing the tasks (see Figure 6.2). Figure 6.2 Students' demonstration of autonomy in prescribed tasks Prescribed tasks and students' demonstration of compliance The findings indicated that the prescribed – compliant pattern of students' responses to tasks was the most prominent pattern across the three classes. In other words, the students complied with or followed the teachers' instructions closely in prescribed tasks. They adhered unquestioningly to their teachers' instructions. In the prescribedcompliant pattern, the teachers were the primary agents who were in charge from task initiation to task implementation, while the students received and followed the teachers' instructions. Example 2 is an illustration. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Compliance Reactivity Mixed autonomy Proactivity Teacher C's class Teacher A's class Teacher S's class 225 Example 2. Speaking task: the teacher asked the students to talk about a person that they admire by answering the guided questions who this person is, what kind of job he/she does, and why they like him/her. First, the teacher provided students with structures to answer the questions ('A is my idol because...he/she is a/an.../what's special about him or her is that.../I like/admire him/her so much because...'). Then he asked the students to look back at the reading about David Beckham to see how the author talked about the things she admires about the famous footballer. Students took note of the teacher's model structures on the board and then opened the reading to find the model answers. (SOB10) This task was prescribed in scope because it was initiated by the teacher. The output was somewhat predefined by the guided questions. Usually, the output of a speaking task is not predictable, but in this case, it was somewhat predictable because all the answer structures were provided by the teacher. This task, therefore, offered almost no scope for students to make decisions. Students demonstrated their compliance in the task by looking for model answers in the reading and used the model answers and structures (that the teacher provided) to prepare their answer. Prescribed tasks and students' demonstration of reactivity Students in some cases navigated beyond the scope designated for them in a prescribed task. Instead of strictly following teachers' instructions, they initiated their own actions, made their own choices, or applied their own strategies so that they could complete the tasks more easily and effectively, demonstrating a higher level of autonomy than that supported by the task. For example, they made use of available resources such as their mobile phone and the Internet to look up new vocabulary or translate their ideas from Vietnamese into English. They cooperated with their colleagues and sought help from the teacher and fellow students. They opted to work individually when told to work in 226 pairs, and vice versa. They brainstormed ideas in Vietnamese instead of in English and then asked their fellow students or the teacher for help to convey these ideas in English. Examples 3 and 4 illustrate the prescribed reactive pattern. Example 3. Teacher C organised a group work activity. She divided the students into groups and provided them with a card, which contained a name of a place and some information in Vietnamese about the weather in this place. The students were required to work in groups to make a weather forecast in English for the place on their card, using the information (in Vietnamese). A student from each group would present the group's completed weather forecast to the class. The students were actively engaging and participating in the task. They used mobile phones to look up new words and used Google Translate to translate the provided information from Vietnamese into English. They also discussed noisily with friends and sought help from the teacher and the observer for new words and expressions in English. However, it seemed to the researcher that the students could not complete the task successfully. (COB3) The task in example 3 was prescribed in scope because it was initiated by the teacher. She decided on the input of the task. The output was predefined by the teacher, as she provided the students with information about the weather in the relevant place in Vietnamese. She also determined the grouping and time allocation for the task. The students were reactive in the sense that they attempted different strategies in order to complete the task. They cooperated with their peers, actively managing different resources around them (e.g., the Internet, Google Translate, the observer, the teacher). In this case, the teacher had turned the speaking task into a translating task by providing the Vietnamese version of the weather forecast, which made the speaking task 227 more challenging for the students. Post-observation interviews with the students supported this speculation. Students reported that the Vietnamese version of the weather forecast made it very difficult for them, as it made the task inflexible in terms of language use. Additionally, there were many uncommon Vietnamese words and phrases in the teacher's writing, which made it hard for them to translate it into English. Example 4. Students were asked to work in pairs to match the definitions with appropriate occupations. They had 20 minutes to complete the task. Students just needed to write the number next to the definition. Students discussed noisily. They all used mobile phones to look up new words. They all enthusiastically and fully engaged in the task. Some pairs decided in advance who would look up words and who wrote the meanings before they matched pictures and words together in order to complete the task more quickly. (SOB6) This vocabulary task was also highly prescribed because it was initiated by the teacher, who determined every aspect of the task. However, students actively applied many different cognitive and social strategies, such as using mobile phones and cooperating with peers. In fact, although the teacher did not explicitly communicate with his students about how the task was assessed, the students knew that the teacher would ask different pairs to exchange their completed work for peer-marking and then grant a good mark to the fastest pairs with the most correct answers, as he had been applying this technique since the first lesson. This speculation was confirmed because after the students completed the task, the teacher did require them to exchange their work and gave full marks to the group that had all the answers right. This could be the reason for students' active engagement in the task and their demonstration of reactivity, which seemed to be beyond the scope given to them. In this case, the students complied 228 not with the teacher's instructions, but with the rewards that the teacher explicitly offered or implicitly implied in his communication. Prescribed tasks and students' demonstration of mixed autonomy The data also showed that in some cases, the students had mixed responses to the prescribed tasks. Some of the students appeared compliant with the teacher's instructions, while others cooperated with peers, implemented their own strategies or used different resources (e.g., the Internet, mobile phones, dictionaries) in order to complete their tasks effectively. Examples 5 and 6 illustrate this finding: Example 5. The teacher asked the students to work individually. They needed to look at the pictures in the handout and write the names of the sports they saw. The first letter for each sport was provided. Most of the students worked individually. Some of them worked in pairs and used their mobile phones to look up words and search for information. One pair found the words in Vietnamese and then used the dictionary on their mobile phones to find the English equivalent for this word. One student turned around and tried to ask other students. (COB1) In example 5, the task was termed prescribed because the teacher was the sole agent involved in the orchestration of the task. Most of the students were compliant with the teacher's instructions. They did the task individually as instructed. However, some students worked in pairs instead of working individually as instructed by the teacher, or sought help from their peers. Some were flexible in carrying out the task, actively implementing their strategies and cooperating with others. Example 6. Teacher S asked his students to do a listening task. They had to listen to a recording in which a girl talked about her favourite subject and do two 229 gap-filling exercises, which means they had to fill in the blanks with words (subjects) provided in a box. In the first gap-fill exercise, the majority of students listened to the recording and did the task as prescribed. However, one student Huy (pseudonym) could not write the words into the blanks (at the first listening) because the recording was fast. Tu (pseudonym), sitting next to Huy, advised him to apply his technique for the task – number the provided words and then write the number in the blanks. Huy took Tu's advice on the second listening and completed the task. In the second gap-fill exercise, while other students followed the teacher's instructions, Huy numbered the provided words and wrote the number in the blanks during the first listening. In the second listening, he wrote the words in the blanks. (SOB5) In the above example, the task was prescribed in scope, as the teacher initiated it and described the steps to complete the task. In the first listening, the majority of the students, Huy included, appeared compliant with the teacher's instructions, except for Tu, who implemented his own strategy to complete the task. Huy struggled to comply with the teacher's instructions in the first listening, and in the second listening he opted to take Tu's advice and was able to complete the task. 230 Bounded tasks Figure 6.3 Number of bounded tasks compared to the total number of tasks in three classes There was a small number of tasks in the three classes that provided scope for students to demonstrate their autonomy (see figure 6.3). The teachers still initiated these tasks, but the outcome was often not confined to a specific correct answer or a predefined standard or criterion. The students could also make decisions regarding when, where and with whom they would conduct these tasks. Examples 7 and 8 illustrate this finding. Example 7. Teacher S asked his students to write a short letter to a father answering his questions about weather in Vietnam. The questions included what the weather was like, what season it was, what people did in this season, and one special thing about this season. Before the students did the writing task, the teacher read the instructions, translated them into Vietnamese for the students, and explained some words. (SOB4) The task in example 7 was bounded in scope because the output of this task was somewhat predefined by the guided questions, but not predictable. Therefore, students 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Teacher S's class Teacher A's class Teacher C's class Bounded tasks Total number of tasks 231 could produce and use their own ideas for writing. They could also decide where and how to find the information for their writing. Example 8. Teacher A divided her students into groups by asking them about their favourite season. Those who liked the same season were placed in the same group. Those who did not answer the teacher's question were placed in another group. Students had to work in groups to discuss in 10 minutes the provided questions about seasons ('how many?', 'what is the weather like in each season?', 'what is your favourite season?', 'what do you often do in this season?'). (AOB3) The task in example 8 was initiated by Teacher A. Although the teacher provided the students with some guiding questions, the answers to these questions were open-ended. The grouping of students and the time allocated to the task were determined by the teacher, but the students could make their own choice regarding where and how to find the information for their speaking task. Students' responses in bounded tasks Figure 6.4 Students' responses in bounded tasks 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Compliance Reactivity Mixed autonomy Proactivity Teacher C's class Teacher A's class Teacher S's class 232 Figure 6.4 shows that students across the three classes appeared to demonstrate reactivity in the teachers' bounded tasks. They actively adopted some learning strategies and used resources such as the Internet and their mobile phones to complete the task effectively. For example, they used mobile phones and Google Translate to help to translate their ideas into English. They also actively participated in the tasks to generate their ideas or solutions, discussing with their peers or searching the Internet for ideas. Some of them brainstormed ideas in Vietnamese and then used their phones to look up words, or used Google Translate to translate their ideas into English. Example 9 exemplifies students' demonstration of reactive autonomy in bounded tasks. Example 9. The teacher asked the students to work in pairs to ask each other about their family members and then report the information about their partner's family to the class. The teacher provided the students with guided questions as follows: 1. How many people are there in your family? Who are they? 2. What are their jobs? 3. What does your family often do at the weekend? The students were active and engaged well in this activity. They asked and answered noisily. Some students asked others for help with vocabulary so that they could convey their ideas in English, as illustrated below: \"What if my family members still go to work at the weekend?\" \"Teacher, how can I say 'can bo' in English?\" \"How to say 'do choi' in English'?\" One student asked the observer, \"What does 'quan ly' mean in English?\" (AOB2) Example 9 was initiated by the teacher. It is described as bounded because its outcome was somewhat predefined by the guiding questions but not predictable, as it 233 was not tied to a specific solution. Therefore, students could enjoy freedom in demonstrating their thoughts. Students in the above situation appeared to demonstrate their reactivity. They attempted to use the language by translating their ideas from Vietnamese into English. They actively sought help from others-their teacher, their colleagues and the observer- in order to complete the task. Open tasks The findings indicate that there were no open tasks evident in the observation data across the three classes. The teacher was always the one who initiated the tasks for inclass learning. The students were not officially encouraged or entitled to initiate learning tasks for in-class learning. 6.1.2. Tasks for out-of-class learning The findings indicate that teachers' attitudes towards homework and the practices relating to homework were divergent. Teacher S did pay attention to students' out-ofclass learning, which in many situations was perceived as autonomous learning by both the teacher and the students. He assigned the students homework in every lesson, which he said: \"focuses on language skills\" (SI). He also confessed that the tasks he assigned for his students were test-oriented, but also expressed a belief that \"this is good for students in the short-term although it might be not in the long-term\" (SI). The tasks designated for out-of-class learning were mostly the left-over exercises in the handout and writing and speaking tasks. All the tasks for homework were test-oriented. That is, they were designated to help the students strengthen knowledge that would be assessed in the test or exam, as well as helping them get used to the format of the test. The tasks for out-of-class learning also varied in levels of scope offered for student autonomy. Teacher A stated that she did not assign much homework to her students. She did not focus much on homework. She believed that if the teacher assigned students homework but could not control their completion of it, it would be useless. She thought 234 that homework existed for the purpose of making weak students become hardworking and self-regulated, so it was necessary to control homework completion through frequent checking. Due to time constraints, she could not check her students' homework completion regularly, so she decided not to assign her students much homework. Teacher C assigned a number of tasks to her students to complete outside of the classroom. Right from the orientation class, she explained that the students should prepare vocabulary in advance of each lesson, checking the meaning and pronunciation of new words. The students had to complete the exercises in the workbook and the leftover exercises in the book and in the handout that the teacher designed and gave to the students at every lesson. She repeated her requirements for homework during and after each lesson. In the first few lessons, she checked students' completion of homework very carefully before she started a new lesson. The class atmosphere seemed intense and stressful during homework checking time, and the students appeared disengaged with the upcoming tasks in the lesson. That might be the reason why from lesson 5 onwards, she no longer checked the students' homework. In the observation data, student autonomy could only be judged in terms of the level of autonomy offered in each of the tasks and the rate of task completion and submission. The researcher was aware that the observation data could not reveal much about student autonomy outside of the class. Therefore, findings relating to the students' reports on their completion of homework will be discussed so as to provide more insights into student autonomy. 235 Prescribed tasks Figure 6.5 Number of prescribed tasks compared to total number of tasks for out-of-class learning The majority of tasks for out-of-class learning belonged to the prescribed category (see figure 6.5). These tasks mostly related to grammar and vocabulary exercises with predefined answers. There were some writing and speaking tasks for homework, but these tasks were prescribed in scope because the teacher provided the students with the ideas for the tasks, as illustrated in example 10. Example 10. Grammar and vocabulary exercises for homework: Students were asked to complete two exercises in the course book, and two exercises in the workbook, writing answers on A4 paper and submitting their work to the teacher in the next lesson. (SOB8) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Teacher S's class Teacher A's class Teacher C's class Prescribed tasks Total number of tasks 236 Bounded tasks Figure 6.6 Number of bounded tasks compared to the total number of tasks for out-of-class learning Observation data showed that a small number of homework tasks offered a bounded scope for student autonomy (see figure 6.6). These tasks were all speaking and writing tasks. The majority of the speaking tasks were preparation for the topics that would be used in the tests and exams. Teacher S asked his students to record their answers for the guided questions and send the recordings to him. Example 11. Speaking task: The teacher asked the students to search for as much information as possible about a famous person of their choice. (COB10) The writing tasks were mostly in the form of a reply to a letter, which was similar to the format of the writing task in the test or exam. These tasks allowed students to make decisions regarding strategies, schedule and time needed for the task, signifying a bounded scope for the demonstration of autonomy. The following tasks exemplify bounded tasks for out-of-class learning. Example 12. Students were asked to complete the writing task in the handout at home. They would have to write a reply letter to their teacher and answer her questions about their study (Which school? How many subjects? What subject 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Teacher S's class Teacher A's class Teacher C's class Bounded tasks Total number of tasks 237 did they like most?...) The teacher translated the requirements of the task with his students. (SOB5) Open tasks The observation data did not indicate any open tasks (tasks that the students initiated) for out-of-class learning. In the class, the teacher did not officially and explicitly encourage the students to initiate any tasks to complete outside the class. Additionally, the observation data could not capture evidence of students' initiation of tasks for their outof-class learning. However, indications of task initiation were evident in the interview data and are reported in section 5.3 of Chapter 5, which concerns students' self-reports of their out-of-class English learning. 6.1.2.2. Students' reported responses to tasks for out-of-class learning As mentioned earlier in section 6.1.2 (which addresses out-of-class learning tasks), the students' reports on their homework completion were analysed and presented to provide more insights into their demonstration of LA in out-of-class tasks. Demonstration of proactive autonomy One student in Teacher S's class appeared to demonstrate a proactive level of autonomy when he reported how he balanced doing homework and carrying out learning that he initiated. He said: I sometimes do not do my homework. When I do not have enough time, I normally prioritise my learning (3 hours every day) first because I feel that this is more useful to me. Alternatively, when I have a test or exam, I will prioritise my learning for the test or exam. (SS4) This student demonstrated critical thinking, self-reflection and choice-making ability in reference to his own needs and purpose. When it was necessary, he chose to follow his own learning agenda rather than his teacher's, because he found his agenda to be more valuable at that time. However, at other times, he opted to follow his teacher's 238 agenda, because it might be more useful for an upcoming test or exam. This suggested that his flexibility in following learning agendas allowed him to balance his learning for the exam and learning for his own goals. Demonstration of reactive autonomy The majority of students (n=10) demonstrated reactive autonomy when doing homework. They complied with the teacher's agenda, but actively displayed their initiative in arranging their learning so that they could complete their tasks in the most effective way. For example, students in Teacher S's class sought help from their peers or their teacher or made use of the available resources such as the Internet, dictionary or mobile phone in order to complete their homework, as illustrated in SS2's report: I always do my homework. I usually can do most of my English homework by myself. When I have difficulty with vocabulary, I will use a dictionary to look up. Sometimes I ask my friends who are better at English than me; sometimes I ask my ex-teachers for help because I have quite a good relationship with them. (SS2) Students in teacher C's class believed that homework was meaningful to their learning, helping them to better understand and remember the knowledge presented to them in a lesson. They reported that they normally attempted to complete the homework on their own. However, if there were any difficult questions, they would actively search for help from their peers or their teachers, or they would search for clues in books or on the Internet. One student collaborated with her friends to form a study group in order for students to help one another with homework, as illustrated in her statement below. I always complete my homework. If I have a lot of homework, I will spend two to three hours for it. I will do my homework when I have time, normally before the next lesson. I often try to do homework by myself first. If there are questions that I cannot answer, I will search 239 for the clues on the Internet to discuss with my friends in my study group. Our group has six members. We also have a Facebook group, and we often discuss with one another in this group. Sometimes, we have meetings in the library. I think it is very useful to have this study group because I can learn a lot from others. (CS5) Students in Teacher A's class thought that homework completion could contribute to a better test or exam result, as illustrated in the following excerpt: We will do selective homework when we think this homework is about something important. By 'important' we mean when the teacher emphasises that it is important and this is the knowledge that will be tested in the exam. (APOI4) Therefore, they displayed initiative in doing the homework. For example, when they had difficult questions, they would actively search for answers in different places: When I have a difficult question, I will google the solution clues on the Internet. If I can't find any clues on the Internet, I will ask my peers who are good at English, or I will ask my teacher when I come to class for the next lesson. (AS1) Demonstration of compliance Five students in Teacher S's and Teacher C's classes appeared compliant with the teacher's agenda. One student in Teacher S's class completed homework, although he did not see the value in it: ....my learning at home has nothing to do with teacher's assessment in the class, but I still do homework. If the teacher assigns homework, we have to do it. (SS6) Other students tried to complete homework because they wanted to avoid the negative consequences that might arise if they did not: 240 In order for homework to be useful for students, homework must be compulsory in the sense that if you do not do homework, you will have some bad consequences. If the teacher gives homework without checking or controlling, we will not do it. I think checking homework is necessary. If the teachers check homework regularly, we will have to do it. Therefore, the teacher's checking homework is a method to force us to do homework. (SS3) The observation data also showed that students appeared compliant with the teacher's agenda because they were afraid of punishment. For example, in the first few lessons of Teacher S's class, the rate of homework completion was low, so the teacher informed his students of the rules that he would apply in the class regarding homework (a fine of 10,000VND and a record of absence) (SOB2). After the teacher's communication about the homework rule, the rate of homework completion increased dramatically. All students completed and submitted the homework in the handout, and only 2-4 students did not submit the speaking assignment each time. Students in Teacher A's class appeared to share a similar view: We will do homework when the teacher has strict punishment such as giving bad marks or minus points.\" (APOI4) 6.2. Assessment techniques and students' responses The most prominent assessment techniques used by the three teachers were questioning, observation, checking of individual performance/role play and self/peer-assessment, as shown in figure 6.7. The following section presents the scope offered in these techniques for students to demonstrate their autonomy and the extent to which students demonstrated their autonomy within that scope. 241 Figure 6.7 Assessment techniques utilised in the three classes 6.2.1. Questioning Prescribed level and students' responses Observation data indicated that questioning was the most commonly used assessment technique across the three classes (see figure 6.7). The majority of questions used by the three teachers were closed and convergent. Teachers used these questions to check if their students knew something predefined and known or expected to the teachers. Typical examples of closed convergent questions that teachers used in the three classes included questions to check students' responses: \"what is the answer for question ....\" (AOB 3, COB1, COB2, COB5, COB6, COB8, COB9); questions to check if the students knew a structure in English: \"how can you ask for the way to the canteen?\" and \"How can you make negative statements?\" (AOB7); questions to check students' vocabulary: \"what does generation mean?\" (SOB2); \"what does weather mean in Vietnamese?\" (SOB4); \"what does 'too much weather mean [sic]'?; what does 'too' mean\" (COB3); \"What does 'nguoi ban hang' mean in English?); questions to check if 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Prescribed Bounded Open Presscribed Bounded Open Prescribed Bounded Open Prescribed Bounded Open Q ue st io ni ng O bs er va tio n Ch ec ki ng o f in di vi du al pe rf or m an ce / ro le p la y Se lf/ pe er as se ss m en t Teacher C Teacher A Teacher S 242 the students understood or remembered a grammar structure: \"If we put adjectives in order, what order will they be in? What is the rule?\" (COB4); Teachers also asked students to elaborate on their answers. Some instances of teachers using questions to ask students for clarifications and clues for their answers included: \"why do you use 'eating' for question 1? Can you explain why you choose this answer? Why do you use present perfect and not past simple?\" (COB7). The students in all three classes appeared compliant with their teachers' instructions. They answered the teacher's questions, provided explanations for their answers or engaged in the task where they were able. Student-initiated questioning Demonstration of reactive autonomy Observation data showed that students in the three classes sometimes initiated questions during lessons. However, these questions were often in Vietnamese and often involved requests for the teacher's assistance with vocabulary. These questions arose from tasks initiated by the teacher, and the students initiated the questions with the hope of better completing the task, indicating their demonstration of reactive autonomy. In these cases, the teacher usually answered students' questions straight away. 6.2.2. Observation Prescribed level All three teachers used observation as an assessment technique in their classes to see whether students were complying with instructions, making any mistakes, and making any inquiries or requiring any further explanation for the task. When Teacher C identified that the students were not attentive, she encouraged them to engage in the task. Teacher A explained new vocabulary or checked students' understanding of vocabulary and sometimes praised the students if she recognised that they were doing a 243 good job. Observation was basically a teacher-controlled assessment technique whose prime purpose was to make sure that learning activities happened as planned, indicating the teachers' expectation of students' compliance with their instructions. Therefore, no bounded or open level is expected from observation assessment technique. 6.2.3. Checking of individual performance/role play Prescribed level and students' demonstration of compliance Another assessment technique that the three teachers used in their classes was checking of individual performance or role-play. That is, they called one or more students to write their answers on the board, give solutions to a problem or perform a language task. Sometimes, they called pairs to role-play their conversations. This assessment technique was prescribed in scope, as the majority of incidents involved forced engagement. Although the teachers sometimes called for the students' voluntary engagement, if students did not volunteer, they were required to perform the task regardless. The answers were always assessed against a predefined standard or answer keys. The students appeared to comply with the teacher's requests when possible. There were no bounded or open examples observed in the context of this technique. 6.2.4. Self/peer-assessment and students' responses Prescribed self/peer-assessment and students' demonstration of compliance The three teachers sometimes organised self/peer-assessment activities to involve students in the assessment of a task (see figure 6.6). However, most of the self/peerassessment tasks were prescribed in scope because they required students to judge their own or others' works against a standard or criterion predefined and provided by the teacher. All the students needed to do was to follow the teacher's instructions strictly. For example, Teacher S involved his students in peer-marking of their fellow students' work. Students swapped their work and teachers checked and confirmed the 244 answers with the whole class. The students then calculated and wrote the number of correct answers for their fellow-students and handed the marked work to the teacher. Teacher A and Teacher C involved their students in self-marking of their own work. They asked their students to complete a test or exercise, and then provided them with answer keys so that students could check their answers by themselves. The observation data indicated that students were compliant with the teachers' instructions, but participated in the task enthusiastically. They listened to their teacher and fellow-students, and used the answer keys to carry out self-marking or peer marking. Bounded self/peer-assessment and students' demonstration of reactivity There were some cases in Teacher S and Teacher C's class where the teachers offered bounded scope for students in self/peer-assessment practices. Teachers initiated an assessment for the students, but did not provide them with the answer keys. Students had to exchange their answers, discuss, compare and defend their choice of answers. During the exchange and discussion of answers to the listening tasks, the students were involved in the process of determining the criteria for task achievement and specifying their own and their peers' attainment in the listening task. 245 6.3. Assessment feedback and students' responses Figure 6.8 Feedback used in the three classes 6.3.1. Mistake identification and correction Prescribed mistake identification and correction and students' demonstration of compliance All three teachers appeared to pay attention to corrective aspects when giving feedback. They often identified the mistakes for the students and corrected these mistakes for them immediately without allowing students the chance to think about or correct their own mistakes. The students' involvement in mistake identification and correction was restricted to listening to the teacher and taking notes on what they said. Bounded mistake identification and correction and students' demonstration of compliance Teacher S did offer some scope for students' involvement in corrective feedback. In some cases, he did not directly point out mistakes for his students but tried to help them recognise their mistakes in an indirect way, sometimes by repeating them several times with a raised voice. Students in these cases were involved, albeit still minimally, in the identification and correction of mistakes. This technique was believed to make students 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Precribed Bounded Open Precribed Bounded Open Precribed Bounded Open Precribed Bounded Open M ist ak e id en tif ic at io n an d co rr ec tio n Co nf irm at io n of a ns w er Se lf/ pe er fe ed ba ck Fe ed ba ck fo r fu tu re im pr ov em en t Teacher C's class Teacher A's class Teacher S's class 246 \"be more aware of their mistakes so they would make progress\" (SI). Similarly, the teacher avoided correcting the mistakes by himself, but assisted his students so that they could correct their own mistakes. For example, he again explained the differences between 'miss' and 'remember' for the students when they misused these two verbs (SOB4), and he re-taught students the pronunciation of the word 'history' when they mispronounced it (SOB5). Additionally, he asked guided questions so that the students could know why they made mistakes and how to correct them (SOB6, SOB10), or he offered a chance for students to think about their mistakes and how to correct them (SOB3, SOB7). In these cases, although the teacher was still the main agent who triggered students' actions in the mistake identification and correction, he provided opportunity and scaffolding for students to get involved in the process and carry out part of it by themselves. 6.3.2. Confirmation of students' answers Prescribed level and students' compliance As shown in the observation data, confirmation of answers was one of the most widely used types of feedback across the three classes. The teacher typically confirmed the right answer by giving students praise or by just moving to the next question. Where the students provided the wrong answer, the teacher simply stated that the answer was not correct and gave them the right answer. Sometimes, the teachers confirmed the answer and provided elaboration. For example, if it was a reading question, teachers would show the students the information for the answer in the reading passage, or if it was a listening question, they would stop the recording at the answer and translate it into Vietnamese. The confirmation feedback did not appear to support the students' demonstration of autonomy, as the scope for their active involvement in feedback was limited. In this feedback, the role of students as active learners was not apparent. They were provided with a correct answer. The teachers were the sole information holders, 247 and they decided the amount of information they would provide to the students. The observation data indicated that the students were compliant with the teacher's instructions by offering their answers on request, listening to the teacher's explanation and taking notes on the information provided. 6.3.3. Self/peer-feedback and students' responses Prescribed level and students' demonstration of compliance Teacher S and Teacher C created opportunities for students in their classes to be involved in self/peer-feedback. They typically invited some students to write their answers on the board or called some students to stand up and perform a task, then invited one or more students to give comments. Teachers often confirmed the correct answer with the class. These peer-feedback tasks were confined in scope because the students judged a performance or answer against a predefined right or wrong answer. Observation data indicated that students were compliant with their teachers' instructions. They wrote their answers on the board, provided their answers or performed tasks, and gave comments on their friends' answers. Bounded level and students' demonstration of compliance There were two cases in Teacher A's class in which she created an opportunity for students to give feedback on their colleagues' work. These two cases both related to sentence transformation. The teacher first provided the students with a formula for transforming sentences from one structure to another (i.e., from past simple to present perfect), and then asked the students to complete sentence transforming exercises. She then invited some students to write their answers on the board and asked the class to give comments on their fellow-students' work. In these cases, the teacher allowed some scope for students to demonstrate their autonomy. The peer-feedback process in these two cases involved students' independent analysis and thinking. The students had to analyse the assessment criteria (i.e., formula for sentence transformation) and analyse 248 their fellow-students' transformed sentences, then make decisions about these sentences. Moving from Open to Bounded level There were cases in Teacher S's class in which he offered open scope in the provision of feedback. However, the students failed to cope with this open scope, leading the teacher to provide some scaffolding in order to help the students carry out the task. The process of shifting from open to bounded scope is detailed in example 11. Example 11. In lesson 3, the teacher checked his students' preparation for a speaking topic about a hobby. He called four students to go to the front and speak about the topic in turn. While the students were speaking, the teacher noted their mistakes on the board. After the first student finished speaking, he asked the class to comment, but no one volunteered. He called three individual students to comment, but they either kept silent or said they had no comment. (SOB3) In this situation, the teacher offered students an open scope for their demonstration of autonomy. However, the students did not comment on their fellow student's speech; in other words, they did not demonstrate any autonomy in this situation. Example 12. In the same lesson, when the second student finished speaking, the teacher did not invite students to comment straight away. Instead, he communicated the assessment criteria for the content of the speaking to the students: \"There are four requirements in the speaking task: name of the sport; when you started playing it; what you like about the sport; and why this sport is important to you\". He then asked the class if the second student's speech covered all the required content. Although no one volunteered, when the teacher 249 called some students, they did make some comments: \"the speaking had not covered all the required contents. Question 3 was not clearly answered\" (SOB3) In the second situation, the scope for students was narrowed. The students were provided with some assessment criteria for the content of the speech, and within this narrowed scope, the students could give some feedback. 6.3.4. Feedback for future learning There were two cases in Teacher C's class in which she specified the students' attainment and indicated to them how to improve their work. Teacher C started the feedback about students' writing by referring back to the requirements for each writing task, then she pointed out good points in their writing and places where they needed to improve. This was general feedback for the whole class. Individual feedback was provided in the context of each student's writing, where the teacher underlined all the mistakes (grammar, structures, expressions). Some of the mistakes she corrected; others she just underlined for students to correct independently 6.3.5. Student-initiated feedback Demonstration of proactive autonomy These were seven cases in the three classes where students initiated feedback. Students took initiative in identifying and correcting their own or others' mistakes, demonstrating proactive autonomy. Example 13 illustrates student-initiated feedback in Teacher S's class. Example 13. This example was a vocabulary task. The students were given a table containing the names of nine countries and corresponding nationalities. They were asked to complete the table with languages spoken in these countries. When checking with the class, the teacher mistranslated Switzerland as Sweden in Vietnamese, so the information about languages spoken in this country was incorrect. One student corrected it for him. 250 6.4. Assessment-related communication This section presents details on the three teachers' communication with students regarding assessment. The communication relating to assessment was analysed in terms of the levels of autonomy that it might potentially promote. If assessment communication helped the students to internalise assessment knowledge and techniques so that they could assess their future learning by themselves, or encouraged them to determine their directions and actions in learning, it was considered as promoting proactive autonomy. If the assessment communication helped to indicate the direction in learning for the students, it was regarded as promoting reactive autonomy. If the communication used assessment as a means to control students' learning, it was considered as promoting compliance. Figure 6.9 illustrates episodes in assessmentrelated communication that potentially promoted demonstration of different levels of autonomy across the three classes. Figure 6.9 Levels of autonomy that assessment-related communication might have potentially promoted 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Promoting compliance Promoting reactivity Promoting proactivity Teacher C's class Teacher A's class Teacher S's class 251 6.4.1. Promoting proactive autonomy Teacher A communicated her expectation clearly in the very first lesson that the students would have to take responsibility for parts of their learning, and she reiterated this during the semester. She said: There is so much to learn, but the time in the class is limited, so I only focus on important parts (relating to test) in the class. Other parts that we cannot cover in the class, you have to self-study at home. (AOB1) She showed the students the answer keys for exercises in the workbook and advised them to do the exercises and self-assess their work. She also emphasised that she was not going to check students' completion of exercises in the workbook, and so they should do the exercises for the sake of acquiring knowledge, rather than for assessment. Teacher A and teacher C also communicated clearly with their students that mistakes were an acceptable part of the learning process. Teacher A's and Teacher C's tolerance for the students' mistakes seemed to create a safe and friendly environment to them. This might have served to nurture their confidence in learning the language and encouraged them to engage in a task or display their language ability, demonstrating their proactivity in language learning and performance. 6.4.2. Promoting reactive autonomy The observation data suggested that teachers used different methods to communicate learning direction for the students, as shown in figure 6.9. All three teachers used tests and exams to shape the direction of their students' English learning. For example, Teacher S often related objectives for a lesson or an assigned task to the incoming tests or exams. Teacher A often emphasised that a task 252 was necessary because its format was akin to the format of a task in the coming tests or exams. She also tried to link a piece of knowledge that she was introducing to the students to the content to be tested in upcoming tests or exams. Example 14. The teacher introduced to the students the order of adjectives in a sentence. She drew out the OPSACOMK rule to help students remember the order of adjectives more easily (OPinion Size – Age – Colour – Origin – Material – Kind) and told her students that \"in the final term test, there will be questions asking you to order the adjectives and noun. Remember the noun is always at the end of the phrase.\" (AOB4) Teachers' use of tests and exams to direct students' learning might have kept students on track and encouraged them to invest time and effort in learning, both inside and outside the class. This was supported by the students in Teacher A's class, who all said that they would search for the information and vocabulary and practice (in advance) the topics that their teachers provided them for the midterm test. (POASI3) Apart from using tests and exams, Teacher C established learning direction by communicating her expectations and requirements relating to the students' learning in her class (e.g., homework completion, engagement in the class, lesson preparation) and informing her students of the assessment framework. In the very first lesson, Teacher C explained what would be calculated in the final course grade, and how she would assess the students. The framework provided the students with a learning orientation, and if they wanted to achieve good results, they would have to display initiative in, for example, homework completion, engagement in the class and preparation for the next lesson. She also spent an hour on class orientation in which she communicated all her expectations and requirements to the students. 253 Teacher C appeared to direct the students' learning outside of the class. She assigned the students many tasks to complete at home which all contributed to their course mark at the end. This approach encouraged the students to adopt a strategic learning approach in order to achieve a good result for the course, promoting the demonstration of reactive autonomy. Teacher S and Teacher A sometimes used grades as rewards for students' task achievement and performance. These rewards motivated the students to try their best and provided a source of information for the students on their performance in the task. 6.4.3. Promoting compliance The observation data showed that all three teachers used punishment and rewards to control their students' learning, as demonstrated in figure 6.8. Teacher S frequently used punishment and imposed his rules to control students' out-of-class learning, as illustrated in examples 15, 16 and 17. Example 15. When the teacher checked students' homework in lesson 2, some students did not do the homework, so he established a rule to control that: I do not punish those who did not do homework today, but from now on not doing homework means a record of absence from class. (SOB2) From lesson three onwards, all students submitted the homework to the monitor every lesson. Example 16. In lesson 4, he formulated another rule to control the students' speaking assignment when he recognised that only 17 out of 24 students had sent the speaking assignment to him. I didn't tell you about the punishment if you don't do and send me the assignment. Now, I will tell you. If you don't do and send me your 254 speaking assignment, it means you are recorded as being absent from class, and you will be fined 10.000 Vietnamese Dong (about 0.6 AUD). (SOB4) From lesson five onwards, only a couple of students failed to submit their speaking assignment, and they often had a legitimate justification for this. Example 17. In lesson 5, the teacher organised an activity in which students had to work in groups of five to match a set of pictures with a set of words. The teacher set the rule for the task as follows: The group which finishes first will get 10 points, second will get 9 points, and third will get 8 points and so on. For each correct match, you will get one point. Your total points will be the points you get from your correct match and the points for your matching speed. The group with the highest points will get 10 marks for this task. (SOB5) In example 17, the students completed the task or engaged enthusiastically in the task, discussing, using a mobile phone to look up new words, and urging one another to work fast. This can be seen as an indicator of their reactivity in these tasks. However, their reason for engaging so enthusiastically was to win the competition and the rewards, or to avoid punishments, rather than to learn per se. This suggests that the type of communication exhibited in example 15 17 promoted compliance, rather than any level of autonomy. Teacher A also used marks as a reward to motivate her students to engage in tasks and to arouse competitiveness among her students. Students usually engaged enthusiastically in the tasks. However, when there was no reward, the students did not appear motivated to engage. 255 In some cases, the students requested a mark or grade as a condition for their engagement in an activity, and when the teacher complied, they did the tasks enthusiastically. Teacher A appeared aware that the chief factor that determined her students' engagement in an activity was marks and she also believed that in order to control the students' homework completion, she would need to use the 'stick and carrot' policy, which implied a mixture of strict punishment and rewards (POAI4). She reported that if she gave the students a selective task, only 20% of the students would complete it- those who were hard-working, had a right attitude toward learning and were aware of the usefulness of the task to their goals (POAI4). Teacher C often mentioned punishment or checking in her lesson to control the students' homework completion. She reiterated the consequences of not completing and handling homework to her: suspension from class or reporting to the department of academic affairs. She used records such as bonus points to encourage the students to engage in assessment tasks. Students appeared to participate more enthusiastically when rewards were offered. This finding suggests that students' engagement in a task was conditioned by the teacher's rewards or punishment. The students supported this finding when they stated that \"if the teacher awarded a good mark to volunteer students, we would volunteer to participate in a task. If not, we did not want to volunteer\" (POCI3). Chapter summary This chapter has presented the findings from the observations in three English classes. It has reported teachers' assessment practices in terms of the levels of autonomy offered for students' involvement and decisions or the potential levels of autonomy that these 256 practices could promote. It has also described students' behaviours in these practices in terms of the levels of autonomy that they demonstrated. The findings indicate that, in general, teachers allowed students limited autonomy in assessment practices. The majority of assessment tasks, assessment techniques and assessment feedback belonged to the prescribed category, indicating limited student involvement in these aspects. Assessment-related communication appeared to promote students' compliance and reactivity rather than their proactivity. The findings also show that students appeared to demonstrate a low level of autonomy, and the levels of autonomy demonstrated appeared to correspond to the levels of autonomy offered. The majority of students demonstrated their compliance in prescribed assessment practices, and their reactive autonomy in bounded ones. Observation data also recorded cases where students demonstrated a higher level of autonomy than that which was offered, and cases where students struggled with the level of autonomy offered to them. 257 CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION Chapter overview This research enquiry was carried out to address the question, 'What are the assessmentrelated factors that enable or constrain the demonstration of learner autonomy in learning English as a Foreign Language in the Vietnamese Higher Education context?' The overarching aim of the thesis was achieved by addressing the following objectives: • Explore English language teachers' and students' understandings of the concept of LA • Examine English language teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA • Investigate the current EFL assessment practices in the VHE context • Investigate students' demonstration of LA in learning English in the VHE context. This chapter discusses the findings from the case study comprising three classes (including teachers and students) in light of the literature and theoretical framework, and reviews how each objective was addressed. 7.1. Teachers' and students' understandings of learner autonomy 7.1.1 Teachers' understanding of learner autonomy There were inconsistencies in each teacher's understandings about LA, as demonstrated in the contradictions between each person's interview statements and actions in the classroom in relation to assessment. For example, Teacher S's statements indicate that he understood LA in a proactive sense, while his reported practices and methods to enhance LA in his class indicated implementation of LA in a reactive or even compliant sense. Similarly, Teacher C tended to discuss autonomy in a reactive sense, but her 258 understanding of the concept conflicted with the methods and activities that she reportedly used to promote LA – assigning the students many tasks and using assessment as a mechanism to force and control the students' learning, indicating her implementation of LA in a compliant sense. These inconsistencies led each teacher to act ineffectively in the promotion of LA, as research has shown that teachers' perceptions, beliefs and understandings of LA can have a great impact on their methods and practices, as well as the extent to which LA is fostered in language classrooms (Borg, 2006, 2011; Borg & Al-Busaidi, 2012; T. N. Nguyen, 2014; Suraratdecha & Tayjasanant, 2018). Data also indicated that the teachers' understandings of the concept diverged from each other. For example, Teacher S's interpretations appeared to cover a spectrum from compliance to proactivity, while Teacher C interpreted the concept in a reactive and compliant sense. Teacher A, on the other hand, seemed to consistently view LA in a proactive sense. She was also aware that the development of LA involved various factors relating to the learners, the teachers, the learning content presented to the students and the situated context. This finding are in line with those of previous studies (e.g., Marsh, Richards, & Smith, 2001; Hamad, 2018) which reported varying understanding about LA among their participants. This finding also highlights the complicated and multifaceted nature of LA, which has been widely accepted in the literature (Boud, 1988; Candy, 1991; Little, 1991; Benson, 1997; Nunan, 1997; Sinclair, 2000; Everhard, 2015a; Lamb, 2017). Benson (2011), for example, claims that \"autonomy is a multidimensional capacity that will take different forms for different individuals, and even for the same individual in different contexts or at different times\" (p. 37), implying that various interpretations and understandings of the concept are to be expected. The divergence in teachers' understandings of LA suggests that it is very 259 likely that there would be no uniformity in teachers' practices to promote LA in the current context, which could reasonably influence the effectiveness of autonomy promotion. During interviews, there was a convergence of the three teachers' perspectives on the role of teachers and students in the learning process. They agreed that teachers should only be the facilitators or mentors who provided students with guidance and support, while the students should be the main agents in their own learning. This finding appears to contradict a currently common concept about the teacher-student relationship in the Vietnamese education system, which has been consistently portrayed as heavily influenced by Confucianism (Woodside, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2005; Nguyen et al., 2005, 2006; To, 2010; Marginson, 2011; Q. X. Le, 2013; Q. T. N. Nguyen, 2016). As suggested in the literature, Confucianism leads to an unequal and hierarchical teacherstudent relationship in education. In this relationship, teachers are often perceived as being authority holders, knowledge transmitters or experts who are expected to make all decisions about learning, while students are supposed to be obedient and compliant in class (Le, 2011; C. T. Nguyen, 2011; Q. X. Le, 2013; V. L. Nguyen, 2016). The above finding indicates there may be a movement in teachers' perceptions of learning from teacher-centeredness to learner-centeredness, which has been a focus of education reforms in Vietnam for over a decade (Vietnamese Government, 2005; Dang, 2006; L. H. N. Tran, Phan, & Tran, 2018). It is possible that the education reforms have started to cause some changes in teachers' perceptions of learning in the current context, and if so, it is likely that these changes in perceptions will lead to innovations in practices. All three teachers believed that autonomous learners possessed certain similar qualities and abilities, such as the ability to reflect, quick adaptation, attentiveness, a positive attitude, love for the subject, and diligence. Additionally, they felt that 260 autonomous learners searched for information about subject matter, studied the textbook and completed all assigned tasks. Teacher S and Teacher A agreed that autonomous learners actively cooperated and interacted with their teacher and peers for their learning purposes. The three teachers' descriptions of autonomous learners resonate with the 'psychological', 'technical' and 'sociocultural' dimensions of LA (Oxford, 2003; Benson, 2007; Murase, 2015). The psychological dimension is concerned with characteristics of an individual, such as attitudes and behaviours that permit autonomy. The technical dimension relates to situational settings, learning strategies and techniques supporting LA (Benson, 1997; Murase, 2015). The sociocultural dimension deals with the interactions between teachers and students and between students and their peers, both of which support students in the process of becoming self-regulated in their learning (Oxford, 2003; Murase, 2015). It is noticeable that the three teachers did not mention 'choice' and 'freedom', which are recognised by many scholars and researchers as being the cornerstones of LA (Holec, 1981; Grow, 1991; Dam, 1995; Esch, 1996; Hughes, 2003; Patall, Cooper, & Wynn, 2010; Assor, 2012; Benson, 2013). The absence of these words in the teachers' perceptions of LA suggests that the teachers in the current context might not be aware of that dimension of LA. Consequently, it is possible that the students in the current context would not be offered much freedom visà-vis choices in their learning process. This could inhibit students from demonstrating their LA. Findings relating to the teachers' perceptions of the role of LA showed that all three teachers believed that LA played a crucial role in language learning. They considered LA to be a solution to contextual constraints, including constraints relating to time, syllabus and class size. For example, Teacher S believed that LA was necessary because the students could not complete all the learning tasks in the class, resulting in 261 the need for self-regulated learning outside of the class. Teacher S's perspective illustrated his understanding of autonomous learning as the continuation of classroom learning outside of the class, without teachers. Teacher A and teacher C contended that the time in the class was only adequate for the teachers to provide the students with fundamental and basic knowledge, and the students would have to initiate learning outside the class if they wanted to be successful in their language learning. The three teachers' perceptions about the role of LA in language learning align with economic justifications for LA in the literature (Crabbe, 1993; Smith et al., 2018). Such justifications take the following form: it is reasonable to assume that formal education cannot accommodate all students' personal learning needs (Crabbe, 1993; Everhard, 2015a), and there exists a dissonance between what formal education can offer and learners' needs and wants. Formal language education is no exception. Language learning should not and cannot be restricted to learning in schools or classes, because no language institution or program can equip learners with all the language skills and knowledge necessary for their communication in the outside world. Therefore, much of the students' language learning has to happen outside of the class without assistance from teachers, so LA is indispensable in students' life-long learning (Everhard, 2015a). Additionally, teachers' perspectives on the role of LA appeared to reflect their understanding about LA in a technical sense. That is, they perceived it as a rescue strategy for teachers' problems. However, the teachers desired students to be autonomous, rather than providing a learning environment that guided students towards being able to learn autonomously at times, or to facilitate LA among students. This finding supports a previous study about teachers' perceptions of the role of LA in learning and their role in promoting LA, in which teachers showed positive views about 262 the role of LA in learning, but did not appear to recognise their role in promoting this kind of learning among their students (Lai, Yeung, & Hu, 2016). In summary, analysis of the teachers' interpretations and understandings of LA reveals potential factors in their perceptions that might inhibit or facilitate the promotion of the concept in the current context. The major barriers include teachers' limited and inconsistent understanding of the concept, together with a lack of consideration for the role of 'choice' and 'freedom' in LA. The enablers include the teachers' appreciation for LA in language learning and their recognition of the students' active role in the learning process. These findings suggest that in order to promote LA, the first step could be helping teachers (as one stakeholder in the learning process) have a clear understanding of the concept, implying that higher education policy makers should introduce a consistent definition or description of LA (that they want teachers to promote in VHE). Additionally, teachers should support the students in taking their own active role in learning by, for example, designing tasks for autonomous learning, equipping students with learning strategies and methods, providing them with learning resources, and supporting their preferred learning style. 7.1.2 Students' interpretations and understandings of the concept There were varying understandings about LA among students in the three classes. Students' interpretations reflected their understandings of LA in two senses: reactive and proactive. The majority of students across the three classes understood LA in a proactive sense in terms of their ability to be self-reliant and self-regulated and to display initiative in their learning. They perceived themselves as being primary agents in the learning process who needed to both initiate and carry out learning. Some other students understood LA in a reactive sense, conceptualising it as the ability to be selfregulated and display initiative in learning. However, these students tied their learning 263 to a common learning agenda determined for everyone taking part in the course. As discussed in the previous section, divergence in understandings of LA is to be expected due to the complicated and multifaceted nature of the concept. Nevertheless, the understandings, beliefs and attitudes students have about LA can have a significant impact on their autonomous learning behaviours (Cotterall, 1995; Altunay et al., 2009; Joshi, 2011; T. V. Nguyen, 2011). The students' varying understanding of LA suggests that they are likely to demonstrate various degrees of LA. There was consensus among the students across all three classes that autonomous learners possess certain qualities such as diligence, perseverance, consistency and self-discipline. They were depicted as being able to demonstrate various skills such as planning and time management, and having clear learning goals, learning plans, learning schedules and learning methods. They were also seen as having intrinsic motivation in learning. The students' perceptions of an autonomous learner corresponded with literature about the characteristics of autonomous learners (Holec, 1981; Boud, 1988; Candy, 1991; Dickinson, 1993; Littlewood, 1996; Breen & Mann, 1997; Little, 2003b). The findings show that the students in the three classes appeared to hold a positive view towards LA. They all believed that LA played an important role in language learning because of the specific nature of the language learning process. In the students' view, language was diverse, and there were so many things to learn in a language, especially vocabulary. Additionally, language learning was an ongoing process and took time, so it was not something that could be achieved overnight. Therefore, language learning required diligence and self-discipline. Additionally, when learning a language, it was necessary to do a lot of practice and to have authentic experiences that might not be available at school, so self-studying was crucial. The 264 students all believed that LA could help them be successful in their language learning. It seemed that from the students' perceptive, an autonomous learner very much resembled a good language learner. That may be the reason why apart from being depicted as possessing a number of good personal qualities, an autonomous learner was also described a successful language learner. The students' perceptions are in line with literature about the relationship between LA and language achievement, which often reports a positive correlation between the two (e.g., Dafei, 2007; Nguyen, 2008; Pan & Chen, 2015; Faramarzi et al., 2016). Students also thought that LA was necessary to compensate for the university's inadequate English syllabus. In their view, language learning included not only language systems (e.g., vocabulary and grammar), but also language skills (e.g., listening and speaking), all of which required a lot of practice and effort. However, at the university, they mainly learned grammar rules and structures, rather than how to communicate in the target language, and there were few opportunities for them to practise language skills. Therefore, they believed that learning English only at the university was not adequate. In order to be successful in learning a foreign language (English, in particular), students had to be self-directed and display initiative in their learning. These findings suggest that students were aware of the language learning process and the current contextual constraints on their language acquisition and the acts they needed to perform in order to overcome constraints and be successful in their language learning. In short, analysis of students' interpretations and understandings of LA indicates that they had positive attitude towards the concept and were aware of its role in language learning, demonstrating that students in this study had potentials for LA. However, some students' understanding of LA in a reactive sense might be barriers to 265 the effectiveness of their attempts to become more autonomous. An implication of this finding is that helping students understand LA adequately is a significant step in promoting them to demonstrate LA. 7. 2. Teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment 7.2.1 Teachers' perspectives There was little convergence in the three teachers' perspectives on the role of assessment in learning. Teacher A and Teacher S focused on the formative roles of assessment in learning. They agreed that assessment existed for serving the purpose of learning. That is, assessment should provide the students with information about their learning so that they know where they are, what they have achieved, their strengths and weaknesses, where they need to go, and what they need to do in order to reach their destination. However, the impact of assessment on learning in Teacher S's perception appeared to be narrower than that in Teacher A's view. Teacher S tied the students' learning to classroom learning that aimed to meet the course requirements, while Teacher A related assessment to the students' learning both inside and outside the classroom. Teacher C's perception suggests that she paid more attention to the summative purposes of assessment than to formative ones. She believed that there was a bilateral relationship between assessment and learning; assessment could be thought of as the learning objective, and therefore learning should serve the purpose of assessment. Simultaneously, assessment should serve the purpose of learning. With regards to current assessment regimes, all three teachers shared the view that the existing system focused more on summative and certification purposes rather than supporting students' learning. Consequently, learning served the purpose of assessment. All three teachers blamed the administration of the A2 test and the provision of assessment guidelines and formats for having a negative impact on the teaching and learning of English at the university. In their view, these prompted test- 266 oriented teaching and learning, which impeded LA. Teacher A added that the pressure from the university of achieving a pass rate forced her to opt for test-oriented teaching at the expense of LA. Additionally, all three teachers questioned the validity and reliability of the A2 test in the current context. They thought that the use of a test bank of only 10 tests for the A2 test could not determine students' language competency, as students might still be able to achieve a good result by memorising the answer keys. There are several insights from the findings relating to teachers' views on current assessment regimes. First, the assessment system had negative washback on the teaching and learning of English at the university, which is considered a typical impact of high-stakes assessment on teaching and learning in the literature (Bailey, 1996; Spratt, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Cheng & Curtis, 2012). This system inhibited teachers from implementing assessment practices that could promote LA among their students, and fostered rote and surface learning among students (Little, 2003a). In short, the negative washback of current assessment regimes is inhibitive to the enhancement of LA. This supports previous claims about the negative impact of a summative assessment system on LA (e.g., Boud, 1988; Little, 2003a; Benson, 2015; Everhard, 2015a). Second, in the current system, the teachers' practices might not always be congruent with the values they perceived they should foster, as in the case of Teacher A. She held a positive attitude towards LA, believing that it facilitated students' learning of English, and that it was feasible to promote LA among her students. However, in her practice, the existing system required her to sacrifice the goal of promoting LA in her class and opt for testoriented teaching instead. This finding aligns with James and Pedder's claim that teachers have to confront the contradiction between their values and their practices relating to assessment and autonomy promotion (James & Pedder, 2006). 267 The findings also indicated that the students' involvement in both assessment policies and practices in the current context were very limited. Teacher S did not think that the students should be involved in the determination of assessment policies (e.g., assessment format and criteria). Teacher A believed that students should be allowed to participate in assessment in relation to both policies and practices, and she reported having involved her students in the determination of assessment criteria, rules and regulations (e.g., homework, format). However, observational data indicated that she sketched out all the rules and regulations relating to assessment beforehand, and then asked her students if they had any opinions on these. The students kept silent when asked their opinion about the teacher's proposed assessment framework, rules and regulations, so engagement in this aspect was limited. Teacher C also indicated her willingness to involve the students in decisions relating to assessment policies, but had never done that in practice, because her students seemed passive and reliant in her observation. All three teachers appeared to offer a prescribed scope for the students' participation in actual assessment practices. Their self/peer-assessment techniques were limited to the students marking their own or their colleagues' work using the answer keys provided by the teachers. Therefore, the students' involvement in assessment practices was restricted to following the teachers' prescribed instructions. In fact, the self/peer-assessment practices that the teachers utilised only served the \"technical knowledge interest\" (Boud & Brew, 1995, p. 133). They did not contribute significantly to the development of LA, because the control of assessment rested in the hands of the teachers (Boud & Brew, 1995; Brew, 1999). As suggested in the literature, in order for the students to develop their autonomy in learning, it is necessary that they be empowered and involved in the 268 assessment process (Boud, 1988, 1995; Williams & Burden, 1997; Leach, Neutze, & Zepke, 2001; Falchikov, 2005; Boud & Falchikov, 2006; Brookhart, 2011). They should be able to negotiate assessment criteria and learning contracts with their teachers and able to carry out the assessment of their own or their colleagues' work (Boud, 1988; Berry, 2009; Little, 2010; Little & Erickson, 2015; Panadero et al., 2017). Findings relating to teachers' views on the role of students in assessment indicated that the teachers in the current context were still the main agents who controlled the assessment process. The students appeared to be marginalised. This marginalisation may have hindered both the demonstration and the development of LA among the students. In terms of assessment feedback, all three teachers thought that feedback could inform and raise the students' awareness of their learning, so that they could plan future actions to improve their learning and make progress. Both Teacher A and Teacher C agreed that the effectiveness of feedback depended on the students' responses to it, which is consistent with previous perspectives on feedback (Sadler, 1989; Hattie, 2011; Boud & Molloy, 2013; Carless & Boud, 2018). Teacher A stated that feedback was more helpful for those students who paid attention to the teacher's comments and feedback than for those who only focused on grades and marks, and she stated that the former group often included active and autonomous students. The findings also indicate that the teachers' choice of feedback was determined by various factors such as the students' level of language competence, time and cultural factors. Teacher S reported that he mainly focused on corrective feedback because his students' English level was low, so he believed that identifying and correcting grammar, vocabulary and pronunciation mistakes was critical for his students. Teacher C believed that feedback should not only include information about the students' performance or work, but also information about the students' learning process. She believed that the latter could 269 contribute to the students' positive attitude and feelings towards learning. She reported that due to time constraints, she could only fulfil the first purpose of feedback. Teacher A thought that teachers should be sensitive to cultural factors when giving feedback. She assumed that Vietnamese culture was not open to feedback in public, especially negative feedback and criticism. Therefore, in her practice, she often avoided giving these types of feedback to her students in public and provided direct and detailed feedback on private individual work. All three teachers believed that LA related to assessment. Both Teacher S and Teacher A stated that assessment feedback could help to promote LA. Teacher S believed he was promoting students' demonstration of LA by providing iterated feedback and delayed responses to students' enquiries (e.g., not immediately showing them how to pronounce a word). Teacher A thought that her feedback could help the students position themselves in their learning journey. Teacher A and Teacher C contended that assessment could be utilised as a mechanism to make the students learn. For example, they could assign the students many tasks to complete at home, check the students' homework completion frequently and use rewards or punishment to control the students' learning. In their view, these activities could move the students towards autonomy, since assessment would force students to engage in regular learning. This was in line with a common view that teachers in New Zealand and Vietnam shared about assessment and autonomy (Wass et al., 2015; Vu & Shah, 2016). Wass et al. also noted that the practices of awarding a grade, frequent assessment and punishment have a negative impact on the development of LA. The teachers' views about the relationship between assessment and LA illustrates their limited understanding of this aspect. In summary, findings relating to the teachers' perspectives on assessment reveal the factors that influence the demonstration and development of LA in the current 270 context. The key factors are: (1) the washback of the current assessment system on teaching and learning; (2) the teachers' limited understanding about the role of assessment in LA promotion and development; (3) the failure of teachers' assessment practices to allow scope for students' demonstration of LA; (4) cultural factors that made students passive, compliant and closed to feedback and prevented them from displaying initiative in assessment. Some implications can be drawn from these findings. For example, to encourage teachers to promote LA, they should have more autonomy in their teaching, not being restricted in implementing learning activities and assessment methods. Also, teachers should have opportunities to participate in professional development programs to develop their assessment literacy and improve assessment practices. 7.2.2. Students' perspectives With regards to the students' perspectives on the role of assessment in their learning, the most prominent similarity across the three classes was that the students felt assessment was external to them, and they were not in control of the process. Instead, they were receivers of, or respondents to, assessment. The majority of students in all classes perceived assessment as a source of information about their learning, generated by their teachers' assessment practices. This source of information could inform them of their strengths and weaknesses, indicate where they were in their learning, and signpost their future learning. Their perceptions suggest that they viewed assessment as formative assessment (Sadler, 1989; Black, 1998; Black & Wiliam, 2009) which has potential for the development of autonomy (Assessment Reform Group, 2002; Black & Wiliam, 2009). Students in Teacher A and Teacher C's class agreed that assessment information not only benefited the students but was also crucial for informing teachers of the quality and relevance of teaching 271 methods to students and guiding future teaching. These views conform to previous views about the formative role of assessment in teachers' teaching (Sadler, 1989; Black, 1998; Black & Wiliam, 2004; Stiggins & Chappuis, 2005; Black & Wiliam, 2010; Hattie, 2011; Gao, Liu, & McKinney, 2019). Findings about the students' perceptions of the role of assessment in their learning illustrate that they were aware of the formative role of assessment in their learning. However, as suggested in the literature, if students are still reliant on teachers for information about their learning, they cannot become fully autonomous (Boud, 1988, 1995). In other words, the students' perceptions of assessment as an external force in their learning could be a barrier to their development of full autonomy. Students in all three classes also perceived assessment as being a source of motivation for their learning. Students in Teacher C's class believed that the teacher's positive comments and feedback on their performance could rouse positive feelings and motivate them to take on more learning. This is supported by Hancock (2002)'s finding that students who are exposed to well-administered verbal praise spend more time doing homework and exhibit significantly higher learning motivation. The majority of students in Teacher C and Teacher A's class perceived assessment as a motive for their engagement in a task. They reported that competitiveness and rewards in an assessment task motivated them to participate. Students in Teacher S and Teacher A's class also reported that assessment forced them to commit to their learning if they wanted to achieve a good learning result. The above finding indicates that for the students, assessment was an external force that controlled their learning. Students relying on this extrinsic motivation for their actions are considered by deCharms (1968) \"pawns\" whose behaviours are determined by external forces beyond their control (cited in Stefanou et al., 2004, p. 98). They might carry out tasks, spend time learning or engage 272 in a task not for the sake of learning per se, but for the promise of reward or an avoidance of punishment (Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 1983; Dickinson, 1995; Assor, 2012). The aforementioned points of view indicate that the students' perceptions of assessment reflect their compliance with assessment rather than their autonomy in learning. Only one student mentioned self-assessment when talking about the role of assessment in learning. He believed that self-assessment helped him determine his current position in learning so that he could plan and initiate learning to reach his goals. It has been well-established in the literature that self-assessment plays a crucial role in the development of LA (Boud, 1995; Assessment Reform Group, 2002; Black, Harrison, Lee, Marshall, & William, 2003; Little, 2003a; Berry, 2009; Everhard, 2015b; Little & Erickson, 2015; Panadero et al., 2017). Boud, for example, states that \"if learners were to take responsibility for their own learning, then part of this process was, inevitably, their involvement in making assessments of their own learning goals, the activities in which they were to engage and the ways in which they would judge the outcomes\" (Boud, 1995, p. 5). The finding suggests that this student was aware of his central role in the assessment process, and that he viewed assessment as an integral embedded part of student learning. In other words, this student appeared to be ready to demonstrate a high level of autonomy. There was convergence in the students' perspectives on the existing assessment system across the three classes. All students believed that the system required them to demonstrate a greater level of LA. They all reported that the system required them to choose the subjects they wanted to learn in a semester, to choose lecturers they wanted to work with and to register their learning schedule with the university. Additionally, students reported that self-study was officially a requirement in the credit-based system, 273 so they had to display initiative in their learning if they wanted to achieve good results. Students also said that the combination of ongoing assessment and end-of-term assessment made them more autonomous in their learning. They reported that the assessment framework was made public to them and all their effort in learning (e.g., participation, homework completion and lesson preparation) was counted in the final grade, encouraging them to invest time and effort in order to achieve their learning objective. Benson, in a series of publications, argues that LA relates to the students' capacity to take control of three aspects of learning: learning management, cognitive processes and learning content (Benson, 2001, 2010, 2011, 2013). The students' views about the current assessment system suggested that the system encouraged the students to take control of their learning management and probably their cognitive processes, but not the learning content. As such, it hence might have enhanced reactive autonomy among the students (Benson, 2011) because their learning direction was still bounded by the learning content, which was determined by others. The majority of the students believed that they could help their teacher with assessment. Some students in Teacher S and Teacher C's classes believed that they could help the teacher with the marking of their own or others' work against the provided answer keys, suggesting that these students preferred prescribed instructions in assessment, and hence might have been more likely to demonstrate compliance in this respect. Some students in Teacher S and Teacher C's classes reported that they could help their teacher by giving comments and feedback to their colleagues (e.g., identifying mistakes), which indicated that they were capable of engaging in assessment within a bounded scope. It was likely that these students would demonstrate reactive autonomy in giving feedback. 274 The majority of the students showed their lack of confidence in carrying out self/peer-assessment, even though they indicated their willingness to take part in these activities. They reported that they were not confident about their language competence. This finding supports the finding from a literature review about assessment by Asadinik and Suzani (2015), where students were not in favour of self-assessment, nor were they confident in doing this kind of task. Some students in Teacher C and Teacher A's classes said that they could self-assess their work and peer-assess their colleagues' work, but that assessment tasks should be limited to simple grammar or vocabulary tasks, or to marking with provided answer keys. As mentioned in section 7.2.1, selfmarking or peer-marking do not contribute much to the promotion of LA. Therefore, these students' views suggest they were unlikely to support a high level of autonomy in learning. Only two students in Teacher S's class stated that they were willing and able to carry out self/peer-assessment. They reported that they normally self-assessed their learning progress to see if they were on the right track, reflecting on their learning methods. These two students' reports indicate that they might have demonstrated a higher level of autonomy than their peers. The majority of the students perceived mistake identification and correction as the most helpful kind of feedback, which suggested that the students appeared comfortable working within a prescribed scope in the teachers' instructions. Data from this study also showed that there was a mismatch between the teachers' offered scope for involvement in feedback and the students' expected scope. The majority of the students in Teacher C and Teacher S's classes wanted their teachers to allow them more autonomy in assessment feedback. They reported that teachers should not provide corrections for students immediately but allow them time to think and find the solution 275 by themselves. This finding indicates that students did not want to be passive receivers of teachers' instructions. Rather, they wanted to actively participate in the learning process. This also suggests that the teachers' current feedback practices were a barrier to students' demonstration of autonomy, and if teachers wanted to encourage students to demonstrate LA in learning, they should allow space for students' involvement in learning tasks in general and assessment tasks in particular. Students in all the three classes contended that their teacher's assessment practices had an impact on LA. However, their explanations illustrate their diverse understanding about both assessment and LA. Some students believed that the teacher's assessment could promote LA because autonomy in their view meant taking some action or completing learning activities (e.g., homework and revision), and the teacher's assessment could encourage this kind of learning to take place. For example, three students in Teacher A's class reported that they would work harder if their teacher assessed them, and they would try harder if she awarded them a grade; otherwise, they would not try their best and would become lazy and inattentive. This perspective is in line with behaviourists' views of learning, which recognise the stimuli-responsive mechanism underlying human actions (McLeod, 2007). In this sense, assessment conditioned students' behaviours, or to put in in a metaphorical sense, students were like dolls, and assessment was like the dolls' key wind once wound up, the doll would start to dance. Other students saw assessment as a parameter or a signpost for their learning, and autonomy as the ability to take responsibility or initiative in learning using these parameters or signposts. In their view, assessment set the boundaries, directions, and overall goal for their learning path. Once these aspects were set, the students would 276 actively take responsibility for their learning, by making plans, managing their time and searching for materials so that they could learn effectively and achieve the best results. Students also saw assessment as a source of information for their learning and believed that feedback is the aspect in assessment that has the most impact on LA. They thought that feedback information could help them reflect on their learning (i.e., their learning needs and wants, their learning resources, their strengths and weaknesses) in order to plan and take action. Assessment, in this case, can be seen as the mirror that helps students to reflect on their learning process and the guideline for them in their learning. Findings relating to the students' perceptions of the relationship between assessment and LA again illustrate that the students had limited understanding about both LA and assessment, and this limitation was a barrier to the demonstration of LA. In summary, findings relating to the students' perspectives on assessment indicate factors that contribute to the demonstration of LA in the current. They include: (1) students' unreadiness for carrying out assessment by themselves; (2) their perception of LA as being external to them; (3) their preference for prescribed assessment; and (4) their limited understanding about the role of assessment in LA promotion and development. One of the pedagogical implications from these findings is that in order to promote LA, teachers need to train students to carry out self/peer-assessment, involve them in assessment practices and scaffold them in doing self/peer-assessment. 7.3. Characterisation of assessment practices in Vietnamese higher education 7.3.1. Assessment tasks The observation data from this study indicate that the three teachers did not allow much scope for students to demonstrate their autonomy in assessment tasks. The three teachers used a majority of prescribed tasks in their assessments, both inside and 277 outside of the class. Bounded tasks that allowed the students some choice and freedom to make decisions regarding different aspects of a task were rare. There were no open tasks for learning either inside or outside the class, meaning that teachers did not formally encourage students to initiate learning tasks and take control of learning content. Researchers have agreed that in order to promote LA, it is necessary to, first and foremost, create opportunities and conditions and allow space for students to develop and demonstrate their autonomy in learning (Boud, 1988; Macaro, 1997; Hughes, 2003; Little, 2004a; Reinders, 2010; Benson, 2013; Tatzl, 2016). In other words, the prerequisite for LA to flourish is arranging a learning environment in which students have opportunities to make choices and decisions about their learning, and they are allowed space to participate in different aspects in the learning process. Empirical studies (Perry, VandeKamp, Mercer, & Nordby, 2002; Patall et al., 2010) have also compared and contrasted different learning environments and the impact of these environments on LA. These studies found that students demonstrated a higher level of autonomy in an autonomy-supportive environment (i.e., one which allowed students choices and opportunities for involvement). This finding suggests that students' autonomy might be constrained by the low level of autonomy offered to them by teachers. 7.3.2. Assessment techniques The three teachers used four different assessment techniques in their classes: questioning, observation, checking of individual performance/role play and self/peerassessment. However, the majority of these assessment techniques were prescribed in scope, with little room for students' involvement in assessment itself and limited information that could guide the students in their future learning. 278 Questioning was the most popular assessment technique in use across the three classes. However, the majority of questions that the teachers used in their classes were closed convergent questions that were either restricted to one correct answer or the answers were known or predefined by the teacher. These questions mainly served to check whether the students knew, understood or could propose a predefined solution. The students' involvement in this questioning was limited to answering the teachers' questions, without any further elaborations or explanations. This questioning technique is deemed to lead to a common pattern of IRE (Initiate – Response – Evaluation) in classroom discourse, producing surface learning (Roth, 1996) which has limited value in promoting LA (Van Lier, 1996). All three teachers used observation as an assessment technique in their class. Observation was basically a teacher-controlled assessment technique that served to collect data about students' learning, which was in turn used to adjust teachers' teaching or provide contingent assistance to students while they were doing a task. The prime purpose of teachers' observation in the three classes was to make sure that learning activity happened as planned, indicating the teachers' expectation of students' compliance with their instructions. Therefore, the observation technique did not appear to support LA. Checking of individual performance/ role play was a common assessment technique that the three teachers used in their classes. Similar to observation technique, this technique is mostly teacher-controlled because the teachers normally decided on what, when and who to check. Sometimes, the teachers invited students' voluntary engagement, but in case students did not volunteer, they would be forced to engage regardless. Additionally, the students' answers were always assessed against a 279 predefined standard or answer keys, so students almost had no space to demonstrate their autonomy in this assessment. The three teachers did create opportunities for their students to carry out self/peer-assessment practices in their classes. However, the self/peer-assessment practices that teachers used were limited to peer-marking based on provided answer keys. As such, students' involvement in these practices was restricted to following the teachers' instructions. Students acted as 'marking machines' for the teachers, since they could not control any aspect of assessment except for the task of marking. Although self/peer-assessment is considered part of an indispensable autonomous learning toolkit (Boud, 1995; Gardner, 2000; Tholin, 2008; Berry, 2009; Panadero et al., 2017), self/peer-assessment practices used by teachers in this case only served \"technical knowledge interest\" (Boud & Brew, 1995, p. 134). Therefore, these practices did not contribute to the demonstration of LA (Boud & Brew, 1995; Brew, 1999). 7.3.3. Assessment feedback The findings indicated that all three teachers appeared to focus on task-level corrective and evaluative feedback in their current practices. Observation data showed that the most common type of feedback in the three teachers' classes was teachers' confirming or disconfirming of students' answers, mistake identification and correction. The students' involvement in feedback was minimal. Among the three teachers, only Teacher S involved his students in mistake identification and correction. Students in the other two classes were only receivers of feedback information. Gipps (2002) argues that feedback can be analysed in terms of the power relationship between teacher and student, which implies levels of empowerment in different types of feedback. Tunstall and Gipps (1996), for example, suggest a typology of feedback which consists of evaluative feedback and descriptive feedback. Evaluative 280 feedback involves judgemental information such as confirming/disconfirming of students' answers, and descriptive feedback involves students' actual competence and achievement. Descriptive feedback is further categorised into \"specifying attainment and achievement\" and \"constructing achievement and the way forward\" (Tunstall & Gipps, 1996, p. 392). The typology of feedback: (1) Evaluation, (2)Specification, (3) Construction indicates a decrease in teacher power and control in the this sequence of feedback (Gipps, 2002), suggesting an increase in the support of student self-regulated learning from low to high respectively. In the present study, teachers' feedback was limited to evaluating feedback, which had limited value in promoting autonomous learning (Gipps, 1999; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Hattie, 2011). Researchers have emphasised the importance of feedback to students' selfregulated learning (e.g., Butler & Winne, 1995; Tunstall & Gipps, 1996; Taras, 2002; Black et al., 2004; Nicol & Macfarlane‐Dick, 2006; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Hattie, 2011). Butler and Winnie (1995) suggest that feedback should be viewed as being embedded in self-regulated learning because they found that students used their knowledge, beliefs and emotions to internalised external feedback they received. Nicol and Macfarlane‐Dick (2006, p. 203) recognise the significant role of feedback in selfregulated learning and propose a seven-rule feedback framework to promote selfregulated learning: (1) clarify what a good performance is, (2) facilitate self-assessment, (3) deliver high quality feedback information, (4) encourage teacher-student peer dialogue, (5) encourage positive motivation and self-esteem, (6) provide opportunities to close the gap, and (7) use feedback to improve teaching. Hattie and Timperley (2007) claim that apart from helping students understand their goals and have a clear picture of what their successful goals should look like, feedback should help students reflect on past and current learning and show them the way forward. The element of feedback 281 which concerns the 'way forward' (also referred to as 'feedforward' information) is deemed to play a significant role in students' self-regulated learning (Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Hattie, 2011; Boud & Molloy, 2013). Compared to the conditions for feedback to enhance autonomous learning, feedback utilised in the current context appeared to be inadequate because the teachers were still in control of giving feedback to the students, and the element of feedforward was missing from teachers' feedback. 7.3.4. Assessment-related communication The findings indicated that the most prominent theme in teachers' assessment communication related to different measures for controlling students' learning. For example, they frequently informed the students of the negative consequences associated with failing to conform to teacher instructions a bad mark, a minus point in their grade, a record of absence, or missing a turn in a competition. Teachers also informed students of the rewards (e.g., attaining a good mark or a plus point in their grade) they would earn if they complied with teacher instructions. The data indicated that when teachers used punishment or rewards with students, students appeared to comply with teachers' instructions. For example, students in Teacher S's class did not submit their speaking homework in the first two lessons, so he informed his students in lesson 4 that he would apply a punishment of 10,000VND6 and a record of absence for those who did not submit their homework. From lesson 5 onward, only two to four students failed to submit their speaking assignments, and they often had a legitimate justification for this. Observation data in teacher C's class indicated that students often volunteered to engage in a task or to give answers or solutions for problems whenever the teacher informed the students that they would receive a plus point in their course grade. Post-observation interviews with students in Teacher C's class supported this finding. They stated that if 6 1 AUD is equivalent to around 17,000 VND 282 the teacher awarded a good mark to volunteer students, they would volunteer to participate in a task. If not, they did not volunteer (POCSI3). Cognitive evaluation theory (Ryan, 1982; Ryan et al., 1983; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Reeve, 2012) explains why and how external events such as rewards, punishment and prizes influence students' perceived autonomy. According to this theory, external events such as rewards or punishment have two aspects: information and controlling. The information aspect communicates competence feedback, while the controlling aspect implies an expectation of compliance. The impact of external events depends on teachers' purposes in using these events. In the above cases, the teachers used punishment and rewards as the condition for students' engagement in a task or as a method to control students' learning behaviours outside of the class. As such, their use of these external events mostly promoted learner compliance. Teachers sometimes used grade rewards for the students' achievement or performance in the task. For example, they promised to award good grades or marks to pairs or groups that had the largest number of correct answers or to a person who completed the task first with the highest score. Unlike the above cases (where rewards were used as an exchange for the students' compliance) in these cases, grade rewards were used to channel the students' attempts and efforts and communicate to the students about their performance or achievement, resulting in student reactivity. The students often engaged enthusiastically in tasks with embedded rewards and attempted different strategies in order to complete these tasks as fast and effectively as possible. Postobservation interviews with students in Teacher S and Teacher A's classes also supported this finding. They all cited marks or grades as contributing factors to their active and enthusiastic engagement in a task. For example, students in Teacher S's class 283 reported \"if there were no marking or grading, we would not have participated that enthusiastically\" (POSSI4). The findings also showed that the three teachers often related a task they assigned to tests and exams, which seemed to serve the purpose of promoting students' engagement in a task. Teachers' techniques appeared to influence the students' learning behaviours. Teacher A's class reported that they would search for the information and vocabulary to prepare for speaking topics that she told them she would use for the midterm test, and they would practise these topics in advance (POASI3). This finding resonates with Littlewood (1999)'s description of reactive autonomy, which refers to students' displaying initiatives in their learning within a learning direction set for them. There is little doubt that tests and exams are significant to students, as students' learning achievement in formal education is normally accredited in this way. Therefore, the teachers' technique of linking a task to exams and tests could be seen as creating a learning direction for the students and making the task relevant to the students in that direction. The teachers' technique, at its best, might have encouraged students to display initiative in completing the task in order to achieve good test results. They might, for example, have actively engaged in the task, invested time and effort, and cooperated with their peers in order to complete the task more effectively. Teachers' assessment communication sometimes contained information that could promote, or at least nurture, learners' proactivity. This information related to the teachers creating a non-threatening environment for students' engagement, transferring learning responsibility to the students, equipping the students with knowledge for independent learning, and prompting students to internalise the value of a task to their personal learning goals. Although students' overt responses to the teachers' communication were not always evident, observation data recorded some indicators of 284 students' proactivity as a result of the teachers' assessment communication. For example, Teacher A and Teacher C often showed tolerance for their students' mistakes, emphasising that mistakes were part of the learning process, in order to encourage student engagement or initiatives. Students in Teacher A's class displayed their initiative by engaging in the tasks. They volunteered to perform a task or provide answers or solutions to teachers' questions when they knew that their mistakes did not count. The findings relating to teachers' assessment communication indicated that the focus of the teachers' practices was not on encouraging students to demonstrate LA, but on fostering a surface learning approach among the students to meet the course requirements. In terms of autonomy promotion, teachers' assessment communication could foster students' compliance, or at best, reactive autonomy among the students. 7.4. Students' demonstration of learner autonomy 7.4.1. Demonstration of autonomy in the classroom Students' uptake of autonomy mainly corresponded to the level of autonomy offered to them. That is, the majority of the students in the three classes demonstrated their compliance with their teachers' prescribed tasks or instructions, and demonstrated their reactivity to the bounded ones. The majority of the teachers' tasks and instructions belonged to the prescribed category; accordingly, the majority of students' responses to these tasks and instructions were compliant. In some cases, the students demonstrated reactivity within the prescribed scope offered. The students appeared to initiate their own actions, implement their strategies and made their own choices in order to complete tasks effectively or respond to the teachers' instructions. For example, they actively made use of available resources such as their mobile phone and the Internet to look up new vocabulary or translate ideas from Vietnamese into English. They autonomously cooperated with their colleagues or 285 sought help from their teacher or other students, and opted to work individually instead of working in pairs as instructed. Students appeared to demonstrate their reactive autonomy when the teachers' prescribed instructions or tasks became an obstacle to their task completion. For example, in lesson 5, Teacher S asked the students to do a task in which they listened to a girl talking about her favourite subject and filled in the blanks with provided words. The majority of the students in the class listened to the recording and did the task as prescribed except for Huy and Tu (pseudonyms). Huy was struggling and actually could not complete the task at his first listening because the speed of recording was faster than his writing speed. Tu, sitting next to him, advised him to implement the strategy that he was using – number the provided words and write the number in the blanks instead of words. Huy took Tu's advice on the second listening and was able to complete the task (SOB5). It is clear from the above example that the students' lack of strict compliance with the teacher's instructions enabled them to complete the task more easily and effectively. Another example where the teachers' prescribed scope acted as an obstacle to students' completion of a task was in Teacher C's class. She assigned students to prepare a spoken weather forecast for different regions in Vietnam, organised the students into groups and provided them with information about the forecast in Vietnamese. Students in Teacher C's class engaged well in the tasks. They used mobile phones to look up new words and used Google Translate to translate the provided information from Vietnamese into English. They also enthusiastically discussed with colleagues and sought help from the teacher and the observer for new words and expressions in English. However, they could not complete the task successfully. One point that the researcher recognised in the above task was that if the teacher had not 286 provided the Vietnamese version of the weather forecast, it would have been easier for the students to handle the task. It seemed to the researcher that the narrow scope of the task made it more challenging for the students to complete than if it had been more bounded and less prescribed. When the researcher interviewed the students about this task after the observation, they reported that the Vietnamese version of the weather forecast made it very difficult for them because it made the task inflexible in terms of language use. Additionally, there were many uncommon words in the teacher's writing, which were hard for them to translate into English. In this case, the teachers' prescribed instructions became an obstacle for the students' completion of the task and the students' reactivity could not help them be successful in it. The above finding conforms to Vermunt and Verloop (1999) finding that complex interplays exist between teachers' external regulation of learning processes and students' self-regulation. Vermunt and Verloop propose that congruence takes place when teachers' strategies and learners' strategies are compatible, and friction occurs when this is not the case. Friction can be constructive or destructive, depending on whether the friction challenges students to increase their learning and cognitive strategies or decreases students' learning and thinking skills. Their finding provides insightful implications for understanding the relationship between autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated in this study. As with the relationship between teachers' regulation and learners' self-regulation, autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated can have complex interplays, either of congruence or friction. If teachers' autonomy offered is compatible with students' autonomy demonstrated, congruence occurs, resulting in a positive learning outcome. If teachers' autonomy offered is not compatible with learners' autonomy demonstrated, friction occurs. The results depend on whether autonomy offered is a barrier to students' learning or a challenge for them. In Teacher S 287 and Teacher C's classes, friction occurred. In teacher S's class, the friction was constructive, as it challenged the students to think and do differently to what was instructed. In Teacher C's class, friction was destructive, as her prescribed instructions prevented her students from exercising flexible and creative thinking. An important implication of this finding is that while it is necessary to allow students space to demonstrate their LA, it is essential that teachers be sensitive to students' ability to demonstrate LA and provide then with adequate scaffolding. Another prominent cause of students' reactivity in prescribed tasks and instructions was the grade rewards embedded in these tasks and instructions. Students engaged enthusiastically, initiating and using various strategies in tasks with grade reward involvement. As discussed in section 7.3.4, the influence of grade rewards on LA depends on whether such rewards are used in exchange for students' compliance or as feedback for students' competence (Ryan, 1982; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Reeve, 2012). In fact, the use of grade rewards made students reactive to the tasks and instructions but compliant with the grade rewards. Therefore, it could be argued that this technique produces 'surface' reactive autonomy rather than 'deep' reactive autonomy. It is likely that these instances of 'surface' reactive autonomy will not develop into fully reactive autonomy, as they derive from external events. This finding appears to be in line with Breen and Mann (1997)'s argument that students can sometimes wear a 'mask of autonomy' for some specific purpose without being necessarily autonomous. Benson (2001) also point out that students can sometimes be forced by circumstance to perform actions involving self-management. However, this does not mean that they can demonstrate these actions in a systematic and effective manner, or, in other words, that they are autonomous. 288 7.4.2. Discrepancy between demonstration of LA in the classroom and outside of classroom context The findings also illustrated that there was a discrepancy between the students' demonstration of LA in formal education (classroom-based learning) and informal education (learning outside of the class). There was hardly any evidence of proactive autonomy to be recorded in formal education. However, the data showed that many students demonstrated their proactivity outside of the class where they initiated their learning agendas, and displayed initiative in carrying out their learning agendas to reach their goals. This suggests that teachers allowing a low level of autonomy inside of the class could be for setting up students with foundations so that they can demonstrate a higher level of autonomy outside of the class, or that LA might be supressed in formal education. Both cases indicate that LA is more about the relationship between the students and the surrounding environment than an attribute of learners. This finding is in line with the constructivist views on LA (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Paiva & Braga, 2008; Van Lier, 2008; Tatzl, 2016) and the results of previous studies (e.g., Q. L. Trinh, 2005; Willison et al., 2017). The finding has implications for teachers wanting to promote LA. Because LA is more about the emergent product of the interactions between learners and different contextual factors (e.g., teachers, tasks), the arrangement of the learning environment is crucial in facilitating autonomy. 7.4.3. Personal relevance-the key to the demonstration of LA The data indicated that the drive for students' demonstration of autonomy was their need to see the relevance of English learning to their personal needs and purposes. This 'personal relevance' (Benson, 2013; Huang & Benson, 2013) influences students in establishing and carrying out learning agendas, and is considered a \"defining characteristic of an autonomous learner\" (Huang & Benson, 2013, p. 11). Nunan (1996) also claims that 289 LA is not an absolute concept. There are degrees of autonomy, and the extent to which it is desirable and feasible for learners to embrace autonomy will depend on a range of factors to do with the personality of the learner, their goals in undertaking the study of the other language, the philosophy of the institution (if any) providing the instruction, and the cultural context within which the learning takes place (p.13). Data from this study showed that students' purposes for learning English were divergent and their demonstration of LA also appeared divergent. For example, six student participants had private goals for learning English on top of the public goals set for anyone taking the course- achieving good grades and completing the A2 English certificate for graduation. These six students all had their own private agendas for learning English outside of the class and demonstrated proactivity in their learning. For example, they built up their own learning paths and selected learning strategies and materials apt for their needs, styles and preferences. They constantly reflected on the effectiveness of their choice and monitored their learning progress by utilising tools for self-assessment. Eight students did not have any private goals; their goals were the same as the public goals of the course. These students did not initiate private agendas for learning English, but took surface or strategic learning approaches to meet the course requirements. For example, they displayed their initiative in doing homework, attending an A2-preparation class organised by the English club at the university, organised learning groups to discuss difficult learning issues in the class and prepared for speaking topics designated for a speaking test. This finding suggests that LA may be primarily a matter of individual students, as their motives for learning can vary. This finding carries multiple pedagogical implications. For example, teachers should understand students' motives for learning English so as to nurture and support various levels of LA 290 associated with students' learning motives because different kinds of learning motives might lead to different levels of autonomy demonstrated. Additionally, because 'personal relevance' is the key to the demonstration of LA, it is crucial to raise students' awareness of the role of English in their current and future education and career prospects so as to make the learning of English relevant to each student. Chapter summary This chapter has discussed major findings relating to teachers' and students' understandings about LA, their perspectives about assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA, teachers' assessment practices, and the students' demonstration of LA. The findings relating to teachers' and students' understanding about LA appear to resonate with the literature about, for example, the limits of teachers' and students' understandings, the complicated and multifaceted nature of the concept, the characteristics of autonomous learners, and the role of LA in learning. One finding indicating teachers' recognition of students as main agents and themselves as facilitators in the learning process appears to contradict the current concept of the unequal teacherstudent relationship in the Vietnamese education system. Teachers' descriptions of autonomous learners indicates that their understanding of LA lacks a dimension relating to freedom vis-à-vis choices, which is vital in the promotion of LA. The findings relating to teachers' and students' perspectives on the impacts of current assessment regime on teaching and learning support the literature on the negative washback of high-stakes assessment on teaching and learning, and, in turn, on the promotion and demonstration of LA. The findings also highlight the marginalisation of students in assessment practices and the externality of assessment to students' 291 learning, which might influence the students' demonstration of LA. Teachers' and students' perspectives on the relationship between assessment and LA show that assessment can influence the demonstration of LA at various levels, depending on how assessment is used and what purpose it serves. The findings relating to teachers' assessment practices show that none of the aspects relating to their assessment practices, such as assessment tasks, assessment techniques, assessment feedback and assessment-related communication appeared to support the demonstration of LA. The findings relating to the students' demonstration of LA indicate that they mainly demonstrated a low level of autonomy in the classroom, but generally demonstrated a higher level of autonomy outside of the class if they found a 'personal relevance' in learning English. The chapter has also drawn out the factors that contribute to the demonstration of LA. They include the negative washback of current assessment systems on teaching and learning practices; prescribed assessment practices in the class; teachers' and learners' limited and divergent understandings about the concept of learner autonomy; and their limited understanding about the role of assessment in learning in general and in learner autonomy promotion and development in particular. 292 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION Chapter overview This chapter concludes the thesis by reflecting on the research aims, summarising the main findings of the research, discussing the contributions of the research program, considering its limitations and recommending directions for future research. 8.1. Summary of the research This research aimed at investigating the impacts of EFL assessment on the demonstration of LA, with the research question: What are the factors in assessment that enable or constrain the demonstration of learner autonomy in learning English as a Foreign Language in the Vietnamese Higher Education context? The overarching research question was addressed through the following objectives: • Explore English language teachers' and students' understandings of the concept of LA • Examine English language teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA • Investigate the current EFL assessment practices in the VHE context • Investigate students' demonstration of LA in learning English in the VHE context. The research program generated the following key findings: • English language teachers in the current research had limited understanding about LA. It is possible that their limited understanding might have influenced their practices in relation to promoting LA. 293 • Both teachers and students had divergent interpretations of LA. This finding supports the claim in the literature that multiple interpretations and understandings of LA are to be expected in such a complicated and multifaceted concept as LA. While it may be infeasible to have only one definition of LA, it is necessary to streamline interpretations of LA in order to clear up the confusion about the concept. • Both teachers and students recognised students as being the owners of their learning and teachers as being the facilitators in the learning process. This finding appears to contradict the common belief about teacher-student relationships in a Confucian heritage culture like Vietnam. The finding suggests a movement in teachers' perceptions from teacher-centredness to learnercentredness as a result of the past decade's educational reforms in Vietnam. It may be that the reforms have started to cause some changes in teachers' perceptions and if so, it is likely that these changes in perceptions will lead to innovations in practices. This finding also indicates that Vietnamese culture did not seem to inhibit students from demonstrating their autonomy in learning. • Teachers' understandings of LA appear to lack any dimension that denotes the freedom or choices offered to students so that they can demonstrate their LA. The absence of these elements in teachers' understandings of LA suggests that students in the current context may not be offered many choices or much freedom in their learning. This may inhibit students from demonstrating their autonomy in assessment contexts. • Both teachers' and students' perspectives on assessment indicated that they perceived assessment as being external (i.e., it is imposed from outside) to students and their learning. This finding suggests that teachers are not ready to 294 support students to demonstrate the optimal level of proactive autonomy, and students are also not ready to demonstrate the optimal level of proactive autonomy. • The assessment regime in the current context focused more on summative and certification purposes than on serving learning. It prompted test-oriented teaching and learning, exerting negative impacts on teaching and learning and inhibiting the demonstration of LA. • Students' perspectives on their role in assessment indicated that they are more comfortable working within a prescribed scope because they lack confidence in taking responsibility for the evaluation of their own learning. This suggests that students in the current research were not ready to demonstrate a high level of LA. • All teachers believed that autonomy related to assessment. Assessment can be the signpost for students' learning or a mechanism to condition their learning. Teachers' perspectives on this relationship revealed that assessment can support different levels of LA depending on how teachers use assessment in their teaching. Their ways of using assessment, in turn, might depend on their beliefs about the role of assessment in learning and in promoting LA. • From the students' perspective, assessment can support different levels of LA. First, assessment can condition students' learning, promoting compliance with teachers' instruction. Secondly, assessment can provide parameters or signposts for learning, shaping directions for students' learning and promoting reactive autonomy. Finally, assessment can be the internal element in the students' learning (i.e., it is an inseparable component in the students' learning and students have to carry it out by themselves) and the ability to carry out 295 evaluation of their own work, signifies a high level of proactive autonomy among students. This finding suggests that the impacts of assessment on LA depend largely on how it is used and which purposes it serves. • The majority of assessment tasks, assessment techniques and assessment feedback belonged to the prescribed category. The research also found that students appeared to demand more autonomy offered in assessment practices in comparison to what is currently offered. This suggests that teachers' current prescribed assessment practices can be a barrier to their demonstration of LA. • Students' uptake of autonomy mainly corresponded to the level of autonomy offered to them in the class. However, there were times when students demonstrated a higher level of autonomy than that which was offered to them, or failed to manage the high level of autonomy offered. This finding suggests that in the classroom context, autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated are not always compatible and congruent, so the role of teachers is to make sure this compatibility and congruency happen in order to produce good learning results. • Sometimes, students did not demonstrate proactive autonomy in the class, but demonstrated this level of autonomy outside of the class. Therefore, LA is more about relationships between students and the learning environment than an attribute of learners, being an emergent product of the interactions between students and different contextual factors. • The drive for students' demonstration of proactive autonomy emerges from their awareness of the relevance of learning English to their personal needs and purposes. Therefore, the demonstration of proactive autonomy might be a matter for each individual student. 296 8.2. Contributions Theoretical contributions This study clearly distinguished three dimensions of LA that are often blurred in the literature, proposing three terms that refer to three prominent connotations of LA in the literature. The first term is autonomy capacity, which refers to students' internal resources to take control of their own learning. The second term is autonomy offered, which refers to the level of freedom (the extent to which students are permitted to control their learning) or opportunities created for learners to exert control over their learning. The third term is autonomy demonstrated, which refers to the extent to which the students actually exercise their capacity to take control of their learning in different learning situations. This distinction can help to streamline interpretations and understandings of LA and clear up the conceptual mist surrounding the construct. This study contributes a framework designed to categorise the level of autonomy offered in activities and tasks for learning and assessment. The framework offers three levels: prescribed, bounded, and open. Prescribed is used to describe tasks or activities in which students can make almost no choices or decisions regarding their learning. Bounded is used to describe tasks or activities in which students can make some choices and decisions regarding their learning. Open is used to describe tasks or activities in which students can make all the choices or decisions regarding their learning. All activities and tasks can be categorised based on the level of conceptual space embedded in these activities and tasks for students' involvement and decision. This study also contributes a framework to categorise the level of autonomy demonstrated in students' learning. Starting from Littlewood's (1999) framework, the framework proposed in this study describes three levels of autonomy demonstrated. Compliant is used to describe a situation where students closely follow teachers' instructions. Reactive is used to describe a situation where students initiate some actions 297 in order to follow an other-initiated learning agenda. Proactive is used to describe a situation where students initiate their learning and actions in order to complete their own learning agenda. This research is the first to investigate the impacts of assessment on the demonstration of LA in the light of the interplay between autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated. The findings suggest that rather than being an attribute of learners, LA is more about the relationship between learners and the learning environment. Therefore, the demonstration of LA changes in line with changes in the learning environment. As such, it is essential that the learning environment be arranged in a way that fosters the demonstration of autonomy. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first study in Vietnam and is one of very few empirical studies that have used sociocultural theory to investigate the impacts of assessment on the demonstration of LA in learning English. The research suggests that sociocultural theory can be a useful framework to investigate the facilitative and inhibitive factors in assessment in regard to the demonstration of LA. While the findings of this research confirmed the significance of different sociocultural factors in the demonstration of LA, the findings also recognised the significance of students' personal factors. This research also adds to the existing literature on factors contributing to the demonstration of LA. Findings indicate that such factors include negative washback of assessment systems on teaching and learning practices, prescribed assessment practices in the class, teachers' and learners' limited and divergent understanding about LA, and teachers' and students' limited understanding about the role of assessment in learning in general and in LA promotion in particular. 298 Methodological contribution This study has also made a number of methodological contributions to the literature. First, it utilised a qualitative case study design to investigate the impacts of assessment on the demonstration of LA in learning English. It is notable that the current research is one of the rare Vietnamese studies on LA to use a qualitative case study design, providing evidence for the effectiveness of using qualitative case studies in researching complicated phenomena. Additionally, this research is one of very few studies on LA to adopt participant observation as a method of data collection. Few studies on LA use participant observation as a method of study, as LA is believed to be a psychological construct that is not observable. However, evidence from this study suggests that observation of both teachers' and students' practices can provide insights into LA. Moreover, the analytical framework for autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated developed in the current study provides a useful reference for future LA researcher who wish to design a framework for observation and to analyse teachers' and students' practices. Pedagogical recommendations Several implications for practice can be drawn from the findings of this research. First, teachers' understandings of LA, as indicated in the research, are limited, which can inhibit their practices in promoting LA. Therefore, this research proposes that educational policy makers should be clear about the concept of LA when they introduce it to the local context, in order to reduce misunderstanding and divergent interpretations among teachers and students. Additionally, professional development is important when new concepts or ideas are introduced to the local context, in order to prepare and scaffold teachers in their implementation of these concepts in practice. Based on the findings about teachers' understandings of LA, their perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA, and their assessment practices and their 299 practices to promote LA, this study proposes that teachers need assistance in the following aspects: • Understanding new terms and concepts such as LA, formative assessment, summative assessment, self/peer-assessment, authentic assessment, and portfolios. • Having a clear model of LA. • Designing and utilising assessment tasks and techniques to support the demonstration of LA. • Involving students in self/peer-assessment practices and scaffolding them in carrying out these practices. • Using assessment information to support students' learning and LA. • Arranging the classroom environment so that it can promote LA. Secondly, as LA is an emergent product of the interaction between learners and the learning environment, it is important to build up a learning environment that provides favourable conditions for teachers to promote LA and for students to demonstrate it. In order to do so, teachers should be able to negotiate curriculum and assessment at the university level so that they are not restricted in implementing learning activities and assessment methods in their class. Additionally, LA could be included in the course as one of the learning objectives. This would help to raise awareness of the importance of LA among both teachers and students. Thirdly, in order to support students to demonstrate their LA, it is essential to allow them space for involvement and decisions regarding both learning and assessment. However, students' ability to demonstrate autonomy in learning is not always compatible and congruent with the level of autonomy offered to them. Thus, it is necessary for teachers to be very sensitive about the students' ability to demonstrate 300 autonomy in order to provide them with just the right amount of autonomy for compatibility and congruency. Moreover, since students' demonstration of autonomy is not fixed and may vary from situation to situation, scaffolding by the teacher is vital. 8.3. Limitations It is inevitable that there are some limitations in any research. In this study, the first limitation pertains to the translation of the concept of learner autonomy to Vietnamese in the student interviews. Translating a term from one language into another always poses the risk of losing some nuance due to linguistic and culture-specific factors (Sutrisno, Nguyen, & Tangen, 2014). It is unlikely that one can find a single exact equivalence for a foreign concept in the target language (T. N. Nguyen, 2014; Sutrisno et al., 2014). The researcher used the Vietnamese equivalent of tính tự chủ, chủ động, tự giác for the term 'learner autonomy' in the interviews with student participants. This is because 'learner autonomy' appeared to be an uncommon term for them, and tính tự chủ, chủ động, tự giác are the most common among the Vietnamese equivalents for LA embedded in education initiatives and policies (T. N. Nguyen, 2014; Phan, 2015; Phan & Hamid, 2017). The students' interpretations of autonomy might thus have been influenced by the researcher's choice of translation. In Vietnamese, the word tự' means by oneself or on one's own (T. N. Nguyen, 2014; Sutrisno et al., 2014). That may be the reason why the majority of the student participants understood LA as the ability to be self-reliant and self-regulated and the ability to display initiative and to do self-study. The second limitation relates to generalisability. This is a case study which aims to investigate a case in depth in order to provide a rich description of it. The study relied on the observations of three English classes in a university, interviews with three English teachers and sixteen non-English major students. Therefore, the results of this study may be not generalisable to other contexts (e.g., students and teachers in other 301 universities in Vietnam and students and teachers in other countries) or to disciplines other than English (e.g., engineering or accounting). The third limitation may be due to the observation method. Due to ethical issues, the researcher could not video record the observations. She could only opt for a running record technique to record teachers' and students' practices in the class. For that reason, she might have missed some data (e.g., non-verbal communication between teacher and students, their feelings and emotions, and class atmosphere), even though she attempted to record what was happening in the class as far as possible. 8.4. Recommendations for future research There is still insufficient empirical research on assessment and LA, so future research should consider the following directions: • As the current research found that teachers' perspectives on assessment influenced their LA-promoting practices, future research could investigate teachers' assessment literacy and its impacts on teachers' practices to promote LA. • As this research only focused on non-English major students, future research could consider including English major students to see if there are any differences in autonomy demonstration between two groups. • Future research should investigate the relationship between the levels of autonomy that students demonstrate and their academic achievements. 8.5. Concluding remarks This study examined the impacts of EFL assessment practice on demonstration of learner autonomy in the Vietnamese higher education context, in order to discover assessment-related factors that facilitate or inhibit the demonstration of LA in that context. Learner autonomy appears to have three facets: autonomy capacity, autonomy 302 offered and autonomy demonstrated. This study used autonomy offered and autonomy demonstrated to analyse teachers' assessment practices and students' responses to these practices, in order to discover the interaction between the two and the factors that contribute to that interaction. Teachers' and students' understanding about LA and perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA were also taken into consideration. LA appears to be the emergent product of the interaction between students and contextual factors including their teacher, their peers, learning tasks, class rules and values, and university values and regulations. This suggests that students, first and foremost, need to be allowed autonomy in order to demonstrate it. Additionally, the compatibility and congruence between autonomy offered and students' uptake of autonomy are vital in making sure that fruitful results can be achieved. The study concludes that the level of autonomy offered in assessment practices is a significant assessment-related factor that contributes to the demonstration of LA. Other than autonomy offered, teachers' and students' understanding of LA, their perspectives on assessment and the relationship between assessment and LA all contribute to the promotion and demonstration of LA. 303 LIST OF REFERENCES Abdel Razeq, A. A. (2014). 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Business Studies Journal, 4(2), 91-99. 329 LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A: Interview protocols Appendix A1: Teacher interview protocol in English and Vietnamese TEACHER/ACADEMIC INTERVIEW PROTOCOL Fieldwork Stage: Teacher interview session Data Identity Pseudonym name: Date: Site/Venue: Duration: 60 minutes Interview Goal To explore the teacher's interpretation of the concept of autonomy and his/her beliefs about the role of assessment practices in learning and in the development of autonomy. Type of Interview Semi-structured interview Language Used Vietnamese Nature of themes/ Interview Questions Questions to allow elaboration are indicated underneath the main question. A. Teachers' interpretation of the concept of autonomy 1 What do you understand by \"learner autonomy\"? • What are the key characteristics of an autonomous language learner? • Is learner autonomy important in students' learning? Why? Why not? 2 How could English language teachers develop learner autonomy in the Vietnamese higher education context? • Is it possible to develop learner autonomy among Vietnamese students? Why? Why not? • How can learner autonomy be best promoted among Vietnamese students? 330 • What do you do to encourage learner autonomy in your class? B. Teachers' beliefs about the role of assessment in learning 3 What do you think the role of assessment is in students' learning? • Do you think assessment is for learning or learning is for assessment? • In what ways do assessment practices affect students 'learning? 4 What do you usually include in your feedback to your students' work or performance? • If you don't give feedback, why not? • What do your students often do with your feedback? • How important do you think your feedback is to your students' learning? C. Teacher's choice of assessment practices and factors that influence their choices 5 What do you know about the assessment requirement in a credit-based system? What do you think of these requirements? 6 What do you think about the assessment policies of the university and the division? • How do these policies affect your assessment practices in class? • Should they be changed? In what ways? 7 What assessment strategies do you use? Why? • What are the factors that you take into consideration when you choose an assessment practice in your class? • How do your assessment strategies affect your students' motivation and self-efficacy? D. The impacts of assessment on autonomy and the factors that define these impacts 8 Do you think assessment links to learner autonomy? If no, why do you think that? If yes, in what way? • How does your assessment impact your students' autonomy? • Do you ever let your students discuss and co-decide on the assessment practices in the class? For example, students could decide on assessment criteria, assessment formats, and assessment contents? Why? /Why not? • Have you ever used peer-assessment, self-assessment, portfolios and other forms of authentic assessment in your class? 331 If yes, what are their advantages? What difficulties did you encounter? If not, why not? • Do you want to change your assessment strategies? How would you like to change them? What would you require to make that occur? 9 Do you take the need to foster autonomy into consideration when you use an assessment practice in your class? • How do your students respond? • Why do you think they respond this way? TEACHER/ACADEMIC INTERVIEW PROTOCOL Fieldwork Stage: Teacher interview session Data Identity Pseudonym name: Date: Site/Venue: Duration: 60 minutes Interview Goal To explore the teacher's interpretation of the concept of autonomy and his/her beliefs about the role of assessment practices in learning and in the development of autonomy. Type of Interview Semi-structured interview Language Used Vietnamese Nature of themes/ Interview Questions Questions to allow elaboration are indicated underneath the main question. E. Teachers' interpretation of the concept of autonomy 1 Thầy cô hiểu khái niệm \"learner autonomy\" có nghĩa là gì? • Đặc điểm nổi bật của các sinh viên tự chủ/chủ động là gì? • Sự chủ động/tự chủ có quan trọng đối với việc học của sinh viên không? Tại sao có? Tại sao không? 332 2 Làm thế nào để các giáo viên tiếng Anh có thể phát triển tính tự chủ của sinh viên trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam? • Liệu có thể phát triển được tính tự chủ trong sinh viên Việt nam không? Tại sao có? tại sao không? • Làm thế nào để phát triển tốt nhất tính tự chủ trong sinh viên Việt nam? • Các thầy cô thường làm gì để khuyến khích tính tự chủ của sinh viên trong lớp các thầy cô giảng dạy F. Teachers' beliefs about the role of assessment in learning 3 Theo các thầy cô thì vai trò của kiểm tra đánh giá trong việc học của sinh viên là gì? • Theo các thầy cô thì kiểm tra đánh giá vì mục đích học hay mục đích học là để kiểm tra đánh giá? • Theo các thầy cô thì các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá tác động đến việc học của sinh viên như thế nào? 4 Các thầy cô thường đưa thông tin gì trong phần nhận xét đối với bài làm hoặc thể hiện của sinh viên? • Nếu các thầy cô không đưa ra nhận xét thì lý do à tại sao? • Các sinh viên thường làm gì với các nhận xét của các thầy cô? • Theo các thầy cô thì phần nhận xét của các thầy cô quan trọng như thế nào đối với việc học của sinh viên? G. Teacher's choice of assessment practices and factors that influence their choices 5 Các thầy cô biết gì về yêu cầu trong kiểm tra đánh giá của hệ thống tín chỉ? Các thầy cô nghĩ gì về các yêu cầu đó? 6 Các thầy cô nghĩ gì về các quy định về kiểm tra đánh giá do trường/bộ môn đưa ra? • các quy định này ảnh hưởng đến các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trên lớp của các thầy cô như thế nào? • Những quy định này có nên thay đổi không? nếu có thì nên thay đổi như thế nào? 7 Các thầy cô sử dụng các hình thức kiểm tra đánh giá nào? Tại sao các thầy cô lại dùng các hình thức đó? • Các yếu tố mà các thầy cô xem xét đến khi lựa chọn một hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá là gì? 333 • Hình thức đánh giá mà các thầy cô sử dụng có ảnh hưởng gì tới hứng thú và sự tự tin trong học tập của sinh viên? H. The impacts of assessment on autonomy and the factors that define these impacts 8 Các thầy cô có cho rằng kiểm tra đánh giá liên quan tới tính tự chủ của sinh viên không? nếu không thì tại sao các thầy cô nghĩ vậy? nếu có thì nó có liên quan như thế nào? • Các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của các thầy cô ảnh hưởng như thế nào đến tính tự chủ của sinh viên của các thầy cô? • Các thầy cô có bao giờ để cho sinh viên thảo luận và cùng quyết định về các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trên lớp không? Ví dụ như sinh viên có thể tham gia quyết định vể tiêu chí đánh giá, hình thức đánh giá, nội dung đánh giá. Nếu có thì tại sao? Nếu không thì tại sao? • Các thầy cô đã bao giờ sử dụng hình thức đánh giá chéo, tự đánh giá, hồ sơ học tập hoặc các hình thức đánh giá thực tiễn khác trong lớp của các thầy cô chưa? Nếu có thì điểm mạnh của các hình thức này là gì? Các thầy cô có gặp khó khăn gì không? Nếu không thì tại sao không? • Các thầy cô có muốn thay đổi các hình thức đánh giá mà các thầy cô đang sử dụng không? Các thầy cô muốn thay đổi như thế nào? Các thầy cô cần các điều kiện gì để có thể thay đổi? 9 Các thầy cô có xem xét đến yêu cầu phát triển tính tự chủ của sinh viên khi sử dụng một hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trong lớp mình không? • Sinh viên của các thầy cô phản ứng như thế nào? How do your students respond? • Theo các thầy cô thì tại sao sinh viên của các thầy cô lại có phản ứng như vậy? 334 Appendix A2: Student interview protocol in English and Vietnamese STUDENT INTERVIEW PROTOCOL Fieldwork Stage: Student interview session Data Identity Pseudonym name: Date: Site/Venue: Duration: 45 minutes Interview Goal To explore students' interpretation of the concept of autonomy, and their beliefs about the role of assessment practices in learning and in the development of autonomy. Type of Interview Semi-structured interview Language Used Vietnamese Nature of Interview Questions Questions to allow elaboration are indicated underneath the main question. A. Demographic information • Tell me about yourself • Where are you from? • How long have you been learning English? • Do you like English? • Why are you learning English? B. Students' interpretation of autonomy concept 1 Have you ever heard of the term \"autonomy\"? What does that term mean? • Do you think learner autonomy is important in language learning? Why? Why not? • What makes an autonomous learner? • Are you an autonomous learner? Why? Why not? • Do you think you can learn without a teacher? Why? Why not? 335 2 What do you think are the requirements of a credit-based system for students? What do you have to do to meet these requirements? C. Students' beliefs about the role of assessment in their learning 3 What do you think the role of assessment is in your learning? • Do you think assessment is important? Why? Why not? What is your first response when you are given an assessment? • How do your teacher's assessment practices impact your motivation and self-efficacy? • How does assessment affect your learning inside and outside class? 4 How important is teacher's feedback to your learning? • How do you feel when teacher assess your work? • How often do you get feedback on your work/performance? • What kind of feedback does your teacher usually give? • What do you usually do with your teacher's feedback? • Do you think your teacher's feedback is useful? Why? Why not? • What kinds of teacher's feedback do you find the most helpful to your learning? Why? 5 Can students help with assessment and feedback in class? • Do you think you can self-assess your learning? • Do you think you can assess your friends' work? • If your teacher let you assess your friends' work, would you like to? D. The impacts of assessment practices on students' autonomy 6 Do you think assessment links to learner autonomy? If yes, in what way? If no, why not? 7 How does your teacher's assessment impact your autonomy? • What do you do when you are informed that you are going to have an exam? • What assessments do you like to have? Do they give you autonomy in your learning? Why do you think so? Do they motivate you to learn? How do you learn for those assessments? • What assessments would give you more autonomy? 336 Would you be more motivated to learn with more autonomous assessments? Explain how you might behave in those assessments? STUDENT INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (Vietnamese version) Fieldwork Stage: Student interview session Data Identity Pseudonym name: Date: Site/Venue: Duration: 45 minutes Interview Goal To explore students' interpretation of the concept of autonomy, and their beliefs about the role of assessment practices in learning and in the development of autonomy. Type of Interview Semi-structured interview Language Used Vietnamese Nature of Interview Questions Questions to allow elaboration are indicated underneath the main question. E. Demographic information • Em hãy giới thiệu về bản thân mình? • Em quê ở đâu?? • Em đã học tiếng Anh được bao nhiêu lâu rồi? • Em có thích học tiếng Anh không? • Tại sao em lại học tiếng Anh? F. Students' interpretation of autonomy concept 1 Em đã bao giờ nghe về khái niệm \"tự chủ\" chưa? em hiểu như thế nào về khái niệm đó? • Em có nghĩ rằng tự chủ quan trọng trong việc học ngoại ngữ không? Tại sao có? Tại sao không? • Điều gì làm nên một người học tự chủ/chủ động? 337 • Em có phải là một người chủ động không? tại sao có? tại sao không? • Em có cho rằng em có thể học mà không cần có giáo viên không? Tại sao có? tại sao không? 2 Theo em thì yêu cầu của hệ thống tín chỉ đối với sinh viên là gì? em cần phải làm gì để đáp ứng được các yêu cầu đó? G. Students' beliefs about the role of assessment in their learning 3 Theo em thì vai trò của kiểm tra đánh giá trong việc học của em là gì? • Theo em thì kiểm tra đánh giá có quan trọng không? Tại sao có? tại sao không? Khi em bị kiểm tra đánh giá thì phản ứng đầu tiên của em là gì? • Các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên ảnh hưởng như thế nào tới hứng thú cũng như sự tự tin của em trong việc học? • Các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá có tác động như thế nào tới việc học của em ở trên lớp cũng như ở nhà? 4 Các nhận xét của giáo viên quan trọng như thế nào đối với việc học của em? • Em cảm thấy như thế nào khi giáo viên đánh giá bài làm của em? • Em có thường xuyên nhận được nhận xét đánh giá của giáo viên đối với bài làm cũng như thể hiện của em? • Giáo viên thường đưa ra kiểu nhận xét như thế nào đối với bài làm của em? • Em thường làm gì với các nhận xét đánh giá của giáo viên? • Em có thấy nhận xét đánh giá của giáo viên hữu ích không? Tại sao có? Tại sao không? • Các nhận xét đánh giá như thế nào em thấy hữu ích nhất đối với việc học của em? Tại sao? 5 Theo em thì sinh viên có thể giúp trong việc kiểm tra đánh giá và nhận xét trong lớp không? • Em có cho rằng mình có thể tự đánh giá được bài làm của mình không? • Em có cho rằng em có thể đánh giá được bài làm của bạn mình không? 338 • Nếu giáo viên cho phép em đánh giá bài làm của bạn em thì em có muốn làm không? Tại sao? H. The impacts of assessment practices on students' autonomy 6 Theo em thì kiểm tra đánh giá có liên quan đến tính tự chủ của sinh viên không? nếu có thì nó liên quan như thế nào? nếu không thì tại sao lại không? 7 Các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên tác động như thế nào lên tính tự chủ của em? • Em thường làm gì khi được thông báo là sắp có bài kiểm tra? • Em thường thích có dạng kiểm tra như thế nào? Dạng kiểm tra đó có cho em tự chủ trong việc học của mình không? tại sao em nghĩ vậy? Dạng kiểm tra đó có tại hứng thú học tập cho em không? vì sao? Em học như thế nào để đáp ứng tốt được yêu cầu của các dạng bài kiểm tra đó? • Dạng kiểm tra đánh giá nào cho phép em tự chủ trong học tập? Em có hứng thú học hơn với những hình thức đánh giá cho phép em chủ động không? Em hãy giải thích cách thức em sẽ phản ứng trong các dạng kiểm tra đánh giá này? 339 Appendix B: Observation protocol PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION PROTOCOL Date: Time of observation: Start: End: Case code: Teacher's gender: Number of students: Female: Male: Course book used: A. Classroom context: 1. Classroom resources and teacher resources ................................................................................................ ......................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................... ........................... 2. Classroom space ................................................................................................ ......................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................... ........................... 3. Room arrangement ................................................................................................ ......................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................... ........................... B. Description of the lesson observed 340 Comments 1. Major way(s) in which student activities were structured (As a whole group/ small groups/pairs/ individuals) 2. Major activities of students in the lesson (listen to presentation/engage in discussion/Engage in problem solving/engage in reading/reflection/written communication, etc.) C. Assessment practices observed o Teachers' assessment practices (Formative/summative) Comments Students' strategies (cognitive, metacognitive, affective) Comments 341 Appendix C: Survey questionnaire for selecting participants QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENGLISH TEACHERS Thank you for taking part in this survey. The survey asks you about your current teaching practices in your classroom. The survey consists of two parts, namely Background information and Teachers' teaching practices. It will take approximately 10 minutes to complete, and you can choose to do either the English version or the Vietnamese version. This project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Adelaide (approval number...). By completing the survey you will be consenting to be involved in the project. Your participation is entirely anonymous, and you will not be identified in any research based on this survey. Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary, and you may leave the survey at any time. The University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee monitors all the research projects which it has approved. The committee considers it important that people participating in approved projects have an independent and confidential reporting mechanism which they can use if they have any worries or complaints about that research. If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you should consult the project co-ordinator, Dr Julia Miller (email: julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au; telephone: 00 61 8 8313 4721). If you wish to discuss any concerns about the project with an independent person, contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat by phone (00 61 8 8313 6028) or by email: hrec@adelaide.edu.au Part I: Background information Your gender (tick ONE): Male Female Your age group (tick ONE): 22-29 30-39 40-50 over 50 Years of experiences as an English teacher (tick ONE): Under 5 years 5 to 10 years 11 to 15 years more than 15 years Years of experience as an English teacher at your current university (tick ONE): Under 5 years 5 to 10 years 11 to 15 years more than 15 years Number of classes you usually teach each semester (tick ONE): 1 -2 3-4 More than 4 342 Your highest qualification (tick ONE): Bachelor Master Doctorate Other Please specify Number of conferences/ training sessions about assessment you have taken part in (tick ONE): 0 1-2 3 4 5 or more Part II: Teachers' teaching practices Instructions: Please read each statement starting with \"IN MY ENGLISH CLASS\" carefully and then tick the frequency level that best matches your teaching practices. Your honest responses are very important and highly appreciated. IN MY ENGLISH CLASS N ever A few tim es a term In about half of m y lessons In m ost lessons In every lesson 1. I explain the objectives of my lessons at the beginning. 2. I use assessment to determine how much help my students need from me. 3. I test my students using task-based activities other than written tests. 4. I determine the degree of accomplishment of a desired learning outcome for a lesson. 5. I provide feedback to students in order to improve their learning. 6. I use assessment activities (e.g. quizzes, probing questions) to identify better learning opportunities for students in class. 7. I grade my students based on their class performance. 8. I use questions to check my students' understanding of what I have taught. 9. I make notes about my students while observing them working. 10. I use the last 5 minutes to prompt student reflection on what they have learnt. 11. After a learning task, I ask students to reflect on what they have done using criteria I have given to them. 12. I set up practice activities (presentation, listening and writing) before exams. 13. I ask students to set their own goals and monitor their own learning progress. 14. I encourage students to identify their learning difficulties in class. 343 IN MY ENGLISH CLASS N ever A few tim es a term In about half of m y lessons In m ost lessons In every lesson 15. I share criteria for good work before asking my students to do a task. 16. I model tasks before asking my students to do them. 17. I use online tools (e.g. Facebook groups) to give students feedback. 18. I use online tools (e.g. Facebook groups) to allow students to ask questions about my lessons. 19. I provide opportunities for students to peer-assess each other's work (e.g. mark each other's test paper, assess each other's writing or speaking). 20. I provide opportunities for students to assess their own work using criteria I have given. 21. I use student learning portfolios. 22. I take my students' opinions into consideration while determining objectives for the lessons, in-class activities and deadlines for the assignments. 23. I encourage my students to determine their own needs for the acquisition of English. 24. I support the different learning preferences/styles of my students. 25. I emphasize that the responsibility of learning belongs to the students themselves. 26. I arrange group work in class. 27. I arrange group work as an out-of-class activity. 28. I give my students various responsibilities (board arrangement, today's proverb, phonetics, important events, etc.) in in-class and out-of-class activities. 29. I set projects so that students have to use various sources to complete them. 30. I encourage students to use as much English as possible. 31. I tell students not to be afraid of making mistakes when using English because they are part of the learning process. 32. I encourage students to discuss topics they have researched. 33. I encourage my students to further their learning of English in situations outside the classroom without help from any teacher. 34. I try not to answer my students' questions but give them sources so that they can find the answer themselves. 344 Would you like to participate in a project that can give you ideas and techniques of how to improve your assessment practices so that they support your students' learning and develop their autonomy, and GET A GIFT FROM AUSTRALIA? Yes No If you are interested in participating in this project by taking part in an interview, could you please give me some personal details? Your name:.............................................................................................. Your email address:.................................................................................... If you agree to do an interview, please tick the box if you agree with the following piece of information. I agree for my survey results to be matched to my interview. I understand my overall results will be confidential. Thank you for your help Your answers will remain confidential 345 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENGLISH TEACHERS (Vietnamese version) Cám ơn thầy/cô đã tham gia vào cuộc khảo sát này. Các câu hỏi khảo sát nhằm tìm hiểu hoạt động giảng dạy mà các thầy cô sử dụng trong lớp học của mình. Các câu hỏi khảo sát gồm 2 nhóm: Thông tin chung và các hoạt động giảng dạy của các thầy cô. Các thầy/cô sẽ mất khoảng 10 phút để hoàn thành cuộc khảo sát này. Các thầy cô có thể lựa chọn làm bản tiếng Anh hoặc tiếng Việt. Đề tài nghiên cứu này đã được phê duyệt bởi bởi Ủy ban Đạo đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người, Trường Đại học Adelaide. Việc hoàn thành các câu hỏi khảo sát thể hiện các thầy/cô đã đồng ý tham gia vào đề tài. Việc tham gia của các thầy cô là hoàn toàn ẩn danh, và danh tính của của thầy/cô sẽ không bị tiết lộ trong bất kỳ nghiên cứu nào sử dụng thông tin của cuộc khảo sát này. Việc tham gia vào cuộc khảo sát này là hoàn toàn tự nguyện, các thầy/cô có thể dừng lại không tiếp tục tham gia khảo sát vào bất kỳ thời điểm nào. Ủy ban Đạo đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người quản lý, giám sát tất cả các nghiên cứu mà đã được phê duyệt. Ủy ban nhận thức được tầm quan trọng của việc có một cơ chế báo cáo độc lập và bảo mật để cho những khách thể nghiên cứu của dự án đã được phê duyệt sử dụng khi họ có bất kỳ lo lắng hay khiếu nại gì về dự án mà họ tham gia Nếu thầy/cô có câu hỏi hay vấn đề thắc mắc nào về các lĩnh vực tham gia của thầy/cô trong đề tài nghiên cứu, hoặc muốn phàn nàn hay phản án gì về đề tài nghiên cứu, hãy liên lạc với giáo viên hướng dẫn chính của tôi, Tiến sỹ Julia Miller (email: julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au; số điện thoại: 00 61 8 8313 4721) Nếu thầy/cô muốn trao đổi với 1 người độc lập về những phàn nàn của thầy/cô, hãy liên lạc với Thư ký của Ủy ban Đạo Đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người theo số điện thoại +61 8 8313 6028 hoặc gửi thư tới địa chỉ email hrec@adelaide.edu.au. Phần I: Thông tin chung về người tham gia khảo sát Giới tính (chọn một thông tin): Nam Nữ Nhóm tuổi (chọn một thông tin): 22-29 30-39 40-50 trên 50 346 Số năm kinh nghiệm dạy tiếng Anh (chọn một thông tin): Dưới 5 năm 6-10 năm 11-15 năm trên 15 năm Số năm kinh nghiệm dạy tiếng Anh tại trường hiện thầy/cô đang dạy (chọn một thông tin): Dưới 5 năm 6-10 năm 11-15 năm trên 15 năm Số lớp các thầy/cô thường đảm nhận trong một học kỳ (chọn một thông tin): 1 -2 3-4 Hơn 4 Bằng cấp cao nhất (chọn một thông tin): Đại học Thạc sỹ Tiến sỹ Bằng cấp khác ______________ Số lượng các hội thảo hoặc khóa đào tạo về kiểm tra đánh giá mà các thầy cô đã tham gia (chọn một thông tin): 0 1-2 3 4 5 hoặc hơn Phần 2: Hoạt động giảng dạy của giáo viên Hướng dẫn: Các thầy/cô hãy đọc kỹ các thông tin bắt đầu bằng \"Trong lớp học tiếng Anh của tôi\" và đánh dấu vào các cột thể hiện mức độ mà thầy cô thấy rằng phản ánh đúng nhất các hoạt động giảng dạy trên lớp của các thầy cô. Tính chân thực trong các câu trả lời là rất quan trọng và được đề cao. 347 TRONG LỚP TIẾNG ANH CỦA TÔI K hông bao giờ M ột vài lần trong m ột học kỳ Trong khoảng m ột nửa các bài giảng Trong hầu hết các bài giảng Trong m ỗi bài giảng 1. Tôi giải thích mục tiêu của bài giảng trước khi bắt đầu buổi học. 2. Tôi sử dụng phương pháp kiểm tra đánh giá để xác định xem sinh viên của tôi cần tôi hỗ trợ như thế nào. 3. Tôi kiểm tra sinh viên bằng các tổ chức các hoạt động trên lớp thay vì sử dụng bài kiểm tra viết. 4. Tôi xác định mức độ hoàn thành của một mục tiêu học tập vào cuối mỗi buổi học. 5. Tôi đưa ra các nhận xét đánh giá nhằm giúp sinh viên cải thiện việc học của mình. 6. Tôi sử dụng các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá (ví dụ như các câu hỏi trắc nghiệm và câu hỏi thăm dò) để tìm ra các cơ hội học tập tốt hơn cho sinh viên trong lớp. 7. Tôi cho điểm sinh viên dựa trên sự thể hiệ của sinh viên dó ở trên lớp. 8. Tôi sử dụng câu hỏi để kiểm tra mức độ hiểu bài của sinh viên. 9. Tôi ghi chép về sinh viên khi quan sát các em thực hiện các nhiệm vụ học tập mà tôi yêu cầu 10. Tôi sử dụng 5 phút cuổi bài để đánh giá lại những gì mà sinh viên vừa học trong bài. 11. Sau mỗi nhiệm vụ học tập, tôi yêu cầu sinh viên đánh giá lại những gì các em đã làm được dựa trên các tiêu chí đánh giá mà tôi cung cấp. 12. Tôi tổ chức các hoạt động luyện tập (nói, ghe, viết) trước các kỳ thi chính thức. 13. Tôi yêu cầu sinh viên xác định mục tiêu học tập cho mình và theo dõi sự tiến bộ của mình. 14. Tôi khuyến khích sinh viên tìm ra những khó khăn của các em trong việc tiếp thu bài trên lớp. 15. Tôi chia sẻ các tiêu chí đánh giá một bài tập tốt trước khi cho sinh viên thực hiện bài tập. 16. Tôi làm mẫu trước khi yêu cầu sinh viên thực hiện một yêu cầu trong lớp. 17. Tôi sử dụng các công cụ trực tuyến (ví dụ như các nhóm trên facebook) để đưa ra nhận xét cho sinh viên. 348 TRONG LỚP TIẾNG ANH CỦA TÔI K hông bao giờ M ột vài lần trong m ột học kỳ Trong khoảng m ột nửa các bài giảng Trong hầu hết các bài giảng Trong m ỗi bài giảng 18. Tôi sử dụng các công cụ trực tuyến (ví dụ như các nhóm trên facebook) để cho sinh viên đặt câu hỏi về bài giảng của tôi. 19. Tôi tạo cơ hội cho sinh viên đánh giá chéo bài của nhau (ví dụ như chấm điểm bài kiểm tra trên lớp hay đánh giá bài viết hay bài nói của nhau) dựa trên các tiêu chí đánh giá mà tôi cung cấp. 20. Tôi tạo cơ hội cho sinh viên tự đánh giá bài của mình dựa trên các tiêu chí mà tôi cung cấp. 21. Tôi sử dụng hồ sơ học tập của mỗi sinh viên (ví dụ như bài kiểm tra, nhận xét của giáo viên trên mỗi loại bài tập, kế hoạch, mục tiêu). 22. Tôi xem xét tới ý kiến của sinh viên khi xác định mục tiêu cho bài giảng, các hoạt động tôi sẽ triển khai và thời gian hoàn thành các các bài tập. 23. Tôi khuyến khích sinh viên xác định nhu cầu học tiếng Anh cho riêng mình. 24. Tôi ủng hộ các sở thích và phong cách học khác nhau của sinh viên. 25. Tôi nhấn mạnh với sinh viên của mình rằng việc học là trách nhiệm của sinh viên. 26. Tôi tổ chức các hoạt động nhóm ở trên lớp. 27. Tôi tổ chức các hoạt động nhóm ngoài lớp học. 28. Tôi giao cho sinh viên các trách nhiệm khác nhau (ví dụ như chuẩn bị bảng, chuẩn bị câu thành ngữ của ngày, luyện phát âm, chuẩn bị các sự kiện quan trọng) ở cả trong và ngoài lớp học. 29. Tôi thiết lập ra các dự án mà sinh viên sẽ phải sử dụng nhiều nguồn lực khác nhau để hoàn thành. 30. Tôi khuyến khích sinh viên sử dụng càng nhiều tiếng Anh càng tốt. 31. Tôi khuyên sinh viên không nên sợ mắc lỗi khi sử dụng tiếng Anh vì lỗi là một phần của quá trình học. 32. Tôi khuyến khích sinh viên thảo luận các chủ đề mà các em đã tìm hiểu. 33. Tôi khuyến khích sinh viên học tiếng Anh trong các tình huống bên ngoài lớp học mà không có sự trợ giúp của giáo viên. 349 TRONG LỚP TIẾNG ANH CỦA TÔI K hông bao giờ M ột vài lần trong m ột học kỳ Trong khoảng m ột nửa các bài giảng Trong hầu hết các bài giảng Trong m ỗi bài giảng 34. Tôi cố gắng không trả lời trực tiếp câu hỏi của sinh viên mà cung cấp các nguồn thông tin để sinh viên có thể tự tìm câu trả lời cho mình. Các thầy cô có muốn tham gia và một dự án mà có thể mang lại cho thầy/cô các ý tưởng và các hoạt động để cải thiện các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của các thầy/cô, giúp các thầy cô phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động của sinh viên trong việc học tiếng Anh và nhận một món quà từ Úc không? Yes No Nếu các thầy cô sẵn lòng tham gia vào dự án thông qua việc tham gia vào một cuộc phỏng vấn thì xin các thầy cô để lại thông tin để chúng tôi có thể liên lạc. Tên:.............................................................................................. Địa chỉ email:.................................................................................... Nếu các thầy/cô đồng ý tham gia phỏng vấn, xin các thầy cô hãy đánh dấu và ô thông tin dưới đây Tôi đồng ý là thông tin chung mà tôi cung cấptrong bản khảo sát cũng là các thông tin mà tôi sẽ cung cấp nếu được hỏi các câu hỏi tương tự trong cuộc phỏng vấn tôi. Tôi hiểu rằng kết quả chung của cuộc khảo sát sẽ được giữ bí mật. Trân trọng cảm ơn sự giúp đỡ của thầy/cô Tất cả các câu trả lời của các thầy cô đều được giữ bí mật 350 Appendix D: Ethics approval 351 Appendix E: Participant information sheets Appendix E1: Participant information sheet for teachers PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR ENGLISH TEACHERS PROJECT TITLE English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese Higher Education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: H-2016147 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Julia Miller STUDENT RESEARCHER: Ha Thi Ngoc Tran STUDENT'S DEGREE: PhD Dear Participant, You are invited to participate in the research project described below. What is the project about? This study explores the enablers and barriers to the development of English language learner autonomy in assessment practices in the Vietnamese higher education context. The research explores the characterisation of current assessment practices in the Vietnamese higher education context, whether these classroom assessment practices enable or constrain English language learner autonomy, and what factors in assessment practices enable and constrain learner autonomy. Who is undertaking the project? This project is being conducted by Ha Thi Ngoc Tran. This research will form the basis for her PhD studies at the University of Adelaide under the supervision of Dr Julia Miller, Dr Edward Palmer and Dr John Willison. Why am I being invited to participate? The participants invited in this research are those who are identified as: • Willing to take part in the project 352 • Using a variety of assessment practices in their English language classes • Allowing some degree of learner autonomy in their classes What will I be asked to do? The participants will be involved in the following activities: • Have one of their class observed by the researcher during the period of 15 weeks. • Interact with the researcher before and/or after class time. • Take part in one audio-recorded interview section that will last for one hour. • Possibility for follow-up interview (s): when clarity for further information is needed. Locations and time for the interview will depend upon agreement of both the participant and the researcher. How much time will the project take? The observation will be conducted over 15 weeks. There will be one interview that takes about one hour. The interview will be conducted at the participants' most convenient time. The participants involving in the project will get an English book and a pen for their interviewing time. Are there any risks associated with participating in this project? For the observation, there are no foreseeable risks other than those associated with regular observation process. The researcher will only focus on and take notes about the assessment activities carried on in the class and the responses of the students. The researcher will sit quietly in the class like a normal student and will not interfere in the teacher's teaching and the students' learning. In addition, teacher participants will be clearly informed of the frequency of the observations, and the schedule of the observations will be provided for them in advance. Teacher participants will also be informed that no audio-recordings or video-recording will be made during the observation. For the interview, there are no foreseeable risks other than those associated with regular interview process. The interviewees can choose the time and place they are happiest with for the interview. What are the benefits of the research project? This research may benefit the participant and/or the community in several ways: 353 • This research may provide a framework for English language teachers at tertiary education in Vietnam who would like to promote autonomy among their students to reflect their teaching activities in general and assessment practices in particular. • This research may propose some assessment models that would be useful for English teachers who would like to promote learning in general and learner autonomy in particular via assessment practices. Can I withdraw from the project? Participation in this project is completely voluntary, and the participant may withdraw at any stage or avoid answering questions which are considered too personal or intrusive. A decision not to take part in or withdraw from the project will not affect the participants' professional status at the affiliated institution. What will happen to my information? All the information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence during the research process (i.e. recruitment, data collection, data analysis) and during the reporting of research results and publications. Participants' identities will not be revealed. The interview data will be transcribed and the participant will have access to the transcripts in order to give additional comments or feedbacks. Access to the interview data will be restricted to the researcher, the supervisors and the participant. The interview transcript will be stored in two secure places: the researcher's password-protected computer and a secure locker in the researcher's office. Only the significant and relevant parts of the interview transcripts will be translated into English language for discussion with the PhD supervisors as well as for the research report. The participant will be given a summary of the research results in Vietnamese language. Who do I contact if I have questions about the project? If you have questions or inquiries regarding the project, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher or the supervisory panel. Name, Title Telephone Number Email Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Tran +61 410250690 ha.tran@adelaide.edu.au Dr Julia Miller +61883134721 julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au Dr Edward Palmer + 61 883138931 edward.palmer@adelaide.edu.au Dr John Willison +61883133219 john.willison@adelaide.edu.au What if I have a complaint or any concerns? The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number H-2016-147). If you have questions or problems associated 354 with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you should consult the Principal Investigator, Dr Julia Miller. Contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on phone +61 8 8313 6028 or by email to hrec@adelaide.edu.au. If you wish to speak with an independent person regarding concerns or a complaint, the University's policy on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant. Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of the outcome. If I want to participate, what do I do? If you would like to participate in this research project, please contact the researcher on the aforementioned details or reply to the email sent to you by the third party. A consent form will be given to you to sign before the project starts. Yours sincerely, Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Tran Dr Julia Miller Dr Edward Palmer Dr John Willison 355 BẢNG THÔNG TIN DÀNH CHO KHÁCH THỂ NGHIÊN CỨU LÀ GIÁO VIÊN TÊN ĐỀ TÀI: Tính tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên đại học không chuyên ở Việt nam: Những yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên SỐ PHÊ DUYỆT CỦA ỦY BAN ĐẠO ĐỨC TRONG NGHIÊN CỨU CON NGƯỜI: H-2016-147 GIÁO VIÊN HƯỚNG DẪN CHÍNH: Tiến sỹ Julia Miller NGHIÊN CỨU SINH: Trần Thị Ngọc Hà BẬC HỌC: Tiến sỹ Kính gửi các thầy/cô tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu Thầy/cô được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu dưới đây Đề tài nghiên cứu vấn đề gì? Đề tài này nghiên cứu để tìm ra các yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên đối với sự phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên không chuyên trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam. Mục tiêu của đề tài nghiên cứu là tìm ra các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trong các lớp học tiếng Anh trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam đang diễn ra như thế nào, các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá này cản trở hay thúc đẩy tính tự chủ của sinh viên và các yếu tố nào góp phần cản trở hay thúc đẩy tính tự chủ của sinh viên trong việc học tiếng Anh. Đề tài nghiên cứu này được thực hiện bởi những ai? Đề tài nghiên cứu này được thực hiện bởi Trần Thị Ngọc Hà Đề tài nghiên cứu này là cơ sở cho việc hoàn thành bậc học Tiến sỹ tại Trường Đại học Adelaide, với sự hướng dẫn của Tiến sỹ Julia Miller (giáo viên hướng dẫn chính), Tiến sỹ Edward Palmer (giáo viên hướng dẫn phụ), và Tiến sỹ John Willison (giáo viên hướng dẫn phụ) Tại sao tôi lại được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu này? Những thầy/cô được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu này là những thầy/cô: • Tự nguyện tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu • Sử dụng đa dạng các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trong lớp mình giảng dạy • Khuyến khích sinh viên trong lớp mình giảng dạy thể hiện sự chủ động/tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh. Tôi sẽ phải làm gì khi tham gia đề tài nghiên cứu này? Những thầy/cô tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ tham gia vào các hoạt động sau: • Cho phép nghiên cứu sinh dự một trong các lớp học của mình để quan sát. • Trao đổi với nghiên cứu sinh trước và sau giờ lên lớp. • Tham gia vào một cuộc phỏng vấn có ghi âm kéo dài trong khoảng 1 giờ. 356 • Tham gia vào các cuộc phỏng vấn sau đó nếu có thông tin gì cần làm rõ. Thời gian và địa điểm của cuộc phỏng vấn sẽ tùy thuộc vào sự đồng thuận giữa nghiên cứu sinh và thầy/cô. Tham gia vào đề tài sẽ mất bao nhiêu thời gian? Quá trình quan sát sẽ diễn ra trong vòng 15 tuần. Sẽ có một cuộc phỏng vấn kéo dài khoảng một giờ. Cuộc phỏng vấn sẽ diễn ra vào thời gian thuận tiện nhất cho thầy/cô. Trao đổi giữa thầy/cô và nghiên cứu sinh sẽ diễn ra trong thời gian từ 4-7 phút trước và/hoặc sau giờ lên lớp. Các thầy/cô tham gia vào dự án sẽ nhận được một quyển sách tiếng Anh hoặc một món quà từ Úc để cảm ơn về thời gian tham gia vào dự án. Có rủi ro nào mà các khách thể tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu có thể gặp phải không? Thầy.cô tham gia vào đề tài không gặp phải rủi ro nào trong quá trình quan sát. Nghiên cứu sinh sẽ chỉ tập trung ghi chép các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá mà giáo viên sử dụng trên lớp và phản ứng của sinh viên đối với các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên trên lớp. Nghiên cứu sinh sẽ không can thiệp vào quá trình giảng dạy của giáo viên cũng như quá trình học của sinh viên. Ngoài ra, tần suất cũng như lịch trình dư giờ quan sát sẽ được thông báo trước cho thầy/cô. Trong xuốt quá trình quan sát, sẽ không có ghi âm hay ghi hình. Thầy/cô tham gia vào đề tài không gặp phải rủi ro nào trong quá trình phỏng vấn. Thầy/cô có quyền lựa chọn thời gian và địa điểm phỏng vấn mà họ cảm thấy thoải mái nhất. Các lợi ích mà đề tài nghiên cứu mang lại là gì? Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể mang lại một số lợi ích sau cho khách thể nghiên cứu: • Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể cung cấp cho các thầy/cô một mô hình để các Thầy/cô mong muốn phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động của sinh viên trong việc học tiếng Anh đánh giá lại các hoạt động giảng dạy của mình và đặc biệt là các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trên lớp mà mình thực hiện. • Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể đề xuất một số mô hình kiểm tra đánh giá mà có thể hữu ích cho những thầy/cô mong muốn phát triển tính tự chủ của sinh viên trong việc học tiếng Anh. Tôi có thể rút khỏi đề tài nghiên cứu không? Việc tham gia vào đề tài này là hoàn toàn tự nguyện, và các thầy/cô có toàn quyền rút khỏi dự án vào bất kỳ thời điểm nào hoặc từ chối trả lời bất cứ câu hỏi nào mà họ rằng riêng tư hoặc không phù hợp. Quyết định tham gia hoặc rút khỏi đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ không ảnh hưởng gì đến vì thế của các thầy/cô trong cơ quan/tổ chức nơi thầy/cô công tác. Thông tin của tôi được sử lý như thế nào? Tất cả thông tin sẽ được bảo mật hoàn toàn trong suốt quá trình nghiên cứu (tuyển khách thể nghiên cứu, thu thập số liệu, phân tích số liệu) và trong suốt quá trình báo cáo và trình bày kết quả nghiên cứu. Đặc điểm nhận dạng của khách thể nghiên cứu sẽ không được tiết lộ. 357 Các ghi chép trong quá trình quan sát chỉ dùng duy nhất cho mục đích nghiên cứu. Chỉ có nghiên cứu sinh, giáo viên hướng dẫn và khách thể nghiên cứu là được truy cập vào dữ liệu. Bản ghi lại cuộc phỏng vấn sẽ được lưu trữ ở hai nơi khác nhau: trong máy tính có cài mật khẩu của nghiên cứu sinh và trong tủ có khóa trong văn phòng của nghiên cứu sinh. Chỉ những phần quan trọng và thích hợp mới được dịch sang tiếng Anh để thảo luận với giáo viên hướng dẫn cũng như trong báo cáo nghiên cứu. Khách thể sẽ được cung cấp bản tóm tắt kết quả nghiên cứu bằng tiếng Việt. Tôi sẽ liên hệ với ai nếu tôi có câu hỏi về đề tài nghiên cứu? Nếu thầy/cô có câu hỏi nào, hãy liên hệ trực tiếp với tôi hoặc các giáo viên hướng dẫn của tôi theo thông tin liên lạc cụ thể như sau: Tên/chức danh Điện thoại liên hệ Email Nghiên cứu sinh: Trần Thị Ngọc Hà +61 410250690 ha.tran@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ Julia Miller +61883134721 julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ Edward Palmer + 61 883138931 edward.palmer@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ John Willison +61883133219 john.willison@adelaide.edu.au Nếu tôi muốn phàn nàn hay phản ánh về dự án thì tôi sẽ phải làm gì? Đề tài nghiên cứu này đã thông qua bởi Ủy ban Đạo đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người, Trường Đại học Adelaide (theo số H-2016-147). Nếu thầy/cô có câu hỏi hay vấn đề thắc mắc nào về các lĩnh vực tham gia của thầy/cô trong đề tài nghiên cứu, hoặc muốn phàn nàn hay phản án gì về đề tài nghiên cứu, hãy liên lạc với giáo viên hướng dẫn chính của tôi, Tiến sỹ Julia Miller. Nếu thầy/cô muốn trao đổi với 1 người độc lập về những phàn nàn của thầy/cô, hãy liên lạc với Thư ký của Ủy ban Đạo Đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người theo số điện thoại +61 8 8313 6028 hoặc gửi thư tới địa chỉ email hrec@adelaide.edu.au.Ý kiến phản ánh hay phàn nàn của thầy/cô sẽ được xem xét và giải quyết triệt để. Kết quả giải quyết sẽ được thông báo tới thầy/cô. Nếu tôi muốn tham gia, tôi phải làm gì? Nếu thầy/cô muốn tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu thì hãy ký vào bản đồng ý tham gia đề tài mà đã được cung cấp và gửi lại cho người đại diện của tôi. Tôi xin chân thành cảm ơn Trần Thị Ngọc Hà Julia Miller Edward Palmer John Willison 358 Appendix E2: Participant information sheet for observed students PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR OBSERVED STUDENTS PROJECT TITLE English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese Higher Education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: H-2016147 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Julia Miller STUDENT RESEARCHER: Ha Thi Ngoc Tran STUDENT'S DEGREE: PhD Dear Participant, You are invited to participate in the research project described below. What is the project about? This study explores the enablers and barriers to the development of English language learner autonomy in assessment practices in the Vietnamese higher education context. The research explores the characterisation of current assessment practices in the Vietnamese higher education context, whether these classroom assessment practices enable or constrain English language learner autonomy, and what factors in assessment practices enable and constrain learner autonomy. Who is undertaking the project? This project is being conducted by Ha Thi Ngoc Tran. This research will form the basis for her PhD studies at the University of Adelaide under the supervision of Dr Julia Miller, Dr Edward Palmer and Dr John Willison. Why am I being invited to participate? The student participants invited in this research are those who are identified as voluntary to participate in the project. What will I be asked to do? 359 The student participants will involve in the following activities: • Have their class behaviours observed during class time. • Interact with the researcher after the class time (possibly at break time). How much time will the project take? The observation will be over 15 weeks. The interaction will take about 5 to 10 minutes each time. Are there any risks associated with participating in this project? For the observation there are no foreseeable risks other than those associated with regular observation process. The researcher will only focus on and take notes about students' responses to teacher's assessment practices in the class. The researcher will sit quietly in the class like a normal student and will not interfere in teacher's teaching and students' learning. No video or audio recordings will be made during the observations. For the interaction, there are no foreseeable risks. What are the benefits of the research project? This research may benefit the participant in several ways: • The project may provide students with a different look at the role of assessment in learning and inspire them to take on some assessment models that help develop their autonomy. • This research may propose some assessment models that would be useful for English learners who would like to self-reflect their own learning. Can I withdraw from the project? Participation in this project is completely voluntary, and the participant may withdraw at any stage or avoid answering questions which are considered too personal or intrusive. A decision not to take part in or withdraw from the project will not affect the participants' status at the affiliated institution. What will happen to my information? All the information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence during the research process (i.e. recruitment, data collection, data analysis) and during the reporting of research results and publications. Participants' identities will not be revealed. The observation field notes will be kept confidentially and used only for the purpose of this study. Access to the field notes will be strictly restricted to the researcher and her supervisors. The field notes will be stored in two secure places: the researcher's password-protected computer and a secure locker in the researcher's office. 360 Who do I contact if I have questions about the project? If you have questions or inquiries regarding the project, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher or the supervisory panel. Name, Title Telephone Number Email Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Tran +61 410250690 ha.tran@adelaide.edu.au Dr Julia Miller +61883134721 julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au Dr Edward Palmer + 61 883138931 edward.palmer@adelaide.edu.au Dr John Willison +61883133219 john.willison@adelaide.edu.au What if I have a complaint or any concerns? The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number H-2016-147). If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you should consult the Principal Investigator, Dr Julia Miller. Contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on phone +61 8 8313 6028 or by email to hrec@adelaide.edu.au. If you wish to speak with an independent person regarding concerns or a complaint, the University's policy on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant. Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of the outcome. If I want to participate, what do I do? If you would like to participate in this research project, please sign in the consent form and return it to the third party. Yours sincerely, Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Tran Dr Julia Miller Dr Edward Palmer Dr John Willison 361 BẢNG THÔNG TIN DÀNH CHO KHÁCH THỂ NGHIÊN CỨU LÀ SINH VIÊN ĐƯỢC QUAN SÁT TÊN ĐỀ TÀI: Tính tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên đại học không chuyên ở Việt nam: Những yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên SỐ PHÊ DUYỆT CỦA ỦY BAN ĐẠO TRONG ĐỨC NGHIÊN CỨU CON NGƯỜI: H-2016-147 GIÁO VIÊN HƯỚNG DẪN CHÍNH: Tiến sỹ Julia Miller NGHIÊN CỨU SINH: Trần Thị Ngọc Hà BẬC HỌC: Tiến sỹ Kính gửi các anh/chị tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu Anh/chị được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu dưới đây Đề tài nghiên cứu vấn đề gì? Đề tài này nghiên cứu để tìm ra các yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên đối với sự phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên không chuyên trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam. Mục tiêu của đề tài nghiên cứu là tìm ra các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trong các lớp học tiếng Anh trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam đang diễn ra như thế nào, các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá này cản trở hay thúc đẩy tính tự chủ của sinh viên và các yếu tố nào góp phần cản trở hay thúc đẩy tính tự chủ của sinh viên trong việc học tiếng Anh. Đề tài nghiên cứu này được thực hiện bởi những ai? Đề tài nghiên cứu này được thực hiện bởi Trần Thị Ngọc Hà Đề tài nghiên cứu này là cơ sở cho việc hoàn thành bậc học Tiến sỹ tại Trường Đại học Adelaide, với sự hướng dẫn của Tiến sỹ Julia Miller (giáo viên hướng dẫn chính), Tiến sỹ Edward Palmer (giáo viên hướng dẫn phụ), và Tiến sỹ John Willison (giáo viên hướng dẫn phụ) Tại sao tôi lại được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu này? Những sinh viên được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu này là những sinh viên tự nguyện tham gia vào dự án. Tôi sẽ phải làm gì khi tham gia đề tài nghiên cứu này? Những sinh viên tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ tham gia vào các hoạt động sau: • cho phép nghiên cứu sinh quan sát các hành vi thể hiện trong lớp học • Tham gia trao đổi với nghiên cứu sinh sau giờ học (giờ ra chơi) Tham gia vào đề tài sẽ mất bao nhiêu thời gian? Quá trình quan sát sẽ diễn ra trong vòng 15 tuần. 362 Thời gian trao đổi giữa nghiên cứu sinh và sinh viên sẽ diễn ra trong khoảng 5 đến 10 phút Có rủi ro nào mà các sinh viên tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu có thể gặp phải không? Sinh viên tham gia vào đề tài không gặp phải rủi ro nào trong quá trình quan sát. Nghiên cứu sinh sẽ chỉ tập trung ghi chép phản ứng của sinh viên đối với các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên trên lớp. Nghiên cứu sinh sẽ không can thiệp vào quá trình giảng dạy của giáo viên cũng như quá trình học của sinh viên. Trong xuốt quá trình quan sát, sẽ không có ghi âm hay ghi hình. Trong quá trình trao đổi, sinh viên cũng không gặp rủi ro gì. Sinh viên tham gia đề tài nghiên cứu có quyền lựa chọn thời gian và địa điểm phỏng vấn mà họ cảm thấy thoải mái nhất. Các lợi ích mà đề tài nghiên cứu mang lại là gì? Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể mang lại một số lợi ích sau: • Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể mang lại cho sinh viên một cái nhìn khác về vai trò của công tác kiểm tra đánh giá trong quá trình học và có thể tạo động lực cho sinh viên thực hiện một số mô hình kiểm tra đánh giá để phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động của mình • Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể đề xuất một số mô hình kiểm tra đánh giá mà có thể hữu ích cho những người học tiếng Anh mà muốn tự đánh giá quá trình học của bản than Tôi có thể rút khỏi đề tài nghiên cứu không? Việc tham gia vào đề tài này là hoàn toàn tự nguyện, và sinh viên có toàn quyền rút khỏi dự án vào bất kỳ thời điểm nào hoặc từ chối trả lời bất cứ câu hỏi nào mà họ rằng riêng tư hoặc không phù hợp. Quyết định tham gia hoặc rút khỏi đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ không ảnh hưởng gì đến vì thế của sinh viên trong trường/tổ chức nơi sinh viên theo học. Thông tin của tôi được sử lý như thế nào? Tất cả thông tin sẽ được bảo mật hoàn toàn trong suốt quá trình nghiên cứu (tuyển khách thể nghiên cứu, thu thập số liệu, phân tích số liệu) và trong suốt quá trình báo cáo và trình bày kết quả nghiên cứu. Đặc điểm nhận dạng của khách thể nghiên cứu sẽ không được tiết lộ. Các ghi chép trong quá trình quan sát chỉ dùng duy nhất cho ,mục đích nghiên cứu. Chỉ có nghiên cứu sinh, giáo viên hướng dẫn và khách thể nghiên cứu là được truy cập vào dữ liệu. Bản ghi lại cuộc phỏng vấn sẽ được lưu trữ ở hai nơi khác nhau: trong máy tính có cài mật khẩu của nghiên cứu sinh và trong tủ có khóa trong văn phòng của nghiên cứu sinh. Chỉ những phần quan trọng và thích hợp mới được dịch sang tiếng Anh để thảo luận với giáo viên hướng dẫn cũng như trong báo cáo nghiên cứu. Khách thể sẽ được cung cấp bản tóm tắt kết quả nghiên cứu bằng tiếng Việt. 363 Tôi sẽ liên hệ với ai nếu tôi có câu hỏi về đề tài nghiên cứu? Nếu anh/chị có câu hỏi nào, hãy liên hệ trực tiếp với tôi hoặc các giáo viên hướng dẫn của tôi theo thông tin liên lạc cụ thể như sau: Tên/chức danh Điện thoại liên hệ Email Nghiên cứu sinh: Trần Thị Ngọc Hà +61 410250690 ha.tran@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ Julia Miller +61883134721 julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ Edward Palmer + 61 883138931 edward.palmer@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ John Willison +61883133219 john.willison@adelaide.edu.au Nếu tôi muốn phàn nàn hay phản ánh về dự án thì thì tôi sẽ phải làm gì? Đề tài nghiên cứu này đã thông qua bởi Ủy ban Đạo đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người, Trường Đại học Adelaide (theo số H-2016-147). Nếu anh/chị có câu hỏi hay vấn đề thắc mắc nào về các lĩnh vực tham gia của anh/chi trong đề tài nghiên cứu, hoặc muốn phàn nàn hay phản án gì về đề tài nghiên cứu, hãy liên lạc với giáo viên hướng dẫn chính của tôi, Tiến sỹ Julia Miller. Nếu anh/chị muốn trao đổi với 1 người độc lập về những phàn nàn của anh/chị, hãy liên lạc với Thư ký của Ủy ban Đạo dức trong Nghiên cứu Con người theo số điện thoại +61 8 8313 6028 hoặc gửi thư tới địa chỉ email hrec@adelaide.edu.au.Ý kiến phản ánh hay phàn nàn của anh/chị sẽ được xem xét và giải quyết triệt để. Kết quả giải quyết sẽ được thông báo tới anh/chị. Nếu tôi muốn tham gia, tôi phải làm gì? Nếu anh/chị muốn tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu thì hãy ký vào bản đồng ý tham gia đề tài mà đã được cung cấp và gửi lại cho người đại diện của tôi. Tôi xin chân thành cảm ơn Trần Thị Ngọc Hà Julia Miller Edward Palmer John Willison 364 Appendix E3: Participant information sheet for interviewed students PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEWED STUDENTS PROJECT TITLE English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese Higher Education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: H-2016147 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Julia Miller STUDENT RESEARCHER: Ha Thi Ngoc Tran STUDENT'S DEGREE: PhD Dear Participant, You are invited to participate in the research project described below. What is the project about? This study explores the enablers and barriers to the development of English language learner autonomy in assessment practices in the Vietnamese higher education context. The research explores the characterisation of current assessment practices in the Vietnamese higher education context, whether these classroom assessment practices enable or constrain English language learner autonomy, and what factors in assessment practices enable and constrain learner autonomy. Who is undertaking the project? This project is being conducted by Ha Thi Ngoc Tran. This research will form the basis for her PhD studies at the University of Adelaide under the supervision of Dr Julia Miller, Dr Edward Palmer and Dr John Willison. Why am I being invited to participate? The student participants invited in this research are those who are identified as: • Willing to participate in the project. • Demonstrating a variety of levels of autonomy. What will I be asked to do? 365 The student participants will take part in an audio-recorded interview that will last for forty-five minutes. Locations and time for the interview will depend upon agreement of both the participant and the researcher. How much time will the project take? There will be one interview that takes about forty-five minutes. The interview will be conducted at the participants' most convenient time. The participants involved in the project will get a small gift from Australia for their time. Are there any risks associated with participating in this project? For the interview, there are no foreseeable risks other than those associated with regular interview process. The interviewees can choose the time and place they are happiest with for the interview. What are the benefits of the research project? This research may benefit the participant in several ways: • The interview may be a fruitful sharing session to reflect the participants' beliefs and understanding about learning and assessment, as well as their roles and their teacher's roles in learning process. • The project may provide students with a different look at the role of assessment in learning and inspire them to take on some assessment models that help develop their autonomy. • This research may propose some assessment models that would be useful for English learners who would like to self-reflect their own learning. Can I withdraw from the project? Participation in this project is completely voluntary, and the participant may withdraw at any stage or avoid answering questions which are considered too personal or intrusive. A decision not to take part in or withdraw from the project will not affect the participants' status at the affiliated institution. What will happen to my information? All the information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence during the research process (i.e. recruitment, data collection, data analysis) and during the reporting of research results and publications. Participants' identities will not be revealed. The interview data will be transcribed and the participant will have access to the transcripts in order to give additional comments or feedbacks. Access to the interview data will be restricted to the researcher, the supervisors and the participant. The interview transcript will be stored in two secure places: the researcher's password-protected computer and a secure locker in the researcher's office. 366 Only the significant and relevant parts of the interview transcripts will be translated into English language for discussion with the PhD supervisors as well as for the research report. The participant will be given a summary of the research results in Vietnamese language. Who do I contact if I have questions about the project? If you have questions or inquiries regarding the project, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher or the supervisory panel. Name, Title Telephone Number Email Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Tran +61 410250690 ha.tran@adelaide.edu.au Dr Julia Miller +61883134721 julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au Dr Edward Palmer + 61 883138931 edward.palmer@adelaide.edu.au Dr John Willison +61883133219 john.willison@adelaide.edu.au What if I have a complaint or any concerns? The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number H-2016-147). If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you should consult the Principal Investigator, Dr Julia Miller. Contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on phone +61 8 8313 6028 or by email to hrec@adelaide.edu.au.if you wish to speak with an independent person regarding concerns or a complaint, the University's policy on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant. Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of the outcome. If I want to participate, what do I do? If you would like to participate in this research project, please sign in the consent form provided and return it to the third party. Yours sincerely, Ms Ha Thi Ngoc Tran Dr Julia Miller Dr Edward Palmer Dr John Willison 367 BẢNG THÔNG TIN DÀNH CHO KHÁCH THỂ NGHIÊN CỨU LÀ SINH VIÊN ĐƯỢC PHỎNG VẤN TÊN ĐỀ TÀI: Tính tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên đại học không chuyên ở Việt nam: Những yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên SỐ PHÊ DUYỆT CỦA ỦY BAN ĐẠO ĐỨC TRONG NGHIÊN CỨU CON NGƯỜI: H-2016-147 GIÁO VIÊN HƯỚNG DẪN CHÍNH: Tiến sỹ Julia Miller NGHIÊN CỨU SINH: Trần Thị Ngọc Hà BẬC HỌC: Tiến sỹ Kính gửi các anh/chị tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu Anh/chị được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu dưới đây Đề tài nghiên cứu vấn đề gì? Đề tài này nghiên cứu để tìm ra các yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên đối với sự phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên không chuyên trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam. Mục tiêu của đề tài nghiên cứu là tìm ra các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá trong các lớp học tiếng Anh trong các trường đại học ở Việt nam đang diễn ra như thế nào, các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá này cản trở hay thúc đẩy tính tự chủ của sinh viên và các yếu tố nào góp phần cản trở hay thúc đẩy tính tự chủ của sinh viên trong việc học tiếng Anh. Đề tài nghiên cứu này được thực hiệ bởi những ai? Đề tài nghiên cứu này được thực hiện bởi Trần Thị Ngọc Hà. Đề tài nghiên cứu này là cơ sở cho việc hoàn thành bậc học Tiến sỹ tại Trường Đại học Adelaide, với sự hướng dẫn của Tiến sỹ Julia Miller (giáo viên hướng dẫn chính) và Tiến sỹ Edward Palmer (giáo viên hướng dẫn phụ), và Tiến sỹ John Willison (giáo viên hướng dẫn phụ) Tại sao tôi lại được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu này? Những sinh viên được mời tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu này là những sinh viên • Tư nguyện tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu • Thể hiện các mức độ tự chủ/chủ động khác nhau trong việc học tiếng Anh Tôi sẽ phải làm gì khi tham gia đề tài nghiên cứu này? Những sinh viên tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ tham gia vào một cuộc phỏng vấn có ghi âm trong vòng 45 phút. 368 Thời gian và địa điểm phỏng vấn sẽ phụ thuộc và sự đồng thuận giữa người nghiên cứu và người tham gia phỏng vấn. Tham gia vào đề tài sẽ mất bao nhiêu thời gian? Sẽ có một cuộc phỏng vấn kéo dài 45 phút. Cuộc phỏng vấn sẽ diễn ra vào thời gian thích hợp nhất cho khách thể nghiên cứu. Sinh viên tham gia và đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ nhận được một món quà nhỏ từ Úc để cám ơn về thời gian mà họ đã dành để tham gia đề tài nghiên cứu. Có rủi ro nào mà các sinh viên tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu có thể gặp phải không? Sinh viên tham gia vào đề tài không gặp phải rủi ro nào trong quá trình phỏng vấn. Sinh viên tham gia và dự án có quyền lựa chọn thời gian và địa điểm phỏng vấn mà họ cảm thấy thoải mái nhất. Các lợi ích mà đề tài nghiên cứu mang lại là gì? Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể mang lại một số lợi ích sau cho các sinh viên tham gia: • Quá trình phỏng vấn có thể là thời gian chia sẻ quý báu giúp cho sinh viên nhìn nhận lại nhận thức, hiểu biết của mình về việc học cũng như công tác kiểm tra đánh giá và vai trò của sinh viên và giáo viên trong hoạt động học. • Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể mang lại cho sinh viên một cái nhìn khác về vai trò của công tác kiểm tra đánh giá trong quá trình học và có thể tạo động lực cho sinh viên thực hiện một số mô hình kiểm tra đánh giá để phát triển tính tự chủ/chủ động của mình • Đề tài nghiên cứu có thể đề xuất một số mô hình kiểm tra đánh giá mà có thể hữu ích cho những người học tiếng Anh mà muốn tự đánh giá quá trình học của bản than Tôi có thể rút khỏi đề tài nghiên cứu không? Việc tham gia vào đề tài này là hoàn toàn tự nguyện, và sinh viên tham gia dự án có toàn quyền rút khỏi dự án vào bất kỳ thời điểm nào hoặc từ chối trả lời bất cứ câu hỏi nào mà họ rằng riêng tư hoặc không phù hợp. Quyết định tham gia hoặc rút khỏi đề tài nghiên cứu sẽ không ảnh hưởng gì đến vì thế của sinh viên trong trường/tổ chức mà sinh viên theo học. Thông tin của tôi được sử lý như thế nào? Tất cả thông tin sẽ được bảo mật hoàn toàn trong suốt quá trình nghiên cứu (tuyển khách thể nghiên cứu, thu thập số liệu, phân tích số liệu) và trong suốt quá trình báo cáo và trình bày kết quả nghiên cứu. Đặc điểm nhận dạng của khách thể nghiên cứu sẽ không được tiết lộ. Dữ liệu phỏng vấn sẽ được ghi chép và khách thể nghiên cứu có thể truy cập vào các ghi chép này để đưa ra các nhận xét và góp ý. Chỉ có nghiên cứu sinh, giáo viên hướng dẫn và khách thể nghiên cứu là được truy cập vào dữ liệu. Bản ghi lại cuộc phỏng vấn sẽ được lưu trữ ở hai nơi khác nhau: trong máy tính có cài mật khẩu của nghiên cứu sinh và trong tủ có khóa trong văn phòng của nghiên cứu sinh. 369 Chỉ những phần quan trọng và thích hợp mới được dịch sang tiếng Anh để thảo luận với giáo viên hướng dẫn cũng như trong báo cáo nghiên cứu. Khách thể sẽ được cung cấp bản tóm tắt kết quả nghiên cứu bằng tiếng Việt. Tôi sẽ liên hệ với ai nếu tôi có câu hỏi về đề tài nghiên cứu? Nếu khách thể nghiên cứu có câu hỏi nào, hãy liên hệ trực tiếp với tôi hoặc các giáo viên hướng dẫn của tôi theo thông tin liên lạc cụ thể như sau: Tên/chức danh Điện thoại liên hệ Email Nghiên cứu sinh: Trần Thị Ngọc Hà +61 410250690 ha.tran@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ Julia Miller +61883134721 julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ Edward Palmer + 61 883138931 edward.palmer@adelaide.edu.au Tiến sỹ John Willison +61883133219 john.willison@adelaide.edu.au Nếu tôi muốn phàn nàn hay phản ánh về dự án thì tôi sẽ phải làm gì? Đề tài nghiên cứu này đã thông qua bởi Ủy ban Đạo đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người, Trường Đại học Adelaide (theo số H-2016-147). Nếu anh/chị có câu hỏi hay vấn đề thắc mắc nào về các lĩnh vực tham gia của nh/chị trong đề tài nghiên cứu, hoặc muốn phàn nàn hay phản ánh gì về đề tài nghiên cứu, hãy liên lạc với giáo viên hướng dẫn chính của tôi, Tiến sỹ Julia Miller. Nếu anh/chị muốn trao đổi với 1 người độc lập về những phàn nàn của anh/chị, hãy liên lạc với Thư ký của Ủy ban Đạo đức trong Nghiên cứu Con người theo số điện thoại +61 8 8313 6028 hoặc gửi thư tới địa chỉ email hrec@adelaide.edu.au.Ý kiến phản ánh hay phàn nàn của anh/chị sẽ được xem xét và giải quyết triệt để. Kết quả giải quyết sẽ được thông báo tới anh/chị. Nếu tôi muốn tham gia, tôi phải làm gì? Nếu anh/chị muốn tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu thì hãy ký vào bản đồng ý tham gia đề tài mà đã được cung cấp và gửi lại cho người đại diện của tôi. Tôi xin chân thành cảm ơn Trần Thị Ngọc Hà Julia Miller Edward Palmer John Willison 370 Appendix F: Consent forms Appendix F1: Consent form for teachers Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) CONSENT FORM 1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research project: Title: English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese higher education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices. Ethics Approval Number: H-2016-147 2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. My consent is given freely. 3. Although I understand the purpose of the research project it has also been explained that involvement may not be of any benefit to me. 4. I have been informed that, while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified and my personal results will not be divulged. 5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time. 6. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. Yes No 7. I am aware that if I do not agree for research on this project to be published in the future , I can decline to participate in the project 8. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the attached Information Sheet. Participant to complete: 371 Name: _____________________ Signature: _______________________ Date: _______________________ Researcher/Witness to complete: I have described the nature of the research to ____________________________________________________________________ (print name of participant) and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation. Signature: __________________ Position: _________________________ Date: _______________________ 372 Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) BẢN ĐỒNG Ý THAM GIA ĐỀ TÀI NGHIÊN CỨU 1. Tôi đã đọc bản thông tin kèm theo và đồng ý tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu sau: Tên đề tài: Tính tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên đại học không chuyên ở Việt nam: Những yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên Ethics Approval Number: H-2016-147 2. Tôi đã được nghiên cứu sinh đã giải thích đẩy đủ và cặn kẽ về đề tài nghiên cứu. Sự đồng ý của tôi là hoàn toàn tự nguyện. 3. Mặc dù tôi hiểu mục đích của đề tài nghiên cứu, nhưng tôi cũng vẫn được giải thích cụ thể rằng việc tham gia vào nghiên cứu có thể sẽ không mang lại lợi ích gì cho tôi. 4. Tôi đã được thông báo rằng, khi số liệu thu thập được có thể được công bố, tên tôi và các thông tin cá nhân của tôi cũng sẽ không bị tiết lộ. 5. Tôi biết rằng tôi có thể dừng tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu bất kỳ lúc nào 6. Tôi đồng ý để các cuộc phỏng vấn được ghi âm. Có Không 7. Tôi nhận thức được rằng nếu tôi không đồng ý để các thông tin trong nghiên cứu này được xuất bản trong tương lai, thì tôi có thể từ chối tham gia vào dự án này 8. Tôi biết rằng mình nên giữ một bản tham gia đồng ý tham gia đề tài nghiên cứu, sau khi đã được hoàn thành, và một bản thông tin dành cho khách thể nghiên cứu. Phần dành cho khách thể nghiên cứu: Tên: _______________________ Chữ ký: _________________________ Ngày: _______________________ Nghiên cứu sinh/ Người làm chứng 373 Tôi đã miêu tả bản chất của đề tài nghiên cứu cho ___________________________________ (in tên của khách thể nghiên cứu) và tôi nghĩ cô ấy/ anh ấy đã hiểu rõ những gì tôi giải thích. Chữ ký: ____________________ Chức danh: ______________________ Ngày:_____________ 374 Appendix F2: Consent form for observed students Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) CONSENT FORM 1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research project: Title: English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese higher education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices. Ethics Approval Number: H-2016-147 2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. My consent is given freely. 3. I have been given the opportunity to have a member of my family or a friend present while the project was explained to me. 4. Although I understand the purpose of the research project it has also been explained that involvement may not be of any benefit to me. 5. I have been informed that, while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified and my personal results will not be divulged. 6. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and that this will not affect my study at the University now or in the future. 7. I agree to be observed in the class. Yes No 8. I am aware that if I do not agree for research on this project to be published in the future, I can decline to participate in the project. 9. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the attached Information Sheet. Participant to complete: 375 Name: _____________________ Signature: _______________________ Date: _______________________ Researcher/Witness to complete: I have described the nature of the research to ____________________________________________________________________ (print name of participant) and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation. Signature: __________________ Position: _________________________ Date: _______________________ 376 Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) BẢN ĐỒNG Ý THAM GIA ĐỀ TÀI NGHIÊN CỨU (Dành cho sinh viên được quan sát) 1. Tôi đã được đọc bản thông tin kèm theo và đồng ý tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu sau: Tên đề tài: Tính tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên đại học không chuyên ở Việt nam: Những yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên Ethics Approval Number: H-2016-147 2. Tôi đã được nghiên cứu sinh đã giải thích đẩy đủ và cặn kẽ về đề tài nghiên cứu. Sự đồng ý của tôi là hoàn toàn tự nguyện. 3. Gia đình và bạn bè tôi được tạo điều kiện có mặt khi tôi được giải thích về đề tài nghiên cứu 4. Mặc dù tôi hiểu mục đích của đề tài nghiên cứu, nhưng tôi cũng vẫn được giải thích cụ thể rằng việc tham gia vào nghiên cứu có thể sẽ không mang lại lợi ích gì cho tôi. 5. Tôi đã được thông báo rằng, khi số liệu thu thập được có thể được công bố, tên tôi và các thông tin cá nhân của tôi cũng sẽ không bị tiết lộ. 6. Tôi biết rằng tôi có thể dừng tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu bất kỳ lúc nào 7. Tôi đồng ý để người thực hiện đề tài quan sát các hành vi của tôi ở trên lớp. Có Không 8. Tôi nhận thức rõ rằng nếu tôi không đồng ý để các thông tin trong nghiên cứu này được xuất bản trong tương lai, thì tôi có quyền từ chối tham gia vào dự án. 9. Tôi biết rằng mình nên giữ một bản tham gia đồng ý và đề tài nghiên cứu, sau khi đã được hoàn thành, và một bản thông tin dành cho khách thể nghiên cứu. 377 Phần dành cho khách thể nghiên cứu: Tên: _______________________ Chữ ký: _________________________ Ngày: _______________________ Nghiên cứu sinh/ Người làm chứng Tôi đã miêu tả bản chất của đề tài nghiên cứu cho ___________________________________ (in tên của khách thể nghiên cứu) và tôi nghĩ cô ấy/ anh ấy đã hiểu rõ những gì tôi giải thích. Chữ ký: ____________________ Chức danh: ______________________ Ngày:_____________ 378 Appendix F3: Consent form for interviewed students Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) CONSENT FORM 1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research project: Title: English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese higher education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices. Ethics Approval Number: H-2016-147 2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. My consent is given freely. 3. I have been given the opportunity to have a member of my family or a friend present while the project was explained to me. 4. Although I understand the purpose of the research project it has also been explained that involvement may not be of any benefit to me. 5. I have been informed that, while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified and my personal results will not be divulged. 6. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and that this will not affect my study at the University now or in the future. 7. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. Yes No 8. I am aware that if I do not agree for research on this project to be published in the future, I can decline to participate in the project. 9. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the attached Information Sheet. 379 Participant to complete: Name: _____________________ Signature: _______________________ Date: _______________________ Researcher/Witness to complete: I have described the nature of the research to ____________________________________________________________________ (print name of participant) and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation. Signature: __________________ Position: _________________________ Date: _______________________ 380 Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) BẢN ĐỒNG Ý THAM GIA ĐỀ TÀI NGHIÊN CỨU (dành cho sinh viên được phỏng vấn) 1. Tôi đã được đọc bản thông tin kèm theo và đồng ý tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu sau: Tên đề tài: Tính tự chủ trong việc học tiếng Anh của sinh viên đại học không chuyên ở Việt nam: Những yếu tố thúc đẩy và cản trở nảy sinh trong các hoạt động kiểm tra đánh giá của giáo viên Ethics Approval Number: H-2016-147 2. Tôi đã được nghiên cứu sinh đã giải thích đẩy đủ và cặn kẽ về đề tài nghiên cứu. Sự đồng ý của tôi là hoàn toàn tự nguyện. 3. Gia đình và bạn bè tôi được tạo điều kiện có mặt khi tôi được giải thích về đề tài nghiên cứu 4. Mặc dù tôi hiểu mục đích của đề tài nghiên cứu, nhưng tôi cũng vẫn được giải thích cụ thể rằng việc tham gia vào nghiên cứu có thể sẽ không mang lại lợi ích gì cho tôi. 5. Tôi đã được thông báo rằng, khi số liệu thu thập được có thể được công bố, tên tôi và các thông tin cá nhân của tôi cũng sẽ không bị tiết lộ. 6. Tôi biết rằng tôi có thể dừng tham gia vào đề tài nghiên cứu bất kỳ lúc nào 7. Tôi đồng ý để các cuộc phỏng vấn được ghi âm. Có Không 8. Tôi nhận thức được rằng nếu tôi không đồng ý để các thông tin trong nghiên cứu này được xuất bản trong tương lai, thì tôi có quyền từ chối tham gia vào dự án 9. Tôi biết rằng mình nên giữ một bản tham gia đồng ý và đề tài nghiên cứu, sau khi đã được hoàn thành, và một bản thông tin dành cho khách thể nghiên cứu. Phần dành cho khách thể nghiên cứu: 381 Tên: _______________________ Chữ ký: _________________________ Ngày: _______________________ Nghiên cứu sinh/ Người làm chứng Tôi đã miêu tả bản chất của đề tài nghiên cứu cho ___________________________________ (in tên của khách thể nghiên cứu) và tôi nghĩ cô ấy/ anh ấy đã hiểu rõ những gì tôi giải thích. Chữ ký: ____________________ Chức danh: ______________________ Ngày:_____________ 382 Appendix G: Complaint forms The University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) This document is for people who are participants in a research project. CONTACTS FOR INFORMATION ON PROJECT AND INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE The following study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee: Project Title: English language learner autonomy in the Vietnamese higher education context: Enabling factors and barriers arising from assessment practices. Approval Number: H-2016-147 The Human Research Ethics Committee monitors all the research projects which it has approved. The committee considers it important that people participating in approved projects have an independent and confidential reporting mechanism which they can use if they have any worries or complaints about that research. This research project will be conducted according to the NHMRC National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (see http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/e72syn.htm) 383 1. If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you should consult the project co-ordinator: Name: Dr Julia Miller Phone: +61 8 8313 4721 Email: julia.miller@adelaide.edu.au 2. If you wish to discuss with an independent person matters related to:  making a complaint, or  raising concerns on the conduct of the project, or  the University policy on research involving human participants, or  your rights as a participant, contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on phone (08) 8313 6028 or by email to hrec@adelaide.edu.au 384 Appendix H: Sample assessment grid for CEFR A2 test Listening Speaking Reading Writing Spoken interaction Spoken production A2 I can understand phrases and the highest frequency vocabulary related to areas of most immediate personal relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, shopping, local areas, and employment). I can catch the main point in short, clear simple massages and announcements I can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar topics and activities. I can handle very short social exchanges, ever though I can't usually understand enough to keep the conversation going myself I can use a series of phrases and sentences to describe in simple term my family and other people, living conditions, my educational background and my present or most recent job I can read very short and simple texts. I can find specific and predictable information in simple everyday materials such as advertisements, prospectuses, menus, and timetables and I can understand short simple personal letter. I can write short and simple notes and massages relating to matters in areas of immediate need. I can write very simple personal letter. For example, thanking someone for something. 385 Appendix I: Sample of assessment grid for listening skill in KNLNNVN (Vietnam Framework of Reference for English) A2 test A2 Kỹ năng nghe Đặc tả tổng quát (general descriptors) Có thể hiểu những cụm từ và cách diễn đạt liên quan tới nhu cầu thiêt yếu hàng ngày (về gia đình, bản thân, mua sắm, nơi ở, học tập và làm việc...) khi được diễn đạt chậm và rõ ràng (can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, shopping, local geography, employment) Có thể hiểu được ý chính trong các giao dịch quen thuộc hàng ngày khi được diễn đạt chậm và rõ ràng (Can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters) Nghe hội thoại giữa người bản ngữ hay những người không trực tiếp đối thoại (listen to dialogues between native speakers or nondirect conversations) Có thể xác định được chủ đề của các hội thoại diễn ra chậm và rõ ràng (can determine the topic of the clear and slow spoken dialogues) Nghe trình bày và hội thoại Không có đặc tả tương ứng (no descriptors) Nghe thông báo hướng dẫn (listen to announcements and instructions) Có thể hiểu được ý chính trong các thông báo hay tin nhắn thoại ngắn, rõ ràng, đơn giản (can understand main ideas in short and clear announcements or voicemails) Có thể hiểu được những hướng dẫn chỉ đường, sủ dụng phương tiện giao thông công cộng đơn giản (can understand directions or simple instructions to use public transforts) Nghe đài và xem truyền hình (listen to the radio and watch TV) có thể xác định thông tin chính của các bản tin trên đài và truyền hình tường thuật các sự kiện, tai nạn... (Can determine main ideas on radio or TV news describing events, accidents etc.)", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E The Problem of Mind-Body Dichotomy: A Critique of the Cartesian Approach John Gabriel Mendie | Udofia, Stephen Nwanaokuo 1P.hD Candidate, Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Cross River State. 2 Department of Philosophy, University Of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. Abstract: The mind-body problem is a perennial philosophical problem that seeks to uncover the relationship or causal interaction that exists between the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of the human person. It thrives under the assumption that the human person is made up of two distinct entities, that is, mind and body, which explains their assumed causal relation. As attractive as this may seem, not all philosophers agree to this feigned idea of interaction and bifurcation of the human person. One philosopher of note, who sorts to address this problem in the 17th century, is René Descartes. For Descartes, minds and bodies are distinct kinds of substance, where bodies are spatially extended substances (a res extensa) and minds are unexpended substances characterised primarily by thought (a res cogitans). But, if minds and bodies are radically dissimilar, how could they causally interact? This paper therefore attempts to examine the philosophical foundations of Cartesian dualism. It also articulates the major arguments adopted by Descartes through his methodic doubts to address the mindbody problem. The paper concludes by highlighting some fundamental criticisms of Cartesian Interactionism in the light of recent trends in parapsychology and neuro-scientific research. Keywords: Human Person, Mind-Body Problem, Cartesian Interactionism, Parapsychology, Neuroscience INTRODUCTION Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the French born mathematician turned philosopher, was chiefly concerned with the disharmony that pervaded the house of philosophy. This disharmony, to him, unlike in the exact sciences of physics, geometry and mathematics (his original background), gave audience to skepticism to hold sway over every position philosophers had hitherto advanced even before his arrival to the scenery of philosophical discourse. Descartes' diagnosis of the skeptical challenge was that the skeptical confront was apparently unassailable, because prior philosophies had been anchored on shaky foundations. If this is the case, it should follow, for Descartes that if a solid foundation can be found upon which an epistemological edifice can be erected, then the arguments of the skeptics will no longer hold any water. Upon critical reflections, and having employed the methodic doubt as his intrumentum laborat (working tool) Descartes concluded that what this indubitable foundation upon which a philosophy immune from skepticism can be built on, is the ego or mind. Thus, the fact that one is involved in a process of doubt, cannot be logically doubted. The certainty of the doubting and the doubter is, therefore, self-evident. The mind which is effecting this self-evident activity and all beliefs emanating from it, therefore, becomes apodictic and self-evidently justified.iFrom the indubitability of the subsistence of the mind, 45 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) Descartes was able, in a manner akin to the mathematical sciences, to deduce the existence of the physical world which he believes interact with the mentalistic world of the mind. It is this aspect of the Cartesian philosophical project of mind-body interaction that this paper seeks to appraise. Before cutting into the chase, it will be apposite to commence our discourse with a brief review of the idea of personhood. ON THE ONTOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON IN TRADITIONAL (WESTERN) PHILOSOPHY Ontology, or the study of being qua being, is the aspect of metaphysics that critically reflects on that which exists in reality. The word ontology is used to refer to philosophical investigation of existence, or being. Such investigation may be directed towards the concept of being, asking what 'being' means or what it is for something to exist; it may also be concerned with the question 'what exists?', or 'what general sort of things are there?' It is common to speak of a philosopher's ontology, meaning the kind of thing they take to exist, or the ontology of a theory, that is, the things that would have to exist for that theory to be true. ii With respect to the 'human person', philosophers have been concerned about putting rational arguments forward in support of their respective views to what really constitutes human nature, as opposed to illusions and myths. These concerted efforts have yielded some relevant ontological questions such as: What is a 'person' made up of? Is a person a physico-chemical entity amenable to pure scientific analysis? Isa person a purely spiritual or physical entity, or a union of both spiritual and physical substances? A plethora of answers have been put forward by philosophers down the ages and across cultures to attempt these questions. Plato, for instance, argues for a dualistic understanding of human nature. For him, a person is made up of soul and body. The soul is in the body not like form in matter, but as a mover in a mobile body. The soul is to the body what a captain is to a ship, that is, the captain governs the ship, but the captain is a being that is ontologically distinct from the ship and can exist when not on the ship. Hence, Plato was an uncompromising spiritualist for he reduced human nature to a purely spiritual entity.iiiThis explains why he had often been charged with the error of existence for relegating and excluding matter from the economy of existence.Aristotle argues for a rather complementary position by positing that, although human nature is made up of a subsisting soul (form) and a corruptible body (matter), the soul is the life-giving principle (primum principiumvitae) of the body and the body is the principle of individuation through which the soul achieves its basic function of intellection. Both components are substantially and hypostatically united to make up a person. ivThomas Aquinas, borrowing from Aristotle, also argues for a hylemorphic understanding of the human person. In his view, a person is substantially a union of soul (μορφή) and body (υλή), which though distinct are not separate.v On his part, David Hume believes thatspiritual and material substances are evenly inconceivable. His idea of personhood or human nature is summed up in his bundle theory, which states that, the mind is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other in an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.vi Thus, the human person is ipso facto nothing but a bundle of perceptions. In contemporary time, a laboratory analysis of a person's anatomy will only reveal that a person is nothing other than a physico-chemical entity. If this is the case, how come our ordinary language seems to endorse a contrary view that there is something else – fundamentally 46 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) different from physico-chemical properties – that make us up, say spirit, mind, an ego or conscious-self that is not amenable to scientific and laboratory analysis? This ordinary language refutation of the position that we are merely physico-chemical entities is also endorsed by religion with its attendant teachings of 'after-life', God, angels, and so on. The physico-chemical ontology of the human person, among many other criticisms, seems to imply that a human person is no different from other physical entities in nature and hence is amenable to the mechanical laws of nature. If man is amenable to the mechanistic and, consequently, 'deterministic' laws of nature, then there is no 'freewill' basis for his or her moral actions and choices. Other objections against the physico-chemical ontology of the human person is that of the data of phenomena like 'Extra Sensory Perception', 'magic', 'Psycho-kinesis', 'Telepathy', 'Witchcraft', and so on, that have been suggested by scholars and researchers like Albert Mosleyvii and Sophie Oluwole,viii among a host of many others. In light of the preceding, if it is true that these phenomena subsist then the human person is not only a physico-chemical entity. Before we conclude our discussion in this part of the essay, it is crucial to note that \"the view that the human person is essentially a physico-chemical entity (with diverse formulations) is a version of materialistic monism. Another version of such formulations is that of idealistic monism. This latter view of personhood holds that man, essentially, is only a spiritual entity. We need not rehearse the difficulty in maintaining a view like this, since it apparently denies that we have no physical bodies – and by extension the corporeal world is unreal. Interestingly, one may ask, where René Descartes fits into all these, taking to mind his bent towards a dualistic ontology. In what follows, the paper, attempts this question with a brief retrieval of the central arguments of Descartes'ontology of the human person. DESCARTES' ONTOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON: A RETRIEVAL OF THE CENTRAL ARGUMENTS Without prejudice to the title of this section, let us quickly bear inmind that throughout the Meditations, Descartes' primary concern is epistemology, so he never stops tinkering with his theory of knowledge. As such, in the final three meditations, he moves from the epistemological problem of certainty to metaphysical questions about reality. These include the existence of God, the existence of the physical world, and the mind-body relationship. ixIt follows from the above that the Cartesian ontology of the human person can only be understood if we first discussed briefly, his theory of knowledge. Descartes, it will be recalled, had commenced his philosophical career with his disillusionment that there was no certain knowledge in the discipline. But as an 'epistemic optimist', he was not merely content to accept this apparent conclusion. He thought it will be prudent to 'sift' every piece of 'knowledge' he had hitherto acquired before he will affirm this pessimistic conclusion that knowledge was impossible. To perform this pretty onerous task of sifting all his former beliefs, Descartes chose to employ the attitude of the skeptics – those who deny that objective knowledge of reality (in any guise) is impossible. This attitude has been called, by commentators, the methodic doubt. While employing this 'methodic doubt', Descartes concludes, first, that all his former beliefs that derive from common sense experience, cannot provide him with certain knowledge on two grounds: one, sense experience often deceive us (optical illusions, for example).According to him, is it not \"prudent never to trust completely those who have 47 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) deceived us even once?\"x Besides this, even if we seem so sure of ourselves as being conscious beings, Descartes is quick to remind us of the sheer resemblance of dream and 'real life.' In light of this fact, he rhetorically queries us again: how do we know for certain that this so-called present 'real life' is not a long dream from which we might one day wake up from? Second, and lastly, Descartes avers that the seemingly apodictic proofs and conclusions of the mathematical sciences are not immune from doubt. His justification for this rather startling supposition is that it is not impossible, logically speaking, to imagine that an evilgenius has hitherto been feeding us with perpetual phantasmagoria about the 'truths' of our mathematical conclusions. But, are all things then uncertain, Descartes wonders? Descartes' answer to this question is, No. To him, even if all things are uncertain, the 'subject' behind this 'doubting' (or thinking) must be real, certain. This 'I' or Ego that doubts (thinks) must, therefore, exist – cogito ego sum, simpliciter! In an apparent reversal of the denial that there was no certain belief, Descartes now maintains that there is at least one certain belief – that is, the 'I' or 'Ego' or 'Mind' which is responsible for this self-evident activity of doubting. To Descartes, therefore, \"even though there may be a deceiver of some sort who bends all his effort to keep me perpetually deceived, there can be no slightest doubt that I exist.\"xi Like the rationalists before him, Descartes, having gotten this indubitable knowledge of the subsistence of his mind, subsequently erects a knowledge edifice on it. His 'deduction' of other apodictic beliefs, like the physical world and God, from the indubitable subsistence of his mind, simultaneously represents his position on the ontology of the human person. To this, we now turn our beam in the subsequent paragraphs. What encapsulates Descartes' ontology primarily is his dualistic view of the human person. This is clear in his avowal that in him is found an \"intelligence\" whose nature was distinct from his body. He writes: I find in myself faculties employing modes of thinking peculiar to themselves, to wit, the faculties of imagination and feeling, which I can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a complete being; while, on the other hand, they cannot be so conceived apart from me that is, without an intelligent substance in which they reside...I observe also in me some other faculties such as that of change of position, if it be true that they exist, they must be attached to some corporeal or extended substance, and not to an intelligent substance. There is certainly further in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible things, but this would be useless to me seeing that it does not presuppose thought. It is thus necessarily the case that this faculty resides in some substance different from me. And this substance is either a body, that is, a corporeal nature...xii As expressed above, we can draw a distinction between the body and mind by expounding their characteristics in the aforementioned enunciation. Body, for Descartes would be a substance characterized primarily by extension; defined by a certain figure; can be confined in a certain place; can be perceived either by touch, by sight, by hearing, by taste, or by smell; and can be moved in many ways by something foreign to it. While Mind, would be a 48 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) substance characterised primarily by Thought. With this in mind, it would be sufficient to say that Descartes considered mind and body as two distinct substances. In view of this submission, three quintessential questions can be raised regarding Descartes' ontology: 1. If the body is a material substance or entity with extension as its essential feature, and the mind is a substance too, with thought as its own essence, then, how can interaction, that is, the \"union\" and \"intermingling,\" between such ontologically different entities occur? If mind is unextended and matter is extended, how do they interact? 2. The second question follows directly from the first: where does this interaction take place, even if the possibility of interaction was to be valid? 3. A third question rests on the supposition of substance as defined by Descartes; where Descartes understood substance to be \"nothing other than anything which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence.\"xiii By this definition, can we strictly call mind and body substances contrary to Descartes' aboriginal expression? The notion of mind occupies a conspicuous stead in Descartes' ontology of the human person. The mind is a substance in which thought immediately resides. Descartes preferred the word mind to soul on the ground that he saw the latter as not only ambiguous but as often applied to something corporeal.xiv The mind however is a thing that thinks; an intelligence, intellect or reason. It is also the \"first actuality\" or \"the principal form of man\" which must be understood to apply only in virtue of which we think. Although Descartes demeans the word soul, we still see an interchangeable use of it in reference to the intrinsic principle of thought in the human being (mind). Apart from thoughts, nothing else can be attributed to the soul. There are two principal kinds of thought: actions of the soul on one hand, and its passions, on the other. Of the first kind, Descartes calls volitions, considering that we experience them as proceeding directly from our soul and as seeming to depend on it alone. The passions constitute those various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us. They are called passions judging from the view that it is often not our souls that make them as they are, but in turn receives them from the things that are represented by them. xv A further division of the volition gives us the first part, those which consist of the actions of the soul which terminate in the soul itself, while the other consists in those actions which terminate in the body, as in locomotion.xvi In Descartes, there is the power of the soul with respect to the body and the power of the soul, with respect to its passions. The former, within the limits of volition is strictly within the power of the soul, and can only be changed indirectly by the body. The latter are absolutely dependent on the actions which produce them, and can be changed by the soul only indirectly, except when it is itself the cause.xvii Descartes goes further to distinguish between two faculties or principal properties of the soul, namely: the perception of the intellect (the act of sensory perception, imagination and pure understanding) and the determination of the will (desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt).xviii In his argument for immortality of the soul, Descartes maintains that since the mind is distinct from the body, and since the human soul is in its nature per se entirely independent of the body, it is consequently immortal and incorruptible.xix Rebuffing the arguments of some ancient philosophers about the plurality of souls in human beings, Descartes argues that there is only one soul in human beings, the rational soul; for no action can be reckoned human, unless they depend on reason. The vegetative power 49 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) and the power of moving the body, which are called the vegetative and sensory souls in plants and animals, exist also in human beings; but in the case of human beings, they should not be called souls because they are not the first principle of their actions, and they belong to a totally different genus from the rational soul.xxWith this argument in mind, Descartes affirms that the essence of man is mind (thoughts). He writes: \"I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my essence excepting that I know no other thing which pertains to my essence. I do not admit in myself anything but mind, therefore, I am a thing that thinks or a thing that has in itself the faculty of thinking.\"xxi Descartes' distrust therefore covers everything, including his own body, an entirely different substance. Since he has already defined that he is, a thinking thing, he therefore finds it necessary to reject other aspects of his perceived existence to add up to his thesis: Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore, I am). From the foregoing, it is clear that the essence of man for Descartes is mind; this indicates a systematic rejection of the body and its attributes in the philosophical corpus of Descartes. Descartes further writes, \"of these things(the body and its attributes), I found none of which I can say that it pertains to me. I am, I exist, that is certain. If I ceased entirely to think, I should likewise cease altogether to exist, hence to speak accurately, I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul or an understanding or a reason. I am however a real thing and really exist; a thing that thinks.\"xxiiThis implies that all those that relate to the nature of body are nothing but dreams (and chimeras) and there is no argument for him, which the existence of the body can be necessarily deduced. Having espoused the nature of the mind, the essence of man, the place of matter and other related themes in his ontology, the onus was on Descartes to explain the causal relationship or interaction of mind and body. To this, he writes: \"I contented myself with supposing that God formed the body of man altogether like ours, in the outward figure of its members as well as in the interior conformation of its organs, without making use of any matter other than that which I had described...(therefore) God created a rational soul and united it to the body in a particular manner.\"xxiiiThis union or interaction takes place in what Descartes calls the seat of interaction: the pineal gland. This gland corresponds to his description of the existence of, a small gland in the brain where the soul exercises its functions more particularly than in the other parts of the body. What influenced Descartes' choice was his convictions via observation, that all the other parts of our brain, except the pineal gland, are double, as also are all the other organs of our external sense.xxiv We can easily understand that images or other impressions are unified in this gland by means of the animal spirits xxv which fill the cavities of the brain. But they cannot exist in this way in any other place in the body, except as a result of being in its gland. As seen ex post facto, despite the separate, irreducible, subsistence of mind and body, Descartes believes that they causally affect or causally interact with each other. The mind wills to sing and the mouth necessarily carries out the order. Similarly, the body, say nostrils, perceives the aroma of scrambled eggs and bread, and the mind starts to feel hungry, and so on. Essentially, \"my mind is capable of putting my body into motion and vice versa.\"xxvi The obvious consequence of this position, which Descartes himself saw, is to ask exactly how an unextended, non-physical, mind can 'affect' (or 'interact' with) an extended, physical, body. And granted that they interact, exactly where is the location of this alleged interaction? Descartes' answer that the pineal gland, which is located at the base of the brain (effectively explains this how and where questions of interaction) – provokes further problems. Let us 50 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) suspend our critique of the Cartesian thesis of mind-body interaction till the next section of our discourse. In the interim, suffice it to say that the rationale behind Descartes' position on the of the human person is his background as a persona of faith (religion) and science. His catholic background privileges the doctrines of 'after-life' and freedom of the will, while his scientific background thrives on the assumption that all inanimate objects in the physical world (including man's body) follow a deterministic course. It was in a bid to reconcile these counter theses, which he found quite persuasive, that Descartes advanced his interactionist thesis of mind-body relationship. THE CARTESIAN PROJECT OF MIND-BODY INTERACTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS The principal merit that can be adduced in favor of the Cartesian interactionist theory of psycho-physical dualism which our former analysis seems to have thrown up is that it preserves the notion of 'freewill (volition)' upon which the twin worlds of ethical theorizing and religious beliefs are founded. It also presents supplementary knowledge on the ontological status of the mind and its functional attributes. Beyond this, however, the theory throws up a plethora of insuperable difficulties. As earlier intimated, Descartes' position that mind-body interaction takes place in the 'pineal gland' is problematic. It is asked: is the pineal gland a physical or non-physical thing? If it is the former, then exactly how does a non-physical mind 'act' on it, and vice versa? Till date, this problem assails the staunchest protagonist of the view of Descartes. Until Descartes, or his adherents are able to show us \"how a non-spatial (unextended) substance, which cannot thereby be in motion, can cause the motion of an extended substance, or how motions in our bodies can cause changes in consciousness,\"xxvii his views will still be clouded in a penumbra of irreconcilable difficulties. On his part, Gilbert Ryle, writing in the 20th century, gave a sustained criticism of the Cartesian theory of interactionism. As a prelude to his own favored theory of mind which has been tagged Logical Behaviorism, Ryle took it as a necessary condition, the task of dismantling the Cartesian epistemological cum metaphysical edifice. According to Ryle, the Cartesian theory of mind-body interaction, which he calls the official doctrine, is guilty of a special charge, namely, the 'Category Mistake.' In submitting that the human mind is like a 'ghost in a machine,' Descartes, Ryle thinks, painted a fundamentally flawed picture of the human person because he \"represents the fact of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another.\" xxviii Hence: It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice that there exist minds and to say...that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'colored' or 'sexed.' They indicate two different senses of 'exist,' somewhat as rising has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hopes are rising', and 'the average age of death is rising.xxix To Ryle, the mind is not to be construed in terms of an occult entity but, rather, is to be gleaned from the actual 'behaviors' of a person. \"The cleverness of the clown\", Ryle states, \"may be exhibited in his tripping and tumbling.\"xxxAgainst Ryle's criticism of Cartesian interactionism, Olatunji Oyeshile argues that, \"it is... doubtful whether Ryle has succeeded in 51 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) explaining the mind-body relationship as well as the ontological status of the mind.\" xxxi The doubt Oyeshile is speaking of here, derives from the fact that Ryle's Behaviorist program of mind, fails to square with the data of acting or mimicry and other 'make believe' behaviors. Aside from Ryle's criticism of Cartesian interactionism above, there are pockets of other difficulties to note. For instance, some critics of Cartesian interactionism think its bifurcation of the human person into two parts (mental and physical) violates Ockham's principle of parsimony according to which we are forbidden from the postulation of many entities when it is unnecessary to do so.xxxii Also, it has been pointed out that Cartesian interactionsim apparently violates the principle of conservation of energy. According to this view, energy ought to be lost if indeed a bodily event produces (by way of an 'interaction') mental effects. Since there has been no report of any depletion in the amount of energy in the universe, according to energy scientists, it must follow that no such interactions take place.xxxiii Much worse for Descartes is his presumption that apodictic beliefs are derivable. Richard Rortyxxxiv and W.V.O. Quine,xxxv amongothers, dismiss Descartes' quest for an infallible epistemology as pseudo quest, for it ignores the facticity of man's fallibility. Cartesian interactionist thesis, a product of the 'infallible notion of mind,' seems to be an exercise in futility. This is the case because: It fails to properly investigate the essence of the whole foundationalist programme which is to argue against the fallibilists. Since man is fundamentally a fallible being, it can be very difficult to seek to establish that man can have an infallible idea (say, the infallible idea off an apodictic mind).xxxvi Richard Rorty, writing in his hugely influential work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature(1979) also rejected Descartes' theory of mind-body interaction. According to him, \"... the conception of the 'mind' as a separate substance in which mental processes are located, far from being a concept based on direct experience, is an 'invention' of Descartes, which has misled philosophers since his time.\"xxxvii In 'deconstructing' Cartesian interactionism, Rorty postulates a hypothetical world, \"antipodea\" whose inhabitants have no concept of mind. These antipodeans, according to Rorty, express their mentalistic feelings by referring, instead, to the neural states of their brains and central nervous system (CNS). xxxviii Of course, I am not unaware of the many criticisms that have been leveled against Rorty's ideas here. But what is worth stressing, with respect to our purposes in this essay, is that Rorty rejects Cartesian psycho-physical dualism and also clearly favors the scientific worldview of personhood. The 'problem of other minds', or solipsism, is another criticism that has been leveled against Cartesian interactionsim. According to advocatesof this criticism, one immediate consequence of Descartes' theory is that one can only have knowledge of oneself or selfenclosed world, while the external world and other people (or minds) being currently figments of imagination. If Descartes' position is rightly interpreted as solipsism, then the question that necessarily emanates from this is: Do not other persons also exist in the sense Descartes exist? If they do exist, then it follows that they too, like Descartes, have minds. If this is the case, then a more insuperable question that inevitably arises from this answer is: What are the possibilities of our having knowledge of other minds in the same way in which we also have knowledge of our own mind? This 'problem of other minds' that Cartesian interactionism engenders is not merely about whether other persons have minds but, more technically, about 52 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) how we know that they do have minds. As broached by J.L. Austin, \"I may say I believe other minds exist but that does not mean that I know them all. (This is because) in philosophical discourse the existence of your alleged beliefs is not challenged, but the existence of your alleged knowledge is challenged.\"xxxix It is important to note that neither René Descartes nor his protagonists have been able to put forward adequate answers to these difficulties. Their various theories, for example the Analogical, Linguistic and Intuitive theories are all riddled with theoretical difficulties and as a result have made this problem, till date, seemingly unassailable.xl One last criticism of Descartes' theory of mind-body interaction that is worthy of note has been raised by Gabriel Vacariu. Vacariu thinks that \"even if most people consider, ontologically, the mind as a physical entity, many of them do not admit the epistemological reduction of the mind to the brain.\"xli He argues that the 'error' of these ('reductionist') researchers derive from their belief in a mono-ontological world (or 'unicorn' world, as he calls it) when the reality is actually that of a 'multiverse' ontological world. In this erroneous belief in the subsistence of a 'unicorn' world, argues Vacariu, is both Descartes and (his chief opponents) cognitive neuroscientists. On the basis of Vacariu's sweeping rejection of the views of modern science, as well as Cartesian interactionism, he advances the view that the phenomena of 'mind' and 'body' (or brain) belong to 'Epistemologically Different Worlds' (EDWs). From the EDWs' perspective, states Vacariu, the phenomena of mind and brain exist separately and canonly be apprehended (or known) in different terms. The one is, internal and can only be had through 'representation,' whereas the other can be observed through the perceptual or laboratory mechanisms of positron emission tomography (PET), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI). Given this reality, therefore: It is not possible to locate epistemologically different ontological substances within the same world (as Descartes wanted). In this case, the position of elements must be preserved: new conditions of observation require new entities within the new worlds, but what kind of worlds? It is not about ontological, many, multiverse or possible worlds, but about \"epistemological different worlds\" (EDWs).xlii To this philosopher, therefore, the mind-body problem, an 'error' from Cartesian interactionism, is a pseudo-problem. So, is cognitive neuroscience (including psychology, psychiatry, and so on), as well as all versions of identity/materialistic theories (for example, Central State Materialism, Logical Behaviorism, Brain Process materialism, and so on). Mental states could only correspond to entities that belong to other EDWs; they are not identical, produced or supervene on states of other hyperontological status. With the EDWs perspective, we have to move from ontological and/or epistemological frameworks in analyzing different classes of entities to a hyperontological framework. Thus, the EDWs perspective rejects the Cartesian dualism, the identity theory and all the nonreductionist approaches.xliiiOther traditional theories that can also be pitched against Cartesian interactionismand its cognates includes: 'Psycho-physical Parallelism,'xliv'Panpyschism'xlv 'Actualism (phenomenism),'xlvi'Agnosticism'xlvii'Epiphenomenalism','Occasionalism' and 'Pre-established Harmony.' We will not discuss these positions in detail in this paper. Our justification for this deliberate desert is because, they all suffer, more or less, from the same defects that Descartes' own theory had– especially from the point of view of physicalism. 53 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) PARAPSYCHOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE AND CARTESIAN INTERACTIONIST THEORY OF MIND. Parapsychology is the scientific investigation of paranormal and psychic phenomena including telepathy, clairvoyance, near-death experiences, precognition, psychokinesis, reincarnation, synchronicity, apparitional experiences and other paranormal claims.xlviiiPhilosophers of mind, or parapsychologists, researchers in the allied fields of neuroscience (scientific study of the nervous system) and artificial intelligence (AI), since the last century (and especially the present) have been able to put forward luminous statements of research whose theoretical coherence and experimental qualities now threaten the views of people like Descartes and other so-called 'religious philosophers (of mind).' In this circle of influence are personages like Gilbert Ryle and his theory of 'Logical Behaviorism' (that we earlier considered); J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place and their theory of 'Brain Process Materialism,xlixand David M. Armstrong's 'Central State Materialism.' Others are Jerome Schaffer, Keith Campbell, Herbert Feigl, as well as Alan Turing and F.H. George in the field of artificial intelligence (AI).Interestingly, some of these recent trends, through their theoretical coherence and experimental qualities seem to advance a physicalist outlook to the mind-body problem. Physicalism, simply put, is the position that everything is physical. It is a thesis about the nature of reality. Contemporary philosophers, sometimes refer to physicalism, as expressing the thesis that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. l This could mean that everything, no matter how it appears to us, will ultimately be accounted for physically. In philosophy of mind, 'Identity theory of mind' represents a very strong version of a physicalist account of the mind. According to J.J.C. Smart, the identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain.li As espoused by U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl and J.J.C. Smart, the identity theory of the mind, is sometimes referred to as, brain process materialism, because these philosophers, hold that sensations are identical with brain processes. The theory, denies the existence of any irreducible non-physical property of the mind. U.T. Place, in his Magnum opus, \"Is Consciousness A Brain Process?\"argues that the thesis 'consciousness, is identifiable with certain processes in the brain', and is a reasonable scientific hypothesis. Place, suggested, that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity.liiThree years after Place' article, J.J.C. Smart published an article titled, Sensations and Brain Processes. In this article, Smart, defends Place' position and hopes to put the argument that, 'consciousness is identifiable with brain process', in a more nearly unobjectionable form. His basic claim in the article is that, \"in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process, sensations are nothing over and above brain processes.\" liii The identity theory (Central-State Materialism), as fleshed out by David Armstrong in his \"A Materialist Theory of the Mind\", maintains that mental states, beliefs and desires, are identical with the states of the central nervous system. Armstrong further argues that, if the mind is thought of as 'that, which has mental states,' then we can, on this theory (of centralstate materialism) say, that the mind is simply, the central nervous system, or less accurately but more epigrammatically, the mind is simply the brain.liv Mental states here are identifiable with physico-chemical states of the central nervous system. Suffice it to say here that all these permutations are direct responses to the undoing of previous dualistic (i.e Platonic and 54 GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(2) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/10.5281/zenodo.3463785) Cartesian) attempts to factor out a dependable corpus in the herculean task of unearthing the ontology of human person. CONCLUSION We set out in this paper to discuss the Cartesian approach and contributions to the mind-body problem. In discussing this, the paper critically examined the central arguments of Cartesian interactionism and carefully highlighted some criticisms besetting Descartes' approach. The paper also identified some recent trends in parapsychology and neuroscientific research to stifle the Cartesian project. Admittedly, a relationship among self, mind and body in humans is still not clearly known in philosophy and science because of the absence of germane human data that adequately facilitates an objective explanation. Teachings connected to their relationship in religions have been given in general and subjective terms. Consequently, philosophers and scientists have been investigating to find objective proofs related to their relationship.lv Recent findings in neuroscience, by their physicalist approach, seem to construe the mind-body problem as a pseudo-problem. But, their monistic and materialistic account of human person fails to square with the data of phenomena like precognition (in dreams, for example), out of body experiences, near death experiences, telepathy and many other concerns. Given their inadequacies, Descartes ought to be credited for articulating foundational knowledge on the ontological status of the mind and its functional attributes. Beyond this, neither Descartes nor his detractors can be said to have adequately succeeded in offering an objectively reliable account of the human person. Thus, the project of personhood or the discourse on human nature remains a perennial philosophical mission. Endnotes 55 iKolawole Owolabi, \"Edmund Husserl's Rehabilitation of Cartesian Foundationalism: A Critical Analysis\". In Indian Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXII, No. 1 (January, 1995), pp. 13-14. ii Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1998), p. 6199. iii Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol.1 (New York: A Division of Doubleday & Company, 1962), p. 232 iv Aristotle, De Anima, Translated by Kenelm Foster, Silvester Humphries and Ivo Thomas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951). 430a, 15-25 v Thomas Aquinas, SummaTheologiae, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947). I, q.75, a.2 vi David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Ernest C. Messner. (England: Penguin Books, 1969). Book I, Part IV vii See Albert Mosley, \"The Metaphysics of Magic: Practical and Philosophical Implications\". In Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy, vol. VII, Nos. 1&2 (Jan. & July, 1978), pp. 3-19. viii See Sophie B. Oluwole, \"On the Existence of Witches\". In Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, Nos. 1&2 (Jan. & June, 1978), pp. 20-35 ix William F. Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth publishers, 2002), pp. 232-3. x W.F. Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery, op. cit. p. 230. xi Rene Descartes, \"Meditations on First Philosophy\". In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1985), p. 14. xiiRené Descartes \"Meditations\", in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 190 xiiiRené Descartes, \"Principles of Philosophy\" In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 210 xiv Ibid., p. 115 xv Cf. René Descartes, \"Passions of the soul\" In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 335. xvi Ibid., p.343. xvii Ibid., pp.343-345. xviii Cf. René Descartes, \"Principles of Philosophy\" Op. Cit, p. 204. xix Cf. René Descartes, \"Replies to the Second Objection\" In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 91, 103, 118 xxRené Descartes, \"Reply to Regius\" In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 182 xxi Cf. René Descartes \"Meditations\", Op. Cit., pp.149-157 xxii Ibid., pp.151-152 xxiiiRené Descartes \"Discourse on Method\", in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp.109-110. xxiv Descartes further affirms: \"My view is that this gland is the principal seat of the soul and the place in which all our thoughts are formed. The reason I believe this is that I cannot find any part of the brain except this which (...) is not double. Again, since it is the only solid part of the whole brain which is single, it must necessarily be the seat of the common sense, that is, of thought and consequently of the soul.\" Cf. René Descartes, \"To Mersenne, 24 December, 1640\" In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.162. xxv Animal spirits consists \"of a certain fine wind or rather a very lively and pure flame\", which is found in the blood. This part of the blood without any preparation or alteration except for their separation from the coarser parts and their retention of the extreme rapidity which the heat of the heart has given them, cease to have the form of blood. These spirits enter into the cavities of the brain, passing from there into the pores of its substance and from these pores, into the nerves. Motion in the human body is therefore explained by Descartes with the firing of the animal spirits into the various parts of the body, through the brain. Cf. René Descartes, \"Treatise on Man\" In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.100 xxvi W. Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery, op. cit. p.232. xxvii Roger Scruton, Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy (London: University College Press, 1993), p. 86. xxviii Gibert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson House, 1949), p. 17. xxixIbid. p. 23. xxxIbid. p. 116. xxxi Olatunji Oyeshile, \"The Problem of Mind\". In K.A. Olu-Owolabi (ed.) Issues and Problems in Philosophy (Ibadan: GROVACS Network, 2007), p. 108. xxxiiIbid. p. 109. xxxiiiIbid. p. 107. xxxiv See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). xxxv See W.V.O. Quine, \"Epistemology Naturalized\", op. cit. xxxvi K. A. Owolabi, \"Edmund Husserl's Rehabilitation of Cartesian Foundationalism\", op. cit. p. 21. xxxvii Kenneth T. Gallagher, \"Rorty's Antipodeans: An Impossible Illustration?\" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 45, No. 3 (Mar., 1985), pp. 449-455. xxxviii R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., pp. 70-72. xxxix Quoted in John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 463. xlSee H.H. Price, \"Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds' in Philosophy, vol. XII (1938), pp. 425-456. xli Gabriel Vacariu, \"The Mind-Body Problem Today\" in Open Journal of Philosophy, vol. 1, No. 1 (2011), p. 26. Available online at DOI:10.4236/ojpp.2011.11005 xliiIbid., p. 27. xliiiIbid., p. 33. xliv Body and soul are complete substances which do not act upon each other. It holds that between the series of events in the soul (psychic events) and the series of events in the body (physical events) there is a perfect parallelism, so that whenever something happens in the soul, there is a corresponding occurrence in the body, and vice versa. This was thoroughly explicated in Malebranche's theory of Occasionalism. xlv Otherwise known as monistic parallelism, claims that body and soul are but two aspects of one fundamental reality. The basic stuff of reality, being, possesses two sides which always occur together: a psychic side and a physical side. If all reality possesses a physical and a psychic side, the Supreme Reality will not constitute an exception to this rule. Hence, God too must have some material, bodily, physical aspect. He must be extended in space. The greatest proponent of Panpsychism is Baruch Spinoza a Jewish-Dutch philosopher. xlvi Only the body is a substance; what is called \"soul\" is but a collection of psychic phenomena. Hume's statement on this subject matter is famous. Man he says is \"nothing but a collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement....\" Cf. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, part IV, Section VI. (William James held similar views). xlvii The soul may be a substance, but we cannot demonstrate this by theoretical reason. This is Kant's objection. He admitted that the human mind, following its natural bent, inevitably reaches the conclusion that the human soul exists as a substance. Yet the conclusion is false, and the reasoning which leads to it is a \"paralogism of pure reason\". xlviiiSchmeidler, G.R. 2018. Parapsychology. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Retrieved November 17, 2018, from https://www. encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/pa rapsychology xlix See U.T. Place, \"Is Consciousness a Brain Process?\" in The British Journal of Psychology, vol. XLVII (1956), pp. 44-50. See, also, J.J.C. Smart, \"Sensations and Brain Processes\" in C.V. Borst (ed.) The Mind/Brain Identity Theory (London: Macmillan, 1970). lStoljar, D. 2001. Physicalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved June 10, 2016, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ li Smart, J. J. C. 2007. The Mind/Brain identity Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved June 10, 2016, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mindidentity/ lii Cf. U. T. Place. 1956. Is Consciousness A Brain Process? British Journal of Psychology 47.1: 44-50. liii J. J. C. Smart. 1959. Sensations and Brain Processes. The Philosophical Review 68.2: 141-156. liv D. M. Armstrong. 1968. A Materialist Theory of The Mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 73. lv Sung Jang Chung, \"The Science of Self, Mind and Body\" in Open Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, No. 3 (2012), p. 171. Available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2012.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "HYBRIS nr 47 (2019) ISSN: 1689-4286 ADRIAN MRÓZ UNIWERSYTET JAGIELLOŃSKI AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA1 [...] artists have a very specific responsibility: it is in the work of art that what constitutes the libido makes itself most purely visible. What is the work of an artist-say, a painter? To produce an eye. The eye is not simply that which is found in the eye socket in the skull. No more than the tongue is only in the mouth. The tongue [la langue], the organ that is in our mouth, is our tongue, not a cat's tongue [langue de chat], only inasmuch as it also produces language [la langue]. As for our eye, it is painting, sculpture, architecture, the entire visibility of that which has been seen by those who have seen it only to the extent that they knew how to bring it to sight, that weaves it into a noetic eye-and by which it transindividualizes itself. Just as the tongue/language [la langue] is constructed, the spiritual eye that visible works give us to see is woven by the hands of artists. Therein it appears that a noetic organ always forms a system with one or several other organs that are themselves as such noetic, and that what links them passes outside the body, through a social body that is woven by a tekhnē: the tongue with the hand of the writer, the eye with the hand of the painter, the ear with the hand and the eye of the musician, and so on -all of which is articulated by words, papers, brushes, pianos, and other instruments.\" (Stiegler, 2011, p. 227-228). 1. A General Description of Aesthetic Dissonance The state of violating preexisting mindsets concerning experience related to aesthetics-cultural conditioning concerning human relationships with art, sensation, sensibility, attraction and repulsion, 1 This article was presented at The Nordic Society of Aesthetics, Annual Meeting 2018 in Paris, May 31June 2, 2018. ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA pleasure and suffering, patterns of choice and preferences, judgements, practices, and emotional values, or \"knowledge\"-subsists in an existential state of discord between an experienced perceptual act and the expected aesthetic experience, which gives rise to something unforeseen or unexpected: it is perplexing, mystifying, and disorientating. This dynamic, which I will call Aesthetic Dissonance, is imperative to aesthetic responses and a relative of cognitive dissonance and sensory dissonance. Cognitive dissonance results from a conflicting worldview and concerns psychological stress of an individual performing an action, or confronted with new information, that is in disagreement with personal beliefs, ideas, values, or emotions. It is frequented by what Dan Ariely calls predictable irrationality, where an individual's formation subverts rationality by unconsciously adapting a behavior pattern, which alters preferences in spite of the availability of other options. This results in the act of an individual criticizing their object of desire as worthless, which is commonly known from Aesop's fable The Fox and the Grapes by the idiom of \"sour grapes\", which I can also see to be diffracted as a form of miswanting utilized by commercial marketing and advertising industries, objects of indifference and/or misery are cherished as valuable, which we might call \"sweet lemons\"2. Sensory dissonance, on the other hand, usually refers to musical phenomena; however, here I will adopt it as an expanded synonym for Fredrick Matthias Alexander's notion of \"debauched kinesthesia\" or faulty sensory appreciation3. According to him \"All people whose kinaesthetic systems are debauched and delusive develop some form of perversion or abnormality in sensation\" (Alexander, 1946a, p. 42). This 2 According to the Urban Dictionary \"sweet lemons\" is \"an idiom that is roughly the inverse of 'sour grapes', though much rarer: insisting that something unpleasant is in fact desirable, esp. if it was actively sought for earlier.\" Example of usage: \"I know the guy's miserable at work, but he keeps telling me he loves it. Sweet lemons, right?\". See: https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=sweet%20lemons) 3 \"I had proved in my own case and in that of others that instinctive control and direction of use had become so unsatisfactory, and the associated feeling so untrustworthy as a guide, that it could lead us to do the very opposite of what we wished to do or thought we were doing. If, then, as I suspected, this untrustworthiness of feeling was a product of civilized life, it would tend, as time went on, to become more and more a universal menace, in which case a knowledge of the means whereby trustworthiness could be restored to feeling would be invaluable.\" (Alexander, 1946b, p. 22). [2] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA relates to the unreliability of subjective feelings, since that what \"feels right\" or is habitually formed and comfortable, is in conflict with new experience, or what \"feels wrong\" or uncomfortable. Its fault lies in an instinctive form of misdirection, which results in a malformation of bodily sense that requires behavioral re-formation due to mislearned habits of psychosomatic sensation. The perception of the physical self is unreliable, thus humans must supplement themselves with external techniques, which subjectively feels \"wrong\" during the early stages of practice, yet in itself this negative feeling is a delusion in regard to any objectivity, since such feelings arise from relativity. The negative sensations have not yet become habitually internalized, both judgement and execution need to be synchronized. What feels comfortable, familiar, or \"right\" can switch places with that, which feels uncomfortable, strange, or \"wrong\", hence processes supersede products. This rests at the heart of acquiring knowledge in learning the know-how of different fields of producing art objects (such as musical performances and skills) necessary for the lovers of art, the amateurs4. Aesthetics is thought of as not only a theory of art or beauty, but also includes sensibility, experience, judgement, and relationships. It is regarded as widely as possible in terms of aisthesis (gr. α σθησιςἴ ). Aesthetic dissonance is the case of the mutual interaction between cognitive dissonance according to the cognition or reception of art objects and that of sensory dissonance in terms of the production of art objects. This implies the capability of what Stiegler refers to as the continuous reformation of aesthetics as a communal discovery of an alterity or otherness (fr. l'altérité) of feeling and in its becoming a promising future5. I would add that this consists in the quality of what is Other, the recognition of the other in its différance, whether ethnic, social, cultural, political, or religious. Sensory dissonance is a psychosomatic phenomenon that signals the presence of sensual otherness. Instead of intuitively resolving this dissonance, the trick is to take the step into the being with dissonance. In terms of art it could be said that it is approached with expectations formed on previous experience. Those expectations can be fulfilled, but they also could lead to surprise or offend presumptions and expectations. Techniques of 4 I would like to make a note that I use the term amateur in Bernard Stiegler's interpretation. See (Stiegler, 2017b). 5 « pour découvrir l'altérité du sentir, son devenir porteur d'avenir. » (Stiegler, 2005). [3] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA shocking anticipations result in art objects, which are among others funny, confusing, intimidating, or a maddening hot mess. The experience of sensory dissonance demands to take care of the cognitive dissonance that conditions comfort, attitudes, and habits. It demands to pause, break, and stop. It calls for a re-cognition of the object of art. This is especially true for the performance or production of art objects. Consider the situation of knowing-how to do something, but without being able to trust if you can-do it to reliably achieve it when you will it into being. Similarly, it can be thought that imagined knowledge about some action does not lead to producing desired aeffects 6. Or the opposite, the ability to do something without understanding or being able to put into words by the active intellect or nous (gr. νοῦς) about how it was accomplished. In my experience as a music teacher, I have encountered explanations by students that they know how to play a piece, yet can't reliably execute it, explaining away that their practicing at home was much more successful than the performance during a lesson. A slip into a narrow form of aesthetic dissonance has occurred on the level of the individual confronted with the violation of what is habitually felt as normal, and with what their beliefs about their actions are. It is an important signal. It prefigures intentionally giving yourself permission to take care of Other or unfamiliar and strange feelings, which arouse within the body. This psychosomatic feedback is an opportunity, which allows for the consideration and reflection on the acting upon the revelation of surprise or of unexpected information about the current set of circumstances. In the case of a music instructor, it is an act of engaging in the aesthetic sensibility of the other. I believe this phenomenon can be looked at on the level of the community, even a globalized one. If, instead, an art object comfortably reinforces previous patterns of behavior and thought, then it is what August Schulenburg calls entertainment, and what I would add, be part of a system belonging to the industries of producing culture. In my reading, Schulenburg continues by claiming that the force of cognitive dissonance brought into consciousness is transformative if we remain in the being with dissonance, which has the power to push an individual towards a reformation of cognitive beliefs. I claim that the same holds true for 6 As both affect and effect. [4] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA sensory dissonance, where the experienced friction necessitates a change of belief about what feels \"right\" on the somatic level. Schulenburg calls the act of forcing change of belief in regard to \"uncomfortable truths in our minds\" to be art and considers entertainment as the conditioning that reinforces prior belief. The criteria of distinguishing art from entertainment is dissolved, wherein the condition of cognitive dissonance that is produced by an art object within its deceptive pleasure is decided by cultural, social, technological, ethnic, political, and mundane contexts. The shifting contexts insist on what is art and what is entertainment. So, a singular art object is a singularity that manifests itself as either art or entertainment or both. So, cognitive dissonance is to values as sensory dissonance is to behavior. Their combined aeffects results in the experience of aesthetic dissonance, which has always been conditioned and mediated by nonexistent or imagined art objects. What we perceive is learned, conditioned by our environment in its totality as an external milieu and through the formation of the senses themselves, as can be observed in the differences in color perception across cultures, differences in values such as the relationship between the individual and Others, perceptions of emotions, perceptions of reality, and other aeffects arising from culturally conditioned pre-behavioral processes of perception and cognition. 2. A Reading of Aesthetic War and Symbolic Misery The major political question of tomorrow is, then, that of artists, who have a very important role to play in an aesthetic war that will be carried out with new arms-those of transindividuation. (Stiegler, 2011, p. 235). Bernard Stiegler's approach to aesthetics is at the same time an approach to politics, for him the separation of the artworld from policymaking and politics from the discipline of aesthetics is a disaster. Aesthetics in the widest sense of the word is concerned with general feeling and sensibility, within which the sense experiences of the Other are retained at the core of aesthetic objects, such as those created by artists. Politics in turn is concerned with sympathy (gr. συμπάθεια – sympátheia) or fellow feeling, which establishes affection or affinity, and [5] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA a relationship with the Other, or the circumstance-of and manner in which an individual is related to an-other. Politics conditions the ability to feel together, a degree of mutual feeling, within which concern and care are implied, a desire to reduce negative feelings the Other(s) experience(s), a sharing of emotion. A political practice is orientated towards unification for a desired common future, which is united through feeling and the capability of a collected ability to love, which is a sharing of the aesthetic, the sensibilities and feelings. In my understanding of Stiegler's writing, the act of severing such relationships, by something that \"casts through\" by means of calumniation, which malignantly and unjustly hurts and condemns the possibility of feeling together or sympathy is diabolic. The words symbol (sym-ballo, gr. συμ-βάλλω) and diabol (dia-ballo, gr. δια-βάλλω) are etymologically related. Particularly, that which brings together, forms community, a meeting, or union is a symbolon (gr. σύμβολον), whereas its etymological opposite can be called the diabolon (gr. διάβολον), which introduces division, estrangement, falling-out, and separation. I claim that just as symbols are the condition of eudaimonia (ε δαιμονία), diabols are the condition of ὐ dysdaimonia (gr. δυσδαιμονία7). Aesthetic dissonance is an experience, which can become either diabolical or symbolical depending on circumstances, relationships, devices and context. It leads to a re-formation of habits, beliefs, behavior, values, and institutions. The experienced violation of aesthetic expectations can be done in such a manner that it conditions 7 „The noun δυσδαιμονία and especially the adjective δυσδαίμων are common enough, and they are usually taken to indicate unhappiness or misery; hence, the translation of δυσδαιμονο σιν offered above has been \"unhappy men.\" Yet, the reiteration of theῦ chiasmus of men and gods in the participle δυσδαιμονο σιν entails that the secondῦ compound, δαίμων, meaning god, has to be retained. And it has to be retained in a manner that brings the action in the participle to the fore. From one point of view, this makes the participle impossible to translate. And yet, simultaneously, it makes the participle a very accurate description of the ψος that characterizes the subject as itὕ becomes involved in the divine but without rescinding the human. From this latter perspective, the subject becomes an allegorical function. What differentiates the subject from the gods, as the presence of the prefix δυσindicates, is the presence of unhappiness, unfulfillment, incompletion. However, this \"disaster\" for humankind may not be so disastrous after all: for it is the absence of such a prefix that banishes the gods from good fortune, so that their misfortune (τυχίαν) is everlasting. For humans, on the other hand, there is an end point that can redeem them: the harbor of death. This point provides the interruption between the eternity of godly misfortune and the particularity of human unhappiness\" (Vardoulakis, 2010, p. 99-100). [6] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA its aeffects, which is to say it is an aeffect of that, which grants significance, powers or authority to cults and religions, as well as to philosophers, healers, magicians, rhetoricians, and poets. The empowering, impactful, dangerous, and trans-formative pharmaka are not only remedies and poisons, but also a supplement, an antidote, a drug or narcotic, a sacrament, a source of intoxication, madness, ecstasy, and trance, or a device such as talismans, amulets, wine, cosmetics, paint, dies, perfumes, poetry, and in my conviction, music. The inability to feel with, or care about, the Other is diabolic. The role of aesthetic dissonance would be to take care and transform the diabolic into the symbolic. This leads us to Stiegler's question of symbolic misery. It is a shortage of symbolic exchange resulting in feeling of no longer being someone, being a nobody, a defective libidinal economy of desire. I understand this as analogous to time poverty. Time poverty results from the exploitation of free time, of Aristotelian schole (gr. σχολή), which is colonized by external efficient or productive ends that occupy the intrinsically good noble leisure, thus it occupies the condition necessary for eudaimonia, resulting in dysdaimonia, since such activities separate us from community and from the time needed to love oneself. Stiegler's idea of symbolic misery consists in a poverty of communal feeling, an underdevelopment of the aesthetic since, in his terms, it is originally \"engaged\" in the sensibility of the Other, or the sharing of sensory experience, cognition and feelings. Individuals don't feel part of a society or part of undergoing events of the world. Symbolic violence is ensued through a loss of individuation and participation in the creation of symbols. Such social isolation creates a mass case of collapse: the separation of individuals, for whom the experience of misery is universal, yet not shared. I believe this is signalized by studies that show the epidemical and shocking rise in depression, loneliness, or being in the state that Sherry Turkle called \"alone together\", and a general unhappiness or ill-being, which definitely is one of the greatest problems humanity needs to face in the 21st century. I think the aeffects of such isolation emerge through crises, violence, suicide, terrorism, or the general seeking redemption via the absolute form of interruption, which is through Death, since dys-daimonia cuts mortals off from the infinite immortality of spirits, who are plagued with everlasting misfortune. This sight is part of the field of aesthetic war. [7] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA The war is foremost a conflict of values, that of the market and that of \"spirit\". Marketing and advertising are a hegemonic force that fight to capture human attention and desire, which are fundamental for \"spirit\". Those suffering from symbolic misery, which is composed of humiliation and offence, are subject to aesthetic conditioning, which is segregating, alienating or diabolic, which replaces aesthetic experience and renders it impossible, decomposing it into drives. The aesthetic is dis-ordered. The aesthetic war is a stasis (gr. στάσις) that means political standing, faction, as well as civil war. Stasis sets humans against each other, a division rising from political standing with the nastiest of overtones. There is a struggle in contemporary society between domains of social life like family and politics. One case encompasses Stiegler's observation that an individual's sensibilities, the emotional and aesthetic dimension, have been functionalized to make a consumer. Such a process is part of an everlasting functionalization and defunctionalization process, which modifies the psycho-physiological sense organs and art, its history, artefacts, symbols, and works. Aesthetic power is shaped by the body, artificial organs composed of techniques, objects, tools, instruments and art, and by social organs of emergent institutions, which for Stiegler compose the key areas of study for his general organology. The origin of the struggle between market values against spirit values, human life and consciousness, has been dated to be in the early 20th century, with Edward Barnays' techniques of marketing overproduced 'sweet lemons', which developed an industrial aesthetic audiovisually mediated with the power to functionalize the aesthetic dimension of an individual so as to nudge them to behave as a consumer. A manipulation of desire to economically combat the problem of diminishing rate of returns on profits as described by Marx. This result in a loss of aesthetic attachment to singular objects, to symbolic misery, and an ill-being of desire and affect. The aesthetic experience is threated by the hegemony of lived experience within neoliberal hyperindustrial society, which has become calculable, and prevents people from creating affective and meaningful attachments to symbols in relation to our retentional apparatuses, technology and memory. The factors that make life worth living are replaced with emptiness that is overwhelming, instead of aesthetic [8] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA dissonance, we are left with aesthetic deprivation, the anesthetic or diabolic condition of symbolic misery. Such tension can be thought of as a dissonance between overlapping domains of social life, private and public. What can be learned from being with dissonance is that compelling, beautiful, and dramatic stories and narratives, as well as music, are invitations to experience it. A resolution is possible if we will to stay with it, the resolution of which is a narrative of hope or redemption. The formation of the aesthetic feelings and sense of curiosity towards dissonance bring to the unexpected, the uncalculatable and unmeasurable, a synergetic sense of wonder and awe in regards to being human and can be part of the artificial organs which develop mental stability and even courage, instead of fearing the unexpected and immediately resolving the tension of aesthetic dissonance with that, which feels \"right\" or has been culturally conditioned by competing entities for our desire and attention within the ramifications of aesthetic war, an arms race of behavioral nudges and cognitive heuristics. This is also a practice of loving oneself, since it asks for us to pay attention to and care for with our conscious presence any uncomfortable experiences, it is a re-cognition of values. This requires those in symbolic misery and artists to engage with suffering, as opposed to avoiding it through \"debauched kinesthetics\" shaped by the aesthetic conditioning of marketing. This opportunity is a lesson to learn the communal sharing of discomfort and ill-being, trans-forming the diabolic into the symbolic. To remain with silence, a busy mind, withdrawal symptoms or even an itch. A communal knowing of how-tolive can develop, of how-to-stay or return to conscious presence and attention in spite of tendencies to break the silence, write down our thoughts, reinforce addiction patterns, or scratch an itch. [9] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA 3. Aesthetics and New Media Art holds up a mirror to shifting attitudes. Initial tags of 'ugly' sometimes get forgotten as once-derided subjects become valued. Impressionism of the 19th century – now featured in blockbuster exhibits – was initially compared to mushy food and rotting flesh. When Henri Matisse's works showed in the US at the Armory Show of 1913, critics lambasted his art as 'ugly', while art students in Chicago burned an effigy of his Blue Nude in front of the Art Institute. The same institution mounted a major retrospective of his work a century later. Jazz and rock'n'roll were once considered 'ugly' music, threatening to corrupt entire generations (Henderson, 2016, para. 12). What develops through digital technologies and the networks they weave are associated technical milieus that allow a true symbolic life- and it is within this milieu that free software and the Linux platform could appear: the relations of industrial work formed here are not those of the division of labor and the social roles that nineteenth-century productivism and twentieth-century consumerism had imposed: they are associative and participative. (Stiegler, 2011, p. 233). The aesthetic community to come is formed by conflicts as processes of building sympathy, a new common sensibility of a transformed world. Breaks with tradition are points that insist on and discover a feeling, which is not shared by all. Historically the multiplying conflicts of aesthetics from the 19th century onwards, some of which functionalize the aesthetics and emotions of individuals for the admiration of power, recruitment of believers, or for free-thinking and exploration of the unlimited possibilities which make the body resonate are shared with Others, the world and its future aesthetical or artistic becoming. New Media is at once a diffractive mirror of us and a reflection of aesthetic dissonance. In it, conflicting experiences such as being bored and entertained at the same time are possible. They are persisting organs of re-functionalization that arouse antagonistic experiences, values, and behavior. They shape what feels \"right\" and what feels \"wrong\". New media can be a vehicle for creating aesthetic dissonances in regard to at least what is perceived as art and in general to that, which arises from encountering conflicting beliefs and feelings. It is a breeding ground of \"fake news\", conspiracy theories, and also of beneficial mass cooperation and community, of rebuttal and verification. It breeds antivaxxers, incels, and populism but it also brings together social institutions, grassroot movements, and is an [10] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA extension of an individual's biological eyes and ears through videorecording and live transmission. An opportunity for us to take responsibility for actions, consider the significances of our behavior and objectify imagined beliefs about social reality. New Media without proper care for the energies of symbolic misery become destructive pharmaka, and with proper care, tools such as the Internet, become magical artistic mediums of the amateurs in spite of the loss new technology inherently brings and supplements. New media is at once a medium of customizing aesthetic experience individually, however it is threatened by the practice of prioritizing calculability and modeling consumer behavior in favor of capitalistic effectiveness, ascholia or the state of being permanently busy, which results in the simultaneous categorization of an individual as a data point, punishing those who do not fit an algorithm's premises, which Cathy O'Neil has described in Weapons of Math Destruction and Marcus Gilroy-Ware in Filling the Void. Behavior, values and experience are shaped by New Media; however, a new knowledge needs to individuate like the way an athlete stretches or a musician practices scales. Bodily organs, artificial organs, and social institutions should preferably lean into persisting, insisting, and consisting aesthetic experiences for their exploration, developing a know-how in regard to stretching and being with dissonance rather than realizing impulsive behaviors, which are rationalized for the reclaiming of symbolic control. The aesthetic re-conditioning teaches not only exploration of presented dissonances and experiences, but also cultivates curiosity, increased compassion or sympathy, and develops the capability to distinguish the suffering of the other from our own. This can of course be accomplished with episodes of dissonance and resolution experienced through music, literature, fairy tales, and cinema. A holistic narrative that accents dissonance with its accumulative crescendo before its climax and resolution. Learning to generate art objects, such as to play music is practicing of dissonance. Conscious awareness and acute attention towards each articulated note precede later awareness of the overall coherence of action and aeffects. When faced with stasis, horror, misery, and suffering, emphatic response does not \"feel\" right, it is not \"natural\", speaking in terms of aesthetic war. These natural responses are pain avoidance and circumvention of the disagreeable or \"ugliness\", or what feels \"wrong\" in search for [11] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA comfort, calm, and tranquility. However, art does not emerge from mindless harmony, but is discovered with patience and after delving into the dissonances that are avoided. It makes us acknowledge and recognize emotions and their sources. Since new generations also spend over 10,000 hours playing video games before maturing into adults (Zimbardo, 2016), I would like to comment on ludonarrative dissonance. This device forces players of video games into discomfort, which these narratives foster. The most adored stories come from dissonant characters \"as it is the surprise, the disturbance, the accident, the sacrosanct disruptive element, that justifies the very act of telling a story\" (Seraphine, p. 8). Such a device is described as the violation of immersion, which is to say it is an emersion, since it draws players out of the work and violates a state of detachment and disinterested delight. Desire for the object itself is a condition of love, if not, then what we are left with is what Stiegler describes as cultural philistines or new barbarians, who only perceive art as \"interesting\", a consumable, and nothing more. Video games are new pharmaka: \"Games players are also more likely than non-games players to participate in other forms of culture, especially through active participation (e.g., creating digital video, photography or animation or writing stories or poetry), but passive participation (e.g., attending cultural festivals) is also common.\" (Borowiecki, K. & Bakhshi, 2017, p.1). The Internet is the new gallery of art, and even art itself, at least according to Virginia Heffernan, where these works are published and with which individuals participate, share, and engage in symbolic exchange, what I would describe as one instance of symbolic fertility . [12] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA 4. Coda To arrive at an aesthetic experience was to be inscribed within a social process of participation that engaged one in a practice: this was not a consumption, but a sociation that was also a cultuality carried through practices, an active relation, compared with which cultural consumption had no meaning. (Stiegler, 2011, p. 233) In going to see an exhibition at the museum, in reading a novel, in watch ing a film in a non-consumerist manner, in opening my eye to expand my view (by means of my hands, from Lascaux to Cézanne, and after Cézanne, the hand is seized by the reproducibility set off by the fingers) -just as my tongue [ma langue] gives me access to language [la langue] as a process of individuation of a symbolic milieu, binding and unbinding, with my ears that heed it, with the tongue that is in my mouth-in going to see an exhibition and in reconnecting through all these paths works that I thus take care of while taking care of myself and of others, I participate in the weaving of the long circuits of transindividuation (Stiegler, 2011, p. 234). Art as a product of negentropy, however, can reconcile the entropy or dis-ordering of stasis in the fight against symbolic misery. According to Plato, music (μουσιqκή), especially enchantment by playing the aulos or kataulein) can be the cause of mania, which is rooted i.a. in fear, and at the same time its medicine consists in a reintegration of an individual within a group, counteracting fear. This was the ancient practice of mania of the Elysian mysteries and rituals of Dionysic cults of the Bacchantes or the Korybantes (Plato, 1967/1968, 791a-b). Music must save the world according to Stiegler, it is an art of creating protentions or anticipating, waiting, and making people behave a certain way. It is transformative and pharmacological. In the context of aesthetic dissonance, the exploration of the possibility of creating new sensibilities and re-cognitions, patience with conflict without seeking immediate resolution of tension, an opportunity for healing symbolic misery arises. This is not simply cognitive or behavioral, but an artistic act of mastery, or action, which demands patience, attention, and curiosity. It challenges the drive to turn away from the displeasing, discord, suffering and tension through the exploration of their nuances, and the possibilities they unfold. Aesthetic dissonance is not simply a state of arousal or conflicting feelings and emotions. It is a lens through which practices, behaviors, politics, psychopathology, and other issues can be viewed. It [13] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA is a condition of making insights on the role of aesthetic and cultural capital on our social behavior, as well as the result of mutual aeffects from the study of culture that expand understanding on the phenomenon of dissonance. Internalized standards from culture, society, and family and one's personal beliefs about themselves, create the measuring tools of cognitive dissonance, which has a tendency to lean towards the normative practice of marketing, nonetheless, a dissonant habituation in an individual's environment can also make participatory standards more accessible. [14] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander, F. M. (1946a). Man's Supreme Inheritance. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from https://www.globalgreyebooks.com/content/ books/ebooks/mans-supreme-inheritance.pdf. Alexander, F. M. (1946b). The Use of the Self. Chaterson. 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(2011) The Tongue of the Eye What \"Art History\" Means. Ravindranathan, T & Geoghegan, B. (Trans.). In: Khalip, J., & Mitchell, R. (Eds.). Releasing the Image: From Literature to New Media. Stanford: California. Stiegler, B. (2017a). Kant, Art, and Time. Boundary 2, 44(1), 19–34. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-3725845. Stiegler, B. (2017b). The Proletarianization of Sensibility. Boundary 2, 44(1), 5–18. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-3725833. Stiegler, B. (2017c). The Quarrel of the Amateurs. Boundary 2, 44(1), 35–52. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-3725857. Symbol\" and \"diabolo\" (devil) are two related words. (2013, September 13). Retrieved February 10, 2018 from http://en.antiquitatem.com/symbol-devil-symballon-diabolosdemon. Urban Dictionary. [Calenardhon]. (2009, February 14). Sweet Lemons. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=sweet %20lemons. Vardoulakis, D. (2010). The Doppelgänger: Literatures philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press. [18] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA Zimbardo P. G. & Coulombe N. C. (2016). Man, Interrupted: Why Young Men are Struggling & What We Can Do About It. Newburyport, MA: Conari Press. [19] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA ABSTRACT Aesthetic Dissonance. On Behavior, Values, and Experience through New Media Aesthetics is thought of as not only a theory of art or beauty, but also includes sensibility, experience, judgement, and relationships. This paper is a study of Bernard Stiegler's notion of Aesthetic War (stasis) and symbolic misery. Symbolic violence is ensued through a loss of individuation and participation in the creation of symbols. As a struggle between market values against spirit values human life and consciousness within neoliberal hyperindustrial society has become calculable, which prevents people from creating affective and meaningful attachments to symbols in relation to our retentional apparatuses, technology and memory. Such tension can be thought of as a dissonance between overlapping domains of social life, private and public. New Media is a reflection of aesthetic dissonance, an experience such as being bored and entertained at the same time, between antagonistic experiences, values, and behavior. Moreover, new media is at once a medium of customizing aesthetic experience individually as well as the threat and practice of prioritizing calculability and modeling of consumer behavior in favor of capitalistic effectiveness, which results in the simultaneous categorization of an individual as a data point, putting those who do not fit an algorithm's premises at a disadvantage. KEYWORDS: Aesthetics, Symbolic Misery, New Media, Cognitive Dissonance, Faulty Sensory Appreciation, Behavior. ABSTRAKT Dysonans estetyczny. O zachowaniu, wartościach i doświadczeniu poprzez nowe media. Estetyka jest rozumiana nie tylko jako teoria sztuki lub piękna, ale także obejmuje wrażliwość, doświadczenie, osąd i relacje. Artykuł ten jest studium Bernarda Stieglera na temat pojęcia wojny estetycznej (staza) i nędzy symbolicznej. Przemoc symboliczna następuje w wyniku utraty indywiduacji i udziału w tworzeniu symboli. Jako walka między wartościami rynkowymi a wartościami duchowymi życie i świadomość ludzka w ramach neoliberalnego społeczeństwa hiper-przemysłowego stała się obliczalna, co zapobiega tworzeniu przez ludzi afektywnych i [20] ADRIAN MRÓZ AESTHETIC DISSONANCE. ON BEHAVIOR, VALUES, AND EXPERIENCE THROUGH NEW MEDIA znaczących przywiązań do symboli w odniesieniu do naszych aparatów retencyjnych, technologii i pamięci. Tego rodzaju napięcie można postrzegać jako dysonans zachodzący pomiędzy nakładającymi się na siebie dziedzinami życia społecznego, prywatnego i publicznego. Nowe media są odzwierciedleniem dysonansu estetycznego, takiego doświadczenia jak bycie zanudzonym i rozbawionym jednocześnie, pomiędzy antagonistycznymi doświadczeniami, wartościami i zachowaniami. Co więcej, nowe media są zarazem medium indywidualnego dostosowywania doświadczeń estetycznych, a także zagrożeniem i praktyką nadawania priorytetu obliczalności i modelowaniu zachowań konsumentów na rzecz kapitalistycznej efektywności, co skutkuje jednoczesną kategoryzacją jednostki jako punktu danych, co stawia w niekorzystnej sytuacji tych, którzy nie pasują do założeń algorytmu. SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Estetyka, nędza symboliczna, nowe media, dysonans poznawczy, nieprawidłowe wrażenia sensoryczne, zachowanie [21]", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "MATTERS OF TRUST AS MATTERS OF ATTACHMENT SECURITY Forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (please only cite final published version) Andrew Kirton University of Leeds Abstract I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to that individual, or to the group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to betrayal, because how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, or to the group, thereby threatening the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive attitudes characteristic of betrayal. Introduction I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to that individual, or to the group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to betrayal, because how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, or to the group, thereby threatening the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive attitudes characteristic of betrayal. I defend the account as follows: in §1 I outline how an account of the vulnerability of trust should explain the characteristic interpersonal importance, rather than mere practical or instrumental importance, of matters of trust. In §2, I outline how three prominent accounts of trust – those of Annette Baier (1986), Richard Holton (1994) and Katherine Hawley (2014) – have sought to explain that importance, and how ultimately Hawley's 'commitment' account appears best suited. In §3, I raise problem a type of problem case for the commitment account, using this to show why the commitment account is more generally inadequate as an account of the characteristic vulnerability of trust. In §4, I outline the shape of the attachment account, illustrating how it sheds light on the nature of betrayal. In §5, I use the account to explain the problem cases raised against the accounts of trust discussed in §2 and §3. In §6, I address a possible objection to the attachment account; that it focuses too much on trust in intimate relationships. Finally, in §7, I use it to help explain how it is true that distrust can be betrayed. 2 1. Seeking an account of the vulnerability of trust What is it to trust or to distrust someone? Following Annette Baier, many authors agree that trust is fundamentally about accepting vulnerability, in some sense, to another's possible (in)action (Baier 1986 p. 235). Many also connect the concept of vulnerability at issue, to the possibility of being betrayed or let down.1 This is as opposed to simply having one's goals frustrated from relying on the unreliable. The trust/betrayal connection is, of course, one of the reasons that trust is interesting: it is an attitude where we cast others in a moral or ethical light, but in an up-close-and-personal way; not simply praising or blaming. If I disappoint your trust, you can feel wronged by me. But it can also be true that objectively I did not wrong you, for perhaps you shouldn't have expected it of me to do otherwise. Trust and distrust spark a protomoral response toward others, and it may be that, given how systems of moral norms appear to be influenced from the bottom up by trust relationships,2 gaining a deeper understanding of why this is so, would help shed light on what moral judgements are about more generally. The connection between matters of trust and betrayal is obvious. Some authors though are also quick to note that distrust, not just trust, can also be betrayed (Hawley 2014 p. 13; Hieronymi 2008 p. 229).3 On this basis it seems that trust and distrust share a common moralising 'content'. Both attitudes leave their bearers vulnerable to being betrayed or at least let down, where this is a sort of interpersonal harm: a diminishing of our wellbeing at the actions of another. It follows that an account of the vulnerability of trust should also furnish us with an account of the vulnerability of distrust. And because betrayal seems to be the key notion in accounting for that vulnerability, an account of the vulnerability of trust and distrust should explain why they are attitudes that make us able to be betrayed, not simply frustrated. How do we explain the vulnerability of (dis)trust: the ability to be betrayed, or 'betrayability'? What is true of a (dis)trustor that makes them betrayable? We need to first be clear on a key explanatory demand of an account of betrayability. An account of betrayability must capture the characteristic concern we have about the way others may act, when we trust or distrust. By concern, I mean roughly the kind of interest we have in, or the sense of importance we bestow 1 In what follows, I'll generally refer to betrayal in particular as the harm of disappointed trust. This should be taken as shorthand for other harms of the lesser degree, like being let down, that are in the same realm of 'personal' harms. Betrayal is simply the flag-bearer for this family of harms enabled by trusting or distrusting. 2 E.g. in moral systems like those in religious cults, or the Mafia's 'Omertà', there is a code of not betraying others in the community to those outside of it, e.g. to the authorities of the nation state. These systems of norms tend to endorse immoral action overall, but they are sustained by the proto-morality of trust and distrust relationships, deterring against betrayal. In other words, from within the community, it feels wrong to break those codes, even if it is objectively right for members to do so. 3 Hawley's example is that Jesus distrusted Judas, but Judas still betrayed Jesus. Another, more everyday example: you can distrust your partner in suspecting them of cheating, but still be betrayed when those suspicions turn out to be accurate. 3 on, how someone proceeds to act, in a matter of trust. This is the sort of concern that manifests in feelings and accusations of betrayal, should expectations be disappointed. We can of course have different kinds of concern about how others will act. As a first step, we need to be able to outline the relevant difference: that between just having a practical concern and having an interpersonal concern about how another acts.4 The following two examples provide a contrast to illustrate this: Predictable Flatmate: John is trying to submit an essay to a journal for a deadline tonight. He won't have time to go out and buy himself some food for dinner if he chooses to do this. However, he knows his flatmate Elis will also be going food shopping himself. The food Elis puts in the shared fridge can easily be taken without Elis noticing. Helpful Flatmate: Maria is trying to submit an essay to a journal for a deadline tonight and won't have time to go out and buy herself something for dinner. But her flatmate Izzy has told her not to worry, and that she will buy Maria some food, and that Maria can pay her back later. Predictable Flatmate is a case of simply relying on another's acting. John has an instrumental/practical concern about how Elis acts; he wants to satisfy both the goals of having his tea and also submitting the paper. How Elis acts is instrumental in achieving both. Helpful Flatmate is a case of trusting another to act.5 Maria has a similar practical concern to John about Izzy's going food shopping, but this concern also carries interpersonal, normative weight. It matters to Maria, in a way beyond the instrumental satisfaction of her own desires, how Izzy acts. Maria would be betrayed and not simply frustrated, should Izzy fail to do as she promises. Setting out an account of a concept is akin to giving the terms of a database search that sifts all candidate cases for the ones we want. A key demand of an account of trust and distrust is that it not 'return' cases where individuals have the wrong kind of concern about another's acting. It must only be true of cases where individuals exhibit the interpersonal import of trust and 4 Baier (1986) raises a number of such contrast cases. One is based on the folklore surrounding Kant's regularity in his daily routine. Kant's neighbours would – the story goes – rely on him for their own timekeeping. If Kant decided to take his walk at a different time one day, they might be surprised, and frustrated in their goals. But they would not feel betrayed by Kant. The case also supports the intuition at hand that, intuitively, there is an interpersonal concern about matters of trust, not just a practical concern. 5 The Helpful Flatmate case can be turned into a case of distrust, if we imagine that Izzy is notoriously unhelpful or outright deceitful, such that Maria has some hesitance about taking her up on the promise of help. In that case, Maria would still have the same interpersonal concern in her attitude toward Izzy's possible acting, but it would now carry a pessimistic anticipation of non-fulfilment. 4 distrust. It mustn't return us counterexamples, where the conditions we provide are also true of non-trustors. 2. Baier's 'reliance on goodwill' account Baier's own account of the betrayability of trust as 'reliance on another's goodwill toward one' (1986 p. 235) seems to get us the correct search terms for trust, on the face of it. It seems right to say that when Maria takes up Izzy's promise to buy her food for the night, she is forced to rely on Izzy's goodwill toward Maria. Perhaps, then, 'reliance on another's goodwill' captures the interpersonal concern of matters of trust. Holton (1994), however points out that the 'reliance on goodwill' account of trust is susceptible to a counterexample. It returns some cases of the wrong type. The counterexample it returns is the 'confidence trickster' (1994 p. 65). Confidence tricksters typically elicit sympathy from marks, in order to procure instrumentally beneficial behaviour from them. For example, imagine a variant of the Helpful Flatmate case where Maria simply lies to Izzy about having deadlines to hit, and being too poor to pay her back for now. It seems true in that case that Maria still relies on Izzy's goodwill toward her. But it isn't true that Maria trusts Izzy, except perhaps in some deviant sense of trust (she maybe 'trusts' her gullibility). Thus, we need a better account of betrayability, than the 'reliance on goodwill' account. 2.1 The participant stance and commitment accounts Holton's own account of trust is that it is reliance from a 'participant stance' (1994 pp. 67–8). The participant stance is in the spirit of Strawson's participant attitude; the kind of regard we take toward others when we appraise their actions in a moral way; according them e.g. praise or blame (Strawson 1974 pp. 5–6). Yet, we sometimes regard others in a way that involves treating them more like machines or instruments. In such cases we do not have reactive attitudes toward others, so do not have a participant stance toward them. Holton suggests that the 'reliance plus participant stance' account avoids the confidence trickster case. The confidence trickster merely relies on you as he would an instrument. Thus, he does not have reactive attitudes toward you when you fail to fall for his trick, so frustrating his reliance. He does not take a participant stance toward you, and this is why we can say he does not trust you. Hawley (2014), however, suggests that while reliance from a participant stance is necessary for trust, it is insufficient for it. Plugging in the participant stance to our database search terms does not adequately narrow down the results. This is because, Hawley argues, we can rely on others from a participant stance, so be disposed to reactive attitudes, yet not be disposed to betrayal in particular. The example she offers is of one side of a romantic partnership (X) coming to rely on the other (Y) to cook dinner. It may be appropriate for X to express gratitude 5 to Y, about Y cooking X's dinner. Yet there is something else needed for it to be appropriate for X to feel betrayed in case Y does not cook dinner (Hawley 2014 pp. 7–8). A participant stance is therefore not enough to make this a matter of trust. Hawley's positive account is that trust and distrust involve reliance and non-reliance (respectively) on another to fulfil a normative commitment to acting (2014 pp. 10–2). A supposition of the other having made a commitment – akin to a promise – enables betrayal. This explains what our intuitions about the cooking dinner case hinge on. When Y makes a commitment to cook dinner, X can appropriately feel betrayed in case this does not happen. Absent commitment, it can be appropriate for X to express gratitude if dinner is cooked, but not betrayal if it is not cooked. Our inclination to label the case as one of X trusting Y, seems to hinge on the presence of a commitment by Y. Furthermore, the commitment account explains what is missing in the confidence trickster case. The mark does not make a genuine commitment to acting, so it is not appropriate for the confidence trickster to feel betrayal. This accounts for why he does not trust the mark. What we seem to have with the commitment account is a robust account of the vulnerability of trust and distrust: we are able to be betrayed when others have made commitments to acting. Furthermore, an attractive feature of Hawley's account is that allows that commitments can be implicit; incurred or generated through roles, circumstances, mutual expectation and convention, unless we explicitly warn others not to rely on us (2014 p. 11). This helps explain why we can have disputes about whether some (in)action was genuinely a betrayal or not: we may dispute whether a commitment was ever made. Matters of trust can be fuzzy, and the commitment account is well placed to explain this. 3. What the commitment account leaves wanting Is this the end of the road for our account of the vulnerability of trust? I argue that our understanding is still lacking. For one: what is left out from the commitment account is an explanation for why commitments matter to us in a way that enables betrayal. Certainly, there seems to be a tight co-variance relationship between the presence of commitment, and the presence of betrayability. But this is not as tight as we might think. There are cases where our trust, and so our betrayability, and the actual commitment made by another and accepted by us, come apart. This passage from Judith Herman's 'Trauma and Recovery' helps illustrate the present point: The imagery of [traumatic] events often crystallises around a moment of betrayal, and it is this breach of trust which gives the intrusive images their intense emotional power. For example, in Abram Kardiner's psychotherapy of the navy veteran who had been rescued at sea after his ship was sunk, the veteran became most upset when revealing how he had felt let down by his own side: \"The patient became rather excited and began to swear profusely; his anger aroused clearly by incidents connected with his rescue. 6 They had been in the water for a period of about twelve hours when a torpedo-boat destroyer picked them up. Of course the officers in the lifeboats were taken off first. The eight or nine men clinging to the raft the patient was on had to wait in the water for six or seven hours longer until help came.\" The officers had been rescued first, even though they were already relatively safe in the lifeboats, while the enlisted men hanging onto the raft were passed over, and some of them drowned as they awaited rescue. Though Kardiner accepted this procedure as part of the normal military order, the patient was horrified at the realization that he was expendable to his own people. The rescuer's disregard for the man's life was more traumatic to him than were the enemy attack, the physical pain of submersion in the cold water, the terror of death, and the loss of the other men who shared his ordeal. (Herman 2001 p. 55) In this case, the procedure to rescue officers first was an express commitment (or a consequence of one) from the veteran's side, that he understood. Yet regardless of what had been explicitly communicated, the veteran trusted his side to rescue him. The feeling of betrayal he experienced when his side in fact followed through on their commitment, was vivid and traumatising. What this demonstrates is that the connection between trust, commitment, and betrayability, is looser than we need it to be, if the commitment account is to explain the vulnerability of matters of trust. We can be betrayable on a matter in spite of the other's commitment to some opposed action that we, as trustors, accept. Similar cases can be raised. Imagine a casual 'no-strings attached' sexual relationship between two people, who both agree that each has no commitment to be faithful to the other. In such cases, it's commonplace that despite a recognised lack of commitments to being faithful, feelings of betrayal can easily result on one or both sides, when it becomes clear that one or both sides have seen other people. The vulnerability of trust – betrayability – can come about despite a lack of a commitment on the others' part. How might we respond to these cases, in defence of the commitment account? It cannot be denied that the feelings of betrayal by the subjects are genuine. Could it be denied that they are cases of trust, such that some other attitude is betrayed? This would be a stretch. If anything can be betrayed, it surely indicates that whatever was betrayed, was a matter of trust. This is regardless of whether either party was previously aware of that being the case.6 What we could deny is that the actions that violated the trust in these cases were genuine betrayals. This is because, perhaps, a genuine normatively binding commitment does not hold 6 Matters of trust can of course be unconscious or unrecognised. Several authors note this kind of trust is required for being able to live comfortably in communities e.g. (Thomas 1989 p. 34), and is the sort of trust shattered in unanticipated or previously unthinkable violations of trust. Jones (2004) for example argues this kind of trust is what the power of terror attacks depends upon. In the casual relationship example, it might be that one party didn't even realise they regarded the other's fidelity as a matter of trust, until the betrayal is felt. 7 in these cases. There is a crucial distinction between betrayal qua feeling/reactive attitude, and betrayal qua form of action. These can come apart. These are cases where the feeling results, but not where the action has occurred. The commitment account explains vulnerability to the action type of betrayal but not the feeling type. But this response reveals why the commitment account is inadequate as an account of the vulnerability of trust. We are looking for an account of what gives trust its characteristic betrayability in terms of the reactive attitude. We are not seeking an account of when our reactive attitude was also the result of an action that the other can be blameworthy for. That is what the commitment account provides, but that doesn't unpack for us why the attitude of trust makes us susceptible to that proto-moralising reactive attitude. We're interested in what the psychology of trustors is that makes them susceptible to feel betrayed, in a way that is not true of e.g. John's regard of Elis in the predictable flatmate case, or Holton's confidence trickster. Those subjects' psychological make-up is distinct from comparable trustors in a way we seek to explain. Focusing solely on trustors whose trust is in some sense well-founded, warranted, or appropriate, is to miss what is at issue. We seek to explain the vulnerability of trust full-stop. A related problem arises if we try to respond that in these cases there were implicit commitments that held. The response goes, these are not counterexamples to the commitment account: what we have are trustees betraying their implicit commitments to trustors. Implicit commitments are of course what Hawley supposes we can incur if we are not careful (2014 p. 11). These make it possible for us to betray others' trust, and to do so in a morally problematic way, even when we never made a corresponding explicit commitment. However, there are several problems with this response, as a way of explaining away these cases. Fundamentally, it appears to be ad hoc. These are cases where we would have to suppose that just because a trustor trusts, there must be an implicit commitment the trustee holds. But this isn't what we want to suppose. We want to allow cases where trust is based on nothing that the trustee did to encourage it. We want to allow for groundless or unwarranted trust, and also allow that with such trust, trustors are open to a sort of vulnerability in being able to be betrayed, just not a betrayal the trustee can be blamed for. On the implicit commitment line of response, we would also have to suppose that, in these cases, the trustees somehow have conflicting commitments. They would have explicit commitments to one course of action, and implicit commitments to the opposite course of action. But the explicit commitments are what disavow them of the implicit ones. Those explicit commitments are meant to let them off the hook. It seems right that the explicit commitments have indeed served that function, because the trustees cannot be held accountable as having betrayed the trustor, in a morally problematic way. This is so even though the trustor was still vulnerable to the trustee. Again, the problem is in the commitment account's confusing betrayability qua being the patient of another's morally blameworthy action, with betrayability qua susceptibility to a type of feeling or reactive attitude. 8 Finally, we can consider the more simplistic response, that the trustors in these cases have a mistaken belief that the other party has a commitment, in respect of what they later feel has been betrayed. In the veteran case, there is the mistaken belief that his side has a commitment to rescuing him. In the no-strings-attached sexual relationship, there is the mistaken belief that there are strings. Note that this is a distinct response to imputing implicit commitments. That response says there is a genuine betrayal that has taken place. On this response we suppose no genuine betrayal has taken place, but the trustors believe that it has. But this response mis-describes the cases. The veteran was under no illusions about what his side had committed to, and neither are the partners about each other. Yet the sense of betrayal is real. The trustors are betrayable in spite of the commitments (or lack of) that they themselves recognise the trustees to have made. 4. The positive account: attachment concern The account of the vulnerability inherent in matters of trust I want to propose is meant to explain both how trustee commitments typically elicit vulnerability to betrayal in trustors, and also how commitments and that vulnerability can become misaligned (as in the above example cases). This is because underneath commitments there is a more basic concern we have about others, which everyday commitments interact with. Matters of trust and distrust are fundamentally concerned with, or about, our need for secure attachments. Particular matters of trust are emblematic of, or stand in for, the potential for the security of these attachments to be put in question. This is what gives matters of trust a characteristic betrayability: when we trust someone on a matter, and she disappoints that trust, we not only are practically disappointed, but the security of our attachment to her, or to the group we both are members of, is shaken. In other words, trust and distrust are attitudes we have in response to a kind of vulnerability we possess as social beings, that feel a need to be close to others, and to belong in groups. The concept of attachment comes from developmental psychology and earlier 20th century psychoanalysis. In developmental psychology, Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) and Ainsworth (1969) used the concept to characterise the emotional bond that children and caregivers form, such that the continued presence of the caregiver is a matter of emotional wellbeing for the child. Bowlby's studies of attachment centred on a scenario called the 'strange situation'. The strange situation involves observation of a child playing in a room, in close proximity to her caregiver. The caregiver then leaves the room, and a stranger enters. After a time of being left in the stranger's presence, generating uncertainty and wariness on the child's part, the caregiver reenters the room. From observing different ways children respond to the caregiver upon reentering, Bowlby and Ainsworth theorise that a child's way of responding manifests different methods of securing the continued proximity of caregivers and/or of coping with felt needs for 9 caregivers. In most cases (in healthy, or secure styles) this involves approaching the caregiver for reassurance, to secure continued proximity in future. In other cases, the child admonishes the caregiver for leaving, and in still others, chooses to ignore or give the 'silent treatment' to the caregiver. 4.1 Attachment as a more general phenomenon The concept of attachment, which I'm claiming explains the vulnerability of trust, has its root in the concept outlined by Bowlby and Ainsworth. However, I am applying the concept of attachment more broadly to describe the ongoing felt need for the presence of other people, and for assurance of their non-instrumental concern about us, that persists throughout life.7 In this respect, this more general concept of attachment takes its core meaning from the phenomenon outlined in Bowlby and Ainsworth's attachment theory. But it also applies to matters of trust more generally. Matters of trust in the adult world, in the various of domains of interaction we have with others, are, in a sense, Bowlby's 'strange situation', writ large. Wonderly (2016) puts forward a philosophical account of attachment that is fit for present purpose. Wonderly outlines \"security-based attachment\" as a rich \"mode of mattering\". She suggests \"that the relevant form of attachment involves a felt need for its object and particular relationship between the object and the attached agent's sense of security.\" Furthermore, this is a distinct attitude \"from the more philosophically familiar notion of caring.\" (2016 p. 223). Wonderly summarises the core concept as follows: In this form of attachment, the agent experiences a particular object as a felt need, such that her senses of well-being and general competence suffer without it. Unlike caring, this attitude is largely self-focused and marked by an integral connection between its object and the agent's felt security. (2016 p. 224) Attachment is, like caring, a mental phenomenon implicated centrally in things mattering to us. But attachment involves a mode of mattering that is stronger than caring about something. Attachment is related to our proper functioning and wellbeing. As such, when we are attached to someone, this is not merely a matter of desiring the presence of the person (as per the folkpsychological concept of desire) or simply caring about her. As Wonderly emphasises above, attachment involves a self-focused concern for the continued presence of the object. It is not that we necessarily care about the other person, rather that we need her. When our felt need for another is so strong, we can in fact fail to display care about her; being so focused on our own need of her, that she is neglected as a result. This can give rise to goal-directed activity to secure her continued presence, when this is felt to be under threat. Precursors to this activity are 7 The exception may be those with psychopathic traits, who have a largely instrumental concern about contact with other people. One could armchair-speculate that this may be connected to why so few psychopaths can treat interactions with others as matters of trust, and why interactions with psychopaths are marked by manipulation and exploitation (cf. Bosmans et al. 2010; Mikulincer & Shaver 2012). 10 glimpsed in children, in the caregiver proximity-maintaining behaviour that Bowlby and Ainsworth highlight. Wonderly summarises the overall result succinctly: \"in virtue of (what I feel as though is) my need [for the attachment object], I am tugged this way and that\" (2016 p. 228). This concept of attachment helps characterise how, post-childhood, the relationships we have with others are tied to our sense of wellbeing and felt security. Those of us with an attachment concern have a disposition to form social bonds, and need close relationships, e.g. friends, family, romantic partners. The strong relationship between trust and attachment also finds support in cases of individuals with William's Syndrome (WS), who are 'pathologically trusting'. Such individuals find it difficult to distrust others, and are driven to approach strangers with the level of affection reserved for close friends (Dobbs 2007; Doyle et al. 2004; Järvinen-Pasley et al. 2008; Moseley 2014). Empirical evidence suggests that this results from a lessened ability to detect threat of deception or ill will in facial expressions (Ng et al. 2015; Riby et al. 2014), such that WS individuals don't have the necessary competing evidence of untrustworthiness to temper a strong drive for social approach. Such individuals also appear to have heightened levels of oxytocin – the hormone implicated in affiliative attachment (mother/child, romantic partners, friends etc.) – when around others, as a result (Dai et al. 2012). Ng et al. (2015), though, note that WS individuals are able to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals when reflecting on abstract examples of behaviour. Overall, WS individuals suggest that the extent to which we trust others is guided by an attachment drive. When this drive goes unchecked to a greater extent – i.e. when the mechanism for relaying evidence of social threat is impeded – then the scope of secure attachment expands. It would follow that matters of trust expand in scope, if trust is a positive sense of secure attachment.8 4.2 Disrupted attachment is at the heart of experienced betrayals The experience of a child left in the 'strange situation', who then seeks assurance from a returned caregiver, has echoes in the adult experience of disappointed trust. We can see this by reflecting on what the experience of betrayal more generally is like. Remarkably, even though 8 This needn't entail that WS individuals expand the scope of matters of trust in the sense of trusting others to perform specific actions beyond perceived competence (e.g. suddenly trusting you to be able to fix the boiler, despite having no indication you can). It does mean WS individuals are comfortable with others beyond affiliative/emotional intimacy boundaries non-WS individuals ordinarily adhere to, since those are a function of attachment security. In an unfortunate irony, this purportedly makes it harder for WS individuals to build close relationships (Dobbs 2007), because sensitivity to the dance of mutually expanding and contracting affiliative boundaries is needed to nurture intimate relationships. 11 authors focusing on trust often note the connection with betrayal, it is rare to find a sustained treatment of betrayal in the literature. Two exceptions are Jackson (2000) and Shklar (1984), who both note that literature and history, rather than philosophy, are more fruitful in attempting to understand the nature of betrayal (dramatic fiction and non-fiction, high or low brow, tends to revolve around the dynamics of trust and betrayal). Both also offer their own useful characterisations of the nature of betrayal. Here I focus on Shklar's, which draws on dictionary definitions of betrayal, in order to paint a vivid picture of the emotional turmoil that accompanies it:9 Betrayal [...] is to place another person \"in the power of an enemy, by treachery or disloyalty,\" and also \"to prove false to, to disappoint the hopes or expectations of.\" This, I think, should include breaking an appointment that means much to the other person, neglecting those who depend on our care, and talking maliciously about our friends. [...] There is, as the dictionary does show us, an irreducible experience in betrayal: desertion. That brings into play the greatest of childhood anxieties, the fear of abandonment. In quitting a bonded group, an equally primeval fear is stirred: of the failure to distinguish kin and stranger, the latter almost always called \"enemy\" as well. To reject a blood relationship for a new and alien association, or for none at all, is to deny the most elementary of social ties. (Shklar 1984 p. 139) Shklar points out that, at the core experience of betrayal, there lies neglect and abandonment. To feel a betrayal is to perceive abandonment by the other. This can spur responses of outrage, confusion and so on. The characteristic sting of betrayal is, at root, the sting of being rejected by someone, and so ostracised from the group. This is attachment disruption laid bare. Someone who doesn't have such an attachment need, such that it cannot be elicited by promises or expressed commitments from others, is not betrayable. We simply would not be able to experience the sting of rejection if we felt no need to belong to a group. To lack this need would amount to a kind of social invulnerability. Betrayal and abandonment, as Shklar's illustration points out, have the threat of desertion as their focus. Putting the concept of social attachment at the heart of matters of trust, explains why trust and distrust carry the threat of betrayal, and not just disappointed goals. The kind of 9 Jackson's account is similar to Shklar's, in focusing on the trustor's violated expectation of loyalty and non-instrumental concern from a trustee, despite trustee assurances to the contrary. He gives an example from Sense and Sensibility: Willoughby's withdrawal from his relationship with Marianne, which – Jackson argues – is technically an abandonment, rather than a betrayal. However, we should resist the move of drawing a clear distinction between betrayal and abandonment (which, to motivate the attachment account, I want to suggest are roughly synonymous). It seems reasonable that Marianne would experience Willoughby's abandonment as a betrayal of trust. To give a comparable example, imagine a close friend one day refuses to speak to you with no explanation, and never again initiates contact. This is an abandonment of the relationship, but also would give rise to feelings of betrayal, insofar as continued contact, and explanation of any withdrawal, is part of what one cares about in a friendship. 12 agent that can trust or distrust in the way we do, is the kind of agent that forms attachments, and is then prone to attitudes that are geared toward preservation of attachments. Others can threaten the security of those attachments by displaying our seeming lack of worth to them, or to the group. They can display that lack of worth in their actions toward us: showing that they do not care about the fact that we care about whatever matter they disappoint us on. This carries the realisation that we cannot count on the other to look out for us. That is the general form of the account of the particular vulnerability of matters of trust I argue for. How does the attachment account help where the commitment account was lacking? The key issue with the commitment account was that it focused on what is required for trustees to be culpable for betrayals, not on what trustor vulnerability to betrayal consists in. In the next section, I use the attachment account to resolve the difficulties that faced the commitment account. First, though, I put it to work in shedding more light on the 'confidence trickster' case – why the trickster does not trust the mark – that does not require us to appeal to the 'bindingness' of the mark's commitment to the trickster, as the commitment account did. 5. Explaining the confidence trickster and misaligned commitment cases Recall the confidence trickster case. The trickster has an instrumental interest in the mark's action, insofar as it would help the trickster. The trickster doesn't have a vulnerability that is characteristic of trustors. The mark failing to fall for the con doesn't amount to a rejection of the trickster, because the trickster didn't make himself vulnerable in the way he could be rejected. This avoidance of social vulnerability is an aspect of his manipulative behaviour: he manoeuvres outside of the group, being parasitic on it, but not participating in it, in a way that could then make him vulnerable to being rejected from it. Furthermore, the explanation for why the trickster is not betrayable qua reactive attitude, isn't that the mark fails to make a genuine binding commitment. This is the explanation the commitment account resorted to. But this puts the cart before the horse. It is actually the case that the mark's commitment being non-binding is partly the result of the trickster not being betrayable qua reactive attitude; by the trickster not caring in the manner of a trustor about whether the mark acts as promised. Commitments bind, partly because of the possibility of causing a sense of betrayal, should they not be fulfilled. For instance, commitments that are about things the other simply doesn't care about, do not bind. Imagine that your colleague promises to bring you a CD of his new self-produced album, because he is under the misapprehension that you really care about hearing it. But you don't care about this at all.10 The expressed commitment your colleague makes is non-binding 10 I am construing the kind of process that gives rise to binding commitments as similar to that set out in Scanlon's (1990) account of promising, and Black's (2004) discussion of whether obligations can be incurred through reliance. Both involve a set of conditions that stipulate an obligation to another to φ, can only go through when X and Y mutually recognise that Y wants X to φ, and that X is encouraging 13 because you simply don't care; you are not made vulnerable to him in the manner of a trustor, by his promise. You couldn't truly hold him accountable, except in a disingenuous way, should he fail to bring the CD. Alternatively, imagine that I care about having my colleague's CD, because I know I can use it to mock him with others at work. I do not elicit my colleague's commitment from deceitful means, like the trickster; I simply accept it when he makes the promise, seeing an opportunity for some fun at his expense. In this case, again, his commitment is not binding, partly because I am not taking him up on the offer in the right spirit, and am not vulnerable to a sense of social rejection and so disrupted attachment, should he fail to bring it in. My orientation toward the situation is in fact being intent on fuelling the group singling out him. The point is that commitments do not bind ex nihilo. The machinery of binding commitment clicks into place when it matters to us, in a non-instrumental way, that others follow through on what they say they will do. This happens when others could display how little they care about the fact we are reliant or dependent on them for something, and for this to matter to us in a particular way. That particular way is when the security of our attachment to them, or our sense of belonging in the group, could be shaken by their (in)action. That's when the protomoralising of trust and distrust kicks into gear. We can also explain what is going on in the 'misalignment' cases where trustors are vulnerable to betrayal in spite of explicit trustee commitments to the contrary. To extend the 'no-stringsattached' metaphor; in those misalignment cases, it seemed that trustors tangled themselves on loose strings, that explicit commitments were meant to 'snip' away. This is because those commitments, that were clarified and even accepted by a trustor, do not necessarily have the power to override that trustor's deeper need for secure attachment. In the casual relationship case, strings can become attached (one or more participants are susceptible to becoming betrayable) despite explicit declarations that they aren't supposed to be. Over time, one side could demonstrate a lack of concern about the other's felt need for sexual fidelity, simply because it may not have been recognised (and presumably not desired) that this need had taken root. The process of affiliative bonding that sexual intercourse fuels, can of course creep up on casual sexual partners. Similarly, the veteran was vulnerable just by virtue of being attached to his side; feeling a sense of belonging within it.11 Even if he accepted the policy that officer's safety was priority for his side, this again does not override the basic concern he had: that he mattered to the side he was (in some sense) Y to believe that X will φ. Other accounts of promissory obligation state that the obligation holding depends on X's reliance on Y being invited, on the basis that Y recognises that the matter is practically important to X. (Friedrich & Southwood 2011; Pink 2009; Thomson 1990). The point is that promises cannot obligate promisors to actions, that a promisee just does not care about being performed. The same is surely true of commitments more generally. 11 Military units are notoriously closely bonded, and this is often part of the selling point that the military uses in attracting potential recruits. 14 attached to. In these misalignment kind of cases, windows of vulnerability become opened, that explicitly stated or clarified commitments have limited power to shut. These windows of vulnerability open up when it is simply possible for the trustee to display how the trustor ultimately does not matter that much, and this can be possible just by virtue of the trustor becoming attached to the trustee. In the next section, I address a possible objection to the attachment account. This is the objection from non-intimates: non-intimates can trust and betray one another but are often not attached. Therefore, the attachment account is false, because attachment is not necessary for betrayability. 6. Matters of trust with non-intimates The objection from non-intimates goes as follows: it may seem plausible that an attachment concern underpins matters of trust with those we already have close relationships with. But what about when we trust strangers/non-intimates? It still matters that non-intimates fulfil our trust, even if those are on more mundane or practical matters, and it is still possible that nonintimates can betray our trust. But it seems less clear that our vulnerability is in a shaken attachment to those strangers, because surely, we have no prior attachment to them. Of course, I grant we can trust those we do not have a personal relationship with. And, matters of trust can be about the relatively mundane. You can trust the plumber to fix the boiler, but you are not strongly attached to the plumber (even if you are fond of them). As such, if the attachment account is meant to explain the vulnerability of any matter of trust, we need to square how it is an attachment concern at stake, even in trust or distrust of such non-intimates on mundane matters. My proposal here – which has been foreshadowed – is that we are (often via our close attachments), attached more generally to a social group. A sense of secure belonging to a group is core to our security and wellbeing. Matters of trust with non-intimates can strike at our attachment security, insofar as they reflect the security of our attachment to the group. They are windows of vulnerability where others can demonstrate our apparent lack of worth to the group. And this makes us betrayable, because we have a social dependence on the group at large. Literature on the negative effect that social isolation has on our wellbeing supports the idea that group belonging matters in the deep sense of attachment. For example, Brownlee (2013) puts forward a defence in favour of a right to social contact with anyone – not just intimates – such that social deprivation is a violation of human rights. In defence of this she cites cases that illustrate the effects of social deprivation on astronauts, long-distance solo sailors, and prisoners left in solitary confinement. In each case, the effect of isolation constitutes not just emotional but also physical harm, such is the strength of the need for social contact. The behaviour of individuals subjected to isolation tends to become driven around the procurement 15 of interactions with others, with long-distance sailors coming to \"depend on radio and video communications for social contact\" (2013 pp. 205–6). This is the drive for securing attachment to the group, manifesting in desperate ways, in situations of extreme isolation. Similarly, Cacioppo & Patrick (2008) argue that loneliness and social isolation have a profoundly deleterious effect on physical and emotional wellbeing. They suggest that the \"special balm of acceptance that [social] bonds provide, and the uniquely disturbing pain of rejection when they are denied, is what makes humans so highly attuned to social evaluation. We care deeply what others think of us, and this is why, of the ten most common phobias that cause people to seek treatment, three have to do with social anxiety: fear of speaking in public, fear of crowds, fear of meeting new people.\" Like Brownlee, they note the punishment of banishment/ostracism constitutes \"the most severe punishment, short of torture or death,\" and that this is why in modern prisons, \"the penalty of last resort is solitary confinement.\" (2008 pp. 10–1). The lasting effects of isolation take their toll in physical health, even in cardiovascular functioning (2008 p. 31), because of the stressful effect of ongoing feelings of abandonment resulting from isolation. In a matter of trust with a non-intimate, she has the capacity to make clear our lack of worth, so manifesting our lack of worth to the group more generally. It is in that interaction with her we glimpse the possibility of being left behind by others. If a non-intimate is in a position to demonstrate concern for us, via fulfilling our reliance on her, then that situation could become a matter of trust; we are vulnerable to her in the sense we have a need to be anchored within a wider group, of which she is also a member. It is telling that the effect of being short-changed, let down, or betrayed, in an interaction with a non-intimate, will prompt the sort of assurance/soothing seeking behaviour descended from that we see in a child left in the strange situation, who seeks reassurance from her returned caregiver. We might appeal to those we have close attachments to, such as our friends, to validate that what the other person did to us was 'not on'. What we are doing is seeking the comfort of secure bonds, to reassure us of our worth to the group. If our friends don't validate us in that situation, we will be betrayed twice-over; first by the action of the unknown, then by our friends. We will likely feel rejection more strongly, as a result of the latter. The close relationships we have anchor us in a wider group. Alternatively, we sometimes require the validation of the group more broadly. Herman (2001) notes that the shattering of basic trust experienced in severe trauma, requires validation from the community as a whole, to be overcome. When the group fails to recognise and express genuine non-instrumental concern for the victim's standing in the group, the victim can feel lingering betrayal and ongoing distress. What the group does to us, and how the group responds to what members do to us, matters to us non-instrumentally. It's plausible to suppose that the legal institutions we have to resolve disputes and rule on accusations of harm are, at some level, functions of our felt need for validation and assurance from the group. When another exploits our position of vulnerability or fails to express the non-instrumental concern we need in such a position, we seek the affirmation from the group that we do indeed matter (plus, that the other 16 person is made to understand this). But when the group as a whole responds with indifference, or against us, we feel betrayed, because our lack of worth to the group then is communicated clearly. A final bit of support for the proposal that we have a need to belong to a group comes from Gudrun (2016), who notes the importance of low level gestures of goodwill and concern in neighbourhoods comprised of individuals from diverse backgrounds. Gudrun points out from an ethnographic study that, while large diverse neighbourhoods don't foster many personal trust relationships, neighbours place an importance on feeling \"safe\" (2016 p. 27). A large part of this feeling of safety hinges on conventions among residents of expressing minor gestures of social contact and recognition, such as nodding or greeting when walking on the same paths, fostering feelings of connection among different and relatively unknown individuals (2016 p. 31). While these neighbours don't place importance on close trust relationships with their neighbours, this isn't as important to them as the feeling that they themselves matter at a basic level to their fellow residents. This enables high levels of basic trust to be upheld, and a sense of safety as part of a group, even when surrounded by relative unknowns. Just because matters of trust between non-intimates appear not to require prior personal attachments, this does not entail that our attachment security isn't the underlying concern in our interactions with non-intimates. It just so happens the attachment concern at issue can be to the group. Even in the detached exchanges of the marketplace, the possibility of such exchanges being construed as matters of trust, means they create the risk of the trustor experiencing social rejection. The marketplace, after all, is a space of shared activity, governed by rules of fair exchange, buttressed by legal institutions to enforce them. Those rules are a reflection of a concern to maintain group cohesion, to ensure that we are validated in cases of being victim to another's betrayal. We need rules that 'contain' the fallout of upset that results from selfish, disrespectful behaviour, to minimise retaliatory action, so individuals can remain assured about engaging in that shared activity. Onora O'Neill remarks that Baier's view, which emphasises interpersonal relationships, is \"nostalgic,\" and not for \"trust in a complex social world\" (Lagerspetz 2015 p. 49). She fails to recognise that the beating heart of matters of trust, in a complex social world, is our need for a sense of belonging to, mattering to, a group, and the individuals within it. The above discussion may explain how matters of trust can be had with those belonging to a group we identify with. But what of matters with those who do not belong to a group we identify with, as in a 'state of nature' case, encountering a complete unknown? My suggestion is that such an interaction can still implicate a potential for an attachment, either to the individual, or to the group this unknown belongs to. This, combined with the well-supported empirical claim that most of us have a disposition to seek out secure attachments (e.g. see the long-distance sailors Brownlee refers to), means that we can treat an interaction with a complete unknown as a matter of trust. On the other hand, if we are fearful, or wary, of an unknown, to the point we don't open ourselves to the opportunity to receive their help, then we may be unable to get the ball rolling on that potential attachment. But it may be that this 17 unknown has the ability to help us out anyway, so riding roughshod over our defences that we put up, eliciting our attachment regardless. 7. The betrayability of distrust In this final section, I use the attachment account to shed light on why we can be betrayed by those we distrust. The answer to this is hinted in the last paragraph of the previous section: it can still be important to us that we matter to those who we withdraw from or are wary of. This is even if our distrust is pulling us away from them and inclining us toward putting up our defences. There is a feeling of tension in distrusting another. This partly results from an underlying concern for belonging we have, combined with the protective urge to pull away, to protect ourselves from the one we distrust. The attachment account helps explain this. Those we distrust, I suggest, have our attachment concern 'in their teeth', perhaps via promises they make to us. Consider the accompanying feeling of warmth and relief, when someone we previously distrusted, turns out to have our concerns at heart. This motivates the sort of bonding process we see, noted by Hawley, when we express sorrow for having previously distrusted another, who instead fulfils our trust (2014 p. 3). If there was no attachment concern we had about the one we distrusted, prior to being helped by her, then the follow-up process of expressing sorrow would not involve the relief that we can trust her. There would be nothing to express relief about, because how she regarded us would not previously have mattered in the way it does in matters of trust. Attachment concern underpins distrust, and the attachment account can help explain the claim that has been noted previously, that it is possible to be betrayed by those we distrust. We can, because we can have attachment concerns about those we distrust. Felt trust is not a prerequisite of betrayability. To illustrate this, we can consider a point that Hieronymi (2008) makes in defence of the opposite claim. Hieronymi argues that the degree to which we trustingly believe another will fulfil our reliance on her, is also the degree to which we can be betrayed. Hieronymi compares two examples; (i) we trust a friend with a secret and \"fully believe\" that she is trustworthy; (ii) we have doubts about our friend who we tell a secret, and merely 'entrust' the secret to her. Suppose in both cases the friend tells our secret to others. Hieronymi claims that in the first case, where we had a fully trusting belief in the friend, we are more betrayed than in the second case (2008 p. 230). Hieronymi also suggests that we often mitigate the possibility of betrayal by mitigating our trusting belief (2008 p. 231), i.e. we tell ourselves we never trusted the friend anyway. This is why, she argues, the case of merely entrusting the secret to your friend has lesser betrayability than the first case. 18 But Hieronymi gives no argument for agreeing that we will necessarily feel more betrayed in the first case than the second. While it might be right that being distrustful of another can incline us to begin the process of detaching from her, which shields us against the painful feelings of betrayal, this is distinct from actually not being vulnerable to feeling betrayed. Put simply: distrusting another on a matter doesn't diminish the extent to which we can be betrayed on the matter. Consider Yolanda who strongly suspects her partner Xavier of cheating and is nonetheless severely betrayed when her suspicions are confirmed. Perhaps after many repeated violations of trust, Yolanda will have begun to detach to the point that the betrayals no longer sting. But this is not mitigating the extent of the trust attitude, it is mitigating the extent of her attachment.12 Conclusion I have defended an account of the vulnerability of trust and distrust: the attachment account. The attachment account is well suited to explaining what the characteristic vulnerability of matters of trust is, so what trust and distrust are at a deeper level about. The account explains that matters of trust carry a characteristic interpersonal importance, stemming from an underlying need for secure attachments, to individuals and to a group. This attachment concern can be implicated in situations where we rely or depend on others, where we also have a practical concern about how others act. This is because in matters of trust, another can demonstrate their lack of concern about us, by failing to take into account something we care about, in their actions. Complete unknowns can elicit our need for secure attachment, through promises of help. Overall, matters of trust present to us opposing horizons. Beyond one lies increased contentment and a feeling of belonging. Beyond the other lies the pain of rejection. 12 Hieronymi is inconsistent on this issue, as she elsewhere claims that distrust is able to be betrayed (2008 p. 229). 19 References Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1969). 'Object Relations, Dependency, and Attachment: A Theoretical Review of the Infant-Mother Relationship', Child Development, 40/4: 969–1025. DOI: 10.2307/1127008 Baier, A. (1986). 'Trust and Antitrust', Ethics, 96/2: 231–60. Black, O. (2004). 'Reliance and Obligation', Ratio Juris, 17/3: 269–284. Bosmans, G., Braet, C., & Van Vlierberghe, L. (2010). 'Attachment and symptoms of psychopathology: early maladaptive schemas as a cognitive link?', Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 17/5: 374–85. DOI: 10.1002/cpp.667 Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss, Volume I: Attachment. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. --. (1973). Attachment and Loss: Volume II: Separation, Anxiety and Anger. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. --. (1980). Attachment and Loss, Volume III: Loss, Sadness and Depression. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Brownlee, K. (2013). 'A Human Right Against Social Deprivation', The Philosophical Quarterly, 63/251: 199–222. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12018 Cacioppo, J. T., & Patrick, W. (2008). Loneliness: human nature and the need for social connection., 1st. ed. New York: Norton. Dai, L., Carter, C. S., Ying, J., Bellugi, U., Pournajafi-Nazarloo, H., & Korenberg, J. R. (2012). 'Oxytocin and Vasopressin Are Dysregulated in Williams Syndrome, a Genetic Disorder Affecting Social Behavior', (D. A. Slattery, Ed.)PLoS ONE, 7/6: e38513. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0038513 Dobbs, D. (2007). 'The Gregarious Brain'. The New York Times Magazine. Doyle, T. F., Bellugi, U., Korenberg, J. R., & Graham, J. (2004). '\"Everybody in the world is my friend\" hypersociability in young children with Williams syndrome', American Journal of Medical Genetics Part A, 124A/3: 263–73. DOI: 10.1002/ajmg.a.20416 Friedrich, D., & Southwood, N. (2011). 'Promises and Trust'. Sheinman H. (ed.) Promises and Agreement: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. Gudrun, J. T. (2016). 'Neither Trust Nor Distrust', Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 6/1: 25–32. DOI: 10.1515/njmr-2016-0009 Hawley, K. (2014). 'Trust, Distrust and Commitment', Noûs, 48/1: 1–20. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12000 Herman, J. L. (2001). Trauma and Recovery. Pandora. 20 Hieronymi, P. (2008). 'The reasons of trust', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86/2: 213– 36. DOI: 10.1080/00048400801886496 Holton, R. (1994). 'Deciding to trust, coming to believe', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72/1: 63–76. DOI: 10.1080/00048409412345881 Jackson, R. L. (2000). 'The Sense and Sensibility of Betrayal: Discovering the Meaning of Treachery Through Jane Austen', Humanitas, 13/2: 72–89. Järvinen-Pasley, A., Bellugi, U., Reilly, J., Mills, D. L., Galaburda, A., Reiss, A. L., & Korenberg, J. R. (2008). 'Defining the Social Phenotype in Williams Syndrome: A Model for Linking Gene, the Brain, and Behavior', Development and psychopathology, 20/1: 1–35. DOI: 10.1017/S0954579408000011 Jones, K. (2004). 'Trust and Terror'. DesAutels P. & Walker M. U. (eds) Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, pp. 3–18. Rowman & Littlefield. Lagerspetz, O. (2015). Trust, ethics, and human reason. London: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2012). 'An attachment perspective on psychopathology', World Psychiatry, 11/1: 11–5. Moseley, T. (2014). 'What Happens When You Trust Too Much'. The Atlantic. Retrieved March 30, 2016, from <http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/05/going-towork-with-williams-syndrome/361374/> Ng, R., Fillet, P., DeWitt, M., Heyman, G. D., & Bellugi, U. (2015). 'Reasoning About Trust Among Individuals With Williams Syndrome', American Journal on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 120/6: 527–41. DOI: 10.1352/1944-7558-120.6.527 Pink, T. (2009). 'Promising and Obligation', Philosophical Perspectives, 23/1: 389–420. Riby, D. M., Kirk, H., Hanley, M., & Riby, L. M. (2014). 'Stranger danger awareness in Williams syndrome', Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 58/6: 572–82. DOI: 10.1111/jir.12055 Scanlon, T. (1990). 'Promises and Practices', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19/3: 199–226. Shklar, J. N. (1984). 'The Ambiguities of Betrayal'. Ordinary Vices. Harvard University Press. Strawson, P. F. (1974). Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Methuen: London. Thomas, L. (1989). 'Trust and Survival: Securing a Vision of the Good Society', Journal of Social Philosophy, 20/1–2: 34–41. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1989.tb00005.x Thomson, J. J. (1990). 'Giving One's Word'. The Realm of Rights. Harvard University Press. Wonderly, M. L. (2016). 'On being attached', Philosophical Studies, 173/1: 223–42. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0487-", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Getting Priority Straight Louis deRosset December 2, 2009 Consider the kinds of macroscopic concrete objects that common sense and the sciences allege to exist:1 tables, raindrops, tectonic plates, galaxies, and the rest. Are there any such things? Opinions differ. Ontological liberals say they do; ontological radicals say they don't. Liberalism seems favored by its plausible acquiescence to the dictates of common sense abetted by science; radicalism by its ontological parsimony. Priority theorists claim we can have the virtues of both views. They hold that tables, raindrops, etc., exist, but they aren't fundamental. The ontological liberal's ontology provides the correct inventory of existent individuals. The ontological radical's more restricted ontology provides the correct inventory of fundamental individuals. The priority theorist claims that the derivative individuals are \"no addition in being\" to the fundamental ones,2 so we can have our cake and eat it too. It would be nice if priority theorists were right. In this paper I argue, with regret, that they are not. One upshot is that explanations of the sort which underwrite the priority theorist's distinction between fundamental and derivative individuals do not mitigate our ontological commitments. Another is that we still have to choose between the charms of liberalism and radicalism.3 Here is the plan. I will start by trying to get a little clearer on what the 1Quine (1948) was prepared to give the word \"exists\" to philosophers who wanted to distinguish claims about what there is from claims about what exists. I am for stylistic reasons unwilling to be so generous. So when I talk about a particular thing's existing I always have in mind the claim that there is something identical to that thing. Likewise, when I speak generically, saying, \"F 's exist\", I always have in mind the claim that there are some F 's. 2The metaphorical expression \"no addition to being\" is borrowed from (Armstrong, 1997, p. 12). 3I am assuming throughout that what Quine (1948) called the ontological question, \"what is there?\" is both meaningful and univocal, and that radicalism and liberalism provide competing partial answers to that question. No choice between radicalism and liberalism will be necessary if this assumption fails.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "1 Philosophical Research on Mary Shepherd (1999-2005) Jennifer McRobert 1. Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation, Part Two (2003), book manuscript, last saved December 31, 2003 2. Mary Shepherd's Two Senses of Necessary Connection (2002), CPA paper, last saved December 20, 2002 3. Mary Shepherd and the University (2002), book manuscript, last saved May 30, 2002 4. Mary Shepherd's Refutation of Idealism (1999), CPA commentary and paper, last saved October 1999 The book manuscript Mary Shepherd and the University (2002), included below, was in the process of being split into two works, Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation, Part One and Part Two (2003) and How Hume Became a Sceptic (2005) when I left academia in 2005. Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation, Part Two (2003) was to provide an overview of Mary Shepherd's main philosophical contributions, particularly as concerns the causal relation. A further book was also projected. This book (primarily relating to Mary Shepherd's involvement with the ideas, figures and movements in the four major universities in Britain, and potentially, the Philosophy of Theism (1857)), would have been based on the remnant material in the original book manuscript, Mary Shepherd and the University (2002). Mary Shepherd and the University (2002) was converted from an older Word Perfect format and contains bad characters. The text of Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation, Part Two (2003) is disjointed in places. Material was roughly situated in 2003, when the manuscript was set aside for future revision. The papers Mary Shepherd's Refutation of Idealism (1999) and Mary Shepherd's Two Senses of Necessary Connection (2002) were read at Canadian Philosophical Association meetings sometime between 1998 and 2003. There are too many errors, typos, formatting challenges &c. to fully address (at this time). An updated version of this file will be uploaded in the near future. The substantive content will remain the same, but a list of the most glaring textual errors will be provided, the text will be formatted. In the meantime, the material is posted here for the benefit of interested historians, philosophers & others. Contents Mary Shepherd and the University (2002) Babbage Correspondence Errata (forthcoming) Notes for Revisions 4 2 Draft of original Mary Shepherd Book (last saved May 30, 2002) Mary Shepherd and the University By Jennifer McRobert Book 1: Philosophy and Fealty Chapter 1: The Scottish Origins of Mary Primrose 1.1 The Primrose Ancestry 1.2 Scholasticism and the Curriculum 1.3 Hume and the Limits of Moderation 1.4 A Childhood in Dalmeny Chapter 2: The Town and Gown Politics of John Leslie 2.1 Dangerous Philosophy 2.2 Metaphysical Footnotes 2.3 Edinburgh Debates the Causal Relation 2.4 Brown's Observations and Shepherd's Reply Chapter 3: The Causal Relation 3.1 Spurious Connections: Leslie, Malthus, and Common Law 3.2 Brown's Inquiry and Whately's Historic Doubts 3.3 The Trials of Carlile and Leslie 3.4 The Causal Relation Reconsidered Book 2: Education and Reform Chapter 4: Mary Shepherd's Salon: Science and Society 4.1 Shepherd's Circle of Literati, Scientists and Publishers 4.2 Kant and the Philosophical Radicals 4.3 Causality and the Unity of Knowledge 4.4 Systematic Philosophy and the 1827 Essays Chapter 5: The Camera Obscura and the Difference Engine 5.1 Empiricism and the Camera Obscura 5.2 The Difference Engine and 'Modified Berkeleian Theory' 5.3 The Logic of Induction and Confirmation 5.4 On Necessary Connection: A Philosophical Answer to Hume 4 3 Chapter 6: On the Causes of University Reform 6.1 The New University and the Via Media 6.1 Science, Technology, and Liberal Education 6.2 University Reform: Edinburgh and New College 6.4 Mary Shepherd and Scottish Philosophy Synopsis Mary Shepherd and the University -Jennifer McRobert Mary Shepherd's life and work are bound together with the issues of academic freedom and the university. Theoretical and practical questions ranging from ideas on causality and theism to political moderatism and university reform draw the attention of Mary Shepherd and her contemporaries. The cluster of subtle and complex issues facing those living in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, and the strategies adopted to bring about university reform, provide insights for contemporary readers. Book 1: Philosophy and Fealty Chapter 1: The Scottish Origins of Mary Primrose 1.1 The Primrose Ancestry Mary Shepherd is born Mary Primrose on 31 December 1777. The daughter of an Earl, she is raised on a country estate near Edinburgh during the Scottish Enlightenment. Mary Primrose was very much a product of her family traditions and Scottish heritage, and the circumstances of the Primrose family's rise to prominence help to define her outlook. 1.2 Scholasticism and the Curriculum Following the turn of the eighteenth century, the political scene in Edinburgh is dominated by a Presbyterian-Whig alliance. The political dynamic is evident in records relating to Edinburgh University. Faculty and Town Council dispute the status of Edinburgh's professors and discuss matters relating to the curriculum. The old Regency system is abandoned. Professors are recruited on the basis of specialization and merit. Updates to the scholastic curriculum include the study of Bacon, Newton, and Locke. 1.3 Hume and the Limits of Moderation In the mid-eighteenth century, amidst Jacobite unrest, David Hume applies for the Chair in Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh University. As author of a treatise that challenges the foundation for belief in the existence of God, Hume is accused of atheism. For most of Edinburgh's establishment, this accusation presents an open-and-shut case against his candidature. Though there is growing support for moderatism, the bounds of tolerance cannot be made to stretch to a perceived case of atheism. The political and intellectual controversy in the Hume affair is insubstantial; yet, over the decades, there is continued interest in Hume and his philosophy. 1.4 A Childhood in Dalmeny Mary Primrose enjoys a rather idyllic childhood in the countryside near Edinburgh, after a pattern prescribed and romanticized by writers such as Locke and Rousseau. She is one of a fortunate minority of Scottish girls to receive instruction from a 'Dominie'; one Mr. Pillans. Her 4 4 education includes subjects considered crucial for higher learning, such as Latin, mathematics, and philosophy. As Mary Primrose's youth comes to a close, there is a growing sense of conservatism in Edinburgh. This conservatism is bolstered by fears of social unrest -a possibility made vivid by the French Revolution. In sounding the alarm, the finger of blame is pointed at the moderate leadership and the ideological defense of liberty and tolerance. Chapter 2: The Town and Gown Politics of John Leslie 2.1 Dangerous Philosophy Shepherd's first book, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, published anonymously in 1824, is best understood in connection with the 1805 election of John Leslie to a Chair at Edinburgh University. The controversy around Leslie's appointment echoes the earlier controversy regarding the appointment sought by Hume. Given the unanimous censure of Hume, there had been little need to vet the charges against him in any sort of debate; it was apparent to all that Hume's dangerous philosophy of 'heresy, deism, scepticism and atheism' would have to be quashed. In the long run, both Hume's doctrine and the issues around academic freedom and religious tests receive a public hearing. This hearing, which ensues long after Hume has been laid to rest, is initiated by the Leslie episode. 2.2 Metaphysical Footnotes The question of whether Leslie's endorsement of Hume requires the exercise of the Minister's avisamentum regarding university appointments becomes a matter of controversy. Leslie's remarks are worrisome to the pious, but many feel that the proceedings against him are unfair. The Leslie affair becomes the subject of considerable ridicule. As part of the public discussion, there is frequent jibing about the significance of footnotes in scholarship. Numerous texts reserve serious discussion for footnotes, or claim that the serious discussion had been moved from footnotes, or that an important point will follow in the footnotes, and so on. Though the Leslie affair did reach comic proportions, the underlying issues were far from superficial. On a more solemn note, Professor John Playfair expressed regret for the underlying social dimension. Playfair sums up his concerns in a moving plea for academic freedom. 2.3 Edinburgh Debates the Causal Relation Hume's arguments cast serious doubt on our capacity to arrive at certain knowledge of causal relations and undermine traditional proofs for the existence of God. By 1805, Edinburgh's literary community has had ample opportunity to read and reflect upon his work. The philosophical community in Edinburgh is also aware of Kant's interest in Hume. The conceptual issues underlying the charges against Leslie come to hold considerable interest in Edinburgh, and the Leslie affair takes on the character of a public debate. Leading scholars in Scotland's universities, including Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, take up the defence of Hume and Leslie, arguing that Hume's philosophy does not in fact lead to atheism. In the debate, empiricism triumphs over scholasticism. 2.4 Brown's Observations and Shepherd's Reply Having engaged the subject of Hume's philosophy in a series of youthful 'metaphysical disquisitions', Mary Primrose is convinced that Hume's doctrine does in fact lead to atheism. Philosophically, her ambition is to advance a theory of ideas that can defeat the sceptical arguments of Hume. She appeals to reason's introspective discovery of the causal relation, and claims that the causal relation is a condition of representation. Her specific target in the Edinburgh debate is Thomas Brown's 1805 Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr Hume concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect. Her strategy in responding to Brown fills a gap in the Leslie affair noticed by David Brewster -the debate had ignored the a priori defense of the causal relation. 4 5 Chapter 3: The Causal Relation 3.1 Spurious Connections: Leslie, Malthus, and Common Law There is a gap of nearly twenty years between the Edinburgh controversy of 1805 and the publication of the 1824 treatise. In 1808, Mary Primrose marries a barrister named Henry John Shepherd, after which she becomes known under her married name of Lady Mary Shepherd. Henry John Shepherd is the son of Sir Samuel Shepherd, a prominent member of the British legal profession. Prior to the marriage, in 1807, William Kerr publishes A Summons of Wakening, a text that mixes together methodological criticisms and personal attacks. In one breath, Kerr claims that scientific experimentalism is a dangerous and 'heterogeneous mixture of truth, falsehood, and speculative opinions'. In another, he likens Leslie to the Devil and Malthus to Paine. Kerr proposes that laws be introduced to limit the press. Kerr's text provides important clues to the wider social context in which the response to Hume is best understood. 3.2 Brown's Inquiry and Whately's Historic Doubts In 1818 and 1819, respectively, Brown and Whately publish on the subject of causality. These publications stand in contrast to the 1824 contribution of Mary Shepherd. Brown's 1818 work develops his 1805 analysis. Brown's view is that causal beliefs arise immediately from sensations in conscious experience. He argues that we are subject to feelings that lead irresistibly and intuitively to belief in an external world --feelings that compel us to form beliefs about external causes. Shepherd rejects Brown's empiricism, which she takes to be an invitation to scepticism. In an altogether different approach, Whately's Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Buonaparte runs together the image of the Humean sceptic and the Napoleonist in an amusing and socially telling way. Whately's strategy is to shift the burden of doubt onto the sceptic. Shepherd objects to the purely deductive approach in Whately, which is insufficient to quell the sceptical worry raised by Hume. 3.3 The Trials of Carlile and Leslie Mary Shepherd's life is once again filled with the same controversy, persecution, and party politics that prompted the Leslie affair in 1805. Circumstances conspire to place her father-in-law at the center of the 1819 prosecution of Richard Carlile for the publication of Paine's Age of Reason. Following the trial, Sir Samuel Shepherd resigns his position as King's Advocate and becomes Exchequer for Scotland. The story leads us back to Edinburgh and to another Summons -the summons of William Blackwood for publishing slanders against John Leslie. It turns out that the Carlile and Leslie trials bear circumstantial and social connections dating back to the days of the original Leslie controversy. 3.4 The Causal Relation Reconsidered Attention to the nature of scientific reasoning is required for an adequate response to Hume's scepticism. Shepherd's full response to Hume is founded on an alternative account of how the causal relation is first discovered and then justified as an objective, a priori feature of representation. Shepherd proposes an experimentalism based on a two-step method. The first step, which leads to the discovery of causal relations, is inductive. The second step, which involves the justification of causal necessity, is deductive. The discussion and debate surrounding causality and induction in Shepherd's circle influences the direction of the 1824 treatise. Book 2: Education and Reform Chapter 4: Mary Shepherd's Salon: Science and Society 4.1 Shepherd's Circle of Literati, Scientists and Publishers 4 6 Many of the Shepherds' friends were interested in reform. Shepherd frequently entertained members of the legal community, aristocrats, publishers, and a considerable number of socalled 'Benthamites' and philosophical radicals. An important influence on Mary Shepherd's thought appears to derive from the political economists in her circle. Shepherd's connections to individuals such as David Ricardo shed light not only on her personal and political convictions, but also on the systematic approach in the development of her philosophy. 4.2 Kant and the Philosophical Radicals James Mill and David Ricardo help to rekindle the British interest in Kant. Mill argues that a deduction from fixed principles governing human nature provides the basis for a science of government. This is an approach that critics, such as Macaulay, deride. David Ricardo is similarly criticized for his adherence to Say's Law and for his abstract approach in political economy. Like Mill, Ricardo, and others, Shepherd is influenced by the ideal of a systematic philosophy advanced by thinkers such as Kant. 4.3 Causality and the Unity of Knowledge Shepherd's theory of representation bears affinities to Kant's. Shepherd's view is that in the act of representation, the mind brings together sensations of sensible qualities and sensations of ideas of cause and effect, forming compound objects. Shepherd holds that there are a posteriori and a priori elements in representation and argues that knowledge is inferred from marks of objectivity and necessity in representation. The concept of causality is central in Shepherd's philosophy and is the foundation for systematic unity in her thought. Shepherd's views on causality and subsumption show an appreciation for the sense in which Kant views a priori features of representation as criteria for truth and necessity in empirical knowledge 4.4 Systematic Philosophy and the 1827 Essays For those involved in the second wave of interest in Kant, the criteria of adequacy for scientific theories include subsumption under causal laws. In Shepherd's 1827 Essays, it becomes apparent that the causal axiom serves as a fundamental subsumptive law. The view of scientific theories held by Shepherd and members of her circle is examined. Chapter 5: The Camera Obscura and the Difference Engine 5.1 Empiricism and the Camera Obscura Shepherd appeals to the metaphor of the camera obscura to describe the relation between processes in the mind, representations, and the external world. In 1801, Villers had used the metaphor of the camera obscura to explain the sense of inference in Kant's transcendental philosophy. Thomas Brown and other empiricists had rejected the metaphor, charging that the camera obscura would never be able to draw inferences. Shepherd resurrects the metaphor in 1832, revealing a fundamental sympathy with transcendentalism. 5.2 The Difference Engine and 'Modified Berkeleian Theory' In the 1830s, Shepherd takes an interest in the inference-drawing capacity of Babbage's Difference Engine. Just as the Difference Engine calculates tables of data using rules, so too might human beings infer objective knowledge using rules. Shepherd explains her theory of representation by analogy to algebraic signs. 'Now the causes of our ideas', she writes, 'may be considered as simple algebraic quantities', such that in the determination of causes on the mind, their effects may 'be considered as their squares'. 5.3 The Logic of Induction and Confirmation There are a number of important contributions to the physical and social sciences during the first half of the nineteenth century. New views on the logic of induction begin to emerge, and Shepherd's work contributes to these developments. 4 7 5.4 On Necessary Connection: A Philosophical Answer to Hume Shepherd's answer to Hume on necessary connection is a philosophical one, and it helps to advance the intellectual debate on science and scientific reasoning. Shepherd proposes two senses of necessary connection. In one sense, necessary connection is discovered through the use of the causal axiom and its role in our coming to have law-like representations. In another sense, necessary connection is discovered from the evidence of metaphysical necessity in representations of external existence. Taken together, Shepherd attempts to defend a noncircular account of knowledge based on an argument from empiricism to realism. Chapter 6: On the Causes of University Reform 6.1 The New University and the Via Media Many of Shepherd's friends were university, church, and government officials interested in institutional reform. The group that helps to establish London's University College includes several Scots well-known to Mary Shepherd. The new university places emphasis on the science curriculum, 'with deliberate exclusion of theological studies or religious affiliation'. The approach is both novel and controversial, but it sets a new standard for freedom of conscience and free speech in the universities. Despite this, liberal ideas on education are slow to take a hold in the older, established universities. Richard Whately initially welcomes the theological liberalism of the Oxford movement, but when the movement degenerates into destructive party politics, he leaves his position at Oxford. What began in Edinburgh as a 'roasting of Scotch atheists' turned southward in the form of controversy over religion and the curriculum at London, Cambridge, and Oxford. 6.2 Science, Technology, and Liberal Education Shepherd is religiously inclined, but optimistic that there exists harmony between faith and reason. Shepherd and her circle take an interest in both theoretical and practical aspects of science. Whewell casts aspersion on the value of recent scientific research, arguing that new sciences should be gradually introduced into the university curriculum in order to allow plenty of time for an evaluation of their merits. Babbage disagrees with Whewell's assessment, and claims that the government has hindered the progress of science by failing to assist in the development of science, technology, and industry. 6.2 University Reform: New College and Edinburgh As the mid-nineteenth century approaches, little has been done to address the matter of religious oaths in Edinburgh. Those unable or unwilling to swear to the Confession of Faith are still ruled out as candidates for positions at the University. In 1843, Thomas Chalmers founds Edinburgh's New College for the purpose of educating Ministers of the newly formed 'Free Kirk'. New College symbolically achieves a new beginning at Edinburgh. By the mid-1840s, the University Senate begins in earnest to discuss the restriction of religious tests to those involved with the professional training of students in Theology. James Pillans, Professor of Humanities and descendant of Mary Shepherd's tutor, promotes academic freedom at the University. 6.4 Mary Shepherd and Scottish Philosophy Mary Shepherd's philosophical work is best understood in light of Scottish philosophy and the empiricist response to Hume. Shepherd and others propose new ideas on causality and induction and advance debates in both science and philosophy. With new ideas of causality and induction in hand, John Stuart Mill, William Hamilton, William Whewell, William George Ward, Alexander Campbell Fraser, and others resume the debate around causality and theism. The new proofs for theism are of limited value, since the arguments turn out to be just as controversial as their forerunners. There are, on the other hand, lasting advances made in philosophy of science, where the new ideas on causality and induction contribute in important 4 8 ways to the discussion and development of ideas on scientific reasoning and theory. Shepherd's contributions to thought on causality and induction are part of a complex reaction to Hume's philosophy, one that is ultimately tied to both ideological and social change in Britain. 4 9 Introduction Mary Shepherd was born Mary Primrose on 31 December 1777. The daughter of an Earl, she grew up on an estate near Edinburgh during the Scottish Enlightenment. Her life and work unfold in three distinct threads; biographical, historical, and philosophical. The first of these threads, the biographical one, traces Shepherd's life and development through various family and social circles in Scotland and England, and offers significant clues to her personal and political outlook. The second, historical thread relates to the educational reform movement in Britain -and to university reform in particular. As Mary Shepherd and her circle move geographically between northern and southern parts of Britain, engaging and initiating important events in the history of university reform, there emerges a definite context and chronology for interpreting her life and work. These biographical and historical details unfold and combine to reveal ongoing interests in the university, in philosophy, and in academic freedom -a pattern of interests that ultimately brings continuity and coherence to Mary Shepherd's life and work. Yet, it is the third and philosophical thread that most clearly speaks to Mary Shepherd's inner life. This thread follows Shepherd's arguments for knowledge of causality and the external world, showing how Shepherd aims to close a gap between scepticism and science by appeal to standards of reason and evidence. As the three distinct threads of the narrative are woven together, it becomes apparent that Mary Shepherd applies the standards of reason and evidence equally to personal, political, and philosophical matters. In the end, there is both coherence and significance to a life and philosophy built upon the foundations of the Enlightenment. The second half of the eighteenth century was a period of relative stability and prosperity for Edinburgh's upper classes. In many respects, Mary Shepherd seems to have enjoyed an idyllic childhood. Born a Primrose, her family was settled in a small thirteenth century castle on an estate outside of Edinburgh. The nobility scattered through the 'numerous towns, villages, seats, [and] woody hills' nearby, were enjoying a period of political stability under a firmly aligned Presbyterian-Whig government. i Like other children living in manorial country homes, Mary Shepherd benefited from the cultural activities and freedoms associated with country living. At the same time, town life, with its more demanding standards of decorum and accomplishment, was never distant; for the Primrose family was well connected in the fashionable and literary circles of Edinburgh and London. Enlightenment ideals prevailed quite generally in the area, and education was an obviously priority. This was especially so in the Primrose household, where the girls and boys each had a tutor. The girls' tutor, a man named Pillans, 'taught the girls Latin, for the basis of language, Geography, Mathematics, History' and 'a vast deal of thinking upon the elements of Truth as to things in general.' ii Pillans encouraged his pupils to specialise according to interest and ability, and Mary Shepherd's interests turned to philosophy. Between the ages of 17 and 27, she wrote numerous philosophical manuscripts 'full of metaphysical disquisitions, exposing errors in the reasoning of Hume's atheistical treatises, and the unitarian doctrine of the then new philosopher, Priestley'. iii In fact, a literary culture emerged among the five Primrose siblings, who 'managed to live a very sociable brother and sister life together, with a good deal of love for books, talk, country roaming... [and who] used to write each other long letters like essays, and reply punctually.' iv The love of literary culture would never cease for Mary Shepherd, who, in adulthood, continued to pursue philosophy, developing analyses on topics such as causality, induction, external existence, theism, and so on. On the surface, Mary Shepherd was simply one of among many members of the Scottish nobility who flourished within Edinburgh's Enlightenment culture. That she did so as a woman 4 10 gives her life special interest. However, at a deeper level, her story takes on complexity and significance, and shed new light on history. Shepherd was very much a product of her family traditions and Scottish heritage, so that the circumstances of the Primrose family's rise to prominence help to define the ideological boundary of her political outlook. This boundary broadly encompasses various forms of what we might think of as political liberalism, but what would then have been designated by the term 'moderatism'. Indeed, the family's rise to prominence during the seventeenth century is marked by her ancestors' service to King James VI, whose later reign was marked by attempts to smooth over differences between Scotland's two main religious groups -Presbyterians and Episcopalians. Although these and other the seventeenth century efforts to cultivate moderatism seem to have failed, the outlook had improved by the eighteenth century, when a conciliatory group of leaders in Edinburgh -including members of the Primrose family -developed a firm alliance based on political compromise. This group succeeded in building a form of moderatism that would influence the religious, political, and intellectual culture of Scotland. In consequence, the second half of the eighteenth century, the period in which Mary Shepherd enjoyed a rather idyllic childhood in the countryside near Edinburgh after a pattern prescribed and romanticised by writers such as Locke, was one of relative peace and stability. Even so, religious conflict and social unrest in Scotland was never far beneath the surface, and as the eighteenth century drew to a close, the new and fragile sense of security that had accompanied the Scottish Enlightenment came under threat. The youth of Mary Shepherd ends amidst a sense of rising panic and a growing conservatism, bolstered by fears of social unrest -a possibility made vivid by the American and French Revolutions. Mary Shepherd, born and raised in the security of political moderatism and enlightenment ideals, witnessed a resurgence of a persecuting spirit that had only just been quelled. This spirit -fed by fear, conflict, and intolerance -had for centuries cursed the progress of Scotland and its people. The relative peace and prosperity that had begun to flourish in Edinburgh was threatened. Those with most to lose, the moderates of the Presbyterian-Whig alliance took a stand in support of tolerance and moderation. Those with most to gain, conservative leaders who had lost power under the Presbyterian-Whig alliance played on people's fears of social instability. In sounding the alarm of social unrest, the finger of blame was pointed at the moderate leadership and their ideological cries for liberty. In an important sense, it is these events, events that mark the rise and fall of moderatism in eighteenth century Edinburgh, which define the edges of the world from which Mary Shepherd and her thought emerged. Mary Shepherd's adult life and interests are further revealed through the people and events that connect her personal story with the history of university reform in Britain. This history is bound up with stories of persecutions, appeals for moderation, and conceptual debates. Shepherd's first book, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, published anonymously in 1824, is best understood in connection with a specific episode in the history of Edinburgh, an episode that began in 1805 and concerned the election of John Leslie to a chair at Edinburgh University. v The controversy around Leslie's appointment echoed an earlier controversy dating back to 1744, a controversy regarding an appointment sought by David Hume. In 1744, David Hume had put forward his candidacy for the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. As author of a treatise that was considered to have challenged the rational foundation for belief in the existence of God, Hume had been accused of atheism. The accusation of atheism against Hume presented, for most of Edinburgh's establishment -few of whom could lay claim to having read and understood Hume's recently published work -an open-and-shut case against Hume's candidature. Given the unanimous censure of the religious community, there was little need to vet the philosophical and theological charges in any sort of debate; it was apparent to all that Hume's dangerous philosophy of 'heresy, deism, scepticism and atheism' would have to be quashed. vi For though there was growing support for freedom of conscience and religious 4 11 tolerance, the bounds of that tolerance could not easily be made to stretch to a perceived case of atheism, which was what most of Edinburgh's leaders were prepared to charge against Hume. In the long run, both Hume's doctrine and the issues that they raised around academic freedom would in fact receive a public hearing. That hearing, which ensued decades after Hume had been laid to rest, occurred as part of the Leslie episode. The vacancy for which Leslie had put forward his candidacy in 1805 was for a Mathematical Chair; however, Leslie had somewhere written a footnote endorsing Hume's doctrine of causation, a subject anathematized by the Ministers of Edinburgh: ...Mr Leslie, having, along with Mr Hume, denied all such necessary connection between cause and effect, as implies an operating principle in the cause, has, of course, laid a foundation for rejecting all argument that is derived from the works of God, to prove either his being or attributes. vii The main tactic of the Ministers was to charge that Leslie's footnote, since it endorsed Hume's view of causality, was an open endorsement of atheism. And, Hume's empiricist analysis of causal inference, it should be remarked, did in fact seem to question the very foundations of theology as understood on the scholastic tradition. This tradition had prevailed throughout Europe prior to the advent of empiricist theories of knowledge, and invoked causal reasoning in support of theism, for instance, in cosmological arguments intended to show that God, as the first cause in the universe, must exist. Hume analysis of causality, however, had shown that we have no rational justification for our expectation that the future will resemble the past, and so led to a general scepticism about casual knowledge, a scepticism that extended to causal proofs of God's existence. Hume notices that we are unable to form a belief in a cause and effect connection after having seen just one instance. Nor are actual causal relations are not known by demonstrative proof or analysis. He thinks that the evidence suggests that causal inference is based on a habit of mind, a habit developed by repeated experiences of resembling cases. If so, Hume reasons, then any justification that we could offer for causal knowledge would be circular. That is, knowledge of a causal relation such as 'The sensible effect of sunlight is caused by the Sun.' seems to depend upon our having knowledge of matters of fact such as 'The sun is a yellow globe in the sky.' At the same time, knowledge of matters of fact such as 'The sun is a yellow globe in the sky.' also depends on our knowledge of the causal relation invoked in the claim that 'The sensible effect of sunlight is caused by the sun.' What this means is that knowledge of matters of fact must depend on causal reasoning; and, knowledge of causal relations must depend on knowledge of matters of fact. So, on Hume's account, the senses enable us to perceive the constant conjunction of events; but we are unable to provide an argument to show that there are necessary connections between causes and effects 'out there' in the world. Hume's subjectivist conclusion is that the idea of necessary connection is a subjective fiction ascribed by the mind when it perceives a constant conjunction of sensible qualities. To many of those versed in philosophy, and particularly in scholastic theology, Hume's arguments concerning causality cast serious doubt on our capacity to arrive at certain knowledge of causal relations. This in turn undermined traditional proofs for the existence of God. By 1805, many in Edinburgh had had ample opportunity to read and reflect upon Hume's work, although the significance of his work was by no means universally agreed upon. Mary Shepherd, however, had already engaged the subject of Hume's philosophy in her youthful metaphysical disquisitions, and she was convinced that his doctrine led to atheism. But the question of whether Hume's atheistic doctrine, and Leslie's endorsement of it, required the 4 12 exercise of the Minister's avisamentum regarding university appointments, was a matter of controversy in its own right. The Professors of the University of Edinburgh questioned this right, and several ministers expressed concerns about its 'proper extent'. viii The attack on Leslie was, according to Dr Hunter, Professor of Divinity, personally devastating. 'He was represented, in the church courts, and even in the public newspapers, as hostile to religion, and as an abettor of atheism, and as having carried the sceptical tenets of Hume further than Hume himself.' ix Those ministers most vocal in their opposition to Leslie were charged by Dugald Stewart, Professor of Moral Philosophy, with exhibiting 'an unbecoming zeal' unworthy of genuine moderation and as 'tending to persecution'. x Following the leadership of Stewart, members of Faculty and other moderate leaders in Edinburgh stood behind Leslie's right to academic freedom -while also arguing that Hume's philosophy did not lead in any inevitably way to atheism. In taking this stance, Stewart seemed to represent the voice of reasonableness and tolerance in the face of the Ministers' cries of infidelity. In fact, like most empiricist philosophers in Britain, Stewart was working within a post-scholastic, empiricist tradition. Empiricists working in this tradition, including deeply religious ones, were prepared to swallow the bitter aftertaste of Hume's critique of causality, and to begin the task of building a new philosophy and theology from an empirical foundation. In fact, Hume's analysis had not only influenced the empiricists in Britain, it had quite generally influenced the direction of European philosophy, and those at the forefront of scholarship were very much engaged in responding to Hume's critique. So, by the nineteenth century, the philosophical issues at the base of the charges against Leslie were of some considerable interest in Edinburgh, and the Leslie affair took on the character of a public philosophical debate. Leading scholars in Scotland's universities, including figures such as Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, took up the defence of Hume and Leslie, arguing that Hume's philosophy did not in fact lead to atheism. In defending Hume, Stewart's strategy was to attempt to distinguish two senses of causation, the one physical, and the other metaphysical. Stewart maintained that only in the latter sense could there be talk of necessity. Since Leslie's citation of Hume concerned a matter relating to physics, the applicable sense of the term was the physical one, the sort of case in which, as Francis Bacon and other respected empiricists had shown, there could be talk of contingency, but not of necessity. Stewart's view, the view that a limitation expressed by inserting the word 'physical' before the word 'cause' would have been sufficient to dismiss the charge of atheism, was endorsed by Leslie and the professors and students who agitated in his defence against the Ministers' objections. Indeed, the general sentiment regarding the outcome of the debate was in fact in favour of Stewart's analysis. As one observer remarked, 'It was on all hands admitted, that if Mr Leslie had, by a single word, limited his observations to Physical causes, they, in that case, would have been wholly free from objection'. Thomas Brown, Stewart's student, assistant, and successor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy, also addressed Hume's philosophy on this occasion. Like most of his contemporaries, Brown accepts the empiricist theory of ideas. He takes it as an obvious point that causality is not discovered in the mind a priori, and holds that belief in causality is based on an analogy from observed conjunctions to the idea of invisible causes or powers. Moreover, Brown agrees with Hume's view that the relation of cause and effect is not discovered by analysis since 'future and invariable antecedents and sequences' are neither discernible in nor implied by what is given in experience. Brown's original contribution relates to his interpretation of Hume. Brown defends Hume by claiming that when Hume asserts that the relation of cause and effect is an object of belief, what he really means that it is an object of faith. For, the first proposition shows that the causal relation cannot be perceived, and the second proposition shows, the causal relation cannot be inferred, so the only remaining sense of 'belief' is in the sense of 'having faith'. As such, Brown claims, for Hume, the causal relation is believed as an object of faith. Brown then 4 13 interprets what this might mean, saying that '...as soon as we believe the relation of cause and effect, the idea of power arises. The belief, indeed, is \"instinctive\" but the ideas that follow do so regardless of the origin of this belief.' xi So, in the end, Brown argues, Hume does provide a foundation for cause and effect, but that the foundation is based on instinct rather than reason, so that 'we believe, rather than discover, the relation of cause and effect.' xii Thus, on Brown's interpretation of Hume, it is but a short journey from 'belief' in causality to theism. Unfortunately, the defenses mounted by Stewart and Brown in support of Hume, while well intended, suffer from the general tendency of Scottish philosophers to misunderstand Hume. Stewart bases his defense of Hume on a spurious distinction between physical and metaphysical senses of causality -one that Hume himself would surely have rejected. Brown rises to Hume's defense by arguing that causality is founded on an irrational kind of intuition or faith -on something well beyond the purview of either the senses or reason -also an interpretation that Hume would not have endorsed. In a sense, Stewart and Brown's analyses are cover-ups; rather than engaging Hume's critique, they do Hume's analysis a sort of violence. As Kant had earlier pointed out in his Prolegomena, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and Priestly had also missed Hume's point. That is, they took for granted that which Hume had doubted, and doubted that which it had never occurred to Hume to doubt: It was not the question, whether the conception of cause be right, useful and, relatively to the whole cognition of nature indispensable, for of these Hume never harboured a doubt; but whether it be thought a priori by reason, and in this manner have an internal truth independent upon all experience: on this head Hume expected information and, as he himself says, still kept his mind open to instruction, if any would vouchsafe to bestow it on him. xiii The significance of the a priori question concerning causality was not missed by Shepherd, who saw the faults in both Stewart's and Brown's analyses. Against Brown, Shepherd aims to show that reason, not faith, leads to the discovery of necessary connection. Shepherd argues that the 'manner and action' of causation is such that ideas of cause and effect are included in representations 'in the very moment of their formation'. It would appear, in fact, that what Shepherd intends to advance is a line of argument that combines a posteriori reasoning about the mind's contents with an a priori sense of causal necessity. In doing so, she rejects Hume's main claims regarding causality, by claiming that an empirical act of introspection does lead the mind to the discovery of a necessary connection, and that this necessary connection is thought a priori by reason. What Shepherd argues is that the determination of anything noticed by the mind -of anything that 'begins to exist' -requires the inclusion of the general idea of a cause in our representations. It follows that any attempt to think 'dependent qualities that begin to exist' as uncaused leads to contradiction. xiv In consequence, Shepherd maintains, 'when the mind perceives by what passes within itself, that no quality, idea, or being whatever, can begin its own existence, it...perceives the general necessity of a cause for every effect'. xv Thus, introspection and analysis are required before the mind can gain knowledge of necessary connection, which connection, however, is thought a priori by the mind in the very moment of concept formation. Philosophically, Shepherd's ambition was to advance a theory of ideas that could defeat the sceptical argument of Hume by appeal to reason's introspective discovery of the causal relation, conceived as a condition of representation. This would fill in the gap in the Leslie affair noticed by David Brewster, who remarked that that the debate had proceeded in such a manner as to ignore the a priori defence of the causal relation. As Shepherd sees it, both a priori elements and reason are indispensable in defending knowledge of causal necessity. 4 14 There is a gap of nearly twenty years between the Edinburgh controversy of 1805 and the publication of Shepherd's 1824 treatise. In 1808, Mary Shepherd was married to a barrister by the name of Henry John Shepherd, after which she became known under her married name of Lady Mary Shepherd. Henry John Shepherd was the son of Sir Samuel Shepherd, a prominent member of the British legal profession based in London. Marriage permanently shifted the centre of Mary Shepherd's world from Edinburgh to London. While in London, she remained close to many of her former Edinburgh associates, but her intellectual circle expanded to include a wide range of brilliant minds living in the southern parts of Britain. Charles Babbage, William Whewell, and David Ricardo, and Richard Whately, for example, were intimate intellectual companions. Mary Shepherd was also connected with a number of important figures in the university community, of whom many were involved in educational reform in one way or another. She frequently entertained these friends, along with members of the legal community, aristocrats, publishers, and a considerable number of so-called Benthamites and 'philosophical Radicals' such as T.R. Malthus, Lord Brougham, J.C. Hobhouse, Henry Hallam, and others. Although members of her social circle had wide-ranging interests and political views, they shared a common commitment to developing an empiricism that could withstand scepticism, a sympathetic view of academic freedom, and a desire for social and political reform. Shepherd's 1824 An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect was followed by the publication of a second major philosophical work in 1827, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe. xvi Both texts reflect influenced and interests prevalent in her London circle. xvii By 1824, it was evident that the growth and success of science made it imperative that there be some kind of empiricist and philosophical answer to Hume. One of Shepherd's close confidants, Richard Whately, attempted to challenge Hume in a way that makes recourse to only to deduction. In his Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Buonaparte, Whately runs together the image of the Humean sceptic and the Napoleonist in an amusing and socially telling way. Whately asks of the sceptic 'what is the evidence proposed to himself in particular, for the existence of such a person as Napoleon Buonaparte.' xviii He calls 'upon those therefore who profess themselves advocates of free inquiry' to 'follow up their own principles fairly and consistently'. 'If after all that has been said, they cannot bring themselves to doubt of the existence of Napoleon Buonaparte, they must at least acknowledge that they do not apply to that question, the same plan of reasoning which they have made use of in others; and they are consequently bound in reason and in honesty to renounce it altogether.' xix Whately's strategy then, is simply to shift the burden of the doubt back on the sceptic. An amusing response to Hume and free speech, no doubt, but his deductive arguments would be insufficient to quell sceptical worry. For Hume is not accountable for the quandary in which he left metaphysics, nor is he obliged to personally address any personal inconsistency in philosophy or practice. In short, Whately's challenge is simply not satisfying as a reply to Hume. Though Whately's Elements garnered high acclaim as a 'standard' logic, and his eccentricity and wit had endeared him to many, he was surely limited in his approach. As his biographer, Alexander Campbell Fraser, laments, Whately was unable to embrace the new inductive logic. xx Thus, deductive arguments were surely inadequate as a response to Hume. But so too was it a hopeless strategy to deny or ignore the magnitude of Hume's critique. Careful attention to the nature of scientific reasoning and to the defence of causal necessity and induction would be required for an adequate response to scepticism. Mary Shepherd and her circle were particularly sensitive to this need, and one of their central preoccupations was, in fact, with the logic of induction and its bearing on scepticism. The discussion and debate surrounding causality and induction in her circle very likely influenced the direction of the 1824 treatise. For, like many of those who would contribute to the development of thought on induction, she most certainly saw the limitations of Whately's deductive approach to Hume. Shepherd, along with several of her 4 15 contemporaries, saw herself as forging a solution by building on the Baconian thought on induction. Thus, Shepherd's analysis of the discovery of causal connection in nature is based on a Baconian form of experimentalism. This experimentalism is equally evident in her descriptions of the introspective discovery that ideas of causes are involved in the determination of representations a priori and in her claim that knowledge of the future is based on the discovery of causal hypotheses containing causal necessity. For the emphasis on observation of things in nature and contents of mental representations is empiricist and Baconian in particular, and becomes the starting point for further analysis. In building on this emphasis on inductive and empiricist analysis, Shepherd develops her a priorism to introduce an epistemological ascent to the discovery of causal necessity. Ultimately, Shepherd develops an account of experimental reasoning involving both inductive and deductive steps, arguing that we do have knowledge of causal necessity, and that it is grounded in a form of experimental reasoning. In Shepherd's twostep experimental reasoning, the first step is inductive, and the second step is deductive. Shepherd's view is that our particular expectations for the future are first formed inductively, and then justified by appeal to deductive test. It follows that expectation for the future is 'founded upon much stronger principles than those of custom and habit': Thus all experimental reasoning consists in an observation, and a demonstration, as has been shown; --an observation whether the circumstances from which an object is produced, and in which it is placed, are the same upon one occasion as upon another; --and a demonstration, that if it is so, all its exhibitions will be the same. xxi In the first instance, the mind takes notice of 'like qualities' and 'invariable sequences of effects' in compound sense objects, and the invariability of sequences leads us to conclude that there probably exists a causal connection. xxii Next, an experimentum crucis is performed in which the mind considers whether the difference in qualities could have begun of itself, and concludes that 'after the application of an exact experiment, it is impossible to imagine a difference of qualities to arise under the same circumstances'. xxiii In other words, her view is that the probable knowledge rests on experience of what does take place on a given trial. However, this knowledge is supplemented with a deductive argument to show that nothing else could ensue under exactly similar circumstances except if the causal principle were violated. It is this argument that justifies the claim that our expectations for the future are based on the idea of a productive principle according to which 'similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects'. xxiv This is the defence of causal necessity therefore depends on the earlier discovery that causality is an a priori feature of representation. Shepherd's argument for causal necessity recognises and responds to perceived limitations of a deductive paradigm still championed by Whately. Initially, she coupled introspective analysis of the mind's contents with deductive argument to defend the a priori status of the causal principle. Hence, the causal law is discovered through introspection as a 'universal axiom', on the order of a law of thought, so that the mind applies the principle 'Like effects must necessarily have like causes' in determining representations. The further claim that experience can lead to a demonstration that knowledge contains causal necessity is based on a separate argument to show that causal hypotheses discovered by induction are also governed by causal necessity. In looking back to Bacon then, Shepherd evidently saw a need for an updated discussion of inductive method, a need that becomes ever more pressing in the wake of Hume's critique. Shepherd and her counterparts may be broadly construed as endeavouring to address issues around methodology, causation, and metaphysics -and they saw this endeavour as part of an effort to initiate new strategies in answer to Hume. Shepherd's own response to Hume was based on a combination of both deductive proof and experimentalism, a methodological combination that she hoped would lead to a critically defensible response to the scepticism 4 16 engendered by Hume. With this as a context for understanding her response to Hume, we can see that her specific arguments are intended to bridge a gap from the sceptical predicament of empiricist philosophy to a new philosophy of science. As Shepherd explains, her account places emphasis on the role of reason; for contra Hume, there is an inferential 'step' that the mind takes in gaining knowledge of causal necessity and external existence: Now because we perceive, when awake, that sensible qualities are no more than one set of the conjoined effects flowing from exterior objects, which when meeting with various other circumstances, are known to be capable of determining the remainder of their qualities; we therefore refer them to such compound objects as their causes, as capable of their further effects; and this reasoning is the step the mind takes in arguing from the present sensible qualities of things to their future properties, and that which Hume eagerly enquires after, denying the possibility of finding it. xxv Shepherd's claims about external existence and knowledge of the future are thus supposed to rest on this foundation. For, 'knowledge of Cause is supposed to be first, because previous to any belief in exteriority', and our knowledge of its manner of action forms the basis for a proof of external causes. Ideas of causes are 'elicited by a separation of ideas of the exterior causes of our sensations, and the sensations themselves'. xxvi Initially, through introspective analysis, we discover two kinds of objects in nature; namely, exterior objects, which are acting causes in nature, and sensible effects, which determine specific qualities on the mind when meeting with the human senses. xxvii This discovery leads to further introspection, and to the reasoning that leads to discovery of the causal axiom, and ultimately of its role in our forming of law-like causal hypotheses. Shepherd later develops this view as part of an argument against Berkeley. The details of this argument must be postponed for now, but the general view is that knowledge of the external world is inferential. Shepherd suggests that the mind is like a camera obscura, and that the inference to knowledge of the external world is to be understood by analogy to the way in which algebraic representations give evidence of quantitative relationships and properties in nature. Shepherd argues that, 'our ideas are as algebraic signs, which give evidence both of their own existence, and the quantities also signified'. With these and other arguments, Shepherd supplies a foundation for empirical realism, based on knowledge of the continuous existence of external, mind-independent objects. In addition to the foundational questions concerning causal necessity and knowledge of external existence, Shepherd addresses specific philosophical questions. As Blakey points out, the shorter essays in the latter half of Shepherd's 1827 book, the essays touching upon those very subjects, are intended to rest on the foundation supplied by her analysis of causality. The main subjects of these essays involve attacks on the common sense empiricism of her Scottish and empiricist predecessors, on some of the underlying methodological assumptions of materialists, and so on. Again, there are too many specific arguments to address here, but one of them, concerning God's existence, is particularly salient. Shepherd, without intending to offer a separate theology, defends theism on the basis of her arguments for causal necessity and knowledge of external existence. She defends the existence of God on the grounds that \"Whatever variety and change of beings there are, all changes must finally be pushed back to that essence who began not, and in whom all dependant beings originally resided, and were put forth as out goings of himself in all those varieties of attitudes which his wisdom and benevolence thought fit.' xxviii Thus, God, though a 'hidden mind', is known through reason. For we are able to infer God's 'eternal continuous capacity' as the necessity basis upon which the possibility of change in this world depends. She describes God's nature as 4 17 an 'eternal continuous capacity': The universal mind, the infinite space for his residence, the amalgamation of all possible qualities in nature in One Being necessarily existing, -the capacity of perceiving all ideas executed in his own mind by the eternal, necessary, and essential union of such qualities as are fitted to the consciousness of all future knowledge, the circumference, towards which is propelled every direction of motion which forms the creatures, -this is God, as far as our natures can contemplate such an awful, infinite, and invisible being. xxix The theistic direction in which Shepherd's arguments advance must always be kept in view when considering her work. xxx For she advocates for a middle ground between science and theism, and her compromise involves invoking God as the necessity upon which the world depends -as a Being whose existence is known by inference, but whose essence is beyond the grasp of rational and empirical analysis. It is in pursuing this goal that Shepherd moves beyond the common sense philosophy to nineteenth century philosophy of science. As Blakey notes in his A History of the Philosophy of Mind, the view of causation espoused by Hume and Brown 'appeared to Lady Mary Shepherd to lead by an inevitable consequence to downright Atheism': xxxi When she undertook a public refutation of these erroneous notions of cause and effect, it must be remembered it was at a time when they were most rampant, and widely spread over the northern parts of Britain in particular. Every young man who came from the Universities of Scotland, attempted to show off his subtlety and academic lore, by denying there was any real causation in the world; all was mere imagination, and a piece of gross vulgar credulity. xxxii Shepherd's effort to prove that Hume and Leslie were analytically mistaken was consistent with her ambition to bring theology in line with reason. No doubt Shepherd's personal conviction was that theism could be rationally defended alongside of science. At a personal level, Shepherd's own faith never wavered, despite the range of views -including atheism -encountered in her social circle. But theism was not the only concern of Mary Shepherd. As part of a generation convinced of the importance of political and personal freedoms, the persecution of academics such as Leslie, on the grounds of insubordination to the established Church and its theology, seemed an injustice. As one fellow Edinburgh bystander commented, Leslie's remarks may have been worrisome to the pious, but the proceedings against him were unfair. xxxiii Thus, the commitment to theism seemed compatible with having a healthy respect for free exchange and debate of intellectual matters -a value held dear by many of Shepherd's ilk and generation in Edinburgh. The point was not to insist that others hold one's own view; but to bring others around to one's view by appeal to reason. Thus, issues relating to academic freedom and theism were separable for Shepherd, as they were for many others involved in the Leslie affair. It is clear then, that Shepherd's life and work relates to conceptual and social developments in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain. Shepherd lived at a time when there was considerable social unrest in Europe -at a time when connections between ideologies and institutions were at the forefront of public attention. To some, scholastic philosophy and theology were considered to play significant roles in holding together the very fabric of civil society, so that empiricist critiques bearing on these subjects were regarded not only as ideological threats, but also as pernicious to social order. There was widespread suspicion of philosophical argument, free speech, and academic freedom and their apparently dangerous effects. Empiricist responses to these attitudes and to Hume were of various sorts, although most simply 4 18 took for granted that the social unrest was in fact causally linked to ideology and free speech. One reaction involved the assumption that the scientific study of mind and behaviour would enable us to deduce behavioural effects from mental causes, thereby paving the way for government to maintain the social order. James Mill, for example, argued that a deduction from the fixed principles governing human nature could provide the basis for a science of government, and hence a basis for understanding social and political order. Another approach argued that the science of behaviour and mind must be based on an inductive account of causal knowledge. Thus, Thomas Macaulay raised a fundamental methodological objection to Mill's proposal of a deductive 'Science of Politics' in which psychological characteristics are linked to good or bad government. Macaulay charges, 'that it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human nature' xxxiv 'How, then', he asks, 'are we to arrive at just conclusions on a subject so important to the happiness of mankind'? xxxv The answer, Macaulay proposes, is by the method of experimentalism, that is, the method of induction: Surely by that method, which, in every experimental science to which it has been applied, has signally increased our power and knowledge of our species ... by the method of induction; by observing the present state of the world by assiduously studying the history of past ages, by sifting the evidence of the facts, -by carefully combining and contrasting those which are authentic, by generalizing with judgment and diffidence, by perpetually bringing the theory which we have constructed to the test of new facts, by correcting, or altogether abandoning it, according as those new facts prove it to be partially or fundamentally unsound, Proceeding thus patently, diligently, -candidly... xxxvi Thomas Brown mocks this confident attitude toward the science of behavior in his poem entitled 'The Paradise of Coquettes'. Brown suggests that the empirical evidence for Scotland's 'national character' is equivocal, and leads no trustworthy conclusion. For, 'If an estimate of our national character were to be formed, in our drawing-rooms' then 'we should unquestionably be ranked as a people of the gay'. 'But if it were on the prevailing poetry of the time' that 'there can be as little doubt, that we should be characterized as a far more serious generation...'. xxxvii Mary Shepherd, however, belongs to another camp altogether. She rejects the deductive science of James Mill, the simple form of empirical generalization of his son, John Stuart Mill, and Brown's intuitionism -laying her trust in a more complicated two-step inductive method. This inductivism was intended as a foundation for all that empiricism might yield as knowledge of the external world and of God. One way or another, it is evident that her philosophical development occurs at a time when controversial assumptions are made concerning ideology, free speech, and their causal connections to behavior. Pressing questions included ones concerning the link between intellectual freedom and the suspected unraveling of civil society, a link that could only be established, it was thought, by science. And, as it turns out, the interplay between the conceptual and social history reveals a set of controversial assumptions concerning causality and induction that come to play a role in the emergence of various sciences and social sciences. The assumption made in Shepherd's day about causality -like the assumption implicit in, say, John Stuart Mill's harm principle -take for granted that, though unseen, unknown, and unproven, ideology and excessive freedom of speech very likely perpetrate harms on society and social order. The roots of the ever-growing fields of the social sciences can be traced back to this period and its assumptions and debates. As part of the changing university scene in Britain, new Chairs in the sciences and social sciences were introduced and the curriculum was updated. Friends of Mary Shepherd's circle associated with the universities at London, Cambridge, Oxford, and Edinburgh, such as Leonard Horner, William Whewell, Richard Whatley, and James Pillans, would become involved in university reform. All aimed for a new approach to education that 4 19 could embrace science, theism, and a reasonable level of freedom and tolerance. The proper extent of that tolerance was itself a subject of debate; but most seemed to agree that it would, in principle, be determined by the new social sciences, which were expected to yield knowledge that could help to maintain the social order. This assumption has since proven controversial; for there is to this day, no proof that free speech can in fact present a danger to society and threaten the stability social norms. Nor has it been shown that holding certain beliefs can be linked to specific social norms. Thus, the project of Mary Shepherd and her circle, a project that lies at the very roots of the social sciences, is one that remains steeped in questionable assumptions and motivations. The above conceptual developments took place at a time of significant ideological and institutional reform in Britain's universities. Intellectually, Shepherd herself was most concerned was to show that the empiricist arguments of her predecessors that had led to both scepticism and persecution were themselves flawed, because based on a limited understanding of scientific reasoning and its connection to causal necessity. Personally, Shepherd was firmly inclined toward political moderation, and so was moved by appeals for academic freedom and religious toleration. She was fully confident that reason could be combined with scientific method in a manner that would vindicate tolerance of religious difference and knowledge of God. In all of this change, neither she nor her friends ever forgot the importance of academic freedom, and the unfairness of the religious persecution to which Leslie and others had been subject. In addition to updating the science curriculum at Britain's four major universities, this circle of individuals conceived of University College in London as a new university that would dispense altogether with religious tests. And it was her tutor's progeny, the James Pillans who became Professor of Humanities at Edinburgh University, who would tirelessly pursue the cause for university reform at Edinburgh, eventually succeeding in reversing the Act of Parliament requiring religious test at Edinburgh. Another friend of the family, Thomas Chalmers, the acknowledged leader in the disruption of the Church of Scotland also founded Edinburgh's New College. This New College symbolically achieved a new beginning at Edinburgh, a university finally at ease in a new era of liberal theological principles. Mary's sister Charlotte, who supported the Episcopalian Church, also supported the new 'Free Kirk', providing the latter with both a Chapel and a Chair in Theology at Edinburgh's New College. A century after the original episode with Hume, and numerous controversies and injustices later, amends for past wrongs had finally been made, and a new era of tolerance and liberalism initiated. The effort to tell Mary Shepherd's story, and to tell it as fully as possible, is one that is well worth making. One reason is that as a philosopher, Mary Shepherd's work contributes in an important and unique way to the development of empiricism that took place following Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment. Shepherd challenges foundational tenets of the major Scottish thinkers who preceded her and those of her contemporaries as well, systematically dismantling the empiricist theory of ideas in order to secure a defence of theism. It is also important to notice that Shepherd's philosophical answer to scepticism is forward looking, and sheds light on later conceptual developments concerning causality, induction, and theism in nineteenth century philosophy of science. The details of Shepherd's arguments and the soundness and significance of her intellectual contributions must be decided through further philosophical adjudication. However, a full appreciation of Shepherd's arguments will undoubtedly require an understanding of the social and historical context in which her texts were written. For, the specific combination of biographical, historical, and philosophical elements in the story of Mary Shepherd traces a unique historical path. A new narrative emerges from a myriad of facts about the past, and helps to fill in gaps in existing historical and philosophical accounts and to correct distortions created as a result of the oversight of women's contributions to social, political and intellectual history. Last, and by no means least, the issues around academic freedom, the university, political 4 20 moderation, and social change that drew in Mary Shepherd and her contemporaries merit the attention of today's reader. For, in many respects, and especially with regard to this cluster of subtle and complex issues, individuals living today faced similar challenges to those living in the early nineteenth century Europe. With this in mind, we turn back in time to Scotland, back even further than the Mary Shepherd's birth and early years, to the larger contours of the world into which she was born. * 4 21 The Scottish Origins of Mary Primrose 1.1 God and the King: The Primrose Ancestry Scotland's first female philosopher, Mary Primrose, was born on 31 December 1777 at Barnbougle Castle near Edinburgh. Little is known about Mary Primrose, and one of the few personal remarks to have survived about her is that she loved her birthplace, Barnbougle. xxxviii Built in the thirteenth century, the castle is framed on one side by the Firth of Forth and on the other by the woodland parks of Dalmeny estate. Thus does the castle appear in the backdrop of Nasmyth's 1788 family portrait, in which a ten-year-old Mary looks on as her father, Neil Primrose, 3rd Earl of Rosebery, points across the drum sands toward Hound Point and the Fife lands from which the family took its name. xxxix However, Barnbougle's picturesque setting was not the whole of its charms. For the history of the medieval castle was tied to local superstition and legend. xl According to one story, an original owner, Sir Roger Mowbray, was killed on crusade, leaving behind a dog whose ghost haunts Hound Point. The Mowbray family was also rumoured to have shipped contraband directly into the castle cellars. Evidently a colourful lot, when Sir Robert Mowbray lost title to the estate in 1620 'through debts and other misfortunes', his demise touched the hearts of many. xli One local item, for example, had it that Mowbray's direct representative was 'still in the parish, but reduced to the condition of a common servant.' xlii But the Mowbray family's loss would be the Primrose family's profit. In 1662, Barnbougle again became 'the point of victory of strangers' when Archibald Primrose, Mary Primrose's great-great grandfather, purchased the title to the property. xliii This heritage, together with a century of Primrose family connections to the castle, would doubtless have accounted for Mary Primrose's emotional ties to Barnbougle. Legend aside, the realities of living at Barnbougle were far from rosy. In comparison with the many fine manorial homes in the area, the castle was small, cold, and damp. But for its 'fanciful situation within the sea mark, and for its embrazures presenting a strong front to the sea', the edifice was 'in no way remarkable'. xliv Moreover, title to Barnbougle was accompanied by the unenviable responsibility of church patronage in Dalmeny, an area that typified the volatility of post-Reformation Scotland. xlv Religious dissent in the area had attracted royal attention as early as 1580, when King James VI personally oversaw the presentation of one George Lundie, to the vicarage. xlvi More than a decade later, a documented episode attests to the growing divisions within the religious community. This episode dates to 1606, and concerns several Presbyterian ministers indicted on charges of high treason, having denied the King's authority in ecclesiastical matters. xlvii Two prominent local figures were involved with the trial. Henry Stewart, a member of the prosecuting team, is said to have ceased to prosper after the trial, presumably on account of his Episcopalian sympathies. xlviii In post-Reformation Scotland, such an outcome would be no surprise. The fate of Thomas Hope, a member of the defence council, is more perplexing. For Thomas Hope was handsomely rewarded for his efforts on behalf of the Presbyterian Ministers; he was created a Baronet, given the office of King's Advocate, and his family and fortune thrived. xlix On the surface, the message sent by King James VI was a baffling one, since he now appeared to be rewarding individuals with 'known Presbyterian sympathies'. As the Dalmeny episode shows, the policies and practices -and ultimately the will of King James VI must have seemed unpredictable and arbitrary to the average subject. l Such incidents were typical of ecclesiastic episodes throughout the 36-year reign of King James VI, and fostered a growing hostility and mistrust toward the Stuart monarchy. Moreover, it was not merely King James VI involvement in religious affairs drew criticism from his subjects. Especially controversial was the Stuart insistence on the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, according to 4 22 which kings were appointed by God and were beyond the judgement or reproach of their subjects. Families associated with the monarchy and its involvement in religious affairs, including the Stewarts as well as the Primroses, would have been targets of local hostility. The 'remnant Establishment' in the area, as one nineteenth-century observer reflected, 'had followed its own ideal of Christian duty', and this 'not without painful sacrifice'. li Mary Primrose's family history reveals a rise to prominence that is directly tied to support for the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings and shows that the Primroses were firmly entrenched in Scotland's hereditary-based power structure well before Archibald Primrose first became 'Laird of Barnbougle' in 1662. By the turn of the seventeenth century, Archibald's Primrose's father and uncle had risen to considerable prominence under King James VI. In fact, Mary Primrose's ancestors loyally defended the politics and policies of King James VI. This aspect of Mary Primrose's family history, particularly as it concerns religious, civic, and intellectual freedom, frames the themes of her life and work in curious ways. Indeed, in an important sense, the story of Mary Primrose begins even before her birth, with the circumstances and controversies that affected her ancestors, and with the context of Scottish culture, philosophy, and history into which she was born. With this in view, we will trace the historical context of Mary Primrose's world, weaving the stories of her ancestors into their wider historical context. Our aim will be to evoke a world from which to mark the emergence of Mary Primrose, Scotland's first female philosopher. * * * The most famous of Mary Primrose's ancestors to have risen to prominence under King James VI was Gilbert Primrose, DD, cousin of the Archibald Primrose who first became 'Laird of Barnbougle'. Of particular interest is the story of how Gilbert Primrose's close association to the ecclesiastical policies of King James VI brought him both controversy and good fortune. This Gilbert Primrose was a highly educated and articulate Minister of the French Reformed Church at Bordeaux. Loyal to King James VI, he promoted a royalist vision of Reform aimed at establishing a moderate and unified form of Protestantism. At the same time, when Scotland's most articulate and confrontational of Presbyterian leaders, Andrew Melville, was imprisoned in London Tower in 1607, Gilbert Primrose had been among those to appeal to the King for Melville's release. Primrose, like others involved with the French Church, was no stranger to controversy. Indeed, he may have empathised with Melville's plight. For just a few years earlier, in 1603, Gilbert Primrose had himself fallen into difficulties with his Huguenot patron, Monsieur de Mirambeau, due to suspected connections with the 'cult of images'. lii Though remembered in Mirambeau as an enthusiastic supporter of the Reformation, Primrose was nonetheless transferred to Bordeaux. Thus, Primrose could well understand how easy it was to fall from grace in times of religious and political controversy. For seventeenth century intellectual leaders such as Primrose and Melville, political and theological stakes were high -sometimes accompanied by great personal risk. One source of peril related to the general perception on the part of the heads of state and church that ideological change presented a threat to the stability of nations. Indeed, in the wake of both the Renaissance and the Reformation, Europe had witnesses a period of unprecedented change, change that was often accompanied by challenges to existing authorities. Consider, for one thing, the hitherto unbelievable feats of exploration and expansion. Renaissance explorers, including Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh sailed to places such as India and America, eventually circumnavigating the globe. These voyages had been possible in virtue of scholarly geographical and navigational research on the part of the best cartographers, mathematicians, and astronomers of the day. liii This exploration and discovery of the New World not only 4 23 challenged the Continental European's understanding of the world, it also brought a vast infusion of wealth into Europe wealth from Mexico Peru, India, Africa, and Brazil. New wealth meant that more Europeans were able to afford and aspire to a gentleman's education. This trend in turn led to the emergence of generations of knowledgeable, wealthy patrons who were increasingly interested in, and supportive of, their flourishing artistic and intellectual communities. Thus, the educated post-Renaissance European was engaged in the task of attempting to understand the universe anew -indeed, of attempting to find new foundations for the entire intellectual world. In most instances, the impetus for social change could be traced back to intellectual discoveries made by church and university scholars. That the situation was a source of irritation is apparent form the remark made by the King of France in denying a charter to the University of Leyden; [saying that the universities were 'hotbeds of heresy']. Since theologians and other intellectuals represented the chief vehicles for conveying new ideas to the public, they ran the risk of incurring the wrath of civil and religious authorities. New ideas drew Scots such as Primrose and Melville to study in major European centres. There, they enjoyed the privilege of the most advanced education of the day. The novel claims of many Renaissance thinkers stimulated a re-examination of ancient authorities. One of the first natural philosophers to succeed in raising serious doubts about the ancient world-view was Copernicus. Copernicus made great advances in reasoning about celestial phenomena, although his work was ultimately held back by an ancient theoretical commitment to the idea of perfectly circular orbital motion. liv Despite this limitation, Copernicus was able to put forward a heliocentric model of planetary motion that succeeded in revolutionising our way of looking at the universe. Copernicus's novel ideas about planetary motion were fully accepted after the ancient Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system of physics had been discredited, a task left to the generation of natural philosophers who followed in Copernicus's footsteps -figures as Kepler, Galileo, and Bacon. Like Copernicus, all were critical of the appeal to the ancient authority implicit in the received views of their day. Kepler, for example, combined Copernicus's heliocentric insight with a willingness to drop Plato's requirement of perfectly circular orbits. lv As a result, Kepler discovered the three laws of planetary motion that fit the observed data so well that the ancient earth-centred cosmology was replaced with Copernicus's sun-centred cosmology. With Kepler's laws, the paths of the planets could be accurately described by mathematical formulas without Aristotelian attributions of goal-oriented motions to objects (teleology). With the aid of his telescope, Galileo observed mountains on the moon and sunspots, raising further challenges to older assumptions concerning the perfection of the planets and their motions. In fact, Galileo quite generally and directly challenged the widespread appeal to the authority of Aristotle. He claimed that the real bar to scientific progress was the appeal to the authority of Aristotle, a habit ingrained by the so-called 'scholastic philosophy', based in an unquestioned foundation in Scripture and Aristotle. In England, Francis Bacon had likewise criticised the authority of Aristotle as a stifling influence on new thought. lvi As Europe's leaders came to fear, the advent of new ideas and the fostering of questioning dispositions seemed inevitably to end in the questioning of their own authority. Repercussions for questioning authority were varied. Copernicus had merely been entreated to claim mathematical but not physical truth for his sun-centred model. Galileo, on the other hand, had been excommunicated for upholding his views. Public execution was the unlucky fate of others. Yet, there seemed to be little that the authorities could do to prevent the new information from flowing and to deter the prevailing inquisitiveness. King James VI was especially sensitive to the challenges accompanying ideological change. In particular, his concern was to preserve the ideology of Divine Right against the assault of Presbyterians such as Melville. Just as his mother, Mary Queen of Scots, had struggled against the Presbyterian system proposed by John Knox, King James VI struggled to contain the 4 24 influence of Knox's successor, Andrew Melville. At the same time, both Mary Queen of Scots and King James VI seemed to realise that the welfare of Scotland depended on its ability to catch up with flourishing European nations. For, while the Renaissance and Reformation had profoundly affected the educated Continental European's understanding of the world, few such inroads had been made in Scotland. Scotland's medieval universities struggled to introduce students to the bare fundamentals of the arts curriculum. Far from fostering a culture of discovery, they were bogged down by a conservative response to the Reformation and adherence to an outdated scholastic curriculum. In short, Scotland was rural and remote. With this in mind, Mary Queen of Scots toured the Universities in Scotland, only to convey her dismay when she claimed to find ['eine universite in ruins']. lvii The Queen thus proposed the inauguration of a new college in Edinburgh. In 1556-7 the first in a series of lectures was hosted in Edinburgh's Magdalene Chapel. lviii But the mere fact that Edinburgh's college had been inaugurated under Stuart auspices was sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of Presbyterians, so that 'it is impossible to resist the conclusion that this first College of Edinburgh disappeared in the tumult of the Reformation, if not earlier.' lix Thus, Edinburgh's fledgling college was soon overwhelmed. lx In 1561, the Presbyterian Council resolved against 'payit furth of landis and tenementis within this burgh to papists, priestis, freris, monkis, nonis, and utheris of that wikit sort, for manteinying of idolatrie and vane superstitioun'. lxi As such, Scotland failed to keep apace of the European Renaissance. In this degenerative state, with an educational system and outlook far inferior to that found elsewhere in Europe, Scotland's colleges struggled to attract the nation's gentry, who typically left to complete the final two years of the four-year arts curriculum, if not their entire program of study, on the Continent. In comparison to Scotland, the educational milieu on the Continent must have seemed breathtakingly cosmopolitan. Nonetheless, after John Knox died in 1572, Andrew Melville had returned there and to devote himself to raising the standard of education in Scotland. Arriving in 1573, he took up an appointment at Glasgow in 1574 and then St Andrews in 1580. Having been educated by Ramus in Paris, Melville was well aware of the major intellectual developments of the Renaissance. In particular, the influence of Ramus meant that he was well aware of the challenges to the Aristotelian underpinnings of theology and philosophy. lxii Rejecting scholastic ideas, Melville began an accelerated program of reform in Glasgow and St. Andrews, re-training faculty and updating the curriculum. These changes must have seemed radical in their day, for when Melville openly attacked Scholasticism and defended the new scholarship, he was denounced and criticised by his colleagues. Melville's questioning of academic authority may have been problematic, but it was his flagrant disrespect for the doctrine of Divine Right that led to serious political trouble. Melville's criticism was more than King James VI could stomach, and so he was cast as a dangerous radical. In 1584, Melville was summoned before the Privy Council in Edinburgh on charges of treason [Cf. this story to date of James Primrose's replacement of John Hay on PC]. Sanctions were then enforced, and, for a time, Melville fled into exile to escape imprisonment. When he returned, he continued his attacks on King James's ecclesiastic authority, which culminated in the imprudent charge that King James was 'Gods sillie vassall'. lxiii For his outspoken and treasonable remarks, Melville was imprisoned in the Tower of London. Indeed, it was only through the intervention of French Church Ministers such as Gilbert Primrose that Melville's sentence was reduced to exile in France. lxiv Melville's harsh treatment may help explain the lack of incentive to bring about educational and curricular reforms in Scotland. Penalties such as imprisonment, execution, exile, and the like undoubtedly had a dampened effect on proposals to challenge either curriculum or King. Indeed, there is a near halt to change on the educational front until the late seventeenth century in Scotland. King James VI did re-issue charters for Edinburgh's college in 1582 and 1584, when 4 25 Edinburgh College, known locally as 'Tounis College', officially became 'King James Sixth's Academy'. lxv King James VI did not provide much by way of financial support, perhaps because the Town Council had exclusively in view a school system that would pursue the academic ideals of Calvin and Knox. Notwithstanding, King James VI conceded a right of avisamentum in university appointments to the Ministers of Edinburgh -a right that would ensure ongoing Presbyterian influence at the college. In addition, the King took the unusual step of allowing that the Magistrates and Town Council of Edinburgh should become the College's governing Patrons. lxvi In the end, the struggle to preserve the old system of fealty proved to be an overwhelming task for the Stuart monarchs. As they saw it, success would depend on a subtle manipulation of ideologies and institutions. King James IV is said to have favoured a sort of 'Armenian solution' to the religious conflicts and political differences arising in Scotland and England. lxvii This policy of 'Armenian moderatism', which was promoted by Gilbert Primrose and other royalists, sanctioned the idea that the Reformation was simply a renewal of the old church and downplayed the extent and scope of any ideological change. More specifically, Armenianism moderatism, named after the Dutch professor Jacob Arminius, advocated a compromise aimed at unifying Protestant sects. The Armenian compromise was based on dropping the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, and so was bound to be controversial in Scotland. Royalist theologians did their best to cast this moderate alternative as a trend toward theological liberalism that promoted unity and moderation. lxviii This ideological spin was supplemented by a moderate political spin on the Reformation to the effect that, 'we live in a Church reformed, not in one made new.' lxix Royalist attempts to introduce moderation, although ostensibly liberalising in spirit and aim, were disliked by the more extreme Protestants in Britain and France, including Melville. Melville saw that King James VI's proposal to unite Protestant churches by dropping of the Calvinist doctrine of pre-destination and to reduce the emphasis on grace and salvation could only threaten Presbyterianism. lxx Thus, continued religious conflict was inevitable throughout King James's long reign. * * * Gilbert Primrose DD was not the only Primrose ancestor with connections to King James VI and the doctrine of Divine Right. Mary Primrose's great-great-great grandfather, James Primrose, was Clerk to the Privy Council under King James VI. lxxi As Privy Council Clerk, James Primrose was not only entrusted with secrets of state. In 1616, he obtained exclusive publication rights to a catechism on high prerogative entitled God and the King. The text, which teaches the absolute authority of the King, was made mandatory at all educational levels. Published anonymously, it takes the form of a dialogue between Theodidactus [teacher of religion] and Philalethes [lover of death/oblivion]. The main objects of the work are to describe the 'occasions and chief end', 'special heads and branches', and 'principall grounds' of the 'Oath of Allegeance' that British subjects must swear to the King. In particular, the document sets out to establish, First, That our Souveraigne Lord King James hath no Superior besides God, unto whome hee is immediately subject within his Dominions: Secondly, That the bond of Allegiance from his Subjects unto him as their Supreme Lord, is inviolable, and cannot by any means be dissolved. lxxii The main argument advanced in God and the King in defence of the above claims is by appeal to the authority of the Scripture. For example, the text opens with an appeal to the Fifth Commandment, 'Honour thy father and thy mother.' It reasons that just as we are obliged to 4 26 honour our respective fathers and mothers, so we are likewise obliged to honour 'all higher powers, and especially such as have Soueraigne authority, as the Kings and Princes of the earth.' lxxiii Indeed, kings and princes are not only 'nuturing Fathers of the Church', they are also nurturing 'Fathers of the Commonwealth'. For, both evidence and reason teach that 'there is a stronger and higher bond of duty betweene children and the Father of the Country, then the Fathers of private families.' lxxiv Yet, despite this royal claim to fealty, the 'arising of Seditious and rebellious types' has forced 'his most excellent Majesty to secure himself of his Subjects loyalty and allegiance by a Solemne Oath.' lxxv Thus God and the King insists on royal prerogative, laying out the role of the King as medium between God and subject. The doctrine to which God and the King appeals is defence of the oath of allegiance is none other that the doctrine of Divine Right. Following this doctrine, the oath claims that the King, and only the King, stands between God and his subjects and that the King is the sole authority over his Dominion. In consequence, subjects must promise to bear faith and true allegiance to the King, his heirs and successors, and to make known to them 'all treasons, or trayterous conspiracies'. lxxvi Moreover, the subject must profess to do all of this, to reject the authority of the Pope, and to be 'a true Christian.' In fact, in its simplified version, the oath is reduced to twelve statements, each of which claims to establish that the King, and not the Pope, is the sole Paternal authority standing between God and the Dominion. What then follows is a rather longwinded justification of the document by further appeal to the authority of God and the sacred and inviolable union between the King and his Subjects. lxxvii As with most scriptural appeals, much about the relationship between God, King, and subject can be taken both literally and figuratively. On the literal interpretation, as depicted on the frontispiece of the book, the figure of King James VI is depicted as being showered by the rays of the sun, upon which the word 'God' is inscribed. Between the sun and King James VI is the further inscription 'By me Kings Raigne', thereby implying that the will of God is the causal link that confers Divine Right. It is equally apparent from the text that the doctrine of the Divine Right is intended to supplant the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, according to which only the Pope, and not the King, stands in direct relation to God. Doubtless, this picture, with all of its literal causal implications, was indelibly ingrained upon the minds of British schoolchildren. Whatever might be the more vague and figurative interpretations of the document, few loyal subjects would willingly say. A second, more secular justification for the Oath found in God and the King was that it served the political end of curbing the 'rancorous spirit' of 'Romanists' conspirators, such as those behind the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. Responding to political pressure from Parliament to introduce anti-Catholic laws, God and the King publicly lays blame on the Catholics for the Gunpowder plot, thereby establishing justification for the harsh treatment of Catholics. The oath, the text implies, will help to preserve civil order by extinguishing 'the AEgeptian darkness of Popery'. lxxviii Aimed at the King's Protestant critics, such comments might have provided some reassurance that the oath was an instrument in the interest of civil order. In sum, God and the King served to unite the political and theological foundations of the Stuart monarchy. The privilege of distribution rights to God and the King must have been a considerable one, and the Primrose family's support of the Stuart monarchy, though controversial in Dalmeny, brought good fortune to more than one member of the Primrose family. James Primrose's daughter, Alison Primrose, married George Heriot, Goldsmith and Jeweller to King James VI. Moreover, his first cousin, Gilbert Primrose MD, was Principal Surgeon to the King. lxxix Thus, there was no shortage of Primrose connections to the Stuart monarchy prior to the advent of Archibald Primrose, the first 'Laird of Barnbougle'. 4 27 * * * God and the King was, in King James VI's day, one of the few ties binding British subjects. Had the royalist vision a religious union been accomplished, and a moderate form of Protestantism put in place, much of the ensuing civil unrest under Stuart rule might have been entirely averted. Britain, like France, was still deep in the turbulence of the Reformation. In fact, back on the continent, things were about to take a turn for the worse for Gilbert Primrose. Whereas in 1603 Primrose had been suspected of harbouring Catholic sympathies, in 1617, he found himself in deep trouble with the Jesuits. Gilbert Primrose, called upon to write a reply to the Archbishop of Bordeaux's The Pastoral Letter, committed a serious offence in publicly attacking a Catholic doctrine. We do not know who made the request of Gilbert Primrose to write his reply to Cardinal Sourdis, only that Primrose was not in a position to refuse the requested service. lxxx Whatever the circumstances, the text of Jacob's Vow would draw the negative attention of religious and political leaders in France. Primrose's main point of contention in Jacob's Vow was Cardinal Sourdis' denial of the civic and religious authority of parents over children in the decision to become Monks. The Pastoral Letter advanced a Catholic justification for the tradition of celibacy and Monkhood. [----] As such, it challenged various aspects of the Protestant religion and even the paternalistic authority upon which Protestant monarchs such as King James VI staked their own claim to allegiance. Primrose not only disputed the claim that the Scriptures counsel a monastic life of the Catholic sort, he went so far as to challenge the Catholic doctrine of monastic succession, charging that many High Priests, Bishops and Popes had been 'Idolaters, Hereticks and Socerers'. Such charges were bound to cause immense difficulties with the Jesuits. lxxxi Banished from France in 1623, Primrose was lucky enough to find favour with King James VI, thanks in part to the support of the Marquess of Hamilton. Primrose expressed his gratitude to Hamilton by dedicating to him another book, entitled The Righteous Man's Evils and the Lord's Deliverances. There, Primrose recalled his experience of having been censured for having held certain religious and political convictions: I cannot omit that which toucheth my self: For being banished from France for the Gospell of Christ, and for my nation's sake, and coming to his Majesties Court, where like unto Endimion after his long sleepe, I saw nothing but new faces, and seemed to my self as a man fallen out of the Cloudes; your Honour embraced me with such kindness and humanitie, and recommended me to his Majestie with such affection that I should be justly condemned of ingratitude, if I did ever forget it. lxxxii Thus it was that Gilbert Primrose, with high recommendations, became 'a great favourite' with the King. Principally, he is remembered for his published tracts on reformed religion and for having adopted a loyal stance on behalf of the King's interests in disputes with Roman Catholic Priests. lxxxiii But he also appears to have been one of those who promoted that particular vision of moderate Protestantism adopted, sometimes at peril, by King James VI. lxxxiv Though none of his direct descendants enjoyed the same level of prominence, Gilbert Primrose became one of His Majesty's Chaplains in Ordinary, was awarded the degree of DD from Oxford, and a canonry of Windsor. lxxxv It seems to have been beyond the Stuart monarchs to bring about such a moderate vision, and the attempt may have exacerbated existing animosities. Many Scots were becoming increasingly convinced that the political policies of Stuart rule and the institution of the Bishopric were doing more harm than good, and there were growing fears of an underlying intent to return 4 28 to the 'old religion'. The Stuart monarchs proved unable to prevail over the will of the Scottish people and the appeal of Presbyterianism. By the time that Charles I had acceded to the Throne and was attempting to restore the Episcopacy, the conditions were decidedly hostile. Charles I introduced various Episcopal Acts, founded the See of Edinburgh in 1633, and, in 1637, introduced the Scottish Book of Common Prayer. This book was singularly unpopular in Scotland. Several prominent residents in the Dalmeny area, including John Elphinstone, the second Lord Balmerino, and Thomas Hope (the successful advocate) had assisted in its preparation, but to no avail. The prayer book was quickly dubbed 'Romisch superstition', and petitions were circulated to the effect that the canons, liturgy, high commission, and bishops were all 'Popish'. lxxxvi By 1637, the Scottish Episcopate 'was a helpless ship among deadly rocks.' lxxxvii Thus, Charles I achieved no religious unity whatsoever, and instead succeeded in solidifying anti-Catholic sentiment. Ultimately, the religious controversy ended in the declaration of a Scottish National Covenant of 1638, whose signatories resolved 'constantly to adhere unto and defend' Presbyterianism. Rather than achieving a moderate form of Protestantism, religious opposition had become more deeply entrenched than ever. Following the signing of the National Covenant, there was further religious conflict between the Episcopal and Prostestant Reformers. One prominent resident of the Dalmeny area, John Elphinstone, supported the Covenanters, who opposed the absolutism of the monarch, claiming that the government of archbishops and lord bishops was 'prejudicial and very dangerous both to the Church and Commonwealth'. lxxxviii John Elphinstone, Lord Balmerino, was remembered 'for being the best friend that the Covenanters ever had' and for his 'spirited opposition to the tyrannical proceedings of Charles I, for which he narrowly escaped losing his head'. lxxxix Whatever the personal danger involved for Elphinstone, his willingness to support the Covenanters could only be read as a sign that the Stuart regime was now in deep water. Whatever the precise nature of their interventions, the leadership of locals such as John Elphinstone and Thomas Hope was evidently appreciated. They were chosen as representatives to the 1643 General Assembly in Edinburgh that met to consult on matters relating to religion and church government. xc The meeting was itself prohibited by the King, who later took measures to annul the pretended convention of Estates of 1643 in Edinburgh which had taken place without the lawful authority of the King. xci There were various spins on the purpose of this so-called 'Westminster Assembly'. To royalists, the assembly was seen as an attempt to inculcate a Calvinistic extreme -it was cast as a 'special polemic against the via media.' xcii Calvinists, suspicious of the tactics of royalist moderates, purposely excluded them from the meeting. Not surprisingly, each side advanced a claim to represent the more genuine form of moderatism. The royalist claim, built around a system of divine prerogative, was an alternative that the Presbyterians likened to 'Papism'. The Presbyterian claim, defended by the proponents of the Westminster Assembly, was built around the ideals of Calvinism. On this view, The Westminster Assembly was called together for two purposes: viz. 1st, To vindicate the doctrine of the Church of England from misrepresentation, and to show that it was in harmony with that of the other Reformed Churches on the continent; and 2d, To effect such changes on her polity and worship as would bring her into closer union with the Church of Scotland and the Reformed Churches in the Continent. xciii This official spin on the Westminster Assembly was regarded with suspicion by the royalists who insisted that the real aim of the Assembly as one of entrenchment of an extreme Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination. In many respects, the Westminster Assembly did in fact lead to an 4 29 entrenchment of an uncompromising line of Presbyterianism in Scotland. It achieved a 'union' of factions by bringing more of the moderate Episcopals on side. However, to be fair to the Presbyterian side, their program of assimilation was simply an inversion of the royalist own plan. Moreover, the Presbyterians had good grounds to be suspicious of the Stuart programme. As the evidence shows, the Stuarts persisted doggedly in advancing their unpopular doctrine of Divine Right, regardless of its having already been poorly cast in the public eye. In retrospect, we can see that the Westminster Assembly did in fact devote much effort to two main aims: 1) It worked to integrating a Calvinist form of Predestinarianism into the articles of the Westminster Confession, and 2), it established a personal relationship with God, unmediated by either a royal Father figure or the Pope as the symbolic basis of religious devotion: God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath set it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his word or beside it, if matters of faith and such commandments out of conscience is to betray true liberty of conscience; and the requiring of an implicit faith and an absolute blind obedience it to destroy liberty of conscience and reason also. xciv While the spirit underlying the above declaration seems one of reclaiming civil and religious freedoms, time would show that in actual fact, implementation of the principles of the Westminster Confession were not nearly as positive as might have been predicted by the idealism of the original vision. * * * Given the longstanding service of the Primrose family, and the political system under the Stuart monarchs, it is not at all surprising to find Archibald Primrose, great-great grandfather to Mary Primrose, succeeding his father as Clerk to the Privy Council in 1641. His family was well established in the power structures of Scotland by the mid-seventeenth century, although the nature and demands of royal service was rapidly changing as opposition to the Stuart rule mounted. xcv [Commonwealth &c.] As a devoted royalist, Archibald Primrose followed the Marquis of Montrose in supporting Charles I, and continued in this support during the Commonwealth. Thus, when Charles I was overthrown, he was, along with other royalists, taken prisoner at Philiphaugh. Cromwell's Scottish administrator, the Marquis of Argyll, later spared Primrose his life. Following the restoration, Primrose's loyalty to the Stuarts proved to be a winning cause. xcvi Archibald Primrose, most highly admired by his descendants, was remembered for his leadership through the stormy politics of mid-seventeenth century Scotland. As one of his contemporaries remarked, 'Throughout the changes of that troublesome period, he maintained so high a character for integrity and wisdom, as to have exercised immense influence over the destinies of his country, whose welfare he had deeply at heart'. xcvii In 1651, King Charles II awarded Archibald Primrose a knighthood, and if recollections of Sir Archibald's character and deportment reflect any measure of truth, this honour may have been well earned. Sir Archibald is said to have possessed 'a great measure of sagacity and prudence, with expedients always ready for every difficulty'. xcviii As statesman and aristocrat, Sir Archibald appears to have embodied a Stoic ideal of leadership that was highly prized during Scotland's turbulent past. xcix But Sir Archibald's service to the King extended well beyond steadiness throughout the turmoil of the Commonwealth. Following the restoration, the new constitutional monarchy could no longer be adequately served by a document such as God and the King. An official legal constitution setting the limits of rights and responsibilities of the monarch and his subjects was 4 30 required. This document, The Lawes and Actes of 1661, was edited by the Clerk to the Privy Council of the day, namely, Sir Archibald Primrose. The Lawes and Actes of 1661 were, ostensibly, a new beginning for the Stuart monarchs in post-Commonwealth Britain. Extracted and collected from the records of Parliament by Archibald Primrose, what The Lawes and Actes of 1661 in fact comes close to restating the very doctrine of Divine Right that had become so objectionable to British subjects. Given the controversy relating to royal prerogative, the continued allusions to Divine Right on the part of the Stuarts is somewhat baffling. It takes only a little reconstruction with some carefully selected quotes to see how elements of the old Stuart regime are carried over into the new document. First, consider the tenor of Act VIII, the 'Act Against Papists, Priests, and Jesuits', which explicitly condemns the Catholic framework. The Act establishes the heresy of Catholic worship under the Papal system, and expressly forbids the instruction of children under this system: Likeas, His Majesty considering how dangerous it is that children be educat by persons popishly affected, do therefore, conform to former Acts of Parliament, appoint that Children under popish Parents, Tutors or Curators shall be taken from them, and committed to the education of some well affected and religious friend, at the sight and by order of His majesties Privy Council: And Ordains publication hereof to be made at the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh and at other places needfull. c At the same time, the document very nearly reaffirms the secular substitute for this doctrine, namely, the doctrine of Divine Right. Hence, we find in The Lawes and Actes a statement that clearly alludes to the doctrine of Divine Right: Yet, such has been the madness and delusion of these times, that even Religion itself, which holds the Right of Kings to be Sacred and Inviolable, hath been pretended unto, for warrand of all these injurious Violations and Incrachments, so publickly done and owned, upon and against, His Majesties just Power, Authority and Government... ci In this context, with clear echoes of God and the King, is proposed a new and much briefer Oath of Allegiance: For testification of my faithful obedience to my most gracious and redoubted Soveraign, Charles, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. Affirm, testifie and declare, by this my Solemn Oath, That I acknowledge my said Soveraigne only Supreme Governour of this kingdom, over all Persons and in all Causes; And that no Foreign Prince, Power or State or Person Civil or Ecclesiastick, hath an Jurisdiction, Power or Superiority over the same; And therefore I do utterly renounce and foresake all Forreign Power, Jurisdictions and Authorities; and shall at my utmost power, defend, assist and maintain His Majesties Jurisdiction foresaid, against all deadly, and shall never decline His majesties Power and Jurisdiction, as I shall answer to God. cii Given the existing controversies and power struggles between supporters of the Commonwealth and royalists, The Lawes and Actes may have sounded like too much of a reinstatement of the ancient doctrine of Divine Right. This doctrine had by this time been many times over rejected as a basis for the monarchy by the people of Britain. Whether justified in their sentiment or not, the political will in post-Commonwealth Britain was set against reverting to the old Stuart regime. The new goal was to establish that the proper extent of civil and religious liberties would be a 4 31 matter of secular governance through elected bodies of laymen, rather than a matter of the prerogative of any one individual or party. Having edited the Laws and Actes of 1661 -a document intended to help to bridge the transition from the era of God and the King to post-Commonwealth Britain, a document intended to define and balance the respective rights and responsibilities of the sovereign and his subjects -Sir Archibald Primrose had firmly established the succession of the Primrose family. He was able to purchase Barnbougle in 1662, and, conscious of the duties of patrons as defined in the Lawes and Actes, promptly instituted changes in Dalmeny parish. The popular local Minister, Alexander Hamilton, despite his willingness to express sorrow for the irregularity of his entry into the Presbytery and Synod, was 'Deprived by the Act of Parliament 11th June, and that of the Privy Council 1st Oct. 1662, for not submitting to Episcopacy'. The Privy Council did eventually indulge Hamilton in 1669, and he then returned to Dalmeny. ciii However, according to the Scots Fasti, Hamilton was again removed from Dalmeny in 1677, on the ground that he drew too many worshippers from Edinburgh. He is again listed in Dalmeny in 1690, but also charged with 'occupying a meeting house in Edinburgh'. Restored by an Act of Parliament in the same year, Hamilton finally left Dalmeny to take up a position in Edinburgh's High Kirk, St. Giles Cathedral. civ His ministerial style and charisma may not have suited all, but Hamilton represented a significant voice in the parish. In any case, it is evident that Dalmeny, like many parishes in Scotland, continued to feel the shock and turbulence of the nation's political and religious conflict. The Primrose family, patrons in the area with close associations to the monarchy, would not escape the effects of this turmoil. cv Whether the early success of Mary Primrose's branch of the family can be fairly attributed to their faithfulness to the Stuart doctrine of royal prerogative is hard to say. One thing that is clear is that Mary Primrose's branch of the family showed enough political savvy to continue flourishing through the centuries. As we shall see, the controversies in Dalmeny and the circumstances surrounding the Primrose family's acquisition of Barnbougle would come to shape the views and attitudes of Mary Primrose. From 1662 onward, the legends and charms of Barnbougle and environs would be the inheritance of the Primrose family. Indeed, with a little imagination, we can picture the ghost of Hound Point howling across the waters of the Forth on New Year's Eve of 1777 when Mary Primrose was born. One way or another, we can rest assured that Barnbougle and its surroundings had made their mark on the heart and mind of Mary Primrose. 1.2 Fealty, Revolt and the House of Hanover Primrose family allegiances grew somewhat complicated in the late seventeenth century, right around the time of Britain's so-called 'Glorious Revolution'. Revolutions tend to build new political affiliations around shared 'revolutionary' ideals, and the Glorious Revolution was, in this respect, a case in point. Families such as the Primroses retained power through the revolution by switching fealties from the Stuart monarchs to the House of Hanover. To many Scots, the transition to the new Hanoverian succession must have been akin to the creation of a divided self. Indeed, a comparison of Stuart and Hanoverian fealty reveals superficial similarities, but deeply rooted ideological differences. The Stuart monarchs, committed to an unpopular vision of moderate Protestantism and absolute monarchy, hoped that Divine Right and an oath of allegiance might firmly establish the place of British monarch relative to God and British subjects. Attempting to identify themselves with the growing Protestant movement, they appealed to a form of anti-Catholic sentiment that had long 4 32 been a popular rallying cry in Britain. But the ultimate goal of their campaign, it seemed, was to bolster their authority and the claim to Divine Right. As such, their political agenda was objectionable to many, and their strategy failed miserably. There grew increasing fears that the already unstable political environment might take a turn for the worse. When King Charles II's son and successor, King James II, appeared to insist on both Catholicism and the doctrine of Divine Right, his will was seen as provokingly contrary to the ideals of post-Commonwealth Britain. For, the British now wanted government to respect the principle of compromise between Parliament and the monarchy. It seemed that King James II would have none of this, and a crisis shortly ensued. Even Scots with royalist sympathies began to lose confidence in the Stuarts, and there grew a conviction that a thoroughly Protestant succession would be needed to ensure good civil government in Britain. Blind allegiance to the Stuarts became impossible, and those among Britain's most powerful elite began to look elsewhere for a line of monarchs to succeed the Stuart regime. In doing so, they turned their attention to Hanover, where a direct Stuart descendant named Mary was married to the Protestant William of Orange. The Hanoverian succession was welcomed and assisted by Scottish Presbyterians who stood to gain from a change of administration. Like other Protestants, Presbyterians had staked their rise to power on the widespread anti-Catholic sentiment. Though superficially similar to the antiCatholic sentiment of the Stuarts, the Presbyterian claim against 'Popery' was associated with a very different set of values. For the Stuarts, anti-Catholic sentiment was linked to the doctrines of moderate Protestantism and Divine Right. By way of contrast, the Presbyterian had built their very campaign on the rejection of both Papal and Royal prerogative, which they regarded as illegitimate forms of arbitrary power. In the case of the Presbyterian movement, anti-Catholic sentiment was more than a convenient tool for harnessing support; it was in fact a corner stone of the religious movement itself. It was also based on an ideology directly contrary to the Stuart claim to Divine Right. The centrality of anti-Catholic sentiment to the Presbyterian movement is evident in a 1683 catechism entitled 'No Popery'. This anonymous pamphlet served to encourage much bigotry and zeal within Scotland's Presbyterian community. cvi The text explicitly condemns traditions that spoil 'through Philosophy and vain deceit'. It criticises the Catholic Church for 'her Errors and Superstitions' and because 'we find not in her the only mark of the True church, which is conformity to the word of God, nor the pure Administration of the Sacrament'. Further to this, as the sub-title indicates, the text condemns many specific Catholic beliefs and practices, including those of praying to saints and angels, many Catholic miracles and sacraments, the priesthood, and so on. For example, on p. 15, Q. What Traditions are to be condemned? A. All Traditions wherewith they pretend to bind the Consciences of men, and give for Articles of Faith, which S. Paul Colos. 2.8 would that we should take heed of: Beware lest any man spoil you through Philosophy and vain deceit, after the Traditions of men, after the Rudiments of the world, and not after christ. Similarly, on p. 29, Q. Why have you Separated from the church of Rome? A. Because our conscience would not suffer us to partake of her Errors and Superstitions, since we find not in her the only mark of the True church, which is conformity to the word of God, nor the pure Administration of the Sacrament. 4 33 The anti-Catholic sentiment expressed in 'No Popery' captures an important aspect of the Presbyterian movement. Neither the Presbyterians nor their natural allies, the Hanoverians, were inclined to share in the spoils of anti-Catholic sentiment. As such, the Presbyterians, with their Hanoverian allies in tow, attacked the Stuart effort to associate moderate Protestantism and Divine Right with the rejection of Papal authority. Melville had already shown the way in this respect, and the newfound alliance against the Stuart monarchy simply renewed the effort to cast the Stuart lot on the wrong side of the Papal divide. They succeeded in their efforts, and a new brand of Hanoverian fealty began to emerge, with Presbyterian blessings. In many respects, the task of re-defining the nature of royalist fealty was akin to the task of forging a new identity. Archibald Primrose, son of the first 'Laird of Barnbougle', was among those who attempted to forge such a new path into the future. As any Scottish statesman of his day might well have held, the art of the politician turns on an ability to find rational compromise between opposing tendencies. And, as we shall see, the new Hanoverian fealty did indeed represented an opposing tendency to Stuart fealty; for it was based in an ideology that differed fundamentally from its predecessor at the most basic levels. * * * Fears that a regressive political and cultural regime was taking hold began to grow more intense. There was increasing discussion of the proper role and function of government. The ideas of John Locke, now famous for his influential Two Treatises of Government, played a major role in articulating a new set of political ideals. At the same time, Locke expressed views that were highly critical of the principles underlying Stuart monarchy. In retrospect, there can be little doubt that Locke's political ideas were instrumental in the developments leading to the downfall of the Stuarts and the rise of the Hanoverian monarchy. Indeed, Locke's progressive ideas on government were well known to the influential Lord Shaftesbury, Locke's friend and patron, and the one who had 'put him upon the study of the religious and civil affairs of the nation with whatsoever related to the business of a minister of state'. Shaftesbury and his friends, it turns out, often consulted Locke upon political matters. cvii Philosophically, Locke advanced a position in defense of religious toleration and of an enlightened account of the origin, aims, and structure of civil government. He advocated socially advanced and even radical views for his day, but justified his political and social views by appeal to Biblical passages. [example] His appeal to Scriptural authority was both typical and effective, and the technique help secure acceptance for Locke's novel claims. While accepting Scriptural authority, Locke rejected as objectionable appeals to Papal authority or Divine Right. He held, for instance, that political power derives from the transfer of the power of individuals in the interest of preserving the natural rights of the citizens and supporting the public good. He rejected the notion of an absolute divine monarch, since this implies a right on the part of the monarch to take away the natural rights of citizens -that is, the life, liberty, health, and property of the subject. Such government is illegitimate, said Locke, because it violates the natural rights of subjects. For these reasons, Locke and his followers explicitly rejected the claim of the Stuart monarchs to their divine right as Kings. Moreover, they also held that in cases of 'illegitimate' civil governments, conditions might arise under which rebellion and regicide is both justifiable and appropriate. Lord Shaftesbury and several other Whig politicians took both a theoretical and a practical interest in Locke's political views, hoping 'to raise that spirit in the nation which was necessary against the prevailing Popish party'. cviii With new political ideals in hand and trying political 4 34 circumstances undermining the nation, there arose a Whig conspiracy, dubbed the 'Rye-House Plot' of 1684. Led by the Lords Shaftesbury, Russell, and Argyll, the conspiracy aimed to overthrow the Stuart regime. Bolstered by the political ideas of John Locke, the conspiracy aimed at the assassination of King James II and the Duke of York, and at a general rising in England and Scotland. cix [details] The planned regicide itself was uncovered, but the general effort to mount an overthrow of James II outlived the Rye House Plot. In addition to developing his political theory, Locke was also working on a theory of human understanding, the very foundation of which was to be consistent with the political views that he had elsewhere espoused. For, both the theories of politics and human understanding were to be founded on appeals to experience, reason, and Scripture. In Locke's day, politicians and aristocrats were accustomed to look for deeper philosophical foundations for political ideology -foundations that in some way tied political institutions to human nature itself. Seeking just such a foundation, Locke eventually publishing his ideas on human understanding under the title Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ostensibly, the book aims to determine the bounds of human knowledge, but the emphasis on the role of the subject in knowledge acquisition also raises a profound challenge to the authoritarian traditions of Papal authority and Divine Right. [explain] As such, Locke's theory of human understanding further served to undermine the traditional of appeals to absolute authority that Locke and many others by now rejected. In searching for the boundary between mere opinion and genuine knowledge, Locke proposed to examine the origin of our ideas, to discern the limits of understanding, and to distinguish knowledge from mere opinion. To this end, he places emphasis on the role of the senses in describing the process of knowledge acquisition. Indeed, on Locke's 'empiricist' view, all of our ideas derive from or are built out of reflection upon sensation. Contra the rationalist presuppositions of scholastic philosophy and would-be defenders of Divine Right, Locke disputes the existence of innate and other privileged ideas. cx He opposes the predominant 'rationalist' views on knowledge, which lays stress on innate ideas and the role of reason in knowledge acquisition. One of Locke's 'rationalist' targets is the Cartesian claim to privileged access to certain knowledge through introspection. Following in the scholastic tradition, Descartes' theory places great emphasis on the evidence of reason, casts doubt on the evidence of the senses, and aspires to uphold the foundations of the 'scholastic' philosophical system -a system that leaves the door open for authoritarian appeals to Papal and Royal authority. Against this authoritarian and dogmatic tradition, Locke argued that the two 'fountains' of knowledge 'from whence all the ideas we have' arise are sensation and reflection. For Locke, these are the only 'natural' sources of ideas that Locke acknowledges. Indeed, Locke thinks that it would be absurd to suppose that we are born with an idea or the God gave us an idea if we could just as well explain the origin of that idea with reference to sensation and reflection. His main point then, is that ideas are built up from sensations, and that the process through which these ideas get built up leads to knowledge. For example, when a child begins to notice that some of her ideas are different and that others are similar, this becomes the basis for ideas of reflection. Ideas of reflection lead us to form more general ideas, and these are meaningful because they are grounded in experience. Whether foreseen or not, Locke's insistence on the evidence of the senses would eventually be discovered to have undermined standard arguments for the existence of God. On Locke's analysis, the 'evidence' upon which our ideas of God and immaterial existence might be founded was completely beyond the purview of sensation. In the long run, as later empiricists would realize, Locke's theory would present major difficulties for all manner of traditional appeals to 4 35 authority and dogma. For, if all legitimate knowledge claims were such that the subject should be able to trace the steps of concept formation to sensation and rule out possible sources of error then what possible foundation could there be for authoritarian claims to direct communication with God? Typically, claims to privileged knowledge of this form were unable to withstand empiricist scrutiny. Locke's empiricism also raised many questions about the method through which knowledge of non-sensory ideas was acquired. Though it appeared to explain the epistemological foundation for scientific investigations, it was directly at odds with rationalist and scholastic traditions. For example, Aristotle had held that a thing's 'necessity' rested in its independent existence or compulsory nature. If a thing was necessary, it could not be otherwise. But this way of understanding necessity invokes terms that are literally meaningless on Locke's empiricist theory of ideas, because they have no experiential correlate. Similarly, on the Aristotelian account, understanding a thing's 'causes' was a basis for understanding its true nature, but, for the most part, the Aristotelian notion of causality was clearly beyond empirical investigation. cxi Given that Aristotelian notions of 'necessity' and 'causality' had for centuries formed the basis for many discussions of the nature of reality and of God, Locke's empiricist view presented significant challenges to this traditional in metaphysics and theology. More than this, however, Locke theory seemed to point to a problem with the everyday sense of 'cause' and 'effect' with which we are today familiar; for in any inference from an observed effect to an unobserved cause, the effect, but not the cause, is an idea obtained through sensation. If an inferred cause is unobserved, then the basis on which we can claim to have knowledge of it on a Lockean theory becomes a matter of some moment. cxii What arguably began as part of an effort to undermine a corrupt system of governance, had now spread its tendrils very wide indeed. Some have argued that Locke did not see the full significance of his theories. While this may be true in the case of his theory of understanding, the same cannot be plausibly said of his political views. There, Locke seems to have known exactly what he was about. When the Stuart monarchs and their supporters got wind of the general gist of his ideas, Locke was soon in trouble with the King. Expelled from Oxford by Royal order in 1684, he escaped into exile in Holland. Meanwhile, back in Britain, the Stuarts began to persecute those suspected in connection with the Rye House Plot. And, like many Scottish nobles of his day, the son of Sir Archibald Primrose, the first 'Laird of Barnbougle', found himself in trouble with King James II. Primrose succeeded in removing himself from difficulty by 'declaring Popish' before the Privy Council in 1688. Afterwards, he left to serve as Gentleman of the Bedchamber to Prince George. This escape was doubtless motivated by support for the Hanoverian succession; however, the prospect of further persecution at the hands of the Privy Council would itself have warranted the flight. Consider, for example, the fate of William Carstares, notorious for having had the 'thumbkins' applied to him by Edinburgh's Privy Council. The torture was intended to procure information about the plot, and Carstares, [suspected as a double agent], is said to have endured extreme agony for more than an hour. cxiii Through these and similar persecutions, the Stuarts had repeatedly shown themselves to be incapable of representing the voice of compromise that so many saw as critical for stability in Britain, and so were finally deposed. A new royal dynasty, known as the House of Hanover, was initiated under the Protestant William of Orange and his wife Mary. In Scotland, a new era heralded new alliances between Presbyterian and Hanoverian leaders. Upon his return to Scotland, Archibald Primrose, now a firm supporter of William of Orange, became, [in ---], one of the Commissioners of the 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland. Primrose was entrusted with the important task of collecting information about Jacobite activities in the highlands for the new government. [secret agent man?!] This fealty to 4 36 the Hanoverian cause was richly rewarded, and so, Mary Primrose's great-grandfather, Archibald Primrose, was created Viscount in 1700 and Earl in 1703. One of the patents of creation refers explicitly to the services of Sir Archibald Primrose to King Charles I and II, and also to 'the good behaviour of his son'. cxiv For his part, William Carstares survived his encounter in the Privy Council Chamber and is said to have encouraged King William III to trust the Presbyterians rather than the Episcopalians. cxv Carstares' influence must have been considerable, for he was later credited with having persuaded Scotland's General Assembly to accept the Act of Union with England. And, though it took decades for the full significance of Locke's ideas to unfold, the underlying reasonableness of Locke arguments held immediate appeal. With Lockean moderatism and reason on their side, the Hanoverian and their new Presbyterian garnered wide support. Thus it was that the Stuart monarchs were finally ousted, largely because of their unpopular insistence on the extreme doctrine of Divine Right. Archibald Primrose, in what at least superficially appears to have been a surprising feat of political gymnastics, was among those who endorsed the new vision of Lockean fealty and Hanoverian succession. Now elevated to the peerage, Archibald Primrose espoused values and ideas utterly different from those upon which the family's original rise to prominence had depended. Thus, new times and a new vision of good governance meant a new form of fealty. As the decades unfolded, the development of these new notions of fealty and government would eventually lead to a clearer articulation of new ideals for civil order and freedom. However, the transition to this new regime, and the new alliances that subsequently emerged, were by no means easy to navigate. Indeed, despite its initial foundation in a Lockean ideal of moderation, the realities of political pressure and uncertainty meant that the new order was quickly marred by the same sort of arbitrary and persecutory politics that had been deemed intolerable under the Stuarts. * * * In Scotland, the new regime emerged as a political alliance between powerful Hanoverian and Presbyterian leaders whose administration dominated Edinburgh's Town Council, General Assembly, and College. cxvi [As part of this shift in administration, newly minted Hanoverians such as Archibald Primrose did XYZ, while] William Carstares became Principal of Edinburgh College. The new Town Council insisted on conservative and intolerant policies. As part of the Revolution Settlement, there was established in 1690 an explicit requirement of a religious test to ensure Presbyterian sympathies and teachings in the university. The conservative Council also insisted on preserving the old scholastic educational system, so that we can safely assume that at the turn of the eighteenth century, the course notes for Regent Pillans' 'Philosophia Peripateti', were still highly relevant. cxvii By all accounts, popular themes at the College included salvation, grace, and a proper understanding of the spiritual substances such as 'God, the Angels, and the souls of men'. In effect, the curriculum in Scotland continued to emphasise the ancient and medieval themes of scholastic theology and philosophy. cxviii Similarly, Cicero and other representatives of Patristic studies were still much recommended, despite the flourishing of new ideas already well underway elsewhere in Europe. Like the curriculum, the college's political and social policies were also retrograde. As one commentator remarked, 'The glorious Revolution of 1688 was followed by what was known in Episcopalian circles as the \"Presbyterian Inquisition\", which transformed Edinburgh from an Episcopalian college, with one or two masters who had hobnobbed with the Jesuits, into a Presbyterian seminary.' cxix An Act was passed 'with a view of excluding Episcopalians and Jacobites from the Universities, which obliged every Professor before induction to sign a declaration before the Presbytery of the bounds that he accepted the Confession of Faith, and avowed obedience to the Established Church of 4 37 Scotland.' cxx The Town Council then took measures to eliminate Jacobitism and Episcopalianism, and went so far as to 'abolish outlets for student high spirits which could be exploited and transformed into political demonstrations by those who disliked the Whig and Presbyterian establishment.' cxxi The rigid and sometimes extreme enforcement of policies was by no means universally welcome. In 1703, all but one of the Regents and Professors at the College rebelled against the new regime, signing a petition in defence of their right to call themselves a 'Faculty' with certain powers of election. The Town Council responded to this insubordination in full force, and 'at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the absolute powers of the Town Council over the College were declared by legal authority.' cxxii In the face of these and other difficulties, the new Principal, William Carstares, appears to have adopted a conciliatory stance. When the Town Council presented him with a new set of rules governing his office, Carstares carefully but firmly responded. With cautious support for the professors, he stated that, 'I cannot but tell your Lordship and the other worthy magistrates of the city...that I look upon myself as coming into this post upon no other terms than what my predecessors did; and that, as to my part, all affairs relating to this College remain entire.' cxxiii Carstares is credited with having smoothed things over in this instance, but there is evidence of ongoing political struggles between university Professors and Patrons, particularly over claims relating to the use of the term 'Faculty'. cxxiv Eventually, a Town Council committee was formed to eliminate all such references, and to ensure that the relevant legal documents were 'fairly transumed and more regullarly wrytten' cxxv Shortly afterwards, the Town Council also took the opportunity to ensure that Presbyterian teachings were foremost at the College. They 'revised' the curriculum by insisting on Presbyterian religious teaching, moral instruction, and mandatory church attendance. To top it all off, it was further insisted that there were so 'many usefull things belonging to the Pnewmaticks and Morall Philosophy' that public lessons should be given 'at such times as the students are not obleidged to be in their classes'. cxxvi Nothing contrary to the Scriptures or the Presbyterian Confession of Faith was to be allowed, and for all intents and purposes, neither the ideological lessons of the Glorious Revolution, nor those of the Renaissance, for that matter, had yet to sink in. cxxvii Given the state of learning in Continental Europe, the advances in the arts and sciences, and the discovery of the New World, it was apparent the local curriculum in Edinburgh had failed to keep apace of the expanding body of scientific knowledge and philosophical inquiry. Education was, of course, key to moulding the ideas of the upcoming generation, and for this reason, remained a point of controversy in Scotland. Conservatives tended to support the scholastic system of learning in which many of their ideals and traditions were embedded. In particular, the Presbyterian administration had an interest in retaining the antiquated curriculum, because Presbyterian theology was based on a combination of the old Scriptural-based scholasticism and Calvinism. Hence, although it might have seemed natural, and even desirable, for Presbyterian Scotland to adopt the newer post-scholastic thought in its early stages, for various reasons, this early adoption did not in fact take place. [explain] Fortunately, Edinburgh's Town Council did eventually begin to address the need for change, though they attempted to introduce change in a way that would leave intact their conservative educational policies. What the Council in fact implemented was a series of administrative changes at the College. However, in the long run, these changes had a big impact on the curriculum as well. The Town Council looked to Dutch universities such as Leyden as models for updating the infrastructure of Edinburgh College. The old Scotch system -based on a single college Regent overseeing the progress of a class of students through their four-years of college studies -was finally replaced by a system in which Professors were responsible for teaching in 4 38 a single subject area. For the first time in Scotland, professorships were established in different areas of the arts curriculum. cxxviii Astonishing advances in knowledge had already been made in Europe on just such a model, and it was becoming apparent that Scotland's own higher educational system would have to allow for specialisation if it hoped to encourage scholarly research and to entice its own citizenry. On the revised system, professors gained new authority. Indeed, 'A Professor was appointed to pursue for life a particular subject, and, with the whole University teaching of that subject placed in his hands, was in a very different position in point of authority, responsibility, and incentives to exertion from either a Regent or a College tutor.' cxxix The major revision to the system then, was not specific to the curriculum, but involved discarding the old system of Regents and tutors in favour of a system designed to encourage specialisation and scholarship. Thus, as the eighteenth century began to unfold, Edinburgh College would finally witness a series of changes to administrative and teaching positions, changes that would in turn affect the curriculum. The new emphasis on specialisation and scholarly research meant that ideas from other parts of Europe were now being unofficially introduced to Scotland's educational system on a regular basis. The 'enlightened' philosophy from the Continent had a liberal and democratic flavour, and, while it was not considered politically correct reading, it grew in popularity. The ideas of the British empiricist thinkers, such as John Locke, also became objects of serious academic interest. Already heralded as the political and moral thinker whose ideas had ushered in the new monarchy, Locke's newly published work grew very popular. Interest in the forward-looking Locke turned to his claim to have translated Newton's success in science into a philosophical revolution for a general theory of knowledge. His epistemology became widely accepted as a basis for an account of empirical knowledge acquisition, and seemed to many to support the method of knowledge acquisition implicit in some of the most advanced scientific theories of the day. The significance of Locke's empiricism and its criticisms of scholasticism became an object of great interest in Britain and Ireland. The discussion of philosophy that ensued in eighteenth century Scotland was informed these influences and more -influences that extended well beyond the official, approved curriculum. Philosophical debate began to overflow the confines of the university and its overly scholastic curriculum, so that most of the important work being done in philosophy was, by this time, outside of the purview of the official curriculum of the professors. The sheer momentum and excitement of the new ideas seemed to spill over into the universities and learned societies of the eighteenth century. Many accepted Locke's philosophy wholesale; although there were some detractors. One of Locke's best-known critics was the Irish philosopher George Berkeley. Berkeley's fellow patriot and contemporary, Francis Hutcheson, was also a critic. Hutcheson, a professor who moved from Dublin to Glasgow in 1729, rejected several important aspects of Locke's empiricism. cxxx In particular, Hutcheson modified Locke's empiricist doctrine by claiming that there exist certain 'finer powers of perception' that lead to non-sensible moral and aesthetic awareness. The strategy amounted to a kind of side-stepping of the bounds of human knowledge implicit to Lockean empiricism, and enabled Hutcheson to defend the claim to moral, aesthetic, and religious knowledge. Thus, the idea that we have a capacity for finer sensibility figures centrally in Hutcheson, whose strategies and ideas would influence an incoming generation of Scottish scholars, including the famous Thomas Reid. Locke, however, had many more converts than critics. Many held Locke that his epistemological perspective was supported by the success of empirical investigations such as Newton's. Newton's physics had by then overwhelmed Britain's intellectual community, and indeed the world. In its day, Newtonian mechanics was the best and most comprehensive scientific system ever produced. Based on a 'rational mechanics', that is, on 'the science of motions resulting from any forces whatsoever, 4 39 and the forces required to produce any motions, accurately proposed and demonstrated', a large portion of the Principia reasons inductively from phenomena to establish 'general propositions'. Book I reasons from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature. Book II reasons from these forces to demonstrate further phenomena. Book III then reasons from celestial phenomena to the force of gravity which draws bodies toward the sun, and then generalises the results for both celestial and terrestrial bodies. Since much of the argument in the Principia assumes that sense data is trustworthy, there seemed good reason to think that the empiricist theory of Locke was on the right track in the general area of theory of knowledge. Taken together, Locke and Newton seemed to represent an unbeatable duo of philosophical and scientific knowledge. Having paid top dollar to bring the best educators to Edinburgh College, it was ludicrous to forbid them from teaching a more advanced and up-to-date curriculum. In consequence, changes were finally allowed in the new curriculum. Empiricist philosophers such as Bacon, Locke, and Newton were studied, both officially and unofficially. Bacon, a critic of the scholastics, was introduced in the area of classics; Locke was studied under the heading of moral philosophy; and, Newton was studied in mathematical science. Edinburgh mathematician, Colin Maclaurin, one of the stars of the newly re-modelled professoriate, amazed students and colleagues alike with his ability to teach the mathematical foundations of Newtonian mechanics. In addition to teaching the basics of mathematics, algebra, geometry, optics and astronomy, it was reported in 1741, Maclaurin 'prelects on Sir Issac Newton's Principia, and explains the direct and inverse method of fluxions' all of which was followed by lectures on experimental philosophy. cxxxi This was considered a substantial improvement over the days of the Regents, when natural philosophy was limited to the Physical Lectures of Aristotle. cxxxii As a result of Maclaurin's successful teaching of the mathematical basis of Newtonian mechanics, Newtonian science became wildly popular, and it grew nearly impossible to curb the appetite for and understanding of this science. Other professors at Edinburgh, particularly those in areas seen as separable from religion and morality, were likewise engaged in expanding the curriculum. Professor Robert Stewart used works by Issac Newton, Dr. David Gregory, and Dr. John Keill for his natural philosophy courses. John Stevenson, who taught rational philosophy, used De Vries, Locke, and a history of philosophy text. In moral and political philosophy, the chief authors studied continued to be the ancient writers such as Cicero, Marcus Antonius, Puffendorff. But a notable exception was the introduction of Bacon. In most respects, 'The reaction against the old system of Regenting had been complete. The Arts Faculty of the University of Edinburgh, with the exception of its classical department, had been re-modelled after the example of Leyden and Utrecht. In supplement to the Dutch influence, inspiration was borrowed from Bacon, Newton, and Locke.' cxxxiii Though initially thwarted by the administrative policies of the new and conservative Town Council, the ideology that had propelled forward the Glorious Revolution did take root in Edinburgh. Secular leaders such as Carstares and successor William Robertson made efforts to introduce a moderate style of leadership in Edinburgh. At the same time, conservative Council policies slowed the pace of change and established a history of disputes and power struggles between the General Assembly, College, and Town Council of Edinburgh. The Council and the Assembly, always dominant in political and ecclesiastic disputes, attempted to dictate policies at the College. And, over the decades, as competing political factions struggled for control over Scotland's principal institutions, Edinburgh College became embroiled in political disputes of one sort or another. Thus it was that efforts to promote Lockean ideals of moderation and tolerance were often countered by a conservative reaction on the part of local administrators. A new pattern of opposing tendencies had been established. 4 40 * * * Thinkers such as Locke, Berkeley, Hutcheson, Turnbull, and Reid initiated a kind of intellectual chain reaction in Scotland's philosophical community. Their innovative thought inspired Edinburgh's men of letters to new heights of creativity. Significant advances were made in the area of philosophy known as the theory of knowledge or 'epistemology', principally as a result of critical reflection on the philosophical contribution of Locke. This period of innovative thought came to be known to the world as the 'Scottish Enlightenment'. As a development of the empiricist reaction against the scholastic tradition in philosophy, the Scottish Enlightenment found its most dramatically articulation in mid-eighteenth century Scottish thought of Edinburgh's David Hume. Just as new philosophical ideas were beginning to take hold in Edinburgh, there was a growing Jacobite movement to advance the Stuart claim to the throne. Political and religious unrest began to mount, and the political climate grew very uncertain, very quickly. The Glorious Revolution had redefined the nature of the political union between Scotland and England, and given the magnitude of the changes, and the existing divisions in Scotland, there was widespread discontent. Many Scottish nobles refused to swear allegiance to William and Mary. Others, like Mary Primrose's great-grandfather, Archibald Primrose, supported the new Protestant monarchs. One way or another, the country was more divided than ever, and conditions in Scotland were ripe for revolution. In 1745, Highland Jacobites (supporters of James II and his descendants) and non-juring Episcopalians united against the newly emerging power structure. The details of these Jacobite Rebellions are too involved for our story, but we can at least take note of the fact that the Primrose family, like many others, was divided on the issues. At the same time as Mary Primrose's ancestor, Archibald Primrose, swore allegiance to the new Hanoverian monarch, his cousin, also Archibald Primrose, is remembered as a friend to the Jacobite cause. cxxxiv As fears of civil unrest grew, so too did fear of further ideological challenges. While the views of the intellectual hero of the Glorious Revolution were seen as trustworthy, some of the thought that had taken its inspiration from Locke came to be regarded as less than savoury. Such was the case with Edinburgh philosopher and historian, David Hume. Hume's epistemological views were simply a development of Locke's theory, and though seemingly remote from political themes, they were labelled as 'dangerous' to civil society. As a matter of personal politics, Hume was opposed to revolution and unsympathetic to the popular cause. Hume identified civil war with religious fanaticism, both of which he disliked. In fact, Hume's personal politics were clearly on the side of the conservative ruling class, so it is a matter of some curiosity that Hume came to be regarded as ideologically suspect. Ironically, Locke and his philosophy, widely regarded as reasonable and enlightened, had had a most subversive influence on government. For Locke's combination of reasonable Christianity, political theory, and empiricism held enough appeal to play a substantial and profound role in social change. cxxxv But, whatever the specifics, Hume's epistemological views seemed to many to have crossed into a forbidden philosophical territory. The trouble began when David Hume sought the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in the midst of the Jacobite uprisings of 1744-5. To conservatives, Hume seemed to represent the very sort of ideological radicalism suspected of germinating seeds in those 'hotbeds' of political heresy. What Hume had in fact done was to develop the implications of the empiricist ideas of Locke. In doing so, he seemed to some to have shown that empiricist ideas led to scepticism; for Hume's views had been articulated in a treatise that ultimately challenged the rational and Scriptural foundations for belief in the existence of God. Denounced by 4 41 Hutcheson, Hume was denied the position and publicly charged with atheism. This accusation presented for most of Edinburgh's establishment an open-and-shut case against Hume's candidature. For though there was support for freedom of conscience, the bounds of tolerance could not easily be made to stretch to a perceived case of atheism, which was what most of Edinburgh's leaders were prepared to charge against Hume. Hume's theory of ideas was largely based on Locke's empiricism. Hume divides the perceptions of the mind into two classes, impressions and ideas. He also identifies three distinct faculties of the mind, sensation, memory, and imagination. Simple ideas copied from sensation provide the materials for complex ideas. Having modestly elaborated on Locke's empiricist foundations, Hume then defended some philosophically and theologically shocking conclusions about the limits of human knowledge. On the basis of his empiricist theory, Hume argued that we have neither ideas nor knowledge of immaterial substances such as the soul or God. On the same grounds, Hume also denied the possibility revealed knowledge of God, the rationality of believing reports of miracles, and the soundness of all of the traditional proofs for the existence of God. Shocking as these claims were in his day, Hume is today most celebrated for his insights into the limits of our knowledge of causal necessity. The specific thread of Hume's account went as follows. For Hume, knowledge is built from relations of ideas and matters of fact. As Hume explains, characteristics of relations of ideas are that they are known by demonstrative proof; known by the operation of comparing ideas with one another; and, cannot be denied without contradiction. Matters of fact, on the other hand, are not known by demonstration because they depend on reference to what actually exists somewhere in the universe. Such matters of fact can be denied without contradiction. Hume attaches significance to the fact that we are unable to form a belief in a cause and effect connection after having seen just one instance or by analysis. He takes this as very probable evidence that our causal inferences must be based on a habit of mind. The habit is developed by repeated experience of resembling cases rather than by reasoned analysis. Two things are necessary for causal inference, an impression or idea of some object, and experience of customary conjunction between this object and another. Hume's discussion of causal reasoning turns out to have significant ramifications, because it implies that the justification for knowledge of causal relations is based on circular reasoning: For, knowledge of matters of fact depends on causal reasoning, and knowledge of causal relations depends on knowledge of matters of fact. Thus, Hume has shown himself to be a sceptic by arguing that we have no rational justification for our expectation that the future will resemble the past. All that experience can tell us is that a certain cause has led to a certain effect, not that it will or must lead to that effect. For all we know, the course of nature could change -there is no contradiction in this possibility. Hume's critique of causality also challenged revealed and natural religion, and hence, ideas upon which religious and civil institutions still relied. Hume questioned the Bible and the theological arguments of philosophers and theologians from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas, still taken by conservatives to be authoritative. Aquinas was famous for his five arguments for the existence of God, although he is best remembered for two of his five ways, versions of what is called the 'cosmological' argument for the existence of God. Based on an Aristotelian insight, Aquinas' 'unmoved mover' argument is this: All things are observed to be in motion, so there must have been some 'First Mover' that set all things in motion. This unmoved mover is God. Aquinas is also credited with the first cause argument, which goes as follows: We observe those things around us to be causally related. There must be some one thing that first set the chain of efficient causes in the world in motion. This thing is the 'First Cause', or God. Aquinas had a number of other ways, and he even had an early version of the 'design' argument, which appeals to the purposeful nature of things in the world, amongst his five ways to prove the existence of God. Since virtually all theologians endorsed these arguments in Hume's day, 4 42 Hume's critique of causality could not have failed to put him at odds with all factions of his community. The political and intellectual controversy that unfolded in the Hume affair was insubstantial, although it is interesting to note that the struggle over Hume's candidature can be directly tied to a power struggle between competing Whig factions in Edinburgh: cxxxvi The first thing one must understand about Scottish university appointments in the eighteenth century is that they were politicized, and that the politicians concerned with them were intent upon controlling every office of profit and honour in the kingdom. The more one controlled, the greater one's prestige, power, and ability to manage affairs in ways useful to oneself and one's associates or masters in London. The privilege of managing Scottish affairs for the ministry in London had been sought since c. 1714 by two competing Scottish factions -the Squadrone and the Argathelians. Both were Whiggish in outlook, but their territorial bases and leaders were very different. cxxxvii Yet, it is unlikely that Hume's failure to secure a university position can be convincingly attributed political power struggles. Hume himself had friends in both Whig camps. cxxxviii The temptation to reconstruct the theological and political controversy as foremost in the Hume affair is a strong one, but one that must, to an extent, be resisted. In hindsight, it seems plausible to say that Hume's trials and tribulations were eclipsed by local political struggles. For, it is well to remember that from the perspective of competing factions in the political elite, the truly pressing concern in 1745 was not Hume, but Jacobite unrest. Moreover, it is also important to remember that Hume's difficulties arose at a time when a new Hanoverian administration was struggling to establish itself in Britain. In post-Union Scotland, the struggle for political power and stability was an especially difficult one, and Hume's failed candidature received relatively little public attention. The real problem facing the various ruling families was how to prevent subversion of their hold over the Church, the town, and the College -the very institutions, and indeed the nation, through which they exerted their power. In the final analysis, the struggle over Hume's appointment was buried under layers of history and politics, so that neither the tenets of Hume's philosophy nor his accomplishments received much of a hearing. Moreover, given the Episcopalian and Presbyterian rivalry that always accompanied political unrest, a cry in support of Hume's right to freedom of conscience would have been, to put it mildly, untimely. The charges of atheism against Hume could only have served to feed existing worries: At some level, it must have been apparent to all sides, as well as to Hume, that the dangerous philosophy of 'heresy, deism, scepticism and atheism' would have to be quashed. cxxxix There was no need to vet the philosophical and theological charges in any sort of debate. For the charge of atheism was beyond smoothing over. And, the political instability of the day meant that all parties would be especially cautious in the face of controversy touching on the foundations of religious and political belief. Moreover, given the causal connections implicit in both religious and royalist arguments, Hume's claims about causality and religious ideas presented threats on all fronts. In Hume's case, the struggle for civic and religious freedom was not a central issue. In sum, all things considered, Hume was a sure loser, even if his fate was, by all accounts, unjustly delivered. He was quite simply a casualty of a country deeply divided on both political and religious grounds. In the end, the Jacobite rebellions were in fact successfully put down, but only just. At one point during the uprising, the town of Edinburgh briefly fell under a slight threat of a Jacobite invasion. Edinburgh's professors, perhaps more in the interest of publicity than anything else, rose to the defence of the town. The event succeeded in drawing positive attention to the leadership of the professoriate, and became legendary in the popular 4 43 imagination -if not entirely effective. Indeed, the early death of the mathematician Colin Maclaurin was attributed to his heroic efforts to defend Edinburgh from the Jacobite threat. After the crisis, the professors further established their credibility by strengthening the political alliances linking the old ruling Whigs and the Presbyterian leaders in the Church of Scotland. cxl As for Hume, at least some of Scotland's professors were quietly sympathetic. Francis Hutcheson, Hume's ideological opponent and critic, was offered the Edinburgh post. Hutcheson declined, and another philosopher, William Cleghorn, took up the position. In Dalmeny, the only local known to have openly expressed sympathy for Hume was Henry Erskine. Given personal and political affiliations, it seems likely that the Primrose family would have been among Hume silent supporters. But the uncertainty of the times, politics could well have placed them on either side, regardless of their private views on the implications of Hume's doctrine. cxli Neil Primrose's mother, Mary Campbell, was sister to the fourth Duke of Argyll, who, having recently inherited both title and political power from his cousin, was one of Hume's principal supporters. cxlii In any event, Neil Primrose, Mary Primrose's father, would have taken at least some interest in the episode, for he was a student in William Cleghorn's Moral Philosophy course in 1746. cxliii All the same, divisions within the Campbell family, Neil Primrose's own differences with his father, and his uncle's 1746 execution for treason all cloud the issues. The historical evidence is equivocal, and suggests that Neil Primrose could well have been personally and politically allied with either Hume's supporters or his detractors. Either way, few were willing to openly push the bounds of moderation in support of the 'infidel' Hume during the Jacobite turmoil, and it is doubtful that Neil Primrose openly took a stand on the issue. 1.3 A Childhood in Dalmeny The second half of the eighteenth century was comparatively peaceful in Edinburgh. After decades of strife, roars of controversy and unrest subsided into tired rumbles. However, controversies such as that surrounding Hume and his philosophy did not entirely die out. Ten years after the Hume affair, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland felt the need to unanimously articulate its 'warning against the infidel principles of Mr Hume'. cxliv Yet, in spite of the ongoing stigma, and in a strange way, both Hume and his philosophy became part of the very fabric of Scottish society. Some of the most prominent members of Edinburgh society were on intimate terms with Hume until his death in 1776, and through these channels, there grew an ongoing support for Hume and his work. This support took the shape of a humanistic appeal for tolerance -an appeal that survived in Edinburgh long after the academic scandal had blown over. The moderate stance was not, however, universally welcome. Conservative members in Edinburgh society favoured tighter social controls and greater restrictions on liberties than those advocated by moderate leaders. However, fortunately for Mary Primrose, the underlying antagonisms between liberal and conservative elements in Edinburgh society rarely escalated into civil disturbances in the decades of her youth and young adulthood. Indeed, occasional rumblings and fears about civil unrest aside, the second half of the eighteenth century was a period of relative stability and prosperity for Edinburgh's upper classes. Mary Primrose, like many of her generation, seems to have enjoyed an idyllic childhood. At least, the remaining clues that can be pieced together would suggest as much. The enchantment of Barnbougle and the natural beauty of its rural setting must have offset the limitations the five-century old dwelling. The 'charming park of Barnbougle', as one eighteenth century observer remarked, is 'characterised for its bold waving surface, composed of the finest heights and lawns, and also for the variety, elegance, and fancy, of the rides within its circuit.' cxlv Indeed, its prospect was said to extend 'as far as the eye can reach', and the scenery was described as 'among the finest in Europe.' cxlvi Barnbougle was in fact a local landmark, and, having enjoyed generations of ownership, the Primrose family had grown attached to the 4 44 property. On one account, 'The 3rd earl decided to have a new residence built slightly inland, the story being that one day he had just risen after dinner and was soaked by a large wave.' cxlvii However, whatever minor inconveniences the castle may have occasionally presented were evidently overcome, for Neil Primrose could not bring himself to put such plans to action, and his settled view was that any home good enough for his ancestors was good enough for his own family. Thus, during the youth of Mary Primrose, the family continued on as they had for many years, dividing their days between London, Norfolk, and Barnbougle. cxlviii In London, the family leased Holland House in Kensington while the children were young. Holland House had recently passed into the hands of Charles James Fox, the prominent Whig leader who became a vocal opponent to conservative policies under King George III. cxlix In later years, Holland House would gain notoriety as a social hub for the Whig party, [but how long before this?], Neil Primrose had decided upon Barnbougle as a primary residence for his young family. Indeed, to the eighteenth century aristocrat, the country held many attractions, both real and imagined, and children in wealthy families were often brought up 'in the fresh country air'. At a time when diseases such as smallpox and rickets threatened the survival of young heirs, and reckless gambling could land a family in poverty, the country came to represent an escape from the ravages of disease, depravity, and poverty. cl Drawing on and reinforcing these stereotypes, authors such as Locke and Rousseau promoted the romantic ideal of country living. Locke, for example, emphasised the importance of health to the education of children, weaving together practical, moral, religious, and civic advice in an account that was widely accepted in eighteenth century Britain. As Locke convincingly argued, parents were responsible for seeing that their children received a proper education, and for ensuring 'such strength and health to their Bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their Minds, as may best fit his Children to be most useful to themselves and others'. cli Thus, country living was not merely a lifestyle suited for leisure, but essential for the healthy upbringing of children. The country was 'the place from which the nation's leaders must spring and the untainted paradise which must sustain them.' clii The Primrose family had several country homes, and as the years went by and Neil Primrose's family grew in number, Barnbougle became the primary residence. cliii The countryside there, it turns out, was perfectly suited to the ideal of country living. One of several coastal parishes near Edinburgh, the view from the rising banks of the Forth encompassed 'numerous towns, villages, seats, [and] woody hills'. cliv Thus, the local parish, Dalmeny, offered views extending to the seats and villages of All told, Dalmeny, along with the nearby parishes of Cramond and Queensferry, included dozens of fine homes. These were owned or rented by prominent figures, members of the Dundas, Erskine, Napier, Law, Stewart, Hamilton, Cockburn, Cleghorn, Blair, Campbell, Wilkie, Inglis, Chalmers, Bonar, Caird, Brewster, Jeffrey, and Pillans families. clv The legal profession was particularly well represented, and over the decades, local notables included Henry Erskine, Hugh Blair, Henry Cockburn and Francis Jeffrey. There were also prominent clergy, scholars, inventors, statesmen, professors, and university administrators. The accomplishments of the various individuals with connections to the area are too many and varied to describe in passing, and it suffices to say that the area attracted many of Edinburgh's gentry. They studied, worked and entertained in their country manors and town residences, commuting on the 'Great North Road' from Edinburgh, described as 'one of the pleasantest and most frequented in Scotland'. clvi The distinguished local community must have presented a stimulating and rich environment for a country childhood. Music, drama and reading were important aspects of country life, and several of the country homes in the area might easily have served as a 'court' to shelter artists, writers, musicians, and actors.' clvii Like other children living in manorial country homes, Mary 4 45 Primrose would have enjoyed these forms of cultural enrichment, as well as some of the special freedoms associated with country living. Children living in country manors 'had greater opportunities than many others to express their feelings and energy, in wild games which could take place in the fine landscapes and shrubberies their families owned.' clviii Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Primrose children did in fact enjoy such a carefree and unspoiled childhood. Consider, for example, that only a strong sense of freedom and adventure could have led to the contemplation of the following mischief on the part of Mary Primrose and her siblings. On one occasion, Mary Primrose tattled that 'Lady Charlotte had declared her intention of driving a four-in-hand phaeton dressed in a drab coat with seven capes and a long whip.' clix Moreover, it was not beyond the pale for the Primrose girls to steal away to the local manse to engage Mr. Archibald Bonar, Minister of Cramond, in 'theological scéances'. clx This level of independence would have been unusual for Scottish girls of the period; however, the freer standards associated with country living and the social standing of the Primrose family would have mitigated the stricter rules appropriate for city living. While country living had its freedoms, it also had its formalities and traditions. Religious observance, for example, was nearly universal. The church and parish history at Dalmeny had long been one of Episcopalian and Presbyterian rivalry, and this rivalry appears to have persisted throughout the eighteenth century. clxi Neil Primrose was probably among the so-called 'Faithful Remnant' of Episcopalians who, having been turned out of St. Giles Cathedral, met in secret over a shop in Carubber's Close, and then later, in Charlotte Chapel on Register Street. clxii Whatever the particulars in Dalmeny, it is clear that various religious divisions prevailed. By the late eighteenth century, there were 143 seceders in the parish, including one clergyman. clxiii The large number of Covenanters in the area suggests that the Dalmeny figure reflects the growing divisions within Presbyterian Church. Indeed, following the triumph of Presbyterianism, it was not only Scottish Episcopalians, but also the members of other dissenting Presbyterian congregations, who were forced into secrecy and covert worship. clxiv Thus, over the centuries, the local communities had continued to be divided on religious grounds, and Mary Primrose would have been sensitive to the ongoing religious conflict in Scotland. Whatever their emphasis, the sermons preached in the Dalmeny area during Mary Primrose's youth were probably quite stimulating and rich. Both the Dalmeny and the nearby Cramond church had highly educated ministers. For those times when the mind did seek an escape, there was still plenty to fill the eye and the imagination during the service. Dalmeny church dates from about 1160, and, like the Cramond and other local churches, it has a rich history. clxv Dalmeny church, which is ancient and beautiful, is described as 'a small but elegant fabric of Saxon architecture' and as 'one of the finest specimens of that style in Scotland'. clxvi Architectural details include an elaborately carved entrance door, 'with fabulous animals, figures and grotesque head, probably taken from the Bestiary, the product of credulous medieval imagination'. clxvii The arches of the apse, chancel, and nave are decorated with Norman chevron carving, and mason's marks cut into floor slabs date the church to its medieval origins. clxviii Indeed, traditions of worship at the site extend from Celtic to Catholic, Catholic to Episcopalian, and finally to Presbyterian worship. By the late eighteenth century, the Episcopalian patronage of Mary's father, Neil Primrose, would likely have introduced tensions for the Presbyterian congregation -the same kinds of tensions and conflicts reflected quite generally in the history of Scotland itself. In view of this, whether Mary Primrose, baptised at Barnbougle Castle on January 8, 1778, was ever dipped into Dalmeny's baptismal basin -inscribed 'Dalmeny Kirk 1778' --, we can only guess. Nonetheless, we do know that the Primrose family attended services at Dalmeny church, which stands as a living monument to the many forms of religious ritual and devotion witnessed on its grounds. At the same time, Mary Primrose evidently became 4 46 familiar with the conventions of Anglican worship through her sojourns in London. On one visit to London, Mary Primrose wandered into an Anglican Church, and found her religious experience suddenly expanded beyond the familiar limits: clxix Once --it was a Sunday-my mother heard the church bells and went as the sound led her. The bells stopped, and she heard the organ peal out. In the Scotch Church at Dalmeny there was no organ. She went in, and there sat through the service in wondering delight at the beauty of the music and the prayers of the liturgy. She got back safe to the inn, but missed her dinner. However, no scolding came, and her father seems to have sympathised in a kind of silent way. clxx Given the evidence, one is easily led to suspect that the Primrose family was in a delicate situation in Dalmeny with regard to religion. As 'Laird of Barnbougle', Neil Primrose was legally required to provide funding for the Presbyterian parish and by the Patronage Act of 1712, was entitled to appoint parish ministers. In 1775, Reverend Thomas Robertson was invited by Neil Primrose to take up the charge of Dalmeny, and his appointment, by his own admission, was controversial. clxxi Moreover, the family was on intimate terms with at least one Presbyterian dissenter, James Pillans, a'tutor or 'Dominie'. clxxii In view of the history of religious conflict in Scotland, the Primrose family's diverse religious affiliations are probably significant. They suggest sympathy and sensitivity toward problems arising from religious divisions, and a willingness to treat religion as separable -to some extent at least -from educational and political matters. Such an attitude is now common, but was less widespread in the late eighteenth century. There is much evidence to suggest that Mary Primrose's childhood in Dalmeny was relatively peaceful and pleasant. Edinburgh society enjoyed a period of artistic and intellectual flourishing, and, as such, the spirit of the times was, for the most part, positive and open-minded. * * * As daughter to the 'Laird of Barnbougle', Mary Primrose enjoyed many advantages. She received a fine education, much better than was generally accessible to children of her generation. She did not, for instance, attend the local parish school. In the late eighteenth century, Dalmeny's school, despite the small size of the parish, had about 50 to 70 students per year. The subjects taught there were typical, including English and writing, Arithmetic, Latin and French. clxxiii For whatever reasons, whether due to church patronage or to the popularity of local teachers, the Dalmeny school developed a good reputation. The Reverend Thomas Robertson, himself a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, remarked that, 'The purity of the air has, among other considerations, occasioned a great number of gentlemens sons to be sent as boarders to the parish school here.' clxxiv There were numerous girls in attendance at Dalmeny as well; the school log for 1792 shows that about one third of Dalmeny's students were girls. clxxv Whether this statistic is representative of the educational opportunities generally available to eighteenth century Scottish girls is difficult to say. Indeed, it is hard to estimate the extent of the education available to girls in the parish school system. clxxvi But, in any event, as Mary Primrose's daughter reports, 'my mother was brought up chiefly at Barnbougle (though sometimes in London at Holland House), on the old fashioned Scotch plan with a Dominie --one Mr. Pillans.' clxxvii Thus, Mary Primrose was among a fortunate minority of Scottish girls to receive formal instruction from a 'Dominie' or tutor, and there is reason to think that they received excellent training at home. 4 47 Mary Primrose and her sisters were doubly fortunate. Not only did they have a tutor, their tutor, James Pillans, was an exceptional educator. clxxviii Though the practice of engaging tutors to educate children of both sexes was commonplace among the well to do, the nature and extent of the Primrose girls' education, and the employment of a separate tutor for the girls was somewhat unusual. clxxix Another unusual aspect of girl's education was the decision to employ as tutor a man of strong Presbyterian convictions. This, and other evidence concerning the Primrose family, points to an open-minded and liberal educational environment. clxxx Apart from these exceptions, much about the educational pattern in the Primrose household was typical for its day. Hence, 'The education of children, at least during their early years, often took place within the country house itself. There was a common belief that private education by a tutor produced a more virtuous child.' clxxxi Moreover, we might expect that Pillans, a religious man, was possessed of the sort of character though to engender good values. 'Tutors and governors were required by writers in the early years of the eighteenth century to be virtuous above other qualities.' clxxxii Indeed, though there are few descriptions of the elder Pillans, his religious and moral convictions are evident from the ones that remain. To wit, the Primrose girls describe their own tutor as a 'descendant of the old Covenanters' who had 'himself had seen \"Old Mortality\" cleaning the inscriptions on their gravestones.' clxxxiii Another writer describes Mary Primrose's first tutor as 'a scholastic person, who believed in the inextension of the mind' -a portrayal that suggests that the course notes of the Peripatetic Regent named Pillans may well still have been in circulation in the late eighteenth century! clxxxiv In any event, however curious the circumstances, the Primrose girls appear to have been subject to a rigorous and effective educational program by their ageing tutor. Pillans may have been given to a little ranting about 'Old Mortality', but it was evidently in a spirit of egalitarian largesse and intellectual curiosity that he tutored the Primrose girls. He was an ageing man, probably between the ages of sixty-five and eighty, when he tutored the girls, and they appear to have regarded him with a mixture of fondness and humour. clxxxv Arabella Primrose, the youngest daughter, is said to have had little interest in scholarship, and to have taken up nothing 'but a sort of jocose kindly feeling towards the old tutor himself, laughing at him gently.' clxxxvi Such frivolousness does not appear to have been characteristic of Mary or Charlotte, and with these interested and serious-minded pupils, Pillans appears to have been an outstanding tutor. He took his role as educator to heart and engaged the imaginations of his pupils with wonderful stories of adventure and discovery: 'There was one account, that none would believe but my mother, of the first steamboat on an American river. Many years afterwards, a small steamboat was tried on the Thames, and then \"seeing was believing\".' clxxxvii It is also evident that Pillans approached the task of tutoring with considerable tact and commitment. He emphasised the basics, but encouraged the girls to pursue subjects to which they were naturally drawn. 'Mr. Pillans taught the girls Latin, for the basis of language, Geography, Mathematics, History, and besides, a vast deal of thinking upon the elements of Truth as to things in general. Out of it all each pupil 'took up' the portion which fell in with her own mind's natural working.' clxxxviii The two older Primrose girls, Charlotte and Mary, became keen scholars. Charlotte, the eldest daughter, who excelled in Latin and Mathematics, was often called upon to help with estate accounting. Mary, the middle daughter, took an interest in philosophy. Though most of the particulars of her education are lost, we can safely gauge that Mary Primrose's youthful interest in intellectual matters was further encouraged by a culture of letters that existed among the five Primrose siblings. For, 'the five young people managed to live a very sociable brother and sister life together, with a good deal of love for books, talk, country roaming...[and] used to write each other long letters like essays, and reply punctually.' clxxxix This practice may have been encouraged in part for the sake of the two younger Primrose boys, 4 48 although it seems that it was Mary who ended up the scholar in the family. In addition to formal instruction and literary aspirations, the Primrose children had access to many books in the family library. An 1820 catalogue of the Primrose family library lists about 1000 volumes, a considerable number for any private library of the period. It seems to have been a difficult job to pry the young Mary loose from some of these books. On one journey from Scotland to London, Mary accompanied her father in his carriage, '...and by degrees took out of one pocket a volume of Milton, and out of the other Pope's translation of the Odyssey. After a time he took hold of her chin, and turning her head said in a kind of melting voice, 'Child, thee needn't keep at books whilst we're travelling does your mother put such strict orders on you?' cxc If such comments are a fair indication, Mary Primrose took her education even more seriously than was expected of her. In adulthood, she reflects upon her youthful efforts in a letter to Charles Babbage, recollecting the early origins of her analytic bent and interest in higher learning: ...I can truly say that from a very early age, I have examined my thought, as to its manner of reasoning in numbers; and from time to time have applied such notices to other reasonings, either for amusement or improvement; indeed chiefly in order to chastise the vague, illusory, illogical method of reasoning admitted with every part of discourse, whether gay, or serious, & into each department of literature however important its object. cxci Perhaps most significant of all to the development of Mary Primrose as a philosopher, was that she and her sisters were encouraged to learn the subjects required for higher education. This, along with the quality of their educational instruction, must have played a significant role in shaping the direction of Mary Primrose's life. For Mary Primrose evidently applied herself to higher education in an unexpectedly devoted manner, at a time when there was no official support for or endorsement of higher education in women. But, given the developments in Scottish philosophy and culture in her day, her interest in classical literature, and in subjects traditionally associated with higher learning, it is not as surprising as it might at first seem. Moreover, the pursuit of philosophy was very much 'au courant' in Edinburgh by this time -so much so, in fact, that both the medical and the arts students at the Edinburgh College complained of a bias in the curriculum in favour metaphysics. cxcii Local literary societies, such as the Royal Society of Edinburgh, were now open to members of the business community and the class of literary gentlemen. When the Royal Society of Edinburgh met for the first time under the terms of its royal charter on June 23, 1783, its membership was drawn from the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, but provisions were immediately made to extend the membership to members of the legal community and the gentry at the first meeting of the society. As the society unanimously resolved, 'That the Lords of Council and Session, the Barons of the exchequer for Scotland, and a select number of other gentlemen, should be invited to a participation of the Society's labours.' cxciii A further consideration to keep in mind when considering the education of Mary Primrose is that the emergence of a culture of letters within aristocratic circles was not confined to the male sex. Pioneers of educational reform such as Hannah More had promoted Liberal philosophies of education, and Britain had witnessed the emergence of a radical group of liberated, educated women known as 'blue-stockings'. These ambitious women had prevailed in the first half of the eighteenth century, and were called 'blue-stockings' because they shunned all form of ornamental attire and entertainment in favour of simple dress and serious-minded soirées. cxciv The blue-stockings took what was then considered a radical approach, although they did not aspire to scholarship in the same way as Mary Primrose, and were often derided, even by 4 49 proponents of educational reform. In spite of negative appraisal, the Bluestockings had an impact. It was thanks in part to such efforts that liberal views of education grew increasingly popular. While employed in Edinburgh as a tutor from 1798 to 1803, Reverend Sidney Smith noted that the predilection for metaphysics in Edinburgh's fashionable circles had extended so far as to include women. As Sydney Smith remarked of Edinburghers, 'They are so imbued with metaphysics that they even make love metaphysically. I overheard a young lady of my acquaintance, at a dance in Edinburgh, exclaim, in a sudden pause of the music, 'What you say, my Lord, is true of love in the aibstract, but --\"here the fiddlers began fiddling furiously, and the rest was lost.\"' cxcv By 1804, when Sydney Smith had moved to London, scores of women were in attendance at his public lectures on moral philosophy. According to one observer, Sydney Smith 'cultivated the good opinion of the fair sex by warmly complimenting them on their natural talents and by urging them to devote themselves to substantial literary studies.' cxcvi Still, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that women began to apply themselves to literary studies in earnest, and to fight for the right to gain regular admission to the universities and to receive degrees. So despite the tendency toward educational reform, Mary Primrose's scholarly interest and the level of intellectual development was both precocious and rare in the late eighteenth century Scotland. cxcvii It remains difficult to get a clear and consistent picture of the extent and quality of the education available to most girls in eighteenth century Scotland, although it is evident that Mary Primrose's educational experience was the exception rather than the norm. Like her contemporaries and neighbours, Mary Primrose's philosophical development was influenced by the by the culture around her and by the then legendary moderates of late eighteenth century Edinburgh. Along with liberal ideological views, came a more open culture -one that fostered liberal ideals. It seems reasonable to suppose that Mary Primrose's unusual opportunities for academic development were positively influenced by the intellectual flourishing in late eighteenth century Edinburgh. However, it is well to remember that limitations in subjects crucial to higher learning were frequently imposed, and it is perhaps safest to say that educational opportunities for women in eighteenth century Scotland were varied. cxcviii One way or another, Scotland's relative stability and cultural climate enabled at least a few women, such as Mary Primrose, to overcome the barriers to higher education facing so many of their sex. * * * As Mary Primrose approached young adulthood, Scotland had settled into a comfortable period of cultural flourishing and economic growth. It was, by all accounts, the golden age of the Scottish Enlightenment. During this period of cultural growth, Edinburgh's moderate professors and men of letters formed a nucleus of church, government, and university leaders. Ideologically, these moderates presented what would be considered a 'liberal' stance -one based on compromise between the opposing tendencies of ruling interests. They advocated greater freedom of conscience, increased liberties for all, and conciliation in the face of controversy. However, very gradually, the power of this ageing generation of moderates began to wane and attempts were subsequently made to unsettle the relative stability of Edinburgh society. And, as Mary Primrose entered young adulthood, conservative elements in the local culture attempted to upset the passing of the torch from an older to a younger generation of moderate leaders. William Robertson, one of Hume's supporters, was the acknowledged leader of the older generation of moderates. As 'moderates', Robertson and his followers defended enlightenment ideals such as personal freedom of conscience, supporting, for example, Hume's right to philosophical expression. At the same time, they rejecting the claim that Hume's doctrine led to 4 50 atheistic conclusions. These moderates, Robertson, along with associates such as John Home, Hugh Blair, Adam Ferguson, and Alexander Carlyle, 'esteemed a rational, polite form of Presbyterianism that would bridge the gap between John Knox and David Hume, between fanaticism and infidelity, between tradition and modernity. They emphasised the moral lessons of Christianity within a thoroughly Presbyterian framework and remained loyal, active members of their national church despite their other interests and activities.' cxcix Under Robertson's administrative leadership as Principal of Edinburgh College and head of the affiliated Presbytery, the town grew increasingly independent, secular, and tolerant. It was not simply the moderate party's enlightened vision that held appeal; for the party's leader, Robertson, was skilled in averting conflict. In the years following the Hume controversy, Robertson arranged things so that most of the chairs established at the College were in the sciences -a domain not generally thought to require theological advice. cc In consequence, the avisamentum -by now regarded as a political instrument used for excluding or including candidates connected with one political party or another -was infrequently exercised and duplication of the Hume affair was forestalled. Nor did Robertson insist on the formal Westminster Confession of Faith, the oath of allegiance to the Presbyterian Church traditionally required of incoming candidates. Robertson's resistance to the Confession of Faith was not appreciated by religious conservatives: 'This test was constantly evaded in the University of Edinburgh, and notably so from the commencement of Robertson's Principalship (1762), but it still existed as part of the law of the country.' cci Such rumblings aside, moderates continued to hold sway in Edinburgh. ccii Indeed, Robertson knew how to handle controversy. He encouraged off-campus forums for controversial debate and discussion. Numerous literary and intellectual societies sprang into existence in Edinburgh, including, among others, the Select Society, the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh (which later became the Royal Society of Edinburgh), and the Pantheon Society. With the leadership of local intellectuals such as Hume, Carlyle, Ferguson, Smith and others, these societies were much in demand. As Hume wrote to Allan Ramsey, founder of the Select Society, 'Young and old, noble and ignoble, witty and dull, all the world are ambitious of a place amongst us...'. cciii Since these literary societies were technically independent of the College, campus affairs could unfold more smoothly. In sum, Robertson succeeded in drawing lines between institutional norms and civil freedoms in a way that appealed to the better judgement of his contemporaries. Thus, Robertson and his circle of exerted an influence that established and promoted a healthy and tolerant culture and community as befitted the standards of the day. By the time that Mary Primrose had reached young adulthood, many of the social and literary clubs of the older generation were either folding or beyond the point revival. As Walter Scott remarked, the old guard resembled ghosts 'sitting on their midnight tombs' occupied with 'deeds they have done and witnessed while in the body'. cciv The new generation of literati was represented by a vibrant and diverse group, including not only clergy and professors, but also, a substantial number of secular-minded lawyers, men of letters, and merchants. They were all, byand-large, students of William Robertson and his successor, Dugald Stewart. With few exceptions, they had thoroughly adopted liberal enlightenment ideals. Their professors had encouraged them to pursue scholarly interests and to keep apace of new developments in their areas of interest. The cumulative effect of their education and cultural context was an increased appetite for civil and intellectual freedom. Thus, as the older generation gave way to the younger, the complexion of the city and its leadership became more secular and libertarian. These increasingly secular, and in some respects, radical moderates, had studied enlightenment philosophy and grappled with social and intellectual questions at an ideological level. They were quick to rise to the defense of personal and civil rights, and, to extreme conservatives, were seen as excessively radical. 4 51 Tensions between conservatives and moderates were exacerbated by fears of social unrest in Continental Europe. Britain now looked to events on the Continent with horror, witnessing the overthrow of the French monarchy and nobility, and the beginning of Robespierre's 'reign of terror'. Extreme conservatives pointed the finger at 'dangerous ideologies' and urged that unrest and infidelity witnessed on the Continent might soon take hold closer to home. For example, it was suggested that German illuminati had 'conspired to overturn the religion and government of their country, and who were to prepare their way by seizing on the Universities, and excluding Clergymen from the places of trust and influence which they occupied in those seats of learning...'. ccv Thus, the conservative rhetoric urged caution in the face of dangerous political and religious ideologies, returning to the age-old themes of pernicious intellectual influences on civil order. ccvi As late as 1788, Professors Stewart and Gregory declined to publish their papers on cause and effect in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Stewart's official reason was the connection between the paper and others that 'he did not chuse to publish at present'. ccvii Dr Gregory simply stated that 'he did not incline, that either the Essay itself, or any abstract of it, should appear in this volume of the Society's Transactions.' ccviii Although it is not made explicit, it seems likely, given the politics of Hume's doctrine of cause and effect in Edinburgh, and the growing fear of social unrest, that neither individual wished to risk public censure as a result of speculation on such a 'dangerous' subject. Further evidence of the growing instability of the political climate in Edinburgh can be found in an edited collection entitled Essays and Treatises On Moral Political and Various Philosophical Subjects, published by a German visitor to Edinburgh, some forty-five years after the Hume scandal. The visitor, Willich, reflects on the ongoing persecution of Hume and his followers. 'Hume's scepticism', he comments, 'seems to be the favourite and inexhaustible topic, on which our modern champions of orthodoxy still insist.' But 'these modern practitioners' he continues, are 'more attentive to the cant of their profession, than observant of the spirit of Christianity' and 'betake themselves but to invective, personal attacks, foul aspersions and declamation, instead of argument.' ccix Let people alone, Willich pleads, 'if they have talents, if they show a spirit of profound and new inquiry, in a word, if they possess but reason, which always gains'. For otherwise, 'if ye call out high treason, call together, as if by alarmbell, the commonwealth, which by no means understands such subtile elaborations, ye render yourselves ridiculous.' ccx Willich, in fact, quite openly condemns Scotland's tradition of persecution, saying that 'men of candour and discernment look upon it as disgraceful, not only to sacred offices, but to the rank in society of men of letters'. ccxi And so it was that the golden age of the Scottish Enlightenment came to a close, with a new generation of moderates struggling to affirm moderate values. The first of the many challenges faced by this younger generation began even while they were still in their student days at Edinburgh College. At about this time, the voice of political disaffection was taking hold quite widely in Britain, and conservatives were railing against the dangers of texts such as Thomas Paine's, Rights of Man -a critique of Britain's monarchy and government that seemed to pose a significant threat to the status quo. Existing social tensions at home and abroad were further complicated by rapid economic and social change; in particular by the land reform movement and the Industrial Revolution. At this time, the circumstances of the wealthy landed families in the Edinburgh area, with their carriages, servants, and luxuries, stood in stark contrast with the conditions of the poor. Indeed, Scotland was not a wealthy country by European standards, and the lives of most parish residents were grim in comparison to those of the wealthy. In the eighteenth century, Scottish landowners took measures to consolidate their estates, turning large portions of land to pasture and wood lot, and Scotland's rural parishes entered a period of transformation. One of the direct consequences of the land enclosure movement was that rural parishes experienced significant reductions in population. The population of Dalmeny dwindled from 1300 in 1750 to 900 in 1790 and then 765 in 1801. ccxii As Dalmeny Reverend Thomas 4 52 Robertson speculates, the 'depopulation appears to have been occasioned solely by one large district having been turned from tillage into pasture. This tract may consist perhaps of 1500 acres, upon which formerly, it is said, were fifteen or sixteen farmers; at present, and for some time past, there has not been one.' ccxiii Thus, the land enclosure movement increased the discrepancies between landowners and their tenants. Local farmers had long lived from hand to mouth, with half of their wages paid in oatmeal, a small house and garden, the carriage of coal, and some food at the harvest. 'The people's diet was rather plain, consisting of oat-meal porridge, oat-cakes, pease-bannocks, barley broth, vegetables, potatoes, butter-milk and water while some were beginning to eat wheaten bread and drink small-beer. Very little meat was eaten and for luxuries there was tea and whisky.' ccxiv With the land enclosures, even this meagre fare was out of reach for many of those who had previously worked the land. Paine's work gave voice to the injustice of the conditions and circumstances of the lower classes, a development to which many among the well-to-do objected. The contrast in the social circumstances of the rich and the poor must have been striking. As the poor struggled to find adequate food and shelter, the rich enjoyed their luxurious surrounding and indulged refined tastes. By the late eighteenth century, Edinburgh was replete with the societies and soirées of a new and younger generation. Local personalities, some of whom were brilliant intellectuals, congregated at the homes of socialites such as Mrs. Fletcher and Mrs. Apreece. The Primrose family is likely to have shared in the extravagant parties and excitement of Edinburgh's fashionable circles. There, they would have met up with luminaries of all political stripes, including Walter Scott, John Allen, Francis Jeffrey, Henry Brougham, John Playfair, Thomas Brown and James Pillans. ccxv Included in the group were the liberal Whigs who would go on to form the Edinburgh Review, in its day touted as the most important critical and literary journal in Europe. It is impossible to say with certainty whether Mary Primrose and her siblings attended many of the Edinburgh's soirées, although it seems likely that they did. For, Mary Primrose was acquainted with many of the same individuals in adulthood, and entertained them in her own home in London. It should be noted, however, that her father, Neil Primrose, was a frugal man, and this may well have limited the family's participation. ccxvi The family circumstances may have placed modest limitations on the social life of the children; however, they were certainly well off by local standards, and Neil Primrose's eccentricities would have been more of an embarrassment than an impediment. Thus, there would likely have been parties and gatherings, and on such occasions, the Primrose family would have enjoyed fine conversation, dancing, perhaps a toast or two, and some of Scotland's culinary delicacies. But the conversations at Edinburgh's parties were notoriously intellectual, and it is doubtless there that attitudes and controversies on social issues were explored. To the more conservative elements of the society, namely, to those who stood to lose the most if the revolutionary spirit took hold in Britain, social critiques such as Paine's presented a terrifying call to address social injustices. Among the many angry reactions to Paine's Rights of Man was an anonymous letter published in Scotland in 1792. In this case, the author's anger betrays a deep underlying fear of civil unrest. Against Paine, it is argued, ad hominem, that, 'For an itinerant political quack to pretend to more sound sense and judgement than all the inhabitants of the British isles put together, and to dictate his own fanciful form of government to them, is in the highest degree assuming'. ccxvii The author goes on to insist that a good citizen would petition Parliament rather than 'rouse a mob'. For, 'A man who endeavours to rouse a mob, is of all men the most dangerous to society; -he must either have interested views, be mad, or infamously wicked.' ccxviii And, like this anonymous letter writer, Edinburgh's older generation of moderates grew more conservative in the face of social unrest. For example, the then Professor of Moral Philosophy, Dugald Stewart, endeavoured 'to show that a zeal for liberty could be combined with a philosophically and religiously safe stance.' ccxix As Stewart explains in 1792, the need for 4 53 limitations on political liberty in light of the 'reckless boldness of the uncompromising freethinker' and the dangers of civil unrest, The danger with which I conceived the youth of this country to be threatened by that inundation of sceptical or rather atheistical publications which were then imported from the Continent, was immensely increased by the enthusiasm which, at the dawn of the French Revolution, was naturally excited in young and generous minds. A supposed connection between an enlightened zeal for Political Liberty and the reckless boldness of the uncompromising freethinker, operated powerfully with the vain and the ignorant in favour of the publications alluded to. ccxx Thus it was that the moderate leaders of Edinburgh, after what we might consider a rather conservative fashion, advocated a restricted form of liberalism in the 1790's. Fear of the revolutionary forces prevailed throughout Britain, and many of the nation's wealthy young men were sent to be educated by professors such as Stewart in Edinburgh in lieu of a 'Grand Tour' of Europe. Yet, for all of its enlightenment culture, fears of social unrest soon led to inevitable, painful reverberations. The call for increasing conservatism was soon followed by seemingly 'justifiable' cases of persecution and bigotry. Over the decades, opposing parties would engage in a bitter leadership contest in Edinburgh, and liberal values would increasingly become a focal point in the public debates of the town. Given the Primrose family's ties to the local community, it is almost certain that Mary Primrose would have known about the local public controversies. ccxxi One such controversy, which involved the Select Society, became notorious, in part because it was brought into focus a significant shift in the values of an older generation and new generations of liberal and conservative lawyers. The events around this controversy began to unfold in 1798. On one account, the controversy, which is reported to have involved 'attacks on Christianity' and to have been 'connected with revolutionary principles' is explained away as a natural outgrowth of political concerns linked to the French Revolution. For, 'The Society, like everything else in the country, was affected by the white heat of political passion generated by the French Revolution.' ccxxii Other accounts, such as those given by Henry Cockburn and Francis Jeffrey, link the Select Society controversy more directly to local politics and to the issue of freedom of debate. According to this report, the question under debate was 'Have the States of Europe any reason to dread the increasing ascendancy of Russia in the balance of power?', a topic to which conservative members of the society objected, on the grounds that it contravened a 1794 resolution against topics relating to political questions of the day. ccxxiii [dig deeper the accounts conflict] To this, the response on the part of the younger generation was to rescind the motion of 1794, on the grounds that it was an attempt to restrict the 'freedom of debate'. ccxxiv When the controversy arose over the resinding of the 1794 motion, religious questions were unfairly implicated in the controversy: Since it was enacted, not a single question has ever been appointed, or an essay delivered, the discussion of which led either directly or by the most remote allusion to arguments or topics of a theological description. ccxxv As a show of sincerity, the new motion was itself repealed and 'a positive law substituted in its place against all religious and political discussions. ccxxvi Thus, the incoming moderates were thus quite regrettably reduced to 'the necessity of deploring those misconceptions which we have done everything in our power to obviate and correct.' ccxxvii Thus it was that the incoming generation of moderates was temporarily silenced. Whatever 4 54 tolerance existed for free speech and debate was further limited, and hampered by conservative appeal to political instabilities in Europe. Fear of civil unrest bred a fear-mongering rhetoric that promised social disaster as a natural culmination of free speech. Free speech might well be appropriate for back-room, closed-door discussions, but it was inappropriate in such an 'open' political forum. Edinburgh intellectual society was abuzz, but the object of the rich and the powerful conservatives was to contain that buzz, and to delimit the appropriate questions for public debate and discussion. * * * In spite of, or perhaps because of, the controversies around her, the young Mary Primrose became very interested in religious, philosophical, and political matters. Indeed, it was in this context, with political anxieties renewed to full pitch in Edinburgh and the influence of the ageing moderates on the wane, that Mary Primrose turned to the development of her own views on the leading debates of her day. Between the ages of 17 and 27, Mary Primrose's inquisitiveness led her to write numerous manuscripts 'full of metaphysical disquisitions, exposing errors in the reasoning of Hume's atheistical treatises, and the unitarian doctrine of the then new philosopher, Priestley'. ccxxviii Whatever their analysis, Mary Primrose's youthful essays were likely a response to the philosophical issues and the personal difficulties that she encountered in Edinburgh and area. The significance of Mary Primrose's scholarly achievements cannot be appreciated apart from the historical context of the people, institutions, and ideologies that shaped her world. The ongoing tradition of political and religious rivalry and persecution, its particular history in Dalmeny, and the situation of Primrose family in respect of all of this, would permanently shape and direct Mary Primrose's outlook on life. The question that arises for us is that of where Mary Primrose drew the line between fealty to tradition and authority and the more liberal ideals of moderatism. In certain respects, it is evident that she held that Hume was in error, but the evidence suggests that she held high the ideal of freedom of conscience, and felt that Hume's error was in fact an analytical one. However, without access to Mary Primrose's 'metaphysical disquisitions', it is impossible to guess at the specific criticisms they contained. However, the subjects of the essays provide contextual help, for they suggest certain books and doctrines as targets of her critical assessment. Hume's 1748 Essay on Miracles, for example, criticised revealed religion on the basis of an analysis of the evidence that could be garnered from experience. Experience, Hume argues, as recorded through history, reveals to us a natural order, and additionally, the testimony of those who are witness to miracles. Unfortunately, experience also shows that such testimony can be mistaken, fallacious, unreliable, and so on. In fact, Hume maintains, it is more probable that the witness to a miracle was deceived than that the natural order was violated by a miraculous event. Hume's Natural History of Religion was a similarly shocking in its day. It offered an historical analysis of the origins and development of religion and religious beliefs, but in a style that diminished and ridiculed religious traditions and theology. Hume noted the way in which 'primitive peoples' formed beliefs to explain natural phenomena that was not well understood, and exposed the ludicrousness of some of such beliefs. At the same time, he praised the tolerance and diversity of polytheistic traditions, which he set in stark contrast to intolerant monotheism. In the end, he pronounces religion to be irrational, and suggests that, like other beliefs that are unable to withstand the scrutiny of critical and historical analysis, it should eventually be eliminated altogether. Though the above criticisms would surely have been sufficient to do the job, Hume's atheistic reputation was firmly cemented by his damaging 4 55 critiques of the argument from design in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. There, Hume considers the design hypothesis, and specifically the argument that the claim that the hypothesis that the universe was designed by an intelligent Deity is better able to account for the appearances of nature than any alternative hypotheses. In Hume's day, people thought that they had a great number of experiences of design and many claimed to have experiences of God's design arising from the 'vegetable principles' or life forces. The idea was that such forces were products of minds or souls embodied in matter, and that such forces could be detected in phenomena. Hume argued that such beliefs have no adequate grounding, and that appearances are in fact inadequate to give us good reason to choose the design hypothesis over rival hypotheses. Indeed, the most that an appeal to nature can possibly tell us, he thinks, is 'That the causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence'. ccxxix However, such a view has no special existential implications for God. For 'We ought not to hold a strong belief in the existence of a certain cause if that cause only imperfectly resembles other causes of similar effects or if the effects of that cause only imperfectly resemble the effects we observe to follow from other causes of that kind.' ccxxx Joseph Priestley's works would also have been shocking, not only because Priestley shared many of Hume's views on religion, but also because he touched on some of the most sacred and central doctrines of Christian dogma and ritual. In the 1780's, Priestley's published his The History of the Corruptions of Christianity and History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ. There he argued that the doctrine of the Trinity was not in fact a tenet of the primitive church and that worship should proceed without elaborate ceremony or dogma. Priestley's view was in fact very liberal in its interpretation of salvation and emphasised tolerance for different ways of seeking God; yet, it posed a challenge to traditional religion and to the requirement of conformity to the Anglican Church of England. In addition, Priestley's works criticised doctrines such as the virgin birth, and it became commonplace to regard Priestley as an atheist. Although it is impossible to know the specific points taken up against Hume and Priestley in Mary Primrose's early 'metaphysical disquisitions', it seems likely, given the tenor of her mature work, that she set out to defend theistic doctrines against the criticisms of Hume and Priestley. With a freshly educated, more radical generation of intellectual aristocrats on the rise, yet another political and religious struggle would come to hold the attention of Edinburgh. The episode concerned the suitability of John Leslie as candidate for the Chair of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh. The Leslie affair was directly and explicitly linked to both the Hume controversy and fears of civil unrest in Europe. Unlike the case of Hume, which was in many respects a back-room affair, the Leslie episode was played out in the public eye. As we shall see, the events and discussions arising in connection with the Leslie episode would profoundly influence the direction of Mary Primrose's philosophical writing. For, this time, many of those who frequented Edinburgh's most fashionable and literary circles, including Mary Primrose, would jump into the fray. * * * In looking back on the Scottish heritage of Mary Primrose, it is evident that few personal details concerning Mary Primrose's early life have survived and that the better part of her youth remains a mystery. However, what is known of her adult life and interests suggest that Mary Primrose's early years in Scotland, her family heritage, and the Scottish Enlightenment were all important influences. To better understand Mary Primrose and her work, we next turn to the controversies relating to John Leslie, but before we do, we should take a moment to reflect on how Mary Primrose's own narrative emerges as part of the larger historical context of her ancestors and her social milieu. 4 56 By the end of the eighteenth century, the rise of the Primrose family, which began with service to King James VI and support for Stuart ideals, was no more than a fading memory. The basis for a genuine form of moderatism was inadvertently introduced in Scotland through innovations to the professoriate and the college curriculum. The golden age of moderatism, which began in the mid-eighteenth century, was characterised by an allegiance between Hanoverian and Presbyterian leaders. There were very definite limits to this form of moderation espoused at this time; while the ideal of freedom of conscience was one thing, its application in real life was quite another. As the times changed and grew unstable, moderate ideals came to sound more conservative, and the struggle to defend political ground grew more intense. It is the story of Scotland's struggle for moderatism that forms the most significant boundary to the world from which Mary Primrose, the philosopher, emerged. 4 57 The Town and Gown Politics of John Leslie 2.1 Dangerous Philosophy By 1824, Mary Primrose had anonymously published An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, and was known under her married name of Mary Shepherd. The book is best understood in connection with a specific episode in the history of Edinburgh. The episode was the election of John Leslie to the Mathematical Chair at the University of Edinburgh, an election that gave rise to considerable controversy. ccxxxi The events in question took place in 1805-06, and they echoed an earlier controversy in 1744-45, regarding an appointment sought by David Hume. In both instances, the Ministers of Edinburgh exercised their right to be consulted in the appointment, a peculiar right of avisamentum, originally conferred by King James VI. The avisamentum is nothing more than the right of the Ministers of Edinburgh to offer advice to the Magistrates and Town Council on university appointments. However, the circumstances under which the right had been conferred had invested it with considerable authority, and until the mideighteenth century, the right of avisamentum was undisputed. The appointment sought in the case of Hume was in the area of moral philosophy, an area where the advice of the Ministers of Edinburgh would carry considerable weight. As it happened, the testimony was unanimous against Hume and his 'dangerous philosophy', and the Ministers of Edinburgh were widely regarded as having influenced the Town Council to prevent his appointment. ccxxxii Indeed, Hume and his philosophy would continue to raise the ire of the Presbyterian Church for years to come. Ten years after the initial controversy, the General Assembly once again had occasion to reiterate its unanimous censure of Hume's philosophy, issuing a 'warning against the infidel principles of Mr Hume'. ccxxxiii Hume's exclusion from university office was personally devastating, and the stigma of infidelity remained attached to his name. Despite this, and in a strange way, both Hume and his philosophy became part of the very fabric of Edinburgh. In defiance of public censure, many of Scotland's professors taught Hume's philosophy in the universities. Hume, it will be recalled, proposed that the causal relation is a subjective fiction supplied by the mind that derives necessity neither from experience nor reason. Since knowledge of causality is central to proofs for God's existence, Hume's questioning of the causal relation was seen as an implicit critique of theism. As such, his doctrine was regarded as pernicious. Apart from Thomas Reid in Glasgow, and later, as expositor of Reid, Dugald Stewart in Edinburgh, few academics were brave enough to teach Hume in Scotland's universities. Reid and Stewart were apologists for Hume, arguing that his premises were quite correct, but that Hume's interpreters had been mistaken in their inferences to sceptical and atheistic conclusions. But Hume's influence did not stop there. Hume was also an intimate of the moderate leaders who influenced Edinburgh society in the decades between 1740 and 1790. Through connections to Edinburgh's moderate leaders, and Hume's involvement in the literary societies of Edinburgh, there grew to be an underlying interest in Hume and his work that would keep his doctrines alive and well long after the academic scandal had blown over. One of Hume's supporters was William Robertson, the acknowledged leader of the moderate party. Under Robertson's influence as Principal of the University of Edinburgh and head of the affiliated Presbytery, the University of Edinburgh became increasingly independent, secular, and tolerant. It is interesting to note, for instance, that in the years following the Hume controversy, most of the university chairs that were established were in the sciences, a domain not generally thought to require theological advice. ccxxxiv The practice under Robertson seems to have been to shift people around within the university in order to prevent the exercise of the avisamentum. When a humanities position opened up, it was filled internally, so that the vacant position would 4 58 be in the sciences. As a result, the avisamentum -by now regarded as a political instrument for excluding or including candidates connected with one political party or another -was infrequently exercised. Moreover, Robertson did not insist on the formal Westminster Confession of Faith, the oath of allegiance to the Presbyterian Church traditionally required of incoming candidates. Hume died in 1776, and by the early 1780's, the moderate clergy and professors who had worked to promote tolerance and to defend Hume were nearing retirement. Through death, retirement, and infirmity, the influence of the old guard began to wane. When Robertson decided to retire, he gave the official nod to the younger, incoming generation by supporting the candidacy of Andrew Dalzell as Clerk to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. At this point, the social and literary clubs of the older generation had either folded, or were beyond the point revival. As Walter Scott remarked, the old guard resembled ghosts 'sitting on their midnight tombs' occupied with 'deeds they have done and witnessed while in the body'. ccxxxv By way of contrast, the incoming generation of moderates was a vibrant and diverse group. This new generation included not only clergy and professors, but also a substantial number of lawyers, men of letters, and merchants. They were by and large the students of Robertson and his followers, and with a few notable exceptions, had been thoroughly imbued with secular and liberal enlightenment ideals. As the older generation gave way to the younger, the complexion of the city and its institutions became more secular than ever. The increasingly secular, and in some cases, radical elements in the moderate party, gave rise to fresh controversy in Edinburgh. The incoming moderates were less conciliatory. They had studied enlightenment philosophy, and had grappled with social questions at an ideological level. They were quick to rise to the defense of personal and civil rights. Given the general societal shift away from church to economic and secular power, and the influx of professional men into the moderate ranks, these young moderates were coming to exert even greater control over Scotland's governing institutions. This was true not only of the General Assembly, the University of Edinburgh, and the Town Council, but also of the local literary societies. The Royal Society of Edinburgh, for example, met for the first time under the terms of its royal charter on June 23, 1783. Formed from the membership of the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, and provisions were made to extend the membership to members of the legal community and the gentry at the first meeting of the society. There, it was unanimously resolved, 'That the Lords of Council and Session, the Barons of the exchequer for Scotland, and a select number of other gentlemen, should be invited to a participation of the Society's labours.' ccxxxvi To conservative members of the Church of Scotland, loss of influence led to bitterness, particularly since many within the ranks of the Established Church had also adopted the secular ideals of the moderate party. At the same time, there were fears that unrest and infidelity on the Continent might take hold closer to home, fears that were strongly encouraged by the city's conservatives Ministers. According to one Minister of Edinburgh, the German illuminati had 'conspired to overturn the religion and government of their country, and who were to prepare their way by seizing on the Universities, and excluding Clergymen from the places of trust and influence which they occupied in those seats of learning...'. ccxxxvii Thus, the conservative rhetoric urged caution in the face of dangerous political and religious ideologies. It may have been that this sort of rhetoric contributed to the decisions on the part of Professors Stewart and Gregory to decline to publish their papers on cause and effect in the 1788 Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Stewart's official reason was the connection between the paper and others that 'he did not chuse to publish at present'. ccxxxviii Dr Gregory simply stated that 'he did not incline, that either the Essay itself, or any abstract of it, should appear in this volume of the 4 59 Society's Transactions.' ccxxxix Although it is not made explicit, it seems likely, given the politics of Hume's doctrine of cause and effect in Edinburgh, and the growing fear of social unrest, that neither individual wished to risk public censure as a result of speculation on such a 'dangerous' subject. In view of the rising fear of social unrest, the ongoing censure of infidels, and the threat presented by the complexion of the incoming generation of moderates, the fact that Leslie's candidacy for the Mathematical Chair in 1805 gave rise to an avisamentum is not entirely surprising. The vacancy in 1805 was in the sciences, but Leslie had written a footnote concerning Hume's doctrine of causation, a subject that was, according to the Ministers of Edinburgh, central to theism: ...Mr Leslie, having, along with Mr Hume, denied all such necessary connection between cause and effect, as implies an operating principle in the cause, has, of course, laid a foundation for rejecting all argument that is derived from the works of God, to prove either his being or attributes. ccxl The main tactic of the Ministers was to charge that Leslie's footnote was an open endorsement of atheism, an endorsement that justified the need to exercise of the avisamentum. The Professors of the University of Edinburgh questioned the right of avisamentum, and several ministers expressed concerns about the 'proper extent' of this right. ccxli The attack on Leslie was, according to Dr Hunter, Professor of Divinity, personally devastating. 'He was represented, in the church courts, and even in the public newspapers, as hostile to religion, and as an abettor of atheism, and as having carried the sceptical tenets of Hume further than Hume himself.' ccxlii Those ministers most vocal in their opposition to Leslie were charged by Dugald Stewart, Professor of Moral Philosophy, with exhibiting 'an unbecoming zeal' and as 'tending to persecution'. But, as John Inglis, Minister of Edinburgh, bitterly retorted, the so-called moderates of the professoriate had not always been complacent when it came to the philosophy of David Hume. For 'Campbell, and Gerard and Reid, were not afraid that they should be accused of a zeal unworthy of genuine moderation, in withstanding the philosophy of Mr Hume.' ccxliii The dispute was also tied to practices and policies relating to university appointments. There was open disagreement, for example, over the neglect of the Westminster Confession of Faith. As one Minister complained, Dugald Stewart 'makes no secret of his thinking it very wrong and injurious to the interests of Literature, that Professors should be required, in any way, to express their adherence to the standards of a National Church.' ccxliv It is well known, he continues, 'that by the laws relating to Universities, both in England and Scotland, men of talents must, sometimes, be excluded from offices, for which they are well qualified in respect of literature. There have been learned Presbyterians, who would have done honour to an English University, as well as eminent Episcopelians, who would have adorned our seats of learning in Scotland.' Moreover, 'The Clergy, connected with Oxford or Cambridge, would probably feel not a little surprised, were any man to propose officiating as a Professor in one of those Universities, without subscribing the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England.' ccxlv And so it was that in 1805, the Presbytery met to discuss the Westminster Confession of Faith. As the Ministers of Edinburgh claimed, 'for many years past the members of the University of Edinburgh have not been in the use of complying with those Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, by which they are expressly required to acknowledge, profess and subscribe, before this Presbytery, the Confession of Faith...'. ccxlvi Thus, the Leslie affair, like the Hume controversy, was tied to local political and power struggles. The conservative Ministers of Edinburgh did not turn university politics into the central issue of 4 60 the debate. Rather, they drew the public's attention to the avisamentum, and to their charge that Leslie, as a supporter of Hume, was an infidel. To many in Edinburgh, the Leslie affair quickly became an unpleasant reminder of the Hume episode. In both cases, the central issue before the public was Hume's doctrine of cause and effect. The conservative Ministers of Edinburgh saw their role as one of 'guarding the entrance to those academical chairs from which the youth of the land receive their instruction' and preventing 'false philosophy' from 'subverting the foundations of the Christian faith, and, by consequence, the foundations of civil society'. ccxlvii With charges such as these pending, the 1805 controversy created a local sensation. As Mr Gillies remarks, 'Mr Hume's Essays have been, for some time, in a great measure neglected and forgotten. The zeal of these reverend gentlemen is calculated to recommend them to renewed and increased attention.' ccxlviii Indeed, it is evident that the public attended the General Assembly meetings held in connection with the Leslie affair, since it is remarked in the minutes that 'strangers should not in future be admitted without tickets'. ccxlix The interchange between the Ministers and Professors of Edinburgh offers a glimpse at the tensions arising in connection with the growing influence of the new generation of moderates. Reverend John Inglis, leader of the conservative opposition to Leslie, would advance values directly opposed to both generations of moderates. For the conservative Ministers of Edinburgh, there was little hope of any gaining political ground without a fight, and so they proceeded with the avisamentum, with various publications, and with a General Assembly debate through which Leslie was unofficially put on trial before the whole of Edinburgh. In the end, the Leslie affair would serve to solidify the transition of power from the old to the new generation of moderates. But the contest was not easily won, and as part of the episode, Edinburgh witnessed the development of new battle lines in which members of the Episcopal elite openly united in support of the moderate party against the conservative Presbyterian Ministers. 2.2 Metaphysical Footnotes The events surrounding the Leslie controversy began to unfold following the death of Professor Robinson. John Playfair, Professor of Mathematics, expressed an interest in the Chair in Natural Philosophy. Upon hearing of this development, a lecturer by the name of Macknight approached Dugald Stewart to indicate his interest in the Mathematical Chair. Stewart's response was that as far as he was concerned, Macknight would have to seriously consider giving up his ministry in order to fulfill the duties associated with the Mathematical Chair. ccl Macknight conveyed Stewart's message to the Ministers of Edinburgh, who then began to mobilize against both Stewart and his stated requirement. In the meantime, Professors Stewart and Playfair wrote letters to the Provost, George Baird, regarding the matter of the performance of academic duties while employed in two jobs. Angered by the intervention of Stewart and Playfair, the Ministers of Edinburgh met in February 1805 and resolved to take up the matter of Leslie's candidacy, and a request was made to exercise the right of avisamentum, a practice that had been much neglected under Robertson's leadership at the University. ccli As letters were exchanged, party lines began to form. The opposing parties began to take steps to secure the position for their respective candidates. John Leslie was the candidate supported by Stewart and his followers; Macknight was the preferred candidate of the Ministers of Edinburgh. The avisamentum, and its connection to Hume's doctrine, quickly became a focus of controversy. Despite Hume's notoriety in Edinburgh, by the turn of the nineteenth century, many prominent theologians, philosophers, and scientists had either explicitly or implicitly adopted Hume's view that causal necessity is not derived from experience. John Leslie, in the footnote remark to his 1804 An Experimental Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation of Heat, had taken the additional step of openly admiring Hume's analysis. The context of Leslie's footnote was a 4 61 discussion of Newton's speculation on the cause of gravitational effects. According to Leslie, it was an 'evil hour' in which Newton proposed that the material medium of aether, rather than action at a distance, might explain gravitational effects. Subsequent commentators have likewise deplored Newton's remark on aether, especially since it appears to contravene Newton's own methodological principle against introducing more than necessary to explain a phenomenon. As part of his censure of Newton, Leslie invokes Hume's account of causal necessity. The salient extract from the now infamous footnote runs as follows: Mr Hume is the first, as far as I know, who has treated of causation in a truly philosophic manner. His Essay on Necessary Connexion seems a model of clear and accurate reasoning. But it was only wanted to dispel the cloud of mystery which has so long darkened that important subject. The unsophisticated sentiments of mankind are in perfect unison with the deductions of logic, and imply nothing more at bottom, in the relation of cause and effect, than a constant and invariable sequence. cclii What follows upon the remark on Hume is a rather long and controversial etymological analysis of the word 'cause' in which Leslie characterizes various languages as more or less advanced in connection with their senses and uses of the term 'cause'. The more mythic and poetic imagination, Leslie says, gives anthropomorphic interpretation to the feeling of succession, and this forms the basis of figurative language regarding causation. Sophisticated languages, Leslie maintains, use the word 'cause' to mean antecedence in the succession of events. Leslie's point, apparently, is that philosophy would do well to stick with the latter construction, and abandon the unsophisticated senses. Neither Leslie's digressions on Newton, nor those on etymology, attracted much attention in 1804. However, in 1805, once Leslie had become a candidate for the Mathematical Chair at the University of Edinburgh, his footnote turned into a magnet for an amazing variety of tensions within Scottish society. These tensions were tied to developments in the political, ecclesiastical, and philosophical history of Scotland. Initially it appeared that the interests of the moderate party would immediately prevail, and that the appointment of Leslie would unfold with only a modest political scuffle. The Ministers of Edinburgh were determined to put up a fight, and so began to prepare a case against Leslie's candidature. They notified Leslie of their intent to submit an avisamentum against him just two days in advance of the meeting called for Leslie's election. On the understanding that a letter of explanation would satisfy the Ministers of Edinburgh, Leslie prepared a letter in which he denied ill intent, affirmed his religious principles, and stated that it was never his intention to take up the subject of metaphysical causation. According to Macvey Napier, 'Mr Leslie, on being informed of the charge, immediately declared, in a very pointed Letter laid before the junto, that his observations \"referred entirely\" to the relation between cause and effect, considered as an object of physical examination. ccliii In fact, Leslie explicitly sought to distance himself from Hume. He condemned the 'gros misapplication which Mr Hume has made of these premises, to invalidate the argument for the existence of the Deity', which, he says, it did not occur to him to 'point out in a treatise entirely confined to physical discussions'. ccliv Leslie's letter was duly delivered and read before the Ministers in Edinburgh. Unmoved, the Ministers decided to proceed with their avisamentum. In fact, the existence of Leslie's letter of explanation was suppressed; for it was not mentioned to the Magistrates and Council when the Ministers' avisamentum was delivered. Not only did the Ministers of Edinburgh ignore and suppress Leslie's plea, they took the view that the letter was intellectually dishonest. They argued that Leslie's letter was ...little more than an attempt to deny and misrepresent the obvious meaning of words, as if 4 62 both Mr Hume's doctrine and Mr Leslie's referred merely to physical causes; while every man who reads Mr Hume's Essay in connexion with Mr Leslie's Note, must perceive that their conjoint doctrine upon the subject of causation is placed upon the broadest ground, extending to every thing under the name of cause, in either matter or mind. cclv The avisamentum was delivered to the meeting of the Magistrates and Council on the 12th of March, the very meeting where Playfair and Leslie were to be elected. Having considering the avisamentum, elections proceeded in favour of Playfair and Leslie. However, it was decided that, owing to peculiar circumstances associated with the Mathematical Chair, which was held jointly with Professor Fergusson, that a formal consultation with Professor Ferguson was required. In the meantime, further angered that their avisamentum had not produced the desired effect, the Ministers of Edinburgh pursued the matter in civil court. But the civil court ruled that the avisamentum was not a power of veto. By now a fractured group, the Ministers voted 14 to 13 in favour of pursuing the Leslie affair in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. In the meantime, Leslie's second election, which was held on March 29, resulted in his re-election to the joint Chair of Mathematics with Ferguson. Although the matter of Leslie's appointment had now been settled, the public tribunal was just beginning. The main element of Leslie's public trial was the publication of letters, treatises, newspaper articles, and various other materials, all of which came into wide circulation in both Edinburgh and London. The literature produced was voluminous and full of invective. Dozens of publications, clarifications, accusations, and so on, ensued, most of them long-winded and caustic. In May 1805, in two days of debate held in the General Assembly, the whole matter was re-examined from head to toe. The General Assembly debates were well attended, and the proceedings, like many of the publications connected with the Leslie affair, went through several editions. Additional material relating to the case continued to emerge over the next year or so. As the record of publication shows, there were many and varied responses in the footnote dispute. A surprising number of responses were simply mockeries of the whole affair. The scorning of Leslie's persecution is of interest insofar as it reveals the underlying tensions that led to his ill treatment. The following excerpt from an anonymous poem written about the Leslie episode, opens by conjuring an image of the persecution and hypocrisy of John Knox, thus making the point that religious persecution was alive and well in Scotland: Once more, John Knox, erect your surly front, And teach the snarling hypocrites to grunt: At soaring L****e point your blust'ring thunder, And plunge him down to hell, and bolt him under! For, lo the Culprit, with an impious hand, Spreads hellish doctrine o'er th' ungodly land; And what, with toilsome care, unwearied Jove Displays in wrath, or manifests in love, (And hides in darkness deep the hidden cause,) Ascribes to Nature, and her General Laws. cclvi Sadly, the Leslie affair also became the subject of considerable ridicule. As part of the public discussion, there was frequent jibing about the significance of footnotes in scholarship. Numerous texts reserved serious discussion for footnotes, or claimed that the serious discussion had been moved from footnotes, or that an important point would follow in the footnotes, and so on. Henry Erskine, a well-known local wit and highly placed advocate with thirty years experience in the General Assembly, could not resist the following pun relating the 4 63 etymology of the term 'metaphysics' to the ongoing footnotes controversy. cclvii As Erskine remarked, he failed to follow the reasoning of some of his esteemed colleagues. For, 'They have told us, that because the subject of Mr Leslie's book is physical, therefore the notes must be metaphysical; that notes make up no part of a book, and have nothing to do with it. This is a discovery equally ingenious and amusing.' cclviii Long after the Leslie affair had come to its conclusion, the derision persisted. The Reverend Sydney Smith, frequent guest among the 'motley company of lawyers, statesmen, critics' at Holland House, persisted in the ridiculing of 'Scotch atheists'. In a state of 'high glee', as one observer noted, Sydney Smith announced to Mr Ward and Mr Allen that 'the best way to keep a merry Christmas was to roast a Scotch atheist, as the most intolerant and arrogant of all two legged animals'. Allen was not pleased, and 'kept clasping his hands together till his fingers cracked' so that Sydney Smith called out 'See! there's one beginning to crackle already.' cclix As this incident shows, Scotland's persecutions had become a matter of national ridicule. Though the Leslie affair did reach comic proportions, the underlying issues were far from superficial. On a more solemn note, Professor Playfair captured the feelings of many in his expression of regret for the underlying social dimension. The reputation of Stewart and others had been stained by the intentional misrepresentation of facts, and the Ministers of Edinburgh had preyed upon renewed fears of social unrest, likening the situation in Scotland to that of Germany, and then laying the blame on philosophy. Playfair sums up his concerns in a moving plea for academic freedom: If it was no longer safe, when a work contained in it exceptional doctrines, to express satisfaction with any part of it; if a man must be answerable for all the inferences which the ignorance or ingenuity of his adversaries could draw from his opinions; there was an end of all the freedom of debate, and the truth of any principle was no longer sufficient to give it currency in the world. The days of intolerance were returning: the clouds which we supposed dispelled for ever seemed again to be gathering round our horizon; and we were reminded of the age when the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo were subjected to the anathemas of the church. cclx In the end, both Hume's doctrine and the issues around academic freedom would get a public hearing. The hearing, which occurred decades after Hume had been laid to rest, occurred as part of the Leslie affair. However, a lasting reminder of Hume's own castigation can be found on his monument in Edinburgh's Old Calton Cemetery. The monumental inscription, presumably the work of the city's Presbyterian Ministers, appears calculated to make Edinburgh's infamous 'Saint David' turn in his grave: Behold I come quickly Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory, through our LORD JESUS CHRIST. 2.3 Edinburgh Debates the Causal Relation By 1805, the atheistic implications of Hume's philosophy, the propriety of persecuting individuals for their beliefs, and the right of avisamentum were matters of considerable dispute. The avisamentum had placed the Leslie controversy on a philosophical footing, charging that Leslie, like Hume, had threatened the foundation for belief in God by denying 'all such necessary connection between cause and effect, as implies an operating principle in the cause'. Given the 4 64 history associated with Hume's doctrine in Edinburgh and the seriousness of the charge of atheism, one is led to wonder about the circumstances that could have swayed so many of the Professors and Ministers of Edinburgh to defend Leslie. For, as the Leslie episode bears testimony, Dugald Stewart and his followers succeeded in defending Leslie against the charges of the 'Protestant Divines' of Edinburgh by establishing the importance of the philosophical quest for truth. And, though Stewart would later regret the philosophical dispute, it was largely his criticism of the Ministers of Edinburgh's charges against Leslie that had initiated the public discussion. In the end, the philosophical question was taken up quite widely. Stewart and his students, writes Inglis, seek to 'contribute to the maintenance and advancement of sound philosophy. They are convinced that the agitation of this question ...was essential to that important object.' cclxi Thus, in addition to its political dimension and its lighter treatments, Leslie's footnote on Hume was debated on metaphysical and theological grounds. Leslie's case became a testing ground for a protracted and complicated debate that involved a wide spectrum of the Edinburgh community. Numerous philosophical texts, letters, and pamphlets published in connection with the Leslie affair attempted to elevate the controversy, couching censure or approbation in principled and philosophical terms. One might wonder how a predominantly philosophical debate could have engaged Edinburgh at large. Part of the reason for widespread interest was undoubtedly an attraction for the spectacle of Leslie's persecution. But the philosophical discussion itself extended to university administrators, ministers, lawyers, media contributors, 'tradesmen and their wives', and so on. As one observer remarked, 'The honest tradesman, and his wife, may now be expected to be found poring over the unprofitable metaphysics of Mr Hume, to the exclusion of the 'Spectator' and the 'Rambler'; or, when it shall appear, studying 'A Logical Exhibition of Mr Leslie's Heresy, by the Ministers of Edinburgh'. cclxii While this level of public involvement in a philosophical and theological debate might seem strange to the contemporary reader, it is well to keep in mind that the kind of education received in eighteenth century Scotland was quite different from that received today. In those days, every school child was exposed to classical literature through language and religious studies. A solid foundation in the humanities was required of all university graduates, and professionals, merchants, and members of the gentry spent much leisure time in the study of classical literature and philosophy. A culture of letters predominated quite generally in British society, and especially in Scotland, where a single literary magazine such as the Edinburgh Review might sell as many as ten thousand copies per month. Thus it was that lawyers such as Henry Erskine were able to craft puns on the etymology of abstract terms such as 'metaphysics' -puns that the majority of today's university educated would fail to grasp. A fair appreciation and understanding of matters philosophical and theological were thus within the reach of many otherwise quite average citizens, so that even working class men and women could follow the issues in the news, and the Church of Scotland's General Assembly debates attracted a full house. This level of appreciation for philosophy and literature, particularly in the fashionable circles of eighteenth century Edinburgh, could not be matched today. Another factor that contributed to the interest Hume and his philosophy was the recognition of Hume's contribution on the part of Europe's scholarly community. In the sixty years intervening between the cases of Hume and Leslie, many philosophers had acknowledged the importance of Hume's philosophical work, including the widely admired philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant was in fact notorious in England for having been awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume. F.G. Born's translation of Kant's Critique into Latin, the language of instruction at most universities, made Kant's work more accessible to English readers, most of whom had little or no knowledge of German. In addition, some of the early articles on Kant's Critique that had first 4 65 appeared in Germany were being reprinted in British journals such as the Monthly Review. Interest in the now famous Kant was growing, and between 1794 and 1796, Frederich Auguste Nitsch was invited to give a series of lectures on Kant's philosophy in London. As a former student of Kant's, his aim was ostensibly to give an introduction to Kant's principles concerning man, the world, and the Deity. Less explicit, but no less important, was his ambition to proselytize Kant's philosophical system in the English speaking world, a plan that Kant himself supported. cclxiii As René Wellek notes in his book Immanuel Kant in England: 1793-1838, late eighteenth century Edinburgh society also witnessed a sudden interest in Kant. Beginning in about 1792, Walter Scott, William Clerk, William Erskine, Thomas Thomson, John Colquhoun, and others, submitted to German language instruction under a certain Mr Anthony Florian Madinger Willich. Willich's interest in Kant led to a convergence of German and Kant studies. cclxiv Edinburgh was considered one of the great centres of learning in Europe, and many young men, including Willich, went to Edinburgh to pursue studies in medicine, law and the humanities. As a former student of Kant's, Willich offered lectures on the German language, supplemented by discussions of Kant's philosophy. In 1798, Willich published two works that were evidently the outgrowth of his lectures; Elements of the Critical Philosophy, and Essays and Treatises On Moral Political and Various Philosophical Subjects. The former work brought together the historical context of the critical philosophy, the tenets of transcendentalism, a representative selection of short summaries of Kant's epistemological works, and translations of three philological essays. The latter work was also devoted to Kant, covering his moral philosophy and other miscellaneous writings. Willich's Elements was criticised as a mere piece of book-making, and a large chunk of the work does appear to be a synopsis of Schultz's German language summary of the first Critique. However, Willich's concise summaries of Kant's texts were a considerable improvement over Nitsch, and better than any other writing on Kant then available to the English speaking world. Willich's descriptions of Kant's corpus would have been very useful to the English reader of his day, for they were arguably the only clear English texts available prior to 1800 that actually summarised the Kantian system. cclxv The most influential works on Kant's philosophy in early nineteenth century Edinburgh were those of Willich (1798), Villers (1801), Brown (1803) and Drummond (1805). The discussion of Kant did not sound very Kantian, and largely consisted in an effort to mitigate in the disputes between empiricism and transcendentalism. cclxvi This interest in Kant, and Kant's own interest in Hume, help to explain the attention and seriousness with which Hume's doctrine of causality was now met in Edinburgh. It is true, of course, that Kant's early Scottish critics paid little attention to the details of the critical philosophy. But, what is historically important is that an interest in Kant and in Kant's response to Hume had immediately preceded the Leslie affair, and is likely to have shed new and sympathetic light on Hume and his quest for truth. The Ministers of Edinburgh attempted to turn the local interest in Kant and his response to Hume against Leslie. In sounding the alarm, they claimed that atheism was undermining civil order in Europe, and suggested that the same atheism and unrest might compromise the civil order in Scotland. Fortunately, Hume had also earned admirers closer to home, and as Dugald Stewart established, dozens of eminent British philosophers and theologians had also endorsed Hume's position, whether intentionally or not. Stewart cited Barrow, Clarke, Butler, Berkeley, Hale, Price, Reid, Ferguson, Robison and Gregory as examples. In what is almost certainly a nationalistic dig at the Ministers of Edinburgh, Stewart notes that he has cited many English divines, 'but which, I am sure, will not, on that account, meet with the less respect from any one party connected with the established Church of Scotland...'. cclxvii The disturbing events of 1805 were enough to raise the temper of Stewart, who, perhaps 4 66 unwisely, engaged the Minister's philosophical point about causality. In doing so, Stewart passed along a critical appraisal of the charge against Leslie that is said to have originated with the London theologian, Dr Clarke. cclxviii The remark was to the effect that the Minister's reproach of Leslie on the grounds of his having 'denied an operating principle in the cause' suggests that their own view must actually endorse the idea that the necessity in operating principles is to be attributed to physical events themselves. As Stewart argued, such a view could also be made to appear to endorse atheism. Stewart elaborates on the main idea behind this criticism in his Short Statement of Facts. He begins by asking to what species of cause the operating principle described in the charge is to be applied. It cannot be to God, he reasons. For, as was argued by Leibniz's famous correspondent, Dr Samuel Clarke, physical laws governed by necessity would be independent of any will whatsoever. As Dr Gregory elaborates, events bound by necessity do not require God, and nothing on heaven or earth could prevent them from being what they are. 'The only supposition, then, that remains', Stewart argues, is that 'the operating principle is to be understood to belong to the physical cause itself, connecting it necessarily with the effect; or, in other words, that physical and efficient causes are one and the same.' cclxix Stewart goes on to say that he can hardly believe that the Ministers could have intended such an argument. Indeed, it is 'the very essence of the system of Spinoza', which 'acknowledges in words the existence of a Deity' but, by means of the doctrine that active powers in physical causes connect them necessarily with their effects, is 'subversive of that fundamental principle of all religion'. 'The amount of the system' (says Dr Clarke) 'is this, that all things are equally self-existent, and consequently, that the material world is God.' cclxx Thus, Napier reports, 'owing to an ignorant blunder in their statement of what they conceived to be the true notion of Causation', Leslie's persecutors 'were themselves obliged to have recourse to explanation, in order to show that their own doctrine was not identical with that of the Fatalists and Spinoza!' cclxxi Having raised the question of the philosophical perspicuity of Edinburgh's clergy, Stewart had, wittingly or not, set off what would become an extended debate. Taking for themselves the very liberty they had denied Leslie, the Ministers clarified the meaning of their original charge against him. What they now claimed was that Leslie had in fact denied both a connection between cause and effect and an operating principle in the cause. cclxxii As such, they claimed that the doctrine amounted to a denial of Divine power. Either it claimed a causal connection independent of the will of God, or it denied an operating principle in causes. Thus Leslie's statement would be tantamount to the denial of God as Creator. But as Stewart pointed out, this new charge was merely a trap contrived to make it impossible to admit or deny the view, since 'all implications could be made to sound bad'. cclxxiii Although Stewart would come to regret having dignified the persecution of Leslie by pursuing the philosophical question, he had in fact entered the fray. He explains his actions by saying that the events in question had placed him in a difficult position: Interests of a higher nature than those of any individual were now at stake. Insult after insult had been offered to the University; and the opinions of our Academical Youth, concerning the foundations of those essential principles which it is my professional duty to illustrate, and which it has been the great object of my life to defend, were in no small danger of being unsettled by the crude and contradictory notions which were everywhere afloat. On the one hand, I saw a doctrine, which had been sanctioned by the highest names in Theology and Philosophy, and which I myself, for more than twenty years, had laboured to establish, from the firmest conviction of its importance, not merely to the progress of physical science, but to the best and highest interests of mankind; this doctrine I saw menaced with the anathemas of a powerful party in the Church; while, on the other hand, Persecution was preparing, as of old, to display her banners, in defense of an inconsistent jargon of 4 67 metaphysical words, which waged war with the human understanding. cclxxiv As Stewart explains, the Leslie affair represented a rather unfortunate constellation of many of the themes of his life's work. Having devoted his life to defending a form of political liberty compatible with 'theological interests', Stewart's own view was that Hume's position is compatible with theism. Hume's point, Stewart argued, was that descriptions of causes and effects are analogies to what is observed in nature, and that real causal links are invisible. On Stewart's reckoning, this account supports theism, since it 'keeps the Deity always in view, not only as the first, but as the constantly operating cause in nature, and as the great connecting principle among all the various phenomena which we observe.' cclxxv Understood in this way, Stewart argues, Hume's position is consistent with theism, so long as it is admitted that the mind can infer that observed changes are due to an efficient cause. The central point in Stewart's defense of Leslie is that metaphysical and physical senses of causation are to be kept separate. Stewart cites his own definitions in his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, where he distinguishes between metaphysical and physical causes. The metaphysical sense of cause is that every change in nature indicates the operation of a cause, and this cause is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change. The term 'physical cause', however, is used merely with reference to constant conjunctions of things, although it is these constant conjunctions which lead us to speak in terms of 'metaphysical causes'. cclxxvi Physical laws, such as the law of gravity, Stewart explains, are based on observational evidence, and express only contingent necessity. Since necessary connection cannot be known by observation, we cannot deduce effects from causes or vice versa. So Leslie's was right to say that invisible intermedia should not be supposed to cause gravitational effects. Indeed, as Francis Bacon advocated, scientists should exercise great caution in introducing new causes. Stewart concludes by pointing out that to maintain the view that there is observational evidence of necessary connection is contrary to received opinion and absurd. In one biting remark, he points out that the Church of Scotland had recourse to the same mistaken supposition, when it declared that 'it may very well discharge all such acts wherein there is no necessary connexion inter causum et effectum as it pleases, under the pain of Witchcraft'. cclxxvii Stewart's strategy then, was to attempt to distinguish two senses of causation; the one physical, and the other metaphysical. Stewart maintained that only in the latter sense could there be talk of necessity. Similarly, Leslie, and those professors and students who would defend him, maintained that a limitation expressed by inserting the word 'physical' before the word 'cause' would have been sufficient to dismiss the ambiguity that led to the charge of atheism. Whether or not the point can withstand scrutiny, it did have merit as a forward-looking step in the direction of solving Hume's problem. As Macvey Napier reports, the general sentiment regarding the outcome of the debate was in favour of Stewart's view. For, 'It was on all hands admitted, that if Mr Leslie had, by a single word, limited his observations to Physical causes, they, in that case, would have been wholly free from objection'. To suppose some other meaning would lead to a 'most perverse and intolerant construction' of a footnote to 'a work purely physical' in which the criticism was 'obviously leveled at those theories which resort to certain invisible intemedia, in order to account for the connection of physical sequences.' cclxxviii Having committed themselves to a fairly specific charge, the alternatives for the objecting Ministers of Edinburgh were to back down defeated, or to continue with the offensive. Reverend John Inglis, head of the Presbytery bearing the right of avisamentum, decided to forge ahead. Much of his commentary was aimed at the inconsistency of Stewart's position, based on definitions of terms in various of Stewart's texts. But the substantial point on which Inglis's case rested was the claim that the only theologically acceptable understanding of the term 'efficient 4 68 cause' was the scholastic one. Citing authorities such as Malebranche and Archbishop King, Inglis maintained that the sense of causality still in general acceptance was the scholastic sense of the term. Thus, a 'true cause', as Malebranche writes, is 'that betwixt which and its effect, the mind perceives a necessary connexion.' cclxxix Similarly, Archbishop King writes that when we contemplate ourselves, we realize that we do not exist of ourselves, and that 'we are necessarily carried to some cause' and that our understanding 'must have a necessary connection with some cause distinct from us.' cclxxx Thus, Inglis argued, 'The word cause, in its primary use, and as still understood by most writers, does, in itself, denote efficiency. A physical object or event, if it possesses no efficiency, is improperly denominated a cause.' cclxxxi In appealing to scholastic sources, Inglis showed little sensitivity to the sort of philosophical defense that would be effective in early nineteenth century Edinburgh. In a post-Humean and post-Kantian context, the return to scholastic authorities sounded hollow to most ears. Scholastic traditions had long since been replaced in Edinburgh's literary circles, and recent epistemological debate had centered on questions such as the relative merits of empiricism and transcendentalism. Inglis simply could not muster a contemporary sounding epistemology to accompany his theological precepts. In the end, he fell back on a standard appeal to ignorance. In trying to drive a wedge that could mitigate the damage caused by the Ministers claim about 'operating principles in the cause' Inglis suggests that the conception of necessity applicable to the physical world might well be different from that applicable to divine legislation. For all we know, the argument goes, mathematical necessity might not hold a candle to divine necessity. If so, then no one, including Hume, can understand the sense of necessity at work in God's creation. One problem with this argument is that the appeal to ignorance fails to supply evidence in support of theism. Another difficulty is that as a sceptical appeal, the argument is surely just as 'dangerous' as Hume's doctrine of causality. Thomas Brown, whose 1805 Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr Hume concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect had been discounted by Inglis, on the grounds that it did not align with other positions in the debate, took the opportunity to mock Inglis's scholastic approach. cclxxxii Rejoining the discussion in 1806, Brown took up the details of Inglis's position, and made short work of reducing it to absurdity. As Brown pointed out, on Inglis's view, the terms 'physical cause' and 'efficient cause' are to be understood as follows: A physical cause is 'the observed antecedent of an event, considered merely as the prior in a sequence of changes'. An efficient cause denotes 'that unobserved, but imagined circumstance of power, supposed in the schools to be essential to the sequence, by which a physical cause is rendered the invariable antecedent of its proximate event'. cclxxxiii The Ministers of Edinburgh, in having 'expressly excluded from their ground of accusation, any thing relative to physical doctrine', denied the physical sense of cause intended by Leslie. cclxxxiv Rather, they insisted that the word 'cause' be used only with reference to the Supreme Being. Thus, the Ministers' charge against Leslie rested only the theologically sanctioned sense of 'efficient causality'. The absurd implications are as follows: Mr Leslie will then be accused of denying all such necessary connection between an efficient cause and its effects, as implies an operating principle in the efficient cause; or, as an operating principle is only another phrase for efficiency, the expression may be thus varied, without altering in any respect the intended sense; Mr Leslie having along with Mr Hume DENIED ALL SUCH EFFECT, AS IMPLIES EFFICIENCY IN THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, has of course laid a foundation for rejecting all the argument that is derived from the works of God, to prove either his being or attributes. In other words, if restricted to the sense of efficient causality sanctioned by the Ministers, the 4 69 charge against Leslie is the denial of a tautology. Professor John Playfair later gave the nod to this argument, which he described as a 'masterly and victorious refutation'. Brown's analysis, he wrote, was 'as clear and exact as could be expected in the solution of an algebraic equation' and it 'proved that Leslie was accused of denying an identical proposition.' cclxxxv Another observer would sum up the feelings of many in regretting that scholastic philosophy had been brought into the debate, since it had blown the Leslie affair quite out of proportion, and tied it in an unfortunate way to 'matters ecclesiastical'. cclxxxvi One reason that the connection between Hume and scholastic theology was a problem, was that it served to emphasize the fact that most empiricists working in the post-scholastic tradition were inclined to treat the issue of causality as had Hume. Indeed, Hume's view, whatever its theological consequences, had already been widely received as the standard empiricist position. There was thus a strong temptation on the part of many, including Leslie and Stewart, to separate theological and empirical investigations, an unhappy solution for those who did not wish to leave theology outside the purview of empiricist philosophy. Philosophers such as Kant had offered transcendentalist solutions to Hume's problem, solutions that had been promoted in Edinburgh's literary circles years before the Leslie episode. Willich, for example, had repeatedly endorsed Kant's answer to Hume. In his 1798 publications, Willich addresses local concerns regarding atheism and promotes Kant answer to Hume. In recommending Kant, Willich pacifies the clergy by saying that Kant is 'the only person who has ever yet been able to subvert the reasoning of the British sceptic'. He then adds for the sake of his scholarly readership that the critical philosopher's answer is 'not from a theological moralist, but from a moral theologian'. cclxxxvii Moreover, the answer is sorely needed, Willich laments, for as Kant pointed out in his Prolegomena, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and Priestly all missed Hume's point. They took for granted that which Hume had doubted, and doubted that which it had never occurred to Hume to doubt. It was not the question, whether the conception of cause be right, useful and, relatively to the whole cognition of nature indispensable, for of these Hume never harboured a doubt; but whether it be thought a priori by reason, and in this manner have an internal truth independent upon all experience: on this head Hume expected information and, as he himself says, still kept his mind open to instruction, if any would vouchsafe to bestow it on him. cclxxxviii Thus, Willich made a direct appeal to the interests of his Scottish readership, and tried to set Kant's transcendentalism in a positive light against sceptical forms of empiricism. Although he doubtless raised the ire of local scholars when he at one point likened empiricist doctrines to noxious weeds -and then applauded Kant for having choked them out -he was also conciliatory, liberal, and tolerant. In his edited collection, Essays and Treatises On Moral Political and Various Philosophical Subjects, published some forty-five years after the Hume scandal and several years before the Leslie episode, Willich reflects on the persecution of Hume and his followers. 'Hume's scepticism', he comments, 'seems to be the favourite and inexhaustible topic, on which our modern champions of orthodoxy still insist.' But 'these modern practitioners' he continues, are 'more attentive to the cant of their profession, than observant of the spirit of Christianity' and 'betake themselves but to invective, personal attacks, foul aspersions and declamation, instead of argument.' cclxxxix Let people alone, Willich pleads, 'if they have talents, if they show a spirit of profound and new inquiry, in a word, if they possess but reason, which always gains'. For otherwise, 'if ye call out high treason, call together, as if by alarmbell, the commonwealth, which by no means understands such subtile elaborations, ye render yourselves ridiculous.' ccxc Willich, in fact, quite openly condemns Scotland's tradition of persecution, saying that 'men of candour and discernment look upon it as disgraceful, not only to 4 70 sacred offices, but to the rank in society of men of letters'. ccxci Thus it was that Willich endorsed Kant as an antidote to dogmatism, atheism, scepticism, -and perhaps even to persecution. Willich had anticipated the very sentiment regarding free speech that Playfair expressed in connection with the Leslie affair. And though his polemic on persecution may have been appreciated by some of Leslie's supporters, Willich's recommendation of Kant as a philosophical antidote to Hume was overlooked. Well-known figures such as Brown and Drummond had recently censured Kant's transcendentalism, and it is likely that the prevailing empiricist school, not to mention the incendiary charges against Germany and its philosophers, would have made a Kantian remedy sound worse than the ailment. In fact, the differences between transcendentalism and empiricism were only just beginning to be understood at this point in time, and both sides in the debate had difficulty appreciating the strengths of the competing view. Thus, in Villers' 1801 Philosophie de Kant, the conflict between empiricism and transcendentalism had been set in a light unflattering to the empiricism -a challenge taken up in Brown's 1803 critique of Villers. The conflict can is well illustrated in connection with the discussion of Villers' appeal to the metaphor of a camera obscura, a metaphor introduced to explain Kant's transcendentalism. The idea behind Villers' example is to show how the mind might come to distinguish objective and subjective elements in cognition. According to Villers, the mind might accomplish this just as the camera obscura, in becoming animate, might come to see that its red lens acts as a 'universal form for all of the objects it perceives'. ccxcii Supposons une de ces machines d'optique connues sous le nom de chambre obscure, qui soit munie à l'ouverture par où elle reçoit la lumi ère d'un verre rouge. Tous les objets seront rouges au fond de la chambre obscure, et cette teinte rouge sera un produit de la nature du verre; ce verre est constitué de sorte que la couleur rouge doit être une loi, une forme universelle pour tous les objets perçus par lui. Si notre chambre obscure pouvait sentir et s'exprimer, elle ne manquerait pas de juger et de soutenir les bâtimens, les arbres, les hommes, en un mot que toute la nature est rouge; elle se garderait bien de devenir d'abord que cette couleur générale dans les objets de sa connaissance, provient d'ellemême, de la constitution de l'organe par où elle reçoit des impressions. ccxciii Villers goes on to ask us to imagine a variety of scenarios, each designed to assist initiates to the transcendent perspective. He ask us to imagine, for example, a rock engraved with the design of a 'Minerva', a rock that would always imprint sealing wax with its 'Minerva' design. Would it not be the case, Villers asks, that such a rock, once animated, would simply assume that all seals must be of the form of a Minerva? The example, is, presumably designed to help us to understand how the mind might 'stamp' its a priori imprint onto representations. Another example uses the metaphor of three distinctly shaped mirrors to show how reality might well differ from appearance, but unfortunately portrays transcendentalism in a rather simplistic manner: Trois mirroirs, l'un plan, l'un cylindrique, le troisième conique, reçoivent l'image du m ême object; cette image sera trèsdifférent pour les trois mirroirs. D' où procède cette différence? De la structure de chacun, qui détermine la forme,la loi que doivent subir tous les objets qui s'y réfléchissent. Prêtons le sentiment et la parole à nos mirroirs; Si celui qui est plan dit: la chose qui est là devant nous, est un beau cercle très parfait, '<<le cylindriqu répliquera>>: point du tout, c'est un ovale prodigieusement allongé, et le conique protestera que: <<C'est une esp èce d'hyperbole double, don't l' ècartement est manifeste.>> Dans le fait l'objet en lui-même ne sera peutêtre aucune de ces choses, et cependant chacun des trois mirroirs aura raison, car n'ayant réellement pour objet que sa propre représentation de la chose, représentation soumise au mode de sa construction intrinsèque, l'objet du premier 4 71 sera bien évidement un cercle, celui du second un ovale, et celui du troisi ème une hyperbole. Si l'entendement que nous avons prêté au trois mirroirs, au-lieu de leur servir à disputer à perte de vue, sur leurs objets, les analyser, les retourner, s'en fairs des idées soidisant claires, et à se traiter l'un l'autre de visionnaire et de fou, leur servait à se replier sur eux-mêmes pour s'etudier, et rechercher dans leur nature ce qui peut influer sur leurs perceptions, ils finiraient par s'entendre mutuellement, bien qu'aucun d'eux ne puisse jkamais parvenir à connaitre l'objet en lui-m ême. -Il pourrait bien arriver autant à tous les métaphysiciens, s'ils prenait le même parti. ccxciv The camera obscura metaphor was to become a focus for Thomas Brown and Sir William Drummond, both of whom invoke it in ridiculing the tenets of transcendentalism, saying that the machine would never be able to draw the inference in question. In 1803, Brown writes: As an illustration of the possibility of this analysis, M. Villers adduces the probable reflections of a camera obscura, which, by the power in him invested, he has endowed with animation. To the sensorium of this transcendentalist, the light is supposed to pass through a coloured medium; and the subjectivity of the colour, as part of its sensations, it is affirmed to be capable of discovering, by the exertion of its own unaided powers. To us, indeed, who knows that light has been decomposed in passing, it is easy to make the inference, that all the objects in nature are not red; but we cannot suppose the machine itself, however subtile, to be capable of such an inference. It may, indeed, attain that acuteness of scepticism, which denies the existence of external objects; but it cannot separate their believed existence from their redness; since it is only as definite redness they can be known to exist. ccxcv Drummond, although he receives the least credit for philosophical acumen and originality, gets full marks for style in his dismissal of Villers' example. In this short excerpt gives the flavour of Drummond's derisive, but nonetheless amusing, 1805 tirade: But it is now, we may conclude, that the mystagogue proceeds to the explanation of the distinction between what is objective, and what is subjective -the most sublime, we are told, and the most extravagant, we think, of the doctrines of Kant. It is now, that he draws from beneath his philosopher's robe, a camera obscura, a seal-ring, and three pocket mirrors. The camera obscura receives the light through a red glass -the figure of Minerva is engraved in the seal-ring -one of the mirrors is cylindrical, another plane, and a third conical. Such are the instruments, with which the transcendental philosopher prepares to unfold the secrets of nature, and the laws of the universe. If the camera obscura, observes the mystagogue, could feel and speak, it would say, that all the objects of its perception are of a red colour. The seal-ring endowed with sentiment would think, that wax can only take the form of Minerva. The three mirrors would no sooner see, what is seen in them, than each would jugde of the forms represented upon its surface, according to its own proper construction, and would conclude, that these are the real forms of the external objects. Now, continues the mystagogue, the camera obscura, the seal-ring, and the three mirrors, are so many empirical philosophers. Let us learn from the French author, how they may be metamorphosed into critics and transcendentalists. ccxcvi Thus, the defenders of empiricism summarily dismiss the camera obscura metaphor, opting instead to develop an empiricist response to Hume's challenge. The most celebrated of these philosophical efforts was the one published by Thomas Brown in 1805. Brown's Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr Hume concerning the Relation of Cause and 4 72 Effect, which was in fact written as part of an effort to establish a philosophical rather than political base for the discussion of Hume in the Leslie controversy. ccxcvii However, as an advocate of empiricism, Brown's did not aspire to the transcendentalist's reply to Hume. In addition, as David Brewster noted, 'the moderate clergy in our church, have dismissed, simpliciter, the a priori argument, in as far as they have proved that Mr Leslie, by attacking the doctrine of necessary connexion, has denied all argument whatever for the being of God'. ccxcviii Nonetheless, at least one publication connected with the Leslie affair did attempt to bring in 'the a priori argument'. Published many years after the initial controversy had taken place, the work was Mary Shepherd's book entitled An Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect. ccxcix The book represents a sincere effort to engage both Hume's philosophy and the a priori argument. The work responds to many of the points raised in Leslie dispute, and in particular, to the position developed by Thomas Brown in his otherwise neglected Observations. 2.4 Brown's Observations and Shepherd's Reply In the end, the discussion surrounding the appointments of Hume and Leslie drew attention to the importance of Hume's achievement, and this in turn led to a growing demand for a serious philosophical response to his doctrine of causality. The most celebrated of these philosophical responses was Thomas Brown's seminal work, Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr Hume concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect, published in 1805. There, Brown follows the lead of Reid and Stewart, and acting as apologist for Hume, begins by accepting a number of Hume's empiricist premises. Brown says, for example, that a cause is defined as 'an object followed by another, where, if the first object had not been, the second had not appeared, and which, existing again in similar circumstances, will always be followed by the second.' ccc He goes on to attribute five propositions to Hume, taking them up one at a time for the purpose of examining, and ultimately defending, Hume's theory of causation. ccci Brown's five propositions are: 1. The relation of cause and effect cannot be discovered a priori. 2. Even after experience, the relation of cause and effect cannot be discovered by reason. 3. The relation of cause and effect is an object of belief alone. 4. The relation of cause and effect is believed to exist between objects, only after their customary conjunction is known to us. 5. When two objects have been frequently observed in succession, the mind passes readily from the idea of one to the idea of the other; from this transition, and from the greater vividness of the idea thus more readily suggested, there arises a belief of the relation of cause and effect between them. cccii Brown admits the first three propositions, but rejects the fourth and fifth. Like Hume, he accepts Locke's theory of ideas, and he takes it as an obvious point that causes are discovered through experience and not known a priori. To this, he adds that belief in causality results from drawing an analogy from observed conjunctions to the idea of invisible causes or powers. The second proposition that Brown considers is that the relation of cause and effect is not discovered by reason's examination of experience. Brown argues that this follows because 'future and invariable antecedents and sequences' are neither discernible in nor implied by what is given in experience. What Brown next claims is that when Hume asserts that the relation of cause and effect is an object of belief, he really means that it is an object of faith. For, the first proposition shows that the causal relation cannot be perceived, and the second proposition shows, the causal relation cannot be inferred, so the only remaining sense of 'belief' is in the sense of 'having faith'. As such, Brown claims that for Hume the causal relation is believed as an object of faith. Brown interprets what this might mean, saying that '...as soon as we believe the relation of 4 73 cause and effect, the idea of power arises. The belief, indeed, is \"instinctive\" but the ideas that follow do so regardless of the origin of this belief.' ccciii So, in the end, Brown argues, Hume does provide a foundation for cause and effect, but that the foundation is based on instinct rather than reason, so that 'we believe, rather than discover, the relation of cause and effect.' ccciv Having defended the first three propositions, Brown rejects the fourth and fifth. He rejects the fourth on the grounds that we are in fact able to draw conclusions about cause and effect after only a single trial. The boy who is stung by a bee, Brown maintains, does not wait for a second or third application before he fears the sting. cccv Brown also rejects the fifth proposition, which concerns the psychological mechanism that leads to belief in cause and effect. Against Hume, he argues that it is not frequency of conjunction and the attendant vividness that leads to the formation of ideas of cause and effect. For, we often have intense sentiments annexed to consecutive ideas wherein no causal belief is formed. Here Brown elaborates by drawing on the example of the romantic memory of a loved one that 'is a cause not of less, but of more, lively conception' than those in which causal beliefs are formed. cccvi Thus, Brown rejects the final claim that the belief in causal connection depends on frequency of conjunction or vivacity of impression. In 1805, the Reverend Inglis and others had discounted Brown's analysis as 'substantially and radically different' from the discussion of both parties in the Leslie controversy, so that Brown was thereby 'disqualified, as an antagonist'. cccvii Brown is modest on the subject of his Observations. 'Whatever, therefore, may be the general sentiment, as to my own peculiar views of the subject' he writes, 'I shall have attained my wish, if... I have succeeded in shewing, that the evidences for the most important of all truths remain unshaken'. cccviii What Brown really hoped to secure then, were 'evidences for the most important of all truths'; namely, the truth of God's existence. Theism was also the central issue for Mary Shepherd. However, Shepherd rejects Brown's analysis, which she takes to undermine the foundation for our belief in God. Like others of her day, Shepherd found Brown's analysis to be crude and mistaken. However, she did consider the work to merit a response. Her 1824 Essay is in fact advertised to the reader as a reply to Brown's Observations: It is not many years since Mr Hume's notions were the occasion of much dispute, on the very ground on which I have undertaken it; a dispute which nearly lost the mathematical chair in one of our universities to the present possessor of it, on account of his favouring this doctrine. His opinion, however, as far as it related to any countenance it might afford to the principles of atheism, was defended by a learned treatise, from the then Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the same University. This treatise, whilst it controverts Mr Hume's opinions in some respects, denies that atheistical inferences may be deduced from them; but I shall endeavour to show, that, in this respect, the author wanted observation and acuteness; neither perceiving the corollaries that go along with the doctrine, nor detecting the sly and powerful sophistry of the reasoning by which they are supported. cccix Shepherd's 1824 An Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect should therefore be studied in conjunction with Brown's text. There, Shepherd repeats Brown's format, but unlike Brown, she proposes five propositions to the end refuting Hume. Shepherd's five propositions are: FIRST, That reason, not fancy and 'custom', leads us to the knowledge That everything which begins to exist must have a Cause. SECONDLY, That reason forces the mind to perceive that similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects. THIRDLY, I shall thence establish a more philosophical definition of the relation of Cause and 4 74 Effect. FOURTHLY, show, in what respects Mr Hume's definition is faulty. FIFTHLY, proceed to prove that Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course without a contradiction in terms; and, finally, show that Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our expectations in ordinary life. cccx Not only does Shepherd's Essay parallel the form of Brown's Observations; it also takes up the challenge posed in Brown's closing remarks. After reiterated his thesis that Hume identifies instinct as the one and only possible foundation for the causal relation, Brown goes on to claim that the 'only dangerous scepticism would be, to deny the reality of the instinct'. cccxi He closes with the disingenuous lament that 'if the belief of power had depended, not on instinct, but on reason, it would have rested on a principle of surer evidence.' cccxii Shepherd is not convinced by Brown's argument, and she objects to his founding of belief on 'inferences of imagination' and the 'blind impulse of faith'. cccxiii Her 1824 Essay takes up the challenge to provide a foundation for the causal relation in reason. The discussion there, however, is largely directed against Hume rather than Brown. cccxiv The full details of Shepherd's account can only emerge given a careful examination of her texts, the initiation of which follows in the next chapter. However, it is clear, both from Shepherd's linking of her own text with Brown's, and from the manner in which she argues, that it is her intention to respond to the analysis set out by Brown in his Observations. Against Brown, Shepherd aims to show that reason can prove the existence of a necessary connection between cause and effect. It would appear, in fact, that Shepherd intends to advance a line that combines a posteriori reasoning with a priori causal necessity. Shepherd rejects Hume's doctrine of causation, a doctrine whose arguments she regards as 'illogical' and whose conclusions she takes to be 'untrue'. Against Hume, she claims that an empirical act of introspection does lead the mind to the discovery of necessary connection. For, the determination of anything that begins to exist requires the inclusion of the idea of a cause in our representations, and it follows that any attempt to think 'dependent qualities that begin to exist' as uncaused leads to contradiction. cccxv As such, Shepherd maintains, 'when the mind perceives by what passes within itself, that no quality, idea, or being whatever, can begin its own existence, it...perceives the general necessity of a cause for every effect'. cccxvi Thus, introspection and analysis are required before the mind can gain knowledge of necessary connection, which connection, however, is given a priori in the very moment of concept formation. This would fill in the gap in the debate that David Brewster noted in his remark that the Leslie affair had proceeded in such a manner as to ignore the a priori defence of the causal relation. As Shepherd sees it, both a priori elements and reason are indispensable in defending knowledge of causal necessity. It is quite evident then, that Shepherd's 1824 text emerges directly from the philosophical discussion and debate of her social and intellectual milieu. Shepherd was well educated, a woman, a member of the nobility, a theist, and a social acquaintance of Leslie and his many supporters. As such, she brings a unique approach to the controversy. Indeed, of all those directly affected by the Leslie controversy, Shepherd was one of just two of Edinburgh's philosophers who would make the debate and discussion surrounding the Leslie controversy the centre of their life's work. For the two individuals involved, Thomas Brown and Mary Shepherd, the issues ran very deep, and they continued to develop ideas of causality initially conceived in response to the Leslie controversy of 1805-06 for many years. The late publication date of Shepherd's 1824 treatise can in part be explained in relation to Brown's re-publication of his own analysis of causality in his 1818 Inquiry. As a woman, Shepherd was more of an outsider to scholarship than most agitators in the debate, a fact that also goes a long way to explain why her contributions emerged so much later than the initial publications in the controversy. 4 75 However, as we shall see, the late publication date of the 1824 treatise can only be fully understood in connection with subsequent events in Mary Shepherd's life. 4 76 The Causal Relation and the 1824 Treatise 3.1 Spurious Connections: Leslie, Malthus, and Common Law There is a gap of nearly twenty years between the Edinburgh events of 1805 and the publication of Mary Shepherd's 1824 treatise. It was during these years that Lady Mary was married to a barrister by the name of Henry John Shepherd, after which she became known under her married name, Lady Mary Shepherd. Henry John Shepherd was the son of Sir Samuel Shepherd, a prominent member of the British legal profession, based in London It seems likely that the couple met in London; and, the Primrose family did, in fact, have long-standing London connections. Under James VI and I, Sir Archibald had been a member of the Privy Council of Scotland, and, soon after the Revolution of 1688, his son was created the Earl of Rosebery. Mary's father, Neil Primrose, was Representative Peer for Scotland between 1768 and 1784, and during this period, the family rented Holland House. cccxvii By 1796, the Earl of Rosebery appears in Boyle's Court Guide on Bruton Street, Berkeley Square, and beginning in 1801, Neil Primrose is listed at Park Lane. At this point, the Primrose daughters had advanced to a marriageable age, and it is likely that the family spent a considerable portion of the year in London. Mary Shepherd was the last of Neil Primrose's daughters to marry, and her marriage permanently shifted the centre of her world from Edinburgh to London. In London, she remained close to many of her Edinburgh associates, but her intellectual circle expanded to include a wide range of brilliant minds living in the southern parts of Britain. By 1824, it was evident that careful attention to the nature of scientific reasoning and to the defence of the causal relation would be required in the wake of Hume's critique. Mary Shepherd and her circle were particularly sensitive to this need, and one of their central preoccupations was, in fact, with the logic of induction. In this chapter, we will consider both the social and intellectual influences that shaped Mary Shepherd in adulthood, with the aim of reconstructing how the discussion and debate surrounding causality and induction influenced the direction of the 1824 treatise. To begin, we turn to the circumstances of marriage and the social connections of the Primrose children. Like many aristocratic families of the eighteenth century, the Primrose family would have been conscious of the importance of an advantageous marriage. A few love matches, and too much time spent gambling away the family fortune could easily lead to trouble, and possibly extinguish a family line altogether. And, though it was important to marry well, it was often difficult to find a suitable match. It turns out that the conventional expectations regarding marriages of the period are reasonably helpful in understanding the marriage pattern in the Primrose family. According to the conventional pattern, elder sons or sons who could expect to inherit a large chunk of the family's wealth, generally had the pick of marriageable women. And, such was the case for Neil Primrose's eldest son, Archibald Primrose, who became the fourth Earl of Rosebery. Younger sons, however, especially sons who did not expected to inherit a substantial fortune, were encouraged to take on a profession. The Primrose family's younger son, Francis Ward Primrose, did inherit a family estate in Norfolk, but he had a gambling problem, and ended up in the civil service in Canada. Though the prospects of younger sons could be bleak, daughters of aristocrats faced especially difficult circumstances. The system of primogeniture meant that there were few heirs and few opportunities for aristocratic girls to retain social status. At the turn of the nineteenth century, about one quarter of upper-class young women remained unmarried. In many cases, they were regarded as a burden to their families, and were obliged to take on roles such as governess or companion. Undoubtedly the preference for most daughters would have been to retain social standing through marriage, and with this in mind, daughters of aristocrats were encouraged to acquire the basic arithmetic and literacy skills required to manage an estate and to learn 'polite manners'. cccxviii Fortunately, the marital outlook of the Primrose daughters was not at all grim; for Neil Primrose was able to 4 77 provide a dowry of £20,000. cccxix Thus, the Primrose children were well educated, well provided for, and ideally placed to make good matches. And, London was just the place to find a suitable match. Despite all of this, the Primrose children do not seem to have fallen neatly in line with the pattern typically associated with the advantageous marriage. From an early age, Charlotte Primrose had excelled in mathematics, and was frequently called upon by her father to assist with estate management, a circumstance that would have helped to single her out for marriage into the peerage. In fact, of the three Primrose girls, Charlotte's marriage appears to have been the most socially advantageous. Her husband, Kenneth Howard, stood in line to become the Earl of Effingham. Unfortunately, at the time of his marriage in 1800, Kenneth Howard had neither wealth nor title, and Charlotte Primrose's parents did not approve of the match. Kenneth Howard, so the story went, is 'a near relation of Lady Rosebery's and may become Earl of Effingham, but has at present only his pay as Col. in the Guards.' cccxx In the end, Charlotte Primrose did become Countess of Effingham, and, best of all, she made a rare love match. It is true, however, that she and her children struggled financially; and that Kenneth Howard did not succeed to the Earldom until 1837. Of the other Primrose marriages, the most noteworthy were those of Mary and Archibald. cccxxi Both marriages appear to have been products of the family's London connections, and both were unusual in their own ways. In 1808, Archibald Primrose, who became the forth Earl in 1814, married the beautiful Harriet Bouverie, daughter of Bartholomew Bouverie. Archibald loved his wife desperately, but the marriage ultimately ended in lawsuit and divorce. According to Henry Brougham, defence council for Sir Henry Mildmay, it was a series of unfortunate and accidental circumstances that had culminated in this 'melancholy story of a mutual, sincere, ardent, devouring passion' between Sir Henry Mildmay and his deceased wife's sister. cccxxii Archibald Primrose, hopelessly in love with his wife, sent her away to Barnbougle. Mildmay, naturally, soon followed. Travelling in stealth to the castle, he would nightly join the Countess in her bedroom after dinner. Upon catching the adulterers in the act, Archibald Primrose is said to have shot Mildmay in the arm. cccxxiii The Primrose family account of the divorce is somewhat different. cccxxiv Archibald Primrose, and several other members of the family, remained sympathetic to the beautiful Harriet Bouverie, who was cast as a victim of Sir Henry Mildmay. Considerable blame was laid on the interference of the Countess dowager, who withheld Harriet's letter of explanation and apology. Many years later, upon learning of this interference, Archibald Primrose was crushed, and avowed that, 'I love her now as I did the day we were married.' cccxxv Thus, there was a second love match in the family, but one with a tragic twist. In the well-publicised court case, Archibald Primrose won £15,000 in damages, a huge sum, but apparently no consolation for his broken heart. Sir Henry Mildmay, on the other hand, triumphantly mocked the whole affair in court, sporting the Countesses' yellow garter on his arm. Lady Mary's marriage is something of a mystery. She was thirty years old when she married, and unlike most young women of her class and generation, she did not marry an older, wellestablished man. Her husband, Henry John Shepherd, was a poetic and romantic individual six years her junior. Lady Mary was married by license, an unusual choice for a woman of her standing, but a practice that would have avoided the reading of Banns. She took her vows on 11 April 1808, and gave birth to her eldest daughter, Mary Elizabeth, on her own birthday, 31 December 1808. cccxxvi Her second and third children, Henry Primrose and Maria Charlotte, were born in 1814 and 1815, respectively. Although we do not know of the circumstances that led to the marriage, we do know that Mary Primrose became Lady Mary Shepherd, a London society woman and mother to three children. And, regardless of the circumstances of the marriage, happy, sad, or indifferent, Mary Shepherd thrived in her marriage more than many can boast. 4 78 Lady Mary's husband, Henry John Shepherd, was educated at Eton and Cambridge, and, following this, took up law at Lincoln's Inn. He was a barrister on the Oxford circuit, and, from 1818-1820, MP for Shaftesbury. In the 1820s, he took a graduate degree at Cambridge, and it was probably through his connections in Cambridge and Oxford that the couple became social intimates of some of the finest young thinkers of their generation, many of whom became eminent scholars and scientists. In addition to writing a Master's thesis, Henry John later produced some dramatic works, and a summary of the law concerning elections of Members of Parliament in Britain. cccxxvii His eldest daughter describes her father in affectionate terms, as having a nature that 'united with deep tenderness of heart, and sympathy for his fellow creatures, a brilliant and attractive fancy and imagination.' cccxxviii But Henry John Shepherd may have been more inclined towards poetry than philosophy, for 'he was full of apparent paradoxes, which from his friends always met with a kind of tender appreciation.' cccxxix Lady Mary, tutored at home on the 'old fashioned Scotch plan' of James Pillans, appears to have been the product of a more rigorous and demanding education. The resulting combination in the marriage was slightly odd, but not unpleasant: 'The difference of circumstances in their bringing up, combined with the similarity in simplicity of character, between my father and mother, made the peculiar natural flavour and refinement of the tone of conversation in their home.' cccxxx The Shepherd family was very well placed socially. Sir Samuel was King's Advocate between 1813 and 1819 and later Lord Chief Baron of the Court of the Exchequer of Scotland from 1819 to 1830. All told, the family circle attracted many eminent individuals, and the home of Lady Mary and Henry John Shepherd became a sort of intellectual and literary hub. Their circle of social, scientific and literary friends, included, among others: Jeffrey Lockhart and family, the Reverend Sydney Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Henry Hart Milman, Henry Hallam, the Leonard Horners, Charles Lyell, Charles Babbage, Mary Somerville, William Whewell, John Murray, Lord Lyndhurst and family, and Lord Dudley. cccxxxi Other guests were college friends of Henry John Shepherd, such as William Maule, Lord John Campbell, Thomas Talfourd, the Hobhouses, and Mr. Abraham Hayward. Among the ladies were Lady Charleville, Lady Stepney, and Miss Runnington. cccxxxii Thus, Lady Mary not only pursued her scholarly interests throughout her married life, she ran a salon of sorts, to which there were many regular subscribers. According to her daughter, there were frequent dinner parties, and after dinner, these parties were opened up to a wider circle of friends who would gather to discuss the latest developments in a variety of fields. 'Sometimes there would be a dinner of 8 or 10 with general conversation, sometimes of 12 or 14 breaking into groups. Dinners then were early enough to have an after evening; and at half past 9 or so, there would assemble really at tea, 20 or 30 more in the drawing-room, and the society would melt away at 11.' cccxxxiii There were other guests as well, but some have been forgotten, and others left unnamed. cccxxxiv Although it is hard to gauge personal convictions by the wider circle of acquaintance, Lady Mary Shepherd's inner circle supplies clues to her deeper affinities and beliefs. With this in mind, several friends deserve notice as the close confidants of Lady Mary Shepherd. 'The persons who, besides my father, most thoroughly entered into my mother's mind, and followed where she led into great and wide depths of abstract enquiry, were Mr. David Ricardo the political economist, Mr. Pearson, Dr. Whately Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Whewell, afterwards master of Trinity, and Mr. Cameron.' cccxxxv For now, the important point to note is that Mary Shepherd continued to engage many of the brightest and most exciting minds of her time after her marriage. In fact, it was through her marriage that Mary Shepherd succeeded in cultivating her intellectual gifts into mature adulthood, a circumstance that was both extremely fortunate and unusual in her day. That the people and events in her life provide clues to understanding Lady Mary Shepherd's philosophical work will become increasingly apparent as her story unfolds. In the meantime, we must turn to developments in the philosophical, social, and religious context in 4 79 which Mary Shepherd's thought evolved. As with her social connections, the social and religious context of the times has no direct bearing on the cogency of Mary Shepherd's arguments. However, just as the social connections provide clues regarding intellectual influence, so the contextual clues help to underscore the significance of and motivations behind Shepherd's philosophical contribution. We have already glimpsed at how the Leslie affair, and especially the philosophical material written in connection with the episode, influenced the direction and form of Mary Shepherd's 1824 treatise. I have further suggested that Mary Shepherd and her intellectual circle during marriage shared a preoccupation with causality and the logic of induction. As respondents to Hume and his critics, they assessed these subjects not only from scientific, but also from historical, philosophical, and theological standpoints. As such, there are features of the mind set of the times of which we must take note as well, not because of intellectual merit, but because they reveal something about the ideas and attitudes to which Mary Shepherd and her circle were moved to respond. One text, written by William Kerr in response to the Leslie affair, speaks from an extremely conservative religious perspective, and is, in more ways than can be readily counted, bizarre. Yet the 1807 text reveals important things about the way that the Leslie affair appeared to some of the more orthodox thinkers. Kerr's long and rather descriptive title gives the reader a considerable hint: A Summons of Wakening or, The Evil Tendency and Danger of Speculative Philosophy Exemplified in Mr. Leslie's Inquiry into the Nature of Heat; and Mr. Mathus's Essay on Population, And in that Speculative System of Common Law, which is at the present administered in these kingdoms. To which is subjoined, A prospectus of one Inquiry into the Origin of Government and Law. cccxxxvi The connections made loosely and carelessly by Kerr in 1807, would later be philosophically addressed by Shepherd and her circle, which, it turns out, included several of those implicated in Kerr's personal attacks. One of the distinctive features of Kerr's work is its censure of speculative and mathematical analyses of nature. Speculative thought, Kerr charges, is an evil threat to religion found in the works of Leslie, Malthus, and the common law. Kerr's rejection of 'speculative systems' is rooted in anger at intellectual developments that threaten religious belief. Hume's doubts about causality, for example, had stemmed from empiricist and speculative analyses, and ultimately led to questions about God's existence. And, with the rise of empiricist analyses went the decline of scholastic philosophy, a decline that gave rise to a broad range of questions relating to causality, God, miracles, the sacraments, and more. One response to empiricist critiques was to offer explicit or revised interpretations on religious matters. For example, both the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches adopted as an official view, that Eucharistic Presence of Christ was impossible, and that Holy Communion could represent no more than a symbolic union with Christ. Given an empiricist analysis, transubstantiation, which literally requires that Christ enter the bread and wine during Communion, could not be explained; for, there could be no mundane explanation of ordinary wine and bread producing the effect of the Eucharistic Presence. As such, the empiricist analysis threatened the traditional Episcopalian interpretation of the Eucharist, and orthodox Episcopalians, like conservative Presbyterians, had their reasons for rejecting empiricism and its critique of causality. Scholastic philosophy, which had argued that God's agency is at work in the world, offered an alternative analysis in which God is the causal agent in the Eucharistic mystery, and so overstepped empirical difficulties. However, as Dugald Stewart had argued in 1805, this view demands an explanation of the nature of God's Presence in the material world, and may lead to the 'dangerous' theology of Spinoza. Although it may be that no rational analysis could resolve the conceptual difficulty attendant to the interpretation of the Eucharist, the Anglican and Presbyterian solutions were deemed to have the advantage of not resting on standard empiricist or rationalist analyses. Nonetheless, the philosophical and theological predicament that the combination of speculation and empiricism had brought on was 4 80 one that angered many, and especially those who sought to defend orthodox traditions. Kerr, like many conservative religious thinkers, saw speculative philosophy as an incitement to sceptical doubt and social unrest. Thus, he sought to make precise the sense in which not only speculative thought, but also its proponents, presented a grave danger to religious doctrines and civil society. What is perhaps the most interesting and distinctive feature of Kerr's A Summons of Wakening is that it is the only text in the Leslie affair that attempted to address evidential and methodological issues in Leslie's 1804 An Experimental Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation of Heat. cccxxxvii The main goal of Leslie's 1804 analysis is to reject the view that heat radiation is a real emanation of caloric in the rays propagating from the heated body. His secondary aim is to show that the medium of propagation for heat is only the ambient air, and not an aetherial medium. With respect to the former goal, Leslie argues that 'there is no proper radiation of caloric' and claims that the effect of heat radiation 'is produced entirely by the mediation of the air'. cccxxxviii He sums up his 1804 view that transmission of heat is by means of radiation through the air: The portions of heat are not transported by the streaming of the heated air, for they suffer no derangement from the most violent agitation of their medium. The air must therefore, without changing its place, disseminate the impressions that it receives of heat, by a sort of undulatory commotion, or a series of alternating pulsations, like those by which it transmits the impulse of sound. The portion of air next the hot surface, suddenly acquiring heat from its vicinity, expands proportionally, and begins the chain of pulsations. In again contracting, this aerial shell surrenders its surplus heat to the one immediately before it, and which is now in the act of expansion; and thus the tide of heat rolls onwards, and spreads itself on all sides. These vibratory impressions are not strictly darted in radiating lines, but each successive pulse, as in the case of sound, presses to join an equal diffusion. cccxxxix The second and related goal of Leslie's 1804 book is to discredit the theory that a material aether is the fundamental medium through which physical motion takes place. cccxl Leslie's remarks on aether, including those that led him to write his infamous footnote, indicate that he thought that both the caloric theory of heat and the aether hypothesis had been thoroughly discredited by his own experimental results: What then is this calorific and frigorific fluid after which we are inquiring? It is incapable of permeating solid substances. It cannot pass through tin, nor glass, nor paper. It is not light, it has no relation to aether, it bears no analogy to fluids, real or imaginary, of magnetism and electricity. But why have recourse to invisible agents? Quod petis hic est. It is merely the ambient air. cccxli In assessing Leslie's work on heat, it is well to keep in mind the difficulties facing early chemists. At the turn of the nineteenth century, for example, chemical theories were vague and there were few known physical facts. Leslie's strengths as a scientist include his ability to see beyond prevailing opinion, what Bacon called the Idols of the Tribe, and his realization that advances in chemical science will require 'more delicate instruments, and more accurate modes of experiment'. cccxlii His weaknesses have to do with his limited understanding of the logic of confirmation. Like other scientists of the early nineteenth century, Leslie almost invariably looks for confirming instances of his theory, a habit that leads to a false sense of confirmation, today termed 'confirmation bias'. Thus, even when Leslie is on the right track, he does not have the conceptual or experimental means to sort through confusions. Indeed, Leslie's work on heat 4 81 suffers from many of the same challenges facing other researchers of his day; specifically, vague theories, few facts, the paucity of instruments, and poor experimental methods. With this caveat, we turn next to Leslie's reasoning in his 1804 treatise on heat. Leslie, we have said, was afflicted with confirmation bias, and so never gave a truly compelling basis for his doubts. Given that heat does not behave like fluid or like any other substance suggested on the caloric theory, he was quite right to doubt caloric theory. Yet, his experiments, while revealing interesting things about heat radiation, were insufficient to establish that radiation theory was superior to caloric theory. The correct theory of heat, that heat is the kinetic energy of atoms, rather than a latent property of bodies, was not yet available to scientists. In the meantime, Leslie's work on heat radiation, although interesting, did not represent a welldeveloped theoretical alternative for explaining the available data. The following experiment, for example, is one that Leslie takes to be favourable to his view: If successive rings of pasteboard be fashioned into the twisted form of a cornucopia, and its wide mouth presented at some distance to the fire, a strong heat will, in spite of the gradual inflection of the tube, be accumulated at its narrow end. cccxliii The experiment is supposed to present a difficult case for the caloric theory. For, the cornucopia shape of the instrument should impede the transmission of caloric in right lines from the wide to the narrow end, and yet the evidence shows that the far end of the instrument accumulates a 'strong heat'. The example, however, offers little by way of alternative explanation, and Leslie treats negative evidence for the view that there is proper radiation of caloric as positive evidence for his view that the effect of heat radiation 'is produced entirely by the mediation of the air'. But the major difficulty with the 1804 treatise on heat is that Leslie fails to present a genuine alternative theoretical model for his view that heat is 'merely the ambient air', and that air, rather than aether, is the medium through which heat moves. Kerr is most critical of Leslie's attack on the aether hypothesis, since he takes the aether hypothesis to be supported by revelation. It is in this context that Kerr points out Leslie's confirmation bias; arguing that Leslie overlooks evidence against his own assumptions about heat and that the evidence is ambiguous. Perhaps it is in compensation for these shortcomings that Leslie makes an appeal to the methodological principle of simplicity. 'But why have recourse to invisible agents?' he asks, -and rightly so. For it is true that according to Ockham's razor, simplicity does count against aether theory. But, as we have already noted, the weakness of aether theory provides no independent support for Leslie's hypothesis, and neither heat radiation nor the air hypothesis can be made to look better because of the poverty of the aether hypothesis. And since Leslie's air hypothesis accounts for phenomena by means of a trivial simplification -the elimination of assumptions about aether and caloric -simplicity plays no genuine role in helping to decide between the theories. That is, Leslie's proposal is trivial in the sense that it does neither more nor better explanatory work than did the old theories. In the final analysis, no matter how bad the aether hypothesis or caloric theory, the only thing that would help to confirm Leslie's air hypothesis is independent evidential support. Since this support is not forthcoming, Leslie's experimental evidence does not warrant his appeal to modus tollens to rule out the received theories in favour of his own view that heat is no other substance than ambient air. Leslie, however, treats the matter as settled. He argues, for example, against the received view that heat radiation behaves like light, and concludes that, 'Reflection had long taught me to consider the communication of heat among insulated bodies, as performed only by the medium of the intervening air. This opinion I now put beyond dispute.' cccxliv Thus, we cannot credit Leslie with having supplied the crucial evidence or arguments against 4 82 caloric or aether theories. Though we would today agree that the theories have been disproven, Kerr was technically right to argue that Leslie's work did not itself disprove them. Many scientists, for example, continued to take aether theory seriously long after Leslie had been laid to rest, mainly because the methodological principle of conservatism advises us to hang onto prevailing theories until they have been successfully discredited. The aether hypothesis was decisively falsified in the twentieth century by the Michelson-Morley experiment, which showed that the round trip velocity of light is the same in all directions on the earth's surface. The Michelson-Morley result is inconsistent with the aether hypothesis, according to which light should travel slower in the direction of the earth's motion than it does in a direction perpendicular to the earth's motion. Neither Kerr nor Leslie had an adequate evidential or conceptual basis for such an argument. More importantly, neither had the theoretical means to adequately explain either the nature of falsification or the characteristics of bad science. These methodological insights, and the reasons for rejecting caloric and aether theories, would eventually be fully articulated, but only in twentieth century discussions of falsification and the criteria of demarcation in science. Karl Popper's theory of falsification, for example, drew several conclusions about the nature of confirmation in science. His most important claims were that only risky predictions that could falsify a theory should count as confirmatory, that the more a theory forbids as impossible, the better, and that ad hoc re-interpretation lowers or destroys the scientific status of a theory. On Popper's view, 'the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability', and a theory is 'scientific' only if we can specify in advance some form of crucial experiment or observation that could falsify the theory. cccxlv According to Popper's criteria, aether theory is pseudoscience, since it fails to specify an experiment that could falsify the theory. Leslie had the right idea then, when he aimed to falsify aether theory, but his experimental results did not meet the criteria that would enable us to conclude that the aether theory had in fact been falsified. As for the explanation of why aether theory was bad science, Leslie and Kerr both seem to recognize, although they were unable to express the point clearly, that what really matters in evaluating a scientific theory is the objective support that a claim has in facts. cccxlvi As another twentieth century philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos, has explained, successful research programs in science are ones that predict novel facts. In degenerate research programs, theories are fabricated only to accommodate known facts. The aether and caloric theories, which produced no stunning or unexpected predictions, and which continually introduced ad hoc hypotheses to accommodate novel facts that tended to disconfirm the theories, represent what Lakatos terms degenerating research programs. Unfortunately for Leslie, his work in connection with heat does not bear the hallmarks of good science either. There are, of course, many other theories that broaden or otherwise construe falsification and demarcation in science. The aim here is not to establish the correct account, but to point out that it is not until twentieth century thinkers such as Popper and Lakatos, that there are clear accounts of falsification and demarcation in science. Although unknown to Kerr and Leslie, the views of Popper and Lakatos help to illustrate the kind of experiment and analysis that Leslie would have had to provide to show that caloric and aether theory are unscientific. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that earlier writers make stronger claims regarding confirmation than evidence and analysis can warrant. However, in the decades to come, further attempts would be made to understand experimental reasoning and induction, and it was doubtless the sort of commentary found in Kerr that called forth a response and improved analysis on the part of defenders of induction and science. In any case, a certain amount of interest would have stemmed from social connections to those attacked in Kerr's work, from the religious and personal dimensions of the attacks, as well as from the challenge that Kerr's work presented to those grappling with questions concerning causality and induction. 4 83 What makes Kerr's attack in A Summons of Wakening sound quite mad, however, is his combination of evidential and methodological criticism with other views. Kerr elaborates his attack on Leslie with countless bad points, bitter invective, and emotional language -all of which go awry of academic scholarship. His general criticism of Leslie, for example, is that his experimentalism slyly mixes speculative thought with 'false constructions of language' and thereby changes the 'truth itself into the semblance of a lie'. The resulting 'heterogeneous mixture of truth, falsehood, and speculative opinions, has a direct tendency to darken the minds of men, to lead them to the path of error, and to bring them into a state of bondage or slavery.' cccxlvii Abandoning the proper combination of reason and revelation, Leslie's theory raises doubts about 'true religion', and questions concerning whether natural evidence proves 'that the revelations of God are the words of truth.' cccxlviii Worse still, Leslie willfully disregards evidence that 'naturally and irresistibly' leads us to belief in a creator. cccxlix Thus, Leslie asks us to not only abandon sense and reason, but also the conclusions that 'the Almighty has been graciously pleased to bestow upon us'. cccl And so, Kerr concludes, 'the cloven foot appears'. cccli As agent of the Devil, John Leslie is 'the means which the great deceiver of mankind, has employed to seduce them from their allegiance to God; and to bring them under bondage to himself, and to his ministers.' ccclii In sum, there is an 'Evil Tendency and Danger of Speculative Philosophy Exemplified in Mr. Leslie's Inquiry into the Nature of Heat'. Kerr's invective against Thomas Malthus's 1798 Essay on Population is similarly skewed. cccliii By the time Kerr gets to his critique of Malthus, it is apparent that he is quite generally opposed to the application of mathematics to natural phenomena. He clings, for example, to the threads of Aristotelian physics, and calls vis viva (mv 2 ), the principle of conservation of motion, a 'lying principle'. cccliv Indeed, preserving a form of Aristotelian physics appears to be part of his theological aim. Having revealed the basis for his rejection of a mathematical interpretation in physics, Kerr goes on to treat of Malthus's principle of population growth. Malthus, he claims, has deceived readers into thinking that something other than God might be responsible for population growth, claiming that the population will tend to grow at a geometric ratio while the means of subsistence can normally increase at no more than an arithmetic ratio. And, to claim that the population increases faster than the means of subsistence unless population growth is checked by famine, pestilence, and so on, is to suggest that God is the author of evil. ccclv Moreover, when Malthus warns that multiplying too fast leads to poverty, contagion, and death -advising couples to delay marriage and procreation -he advances a system that is pagan rather than Christian. ccclvi Kerr further charges that Malthus regards the chief cause of misery and vice as 'that unequal distribution of the bounties of nature, which he it seems, like Tom Paine and the French Philosophers, considers to be one of the greatest impediments to human happiness...'. ccclvii As such, Kerr brings together several diverse charges against Malthus, and expresses his general apprehension of political economy, which he links to the revolutionary impulse. Kerr culminates his discussion with a reproach to the lawmakers. 'Is there no law in this kingdom' he writes, 'for punishing a man for publishing a libel against the Almighty himself, and for endeavoring to seduce all the rest of mankind to join with him, for the purpose of overturning his government?' ccclviii His point, it seems, has been to establish that there ought to be limits imposed on the publication of treatises such as Leslie's and Malthus's: The liberty of the press has, by the mercy of Providence, been preserved in these kingdoms; and it has become one of the chief instruments in his hand, for the protection of British liberty, and for diffusing knowledge to all the rest of mankind. But neither the law of God, nor the laws of this kingdom, will permit any man to abuse this liberty of the press, and employ it 4 84 to the injury of other men. ccclix As must have been evident to most readers, Kerr had religious motives for supporting Aristotelian physics and attacking Leslie and Malthus. Kerr's weaving together of methodological and evidential points, conservative religious politics, and personal attack, would have been a source of considerable irritation to many scientists and philosophers with connections to the Leslie episode. Although his work was doubtless regarded as intellectually suspect by those in Shepherd's circle, it reflects the sort of careless and prejudicial thought that she and her associates hoped could be overcome with careful, reasoned analysis. Regardless of its intellectual limitations, one thing that Kerr's work did made clear, was that Hume's critique placed the onus on defenders of scientific and speculative inquiry to shore up the analysis of causality and induction. Indeed, the analysis that scientists still relied heavily upon at the turn of the nineteenth century was that given by Francis Bacon in his Novum Organon. ccclx Bacon's contribution to the understanding of induction is especially significant because it was he who realized that a method for ruling out 'accidental' from 'essential' generalizations would be necessary for inductive methods to succeed. To this end, Bacon developed a method in which tables of data could be examined in a manner that would help to exclude accidental generalizations. According to Bacon's method of exclusion, a correlation with an instance in which an attribute decreases when another increases, or in which one attribute is absent when another is present, would be considered an 'accidental' generalization. Bacon envisioned that the experimenter would use his method of exclusion to move from the stage of making observations, to the discovery of, first, invariant relations, and then, more inclusive correlations. In cases where there might exist competing essential correlations, one correlation might be ruled out by a crucial instance, but only if the instance was inconsistent with every set of explanatory premises but one. The scientist's reasoning eventually culminates in the extraction of 'essential correlations' and in an increasing level of generality, finally leading to the discovery of the metaphysics 'forms' of the subject under investigation. Bacon illustrates his method using the example of heat in Book II of his Novum Organon. The first step, he says, is to 'have a muster or presentation before the understanding of all known instances which agree in the same nature, though in substances most unlike.' ccclxi If the investigation concerns the nature of heat, then a list is made of the instances where heat is present; for example, the rays of the sun, fiery meteors, burning thunderbolts, all flame, natural warm baths, and so on. A second list is compiled that is as much like the first as possible, except that heat is taken to be absent from the phenomena. Examples include the rays of the moon, stars, and comets, and the 'negatives' of various previously warm things, like liquids, vapors, air, metals, and so on. ccclxii Third is a list of instances where heat is present, but varies in degree with the degree of something else. ccclxiii With these tables, we are to perform an induction; we reject the things that are present in the first and second tables, or do not vary when what is under investigation varies. This process is supposed to shorten the tables dramatically, so that we are soon in a position to form a hypothesis. In the heat example, the hypothesis is that, 'Heat is an expansive motion whereby a body strives to dilate and stretch itself to a larger sphere or dimension than it had previously occupied.' ccclxiv Bacon's method, although widely admired among the scientific community of the day, had been thrown into question by Hume's critique of causality and induction. For, if Hume was right about necessary connection, then the standard interpretation of scientific method in Bacon could not lead to knowledge of causal necessity. Indeed, it is possible that Leslie may even have seen his work on heat as an advance on Bacon made possible by the post-Humean understanding of causality. But to those who held firm that laws of nature must contain causal necessity, Hume's 4 85 critique called for a clearer and more philosophical account of scientific reasoning than Leslie had to offer. Thus, Herschel, Shepherd, Whewell, and others would revisit Bacon's method for the purpose of re-examining the logic of induction. Thus it was that a re-examination of the nature and logic of induction, something that had not been seriously undertaken since the days of Bacon, would become central to the work of several figures connected with Shepherd and her salon. Kerr's 1807 A Summons of Wakening, no matter how suspect, provides important clues to the wider social context in which the response to Hume must be understood. Kerr's text stands as an interesting example an extreme form of religious orthodoxy that accuses scientific, philosophical, speculative, and mathematical analysis of leading the innocent to the Devil and eventually, to social chaos. Of particular interest is Kerr's mixing together of empirical and methodological critique with personal attacks. For in one breath, Kerr claims that scientific experimentalism is a dangerous and 'heterogeneous mixture of truth, falsehood, and speculative opinions'. In another, he likens Leslie to the Devil and Malthus to Paine. He further proposes that laws be introduced to limit the press, on the assumptions that causal laws govern social and individual character, and that limiting free press will help to maintain social order. This cluster of spurious connections recurs not only throughout the Leslie affair, but also as a central theme to many episodes that touched on the life of Mary Shepherd. It is interesting to note that when Leslie's library was sold in Edinburgh, the only publication in the catalogue relating to the Leslie affair was William Kerr's A Summons of Wakening. Indeed, the text would have drawn the attention of many of those involved in the Leslie episode, as well as that of Malthus. And, both Leslie and Malthus, it turns out, were social acquaintances of the Shepherd's. In addition, Kerr's work would have held curiosity for anyone with an interest in law, including Sir Samuel and Henry John Shepherd. Thus, Kerr's 1807 text, weaknesses an all, helps us to understand not only the mind set of the times, but also some of the motivations that spurred on the reinterpretation of the logic of induction that began in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. 3.2 Brown's Inquiry and Whately's Historic Doubts It is really no surprise then, to see a return to questions surrounding the causal relation and induction in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. One of the more significant contributions, in terms of influence, was Thomas Brown's 1818 Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, which develops the doctrine of causality first published in his 1805 Observations. ccclxv The doctrine in Brown's later work does not appear to have changed fundamentally from its 1805 formulation, and the book was published as a 'third edition' of his 1805 and 1806 efforts. But by 1818, Brown's definition of 'cause' is more precise. In 1805, Brown says that cause is defined as 'an object followed by another, where, if the first object had not been, the second had not appeared, and which, existing again in similar circumstances, will always be followed by the second.' ccclxvi In 1818, his definition is clearer, but still places emphasis on antecedence and consequence, so that 'cause' is defined as 'that which immediately precedes any change, and which existing at any time in similar circumstances has always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change.' ccclxvii Given the similarity in the doctrines of the three works, and the fact that Brown published the 1818 text as a third edition of his original 1805 text, it is fair to ascribe to Brown the intention of elaborating on his original text. And, while there is development in Brown's thought between 1805 and 1818, it is not the sort of development that requires him to backtrack. In fact, Brown's 1818 arguments support his 1805 analysis by producing an accompanying philosophy of mind, the latter being based on ideas developed for his lectures at the University of Edinburgh. 4 86 Brown's 1818 views on causality continue to develop as a response to Scottish philosophy, and especially in response to Reid. Brown objects to Reid's philosophy on the grounds that he multiplies both entities and mental operations. Reid introduces ideas of primary qualities, for example, to assist in the explanation of knowledge of the external world; Brown, however, raises a general objection to the theory of ideas and its account of perception. In explaining knowledge of the external world, Brown notices, the theory of ideas construes perception of external things in terms of the reference between sensations and external causes. But any perception that is extra-sensory, such as the perception of primary qualities, must somehow be tied to sensory perceptions of secondary qualities. Thus, primary qualities must really be perceived as a form of sensation, a sensation that differs in kind from sensations of secondary qualities, but that is nonetheless a kind of sensation. As such, belief in an external world, Brown argues, is not based on the direct perception of ideas of primary qualities, as claimed by defenders of the theory of ideas, but rather, on sensation. In view of this, he argues, belief in an external world must be on the order of an immediate and irresistible belief arising from sensation. Brown's develops this latter suggestion, first introduced in 1805, with reference to his work on physiology and philosophy of mind. Beliefs in external causes, he proposes, arise in connection with feelings of resistance associated with muscular contractions. When feelings of resistance intrude on familiar muscular sensations, they make us aware of external objects. On Brown's reckoning, these feelings of resistance, rather than ideas of primary qualities, lead to belief in independent, external causes. For, it is by association with feelings of resistance that there arise in us certain feelings of extension, and in consequence, the irresistible belief that some of our sensations have an external reference. Contra Reid and the theory of ideas then, the foundation for our belief in external existence is in sensible effects that directly compel us to form certain beliefs. ccclxviii With Brown's physiological emphasis in mind, we are now in a position to see how the 1818 Inquiry builds on his earlier work on causality. The 1818 book is divided into four parts, each of which places emphasis on the physiological and phenomenal basis for belief in causality. ccclxix The first part of the book begins by considering a standard definition of causality, based on observations of invariable antecedence and consequence, as stated above. Brown shows how observations of antecedence and consequence can always be linked to physical and mental events. In the second part, he argues that many philosophical beliefs about the causal relation are based on delusion. The language that we use to describe cause and effect, he argues, following Hume, Reid, Stewart and others, is metaphorical, and as such, easily leads to error. Hence, we talk of causal 'powers', although this is just another name for an effect that is perceived as an antecedent circumstance. Next Brown explains what he takes to be the real circumstances in which belief in the causal relation arises. In this part of his analysis, he virtually repeats the appeal to intuitive and immediate belief first proposed in 1805. And, it is primarily this view, rather than his philosophy of mind, that the critics continue to light upon after the 1818 publication. Brown's analysis, it will be recalled, is based on the claim that belief in antecedence and consequence can arise only in connection with experience. That is, there is no sense in which belief in causality arises as a result of reasoning or as a consequence derived from an a priori axiom of sufficient reason or any other axiom concerning physical forces. In the final section of the book, Brown argues that the customary connection noticed by Hume is what enables us to separate causal events from irrelevant circumstances. However, contra Hume, Brown argues, it is not the transition from one idea to the next that produces the belief in causal connection. Here again we see evidence of Brown's earlier doctrine. In sum, Brown's 1818 work supplements the 1805 analysis, offering an explanation of the mental operations that give rise to belief in cause and effect. This explanation is ultimately grounded in the different feelings that arise in conscious experience. Since some of the feelings that arise in us lead irresistibly and 4 87 intuitively to the belief that there is an external world of causes producing effects in us, we are compelled to form beliefs about external causes. ccclxx Thus, the 1818 treatise represents an embellishment of his 1805 theory, and appeals to his more recent work in the philosophy of mind in support of his earlier view. The reception of Brown's 1818 Inquiry was mixed, and several important figures gave negative reviews. Victor Cousin remarked in his Remains de M. de Biran that Brown's theory is 'a fantastical one, and destructive of all true metaphysics'. John Herschel's comment in his Cabinet Cyclopedia article on Astronomy is even more explicit. As Herschel writes, 'the whole train of argument is vitiated by one enormous oversight; the omission, namely, of a distinct and immediate personal consciousness of causation, in his enumeration of that sequence of events, by which the volition of the mind is made to terminate in the motion of material objects.' ccclxxi And, Richard Blakey, a great admirer of Mary Shepherd's work, echoes her own view when he identified the source of the problem in Brown's 'peculiar ideas' on cause and effect and their atheistic consequences. Specifically, the problem is that for Brown, The cause of a thing is only the immediate invariable antecedent in any sequence, while the immediate invariable consequent is the correlative effect. It is somewhat surprising that a doctrine of this kind should have met with so much encouragement in the northern part of the kingdom; fraught, as it evidently is, with the most absurd and dangerous consequences. ccclxxii Brown's 1818 Inquiry may not have received universal acclaimed in its day, but it did garner respect in some circles, and it bears on our understanding of Shepherd's response to Hume. Its publication was a reminder that the fall-out from Hume's challenge to the doctrine of causality was far from over. On the one hand, there were the outstanding conceptual issues concerning causal knowledge. On the other hand, there were related social and religious questions concerning the causes of civil unrest and the proper bounds of civil liberty. Mme de Staël's posthumously published work of 1818, entitled Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française, had the working title in 1816 of Des Causes et des Effets de la Révolution Française, the sort of title, which suggests just such a connection of ideas. ccclxxiii Indeed, the themes of abstract analysis of causality and social unrest were very often combined, sometimes in all seriousness, and sometimes not. Mme de Staël's working title is likely tonguein-cheek, and so too is Richard Whately's 1819 contribution entitled Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Buonaparte. The latter work is a humorous contribution that identifies the fallacies underlying debates on Hume and causality. Highly entertaining and topical, the book also poses a philosophical challenge to Hume's supporters. An enormously popular work, it drew on the 'universal scepticism' engendered by Hume to undermine the sceptic's belief in the existence of Napoleon Buonaparte. ccclxxiv To begin, Whately's Historic Doubts points out that most of the evidence concerning Napoleon comes from newspaper reports. These reports are treated as pieces of evidence about Napoleon and his existence. Traded around from one newspaper to the next, they eventually take on the form of appeals to the masses. This evidential problem is complicated by the fact that we are not normally in a position to verify newspaper reports about Napoleon, and so we can't appeal to personal testimony as support for the newspaper claims. Moreover, those who claim to have visited Napoleon, Whately notes, could well be deceived about the testimony of their own senses. After all, how do they know that the person that they have seen is Napoleon? Another important consideration that raises doubt about Napoleon, is the fact that various media reports palpably contradict one another on important points. Finally, it is well to keep in mind, says Whately, that the defenders of liberty and publishers could easily have conspired to fabricate the stories about Napoleon in support of their cause. 4 88 Having thus cast doubt on the belief in Napoleon, Whately formulates his philosophical challenge, Let those who pretend to philosophical freedom of inquiry, who scorn to rest their opinions on popular belief, and to shelter themselves under the example of the unthinking multitude, consider carefully each one for himself, what is the evidence proposed to himself in particular, for the existence of such a person as Napoleon Buonaparte. ccclxxv Whately goes on to congratulate those who believe without good reason on their 'easy faith', and to question how those who affirm the existence of Napoleon, when the evidence is blatantly contradictory, can nonetheless profess disbelief in miracles. In his pièce de résistance, he includes a mock Biblical extract starring Napoleon as God. And when Napoleon saw that the kingdom was departed from him, he said unto the rulers which came against him, Let me, I pray you, give the kingdom unto my son: but they would not hearken unto him. Then he spake yet again, saying, Let me, I pray you, go and live in the island of Elba, which is over against Italy, nigh unto the coast of France; and ye shall give me an allowance for me and my household, and the lands of Elba also for my possession. So they made him ruler of Elba. ccclxxvi After much amusement, Whately gets to his main point. He says, 'I do not pretend to decide positively that there is not, nor ever was, any such person; but merely to propose it as a doubtful point...'. ccclxxvii In fact, his goal is to shift the burden of the doubt onto the sceptic, and to challenge the sceptic to justify his own beliefs based on causal inference. I call upon those therefore who profess themselves advocates of free inquiry -who disdain to be carried along with the stream of popular opinion, -and who will listen to no testimony that runs counter to experience, -to follow up their own principles fairly and consistently. Let the same mode of argument be adopted in all cases alike; and then it can no longer be attributed to hostile prejudice, but to enlarged and philosophical views. ccclxxviii Hume, of course, admitted that he had no philosophical justification for his own credulity. But in Whately's closing argument, he charges that sceptics who continue to believe in such mundane things as the existence of Napoleon should either admit inconsistency or give up scepticism. 'If after all that has been said, they cannot bring themselves to doubt of the existence of Napoleon Buonaparte, they must at least acknowledge that they do not apply to that question, the same plan of reasoning which they have made use of in others; and they are consequently bound in reason and in honesty to renounce it altogether.' ccclxxix The approaches of Brown and Whately are significant to understanding the contribution of Mary Shepherd. For not only does Mary Shepherd reject Brown's appeal to intuition, which she thinks of as leaving the door wide open to sceptical doubt; she also objects to the purely deductive approach in Whately, which see sees as having limited application in empirical investigations. 3.3 The Trials of Carlile and Leslie There is still more to the story leading up to the publication of Mary Shepherd's 1824 treatise. For, in the years directly preceding the 1824 publication, Lady Mary Shepherd's life was once again filled with the same controversy, persecution, and party politics that had prompted the Leslie affair in 1805. This time, however, circumstances conspired to place her near relations at 4 89 the center of what must have been a very unpleasant business, the prosecution of Richard Carlile in 1819 for the publication of Paine's Age of Reason. We begin, then, the next part of our account with circumstances surrounding the trial and prosecution of Richard Carlile in London. However, our story leads us back to the Edinburgh of 1820, and to another Summons, the summons of William Blackwood to court for publishing slanders against John Leslie. It turns out that the two Carlile and Leslie trials bear circumstantial and social connections, and that the antagonisms that they aroused re-opened the old wounds dating back to the days of the original Leslie controversy. In 1819, Mary Shepherd's father-in-law, Sir Samuel Shepherd, was King's Advocate, or Attorney General, under the Regent, Prince George. The mood in England was quite revolutionary, much more so, in fact, than in the early days of the French Revolution. The Industrial Revolution had led to widespread job loss in Britain, and the combination of land enclosure, expensive wars, poor agricultural yields, and taxes meant that the people of Britain were literally starving. To make matters worse, sinecures and offices connected with colonization were reserved for the rich, who began to achieve unprecedented levels of wealth. The so-called 'Luddites' took up the cause against industrialization, organizing an underground militia to lead mobs in looting and burning the homes and factories of the wealthy. Although the general level of discontent grew frightening, the majority of aristocrats persisted in voting down proposals for much needed reforms. Unwilling to yield concessions to the people, the terrified aristocracy sought comfort in escape, debauchery, and commiseration. At about this time, we find Lord Grey writing to Lord Holland that 'We shall see, if we live, a Jacobin Revolution more bloody than that of France.' ccclxxx After decades of failed attempts at reform, the French Revolution had suggested a solution to the English, and by 1819, revolutionary aspirations appeared daily more threatening: This was a year of great commercial distress, of riots, demonstrations, and uprisings ever increasing; with unflinching resistance on the part of the Government. In January, Henry Hunt presides over a great Reform meeting in Manchester. In July, Birmingham elects Sir Charles Wolsley as its representative. He is very soon arrested, and becomes long a popular hero. In August, took place the Manchester demonstration that led to the Peterloo affair, for which Hunt and many others were apprehended. In December, Parliament passed the famous Six Acts of Castlereagh, against sedition and libels. ccclxxxi As the aristocracy grew hysterical with fear of widespread social unrest, many of those who had earlier avowed support for the French grew silent or adopted the conservative rhetoric. The monarchy had turned its back on liberalism in all its forms, and adopted a conservative stance. In an effort to prevent incendiary material from reaching the public eye, strict publication laws were introduced and enforced. Many journals responded by becoming increasingly conservative or equivocal, out of fear of being charged with treasonable offenses. The matter of publication bans became controversial, and when Richard Carlile defiantly published Paine's Age of Reason, Prince George insisted on a public shaming for this insubordination, including eventually, imprisonment for both Carlile and his wife. The man who would do the honors in this prosecution was Sir Samuel Shepherd himself. Whether Sir Samuel Shepherd enjoyed the task of prosecuting on behalf of the King is doubtful. Among the Shepherd family's personal friends were included publishers, the full spectrum of Whigs, a few Tories, and a select group of Westminister radicals. Given this variety of social ties, navigating between social and official lives would have been enough of a challenge; but as crown prosecutor, Sir Samuel Shepherd was also in peril for his own life. Once, after having obtained some convictions for treason, Sir Samuel was waylaid by an angry mob at the door of Westminster Hall. When urged to follow a discreet route home, Sir Samuel objected with 4 90 bravado. In the end, he was forced to flee in security. ccclxxxii His home residence was also targeted. Forewarned of the attack, Sir Samuel's wife had prepared a 'great quantity of good cold tea, well sweetened with brown sugar' and collected 'as much provision of plain substantial food as possible' including 'meat, bread, butter, cheese, milk' into the house. Having eaten the food, 'the mob trooped out at the front, several expressing their opinion that \"Shepherd is a very good fellow after all.\"' ccclxxxiii Such events, and particularly the Carlile prosecution, must have been stressful. Sir Samuel was severely criticized for his role in the trial, and especially for the fact that the counts filed against Carlile were manufactured by the 'Society for the Suppression of Vice'. As Richard Carlile complained, 'the prosecuting parties' designed to 'give the information an air of importance' by 'acting in concert'. ccclxxxiv The counts themselves related specifically to the text of Paine's Age of Reason, which Carlile was held responsible for publishing and distributing. The counts were repetitive, and all related to the Old Testament. ccclxxxv For Paine had claimed that the Old Testament was full of 'obscene stories', 'voluptuous debaucheries', 'cruel and torturous executions' and 'unrelenting vindictiveness'. The book, according to Paine, 'is a history of wickedness that has served to corrupt and brutalize mankind'. ccclxxxvi It contains 'lies, wickedness and blasphemy' and so 'many absurdities and contradictions' that it is 'impossible to find in any story upon record, so many and such glaring absurdities, contradictions, and falsehoods'. ccclxxxvii Paine ridicules the story of the Virgin Mary, saying that this 'debauchery by a ghost' under 'impious pretence' is 'blasphemously obscene'. ccclxxxviii He also questions why all of humanity has not perceived the truth of Christianity, charges that Priests seek to stifle inquiry, says that the Bible is a romance devoid of historical truth, and so on. ccclxxxix Sir Samuel Shepherd's name arose often in connection with the trial. To many, even those who supported free press, Paine's religious blasphemy had crossed the line from sincere inquiry to uncompromising infidelity. The following remark, made by J. Mills during speeches delivered at the Crown and Anchor Tavern's British Forum, 'Ought R.C. to be Censured?', implies that Sir Samuel's role in the trial was hypocritical: Some will naturally be more sceptical than others, according to their means of forming a sound judgment; but of all men living, I should think an English Attorney-General the least likely to have very orthodox notions upon the subject of religion, if these notions are to be attained by translations of the Bible or attendance at church. cccxc Despite the shock value of what Paine had written, many supported his right to raise questions. As one author wrote, Paine's charges can be taken 'as a challenge that can be answered by Reason', that affords 'an opportunity to sharpen our arguments'. cccxci In fact, one of Sir Samuel Shepherd's closest friends, Thomas Erskine, fellow advocate and courtier, was famous for his advanced liberalism in successfully defending Paine himself from charges in connection with his Rights of Man in the 1790's. Erskine was one of the many liberals sympathetic to the French Revolution in its early days. So, it is curious to notice that while Sir Samuel Shepherd was famous for having prosecuted Carlile for publishing Paine in 1819, that in 1792, Thomas Erskine became famous for his defense of Paine. In 1792, Thomas Erskine provides a sympathetic portrayal of the helplessness of the average citizen in the face of an absolute authoritarian. As Conway reports in his Life of Paine, Erskine's speech in defense of Paine told the story, taken from Lucian, of Jupiter and the countryman: 'The countryman listened with attention and acquiescence, while Jupiter strove only to convince him; but happening to hint with his thunder. 'Ah, ha!' says the countryman, 'now, Jupiter, I know that you are wrong; you are always wrong when you appeal to your thunder.' 'This', concluded Erskine, 'is the case with me. I can reason with the people of England, but I cannot fight against the thunder of authority.'' cccxcii But by 1819, 4 91 the British aristocracy lived in a very real fear of Luddites and of revolution. Sympathy for the people had long ago been tempered by the alarm of social unrest, and the bravado of 1792 would have been unpalatable to the members of Parliament and the Prince Regent alike. And so, the official line of Samuel Shepherd in 1819 is quite the opposite of Erskine's, and aims to inspire fear of social activism and its consequences -and to suggest in particular that a treasonous and irreligious tenor would not be tolerated. By 1819 then, the unofficial policy seems to have been one of political quietism. Liberal ideals were to be kept in their place and a conservative political agenda prevailed. One commentator bitterly remarks that Carlile goes to court 'with the whole weight of Government against him', and that the trial will merely 'put money into the pockets of the Attorney and Solicitor-General'. cccxciii In an open letter to Sir Samuel Shepherd, it is pointed out that with three prosecutors against him, little by way of counsel, and a judge interrupting all train of thought, Carlile would not stand a chance. cccxciv And so went the pamphlets, letters, and indictments. Friends of Sir Samuel who had landed themselves in similar positions of authority wrote sympathetic and reassuring letters, saying that he had, after all, simply done his duty. And this was how Sir Samuel himself saw the matter. His own words were, 'I am not going to be afraid of an angry mob when I have done my duty'. cccxcv Whatever his personal views on the propriety of the prosecution, whatever thoughts and words may have passed between friends on the subject in private, as Attorney General, Sir Samuel would have felt that he had no alternative but to prosecute on behalf of the Prince Regent. Yet, in the midst of the year's events, in June 1819, Sir Samuel gave up his position as Attorney General. He declined offers of Chief Justice, Home Secretary, and also refused to act as the Prince Regent's attorney in the divorce of Queen Caroline. The Prince Regent gently mocked Sir Samuel's sensitivities, saying, 'Shepherd, Shepherd, you are the honestest man in England, and the worst courtier in the world.' cccxcvi Given the controversies of the day, it was probably with considerable relief that Sir Samuel left London for Edinburgh, and took up the role of Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer for Scotland. cccxcvii However, Sir Samuel's worries may not have ended with his removal to Edinburgh. For there ensued shortly thereafter a series of vicious and slanderous attacks on John Leslie, attacks that amounted to an ongoing persecution of Leslie by the press, and that led to the trial against William Blackwood. The attacks against Leslie were initiated in the November 1819 issue of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, No. XXXII. There, Leslie was accused of a slur against the Hebrew language. The slur was located in a note about numeration in ancient Hebrew, a note to the text of Leslie's 1817 Philosophy of Arithmetic. In the note, Leslie says that Hebrew is 'the rudest and poorest of all written languages' because in representing the higher numbers, ancient Hebrew 'has recourse to the clumsy expedient of addition'. cccxcviii The remark went unnoticed until 1819, when Leslie moved from his Chair in Mathematics to the Chair in Natural Philosophy. Given the theistic overtones of the 1805-6 scandal, it is no coincidence that the Blackwood's attack claimed Leslie had made a slur against 'the language of the Old Testament; -the language, as a philosopher like Hume, or a partizan of Mr Hume's, would say, dedicated to superstition...'. cccxcix Nor can it be coincidence that the charge involved a note to a scientific text, or that Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine No. XXXV included a note about Leslie's erroneous use of the word 'cause'. cd These aspects of the new episode, in addition to explicit connections made during the trial by the defense council for Blackwood, clearly establish that the later attacks represented an ongoing persecution of Leslie: A man who would go out of his path, on an inquiry on the nature of heat, to recommend an impious work; and, in a Treatise on Arithmetic, to cast an ignorant sarcasm on the language of the Bible, or to sneer at the fancies of one of the Apostles, must ever be an object of 4 92 suspicion to those who hold the Scriptures in honour... We have no assurance that he may not digress as culpably hereafter, and if he does so, it is only fair to give him warning that I shall take care to point it out. cdi It was at first rumored that John Gibson Lockhart, a conservative Christian who was son-in-law to Walter Scott, had penned the original attacks on Leslie for Blackwood's. cdii Lockhart, however, denied the authorship, and the matter was dropped during the trial. By then, the author of the attacks was widely believed to have been John Wilson, then the candidate in place to succeed Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown in the Chair of Moral Philosophy. For the attacks on Leslie had been penned in a pretended letter to 'Christopher North', which was John Wilson's pseudonym. cdiii John Murray, the London-based publisher and family friend of the Shepherd's, was also indirectly connected with the trial's events. Murray had originally been Blackwood's partner and London publisher for the magazine. When, in December 1819, it was reported that, Mr Murray and Mr Stewart were not on good terms, the reason is likely the connection between Murray, Blackwood and Wilson. 'Mr Stewart is now resolved upon leaving him [Mr Murray] about Christmas...Mr. S. is decidedly of opinion that the person you heard of as most likely to succeed [John Wilson], is by no means equal to the situation, and Mr S. intends to tell Mr. Murray as much. Mr. M. and Mr. S. are not so cordial as they were a few weeks ago, but this is no matter of surprise. I have still some hopes from that quarter, but I confess that they are not very sanguine.' cdiv Indeed, much to the chagrin of Stewart and others, John Wilson did in fact succeeded to the Chair in Moral Philosophy in 1820. Macvey Napier expressed his distaste for Wilson, saying in a letter to James Mill dated 11 May 1820, that 'it makes one sick to think of him.' Napier then justifies this dislike, explaining that Wilson is likely to persecute those with unorthodox views: Instead of delightful exhortations to mental enterprise, and to press forward unceasingly to new attainments, to which I listened with rapture from the lips of Mr Stewart, the unfortunate youth will hear from the man in question nothing but exhortations to the implicit adoption of opinions already received, and to hate and persecute every man who shows a disposition to go beyond them. cdv During the trial, Leslie's supporters quickly rallied behind him. But new and old wounds were opened for all those involved in the earlier Leslie controversy. Leslie, with his 'dangerous philosophy' had just moved to the Chair of Natural Philosophy. John Wilson, conservative Christian and probable author of the attacks on Leslie, had just succeeded to the Chair of Moral Philosophy, winning despite competition from at least one real genius, namely, Charles Babbage, who was very likely Dugald Stewart's preferred candidate. As the local antics make evident, the absurdity of the situation, particularly in view of the history associated with Edinburgh's university appointments, led to mockery. One newspaper advertisement states that on 16 December 1820, 'under the patronage of Queen Caroline', is to be hosted, the 'Grand Exhibition of the New Heathen Mythology'. Stars included, among others, James Moncrieff, Francis Jeffrey, John Murray, Henry Cockburn and John Leslie, who is singled out for the role of the female goddess Venus! cdvi The advertisement ends with the exclamation 'Vivat Regina!' -surely a sardonic reference to Queen Caroline's ongoing public trial for adultery, an indignity that she had to endure, but that was met with considerable sympathy on the part of her many supporters. cdvii One cannot help but notice that the main text at issue in the Leslie trial concerned mathematics, and that Leslie's note concerned the language of the Old Testament. There is a resonance here with the Carlile prosecution for 'scandalous, impious, and blasphemous libel, of and concerning 4 93 that part of the Holy Bible which is called the Old Testament.' cdviii There is also a resonance with Kerr's 1807 rhetorical question, 'Is there no law in this kingdom for punishing a man for publishing a libel against the Almighty himself, and for endeavouring to seduce all the rest of mankind to join with him, for the purpose of overturning his government?' cdix To an extent, the appearance of convergence may simply be a sign of the times. Even so, one is hard pressed not to speculate on how the connections between the two trials would have appeared to Mary Shepherd and others involved in the Leslie affair. For the charges against Carlile and the attacks on Leslie both centered on the Old Testament, and Carlile's prosecutor, Sir Samuel Shepherd, had just taken up the position in Edinburgh when the renewed attacks on Leslie were initiated. Perhaps those responsible for Leslie's renewed persecution had Carlile's trial in mind as they schemed and gossiped against him. Indeed, how would the conservative rhetoric now supported by mainstream liberal and secular lawyers appear to those religious conservatives who, in 1805, had been publicly derided by the moderates of Edinburgh? Sir Samuel had justified the prosecutions on behalf of the King as the performance of duty. Might not the conservative ministers involved in the original Leslie affair have seen themselves as doing their duty? The recent prosecution of Carlile for his libelous blasphemy against the Old Testament must have appeared like the hypocrisy of political turncoats. It is true that the unrest of the times had forced many liberal minded individuals into silence or apparent conservatism. For by 1819, even literary journals such as the Edinburgh Review were playing it safe, supporting both Whig and Tory viewpoints, much to the irritation of the radical reformers, such as James and John Stuart Mill. cdx Fears of social unrest no longer seemed unfounded, and so political conservatism, or at least the appearance, seemed obligatory. The opportunity for the traditionally conservative to play up this apparent hypocrisy may well have been irresistible, and Leslie, apparently a magnet for trouble, was once again at the center of crossfire. Leslie's libel charge against William Blackwood dealt with four general classes of attack, all of which related to the destruction of Leslie's character and reputation. The first charge concerned the general impeachment of Leslie's reputation as a philosopher and scientist. It reads: 'He is accused of ignorance and presumption, and even where his superiority as a man of science has been universally acknowledged, he has been treated as a plagiarist, as of secondary talents, and as deserving of contempt.' cdxi The second charge related to the claim that Leslie had dishonestly colluded with others to impose upon the public in publishing an essentially unchanged version of his 1817 Philosophy of Arithmetic as a new edition with a new publisher in 1820. The third charge was that Leslie's person had been maliciously ridiculed in order to lower his position in society and ultimately, to jeopardize his station. cdxii Finally, the last charge, which was perhaps the most significant of all, was that the attacks had injured Leslie's respectability as a public teacher and had depicted him as an enemy to religion and corrupter of the young men studying at the University of Edinburgh. cdxiii With the overwhelming support of the legal and publishing community, and excellent arguments on his behalf, Leslie was handily vindicated in the legal trial. His council was comprised of the formidable team of Henry Cockburn, Francis Jeffrey, and James Moncreiff, and through them, liberal and moderate ideals won a partial victory in a very conservative political climate. The judges summing up the case found the first three charges in Leslie's favour. It is significant, however, that the fourth charge, the one relating to Leslie's corruption of the youth, was found in favour of William Blackwood. For, the fourth charge was tied to the requirement that Scotland's professors swear to the Westminster Confession of Faith. The argument that formed the basis for the judgement was premised on the claim that, as a university professor, Leslie held a public office, and that this entitled Blackwood's to launch a public attack of his habit of instilling principles contrary to Presbyterianism: 4 94 The liberty of the press in this country is well known to you. We are at full liberty to discuss the public conduct of public men, and to attack or defend the measures of government, and to maintain the rights of the people through the medium of the press ... In like manner, if an instructor of youth in his discourses to his pupils, should instill into their minds principles contrary to the established faith, whether as a professor in a university, or as a private teacher; or, if the ministers of the Gospel in the pulpit (and the people of this free protestant country do not go to private houses to be instructed by their priests, but to church) should do the same thing, and we should find fault with them for doing so, through the medium of the press -we do nothing but attack them in their public characters, and we are entitled to do so. cdxiv This argument was apparently considered good enough for a ruling in favour of Blackwood. Thus, the trial left as outstanding issues, the matters of the Westminster Confession of Faith and freedom of conscience. In particular, it left open the question of whether religious oaths ought to be required of academics. There can be little question that the renewal of Leslie's persecution would have brought back memories of the Edinburgh of old for Mary Shepherd. It is also likely that her reaction to the Leslie trial would have been further complicated by the recent events concerning Carlile and free press that had touched her immediate family. To make matters worse, the people of England did not soon forget the plight of Richard Carlile. The Benthamites, for example, are widely believed to have assisted Carlile throughout his long imprisonment. In 1823, John Stuart Mill anonymously contributed five letters concerning Carlile and 'the question of free publication of all opinions on religion' to local newspapers such as the Morning Chronicle and the Traveller. He also wrote letters and book notices on topics ranging from 'nonsense talked in Parliament', to 'defects of the law', and 'misdoings of the magistry or the courts of justice'. cdxv Over the next decade, the Chronicle increasingly came to voice the concerns of the utilitarian radicals, and much of their criticism was leveled at the legal system: The defects of the law, and of the administration of justice, were the subject on which that paper rendered most service to the improvement. Up to that time hardly a word had been said, except by Bentham and my father, against that most peccant part of English institutions and of their administration. It was the almost universal creed of Englishmen, that the law of England, the judicature of England, the unpaid magistry of England, were models of excellence. cdxvi Thus, Richard Carlile's trial had long and lingering effects. So too did the Leslie trial. One of the central points of contention in both cases was the propriety of personal attacks. In fact, the divisions on the matter of personal attacks crossed political boundaries, and, in some cases, longstanding friendships were eventually strained or dissolved. At the invitation of Macvey Napier, for example, the young Whig, Thomas B. Macaulay, submitted an unfavorable review of the utilitarian radical James Mill's 1820 Essays on Government. Macaulay's critique appeared in an 1829 issue of the Edinburgh Review. The basis for the critique was conceptual, although the motivation was partly political. Philosophically, Mill had argued that a deduction from the fixed principles governing human nature could provide the basis for a science of government, and hence a basis for understanding social and political order. Macaulay raises a fundamental objection to Mill's proposal of a deductive 'Science of Politics' in which psychological characteristics are linked to good or bad government. Macaulay charges, 'that it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human nature' cdxvii 'How, then', he asks, 'are we to arrive at just conclusions on a subject so 4 95 important to the happiness of mankind'? cdxviii The answer, Macaulay proposes, is by the method of experimentalism, that is, the method of induction: Surely by that method, which, in every experimental science to which it has been applied, has signally increased our power and knowledge of our species ... by the method of induction; by observing the present state of the world by assiduously studying the history of past ages, by sifting the evidence of the facts, -by carefully combining and contrasting those which are authentic, by generalizing with judgment and diffidence, by perpetually bringing the theory which we have constructed to the test of new facts, by correcting, or altogether abandoning it, according as those new facts prove it to be partially or fundamentally unsound, Proceeding thus pateintly, diligently , -candidly... cdxix The implications of Macaulay's critique were more than conceptual. For the Whig and radical responses to the political uncertainty of the times, and, in particular, to the propriety of personal attacks, differed. Indeed, the divergence underlying their approaches to reform had by the late 1820s grown pronounced, and had become a source of dissent. James Mill, formerly a contributor and friend to the Edinburgh Review, had since taken an uncompromising stance on political reform, and so became a target for the increasingly neutral and equivocal literary organ. The Macaulay article, in fact, marks the widening of a rift among defenders of political liberty who, at the turn of the century, had been conciliatory and compromising. John Stuart Mill would eventually take the conceptual basis for Macaulay's criticisms very seriously. Although the younger Mill would continue to accept his father's assumption that a 'political science' was feasible, he eventually abandoned the apriorism implicit in James Mill's political science in favor of a method based on empiricist generalization. All the while, John Stuart would remain a staunch defender of his father's political radicalism. In forming a younger generation of radicals, he proposed a philosophical radicalism founded on knowledge of social causes and effects, where such knowledge is based in empirical generalization. Thus, a 'philosophical radical' was someone, 'who when they are discussing means begin by considering the end, and when they desire to produce effects, think of causes'. As such, the philosophical radical traces political problems back to original causes -the aristocracy, the system of parliamentary representation, and so on. cdxx Indeed, John Stuart Mill accepted the view that human character was a product of circumstances, and based much of his inquiry on the assumption that social factors influenced the development of both individuals and nations. He dubbed his own political science 'Ethology', its fundamental assumption being that it is possible to identify from among the myriad factors, specific causes that influence the formation of individual and national character. Whether political 'science' was to be attained through deduction from the principles of human nature, as James Mill supposed, or by heterogeneous mixture of speculative and empirical thought, as Kerr would put it, or by empirical generalization, as John Stuart Mill argued, it was grounded on a single assumption. Namely, the assumption that there were identifiable causal relations holding between individuals and the social order that can be discovered through scientific investigation of the causes. Presumably, it is this same basic assumption about causal factors underlying individual and national character that is implicit in Kerr's attacks on Leslie, Malthus, and the common law. However different the two Mills and Kerr might otherwise seem, the general and underlying assumption that individual and national character can be shaped given correct manipulation of the relevant causes is implicit in all three thinkers. It is perhaps this set of assumptions that explains the occasional remark, that the radicals were the 'best friends' of the monarchy. cdxxi For their view actually supplies a justification for limiting free speech, since it presumes that there are identifiable and discoverable harms to society. cdxxii Taken together, the national social unrest, the assumptions implicit in Ethology, and the outstanding 4 96 philosophical questions about the causal relation, help to explain the return to foundational issues surrounding the logic of induction. In particular, the set of assumptions relating to causality and the social order gave rise to new questions, and sometimes to derision, in the philosophical debate surrounding causal necessity. The complexity of social ties and of the political times makes it very difficult to say just where Mary Shepherd stood in connection with the Carlile and Leslie trials. It is simply not an easy matter to decide who supported whom from a distance. It is clear that she knew Leslie, for in a letter written to Charles Babbage in 1832, Lady Mary mentions a discussion with Leslie over a dispute about the latitude and longitude of the magnetic poles. cdxxiii She ends the letter with a teasing suggestion of irony: 'pray what is the true faith?'. Given the context of the aside, it seems very likely a reference to Leslie and his religious persecution. Perhaps, Mary Shepherd shared the feelings of Macvey Napier, who said that Leslie's remarks may have been worrisome to the pious, but that the proceedings against him were unfair. cdxxiv One thing that is certain is that many of Leslie's supporters were friends of Mary Shepherd. Moreover, we know that Mary Shepherd's social circle included Whigs of every stripe, philosophical radicals, and atheists; so, her social set was decidedly open-minded. cdxxv At the same time, Blakey describes Shepherd in a way that leaves the question of her religious convictions unambiguous. As Blakey notes in his A History of the Philosophy of Mind, the view of causation espoused by Hume and Brown 'appeared to Lady Mary Shepherd to lead by an inevitable consequence to downright Atheism': cdxxvi When she undertook a public refutation of these erroneous notions of cause and effect, it must be remembered it was at a time when they were most rampant, and widely spread over the northern parts of Britain in particular. Every young man who came from the Universities of Scotland, attempted to show off his subtlety and academic lore, by denying there was any real causation in the world; all was mere imagination, and a piece of gross vulgar credulity. cdxxvii Given the evidence, it is fair to draw the conclusion that Mary Shepherd's personal convictions may well have been narrower than those of many in her social circle. She was certainly of a religious persuasion. But it is hard to believe that she herself could have adopted the same irrational fears and persecuting stance as some of the more orthodox and conservative thinkers. Otherwise it is almost impossible to imagine her socializing with the individuals who frequented her salon. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, a truly narrow-minded person allowing her daughter to discuss Divine love with Charles Babbage, whose response to her daughter's proclamation of faith was that, 'I would give ten thousand worlds, if I had them, to believe what you do!' cdxxviii It seems more likely that Mary Shepherd, like many in her social set, was a strong defender of liberty and freedom of conscience, and an opponent of both persecution and party politics. Like many of her associates, she would probably have adopted a cautious approach to politics and the press in view of the growing social unrest in Britain in 1819. All of this is consistent with her having had strong religious convictions. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine that Mary Shepherd has some very specific religious views, but that she was also open to all forms of legitimate dialogue and reasoned argument. One plausible interpretation of Mary Shepherd's attitude toward free press and free inquiry is that she so firmly believed that rational discourse would lead to proof of theism, so that she did not fear placing her faith in reason. In this regard, Mary Shepherd's youthful interest in Milton may be illuminating. In his 1644 Areopagitica, Milton, notes that freedom of the press is a matter of religious and civil concern; for books are not 'absolutely dead things', but active and potent 'as the soule was whose progeny they are'. Having acknowledged this, Milton appeals to God, 4 97 reason, and humanity, in a moving defense of freedom of the press: And yet on the other hand unlesse warinesse be us'd, as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book; who kills a Man kills a reasonable creature, Gods Image; but hee who destroys a good Booke, kills reason it selfe, kills the Image of God, as it were in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the Earth; but a good Booke is the pretious life-blood of a master spirit, imbalm'd and treasur'd up on purpose to a life beyond life. 'Tis true, no age can restore a life, where of perhaps there is no great losse; and revolutions of ages doe not oft recover the losse of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole Nations fare the worse. We should be wary therefore what persecution we raise against the living labours of the publicke men, how we spill that season'd life of man preserv'd and stor'd up in Books; since we see a kinde of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martyrdome, and if it extends to the whole impression, a kind of massacre, where of the execution ends not in the slaying of an elementall life, but strikes at that ethereall and fift essence. cdxxix Milton's defense of freedom of the press is based on his faith in a harmony between truth and religious belief. 'For who knows not that Truth is strong next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, nor strategems, nor licencings to make her victorious, those are the shifts and the defences that error uses against her power: give her but room, & do not bind her when she sleeps'. cdxxx Thus, as an ultimate testimony to faith, truth must be allowed free reign; for, it is through reason that God will become better known to us. That such an attitude could also describe Mary Shepherd should not be surprising. Although she may well have had serious reservations about promoting religious infidelity or civil unrest, the ideal of free inquiry, when coupled with the optimistic conviction that science would, in the end, support revelation, would have been sufficient to dispel such fears. Thus, the quotes from Milton may well capture the inspiration behind Shepherd's philosophical work. One way or another, it is clear from Mary Shepherd's own texts that she intends to settle conceptual matters by appeal to reason, and not by persecution. 3.4 The Causal Relation Reconsidered Shepherd's views on causality are framed with reference to both Hume and his critics. She rejects, for instance, the analysis of causality in Brown's reply to Hume. The difficulties she sees in Brown's 1818 Inquiry are foundational; indeed, she rejects the appeal to intuition as a basis for an account of causality. With such a dubious foundation, a view such as Brown's presents an obstacle rather than an aid to theism. So too was the outdated scholastic approach rejected. Shepherd also has reservations about Whately's deductive method, although the limitations of Whateley's work differ from those associated with either the appeal to intuition or scholasticism. Whately's Elements garnered high acclaim as a 'standard' logic, and his eccentricity and wit had endeared him to many; however, as his biographer, Alexander Campbell Fraser, laments, Whately was unable to embrace the new inductive logic. cdxxxi It is true that in the first half of the nineteenth century, established logicians disagreed on the appropriate applications for deductive and inductive proofs, and that, as a paradigm for knowledge acquisition, inductive reasoning had its detractors. But those at the forefront of thinking on science and scientific method were convinced that inductive methods were of great significance. By the min-nineteenth century, induction was quickly gaining ground, under the influence of John Herschel, William Whewell, John Stuart Mill, William Hamilton, and others. Thus, though there was dispute concerning the context in which inductive methods were appropriate, all in all, it was a time of creative exchange of ideas on the subjects of induction and the scientific method, particularly among 4 98 Mary Shepherd and her friends. Unlike the eccentric Whately, Shepherd does not want to rely on an exclusively deductive approach in her analysis of causality. That said, the influence of Whately is quite evident. Shepherd frequently relies on a traditional form of metaphysical repartee in which fallacies, logical errors, and questionable assumptions are ferreted out of metaphysical treatises by deductive analysis. This deployment of deductive argument is apparent from the outset of the 1824 treatise, where she lists her five propositions to be demonstrated against Hume. cdxxxii Recall, the five propositions, modelled on Brown's: FIRST, That reason, not fancy and 'custom', leads us to the knowledge That everything which begins to exist must have a Cause. – SECONDLY, That reason forces the mind to perceive that similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects. – THIRDLY, I shall thence establish a more philosophical definition of the relation of Cause and Effect. – FOURTHLY, show, in what respects Mr. Hume's definition is faulty. – FIFTHLY, proceed to prove that Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course without a contradiction in terms; and, finally, show that Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our expectations in ordinary life. The discussion of these propositions forms the framework for Shepherd's critical response to Hume. In many instances, when she aims to simply establish weaknesses in Hume's arguments, she follows Whately's style of locating fallacies and controversial assumptions. This is evident in her critical commentary in discussing her first proposition, \"That reason, not fancy and 'custom', leads us to the knowledge 'That everything which begins to exist must have a Cause.'\" Against Hume, she claims that the causal axiom follows from the impossibility of conceive of causes and effects existing apart in nature without contradiction. cdxxxiii Taken as a bald assertion, that is, without an appreciation for Shepherd's positive doctrine of causality and its 'manner of action', her position is hard to fathom. For, as we shall see, Shepherd always has in view an alternative account of how causality is discovered as an objective and a priori feature in representation. But even without a full appreciation of her view, we can at least document her style of deductive analysis in critically evaluating Hume. She reasons, for instance, that when Hume denies the causal axiom, he asks us to imagine an effect 'non-existent this minute' and 'existing the next'. In saying as much, Hume 'has no other way of supporting his own notion of the beginning of existence by itself', she continues, except under the idea of 'an effect in suspense'. This supposition, she says, 'begs the question for the necessity of its correlative, i.e., its cause'. In this argument, and elsewhere, we see Whately's logic put to use in an attempt to undermine Hume. There are, of course, many examples of similar deductive arguments in Shepherd's work. In discussing her fourth proposition, for example, she disagrees with Hume, who defines 'causality' in terms of antecedence -the very mark that Leslie's etymology of the word 'cause' attributes to 'sophistication' in a language. Shepherd's view is that Hume's doctrine rests on a faulty analysis of causation in terms of temporal 'antecendency' and 'subsequency'. Hume is wrong, Shepherd reasons, to say that noticing the temporal order of sensible qualities is an essential characteristic in the formation of causal judgements. Contra Hume, she maintains that it is sensible qualities that give rise to ideas of invariable sequences, and that compound objects have ideas of causes and sensible qualities included within them in the very moment of formation. As such, the view that temporal succession is essential to the definition of causality is just a by-product of our abstract analysis of the causal relation in the representational object. cdxxxiv 4 99 Shepherd's full response to Hume is founded on an alternative account of how causal necessity is discovered and then justified as an objective and a priori feature in representation. Her argument for causal necessity recognises and responds to perceived limitations of a deductive paradigm; for, Shepherd's draws on an account of experimental reasoning involving both inductive and deductive methods. Shepherd is among those at the forefront of the new thinking on induction and she uses her method to directly engage the arguments against the two alternative accounts of causal necessity proposed by Hume. One of these accounts is that the idea of a necessary connection between causes and effects arises from a logical sense of causal connection. The other is that our idea of necessary connection between causes and effects arises from a non-logical sense of necessary connection. The first alternative Hume denies for the reason that effects cannot be deduced from causes prior to experience such that we can know that one kind of cause is invariably linked with one kind of effect. Hume also denied the plausibility of the second alternative, concluding instead that it is a subjective fiction of mind that leads humans to ascribe causal necessity to nature. Hume's argument against the second alternative amounts to the claim that when he inspects his mental experiences, he finds that neither perception nor acts of will contain an element of necessity. cdxxxv Shepherd rejects this dilemma, and argues that Hume relies on 'illogical' arguments and that his conclusions that are 'untrue'. Shepherd's response to Hume, of course, is that we do have knowledge of causality, and that it is grounded in a form of experimental reasoning. There are two parts to her argument against Hume, and each has two steps. The first part establishes as a 'universal axiom', on the order of a law of thought, that 'Like effects must necessarily have like causes'. The second part establishes that causal hypotheses also contain necessity. Both the universal axiom and causal hypotheses arguments are established through Shepherd's experimental reasoning, which involves a two-step method. The first step is inductive, and the second step is deductive. For the sake of clarity, I shall consistently refer to the two parts of Shepherd's universal axiom and causal hypotheses arguments against Hume as 'parts', and the two steps of her method as 'steps'. Like some of her contemporaries, Shepherd sees herself as invoking a methodology that combines induction and deduction in an experimentalism that both responds to Hume and that makes explicit the successes of empiricism nascent in the methodologies Bacon and Newton. Among those who would publish along similar lines, and whose work is helpful in illuminating the direction in which Shepherd's own thought was moving in 1824, are John Herschel and William Whewell, both of whom were part of the eminent group of scientists and intellectuals that former her social set. cdxxxvi Like Herschel and Whewell, Shepherd saw a need to supplement and elaborate on the Baconian method of induction. Herschel, for example, thought that the dominant Baconian model, with its appeal to agreement and difference, variations and residues, was an essentially correct, but incomplete picture of scientific method. This sense of building upon and revising a still revered Baconinan method is implicit in all three thinkers. Herschel is credited with having introduced two distinctions; namely, the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of justification'. The context of discovery, he said, does not always resemble the context of justification; a wild guess can turn out to be right, and it is no less valuable or credible than deduced hypotheses once it has been observationally confirmed. cdxxxvii Another important point that Herschel made is that the context of discovery of laws of nature can be either inductive or deductive. An example of the former is Boyle's law, in which the correlation of properties is noticed through the assessment of a large sample of data. In the latter instance, laws may be discovered through the formulation of hypotheses. In such cases, laws are formulated in a kind of problem solving activity whereby the phenomena is 'saved' by the introduction of a hypothesis; however, the hypothesis must then be subject to independent testing. Finally, Herschel also pointed out the importance of observation to the confirmation of 4 100 laws and theories. Recognising the importance of the 'severe test' in the context of justification, Herschel realised that if a law can be shown to apply in extreme cases, which are nonetheless genuine tests, then there is a strong indication of confirmation. He also noted that instances of discovering that a law has a wider application than was initially thought turn out to provide additional confirmation. Thus, Hershel adopts a Baconian picture, but complicates it, adding emphasis on the role of creative imagination in discovery and the importance of severe tests in theory confirmation. Hershel's principal modification to Baconian induction is his distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification. This distinction is also in Shepherd; though not fully articulated; is constantly invoked in her arguments. Both thinkers evidently see a greater need to distinguish the underlying logic of the contexts of discovery and justification than did earlier thinkers such as Bacon. We will next take a closer look at Shepherd's two-step method and its application in the two parts of her argument against Hume. We begin with the first part of Shepherd's argument against Hume, the part that establishes the universal axiom that 'Like effects must necessarily have like causes'. In establishing this axiom, Shepherd appeals to an experimentalism in which inductive reasoning forms the basis for the 'context of discovery', and deductive reasoning forms the basis for the 'context of justification'. For Shepherd, emphasis is placed on the discovery of causal necessity through introspective analysis of mental operations. As we shall see, justification for the causal axiom builds on this discovery, and follows when we apply a second deductive step. Thus, in justification, we build on the discovery of causal necessity, and proceed to a deductive argument in which it is impossible to deny the causal axiom. As such, in the context of justification, Shepherd, like Herschel, emphasises the 'crucial experiment'. In terms of discovery, Shepherd's claim is that causal necessity is discovered through an introspective analysis of the processes underlying the 'manner and action of causation'. With this in mind, we can understand the first part of Shepherd's answer to Hume. Against Hume, Shepherd claims that an empirical act of introspection does lead the mind to the discovery of necessary connection. What she maintains is that 'when the mind perceives by what passes within itself, that no quality, idea, or being whatever, can begin its own existence, it...perceives the general necessity of a cause for every effect'. cdxxxviii If this analysis of the process of the discovery of causal necessity is overlooked, it is easy to fail to grasp Shepherd's argument against Hume. Indeed, it might appear, for example, that Shepherd commits a fallacy when she claims that to deny her causal axiom leads to contradiction. cdxxxix As Hume, and later Kant, showed, the principle that 'All effects have causes' cannot be used to justify the inference that 'All events have causes'. cdxl Shepherd, however, has in mind a kind of answer. Her answer is that there simply is no empirical distinction to be made between effects and events, since those 'objects usually considered as effects' always appear to us as 'dependent qualities' that begin to exist. cdxli What Shepherd wants to claim is that as a matter of psychological fact, a given effect or 'dependent quality' of which we take notice just is an event with existence. For Shepherd then, an effect is a felt event that is noticed by the mind and then determined to the mind as a sense object. cdxlii Most importantly, since the determination of anything that begins to exist requires the inclusion of the idea of a cause, our representations of events are necessarily bound up with ideas of cause and effect. Given her view that there is no empirical distinction to be made between effects and events, it does follow that 'All events have causes'. Another objection that might occur to the reader at this stage, as it did to one of Shepherd's early critics, is that Shepherd's response to Hume simply amounts to a scholastic appeal that causal necessity is perceived as a real property of external objects. John Fearn, for example, accuses Shepherd of having acquired scholastic leanings from her earliest instructor. cdxliii However, unlike the scholastics, Shepherd rejects the view that we can have direct knowledge 4 101 of the real essences of exterior objects. Moreover, she lays stress on her rejection of this point. For Shepherd, knowledge of 'natures' amounts to knowledge of the elements of 'perceived, internal objects', and such, knowledge is understood to involve subjective and objective elements that come together in the act of representation. Scholastic accounts of knowledge differ in that they are based on direct realism and place little emphasis on the empirical accounts of representation or philosophy of mind. AS such, they offer no means of explaining error in judgement or of distinguishing between merely subjective and objective elements in knowledge. The principal reason that Shepherd's account is post-scholastic is that she explains causal representation within the context of the nascent philosophies of mind found in Reid, Stewart, and Brown. Having been educated in Scotland, Shepherd was undoubtedly influenced by developments in faculty psychology and philosophy of mind. Reid, for example, introduced numerous functions to classify the brain's activities, and was an important influence in the development of faculty psychology. Thomas Brown, who also makes philosophy of mind central to his philosophy, is applauded for having reduced the number of classifications of faculties in Reid, and for having emphasised the importance of attention, association, affect and functional analysis in the philosophy of mind. Like her Scottish counterparts, Shepherd supplements Hume's simple account of mental association with a more developed philosophy of mind, one that that lays emphasis on the roles of attention and affect in describing our perception and knowledge of inner objects. cdxliv Shepherd is also interested in these functions and activities of the human mind, and she uses her introspective analysis of the mind's activities to describe the 'manner and action' of causation. In effect, she addresses the 'enormous oversight' that Herschel noticed in Brown, namely, the omission of 'a distinct and immediate personal consciousness of causation, in his enumeration of that sequence of events, by which the volition of the mind is made to terminate in the motion of material objects.' cdxlv In doing so, Shepherd appeals to a 'context of discovery' for causal necessity -a context in which discovery of an a priori causal relation is made through introspective analysis. In this case, empirical reasoning and introspective analysis form the basis for the discovery of the activities of the mind in coming to discover causes and effects. While the methodologies of Herschel and Shepherd share an emphasis on the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, it is even more interesting to notice the many affinities between the views of Mary Shepherd and William Whewell. Both thinkers, for instance, insist on apriorism in epistemology, an approach that was unusual in its day. Whewell, for example, adopts a line on representation that is similar to Shepherd's, when he says that ideas 'are the mental sources of necessary and universal scientific truths.' cdxlvi For Whewell, 'the part of a man's knowledge which belongs to his own mind, is subjective: that which flows in upon him from the world external to him, is objective. ... The combination of the two elements, the subjective or ideal, and the objective or observed, is necessary, in order to give us any insight into the laws of nature.' cdxlvii Like Whewell, Shepherd appeals to ideas contributed by the subject to argue that laws of nature do contain necessity. This argument leads her to reproach Hume on the grounds that he denied that 'reason could prove, by the relation of our ideas, the knowledge of continued existences, and resolved all into \"custom and imagination.\"' cdxlviii As part of their apriorism, Shepherd and Whewell also share the view that ideas supplied by the mind relate disconnected bits of sense data in the process of concept formation. cdxlix On Whewell view, this 'binding together' involves ideas that are 'necessary conditions of knowledge' and reflects certain 'intellectual tendencies'. cdl Whewell writes that, 'Our sensations require ideas to bind them together' and that, 'If not so bound together, sensations do not give us any apprehension of things or objects.' cdli These ideas, Whewell claims, 'are relations of things, or of 4 102 sensations', so that sensation and ideas are always combined 'in a manner inseparable even in our conceptions'. cdlii Thus, 'it must always be possible to derive one of these elements from the other, if we are satisfied to accept, as proof of such derivation, that one always co-exists with and implies the other.' cdliii Whewell also grants the plausibility of a view that Shepherd's argues for, the view that the ideas, as elements in perception, are a kind of sensation. Thus, ideas of the causal relation can correctly termed 'sensations of ideas' in contrast to 'sensations of qualities'. As Whewell explains, But granting this form of expression, still a relation is not a thing or a sensation; and therefore we must still have another and opposite element, along with our sensations. And yet, though we have thus these two elements in every act as absolutely and exclusively belonging to one of the elements. Perception involves sensation, along with ideas of time, space, and the like; or, if any one prefers the expression, involves sensation along with the apprehension of relations. Perception is sensation, along with such ideas as make sensation into an apprehension of things or objects. cdliv Thus, Shepherd's contribution may have been forgotten for over a century, but there is a sense in which her doctrines survived through Whewell and Herschel. There was doubtless some degree of influence between friends and associates in all directions. For it is evident that thinkers such as Hershel, Whewell, Whately, and Shepherd were all deeply involved in a discussion and debate surrounding the relative importance of deductive and inductive methods in scientific reasoning and the nature of our knowledge of causality. We have seen that Shepherd may initially appear to have offered a dogmatic denial of Hume's position, but that she actually proposes a substantive response to Hume that is based on her philosophy of mind and theory of representation. Shepherd's considered view is that the discovery of causal necessity rests on introspective analysis of the mind's operations. This is the first step in her argument in defence of the causal axiom. There is a further deductive step to be taken in connection with this discovery, a step that is required to justify the claim to knowledge of causal necessity. As Shepherd explains 'the relation of cause and effect is the chief proposition immediately associated with and applicable to certain exhibited sensations' and can be used to infer that similar effects have similar causes.' cdlv It is this inference that will complete the first part of Shepherd's answer to Hume. As Shepherd explains, the next step involves the justification of the universal axiom that 'LIKE CAUSES must necessarily have LIKE EFFECTS'. cdlvi 'In order to do this' she writes, 'let us bear in mind the reasoning already adduced in the foregoing Chapter, and it thence immediately follows that objects which we know by our senses do begin their existences, and by our reason know that they cannot begin it of themselves.' cdlvii Thus, having perceived through introspection that causal necessity is a feature embedded in representation, it remains to be shown that the attempt to think 'dependent qualities that begin to exist' as uncaused leads to contradiction. cdlviii The deduction, she argues, is based on the following experimentum crucis: cdlix Here is a new quality, which appears to my senses: But it could not arise of itself; nor could any surrounding objects, but one (or more) affect it; therefore that one, (or more) have occasioned it, for there is nothing else to make a difference; and a difference could not 'begin of itself'. cdlx Thus, 'reason forces the mind to perceive that similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects'. As Shepherd elaborates, what is meant by 'Cause producing Effect' is 'a new object 4 103 exhibiting new qualities; or shortly, the formation of a new mass of qualities'. The formation of such new qualities involves bringing together original separate natures into a 'newly combined nature', so that 'each conjunction of bodies...produces upon their union those new natures, whose qualities must necessarily be in and with them, in the very moment of their formation.' cdlxi With this justification, Shepherd completes her proof of the causal axiom. While the first step of this proof is based on the discovery of the idea of necessary connection, the second step draws on this discovery in order to justify the causal axiom that like effects must necessarily have like causes. It is important to note that at this stage, Shepherd has ventured nothing to support her view that specific propositions, such as natural laws, contain necessity. It is only in the second part of her argument against Hume that she attempts to defend this latter claim, a claim that she regards as requiring an entirely distinct proof. Shepherd argues that Hume wrongly conflates the discovery and justification of the causal axiom with the proof that specific propositions concerning causes and effects contain necessity. Hume, she says, conflates the two matters and 'makes a great mistake in supposing it necessary to demonstrate, in every particular instance, what particular Effect must necessarily flow from its object, in order to gain the idea of necessary Connection.' cdlxii With this in mind, Shepherd turns to her next task, which is to provide a separate argument to show that there is necessity in causal natural laws. This argument is made with a view to establishing her fifth proposition against Hume, that 'Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course without a contradiction in terms' and 'that Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our expectations in ordinary life'. Here again, she appeals to her two-step experimental reasoning in which our inductive reasoning culminates in a 'deductive test'. Shepherd's view is that our particular expectations for the future are first formed inductively, and then justified by appeal to deductive test. It follows that expectation for the future is 'founded upon much stronger principles than those of custom and habit': It is founded – First, --Upon a quick, steady, accurate observation, whether the prevening causes are the SAME, from which an object is elicited in any PRESENT instance, as upon a FORMER one; --and, 2dly, --Upon a demonstration, that if the observation hath been correct, the result –(i.e., the whole effects or qualities,) must necessarily be the same as heretofore; otherwise contrary qualities, as already discussed, would arise without a cause, i.e., a difference begin of itself, which has been shown to be impossible. cdlxiii Once again, we see that there is a role for inductive argument and a role for reason in Shepherd's experimentalism: Thus all experimental reasoning consists in an observation, and a demonstration, as has been shown; --an observation whether the circumstances from which an object is produced, and in which it is placed, are the same upon one occasion as upon another; - -and a demonstration, that if it is so, all its exhibitions will be the same. cdlxiv In the first instance, the mind takes notice of 'like qualities' and 'invariable sequences of effects' in compound sense objects, and the invariability of sequences leads us to conclude that there probably exists a causal connection. cdlxv Next, an experimentum crucis is performed in which the mind considers whether the difference in qualities could have begun of itself, and concludes 4 104 that 'after the application of an exact experiment, it is impossible to imagine a difference of qualities to arise under the same circumstances'. cdlxvi In other words, her view is that the probable knowledge rests on experience of what does take place on a given trial. However, this knowledge is supplemented with a deductive argument to show that nothing else could ensue under exactly similar circumstances except if the causal principle were violated. It is this argument that justifies the claim that our expectations for the future are based on the idea of a productive principle according to which 'similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects' cdlxvii It is apparent then, that the force of Shepherd's answer to Hume rests on her claim that questions relating to a posteriori knowledge of causality lead directly to questions pertaining to a priori knowledge of the causal relation. In the latter sense, ideas of causality are contributed by the mind in the process of concept formation, and this forms the basis for the deductive test that leads to knowledge of the causal principle. On this point, Shepherd is perhaps best understood in light of her remark in the 1824 treatise 'that the first of these questions is sunk in the latter': It may be plainly seen, that the first of these questions is sunk in the latter, because, if objects usually considered as effects need not be considered as effects, then they are forced to begin their existences of themselves; for, conjoined or not to their causes, we know by our senses that they do begin to exist: we will, therefore, immediately hasten to the consideration of the second question, which may be stated in the following terms: Whether every object which begins to exist must owe its existence to a cause? cdlxviii Hume's view is that the 'philosophical' and 'natural' senses of cause are intimately linked, and that only experience could gives rise to the habit of mind leading us to think that every effect must have a cause. Thus, any query relating to the philosophical sense of cause can be 'sunk' into a query into the natural sense of cause. Against this view, Shepherd holds that that quite the opposite is true: the query regarding the philosophical sense of cause is the one into which other questions concerning causality are sunk. Specifically, the question 'Whether every thing which begins to exist requires a cause for its existence?' resolves itself into two other questions: the first is the question whether particular effects require causes; and the second is the more general question whether an object can begin its own existence. The latter queries are in the first instance answered by appeal to empirical and inductive considerations and in the second instance by appeal to a deductive test resting on causal necessity, an idea contributed a priori by the mind. So Shepherd inverts the direction of the reduction proposed by Hume, on the grounds that in order to consider particular ideas of causes and effects, we must first invoke the general principle of causality. Shepherd's point then, is that the consideration of particular instances of causality a posteriori leads to the discovery of causal necessity by means of a further a priori demonstration. And, this is a claim that Hume denies. However, the question of whether an associationist or necessitarian view is correct remains a matter of controversy, so Shepherd is well within reason in staking her position. In the end, Shepherd's answer might not satisfy every post-Humean critic of causality, but it does count as one kind of answer to Hume. Shepherd's view of causation appears to involve an 'epistemological ascent' from probabilistic descriptions of regularities to talk about necessary connection as a feature built into representation. It is clear from Shepherd's argument that what she intends to do is to affix a deductive reductio-style argument onto results of inductive inquiry, all of which is supposed to work in virtue of her analysis of sense objects. To sum up, there can be little doubt that the views on methodology expressed in Shepherd's 1824 treatise were, like the analyses of causality and induction proposed by her contemporaries, influenced by thinkers such as Bacon, Newton, and Kant. It also seems likely that there were 4 105 influences that ran between Shepherd and some of her younger associates in London and Cambridge -individuals such as Herschel and Whewell. Herschel's distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification is particularly helpful in understanding how Shepherd moves beyond the dilemma proposed by Hume. For the in the context of discovery, we are led to sensations of ideas and sensations of qualities, the former, as ideas of necessary connection, supplying the basis for objectivit and necessity in our knowledge of the external world. Whewell's account that concepts are formed through the binding together of sensations and ideas sheds light on Shepherd's own view of representation, which is central to an understanding how she moves beyond the empiricist theory of ideas in her answer to Hume. In addition, Herschel, Shepherd and Whewell, in varying ways, all place emphasis on the idea of an experimentum crucis in scientific experimentalism, a notion that also figures centrally in Reid. It is this particular feature of their views that is most reminiscent of Bacon. Indeed, Shepherd's remarks on Bacon suggest that she thinks of herself as working in a post-Baconian tradition. She applauds Bacon's methodology, arguing that Bacon's views were perfectly consistent with both theism and recent scientific experimentalism: Lord Bacon was a severe theist, and he never imagined for a moment, but that a God had designed and arranged to given ends the whole of what we see around us. Lord bacon, for instance, would have thought it vulgar, were the physical causes of HEAT inquired into, to have it answered, that it arose from the spark intentionally communicated to a heap of wood. Nevertheless he could not deny in such a case, that the intention to create a partial fire, and the means used toward it, were the one its final cause, the other, its efficient causes. cdlxix Shepherd's above remark reminds us of the controversy over Leslie's 1804 footnote, and suggests a critical stance toward the scholastic analysis. Her view of the relationship between final and efficient causes is that final causes are 'nothing more than a name for a compound set of PHYSICAL EFFICIENT CAUSES'. However, unlike efficient causes, final causes are not detectable by sense organs. Still, final causes are experienced as 'essences' and 'primeval natures', she argues, and can only be indirectly known by reason and analogy to the visible things perceived around us. cdlxx For now, what is important to note is that Shepherd does not make a scholastic appeal as a basis for knowledge of efficient causality. Nor does she uncritically adopt the distinction between efficient and metaphysical causes as it is understood by Stewart. What her account emphasises is that knowledge of the necessity underlying efficient causes is possible through scientific experimentalism. Ultimately, this knowledge of proceeds on the basis of first, an a posteriori, inductive argument, and secondly, by epistemological ascent, to reason and the a priori. It is impossible at this juncture to speculate with any confidence on the extent of the communication of ideas between Mary Shepherd and others involved in modifications to Baconian induction. It would be difficult to establish the priority of ideas in this circle, and there were quite likely many ideas on induction, causality, and scientific reasoning 'in the air'. Moreover, views on intellectual property, for example, were somewhat vague, and certainly less restrictive than our own. Whewell, for example, held that once an idea becomes comprehensible to a wide enough circle of individuals, it then becomes the intellectual property of all those who fully and intelligently grasp the problem. cdlxxi In any case, I have made no an attempt to establish intellectual priority, and simply drawn links between views as they seem philosophically appropriate and helpful. It is interesting to note, however, that one of those to whom Shepherd is described as having poured out her metaphysical speculations is William Whewell. Understanding this, and looking forward to the theories of Herschell and Whewell, it is easier to understand how and why Shepherd developed her arguments against Hume on causality. 4 106 Whatever the precise connections between ideas and the directions of influence, it is safe to say that Shepherd shared in the efforts of some of the most important contributors to methodological analysis of her day. Like Herschel and Whewell, Shepherd clearly saw herself as building on a Baconian tradition in her analysis of experimentalism and causality. She evidently fell on the same side on the issue of apriorism as Whewell; and departed on this score from Herschel and John Stuart Mill. And, like many of those who would follow her in developing thoughts on induction, she most certainly saw the limitations of Whately's logic. For, one thing that seems certain is that Shepherd was involved in an effort to describe how the combination of deduction and induction in experimentalism could lead to a critically defensible response to the scepticism engendered by Hume. Indeed, in looking back to Bacon, we see that there is a need for an updated discussion of scientific methodology, a need that becomes ever more pressing after Hume's critique. And, in light of the sort of wild charges made by figures like Kerr, we can understand why Shepherd and her counterparts may have considered it important to address the issues around methodology, causation and metaphysics in the way that they did. So, whatever the precise influences and motivations, Shepherd's 1824 treatise initiated a new and promising strategy in answering Hume. Although it would be some time before the basic ideas would come find clear and full articulation, the rudiments of the strategy are already evident in Shepherd. One way or another, Shepherd's answer to Hume belongs in the same tradition as that of her scientific and intellectual circle in London. 4 107 Mary Shepherd s Salon: Science and Society 4.1 Shepherd's Circle of Literati, Scientists and Publishers Mary Shepherd ran a salon. Her salon brought together old and new friends in London's Westminster district, friends that included some of London's best and brightest in terms of intellect and ingenuity. Although too little is known of Shepherd's salon, Shepherd herself was remembered as a hostess of unusually sharp wit and logical ability: I should like to hear more about the gifted Lady Mary Shepherd -and her 'Salon,' which my mother has often assured me was a very interesting and agreeable one. My father seems to have been often there, and Lady Mary's humour seems to have been as well known as her logical powers, and occasional causticity. cdlxxii The list of friends and guests entertained at the dinner and after-dinner soirées in the Shepherds' home is a partial one, and yet, it is of great assistance in the reconstruction of this aspect of Mary Shepherd's life. *** [ch3: The Shepherd family was very well placed socially. Sir Samuel was King's Advocate between 1813 and 1819 and later Lord Chief Baron of the Court of the Exchequer of Scotland from 1819 to 1830. All told, the family circle attracted many eminent individuals, and the home of Lady Mary and Henry John Shepherd became a sort of intellectual and literary hub.] Their circle of social, scientific and literary friends, included, among others: Jeffrey Lockhart and family, the Reverend Sydney Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Henry Hart Milman, Henry Hallam, the Leonard Horners, Charles Lyell, Charles Babbage, Mary Somerville, William Whewell, John Murray, Lord Lyndhurst and family, and Lord Dudley. cdlxxiii Other guests were college friends of Henry John Shepherd, such as William Maule, Lord John Campbell, Thomas Talfourd, the Hobhouses, and Mr. Abraham Hayward. Among the ladies were Lady Charleville, Lady Stepney, and Miss Runnington. cdlxxiv ] Thus, Lady Mary not only pursued her scholarly interests throughout her married life, she ran a salon of sorts, to which there were many regular subscribers. According to her daughter, there were frequent dinner parties, and after dinner, these parties were opened up to a wider circle of friends who would gather to discuss the latest developments in a variety of fields. 'Sometimes there would be a dinner of 8 or 10 with general conversation, sometimes of 12 or 14 breaking into groups. Dinners then were early enough to have an after evening; and at half past 9 or so, there would assemble really at tea, 20 or 30 more in the drawing-room, and the society would melt away at 11.' cdlxxv There were other guests as well, but some have been forgotten, and others left unnamed. cdlxxvi Although it is hard to gauge personal convictions by the wider circle of acquaintance, Lady Mary Shepherd's inner circle supplies clues to her deeper affinities and beliefs. With this in mind, several friends deserve notice as the close confidants of Lady Mary Shepherd. 'The persons who, besides my father, most thoroughly entered into my mother's mind, and followed where she led into great and wide depths of abstract enquiry, were Mr. David Ricardo the political economist, Mr. Pearson, Dr. Whately Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Whewell, afterwards master of Trinity, and Mr. Cameron.' cdlxxvii For now, the important point to note is that Mary Shepherd continued to engage many of the brightest and most exciting minds of her time after her marriage. In fact, it was through her marriage that Mary Shepherd succeeded in cultivating her intellectual gifts into mature adulthood, a circumstance that was both extremely fortunate and unusual in her day. That the people and events in her life provide clues to understanding Lady Mary Shepherd's philosophical work will become increasingly apparent as her story unfolds. In 4 108 the meantime, we must turn to developments in the philosophical, social, and religious context in which Mary Shepherd's thought evolved. As with her social connections, the social and religious context of the times has no direct bearing on the cogency of Mary Shepherd's arguments. However, just as the social connections provide clues regarding intellectual influence, so the contextual clues help to underscore the significance of and motivations behind Shepherd's philosophical contribution. *** It suggests friendships acquired in youth and extending throughout life -friendships that extended from early days in Holland House and Barnbougle to an intellectual circle of scientists, publishers, and 'men of letters' with links to the four major universities in Britain; Edinburgh, Cambridge, Oxford, and London. It is very likely that the Primrose children were socially acquainted with a number of the young gentlemen -aspiring scholars, clergy, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and politicians -who came to Edinburgh to study under well known teachers such as Dugald Stewart. The Primrose family had rented Holland House during the minority of the third Lord Holland, and Charles Fox and his son and nephew would have been acquaintances. So Lord Holland and his circle, individuals such as Allen and Brougham, for instance, would have been friends of the family. Of course, Mary and her siblings had been educated at home by private tutors and encouraged to develop a 'culture of letters', and so would have been comfortable with advanced philosophical conversation. It is easy to imagine them participating in the lively social and intellectual scene in Edinburgh. The Primrose family, as part of the 'upper crust' of Edinburgh society, would also have known Edinburgh figures such as Thomas Brown, Henry Cockburn, Francis Jeffrey, Henry Brougham, and Macvey Napier. These and many more would all have been social acquaintances. Precise connections are never easy to discern, but there can be little doubt that, as an aristocratic family with five lively and well-educated children, that in all likelihood, the Primroses were socially active with a substantial subset of Edinburgh's men of letters. And, if adulthood friends are any indication, Mary Shepherd was neither a snob nor a bigot; her intimate circle included self-made scholars, tutors, the less fortunate, the controversial, and the eccentric. Not surprisingly, Shepherd knew many of the public figures involved in the Leslie affair. She was personally acquainted with John Leslie, and many other scientists and mathematicians, including Charles Babbage, William Whewell, Mary Somerville, and others. According to one description, in the 1840s, Charles Babbage, who is described as an 'intimate friend' of the family, shared virtually the same dinner society as the Shepherds'. Henry Hart Milman, Lady Catherine Stepney, Mary Somerville, Sydney Smith are all listed as part of Babbage's social circle; the list closely resembles one describing the dinner guests of the Shepherds. cdlxxviii In a letter to Charles Babbage, Mary Shepherd mentions a discussion with Leslie about the Humbolt -Biot dispute over the location of the magnetic poles. cdlxxix Babbage and Leslie would themselves have been acquainted at least from 1819 onward, since Babbage's name was put forward as a candidate to replace Leslie in the Mathematical Chair at Edinburgh --the very same position that was filled by John Wilson. As for Edinburgh's professors, Mary Shepherd, though she does not mention any personal connection, was evidently familiar with the philosophical work of both Stewart and Brown. Babbage, on the other hand, actually mentions visiting Dugald Stewart in Scotland. Though it is never easy to estimate the depth of the personal regard between historical figures, it is worth noting that Babbage named one of his sons 'Dugald'! cdlxxx It seems likely that Mary Shepherd would also have been at least socially acquainted with Stewart and Brown. She is critical of some of their philosophical views, but took the unusual step of rising to Stewart's defense in print. Following her marriage, Mary Shepherd's social world was largely drawn from society in 4 109 London's Westminster area. The Shepherds' London friends had wide-ranging interests and views, although there are clearly some shared interests and concerns among the members of her Westminster circle. Many in her social circle, for example, shared a love of mathematics, science, and abstract analysis -subjects that played an important role in the emerging and developing sciences of the nineteenth century. A cursory look at the list of college friends of Henry John Shepherd suggests that Trinity College's Analytical Society played a role in uniting the members of the Shepherd's London salon. Charles Babbage, Frederick Maule and Edward Ryan, for example, were among the family friends involved with the Analytical Society. cdlxxxi Another university connection may have been the Cambridge Philosophical Society, which included at least several of the Shepherds' dinner guests, including Reverend William Pearson. Pearson, along with the likes of Babbage, Herschel, and others, was a founding member of the Astronomical Society, which was an outgrowth of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. A second interest of the members of Shepherd's group was political and economic reform. For a majority of guests belonged to 'Benthamite' and 'radical' circles. James Mill, a close friend and follower of Jeremy Bentham, was, at least for a time, one of those who formed part of Mary Shepherd's circle of intimates. David Ricardo, however, is given special mention as a close confidante of Mary Shepherd. Interestingly, Bentham himself claimed to be the spiritual father of James Mill, and said of Mill that he was the spiritual father of David Ricardo -this making Bentham the spiritual grandfather of Ricardo. cdlxxxii As political economists, their views often differed, but they overcame differences that arose and valued their debates. In fact, for the most part, they self-consciously modeled good conduct in public debate, which gives insight into the value placed upon human dignity and respect within this intellectual set. cdlxxxiii There may well be philosophical reasons, in addition to social ones, for this attitude. Consider, for example, that they agreed, for the most part, that the interests of the collective were reducible to the common interests of individuals. This ideal, which heralds back to enlightenment thinkers like JeanJacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, was also promoted by Dugald Stewart, and is now seen as a hallmark of the liberal tradition. The influence of their views, and especially of Ricardo's views on political economy, eventually grew considerable. Most importantly, however, these Benthamites, radicals, and reformers agreed to certain enlightenment assumptions about the state and society, and shared in common a desire to establish political and economic reforms. The politics of reform was no doubt a central topic of conversation in Mary Shepherd's salon and among her circle more generally. Despite their philosophical differences, it is clear that this set shared a desire to get at the fundamental principles governing the economy and an interest in reform. But for Mary Shepherd, the most important intellectual companion in the set was David Ricardo. Ricardo's abstract economics and his moderatism earned him criticism from some of the more radical members among the Westminster radical circle, and this is particularly true after the radicals became increasingly divided on issues related to reform. However, in 1818, it is clear that the Shepherd's group is quite cohesive. On one occasion, Ricardo writes to Malthus from Gatcomb Park in Minchinhampton to say that James Mill had arrived the day before and that Malthus's company is strongly desired by the party at Ricardo's estate. The letter, dated 20 August 1818, is franked by Mary Shepherd's husband, Henry John Shepherd, M.P. for Dorsetshire, Shatftesbury from 1818-1820. cdlxxxiv This letter is significant for our story because it puts James Mill, David Ricardo, and the Shepherds together in 1818 in no uncertain terms. It is important to note the date, however. For the Carlile affair of 1819 may well have divided the group -at least for a time. However, there is every reason to think that the Shepherds were connected to Mill and Ricardo at the very time that they took an interest in Kant studies (despite its apparently treasonable consequences). The letter also makes it apparent that the Shepherd's were still connected to political and philosophical radicals shortly after the famous 1818 election. cdlxxxv Kant studies aside, the main topics in 1818 were undoubtedly Parliamentary reform and political economy, topics which would have been of considerable interest to Henry John Shepherd, who published the first edition of his A Summary of the Law relative to the 4 110 Election of Members of Parliament in 1825. cdlxxxvi Thus, some of Mary Shepherd's friends were evidently ones acquired in her youth; others were friends acquired through marriage, and still others were friends acquired through London society. A hallmark of the individuals in Shepherds' set was the ability to cross party lines in the name of friendship, civility, and reform. Another noticeable feature is that many in her social set were considered eccentric. In addition to Babbage, there was Richard Whately, an eccentric clerical figure and minor celebrity after his outrageous Historic Doubts. Equally notorious and unique was Sydney Smith, who became well known for his acerbic wit and entertaining antics, and was a favorite at Holland House for some time. Another socially controversial acquaintance, at least for his drug addiction, was Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Coleridge's deep fascination for German philosophy and literature did much to re-awaken the British interest in German ideas, and especially in Kant. cdlxxxvii Among the many family friends were individuals notorious for having expressing liberal, reformist, or radical sympathies in the early days of the French Revolution, and then later adopting more conservative views. This is arguably true of Thomas Erskine, James Mackintosh, Sydney Smith, John Murray, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth and others in Shepherd's social circle. Though initially sympathetic to the cause of the people, they later openly denounced revolutionary and republican ideals. In staying the course of the reform movement, the Shepherds appear to have emphasized diplomacy and moderation. They were equally comfortable with more conservative reformers such as Lord Lyndhurst (Sir Samuel Shepherd's brother-in-law) and radical reformers such as John Cam Hobhouse. cdlxxxviii Although genteel standards are more often the norm in academia and other professions today, they were a far cry from the persecutory and vicious personal attacks still frequently invoked to silence the views of ideological opponents in Shepherd's day. This intangible good, as much as any intellectual contributions or political reforms, is a legacy of Shepherd's social set. The importance attached to 'refinement of tone' in Shepherd circle cannot be overemphasized; it seems to have been one of the uniting creeds of the group. The members of the coterie sometimes held different philosophical and political views, but they usually did so without animosity. That said, it is possible that relations became strained among some members of the group after 1819. James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill, for example, had strongly objected to the trial and imprisonment of Carlile -events that began to unfold in 1819 and that had involved the Shepherd's directly. The Mills, and several others in the radical set, were uncompromising and unforgiving in their attitude toward those involved in the Carlile affair -including Sir Samuel Shepherd -even though Sir Samuel's fate would have been one with Carlile's had he publicly refused to co-operate with the Prince Regent. Most in the circle however, seem resigned to a more moderate approach to reform after the sobering events of 1819. David Ricardo and others were accused by angry hard -liners of associating with 'Change Alley devotees' and 'boroughmongers', and with supporting policies that would encourage political quietism. Hobhouse was similarly criticized as his rhetoric varied from Radical to Whig to suit the day. Hobhouse eventually came to be regarded as a hypocrite in the eyes of the public, although his ability to read the times and to adjust his rhetoric made him one of the most important and effective politicians involved in parliamentary reform. In any case, because of the social change and unrest in the period, it is difficult to pigeonhole the politics of public figures of the day -and this is also true of Mary Shepherd and her circle. After 1819, it became increasingly difficult to openly press liberal or radical views against the conservative policies of Prince Regent, whose own 'about-face' in politics had placed many of his liberal-minded courtiers in a nearly impossible situation. And, as social unrest increased, the conservatives had the distinct advantage of appearing to have been right in their claims about the dangers of liberal policies and practices. cdlxxxix 4 111 In the end, it was the moderate course that would lend credibility to proposed social and political reforms, and the moderate reformers would in fact do much to bring about the needed reforms. These reforms succeeded, by and large, as a result of the varied and co-operative efforts of those who united -despite personal and political differences -to bring about change. In uniting, they were able to introduce reforms as profound as those earlier accomplished by Locke and his circle of Whig politicians. As in the case of Locke and the Glorious Revolution, victory had depended upon adopting a moderate rhetoric and plan for reform. Thus, seen in the light of a strategic effort, the changing rhetoric of the 'turncoats' was not part of an effort to introduce political quietism, but an effort to sustain the spirit of reform amidst the growing sense of conservatism. As philosophical and reforming radicals, they continued to seek out the 'true causes' of failing social and economic conditions around them; but most of all, they were devoted to finding and implementing successful measures and strategies for reform. It was an approach to reform that made party politics the secondary agenda, and with leadership drawn from parties on all sides, they succeeded in cutting across party lines in the name of moderation. Arguably, it was through the moderate strategies, determination, and collaborative efforts of this talented group that the much-needed reforms were in fact achieved. John Stuart Mill, once a virulent critic of these publishers, scientists, lawyers, and politicians, regretted the rashness of his youthful attacks in his autobiographical remarks. Moreover, in his mature writings on utilitarianism, the younger Mill adopts 'the harm principle', a principle that specifies the sense in which individual freedoms can legitimately be limited. It is well to remember then, that Mary Shepherd's social circle was quite diverse. She was an aristocrat by birth, but close friends with many of humbler origins, including Ricardo. Among her close friends was Charles Babbage, who, though of good family, was considered 'poor' and eccentric by many. cdxc Thus Shepherd was comfortable in the best of social circles, but by no means close-minded or narrow in her views or in her society. Because of her Whig family traditions, and her connections to radicals and 'turncoats', it is not an easy matter to decide on her politics. What we do know is that she was frequently engaged in abstract debate, that she enjoyed wit, and that she sought a social and intellectual milieu that would ensure stimulating conversation and controversy. 4.2 Kant and the Philosophical Radicals Among the group of radicals known to have been associated with the Shepherds are included James Mill, Henry Hallam, David Ricardo, William Maule, and John Cam Hobhouse. cdxci This list suggests that the Shepherds were connected to both 'Westminster' and 'philosophical' radicals. In the former group are included mainly politicians, such as John Cam Hobhouse. The latter group, broadly construed to include James Mill and David Ricardo, included political economists and self-proclaimed 'philosophical radicals' -individuals committed to identifying and theorizing about the root causes of social problems -causes such as unrepresentative government, inflation, excessive taxation, and so on. cdxcii The philosophical radicals were not merely interested in bringing about reforms; they placed great emphasis on the activity of understanding the underlying issues. Both the Mills and David Ricardo can be counted among the 'philosophical radicals', since all sought to formulate causal explanations and theoretical justifications of conceptual issues underlying reform. Mary Shepherd, who was highly abstract in her approach to most questions, is more easily identified with the 'philosophical radicals' in her social set than with the 'Westminster' radicals. Her husband, Henry John Shepherd, on the other hand, would likely have shared interests in common with the 'Westminster radicals, who were more actively involved in bringing about parliamentary and political reforms. The philosophical radicals shared common ideals and objectives. For instance, they appealed to the enlightenment ideal of individual liberty. In addition, they sought to identify causal laws governing economic activity, and develop the theoretical underpinning for reform. cdxciii James 4 112 Mill, arguably the first in the line of so-called 'philosophical radicals', looked explicitly to Thomas Brown for ideas for developing his own theories. It is likely that both Brown and Mill would have known Willich, the former student of Kant's who had gone to Edinburgh to study. Willich had offered German and Kant instruction while in Edinburgh, and his publications summarizing Kant's critical system were the first to include a description of Kant's foundation for science. Kant's view of science was influential on Brown, whose desire to make mental philosophy 'scientific' in a Kantian sense is evident in his Observations on the Zoonomia of E. Darwin, published about 1796. Perhaps inspired by Kant's attempts to provide a metaphysical foundation for Newtonian science, Brown went so far as to attempt a Kantian foundation for medical science [get and describe]. Villers' wrote a condescending footnote on Brown's efforts to develop a Kantian philosophy of medicine, and the reference may well have spurred Brown to write his 1803 review of Villers' Philosophie de Kant. cdxciv Despite the efforts of Nitsch, Willich and Villers, it is arguable that none of Britain's philosophers had fully understood the complexity of the critical system of philosophy by the turn of the nineteenth century. At this point, the concept of systematic philosophy is primarily understood in terms of schemes of classification -not in Kant's deeper sense of systematic unity under causal laws with objective, a priori content. Brown may have been the first among the British to begin to grapple with and develop the Kantian idea of the subsumptive character of science. The idea was all but forgotten, however, until the second wave of interest in Kant, and by that time, Brown was nearly dead. cdxcv The first wave of Kant studies had subsided due to a sort of suspicion that Kant's philosophy, although 'abstract, remote from experience and intellectualistic', might actually harbour socially and politically dangerous elements. As Giuseppe Micheli explains in his article 'The Early Reception of Kant's Thought in England: 1785-1805', the political unrest in early nineteenth century Continental Europe was a matter of close scrutiny in England, and liberal philosophies became a focus for the anxieties of political conservatives. cdxcvi Condemned for its effects on Germany's youth and universities, Kant's philosophy became a target for England's increasingly conservative literary journals. As Micheli explains, 'To conservatives it was an irreligious and politically dangerous system. Liberals and radicals, all firmly following in the wake of the tradition of Locke...were repelled by a form of language and a type of problem which they considered abstract, remote from experience and intellectualistic.' cdxcvii Thus, Kant fell out of favour, for reasons not unlike those cited against Hume and Leslie by the ministers of Edinburgh. Brown himself died before the second wave of interest in Kant had taken root, although he had, in the meantime, drawn attention to the analysis of the human mind. In this area, Continental thinkers, including Condillac and Kant, had influenced Brown. The character of knowledge is, for Brown, as for the enlightenment philosophes, systematic. As Robinson explains, 'We find also in the genius of the Enlightenment the ubiquitous notion of system, the idea that in every domain of inquiry there is within reach an overarching set of principles or laws with which to connect the otherwise isolated links on the great chain of thought. Whether the philosophe's talent was addressed to politics or ethics, logic or philosophy, art or history, he was convinced that a successful effort on his part would yield a system.' cdxcviii Condillac, whom Robinson takes to be an important influence on Brown, holds that finding the true system of mind is important for foundational reasons. And, Condillac, according to Villers, was a proto-Kantian. For he claimed that the development of a single foundational concept in the philosophy of mind should be the basis for the system of knowledge, and this, in Villers' view, is in the spirit of Kant's transcendentalism. It is important to take into consideration the influence of Condillac and Kant in interpreting role of systematicity and unity in Brown's philosophy. Brown's presupposition was that all domains of knowledge, including theology, are unified by an underlying account of the mind -and particularly to an account of sensation, cognition, and language. Although often criticised, Brown had his supporters too. As James Mackintosh pointed out, the simplicity in Brown's philosophy 4 113 of mind did away with the onerous metaphysical assumptions that Reid had taken for granted. cdxcix This result was in consequence of Brown's methodological bias in favour of a unified system of knowledge. As Brown explains, knowledge of the mind holds the key to further research in areas as diverse as ethics, politics, and theology. Brown writes, 'Such are the various lights in which the human mind may be regarded, -physiologically, ethically, politically, theologically. It is thus the object of many sciences, -but of sciences that, even when they seem most remote, have still one tie of intimate connection, in the common relation which they all directly bear to the series of feelings of the inquirer himself.' d What Brown has in view that mental and physical feelings given in sensation can be scientifically and systematically described. Brown also points out quite explicitly that all physical inquiry depends on an understanding of cause and effect. di James Mill deployed Brown's terminology in his own philosophy, and Brown may well have mediated the link between Kant and Mill. In any case, we know that as the scandal surrounding Kant's philosophy began to subside in Britain, a second wave of interest in his philosophy emerged, and that this wave is associated with figures such as Mill and Ricardo. dii In his diary for March 1819, George Grote remarks that he had been studying Kant prior to daily discussions with Mill and Ricardo. Grote records his activities on Sunday, March 28th: 'Studied Kant until 1/2 past 8, when I set off to breakfast with Mr. Ricardo. Met Mill there, and enjoyed some of the most interesting and instructive discourse with them...'. diii Thus, there is evidence of a renewed interest in Kant. It was this second wave of interest that eventually led to a much clearer understanding of Kant's philosophy in Britain, and ultimately, to the publication of English language editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. Given the influence of Brown, the return to Kant studies would have meant that the notions of the a priori, of systematic unity, and of subsumption under laws would have been examined as epistemic criteria of truth. Kant is by no stretch of the imagination the sole influence on the philosophical radicals, although his response to Hume plays an important role in Britain's nineteenth century developments in philosophy of science. Ideas on the foundational role of causality were, naturally, a subject of great interest, particularly given the implications of Hume's critique. Where Hume raised doubts about the potential of science, Kant subdued worries. Kant was an antidote to Hume's scepticism -a fact that Willich had advertised so many years earlier, but that for various reasons was slow to be received. There was still a strong desire to model philosophy after Netwonian mathematical physics, and quantificational analysis had long been an ideal for political economy. As early as the seventeenth century, the political economist William Petty had used the quantitative methods of counting and measuring to describe and analyze the characteristics of prosperity in a society. Data collected on population, land, resources and the like were used to determine unknown values. As Adam Smith reasoned in his Wealth of Nations, if it took one day to kill a beaver and one day to kill two deer, then, using labor as the measure of the value of the product, the value of one beaver is equivalent to the value of two deer. And, just as the labor theory provided a means of adding the value of production, so did distribution theory explain the division of wealth in terms of the value of a product. div Smith's ideas had a tremendous impact on the theories of Bentham, Malthus, Mill, and Ricardo. Bentham drew on the utilitarian idea of quantifying value implicit in Smith to interpret moral decision making itself in terms of the calculation of 'utilities' or values. The idea behind Bentham's utilitarian doctrine is to extend quantitative analysis to applications in the social and moral context. The general moral directive is to maximize the happiness or pleasure of the greatest number. The presumption is that a mathematical calculation of utility or value would be an effective approach to establishing the sum of happiness that an action or rule might produce. dv Malthus built on the existing framework in Smith and Bentham with his theory of population. Malthus' theory included the speculation that food increased at an arithmetic rate while population increased at a geometric rate. His theory was both abstract and quantitative -\n\nnot to mention seemingly invulnerable to empirical refutation. Thus, Malthus appeared to have found a quantitative law regarding population growth. In sum, both natural philosophers and early political economists such as Smith, were important influences on the later Benthamites and Utilitarians. By the 1820s, the political economists and philosophical radicals in Shepherd's circle were particularly keen on formulating causal laws and on identifying a consistent and coherent set of mathematical economic principles that could be subsumed under such causal laws. Whereas early economic theories had been 'partial, concrete and causally empirical'; as time went on, the methods of economic analysis became increasingly 'general, abstract and deductive'. dvi James Mill's political economy falls neatly into the latter category. Indeed, James Mill, who wrote on a wide variety of topics, is often noted for his commitment to a deductive system of philosophy. As an alternative approach to Paine's natural rights justification for reform, Mill, following Bentham, aimed to base social reform on a theory combining appeals to laws of thought and individual rights founded in law. Indeed, James Mill firmly believed that the lasting solutions to social problems in Britain would be discovered and justified on a rational basis, solutions described in economic theories crowned by causal laws. Mill in fact argues for a form of democracy in his Essays on Government, but his failure to advance an 'data-drive' model led to the severe criticism of his work in Thomas Macaulay's Edinburgh Review article. Macaulay, it will be recalled, claimed that a science of politics could only advance by observation and induction from the data. He was entirely unsympathetic to Mill's appeal to the principle of a fixed human nature --that humans are, as Bentham had claimed, essentially self-interested --from which principles of good government could be deduced. Mill's model presumes that the principles of human nature are a priori and fixed, and that specific knowledge with a bearing on the workings of political institutions, would follow from knowledge of the fundamental principles of human nature. Mill's style of political 'science' may initially seem implausibly abstract in hindsight, but whether Mill's view would have sounded absurd in his day is a matter of some doubt. Consider, for example, that these were the heady days of phrenology -the theory that fixed laws governed character traits -traits supposed to be determined by the size of the brain as judged by observation and measurement of the skull. Though already discounted by many of the leading scientists of the day as fraudulent, many were credulous. dvii The famous phrenologist, Franz Joseph Gall, probably sounded compelling to many, appealing to his 'scientific' authority to declare, 'Who, now, will dare to maintain, that there is not in man an innate propensity, which leads him to the destruction of his own species? Where is the creature, that evinces more ferocity towards all other animals, not excepting his fellows, than man?' dviii Of those who were not believers in phrenology, many were still prepared to believe that human nature was fixed. Both Brown and Mill could be counted among the latter group. To those committed to the science of the fixed principles of human nature --whether via phrenology or philosophical introspection -there was further commitment to the belief that putative discoveries of correlation were indicative of causal relations. Not surprisingly, causal assumptions, if not always explicit, are implicit in Mill's theory; human nature causes certain behavior, and knowledge of the causal relationships underlying human behavior can be used to achieve certain social and political results. In addition to its causal implications, Mill's system, was a quintessentially axiomatic deductive system. Unfortunately, in the context of the increasing confidence in observational and inductive methods, Mill's theory received little credit. After his father's death, John Stuart Mill modified his father's system of political economy, adding the qualifications that experience could alter fundamental character, so that the empirical 'laws' of political economy would be tentative and subject to revision. Thus, James Mill's son would eventually redressed the imbalance to include both abstract considerations proceeding from 'top' and inductive analysis proceeding from the 'bottom' upwards. 4 115 Like James Mill, David Ricardo was also criticized for his abstract approach in the field of political economy. Ricardo contributed to the trend toward abstraction, and is credited as the founder of 'pure economic theory', which develops consistent theories by deriving consequences from a small set of assumptions. It was thought that if the assumptions are true, and the theories logically consistent, then the theories would also be true and applicable. dix This is precisely the virtue attributed to subsumption in scientific theory. In addition to his methodological interest in subsumption, the spirit of quantitative analysis is also evident in the political economy of Ricardo. Ricardo expresses his central ideas relating to the distribution of wealth in terms of a quantifiable interpretation of the concept of value; that is, value as understood in terms of quantity and cost of labour. One area where the abstract, deductive and mathematical approach in Ricardo is particularly apparent is in his ideas on international free trade, initially developed from James Mill's theory of 'comparative advantage': By assuming differences in technology and nothing else he reached the conclusion that free trade would promote the welfare of all societies. The scenario is a textbook favourite: two countries, two products, constant returns, etc. However, the assumptions which are not normally mentioned are: no history, no institutions, no technological rigidities, no transfer of resources, no unemployment, no exercise of unequal political power, free trade between and perfect competition (i.e., 'the natural state') within each country! dx Even in the nineteenth century, Ricardo was frequently criticized for his theoretical approach to free trade. This criticism seems equally applicable in the case of Ricardo's account of the nature of value and production in the economy. Ricardo's writings emphasized Say's Law of Markets, claiming that the money supply in the system must only be adjusted according to the production of goods, since, as Ricardo puts it, 'Money cannot call forth goods, but goods can call forth money...'. dxi In his attempts to determine the conditions of 'equilibrium' in the system, Ricardo is famous for having severely criticized inflationary monetary policies based on the introduction of excess paper currency in the form of credit. According to Ricardo, the only justification for introducing new money into the system is production in the economy. But Ricardo's economic theory focussed mainly on analysis of the commodities market, and on his labor cost theory of value. Hence Ricardo was criticized for his failure to integrate the commodities and money markets in his analysis. Others claimed that bottom-up considerations are in fact implicit in Ricardo's account of the nature of value and production in the economy. This integration is not readily apparent in Ricardo's Principles, but his knowledge of money markets was extensive, as is evident in his many pamphlets on the subject. dxii Perhaps Ricardo did draw on his experience and understanding of money markets, and perhaps real life considerations did play a role as he formulated his theories. There is even some loose sense in which Ricardo may have had a standard of theory-data fit. But the question of whether data actually serve as a basis for modification to Ricardo's theoretical models remains an open one. One thing that seems indisputable, however, is that there was a strong emphasis on deductive elements in Ricardo's system -and emphasis on abstraction, causality and systematic unity. While Kant may have encouraged an interest in subsumption and causal laws, there were a variety of influences pushing economics toward the science model. Over time, the British government would grow increasingly aware of the political power of this quantitative data and analysis, and take over the task of collecting and managing the data themselves. Thus, the quantitative analysis of society grew increasingly important. The hope was that social phenomena might be studied with the same precision as natural phenomena, and lead to exact knowledge that might be fruitful both for government and for the other developing sciences. dxiii By the turn of the nineteenth century, it was expected that the resulting 'science' would serve to justify suggested or needed reforms. Mary Shepherd, who spoke intimately on intellectual matters with David Ricardo, was strictly interested in epistemology and metaphysics -and 4 116 wrote nothing on economic theory. However, Ricardo, Mill, and Shepherd all placed emphasis on abstract analysis, on the discovery of causal laws, and on an axiomatic, unified system to supplement the criteria of truth for empiricism. In this sense, they were in basic agreement about some of the fundamental characteristics of knowledge. Shepherd's connection to the Westminster radicals, while suggestive of personal and political convictions, also shed light on the systematic approach implicit in her work. Shepherd's two major philosophical works, published in 1824 and 1827, and entitled An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect and Essays on the Perception of an External Universe are united by an underlying account of causality. dxiv In addition, Shepherd two shorter pieces, published in 1828 and 1832, are also intended to elucidate her system. dxv Shepherd commitment to unifying a wide range of subjects under the causal axiom marks her philosophy as belonging to the same Kantian vintage as that of the political economists and philosophical radicals in her circle. Like Kant, Shepherd intends the whole to hang on a system that is ultimately subsumed under laws with a priori content. As Shepherd writes of her 1824 and 1827 books, 'the subjects of the two Essays are capable of being considered independently, yet of throwing a mutual light upon each other.'... 'The analysis, therefore, of the operations of mind from infancy, throws light upon the knowledge we have of cause and effect; and the relation of cause and effect when fully known and established, affords the only method of proof in our power, for the knowledge of external existence.' dxvi Such an account, she says, will not amount to 'reasoning in a circle, if by carefully defining the nature of internal and external existence of objects perceived and unperceived, we gain thereby clearer ideas of the method and action of causation.' dxvii The aspiration to a systematic philosophy is already apparent in this statement. But there are also aspirations to an axiomatic system apparent in Shepherd's work, and this will also become increasingly apparent. The tendency toward systematic thought is evident in Shepherd. Clearly there are grounds for adding thinkers such as Kant and Brown to the list of influences on Shepherd. Like them, Shepherd was influenced by the enlightenment ideal of systematic thought. She sought to incorporate a wide range of topics under a small set of assumptions, according to the precepts of those in her circle. In this respect, the links to Kant's philosophy of science, whether direct or indirect, are readily apparent in Shepherd. For Kant's thought continually points to the epistemic role of subsumption of empirical generalizations under more abstract and even a priori features of general laws and their concepts. As we shall see, Shepherd's theory of representation, her assumption that 'bottom up' elements will meet those from 'top down', as well as her arguments refuting Berkeley, contain further echoes of Kantianism. Mill, Ricardo, and Shepherd also share a number of specific philosophical and methodological presuppositions in the philosophy of mind -presuppositions explicit in Condillac and Brown. With Brown, they share a fundamental commitment to empiricist associationism -and a desire to supplement associationist psychology with something rationalistic. As we have seen, Brown's philosophy focussed of the development of a single foundational concept, that of causality. This same approach is adopted by Shepherd, who sees the causal relation, in conjunction with a 'scientific' analysis of the operations of the mind, as the basis for a secure foundation for knowledge. In Shepherd's metaphysics, the causal relation is also fundamental. The two thinkers, in fact, share much in common. According to Shepherd, the fundamental problem with Brown is that he has grievously erred in his basic analysis of the foundational concept of causality. Shepherd develops her philosophy by drawing out the implications of what she takes to be the correct notion of causality, and the correct theory of representation, based on her observations of the workings of the mind. Finally, Brown and Shepherd share in the desire to develop a metaphysical system that could answer 'atheists'. It is very hard to establish the precise direction of influence between Shepherd and her friends. It is, however, much less difficult to find common sources for them. There is evidence in the 4 117 group of an emerging interest in scientific method. In this regard, Mill, Ricardo, and Shepherd all looked to criteria such as the unity of knowledge, and to a priori concepts and laws for inspiration in the wake of Hume. Mill and Ricardo differ from Shepherd in seeming to place even greater emphasis on deduction in their theories. Shepherd, in any case, develops her theory in a way that appears to balance inductive and deductive methods. Shepherd, Brown, Mill may also have been influenced by Villers' Kant -as well as Villers' reading of Condillac as proto-Kantian. In addition, all three were in Edinburgh around the time of Willich's German classes, and may well have learned something of Kant from him. The influence of a systematic philosophy can't be overlooked if we are to understand Mary Shepherd's work. For it is this framework, and the return to Kant studies, that helps us to discern the structure and aims of her work. In Shepherd's thought, the systematic project is explicitly conceived as a union of inductive analysis and a deductively justified concept of causal necessity. On a final note, it is worth remarking that Shepherd, along with Mill, Mathus, Ricardo, and others, must be counted among the group of 'dangerous' thinkers that had affronted William Kerr in 1807. Recall that Kerr had charged Leslie and Malthus with being among those in the habit of mixing together speculative, mathematical truths with real truths in order to 'give their speculative opinions the semblance of truth' and to 'change truth into the semblance of a lie.' dxviii While Kerr's linking of the doctrine of causality with political subterfuge might at first seem accidental, attenuated, or spurious, the connection was not scoffed at in Shepherd's day. Richard Whately and Mme de Staël openly joked about the connections between abstract notions like causality and revolution -but underneath the jokes lay the recognition of the simmering social unrest and its attendant ideological controversy. For the philosophical radicals and political economists, the idea of connections reaching from abstract concepts such as causality to the social order was not in fact absurd. However, whether the causes of social unrest were to be located in liberal ideologies, as the conservatives maintained, was a matter of some dispute. Another way to see the issues was in terms of economic and social conditions and their root causes -and it was to this very analysis that the philosophical radicals would turn. 4.3 Causality and the Unity of Knowledge Shepherd rejects the definition of causality based on antecedence and subsequence that is fundamental to Hume and the later empiricists. For Shepherd, ideas of cause and effect are always implicit in the representation under analysis, because causality is mixed together with ideas of sensations in the very act of representation. This is not an entirely new view of representation. It has earlier Continental roots, especially, but not exclusively, in Kant. However, it turns out that Kant's own views on representation contain several elements in common with Shepherd's, and are helpful in appraising the aims and significance of Shepherd's own philosophical contribution. Kant's philosophy is influenced in important ways by both German rationalist metaphysics and British empiricism. As the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence makes clear, thinkers working in these traditions disagreed over epistemological, metaphysical, and physical aspects of Newtonian science. One area of disagreement concerned matter theory. Leibniz was committed to a forcebased concept of matter, and his reading of Newton (now seen as controversial) was that Newton favored an atomistic view on which ultimate particles of matter are impenetrable to forces. As the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence makes apparent, the physical theories of Newton and Leibniz are not only based on ontological differences, they are the result of very different methodological presuppositions, including presuppositions about how one reasons from effects to causes and from causes to effects. Newtonian physics arrives at its conclusions using definition, geometrical analysis, observed phenomena, and a combination of the methods of analysis (reasoning from observed effects to causes) and synthesis (reasoning from proven causes to further effects). Leibniz arrived at his conclusions by using a relatively small set of 4 118 metaphysical and epistemological principles to interpret the observable phenomena. Much of the disagreement between the two thinkers boils down to a disagreement about the appropriateness of each of the methods of causal reasoning. By the nineteenth century, the Leibniz-Clarke dispute was well known to scholars. Given Newton's apparent methodological commitments, as voiced through Clarke, one of Newton's remarks in his Principia has often struck commentators just as it did John Leslie, as a puzzling and anomalous. Leslie's fateful note, you will recall, had been a criticism of the methodological soundness of Newton's speculation about aether as a medium through which gravitational forces might work. In particular, it has been difficult to understand the sense of the distinction that Newton intended when he claimed that gravity was a universal, but not an essential property of matter. Here are the remarks in Book III, Rule II of the Principia, that have given commentators considerable pause: For the argument from the appearances concludes with more force for the universal gravitation of all bodies than for their impenetrability; of which, among those in the celestial regions, we have no experiments, nor any manner of observation. Not that I affirm gravity to be essential to bodies: by their vis insita I mean nothing but their inertia. This is immutable. Their gravity is diminished as they recede from the earth. dxix To those with an interest in Newton's alchemical work, these remarks appear somewhat less puzzling. For it is now quite well known that Newton did extensive alchemical work on the 'Star Regulus of Antimony', nearly all of which remains unpublished. What remains of the work is a copious set of notes about the appearance of net-like, geometrical patterns formed in the crystallization process of the Star Regulus. dxx Given the nature of his experimental work, it is likely that Newton supposed that an aetherial medium left traces of geometrical patterns, traces that in turn represent visible effects of the original forces of nature. Newton speculated that 'all bodies, like networks, allow magnetic effluvia and rays of light to pass through them in all directions', and suggested that it was by the force of nature that 'the first seeds of all things' come together 'geometrically in net-like figures.' dxxi In the context of his times, Newton's speculation about aether is not all that surprising. Forces in his day were generally not well understood, and the idea of attraction at a distance was repugnant and strange to many. If Newton did suspect that a universal aetherial medium existed, and if he hoped to find a unified account of force laws governing all matter, then his reluctance to affirm that gravity is essential to matter may reflect his unwillingness to commit to gravity as an ultimate and irreducible force. And, as Newton realized, his work proved the universality of gravitational effects, but not that gravity, rather than some other force, was essential to matter. Contra Leslie, Newton's methodological instincts were, after all, quite sound. Indeed, Newton acknowledges that his alchemical work is entirely speculative. He writes that 'I am far from affirming that my views are correct, and I acknowledge their great imperfection, nevertheless they are simple and easy to conceive, and of the same kind as the natural philosophy of the cosmic system which depends on the attractive forces of greater bodies.' dxxii Kant, though schooled in the German tradition of deductive metaphysics, often expressed enthusiasm for Newtonian science. Kant obviously understood the problems set out in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, and he eventually came to reject Leibniz's physics. Moreover, following his remarks in his 1747 Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces, we can also assume that he was dissatisfied with the state of deductive metaphysics. Upon reflection, Kant offered the diagnosis that there existed an irreconcilable conflict between physical and metaphysical modes of thought. The solution was to begin again and to lay a proper epistemological foundation for both metaphysics and physics. Kant sets out to draw the proper demarcation between the spheres of natural philosophy and metaphysics, doing so with the 4 119 conviction that each had its role to play in our knowledge, and these roles could eventually be reconciled. dxxiii Kant then, is convinced that Newtonian physics stands in need of a proper foundation, and holds that 'what many say can be properly absent from physics is in fact its only support; it is metaphysics that brings light.' dxxiv But what will provide the new foundation for metaphysics and natural science? In 1786, Kant aims to develop the details of his foundation for physics in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. These details, it turns out, rest on his new metaphysics in his 1787 Critique of Pure Reason, which explains the foundations of knowledge at a very high level of generality. Kant thinks that the new foundation for physics must rest on a new metaphysics -a metaphysics that has an explicitly epistemological orientation. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he presents a radical re-conception of the methods and content of metaphysics; so radical that it evoked for Kant the image of a conceptual about-face, of a so-called 'Copernican revolution'. dxxv Kant's claim is that the limits of what metaphysics can say about the world are discovered through an analysis of the most abstract and rudimentary elements involved in the operations of our faculties of understanding, imagination and reason. He develops this general epistemological doctrine, the critical philosophy, in his Critique of Pure Reason. For the critically awakened Kant, metaphysical explanation no longer aims to capture the basically real features of the universe through deductive reasoning, but rather becomes subject to a set of demands of reason in its effort to regulate human inquiry. Hence, after the critical turn, the role of metaphysics is no longer to fulfil the tasks Leibniz that set out, that of exhibiting the original causes and forces underlying the phenomena of natural science. As Kant, explains, part of this recognition is due to the force of Hume's critique of basic metaphysical concepts such as causality. Hume's question, 'By what right does [reason] think anything could be so constituted that if that thing be posited, something else must necessarily be posited [?]', suggested a critique so penetrating that metaphysics would have to provide a new foundation for the grounds and possible extent of human knowledge. In the empiricist spirit, Kant claimed that 'Clearheaded philosophers' should 'admit nothing except what becomes directly known by the testimony of the senses.' For, the safe course reflects the fact that 'we can exhibit the laws of nature but not the origin and causes of these laws'. dxxvi He [Hume] demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts such a combination [e.g., of cause and effect], for it implies necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. Hence he inferred that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her own children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of imagination, impregnated by experience... dxxvii Kant saw Hume's critique of metaphysical concepts such as causality as not only undermining the old procedure in metaphysics, but as a threat to natural science, rendering it no better than fiction and fantasy. Kant 'tried whether Hume's objection [to causation] could not be put into a general form, and soon found out that the concept of connection of cause and effect was by no means the only concept by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such concepts'. dxxviii Kant's response to the problem Hume had raised began with the identification of all of the relevant metaphysical concepts at stake -- 'I sought to ascertain their number' -and then proceeded to try to find the justification for their use -- 'I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts.' Kant devised a special representation terminology to try to solve Hume's problem: he distinguished between analytic and synthetic judgments, and a priori and a posteriori. An analytic judgment is one in which there is a (partial) identity between subject and predicate. A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate 'falls outside' the concept of the subject. For Kant, 'a priori' means 'independent from experience' and 'a posteriori' means 'derived from experience'. 4 120 Kant argues that the concepts and principles 'by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori' are synthetic and a priori. That is, representations of natural phenomena that extend our knowledge of things are the result of synthetic combinations of sense data, and elements that contribute to this synthesis, intuitions of space and time and concepts of understanding, are known a priori. The Critique of Pure Reason aims to establish that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. Hence, Kant responds to Hume's doubts about whether science could rest on concepts such as causality by attempting to show the sense in which there are features in the concepts and propositions of science that supply a certain foundation for knowledge. These features are described in Kant's system of metaphysical concepts and principles, principles that also place formal conditions on the empirical concepts and laws set out in Newton's Principia. The metaphysical concepts and principles contain the necessary, universal, and objective elements that we discover as characteristics of our representations of the empirical world. In sum, Kant holds that natural science presupposes certain fundamental propositions. The epistemological warrant for Newtonian science, its claim to objectivity and certainty, turns on its critical underpinning. Kant's special metaphysics provides a specific answer to this question by appeal to how the a priori elements of his critical formalism -space, time, and the categories -lend objectivity and necessity to the representation of matter and motion in Newtonian mechanics. Kant's special metaphysical reasoning in his Metaphysical Foundations reinforces the general thesis of the Copernican revolution, offering Newtonian science as a case study in defense of his claim that knowledge must conform to a subject's faculties on understanding, imagination and reason. In carrying through the critical project in the direction of the concepts and laws of matter and its motions as conceived in Newtonian physics, Kant gives content to the very abstract concepts and principles in his general metaphysics. The appeal to a priori elements in representation is not the whole of Kant's answer to Hume. There are other methodological considerations -second order desiderata that supply criteria for judging the status of a theory. For Kant, these criteria are linked to reason's drive to unify knowledge. Gerd Buchdahl has stressed the importance of reason's unifying activity in Kant's a priori foundation for science. According to Buchdahl, Kant's natural philosophy contains an essential distinction between 'nature' and the 'order of nature'. In the Metaphysical Foundations, the categorical principles are developed into specific laws in understanding, and these define the possibilities for 'nature'. However, it is reason which requires us to seek unity in science, and which ultimately secures the sort of necessity for the lawlikeness which we find in the 'order of nature' dxxix Consider what Kant says in the Doctrine of Method: Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding, and it is only through the understanding that it has its own [specific] empirical employment. It does not, therefore create concepts (of objects) but only orders them... dxxx The role of reason in natural philosophy, Kant goes on to say, is to 'assist the understanding by means of ideas, in those cases where the understanding cannot by itself establish rules, and at the same time to give to the numerous and diverse rules of understanding unity...'. dxxxi What Kant indicates then, is that understanding plays an important role as a mediator, and this suggests that the need for a transition to reason is constrained as it were, 'from below', rather than 'from above'. Hence, empirical lawlikeness is a result of the regulative function of reason, although there is also a sense in which the necessitarian character of laws emerges from understanding: The lawlikeness of the empirical laws of Newtonian science (e.g. of Kepler's laws, Galileo's laws) has now been seen to be a function of the architectonic of reason; it is injected, so to 4 121 speak, 'from above'. There are, however, certain privileged principles whose necessitarian character is established 'from below'. They are part of Kant's 'special metaphysics of nature', being contrasted with his 'general metaphysics' (i.e. the doctrine of the Transcendental Analytic) where the former, instead of being occupied only with the concept of nature in general, involves the introduction of a specific aspect of nature, viz. nature qua 'matter' -a concept which Kant declares to be 'empirical'. dxxxii Thus, reason systematizes Kant's transcendental concepts and principles by projecting a 'synthetic unity objectively', and thereby yields an 'order of nature', but the elements in this order are strictly constrained by understanding, which alone has the capacity to prescribe concepts of objects. dxxxiii There are several interesting things to note in connection with Kant's view of the 'order of nature' and its connection to 'nature'. Firstly, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that empirical laws must be thought of as necessary because reason regards them as part of a systematic and unified theory of nature. Buchdahl has established this point in some detail. Buchdahl writes that 'In so far as empirical generalizations are to be called laws they must be regarded as necessary. And Why? In virtue of 'the principles of the unity of the manifold' -which is here a reference not to the unity of the understanding but to reason or reflective judgement.' dxxxiv Kant describes the relationship between particular empirical generalizations and the unity of the 'order of nature' in just this way: ...that we are justified in declaring all possible cognitions -empirical and others -to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they are all derivable -such an assertion can be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically -in its character of a method, but objectively necessary. dxxxv According to Kant then, reason demands that we regard our experience of nature as part of an order of nature such that particular generalizations are subsumed under more general ones. As such, empirical law-likeness is partly the result of an embedding in a system or theory under a few general principles. The philosopher of science, Carl Hempel, makes a similar point in the familiar terminology of twentieth century philosophy of science. On Hempel's account, empirical laws are valid in so far as they are subsumable under a general theory -a theory being a unified small set of general laws. Moreover, for Hempel, empirical laws serve to reinforce the unity in natural science by 'connecting events in patterns which are usually referred to as explanation and prediction'. dxxxvi Hempel argues that when the subsumption requirement is met, predictions and explanations of empirical instances of a law will not fail to hold: Thus, the explanation of a general regularity consists in subsuming it under a more general law. Similarly, the validity of Galileo's law for the free fall of bodies near the earth's surface can be explained by deducing it from a more comprehensive set of laws, namely Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravitation, together with some statements about particular facts, namely about the mass and the radius of the earth. dxxxvii So, like Kant, Hempel draws an essential link between the status of laws, subsumption and the unity of natural science. This similarity between Hempel and Kant provides a certain amount of clarification of what Kant meant by his subsumption requirement. For Kant then, laws of nature are 'formally' characterized as both universal and subsumable within a unified system of nature. Kant's own claims in the Critique of Pure Reason make it clear that both the understanding's prescription of 'nature' and reason's unifying activity under an 'order of nature' provide important criteria of empirical truth in critical philosophy. In the first 4 122 instance, Kant writes that reason's unity ' ...aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding in its manifold and special modes of employment, directing its attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering it more coherent.' dxxxviii The second point is evident in passages such as the one below: For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and self accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity. dxxxix It is important to note, then, that Kant's view is that reason's unifying activity is determined by what is given in the understanding -an important point that sometimes gets overlooked. Like Kant, Shepherd rejects Hume's definition of causality. Her positive claim is based on a kind of a priorism regarding the causal axiom. Shepherd makes an effort to show why Hume's definition based on 'the customary antecedency and subsequency of sensible qualities' is inadequate. Shepherd argues that it is Hume's mistaken analysis of causal objects and their agency that leads him to hold the incorrect view that causality should be defined in terms of antecedence and subsequence: This impossibility of sensible qualities, being the productive principle of sensible qualities, lies at the root of all Mr. Hume's controversy concerning the manner of causation; for he, observing that such ideas could only follow one another, resolved causation into the observations of the customary antecedency and subsequency of sensible qualities. But objects, when spoken of and considered as causes, should always be considered as those masses of unknown qualities in nature, exterior to the organs of the sense, whose determination of sensible qualities to the sense forms one class of their effects; whereas philosophers, (with the exception of Berkeley) and mankind in general, look upon the masses of sensible qualities after determination to the senses as the causes, the antecedents, the productive principles of other masses of sensible qualities, which are their effects or subsequents; a notion naturally arising from the powerful style of the associations in the mind, and which our Maker has ordained for practical purposes;--but monstrous when held as an abstract truth in analytical science. dxl Hence, Hume errs because his definition of causality is itself based on the mistaken ascription of causal agency to sensible qualities. Sensible qualities, according to Shepherd, are noticed as dependent effects before the mind. But the temporal associations in the perception of qualities is due to the manner in which they are noticed by the mind, rather than to the character of either the perceived or exterior objects themselves. Shepherd's own view of causal objects, as we have seen, requires attention to the distinction between exterior and perceived objects. Perceived objects are compounds of ideas of sensible qualities and ideas of cause and effect and are determined to the mind in representation, but ultimately due to exterior causes. For Shepherd, compound objects are inner objects that result from the mental union of sensible qualities and ideas of causes; whereas exterior objects are the unperceived causes of the various species of sensible ideas. dxli According to Shepherd, only compound objects are directly perceived by the mind. The unperceived, exterior objects -or more properly their relations -are known by inference alone. Shepherd relies on her distinction between perceived, compound and unperceived exterior objects and a metaphysical and epistemological sense of necessary connection to explain her views on necessary connection: 4 123 The necessary connection therefore of cause and effect arises from the obligation, that like qualities should arise from the junction, separation, admixture, &c. of aggregates of external qualities. But the necessary connection of invariable antecedency and subsequency of successive aggregates of sensible qualities' from the necessity 'that there should be invariable sequences of effects, when one common cause (or exterior object) mixes successively with different organs of sense, or various parts of the human frame, & c. dxlii In other words, in the first instance, necessary connection supposed to be a feature of exterior things in a metaphysically deterministic world. Properly speaking, 'all of the exterior and uncombined objects, whose junction is necessary to an event' are causes that lead up to the proximate cause that we identify with an event. dxliii Hence, there is a sense of metaphysical necessity in exterior objects implicit in Shepherd's thought. The second kind of necessary connection described above is the sense of necessity that we discover through examination of our representations. This is the a priori sense of causal necessity that is the main focus of her philosophical argument against Hume. As Shepherd reasons, when a 'common object' mixes with the sense organs, we notice a succession of qualities. When the common object gives rise to an invariable sequence of qualities such that it passes the experimentum crucis, we say that we have discovered a necessary connection of cause and effect. dxliv This is an epistemological sense of necessity, a sense that is possible, for Shepherd, because the world is metaphysically determined. As Shepherd explains, it is important to distinguish between the 'perceived internal qualities' and the 'external aggregates of qualities', 'which form the determining causes of these on the mind'. dxlv In addition to developing the above general accounts of necessary connection, Shepherd holds that causal natural laws contain necessity. Her argument shows that the necessity of empirical laws is linked to their subsumption under the causal axiom. Shepherd's view is interesting not only in view of comments on Hume and causality, but also because they show a methodological interest in subsumption under the causal axiom. Shepherd's methodological appraisal of Newton begins with her expression of agreement with LaPlace's assessment of the necessary status of the law of gravitation. dxlvi Shepherd agrees with LaPlace's assessment that Newton would have attributed the same necessity to this physical law as to the demonstrative proof of his binomial theorems. dxlvii In short, did there exist the slightest shade of difference between the degree of his assent to this inductive result, and that extorted from him by a demonstration of Euclid? Although, therefore, the mathematician, as well as the natural philosopher, may without any blameable latitude of expression, be said to reason by induction, when he draws an inference from the known to the unknown, yet it seems indisputable, that, in all such cases he rests his conclusions on grounds essentially distinct from those which form the basis of experimental science. dxlviii Shepherd does, however, raise one important quibble with LaPlace. She says that LaPlace is imprecise in his description of Newton's method. For, at base, the necessity of Newton's binomial theorem and the law of universal gravitation must have one and the same foundation. Indeed, 'the science of mathematics is truly but one branch of physics' since 'all the conclusions its method of induction demonstrates, depend on the truth of the causal principle 'That like cause must have like effect'. dxlix As Shepherd clarifies what has in mind, it becomes apparent that she is saying that the necessity of the causal axiom is the single foundation for necessity in physical laws and in mathematics. For, 'when objects are formed the same upon one occasion as another, their qualities, properties, and effects, will be similar.' She adds that 'It is this proposition on which mathematical demonstration, and physical induction equally, and only, rest for their truth.' dl Thus certainty in mathematics is dependent on the same manner and action of causation that we 4 124 trace in the 'original FORMATIONS of the objects'. For this reason, true physical laws are not merely a contingent, but also necessary truths. Similarly, mathematical demonstrations involve objects that resemble one another 'only because there is nothing to make a difference among them.' If, as Shepherd claims, a cause 'C' is properly represented as a compound of 'A X B', so that 'C' is included in the mixture of 'A X B', then the necessity underlying causal connection will apply to mathematical and physical representations. Thus, in the case of mathematical representations, the results of arithmetic combinations are included in their statements. dli Physical representations follow along similar lines. New qualities that appear to arise result from a union of qualities in such a manner that every repetition of that union will always give rise to that same new quality. dlii The argument then, on the status of mathematical and physical induction, once again points us back to the foundation in the causal relation and its role in representation. Shepherd's methodological points are interesting to those who seek to understand the philosophical foundations of causal natural laws. As a general claim about how we are to understand the necessity of a physical law, they represent a kind of account not unlike that given by some recent thinkers regarding an 'epistemological ascent' to necessary status. Like Kant, Shepherd is sensitive to the epistemological virtues of subsumptive causal laws in science and metaphysics. As we have seen, subsumption confers explanatory unity, and increases our confidence in the scientific status of the most general laws of a theory. And, according to some, subsumption is a criterion of necessity for empirical laws. Hence, Shepherd is to be credited not only for her awareness of the need to combine inductive and deductive methods in scientific experimentalism, her notion of testing as a method for distinguishing accidental from lawlike generalizations, but also for her sense of the significance of subsumption in scientific theories. Whether or not she took an interest in subsumption under the causal axiom because she took explanatory unity or systematicity as marks of truth or because she saw subsumption as a mark of the necessity of physical laws is open to further investigation. But one thing that is clear, however, is that Shepherd departs from the majority of her empiricist counterparts by requiring that the criteria of good science also be guided by 'top-down' considerations -by the very sort of abstract epistemological considerations that her common sense counterparts were loathe to introduce. Shepherd also invokes a wider view of the sense of subsumption in knowledge than her political economics counterparts. For Shepherd, as we shall see, systematic unity extends from the causal axiom to a wide range of subjects, from mathematics to the sciences, and, ultimately, to theology. 4.4 Systematic Philosophy and the 1827 Essays There is a plausible argument to be made that Shepherd's 1827 Essays were not developed as a system of ideas. It is certainly true that the essays appear to be a motley collection of arguments touching on a variety of subjects connected with external perception. And, as they were evidently collected for publication without having been prepared as a systematic philosophy, the question of whether a there is a systematic philosophy underlying her 1827 work is one that needs to be addressed. Indeed, Shepherd's presentation in the 1827 Essays seems anything but systematic. Much of the reasoning is directed against Berkeley, and appears to have little to do with the theory of representation in her 1824 treatise. For example, when Shepherd uses syllogistic reasoning to dismantle Berkeley's views; her style of argument draws on the canons of deductive logic and the principle that one should avoid presupposing more than that to which a reasonable interlocutor would assent. Indeed, logic and analysis were always central preoccupations for Shepherd, who recommends that dliii In this regard, there is little doubt that Whately's logic assisted Shepherd in her specific criticisms. 4 125 Careful perusal of the 1827 book shows that Shepherd supplements her negative criticisms with positive arguments. These arguments show how her alternative theory of representation makes sense of the inference from the marks of objective reality to knowledge of an external world. It is these latter arguments that develop the systematic character of her work. To wit, they show how Shepherd's whole philosophy ultimately hangs on her theory of representation -on her claim that sensations of ideas such as cause and effect mix together with sensations of sensible qualities in representation. As we have noted, Shepherd herself explains in the 1827 objective account of causality. For ...the question concerning the nature and reality of external existence can only receive a satisfactory answer, derived from a knowledge of the relation of dliv Unfortunately, apart from this remark (and the occasional aside), Shepherd gives little indication that she takes herself to have exhibited a system in the 1827 Essays. However, in the end, her substantive arguments against Berkeley the soundness of Berkeley's idealist position depend on her theory of representation and its a priori causal axiom. In the following section, I will argue that there is in fact a systematic element implicit in Shepherd's 1827 Essays. Unfortunately, the contrast in Shepherd's argumentative styles in the 1827 Essays can be misleading on a cursory reading. Let's begin looking at the arguments to see why this is so. Fir involve logical errors. Recall first that Berkeley adopts the principle esse percipi on in The Principles of Human Knowledge. dlv He thinks that this principle, from which it follows that no sensible object could have an existence distinct from its being perceived by the understanding, ought to be granted by the empiricist. dlvi Shepherd advances several arguments against this position, and, in particular, rejects Berke nothing but ideas and sensations: For if the major proposition stands, Our ideas and sensations, are the only things we perceive viz. Therefore objects because the middle term would then consist of two different parts, or kinds, of the same universal and this will never serve to show whether the subject and predicate agree, or disagree. dlvii particular sensible ideas and in the minor premise to be consciousness of the use of the sense organs in relation to outward objects. dlviii These are, in fact, two different ways of talking about perception. As Shepherd writes, the conscious use of the mechanical action of the five senses mental consciousness of PARTICULAR SENSIBLE QUALITIES only dlix The former usage, Shepherd thinks, assumes that particular ideas cannot be perceived unless mechanically imprinted on sense organs by outward objects. This objection to Berkeley's account of the sense organs is best understood in light of realism typical of the philosophy of Shepherd's day. Like her Scottish counterpart, Thomas Brown, Shepherd finds it psychologically impossible to imagine sense organs as mere complexes of ideas in the minds of perceivers. Brown, however, has nothing more to offer against Berkeley than incredulity. He rejects Berkeley on the grounds that 'The instinct, by which we consider the sensation of our mind, as marks of the existence of an external world, is too powerful to be weakened by any theory...'. dlx Brown's arguments would be insufficient to force Berkeley, or an extreme sceptic, to concede his sceptical view. That said, many would object to Berkeley's vagueness on distinction between general conscious perception and perception by means of the 4 126 sense organs. If there is a fundamental difference in the character of our sensations, then Berkeley should not be allowed to gloss over the fact in his syllogism. Berkeley never offers a clear account of what it means to say that ideas arise through the mediation of sense organs. Shepherd thinks that if pressed on the point, he would be forced to conclude that sense organs are more than . dlxi Specifically, he would be forced to admit that sense organs are mechanical instruments that so that external and independent causes give rise to ideas in us. dlxii But this is to rely on a conception of the world that Berkeley explicitly rejects as a foundation for his own theory of ideas; hence, Berkeley's description of ideas being imprinted on the senses ... contains the dlxiii On the one hand, this criticism of Berkeley can be criticised as being one that is not especially charitable, since Berkeley likely has in mind that spirits imprint ideas on the senses. dlxiv On the other hand, we can sympathise with Shepherd to the extent that Berkeley leaves the basis for sensible ideas of human embodiment and the sense organs something of a mystery. dlxv Berkeley builds on his conclusion that formulating his 'master argument' against materialism. The master argument draws on the above argument and leads to the conclusion that No sensible objects are things that exist gument cuts against the realist view that there exists an unperceived, external substratum of material things. For, as Berkeley points out, his argument shows that the materialist can have no idea of what she is talking about when she refers to an unperceived material substratum of external objects. dlxvi The master argument is an important step in Berkeley subjective idealism is based on his argument to show that other spirits are causes of our ideas. His argument, invokes his claim that ideas are passive and is based on his 'likeness principle', that dlxvii In this case, Berkeley reasons that all of our ideas are passive and that ideas can only be like other ideas, concluding that our ideas cannot cause one another. But, at the same time, Berkeley reasons, sensible ideas are effects, and as such, they must have causes. dlxviii Indeed, Berkeley appears to invoke the causal principle that all effects have causes, for he says that There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depe he wonders? Berkeley takes it that the intelligibility of suggesting that causes originate in a material substratum has been ruled out. Since sensible ideas must be caused by something, and, since cause must be active, Berkeley reasons, active spirits must be the causes of our ideas. dlxix cannot claim to know. Berkeley's argument involves the claims that all that exists are and have no notion of and that he So what sort of idea of cause could Berkeley possibly have? dlxx that he can have no idea of what he is talking about when he refers to an immaterial substratum. As Shepherd writes, it is plain we can know no more of activity, indivisibility, and simplicity, as applied to substance, called mind, than of inertness, divisibility, &c. applied to another sort of dlxxi While Berkeley is not here charged with equivocation, he has erred in using a term that can have no exact meaning on his own theory of ideas. In view of this, it seems unfair of Berkley to allow himself the inference to spirits while denying the materialist her inference to a material substratum. dlxxii Berkeley, of course, defends his view by maintaining that our ideas of spirits are that spirits are causal agents. Shepherd is suspicious of the tactic, and with good reason. For f sensible qualities. How then, does the will acquire such notions of active spirit from our passive 4 127 ideas? To be consistent with his claims about the passivity of ideas, Berkeley must maintain that we infer the existence of active spirits. But Shepherd wonders what the details of this account involve. How can the will 'call upon an idea, when before it begins to call, it must know what it wishes to call'? Her point is that we 'must have consciousness of the idea in question, which as an object associated with another idea, can and does truly act as a cause in order to introduce dlxxiii If Shepherd is right, then we do, after all, directly perceive ideas of active causes. Shepherd does a fair job using reasoning to uncover the question begging elements in Berkeley. negative arguments do not, on the face of it, depend on her own theory of representation, the role of her representational theory in defending external perception is unclear. Indeed, Shepherd's substantive arguments for external perception need separate attention in order to ensure that her full response to Berkeley is charitably reconstructed. And, with Shepherd's positive theory to illuminate her arguments, she has more to offer against Berkeley's subjective idealism than at first meets the eye. In order to see this, we must recall once again that the 1827 and 1824 treatises are conceptually connected. The point is remarked upon by Shepherd, but is also evident from a philosophical perspective. dlxxiv In the later work, the philosophical aim is to apply the doctrine of cause and effect to the question of the existence of an external world. Once again, Brown is helpful in setting the context for Shepherd's philosophical position. For having closely studied his Observations, it is unlikely that Shepherd would have missed Brown's remark about Bishop Berkeley. There Brown says, provokingly, that the perceived dangers of Hume's doctrine pale in comparison with those occasioned by Berkeley's doubts about external existence. According to Brown, Berkeley's denial of our grounds for belief in external existence is 'completely unanswerable', so that 'magnificent arguments for the existence of a Deity were annihilated in the general desolation powered by a few propositions!' dlxxv With her theory of representation in mind, Shepherd identifies the general problem in Berkeley's view, as she sees it. The principal difficulty, Shepherd thinks, lies in his failure to carefully distinguish between ideas of external causes, ideas of sensible qualities, and the capacity for can coherently think of sense organs as mechanical instruments; which powers modify exterior general power of feeling dlxxvi Moreover, such careful distinctions are required for a correct definition of the term y of representation. Shepherd notes that I do not agree with him, in stating, that objects are nothing but what we perceive by sense, or that a complete enumeration is made of all the ideas which constitute an apple, a stone, a tree, or a book; in the summing up of their sensible qualities. dlxxvii So it turns out after all that Shepherd's rejection of Berkeley is in part based on rejection of his theory of representation. Unlike Berkeley, her own theory places emphasis on the distinction between general conscious perception and the various kinds of sensations of qualities and ideas of which we are conscious. Like Berkeley, Shepherd's epistemology draws a close connection between ideas and sensations; indeed, she defines the term sensation. dlxxviii The mix of sensations involved in representation consists of both sensations of ideas and sensations of qualities. According to Shepherd, sense objects are 'compound beings' consisting of various distinct sensations; specifically, sense objects are composed of sensations of sensible qualities that arise through the use of sense organs, and sensations of ideas of causes that arise in understanding. Thus, ideas and sensible qualities are distinct species of sensations, but the dlxxix As Shepherd writes, 'Now objects in our conscious apprehensions are compounded of each of these kinds of ideas; or red, sweet or sour, hard or soft, beautiful or ugly, warm or cold, loud or low; but the ideas of their 4 128 causes are included in their names as continually existing, and that even when the organs of sense are shut.' dlxxx Shepherd sums up her charge against Berkeley as a failure to recognise that sense objects are always compound objects in which general ideas of causes mix together with sensible qualities, leads him to an incomplete definition of the term The logical error, therefore, of Bishop Berkeley on this part of the subject, is an incomplete definition; for no definition is good which does not take notice of all the ideas, under the term; and in every object of sense which the mind perceives, the knowledge of its genus, as a general effect arising from a general cause independent of mind, is mixed with the sensations or ideas resulting from its special qualities affecting the same. dlxxxi bjects are complexes that combine sensible qualities and ideas of causes. She often repeats the point, and it is clear that the foundational role attributed to ideas of causes takes her theory of representation well beyond standard empiricist theories. Berkeley and Hume adopt Locke's view that ...the objects of human knowledge ... are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else are such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas forged by dlxxxii While it is true that Shepherd, Locke, and Berkeley all hold that mental operations act on sensible qualities, Shepherd rejects the view that sensations of sensible qualities enjoy either temporal or epistemological privilege as simple components of representations. What she maintains is that particular ideas, such as general ideas of causes, are mixed together with sensible qualities in the very moment of representation. So unlike those empiricists who conceive of general and abstract ideas as products of mental operations upon sensible ideas, Shepherd denies that the operations of understanding are introduced in representation only after collections of sensible impressions arise in the mind. dlxxxiii This view places her at variance with Locke, Berkeley and Hume, although not with Thomas Brown. Brown also conceives of causal belief as immediate to acts of representation. Representation, he thinks, requires that we suppose causal beliefs to arise immediately in an act of faith. But Brown's view appears to commit him to the claim that faith rather than reason is the foundation of the causal relation, and Shepherd explicitly rejects this view. completely n be read as a direct response to Brown's more specific charge that Berkeley and Kant share 'precisely the same doctrine'. In his 1803 review of Charles Villers' Philosophie de Kant ou Principes Fondamentaux de la Philosophie Transcendentale, Brown charges that Kant's position collapses into Berkeley's doctrine, not only because of his 'denial of space', but also because, for Kant, causation is 'phenomenal only'. Specifically, Brown charges that Kant's appeal to space and time leads his position to collapse into Berkeley's doctrine, and that the problem rests with Kant's account of causation: The idea of anything external to ourselves is confessed to involve space; yet with the denial of space, the reality of objects external to ourselves is affirmed; and the affirmation is peculiarly frivolous, since real objects, not having causation, which is phenomenal only, cannot affect our sensibility. It is not enough to say against the solitude of self which the consistent discipline of Berkeley must adopt 'that our mind revolts, and is indignant of the very idea' or that 'he professes a belief which is not human, and which, therefore, among human beings, can never be the doctrine of a numerous sect': for the argument is of equal force against transcendentalism, which, if consistent, is precisely the same doctrine with a new name... dlxxxiv Shepherd's reply to Berkley takes up this very point about causation, and endeavours to show that objective knowledge of causal necessity, as described in her 1824 treatise, leads to knowledge of the external world. As Shepherd writes, the subjects of the two Essays are 4 129 The analysis, therefore, of the operations of mind from infancy, throws light upon the knowledge we have of cause and effect; and the relation of cause and effect when fully known and established, affords the only method of proof in our power, for the knowledge of external dlxxxv Such an account, she says, will not amount to reasoning in a circle, if by carefully defining the nature of internal and external existence of objects perceived and unperceived, we gain thereby clearer ideas of the method and action of causation dlxxxvi Whether Shepherd can avoid all circularity in her account depends on our granting her view that causal necessity is an objective feature built into sense objects in representation. What Shepherd maintains, it will be recalled, is that ideas of causes are so 'interwoven' and 'immediate' with the use of the sense organs that 'they ought always to be considered as forming a component part of the whole ideas which lie under the terms, THE OBJECTS OF SENSE.' dlxxxvii Thus, Shepherd departs from the strict empiricism of her British counterparts. Brown, for example, claims that it would be impossible to isolate the subjective and objective elements in subjective perception, since they never exist apart. According to Brown, 'We own the subjectivity of our perceptions; but we are convinced of the impossibility of analysing them into objective and subjective elements; since to us, by the laws of our nature, these elements must ever coexist.' dlxxxviii Shepherd disagrees. Although she concedes that the senses and understanding 'are acting in concert when any object affects the senses', she holds that 'the understanding knowing the simplicity of mental sensation' can distinguish 'the varieties of the causes' and thus discover the subjective and objective elements in representation. dlxxxix Her epistemological view is that objective, a priori ideas of causes arise directly when outward objects affect the senses, so that such ideas are always included in the formation of compound objects: Now I repeat there is one sense in which it may be said that objects are perceived immediately, as existing outwardly, by the senses. It is this; the conscious powers of understanding, and the senses, are blended together in man; we are analysing them, but in nature they are united as intimately as are the prismatic colours in one uniform mass of light. This being the case, they are acting in concert when any object affects the senses. Therefore the understanding knowing the simplicity of mental sensation, it follows, that the varieties of the causes, (which create varieties in the effects,) are instantly perceived and detected, and that immediately with the conscious use of the senses; whilst also the mind as immediately mixes that idea of which the understanding is aware; viz, that theses varieties, as complex objects, continue to exist unperceived and independant, when unnoticed by the senses. dxc It is worth taking note of the sense in which Shepherd's above argument is reminiscent of Kantian philosophy. Like many of Kant's early critics, Shepherd rejects the appeal to forms of intuition (taking them to lack genuine objectivity), so she clearly rejects this central claim of Kant's theory of representation. But we have already taken note of the centrality of apriorism and of methodological unity in her epistemology. In addition to this, Shepherd appears to offer a form of transcendental argument in defence of her claim that we have knowledge of external existence. Like Kant, Shepherd's holds that the possibility of having knowledge of the real properties of things requires that we suppose the existence of an order of 'insentient existence'. As Shepherd writes, 'time must be capable of being measured externally to the mind, by whatever could measure equality, such as the beat of a pendulum, &c' and 'this capacity of admeasurement must exist as a possible quality, capacity, or object in nature.' Accordingly, Shepherd's view supposes more than a merely phenomenal world; and her argument, it turns 4 130 out, depends on her claim that 'The senses and mind, also, may be considered as measures of the proportions of exterior objects'. For the very possibility of knowledge, Shepherd thinks, depends on an underlying order in what she calls, 'insentient existence'. Hence, Shepherd writes that the nce that in order to support the phenomena, there must needs be other continuous existences than dxci Sense organs and outward objects must exist, since ideas of colours cannot be imprinted on the eye; nor those of sound on the ear; nor those of extension on the touch; there are no such IDEAS, until after the eye, as an instrument, has been affected by some sorts of . dxcii Also like Kant, is Shepherd's proof of external existence involves a proof that we can infer objective properties of external things from the character of our representations. In this case, Shepherd argues that general ideas of causes are included in representations in such a way as to supply a rule from which we infer knowledge of exterior, continuing and independent existence. Sensations, she explains, are effects on the mind requiring causes, and the 'mind could not change, unless interfered with, therefore the interfering object is exterior to the mind dxciii On similar grounds, Shepherd holds that continuous existence is known by inference, not by sensation'. She later adds that Those circumstances which go to prove that there must be truly outward causes, for particular sensations, prove them to be independent dxciv Shepherd frequently returns to this line of argument in her refutation of idealism, so she is, in a limited sense at least, she endorses a form of transcendental idealism. So, Brown's remarks on Kant, and Kant's own transcendental idealism, are helpful in understanding Shepherd's reply to Berkeley. dxcv The difference between recognition that an analysis of causality should figure in a reply to Berkeley. dxcvi It would appear then, that Shepherd's full response to Berkeley's subjective idealism is one that appeals to her theory of representation. Moreover, the systematic aspirations of Shepherd's philosophy are apparent once we extended our view beyond Shepherd's negative criticisms of Berkeley. Shepherd's systematic aspirations bear repeating. 'The analysis, therefore, of the operations of mind from infancy, throws light upon the knowledge we have of cause and effect; and the relation of cause and effect when fully known and established, affords the only method of proof in our power, for the knowledge of external existence.' dxcvii These prefatory remarks to the 1827 treatise indicate that the analysis of causality there is the basis for her other arguments concerning external existence. But it also becomes apparent to the reader that she intends to rest her various claims there about induction, dualism, external perception, final causes, miracles, morality, and so on, on her arguments concerning causality. As we have already seen, Shepherd ties her views of mathematical and physical induction into her view of the causal relation when she argues that the former depend for their certainty on the latter. That is, mathematical and physical induction equally depend upon the truth of the proposition 'That , when objects are formed the same upon one occasion as another, their qualities, properties, and effects, will be similar.' For, whether in mathematics or in physics, the objects are formed from aggregates according to the axiom 'That like cause must have like effect.' dxcviii The law of causation forms the base on which mathematical certainty is built; the only difference in the case of other sciences derives from the difficulty in tracing the original formations of the objects without impugning the causal axiom. dxcix A similar sort of appeal to the role of the causal relation is typical of many of her arguments. This is not really surprising, once she makes it clear that she takes causal reasoning is central to just about anything that could deserve to be called 'knowledge'. Shepherd makes no bones about her view of the importance of the causal axiom. 'The faculty of abstraction' she writes 'is truly the origin of all science'. dc It is through abstraction of the parts of representations that we can consider qualities separately, and are thereby led to knowledge of the causal axiom. She says that of mathematics that 'THE 4 131 DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION IS UNDERSTOOD BY SCHOLARS AS THE BASE ON WHICH THE TRUTH OF EVERY THEOREM IS SURELY BUILT' dci . Shepherd makes dependence on causality a very explicit part of her arguments for external existence. The foundational role of the causal axiom supplies the basis for inference to external existence. Her arguments, therefore, generalize not only to the physical sciences, but to everything in creation, which is itself causally determined. Indeed, 'to understand God aright, he cannot work a contradiction; he cannot occasion the same objects without any alteration amidst them supposed to produce dissimilar effects.' dcii Indeed, if God created a deterministic world, then our knowledge of such a world would be consistent with the causal axiom. As for miracles, Shepherd reminds us that the key to understanding their possibility is in the proposition that 'All laws of nature are comprehended in one universal law, that similar qualities being in union, there will arise similar results'. dciii A miracle is just an apparent deviation from nature's course as we understand it. No miracle could actually violate the causal law or nature's laws -a miracle is merely 'an exception to nature's apparent course'. dciv Shepherd's continual return to the causal principle seems very deliberate, and is strongly suggestive of systematic motivations. Several of her shorter essays develop specific arguments about the nature of representation that show how her analysis of the inferential basis for knowledge is consistent with observations of science. For example, the sense organs, she explains, are known by our inference to their causal role in bringing about effects of which we are conscious. dcv Indeed, all knowledge, no matter how bodily it may seem, turns on the causal axiom. Thus, sensations of moral and aesthetic worth depend in some sense on the brain and nervous system, but they also depend on thinking minds as causes for the sensations themselves. dcvi Not surprisingly, when it comes to the question of final causes, the analysis also turns to causation. 'To be a final cause' Shepherd writes, 'is to perceive a future possible quality'. dcvii A final cause, then, is a perceived mental quality -not one that is immediately sensible, but one that is discernible in and united with the action of the brain. dcviii When there is evidence for design, there is also evidence for the action of efficient cause equal to bringing about the contrivance, which we reason to be of a like kind with the mental capacity for action. This analysis forms the basis for an argument by analogy for the existence of a Deity -if not a fully demonstrative proof, Shepherd claims. Apart from philosophers on the Continent, Shepherd and her circle were among those in Britain most inclined to take the challenges in Berkeley and Hume seriously. Brown and Shepherd are among the first to perceive that an answer to empiricist scepticism would have to probe the underlying account of causality and its connection to representation in theories of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. In this sense, Shepherd is undoubtedly deeply motivated to respond to the Scottish reception of Berkeley and Hume in figures such as Reid, Stewart, and Brown. But Shepherd is alone among them in developing a theory of ideas based on reason and the a priori -an approach that is virtually unknown in the Scottish philosophy of her day. Like Mill, Ricardo, and others, Shepherd was probably involved with and influenced by the second wave of interest in Kant in England. The theoretical work of those connected with this second wave suggests that they looked to Kant for ideas on the second order discipline of philosophy of science. As we saw, Kant's philosophical foundation for natural science is motivated by two kinds of epistemic constraints; i) constraints on empirical knowledge from the a priori elements that understanding prescribes in representation and, ii) reason's drive to ascribe unity to nature. Shepherd takes both sorts of epistemic constraints quite seriously, and may have been directly or indirectly influenced by the second wave of Kant studies. Indeed, several of the political economists in Shepherd's circle appear to have been guided by Kantian methodological considerations in developing their 'scientific' theories. Debate and discussions of the 'scientific' character of political economy no doubt contributed to the development of ideas in this direction. 4 132 After Hume, the need to develop clearer ideas on the scientific method was pressing. But discussions of the sciences in Shepherd's day were often imbued with controversial value judgements and other confusions. For example, it was not always clear where facts and values entered into accounts. Malthus's theory of population, for instance, drew a connection between a family's level of wealth and its number of children. Malthus rested much of the responsibility for a family's wealth on the parents' decision of how many children to bring into the world. In a sense, it seemed that the poor, the sick, and the hungry had brought about their own misery through lack of good judgement. This analysis became the basis for a controversial campaign against public assistance that culminated in the 1836 Poor Law Reform. The subjectivism of these 'value-added' speculations of early political economy becomes even more apparent as the less scientific-minded theoreticians develop the basic framework of nineteenth century political economy. John Hill Burton's description of the 'theology of political economy' provides a good example of a value-ladened interpretation of political economy that would be palatable to the religious. With an evident sense of satisfaction, Hill Burton reflects on the emergence of a new and enlightened understanding of the human race in political economy. According to Hill Burton, it is an understanding through which 'the natural passion of man to increase his acquisitions' has 'been made subservient to a principle of union' based on human interdependence. 'Our legislature has, after long conflict' he writes, 'done homage to the presence of this influence, in free trade...' dcix Indeed, political economics has exposed the 'causes and temptations of offences' in the 'traditional community of wickedness' has led to new insights about the true 'connection of nations with each' and the 'sympathy and communion' between individuals -in effect, to a new theology: dcx Every new day, with its new facts discovered and laws explained, tends to show more clearly to us the intimate dependence of the members of the whole human family upon each other; and within the past few years, as much has been developed about this interesting law of the world's nature as might supply a Paley with materials for a new Natural Theology -showing how the Deity has thus cared for the preservation, the happiness, and the indefinite improvement of the race whom he sent to people and command the earth. dcxi Hill further notes that where previously, it was held to be necessary to trample upon others in the pursuit of prosperity, 'the gradual development of our knowledge of the economy of the human race, has tended to dispossess us of our unamiable and cruel philosophy...' dcxii Hill Burton's remarks reveal the close connection in the minds of nineteenth century political economists between the search for true causes, theology, and political economy. It was a short step from discussions of theism to political economy to the theology of political economy. Where one subject began and the other ended was a matter of some subtlety, a matter that would only become clearer as ideas on the scientific method became more precise. Indeed, some today still find the demarcation between science and non-science to be fuzzy in the field of political economy. According to John Hick's in his Causality in Economics, the study of causation is as fundamental to a science of economics as it is to any science, since 'economic problems are problems of change, of growth and retrogression, and of fluctuation.' dcxiii It is vexing, then, that experiments in economics have to be 'static', 'since they have to assume that it does not matter at what date an experiment is performed.' dcxiv The temptation in economics, however, a temptation which can be readily traced to Ricardo's 'pure economic theory' approach, is to ignore temporal and concrete elements that ought to be considered relevant in any adequate 'scientific' investigation into causal relations. Sounding a bit like Hume, Hicks reflects on the problems of analysing change: The extent to which these [problems of change] can be reduced into scientific terms is rather 4 133 limited; for at every stage in an economic process new things are happening, things which have not happened before --at the most they are rather like what has happened before. We need a theory that will help us with these problems; but it is impossible to believe that it can ever be a complete theory. It is bound, by its nature, to be fragmentary....As economics pushes on beyond 'statics', it becomes less like science, and more like history.' dcxv As Hicks warns, left unchecked, the tendency to abstraction and idealization in economic method compromises the scientific character of its analysis, including probabilistic analysis. The dangers in probabilistic analysis, for example, may involve drawing from small sample sizes or making unjustified assumptions about randomness. Thus it is not at all sensible to take a small number of observations (sometimes no more than a dozen observations) and to use the rules of probability theory to deduce from them a 'significant' general law. For we are assuming, if we do so, that the variations from one to another of the observations are random, so that if we had a larger sample (as we do not) they would by some averaging tend to disappear. dcxvi Others have gone as far as to claim that economics is no better than pseudo-science. They argue that there is a lack of fit between data and theory in political economy -suggesting that economics has not in fact met the methodological and empirical standards of logical consistency, correspondence with observation, explanatory comprehensiveness, and theoretical unity required to make it scientific. In response to these charges, social scientists sometimes point to the difficulty in carrying out empirical research in the social sciences or to practical results as a measure of theoretical success. dcxvii Apologetics, of course, can serve as no excuse when it comes to empirical theories. Nor can the creation and dissemination of information about the practical effectiveness of a social theory or paradigm by governments, media, or social scientists themselves be regarding as an objective measure of a theory's success. Thus, even today, many convincingly argue that there is no genuine scientific method underlying economics. The problem is the same as it was in the days of classical economics, and is methodological at base. As Kant, Mill, Ricardo and Shepherd saw, it concerns the question of whether political economy is able to identify causal relations and genuine subsumptive laws according to accepted standards of genuine science. 4 134 Chapter 5: The Camera Obscura and the Difference Engine 5.1 Empiricism and the Camera Obscura Mary Shepherd was not a scientist, though she took a keen interest in the progress of science. According to her daughter, she 'liked to pick up from such friends as Mrs Somerville, all possible beauties and curiosities in scientific results'. dcxviii It is not altogether surprising then, to find Shepherd appealing to scientific metaphors and devices to explain her philosophical views. She draws, for example, on the metaphor of the camera obscura to describe how the mind represents the external world. She also sees a parallel between the inference-drawing capacities of her friend Charles Babbage's 'curiosities of manufacture' and her own view of the mind's activity in representation. Shepherd appeals to other scientific metaphors as well, including an analogy to algebraic signs, in order to illustrate her account of our representation of exterior objects. On the face of it, such enthusiasm for science would seem to conflict with worries about atheism. However, like other members of her social group, Shepherd anticipates an underlying harmony between science, society, and religion. It is thus with an optimistic outlook that she appeals to scientific metaphors to assist the imagination with abstract epistemological and methodological points. In this Chapter, we will consider some of these metaphors, as part of an effort to elaborate and defend an interpretation of Shepherd's epistemology. Shepherd's epistemology diverges from standard empiricist accounts of our perception of external existence. She agrees with Berkeley, for instance, that there are serious problems with the primary/ secondary quality doctrine. Specifically, her charge is that the account of how we acquire knowledge of primary qualities is at base incoherent. Strictly speaking, Shepherd reasons, primary qualities cannot be sensations in the mind, since they arise from the 'unperceived qualities of exterior objects'. dcxix But how can such 'perceptions of extension, figure, solidity, motion, hardness, and softness' be 'unperceived' and 'totally unlike' sensation, she wonders. It is the philosophy of these authors, that the primary qualities of bodies are objects immediately perceived to be exterior to the mind, whose essences also may distinctly be conceived of...These exterior qualities are, therefore, perceived NOT to be sensible qualities, but to be totally unlike them...Thus, the perceptions of extension, figure, solidity, motion, hardness, and softness, &c. are NOT sensations of mind... dcxx There is then, a coherence problem, and it is an inescapable one. For, all ideas must be perceived as sensations before the mind, and no sensation before the mind could arise from an unperceived quality of an exterior object. Shepherd goes on to quip that When such thoughts as these are still held as the doctrines of common sense, how shall there be future improvement in any department of philosophy? dcxxi Shepherd further rejects attempts to forestall criticism through modifications to the primary qualities doctrine. Consider, for example, Shepherd's response to Thomas Reid, father of the common sense school and apologist for the primary qualities doctrine (and empiricism at large). Reid holds that immediate objective knowledge of space is possible through the perception of primary qualities. He tries to embellish the standard appeal to primary qualities by characterising 'extension, figure and motion, as instinctive simple conceptions of understood qualities of external matter'. dcxxii ...[Reid] truly thought the senses could suggest the conception of the nature of the real essential primary qualities of matter, without such sensations becoming sensations, whilst the understanding was satisfied it was legitimate to do so, because 4 135 the mind to such a conception, and resolved the notion into a primary law of human belief dcxxiii Hence, what is still worse than the original appeal to the primary and secondary quality distinction, is the attempt to shore up the doctrine by appeal to instinct as an aid to the underlying mechanism. For this is tantamount to self-contradiction, insofar as it involves the denial that perception of primary qualities is immediate through sensation. Such an embellishment only compounds the original atrocity, namely, the assumption that immediate access to primary qualities provides grounds for knowledge of external existence. In any event, the underlying doctrine of perception is flawed in both cases, and so cannot provide an acceptable foundation for our knowledge of external existence. Shepherd is in fact sympathetic to Berkeley's doubts about the coherence of the appeal to the primary and secondary quality distinction. With Berkeley, she rejects the description of the idea of extension as denoting a 'quality of an external object': There is here said to be, an intimate association between two notions, viz. those of extension and colour; whilst yet the word extension is said to express 'the quality of an external object,' instead of a notion; and as such must be incapable of associating as an 'idea,' with the 'idea of colour.' which is also said to be 'a sensation of the mind.' The whole sentence to those who will examine it accurately, must appear to involve a contradiction. dcxxiv In sum, it is a misconception, Shepherd thinks, to say that primary qualities are properties of external objects that are directly perceived or intuited by the mind. She says that the view implies the absurdity that either extension is in the mind with colour or that colour is out there with extension. dcxxv Shepherd thinks that this assumption is buried in Hume's own theory of human understanding. For, Hume, like other empiricists, holds the inconsistent position that we form ideas of primary qualities -sensations of exterior objects that literally, are unfelt. 'Mr. Hume' she says, 'has recourse, whence it is, that colour, sound, &c. as well as extension and solidity; i.e., all our perceptions of primary and secondary qualities, are thought to exist unperceived, when yet a perception certainly cannot exist unperceived, nor a sensation unfelt.' dcxxvi Shepherd disagrees strongly with this analysis of perception and sense objects, and so dismisses Hume, Reid, and Stewart with a single stroke, claiming that they follow a mistaken line of argument regarding external perception and the objects of perception. The problem then, for the defenders of the primary qualities tradition, is that their view fails to supply a plausible and specific story about how representations can carry the marks of objectivity that reflect the structure of the external world. For this reason, Shepherd rejects all forms of the standard appeal to the primary and secondary quality distinction as a foundation for realism. Although Shepherd rejects the foundation for representational realism elicited from the empiricist theory of ideas, she does nonetheless hope to provide a foundation for representational realism. This foundation is to be neither materialist nor idealist, however. Hence Shepherd argues against materialists such as John Fearn, and against idealists such as George Brekeley. The foundation for representational realism, Shepherd thinks, will require dualist metaphysics. Shepherd, for example, had two pieces published as part of an exchange with Fearn, whose materialst views she entirely rejects. dcxxvii This philosophical exchange can be traced back to an accusation of plagiarism made in 1817 by John Fearn against Dugald Stewart. dcxxviii This accusation concerns the view that visible line is merely the sensation of colour. In the letters through which we trace the exchange, it becomes apparent that Fearn sought to promote his own work by publicly involving Stewart's name in scandal. Stewart, who is at the end of a long and venerable career, declines to comment on Fearn's work. He rightly fails to take the accusation of plagiarism seriously, since doctrinal priority in this case might well be given to any number of writers on the subject of external perception. Fearn later repeats the charge of 4 136 plagiarism against Shepherd, who in turn, defends both herself and Stewart by citing an earlier, eighteenth century source for the view. In 1796, Shepherd reports, Mr. Crisp said 'that visible figure was only known by the mental perception of contrasting colours' dcxxix Stewart had declined to comment on Fearn's philosophy, in part because he was trying to complete his own work, but also because Fearn's materialist doctrine was so severely at odds with his own view. Shepherd herself objects at some length to Fearn's claim that sensations are extended. For while Stewart, Fearn, and Shepherd all agree that visible line and figure are perceptions of colour, Fearn goes on to reason that if colour is nothing but sensation, then sensations must themselves be extended. dcxxx Fearn adds that anyone who maintains that perceptions are sensations is committed to the extended nature of sensation, and that he fails to see how Shepherd can be consistent in maintaining the distinction between ideal and real extension: ...her Ladyship, although she rationally admits that external unperceived objects or causes, and external space beyond them, have an extension really spread out, confidently, at the same time, insist that all the seemingly-extended things, which we perceive, and which we call heaven and earth, in as much as these things are nothing but sensations in our minds, are NOT REALLY spread out. dcxxxi Shepherd's reply to this charge is that perception and unperceived causes are different things requiring different definitions. External extension, she says, is not itself an idea, but an unperceived cause, fitted 'to create or produce the idea of extension' and for the 'capacity for the admission of unperceived motion'. In contrast to this, ideal extension is 'a simple sensation of the mind relative to external extension'. Shepherd's strategy then, is to draw a fine line between the idealist and realist positions, maintaining both real and ideal extension, which she takes to be different things requiring different definitions. She sums up her position as follows: dcxxxii Thus I have said, 'Coloured extension is a compound sensation; the sense of motion is another; tangibility and extension are others; but their unperceived continually existing causes are independent of sensation, unperceived and unknown; and whilst their positive nature is unknown, yet their relative value among themselves is known to be equal to the relative variety of the ideas and sensations; i.e. to the effects they determine on the mind. dcxxxiii Shepherd's principal claim then, is that ideal perceptions of extension are not to be confused with external causal agents, since they have distinct properties. For, 'the idea of extension will not produce in any other mind the idea of extension' nor will it 'admit of unperceived motion'. Ultimately, Shepherd concludes that 'each particular sensation must be the unextended quality of some kind of extension' whose real properties are known by inference. In short, the sensible qualities FORM the sensible objects; but it is a reasoning arising out of a perception of the relation of these qualities; -of the different positions of colours in relation to motion; -of the knowledge of the place where we are, &c. by which external continuous existences are proved; a reasoning which Bishop Berkeley uses in proof of the independent existence of separate minds, and which reasoning and which minds he does not think can belong to dreams and frenzies, &c. dcxxxiv Thus, Shepherd rejects Fearn's view, which she claims implies the absurd view that there are actually extended things in the mind along with sensations of colour. Her own theory of colour vision maintains that there is both ideal and real extension. The latter is known, but only by means of inference from the former. Shepherd's view also stands in contrast to Berkeley's epistemology. Berkeley, for example, holds that 'visible distance' is merely ideal, since perceived 4 137 objects can be reduced to collections of immediately perceived sensations. Shepherd complains about this obstinately simple-minded view of representation, saying that 'Berkeley never affixed the names of objects to anything, but the combined sensible qualities which the organs of sense helped to form'. It is by means of this strategy, which discounts the possibility of a more complex form of representational realism, that Berkeley commits the unsuspecting reader to subjective idealism. In fact, Shepherd charges that Berkeley 'wrote his theory of vision to obviate an objection that might be made on the score of 'visible distance,' in order to prove it to be a sensation of mind only suggested by tangibility, &c...'. dcxxxv As Shepherd points out, the view that sense object are complexes of sensations and relations is purposely discounted at the outset by Berkeley. His own argument against materialism, as well as his positive doctrine, is in fact founded on the assumption that sense objects are nothing more than immediately perceived collections of sensations: This he omitted purposely, in order to have nothing to do with the causes and objects which create sensations, until he came to explain them after his own notions, as necessarily active, and therefore spirit. His method of incomplete definition, and naming only the combined sensible qualities the effects of things, when all men name them as united with the perceptions of the understanding, and the observations of experience, is the reason why his philosophy seems at once plausible, contradictory, and unanswerable. dcxxxvi Hence, Shepherd's epistemology is unlike the received empiricist accounts, and also unlike materialist and idealist theories. Shepherd elaborates her own view with an explanation of how, contra Berkeley, the mind perceives changes internally, and yet knows that these perceptions correspond to changes in external things. The explanation is given by means of a metaphor that is telling with respect to Shepherd's own philosophical views. The metaphor in question is that of the camera obscura. Shepherd uses the camera obscura metaphor in 1832, when searching for an image to help make her abstract discussions more concrete. Early versions of the device had existed for centuries, but rapid technological advances in lens manufacture had significantly improved the capacity to represent outer scenes in 'dark rooms' by the 1830s. So at this point in time, the camera obscura would have been a device of considerable interest, especially to some of the scientists known to or connected with Shepherd's circle. The full-size camera obscura is literally a dark room into which images from outside are projected. A popular device in the days before photography, the careful arrangement of mirrors and lenses afforded panoramic view of towns. As the mirrors of the are manipulated to change their position, they vary the panorama. The viewing room is left dark in order to enhance the contrast and brightness of the image under view. dcxxxvii As would be the case today, technological advances were then regarded with great interest as curiosities, but also with an eye to utility. Portraiture, for example, was often accomplished with the help of portable versions of the device. For scientists working to advance the field of chemistry, one goal was to discover a chemical process that could capture the image of the camera obscura on paper. Both Herschel and Brewster, for example, are well known to have contributed materially to related advances in chemistry and photography. For someone such as Shepherd, more inclined to philosophy than to science, the camera obscura would come to serve as a metaphor for understanding the relation between processes in the mind, representations, and the external world. The outside world is like the world reflected by the mirrors of the camera obscura. The mind, partly hidden and partly perceptible, is like the 'dark room' itself; while the images displayed on the surface in the camera obscura are like the representations before the mind in conscious perception. Shepherd's use of the camera obscura as a metaphor for the mind has a special significance. For the camera obscura, as you will recall, was the psychologistic metaphor introduced by Villers in his Philosophie de Kant for the purpose of explaining Kant's transcendentalism. 4 138 Shepherd could easily have learned about the metaphor in Villers, Brown, or Drummond, but regardless of her source, she must have been aware of the discussion and criticism surrounding the metaphor. dcxxxviii And, as Wellek points out, both Villers' camera obscura example and his reading of Kant suffer from an excess of psychologism. dcxxxix Shepherd nevertheless makes appeal to the metaphor to describe her own view, bringing together the camera obscura, the element of animation, and the various perspectives of the animated, mutliple-mirrored, camera obscura: The mind in this scene is as the reflecting mirror in a camera obscura, were it imagined to be consciously observing its shifting images, knowing them to be changed by the influence of corresponding, though unlike, objects from without; and directing the succession of its changes, by its power of varying the position of the intervening instruments which connect the exterior changing objects with their responding changing representative. dcxl As the use of the camera obscura metaphor makes apparent, Shepherd evidently intends to portray the mind as an active and important element in her epistemology. Indeed, Shepherd's main arguments against the received empiricist views, the ones that relate to her claims about representation, ultimately turn on her view of the mind and its activities in perception. That she placed such an emphasis on the nature of mind is evident from accounts given by her contemporaries and successors. Robert Blakey, for example, gives a sympathetic portrayal of Shepherd's view of the mind and perception in his A History of the Philosophy of Mind. dcxli Blakey devotes a considerable number of pages to Shepherd. Quite appropriately, he begins by locating the basis of her criticism of Hume. He reminds the reader that Hume had 'publicly promulgated the doctrine' that 'we had no idea of causation whatever; but only that of two events following on another.' 'The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect' so that 'We may define a cause to be an object followed by another'. But, as Shepherd points out, Hume's account of how we come to form such ideas is very vague. According to Hume, ideas such as those of cause and effect are products of a 'feigned imagination'. That is, they are mere imaginings not susceptible to proof of existence. Hence, despite having presented a most obscure analysis of the mind's activity, ideas of cause and effect are attributes an imaginary status, and Hume succeeds in casting widespread and profound doubt on belief in external existence. As Blakey remarks, modified versions of Hume's doctrine were promoted by Reid, Stewart and Brown, so that Hume's view was 'very generally adopted by nearly all the Scottish metaphysicians. dcxlii Shepherd proposes an alternative doctrine of perception and external existence that is linked to her account of causality and representation. Her analysis places emphasis on describing the 'manner and action of causation' as it is discovered in introspection. In particular, Shepherd holds that the causes of the general powers of sensation are not the same as those for particular sensations -for these are in fact several distinct kinds of sensation. Hence, we are able to distinguish sensible qualities from ideas, and these from the sensation of the general powers of consciousness. In analysing sense objects, we discover two types of sensation mix together, and reason quickly proceeds to distinguish the various types of sensations. We then infer, using the causal principle, the properties of things in the external world. Moreover, since each particular sensation is always felt as an effect that begins to be, we are able to distinguish our general conscious awareness from particular ideas of sensation, leading us to discover the sensation of the 'self'. Hence we further discover the sensation of ourselves as continuing conscious capacities, and this forms the basis for personal identity. dcxliii Given the history of the discussion surrounding the camera obscura metaphor, the fact that Shepherd makes use of the comparison is intriguing. In 1801, Villers had used the metaphor of the camera obscura to explain the sense of inference in Kant's transcendental philosophy. 4 139 Thomas Brown and other empiricists rejected the metaphor, charging that the camera obscura would never be able to draw inferences. Like Villers, Shepherd supposes that the example succeeds in illustrating how we come to recognise objective elements in cognition. Yet she is evidently influenced by the discussion of transcendentalism and empiricism surrounding the metaphor. Given the benefit of the empiricist critiques that followed the publication of Villers' book, Shepherd attempts to rescue the metaphor from its critics. She does so by supplementing Villers original example with an actual account of how the camera obscura is supposed to acquire objective knowledge. In Shepherd's example, the animate camera detects objectivity through its 'power of varying the position of the intervening instruments which connect the exterior changing objects with their responding changing representative'. Thus Shepherd takes up the transcendentalist's cause, supplementing the purely psychologistic reading of transcendentalism in Villers with a justification of sorts. The details of Shepherd's view of the mind and its activities in cognition emerge through her discussion of colour vision. For example, Shepherd says that she agrees with the usual view that colour is a 'sensation in the mind', but also holds that ideas of colour and extension are intimately associated by the mind, and arise according to a mechanism unlike the one describe by the common sense realists. Like Condillac and Berkeley, Shepherd holds that empiricism must fall back on the sense of touch in order to explain extension. She writes that 'I conceive ideas of colour to be from habit immediately associated with those of touch and motion. Contrasting colours, yielding us, therefore, by means of their associations, the ideas of distance dcxliv Indeed, Shepherd's view of the relation between colour and extension is that conscious, coloured extension, is as a picture in the mind, and must be associated there with ideas of position and distance, and direction, in relation to motion.' In understanding, '...the soul perceives the picture in which the coloured atmosphere appears, as well as the objects beyond it'. It then places these elements 'in proportion to its perception of the motion requisite to attain contact with them' by 'referring all the perceived qualities, which are effects, equally to all the unperceived qualities which are their causes; and which are equal in their mutual relations.' dcxlv On Shepherd's alternative, we perceive sensations of sensible qualities, in addition to which we perceive sensations of ideas connected with exterior objects. In observing visible figure uniting colour and extension, we can conclude only that primary and secondary qualities 'are conscious exhibited effects; sensations formed by the excitement of unknown causes, on the sentient powers'. Indeed, for Shepherd, 'motion in this respect is also a sensation; distance likewise; every consciousness, every perception, every notice, is mental.' dcxlvi Thus, ideas such as the idea of visible figure, arise as sensations in the mind, and are known to represent objects by inference. Such ideas are distinct from other sensations of sensible qualities, but are mixed with them in our representations of external things: No, there are perceptions of sensible qualities; and perceptions of their relations by reasoning, yet both are but species of sensations. The perceptions of sense, neither immediately, nor mediately as signs of conceived qualities, can ever tell us of their positive nature when unfelt, whether they be primary or secondary. The perceptions of reason, will tell us, that there must necessarily be exterior objects, and that these must be as various as the sensations they create. dcxlvii Shepherd's account then, links the possibility of knowledge of external objects to direct contact with exterior objects through tangibility and the associations between touch and colour vision. Like Berkeley, Shepherd argues that touch and sight are basic to visual perception. She also holds that tangibility is a distinct sensation, and so must be treated like 'coloured extension', i.e., as an ideal object with a real counterpart. Tangibility, presumably, is what gives rise to ideas of 4 140 a point of reference in detecting the position and motions of other bodies. We move around in our environment, as if from the centre of a circle towards its circumference, and so discover patterns of motion and colour. The conformity of our measurements with patterns repeatedly encountered in sensation leads us to infer, by means of the causal principle, the specific properties of space, time and matter. Hence, Shepherd rests her case for knowledge of external existence on sensation, inference and the causal principle. Shepherd's view of perception then, is that both colour and patterns are seen by the mind and reflect a reality exterior to the mind and body. As such, neither colour nor pattern is a mere affection of the mind. dcxlviii Shepherd is able to maintain this view in part because she holds that there are distinct types of particular qualities of which we are conscious -sensations of colour and sensations of patterns. Both exist as mental sensations that are felt as distinct effects or changes upon the various powers of sensation. Moreover, all such particular sensations are distinct from our sensation of general conscious awareness. dcxlix In determining what it perceives, the mind is able to distinguish all of these elements, and to distinguish patterns from colours and so on. As for specific knowledge of external objects, Shepherd cautions that on her view, only real dcl Moreover, the five senses alone cannot prove knowledge of external existence, they do so only by means of inference. dcli Nonetheless, as she elaborates on her account of mediate representation, it becomes clear that Shepherd intends to part ways with Berkeley. For, Shepherd invokes a more substantive epistemological analysis of mediate representation than can be found in her empiricist predecessors to explain the process of knowledge acquisition. Berkeley does not seriously consider such an account of mediate perception, and so his criticisms against representational realism do not extend directly to Shepherd's view. Shepherd holds, for example, that 'sensible qualities form the sensible objects; but it is a reasoning arising out of a perception of the relation of these qualities; -of the different positions of colours in relation to motion; -of the knowledge of the place where we are &c. by which external continuous existences are proved... dclii What Shepherd maintains, contra Berkeley and other empiricists, is that we discover the various objective components in analysis of our representations. For Shepherd, objective features of exterior things, such as primary qualities, are also discovered through reason. Thus, she denies that the objective components of complex objects that are encountered in their 'intimately mixed' form are also inseparable in analysis. In the end, Shepherd's use of the camera obscura metaphor helps us to see how she intends to distinguish her view from her empiricist counterparts -that is, from Fearn, Berkeley, and the common sense realists. Although Shepherd maintains that we can discover objective qualities such as 'outwardness', her view of perception does not fall on the side of Fearn's materialism or of common sense realism. Shepherd's camera obscura example instead places her on the side of transcendentalism. dcliii But when Shepherd uses the camera obscura example to argue against Fearn, she claims that 'the above arguments elicit the reason' for her definition of extension, and concludes that 'there is no inconsistency in extension holding unextended qualities of a higher nature than itself.' dcliv Fearn, of course, quite failed to see the transcendentalism in Shepherd's philosophy and her use of the camera obscura metaphor. As a result, he misconstrues her view. So the Dictionary of National Biography's description that Fearn 'was no transcendentalist', is therefore apt. Indeed, Fearn's failure to detect Shepherd's transcendentalism leads him to read her as half-scholastic and half-Berkelean, a peculiarity that he attributes to the influence of her earliest instructor, whom Fearn supposes to have inculcated in Shepherd a commitment to metaphysical dualism. While Fearn is correct in pointing out Shepherd's metaphysical dualism and her affinities to Berkeley, he is wrong in thinking that her argument makes a direct scholastic appeal to ontology to defend real extension. Moreover, in Shepherd's eyes, most direct realists are, philosophically, in no better shape than a Fearn or a Berkeley. For, as defenders of the primary qualities tradition, they are committed to an absurd 4 141 view of perception. Shepherd points out, for example, that Reid and Stewart hold that colour is a 'sensation in the mind' but that extension is 'a quality of an external object.' dclv Rejecting all of these empiricist alternatives, Shepherd appeals to the transcendentalist's metaphor of the camera obscura to describe the relation between processes in the mind, representations, and the external world. Thus, the clue provided by the camera obscura metaphor is important has a wider significance for interpreting Shepherd's philosophy and her departure from empiricsm. For Shepherd, the account of sensible objects brings together sensible qualities, ideas of causes, and inferential processes in a way that endeavours to justify our claim to knowledge of unperceived exterior objects and their objectively real qualities, both of which derive from a world independent of the subject. The fact that our various sense perceptions converge on a single coherent account of the world is ultimately explained with reference to the marks of objectivity in knowledge and it is the marks of objectivity in sensible ideas that lead us to infer knowledge of But the marks of objectivity arise and are detected independently of the usual empiricist appeal to primary qualities. And although the usual physical mechanisms are presumed to underlie the physical perception of sensible qualities, it is not mechanical action itself, but inference that leads to knowledge of the real properties of objects. 5.2 The Difference Engine and 'Modified Berkeleian Theory' It is evident that Shepherd objects to various empiricist arguments for realism. She makes it clear, for example, that psychological inclination alone is insufficient to explain how we detect primary qualities in external objects. Despite this and other objections to empiricism, Shepherd still appeals to sensation and experience as a basis for her defence of realism. Her use of the camera obscura metaphor shows us something of her view of how the mind is at work in representing the world -extracting marks of objectivity from sensible patterns in representations, inferring from these patterns to objectively valid knowledge, and so on. Ultimately, Shepherd a rule from which we infer that specific changes in sensible patterns are caused by external objects. But Shepherd's epistemology and metaphysics depends on other claims -some of which have not yet been discussed in detail. One such dependency is the claim that we have a distinct awareness of a general self-conscious perception. Another is the claim that we are able to analyse the contents of representations in much the same way that we can analyse algebraic signs. Shepherd describes this view as a 'modified Berkeleian theory', important features of which are captured, she thinks, in the operation of Charles Babbage's Difference Engine [cf. Algebraic Engine and 1839]. In the end, as we shall she, Shepherd focuses her argument around the causal axiom, arguing for objective knowledge of external existence in a way that differs from Locke and his empiricist successors. In fact, what Shepherd appears to advance is transcendental argument for realism that, in some respects at least, resembles Kant's refutation of idealism. There are, of course, some very substantial differences between the two arguments. For one thing, Shepherd rejects Kant's forms of intuition -for reasons that we will consider more fully later on. Nonetheless, it is helpful to compare the two responses to Berkeley's idealism, since Shepherd's analysis seems to draw on similar argumentative strategies to those found in Kant. Whether or not Kant did influence the direction of Shepherd's argument, it is apparent that the emphasis on the distinct kinds perception associated with conscious awareness and the subjective and objective elements of particular representations must be considered to be an important part of her argument against Berkeley. In addition, it is interesting to note that Shepherd's refutation of idealism seems to involve an appeal to a priori conditions of representation. Given the evidence, it is no exaggeration to say that she takes inspiration from the Kantian strategy in her refutation of idealism. 4 142 To begin, consider Kant on his claim that the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a determinate dclvi -conscious awareness depends on the consciousness of actual things in space. His point is that it would be impossible to have a unified conscious awareness of the self unless we also had determinate consciousness of a succession of effects due to actual, permanent existences outside of ourselves. Kant emphasises that the distinction between general self-conscious awareness and the awareness of particular ideas is the basis for a further distinction between inward and outward existence. However, by Kant unless it can also be shown that consciousness of things in space and time constitutes direct and trustworthy knowledge of actual outer things. For idealist doubts about the external world, Kant notes, call into question whether our inferences to outer existence are trustworthy: Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it ner, as in all cases where we are inferring from given effects to determinate causes. In this particular case, the cause of the representations, which we ascribe, perhaps falsely, to outer things, may lie in ourselves. dclvii Thus, for Kant, the real burden of the refutation of idealism is placed upon the argument to show the trustworthiness of inferences from what is given in experience to the real features of outward things. Kant emphasises that this can only be achieved through a combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. His transcendental idealism holds that determinate experience is possible only in virtue of aesthetic sensibility through forms of intuition in space and in time. Kant argues that the succession of effects that we perceive is determined in a temporal order, and that time-determination presupposes the existence of the outer things that we perceive in space. Since time and space contribute formal a priori characteristics to our determinate representations of both our own existence and that of outer things, these formal is that the formal characteristics of representations due to space and time are also objectively real features of the external world; hence the real features of things are and lie both in us and in outer things. dclviii Similar to Kant, Shepherd's argument for external existence appeals to her view that such knowledge rests on our ability to distinguish general self-conscious awareness from other sensations. Shepherd argues that awareness of the use of the sense organs, awareness of particular sensible qualities, and a general self-conscious awareness are all presupposed in our representation of sense objects: The union of the three following things are required to form the proximate cause for that great effect, the formation and combination of those aggregates of sensible qualities usually called objects; namely, first, the unknown, unnamed circumstances in nature, which are unperceived by the senses; secondly, the organs of the sense, whose qualities mix with these; and thirdly, the living, conscious powers necessary to sensation in general. dclix Shepherd's defence of external existence then, turns on our ability to form a distinct awareness of general self-conscious perception. This analysis plays a part in Shepherd's transcendentalism, and specifically, in her positive arguments against Berkeley's subjective idealism. Moreover, the distinction between general conscious awareness and particular sensations sheds significant light on the mystery of internal and external existence. Shepherd's own view is that knowledge of external existence depends on distinguishing various sensations from general conscious perception: 4 143 Now I repeat there is one sense in which it may be said that objects are perceived immediately, as existing outwardly, by the senses. It is this; the conscious powers of understanding, and the senses, are blended together in man; we are analysing them, but in nature they are united as intimately as are the prismatic colours in one uniform mass of light. This being the case, they are acting in concert when any object affects the senses. Therefore the understanding knowing the simplicity of mental sensation, it follows, that the varieties of the causes, (which create varieties in the effects,) are instantly perceived and detected, and that immediately with the conscious use of the senses; whilst also the mind as immediately mixes that idea of which the understanding is aware; viz, that theses varieties, as complex objects, continue to exist unperceived and independant, when unnoticed by the senses. dclx On Shepherd's view then, sensibility and understanding are mixed together in cognition just as the colours are mixed together in a uniform mass of light. In both cases, the parts can be considered separately; in the first instance through the action of the mind; in the other instance through the action of the prism. Hence, Shepherd takes it that analysis by reason enables us to distinguish general self conscious perception, sensations of ideas and sensible qualities in our representations, just as the prism distinguishes and separates the various colours that together form light. According to Shepherd, having distinct consciousness of the varieties of causes, we are in a position to invoke the causal axiom, which acts as a rule governing our knowledge of objects. This aspect of Shepherd empiricist counterparts. What Shepherd maintains, contra Hume and Locke, is that the application of the causal principle is either an innate or ve principle. dclxi As Shepherd explains, it is easily perceived that if any particular quality were supposed to begin of itself, the following contradiction would arise, viz. that the beginning of dclxii That is, if we try to imagine a dependent quality that begins to exist, but that does not at the same time exist as a dependent quality, we are led to contradict the principle that that nothing that begins its own existence could be a dependent quality. Her argument turns on the fact that we can only represent things according to principle that 'No dependent quality can begin its own existence.' Evidently then, it is impossible to coherently think our representations of sense objects in a way that violates the causal principle. Thus, for Shepherd, the causal principle is a necessary and universal condition of determinate representation. Moreover, since ideas of causes arise directly in the mind in the act of representation, and are included in representations 'even when the organs of sense are shut', the causal principle governs representation in a rule-like way quite independently of any particular experiences. Given this analysis, it is worth reflecting on the fact that, for Shepherd, the causal principle is known a priori and serves as a criterion of truth by means of a rule-like application. The appeal to a priori causal axiom should not obscure the fact that there are major and important differences between Shepherd's and Kant's epistemologies. Most importantly, Kant's argument against Berkeley is based on his demonstration that objects of experience must be given to us in space and time, so that the foundation for his refutation of idealism lies in the arguments for space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic. For Shepherd does not endorse the Kantian view of space and time. What she holds is that we must infer that the kinds and which can then be basis the inference to external existence and to knowledge of the real and measurable properties of space, time, and matter. The inference is in the first instance possible because we 4 144 have the capacity to distinguish, as distinct sensations in the mind, particular sensible ideas, ideas of causes, and general conscious awareness. Yet it also depends on our having general ideas of causes included in representations in such a way as to supply a rule from which we infer that exterior, independent and continuing existences are causes of invariable sequences in sensation. Moreover, it is the conformity of our measurements with patterns repeatedly encountered in sensation leads us to infer the reality of specific properties of space, time, and matter. Such inferences are taken to be meaningful indications of objective knowledge that is not directly accessible in sensation by means of analysis. dclxiii Shepherd then, rejects Kant's view that space and time are forms of intuition. Her specific objection is the typical one of her day, namely, that Kant's forms of intuition make space and time thoroughly subjective. 'Kant imagines time and space to be only modes of the mind, which is mistaking the causes which determine a mode of the mind with the effect, viz. the mode of the mind.' dclxiv She argues, for example, that the existence of time, like every other existence in nature, is perceived by some quality it determines to the mind, but has not its whole existence dclxv Similarly, space is a sensation that originates in us as a mode of the mind or sensible quality, although sensation alone does not lead to immediate knowledge of the properties of space or matter. In other words, Shepherd thinks, along with most of the early commentators on his thought, that Kant turns space and time, which are caused by external things, inward, and reduces them to something purely subjective in claiming that they are features of the mind. Shepherd does not accept that Kant's a priorism about intuition leads to objective knowledge of sensibility. She may perhaps be frustrated by Kant's vagueness of the account of how sensation figures in sensibility, just as she was frustrated by Hume's critique of causality based on a vague account of 'feigned imagination'. Her own view, it will be recalled, assumes the possibility of discerning patterns in sense data, but replaces the forms of intuition with association and inference, so that her account of vision is based on our linking perceptions of colour, motion and touch, and on inferring the visual pattern. dclxvi Unlike Kant, Shepherd is explicit and up-front about what her assumption of empirical realism entails, and she unambiguously claims that space and time more than 'mere modes' of the mind. Shepherd has good reasons for rejecting Kant's view of space and time as forms of intuition. One reason is that the emphasis on forms of intuition would threaten to displace the central role given to the causal axiom in Shepherd's epistemology. Her positive account of objective knowledge of external existence attempts to bridge the gap between sensible perception and external objects by appeal to the causal axiom, and its role in helping us to distinguish objective patterns from sensible qualities and general conscious awareness. What is most important for our purposes is to note that Shepherd, like Kant, bases one of her arguments for our knowledge of external existence on an appeal to the distinction between general conscious awareness and particular sensations. Still more significant is the fact that Shepherd's argument is profitably illuminated by Kant's refutation of idealism. The obvious and important difference that must always be kept in view, however, is that Kant's argument, but not Shepherd's, is based on an appeal to forms of intuition that govern perception of space and time. Indeed, in arguing against Berkeley, Kant's forms of space and time stand in a role that Shepherd seems to reserve for the causal relation. Shepherd may be too quick to dismiss Kant's view, but in any case, she has an alternative view of mind on which to base an analysis of our perceptions of objective spatial and temporal relations. Despite their differences, it helps to see that Shepherd's strategy in refuting Berkeley bears resemblance to Kant. The argument for realism seems to hinge, in both cases, on appeals to the a priori conditions of representation and on our distinct awareness of particular sensations and general self-conscious awareness -strategies that we first see adopted by Kant in his refutation of idealism. Kant thought that his argument was able to show how transcendental idealism leads directly to empirical realism. dclxvii Transcendental realism, the empiricist view that objects of 4 145 sense given in outer appearance exist independently of our a priori forms of intuition, leads directly to empirical idealism. That is, transcendental realism leads to uncertainties about whether representations of outer things correspond to things outside of us. dclxviii Shepherd is not tempted by the transcendental realism of her empiricist counterparts, although her view of sense objects cannot strictly be described as transcendental idealism in Kant's sense either. For that space and time are mere forms of intuition. If there is just one way to construe transcendental idealism, that is, if transcendental idealism is just the Kantian view that outer appearances are represented through immediate intuition in space and time, then Shepherd is not a transcendental idealist. However, as Henry Allison notes, transcendental idealism can be more generally understood as the claim that there exist conditions that are known a priori and that govern representation. Since Shepherd's view is that knowledge of external existence rests on a causal axiom that is known a priori, Shepherd appears to accept something like Kant's 'weaker' doctrine of transcendental idealism. dclxix However, if we take transcendental idealism in the broader sense to include a weak version of the transcendentalist doctrine, it is clear that Shepherd's analysis does fall under the rubric of transcendental idealism. As Henry Allison has argued, Kant's broader thesis of transcendental idealism can be viewed as an exclusive and dclxx Why then, does Shepherd think, with the transcendentalists, and contra Brown and her other common sense counterparts, that complex objects, reasoning according to the a priori causal axiom, and inference must be attributed to the mind in order to account for meaningful perception? In other words, why does Shepherd attribute the power of objective perception to the camera obscura? Brown, for example, explicitly rejected both the camera obscura metaphor and the transcendentalist strategy, on the grounds that it would be impossible to isolate the subjective and objective elements in subjective perception, since they never exist apart. According to Brown, 'We own the subjectivity of our perceptions; but we are convinced of the impossibility of analyzing them into objective and subjective elements; since to us, by the laws of our nature, these elements must ever coexist.' dclxxi Although Shepherd concedes that the senses and understanding 'are acting in concert when any object affects the senses', she holds that 'the understanding knowing the simplicity of mental sensation' can distinguish 'the varieties of the causes' and thus discover the subjective and objective elements in representation. dclxxii As with other transcendentalist accounts, Shepherd's theory of knowledge acquisition places emphasis on reason and its role in helping us to detect objectivity. From representation we infer objective marks, using the causal principle, that sense objects cannot exist as determinate causes. Shepherd's view further differs from empiricist views in the way that knowledge of sense objects depends on having ideas of causes mixed with other sensations in the very act of representation. This 'mixing' is associated with ideas of mechanical operations on the senses. For in the general conscious perception of sensible qualities are included the knowledge that the organs of sense are used, as mechanical instruments acted upon by certain causes, and the IDEAS dclxxiii Under these conditions the mind with the representation, the idea of an unperceived, independent, externally existing cause. The crucial thing, and the thing that bears emphasis, is that Shepherd holds that once represented, reason can detect that the object is a complex in which ideas, such as the idea of cause, are somehow already included. Ideas of particular causes of sensible qualities are included in representation so that we know that the distinct and different actions of the brain...must be synchronous dclxxiv It is a transcendental inference then, to the powers of mind that mix together sensations of ideas and sensations of sensible qualities. 4 146 For, it makes appeal to the fact that sensibility and understanding always act in unison in the brain in the very act of concept formation. This differs from the standard empiricist line that the operations of the understanding are introduced only after sense objects arise (as mere aspects of Locke, Berkeley and Hume's empiricist theories of ideas. It is this part of her argument that shows how representation of external existence depends on the mediate perception of objective features of objects -features that are known by means of the a priori causal principle. Hence, something other than sensible qualities is allowed as basic and immediate to the representation of sense objects. With the emphasis on reason and mediate perception in mind, we are in a position to appreciate the full significance of Shepherd's view that representations are complex objects mixing together sensations of sensible qualities and ideas. Given that complex objects have subjective and objective features, the mind has something to work on -something to analyse into subjective and objective elements, and presumably, something that would count as an objective basis for causal inferences to external existence. Indeed, it is the combination of reason's activity and mediate perception that leads to Shepherd's fuller account of our knowledge of the external world. For, it is a discovery of reason that explains the basis for our initial detection of variety in particular sensible ideas. For example, we reason that sensation does not give rise to the variety therefore there must be variety without various existences must be ready in order to be perceived, and that these must lie under various positions in relation to each other dclxxv As Shepherd writes, we notice the regular reply of the organs of the senses to the irregular calls from point to point' to particular ideas of resistance and extension, i.e., to ideas of body. ...for the mind perceiving, upon each irregular application to some sorts of beings, or qualities, or ideas, which it may call the organs of sense if it please, that they regularly reply to that application, justly concludes them to exist when unnoticed, in order to be capable of this readiness to reply. Those objects, also, which do thus reply, yield to the sense of motion from point to point, an idea of resistance and extension in particular; and so are regarded as body; that is, as essences different from the mind, or the powers of sensation in general; but continually existing objects, or qualities, which yield ideas of extension, are not ideas, but continued existences called bodies. dclxxvi To elaborate this account, Shepherd argues that the variety detected in sensible ideas and the causal principle enables us to infer the existence of continuous, external and independent objects. dclxxvii She writes, continuous existence is known by inference, not by sensation; for already i dclxxviii But as each mind could not change, unless interfered with, therefore the interfering object is exterior dclxxix She later adds that Those circumstances which go to prove that there must be truly outward causes, for dclxxx Shepherd's view is further illuminated by her claim that the meaningful determination of sense objects under names requires that her account be true. In this respect, Shepherd's interest in Charles Babbage's Difference Engine may shed some light on how her alternative theory of representation to cut against the empiricist alternative. Shepherd was in fact very well acquainted with Charles Babbage and his intellectual circle, and Babbage and his family are described as 'intimate friends'. dclxxxi An invitation to join Babbage for tea in his Devonshire Street Gazebo must have been a fascinating event. 'Mr. Babbage after tea, which was enlivened with many anectdotes and interesting descriptions, opened his cabinets, and in the most unaffected 4 147 way explained and illustrated their contents, many being specimens of curiosities in manufacture.' dclxxxii As with the camera obscura Shepherd took a philosophical interest in Babbage's Difference Engine. Confidence in the mind's capacity to isolate objective features of representation must have drawn Shepherd's interest to the Difference Engine as an illustration of just such a capacity. In the 1820s and 30s, the Difference Engine was of great public interest, and was perhaps the first publicly funded technological research in Britain. Charles Babbage conceived of the engine, and then assembled it, after much labour and effort. The main innovation of the Difference Engine over existing mechanical calculators of the day was that it could be set to draw inferences based on 'operating laws' or rules, and so functions on the same basic principles of the modern day computer. Thus, if a given arithmetic rule is programmed into the machine, data is stored and processed and tables are generated, all according to the pattern set out in the initial law. Just as the Difference Engine calculates tables of data using rules, so too might human beings infer objective knowledge using rules. But Shepherd herself held out hope for an account of knowledge on which we infer objectivity from features that represent the external world. She explained her view of representation by analogy to the way in which algebraic signs represent outer things. Hence, perceived qualities are 'as algebraic signs, by which we can compute and know the proportions of their qualities; as a language, which must be translated before it can explain the actions of nature.' dclxxxiii As such, reason plays an equal role to sensation in helping to show that qualities such as extension are discovered in perception. dclxxxiv The mind is like a computer that discovers the proportions in our representations. And it seems that the Difference Engine would assist Shepherd in thinking about the mind's cognitive capacities. And Shepherd evidently grew increasingly interested in doing math as part of an effort to explore the analogy between the capacities of the Difference Engine and the mind. She writes Babbage from the countryside in 1836 to say that, 'We are all busy in algebra I have begun to do it regularly'.' dclxxxv Shepherd soon writes again to ask about the extent of the capabilities of Babbage's machine. She asks whether 'your machine could work out the sums of the square numbers following the law as given [below]': C. Babbage Esq. With Lady Mary Shepherd's Compts 49 - - 7 240 v289 - - 17 diff 200 ) 440 729 - - 27 2 d diff 200 ) 640 1369 - - 37 3 d diff 200 ) 840 2209 - - 47 4 th diff 200 )1040 3249 - - 57 5 th diff 200 )1240 4489 - - 67 6 th diff 200 )1440 5929 - - 77 7 th diff 200 )1640 7569 - - 87 8 th diff 200 )1840 9409 - - 97 4 148 9 th diff 200 )2040 11449 - - 107 Dear Mr. Babbage I want to know if your machine could work out the sums of the square numbers following the law as given above viz Every square number ending after the square of 7 in the units is = + 240 + 200 for every adl ten in the root - +49 ad infinitum I am very desirous to know, because I think it has by the knowledge of this law mixed with the observation that every square offers a corresponding change & regular order in the place of the tens, as -, 4, 8, 2, 0, with analogous laws in every other sqr number which has the sense of the American phrase being said, to know roots by inspection - Yours always M Shepherd dclxxxvi Shepherd's above letter to Babbage shows that she, unlike most of her contemporaries understood the rule-based principle on which the Difference Engine operates. Babbage's Difference Engine could draw out tables of numbers, operating according to a rule. Babbage projected that it would be useful in many fields, and especially where calculations are required to determine position, fields such as astronomy and navigation. Supposing that the mind is like a rule-based inference machine, a machine that can inspect and track its own application of rules, then it is like a camera obscura that is fitted with a Difference Engine inside. The combined metaphors offer an explanation of how the mind itself contributes objectivity and necessity in representing the external world. Mary Shepherd evidently found Babbage's 'calculating machine' to be of particular interest. She writes again in 1839, having perused some of Babbage's papers [cf. Algebraic Engine?]: My dear Sir I hope I do not betray an unpardonable vanity in requesting your acceptance of this little volume. I do assure you my motive for offering it to you is not merely that I may thereby chance to gain you a my convert by affording to you a ready reference, to some arguments which favour my notions of induction, causation, [etc] but chiefly as a small testimonial of the high gratification I felt in being permitted to peruse & observe upon your papers, & in being considered as in any degree qualified by you to apply the doctrine of this little volume to such abstruse enquiries, where to say truth they come into play more as I conceive than yourself as well as the generality of philosophers at present suppose. I have ventured to open the leaves in order to come on the passage page 85 - (* see also pp. 77, 91) as an instance of that latent reasoning used in experiment by which it comes to be an example of all future, or other instances of a like kind & in which point of view an exact experiment in physics (supposed) becomes precisely analogous, to any example used in [for ] proportions in mathematics or for results in algebra. - I shall hope to see you tomorrow, when however we must be a little diverted from the grave to gay. until then I remain very sincerely yrs MS - Babbage's machine was of considerable interest to Shepherd, because it suggested a way of explaining how the causal principle might serve as an a priori rule governing cognition and 4 149 determining the law-like character of empirical generalisation. Shepherd, in short, may well have drawn inspiration from the Babbage's work as an example of how a mechanical machine might draw inferences from a rule to calculate complex tables of data inferred from the rule. By analogy, the brain might consciously reflect on the mind's contents, and reason apply rules for inferring objective elements (e.g., ideas of causes, patterns in sense data) contained in representations. Indeed, the Difference Engine might supply an answer to the empiricist doubts about how the camera obscura draws its inferences -and an answer to why transcendentalism is a plausible philosophical answer to empiricist scepticism. Shepherd's letter suggests that she is interested in drawing on the Difference Engine as an example of the ability to draw inferences from inspection of complex patterns in introspection on the mind's contents. This example lends further proof of the role of reason in discovering necessity in knowledge. This then, is the beginning of a substantial philosophical answer to Brown and Drummond's ridiculing of the camera obscura -and of the idea that the mind can draw inferences from patterns discovered in introspection and determine the objective features of representations. Shepherd defends her theory of representation from such attacks with her analogy to algebraic signs. 'Now the causes of our ideas', she writes, 'may be considered as simple algebraic quantities', such that in the determination of causes on the mind, their effects may 'be considered as their squares'. Shepherd argues that the representation of sense objects is analogous to algebraic representation, where the values of abstract components that are mixed together in representations are not immediately known to the senses, but discovered through analysis and inference. Shepherd elaborates on the metaphor of algebraic signs to explain how representation leads to knowledge of continuous external existence. She writes that, 'all our ideas are as algebraic signs, which give evidence both of their own existence, and the quantities also signified; whose proportions among themselves are known thereby, as well as their positive values. It is in connection with this view that Shepherd is clearly excited at the prospect of Babbage's machine. She apparently sees not only its brilliance, but also its potential for understanding the mind and its process of acquiring knowledge of the external world. It is a point of great interest that she remarks at the end of her letter that the rule in question might typify the sense of the American expression ' to know roots by inspection'. [To whom is she referring?] Shepherd goes on to hint at what she might take to be the important connection between mathematics and her system of philosophy, showing that her interest extends beyond mathematics to philosophy of mathematics. dclxxxvii Indeed, she there mentions the connection between algebra, analogy, and concrete things, making a note of how the analogy expressed in algebraic quantities can be 'first translated into mathematical language' and '2dly applied to concrete things'. Her point is that in mathematics, algebraic signs stand for magnitudes that are not immediately known to the senses. These signs lead us, by analogy and inference, to knowledge of objective magnitude. Given that there was a general desire within her intellectual circle to bring science and rational principles more closely together, it is interesting to note that Shepherd attempts to elucidate her notions of representation and inference by analogy to algebraic signs. Shepherd in fact goes so far as to explain her theory of representation by analogy to algebraic signs. 'Now the causes of our ideas', she writes, 'may be considered as simple algebraic quantities', such that in the determination of causes on the mind, their effects may 'be considered as their squares'. dclxxxviii She goes on to explain that 'The causes, therefore, of the ideas of sense, which determine their effects, viz. the ideas of sense upon the mind, must never be considered as holding similar definitions with those ideas of sense'. dclxxxix In metaphysics then, the representation of compound sense objects is analogous to algebraic representation, wherein components mixed together in representations are not immediately known to the senses, but discovered through analysis. 4 150 Further use of the analogy to algebraic signs illustrates the sense in which detecting the causal principle in compound objects leads us, by analogy and inference, to knowledge of objective features of external existence. Here Shepherd is clearly drawing on ideas in philosophy of algebraic signs in explaining how her theory of representation leads to knowledge of continuous external existence. As she explains, 'For all our ideas are as algebraic signs, which give evidence both of their own existence, and the quantities also signified; whose proportions among themselves are known thereby, as well as their positive values.' dcxc In sum, the mind discovers that there are a priori objective features embedded in our representations. And, just as we can understand that an algebraic sign stands for a real magnitude indirectly linked to what is observed, we understand that features of our representations relate to objective features in the external world. Thus, it is through the assistance of objective marks in representation that the understanding draws legitimate inferences about the specific spatial and temporal properties of sense objects when properties discovered in appearance, or 'sentient existence', may also be supposed as manifest in the actual causal order of nature. Hence, when Shepherd writes to Babbage of her interest in the analogy expressed by algebraic quantities through their application to concrete with her interests in epistemology and metaphysics. This, in the end, is the reasoning that underlies Shepherd's 'modified Berkeleian theory', and through which she endeavours to propose a transcendentalism that can bridge the gap from empiricism to realism. 4 151 Chapter 6: On the Causes of University Reform 6.1 The New University and the Via Media The issues surrounding religious persecution and freedom of conscience that we first saw in connection with mid-eighteenth century Edinburgh did not die out in nineteenth century Britain. What began in Edinburgh as a 'roasting of Scotch atheists' turned southward to Oxford and Cambridge, where there ensued much controversy over religious doctrine and curricular reform. There was growing support for the removal of exclusionary religious test and antiquated curriculum requirements, and prior experience with the issues put the Scots in a leadership position in the educational reform movement. Mary Shepherd and her circle of friends were particularly keen to ensure that the removal of religious tests figured centrally in university reform. Change did not come easily. The original statutes of Britain's major universities dated to medieval times, and the curriculum goals and religious requirements, like the statutes themselves, were revered as combinations of tradition and truth. Innovations of various sorts were tried, particularly in Edinburgh, where there is evidence of revision to university statutes as early as 1709. To wit, the Town Council declared that the office of Professor of Divinity could not be held in conjunction with a ministerial charge, because the academic post held 'in conjunction with the ministeriall charge is too great a burden for one person' dcxci . Hence, it was resolved that 'the said office be supplyed in such way and manner as may tend most to the advancement of learning' and that 'the person to be elected shall have no ministeriall charge but shall dedicat himself to the said office allenarly' dcxcii Presumably, this particular innovation was undermined. As the letters written by Dugald Stewart and John Playfair to the Lord Provost, George Baird attest, there was a continuing concern over the problem of professors holding ministerial charges in 1805. Elsewhere in Britain, proposals to reform higher education were similarly stonewalled. Richard Carlile's 1821 Address to Men of Science, written from prison, advocated the study of science to the exclusion of religion and metaphysics. dcxciii Specifically, Carlile proposed teaching the youth only science 'instead of torturing their minds with metaphysical and incomprehensible dogmas about religion.' dcxciv 'My present aim', he continues, 'is to lay down a sketch of what seems to me to be a more instructive and useful system of education.' dcxcv Carlile advised banning religious instruction. He recommended instead the classics, historical subjects, geography, Linnean classification, physiology, zoology, and the like. For, the 'study of Nature and her laws, alone forms any substantial faith or religion.' Indeed, physiology and zoology prove 'that the organization of the animal called man, is not more wonderful than that of every other animal and vegetable, nor is he of more importance in the scale of Nature.' dcxcvi Carlile ends with the even more shocking claims that 'Man has nothing but the dogmas of superstition in support of his future sensible existence' and that mankind exists 'to no other purpose, and by no other cause than every other animal and vegetable.' dcxcvii Evidently, Carlile's program of reform would have left almost everyone, from Liberal to Tory to the average citizen, aghast. Despite Carlile's unsatisfactory manner of making pronouncements on the subject of religion and education (not the least of which was his circumstance of being jailed at the time), curricular recommendations quite similar to his were in fact adopted as founding principles of London University. Among the group that helped to establish London's University College were several of the Scots who had supported John Leslie and Richard Carlile throughout their troubles. Many were well known to Mary Shepherd, including James Mill, Henry Brougham, and Leonard Horner. This 'new university' placed emphasis on the science curriculum, 'with deliberate 4 152 exclusion of theological studies or religious affiliation'. Such reforms were controversial -even at London -where the new university and curriculum were being created with a relatively free hand, and curriculum reforms were tailored and packaged in appropriate and acceptable rhetoric. Thus, in July 1825, as Henry Brougham busied himself with fundraising for the university, he was lampooned in the act of selling shares in a Robert Cruikshank cartoon. Among the other Scots who were influential in bringing about the educational reforms at London were Leonard Horner and Joseph Hume. Horner, who is listed among the Shepherd's dinner guests, took up the administrative end of things. Having left a manufacturing business in Edinburgh, he went on to become Warden of the University of London. Horner, like the other Scots involved in the establishment of London University, would doubtless have supported its founding principles. When the university opened its doors in 1836, it was designed 'to supply the shortcomings of Oxford and Cambridge', offering 'higher education free of religious tests, a nonresident system that substantially reduced costs, with teaching organised upon professorial lines after the Scottish pattern.' dcxcviii Evidently, what all of these individuals interested in bringing about university reform shared in common was the goal of establishing an educational environment that would support a system for learning that was unfettered by religious tests, financial barriers, and persecutory politics. dcxcix James Mill, one of the Scots involved with the London University reform, contributed to the conceptual end of things. True to his a priori and deductivist leanings, Mill conceived of a plan for university education founded on rational and consistent principles. Much of the intended educational reform was based on reorganising branches and sub-divisions of knowledge into a systematic classification, allowing for a well-ordered plan of study and for coherent advancement within each discipline. The end of the education of the individual was conceived entirely along utilitarian lines, and was to 'render the individual, as much as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other beings.' dcc Not only was this vision of a new curriculum explicitly utilitarian, but it was entirely rationalist at base and abstract in tenor. As Mill's biographer remarks, ' the a priori, or deductive handling is here exclusively carried out. The author hardly ever cites an actual experience in education; far less has he a body of experience summed up in empirical laws, to confront and compare with the deductions from the theory of the human mind.' dcci [Mill's On Education] Mill, however, is abstract to the taste of Mary Shepherd, who ties her theory of representation directly to Mill's views on education. In her long essay against Berkeley she writes that 'Objects are reckoned independent of ourselves, because they appear like ourselves plus or minus the varieties of the qualities.' To this comment, which relates directly to perception and representation, is attached a footnote that reads, 'I find an unexpected coincidence of thought here with Mr. Mill in his pamphlet on Education.' dccii In the Mill footnote, as in other footnotes, Shepherd reveals her predilection for the abstract and axiomatic. Given the context of her day and the underlying issues with which her group was concerned, Shepherd's linking of an abstract epistemological point and Mill's pamphlet on education is telling with regard to her interests. dcciii Other suggestions for reform in education that would prove more practical included those of James Pillans Jr, descendent of Mary Shepherd's tutor and Professor of Humanities at Edinburgh. In the 1830s, Pillans offered suggestions to Parliament on educational reforms that would indeed prove influential in Britain. [Pillans on educational reform] With such ambitious reforms in mind, and hopes to follow a new, democratic, and professional model for education, plans began to take shape in the minds of many Parliamentarians and philosophers. [Whately] At this point, change was beginning to get a wider foothold. At Cambridge and Oxford, movements to encourage theological liberalism were initiated. In the 1820s, the early years of what came to be known as the Oxford movement, Whately supported the movement toward 4 153 theological liberalism at the university. In those days, the movement amounted to little more than an evangelical call to renew the spirit and vigour of the church in its traditional, ecumenical role. That said, according to Edward Bouverie Pusey, a significant factor in the origin of the Oxford movement can be traced back to John Keble's 1827 publication The Christian Year, a publication that dates the origins of the Oxford movement quite early. In this work, Keble addressed the doctrines related to the Holy Eucharist and Divine Presence. The book's poetry touched on and re-awakened interest in doctrines such as Apostolic Succession, Baptismal Regeneration, and the Holy Trinity. dcciv In the main, Keble's book was a call to spiritual reawakening in the Church of England -a Church that was increasingly criticised as devoid of genuine spiritual calling. The call, particularly in its Catholic elements, was controversial in many ways. For as the Catholic-Evangelical revival gained momentum, more sermons were preached on the role and duties of the clergy, and guidance in moving the church forward was increasingly sought through inspiration from the past. In particular, the Catholic Church was seen as a guide on subjects such as Church Authority, Episcopacy, and Apostolic Succession. The movement itself turned into a revival of High Church tradition, a revival that supported the cause of Catholic emancipation, and that involved figures such as Hugh James Rose, Charles Lloyd, John Henry Newman, Edward Bouverie Pusey, William Froude, William Palmer, Issac Williams and Frederick Oakeley. [Bouverie family] It is interesting to note in connection Pusey's comments about The Christian Year, that several prominent figures of the Oxford movement, including Keble and Pusey, had connections to Scotland's Episcopal Church. Although interest in ritualistic and aesthetic aspect of the service was not emphasised in northern parts of Scotland, Catholic sympathies were shared in varying degrees in many parts of Scotland. In the north, Catholic interpretation was quite welcome. In south, with the exceptions of Edinburgh's St. Columba's and Jedburgh -both of which were Tractarian in foundation -- 'The strong, Catholic teaching of Keble and Pusey was tactfully omitted.' dccv Alexander Forbes, who later became an influential Episcopal Bishop, came under the influence of Keble, Pusey, and Newman, while a student at Oxford, and this was likely an important connection between the Oxford movement and Scotland's Episcopal Church. dccvi In the end, the Anglican, Catholic, and Episcopal connections would lead to a doctrinal emphasis on the ancient Catholic traditions and dogmas, an emphasis that would ultimately lead to considerable schism at Oxford. For, the 'Tractarian' movement that ensued produced tracts that interpreted the Anglican doctrine as virtually identical with the doctrines of the Catholic Church. Where variation existed, the results were either inconsistent or unintelligible. Indeed, many of the central issues of the Tractarian movement were based in the theology of the Eucharist, which was central to both Catholicism and to traditional forms of Episcopacy. Thus, the interest in dogma began as part of an evangelical revival that looked to fundamental doctrines as a source of spiritual renewal. In 1828, Newman gave a sermon On the Lord's Supper in which he interpreted the distinction between the 'real presence' and its effects. At this stage, Newman is still conventionally Anglican, describing the Lord's Supper as a feast through which we become one with Christ -except that it is only in a metaphorical sense that we gain in spiritual strength through the sacrament. dccvii Whately's name arises often in connection with the early days of theological liberalism at Oxford. The political dealings that later emerged in connection with the 'Hampden controversy' and subsequent events would eventually turn him away from Oxford. In addition to Whately, other names that arise in connection with the Anglican revival at Oxford and the Hampden controversy include those of Copleston, Arnold, Davison and Hawkins. They formed a group that represented neither High nor Low Churchmen. Rather, they 'had become a new school, characterised by its spirit of moderation and comprehension', a school that came to be regarded as 'forerunners of the oxford liberals'. dccviii Because of their liberal politics, they supported the 4 154 Catholic-Evangelical revival, as a matter of principle, in its early days. Their emphasis as Christians was non-denominational and non-partisan. As a well-respected group of academics and intellectuals, their support for the revival angered the orthodox opponents of the movement. At this point, for principled reasons, Whately removed himself from the open controversy. For what had begun as a movement in support of theological liberalism was becoming transformed into a political war in which various parties engaged in destructive personal attacks against those involved. Things really began to heat up at Oxford in connection with the controversy that came to be known as 'the Hamden controversy'. Renn Dickinson Hampden's name became known after he delivered his Bampton Lectures 'On the Scholastic Philosophy' in 1832. Blanco White, a friend of Richard Whately, and tutor to his children, is said to have assisted with the lectures, and perhaps to have contributed to their somewhat unorthodox flavour. [Hampden's Bampton Lectures 'On the Scholastic Philosophy' and 1832 controversy] But, as with Leslie's footnote, Hampden's lectures did not attract any notice when they were published in 1832. In fact, after the lectures, Hampden was made principal of St. Mary's Hall and later, in 1833, Professor of Moral Philosophy. In 1836, Hampden was further honoured when Lord Melbourne made him Regius Professor of Divinity. It was at this point, in part as a result of a backlash against Hampden's appointment, that the trouble began. The impetus for the backlash was jealousy over Hampden's appointment, but in the context of the Anglican revival underway at Oxford, the attack on Hampden soon turned to matters theological and political. The 'leading bigots', so it seemed, were offended by the new political liberality symbolised by Hampden and the Anglican Revival, and so found a means of lashing out against Hampden's 1836 appointment. That means was to light upon his earlier Bampton Lectures, and to claim that in these lectures, Hampden had 'so treated theological questions that, in this behalf, the University had no confidence in him.' dccix This negative portrayal of Hampden's theology and motives is in no way consistent with the vast majority of reports on his character and intentions. He is described as someone who, 'with no definite intentions of innovating on the received doctrines of the Church' had 'taken a very difficult subject' and 'without all fathoming its depth and reach, and had got into a serious scrape in consequence.' dccx Following the lead of German theologians, Hampden had envisioned a large divide between dogma and Scriptural authority. His underlying intent was to elevate Scriptural authority, and he aimed to do so by qualify the authenticity of the various scriptural interpretations expressed in church dogmas that were major causes of dissent and division. In attempting this, Hampden is said to have unwittingly undermined the church and its authority to legitimate divine fact. Hampden, according to his critics, 'left nothing standing but the authority of the letter of Scripture. All else --right or wrong as it might be -was \"speculation,\" \"human inference,\" \"dogma.\"' dccxi Hampden was quick to offer explanations, but now the controversy began to unfold at an unmanageable pace. His worst 'offence' may well have been his selfdefence by appeal to personal conviction. It was suggested that what Hampden had thereby reduced all but the letter of the Scripture to his own personal conviction and opinion. In the minds of the extreme conservatives, such an appeal to personal freedom of conscience was clearly insufficient. This controversy urged on the later stages of the Oxford movement -the Tractarian debates over the correct interpretation of the Anglican dogmas, and eventually the break from the Anglican Church and adoption of Catholicism on the part of Tractarians such as Keble, Pusey and Newman. Whately and his followers had supported Hampden through his crisis. Whately's own views on the Hampden controversy had all along strongly favoured the via media -a moderate approach in both policy and practice. 'For when we differ from a man in any of his views, it is more 4 155 incumbent on us to allow him fair play, and to demand it in his favour.' dccxii This was the proper time and place for neutrality. At the same time, Whately expressed grave concerns over the ill effects of remaining neutral with regard to bigotry and persecution. In a letter to Dr. Tyler regarding the injustice of the proceedings at Oxford against Dr. Hampden's appointment as Regius Professor of Divinity, Whately writes, If whenever a party of furious bigots have gained a majority in favour of some extravagant or unjust measure, all who are not of that party should make it their rule to stand neuter till the violent passions had cooled, the result would plainly be that the most violent and irrational would be likely in each body to bear rule unresisted. dccxiii Thus, bigotry must be fought, although the spirit of neutrality toward those whose views on Christianity differed from authoritative interpretations of doctrinal matters was also paramount. Whately, of course, was no sceptic on religious matters. Of his scholarly interest in theology, we know that he supported Paley's natural theology. But the religious thinker to whose thought he closely adhered was Butler. dccxiv Like Butler, Whately preferred historical analysis to proof and argument in support of the rationality of Scripture. He was content to leave metaphysical and doctrinal mysteries to personal contemplation. In the main, Whately worked to promote the sort of non-denominational approach to religious education that prevails in Western societies today. As one commentator explains, Butler's moderate and rational stance was an important ideal for Whatley in the face of the raging controversies of his day: This was partly because such divines as Whately felt intellectually stranded in the midnineteenth century cross-fire between, on the one side, the Tractarians and the Evangelicals, and, on the other, the 'Mythics' and 'Naturalists' (to us Whately's terminology), those German-inspired theologians who reduced the Scriptures to the level of parables, or who explained away miracles as natural phenomena. Paley was an eighteenth-century guide to a via media of reason and light, which led between routes either to infidelity or to irrational, although traditional, faith. dccxv The spirit of compromise and tolerance so formed the essence of Whately that it seems to have been even more important to him than settling points by philosophical argumentation. Whately, it might be said, was a liberal in the sense of being opposed to extremes. He was essentially supportive of a liberal-tending status quo in the church, state and university. His moderate views are evident in a letter to Dr. Arnold, written on the subject of London University and other educational reforms. Whately expresses a strong preference for a non-denominational approach to Christian education in both the university and school systems. He emphasised the importance of Christian history as a component of the education of citizens of predominantly Christian countries, which is, he points out, the reverse of traditional practice. But, since such a reversal avoids the 'fierce and mutual persecution' of opposing parties, Whately approves the change, and he even suggest that, as a matter of policy, 'I should call for no signing of articles -no profession of faith'. dccxvi Other influential individuals expressed distaste for any form of secularism in the university and its curriculum, and for policies designed to improve accessibility to higher education. Newman, for example, gave voice to the views of many conservatives when he said that only religion could be the basis for a sound national university that could mould the student body together in 'one tone and one character'. dccxvii Newman's position was later summed up in his book entitled The Idea of a University, in which he argued against 'the so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects'. Specifically, Newman objected that such a university 4 156 would not be 'successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind' or in sending out 'men fitted for their secular duties'. dccxviii As late as 1860, there are bitter cartoons that capture this sentiment, depicting the University of London as 'The Battle Field of Sciences and the Churches.' Ultimately, Newman came to promote the very sort of the persecutory and confrontational approach to university politics that was inimical to Mary Shepherd and her circle. Having once been friends, Whately and Newman eventually parted ways over their theological and political differences at Oxford. In the end, theological liberalism had posed such a threat to conservative forces at Oxford, that what began as a move toward liberalism devolved into bitter political warfare, destroying old friendships: Newman and Whately had been friends, and from the latter the former admits that he had learnt many things. In later years Newman was in Dublin for some years as rector of the ill-fated Catholic University, and at the same time Whately was there as Protestant archbishop. Yet they never met to speak to one another even in the street. dccxix Having initially welcomed the liberalism of Newman and others, Whately came to shun the excesses of Tractarians such as Newman. As Windle points out in Who's Who of the Oxford Movement, the title of Newman's last sermon as an Anglican clergyman acknowledge that the whole affair had led to 'The Parting of Friends'. That said, Whately himself is perhaps best remembered for advocating the via media -a moderate, middle course between intolerance and indifference on religious and political matters. He opposed the Tractarian movement that followed the Hampden controversy, and which he suspected was merely a divisive movement 'to propagate a secret infidelity' to the Anglican Church. dccxx In a similar spirit, his friend Dr. Arnold wrote an Edinburgh Review article entitled 'The Oxford Malignants' decrying the vicious party politics engendered by the Tracts at Oxford. Thus, many of Shepherd's friends were university, church, and government officials interested in institutional reform. Like other Scots affected by the discussion of theism and causality that ensued in the wake of Hume, many of these individuals would actively promote a more secular and democratic context for university education. For some, like Mill, Shepherd, Pillans, and Whately, the issues were explicitly grounded in principled foundations, and especially, in a respect for academic freedom. It is largely due to their efforts that there would be novel and controversial policies introduced at London, policies that would set a standard for freedom of conscience and free speech in the university. However, despite the example set at London, the requirement of religious tests and religious instruction in the more ancient universities remained unchanged for a long time to come. Issues around religion and university reform continued to simmer and boil in Britain, and theological controversies likewise persisted. Thus, the conceptual and political issues that first emerged at Edinburgh University, and that would later take hold at London and the Oxford, illustrate the continuity in the debate and discussion of issues around religion and academic freedom in Britain. The debate originated in Edinburgh with Hume, and it there drew the attention and interest of many of those who would take an interest in shaping the direction of Britain's universities. 6.2 Science, Technology, and Liberal Education Shepherd took an interest in science and technology, and like other members of her circle, she hoped to find a harmony between faith, science and reason. She was deeply committed to the 4 157 idea that at some fundamental level there would be unity in knowledge, and so she was predisposed to explain away new data emerging from the physical sciences. With her commitment to unity, and her rationalist assumption that reason is the key to systematic unity in knowledge, she could justifiably uphold the right to freedom of conscience and expression. Indeed, Shepherd's approach to science, religion, and education, like her discussion of Hume, was based on a fundamental respect for the open exchange of ideas. For Shepherd and her circle, interest in the sciences was not merely theoretical; it had practical dimensions as well. Members of the group developed strong views and attitudes towards progress and the social and ideological impact of science. In 1830, for example, Charles Babbage, wrote a book entitles Decline of Science in England, which seems to have inspired debate on the subject of progress and science within Shepherd's circle. dccxxi In any event, Whewell and Babbage entered a public debate on the subject, and debate is interesting insofar as it relates to attitudes towards science, technology, and industry in a society deliberating the future of science. Babbage, for example, criticised the aristocratic flavour and lack of professionalism in the Royal Society in his Decline of Science in England. To these criticisms, he added a general castigation of the government's lack of support for science. William Whewell referred to Babbage as the 'leader of the 'Declinists', despite the fact that he himself questioned the value and legitimacy of the progress made in the sciences during the nineteenth century. In what would seem a ludicrous suggestion today, Whewell advocated that one hundred years be allowed to pass before introducing a particular new theory to the university curriculum. Ostensibly, this temporal lag was not proposed for the purpose of protecting religion from evidential challenges, but in order to give adequate opportunity for a proper assessment of the merits or demerits of each new physical theory! At the same time, Whewell presented himself as a supporter of curricular change, encouraging the study of the natural sciences. His suggested reforms were much more conservative than those introduced at London. However, this conservatism may in fact have been key to his success in opening the door to change at Cambridge. For, in this instance, achieving any modification of the medieval statutes was a great innovation in its own right -for it was daring to attempt revision of the statutes in the first place. Whewell's contributions to educational reform at Cambridge were generally regarded as positive. Controversies there were mild in comparison with the bitterness and animosity that ensued at Oxford. As Master of Trinity, Whewell oversaw modest revisions of the statutes, although his real interest lay in outlining the direction of liberal education. Whewell's position was that the curriculum at Cambridge should not include recent works, even ones of great scientific value, 'until some time has elapsed, and the mathematical world has given them their sanction.' dccxxii Whewell's motive might well have been that of avoiding the embarrassment of teaching patently false doctrines -but it also suggests that he felt that a firm foundations in the classics was necessary -perhaps to ensure a theologically sound footing for young students. Whewell seems to have had theologically conservative motives in his reservations about science. He may well have sanctioned the idea of open inquiry, but he was often strategic in his attitude toward theories. dccxxiii It took many years to bring about curricular change at Cambridge, but Whewell eventually published a book entitled Of a Liberal Education in which he explained and summarised his views. Whewell's most important recommendations for curricular change involved the encouragement of the study of the natural sciences, and the requirement that, in a limited sense, the study of mathematics should precede and be prerequisite to the former. These suggestions, although modest in some senses, did have an impact on reforms at Cambridge. 4 158 Interestingly, to the rigidly conservative, Whewell's modest proposals were seen as radical. Whewell's suggested reforms were criticised as having over-emphasised the importance of mathematics. Moreover, his neglect of the study of classical subjects such as geography, modern language, and aesthetics was seen as a fault of his proposed reforms. Ostensibly, the actual debate between Whewell and Babbage begins with Whewell's critical remarks concerning recent contributions of mechanical philosophers and mathematicians to an understanding of the universe in his 1833 Bridgewater Treatise: 'We may thus, with great propriety, deny to the mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times any authority with regard to their views of the administration of the universe; we have no reason whatever to expect from their speculations any help, when we ascend to the first cause and supreme ruler of the universe. But we might perhaps go farther, and assert that they are in some respects less likely than men employed in other pursuits, to make any clear advance towards such a subject of speculation.' dccxxiv Babbage quotes Whewell's prefatory remarks in his own Ninth Bridgewater Treatise. Babbage seems to have regarded Whewell's remark as traitorous of the Cambridge community of mathematicians and particularly, of their accomplishments in advancing ideas on scientific notation. In the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, Babbage defends knowledge of the existence of God by citing the abundant examples of evidence of the Creator in the works, evidence that scientists in the fields of geology, zoonomy, chemistry, and the like were busy collecting, classifying and interpreting. Whewell foresaw a potential danger in Babbage's argument, to some extent anticipating the evolution controversy that would ensue in the latter half of the century. The two thinkers had an open and gentlemanly disagreement on the subject -although in his private letters Whewell refers to the circle of 'analytical mathematicians' to which Shepherd and Babage belonged with some derision. dccxxv In his Open Letter to Charles Babbage, Whewell appears to acknowledge Babbage's point about the recent advances of science, although in many respects he remained firm on the wisdom of the very slow approach to the advancement of science. dccxxvi In the end, the sort of attitude promoted by Whewell seems to have been intended to soften the impact and slow the advance of science. It was the very sort of attitude to which Babbage strongly objected, since its prevalence undermined the advancement of science and technology in Britain. Babbage strongly disagreed with Whewell's view that new sciences should be gradually introduced into the university curriculum in order to allow time for an evaluation of their merits. Babbage was in general opposed to Whewell's under-rating of recent scientific progress, which he took to undermined attempts to advance the cause of science. Unlike Babbage and Shepherd, Whewell seems to disavow that scientific evidence, aided by pure mathematics, can lead to firm and decisive theories. dccxxvii At some level, Whewell gives the impression of a lack confidence in the rational foundation in certainty of scientific theory. This, at least, suggested by his concern that new scientific theories not be introduced until one hundred years had passed, and in his efforts to eliminate heavy mathematical requirements that he considered excessive for the liberal arts student. Whewell's approach to science seems to suggest either a fear that scientific truth would undermine religious belief or that he thought that rapid ideological change would lead to dangerous social consequences. Babbage's own motives in castigating English society for its lack of support for science may have been partly personal; his life was marred by frustrating and disappointing efforts to secure 4 159 public funds for his research. Unfortunately, Babbage was not an effective self-promoter, and he failed to see that the average government administrator or Member of Parliament would never grasp the merit and potential of his calculating machines. The principles of his machines went far beyond those of simple calculators, and in fact were conceptually based on principles that brought mathematics and analysis much closer together than a mere calculator could. His machine was more than a simple calculator; it was the prototype for a computer and ran according to rules and inferences. Indeed, one of the problems that Babbage spent years trying to figure out was a principle whereby the machine mechanically could carry numbers in a time efficient manner. As Babbage understood it, the solution would require a mechanism to allow the machine to anticipate all of the carrying operations that it would need to perform to follow the rule of differences, and then perform them all in a single operation at the end. It took many years to develop a machine that could run with speed, although Babbage made huge advances in his own lifetime -advances that were hard for the average educated person to fathom. As Babbage developed his 'curious machines', it became increasingly apparent that he was working to develop a device that could take over the repetitive, time-consuming acts of mental calculation. It was soon apparent -and Babbage made no secret of this -the machines could perform mental operations similar to those of humans. The public grew anxious, fearing and developing a sense of outrage at the machine and its audacious inventor, who had dared to devise 'machinery to calculate by differences, which, if well made, cannot err.' dccxxviii Initial reactions to Babbage's first completed Difference Engine were less than rewarding, although it was one of the most remarkable and advanced feats of mechanical engineering and design for decades to come. The Engine was, on one occasion, likened to a Trojan horse by the bureaucratic Robert Peel, who strongly disliked industry and technology. He suspiciously remarked that 'It is an engine designed against our walls or some other mischief hides in it.' dccxxix The statement is telling, for it shows an underlying attitude of fear toward the new technology. The lack of understanding persisted throughout his lifetime, and Babbage himself sadly reflected that 'The Analytic Engine is too much in advance of my countrymen, scarcely one of whom comprehends its results or sympathizes with its author.' dccxxx One outraged (but probably typical) critic named John Lee (1783-1866) took Babbage's infallibility claim for his machine as a direct affront to religion. Lee makes angry remarks in the margins of his copy of Passages. 'What does the Holy Father and his ministers say to this idea -will they admit that the powers of mind of the author of the A E are equal to the powers of His mind -If so -they must admit the superiority of the powers of mind of the author of the A E.' dccxxxi [cf. Dr John Lee Principal Edin Univ. Pres. 1840s] Babbage had his supporters as well, some of whom supported him on principle, even if they were somewhat fearful of his research. Babbage's support was greatest in the earlier years of his project and outside of his native country, where the significance of his work was better understood. One of his strongest supporters was Byron's daughter, Ada Augusta, who became Countess of Lovelace. She translated Menabtea's paper on the Analytic Engine, adding extensive explanatory notes to help the reader to interpret the significance of Babbage's achievements. The notes were so good that Babbage tried to press her to write them up as an independent article. Lady Lovelace's article helped to elucidate to the public Babbage's own thoughts on the use and functioning of the Engine. dccxxxii Elizabeth Barrett, a young acquaintance of Mary Shepherd, also rose to Babbage's defence in a letter to her future husband, Robert Browning on 17 February 1844, supporting his right to creative expression and defending his search for truth, despite her evident reservations about his work. She writes, Do you know Tennyson? that is with a face to face knowledge?... That such a poet shd submit blindly to the suggestions of his critics is much as if Babbage were to take my 4 160 opinion & undo his calculating machine by it. dccxxxiii In addition to the lack of support and understanding, Babbage himself felt unappreciated by the public. Many were affronted by the idea of a calculating engine that could replace the functions of the human mind -it seemed an irreligious and frightening advance. Though religious himself, Babbage was unhappy with the sort of conservative and slow course of change proposed by figures such as Whewell. Babbage claimed that the government had hindered the progress of science by failing to assist in the development of science, technology, and industry. He rejected Ada Lovelace's offer of financial support for his research and determinedly persists in his efforts top secure public funding for research. Babbage's views on government intervention were based on the assumption that governments will disinterestedly fund pure research, an assumption that we would question today, given the close alliance that has developed between corporate, government and university interests. Whewell represents the more conservative voice of concern regarding the appropriate speed, role, and extent of advance in science, technology, and industry. It is worth looking at the debate and discussion between Whewell's and Babbage, for their differences were especially evident in discussions of the roles of government and universities in advancing science. Babbage spent many years trying to obtain government funding for work on his Difference and Analytic Engines. But instead of receiving government support, Babbage was forced to fund his own work -even while he wasted valuable energy and time in trying to sincerely engage what amounted to a constant administrative run around. The symbolic aspect of Babbage's insistence on government support for science, industry and technology was at least as important a message as any other message that he left. Babbage, of course, envisioned this support as an unfettered funding of worthwhile projects, as determined by competent judges. According to Babbage, the government of England, unlike those in foreign countries, had failed to encourage scientists in useful discoveries, and had relegated science to a kind of sport for amateurs: In England, those who have hitherto pursued science have in general no reasonable grounds of complaint; they knew, or should have known, that there was no demand for it, that it led to little honour, and to less profit. dccxxxiv Babbage's dream was to see the introduction of institutionalized support for science and of active intervention of government. He objected that the scientific societies to date were 'managed by a party or coterie' with the object 'of maintaining itself in power and to divide, as far as it could, all the good things amongst its members.' dccxxxv The situation in England was worthy of contempt and ridicule. dccxxxvi The Babbage and Whewell debate is interesting insofar as it relates to attitudes towards science, technology and industry. On the one side, that claim is that science must be left alone, free from the influence and interests of government if truth is to be its object. On the other side, the claim is that social welfare requires that science be funded and made practical if it is to advance the general good. But the friendly debate is notable for other reasons as well. For it serves to further illustrate the standard of professionalism in debate and the underlying humanitarianism valued by those in Shepherd's circle. Differences on the subject of how to move science forward aside, generally speaking, Shepherd's circle was among the most advanced in promoting science and technology and its benefits for society. Whatever reticence can be found within the group betrays an underlying an nagging worry regarding the growing conflict between science and religion, a worry that beset even the most ardent of advocates for science. 4 161 For the likes of Shepherd and Babbage, science and truth should be upheld as part of the promise of a more enlightened and humanitarian world. The Creator must have made a world such as this, a rational world that held promise of salvation. Such assurance rested on one simple assumption: That scientific truth could ultimately be inconsistent with the laws that God created to govern the universe. Babbage and Shepherd held tenaciously to this view, despite the fact that the physical sciences had advanced numerous challenges and proposed truly radical new ideas about the natural world in the first half of the nineteenth century. Major contributions already in hand by the early part of the century were Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia, Paley's natural theology, Dalton's atomic theory, Faraday's discoveries relating to electricity, Humboldt's ideas on rock geology, and several discussions of species evolution. There would be much to follow upon these discoveries, of course, but even in the first half of the century, the pace and significance of scientific advance was astonishing. Shepherd took an interest in several physical sciences, and especially in physics, geology, and zoonomy. Shepherd appears to have subscribed, most likely as an Honorary Member, to the Geological Society of London. This is difficult to establish, however, since no women are listed as Fellows of the Geological Society of London between 1826 and 1838. In a letter to Babbage, Shepherd claims to be quite comfortable with the subject of geology, saying that she has already 'studied so much in Mr. Lyell's book', that a recent presentation on rock geology 'was quite familiar to me & easy to be understood as consistent with his principles'. dccxxxvii Geological hypotheses were a source of great controversy and concern in the nineteenth century, and Shepherd, like most of her generation, found some of the newer geological interpretation of her day difficult to swallow. There is little doubt that the new geological views on rock formation would have given considerable pause to any sincerely religious thinkers of Shepherd's day. Many were convinced that the physical sciences must all somehow converge with the Bible, so that doubts about theory-data fit were likely motivated by prior commitments to Biblical claims, commitments that appeared to be at variance with descriptions of events taking place in geological time. It is worth remarking here that Shepherd may also have written a third philosophical treatise, a teaser suggested in both the Dictionary of National Biography and a curious typewritten insert left in the Cambridge University copy of her 1827 publication. dccxxxviii The third work attributed to Shepherd, entitled An Enquiry Respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect, is a bit of a mystery. Unlike the later works, the 1819 piece was published in Edinburgh together with a second, very different, work on natural history. Although consistent with the arguments of her 1824 and 1827 books, the 1819 work contains little that can be directly related to Mary Shepherd's original philosophical views. As a result, Shepherd's authorship is difficult to establish in the absence of further evidence. The 1819 publication on the Theory of the Earth that appears as the companion piece to the one on Brown's theory of causality attributed to Shepherd offers an imaginative reconstruction of the earth's history that attempts to account for geological data in terms of two catastrophic collisions. dccxxxix One of the collisions leads to an immense conflagration; and the other to a deluge. The picture of the earth and its development presented in the book fits with a Biblical account of the natural history of the earth, and any mention of time periods is decidedly vague. But the approach of the anonymous 1819 work on geology is typical of its day -at a time when geological studies were highly speculative. In truth, the book could well have been written by a number of Edinburgh scholars. So we do not know whether Shepherd wrote the 1819 work, but we do know that she was familiar with geology -and particularly with Lyell's work. Shepherd refers to research suggesting a geological time span and explanation of geological phenomena according to slow and continuing forces on the earth -both controversial hypotheses in her day. In a letter to Babbage, she remarks upon recent geological research. The research is along 4 162 the lines of Lyell's work, circa his 1828 trip to Mount Etna, which he later presented in papers to the Royal Society etc.. Like many, Shepherd reacts with scepticism to the new geological hypotheses. Her initial reaction to the presentation is that it suffers as a consequence of an insufficient fit between theory and data: Yet I cannot believe upon any evidence other than demonstrative, that there could be such an uniformity not merely of the laws; but of the facts or events in nature. That these [being] supposed sufficient land &, which man might occupy, that no man occupied the same, : and that for ages. Show me the world in impressure and not under analogous change maybe, & then 'I might believe,' however long & various might have been the changes our planet might have undergone: Also, I do not see why the [remaining] rocks should not hold as much granite as those in [hills] surrounding. dccxl Whether the theory-data fit was truly inadequate, or whether Shepherd's bias in favour of a Biblical account hindered her objectivity is difficult to say. Given her historical context, it is notable that her initial reaction is at least somewhat open-minded -the sort of response that one would anticipate from an intelligent, well-educated person who wishes to give a full and fair hearing to all of the views under consideration. Thus, Shepherd does not immediately dismiss the 'controversial' geological theory on prejudicial grounds, though she is dubious enough to ask for more information on the theory-data fit. She presents what she considers to be rational grounds for doubt, and these grounds are based on her view that the laws of nature must have a necessary status, a necessity established by means of demonstrative proof. It is easy to see this as a defensive stance against the new and growing geological evidence, and Shepherd's doubts about the new hypotheses show that she was a sincere and concerned Christian. But she was generally open to and optimistic about the discoveries in the newly emerging sciences of the nineteenth century; for he goal was to seek out the 'deeper' grounds that could resolve the seemingly incompatible doctrines. One of these foundational elements was the causal axiom, Presumably another related to the deep hope that at the most abstract level, there would be a basis for unity in knowledge. That such a meeting point existed was something that Shepherd and her intellectual colleagues firmly believed, almost as an article of faith. In consequence, Shepherd was devoted to the truth, and willing to face the evidence of the sciences. Shepherd's attitude toward science was in fact quite typical of her circle. Shepherd and Babbage, for example, adopt the same basis for rejecting Hume's claims against miracles. dccxli Both seem to have held that the occasional miracle would be consistent with an otherwise invariant principle of uniformity in nature, because a divine creator could well have designed the world as such at the time of Creation. dccxlii [Babbage on miracles] Shepherd was evidently curious about Babbage's views on the relationship between geology and Biblical history. For she writes of his view of miracles in a letter dated about 1839, I read a great on Sunday in your Bridgewater treatise w. a new & increased delight. - The chapter on miracles appears to me as beautiful, as the mechanical instrument which serves as its illustration. That on the Mosaic history, is to my faculties somewhat obscure I read it twice over, and am not sure that I yet quite catch the full meaning of some of the reasoning. How I should enjoy a talk on it wt. you. dccxliii In later life, Babbage expresses his thoughts on the subject in a manner that Shepherd herself, had she lived long enough, might one day also have expressed herself. As Babbage writes, Although I have contended for the Mosaic date of the creation of man as long as I 4 163 decently could, and have even endeavoured to explain away some of the facts relied upon to prove man's anterior origin; yet I must admit that the continual accumulation of evidence probably will, at last, compel me to acknowledge that, in this single instance, the writings of Moses may have been misapprehended. dccxliv As this remark suggests, the intent of both Shepherd and Babbage was always to face the truth -a truth that they held to be accord with faith. This attitude is perhaps no more than obliquely evident in Shepherd's response to new theories of geology, although it is clearer elsewhere. The strength of this conviction is shored up by the belief that religious and philosophical truth will be in harmony. For theoretically, on her view, all of the sciences, and even theology itself, must fall under the unity and necessity of the causal axiom. This idea seems to have been one shared by many of those in Shepherd's circle, and it was certainly held by the likes of Mill and Ricardo, who explicitly aimed to place even the social sciences on the same footing of axiomatic certainty. Whewell's reticence to adopt this optimistic line betrays something like an underlying doubt about the unity of knowledge. Or perhaps his worry is simply that the time that would be required to discover and establish this unity would be so extensive as to seriously undermine religion. Whewell focuses on developing a view of science that is grounded in his conception of natural theology. For Whewell, our ideas are 'shadows' of Divine Ideas, and to see a law as a necessary consequence of our ideas is to see it as a consequence of the very Divine Ideas exemplified in the world. Understanding involves seeing a law as being not an arbitrary 'accident on the cosmic scale,' but as a necessary consequence of the ideas God used in creating the universe. Hence the more we idealize the facts, the more difficult it will be to deny God's existence. We will come to see more and more truths as the intelligible result of intentional design. This view relates to Whewell's point in his Bridgewater Treatise that the more we study the laws of nature the more convinced we will be in the existence of a Divine Law-giver Shepherd, like many others in her day, hoped that natural theology might resolve the apparent tension between science and religion. Given what Shepherd has to say about the causal principle in connection with physical phenomena, it is not surprising to find that she invokes her views on causality in connection with natural theology. She may have been influenced by the theories of writers such as John Ray, William Derham, and William Paley, although her views are also in keeping with those in her own circle. Shepherd adopts the view that proof of God's existence can be deduced from the complexity of design in nature. Her essay on the subject of natural theology is one of her shortest and simplest; she here ties her analysis to her view that causation is more than merely phenomenal, and focuses in a more general way on the causal relation and its connection with the organs of sense. Thus she takes up one of her favourite themes, the manner and action of causation on the sense organs. Shepherd begins by saying that she intends to address issues around design in nature and Deity. She hopes to answer the charge that design arguments suppose that organization is itself a necessary attribute of the Deity. Shepherd denies that this is so, and the main ground for her denial is the manner and action of causes with respect to the sense organs. According to Shepherd, organization is exhibited in the sense organs in animal life. She points out that the current view of physiologists is that the organization of animal life, although one element of life, is not itself the cause of life. Rather, the organization or design of a being requires that changes be enacted upon it to support life. In this regard, the sense organs are merely recipients upon which the causal world impinges, and as recipients to causal influences, they give rise to perceptions, including the perception of design. 'Whatever the organs are, they are but qualities, in relation to mind, or the power of feeling, with which they unite in the order of perception.' dccxlv 4 164 In other words, the arrangement and first action of the organs, and the animal power to feel, are given properties to EACH, and therefore to ALL men and animals, antecedently to their own action, in conjunction with the atmosphere under which they first draw life. Thus organization does not give any original powers, but merely its action changes the action and perception of those powers. dccxlvi Most importantly, the original powers through which life becomes possible, she tells us, require that change to the sense organs occur in time. Since God is outside of time, the atheist's criticism that the design argument requires that God also have a design does not follow. We see then, examples of the debates that ensued over the proper manner of introducing the sciences and of integrating scientific advance in society. These questions are linked to other practical problems, problems of how institutions -government, university, or business -can either help or hinder the search for philosophical and scientific truth. In both theoretical and practical senses then, attention to the developments in sciences was paramount for those in Shepherd's circle. Conflict in the group arose over the question of which values to attempt to preserve in advancing into the future. Whewell, for example, seems to have worried that religious truth would not survive the rapid introduction of new scientific challenges. Shepherd and others disagreed, Perhaps following the same line as Babbage, she seems to come out clearly in favour of the benefits of rapid advance of science. This she does because she is ultimately convinced of the unity in knowledge, of the social benefits of inventions based on the new knowledge, and of the importance of free and open inquiry. She was, from her youth, against party politics and personal attacks in name of achieving political end. We see this same humanitarian ideal embodied the manner of public debate among other members of her circle. We see it also in the issues for which they stood and in their intellectual and political aspirations to discover the laws that by which we could govern a country and live wisely as a society. Above all, Shepherd and her circle sought to give philosophical answers -and to replace the persecution, exclusion, and personal attacks with a reason and humanism in negotiation. This was to be a foundation for ideas as well as a foundation for a democratic society. Indeed, the direction in which Shepherd's arguments aim must always be kept in view when considering her work. For though providing a philosophical basis for theism was an aim that motivated Shepherd throughout her life, she was also motivated by a certain set of attitudes toward open inquiry. At the same time, at a personal level, Mary Shepherd's own faith never wavered. She sought to defend the existence of a deity on philosophical grounds, the only safe and fair grounds upon which such a discussion should rest. Thus, her response to common sense philosophy and scientific challenges to religion was part of a larger project to establish, on the strength of reason and not of persecution, a foundation for theism, and a world in which free inquiry is upheld in the name of truth and God alike. 6.3 New College and Edinburgh University As the mid-nineteenth century drew near, relatively little had been done to address the matter of religious tests in universities. Apart from the newly introduced London University, changes to Britain's established universities had been modest or non-existent. Policies and practices continued to enforce the requirement of adherence to the doctrines of the national Church. In Scotland, for example, those unable or unwilling to swear to the Confession of Faith continued to be ruled out as candidates for university positions. Archibald Tait, later to become Archbishop of Canterbury, declined the offer of the Greek professorship at the University of Glasgow in 1838, on the grounds that he was unable to avow support for the doctrines contained in the 4 165 Westminster confession. dccxlvii Thus, as the decades unfolded, little had been accomplished to change the institutions and to promote and secure academic freedom. It still continued to be the case that those unable to swear to religious oaths were ruled out as candidates for university positions. Scotland would again show leadership on this front. As the more conservative and established universities in the southern parts of Britain braved their first brushes with religious controversy and persecution, institutional change was taking shape in Edinburgh on at least two fronts. First, there was a move to disrupt the Established Church of Scotland, a move that was accompanied by the introduction of Edinburgh's New College, whose mandate involved the education of ministers intending to work outside of the Established Church of Scotland. Secondly, Edinburgh University radically altered its policies relating to religious tests, restricting them to theological positions. Both developments represented significant institutional and social changes. The Disruption of the Established Church of Scotland was in part a response to the state control of the Church, and in part a response to an Evangelical revival that urged the filling of a spiritual void created by the state dominance. In 1838, an evangelical preacher from America, Charles Finney, published his Lectures on the Revivals of Religion in Edinburgh's Presbyterian Review. dccxlviii Finney's message, which seems to have struck a deep chord in Scotland, was a call to focus on the Holy Spirit as a source of renewal in the church. This call to spiritualism, and ultimately to a form of spiritual independence, aroused great interest, and eventually led a great number of clergy and their congregations into an evangelical fervour. In the years between 1838-1843, this evangelical fervour took hold in Scotland, and the movement took on great proportions. As such, a schism within the Established Church of Scotland began to develop. When the break did ensue, nearly half of the Presbyterians of Scotland had shifted religious focus. As a result, in 1843, there was a sudden need for a new church and educational infrastructure to accommodate the new congregations formed from this 'Disruption' of the Established Church. The figure most central in the evangelical revival in Scotland, Thomas Chalmers, gave the inaugural address to the first Free Church congregation in Cramond -just a stone's throw from Mary Shepherd's ancestral home of Barnbougle Castle. It was an important achievement on many levels, and one that had been the result of a long-standing movement to promote theological liberalism in Cramond parish. But Chalmers does not deserve the sole credit for having established Cramond as the epicentre of the Disruption. It was in large part due to the leadership of the Reverends Bonar and Muir that the Cramond congregation would be the first to openly avow support for the 1843 Disruption. Indeed, many Free Church clergy and laymen involved in the Disruption had links to Cramond. Among them were counted numerous distinguished clergy and professors -Welsh, Candlish, Guthrie, Caird, Chalmers and Brewster. dccxlix Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser, one of those involved in this union of nonconformist congregations under the Free Church, describes a surprisingly lively intellectual circle in Cramond, many of whom were central figures in the mid-nineteenth century Disruption: There I met persons of note, mostly Free Church clergymen and laymen: Welsh, my old professor, in the last year of his life, Candlish, the brilliant and versatile ecclesiastic, next in succession to Chalmers; and the philanthropic Guthrie, along with Chalmers and Caird, one of three illustrious Scottish preachers in the nineteenth century. Among the laymen Sir David Brewster was foremost. dccl So, despite the ancient history of religious conflict in the Dalmeny and Cramond, there is good reason to think that, by the turn of the nineteenth century, attitudes toward religion tended to 4 166 favour freedom of worship, tolerance, and diversity. The days of religious persecution in Scotland were by no means at an end, but there was a growing opposition to religious intolerance per se, and Cramond appears to have played an important role in this shift in attitude. The Disruption itself was a risky affair for those involved. Sir David Brewster, whom Campbell Fraser encountered in Cramond shortly before the Disruption, is noted for having nearly lost his office after seceding from the Established Church of Scotland. 'He was then Principal at St. Andrews, threatened with expulsion from his office as a Free Church seceder the Church Establishment claiming exclusive possession of the university chairs.' dccli But many Scots evidently felt sympathy for the plight of congregations outside the Established Church. There was, of course, a long history of religious intolerance, and an equally long history of quiet compassion for victims of such intolerance. As girls, Charlotte and Mary Primrose, for example, often spoke with Archibald Bonar and Thomas Chalmers -both of whom were later be instrumental in the 1843 Disruption of the Established Church of Scotland. Given the events and interests that marked their later lives, and the theological nature of their exchanges, it is highly probably that these discussions sometimes related to issues concerning freedom of conscience in matters of religion. The girls tutor, Pillans, would also have provided a strong model of religious independence as well as evoked sympathy for freedom of conscience in religious and intellectual matters. Of the Primrose children, we know that Charlotte Primrose came to hold a deep interest in the cause of the newly established Free Church. Despite her love of the Anglican tradition, Lady Effingham had great sympathy for the cause of the Free Church. She is remembered in Edinburgh for having provided funding for a University chair on behalf of the Free Church: I must not forget the circumstance which made her name grateful and celebrated at Edinburgh; she founded, endowing with I think £ 3,000, a chair in the University required by the Free Kirk on its constitution being settled. dcclii The Countess of Effingham in fact became a church patron to both the Free Church and the Anglican Church. With her husband's permission, she donated her dowry of £ 20,000 to built and endow an Anglican Church near her husband's Yorkshire seat. She later raised a sea hulk near Dover for the use of sailors, eventually building a substantial church to replace the sea hulk. She then donated the 'Chapel Hulk' for the use of the Free Church. She was, in fact, a great friend and admirer of Thomas Chalmers -though she evidently differed from Chalmers on doctrinal issues. But, according to the Primrose mores, such differences were not grounds for division and persecution. dccliii Indeed, persecutions based on denomination were probably seen in much the same way by Mary Shepherd and her Primrose siblings. A number of significant changes occurred in Edinburgh's academic institutions on the heels of the Disruption. In terms of university reform, leadership again came from Scotland. For in the same year that Chalmers led the Disruption of the Church of Scotland, he founded Edinburgh's New College for the purpose of educating Ministers of the 'Free Kirk'. New College symbolically achieved a new religious freedom in higher education in Edinburgh. And the need for this new religious freedom in higher education was never more apparent than in 1843. David Brewster, for example, Principal of St. Andrews, had been 'threatened with expulsion from his office as a Free Church seceder'. dccliv The Church of Scotland, still in exclusive possession of the university chairs in Scotland, and seceders were technically ineligible to hold office. As Chalmers explained to the Cramond congregation, there was an urgent and immediate need for new 4 167 educational institutions and offices in the wake of the Disruption. 'A large number of teachers, as Chalmers informed the first Free Church Assembly on 20 May 1843, had already been dismissed from their positions for expressing approval of Free Church principles, and they must not be forsaken.' dcclv As a result, plans for an educational institute to train new clergy were quickly undertaken, and fundraising campaigns initiated to build new schools and churches. Chalmers' call for immediate action on the educational front met with great success. In May 1843, just a few days after the Disruption, the Assembly of the Free Church appointed a committee headed by David Welsh to plan a college. The New College was immediately needed, and was opened in the very year of the Disruption, in November 1843. Initially, classes were held in rented rooms on George Street, but eventually the college was moved to a site overlooking Edinburgh's New Town. By 1847, half of Scottish children were in Free Church schools, and there were ministers in training in New College to teach them. Thus, the need to provide educational training for ministers and teachers associated with the Free Church was met. New College was eventually merged with the University of Edinburgh, and with this change, Edinburgh had fully embraced a new liberal set of values for the future -values that embodied the liberal ideological principles of enlightenment, the very principles of education long upheld by Edinburgh's greatest philosophers. At Edinburgh University, change was slower. This slowness was can be accounted for by the same recurring efforts on the part of the conservative factions to forestall progressive change by resorting to petty and persecutory attacks and party politics. Experience of the retrograde policies and practices in Scotland's universities had profoundly marked the lives of individuals such as Stewart, Brown, Shepherd, Mill, and Pillans, providing impetus for change despite considerable resistance. Success would eventually come, however, and Edinburgh seems to have been the breeding ground for the new thought and activism that led to change. By the mid1840s, Edinburgh's Senate, under the leadership of James Pilland Jr, began in earnest to discuss the possibility of restricting religious tests to those involved with the professional training of students in Theology. Pillans, the Professor of Humanities at the University of Edinburgh and descendant of Mary Shepherd's tutor, succeeded in advancing the motion that would eventually lead to academic freedom at Edinburgh University. The 1844 motion read: 'That in the opinion of the Senatus Academicus the time is now come when -except in regard to the Faculty of Theology -a change is required in the law which calls upon every Professor in every University of Scotland to sign the Confession of Faith and the Formula before his induction.' The case for university reform is successfully advanced, and the original Act of Parliament requiring the religious test is modified. It is worth noting the slow progress of this change, which begins a full century after the Hume affair was initiated in 1744. The following Motions regarding University Tests are chronologically ordered and taken from the Town Council of Edinburgh Minutes and the Extracts from Laws and Regulations enacted by the Faculty and Senatus Academicus, and their record, which is included directly below, shows that opposing parties continually attempted to thwart the introduction of progressive policies. dcclvi Motions regarding University Tests taken from the Town Council of Edinburgh Minutes and Laws and Regulations enacted by the Faculty and Senatus Academicus: [Town Council] 27th February 1844 Edinburgh 26th February 1844...The College Committee unanimously report to the magistrates and Council that they should approve and adopt the following Memorial to Her majesty's Government. [The Memorial argues at length in favour of the abolition of religious tests, because they \"are discouraging to such as are honourably engaged in 4 168 pursuit of literary or scientific eminence, and are besides unnecessary seeing that those entrusted with the appointment of Professors possess the ordinary means of ascertaining the religious and moral qualifications of Candidates.\"] The Magistrates and Council approved of the report and adopted the Memorial [two Councillors dissenting]. (197) [University Senate] 13th March 1845 Prof. Pillans gaves notice of the following motion: - 1. That in the opinion of the Senatus Academicus the time is now come when -except in regard to the Faculty of Theology -a change is required in the law which calls upon every Professor in every University of Scotland to sign the Confession of Faith and the Formula before his induction. 2. That a Committee be appointed to draw up a Memorial. (278) [University Senate] 19th April 1845 Mr Pillans' motion regarding Tests submitted to the Senatus at last meeting was taken into consideration and agreed to...the Principal [Rev. Dr. John Lee] dissenting for reasons to be afterwards assigned. (278) [University Senate] 27th November 1847 [Drs Christison and Gregory move to petition the Queen to redress the injury to the university caused by the present 'anomalous constitution, and more especially from the administration and jurisdiction now exercised by the Town Council'...and ask for a transfer of 'the government of the University into the hands of a duly constituted University Court'... (280-1) [Town Council] 30th November 1847: [Motion]: That it be remitted to the College Committee to prepare a Petition to Parliament for the abolition of all University Tests, except in case of Chairs of Divinity, Church History, and Biblical Criticism, and that the Petition be forwarded to the City Members for presentation and support. [The Motion was carried by a majority, and the Lord Provost was authorised \" to sign the Petitions, and to affix the City Seal thereto.\"] (200-201) [University Senate] 25th March 1848 The following motion was made by Dr. Christison, and seconded by Professor Dunbar:- \"That a petition be presented by the Senatus to both Houses of Parliament praying that the Acts relative to University Tests in the Scotch Universities be amended; but so as to procure the Christian and Protestant character of these Universities, that in any 4 169 Amendment of these Acts it shall be made a condition that Principals, Professors of Theology, Church History, Biblical Criticism, and Hebrew, and any other Professorships that may be instituted for the professional training of Students in Theology, shall be Ministers or Licentiates of the Church of Scotland.\" On being put to the vote the Motion of Dr. Christison was carried by a majority. (281) [University Senate] 1st August 1848 The Senatus unanimously resolved that the attempt by the Patrons to assume to themselves the exclusive power of admitting Professors is wholly contrary to Law and to the practice which has prevailed hitherto, is an invasion of the rights and privileges of the Senatus Academicus, and they deem it necessary solemnly to protest against this proceeding of the Patrons, and further direct Mr Cook as their agent to intimate this protest to the Patrons either by notarial instrument, or otherwise, as he shall be advised by Counsel will most effectually vindicate the Rights of the Senatus in this matter. (281) [Town Council] 3rd June 1851 Bailie Fyfe, in terms of notice given by him, moved as follows: That the Tests required to be taken by Professors elected to Chairs of Literature, Science, and Philosophy in the Universities of Scotland, and which were originally imposed in 1690, having now, in the altered circumstances of the country, become altogether unsuitable, and their continuance proving injurious to these Universities, the Council agree to present Petitions to both Houses of Parliament praying that a Bill now pending before the House of Commons entituled \"A Bill to regulate admission to the Lay or Secular Chairs in the Universites of Scotland,\" may pass into a Law. [The Motion having been seconded, the previous question was moved, and after a vote \"the Motion was adopted by a majority of 27 to 3, and a remit was made to the Lord Provost's Committee to prepare and forward the Petitions, which the Lord Provost was authorised to sign and seal in the usual way.\"] (201-202) [Town Council] 13th January 1852 Bailie Fyfe, in terms of notice given by him, moved as follows: - That the Tests required to be taken by Professors elected to Chairs of Literature, Science, and Philosophy in the Universities of Scotland, and which were originally imposed in 1690, having now, in the altered circumstances of the country, become altogether unsuitable, and their continuance becoming injurious to these Universities, the Council agree to present Petitions to both Houses of Parliament praying that these Tests may be totally repealed. The foregoing Motion having been seconded...was unanimously adopted by the Magistrates and Council, and a remit made to the Lord Provost's Committee to prepare the Petitions, which the Lord Provost was authorised to sign and seal, and to transmit the same for presentation at the proper time. (202) 4 170 [Town Council] 8th February 1853 Baillie Fyfe again proposes a Motion to petition Parliament praying for the abolition of 'the Tests imposed upon Professors at thier admission to Chairs in the Universities of Scotland, other than to the Theological Chairs...' (204) Councillor Hill proposes amendment on the grounds that 'the motion is inexpedient at the present time, seeing that there is difference of opinion existing as to those Chairs which ought to be considered Theological, and seeing that to grant its prayer would be to open up the Lay Chairs to men of questionable principle, an evil of paramount importance in all matters of Education.' (204) [Town Council] 5th April 1853 Another motion to approve the proposed Bill, and to say that the Council does not require the official declaration by Parliament before the motion is brought into effect. (205) When Pillans introduced his 1844 motion, one hundred years had passed since Edinburgh's 1744 Hume affair. To us, the slow pace of change on the issue is almost unfathomable. But it was not until 1844 that the issue of religious tests would regain centre stage in Edinburgh. When Mary Shepherd died in 1847, the reversal of policy had not yet been achieved, although the wheels that would introduce permanent change and ensure freedom of conscience and speech had finally been put in motion. And, the persistent efforts of detractors who saw their own gain in preserving the conservative policies that would prevent the free and democratic voice would delay the change in policy for a few more years yet. It was only in 1853 that the Town Council and Senate of the University of Edinburgh actually succeeded in seeing that changes to the Parliamentary Act required to eliminate the requirement of University Tests to just those professors involved in 'the professional training of Students in Theology'. dcclvii Hence, even after all this time, surprisingly little had been done to address the matter of religious oaths, which had been an issue even before the Leslie affair. It is interesting to note that it was again Edinburgh that showed a leadership in bringing about reforms that would help to establish a fuller sense of academic freedom in Britain's universities. The struggle for this freedom was a long and hard one, and the value of the freedom achieved is not easily overestimated. It is this freedom of expression that is the cornerstone and the very basis for the success of democratic society, and it was not a freedom to be unwittingly sacrificed for lack of appreciation of its rarity and worth. Fortunately, Mary Shepherd and her peers never lost sight of the importance of their goal. Thus there ensued a very fitting end to the activism for university reform on the part of Mary Shepherd and her generation of Scots. dcclviii Their youth was influenced by leaders such as Dugald Stewart, who taught them the importance of the enlightenment ideals of liberty, social justice and freedom of conscience, which were seen as the only true basis for inquiry in the university. Mary Primrose, her siblings, and many others of her generation took this message to heart, bringing to life the insights of the enlightenment. Without their efforts to bring theory into practice, the lessons of the enlightenment would themselves have been lost. 4 171 6.4 Mary Shepherd and Scottish Philosophy As for Mary Shepherd and for women in the university, it would be decades before women were admitted to the standard degree programs in British universities. Mary Wollstonecraft, as early as 1792, had argued that women had a right to the benefits of education, but it was nearly a century until this voice would be fully heard. Fortunately, in the long run, efforts to promote higher education for women were effective. In 1861, after a long gap, John Stuart Mill followed Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women with his The Subjection of Women. In 1862, George Grote, Vice-Chancellor to the University of London, pleaded for the admission of women to the University of London. dcclix After decades of debate and discussions on the subject of women in higher, women were admitted to London University on a regular basis in the late 1860s. London University was in this case central in advancing arguments in support of women's education. As one might expect, Scotland and Edinburgh played important roles in establishing the precedent. Given the advanced state of the educational system in Scotland, and the fact that educational opportunities were available to both sexes, it is not entirely surprising to learn that by the early nineteenth century, some women had been admitted to courses at the University of Edinburgh on an informal basis. dcclx During the summer session of 1826, for example, John Leslie introduced lectures in Natural Philosophy for mixed classes of men and women. The Town Council permitted the course for just a single session. Similarly, Humphrey Davy, Sydney Smith and others had admitted both men and women to his lectures offered through London's Royal Society and London University. dcclxi In light of such innovations, questions appear to have been raised in Edinburgh concerning policies on the participation of women. By and large, the discussions resulted in immediate setbacks. For example, when the Council of the Royal Society of Edinburgh considered the matter of its policies concerning the admission of women to the Society and its library, the results were negative, enforcing restrictions where none had previously existed. dcclxii In a similar move, the matter of informal arrangements that had enabled female students to attend lectures was brought before Edinburgh University Senate, resulting in an explicit ban of the practice. dcclxiii 'It is true that ladies had been admitted in the early nineteenth century to certain special courses of lectures given by individual professors on their own subjects within the College buildings; but attendance on such courses could not qualify them for degrees and the Senate discontinued the experiment.' dcclxiv In light of the negative attitudes towards women's education evident in the nineteenth century, it is sometimes difficult to imagine how a girl like Mary Primrose could have become a philosopher in late eighteenth century Edinburgh. Fortunately for Mary Primrose, the prevailing educators and leaders in her circle were political moderates. dcclxv Within her family and society, attitudes tended toward freedom and tolerance, and as such, liberal values would have influenced the thoughts and interests of the young Mary Primrose. In an odd way, Mary Primrose would also have benefited from her precocity with regard to women's higher education. For, in her youth and early adulthood, an educated woman was simply a curiosity, and it was not until a substantial number of women expressed interest in higher learning that policies excluding women were set down. Thus, it was only toward the middle and late nineteenth century that negative attitudes towards higher education for women became deeply entrenched. It is interesting to note, however, that in the nineteenth century, one of the 'problems' identified with a system of national testing introduced by the University of Edinburgh's was the large number of girls writing and passing the tests. In 1883, 746 of the 891 candidates who were tested were girls. dcclxvi The reason that so many girls were admitted to the national exams is unclear. However, one would expect that if the large majority of those tested in 1883 were girls, that there had already been a great many girls in attendance at schools in the eighteenth century, 4 172 and that many of them had also achieved high standards of academic excellence. Thus, London University was not alone in leading the way to an egalitarian approach in education. In Edinburgh, the Association for the University Education of Women led a campaign for the admission of women to higher education. Perhaps fittingly, Edinburgh was among the established universities in Britain where changes first became official. In 1867, Edinburgh admitted women to study arts. Initially, lectures to the female candidates were given separately by willing professors during the winter session, and female students were awarded 'certificates in Arts'. After another twenty years, and much controversy and even some legal action, Parliament became involved, and finally authorized universities to admit women to medical and other degrees. dcclxvii Meanwhile, by the late 1860's, Edinburgh's Association for the University Education of Women had at least succeeded in establishing a course of study for women. Appropriately, Archibald Campbell Fraser, in his introductory lecture to his 'Course on Mental Philosophy', tips his hat to Mary Primrose, who, under her married name of Lady Mary Shepherd, became known as Scotland's first female philosopher. dcclxviii As Fraser reminded the aspiring young women, 'Lady Mary Shepherd, some forty years ago, in her Essay on Cause and Effect, and Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, discussed with ingenuity and acuteness some of the profoundest questions to which the human mind can be applied.' dcclxix And so it was. For, Mary Primrose had established that a Scottish girl could well become a philosopher. It is well to reflect a little on what she did accomplish, and on the significance of her contributions. Mary Shepherd's philosophical work is best understood in light of Scottish philosophy and the empiricist response to Hume. Following Hume, new ideas on causality and induction were introduced and integrated with debates in science and religion. The series of conceptual and ideological changes, when seen in light of the roles played by Mary Shepherd and her circle, show that the original controversy around Hume in Edinburgh led to gradual changes throughout the educational system. It is important to note that the intellectual response to Hume occurs within a specific political and social context, a context in which many assumptions about causality come under examination by Mary Shepherd and her friends. Thus, Shepherd's philosophical contributions to thought on causality and induction are part of a complex reaction to Hume's philosophy, one that is ultimately tied to ideological and institutional change in Britain. In the long run, the discussion of subjects such as causality, theism, and freedom of conscience came to a head at all of the major British universities, although especially at Oxford -arguably the most conservative among them. The Oxford movement led to a revival and renewal of the discussion of theism -this time with new ideas on causality and induction in hand. John Stuart Mill, William Hamilton, William Whewell, William George Ward, Alexander Campbell Fraser, and others enter the debate. Attempts were made to produce new proofs for theism -proofs that will not falter on the analysis of causation. These proofs were of limited value in the long run, and just as controversial as their forerunners, but the advances in philosophy of science were longer lasting. The goal was to produce a proof that could build on empiricist views of causality, withstand challenges to the Design Argument, and ultimately defeat atheism. The long tradition of explaining the meeting points of the mysteries and evidences of Christianity, however much disliked, presented ongoing debates involving causality that simply had to be resolved. In particular, there was no way to avoid the doctrine of the Eucharist, a doctrine at the very center of not only the Oxford movement, but also the Episcopal faith: The Catechism was explicit that 'the Body and Blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful'. The Liturgy expressed this belief, in prayer and exhortation and rubric. The teaching of Scripture was plain, that of the Fathers 4 173 concordant. dcclxx The mystery of the Eucharist, which had presented such a problem for the unity of Scotland's Episcopal tradition, and such a barrier to any unification of Episcopal and Presbyterian denominations under a single national Church of Scotland, was revisited with a new account of causality in hand. dcclxxi The revival of interest in Catholic and Evangelical traditions gathered momentum at Oxford, and figures such as Ward and Newman had taken a hard line on issues relating to doctrinal interpretation, eventually defecting from the Anglican Church. As the Oxford Movement had become increasingly politicised and focussed, it found a natural ally in the Episcopal Church of Scotland. H.R.T. Brandreth, in his book The Oecumenical Ideals of the Oxford Movement, traces the movement back to Jacobite supporters and Non-jurors. This, along with the Catholic element in the revival, links it to the northern segment of Scottish Episcopacy. Specifically, the link is to those who still saw a future for Episcopacy as a Scottish national church closely aligned with the Church of England. William Perry pursues this theme in his book The Oxford Movement in Scotland, saying that many Scottish clergy were already ' by conviction and sympathy, Tractarians long before The Tracts For the Times were written'. dcclxxii This conviction may be loosely attributed to the Catholic element of the revival, but is more specifically ties to interpretation of the Eucharist, and related metaphysical issues. Some of Newman sermons, for example, attempt to address the issue directly. In his later sermons, Newman rejected efforts to deal with the Eucharistic presence as a philosophical problem, and he especially rejected the rationalism and liberalism that he saw in Whately and his circle. Whately himself had declined to interpret the metaphysical doctrines, and claimed to dislike metaphysics, although he generally favoured the rationalist outlook and program in other matters. Whately's view seems to have been that issues such as the Eucharistic presence are best left mysteries and that analysis and dissent would surely not help to unify and strengthen the church. Newman, however, was not content to let such matters rest. Like other Tractarians, he explicitly rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation in the Eucharistic sacrament, that is, he rejected the idea of the mutation of one substance into the form of another as being contrary to Scripture. However, Newma did attempt some sort of analysis of transubstantiation. Newman's analysis of transubstantiation, although not based in the empiricist or rationalist traditions, did require some discussion of causation. For example, as some had argued, if the testimony of the senses is to be relied upon, then transubstantiation is false. Thus the senses, must in some way be deceiving us when they tell us that bread and wine are present. Rather, there must in fact only be a 'Real Presence' -and no bread and wine at all. On such an account, the bread and wine undergo no substantial change in the Eucharistic sacrament since the only substance present throughout is that of Christ. Like many Anglican churchmen, Newman here sweeps away the historical metaphysical analysis of the 'Real Presence', rejecting as a basis for analysis the definitions of the nature of real presence. Indeed, any analysis that tries to make the real presence intelligible in an objective, and not merely a subjective sense, is bound to run aground. In particular the doctrine of causality and the emphasis on the evidence of the senses and reason would be sticking points. So, in answer to the question 'How could Christ be present both in heaven and on the alter?', it would have to be pointed out that that the eucharistic presence was a spiritual presence, and that very little was known about the nature and action of spiritual bodies. And the sensible evidence relating to the bread and wine that seemed to count against the Eucharistic presence were simply dismissed as a test of faith. dcclxxiii Like many of his colleagues then, Newman shifted focus onto the spiritual 4 174 effects of the mysterious presence of Christ, which was, after all, the important issue. Thus, doctrinal interpretation, including interpretation of causality in the Eucharist, would become central to the Oxford movement, and would lead to a continued discussion of the philosophical issues around causality and theism. Philosophically then, the impetus for the Tractarian and Episcopalian discussions of the Eucharist in the nineteenth century can be tied to the original challenge that Hume was thought to have posed for religious belief. The significance of that challenge was, a century later, still being processed in the minds of British theologians. Whately had already shown that it was impossible to take Hume entirely seriously -for Hume's scepticism could never succeed in producing convincing doubts about well established historical facts, facts to which the rational mind is compelled to assent. But there nonetheless remained a need to demonstrate anew the rational foundation for theism. Such a foundation must be one impervious to Humean doubts, and so it must replacing the flawed a priori and posteriori arguments for causality and God's existence. The analysis that was initially put forward was published in a book entitled Philosophy of Theism. dcclxxiv Published anonymously in 1857 by J&D Croll in Glasgow and Ward and Company in London, the book appears to be the mature work of someone well versed in Scottish, English, French, German and American philosophy. References are made to arguments of the Scottish common sense philosophers, as are authors such as John Stuart Mill, Whewell, Cousin, Tappan, and Edwards. dcclxxv According to the book's author(s), 'The direct object of the work is not to prove the existence of God, but to investigate the method to be pursued, in order to arrive at a proof of his existence.' dcclxxvi The goal is accomplished in three stages. The first part of the work is devoted to a description of the dependence of theology on metaphysics, and particularly to establishing the importance of the causal relation to theism. The second part is a vindication of metaphysics that rests the foundation for the causal relation on a mathematical foundation. The third part describes the method of proof for theism, being a 'Proof of Being of God from Organism'. An excerpt from the book's introduction gives a good sense of the analysis and intent of its author(s): In the first part we have attempted to show that a purely a priori or a purely a posteriori proof of the existence of God is impossible. We cannot, on the one hand, arrive at a proof by means of a priori elements alone without experience, without a priori elements. The only possible way, then, is by a method which combines both. We have thus two elements in the proof -objects or facts of experience, and a priori principles. But before we can legitimately use these principles in our proof, in opposition to the Atheist, we must first establish their validity. This we cannot do without having recourse to Metaphysics. But here a formidable difficulty meets us at the outset; for Metaphysics itself is a science, the validity of which few Atheists will acknowledge. And, to add to our difficulty, Theists themselves have generally misunderstood or underrated this science. We are therefore necessitated to enter into a vindication of metaphysics, which forms Part II. We find that the chief objection urged against Metaphysics, is the fact of its present imperfection when compared with Mathematics and the Natural Sciences. We are then led into an examination of the essential difference between Metaphysics and Mathematics, in order to show that, from the very nature of Metaphysics, it must succeed Mathematics, and that its present imperfect state is no proof whatever of any essential defect in its nature. After this, we are prepared to enter into the third, and last, part of the work -a discussion of the method of proof. But before proceeding far, we find that we must have recourse to the principles of causality, and here, again, another difficulty meets us; for this principle is in about as unsettled a state as Metaphysics itself, 4 175 and we are then led into a long discussion, in order to fix precisely its nature and import; after which, all that remains is simply the exposition of the method of proof. dcclxxvii Regardless of who authored the work, it is evident that all of major elements in the analysis are ones found in Mary Shepherd's works of 1824 and 1827. There is first the examination of a priori and a posteriori approaches in the analysis of causality. Secondly, there is the foundation in certainty for the causal relation by appeal to mathematical analysis -the same sort of analysis that we find in Shepherd's own appeal to algebraic signs. Finally, there is the argument that the proof of God's existence can be made by appeal to the concept of organism. Thus, we see that Mary Shepherd's contributions in the 1820s may well have reached her contemporaries and immediate successors. All the while, her works, like those of many women, were being quietly suppressed, discarded, and forgotten. The subject of 'Philosophy of Theism' was not forgotten after the 1857 publication. In 1871, Ward began a series of articles that appeared in the Dublin Review, articles that later came to be reprinted as a book entitled Essays on the Philosophy of Theism. In these articles, Ward's attitude toward figures such as Whewell and John Stuart Mill becomes quite evident. dcclxxviii Ward argues against the 'experiential school' of Mill, showing that he is just as opposed to other empiricist schools as he was to the 'limitless rationalism' of interpreters such as Whately. Ward's basic position was that theism was a conviction based in man's moral nature. Ward's plan was to: Establish the mind's power to perceive objective truth, to acquire knowledge of objective facts by intuition (to use the technical phrase), and the one coherent philosophy which at that time was paralysing the very idea of religious inquiry, must halt and fail to effect. The criticism of Theistic philosophy as defective would no doubt remain. But from its negative character this was much less formidable; or at least it admitted a common basis of reasoning with the a priori thinkers, which the Experience Philosophy professed to have destroyed. dcclxxix The goal then, was to put a stop the development of the Hume's position that he saw in Mill, and that would also appear to have been advanced in the 1857 Philosophy of Theism, wherein a foundation for knowledge is ultimately derived from sense experience. Indeed, Ward explicitly objected to both Mill's approach and to the sort of middle ground in the debate presented by thinkers such as Whewell: Mr. Ward held that nothing but constant concentration on a few critical points was required to show the root doctrines of the Experience School could not stand philosophically. Whewell and others had introduced confusion into the controversy. For example, in endeavouring to prove against the experience School that the mind can perceive the intrinsic necessity of certain truths, they had treated the relative necessity of natural law as on a similar footing with the absolute necessity of mathematical truth. Mill had been victorious in his criticism of such loose thinking, and his theory was daily accepted by a larger number as conclusively established. Ward's object was to narrow the ground of controversy, to seize upon his root-doctrine and confront them; to stand over him till he confessed that they could not be logically defended. Hence the narrowness of the ground taken up. dcclxxx Ward's basic strategy was to adopt intuition as the certain foundation for theism, much as Thomas Brown had first done in defence of the idea of a necessary cause and belief in God in 4 176 1805. The strategy was not highly regarded in its day, and it is certain that Ward underrated the philosophical acumen of his opponents and the force of their positions. He has also been characterised as having a 'profound ignorance' of induction. dcclxxxi Some years later, in 1895, Alexander Campbell Fraser would also publish a work entitled Philosophy of Theism, to the same end as those previously published under this title. Fraser's approach is closer to material later published on the same subject by several American transcendentalists, and shows the extent of the influence of German idealism on his thought. dcclxxxii [cf. Fraser] Fraser takes off from the strategy of the middle ground found in Whewell and others who sought to unite the Kantian a priori with the a posteriori elements of inductive science. Fraser introduces German Idealism into the debate, adopting a subjectivist line on the causal relation that extending the analysis of causality well beyond the sort of realist and objectivist commitments that Whewell and Shepherd would have insisted upon. Borden Browne would go on to develop further ideas under the title Philosophy of Theism in 1899. [Borden Browne] But the most significant part of all of this is that the disputes of the Oxford movement and of the Scottish theologians all revolved around causality, theism, and academic freedom, and hence, ended in connecting philosophical analysis and debate to social and ideological change. The origin of the debate was, as in the affairs of Hume and Leslie, part of an effort to demonstrate that the provability and rationality of theism had survived the atheistic threat of Hume. Like the controversies in Scotland, the Oxford movement would tie together the politics of church, state and university. If any approach could have represented the position closest to Mary Shepherd's, it was that of the original work of 1857. Indeed, the 1857 work entitled Philosophy of Theism represents a culmination of the same methodological and philosophical goals that Mary Shepherd had aimed at in her responses to Hume, Berkeley and others in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Although such advances in theology were of limited value, the news ideas on causality and induction led to long-lasting advances in philosophy of science. And all of these advances can also be traced back to Hume and Leslie, and to the original motivations and contribution of Shepherd and other members of her circle. Apart from the recording of social and political circumstances and their connections to philosophical ideas, some sort of overall assessment of Shepherd's philosophical contribution, particularly the contributions to epistemology and philosophy of science, is appropriate, if only in a preliminary way. It is to this that we must finally turn our attention. The most obvious question, of course, is whether Shepherd fits into the Scottish school. Insofar as the Scottish school is identified with adhering to some version of a common sense doctrine, Shepherd is not a member of that school. In fact, one way of understanding her philosophical motivation and work is to see her as carving out a position that is decidedly against common sense. This is not to say that she rejects all of the tenets of her Scottish predecessors. For it is evident that Shepherd develops her analysis in a way that draws inspiration from many of her Scottish predecessors, just as it is apparent that she develops a unique and original metaphysics and epistemology. Another way to understand Shepherd's connection to the Scottish school is to note that she very often focuses on the very themes identified with the Scottish school; the themes of Hume, empiricism, realism, perception, and representation. dcclxxxiii If emphasis on these themes is taken as the main criteria for inclusion, then Shepherd ought in fact to belong to the Scottish school. 4 177 Where and whether Shepherd fits into the Scottish tradition in philosophy may easily be questioned. She stands apart from her Scottish contemporaries in adopting a transcendentalist position as grounds for rejecting Hume. Indeed, what makes Shepherd's contribution to the debates of her day intriguing is that she stands apart from her Scottish contemporaries in adopting a transcendentalist position against Hume. Moreover, in developing her transcendentalist response to Hume and Berkeley, Shepherd develops an original metaphysics and epistemology, a position that represents a departure from the Scottish common sense tradition in philosophy. In the end, the conclusion that Shepherd draws is that reason supplies knowledge of the causal relation and of its 'manner of action', and hence, supplies the true foundation for science, moral philosophy and belief in God. Fearn, you may recall, looked only far enough into Shepherd's position to see what appeared to him as a union of scholastic arguments for God's existence and an empiricist theory of ideas. Fearn's criticism of Shepherd is interesting not only for the light shed on how her view can be misread, but also for the questions it raises regarding the proper interpretation of her philosophy. Fearn is correct in pointing out Shepherd's metaphysical dualism, he is wrong in thinking that Shepherd's argument makes a direct appeal to ontology to explain real extension. For like Kant, Shepherd makes appeal to transcendentalism to explain why actual physical objects, including the sense organs and other objects, are required for the possibility of sensation. When Shepherd holds that unperceived, extended causes must be presupposed as support for ideal, unextended phenomena; she does not argue by appeal to the real essences of unperceived causes. What she invokes is a transcendental argument that rests on the distinction between subjective and objective elements in cognition, and the role of the latter in our coming to have trustworthy knowledge of external existence. It is only by supposing Shepherd's metaphysical views are intended as dogmatic assertions, and by ignoring her view that we never know the real essences of things, that Shepherd can be made to sound like a scholatic. And in missing her transcendentalism, Fearn has missed the tenor of her arguments against Hume and Berkeley, and the sense in which Shepherd differs from her earlier empiricist contemporaries. As a transcendentalist, Shepherd aims at a sort of compatibilism between empiricism and rationalism. She draws on elements from both views, and seems entirely comfortable in doing so. Insofar as Shepherd is a transcendentalist, comparisons to Kant are helpful. Apart from circumstantial evidence, chief among the reasons why comparison between Shepherd and Kant seems appropriate, is that Shepherd's realism turns on her claims that the mind contributes a priori the idea of a cause in representation and causal principle in judgement. Locke, for example, was unaware that the thesis of transcendental idealism might supply a means of avoiding sceptical idealism. Indeed, he was so far removed from the consequences of his own theory, as Reid remarks, that he quite failed to perceive that his own theory implied the impossibility of our having an idea of power. dcclxxxiv So if Shepherd's is in any sense completing a Lockean programme, the task is accomplished in way that draws her view closer to Kant's transcendental idealism than to Locke's transcendental realism. It is also possible, of course, that Shepherd understood Locke's position as one approaching more nearly to Kant's than is often thought to be the case. And this leads to questions about what she could possibly have meant in describing her own theory as a 'modified Berkelean theory'. My suggestion, of course, has been that we ought to read Shepherd as a transcendentalist. But if so, it is not entirely clear to what extent Shepherd's transcendentalism can be tied to Kant. There are elements of Condillac in account of extension. If Shepherd did read Villers, she may have been influenced by his claim that Condillac saw an important role for transcendentalism in addressing the problems of empiricism, and in his additional remark that Condillac's recommendation ought to be taken very seriously by empiricists. dcclxxxv 4 178 It is also clear that Shepherd wishes to endorse a form of realism, though she distinguishes her view from Malebranche, Leibniz, Reid and others. She appears to want to distance herself from appeals to the direct intervention of God, pre-established harmony, immediate intuition, and the primary/secondary quality distinction: Thus some philosophers make God create all the images at the moment they appear in every mind. [Malebranche] Others conceive there is a pre-established harmony between the qualities of the external object, and our inward perception of it? [Leibniz] One considers the sensations arising from some of the senses to exist outwardly, but not those of others, arising from the rest of the senses. [Reid] Another gives up all outward existence whatever of objects and qualities. [Berkeley] And some suppose that if there be such things, that unless they be like our sensations, they are not worth talking about. [Hume]. dcclxxxvi As the context of the passage makes clear, Shepherd does not intent to follow any of these thinkers in her own philosophy. Indeed, the form of realism that Shepherd wishes to endorse against the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume is not that of her predecessors. Shepherd's argument does not amount to a straightforwardly Kantian refutation of idealism. However, it does make appeal to a number of elements found in Kant's transcendental idealism. To wit, it makes central to the refutation of Berkeley's idealism our ability to distinguish selfconscious awareness from the awareness of outward things. It also emphasises the dependency of sense objects on a priori elements contributed by the mind, and claims that sensation and understanding are 'united intimately' in the very moment of representation. Moreover, as Shepherd argues, our ability to quickly discern various species of sensible ideas included in compound objects, leads, by application of a causal principle, to the knowledge that outward objects are due to causes that continue to exist 'unperceived and independent, when unnoticed by the senses'. Of course, Shepherd's epistemology makes appeal to an a priori causal principle in lieu of space and time, and this raises the question whether we can properly construe her response to Berkeley as an argument leading from transcendental idealism to empirical realism. For Kant's a priori forms of intuition and categories together lead to a detailed account of the objective validity of the mathematical features in our representations of nature, and this account justifies our claim to both metaphysical and physical knowledge. Shepherd's realism points in a similar direction by means of the causal principle, but doesn't have the requisite machinery to support a similar foundation for knowledge. Shepherd may intend to supply an argument leading from transcendental idealism to empirical realism, but her transcendental idealism supports a weaker form of empirical realism, so that she is vulnerable to the charge that her argument leads back to scepticism. For it is the breadth and detail of Kant's empirical realism that lends appeal to transcendental philosophy. Still, there would appear to be little room to question that outlines of Shepherd's refutation of idealism are better revealed through comparison with Kant than through comparison to empiricist counterparts such as Locke. Unlike Locke and other empiricists, for Shepherd, the detection of repeated patterns in sensation leads to ideas of external causes, including ideas of the external sense organs, but this detection is not tantamount to the perception of primary qualities. Rather, the detection of patterns in sensible ideas leads to the idea of an external cause, the idea of cause built into representations makes possible an application of the causal axiom, and such an application is required for inferred knowledge of the specific measurable properties of objects. The external causes of sensation can't be mere spirits, Shepherd reasons, because this would require us to 4 179 adopt a view of the action of spirits and of God, which, according to Shepherd, is unchristian and atheistic. Shepherd's own appeal to touch and the feeling of resistance is part of her attempt to defend the materiality of exterior objects, and thus establish a world of material things beyond Berkeley's spirits and Kant's more ambiguous ambiguous noumena. However unsatisfactory any defence of mechanistic materialsim may be, it is evidently this materialist commitment that motivates Shepherd's sympathy for Locke. Foundationally, there is little else in Shepherd's analysis that can be attributed to Locke. Moreover, Shepherd sees that the adoption of materialism is not itself adequate to answer Berkeley's sceptical idealism. So it is not surprising that Shepherd seeks to strengthen her reply to Berkeley by appeal to an entirely separate epistemological argument based on appeal to a priori ideas of causes and the causal principle. As a result of this latter strategy, Shepherd's position does appear to amount to a form of transcendental idealism. Indeed, Shepherd's reply to Berkeley and Hume, properly construed, not only avoids the problem of circularity, but succeeds in evading Kant's charge that transcendental realism leads to either to empirical idealism or scepticism. Thus Shepherd is not a thoroughgoing continental rationalist, not a Lockean empiricist, and not a Berkeleyan idealist. Nor is she, in any strict and straightforward sense, a Scottish common sense philosopher or a Kantian transcendentalist. She clearly regards herself as making an original contribution to philosophical debate. Mary Shepherd's work thus offers a critical and original response to Hume and Berkeley that deserves the careful consideration of contemporary historians and philosophers. She is, in my estimation, the clearest and the most critically acute of the women philosophers of the modern period, with a distinctive, analytical style of criticism. She focuses her attention on careful definition and on the identification of fallacies in the arguments of her predecessors, and lays out compelling arguments against her opponents. In addition to identifying the conceptual and logical limitations of other philosophical arguments, she seeks to develop an original and plausible account of objective knowledge of the external world. Shepherd's account brings together sensible qualities, ideas of causes, and inferential processes in a way that endeavours to justify our claim to knowledge of unperceived exterior objects and their objectively real qualities, both of which derive from a world independent of the subject. The fact that our various sense perceptions converge on a single coherent account of the world is ultimately explained with reference to the marks of objectivity in knowledge and it is the marks of objectivity in sensible ideas that lead us to infer knowledge of 'exterior objects'. One of the interesting features of Shepherd's discussion of the sciences in her shorter essays is that she is not afraid at this juncture to draw freely on her full view of causation. For in her 1824 and 1827 works, she establishes the epistemological basis for our knowledge of causal necessity. As part of that argument, she establishes the general possibility of real causation by transcendental argument and by appeal to the unity of knowledge. Thus she feels entitled to draw on the 'manner and action' of causation on the organs of sense, which presumes that and one that knowledge of a complex order supports the inference to some real existence outside of the self. Other elements in her discussion of the sciences include the unity of knowledge and the necessary status of causal laws, both of which fall under the causal principle. A final, but no less important theme is the concern regarding theism and the underlying assumption that we have knowledge of God's existence and can reject materialism forms part of her full unified account of knowledge The variety of elements and complexity in Shepherd's philosophy make it difficult to classify her philosophical contribution. However, we can draw at least a couple of conclusions at this stage. First, that Shepherd's position falls uneasily between both empiricism and rationalism and idealism and realism. Secondly, that her philosophical contribution represents an original and 4 180 interesting effort to engage contemporary philosophical debates. It is also apparent that Shepherd's social context played an important role in motivating her work. She appears to take quite seriously Brown's charge that causation is merely phenomenal for Berkeley and Kant, and her principal aim is to show that an adequate account of causality can be effectively used to rebut both Hume and Berkeley. At a personal level, Shepherd was inspired by the case of Mr. Leslie, the Edinburgh controversy that led her to write her first book. As Blakey notes in his A History of the Philosophy of Mind, the view of causation espoused by Hume and Brown 'appeared to Lady Mary Shepherd to lead by an inevitable consequence to downright Atheism': dcclxxxvii When she undertook a public refutation of these erroneous notions of cause and effect, it must be remembered it was at a time when they were most rampant, and widely spread over the northern parts of Britain in particular. Every young man who came from the Universities of Scotland, attempted to show off his subtlety and academic lore, by denying there was any real causation in the world; all was mere imagination, and a piece of gross vulgar credulity. dcclxxxviii Thus it was the Scottish common sense philosophers who drew Shepherd into the philosophical debate in the first place, and to the Scottish philosophers that Shepherd addressed her philosophical contribution. For Shepherd and others committed to academic freedom and university reform, this philosophical contribution developed over time in tandem with other lifelong efforts to see changes introduced to the educational system. In the end, the sciences given prominence in the universities, and academic freedom came to be the prized and protected value of proponents of an enlightened and democratic society. But, wherever the quest for philosophical truth took Shepherd in the end, the problems that she set out to resolve, and the terms through which she understood those philosophical problems, are unequivocally located in her Edinburgh roots. 4 181 Mary Shepherd – Charles Babbage Correspondence Babbage Correspondence MSS 37183 f. 204 Friday November 18, 1825 My Dear Sir, The pressure of a recent and heavy affliction must excuse my being so explicit as otherwise I should have endeavoured to be, in the observations you flattered me so far as to request me to make on the interesting papers you entrusted to my perusal on Sunday last. My capacity & acquirements are quite inferior to the comprehension of the greater part of the mathematical and algebraic illustrations which form much of the subject matter of these Essays, & therefore I should only betray my own ignorance by making any comment upon their nature: Nevertheless I know sufficiently both mathematical & algebraic science, (especially of the foundations & method of reasoning employed in their analysis,) to feel myself fully capable of understanding every general appeal made to their powers, as well as competent to compare the modes of induction wrt those employed on other subjects. - In this point of view I hope you will bear with me if I allow myself freely to make some remarks upon the general & metaphysical observations I find in these short, but useful treatises: - They will be expressed under the 3 following heads. – First; The objections I would make to the expression of two short paragraphs, the one on the difference between mathematical & physical induction; the other on the difference supposed to exist between geometrical & algebraic signs.- Second; The satisfaction I feel in the author litany in several passages (in the Essay on Induction) upon the reason whence there is a logical method of the mind in forming general inferences from particular premises, altho' these explanations be too short; altho' he seem hardly aware of their compass & importance, & does not as I think perceive that the same are also applicable to the objects of physical science. Third The importance of & feasibility of applying the strictest order of metaphysical reasoning to the process of the mind in its attention to every branch of mathematical & algebraic analysis. - 4 182 First. Mr Dugald Stewart has the same sentiment as our author, when he expresses himself thus. - 'The term induction when employed in mathematics is not to be understood in precisely the same acceptation, as it is used by the followers of Bacon in 'Enquiries of Natural Philosophy.'- I consider this notion to arise from an erroneous view of the nature of physical Cause, as tho' it were not necessarily connected with its Effects; in opposition to the perception there is that in all mathematical & algebraic conclusions, the results are necessarily included in the relations of the stated quantities, if the operations on them be supposed correctly formed. This error is I think prevalent on account of Hume's introducing a confusion between, the detection of the presence of like cause, & the necessity of its connection with its effects, when supposed & allowed in the present - (See Essay on C.& E. P. 60 & note on it. ) The method in which Bacon used the word 'induction', was in opposition to 'hypothesis', as the method by which conclusively to find the true operations of nature. He ordered the mind to be 'induced' to its conclusions, by reasoning from facts brought under experimental observation. In like manner it were in vain previous to trial, to predicate the results of the involvements of quantities; But when tried to the mind holds them as universals in similar cases. - The reason whence the conclusions are thus 'induced' from particulars to generals, is the same, (as it appears to me) in both cases; & the difficult part of the question recurs equally in each; namely, 'What is that reason which can render so apparently an illogical procedure of intellect, to possess a logical & demonstrative force of conclusive evidence.'. - To explain this has the object of my 'Essay', & indeed it requires one aspect to itself in order to execute the solution of the problem after a proper manner. To brief is to be obscure, yet it is all I can be at present - 'The mind by the faculty of abstraction perceives that individual qualities repeated are not altered in their nature by the accidents of time, place & like. By one example we may know by the sense that 1 equal added to another equal, in 2 separate parcels, the wholes will be equal; by reason we discern, that no accident, can ever present equals when equals are supposed to be present from being thus affected by their mutual addition. Thus is a perception of the general nature of a quality, by one example of universal similarity! There is thus an experiment (or experience then) of one quality to see what it is; & there is then a reasoning on the experiment to this effect, namely; 'That whatever it be, it will be an universal not affected by such accidents as interfere not with it.' So also in physics; Very nice experiments are needful, in order to find what qualities will arise, under the interactions of certain bodies; but when found, one, they are found for ever; i.e. when the same bodies only are supposed to interact: for they are for all intents and purposes merely the same things repeated, - & must necessarily therefore be similar & not different as effects; be objects of necessary qualities, not of contingent qualities or effects.-' 4 183 I grant that the detection of the presence of like qualities is much easier in those of arbitrary quantities, than in any other subject, because we ourselves form them, & name them. Every thing is what it is by its' formation, and however nicely we observe nature it is true, 'her secrets are beyond our grasp; 'Still, this is another part of the question; and I shall not enter upon it here; Suffice it to say that the authors who object to induction in physics being of the same force in its conclusions as those of a mathematical nature, always consider fire as fire water as water man as man - & the mistaken views arise from an ignorance rather of the nature and manner of cause as a productive principle, and as necessarily in, and with its effect; not from any supposed inability in the use of the senses to detect the presence of like cause; when, to my mind, a rational scepticism arises. Upon this part of the question I have a separate chapter in my Essay, but it is too short, hasty, & inadequate at P. 99. Mr. [Telford] has a little diagram representing the inference of the mind from sensible qualities (the effects) to exterior causes, with remarks to show its latent process of reasoning in order to detect like objects present or the contrary which, tho perhaps puerile, is an 'artifice' for explanation which your friend might not wholly despise But this part embraces the whole of the Berkelean theory, that nothing to do with the demonstrative evidence for universal & future conclusions from particular experiments on bodies, when made to interact on each other, as examples of the qualities, & effects of such bodies when again supposed present. In mathematics and physics equally, unless a reasoning occurs on experiment which shows nothing can arise to interfere with the qualities or quantities, the inductive reasoning is not demonstrative Perpetual recurrence thereby does not amount to proof It only amounts to a proof there is a cause as general and present as that recurring effect; & that as there must be a reason or cause for such frequency of recurrence so it may have a still further range. But here physical analogies have the advantage over those which relate to quantities because the slightest unexpected alteration in the involvements of any quantity will [tend] to spoil the analogy, & all its results. - But in the grand operations of nature, her intentions & ends are ever farther into the account, & bread is supposed to be truly bread when formed by apparently similar materials (& hence fitted to nourish) not because of the impossibility of imperceptibly injurious particles creeping in, but because nature's regular neatness in ordering it otherwise must have as regular a cause, and that cause appears her designing care for us in which she cannot be supposed to intend to fail. Saturday The next passage I would allude to is the following. 'The reasonings employed in geometry and algebra are both of them general, but the signs which we use in the former, are of an individual nature, whilst those which we employ in the latter, are as abstract as any of the terms in which the reasoning is expressed.' 4 184 Now I hardly accede to this distinction between algebraic & geometrical signs; I think they must both of them be considered as abstract signs, or neither of them be so considered. For my own part I conceive it a contradiction to suppose any 'sign' whatever can possibly have the quality of abstraction predicated of it; because by its very nature it is an individual. That only can be an abstracted quality which has formed or can form first part of a complete object; Therefore a sign is but an individual example, a substitute for a quality which may be more or less a general quality. There appears to me to be this difference between the sign use in algebra, & that in geometry; in that the sign used in algebra being unlike the thing signified, (& therefore open to any arbitrary definition;) may represent an idea the most universal & abstracted; whereas a geometrical sign being a resemblance of the thing signified, (that is of the individual of any given specie,) can represent no idea more abstract than the common qualities of a species.- I would conclude therefore thus. The geometrical sign is a particular sign of general similarities to it; The algebraic sign, is a particular sign of any quality whatever; - therefore that The conception of the geometrical universal, to which the sign relates, is more limited than the algebraic universal to which its sign relates, but not the sign itself more limited in the former case, than in the latter; the signs in each being equally individuals; & in each, are the examples of all imaginable similarities signified by either. Sunday Nov 20 Second The remark on page 17 'On Induction' contains in my opinion the true, the only reason which ought ever to make the mind draw a larger conclusion than that contained in the premises - 'The reason which compels our assent' (to an universal induction 'from a certain number of recurrences) 'appears to be that we cannot discover any new cause, which may come to play in the higher powers, which shall disturb that regularity that is apparent in the former ones.' This observation is I consider of exquisite nature, and would in my humble opinion, if believed in all its bearings, & allowed its utmost latitude of consequence, considerably alter the whole metaphysical and physical reasonings of modern philosophers. Excuse me if I say, that I do not think your friend himself perceives its full force for he goes on 'Had the experiment been restricted to prime numbers, so small a number of coincidences would hardly have satisfied the most careless enquirer'I consider that ever so frequently recurring co-incidences would not satisfy a logical much less a sceptical enquirer, if the relations of the quantities so recurring did not evince that the reason of the appearance was such, that it must necessarily arise among other powers supposed; the difference of their 4 185 qualities being such as could not interfere with the phenomenon in question. - When such a reasoning can occur, one example is enough: when it cannot it does not appear to me that a million of co-incidences can positively answer for more than themselves. Of the value of such reasoning to a certain degree your friend must however be aware, because he applies it in all its being at page 8 & 9 After showing the reason, why a certain phenomenon takes place in a given column of figures, he applies it universally. 'This reasoning (says he) may easily be applied to all the succeeding vertical columns, & hence we deduce the conclusion; that if any given combination of figures occur in the first period they will be repeated indefinitely at stated intervals; Yet of the full importance of such reasoning & such application of it, he hardly seems to be acquainted, because he himself allows (p. 7) that 'To state with precision the reasons which influence our judgments of these degrees' (of probability) 'would greatly add to the value of this instrument of investigation' - (i.e., induction from particular facts); but the difficulty of accomplishing this is great'- Now it appears something presumptuous in an unknown person, to suppose the difficulty less than that which the newfound mathematician I cope with supposes; yet I cannot avoid suggesting a hint on the subject. 1st Frequent occurrence of similar phenomena influences our judgment to expect similar phenomena without a full proof of its necessity to arise, because there must be some reason for such a recurrence, & among the differences of the future qualities supposed, if no circumstance occur to the mind as probable to interfere with the cause for the given phenomenon, in like degree will the judgment be influenced in its expectation. The more frequent the recurrence of one particular circumstance amidst qualities changing in other respects, the higher also will the probability become of the same occurring amidst other analogous changes; because it is thereby shown such do not affect the cause for it and when any changes do not appear analogous, yet if the mind thinks she perceives they cannot affect the cause, so will be its expectation, but 2dly This method of the mind only amounts to full proof, when the cause of a particular phenomenon is distinctly discerned, & when it perceives that no other changes of qualities supposed, amidst those which remaining the same can affect their relations & their results in consequence:Thus, if by trying in the multiplication table I find 1 times 2 = 2 and 2 times 1= 2; and so on with the multiples of 2. I could not have much data for concluding from 12 co-incidences, that 144 have taken place of a similar nature, with respect to the multiples of 12 objects; Yet there must be a reason for these 12 coincidences and as each operation upon every subsequent object, was similar in its bearings, so the reason (altho supposed undiscernible) would, by appearing not to be affected by the nature of the object, because of a large application. Still, there would now arise a ratio proof for the succeeding deficit, as it might be impossible to discover, whether some alteration of the qualities occurring, would not interfere with its application; altho' the probability for the number 12, would be 12 times higher than for the number 2; whilst the intervening numbers would be under a probability after the same [assertion] But when the reason for the phenomenon alluded to 4 186 be either known, in one example, or it be perceived that whatever it may be (if supposed unknown) no qualities among the remaining numbers can interfere with it, then demonstrative proof arises; for demonstration is nothing more than the clear perception of a universal relation. Third Of the use of finding the metaphysics of mathematical & algebraic science, it is impossible not to perceive your friend is fully aware, & not to be filled with admiration at the undertaking.If the process of the mind is discovered in its reasonings & conclusions, and probable judgments arise in these séances, it will afford I trust an example whence may be induced better rules & methods than we possess for the advancement of every other. Tho' I cannot understand the illustrations yet I perceive their drift & bearings; the subject appears to me equally novel & interesting. With respect to its application to physics; you know my opinion; & I can truly say that from a very early age, I have examined my thoughts, as to its manner of reasoning in numbers; and from time to time have applied such notices to other reasonings, either for amusement or improvement; indeed chiefly in order to chastise the vague, illusory, illogical method of reasoning admitted with every part of discourse, whether gay, or serious, & into each department of literature however important its object.- I am very sincerely yours, M. Shepherd *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37188 f. 121 [1832 or 31] Lady Mary Shepherd Dear Sir I am delighted that Ladies are allowed to subscribe I shall be too happy to do so. Unluckily I am engaged next Tuesday I fear till past 2 o'clock: but that need not hinder the subscription. I accept with gratitude your offer of managing the detail Beg pray do so for me and I will refund the money I will call on you to pay for it. I have studied so much in Mr. Lyell's book that all he said was quite familiar to me & easy to be understood as consistent with his principles The maps were beautifully illustrative of the whole. Yet I cannot believe upon any evidence other than demonstrative, that there could be such an uniformity not merely of the laws; but of the facts or events in nature. That these [being] supposed sufficient land &, which man might occupy, that no man occupied the same, : and that for ages. Show me the world in impressure and not under analogous change maybe, & then 'I might believe,' however long & various might have been the changes our planet might have undergone: Also, I do not see why the [remaining] rocks should not hold as much granite as those in [hills] surrounding.- Mary S. 4 187 *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37201 f. 432 [1832] Charles Babbage Esq. My dear Sir Professor Leslie says that Biot and Humboldt assign for both magnetic poles the opposite latitudes of 79 [degrees] 1' the longitude of the northern being 27 [degrees] 37' and that of the southern 205 [degrees] 12' west from Greenwich. The plane perpendicular to the magnetic one he says intersects the Equator at an angle of 10 [degrees] 59' and in west longitudes 117 [degrees] 37' and 300 [degrees] 27'. But it appears that in 1824 Captn Lyon found the magnetic pole was in latitude 63 [degrees] 26' and 51\" and in 80 [degrees] 51'25\" west long. pray what is the true faith? Yrs truly M.S. Lady Mary Shepherd *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37189 ff 297 C. Babbage Esq. With Lady Mary Shepherd's Compts 49 7 240 289 17 diff 200 440 729 27 2 nd diff 200 640 1369 37 3 rd diff 200 840 2209 47 4 th diff 200 1040 3249 57 5 th diff 200 1240 4489 67 6 th diff 200 1440 5929 77 7 th diff 200 1640 7569 87 4 188 8 th diff 200 1840 9409 97 9 th diff 200 2040 11449 107 Dear Mr. Babbage I want to know if your machine could work out the sums of the square numbers following the law as given above – viz. Every square number ending after the square of 7 in the units is = + 240 + 200 for every adl ten in the root - + 49 ad infinitum I am very desirous to know, because I think it has by the knowledge of this law mixed with the observation that every square offers a corresponding change & regular order in the place of the tens, as -, 4, 8, 2, 0, with analogous laws in every other sqr number which has the sense of the American phrase being said, to know roots by inspection - Yours always M Shepherd Henrietta St . [Cav. Sq] Monday Feb 8 1836 *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37189 f. 383 C. Babbage Esq. No. 5 Devonshire St. [B--and] Place Tunbridge Wells [Tuesday --strikeout] Monday July 10th 1836 My dear Sir I have got a sweet house 'Durham House', with a spare bed, a little boudoir you may have to yourself, if either you & Mrs. Babbage together, or yourself will come down Saturday or Sunday next and stay a few days or a week, or as long as she or you likes. Pray say you will It will do you both good I do not ask Mrs. Bout of mere compliment; I know that I shall talk philosophy with you a good deal but we shall have the long chaise, & a piano forte and tea in the parlor, & then we should amuse and please you with Mary's assistance - We are all busy in algebra I have begun to do it regularly The more I have considered the last view I took of the roots of -Quantities, the more I am convinced of its being the correct one.- 4 189 In that manner it is fraught with meaning & instruction concerning the proportional error in the data contained in the question; whilst also it keeps to the analogy expressed by the roots of other algebraic quantities, as well as that in like manner with them they can be first translated into mathematical language, & 2dly applied to concrete things without which perception of ideas under the terms of calculation, there could not be any security in their results. Pray come & pay me a visit & believe me yours most truly, M. Shepherd *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37201 f. 435 Henrietta St. [torn] Feb 4 [1839] To C. Babbage Esq. 1 Dorset Street [seal] Dear Mr Babbage I am almost afraid that you should think me either ungrateful, or indifferent to your kindness in inviting me two of your agreeable soirées; whereas truly, I am neither one or the other; on the contrary, altho', the serious affliction [torn] lately experienced, something indisposes me, to receiving the same pleasure, I had used to do in general society, yet I know not any house, where I should have sooner liked to have diverted my mind from something of its habitual seriousness than at yours; But having suffered this severe season, frequent returns of cough, I felt afraid of venturing out into the very cold wind of yesterday evening, after the warmth of a large fire in the D. room. Mr Shepherd was suffering severely from a cough, or would have gone to you with great pleasure. I remain very faithfully yours M Shepherd *** 4 190 Babbage Correspondence MSS 37201 f. 433 Charles Babbage Esq. No. 5 Devonshire St. [Argyl] St [--- ] My dear Sir I hope I do not betray an unpardonable vanity in requesting your acceptance of this little volume. I do assure you my motive for offering it to you is not merely that I may thereby chance to gain you a my convert by affording to you a ready reference, to some arguments which favour my notions of induction, causation, [etc] but chiefly as a small testimonial of the high gratification I felt in being permitted to peruse & observe upon your papers, & in being considered as in any degree qualified by you to apply the doctrine of this little volume to such abstruse enquiries, where to say truth they come into play more as I conceive than yourself as well as the generality of philosophers at present suppose. I have ventured to open the leaves in order to come on the passage page 85 - (* see also pp. 77, 91) as an instance of that latent reasoning used in experiment by which it comes to be an example of all future, or other instances of a like kind & in which point of view an exact experiment in physics (supposed) becomes precisely analogous, to any example used in [for ] proportions in mathematics or for results in algebra. - I shall hope to see you tomorrow, when however we must be a little diverted from the grave to gay until then I remain very sincerely yrs MS - *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37201 f. 437 [c. 1839-40] To Charles Babbage Esq. Dorset Str Manchester Sq. No. 1 [seal] Dear Mr. Babbage I fear that you must think me very impolite in not having apologized ere this for my absence & Mr Shepherd's at your intellectual banquet on Saturday last The truth is that my spirits & time have been much engrossed by the sudden illness of Sir Sam Shepherd. I was too depressed on Saturday to enjoy the thought of going to you Sir Sam is now thank God, I believe and hope out of danger but Mr Shepherd went off immediately on hearing the news, and is still in Berks. I read a great on Sunday in your Bridgewater treatise w. a new & increased delight. – The chapter on miracles appears to me as beautiful, as the mechanical instrument which serves as its illustration. That on the Mosaic history, is to my faculties somewhat obscure I read it twice over, and am not sure that I yet quite catch the full meaning of some of the reasoning. How I should enjoy a talk on it wt. you. Yrs. ever faithfully M Shepherd *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37192 f. 428 My dear Babbage I have just learned from Sir James [South] that you are still in town I wish if you are disengaged you would come down to us for a few days. If you leave town by the 4 o'clock Reading train the day you receive this, I will meet you at Reading and bring you here or if you 4 192 should now be engaged, we shall be happy to see you at any other time upon giving us a few days notice - Yrs very sincerely H J Shepherd August 14 1843 Crowsley Park Henley on Thames *** Babbage Correspondence MSS 37193 f. 105 Dear Babbage We should be delighted to see you and Ryan on Saturday next - Yours very truly H J Shepherd Crowsley Park Henley on Thames Aug 16 1844 4 193 Footnotes i. Do not work on these footnotes for now. Consider making revisions that will eliminating them entirely. Robertson, 229. ii. Brandreth, 26. iii. Brandreth, 28-29. [Naturally, I would like to find these.] iv. Brandreth, 31-32. Mr. Stockdale accompanied the Primrose brothers to Cambridge. v. Church of Scotland, Report of the Proceedings and Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Respecting the Election of Mr Leslie to the Mathematical Chair in the University of Edinburg (Edinburgh: James Ballentyne, 1805), 6. Hereafter cited as Report. vi. Emerson, 10. This is George Wishart's description of Hume's philosophy. vii. Report, 6. viii. Report, 33. ix. E. C. Mossner, 'Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David Hume', in V.C. Chappell. ed., Hume, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 8. Hume suffered a similar defamation of character. Samuel Johnson called him a rogue, a blockhead, and a liar, and John Stuart Mill said of him that 'regard for truth formed no part of his character'. x. Report, 143. xi. Brown (1805), 10. xii. Brown (1805), 14. Brown rejects certain aspects of Hume's argument. He claims, for example, that we are in fact able to draw conclusions about cause and effect after only a single trial. The boy who is stung by a bee, Brown maintains, does not wait for a second or third application before he fears the sting. Brown also rejects Hume's claim that the belief in causal connection depends on frequency of conjunction or vivacity of impression. See page 19. xiii. Willich (1798b), vol.II, viii-ix. xiv. Shepherd (1824), 46-49. xv. Shepherd (1827), xv. xvi. Mary Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume Concerning The Nature of that Relation; with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence, Connected with the Same Subject (London: T. Hookham,1824). Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1824). Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (London: John Hatchard and Son,1827). Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1827). xvii. In addition to these books, Shepherd wrote two short pieces that were published in 1828 and 1832. She may also have written a third philosophical treatise, a teaser suggested in both the Dictionary of National Biography and a curious typewritten insert left in the Cambridge University copy of her 1827 publication. The third work attributed to Shepherd, entitled An Enquiry Respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect, is a bit of a mystery. Unlike the later works, the 1819 piece was published in Edinburgh together with a second, very different, work on natural history. Although consistent with the arguments of her 1824 and 1827 books, the 1819 work contains little that can be directly related to Mary Shepherd's original views. As a result, Shepherd's authorship is difficult to establish in the absence of further evidence. The work in question was published anonymously in 1819 under the full title Enquiry Respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect: In Which the Theories of Professors Brown, and Mr. Hume are Examined; and With a Statement of Such Observations as are Calculated to Shew the Inconsistency of These Theories; and From Which a New Theory is Deduced, More Consonant to Facts and Experience. Also A New Theory of the Earth, Deduced from Geological Observations (Edinburgh: James Ballentyne, 1819).The two articles published as part of a philosophical exchange with John Fearn are, Mary Shepherd, 'Observations on Mr. Fearn's Lines of the Human Mind', in E.H. Barker (ed.), Parriana: or Notices of the Rev. Samuel Parr, L.L.D. (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), pp. 624-27. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1828). Mary Shepherd, 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Metaphysics' in Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country, vol. v, no. xxx (July 1832), pp. 697-708. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1832). xviii. Historic Doubts, 29. 4 194 xix. Historic Doubts, 53. Whately added a postscript to his third edition, published shortly after the announcement of Napoleon's death. There, Whately adds an argument to the effect that that the probable case of suspicion that he has established regarding the life of Napoleon gives grounds for the supposition that Whately himself killed Napoleon. xx. Alexander Campbell Fraser, Archbishop Whately The Restoration of the Study of Logic. Lecture Delivered Nov. 3, 1863 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1864), 40. xxi. Shepherd (1824), 108. xxii. Shepherd (1827), 131. xxiii. Shepherd (1824), 129. xxiv. Shepherd (1824), 44-46. xxv. Shepherd (1827) 30-1. xxvi. Shepherd (1827) xii and xiv. xxvii. Shepherd (1827) xiv. xxviii. Shepherd (1827) 189. xxix. Shepherd (1827) 390-1. xxx. It is worth remarking that Shepherd's major publications achieved a certain level of critical acclaim in her day. William Whewell is reputed to have used one of her books as a text at Cambridge and he made inquires for any unpublished manuscripts that she might have after her death. Robert Blakey includes a summary of Shepherd's views in his A History of the Philosophy of Mind, and expresses both admiration and astonishment regarding her philosophical achievements. This sense of appreciation is echoed in Charles Lyell's claim that Shepherd was an 'unanswerable logician, in whose argument it was impossible to find loophole or flaw.' Robert Blakey, A History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. ix (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans,1850), 39-46 and 609-10. xxxi. Blakey, p. 42. xxxii. Blakey, 43. xxxiii. Napier, 23. xxxiv. Thomas Macaulay, 'Utilitarian Logic and Politics' in Edinburgh Review, vol 49, no. 98, 159-189 (March 1829), 185. Hereafter cited as Macaulay. xxxv. Macaulay, 188. xxxvi. Macaulay, 188-9. xxxvii. Brown, Thomas. The Paradise of Coquettes, (London: John Murray), 1814, ii. xxxviii Mary Elizabeth Brandreth, Some Family and Friendly Recollections of 70 years, of Mary Elizabeth Brandreth, widow of Henry Rowland Brandreth, etc. (Westerham: C. Hooker, c.1888), 30. Hereafter cited as Brandreth. Mary Primrose spent most of her formative years at Barnbougle, with annual visits to Bixley Hall, in Norfolk, and occasional visits to London. xxxix [check county lines] In the painting, Neil Primrose could well be pointing toward an ancestral home. Early statistical records concerning the Primrose family show that Henry Primrose (b. 1490), the first recorded ancestor, and his immediate descendents, were associated with 'Culross', the name of a village in both Fife and Perthshire. Culross, Fife was the site of a Cistercian Abbey, a Benedictine order known for the remoteness of its abbeys, and a lifestyle of farming, prayer, and study. The family name seems to derive from the lands of Primrose, near Inverkeithing -lands associated with a Benedictine Abbey in Dunfermline, Fife. There is some ambiguity regarding the county, however. A few vital statistics records for the Primrose family list a location of Culross, Perth. The vast majority of the records for the family and its branches record the location as Culross, Fife. An ambiguity or change regarding a county border, a recording error, or the repetition of the place name 'Culross' by a family member could all explain the discrepancy. xl Scotland's Online Gazeteer for Dalmeny. For information on Barnbougle Castle, see Lady Dierdre Rosebery, Dalmeny House (Broxbum: Alna Press). [Look for Mowbray family history.] xli Four centuries after the original charter was transferred, Barnbougle was still referred to by some as 'the home of the Mowbrays'. See Graham Holton. Some Notes on the History of the Parish and Church of Dalmeny. (Edinburgh: Privately printed, c.1980), 5. Hereafter cited as Holton. Holton writes that, 'Until the 19C, the [Primrose] family continued to live in Barnbougle Castle, the home of the Mowbrays, situated on the shores of the Forth. xlii Thomas Robertson, 'Parish of Dalmeny' in The Statistical Account of Scotland Drawn Up from 4 195 the Communications of the Ministers of the Different Parishes, vol. I, pp. 227-242, John Sinclair, ed. (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1799). Hereafter cited as Robertson, 239. Hereafter cited as Robertson. James Scott's article on Dalmeny in the statistical account of 1845 repeats the story. See also James Scott, 'Parish of Dalmeny' in The New Statistical Account of Scotland by the Ministers of the Respective Parishes, Under the Superintendence of a Committee of the Society for the Benefit of the Sons and Daughters of the Clergy, vol. II, pp. 90-108 (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1845). Hereafter cited as Scott. xliii In Celtic, Barnbougle means 'the point of victory of strangers'. xliv Robertson, 239. xlv For example, the first of Dalmeny's Ministers recorded in the Scots Fastii, John Frude is descibed as a supporter of the 'reformit kirk'. He was 'complained upon' by the local Episcopalian Bishops of Dunkeld and suspended in 1566. xlvi I am presuming that this detail from the Scots Fasti entry for Dalmeny, p. 200, is correct, although King James VI would have been about fourteen years young in 1580. xlvii This period of tension follows after the so-called breaking of the apostolic line of Episcopalian Bishops in 1560, the repeal of Episcopacy by the Scottish Parliament in 1592, and the renewal of the apostolic succession, which was legalised by an Act of Parliament. The restoration of the Bishopric involved the consecration of three Scottish Bishops by four English Bishops 'in the apostolic line'. See Marion Lochhead, Episcopal Scotland in the Nineteenth Century (London: John Murray, 1966), 14. Hereafter cited as Lochhead. xlviii Thomas Hope is the ancestor of the Hope family of Hopetoun. In Morgan, p. 104, a record of 4 May 1625 refers to Hope as 'Thomas Houp of Craighall, advocat', so it appears that Hope family purchased the property of Craigiehall, which is adjacent to Dalmeny. In some vital statistics, Craigiehall is listed in Fifeshire -perhaps reflecting the same sort of county border confusion as the one underlying the Primrose records of Culross, Perthshire. xlix Scott, 95. See also W.l. Colvin, 'Parish of Cramond' in The New Statistical Account of Scotland by the Ministers of the Respective Parishes, Under the Superintendence of a Committee of the Society for the Benefit of the Sons and Daughters of the Clergy, vol. I, pp. *** (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1845) 598. l Photocopy from a Gazeteer, EPL, 339. Problems relating to local religious divisions evidently persisted. Years later, a Dalmeny Minister by the name of John Drurie, is commended for being a 'learned divine and would-be uniter of divided churches'. li Fraser, 122-3. lii La Vie de Gilbert Primerose. Ministre du Ciquiesme Evangile a Belge. MDCXX1. This volume describes the various life and work of Gilbert Primrose during his service in France and describes the suspicions and circumstances that led to Gilbert Primrose's banishment from the country. liii The intellectual impact of the discovery of the New World was profound. The discoveries of the explorers showed that the previous understanding of the nature of the earth was wrong, and that a whole world existed outside of Judeo-Christian history. liv Copernicus had dropped the assumption that the planets and sun revolve around the earth in favour of a solar system model, he held fast to the assumption that the planets moved in perfectly circular orbits in regular, uniform motion. The assumption of perfectly circular orbits was, according to the Greek thinker Simplicius, originally set out by Plato, and so had long been granted as a stating point in astronomical theory. Thus, Copernicus nonetheless claimed that his theory was mathematically superior to its Ptolemaic rival, although it was not. lv Kepler's laws were discovered on a model of elliptical planetary motion, and discredited the notion that the planets moved in perfectly circular paths at constant velocities. His success rested on access to the enormous observational data collected by Tycho Brahe and himself. His view was that that the book of nature is written in mathematical characters by God, the Great Geometer, and thus, that the key to it all could only be found by discovering the mathematical laws of the cosmos. lvi Bacon denounced the worship of ancient wisdom as resting on fallacy: If reverence is due to age, then we should revere ourselves. The so-called ancients lived when the world was young, and in contrast to them, it is we who are truly the old ones. For, we have the wisdom of the ages behind us. lvii In [15--], Mary Queen of Scots visited the Scottish universities in order to assess the state of higher education in Scotland. lviii Alexander Morgan ed., University of Edinburgh: Charters, Statutes, and Acts of the Town Council and the Senatus, 1583-1858 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1937). Hereafter cited as Morgan. In 'Part I: Charters anent the College, and Act of Ratification by the Scottish Parliament' of Morgan, the full history of the charters is given, including evidence of the patronage of Queen Mary. 4 196 The order of charters and related events is as follows: 1. Charter by Queen Mary 13 March 1566-7; 2. Charter of Confirmation and Novodamus by King James VI 14 April 1582; 3. Charter by King James VI uniting the benefice of Currie to the College 4th April 1584; 4. Charter by King James VI, 7th August, 1612; 5. Ratification by the Scottish Parliament, 4th August 1621. For additional information of Queen's Mary's original charter, see Morgan, pp. 2-5. The lecturers, Alexander Sym and Edward Henderson, taught civil law, canon law, Greek, and other sciences. See D.B. Horn, A Short History of the University of Edinburgh 1556-1889 (Edinburgh University Press,1967), 3. Hereafter cited as Horn. lix Horn, 3. The original college resembled the Collège de France, founded at Paris by Francis I a few years earlier. lx Much of the drama associated with the Scottish Reformation can be linked to conflicts between Mary Queen of Scots and the Presbyterian Minister, John Knox -conflicts that took place in Edinburgh. Queen Mary was eventually subverted. In 1566, her suspected lover, David Rizzio, was murdered in front of her. In 1567, Queen Mary's husband, Lord Darnley, was murdered in the college chambers, and Queen Mary was implicated in his murder. She was then forced to abdicate. lxi On p. 84 of Morgan, there is an anti-Catholic article passed by the Town Council, dated 23rd April 1561: The articulia following proponit to the prouest baillies counsale and dekynnis for the commoun policie of this burgh, quhilk thay ordane to be registrat:Item in the first, it is thocht gude that the renttis annuellis and utheris emolimentis quhilkis of before war payit furth of landis and tenementis within this burgh to papists, priestis, freris, monkis, nonis, and utheris of that wikit sort, for manteinying of idolatrie and vane superstitioun, seing it hes plesit the Almychtie to oppin the eis of all pepill and to gyf thame the knaulege of sic vane abuissis, Thairof that the saidis renttis and emolimentis by applyit to mair proffitable and godlie uses, sic as for sustenying of the trew ministerris of Goddis word, founding and biging of hospitalis for the pure, and collegis for leirnying and upbring of the youth, and sic uther godlie warkis. lxii Perhaps the most notable critic of Scholasticism was Erasmus, an early humanist and one of the most influential figures of his day. One of his most important works was a translation of a Greek version of the New Testament, which differed in important respects from the version that had been previously been available in Latin. Knowledge of Greek was rare, even rarer than the knowledge of Latin outside of clerical circles, and Erasmus's work showed a big difference between the Christianity of the early Church and that of the Church of Rome ca. 1500. For example, he discovered that the passage in John supporting the doctrine of the Trinity did not appear in the earliest Greek versions of the Gospel. But rather than attacking the Church or particular Church doctrines, Erasmus's book, In Praise of Folly, ridiculed the intellectual and moral world built up to support Christendom -namely, Scholasticism. As such, Erasmus did not undermine Scholasticism by disproving its tenets, but by making it appear silly. To this day, it is his picture of Scholasticism we have in mind when we imagine bizarre intellectuals debating such questions as 'How many angels can stand on the head of a pin?' Following Erasmus, intellectuals began to devote themselves to scholarship and radical innovations in theology. These innovations led to the emergence of Protestantism under Luther; hence, the saying that, 'Erasmus laid the egg that Luther hatched.' The work of Erasmus inspired and popularised the humanistic rediscovery of the past, i.e. ancient Greece and Rome. Plato, Plotinus, and Aristotle had all influence medieval thought, but now they were rediscovered as Greek thinkers, rather than as material for theological debates. As part of this revival, it was discovered that there existed a whole host of Greek thinkers whose work had been ignored; there were non-Judeo-Christian views of the good life, the nature of morality, of reality and of the limitations of the human subject as 'knower'. Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism, as well as classical mathematical and scientific work, were hardly known in medieval Europe, and all re-entered European intellectual discourse. Of the classical philosophical movements, perhaps the most important was Scepticism. The major text of Greek Sceptical thought -the writings of Sextus Empiricus -were published in Latin translation in 1562 and again in 1569. Dropped in the midst of the crisis of belief produced by the shock waves of geographical and humanistic discovery and rediscovery these writing initiated a sceptical crisis that culminated in religious Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Seizing on certain arguments of Sextus, writers such as Michel de Montaigne and Francisco Sanchez attempted to erode every level of belief and certainty. Montaigne stressed the vast differences of opinion on all subjects between the ancients and his contemporaries, and amongst his contemporaries. Our means for dealing with this, our senses and our reason, he argued, are both unreliable measures of the world around us. Indeed, senses vary according to surrounding conditions, and our reasoning may depend on questionable initial premises. In the face of this, Montaigne recommends that we follow the advice of Sextus -\n\nsuspend judgement on all things that go beyond appearances, and live morally by following nature and custom -but adding that we ought to accept fully the faith God gives us. lxiii DNB entry on Andrew Melville. lxiv Melville was considered to be one of the most able and learned of his countrymen, even after he got himself into trouble for his outspoken criticisms of the King's involvement in ecclesiastical affairs. He did eventually escape his prison sentence, but only in consequence of a deferential public gestures such as his conciliatory and flattering verse in honour of the King and an apologetic letter to the Privy Council. Few were as skilled in the art and uses of flattering rhetoric as Gilbert Primrose DD. It seems likely that the panegyric savvy of individuals such as Gilbert Primrose helped Melville to win back his freedom. Melville, who had branded the moderate agenda as a return to Papism and declared King James VI to be 'God's Sillie Vassel' was suspicious of and refused to join the moderate cause. Through the intervention of the moderates, such as Primrose, Melville, was brought into the French Reformed Church, which was doubtless much too theologically liberal for his own tastes. [His release was purchased at the price of exile to France, a fate that would inhibit Melville from exerting a direct influence in Scotland Did he seek revenge for this last sentence?] lxv King James had requested that the college be named after him. The honour was in practice denied him. The College came to be referred to as 'Tounis College' and 'Edinburgh College' rather than 'King James Sixth's Academy'. lxvi. It is notable that the inaugural event for the College was a bizarre affair. The local scholars are said to have demonstrated a very limited range and depth of scholarship and King James VI is said o have responded with a series of word plays on the names of the speakers, both showing up and making light of the scholars and their presentations. lxvii. 'Beginning in the later years of James I and then carried through under Charles I, Armenianism dominated the church to the extent that in 1626 when Buckingham was appointed chancellor of self-consciously orthodox Cambridge, the teaching of predestinarian doctrine was prohibited.' See [author/title] in David George Mullan, Episcopacy in Scotland: The History of an Idea, 1560-1638 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1986) 167. Hereafter cited as Mullan. lxviii. For such moderates, the goal of reform was weakly interpreted as a religious revival 'in which all christians should participate without quitting the communion of the church universal'. Indeed, these moderates claimed that the Reformation had not resulted in a new religion, but in 'a return to primitive christianity'. Mullan ,166. See Mark Pattison, Issac Casaubon 1559-1614 (Oxford, 1892) 448. lxix. Mullan, 167. Mullan's original reference is from William Laud, Works (Oxford: 1847-1860) III 341. lxx. Mullan 167-8. lxxi Need to research the Privy Council details. lxxii God and the King: Or, A Dialogue shewing that our Soueraigne Lord King James, Being immediate under God within his Dominions, Doth rightfully claime whatsoeuer is required by the Oath of Allegiance. London: Imprinted by his Majesties speciall Privelege and Command, to the onley use of Mr. James Primrose, for the kingdom of Scotland. 1616. Preface, A3. Hereafter cited as God and the King. lxxiii God and the King, 2. lxxiv God and the King, 23. lxxv God and the King, 3. lxxvi God and the King, 20-25. Ironically, King James justifies the introduction of his Oath by appeal to the precedent of the Seventh Century Oath which was to become the backbone of the 'Spanish Inquisition', which is associated with a period of gross violations of human and civil rights – and, in particular, the persecution of heretics and Jews. It is not clear whether this appeal was intended as an appeal to fear. It certainly suggests that a sorry fate would await those such as the 'Popish Lords' said to have engaged in treasonous plotting with King Philip of Spain and who might otherwise have been tempted to encourage subjects to refuse to take the oath. lxxvii Note that this is the very sort of rhetoric upon which Gilbert Primrose based his reputation. lxxviii God and the King, 14-15. Contemporary historians have raised the question of whether blame was correctly laid in this instance. lxxix This is the father of Gilbert Primrose, DD. lxxx Gilbert Primerose. Jacob's Vow, opposed to the Vowes of Monkes and Friers, The first Volume in two Bookes; of the Holy Scripture, And Evangelicall Counsels. Written in French by Mr. Gilbert Primerose, Minister of the Word of God in the Reformed Church of Bordeaux and Translated into English by John Bulteel, Minister of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. London: Printed by Felix Kyngston for Nathaniel Newberry, and to be sold at his shop under Saint Peter's Church in Corne-hill, and in Pope's-head Alley, 1617, C2. Hereafter cited as Jacob's Vow. 4 198 lxxxi Jacob's Vow, Book I, Chap VII, 37. lxxxii Gilbert Primrose, D.D., The Righteous Man's Evils and the Lord's Deliverances, London: Nathaniel Newberry, 1625, A3. The rhetorical skills of the Primroses, and especially of Gilbert Primrose, were tremendous. In his various panygeric works, Gilbert Primrose more or less defines such roles as royal counsellor, Prince, King, subject, etc.. lxxxiii. DNB entry on Gilbert Primrose. lxxxiv. The moderate vision was by no means poplar, and was reviled by committed Catholics and Presbyterians alike. The account of Armenina moderatism is based on an article in Mullan, 167. On this reading, James VI is seen as having sought modest church reform, and as working to bring the Presbyterian and Episcopal churches closer together. One advocate of moderate Protestantism was Philippe du Plessis-Mornay. As a leader of the Huguenots, du Plessis-Mornay aimed for a Protestant synod to settle differences that were threatening to dismantle the advances of the Reformation. Another moderate was Issac Casaubon, who sought a middle ground upon which church unity might flourish. A further influence in Scotland was the German thinker George Calixtus. lxxxv Given that King James VI had reason to suspect the loyalty of many Scottish statesmen, the fact that several members of the Primrose family came to be closely connected with his monarchy suggests that the King considered them to be very a trustworthy family. It was a time of great tension in Scotland, and their service during many years of religious and civil conflict played an important role in establishing the Primrose family. But only one of the two prominent branches of the Primrose family prevailed in the long run. For whatever the reason, the influence of Gilbert Primrose MD and his branch of religious and medical descendants -despite their prolific literary output -gradually diminished. Gilbert Primrose DD's two sons followed in their family's traditional roles of doctors and ministers. James became a physician, principally noted for his mistaken rejection of Harvey's theory of blood circulation. Harvey correctly observed that the blood circulates around the body, and that the heart plays a central role in pumping the blood through the veins. Many objected to Harvey's view, which, in its novelty, seemed strange. James Primrose, the son of Gilbert Primrose DD and grandson of the surgeon to King James VI, devoted his energies to producing unsuccessful arguments against William Harvey's theory of the circulation of the blood. They were perhaps motivated as part of a defence of the scholastic tradition. The second son, David, carried on his father's ministerial connections with the French Church in London. This David Primrose may be the author of the 1625 pamphlet entitled Scotland's Complaint Upon the death of our late Soveraigne King James of most happy memorie, written in the panegyric style akin to that of his father. One explanation for the turn in fortune for this branch of the family might be that it was too overlty linked with controversial religious doctrines and policies of the Stuart monarchs that, whatever their merit, had not gained in popular support. If so, the descendants of Gilbert Primrose M.D. were simply casualties of the severity of religious conflict in Britain. Much effort was spent in the early modern era reacting to the scholastic tradition that had endorsed Aristotle and wholeheartedly embraced medieval theology. Even as the 'received' view -the view under criticism -Aristotle plays an important role in defining the developments out of which in the new ideas emerged. In the midst of all the new experimentation and theorising, there were many hits, but just as many misses. Areas of learning in which it seemed least controversial to break with Aristotelian theories that had dominated the scene related to the sciences. In the domain of medicine, for example, which was quickly gaining in popularity in Edinburgh, there had already been impressive advances made on the Continent. Servetus and Vesalius, had made worldshaking discoveries through anatomical dissections that showed the unreliability of centuries of medical theory and practice. But there was still a great deal of uncertainty and mistaken speculation about how the body and brain worked, and the continued strength of appeals to the authority of Aristotle is apparent from a story in Galileo's Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Galileo's story tells of an incident involving an anatomist from Venice. The anatomist performs a dissection to show that, contrary to Aristotelian doctrine, the nerves originate in the brain, not the heart. The story is meant to illustrate the barrier that Aristotle's philosophy presented to scientific progress, in this case to the claim that the nerves originate in the brain. An Aristotelian philosopher present at the dissection says: 'You have made me see this matter so plainly and palpably that if Aristotle's text were not contrary to it, stating clearly that the nerves originate in the heart, I should be forced to admit it to be true.' [Stillman Drake, Galileo: Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953). [Mathews, 63].The moral of Galileo's story is that the real bar to scientific progress was the appeal to authority, a habit ingrained in Scholastic philosophy's unquestioned foundation in Scripture. In the field of science, Scholastic philosophy transferred similar authority to Aristotle. 4 199 lxxxvi. Mullan,176. Lord Balmerinoch is referred to as 'James Elphinstone, second lord Balmerino' in Mullan article. Spelling discrepancies are typical, and spelling variations are the rule rather than the exception. In Colvin's article on Cramond , the spelling is Lord Balmerinoch and Sir James Elphinston of Barnton. His son, the second Lord Balmerinoch is referred to there as John Elphinston. Wood refers to the son as John Elphinstone. lxxxvii. Mullan, 177. lxxxviii. S.R. Gardiner, ed., The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Oxford University Press, 1906), 132 and 136. lxxxix. Wood, 225. xc. The commission met on 7 August 1643 and was comprised of representatives from Scotland's General Assembly, a Westminster Assembly of Divines, and Commissioners from the English Parliament. xci See Act VI of The Lawes and Actes of the first Parliament of our most High and Dread Soueraign, Charles the Second, by the grace of God, King of Scotland, England, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith. Begun at Edinburgh, the first day of January, 1661. By a Noble Lord, John Earl of Middleton, Lord Cleremont and Fettercain; His majesties Commissioner for holding of the Parliament, by vertue of a Commission under His Majesties Great Seal of this Kingdom; With the Special Advice and Consent of the Estates of Parliament. Extracted and Collected from the Records of Parliament, by Sir Archibald Primerose of Chester, Knight and Barronet, Clerk to Hid majesties Council, Register and Rolls. Edinburgh. Printed by Evan Tyler, Printer to the Kings most Excellent majesty, Anno Dom. 1661. CUM PRIVILEGIO. Hereafter cited as Lawes and Actes of 1661. xcii [Westminster Assembly of Divines]. Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. Ed Rev. Alex F. Mitchell and Rev. John Suthers. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1874. See the Introduction,xxvii. Herefater cited as Westminster Assembly. xciii Westminster Assembly [xxvii]. xciv Westminster Assembly, lxx lxxi. xcv. Brandreth, 89. xcvi. Scott, 97. It is said that that Marquis of Argyll aspired to overthrow the Stuarts because he wanted to become King of Scotland. So, although he led the Covenanting Army against Charles I and later governed Scotland on behalf of Cromwell, he may have had a hidden agenda, and therefore, divided loyalties. xcvii. Scott, 97-8. xcviii. Robertson and Scott. On p. 97 of Scott, one of the descriptions of Sir Archibald Primrose is attributed to Bishop Burnett. xcix. [get David Allen's book on stoicism and Scottish statesmen.] If the early seventeenth century curriculum in Edinburgh is any indication, Allen's thesis that the Roman ideal of citizenship played an important role in shaping several generations of Scotland's statesman is no exaggeration. See Morgan, 110-15. The Edinburgh College curriculum is described on 3rd December 1628: As part of daily Latin studies, incoming students had to translate 'sum pairt of Cicero or any uther Latine author into Inglisch' and the description of the curriculum frequently mentions the study of 'some oratiounes of Cicero'. The written and spoken language of the college was Latin, and penalties were exacted for those speaking in Scots. As the students' Latin translations were individually examined, the Regent would 'in the meane tyme teacheth theme sum pairt of Cicero or sum uther guid writter'. In the second year, another eight or nine weeks emphasising 'some oratiounes of Cicero', and the same goes for the 'Class of Humanities'. The third and fourth year placed emphasis on Aristotelian philosophy, or what we today think of as the scholastic tradition. Other Roman and Greek authors were also studied. Another main component in the curriculum was religious and moral training. c Lawes and Acts, Act VIII, 10. ci Lawes and Actes XV, 38. Act Rescinding and Annulling the pretended Parliaments, in the years, 1640, 1641, &c. cii Lawes and Actes of 1661, Act XI 'Act for taking the Oath of Allegiance, and asserting the Royal Prerogative', 18. ciii Lawes and Actes of 1661, Act XXXVI 'Act of Pre[s]entation of Ministers'. Sir Archibald would have been very aware of the significance of this Act, which stated that any Minister refusing to take the Oath of Allegiance was to be removed from office, and that Patrons refusing to conform would lose the right of Patronage and be considered disaffected to His Majesty. Presumably the example made of Hamilton and his career was in deference to this Act. civ See the Scots Fasti, 201. cv [Follow up: Dalmeny's George Turnbull --1688.] 4 200 cvi No Popery! or a Catechism Against Popery. Wherein the Heretical Doctrines, Idolatrous Worship, and the Superstitious Practices of the Roman catholic Church are Briefly yet Plainly Refuted: And the PROTESTANT PRINCIPLES Proved by Testimonies of Holy Scripture, and the Evidence of Reason. By a Minister of the Gospel. (Edinburgh: John Reid, 1683), 15 and 29. Hereafter cited as No Popery! cvii John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, Peter, ed., (Cambridge University Press, 1960). Hereafter cited as Locke. cviii Locke, 39. The original source is a letter from the third earl of Shaftesbury to Jean Leclerc, February 1705; Shaftesbury Papers (P.R.O. 30/24, XLVII, 28,3). 'When my grandfather quitted the Court and began to be in danger from it, Mr Locke now shared with him the dangers as before the honours and advantages. He entrusted him with his secretest negotiations, and made use of his assistant pen in matters that nearly concerned the state, and were fit to be made public, to raise that spirit in the nation which was necessary against the prevailing Popish party' cix Carstares was sent as an emissary to those plotting in England to place William on the throne. He is said to have known about the Rye House Plot of 1684, which involved a plan to assassinate James II. See Alexander Grant, The Story of The University of Edinburgh During its First Three Hundred Years, vol. I and II, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1884), vol.1, 260. Hereafter cited as Grant. cx One of Locke's principal targets is this respect is Leibniz, who appears to uphold a version of the Platonic theory of ideas, a form of innatism. Plato's theory of recollection invokes the notion that we are in possession of certain ideas that no sensory experience could have given to us. Plato, for example, held a version of the doctrine of innate ideas. According to Plato, we are not born with explicit knowledge of these ideas, but when we have certain experiences, we recall the ideas, from the 'back to our mind' so to speak. Strictly, therefore, Plato does not believe that we have innate ideas, if by this it is meant that we are born with certain ideas already before our minds. But neither does he believe that we obtain all our ideas from experience. Experience serves only to awaken ideas in us that we have forgotten. So in a sense, those ideas must have been in us all along, waiting to be awakened. cxi For Aristotle, understanding something requires knowing its four causes. The four causes are termed the formal, material, efficient and final causes. In Aristotle's famous Bronze statue example, the formal cause is the geometrical form of the finished statue, the material cause is the bronze of the statue, the efficient cause is the sculptor's activity, and the final cause is the sculptor's purpose in carving the block. Having assigned the causes, we can claim to know the nature of the thing. This analysis of causes formed the basis of the analysis of things for Aristotle, suggesting a tight connection between the stuff of the world and its underlying order, as would be consistent with the idea a Divine Creation. cxii Also incompatible with Locke's theory were the views of Descartes and Plato, who are often characterized as holding forms of 'direct realism'; that is, views that hold that the immediate objects of our perceptions are mind-dependent, and that that are mind-independent external objects. Locke replaced direct realism with an 'indirect' or 'representative realism' according to which the image of an external thing is caused by, and a representation of, the real object. The indirect realist thinks that secondary qualities such as colours are mere sensations in the minds of observers, and not in the world at al. However, primary qualities such as size, shape, and motion are objective properties of material bodies. cxiii When the executioner was ordered to remove the thumbkins, 'he found it beyond his strength to undo what he had done, and the King's smith had to fetch his tools to revert the screw, before the broken and mangled thumbs could be released.' As Alexander Grant reflects in The Story of The University of Edinburgh, 'It is remarkable that in the portrait of Carstares the painter gives so much prominence to the right thumb. It is as if Carstares were purposely exhibiting a member which had suffered so much, and were saying: 'You see, it is none the worse.' See Grant, vol. I, 260-1, 261n. See also Robert H. Story, William Carstares, a Character and a Career of the Revolutionary Epoch (1649-1715) (London, 1874), 94. Hereafter cited as Story. cxiv George Edward Cokayne, The complete peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom, extant, extinct, or dormant (Gloucester: A. Sutton, 1984). Hereafter cited as The Complete Peerage. cxv See Grant, vol I, 259. cxvi [Information on Archibald Primrose and others involved with the Whig-Presbyterian government.] cxvii Horn, 24, 26. The notes belonged to a student named Flint. Oddly enough, an Elizabeth Flint marries a Robert Pillans in Cramond not long after these notes were made, leading one to wonder about the connections between the Flint and Pillans families. Regent Pillans was a signatory to the oldest extant Master of Arts degree for the University, awarded in 1674. Pillans' signature is one of 4 201 a handful on the document, and he signs it in Latin as what appears to be 'Ja: Pilanus' -i.e., James Pillans? See Horn, 27. [Find out if this is an ancestor of the later James Pillans and descendants. If so, then Pillans family connections to the university and to Cramond extend very far back indeed and that the university reforms proposed in the nineteenth century by James Pillans, the humanities Professor, take on a new and deeper significance. Cf. Fearn.] cxviii Grant, vol. 1, 274. cxix Horn, 36. cxx Grant, vol. I, 86-87. cxxi Horn, 36-7. cxxii Grant, vol. I, 243. cxxiii Grant, vol. I, 244. cxxiv The record shows that the Patrons describe the book containing the laws made by the Town Council for governing the masters and scholars in the College said to contain numerous faults, especially, several uses of the word 'faculty' as a as a term of reference for the Principal and Professors. In the original Charter of the university, which had vested the government in the Town Council, the term 'Faculty' and 'Senate' do not appear. In 1704, the Council examined the laws pertaining to the university, noting the instances where the word 'faculty' is used to describe the professors. Upon discovering the introduction of the term to its university documents, the Town Council 'objected to them as implying a claim on the part of the teachers to independent powers in the educational and administrative affairs of the University.' Morgan, 230n. cxxv Morgan, Part III: Extracts from Acts of the Town Council anent the College and University, 16th June 1704, pp. 152-4. Afterwards, the term 'University Meeting' was used in the first half of the eighteenth century to replace the offending terminology, the intended significance being the same. cxxvi Morgan, 16th June 1708, 164. cxxvii This was consistent with the objectives of the educational system first introduced to Scotland by John Knox. Scotland's church based school system in the sixteenth century. As a result, virtually all of Scotland's parishes, including Cramond and Dalmeny, had local Presbyterian schools. The Presbyterian parish schools were strongly promoted by the church, so that most parents sent their children to school during the day. At minimum, such schooling ensured that a child would learn to read the Bible: 'But although public schools were established by the authority of government, in every parish in Scotland, no person was compelled to send his children to these schools. They did not indeed require any compulsion. For having themselves found to their comfortable experience, that the word of God is the only true guide to happiness, both in this world and in that which is to come, they were anxious to transmit this blessing to their children, as the very best heritage which they could possibly bestow upon them.' William Kerr. A Summons of Wakening or, The Evil Tendency and Danger of Speculative Philosophy Exemplified in Mr. Leslie's Inquiry into the Nature of Heat; and Mr. Malthus's Essay on Population, And in that Speculative System of Common Law, which is at present administered in these Kingdoms. To which is subjoined, A Prospectus of an Inquiry into the Origin of Government and Law (London: Hawick, 1807), 144-5. Hereafter cited as Kerr. cxxviii M.A. Stewart, The Kirk and the Infidel (Lancaster University Publications: 2001) 4. cxxix Grant, vol. I, 270. cxxx It is seems likely that when Hutcheson had imbibed the lessons of Berkeley's critique of Locke while in Dublin. It may even be possible to trace an influence from Hutcheson, through to Turnbull and Reid. cxxxi Grant, vol. I. 271-2. The original source is Scots Magazine, 1741. cxxxii ibid. cxxxiii Grant, vol. I, 274. cxxxiv This Archibald Primrose was executed for treason in 1746. cxxxv The two thinkers approached political issues quite differently. Hume considered politics and institutions from a historical perspective, with the goal of identifying causal factors leading to the present circumstances and events. As such, he was primarily interested in a historical analysis of politics rather than the conceptual foundations of government. cxxxvi Roger Emerson. 'The \"affair\" at Edinburgh and the \"project\" at Glasgow; the politics of Hume's attempts to become a professor' in M.A. Stewart and John P. Wright, eds., Hume and Hume's Connexions, (Penn State University Press, 1994), 1-22. Hereafter cited as Emerson. cxxxvii Emerson, 1. cxxxviii Initially, he was strongly supported by several leading officials -and the politically powerful third Duke of Argyll in particular. However, it is likely that both Whig parties would have been afraid to give the appearance of sponsoring an 'infidel' and perhaps even fostering social and religious unrest. The Squadrone and Argethelian parties shared many of the same interests and concerns 4 202 as candidate ruling Whig parties. Both parties badly needed to find church and university leaders who could articulate a vision that would bring together a fractured nation. That the Whig elite was involved in a power struggle does turn out to be important to understanding the story of Mary Shepherd, but it is not crucial to understanding the strange combination of values upheld by the Moderate literati or their success in Edinburgh. Both can be readily explained independently of a Squadrone or an Argethelian victory. cxxxix Emerson, 10. This is George Wishart's description of Hume's philosophy. cxl The key to the moderates' success in linking the Whig elite and Presbyterian leadership was in their ability to represent concerns voiced by opposing parties, while appearing to move the political agenda forward in an 'enlightened' way. On the one hand, the moderate professors defended the Hanoverians and condemned the Jacobite rebellion, a stance that was popular with both the monarchy and the Presbyterians. On the other hand, they supported the Patronage Act of 1712, which was popular with the Whig nobility, since the Patronage Act supported their traditional rights of church patrons. In the end, the group succeeded in carving out a delicate position that landed them somewhere in the middle of the incommensurable views of competing political factions.It is difficult to make perfect sense out of the moderate position at a theoretical level. They are best understood as forgers of political compromises. cxli In the seventeenth century, the life of Sir Archibald Primrose was spared following the intercession of the 'Marquis of Argyle' after the battle of Philiphaugh. See Scott, 97. In the eighteenth century, the Primrose family was connected by marriage to the fourth Duke of Argyll. Mary Campbell, sister of the fourth Duke, was married James Primrose, the second Earl of Rosebery. See Complete Peerage under Argyll. The death of the second Duke of Argyll had divided the House of Argyll. Still, it is likely that the Primrose family would have fallen in with the ruling Argathelians throughout most of the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Lady Mary Shepherd was a friend of a descendant of this house, Lord John Campbell, who became Baron and Lord Chancellor of England. Thus, the Primrose and Campbell families had longstanding connections. Brandreth, 42. cxlii The third Duke's involvement seems mainly to have been aimed at gaining control over Edinburgh's Town Council. Emerson, 1-5. With the third Duke's rise to power came the influence of Edinburgh's moderate party. cxliii Rosebery Muniments, (HM Register House, National Archives of Scotland) Neil Primrose, Correspondence 1803-68, NRA 10461, vol. 28. cxliv Inglis (1806), 89n. Inglis writes that 'All parties in the Church, it should be remembered, concurred unanimously in the warning against the infidel principles of Mr Hume, which was given by the General Assembly 1755.' cxlv Robertson, 229. cxlvi Robertson, 229. cxlvii Holton, 5. cxlviii A new dwelling, Dalmeny House, was finally built in 1814-17 under the direction of Mary's brother, Archibald Primrose, the fourth Earl of Rosebery. cxlix The period in which Neil Primrose rented Holland House, then considered on the outskirts of London, was shortly following that in which the proprietor, Lord Kensington, had been forced to sell his own freehold. As with Sir Roger Mowbray and Barnbougle, Lord Kensington and his descendants were 'barred and extinguished' from any further claim to the property and title. cl Christopher Christie, The British Country House in the Eighteenth Century (Manchester University Press, 2000). Hereafter cited as Christie. For more on the specific subjects addressed above, see Christie, pages 2, 109, and 112. cli See 'Of Paternal Power' in Locke, Book II, 64.5. See also Locke's 'On Education'. clii Christie, 2. cliii The family made annual visits to another country residence, Bixley Hall in Norfolk. cliv Robertson, 229. clv The area was home to a dynamic intellectual and religious community by the mid-nineteenth century. See Alexander Campbell Fraser, Biographia Philosophica: A Retrospect (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1904). Hereafter cited as Fraser. See also Grant. clvi John Wood, 'Parish of Cramond' in The Statistical Account of Scotland Drawn Up from the Communications of the Ministers of the Different Parishes, vol. I, pp. 211-226, John Sinclair, ed. (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1799), 225. Hereafter cited as Wood. The entry 'Parish of Cramond' is extracted from an unpublished manuscript by John Wood entitled 'The Topography of Cramond Parish'. Cf. John Wood, The antient and modern state of the parish of Cramond, to which are added, some biographical and genealogical collections, respecting some of the most considerable 4 203 families and individuals connected with that district; comprehending a sketch of the life and projects of John Law of Lauriston. (Edinburgh: Peter Hill, 1794). It is about seven miles from Dalmeny to Edinburgh. clvii Christie, 2. clviii Christie, 131. clix Brandreth, 28. clx Brandreth, 28. It is unclear from the context of the original passage whether Mary, Charlotte, or both girls frequented the local manse. As a member of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and Treasurer of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Mr. Bonar was linked to a controversy surrounding the election of John Leslie to the Chair of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh. The theological séances with Mr. Bonar may well have had something to do with the Leslie controversy. However, given that Bonar and others in the area were involved in the movement that led to the Disruption of the Established Church of Scotland, the discussions may well have had to do with religion and freedom of conscience. In any case, the illicit visits demonstrate the strong sense of independence on the part of the Primrose children. clxi Holton, 5, And note: The grounds for religious division in Scotland were manifold -an important one being that Presbyterianism rejected both the ecclesiastic authority of the monarch and the Papal authority of Rome. Presbyterianism transferred authority directly into the hands of the presbyters themselves, and abolished the Bishopric altogether -an element of democracy popular with many Scots, though problematic for the ruling classes. Indeed, politically, the presbyteries had played an important role in weakening traditional lines of power in Scotland. The English church, which had initially broken with Rome under Henry the VIII, took a radical new direction under the Protestant Elizabeth I, adopting the Anglican denomination, and becoming the national Church of England. Like its Scottish counterpart, the Episcopal Church, the Anglican Church of England retained aspects of the Roman Catholic doctrine, liturgy, and formal structure. However, Scotland's Episcopal Church retained traditions that the Anglican Church had expressly and vehemently rejected; in particular, it retained the tradition of the apostolic succession of Bishops. In its stead, the Anglican Church had adopted a system through which Bishops were appointed by the authority of the monarch. The issues at stake were more than merely doctrinal. For, Scotland's Queen Mary and her descendants stood in line to inherit the English throne, so that both sovereignty and religious independence was at stake for England. In 1560, for example, Presbyterian reforms succeeded in breaking the apostolic line of succession in the Bishops of the Episcopal Church. Though the Episcopate was ordered restored in the same year, the basis for deep ideological and political divisions had been clearly articulated. Moreover, for political reasons, England stood to gain by a weakened Scotland, and often helped to undermine the Episcopacy. The fact that the Scotland's Episcopal tradition remained tied to the Church of Rome on matters such as apostolic succession and Papal authority was sufficient to drive a wedge between the Episcopal and Anglican Churches, and this division worked to the advantage of Presbyterianism. clxii Buried in the Rosebery aisle at Dalmeny Church, Neil Primrose's funeral service was held at the Episcopalian Charlotte Chapel, under the direction of Daniel Sandford, Bishop of Edinburgh. clxiii This is a substantial number, representing about one in six parishioners. clxiv Robertson, 241. Robertson lists two clergymen in Dalmeny; one Established and one Seceder. Thomas Robertson represents the Establish Church of Scotland. clxv Despite the paucity of written history prior to the Reformation, interesting clues to these more ancient times are to be found in architectural and archaeological details. Dunfermline, for example, was originally founded around a chapel belonging to priests of the Celtic Church. Across the Forth, the town of Cramond, near Barnbougle, was built around the remains of an early Roman fort. Dalmeny, which is the name of the parish associated with Barnbougle, bears further evidence of Scotland's history of diverse cultures and traditions. The words 'Barnbougle' and 'Dalmeny', for example, derive from the Celtic 'Bar na-buai-gall', which means 'the point of the victory of strangers' and 'Dumanie', translated as 'black heath' or 'fort of the monks'. See Scott, 96 and Robertson, 227. In addition, 'About a mile to the west of Barnbougle Castle, on top of a high sea bank, is an ancient cairn, called by the country people the Earl Cairny, of a circular shape, 500 feet in circumference, and 24 high in the middle'. The cairn was probably raised as a sepulchral monument in the Celtic burial tradition. Robertson, 238. The Church itself was built for Gospatric by masons from Dunfermline Abbey, it originally belonged to the diocese of St Andrews, and later, to the Augustinian Abbey of Jedburgh. According to one source, there was a monastery of the order of the Holy Trinity at Dalmeny in 1297. Scott, 101.The original source of the remark is Father Hay in his Scotia Sacra. The abbey at Dunfermline is Benedictine and Culross abbey is Cistercian. clxvi Michael Macgregor, The pocket commercial gazetteer of Scotland and directory to the cities, towns, villages and hamlets showing the situations, distance, population and the countries in which 4 204 they are situated...also an alphabetical list of railway stations...etc., etc. (Edinburgh: James Taylor, 1857), 358. [Check Gazeteer sources again, EPL.] clxvii P. MacGregor Chalmers, Dalmeny Kirk: its history and architecture (Glasgow: Carter and Pratt, 1904). clxviii Outside, the churchyard holds reminders of an earlier Celtic tradition, so that 'At the door of the church there is a stone-coffin of large dimensions, cut from a single block, and covered both on the lid and sides with hieroglyphics which cannot now be deciphered'. Scott, 102. To this it is added that, 'Coffins of similar material, but of much simpler and ruder construction, have been found in other parts of the parish, one of which is still to be seen with its end projecting from the bank'. clxix Scott, 101-2. The Dalmeny church has been dated as far back as the tenth or eleventh centuries, based on its resemblance to the church of Narcoide, which was built before the time of William the Conqueror. One description is as follows: It is a very elegant small fabric, all of cut stone, 84 feet long and 25 feet broad, except at the east end, where it contracts into a semicircle. The pediments of the principal doors and windows are richly carved, resting on single columns with Gothic capitals, and round the upper part of the building there is an embossment of carved faces, all dissimilar and of grotesque appearance. But the chief beauty of the church is in the interior, which has a striking effect on entering from the west, especially from the upper part of the gallery. The body of the church is divided into three parts by two semicircular arches, that over the chancel being so much smaller than the other as to render the perspective peculiarly pleasing. They are both richly ornamented with successive tiers of mouldings of a zigzag or starry shape. clxx Brandreth, 34. Given the conventions of Presbyterian worship, there could, of course, be no question of an organ in the Dalmeny church or the secret meeting houses of Mary Primrose's youth. clxxi Robertson, 236. Robertson writes of his own appointment that, 'The last presentation was given by the Earl of Rosebery; against which the late Earl of Hopetoun protested, as Vice-Patron, but waived his claim to the exercise of that right till the next vacancy.' Robertson was himself married in the parish of St. John's, Westminster, which suggests Anglican training and background. clxxii The anti-burghers were formed from a group of seceders who had joined Erskine in first session from the Established Church of Scotland in 1733. The secession was linked to opposition of the Patronage Act of 1712. clxxiii See Wood, 221 and Robertson, 235. Scotland's Presbyterian ministers promoted the parish schools, which served as a means for parishioners to learn the Bible and helped to consolidate the influence of the Established Church. In addition, there were two private schools in the area, and, all told, about 200 children attended the local rural schools. clxxiv Robertson, 230. clxxv Parish of Dalmeny School Records 1792-1817 (National Archives of Scotland, Acc. CH2/86/14). The Dalmeny school log for 1792 lists 27 boys and 17 girls. clxxvi M. Plant, The Domestic Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (The University of Edinburgh Press, 1952), 13-18. On some accounts, the education of Scottish girls was quite limited, and upper class girls might split a typical day between such activities as sewing shirts, reading scriptures, writing letters, taking walks, and the occasional game or amusement. However, one has to wonder whether such accounts are entirely accurate. In addition to the Dalmeny statistics, one well-known Edinburgh teacher, James Mundell, lists 94 girls among his pupils between 1735 and 1761. clxxvii Brandreth, 25-26. clxxviii Brandreth, 26. The Presbyterian dissenter and [probably the father of the Edinburgh printer, and grandfather to the professor of the same name], The reference could be to either James Pillans (b. 1745) or his father, another James Pillans (b. 1722). The former was a printer in Edinburgh, and started his business in 1794. The latter was a contemporary in age to Neil Primrose (b. 1729). Brandreth's recollections of descriptions of Pillans suggest that the James Pillans who tutored the girls was the father of the printer. The grandson of the same name was a contemporary of Mary Primrose and her siblings, and later became a pioneer in the field of educational reform. clxxix Education was obviously a priority in the eyes of Neil Primrose; for, not only did his two sons have a tutor, so too did his three daughters. As was typical, the tutor of the young Primrose brothers, Archibald and Francis, accompanied them to Cambridge. According to Brandreth, p. 116, the tutor, Stockdale, was 'a tall, rather stately looking man, with a large face, pink and white like a healthy child's, and in his later days, a shock head of white hair.' Stockdale remained a personal friend of Mary Shepherd in later years. clxxx As James Pillans (b.1722) and Neil Primrose (b. 1729) advanced in age, it may have been 4 205 difficult to keep up with the lively and bright Primrose brood. Given the authoritarian and paternal emphasis predominant in Scottish households, one would expect that both parents and tutors would have been stern disciplinarians. However, one gets the sense that the discipline in the Primrose household was softened by a love of learning and liberal views on education and religion. clxxxi Christie, 114. clxxxii Christie, 114. clxxxiii Brandreth, 26. clxxxiv John Fearn, 'Reply to the Criticisms of Lady Mary Shepherd's on the \"First Lines\": With Observations on her Ladyship's Views with regard to the Nature of Extension as contained in her Essays on the Perception of an External Universe', in Parriana: or Notices of the Reverend Samuel Parr, E.H. Barker, ed. (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 632. Hereafter cited as Fearn. It is not entirely clear whether the reference is in fact to James Pillans. It could be that Fearn intended to refer to some other instructor of Mary Shepherd's. It is thought that James Mill was employed as a tutor sometime between 1790 and 1802 and one account states that Mill 'had a tutorship in the family of a Scottish nobleman in East Lothian'. Another account suggests that Mill 'had been a corrector for the press in Edinburgh'. With respect to the former account, Alexander Bain reports that the name of the nobleman is not given but that the narrative is repeated in two places. The story is that Mill 'gave offence to the heads of the family by drinking the health at the table of one of the junior female members of the house,' and subsequently 'gave up his situation, and determined to trust to his pen and his own exertions.' A slightly different version has it that Mill 'threw up the appointment suddenly, owing to an affront given to him at a dinner party'. Specifically, Mill's pride was offended when he was 'motioned to leave the dinner table with the ladies'. It is interesting to note in connection with these accounts that the some of the eldest James Pillans was a printer, and that James Mill could well have assisted the ageing Pillans as tutor and the younger as corrector. See Alexander Bain. James Mill: A Biography (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1882), 27-29. clxxxv Brandreth, 26. clxxxvi Brandreth, 27. clxxxvii Brandreth, 26. clxxxviii Brandreth, 26. clxxxix Brandreth, 31-32. Mr. Stockdale accompanied the Primrose brothers to Cambridge. cxc Brandreth, 33. cxci Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, 18 November 1825 (British Library, Babbage Correspondence, MSS 37183, f. 204). cxcii Jane Rendall, The Origins of Scottish Enlightenment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 206236. Hereafter cited as Rendall. cxciii See Edinburgh Transactions, vol. 1, part 1, 10. cxciv R.B. Johnson, ed., Bluestocking Letters (London: Bradley Head, 1926). The most famous Bluestocking was Scotland's own Lady Mary Montague Wortley. On p. 269, a 'Miss Primrose' is mentioned in a letter from Mrs. Carter to Mrs. Vesey dated from Spa on July 26, 1763. The reference could be to Neil Primrose's sister Dorothea. Dorothea Primrose appears to have sued her family and she won a settlement in 1761. She married Sir Adam Inglis of Cramond in 1766, and died without issue at Bath in 1783. cxcv Alan Bell. Sydney Smith: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 20. Hereafter cited as Bell. cxcvi Bell, 55-56. cxcvii In Edinburgh, the grandson of the Primrose tutor, also James Pillans, was among the leaders in educational reform movement. This James Pillans became Professor of Humanities at the University of Edinburgh, and devoted his career to educational reform and the philosophy of education. The majority of his publishing efforts addressed the subject of educational reform, and he made frequent trips to visit rural parishes in both Scotland and abroad, for the purpose of assessing the state of the education system. See the entry under James Pillans (1778-1864) in The Dictionary of National Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). James Pillans Junior assessed the educational systems in various countries, and devoted much of his professional career to the subject of educational reform. In the 1830s, Pillans played an important role in giving advice to Parliament on the subject of educational reform. Alexander Grant writes of Pillans that 'Outside the University he did much good by promoting educational reform in Scotland. He was one of the first to advocate Governmental inspection of schools and the institution of Normal Seminaries.' See Grant, vol. II, 322. See also James Pillans, Contributions to the Cause of Education (London: Printed in Edinburgh,1856). cxcviii Christie, 116. Mary Fairfax Somerville, is said to have studied mathematics at night, hiding her activities from her disapproving father. Mary Somerville went on to make important contributions in 4 206 mathematics and science, and was a friend of Mary Primrose in adulthood. cxcix Richard Sher. Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton University Press, 1985), 324. Hereafter cited as Sher. cc Sher, 309. With regard to the avisamentum, Robertson's practice seems to have been to shift people around within the university in order to prevent the exercise of the avisamentum. Humanities positions were filled internally, so that newly vacant positions would be in the sciences. Eleven of the thirteen chairs created at University of Edinburgh between 1762 and 1859 were scientific or technical chairs, including chairs in areas such as astronomy, agriculture, technology and medicine. cci Grant, vol. I, 86-87. ccii Edinburgh civil unrest and attack on Robertson in 'No Popery' affair of 1770's. cciii David Hume to Allan Ramsey, April or May 1755 in Letters of David Hume, vol. 1, J.Y.T. Greig, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 219-221. cciv Sher, 322. Though politically conservative, Walter Scott was socially intimate with many of the influential liberals and radicals of his day. ccv John Playfair, Letter to the Author of the Examination of Professor Stewart's Short Statement of Facts with an Appendix (Edinburgh: W. Creech and Archibald Constable & Co., 1806), 57. Hereafter cited as Playfair (1806). ccvi Despite continual waves of attack on liberal ideals, Robertson and his followers found ways to negotiate with Edinburgh's conservatives. Their strategy was unique, if somewhat opportunistic. They looked for ways to uphold the values of both the Presbyterian and Whig establishment, while standing firm on their commitment to intellectual freedom -a commitment that positioned them among the intellectual leaders of enlightenment Europe. Strategically, the approach was brilliant. Even as they came to wield considerable power in the General Assembly, the Town Council, and the College, they remained supporters and friends of Hume. In their own way, they secured him a measure of dignity and influence. Their liberal stance and opposition to the 'persecuting spirit' was made clear through their support for Hume after his notorious exclusion from the University of Edinburgh. Through them, the larger issues around both Hume's philosophy and his failed candidature remained alive in Edinburgh for many decades to come. See Sher. Hume's reputation is subject to injury to this day. In Edinburgh, Hume's statue may be seen crowned by an orange road construction marker. Sometimes paraphernalia such as a pack of cigarettes or a can of beer are added. ccvii Royal Society of Edinburgh, Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, vol I., part I (Edinburgh: J. Dickson, 1788), 21. Hereafter cited as Edinburgh Transactions, vol. 1, part 1. ccviii Edinburgh Transactions, vol. 1, part 1, 27-28. The comments are only significant because it appears that the vast majority of read papers were published. ccix A.F.M. Willich Essays and Treatises On Moral Political and Various Philosophical Subjects. By Emmanuel Kant, M.R.A.S.B. and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Koenigsberg. From the German by the Translator of the Principles of the Critical Philosophy. In Two Volumes. (London: Printed for the Translator; and sold by William Richardson under the Royal Exchange, 1798), vol. II, v-vi. Hereafter cited as Willich (1798b). ccx Willich (1798b) vol..II, xiv. ccxi Willich (1798b), vol. II, v-vi. ccxii Robertson, 232. ccxiii Robertson, 232. ccxiv Holton, The pagination is not continuous, and this represents p. 7 of the manuscript, or p. 1 of the section entitled 'Dalmeny Parish Details'. ccxv J.G. Fyfe, Scottish Diaries and Memoirs 1746-1843 (Stirling: E. Mackay, 1942), pp. 318-9. ccxvi By all accounts, the family had suffered serious financial loss due to the mismanagement of the family fortune by Neil's father, James Primrose, the second Earl of Rosebery. Having rebuilt the family fortune, Neil Primrose probably had a good sense of money, although he may have carried his frugality to extremes at times. The third Earl refused his wife the pleasure of an afternoon society of ladies, and is also said to have allowed Barnbougle, and possibly Holland House, to deteriorate under his care. ccxvii A Letter to Thomas Payne Esq.; Written in Consequence of the One Lately Addressed by Him to Mr. Secretary Dundas. By a Highlander. (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1792), 3-4. Hereafter cited as Highlander. ccxviii Highlander, 19. ccxix L.S. Jacyna, Philosophical Whigs: Medicine, Science and Citizenship in Edinburgh, 1798-1848 (London: Routledge, 1994), 65. Hereafter cited as Jacyna. ccxx Dugald Stewart, 'The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man' in The Collected 4 207 Works of Dugald Stewart, Sir William Hamilton, ed., vol. IV (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co., 1855), 111-112. Through the influence of Stewart and others, there grew to be a large contingent of liberal lawyers and politicians in Edinburgh, many of whom would later form part of the Whig opposition in Parliament. ccxxi Most of Mary's Primrose ancestors were either members of or had been educated in the legal profession, including her brothers and many friends and local acquaintances. ccxxii History of the Speculative Society 1764-1904. Edinburgh: T and A Constable, 1905. p. 11. ccxxiii Henry Cockburn. History of the Speculative Society of Edinburgh. From its Institution in MDCCLXIV. Edinburgh: Printed for the Society, MDCCCXLV, p. 33-38. Hereafter cited as Cockburn (1845). ccxxiv Cockburn (1845), 36. ccxxv Cockburn (1845), 37. ccxxvi Cockburn (1845), 37. ccxxvii Cockburn (1845), 37. ccxxviii Brandreth, 28-29. [Naturally, I would like to find these.] ccxxix Standard editions of David Hume's most celebrated works are: A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A.Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). The Letters of David Hume, edited by J.Y.T. Greig, 2 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932); Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, edited by Norman Kemp Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935);The Natural History of Religion, edited by H. E. Root (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1967; Essays, Moral, Political, Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985);The History of England, edited by William B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983). (Hume, the Empiricists, 516). ccxxx [Hume reference]. ccxxxi. Church of Scotland, Report of the Proceedings and Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Respecting the Election of Mr Leslie to the Mathematical Chair in the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: James Ballentyne, 1805), 6. Hereafter cited as Report. ccxxxii. John Inglis, An Examination of Mr Dugald Stewart's Pamphlet, relative to the Late Election of a Mathematical Professor in the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: J. Moir, 1805), 144. Hereafter cited as Inglis (1805). See also John Inglis, Reply to Professor Playfair's Letter to the Author of the Examination of Professor Stewart's Short Statements &c. Including Some Remarks on Mr Stewart's Postscript (Edinburgh: John Moir, 1806). Hereafter cited as Inglis (1806). ccxxxiii. Inglis (1806), 89n. Inglis writes that 'All parties in the Church, it should be remembered, concurred unanimously in the warning against the infidel principles of Mr Hume, which was given by the General Assembly 1755.' ccxxxiv. Sher, 309. Eleven of the thirteen chairs created at University of Edinburgh between 1762 and 1859 were scientific or technical chairs, including chairs in areas such as astronomy, agriculture, technology and medicine. ccxxxv. Sher, 322. Though politically conservative, Walter Scott was socially intimate with many of the influential liberals and radicals of his day. ccxxxvi. See Edinburgh Transactions, vol. 1, part 1, 10. ccxxxvii. John Playfair, Letter to the Author of the Examination of Professor Stewart's Short Statement of Facts with an Appendix (Edinburgh: W. Creech and Archibald Constable & Co., 1806), 57. Hereafter cited as Playfair (1806). ccxxxviii. Royal Society of Edinburgh, Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, vol I., part I (Edinburgh: J. Dickson, 1788), 21. Hereafter cited as Edinburgh Transactions, vol. 1, part 1. ccxxxix. Edinburgh Transactions, vol. 1, part 1, 27-28 ccxl. Report, 6. ccxli. Report, 33. ccxlii. E. C. Mossner, 'Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David Hume', in V.C. Chappell. ed., Hume, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 8. Hume suffered a similar defamation of character. Samuel Johnson called him a rogue, a blockhead, and a liar, and John Stuart Mill said of him that 'regard for truth formed no part of his character'. ccxliii. Report, 143. 4 208 ccxliv. Inglis (1805), 33. ccxlv. Inglis (1805), 34-36. ccxlvi. Dugald Stewart, A Short Statement of Some Important Facts, relative to the late Election of a Mathematical Professor in the University of Edinburg (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable & Co.,1805), 133. Hereafter cited as Stewart (1805). Two later editions followed the 1805 publication of Stewart's pamphlet. Inglis (1805) makes extensive remarks on Dugald Stewart's Short Statement of 1805. ccxlvii. Report, 33. ccxlviii. Report, 234. ccxlix. Report, 239. ccl. Stewart probably intends to follow the precedent set by an Act of the Town Council dated 2nd November 1720. The Act is quoted in Morgan, on pp. 171-2,: Town Council is 'fully satisfied and convinced not only from the nature of the things and from the universall practise of all well governed Colledges and citys that the office of a Minister and Professor cannot be discharged in a suitable manner by one person at one and the same tyme, and haveing likewise observed that the few instances of contrary practises in their said Colledge have rather arisen from necessity then choice, Do hereby Statute and Ordain that hencefurth and in all tyme comeing no person who is a Minister of the Gospel and in the actuall exercise of his ministry in this city shall be by us or our successors in office elected and admitted Professor of Divinity or History in the said Colledge unless previous to his admission he demit his miniteriall charge not to be reassumed during his continuance in his office of professor, And all future Commissions to the saids Professors shall bear a clause by which they shall be voided and become null in the veent of any Professor becoming a Minister of this city, And doe hereby declare they will not directly or indirectly consent to nor concurr in the lieting or calling of any person to be a Minister of this city who is at the same tyme a Professor of Divinity or History in their said Colledge unless he previously resign and demitt his Professorship, Declaring alwayes, as it is hereby declaired, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to the office of Principall of their said Colledge. ccli. Greyfriar's Presbytery, the parish united to University of Edinburgh, was the presbytery eligible to exercise the right of avisamentum. This limitation seems to have been ignored in the Leslie affair. cclii. John Leslie, An Experimental Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation of Heat (London: T. Gillet, Salisbury Square,1804). Note xvi begins on p. 521. It is a note to p. 136 of the main text. Hereafter cited as Leslie (1804). ccliii. Macvey Napier, 'Biographical Notice of Sir John Leslie, Late Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh', Encyclopedia Britannica (1836). [NB This quote was taken from p. 23 of a bound extract of the Encyclopedia article.] Hereafter cited as Napier. ccliv. Stewart (1805), 37. cclv. Stewart (1805), 118-9 cclvi. Envy at Arms! or, Caloric alarming the Church (Edinburgh: Printed for the Booksellers, 1805). cclvii. The full force of Erskine's pun is perhaps impossible to feel unless one also keeps in mind that Leslie's footnote on Hume was followed by a long etymological analysis of the word 'cause'. cclviii. On p. 205 of the Report, Erskine offer this amusing parody of academic metaphysical analysis: Supposing I should go to a gentleman of professional habits, -the deacon of the tailors, -for information on this subject, and, laying hold of one of the buttons of his coat, should say to him, \"Pray, Sir, what is this little incumbrance here? It is surely no part of the coat, for it is made of metal, and the coat of cloth.\" Would he not answer, \"O Sir, it certainly is a part of the coat, and a very important part too; do you not perceive, sir, that it is a button?\" \"A button, say you! -well , deacon, what are these unsightly rents just opposite, which spoil the smooth and entire appearance of the coat? these surely can form no part of it.\" -- \"Why, my dear sir, these are very 4 209 necessary things, they are the button-holes, they will make your coat sit closely and pleasantly upon you.\" This, I suppose, would be the information I should receive, and I have no doubt you would admit it to be correct. -Now, Sir, I apprehend that notes are the buttons of publications. But, after all, the subject is not worth the thing I have been talking about. cclix. Alan Bell, Sydney Smith: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 49. Hereafter cited as Bell. This description of Sydney Smith's humour is in a letter from Lady Bessborough to Lord Granville Leveson Gower. Decades later, the Oxford Movement would involve similar persecutions, so the mockery of Scotland was perhaps a bit premature. The latter persecutions involved a W.G. Ward, but the Mr Ward referred to by Lady Bessborough is most likely J.W Ward, also known as Lord Dudley. The reference to Mr Allen is a reference to John Allen, the personal physician and close companion of Lord and Lady Holland. Allen had lectured in the sciences at the University of Edinburgh at the turn of the nineteenth century, and was considered to hold radical views. See Jacyna, 43. cclx. Playfair (1806), 71. cclxi. Inglis (1805), 146. cclxii. Report, 234. cclxiii. Friedrich A. Nitsch, A General and Introductory View of Kant's Principles Concerning Man, the World and the Diety Submitted to the Consideration of the Learned (London: J. Downes, 1796). Nitsch's book was a direct outgrowth of his London lecture series on Kant. On p. 52-53, Nitsch discusses the materialists, idealists, spiritualists, eclectics and skeptics, with a view to illustrating that Kant shows: ...that Philosophers have not yet succeeded in determining accurately and in a universally evident manner, what we are to understand by the faculty of sense, and that it is still uncertain whether or not this faculty can furnish such materials as can admit of being modified into ideas of immaterial existences, different from the operations of the human mind. ...that is extremely doubtful whether or not this faculty [of sense] can form any solid judgments concerning immaterial existences. ...that the incorrect and ambiguous descriptions of sense and intellect have produced as incorrect and ambiguous descriptions of reason, and that therefore we have no certain authority for assigning to this faculty, a power of penetrating into the invisible regions of immaterial objects. ...that it is to sense, intellect, and reason, that we are indebted for all our knowledge, and that the limits of what can be known by man are still unsettled. On my reading, Nitsch's assessments of Kant's accomplishments are incorrect and misleading. cclxiv. J.G. Lockhart, The Life of Sir Walter Scott (London: Everymans Library, 1957), 62. cclxv. A.F.M. Willich, Elements of the Critical Philosophy (London: T.N. Longman,1798). Hereafter cited as Willich (1798a). Three philological essays by Adelung were translated from German and appended to the back of the work. This may seem an odd sort of appendix, but perhaps not so odd given the context in which Willich's Elements was written and published. The inclusion of the philological essays might simply be a consequence of Willich's having introduced Kant studies through German language classes. The selection of philological essays is also intriguing. One of the early complaints against the critical philosophy was that Kant's representation terminology was too difficult, cumbersome, and awkward. Of philological essays included by Willich, one concerns the history of the English language, and it sets the language in a less than favourable light, so the inclusion of the philological essays might have been intended to deter objectors to Kant's 4 210 terminology. Adelung's first essay on the history of the English language also surveys important contributions to English literature and philosophy, including contributions of eminent women. cclxvi. René Wellek, Immanuel Kant in England: 1793-1838 (Princeton University Press,1931). Hereafter cited as Wellek. On page 31, Wellek says that one German visitor to Edinburgh, a man by the name of Niebuhr, reports that he had been to a philosophical luncheon where Kant's philosophy had been discussed rather badly. Hereafter cited as Wellek. Charles Villers, Philosophie de Kant ou Principes Fondamentaux de la Philosophie Transcendentale, (Gottingue: Metz, 1801). Hereafter cited as Villers. Thomas Brown, 'Viller's Philosophy of Kant' in Edinburgh Review, vol. 1, January 1803, pp. 253-80. Hereafter cited as Brown (1803). Sir William Drummond, Academical Questions (London: W. Bulmer, 1805). Hereafter cited as Drummond. cclxvii. Stewart (1805), 56. The significance of 'London connections' in the discussion is that the real center of power in Britain was London. The ruling parties in Scotland were those most successful in securing the confidence of the monarchy and central London government. Thus, the Ministers claim that the King's tailor endorsed their view; just as Stewart cited a London based theologian as an authority. cclxviii. The theologian in question might be James Stanier Clarke, a clergyman and librarian at Carleton House under the Prince Regent. However, it could also be another individual, possibly a theologian, who communicates with reference to an idea originating with Dr Samuel Clarke. The latter theologian exchanged letters with Leibniz through Caroline, Princess of Wales, and is in fact mentioned explicitly by Stewart. In any event, a letter from Issac D'Israeli to John Murray makes reference to an 'important expedition' made by the printer John Murray to Edinburgh in 1805: 'I have repeatedly felt a secret satisfaction at the spirit with which, by Clarke's communications, I heard you pursued your expedition'. See Samuel Smiles, A Publisher and His Friends: Memoir and Correspondence of the Late John Murray, (London: John Murray, 1891), 54 and 66. It is possible that Dr Samuel Clarke's communication to Leibniz was suggested anonymously, or by James Stanier Clarke, as an answer to the Ministers. This suggestion may have been brought to Edinburgh via the printer John Murray. In any case, at least one John Murray was a defender of Leslie at the General Assembly debates of May 1805. cclxix. Stewart (1805), 88. cclxx. Stewart (1805), 89-90. cclxxi. Napier, 23-24. cclxxii. Stewart (1805), 112n. cclxxiii. Stewart (1805), 96-102. cclxxiv. Stewart (1805), 98-9. cclxxv. Stewart (1805), 83. cclxxvi. Stewart (1805), 50. cclxxvii. Stewart (1805), 94n. Stewart refers to Book III, Title IV. 'Of Witches and Charmers' in Collections and Observations Methodized, Concerning the Worship, Discipline, and Government of the Church of Scotland. By Walter Stewart, Esq, of Perdivan. cclxxviii. Napier, 23. cclxxix. Inglis (1805), 122. cclxxx. Inglis (1805), 122. cclxxxi. Inglis, (1806), 57-58. cclxxxii. Thomas Brown, Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr Hume concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect (Edinburgh: Mundell and Son,1805). Hereafter cited as Brown (1805). cclxxxiii. Thomas Brown, Short Criticism of the Terms of the Charge against Mr Leslie in the Protest of the Ministers of Edinburgh as explained by them in this Late Pamphlet (Edinburgh: Mundell and Son, 1806), 15. Hereafter cited as Brown (1806). cclxxxiv. Inglis (1805), 111. cclxxxv. Playfair, 72-73 cclxxxvi. W.L. Brown, Remarks on certain Passages of 'An Examination of Mr Dugald Stewart's Pamphlet, By One of the Ministers of Edinburgh,' Relative to Subjects Nearly Connected With the 4 211 Interests of Religion and Learning (Edinburgh: W. Creech and A Constable and Co., 1806). cclxxxvii. Willich (1798b), vol. II, v-vi. cclxxxviii. Willich (1798b), vol.II, viii-ix. cclxxxix. A.F.M. Willich Essays and Treatises On Moral Political and Various Philosophical Subjects. By Emmanuel Kant, M.R.A.S.B. and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Koenigsberg. From the German by the Translator of the Principles of the Critical Philosophy. In Two Volumes. (London: Printed for the Translator; and sold by William Richardson under the Royal Exchange, 1798), vol. II, v-vi. Hereafter cited as Willich (1798b). ccxc. Willich (1798b) vol..II, xiv. ccxci. Willich (1798b), vol. II, v-vi. ccxcii. Villers, p. 110. ccxciii. Villers, p. 110. ccxciv. Villers, pp. 111-112. ccxcv. Brown (1803), pp. 265-66. ccxcvi. Drummond (1805), pp. 372-73. ccxcvii. Brown (1805), 14. ccxcviii. D. Brewster, An Examination of the Letter Addressed to Principal Hill on the Case of Mr Leslie In a Letter to its Anonymous Author. With remarks on Mr Stewart's Postscript and Mr Playfair's Pamphlet. By a Calm Observer (Edinburgh: Mundell and Son, 1806), 10-11. Hereafter cited as Brewster. ccxcix. The sense of a priori that Brewster likely had in mind is that in which the idea of necessary connection is linked to the operation of sense organs. This sense of the term a priori gives an empiricist spin to the term. It is a sense that recurs in Scottish thought, and may be broadly understood to mean a priori in the sense of being a condition of empirical cognition. ccc. Brown (1805), 2n. ccci. Brown's propositions are based on the fourth of Hume's Philosophical Essays on the Human Understanding. cccii. Brown (1805). The definitions are spread over pp. 2-24. ccciii. Brown (1805), 10. ccciv. Brown (1805), 14. cccv. Brown (1805), 19. cccvi. Brown (1805), 28. How many are there, who during a long life spent in a foreign country, have lost, in their pictures of remembrance, almost every trace of the friends of their youth! Yet the faint conceptions that arise are dear to them still, not as fictions, but as realities; and it is not from any fading of memory that they tremble, when they fear, that the friends for whom they are anxious exist no more. The very wildness and wonderfulness of romance, as it excites peculiar emotion, is a cause not of less, but of more, lively conception; and when we are interested in our knight, the tower and the giant rise before us in stronger colours, than the host and his inn on a modern highway. cccvii. Report, 46-48. cccviii. Brown (1806), 35-36. Such is the simple view of causation, which in a former work, I have exhibited and supported at length. To the argument of that work I look with peculiar satisfaction, not so much from any importance which I attach to it, in its relation to the progress of science, as from its relation to an object still more intimately connected with human happiness...Whatever, therefore, may be the general sentiment, as to my own peculiar views of the subject of this momentous question, I shall have attained my wish, if, in the discussions into which I have been led, I have succeeded in shewing, that the evidences for the most important of all truths remain unshaken, whether we adhere to the received distinction of efficient and physical causes, or adopt that simpler notion of 4 212 causation, which I have endeavoured to illustrate. cccix. Shepherd (1824), 5-6. cccx. Shepherd (1824), 27-28. cccxi. Brown (1805), 40. cccxii. Brown (1805), 46. The just and beautiful analysis which reduces our expectation of similarity in the future trains of events to intuition, we may therefore safely adopt, without any fear of losing a single argument for the existence of God; -till it be shewn, that physical demonstration itself is not dependent on an instinctive principle, and that, hence, if the belief of power had depended, not on instinct, but on reason, it would have rested on a principle of surer evidence. cccxiii. Shepherd (1824), 136 ff.. cccxiv. Shepherd addresses Brown and Lawrence in the final two chapters of her 1824 treatise. cccxv. Shepherd (1824), 46-49. cccxvi. Shepherd (1827), xv. cccxvii. The third Lord Holland was in his minority at this time. The rental would have been through Charles James Fox. cccxviii. Christie. 104-5. cccxix. This figure is based on the assumption that all of the daughters received the same dowry as Charlotte Primrose. Brandreth, 51. cccxx. Complete Peerage, see Rosebery. Lady Jerningham is said to have made the following unkind remark on 27 May 1800, Charlotte Primrose's wedding day: Lady Charlotte Primrose's match was not sanctioned by her parent's consent. He is a near relation of Lady Rosebery's and may become Earl of Effingham, but has at present only his pay as Col. in the Guards. Her Banns were muttered over in the Parish Church, and she walked out at the Hall door and met Col. Howard at the end of the street, whence they proceeded to the Altar of Hymen. cccxxi. Little is known of Dorothea Arabella Primrose and Francis Ward Primrose. Not long after Charlotte was married, Arabella married Mr. William Hervey, who is said to have been painfully shy, and awkward in company. Arabella's died in 1825. The youngest son, Francis Ward, moved to Canada to escape his gambling debts, where he was happily married. cccxxii. Trowbridge H. Ford, Henry Brougham and His World: A Biography (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1995) 226. Hereafter cited as Trowbridge. cccxxiii. Trowbridge, 225. cccxxiv. Brandreth, 18-20. cccxxv. Brandreth, 19. On page 18, Brandreth writes, That brings me to think of the crushing tragedy which occurred at Barnbougle in, I suppose, 1815. It was crushing, for, as i know, my uncle Rosebery (your grandfather) never inwardly recovered from the anguish of it, and certainly your poor grandmother Harriet Countess of Rosebery was crushed! My mother always had for her the most tender commiseration, and I in degree can share it, for I can just remember her and her sweet child-like face. cccxxvi. Assuming the accuracy of her eldest daughter's date of birth, Mary Shepherd's gestation period was 264 days, which is 10 days shorter than the median gestation of 274 days for primiparas who are 'private-care white patients'. cccxxvii. Henry John Shepherd's principal writings include: A Summary of the Law Relating to the Election of Members of Parliament (H. Butterworth: London,1825), The Countess of Essex. A 4 213 tragedy in five acts and in verse (London, 1834), Pedro of Castile. A poem (London, 1838), and 'Memoir of the Right Honourable Sir Samuel Shepherd,' Law Magazine, no. 52 (c1840). cccxxviii. Brandreth, 25-26. cccxxix. Brandreth, 25-26. cccxxx. Brandreth, 25-26. cccxxxi. Brandreth, 41-42. cccxxxii. Brandreth, 42. cccxxxiii. Brandreth, 4, 43. cccxxxiv. Brandreth, 42. cccxxxv. Brandreth, 119. cccxxxvi. William Kerr. A Summons of Wakening or, The Evil Tendency and Danger of Speculative Philosophy Exemplified in Mr. Leslie's Inquiry into the Nature of Heat; and Mr. Mathus's Essay on Population, And in that Speculative System of Common Law, which is at the present administered in these kingdoms. To which is subjoined, A prospectus of one Inquiry into the Origin of Government and Law (London: Hawick, 1807). Hereafter cited as Kerr. Kerr says that his first two essays were originally intended as a footnote to the latter, but became too long. cccxxxvii. John Leslie, An Experimental Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation of Heat (London: J. Mawman, 1804). Hereafter cited as Leslie (1804). cccxxxviii. 'Leslie on heat and Moisture', Edinburgh Review vol. 24, no. 48, 339-353 (February 1815) 341. I have read somewhere that Leslie is suspected to have been the author of the largely positive reviews of his work in the Edinburgh Review. cccxxxix. John Leslie, A Short Account of Experiments and Instruments, Depending on the Relations of Air, to Heat, and Moisture (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1813) 21-22. Hereafter cited as Leslie (1813). 'Leslie on heat and Moisture', Edinburgh Review vol. 24, no. 48, 339-353 (February 1815) 341. cccxl. Kerr claims that Leslie's work shows that heat does behave like light. That is, heat does appear to radiate in all directions from the center of a body, and to be equally diffused in space. cccxli. Kerr, 23. cccxlii. 'Leslie on heat and Moisture', Edinburgh Review vol. 24, no. 48, 339-353 (February 1815) 339. cccxliii. Leslie (1813), 22. See 'Leslie on heat and Moisture', Edinburgh Review vol. 24, no. 48, 339353 (February 1815) 342. cccxliv. Kerr, 9. cccxlv. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). Popper drew seven related conclusions: i. It's easy to find confirmation of a theory if we look for it; ii. Only risky predictions that could falsify a theory should count as confirmatory; iii. The more a theory forbids as impossible, the better; iv. A theory that is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific; v. Testability is falsification; vi. Only a serious test that could falsify the theory can supply confirmation. vii. Ad hoc re-interpretation lowers or destroys the scientific status of a theory. cccxlvi. Imre Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1977). According to Lakatos, the hallmark of empirical progress is not trivial verifications. Nor are 'refutations' the hallmark of empirical failure, as Popper claimed. 'What really count are dramatic, unexpected, stunning predictions: a few of them are enough to tilt the balance; where theory lags behind the facts, we are dealing with miserable degenerating research programs.' Lakatos's interpretation of the relationship theories and facts emphasizes that: i. The 'unit' of evaluation is not an isolated hypothesis but a research program; ii. The central laws of any research program form an inner core supported by a more flexible and 'protective' set of auxiliary hypotheses; iii. Each research program has its own problem solving techniques or 'heuristic'; iv. Progressive research programs predict novel facts; v. In degenerate research programs, theories are fabricated only to accommodate known facts. As Lakatos's explains, the relationship between theories and facts must emphasize how the central laws of any research program form an inner core supported by a flexible and 'protective' set of auxiliary hypotheses. cccxlvii. Kerr, 3. 4 214 cccxlviii. Kerr, 55. cccxlix. Kerr, 50-51. cccl. Kerr, 48. cccli. Kerr, 48. ccclii. Kerr, 48. cccliii. Thomas Malthus, 'Essays on Population' in The works of Thomas Robert Malthus, E.A. Wrigley and David Sonden, eds. (London: Pickering, 1986) vol. 4. cccliv. Kerr, 58 ccclv. Kerr, 88. ccclvi. Kerr, 98-111. ccclvii. Kerr, 88. ccclviii. Kerr, 123. ccclix. Kerr, 122-3. ccclx. Fulton Anderson, ed., Francis Bacon: The New Organon and Related Writings (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960). Hereafter cited as Bacon, with standard references to the aphorisms. ccclxi. Bacon, Book II, Aphorism XI, 130. ccclxii. Bacon, Book II, Aphorism XII, 132ff. ccclxiii. Bacon, Book II, Aphorism XIII, 142ff. ccclxiv. Bacon, Book II, Aphorism XX, 158. ccclxv. Thomas Brown, Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1818). Hereafter cited as Brown (1818). ccclxvi. Brown (1805), 2n. ccclxvii. Brown (1818), --. ccclxviii. S.A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1960), 182-3. Hereafter cited as Grave. ccclxix. Noah Porter 'Thomas Brown: The Man and His Work' in The Story of Scottish Philosophy, Daniel Sommer Robinson, ed. (New York: Exposition Press, 1961) 190-213. Hereafter cited as Porter (1961). ccclxx. Porter (1961), 192-3. ccclxxi. Blakey, 31n. ccclxxii. Blakey, 30. ccclxxiii. Smiles, 316. The 1816 title is mentioned in a letter from Baron de Staël to John Murray discussing the possible publication of the work. The two were unable to reach a financial agreement, and Murray did not publish the work. It was published as Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française (Paris: Delaunay, 1818). The English edition was published in 1818 by Baldwin, Cradock and Joy. ccclxxiv. Richard Whately, Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte. (London: B. Fellowes, 1837), iii. Hereafter cited as Historic Doubts. On page iii, Whately writes, But some sensible readers have complained of the difficulty of determining what they are to believe. Of the existence of Buonaparte, indeed, they remained fully convinced; nor, if it were left doubtful, would any important results ensue; but if they can give no satisfactory reason for their conviction, how can they know, it is asked, that they may not be mistaken as to other points of greater consequence, on which they are no less fully convinced, but on which all men are not agreed? ccclxxv. Historic Doubts, 29. ccclxxvi. Historic Doubts, 41-42. Whately, incidentally, later became Archbishop of Dublin. Not surprisingly, Archbishop Whately was considered something of an eccentric in his day. ccclxxvii. Historic Doubts, 47. ccclxxviii. Historic Doubts, 51. ccclxxix. Historic Doubts, 53. Whately added a postscript to his third edition, published shortly after the 4 215 announcement of Napoleon's death. There, Whately adds an argument to the effect that that the probable case of suspicion that he has established regarding the life of Napoleon gives grounds for the supposition that Whately himself killed Napoleon. ccclxxx. E. Tangy Lean, The Napoleonists: A Study in Political Dissafection 1760/1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 118. Hereafter cited as Lean. ccclxxxi. Alexander Bain, James Mill: A Biography (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1882), 188. Hereafter cited as Bain. ccclxxxii. Brandreth,153-4. ccclxxxiii. Brandreth, 129-131. ccclxxxiv. A Copy of the Bill of Indictment, Found at the Old Bailey Sessions, January 16, 1819 against Richard Carlile. For Publishing Paine's Age of Reason (London: Richard Carlile, 1819), ivn. Hereafter cited as Bill of Indictment. ccclxxxv. It is remarked in passing that according to Paine, the New Testament will be found to be 'equally false and paltry, and absurd as the Old.' Bill of Indictment, 14. ccclxxxvi. Bill of Indictment, 4. ccclxxxvii. Bill of Indictment, 5-6. ccclxxxviii. Bill of Indictment, 7. ccclxxxix. Bill of Indictment, 8-14. cccxc. J. Mills, Speech of J.Mills at the British Forum Ought R.C. to be censured, Crown and Anchor Tavern, The Strand. (London: Richard Carlile, 1819),13. The name also appears as J. Mill. One has to wonder whether the speaker was James Mill. According to page 435 of Alexander Bain's biography of James Mill, John Stuart Mill first appeared in print on the subject of Carlile: 'John Mill's first appearance in print was to denounce the prosecution of him [Carlile] and his wife. I have reason to believe that he received substantial aid in his long imprisonments from the Bentham circle.' On pages 61-62 of his Autobiography, John Stuart Mill says that his first letters that appeared in print concerned the Carlile affair, but that they were published under a pseudonym at the end of 1822. 'The prosecutions of Richard Carlile and his wife and sister for publications hostile to Christianity, were then exciting much attention, and nowhere more than among the people I frequented. Freedom of discussion even in politics, much more in religion, was at that time far from being, even in theory, the conceded point which it at least seems to be now; and the holders of obnoxious opinions had to be always ready to argue and re-argue for the liberty of expressing them.' John Jacob Coss, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). Hereafter cited as J.S. Mill. If the speaker is actually James Mill, this personal attack may have contributed to an increasing tension between James Mill and the 'intellectual' Whigs in charge at the Edinburgh Review. Whoever it was that spoke the 1819 words, whether one of the two Mills or not, he seems to have been in a position to know that Sir Samuel Shepherd had tolerant views on religion. cccxci. Thoughts on the Christian Religion: By a Deist (London: Richard Carlile, 1819). By Theophilanthropist. Signed 'A firm Believer in the only true God and a future State of Retribution' and dated January 30, 1819. cccxcii. Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, translated by Mary Morris (London: Faber and Faber, 1934) p. 200. Hereafter cited as Halévy. Halévy's text quotes from Conway's Life of Paine, vol. i p. 375. cccxciii. John Gale Jones, Speech of J.G. Jones at the British Forum Ought R.C. to be censured, Crown and Anchor Tavern, The Strand (London: Richard Carlile, 1819), 8-10. cccxciv. Open Letter to Sir Samuel Shepherd, By Philalethes. The letter is dated March 2, 1819. cccxcv. Brandreth, 153. cccxcvi. This remark was made when Sir Samuel refused, on principle, to oversee the King's divorce. But presumably the remark was general in scope. Brandreth, 142. cccxcvii. Walter Scott, The Journal of Sir Walter Scott: From the Original Manuscript at Abbotsford (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1890), vol. I, 51 and vol II, 336. Presumably, Sir Samuel spent most of his time in Edinburgh between 1819 and 1830. He resided at 16 Coates Crescent. In vol. II of his journal, on page 336, Walter Scott remarks on 18 June 1830, that 'the good and very clever Lord 4 216 Chief Baron is returned to his own country, with more regrets in Scotland than usually attend a stranger'. Hereafter cited as Walter Scott. cccxcviii. John Leslie, The Philosophy of Arithmetic: Exhibiting a Progressive View of the Theory and Practice of Calculation, With an Enlarged Table of the Products of Numbers Under One Hundred. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable,1817), 218n. cccxcix. 'Leslie versus Hebrew' in Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, No. XXXV, February1820, 502. cd. James Paterson, Kay's Edinburgh portraits: A series of anecdotal biographies chiefly of Scotchmen (London: Popular letterpress ed., 1885) 128. The article claims that Leslie's first literary employment was on the notes to a new edition of the Bible, published by his friend, Dr. William Thomson. cdi. See the Report of the Trial by Jury, Professor John Leslie against William Blackwood, July 22, 1822, (Edinburgh: W&C Tait, 1822), 62. Hereafter cited as Trial. cdii. Walter Scott, 21-27. Lockhart does seem to have had some part in the Leslie slanders, and with the Leslie trial pending, Walter Scott urged his son-in-law to cease writing for Blackwood's. In 1825, Lockhart accepted John Murray's offer to take up the editorship of his British Quarterly Review. At this stage, Murray apparently still did not know of Lockhart's role in the Leslie slanders. John Murray had himself severed his own ties to Blackwood's in the year preceding the Leslie trial, specifically because he was unhappy about the personal attacks appearing in the journal. But others connected with the Quarterly and its circle did know of Lockhart's role. Walter Scott acknowledged that the appointment was a controversial one, and several individuals, including Southey and Barrow, wrote letters to Scott to express their concerns about Lockhart's earlier slanders. D'Israeli was sent to Scotland to solicit some reassurance for Scott's friends in London. But as Scott remarked, 'I have no idea of telling all and sundry that my son-in-law is not a slanderer, or a silly thoughtless lad, although he was six or seven years ago engaged in some light satires. It turns out that it was Heber who, after Lockhart's appointment in 1825, informed Murray of Lockhart's connection to the earlier Lelslie episode. These reports were said to have had 'startled Murray' whom Byron referred to as 'the most timorous of all God's booksellers'. cdiii. It was widely held that John Wilson was the sole author of the attacks; however, John Gibson Lockhart, was almost certainly connected with the slander as well. The latter information seems to have been successfully suppressed, perhaps out of respect for Walter Scott. cdiv. National Library of Scotland, Letter of George Goldie to Oliver and Boyd, dated December 16, 1819. AC 5000/189, NLS. Oliver and Boyd were the printers for Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. John Murray's stopped representing Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine in January 1819, after Blackwood refused to quit the personal attacks on public personalities. cdv. Bain, 189-190. cdvi. National Library of Scotland. 'Newspaper clippings etc., of David Irving', John Fairley,ed., Acc. L.C. 1957. Such celebrations do not appear to have been unusual. See Henry Cockburn, Some Letters of Lord Cockburn (Edinburgh: Grant and Murray, 1932). On page 20, Henry Cockburn describes another outrageous scene in a letter to his friend Thomas Dick-Lauder, dated 15 February 1822: Oh! what a glorious -what a God-like bouze had we on the opening of Williams' Exhibition in the rooms. Jeffrey. Murray, Keay, Rutherfurd, Pillans, Lambton, G. Jos. Bell, Maitland, Cunninghame, Williams, Horner and myself -twelve in all -being the nine muses and three graces; dined surrounded by Greek scenes, with two fireplaces -two lustres -nobody but ourselves in the house -and had we not a right of it? Geo.Jos. was appointed that day to succeed Hume as Professor of Scotch law -and had you but seen the two professors, Pillans and he engaged, with Jeff piping as a little Pan, with a Pyrrhic dance! cdvii. Lean, 117. The main objective of the trial seems to have been to deprive Queen Caroline of her title as Queen. Public support for the Queen was massive, and the trial was eventually 'postponed'. After Caroline was denied entry to the Coronation, she poisoned herself with opium and magnesia, and she died ten days later. 4 217 cdviii. Copy of the Information Exhibited Ex Officio, January 23, 1819, By His Majesty's Attorney General, Against Richard Carlile, For Publishing Paine's Age of Reason. (London: Richard Carlile, 1819), 3. cdix. Kerr,123. cdx. William Thomas, The Philosophical Radicals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 158. Hereafter cited as Thomas. See also James Mill's article in the Westminster Review, vol. 1, no 1 (January 1824) 207. cdxi. In 1805, Leslie received recognition from the Royal Society of London for his work on heat. As the trial unfolds, we learn that there has in fact been an ongoing persecution of Leslie, involving charges that several of his scientific achievements were plagiarized. Leslie is charged with a 'monstrous plagiarism of his theory of heat'. See Trial, 35, 48. But, as Macvey Napier points out in his memoir of Leslie, though Leslie's experimentalism drew on some previously known facts, the contributions for which he received recognition were the result of a new understanding of the facts, and novel discoveries made upon that new understanding. This, as Napier points out, is the norm in scientific discovery. See Napier. 27-30. cdxii. Further attacks on Leslie followed in various numbers of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, including Nos. XXXV, XL and XLIV, at which point the personal nature of the attacks against Leslie became more pronounced. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine was intended as a rival to the Edinburgh Review. Both publications became notorious for their outrageous attacks on the public personalities of Edinburgh. In promoting gossip and libel, the authors and publishers showed a reckless disregard for reputation and the practice of spreading nasty and often false rumors came to be increasingly disliked in Edinburgh. See also Summons, Professor John Leslie, against William Blackwood, &c. December 4, 1820, 1-2. Hereafter cited as Summons. The charges read that Blackwood and others: ...had recourse to the most false and abominable libels against him; and, in particular, have been in the practice of publishing in a work entitled 'Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine,' the most foul and atrocious calumnies against his private and public character, as a man, and as a Professor: That, activated by this motive, and by a profligate and wanton disregard of his feelings and reputation, one or other, or both of them, have, in various parts of that work...represented, and held him out to the public, as a person distinguished by 'insolence,' 'ignorance,' 'impudence,' and 'impertinence;' as being an 'enfant perdu;' as being 'actuated by a hostility to the language of revelation, simply because it was so;' as 'going out of his path to cast an ignorant sarcasm on the language of the Bible,' as 'being an object of suspicion to those who hold the Scriptures in honour, or impiety in detestation;' as being an imposter and dishonest; as being one of the public teachers of Edinburgh, by whom strangers, who come to the University here, have 'their religious principles perverted,' and their reverence for holy things sneered away,' and as being one to whom the application of these terms and statements was but his due... cdxiii. Trial, 35. cdxiv. Trial, 111-2. cdxv. J.S. Mill, 62. cdxvi. J.S. Mill, 62-63. cdxvii. Thomas Macaulay, 'Utilitarian Logic and Politics' in Edinburgh Review, vol 49, no. 98, 159-189 (March 1829), 185. Hereafter cited as Macaulay. cdxviii. Macaulay, 188. cdxix. Macaulay, 188-9. cdxx. Thomas, 2. cdxxi. It is also worth pointing out that James Mill mounted an attack on 'natural rights' as a basis for the constitutional descriptions of individual rights in America and France. James Mill argued that constitutional rights would have to be explicitly founded in law to be considered valid or 'legal'. Such an argument might serve the ends of the British government and Monarchy quite nicely. cdxxii. Mill's harm principle on liberty, which draws the line at harms to others, appears to me to be 4 218 based on the assumptions of his Ethology. Cf. '...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection.' cdxxiii. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, 1832. British Library. Babbage Correspondence, MSS 37201 f. 432. cdxxiv. Napier, 23. cdxxv. Sir Samuel Shepherd's friendships provide few clues regarding Mary Shepherd's political leanings. He was close to the Thomas Erskine, thought to have been a Napoleonist, and also to Walter Scott, an ultra-conservative monarchist. One can't easily generalize or speculate about personal politics with this set, which is probably what they wanted. cdxxvi. Robert Blakey, A History of the Philosophy of Mind: Embracing all Writers on Mental Science from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1850), vol. iv, 42. Hereafter cited as Blakey. cdxxvii. Blakey, 43. cdxxviii. Brandreth, 108. cdxxix. John Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton vol. II, Ernest Sirluck, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 492-3. Hereafter cited as Milton. The four essences are air, earth, fire and water, the fifth and most fundamental is aether. The last sentence of the passage adds a kind of historical irony, given that it was doubt about the existence of aether that sparked Leslie's 1804 footnote, and that the footnote directly to a controversy relating to free speech and civil unrest. cdxxx. Milton, 562-3. cdxxxi. Alexander Campbell Fraser, Archbishop Whately The Restoration of the Study of Logic. Lecture Delivered Nov. 3, 1863 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1864), 40. cdxxxii. Shepherd (1824), 27-28. cdxxxiii. Shepherd (1824), 30. cdxxxiv. The 1827 argument places greater emphasis on the analysis of sensible objects, although Shepherd mentions the point in her 1824 treatise as well. See Shepherd (1824), 42n. cdxxxv. Hume's subjectivist conclusion is that the idea of necessary connection is a subjective fiction ascribed by the mind when it perceives a constant conjunction of sensible qualities. cdxxxvi. Herschel's diaries and correspondence establish this point as uncontroversial. See David Evans et al., Herschel at the Cape: Diaries and Correspondence of Sir John Herschel, 1834-1838 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969). cdxxxvii. On Herschel's view, laws of nature were seen as involving both correlation of properties and sequences of events, evidently stemming from an assessment of complex phenomena. Examples are Boyle's Law that pressure is proportional to temperature over volume and Newton's third law of the equal action and reaction of motion. cdxxxviii. Shepherd (1827), xv. The claim that neither perception nor acts of will contain an element of necessity is, of course, the very claim that Kant denied when he maintained that the faculty of understanding supplies an a priori rule for causal judgements. Kant's argument is based on the claim that we can distinguish between cases where we perceive the mere temporal succession in appearances and cases where we perceive an objective order in the succession of appearances. The very fact that we are able to make the sort of determination that leads to a causal judgement, Kant argues, should lead us to infer the existence of an a priori causal principle at work in understanding. cdxxxix. Shepherd (1824), 27. cdxl. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Biggs (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 157. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding in The Philosophy of David Hume, V. Chappell. ed., (New York: Random House, 1963) 327-330. Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp-Smith, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1929), B 289. cdxli. Shepherd (1824), 29. cdxlii. Shepherd (1824), 32, 35-37. cdxliii. Fearn, 632. cdxliv. Daniel Robinson, ed., Significant Contributions To the History of Psychology 1750-1920 4 219 (Washington: University Publications of America,1977), vol. v, xxviii. The remark is in Robinson's preface to the selections from Alexander Bain's work. This point will be taken up in detail later in the book. cdxlv. Blakey, 31n. cdxlvi. William Whewell, Philosophy of Discovery (London, 1860) 336. Hereafter cited as Whewell (1860). cdxlvii. William Whewell, History of Scientific Ideas (London,1858) vol. I, 35. Hereafter cited as Whewell (1858). cdxlviii. Shepherd (1827), 70. cdxlix. Whewell (1858), I, 34. In Whewell (1860), 307, Whewell explains the main tenets of his view: The doctrine of Fundamental Antithesis is briefly this: That in every act of knowledge (1) there are two opposite elements which we may call Ideas and Perceptions; but of which the opposite appears in various other antitheses; as Thoughts and Things, Theories and Facts, Necessary Truths and Experiential Truths; and the like: (2) that our knowledge derives from the former of these elements, namely our Ideas, its form and character as knowledge, our Ideas of space and time being the necessary forms, for instance, of our geometrical and arithmetical knowledge; (3) and in like manner, all our other knowledge involving a development of the ideal conditions of knowledge existing in our minds: (4) but that though ideas and perceptions are thus separate elements in our philosophy, they cannot, in fact, be distinguished and separated, but are different aspects of the same thing; (5) that the only way in which we can approach to truth is by gradually and successively, in one instance after another, advancing from the perception to the idea; from the fact to the theory; from the apprehension of truths as actual to the apprehension of them as necessary. (6) This successive and various progress from fact to theory constitutes the history of science; (7) and this progress, though always leading us nearer to that central unity of which both the idea and the fact are emanations, can never lead us to that point, nor to any measurable proximity to it, or definite comprehension of its place and nature. cdl. Whewell (1860), 530. cdli. Whewell (1860), 467. Shepherd speaks most often of ideas of cause and effect being bound together with sense data, although she also suggest in places, that there may be other ideas, such as those of time and space, involved. This is something that I found hard to interpret. cdlii. Whewell (1860), 470. cdliii. Whewell (1860), 470. cdliv. Whewell (1860), 467. cdlv. Shepherd (1827), 169. cdlvi. Shepherd (1824), 40. cdlvii. Shepherd (1824), 43. cdlviii. Shepherd (1824), 30. cdlix. Shepherd (1824), 43. cdlx. Shepherd (1824), 43-44 cdlxi. Shepherd (1824), 50. cdlxii. Shepherd (1824), 59. cdlxiii. Shepherd (1824), 100-101. cdlxiv. Shepherd (1824), 108. cdlxv. Shepherd (1827), 131. cdlxvi. Shepherd (1824), 129. cdlxvii. Shepherd (1824), 44-46. cdlxviii. Shepherd (1824), 34. cdlxix. Shepherd (1827), 358. cdlxx. It is worth pointing out that the anonymous 1819 treatise invokes a 'string of pearls' metaphor in which events are likened to visible pearls, and causality is likened to the unseen thread underneath the pearls. Interestingly, Whewell uses the 'string of pearls' metaphor to explain his own idea of causality. However, for all we know, the metaphor could have originated with someone 4 220 like Dugald Stewart. cdlxxi. Marion Rush Stoll, Whewell's Philosophy of Induction (Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press Inc., 1929), 70. cdlxxii. Brandreth, 4. The father in question is Lord Dalmeny, who was nephew to Mary Shepherd and the first son of her brother, Archibald Primrose, the fourth Earl of Rosebery. cdlxxiii. Brandreth, 41-42. cdlxxiv. Brandreth, 42. cdlxxv. Brandreth, 4, 43. cdlxxvi. Brandreth, 42. cdlxxvii. Brandreth, 119. cdlxxviii. James Bonar, Letters of David Ricardo to Thomas Robert Malthus 1810-1823, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887, 154-7. Hereafter cited as Bonar. Anthony Hyman, Charles Babbage: Pioneer of the Computer Princeton University Press, 1982, 178. Hereafter cited as Hyman. cdlxxix. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, abt. 1832, Babbage Correspondence, BL, MSS 37201, f. 432. My dear Sir, Professor Leslie says that Biot and Humboldt assign for both magnetic poles the opposite latitudes of 79 [degrees] 1' the longitude of the northern being 27 [degrees] 37' and that of the southern 205 [degrees] 12' west from Greenwich. The plane perpindicular to the magnetic one he says intersects the Equator at an angle of 10[degrees] 59' and in west longitudes 117[degrees] 37' and 300[degrees]27'. But it appears that in 1824 Captn Lyon found the magnetic pole was in latitude 63[degrees]26' and 51' and in 80[degrees]51'25' west long. pray what is the true faith? Yrs truly M.S. Lady Mary Shepherd cdlxxx. The suggestion, of course, is that Dugald Stewart might be the namesake of Babbage's son Dugald -a supposition that is certainly consistent with Charles' Babbage's practice --; his first son Herschel, for example, was named after his friend, John Herschel. cdlxxxi. Henry John Shepherd and Edward Ryan were close friends, Babbage and Ryan married sisters, and Ryan helped to oversee Babbage's affairs when he died. Henry John Shepherd's Eton, Cambridge, and Lincoln's Inn connections developed into important social ties. William Maule, Edward Ryan, Thomas Talfourd, like Henry John Shepherd, became barristers on the Oxford circuit. Later, several of these friends achieved prominence through the British India Company. cdlxxxii. Bonar, xi and Letter XXI, 55n. cdlxxxiii. When Ricardo died suddenly in 1823, his close friend James Mill -usually cool and rational - was 'overwhelmed with grief'. But his intellectual antagonist, Malthus, likewise commented that 'I never loved anybody out of my own family so much'. (See Bonar, 240n) And, shortly before his death, Ricardo wrote a final letter to Malthus on a subject of perennial dispute between them, sending along his final greeting with a fine example of the civilized tone typical in this society: (l Bonar, xviii, Cf. Thomas Malthus in Quarterly Review, January 1824) 'And now, my dear Malthus, I have done. Like other disputants, after much discussion we each retain our own opinions. These discussions, however, never influence our friendship; I should not like you more than I do if you agreed in opinion with me.' (Bonar, 240). cdlxxxiv. Cf. Hyman, 78. Who is the Minchin who was an acquaintance of Babbage at Trinity and who went out of his way to return to England in time to vote in support of liberal principles? cdlxxxv. This is important because it shows the early connection to Mill, prior to the trial of Carlile. The Mills were openly critical of the trial and imprisonment of Carlile. They may have crossed the line with this crowd and issued personal attacks on Sir Samuel's role in the trial. John Stuart Mill, who was but a teenager at the time, later regretted some his youthful tactics. Check: James Mill's relations with some reformers may change at this juncture. Mill evidently felt betrayed and saw some of his reformer friends as having betrayed reformist principles of earlier days. The literary journals, for example, he charged with having abandoned the liberal cause. cdlxxxvi. Henry John Shepherd, A Summary of the Law relative to the Election of Members of Parliament (London: Butterworth), 1825. cdlxxxvii. 'One day', Mary Shepherd's daughter writes, 'I went with my mother to see Mr. Coleridge (Samuel Taylor Coleridge) at Highgate'. His conversation, she recalls was 'almost a monologue of poetic philosophy on the things between God and man; but my mother, with great tact, occasionally asked a question which brought forth fresh and fresh streams.' Brandreth, 113. 4 221 cdlxxxviii. Virtually everyone in London society, including the Shepherds, seems to have known and loved Walter Scott -despite his ultra-conservative politics and overwrought sentimentalism for Scottish antiquity. Scott's interest in things historical, literary, and antiquarian would doubtless have been more important to this collection of intellectuals than any personal or political difference. cdlxxxix. As for Shepherd's exact views on social reforms, it is nearly impossible to speculate. Her husband wrote [parliamentary], and this gives at least some indication of where she may have stood. However, it would be unfair to assume this as Shepherd's own view. Although we do not know exactly where Shepherd stood on the political issues, we are not thereby deterred from gaining an understanding her philosophical system, which can be grasped from the general contextual understanding and philosophical analysis. cdxc. Babbage had 450 pounds a year, which would have been sufficient for most. However, for some time, he entertained every Saturday evening -according to reports, sometimes up to hundreds of people on a given evening. Most importantly, he was singularly devoted to his Difference Engine and his Analytic Engine, and had to highly skilled mechanics full time in his shop. At one point, he had to increase his salary offer to his principal mechanic many times over in order to keep him. He asked his mother for advice. She replied that he was so far into it now, that he shouldn't stop pursuing his dreams. She recommended that he simply find a way to do with whatever he had left over! Not the usual parental advice. cdxci. Henry John Shepherd, Edward Ryan, Wiiliam Maule, Mr Pearson and Thomas Talfourd were barristers on the Oxford Circuit. cdxcii. I so construe the group because when the term 'philosophical radical' is defined by John Stuart Mill [1820s], he is still very much an proselytizer of his father's views, and the elder Mill fits the category just as well as the younger. cdxciii. But the social influence of the ideas promoted by this group is an important point to remark. For the influence of their thought spread beyond the liberal and radical Parliamentarians, becoming part of the general outlook of the times in Britain. cdxciv. Mill also found Villers worth some of his time and attention; for he translated Viller's The Reformation in 1805. cdxcv. Brown may have discussed Kant with Dugald Stewart during this 15-year hiatus. Stewart published his own views on Kant about [1815]. [get and describe]. cdxcvi. Giuseppe Micheli, 'The Early Reception of Kant's Thought in England 1785-1805', in George MacDonald Ross and Tony McWalter (eds.), Kant and his Influence (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1990), 273. Hereafter cited as Micheli. cdxcvii. Micheli. 273. cdxcviii. Daniel Robinson. Significant Contributions To the History of Psychology 1750-1920, vol. 1 (Washington: University Publications of America,1977), xxxiii. The remark is made in a Preface to works by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac and Thomas Brown. cdxcix. Noah Porter, 'Thomas Brown: The Man and His Work', in D.S. Robinson The Story of Scottish Philosophy (New York: Exposition Press, 1961), 192. Recent commentators such as Daniel Robinson have echoed this applause of Brown's purging of Reid's metaphysical assumptions from psychology. See Daniel Robinson. Significant Contributions To the History of Psychology 17501920, vol. 1 (Washington: University Publications of America,1977), xxxiii. The remark is made in a Preface to works by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac and Thomas Brown. d. Thomas Brown. Sketch of A System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Part First. Comprehending The Physiology of the Human Mind. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1820), 6-7. Hereafter cited as Brown (1820). di. Brown (1820), 12-13. dii. Cf. Bonar, 157. diii. Bain, 181n. div. Homa Katouzian, Ideology and Method in Economics (London: MacMillan Press, 1980), 23-23. Hereafter cited as Katouzian. dv. The idea behind utilitarianism originates with Scotland's David Hume and Adam Smith, and is first properly developed by Jeremy Bentham. John Stuart Mill, the son of James Mill, became famous for his defense of the principle of utility. This principle, which endorses the idea of the greatest good for the greatest number, was adopted as a new vision for the future of Britain, one that could build on and update the enlightenment ideals of Locke that still meant so much to reformers. Though most conspicuously articulated by the younger Mill. John Stuart Mill, however, explicit links the principle to the justification for social institutions at a time when aristocratic forms of authoritarianism were increasingly seen as unjust. dvi. Katouzian, 18. 4 222 dvii. I have to track this down, but there was some derisive reference to an Edinburgh philosopher (the context seemed to suggest Thomas Brown) who believed in phrenology. dviii. Franz Gall, translated by Lewis, 1835, IV, 117-18. dix. Katouzian,24. dx. Katouzian,24. dxi. Works, 3: 301-2 dxii. Michael Gootzeit, David Ricardo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) 4-5. dxiii. See Karin Johannisson, 'Society in Numbers: The Debate over Quantification in 18th-Century Political Economy' 343361 in T. Frängysmyr, J.L. Heibron, and Robin E. Rider, The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) 348-50. dxiv. Mary Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume Concerning The Nature of that Relation; with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence, Connected with the Same Subject (London: T. Hookham,1824). Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1824). Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (London: John Hatchard and Son,1827). Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1827). dxv. Mary Shepherd had two articles published as part of a philosophical exchange with John Fearn. Mary Shepherd, Observations on Mr. Fearns Lines of the Human Mind, in E.H. Barker (ed.), Parriana: or Notices of the Rev. Samuel Parr, L.L.D. (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 624-27. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1828). Mary Shepherd, Lady Mary Shepherds Metaphysics in Frasers Magazine for Town and Country, vol. v, no. xxx (July 1832), 697-708. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1832). dxvi. Shepherd (1827), xiv-xvi. dxvii. Shepherd (1827), xii. dxviii. Kerr (1807), 6. dxix. Issac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and the System of the World, translated by A. Motte (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), 400. Hereafter cited as Newton. dxx. Newton's alchemical experimentation proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the geometrical analysis developed in the Principia might be successfully modified and applied to the analysis of aether. And it is curious to note that there are places in the Principia where discussions of physics and alchemy seem to cross. In the scholium to Proposition LXXVIII in Book I, Newton writes of 'centripetal forces that observe the same law of increase or decrease in the recess from the centre as the forces of the particles themselves do.' See also Newton, Book III, Section 25, where Newton claims that planets cohere and attract according to the same laws as particles. And in Book I, Proposition XCI, Newton specifies a method for finding 'the attraction of a corpuscle situated in the axis of the round solid, to whose several points there tend equal centripetal forces decreasing in any ratio of the distances whatsoever.' In Corollary III of the same proposition, Newton explains the method for determining the attraction of a corpuscle located within the solid spheroid. The method involves determining the net force on a corpuscle is equal to the force by which some point on the body's surface is attracted to the whole body in proportion to the ratio of the distances from the center to the corpuscle and from the corpuscle to the surface. In these and other similar remarks, Newton speculates in a way that seems to contravene the methodology advanced in his new physical theory. What Newton appears to be doing, is speculating about the geometrical constructions used to discover the gravitational law, and looking from the 'top-down', as it were, for the ultimate force law governing particles. But to many of his later interpreters, Newton's speculative remarks on aether were seen as a violation of his own methodological rules, rather than as part of an effort to push science in new and creative directions. In the end, Newton does not advance nearly as much as he had hoped in this respect, and, on the good advice of his editor, the Principia remained relatively free of speculative remarks on the mysterious forces at work on corpuscles in solid bodies. dxxi. Marie Boas Hall and A. Rupert (eds.), Unpublished Scientific Papers of Issac Newton, (Cambridge University Press, 1962), 317. Hereafter cited as Hall and Rupert. dxxii. Hall and Rupert, 345. This comment is dated May 1687. dxxiii. This theme, emphasised by Robert Butts and traced to Leibniz, is persistent in Kant's philosophy. R. Butts, Kant and the Double Government Methodology (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,1984). dxxiv. [Physical Monadology, 475] G.B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford, eds. 1968. Selected Precritical Writings and Correspondence with Beck. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), L.W. Beck, ed. Kant's Latin Writings: Translations, Commentaries, and Notes. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Company, 1986); L.W. Beck, ed. Kant Selections. (New York: Macmillan Publishing 4 223 Company, 1988). dxxv. Robert Butts' outlines Kant's reversal, as well as its import: Metaphysicians used to delude themselves that they could tell us what is worth seeking to know by telling us first what is. After Kant, epistemologists and methodologists tell us what is is a consequence of what is worth seeking to know. Thus the norms of knowing define the norms of being. Ontology follows epistemology. dxxvi. [Physical Monadology, 475] G.B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford, eds. 1968. Selected Precritical Writings and Correspondence with Beck. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), L.W. Beck, ed. Kant's Latin Writings: Translations, Commentaries, and Notes. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Company, 1986); L.W. Beck, ed. Kant Selections. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988). dxxvii. J. Ellington. 1985. Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Material Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985) [IV, 257]. Hereafter cited as Ellington. dxxviii. Ellington, [IV, 260]. dxxix. G. Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 497. dxxx. N. Kemp Smith, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1929) [A 643/B 672] Hereafter cited as Critique of Pure Reason. dxxxi. Critique of Pure Reason [A 648/B 676] dxxxii. G. Buchdahl, Kant and the Dynamics of Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992) 231. Hereafter cited as Buchdahl (1992). dxxxiii. Buchdahl (1992), 157. dxxxiv. G. Buchdahl, 'The concept of lawlikeness in Kant's philosophy of science' in Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, ed. L. W. Beck, 149-171. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,1972) 157. dxxxv. J. M.D. Meiklejohn, ed., Kant: Critique of Pure Reason (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.) 1934 B-edition, [A 648/B 676]. dxxxvi. C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1965), 232. Hereafter cited as Hempel. dxxxvii. Hempel, 247. dxxxviii. Critique of Pure Reason, [A 647/B 675]. dxxxix. Critique of Pure Reason, [A 647/B 675]. dxl. Shepherd (1827), 126-7. dxli. Shepherd (1827), 125. dxlii. Shepherd (1827), 130-1. dxliii. Shepherd (1827), 124. dxliv. Shepherd (1827), 325, 232 and 138. dxlv. Shepherd (1828), 624. dxlvi. The only criticism that Shepherd makes in connection with the doctrine of Newton is aimed at her common sense counterparts. Shepherd criticizes the idea that the empiricist theory of representation of exterior objects by means of the direct perception of primary qualities is an inadequate interpretation of the basis for Newton's claim to objectivity in his method. Such as view of his inductive method, she rightly notes, would be 'puerile and unphilosophical'. This view is interesting given her wider philosophical views, but not the salient point for our purposes in this discussion. It is worth remarking upon, however, for it is a point in Shepherd remarked upon by John Fearn, who fails to grasp her meaning. Shepherd (1827), 289. dxlvii. Shepherd (1827), [--]. dxlviii. Shepherd (1827), 278. dxlix. Shepherd (1827), 278-9. dl. Shepherd (1827), 279. dli. Shepherd (1827), 281-2. dlii. Shepherd (1827), 284. dliii. Shepherd (1827), 114. Shepherd makes frequent references to both Watts Logic and Whatelys Logic in her work. dliv. Shepherd (1827), xii. dlv. Shepherd (1827), 28 and 83. Shepherd clearly rejects Berkeleys principle that esse is percipi. She writes that existence enables perception and not vice versa. dlvi. Berkeley, 42. dlvii. Shepherd (1827), 202. dlviii. Shepherd (1827), 199-201. 4 224 dlix. Shepherd (1827), 202. dlx. Brown (1805), 42. dlxi. Shepherd (1827), 55. dlxii. Shepherd (1827), 199. dlxiii. Shepherd (1827),199. dlxiv. Shepherd is evidently aware of this. Shepherd (1827), 226. dlxv. It might be objected that for Berkeley, our ideas of objects are complexes of particular, perceived ideas. Hence, there is no gap between perceiving an idea and perceiving an object, because the latter simply involves the perception of a complex of sensible ideas. Shepherd, however, denies that representations of objects can be formed from 'sensations of sensible qualities' alone. This departure signals a fundamental difference between the theories of ideas of Shepherd and Berkeley. dlxvi. Berkeley, 50-51. The summary of Berkeleys master argument given here draws more generally on the extended discussion of the subject in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. dlxvii. Berkeley, 43-4. dlxviii. Berkeley, 52. dlxix. Berkeley, 52-3. dlxx. Shepherd (1827), 216. dlxxi. Shepherd (1827), 215. dlxxii. Shepherd (1827), 208. dlxxiii. Shepherd (1827), 216. dlxxiv. Shepherd (1824), 137n. dlxxv. Brown (1805), On pp. 41-42. Brown writes, When Bishop Berkeley, not content with hesitating as to the grounds of our belief in an external world, boldly denied its existence, what dangerous consequences might have been supposed to flow from the denial! How absurd did moral virtue immediately become, to man, who was for ever in a state of solitude; and what magnificent arguments for the existence of a Deity were annihilated in the general desolation powered by a few propositions! These desolating propositions are, in the strictness and accuracy of mere usage completely unanswerable. No evil consequence indeed can flow from them; but it is only because they are at variance, not with strict demonstrative proof, but with that instinctive belief, which, as it is the ultimate source of all conviction, is paramount to demonstration. The instinct by which we consider the sensation of our mind, as marks of the existence of an external world, is too powerful to be weakened be any theory; and even the celebrated sceptic who opposed it, inconsistently but admirably pious and benevolent, was, at the time of his opposition so completely under its influence, as to deliver his theory professedly for the confirmation of those very free thinkers and atheists, whose actual nonexistence his theory implied. dlxxvi. Shepherd (1827), 199. dlxxvii. Shepherd (1827), 198. dlxxviii. Shepherd (1827), 18-20. dlxxix. Shepherd (1827), 67. dlxxx. Shepherd (1827), 135. dlxxxi. Shepherd (1827), 197-8. dlxxxii. George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (eds.), (London: Nelson, 1967), 41. Hereafter cited as Berkeley. dlxxxiii. Berkeley rejects Locke's view of abstract ideas, and seems to overlook what Locke says about general ideas. For recent discussions of general and abstract ideas in Locke and Berkeley, see John Yolton's A Locke Dictionary (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993) and Sally Ferguson's 'Are Locke's Abstract Ideas Fictions?' In The Review of Metaphysics vol. 53 (September 1999), 129140. dlxxxiv. Brown (1803), 267-8. dlxxxv. Shepherd (1827), xiv-xvi. dlxxxvi. Shepherd (1827), xii. dlxxxvii. Shepherd (1827), 203. dlxxxviii. Brown (1803), 265. dlxxxix. Shepherd (1827), 66-8. dxc. Shepherd (1827), 66-8. An analogy is drawn between the mixing together of sensibility and understanding in cognition and the mixing of colours to form a uniform mass of light. Shepherd takes it that analysis enables us to distinguish the elements of our representations, just as analysis 4 225 enables us to distinguish the various colours that together form light. dxci. Shepherd (1827), 33-4. dxcii. Shepherd (1827), 199-200. dxciii. Shepherd (1827), 43n. dxciv. Shepherd (1827), 76. dxcv. The interpretation and assessment of Shepherds reply to Berkeley in this paper differs from that of Margaret Atherton. Atherton passes a largely negative judgment on Shepherds arguments. My positive judgment is based on the view that Shepherds analysis of causation plays a central role in her response to Berkeley. See Margaret Atherton, Lady Mary Shepherds Case Against George Berkeley in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2, 347-366. dxcvi. As Harry Bracken notes in The Early Reception of Berkeleys Immaterialism: 1710-1733, Berkeleys early critics typically failed to address his position seriously. As Luce remarks that 'But for Scotland Berkeley might have died the second death. During his lifetime and for the greater part of the first century after his death Scottish philosophers took charge of him, and placed and kept him on the map.' Still, most of Berkeleys early critics merely sought to ridicule him, so that by the mid-eighteenth century Berkeley already has a reputation  he has already been called a sceptic, atheist, idealist, egomist and fool. Not only was the ridiculing of Berkeleys position unattractive in its own right, but the early critics relied on fairly crude arguments to show that his philosophy led to absurdity. Samuel Johnson made the notorious remark I refute Berkeley thus and then kicked a rock. See A.A. Luce, The Berkelian Idea of Sense Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, XXVII (1953), 7. See also Harry Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeleys Immaterialism: 1710-1733 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 89. Hereafter cited as Bracken. dxcvii. Shepherd (1827), xiv-xvi. dxcviii. Shepherd (1827), 279. dxcix. Shepherd (1827), 280. dc. Shepherd (1827), 291. dci. Shepherd (1827), 285. dcii. Shepherd (1827), 289. dciii. Shepherd (1827), 329. dciv. Shepherd (1827), 335. dcv. Shepherd (1827), 234-7. dcvi. Shepherd (1824),172-3 and Shepherd (1827), 267-8. dcvii. Shepherd (1827), 347. dcviii. Shepherd (1827), 347-8. dcix. Hill Burton, 138. dcx. Hill Burton, 138-9. dcxi. John Hill Burton, Political and Social Economy: Its Practical Applications (New York: Augusts M. Kelley, 1970) 138. Hereafter cited as Hill Burton. dcxii. Hill Burton, 138. dcxiii. John Hicks, Causality in Economics (New York: Basic Books, 1979), x-xi. Hereafter cited as Hicks. dcxiv. Hicks, x. dcxv. Hicks, xi. dcxvi. Hicks, 122. dcxvii. Alfred S. Eichner, 'Why Economics is not yet a Science' 205-240 in Alfred S. Eichner, ed. Why Economics is not yet a Science (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1983) 209. dcxviii. Brandreth, 118. See also pages 117-8. Babbage was just one of the many mathematically inclined friends of Mary Shepherd. Shepherd's interest in algebra and philosophy of mathematics apparently grew with age. Several mathematically inclined individuals appear to have graced her circle, and several had ties to Scotland. For example, a significant friendship existed between Mary Shepherd and Mary Somerville. As Shepherd's daughter recollects: 'My mother's admiration of Mrs. Somerville's power of deep perception and accurate reasoning was very great; and the quiet charm of her manner and voice, gave to this admiration a great and friendly attraction.'Somerville, however, was not moved by abstract questions and had a great desire to be 'common-place' in conversation. 'My mother's own great power' her daughter writes, 'lay in abstract thought of infinite comprehensiveness, which was probably altogether out of Mrs. Somerville's intellectual field, whilst my mother had never followed out any scientific concretions from their beginning to their latest reach, nor ever sought to do so; but she liked to pick up from such friends as Mrs. Somerville, all possible beauties and curiosities in scientific results...' (119) While Somerville may not have been moved by philosophical problems, there is direct evidence that Mary Shepherd shared Somerville's 4 226 interest in mathematical problems. Mary Somerville's dislike of philosophical controversy seems to have centred on the very points relating to constructions of language and theology that Mary Shepherd was so eager to take up. Brandreth writes, 'Of her desire to be simply common-place in conversation, an illustrating anecdote may also prove a useful hint to the very obtrusive critics of the Bible, who think that the statements there ought to be scientifically correct according to modern knowledge. One of us once asked her, 'why, in answering our questions from time to time, do you always say ''The sun goes round the earth,'' instead of the true way; 'and she replied, 'Because it is best always, when it can lead to no mistake, to speak in the ordinary language of the time.' dcxix. Shepherd (1827), 21, 110-111, 248-49. dcxx. Shepherd (1827), 248-49. dcxxi. Shepherd (1827), 250. dcxxii. Shepherd (1827), 71. dcxxiii. Shepherd (1827), 110-11. dcxxiv. Shepherd (1827), 247. dcxxv. Shepherd (1827), 249. dcxxvi. Shepherd (1827), 21. dcxxvii. Mary Shepherd. Observations on Mr. Fearns Lines of the Human Mind, in Parriana: or Notices of the Rev. Samuel Parr, L.L.D.. Edited by E.H. Barker. London: Henry Colburn, 1828, 624-627, and Lady Mary Shepherds Metaphysics in Frasers Magazine for Town and Country, vol. V, no. XXX (July 1832). 697-708. John Fearn: Reply to the Criticisms of Lady Mary Shepherd's on the 'First Lines': With Observations on her Ladyship's Views with regard to the Nature of Extension as contained in her Essays on the Perception of an External Universe', in Parriana: or Notices of the Rev. Samuel Parr, L.L.D.. Edited by E.H. Barker (London: Henry Colburn, 1828 ), 628-650. dcxxviii. John Fearn, 'A letter to Professor Stewart, on the objects of general terms, and on the axiomatical laws of vision' (London, 1817). dcxxix. Shepherd (1832), 706. dcxxx. Shepherd argues against Fearn's view in her 1827 treatise. Fearn apparently doesn't concede the point. dcxxxi. Fearn, 631-32. dcxxxii. Shepherd (1827), 386. dcxxxiii. Shepherd (1832), 702. See also Shepherd (1827), Essays IV and XIII. dcxxxiv. Shepherd (1827), 93. dcxxxv. Shepherd (1827), 69. dcxxxvi. Shepherd (1827), 68-9. dcxxxvii. Camera obscura devices were popular in the nineteenth century as tourist attractions. Edinburgh, for example, had an observatory on Calton Hill. There, in the early eighteenth century, Thomas Short built his 'Gothic House', where he stored scientific instruments made by his family, and charged admission to those wishing to see through his telescopes and other instruments. Thomas Short died in 1788, and in 1827, a woman named Maria Theresa Short, who claimed to be Thomas Short's daughter, returned to Edinburgh to claim his scientific instruments as her inheritance. For many years she ran a 'Popular Observatory' there, eventually moving to the site on Edinburgh's Castlehill where Edinburgh's camera obscura, now known as 'Outlook Tower', remains to his day. Cf. Maria Short/ Patrick Geddes and the Outlook Tower. (Andrew Johnson and Tony Millar?) dcxxxviii. It is interesting to note that James Mill, a friend of Mary Shepherd, translated Charles Villers' book The Reformation in 1805 while studying under Dugald Stewart in Edinburgh. Mill approves of Villers critical appraisal of the papal system, but disapproves of Villers' disrespectful remarks on the Bible and of his being a Kantian. See Bain, 51-52. dcxxxix. Wellek, 127 [?]. dcxl. Shepherd (1832), 702. dcxli. Robert Blakey, A History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. ix (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans,1850), 39-46 and 609-10. dcxlii. Blakey, 40. dcxliii. Blakey, 44-46. dcxliv. Shepherd (1832), 701. dcxlv. Shepherd (1827), 260. dcxlvi. Shepherd (1827), 256. dcxlvii. Shepherd (1827), 110-11. dcxlviii. Shepherd (1827), 252. dcxlix. Shepherd (1827), 252-54. 4 227 dcl. Shepherd (1827), 243-44. dcli. Shepherd (1827), 177-8n dclii. Shepherd (1827), 94. dcliii. William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, (ed) by Rev. H.L. Mansel and John Veitch (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), 393-99. dcliv. Shepherd (1832), 702 and 707, respectively. dclv. Shepherd (1827), 246-48. dclvi. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp-Smith. London: MacMillan, 1929. B278. Hereafter cited as Critique of Pure Reason. dclvii. Critique of Pure Reason, B276. dclviii. Critique of Pure Reason, A 371. dclix. Shepherd (1832), 71-2. dclx. Shepherd (1827), 66-68. dclxi. Shepherd (1827), xiii, 314, 170, 323. dclxii. Shepherd (1827), 290. dclxiii. Hence, Shepherd supplements the psychologism of Villers camera obscura with a justification of how knowledge of external objects is possible, an account that invokes a priori relations such as cause and effect to illustrate the rule-based nature of judgements about external existence. It is also possible that Shepherd read other works on or by Kant, for example, Willich's Elements of the Critical Philosophy. Although Willich's book was said to contain very little original thought, the work has merit. For it compiles together summaries of Kant's works and the best available digest and introduction to Kant, the one written by Schultz. It may be a mere piece of bookmaking, as one critic asserted, but Willich's book pulled together the diverse parts of Kants vast system in a meaningful assembly, including such presumably hard to find bits from his natural philosophy. dclxiv. Shepherd, (1827), 59. dclxv. Shepherd (1827), 27-28. dclxvi. There may never be a definitive answer to extreme forms of sceptical idealism, of course, but the answers that Kant and Shepherd have given are among the most able and compelling. They have more to offer than just the weak form of Berkeleian idealism, namely, of showing only that there is a world that is 'not me'. William Harper, 'Kant on Space, Empirical Realism and the Foundations of Geometry' in Topoi 3 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984), 143-161. dclxvii. Critique of Pure Reason, A 371. dclxviii. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp-Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929), A 368. Hereafter cited as Critique. dclxix. Critique, A 369. dclxx. Henry Allison, Kants Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 14-34. dclxxi. Brown, 1803, 265. dclxxii. Shepherd, 1827, 66-68. dclxxiii. Shepherd (1827), 202. dclxxiv. Shepherd (1824), 170-71. dclxxv. Shepherd (1827), 72-73. dclxxvi. Shepherd (1827), 231-232. See also page 259. dclxxvii. Cf. Shepherd (1827), 168. Think of a tap that drips water. The variety in the dripping sounds, the independence of each drip and the conscious sensation of the dripping water may all be detected by the senses. In this case a pattern of repetition is detected, but perhaps not as a primary quality. It is important to note that Shepherd does not rest her argument for the existence of exterior objects on the representation of primary qualities through their detection in secondary ones. dclxxviii. Shepherd (1827), 121. In a similar passage, Shepherd claims that ...the independancy which the causes of the objects of sense have of the capacity to general sensation is proved by their affecting changes of qualities, of which the mind has no conscience. dclxxix. Shepherd (1827), 43. dclxxx. Shepherd (1827), 76. dclxxxi. The correspondence between the Shepherds and the Babbages spans at least twenty years, until near the time of Mary Shepherd's death. dclxxxii. Brandreth, 105-06. dclxxxiii. Shepherd (1827), 261. dclxxxiv. Shepherd (1827), 294-95. dclxxxv. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, 10 July 1836, Babbage Correspondence, BL, MSS 37189 f. 383 dclxxxvi. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, 8 February 1836. BL, Babbage 4 228 Correspondence MSS 37189 ff 297. dclxxxvii. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage 10 July 1836, Babbage Correspondence, BL, MSS 37189 f. 383. Unfortunately, Shepherd does not spell out the context fully. What she does say is this: In that manner it [the roots of -Quantities] is fraught with meaning & instruction concerning the proportional error in the data contained in the question; whilst also it keeps to the analogy expressed by the roots of other algebraic quantities, as well as that in like manner with them they can be first translated into mathematical language, & 2dly applied to concrete things without which perception of ideas under the terms of calculation, there could not be any security in their results. dclxxxviii. Shepherd (1832), 703. dclxxxix. Shepherd (1832), 703. dcxc. Shepherd (1827), 38. dcxci. University of Edinburgh, Charters, Statutes, and Acts of the Town Council and the Senatus 1583-1858, Alexander Morgan (ed.), (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1937) 167-8. Hereafter cited as Morgan. dcxcii. Morgan, 167-8. dcxciii. R.Carlile, Address to Men of Science; calling them to Vindicate Truth from the Foul Grasp of Superstition (London: R. Carlile, 1821). Hereafter cited as Address. Carlile's Address to Men of Science was written in prison in May 1821, the fourth month of the imprisonment of his wife for assisting him with his publishing business. dcxciv. Address, 4. dcxcv. Address, 5. dcxcvi. Address, 43. dcxcvii. Address, 44. dcxcviii. Sydney Evans, 'Theology', in University of London and the World of Learning, 1836-1986, F.M.L. Thompson ed. (London: The Hambledon Press, 1990, pp. 147-160), 148. Hereafter cited as Evans. dcxcix. Evans, 148. The primary source is H.H. Bellot, Victoria County History for Middlesex, vol. 1. dcc. Bain, 247. dcci. Bain, 247. dccii. Shepherd (1827), 78. dcciii. I cannot help but wonder if Shepherd is making peace with Mill here. dcciv. Overton, 25-6. dccv. Lochhead, 104. Take note of Jedburgh Abbey, Primrose family, and Dalmeny area connections. Keble was among those at its [St. Columba's?] consecration in 1844, and it was the only church in Scotland in which Keble, who venerated Scottish Episcopacy, officiated dccvi. Lochhead, 108. dccvii. Alf Härdelin, The Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist (Uppsala: Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1965), 148. Hereafter cited as Härdelin. The original source for H.J.Newman's Sermon 172, entitled 'On the Lord's Supper', dated July 13, 1828, is Birmingham, The Oratory, Edgbaston, (A.50.3). dccviii. John Henry Overton, The Anglican Revival (London: Blackie and Son Ltd., 1897), 43. Hereafter cited as Overton. dccix. Bertram Windle, Who's Who of the Oxford Movement (London: The Century Co., 1926), 140. Hereafter cited as Windle. dccx. R.W. Church, The Oxford Movement, 1833-45 (University of Chicago Press, 1970), 115. Hereafter cited as Church. dccxi. Church, 117 dccxii. Letter from Richard Whately to Dr. Tyler, 30 September 1836, in Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, Jane Whately, ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1866) vol. 1, p. 356. Hereafter cited as Life of Whately. dccxiii. Letter from Richard Whately to Dr. Tyler, 30 September 1836, in Life of Whately, vol. 1, 355. dccxiv. Brent, 150. 4 229 dccxv. Brent, 150-1. dccxvi. Letter from Richard Whately to Dr. Arnold, 5 January 1838, in Life of Whately, vol. 1, 411. dccxvii. J. H. Newman, The Idea of a University (London: 1852), Discourse VI, 'Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning', s.9. dccxviii. J. H. Newman, The Idea of a University (London: 1852), Discourse VI, 'Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning', s.9. dccxix. Windle, 56. Hereafter cited as Windle. In the early days of the Oxford movement, Newman and Whately were on cordial terms. Newman eventually broke with the Anglican Church and became a Catholic, he and Whately became divided. Newman may have understood this parting as hypocrisy on Whately's part, since Whately always professed neutrality toward those of different denominations. What Newman may not have realized was that Whately's primary concerns were for the welfare of the national church as an institution. For Whately, the problem over Newman's open break with the Anglican Church was that his departure created fissures in a national church already undergoing reform. dccxx. Church, 107. dccxxi. Todhunter, Vol. II, 122. Charles Babbage, Reflections on the Decline of Science, (B. Fellowes, 1820), 24. Hereafter cited as Decline. dccxxii. Todhunter, Vol. II, 328-9. I am here assuming that an 1845 remark to Herschel is consistent with Whewell's positiojn in the 1830s.. dccxxiii. 394 ff., 389-91. His arguments against the plurality of worlds, for instance, were directly motivated by theology -heaven, thought Whewell, must not be conceived by analogy to an inhabited, material planet, and this planet must not be conceived as a worse world by analogy, a place of sin in relation to another inhabited, perfect planet.[letters] dccxxiv. William Whewell, On Astronomy and General Physics, p?. dccxxv. I. Todhunter, William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity College, Cambridge: An Account of his Writings with Selections from his Literary and Scienitifc Correspondence, Vols. I and II (London: MacMillan and Co., 1876), Vol. II, 343. Hereafter cited as Todhunter. dccxxvi. William Whewell, Open Letter to Charles Babbage, 1837. dccxxvii. D.A. Winstanley, Early Victorian Cambridge, C.U.P., 1940. dccxxviii. Charles Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall) 1968, 57 dccxxix. Hyman, 52. Original source. The Latin original of the quote is 'Aut haec in nostros fabricata est machina muros. Aut aliquis latet error.' Peel to Croker 8 March 1823: Correspondence and Diaries of John Wilson Croker, i, 262-3. (London: John Murray) 1884. dccxxx. Hyman, 202. 1 September 1844, Camden St. BL Add. Ms. 37,193, f 110. dccxxxi. David Kean, The Author of the Analytic Engine (Washington, D.C.: Thompson Book Company) 1966, 9. This Lee sounds familiar, follow up. dccxxxii. Hyman, 233-7. Hyman writes misogynistically about Ada Augusta. dccxxxiii. Hyman, 202. The original source is E. Kintner, The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Harvard, 1968. See also Brandreth, 176-180, who explains that Mary Shepherd and her family were introduced to the Barretts of Hope End while they were staying at Malvern Wells. Mary Shepherd seems to have become something of a mentor. Elizabeth Barrett's father was in debtor's prison and her mother was dying, and soon did die, of consumption. Elizabeth Barrett, whose learning was described as 'vast and accurate' and though 'original and profound' taught all of her younger siblings and managed the home with the help of her younger siblings. Barrett wrote something on Mary Shepherd's philosophical work, which would be interesting to read if it could be found. Note that in 1830, around the time that the Shepherd's were summering in Malvern, the Babbage is in Malvern too. He had been introduced to a 'talented but slightly eccentric young lady'. See Hyman 99: 'Lonely without Georgiana, Babbage was considering remarrying and prudently enquired about a talented but slightly eccentric young lady in the vicinity of Malvern...Shortly afterwards Babbage stayed at Well House, Malvern. But whoever the lady was nothing came of it.' If Babbage's love interest was Miss Barrett, she did not succumb to his charms, despite her rather straightened and difficult circumstances. Herself a poet of some ability even in her early years, she married another poet, Robert Browning, and became known as 4 230 Elizabeth Barrett Browning. dccxxxiv. Decline, 24. dccxxxv. Decline, 45. dccxxxvi. Over the years, Babbage faced much opposition, enough to make him bitter and heartbroken in later life. Only his true friends stood by him, and they did so despite the charges of his many critics. Babbage lived a long life, longer than most. Edward Ryan oversaw his affairs at his death. Another faithful, the Duchess of Somerset, brought the only carriage to the small procession that followed his remains to the grave. It was a long way from the Saturday evening dinner parties where Charles Babbage had entertained two or three hundred of London's society at a time. dccxxxvii. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, 1831 or 1832, Babbage Correspondence, British Library MSS 37188, f. 121. dccxxxviii. The work in question was published anonymously in 1819 under the full title Enquiry Respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect: In Which the Theories of Professors Brown, and Mr. Hume are Examined; and With a Statement of Such Observations as are Calculated to Shew the Inconsistency of These Theories; and From Which a New Theory is Deduced, More Consonant to Facts and Experience. Also A New Theory of the Earth, Deduced from Geological Observations (Edinburgh: James Ballentyne, 1819). dccxxxix. Oddly, there is no direct mention of causality in the 1819 treatise on causality. The Preface does remark that the objective reality of the causal relation is assumed throughout the natural history of the earth. The fact that the work exhibits a religious bias is not telling, since this is a prevailing sentiment of the day. In the absence of further clues, it would be difficult to decide the authorship of the natural history on the basis of this evidence. dccxl. Letter from Mary Shepherd to Charles Babbage, 1831 or 1832, Babbage Correspondence, British Library MSS 37188, f. 121. dccxli. Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, 123. dccxlii. This may compare in their minds to programming a machine to skip one or more of its steps under well-defined conditions. dccxliii. Letter, Sir Sam_1839. dccxliv. Passages, 2 (i.e., in 1864). Babbage is referring to an article in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, 26 May 1859. dccxlv. Shepherd (1827), 397-8. dccxlvi. Shepherd (1827), 396. dccxlvii. Dictionary of National Biography under Tait. dccxlviii. Stewart J. Brown, Thomas Chalmers and the Godly Commonwealth in Scotland (Oxford University Press, 1982), 330. Hereafter cited as Stewart J. Brown. dccxlix. Fraser, 122-3. dccl. Fraser, 122-3. dccli. Fraser. 122-3. dcclii. Brandreth, 55. dccliii. Brandreth, 53-4. Mary Elizabeth Brandreth reports that her aunt preferred her own Anglican tradition against the views of Chalmers. For example, she expressed her support for the petition in the Anglican Litany against 'sudden death' in one discussion with Chalmers. dccliv. Fraser. 122-3. dcclv. Stewart J. Brown, 342. dcclvi. Alexander Morgan ed., University of Edinburgh: Charters, Statutes, and Acts of the Town Council and the Senatus, 1583-1858 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1937). Hereafter cited as Morgan. dcclvii. Morgan, 281. dcclviii. J.M. Barrie, An Edinburgh Eleven: Pencil Portraits from College Life (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1896), 13. Another point worth mention with regard to the Primrose family concerns the legacy of university involvement that was left to later generations of the family. The fifth Earl of Rosebery, who became famous for his marriage to Hannah Rothschild and for his short tenure as 4 231 Prime Minister, who also held the position of Lord Rector of Scotland's Universities. While holding this post, he had occasion to delight the Edinburgh undergraduates with his address on 'Patriotism.' Such is the delight of the Scottish students in Lord Rosebery, that he may be said to have made the triumphal tour of the northern universities as their Lord Rector; he lost the post in Glasgow lately through a quibble, but had the honour with the votes. His address to the Edinburgh undergraduates on 'Patriotism' was the best thing he ever did outside politics, and made the students his for life. Some of them had smuggled into the hall a chair with 'Gaelic chair' placarded on it, and the Lord Rector unwittingly played into their hands. In a noble peroration he exhorted his hearers to high aims in life. 'Raise your country,' he exclaimed (cheers); 'raise yourselves (renewed cheering); raise your university' (thunders of applause). From the back of the hall came a solemn voice, 'Raise the chair!' Up went the Gaelic chair. Like his ancestors, Archibald Primrose, the fifth Earl of Rosebery, placed a high premium on his patriotic duties and on the welfare of the universities of his country. While the family heritage of patriotism extends at least as far back as Sir Archibald Primrose, interest in the welfare of the university can be traced back to Mary Shepherd and her siblings. dcclix. Gillian Sutherland, 'The Plainest Principles of Justice: The University of London and the Higher Education of Women' in University of London and the World of Learning, 1836-1986, in F.M.L. Thompson ed. (London: The Hambledon Press, 1990, pp. 35-51), 35. dcclx. Horn, 191. dcclxi. Jacyna, 44. [Get the date.] dcclxii. Neil Campbell, R. Martin and S. Smellie, The Royal Society of Edinburgh (1783-1983): The First Two Hundred Years. (Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1983). On page 30 it is remarked that, 'For more than 150 years, the R.S.E. was a men's Society and although this was never explicitly admitted Council on one occasion ungallantly decided to exclude ladies from their conversazione.' On page 50, the authors write that until the late nineteenth century 'the R.S.E. was a man's Society with women sometimes barred from its conversaziones and permitted to use the Library only after permission had been granted by Council.' dcclxiii. Grant, 354. dcclxiv. Horn, 191. Horn goes on to mention the eventual introduction of 'ladies lectures' in the late 1860's with some apparent regret. Unlike Horn, Grant is enthusiastic about the participation of women. See Grant, 157-163. dcclxv. Fraser, 122-3. Fraser writes of Cramond, 'There I met persons of note, mostly Free Church clergymen and laymen: Welsh, my old professor, in the last year of his life, Candlish, the brilliant and versatile ecclesiastic, next in succession to Chalmers; and the philanthropic Guthrie, along with Chalmers and Caird, one of three illustrious Scottish preachers in the nineteenth century. Among the laymen Sir David Brewster was foremost.' dcclxvi. D. B. Horn, A Short History of The University of Edinburgh: 1556-1889. (The University of Edinburgh Press,1967), 190. The entire passage runs as follows: 'The General Council had no doubt that their University should establish an examination for candidates from the middle and upper schools of Scotland. Thus was instituted in 1865 the system of local examinations, intended to supply a common test of attainment both for pupils of public schools [in Scottish sense] and for those privately educated. Although this proved a great success for many years, it did not really fulfil the hopes of its promoters out of a total of 891 candidates who were examined at forty-seven centres in 1883, 746 were girls.' Hereafter cited as Horn. In contrast to Horn's account, Alexander Grant's The Story of The University of Edinburgh is quite positive about the advancement of women. Grant writes that the system of local examinations started by the University of Edinburgh 'has proved a welcome stimulus not only to schools, but to many private Students, especially of the female sex. In fact it is remarkable, as results show, that the University of Edinburgh Local Examinations have been chiefly useful in promoting the solid education of girls. During the present year the University has sent down its examination papers to 47 centres. The total number of candidates was 891, of whom 746 were girls.' Grant, 157-8. 4 232 dcclxvii. Horn, 191-2. dcclxviii. Alexander Campbell Fraser, 'Course on Mental Philosophy' in Introductory Lectures of the Second Session, 46-47 (Edinburgh Ladies Educational Association, 1868). The Edinburgh Ladies Educational Association changed its name to the Association for the University Education of Women. dcclxix. Mary Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume Concerning The Nature of that Relation; with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence, Connected with the Same Subject (London: T. Hookham,1824). Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1824). Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (London: John Hatchard and Son,1827). Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1827). Mary Shepherd had two articles published as part of a philosophical exchange with John Fearn. Mary Shepherd, 'Observations on Mr. Fearn's Lines of the Human Mind', in E.H. Barker (ed.), Parriana: or Notices of the Reverend Samuel Parr, L.L.D. (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 624-27. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1828). Mary Shepherd, 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Metaphysics' in Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country, vol. v, no. xxx (July 1832), 697-708. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1832). The work in question was published anonymously in 1819 under the full title Enquiry Respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect: In Which the Theories of Professors Brown, and Mr. Hume are Examined; and With a Statement of Such Observations as are Calculated to Shew the Inconsistency of These Theories; and From Which a New Theory is Deduced, More Consonant to Facts and Experience. Also A New Theory of the Earth, Deduced from Geological Observations (Edinburgh: James Ballentyne, 1819). dcclxx. Marion Lochhead, Episcopal Scotland in the Nineteenth Century (London: John Murray, 1966), 118. Hereafter cited as Lochhead. dcclxxi. Bishop Forbes, for example, who had emphasized the subjective mystery of the Eucharist and the limits of intellectual argument, was accused by his fellow Bishops of teaching a Roman interpretation of the doctrine that 'We are in Christ and Christ in us'. According to this Catholic interpretation, learned from Keble and Pusey, the adoration of Christ in the Eucharist was seen as inseparable from the adoration of the Sacred Manhood. dcclxxi. According to Forbes, the divine Presence, while not possible through transubstantiation, was a mystery. But Forbes' Episcopal colleagues, particularly, Charles Wordsworth, rejected this as an official Episcopal view of the Eucharist. Forbes was publicly forced to 'clarify' his description of the Eucharist to meet with emerging standards of interpretation. Forbes invoked the empiricist notion of causality that had caused so much grief and controversy for the church and university in Scotland. As Lochhead remarks in her description of Forbes, in his clarification 'one can almost catch the hesitancy of voice, the tension in his hearers' as Forbes approached the matter of the Eucharist as a philosophical problem. Bishop Forbes, who reminds his listeners that he speaks with 'great reserve and tenderness,' turned to the business of the intellectual foundation for the Eucharist. dcclxxi. As requested, his revised, official stance on the sacrament was clarified, and Forbes pronounced that the doctrine of the Eucharist was philosophically insufficient, since the effect could not be greater than the cause. How could 'that which is not the Body of Christ produce the effect of the Body of Christ'? As Lochhead points out, 'The theory was more difficult than the mystery', and for many Anglicans, the philosophically respectable teaching 'fell short of that of the Scriptures, of the fathers, of the great Anglican divines of the seventeenth century, of the Liturgy. dcclxxi. [Forbes and Whewell] Thus, Forbes and others who had emphasized the subjective awareness of Christ in the Sacrament ends by supplying an official statement that places emphasis on the unintelligibility of objective Presence. The revised analysis falls in line with the mid-nineteenth century emphasis placed on empiricist definitions of causality in rationalist discussion of the objective Eucharistic Presence. The official version of the mystery, it seems, was to be consistent with secular interpretation and based on a revised understanding of the manner and action of empirical causes. And the interpretation 4 233 was one that could be rationally accepted by Anglicans throughout Britain, one that would unify the Anglican Church, set its doctrines about objective causality on a rational footing, and be accepted and defended by all. Institutional unity of the Anglican Church was paramount, and the empiricist doctrine of causality had finally been made to serve that unity. dcclxxii. Lochhead, 103. See William Perry, The Oxford Movement in Scotland (Cambridge University Press) [?]. dcclxxiii. Härdelin, 151-2. dcclxxiv. The book is exceedingly rare, and peculiar in certain respects. The first pages of the book include advertisements that suggest an American connection to either Francis Wayland or Laurens Hickok. Oddly, these ads, as well as the short introduction, are set in a font, font size and paper that differs from that in the remainder of the book. The book is printed in Paisley, Scotland, and makes reference to 'Burnett's Essays', both of which suggest a Scottish connection. Yet there is a London publisher for the book as well, and this suggests an English source. Finally, the topic of the work, given the later works of the same title and subject, suggest connections to both Oxford movement and to Scottish theological debate around the Eucharist. In short, when the clues are taken together, they serve to confuse the reader rather than to offer a clear statement on authorship. [Forbes, Tait, Whewell, Shepherd?] dcclxxv. Philosophy of Theism (London: Ward and Co. and Glasgow: J&D Croll, 1857), 154. Hereafter cited as Philosophy of Theism. dcclxxvi. Philosophy of Theism, vi. dcclxxvii. Philosophy of Theism, vi-vii. dcclxxviii. Wilfred Ward, William George Ward and the Catholic Revival (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893). See Chapter XIII. Hereafter cited as Wilfred Ward. dcclxxix. Wilfred Ward, 322. dcclxxx. Wilfred Ward, 322-3 dcclxxxi. Dictionary of National Biography entry on William George Ward dcclxxxii. Tract XC: On Certain Passages in the XXXIX Articles. By the Rev. J.H. Newman, B.D., 1841. With a Historical Preface, By the Rev. E.B. Pusey, D.D. (Revised). And Catholic Subscription to the XXIX Articles Considered in Reference to Tract XC By the Rev. John Keble, M.A., 1841 (London: Walter Smith and Innes, 1890), A2. There was interest in the Oxford movement around this time in America. Tract XC had been re-published in 1890. dcclxxxiii. Daniel Sommer Robinson, 'Introduction' in The Story of Scottish Philosophy,D.S. Robinson ed. (New York: Exposition Press, 1961), pp. 15-20. Hereafter cited as The Story of Scottish Philosophy. dcclxxxiv. See The Works of Thomas Reid, edited by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863) Vol II, Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1785. dcclxxxv. Villers, 240. dcclxxxvi. Shepherd (1827), 46. dcclxxxvii. Blakey, 42. dcclxxxviii. Blakey, 43. Bibliography Works by Mary Shepherd An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect: controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, concerning the Nature of that Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence connected with the Same Subject (1824), 201pp Enquiry respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect (1819), 105pp 4 234 Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, and other Subjects connected with the Doctrine of Causation (1827), 432pp 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Metaphysics', Fraser's Magazine, vol. 5 (July 1832), pp. 697–708 'Observations on Mr. Fearn's Lines of the Human Mind', in Parriana: or Notices of the Rev. Samuel Parr, L.L.D. (1828) edited by Edmund Henry Barker, pp. 624–7 Articles on Mary Shepherd Atherton, Margaret. 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Case Against George Berkeley' in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2) 347-366 S 96. Errata (forthcoming) Some of the more glaring textual errors will be appended here. 4 235 Notes for Revisions Reid Stewart Brown et al -contra Arist. It is generally thought that Aquinas based his cosmological arguments on ideas taken from the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. Though the role of the Divinity in Aristotle's philosophy is quite different from the role of God in Christian thought, the main thing was that through Aristotle's argument, God's existence appears to have been established as a necessary final step in a chain of reasoning about change and motion. dcclxxxviii Thus, Aristotle supplied the original form of the 'First Mover' argument, an argument that 4 236 predominated in Christian thought for many centuries, and that, to many, held the promise of a science compatible with theism. Indeed, the cosmological argument formed the mainstay of the schools of theology and philosophy that came to be known as 'Scholastic'. A combination of this old scholastic theology and Calvinist reform became the underpinning of the Presbyterian doctrine. The philosophy of Aristotle was important as a precursor to these scholastic theologians, for Aristotle was considered to be an authority on the nature and method of reason. For, theologians such as Augustine and Aquinas were interested in attempting to prove God's existence primarily on the basis of reason, and the favourite philosopher among scholastic logicians, was, not surprisingly, Aristotle. Indeed, the methodology of the scholastics assumed a complete confidence in reason and logic, and like the metaphysics, it was largely borrowed from Aristotle. In short, the aim of scholastic theology was to elucidate religious truths, to explore their implications, and to examine their deductive relations to each other -in short, to systematise them. One thing that a scholastic philosopher could not do -i.e., which it was theologically impossible to do -was to reject a revealed truth. Since revelation cannot be questioned, the resulting philosophy is not going to be very bold or controversial. In fact to deviate from orthodoxy had its penalties; nonetheless, the scholastic system of philosophy and theology was eventually subject to criticism. Although such criticisms seemed notoriously slow to reach Scotland, and even slower to gain acceptance, they did eventually come to the attention of the scholars there, presenting an intellectual challenge that would eventually require some form of response. Move to Chapter Four -Political Economy As with all major social and economic reform, the land enclosure movement and the push towards industrialisation in Britain was complex. [Luddite unrest] There were many and varied ways in which the losses and gains of the movement were counted. The wealthy maintained that there were fewer farms, but those that remained were run better and were more profitable. By the mid-nineteenth century, it was widely held that Scotland's reformed farm system had produced a superior agricultural system. dcclxxxviii Scottish farmers were seen as enterprising and well educated, and a good farmhouse in Scotland was said to give 'an idea of comfort, prosperity, and independence.' dcclxxxviii However, the transition from agrarian to industrial society exacted heavy tolls on many Scots, and those most closely connected with the displacement of tenants often saw things differently. Relocation to villages and towns brought great personal losses, but those who remained in Scotland's countryside fared perhaps worst of all. One recurring theme of late eighteenth century Dalmeny church sessions is the need to secure better financial assistance for the poor. The poor tax levied on landowners in the area amounted no more than 15 per year; yet the landowners sometimes refused to pay their share in this tax. dcclxxxviii Given the nature of his work in the community, and his remarks on the rapid depopulation at Dalmeny, it is somewhat surprising to hear the optimistic tenor in Reverend Thomas Robertson's praises for the enterprising spirit of Scots and for recent advances in Scotland. He writes that a 'spirit for enterprise and for rising in the world, characterises the Scots in general' and that 'perhaps no people have in so short a period, made so great advances in industry, agriculture, manufactures, refinement, public revenue, and private wealth, as the people of Scotland.' dcclxxxviii Thus, even through the period transition, it was evident that the changes to agriculture and the growth of industry had already revitalised Scotland and urged it forward into the modern world. 4 237 By the late eighteenth century, Scotland was still struggling to develop a stable economy, but the outlook was, by and large, optimistic. Political economy was all the rage in intellectual circles throughout Britain. Scotland's own Adam Smith, and later, Thomas Malthus, were leaders in the field -identifying the causes of economic growth, and suggesting strategies for improving both the economy and the well being of the citizenry. Following Hume, Smith interpreted current events and circumstances primarily by tracing histories, and as with Hume, the goal of the historical analysis is to identify the original causes of events, conditions, and institutions by linking them with past choices and actions. In his celebrated Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776, Smith argued that the economy is based on the division of labour and the mechanism of exchange. Indeed, 'all economic activity is the endurance of present pain in the hope of future pleasure to be got by consuming the fruits of one's labour or what is exchanged for them.' dcclxxxviii To ensure a healthy economy, Smith reasoned, neither division of labour nor the free operation of the market should be impeded. Smith acknowledged that his theory justified an unequal distribution of wealth, but firmly believed in a natural harmony of interests, maintaining that over time, there would be an overall increase of wealth and an evening of the distribution of wealth. A generation later, in 1798, Malthus would publish his Essay on Population, in which he argued that the rate of population growth could, potentially, far outstrip the means of subsistence. Mathus noted the relationship between family size and economic wealth, and showed that larger families were more likely to suffer from poverty. All things considered, better education of citizens and control of population growth would help to ensure improvement in economic and social conditions. Thus, Smith and Malthus, along with the Benthamites, initiated the tradition of classical economic theory. In almost all of the political and economic theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and especially in Malthus, education was advanced as central to the improvement of the economic and social circumstances of the average citizen. dcclxxxviii As such, education had come to be widely regarded in Britain as a distinct economic advantage. Despite the sluggishness of its economy, Scotland had an acquired an advantage over neighbouring countries in this respect. The advantage had arisen as a result of long-standing parish school system and newly revived colleges. Move to Chapter Four: Berkeley's Development of Locke's empicism However, the implications were drawn out by Locke's successors, one of whom was George Berkeley. Berkeley's agrees with Locke that the objects of human knowledge are ideas. For Berkeley, our ideas are either actually imprinted on the senses, perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or formed by the help of memory and imagination by compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived. Berkeley accepted much of Locke's theory of ideas, but added significant developments and modifications after exploring the relationship between ideas, the mind, and external existence in ways that Locke seems never to have imagined. For example, Locke's view was that the world involved, in addition to minds and ideas, material substances, the latter of which he held to be, apart from their primary qualities, unknowable. Berkeley wished to get rid of material substances on the grounds that they were entirely unknowable. Berkeley's arguments against Locke are directed against the tradition of abstraction ideas found in such thinkers as Galileo, and all subsequent defenders of primary qualities. Berkeley questioned the assumption that it is possible to apply an abstract analysis of primary qualities to material substance, and showed that this sort of 4 238 empiricism leads to scepticism. dcclxxxviii To understand Berkeley's argument, we need to recall Locke's view that our minds make particular ideas become general by abstract reflection. According to Locke, abstraction is a function of mind that separates qualities or properties 'peculiar to each' particular representation and 'determines them to this or that particular existence'; and 'retains only what is common to them all.' dcclxxxviii The resulting general idea is an abstract idea, that is, a new idea that arises, possessing universality and generality. Thus, 'the general idea of triangle ... must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once.' dcclxxxviii This Lockean view, Berkeley thinks, is contradictory to experience. Our common knowledge is that sensible qualities of things never exist separately from each other, but rather, are blended together in the same object. For Berkeley, if colour and motion cannot exist without extension, then the mind cannot frame the abstract idea of extension without colour. If this is so, then it must be wrong to claim that the mind is able to observe common characteristics of particular distinct qualities and then frame 'a most abstract idea' by leaving out particular sensations. Berkeley objects that we cannot form abstract idea of quality, such as the idea of a colour that is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour, exclusive of 'those other qualities with which it is united'. This, he says, is contradictory to the common knowledge that all things that exist are compound beings that contain particular qualities. Berkeley insists that when he makes up a compound being in his imagination, it is always imagined along with particular ideas -particular ideas of eyes, hands, shape, colour, and so on. As Berkeley writes 'But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated'. Since ideas, as objects of the mind, are particulars, it is absurd to say that the mind frames abstract ideas, e.g. the idea of extension without magnitude or figure, by leaving out particulars. dcclxxxviii In sum, Berkeley's main argument against Locke is that abstract ideas are inconceivable, and therefore, impossible. Berkeley challenges the reader to try to conceive the abstract idea of a triangle as Locke described it, but doubts that it will be possible to accomplish the task. Berkeley's rejection of Locke's general and abstract ideas forms the basis for his rejection of the existence of unthinking material things. Berkeley is convinced of the truth of the claim that 'it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it'. For this reason, he reasons that Locke is mistaken in inferring that a material substratum exists from the fact that the qualities he senses cannot be conceived to exist without some supporting substratum. For 'anyone who claims that objects can exist apart from being conceived is making a claim that they themselves cannot even conceive of.' If we know 'material objects' only by the qualities which we perceive in them, then materialists like Locke can have no conception of what the material substratum is, or of how it is related to secondary qualities like temperature, smells, or colour. What does Berkeley have to say about 'the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived'? Berkeley says that this seems perfectly unintelligible, and that esse is percipi -to be is to be perceived. Berkeley's thus rejects the existence of any sort of mind-independent object. He argues as follows: Things perceived by the senses are nothing but our own ideas or sensations and that ideas and sensations could not exist unperceived. It follows from this that no sensible object could have an existence distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. Move to Chapter Three: Aristotelian Empiricism Work in to elucidate Kerr's perspective 4 239 Advances made by scholars like Copernicus, Galielo, Kepler, and Bacon had changed attitudes toward natural investigations and raised serious doubts about the tenability of Aristotelian physics. In physics, Aristotle held that scientific reasoning involves arranging sets of statements into deductive argument patterns, and so was based on the combination of logical principles and specific theorems. dcclxxxviii According to Aristotle, science involves using empirical data, generalisations about data, and arguments. As a general picture of scientific activity, this view is adequate, and has much to recommend it. However, Aristotle had a very limited grasp of how to make empirical generalisations from data and of what makes propositions true, or 'self-evident', according to Aristotle, so his empirical investigations were of limited value. dcclxxxviii By the time of Galileo and Bacon, it was already widely held among scientific community that Aristotle's analysis of natural and violent motion did not accord well with the results of empirical analysis. Galileo made it his business to challenge the authority of Aristotle in his writings. As part of his criticism, Galileo initiated new arguments and analysis in physics, theology, and philosophy. His application of abstraction, idealisation and mathematical analysis in reasoning about phenomena was new, and through this method, he furthered the understanding of the role of experiment in science. dcclxxxviii Thus, Galileo's physics, which aimed for a new interpretation of physics based on the used of mathematical analysis, abstraction, and idealisation, led to the discrediting of Arisotelian physics. In his investigation of accelerated motion, the mention of attraction to the centre and of the cause of accelerated motion is close to the idea of gravitational attraction that would form the basis of Newton's theory of terrestrial and celestial mechanics. Galileo introduces the concept of a uniformly accelerated motion, which is a motion that, theoretically, from a resting point, gains momentum in equal increments in equal times. There are no such uniformly accelerated motions in physical reality, and the concept is an idealisation. Uniformly accelerated motions, along with other such idealisations, play an important role in Galileo's scientific reasoning, although Galileo recognised the fact that such idealisations do not correspond to anything in visible phenomena. For Aristotle, such idealisations would be entirely unacceptable in physics. However, in Galileo's reasoning, they are assumed for the sake of argument, because they serve the epistemic purpose of advancing our understanding of natural phenomena in theories and proofs. Thus, it was through such innovative strategies such as idealisation and mathematical analysis, as well as through the careful assessment of the empirical facts, that Galileo was able to advance scientific methodology beyond Aristotle. He used a telescope to observe the planetary motions and to make crucial observations of the planetary system, including observations of the phases of Venus, which he used to help establish the truth of the Copernican system. Indeed, it may have been his sense of the importance of both empirical and abstract analysis that led Galileo to define the concept of primary qualities. Galileo mentions primary qualities such as size and shape and secondary qualities such as sweet and red in The Assayer, a distinction that would become important in early modern philosophy, which was greatly influenced by the new science. dcclxxxviii A primary quality is a property that any body must necessarily be conceived of as possessing. Primary qualities are those which can be handled in the sciences of number and space, i.e., they can be handled quite naturally by arithmetic and geometry. A secondary quality is a property which common sense dictates that we attribute to objects. These qualities are what our senses make of the motions of real bodies. According to Galileo, only mathematically described qualities can be ascribed material reality. If a property cannot be treated mathematically, then it is merely subjective, and by the law of noncontradiction, which tells us that something cannot both have and lack a property at the same time. It is a secondary quality. Although Aristotle's approach to the study of philosophy was still highly regarded in the 4 240 seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was also clear that advances in physics and astronomy had been achieved mainly as a result of a shift away from Aristotelian assumptions. Aristotle had been the first of the ancient philosophers to emphasise empiricism in science, and it is probably due to his success that physics was so long studied in a non-mathematical manner. In the rival Platonic tradition, one must begin with the physical, but the point of learning is to get beyond the physical trappings of things to the formal, abstract and real aspect of things. This tradition emphasised pure mathematics, geometry and all things abstract, but not their application to physical things. Aristotle had sought to carve a special niche for empirical science, a niche that was not recognised in his day as a separate area of study. In doing so, he approached the study of nature and causality in a new way -for his day. Aristotle's empiricism advocated a form of applied science in which the physical and the formal elements of things are part of one whole whose elements are only separable in thought. This kind of thinking paved the way for empirical science, by suggesting that close observation of physical things was a clue to their formal reality. But, since Aristotelian natural philosophy failed to recognise the importance of the application of mathematics in the analysis of physical things, it slowed the progress of science. dcclxxxviii In the end, Aristotelian physics was inadequate to explain the types of motion going on in the universe. Instead, a new science developed, a Galilean mathematical physics aimed at deriving the laws of terrestrial motion, like that of freely falling bodies and motion on an inclined plane, as well as a Copernican system of planetary motions. While observation had played a role in both the new early modern science and the old Greek and Aristotelian physical thought, a major difference lay in the emphasis on a systematic inductive method and exact observation. In the early modern period, with the developments in science, mathematical analysis, and technology, there were enhanced possibilities for observation and experiment. The quest for precision was a major factor in the application of mathematics to physical problems. The new science sought measurable quantities characteristic of observable events. Just as it is impossible to understand medieval philosophy apart from Christianity and the Bible, so modern philosophy is incomprehensible unless seen in relation to the growth of science and the reaction of early modern thinkers to Aristotelian science and methodology. England's Francis Bacon, who emphasised the need for correct methods of collecting and analysing data, was an undisputed leader in this respect, and his work on the method of induction helped to propel science onward from its scholastic stagnation. Indeed, following Aristotle, the standard teaching on inductive method and the role of observation in science had become Francis Bacon's Novum organum. In Bacon's view, the first step towards scientific progress required that the field be completely cleared from traditional prejudices and errors. In his Novum organon -the 'old Organon' being Aristotle's works on logic and scientific inference -Bacon classified prejudices under the metaphor of four kinds of Idols, choosing this word, no doubt, because of its double significance of mere image without substance and of unworthy object of worship. dcclxxxviii The Idols of the Tribe are prejudicial modes of thinking common to humanity as such. The tendency to wishful thinking is the principal one. We overvalue what agrees with our preconceptions and overlook negative instances. The Idols of the cave are related to individual preferences and biases. Some people like to think about things analytically, some people like to think about them organically. The Idols of the Market Place are the infirmities of language: 'the ill and unfit use of language wonderfully obstructs the understanding'. Bacon is not deploring deficiencies in individual vocabulary, but the defects of language itself, which he thinks has words it should not have such as 'fortune' and 'Prime Mover', which signify nothing that exists; and vague, ambiguous words such as humid, earth, generate, corrupt, alter, heavy, light, rare, and dense. 'Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of 4 241 demonstration' These are the Idols of the Theatre. These are the systems of philosophy - Aristotelianism, Scholasticism, and the like -which Bacon considers just so many stage plays. In their grip, we fail to notice what the world is like because we are persuaded that we already know what it must be like. Once we have expelled the Idols from our minds, Bacon tells us that, as natural scientists, we are to perform systematic observations and experiments aiming at the discovery of the simple nature of a thing. This discovery is to be achieved through the use of induction. We find the cause of a phenomenon by gathering instances together, and attempting to control for irrelevant factors. What is distilled through this process is supposed to be the 'principle' of the phenomenon or the axioms of a science. dcclxxxviii Following the promotion of inductive methods in thinkers such as Bacon, Aristotle's categorical syllogisms no longer seemed a complete methodological basis for science. But it was nonetheless felt that Aristotle did in fact have many things right, and Aristotle's philosophy continued to influence natural philosophers for many centuries after the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Bacon. In the seventeenth century, Newton's physics represented yet another major advance in favour of the new physics. And, though the significance of Newtonian physics was not fully understood, it was obvious to the scientific community that Newtonian mechanics had brought together an amazing array of elements into a single unified explanation of terrestrial and celestial phenomena. Newton's Principia combined Kepler's laws of planetary motions, Galileo's law of the free fall of bodies into a single inverse square law of gravitational attraction. He drew on empirical data, the technique of idealisation piloted by Galileo, the Copernican solar system and his own new method for calculation tiny incremental motions as mathematical idealisations and laws of relative motion. Despite all of these impressive and revolutionary advances, the appeal of Greek thought was quite general with the scholastics, and Aristotle had a distinct advantage in one respect. For not only did his natural philosophy appear to be the most forward thinking of ancient doctrines, but he proposed a basis for proof of a divine creator. In sum, despite criticisms of thinkers such as Bacon and Galileo, scholastic philosophy and Aristotelian precepts were popular in educational institutions for many years. They were philosophically and theologically safe, and in fact, still formed the basis for much of Edinburgh's higher education curriculum in the eighteenth century. Indeed, through scholasticism, Presbyterianism and its dogma were reinforced, not only in relation to theology, but also in the domains of science and philosophy. In fact, Aristotle's influence on the history of philosophy was so enormous, that in the early eighteenth century, Edinburgh's curriculum essentially devoted two years of study to Aristotle -which is in itself a testimony to his significance. Thus scholasticism remained the favoured approach to philosophy and theology and served the conservative theology of Presbyterianism, lasting for centuries, until criticisms led to crippling doubts about the possibility of giving sound proofs in support of many of its central tenets. * Move to Chapter ?: transubstantiation Hume's doubts about causality, for example, had stemmed from empiricist and speculative analyses, and ultimately led to questions about God's existence. And, with the rise of such empiricist analyses went the decline of scholastic philosophy, a decline that, as Hume had shown, gave rise to a broad range of questions relating to causality, God, miracles, the sacraments, and more. As the concern of Presbyterian Ministers of Edinburgh shows, Hume's critique was seen to pose a significant threat to Presbyterian religious conservatives. Yet, Hume's analysis bode ill for Scottish Episcopalians as well. For, given an empiricist analysis, transubstantiation, which literally requires that Christ enter the bread 4 242 and wine during Communion, could not be explained; for, there could be no mundane explanation of ordinary wine and bread producing the effect of the Eucharistic Presence. As such, the empiricist analysis threatened the orthodox Episcopalian interpretation of the Eucharist. Scholastic philosophy, however, had supported the view that God's agency is at work in the world, offering an alternative in which God is conceived of as the causal agent in the Eucharistic mystery. However, as Dugald Stewart had argued, this view demands an explanation of the nature of God's Presence in the material world, and may lead to the 'dangerous' theology of Spinoza. God and the King Reform on the side of tradition, how to deal with challenges presented by philosophy, challenges presented by social and political change Hume and Leslie affairs Shepherd is clearly responding to the Leslie affair, but also implicated in later 19th century issues and thought Shepherd sees herself as an original not merely as carrying out the research projects of others thinkers, e.g., Locke Hume from universal to mitigated scepticism and a lot of politics along the way Hume and Priestly Miracles, jesus as a man, disappointment in imperfect nature (following upon scepticism of empiricists) Locke as hero of glorious revolution, but implicated in American and French revolutions confusing times re: tradition and philosophy Brown and Shepherd vs. Reid and Stewart Reid and Stewart on metaphysical and physical causation Need necessity and a non-Humean (e.g., Thomas Brown or Mary Shepherd) faculty psychology to reply to Hume Mill and Ricardo, Babbage, de Stael, London Systematic philosophy, Geology, Math, German influence, Kant, Fr Rev Lawrence and Fearn against materialism, which she sees as a fallout from sceptical empiricism vision, mind, representation, camera obscura Brown and Lawrence on physiology Whatley, Channing? 4 243 Final causes letter to Reverend Channing NLS Coleridge, Wordsworth and British Romanticism There is a thread, I think, an influence that relates to the romantic revival; a desire to find beauty in nature (that has been stripped of its glory by empiricism and scepticism). The same inspiration and motivation in American Transcendentalism. It's there in spirit in MS, I think. As an influence on her standpoint. Or she an influence on theirs. Kant's Transcendentalism Yes to Copernican revolution insight, that our ideas (a priori ideas and, for Kant, intuitions supplied by the faculties) shape experience rather than experience shaping all of our ideas Yes to existence of a transcendent noumenal reality that we cannot 'know' in the same way that we know the appearances, but only 'know of' More of a Kantian tenor in her reply than anyone before her; perhaps influences others, e.g., Carlyle, Campbell and others Links between Kant, British Romanticism and American Transcendentalism Dispenses with everything but an a priori necessity for the causal relation and the main gist of the transcendentalist argument to show how empiricism and science are possible Perhaps, like the British Romantics and American Transcendentalists insofar as she is mainly inspired by the broad conclusions espoused by Kant in his reply to Hume Inspired by and defender of rationalist tenets that put mind, consciousness, god, beauty and perfection of nature forward Espouses ideas as having important role in our knowledge of reality; not just empirical world of senses, we need a priori as foundation for empiricism and science Systematic Philosophy and Philosophy of Theism (1857) Philosophy of Theism (1857) This book reads like a summary of an MS system. I have a strong feeling that it is her work or that it is based on her work. Was the very same version submitted to the New Edinburgh Philosophical Journal (Vol VII 1858)? How is James Croll connected? Given his biographical details, Croll seems an unlikely author for a work such as this. I am doubtful of the attribution. See Irons biographical piece and follow up on the plagiarism and failed exams stories. Could there have been a connection between Croll and MS (or her work). 4 244 One reference that is out of place for an MS authorship (because of the date) is Calderwood's Philosophy of the Infinite (1854). But Calderwood won a Hamilton prize in 1847 for his work on Infinity (Sir William Hamilton, University of Edinburgh). Could MS have reviewed an early version, heard about the essay or met Calderwood in a social setting?", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Review dari Komposisi Pemikiran (The Stuff of Thought) oleh Steven Pinker (2008) (Review revisi 2019) Michael Starks Abstrak Aku mulai dengan beberapa komentar terkenal oleh filsuf (psikolog) Ludwig Wittgenstein karena Pinker saham dengan kebanyakan orang (karena pengaturan default psikologi bawaan kita berevolusi) prasangka tertentu tentang fungsi pikiran, dan karena Wittgenstein menawarkan wawasan yang unik dan mendalam dalam cara kerja bahasa, pemikiran dan realitas (yang ia dipandang sebagai lebih atau kurang coekstensif) tidak ditemukan di tempat lain. TheRe adalah hanya referensi untuk Wittgenstein dalam volume ini, yang paling disayangkan mengingat bahwa ia adalah yang paling brilian dan asli analis bahasa. Dalam bab terakhir, menggunakan metafora terkenal dari gua Plato, ia dengan indah meringkas buku dengan gambaran tentang bagaimana pikiran (bahasa, berpikir, psikologi disengaja)-produk keegoisan buta, dimoderasi hanya sedikit oleh altruisme otomatis untuk kerabat dekat membawa salinan gen kita (inklusif Fitness)--bekerja secara otomatis, tetapi mencoba untuk mengakhiri pada catatan optimis dengan memberi kita harapan bahwa kita tetap dapat menggunakan kemampuan yang luas untuk bekerja sama dan membuat dunia menjadi tempat yang layak untuk hidup. Pinker tentu sadar tetapi mengatakan sedikit tentang fakta bahwa jauh lebih banyak tentang psikologi kita ditinggalkan daripada yang disertakan. Di antara jendela ke dalam sifat manusia yang ditinggalkan atau diberi perhatian minimal adalah matematika dan geometri, musik dan suara, Gambar, peristiwa dan kausalitas, Ontologi (kelas hal atau apa yang kita tahu), sebagian besar Epistemologi (bagaimana kita tahu), disposisi (percaya, berpikir, menilai, berniat dll) dan sisanya psikologi disengaja tindakan, neurotransmiter dan entheogens, negara spiritual (misalnya, Satori dan pencerahan, otak stimulasi dan perekaman, kerusakan otak dan perilaku defisit dan gangguan, permainan dan olahraga, teori keputusan (termasuk. teori permainan dan perilaku ekonomi), perilaku hewan (sangat sedikit bahasa tetapi satu miliar tahun genetika bersama). Banyak buku telah ditulis tentang masing-masing bidang psikologi disengaja. Data dalam buku ini adalah deskripsi, bukan penjelasan yang menunjukkan mengapa otak kita melakukannya dengan cara ini atau bagaimana hal itu dilakukan. Bagaimana kita tahu untuk menggunakan kalimat dalam berbagai cara mereka (yaitu, tahu semua makna)? Ini adalah psikologi evolusi yang beroperasi pada tingkat yang lebih mendasar-tingkat di mana Wittgenstein paling aktif. Dan ada perhatian yang sangat minim pada konteks kata mana yang digunakan = sebuah arena yang dirintis Wittgenstein. Namun demikian, ini adalah karya klasik dan dengan memperingatkan ini masih layak dibaca. Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systEMS tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) \"Jika Allah memandang ke dalam pikiran kita, dia tidak akan dapat melihat ke sana yang kita pikirkan.\" Wittgenstein Pi p217 \"Seharusnya kata\" tak terbatas \"harus dihindari dalam matematika? Ya: di mana tampaknya menganugerahkan makna pada kalkulus; bukannya mendapatkan satu dari itu. \" Edisi revisi RFM (1978) p141 \"Waktu dan lagi upaya dibuat untuk menggunakan bahasa untuk membatasi dunia dan mengaturnya dalam bantuan-tetapi tidak dapat dilakukan. Bukti diri dunia menyatakan dirinya sendiri dalam kenyataan bahwa bahasa hanya dapat merujuk padanya. Untuk karena bahasa hanya berasal cara di mana itu berarti, artinya, dari dunia, tidak ada bahasa yang dapat dibayangkan yang tidak mewakili dunia ini. \" Keterangan filosofis Wittgenstein S47 \"Batas bahasa saya berarti batas dunia saya\" TLP Aku mulai dengan komentar terkenal oleh filsuf (psikolog) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) karena Pinker saham dengan kebanyakan orang (karena pengaturan default dari psikologi bawaan kita berevolusi) prasangka tertentu tentang fungsi pikiran dan karena Wittgenstein menawarkan wawasan yang unik dan mendalam ke dalam cara kerja bahasa, pemikiran dan realitas (yang ia dipandang sebagai lebih atau kurang coekstensif) tidak ditemukan di tempat lain. Kutipan terakhir adalah satu-satunya referensi Pinker membuat Wittgenstein dalam volume ini, yang paling disayangkan mengingat bahwa ia adalah analis yang paling brilian dan asli dari bahasa. Diktum Wittgensteinian terkenal lainnya adalah \"tidak ada yang tersembunyi.\" Jika salah satu dips ke dalam karyanya cukup, saya pikir dia membuat sangat jelas apa artinya ini-bahwa psikologi kami di depan kami sepanjang waktu jika kita hanya membuka mata kita untuk melihat dan bahwa tidak ada jumlah pekerjaan ilmiah akan membuatnya lebih jelas (sebenarnya itu hanya akan lebih dan lebih jelas). Ini tidak antirasional atau antiscientific tapi hanya menyatakan apa yang ia lihat sebagai fakta-sebuah pertandingan sepak bola keluar di lapangan-bukan di kepala kita-dan kita mengerti dengan baik motivasi, kecemasan, stres dan kekecewaan dari para pemain dan upaya apa yang diperlukan untuk bermain dan bagaimana bola bergerak ketika ditendang. Kemajuan besar telah dibuat dalam Fisiologi olahraga, anatomi, bioenergetika, fisika matematika dan kimia. Seluruh buku penuh persamaan telah ditulis tentang bagaimana bola bergerak melalui udara dan otot menerapkan kekuatan untuk menggerakkan tulang; tentang bagaimana gerakan otot berasal di bagian dari korteks, dicerminkan dalam otak orang lain; pegunungan literatur tentang motivasi, kepribadian, fungsi otak dan pemodelan. Apakah ini memberi kita lebih banyak wawasan ke dalam pertandingan sepak bola atau mengubah strategi kita atau pengalaman kita bermain atau menonton? Intensionality (rasionalitas) telah berevolusi sedikit pun dari alat apapun (gen) hewan harus bekerja dengan dan begitu penuh paradoks dan ilusi. Sama seperti kita melihat fatamorgana di padang pasir atau membaca kata menjadi kalimat yang tidak ada di sana, dan melihat animasi gumpalan pada layar \"menyebabkan\" orang lain untuk bergerak dan \"membantu\" atau \"menghambat\" ', kita mencari pemikiran dan percaya pada kepala dan membingungkan aksioma psikologis bawaan kita dengan fakta-kenyataan empiris (misalnya, mengenai matematika dan geometri sebagai hal yang kita \"menemukan\" di dunia , daripada menciptakan). Agar konsep dan kata \"realitas\" untuk diterapkan pada hasil yang kita peroleh dari penggunaan persamaan diferensial, pemindai MRI dan partikel colliders ke tingkat yang lebih besar daripada atau di tempat apel, batu dan badai, itu akan diperlukan untuk penemuan baru-baru ini memiliki peran yang sama dalam seleksi alam lebih dari ratusan juta tahun. Hal ini hanya keuntungan hidup selama ribuan tahun yang memilih gen yang memungkinkan kita jauh (invertebrata) nenek moyang untuk mulai bereaksi dengan cara yang berguna untuk pemandangan dan suara dunia dan pernah begitu lambat untuk menghasilkan otak yang dapat membentuk konsep (pikiran) yang akhirnya yang verbalized. Ilmu pengetahuan dan budaya tidak dapat menggantikan atau mengambil preferensi atas kami psikologi disengaja kuno tetapi hanya sedikit meluas atau suplemen itu. Tapi ketika berfilsafat (atau melakukan linguistik!) kita mudah disesatkan karena konteks hilang dan psikologi kami secara otomatis membedah setiap situasi untuk penyebab dan tingkat tertinggi atau terendah dari penjelasan dan kami menggantikannya bahwa untuk tingkat yang lebih tinggi kotor karena tidak ada dalam aturan bahasa kita untuk mencegahnya. Itu datang selalu begitu alami untuk mengatakan kita tidak berpikir-otak kita tidak dan tabel tidak padat karena fisika memberitahu kita bahwa mereka terbuat dari molekul. Namun W mengingatkan kita bahwa konsep kita tentang, dan kata untuk, berpikir, percaya dan disposisi lain adalah tindakan publik, bukan proses di otak, dan dalam arti apa molekul padat? Oleh karena itu, kutipan di atas, yang beruang mengulang, karena saya melihatnya sebagai salah satu ide yang paling mendasar kita harus mendapatkan jelas tentang sebelum kita dapat membuat kemajuan dalam studi perilaku. \"Waktu dan lagi upaya dibuat untuk menggunakan bahasa untuk membatasi dunia dan mengaturnya dalam bantuan-tetapi tidak dapat dilakukan. Bukti diri dunia menyatakan dirinya sendiri dalam kenyataan bahwa bahasa hanya dapat merujuk padanya. Untuk karena bahasa hanya berasal cara di mana itu berarti, artinya, dari dunia, tidak ada bahasa yang dapat dibayangkan yang tidak mewakili dunia ini. \" Banyak dari w's wradalah contoh dari pengertian umumpengetahuan yang penting untuk keberhasilan semua perilaku hewan dan oleh dan besar tidak hanya perilaku ilmu tetapi bahkan AI, yang tidak dapat berhasil tanpa itu, telah mampu untuk memahami dan menerapkannya. Bahkan salah satu ayah dari AI, Marvin Minsky mengatakan (dalam sebuah 2003 Boston Univ. pidato) bahwa \"AI telah otak mati sejak 70 ' s\" dan tidak memiliki akal sehat penalaran. Tapi buku baru-baru ini \"The Emotion Machine\" masih menunjukkan tidak ada kesadaran dari pekerjaan yang W lakukan 75 tahun yang lalu, dan ini berarti tidak ada kesadaran kontekstual, disengaja, sudut pandang tanpa yang satu tidak bisa berharap untuk memahami bagaimana pikiran (bahasa) bekerja. Ketika berbicara tentang perilaku (yaitu, pikiran atau bahasa atau tindakan) itu adalah kesalahan yang hampir Universal untuk menganggap arti dari sebuah kata atau kalimat yang melekat padanya, mengabaikan seluk-beluk tak terbatas konteks, dan dengan demikian kita tersesat. Tentu saja, kita tidak bisa memasukkan segala sesuatu tentang konteks, seperti yang akan membuat diskusi sulit, bahkan mustahil, tetapi ada perbedaan besar antara mengenai makna sebagai sesuatu yang dapat sepenuhnya diberikan oleh entri kamus dan makna sebagai singkatan untuk keluarga menggunakan kompleks. Bahkan buku klasik Klein ' waktu dalam bahasa ' (tidak dikutip oleh Pinker) regards ' waktu ' sebagai keluarga penggunaan longgar terhubung, meskipun tentu saja ia juga tidak memiliki kesadaran W, Searle atau intensionality. Titik menyebutkan ini adalah bahwa Pinker saham bias retionistik sebagian besar ilmuwan modern dan bahwa warna ini pendekatannya terhadap perilaku dengan cara yang tidak akan jelas bagi sebagian besar pembaca. Seperti yang menarik sebagai data dan sebagai ahli sebagai tulisannya, itu secara halus membawa kita pada apa yang saya anggap sebagai gambaran keliru psikologi kita-pandangan yang disebabkan oleh bias bawaan psikologi berevolusi kami dan karenanya adalah universal gagal. Pinker adalah Richard Dawkins dari psikologi-salah satu popularizers utama ilmu pengetahuan di zaman modern. Mungkin hanya terlambat dan paling unlamented (dia adalah melayani diriegomaniac yang menyesatkan jutaan dengan alasan yang specioUS, neomarxism dan kosong slateism) Stephan Gould terjual lebih banyak volume pop Sci. Ini adalah refutasi ahli Pinker dari khayalan universal bahwa sifat manusia adalah budaya yang dihasilkan (salah satu dari banyak delusi Gould) yang membuat buku sebelumnya ' The Blank Slate ' klasik dan pilihan teratas untuk buku yang paling penting dari abad ke-21. Kebetulan, ada banyak meletakkan-Downs Gould, termasuk beberapa oleh Pinker dan Dawkins (\"ia telah membuat memiringkan di kincir angin ke dalam bentuk seni pribadi\"-seperti yang saya ingat dari Dawkins review dari Gould Tome dari Journal ' Evolution ' satu dekade yang lalu), tapi saya pikir yang terbaik adalah bahwa dari Tooby dan Cosmides dalam surat ke NY Times (mencari halaman atau Times). Semua karya ini berhubungan erat dengan subjek perilaku hewan, psikologi evolusi, dan tentu saja ' The Stuff of Thought '. Setelah Konvensi, Ppenebal membahas terkenal Putnam, tapi buruk Cacat, pemikiran bumi kembar percobaan (aneh berpikir expts. dalam filsafat pada dasarnya diciptakan oleh Wittgenstein), yang mengaku menunjukkan bahwa makna tidak di kepala, tapi itu adalah W di 30 ' s-yaitu, 40 tahun yang lalu--yang menunjukkan secara tegas bahwa semua disposisi atau kecenderungan (seperti yang ia sebut mereka, meskipun filsuf, kurang kenalan dengan karyanya biasanya memanggil mereka dengan nama yang salah dari sikap proposisional) termasuk makna, maksud, berpikir, percaya, menghakimi dll fungsi sebagai deskripsi dari tindakan kita dan bukan sebagai istilah untuk fenomena mental. Mereka tidak dapat di kepala untuk alasan yang sama permainan sepak bola tidak bisa di kepala. Di kemudian hari, Putnam mulai mengambil Wittgenstein dengan serius dan mengubah lagunya sesuai dengan itu. Dia membuat hampir tidak ada referensi ke besar dan menarik Sastra pada perilaku timbulSMS (yaitu, sebagian besar perilaku kita!--lihat misalnya, \"eksperimen dengan orang (2004) atau bargh ' psikologi sosial dan bawah sadar ' (2007) untuk yang lebih tua bekerja, dan \" proses ganda teori pikiran sosial ' oleh Sherman Eta Al (2014) dan the luas dan cepat memperluas literatur tentang kognisi implisit), yang menunjukkan bahwa semakin Anda melihat, semakin jelas itu menjadi bahwa tindakan yang kita anggap sebagai hasil dari pilihan sadar kita tidak. Orang yang menunjukkan gambar atau membaca cerita dari orang tua cenderung berjalan keluar dari gedung lebih lambat daripada ketika memberikann orang muda dll dll Efek plasebo terkenal adalah varian di mana info adalah sadar masukan-e. g., dalam studi 2008 85 persen dari relawan yang mengira mereka mendapatkan $2,50 pil gula mengatakan mereka merasa kurang rasa sakit setelah mengambil itu, dibandingkan dengan kelompok kontrol 61 persen. Efek tersebut dapat diinduksi subliminally jika info harga input melalui gambar, teks atau suara. Mungkin hal yang sama berlaku dari sebagian besar pilihan kita. Hal ini membawa kita ke salah satu keluhan utama saya tentang buku ini-ini obsesi monomaniacal dengan \"makna\" dari kata daripada penggunaannya--sebuah perbedaan yang dibuat terkenal oleh W dalam kuliah dan beberapa buku 20 dimulai pada tahun 1930-an. Seperti w's desakan bahwa kita tidak menjelaskan perilaku (atau sisa alam) tetapi hanya menggambarkan hal itu, ini mungkin tampak seperti tak ada gunanya berdalih, tapi, seperti biasa, saya telah menemukan saat aku merenungkan hal ini selama bertahun-tahun bahwa W benar pada tanda. Dia mengatakan bahwa sebuah formula yang akan bekerja sebagian besar waktu adalah bahwa arti dari sebuah kata (jauh lebih baik untuk mengatakan kalimat) adalah penggunaannya dalam bahasa-dan ini berarti penggunaan publik dalam konteks tertentu untuk mengkomunikasikan info dari satu orang ke pribadi lain (dan kadang untuk mamalia lain yang lebih tinggi - anjing berbagi porsi utama psikologi disengaja kita). Saya menyebutkan sebagian ini menjadipenyebab dalam buku sebelumnya Pinker tertuduh dari menyangkal bahwa hewan memiliki kesadaran (pandangan yang luar biasa yang sebenarnya dipertahankan oleh beberapa) karena ia mencatat bahwa anjing tidak bisa berpikir \"mungkin akan hujan besok\", tapi titik W adalah luar biasa yang ada banyak pikiran bahwa kita tidak bisa tanpa bahasa dan bahwa kita tidak memiliki tes untuk menafsirkan perilaku anjing seperti menunjukkan bahwa hal itu diharapkan sesuatu besok. Bahkan jika itu menggunakan payung dan selalu mendapatkannya keluar dari lemari sehari sebelum hujan, tidak ada cara untuk menghubungkan ini ke keadaan mental itu-sama untuk bisu tuli yang tidak bisa membaca atau menulis atau menggunakan bahasa isyarat. Hal ini menghubungkan ke demonstrasi yang terkenal dari ketidakmungkinan bahasa pribadi dan fakta bahwa disposisi tidak di kepala. W menunjukkan bagaimana tidak adanya tes publik berarti bahwa bahkan anjing dan bisu tidak tahu apa yang mereka pikirkan-juga tidak bisa kita, karena disposisis adalah tindakan publik dan tindakan adalah kriteria untuk apa yang kita pikirkan-bahkan untuk diri sendiri. Ini adalah titik kutipan di atas-baik Allah maupun neurofisiologi dapat melihat pikiran, keyakinan, Gambar, harapan dalam otak kita, karena mereka ini adalah istilah untuk Kisah Para Rasul dan tidak jelas dan sekilas epiphenomena kita alami, atau berkorelasi terdeteksi oleh studi otak, fungsi dalam hidup kita dengan cara yang sama seperti halnya penggunaan kontekstual dari kalimat yang menggambarkan tindakan ini. Dan, mengenai kesadaran hewan, W mencatat bahwa psikologi disengaja mendapat pijakan bahkan dalam sekejap-titik mengagumkan dan semakin didukung oleh genetika modern, yang menunjukkan bahwa banyak gen dan proses fundamental terhadap perilaku primata mendapat awal mereka setidaknya sedini nematoda (yaitu, C. elegans) beberapa miliar tahun yang lalu. Psikologi disengaja atau intensionalitas (sangat kasar kepribadian kita atau rasionalitas atau urutan yang lebih tinggi pikiran (HOT) adalah konsep filosofis sangat tua yang (tidak diketahui sebagian besar) diberikan perumusan modern oleh Wittgenstein, yang, di halaman 20.000 dari nachlass-nya, sekarang sebagian besar diterjemahkan dan diterbitkan dalam beberapa 20 buku dan beberapa CDROM, meletakkan dasar untuk studi modern perilaku manusia. Sayangnya, ia sebagian besar adalah petapa yang tidak mempublikasikan selama 30 tahun terakhir hidupnya, tidak pernah selesai menulis sesuatu dari pekerjaan kemudian dan menulis komentar yang brilian dan sangat asli pada perilaku dalamgaya berbagai disebut epigrammatic, Telegraphic, Oracular, Socratic, mengaburkan dll dan semua diterbitkan secara anumerta selama periode lebih dari 50 tahun (yang terkenal investigasi FILOSOFIS (PI) di 1953 dan yang paling baru-tapi bukan yang terakhir!-The Big typescript dalam 2005) dan dengan demikian, meskipun ia baru-baru ini terpilih sebagai salah satu Top 5 filsuf sepanjang masa, dan penyelidikan filosofis buku filsafat yang paling penting dari 20 abad, ia diabaikan atau disalahpahami oleh hampir semua orang. Perasaan saya sering mendapatkan adalah bahwa psikologi kita adalah terumbu karang dengan kebanyakan orang snorkeling di permukaan mengagumi benjolan sementara Wittgenstein adalah 20 meter di bawah ini menyelidik celah dengan peralatan scuba dan senter. Para pelaksana sastra Wittgenstein adalah akademisi yang pengap dan buku-bukunya sebagian besar dikeluarkan dari Blackwell dengan gelar akademik yang tenang dan tidak ada penjelasan apa pun bahwa mereka dapat dipandang sebagai fondasi utama untuk studi modern psikologi evolusioner, kepribadian, rasionalitas, bahasa, kesadaran, politik, teologi, literatur, antropologi, Sosiologi, hukum dll,-pada kenyataannya segala sesuatu yang kita katakan, pikirkan dan lakukan sejak, saat ia menunjukkan, itu semua tergantung pada aksioma bawaan psikologi berevolusi kita yang kita berbagi untuk sebagian besar dengan anjing, dan sampai batas tertentu bahkan dengan lalat dan C. elegans. Apakah karya-karyanya telah disajikan dengan sampul mencolok oleh penekanan populer dengan judul seperti bagaimana pikiran bekerja, The Language naluri, dan The Stuff of Thought, banyak dari lanskap intelektual abad 20 mungkin telah berbeda. Seperti itu, meskipun ia adalah subjek utama setidaknya 200 buku dan 10.000 makalah dan dibahas dalam ribuan yang tak terhitung jumlahnya (termasuk Pinker's bagaimana pikiran Works), berdasarkan ratusan artikel dan lusinan buku saya telah membaca dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, saya akan mengatakan ada kurang dari selusin orang yang benar-benar memahami signifikansi karyanya, seperti yang saya sajikan dalam hal ini dan saya ulasan lain. Namun baru-baru ini publikasi coliva, DMS dan lain-lain, dan mungkin saya, harus mengubah ini. Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date account Wittgenstein, Searle dan analisis mereka perilaku dari dua sistem pandangan modern dapat berkonsultasi dengan artikel saya struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, pikiran dan bahasa seperti yang diungkapkan dalam Wittgenstein dan Searle 2nd Ed (2019). Salah satu hasil dari semua ini (apa yang seorang filsuf telah disebut \"Amnesia kolektif mengenai Wittgenstein\") adalah bahwa siswa dari bahasa termasuk Pinker mengambil gagasan grice seperti implisit (yang tampaknya hanya sebuah kata mewah untuk implikasi) dan, baru-baru ini, teori relevansi, sebagai kerangka untuk \"hubungan antara kata dan makna\" (tentu saja W akan berbalik di kuburnya pada frase ini, karena bagaimana mereka dapat dipisahkan dari penggunaannya jika seseorang mengikuti maknanya adalah menggunakan rumus?) , tapi mereka tampaknya bagi saya pengganti yang lemah untuk intensionalitas seperti yang dijelaskan oleh W dan direvisi dan diperbesar oleh Searle dan lain-lain. Dalam setiap kasus, grice adalah akademis yang normal, Sperber (pemimpin dalam teori relevansi) ditoleransi, Pinker menarik dan sering elegan dan bahkan pedih, Searle (Lihat esp. rasionalitas dalam aksi ') adalah jelas, ketat, dan cukup asli (meskipun karena, saya pikir, utang yang sangat besar untuk W,) tetapi terlalu akademis untuk daftar buku terlaris, sementara Wittgenstein, sekali Anda memahami bahwa ia adalah seorang ahli psikologi alami yang menggambarkan bagaimana pikiran bekerja, sangat menuntut, tapi cemerlang asli dan sering hati. Pinker menulis prosa yang mahir sementara Wittgenstein menulis Telegram, meskipun sering bergerak dan yang puitis dan pada beberapa kesempatan, ia menulis esai indah. Pinker dapat ditambang untuk beberapa emas, banyak besi dan beberapa sampah sementara W adalah sebagian besar emas, sedikit besi dan hampir tidak ada setitik sampah. Pinker sebagian besar meringkas karya orang lain (meskipun dalam gaya sempurna) sementara W adalah begitu asli dan begitu aneh dia jalan di atas kebanyakan orang kepala. Saya sarankan membaca Pinker, Searle dan Wittgenstein bergantian atau bersamaan dengan sejumput Sperber, Grice dan beberapa ratus orang lain dari waktu ke waktu. W mengatakan bahwa Masalahnya bukan untuk menemukan jawabannya, tetapi untuk mengenali apa yang selalu sebelum kita sebagai jawaban. Artinya, bahasa kita (oleh dan besar) pikiran kita, yaitu tentang peristiwa aktual atau potensial (termasuk tindakan oleh agen seperti menggonggong, berbicara dan menulis), dan bahwa makna, kontra Pinker dan cast ribuan, adalah menggunakan, dan tidak ada yang tersembunyi (yaitu, bahasa -kebanyakanpikir). Ketidaktahuan di banyak kuartal begitu lengkap yang bahkan barubaru ini luar biasa halaman 358 buku oleh Wiese pada sebuah topik yang hampir diciptakan oleh Wittgenstein (Bilangan, bahasa dan pikiran manusia-yang saya lihat adalah dikutip oleh Pinker) tidak ada satu referensi kepadanya! W sebagian besar menekankan kegunaan yang berbeda dari \"sama\" kata (yaitu, splitter) yang awalnya ingin menggunakan kutipan \"Aku akan mengajarkan Anda perbedaan!\" sebagai motto bukunya filsafat penyelidikan. Artinya, dengan menjelaskan penggunaan yang berbeda dari kalimat (permainan bahasa), dan dengan memodifikasi permainan dalam percobaan pemikiran, kita mengingatkan diri kita sendiri dari peran yang berbeda permainan ini bermain dalam hidup dan kita melihat batas-batasan psikologi kita. Tapi Pinker, sekali lagi mengikuti default menggoda kita berevolusi modul dan contoh yang mengerikan dari ribuan orang lain, adalah lumper yang sering mengaburkan perbedaan ini. E.G., ia berbicara berulang kali dari \"realitas\" seolah-olah itu adalah satu hal (bukan seluruh keluarga menggunakan). Dia juga berbicara tentang realitas sebagai sesuatu yang terpisah dari pengalaman kami (yaitu, klasik idealis/realis kebingungan). Tapi apa tes yang ada untuk realitas? Dia slip (seperti yang kita semua) begitu mudah ke substitusi reductionistik tingkat yang lebih rendah untuk yang lebih tinggi sehingga kita semua cenderung untuk mengabaikan pemikiran yang kita dapat melihat (yaitu, tindakan) untuk proses di otak, yang bahasa kita (pikir) tidak mungkin dapat menggambarkan, karena berevolusi jauh sebelum seseorang punya ide fungsi otak. Jika Pinker membayangkan bahwa Anda tidak benar-benar membaca halaman ini (misalnya, retina Anda sedang dipukul dengan foton memantul dari molekul tinta dll) maka saya dengan hormat menyarankan dia perlu merefleksikan lebih lanjut tentang masalah bahasa, pemikiran dan realitas dan saya tahu tidak ada penangkal yang lebih baik untuk meme beracun ini daripada pencelupan di Wittgenstein. Merenungkan Wittgenstein mengingatkan komentar yang dikaitkan dengan profesor filsafat Cambridge C.D. Broad (yang tidak mengerti atau seperti dia), yang berlari sesuatu seperti ' tidak menawarkan Ketua filsafat untuk Wittgenstein akan seperti tidak menawarkan kursi Fisika untuk Einstein! \" Saya pikir Wittgenstein sebagai Einstein psikologi intuitif. Meskipun lahir sepuluh tahun kemudian, ia juga menetas ide tentang hakikat realitas di hampir waktu yang sama dan di bagian yang sama dari dunia dan seperti Einstein hampir meninggal pada tahun WW1. Sekarang Misalkan Einstein adalah petapa homoseksual yang bunuh diri dengan kepribadian yang sulit yang diterbitkan hanya satu versi awal ide-idenya yang bingung dan sering keliru, tetapi menjadi terkenal di dunia; sepenuhnya mengubah ide-idenya tetapi untuk selanjutnya 30 tahun diterbitkan apa-apa lagi, dan pengetahuan tentang karya barunya di kebanyakan kacau bentuk menyebar perlahan-lahan dari kuliah sesekali dan catatan siswa; bahwa ia meninggal pada 1951 meninggalkan lebih dari 20.000 halaman yang sebagian besar menulis tulisan tangan dalam bahasa Jerman, terdiri dari kalimat atau paragraf pendek dengan, sering, tidak ada hubungan yang jelas dengan kalimat sebelum atau sesudah; bahwa ini dipotong dan ditempelkan dari notebook lain ditulis tahun sebelumnya dengan catatan di margin, underlinings dan menyeberang kata sehingga banyak kalimat memiliki beberapa varian; bahwa para eksekutif kesusastraan memotong massa yang dicerna menjadi berkeping-keping, meninggalkan apa yang mereka inginkan dan berjuang dengan tugas mengerikan menangkap arti yang benar dari kalimat yang menyampaikan pandangan yang sama sekali baru tentang bagaimana alam semesta bekerja dan bahwa mereka kemudian menerbitkan materi ini dengan kelambatan menyakitkan (tidak selesai setelah setengah abad) dengan Pendahuluan yang tidak berisi penjelasan nyata tentang apa itu tentang; bahwa ia menjadi terkenal karena banyak pernyataan bahwa semua fisika sebelumnya adalah kesalahan dan bahkan omong kosong dan bahwa hampir tidak ada yang mengerti karyanya, meskipun ratusan buku dan puluhan ribu makalah membahas hal itu; bahwa banyak fisikawan hanya tahu karya awalnya di mana ia telah membuat penjumlahan definitif fisika Newton dinyatakan dalam bentuk yang sangat abstrak dan kental bahwa tidak mungkin untuk memutuskan apa yang dikatakan; bahwa ia kemudian hampir dilupakan dan bahwa sebagian besar buku dan artikel tentang sifat dunia dan topik yang beragam fisika modern hanya melewati dan biasanya keliru referensi kepadanya dan bahwa banyak dihilangkan seluruhnya; bahwa sampai hari ini, setengah abad setelah kematiannya, hanya ada segelintir orang yang benar-benar memahami konsekuensi monumental dari apa yang telah dia lakukan. Ini, saya klaim, justru situasi dengan Wittgenstein. Tampaknya perang salib jelas bahwa psikologi berevolusi kami telah dipilih untuk mencocokkan dunia dengan batas maksimal yang kompatibel dengan sumber daya genetik dan energik kita dan itu adalah semua yang bisa kita katakan tentang realitas, dan kita semua memahami hal ini (kita LIVE it) tetapi ketika kita berhenti untuk berpikir tentang hal itu, default psikologi Universal kita mengambil alih dan kita mulai menggunakan kata (konsep) dari \"realitas , \"\" aspek, \"\" waktu, \"\" ruang, \",\" mungkin, \"dll dari konteks disengaja di mana mereka berevolusi. Permata berikut berasal dari ahli biologi (saya mengambilnya dari buku yang luar biasa Shettleworth tapi diabaikan kognisi, evolusi dan perilaku). \"Peran psikologi kemudian adalah untuk menggambarkan fitur bawaan dari pikiran organisme yang berbeda yang telah berevolusi untuk mencocokkan aspek tertentu dari alam semesta eksternal fisik, dan cara di mana alam semesta fisik berinteraksi dengan pikiran untuk menghasilkan dunia fenomenal.\" O'Keefe dan Nadel \"The Hippocampus sebagai peta kognitif\" Pikirkan cara ini-Anda dapat mencari kata dalam kamus, tetapi Anda tidak dapat melihat penggunaan di sana, kecuali ada video yang menunjukkan sebelum dan sesudah acara dan semua fakta yang relevan tentang hal itu. Kamus seperti kamar mayat penuh mayat tapi kami ingin belajar fisiologi. Di sini terletak \"bangkit\" dan di sini \"lari\" dan di sini \"dalam\" dan di sini \"adalah\" dan apa yang hilang adalah kehidupan. Menambahkan foto dan itu sedikit lebih baik: menambahkan video dan banyak lebih baik: menambahkan warna 3D panjang menyewa video dengan suara dan bau dan itu'mendapatkan sana. Bagian dari deskripsi Wittgenstein psikologi publik kita termasuk banyak contoh rinci tentang bagaimana sensasi dan gambar dalam pikiran saya tidak membawa berat epistemik bahkan untuk saya. Bagaimana saya tahu saya makan sebuah apel? Selera dan visi saya mungkin salah dan bagaimana untuk memutuskan? Tetapi jika saya berbicara ABkeluar atau menuliskannya dan Anda mengatakan \"itu tampak lezat apel\" dll Saya memiliki tes objektif. Benar dan salah mendapatkan pijakan di sini. W akan menggunakan kutipan dari Goethe sebagai motto PI--\"pada mulanya adalah perbuatan.\" Artinya, evolusioner itu persepsi dan tindakan dan kemudian kenangan dari mereka dan kemudian pikiran tentang mereka dan kemudian kata menyuarakan pikiran. Jadi, acara adalah hal yang diperkirakan Australopithecus, dan seleksi alam untuk dapat membuat ledakan akustik, yang digantikan untuk mereka, cukup kuat untuk memodifikasi peralatan vokal dan sirkuit kontrol yang sesuai dengan kecepatan yang fantastis, jadi oleh waktu Neanderthal awal mereka berbicara streak biru dan tidak menutup pikiran atau mulut selama lebih dari beberapa menit sejak. W dipahami, sebagai beberapa memiliki, keutamaan tindakan dan tidak relevan pikiran kita, perasaan dll sebagai dasar komunikasi, itulah sebabnya ia sering disebut perilaku (yaitu, Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner penyangkalan terhadap realitas kehidupan mental kita, pikiran, kesadaran dll) tapi ini adalah terang-terangan absurd. \" Ini mengingatkan saya pada deskripsi yang terkenal oleh Plato dari bayangan pada dinding gua vs berputar di sekitar untuk melihat orang yang sebenarnya menggunakan bahasa-sebuah analogi yang tidak pernah saya pikirkan dalam hal W dan yang saya terpana untuk melihat beberapa jam kemudian dalam bab terakhir Pinker. Dalam hal apapun, jika seseorang menganggap hati setiap kasus penggunaan bahasa, kita melihat bahwa banyak psikologi disengaja kita dipanggil ke dalam bermain. Orang dapat melihat ketidaktahuan Wittgenstein dalam artikel di EEL2 (yang Elsevier Ensiklopedi bahasa dan linguistik-2nd Ed. (2005) 12, 353p-ya itu 12000 PAGES di 14 jilid dan hanya $6000,) yang sejauh ini yang terbesar, dan satu harapan yang paling otoritatif, referensi dalam studi bahasa. Anehnya, Pinker tidak memiliki referensi tunggal untuk itu, tetapi Anda dapat menemukannya, bersama dengan hampir semua Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein dan ribuan orang lain bebas di internet. Untuk mendapatkan pemahaman tentang kebutuhan dasar AI Anda mungkin misalnya, merasa jauh lebih menarik untuk membaca RFM W dari Minsky's ' The Emotion Machine '. Pinker telah mengacu Brown terkenal daftar ratusan Universal perilaku manusia, tetapi ini hampir semua tingkat yang lebih tinggi kasar perilaku seperti kepemilikan agama, timbal balik altruisms dll dan besar itu menghilangkan ratusan Universal lain yang mendasari ini. Wittgenstein adalah yang pertama, dan dalam beberapa kasus mungkin satu-satunya yang sampai saat ini, untuk menunjukkan banyak yang lebih mendasar. Namun, dia tidak memberitahu Anda apa yang dia lakukan dan tidak ada orang lain yang baik sehingga Anda akan harus teka-teki itu keluar untuk diri sendiri. Kebanyakan orang membaca pertama (dan sering tidak ada yang lain) nya investigasi filosofis tapi aku lebih suka contoh-kata matematis yang lebih ketat dalam sambutannya di dasar matematika atau kuliah di dasar matematika. Jika Anda membaca dengan pemahaman bahwa ia menggambarkan aksioma Universal psikologi evolusi kita yang, mendasari semua penalaran kita, maka karyanya masuk akal dan hati dalam kecerdikan. Pinker menggambarkan bagaimana pikiran bekerja dengan contoh saus Barbecue. Tentu saja ada jumlah tak terbatas dari orang lain yang menggambarkan probabilitas subjektif kita (sering disebut penalaran Bayesian-meskipun ia tidak menyebutkan ini). Favorit saya adalah hari kiamat (Lihat misalnya, buku Bostrum atau halaman web), tidur Kecantikan dan Newcomb masalah. Tidak seperti barbecue, yang memiliki solusi yang jelas, banyak orang lain memiliki (tergantung pada sudut pandang Anda) satu, tidak ada atau banyak. Kita mungkin menganggap ini sebagai menarik, karena mereka menunjukkan kesenjangan dalam atau batas untuk rasionalitas kita (sebuah tema utama di Wittgenstein) atau (apa yang kita ketahui setidaknya sejak de Finetti bekerja di 20 ' s) bahwa semua probabilitas adalah subjektif, atau seperti paradoks liar yang terkenal atau teorema Godel (Lihat saya meninjaus dari hofstadter's ' I am a Strange loop dan Yanofsky's ' melampaui batas pemikiran '), sebagai demonstrasi sepele batas pikiran primata kita, meskipun Pinker tidak memperluas masalah ini atau memberikan lebih dari beberapa petunjuk pada literatur yang luas pada teori keputusan, teori permainan, perilaku ekonomi, bayesianisme dll EEL2 memang memiliki artikel pendek lumayan pada W yang menghindari membuat terlalu banyak kesalahan mencolok, tapi itu benar-benar merindukan hampir segala sesuatu yang penting, yang, jika sangat dipahami, akan membuat artikel sejauh satu terpanjang dalam buku. Hampir seluruh hal yang terbuang pada tractatus, yang semua orang tahu dia sepenuhnya ditolak kemudian dan yang sangat bingung dan membingungkan juga. Hampir tidak ada apa-apa pada filsafat kemudian dan bukan kata tentang dua dicari CDROM yang sekarang menjadi titik awal untuk semua W sarjana (dan siapa pun yang tertarik pada perilaku manusia) yang sekarang menjadi tersebar luasd bebas melalui jaring. Ada juga apa-apa di sini atau di artikel tentang Chomsky, ide bawaan, evolusi sintaks, evolusi semantik, evolusi pragmatis (hampir setiap salah satu dari 20.000 halaman yang ada hubungannya dengan gagasan dan contoh novel pada kedua), skema teori dll, atau tentang bagaimana ia mengantisipasi Chomsky dalam mempelajari \"kedalaman tata bahasa\", menggambarkan masalah underdeterminasi atau ledakan Kombinatorial, atau kata tentang penemuannya (berulang kali dan secara rinci-e. g., rpp Vol. 2 P20) sekitar 20 tahun sebelum wason alasan untuk \"glitches\" dalam \"jika p kemudian q\" jenis konstruksi sekarang dianalisis oleh tes seleksi wason (salah satu alat standar penelitian EP), atau tentang bagaimana karyanya dapat dilihat sebagai mengantisipasi banyak ide dalam psikologi evolusi , tentang berdirinya studi modern intensionality, dari disposisi sebagai tindakan, dari epiphenomenality kehidupan mental kita dan kesatuan bahasa, matematika, geometri, musik, seni dan permainan, atau bahkan penjelasan tentang apa yang dia maksudkan dengan bahasa permainan dan tata bahasa-dua dari istilah yang paling sering digunakan. W membuat perubahan dari mencoba untuk memahami pikiran sebagai logis, domain struktur umum yang spesifik domain istimewa satu di akhir 20-an tetapi Kahneman mendapat Nobel untuk itu di 2002, untuk berbagai alasan, tidak sedikit di antaranya adalah bahwa mereka melakukan pekerjaan laboratorium dan analisis statistik (meskipun W adalah seorang experimentalist hebat dan cukup baik di matematika). Tentu saja, orang tidak dapat menyalahkan EEL2 terlalu banyak karena hanya mengikuti kelalaian yang sama dan kurangnya pemahaman seluruh ilmu perilaku. Dan, saya tidak membawa ini dalam cara orang mungkin mengeluh tentang ketiadaan info tentang roket perang Cina kuno dalam sebuah buku tentang mesin roket, tetapi karena karyanya masih yang hampir belum dimanfaatkan tambang ilmu perilaku berlian, dan, untuk uang saya, beberapa yang paling menggembirakan dan mata prosa pembukaan saya pernah membaca. Hampir semua yang telah ia tulis dapat digunakan sebagai teks tambahan atau manual Lab dalam setiap filosofi atau psikologi kelas dan dalam banyak hukum, matematika, sastra, perilaku ekonomi, sejarah, politik, antropologi, sosiologi dan tentu saja linguistik. Yang membawa kita kembali ke Pinker. Dalam bab terakhir, menggunakan metafora terkenal dari gua Plato, ia dengan indah meringkas buku dengan gambaran tentang bagaimana pikiran (bahasa, berpikir, psikologi disengaja)-produk keegoisan buta, dimoderasi hanya sedikit oleh altruisme otomatis untuk kerabat dekat membawa salinan gen kita (inklusif Fitness)--bekerja secara otomatis, tetapi mencoba untuk mengakhiri pada catatan optimis dengan memberi kita harapan bahwa kita tetap dapat menggunakan kemampuan yang luas untuk bekerja sama dan membuat dunia menjadi tempat yang layak untuk hidup. Aku ragu ini sangat banyak (Lihat saya reviewnya ' The Better malaikat alam kita). Pinker tentu sadar, tetapi mengatakan sedikit tentang fakta bahwa jauh lebih banyak tentang psikologi kita ditinggalkan daripada yang disertakan. Di antara jendela ke dalam sifat manusia yang ditinggalkan atau diberi perhatian minimal adalah matematika dan geometri, musik dan suara, Gambar, peristiwa dan kausalitas, Ontologi (kelas hal), disposisi (percaya, berpikir, menilai, berniat dll) dan sisanya psikologi disengaja tindakan, neurotransmiter dan entheogens, negara-negara spiritual (misalnya, Satori dan pencerahan, otak stimulasi dan perekaman, kerusakan otak dan perilaku defisit dan gangguan, permainan dan olahraga, teori keputusan (termasuk permainan teori dan perilaku ekonomi), perilaku hewan (sangat sedikit bahasa tetapi satu miliar tahun genetika bersama). Banyak buku telah ditulis tentang masing-masing bidang psikologi disengaja. Data dalam buku ini adalah deskripsi, bukan penjelasan yang menunjukkan mengapa otak kita melakukannya dengan cara ini atau bagaimana hal itu dilakukan. Bagaimana kita tahu untuk menggunakan kalimat dalam berbagai cara mereka (yaitu, tahu semua makna)? Ini adalah psikologi evolusi yang beroperasi pada tingkat yang lebih mendasar-tingkat di mana Wittgenstein paling aktif. Dan ada perhatian yang mendalam terhadap konteks yang sangat penting untuk memahami bahasa dan di mana Wittgenstein adalah pelopor utama. Di antara buku yang tak terhitung jumlahnya yang tidak disebut di sini adalah karya Guerino Mazzola yang sangat baik yang menyelidiki kesamaan matematika dan musik ' The topos of Music ', pekerjaan luar biasa Shulgin menyelidik pikiran dengan psikokimia ' Phikal ' dan ' Tikal '. Banyak orang lain mencoba untuk mewakili fungsi mental dengan geometris atau matematika sarana seperti Rott ' keyakinan revisi ', gardenfors berbagai buku, dan tentu saja upaya besar-besaran terjadi dalam logika (misalnya 20 atau jadi Vol Handbook logika filosofis) serta banyak orang lain diedit atau ditulis oleh Dov gabbay menakjubkan (misalnya, ' temporal Logic '). Re spasial bahasa-dari berbagai volume pada psikologi, bahasa atau filsafat ruang, yang baru-baru ini ' buku pegangan logika ' (terutama menyenangkan adalah chap 11 pada ruang-waktu dan yang terakhir chap. oleh Varzi) menonjol. Intinya adalah bahwa ini logis, geometris dan matematika karya adalah perpanjangan dari psikologi aksiomatik bawaan kita, dan sehingga mereka menunjukkan dalam persamaan dan grafis mereka sesuatu tentang ' bentuk ' atau ' bentuk ' atau ' fungsi ' dari pikiran kita (modul, template, Mesin inferensi), dan begitu juga bentuk dari mereka hewan dan bahkan mungkin dari komputer (meskipun orang harus memikirkan apa tes akan relevan di sini!). Dan tentu saja. semua karya Wittgenstein, dengan mengingat bahwa dia terkadang berbicara tentang tingkat pemikiran dan persepsi prelinguistik atau bahkan yang paling mendasar. Tentu saja, banyak buku tentang AI, navigasi robot dan pengolahan gambar yang relevan karena mereka harus meniru psikologi kita. Pengenalan wajah adalah salah satu kemampuan kami yang paling mencolok (meskipun bahkan krustasea dapat melakukannya) dan karya terbaru terbaik yang saya tahu adalah ' Handbook of Face Recognition '. Dari berbagai buku tentang ruang/waktu seseorang dapat mulai dengan Klein ' bahasa dan waktu ' atau McLure ' filosofi waktu '. ' Bahasa dan waktu ' Smith, Hawley's ' bagaimana Things bertahan ' dan Sider's ' empat-Dimensionalisme ', Ludlow ' semantik, tegang dan waktu ', Dainton ' waktu dan ruang '. dan ' kesatuan kesadaran ', Diek ' The ontologi dari Spacetime ' dan Sattig ' The bahasa dan realitas waktu \". Tapi seperti yang diharapkan, dan seperti yang diperinci oleh Rupert Read, Permainan bahasa di sini semua terjerat dan sebagian besar diskusi waktu putus asa tidak koheren. Dan juga yang baik tapi sekarang tanggal buku yang mencakup banyak relevansi dengan artikel oleh Searle dan lain-lain adalah Vanderveken's ' logika, pikiran dan tindakan '.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "BARRY SMITH Die Struktur der Common-Sense-Welt1 Einleitung Die zeitgenössischen Philosophen haben zwar der Sprache, die wir verwenden, um die Welt der alltäglichen Erfahrung zu beschreiben oder um uns in dieser Welt zurechtzufinden, grosse Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt, sie haben sich jedoch – von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen – geweigert, diese Welt selbst als passendes Objekt theoretischer Betrachtungen anzusehen. Im folgenden werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, wie es möglich ist, die Common-Sense-Welt als ontologisch eigenständiges Untersuchungsobjekt zu verstehen. Gleichzeitig werde ich mich bemühen, deutlich zu zeigen, wie eine solch eigenständige Behandlung uns möglicherweise hilft, die Strukturen sowohl der physikalischen Welt als auch der menschlichen Erkenntnis philosophisch besser zu verstehen. Der Anlass für meine Bemerkungen ist eine Vielzahl von wichtigen Untersuchungen, die in den letzten Jahren von Nicht-Philosophen durchgeführt wurden. Da gibt es z. B. das Projekt einer 'Semiophysik' einer Physik der salienten Strukturen der Realität -, das in der letzten Zeit von den beiden französischen Denkern René Thom und Jean Petitot entwickelt wurde.2 Zu nennen sind die Experimente der Gestaltpsychologen wie etwa Gaetano Kanizsa und Paolo Bozzi, die die Existenz einer sui generis Organisation der Wahrnehmungswelt zeigen. So z.B. in bezug auf die Kategorien Farbe, Form, Bewegung oder Kontur.3 Da ist die Arbeit von J. J. Gibson und anderen ökologischen Psychologen über Wahrnehmungssalienz und über die Substanzen, Oberflächen, Affordanzen etc. der Common-Sense-Welt.4 Weiterhin gibt es die Untersuchungen von E. Rosch und ihren Kollegen über die Rolle von Prototypikalität in unserem alltäglichen Leben. Ebenso die Arbeit von F.C. Keil und anderen über die Art und Weise, in der unsere Erfahrung durch natürliche Species-Genus Beziehungen strukturiert wird.5 Schliesslich – und in dem hier diskutierten Zusammenhang besonders wichtig – gibt es noch die Experimente der Künstliche-Intelligenz-Forschung (KI), die bei der Modellbildung nicht nur die Prozesse des Common-Sense-Denkens berücksichtigen, sondern die Common-Sense-Realität selbst. 1 Mit Dank an R. Casati, V. Gadenne, J. Petitot und H. Philipse für ihre hilfreichen Kommentare, und ebenso an die Schweizerische Nationalgesellschaft, unter deren Schirmherrschaft die Arbeit an diesem Artikel beendet wurde. 2 Siehe vor allen Dingen Thom 1985, Petitot 1985. 3 Siehe Kanizsa 1979 und Bozzi 1958, etc., sowie Smith 1992. 4 Vgl. Gibson 1979, und ebenso Stroll 1988, der zum ersten Mal, in Anlehnung an Gibson, eine Ontologie von Oberflächen detailliert ausgearbeitet hat. 5 Vgl. Rosch et al. 1976, Keil 1979. Logos, N. F. 1 (1994), 422–449 2 Common-Sense und Künstliche-Intelligenz-Forschung Wie Computerwissenschaftler im Laufe der Zeit feststellen müssen, ist es besonders schwer, einem Computer das alltägliche Wissen zu vermitteln. Gerade dieses Wissen ist jedoch von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Es scheint klar zu sein, dass das System unserer Common-Sense-Überzeugungen nicht nur bemerkenswert effizient ist, wenn es darum geht, Probleme zu lösen, die unser tägliches Leben betreffen, sondern auch bemerkenswert anpassungsfähig. Es erhält auf diese Weise seine Funktionsfähigkeit in verschiedenen Situationen und über verschiedene Generationen sogar dann, wenn sich die Umgebung oder andere Bedingungen katastrophal verändern. Dementsprechend werden einige Anstrengungen unternommen, Modelle zu entwickeln, die nicht nur unsere Common-Sense-Überzeugungen erfassen, sondern auch verschiedene Aspekte der Common-Sense-Realität, in der wir leben, uns bewegen und arbeiten. Ein Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es nun, Ideen zu einer Common-Sense-Physik, wie sie sich aus der KI-Forschung ergeben, als Vorstufe einer philosophischen Darstellung der Strukturen der Common-Sense-Realität zu verwenden, die den Anspruch einer Theorie erhebt. Betrachten wir z.B. die sog. 'qualitative Physik' von Kleer und Brown (1984). Sie versucht, das Verhalten von Geräten vorauszusagen und zu erklären, indem sie Algorithmen verwendet, die die Aktivitätsmuster komplexer Geräte durch das generische Verhalten ihrer Komponenten bestimmt. Dies lässt sich wiederum auf eine kleine Anzahl von Basistypen zurückführen, die sich in unterschiedlichen Gebieten unterschiedlich aber erfreulicherweise dennoch vergleichbar wiederfinden. (Rohre z.B. können Luft, Wasser, elektrischen Strom, Information, Investement Fonds etc. befördern.) In bezug auf jeden Konstituententyp können wir dann wiederum eine kleine Anzahl fester Basiszustände unterscheiden, die durch klare Übergänge getrennt sind (z.B. an/aus; Fliessrichtung links/rechts). Wir stehen daher nicht, wie in der Standardphysik, unüberschaubaren quantitativen Kontinua gegenüber, sondern einem kleinen, endlichen Raum alternativer Zustände, von denen jeder leicht wahrnehmbar von seinem Nachbarn unterschieden werden kann. Bewegungen in einen oder aus einem solchen Basiszustand können zudem durch Gleichungen in einem qualitativen Differentialkalkül dargestellt werden, wobei z. B. p > 0, dp/dt > 0, d2p/dt2 = 0 eine Situation repräsentieren könnte, in der Druck in einem vorgegebenen Behälter konstant ist und mit einer konstanten Rate ansteigt.6 6 Siehe hierzu auch Forbus 1983, 1984, 1985, Kuipers 1986, Weld und Kleer (Hrsg.) 1989. 3 Bedingungen und Beschränkungen Oder man betrachte den Versuch von Gardin, Metzler und ihren Studenten, eine wissenschaftliche, naive Physik zu entwickeln, die auf einer analogen Computerrepräsentation von Alltagsobjekten, wie etwa Seilen, Stangen, Hebeln und Flaschenzügen basiert. Dies wird durch die Konstruktion eines zweidimensionalen graphischen Array erreicht, die als Bestandteile so entworfen sind, dass sie Verhaltensmuster zeigen, die als qualitativ korrekt für die Objekte der angegebenen Art akzeptiert werden.7 Seile z. B. können annähernd als eindimensionale Aggregate von Molekülen modelliert werden, die die folgenden vier Bedingungen erfüllen. Diese Bedingungen erweisen sich als qualitativ hinreichend, um korrekt das Verhalten in einer Reihe von Situationen zu erfassen: 1. Kontinuität: Es gibt einen festen Distanzpartner (z. B. Null) zwischen jedem Molekül und seinen Nachbarn. 2. Flexibilität: Es gibt einen festen Winkelparameter, der die obere Grenze festlegt, um den eine Linie, die die Zentren zweier benachbarter Moleküle verbindet, rotieren darf. 3. Undurchdringlichkeit: Es gibt keine Überschneidung zwischen den Pixeln eines Moleküls und den Pixeln, die Teile von Objekten der Umgebung sind. 4. Empfindlichkeit gegenüber äusseren Kräften: Kräfte wie etwa Gravitation, Wind oder Strömungswiderstand sind in der Struktur eines jeden Moleküls gespeichert.8 Dieser Ansatz ist vielseitig verwendbar. Durch die Veränderung des Flexibilitätswinkels von 180o auf Oo ist es möglich, das Verhalten einer starren Stange zu simulieren. Wählt man Werte zwischen den angegebenen Grenzen, erlaubt dies die Simulation von Hebeln mit verschiedenen Flexibilitätsgraden. Die oben angegebenen Bedingungen werden an einem Computermonitor mittels Versuch und Irrtum experimentell ermittelt: Hierbei wird die menschliche Fähigkeit, die qualitative Richtigkeit einer physikalischen Anordnung, die von einer Reihe von Variablen abhängt, zu erkennen, als Instrument zur Bestimmung von Gesetzen der naiven Physik verwendet. Es sei hieran die sehr viel älteren Experimente von Albert Michotte (1946) erinnert, der noch ohne die Vorteile einer Computersimulation auskommen musste. Diese Experimente wurden entworfen, um zu zeigen, wie (und unter welchen Bedingungen) Dinge und Ereignisse in der Natur als in Beziehung stehend wahrgenommen werden. (Hier interessierten besonders kausale Beziehungen.) Michotte dachte daher natürlich nicht im entferntesten an die Möglichkeit, mittels dieser Methode ein Modell der Interaktion der physikalischen Objekte 7 Vgl. Gardin und Meltzer 1989. 8 Gravitation ist z. B. gespeichert als die Tendenz eines Elementes, sich in eine bestimmte Richtung zu bewegen. Die Entfernung ist hierbei durch einen Parameter festgelegt, der die anliegende Kraft bestimmt. Siehe Gardin und Meltzer 1989, S. 143, sowie Gambadella 1985. 4 unserer gesamten Alltagswelt zu entwerfen. (Es muss natürlich sofort erwähnt werden, dass auch Gardin und seine Kollegen davon noch weit entfernt sind.) Hobbs et al. (1988) untersuchten, in welcher Weise Common-Sense-Wissen beim Verstehen von Texten über mechanische Geräte und ihr Versagen eingesetzt wird. Die daraus resultierende 'Common-Sense-Metaphysik' läuft auf eine Theorie von Zentralbegriffen (Granularität, Skalen, Zeit, Raum, Kraft, Kausalität, Veränderung etc.) heraus, die sich nahezu bei jeder Art von Untersuchung finden. Man betrachte z. B. die Familie der Begriffe, die mit der Vorstellung von Kraft verbunden sind. Ein materieller Körper kann als Forminvariant gegenüber einer angegebenen Kraft angesehen werden, wenn sich seine Form unter Einwirkung dieser Kraft nicht verändert. Die topologische Invarianz eines Körpers kann auf die gleiche Weise definiert werden. Ein Körper hört auf, Formund Topologieinvariant zu sein, wenn Kräfte, die einen bestimmten Schwellenwert übersteigen (z. B. d1 und d2) auf ihn einwirken. (Man beachte, dass wir auch hier, wie oben schon beschrieben, wieder in jedem Fall ein Beispiel für Übergänge von einem Basiszustand in einen anderen haben.) Mittels dieser Begriffe ist es nun möglich zu definieren, was es für ein bestimmtes Material bedeutet 'hart' zu sein, oder 'flexibel', 'geschmeidig', 'dehnbar', 'elastisch', 'zerbrechlich', 'schlüssig' etc.9 Für Kräfte mit einem Wert d < d1, ist das Material hart, für Kräfte mit einem Wert d1 < d < d2, ist es flexibel usw. Ähnliche Methoden können verwendet werden, um die Familie der Begriffe zu untersuchen, die mit den verschiedenen Möglichkeiten der kausalen Verbundenheit zweier Körper assoziiert sind. Die Verbindung von Körpern kann z. B. durch die Tatsache definiert werden, dass die Bewegung des einen eine Bewegung des anderen beinhaltet. In diesem Sinn kann eine Verbindung direkt oder durch einen Pfad besonderer Verknüpfungen vermittelt sein. Diese Begriffe lassen sich nun weiter verwenden, um Vorstellungen wie etwa Barriere, Öffnung, Durchdringung etc. zu definieren.10 Die naive Physik von Patrick Hayes unterstützt eine noch allgemeinere Theorie, die eine grossangelegte Formalisierung der Art von Common-SenseWissen enthält, das geeignet ist, eine formale Theorie (erster Ordnung, axiomatisch) hervorzubringen. Die Axiome dieser Theorie sind intuitiv akzeptabel. (Dies wird hierbei teilweise mittels Introspektion entschieden.) Naive Physik soll in diesem Sinne 'intelligent' sein. Aber sie soll ebenso 'naiv' in dem Sinn sein, dass einer ihrer Ausgangspunkte, die relevanten CommonSense-Überzeugungen von normalen Menschen sind. Wie, so fragt Hayes, kann man einen Roboter konstruieren, der erfolgreich die 'Schlacht am kalten Buffet' besteht? Solch ein Roboter müsste nicht nur die Fähigkeit besitzen, Wände, Türen, Stühle, Tische und Menschen zu erkennen. Er müsste ebenfalls Geschirr und Besteck, Tomaten, Salate, Saucen und andere Dinge handhaben können; und dies in einer Weise, dass er dazu so etwas wie 9 Hobbs et al. 1988, Hager 1985. 10 Hobbs et al. 1988 und schon viel früher Lewin 1936. 5 eine Theorie der gesamten Welt von festen und flüssigen Stoffen benötigt.11 Eine Physik der üblichen Art würde ihm hier nicht helfen. Dies liegt zuerst einmal daran, dass die relevanten Berechnungen, wenn sie auf der Basis der Standardphysik durchgeführt werden könnten (und wenn die relevanten Eingabedaten irgendwie bereitgestellt wären), für die gestellte Aufgabe in bezug auf den Umfang zu langsam und zu rechenintensiv wären. Aber die Standardphysik hilft hier noch nicht weiter, da ihre Theorien sich nicht auf die richtigen Teile und Dimensionen der Realität beziehen, so dass, selbst wenn exakte Lösungen der physikalischen Gleichungen vorlägen, es im allgemeinen unmöglich wäre, hieraus intuitive Information zu extrahieren, die bei zukünftigen Handlungen relevant wäre. Demzufolge stellt sich Hayes die Aufgabe, die Axiome einer Theorie von Eigenschaften und Beziehungen zu bestimmen, die das Feld der normalen, durchschnittlichen oder typischen menschlichen Erfahrung strukturieren. Denn schliesslich scheinen Menschen die Fähigkeit zu besitzen, sich an einem kalten Buffet bewegen zu können. Man muss annehmen, dass sie irgendwie die dabei auftretenden Probleme des Informationssammelns und –interpretierens lösen. Wie wir schon gesagt haben, strebt Hayes eine vollständige Theorie der Common-Sense-Realität an. Er ist nicht willens, die Reichweite und den Detaillierungsgrad seiner Theorie zugunsten einer schnellen Implementierung lauffähiger Programme zu opfern. Solche Programme – so zeigt die Erfahrung – versagen, wenn der Versuch unternommen wird, sie auf einen neuen Problembereich anzuwenden. Sein Projekt steht im direkten Gegensatz zu den früher in der KI üblichen und charakteristischen Ansätzen, kleine, axiomatische Theorien über eingeschränkte Domänen – sogenannte 'Spielzeugwelten' zu formulieren. (Es unterscheidet sich ebenso vom obengenannten Ansatz von Gardin und Meltzer.) Tatsächlich behauptet Hayes, dass die Axiome seiner Theorie alles in allem 104 bis 105 Prädikate benötigen würden. Diese Prädikate lassen sich jedoch in verschiedene Untergruppen aufteilen, die vorläufig und provisorisch unterscheidbare Bereiche der betrachteten Disziplin repräsentieren. So unterschiedet Hayes im besonderen Untergruppen von Prädikaten in Beziehung auf: Orte und Positionen Raum und Objekte Qualitäten und Quantitäten Veränderung und Zeit Energie, Wirkung und Bewegung Zusammensetzungen und Teile von Stoffen Man betrachte z. B. die Untergruppe, die sich auf Orte und Positionen bezieht. Hier sind möglicherweise Prädikate für folgende Begriffe enthalten: auf, in, an, Pfad, innerhalb, ausserhalb, Mauer, Begrenzung, Behälter, Hindernis, Barriere usw. (Man beachte das Ausmass, in dem viele dieser Begriffe 11 Ich vernachlässige hier die erheblichen Schwierigkeiten, die überwunden werden müssten, wollte man die notwendige Hardware bauen. 6 fremdartig in bezug auf die Darstellungen der Standardphysik sind.) In der naiven Physik von Hayes kann keiner der hier genannten Begriffe auf einen anderen Begriff reduziert oder mittels eines anderen definiert werden. Eine adäquate Behandlung des Prädikats, das 'auf' kodiert, würde dieses Prädikat zusätzlich zu den rein geometrischen Komponenten dieses Begriffes, au die sich frühere Untersuchungen von Spielzeugwelten normalerweise konzentrierten, axiomatisch mit Prädikaten für Reibung, Unterstützung, Schwerkraft, Festigkeit, Spannung, Tragfähigkeit usw. verbinden. Zusätzlich könnte jedes dieser Prädikate nur adäquat behandelt werden, wenn es mit Hilfe von Axiomen in nichttrivialer Weise mit einigen oder allen anderen Prädikaten verbunden wäre. Die Theorie der naiven Physik wäre Hayes' Ansicht zufolge, im Gegensatz zu Systemen wie Carnaps Aufbau (oder Zermelo-Fraenkels Mengentheorie), in denen eine kleine Anzahl primitiver Begriffe für den Aufbau des gesamten Gebäudes der Theorie ausreicht, hochgradig nicht-hierarchisch. Die formalen Eigenschaften dieser nicht-hierarchischen Theorie sind, wie es schient, bisher kaum untersucht worden, und wir tappen hierbei ebenso im Dunkeln wie bei der Frage nach den formalen Eigenschaften der alltagsphysikalischen Realität selbst. Es scheint jedoch als gäbe es wichtige Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Theorien der oben beschriebenen Art und logischen Systemen, die die Verwendung sogenannter 'kreativer Definitionen' gestatten; Systemen wie sie von Lesniewski beschrieben wurden.12 Von Aristoteles zu Galileo Die Frage, mit der ich mich hier beschäftigen möchte, ist nicht ob Hobbs oder Hayes et al. mit ihrer Annahme Recht haben, dass man auf diesem Weg zu einer komputationell effizienten Theorie der naiven Physik gelangt, die Probleme zu lösen vermag, die sich in der Robotik stellen. Tatsächlich scheint es zu diesem Zeitpunkt fraglich, ob eine vorhersagende Wissenschaft der eher üblichen Art mittels dieser Methoden erreicht werden kann. Gründe für diese Ansicht werde ich weiter unten angeben.13 Dies ist hier zweitrangig, da die augenblickliche Forschung im Bereich der naiven Physik von einem deskriptiven Standpunkt aus gesehen bereits interessant und herausfordernd ist. Dies gilt unabhängig von allen vorhersagenden oder erklärenden Anliegen, die möglicherweise damit verbunden sind. In dieser, aber auch in anderer Hinsicht finden sich in ihr Anklänge an frühere Exkurse in naiv-physikalische Theorien wie die des Aristoteles und seinen vor-galileischen Nachfolgern. 12 Siehe Rickey 1975. 13 Siehe auch McDermott 1990, der zu Recht Hayes >logizistische< Annahme kritisiert, dass wir Deduktionen aus Axiomen zuhilfe nehmen, wenn wir uns mittels naiver Physik in der Welt zurecht finden. Es gibt andere zentrale Aspekte in Hayes Theorie, gegen die man Einwände erheben kann. So ist z. B. der Ansatz zu einer Ontologie von Flüssigkeiten in Hayes 1985a fehlerhaft, da er wesentlich auf dem nicht durch den CommonSense gestützten (Quine-inspirierten) Trick basiert, Objekte auf vierdimensionale Abläufe zu reduzieren.Wie R. Casatii in einer bisher unveröffentlichten Arbeit gezeigt hat, führt dies zu stark gegen den Common-Sensegerichteten Konsequenzen. 7 Psychologen der Gegenwart haben tatsächlich eine Ähnlichkeit festgestellt zwischen vielen unserer alltagsphysikalischen Überzeugungen und Vorstellungen über Bewegung und Kraft, die von Denkern – wie etwa Philoponus und Buridan – entwickelt wurden, die in einem vorgalileischen Rahmen gearbeitet haben.14 Philosophen haben traditionellerweise mit Aristoteles angenommen, dass sich die Menschen in gewisser Weise in Harmonie mit der Welt befinden: die Formen, die sich in unserem Geist finden, sind die Formen der Dinge, die wir sehen. Wie Feyerabend in seiner 'Defence of Aristotle' (1978) feststellt: Aristoteles suchte nicht nach tieferen Theorien über das, was 'hinter' oder 'jenseits der Erscheinungen' liegt, denn die Suche nach solchen Theorien würde die Annahme beinhalten, dass die Welt nicht so ist wie sie erscheint. Natürlich lässt die aristotelische Ansicht Spielraum für Irrtümer. Diese beziehen sich jedoch nur auf einzelne Wahrnehmungen; die allgemeinen Eigenschaften von Wahrnehmungswissen bleiben unberührt. Daher wird die Aristotelische oder Common-Sense-Konzeption 'niemals zugeben, dass dieses vollständig falsch ist. Irrtum ist ein lokales Phänomen, er zerstört nicht unsere gesamte Ansicht. Auf der anderen Seite postuliert die moderne Wissenschaft (und die Philosophien des Platon und des Demokrit, die in sie eingegangen sind) gerade solch globale Störungen.' (Feyerabend 1978: 148). Das gegenwärtige psychologische Interesse an der naiven Physik tendiert verständlicherweise dazu, sich auf gerade die idyllisch anmutenden Aspekte der Aristotelischen/Common-Sense-Konzeption der Welt zu konzentrieren, von der die nachfolgende Physik zeigte (nach Aristoteles Ansicht per impossibilie), dass sie auf einem systematischen Irrtum beruht. Die Existenz solcher systematischer Fehler sollte uns jedoch nicht daran hindern, die Tatsache zu sehen, dass die zentralen Prinzipien der Aristotelischen Weltsicht durch die nachfolgende Physik nicht als fehlerhaft entlarvt wurden.15 Wurden diese zentralen Prinzipien überhaupt in Frage gestellt, dann wurden sie von einer Philosophie untergraben, die unsere Common-Sense-Überzeugungen en bloc in das Reich der systematischen Fehler verwies.16 Auf diese Weise wird Wahrheit im besten Falle an eine Realität gebunden, die 'jenseits der Erscheinung' liegt, und Ontologie wird auf die gleiche Weise schlussendlich zu einer reinen Wiederholung nachgalileischer Physik. Im Gegensatz hierzu möchten wir an dieser Stelle allgemein zusammenstellen, welche Teile der Aristotelischen Weltsicht zu Recht als wahr gewertet werden können – wahr in bezug auf eine Common-Sense-Realität, deren Beziehung zu einer physikalischen Realität dann natürlich unabhängig 14 Siehe vor allen Dingen die weiter unter genannten Arbeiten von Bozzi, und moderne Arbeiten wie z. B. McCloskey 1983a, Holland et al. 1986, S. 208. 15 So war es für Aristoteles z. B. Vollständig klar, dass feste Körper, wenn sie nicht daran gehindert werden, in Richtung Mittelpunkt der Erde fallen. 16 So vertreten die Korpuskularphilosophen die Ansicht, dass die Mehrzahl unserer normalen Wahrnehmungsurteile wörtlich verstanden falsch sind, da die Röte oder die Wärme, die wir wahrnehmen, nicht – wie wir üblicherweise annehmen – wirklich Eigenschaften oder Zustände von materiellen Dingen sind (Vgl. Philipse 1989: 143). 8 hergestellt werden muss. (Diese zweite Frage, das sie hier festgehalten, taucht nicht auf, wenn man Common-Sense-Überzeugungen von einer rein psychologischen Perspektive heraus betrachtet.) Daher folgen wir Moore in der Annahme, dass die Common-Sense-Sicht der Welt 'in bestimmten Grundzügen vollständig zutreffend ist' (1959: 44). Unsere Aufgabe wird es sein – teilweise inspiriert durch die modernen naiv-physikalischen Theorien – zu bestimmen, welche fundamentalen Grundzüge oder Bestandteile der Common-Sense-Sicht vollständig zutreffend sind. Es wird aber auch die Aufgabe sein zu bestimmen, wie die in Frage kommenden Wahrheiten (schliesslich) als verträglich mit den Wahrheiten der Physik angesehen werden können. Kann es eine Theorie der naiven Physik geben? Nicht jeder, der sich philosophisch mit der Idee einer Common-Sense-Realität beschäftigt hat, begrüsst die Vorstellung, dass es möglich sein soll, in dem Sinne wie wir eine Theorie der Physik oder der Zahlentheorie haben – eine Theorie über die Wirklichkeit zu formulieren. Tatsächlich gibt es jene, die gerade diese Möglichkeit bezweifeln, während sie die Autonomie der Common-SenseErfahrung begrüssen. Ansichten, die sich in verschiedenen Formen bei Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty und Wittgenstein finden spiegeln sich in H. L. Dreyfus'\" Formulierung wieder: „Es mag sein, dass das Problem, eine Theorie der Common-Sense-Physik zu finden, unlösbar ist, weil dieser Bereich keine theoretische Struktur besitzt. Möglicherweise lernt ein Kind einfach beim täglichen Spielen mit verschiedenen Arten von festen und flüssigen Stoffen über mehrere Jahre hinweg, prototypische Fälle von festen und flüssigen Stoffen etc. zu unterscheiden, und auf diese Weise gewöhnt es sich typische fachmännische Reaktionen auf ihr typisches Verhalten in typischen Situationen an\" (Dreyfus 1988: 33). Die Schlagkraft des Dreyfus'schen Arguments ist jedoch schwer auszumachen; sicherlich lässt sich auch Ähnliches z. B. über die Art und Weise sagen, in der sich Physikstudenten 'typische fachmännische Reaktionen in typischen Situationen' angewöhnen, wenn sie versuchen, physikalische oder mathematische Gleichungen oder Einrichtungen in Labaratorien zu handhaben. Klarerweise würde dies nicht schon die Annahme sanktionieren, dass Physik nicht als Theorie existiert. Daher würde man wesentlich weitergehende Argumente benötigen, um zu zeigen, dass verhaltensrelevantes Wissen nur in unbewusster oder vortheoretischer Form existiert – so dass die Vorstellung der naiven Physik, es explizit zu machen inkohärent wäre (Augustinus scheint so etwas in seinen Confessiones in den Bemerkungen über Zeit vorzuschlagen). Man kann jedoch Wege aufzeigen, auf denen es möglich ist, Dreyfus' Vermutung bezüglich des Widerstands gegen eine Theorie des Common-Sense 9 zu stärken. Man könnte versuchen zu argumentieren, dass der angemessene theoretische Ansatz zu beschreiben, wie Menschen handeln und sich in einem bestimmten Bereich zurechtfinden, nicht mittels theoretischer Überzeugungen formuliert werden darf, sondern eher in Begriffen unintelligenter' Prozesse auf sensomotorischer Ebene. D. h. man kann die Ansicht vertreten, dass die Art und Weise, in der menschliche Wesen mit den täglichen Widrigkeiten umgehen im wesentlichen blind oder mechanisch ist, so dass es keine irgendwie geartete Theorie der Common-Sense-Welt gibt – nicht einmal implizit in den entsprechenden körperlichen Prozessen. Auch wenn wir in keiner Weise eine Theorie der Common-Sense-Physik für unsere alltäglichen motorischen Aktivitäten verwenden, können wir jedoch auf der Ebene von Überzeugungen eine solche Theorie besitzen. Tatsächlich scheint es klar zu sein, dass sowohl Kinder als auch Erwachsene die Fähigkeit besitzen, naiv-physikalisches Wissen auf eine abstrakte Weise zu verwenden, das unabhängig von der Einbindung in die praktische Lösung irgendwelcher spezieller motorischer Probleme ist. Zudem ist es schwer einzusehen, wie ein Ansatz über Common-Sense-Wissen und –Handlungen, der sich auf die Beschreibung von Servomechanismen beschränkt, uns die Möglichkeit gibt, das Verstehen von natürlicher Sprache in irgendeiner Form theoretisch zu erklären. Denn die Möglichkeit des Verstehens (und die Möglichkeit einer natürlichen Sprache überhaupt) scheint wesentlich auf einer allseits geteilten Menge von systematischen Überzeugungen und Urteilen über die Common-Sense-Welt zu beruhen, Überzeugungen und Urteile, die schliesslich selbst in Begriffen der natürlichen Sprache formuliert werden können. Eine weniger radikale Anregung wurde kürzlich in einem etwas anderen Zusammenhang von Stroll (1990) vorgetragen. Naive Physiker und Psychologen sollten ihre Suche nach einer 'holistischen' Theorie der Common-SenseDomäne aufgeben, und sich statt dessenin einem Wittgensteinschen Sinne – mit kontext-sensitiven Beschreibungen einzelner Fälle zufriedengeben. Strolls Argumente erinnern in diesem Fall an die Peripatetische Kritik an der 'Abstraktheit' von Galileo, der von seinen Zeitgenossen beschuldigt wurde, bei seinem Versuch, die Natur mittels allgemeiner Gesetze und Prinzipien verstehen zu wollen, Einzelfälle durchweg vernachlässigt zu haben.17 Sie erinnern ebenso an J. L. Austins Ansicht in 'A Plea for Excuses', dass der Common-Sense so fein strukturiert ist, dass er anstelle eines allumfassenden, systematischen Ansatzes eher einen genauen, stückweisen Ansatz erfordert, der es erlaubt, die Aufmerksamkeit auf Nuancen und Details zu richten. Problematisch für Stroll und seinesgleichen ist jedoch, dass zu verschiedenen Zeiten und in verschiedenen Gebieten sehr grosse Teile einer explizit naivphysikalischen Theorie bereits ausgearbeitet wurden. Sie sind tatsächlich in nahezu jedem Fall 'deskriptiv' in dem Sinn, den Stroll bevorzugt (so z. B. Aristoteles' Physik oder Husserls Krisis), aber sie sind zumindest in dem Sinn 17 Vgl. Bozzi 1958: 2f. der Übersetzung. 10 holistisch, dass sie nicht in unzusammenhängende Teile und apercus zerfallen, wie sie von einigen Wittgensteinianern favorisiert werden. Ausserdem lassen sich, wie wir ja schon gesehen haben, Ansätze zu erklärend-voraussagenden Theorien in dem von Stroll vorgegebenen Rahmen in grosser Zahl in der Literatur zur KI finden. Es ist wahr, dass diese Ansätze bisher keine erfolgreich vorhersagenden Programme hervorgebracht haben, die auch nur im entferntesten an die Approximierung eines kleinen Ausschnitts aus dem Bereich menschlicher Kompetenz heranreicht. Vorzuschlagen, im Strollschen Sinne, dass gerade diese Art der Theoriebildung in diesem Gebiet aufgegeben werden sollte, hiesse jedoch den Ratschlag des inellektuellen Nihilismus glaubwürdig erscheinen zu lassen. Ausserdem ist es nicht ausgeschlossen, dass eine adäquate Theorie der CommonSense-Realität entwickelt werden kann, deren Versagen als Vorhersagemechanismus gerade Licht auf die Natur dieser Realität selbst wirft. (Wir werden weiter unten Gründe angeben, warum ein Ergebnis dieser Art tatsächlich zu erwarten ist). Der Status der naiven Physik Ich werde daher im weiteren die Möglichkeit, eine Theorie der Common-SenseWelt entwerfen zu können, wie sie von den gegenwärtigen Anwendern der naiven oder qualitativen Physik erforscht wird, als selbstverständlich voraussetzen. Wenn die Sprache jedoch auf die aktuelle Arbeit in der KIForschung kommt, ist es wichtig festzuhalten, dass Anwender in diesem Feld und verwandten Gebieten sich typischerweise Ansichten über den Status der Disziplin der naiven Physik zu eigen gemacht haben – vor allen Dingen in Hinsicht auf ihre ontologischen Annahmen -, die sich stark von den hier zu erforschenden unterscheiden. Tatsächlich lassen sich drei teilweise überschneidende Auffassungen unterscheiden, auf die wir uns dementsprechend als die pragmatische, die psychologische und die ontologische Auffassung der naiven Physik beziehen werden: 1. Die pragmatische Konzeption der naiven Physik. Diese versteht die naive Physik weniger als eine Menge von Sätzen, die bezogen auf einen bestimmten Bereich der 'Common-Sense-Realität' wahr sind, sondern als eine Sammlung computational effizienter Faustregeln. Naive Physik kann auf diese Weise als eine Art Theorie angesehen werden; aber dann ist sie eine Theorie, die in rein instrumentellen Begriffen konzipiert ist, so dass sich ihr vermeintliches Objekt – eben die Common-Sense-Realität – als eine Art 'theoretische Entität' herausstellt, die keinen irgendwie gearteten autonomen Status besitzt. 2. Die psychologische Konzeption der naiven Physik. Eine andere Menge von Ansichten könnte lose unter der Überschrift der psychologischen (man könnte auch sagen 'epistemologischen' oder 'kognitiven') Interpretation der naivphysikalischen Disziplin zusammengefasst werden. Diese beinhalten, inter 11 alia, Konzeptionen der naiven Physik als eine Sache von 'mentalen Modellen'18 Aus dieser Sicht ist naive Physik tatsächliche eine Theorie, und nicht nur eine pragmatisch orientierte Sammlung von Faustregeln (oder unbewussten Verhaltensweisen). Aber sie ist nicht, wie die richtige Physik, eine Theorie eines transzendenten Bereichs. Sie ist eher eine Art verkleidete Psychologie; eine Wissenschaft von Überzeugungen, die Menschen in bezug auf ihre Alltagsumgebung teilen. Dass zumindest einige dieser Überzeugungen falsch sind, bleibt im Rahmen dieser Ansicht ohne Folgen, denn wahren und falschen Überzeugungen wird völlig zu Recht die gleiche psychologische Realität zugesprochen. 3. Die ontologische Konzeption der naiven Physik. Die dritte Gruppe der hier unterschiedenen Ansichten betrachtet die naive Physik als eine – bis zu einem gewissen Grade zutreffende Theorie über eine stabile, klar abgegrenzte, präzise und natürlich bestimmbare, eigenständige Objektmenge, die von der psychologischen verschieden ist und zu Recht den Titel 'Common-SenseWelt' trägt. Es war die Untersuchungen dieser Objektmenge, die in der Zeit vor (und einige Zeit nach Galileo) die Untersuchungen, bei den Metaphysikern und Naturphilosophen vorherrschte. Hier sind klarerweise wahre und falsche Überzeugungen über die physikalische Umgebung nicht von gleichem Wert. Tatsächlich ist es das wichtigste Ziel dieser Konzeption der naiven Physik präzise die systematischen Hilfsmittel herauszufinden, die es gestatten, solche Überzeugungen, die Eingang in das Gebäude der Theorie verdienen, aus der Gesamtheit der Überzeugungen herauszufiltern. Ad 1. Die pragmatische Konzeption, die vor allen Dingen im Bereich der KIForschung vorherrscht, wird im weiteren wenig interessieren. Ein nicht unerhebliches Problem bei dieser Theorie ist, dass sie unsere normalen Intuitionen in einer Weise verkehrt, dass Tische, Stühle, Brotlaibe etc. als 'theoretische Entitäten' gezählt werden. Ein anderes Problem ist, wie bei allen pragmatischen Theorien, dass sie nur einen Teil der Geschichte erzählt. Sie erzählt nicht, und kann auch nicht erzählen, warum bei mehreren verschiedenen Realisierungen der naiv-physikalischen Disziplin eine mehr oder weniger nützlich oder effektiv sein soll als die anderen. Es hiesse auch hier den Ratschlag des intellektuellen Nihilisten befolgen, wollte man verneinen, dass es an dieser Stelle tiefere Fragen gibt; Fragen, die sowohl Gründe für verschiedene Grade der intuitiven Adäquatheit als auch für computationellen oder prädikativen Erfolg bzw. Misserfolg zu Tage fördern. Ad 2. Forschung auf dem Gebiet der naiven Physik gehört der psychologischen Konzeption entsprechend zur experimentellen Psychologie, so wie sie üblicherweise verstanden wird, oder zu benachbarten Gebieten wie 18 Vgl. Z. B. Gentner und Stevens (Hrsg.) 1983. 12 etwa der kognitiven Anthropologie. Man kann z. B. untersuchen, wie sich die naiv-physikalischen Überzeugungen von Kindern modifizieren oder korrigieren, wenn sie die Newtonsche Betrachtungsweise der Welt entdecken, wie sie sich in Standardbüchern der Physik findet.19 Oder man kann das Ausmass untersuchen, in dem nicht-newtonsche Überzeugungen über die physikalische Welt unbewusst auch bei solchen Erwachsenen erhalten geblieben sind, die andererseits zeigen können, dass sie in der Lage sind, die korrekten Newtonschen Prinzipien zu bestätigen.20 Es gibt bestimmt Hinsichten, in denen die Untersuchungen solcher Dinge nützlich und erhellend sind. Ein Problem an dieser Stelle ist jedoch, dass es – nimmt man die psychologische (anthropologische, Entwicklungs-) Perspektive einmal ernst – schwierig zu rechtfertigen scheint, warum von einer einzigen Disziplin der naiven Physik gesprochen werden sollte. Es scheint bei verschiedenen Gruppen von Menschen zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten und an unterschiedlichen Orten eine grosse Menge verschiedener Systeme von naiv-physikalischen Überzeugungen zu geben. Es gibt nicht nur einen Gegensatz zwischen der Physik von Kindern und Erwachsenen; es scheint ebenso eine Vielfalt von physikalischen Überzeugungen in verschiedenen Kulturen zu geben. Dies geht soweit, dass einige sich vorstellen, die naive Physik kollabiere zu einer strukturlosen Masse von Überzeugungssystemen, in denen sich eine endlose Vielfalt durch Raum und Zeit manifestiert. Sucht man Evidenz für eine solche Ansicht, wird man sicherlich, bei dem reichen Angebot solcher Konzeptionen der Natur der Realität in verschiedenen Kulturen, unzweifelhaft fündig. In bezug au die Vielfalt der naiv-physikalischen Überzeugungssysteme, die die Geschichte der Menschen, vielleicht sogar der Tiere, hervorgebracht hat, wurde tatsächlich viel wertvolle Arbeit in einem Gebiet geleistet, das man 'Ethnophysik' nennen könnte.21 Es wäre jedoch falsch anzunehmen, es gäbe a priori bei einer solchen Verschiedenheit keinen gemeinsamen Rahmen. So sollte nicht vorausgesetzt werden dass sich zu jedem systematischen Unterschied im Verhalten entsprechend ein systematischer Unterschied in dem findet, was richtigerweise als die dieses Verhalten steuernde, naive Physik angesehen 19 Siehe z. B. Shanon 1976, Peters 1982, Clement 1982, DiSessa 1982, Kaiser, Jonides und Alexander 1986, Roncato und Rumiati 1986. 20 Wie McCloskey es in bezug auf die >erstaunlich wohl-formulierten naiven Theorien der Bewegung<, die Menschen aufgrund ihrer Alltagserfahrung entwickeln, feststellt: „Theorien, die von verschiedenen Individuen entwickelt wurden, lassen sich am besten als verschiedene Formen derselben Basistheorie beschreiben. Obwohl diese Basistheorie ein vernünftiges Resultat der Erfahrung mit Bewegung in der wirklichen Welt zu sein scheint, ist sie verblüffend inkonsistent mit den fundamentalen Prinzipien der klassischen Physik. Tatsächlich zeigt die naive Theorie erstaunliche Ähnlichkeit zur vor-newtonschen Theorie, wie sie im vierzehnten bis sechzehnten Jahrhundert populär war.< (1983: 299) Siehe auch S. 318 über die erstaunliche Hartnäckigkeit der Alltagstheorie im Angesicht eines formalen physikalischen Trainings, ebenso McCloskey 1983a, McCloskex et al. 1980 und Forguson 1989. 21 Köhler 1921 beschäftigt sich ausführlich mit der naiven Physik von Schimpansen. Er argumentiert vor allen Digen, dass es für Schimpansen so gut wie keine Statik gibt, und vermerkt, dass Ähnliches auch für sehr kleine Kinder gilt. Siehe auch Lipmann und Bogen (1922), eine Experimentalstudie über menschliche naive Physik, die von Studenten von Köhler in Berlin durchgeführt wurde. 13 wird. Man hätte vielleicht nur einen Fall eines weitverbreiteten Irrtums. Es scheint z. B. bei Amerikanern ein weitverbreitetes, falsches Verständnis darüber zu geben wie ein Thermostat arbeitet. Diese Tatsache sollte jedoch nicht dazu verleiten anzunehmen, wie anscheinend Kempton (1987) dies tut, dass diejenigen, die solch falsche Überzeugungen bzgl. Thermostaten besitzen, dadurch eine nicht-standard, naiv-physikalische 'Theorie der Wärme' offenbaren. Aus unserer gegenwärtigen Perspektive kann es ebensowenig eine Common-Sense-Theorie der Thermostate geben wie es eine Common-SenseTheorie der Osmose oder des radioaktiven Zerfalls geben kann. Thermostate sind, naiv gesprochen, Kästen, die die Wärme regulieren. Theorien oder populäre Vorurteile, die hinter diese naive Basis zurückgehen, gehören nicht zum Common-Sense, und können deshalb auch nicht zur Unterstützung der Ansicht herangezogen werden, dass der Common-Sense selbst in wesentlichen Aspekten stark diversifiziert ist. Ad 3. Es ist die dritte (ontologische) Konzeption der naiven Physik, die an dieser Stelle verteidigt werden soll. Diese Konzeption basiert auf der Vorstellung, dass es möglich ist, Prinzipien zu formulieren, die es schrittweise gestatten, Irrtümer und andere nichtzugehörige Dinge aus der Menge der Überzeugungen zu entfernen, die für die Konstruktion einer zutreffenden naiv-physikalischen Theorie wesentlich sind. Solche Prinzipien geben uns die Möglichkeit, mit der angenommenen Vielfalt alltags-physikalischer Überzeugungssysteme so umgehen zu können, dass die Common-Sense-Welt, mit der die ontologische Konzeption umgeht, sich als unabhängig von Variationen in den Überzeugungen herausstellt. Eine parallele Intuition wird von jenen verteidigt – z. B. den sogenannten 'Südlichen Fundamentalisten'22 -, die der Vorstellung anhängen, dass unsere alltäglichen psychologischen Überzeugungen ebenfalls ein bona fide System von Wahrheiten konstituieren. Tatsächlich scheint jedes physikalische Problem, das hier besprochen wurde, ein exaktes Äquivalent in den Problemen zu besitzen, die Philosophen und andere gerne als 'Folkpsychology' bezeichnen.23 Auch dort findet man eine grosse Spannbreite von Überzeugungen, die Menschen zu verschiedenen Zeiten an verschiedenen Orten besassen. Die Existenz von falschen Überzeugungen bzgl. des Geistes impliziert jedoch nicht schon selbst die Unmöglichkeit, hieraus einen Kern primärer alltagspsychologischer Überzeugungen herauszulösen – Überzeugungen, die wahr sein können und die einen wahren, wissenschaftlichen Status beanspruchen. In ähnlicher Weise, so werde ich behaupten, berechtigt die Existenz einer mehr oder weniger volkstümlichen Physik nicht selbst schon ausreichend die 22 Vgl. Graham und Horgan 1988. Siehe auch Forguson 1989 über >rationale Psychologie< als eine wahre Theorie über unsere geistigen Tätigkeiten. 23 Dies wurde von D'Andrade 1987 klar herausgearbeitet, der nebenbei auch die bemerkenswerte Ähnlichkeit alltagspsychologischer Modelle mit Ansichten über die Strukturen des Geistes in der philosophischen Tradition aufdeckt. 14 Zurückweisung der Idee einer strenger konzipierten, (wahren) naiven Physik. Wenn es ein lohnenswertes Projekt ist, wie einige behaupten, die eher volkstümlichen Teile einer Common-Sense-Psychologie wegzustreichen, um so weit wie möglich die Gesetze festzustellen, die den mentalen Bereich von Überzeugungen und Wünschen regieren, dann ist es ein wohl ebenso verfolgenswertes Projekt, die eher volkstümlichen Teile einer CommonSense-Physik wegzustreichen, um die Gesetze herauszuarbeiten, die den Bereich der Common-Sense-Objekte und –Ereignisse regieren, auf die sich diese Überzeugungen und Wünsche primär beziehen. Die Dominanz der psychologischen und epistemologischen Orientierung der modernen Philosophen tritt sehr deutlich zutage, wenn man das Ausmass betrachtet, in dem Fragen der angegebenen Art für den Bereich der Alltagspsychologie ernsthaft untersucht werden, während ihre alltagsphysikalischen Gegenstücke nahezu vollständig ignoriert wurden. Naive Physik ist wahr Der Anthropologe Robin Horton hat eine für uns in diesem Zusammenhang nützliche Unterscheidung vorgeschlagen zwischen einer, wie er es nennt, 'primären Theorie', und verschiedene Arten von 'sekundären Theorien' die seiner Argumentation zufolge charakteristisch sind für verschiedene kulturelle und soziale Gegebenheiten. Horton macht darauf aufmerksam, dass die primäre Theorie – oder das, was wir bisher Common-Sense genannt haben – in bezug auf die Abdeckung verschiedener Bereiche bei verschiedenen Personen in unterschiedlichem Masse entwickelt ist. In anderen Hinsichten unterscheidet sie sich jedoch nur wenig von Kultur zu Kultur. Im Falle von sekundären oder 'konstruktiven' Theorien ergeben sich im Gegensatz dazu „überraschende Unterschiede zwischen Gemeinschaft und Gemeinschaft, Kultur und Kultur. Ein westlicher Anthropologe z. B., der mit einem rein mechanistischen Weltbild aufgewachsen ist, könnte die spiritualistische Weltsicht einer afrikanischen Gemeinschaft als extrem fremdartig empfinden\" (1982: 228). Diese Übereinstimmung in der primären Theorie hat evolutionäre Wurzeln: „In einer bestimmten Art und Weise muss eine solche Theorie zumindest mit gewissen Aspekten der Realität, die sie vorgibt zu repräsentieren, 'korrespondieren'. 'Korrespondierte' sie nicht, hätten ihre Benutzer über die Zeit hinweg wohl kaum überlebt. Gleichzeitig hat ihre Struktur eine deutlich erkennbar funktionale Beziehung zu den spezifisch menschlichen Zielen und der spezifisch menschlichen Ausstattung, mittels derer sie erworben wird. Insbesondere ist sie sehr gut auf eine spezifische Art der Hand-Auge 15 Koordination zugeschnitten, die charakteristisch für die menschliche Rasse und der mit ihr verbundenen manuellen Technologie ist, die sich im täglichen Leben seit der Geburt der Menschheit bis zum heutigen Tage als Hauptstütze herausgebildet hat.\" (op. cit.: 232). Aus der Sicht des Überlebens gesehen, können wir über Micro-Geister und Macro-Teufel, die sich auf Ebenen über oder unter der Ebene des täglichen Lebens befinden, glauben, was wir wollen; sind jedoch die allgemeinen physikalischen Strukturen der Alltagsrealität betroffen, sind wir darauf beschränkt, die Wahrheit zu glauben – sonst wären wir nicht hier.24 Tatsächlich scheint es der Fall zu sein, dass die Common-Sense-Welt in allen Kulturen als eine Vielzahl von dauerhaften Substanzen mit wahrnehmbaren Eigenschaften verstanden wird, die Veränderungen (Ereignissen und Prozessen) verschiedenster Art unterworfen sind. All dies existiert unabhängig von unserem Wissen und davon, ob es uns bewusst wird. Es existiert weiter als ein einziges Ganzes, das in Raum und Zeit ausgedehnt ist. Die entsprechende Menge von Überzeugungen wird im ständigen Gebrauch geprüft, und überlebt bzw. entwickelt sich in sehr vielen verschiedenen Umgebungen weiter. Unabhängig von den Veränderungen, die in ihrem Umfeld möglicherweise auftreten, haben Menschen anscheinend die Fähigkeit, sich – sofort und spontan – eine Common-Sense-Realität als Zufluchtsstätte zurechtzuschneiden. Zudem lassen sich unsere CommonSense-Überlegungen leicht von einer Sprache in eine andere übersetzen und Urteile, die solche Überzeugungen ausdrücken, sind durch eine weitverbreitete, unwidersprochene Zustimmung gekennzeichnet. Common-Sense-Theorie und die wissenschaftliche Physik Jetzt wird die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen der naiven Physik und einer physikalischen Wissenschaft der üblichen quantitativen Art immer dringender. Und auch hier lässt sich eine Bandbreite von verschiedenen Konzeptionen unterscheiden. Eine extreme Position ist die Ansicht, dass die Common-Sense-Realität selbst die einzige existierende Realität ist, so dass die Standardphysik als zweitrangig zur und hervorgehend aus einer Wissenschaft der Common-Sense-Realität instrumental gedeutet werden muss. (Es gibt Hinweise für diese Ansicht in Husserls Krisis – wo sich auch wichtige Antizipationen von Hortons Idee der primären und sekundären Theorie finden.) Zwischen dieser und der entgegengesetzten Extremposition, die die naive Physik schlicht für falsch hält – eine Position, die wir oben bereits die Gelegenheit hatten abzulehnen – gibt es eine Familie von emergentistischen 24 Wir können jedoch nicht die Evolutionstheorie als Beweis für den Common-Sense heranziehen. Diese Theorie, wie alle voll entwickelten wissenschaftlichen Theorien, beruht auf Evidenzen, deren Interpretation selbst die Wahrheit des Common-Sense voraussetzt. 16 Ansichten, nach denen sowohl der Common-Senseals auch der standardphysikalischen Realität eine autonome, eigene Existenz zugesprochen wird, wobei die erste als ein Überbau angesehen wird, der aus stabilen Eigenschaften der zweiten auf höherer Ebene aufgebaut ist. Solche Ansichten haben gewissen Parallelen zur kürzlich von Searle verteidigten Ansicht, der Geist sei eine Eigenschaft des Gehirns auf höherer Stufe. Geist ist einfach, um es mit Searle auszudrücken, 'verursacht durch ... und realisiert in' bestimmten Teilen der physikalischen Realität25, nämlich in den Operationen und Strukturen des menschlichen Gehirns. Die Common-Sense-Realität wird entsprechend durch Teile der physikalischen Realität, die unsere externe Umwelt konstituiert, verursacht und in ihr realisiert. Common-Sense-Realität und Geist sind entsprechend diesem Standpunkt beide vollständig autonome Objekte von theoretischer Bedeutung: beide sind jedoch dergestalt, dass sie den Arten von Theorien, die sie unterstützen können, Grenzen setzen. Vor allen Dingen kann, wie wir noch sehen werden, die Common-Sense-Realität nicht die Art von voraussagender Theorie unterstützen, die wir gerne in bezug auf Schnitte durch die physikalische Realität auf bestimmten tieferen Ebenen hätten. Die Physik der Common-Sense-Welt26 Wie gelingt es uns, aus der Gesamtheit der Strukturen der physikalischen Welt diejenigen auszuwählen, die für die Ebene der naiven Physik, den wir hier betrachten, gerade relevant sind? Wir richten die Aufmerksamkeit zuerst auf die allgegenwärtige Rolle der wahrnehmbaren Qualitäten, die die Welt der Common-Sense-Erfahrung ausfüllen. Die wahrnehmbaren Qualitäten können in jedem Fall mit den Eigenschaften bestimmter korrespondierender physikalischer Variationen identifiziert werden. So können Farben z. B. mit spektralen Reflektionsstärken von Oberflächen identifiziert werden27, die Qualitäten heiss und kalt mit bestimmten Eigenschaften der Bewegung von Molekülen u.s.w. Nur einige Arten physikalischer Variationen helfen Phänomene der qualitativen Art zu begründen. Einfache mechanische Systeme (Pendel z. B.) fallen in dieser Hinsicht aus, selbst wenn sie möglicherweise genuin qualitative Variationen in anderen Medien verursachen (z. B. in den Luftmolekülen, die sie in Bewegung setzen). Wie gelingt es uns auf die relevanten Variationen zu fokussieren? Hier stammt die Grundidee, die sehr detailliert in den unten genannten Arbeiten von Petitot ausgearbeitet wird, von René Thom.28 Wie kann eine physikalische Theorie 25 Searle 1983: 265 (engl.). Man beachte jedoch, dass die präzise Bedeutung von Phrasen wie >realisiert in< einer detaillierten Klärung bedürften; eine Klärung, die zu geben Searle selbst nicht für notwendig erachtet. 26 Die Ideen in diesem Abschnitt verdanke ich Jean Petitot. 27 Hilbert 1987. 28 Hinterrundinformation kann den Arbeiten von Smith 1993/94 und (im Erscheinen) entnommen werden,. Das erste ist eine Behandlung von topologischen Standardbegriffen auf einer mereologischen Basis. Das zweite präsentiert eine formal ontologische Theorie von Kontinua, die als Primitive die Begriffe Teil und Grenze 17 hinreichend angereichert werden, so dass sie in wissenschaftlicher Form die Eigenschaften erfassen kann, die für die qualitative Realität spezifisch sind? Die Grundlage zu einer Lösung liegt bereits in der Tatsache, dass die Physik, auch wenn sie sich auf das Quantitative beschränkt, tatsächlich von den Phänomenen handelt, aus denen sich unsere qualitative Welt zusammensetzt. Sie behandelt sie nur nicht in der spezifischen, für die Welt unserer qualitativen Erfahrung bedeutsame Weise, in der diese Phänomene zusammengesetzt, bzw. –gefügt oder voneinander getrennt sind. Es ist die Leistung von Thom, diese Lücke zu füllen. Was immer geschieht, geschieht im Kontext eines raum-zeitlich ausgedehnten Ganzen. Es gibt m.a.W. eine grundlegende Beziehung oder existentielle Abhängigkeit zwischen wahrnehmbaren Qualitäten und raumzeitlicher Ausdehnung (Farbe kann – notwendigerweise – nicht ohne räumliche Ausdehnung existieren, ein Geräusch nicht ohne Dauer etc.).29 Die wahrgenommene Qualität eines schwarz und braun gefleckten Hundes z. B. hat eine bestimmte räumliche Ausdehnung. Die Qualitäten, die in einer gegebenen Ausdehnung verteilt sind, verschmelzen entweder phänomenal, so dass es keine wahrnehmbare Abtrennung mehr zwischen ihnen gibt (z. B. wie bei einem fliessenden Übergang von einer Farbe zur anderen), oder sie werden phänomenal 'getrennt'. Im ersten Fall ist die zugrundeliegende physikalische Variation kontinuierlich, im zweiten Fall legt sie eine Art von Diskontinuität fest. Man beachte, dass es im Fall des gefleckten Hundes keinen intrinsischen Unterschied gibt zwischen der Abtrennung, die an den wahrgenommenen, inneren Grenzen auftritt, an denen sich die Flecken von ihrer Umgebung absetzen. Beide sind Fälle der qualitativen Diskontinuität. Tatsächlich scheint in bezug auf eine Gruppe von Fällen klar zu sein, dass sich ein wahrnehmbares Phänomen von einem anderen dort abhebt, wo durch qualitative Momente, die seine Ausdehnung ausfüllen, eine Diskontinuität geschaffen wurde. M.a.W. Abtrennung erklärt Salienz. Um diese Vorstellung mathematisch angemessen zu formulieren, nehmen wir – mit Thom und Petitot an, dass ‚W die raumzeitliche Ausdehnung eines gegebenen Phänomens ist. Als ein Teil der Raum-Zeit ist W ein topologischer Raum mit der üblichen Topologie. Nehmen wir weiter an, dass die verschiedenen Qualitäten, die W ausfüllen, durch verschiedene Grade von n distinkten, intensiven Grössen q1), q2), ...qn ausgedrückt werden, wobei jede eine Funktion von Punkten w є W ist. Diese qi (w) sind nun wahrnehmbare Qualitäten (Farben, Textur, Temperatur, Reflektionsstärke etc.), sie werden jedoch physikalisch30 verstanden als den Objekten selbst immanent und mit einer bestimmten Form der Messbarkeit verbunden.31 verwendet. Auf der Annahme, Grenzen seien immer Teile eines grösseren Ganzen, dessen Grenzen sie sind, baut diese Theorie in einer Weise auf, dass sich eine Alternative zur Standardtopologie ergibt. 29 Vgl. Die Arbeiten in Smith (Hrsg.) (1982), und auch Husserls dritte logische Untersuchung, §§ 8 – 9. 30 Bestimmte Vereinfachungen kommen hier ins Spiel. So gibt es keine einzelne Eigenschaft der spektralen Reflektionsstärke von Oberflächen, die eine makroskopische Annährung an ein feinkörnigeren System auf 18 Ein Punkt w wird regulär genannt, wenn alle qi, (w) in einer Nachbarschaft von w kontinuierlich sind. Sei R die Menge der regulären Punkte in W. R enthält eine Nachbarschaft zu jedem seiner Punkte, und ist somit eine offene Menge von W. Sei K die Komplementmenge von R relativ zu W. K ist die geschlossene Menge der – so könnte man sagen – nichtregulären oder singulären Punkte in W. Klarerweise gilt: w ist ein singulärer Punkt gdw. es mindestens eine Qualität q, gib, die diskontinuierlich zu w ist. Wir werden K die Morphologie des Phänomens nennen, das W ausfüllt. Wir werden nun dafür argumentieren, dass K das System der qualitativen Diskontinuitäten ist, das das Phänomen hervorhebt und als Phänomen salient macht. (Man denke z. B. an die die morphologische Organisation eines Blattes, eines Sprunges in einer Fensterscheibe, an einen Hund oder an die Photographie eines Hundes.) Um diese Definition mit physikalischen Gehalt zu versehen, müssen wir einen Weg finden, uns die Morphologie K als Menge von physikalischen Eigenschaften vorzustellen, die der Grundlage oder der Ursache des in Frage stehenden Phänomens innewohnen. Eine Vielzahl physikalischer Details kurz zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass die unmittelbaren Zustände eines physikalischen Systems, wenn sie einzeln genommen werden, qua Physikalität transient sind: sie sind zu flüchtig, um beobachtbar zu sein. Es gibt jedoch Umstände, unter denen effektiv beobachtbare Zustände eines Systems entstehen: z. B., wenn Trajektorien asymptotisches Verhalten zeigen, oder wenn eine hinreichend schnelle Oszillation zwischen zwei Endpunkten entsteht. Solche effektiv beobachtbaren Zustände, Zustände, in die ein System immer wieder gelangt, oder zu denen es tendiert, werden aus offensichtlichen Gründen die Attraktoren des Systems genannt. Man denke z. B. an einen oszillierenden Stromkreis. Von einem Ausgangszustand erreicht das System nach einiger Zeit einen stabilen Oszillationszustand; seine Trajektorie wird von diesem Zustand angezogen. Kehren wir nun zu unserem Phänomen des gefleckten Hundes zurück, der das Substrat S, die raum-zeitliche Ausdehnung W und die Morphologie K besitzt. Wählen wir einen nicht-singulären Punkt w є W. Der interne Zustand des Substrats S an w kann physikalisch mittels irgendeines Attraktos Aw irgendeiner 'internen' Dynamik beschrieben werden. Dabei sind die qi intensive Quantitäten, die mit Aw verbunden sind. Um die qualitativen Diskontinuitäten der qi zu erklären, nehmen wir an, dass wo є K irgendein singulärer Punkt in W ist. Bei einer Bewegung durch Punkte w є W wird der Attraktor Aw, wenn er wo durchquert, instabil und wird ersetzt durch einen anderen Attraktor Bw. Gleichermassen verschwindet der Attraktor Aw vollständig, wenn wir die äusseren, offensichtlichen Konturen eines Dinges durchqueren. Bei alle dem ist zu beachten, dass das Verhalten des Quantenebene ist – ein Systm von Eigenschaften, die mit den Emissionsabsorptionsspektren der Atome zu tun haben, die das Substrat konstituieren. 31 Man beachte, dass Farbe nur bis zu einem gewissen Punkt zergliedert ist. Man solte daher in einem strengen Sinne nicht von Farbe in bezug au einen Punkt, sodnern in bezug auf eine Region sprechen. Diese Korrektur beeinflusst jedoch nicht die Validität des im Text entwickelten Vorschlags. 19 zugrundeliegenden, physikalischen Systems (die relevanten Variationen selbst) nicht beobachtbar sind. Was wir als salient wahrnehmen, und was wir mit Worten der natürlichen Sprache beschreiben können, ist die qualitative Diskontinuität, die zugleich der Phasenübergang ist. Als beiläufiges Ergebnis dieser Darstellung wird – völlig in Übereinstimmung mit der oben beschriebenen Common-Sense-Ansicht – Lockes These von den inhärent subjektiven sekundären Qualitäten der Dinge die Rechtfertigung entzogen. Sicherlich gibt es einen Unterschied zwischen den physikalischen Strukturen der primären beziehungsweise sekundären Qualitäten der in der Erfahrung gegebenen Dinge.32 Dieser Unterschied liegt jedoch nicht, wie Locke und viele andere geglaubt haben, in einer irgendwie angenommenen 'Subjektivität' der zweiten Gruppe.33 Er liegt vielmehr in der Tatsache begründet, dass aus der Sicht der physikalischen Theorie sekundäre Qualitäten nicht von Interesse sind, weil sie unabhängig von ihrer Rolle in der Wahrnehmung in bezug auf die kausale Struktur der Welt keine wichtige Rolle spielen. Sie spiegeln Abgrenzungen der physikalischen Realität wider, deren Interessantheit wesentlich von der Existenz eines bestimmten Wahrnehmungsapparats bei menschlichen Betrachtern abhängt. Sie sind also nicht von spezifischen Wahrnehmungen oder Überzeugungen abhängig (auch nicht a fortiori von unserer Sprache oder unseren Theorien). Wie Hilbert schreibt: 'Für die Objektivität einer Eigenschaft ist es ausschliesslich notwendig, dass Gegenstände diese Eigenschaft unabhängig von einer Interaktion mit wahrnehmenden Subjekten besitzen oder nicht besitzen. Farbe ist insofern objektiv, als die Farben von Gegenständen nicht davon abhängen, wie sie Betrachtern erscheinen, bzw. ob es irgendwelche Betrachter gibt oder nicht gibt ... Obwohl Reflektionsstärke in diesem Sinne eine objektive Eigenschaft und physikalisch gut verstanden ist, kann sie nicht auf grundlegendere physikalische Eigenschaften zurückgeführt werden' (1987: 120 f). Man beachte, dass die These, die naive Physik sei wahr, nebenbei impliziert, dass sich die Welt der Common-Sense-Realität als unabhängig von menschlicher Erfahrung existierend herausstellt: Die Paläontologie und andere verwandte Disziplinen beschreiben nach wie vor die Common-SenseWelt wie sie vor dem Erscheinen der Menschheit existierte. Natürlich wäre diese Welt nicht interessant, wenn es keine Menschen gäbe, und diese Disziplinen würden ebenfalls nicht existieren. Aber was diese 32 Über die Natur dieser Unterschiede und über die Vielzahl von sekundären Qualitäten im allgemeinen, siehe Witschel 1961, der Husserls Position zusammenfasst. 33 Man beachte, dass die im Text vertretene realistische Auffassung von Farben, die auf Hilbert (1987) zurückeht, sich von der Ansicht Thomas und Petitots unterscheidet, da diese Farben als mit bestimmten zugrundeliegenden, physikalischen Qualitäten bloss assoziiert verstehen. Sie sind aber ihrer Auffassung nach nicht mit ihnen identisch. 20 Disziplinen beschreiben, ist nichtsdestoweniger so geartet, dass es unabhängig von menschlichen Wesen existiert. Eine Theorie der Common-Sense-Welt Unser Ziel ist es, eine stimmige Theorie des eigenständigen Bereiches aufzustellen, der zu Recht den Namen 'Common-Sense-Realität' verdient. Unsere Ontologie der qualitativen Realität kann nur als erster Schritt auf diesem Weg angesehen werden. Zum einen ist das Reich der qualitativen Realität zu gross, da es über den Bereich der Common-Sense-Erfahrung hinausgeht; z. B. enthält es farb-ähnliche Strukturen, die jenseits des Bereiches liegen, den menschliche Wahnehmungsorgane aufnehmen können. Um die qualitative Ontologie zu korrigieren, müssen wir uns der Wahrnehmungspsychologie zuwenden, und dabei die Grenzen der durch das menschliche Wahrnehmungssystem erfassbaren, qualitativen Strukturen feststellen. Zum anderen ist unser Ansatz zu eng, da er nicht den Dimensionen der ontologischen Form gerecht wird, die zur Welt der Common-Sense-Erfahrung gehören, die aber zum streng qualitativen Bereich quer liegen. Es bleibt daher noch die Aufgabe, die qualitative Ontologie um eine Theorie von Kategorien des Common-Sense wie etwa Substanz, Veränderung oder Prozess, Typikalität, Arten und Kategorien, von Orten und Zeiten u.s.w. zu ergänzen. Wie in unserem Ansatz zu einer qualitativen Ontologie, sind auch hier bestimmte Arten von sinnlich erfassbaren (salienten) Grenzen, die in der zugrundeliegenden physikalischen Realität vorhanden sind, wichtig – Grenzen, die in der quantitativen Physik nicht behandelt werden. Die hierin enthaltene Emergenzdoktrin ist dementsprechend eine Emergenz von Grenzen oder Konturen, nicht von Dingen. Aus den Arbeiten von Thom und Petitot wissen wir bereits genug über die sich daraus ergebende Theorie, um zu erkennen, dass ihre Vorhersagekraft im Vergleich mit der eigentlichen Physik unzureichend ist. Die naive Physik versucht nur ein Repertoire von qualitativen und strukturellen Formen, die Substanz, Akzidenz, Veränderung etc. beinhalten, festzulegen, die die Welt der alltäglichen Erfahrung ausmachen. Und es stellt sich heraus, dass es eine eingeschränkte Anzahl solcher Formen gibt, in die die Verhaltensweisen von komplexen Systemen typischerweise hineinpassen. Sie kann jedoch nicht sagen, wann und wo die oder jene Form instantiiert werden wird. Ungleich der Standardphysik, die in ihrer Art auf alles angewendet werden kann, und daher (wenn auch nur in einer bestimmten, begrenzten Auflösung) keine Vorhersage-Erklärungslücken lässt, beschäftigt sich die naive Physik mit einem schmalen Bereich, deren Erklärungs-Vorhersage in nahezu jedem Fall Phänomene ausserhalb dieses schmalen Bereichs miteinbezieht. Dies lässt daran zweifeln, dass naive Physik jemals der KI-Forschung z. B. im Bereich der Robotik oder anderswo nützlich sein kann. Nichtsdestoweniger finden 21 Menschen mit Hilfe von wahren, naiv physikalischen Überzeugungen ihren holprigen Weg durch die Welt, so wie sie mit Hilfe von naiven, psychologischen Überzeugungen normalerweise verlässliche Vorhersagen über die Handlungen ihrer Mitmenschen machen können. Zusammenfassung Der Aufsatz sucht neue Arbeiten über Alltagsoder Common-sense Physik aus dem Feld der Forschung über künstliche Intelligenz als Grundlage einer philosophischen Erklärung der Struktur der Alltagswirklichkeit nutzbar zu machen. Die Forschung im Bereich der Alltags-Physik wird zusammengefasst und die moderne Alltags-Physik mit der Physik der Aristoteles und anderer vorgallileiischer Denker verglichen. Von denjenigen, die in den Bereichen der Software-Technik, Roboterwissenschaft und der Untersuchung von Wissensrepräsentation arbeiten, wird die Alltags-Physik gewöhnlich als eine rein pragmatische Angelegenheit behandelt, welche die Konstruktion von Arbeitsprogrammen betrifft, die relevante Denkprozesse menschlicher Akteure simulieren. Alternativ dazu wird die Alltags-Physik als eine Angelegenheit der Psychologie betrachtet, als eine Untersuchung der Überzeugungen, welche Menschen gewöhnlich über die Struktur der sie umgebenden Realität haben. 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{"text": ".2 HUMAN RIGHTS: HOW TO UNDERSTAND THEM? Marek Piechowiak, Poznań Human Rights Centre, Institute o f Legal Studies, Polish Academy o f Sciences In the most general sense human rights are understood as rights which belong to any individual as a consequence of being human, independently of acts of law. Awareness of the existence of this type of rights finds its expression in the output (especially in literature) of various cultures of various times. However the real career of the category of human rights which led to its common use in disputes of practical type, not only in the area of law but also in politics, morality or religion, dates only from the Second World War. The modem concept of human rights is rooted in the experiences of 'legal lawlessness' when crimes were committed with the authorization of law, and some human beings possessing certain characteristics were refused the status of being human. The emergence of international law of human rights was an answer to these experiences. The conception of human rights adopted in the acts which laid foundations for this law determines nowadays the paradigm for the understanding of human rights not only in international law, but also in other areas of culture. International community's appreciation of the unique worth of every human being led to the concern not only to eliminate elements destructive for an individual but also to create the conditions for his or her development and flourishing. In spite of cultural changes which took place during the last half of this century, in spite of the critics, the basic original ideas of human rights have seemed to remain the same. This paper aims at identifying these ideas and at sketching a coherent perspective for consideration of human rights in their full richness. The legal or semi-legal acts of the protection of human rights are considered here not from legalistic point of view but rather as an expression of an experience of the condition of a human being in the modem world. The first, identical, sections of the Preambles to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the International Covenants of Human Rights read: R ecogn ition o f the inherent d ign ity and o f the equal and inalienable rights o f all m em bers o f the hum an fam ily is the foundation o f freedom , ju stice and peace in the w orld. The Preambles to the Covenants add also: T hese rights derive from the inherent d ign ity o f the hum an person. First of all it should be noted that the fundamental rights and freedoms are universal that is, belong to each and every human being, no matter what he or she is. Universality is rooted in inherency of dignity and rights. Although universality 26 Marek Piechowiak and inherency are decisive for specificity of human rights as rights, these charac- teristics are most often contested by the theoreticians of law. It should be however underlined that both universality and inherence are flatly recognized and em- phasized on the level of practical discussion. The Vienna Declaration, a final document of the World Conference of Human Rights (1993), which was adopted by consensus of unprecedented number of 171 representatives of states, contains, partially in answer to the raised doubts, the following unambiguous phrases: \"Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings\" (1.1); \"The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question\" (1.1). Objections against universality and against existence of human rights as rights, often stem from overlooking of the distinction between human rights law and human rights themselves. Ignoring the fact that human rights concept was bom partially to challenge the positivistic approach to law, human rights are sometimes rejected only because they do not fit these characteristics of rights which were elaborated on the ground of statutory law. The fundamental rights and freedoms are neither obtained, nor granted through any human actions. They may not be recognized or respected in these actions, but they still belong to each individual. The rights which derive from inherent dignity are also inalienable. Nobody can deprive anybody of these rights and nobody can renounce these rights by himself. In this approach the fundamental human rights and freedoms are not related to the duly adopted legal norms, but adoption of the appropriate norms is postulated to protect human rights and to determine the ways of their realization. Legal norms (human rights law) do not establish fundamental rights and freedoms but only guarantee them. The fact that certain actions or abandonment of actions are due to an individual has its primary reason in the uniqueness of being a human. This uniqueness is also a ground for assigning dignity to each and every human being. Every human being is regarded to be an aim in himself; therefore non-instrumental treatment and acknowledgment that an individual is entitled to personal development and to the conditions which lead to it are postulated. Another important feature of the contemporary conception of human rights is the recognition of indivisibility and interdependence of different rights. A ll hum an rights are universal, ind ivisib le and interdependent and interrelated. The international com m unity m ust treat hum an rights g lo b a lly in a fair and equal m anner, on the sam e foo tin g , and w ith the sam e em phasis. Vienna D e c la ra tio n , 1.5 Different aspects of a human being (physical, moral, spiritual, etc.) deserve proportional concern. Individual development requires appropriate social, political, economic, cultural, ecological conditions. Moreover, ensuring a minimum in one respect is usually indispensable for developing or preventing degradation in another; for example, a fulfilment of minimal social standards may be necessary for enjoyment of political rights. Nevertheless, proportions in which means for prevention of degradation or ensuring development should be distributed are difficult to define. The point of departure is a specific person living in unique Human rights: how to understand them? 27 circumstances. The aim of the formulated law is the individual and his or her development, not abstract values. Equality is another major element of the conception of human rights. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: A ll hum an beings are born free and equal in d ign ity and rights. T hey are endow ed w ith reason and co n sc ien ce and should act towards on e another in a spirit o f brotherhood. First the equal dignity is pointed out; there are no human beings which are more human than other human beings. Equal dignity requires equal respect for an individual related to his or her personal development and for his or her rights based on this relation. Respect for equality does not mean an equal treatment in the way of imposing equal aims and equal circumstances of action; differences are even desirable if there are proportional reasons justifying them. That is why equality may be sometimes expressed also in the terms of nondiscrimination, if discrimination means differentiating without proper reason. The point of departure is again a specific human being, living in unique circumstances and endowed with unique abilities. Therefore, while constructing laws, the postulate of equality combines equality before the law and equal protection o f the law. It is not suf- ficient that the same judgment is past in the circumstances which in the face of positive law do not differ in a relevant degree, it is also important that there are proper reasons to regard certain differences as relevant in law. Addressing in Article 1 the freedom of a human being the Universal Declaration points to human dignity, reason and conscience. The reference to reason and conscience underlines that the human being is not absolutely free in defining the standards. In every free decision which contributes to the personal development the indications of reason and conscience have to be taken into account. In such decisions inherent dignity and rights derived thereof are to be respected. If we recognize that inherent dignity is a source of human rights and that human rights are inalienable, we have to accept as a consequence that human rights are not related to any concrete property of human being. If recognition of human rights were to be related to any human characteristic, the deprivation of it would have to mean a deprivation of the rights related to it. Therefore possession of human rights is not a consequence of, for example, being able to exercise free choices or to think logically. Every human being is recognized as free and rational, so being free and rational are not properties related to some functional abilities, but are inherent and may be regarded as at least an element of the foundations of uniqueness and dignity of a human being. Here the universality of human rights finds its real roots. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaking about \"a spirit of brotherhood\" draws attention to the fact that in principle members of society or global community are not competitors who constitute a danger for each other. A human being is a social being*, relations with others are an indispensable 28 Marek Piechowiak condition of development, and at the same time concern for the well-being of others is also an obligation and a part of one's own personal development. Inter- national Covenants on Human Rights in their preambles stress the ind ividual, having duties to other individuals and to the com m unity to which he b e lon gs, is under a responsib ility to strive for the prom otion and observance o f the rights. Recognition of the indispensability of social environment may not lead to assigning priority to the community in the case of conflict between respect for the dignity of an individual and the well-being of the community. A human being is autonomous, he is not a mere part of a society; the society exists for the benefit of the in- dividual. In the paradigmatic conception of human rights recognition of dignity and of the rights which derive from it is the basis o f justice and therefore the basis of every legal system which claims to be just. Indicating the extra-legal foundations of positive law and modelling the legal system on the basis of respect of human rights helps to protect it from degenerating into a system which is unjust and allows to eliminate the emerging elements of the legal lawlessness. Taking into account the basic characteristics of human rights we can attempt to identify definitional elements of the broad philosophical notion of human rights existing independendy of legal instruments. Human rights can be described as (1) a real relation between human beings, the relation of duty to act or duty to abandon an action, which rest on (2) an inherent (rooted in being a human, especially in being an aim in himself) relation of every person to certain goods (things, states, circumstances): (a) in which the human being is not treated as a mere means, and (b) which makes his or her personal development possible. This complex of relations exists independendy of acts of law, and independendy of that whether any individual apprehends it or not. The requirement, not to be treated instrumentally, makes it possible to determine the limits of that which is acceptable. Compromise outside these limits would be contrary to the respect of dignity and would lead to violation of human rights. Recognition of the fact that there are limits which can be crossed neither by an individual, nor by a majority of citizens, nor by a state authority, is one of the basic elements of the contemporary conception of human rights (specific \"fundame- ntalism\" of human rights). Secondly, the respect for a human being related to his or her development requires ensuring in the limits of what is acceptable conditions for free and rational choice of aims of actions and ways of his or her development. If conflicts arise here, there is a space for a compromise in the discussions on the means and ways of development of a human person. But such discussions and compromise do not aim at uniformity; in contrary, realization of human rights means realization of plurality: postulated because of the specific potentialities of each human being, freedom in choosing his or her own way, relation of an individual to a culture which forms an indispensable environment for his or her development, etc. There is no contradiction between plurality and Human rights: how to understand them? 29 universality once we realize that determining what is wrong and unjust does not mean determining a uniform way of realizing the individual. Human rights law, both international and domestic, aims at grasping the relations constituting human rights in their existential aspect, and at creating instruments of protection of these rights. Catalogues of human rights formulated in positive law, and partially also the conceptions of human rights themselves, are an answer to threats to human being and its development. Various fundamental rights and freedoms point to different aspects of the human being, to his or her different potentialities and different categories of goods. In the world of different cultures and rapidly changing circumstances it is not easy to get to know these threats and concrete ways of realizing of a person. It is not easy to find appropriate remedies and to agree upon the organization of social life. This explains the historic and dynamic character of the concepts and standards offered in human rights law. However, this does not deny the existence of human rights and their inherent and universal character, but rather is an affirmation of uniqueness of each human being. 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Raz jeszcze w sprawie tolerancji i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego\" /\"Constitutional Thinking: On Toleration and Constitutional Court\"/, Rzeczpospolita 15-11-1994 \"Prawa człowieka w projekcie konstytucji\" /\"Human Rights in the Draft Polish Constitution\"/, R zeczpospolita 23-5-1995 \"Wolność religii w projekcie konstytucji\" /\"Religious Liberty in the Draft Polish Constitution\"/, Rzeczpospolita 25-5-1995 30 Marek Piechowiak Towards global human rights edited by Patricia Morales edited with the financial support of the National Committee of the Netherlands for the UN50 and the National Commission for Development-Cooperation of the Netherlands (NCO), and with the patronage of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) International Centre for Human and Public Affairs 1996 Contents Foreword Jan Pronk Introduction Global human rights as a common language for the world community Patricia Morales PART I Global human rights: Reflections and proposals 1 The concept of human rights 1.1 Towards global human rights José Ayala Lasso 1.2 Human rights: how to understand them? Marek Piechowiak 1.3 Human obligations The forgotten source of rights' fulfilment Alex P. Schmid 2 The significance of the World Conference on Human Rights 2.1 The universality of human rights Federico Mayor 2.2 Universality of human rights, as discussed during the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights; description and comments Willem van Genugten 2.3 Preliminary evaluation of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights International Commission o f Jurists 3 Proposals of human rights for the United Nations 3.1 Human rights in the United Nations: The achievements so far and challenges ahead José Ayala Lasso 8 Contents 3.2 A permanent international court with universal jurisdiction: an idea whose time has come 55 Tracy Ulltveit-Moe 3.3 Towards a policy framework for advancing preventive diplomacy 59 Kumar Rupesinghe 3.4 The United Nations's 50th Anniversary: an opportunity to reduce conflicts 71 OXFAM (United Kingdom and Ireland) 3.5 The Charter of Basel on federalistic solutions to conflicts 81 Gunther Baechler 4 John P. Humphrey, in memoriam 4.1 John Peters Humphrey: a crusader for human rights 87 A. John Hobbins 4.2 Human rights belong to individual human beings John P. Humphrey 90 PART II Global human rights and the world community 5 Human rights in the political evolution 5.1 A new era for human rights in South Africa Nelson Mandela 95 5.2 The evolution of human rights in South Africa Frederik W. de Klerk 97 5.3 The Czech Republic and human rights Pavel Bratinka 101 5.4 Macedonian independence. A model for the 21st century H.E. Kiro Gligorov 105 5.5 Towards global human rights in Kyrgyzstan Natalia Ablova 109 5.6 No nobodies Bas de Gaay Fortman 5.7 Towards global human rights in Zimbabwe Arnold T. Nhamburo 5.8 'We the indigenous peoples of the United Nations...' Lejo Sibbel Human rights and the religions 6.1 The single rights and the multiple religions Sabine B. Marquardt 6.2 Islam and human rights: The path towards universal human rights Babak Barin Human rights in the world cooperation 7.1 Non-governmental organizations: 'between hope and fear' Tierno Oostenbrink 7.2 An end to impotence? New possibilities in the struggle against mass violence Daan Bronkhorst 7.3 Eager to please: Human rights conditions in foreign policy Martha Meijer 7.4 The protection of refugee children Terre des hommes (Germany) 7.5 Distribution of power as a means to progressively achieve global human rights Carlos A. Mallmann Women's human rights 8.1 Violence against women as an abuse of human rights Christine M. Chinkin Contents 10 Contents 8.2 Violence against women on the human rights agenda 157 Ellen Verwiel 8.3 Women's health and human rights: some WHO contributions and perspectives 163 World Health Organization (Office ofAleya Hammad) 8.4 Women and poverty 167 Ingrid van Tienhoven 8.5 Inalienable, integral and indivisible: women's rights at Beijing and beyond 171 Tracy Ulltveit-Moe Annex I Universal Declaration of Human Rights 175 Annex II Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (part I) 179 Annex III Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Dispute Settlement in EU Free Trade Agreements with Arab Countries Bashar H. Malkawi I. Introduction International trade constitutes a vital lynchpin of the global governance architecture with staggering trillions of U.S. dollars worth of annual trade.1 The global trade order consists of trade policies and systems – in particular FTAs – which have played an increasingly crucial role in the infrastructure of global governance and substantially impacting international economic development and strategic affairs. The trade infrastructure is inextricably linked with global financial institutions and power politics and intertwined with military and political alliances.2 In recent decades, global economic governance has promoted free trade and trade liberalization through regional trade agreements (RTAs) to improve economic welfare of which FTAs form the overwhelming majority of agreements. 3 FTAs have been perceived as stoking global economic growth as well fostering vigorous economic benefits to trade partners and gained in popularity following the failures to implement World Trade 1 In 2016, there was U.S. $20 trillion worth of global trade in goods and services. See WTO, World Trade Statistical Review, available at <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts2016_e.pdf>, 18 (2016). 2 Helen Milner, The Political Economy of International Trade, 2 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 105, 118 (1999). Power politics matters in the global trade paradigm as powerful states may violate their trade commitments toward weaker trading partners, knowing that weaker states are unlikely to carry out retaliation against them. See Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 Harvard International Law Journal 3, 11 (2011). 3 See Chankwon Bae and Yong Joon Jang, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of Korea, 17 Journal of East Asian Economic Integration 417, 423(2013) (In particular, free trade agreements (FTAs) [], account for 90% of the total number of RTAs.) See also Bashar H. Malkawi, Rules of origin under US Trade Agreements with Arab countries: Are they Helping and Hindering Free Trade? 10 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 29, 33 (rules of origin in some FTAs are complex and protectionist and may act as barriers to trade). 2 Organization modifications post-Doha leading to proliferation of FTAs in the early 2000s.4 FTAs are contractual obligations between the parties to reduce or eliminate tariffs and other trade restrictions on imports and a wide array of economic sectors.5 The goals of FTAs are to promote cross-border trade and investment and provide a stimulus to the economy of the trade partners. FTAs arise from perceptions between trading partners that an FTA would benefit the partners by – at a minimum – reducing or eliminating trade barriers and tariffs and establishing rules with respect to what constitutes a product manufactured within the FTA i.e. rules of origin.6 There are many benefits ascribed to FTAs such as vigorous global trade and encouraging efficient allocation of resources, enhanced consumer options and overall lower economic costs. FTAs are widely acknowledged as promoting trade liberalization and access to markets creating a more dynamic economic environment. Trade is considered as an important catalyst of economic growth. Trade promotes more efficient and effective production of goods and services to the countries which have comparative 4 See Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward Trade Liberalization? Available at <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28490/adb-briefs2010-1-free-trade-agreements.pdf> (2010) (The inability to conclude the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round has spawned a proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) across the globe) See also Hitoshi Sato, and Ikumo Isono, Impacts of Free Trade Agreements on Business Activity in Asia: The Case of Japan Daisuke Hirastuka, available at <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/155998/adbi-wp143.pdf> p.2 (2009) page 2 (Efforts to liberalize global trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO) have made limited progress since the Doha round of negotiations was launched in 2001.... [The] disappointing consequences have forced the WTO member countries (US and EU in particular) to choose alternative paths such as FTAs to promote trade. The trend toward FTAs has generated a domino effect in which one FTA triggers the creation of others). See also Julien Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO's Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 Journal of International Economic Law 9, 18-20 (2013). 5 See, e.g., Korea FTA chs. 3, 7, 11, 12, and 18, 46 I.L.M. 642 (2007). 6 William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, p.2-4 (2014), available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31356.pdf> (Rules of origin prevent products from nonmembers entering an FTA market over the lowest tariff wall. Most FTAs also include procedures on the settlement of disputes arising among members and rules on the implementation of border controls, such as product safety certification and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements) 3 advantage in producing them.7 The economic benefits of FTAs are so well-recognized that even on an individual business person level, let alone company level, there is a strong interest in pursuing FTAs.8 FTAs could also provide other less tangible benefits. The signing of FTAs not only signifies economic cooperation between nations, but also cooperation on the political and institutional fronts.9 FTAs and free trade are not without criticism. Although the essential construct of FTAs is tariff and barrier elimination, more recent FTAs are more ambitious and include chapters on investment rules and intellectual property rights in a way that go beyond what is covered by the GATT/WTO.10 In addition, opposing economists claim that FTAs are inferior to the WTO order and they undermine the multilateral trading system.11 II. The Importance of Dispute Settlement Provisions in FTAs It is assumed that the parties to the FTA will carry out their commitments in good faith. Persons and companies would risk capital and may suffer potential loss; therefore FTAs require a strong legal foundation incentivizing stability, transparency and compliance with obligations. Legal guarantees and the knowledge disputes will be fairly 7 See Najabat Ali, Li Xialing, Foreign Direct Investment, International Trade and Economic Growth in Pakistan's Economic Perspective, 7.5 American Journal of Economics 211-215 (2017). 8 See Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Agreements: The Cost of U.S. Nonparticipation, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade. House Ways and Means Committee (March 29, 2001) (arguing that to counter the fact that FTAs are rapidly forming in which the United States is not a participant, the US must vigorously negotiate FTAs or risk harming US interests). 9 See S. M. Thangavelu and C. Findlay, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment in the Asia-Pasific Region, in Findlay, C. (ed.), ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia, ERIA Research Project Report 2010-29 (2011). 10 See Vergano R. Paolo and Tobias Dolle, Free Trade Agreements and Regulatory Change: Examples from the Generic and Biosimilar Sectors, 51 Journal of World Trade 205, 208 (2017). 11 International economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger strongly advocate that the U.S. and other national governments should not pursue FTAs at the expense of multilateral negotiations in the WTO. FTAs are by definition discriminatory and therefore trade diverting. See William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy Specialist in International Trade and Finance 11 (2014). 4 adjudicated with appropriate remedies is the cornerstone of encouraging FTA utilization.12 To provide the inducement, FTAs provide that failure to comply with FTA obligations may trigger the dispute resolution mechanism and result in retaliatory measures or a claim for damages or the imposition of a fine or other negative consequence.13 Even if no disputes are expected, dispute settlement provisions in a FTA reinforce commitments of parties and assure investors that the FTA provides a solid ground for investment. The dispute settlement mechanism in FTAs is necessary as they provide means to settle disagreements on interpretation or compliance with treaty obligations. The dispute settlement mechanism help ease tensions among FTA parties and maintain healthy relationships among trading partners.14 To put is differently, dispute settlement provisions in FTAs provide an organized way for its members to settle disputes otherwise lingering disputes can harm bilateral relations and reduce the FTAs' benefits. In addition to preventing spillovers of disputes, dispute resolution mechanism is considered crucial tool to provide an authoritative interpretation of the rules and norms of a treaty.15 This can enhance commitments of the parties and legitimacy of the FTA itself. Ultimately, the existence of dispute resolution mechanism in FTAs is fundamental to the process of economic integration as it facilitates a deeper and wider integration by 12 The way in which an international treaty ensures that its signatories actually comply with their treaty obligations is one of the critical factors determining the effectiveness and efficiency of the treaty. See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty; Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 3-4 (1995). 13 See for example NAFTA chs. 11, 20, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 (1993); Korea FTA chs. 11, 22. 14 Dispute resolution mechanism can reduce the number of economic and political disputes that could lead to military conflict. See E.D. Mansfield and B.M. Pollins (eds.), Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate 222-224 (2003). See also Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 3-5 (2003). 15 See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, supra note 27, at 24. 5 providing an institutional framework of jurisprudence to develop and increase access to justice by members of the FTA.16 The existence of dispute resolution mechanism shifts the balance in FTAs from power-oriented to rule-oriented legal systems.17 In recent years, a large amount of criticism has been leveled against dispute settlement mechanisms in FTAs. For example, FTAs in general, and their dispute resolution provisions in particular, are seen as a means by which developed countries to export their laws into the other countries that are party to the FTAs.18 Furthermore, dispute settlement provisions are considered as overriding domestic court systems and sovereignty.19 Despite the criticism leveled against dispute resolution mechanisms, their presence in FTAs is of paramount importance in providing stability and incentive for parties to engage in trade. If dispute settlement mechanism fails at encouraging trade, FTAs will not be as successful as the potential. Thus, the dispute settlement mechanism is an important or perhaps even overriding focus in the establishment of FTAs. III. Dispute Settlement Mechanism under EU Association Agreements with Arab Countries The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started in 1995 with the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Declaration established a framework of political, economic and social relations 16 See David Simmons, Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean Creativity, 29 Nova L. Rev. 171, 177-178 (2005). 17 See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 110-11 (2ed., 1997). 18 See Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind; Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under the Guise of Economic Integration, 19 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1321, 1324 (2005). 19 See Josh Wingrove and Eric Martin, Canada, Mexico may Keep Nafta Investor Dispute System without U.S, available a t<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/canada-mexico-may-keep-naftadispute-resolution-without-u-s> (January 25, 2018). 6 between the EU and some Southern Mediterranean Partners.20 These Partners were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestine Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The Barcelona Declaration has as one of its main objectives, the establishment of the Euro Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010.21 The means of achieving the free trade area is through Association Agreements concluded between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Currently, there are association agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt.22 The dispute settlement process in the EU association agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt is short and similar in drafting. Only one article in each of these association agreements address dispute settlement. The EU Association Agreements with Arab countries provides the basis of the dispute settlement mechanism.23 The panel mandate is limited. One party can bring an 20 See Amichai Magen, The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy Achieve Compliance? 12 Colum.J. Eur. L. 383, 392 (2006). 21 See Ferdi De Ville and Vicky Reynaert, The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area: an Evaluation on the Eve of the (Missed) Deadline 356 L'Europe en Formation (2010). 22 See Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, 1998, (OJ L 97/2) signed on 17.07.95, entry into force 1.03.98. 87. See also Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, 2000, (OJ L 147/3) signed on 20.11.95, entry into force 01.06.00. 88. See also Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, 2000, (OJ L 70/2) signed on 26.02.96, entry into force 01.03.00. See also Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, 2002, (OJ L 129/3) signed on 24.11.97, entry into force 15.05.02. See also Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the provisional application of the trade and trade-related provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, 2003, (OJ L 345/115) signed on 25.06.01, entry into force 01.01.04. See also Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, 2002, (OJ L 265/1) signed on 10.10.05, entry into force 1.09.05. 23 See Association between the European Communities and the Republic of Tunisia, supra note 95, art. 86, Association between the European Communities and Israel, art.75, Association between the European 7 action against the other if a dispute arises concerning the interpretation or the application of the association agreement.24 There is no provision concerning non-violation claims. The Association Council is tasked, among other things, with settling disputes by a decision. The Association Council consists of representatives from EC Council, EC Commission, and representatives from Arab government in question.25 The Association Council plays a conciliatory role in the dispute settlement process and can settle the matter by a decision. However, several matters regarding the decision of the Association Council are not clear. For example, the way in which the decision is taken is ambiguous. Moreover, any party to the Association Agreement can block the adoption of the decision. In case the matter could not be settled by the Association Council's decision, then the matter is referred to arbitration.26 The arbitration panel consists of three arbitrators. Each party nominates one arbitrator and the Association Council appoints the third arbitration.27 The EU Association Agreements with Arab countries do not prescribe time Communities and Morocco art. 86, Association between the European Communities and Jordan, art. 97, Association between the European Communities and Egypt, art. 82, and Association between the European Communities and Algeria, art. 100. 24 Id. 25 See Association between the European Communities and the Republic of Tunisia, supra note 95, art. 79, Association between the European Communities and Israel, art.68, Association between the European Communities and Morocco art. 79, Association between the European Communities and Jordan, art. 90, Association between the European Communities and Egypt, art. 75, and Association between the European Communities and Algeria, art. 93. 26 See Association between the European Communities and the Republic of Tunisia, supra note 95, art. 86, Association between the European Communities and Israel, art.75, Association between the European Communities and Morocco art. 86, Association between the European Communities and Jordan, art. 97, Association between the European Communities and Egypt, art. 82, and Association between the European Communities and Algeria, art. 100. 27 See Association between the European Communities and the Republic of Tunisia, supra note 95, art. 86.4, Association between the European Communities and Israel, art.75.4, Association between the European Communities and Morocco art. 86.4, Association between the European Communities and Jordan, art. 97.4, Association between the European Communities and Egypt, art. 82.4, and Association between the European Communities and Algeria, art. 100.4. 8 limits for appointing the arbitrators.28 This is an issue which could prolong the dispute settlement process. It is unclear if the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries maintain a roster of arbitrators from which parties can select the arbitrators. Furthermore, there are no provisions that govern nationality and qualification of arbitrators. Additionally, the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries do not provide for working procedures for the arbitration panel i.e. procures, code of conduct, and interim review. The decision the arbitration panel may not be binding. There are no clear provisions in the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries that shed light on the binding nature of the panel decision.29 However, it is assumed that parties to the dispute may feel obliged to comply with panel decision fearing being labeled as violators of the Association Agreement. In addition, non-compliance with the panel decision could put the whole Association Agreement in jeopardy. The EU Association Agreements with Arab countries include provisions regarding compliance procedures. Each party is required to take the steps required to implement the decision of the arbitrators.30 However, the EU Association Agreements do no set time limits for compliance with panel decisions. Therefore, compliance can vary from one dispute to another. Moreover, it is unclear what steps need to be taken in order to comply with the panel decision. For instance, the EU Association Agreements do not require prompt compliance or reasonable period of time to take the necessary steps. The nature of the steps that need to be taken is unclear. Is withdrawal of the violating measure suffice 28 The complainant selects one arbitrator and the respondent party nominates another arbitrator within the following two months. Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. 9 or compensation is enough? It seems that the compliance provisions of the EU Associations Agreements with Arab countries raise more than questions than providing clear guidelines for settling disputes. The EU Associations Agreements with Arab countries do not provide for retaliation in case of non-compliance with the arbitrators' decision. Retaliation is allowed only when a party considers that the other party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Association Agreement.31 In that scenario, the party is allowed to take the \"appropriate measures\" even without consultation with the other party. The complainant party is required to supply the Association Council with all relevant information with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to all parties.32 In sum, the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries do not provide pathway for enforcing panel decision. Generally, compliance could occur only if the complainant party can enforce compliance through the threat of retaliation. 1. Assessment of Dispute Settlement Mechanism under EU Association Agreements with Arab Countries The procedures of dispute settlement under the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries, to some extent, do not offer potent means for resolving disputes. The EU Association Agreements with Arab countries are akin, more or less, to the early years of the GATT 1994 where diplomacy ruled over legality.33 The dispute settlement 31 See Association between the European Communities and the Republic of Tunisia, supra note 95, art. 84.2, Association between the European Communities and Israel, art.79.2, Association between the European Communities and Morocco art. 92.2, Association between the European Communities and Jordan, art. 101.2, Association between the European Communities and Egypt, art. 86.2, and Association between the European Communities and Algeria, art. 100.2. 32 Id. 33 There was a view that dispute settlement under the GATT should be a natural consequence of the negotiation process. Some countries highlighted the ambiguity of GATT rules, the political sensitivity of trade disputes, and the complex trade-offs of competing interests that go into the formulation of any trade 10 mechanism in EU Association Agreements with Arab countries should have been strengthened since they suppose to serve as a model for the proposed Euro Mediterranean Free Trade Area. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism under the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries, since data is absent to show how many disputes were settled through consultations, brought before arbitration panels, or withdrawn.34 This hints that the dispute system of these association agreements is non-or under-utilized. Therefore, development of jurisprudence under the EU Association with Arab countries is lacking and there are no precedents to which the parties in the future will observe. Difficulties in the interpretation and application of the Association Agreements would ultimately arise. However, despite the fact that the dispute settlement provisions under the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries represent to some degree an interesting language, it is doubtful that they will be used. Frequency of trade disputes between the EU and Arab countries are associated with economic size and trade share.35 Another reason that may explain the non-existence of dispute settlement panels under the EU Association Agreements is the fact that the WTO dispute settlement procedure mostly covers disputes regarding trade. rule. Thus, they argued that GATT dispute resolution should not be formal, legal, or adjudicatory. See David K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 533 (1985). Other countries, such as the U.S., viewed the dispute system under the GATT as rule-based system in which violations are exposed and subject to sanctions. In the U.S. view, GATT rules will become clearer and predictable if GATT dispute resolution is characterized by rule-based decisions rendered through an adjudicatory dispute resolution process, will increase compliance with GATT standards, and will alleviate protectionist pressures. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATION 339 (1995). 34 WTO panel reports are always published. See WTO, Dispute SettlementDisputes by Members < https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (last visited Jan. 10, 2019). 35 See Bashar H. Malkawi, Arab Countries' (Under) Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 14 Flinders Law Journal 1, 7-8 (2012). Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia do not make the list of top trading partners with the EU. See EU Top Trading Partners, Trade Statistics 2018, available at < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf > (last visited May 13, 2019). 11 The Association Counsel cannot force the offending country to remove the measure or pass an order to stop the measure from running. If an arbitration panel finds that the EU is in violation of its obligations under the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries and the EU does not comply, Arab countries may not be to retaliate by imposing trade sanctions against the EU. To reduce the problem of enforcement, the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries should be revised by introducing alternatives such as financial damages. Conclusions A strong dispute resolution mechanism is a core component of FTAs which must provide a reliable and stable venue to address meritorious claims and deliver enforceable results and demonstrates the commitments of each government to comply with the contractual obligations. Without this commitment, businesses will be reluctant to risk capital. The EU concluded free trade agreements with Arab countries for diverse reasons within the economic and geopolitical contexts. The current dispute settlement mechanism in the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries and US-Arab countries FTAs has rarely if ever been invoked and should be modified to reflect legal developments as well as the possible use as a template for a comprehensive trade agreement with the Middle East. In making these suggested improvements, we take into account the marked disparity in both hard and soft power as well as economic resources between the parties to encourage FTA utilization and participation and promote the gains to a developing country such as Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. 12 The EU trade agreements with Arab countries share some commonalities. For example, the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries address disputes between the parties arising from the application or interpretation of the agreements or compliance with treaty obligations. In addition, these FTAs and Association Agreements establish Joint Committees and Association Councils to discuss issues of reciprocal interests, one of which is to resolve disagreements between the parties. Nevertheless, the specific terms and conditions of the dispute resolution provisions vary especially in the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries. The EU kept its policy of not incorporating adjudicative elements in its Association Agreements with Arab countries. The EU adopted, and continues to adopt, this policy despite being the second biggest player and many years of experience under the WTO. The dispute settlement mechanism in the EU Association Agreements with Arab countries can be improved in several concrete ways. These improvements will address potential concerns and should contribute to a higher utilization of trade agreements as well as serve as a template for a more expansive EU regional trade. While trade between the U.S. and EU on the one hand and Arab countries on the other hand remains modest, economies develop and disputes under trade agreements with Arab countries may become more likely in the future.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Ecology and the Common Good: Sustainability and Catholic Social Teaching Catholic Social Teaching and Ecology Villanova University November 10-11, 2005 Russell A. Butkus, PhD. Department of Theology Associate Director, Environmental Studies Program University of Portland, 5000 N. Willamette Blvd, Portland, OR 97203 butkus@up.edu, 503-943-7370 Fax: 503-943-7803 Steven A. Kolmes, PhD. Rev. John Molter C.S.C. Chair in Science Director, Environmental Studies Program University of Portland 5000 N Willamette Blvd, Portland, OR 97203 kolmes@up.edu 503-943-7291 Fax: 503-943-8079 2 ABSTRACT ECOLOGY AND THE COMMON GOOD: SUSTAINABILITY AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING In recent years official Roman Catholic documents have addressed the ecological crisis from the perspective of Catholic social teaching. This expansion of Catholic social thought addresses the social and ecological question. This paper links environmental and human ecology with the concept of sustainability and proposes an interpretation of the common good and a definition of sustainability within Catholic social teaching. Our treatment of sustainability and Catholic social teaching includes: an analysis of the ecological processes that sustain nature; insights from human ecology, and an examination of models of sustainability as a foundation for re-structuring society to promote the common good. The paper provides a summary of the historical expansion of the common good within modern Catholic social thought, and concludes with an ecological interpretation of the common good and a definition of sustainability within the Catholic understanding of justice. 3 INTRODUCTION There is no question that over the last thirty years environmental degradation and the ecological crisis have become in our day and age a predominant sign of the times. In response to this worrisome development official documents of the Roman Catholic Church, at various levels, have sought to address the growing ecological concern from the perspective of Catholic social teaching. Consequently references to ecology and environmental issues have surfaced in papal encyclicals during the last fifteen years generating national and regional responses. In the United States, for example, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has issued two pastoral statements on environmental issues in 1991 and 2001. Significantly, the Catholic Bishops of the Pacific Northwest, representing Canada and the U.S. have also issued a unique international letter focused on a particular ecological region-the Columbia River Watershed. What all of these efforts hold in common is the attempt to apply Catholic social teaching to a new and disturbing phenomenon in human experience. The result has been an expansion of Catholic social thought. What was once the \"social question\" has now become the social and \"ecological question.\" This development, the effort to address ecology and environmental issues as ethical problems, is the focus of this paper. In particular this paper will link environmental and human ecology with the concept of sustainability, with the intention of proposing an interpretation of the common good and a definition of sustainability within Catholic social teaching. The paper begins with an analysis of the science of ecology and the ecological processes that sustain the natural world. In contemporary discourse we are mindful of the fact that the term \"ecology\" is often used as a philosophical abstraction. It is our 4 intention to emphasize that ecology is the scientific investigation of the interaction of organisms with their bio-physical environment, and that an adequate understanding of ecological processes is essential in the human endeavor to successfully develop specific ethical norms that guide our interaction with the natural world. In keeping with our attention to ecology, the paper also utilizes insights from the sub-discipline of human ecology. The focus of human ecology is the interchange between human and natural systems. It provides provocative insights into the nature of human relatedness with and impact on the natural world and a window through which the concept of sustainability may be configured. We will therefore discuss models of sustainability as an ethical praxis that has great potential for providing a foundation for re-structuring human systems to promote the common good and the common welfare of future generations. Moreover it is also our perspective that human ecology offers unique hermeneutical lenses through which the Catholic principle of the common good may be interpreted in our present age. Consequently the paper provides a brief summary of the historical development and expansion of the common good within modern Catholic social thought from the point of view that it is a \"dynamic\" principle that must be applied to the social and ecological concerns at this moment in human history. Finally the paper concludes with an ecological interpretation of the common good and a preliminary attempt to define sustainability in light of the Catholic understanding of justice. Our hope is that this analysis will engender subsequent reflection and ethical action in the interest of justice, the universal common good and the integrity of God's creation. 5 ECOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABILITY There is nothing mysterious or hidden about the fact that the natural world has been in significant decline in many ways for over a century, due to modifications and manipulations caused by human beings. In Centesimus Annus (1991), Pope John Paul II referred to \"the ecological question\" in terms of the impacts of consumerism, the resources of the earth, and the destruction of the natural environment (no. 37). This paper recognizes and affirms the seriousness of the ecological question as a significant sign of our times and in our view it is best understood as a sequence of three interrelated questions. The first question is \"What are the processes by which ecosystems are maintained, and what principles of ecological thought allow us to grasp the interconnected natural processes which human activities have impacted?\" Secondly, \"What is the current status of each of these fundamental ecological processes worldwide, and at what rate are things changing and projected to change in the future due to the activities of humans and their economies?\" Thirdly, \"What would human social and economic activities have to look like in order for us to achieve a sustainable relationship with the natural world, a relationship in which fundamental ecological processes are not deteriorating in either quality or extent, and where future generations will have sufficient resources to meet their needs and appropriate aspirations?\" The first question reflects scientific knowledge that has grown dramatically over recent decades, the second question in isolation could lead to despair and negativism, and the third question is the informed possibility for an economic and environmental vision that we hope to highlight in this paper. 6 The ecological principles summarized below are essential for answering the first and second questions noted above. They include the following processes of the natural world: BIOGEOCHEMICAL CYCLES The cycles of basic molecules crucial to life such as Carbon (C), Nitrogen (N), and Phosphorus (P) involve chemistry, biology, and physics interacting on a complex global scale. Human activities have begun to imbalance these cycles, and early local consequences of these imbalances, such as the eutrophication of lakes due to excess N and P from fertilizer use or sewage effluent, have progressed to much larger manifestations of biogeochemical imbalance on a global scale. Examples include rapidly developing oceanic dead zones, increases in the frequency and severity of toxic algal blooms worldwide, and the many expressions of global climate change. Imbalanced biogeochemical cycles are now considered to be a serious threat to our capacity to continue as a civilization. Inherent to these cycles are clear indications of limitations. For example, the ocean can only absorb so much N and P before near-shore oceanic areas where large rivers drain start to become seasonally, episodically, or permanently anoxic. Likewise the atmosphere can only absorb so much CO2 before global mean temperature increases, disrupting earth's climate. The operation of the hydrological cycle by evaporation, condensation, and precipitation is a very closely related issue. This is an instance of limits that is quite similar to that of biogeochemical cycles. There is only so much freshwater, rivers can only flow if they have snowmelt or rain to do so, aquifers only recharge at a finite rate regardless of how quickly water is drawn from them for irrigation or drinking. 7 These geophysical limitations have ethical consequences relating to human population, consumption and waste. BIOACCUMULATION OF PERSISTENT TOXINS The fact that arctic predators like polar bears suffer from the accumulation of toxins used elsewhere on the planet, such as DDT, is an expression of what environmental scientists call biological magnification or bioaccumulation. Bioaccumulation is the process whereby toxic chemicals or heavy metals accumulate in animal tissue and organs. The related problem of bio-magnification refers to the progressive increase in the concentration of persistent toxins in animals as one ascends the food chain. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the synthetic organic compounds invented by humans over the last century are fat-soluble. Because animals are very efficient at absorbing fatty materials from the food they consume, the ingested chemical compounds pass rapidly into body fat. As a result of bio-magnification, animals higher on the food pyramid, such as humans, are exposed to potentially dangerous levels of persistent toxins. If pathways of exposure are broadened beyond what we think of as food webs to include exposure by breathing and water consumption, the polar bears are really no different scientifically from a discussion of increased cancer rates among farm workers exposed to pesticides, people in North America's \"cancer alleys\" such as Louisiana and the Great Lakes region exposed to industrial pollutants like polyvinyl chloride, and the developmental consequences of poor inner city children exposed to lead. Rachel Carson's classic work published in 1962, Silent Spring, was a defining national moment when growing numbers of U.S. citizens became aware of the extent and 8 implications of toxic exposure. It was the moment we realized that substances like pesticides travel dramatically from one organism to another in a way that is especially dangerous for organisms at higher trophic levels. Silent Spring might be the moment that the environmental movement was born out of the field of ecology. In it Carson observes that These sprays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to farms, gardens, forests, and homes-nonselective chemicals that have the power to kill every insect, the 'good' and the 'bad,' to still the song of birds and the leaping of fish in the streams, to coat the leaves with a deadly film, and to linger on in soilall this though the intended target may be only a few weeds or insects. Can anyone believe it is possible to lay down such a barrage of poisons on the surface of the earth without making it unfit for all life? They should not be called 'insecticides,' but 'biocides' (7-8). HABITAT DIVERSITY, STABILITY, AND FOOD WEB RELATIONSHIPS The stability inherent in complex ecological relationships, the stability provided by complete food webs, exists because of the capacity of plants, herbivores, predators, and prey to compensate for fluctuations of growth or reduction in numbers of any particular species populations. This dynamic directly relates to the value of maintaining biodiversity. This is increasingly important in a world where habitat destruction, susceptibilities to pollution, and effects of invasive species may greatly diminish the numbers of any one species in a food web in an unexpected, sudden, and unpredictable pattern. Diversity in types of intact patches of habitat, combined with diversity in the biological community's resident in those habitat patches, is a requisite for preserving the 9 stability and variety of life on our planet. G. Evelyn Hutchinson, the great BritishAmerican ecologist, considered by many to be the father of modern limnology, recognized the inter-species relationship of food webs a half a century ago when he observed that Biological communities do not consist of independent food chains, but of food webs, of such a kind that an individual at any level (corresponding to a link in a single chain) can use some but not all of the food provided by species in the levels below it. It has long been realized that the presence of two species at any level, either of which can be eaten by a predator at a level above, but which may differ in palatability, ease of capture or seasonal and local abundance, may provide alternative foods for the predator. The predator will therefore neither become extinct itself nor exterminate its usual prey, when for any reason, not dependant on predator-prey relationships, the usual prey happen to be abnormally scarce (149). TROPHIC PYRAMIDS A primary scientific fact is that biological life is all ultimately based on solar energy. Moreover, from a thermodynamic perspective a fundamental organizing principle of ecology is the observation that as one ascends trophic levels available energy is rapidly diminished. There can be more biomass present in plants than in herbivores, more biomass of herbivores than of carnivores, and so forth through higher levels in both natural ecosystems and human-managed situations. The higher up a trophic pyramid, the lower the efficiency of organisms in converting the initial solar energy into biomass, so that unbridled human production of higher trophic level food sources such as grain fed 10 cattle or farmed salmon fed on pellets is especially demanding in terms of energy wastage. Even at one trophic level, variability in energetic efficiency exists. For example, it takes more feed grain to produce a pound of beef than a pound of pork, and more to produce a pound of pork than a pound of chicken. According to Lester Brown, \"Cattle in feedlots require roughly 7 kilograms of feed concentrate per additional kilogram of live weight. For pigs, the ratio is nearly 4 to 1. Chickens are much more efficient, with a 2 to 1 ratio\" (158). There are more calories available in grain than in any of the meats that can be produced indirectly from that grain. While protein rich foods like meat can have an important place in a healthy diet, consuming meat to excess can place a great burden on the planet in terms of the grain required to produce that meat. The environmental cost of the meat also includes the water, pesticides, fertilizers, and fossil fuels required to grow, harvest, process, and ship the grain and subsequently the meat. THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT AND ITS ECOLOGICAL SERVICES The recognition that the important level of organization in nature is an ecosystem containing plants, animals, microbes, and all the physical factors of soil chemistry, and other abiotic habitat factors is a central principle of ecology. The origin of the ecosystem concept goes back to A. G. Tansley when in 1935 he observed that . . . the more fundamental conception is, as it seems to me, the whole system (in the sense of physics), including not only the organism-complex, but also the whole complex of physical factors forming what we call the ecology of the biome the habitat factors in the widest sense. It is the systems so formed which, from the point of view of the ecologist, are the basic units of nature on the face of the 11 earth. These ecosystems, as we may call them, are of the most various kinds and sizes (299). Related to the ecosystem concept is the recognition of the ecological services that ecosystems provide. This notion has gained increasing appeal among some contemporary environmental scientists who, living in a commodity culture such as the U.S., want to highlight the essential \"goods and services\" of ecosystems upon which human existence is dependent. A good example of this is the fact that all oxygen in the earth's atmosphere comes from photosynthesis, consequently the forests of the planet are its \"lungs\" removing CO2 and providing the O2 required to support life. While this is an essential ecosystem service, it is nearly impossible to put a price-tag on O2, but life could not exist without it. Building on Tansley's ecosystem concept, the notion of ecological services accentuates the value of long-term stability of ecosystems to humans and the consequences of the hyper-instrumentalization of nature for short term harvest rates of resources. This concern was articulated by Eugene P. Odum, a leading figure in the development of modern ecology. In 1969 discussing the strategy of ecosystem development he summarized the idea of ecological services when he stated that Man has generally been preoccupied with obtaining as much \"production\" from the landscape as possible, by developing and maintaining early successional types of ecosystems, usually monocultures. But, of course, man does not live by food and fiber alone; he also needs a balanced CO2 O2 atmosphere, the climatic buffer provided by masses of vegetation and clean (that is, unproductive) water for cultural and industrial uses. Many essential life-cycle resources, not to mention 12 recreational and esthetic needs, are best provided man by the less \"productive\" landscapes. In other words the landscape is not just a supply depot but it is also an oikos – the home – in which we must live. Until recently mankind has more or less taken for granted the gas-exchange, water-purification, nutrient-cycling, and other protective functions of self-maintaining ecosystems, chiefly because neither his numbers nor his environmental manipulations have been great enough to effect global and regional balances. Now, of course, it is painfully evident that such balances are being affected, often detrimentally. The \"one problem, one solution approach\" is no longer adequate and must be replaced by some sort of ecosystem analysis that considers man as a part of, not apart from, the environment. .... Society needs, and must find as quickly as possible, a way to deal with the landscape as a whole, so that manipulative skills (that is, technology) will not run too far ahead of our understanding of the impact of change (Odum 266-267). HABITAT FRAGMENTATION, DEGRADATION, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Human activities (urban sprawl, conversion of natural ecosystems to agricultural use, road construction, etc.) both decrease the surface area of native plant and animal communities that exist, and also fragment the existing natural areas into what are frequently unconnected \"puzzle pieces\" that no longer fit together or have any connectivity for animal migration. These isolated pieces of natural habitat take on the characteristics of oceanic islands in terms of the plants and animals that live in them, with areas of inhospitable or impassible terrain generally separating them. As habitat fragments grow smaller, species diversity declines, when organisms whose natural 13 history requires a large home range or extensive migratory movements lose the ability to complete their life cycles. There is much debate about optimal habitat fragment size when ecosystem reserves are being set aside for species conservation. While it is generally true that as habitat patches become larger the number of species they contain increases, local species distributions and the potential uses of migration corridors make attention to the details of the plants and animals in any area crucial where reserves are being considered. David Quammen offers a vivid example of habitat fragmentation likened to cutting up a fine Persian rug. In The Song of the Dodo, Island Biogeography in an Age of Extinctions, Quammen writes, Let's start indoors. Let's start by imaging a fine Persian carpet and a hunting knife. The carpet is twelve feet by eighteen, say. That gives us 216 square feet of continuous woven material..... We set about cutting the carpet into thirty-six equal pieces, each one a rectangle, two feet by three feet.... When we're finished cutting, we measure the individual pieces, total them up and find that, lo, there's still nearly 216 square feet of recognizably carpetlike stuff. But what does it amount to? Have we got thirty-six nice Persian throw rugs? No. All we're left with is three dozen ragged fragments, each one worthless and commencing to come apart. Now take the same logic outdoors and it begins to explain why the tiger, Panthera tigris, has disappeared from the island of Bali. It casts light on the fact that the red fox, Vulpes vulpes, is missing from Bryce Canyon National Park. It suggests why the jaguar, the puma, and forty-five species of birds have been extirpated from a place called Barro Colorado Island and why myriad other creatures are 14 mysteriously absent from myriad other sites. An ecosystem is a tapestry of species and relationships. Chop away a section, isolate that section, and there arises the problem of unraveling (11). . CARRYING CAPACITY The carrying capacity of an environment is the number of individuals of a given species that a defined environment can support indefinitely. Ultimately in nature the movement of energy into the biotic world by photosynthesis, the flow of energy through food webs, and abiotic factors like precipitation and temperature combine to produce carrying capacities that are both characteristic and either stable or cyclic within a normal range of variation. Carrying capacity depends on a wide array of factors (food supply, water supply, availability of shelter, etc.). As organisms become too numerous, an array of density dependant mortality factors emerge that reduce population growth levels and reduce overall numbers of individuals of a species present. The density dependant mortality factors include things like starvation, lack of water, enhanced spread of pathogens and parasites as population density increases, accumulation of waste products, lack of shelter, increased predator populations, and intraspecific competition. Human beings are not immune to these carrying capacity dynamics. With a present global population of roughly 6.4 billion humans, what is our ultimate carrying capacity, and how rapidly are we approaching it? For humans the answer to this question is complex and includes such factors as birth rates, death rates and rates of resource consumption. It is important to note that consumption of natural resources by humans in the northern hemisphere, who typically have low birth rates, far exceeds the rate of consumption of 15 those living in the developing southern hemisphere. This is a serious ecological and ethical issue. WATERSHEDS Within any geographic region there are areas whose topography determines that they share the same stream and river drainage for precipitation running downhill towards the ocean. Such drainage basins are often referred to as watersheds. Within a watershed a number of distinctive biological communities may exist, as in the common pattern where grassy uplands give way to forested riparian zones along rivers, but these are bound together by a common flow of life's most fundamental molecule. Historically, humans have settled and developed their large population centers along the coasts, on large lakes, or on rivers, depending on the availability of water for drinking, transportation, industry, irrigation, and waste disposal. Urban growth challenges watersheds around the world, as mega-cities place huge demands on watersheds that are no longer sufficient to meet increasing needs of growing populations. Watershed level thinking is crucial, as the consequences of alterations to one part of a watershed will inevitably reverberate throughout the rest of the watershed. As the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences says Managing water resources at the watershed scale, while difficult, offers the potential of balancing the many, sometimes competing, demands we place on water resources. The watershed approach acknowledges linkages between uplands and down-stream areas, and between surface and groundwater, and reduces the chance that attempts to solve problems in one realm will cause problems in others. Watershed management is an integrative way of thinking about all the various 16 human activities that occur on a given area of land (the watershed) that have effects on or [are] affected by, water (National Research Council 1). AN ECOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF SUSTAINABILITY The ecological principles outlined above are essential characteristics when considering an environmental and scientific understanding of sustainability. Consequently, defined ecologically a sustainable situation exists when an ecosystem's energy flows and nutrient cycles are stable or fluctuating within a normal range of variability, when the species diversity and population levels of organisms are undiminished, when habitat diversity and the areas and connections of natural habitats are sufficient to allow organisms to carry out all stages of their life cycles, and when toxic materials are not accumulating in the soil, air, or water. Non-deterioration of the biotic and abiotic elements of an ecosystem is the hallmark of ecological sustainability; even a slow rate of progressive, directional deterioration will eventually overwhelm the capacity of any natural ecosystem to regulate its crucial characteristics within acceptable limits. Nevertheless, as crucial as the ecological understanding of sustainability is, the whole picture is incomplete without due consideration of human societies and economies and the largely detrimental impact on natural systems of human activities. This moves the analysis into the arena of human ecology, which can be defined as the study of the interrelationship between human beings and their bio-physical environment. HUMAN ECOLOGY: THE IMPACT OF HUMANITY ON ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES The ever-accelerating pace of fossil fuel consumption by human beings has produced the most obvious imbalance in a biogeochemical cycle, as increasing CO2 levels destabilize our global climate. However, other, less obvious imbalances are 17 beginning to become apparent. As a species we now use enough artificial fertilizer in agriculture and allow enough solid waste from our domestic animals and ourselves to escape into rivers and the ocean that the global N and P cycles are becoming out of balance. This is more severe to date for N because of our capacity to carry out industrial nitrogen fixation and fertilizer production (converting N2 from the atmosphere into biologically available forms of ammonia, nitrite, and nitrate) but excessive mining of P has also begun to imbalance that cycle as well. Accumulating levels of N and P have choked lakes and ponds with a process of eutrophication for years, but now we see oceanic dead zones increasing in both spatial and temporal dimensions, and toxic algal blooms becoming more common. The oxygen starved dead zone, for example, in the Gulf of Mexico, produced by eutrophication caused by massive N and P runoff from America's agricultural heartland down the Mississippi River, grows steadily in its extent and annual duration (Rabalais et al. 6-33). Other biogeochemical cycles, such as Calcium, Sulfur, Magnesium, and Potassium may be shifting out of balance as well (Hungate et al. 47-51). These are huge cycles, whose recovery may take periods of time to ameliorate well beyond the span of the present and next several generations. All of the biogeochemical cycle imbalances share a common root misconception in their origins; we have been acting like the materials draining off landscapes, coming from smoke stacks, and effluent pipes \"goes away.\" It is now clear that there is no \"away\" and that we have exceeded the capacity of the planet to dilute our waste materials without producing unintended ecological consequences. 18 On the issue of bioaccumulation of persistent toxins, the tens of thousands of synthetic organic compounds used and disposed of in our industrial society continually present us with surprises in terms of their persistence, toxicity, voyages through the ecosystem, and health consequences for us and for other life forms. This should come as a shock to no one, the consequences of chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT in the 1960s and the events that took place at Love Canal, NY, were a wake-up call that we only very partially heeded. Consider for a moment a particularly troubling example of exposure recently made available by the Environmental Working Group (EWG). In a first-of-itskind study of newborn infants, researchers with the EWG found pre-natal accumulation of 287 toxins in umbilical cord blood of children in the U.S., 180 of which are known to be carcinogens (Houlihan et al. 7). While regulations about pesticide and herbicide use, industrial waste processing, and the utilization of other toxic compounds have improved since the days of Love Canal, we still license the release of toxins (by setting acceptable emissions levels for industrial facilities) and we know very little about the health effects of most synthetic organic compounds before we begin to use them. The cost of investigating these health consequences by animal testing prior to employing our inventions would be staggering, so we have come to tacitly accept the Frankenstein-like nature of our chemical industry. Some of what we invent serves us well, some of what we invent harms us brutally, and the costs are often borne disproportionately by workers in the chemical industry, and by the poor who live in inexpensive locations near industrial facilities or in third world countries with weak environmental legislation. A significant issue is the apparent inability of modern society to discriminate between \"needs\" and \"wants\". If we focused 19 our chemical industry on developing and testing materials we need to produce food, fibers, medications, vital metals and plastics, etc., we would be dealing with monitoring a much more reasonable number of novel compounds. When we add to those necessary industrial products the materials needed to make portable electric ice makers for picnics, luminescent cosmetics, brilliant yellow Hummers, flashing shoe lights, electric winders for self-winding watches, 20,000 BTU patio barbecues, and his-and-hers cappuccino machines, the multiplication of materials being invented to meet the ultimately insatiable appetites of an excessive consumerism mean we never have time or resources for caution in considering the consequences of what we synthesize and manufacture. Our own accelerating immodesty of consumption poisons us or someone else. The issue of the insatiable appetites of an excessive consumerism requires further reflection. As noted above this is a serious ethical concern. Our accelerating rates of consumption in the Western World, the use of Western society as an economic model for the rest of the planet, and the detailed choices of what is appropriate to consume, must be examined. These choices are ones that increasingly have unintended consequences as human populations increase in numbers in most regions while human affluence increases in some areas. Disproportionate resource consumption and pollution production by industrialized societies, which generally have low population growth rates, mean that this component of the world reaps economic benefits while causing environmental consequences, often in distant locations from which natural resources are being harvested at unsupportable rates. For the West, consumption is the facet of society that needs moderation in order to ameliorate the environmental crisis. High population growth rates in regions like sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia pose their own challenge to the 20 planet. In those areas where population may be doubling every 20 or 30 years, people are generally living at subsistence levels already, and drinkable water, farmland, firewood, and other resources are increasingly scarce on a per capita basis. These regions cannot decrease their per capita consumption rates significantly, nor can they continue to grow exponentially in their human populations without devastating their local ecologies. The ecological impact of a regional population of humans on the planet is the product of their numbers multiplied by their individual consumption rates. People living at a subsistence level may have far less impact on the planet's air, water, soil, and other natural resources than a few people living an excessive lifestyle. Some areas of the globe, such as the northern hemisphere, are peopled by societies making enormous individual demands on a finite global ecosystem as their homes get larger, their cars become bigger their fashions become outmoded and disposable more quickly, and the baseline for what is appropriate in terms of consumption levels creeps insidiously upwards. The culture of \"supersizing\", based on the generally unspoken premise that increasing rates of consumption are of themselves a good thing, must be called into question. Our most successful economic models are predicated on continual growth in consumption providing an engine to drive human progress upwards in terms of employment, productivity, and affluence, but these models are unsustainable and strikingly nonecological in their nature. Ecosystems are stable because the flow of energy and nutrients is maintained by various homeostatic mechanisms within a normal range of fluctuation. The idea of unlimited economic growth is based ultimately on the premise that an infinitely increasing rate of productivity is compatible with a finite global supply of natural 21 resources. This model provided by over-consuming societies is a dual threat to ecosystems and to global political stability. Add to this the legitimate aspiration of impoverished societies to emulate over-consuming societies in what they eat and how they live, and it compounds the threat. The combined phenomena of rapid population growth and over consumption are a serious ecological concern that must be addressed by the world community. Clearly steps towards recycling, reuse, reduction and elimination of waste, are needed as human societies strive to become sustainable, that is, to learn how to live more like nature without impoverishing themselves or the future. The wealthy nations of the world are ethically bound to take the lead in this endeavor. Watersheds deserve separate mention in terms of human ecology, because the present pattern of agriculture and development is so peculiarly out of touch with the reality of water supplies that it needs to be highlighted. In many locations around the world, crops are being grown that are inappropriate for the local availability of water. For example, rice production in the Central Valley of California is based on subsidized water pumped out of the Colorado River as part of a system that almost entirely consumes the water in the river before it reaches the sea. A particular devastating example has been cotton production in the Aral Sea region of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where extensive water diversion into unlined irrigation canals has led to death not only of the Aral Sea itself but to extensive salinization of the surrounding soils as well as immense human suffering caused by airborne pesticide-laden dust from the former sea bottom. In other areas we see rapid urban growth in arid regions where the negative impacts of increasing human population densities are being spread over hundreds or 22 thousands of miles of land surrounding diverted rivers. In the U.S., Phoenix and Las Vegas are perhaps the prime examples of watershed-blind development that is occurring elsewhere around the globe. Watersheds are real entities, and the fact that we ignore them is a major contributor to the newly minted expression \"water will be the next oil.\" If we accept Eugene Odum's observations, noted above, we as a species have never recognized the complexity of ecosystems, the essential services they provide, the vital need for conserving both biotic and abiotic ecosystem components for long-term stability, and the results of partitioning the world haphazardly by our development activities. We have taken for granted that the air will remain breathable, that water will run fresh and clear, that birds will return in the spring and salmon will return to spawn. If this has not been true in our communities, or in our region, we have believed that it was true somewhere. But the views of our planet from space show that our complacency is misplaced. Much of the northern hemisphere glows at night as our cities sprawl, the tropical forests diminish and burn as slash-and-burn agriculture spreads into what were strongholds of rainforest. On the opposite scale, microscopic samples of ocean water show algal diversity declining, and our fish communities are diminished as jellyfish and other \"inedible\" forms replace over-fished commercially valuable species. An intentional engagement with planning and economic activities at every level from the local to the global is vital if the irreplaceable ecosystem services upon which our lives rely are to continue unabated. Crucial to success in this venture is the realization that human ecology has implications at a progression of levels from small geographic units to continents. Integration of things like the planning of local parks, power plants, and reservoirs, is needed. The vertical and horizontal nature of the planning process we need 23 to employ for achieving sustainability is both comprehensible and challenging. One way of grounding the nature and complexity of human ecology is offered by Mark Steiner. He states To understand human ecologies, the most relevant levels of organization include habitat, community, landscape region, nation and state, and earth or ecosphere. These levels present different, yet interconnected, scales of analysis. Each level possesses a history and a literature of analysis and debate. The habitat includes the building and the lot. The community is comprised of buildings, lots, streets, and blocks. Landscapes can be urban, suburban, rural, and wild. Regions are hodgepodges of landscapes, while the distinctions between regions, and often those between states and nations, are even more blurred. But there is less ambiguity about the ends of the Earth (13-14). Steiner's units or levels of human ecology-habitat, community, landscape, region (bioregion or ecoregion), nation-state, and planet-begin with the most basic and local form of human habitation and proceed outward in ever expanding but interrelated circles of human existence ultimately incorporating the entire earth. From a visual perspective, Steiner's levels of human ecology can be represented in the following manner: 24 Figure 1: Concentric Circles of Human Ecology Bear in mind that inherent to this model of human ecology, is the fact that ecological processes function at every level of human habitation. In Steiner's view, habitat, community, landscape, ecoregion, and planet can be regarded as independent yet interconnected ecosystems (24). The human impact in the U.S. on earth's Carbon cycle exemplifies the connectivity within Steiner's levels. At the local level of habitat, many of us burn fossil fuels to heat/cool homes and businesses and we drive to and from work with fossil fuel burning vehicles. Combine that with population density and local weather patterns and that adds up to poor air quality and concomitant health impacts at the community level. Consider for example Los Angeles and Houston, cities according to recent EPA data that have the worst persistent air quality of any urban areas in the U.S. Now consider the impact on landscape and region of burning fossil fuels. One immediate consequence is acid precipitation, which has affected large areas of the east coast from New England PLANET NATION / STATE BIOREGION LANDSCAPE HABITAT COMMUNITY 25 south into the mid-Atlantic region. In addition to reduced visibility of the landscape, acid deposition in these areas reduces pH (increases acidity) of fresh water bodies and negatively impacts forest health and survivability. Compound this at the nation/state level where the U.S. has consistently refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and reduce fossil fuel emissions-no small matter when one considers the fact that 85% of the energy we consume is fossil fuel and, at about 5% of the world's population, the U.S. consumes 25% of the world's primary energy. Combine our fossil fuel consumption with everyone else on the planet and the result is a major impact on earth's carbon cycle with potential serious and devastating consequences. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Third Assessment Report volume II, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, the negative impact and vulnerability scenarios on human populations due to global warming and climate change, will be most acute among the world's poor in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America (915959). A reasoned assessment of the human impact on earth's carbon cycle is that the current rate of fossil fuel consumption worldwide and especially in the U.S. is not ecologically sustainable. Nonetheless, ecological processes are only one component in the overall picture of sustainability. The underlying human drivers, that is, the socialeconomic institutions humans create, must be addressed if we are to realize an adequate understanding of sustainability. In this regard attention to human ecology is indispensable. As Steiner states, \"We must understand the organization-the function, structure and process-of the communities that we inhabit in order to lay the foundation for the future (11-12). 26 HUMAN ECOLOGY AND MODELS OF SUSTAINABILITY All ecologies, whether biological or human, are about understanding relationships. In the case of human ecology the focus is on two sets of relationships. As noted earlier human ecology is concerned with the relationship or interaction between human beings and their bio-physical environment. Unlike environmental ecology, however, human ecology is also concerned with the interrelationship between human beings in the social systems they create and how those institutions interact with the environment. As Steiner states, \"Human ecology extends how relationships occur in nature to human systems. . .\" (24). In this perspective society, understood as a complex web of human behaviors and interactions that have become institutionalized over time, is a critical component for both the study of human ecology and an adequate understanding of sustainability. Within this complex web of human interactions, the economic institution proves to be particularly significant insofar as it is the primary producer of goods and services for society's consumption as well as the primary producer of society's impact on the bio-physical environment. Consequently it is our view that ecology, economy and society, and the interrelationships therein, are key characteristics from a human ecological perspective for adequately understanding and defining sustainability. This model of sustainability can be visualized by a Venn diagram: 27 Figure 2: Ecology, Economy and Society Model of Sustainability Defining sustainability and sustainable, often used as an adjective to describe such things as development, society, economy, etc., has proven to be a difficult and mercurial task. By some counts nearly seventy definitions of the terms exist providing a wide range of perspectives depending on one's loyalties and ideological commitments. This suggests, in Mark Diesendorf's view from \"down under\" that \"sustainability and sustainable development are contestable concepts. . . and . . . They cannot be defined in the same way that physical scientists might define the standard metre\" (110). While there is a great deal of merit in Diesendorf's observation, we would argue that any suitable and acceptable definition of sustainability must address and attend to ecology, economy and society as a basic framework and model for understanding and achieving sustainability. With this in mind we offer the tentative working definition of sustainability as the ethical engagement and process of achieving stability and non-deterioration of ecological processes, through the just and equitable restructuring of economic and social institutions designed to meet present needs without jeopardizing future human and non-human generations from meeting their needs. The image we wish to produce is balance, stability ECOLOGY ECONOMY SOCIETY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 28 and equity within the complex web of relationships identified by ecology, economy and society with a definite future orientation. Moreover our definition of sustainability is applicable to each level of human ecology from the local habitat to the plant's ecosphere. Writing from an Australian context and with the assumption that sustainability must incorporate the ecological, economic and social, Diesendorf makes a compelling case that if sustainability is to be implemented then criteria need to be developed. Calling these \"measurable objectives\" or \"sustainability indicators\" Diesendorf (114) offers these examples: Table 1: Examples of Some Measurable Objectives or Sustainability Indicators 'Ecological' 'Economic' 'Social' Rate of materials' flow Rate of energy use Total and per capita rate of greenhouse gas emissions Vehicle kilometers traveled per capita Human population and growth rate Area of land degraded and polluted Water pollution Air pollution 'Genuine Progress Indicators' Distribution of household and personal income Percentage of income needed to pay for basic 'needs' of a person Percentage of children living in households with no adult earner Mortgage repayments and rents relative to median income region Employment by top five companies in region Basic services within walking and cycling distances of dwellings Availability of day care for under 5s Levels of education, including literacy & numeracy Life expectancies at birth and at age 20 Morbidity rates Crime rates Homelessness Teaching of indigenous languages in schools 29 While we acknowledge the significance of Diesendorf's insight and contribution to the discourse on implementing sustainability, we would adapt his criteria of sustainability indicators to include the following characteristics: Table 2: Characteristics of Sustainability Indicators Ecological Processes Economic Indicators Social Factors Biogeochemical cycles and impacts Bioaccumulation of toxins Habitat diversity, stability Food web relationships Trophic pyramids and energy flow Ecological services of ecosystems Habitat fragmentation Carrying capacity Water quality/watersheds Air quality Distribution of household and personal income Minimum wage issues Percentages of income needed to pay for basic needs Unemployment issues Agricultural operations and organic farms Food delivery systems Number of sustainable businesses in region, Employment projections Potable water Minimum health care benefits availability Urban livability and greenspaces Availability of daycare Homelessness Levels of education and ecological literacy Infant mortality and life expectancy Hunger and food resources Crime rates Environmental health factors Type of Ethical Action Required Ecological Justice Distributive Justice Social Justice These criteria are not intended to be comprehensive or inflexible but to provide the reader with concrete examples of what is meant by the ecological, economic and social dimensions of sustainability. Specific nation-states and ecoregions would most likely have to adapt these criteria to suit their own national and local social, economic and ecological situation. 30 Another model of sustainability that merits serious scrutiny is one proposed by William McDonough and Michael Braungart in their book Cradle to Cradle. McDonough, an architectural designer from the U.S. and Braungart, a German environmental chemist formed a joint business venture in the mid 1990's with the vision of making children the standard for safety in industry. Consequently their principle \"to love the children of all species for all time\" is a working standard in their business enterprise (McDonough and Braungart 14). What is unique and compelling about the McDonough-Braungart model of sustainability is that it is not an abstract theory or concept but an actual concrete model utilized in their business design process-what they refer to as their \"triple top line\" of Ecology, Equity and Economy. They created a visual model, represented below, that allows them \"to conceptualize and creatively examine a proposed design's relationship to a multiplicity of factors. . .\" (150-151). Figure 3: McDonough-Braungart Triangle Model of Sustainability (150). According to McDonough and Braungart, this \"visualization tool\" is based on a fractal tile, a form with no apparent scale that is composed of selfsimilar parts. . . The fractal is a tool, not a symbol, and we have actively applied it ECOLOGY EQUITY ECONOMY 31 to our own projects, ranging from the design of individual products, buildings, and factories to effects on whole towns, cities, even countries. As we plan a product or system, we move around the fractal, asking questions and looking of answers (151). As business people McDonough and Braungart typically begin their process of analysis with the Economic sector and here they are, as they state, \"in the realm of pure capitalism. . .\" Consequently questions regarding profit, wealth and the \"bottom line\" are expected. As the process continues they move toward the Economy/Equity sector where questions of a social and ethical nature are relevant, such as \"Are people treating one another with respect?\" Here issues such as racism or sexism are relevant. As the process transitions into the Equity/Ecology sector McDonough and Braungart \"consider questions of ecosystem effects, not just in the workplace or at home, but with respect to the entire ecosystem: Is it fair to pollute a river or poison the air?\" (152). In the pure Ecology sector, McDonough and Braungart are moving in an entirely new and creative dimension of industrial design that may be described as \"bio-mimicry,\" a process of design that intentionally attempts to mimic natural processes. In this category the ecological processes outlined previously are the baseline for analysis and discernment. From that point the McDonough-Braungart fractal process continues over again in an iterative manner. Their model is, in other words a heuristic and iterative process for visualizing and achieving sustainability within a business context. It is important to note that Diesendorf and the McDonough-Braungart approach to sustainability are grounded in a clear ethical respect for humans and the natural world now and in the future. Also their models are applicable to the multi-layered 32 understanding of human ecology as described by Steiner. The description of McDonough and Braungart's fractal process for achieving sustainability, quoted above, that it is applicable to individual products, buildings, cities and countries clearly suggest this. It is our view that these similar models and approaches to sustainability are applicable to many if not all human endeavors whether they are profit or not-for-profit enterprises. They could for example be applied to an Archdiocesan chancery building or to a parish complex or to an entire Episcopal region. That leads to the crux of our analysis: What exactly is the relationship between sustainability and Catholic social teaching? Our review of the documents pinpoints one-the U.S. Bishops' pastoral statement, Renewing the Earth (1991)-where the language of sustainability is used with considerable frequency. In fact in Section A, \"Aims of This Statement,\" the Bishops state that one of its six goals is \"To promote a vision of a just and sustainable world community\" (Carey 398). As in most literature on sustainability, the term sustainable appears-approximately sixteen times-in Renewing the Earth as an adjective providing a descriptive modification to such things as economy, economic policies, global economy, agriculture, world and development. We, of course, applaud its utilization as it signifies an important development in the tradition of Catholic social ethics and theology. It is our view, through the lenses of human ecology that the most appropriate link with Catholic social teaching is with the central concept of the common good, an evolving principle and norm within this enlightened body of social teaching. In fact we will suggest that sustainability, as an ethical principle is one way of interpreting the work of repairing and maintaining the common good whether it is understood as a local, regional, national or planetary dimension. 33 THE COMMON GOOD AND HUMAN ECOLOGY Derived and developed within the Thomistic and scholastic tradition the principle of the bonum commune or the common good is the hallmark of Catholic social teaching. Simply put this key ethical norm refers to the value or the sum-total of values that shapes the aim of all personal and social activity in a particular society. Typically linked on one hand with the doctrine of the imago Dei validating the intrinsic value and dignity of the human person, and on the other hand with the work of justice and the defense of human rights, the common good is the linchpin of Catholic social teaching and the most appropriate characteristic for developing an interpretation of sustainability within Catholic social and environmental ethics. This section is not intended to provide a detailed analysis of the common good but to identify key historical junctures that highlight the development and expansion of the concept in modern Catholic social teaching beginning with Rerum Novarum (1891). From our review of the tradition it is obvious that the norm of the common good is an evolving and flexible principle that can and has been applied to multiple spheres or levels of human activity and that in the last fifteen years it has been interpreted and its meaning expanded in direct response to ecology and the environmental crisis. What follows is a historical summary of significant moments of development of the common good drawn primarily, but not exclusively from papal documents. Rerum Novarum (1891). Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter on The Condition of Labor is usually seen as the foundational document in modern Catholic social teaching. Written in response to the distressing conditions of labor caused by rapid socio-economic change, this document defined the common good in terms of the nation-state and in 34 reference to the rights of individuals. In David Hollenbach's interpretation of Rerum Novarum, the common good \"consists in the mutual respect of rights and the fulfillment of duties by all citizens\" (49). At this stage of development the common good meant the social constellation of individual rights and the state plays the \"chief role\" of ensuring the common good. Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Following Pope Leo XIII, Pius XI's letter On Reconstructing the Social Order continued to define the parameters of the common good in terms of the nation-state but with a particular emphasis on social and economic conditions. The significance of this papal encyclical is that Pius XI recognized that promoting the common good would require the re-structuring of socio-economic institutions. In this regard the introduction of social justice-in relation to the common good-is a major development in the tradition of Catholic social teaching. Moved by the disparity between rich and poor caused by the Depression of 1929, Pope Pius XI wrote: To each, therefore, must be given his own share of goods, and the distribution of created goods, which, as every discerning person knows, is laboring under the gravest evils due to the huge disparity between the few exceedingly rich and the unnumbered propertyless, must be effectively called back to and brought into conformity with the norms of the common good, that is, social justice (no.58). The significance of this papal letter lies in the recognition that human dignity is constituted by social systems-which in the case of Quadregesimo Anno the economic system is primary-and that in order to ensure the common good, these social systems need to be restructured and transformed. 35 Pacem in Terris (1963). Pope John XXIII's encyclical, Peace on Earth, signifies another important developmental leap in the interpretation of the common good. In addition to articulating the first comprehensive list of human rights in Catholic social teaching, Peace on Earth, expanded the meaning of the common good beyond the nation state to include the entire human race. Finding expression in the language, \"universal common good,\" Pope John, according to David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon, used the common good as a \"principle of integration\" (122). On one hand the common good is ensured when nation-states guarantee the totality of rights of individuals, and on the other hand it is also promoted in reference to the common good of the entire human community. By implication Pope John introduced the notion that the common good, as an ethical norm, may be applied to various levels of human activity whether it is the national or international field of social interaction. Re-iterating his definition of the common good from Mater et Magistra (1960), Pope John stated that \"the common good of all embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living whereby men are enabled to achieve their own integral perfection more fully and more easily\" (Pacem in Terris no. 58). Linking the common good with all humanity prepared the way for subsequent developments in interpreting the common good during the Second Vatican Council and beyond. Gaudium et Spes (1965) and Pope Paul VI. Those familiar with Catholic social teaching usually identify the Second Vatican Council as a highly significant development. Characterized by a fresh awareness of modern human interdependence, pluralism, and a historical consciousness, this development is perhaps best exemplified by the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes. This 36 document continued the identification of the common good with the entire human race but with a broader view of the complexity and historicity of its application. Consequently, the Council Fathers defined the common good as the sum total of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family (Gaudium et Spes no. 26). Two encyclicals by Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (1967) and Octogesima Adveniens (1971) continued in the same vain of thought as the Pastoral Constitution but added new dimensions to the requirements of the common good. While neither of these documents provided a full-blown definition of the common good, they did identify specific needs, the fulfillment of which are necessary to promote the common good on national and international levels. Hollenbach provides an excellent summary of the focus of these documents when he states that Pope Paul's social statements are shaped throughout by consciousness of the historicity of social institutions. They are also dominated by concern with transnational and international patterns of human interdependence. The problems of economic development, international economic relationships, and, above all, the poverty of developing nations are the central concern of these documents (78). In On the Development of Peoples, Pope Paul offered \"a global vision of man and 37 of the human race\" by introducing the concept of integral development. The document argued that \"There can be no progress towards complete development of man without the simultaneous development of all humanity in the spirit of solidarity\" (Populorum Progressio no. 43). A Call to Action re-asserted the need for full human development but also added several new insights to Catholic social teaching with significant ramifications for the evolving norm of the common good. First, A Call to Action explicitly addressed the \"dynamism\" of Catholic social teaching indicating that \"It develops through reflection applied to the changing situations of this world\" and, given its \"rich experience\" can undertake \"daring and creative innovations\" (Octogesima Adveiens no. 42). Secondly, the encyclical acknowledged different but interrelated spheres of human community, and gave new emphasis to human interdependence on the international level, to which Catholic social teaching must be applied. Third, Pope Paul's letter was the first papal encyclical to identify environmental degradation as a new \"wide-ranging social problem which concerns the entire human family\" (no. 21). These innovations prepare the way for the recognition that the bio-physical environment is incorporated into the common good in the social encyclicals of Pope John Paul II and eventually to the idea that the common good is planetary in its scope. Pope John Paul II. With Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) and Centesimus Annus (1991), we see an increased emphasis on universal interdependence and the inclusion of the \"ecological question\" into Catholic social teaching. In honor of Populorum Progressio and in keeping with its focus, Pope John Paul links economic development with ecological concern in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis by declaring \"the need to respect the integrity and the cycles of nature. . . when planning for development. . .\" (no. 26). In 38 making the case that \"the moral character of development\" requires \"respect for the beings which constitute the natural world,\" Pope John Paul highlights three issues: 1) That humanity must consider the \"mutual connection\" of living and non-living aspects of the natural world as part of an \"ordered system,\" 2) That some natural resources are nonrenewable and must be made available to future generations, and 3) That society must be mindful of the consequences of \"haphazard development\" particularly in relation to industrialization and \"the pollution of the environment, with serious consequences for the health of the population\" (Sollicitude Rei Socialis no. 34). In Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul picks up the \"ecological question\" again and makes distinctions between environmental ecology, human ecology and social ecology. What is significant, however, for our analysis is the statement that it is the state's task \"to provide for the defense and preservation of common goods such as the natural and human environments. .\" (no. 40) In its commentary on this issue, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church states that \"Care for the environment represents a challenge for all of humanity. It is a matter of a common and universal duty, that of respecting a common good . . .\" (no. 466). A reasonable interpretation would conclude that the natural environment and its ecological processes is included in the common good and that the care of the bio-physical world is a moral obligation without which the common good can not be promoted or maintained. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. The analysis of the common good in Catholic social teaching would not be complete without a brief reflection on two important pastoral statements by the U.S. Catholic Bishops. In their first letter, Renewing the Earth, the Bishops provided new language and a new dimension to the common good 39 when they referred to it as \"The Planetary Common Good.\" In this section of the letter the Bishops acknowledge the evolving characteristics of the common good and make the point that the ecological crisis \"has heightened our awareness of just how interdependent our world is\" (Carey 407). Moreover this pastoral statement makes the claim that \"The universal common good can serve as a foundation for a global environmental ethic\" (Carey 407). The Bishops re-visit the same idea in their letter on Global Climate Change (2001). In their reflection on climate change and Catholic social teaching, the Bishops link the universal common good with climate, which is \"by its very nature part of the planetary commons\" (Global Climate Change 7). Re-affirming the linkage between the common good and the planetary commons, the Compendium provides an excellent summary of the progressive extension of the principle of the common good-from nation-state to planet-when it states, \"The common good of society is not an end in itself; it has value only in reference to attaining the ultimate ends of the person and the universal common good of the whole creation\" (no. 170). Our summary analysis of the historical evolution and expansion of the common good suggests the following conclusions. First, the norm of the common good in our present historical context must be understood and applied as an inclusive principle that embraces the bio-physical environment and the ecological processes that sustain the natural world and provides the support structure for all life, human and non-human. In theological language the common good embodies the entire commonwealth of creation. It does, of course, continue to apply to the common welfare of humanity, but it recognizes that the well being of humans has relatively little meaning without due recognition of the 40 ecological interdependence between human welfare and a healthy functioning planetary ecosphere. Second, while the common good must be interpreted as an inclusive principle, our analysis strongly suggests that it is flexible and multi-dimensional and consequently, may be applied to various levels of human endeavor. This is certainly clear in our review of papal contributions to Catholic social teaching where it has been applied to human communities and social groups at national and international levels. The flexible adaptation of the common good is also quite evident in the regional pastoral letter of the Bishops of the Pacific Northwest, The Columbia River Watershed, Caring for Creation and the Common Good (2001). In this unique and creative application of Catholic social teaching, the Columbia River Watershed is defined as a common good wherein the principle of the common good is applied to an ecological region as well as local community and landscape. Addressing themselves to the communities within the Columbia Basin, the Bishops propose ten \"Considerations for Community Caretaking\" the first two of which are \"Consider the Common Good\" and \"Conserve the Watershed as a Common Good\" (The Columbia River Watershed 13). Drawing on Catholic social teaching on private property the Bishops state that \"We urge private property owners and all managers of public lands to be good stewards of God's land, to restore and conserve that land, and to promote human communities integrated with regional ecosystems\" (13). As a common good, the Bishops note that \"The Columbia River Watershed is home to people and to a variety of other creatures. This shared habitat needs to be nurtured and carefully conserved if all inhabitants are to live in an integrated and interrelated matter\" (13). 41 With a great deal of sensitivity to the Catholic principle of the common good and ecology, the Bishops of the Pacific Northwest have skillfully crafted a pastoral statement that creatively links the common good with habitat, community and ecological region emphasizing the integration and interrelatedness of these domains of human and nonhuman habitation. Moreover, their pastoral statement provides an exceptional example of the flexibility and adaptability of the common good as an ethical principle that functions as an inclusive universal norm as well as a principle that may be applied the very specific levels of social engagement. In light of our analysis we are encouraged to suggest that, if interpreted through the lenses of human ecology, the common good may be visualized using Steiner's levels of human interaction with the natural world as an interrelated web of human relationships from the local habitat to the entire planet. Figure 4, The Universal-Planetary Common Good PLANET NATION / STATE BIOREGION LANDSCAPE HABITAT COMMUNITY 42 Our point is really quite simple. The common good as \"the sum of those conditions of social life\" that allow individuals and groups \"ready access to their own fulfillment\" has a profound ecological dimension reflecting the interrelatedness and interdependence of human persons in community as well as the interrelatedness and interdependence of human beings in their bio-physical environment. As a moral norm, however, the common good highlights the moral obligations human beings have to one another, society and the natural world in order to respect and ensure human rights and the integrity of creation. In Catholic social teaching this is typically referred to as the work of justice. It is through the work of justice-in all its permutations-that the common good is promoted. This leads to our third and final conclusion, that sustainability as an ethical praxis is a new way of interpreting the work of justice within Catholic social teaching. CONCLUSION: THE PRAXIS OF SUSTAINABILITY, JUSTICE AND THE COMMON GOOD In Catholic social teaching justice is the means whereby individual rights are guaranteed and the common good promoted. Traditionally defined in three modalities, commutative, distributive and social, the work of justice is an integrating praxis where on one hand the rights and dignity of individuals are ensured and, on the other hand, that social goods are equitably allocated and the social institutions necessary for their allocation exist and are properly ordered. In Hollenbach's analysis social justice in particular is an \"aggregative principle\" the measure of which \"orders personal activities in such a way which is suitable for the production and protection of the common good\" (152). Given the models of sustainability, previously noted in this analysis, the three-fold understanding of justice in Catholic social teaching is entirely consistent with the social and economic components of sustainability. In fact it is through the pursuit of justice that 43 social and economic institutions are re-structured, if necessary, enhanced and maintained in order to ensure and sustain the rights of all. Nonetheless, given the ecological component of sustainability and our ecological interpretation of the common good, an additional modality of justice is require-the work of ecological justice. We believe the concept of ecological justice already exists, although in nascent form, in recent documents on Catholic social teaching that address the \"ecological question.\" For example, the Compendium, quoted above, recognizes that \"Care for the environment . . . Is a matter of a common and universal duty. . .\" Given our perspective in this analysis we propose that the work of ecological justice is the ethical duty and moral obligation of ensuring the integrity of creation through the restoration and maintenance of the ecological processes that sustain all life on this planet. Consequently, the praxis of sustainability must be considered an ethical duty and ought to be defined within Catholic social teaching as the work of commutative, social and ecological justice, the metapurpose of which is repairing, producing and sustaining the universal and particular common good for all life. Framed within the ecological-social-economic model of sustainability it may be represented by the following diagram Figure 5, Sustainability, Justice and the Planetary Common Good ECOLOGY Ecological Justice SOCIETY Social Justice ECONOMICS Distributive Justice SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 44 In concluding this reflection on ecology and the common good one final thought is in order. As a result of this preliminary analysis we find the ethical principle of sustainability to be entirely compatible with the broad framework of Catholic social teaching and in particular with the Church's evolving notion of the common good and its growing awareness of and attention to the ecological crisis. In our view this rich body of social teaching contains great potential for creating a platform and horizon for the formation of public policy on sustainability that the United States and the entire world require. The disruption humanity has caused to the earth's ecosphere is no small matter and if we are to avoid the potential for devastating consequences we must act with haste and a sense of urgency. We are reminded, therefore, of Pope Paul VI's A Call to Action in which Christians are urged to \"take the initiative freely and to infuse a Christian spirit into the mentality, customs, laws and structures of the community in which they live\" (Octogesima Adveniens no. 48). We are also reminded of the words of William McDonough (123) that \"all sustainability is local,\" therefore, wherever we find ourselves whether it be community, region or nation, let us embrace the work of sustainability in order to ensure the common good and create the possibility that the children of all species will have a promising and hopeful future. 45 Works Cited Brown, Lester R. Eco-Economy, Building an Economy for the Earth. Washington, D.C.: Earth Policy Institute, 2001. Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962. Diesendorf, Mark. \"Models of Sustainability and Sustainable Development,\" International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology 1 (2001): 109-123. Hollenbach, David, S.J. Claims in Conflict, Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition. New York: Paulist Press, 1979. Hungate, Bruce A., Robert J. Naiman, Mike Apps, Jonathan J. Cole, Bedrich Moldan, Kenichi Satake, John W, B. 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Renewing the Earth, Catholic Documents on Peace, Justice and Liberation. Eds. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977. 307-346. Pius XI. Quadragesimo Anno. On Reconstructing the Social Order. Washington, D. C.: 47 National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1942. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Washington, D.C.: USCCB Publishing, 2004. Quammen, David. The Song of the Dodo, Island Biogeography in an Age of Extinctions. New York: Touchstone, 1996. Rabalais, Nancy N., E. Eugene Turner, Dubravko Justic, Quay Dortch, and Willliam J, Wiseman, Jr. Characterization of Hypoxia: Topic 1 Report for the Integrated Assessment on Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. NOAA Coastal Ocean Program Decision Analysis Series No. 15. Silver Springs, MD.: NOAA Coastal Ocean Program, 1999. Steiner, Frederick. Human Ecology. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002. Tansley, A. G. \"The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,\" Ecology 16 (1935): 284-307. The Columbia River Watershed: Caring for Creation and the Common Good. An International Pastoral Letter by the Catholic Bishops of the Region. Seattle, WA: Columbia River Pastoral Letter Project, 2001. United States Catholic Conference of Bishops. Global Climate Change, A Plea for Dialogue, Prudence, and the Common Good. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 2001. \"Renewing the Earth: An Invitation to Reflection and Action on Environment in Light of Catholic Social Teaching.\" Pastoral Letters and Statements of the United States Catholic Bishops, Vol. VI, 1989-1997. Ed. Patrick W. Carey. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1998. 397-418.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Actor Network, Ontic Structural Realism, and the Ontological Status of Actants Corrado Matta Department of Education, Stockholm University, corrado.matta@edu.su.se Abstract In this paper I discuss the ontological status of actants. Researchers have argued that actants are the basic constituting entities of networks in the framework of the actor-network theory (Latour, 2007). I introduce two problems concerning actants that have been highlighted by Collin (2010). The first problem, according to Collin, is that actants cannot simultaneously be constituents and products of a network. The second problem, as Latour suggests, is that if actants are fundamentally propertyless, then it is unclear how they combine into networks. I suggest that both of the problems Collin ascribes to actants rest on the assumption of a form of object ontology, i.e., the assumption that the ontological basis of reality consists in discrete individual entities. I argue that the solution to this problem consists in the assumption of an ontology of relations and, furthermore, that Ontic Structural Realism (Ladyman & Ross, 2007) is the kind of ontological theory of relations that can solve this problem. While my proposal can be considered as an attempt to solve two problems, it is also an experiment of reconciliation between the analytic and constructivist philosophies of science. Keywords Actor network theory, ontic structural realism, relational ontology, actants/actors Introduction This paper is an exercise in the ontology of networks. Throughout the text I use the term network consistently within the actor-network theory (ANT) framework presented and discussed by Latour (2007)1. The main aim of this paper is to propose a solution to two philosophical problems pointed out by Collin (2010) that concern the ontological status of the basic constituents of networks, i.e., actants (or actors)2. The first problem, according to Collin, is that the same actant that participates in the production of a network be produced by the same network. Collin observes that this seems to generate a vicious circle (Collin, 2010, p. 120). Collin formulates the second problem as follows: \"How can actants generate the world through their interaction, if they are fundamentally propertyless, beyond their penchant for combining?\" (Collin, 2010, p. 137). The solution I propose for these two problems draws on a theory about the ontology of scientific theories usually labeled as ontic structural realism (OSR) (discussed in detail in Ladyman & Ross, 2007). In short, I argue that the possibility for propertyless actants to constitute a network rests on the abandonment of object ontology in favor of an ontology of only relations. Object ontology refers to the assumption that the world 1 Actor-network theory is more a family of approaches than a unified theory or method. It is therefore important to remark that in this paper I only discuss Latour's formulation of the theory as discussed in Latour (2007). My conclusions can be extended and applied to other formulations of ANT as long as they are consistent with Latour's. 2 The choice of the term \"actant\" in the text is problematic. It is sometimes avoided in favor of the term \"actor.\" However, the main sources of the discussion in this paper are Collin (2010), Latour (2007), and Harman (2009). While Harman seems to use the terms \"actor\" and \"actant\" interchangeably, Latour attempts a distinction. As Latour writes, \"any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor-or, if it has no configuration yet, an actant.\" (Latour, 2007, p. 71). I am going to use this distinction as a default position, unless when directly discussing Collin's claims. In this latter case I use the term actant exclusively since that is the only one used by Collin (I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 195 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 basically consists of discrete individual objects that have intrinsic properties. Object ontology is a basic intuitive ontological assumption both in scientific and ordinary discourse; however, as others have previously argued, it rests on neither conceptually nor empirically necessary grounds. OSR claims instead that the analysis of actual scientific theories (both in the natural and social sciences) suggests that we should have an ontological commitment to only a universe of relation without relata. In other words, external relations are irreducible to intrinsic properties. Relations organize and emerge as patterns; scientific theories track these patterns. The fact that theories imply ontological commitments in discrete entities is just a matter of epistemic clarity. Thus, patterns of relations have the capacity of constructing individual entities in the epistemic sense. Thus, I argue that the problems pointed out by Collin rest on the assumption of object ontology. However, I argue that the employment of OSR can, at the price of little modification for both theories, solve both of Collin's two major troubles concerning ANT. I start my discussion by introducing some background terminology for ANT and OSR. I continue by proposing that, in light of OSR, the status of actants is not of individual entities but of structural entities; that is, actants are themselves patterns of relations without relata. In the text I refer to such structural entities as patterns of relations without relata. Finally, I point out some alleged discrepancies between the two theories and argue that these do not constitute a real problem for the project of framing ANT within the context of OSR. Throughout the text I seek support for my claims by referring to examples of application of ANT to the context of networked learning. Arguably, the complexity of the phenomenon of networked learning gives us a convenient vantage point from which we can clearly understand many important aspects of both ANT and OSR. Collin's analysis of ANT The brevity of this paper does not allow me to provide a complete review of ANT or the vast number of ways it has been variously interpreted. Thus, with the help of Collin's analysis (F. Collin, 2010), I briefly analyze a number of claims of Latour's ANT (Latour, 2007) that will be central to my discussion. In short, ANT is an approach to social theory that was developed from science and technology studies (STS) but which diverges from STS in that it takes social constructivism as an ontological claim, and not only, as is the case in classical STS, an epistemological claim. What exists, i.e. the existence of facts, is ultimately the result of a network of actors. ANT's most characteristic and perhaps most controversial feature is the claim that both human and nonhuman actors play a role in networks and, as such, both participate in the construction of social and scientific facts. Networks of actors ontologically constitute facts; this seems to be ANT's main claim. As mentioned above, ANT is the result of the ontological turn in STS. This justifies the requirement of some clear-cut ontological grounds from ANT. However, \"clear-cut\" here does not refer to any kind of foundational ontology, since that would go against the main tenets of constructivism. What is required here is a number of principles that at least partially regulate the existence of networks. Even antirealist ontologies, such as nominalism or instrumentalism, have often been framed by strict logical principles. The same concern pervades Collin's examination of ANT (Collin, 2010, ch. 6–7). As he states, Certain actants only come to exist as result of the activities of a well-established network. The conclusion seems inevitable that those actants could not have contributed to establishing the network in the first place (F. Collin, 2010, p. 117). Actants seem to constitute the ontological base of networks. Whatever it is that has a role in the production of facts, be it human or nonhuman, is an actant. However, as Collin points out, it is unclear how actants can explain networks and be produced by networks at the same time. Actants cannot be the explanans of the establishment of networks and at the same time be explained as generated by networks, on pain of circularity. However, Latour seems to be clear that certain actors, such as measurement instruments or chemical formulas, are themselves produced by networks of actors (Latour, 1987, p. 99). Yet, in some cases, they are actors in the same network that generated them. Networked learning provides us with many clear examples of this problem. For instance, as discussed by Fox (2005), the phenomenon of learning communities in networked learning is Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 196 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 produced by a network of human and nonhuman actors. These nonhuman actors include resources such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC), virtual educational platforms, or the hardware tools used to implement these platforms. As Fox points out (2005, p. 102), when learning communities are the object of analysis, the actors in the network that produces the learning community are black-boxed. However, we should not consider actors such as virtual platforms as stable discrete entities. The platform is produced itself by a network that involve the learning community. A learning platform is produced in the practice of its application, which is itself a complex network of actors, including users, economical interests, school policies, curricula, and so on. As David Lewis described the empty set in mathematics, the platform without these actors is nothing but \"a little speck of sheer nothingness\" (Lewis, 1993, p. 9). However, how can the learning platform explain and, at the same time, be explained by the learning community? This is not only an explanatory problem; it is an ontological problem as well. In Latour's monist ontology, actants are all of the same kind. Yet actants seem to lack any property besides their \"penchant for combining\" (F. Collin, 2010, p. 137). How can they then generate the world? According to Collin, it is utterly mysterious how actants generate reality \"through some kind of bootstrapping process that is essentially beyond explanation\" (Collin, 2010, p. 137). In the next section I introduce a new ontological framework that might provide an answer to these problems. Ontic Structural Realism In this section I provide a brief review of OSR and explain the aim and the main arguments. I also highlight some of the important points of contact between ANT and OSR. According to the pessimistic induction argument (Laudan, 1981), which is one of the best-known arguments against scientific realism, the history of science motivates us to not believe in the existence of the entities that appear in scientific theories. Paradigm shifts in disciplines such as physics or psychiatry suggest that the unobservable entities that inhabit our best theories, such as electrons or consciousness, are the result of cultural and social negotiation and not of scientific discovery. Thus, the role of theories ought not to be considered as describing reality. Ontic structural realism holds that, with the exception of the last sentence, all of the above argument is correct. Theoretical entities are constructions, but this does not imply that scientific theories do not describe reality. The structural part of theories is in fact not affected by the pessimistic induction, since structure is retained throughout the paradigm shift (Worrall, 1989). OSR suggests therefore that we should not have an ontological commitment to the individual entities that scientific theories talk about since the content of the terms denoting these entities is destined to change. However, we should hold the structural part of the theories – that is, all the mathematical and logical relations expressed by the theory – as true. One simple way to illustrate this is by imagining a scientific theory in which all theoretical terms referring to individual entities are changed into variables or dummy names such as x. This is not a suggestion that individual terms should be eliminated from our theories, since they play an important epistemic role in theories. However, we should not consider them as referring to any individual entity. It is not only the criticism against anti-realism that animates OSR. A number of philosophers have suggested that the strongest argument for OSR is that the analysis of micro-physical theories supports the claim that individual entities such as electrons are essentially relational (Esfeld & Lam, 2011; Ladyman & Ross, 2007, ch. 3; Muller, 2011). Thus, according to OSR, successful theories describe reality since they describe the structure of reality. Individual entities populating our descriptions are just constructions that are useful as epistemic bookkeeping devices (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, p. 121). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 197 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 Fig. 1: Actor-network Theory in an Ontic Structural Realism frame Therefore, OSR's main ontological claim is that reality is essentially relational3. The structural parts of scientific theories track patterns of relations. Hence, OSR argues that structures represent real patterns of relations. In this sense, OSR is a form of scientific realism. Patterns of relations exist independently from our knowledge of reality. OSR proposes an antireductionist ontology. First of all, ontological reductionism implies object ontology. In the case of a learning community, the possibility of reducing the phenomenon of learning to cognitive content implies the existence of human individuals having cognitive content. Patterns are not hierarchically ordered according to complexity or to any other property. Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. 199-204) call this claim the scale relativity of ontology, according to which everything that (really, mind-independently) exists is relative to the scale at which it is measurable. The pattern of relations tracked by the theory of learning communities exists only at the particular scale at which it is measured. Shifting the focus to the cognitive aspects entails a different scale of measurement and thus a different pattern of relations. Hence, OSR shows a number of interesting similarities with ANT. First of all, it is impossible to draw a sharp ontological distinction between social and natural reality, since the only ontological category is that of relations. Even the elements that are in play in the process of tracking a pattern of relations are themselves the result of a relational pattern, since another scientific theory can describe them. As discussed above in relationship to Fox's analysis of learning communities, the actors in the network that produces networked learning are themselves explainable as networks. We have then another theory, explaining, for instance, the economic aspects of a particular learning community. This theory tracks another pattern of relations. Both theories stress the relational character of social and natural reality. Latour talks about sociology as \"the tracing of associations\" (Latour, 2007, p. 5, original italicized). Harman (2009) has extensively argued for the relational aspect of Latour's metaphysics. As he states, \"things are not real by being less connected with others, but become more real the more they are linked with their allies\" (Harman, 2009, p. 80). In the same way, as explained above, OSR claims that theories are about real patterns and not about discrete entities. However, the similarity claim between patterns in OSR and networks in ANT is not valid for all aspects of networks and patterns. As we are going to see in the following sections, there are some crucial differences between the two concepts. 3 The concept of relations without individual relation bearers, i.e., relation without relata, is controversial. A way of making sense of it is rephrasing it as the thesis of the irreducibility of relations to intrinsic properties. Individual entities are necessary if relations supervene on intrinsic properties, since intrinsic properties are necessarily tied to their individual property bearer. However, if relations are irreducible to intrinsic properties, then theories that are ontologically committed to these relations are not ontologically committed to individual entities (Esfeld, 2003; MacBride, 2011). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 198 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 This brings us to the main point of contact between OSR and ANT: naturalism. Discussing ANT, Latour talks about \"empirical metaphysics\" (Latour, 2007, p. 51). Both projects are motivated by the aim of naturalizing ontology. That implies that conclusions about ontology are not drawn in light of a priori assumptions but on the basis of empirical evidence. If something exists as the social then it will be the result of an empirical investigation. In Latour's seminal work Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar, 1979), the track is already set for the project of naturalizing philosophy by substituting \"deep-seated ontological commitments\" with \"empirical evidence\" (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 280). Even though Latour seems to be willing to dismiss the largest part of the analytical philosophy of science, we can remark that the advocates of OSR could not agree more with Latour and Woolgar's criticism of a priori philosophy of science. In the frontispiece of Ladyman and Ross' Every Thing Must Go, we read the following claim: The only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, frontispiece). Just as in ANT and STS, the project of OSR is grounded in empirical evidence. The strongest argument for the ontological claim that everything is relational is that both the natural sciences as well as the social sciences (Dennett, 1991; Kincaid, 2008; Ross & Spurrett, 2004; Ross, 2000, 2008) seem to suggest that the claim is correct. Actants in the OSR frame – the case of networked learning Before we consider the ontological status of actors, it is necessary to clarify the relations between patterns within OSR and networks in ANT. Patterns and networks are arguably not the same kind of entity. As represented in Figure 1 above, the framework of OSR consists of data models, synthetic models (the product of the analysis of the data models), and theories (families of synthetic models). Data models are logically embedded in synthetic models, while synthetic models are embedded in theories. A structure is the result of the analysis of a theory. The theory's structure is what is left of the theory when individual entities are eliminated. A structure represents a pattern of relations, which is what there really is. Networks analyzed in ANT belong to the domain of synthetic models, since not all kinds of products of data analysis are networks. Thus, according to OSR, although networks can locate a pattern, not all patterns are networks in the ANT sense. According to OSR, all synthetic models from all empirical sciences track a pattern. This does not completely settle the question. In the spirit of the STS roots of ANT, it is possible to interpret Latour so that any kind of data analysis is a network in disguise, or that (even stronger claim) at any scale of measurement, the most correct analysis of data is done in agreement with ANT methodology. This could open up a discussion concerning the status of ANT as a meta-theory, that is, a theory that provides an account of how science, at any level, is produced. This would imply that networks and patterns are arguably the same kind of entity. However, Latour's critique of philosophy of science as meta-theory makes look this hypothesis implausible. I will therefore assume that networks and patterns are different kinds of entities. This does not imply that ANT and OSR refer to different things when they talk about relational ontology, but only that a) either the models generated within ANT pertain to the area that is described as theoretical level in Figure 1, or b) that ANT models are a priori committed to a meta-theory very much like OSR (this latter is unpalatable from the point of view of naturalism). We must leave these two possibilities open. Let us return to Collin's explanatory and ontological problems concerning ANT and consider them in relation to the concrete case of networked learning discussed by Fox (2005). Recall Collin's first problem: actants cannot explain the same network that concurs in producing the actant. The problem with Collin's analysis of the explanatory role of actants in networks is that it implies an ontology of objects. If an object is the explanans of a network, it cannot also have the same network as its own explanans. If we consider actors as relational entities, however, we can escape this circularity problem. The pattern of relations from which an actor emerges lies at a different scale of measurement than the pattern from which the network emerges. A networked learning community and one of the actors in the network that produces it are Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 199 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 both produced by the same network only if a) we think of networks as consisting of rigid points (nodes) and connections among them, and b) that we can simply isolate one of these objects and analyze it. This is what object ontology implies if applied to networks. However, if we consider networks as tracking patterns of relations, then the question of the ontological nature of the IT resource used to implement networked learning in a particular learning community is tied to the scale of measurement that is most appropriate for analysis of the ITC resources. From this perspective, if we analyze the network that produces the learning community, then there is no point in discussing how the IT resource is constructed because there is no (real, mind-independent) IT resource from the scale of measurement of the whole learning community. Shifting the focus to whichever other actor in the network produces the learning community means assuming yet another scale of measurement, and thus tracking another pattern of relations. Of course, we might want to consider how that particular learning community concurred together with other actors to establish the reliability of that particular IT resource. Yet again, we are looking at another pattern of relations. At this scale of measurement there is no (real, mind-independent) learning community. However, two different patterns cannot result from the same synthetic model (in this case from the same network). This entails that we must be speaking of different networks. As a result, there can be no explanatory circularity. These two arguments speak for a difference between patterns and networks. It looks therefore like the solution to Collin's first problem require to extend ANT so that it can be embedded in the meta–theoretic framework of OSR. We can appreciate how the example provided by the ANT frame analysis of networked learning is capable of shedding light on crucial aspects of ANT and OSR. There is no ordering between patterns, and no macro-micro distinction. The shift of scale of measurement from one network to another explaining one of its actants by no means implies a shift downwards in the scale of complexity. Fox's discussion of the concept of community is very helpful in this sense. The actors that concur in producing a network are not more ontologically primitive than the network itself, since a network can be an actor of the network that explains the network's actors. No hierarchy exists among patterns. The solution to Collin's ontological problem should therefore be stated as follows. From the perspective of a network, actants are propertyless, in that networks consist of only relations. Networks represent patterns. Only for the sake of epistemic simplicity do we attribute dummy identities to actants at this level. OSR does not imply any commitment to claims of immutability of structure, for example, in the context of social science. Structures are ways of considering theories and theories are genidentical entities. This means that they grow, split, merge, and eventually die. Patterns are what really exist, and patterns are just as fluid and complex as we expect reality to be. If a social theory tracks a pattern via its structure, then it does not mean that this pattern is immovable since social reality, or social patterns, are not immovable. Nor can a social pattern determine individual choices, due to the scale relativity of ontology. The existence of holistic social structure does not determine the psychological lives of individual members of societies. As we have seen, at the scale of measurement of a community there are no (real, mind-independent) individual members of the community. At this point it is crucial to ask ourselves the following question: would the ANT theorist be willing to trade off a solution for Collin's problem of actants in exchange of a form of realism? Apparent Discrepancies ANT inherits the critical stance against philosophical and foundational theories of science from STS (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 280). Latour has criticized analytic philosophy of science on many occasions, especially the idea that scientific rationality, evidence, and prediction lie at the core of science. This criticism should make us skeptical of the possibility of framing ANT within OSR. In the end, if the term analytic has any meaning, OSR is a form of analytic theory of science. However, one main flaw in the STS and ANT criticism of philosophy of science is that the object of criticism looks more like a straw man than a real concurring position. The picture of analytical philosophy of science as resting on a clear-cut scientific rationality; on the symmetry prediction/explanation; on the centrality of inductive evidence; and on the search for laws is, at best, an old relic of logical positivism. OSR is a post- Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 200 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 positivist theory of science with a strong focus on the practices of science, and this implies that many of the STS's criticisms against analytical philosophy of science might not affect OSR. Thus, in the following section I consider the positions in which ANT and OSR seem to deviate from one another. As I shall argue, much of the apparent disagreement is only apparent. A first source of discrepancy was actually introduced in the last section and discussed in this section. This discrepancy concerned the status of networks as synthetic or meta-theoretic models. The solution proposed here is to consider ANT models as synthetic models on a par with other scientific models, and to consider OSR as a general ontological framework for scientific theories. This comports some deviation from ANT orthodoxy. This deviation is however arguably a small price to pay in exchange for the solution of Collin's problems. Let us then see which other differences can be observed between OSR and ANT. Two further discrepancies The first discrepancy between OSR and ANT regards the concept of practice. According to Collin's analysis of ANT, \"[R]eality only exists where practices exist, that is, as far as networks of actants extend\" (Collin, 2010, p. 136). It is not so easy to infer from OSR a clear claim concerning practices. As we shall see below, it is arguable that not all existence entails practice within OSR. Nonetheless, this discrepancy can be solved without any cost for ANT. In fact, it would simply be too strong an anthropocentric claim for ANT to intend the term of practice to only refer to human practice. It would contradict one of the main methodological claims of ANT, i.e., the rejection of the social-natural and human-nonhuman dichotomies. The problem, however, is not completely solved yet. Since human and nonhuman elements play an evident role in the emergence of theories, and since ontological categories such as human and nonhuman within OSR are only accepted a posteriori, it can be argued that even OSR endorses the claim that all scientific theories are constituted by networks of human and nonhuman actors. This is a strong detour from standard OSR that might appear to be too permissive toward social constructivism. In fact, and without going into too much detail, microphysical phenomena in OSR are understood as only ontologically consisting of their physical relations (Esfeld & Lam, 2011). This implies that the real pattern tracked by some particle physics might be considered in isolation from their technological context. This sounds like an unacceptable concession from ANT. Would the ANT advocate accept a purely information-theoretic explanation of the IT resource involved in the production of a networked learning community? Would that explanation be exhaustive? There is a possible way out of this problem. We can interpret the scale relativity of ontology in a way that allows us to observe, at some scales of measurement, the kind of pattern that Esfeld and Lam talk about. At this scale of measurement we will not find any purely physical system intended as something completely isolated from technological and human influence. Patterns in OSR are intimately connected with data models (the latter of which are embedded in patterns) and experimental set-ups. However, we can claim that the pattern we find at that scale of measurement is simply not a network in the ANT sense. It is important to remark that this is the natural interpretation of the scale relativity and that it by no means prevents the existence of the ANT-type networks. This solution entails an ontological pluralism grounded on the plurality of scientific approaches, all of which are just as correct as long as they are able to track a real pattern. This brings us back to the discussion concerning networks and patterns in the previous section. OSR clearly entails that ANT is not the only possible way of looking at science; rather, it is just one of many. All of these approaches describe a different reality, and all of these realities are equally real. The second discrepancy concerns the problem of realism. It is intuitively clear that a form of scientific realism such as OSR is not destined to fare particularly well in the company of ANT. As Collin clearly states, it is unclear how we should interpret statements such as \"learning communities existed in 1200 BC.\" We can expect that the realist will try to argue that the statement is in some way true, while the constructivist will try to argue that the same statement is in some way false (since the term \"learning community\" is produced by theories of learning). How can these two interpretations coexist? Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 201 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 Latour, according to Collin's reconstruction, solves this problem by using a double index to the effect that \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is false in 1200, while \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is true in 2013 (F. Collin, 2010, p. 140). Latour seems to claim that for all the time before the development of theories of learning communities, the claim \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is simply false (F. Collin, 2010, p. 141; Latour, 1987, p. 258). This discrepancy is simply apparent. The problem completely depends on the assumption of object ontology. If we disregard the entities involved in these statements (such as community), we obtain that the structural part of the theory of learning community applies to patterns of behavior that precede the development of the theory. Thus, even though it is true that the concept of learning community is a product of the late twentieth century, we can still say that the statement \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is structurally true. Conclusion In this short paper I have argued that the use of OSR as an ontological framework for ANT implies a number of major rewards at a small price and without distorting ANT's original claims. If ANT is framed within an ontology of only relations, we obtain a clearer and less problematic conception of actant/actor. I have also argued that despite a number of apparently irreconcilable discrepancies, ANT and OSR seem to integrate into one another fairly well. References Collin, F. (2010). Science studies as naturalized philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. Collin, F. (2011). Latour's metaphysics. In F. Collin, Science studies as naturalized philosophy (pp. 127–145). Dordrecht: Springer. Dennett, D. (1991). Real patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 27–51. Esfeld, M. (2003). Do relations require underlying intrinsic properties? A physical argument for a metaphysics of relations. Metaphysica, 4(1), 5–25. Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2011). Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects. In A. Bokulich, P. Joshua M. Bokulich (Eds.), Scientific structuralism (pp. 143–159). Springer. Fox, S. (2005). An actor-network critique of community in higher education: Implications for networked learning. Studies in Higher Education, 30(1), 95–110. Harman, G. (2009). Prince of networks: Bruno Latour and metaphysics. Melbourne: Re. press, 2009. Kincaid, H. (2008). Structural realism and the social sciences. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 720–731. Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (2007). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. OUP Oxford. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton University Press. Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48(1), pp. 19–49. Lewis, D. (1993). Mathematics in megethology. Philosophia Mathematica, 1(1), 3–23. MacBride, F. (2011). Relations and truthmaking. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Vol. 111, pp. 161– 179). Muller, F. A. (2011). Withering away, weakly. Synthese, 180(2), 223–233. Ross, D. (2000). Rainforest realism: A Dennettian theory of existence. In D. Ross, A. Brook, D. Thompson (Eds.), Dennett's philosophy: A comprehensive assessment (pp. 147–168). MIT Press. Ross, D. (2008). Ontic structural realism and economics. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 732–743. Ross, D., & Spurrett, D. (2004). What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(5), 603–627. Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43(1-2), 99–124. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 202 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "DOI: 10.5840/pjphil20171114 POLISH JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Vol. XI, No. 1 (Spring 2017), 43-55. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic Vindication of Induction Michael J. Shaffer Department of Philosophy St. Cloud State University Abstract. This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach's views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and of the dominance principle. 1. Introduction Hans Reichenbach's pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction (presented and developed in his 1949a, 1932/1949b and 1949c) was, and still is, of great interest. However, various influential commentators have dismissed it as a pseudo-solution and/or regarded it as problematically obscure.1 This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach's solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. As Laurence BonJour claims, ...the significance of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification remains obscure. As he himself insists, that justification still yields no reason at all for thinking that inductive conclusions, or any of the myriad further beliefs which are epistemically dependent on them, are to any degree likely to be true. The sort of justification in question is thus not epistemic justification, as that concept was construed above; to show that beliefs are justified in this alternative way does not answer, or even purport to answer, the basic skeptical worry about induction, and is indeed quite compatible with the deepest degree of skepticism. It is thus hard to see why it should be regarded as any sort of solution to the classical problem of induction (BonJour 1986, p. 99). 1 See, e.g., Skyrms (1966), Salmon (1966), BonJour (1986), BonJour (1992), BonJour (1998), Rosenkrantz (1981), and Kelly (1991). 44 Michael J. Shaffer This sort of dismissal of Reichenbach's views on induction surely depends to some degree on his adherence to the controversial frequency interpretation of the concept of probability.2 This is plausible to assume in light of the wide-spread popularity of subjectivism about probability that has dominated probability theory subsequent to Reichenbach's work and this aspect of Reichenbach's approach to induction has been treated at length in a variety of other places.3 Another aspect of his vindication that likely fuels the charge of obscurity is the failure of these critics to pay more attention to Reichenbach's commitment to a purely extensional metaphysics. Finally, Reichenbach's attempt to rationally ground induction on the basis of purely pragmatic considerations is also likely to have, at least in part, given rise to the charges of obscurity and failure.4 This last point is especially important because Reichenbach is rather cavalier and informal in his assertion of the claim that following the inductive rule is the best thing to do from a pragmatic perspective. First, it will be shown here that what Reichenbach does in his later work on induction is to establish an important epistemic limitation of extensional empiricism and that there really is nothing especially obscure about Reichenbach's thoughts on induction in this respect. He was simply working out the limits of extensional empiricism with respect to inductive inference. In fact, Reichenbach conveys this very point to Russell in an important letter in 1949.5 It will be shown that these aspects of Reichenbach's position lead directly to his assertion that the only manner in which the inductive rule can be justified in the primitive state of knowledge prior to making sequences of inductive inferences is pragmatic in nature. Finally, and more constructively, it will be shown here that there are perfectly coherent, formal and pragmatic justifications of Reichenbach's inductive rule in the primitive state of knowledge in the forms of the maximin rule for decision making and the dominance principle. With this account of the pragmatic justification of induction in hand, we will see 2 Hájek (1997, 2009). 3 See, e.g., Skyrms (1966), Salmon (1963), Salmon (1966), Galvaotti (2011) and Teng and Kyburg (2001). 4 The sense of pragmatics used here is just the idea that there are justifications that are non-epistemic (i.e. not related to truth, approximate truth or probability) and which are based on some more or less well-understood notion of instrumental success or utility. 5 The letter is a response to Russell's criticisms of Reichenbach's approach to the problem of induction as presented in Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World. This approach stands in sharp contrast to Reichenbach's early work which resembles Russell's approach in holding that the principle that grounds induction is synthetic a priori. See Eberhardt (2011) for discussion of Reichenbach's early views. He explicitly rejects this view in his later work and tells Russell in a 1949 letter that \"Induction does not require an intensional logic\" (1949d, p. 410). Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 45 that Reichenbach's justification of induction can be given a principled ground. 1.1 Overview Let us begin by recalling that Reichenbach's pragmatic justification of induction is based on the following (reconstructed) line of argumentation (i.e. the basic Reichenbach argument): P1: Either nature is uniform or it is not. P2: If nature is uniform, then scientific induction will be successful. P3: If nature is not uniform, then no method will be successful.  If any method of induction will be successful, then scientific induction will be successful.6 But, according to Reichenbach and echoing Hume, we cannot know whether nature is uniform or not, because it is neither a matter that can be settled a priori nor is it a matter that we can non-circularly establish a posteriori. So, as Reichenbach sees it, although we know that if any method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful, we cannot know that any method really is successful. The gist of his attempt to justify inductive practice then comes from the idea that while we do not know that any method will actually be successful, we also do not know that no method will be successful. Given this result and the fact that scientific induction can be shown to be an optimal method (in this important sense of \"optimality\"), we ought to accept induction as being justified, at least pragmatically speaking. As we shall see, what is at the heart of this view is Reichenbach's metaphysical commitment to a form of extensional empiricism that tolerates only the existence of particulars. In any case, as Salmon correctly pointed out in his 1966, the Reichenbach argument depends on a false dichotomy. The uniformity of nature is, of course, not an all or nothing matter. We can, of course imagine possible worlds that contain only individuals with degrees of uniformity that vary radically. So, the uniformity of nature seems to be a matter of degree, and it is at least plausible to believe that there is a measure of the uniformity of extensional worlds. If this turns out to be viable, given the space of possible worlds U, we could define a measure m(x) on U such that m(x) maps the elements of U into the continuous open interval [0,1] 6 This presentation of a simplified version of Reichenbach's main argument is taken from Skyrms (1966). It is important to note at this juncture that the various criticisms of Reichenbach's views, other than Russell's, will (for the most part) be ignored here. To address all of those criticisms would require too much space, and the point of this paper is more historical in any case. 46 Michael J. Shaffer representing the uniformity of that extensional world. This suggests that Reichenbach's attempt to justify induction needs to be retooled in order to accommodate a concept of world-uniformity that admits of continuous degrees. When this is done we can usefully reformulate the basic Reichenbach argument as follows. Consider our world wa (the actual world), where wa  U, with a fixed but unknown measure of uniformity, the set of all inductive methods Y,7 where yi  Y and such that each inductive method has a probability of arriving at a true conclusion in its domain of application, a function f(m(wn), yn) that maps worlds with degrees of worlduniformity and inductive methods into the space of probabilities,8 and a constant  that represents the chance probability of an inductive method succeeding at a world.9 If we understand  as the degree of worlduniformity required for any inductive rule to be reliable with a reliability greater than chance, i.e. greater than , then the more sophisticated Reichenbach argument can be stated as follows: P1′: If the probability that m(wa) = 1 is 1, then scientific induction will be successful. P2′: If it is probable that 1 > m(wa) >  with probability less than 1 but greater than , then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, where p >  < 1. P3′: If it is probable that  > m(wa) > 0 with probability greater than 0 but less than , then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, where p <  < 0. P4′: If the probability that m(wa) = 0 is 1, then no inductive method will be successful.  If any inductive method will be successful, scientific induction will be successful. It should be noted that Reichenbach's conclusion still holds in this case, and we will consider the significance of this conclusion in what follows. 7 Inductive methods are, simply, rules for accepting conclusions concerning unobserved cases based on observed cases. 8 The function f(m(wn), yn) seems, intuitively, to be a natural sort of function, as degrees of world-uniformity seem to be closely related to the probability with which a method produces true conclusions. What f(m(wn), yn) is supposed to yield is a probabilistic measure of the general reliability of a given method at a world with a given measure of uniformity, and, as we shall see in section 4, what this function really represents is the set of worlds where an inductive method with a well-defined probability of arriving at the correct value of a stable frequency will actually produce the correct values. 9 In other words,  represents the threshold at which methods are no better at producing true conclusions than randomly selecting conclusions from the set of all statements of a given language £, and, as we shall see, a method that performs at a success rate no better than chance is no method at all. However, the general successfulness of an inductive method will turn out to be a more complex matter involving two aspects. The first concerns the reliability of the procedure in its domain, and the second concerns whether there exist elements of that domain at a world. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 47 However, before we proceed to do so, it will be instructive to reconstruct Reichenbach's treatment of induction in much greater detail in order to see just what it amounts to and what it implies about inductive inference. 2. Reichenbach's Conception of Scientific Induction The primary motivation that drove Reichenbach to propose his pragmatic justification of induction concerns a central feature of the frequency interpretation of the probability calculus. Familiarity with the details of the probability calculus will be assumed here, and with the fact that it is compatible with at least several interpretations. The axioms of the probability calculus are, of course, as follows: (A.1) P(a)  0 for all a in the domain of P(). (A.2) P(t) = 1 if t is a tautology. (A.3) P(a  b) = P(a) + P(b) if a and b and a  b are all in the domain of P(), and a and b are mutually exclusive. Recall that on Reichenbach's frequency interpretation of probabilities such quantities are to be construed as tautological consequences of the probability calculus.10 More importantly, probabilities are to be regarded as measures of the limit of the relative frequency with which one contingent property is associated with another in an infinite sequence. More formally, the relative frequency of a pair of properties in a sequence is to be defined as follows: F n(A, B) = N n(A, B)/N n(A) Here F n(A, B) is the frequency of associated As and Bs in a sequence of length n. Given this conception of relative frequency we can then define the concept of probability as follows: P(A, B) = lim F n(A, B).11 n   Having introduced this notion of probability Reichenbach then proposes the rule of induction that states, If an initial section of n elements of a sequence xi is given, resulting in the frequency f n, and if, furthermore, nothing is known about the probability of the second level for the occurrence of a certain limit p, we posit that the frequency f i (i > n) will approach a limit p within f n   when the sequence is continued (Reichenbach, 1949c, p. 47). However, these definitions give rise to some very difficult but well-known problems concerning the existence of infinite sequences and the existence 10 See Reichenbach (1949b) and Weatherford (1982), chapter 4. 11 See Reichenbach (1949c) for details concerning how this derivation is carried out. 48 Michael J. Shaffer of such convergent limits.12 Reichenbach assumes that we are only ever aware of sequences that \"...are not intensionally given, but are presented to us only by enumeration of their elements, i.e. are extensionally given (Reichenbach, 1949a, p. 309)\" and that any such sequence of observed associations will be finite. Upon considering further extensional enumeration of the elements of a given observed sequence, we find that such extended sequences are, in point of fact, compatible with any value of the limit frequency. If this is so, we might ask why we are entitled in any way to assume that the frequency of such an association in even very long sequences of observed associations in a population will justify our assertion that that frequency will not diverge in further extensive enumerations of that sequence. Unless one is prepared to reject extensional empiricism this conclusion seems inescapable. Adopting intensionalism and accepting the existence of the relevant sort of a priori knowledge, like Russell ultimately did (1912 and 1948), permits induction to be grounded in a robust essentialism and a form of rationalism that allows for synthetic a priori knowledge of universals. But, although Reichenbach himself endorsed such a view in his early thinking about this problem in his dissertation, in his later work he staunchly opposed this sort of view and the idea of a priori knowledge, claiming that, \"The idea that there is such a thing as a 'rational belief' is the root of all evil in the theory of knowledge and is nothing but a remnant from rationalistic philosophies (Reichenbach, 1949d).\" In any case, Reichenbach saw that his understanding of this problem in terms of frequentism was just the classical problem of induction in a somewhat new guise, and he showed two things. First, he showed that, by definition, if such a limit exists, then the procedure of scientific induction will be successful, and, second, that scientific induction is at least as good as any other method in discovering what is really the case concerning the frequency of an association in a sequence. Reichenbach explains, Let us assume for the moment that there is a limit towards which the sequence converges, then there must be an n from which on our posit [the rule of induction] leads to the correct result; this follows from the definition of the limit, which requires that there be an n from which on the frequency remains within a given interval . If we were to adopt, on the contrary, the principle of always positing a limit outside f n   when a frequency f n has been observed, such a procedure would certainly lead us to a false result from a certain n on. This does not mean that there could not be other principles which like the first [the rule of induction] would lead to the correct limit. But we can make the following statement about these principles: even if they determine the posit outside f n   for a smaller n, they must, 12 Sequences with convergent limiting frequencies are just those sequences that settle into stable frequencies in the limit. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 49 from a certain n on, determine the posit within f n  . All other principles of positing must converge asymptotically with the first [the rule of induction] (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 316). What he showed was that if a limit exists for a sequence, then by repeated application the rule of induction will lead to the value of that limit to any desired degree of approximation in a finite number of applications, and that all other methods will asymptotically converge with the results of the rule of induction. So, in spite of the fact that we cannot know that the limiting frequencies of sequences exist, we might as well simply accept the rule of induction because it is the best method of all methods. All methods are, in a sense, parasitic on the rule of induction. Again, this pragmatic answer to the problem of induction arose directly out of Reichenbach's recognition that, in point of fact, we cannot know that such limits exist in our world. We cannot know whether such convergent limits exist based on the empirical observation of associations in finite, extensionally given, sequences. So, we are stuck in the situation that either no method at all works, or induction is the best of all methods. In terms of the sophisticated Reichanbach argument this can be expressed as follows. If worlds are extensional and there is no a priori knowledge of the regularity of the world, then we cannot know the real value of m(wa). Nevertheless, it will be true that if 1  m(wa) > , then scientific induction will be successful. If this is not the case, then no method will be successful. 3. Posits and Pragmatic Justifications Even so, Reichenbach tells us that we can treat the existence of such limits of relative frequencies as posits, where posits are not to be treated as beliefs in the normal sense, but rather as a kind of wager concerning what would be most advantageous to us. Reichenbach explains that, It is evidently the concept of posit which we have to employ for an explanation of this method. If in the finite section given we have observed a certain frequency f n, we posit that sequence, on further continuation, will converge towards the limit f n (more precisely: within the interval f n  δ). We posit this; we do not say that it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as the gambler lays a wager on the horse which he believes to be fastest. We perform an action which appears to us the most favorable one, without knowing anything about the success of this individual action (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 315). Furthermore, as all other rules are parasitic on the rule of induction, it is only natural to lay our wager on that rule. We are wagering that 1  m(wa) > So, the sort of justification his argument provides is clearly a matter of pragmatics. It is, as Feigl claimed, a justification actionis.13 But, 13 See Feigl (1963). 50 Michael J. Shaffer in any case, the kind of wager involved in positing the existence of convergent limits in infinite sequences is not the typical kind of wager that a gambler makes. Normally, a gambler at least knows the odds with which he is confronted and so can make an informed decision about what outcome to bet on (i.e. which is the best bet), but in the case of the limits of infinite sequences we are making the posit that the limit converges to f n blindly; i.e. we are making this posit when we do not know the odds, and so we do not know if it is the best posit. Reichenbach claims that in such cases we are making what he calls an approximative posit concerning the existence of such limits. We are blindly wagering that 1  m(wa) > . As we have seen, Reichenbach shows that if we are right about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is correct), then induction will be successful, and if any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful. If we are wrong about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is not correct), then if any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful in this more restricted sense. Therefore, scientific induction is at least optimal in this specific sense. However, as BonJour notes in the passage quoted in section 1, this by no means shows that induction is justified in the traditional sense, and Reichenbach's view is apparently compatible with radical skepticism concerning the probity of induction. It may simply be false that 1  m(wa) >  and, given extensional empiricism, we cannot know whether this claim is true or false. So, as far as we know, the method of induction might well be the best of a bad lot. Nonetheless, Reichenbach argues that there is a sense in which his argument vindicates induction if one is committed to extensional empiricism. It does show that if any method works, then induction works. We do not know that the rule is unreliable, but we know that it is the best method if any method is reliable. So, why not commit ourselves to the use of scientific induction? Of course, this may not be a satisfactory justification for someone who has sympathies with BonJour's inductive skeptic, but it is clearly to our practical advantage if scientific induction turns out to be reliable. As Reichenbach sees it, the alternative is to give up on science altogether. More importantly for the purposes of this discussion, what this result really establishes is that given extensional empiricism induction can only be pragmatically justified in the sense of Reichenbach's vindication. But how? Reichenbach is not terribly clear on this point, but this lacuna can be fixed easily by appeal to the decision-theoretic maximin rule. 4. The Maximin Justification of Reichenbach's Rule After presenting his account of the optimality of the inductive rule, Reichenbach discusses the sense in which using this rule can be justified in Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 51 light of the problems associated with our ignorance of the existence of the convergent limit sequences that are required for the success of induction. As we have already seen, he says of the inductive rule that, We posit this; we do not say that it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as the gambler lays a wager on the horse which he believes to be fastest. We perform an action which appears to us the most favorable one, without knowing anything about the success of this individual action (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 315). Elsewhere he also says: Inductive positing in the sense of a trial-and-error method is justified so long as it is not known that the attempt is hopeless, that there is no limit of the frequency. Should we have no success, the positing was useless; but why not take our chance? The phrase \"take our chance\" is not meant to state that there is a certain probability of success; it means only that there is a possibility of success in the sense that there is no proof that success is excluded (Reichenbach, 1949c, p. 49). Finally, he explains to Russell in his 1949 letter that, I have shown that blind posits are justified as a means to an end, and that no kind of belief in their truth is required. This I regard as an essential merit of my theory: I have shown that there are other reasons to make assertions than reasons based on belief (Reichenbach, 1949d, p. 407). So, these remarks show that Reichenbach is clearly asserting that there are alternative justifications that have to do with non-epistemic pragmatic considerations and we know only that the probability that there are limit frequencies is non-zero. But, he also tells us in his 1949 letter that, ...the inductive conclusion can be called probable only when many other inductions have already been made, which tells us something about the second level probabilities. I speak here of the stage of advanced knowledge. In primitive knowledge, i.e. before any inductions were made, the inductive conclusion is not probable (Reichenbach, 1949d, p. 409). So, in point of fact, Reichenbach believes that it is only when we have begun to make inductive inferences that we can even claim that the conclusions of inductive inferences are probable, and this is based on the success of making such inductions. Thus, the second-order probability of the inductive rule itself is very low in the state of primitive knowledge, for we have not therein yet made first-order inductions sufficient to gauge the second-order probability of induction. Prior to this state of advanced knowledge, inductive conclusions are not probable and can only be justified pragmatically in the sense of blind positing. Notice that this will be true for any alternative inductive rule as well. So, the rationality of induction writ large and independent of the selection of one of the possible reliable inductive rules depends on their being a vindication of the inductive rule in this primitive state. Even if there are other rules that are superior to Reichenbach's inductive rule in terms of how often they get correct results, 52 Michael J. Shaffer this can only be determined in the state of advanced knowledge. All of this then suggests that Reichenbach's rather vague appeal to pragmatic justification can be made much more coherent by appealing to some particular resources in modern decision theory and focusing on justifying induction in the primitive state of knowledge. In decision situations where probabilities cannot be meaningfully assigned to outcomes (other than that they are non-zero) advice about what to do is wholly a function of utilities, because no expected utilities can be calculated for such cases. There are then two ways one might provide such a pragmatic justification for adopting the inductive rule. First, in such cases and where the potential losses are great Wald's maximin rule usefully applies: (MR) maximize the minimum utility outcome.14 Reichenbach's approximative posit fits this bill perfectly. Much is at stake here. If scientific induction does not work, then our inductive inferences cannot possibly succeed and we would have to give up on science. Moreover, as Reichenbach admits, we have no idea of the probabilities on which this wager is based. So, where R is '1  m(wa) > ', I is 'employ scientific induction', S is 'assured success in inductive reasoning in the long run', P is 'possible success in the long run', Reichenbach's wager can be fruitfully understood as follows:15 R R I S S I P S 14 See Wald (1939, 1945) and Resnik (1987, pp. 26-27). 15 Since we are only considering the primitive state of knowledge here, we need not be concerned with the claim that there are alternative rules of induction that are superior to Reichenach's preferred rule in our table. We can simply see that whatever rule in particular we adopt as the second-order guide to inductive inference, Reichenbach's considerations show us that the only kind of rational justification for any inductive rule (no matter how efficient) in the primitive state is a blind posit of this pragmatic sort. We could, in effect, run the very same argument substituting for I any such second-order rule. So, the upshot of Reichenbach's considerations really should be that the only justification for induction in the primitive state of knowledge is pragmatic. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 53 Here we also have the following relative ordering of utilities: V(S) > V(P) > V(S), and this is all the application of the maximin rule requires. We do not need to know ordinal utilities to apply MR. MR tells us to look at the worst outcomes of the acts given the relevant states of the world. For I we get S, for I we also get S. These values are equal. By the lexical MR we then look at the next lowest outcome(s) of I and I respectively. In the case of I we get S, and for I we get P. So, the MR tells us that it is maximally rational to do I even in the primitive state of knowledge where inductive conclusions are not probable and where the second-order probability that the inductive rule is correct is also very low. The second way one might flesh out Reichenbach's solution is in terms of a simple dominance argument based on the dominance principle. Again, where we have ignorance of the relevant probabilities we should look at the utilities of the outcomes and apply a principle of pragmatic rationality to decide what to do. The dominance principle is just such a rule. The familiar notion here is that an act A dominates an act B if for every outcome the utility of A is equal to or greater than the utility of B and for at least one outcome the utility of A is greater than that of B. The dominance principle is then this: (DOM) opt for dominant acts. Referring back to our decision table we can see that I dominates I even in the primitive state of knowledge where inductive conclusions and the second-order probability that induction is correct is very low. Nevertheless, DOM tells us that it is pragmatically rational to opt for I. Thus, Rerichenbach's solution can be pragmatically vindicated, but in a principled rather than intuitive manner. It is pragmatically rational to use scientific induction and there is nothing at all obscure about why this is so. It is pragmatically justified in light of the maximin rule and/or in light of the dominance principle, and this is so despite our ignorance of the relevant probabilities concerning the existence/non-existence of convergent limits, the primitive improbability of inductive conclusions, and the improbability of the second-order claim that the inductive rule is correct. 54 Michael J. Shaffer References BonJour, L. (1986). A Reconsideration of the Problem of Induction. Philosophical Topics, 14, 93-124. BonJour, L. (1992). Problems of Induction. In E. Sosa and J. Dancy (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 391-395). Cambridge: Blackwell. BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eberhardt, F. (2011). 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{"text": "International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 682 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org Mary Mitchell Slessor (1848 – 1915) and Her Impact on the Missionary Enterprise in the Cross River Region Augustine Onah Odey, Gregory Ajima Onah Abstract Born December 2, 1848 in Gilcomston, Aberdeen, Scotland, Mary Mitchell Slessor, a five foot, red haired Scottish Missionary who pioneered her way into the jungles of Africa was undoubtedly one of the most outstanding missionaries who made tremendous contributions to evangelism, charity work, educational and healthcare services and publicized Nigeria in the map of the world. She faced many challenges living with the villagers, and at times, even had to be a peacemaker between tribesmen. Her work and strong personality allowed her to be trusted and accepted by the locals while spreading Christianity in Nigeria, promoting women's rights, rescuing unwanted children, protecting native children and died on 13 January, 1915 (aged 66) at Use Ikot Oku, Calabar, Nigeria. Beyond contribution to knowledge this brief work is therefore a legacy of Mary Mitchell Slessor's contributions to the evangelization of Nigeria and Church History. Key Words: Calabar, Christianity, Cross River Region, Mary Slessor, Missionary Enterprise, Nigeria, Twins Introduction Few works exist on the part played in the evangelization of Nigeria by Nigerian descent and church founders (Ferguson, 1978) and as a result very little is known about them except for very few lucky ones like Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1806 – 1891) and Essien Essien Ukpabio, the first Efik Minister ordained in October, 1853. By her colossal and myth-breaking contributions, twins and their mothers are celebrated in Nigeria. There could therefore, not be a better time to historicize our heroine, Mary M. Slessor than on her centenary. Who is Mary Slessor and how has she impacted Nigerian missionary enterprise? Birth and Early Life of Mary Slessor Mary Slessor was born on 2nd December, 1848 in Gilcomston, Aberdeen, Scotland in a poor working-class family. She was the second of seven children of Robert and Mary Slessor. Her father, Robert, originally from Buchan, was a shoemaker by trade. Mary M. Slessor prayed with her mother, Mary Slessor, continually for God's provision and protection. She became a Christian at a young age. Not well educated but learned to read, and loved reading the Bible. In 1859, at the age of eleven, the family moved to Dundee in search of work. Here, Mary Mitchell Slessor gathered boys and girls to attend Sunday school in Dundee, Scotland. Her father, Robert Slessor was an alcoholic and unable to keep up shoemaking, took a job as a labourer in a mill. Her mother, a skilled weaver, also went to work in the mills. At the age of eleven, Mary Mitchell Slessor began work as a \"half-timer\" in the Baxter Brothers' Mill, meaning she spent half of her day at a school provided by the mill owners and the other half working for the company in her effort to enable her help or assist her family. This is a great lesson for many Nigerian youths who stay out of school on ground that they have no one to cater for their studies (Kingsley, 1988). IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 683 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org The Slessors lived in the slums of Dundee. Before long Mary's father, Robert, died of pneumonia, and both her brothers also died, leaving behind only Mary, her mother and two sisters. By age fourteen (1862), Mary had become a skilled jute worker, working from 6.00am to 6.00pm with just an hour for breakfast and lunch (Lingston, 1927). Her mother was a devout Presbyterian who read each issue of the Missionary Record, a monthly magazine published by the United Presbyterian Church (later the United Free Church of Scotland) to inform members of missionary activities and needs. Slessor developed an interest in religion and when a mission was instituted in Quarry Pend (close by the Wishart Church), she wanted to teach. In 1875, Slessor was twenty-seven when she heard about David Livingstone (the greatest of the European explorers, a Scottish missionary who traversed vast barren wastes and jungles from the Cape of Good Hope as far north as Lake Tanganyika and from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. He discovered Victorian falls and the Zambezi River. He began his series of explorations in 1853. He died in 1873. The natives called him, \"The very great doctor\", Wallbank, Taylor and Bailkey, 1971:647) the famous missionary and explorer, had died and decided she wanted to follow his footsteps. It was however from Mr. Thomson, as architect from Glasgow, who had earlier explored the rivers and hills of West African Coast that Mary M. Slessor learned most about the strange country to which she was to spend most of her life. Early Missionary Career of Mary Mitchell Slessor The earliest known Christian mission to Nigeria was the Portuguese Roman Catholic Mission which came to Benin in the sixteenth century at the invitation of Oba Esigie, King of Benin. Later in the seventeenth century a more successful mission by the Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide, established in Rome in 1622, came to Warri. It is possible that both the Benin and Warri missions diffused into the Niger Delta. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, nothing seems to have survived of these earlier missions. By some accidents of history also, the Niger Delta was not to be considered in the early nineteenth century European missionary strategy, for it had become notorious, especially among nineteenth century travellers for unhealthiness and savagery. Besides, at the inception of the missionary movements, especially those from Britain, part of the major objectives had been to reach the Hinterlands to convert the slave dealers in the hope that converting them to Christianity, in addition to introducing \"civilization\" and commerce, would deal a devastating blow to the slave trade. Since the Niger Delta was largely an exporter rather than a producer of the slaves, it, iso racto, became ignored. Agriculturally, the Niger Delta was also not considered important at the time when the agriculture productivity of a place enhanced its importance. Thus, the Niger could not even attract European commercial interests (Tasie, 1978:323-332). On April 10, 1846 Hope Waddell and his missionary team of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland arrived Calabar. In October 1853, seven years after Hope Waddell's arrival in IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 684 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org Calabar, Essien Essien Ukpabio, the first baptized covert was received into the Church was King Eyo of Creek Town. Eventually, Mary Mitchell Slessor applied to the United Presbyterian Church's Foreign Mission Board. After training in Edinburgh, the set sail in the steamer Ethiopia in Liverpool docks and waved good-bye to two companions from Dundee who had gone to see her off on an autumn morning on August 1876, and arrived at her destination in Calabar (West Africa) just over a month later (Wikipedia, 2015). In 1876, on arrival in Calabar, Mary Slessor at 28 years of age, red haired with bright blue eyes (Hardage, 2010), was first assigned to the Calabar region in the land of Efik people. She was warned that the Efik people believed in traditional West African religion and had superstitions in relation to women giving birth to twins. Slessor lived in the missionary compound for three years, working first in the missions in Old Town and Creek Town. Ayandele (1991: 74) reported that in 1873 the part of Duke Town in Old Calabar known as Henshaw Town was the most responsive to missionary teaching and accordingly formed the Young Calabar who on the surface had a purely social and religious programme which consisted of casting of tribal religion, en masse acceptance of Christianity, and adoption of European clothing. He added that in a society like the Efik's where religion could not be separated from politics, such programme implied political independence of Duke Town. Moreover, the missionaries encouraged Henshaw Town's aspirations and one of them took part in the coronation of an independent King for the \"town\". However, Duke Town authorities, the diehard \"pagans\", sought to nullify all this by using Ekpo, a kind of freemasonry with \"pagan\" rituals. Mary Slessor wanted to go deeper into Calabar, but she contracted malaria and was forced to return to Scotland to recover. She left Calabar for Dundee in 1879 (aged 30). After sixteen months in Scotland, Slessor returned to Calabar, but not to the same compound. Her new assignment was three miles farther into Calabar, in Old Town. Since Slessor assigned a large portion of her salary to support her mother and sisters in Scotland. She economized by learning to eat the native food. Mary Slessor adopted four children: Jean, Alice, Maggie and May. Mary Mitchell Slessor among the Okoyong and Efik In Augustine 1888, Slessor travelled north to Okoyong, an area where previous male missionaries had been killed. She thought that her teachings, and the fact that she was a woman, would be less threatening to unreached tribes. For fifteen years, Slessor lived with Okoyong and Efik people. She learned to speak Efik, the language of the people, and made close personal friendships whenever she went, becoming known for her pragmatism and humour. Slessor lived a simple life in a traditional house with Efiks. Her insistence on lone stations, often lead Slessor into conflict with the authorities and gained her a reputation for eccentricity. In 1902, among the Okoyong people, eleven youngsters threatened her with weapon but Mary never budged. She thus gained respect of the leader of the gang and Mary invited them all to join in with the other kids to attend Sunday IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 685 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org school. They were baptized including seven of her adopted children. How Mary Mitchell Slessor Imparted Nigerian Church History Issues Mary Slessor confronted as a young missionary included the lack of Western education, as well as widespread human sacrifice at the death of a village elder or head, which, it was believed, required servants and retainers to accompany him to the next world. The birth of twins was considered a particularly evil course. Indigenes or Africans feared that the father of one of the infants was an evil spirit, and that the mother had been guilty of a great sin. Unable to determine which twin was fathered by the evil spirit, the people often abandoned both babies in the bush. Slessor adopted every child she found abandoned and sent out twin's missioners to find protect and care for them at the Mission House. Some mission compounds were alive with babies. It was reported that Mary Slessor once saved a pair of twins, a boy and a girl, but the boy did not survive. Mary Slessor took the girl as her daughter and called her Janie. This Janie she took with her to Scotland on yet another health furlough raised her up as a Christian (White, 2010). Many childless couples or single parents now have smiles put on their faces by popularizing Mary Slessor's adoption of babies' legacy. Many celebrated twins would have been killed but for Mary Slessor's legacy. Mary Slessor was a driving force behind the establishment of the Hope Waddell Training Institution in Calabar (opened in 1895), which provided practical vocational training to Efiks. The superstitions threat against twins was not only in Calabar, but also spread to Arochukwu on the far west of Calabar. There was an Elementary School named in honour of Mary Slessor in Arochukwu. Her exploits were heralded in Britain and she became known as the \"white queen of Okoyong\". She did not focus on evangelism, but rather on settling disciples, encouraging trade, establishing social changes and introducing Western or formal education. In 1892, Mary Slessor became viceconsul in Okoyong, presiding over the customary or native court. In 1905, she was named vice-present of Ikot Obong native court. In 1913 she was awarded the Order of St. John of Jeruselem. Slessor's work in Okoyong earned her the Efik nickname of Obonganwan Okoyong (Queen of Okoyong). This name is still used commonly to refer to her and many other women in Akwa Ibom State and the Southern Senatorial District of Cross River State. Several memorials in and around the Efik provinces of Calabar and Okoyong testify to the value placed on her work. Some of these include: • Mary Slessor Road in Calabar from Calabar Road to UNICAL. • Mary Slessor Roundabout at Marian Hill, Calabar. • Mary Slessor Church, Port Harcourt. • Statues of her (usually carrying twins) at various locations in Calabar. • Main-belt asteroid 4793 Slessor (1988 RR4) named after her to mark the centenary celebrations on 13th January, 2015 (https://www.facebook.com/achimo taschool). IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 686 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org Mary Mitchell Slessor was one of the greatest women of her generation. The British described her as a \"tornacto\". She was nicknamed \"Carrott\", because of her flaming hair. She was also nicknamed \"Fire\" because of her flaming anger or temper. She was a gentle, sensitive and loving Christian. In 1907, she established a mission at Arochukwu, though she remained or stayed at Ikot Obong. Obutong, Creek Town, Okoyong, Eniong, Itu, Use, Ikpe and Ediene, all fell to her misionarying influence. At Use Ikot Oku, she established a centre for mothers of twins and other distressed women. In 1903, with the aim of passing on to Arochukwu area, she visited Itu (Onah, 2013). A plot of land was donated to her by the chiefs of Okoyong in 1890 for the building of her house. A missionary carpenter, Mr Owen, built a house for her in 1899. All the materials used in the construction of her one-storeyed building were imported from England. She was appointed a British Vice Consul in 1892 by the Consul General of Niger-Coast Protectorate, Major (later Sir) Claude Macdonald. She pierced through the then unfriendly EfikIbibio ethnic groups around modern Itu. Africans call her \"Mother of All People\". She trained herself to live and think like an African. She spoke the local languages fluently and walked bare-footed. She is not only a model but also a mentor to many men and women, clergy and lay people. She saved hundreds of twins out of the bush, where they had been left either to starve to death or be eaten by animals. She helped heal the sick and stopped the practice of determining guilt by making the suspects drink poison. Death For the last four decades of her life, Mary Slessor suffered intermittent fevers from the malaria she contracted during her first station to Calabar and had to travel to Scotland thrice for treatment. During her third mission to Calabar her mother and sister died and so found a sense of independence. With these dead she concluded that \"heaven is now nearer to me than Britain and no one will worry about me if i go up country\" (Onah, 2014). The fever eventually weakened Mary M. Slessor to the point where she could no longer walk long distances in the rainforest, but had to be pushed along in a hand-cart. In early January, 1915, while at her remote station near Use Ikot Oku, she suffered a particularly severe fever. Mary Mitchell Slessor died on 13th January, 1915 (Onah, 2014). Her body was transported down the Cross River to Duke Town for the colonial equivalent of a state funeral. A Union Jack covered her coffin. Attendees included the Provincial Commissioner, along with other senior British officials in full uniform. Flags at government buildings were flown at half mast. Nigeria's Governor-General Sir Frederick Lugard, telegraphed his \"deepest regret\" and condolences from Lagos and published a warm tribute in the Government Gazette (Proctor, 2012). Conclusion Sixty-six-year-old Mary Mitchell Slessor died in Use Ikot Oku, Nigeria. A petite redhead everybody's mother from the slums of Dundee, Scotland, becomes a role model for others, even IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 687 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org today. She has wielded such influence in the land known to her compatriots as the white man's grave. She perfectly fits into the British Empire's plan to \"civilize\" Nigeria. Our foregoing discussion and other studies on Mary Slessor's life reveal certain factors leading to missionary fervour, combined with a large measure of down-to-earth common sense. Through the trying circumstances of her youth, she learned to face and overcome difficult situations in ways that often challenges the mission methods and attitudes of her era. Mary Slessor's stubborn drive to open new territory to education and the presentation of the gospel message stands as a prime example of what Ogbu U. Kalu, Nigerian Church historian and professor of World Christianity and Mission at McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, refers to as \"a broader view of the style and vision of the missionary enterprise\" (Kalu, 2002). Mary Slessor's vision was much broader and more activist than her compatriots could imagine (Walls, 1996:172). Mary Slessor demonstrated her social activism in a number of ways: her persistent rescue of twins and orphans, in some cases adopting and raising the children as her own; her determination to make life better for women in general, especially in setting up vocational training schools for them; her use of the \"each one teach one\" principle later espoused by Frank Laubach and other modern literacy, proponents (she would send a couple of boys who had learned to read into a village that had invited her to come, and there she would teach them not only reading but also what they knew of the Bible); and her participation in settling disputes, whether as an agent of the British government or on an informal, personal basis. She brought a semblance of order to communities in a time of social and political upheaval (Kalu, 2002). Slessor represents a genre of missionary presence which rejected the social and spatial boundaries created by the \"ark syndrome\" in missionary attitude. In Calabar she was a catalyst that challenged the mission to change emphasis, to become a sending body rather than a mostly stationary body, a practice the mission's converts had been urging for some years. She garnered support from younger mission colleagues, in addition to being admired by British colonial personnel and the people of the districts where she lived and worked (Buchan, 1981: 25). Mary Slessor's importance in the history of the development of the Church in Africa cannot be denied. She is remembered – by some, venerated – in both Scotland and South-Eastern Nigeria. In 2000 she was chosen as one of the millennium persons of Calabar, the place she began her witness for Christ. She is honoured in the area with statues, each a likeness of Mary Slessor holding twin babies. A hospital and schools are named for her. In Scotland a tenpound note bears her picture. Queen Elizabeth laid a wreath at her grave in Calabar in 1956. The museum in Dundee displays stained glass windows that depict events from her life. Mary Slessor herself would have shunned such goingson. Regardless, she left a trail of churches and schools, a host of people who admired her deeply and many who still do. She is the harbinger of Women Liberation and Child Rights Law. IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 688 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org References Ayandele, E. A. (1966, Fifth Impression, 1991). The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842 – 1914: A Political and Social Analysis, London: Longman Group Ltd. Buchan, James (1981). The Expendable Mary Slessor, New York: Seabury Press. Hardage, Jeannette (2010). Mary Slessor: Mother of All Peoples, New Rochelle, New York: Holy Trinity. John Ferguson (1978). Some Nigerian Church Founders. Ibadan: Daystar Press. Kingsley, Mary H. (1988, Originally published 1897). Travels in West Africa, Boston: Beacon Press. Lingstone, W. P. (1927). Mary Slessor of Calabar, Pioneer Missonary, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Ogbu, U. Kalu (February 25, 2002). A paper presented at McGormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. Onah, A. Odey (2014). \"Issues in Nigerian and African Church History, 1849 – 2009\", European Journal of Scientific Research, EJSR, Vol. 123, Issue 3. Onah, A. Odey (October, 2013). \"ProphetEvangelist Garrick Sokari Idaketima Braide: The First Revivalist in Nigeria (18821918), International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, IJHSS, Vol. 3, No. 17. Proctor, J. H. (2012). Serving God and the Empire: Mary Slessor in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1876 – 1915, Drill, 45 – 61. Slessor, Mary, 1848 – 1915, https://www.facebook.com/achimotasch ool/ posts/ 1015203085256741. Tasie, G. O. M. (1978). \"The Church in the Niger Delta\", Christianity in West Africa: The Nigerian Story, Ibadan: Daystar Press. Wallbank, I. W., Tayolor, A. M. & Bailkey, N. M. (1971). Civilization: Past and Present, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foreman and Company. Walls, Andrew F. (1996). The Missionary Movement in Christian History: Studies in the Transmission of Faith, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. White, Donna (29th August, 2010). \"Red-hot designers hail Scots missionary for inspiring African style\". The Daily Record. Retrieved 2011 – 09 – 06. Wikipedia (2015). The free Encyclopaedia. _____________________________ Augustine O. Odey is of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, University of Uyo, P.M.B. 1017, Uyo Nigeria, West Africa onah.odey@yahoo.com Gregory A. Onah, is of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies University of Calabar, P.M.B. 1115, Calabar Nigeria, West Africa drgreg.onah@yahoo.com IJSER", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Union Citizenship Revisited: Multilateral Democracy as Normative Standard for European Citizenship Antoinette Scherz Centre for Advanced Studies Justitia Amplificata, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany Rebecca Welge Department of Political Sciences, University of Zurich, Switzerland Antoinette Scherz Goethe University Frankfurt Am Wingertsberg 4, 61348 Bad Homburg v.d. Höhe, Germany +49 6172 13977-54 scherz@em.uni-frankfurt.de Rebecca Welge (corresponding author) University of Zurich, Department of Political Science Affolternstrasse 56, CH-8050 Zurich, Switzerland +41 (0)44 634 52 03 rebecca.welge@uzh.ch Acknowledgements This paper was written in the context of the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research Democracy. Funding by the Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. For valuable comments on previous versions, we thank particularly Francis Cheneval, Dora Kostakopoulou, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Frank Schimmelfennig, and the anonymous reviewers. Funding Paragraph This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation under the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research Democracy. 2 Union Citizenship Revisited: Multilateral Democracy as Normative Standard for European Citizenship Union Citizenship as currently implemented in the European Union introduces a distinct concept of citizenship that necessitates an adequate normative approach. The objective of this paper is to assess EU Citizenship against the theoretical background of multilateral democracy. This approach is specifically suited for this task, as it does not rely on a nation-state paradigm or the presumption of a further transformation into a federation or union. We propose three criteria by which to assess multilevel citizenship: equal individual rights, equal sovereignty of peoples, and the balancing of individuals' and peoples' interests. We argue that the current practice of Union Citizenship does not fully meet the proposed standards, regarding equal rights within, and equal access to, the political system. Based on our assessment, we propose reform options of access to national and supranational citizenship, and argue for supranational participation rights and equal transnational rights to gradually re-establish full membership for individuals. Keywords: EU, Equality, Integration, Legitimacy, Transnational I Introduction European Citizenship is of unique importance for migration in Europe, because it transcends national boundaries and guaranties the right to free movement to all EU citizens. Due to its multilevel structure, European Citizenship has a distinct form composed of national and EU Citizenship. It mirrors the multi-layered legal system and the complex relationship between national and EU law. According to the Treaties, every citizen of EU Member States holds EU Citizenship, which is 'additional' to national citizenship and does not replace it (Art. 20.1 TFEU). The supranationally enshrined status of EU Citizenship creates distinct features of citizenship: such a multilevel citizenship stretches into supranational and transnational realms, which are additional to the national level as it embeds multiple national communities.i The framework of EU Citizenship has changed the conditions of migration in Europe fundamentally and could 3 serve as a model how to deal with challenges of citizenship and migration in the 21st century. The importance of European Citizenship for the democratisation of the European Union is extensively debated (Soysal 1994; Shaw 1998; Wiener 1997; Archibugi, Held, and Köhler 1998; Kostakopoulou 2000; Bellamy and Warleigh 2001; Bauböck 2007; Bellamy 2008). Since the formal implementation of Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht, scholars have discussed the kind of construct Union Citizenship is and what it should be (Closa 1992; Meehan 1993; Kostakopoulou 1996; Preuss 1996; Lehning and Weale 1997; Shaw 1997; La Torre 1998; Eder and Giesen 2001). Adding to this debate, some scholars have argued that citizenship beyond the state lacks substance and that Union Citizenship would be merely symbolic (d'Oliviera 1995; Everson 1995; Evans 1998); others that Union Citizenship would unfold a transformative process of citizenship denationalitisation (Meehan 1993; Linklater 1998; Kostakopoulou 1996; Wiener 1998). These differences affect also the importance that is attributed to Union Citizenship with regard to internal EU migration. Existing theoretical contributions specific to Union Citizenship differ in the extent to which Union Citizenship should remain rooted in national citizenship (Bauböck 1994; Bellamy and Castiglione 1998; Bellamy and Castiglione 1998; Weiler 1999) or represent a tableau for post-national citizenship (Kostakopoulou 1996; Kostakopoulou 2007; Linklater 1998; Wiener 1997; Garot 1998). Either way, existing theories addressing European Citizenship tend to favour unionist or pluralist perspectives. The specific characteristics of multilevel citizenship, however, require a normative approach that balances the tension between unionist and pluralist approaches. We aim at presenting such standards for multilevel citizenship based on the normative approach of multilateral democracy (Cheneval 2011; Bohman 2007; Nicolaïdis 2004; Nicolaïdis 4 2013). Multilateral democracy, as democracy between democratic states, is based on the political equality of individuals and people, i.e. demoi.ii Peoples are regarded as normatively important because they are democratic collectives of individuals and form a realm of justice (Cheneval, 2011, 117). Since the interests of individuals using their rights and the interests of the community might not be the same, tension might arise between the demands of peoples and individuals (Marshall 1950). Multilateral democracy can neither neglect nor dissolve this tension, but provides means to balance the interests of both. We present three general criteria by which to assess the present construction of EU Citizenship. First, European Citizenship should protect individuals' rights in an equal manner. Second, the conception of citizenship should ensure peoples' right to selfdetermination. Third, the construction should balance the interests of individuals and peoples. In contrast to post-national approaches, multilateral democracy is still a bounded system that takes into account the existing state-based demoi. In comparison to cosmopolitan approaches, equality of individuals refers therefore to citizens within the bounded system. In this sense we focus on issues that are specifically important for internal EU migration. II State-based and multilevel Citizenship Concepts State-based citizenship determines nationality and links individuals to a single political entity. Citizenship is the legal tool by which a political community defines its citizenry (Brubaker 1992). In the traditional understanding of citizenship, it is up to the political community to define their members (Magnette 2005). Due to the multilevel conception of the EU system, citizenship is composed of different political communities: it expands vertically to include a supranational level, and horizontally in that it affects multiple 5 states (Shaw 1997; La Torre 1998; Bellamy and Warleigh 2001; Kostakopoulou 2000). This vertical and horizontal extension of citizenship affects the logic of citizenship at its core. Political rights granted by citizenship shall empower individuals by entitling persons to engage or not in a course of action (Benhabib 2004; Mancini, G. Federico 1998). We restrict our analysis to political rights because political rights are foundational and underlie other citizenship rights (Janoski and Gran 2002). Entitling persons in a meaningful way, political rights granted by citizenship in liberal democracies are pivotal for the democratic quality of the system. In a democracy, citizens shall be entitled to participate on equal footing in their political community (cf. Arendt 1968; Benhabib 2004). In a multilateral democracy with multiple levels, this includes not only the domestic, but also the supranational and transnational realms, because individuals are regarded as equals throughout the whole system. A state-based understanding of citizenship explains why the term citizenship is frequently used synonymously with nationality, which refers to individual membership to a nation-state.iii As mentioned earlier, we understand EU Citizenship as compound: citizenship in the multilevel polity is not equivalent to nationality since individuals with different national citizenships are granted EU Citizenship as a common legal status (Closa 1992; Shaw 1997). In traditional systems, the scope of citizenship is a comparatively straightforward concept. Whoever is a citizen (a legal member) of the political community is entitled to exercise rights and is subject to duties of citizenship.iv The multilevel structure, however, implies that citizens are embedded in multiple citizenships: individuals are subject to national citizenship and, in the realm of EU law, to European citizenship, either as static or mobile EU citizens. 6 These substantial differences necessitate a specific normative approach to evaluate citizenship. The concept of transnational or nested citizenship grasps the layers of citizenship beyond the state and theorises its specific characteristics (Bauböck 1994; Mancini, G. Federico 1998; Shaw 1998). Transnational citizenship emphasises the horizontal dimension, the multiplication of memberships and the effects of migration while nested citizenship captures the vertical construction of citizenship in multilevel systems and highlights the effects of the overlapping or 'nested' communities an individual belongs to. Based on multilateral democracy, we elaborate a new approach to multilevel citizenship that aims to integrate both of these aspects. III A new normative Approach to multilevel Citizenship Existing normative approaches to multilevel citizenship do not give equal weight to the different aspects of EU citizenship and the fundamental relation between the national and supranational level as they tend to favour one over the other. Pluralist approaches that defend a 'thin' Union Citizenship, which complements and derives from national citizenship favour the national level (e.g., Everson 1995; Weiler 1997). Other approaches see the development of supranational citizenship as a first step towards global citizenship, overcoming the national (Lehning and Weale 1997) and, thereby, favour the supranational or post-national. By applying the framework of multilateral democracy, we aim at integrating the idea of 'Union of peoples' (Nicolaïdis 2004; 2013; Bellamy and Castiglione 1998, 267) with transformative approaches (Preuss 1996; Kostakopoulou 1996) that acknowledge the dynamic and changing nature of communities. 7 A Multilateral Democracy Multilateral democracy is a theory determining how democratic relationships between several democratic states or peoples should be organised to be legitimate (Cheneval 2011; Bohman 2007; Nicolaïdis 2004; 2013). For multilateral democracy it is fundamental that peoples and citizens are normatively equally important. The institutional implementation of this equality, however, requires further interpretation, which we search to provide for citizenship under the term of balancing. The ideal theory of multilateral democracy is based on a membership structure of liberal democratic peoples (Cheneval 2011). Such liberal democratic peoples are defined by rule of law including individual fundamental rights, constitutional constraints of power and participatory and responsive structures, which are constitutionalised in states. In other words, only liberal democratic states are allowed to enter a multilateral democracy as Member States (Cheneval 2011). According to multilateral democracy just principles are acceptable in an original position for both liberal democratic peoples and liberal democratic citizens (Cheneval 2011). Unlike in Rawls' The Law of Peoples (1999), for multilateral democracy there are not two different original positions – one on the domestic and one on the international level. For this reason, multilateral democracy is based on the interests of both peoples and citizens. Since liberal states should not hinder their citizens from engaging transnationally. They may migrate, conduct business or engage in civil society actions in other states. Multilateral democracy puts emphasis on the EU's multilevel character; it differs from pluralist approaches insofar as it acknowledges the existence of a broader political community, and from unionist approaches, as it does not neglect the existence of multiple demoi. The accounts of multilateral democracy all start with the presumption 8 that democratic national demoi exist in the EU's multilevel system and should be taken into account. They argue that multilateral democracy is better fitted to the EU's reality and is thus a more adequate normative theory. Nevertheless, the accounts differ with regard to the question of whether multilateral democracy or demoicracy can also be transformed into a post-national system. Supporters of multilateral democracy argue either that bounded demoi are worth preserving (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Nicolaïdis 2004; 2013) or that the transformation of demoi is legitimate if they themselves decide on it (Cheneval 2011). In our opinion, the demoi can legitimately change and transform their boundaries being fundamentally politically-constituted communities and normatively relevant insofar as they are democratic. This view is closer to approaches of post-national citizenship but acknowledges today's reality of distinct democratic peoples. B Principles for multilevel citizenship Multilateral democracy provides the means to establish standards of citizenship in the EU's multilevel system that are not based on the nation-state model. The existing literature on multilateral democracy does not, however, outline specific criteria for multilevel citizenship despite its being one of the most fundamental institutions of multilateral democracy. We refer to five of the principles of multilateral democracy, proposed by Cheneval as the most relevant for multilevel citizenship: 1. Sovereignty of the statespeoples' pouvoir constituant regarding entry, exit, and basic rules of the political order of multilateral democracy 2. Non-discrimination of statespeoples and citizens 3. Reciprocity of transnational rights 9 4. Equal legislative rights of citizens and statespeoples 5. Supremacy of multilateral law and jurisdictionv According to Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2011, 12), these principles do not 'have the status of basic principles of law,' but are 'to be specific to and necessary for the legitimate realization of demoicracy.' We aim at providing interpretation of these principles for citizenship under the core assumption of equality between liberal democratic peoples and citizens. The sovereignty of the peoples' pouvoir constituant (P1) regards entry, exit, and basic rules of the political order of multilateral democracy. This means that peoples cannot be forced to join or stay in a multilateral democracy. Multilateral democracy, thus, allows the coexistence of different constitutional models and different models of democracy (Cheneval 2011, 135). Rights within the national system that are not specified by the common treaties might differ significantly from state to state. As long as the commonly ratified treaties do not specify a certain issue, the settings of constitutional rules remain in the peoples' competence.vi The second principle, non-discrimination of peoples and citizens (P2), requires 'states or the multilateral order as such not [to] give preferences to some Member States without granting them to all' (Cheneval 2011, 140). This principle implies equal implementation of individual rights granted by the unanimously ratified treaties within each Member State without discrimination to all citizens under jurisdiction of the Member State. It does not, however, require equal rights in all Member States but the equal implementation of rights provided by Community Law. The reciprocity of transnational rights (P3) specifies how to deal with rights (and duties) in the transnational realm. 'In such a system the fundamental liberal right to exit 10 will thus be reciprocated by all member peoples by a fundamental right to entry and corresponding rights that gradually re-establish a migrant's status as full member of society' (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2011, 16). The claim that migrating citizens have a right to gradually re-establish full membership to a community equals neither the idea of denizenship as it is restricted to migrating EU citizens, nor simplified naturalisation rules as suggested inter alia by Bauböck (1994), but rather stems from the core idea of 'community of communities' according to which all citizens of EU Member States are potential citizens of all EU Member States. In order to establish a comprehensive normative account of multilevel citizenship, it is important to understand how these principles relate to each other. Tensions might arise, for instance, between the sovereignty of peoples (P1) and the non-discrimination of citizens (P2) or the supremacy of common law and jurisdiction (P5). In order to develop them further regarding their meaning for citizenship, we have to consider fundamental presuppositions apparent in the original position. The three fundamental relations of equality that lie at the heart of multilateral democracy are the equality of peoples, the equality of individuals and the equality of peoples and individuals. We take these three foundations of multilateral democracy as superior guidelines for multilevel citizenship. The equality of individuals is mirrored in the supremacy of common law and jurisdiction (P5) and the non-discrimination of citizens (P2). This means supranational and transnational rights recognised in common law, are granted equally to all persons without distinction of any kind, such as sex, religion or nationality. Second, the equality of peoples translates into the sovereignty of the peoples' pouvoir constituant (P1) and the non-discrimination of peoples, meaning that peoples will not give preferences to one other member-people over the others (P2). It should be noted that the criterion of equality of peoples means not only sovereignty, but also non-discrimination for peoples. 11 Third, the equality of peoples and individuals translates into equal legislative rights of citizens and peoples (P4) and to the reciprocity of transnational rights (P3). C Rights of Citizenship in the multilevel System Individual rights within the political systems can be distinguished as 'transnational rights' for citizens with different nationalities who migrate in the system and 'supranational rights' directly linked to the supranational level. Table 1 presents how the principles can be allocated to the three fundamental equality relations and specifies the implications they have for the supranational, transnational and domestic realm. [Table 1 here] The multilateral approach seeks to balance individuals' and peoples' interests in the supranational, transnational and national realm. On the supranational level it gives prevalence to individual equality. This means that if a right relates directly to the European level, e.g. EP voting rights, this right should be equally implemented across the Member States (see also Cheneval 2007). The balancing problem is most pressing with regard to the transnational realm. Transnational rights, per definition, can only be activated via the right of free movement and should be granted in line with mutual recognition (cf. Cheneval 2011). A reciprocal establishment of transnational rights is required for the development of further rights beyond the Treaties, opening up the possibility for differentiated integration. However, if the provision of transnational rights has been agreed upon in common law, the equality of individuals is the relevant criterion as the sovereignty of peoples has already been satisfied in the ratification. Finally, within the member states, the conflict of peoples and individuals should be resolved since multilateral democracy consists only of democratic states. In liberal democratic states, the sovereignty of the people is based on the individual, which means 12 that there should not be an internal conflict if these requirements are fulfilled. In order to secure the equality of individuals also within the Member States, a minimum standard of political rights is demanded in practice. D Access to Citizenship in the multilevel System Access and rights are much more complex in multilevel citizenship than in state-based citizenship. Access to citizenship can be defined on different levels of the system and different sets of rights and duties might be granted to different groups of individuals. This section presents normative expectations of multilateral democracy for access and linkage of citizenship and compares it to alternative approaches.vii First, in a multilevel system, access to each level can be disconnected or connected in different ways (La Torre 1998; Eder and Giesen 2001; Kostakopoulou 2000; Bauböck 2007). If access to different levels is linked, it can generally be granted either top down or bottom up. Strongly linked bottom up access implies that citizens who are members of the lower level are automatically granted access to the higher level. Top down access implies that the citizenry of the highest level is automatically part of the lower level. The historical development of federal states shows linkages in both directions: from regional to national citizenship or vice versa. Either way, the traditional understanding of national states requires strong linkage to guarantee the unity of the demos. The linkage between different levels of citizenship has important implications for who controls access and who determines the rights and duties attached to a legal status. Unlike in traditional federal states, citizenship in multilateral democracy does not necessarily need to be linked across the different levels. If national and supranational citizenship are linked, access has to occur through a bottom-up approach because otherwise national sovereignty would be strongly violated (Weiler 1997; Bellamy and 13 Castiglione 1998). An alternative option to a bottom-up link would be to grant supranational citizenship disconnected from national citizenship, in which case the legally defined supranational demos would not necessarily be congruent with the national demoi.viii Access to supranational citizenship could, instead, be conditional on residency (Rubio-Marin 1998; Garot 1998; Perchinig 2006; Kostakopoulou 2007; Schrauwen 2013). Access to national citizenship should, however, remain in the legal competence of the respective political communities, which can define access conditions for their national citizenship to ensure the sovereignty of peoples in the core issue of defining the respective citizenry. This principle would not be violated if all Member States would agree unanimously to common standards of access. [Table 2 here] We list the normative expectations for both citizen access and linkage in Table 2 and compare it with the demands of alternative approaches. The main difference to other theoretical perspectives lies in the differentiated access to multilevel citizenship. While statist approaches favour the self-determination of access to the whole system, unionist perspectives favour uniform access for all. Linkage in all these approaches is strictly linked and only disconnected for TCNs. IV Realisation of multilateral Principles in European Citizenship This section aims to (a) evaluate the current construction of EU Citizenship as institutionalised in law and (b) present reform options that could increase the legitimacy of multilevel citizenship in light of multilateral democracy. 14 A Access to Citizenship Status Generally, equality of peoples suggests that regulations of acquisition and loss of national citizenship shall remain in the competence of Member States. Access to the supranational level, however, does not necessarily have to be linked to access to national citizenship. Therefore, access to citizenship can, from the perspective of multilateral democracy, be legitimately constructed in two ways: through bottom-up linkage or separate national and supranational access. We discuss in which way these options could increase the legitimacy of multilevel citizenship in the European Union compared to the Status Quo. Currently, access to EU Citizenship is strongly linked to national citizenship. According to the Treaties, every National of a Member State shall be an EU citizen. EU Citizenship is 'additional' to national membership and does not replace it. When implemented in 1992, EU Citizenship was meant to be 'complementary' to national citizenship. The status of EU Citizenship has always been linked bottom-up in its access and loss. This strong linkage means that one cannot hold EU Citizenship without being a Member State national.ix At first glance, the bottom-up linkage between national citizenship and EU Citizenship seems to realise the sovereignty of the pouvoir constituant of the Member States, as each Member State retains the sovereignty to decide who their citizens are by formulating access conditions. Naturalisation procedures, however, vary widely among Member States while the result remains the same: each national for the purpose of community law is automatically an EU citizen and can benefit from transnational and supranational rights in the whole system. In this construction of access, the Member States keep the sovereignty to define their own citizens, however, they do not control who can become citizens of the multilevel system since they do not have a say in the 15 naturalisation rules of other Member States. From the perspective of multilateral democracy, this lack of the competence to decide who shall be EU citizens is of high relevance in the context of migration. Thus, the lack of common standards becomes a crucial issue as it eludes control over access to the political system. EU Citizenship includes not only the supranational, but also the transnational rights of the multilevel system. In consequence, EU citizens also benefit from rights related to the national or local level of other Member States. Further, multilateral democracy claims that EU citizens shall not only have a right to free movement and residence, but also to 'gradually become full members' if they decide to engage transnationally (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2011, 16).x The claim of granting migrating EU citizens access to the political systems, which distinguishes multilateral democracy from pluralist approaches, implies that states accept EU citizens as having rights equal to those of Nationals in the state of permanent residence. Given the sovereignty principle, it is problematic if states do not have a say in who these citizens are. Therefore bottomup linkage, as implemented in the status quo, poses severe problems of unequal access to supranational and transnational citizenship and loss of access-control by Member States over these two levels. From the perspective of multilateral democracy, peoples should retain full competence in defining their national naturalisation rules while citizenship on the supranational level should be equally accessible for all individuals. For this reason, the status quo is more problematic than alternative designs: a lack of common naturalisation standards at the national level combined with automatic access to supranational citizenship for national citizens makes control over access to supranational citizenship impossible. Since supranational citizens should be granted a right to gradually re-establish full membership in each political community, access to national citizenship is eluded if 16 access to supranational citizenship is not controlled by all peoples. Three models of access to supranational citizenship, as illustrated in Table 3, are in principle possible for multilateral democracy. These models include first, a bottom-up linkage model (status quo); second, a decoupled model in which access to the national level is decoupled from access to the supranational level (with or without an institutional opening for TCNs); third, a mixed model (with or without common standards at the national level). We discuss these models with regard to the equality of individuals and inclusiveness, on the one hand, and the sovereignty of peoples, on the other hand. [Table 3 here] A bottom-up 'linked' model (1), assumes an automatic link, which guarantees that all members of the national demoi are also members of the supranational one as realised in the status quo (option 1a). The status quo realises an automatically linked citizenship without common standards. To improve the status quo but remain in the model of bottom-up linkage would require minimal common standards for naturalisation at the national level to which all states would have to agree (1b). This implies that the peoples would gain the competence to define who can become a supranational citizen. It might be argued against minimal common standards that, in a multilateral democracy, all Member States are democratic and, as such, mutually recognised by each other. However, rules for naturalisation might be changed in a national state, and this could be problematic for multilateral democracy in several ways: underinclusiveness of naturalisation rules, on the one hand, might lead to a lack of democratic legitimacy in a Member State and consequently affect democratic quality of the whole system. Overinclusiveness of naturalisation rules, on the other hand, could lead to distinct problems in the national, transnational, and supranational realm. This can for example be caused by extraterritorial mass naturalisations as offered by several member states on 17 grounds of ancestry or co-ethnicity. On the domestic level, this results in the possibility of dominance of external votes. In the transnational realm, it could lead to the subversion of other Member States' rights to control immigration. At the supranational level, overinclusive naturalisation rules could be misused to influence the representations in supranational institutions disproportionally through artificially higher numbers of citizens. Minimal common standards can be a mean to impede the problematic effects of overand underinclusive naturalisation rules on the multilateral polity. An automatically linked approach favours one level over the other. The two alternative approaches, decoupled and mixed, can realise the equal importance of both statuses, which is favourable according to theoretical approach of multilateral democracy. If the national and the supranational levels of citizenship were disconnected, the competence to define conditions of access to the national level would remain at the national level, while Member States would have to agree on common standards of access to the supranational and the transnational realms. Multilateral democracy would favour the decoupled options over an automatically linked option, because it leaves control over national access to the respective states and at the same time guarantees their control over the supranational level through common standards. This means that the decoupled options can solve the main problem of sovereignty loss over multilevel citizenship for peoples. Option 2a defines national citizenship as a necessary but insufficient condition for supranational citizenship. As a result, some national citizens would not hold supranational citizenship, but all supranational citizens would hold national citizenship.xi Even though such exclusion does not comply with the equality between citizens in a multilevel polity, it can be justified if the sovereignty of peoples is 18 undermined by the naturalisation procedures of other states. This is specifically the case if these procedures fall outside of the usual democratic requirements, such as extraterritorial mass naturalisations, and are therefore not covered by mutual recognition. Of course, it depends on the implemented common standards, which nationals exactly would not acquire EU citizenship under this model. Option 2b sets the common standards for supranational citizenship in such a way that it provides access to supranational citizenship for individuals who are not national citizens, as discussed in the idea of 'civic citizenship.' In 2a and 2b, some of the Nationals might not be included in supranational citizenship, but 2b is more inclusive as it provides an institutional opening for TCNs. For this reason, multilateral democracy would favour 2b over 2a. The mixed models are defined through a link from the national to the supranational level and an access option for TCNs to supranational citizenship.xii TCNs could acquire supranational citizenship without holding or gaining nationality. For instance, it could be acquired after a certain period of residence within the territory of the multilateral democracy (Garot 1998; Kostakopoulou 2000). Compared to the status quo, option 3a would provide an institutional opening for TCNs to supranational citizenship.xiii It would also ensure all national citizens automatic supranational citizenship through an automatic linkage. Since national citizenship is not bound to common standards in option 3a, automatic access for all Member State Nationals could still bypass the common standards for supranational citizenship. Therefore, such a design does not solve the problem of control for peoples over access to the supranational level for other national citizens. In option 3b, control over access to supranational citizenship would not be bypassed: in contrast to the decoupled option, Member State Nationals would still be automatically granted supranational citizenship and TCNs could access supranational citizenship, but the inclusion of all citizens would be regulated through 19 minimal common standards on the national level. Hence, it would resolve the sovereignty problem for peoples over access to supranational citizenship. This requires, to a certain extent, the harmonisation of naturalisation rules at the national level, which affect in turn national sovereignty. If harmonisation takes the form of minimal standards for access to national citizenship, it would not be particularly invasive. Another argument can, however, be made against the decoupled and the mixed model from a demoicratic point of view. Decoupling Union Citizenship constructs a separate European demos. This construction of a European demos is understood to contradict the fundamental idea of multilateral democracy as a demoicracy only if it would result in the domination of certain national demoi or even to their replacement. An emerging European demos, however, would still embed the national demoi and European citizenship would not replace the national ones. Finally, common standards for such a procedure would not undermine the ideal of multilateral democracy since they are inherent part of mutual recognition, which is a fundamental principle of multilateral democracy (Nicolaïdis 2013, 359–60). To summarise, a decoupled model that provides an institutional opening for TCNs 2b or a mixed model that applies minimal common standards at the national level 3b would be the best options to realise the ideal of multilateral democracy. This argument flows from the core claim that each migrating citizen in a multilateral democracy has the right to gradually re-establish full access to the political system. In combination with linked citizenship (without common standards) this challenges peoples' sovereignty to decide who becomes a member of the community. Both reform options can improve the status quo and balance the interests of individuals and peoples in the multilevel system. The desirability of model 2b depends on the inclusion of nationals while granting common standards. Just like option 3b, option 2b implements minimal standards for 20 supranational citizenship and realises an institutional opening for TCNs, but increases the sovereignty of peoples as they retain the right to define naturalisation rules for national citizenship. B Citizenship Rights In addition to rights in the national sphere, effective EU citizenship needs to create links between individuals and the supranational and the transnational spheres of the EU's political system. We will now briefly discuss the current framework of rights in light of multilateral democracy separately for three realms: rights related to the supranational level, rights related to the transnational realm, and rights within the state of nationality.xiv i Rights related to the supranational Realm Following the principles of multilateral democracy, rights that relate to the supranational realm shall realise, in accordance with the double equality relationship, the implications derived in Section II, namely: a. Equal implementation of supranational rights in the whole system (individuals) b. Residence-independent application (individuals) c. Legal security for the application of common rules (peoples) d. Veto in the adoption of common rules for access and loss of supranational citizenship (peoples) e. Participation rights for individuals to establish legislative representation (balancing) f. Veto of peoples in the adoption of common rules (balancing) 21 The equality of individuals is insufficiently realised if implementation measurements differ, even for rights that are strictly related to the supranational level and do not influence national matters.xv Accordingly, voting rights for the EP elections and accountability rights towards the EU institutions (such as the right to petition the EP) should be identical for all EU citizens. This could be met if national lists and candidates for EP elections were abandoned in favour of exclusively European-wide lists. Alternatively, the requirement of identical voting rights could also be met by applying either strict residence based or nationality based voting rules for all EU citizens residing in another Member State. Some rights presuppose the exercise of free movement. In consequence, EU citizens who spend their lives in their country of nationality are excluded from some rights that are granted to those who exercise their right to free movement. The principle of equality, however, requires establishing these rights as minimal rights for all citizens, though each Member State could go beyond these provisions. The equal implementation of supranational rights and the further creation of effective participation rights for individuals to establish legal representation at the supranational level are required as the two most important steps for multilateral democracy in order to further develop supranational rights in the EU. ii Rights related to the transnational Realm As argued in Section II and illustrated in Table 1, the following implications are derived from the principles of multilateral democracy: a. Entry rights and political rights, gradually re-establish full membership (individuals) b. Non-discrimination for rights settled in Treaties (individuals) 22 c. Competence to regulate acquisition and loss of national citizenship (peoples) d. Veto in the adoption of common rules (peoples) e. Non-discrimination for rights settled in Treaties (peoples) f. Differentiated integration possible (balancing) The first transnational right granted to individuals in the EU was the free-movement right for workers in the 1950s. The right to entry, in this respect, was at the core of citizenship practices in the EU from the beginning of EU integration and heavily influenced the development of EU Citizenship. Besides the right to free movement itself, the transnational sphere of EU Citizenship includes citizenship rights such as the right to work, study and reside in the host state. In fact, most EU Citizenship rights are activated when an EU citizen resides in another Member State. As a result, the realisation of transnational rights can create situations that strongly violate the assumption of equality between individuals and the related principle of non-discrimination. According to the standards of multilateral democracy, each right that is granted to EU citizens in the transnational realm needs to be granted to the Nationals within the country. This means that citizens living in another Member State could have fewer rights than Nationals but should not have more, in order to prevent reverse discrimination (as it is currently the case for the right to Family Reunification granted by EU Law). As Member States commonly agreed to the introduction of a transnational right, it is not a violation of Member State sovereignty to demand that those rights are extended to all Member State citizens. The gradual re-establishment of full membership for EU citizens living in a host Member State means that all kinds of citizenship rights, i.e. liberty rights, social rights and political rights, should be extended as far as possible while balancing them with the peoples' sovereignty. Regarding political rights, this is surely possible for transparency 23 and accountability rights. Participation rights should also be made accessible in accordance with the duration of residence. This does not mean, however, that transnational rights lead ultimately to naturalisation and therefore to national citizenship. The claim to gradually re-establish full membership in a state implies that individuals shall have the right to participate in all elections after a sufficient period of time. At the local level, and even more so at the national level, the issue of doubleand underrepresentation has to be considered. In practice, EU citizens can double vote in EP elections since, up to now, the EU is lacking a common voter register. Conversely, EU citizens might lose their right to participate in national elections as their state of nationality requires residence and their host state requires nationality. Currently, however, only few states require residency for voting rights in national elections (Arrighi et al. 2013; Bauböck et al. 2012). From the perspective of multilateral democracy, it is not acceptable that individuals in the system might have no participation rights at the national level in any Member State. In contrast to the reciprocity standards of multilateral democracy, some Member States grant certain rights to Non-Nationals because of former links between these countries, but do not extend these rights to other EU Nationals.xvi According to the standards of multilateral democracy, transnational rights must not give preference to some Member States over others. Yet, deeper integration outside of common law, based on autonomously taken measures at the national level or as the result of a collective initiative, could eventually attract all other Member States into this agreement (Shaw 2007, 2557). In this sense, deeper integration on a reciprocal basis is always desirable if it leads to an extension of individual rights in the multilevel system. 24 iii Within Community Rights within the Member States' communities shall be realised in accordance with the sovereignty of the peoples' pouvoir constituant. Thus, the non-domination of citizens shall be realised within the Member States without regulation from the supranational level. As argued in Section 2.3, two exceptions exist in which the common legal system needs competences to constrain Member State sovereignty: a. Minimum standards of political rights (individuals) b. Coexistence of different citizenship models (peoples) The question of common standards of democratic rights within the Member States relates to the issue of EU competences and the scope of EU law, as well as its limits. Generally, common law and EU citizenship rights are not applicable to purely internal situations. However, the distinction between what is internal and what is within the scope of EU law is not always clear-cut. In line with theoretical expectation, individual rights granted by the Member States are in the competence of national institutions. Consequently and legitimately, Nationals of different Member States may have different rights and duties resulting from differences between the national legal systems and the respective national citizenship provisions. Commonly established rights should function as the minimal criteria of individual rights within the Member States. V Conclusion Union Citizenship is a unique legal framework to deal with intra-EU migration and its effects on political participation. As we argued in this paper, the specific characteristics of multilevel citizenship require appropriate normative standards and cannot be evaluated on the basis of a nation-state paradigm or post-national conceptions. The aim of this paper was to assess European Citizenship according to multilateral democracy as 25 a specific standard dedicated to democratic relations between several democratic states. Multilateral democracy is a normative ideal specific to such multilevel systems based on several democratic peoples that is well suited for this task. In contrast to a purely unionist or pluralist view, the account of multilateral democracy does not privilege individuals or peoples. It seeks to balance the sovereignty of peoples and the non-discrimination of citizens throughout the system. Our approach follows Weiler (1997) and Bellamy and Castiglione (1998) insofar as we argue that a European community can co-exist with national communities without replacing them. But, in contrast to existing approaches, we seek to give prevalence neither to national citizenship nor to supranational citizenship, but rather argue for the equal standing of both. The approach we present here seeks not to overcome 'tensions generated by these opposing elements' (Kostakopoulou 2000, 486), but to balance them. This results in a more inclusive approach of a multilevel system that takes peoples as well as static and migrating individuals into account. Our paper therefore promotes an ideal of citizenship for the EU that is not committed to a vision of the EU other than that of democratic relations between peoples. In light of multilateral democracy, the current implementation of European Citizenship is problematic, specifically as regards equal rights within, and equal access to, the political system. Regarding the reforms of rights, citizenship in a multilateral democracy needs to realise equal implementation of supranational rights in the whole system and residence-independent application of these rights to guarantee the equality of individuals, which is specifically important for migrating individuals. Balancing the interests of peoples and individuals in the supranational realm requires further participation rights for individuals to establish legislative representation in addition to the representation of collective interests.xvii Regarding the transnational realm, the 26 equality of individuals can be realised through entry and political rights to gradually reestablish full membership and to facilitate migration. Regarding citizenship rights within the national level, the system needs minimum standards of political rights that respect the sovereignty of peoples and the coexistence of different citizenship models. EU Citizenship grants individuals enforceable rights; nevertheless, large inequalities can remain for individuals as long as acquisition and loss of EU Citizenship depend on national citizenship. An automatically linked model of EU Citizenship access is simultaneously problematic for the sovereignty of peoples. They remain powerless regarding how other nation states grant nationality and, consequently, lack control over access to EU Citizenship. The core argument we develop is thus that the theoretical framework of multilateral democracy favours either a decoupled model with Union Citizenship as an independent status with an institutional opening for TCNs or a mixed model with minimal common standards for national citizenship. In contrast to the mainstream argument that a disconnected EU Citizenship results in a loss of sovereignty, we argue that it can even improve the equal freedom of individuals and peoples. Further it copes better with challenges of intra-EU migration because it allows EU citizens to gradually re-establish full membership and acknowledges citizenship acquisition of non-EU citizens living and migrating within Europe. Therefore, detaching EU Citizenship from national citizenship can increase national sovereignty while consolidating EU Citizenship as a fundamental status for static and migrating citizens in multilateral democracy i We distinguish between 'transnational' and 'supranational' realm. We use the term transnational in the context of internal migration i.e. EU citizens residing in Member States other than their nationality. Supranational, in contrast, refers directly to the EU level and its institutions. 27 ii We refer to the demos in the sense of a political people, and not on a national or ethnical understanding (see e.g., Scherz 2013). In consequence, the terms 'demos', 'people', and 'statespeople' are used interchangeably in this article. iii A discussion of differences in the use of the terms 'citizenship' and 'nationality' in political debates and legal documents in EU Member States can be found at the EUDO Citizenship webpage (see http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-glossary, last accessed on 11 Sept 2013). iv Different conceptualisations of citizenship accept the notion of individual rights and obligations towards the political community as inherent parts of citizenship. Variation exists, however, in approaches to dealing with conflicts between the norms as discussed e.g. in (van Deth 2007). v Cheneval (2011, 132) suggests two additional principles that are of minor relevance for the focus of this paper: '6. Two principles of linguistic justice' and '7. Difference-principle for member statespeoples'. vi This is an issue of scope insofar as every delegation of competences to the supranational level involves interpretation with regard to the extent of harmonisation it requires. vii This paper focuses exclusively on acquisition of citizenship, because a debate on loss cannot be held without discussing citizenship requirements outside of the multilateral polity. viii From the perspective of multilateral democracy, participation rights should be as inclusive as possible and extended to TCNs in accordance with residence criteria (for argument for a general requirement of democracies to be inclusive see for example Dahl 1989; Gould 2007; Abizadeh 2008). ix Accepting that EU citizenship could be disconnected from national citizenship or provide an additional institutional opening for TCNs requires acknowledging that citizenship can be detached from nationality, as suggested, e.g., by (Kostakopoulou 2000). For a critical view on this see, e.g. (Weiler 1999). x This argument and the argument of gradually re-establishing migrants' status as full members are not made explicitly in a later version of this article, (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013) xi In fact, this option is entailed in the status quo because European Citizenship is generally granted automatically to Member State Nationals, but it is up to the Member States first to define who their Nationals 'for the purpose of community law' are. xii Generally, the discussion of rights in this paper deals mainly with the rights of EU citizens. However, the legal framework for individual rights in the EU also includes TCNs. The status of TCNs in the EU entails not only basic freedoms and fundamental rights, but also two important principles of EU law, namely non-discrimination and equality before the law. xiii The Concept of 'Civic Citizenship' was first introduced in 2000 in a Communication of the Commission: 'The legal status granted to Third Country Nationals would be based on the principle of providing sets of rights and responsibilities and a basis of equality with those of Nationals but differentiated according to the length of stay while providing for progression to permanent status. In the longer term this could extend to offering a form of civic citizenship, based on the EC Treaty and inspired by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, consisting of a set of rights and duties offered to Third Country Nationals' (COM(2000)757 final: 21 in (Perchinig 2006). This idea was also discussed earlier in different contributions to (La Torre 1998) and more recently by (Schrauwen 2013). xiv The principles we use are solely rights-orientated and therefore cannot resolve all tensions related to multilevel citizenship. Generally, individuals' rights in a political community should be balanced in respect to their duties. xv Regarding the claim that individuals require direct participation rights at the supranational level to establish a legal representation of individuals able to balance the representation of peoples, EU citizens do have the right to vote (or stand as a candidate) for EP elections, either in their state of nationality or in their state of residence. Likewise, citizens have the right to initiate a citizens' initiative since the Treaty of Lisbon. Both can be seen as legislative representation of EU citizens. However, the procedure in EP elections differs across countries and candidates are elected via national election lists. Directive (93/109/EC) specifies the right to vote in EP 28 elections and needs to be implemented in national law. Member States have leeway in deciding whether to add residence requirements for their own citizens or include residing EU citizens within the entitled persons. The co-existence of different combinations of citizenship or residence requirements for eligibility to participate in the citizens' initiative is problematic insofar as EU rights, granted by EU law, should realise individuals' equality. xvi Voting rights in the UK, for example, are extended to citizens from states that belong to the commonwealth, such as Malta. xvii The implementation of P4 \"Equal legislative rights of citizens and statespeoples\" does, however, not as such require strict equality of both chambers in a bicameral system but rather balanced procedures. 29 1 References Abizadeh, Arash. 2008. \"Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders.\" Political Theory 36 (1): 37–65. doi:10.1177/0090591707310090. Archibugi, Daniele, David Held, and Martin Köhler, eds. 1998. Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1968. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 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Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press. http://books.google.ch/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jJP6l1wZmQkC&oi=fnd&pg=PP8&dq=Soysal+1994&o ts=vdPLcOD3vz&sig=SlJCDUJwdr6cvFnvk7_jkBynB-o. van Deth, Jan. 2007. \"Norms of Citizenship.\" In Political Behavior, edited by Russel J. Dalton and HansDieter Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weiler, Joseph H. H. 1997. \"To be a European Citizen Eros and Civilization.\" Journal of European Public Policy 4 (4): 495–519. ---. 1999. The Constitution of Europe: 'Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?' and Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wiener, Antje. 1997. \"Making Sense of the New Geography of Citizenship: Fragmented Citizenship in the European Union.\" Theory and Society 26 (4): 529–60. http://www.springerlink.com/index/T12129T5748687X7.pdf. ---. 1998. European Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-State. Boulder Co: Westview Press. 32 Tables Table 1. Equality relations and principles of citizenship in multilateral democracy 33 Table 2. Normative expectations for access and linkage of citizenship 34 Table 3. Access and linkage models in comparison", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development Ruth Boeker University College Dublin Penultimate version. Please cite published version. Published in Philosophy Compass 13/1 (2018): e12471 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12471 ABSTRACT Shaftesbury's major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity and shows that Shaftesbury regards metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with normative questions of character development. I argue that he is willing to accept that persons are substances and that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the need to supplement metaphysical debates of personal identity and believes that we have to turn to the character that is realized by a substance if we want to understand who we are. For Shaftesbury persons have a particular character, can act, and govern themselves. I propose that Shaftesbury's approach to persons has a developmental dimension, which is meant to encourage personal development and improvement of character. The developmental dimension can be understood as an intellectual journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our character, and to seek happiness, which ultimately involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe. I show that my developmental interpretation is preferable to other existing interpretations. Keywords: Third Earl of Shaftesbury, person, personal identity, moral self, character, happiness, substance 2 1. Introduction The works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, were enormously influential in eighteenth century Britain.1 His Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times is a collection of his mature works, which was \"first published in 1711, [and] was [besides Locke's Two Treatises] \"the most reprinted book in English in that century.\"2 Yet more research needs to be done to rediscover Shaftesbury's philosophical significance. For Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to \"to refine our Spirits, improve our Understandings, or mend our Manners.\" (S III.1, 1:179; C 129) He emphasizes that philosophy should have an ethical or practical dimension, it should guide our intellectual and moral development, and thereby our search for happiness and the good.3 In a passage that nicely summarizes the central themes of his philosophy, he states: To philosophize, in a just Signification, is but to carry Good-breeding a step higher. For the Accomplishment of Breeding is, To learn whatever is decent in Company, or beautiful in Arts; and the Sum of Philosophy is, To learn what is just in Society, and beautiful in Nature, and the Order of the World. (MR III.1, 3:99; C 407) In this paper I will focus on Shaftesbury's contributions to debates about persons and personal identity and we will see how his moral views shape his thinking about persons and personal identity. Moreover, we will see that personal development culminates in understanding the order of the world and our place in it. 1 More information about Shaftesbury's life and works can be found in Gill (2016a); Klein (2004); McAteer (2011); Milton (2010); Yaffe (2002). 2 den Uyl (2001, vii). References to Characteristicks are to Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (2001), Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. D. den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund), 3 vols., hereafter \"Characteristicks.\" Additionally references to the passages in Shaftesbury (1999), Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions Times, ed. L. E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) will be given. Characteristicks is a collection of Shaftesbury's mature works. Individual works of the collection will be abbreviated and cited as follows: S: Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author M: The Moralists: A Philosophical Rhapsody MR: Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other critical Subjects C: Klein's edition of Characteristics. 3 For further discussion see Gill (2016a); Purviance (2004); Winkler (2000). 3 Shaftesbury's remarks about persons and personal identity are scattered throughout his works.4 Within Characteristicks we find relevant remarks in Soliloquy, The Moralists, and Miscellaneous Reflections. Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author is written as an inner dialogue; it literally addresses authors, but metaphorically it is an invitation to everyone to improve their character and manners. The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody is a dialogue, narrated from the perspective of Philocles. In the passages relevant for our purposes Philocles interacts with Theocles and both dialogue partners are devoted to the search of happiness and the good. Theocles is portrayed as a highly educated, intellectual genius, who devotes his life to the study of the arts, culture and morality.5 In contrast to Theocles, Philocles takes a sceptical stance, and often brings the dialogue back down to earth. Miscellaneous Reflections was originally published as volume 3 of the three volumes edition of Characteristicks and contains reflections on the philosophical ideas developed in the first two volumes. One challenge that every interpreter of Shaftesbury faces is that Shaftesbury's discussion of persons and personal identity is scattered throughout Characteristicks, often developed in dialogue form, both inner and proper dialogues, and the proposed notions of self or person tend to be challenged as the dialogue progresses. This makes it hard to identify Shaftesbury's considered views. Instead of treating this as a limitation of Shaftesbury's view, I believe that interpreters still have to fully appreciate the developmental dimension of Shaftesbury's discussion. His philosophy is meant to be practical and to encourage personal improvement and character development. He would regard traditional metaphysical approaches that aim to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity as limited and static, because they do not help us to improve our lives. Shaftesbury's discussion of persons and personal identity goes beyond the metaphysical project, though-as we will see-does not entirely eliminate it either. I want to propose that his approach involves a developmental dimension and that through the dialogue form Shaftesbury invites his readers to be part of an intellectual journey-a journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our character, to seek happiness, which for Shaftesbury-speaking through the voice of Theocles-involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe (section 2). Next I will outline existing interpretations in the literature and argue why my interpretation is preferable (section 3). I will end by reflecting on the significance of Shaftesbury's contributions to debates about persons and personal identity (section 4). 4 Relevant texts and passages include S I.1–2, III.1; C 70-85, 125–135; M II.1, II.4, III.1; C 247–257, 272–288, 296–316; MR IV; C 419–433. See also Shaftesbury (1900). 5 See Shaftesbury, M II.1, 2:126; C 248. See also Gill (2010). 4 2. Shaftesbury's developmental approach to persons Let us examine more closely the developmental dimension of Shaftesbury's approach to persons. Personal development is not something static. It is not a fixed state, in which one either is or is not. Rather it is an ongoing process that takes place over time and can involve several phases. The individual phases help us to progress in our personal development, or they enable us to look from new perspectives at questions such as who we really are and how we can improve our character and lives. As we progress from one phase to another we come a step closer towards realizing our true self. When I speak of the developmental dimension of Shaftesbury's approach to persons I mean a gradual process that enables personal growth and development and aims at the realization of one's true self. I will show in the following that a developmental dimension in this sense can be found in Shaftesbury's philosophy. Although Shaftesbury does not explicitly use the language of \"phases\" I believe that this term provides a helpful tool to reconstruct how various passages in which he speaks about self, persons and personal identity, and which at first appear unconnected, can be integrated into a coherent view about personal development.6 In the following I will outline one possible sequence of phases that a Shaftesburean approach to personal development could have. Let me emphasize that the order is one among many possible sequences. All of the conceptions of self that I present in the following are discussed by Shaftesbury throughout Characteristicks, but there is no single text that presents all of them, let alone in the order in which I present them. Before I turn to Shaftesbury's positive proposals, I want to put aside the views that he criticizes. He rejects bodily views of personal identity. Matter constantly changes and any theory in terms of matter or bodily appearances would not have the constancy that we assume a self or person to have.7 6\tShaftesbury does not explicitly distinguish the terms 'person,' 'human being,' 'self,' and 'soul,' but he also does not equate all of them and argues that there can be two souls/persons in a human being/self. Relevant passages include the following: \"I have in reality within me two distinct separate Souls\" (S I.2, 1:115; C 83), \"our doctrine of Two Persons in one individual Self\" (S I.2, 1:115; C 83) Note, though, that he also speaks of a \"natural SELF,\" a \"better SELF,\" or \"nobler Self,\" and \"[o]ur real and genuine SELF\" (S III.1, 1:174–175; C 126), which suggests that he does not sharply distinguish the terms 'person' and 'self.' In the following I use the terms 'self' and 'person' interchangeably. 7 See Shaftesbury, S III.1, 1:176; C 127; M II.1, 2:143, III.1, 2:196–197; C 254, 300–301. 5 He regards Descartes's famous cogito-the claim that I exist while I am thinking-as trivial and uninformative. According to Shaftesbury, Descartes does not properly address the important questions, namely \"the Question is, \"What constitutes the WE or I?\" And, \"Whether the I of this instant, be the same with that of any instant preceding or to come.\"'' (MR IV.1, 3:118; C 420). Furthermore, Shaftesbury offers several arguments to show that memory or consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity, which target Lockean views of personal identity.8 It is not necessary, Shaftesbury argues, because persons can continue to exist and continue to be concerned in their past or future even if they have lost memories of their previous thoughts or actions.9 Additionally, Shaftesbury argues that memory is not sufficient for personal identity. One reason he offers is that memory can be false.10 A second reason concerns an example of someone who during travel in foreign countries radically changed their character, but can still remember their former experiences, beliefs, and values.11 Shaftesbury's negative arguments reveal that he assumes personal identity to have a certain stability that cannot be found in fleeting matter or fleeting psychological states. We are now ready to turn to Shaftesbury's positive views and give a reconstruction of the different phases of personal development. In light of his arguments that a person can continue to exist despite changes of outer bodily appearance, it is plausible that we have to turn inward. You have probably been in situations where inner voices pull you in different directions. For instance, part of you may want to stay in bed all day and watch movies, while another part reminds you of your long-term higher goals and convinces you that it is important to get 8 For a more detailed discussion see Thiel (2011, 177–180) and Winkler (2000, 6–8). Locke (1975) in chapter xxvii of Book II of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. Many Locke scholars agree that Locke's notion of sameness of consciousness cannot be reduced to memory; they include Atherton (1983); Matthews (1977); Strawson (2011); Thiel (2011); Weinberg (2016). Stuart (2013) is an exception. Thiel (2011) criticizes Shaftesbury for failing to properly \"grasp Locke's distinctions between consciousness and memory and between man and person\" (177–178). Thiel's observation is correct, but I doubt that Shaftesbury would have entirely retracted his arguments had he better understood the nuances of Locke's view, because Shaftesbury's arguments do not replace a memory view of personal identity with a more sophisticated view of consciousness, but rather are grounded in Shaftesbury's moral views and tend to emphasize the importance developing a stable character. 9 See Shaftesbury, M II.1, 2:133–134; C 253–254. 10 See Shaftesbury, MR IV.1, 118; C420–421. 11 See Shaftesbury, S III.1, 1:176; C 127. We will return to the example and consider it more closely in the following. 6 up and study to reach long-term happiness. Shaftesbury believes that it is important to acquire self-knowledge as it can help improve our manners. For instance, if you start to examine what inner desires or inclinations explain your struggle to get out of bed, you can use these insights to change your manners. As Shaftesbury emphasizes in Soliloquy, self-knowledge is fundamental for any other inquiry. Following ancient philosophers, he encourages his readers to turn inward with the aim of discovering their true self: This was among the Antients, that celebrated Delphick Inscription, RECOGNIZE YOURSELF: which was as much as to say, Divide your-self or Be TWO. For if the Division were rightly made, all within wou'd, of course, they thought, be rightly understood, and prudently manag'd. Such Confidence they had in this Home-Dialect of SOLILOQUY. (S I.2, 1:107; C 77) Shaftesbury believes that when we properly introspect and reflect on who we are, we will realize that there are two persons within one human being. He uses the metaphor of surgery to illustrate the relation between the two persons: one is patient and the other agent. We can also think of the relation between the two persons in analogy to the relation between pupil and teacher, or between advisee and advisor.12 According to Shaftesbury, the better or nobler self, which is one of the persons within ourselves, has a certain authority and is meant to guide the other base or lower self.13 Let us call this inward directed, introspective selfexamination the first phase of a Shaftesburean search for self. One reason why Shaftesbury criticized Cartesian views is that they do not properly engage with the question of what constitutes a person. In phase one this question has not yet been addressed and hence the search needs to continue and offer a further positive characterization of the constitution of a person. Shaftesbury invites us to consider the changes that a close and intimate friend could undergo while sick and travelling in foreign countries. On the one hand, he acknowledges that there could be outer changes of bodily appearances, but he argues that a person can endure such changes.14 On the other hand, there can be inner alterations of beliefs, characters, and manners and if they radically change then- so Shaftesbury suggests-a person is not any longer the same, even if they are still able to remember their former experiences. 12 See Shaftesbury, S I.1, 1:97–100 I.2, 1:106–107; C 70–72, 77. 13 See Shaftesbury, S I.2, 1:106; C 77. 14 See Shaftesbury, S III.1, 176; C 127. 7 But shou'd a like Face and Figure of a Friend return to us with Thoughts and Humours of a strange and foreign Turn, with Passions, Affections, and Opinions wholly different from any thing we had formerly known; we shou'd say in earnest, and with the greatest Amazement and Concern, that this was another Creature, and not the Friend whom we once knew familiarly. Nor shou'd we in reality attempt any renewal of Acquaintance or Correspondence with such a Person, though perhaps he might preserve his Memory the faint Marks or Tokens of former Transactions which had pass'd between us. (S III.1, 1:176; C 127) First, Shaftesbury here makes an epistemological point that it would be difficult to recognize a former friend after they have radically changed their character. Additionally, he seems to draw a metaphysical conclusion, namely that \"this was another Creature.\" The insight that we gain during this second phase is that a person should be identified, epistemically, and arguably also metaphysically, with a stable character. Yet it is worth noting that it is not clear how far Shaftesbury wants to take these conclusions. As the text continues he reminds us how little we know about ourselves and writes:15 When a Revolution of this kind, tho not so total, happens at any time in a Character; when the Passion or Humour of a known Person changes remarkably from what it once was; 'tis to Philosophy we then appeal. (S III.1, 1:176; C 127) Let us pause to consider the worry that phases one and two can be in tension with each other. If we take seriously that a person will not any longer be the same person after radical changes of character, then one may worry that this proposal undermines the efforts of phase one, which presupposes that the base or lower self has the possibility of changing their character. Does this apparent tension undermine Shaftesbury's project? I do not think so. Instead it can reinforce how important it is that the base self listens to the better self and aims to approximate the better self. Only if the base self approximates the better self can others encounter our better character. Since the base self will have more stability when it approximates the better self, we have a further incentive for taking the guidance of the better 15 Further discussion of the role of self-knowledge in Shaftesbury can be found in Renz (2017). 8 self seriously, as this will likely make friendships more stable and prevent scenarios such as the one described in the story of the traveller. Having suggested that a person is identified with a stable character, the question remains whether it is important to cultivate a particular character. This question is the focus of a third phase. For Shaftesbury the cultivation and development of character is intimately tied to his larger philosophical project, namely, the search for happiness and the good. In The Moralists Part II, section 1, the friends Philocles and Theocles meet in the country and their path is devoted to the search for happiness. Theocles proposes \"\"That Nothing can be good but what is constant\"\" (M II.1, 2:128; C 249) and claims that we can find greatest stability in genuine continued friendship: this Pleasure [of friendship] is more debauching than any other. Never did any Soul do good, but it came readier to do the same again, with more Enjoyment. Never was Love, or Gratitude, or Bounty practis'd but with increasing Joy, which made the Practiser still more in love with the fair Act. (M II.1, 2:135; C 254) Genuine friendship, as Theocles understands it, is love of humanity; it is not the love of a particular individual, but rather love of mankind.16 How is pursuit of happiness and the good related to our search for self? We would not be able to acquire true happiness, if we lacked the virtues of a true friend of humanity. In so far as we aim to become a person that lives an intellectually satisfying and good life, it will not be sufficient to have any stable character, but rather it will be important to develop the character of a genuine friend. However, are we able to be friends of humanity? Philocles intervenes and worries that it is too demanding to love humanity in the abstract and beyond the capacities of the ordinary person: I told THEOCLES, going along, that I fear'd I shou'd never make a good Friend or Lover after his way. As for a plain natural Love of one single person in either Sex, I cou'd compass it, I thought, well enough; but this complex universal sort was beyond my reach. I cou'd love the Individual, but not the Species. This was too mysterious; too metaphysical an Object for me. In short, I cou'd love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image. (M II.1, 2:137; C 256) 16 See Shaftesbury, M II.1, 2:127–139; C 249–257. 9 Philocles's doubts invite us to enter a fourth phase where we step back from abstract and highly intellectual reflections and return to wordly interactions with individual persons, whom we can meet, see, hear, touch, and whose company we can enjoy. Philocles's struggle to follow Theocles's proposal illustrates how far removed the position that Theocles aspires to is from ordinary experience. Indeed, it seems inaccessible to most people. Theocles belongs to a small elite circle of upper class gentlemen, which only those who had the privilege to enjoy the finest education can enter.17 Philocles's doubts make explicit that many people lack the intellectual resources that equip them for highly abstract love of humanity. They also show us how hard and intellectually demanding it can be to devote one's life to happiness and character development and to fully realize one's true self. Nevertheless, Theocles and Philocles are not yet drawn back to ordinary life and continue their intellectual journey. In a fifth phase, guided by Theocles, we enter theoretical and cosmological reflections on the self of the universe.18 As mentioned above, for Shaftesbury one of the aims of philosophy is to understand the order of the world19 and he develops this point in the following reflections between Theocles and Philocles. Theocles suggests that the order, unity, and coherence in nature presuppose an underlying system or whole. After reflections on the identity of trees, the two friends start to wonder whether there is a genuine boundary between different persons, say between you and me, or whether we are all part of one universe.20 According to Theocles, \"there is a strange Simplicity in this YOU and ME, that in reality they shou'd still be one and the same, when neither one Atom of Body, one Passion, nor one Thought remains the same.\" (M III.1, 2:197; C301) Modes or accidents cannot explain the simplicity and, hence, both take for granted that persons are substances, though Philocles adds: \"But for anything further relating to this Question, you know my Sceptick Principles: I determine neither way.\" (M III.1, 2:198; C 302). Individual minds are fascinating systems; they enable us to think, imagine and act. Could it be a matter of pure chance that there are many individual intelligent systems (or individual selves) or are they all part of a larger system? Theocles is convinced that there is a larger whole, or a self of nature, and that individual selves are \"copy'd from another principal and original SELF (the Great-one of the World)\" (M III.1, 2:201; C 304). Similarly as a human mind creates order and unity and governs different parts of the human body, the universal mind of the world creates 17 See Gill (2010, 20). 18 See Shaftesbury, M II.4, III.1; C 272–288, 296–316. 19 See Shaftesbury, MR III.1, 3:99; C 407. 20 See Shaftesbury, M III.1, 2:195–201; C 299–304. 10 unity and order in nature and among individual selves. This insight leads us to \"endeavour to be really one with [the self of the world], and conformable with it, as far as [we are] able.\" (M III.1, 2:201; C 304) Once we understand our place in the order of the universe, a \"particular MIND should seek its Happiness in conformity with the general-one, and endeavour to resemble it in its highest Simplicity and Excellence.\" (M III.1, 2:201; C304) Then the dialogue turns to other topics and ends abruptly: \"BY this time we found ourselves insensibly got home. Our Philosophy ended and we return'd to common Affairs of Life.\" (M III.3, 2:247; C 338)21 This concluding remark of The Moralists can be seen as further recognition that the elite intellectual views advocated by Theocles are far removed from ordinary life. 3. Interpretive questions revisited Having suggested that Shaftesbury's approach to persons has a developmental dimension, it is time to consider how the interpretation that I have given above can supplement existing interpretations and help answer problems raised in the literature. Here I will focus on the following questions that have been raised by interpreters of Shaftesbury's account of persons and personal identity: (i) To what extent is Shaftesbury's approach to persons and personal identity ethical or practical, and to what extent is it metaphysical? (ii) Does Shaftesbury make contributions to the traditional problem of personal identity? (iii) Are questions of character development connected with questions of personal identity, or are these separate issues? Although there is relatively little discussion of Shaftesbury's approach to persons and personal identity in the secondary literature, a few prominent and rather different interpretations have emerged and it is worth outlining their key contributions. Susan Purviance (2004, 2006) argues that Shaftesbury offers a \"moral, not metaphysical\" (2004, 161; 2006, 58) approach to self. She takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and emphasizes that a self's struggle of achieving unity is an ongoing 21 For further discussion see Gill (2016b). 11 project of life that aims at personal integrity. Shaftesbury's Soliloquy is an important source for Purviance's interpretation. She draws particularly on the views that Shaftesbury develops during phase one of my reconstruction above. According to Purviance, the dialogic nature of Shaftesbury's approach to self is significant, because the inner dialogue enables us to resolve tensions and thereby strive towards personal integrity. It is often acknowledged that accounts of personal identity involve a unity relation that creates unity at a time and over time. The interesting feature of Purviance's interpretation is her proposal to understand the unity relation in terms of integrity. Kenneth Winkler (2000) also emphasizes the practical or ethical dimension of Shaftesbury's approach to self. According to Winkler, \"Shaftesbury [is] a critic of Locke inclined to locate personal identity not in the understanding, but in the will.\" (5) The will is a seat of active principles that enable us to judge, reach resolutions, act, and govern ourselves.22 Winkler's reading draws on themes from Soliloquy, where the nobler self takes an active guiding role: We hope also that our Patient (for such we naturally suppose our Reader) will consider duly with himself, that what he endures in this Operation is for no inconsiderable End: since 'tis to gain him a Will, and insure him a certain Resolution; by which he shall know where to find himself; be sure of his own Meaning and Design; and as to all his Desires, Opinions, and Inclinations, be warranted one and the same Person to day as yesterday, and to morrow as to day. (S I.2, 1:116; C 84) Although Winkler and Purviance both highlight the practical aspects of Shaftesbury's view, Winkler adopts a more critical attitude. He asks whether Shaftesbury while turning away from speculative metaphysics has failed to properly engage with the metaphysical problem of personal identity.23 Winkler asks further whether the simplicity of self that is discussed in The Moralists24 (phase five) can be reconciled with the complexities of a still to be perfected self that is meant to be guided by our better or nobler self presented in Soliloquy (phase one).25 Udo Thiel's interpretation (2011, 177–180, 240–247) is in part a critical response to Winkler. Although Thiel acknowledges that \"there is an obvious 'ethical orientation' in Shaftesbury's account\" (241), Thiel emphasizes the metaphysical aspects of Shaftesbury's 22 See Winkler (2000, 9, 11, 14). 23 See Winkler (2000, 5, 12). 24 See Shaftesbury, M III.1, 2:196–198; C 300–302. 25 See Winkler (2000, 12–14). 12 view and argues that \"the view that the soul is a simple and immaterial substance forms an essential part of Shaftesbury's account of personal identity.\" (241)26 Thiel's interpretation focuses on The Moralists (phase five). According to Thiel, Shaftesbury-through the voice of Theocles-offers cosmological arguments for the existence of a universal mind of the world.27 In an attempt to illustrate the doctrine of a universal mind the discussion turns to the identity and individuation of persons. Thiel summarizes, \"[q]uite unlike Locke, Shaftesbury falls back on the notion of a simple mind as that which guarantees personal identity through time.\" (245) So far we have seen that the answers to the question to what extent Shaftesbury's approach to persons and personal is moral or metaphysical divide interpreters. However, are the proposals genuinely competing interpretations or can they be reconciled? In support of the latter Laurent Jaffro (2014) argues that in Shaftesbury metaphysical questions of personal identity are directly connected with what Jaffro calls \"normative identity\": I suggest that we differentiate between a normative sense of 'being oneself' or 'remaining the same person', and the metaphysical sense, that is, personal identity. The normative sense is that of constancy of the will: under favourable conditions, I do now just what I have decided to do, and I will do tomorrow what I decide now. If I suffer from weakness of will, then I am not always myself in the normative sense of being myself, although I am myself in the metaphysical sense: I do not lose my personal identity. ... Shaftesbury directly connects personal identity and normative identity. (2014, 158) Jaffro (2008, 153–154; 2014, 155–159) offers a helpful elucidation of Shaftesbury's conception of the will. Shaftesbury develops a Stoic intellectualist position, according to which the will is intelligent or rational. This means that when we are faced with a choice between two options, say A and B, and we believe that A is better than B, then-in so far as we are rational-we must always choose A. According to Jaffro, \"for Shaftesbury the ultimate basis of moral identity, constancy, or integrity lies in our access to the permanence and stability of truth. ... If we do not do our best to have true evaluative judgements then we will lack normative identity.\" (2014, 158) 26 Thiel does not engage with Purviance's interpretation, but I take it that he would disagree with her claim that Shaftesbury's view is \"moral, not metaphysical\" (2004, 161; 2006, 58). 27 See Shaftesbury, M II.4, III.1. 13 To return to the first of our three questions, I believe that Thiel and Jaffro are right that metaphysical themes are relevant for understanding Shaftesbury's approach to persons and personal identity. Purviance offers an insightful understanding of the ethical and practical phases of Shaftesbury's approach, but neglects that ethical perfection for Shaftesbury involves, or strives towards, understanding our place in the order of the universe (phase five) and thus a moral life will eventually lead to metaphysical reflections. For this reason, ethics cannot be sharply separated from metaphysics in Shaftesbury's philosophy and we should reject a purely \"moral, not metaphysical\" interpretation of Shaftesbury's approach to self as proposed by Purviance.28 The further question is whether Shaftesbury's contribution to debates about personal identity is simply a traditional immaterial substance view, as Thiel argues, or whether Shaftesbury connects metaphysical questions of personal identity with normative or ethical questions, as Jaffro proposes. As we have seen (during phase five) Theocles and Philocles agree that a self is a substance (M III.1, 2:197–198; C 301–302). In his Miscellaneous Reflections, after having questioned metaphysical debates about personal identity, including the Lockean proposal to understand personal identity in terms of consciousness, Shaftesbury \"declare[s] that for my own part, I take my Being upon Trust.\" (MR IV.1, 3:118; C 421) These passages intimate that Shaftesbury accepts that a self is a substance and that he takes our continued existence for granted. It is not far to infer that in response to the metaphysical question of what makes a person the same over time, Shaftesbury would be willing to accept that a person continues to exist in virtue of the continued existence of an underlying substance. Yet he makes clear that if we purely focus on the metaphysical questions we will \"be at a loss still about [ourselves]\" (M III.1, 2:199; C 302). For Shaftesbury we take our continued existence for granted, because this presupposition enables us to be devoted to ethics and practical matters. We find evidence for this both in The Moralists and in Miscellaneous Reflections. After the metaphysical remarks (discussed in the previous paragraph) Shaftesbury quickly returns to moral and practical issues and he emphasizes the active governing role of minds or persons: And of this Mind 'tis enough to say, ''... That it superintends and manages its own Imaginations, Appearances, Fancys; correcting, working, and modelling these, as it finds good; 28 Yet Shaftesbury can still be said to be critical of purely speculative metaphysics, or \"superspeculative philosophy\" (S III.1, 1:181; C 131), namely metaphysical questions that are entirely unconnected with questions of happiness and the good. 14 and adorning and accomplishing, the best it can, this composite Order of Body and Understanding.'' Such a MIND and governing Part, I know there is somewhere in the World. (M III.1, 2:199; C 302) Mean while, there is no Impediment, Hinderance, or Suspension of Action, on account of these wonderfully refin'd Speculations. Argument and Debate go on still. Conduct is settled. Rules and Measures are given out, and receiv'd. Nor do we scruple to act as resolutely upon the mere Supposition that we are, as if we had effectually prov'd it a thousand times, to the full satisfaction of our Metaphysical or Pyrrhonean Antagonist. This to me appears sufficient Ground for a Moralist. Nor do I ask more, when I undertake to prove the reality of VIRTUE and MORALS. (MR IV.1, 3:119; C 421) The fact that Shaftesbury immediately moves from metaphysical discussions concerning the ontological status of persons to ethics and practical questions of self-government, gives a hint that Shaftesbury considers metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with ethical or practical questions, as Jaffro argues. Moreover the passage from Soliloquy I.2, 1:116 (C 84), cited above in support of Winkler's interpretation, shows that the will by playing an active governing role, ensures that one is the same person over time. 29 This means for Shaftesbury there is not merely an underlying substance that grounds personal identity, but we play an active role in developing our character and creating the person who we are. The picture that has emerged so far is that Shaftesbury accepts the existence of an underlying substance and that he takes the continued existence of persons for granted. If asked the traditional metaphysical question of what makes a person the same over time, he will likely respond that a person continues to exist in virtue of the continued existence of the underlying substance. However, we can expect that he will add that this view is incomplete and needs to be supplemented. Persons are not just empty vessels, but rather persons have a will, can act, and have a particular character, and as persons we should focus on developing a 29 Additional textual support that for Shaftesbury metaphysical questions of personal identity are connected with ethical and practical questions can be found in his criticism and response to the Cartesian cogito and a Lockean account of personal identity. See Shaftesbury S III.1, 1:176; C127; MR IV.1, 2:118; C 420–421. Had Shaftesbury meant to separate metaphysical questions of personal identity from ethical and practical questions he should have criticized the Lockean account of personal identity by arguing for a substance account of personal identity. Instead Shaftesbury aims to overcome the shortcomings of the Lockean view by drawing attention to the importance of developing a stable character. 15 stable moral character. This suggests that Shaftesbury would find it alienating to talk about persons as substances without also considering the character that is realized by the substance. Jaffro proposes that for Shaftesbury personal identity in the metaphysical sense is directly connected with what he calls normative identity. Is normative identity in Jaffro's sense the same as the developmental dimension that I outlined above? I believe that my interpretation has the potential to challenge Jaffro's understanding of normative selfhood. According to Jaffro, normative selfhood, which is realized by true normative judgements, or at least aims towards truth, is a \"very ambitious conception of selfhood\" (2014, 159), because only highly intellectual and rational individuals are capable of achieving it. However, does the developmental approach require that in order to be a self or person one must have already reached a state of intellectual perfection? In contrast to Jaffro's interpretation, my developmental approach makes it possible to regard moral improvement and character development as an ongoing project of life. My interpretation focuses on the process of striving towards perfection, rather than a state of intellectual perfection. We have seen that phases three and five are intellectually very demanding and that not everyone is able to reach them. Jaffro's interpretation excludes those who have not yet reached a deep understanding of moral truth. This means it excludes those who have not yet reached phases three and five. My developmental interpretation does not have this consequence and includes as persons everyone who is on an intellectual journey anywhere between phases one through five (and possibly in a different order). A developmental interpretation can take seriously Shaftesbury's view that philosophy is meant to be practical. The inner dialogue form of Soliloquy strengthens the invitation to the reader to enter into an inner dialogue with oneself, to listen to the advice of one's better self with the aim of improving one's character and achieving moral integrity. Shaftesbury is aware that this can be a long and difficult process. Rather than being fixated on an intellectual state of perfection, Soliloquy focuses on the intellectual and developmental journey. In this sense Shaftesbury's philosophy is practical. Similarly, the dialogue form of The Moralists offers support for a developmental interpretation. Theocles represents an elite character who is close to reaching highest intellectual perfection. Yet Philocles reminds us of the struggles of such an intellectual journey. It is precisely the back and forth between Philocles and Theocles, between mundane and intellectual views, that turns the project of seeking moral integrity and happiness into a developmental one. 16 4. Shaftesbury's significance Has Shaftesbury advanced debates about persons and personal identity? In the interest of philosophical clarity one may prefer to separate the metaphysical question of personal identity, namely the question of what the necessary and sufficient conditions are that make a person the same over time, from moral or normative questions of character development. Anyone who favours such a distinction is likely to be disappointed by the lack of originality of Shaftesbury's contributions to the former question. The textual evidence, however, suggests that Shaftesbury sees the two questions more closely connected. It may be fair to say that Shaftesbury does not solely address the traditional problem of personal identity and thus has shifted the discourse. Certainly, he has supplemented the metaphysical questions. For him the insight that \"I AM\" will prompt us to turn to the normative question \"WHO and WHAT I ought to be\" (MR IV.1, 3:119; C 421). I suggested that for Shaftesbury the underlying metaphysics of persons and personal identity is supplemented by a developmental project, which invites persons to enter an intellectual journey and to strive to improve their character, to seek happiness, and to understand their place in the order of the universe. Acknowledgements Earlier versions of this paper were presented at at the Victorian Postgraduate Philosophy Workshop at the University of Melbourne in October 2016, the 2017 Dutch Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy in Groningen, the 2017 annual conference of the British Society for the History of Philosophy in Sheffield, and at the Work in Progress Seminar of the School of Philosophy at University College Dublin in April 2017. I would like to thank all my audiences for helpful feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank Jan-Erik Jones, Kenneth Pearce, Lisa Shapiro, and my anonymous referee for constructive and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 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{"text": "Penultimate Draft for The Philosophical Quarterly Forthcoming. doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa026 Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche Matthieu Queloz Amplifying Bernard Williams's critique of the Nietzschean project of a revaluation of values, this paper mounts a critique of the idea that whether values will help us to live can serve as a criterion for choosing which values to live by. I explore why it might not serve as a criterion and highlight a number of further difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project. I then come to Nietzsche's defence, arguing that if we distinguish valuations from values, there is at least one form of the project which overcomes those difficulties. Finally, however, I show that even on this reading, the project must either fall prey to 'Saint-Just's illusion' or fall back into the problems it was supposed to escape. This highlights important difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project and its descendants while also explaining whyWilliams, who was so Nietzschean in other respects, remained wary of the revaluation of values as a project. ABSTRACT 1. Introduction W hich values should we live by? Is there some consideration thatcan function as a criterion by which to compare the values we have with possible alternatives? Such questions, which have recently moved to the forefront of philosophy again with the rise of conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering, were of course a central concern of Nietzsche's.1 Finding that the values of Christian morality tend to stifle human flourishing by uniformly encouraging self-abnegation and asceticism, Nietzsche formulates the project of identifying and cultivating better values to live by, values thatwould enhance 1 See Cappelen (2018) and the essays collected in Burgess, Cappelen, and Plunkett (2020). Cappelen and Plunkett (2020) open the volume with a programmatic quotation from Nietzsche, in which he invites philosophers to be sceptical of all inherited concepts, make new concepts, and persuade in their favour (WP: 220–21). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 2 life instead of stifling it.2 This is Nietzsche's project of an Umwerthung der Werthe-a phrase whose meaning ranges from a shift in to a reversal of values, but which is usually translated as the 'revaluation of values'. On the basis of his doctrine that life is fundamentally will to power-in the technical and notably formal sense of a second-order desire to overcome resistance in the pursuit of first-order desires3-Nietzsche suggests that the corrective criterion for determiningwhich values to live by should be whether a set of values 'enhances people's feeling of power, will to power, power itself' (AC: §2).4 As interpreters have pointed out, there are also passages where the relevant criterion is spelled out alternatively in terms of enhancing life, health, or flourishing.5 I shall refer to this criterion as the vitality criterion, exploiting that label's useful ambiguity between power, life, health, and flourishing. Once a criterion is at hand, it can be used to identify and adopt better values to live by. Simplifying wildly, I shall refer to this enterprise in what follows as 'the Nietzschean project'. Whatever else Nietzsche may be up to,6 this project is clearly a central strand in his thought. And yet it is a project which Bernard Williams, though a fervent admirer of Nietzsche and a self-proclaimed 'Nietzschean', always remained deeply 2 See Nietzsche (WP: 45–46, 522, 529, 545; GM: Preface, §§3–6; BGE: §4). See also Gemes and May (2009); Leiter (2015); Reginster (2006); Richardson (2004: 81–94, 120). 3 I follow Reginster (2006: 11; 2018) in the interpretation of the much-debated notion of the will to power. 4 The term 'corrective criterion' is Richardson's (2013: §5). For the claim that life is will to power, see Nietzsche (GM: II, §12; GS: §349; BGE: §§13, 259; AC: §6; eKGWB: 1884, 26[275]); for the claim that the will to power doctrine yields the standard or criterion of revaluation, see Nietzsche (GM: II, §2; eKGWB: 1885, 2[131, 185], 1886, 5[71], 1887, 11[74], 1888, 14[136]). 5 For accounts of the project of revaluation that variously spell out Nietzsche's criterion in terms of life, power, health, or human flourishing, see Clark (2015a), Gemes (2013), Guay (2006), Katsafanas (2013b, 2013a), Leiter (2015), May (1999), Merrick (2018), Richardson (2013), and Ridley (2005). For an account of the criterion as being less about the effects of values than about the ideals they express, see Huddleston (2015, 2019). 6 Another strand is his critique of ascetic conceptions of values, which I have argued elsewhere is logically prior to the revaluation of values; see Queloz and Cueni (2019). 3 • Matthieu Queloz wary of.7 His grounds for doing so are, characteristically, as elusive as they are suggestive. My main concern in this paper will therefore be to elucidate and amplify his worries so as to articulate precisely what Williams's critique is, and what it can teach us about the difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project. Williams agrees with Nietzsche on three cornerstones of the Nietzschean project: that genealogical inquiry can help us determine whether a set of values has helped us to live; that where our own values are concerned, the verdict will in many respects be negative; and that going forward, the question is whether some other set of values will help us to live (2000: 160–161). But Williams is adamant that this consideration 'does not function as a criterion' (2000: 161), and so he resists laying down the fourth cornerstone-the actionguiding criterion-that would be required to support the Nietzschean project of revaluation as an enterprise for practical deliberation. It is not, of course, thatWilliams takes revaluations of values to be impossible: there clearly can be revaluations, because there obviously have been.8 The point is rather that the possibility of a revaluation of values becomes doubtful once that revaluation is conceived as a project rather than as a historical phenomenon. Once conceived as a project, it properly becomes an object of practical deliberation and calls for choices between the values we have and possible alternatives. But unless they are to be arbitrary, these choices will have to be guided by some criterion (even if, as some interpreters of Nietzsche have suggested, that criterion is context-sensitive, personalized, or embod7 Pressed by Habermas to say whether he was an Aristotelian or a Wittgensteinian, Williams answered (perhaps not altogether in earnest): 'How about I'm Nietzschean?' (1999a: 246). For explorations of Williams's debts to (or parallels with) Nietzsche, see Clark (2015a), Katsafanas (2016), Leiter (manuscript), Prescott-Couch (2014), Queloz and Cueni (2019), Queloz (2017, forthcoming-a; forthcoming-b: ch. 7), and Robertson and Owen (2013). 8 As Nietzsche himself argues (GM: I, §§7–10; BGE: §46). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 4 ied).9 And this is where the Nietzschean project goes wrong on Williams's view: It is not-and this is vitally important-that an increase in power can serve as a criterion of what interpretation or outlook we should adopt. We do not survey a range of perspectives or sets of values and choose one by considering the extent to which it will increase our power. (2006d: 327) An 'increase in power, in a sense adequate to Nietzsche's purposes', Williams maintains, could not 'be the criterion of anything' (2006d: 327). Interestingly, however, Williams's critique of the Nietzschean project does not simply stem from a disagreement over the substance of Nietzsche's criterion. Williams's misgivings are deeper than that, and his critique all the more powerful for being insensitive to what exactly the substance of Nietzsche's criterion is taken to be: he would resist the Nietzschean project on any interpretation of the operative criterion, because he thinks that whether we should move over in the direction of alternative values is, quite simply, 'not a question for deliberation or practical reason' (2000: 161). It is a question to be answered by life itself, and all we can deliberately do is discover after the fact how it was answered: It is not a matter of choosing some concept or image on the ground that it will help us to live. It is a matter of whether it will indeed help us to live, and whether it will have done so is something that can only be recognized first in the sense that we are managing to live, and then later at a more reflective level, perhaps with the help of renewed genealogical explanation. (2000: 161) The crucial point, then, is that the merits of values as measured by some criterion-not just the extent to which they serve the will to power, but any criterion-can only be assessed retrospectively. The question whether 'some other ways of living, something which includes other ways of thinking about 9 See, e.g., Richardson (2013). 5 • Matthieu Queloz living, will help us, or other human beings who follow us, to live' (2000: 161), Williams insists, does not function as a criterion. Somewhat puzzlingly, Williams presents this as 'one of Nietzsche's most important lessons' (2000: 161). But how can it be Nietzsche's lesson? Is it not precisely the point ofNietzsche's project that it takes that question as a criterion and thereby empowers 'free spirits' to liberate themselves from the stifling grip of inherited values and choose a better way to live? And more importantly, why is it that neither an increase in power nor any other way in which values help us to live functions as a criterion by which to choose values? Should it not, or can it not? These are the questions I propose to address in what follows. 2. Williams's Critique of the Nietzschean Project One clue for why the question whether a set of values will help us to live does not function as a criterion lies in Williams's remark that other ways of living include other ways of thinking about living. This means that as we consider possible future values and evaluate them according to our present ways of thinking about living, a different evaluative basis will be nested in the object of our evaluation, and the question arises of which evaluative basis-which standard-is the relevant one. Let us call the evaluation of possible future values by the standard of our present values evaluation from here: Evaluation from Here: At t1, I evaluate, according to the vitality criterion as spelled out in terms of my values Vt1, to what extent, at t2, a given set of alternative values, Vt2, would help me to live. The other possibility is to consider whether these values will be seen to help us to live at t2 given the values we have at t2. Let us call this evaluation from there: Evaluation fromThere: At t1, I evaluate, according to the vitality criterion as spelled out in terms Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 6 of a given set of alternative values Vt2, to what extent, at t2, the values Vt2 would help me to live. Themain thrust ofWilliams's critique of theNietzschean project is to argue that Evaluation fromHere is feasible but not relevant while Evaluation fromThere is relevant but not feasible. Let us start with the relevance claim: it is a plausible default assumption that what we-as Nietzschean revaluators-would really like to know is how future values shape up from the point of view of those who actually live by them. After all, they are the ones who have to live with those values. But could there not be conditions under which we would have reason to treat Evaluation from Here as the relevant standard? In order to be able to say with confidence that Evaluation fromThere really is the relevant standard for Nietzschean revaluators, we first need to grasp what conditions, if any, would license privileging present values over future ones. In 'Persons, Character, andMorality', Williams suggests that in order to be justified in evaluating from here, i.e. in givingmy present values authority over the life of my future self with different values, I would need an understanding of how those future values relate to my present values, and that understanding would have to be such as to vindicate my privileging my present values over my future values. To illustrate this point, Williams discusses Derek Parfit's example of a Russian nobleman who knows he will inherit vast estates, but whose socialist ideals now make him want to give those estates away when he does so. To guard against a change of heart, the Russian nobleman arranges for the estates to be given away automatically, and makes any revocation conditional on the consent of his wife, whom he asks to disregard any future change of mind on his part.10 In this case, Williams argues, it is not clear that the nobleman's present values really have more authority than his future ones, for even if he has some story to tell about why his later values should be discounted, it is not clear why that story should have more authority than the 10 See Parfit (1984: 326–327). 7 • Matthieu Queloz countervailing story that he can expect his later self to tell about his earlier self. As Williams puts it, he may have 'a theory of degeneration of the middle-aged, but then he should reflect that, when middle-aged, he will have a theory of the naiveté of the young' (1981: 10). But we can easily think of an example where authority is more clearly on the side of the present. When Odysseus instructs his men to tie him to a mast as they approach the sirens and to disregard whatever orders he may give once they get there, he is privileging his present attitude in light of a theory explaining why his future attitude, under the influence of the sirens, counts for less. He knows he will change his mind and ask to be freed, but he also knows that he will only think that because he will come under the spell of the sirens. This explanation relating his present to his future self vindicates discounting the opinion of his future self. Accordingly, in order for one's present values to possess enough authority to defeat one's future values, two conditions would have to be fulfilled: first, one would need what might be called a theory of change, a robust understanding of how and why one's future values came to differ from present ones; and second, that theory would have to vindicate one's present values against one's future values, thus explaining why these should count for less. This is true not just where the person doing the evaluating and the person being evaluated are the same person-though that case does raise problems of its own having to do with personal identity11-but also at the level of society. The kind of understanding relating successive outlooks to each other is often available when it comes to relating past outlooks to present ones, because we have access to many of the facts explaining how we came to be where we are; but it is not, typically, available when it comes to relating present outlooks to future ones. And absent such an understanding, there is no reason to think that Evaluation from Here possesses more authority than Evaluation fromThere. 11 See Williams (1973a: 93; 1981: 9–10). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 8 Granted that Evaluation from There is the relevant standard, the issue becomes that of its feasibility. Williams is clearer about the fact that he thinks it unfeasible than about his reasons for thinking this. Two compelling rationales can, however, be reconstructed from his remarks. The first is that the content of future values is likely to be inaccessible to us; and the second is that even if those future values were accessible to us in terms of their content, life with those values would not be recognizable to us as an improvement except insofar as it realized the values we now have. The problem of the inaccessibility of the content of future values is highlighted by Williams when he writes that in contemplating a set of possible future values we do not yet live by, we cannot understand in advance what kind of power it will create, what new forms of life it will make possible, or how those forms of life could express human vitality-just as the ancients could not have foreseen the distinctive shape of that world the creation of which [Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality] claims to describe, a world centered on Christianity; nor could they have understood how that utterly strange thing could come to represent a new way of giving life a meaning. (2006d: 328) Wemay be able vaguely to envision what would be involved in living with a certain set of future values by situating them in a space of human problems or concerns, or by characterizing them in terms of their effects. But this is merely to consider these values from the outside, when what we really need is to understand them from the inside, so that we can see what life looks like from there. From where we are now, we may anticipate the coming of values that are not the ones we presently have, but this is a long way from grasping what it is that one values when one has those values, and why one values it. Insofar as future values involve the introduction of genuinely new concepts that differ both from those we now live by and from those we have inherited, we will not be able to think the ethical thoughts expressible in terms of those concepts (it is partly for this reason, Williams (2006c: 197) suggests, that Marxism and many other ethical and political conceptions culminate in static utopias). Yet 9 • Matthieu Queloz thinking the ethical thoughts expressible in terms of the future values at issue is what one certainly must do before the question of one's ability to evaluate from these future values can even arise. The second problem is that even if those future valueswere accessible to us in terms of their content, living by those values would not be recognizable to us as a genuine improvement except insofar as it served values we shared already.12 What would be recognizable to us is that to them, i.e. to the possible future agents living by those values, it would be recognizable as an improvement; but that does not make it a genuine improvement in our eyes. For even if we understood that the envisioned life was going better, by the light of some future values, than our life was going according to our values, this would still not amount to an ethical judgement that the envisioned life was simply going better and we should move towards it. From where we are now, any picture of future human life that failed to embody the values we now live by would elicit a sense of loss. As Williams puts it, we cannot overcome our outlook. If a possible future that figures in those shadowy speculations does not embody some interpretation of [the] central elements of our outlook, then it maymake empirical sense to us-we can see how someone could get there-but it makes no ethical sense to us, except as a scene of retrogression, or desolation, or loss. (2006c: 197) To those future people with different values, it would of course not appear as a scene of retrogression, or desolation, or loss. But the point is that this vicarious judgement is not an ethical judgement in the relevant sense. We cannot, in the relevant sense, try on values for size. What we can do, as Williams himself insisted (1986: 203), is take up the ethnographic stance and imaginatively inhabit an evaluative viewpoint-that of a different contemporary culture, or that of 12 Thus, when someone in a slave-holding society envisages a possible future society without slavery, the measure of the improvement this would bring is provided by the values the society has already. What is at issue in Williams's critique are even more radical changes recognizable as improvements only as measured by values they themselves instil. I am grateful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 10 a culture in the past-without fully making it our own.13 But even if we had enough of a grip on a future evaluative viewpoint to imaginatively inhabit it, so that we could see how someone inhabiting that viewpoint would evaluate things, this remains crucially different from actually evaluating them. To actually evaluate them is to make sense of them in an ethically engaged way.14 This yields judgements of the form: 'Values V help/do not help people to live'. To evaluate them vicariously, by contrast, is to make sense of them in an ethically disengaged way. This yields judgements of the form: 'To people with values V, it looks like these values help/do not help them to live'. But this is not to express or take up an ethical stance towards those values. The force of the two judgements is different-only the judgement expressing values one actually holds is what might be called a full-throated ethical evaluation, while the vicarious judgement is a disengaged evaluation more akin to a proposition of anthropology. Even if future values were accessible to us in terms of their content, therefore, they would still not be accessible to us as a basis of fullthroated ethical evaluation. Imaginatively inhabiting a future in which values we do not share are successfully realized does not get us past the fact that insofar as this future fails to realize values we actually have, it can only make ethical sense to us as a scene of retrogression or loss. The vitality criterion is no help here, because what counts as an expression of vitality-as an increase in people's feeling of power, will to power, or power itself, for example-is similarly sensitive to one's actual outlook. The power 13 See also Williams (1995c: 206; 1995b: 239; 1995e: 185–187; 1996: 29; 2006b: 61). 14 The engaged/disengaged terminology hails fromMoore (2006). A helpful account of the distinctive form of agency involved in aspiring to acquire values one does not yet possess is Callard (2018). More decision-theoretic framings of related problems are discussed in Ullmann-Margalit (2006) and Paul (2014). Eklund (2017) explores how the possibility of alternative normative concepts relates to certain forms of metaethical realism, and in particular whether it is possible for concepts with the same normative role to have different referents-a focus which renders it orthogonal to the Nietzschean concerns at issue here, however. 11 • Matthieu Queloz that a different way of life will embody 'will not reveal itself as recommending it until it is a power that someone already possesses' (Williams 2006d: 329). It might be objected that this rather overstates the difference between values we live by and values we do not live by. After all, we seem to manage well enough when it comes to evaluating whether the values of past societies have helped them to live by their own lights as opposed to ours. Some societies were clearly disasters on their own terms, and our ability to understand this becomes important when we seek to explain why some societies decided to move away from slavery or honour killings, for example. Indeed, our capacity for this kind of detached retrospective judgement seems to be presupposed by Williams himself when he grants Nietzsche that genealogical inquiry can reveal to what extent values have proved life-promoting in the past (unless the idea is to assess even values from the distant past only by our present values-an exercise whose result for large swathes of history can only be so indiscriminately negative as to be futile). What is so different about future values? The answer is that both with regard to the accessibility of future values in terms of their content and with regard to their accessibility as an evaluative basis, there are important asymmetries between the past and the future. One is what we might call the hermeneutic asymmetry: while past societies used to make ethical judgements that we no longer make, we often still take the content of those judgements to be accessible to us, because the terms in which they were articulated have been handed down to us. Ethical outlooks may have been lost, but our picture of a lost ethical outlook is paradigmatically one where the terms in which that outlook was expressed have not been lost. By contrast, future ethical outlooks have yet to arise, but our picture of a future ethical outlook is one where the terms in which that outlook will be expressed Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 12 have not yet arisen either. As a result, the content of many past outlooks is accessible to us in a way that the content of future outlooks is not.15 In addition, Williams suggests that there is also an asymmetry between past and future with regard to the second problem of the inaccessibility of future values as an evaluative basis, an asymmetry which might be labelled the identification asymmetry. We can explore our present values 'on this side, in relation to their past, and explain them', and in contemplating the past, 'we can identify with the process that led to our outlook because we can identify with its outcome' (Williams 2006c: 197).That history presents alternative ways of living merely in terms of a wider 'us', because we have available to us a story detailing how 'they' became 'us'. But with regard to the future, that story has yet to be written. As a result, we find it much harder to identify with 'them' as a future 'us'. This in turn makes it much harder to identify with their future values, since on Williams's account, historical narratives about how a society came by its values enable the society to make sense of its values as its own (2006c: 193–197; 2006d: 328–329). Without this kind of narrative continuity, we cannot identify sufficiently with values other than those we now have to be able to evaluate from them. And the identification asymmetry is that while such narrative continuity often obtains (or is taken to obtain) between the past and the present, it is lacking between the present and the future. This is why Williams writes that 'we cannot in our thought go beyond our outlook into the future and remain identified with the result: that is to say, we cannot overcome our outlook' (2006c: 197). We thus reach the conclusion that the prospective value of another set of values, to the extent that we even understand it, will have to be judged in terms of its tendency to promote the values we already have, while the respects in which adopting this different outlook promotes values it itself instils will only be recognizable retrospectively. 15 See Williams (2006e: 174–175). 13 • Matthieu Queloz These hurdles might encourage one to think that Nietzsche's vitality criterion needs to be construed in maximally perspective-independent and neutral terms. This would give us a neutral standpoint from which to identify a set of values which, by that criterion, would be absolutely best. But this, quite apart from being dubious as a reading of Nietzsche, would certainly be a mistake in Williams's eyes. In ethics, Williams maintains, we should not try and determine which values are absolutely best according to some maximally abstract and perspective-neutral standard.16 This is not merely the trite point that we cannot do so, because we cannot entirely stand back from our values if we are to evaluate alternative values. That is also true-as Williams puts it, there is no Archimedean standpoint, and even if there were, it is a standpoint from which we could not decide the respective merits of values, because we would shed the evaluative resources to do so in striving for what George Eliot called 'that bird's eye reasonableness which soars to avoid preference and loses all sense of quality' (1999: 814).17 But the fact that one needs to evaluate from something would be allowed for as long as one had the vitality criterion as an evaluative basis. Williams's objection is not just that there is no Archimedean standpoint, but that the very urge to move towards such a standpoint, while legitimate in science, is out of place in ethics. Ethics is radically first-personal in a way that science is not, and it is a misunderstanding of ethical evaluation to think that we should aim to be 'unencumbered intelligences selecting in principle among all possible outlooks'-it is a 'scientistic illusion' to think that it is 'our job as rational agents to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a system of political and ethical ideas which would be the best from an absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of contingent historical perspective' (Williams 2006c: 193–94). Bringing my personal loyalties and attachments to bear on ethical evaluation is not necessarily a distortion to be avoided, because the 16 Williams (1995d: 164–170; 2003; 2006c: 193–94). 17 This is a central theme in Williams (2011: esp. ch. 2). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 14 evaluation is not just incidentallymine: 'my life, my action, is quite irreducibly mine, and to require that it is at best a derivative conclusion that it should be lived from the perspective that happens to be mine is an extraordinary misunderstanding' (Williams 1995d: 170). Hence, the very ambition to rank values according to some perspective-neutral criterion that will tell us which are absolutely best is a scientistic misunderstanding of ethics. In ethics, the Archimedean urge must be resisted.18 For Williams, then, Nietzsche's question whether some other set of values will help us to live both cannot and should not function as a criterion. It cannot function as a criterion if it is construed in terms that render it sensitive to the content of the evaluative outlook under consideration, because that renders the only version of the criterion that is accessible to one irrelevant. And it should not function as a criterion if it is construed in content-neutral terms, because that would embody a scientistic misunderstanding of the ethical evaluation at stake. So either way, the question does not function as a criterion. In addition to this main line of criticism, Williams also sees a number of other structural difficulties for the Nietzschean project which, while they do not in principle threaten the idea that one might choose values on the basis of the vitality criterion, nonetheless highlight some serious epistemic and practical hurdles. These are worth attending to also because they are revelatory of howWilliams interpreted the project itself. First, Nietzsche conceives of his project in overly individualistic terms on Williams's view. His 'models of overcoming and transforming our values, which is his most enduring concern', Williams points out, 'tend to be personal, individualistic, occasionally heroic' (2006d: 327). Often, the undertaking 'is regarded as an expression simply of a personal endeavour, like that of an artist; sometimes it takes on an historically transformative note, as though the individual's feat of transvaluation will itself change society' (2006d: 327). In 18 The phrase 'Archimedean urge' hails from Srinivasan (2015). 15 • Matthieu Queloz opposition to this individualistic model, Williams insists that values come in socially shared webs which individuals, however heroic, would be powerless to change on their own.19 The project is also overly individualistic in a different sense, moreover: there is something remarkably apolitical about considering the question of what values an individual should live by in order to flourish in isolation from the political order in which these values are expressed. That orderwill itself reflect political values, and the question ofwhat personal values would help a given individual to live cannot be answered independently of the question of what political values a society should embody. But as Williams repeatedly emphasizes, Nietzsche betrays a severe lack of sensitivity to the political dimension of his concerns.20 Second,Nietzsche's conception of his project is too voluntaristic: we cannot simply choose to value something, for in order to succeed in valuing it, we need to be able to make sense of it as valuable, and what 'makes sense to someone is not, in any connection, a matter of will' but rather 'comes as a discovery' (Williams 2002: 261–62). What determines whether something can make sense to us as valuable? Williams highlights two conditions.21 On the one hand, it must engage our ethical emotions, and whether it does so depends, not on an act of will, but on one's education, socialization, and other processes by which one has cultivated a certain emotional sensibility. On the other hand, it must be conceptually articulated and intelligibly related to other things that we value, as instantiating, bearing, expressing, or facilitating them, so that there can be an answer to the question of what it is about something that one values. Merely understanding that adopting some value would help us in some respect does not yet suffice to internalize that value. In a Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, understanding that I have instrumental reason to come 19 See Kusch (2009) and Queloz (2018; forthcoming-b: ch. 7) for further discussion of this aspect of Williams's conception of values. 20 See Williams (1999b: 150; 1999a: 257; 2006d: 326–327; 2012: 141). 21 See Williams (2002: 91–92; 2006a: 135–137). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 16 to treat the welfare of other players as intrinsically valuable provides no stable ground for me to do so: if all I have to support the value I am trying to reason myself into is the thought that I have reason to treat it as a value, this will not be enough for me to make sense of it as a value, and my attempt to pretend otherwise will unravel upon reflection.22 It must be possible to say more about why something is valuable. As long as we remain unable to do so, the value remains humanly unintelligible. Isaiah Berlin offers a vivid illustration of this point: If I find men who worship trees, not because they are symbols of fertility or because they are divine, with a mysterious life and powers of their own, or because this grove is sacred to Athena-but only because they are made of wood; and if when I ask them why they worship wood they say 'Because it is wood' and give no other answer; then I do not know what they mean. (1997: 10) Williams's own example is the value of truthfulness: the Greeks made sense of truthfulness as a value by relating it to other things that they valued, such as honour and nobility of character; later societies have made sense of it in different terms, by relating it instead to notions of freedom and absence of manipulation; but in each case, people could coherently make sense of truthfulness as a value because that value was fleshed out and supported by its connections to other things of value.23 When we discover that something makes sense to as a value, part of what we discover are these connections to other things that we value. But such connections cannot be forged by an effort of will. Hence, we cannot simply choose to value something. Third, new thoughts have to be generated out of the material made available to us by history. We 'do not make our thoughts out of nothing' (Williams 2006d: 327), and societies can no more transcend their historical conditions in this respect than individuals can transcend their social conditions. Part of 22 This is howWilliams attacks Gauthier's (1986) proposed solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma (Williams 2002: 91). 23 See Williams (1973b; 1997: 26; 2002: 89–92, 115; 2006a: 136). 17 • Matthieu Queloz Williams's point is that since nothing comes from nothing, innovation is subject to developmental constraints or path dependences: new valuations have to be forged out of the old ideas we have inherited by combining, elaborating, or extending them; moreover, taking up once more the idea that values have tomake sense to us as values-merely recognizing the practical necessity of coming to see something as valuable does not suffice actually to do so-the conceptual material in terms of which we make sense of these better values will itself have to be drawn from our conceptual inheritance. But there is also an internalist rationale for highlighting the constraints imposed by our conceptual inheritance: for an internalist about reasons such as Williams, the very reasons for adopting new values will have to tie in with antecedent motivational states, the content of which will have to be articulated in terms of extant concepts. One's conceptual inheritance does not just impose limits on what values one can adopt, therefore, but also on what values one can find that one has reason to adopt. Fourth, Williams adds that the material out of which we develop values is in many respects obscure to us, because we only dimly and incompletely understand what the ideas we inherit entail, where they conflict with one another, and what historical deposits they carry with them. Our thoughts and ideas are the product 'of an obscure mixture of beliefs (many incompatible with one another), passions, interests, and so forth' (2005: 12–13), and when new thoughts and ideas form, these 'come in part from what is around us, and we have a very poor grasp, for the most part, of what their source may be' (2006d: 327). In addition to being limited in the values we can adopt or have reason to adopt, we are thus also epistemically limited in our understanding of where and what we draw these values from. Finally, these epistemic limitations apply even more severely with regard to the future consequences of adopting possible values. We have difficulties anticipating what the effects of adopting a value will be, because too many of Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 18 the consequences of concept use are unintended by and opaque to conceptusers: What ideas actually do is not under the control of their creators, and is rarely what their creators intend.Their ideas may help to shape other people's aims, but they are more deeply at the mercy of those other people's needs, and of opaque historical contingency. (Williams 2006d: 327) Wemay think we have a firm grasp of the practical consequences of adopting a value. But a value that has beneficial consequences in one set of circumstances may have pernicious consequences in another set of circumstances; moreover, as the value comes to be adopted by an increasing variety of people, it will also be adapted to their needs and situations in ways that may alter both the value and its practical consequences. Once in circulation, a concept is open to appropriation, reinterpretation, and repurposing by others in ways that render its net effect on human lives extremely difficult to foretell. Nietzsche's own ideas of the will to power or the Übermensch-appropriated, distorted, and exploited by just the nationalistic and anti-Semitic movements he himself despised and deplored-are a case in point. In the face of all these structural problems for the Nietzschean project, Williams concludes that there can be no question of making a criterial choice between the values we have and the values we might come to live by-'there is no way in which, in these fundamental respects, the understanding of life can get ahead of life itself' (2006d: 328). All we can do is recognize whether or not the values we have help us to live, as measured by those same values. Whether that is the case will be immediately manifest in howwe are managing to live, and, as Williams's pointer to genealogical explanation indicates, it will be manifest in retrospect in how we and others have managed to live in the past. But there is no room for a prospective criterial choice between values.24 24 A reviewer points out thatWilliams's critiquewill seem to have less bite if one readsNietzsche as advocating what is sometimes called moral 'experimentalism' (Bamford 2016; Hunt 1991: ch. 7), which invites one to experiment with new values and evaluate them as one goes 19 • Matthieu Queloz 3. A Mere Reversal of Valuations Before we come to Nietzsche's defence, it is worth noting that many of the ideas that Williams deploys against the Nietzschean project are very much Nietzschean ideas. Most notably, there are several places where Nietzsche proves mindful of the perspectival character of the criterion for whether something helps or hinders the attainment of the 'highest power and splendor of the human type' (GM: Preface, §6). He does not take himself to be in a position to say-indeed clearlywishes not to say-what this future human type should look like. The notion of the highest power and splendour of the human type functions as a placeholder: unlike Aristotle, Nietzsche does not believe in a constant anduniformhuman nature fromwhich an absolute, one-size-fits-all notion of the 'full realization' of humannature couldbe derived. Andunlike the Christian morality he opposes, he does not believe that there is a one-size-fitsall ideal of a human being which unites all definitively desirable properties.25 As he says, the point is precisely not 'to direct and edify, to maintain one's own type as the first and highest' (eKGWB: 1888, 14[225]). He condemns as a relic of the 'Christian prejudice' the 'optical habit' [optische Gewöhnung] of estimating the value of the human being according to how close it comes to some 'ideal human being' (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]): 'one thinks one knows what, with regard to the ideal human being, is of definitive desirability' (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]). But 'any careful examination of this \"ideal type\"' will lead one to abandon it immediately. It is the 'Christian ideal' that leads one to 'think one knows, first, that approximation to One single type is desirable; second, what this type is like; third, that any deviation from this type constitutes a along. But either the choice of which values to move over to and experiment with is a rationally grounded choice, in which case even the experimentalist reading remains-at least where radical value experiments are concerned-vulnerable to Williams's point that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself, or the choice is an initially arbitrary choice that then proves its worth in the course of the experience of living by those values, in which case the experimentalist reading ends up conceding Williams's point. 25 See Leiter (2015) for a valuable discussion of this point. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 20 decline, an inhibition, a loss of strength and power for mankind' (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]). These and other passages suggest that Nietzsche is keenly aware that the assessment of whether a set of values helps us to live depends on who and where we are. Similarly, many of the other issues Williams raises arguably turn on Nietzschean ideas. The idea that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself is sometimes attributed to Nietzsche under the heading of 'experimentalism'.26 That the sources and consequences of our thoughts are in many respects opaque to us is a leitmotif throughout Nietzsche's work, and his conception of a revaluation of values is less naïve than Williams's critique may lead one to think: To revalue values-what would that mean? The spontaneousmovements must all be there, the new, future, stronger ones: it is only that they still stand under false names and valuations and have not yet become conscious of themselves. (eKGWB: 1887, 9[66]) Any doctrine is pointless if all the accumulation of forces and explosive materials it demands are not yet in place. A revaluation of values is achieved only when there is a tension from new needs, from the newly needy [NeuBedürftigen], who suffer from the old valuation without coming to consciousness [ohne zum Bewusstsein zu kommen]. (eKGWB: 1887, 9[77]) As these little-known passages bring out,Nietzsche does show some awareness of how the success of the project of revaluation depends on the necessary material and the necessary driving forces being available in society. He knows that individuals cannot transcend their social and historical conditions, that they do not create their thoughts ex nihilo, and that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself. In effect, Williams channels one current in Nietzsche's thought to drive back another, and as we saw at the beginning, Williams himself conceives of what he is doing in these terms: he presents the main point of his critique as 26 See Hunt (1991: ch. 7) and Bamford (2016). 21 • Matthieu Queloz 'one ofNietzsche'smost important lessons' (2000: 161); he prefaces his criticism of the idea that one might anticipate the effects that adopting a value will have with the claim that this idea 'belies one of [Nietzsche's] thoughts' (2006d: 327); he notes that the individualistic or artistic model of value creation 'is not true to much else that Nietzsche believed' (2006d: 327), and remarks that while Goethe's dictum, 'in the beginning was the deed', was not in fact cited by Nietzsche, it 'might well have been' (2006d: 328). In a conciliatory tone, Williams also emphasizes that Nietzsche was anyway keener on spelling out the character traits of creators of values than on spelling out the content of their values (2006d: 329), and he intriguingly suggests at one point that Nietzsche's individualismmight be a feature of hismode of presentation rather than a substantial commitment about how the revaluation of values actually works, because 'a social process which in actual fact no doubt has many stages, discontinuities, and contingencies . . . can be illuminatingly represented on the model of a certain kind of psychological strategy' (2000: 158). Since Nietzsche anticipates much of the Williamsian critique, and since Williams himself is aware of that fact, the Williamsian critique can thus be seen as an internal critique of Nietzsche's thought. Even conceived as an internal critique, however, the Williamsian critique seems to leave us at precisely the point in Nietzsche's intellectual development where Nietzsche had the means to make sense of a devaluation of values, but not of a revaluation of values: roughly, it vindicates the Nietzsche of Human, All Too Human against the more ambitious Nietzsche of Daybreak and later works.27 But perhapswe can come to the defence ofNietzsche's ambitions by specifying more carefully how ambitious the envisaged revaluation itself is supposed to be. Revealingly, Williams takes it to be quite ambitious: he writes that Nietzsche 'leaves us for the most part with an image of some solitary figure 27 See Owen (2007: 20) and Ridley (2005). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 22 bringing new values into existence' (2006d: 327), and that although he 'rightly foresaw' that the false presuppositions of many of our present values 'would one day come to be generally recognized', he 'almost completely failed in his visionary attempts to grasp what could take their place' (1984: 255). As we noted at the beginning, however, the GermanUmwerthung suggests a shift in or a reversal of values rather than the wholesale de novo creation of values, and, especially in the work that until the last minute was to be called The Revaluation of All Values (and which Nietzsche eventually retitledThe Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity), Nietzsche can give the impression that his chief concern is not to create new values ex nihilo, but to reverse the polarity of existing valuations in order thereby to undo the revaluation of values that brought usChristianity.28He even singles out the Renaissance ofCesare Borgia as the time that came closest to completing just the revaluation of values that Nietzsche advocates: the replacement of Christian values by 'opposite values, noble values' (AC: §61).29 AsDavidOwen (2018: 73–75) and others have argued, these values are humanistic values encouraging the continual setting and overcoming of ideals in this life rather than the next. Roughly, they are the values of Renaissance virtù, which Nietzsche liked to call 'moraline-free virtue' (AC: §2; eKGWB: 1887, 10[45, 50, 109], 11[43, 110, 414], 1888, 15[20]). Particularly in his late work, there are thus passages in which Nietzsche seems to understand 'revaluation' not as a bringing into existence of new values, but merely as an inversion of our present valuations aiming to bring back valuations that formerly existed. Of course, for each of these passages, there are countervailing passages where Nietzsche speaks of the need for 28 See, e.g., Stern (2018). 29 Borgia was the son of the Pope, and had he not fallen ill, this ruthless operator-Machiavelli's model for the Machiavellian-might well have become Pope himself, something which Nietzsche thought would have spelled the end of Christianity. As Jacob Burckhardt already remarked, Borgia 'could have secularized the States of the Church, and he would have been forced to do so to keep them . . . He, if anybody, could have . . . annihilate[d] the Papacy' (1990: 88). 23 • Matthieu Queloz 'law-givers' and 'creators' of new values while studiously avoiding to specify what these future values should look like (GS: §§301, 335; BGE: §§211, 253; EH: 'Fate', §4; TSZ: Preface, §9; eKGWB: 1884, 26[243], 1886, 6[25], 1887, 11[411]).30 And even where he talks about the 'fear-inspiring consistency' with which the 'aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)' was inverted to suggest that the 'miserable', 'poor', 'powerless', 'suffering', and 'ugly' were beloved of God (GM: I, §7), it is clear that some values are exempt from this inversion: the rank order between truthfulness and lying, for example, is not inverted.31 But the point remains that at least insofar as revaluation issues only in new valuations rather than in new values, it merely requires changing the valence of existing concepts. The distinction between valuations and values therefore gives Nietzsche the means to resist Williams's critique. Insofar as the idea is to revert back to valuations that have helped us to live in the past, revaluation can be guided by retrospective assessments of what kinds of lives values historically tended to foster. There will then be no need to evaluate values whose content we do not yet grasp and whose effects on society we cannot fathom. Nor will one need to create entirely new ways of thinking. One will only need to present the properties and character traits in terms of which we already think in a contrasting moral light. In that sense, the revaluation of values involves not value creation, but merely the old rhetorical strategy that Quintilian termed the paradiastolic redescription of virtues as vices and vices as virtues-a redescription, moreover, which by Nietzsche's lights is just the reversal of a previous redescription along these same lines.32 The title Der Anti-Christ, which in German can also meanThe Anti-Christian, then appears 30 On Nietzsche's ambition to create values, see Clark (2015b), Dries (2015), Langsam (2018), and Lambert (2019). 31 For different attempts to explain why the rank order between truthfulness and lying is not inverted, see Owen (2007: 70) and Queloz (forthcoming-a). 32 The connection to paradiastolic redescription is also drawn by Skinner (2002: 185), Owen (2018), and Srinivasan (2019: 144). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 24 well-chosen: Nietzsche characterizes what he advocates negatively, as a mere reversal of Christian valuations. 4. Saint-Just's Illusion Even this mere reversal of existing valuations must seem suspicious to Williams, however, for its optimism that formerly helpful values can be safely revived and expected to work just as well for us, under our very different circumstances, is precisely what Williams attacked under the heading of 'Saint-Just's illusion'.33 Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, the French revolutionary who became Robespierre's right hand and is often seen as the purest embodiment of the Jacobin ideology (his angelic features and steely ruthlessness during the Reign of Terror earned him the sobriquet 'Angel of Death'), tried to recreate, in eighteenth-century France, an ideal of civic virtue drawn from Roman antiquity. 'Let Revolutionists be Romans' (2004: 820), he urged. 'The world has been empty since the Romans' (2004: 735).34 The illusion from which Saint-Just suffered according to Williams was the illusion of thinking that the values of ancient Rome were a live option for revolutionary Paris-that these values could simply be transplanted from antiquity into aworldwith completely different needs and social and economic structures.The particular way in which a value such as freedomwas expressed and concretely elaborated in ancient Rome may have answered to the needs of Roman society. But as Williams points out, a value 'can demand different social and political expressions at different times', and what makes a value 'viable in one set of historical conditions may make it a disaster in another: that was the nature of Saint-Just's illusion' (1995a: 137). Blind to the way in 33 See Williams (1995a). He takes the phrase fromMarx and Engels'The Holy Family. 34 See Linton (2010) and Andrew (2011: chs. 6 and 7) for accounts of how Saint-Just selfconsciously modelled himself and his ideals on those of the Roman republic. In this he was but an extreme example of a general tendency among the revolutionaries. 25 • Matthieu Queloz which the viability of particular expressions of values is a function of the sociohistorical context in which they are put to work, Saint-Just tried to impose ideas on modern French society that were entirely alien to it and could never have worked in it. Now Nietzsche, in calling for a reversal of the Christian revaluation, likewise lays himself open to the charge of succumbing to Saint-Just's illusion. There is every reason to fear that what made virtù a viable alternative to Christian virtue in the Italian Renaissance will make it a disaster under conditions of modernity-and Nietzsche's enthusiastic pointer to Cesare Borgia is hardly reassuring. By interpreting Nietzsche's project so that it can sidestep some of the problems we highlighted above, then, we just render the project vulnerable to the objection that the inference from the success of an older set of values in their particular socio-historical circumstances to the idea that they will similarly succeed under modern-day conditions is both a lapse of historical sense and a dangerous ethical and political error. Yet it turns out that Nietzsche appears to have been aware of that difficulty as well. InThe Gay Science, he speaks to this very issue and even employs the same example: TheFrench of Corneille's age as well as those of the Revolution seized Roman antiquity in a way we no longer dare to-thanks to our higher historical sense. And Roman antiquity itself: how violently and yet naively it laid its hand on everything good and lofty in the older Greek antiquity! How they translated things into the Roman present! . . . They seem to ask us: 'Should we not make new for ourselves what is old and put ourselves into it? Should we not be allowed to breathe our soul into their dead body? For it is dead, after all: how ugly everything dead is!' They did not know the pleasure of a sense for history. (GS: §83) Nietzsche uses the phrase 'historical sense' in a variety of ways, but the relevant sense here seems to be exactly the one at stake in Saint-Just's illusion: one betrays a lack of historical sense if one fails to grasp how past values were Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 26 embedded in, and drew their point from, an entire form of life. As Nietzsche writes in Human, All Too Human, the historical sense consists in the ability to rapidly 'conjure up a certain horizon' or 'system of ideas and sensations', just as one conjures up 'the impression of a temple on the basis of a few pillars and pieces of wall that chance to remain standing' (HA: I, §274). In Beyond Good and Evil, historical sense is characterized as the ability 'quickly to guess the rank order of the valuations that a people, a society, an individual has lived by' as well as the 'connections between these valuations' (BGE: §224). The draft of this passage in his notebook revealingly adds: 'the relation of these valuations to the conditions of life, the relationship between the authority of values and the authority of effective forces (the presumed relationship usually even more than the actual one): the ability to reproduce all this in oneself is what constitutes historical sense' (eKGWB: 1885, 35[2]). On Nietzsche's view, one displays historical sense notably by grasping the connection between valuations and the form of life in which they are embedded. If one assumes that Nietzsche the philologist was too historical a thinker to fall for Saint-Just's illusion-if one assumes, in particular, that he was aware of how the viability of particular expressions of values depends on the context in which they are deployed-then the insight animating the charge of Saint-Just's illusion might be turned into a steppingstone by which to overcome it. The tel quel transplantation of Renaissance conceptions into modern society may founder on the fact that viable values demand new expressions and elaborations in different socio-historical contexts; but this just shows that what is needed are new expressions and elaborations of the values underlying Renaissance conceptions, expressions and elaborations adapted to the modern context. What we should aim to recreate, therefore, is not the Renaissance conception of virtue itself, but the benefits and possibilities it brought in its wake. The guiding question will then be: what new elaborations and expressions of values do new contexts demand in order to deliver the same goods as past elaborations and expressions of those values in past contexts? 27 • Matthieu Queloz There is some textual evidence to suggest that Nietzsche indeed understood that values would require different expressions and elaborations in different contexts. For example, he suggests at one point that the contest of valuations that concerns him unfolds throughout Western history, with two sets of valuations re-emerging again and again in notably different guises (GM: I, §16). The crunch, however, is that even if Nietzsche is aware of the pitfalls involved in Saint-Just's illusion, this awareness can only drive him back to the idea that what we need are values that, at least in their expression, elaboration, and concretization, are not the recycled values of a bygone era, but values which are adapted to our own, novel circumstances; and to the extent that they are that, they will be precisely what we were trying to avoid, namely genuinely new values whose anticipation and assessment must once again give rise to the difficulties we started out from. The line of interpretation leading past Saint-Just's illusion thus runs into just the host of problems that the line of interpretation leading to Saint-Just's illusion was intended to get away from in the first place. On either interpretation of the revaluation of values as a project, then, the Williamsian critique highlights serious difficulties for it, difficulties which are neither specific to Nietzsche nor to the substance of his criterion. Perhaps further reflection on these matters can show that some of these difficulties can be overcome. But what the present discussion suggests is that they really do need to be overcome, and the value of flagging these difficulties lies in the guidance it offers in that regard, not only to those seeking an interpretation of Nietzsche's project on which it emerges as viable, but also-since the difficulties have not gone away-to those in conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering who seek to continue what he began.35 35 I am grateful to Damian Cueni, Amia Srinivasan, Johannes Steizinger, Rebekka Hufendiek, Jelscha Schmid, Markus Wild, David Owen, Friedemann Bieber, Alexander Prescott-Couch, Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 28 References Andrew, E. (2011), Imperial Republics: Revolution,War and Territorial Expansion from the EnglishCivilWar to the FrenchRevolution. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bamford, R. (2016), 'The Ethos of Inquiry: Nietzsche on Experience, Naturalism, and Experimentalism', Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 47/1, 9–29. Berlin, I. (1997),The Proper Study of Mankind. London: Chatto and Windus. Burckhardt, J. (1990),The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. London: Penguin. Burgess,A.,Cappelen,H., andPlunkett,D. eds. (2020),Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Callard, A. (2018), Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. New York: Oxford University Press. Cappelen, H. (2018), Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cappelen, H. and Plunkett, D. (2020), 'Introduction: A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics', in A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, andD. Plunkett (eds.),Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, 1–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, M. (2015a), 'On the Rejection of Morality: Bernard Williams's Debt to Nietzsche', Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics, 41–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press. - (2015b), 'On Creating Values', Nietzsche-Studien, 44/1, 98–103. Dries, M. (2015), 'How Hard Is It to Create Values?', Nietzsche-Studien, 44/1, 30–43. Eklund, M. (2017), Choosing Normative Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. and Manuel Dries for valuable discussions of these issues. I am also indebted to two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments. 29 • Matthieu Queloz Eliot, G. (1999), Daniel Deronda. London: Everyman. Gauthier, D. (1986),Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gemes, K. (2013), 'Life's Perspectives', in K. Gemes and J. Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, 553–575. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gemes, K. and May, S. eds. (2009), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guay, R. (2006), 'The Philosophical Function of Genealogy', in K.A. Pearson (ed.), A Companion to Nietzsche, 353–370: Blackwell. Huddleston, A. (2015), 'What is Enshrined in Morality? Understanding the Grounds for Nietzsche's Critique', Inquiry, 58/3, 281–307. - (2019), Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hunt, L.H. (1991), Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue. London: Routledge. Katsafanas, P. (2013a), 'Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology', in J. Richardson and K. Gemes (eds.),The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, 727–755. Oxford: Oxford University Press. - (2013b), Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. - (2016), 'Naturalism,Minimalism, and the Scope of Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology', in K. Gjesdal (ed.), Debates in Nineteenth-Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, 326–338. New York: Routledge. Kusch, M. (2009), 'Testimony and the Value of Knowledge', in A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, 60–94: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lambert, T. (2019), 'Nietzsche on Creating and Discovering Values', Inquiry, 62/1, 49–69. Langsam, H. (2018), 'Nietzsche and Value Creation: Subjectivism, SelfExpression, and Strength', Inquiry, 61/1, 100–113. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 30 Leiter, B. (2015), Nietzsche on Morality, 2 edn. London: Routledge. - (manuscript), 'Williams's Debt to Nietzsche: Real or Illusory?'. Linton, M. (2010), 'The Man of Virtue: The Role of Antiquity in the Political Trajectory of L. A. Saint-Just', French History, 24/3, 393–419. May, S. (1999),Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality'. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press. Merrick, A. (2018), 'We Need a Critique of Moral Values: Regarding On the Genealogy of Morality and Normativity', in P. Katsafanas (ed.),The Nietzschean Mind, 70–82. London: Routledge. Moore, A.W. (2006), 'Maxims andThick Ethical Concepts', Ratio, 19, 129–147. WP: Nietzsche, F. (1967),TheWill To Power. New York: Vintage Books. HA: - (1986), Human, All Too Human. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. GM: - (1998), On the Genealogy of Morality. Indianapolis: Hackett. GS: - (2001),The Gay Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BGE: - (2002), Beyond Good and Evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. AC: - (2005),The Anti-Christ. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. EH: - (2005), Ecce Homo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. TSZ: - (2006),Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. eKGWB: - (2009), Digital Critical Edition of the Complete Works and Letters. Owen, D. (2007), Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality. Stocksfield: Acumen. - (2018), 'Nietzsche's Antichristian Ethics: Renaissance Virtù and the Project of Reevaluation', in D. Conway (ed.), Nietzsche and The Antichrist: Religion, Politics, and Culture in Late Modernity, 67–88. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Parfit, D. (1984), Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Paul, L.A. (2014), Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 31 • Matthieu Queloz Prescott-Couch, A. (2014), 'Williams and Nietzsche on the Significance of History for Moral Philosophy', Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 45/2, 147–168. Queloz, M. (2017), 'Nietzsche's Pragmatic Genealogy of Justice', British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25/4, 727–749. - (2018), 'Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality', Philosophers' Imprint, 18/17, 1–20. - (forthcoming-a), 'Nietzsche's English Genealogy of Truthfulness', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. - (forthcoming-b),The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Queloz, M. and Cueni, D. (2019), 'Nietzsche as a Critic of Genealogical Debunking: Making Room for NaturalismWithout Subversion',TheMonist, 102/3, 277–297. Reginster, B. (2006),TheAffirmation of Life:Nietzsche onOvercoming Nihilism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. - (2018), 'The Will to Power', in P. Katsafanas (ed.),The Nietzschean Mind, 105–120. London: Routledge. Richardson, J. (2004), Nietzsche's New Darwinism. New York: Oxford University Press. - (2013), 'Nietzsche on Life's Ends', in J. Richardson and K. Gemes (eds.),The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, 756–784. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ridley, A. (2005), 'Nietzsche and the Re-Evaluation of Values', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105/1, 155–175. Robertson, S. and Owen, D. (2013), 'Influence on Analytic Philosophy',The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, 185–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saint-Just, L.A. (2004), Les oeuvres complètes de Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just. Paris: Gallimard. Skinner, Q. (2002), Visions of Politics I. Regarding Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 32 Srinivasan, A. (2015), 'The Archimedean Urge', Philosophical Perspectives, 29/1, 325–362. - (2019), 'Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CXIX/2, 127–156. Stern, T. (2018), 'History, Nature, and the 'Genetic Fallacy' inThe Antichrist's Revaluation of Values', in D. Conway (ed.),Nietzsche andThe Antichrist: Religion, Politics, and Culture in Late Modernity, 21–41. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Ullmann-Margalit, E. (2006), 'Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting', Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 58, 157–172. Williams, B. (1973a), 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', Problems of the Self, 82–100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - (1973b), 'Morality and the Emotions', Problems of the Self, 207–229. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - (1981), 'Persons, Character, and Morality', Moral Luck, 1–19. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - (1984), 'Präsuppositionen der Moralität', in E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl (eds.),Bedingungen der Möglichkeit: \"Transcendental Arguments\" und Transzendentales Denken, 251–261. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. - (1986), 'Reply to Simon Blackburn', Philosophical Books, 27/4, 203–208. - (1995a), 'Saint-Just's Illusion',Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, 1982–1993, 135–150. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - (1995b), 'Truth in Ethics', Ratio, 8/3, 227–238. - (1995c), 'Replies', in J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, 185–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 33 • Matthieu Queloz - (1995d), 'The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics', Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, 1982–1993, 153–71. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - (1995e), 'What Does Intuitionism Imply?',Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, 1982–1993, 182–191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - (1996), 'Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look', in N.B.a.E.P. Tsui-James (ed.),The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, 23–35. Oxford: Blackwell. - (1997), Der Wert der Wahrheit. Wien: Passagen. - (1999a), 'Seminar with Bernard Williams', Ethical Perspectives, 6/3–4, 243–265. - (1999b), 'Bernard Williams', in A. Pyle (ed.), Key Philosophers in Conversation:The Cogito Interviews, 142–163. London: Routledge. - (2000), 'Naturalism andGenealogy', in E. Harcourt (ed.),Morality,Reflection, and Ideology, 148–161. Oxford: Oxford University Press. - (2002),Truth and Truthfulness:An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. - (2003), 'Relativism, History, and the Existence of Values', in R.J. Wallace (ed.),The Practice of Value, 106–117. Oxford: Clarendon Press. - (2005), 'Realism and Moralism in Political Theory', in G. Hawthorne (ed.), In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism andMoralism in Political Argument, 1–17. Princeton: Princeton University Press. - (2006a), 'Plato's Construction of Intrinsic Goodness', in M. Burnyeat (ed.), TheSense of the Past: Essays in theHistory of Philosophy, 118–139. Princeton: Princeton University Press. - (2006b), 'Understanding Homer: Literature, History and Ideal Anthropology', in M. Burnyeat (ed.),The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy, 60–70. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche • 34 -(2006c), 'Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline', in A.W.Moore (ed.),Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 180–199. Princeton: Princeton University Press. - (2006d), 'There Are Many Kinds of Eyes', in M. Burnyeat (ed.),The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy, 325–330. Princeton: Princeton University Press. - (2006e), 'Philosophy and the Understanding of Ignorance', in A.W. Moore (ed.), Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 169–179. Princeton: Princeton University Press. - (2011), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Routledge. - (2012), 'Nietzsche: The Gay Science', in R.B. Pippin (ed.), Introductions to Nietzsche, 137–151. New York: Cambridge University Press.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "History of Science Society and University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Isis. http://www.jstor.org Review Author(s): Gary Hatfield Review by: Gary Hatfield Source: Isis, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 340-341 Published by: on behalf of University of Chicago Press History of Science Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/233741 Accessed: 24-11-2015 14:24 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:24:20 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 340 BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 81: 2: 307 (1990) Three aspects of maritime concern can be identified: cosmographic theories about the globe and the oceans involved astronomy , cartography, and mathematics. The measurement of space and time depended on the development of instruments, and the story of ships and sail is that of technology. The social dimensions of a maritime society , and the trend toward \"scientific\" description , representation, explanation, and treatment of new environments and societies , are discussed in the context of the Casa de la Contratacion and the Consejo de Indias, unique centers of learning built on secular concerns. There are no footnotes, but a basic bibliography , an index, and a chronology make this well-written survey a useful reference as well. URSULA LAMB * Early Modern Period Marinus Dirk Stafleu. Theories at Work: On the Structure and Functioning of Theories in Science, in Particular during the Copernican Revolution. (Christian Studies Today .) 310 pp., bibl., index. Lanham, Md.! New York: University Press of America, 1987; Toronto: Institute for Christian Studies , 1987. $28.75 (cloth); $16.50 (paper). Theories at Work arose from classroom teaching and probably is intended for use in upper-level courses in the history and philosophy of science. It attempts to develop a theory of theories and to test that theory against the \"history of ideas,\" both philosophical and scientific, during the Copernican revolution. Two reasons are offered for this choice of historical test. First, it is claimed that the Copernican revolution brought about a fundamental change in the way the basic axioms of a theory were conceived : whereas the ancient ideal required that axioms be self-evident or intuitively obvious, Copernicus's willingness to flout common sense ushered in the modern penchant for treating theoretical axioms as contingent and as initially unknown. Second , the Copernican revolution has been a central test case for the \"new\" philosophy of science of Karl Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn. The second reason plays the larger role in structuring the book, which effectively contains two parts: an examination of the role of theories in early modern astronomy and physics (Chs. 2-6), and a discussion of the norms and values that should guide the development of theories (Chs. 7-12). In the first part the author argues that theorists should aim for causal explanation, rather than mere prediction; that during the Copernican revolution there was a change in the principles of scientific explanation, and in particular that motion changed from being something that required explanation to being a principle of explanation; and that the aim of modern science is to discover laws, not merely to solve problems. In the chapters on value he argues that the norms of theory making should include the attempt to be clear, the attempt to avoid giving offense, the duty to publish, and the search for simple and harmonious laws. In the final chapter the author contends that realism in science always is a matter of belief , for which no proof is possible. He commends a \"reformationist view\" of the laws of nature, attributed to John Calvin, according to which laws are the free and arbitrary creation of a god who remains faithful to the laws so decreed, thereby ensuring a stable natural order that is subject to scientific investigation. The author describes this view not as a metaphysical tenet but as an article of faith. The book's theism will seem a benefit to some and a drawback to others. Let us place it to one side and examine the book on its historical and philosophical merits. The description of the \"article of faith\" just mentioned as essentially \"reformational\" may be questioned, for Descartes adopted a voluntarist position virtually identical with the one attributed to Calvin. More generally, although the book cites primary sources frequently, the interpretation of these sources draws heavily upon such authors as E. A. Burtt, E. J. Dijksterhuis, the early A. R. Hall, and Alexandre Koyre. The historiography is thus quite dated and echoes the familiar but dubious position that Archimedes, Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes were all \"Platonists.\" In accordance with Pierre Duhem, all technical astronomy prior to Copernicus is incorrectly described as \"instrumentalist\" (Sec. 2.1). Some of the historical discussions are interesting , including the analysis of Christiaan Huygens as a \"normal scientist\" (Sec. 4.2), the claim that \"crises\" follow the introduction of new theories, rather than preceding them (Sec. 4.5), and the discussion of the This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:24:20 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 81: 2: 307 (1990) 341 relations among the theories of Newton, Galileo, Kepler, and Descartes (Sec. 5.1). In general the work is strongest when dealing with the relation of Newton to his predecessors and successors. However, numerous factual and interpretive errors undercut its usefulness as a textbook, as when it is claimed that according to Descartes planetary rotation is the cause of vortical motion, or that Descartes's treatment of rest and rectilinear motion as \"states\" was fully equivalent to Newton's law of inertia (Sec. 3.4; according to Descartes, a change in the direction of straight-line motion does not require force). Moreover, the chief historical argument of the book, pertaining to the rejection of the Aristotelian ideal of self-evident axioms, is weakened by a failure to discuss the Aristotelian distinction between the order of knowledge and the order of nature (in the former order, axioms are not originally evident). Philosophically, the attempt to observe \"theories at work\" is commendable and indicates the author's alliance with Popper, Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan, who are frequently cited, sometimes with approval, sometimes in disagreement. The more particular philosophical claims of the author, such as that human experience can be analyzed into four irreducible modes (number, space, motion, and physical interaction ), are of interest but are not developed sufficiently to permit evaluation. GARY HATFIELD Juan A. Frago Gracia; Jose Garcia-Diego. Un autor aragone's para \"Los veintiun libros de los ingenios y de las maquinas.\" (Coleccion Estudios y Monografias, 7.) 148 pp., illus. Zaragoza: Diputacion General de Aragon, 1988. The Veintiun libros is among the most substantial technological manuscripts of the sixteenth century. Running to over nine hundred pages, now bound in five volumes, the twenty-one books describe every technology that makes use of water, with information on such matters as the chemical processes used in refining, the material used in the construction of bridges, harbors , conduits, and much else. In all, the work is almost as comprehensive as Georgius Agricola's De re metallica or Vannoccio Biringuccio's Pirotechnia, which may have been its model. Until 1976 the manuscript was assumed to be by a celebrated maker of clocks, planetaria, and automatic puppets, Juanelo Turriano of Cremona: he was also known as a hydraulic engineer and had designed a novel if cumbersome waterworks for Toledo and its palace, the Alcazar. In that year, however, J. A. Garcia-Diego showed how implausible this attribution was. Simply , there is hardly any congruence between Turriano's career as known to us and the areas of expertise of the author of the Veintiu'n libros-no mention of any of the inventions of Turriano or of the places where he worked (the places that are mentioned are in Aragon, where Turriano apparently never went). At first Garcia-Diego thought something at least of the manuscript was contributed by Giovanni Francesco Sitoni, an Italian engineer who did work in Aragon. GarciaDiego has since found a manuscript on irrigation by Sitoni, which he hopes to publish . But it is now clear that Sitoni cannot be the author of the Veintiuin libros. Garcia -Diego had already concluded that the author must be a native speaker of Spanish. He has now collaborated with the philologist Juan Frago Gracia to produce what must be a definitive study of the language of the Veintiuin libros. Frago Gracia's thorough investigation reveals a wealth of words used only in certain parts of Aragon, with local spellings and syntax. Clearly the author's mother tongue was Aragonese Spanish. Indeed, although a number of the place names mentioned are in the southern highlands of Aragon, the vocabulary strongly suggests an origin further north, in the Alto Aragon between the Ebro basin and the Pyrenees (roughly, the modern province of Huesca). More tentatively , Frago Gracia proposes the central part of the province. Other inquiries by Garcia-Diego, to experts in design, tell us that the costume and architectural details of the four hundred-plus drawings that illustrate the Veintiiun libros are probably of the last decade of the sixteenth century. The language seems to bear this date out, broadly speaking. So we now have a time and a place-approximately. Have we an author? N. Garcia Tapia has argued for the one man he believes fits the bill, Pedro Juan de Lastanosa (most recently and most fully in \"Pedro Juan de Lastanosa y Pseudo-Juanelo Turriano,\" Llull, 1987, 10:51-74). He has claimed that Lastanosa is the only engiThis content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:24:20 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "(This is the accepted version of the paper. Please download the published version of the paper later at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/psc) Political Meritocracy and Its Betrayal Franz Mang Abstract: Some Confucian scholars have recently claimed that Confucian political meritocracy is superior to Western democracy. I have great reservations about such a view. In this paper, I argue that so long as political meritocracy-be it Confucian or non-Confucian-does not commit itself to the ideal of democracy, it has the dangerous tendency to become politically oppressive in the hands of authoritarian rulers. To illustrate the problem, I first revisit Isiah Berlin's classical discussion of the idea of positive liberty; he is deeply concerned about the abuse of this idea in the hands of dictators. Next, I examine Daniel Bell's model of meritocracy in relation to China's present form of governance. While Bell's model and China's present form of governance may not show political meritocracy at its best, they help to show that any version of political meritocracy that lacks a strong commitment to democracy tends to be political oppressive and, ultimately, may betray the ideal of political meritocracy. 2 1. Introduction With the growth of East Asia's political influence-in particular, China's influence- Confucian scholars are once again contemplating how Confucianism might shape the world's future.1 And for those Confucian scholars who are particularly interested in political philosophy or political theory, the Confucian approach to statecraft has become all the more important, given the recent setbacks to democracy around the world.2 Some political philosophers, including Jiang Qing, Bai Tongdong, and Daniel Bell, have even claimed that Confucian political meritocracy is superior to liberal democracy.3 But is that really the case? Political meritocracy, or simply meritocracy, can be understood as a political mechanism that selects and promotes leaders with superior ability and virtue. To achieve this aim, the relevant kinds of political rights are distributed on the basis of people's ability and virtue. In contrast, contemporary democracy, or simply democracy, can be understood as the ideal of rule by the people that is tied to the ideal of political equality; and the ideal of political equality, in turn, can be understood as the ideal of guaranteeing equal political standing of all citizens.4 Confucian political philosophers, in general, depart from the ideal of democracy as it is defined above. This is not to say that they want to dismiss democracy and get rid of popular 1 See, e.g., Angle (2012); Bai (2012); Bell (2015); Chan (2014); Fan (2013); Jiang (2013); Kim (2018); Li (2009); Shin (2011); and Tan (forthcoming). 2 For an instructive discussion of the recent setbacks to democracy, see Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018: 1–10). 3 See, e.g., Jiang (2013: 27–32); Bai (2012; 2013a: 74–80); and Bell (2015: 27–43). 4 For a similar interpretation of political equality, see, e.g., Anderson (1999: 312–13); Buchanan (2002: 710); Cohen (2003: 92). Of course, it can be reasonably argued that democracy is not necessarily associated with political equality; see Wall (2007). 3 election. Yet, they generally think that it is of vital importance for the state, such as the Chinese state, to seek to combine Confucian political meritocracy-or simply Confucian meritocracy- and democracy in some way. Confucian meritocracy refers to any kind of meritocratic political mechanism that is based on, or inspired by, Confucianism or Confucian values. For example, in ancient China, the imperial examination (keju) adopted a Confucian examination syllabus for selecting officials. For some Confucian scholars, while Confucian meritocracy needs to be endorsed in order to prevent the ills of liberal democracy and to make politics truly aim at the good, a robust commitment to the ideal of democracy, as the ideal is defined above, is either unnecessary or undesirable. For example, Jiang Qing has claimed that \"the way ahead for China's political development is the Way of the Humane Authority and not democracy.\"5 To him, the main problem with Western democracy is that \"there is nothing that can keep it in check.\"6 He proposes a specific type of tricameral legislature, which consists of the House of Ru (i.e., the House of Confucian scholars), the House of the Nation, and the House of the People.7 It is worth noting that, in Jiang's model of meritocracy, while the House of the People is democratically elected and the three houses are supposed to counterbalance each other, the House of Ru, which consists of Confucian scholars not democratically chosen, enjoys \"a permanent power of veto\" over the laws proposed by the House of the People.8 Thus, Confucian meritocracy enjoys 5 Jiang (2013: 27). 6 Jiang (2013: 29). 7 Jiang (2013: 27–43). 8 Jiang (2013: 41–42). 4 supreme power. Jiang's model of meritocracy obviously departs from the ideal of democracy as defined above. Unlike Jiang, Bai Tongdong is concerned about the danger of making Confucianism a national religion for any modern pluralistic society such as today's China.9 However, he agrees with other Confucian scholars that Western democracies are plagued with serious problems. Drawing on Mencius, he proposes a hybrid regime that gives Confucian meritocracy a central role to play.10 Such a hybrid regime consists of \"a popularly elected chamber\" and a Confucian chamber whose members \"hold to the basic ideas of Confucianism\" and are \"selected through examination or recommendation.\"11 He believes that \"a strengthened voice of the Confucian in the legislature\" can \"promote good policymaking in key areas.\"12 Yet, it is unclear whether for him the head of state and the highest officials should be democratically elected or meritocratically chosen. If he is right in claiming that \"the shortcomings of the popular vote\" are \"deeply rooted\" and \"cannot be put to rights within the present democratic system,\"13 then it is most likely that he would agree that the head of state and the highest officials need not be democratically elected. Thus, it appears that Bai's model of meritocracy also lacks a strong commitment to the ideal of democracy. 9 Bai (2013b: 117–18). 10 Bai (2012: 74–80). 11 Bai (2012: 79). 12 Ibid. 13 Bai (2012: 78). 5 As for Daniel Bell, Western democracy has attracted a lot of \"blind faith.\"14 Since I will examine his model of meritocracy later, let me here describe only briefly how it departs from the ideal of democracy. Basically: he endorses a certain meritocratic and nondemocratic method for the selection of the highest political leaders, and, for him, this group of leaders make the most important political decisions on behalf of the people. In short, Jiang, Bai, Bell, and some other Confucian meritocrats depart from the ideal of democracy as it is commonly understood, since they believe that (a) the highest political leaders, including the head of a government, need not be democratically chosen, and that (b) the exercise of political power by the leaders who are meritocratically chosen need not be severely restrained by the people. I have great reservations about such a limited commitment to democracy. This is not because I consider political meritocracy as unjustified.15 Rather, it is because those Confucian meritocrats have overlooked the following important thing: political meritocracy-be it Confucian or non-Confucian-has the dangerous tendency to be politically oppressive in the hands of authoritarian rulers if it is not accompanied by a strong commitment to democracy.16 14 Bell (2015: 61–62). 15 In my view, some meritocratic practices are justifiable and may even be necessary for some societies (at least for a specific period of time). After all, democracy should not be pursued regardless of the concrete social and political conditions of a society. For a related discussion, see Hadenius and Teorell (2005). 16 This problem should not bother those Confucian scholars who hold a steadfast commitment to the ideal of democracy in seeking to combine democracy and Confucian meritocracy. Sungmoon Kim is one of these scholars; see Kim (2018, esp. Chs.1–2). 6 To illustrate the problem, I will revisit Isaiah Berlin's classical discussion of the idea of positive liberty. I argue that what he intended to show are historical lessons about the abuse of the idea of liberty in the actual world, rather than a pure conceptual analysis of the idea of liberty. I submit that we should take these historical lessons seriously in understanding the practice of political meritocracy. Next, I examine Bell's model of meritocracy in relation to China's present form of governance. I have serious doubts about the legitimacy of any kind of political meritocracy that is not committed to the ideal of democracy. 2. From political ideas to political oppression Confucian meritocrats might say that there is, of course, a gap between the ideal and the practice concerning political meritocracy, just as there is such a gap in relation to other political ideals. But, in my view, what is deeply worrying about political meritocracy cannot be fully grasped in terms of such a gap. As I will seek to demonstrate, there is a dangerous risk of the abuse of the idea of political meritocracy in the hands of authoritarian rulers. To illustrate the problem, let me revisit Berlin's discussion of positive liberty. In his seminal essay \"Two Concepts of Liberty,\" Berlin distinguishes between two different ways of understanding political liberty.17 Accordingly, there is the negative sense of liberty and there is the positive sense of liberty. Negative liberty is the freedom from constraints imposed by other agents, while positive liberty is the freedom to pursue and achieve desired goals. Notice that Berlin's analysis of the two concepts of liberty was accompanied with a historical account. To him, the negative sense of liberty has a relatively clear meaning. It 17 Berlin (2002a). 7 emerged and developed from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries in some Western countries, in particular Britain and France, and it had long been associated with classical liberal thought.18 Positive liberty, though, was a more ambiguous concept. Throughout the history of philosophy, liberty (in the positive sense) had been taken to refer to autonomy, rational selfmastery, self-overcoming, and the Rousseauian idea of collective self-rule.19 Berlin pointed out that, in Rousseau's view, freedom is achieved through obedience to the general will. Thus, freedom involves \"obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves,\" irrespective of our disparate preferences.20 It is this collective sense of freedom that deeply concerned Berlin; indeed, he considered that it had been historically central in politics. Importantly, whether freedom is understood in terms of Rousseau's general will or Kant's idea of rational autonomy, it invariably points to the transformation of the concept of the individual's will from what an individual actually desires to what an individual ought to desire. As such, an individual's goals or preferences should be regarded as unimportant, or simply irrelevant. Against this, Berlin advocated negative liberty, according to which an individual, at an empirical level, desires to be free from constraints and to act freely in his or her own way. To Berlin, negative liberty is definitely \"more humane\" than \"the goals of those who seek in the great disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 'positive' self-mastery.\"21 18 Berlin (2002a: 170–71). 19 Berlin (2002a: 179–212). 20 Berlin (2002a: 183). 21 Berlin (2002a: 216). 8 Berlin was horrified by the political enforcement of positive liberty. In \"A letter to George Kenna,\" he wrote: What horrifies one about Soviet or Nazi practice is not merely the suffering and the cruelty. . . . What turns one inside out, and is indescribable, is the spectacle of one set of persons who so tamper and \"get at\" others that the others do their will without knowing what they are doing; and in this lose their status as free human beings, indeed as human beings at all.22 In other words, Berlin was horrified by the fact that positive liberty was easily exploited by politically powerful people, causing massive manipulation and dehumanization. To him, liberty misdefined is not liberty at all. The history of totalitarian movements of the twentieth century has shown that Berlin's worries are far from theoretical. For example, Pol Pot (1925–1998), the general secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea from 1963 to 1981, frequently claimed that the Cambodian people should be \"liberated.\"23 Under his rule, the majority of the Cambodian people were relocated to the countryside to work on collective farms-the fulfilment of Pol Pot's ideal of liberation. Many of them died of malnutrition, starvation, or execution. It is estimated that around 1.5 million people perished in Pol Pot's prison-camp state.24 This is only one of the tragic examples of the betrayal of liberty, and it may be worth noting that Berlin's lecture on the two concepts of liberty was first delivered at Oxford in 1958, which was five years before the commencement of Pol Pot's leadership of the Cambodian Communist Party. 22 Berlin (2002b: 339; emphasis added). 23 Kiernan (1996: 31). 24 Kiernan (1996: 9). 9 Hence, what Berlin intended to offer was not a pure conceptual analysis of liberty. If we regard his analysis as purely conceptual, then we would not sense the kind of fear he had-which he thought all of us should have-about the possibilities for monstrous abuse of the concept of liberty.25 As some scholars have already suggested, political theorizing should have a historical dimension.26 From ahistorical conceptual analyses and thought experiments alone, we will not find any bloodstains, so to speak. The kind of historical lessons that Berlin intended to draw about liberty can be called the betrayal of liberty: in the name of liberty, authoritarians and dictators have adopted highly oppressive measures for achieving \"liberation\" or \"real freedom,\" causing widespread suppression of individual liberties and sometimes even the killing of people.27 I submit that we should take serious note of such historical lessons about political oppression in understanding the practice of political meritocracy. To be sure, political meritocracy and positive liberty are not the same thing, and they certainly differ in their practices. But, importantly, they might both appear to be attractive as theoretical concepts while their adoption in politics can be disastrous for the people who are subject to them. I propose, therefore, what can be called the betrayal of meritocracy, as follows: 25 Berlin has also discussed the political persecution in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia; see Berlin (2002a: 55– 93, 336–44). 26 For a useful discussion, see Smith (2000). 27 In my view, rather than treating Berlin as an adamant opponent to positive liberty, it would be more appropriate to treat him as a resolute advocate for individual freedom against collectivism and totalitarianism. Here, I share Joshua Cherniss's and Henry Hardy's view (2018). 10 In the name of political meritocracy, some rulers claim that the rule of the elite is necessary for maintaining law and order, for promoting people's welfare, or for enhancing national prestige. Hence, they adopt what they consider to be the necessary measures of suppressing individual liberties and, in some cases, even killing some of those who, they think, stand in the way of meritocracy.28 A note should be made to avoid misunderstandings. Some might think that what I am calling the \"betrayal of meritocracy\" need not be a problem for the rulers who adopt meritocracy, since these rulers may not care about the suppression of individual liberties and even the killing of some people; they are concerned, most fundamentally, with the success of their meritocratic rule. I do not necessarily deny this. Yet, in my discussion, the betrayal of meritocracy is a kind of betrayal of the subjects of meritocracy. It is a betrayal because the rulers who advocate meritocracy most commonly promise that each and every individual can benefit from it; but, in fact, this is seldom the case. To illustrate my point, I will discuss Daniel Bell's model of meritocracy in relation to China's present form of governance. 28 Of course, suppression of individual liberties and the killing of people are not the same thing, but it is not uncommon for rulers who consider themselves meritocratic to do both things for a \"better future\" of their country. For examples of the killing of people on such grounds, please refer to the Chinese government's bloody crackdown on democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, and the Khmer Rouge's purges in 1970s with the aim of creating \"only pure Khmer people\"; see Lim (2014: ch. 2) and Kiernan (2008: ch. 7), respectively. 11 3. Daniel Bell's model of political meritocracy To Daniel Bell, people have put a lot of blind faith in Western electoral democracy.29 Against electoral democracy, he proposed a meritocratic form of government that he called \"the China Model,\" or, more precisely, \"the vertical model of democratic meritocracy.\" While such a model of government adopts some democratic practices, it does not commit itself to the ideal of democracy as defined above. His model has three planks: democracy at the local level, experimentation with democratic practices below the top leadership level, and nondemocratic selection of leaders at the top.30 Drawing inspiration from Confucian ideas, he seeks to show that his model is both \"morally desirable and politically realistic.\"31 He develops his model of meritocracy in four steps. First, he criticizes liberal democracy.32 To him, liberal democracy suffers a number of serious flaws, including the tyranny of the majority (i.e., the interests of minorities are either compromised or sacrificed), the tyranny of the minority (i.e., the wealthy class corrupts fairness in politics), the tyranny of the voting community (i.e., voters tend to ignore the basic interests of future generations and foreigners), and the tyranny of competitive individualists (i.e., democratic competition exacerbates social conflicts). So, he invites us to think about alternatives to electoral democracy-in particular, the prospects of political meritocracy. 29 Those who have blind faith in electoral democracy he calls \"democratic fundamentalists.\" See Bell (2015: 61–62). 30 Bell (2015: 151–78). 31 Bell (2015: 6–7). 32 Bell (2015: 14–62). 12 Second, he investigates the qualities that matter most in a meritocratic leader.33 To Bell, intellectual abilities, social skills, and moral virtue are the most important qualities that make a political leader suitable for governing a political community in the contemporary world. For the sake of China's future, he believes, certain things should be done to improve its meritocratic system. These measures include: a better examination system for testing people's intellectual abilities, an increase in the participation of women in political leadership, and an improved peerreview system for promoting (and demoting) political leaders. Third, he examines the main difficulties with political meritocracy.34 To him, independent supervisory institutions, higher salaries, and moral education are all crucial for tackling the abuse of political power. It is also necessary to prevent the political hierarchies from becoming fixed. However, he admits that it is very difficult for political meritocracy to be fully legitimate. As a solution, he proposes that some democratic practices seem to be necessary for legitimizing meritocracy. Finally, fourth, he argues that political meritocracy and democracy can be reconciled.35 His solution is the three-plank vertical model of democratic meritocracy. In arguing for this model, he rules out alternative models of democratic meritocracy, for he thinks that they are either politically unrealistic or insufficiently meritocratic. He claims that his own model, which retains meritocratic leaders at the top and seeks to improve itself through perfecting the peerreview system for selecting leaders, is both practicable and desirable. Interestingly, he suggests that the Chinese government may need to secure people's support by referendum, for reasons of 33 Bell (2015: 63–109). 34 Bell (2015: 110–50). 35 Bell (2015: 151–98). 13 political legitimacy. He claims that it would be ideal to \"specify a time period in the referendum itself-say, fifty years-long enough to provide stability for the recruitment and training of meritocratically selected leaders.\"36 To be fair to Bell, it should be noted that he has not claimed that societies should pursue political meritocracy through political oppression. In fact, he has pointed out that the Chinese state ought to become less oppressive and that the rule of law is of great importance for meritocracy to succeed.37 Yet, he believes that his model is most likely to work only in the context of a single-party state, such as China under the Chinese Communist Party.38 But it is exactly such a lack of commitment to democracy in Bell's model and in some other models of meritocracy that is deeply problematic from a moral point of view. In order to see the problems clearly, let us reflect on China's present form of governance. Bell and many other scholars have praised China's development in recent decades as an enormous success. Yet, whose success are they talking about? a. China's success-whose success is it? Bell-and many others who have expressed admiration for \"China's success\"-have not asked the above question. It might appear to be a silly question, as they might simply say that the success is, of course, China's and the Chinese people's. But the answer may not be so simple. It has been reported that a large number of Muslim Uyghurs in China are being \"reeducated\" in 36 Bell (2015: 177). 37 Bell (2015: 114, 191, 197). 38 Bell (2015: 172). 14 camps set up by the Chinese government.39 Suppose we had the opportunity to ask some of these Uyghurs: \"To what extent are you enjoying China's success?\" What sort of answer might we expect from them? Notice that the Chinese government doesn't simply treat these Uyghurs as foreigners or \"losers\" in China's development; the point of \"reeducation\" is exactly that they are being treated as part of the Chinese people and that, as some officials have claimed, they will benefit from China's development only by learning to become \"civilized\"-in a certain way. Yet, we seem to have every reason to regard such treatment of the Uyghurs as a case of ethnic oppression. It is, in fact, rather easy to catalog examples showing that China's \"success\" has not been equitably shared. Notably, the 1994–2012 construction of the Three Gorges Dam, the world's largest hydropower project, led to the displacement of more than 1.4 million people and the destruction of more than a thousand villages by flooding.40 Advocates of political meritocracy, such as Bell, might argue that, despite a rather long list of moral problems with the Chinese government, the government is still doing the right thing for the people. As Bell has reminded us, several hundred million Chinese have been lifted out of poverty under the Chinese Communist Party's leadership.41 39 See, for example, a BBC report, \"UN 'alarmed' by reports of China's mass detention of Uighurs (31 August 2018),\" at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45364689. It is worth noting that the CCP has been adopting \"thought reform\" for the purposes of brainwashing since the 1950s, if not earlier. See the psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton's research (1989). 40 See Dawson and Farber (2012: ch. 2). 41 Bell (2015: 36). 15 Let us grant that poverty in China could not have been alleviated to such a remarkable degree without the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).42 Nevertheless, Bell's kind of utilitarian reasoning can hardly justify the party's rule. For, even if utilitarianism as a moral theory is sound, it is definitely possible that the suffering of the victims under the party's rule has been so enormous that it outweighs all the happiness and pleasure that have been enjoyed by the (up-to-now) more fortunate Chinese people.43 In addition, there is a fundamental moral criticism of utilitarianism pertinent to our assessment of the party's political legitimacy; namely, that utilitarianism fails to take the separateness of individual persons seriously.44 Basically, it makes little sense to treat all Chinese people from the past to the present as a homogeneous entity that can enjoy \"China's success.\" Would it not make more sense to treat each Chinese man or woman as an individual with human dignity? Some might argue that it is pointless to insist that the moral legitimacy of a meritocratic regime needs to be assessed in terms of individuals' human dignity, for, after all, it is the total welfare of the subjects of meritocracy that counts. But, as a matter of fact, advocates of meritocracy usually do claim that meritocracy benefits each and every individual. Even for Bell, meritocracy should not concern the total welfare of the subjects of meritocracy alone. At one 42 Note that it is always difficult to show that authoritarian rule is essential to economic development. For an indepth discussion, see Sen (1999: 148–51). 43 Indeed, Bell has not said much about those who died because of the CCP's oppression or misrule. And for the current status of civil liberties in China, see, e.g., \"Human Freedom Index\" and \"World Press Freedom Index\" published in 2018. 44 John Rawls has made this criticism. See Rawls (1999: 167). 16 point, he juxtaposes Mencius and John Rawls to highlight the great importance for politicians to pay attention to the plight of the individuals of the least advantaged group in China.45 However, Bell cannot have it both ways; either he is concerned exclusively with the aggregate welfare of the people or he is concerned about the plight of the individuals of the least advantaged group in a country. He seems to be concerned exclusively with the aggregate welfare of the people in China. For in his assessment of the CCP's legitimacy, he has not asked any challenging question about the party's legitimacy from the perspective of the least advantaged groups in China, which may well consist of Muslim Uyghurs, Liu Xiaobo, and those students and workers who set up their tents at Tiananmen Square in 1989.46 b. Full protection of the rule of law and civil liberties without democracy? To be fair to Bell, it should be noted that he has stressed the importance of the rule of law and of civil liberties.47 But there is a problem: how could the CCP safeguard civil liberties while maintaining its authoritarian rule? In defending meritocracy, Bell often talks about the CCP and Singapore's People's Action Party.48 However, there is little reason to think that these political parties are champions of civil liberties or of human rights. 45 Bell (2015: 74). 46 I am referring to the crackdown on students and demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in 1989. In fact, Bell has conceded that the Chinese state should be more tolerant. He has also pointed out that the CCP sometimes was unnecessarily oppressive. See Bell (2015: 269 note 60). In my view, while theorists of meritocracy may complain about the \"unnecessary\" oppression executed by authoritarian rulers, the fact remains that political oppression and the killing of people tend to repeat themselves so long as authoritarian rulers wield absolute power. 47 Bell (2015: 114, 191, 197). 48 Bell (2015: 32-36). 17 Bell sometimes uses Hong Kong as an example to illustrate how a political community can maintain the rule of law and fight corruption without democratic election of the head of a government and of the highest officials.49 This is not an entirely bad example. Indeed, before its handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong appeared to be an outstanding example of a free society governed by a meritocratic yet nondemocratic government. However, it should be noted, first, that Hong Kong before 1997 was not comparable with China or Singapore, for it was not under any single-party rule, whether within Hong Kong or from the United Kingdom. Second, since 1997, Hong Kong has been governed under the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's formula of \"one country, two systems.\" But the so-called two systems have been subject to the increasing political influence of the CCP's single-party rule, and, in this way, Hong Kong is becoming increasingly more comparable to China and Singapore. Notably, we are observing an obvious decline in the Hong Kong government's commitment to the rule of law.50 Hong Kong citizens' liberties, in particular freedom of speech and freedom of association, are being continuously reduced and threatened. Had Bell kept himself updated with recent developments in Hong Kong (he needed only to know a little more about Hong Kong's development since 1997), he would have been able to see that his ideal of a free society under a nondemocratic political meritocracy has been discredited. Political meritocrats, in general, are very critical of liberal democracy. But they tend to overlook the fact that liberal democracy, coupled with the rule of law, has enabled many countries to enjoy sustainable economic and social development without suppressing civil 49 Bell (2013: 2015: 117–18, 191) 50 For a recent example, see a BBC report, \"Fears over Hong Kong–China extradition plans (on 8 April 2019)\" at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-47810723. 18 liberties.51 Bell has not denied that, nor has he denied the importance of civil liberties, as I have pointed out. Yet if civil liberties are really important, then the Western democracies should take pride in what they have achieved. Why should they look up to any model of meritocracy- Confucian or non-Confucian-that lacks a strong commitment to democracy? Further, so long as a nondemocratic regime is determined to maintain its authority, it needs to suppress its political opponents in a systematic way. Thus, there develops what I call a cycle of oppression and resentment: violent oppression and humiliating punitive measures make many people resent the oppressors, and some of these people tend to retaliate violently, which, in turn, leads to more political oppression executed by the government in the name of social order and harmony, and so on, and so forth.52 A free society under a nondemocratic meritocracy seems to be a chimera. c. Nondemocratic political meritocracy-temporary or eternal? Some advocates of political meritocracy might claim that for China, Vietnam, and some other countries the premature adoption of democratic practices will do more harm than good, and that, for these countries, a nondemocratic meritocratic government is vital for achieving sustainable economic growth and social development.53 This line of argument is worth noticing, 51 For discussions of the crucial importance of democracy for protecting individual liberties and preventing political oppression, see, e.g., Dahl (1989: esp. 77–79); Linz (1997: esp. 418–19); O'Donnell (2004); Sen (1999: 146–59, 227–49); and Shapiro (2003: 224–30). 52 Such a cycle can be observed in China's Xinjiang, and in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, etc. 53 Bell has pointed out that the premature adoption of democracy could be harmful for a political community. See, for example, (2015: 15). 19 and I can agree that, in some cases, democratization does more harm than good for a country's short-term development. However, there are certain difficult problems with the above argument. First, as we have seen, so long as a meritocracy lacks a strong commitment to democracy, it tends to be politically oppressive. The moral loss that results from the suppression of civil liberties-and even the killing of heretics-can hardly be offset by economic growth and social development. Second, if it is correct to claim that liberal democracy coupled with the rule of law has enabled many countries to enjoy sustainable economic and social development without suppressing civil liberties, then there is very strong reason for any nondemocratic meritocracy to become fully democratized in the long term.54 In addition, a difficult problem exists concerning meritocratic leadership; namely, who is morally qualified to make meritocracy work? Bell is surely right in saying that if political meritocracy is desirable, then reliable mechanisms should be in place for choosing virtuous leaders.55 However, who will set up these mechanisms? Who will train future leaders? And who will devise regulations for meritocratic rule? It is extremely difficult to determine those who are qualified to shoulder these responsibilities on a long-term basis.56 For all of the above reasons, we should worry about the long-term performance of any government that lacks a strong commitment to democracy-be it meritocratic or not.57 54 Sustainable economic growth is another strong reason for democratization. See, e.g., recent research by Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson (2019). In fact, some historians hold the view that, for its long-term development, China should become a liberal democratic regime. See, e.g., Yu (2018: 129). 55 Bell (2015: 99–105). 56 Bell appears to have a good deal of trust in the Chinese political leaders (see Bell 2015: 105, 112). However, he has not provided argument for that. 57 For a related discussion, see Sen (1999: 51, 152; 2001: 188–9); and Drèze and Sen (1989: 264). 20 4. Must political meritocracy be politically oppressive? Of course, the pursuit of political meritocracy does not have to rely on oppressive measures-at least, that is the case in theory. However, what I have sought to demonstrate is that political meritocracy does have the tendency to become politically oppressive in actual politics, insofar as it does not commit itself to the ideal of democracy. Let me explain this point more clearly. Facing citizens' oppositional political views and, in some cases, their resistance to the government, rulers-be they Confucian or non-Confucian-who do not commit themselves to democracy have to adopt a wide range of high-handed measures to sustain their authority. Many people consider Singapore and China as outstanding examples of political meritocracy, but few would deny that these are authoritarian regimes and that they are oppressing people's basic liberties in the face of political disagreements and political resistance. Living under such regimes, citizens have every reason to complain that they are being betrayed by their rulers who claim to be meritocratic. The betrayal of meritocracy has two aspects. On the one hand, in the name of meritocracy, rulers may abuse power to satisfy their own interests, and, as a result, some citizens who have expected to benefit from meritocratic rule become victims of political oppression. On the other hand, even conscientious rulers may suppress citizens' basic liberties and, in extreme cases, kill some of them on the grounds of maintaining political meritocracy. As a result, there again arises what I have referred to as the vicious cycle of oppression and resentment: the victims of political oppression tend to react 21 violently, as they cannot seek redress through democratic procedures and an independent judiciary, and their violent acts, inevitably, lead to further political oppression, and so on.58 In short, although political meritocracy, at least in theory, does not have to be politically oppressive, it does have the dangerous tendency to be politically oppressive so long as it lacks a strong commitment to the ideal of democracy. 5. Concluding remarks Advocates of Confucian political meritocracy tend to compare political meritocracy at its best with liberal democracy at its most mediocre (or, simply, at its worst). But if my argument in this paper is, by and large, convincing, then it is extremely important for us to compare a political meritocracy and a liberal democracy at their worst. Indeed, we do not have to deny that contemporary Western democracies should learn something from Confucianism; after all, it would seem naïve to think that all the deep-rooted problems facing liberal democracy can only be cured by increased democratic participation. Nevertheless, we should see that any form of political meritocracy that does not commit itself to democracy is constantly on a dangerous slide toward the betrayal of meritocracy. Importantly, we should learn from history that most of the nondemocratic regimes-be they genuinely meritocratic or not-are politically oppressive, and that countless people have been persecuted, tortured, and/or killed in the name of national glory, social harmony, and the welfare of the majority. Think for a moment about China's future: We do not know exactly who 58 Some scholars, including Guillermo O'Donnell (2004), have argued that a truly democratic rule of law is crucial for ensuring political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability, and these things, in turn, affirm political equality of citizens and effectively prevent the abuse of political power. 22 will suffer the betrayal of meritocracy-they could be some of us, some of our friends, and even some of our children, insofar as the Chinese political leaders who claim to be meritocratic fail to take seriously the ideal of democracy. 23 References Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. \"Democracy Does Cause Growth.\" Journal of Political Economy, 127(1): 47–100. https://economics.mit.edu/files/16686. Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. \"What is the Point of Equality?\" Ethics, 109: 287–337. Angle, Stephen C. 2012. Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy. 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{"text": "", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "O Superv alorativismo e a Yagueza de Ordem Superior Ricardo Santos ] Universidade de É'ooro \"Querem fechar as escolas com menos de 2I alun Porque será uma escola com 21 alunos a. -.,ito plJ, qualidade do que uma com 22?\" Ana Benavente, Público, 7.VI.2010 S 1. ApnesENrAÇÃo Este artigo apresenta a teoúa supervalorativista da vagueza e discute a objecção, que frequentemenre lhe é dirigida, segundo a qual essa teoria não consegue dar conta do fenómeno da vagueza de ordem superior. Na lógica bivalente clássica, considera-se que todas as frases declarativas são ou verdadeiras ou falsas e que, normalmente, um predicado é verdadeiro de alguns objectos (ou sequências de objecros, se for relacional) e falso dos restantes. Mas predicados vagos como \"morìte\", \"careca\" r \"alto\", ttfíco\" ou \"corajoso\" resistem a esta regta: cada um destes predicados parece ter objectos chamados casos de fronteira a respeito dos quais nem é claro que a predicação seja verdadeira nem é claro que ela seja falsa. A teoria supervalorativista diz que, nesses casos, efectivamente, a predicação não é uerdadeira nern falsa e que isso acontece porque os predicados vagos têm um significado deficienre ou incompleto. Mas, muitas vezes, o que é incompleto pode ser completado; 197 e o que é vago pode ser tornado precis o. precisal um predicado vago seria distribúr os seus casos de fronteira pela sua exten. são e pela sua anti-extensão, até não restar mais nenhum (reg. taurando assim a bivalência). Essa distribuição seria arbitrâria, havendo múltiplas maneiras igualmente aceitáveis de a f47s1multiplas precisões. A ideia-chave do supervalorativisÍrìo coo. siste em, para cada palawa ou expressão vaga, não privilegiar nenhuma das suas possíveis precisões, mas considerar antes a sua totalidade, determinando então uma frase como verdadeira (ou falsa) se e somente se ela for verdadeira (ou falsa) em todas as precisões. Argumentavelmente, isto resulta numa clam tdpartição de valores as aplicações de um predicado vago aos objectos dividir-se-iam exaustivamente em uerdadeiras (ou verdadeiras em todas as precisões), falsas (ou falsas em todas as precisões) e indeterminadas (ou verdadeiras numas precisões e falsas noutras) -, â qual seria incompatível com o fenómeno da vagueza de ordem superior. Se chamarmos penumbra à zona onde estão os casos de fronteira de um predicado vago por oposição à sua extensão (onde estão os objectos de que ele é verdadeiro) e à sua anti-extensão (onde estão os objectos de que ele é falso) -, âvaguezade segunda ordem consiste na existência de objectos a respeito dos quais não ê claro, por exemplo, se pertencem à extensão ou à penumbra do predicado: objectos que são casos de fronteira de casos de fronteira do predicado. Aparentemente, esta ideia pode repetir-se indefinidamente, gerando aquilo a que se chama avagueza de ordem superior. Se um prcdicado como \"alto\" tem este tipo de vagueza,então não devcrá ser possível, numa série airropriada de homens ordenados quanto à sua altura, üzer qual é o ultimo que aind a é clammente alto (ou alto em todas as precisões), nem qual é o primeiro quc claramente não é alto, no meio dos quais ficariam aqueles que tanto poderiam ser classificados de uma maneira como de outra. Além cle ter casos de fronteira, um predicado vago não tem limites exacros de aplicação. De acordo com a objecção, é esta ultima característica que a teoria das supervalorações, com 198 199 atúparttção de valores semânticos que resulta da quantificação sobre todas as precisões admissíveis, não poderia respeitar. Esta objecção pode ser respondidal. Neste afiigo,irei considerar a resposta dadapor Rosanna Keefe, cujo livro Theories of Vagaeness constitui a mais decidida e elaborada defesa da teoria supervalorativista davaguezaz. Keefe considera que a objecção assenta no pressuposto de que a metalinguagem usada para descrever semanticamente (pela técnica das supervalorações) a linguagem vaga sob consideração é da própria uma linguagem precisa (na sua parte própria) e, então, nega que isso seja assim, propondo em alternativ a rma hierarquia de metalinguagens, ao longo da qual avagueza está sempre presente, de modo não eliminável. Keefe alega que o uso de uma metalinguagem vag para formular uma teoria que se propõe explicar como é que funciona uma linguagem vaga não ê viciosamente circular nem reduz a teoúa à trivialidade. Discutirei esta resposta, procurando avaltar os seus méritos. A adopção de uma metalinguagem vaga permite evitar a postulação de limites exactos em paqtictiar, ela abre espaço para a suposição de que não há um conjunto de frases verdadeiras da linguagem. Mas isso é conseguido à custa de um atestado de inadequação que a teoria passa a si próp ria dizendo que há frases que não são correctar Ao contrário do que parece penóar Guido Imaguire, que, no ensaio \"A vagueza e os paradoxos do sorites\" (in Imaguire e Schirn 2008: 101-124), sem considerar possíveis respostas, conclui precipitadamente que o supervaloratiüsmo \"não consegue dar conta do fenómeno da vagvez de ordem superior\" (117). Pedro Santos, na entrada \"Sorites\" da Enciclopédia de Ternzos Lógico-Filosóficos (2006), quando discute a teoria supervalorativista, também menciona a vagueza de segunda ordem como uma possível dificuldade, mas parece âpontar a aceitação da vagueza do conceito metalinguístico de verdade (\"par a P vago, a noção de Pa ser verdad eira ê ela própria vaga\") como uma via de saída, que todavia considera indesejável, na medida em que implicaria renunciar ao ideal de \"um tratamento preciso dos predicados vagos\" QL9), através do qual se conseguisse reduzit ava,guez à precisão. 2 Keefe (2000) baseia-se na semântica supervalorativista apresentadâ por Kit Fine (1975). Pode ler-se uma breve síntese da história do supervaloratiüsmo em \\üüilliamson Í994\\ l$-146 e em Keefe (2000) 165-L66. mente classificáveis por nenhum dos valores semânticos que a teoria postulou, em alternativa àlígica bivalente clássica. 52. VacuEZAE PARADoxo: o Somrps Ao mesmo tempo que recuperou o problema antigo da vagueza (discutido por Eubulides e pelos estóicos), a filosofia contemporânea mudou a atitude que inicialmente teve a seu respeito. Na sua grande maioria, os filósofos participantes na copiosa investigação sobre vagtJeza que se tem desenvolvido desde os anos 1970s não partilham da visão negativ^ de Frege e Russell, segundo a qual se trataria de um defeito das línguas naturais, que as condena irremediavelmente à inconsistência ou que as torna impróprias paru uso científico e insusceptíveis de qualquer tratamento lógico coerente. É tecorhecido por todos que as línguas naturais têm um léxico onde a vagueza predomina em grande medida sobre a precisão. De facto, quase tudo o que dizemos é dito em termos vagos. Mas porque é que ísto é assim? Porque é que as línguas naturais têm tantas expressões vagas? Russell sugeriu que isso é assim porque os nossos antepassados teriam sido demasiado preguiçosos e pouco interessados na correcção lígicaparz se darem aotrabalho de criar uma linguagem melhor. Hoje, inclinamo-nos antes a pensar que temos uma linguagem tão vaga porque, em muitíssimas ocasiões, é precisamente isso que nos convém ter e que serve as nossas necessidades de expressão e de comunicação. Nós temos capacidades cognitivas de observação e de memória, por exemplo que são limitadas e muitos dos conceitos que temos e que usamos reflectem essas limitações, ao serem aplicâveis com base em evidência imperfeíta e, por isso, também aplicáveis com limites imprecisos. Basta pensar que, com â nossa aparc)hagem cognitiva, é naturd, que tenhamos o conceito de montanba e não apenas conceitos como o de eleuação com 1.574,599 metros, é natural que tenhamos o conceito de cabeludo e não apenas conceitos como o de pessoa corn 4.732 cabelos na cabeça, é natural que tenhamos conceitos como perto e longe, aqui e ali, muito e pouco, uelho e nouo, alto,lento, competente, azul, etc. Tente-se imaginar o que seria só podermos falar numa linguagem sem termos vagos. Quando dâ a sua palestra 200 sobre vagúeza em t922, Russell diz que não vai poder usar a linguagem precisa que inventou nos Principia Mathematica, porque \"infelizmente é inadequada paru ocasiões públicas\"l. Mas imaginemos que aquele público conhecia bem a linguagem dos PM: poderia Russell têla usado (aumentando o seu léxico só com expressões precisas e bem definidas)? É verdade que o empreendimento seria muito trabalhoso, e que a eventual \"tradução-com-precisão\" só das primeiras frases ocuparia mais tempo do que durou a palestra inteira. Mas imaginemos que não havia constrangimentos temporais nem de esforço. O que parece plausível é que, seguindo esta experiência mental, acabaríamos por concluir gu€, usando uma linguagem inteiramente precisa, Russell não poderia nunca ter dito as mesmas coisas que disse . Talvez baste este exemplo: qual seria a tndução numa linguagem precisa de \"infelizmente a linguagem dos PM é inadequada para ocasiões públicas\"? Começamos, então , a tet uma melhor ideia de porque é que as línguas naturais são tão vagas. Mas estamos ainda longe de conseguir compreender o que é realmente a vagueza e como funciona lígica e semanticamente uma linguagem vaga, ou como é possível dominar uma tal linguagem e comunicar com ela. E, além destes objectivos mais gerais, unda nos falta livrar a vagueza do paradoxo, quer üzeg solucionar o muito antigo paradoxo de sorites de um modo que mostre definitivamente que, ao contrário do que parece, a vagueza, não ê. (como esperamos que não seja) intrinsecamente incoerente. O sorites é um paradoxo no sentido moderno de um argumento aparentemente válido (ou logicamente correcto), mas que parece ter premissas verdadeiras e conclusão falsa ulgo que é impossível de acontecer. Eis uma versão4: (1) Bertrand Russell não era velho quando nasceu (i.e., com 0 nanossegundos de idade). I Russell 09D) 61. 4 Adapteda de Field (2008) tOO. 20r (2) se Russell não era velho quando tinha z nanossegundof de idade, então também não emvelho quando tnha n+! nanossegundos de idade Por conseguinte, (l) Russell não era velho quando tinha I x 1018 nanosseguni dos de idade (i.e., com cerca de 95 anos). Porquê nanossegundos? Bem, o argumento podia ser for.l mulado com horas ou minutos e, ainda assim, a premis sa (2) continuava a ser plausível. A ideia aqui é considerar transiçõer mútíssimo pequenas: alguém acredita que no intervalo de um nanossegundo Russell se tornou velho? O problema é que ele chegou aos 95 anos de idade atravessando, um a um, cada um dos 3 x 1018 nanossegundos que viveu; e se no princípio não era velho, mas no fim iâ o en, então algures no meio terá pas. sado de uma condição à outra. Mas quando? Se recusarmos que essa transição se tenha feito em qualquer dos 3 x 1018 nanossegundos decorridos, somos forçados a concluir que a transição nunca se deu e que, por isso, Russell continuava anão ser velho com 95 anos. O paradoxo confronta-nos com esta dificuldade: pensamos que a transição se deu algures nesta série, mas também pensamos que ela não se deu em nenhum ponto da série, e estes pensamentos não parecem compatíveis. Há um conjunto vasto de filósofos, no qual os supervalomtiüstas se incluem, que, após análise, consideram que a solução do sorites deve envolver a rejeição da sua chamada \"premissa maior\", isto é, da premissa universal (2) que diz que a passagem de um só nanossegundo não pode tornar uma pessoa velha5. À primeira vista, isto é mútoìurpreendente. A nossa tendência naturd, é pam aceitat essa premissa como verdadeira, considerando até que ela ê a própria expressão da vagueza dopredícado crucialmente envolvido no argumento: dir-se-ia que afirmar 5 Incluem-se neste grupo pensadores importantes no estudo davagoezacomo Kit Fine, Crispin tü(/right e Timothy \\üíilliamson, gu€, no entanro, defendem perspectivas muito diferenciadas entre si. 202 20) que um predicado é vago equivale a afkmar que ele não tctÌl um limite exacto de aplicação ou que ele tolera pequenas mudanças, e que é isso que é dito em (2). Mas, se assim fosse, o argumento constituiria uma prova de que avagtJeza é intrinsecamente incoerente. A ideia é então a de virar este pensamento ao contrário: porque a vaguezanão é incoerente, o sorites constitui uma prova de que a premissa maior não ê verdadeíra6 e de que, por isso, estávamos enganados quando a tomávamos como a expressão adequada da vagueza do predicado. Crispin \\íright, por exemplo, afirma que o sorites é \"uma reductio da premissa maiof'7 . Mas como pode aquela premissa não ser verdadeira? Como se explica isso? O que é que a determina como não-verdadeira? E como se explica que tenhamos uma tendência tão forte para acreditar nela? Estas são questões que têm de ser respondidas não só, mas também pelos supervalorativistas. Neste aftigo, não poderei ocupar-me delas. Mostrarei apenas como é que, dada a semântica supervalorativista, a premissa (2) rcsultafalsa de acordo com ela. 53. A Tsonn SpuÂxrtcA DAS SuppnvnLoRAÇÕES E A suA Locrca Enquanto um predicado preciso divide o domínio dos obiectos em dois conjuntos, um predicado vago tem também uma zona de penumbra, além da sua extensão e anti-extensão. Nessa penumbra, estão objectos a que o predicado não se aplica claramente, mas relativamente aos quais também não é claro que ele não se lhes aplique. Uma precisão é uma construção teórica 6 As alternativas à rejeição da premissa maior são: considerar que (1) Russell já nasceu velho (completamente inaceitável), ou que (2) Russell não morreu velho (por exemplo, defendendo que os predicados vagos não descrevem nada de modo verdadeiro) ou que (3) o argumento não é válido (defendendo, por exemplo, que o modus ponens não é um padrão de inferência seguro). Para uma apresentação preliminar destas alternativas, consulte-se Sainsbury (2009) 48-49 e 56-6). 7 \\rright (t9s7) 234. que resulta de esvaziarmos a zona de penumbra, distribui os objectos que aí estavam pela extensão e pela anti-ext Tem de obedecer a algumas condições: (i) os objectos que estavam na extensão ou na anti-extensão têm de perma onde estavam; (ii) todos os objectos rêm de ficar situados ou extensão ou na anti-extensão; e (iii) se houver alguma o ção prévia dos objectos na penumbra, elatem de ser respei por exemplo, se o predicado em causa for \"alto\", uma pfl cisão não pode colocar indivíduos com 1,78m na extensão mesmo tempo que coloca indivíduos com 1,79m na anti são. O que assim se obtém é uma espécie de versão precisa predicado, no seguinte sentido: se ele fosse um predicado pre. ciso (sem contradizer o seu significado original, mas comple., tando-o), aquela poderia ser uma sua valoração,tal como serid dadana semântica clássica. o mesmo ê üzer que cada precisãd é, em si mesma, urrì modelo clássico (bivalente). uma vez que existem relações semânticas óbvias entre ai diversas expressões de uma linguagem (como, por exemplo, a relação que há entre os predicados 'Íalto\" e \"baixo\", por causa da qual reconhecemos como verdadei ru a ftase \"Nenhuma pessoa baixa ê alta\"), temos de as tomar em conjunto quando as tornamos precisas, de modo a respeitar aquilo a que Kit Fine chamou \"conexões de penumbta\"S. Como vereÍnos, este aspecto será também importante quando ttatarmos da semântica das expressões lógicas. Cadapredicado vago terá umapluralidade de precisões, eü€ diferem entre si pelas distribuições que fazem dos casos de fronteira. Essa pluralidade permite então definir as condições de verdade de cada predicação atómica, dízendo que ela será verdadeira se for verdadeira em todas as precisões, será falsa se for falsa em todas as precisões e será indeterminada (i.e. 8 Fine 1975) 124. 2U nem verdadeira nem falsa) se for vcrdadeira numas precisõcs e falsa noutras. Antecipemos desde jáumaobjecção frequente. Muita gente critica o supervalorativismo por fazer a caïacterização semântíca dos predicados vagos como se eles fossem precisos. Pois não estaremos assim a modificar o seu significado original e a fazê-lo de um modo completamente arbitrârío? Esta objecção é precipitada e injusta. O supervalorativista sabe bem que as precisões são extensões arbitrárias do significado das expressões vagas (mas compatíveis com o seu significado original); precisamente por isso, ele diz que a semântica de uma expressão vaga não ê dada por nenhuma das suas precisões. A proposta é, antes, a de que ela possa ser dada aüavés de uma quantificação sobre a totalidade dessas precisões. Porquê? Bem, a ideia de base ê a de que, dado um predicado vago, se considerarmos as diversas maneiras aceitáveis de o tornar preciso, consigamos de algum modo isolar aquilo que todas elas têm em comum, na expectativa de que esse \"núcleo comum\" constitua um modelo adequado do significado incompleto do predicado vago9. A aplicação de um predicado vago a um dos seus casos de fronteira resulta numa frase que, para o supervalorativista, não é verdadeira nem faIsa. Ora, quando temos \"falhas\" (gaps) de valor de verdade, o esquema clássico para avaliar frases complexas as tabelas de verdade bivalentes para negações, conjunções, etc. deixa de ser súiciente e precisa de ser suplementado. Uma ideia natural é a de, mantendo o princípio de que estas construções são verofuncionais, tentar preencher tabelas com três valores semânticos, que sejam uma extensão conservadora das tabelas bivalentes clássicas. Por exemplo: 9 Sainsbury (ZOOS) tem esta feliz analogia com uma \"casa inacabada\": \"we can reveal a vague word's incomplete meaning, rather as we could reveal what Jack's unfinished house is like by showing all the various ways in which he could complete it. \\üühat has actually been constructed is what all these possible completions have in common\" (52). 20, -'ì V F I ) F V V I F V V ? F I 2 ? ) F F ? F V I F V V ? V I ? ? 2 F V ? F Lukasiewicz e Kleene forneceram-nos três maneiras alternd,Í tivas de preencher as células marcadas com \"?\"10, mas, r.gut d{ Fine, nenhuma delas serye pa', uma teoria da vague za, poir!. pam respeitarmos as conexões de penumbra, temos de rejeita( a púpúa verofuncionalidade das conectivas binárias. (euantd à negação, os três autores concordam que a negação de umi frase indeterminada é elaprópria indeterminada). Se imaginar. mos um livro cuja cor se situa na fronteira entre o verde e o antl,, os valores que intuitivamente atribúmos às frases seguin\" tes são: (1) \"O livro é verde e não é verde\": falso. (2) \"O livro é verde e é verde\": indeterminado. (l) \"O livro é verde ou é verde\": indeterminado. (4) \"O livro é verde ou an;d\": verdadeiro. E, no entanto, (1) e (2) são conjuirções que caem na mesma célula databda (são ambas IAI), o mesmo aconrecendo com as disjunções (3) e (4) (que são ambas IvI). Pam a condicional, imaginemos que temos um segundo livro cuja cor está na mesma fronteira, mas que é ligeiramente mais anilado do que o primeiro, e avaliemos intuitivamente as frases: (5) \"Se o 1\" livro é ani,, então o 2\" livro é azrtl\": verdadeira, apesar de ser I-*+I. (6) \"Se o Lo livro é azul, então o 2\" livro não é azril\": falsa, apesar de ser também I-+I. 10 Vela-se uma boa apresenração em Sider (2010) 75-75. 206 207 A alternativa proposta pelo supervalorativismo é a scguintc. Se uma frase complexa contém constitúntes imediatos indeterminados, consideremos as diversas maneiras possíveis de lhes atribúr um valor de verdade clássico (as suas diversas precisões); se em todas elas resultar um mesmo valor clássico paÍa a f.rase complexa, então é efectivamente esse o seu valor. Por exemplo, na frase (1) acima, se atribuirmos o valor verdadeiro à frase componente \"o livro é verde\", o resultado é VA-V ou seja, F; e se lhe atribuirmos o valor falso, o resultado é FA-F, ou seja, igualmente F. Por isso, (1) é falsa em todas as precisões, logo é falsa simpliciter. Mas se o resultado não for o mesmo em todas as precisões, então a frase complexanão é verdadeira nem falsa. É, pot exemplo, o que se passa com (2), que numas precisões é VnV (ou seja, V), enquanto noutras é FnF (ou seia, F). Este abandono da verofuncionalidade, que, como vimos, está motivado pelos próprios dados da vagueza, tem as seguintes consequências notórias: (i) Todas as instâncias da forma (X v --X) (\"lei do terceiro excluído\") são verdadeiras, mesmo quando X é indeterrninada. O que significa que há disfunções verdadeiras nas quais nenhum dos membros é verdadeiro. Isto é devido àquilo a que Fine chamou \"deslocações de valor de verdade\" (truth-ualue sbfts): em todas as precisões há uma verdade que torna aquela disjunção verdadeira; mas ela vai-se deslocando de umas precisões paru as outras numas é X, enquanto noutras ê'-X. (ii) Algumas quantificações existenciais são verdadeiras sem que nenhuma das suas instâncias o seja. (Também aqui, em todas as precisões há uma instância verdadeira, mas nãohâuma instância que seja verdadeira em todas as precisões). (iii) Algumas quantificações universais são falsas sem que nenhuma das suas instâncias o seja. (Uma consequência de ii, dada a eqúvalência entre -=l e V-.) Apesar deste desvio relativamente à semântica clássica (abandono da bivalência e da verofuncionalidade das expressões lógicas para aLém da negação), a teoria supervalorativista na sua forma standard costuma apresentar-se como preservadora da lógica clássica. E, de f.acto, se não acrescentarmos à linguagem nenhuma ouma expressão lógical1, as verdades lógicas do supervalorativismo coincidem com as verdades lógicas da lígica clássica e as respectivas relações de consequência lógica também são as mesmas. Isto é assim, basicamente, porque cada precisão completa da linguagem vaga é um modelo clássico, pelo que cada modelo supervalorativista é um conjunto de modelos clássicos; então, se uma frase é logicamente verdadeira de acordo com alígica clássica, ela será também verdadeira eÍn todas as precisões completas da linguagem. Esta preservação da lógica clássica é relevante quando se úata de avaliar o sorites. Se desdobrarmos a premissa maior do sorites numa série (grande) de condicionais - \"Se Russell corn 0 nanossegundos não era uelbo, então Russell com 1 nanossegundo não era uelho\", \"Se Russell com 7 nanossegundo não era uelho, então Russell com 2 nanossegundos não era uellto\" ,etc. - , podemos observar que o sorites usa o modus ponens como única rcgta de inferência. E a nossa apreciação intuitiva de que esta regra é fiâvel (nunca nos leva de verdades para não-verdades) é confirmada pela semântica supervalorativista. Efectivamente, sep e (p -q) forcm ambas verdadeiras em todas as precisões, q terâ de ser também verdadeira em todas as precisões; pois, se 4 fosse falsa nalguma precisão, então, supondo que p seria verdadeira em todas elas, (p q ) jâ não poderia ser verdadeira em todas as precisões. O que acontece, àluz do supervalorativismo, é que o sorites parte de uma premissa falsa. A afhmação universal \"Para todo o n, se Russell com n nanossegundos de idade não era uelho, então Russell com n+l nanossegundos de idade também não era uelbo\" é falsa em todas as precisões, uma vez que em cada precisão há sempre um número exacto ,ë que é o número de nanossegundos de idade com que Russell se tornou velho. No entanto, 11 Nomeadamente, se não lhe acrescentarmos um operador D que, quando prefixado a uma frase como \"Rui é alto\", gera uma frase que significa que Rui é claranente alto. 208 se em vez da affumação universal considerarmos, colno Íïzctnos antes, o conjunto das suas instâncias (condícionais), verificamos que nenhuma delas é falsa: as primeiras condicionais da série são V-*V (logo V) em todas as precisões e as ultimas são F---+F (logo V) em todas as precisões, mas no meio todas as restantes são indeterminadas (i.e., verdadeiras nas precisões em que são V-*V ou F+fl e falsas nas precisões em que são V-rF), e não há nenhuma que seja V-*F em todas as precisões. 54. A Vncupze DE ORDEtvt Suppruon Se um predicado é vago, então tem casos de fronteira, quer üzegobjectos que são tais que nem é claro que ele se lhes aplique nem é claro que ele não se lhes aplique. A atribuição da propriedade expressa por um predicado vago a um dos seus casos de fronteira resulta numa frase eue, de acordo com o supervalorativismo, não é verdadeira nem falsa. Mas, na opinião de muitos filósofos, a vagueza não termina aqui. Pois não é só a distinção entre os casos positivos e os casos negativos do predicado que ê vaga e admite casos de fronteira: se o predicado é genuinamente vago, então parece que a distinção entre os seus casos positivos (ou negativos) e os seus casos de fronteira ê da própria vaga, devendo por sua vez admitir também casos de fronteira. Estes putativos casos de fronteira de casos de fronteira exibiriam a vagveza de segunda ordem do predicado. E como não parece haver nenhuma boa mzão para supor que o fenómeno termina aqui e que não se repete a respeito da distinção entre casos positivos, por um lado, e casos de fronteira de casos de fronteira, por outro, o prolongamento natural desta linha de raciocínio conduz à admissão de vagueza de ter ceira ordem, de quarta ordem e assim por diante, ao longo de uma hierarquia sem fim. E é neste ponto que é frequente levantar uma objecção à teoria supervalorativista, dizendo que ela, ao dividir as frases em verdadeiras, falsas e indeterminadas, não consegue dar conta deste fenómeno da vagueza de ordem superior. Consideremos a sequência constituída por todas as frases com a forma \"Russell com n nanossegundos de idade é velho\" que abreviaremos para \"Vn\" -, começando com n = 0 e terminandocom n -i x 1018. O supervalorativistadiz-nos quc a primeiru pafie da sequência é formada por frases falsas e e última parte iâtem só frases verdadeiras, mas nãohá uma fron. teira exacta entre umas e outras. Entre as frases falsas com quc começa a sequência e as frases verdadeiras com que termina, há também, no meio, frases que não são verdadeiras nem falsas. \"Velho\" é um predicado vago, cujo significado poderia ser completado tornado preciso de múltiplas maneiras. A cada precisão do predicado corresponde, na nossa sequência, a escolha de um número definido k tal que Vn ê falsa nessa precisão quando n < k eVn é verdadeira nessa precisão quando n ) k, O significado efectivo de \"velho\" não é dado por nenhuma dessas precisões, mas sim por aquilo que todas elas têm em comum: só as frases verdadeiras (ou falsas) em todas as precisões é que são verdadeiras (falsas) simpliciter (ou seja, verdadeiras de acordo com o significado efectivo do predicado). O problema, agota, não ê apenas (nem sobretudo) que a teoria não apresenta recursos para distínguir, nesta sequência, casos de fronteira que exibissem vagueza, de diferentes ordensl2. O que a objecção principalmente alegaé que ateoúa está comprometida com a existência de um núme rc i tal que Vi é a última frase da sequência que é falsa em rodas as precisões (imediatamente seguida por uma frase Vi+l que iâ é verdadeira nalguma precisão) e de um núm erc j tal que Vj ê a primeira frase da sequência que é verdadeira em todas as precisões (imediatamente precedida por uma frase Vj-L que ainda ê falsa núguma precisão). Isto significa que embora, de acordo com a teoria, não haja uma transição abrupta (num intervalo de um nanossegundo) de não-velho para velho pois entre uma coisa e outra, Russell teúa passado por um período de tempo em que tinha um estatuto indeterminado relativamente a essa classificaÇão -, haveria no entanto um instante preciso em que Russell deixou de não ser velho e também um instante preciso em que ele passou a ser velho. Dito de outro modo: o prediL2 Parutornar essa distinção possível, é frequente propor-se a inmodução na linguagem de um operador como o que mencionei na nota anterior. 2t0 21r cado teria casos de fronteira, mas apesar disso não deixaría dc ter limites de aplicação exactos. Mas um predicado com limites de aplicação exactos não é genuinamente vago. Rosanna Keefe responde a esta objecção, dizendo que não há realmente aqueles compromissos, porque o supervalorativista f\"az a descrição semântica de uma linguagem vaga usando uma metalinguagem que ela propria também êvagaÚ. Avagueza da metalinguagem revela-se especialmente, segundo Keefe, na noção de precisão (com base na qual o supervalorativista define a noção de verdade como verdade em todas as precisões). Uma precisão, recordêmo-lo, é uma maneira aceitâvel (entre outras) de tornar conjuntamente precisas as expressões vagas de uma linguagem. Mas exactamente quando, ou em que condições, é que uma atribuição de significados precisos uma valonção ou interpretação clássica às expressões de uma linguagem será aceitáuel? Provavelmente, haverâ aqui uma certa vagrJeza, quer üzet, paru certas interpretações clássicas da linguagem, não será claro se elas são ou não são aceitâveís. Por exemplo, numa pâgina célebre, Quine declarou que não sabia se a frase \"Tudo o que é verde é extenso\" poderia não ser verdadeiral4. Pam alguém que partilhe da indecisão de Quine, uma interpret ação na qual esta frase não resulte verdadeira será, então, um caso de fronteira de uma precisão da linguagem. Isto significa que nãohâ um conjunto preciso e único de todas as precisões da linguagem tal como, no primeiro nível, dizemos que não hâ um conjunto preciso e único de todos os homens velhos (uma vez que há indivíduos relativamente aos quais é indeterminado se pertencem ou não ao conjunto). Como a noção de precisão êvaga, a noção de verdade (definida como verdade em todas as precisões) será vaga também e, por isso, haverâ frases na nossa sequência a respeito das quais é indeterminado se são ou não são verdadeiras (ou falsas) pelo que não se pode dizer que o supervalorativista esteja comproÚ Keefe (2000) 202-211. 14 Quine (L9iD t2. metido com uma divisão exacta da sequência em três segmen. tos mutuâmente exclusivos e conjuntamente exaustivos. A primeira vista, esta resposta parece fornecer uma solução plausível e Keefe complementa,-a com observações valiosel e respostas a possíveis objecções: mostrando que ateonanão ú (viciosamente) circular nem trivial, que é logicamente conser. vadora, que tem recursos pam lidar com versões metalingústi. cas do sorites e que está em conformidade com a ideia geral de que a vagLteza é um fenómeno irredutível. Mas , ainda assim, cabe perguntar se esta solução é realmente bem sucedida. É que, quando discutiu as teorias multivalentes nomeadamente, f, teoria que adopta três valores de verdade e a teoia gradativa \" que adopta uma infinidade de valores entre zeto e um e o modo como lidam com a vagueza de ordem superior, Keefe apresentou bons argumentos contra a utüzação de uma metalinguagem vagarS, mas depois não se detém o súciente a analisar se esses argumentos não se poderãovitar também contra a sua própria solução. Aparentemente, dir-se-ia que uma teoría que reconhece uma infinidade de valores de verdade tantos quantos os números reais entre zeto e um tem aquilo de que precisa pala dar conta da vagueza de qualquer ordem e que, em particular, não postula separações nítidas entre os casos positivos, os casos de fronteira e os casos negativos de um predicado vago. Pois, paÍa ela, entre os dois extremos , hâ uma infinidade de possíveis casos intermédios, diferentes uns dos outros quanto ao grau com que o predicado se lhes aplica. Porém, se olharmos melhor, podemos ver que as vantagens não são assim tão evidentes, pois uma tal teoria continua a fazer uma distinção nítida, por exemplo, entre os objectos de que o predicado é completamente verdadeiro (com grau l) e todos os outros. Perante esta objecção, o teórico dos graus de verdade pode querer postular vagueza na metalinguagem, dizendo que as 15 Keefe (2000) 11,8-IT. 2t2 2n atribúções primárias de valor de verdade com a fclrma \"p tcttt valor de verda de u\" podem ter elas próprias um valor de verdade intermédio. Isto significa que, mesmo com um conjunto infinito de valores de verdade, pode haver frases que não tenham nenhum valor exacto, isto é, frases às quais nenhum valor desse conjunto se lhes pode atribuir com grau L. Aparentemente, isto seria uma maneira viável de tornar difusas as fronteiras entre as frases com diferentes valores de verdade. Mas, de facto, o que o teórico dos graus de verdade está a dizer é que, mesmo com um número infinito de valores disponíveis, há frases que não têm nenhum desses valores. Portanto, o conjunto de valores postulado não é adequado para as avaliar. Como alternativa aos dois valores da lógica clássica, e aos mês ou cinco valores de outras lógicas multivalentes, este teórico postulou um conjunto infinito de valores mas, agora, estâ a reconhecer que ele, tal como os anteriores, também é inadequado. (Uma outra hipótese é considerar que ele está apenas a aumentar o número de valores disponíveis: para cadavalor preciso que antes tinha (por exemplo, \"p tem valor 0,73\"), agoru passou a tet uma infinidade de valores (\"p tem valor 0,73 com grau n\", variando n ao longo do intervalo [0,1]). Mas, se a intenção é essa, aplica-se o dito de Sainsbury segundo o qual iterar uma mâ ideia não a torna melhor16, pois as objecções anteriores, da atribuição de valores exactos e do estabelecímento de limites precisos, voltam a colocar-se.) E, em qualquer dos casos, não é nada claro que a manobra pudesse evitar o compromisso com limites exactos. Regressemos à sequência de frases a respeito da idade de Russell: a primeira frase da sequência (Vg) êfalsa;e isto que acabamos de dizer -uiz., gue VOéfalsa ê completamente verdadeiro. Muito provavelmente, esta avaliação aplica-se também a V le a mais algumas das frases que se seguem. Mas nada do que o teórico dos graus de verdade disse torna impossível a existência de uma ultima frase da L6 Sainsbury (1990) 255 \"you do not improve a bad idea by iterating it\" sequência à qual esta avaliação se aplica, imedíatamente seguida por outra à qual da iâ não se aplica. A líção a thar daqui é que uma teoria semântica que, em alternativa à lôgicabivalente clássica, postula um certo conjun. to u de valores que as frases da linguagem podem receber não pode deixar de afirmar que todas as frases têm um valor nesse conjunto. Keefe diJo muito claramente. Vale ^ pena citar a sua conclusão par:a o caso específico das teorias com três valores: The use of a tbree-aalued logicfor a aague language requires the assumption tbat the three ualues prouide an exclusiue and exbaustiue classification of declaratiue sentences; if not, it suffers tbe same defects as tbe rejected tuo-ualued system. 1...1 A three-ualued logic for a language is inadequate if it is not true tltat all its sentences take one of tlte tltree ualues.rT Ora, a teoúa supervalorativista usa uma lógica com três valores e, por isso, encontra-se sob a mesma exigência: todas as frases têm de ser ou verdadeiras (i.e., verdadeiras em todas as precisões) ou falsas (i.e., falsas em todas as precisões) ou indefinidas (i.e., verdadeiras numas precisões e falsas noutras). Ao invocar a vagueza da noção de precisão e üzet que, por causa disso, há certas frases a respeito das quais é indeterminado se são ou não são verdadeiras em todas as precisões, Keefe, se não estâ a propor a adopção de um quarto valor, está pelo menos a reconhecer que os seus três valores não são conjuntamente exaustivos e não formam um conjunto adequado. Keefe poderia ainda contra-argumentar que a aÍhmação (K) \"Todas as frases da linguagem-objecto são verdadeiras, falsas ou indefinidas\" é, de acordo com o supervalorativismo, verdadeira. Ela diria que (K) inclui três rermos semânticos vagos e que, em cada maneira de os tornar precisos, a generalização 214 17 Keefe Q00ü 122. resulta sempre verdadeira. Mas isso não oblitera o facto de que existem algumas frases gu€, à Iuz da teoria, não caem clammente sob nenhum dos três valores; quer dízeg há frases f a respeito das quais não ê correcto dizer \"í é verdadeira\" nem \"f é falsa\" nem \"f ê indefinida\". E, se isso é assim, devemos interrogar-nos, como aconselhava Keefe, sobre a rcd, vantagem desta teoria sobre alógicabivalente clássica oü, pelo menos, sobre uma versão desta Iógica que aceite que, havendo apenas dois valores, existem no entanto frases a respeito das quais é indeterminado se são verdadeiras ou falsas. Concluo portanto que, salvo melhor júzo, o tratamento da vagtreza de ordem superior pela adopção de uma metalinguagem supervalorativistavaga, apesar de parecer atractivo, não é realmente viável (por mzões que uma supervalorativista como Rosanna Keefe nos ajudou a compreender). 55. OnspnvnçÕEs Fnars Neste artigo, caracterizei brevemente a teoúa supervalorativista da vagueza, apresentei o problem a da vagtJeza de ordem superior e discuti a proposta de lidar com este problema usando uma metalinguagem com termos semânticos vagos (nomeadamente, termos nucleares como \"precisão\" e \"verdade\"), tendo concluído pela sua inúabilidade. Muitas questões importantes não foram abordadas. Por exemplo, mantive toda a discussão independente da decisão de enriquecer a linguagem-objecto com um operador par.a expressar a aplicação clara de um predicado (bem como da discussão em torno da semântica e da lógica mais adequadas para esse operador). O artigo assenta na suposição de que a vagueza de ordem superior é um fenómeno real, mas não a defende, nem menciona as dúvjdas que se podem colocar a esse respeito. Também não foi objectivo do artigo chegar a uma avaliação global do supervalorativismo, nem confrontá-lo com as principais teorias suas rivais (onde se destacam a teoria dos graus de verdade e o epistemicismo, mas também o contextualismo). O que apresentei é apenas uma parte de uma investigação em 215 cursolS e, dada a escassez de bibli ografia portuguesa sobre este assunto, foi redigido com a preocupação de ser acessível a pessoas para quem ele seja ainda relativamente desconhecido.l9 RppsnÊrucrAs BrBLrocRÁFrcAS Field, H. (2008) , SauingTruth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, K. (1975), \"Vagueness, Truth and Logic\", reimpresso em Keefe e Smith (1997), pp. 119-150. Imaguire, G. e Schirn, M. (2008), Estudos ern Filosofia da Linguagem, São Paulo: Edições Loyola. Keefe, R. (2000), Theories ofVagueness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keefe, R. e Smith, P. (eds.) (L997), Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Quine, ìí.V.O. (1951), \"Two dogmas of empiricism\", in Quine, From a Logical Point of Vìeut,2\" ed. rev., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp.20-46. Russell, B. (L923), \"Vagueness\", reimpresso em Keefe e Smith (1997), pp. 61-68. Sainsbury, R.M. (1990), \"Concepts without Smith (1997), pp. 251-264. Sainsbury, R.M. (2009), Paradoxes, )\" ed., University Press. Santos, P. (2006), \"Sorites\", in J. Branquinho, D. Murcho e N. G. Gomes (eds.), Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, pp. 7 13 -721,. l8 No âmbito do projecto de investig ação Paradoxos: Dedutiuos, Indutiuos e Práticos (PTDC/FIL/67ú9/2006), financiado pela Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia e sediado no Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem FCSH-UNL e na Universidade de Évora. 19 Apresentei versões preparatórias deste trabalho em sessões na Universidade de Éuor\" (em l0 de Outubro de 2009) e na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa (em22 deJaneiro de 2010). Agradeço às audiências arentas que tive em ambas as ocasiões e, em especial, às questões colocadas por Miguel Tamen, Humberto Brito, Fernanda Henriques e José Manuel Martins. A versão escrita beneficiou da leitura e comentários de Célia Teixeira e Bruno Jacinto, a quem muito agradeço. Sider, T. (2010) , Logic for Phihts 'o1t l ty, ( )x lotr l : ( ) r l , ' r , l l l t t tvr ' t : t ly Press. \\)í i l l iamson,T. (1994),Vagueness, Londres c Nova lorc;ttt ' : l{orrtlt 'r lgt '. \\X/right, C. (1987), \"Further reflections on the sorites paratkrx\", r'cinrpresso em Keefe e Smith (1997), pp.204-250. boundaries\". in Keefe e Cambridge: Cambridge 216", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Francoise Monnoyeur What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? Epekeina, vol. 6, n. 2 (2015), pp. 1-13 History of the Platonic-Aristotelian Tradition ISSN: 2281-3209 DOI: 10.7408/epkn. Published on-line by: CRF – Centro Internazionale per la Ricerca Filosofica Palermo (Italy) www.ricerca\u001bloso\u001bca.it/epekeina This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter?∗ Francoise Monnoyeur Introduction The understanding of matter is a philosophical endeavor. Scientists are interested in \u001bnding or building adequate models in order to explain phenomena and \u001bnd the properties of matter.1 Models are then tested against experience and when validated lead to the formulation of laws. From a philosophical perspective models are not only tools to understand matter and discover laws of nature, but representations that reveal how we acquire knowledge about nature.2 The philosophical perspective takes into account that models are representations of an object under the scrutiny of a viewer, and therefore analyzes the interaction between the mind and the object. We focus on two geometrical models created with more than two millennia apart, and consider how they capture natural phenomena. The \u001brst model appears in one of Plato's dialogues when the young astronomer Timaeus, in a conversation with Socrates, introduces geometric solids to understand the basic structure of matter and interaction of the primary elements: \u001bre, air, water, and earth. The second geometric model appeared nowadays with the development of electron microscopy and x-ray di\u001draction and allows physicists to discover the atomic structure of matter. Furthermore, we analyze the value of these geometric models and identify their cognitive function. 1. Function of geometric models in Plato and crystallography 1.1. Platonic models In the Timaeus one of Plato's latest dialogues, Timaeus in the name of Plato gives an account of the creation of the world and origin of ∗ The author acknowledges Mr. Konstantinos Bakoglidis for some of the \u001bgures from Plato and inspiring discussions. 1. Hertz 2007 and Hesse 1953, 198. 2. Monnoyeur 2000a. Francoise Monnoyeur matter. This story does not pretend to deliver a scienti\u001bc theory, but is a possible explanation of the origin of matter when absolute truth falls short. That's why Plato proposes a model of matter and not a theory. At this stage, it seems to me necessary to draw the distinction between theory and model, as Timaeus recalls several times at the beginning of his explanation that he is telling a \"story\" or a \"tale\":3 Wherefore, Socrates, if in our treatment of a great host of matters regarding the Gods and the generation of the Universe we prove unable to give accounts that are always in all respects self-consistent and perfectly exact, be not thou surprised; rather we should be content if we can furnish accounts that are inferior to none in likelihood, remembering that both I who speak and you who judge are but human creatures, so that it becomes us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search beyond it. In the introduction of Inventing the Universe, Luc Brisson emphasizes the axiomatic structure of science in the Timaeus and writes:4 In our analysis, we will endeavor to display the axiomatic structure which underlines the Timaeus. In fact, we will exhibit, as completely as possible, the list of axioms, or primordial assumptions, upon which Plato's cosmological system is ultimately founded. In this article, I show how the Platonician mathematical theory of the elements, although founded on certain axioms, relates to our perception. Because we focus on physics, namely the theory of matter and the movement of the elements, a special attention is given to the relationship between mathematics and perception. Further in his introduction,5 Brisson elaborates that Plato develops \"scienti\u001bc knowledge\" against \"scienti\u001bc method of choice. . . directly based on the technology of experimentation.\" Our purpose is to present the Platonician model of the elements as hypothetical in its nature, geometrical in its reasoning, but also relying on perception in some ways. Plato proposes, therefore, a model to explain the movement and nature of matter, and chooses a geometrical model able to express the perception we have of the 3. Plato, Timaeus 29c-29d in Lamb 1925, 29. 4. Brisson and Meyerstein 1995, 6. 5. Brisson and Meyerstein 1995, 7. 2 What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? elements. According to my interpretation, Plato's model solves the following problem: how to represent in an intelligible way the matter we sense? There are three actors involved in this problem: the moving matter we sense, the representation supporting this moving matter, and the intelligibility of this representation. Plato's main objective is to \u001bnd the best representation or model of the sensible world. Previous philosophers such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Thales, and Leucippus used combinations of four basic elements (air, earth, water, \u001bre) to identify primordial matter. Plato refers also to these four elements, and conceives his model to understand how the four elements move and transform into each other. This model is not a pure abstraction but relates to the sensible phenomena. For Plato, models tell us something of the essence of matter as they establish the salient and permanent relationships between the elements. According to the analogy of the divided line of the Republic,6 these models belong to the intelligible knowledge namely the mathematical and geometric knowledge. The Platonician solution consists in establishing correspondences between the four elements and four regular polyedres (Figure 1). In the Timaeus, geometry is chosen because it is considered to be the everlasting or reliable representation. More precisely, the explanation of the interaction between the elements follows geometric rules when transposed in geometrical solids. (a) Fire (tetrahedron). (b) Air (octahedron). (c) Water (icosahedra). (d) Earth (cube). Figure 1 – The geometric model of the four elements according to Plato The choice of geometric solids gives a basis to scienti\u001bc representation and understanding of the changes in physical reality. Plato's main 6. Plato, Republic, Book 6, 509d-513e in Shorey 1969, 509. 3 Francoise Monnoyeur objective is to represent the change of water into air through \u001bre, and the stability of earth as it cannot be changed into any other element; on the contrary, earth remains earth when interacting with \u001bre, water or air. The geometric explanation is as follows; the solids analyzed by Plato are made of faces, more exactly of triangles. In 54e-55d, Plato explains how we can use equilateral triangles to build three regular polyhedrons representing \u001bre, air, and water: the tetrahedron (\u001bre) is made of four equilateral triangles, the octahedron (air) is made of eight equilateral triangles, and the icosahedra (water) is made of twenty equilateral triangle.7 The cube representing earth is di\u001derent because it is made of four squares. Each face of the \u001brst three solids (\u001bre, air, and water) is built of equilateral triangles. Plato describes how an equilateral triangle consists of six scalene triangles (\u001bgure 2); a scalene triangle comprises one right angle with three unequal sides (\u001bgure 3). Figure 2 – The equilateral triangle from Plato is built with six scalene triangles (1 to 6) 7. Plato, Timaeus, 54e-55d in Lamb 1925, 54. 4 What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? Figure 3 – Isosceles and scalene triangles A square is made of four isosceles triangles (\u001bgure 4). Figure 4 – A square formed by four isosceles triangles These two right-angle triangles of \u001bgure 3, scalene and isosceles, cover the possible structures of the four primary elements. They are two presuppositions or axioms in this theory: the \u001brst is that elementary right angles triangles cannot be created or destroyed, and the second is that only the solids made of the same triangles can act on each other. Earth is identi\u001bed with the square, and is the only solid made of four isosceles triangles; consequently, earth cannot act on another element or be acted upon by any other element; thus explaining the stability of the squared face. On the other hand, the faces of \u001bre, water and air made of equilateral triangles, and can interact with each other since any change in the fundamental elements can be explained according to the division and re-composition of the fundamental tri5 Francoise Monnoyeur angles. The relationship between the various elements can be written with the following equation: fire air = air water = water earth In the equation above, \u001bre and earth are connected through air and water whereas water and air are the «geometrical medians». Plato shows how the four elements are combined in various ratios and how they are made of material substances that interact with each other. For instance, water heated by \u001bre dissolves and its fragments recombine and produce two corpuscles of air (vapor) and one corpuscle of \u001bre. Plato, taking into account the number of faces, writes8: 〈 water 〉 −−→ heat 2 〈 air 〉 + 〈 fire 〉 20 = 2x8 + 4 Figure 5 – Equation for the transmutation of the elements In this equation, Plato rationally establishes that the transmutation of \u001bre, air, and water occurs by redistribution of the faces of these \u001bgures and writes a \"chemical equation\" explaining the transformation of the four elements. For Plato, the type and number of triangles determine the properties of each element. The whole system is supported with a set of relationships expressed with the geometry of the solids. Without these models, we would be unable to scienti\u001bcally determine the way elements interact and move. 1.2. Comparison with the geometric models of matter used in crystallography Crystallography, the science that examines the arrangement of atoms in solids, developed rapidly at the beginning of the twentieth century 8. Plato, Timaeus 56d in Lamb 1925, 56. 6 What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? with Sir William Lawrence Bragg's discovery of the x-ray di\u001draction law;9 the subsequent development of x-ray di\u001draction technology and transmission electron microscopy have paved the way towards exploration of the nano-structure of the materials. It is now established that matter made of atoms can only belong to seven di\u001derent crystalline systems: triclinic, monoclinic, orthorhombic, tetragonal, rhombohedral, hexagonal, and cubic. In this paper, we focus solely on three crystalline structures composed of carbon atoms. The \u001brst material, graphite, is soft and composed of carbon atoms that are arranged into a hexagonal shaped structure (\u001bgure 6a). The second material, diamond, is the hardest known material and composed of carbon atoms arranged in a tetrahedral (cubic) structure (\u001bgure 6b). Finally, the third material, fullerene, is a molecule in the form of a hollow sphere that is composed of sixty atoms interconnected by pentagons and hexagons (\u001bgure 6c). Fullerene is elastic and extremely strong.10 The science of crystallography studies the various structures taken by the carbon atoms and identi\u001bes di\u001derent materials such as graphite, diamond, or fullerene. These geometric models give scientists the ability to identify the location of atoms as well as the distances and angles between atoms. Scientists can then perform further experiments to investigate the properties of materials, for example, hardness/softness, and elasticity. We can see how each material corresponds to a speci\u001bc structure with speci\u001bc properties in the same way that Plato relates each of the four elements to a geometric solid with distinct properties. 2. What is the value of these geometric models to understand matter? There are obvious and surprising similarities between the models described by Plato to understand the transmutation of the elements and the models of the various structures of carbon atoms. Both of these models are based on Euclidean geometry, but the Platonician is chosen, and the Crystallographic is observed by electron microscopy and x-ray di\u001draction. Nevertheless, the identity between these two models does not happen by chance, or because Timaeus had good intuition. How 9. Giacovazzo 2002. 10. Broitman and Hultman 2014, 390-392. 7 Francoise Monnoyeur (a) Graphite. (b) Diamond. (c) Fullerene. Figure 6 – Three di\u001derent crystallographic carbon structures 8 What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? can we understand how these models, which were developed millennia apart, are so similar? The answer could be that both provide what is required to understand matter and correspond de facto to our cognitive functions. According to Raymond Duval:11 Representation and visualization are at the core of understanding in mathematics. We can apply this conception to the case of the geometrical models because there seems to be two distinct phases in the way we perceive these models; \u001brstly, we conceive the mathematical explanation through visual representation, and secondly, we visualize the solids with their properties. Let's analyze how these two phases work in the Platonic and crystallography models. In the \u001brst phase, we build up a visual representation of the model that allows us to understand the properties of matter. For instance, the Platonic models identify the nature of the triangles composing the faces of the solids while crystallography perceives the atoms and connects them in order to build geometrical solids. The second phase allows us to visualize in three dimensions the solids with the properties they represent. Visual representation (two dimensions) and visualization (three dimensions) are at the core of the understanding of these models. The scienti\u001bc understanding of the movement of elements and the detection of the structure of carbon atoms is realized thanks to the geometrical models that enable the visualization of the properties of the materials such as mobility, stability, hardness, softness and elasticity. Hans Reichenbach notices in the Philosophy of space and time12 that: It seems to be much easier to make logical inferences with the help of visual representation than by means of abstract concepts. 2.1. What is the value of the Platonic geometric models? 2.1.1 Visual representation in the Platonic solids What can we learn from the geometric decomposition of the elements? Because \u001bre has less number of faces, the solid is more acute; it is the 11. Duval 1999, 3. 12. Reichenbach 1958, 117. 9 Francoise Monnoyeur lightest, most mobile and sharpest element, which explains how it can transform water into air. Air has more faces than \u001bre but is more mobile and lighter than water. Water has a large number of faces and is less mobile and heavier than air. Earth, the heaviest element, represents stability because its planes are squares and cannot be changed by the other faces.13 Therefore, according to these models, there is a relationship between the number of faces and their mobility. Plato deploys geometrically the properties of the elements, captures the transformation of one element into another and then expresses this phenomenon into an equation. As geometry is a science of relations,14 it gives the opportunity to establish relations between objects, here between the elements. Poincaré explains in the preface of his book Science and Hypothesis the purpose of mathematics:15 Mathematicians do not study objects, but the relations between objects; to them it is a matter of indi\u001derence if these objects are replaced by others, provided that the relations do not change. Matter does not engage their attention, they are interested in form alone. The geometric models give a scienti\u001bc explanation of the properties of the elements. This means that their properties are revealed upon relationships represented geometrically and mathematically. We can see how Plato interpretes the movement and properties of the elements in terms of number and type of triangles in the faces of the solids. The triangles in the geometric solids represent the way the elements move and how they transmute into each other. Having no scienti\u001bc instruments to analyze matter, we can say that the correspondence discovered between \u001bgures and the movement of the elements depends on a combination of observation and intuition. As this model is supported by mathematical equations, we can say that Plato's intuition goes beyond intuition that is delivered by senses alone. Poincaré describes as follows the kind of intuition that comes into play in this case:16 13. Plato, Timaeus, 56a-56b in Lamb 1925, 56. 14. Monnoyeur 2013. 15. Poincare 1952, 20. 16. Poincare 1914, 128. 10 What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? The principal aim of mathematical education is to develop certain faculties of the mind, and among these, intuition is not the least precious. It is through it that the mathematical world remains in touch with the real world, and even if pure mathematics could do without it, we should still have to have recourse to it to \u001bll up the gulf that separates the symbol from reality. Geometric spatial representation of movement relates to the properties of the elements, to the «real world». Plato's geometric solids are spatial representations of movement expressed in a proportional equation. Thanks to visual representation of triangles, the rules of division and re-composition of the triangles have been established together with the relationship between the properties and movement of the elements. The visual representation of the Platonic solids paves the way to the understanding of matter. 2.1.2 Visualization of the Platonic solids Geometric models relate \u001bnally to the «real world» with the geometric solids that give us a three dimensional representation of the movement and properties of their elements. This visualization completes the visual representation of the relationships between the triangles and gives a picture of how \u001bre, air, water and earth interact on each other. Three-dimensional visualization combined with two-dimensional representation allows us to reach an understanding of the movement and properties in the elements. 2.2. What is the value of the geometric models in crystallography? 2.2.1 Visual representation in crystallography In crystallography, the geometric solids are not chosen as in Plato, but observed with scienti\u001bc instruments. Although technology helps to locate the atoms, the scientist still needs to draw the lines between the atoms in order to construct a \u001bgure that accurately represents the spatial arrangement of the atoms. This presupposes the calculation of the atoms quantity, of the respective distance between each other, and the angles they form in the structure. Thanks to the development of 11 Francoise Monnoyeur new technologies (electron microscopes and computers), microscopic data can be calculated. It follows that progress in crystallography is based in the interpretation of the spatial representation detected by the scientist. The human eye and mind together with the image presented by the microscope constitutes the model to be interpreted. 2.2.2 Visualization reveals the various structures of carbon atoms After being able to represent the atomic structure of materials, the scientist can identify the kind of material and consecutively its speci\u001bc properties embedded in the di\u001derent geometrical structures. The three dimensional visualization of the structure of the carbon atoms indicates their type and properties. We can reach this \u001bnal stage after the building up of the visual representation of the structures. The understanding of matter happens via two phases, visual representation and visualization in three dimensions of the whole structure. Conclusions We have discussed how Platonic and crystallographic models are rooted in Euclidean geometry and both explain and reveal the properties of materials. In the Platonic solids, the nature and number of triangles justify their movement or stability; in crystallography the nature of the geometric structure of the carbon atoms (hexagonal, cubic, or fullerene) indicates the type of material and properties: hardness or softness and elasticity. In both cases, scientists are depending upon visual representation and visualization to be able to analyze the nature of matter and measure it. Not only these spatial models give valuable scienti\u001bc information about the matter studied, but they also are the main cognitive support for scienti\u001bc activity. Besides the extraordinary fact that these models have important similarities, they nevertheless di\u001der in the way they are obtained. The Platonic models are chosen and the interpretation of matter changes relies in geometry and mathematics. On the contrary, in crystallography the physicists discover atoms and identify their position in de\u001bning the structure of these atoms. Besides technology (microscopes, di\u001dractometers, and computers) the understanding of matter relies on \u001bne observation, interpretation and design 12 What is the Value of Geometric Models to Understand Matter? by the scientists of the structure itself. In both of these models, the understanding of matter is depending upon active visual representation and visualization that synthetizes the whole process of knowledge. We can conclude that the geometric models are the expression of the mind to understand physical matter. Francoise Monnoyeur Centre Jean Pepin, CNRS, Paris, France monnoyf@gmail.com References Brisson, L. and F. W. Meyerstein 1995, Inventing the Universe, Suny, Albany. Broitman, E. and L. Hultman 2014, \"Advanced Carbon-based Coatings\", in Cameron 2014, pp. 389-412. Cameron, D. (ed.) 2014, Comprehensive Materials Processing, Elsevier, Amsterdam. Duval, R. 1999, \"Representations and visualization: cognitive functions in mathematical thinking\", in Santos 1999, pp. 3-26. Giacovazzo, C. 2002, Fundamentals of Crystallography, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hertz, H. 2007, Principles of Mechanics, Cosimo, New York. Hesse, M. 1953, \"Models in Physics\", in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 4. Lamb, W. (ed.) 1925, Plato, Timaeus, William Heinemann, London. Monnoyeur, F. 2000a, \"La matière au kaléidoscope de l'interdisciplinarité\", in Monnoyeur 2000b, pp. 13-22. - (ed.) 2000b,Qu'est-ce que lamatière? Regards scienti\u001bques et philosophiques, Hachette, Paris. Nicholas of Cusa's methodology of the In\u001bnite 2013, History and Philosophy of In\u001bnity, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1595. 0881. Poincare, H. 1914, Science and Method, ed. by F. Maitland, Routledge, London. - 1952, Science and Hypothesis, ed. by W. J. Greenstreet, Dover, New York. Reichenbach, H. 1958, The Philosophy of Space and Time, Dover Publications, New York. Santos, F. H. M. (ed.) 1999, Proceedings of the Twentieth-First Annual Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of the Mathematics Education, ERIC Clearinghouse, Columbus. Shorey, P. (ed.) 1969, Plato, Republic, William Heinemann, London.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Reply to Yli--‐Vakkuri Timothy Williamson In 'Epistemicism and modality', Juhani Yli--‐Vakkuri rigorously treats the problem of developing a model--‐theoretic semantics for a formal language with the operators 'necessarily' and 'actually', interpreted in terms of metaphysical modality, and an operator 'definitely', interpreted in the spirit of the epistemicist theory of vagueness developed in my book (Williamson 1994). The challenge is especially pertinent because my epistemicist account of definiteness has a modal dimension, whose interaction with other forms of modal variation raises delicate issues for the overall theory. 1. Worldly differences and semantic differences According to epistemicism, vagueness in a language induces no deviation from classical logic or from bivalent semantics. It is a purely epistemic phenomenon: borderline cases are just cases of unavoidable ignorance for a special sort of reason. The actual meaning of a vague 2 expression differs from some of its potential alternative meanings in ways indiscriminable by native speakers of the language. Following John Hawthorne, Yli--‐Vakkuri calls this idea 'Semantic Plasticity'. The upshot is a special obstacle to knowing some truths expressed using the vague expression. Very roughly, the definite truths are those knowledge of which is not blocked by an obstacle of that sort. I developed the underlying epistemology in safety--‐ theoretic terms. Knowledge requires safety from error: one knows in a given case only if it is not relevantly close to an error possibility. Actuality is never close in that sense to metaphysical impossibilities, because they present no real danger. Compare a case where one assents to a true proposition expressed by a vague sentence with a similar case where one assents to a false proposition expressed by the same sentence.1 The difference in truth--‐value may result from either one of two kinds of difference between the cases (perhaps from both). The first kind of difference is worldly. The vague sentence may express the same proposition in the two cases, while the objects under discussion vary in their properties or relations. For instance, in both cases the sentence 'Jack is bald' expresses the proposition that Jack is bald, but Jack has less hair in one case than in the other. Thus the sentence 'Jack is bald' may express a true proposition in the former case and a false proposition in the latter. The second kind of difference between cases is semantic. Even if the objects under discussion have the same properties and relations in the two cases, the sentence 'Jack is bald' may express different propositions, because it is used in very slightly different ways. For instance, in one case the sentence 'Jack is bald' still expresses the proposition that Jack is bald, while in the other it expresses the distinct proposition that Jack is bald*, where the standard for being bald* is slightly more demanding than the standard for being bald. Thus, even though the state of 3 Jack's scalp is exactly the same between the two cases, the sentence 'Jack is bald' may again express a true proposition in the former case and a false proposition in the latter. Of course, two cases may also differ in both worldly and semantic respects simultaneously, and in other respects too. Concerning our ignorance in paradigmatic borderline cases, I proposed that the error possibilities by which vagueness blocks knowledge are the close ones differing from the given case in semantic but not in worldly respects (1994, p. 231). By contrast, most discussions of safety in epistemology concern worldly but not semantic differences; the proposition at issue is held fixed across the cases under discussion. However, if one wants a non--‐trivial safety condition for knowledge of necessary truths, as in mathematics, one must look at semantic rather than worldly differences: if a sentence expresses a necessary truth in a given case, then it expresses a truth in all cases differing from the former only in worldly respects (assuming that all cases, or at least all close cases, are metaphysically possible). Thus there are reasons independent of vagueness for using a safety condition that takes account of cases that differ in semantic respects, as well as of those that differ only in worldly ones (Williamson 2000, pp. 181--‐2). However, the semantic differences relevant to mathematical knowledge will typically be much larger than those relevant to vagueness; the cases will not be semantically indiscriminable to native speakers. For straightforward examples, we can treat the worldly and semantic dimensions as mutually orthogonal: we can vary a case on either dimension while holding it fixed on the other. For more complex examples, however, the independence assumption breaks down: varying a case on one dimension entails varying it on the other too. For instance, a vague word may be both used and mentioned in the same sentence, as in disquotational 4 biconditionals for truth such as '\"Jack is bald\" is true if and only if Jack is bald', a type of example much discussed in the recent literature on vagueness and featured in Yli--‐Vakkuri's paper. A difference between cases in the use of the word 'bald' is semantic in respect of the right--‐hand side of the biconditional ('Jack is bald') but worldly in respect of the left--‐hand side ('\"Jack is bald\" is true'), since the latter is about a broadly semantic feature of the former. It is often unclear how to apply the rough dichotomy between the world and our descriptions of it to examples where we cannot ignore the fact that our descriptions are part of the world. Similarly, it is often unclear how to apply the rough dichotomy between the world and our knowledge of it to examples where we cannot ignore the fact that our knowledge is part of the world, as in the so--‐called paradox of knowabilty (we cannot know a conjunction of the form: P and it will never be known that P; see Williamson 2000, pp. 270--‐ 301). Yet any theory of vagueness must be applicable to such complex examples. Problems of vagueness in the law remind us that the distinction between clear cases and borderline cases arises in practice for arbitrarily complex sentences. One benefit of trying to construct an adequate model theory for a formal language with a 'definitely' operator is that it forces us to think systematically and quite generally about how to apply vagueness--‐theoretic distinctions to such sentences. At this point, some philosophers will be inclined to scrap the account of definiteness based on the worldly--‐semantic distinction as insufficiently general, and start again from scratch. But that is just the sort of methodological impatience that so much impedes progress in philosophy. In particular, the fact that the worldly and semantic dimensions are not fully independent of each other does not entail that an initial assumption of their 5 independence makes a bad starting--‐point. After all, if we are trying to understand a phenomenon in natural science, we may initially make the simplifying assumption that two aspects of it are mutually independent, even though we know that the assumption is not strictly correct. For instance, we may treat propositions about the shape of an object as probabilistically independent of propositions about its colour, so that we can calculate the probability of the conjunction of a shape proposition and a colour proposition as simply the product of the probabilities of the conjuncts. We can then use the results obtained under that simplifying assumption as a starting point for a more general account that allows for the interdependence of the two dimensions. The same goes for the treatment of the worldly and semantic dimensions as mutually independent in the initial explanation of ignorance in borderline cases. Rather than scrapping the first pass explanation, we may do better by refining it. A specific reason for optimism is that vagueness in complex expressions derives somehow from vagueness in their atomic constituents and modes of composition. The worldly--‐semantic dichotomy works best for atomic expressions, although doubtless not perfectly even there. A further consideration comes from the nature of the 'definitely' operator. Its treatment as a sentence operator in a formal language with a compositional semantics turns out to involve a significant degree of idealization. Within limits, the theorist has discretion to decide what idealizations of its meaning will conduce to the most illuminating logic of vagueness. 'Definitely' is not just a philosopher's invention. To describe someone as 'neither definitely tall nor definitely not tall' is quite intelligible in ordinary English, even if it sounds a bit pedantic. Although the complement of 'definitely' in English is normally an adjectival 6 phrase rather than a sentence, that goes for modal words such as 'necessarily' and 'possibly' too; it does not prevent them from being most usefully formalized by operators on sentences. Many ordinary uses of 'definitely' are epistemic in a way not specifically related to vagueness. For instance, a detective asking 'Who was definitely in the building last night?' probably means something like 'Who is known to have been in the building last night?'; borderline cases of being in the building last night are probably not at issue. Still, theorists of vagueness can legitimately requisition the word 'definitely' for their more specific purposes. So far, so good. 2. Use and mention A more pressing concern is that the formalization of 'definitely' as a sentence operator Δ tailored to suit the theory of vagueness may not fit the structure of a compositional semantics. To start simple, consider a semantic theory that assigns a set of (metaphysically) possible worlds as the semantic value of a sentence. The compositional semantics makes the semantic value of the sentence operator Δ a function from sets of possible worlds to sets of possible worlds. Let 'small' be a vague predicate of natural numbers whose application to them is nevertheless non--‐contingent. Thus, we may suppose, 17 is a borderline case for 'small'; it is vague whether 17 is small, but not contingent whether 17 is small. If 17 is small, it is necessary that 17 is small; if 17 is not small, it is necessary that 17 is not small. Consequently, the semantic value of '17 is small' is either the set of all worlds or 7 the set of all worlds. In the former case, '17 is small' has the same semantic value as '0 = 0', so by the compositional semantics 'Δ(17 is small)' has the same semantic value as 'Δ(0 = 0)', and so is true (definitely 0 is self--‐identical). In the latter case, the semantic value of '¬(17 is small)' is the set of all worlds and so the same as the semantic value of '0 = 0', so by the compositional semantics 'Δ¬(17 is small)' has the same semantic value as 'Δ(0 =0)', and so is true. Either way, the disjunction 'Δ(17 is small) ∨ Δ¬(17 is small)' is true: it is definite whether 17 is small. But that contradicts the hypothesis that it is vague whether 17 is small. One might simply draw the moral that sets of possible worlds are too coarse--‐grained to serve as the semantic values of sentences in the semantics for a logic of vagueness and modality. That is hardly surprising. The envisaged semantics is one--‐dimensional, whereas Yli--‐ Vakkuri argues powerfully that it needs to be three--‐dimensional rather than two--‐ dimensional, to accommodate both the usual two modal dimensions for the operators 'necessarily' and 'actually' and a further dimension for the operator 'definitely'. But further reflection suggests that the problem goes even deeper. Any compositional semantics for Δ makes the meaning of the sentence Δφ a function of the meaning of the sentence φ, in some appropriate sense of 'meaning'. Thus if φ is synonymous with ψ (they have the same meaning in the relevant sense), then Δφ is synonymous with Δψ, and moreover ¬φ is synonymous with ¬ψ, so Δ¬φ is synonymous with Δ¬ψ; thus φ and ψ have the same borderline cases. But is that principle defensible? To see the difficulty, let us make the standard assumption that the natural kind terms 'furze' and 'gorse' are synonymous. They are also presumably not perfectly precise: for instance, it is slightly vague when furze and gorse first evolved. Nevertheless, for purposes of meaning, the two words are vague in the same way. Let φ be the sentence 'All 8 and only furze is furze' and ψ the sentence 'All and only furze is gorse'. On a standard compositional semantics, φ and ψ have the same semantic structure and synonymous corresponding constituents, and so are synonymous. Thus, by hypothesis, Δφ and Δψ are synonymous too. Since φ is a trivial logical truth, Δφ is true. Hence Δψ is true too. But is it? We may assume that 'furze' and 'gorse' are understood independently of each other; a speaker may understand either word without understanding the other. No special rule co--‐ ordinates them; they just happen to have the same meaning. Although the use of 'furze' happens exactly to match the use of 'gorse', there could very easily have been a slight mismatch, where the use of one word was slightly more liberal than the use of the other, so that the extension of the former included slightly earlier samples than the extension of the latter did. The vagueness of 'furze' and 'gorse' makes it unclear to native speakers whether there is indeed such a slight difference in extension. Thus it seems to be definite that all and only furze is furze, but not definite that all and only furze is gorse. On this view, φ and ψ are synonymous, but Δφ and Δψ differ in truth--‐value and so in meaning. If so, the operator Δ does not have a compositional semantics. Could a theorist respond by individuating meanings in a more fine--‐grained way? We may assume that the only relevant difference between 'furze' and 'gorse' is the syntactic difference between the words themselves. A way of individuating meanings on which 'furze' and 'gorse' differ in meaning makes synonymy between distinct words virtually impossible. A supervaluationist might implement such a fine--‐grained standard by identifying meanings with functions from admissible sharpenings of the language to Kaplanian characters. Suppose that one admissible sharpening assigns the character C to both 'furze' and 'gorse', while another assigns a distinct character C* to both words. Then if a third admissible 9 sharpening assigns C to 'furze' and C* to 'gorse', while a fourth assigns C* to 'furze' and C to 'gorse', the account makes 'furze' and 'gorse' differ in meaning, even if the overall range of admissible sharpenings associates each of them with exactly the same range of characters. The trivialization of synonymy is a high price to pay for such a view, especially since it threatens to trivialize the requirement of compositionality too. An alternative way of interpreting the semantics is to retain a conception of meaning that allows 'furze' and 'gorse' to be synonymous, but to treat the Δ operator as tacitly quotational: Δφ is really about the sentence φ itself, at least partly (a move Yli--‐Vakkuri may accept). In that case, the so--‐called compositional semantics for the language is not what it seems, since it does not determine the meanings of complex expressions just from the meanings of their constituents and the way those constituents are put together. For a genuinely compositional semantics, one might have to make the quotation explicit - and supply a semantics of quotation. These problems are reminiscent of those facing attempts to give a compositional semantics of variable--‐binding, on which Yli--‐Vakkuri has written illuminatingly elsewhere (2013). In the simple case of an extensional, non--‐indexical language, if one identifies the meaning of a singular term with a function that maps each assignment of values to variables to the denotation of the term on that assignment, the variables 'x' and 'y' count as different in meaning, simply because they have distinct values on at least one assignment, even though that is just a corollary of their syntactic difference. In one respect, however, the problems raised by Δ are more acute, since they arise for closed as well as open expressions.2 10 Similar problems arise anyway for epistemic operators, and so pose no threat to the epistemicist view that Δ is an epistemic operator. For instance, even though 'furze' and 'gorse' are synonymous, it may be natural to describe someone as knowing that something is furze without knowing that it is gorse, or as knowing that all and only furze is furze without knowing that all and only furze is gorse. If one is doing the semantics of 'know' in terms of epistemically possible worlds, one may then be driven to assign 'furze' and 'gorse' distinct intensions (here, functions from epistemically possible worlds to extensions), even though they are synonymous. Of course, one may take a more coarse--‐grained view of knowledge and simply tough it out, insisting that to know that all and only furze is furze just is to know that all and only furze is gorse, even if those who recognize that truth under the guise of the sentence 'All and only furze is furze' cannot recognize it under the guise of the sentence 'All and only furze is gorse'. In principle, someone might take the same line with vagueness and simply tough it out, insisting that for it to be definite that all and only furze is furze just is for it to be definite that all and only furze is gorse, even if those who recognize that truth under the guise of the former sentence cannot recognize it under the guise of the latter. However, the tough line is better motivated for 'know' than for 'definite'. When we speak of knowledge and ignorance, we often wish to prescind from the words in which a given piece of knowledge might be expressed. By contrast, when we speak of definiteness and vagueness, the expression in given words is typically central to our interest. To prescind from it would be to miss the very point at issue. These questions also arise for Yli--‐Vakkuri's preferred epistemic interpretation of his three--‐dimensional semantics. To make all the desired distinctions, an intended model will 11 have to assign distinct 3D profiles to sentences that, by a natural compositional standard, are synonymous. That is very far from making the theory useless: it can still serve as a good guide to reasoning about the interaction between vagueness and metaphysical modality. But it will not be a compositional semantics in the sense one might originally have expected. To the two non--‐epistemically modal dimensions needed for a standard semantic treatment of 'necessarily' and 'actually', Yli--‐Vakkuri adds a third modal dimension for the treatment of 'definitely', with promising results.3 He argues that the third dimension is best understood as epistemically modal. Since he is implementing an epistemicist account of vagueness, that is not altogether surprising. He requires the epistemic dimension to include metaphysically impossible epistemic possibilities as well as metaphysically possible ones. On his interpretation, 'when φ is borderline, φ expresses in the actual world, according to some close epistemic possibility, a proposition other than the one it actually expresses in the actual world', but 'any such epistemic possibility will be metaphysically impossible, because it is a noncontingent matter which proposition is actually expressed by a sentence'. Such a use of metaphysically impossible worlds in the semantics for 'definitely' poses an apparent threat to epistemicist theories that explain actual borderline cases in terms of Semantic Plasticity, for surely no metaphysically impossible world is close in the safety--‐relevant sense to the actual world. However, we may be able to reconcile Yli--‐Vakkuri's semantics with the safety--‐ theoretic considerations by elucidating its explanatory ambitions. For just as a theory of the meaning of the word 'light' is not tasked with explaining the underlying nature of light, and a theory of the meaning of the word 'knowledge' is not tasked with explaining the underlying nature of knowledge, so a theory of the meaning of the word 'indefinite' is not 12 tasked with explaining the underlying nature of indefiniteness. The point is easier to miss in the latter case, for while semantics is obviously separate from physics, and only slightly less obviously separate from epistemology, it is not at all obviously separate from the theory of indefiniteness as a linguistic phenomenon. A comprehensive book on semantics should say something about vagueness and indefiniteness. Nevertheless, that task must be distinguished from the task of giving the semantics of the word 'indefinite', just as the task of explaining the underlying nature of meaning must be distinguished from the task of giving the semantics of the word 'meaning'. Thus, even if safety--‐theoretic considerations are central to the underlying nature of indefiniteness, they need not figure in a good semantic account of the word 'indefinite' or the Δ operator, just as, even if safety--‐theoretic considerations are central to the underlying nature of knowledge, they need not figure in a good semantic account of the word 'knowledge'. By itself, the appeal to merely epistemically possible worlds in Yli--‐Vakkuri's semantics for Δ poses no threat to a safety--‐ theoretic account of the underlying nature of indefiniteness, since the semantics is not expected to describe that underlying level. Of course, if for some sentences in some contexts the semantics predicted truth--‐values incompatible with the safety--‐theoretic account, that would be a problem, but just appealing to merely epistemically possible worlds forces no such incompatibility. The point can be restated in terms of the distinction between semantics and metasemantics, where a metasemantic theory is supposed to explain why a given semantic theory holds for the language of a given community at a given time. The possible worlds of the safety--‐theoretic considerations are the concern of the metasemantic theory; Yli--‐Vakkuri's impossible worlds are the concern of his semantic theory. 13 Also to be taken into account is the extent to which the Δ operator and related English words such as 'indefinite', 'borderline', and 'vague' are all being used as theoretical terms, and rightly so. Although their introduction by examples is good enough for initial working purposes, some refinement is needed once they are used in formulating a positive theory of vagueness. For when we encounter more complex cases than the usual sorites series provide, especially cases where the semantic and worldly dimensions fail to be independent, the initial paradigms give no clear guidance as to how those terms should most fruitfully be applied for theoretical purposes. We see many apparent joints, and are unsure where to cut. For any theory that uses an operator like Δ to characterize vagueness--‐ related phenomena, choosing a semantics for Δ is a prescriptive as well as a descriptive task. It is a matter of deciding what it is best to mean by Δ. In this respect, the model--‐theoretic nature of Yli--‐Vakkuri's semantics strikes a helpful balance between informativeness and flexibility. It is primarily designed to generate a good logic for Δ, especially as it interacts with the modal operators. It validates nice structural principles for Δ, in particular those corresponding to the modal system T, thereby imposing constructive discipline on our use of Δ. At the same time, it does not specify in any detail an intended model (or even frame) for the model theory. It thereby leaves considerable scope for fine--‐tuning the specific application of Δ in line with future metasemantic developments. Like most accounts of vagueness, the epistemicist account in my book focusses on simple borderline cases, and does not provide clear guidance on how to apply an operator like Δ to more complex cases, especially those where the semantic and worldly dimensions are not independent. As already noted, that does not make it irrelevant to such cases. Science is full of cases where we know how to apply a theory to simple examples of a 14 phenomenon but not to more complex examples. Typically, progress is then incremental, as models (in the scientific sense, not the semantic one) are developed to permit the theory to be applied to more complex examples, though never all at once, and always under simplifying assumptions. I see no reason why such progress should not also be made in the theory of vagueness, if philosophers are willing to do the hard work of model--‐building. 3. Semantic Plasticity Where do these general methodological considerations leave Semantic Plasticity? In section 5, Yli--‐Vakkuri argues directly against a version of it that appeals to metaphysical possibilities. He formulates the version thus: (*) Whenever φ is true and borderline, there is a close metaphysically possible world in which φ expresses a proposition other than the proposition φ actually expresses, and in which that proposition is false. As a counterexample to (*), he discusses the case where φ is the material conditional # → χ, χ is an actually true borderline sentence, and # is a relevantly precise actually non--‐ borderline specification of the actual use facts that determine which proposition χ actually expresses (so # is actually true). Thus Δ# and ¬Δχ are true, so ¬Δ(# → χ) is also true by the normal logic of Δ. Therefore, since # → χ is true, it is also borderline. Thus, given (*), it follows that there is a close metaphysically possible world w* in which # → χ expresses a proposition other than the proposition # → χ actually expresses, and in which that 15 proposition is false. We may assume that in all close metaphysically possible worlds # and → express what they actually express. Thus if # is true in w*, the actual use facts that determine which proposition χ expresses are the same in w* as in the actual world, so # → χ expresses the same proposition as it actually expresses, contrary to hypothesis. On the other hand, if # is not true in w*, it is false in w* (given epistemicism, bivalence holds), so # → χ is true in w* by the truth--‐table for →, again contrary to hypothesis. Thus # → χ is a counterexample to (*). This argument against (*) does not depend on Yli--‐Vakkuri's formal semantics, although it does use the standard assumption that the logic of Δ is like that of □ in a normal modal logic, which Yli--‐Vakkuri's semantics validates and I happily grant. I will not defend (*). However, the falsity of (*) does not mean that the more general phenomenon of semantic plasticity as described in my book plays no role in explaining the borderline status of # → χ, even when semantic plasticity is understood, as here, to be variation in what is expressed in close, so metaphysically possible, worlds (epistemically possible but metaphysically impossible worlds do not count). For the normal logic of Δ has these theorems, which Yli--‐Vakkuri's semantics also validates: Δ# → (Δ(# → χ) ↔ Δχ) Δ# → (Δ¬(# → χ) ↔ Δ¬χ) Δ# → ((¬Δ(# → χ) & ¬Δ¬(# → χ)) ↔ (¬Δχ & ¬Δ¬χ) In brief, given that # is definite, the question whether # → χ is borderline reduces to the question whether χ is borderline. We can explain the definiteness of # in terms of its truth and lack of semantic plasticity, both of which Yli--‐Vakkuri stipulates. Thus, if we can explain the borderline status of χ in terms of semantic plasticity, then we can also explain the 16 borderline status of # → χ indirectly in terms of semantic plasticity, using our explanations of the definiteness of # and the borderline status of χ in those terms. For instance, if χ is a semantically simple sentence, we may be able to explain its borderline status directly in terms of its semantic plasticity, along the lines I originally proposed, for all that Yli--‐Vakkuri's arguments show. Of course, χ may itself be complex, and present similar difficulties to those # → χ did, but then we can apply the same strategy to χ as we did to # → χ, and so on down in a recursive process terminating at the latest in semantically simple constituents. An encouraging observation is that both the normal logic of Δ and Yli--‐Vakkuri's semantics yield the principle that any truth--‐function of non--‐borderline sentences is itself non--‐borderline. For instance: (Δφ ∨ Δ¬φ) → (Δ¬φ ∨ Δ¬¬φ) ((Δφ ∨ Δ¬φ) & (Δψ ∨ Δ¬ψ) → (Δ(φ & ψ) ∨ Δ¬(φ & ψ)) The negation of a non--‐borderline sentence is itself non--‐borderline, a conjunction of non--‐ borderline conjuncts is itself non--‐borderline, and so on. Contrapositively, if some truth--‐ function θ of the simple sentences φ1, φ2, ..., φn is borderline, then at least one of φ1, φ2, ..., φn is borderline too. Thus if the explanation of borderline status in terms of semantic plasticity works for simple sentences, there is some hope of explaining θ's borderline status indirectly in terms of semantic plasticity through the contributions of its simple constituents. One will not always be able to deduce θ's borderline status from the borderline status of its constituents, for not every truth--‐function of borderline sentences is itself borderline: for instance, φ & ¬φ is a non--‐borderline truth--‐function of φ, even when φ is borderline. Nevertheless, if θ is borderline, a reasonable goal is to explain its borderline status in terms 17 of the interrelated ways in which its constituents are borderline, where those ways essentially involve semantic plasticity. More generally, suppose that only semantically plastic sentences are borderline; Yli--‐ Vakkuri's arguments in no way undermine that principle. Let σ be a complex sentence with a compositionally determined meaning. Thus if all the simple constituents and modes of combination from which σ is composed are semantically non--‐plastic, so is σ itself; by hypothesis, then, σ is non--‐borderline. Contrapositively, if σ is borderline, then some of its simple constituents or modes of combination are semantically plastic. Thus we can hope to explain σ's borderline status in terms of the semantic plasticity of those simple constituents or modes of combination. Although the present considerations do not guarantee success, they suggest that it is a reasonable strategy. How does that strategy square with a safety conception of knowledge? For the truth actually expressed by # → χ is not known, yet in every close metaphysically possible world the sentence # → χ expresses a true proposition (by Yli--‐Vakkuri's argument). Moreover, it is quite compatible with the previous assumptions that the proposition actually expressed by # → χ is both actually believed and true in every close metaphysically possible world. Invoking epistemically but not metaphysically close worlds looks like abandoning the safety conception. If # → χ simply refutes that conception, then the original explanation of our ignorance in terms of semantic plasticity fails even for the simplest borderline cases, because it depends on a false epistemology. At this point, it helps to recall how safety--‐theoretic considerations would explain the failure of irrational but true mathematical beliefs to constitute knowledge. Someone irrationally plumps for believing a proposition p expressed by a precise mathematical 18 sentence π. In fact, p is true, and so necessarily true. Thus in every close world, π expresses p (π is not semantically plastic) and p is true. However, in some close world w, he irrationally plumps in a similar way for believing a different proposition r expressed by a different precise mathematical sentence ρ. But r is false, and so necessarily false. The sentences π and ρ are not semantically indiscriminable to the subject; he understands both and is aware of their semantic difference. It is just that his plumping does not track their difference in truth value. Since his irrational false belief in the close world w is relevantly similar in method to his irrational true belief in the actual world, the latter fails to constitute knowledge. Now consider Yli--‐Vakkuri's case. We may assume that the borderline true sentence χ is semantically plastic along the lines of (*), for otherwise his argument against (*) would assume more than it was entitled to by resting on stipulations hostile to (*). We may also assume that the subject actually believes the proposition expressed by the sentence # → χ, for the challenge is to explain in appropriate terms why such a belief does not constitute knowledge. But then we should expect that in some close metaphysically possible world x, the subject believes in a similar way the proposition expressed in x by the sentence #x → χ, where #x is a relevantly precise non--‐borderline specification of the use facts in x that determine which proposition χ expresses in x (so #x is true in x), while by semantic plasticity the proposition χ expresses in x differs from the one it actually expresses and is false in x, even though x is just like the actual world in the worldly ways relevant to χ, though not in those relevant to # and #x. For we were not supposed to assume that the actual world was uniquely special in the subject's believing the proposition expressed by the material conditional with a true relevantly precise non--‐borderline specification of the use facts that 19 determine which proposition χ expresses as the antecedent and χ as the consequent. But then #x → χ expresses a false proposition in x, for there #x expresses a truth and χ expresses a falsehood. The false belief in the close world x in the proposition there expressed by #x → χ is relevantly similar in method to the true belief in the actual world in the proposition actually expressed by # → χ, so the latter fails to constitute knowledge. Thus we can explain in safety--‐theoretic terms the obstacle to knowing the truth expressed by # → χ, and so the borderline status of # → χ. The explanation crucially invokes semantic plasticity in relation to the vague consequent and a different safety--‐theoretic consideration in relation to the precise antecedent. That is a natural generalization of the original explanation by appeal to semantic plasticity of the obstacle to knowing the truth expressed by a simple vague sentence. The hybrid aspect of the explanans follows the hybrid aspect of the explanandum, where the sentence at issue combines the relevantly vague constituent χ with the relevantly precise constituents # and → . The previous paragraph made various simplifying assumptions. We can construct more complicated scenarios. For instance, we can imagine subjects hard--‐wired to believe propositions expressed by the sentence # → χ but not those expressed by similar sentences #x → χ in any close world. On a suitable development of the story, the true beliefs expressed by # → χ of such bizarre creatures may bizarrely constitute knowledge.4 If so, and they also somehow know the truth expressed by the precise but massively detailed specification #, may they not also know the truth expressed by χ inferentially, by modus ponens? But then χ is presumably not borderline for them. That does not mean that it is not borderline for us: our use of χ is different from theirs, even if we do in fact express the same proposition. If # correctly describes their use, then it does not correctly describe ours. If we enter into 20 communication with them, it may be unclear to us whether χ as they use it expresses the same proposition as χ as we use it. The foregoing line of thought opens up many complex questions that I cannot hope to deal with adequately here. Rich explanatory resources are available to an epistemicist approach to vagueness articulated in terms of safety and semantic plasticity, given a willingness to apply those resources to complex cases in correspondingly complex ways, in the spirit of scientific model--‐building. 21 Notes 1 For the sake of brevity, when I speak of knowing or believing a proposition expressed by a sentence, I will mean that it is known or believed under the guise of that sentence. Thus one may know or believe it expressed by one sentence (say, 'Hesperus is Hesperus') but not expressed by another sentence (say, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'). 2 The analogy may suggest a treatment along the lines of Fine (2007). This is no place to discuss such a radical departure from the usual form of compositional semantics; Yli--‐ Vakkuri follows the latter. 3 The technical aspects of the logic were developed in collaboration with Jon Litland (Yli--‐Vakkuri and Litland 2016). 4 See Williamson 2016 for an analogous possibility concerning knowledge of mathematical axioms. 22 Fine, Kit 2007: Semantic Relationism. Oxford: Blackwell. Williamson, Timothy 1994: Vagueness. London: Routledge. Williamson, Timothy 2000: Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williamson, Timothy 2016: 'Absolute provability and safe knowledge of axioms', in Leon Horsten and Philip Welch (eds.), Gödel's Disjunction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yli--‐Vakkuri, Juhani 2013: 'Propositions and compositionality', Philosophical Perspectives 27, pp. 526--‐563. Yli--‐Vakkuri, Juhani 2016: 'Epistemicism and modality', THIS VOLUME. Yli--‐Vakkuri, Juhani, and Litland, Jon 201X: 'Vagueness and modality', MS.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "| 257 JEAN CLAUDE LARCHET. (2014). TERAPÉUTICA DE LAS ENFERMEDADES ESPIRITUALES. SALAMANCA: EDICIONES SÍGUEME. (734 PP). Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez1 Terapéutica de las enfermedades espirituales es el título del libro escrito por Jean Claude Larchet, publicado en el 2014 por Ediciones Sígueme, traducido del original francés: Thérapeutique des maladies spirituelles, Les Éditions du Cerf; del año 2000. En este texto el autor nos presenta la vida espiritual como una dimensión real del ser humano, que así como en su dimensión física trabaja por su salud, lo debe hacer también en el ámbito de su vida espiritual; no hacerlo, lo conduce a enfermarse, leve o gravemente. El libro plantea la descripción de esas enfermedades espirituales que aquejan al ser humano y cuál es su terapéutica. Jean Claude Larchet nació en Francia en 1949, es doctor en filosofía y teología. Sus estudios, centrados en la Edad Antigua, le han convertido en un experto del pensamiento patrístico. Actualmente es profesor de 1 Magíster en Bioética, 2017. Miembro del Grupo Kheiron Bioética Universidad de la Sabana, Chía, Cundinamarca, Colombia. ORCID: 0000-0003-1529-3785 Correo electrónico: carlosalbertorosasj@gmail.com Atribución – Sin Derivar – No comercial: El material creado por usted puede ser distribuido, copiado y exhibido por terceros si se muestra en los créditos. No se puede obtener ningún beneficio comercial. No se pueden realizar obras derivadas ISSN: 0120-131X • ISSN: 2389-9980 (en línea) | Vol. 45 | No. 103 | Enero-junio • 2018 | pp. 257-261 Cuestiones Teológicas | Medellín-Colombia http://dx.doi.org/10.18566/cueteo.v45n103.a09 Artículo recibido el 29 noviembre de 2017 y aprobado para su publicación el 16 abril de 2018. 258 | Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 45, No. 103 (Enero-junio, 2018) Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Filosofía en Forbach, Lorena, Francia. Especialista en Teología Patrística, y en la relación entre la salud, la enfermedad y la curación según la tradición cristiana oriental, pues pertenece a la Iglesia Ortodoxa. Entre sus muchas obras podemos nombrar: Théologie de la maladie, Cerf, Paris, 1991; 1994, II ed.; La divinisation de l'homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, Cerf, Paris, 1996. Vie après la mort selon la tradition orthodoxe, Cerf, 2001; Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Cerf, 2003 y Malades des nouveaux médias, Cerf, 2016. La presente obra está organizada en 6 capítulos, con una breve introducción y una, también breve, conclusión. El capítulo 1 trata la salud original y el origen de las enfermedades dando unas premisas antropológicas. El capítulo 2 se titula: \"Las pasiones. Nosografía, semiología y patogénesis de las enfermedades espirituales\". El capítulo 3 trata las condiciones generales de la terapéutica. El capítulo 4 nos da la aplicación de la terapéutica. El capítulo 5 se dedica a la terapéutica de las pasiones y a la adquisición de las virtudes. Finalmente, el capítulo 6 se titula: \"La Salud Recobrada\". A continuación queremos resaltar algunos puntos que nos han parecido importantes que pueden motivar la lectura del libro. En primer lugar, podemos decir que el libro es una exhaustiva recopilación de textos de muchos Padres de la Iglesia, principalmente de los primeros siglos después de Cristo. El libro recoge una vasta tradición espiritual consignada en las obras de grandes autores espirituales como: Juan Casiano, San Juan Clímaco, Doroteo de Gaza, San Máximo el Confesor; además de otros grandes teólogos como lo son: San Basilio el Grande, San Gregorio de Nisa, San Gregorio Nacianceno y San Juan Crisóstomo. Estos autores le aportan a la obra una profundidad teológica y espiritual significativa. Las citas textuales son muy pertinentes y han sido tan bien armonizadas en el desarrollo del texto que son fáciles de leer y de entender. La lectura es muy fluida y la organización en pequeños acápites dentro de cada capítulo facilita la lectura, dado que el contenido espiritual y profundo de cada sección hace necesaria una reflexión y meditación para una adecuada comprensión. Por otro lado, para poder hablar de la necesidad de una terapéutica de las enfermedades espirituales, el autor explica clara y brevemente el porqué de estas. En síntesis, el estado enfermizo del ser humano se debe a la separación de Dios, porque permanece apegado al mundo material. Para salir de ese estado es necesaria una terapéutica divino-humana en la que se requiere del Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 45, No. 103 (Enero-junio, 2018) | 259 Jean Claude Larchet. (2014). Terapéutica de las enfermedades espirituales. esfuerzo del hombre pero que necesita, principalmente, la acción de Dios. Todo el esfuerzo del hombre para librarse de las enfermedades espirituales consiste en dejar obrar a Dios en su vida; la salud se podría entender como la facilidad para que la voluntad divina encuentre un camino en nosotros (cf. p. 265), una auténtica salud espiritual es un sinónimo de santidad. En este esfuerzo por curarse y obtener la salud Dios le ha dado al hombre la ley, pero ésta no es suficiente para la cura (cf. p. 256). El ser humano tuvo necesidad de un remedio mucho mejor, pues como dice san Gregorio Nacianceno: Reprendido primero de muchas maneras por sus numerosos pecados, que crecieron como retoños de una mala raíz, corregido por diversos motivos en distintas circunstancias por medio de la palabra, la ley, los profetas, los beneficios, las amenazas, los castigos, los signos [...] el hombre tuvo necesidad de un remedio más eficaz para curarse de unos males que no hacían más que empeorar (p. 257). Y es en ese momento que se plantea la necesidad de: \"un médico y un cirujano cuya habilidad fuera proporcional a la gravedad de sus enfermedades y sus llagas. Solamente Cristo, por ser Dios, podía, haciéndose hombre sin dejar de ser Dios, ser ese médico eficaz\" (p. 257). Cristo es presentado como el médico carnal y espiritual (cfr. p. 259), como dice la Escritura: \"El soportó el castigo que nos trae la paz, y con sus cardenales hemos sido curados\" (Is 53, 5b). Podemos decir que la base teológica de la sanación de las enfermedades espirituales que menciona el libro es bastante amplia, pero aun así es posible resumirla de la siguiente manera: En su naturaleza, restaurada por la unión con la naturaleza divina en la persona de Cristo muerto y resucitado, el hombre, del que se han eliminado todas las enfermedades, recobra la salud plena. En Cristo, vuelve a ser un hombre normal; recupera sus facultades en su estado primero, conforme a su naturaleza, que, recordémoslo, es estar orientadas hacia Dios (p. 270). El profesor Larchet menciona, por un lado, las pasiones, su semiología y la patogénesis, y, por otro lado, describe la terapéutica de cada una de las enfermedades; las que describe con su terapéutica son: la filautía, la gastrimargía, la lujuria, la filargia, la pleonexia, la tristeza, la acedia, la ira, 260 | Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 45, No. 103 (Enero-junio, 2018) Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez el temor, la cenodoxia y el orgullo. Si bien es cierto que es necesario que el cristiano se dedique a comprender las enfermedades que padece y a buscar su curación, el autor sostiene que: Conviene ser consciente de que la salud, aunque sea espiritual, no es un fin en sí misma. Es sólo la condición para que el hombre pueda convertirse en \"una nueva criatura\" (Gal 6,15), llevar una vida nueva, realizar su destino, que es glorificar a Dios dignamente y con la plenitud de los medios que el Creador le ha dado, y vivir plenamente en Dios siendo él mismo deificado por la gracia (p. 712). Otro punto que vale la pena destacar de la aproximación que tiene el profesor Larchet es que da luces para la construcción de un mundo mejor, pues en un mundo tan violento y acelerado como en el que vivimos actualmente, es interesante advertir cómo los autores espirituales plantean la mansedumbre y la paciencia, no sólo como un remedio para tratar la ira, sino para todas las enfermedades del alma (cf. p. 567, 568). Asimismo, nos recuerda que la tristeza es un mal escondido, puede estar muy presente en los ambientes en los que nos movemos, pero pasa siempre desapercibida; para tratarla se insiste en dedicar tiempo a la oración (cf. p. 535), no sólo para la tristeza, sino para las otras enfermedades espirituales. El profesor Larchet también da una renovada aproximación a la ascesis corporal, que puede haber quedado muy desprestigiada por prácticas antiguas muy exageradas, insistiendo que: la finalidad de la ascesis corporal, que es favorecer la vida espiritual [...] no es proponerse agobiar el cuerpo, sino facilitar las funciones del alma [...] Se tratará hacer de modo que la abundancia no posea demasiado y que la indigencia no carezca de nada (p. 492). En conjunto con esto da luces a la acción pastoral de la Iglesia actual, dando elementos muy concretos para quienes se dedican a la cura de almas, a quienes tienen que caracterizar: la paciencia (p. 434), la pureza (p. 424), la humildad; entre otras (424 ss.); pero, sobre todo, el respeto total a la libertad de quien se acompaña (p. 436). Finalmente, tenemos únicamente una muy breve crítica al libro, pues en un momento el autor dice: Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 45, No. 103 (Enero-junio, 2018) | 261 Jean Claude Larchet. (2014). Terapéutica de las enfermedades espirituales. Esperamos haber mostrado suficientemente que las nociones de enfermedad, curación y salud son una clave importante ofrecida por la teología, la antropología y la ascética ortodoxas para entender el estado de la humanidad caída y las modalidades de su salvación en Dios (p. 711). No estamos de acuerdo con que toda esta sabiduría recopilada en esta magistral obra se diga que es exclusiva de la Iglesia ortodoxa, pues lo es también de la Iglesia católica. Por lo tanto, es un patrimonio que compartimos ortodoxos y católicos, fruto de la reflexión de muchos autores espirituales que siguieron a los primeros seguidores de Cristo y de la enseñanza de los grandes padres de la Iglesia de los primeros siglos de la era cristiana. En conclusión, recomendamos este libro a todos aquellos que quieran conocer más sobre sus propias enfermedades espirituales y cómo tratarlas, así como a aquellos que se dedican al acompañamiento espiritual y a los que quieran conocer más sobre los padres de la Iglesia de manera muy encarnada en el combate espiritual que vivimos todos los cristianos.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Alice Pinheiro Walla Original Scientific Paper Trinity College Dublin UDK 17 Кант И. 17.023.2 LOCAL DESIRE SATISFACTION AND LONGTERM WELLBEING: REVISITING THE GOUT SUFFERER OF KANT'S GROUNDWORK Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the least discussed of Kant's four examples of duty in the first section of his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals: the gout sufferer who is no longer motivated by natural interest in his long-term wellbeing, and is thus in a unique position to secure his own happiness from duty. This example has long been wrongly interpreted as a failure of prudential rationality, as recently illustrated by Allen Wood's reading of that example. I argue that the gout sufferer example is meant to illustrate a violation of a duty to the self and should not be confused with mere prudential failure. The example also helps us understand the line between prudential reason and duties to the self. I show that given Kant's conception of happiness as an indeterminate concept and his hedonistic account of non-moral ends, it can sometimes be more rational from the perspective of empirical practical reason to choose short term over longterm wellbeing when long term wellbeing seems uncertain in regard to expected pleasure. In other words: Kant's account of empirical practical reason does not rule out as irrational choosing short term pleasure at the expense of long-term wellbeing. However, this is precisely why the gout sufferer's long-term happiness can be directly morally required and so becomes the content of a duty to the self. To explain how there can be a direct duty to promote our own happiness under certain circumstances I also elucidate Kant's distinction between direct and indirect duties. Kant's general conception of practical reason Reconstructing Kant's general conception of practical rationality is a particularly difficult task. Kant's main project when he writes about practical reason is to give an account of the principle of morality and why it must be understood as a categorical imperative, as opposed to principles presupposing an existing desire of the agent. For the most part, Kant's account of non-moral rationality can be reconstructed only indirectly, that is, from what Kant says when he is primarily attempting to draw a contrast between moral and nonmoral practical reasoning and motivation. Kant scholars have tried to reconstruct Kant's conception of practical rationality beyond his account of moral reasoning. Thomas E. Hill introduced the so called \"instrumental principle\" into the Kant literature (\"whoever wants an end wants the necessary means\").1 Allen Wood suggested that it is possible 1 Thomas E. Hill, \"The Hypothetical Imperative\", Philosophical Review 82 (4):429–450 (1973) 32 BELGRADE PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL Vol. XXVIII (2015) to spell out a \"principle of prudence\", which requires rational agents to take the means not to an isolated end, as in the instrumental principle, but to our happiness as a whole. Wood formulates this principle as follows: \"use your reason, understanding and imagination to form for yourself a more determinate idea of the greatest attainable total satisfaction of your inclinations (under the name of 'happiness'); and give first priority, among all your non-moral ends, to happiness, preferring it to all other non-moral ends when they conflict with it.\"2 Allen Wood's main project is to draw a clear cut distinction between instrumental and prudential rationality. As Wood notes, Kant did not keep this distinction clear in the Groundwork and attempts to reduce prudential reason to mere instrumental rationality; further, he argues that Kant's conception of prudence is incoherent, in contrast to his conception of instrumental reason, which can be reconstructed into a cogent account.3 Wood's aim is to provide a modified interpretation that can offer a \"minimally coherent story\" about prudential reason. He suggests reading the gout sufferer example as a failure of prudential rationality. Further, he makes the case for interpreting prudential reason as a distinctive kind of rationality, as opposed to mere instrumental reasoning. Kant, Wood argues, often gives the impression that what is wrong with the gout sufferer is that he fails to take the necessary means to his happiness; however prudential rationality, if considered a distinctive kind of practical rationality, would consist in giving the end of happiness an absolute priority over other isolated non-moral ends and immediate desires (constrained only by morality). Therefore, in Wood's interpretation the gout sufferer is imprudent because he fails to assign happiness priority over his immediate inclination: Kant's imprudent gout sufferer (GMS 4: 399), for instance, knows perfectly well the means to open the liquor cabinet and get at the brandy he desires, and also the means to keep his gout from acting up – namely, to leave the liquor cabinet alone and lay off the brandy. What he needs to constrain himself to do, through the exercise of prudential reason, is to give priority to the end of his happiness (satisfaction with his life as a whole) over the short term end of satisfying a momentary impulse the indulgence of which will later leave him much unhappier. So it gets prudential reason basically wrong to focus, as Kant does, on the possible hypothetical imperatives that might be involved in pursuing the end of one's happiness. (Wood, \"Kant on Practical Reason\", p. 73) 2 Allen Wood, \"Kant on Practical Reason\". In: Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu, Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (OUP 2013). A related debate in Kant scholarship is whether we should take these principles to be normative or merely descriptive. The reason for scepticism about the normativity of the non-moral principles of rationality is based on Kant's claim that the hypothetical imperative is analytic (GMS IV: 217) and that there are no pragmatic imperatives, only counsels of prudence (GMS IV: 418). Kant's formulation \"whoever wills the end wants the necessary means\" also suggests a merely descriptive principle. For positions who deny that the instrumental principle is normative see Bernd Ludwig, „Warum es keine „hypothetischen Imperative\" gibt\", In: Klemme, Ludwig, Pauen and Stark (eds.) Aufklärung und Interpretation. Studien zu Kants Philosophie und ihrem Umkreis. Königshausen & Neumann, 1999. 3 Wood, \"Kant on Practical Reason\", p. 69. Alice Pinheiro Walla: Local Desire Satisfaction and Long-Term Wellbeing 33 Was Kant merely confused in this example about what is prudent and what is moral? Did Kant fail to recognize prudential reason as a distinctive kind of practical rationality? I will argue in this paper that the gout sufferer example illustrates a violation of a duty to the self rather than a prudential interest. Kant's refusal to accuse the gout sufferer of prudential irrationality is significant, and has not been acknowledged enough in the literature. As Kant stresses in the text, the principle enjoining the gout sufferer to secure his health is the moral law, not prudential reason: \"there still remains a law, namely to advance one's happiness, not from inclination, but from duty, and it is not until then that his conduct has its actual moral worth. (GMS IV: 399, my emphasis).\"4 In this paper I will take seriously the fact that Kant did not criticise the gout sufferer for prudential irrationality and draw some conclusions about the nature of prudential reason in Kant's account. Further, I will analyse the distinction between direct and indirect duties, and show that it is central for understanding how and when securing one's happiness can become the object of a direct duty to the self, despite Kant's claim that there can be no duty to promote one's own happiness. The Gout Sufferer of the Groundwork: imprudent or immoral? In the Second Critique, Kant identifies both desire satisfaction and our interest in prudence with the principle of one's own happiness or self-love (KpV V: 22). This suggests that there is no relevant difference between the two. As Kant notes, \"the principle of one's happiness, however much understanding and reason may be used in it, still contains no determining ground of the will other than such as is suitable to the lower faculty of desire\" (KpV V: 24). However, in the Groundwork Kant draws an explicit contrast between the gout sufferer's immediate desire to indulge in food and drink and the \"general inclination to happiness\" (allgemeine Neigung nach Glückseligkeit). What can the gout sufferer of the Groundwork teach us about Kant's conception of prudence? To secure one's own happiness is one's duty (at least indirectly) [wenigstens indirect]; for lack of contentment with one's condition, in the trouble of many worries and amidst unsatisfied needs, could easily become a great temptation to transgress one's duties. But, even without taking note of duty [auch ohne hier auf Pflicht zu sehen], all human beings have already of their own the most powerful and intimate inclination to happiness, as it is just in this idea that all inclinations unite into one sum. (IV: 399) What does Kant mean by \"securing one's happiness\" (seine eigene Glückseligkeit sichern) in the above passage? As Kant notes, \"lack of contentment 4 „Aber auch in diesem Falle, wenn die allgemeine Neigung zur Glückseligkeit seinen Willen nicht bestimmte, wenn Gesundheit für ihn wenigstens nicht so nothwendig in diesen Überschlag gehörte, so bleibt noch hier wie in allen andern Fällen ein Gesetz übrig, nämlich seine Glückseligkeit zu befördern, nicht aus Neigung, sondern aus Pflicht, und da hat sein Verhalten allererst den eigentlichen moralischen Werth.\" (GMS IV: 399) 34 BELGRADE PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL Vol. XXVIII (2015) with one's condition, in the trouble of many worries and amidst unsatisfied needs, could easily become a great temptation to transgress one's duties.\" The moral reason for securing our happiness is thus to make us less susceptible to temptations arising from unsatisfied needs and general discontentment with one's life. We must take into account and avoid possible impediments to morality arising from human nature. This view presupposes the assumption that humans can achieve a certain level of satisfaction, sufficient to enable them to comply with moral commands. From this, it is possible to infer that Kant is thinking of happiness in the sense of one's overall, long term wellbeing, as opposed to the satisfaction of isolated, immediate desires. Happiness as overall, long term wellbeing will include a certain level of health, wealth and agreeableness in one's life (KpV V: 93, MS VI 388 and 432). How much wellbeing is necessary is presumably an individual question which cannot be settled in advance for all agents.5 Although happiness in this sense is far from being an uninterrupted state of satisfaction, where all needs and inclinations of the agent are satisfied (GMS IV: 405), it will ensure that the agent has a minimal amount of contentment in her life to ensure her ability to respond to rational requirements. However, in other passages Kant suggests that the moral significance of happiness is not restricted to being a mere means to morality. A certain degree of agreeableness in life can be seen as something owed to oneself, as a rational being who also possesses an animal nature, and consequently has needs. In MS VI: 432, Kant criticizes the miser for restricting her enjoyment of the means to good living to the point of leaving her true needs unsatisfied. It is important to note that the argument is not that miserliness amounts to a violation of a duty to others (although the miser certainly fails in this too). Her moral failure consists instead of voluntarily depriving herself of the permissible joys and comforts of life, despite having the necessary means. The miser is primarily violating a duty to the self. 6 As Kant stresses in the quoted passage, securing one's happiness is one's duty at least indirectly (wenigstens indirect).7 What does it mean for a duty to be \"at least\" indirect? In answering this question, we must first consider what an indirect duty is. Very little work has been done on the notion of indirect duties in Kant.8 In the following, I will offer an interpretation of indirect duties in which \"indirectness\" refers to the impossibility of direct moral motivation, that is, of action from duty. As the term 'indirect' suggests, indirect duties presuppose the assumption that some duties can be directly commanded. More precisely, what can be directly 5 Cf. MS VI: 395, where Kant identifies happiness with one's true needs and argues that one must decide for oneself \"in view of one's sensibilities\" how much to contribute to the happiness of others. 6 Cf. also MS VI: 420, where preserving one's natural capacity for enjoying life is said to be an end of nature human beings must not violate for arbitrary reasons. 7 Cf. KpV V: 93 ll. 15–9. 8 See Alix Cohen, Kant and the Human Sciences. Biology, Anthropology and History. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, and Jens Timmermann, 'Kant on Conscience, Indirect Duty and Moral Error', International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 46, no3 Issue 183, September 2006. Alice Pinheiro Walla: Local Desire Satisfaction and Long-Term Wellbeing 35 commanded is the omission or performance of a specific action (when acting otherwise would violate a duty) or the adoption of a specific moral maxim or moral end.9 The agent is able to follow the command out of respect for the law, that is, her motive for the action is duty. Kant makes several scattered remarks about indirect duties without ever defining them in greater depth. Examples of indirect duties in Kant's works are for instance, natural predispositions to be emotionally affected by the moral law (what he calls \"conscience\" or \"moral sense\"), natural feelings and inclinations of human beings, which can facilitate and support moral agency (natural sympathy or love of humanity; sensitivity to the pain of animals and beauty in nature). Securing one's own happiness is an indirect duty, while adopting the happiness of others is a direct duty.10 Indirect duties have a general common trait: they involve some natural feature of human beings that we can neither create nor manipulate at will, although these natural features may allow cultivation for our moral purposes. Although complying with indirect duties may be seen as the expression of an agent's commitment to moral principles, it is distinctive of indirect duties that all we can do is to consciously allow ourselves be moved by certain natural feelings, which we neither create nor can invoke at will.11 Securing one's happiness is an indirect duty because Kant assumes that all human beings want their happiness as a matter of fact. And what we already want cannot be commanded as one's duty (and I shall add, at least not as one's direct duty). A different interpretation, proposed by Jens Timmermann, explains indirect duties as not being duties proper, i.e. as not binding \"in their own right,\" as opposed to the categories of perfect and imperfect duties.12 Although it is a matter of duty to do what is commanded, the injunction of indirect duties is only accidental, as means to the realization of a directly commanded moral end. Indirect duties are not generated by the categorical imperative alone, but also require instrumental reasoning. It follows that complying with indirect duty does not have any moral worth \"as such\", only as a means to a direct duty. As Timmermann rightly stresses, indirect duties express our concern with the effectiveness of moral agency, which is that we be able to bring about what the 9 This corresponds to direct and indirect duties respectively. 10 For a very useful summary of Kant's scattered remarks on indirect duties, see Alix Cohen, Kant and the Human Sciences. Biology, Anthropology and History. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 92. 11 The interpretation of indirect duties I have put forward regards the objects of indirect duties as those dispositional or emotional states which exclude the possibility of direct moral motivation, because the disposition or emotion in question can only be naturally given. If a non-moral disposition happens to coincide with what duty commands, indirect duty does not command that it be suppressed or replaced by the moral motive. My view is that its presence is desirable insofar as it excludes the presence of inclinations contrary to duty, which could tempt us to act otherwise as reason commands. 12 Jens Timmermann, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary. Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 36. See also Timmermann, 'Kant on Conscience, Indirect Duty and Moral Error', International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 46, no3 Issue 183, September 2006. 36 BELGRADE PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL Vol. XXVIII (2015) motive of duty alone may not be able to effect, given the limitations and \"frailty\" of human nature (MS TL VI: 456–7). Kant's notion of indirect duties is therefore evidence that his moral theory is not indifferent to the consequences of moral endeavours.13 However, the problem with this interpretation is that it creates more indirect duties than Kant himself acknowledges. To identify whatever is a necessary means to moral ends with indirect duties as Timmermann suggests, would imply that all hypothetical imperatives we need to follow in order to realize our duty in the world would have to be considered indirect duties: for example, if my helping you out of a pond requires taking off my shoes, I would have an indirect duty to take off my shoes. However, this is not only incorrect but also unnecessary, since according to Kant, to have an end analytically implies the commitment to take the necessary means to that end (GMS IV: 417). Since the requirement to take the means is analytically implicit in the notion of willing an end, there is no need to posit further duties to take the necessary means to fulfil one's duty. Conflating indirect duties with means to direct duties overshadows the real function of indirect duties and why Kant saw fit to posit them. They are indirect because it is not possible to feel or love or have a natural disposition on command (KpV V: 83). The feelings or dispositions in question can only be naturally given.14 As Kant stresses, an imperative is a rule the representation of which makes necessary an action that is subjectively contingent; the subject must therefore be constrained (necessitated) to conform to the rule (MS VI: 222). But we cannot be constrained to something we already want or are naturally disposed to. When the object in question is morally relevant (in this case, when it can reduce possible obstacles to moral agency), is a naturally given disposition or feeling, and cannot be activated on command, we have an indirect duty to cultivate, develop or realize it, as far as possible. This is the case, for instance, of sympathetic feelings towards others. While one should not let sympathy become the one's motive when helping others (respect for the law must be this motive), sympathy nevertheless makes compliance with duty easier by avoiding struggle and the temptation to disregard the moral law. Kant's formulation in the gout sufferer passage implies that securing one's happiness can nevertheless become the object of a direct duty. This is only possible if one can cease to be motivated by natural interest in one's own happiness, and replace it with duty as a motive. Although Kant claims that happiness is an end of human beings according to a natural necessity (nach einer Naturnothwendigkeit, GMS IV: 415–6), the gout sufferer example of the Groundwork makes clear that Kant differentiates the general desire for happiness from the wish to satisfy a single inclination, when this inclination is incompatible with one's long term wellbeing. 13 It is important to stress that indirect duties do not guarantee successful actions, only a successful determination of the will by the moral law (given the lack or reduction of temptations against duty). The consequences of the agent's successful determination of the will are thus secondary, because they depend on contingent factors external to the will. 14 As I shall explain, this does not always apply to the duty to promote one's happiness. Alice Pinheiro Walla: Local Desire Satisfaction and Long-Term Wellbeing 37 However, I will argue that in the long term wellbeing is assigned no independent value in Kant's theory of practical reason. The neglect of one's overall wellbeing for the sake of a single inclination only becomes a problem because the neglect of one's overall, long term happiness has a bearing on moral agency and/or on the agent's dignity as a person. The agent is thus required to secure her wellbeing out of duty. It follows that the indirect duty to secure one's happiness differs from the other indirect duties I have mentioned because it also qualifies as a direct duty under specific circumstances. Should we fail to be motivated by the natural inclination to secure our long term happiness, we then have a direct duty to secure at least the minimal conditions of our wellbeing, since failing to do so would imply a violation of a duty to the self.15 This is what I will attempt to show in the next two sections. Empirical Practical Reason and the indeterminacy of Happiness ...the prescription of happiness is predominantly such, that it greatly infringes on some inclinations and yet human beings can form no determinate and reliable concept of the sum of the satisfaction of all under the name of happiness; which is why it is not surprising that a single inclination – if determinate in regard to what it promises, and to the time its satisfaction can be obtained – can outweigh a wavering idea, and that a human being, e.g., someone suffering from gout of the foot, can choose to enjoy what he fancies and to suffer what he can, since, according to his calculation, at least then he has not denied himself the enjoyment of the present moment because of possibly groundless expectations of some good fortune (grundlose Erwartungen eines Glücks) that is meant to lie in health. (GMS IV: 399, my emphasis) Kant has a complex conception of happiness, which he does not discuss openly in his works. As previously mentioned, Kant's main goal is to develop his moral theory. He therefore develops his conception of empirical practical rationality passim, only as far as required for this aim. His conception of happiness receives a similar treatment in his ethical works. A central trait of Kant's conception of happiness is that happiness is an indeterminate concept. Although every human being strives for happiness, no one is able to determine with certainty \"and in agreement with himself what he actually wishes and wants\" (GMS IV: 418). There are two different sources of the indeterminacy of happiness, both due to our cognitive limitations as finite rational beings. The first limitation is that we cannot foresee all the external consequences of the achievement of an end and their impact on our happiness. Our desire for an end is based on our conception of expected results and not on a complete knowledge of all possible outcomes. The other source of indeterminacy is that we don't even know our own desires with certainty. We must form a conception of our own happiness by means of our beliefs about what would make us happy and about what we think we want. Our only means to define what we want is by reference to our feelings of pleasure or displeasure in the representation of an object 15 As we shall see, this is not the duty to secure one's wellbeing per se, but in fact the duty to protect the conditions of moral integrity and agency. 38 BELGRADE PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL Vol. XXVIII (2015) or condition (see KpV V: 21 and MS VI: 211). However, pleasure and displeasure involve \"what is merely subjective in the relation of our representation and contain no relation at all to an object for possible cognition of it (or even cognition of our condition)\". (MS VI: 211, my emphasis). Let us now return to the gout sufferer. As Kant states in the passage, he does not know for sure if health will make him happy: his „expectations of some good fortune that is meant to lie in health\", he calculates, could well be groundless. Having adopted an excessive, unhealthy lifestyle for a long time, restoring his health would involve drastically changing his eating and drinking habits and foregoing many pleasures. Even if he ever succeeds in restoring his health to some extent, it may never be very pleasant again. Making sacrifices for the sake of one's health may not make much sense anymore. What could possibly motivate the gout sufferer to make such an effort? Kant assumes that there are only two types of motivation: duty (respect for the moral law) or inclination, which Kant identifies with self-love, and consequently with the desire for one's own happiness. In the latter case, \"it is not the form of lawfulness that counts but simply the matter, namely whether I am to expect satisfaction from following the law, and how much\" (KpV V: 25–6, my emphasis). In other words, Kant assumes that non-moral motivation is hedonistic.16 It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the plausibility of Kant's conception of non-moral motivation. For the purposes of the paper, I will take Kant's hedonism about non-moral motivation for granted, and analyse its implications for the relationship between prudence and duties to the self. If we set aside moral motivation, the only motive the gout sufferer could have for promoting his health is expectation of pleasure or the desire to avoid pain. However, he is aware that restoring his health will be toilsome, and that the rewards in terms of expected pleasure are uncertain. From the perspective of empirical practical reason, it is perhaps not worth the effort. It might be better just to eat and drink what he can and to suffer afterwards (assuming that some pain will be inevitable whatever he does). It follows that from the point of view of expected pleasure, it is not irrational for the gout sufferer to sacrifice his health for his immediate desire for food and drink. This is because considering his particular circumstances, satisfying a single actual desire is more likely to bring pleasure than the \"wavering\" promise of long-term wellbeing. I also assume that the gout sufferer has also considered the amount of pain involved in either restoring his health or indulging in his desire for food and drink. Even though he is aware that physical pain will follow from indulging himself, he is more willing to put up with pain that follows as a result of his indulgence than with the discomfort of having to forego pleasures and change his lifestyle.17 16 There is enough textual evidence confirming that Kant explicitly adopted hedonism about non-moral ends. See for instance KpV V: 22, 23 ll. 25–39. However, there is disagreement in the literature about whether Kant should be read in that way. For a non-hedonistic interpretation of Kant's account of empirical practical reason, see Andrews Reath, „Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness\". In: Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory, Oxford University Press, 2006. 17 Although one could question the rationality of such a preference, it seems at least psychologically plausible to assume that agents can be more disposed to put up with pain as the result of enjoying life than with the restrictions required by a healthy life style when Alice Pinheiro Walla: Local Desire Satisfaction and Long-Term Wellbeing 39 While happiness as long term satisfaction is uncertain for the gout sufferer, immediate desire satisfaction seems less uncertain to him. Whether this is truly the case no one can know for sure, since this would require omniscience (GMS IV: 418). It could be that the meal turns out to be disappointing, or that the unexpected heart burn after the brandy by far outweighs the pleasure one had in drinking it. However, satisfying a desire that is closer in time and more determinate in scope can seem, at least psychologically, more certain to the agent than investing one's energy in a long-term, general state of wellbeing (her health) when the agent's health is already compromised to the extent that she can only avoid increasing pain, but will severely restrict what she considers positively enjoyable. Kant assumes that most agents are naturally inclined to promote their overall wellbeing or happiness. This is why it is needless to posit a duty to pursue one's own happiness. However, as the gout sufferer illustrates, it is possible that agents come to lack or simply disregard the concern for long term happiness that most people naturally have.18 Surprisingly, Kant argues that the gout sufferer has a duty to promote his health. When promoting his health in the absence of an inclination to it, the conduct of the gout sufferer acquires moral worth. Is Kant confusing a maxim of prudence with a moral duty? I will argue that Kant implicitly distinguished between an objective and a merely subjective conception of happiness. While the objective conception includes the basic ends of our animal nature which have an impact on our moral integrity and which can be directly commanded in case of neglect, the subjective conception of happiness is dependent on the agent's conception of her desires and needs. Although the latter may coincide in content with the objective conception of happiness, this coincidence is merely contingent. We usually adopt the basic ends of human animal nature from inclination, and not duty. This is what Kant calls our \"general inclination for happiness\", allgemeine Neigung nach Glückseligkeit. However, we cannot arbitrarily choose to neglect these ends without violating morality. Happiness and Duties to the Self But also in this case, if the general inclination to happiness [allgemeine Neigung nach Glückseligkeit] did not determine [the gout sufferer's] will, if health, at least for him, did not enter his calculation so necessarily, then here, as in all other cases, there still remains a law, namely to advance one's happiness, not from inclination, but from duty, and it is not until then that his conduct has its actual moral worth. (GMS IV: 399, my emphasis)19 no pleasures, or at least absence of discomfort, are in sight. However, one may feel scared of the consequences of deteriorating health and the possibility of a shorter life. In this case, the agent would have an inclination which could provide a strong enough motive to change one's lifestyle. Fear of death does not enter the gout sufferer's calculations at that stage. 18 A similar example is the miser in the Doctrine of Virtue (MS TL VI: 432–3) which I discuss below. 19 „Aber auch in diesem Falle, wenn die allgemeine Neigung zur Glückseligkeit seinen Willen nicht bestimmte, wenn Gesundheit für ihn wenigstens nicht so n othwendig in diesen Überschlag gehörte, so bleibt noch hier wie in allen andern Fällen ein Gesetz übrig, nämlich 40 BELGRADE PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL Vol. XXVIII (2015) As Kant surprisingly remarks in the Critique of Judgment, our species is in complete consensus (durchgängig mit sich übereinstimmt) in regard to genuine natural needs of human beings (wahrhafte Naturbedürfniss, KU V: 430). However, there can be no categorical imperative commanding us to include these natural needs in one's subjective conception of happiness, since most people are already naturally inclined to adopt these ends (in which case it cannot be a duty to adopt them). From the perspective of happiness there can be no prudential imperative to adopt these ends either, since there is no guarantee that these ends will make us happy. Telling someone that it would be prudent for her to adopt a certain end (say, that she should save money) is merely giving advice (Rathgebung) in the assumption that the person has included certain ends in their conception of happiness and would thus have a reason to follow our counsels. Therefore, a counsel of prudence contains necessity (Nothwendigkeit) or normative force only for those agents who already want the end in question, given their conception of happiness (GMS IV: 416), but not for those who have a different conception of happiness. In his account of the vice of intemperance in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant stresses that \"the reason for considering this kind of excess a vice is not the harm or bodily pain (diseases) that a human being brings on himself by it; for then the principle by which it is would be one of well-being and comfort (and so of happiness), and such a principle can establish only a rule of prudence (Klugheitsregel), never a duty – at least not a direct duty\" (MS VI:427). Although rules of prudence do not give rise to duties, the object of rules of prudence can nevertheless coincide with the content of certain direct duties (as I will argue, these are duties to the self). In this case, the ends recommended by prudence may either be the object of an indirect duty (when we have an inclination for the end anyway and consequently cannot be necessitated to act by an imperative of duty) or the object of a direct duty (when we lack the inclination for the end and the end can be directly commanded, as in the case of happiness). One may eat healthily and exercise regularly not out of duty, but because one is afraid of having a stroke or a heart attack, or simply is afraid of pain or death. However, good health also belongs to those genuine natural ends all finite rational beings ought to care about for moral reasons. If, similarly to the gout sufferer, one no longer cares to maintain one's health because some short term pleasure seems more likely to bring satisfaction, morality can command directly that one secures one's health instead of indulging in shortterm pleasure. Then the agent would be securing her health out of respect for the moral law and her conduct would have moral worth. Prudence would only have a say for such an agent if she still happened to have an inclination for her overall happiness, in which case the counsels of prudence would only \"remind her\" of what she already wants, namely, her overall, long-term wellbeing, and the satisfaction of some particular inclination may be inconsistent with her long-term wellbeing. seine Glückseligkeit zu befördern, nicht aus Neigung, sondern aus Pflicht, und da hat sein Verhalten allererst den eigentlichen moralischen Werth.\" (GMS IV: 399) Alice Pinheiro Walla: Local Desire Satisfaction and Long-Term Wellbeing 41 The line between duties to oneself and rules of prudence is a very subtle one. Kant stresses that violations of duties to the self at first glance often seem a matter of imprudence rather than proper vices. Kant makes this worry explicit in the case of the vice of stupefying oneself by excessive drink and food (MS VI: 426) and the maxims of prodigality and miserliness (MS VI: 434). However, the rationale of the duty is not primarily the harm or bodily pain caused by such vices. There are two ways in which actions can be regarded as violations of duties to the self. I shall therefore distinguish between an instrumental and a constitutive argument for perfect duties to the self as an animal and moral being. In the case of gluttony, drunkenness and drug addiction, it is usually the impairment of our ability to use our capacity for sensible enjoyment which makes these actions vices. This is why the enjoyment of alcohol to the extent that it stimulates conviviality and conversation should not be regarded as a vice (MS VI: 428). The idea is that, since an enjoyment is just one subjective end among others, it should neither hinder the pursuit of the other ends of the agent nor impair the use of her rational capacities. The agent's capacity to set herself ends is what enables the pursuit of particular ends; choosing ends that undermine this capacity is self-contradictory and a perversion of one's ability of non-moral choice in general. This is morally relevant inasmuch as the way we dispose of our ability to choose in non-moral matters also has an impact on our ability to act morally. In other words, these vices ultimately impair us as moral agents, temporarily or permanently. More importantly, the way we treat our ability of non-moral choice also expresses respect or disrespect for the humanity in our person. The requirement to respect humanity in everyone's person (including one's own person) imposes constraints on possible uses of our non-moral capacities. This view is confirmed by Kant's claim in his lectures that drunkenness may be considered morally objectionable even if the agent does not harm herself physically (for instance, when she is very strongly constituted, Moral Collins, XXVII: 341). If a drunkard does not harm others and cannot harm herself, is drunkenness still a vice? Since Kant grounds duties to the self independently of the agent's relations to others, it is possible to violate a duty to the self even when no one is affected (not even the agent herself in her ability to comply with duties to others). Timmermann thus calls duties to the self \"desert-island duties.\"20 In this case, it is our moral personality alone which prohibits drunkenness as a use of our person. Since certain uses of our person imply reducing ourselves to mere impulses and inclinations, they are incompatible with the agent's self-esteem (MS VI: 435). No instrumental connection between the omission of an action and our capacity for moral agency is required: omitting certain actions can be identical to the preservation of the agent's dignity or self-esteem. I conclude that the rationale of duties to self is ultimately the humanity in the person of the agent, and not merely the preservation of her capacity of rational agency. 20 Timmermann, 'Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended', Philosophy, 81, p. 508. 42 BELGRADE PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL Vol. XXVIII (2015) Conclusion: Prudential Reason in Kant's ethical theory There is a clear parallel between the gout sufferer example and the suicide example in GMS IV 397. Both examples concern things that are naturally dear to us: the preservation of our lives and our own happiness. In both examples, the natural inclination in question fails to motivate us: the depressed person wishes to put an end to her life; the gout sufferer chooses to disregard his health for the sake of actual enjoyment. Both are motivated by the gratification expected from an immediate inclination (the desire to put an end to one's distress and the desire to continue to have a pleasurable existence despite one's sickness). In both cases, Kant derives a direct moral obligation to preserve one's life and one's health. Kant states that if we could know for certain what will make us happy, the counsels of prudence would turn into rules of skill (GMS IV: 417). Therefore, even if happiness was not an indeterminate concept, it would still not be the source of categorical requirements to take the means to our happiness. While the distinction assertoric / problematic concerns the question whether the end in question is actual or merely possible for an agent, the distinction hypothetical / categorical concerns the kind of necessitation of the rational principle in question: whether the principle is binding given the end one happens to have or could have, or binding independently of any inclinations or ends of the agent. Instrumental reason and prudence both give rise to hypothetical imperatives because their binding force is always conditional on the presence of an inclination or end. In contrast, only pure practical reason can give rise to categorical commands. Its necessity is derived from its rational, i.e. universal character. While one can identify three forms of practical reason, there are only two ways in which a principle can be binding: either categorically or hypothetically. Tertium non datur. As beings aware of our existence over time, we can represent ourselves in the future. We are also aware that satisfaction with our condition does not last and consequently form the desire to extend the duration of satisfaction over time. This is why prudence can be normative to us: it tells us how to extend and possibly maintain a certain amount of satisfaction with our condition beyond immediate desire satisfaction. Prudential reason has a broader scope than instrumental reason: it must encompass our future selves, and for this it must take into account the ends we have now and possible ends we may have in the future. It requires that we plan and coordinate the satisfaction of our different non-moral ends over time, determine which ends have priority, and give up ends when compatibility is not possible. This is the sense in which prudential reason is not mere instrumental reason: simply taking the means to satisfy whatever desires we happen to have in the present does not guarantee satisfaction in our future condition; more needs to be achieved to ensure that contentment obtains in the future. Among other things, we try to avoid foreseeable hardships and provide the means to the satisfaction of our future ends: we try to keep healthy, we study for a degree, save money and so on. Prudential reason can be seen as a normative standard of rationality, but only if the agent has an inclination for her long term happiness, that is, if she expects satisfaction from it. This is the sense Alice Pinheiro Walla: Local Desire Satisfaction and Long-Term Wellbeing 43 in which prudence can be said to give rise to hypothetical imperatives, in the same way as instrumental reason. It follows that empirical practical reason as Kant conceives it cannot always command that long-term happiness be given absolute priority over other nonmoral ends. From the perspective of empirical practical reason, what ensures the priority of long-term happiness is overall expectation of pleasure. Our reason to be prudent is thus that it promises more pleasure in the long run than indulging in immediate desires. However, depending on the circumstances, prudence does not always result in more pleasure, and we can foresee that. This is precisely the realization of the gout sufferer. But this is also why the gout sufferer is in the unique position to secure his own happiness out of respect for the moral law, and Kant's point in using this example to illustrate action from the motive of duty. It is important to note that acting from duty does not render happiness less indeterminate; it could well be that happiness will follow from securing his health. However, this is only a problem for prudential reason, and not for morality: while prudence only makes sense if securing our health will in fact make us happy, for morality what matters is that we have done the right thing from the right motive. In the gout sufferer's case, that he not reduce his animal nature to the pleasures of the moment, and treat his own person in a way compatible with his dignity and rational nature.21 21 I would like to thank the participants of the Irish Philosophical Club 2016 for their enthusiasm and very helpful questions and comments on this article, in particular Jim O'Shea, Jim Levine, Adam Loughnane, Markus Schlosser, Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson, Sean Enda Power and Jason Dockstader. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee of the Kantian Review for very encouraging and helpful feedback on an earlier version of this article.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "r e r i s t a áe !•» a l u n a s ée fil#a#fía áe Salamanca \" P A R A V I V I R S Ó L O H A Y Q U E SER U N A N I M A L 0 U N DIOS , S E G U N A R I S T O T E L E S . F A L T A E L TERCER CASO: H A Y Q U E SER L O U N O Y L O OTRO, U N F I L Ó S O F O \" . (NIETZSCHE, EL CREPÚSCULO DE LOS ÍDOLOS) Editorial. Diario de un genio 2 La dictadura de la vida 3 E. M. Cioran: filosofar sobre la sangre 6 Sobre la ontología trascendental... 9 Sección de poesía 13 Entrevista a Dionisio Cañas 19 Alcuza 22 Verse en la mirada de otro 24 La séptupla mirada 25 Undergroundmanía 28 A la sombra de las santas 32 Suspiria, revista de los alumnos de la Facultad de Filosofía, número 2, año I I . REDACCIÓN: Guillermo da Costa Palacios, Carlos Rodríguez Gordo, Santiago Arroyo Serrano. DISEÑO: Carlos Rodríguez, Guillermo da Costa. MAQUETACIÓN: Trafotex. IMPRESIÓN Y ENCÜADERNACIÓN: Gráficas Cervantes. EDITA: Delegación de Alumnos de Filosofía de la Universidad de Salamanca, Campus \"Miguel de Unamuno\", F.E.S. 004, teléf. 923 293 390, correo electrónico: suspiriadigital@hotmail.com ILUSTRACIONES: p. 2 Juan María Moreno, p. 32 Ricardo Hirschfeldt, pp. 25, 26, 27, 30 David de la Mano, p. 16 Iván Rojas, p. 6 Irmeli Jung, p. 8 Jacques Sassier. RESTO DE ILUSTRACIONES: MAN RAY. DEPÓSITO LEGAL: S. 675-2002 o o Segundogénita publicación de Suspiña. He aquí otro fruto de la inquietud y, por extensión, del laberinto existencia! que nos atrapa. Los \"suspiros\" prorrumpen nuevamente en el soñoliento escenario cultural intentando aguijonear la conciencia de los lectores. Roídos por el apetito de divulgar manifestaciones intelectuales de índole heterogénea, ofrecemos una particular panorámica del quehacer humano y de cuanto le envuelve. Con respecto al número príncipe procuramos en éste continuar la dirección proyectada en aquél apostando, reiteradamente, por todos esos autores a los que refería nuestro primer Editorial. Así pues, hemos compilado una suerte de exploraciones fílosófico-artísticas con el propósito de invitar al lector a que sea sujeto de una reflexión en torno a sí y al mundo. Esta vez prevalecen el ensayo y la poesía como expresiones literarias legítimas del ámbito íntimo. Los suspiros son de naturaleza miscelánea: unos hay producto del estremecimiento amoroso, otros motivados por una ilusión, por vitalismo o incluso por hastío e impotencia, etc.: y durante la gestación del proyecto hemos podido exhalar cada uno de ellos, bien sea a causa de circunstancias históricas, bien a consecuencia de nuestras experiencias personales o como resultado de una tensión interior. Tras cada una de estas páginas se ocultan las vidas del autor, editor, impresor y, por supuesto del lector. Compartamos pues la experiencia Suspiria nuevamente. Con vuestra lectura honráis nuestro trabajo -tanto mejor si además os complace. Disfruta, hipócrita lector... S O B R E L A ONTOLOGÍA T R A S C E N D E N T A L ALBERTO-LUIS LÓPEZ Comencemos ref lexionando sobre la filosofía y su actual estar alejada de la búsqueda, hasta hoy insoluble, del ser. Pero no sólo ref lexionando sino además dando u n giro a la inamovible e inmodificable f o r m a de explorar al ser. A pesar de no haber acertado a lo largo de todos estos milenios de constante creer-saber o creertenerla , h a n o lv idado (en muchos casos) que la exploración también incluye el campo de la ontología como la vía o el trayecto hacia la superación de la i n f o r t u n a d a indagación por el ser, idea que en tanto que es necesaria retomar, es a su vez necesaria uti l izar, ampl iar y concretizar. A l var iar sobre el método que durante siglos se ha uti l izado como preponderante y ahora explorar desde el campo ontológico también es necesario extender la visión unívoca del ser, cambiar la f o r m a pero sobre todo el fondo. La pregunta por ¿qué es el ser? ha sido suplida por u n ¿vale la pena preguntarse-por?, ¿será posible creer-en?, ¿el ser, la verdad? ¡es algo superado!, o en su defecto se ha llegado a aseveraciones tales como ¡es algo obsoleto!, ¡a qué nos ha llevado¡, ¡mera subjet ividad! , ¡a quién le i m p o r t a ! El planteamiento correcto se nos ha dado, fue otorgado desde tiempos inmemorables y hoy en día se ha caído en la retórica sofista o en la repeticiónt ransmit i r de lo ayer claro, ta l vez aún en la no-comprensión del ahí. El cerrar impl ica la no-posibilidad de seguir avanzado en el camino del desocultamiento del ser como verdad. Conforme continúan las habladurías 1 , en ellas implícitas las escribidurías por parte no sólo, hoy, de los sofistas profesionales y falsos filósofos sino también por la intromisión de ciencias que divergen con el fin mismo del acto del reflex ionar sobre lo oculto a efectos de ser desocultado (hecho que debe ser superado por la filosofía), nos vemos en la necesidad de replantearnos lo esencial en el campo ontológico-epistemológico y retomar la cuestión esencial de acuerdo con los tiempos actuales para seguir avanzando en el sendero del destapardesarropar-revelar-descubrir el significado de ser y como consecuencia desvelar y desarrollar el ¿qué es? Esto, claro, sin menospreciar los intentos de antaño por resolver e incluso más que resolver por asegurar (sus únicas vías) de acceso al ser, acciones que nos h a n clarificado el hecho de que se ha dado u n nodicho sobre lo dicho o incluso u n no-dicho acerca de lo aún no-dicho y por lo tanto u n caer en semi-habladurías de tipo inconcebible sobre los intentos trascendentales del encuentro con el ser. 1 Mart in Heidegger: Ser y Tiempo, \"las 'habladurías'\", parágrafo 35, p. 186. Fondo de cultura económica, Madrid, 1971. r e i i a t a A» la» aluna» El título ontológico-trascendental para s i tuar al ser or i l l a a pensar en u n a paradoja o inclusive en u n a contradicción de p r i m e r orden, por ello es necesario ampl iar el porqué de ontología-traseendental . Para poder c o n t i n u a r con la evolución del pensamiento se necesita (como lo he dicho anter iormente) remontarnos a u n a visión ontológica en contraposición con u n a perspectiva metafísica l a contraposición no impl ica u n enemigo-de o u n a n i q u i l a m i e n t o d e - ¿Por qué ontología y no metafísica si ambos se enfocan en el ser?, ¿a qué se debe lo trascendental? A l ser ontología, claro esta, se habla del ser mas no u n ser-fuera-de, exterior-a, trascendente-metafísico sino más bien a u n ser que más que haya de situarse en el allá, esta en el aquí, en el ahora. No sólo no va a u n alejarse-de sino que por el contrar io se r e m o n t a en todo m o m e n t o a u n aquí estar presente, cerca-de. De esta f o r m a al tener u n cerca-de existe la entera posibil idad de u n tomar-a y por lo tanto se da de manera coherente la verdadera posibi l idad de l levar del ser en-sí a la perspectiva óntica del para-sí del para-el-hombre, del en-el-hombre. A l alinearse al fuera-de (metafísico) se sitúa al ser ya no en lo fáctico; esto quiere decir que la facticidad del ser queda superada y de hecho aniqui lada por u n a imposibi l idad del estar cerca-de. El t ratar de desocultar al ser desde la postura de u n alejamiento sujetoobjeto= filósofo-ser (ser=objeto en tanto búsqueda y tarea del pensamiento) representa de facto u n error si lo que se pretende es revelar al ser óntico. La metafísica nos remite al allá, por ello lucha incesantemente y de f o r m a def ini t iva contra el aquí, el cual es representado por el bando ontológico que simboliza la facticidad del aquí en el ser. En tanto que la onto logía desvela al ser de lo óntico, permite u n asir, da la pauta para poder tomar-a . La his tor ia de la filosofía (desde la perspectiva ontológica) nos ha demostrado que el in tento metafísico para desvelar al ser cayó en desviaciones filosóficas como el panteísmo, la teología o incluso el n ih i l i smo así como equívocos, hoy insostenibles, que nos h a n llevado a la necesidad de dar u n giro y maniobrar de dist inta f o r m a para así co nt inua r s in mesura el encuentro con el ser, hoy t a n soslayado, esto a pesar de que la metafísica tuvo o tiene todos los elementos para poder descubr i r o in tervenir en el plano abierto de la u n i d a d esencial del ser. A l tenerlos, nos demuestra perfectamente que sus elementos o herramientas para la desocultación h a n sido u n no-explotado o ta l vez u n no-correcto llevándonos a la necesidad de tomar otro camino. En el siguiente apartado es necesario c o m p r e n der el porqué de trascendental , sólo así la paradoja filaaafía «f Salamanca 9 Man Ray planteada en un principio se verá reducida totalmente a un vacío, al sin-sentido y por lo tanto a un no-existente. El término trascendental aquí empleado está determinado por la filosofía kantiana del siglo XVIII, donde se formulaba la trascendentalidad como nombre genérico de su nueva filosofía y se incluía el yo, una filosofía del ego. En aquel tiempo se entendía trascendental como posibilidad o afección del conocimiento a-priori puro, una facultad en potencia. Se dio la contraposición de filosofía inmanente, no trascendente y, por el contrario, sí trascendental. Para efectos de la exposición retomaré esta visión de trascendental como aquella facultad humana del conocimiento remitida a lo apriori puro, aquello que puede ser, que es inmanente en el hombre pero que no es, inclusive puede nunca serlo pero existe la potencialidad de que llegue a ser, una visión del principio de finalidad: el ser desocultado. Desde esta visión la búsqueda ontológica-trascendental del ser es una potencialidad en intento de acto que representa una facultad en el hombre-filósofo de descobijar al ser y, por ende a la verdad, no sólo descobijarlo sino inclusive hacerlo suyo, hundirse en la unidad de ser-en, de sercon. En tanto que la postura es trascendental y ontológica no por ello existe una limitación hacia el intento de llevar a cabo un análisis del yo subjetivo que se remita a una visión objetiva, por consiguiente estaríamos hablando de una filosofía trascendental con fines objetivistas. Una vez explícito esto es necesario remitirnos a los elementos metodológicos con cierta carga epistemológica y de investigación trascendental (ya aclarado el uso de este concepto), para estar inmersos en la continuación de la búsqueda por el descobijamiento del ser como verdad. Tiempo atrás Heidegger dio cuenta perfecta del camino hacia el encuentro con el ser utilizando los elementos del habla. Utilizó la fórmula ser-pensar-hablar intercambiando los términos (sin cambiar el sentido) por un llevar el habla como habla al habla en busca del ser=verdad. Desde esta perspectiva es igualmente factible hacernos preguntas epistemológicas del habla que servirán como delimitadoras para el posterior desarrollo del habla como vía del acercamiento-a, de la posesión-de. Preguntas como ¿dónde está el habla?, ¿es posible aseverar que el habla esta en algún punto de la cabeza?, ¿es externa a nosotros?; hablo, ¿pero de dónde surgen mis palabras si no se da el enlace previo de pensamiento con lenguaje puesto que es inmediato el abrir la boca y hablar, inclusive saliendo las palabras deseadas sin ser anteriormente reflexionadas e inquiridas en el apartado especial del cerebro para el habla? Partiendo de esto se puede pensar que el habla es una \"entidad fantasmal\"2 puesto que es un algo fuera-de que marca el adentro. Un algo que es dado quizá por la divinidad o por un ser alejado-de. Pero si nos enfocamos en el habla como camino al ser que desvelará la verdad nos vemos en la necesidad de inferir que el habla, no es un externo-a sino por el contrario que a partir del habla misma como facultad o actividad del hombre y por lo tanto si está intrínseco en él, la posibilidad de ser un atributo externo-a dispuesto por una entidad divina queda 2 Martin Heidegger: De Camino al habla. Sección \"El Camino al habla\", Serbal, Barcelona, España, 1990, p. 230. refiaia de la» alumaa ie íilaaafía é» Salanaaca 10 relegada. Para clarificar más este p u n t o podemos llegar a ejemplos tales como: el caminar es u n a facultad del hombre (trascendental en Kant en tanto posibil idad, en tanto potencialización), y si todo hombre puede caminar ¿eso me llevaría a pensar en u n algo externo-a, quizá divino que hace que el hombre camine? La respuesta sería no. El movimiento de u n dedo se debe al movimiento mismo de los ligamientos en unión con los huesos, elementos que son parte de la total idad orgánica del cuerpo, o ¿será que la absolutez misteriosa trascendente ha decidido i l i m i t a r m e con u n benéfico movimiento de mis extremidades? Si por el contrar io hay hombres que sufren de migraña, ¿eso me indica que el sufrimiento proviene del enojo i racundo de Zeus y ese dolor es su castigo, o más bien que el problema radica en accesos de cefalalgia v io lenta, que afecta preferentemente a las regiones orb i ta l y temporal del cerebro? Las ciencias modernas nos h a n dado elementos coherentes para pensar ya no en ese ser externo-a sino en simples facultades fisiológicas integrantes del organismo en el hombre. Facultades potencia, en la mayoría de los casos llevadas a actos. La vía epistemológica nos guía a pensar qué es el habla y (dependiendo de su uso), si por ese medio podemos llegar a u n conoc imiento del ser. Me he inc l inado a pensar que el ser es aquella ventana por la cua l , u n a vez l legando a ella, podemos visualizar perfectamente la verdad ónt ica en t a n t o que es u n a verdad que si parte de la subjet ividad hacia la objet i v i d a d tiene por fuerza que guiarnos a la verdad del hombre en tanto que ente. Part iendo, claro, de la ob jet ividad del ser, que al ser puesta (para su estudio) a la subjet ividad del h o m b r e puede a lcanzarse por ese medio ya no la subjetiva objet ividad sino más bien la objetiva ob jet iv idad. Cosa que nos har ía pensar en la desvelación del ser como acto plenamente objetivo. Pensando al habla no sólo desde las preguntas hacia las respectivas respuestas del conocimiento , sino ya como u n a act iv idad del sujeto que a pesar de in tegrar u n a serie de cuestiones a resolver es u n acto ( indiscutible) su capacid a d en el h o m b r e del hablar , podemos dar el siguiente paso que nos llevaría a pensar al habla como vía del encuentro con el ser y por consiguiente c o n la verdad. El habla como ser-pensar-hablar es el elemento pr imar io en el hombre, es quizá la facultad que hace al hombre hombre, que verifica y cerciora al homo sapiens como ta l . El pensar esto se debe a que el habla no sólo se encuentra como u n sonido art iculado o fonético sino como vía indiscutible para el señalamiento del ser en tanto total idad y es a su vez el habla misma la que lleva el peso histórico de llevarnos a la fórmula ser=verdad. Es imprescindible no entender al habla sólo desde lo fonético sino también como silencio y pensamiento. Para poder acercarnos-a, y no sólo eso sino inclusive u n incorporarse-a, u n hacer mío se necesita forzosamente del habla; de hecho la superación histórica del ser incluye la comprensión, llegar plenamente a la comprensibil idad del habla. Si entendemos al habla como totalidad-desveladora que integra ser-pensar-hablar, caemos en la r a r i a t a ée l a s a l u n a s cuenta de que descobijar la u n i d a d esencial del habla como vía al encuentro con el ser es el tópico que asoma a la ventana esperando ser visto, y u n a vez visto, poder señalarlo. Pero para poder ser visto debe estar esa ventana transparente, sin lo cual , la posibil idad del señalamiento -posterior a u n a plena comprensibilidad del a c t o imposibilitaría el acto mismo del señalar ese acercamiento y el descobijar quedaría relegado de toda probabilidad. Entromoa ort el d c s c r i v o l v i i i i i c i i t u J c Z L C I I I I Í I I U al habla como vía para la captura del ser=verdad. Las preguntas formuladas anteriormente de corte epistemológico sirven de apoyo para desarrollar el habla, su camino directo con el hablar, el señalar y no sólo señalar o pensar sino inclusive apalabrar. Remitirse al habla es sujetarse al trazo abriente como la un ida d esencial del habla (plenamente objet iva , que part iendo del sujeto el cual es postrado por el objeto objetivo como habla se objetiviza su comprensión y por lo tanto su ser mismo) , en el cual se da u n a conglomerac ión de puntos interconectados entre lo trascendental, que es el habla en tanto facultad no siempre desarrollada con el hablar fusionados por el decir del Decir (como medio de comunicación del habla en-sí con su para-sí, o sea, el decir del Decir=mostrar) , que nos envía al apalabramiento y éste a su vez nos dirige a descobijar al ser=verdad como concepto ontológico-trascendental-transformador de la realidad. Nos encontramos en el trazo abriente el cual como es dicho anteriormente se remite a esa unidad. Este trazo es cruc ia l para la realización del ciclo del habla y de su correspondiente interconexión en tanto que representa el p u n t o neurálgico y de potencialización en la formación del camino del habla como ser=verdad. ¿Cómo hablar primeramente del habla? Y, ¿en qué p u n t o situarnos ante su diálogo, ante su comunicación? Primeramente el habla es algo que debemos escuchar, el escuchar el habla se remite al habla esencial, el habla del habla que es el decir, su decir del Decir=mostrar como p u n t o que interrelaciona el escuchar-habla con el silencio. El decir del Decir  m o s t r a r es el sendero manejado por el habla para, al ser escucha, escuchar uti l izando la comprensión-de, aquí es donde entra la aletheia. He ahí de la necesidad de pensar en el habla también como silencio, como u n no-sonoro. Aristóteles en el l ibro X I de su metafísica planteó: \"...los que quieren conversar entre sí deben comprenderse, porque, ¿cómo puede sin esta condición haber entre ellos comunicación de pensamientos? Es preciso, por lo tanto que cada u n a de las palabras sea conocida, que exprese u n a cosa, no muchas, sino u n a sola; o bien, si t ienen muchos sentidos, es preciso que indiquen claramente el objeto que al presente se quiere indicar con la p a l a b r a \" 3 . Somos oído del habla que por medio del decir del Decir se nos muestra, ese Decir es igual a l mostrar , a u n manifestar-se. A l i g u a l que Aristóteles lo planteó, es necesario u n a comprensibi3 Aristóteles: Metafísica, libro XI, 5 (Espasa-Calpe, Madrid 1998, p. 279-280). filasaíía 4t Sala»a»ca 11 Man Ray lidad plena del escucha hacia el hablante (el habla). Se nos des-vela, se nos da un mostrar del habla que necesita primeramente para llegar a esta comprensibilidad el silencio como parte de la inter-comprensión con el habla. ¿Comprendemos y conocemos el lenguaje del habla? El escucha nos remite al callar, ese callar es la base de la comprensión plena de la esencia del habla aunado al estar introducidos en el trazo abriente (que necesita del escucha-callar), nos da los elementos necesarios y constitutivos del habla misma. Al callar-escuchar existe la conexión íntima con el lenguaje no-sonoro del habla que es escuchado en la interioridad. El papel trascendente de la comprensibilidad es el de no caer en el trasmitir-repetir que demuestra la falta del escuchar-callar y por consiguiente la imposibilidad del apalabrar. La comprensión es el acto de junto-a de posesión-de como única vía de superación y de acercamiento-a del habla por medio de su advenimiento apropiador para el desvele del ser como verdad transformadora. El planteamiento de lo trascendental nos lleva a pensar en esa facultad inmersa en el ente que genera la probabilidad de poder llegar a la comprensibilidad del habla por medio de su Decir=mostrar, utilizando la fórmula callarescuchar-comprender-apalabrar-desvelar-transformar. Una vez llegado a la comprensibilidad del habla y por lo tanto a la posesiónde, entra el apalabramiento. Para apalabrar algo, el mismo Aristóteles dijo: \"Si la palabra designa la existencia, esta existencia es una realidad\"4. El camino al habla tiene como fin el apalabrar al ser. Si se ha seguido la vía del habla en su unidad esencial en el escucha y en el nombrar (hablar-señalar) se puede apalabrar. Este apalabrar necesita forzosamente de la interioridad, aquella voz silenciosa que manifiesta la comprensión total del ser como totalidad, el ser en su esencia que al ser escuchado, previamente comprendido, manifiesta el entendimiento pleno del hombre con su esencia, esto es el hombre-con, el hombre-de, el hombre-en, el principio de finalidad (ya no sólo enfocado al ser sino al entehombre) que es el concebir al ser del hombre como totalidad, un todo que necesita ser exteriorizado para la transformación total ontológica trascendental. Aquí entra el advenimiento apropiador como la posesión del habla sobre mí mismo. En tanto que el ser puede ser apalabrado, existe, y si existe es una realidad. El apalabramiento necesita forzosamente el desocultar aquello oculto en la realidad que sería el punto transformador más allá de las ciencias y las artes, nos conduciría a la alteración del todo. Apalabrar como un señalar al ser que es desocultado para, así, mostrar el concepto trascendental transformador de la totalidad. Este concepto ontológico trascendental, como lo no-dicho será la verdad ya no en el allá sino en el aquí, en el ahora. Esa verdad óntica existe en tanto potencialidad en espera de ser descubierta y dirigida al acto, ya en acto, metamorfoseará a plenitud la realidad misma. Ibíd. rerieta de la» aluna» de fileaeíía de Salaaaica", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "LOGOS & EPISTEME, X, 1 (2019): 77-94 A GIFT FROM THE GODS: SOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE IN PLATO'S LATE DIALOGUES Daniel LARKIN ABSTRACT: While much attention has been paid to the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates within Plato's early and middle period dialogues, this paper examines Plato's late period works and argues that despite the drastic changes in methodology found in dialogues such as the Sophist and Philebus, Plato still acknowledges, and emphasizes, the role played by divine inspiration in regard to Socratic knowledge. KEYWORDS: Socrates, Late Dialogues, Divine Inspiration, daimonion As Plato transitioned into his late period, the character of Socrates no longer consistently resides at center-stage of the dialogues. In dialogues such as the Sophist and Statesman, for example, we find in his place the Eleatic Stranger, an individual who utilizes a new methodology, i.e., collection and division, in his efforts towards the acquisition of definitional knowledge. Given the change in cast and methodology of the Sophist, Statesman, as well as the Laws1, it could be argued that Plato finally dismisses the more supernatural aspects of his earlier work2, favoring instead the 1 Indeed, in the Laws, Socrates is absent entirely. Also, while the method of collection and division is not used by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, it is, in contrast to the earlier, and even middle periods, similarly rigid and meticulous in its presentation, lacking any traces of the elenchtic questioning that drives those earlier dialogues. 2 As evidence to this claim, we find that throughout the early and middle period dialogues, Socrates consistently adheres to the warnings issued by his daimonion. Textual examples of such reliance include, but are in no way limited to: Apology 31c4-32a3, Euthydemus 272e1-3a3, and Phaedrus 242b-c. In addition to his daimonion, Socrates also consistently recognizes the legitimacy of divine inspiration in the case of certain individuals. Examples of such instances can be found in the Apology (22b8-c4), as well as the Ion (534b1-c7). And, while some scholars, Martha Nussbaum, \"Commentary on Edmunds,\" Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy (1985) 1: 231-240, perhaps most notably, have dismissed these references to divine inspiration as instances of Socratic Irony, given the consistency of textual evidence to the contrary, such a position is, I would argue, untenable. For a comprehensive and thoroughly convincing argument that Plato took divine inspiration seriously throughout his early and middle periods, see Daniel Larkin 78 rigidly rational methodology prominently featured therein. Yet, while both the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist and Statesman and the Athenian Stranger of the Laws, do not themselves directly appeal to the divine for assistance in their philosophical endeavors3, when we turn our attention to those dialogues of the late period where Socrates takes center stage, we are subject once more to a consistent appeal to the divine for assistance in his philosophical endeavor. Given this disparity, the question arises as to Plato's views on Socrates in this late period, in particular the role that divine inspiration plays in the case of Socratic knowledge. To answer this question, however, requires that we address a problem that arises in Plato's late period, i.e., the varying images of Socrates. To explain, in the late dialogues, we are given multiple images of Socrates, all of which are, at least on the surface, distinctly different than the last. In the Sophist, for example, we are presented with the image of Socrates as the 'noble sophist,' i.e., the individual who, through the elenchus, is able to purge his interlocutors of their false beliefs.4 In the Theaetetus, on the other hand, a dialogue that serves as the dramatic predecessor to the Sophist, we are presented with a slightly different image, i.e., Socrates as Mark L. McPherran, The Religion of Socrates (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), as well as Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato's Socrates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 3 It should be noted here that despite the Athenian Stranger's lack of appeal to the divine for direct assistance in his own presentation of the laws, it is argued consistently throughout the laws that the gods and their supreme wisdom must serve as the foundation for the laws of men. See Laws 903bb-905d, 907a, 967b. 4 While this is not explicitly stated to be describing Socrates in the dialogue itself, I would argue that we ought to understand the 6th definition as presented in the Sophist to be a description of Socrates. As we read at Soph. 230b3-c2, \"They cross-examine someone when he thinks he is saying something though he is saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them. They will collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer towards others. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on them.\" For support of this view, see C.C.W. Taylor, \"Socrates the Sophist,\" in Remembering Socrates, ed. Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 168. See also Dorothea Frede, \"The Hedonist's Conversion: The Role of Socrates in the Philebus,\" in Form and Argument in Late Plato, ed. Cristopher Gill and M.M. McCabe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 223. Frede notes that the 6th definition \"seems to represent something like Plato's last word on Socrates.\" A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 79 midwife. Here, Socrates is able to assist in the delivery of wisdom from within the mind of his interlocutor. And, while this may seem similar to the 'noble sophist' as described in the Sophist, given the more positive capacity exhibited by the expertise of mental midwifery, such an image of Socrates appears markedly different from the strictly purgative Socrates of the Sophist. Finally, in the Philebus, we are yet again presented with a seemingly distinct Socrates, one who takes up the method of collection and division as his weapon of choice in the search for the definition of the good life. As before, this new image of Socrates seems to be set apart from his fellow late period Socratic counterparts, most notably in his apparent acceptance of the superiority of the method of collection and division over his traditional elenchtic approach. Yet, despite these seemingly disparate depictions of Socrates, I would argue that we ought to see these varying images as one and the same character, with each depiction highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of Plato's mentor as he has now come to see him. And, while this position will be argued in full in the pages to follow, it is important to note here at the outset that, regardless of the differences in methodology utilized by the varying depictions, there arises a common thread that carries through these late period Socratic dialogues, i.e., Socrates' unwavering appeal and adherence to his divine voice. Given this consistency despite all else, it is my position that Plato maintains his continued belief regarding the influence of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates. Divine Inspiration in the Late Dialogues The Divine and the Statesman in the Statesman Given the many changes that arise in Plato's late period, before turning our attention to Socrates in particular, it is necessary to first establish that Plato's recognition of the validity of divine inspiration is not limited to a nostalgic portrait of his mentor. To do so, we look first to two dialogues of Plato's late period that do not feature Socrates as its protagonist, the Statesman and the Laws. Looking first to the Statesman, we find that, according to the Eleatic Stranger, the role of the divine is of significant importance to what Plato will regard as the true ruler.5 As the stranger explains, in order to establish stability, the rulers must 5 In this argument I follow closely that of Stephan Büttner, \"Inspiration and Inspired Poets in Plato's Dialogues,\" in Plato and the Poets, ed. Pierre Destree and F.G. Hermann (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 119-120. Daniel Larkin 80 possess the ability to reconcile seemingly incompatible individuals under their rule.6 As an example, the Stranger notes that, if not properly handled, a conflict will inevitably arise between those individuals who are more inclined towards the virtue of courage and those who favor a more moderate approach. While both courage and moderation are virtues to be praised, given the disparity between the two, the course of favored action between individuals occupying the opposing worldviews will quite often be in conflict. Thus, to avoid this potential confrontation, the ruler must possess the ability to 'interweave' the two together to create a harmony that is conducive to each individual, as well as the society at large. In response to the question posed in the dialogue by Young Socrates as to how the ruler is able to peacefully mix these two dichotomous individuals together, the Stranger explains that the ruler has two options: (1) through creating a mortal bond between the two, i.e., by uniting them through marriage,7 and (2) by \"fitting together that part of their soul that is eternal with a divine bond.\"8 To elaborate on precisely what is meant by the forging of a \"divine bond,\" the stranger explains as follows: I call divine, when it comes to be in souls, that opinion about what is fine and good, and the opposite of these, which is really true and guaranteed; it belongs to the class of the more human...Then we do recognize that it belongs to the statesman and the good legislator alone to be capable of bringing this thing about, by means of the music that belongs to the art of kingship, in those that had their correct share of education.9 Thus, the statesman possesses the ability to instill within the citizenry the correct opinions on matters of the Good, Beauty, Justice, etc., which, in turn, will prevent them from veering off into the extreme form of whatever virtue they may naturally favor. So, for instance, lacking in such guidance, the courageous individual will, through unchecked aggression, eventually become more of a beast than a man.10 As such, it is the responsibility of the true statesman to introduce the courageous individual to ideas that properly highlight the benefit of a more moderate approach in certain instances, to educate him in such a way as to instill a 6 Pol. 308d-309c. 7 Pol. 310b2-4. 8 Pol. 309c1-2. 9 Pol. 309c4-d5. 10 Pol. 309e1-4. A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 81 balance in his soul.11 It is important to note, however, that the Statesman is not claimed to possess the knowledge of these things, but rather, merely the correct opinions. Thus, we are provided the image of the divinely inspired individual who, while lacking knowledge of their own, is in possession of correct opinions, i.e., they have access to truth.12 Further, given the sincerity of this description, not to mention the pivotal role this divinely gifted skill of interweaving plays for the stranger in the final definition of the true statesman, that Plato would ironically attribute this ability to divine provenance seems distinctly improbable.13 Divine Inspiration in the Laws In addition to the role of the divine in the Statesman, we also find instances within the Laws wherein the Athenian Stranger14 specifically refers to divine inspiration. 11 While there are indeed differences between the Republic and the Laws, I would contend that the two texts are, in fact, surprisingly similar, a point which can be seen here in the stated importance that the soul, and the balancing thereof, plays in the establishment of justice in the polis. For more on the similarities between the Laws and Republic, see Daniel Larkin, \"Paint Him? I Hardly Know Him: Reconciling Plato's Aesthetics in the Laws and Republic Book X,\" Paper presented at the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Conference, New York, NY, 2015. 12 See Büttner, \"Inspiration and Inspired Poets,\" 120. Büttner adds that such an image of the true statesman, i.e., one that, through a connection to the divine is in possession of correct opinions, and, as such, is able to properly guide his subjects in matters of ethics and morality, is consistent with earlier depictions of the divine ruler, most notably in the Meno 98e7-99d. 13 Büttner, \"Inspiration and Inspired Poets,\" 120. 14 It has been suggested by some scholars (such as Leo Strauss, The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), and Thomas L. Pangle, \"The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws,\" American Political Science Review 70, 4 (1976): 1059-77) that the Athenian Stranger represents Socrates. In support of this position, Aristotle's Politics 1265a is often referenced, as, transitioning from his analysis of the Republic to the Laws Aristotle writes, \"Now it is true that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it is no doubt difficult to be right about everything.\" However, while this passage might be seen as Aristotle identifying Socrates as the Athenian Stranger, we find that Aristotle never explicitly states this connection. Further, later on in this same passage, Aristotle refers to the author of the Laws as 'the writer,' whereas in his description of the Republic the preceding passage, Aristotle consistently identifies Socrates by name. Additionally, given Plato's willingness to use Socrates in other late dialogues, it would seem odd that he would, in his final work, feel the need to hide Socrates behind a curtain of anonymity. In support of this position, see also Kevin M. Cherry, \"Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle's Critique of Plato's Laws,\" in Natural Right and Political Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, ed. Ann Ward and Lee Ward (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 50-66. On Cherry's Daniel Larkin 82 To begin, we look to 682a, where we read: He (Homer) composed these lines... under some sort of inspiration from God. And how true to life they are! This is because poets, as a class are divinely gifted and are inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they frequently hit on how things really happen. Here we find direct testimony regarding the ability to those divinely inspired to gain access to truth. Note, however, the Stranger is not claiming that such moments of divine revelation result in the acquisition of knowledge, a point which is once more strikingly consistent with comments regarding divine inspiration as seen in the earlier dialogues, most notably the Apology.15 Yet, while the divinely inspired may lack knowledge insofar as he cannot provide an account for that which is gifted to him, he nevertheless stumbles upon the truth, an occurrence that arises with such consistency that it cannot be reduced to mere coincidence or luck. Interestingly, that Plato takes such moments of actual inspiration seriously is made clear in another passage found later in the Laws, one that serves as a warning of the potential dangers that arise from adhering to the revelations as given by the gods. We read at 719c: When a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the muse, he cannot control his thoughts. He is like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked. His art is the art of representation, and when he represents men with contrasting characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he does not know which of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator this is impossible, he must not let his law say two different things on the same subject. From this section we might glean a number of important points. First, while the passage does indicate that the inspired poet cannot determine which of his gifted revelations contains the truth, we do find the Stranger indirectly noting that the truth is revealed. The problem, then, is not the source of the revelation, nor the potential veracity of such revelation, but rather the inspired individual's lack of understanding. In other words, we are once again given evidence that Plato, through the Athenian Stranger, recognizes that the truth can be, and is, revealed through moments of divine inspiration. Second, it is admittedly true that this passage is presented with an admonitory tone, warning us that the legislator cannot rely on divine inspiration in matters of law, as the contradictory accounts that so often view, \"What (Aristotle) finds most praiseworthy about the Socratic dialogues-their searching, or zetetic character-seems to be wholly absent from the Laws.\" 15 Ap. 22c1-3. A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 83 accompany revelation would be detrimental to the consistency required for a stable constitution. However, while this warning clearly indicates a hesitancy to rely upon divinely inspired revelation for matters of law, it does not condemn such revelation as chicanery, but rather, once more indicates a sincere belief in its legitimacy, albeit one that should be approached with caution. Images of Socrates in the Late Dialogues With the evidence from the Statesman and the Laws now established, we can proceed on to our analysis of Socrates and the role of divine inspiration in Plato's late dialogues. As noted above, while he is often silent, or even absent, from many of the later dialogues, he is very much present in others. This is most apparent in the Theaetetus, a dialogue which dramatically precedes the Sophist and Statesman, and in the Philebus, an oddly 'Socratic' dialogue wherein Socrates, though similar in many ways to the Socrates of the early period,16 often substitutes the elenchos for the new method of division. In addition to these two obvious examples, I would add a third, i.e., the image of Socrates as indirectly presented via the 6th definition of sophistry as found in the Sophist. And, while these three presentations of Socrates may, at first glance, strike us as three distinct representations of Socrates, I would argue that, when viewed through the lens of divine inspiration, these somewhat disparate images of Socrates are revealed as one and the same, each image providing a deeper insight into Plato's late understanding of his mentor, and the role that divine inspiration plays in his philosophical endeavors and ability. Setting the Stage for Change: Socrates as Midwife in the Theaetetus In terms of chronological events within the dialogues, the Theaetetus is the direct predecessor to the Sophist and Statesman. And, given the Sophist and Statesman both feature the Eleatic Stranger as its protagonist, it is of note that the Theaetetus features Socrates front and center, leading a discussion regarding the definition of 16 See Frede, \"The Hedonist's Conversion,\" 215. Frede notes a number of striking similarities that are almost nostalgic in effect: (1) The dialogue begins abruptly, which recalls similar literary approaches as found in the Meno and Gorgias. (2) Socrates claims that moral mistakes are involuntary (22b). (3) The different pleasures and kinds of knowledge are afforded the opportunity to speak for themselves, which, as Frede notes, ought to remind us of the Crito, wherein the Laws themselves are personified. Daniel Larkin 84 knowledge. Interestingly, despite its late placement in the Platonic corpus, in many ways the Theaetetus may strike the reader as fairly reminiscent of the earlier Socratic dialogues, for not only is the dialogue fairly elenchtic in nature, but further, it ends in aporia!17 Yet, despite this familiar mise-en-scene, if examined closely, it becomes apparent that this familiarity is actually a forbearer of change for Plato, not only in terms of a break from the middle period,18 but also as an indication of the need for new developments, i.e., the methodology found predominantly in the Sophist and Statesman.19 In defense of this position, let us look first to the image of Socrates we are presented with at the beginning of the dialogue: Socrates as midwife. Typically speaking, a midwife is an individual who is instrumental in the birthing process, not only in their ability to rightly determine when a woman is pregnant, but further, and more importantly, aides in the delivery of that child. Regarding the midwifery of Socrates, however, there are some critical differences. As Socrates explains: 17 Tht. 210a8-b2. While the dialogue does successfully determine what knowledge is not, i.e., perception, true judgment, or an account added to true judgment, the discussion fails to find a satisfactory definition of knowledge. Also, given the contextual connection to the Sophist and the significant change in cast and methodology that comes with that dialogue, the methodology used by Socrates in the Theaetetus, and its failure to achieve satisfactory results in the eyes of the interlocutors, is, I believe, of significant importance. For the contrary position, i.e., that the Theaetetus does end with a positive account of knowledge (or at the very least, human knowledge) see David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 18 M.F. Burnyeat, \"Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration,\" Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 24 (1977): 7-16, argues that Plato appears to distance himself from the metaphysical commitments he introduced in his middle period, e.g., the theory of recollection, as well as, to an extent, the theory of the forms. Indeed, we see this at Tht. 188a, where the idea of recollection is somewhat dismissed outright. Further, and of particular interest, Burnyeat draws the distinction between the image of the barren midwife in the Theaetetus and that of the pregnant Socrates of the Symposium. In both dialogues, the imagery of pregnancy and delivery are used to explain the development of ideas, however, whereas in the Symposium, Socrates seems to be in possession of the wisdom himself, the Socrates of the Theaetetus cannot make such a claim, as he admits that he is barren. I agree with Burnyeat that this revisiting of theme is not coincidental, and would add that this once more indicates that Plato is rethinking and breaking from his more positive account of the Socratic method as found in the middle period. 19 Granted, the method of collection and division is utilized by Socrates in the Philebus. However, it is my contention that such use only further proves the point that Socrates is ill equipped to use the methodology, as his inability to utilize it properly shows. A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 85 The difference is that I attend to men, not women, and that I watch over the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.20 In short, Socrates aids in the delivery of wisdom, guiding his interlocutors in the development of their own beliefs and ideas. Further, in line with his consistent disavowal of knowledge, Socrates admits that, similar to actual midwives' inability to have children themselves, he is himself barren of all wisdom. Thus, Socrates explains, when an interlocutor does succeed in the discovery of wisdom through their interaction, it is not from Socrates that this wisdom arose, but from within the interlocutor alone.21 However, while Socrates adamantly maintains that any wisdom delivered is not his own, he does insist that he plays a critical role in the discovery of truth. As evidence to this claim Socrates points to those individuals who, failing to recognize the role of Socrates in the delivery process, mistakenly believe that the truth was discovered by their work alone. By Socrates' account, these unfortunate pupils who leave his tutelage prematurely, believing themselves to be fully capable of delivering additional truths without the assistance of their former midwife, are destined to fall back into the very ignorance from which he so selflessly delivered them. As Socrates explains: After they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the result that what has remained in them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by everyone else.22 Thus, based on this testimony, it is clear that Socrates believes that he plays a fundamental role in the delivery of wisdom from the minds of his interlocutors. Yet, this certainty on the part of Socrates regarding his role in both the delivery, and rearing, of truth should strike us as perplexing. Given his admitted lack of wisdom, questions arise as to how Socrates is able to (1) exude such confidence in his ability, (2) successfully determine who is (and is not) worthy of his tutelage, and (3) successfully determine which ideas are in fact true. And, similar to the evidence found in the early dialogues regarding Socrates' seemingly inexplicable abilities, we 20 Tht. 150b7-c3. 21 Tht. 150d6-7. 22 Tht. 150e2-151a. Daniel Larkin 86 find that the answer to each of these questions arises through an appeal to divine inspiration. Beginning with the first inquiry regarding the confidence exuded by Socrates regarding his own abilities, we find that, similar to statements made as early as the Apology,23 the reason why the Socrates of the Theaetetus engages in such mental midwifery is that he is compelled by the god to do so.24 Indeed, as Socrates notes, not only is his engagement in mental midwifery ordered by the god, but further, it is the god himself that leaves Socrates barren.25 Thus, given this lack of wisdom, it cannot be the case that Socrates, in recognition of his own wisdom, feels obligated to instruct others. Rather, it is divine command alone that serves as the catalyst, spurring him on towards the assisting of young minds in the development of their ideas. And, given Socrates' belief in the superiority of divine wisdom to human wisdom,26 a point made clear to Socrates throughout his life via the advice of his daimonion, the origin of Socrates' confidence regarding his role as midwife is made quite clear. Moving now to the question of Socrates's determination of which students are worthy of his assistance, we find once more Socrates directly attributing this ability to the divine. As we read at 151a1-6: Sometimes (those that leave) come back, wanting my company again, and ready to move heaven and earth to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin to make progress. We see here, yet again, direct testimony to the involvement of the daimonion in the decision making process of Socrates. What is also of interest here is the similarity to the description of the daimonion as understood in the early dialogues, both dissuading Socrates from engaging in activities that he ought to avoid,27 as well as the more positive act of permitting other action.28 The point here is that we find a continued acceptance of Socratic appeal to the divine in these later dialogues, an 23 See Zina Giannopoulou, Plato's Theaetetus as a Second Apology (Oxford University Press, 2013), for a critical comparison of the Theaetetus and Apology. 24 Tht. 150c9, Ap. 30e, 28e, 29d. 25 Tht. 150c8. 26 Ap. 23a4-b2. 27 For example, engaging in a life of politics. See Ap. 31c4-32a3 28 As we find at Ap. 40c1, Socrates notes that the silence of his divine sign is to be taken as affirmation of his course of action. A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 87 acceptance that is consistent in manner and tone. In other words, if it were the case that Plato were trying to distance himself from the more fantastical aspects of Socrates ability from the early dialogues, one might think that by the time he set out to write the Theaetetus, an intricately woven treatise on the nature of human knowledge, such whimsical references to the supernatural would be absent, or at the very least relegated to a significantly diminished role. However, given Socrates' consistent and unapologetic appeals to the wisdom of such divine insight, it is difficult to see how such a claim could withstand this blatant textual evidence to the contrary. Finally, we look to the most interesting of the above concerns, i.e., how Socrates, a man who lacks all wisdom himself, is able to determine which ideas are true, and which are false. To answer this, let us look very briefly to the methodology employed by Socrates in the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus we are once more presented with a Socrates who consistently admits his own ignorance, knowing nothing of the topic at hand himself.29 And, while this may not seem a remarkable point, we find that such consistent admissions of absolute ignorance are, in a way, a return to form for Socrates. To explain, while the earlier dialogues are rife with such pleas of ignorance, as Plato develops into his middle period, we find a change in the character of Socrates as well.30 Specifically, in such middle period dialogues as the Meno, Republic, and Symposium, we find Socrates now holding a variety of metaphysical commitments, e.g., recollection, the forms, etc., that neither the Socrates of the early dialogues, nor the Socrates found in the Theaetetus maintain. Thus, with the image of Socrates as midwife we find Plato giving up on many of the conventions introduced in his middle period, conventions that, I would argue, were used as attempts to build upon the Socratic method, allowing for a more positive methodology, as opposed to one used merely to expose the inconsistencies in the beliefs of others.31 Thus, the Socrates of the Theaetetus does not possess any wisdom of his own. Thus, he does not, and cannot, impregnate his interlocutors with his own ideas as sophists do,32 but rather, merely assists in the delivery via the elenchtic form of questioning more reminiscent of his earlier engagements. 29 Tht. 151c4-d1, 161b1-b4, 161e5-8, 184b. 30 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 50 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46-49. See also, Burnyeat, \"Socratic Midwifery.\" 31 See also, Burnyeat, \"Socratic Midwifery,\" 57. 32 Tht. 151b. Daniel Larkin 88 Yet, despite his lack of wisdom, we recall that, in the Theaetetus, Socrates does claim that he is able to determine which ideas are worthy and which should be discarded. Since such determination cannot be the result of his own wisdom (as he admits none of his own), I would once more suggest that, on the view of Socrates, this inexplicable ability is made possible, at least in part, by divine assistance, a claim which, again, is admitted to by Socrates himself.33 This claim is supported by a number of factors: (1) As noted above, in his description of his own ability, Socrates consistently refers to divine influence as a major component of his craft. (2) The image of Socrates as midwife that we are presented with in the Theaetetus is quite similar to the Socrates of the early dialogues, i.e., an individual who, unlike the more protreptic figure of the middle dialogues, is able to properly guide his interlocutor away from false beliefs without admitting any wisdom of his own, yet, is effectively guided by his divine sign. And, (3) given Plato's acceptance of divine inspiration as a plausible source of assistance in these earlier works,34 when we consider the nostalgic portrayal of Socrates found in the Theaetetus, it stands to reason that we ought take Socrates (and thus Plato) at his word regarding the role of the divine in the case of Socrates in the Theaetetus. Evidence from the Philebus Yet, while the Theaetetus might provide us with an image of Socrates as reliant upon divine inspiration, the image of the midwife is not the only version of Socrates we are given in the late period. Indeed, in what would seem to be a directly contradictory image to the classically elenchtic Socrates of the Theaetetus, we find in the Philebus a Socrates that seems to do away with the elenchos altogether in favor of the method of collection and division! Yet, despite these disparate appearances, I would argue that the evidence in the Philebus only lends additional support to my position. My reasons are as follows: (1) Socrates is not especially adept in his deployment of the method of division, a lack of expertise which I will argue only helps prove my position that Plato does not consider Socrates to be a philosopher in the unqualified sense at this later stage of Plato's development. (2) While Socrates does indeed use the new method of collection and division, to aide in his progress he consistently appeals to, and relies upon, divine assistance. Thus, while the Socrates of the Philebus, insofar as he discards the elenchos in favor of the 33 Tht. 150d7-e2. See also Burnyeat, \"Socratic Midwifery,\" 60-61. Burnyeat here points to such a possibility, though he does not strongly commit. 34 See n. 2 A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 89 method of collection and division, may, prima facie, appear to be in direct opposition to the image of Socrates as depicted in the 6th definition of the Sophist (let alone the midwife of the Theaetetus), I would argue that upon closer examination, the seemingly different images of Socrates we are given are not as disparate as they might first appear. Socrates and the Method of Division It is widely accepted that the Philebus should be counted amongst Plato's latest dialogues.35 Given the dialogue's placement in the corpus, and, considering the diminished role of Socrates in the late period, the question arises as to why Plato would choose Socrates as his protagonist. In answer to this question, some scholars have suggested that perhaps the reemergence of Socrates is owed to the ethical nature of the discussion at hand.36 Yet, while I do agree that the earlier dialogues do primarily focus on more practical matters, such concerns are not entirely absent in the late period, especially when taking the overall project of the Laws into consideration.37 If the sole reason for Socrates' resurrection was simply on account of the topic's connection to more traditionally Socratic themes, then it seems odd to render him silent or absent entirely from other dialogues which feature similar connections to earlier dialogues.38 35 See Leonard Brandwood, The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and G.R. Ledger, Re-counting Plato: A Computer Analysis of Plato's Style (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), cited in Frede, \"The Hedonist's Conversion,\" 214. 36 R.A.H. Waterfield, \"The Place of the 'Philebus' in Plato's Dialogues\", Phronesis 25, no. 3 (1980): 270-305. 37 It should be noted that Socrates' general interest in matters pertaining to ethics does not preclude his interest in other, more theoretical fields of inquiry. For example, there is evidence to suggest that Socrates, as early as the Euthyphro, was very much concerned with epistemological issues, as well as matters of methodology. It is perhaps too long of an argument to make in full here, however, I will point out that we need think only of Socrates' response to Euthyphro's first attempt to define piety. On Socrates' view, Euthyphro's first attempt fails to capture the definition of piety itself, as it is merely an example of an action that might be considered pious. Indeed, given Socrates' attention to acquiring the proper definition, one that satisfies the definitional requirements stipulated by Socrates, it is not altogether clear that we can entirely divorce the epistemological from the moral in these early dialogues. 38 See Frede, \"The Hedonist's Conversion,\" 215. On Frede's view, not only would Socrates, on these grounds, be qualified to lead the discussion regarding the ideal state as found in the Laws, but similarly, in the Timaeus 19b-20c, Socrates would appear qualified and willing to discuss the ideal state, and yet, passes this duty on to Timaeus and Critias. Daniel Larkin 90 Given the implausibility of the above suggestion, I would argue that there must exist other reasons as to Plato's selection of Socrates in the Philebus. And, in this vein, I agree with Dorothea Frede's claim that Plato's use of Socrates in the Philebus was, at least in part, to distinguish Socrates from the master dialectician.39 To quickly recap, while Socrates does indeed discuss the 'divine method' of division, and further, uses it throughout the dialogue to determine the proper ranking of goods,40 the dialogue ends with Protarchus noting to Socrates that the task is not complete, and that Socrates should continue on to finish what he started.41 And, while this incomplete result is fairly common (if not expected) for a 'Socratic' dialogue, when compared to the Sophist and Statesman, two dialogues that feature the same method of collection and division, we find the conclusions to be strikingly different, as both dialogues end with a clear agreement that a definition has been reached by the Eleatic Stranger. Looking first to the Sophist 268c7-268d, we find the following exchange to close out the dialogue: VISITOR: Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the way we did before? THEAETETUS: Of Course. VISITOR: Imitation of the contrary-speech producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the appearance making kind of copy making, the word juggling part of production that's marked off as human and not divine. Anyone who says the sophist is of this 'blood and family' will be saying, it seems, the complete truth. THEAETETUS: Absolutely. Further, a definitive conclusion of this sort is echoed in the Statesman as well, for, at the end of the Statesman, following the final recap of their efforts towards defining the statesman, Socrates himself responds as follows at 311c4-7: \"Another most excellent portrait, visitor, this one that you have completed for us, of the man who possesses the art of kingship: the statesman.\"42 We find then a striking contrast between the three dialogues: While all three dialogues feature the method of division, only those wherein it is the Eleatic stranger leading the discussion does the discussion conclude definitively. On the other hand, in the Philebus, where it is Socrates, not the Stranger, using the method of division, 39 See Frede, \"The Hedonist's Conversion,\" 229-232. 40 Phil 66a-d. 41 Phil. 67b. 42 Italics added for emphasis. A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 91 we are left wanting, as the dialogue ends in incompletion. Given this inconclusiveness, I would once more state that this is precisely the point, i.e., that Plato, through his use of Socrates in this way, is demonstrating the need for a mastery of this new method if one is to achieve definitive results. And, given his affinity for Socrates, and the skill exhibited by Socrates throughout Plato's corpus, that Socrates would be shown to be inefficient is perhaps that most compelling way for Plato to emphasize this point. The Role of Divine Inspiration in the Philebus Yet, while it is true that Socrates ultimately fails to bring about the definitive conclusion presented in other late dialogues, I would argue that we are not to take this failure as an indication that Plato has lost faith in the methodology or ability of his mentor. In fact, I would suggest that, similar to the depictions of Socrates we are given in the Theaetetus and Sophist, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as a reflection of Plato's mature understanding of his teacher, one which, as with those other depictions already described, once more prominently features an attention to the role of divine inspiration in the methodology of Socrates. To begin, it should be noted that, despite his failure to properly execute the method of division, Socrates is still able to proceed quite far into the discussion. This ability to do so despite his lack of expertise is particularly interesting, especially when we consider Socrates' consistent appeal to the divine throughout the dialogue: (1) The method itself is called, by Socrates, the \"divine method\" (18b6), (2) there is a prayer for divine assistance to help establish the fourfold division of all being (25b), (3) Socrates consistently refers to the difference between the human and divine mind (22c), and (4) Socrates appeals to the differences between the divine and human ideal condition (33b).43 In this evidence we see, once again, that Socrates, even when utilizing the new, rigid method of division, does not waver from his appreciation of divine assistance. Yet, while this attention to divine influence should be of no surprise at this point in the case of Socrates, we are presented with one extraordinary piece of textual evidence that demands our attention. Following his praiseful description of the divine method of division, we find, now faced with a potential roadblock in in their discussion, Socrates, abandoning the method of division, proclaims that they 43 Frede, \"The Hedonist's Conversion,\" n. 36. It should be added that points (3) and (4), while not directly related to divine assistance, do reinforce the idea that Socrates would take seriously the wisdom of the divine over human wisdom. Daniel Larkin 92 need not be concerned, as, \"some memory has come to my mind that one of the gods seems to have sent me to help us.\"44 This single line is of exceptional importance as, in striking contrast to the apotreptic messages of the daimonion in which Socrates was warned against a particular course of action, here, in the Philebus, we are given textual evidence wherein Socrates is claiming to have received a positive message directly from the gods. And, in the context of the dialogue, this revelation bestowed upon Socrates, i.e., that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the good, but rather a third thing which is superior to both, is instrumental for the remainder of the discussion. Granted, one could argue that such a direct appeal to the divine ought to be taken as an ironic gesture. However, given the staggering amount of evidence that has been presented against such a claim, evidence that is found throughout the entire Platonic corpus, such a claim seems, to me, to be particularly unfounded. Thus, instead of approaching this problem from a skeptic's perspective, I suggest that we take this moment of positive divine influence with the utmost sincerity, as doing so would provide us insight into how we are to understand Socrates in Plato's later dialogues. To explain, as we have seen, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as not entirely skilled regarding the method of division. And yet, he is able to continue the discussion significantly further than would be expected for someone lacking in expertise. And, while this lack in ability would have crippled other individuals, Socrates, through the direct assistance of the gods, is able to proceed onward. The point I am attempting to convey here is that, in the Philebus, we are given insight into Plato's understanding of his mentor. To explain, as I have argued, as Plato progressed into his late period, his conception of philosophy has evolved. As such, he has come to realize that Socrates can no longer qualify as the embodiment of what the philosopher ought be in an unqualified sense. In short, Plato came to realize that the Socratic method, while useful for tearing down fallacious arguments and exposing inconsistencies in the beliefs of others, is unable to achieve the sort of definitional knowledge he desired. And yet, despite this inability, Socrates does seem to know things, i.e., his opinions and instincts always seem to be inexplicably pointed towards the truth. To account for this then, what we find in these late dialogues are images of Socrates wherein the role played by divine inspiration is placed front and center. Here in the Philebus we see evidence of Socrates, unable to push forward in the discussion, directly assisted by the gods. Whereas others would have faltered, or given up, Socrates, through divine revelation is able to continue. 44 Phil. 20b3-4. Italics added for emphasis. A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato's Late Dialogues 93 And, it should be noted, that this revelation occurs must be seen as positive in the eyes of Plato. In other words, while it is true that Socrates must rely on divine assistance to proceed in the discussion, such assistance does not diminish the results of the discussion, especially when one considers the reverence shown by Plato to the wisdom of the gods. Yet, while Plato does, in the case of Socrates, hold such divine revelation in high esteem, it is my view that he recognizes the limitations and potential pitfalls of reliance upon those few fortunate individuals lucky enough to be so inspired. Indeed, we might glean insight into this view when we consider the ending of the Philebus, wherein we recall that, despite Socrates being able to rank the various types of goods, Protarchus reminds him that his task is incomplete. To explain, we recall that in the Sophist and Statesman, an emphasis was placed on maintaining the proper divisions all the way through to the conclusion. In other words, the method of division is so effective because each division can be traced back and explained to any who would inquire. In the Philebus, however, we recall that the initial idea that spawned the discussion, i.e., that neither pleasure or knowledge alone was the good, was given to Socrates by divine inspiration. As such, this wisdom is not possessed by Socrates, and is thus unexplainable. No account can be given, and so, the division cannot be considered complete. Thus, while Socrates, via his divine connection, is able to proceed further in the discussion than the uninspired many, and, while this can be positive given the possibilities such inspiration provide,45 Plato recognizes the need for a methodology that does not rely on the assistance of the divine, hence his development of the method of division.46 Conclusion Thus, despite the limitations that may be related to reliance upon divine inspiration in matters of philosophy, it is quite clear that, in the case of Socrates, Plato still recognizes its value. Indeed, when we look to the three major images of Socrates presented in the late dialogues, we find that, despite surface discrepancies, the common link between them is their reliance upon and reverence for the divine. As 45 See Phaedrus 243e-245b. In Socrates' Second Speech, Philosophy is described as a form of madness. See also Francisco Gonzales, \"The Hermeneutics of Madness,\" in Plato and the Poets, ed. Pierre Destree and F.G. Hermann (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011). 46 Additionally, we are left without the precise ratios between pleasure and knowledge. Daniel Larkin 94 such, we find cause to take seriously the role of the divine in the case of Socrates in Plato's late dialogues.47 47 The objection might be raised here that we ought to understand the dialogues in a more skeptical light, especially given the more aporetic nature of the majority of the so-called Socratic dialogues. In this view, my position, which depends on seeing Plato (and by extension, the character of Socrates) as holding firm convictions regarding theological beliefs, arises as problematic. In response to this critique, however, we might look to the Laws, wherein we find evidence to support the contrary position, i.e., that Plato, especially in these late dialogues, does in fact posit such convictions sincerely. To begin, we find a concerted effort on the part of the Stranger throughout the Laws to prove that the gods do exist, and that, their supreme wisdom and control over the universe should serve as the basis from which the laws of men be established. See Laws 903bb-905d, 907a, 967b. See also Büttner, \"Inspiration and Inspired Poets\". Büttner calls attention to Laws 811c, wherein, in defense of the legitimization of the constitution thus far constructed, the Stranger notes that their discussion has \"not been conducted without a certain breath of the gods.\" As Büttner argues, considering the context here, it seems unlikely that we are to take this claim ironically. See also Cristopher Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). Yet, this position is perhaps made most clearly in those instances wherein the Athenian Stranger is describing the various punishments to be levied upon those individuals who dishonor the gods, whether that offense arise as atheism, theft from a temple, or even the practicing of improper rituals, should be subjected to capital punishment. And, the strictest of these punishments is reserved for the atheist, as such an individual \"...deserves to die for his sins not once or twice, but many times...\" (Laws 908e2-3) Further, this condemnation for atheism should not be taken lightly, for, while there are other offenses Plato believes deserving of capital punishment aside from those pertaining to impiety, e.g., premeditated murder (871d), wounding a family member with the intention of murder (877b7-9), and waging a private war without the backing of the state (955c), that the punishment for atheism should be more severe than the punishment for violent charges is quite telling. Given the severity and consistency of this evidence, we have cause to take such references to the divine as sincere, especially in the late Platonic dialogues. I would like to thank Hal Thorsrud for his insightful comments which raised this issue to my attention.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Published in Adaptive Behaviour: doi.org/10.1177/1059712318770387 Please quote from the published version. Going Wide: Extended Mind and Wittgenstein Victor Loughlin Centre for Philosophical Psychology University of Antwerp Belgium victorloughlin@hotmail.co.uk Abstract Extended mind remains a provocative approach to cognition and mentality. However, both those for and against this approach have tacitly accepted that cognition or mentality can be understood in terms of those sub personal processes ongoing during some task. I label this a process view of cognition (PV). Using Wittgenstein's philosophical approach, I argue that proponents of extended mind should reject PV and instead endorse a 'wide view' of mentality. This wide view clarifies why the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM) is incoherent. However, this view also indicates why the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) could be true. 2 1. Introduction Extended mind, broadly understood, is the claim that during certain tasks, our dependence upon environmental objects can be such that those objects can literally become part of the processes and states that realize our cognizing. Think of someone whose reliance on their Smartphone is such that they hardly do anything without it. This Smartphone could be more than simply a tool. Given the right conditions, it could instead be viewed as a genuine part of that person's mind. Or so claim proponents of extended mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). It is now standard to read the extended mind claim (henceforth EM) as a metaphysical claim. Read as a metaphysical claim, for EM to be true, environmental objects or processes must play a constitutive (and not merely causal) role in realizing our capacities to think or remember. To borrow Clark and Chalmers' famous example of Otto and his notebook, their claim isn't simply that the markings in Otto's notebook cause Otto's dispositional belief. Rather their claim is that such markings are part of those material processes that constitute or realize Otto's belief (ibid). There are also grounds to think that EM should be read as a metaphysical claim. First, doing so distinguishes EM from its near conceptual rival, the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition or HEMC (Rupert, 2004). HEMC is the claim that while environmental objects or processes may be essential to the exercise of some cognitive or mental capacity e.g., Otto's remembering may be facilitated by his accessing his notebook, it does not follow that such objects or processes are thereby part of the processes that constitute that capacity. That is, HEMC denies the metaphysical implications of EM. Hence, understanding EM as a metaphysical claim helps locate it in terms of an alternative view like HEMC. Second, attempts to view EM as only an explanatory endeavour confront the difficulty that it is unclear that EM has any explanatory edge over HEMC (see Rupert, 2004; also Sprevak, 2010). In which case, going explanatory about EM invites the danger of a stalemate between opponents and proponents of EM. By contrast, viewing EM as a 3 metaphysical claim has the merit of clarifying how the claim could be either confirmed or denied. For example, if the constituents of cognition or mentality do in fact extend to include environmental objects and processes, then EM could be true. Alternatively, if such constituents remain inside the skull, then EM could be false. For these reasons, I will read EM as a metaphysical claim. Interestingly, both those for and against EM can be understood as tacitly accepting what I will call a process view of cognition (PV). The central contention of PV is that constitutive questions about cognition or mentality, that is, questions about what cognition or mentality is, can be answered by identifying accompanying processes, where the term 'accompanying processes' refers to those sub-personal spatial and temporal processes ongoing during some task. PV has taken different forms in this debate. But the motivation for accepting PV in the context of extended mind seems straightforward. Consider that whenever you or I think or remember, it can seem natural to speculate that there must be some process occurring now that makes our activity one of thinking or remembering. We can then wonder as to the extent of that process. Does this process remain confined to the head? If so, then EM is false. Alternatively, does this process also extend to include environmental objects? If so, then EM is true. However, drawing upon Wittgensteinian considerations, I will argue that proponents of EM should in fact reject PV and embrace what I (and others) have labeled a wide view of mentality (Loughlin and Zahidi, 2017). For example, later Wittgenstein (2001) explored in detail the tendency we have to appeal to accompanying processes to understand mentality (all subsequent references will be to the later Wittgenstein). 1 Wittgenstein challenged this tendency by reminding us of the non-mediative link between our use of psychological concepts and our behaviours. This link ensures that our cognitive or mental capacities are 1 As pointed out by Noë (2004, p220), there is reason to think Wittgenstein might have been sympathetic to extended mind. Wittgenstein wrote: \"I really do think with my pen, for my head often knows nothing of what my hand is writing\" (1998, p24e). 4 manifested or displayed in what we say and do. That is, it is the norm governed practices and contexts within which we say someone is thinking or remembering that makes an agent's activity one of thinking or remembering. This clarifies why PV is false. PV is false because there is nothing ongoing, say, at the moment I am thinking or remembering, that makes my activity one of thinking or remembering. I shall propose that proponents of EM thus use these Wittgensteinian considerations to reject PV and adopt instead a wide view, according to which a given activity is cognitive or mental if and/or when it accords with wider behavioural conditions i.e., the conditions found in norm governed practices and contexts. This proposal impacts on the debate over extended mind in the following way. On the one hand, rejecting PV and going wide clarifies that cognition or mentality should not be understood as some bounded entity that can extend into the environment. In other words, the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM), that is, the standard reading of extended mind given in Clark and Chalmers (1998), can be discarded as incoherent. On the other hand, this clears the way to investigate those causal mechanisms that underpin our various cognitive or mental capacities. If such mechanisms can be shown to extend to include environmental objects or processes, then the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) could be true. Thus, rejecting PV and going wide could be attractive strategy for those keen to discard HEM and develop HEC. The layout of the paper then is as follows. In section 'A Process View of Cognition', I detail how both opponents and proponents of EM can be understood as offering views that are compatible with PV. In section 'Wittgenstein', I describe how Wittgensteinian considerations clarify why PV is false. In section 'Going wide', I propose that proponents of EM should reject PV and adopt instead a wide view. 2. A Process View of Cognition (PV) Clark and Chalmers (1998) originally launched extended mind in terms of cognitive processes and cognitive (or mental) states. Other participants in this debate have since accepted that constitutive questions about cognition or mentality, that is, questions about what cognition or mentality is, can be answered by identifying accompanying processes. Here the term 'accompanying processes' refers to those sub-personal 5 spatial and temporal processes ongoing during some task. I call this a Process View of Cognition (PV). If PV is correct, then there must be a process, either ongoing inside the agent's head or spread out between the agent and their environment, that makes a given task a cognitive one. One way (though not the only way) to flesh this out is to conceive of the process in question as possessing special properties such as those found in a 'mark of the cognitive'. The search for marks of the cognitive has proved a popular strategy in the debate over extended mind. On the one hand, opponents of EM, like Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2010a,b) have appealed to such a mark in order to demonstrate that EM is false. On the other hand, proponents of EM, like Rowlands (2010), have appealed to such a mark in order to demonstrate that EM is true. Now, while it would be a stretch to categorize these respective marks of the cognitive as simply statements of PV or reducible to PV, they nonetheless are compatible with PV. 2 I claim this demonstrates how both opponents and proponents of EM have tacitly accepted PV. For example, Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2010a,b) have claimed that (1) cognition involves representational states with nonderived content and (2) the cognitive is to be distinguished from the non-cognitive by virtue of underlying causal mechanisms (2010b, p9, p58). (1) and (2) lead them to propose the following mark of the cognitive: \"cognition is constituted by certain sorts of causal processes that involve nonderived content\" (2010a, p. 68). The notion that mentality involves non-derived content is not unique to Adams and Aizawa. Indeed, as they acknowledge (2010b, p31), they take this idea from the naturalized semantics literature (see Adams and Aizawa, 2010b, chapter 3 for a full discussion). Yet what exactly is such content? Non-derived content, say Adams and Aizawa (2010b), refers to the information garnered in an intentional agent's thoughts, experiences and perceptions (ibid, p32). Such content is to be contrasted with bodily 2 Other marks of the cognitive are perhaps possible. However, as far as I am aware, no such alternatives are readily available in the literature on extended mind. Indeed, I would venture that the marks provided by Adams and Aizawa and Rowlands remain the leading candidates. 6 external objects, like traffic lights, gas gauges, and flags, which possess only derived content, that is, informational content derived from other intentional agents (ibid). Adams and Aizawa argue that cognitive psychological research has revealed that the only causal mechanisms that possess non-derived content are those mechanisms found inside the head. As such, the mechanisms that constitute or realise our cognitive or mental capacities are, for purely contingent reasons, intracranial. Consequently, EM is false. Yet this dismissal of EM, I claim, is compatible with PV. For, as their mark of the cognitive attests, Adams and Aizawa insist that cognition is constituted by those processes ongoing during some task, which, they argue, are those subpersonal causal mechanisms that possess non-derived content. However, contrary to Adams and Aizawa, Rowlands (2010) has sought to demonstrate that EM is true. For Rowlands, \"processes of manipulation and transformation of [bodily] external structures should be regarded as cognitive and not as merely extraneous causal accompaniments to the supposedly real, internal processes of cognition\" (ibid, 124, my italics). Such processes are cognitive, claims Rowlands, whenever they fulfill the following four conditions. The first condition is that a process must involve the manipulation and transformation of information-bearing structures. The second condition is that the manipulation and transformation of such structures must have the proper function of making new information available to the agent or to processing operations within the agent. The third condition is that this new information must be made available to the agent via a representational state with non-derived content. The fourth condition is that the agent must own the process (ibid, p110-111). Note that one could read this as not compatible with PV. After all, if what matters are processes of manipulation and transformation that make new information available to the agent and the agent owns such processes, then such processes could be pitched at the personal and not sub-personal level. However, a closer inspection of Rowlands' mark reveals that there is such a compatibility. 7 For example, as part of the fourth condition of his mark, Rowlands uses his analysis of intentionality to detail how personal-level processes can be owned. 3 Rowlands argues that on the standard model of intentionality, there is an ambiguity in the notion of mode of presentation, such that the notion can be interpreted to mean either (1) an empirical mode of presentation or (2) a transcendental mode of presentation (ibid, p185). The empirical mode of presentation refers to the contents of experience (the shininess and redness of a tomato, for example). The transcendental mode of presentation, on the other hand, refers to those conditions that make possible, or in virtue of which, the object (such as the tomato) is presented to our awareness as being the way it is. In other words, the transcendental mode of presentation is that \"in virtue of which the tomato, or relevant part of the world, is disclosed or revealed to me as shiny and red. The non-eliminable core of intentional experience, therefore, consists in a disclosure or revelation of the world\" (ibid, p186, emphasis in original). According to Rowlands, \"the relevant sort of disclosure will be that belonging to the vehicles of cognition rather than the content of cognitive states\" (ibid, p195). Such \"causal disclosure\" (ibid), says Rowlands, is not restricted to brain states but rather can extend to include saccadic eye movements, probing and exploratory activities in the identification of sensorimotor contingencies, and the manipulation and exploitation of the optic array (ibid, p202). Indeed, when such processes are operating as \"vehicles of disclosure\" (ibid), then they are part of the conditions that disclose or reveal the world to the agent, that is, they are the processes with or in virtue of which the agent becomes aware of their surroundings (ibid). Such processes are sub-personal processes. This suggests that Rowlands' mark is in fact compatible with PV. For among the conditions that make a process cognitive, claims Rowlands, are those processes that disclose or reveal the world to the agent, which include (though are not limited to) ongoing sub personal processes, like visual saccades. 4 3 The following is based on Loughlin (2013). 4 In the text, I only focus on one source for Rowlands e.g., Rowlands, 2010. In other work, Rowlands (2006) has explored in detail how bodily movements can be representational (see Gallagher, 2017 for analysis). I have restricted my focus in the aforementioned way because my aim here is only to demonstrate that Rowlands' mark of the cognitive, like that of Adams and Aizawa, is compatible with PV. As I make clear in the text, I think this can be done by examining his 2010 work. 8 It is also worth pointing out that compatibility with PV is not confined to those in search of a mark of the cognitive. Functionalism, as is well known, has played a key role in the debate over extended mind. One of the leading advocates of an \"extended functionalist\" approach has been Clark (2010). Briefly, Clark views EM as a claim about the constitutive (and not cognitive) role played by an environmental object. Constitution, says Clark, is determined by the information-processing role of that object i.e. its functional role, which is in turn determined by the \"precise nature of the coupling\" (ibid, p90) that occurs whenever the agent interacts with such an object. This sketch reveals that extended functionalism is compatible with PV. A cognitive activity is constituted by accompanying processes, which are those sub-personal causal couplings that occur whenever an agent interacts with an environmental object. 5 If the foregoing is correct, then both opponents of EM, like Adams and Aizawa, and proponents of EM, like Rowlands and Clark, develop views that are compatible with PV. At the very least, this tacit acceptance of PV by both opponents and proponents of EM suggests that PV cannot help resolve the extended mind debate. This should, I think, motivate a questioning of the merit of PV. In the next section, I will develop this point by arguing that Wittgensteinian considerations can be used to clarify why PV is in fact false. 3. Wittgenstein 5 Jumping ahead, the sort of wide view I defend in section 4 of this paper can be viewed as offering the following response to the functionalist (extended or otherwise). Functionalism can be read as the claim that, \"what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system in which it is a part\" (Levin, 2008). A wide view insists that a given activity is cognitive or mental if and/or when it accords with wider behavioural conditions i.e., the conditions found in norm governed practices and contexts. But if so, then, pace the functionalist, it is not the sub personal role (function) a state plays within some system that makes that state mental. States (or activities) are mental dependent upon on whether or not they satisfy wider behavioural conditions. Functionalism is thus false. On the other hand, if functionalism were instead read as identifying the role (function) of states within some system pitched at the sub-personal level, then this would be compatible with a wide view. For, as I make clear with the Smartphone example (see section 4), going wide about mentality is compatible with there being subpersonal systems, as could occur when an agent is causally coupled to an environmental object. 9 In the introduction, I claimed that a possible motivation for accepting PV in the context of extended mind is our tendency to speculate that, whenever you or I think or remember, there must be some process occurring now that makes our activity one of thinking or remembering. I claim such a tendency is evidence that we are, in Wittgenstein's words, 'captivated by a picture' (2001, s115). By employing Wittgenstein's philosophical approach, that is, by assembling reminders about how we actually use psychological concepts, we can cease to be so captivated. This is because such reminders can help clarify for us why PV is false. 6 Suppose, for example, I watch someone building a wall. While they do so, I notice that they seem to carefully weigh certain bricks in their hands before setting them on the wall, sometimes discarding one, sometimes picking up another. Done in such a way, we would probably call the actions of the builder \"thoughtful\". For although the builder has not said anything, there nonetheless seems to be something considered or reflective about what they are doing. According to Wittgenstein, this may lead us to picture thinking as involving some \"process, which may accompany something else or can go on by itself\" (ibid, s330). For instance, in calling what the builder is doing \"thoughtful\", we seem to be identifying some process ongoing inside the builder. Yet how do we identify this process? Continuing our example, suppose I were to stop the builder and ask him to explain to me his actions. It would be odd if he could not furnish me with reasons for what he is doing. However, the reasons the builder gives cannot be the process we are searching 6 In this paper, I will not examine the many interpretative issues Wittgenstein's later work raises. However, I will say the following. Stern (2006) divides interpreters of later Wittgenstein into two broad camps. On the one hand, there are those who regard Wittgenstein as someone profoundly skeptical about the remit of philosophy ('pyrrhonian' interpreters). On the other hand, there are those who insist that, while Wittgenstein's approach has distinctively therapeutic elements, the outcome of this therapy can nonetheless be a positive one ('non-pyrrhonian' interpreters). One way to understand this could be to say that, by clarifying how our language-games operate in our form of life, we can gain new insight into the issues that trouble us. If so, then my use of Wittgenstein's philosophical approach is non-pyrrhonian, since I am using his approach to gain new insight, such as indicating why PV is false. 10 for. For, in contrast to processes, we don't usually take reasons to have properties like duration, that is, beginnings, middles and endings. As such, whatever else reasons are, they are not processes. 7 Yet if the builder cannot identify the process we are looking for, then how can we? For why would we be in a better position than the builder to identify what he is thinking? In other words, if we insist on picturing thinking as a process going on inside the builder, then it is not clear how either the builder or ourselves could identify this process. 8 Why does this problem arise? Wittgenstein offers the following diagnosis: \"The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. But that's just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive move in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.)\" (ibid, s308, my italics). In other words, our problem, insists Wittgenstein, arises from our uncritical acceptance of the aforementioned picture. We dissolve our problem by rejecting that picture. And we do this by instead asking ourselves: what are the particular circumstances that fix our use of the concept 'thinking' (ibid, s154, s155)? 7 One way to expand on this point would be to say that giving reasons is something one is able to do. And understood as a capacity, giving reasons is not a process, even in cases where giving reasons could have process-like characteristics e.g. when I describe to someone the steps I took to calculate some mathematical sum. Here we can draw a parallel with what Wittgenstein says about understanding: \"In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process\" (2001, s154). Arguably the same holds true for giving reasons. 8 Notice that the problem here is conceptual, not empirical. Suppose, for example, we opened up the builder's head and were able to identify some mechanism occurring inside his brain. Why should this mechanism (or any mechanism like it) be the process we are searching for? The builder cannot answer our question. He can give us reasons for his actions but he cannot identify the process we are looking for. And we can't answer this question. For why would we be in a better position than the builder to determine what he is thinking? As Wittgenstein says, we are in a 'muddle' (2001, s153). 11 For example, in the case of the builder, what does it mean to call his actions \"thoughtful\"? One possibility is that we are characterizing the builder's behaviour as being of a certain sort, that is, as being such that if, say, I were to stop him and ask him to explain to me what he is doing, he could give me reasons for his actions. It is thus the builder's capacity to give reasons that justifies my characterization of his actions as \"thoughtful\". This reminds us that it is internal to our use of a psychological concept, like 'thinking', that such use is confirmed by the satisfaction of certain conditions, like being able to give reasons (Glock, 1996). Notice that the term 'internal' should not be confused with some process inside the head. Rather it is a reminder that there is a non-mediative link between our use of a psychological concept, like 'thinking', and our behaviour, which ensures that our cognitive or mental capacities are manifested or displayed in what we say and do. Notice also that the term 'psychological concepts' should not be confused with interior mental items. As talk of a non-mediative link clarifies, concepts can be understood to be doings or behaviours e.g., we call the actions of the builder \"thoughtful\". Internal relations \"depend on how we describe things\" (ibid, p327). That is, it is the norm governed practices and contexts within which we describe someone as thinking or remembering that ensures an agent's activity is one of thinking or remembering. This may appear as if it is simply a matter of convention as to what activities we call \"thinking\" or \"remembering\". Yet while there is a difference between our use of psychological concepts and behaviour, there is \"no gap to be bridged\" (ibid), since if different behavioural conditions were appealed to, then this would no longer be thinking or remembering as we understand these capacities. In other words, it is not just a matter of convention. It is instead built into the very games we play with language that we call some activities and not others \"thinking\" or remembering\". Indeed, to do otherwise would be to occupy a different form of life. This impacts on PV in the following way. If it is wider behavioural conditions i.e., the conditions found in norm governed practices and contexts, that determine if and/or when an activity is an example of a cognitive or mental capacity, then it follows that there is nothing ongoing, say, at the moment I am thinking or remembering, that 12 makes my activity one of thinking or remembering. Instead, it is \"what leads to, surrounds, and follows from the..movements with which we usually associate the activity [that make that activity cognitive or mental]\" (Klagge, 1995, p473). This clarifies why PV is false. PV is false because thinking or remembering are not constituted by any sub-personal processes ongoing at the moment you or I think or remember. This isn't to deny that what you or I do at any moment matters. This also isn't to deny that there are ongoing sub-personal processes. Rather it reminds us that, when it comes to thinking or remembering, what we do at any moment matters only to the extent that what we are doing now can be understood as satisfying wider behavioural conditions. And no sub-personal process (ongoing or otherwise) can satisfy such conditions. 9 Now, for those opposed to EM, like Adams and Aizawa, these sorts of Wittgensteininan considerations may look unpersuasive. Indeed, they may object that cognitive science is often understood as aiming to upset or challenge folk psychological notions. Hence, if Wittgensteinian considerations simply involve an appeal to such notions, then using his approach to challenge cognitive science begs the question against such a science. For it would seem to take as given that folk psychological notions must trump the explanatory concerns of scientists. However, while Wittgenstein's approach does indeed appeal to our everyday use of psychological concepts, the aim, as I have made clear, is not to settle accounts about what can and cannot be said about some concept. It is rather to liberate us from captivating pictures. Assuming that there is some sub-personal process occurring now that makes a given activity a cognitive or mental one is such a picture. We cease to be 9 Wittgenstein could be read as denying that there must be an a priori connection between mental explanations and explanations pitched at sub-personal levels. For example, Thornton (2015) takes Wittgenstein to be \"caution[ing] against assuming that a pattern at one level [say, the mental or psychological level] must be relatable to a pattern at a lower level [say, the sub-personal level]\" (p7). Given that PV is built on the tendency to think that there must be such a connection, as I have claimed, then this supports using Wittgenstein to clarify why PV is false. However, Thornton also points out that Wittgenstein does not exclude the possibility of establishing \"local connections\", that is, a posterioi connections, between these levels. In the current context, HEC could be understood as investigating such local connections (see section 4 of this paper). 13 captivated by that picture once we have clarified why PV is false. Thus, I would argue that we can employ Wittgenstein's philosophical approach, not in order to trump folk psychological notions, but rather in order to (hopefully) dispel conceptual confusion among cognitive scientists (like that generated by tacitly accepting PV) and so help do such a science better. For example, this use of Wittgenstein can help demarcate broader philosophical concerns about what cognition or mentality is from narrower empirical questions about the role of causal mechanisms (see section 4 for development of this point). 10 Importantly, this use of Wittgenstein's approach should be attractive to those keen on EM, like Rowlands or Clark. For this outcome vindicates their views vis-à-vis the claim that what constitutes our cognitive or mental capacities cannot be solely determined by whatever is ongoing inside our heads. In what follows, I will aim to convince those keen on EM to thus reject PV. 4. Going wide Drawing on Wittgenstein's philosophical approach, I think proponents of EM should reject PV and instead embrace what can be called a wide view of mentality (Loughlin and Zahidi, 2017). This wide view argues that what makes a given activity cognitive or mental is not where such an activity takes place (either inside and/or outside the head) but rather whether or not it satisfies wider behavioural conditions, like those found in norm governed practices and contexts. A wide view thus rejects the idea, exemplified in PV, that constitutive questions about cognition or mentality can answered by identifying sub-personal accompanying processes and instead emphasizes the role played by wider conditions in constituting our cognitive or mental capacities. The question then is: what consequences does this wide view have for the debate over extended mind? 10 The way I have used Wittgenstein's philosophical approach in the text is compatible with the position defended by Hutto and Satne (2018), who claim that philosophical clarification, inspired by Wittgenstein's relaxed view of naturalism, can have scientific benefits. 14 In order to answer this question, I will introduce a distinction that has recently gained traction within the literature. It is the distinction between, on the one hand, the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM), and on the other, the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) (Palmeros, 2014; Pöyhönen, 2014; Bernecker, 2014). This distinction is not hard and fast. Nonetheless, one way to parse it out is to say that HEC theorists take as given what cognition or mentality is and then seek to identify, for explanatory purposes, the boundaries of those sub-personal processes that underpin a cognitive or mental capacity. Put another way, HEC theorists aim to show that giving an explanation of the sub-personal mechanisms that underpin a cognitive or mental capacity requires appealing to bodily external objects or processes. By contrast, HEM theorists focus instead on ontological issues, such as those concerning the location of mentality. Understood in this way, HEM can be read as the standard way to formulate EM (see the introduction to this paper). Indeed, as both Palmeros (2014) and Pöyhönen (2014) point out, Clark and Chalmers' example of Otto and his notebook is a case study for HEM, since the example, if plausible, is intended to undermine the intuition that mentality must be solely located within the skull. Rejecting PV and embracing a wide view demonstrates why HEM no longer makes sense. If our cognitive or mental capacities are determined by our satisfying wider behavioural conditions, then while such capacities obviously have locations (in the trivial sense that everything occurs somewhere), it does not follow that such capacities also have boundaries and so can extend into the environment. HEM, in other words, is incoherent. 11 11 As I outlined in the introduction, embedded mind theorists, like Rupert, are usually understood as challenging the metaphysical implications of EM. Such theorists insist that there is only a causal (and not constitutive) dependence between an agent and an environmental object during a task or activity. Given that rejecting PV and embracing a wide view renders HEM (the hypothesis of extended mind) incoherent, then this could be taken to support an embedded position. However, notice that Rupert (2010) views cognition in terms of underlying physical mechanisms \"each element of which contributes, as a member of overlapping subsets of mechanisms, to a wide range of cognitive outcomes\" (p12). This seems to accept that constitutive questions about what mentality is can be answered by identifying accompanying processes, where such processes are those sub-personal processes ongoing during a task. In other words, this accepts PV. But if so, then rejecting PV would also entail rejecting embedded mind. 15 On the other hand, rejecting PV and embracing a wide view can potentially support HEC. For there still remain questions to be asked about those causal mechanisms that underpin a given cognitive or mental capacity. Causal mechanisms obviously have identifiable spatial and temporal boundaries. Hence, proponents of HEC can seek to determine if the mechanisms that underpin a given capacity can extend to include non-bodily processes and/or environmental objects. If they do, then HEC could be true. By way of illustration, recall the example given earlier of someone who makes extensive use of his or her Smartphone. Suppose this individual is now typing on their phone to a friend. They may be typing for a particular reason e.g., to tell their friend about an embarrassing moment that occurred at work today. They may be anxious for their friend to respond in a particular way (with sympathy, not with derision), so they are choosing their words carefully or perhaps peppering their text with emoticons. Most people would agree, I think, that this activity qualifies as a cognitive or mental one. Yet what is it about this activity that makes it cognitive or mental? According to a wide view, the individual's typing on their Smartphone qualifies as cognitive or mental because it satisfies wider behavioural conditions. For example, if I were to stop the individual while they were typing and ask them what they were typing or who they were sending their message to, then they could answer my questions in a straightforward fashion. As with the case of the builder (see section 3), it is the Smartphone user's satisfaction of those conditions found in norm governed practices and contexts that leads me to describe what they are doing as an example of thinking. Notice a number of things about this example. First, if this example is correct, then PV is false. There are no sub-personal processes ongoing while the individual is typing on their Smartphone that makes what the individual is doing a cognitive or mental activity. Second, this example does not support HEM. It is the individual's capacity to satisfy wider behavioural conditions that matters and this capacity is not some bounded entity that extends into the environment. Third, this example is 16 compatible with asking questions about the extent of sub-personal processes. That is, this example is compatible with HEC being true. For instance, various neural processes obviously need to be operational inside the individual's head for them to be able to type on their phone. Moreover, there could also be a close causal coupling occurring whenever the individual uses their phone. Clark describes the coupling of interest to (some though by no means all) proponents of EM as involving \"continuous reciprocal causation\" or CRC (Clark, 1997, p163; see also Clark and Chalmers, 1998). CRC occurs when \"some system S is both continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected by, activity in some other system O\" (Clark, 2008, p24). That is, when the back-and-forth between an individual and an environmental object involves CRC, then just as the agent causes changes in that object through their interaction with it, then similarly the object can cause changes in the agent through that interaction as well. Under these circumstances, the agent and object could form one extended system. This could be what is happening in the Smartphone example. The coupling between the individual and their Smartphone could such that this coupled agent-object system is part of the mechanisms that underpin the agent's capacity to think. If so, then giving an explanatory account of the sub-personal mechanisms that underpin the individual's capacity to think will require including this coupled agent-object system. Thus, the hypothesis of extended cognition, that is, HEC, could be true. And this would be compatible with embracing a wide view. For the agent's activity counts as an example of thinking because it satisfies wider behavioural conditions. Now consider a different example. Most people would agree that memory is about the recall of information. 12 If I remember what I did yesterday morning (I took my wife to a doctor's appointment, for example), I am recalling information about what I did yesterday. The standard move (a move evident in the debate over extended mind) is to link recall with retrieval. So when I recall what I did yesterday morning, this means that I retrieved information about what I did yesterday morning. Once recall and retrieval are linked, then it follows that the information I retrieved must have been 12 The following is based on Loughlin and Zahidi (2017). 17 stored somewhere (I can't retrieve something if it isn't stored). Further, once it is accepted that information must be stored somewhere, then there must be a repository for this stored information. For internalists, like Adams and Aizawa, this repository is the brain. For externalists, like Clark and Chalmers, this repository can be spread out between brain, body and world, as in their example of Otto and his notebook. Hence, as Loughlin and Zahidi (2017) point out, both internalists and externalists endorse the memory-as-information-retrieval view. However, it is possible to accept that memory involves the recall of information without also accepting that this involves information retrieval. Consider the following. Suppose you asked me to remember the time of our friend's party tomorrow so we know when to leave the house. However, when we subsequently arrive at the party the next day, we find the party is already over. You understandably get very angry. You ask me: \"why didn't you remember the right time?\" If the memory-as-information-retrieval view is correct, then I either noted (stored) the correct time of our friend's party or I did not. I obviously did not, hence why we arrive only to find the party already over. However, according to a wide view, for the recall of information to count as an act of remembering, the recalled information has to be appropriated situated and contextualised within the personal and impersonal circumstances of the person. For example, if you hadn't asked me to remember the time, then you couldn't justifiably get angry when we arrived late. As such, it is your asking me to remember the time and my failure to fulfil this order that leads us to call what I did \"misremembering\". If this is correct, then while remembering involves the recall of information i.e., information that is appropriately situated and contextualised, this need not entail that it also involves the retrieval of something previously stored. It instead means that we satisfy (or fail to satisfy, as in this example) wider behavioural conditions. Thus, adopting such a wide view clarifies that memory does not involve information retrieval. More could be said here (see Loughlin and Zahidi, 2017 for a fuller account). Nonetheless, notice two things. First, if this wide view is correct, then PV is false. 18 There are no ongoing sub-personal processes that make an activity one of remembering or misremembering. Second, questions can still be asked about those causal mechanisms that underpin any act of remembering or misremembering. For instance, empirical investigation may reveal that the causal mechanisms involved are entirely confined to the brain (the hippocampus of the medial temporal lobe could be such a mechanism, for example). However, investigation may instead reveal that such mechanisms can also sometimes extend to include what you or I do and/or how we use environmental objects. Indeed, there could be circumstances where the keeping of a diary or notebook could be such that, during those moments when the agent is using the diary or notebook, such use is part of the mechanisms that underpin their capacity to remember. That is, giving an explanatory account of the sub-personal mechanisms that underpin the agent's capacity to remember could require appealing to environmental objects. Under these circumstances, the hypothesis of extended cognition or HEC could be true. Nonetheless, the agent's activity counts as one of remembering because it satisfies wider behavioural conditions. Thus, rejecting PV and embracing a wide view places proponents of HEC in an interesting position. On the one hand, it enables them to demarcate broader philosophical concerns about what cognition or mentality is from narrower empirical questions about the role of causal mechanisms. On the other hand, this ensures that they can follow Ross and Ladymans' advice and insist that, \"metaphysical considerations should play no role in deciding how to model cognition... Modelers will and should draw system boundaries in whichever ways maximize efficient capture of local phenomena\" (Ross and Ladyman, 2010, p156). 13 As both the Smartphone and memory examples suggest, doing so raises the possibility that HEC could be true. 5. Conclusion 13 Pöyhönen (though for different reasons) seems to reach a similar conclusion: \"I contend that choices between externalist and internalist classification strategies are necessarily more local, and based partly on the epistemic aims of the scientific field in question\" (Pöyhönen 2014: 755). 19 Extended mind remains a provocative claim that arguably still offers a fresh approach to cognition and mentality. However, both those for and against this approach have tacitly accepted that cognition can be understood in terms of sub-personal processes ongoing during some task. I labeled this a process view of cognition (PV). Using Wittgenstein's philosophical approach, I have argued that proponents of extended mind should reject PV and instead embrace a wide view of mentality. Doing so has both negative and positive consequences for the extended mind debate. On the one hand, it demonstrates why the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM) is incoherent. On the other, it highlights how proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) can focus on those causal mechanisms that underpin our mental or cognitive capacities. If explaining such mechanisms requires appealing to environmental objects or processes, then HEC could be true. Bibliography Adams, F, Aizawa, K (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14, pp43-64. Adams, F, Aizawa, K (2010a). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. 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{"text": "Kant's Schematism of the Categories: An Interpretation and Defense Nicholas F. Stang University of Toronto nick.stang@gmail.com Draft – do not cite or circulate without permission Abstract Most commentators agree that the Schematism chapter plays a very important role in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). But there is little agreement on what role, exactly, the Schematism is supposed to play and how successfully it plays that role. Many commentators consider it a failure. My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of the role of the Schematism and a qualified defense of its main doctrines. The topic of the Schematism is the \"subsumption\" of objects under concepts, as the first sentence announces: \"in all subsumptions of an object under a concept [. . .]\" (A137/B176). Its primary aim is to explain how it is possible for sensible objects to be subsumed specifically under the pure concepts of the understanding (categories). That much is relatively clear. However, \"subsumption\" admits of two different readings, which previous commentators have not carefully distinguished. In one sense, an object a can be said to be subsumed under a concept F just in case some subject thinks of a that it is F. In another sense, though, an object is only said to be subsumed under a concept when it instantiates that concept, e.g. when a is F. The first notion of subsumption is neutral on the truth of subsumption, whereas, on the second reading, subsumptions as such are true. In this paper I argue that this ambiguity in \"subsumption\" is the key that unlocks the argument of the Schematism. Introduction Most commentators agree that the Schematism chapter plays a very important role in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). But that is where the agreement ends. In particular, there is little agreement on what role, exactly, the Schematism is supposed to play and how 2 successfully it plays that role. Many commentators consider it a failure.1 My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of the role of the Schematism and a qualified defense of its main doctrines. The topic of the Schematism is the \"subsumption\" of objects under concepts, as the first sentence announces: \"in all subsumptions of an object under a concept [. . .]\" 1 Prominent Schematism-bashers include Jacobi (\"the most wonderful and mysterious of all unfathomable mysteries and wonders\" – quoted by Schaper 1964, 270), Schopenhauer (\"famous for its profound darkness, because nobody has yet been able to make sense of it\" 1911, vol. 1, 533), Adickes (\"in my opinion, the section on the Schematism is of no scientific value\" Kant 1889, 171), Prichard (\"it seems clear that if the first part [of the Analytic] is successful the second must be unnecessary\" 1909, 246), Kemp Smith (\"no such problem as Kant here refers to will exist\" 1923, 334), Warnock (\"but if this is [. . .] Kant's question, he fails to answer it\" 1948–9, 81), Bennett (\"the incoherence of Kant's problem of category-application is matched by the vacuity of his proposed solution\" 1966, 151), Wolff (\"the artificiality of the problem and the solution is evident upon reflection\" 1969, 207), and Wilkerson (\"the Schematism serves no useful purpose and can in my opinion be ignored without loss\" 1976, 94). Guyer offers a more mixed verdict: \"only in the case of the three relational categories does there seem to be a genuine possibility that any persuasive connection can be drawn\" (1987, 175). More recent commentators tend to be more sanguine; see Pendlebury 1995 and Allison 2003, 202–228 for sympathetic reconstructions. 3 (A137/B176).2 Is primary aim is to explain how it is possible for sensible objects to be subsumed, specifically, under the pure concepts of the understanding (categories).3 That much is relatively clear. However, \"subsumption\" admits of two different readings, which previous commentators have not carefully distinguished. In one sense, an object a can be said to be subsumed under a concept F just in case some subject thinks of a that it is F. In another sense, though, an object is only said to be subsumed under a concept when it instantiates that concept, e.g. when a is F. The first notion of subsumption is neutral on the truth of subsumption, whereas, on the second reading, subsumptions as 2 The Critique of Pure Reason is cited in the customary fashion: the page number in the 1781 edition (A) followed by the page number in the 1787 edition (B). Kant's other works are cited by volume and page number in the Akademie edition, Kant 1902–. \"Refl.\" refers to Reflexionen, Kant's unpublished handwritten notes, which can be found in volumes 14–19 of the Akademie edition. The CPR is quoted from the Guyer & Wood translation (Kant 1998a), with my modifications. 3 In this essay, I only discuss \"determining\" or \"subsumptive\" schemata (by which sensible objects are subsumed under corresponding concepts), the topic of the Schematism chapter of the CPR, rather than schematism by analogy or symbol (5:351– 2). Neither do I discuss the \"schematism\" of the moral law (5:68–70), the pure concept of right (23:273-5), the duties of virtue (6:398), or the Ideas of reason and their associated regulative principles (A665/B693, A674/B702, A682/B710), much less the imagination \"schematizing without a concept\" in aesthetic judgment (A684/B712). A comprehensive account of Kant's general notion of \"schematism,\" and its applications in various domains, is a project for future work. 4 such are true.4 If we make this distinction precise, we get two different questions that might be the question of the Schematism: (1) The subsumption1 of an object a under a concept F is the thought that a instantiates F (the thought that Fa). (Q1) How is it possible to think of a sensible object that it falls under a category (where F is a category, to think a thought whose content is Fa)? (2) The subsumption2 of an object a under a concept F is the object's instantiating that concept, thus the content of the thought involved in the corresponding subsumption1 (Fa) being true. (Q2) How is it possible for sensible objects to instantiate categories (where F is a category, how is it possible that Fa)?5 Kant sometimes talks about the \"application\" (Anwendung) of concepts to objects,6 and some commentators follow him by talking about schemata as \"application conditions\" for the categories, but \"application\" admits of the same ambiguity: is satisfaction of the application conditions for concept F sufficiently merely to think of an object as falling under F (to think that Fa) or is satisfaction of those conditions sufficient for a to instantiate F (for it to be the case that Fa)? This distinction between two notions of \"application\" mirrors precisely the distinction between subsumption1 and subsumption2. 4 Since we are concerned only with the subsumption of sensible objects, and hence with objects of cognition, this agrees with Kant's official definition of truth at A58/B82. 5 Where the expression \"Fa\" abbreviates \"object a falls under/instantiates concept F.\" 6 E.g. \"How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible?\" (A138/B177). 5 Some previous commentators have focused on the \"semantic\" question (Q1),7 others on the \"metaphysical\" question (Q2),8 but have not carefully distinguished them.9, 10 7 E.g. \"we are, then, asking in our schematism question [. . .] for the rules which specify the conditions under which [whether this or that is a causal connection] could ever be a question\" (Pippin 1976, 161; emphasis in original); \"this raises issues concerning the possibility of intentional content\" (Pendlebury 1995, 777; Au's emphasis); \" 'applying a category' then means claiming for a discursive combination objective validity, validity not only 'for myself, in my present state of perception' but 'for everybody, always'\" (Longuenesse 1998, 244; Au's emphasis) 8 E.g. \"the problem is not a new one, but simply Plato's problem of giving an account of how it is possible to subsume a concrete particular under a thoroughly abstract universal\" (Chipman 1972, 43); \"the chief objective of the Schematism must therefore be to show how exactly these categories can be instantiated or manifested in our sensible intuitions of objects\" (Guyer 1987, 158). 9 A notable exception to the trend of conflating Q1 and Q2 is W.H. Walsh, whose distinction between a weaker and a stronger sense in which categories might have \"sense and significance\" roughly parallels my Q1 and Q2 (Walsh 1957, 97). Walsh interprets the problem of the Schematism as Q2, without connecting it, as I do, to Q1. As a result, he is unable to give a satisfactory reconstruction of the argument of the Schematism. 10 Some scholars even read the Schematism as concerning the epistemic problem of how we know that objects instantiate categories or how we \"recognize\" them under categories (Krausser 1976; Dicker 2004, 213). I take it to be clear, though, that the epistemic problem is downstream of both Q1 and Q2: to know that an object falls under a concept, 6 In this paper I will argue that this ambiguity in \"subsumption\" is the key that unlocks the argument of the Schematism.11 I agree with many commentators that Kant's ultimate aim in the Schematism is to explain the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories (to answer Q2). He does so by explaining the possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under schemata. This much is relatively uncontroversial.12 But Kant's explanation of the possibility of subsuming2 objects under schemata will issue in an answer to Q2 only if there is a connection between subsuming2 an object under a schema and subsuming2 it under the corresponding category. I think I must be able to subsume1 and subsume2 it under that concept, but not vice versa. I will ignore the epistemic question in what follows. 11 The Schematism chapter is not the only text where Kant discusses the mediating representations (schemata) by means of which sensible objects are subsumed under categories; he discusses them elsewhere in the CPR (A163/B204, A181/B223–4, A245, A247/B304, A665/B693, A286/B342, A553/B581, A664/B692, A682/B710, A718/B746) in other writings (4:316, 495; 5:68-9; 20:212, 232, 274), and in some unpublished Reflections (Refl. 5552, 5933, 6359) and letters (11:316, 12:224–5). But the Schematism is by far the most extensive and informative discussion of transcendental schemata in Kant's entire corpus. 12 My strong suspicion is that even the commentators quoted in note 7 would agree that the ultimate aim of the Schematism is to explain the possibility of subsumption2 (Q2); however, because they do not make explicit how they understand \"subsumption\" (or \"application\") it is hard to say for certain. 7 this connection is established by means of the notion of subsumption1 and a connection between subsumption1 and subsumption2, namely: Subsumption Link: if subsuming1 an object under a concept F is sufficient to subsume1 that very object under a concept F* then explaining the real possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under F is sufficient to explain the real possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under F*. This principle might appear complicated, but, I think, it expresses a straightforward truth. If I can prove the real possibility of sensible objects instantiating F (being subsumed2 under F) then I can prove the real possibility that Fx (for at least some sensible object x). But if the thought that Fx is sufficient for the thought that F*x (subsuming1 x under F is sufficient for subsuming1 x under F*) then by proving the real possibility that Fx I have thereby proved the real possibility that F*x. For example, since <gold> contains <yellow> as a mark, subsuming1 an object under <gold> is sufficient to subsume1 it under <yellow>; consequently, proving the real possibility of an object being subsumed2 under <gold> is sufficient to prove the real possibility of an object being subsumed2 under <yellow>. If I am right that this principle plays a key role in reconstructing Kant's argument in the Schematism, this will vindicate my claim that the distinction between subsumption1 and subsumption2 (and thus the distinction between Q1 and Q2) are key to understanding this chapter of the CPR. Where G is a mark of F, subsuming1 an object under F is analytically sufficient for subsuming1 under G. Subsumption Link will be of interest only if we can find instances 8 of non-analytic sufficiency of subsumption1 under categories.13 I will argue that this is precisely what the Schematism provides: subsuming1 an object under a schema is sufficient (thought not analytically sufficient because the category is not a mark of the schema) for subsuming1 it under the corresponding category. Consequently, the task of explaining the real possibility of objects being subsumed2 under categories is reducible to the task of explaining the real possibility of their being subsumed2 under the corresponding schemata. Schemata thus play two crucial roles in Kant's proof of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories. On the one hand, they help establish that: Subsumption Sufficiency: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of a concept is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under that concept.14 After some preliminaries (§§1–2), in Part One I reconstruct Kant's theory of schemata, focusing on explaining why Subsumption Sufficiency holds. The guiding thread of my 13 Analytic sufficiency will not help for it would require finding concepts of which the categories are marks; explaining the possibility of subsuming objects under those \"enlarged\" concepts would require explaining the possibility of subsuming objects under their marks, the categories, the very problem with which we started. See §2 for more discussion of this issue. 14 If we read \"application\" as application1/subsumption1 this corresponds to Kant's claim that \"an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former\" (A139/B178). 9 interpretation is Kant's claim that schemata are \"transcendental time-determinations.\" After specifying what notion of \"determination\" is involved in this claim (§3), I explain why the schemata of empirical concepts (§4) and mathematical concepts (§5) are timedeterminations, and why the schemata of categories are transcendental timedeterminations (§6). The conclusion of Part One is that, for each kind of concept and their associated schemata, Subsumption Sufficiency holds. In the much shorter Part Two I explain Kant's justification for: Real Possibility: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under schemata of empirical concepts, mathematical concepts, and categories. In the case of empirical and mathematical concepts I argue (§7) these explanations are nearly direct consequences of the theory of schemata outlined in Part One and some relatively uncontroversial features of Kant's cognitive theory. In the case of categories, though, the explanation is not significantly more difficult. I argue in §8 that the real possibility of subsuming sensible objects under categorical schemata follows almost immediately from Kant's specification of those schemata. Subsumption Link, Subsumption Sufficiency, and Real Possibility allow Kant to conclude that: Conclusion: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories. This is precisely the conclusion for which the Schematism, on my interpretation, constitutes an argument. This establishes that, on my reading, the argument of the 10 Schematism is valid.15 Whether it is sound depends on the strength of the arguments Kant gives in favor of the premises. I will argue that Kant's detailed theory of schemata provides a plausible case for the truth of these premises. Thus, I will argue, the Schematism to a large extent succeeds in its aims.16 But we can only see this if we explicitly distinguish subsumption1 and the \"semantic\" question Q1 from subsumption2 and the \"metaphysical\" question Q2.17 Preliminaries Before proceeding to the core of the argument in Part One, I clarify some key preliminary notions. 15 None of the commentators I am aware of (see Bibliography at the end) reconstruct the Schematism as an argument. Even George Dicker, who is otherwise so meticulous in formally reconstructing Kant's arguments, abandons this methodology when it comes to the Schematism (Dicker 2004, 213–224). 16 To this extent I agree with Allison 2004, 202–228. However, I provide detailed reconstruction of the argument of the Schematism, which Allison does not. 17 This paper covers most of the main topics, and many of the details, of the Schematism. One topic that is salient by its absence is the imagination. Kant writes that \"the schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination\" (A140/B179). For reasons of space, I omit here my detailed interpretation of imagination and its relation to schemata (and time-determination). Two interpretations of Kant's theory of the imagination that harmonize with some of the points I make here are Sellars 1978 and Young 1988. 11 §1. Subsumption Kant sometimes uses \"subsumption\" to refer to a relation between concepts: one concept is said to be \"subsumed\" under a more general concept (e.g. <human> under <animal>).18 However, in the Schematism he is concerned with subsumption as a relation between an object and a concept (e.g. subsuming Socrates under <human>); the very first sentence of the Schematism chapter begins \"in all subsumption of an object under a concept [. . .]\" (A137/B176; Au's emphasis). I will refer to the latter as object subsumption and the former as concept subsumption. This distinction can be drawn within either subsumption1 or subsumption2. We can distinguish between the thought that an object falls under a concept and the thought that one concept falls under another (subsumption1). Likewise, we can distinguish between the fact that an object falls under a concept and the fact that one concept falls under another concept (subsumption2).19 Until Part Two, unless otherwise noted, when \"subsumption\" appears without a modifier, it always refers to object subsumption1. The logical form of object subsumption is simple: a is subsumed under F, or, in contemporary symbolism Fa. The logical form of concept subsumption is, I take it, the logical form of judgment in general, which Kant specifies in the Jäsche logic as follows: \"to everything x, to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs, belongs also attraction 18 For instance, in his discussions of subsumption in syllogistic reasoning: A301/B357, A304–5/B361, A308/B364. 19 For further discussion of these two different uses of \"subsumption\" see Longuenesse 1998, 92–97, and de Boer 2016, 451. 12 (c)\" (Jäsche Logic, 9:111).20 In contemporary symbolism, the subsumption of concept F under concept G has this logical form: (x)(Fx → Gx). In the case of an analytic subsumption (subsuming one concept under a concept of which it is a mark), G will be a constituent of F; in the case of synthetic subsumption (subsuming one concept under a concept which is not one of its marks), G will not be a constituent of F, but the logical form of the subsumption will still be (x)(Fx → Gx). All of the objects subsumed under F are also subsumed under G. If I am right that the logical form of object subsumption is Fa then this means that object subsumption is already \"built into\" the logical form of judgment (concept subsumption). The role of judgment, after all, is to relate concepts which can be used to subsume objects.21, 22 20 This is specifically the form of synthetic judgment because Kant uses the variables \"(a + b)\" and \"(c)\" to indicate that a and b are not marks of c. If we relax that requirement (the mere form of the symbols is non-committal about mark-inclusion) we can use this as the form of judgment in general, both analytic and synthetic. 21 The same point can be drawn out of the quoted passage: \"to everything x, to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs\" already involves a universal quantifier \"to everything x\" and an object subsumption \"to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs.\" Cf. Longuenesse 1998, 87. 22 I thus depart from Allison 2004, 212, who takes the problem of subsumption to be the problem of how judgments are possible. On my reading, subsumption is a necessary condition on judgments relating to objects, but one can make judgments (conceptsubsumptions) involving concepts under which no object can be subsumed1. 13 What objects are available to us to be subsumed under concepts? Given the logical form of object subsumption, what values can be substituted for x in the form Fx? When I subsume an object under a concept I am not subsuming a general class of objects under that concept (that would be concept subsumption), I am subsuming a specific object. To the question \"which object is subsumed\"? the answer must always be a single object. This means that subsumption involves a singular aspect as well as a general aspect (the concept under which the object is subsumed).23 Intuitions, in virtue of being singular representations, are the source of our ability to represent single objects. Consequently, to subsume an object under a concept I must be able to intuit that object.24 If I cannot intuit objects of a certain kind then I may be able to have general thoughts about them (I can engage in concept subsumption involving concepts of them) but I cannot think de re of a single one of them that it falls under a concept. I cannot engage in object subsumption with respect to that kind of object. The objects we can intuit are what Kant calls \"phenomena,\" objects of sensible spatiotemporal intuition. Thus, in talking about object 23 This does not mean that \"universal\" object subsumptions are impossible (e.g. \"to everything x, to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs\") but that they are parasitic on the ability to subsume individual objects under concepts (\"the concept of body (a + b) belongs to x\"). 24 My interpretation of intuition agrees, in broad outlines, with that of Allais 2015, while remaining neutral on her more controversial claims (e.g. the independence of intuition from understanding). See Stang (2016) for some differences between my reading of transcendental idealism and Allais's. 14 subsumption I will always mean the subsumption of spatiotemporal objects under concepts.25 25 This means that I can think whole judgments involving concepts like <noumena> (e.g. that noumena causally affect us) but for no noumenon x can I think a thought of the form Fx. I anticipate two objections. First, Kant allows us to think about God and <God> is not a general concept (there is at most one God) so this might appear to be an object subsumption involving a noumenon (God cannot be intuited by us). That there can be at most one God does not mean, however, that a thought about God has the form Fa (where \"a\" refers to God); it means that the concept of God is so determinate that it can be instantiated by at most one object. Nonetheless, thoughts about God remain concept subsumptions, not object subsumptions (their logical from is: (x)(God(x) → Fx)). Secondly, Kant allows that we I can think of myself as a noumenon. Here we must distinguish between theoretical and practical representation. Within theoretical philosophy I think that all of our thoughts about ourselves as thinking substances underlying our mental lives are concept subsumptions (e.g. \"to everything x, to which the concept <substance underling my thought-predicates> belongs, belongs also <simplicity>\"). In practical cognition, though, we can represent ourselves de re as noumena through the awareness of ourselves as bound by the moral law. I take this to involve something like the practical analogue of a singular representation. In this paper I am focusing solely on theoretical contexts where such de re noumenal representation is impossible. For a compelling account of the source of our practical awareness of ourselves as noumena, see Schafer Forthcoming. 15 My discussion up to this point implicitly presupposed that \"subsumption\" means subsumption1 but all of the issues I raised can also be raised about subsumption2. We can distinguish between facts of the form (x)(Fx → Gx) and those of the form Fx, and we ask, of those objects x which we can intuit, how it is possible for a fact of the form Fx to obtain? §2. Categories and Schemata In trying to understand Kant's explanation of the possibility of the subsumption (in either sense) of objects under categories it is helpful to think about the negative case where Kant thinks that such subsumption is impossible: non-sensible objects or \"noumena.\" In the Phenomena and Noumena section Kant writes: \"if this condition of judgment (schema) is missing, then all subsumption disappears; for then nothing would be given that could be subsumed under the concept\" (A247/B304). Subsuming1 an object under a category, without its schemata, is impossible. Because schemata relate categories exclusively to sensible objects, this means no subsumption1 of a non-sensible object under a category (or any concept for that matter) is possible.26 26 But this does not entail that the subsumption2 of individual noumena under categories is impossible. It entails that Kant's strategy for explaining the possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories cannot work for noumena. Since Kant (with his characteristic modesty) takes this to be the only possible such explanation, he takes the subsumpion2 of categories under noumena (their instantiation of categories) to be inexplicable. 16 Kant is not denying, though, that we can subsume concepts of non-sensible objects (e.g. <noumenon>) under other concepts (e.g. <non-spatiotemporal>), even categories (e.g. <cause-effect>), for his transcendental theory of experience requires precisely such concept-subsumptions (e.g. the thought that noumena are non-spatiotemporal and that noumena cause the matter of experience).27 As so-called \"metaphysical\" readers of Kant point out, the CPR is replete with claims that, in my terminology, are conceptsubsumptions involving concepts of non-sensible objects.28 These \"noumenal thoughts\" remain available to us, even if we cannot use their constituent concepts to subsume nonsensible objects. It is clear that the categories as they appear in these thoughts are not identical to schemata and, what is more, these thoughts do not even involve application of the corresponding schemata. This has given rise, in the Kant literature, to talk about \"unschematized\" categories (a term Kant never uses)29 or \"pure\" categories (see A248/B304), i.e. categories that appear in thoughts (concept subsumptions) about nonsensible objects and hence do not involve schemata. What, then, is the relation between 27 For the former claim, see B307–8; for the latter, see especially 8:215, as well as the texts cited by Adickes 1924, ch. 3. 28 E.g. Adickes 1924, Aquila 1979, Ameriks 1982, and Allais 2015. The presence of these noumenal thoughts is not proof that the \"metaphysical\" reading is correct, however. For a non-metaphysical take on, for instance, Kant's talk of noumena affecting us, see Allison 2004, 64–73. 29 This term appears to have been introduced into the Kant literature by Paton 1936, vol. 2, 41. 17 so-called \"pure categories\" and schemata?30 One tempting, but ultimately mistaken, model would take the unschematized or \"pure\" category to be a genus and the schemata to be a differentia within the relevant genus, so that the \"schematized\" category would be something like a species. For instance, the genus would be <cause-effect> (\"something that allows an inference to the existence of something else\" – A243/B30131), the differentia would be the corresponding 30 de Boer 2016 argues that \"pure concepts of the understanding\" already contain their own schemata (are already \"schematized\"), while \"categories\" are these pure concepts, abstracted from their schemata. While I have my doubts about whether this is accurate to Kant's uses of these terms (de Boer's reading is hard to square with Kant's use of \"category\" at B128, A146/B185, A161/B201–2, A184/B227, A219/B266, A222/B269, and many other passages) even if de Boer is correct, my view can be easily translated into her terms as follows: where I say \"unschematized category\" substitute \"category\" simpliciter. 31 A page earlier, at A242/B300, Kant distinguishes between the purely nominal definitions we can give of the categories in abstraction from their relation to sensible objects, and the real definitions that are possible in relation to such objects. In the case of each category he discusses, he identifies the possibility of the real definition of the category in its sensible use with its relation to time: quantity: \"this how-many-times [Wievielmal] is grounded on successive repetition, thus on time\" (A242/B300); reality: \"reality, in contrast to negation, can be defined only if one thinks of a time (as the sum total of all being) that is either filled by it or empty\" (A242/B300); substance: \"if I leave out persistence (which is existence at all times)\" (A242/B300); cause: \"from the concept 18 schema (\"the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows\" – A144/B183), and the \"schematized category\" would be the conjunction of the two: a cause is a real being (one possessed of an intensive degree of reality) whose existence posits, and from whose existence always follows according to a rule, the existence of a distinct real being, its effect. The problem with the species-genus model is that it fails to explain precisely what Kant wants to explain: the subsumption of a sensibly given object under the category. A differentia is one mark among others of a species-concept; e.g. <rational> is one mark, among others, of <human> (<rational animal>). Likewise, on the species-genus model, the schema is one mark among others of the schematized category. But in order to subsume an object under a concept one must subsume it under all of its marks, not merely one of them. The species-genus model fails to explain why, in subsuming the object under the schema (differentia), one thereby also subsumes it under the category (genus). It is akin to explaining the possibility of subsuming an object under <human> by citing merely the possibility of subsuming it under <rational>. The defender of the species-genus model might reply that this is part of the definition of a cause as a pure category (if I leave out the time in which something follows something else in accordance with a rule)\" (A243/B301); contingency: \"I would gladly know by what means you intend to cognize the possibility of this not-being, if you do not represent a succession in the series of appearances and in this succession an existence, which follows on the not-being (or conversely), and thus a change\" (A243/B301). I take this to mean that the distinction Kant is drawing is between \"pure\" categories, abstracting from their temporal schemata, and schematized categories. See also A146-7, B186. 19 of a species-constituting differentia: it can only apply to instances of the genus (e.g. only animals can be rational).32 But this is to restate my point without responding to it: without a further explanation, the species-genus model fails to explain why the schema is a differentia, in this stronger sense, of that category, i.e. why anything that is subsumed under \"the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows\" is thereby subsumed under <cause-effect>. And that is precisely what needs to be explained.33 The schema cannot be identical to the unschematized category (this would render thoughts involving pure categories impossible), it cannot be a species-constituting differentia, and, more generally, it cannot be one of the marks of the schematized category. What other relation might obtain between schema and category? In this paper I will defend the following proposal: although the schema is not identical to the category, to subsume1 an object under a schema is sufficient to subsume1 it under the corresponding category. Schemata are vehicles of object subsumption1 for categories. This is the principle of Subsumption Sufficiency. Subsumption Sufficiency is secured, on my reading, because schemata are, in Kant's words, \"transcendental timedeterminations.\" In Part One, I explain what this means, and why it secures Subsumption Sufficiency. 32 See Anderson 2014, 123–5. 33 To call schemata \"application conditions\" of categories is just to state my question, not to answer it. Why is satisfaction of the application-conditions (schema) of <cause> sufficient for subsumption under <cause>? 20 Part One §3. Determination In exploring Kant's argument for Subsumption Sufficiency, my guiding thread will be his claim at A139/B178 that the schema of a category is a \"transcendental timedetermination\": \"hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination [transcendentale Zeitbestimmung], which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter [appearances] under the former [the category]\" (A139/B178). To unpack the notion of transcendental time-determinations we need to understand (i) what it means that schema are \"transcendental,\" (ii) what they have to do with time, and (iii) what it means that they are \"determinations.\" With respect to (i), for now I will merely point out that, in explaining how subsumption1 of objects under a priori concepts is possible, schemata of such concepts explain (on my reading) how subsumption2 of objects under such concepts is possible, and the possibility of subsumption2 is a necessary condition for cognition using those concepts (Bxxvi, footnote). Consequently, schemata, insofar as they explain the subsumption2 of objects under categories, will be transcendental in precisely Kant's technical sense at A56/B80: they will explain (partly) how a priori cognition is possible. 34 I will return momentarily to (ii) their relation to time, but I will 34 \"[. . .] not every a priori cognition [Erkenntnis] must be called transcendental, rather only those through which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied merely a priori or are possible (i.e. the possibility of cognition or its use a priori).\" Cf. Allison 2004, 216. 21 begin by examining (iii), the respect in which schemata are determinations (Bestimmungen). We should distinguish at least four different senses of \"determination\" that are relevant to Kant's investigations. Each of these is a sense the German word \"Bestimmung\" and its cognates (bestimmen, bestimmt, bestimmtheit, unbestimmt, unbestimmtheit, etc.) can have.35, 36 Determination-1 is the semantic notion of a representation representing its object as determinately having or lacking a predicate (being determinate with respect to that predicate). Indeterminacy1 is the notion of a representation that represents its object neither as having nor as lacking a predicate. Conceptual representation, being general, is typically indeterminate1 to some degree.37 Determination1 is a gradable notion; one representation can be more determinate1 than another in virtue of representing its objects as possessing a wider range of predicates (e.g. a species-concept is more determinate1 35 One difference between English and German is that German does not have different words for \"determined\" and \"determinate\"; both correspond to \"unbestimmt.\" 36 Stang 2012 contains a preliminary version of these distinctions. 37 A concept is completely determinate1 just in case, for every predicate F, it either contains F or ~F. Our concepts are typically incompletely determinate1, the possible exception being <God>, for it is completely determinate1 at least with respect to God's intrinsic properties. Conceptual representation, in general, is not completely determinate1. For extensive discussion of complete determination1 see Kant's lectures (28: 413, 503, 554, 630, 722–4, 779, 1156) and Reflexionen (Refl. 5760, 5783, 5784, 5786, 6245, 6255, 6290, and 6322) on metaphysics. 22 than a genus-concept). Determination1 will play a key role in the argument of this paper; I will sometimes refer to it as \"semantic\" determination (likewise \"semantic\" indeterminacy is indeterminacy1). Determination-2 is the metaphysical notion of an object determinately having or lacking a predicate (being determinate with respect to that predicate). It is the notion involved in the \"principle of complete determination,\" according to which every object is fully determinate with respect to every predicate (it either determinately has or determinately lacks it).38 Indeterminacy2 is the notion of an object neither determinately having nor lacking a predicate (which may or may not be possible). Determination2 is gradable; one object may be more determinate2 than another in virtue of being determinate2 with respect to a wider range of predicates. Determination2 will also play a key role in the argument of this paper; I will sometimes refer to it as \"metaphysical\" determination (likewise, \"metaphysical\" indeterminacy refers to indeterminacy2). Determination-3 is also a metaphysical notion, closely tied to the notion of a determining ground. An object is said to be determined3 with respect to a predicate just in case there is a determining ground of its possessing that predicate.39 A determining ground of an 38 See Kant's discussion of this principle at A573/B601, as well as Stang (2012). 39 A determining ground is one that not only brings about its consequence but does so necessarily: it is impossible that a determining ground, in the very same context, would \"posit\" a different consequence (or fail to posit any consequence). The notion of a determining ground (and its difference from a merely sufficient ground, which may posit different consequences in different contexts) is important primarily in the context of debates about free will, in particular, whether the will is a determining ground of its acts, 23 object's possession of a predicate is an entity such that, necessarily, if the same background conditions obtain, it grounds the possession of that predicate by that object. Determination3 will not be further discussed in this paper (though it has a claim equal to determination2 to be called \"metaphysical\" determination). I mention it only to distinguish it from other notions of determination. Determination-4 is an epistemic notion. An object is determined4 with respect to a predicate by an agent just in case that agent knows that object has or lacks that predicate.40 An object is said to be indeterminate4 with respect to a predicate when it is epistemically open, for an agent, whether or not the object has that predicate. Determination4 will not be further discussed in this paper. I mention it only to distinguish it from other notions of determination. While determination1 and determination2 are distinct notions, they are closely connected in Kant's philosophy. Because \"the conditions of the possibility of the or merely a sufficient ground. The distinction is originally due to Crusius, in his 1763 work Dissertatio de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis (Crusius 1964, vol. 4, §§I, III, XX). Kant notes this distinction with approval in the preCritical Nova dilucidatio (1:398), although he later distances himself from it in his metaphysics lectures (28:14, 30, 54, 401, 491; 29: 808, 809, 815, 819). For critical discussion see Hogan (2009) and Stang (2019). 40 Determination4 could be extended to include other epistemic states less demanding that knowledge (e.g. Kant's notion of Glaube). However, since this notion of determination will play a minimal small role in this paper, I will leave it at that. See Chignell (2007) for an account of different kinds of epistemic states in Kant. 24 experience of objects [determinately1 representing them as, e.g. substances and causes] are the conditions of possible objects of experience [their determinately2 being substances and causes] (A493/B521), they are determinate2 (at least with respect to the range of predicates representable in experience) only insofar as we determinately1 represent them. Having made some preliminary distinctions among different notions of determination, we must now ask: in which (if any) of these four senses are schemata transcendental time-determinations? On my reading (see Introduction) the primary role of the Schematism is to establish a thesis about the subsumpion2 of objects under categories (Conclusion) by means of a premise about subsumption1 (Subsumption Sufficiency). Subsumption1 involves determinacy1: to subsume1 an object under a concept is to determine1 that object with respect to that concept. To subsume2 an object under a concept, by contrast, that concept must represent the object as having features the object determinately2 has.41 Determination2 will thus become relevant when we reconstruct Kant's argument for the claim that it is really possible for objects to be subsumed2 under schemata (Real Possibility) and thus under categories (via Subsumption Link). While determination3 (having a determining ground) is not strictly irrelevant it is decidedly secondary to this project.42 So is determination4 (being epistemically determined). The 41 See the opening of the Schematism at A137/B176. 42 For one thing, one of the categories <cause-effect> is the category by which we think of one object being determined3 by another; for another, the determinacy1 (content) of our representations determines3 (grounds) objects as determinate2 (having properties) and 25 question of how we know objects to fall under a set of concepts (determining4 them with respect to those concepts) cannot arise unless we assume that those concepts can be representationally determinate1 with respect to properties sensible objects have (determination2).43 I can now offer a first-pass characterization of my interpretation of schemata as transcendental time-determinations: schemata explain the possibility of determinately1 representing a sensibly given object under a category (subsuming1 it under the category). They do so by determinately1 representing the specifically temporal features of objects.44 thus allows us to determine4 (know) them a priori. (I promise the reader this is the only sentence in this paper in which all four notions of determination are involved!) 43 More indirectly, Kant makes clear that schemata make possible cognition (Erkenntnis) of objects using categories rather than knowledge (Wissen) that they fall under categories. While there is, as of yet, no consensus among scholars what \"cognition\" (Erkenntnis) is, there is a growing awareness that it is crucial to distinguish it from knowledge (Wissen); see Smit 2000, Hanna 2006, Watkins and Willaschek 2017, and Schafer Forthcoming. Kant's investigation into the possibility of cognizing objects using categories is not thereby an investigation into the possibility of knowing (determining4) that objects fall under categories. 44 By contrast, Henry Allison gives the following definition: \"we may preliminarily characterize a transcendental time-determination as a rule-governed product of the figurative synthesis (a \"transcendental product of the imagination\"), which exhibits in a non-discursive manner the form of unity conceptually expressed in a category\" (Allison 26 Why determinately1 representing the temporal features of objects should have anything to do with determinately1 representing them as falling under categories (subsuming1 them under categories) is one of the main things I shall have to explain in this paper. Until further notice, \"(in)determinate/determinacy/determination\" will refer to the relevant forms of determination1. At the risk of introducing yet a further distinction, I think it will aid our comprehension of Kant's discussion if we distinguish, within determination, what I will call the agent of determination (the determining representation) and the patient of determination (the determined object). For instance, as I progressively determine my concept of matter (e.g. through physical investigation), my concept becomes further determinate and is thus an agent by which I further determine matter, the patient of determination. The agent of determination in our case is two-fold: the schema (it determinately represents the temporal features of objects) and the category (we are explaining how it comes to be able to determinately subsume objects). But what is the patient? Schemata can mediate between pure intellectual concepts and sensibly given objects, Kant writes, because they are \"homogenous\" with both (A138/B177). They are homogenous with sensibly given objects because \"time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold\" (A139/B178). It is important to realize that \"contained in\" (enthalten in) cannot mean \"contained in the content of\" because time is the form of 2004, 215). I do not think this characterization is false, but I think my characterization is more explanatory. 27 inner sense45 (as Kant reminds us earlier in the same paragraph) and thus outer sense intuitions are not as such intuitions of objects as temporal.46 In fact, Kant will have to do some very intricate work in the Analogies and the Refutation of Idealism to demonstrate both the possibility and necessity of representing outer objects as also being in time.47 At this point, in the Schematism, before he has done that work, Kant can only assume that representations of outer objects are in time (because all representations, as states in us, are in time).48 Hence it might have been more perspicuous if Kant had written: \"every empirical representation of the manifold [is contained in time]\" (A139/B178). 45 \"Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition of ourselves and our state [Zustand]\" (A49/B50). 46 \"Time cannot be a determination of outer appearances: it belongs neither to shape nor location etc., but rather determines the relation of representations in our inner state\" (A33/B49–50). 47 I read Kant's discussion of \"time determination\" in the Analogies (A183/B226, A185/B228, A188/B231, A215/B262, A217/B264) and the Refutation (B275–8), continuous with my reading of the Schematism, as concerning the conditions of the possibility of determinately1 representing the temporal relations of outer objects (permanence, succession, simultaneity), which, given that these objects are mere appearances, are at the same time conditions of the possibility of their determinately2 standing in those temporal relations. 48 See A34/B50–1. My reading is in some tension with the conclusion of that paragraph: \"from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time.\" This 28 Schemata mediate categories with appearances because, as time-determinations, they are \"homogenous\" with appearances. But if appearances are in time (at this point in the CPR) only in the indirect sense that the sensible representations by which those appearances are given to us (intuitions) are in time, then schemata mediate categories with appearances by mediating categories with intuitions of appearances. Time is the \"medium\" of this mediation because all representations, as states of ours, are in time. Schemata, as mediating representations, are specifically time-determinations, because they further determine objects in respect of temporal features. But which objects? What is the patient of determination here? It cannot be, at this point in the CPR, that they immediately determine outer objects in respect of time, for Kant has not yet built the can be read as making either a weak or a strong claim about the temporality of all appearances überhaupt (including outer ones): (i) all appearances, even outer ones, are in time in the minimal sense that our intuitions of them are in time (weak), or (ii) all appearances, even outer ones, not merely our intuitions of them, are in time (strong). On the weak reading, Kant is entitled to this claim at this point in the Aesthetic, but the weak reading does not fit the text very well (Kant emphasizes that it is the objects of representation, not merely the states in us by which we represent them, that are in time). The strong reading is more natural to the text, but it is a non sequitur, for it does not follow from what Kant says earlier in the paragraph. I think the sentence must be read in the strong way, but as anticipating an argument Kant will give later, in the Analogies and the Refutation of Idealism. Bader 2017 offers a fascinating, and very different, account of why outer objects are in time, but one not very closely tied to the letter of the text. 29 machinery for doing so (primarily, the Analogies).49 Instead, schemata immediately determine the inner states by which such objects are given to us (intuitions, which qua states in us are in time). Specifically, they determine the temporal properties of those states.50 At a first approximation, then, we can say that schemata are transcendental timedeterminations insofar as: (i) they allow us to determine1 objects with respect to categories by allowing us to subsume1 sensibly given objects under them; (ii) they do so by determinately1 representing temporal relations among the states by which these objects are given to us (intuitions). The question is: why, in doing (ii), do schemata also do (i)? §4. Empirical Schemata as Time-determinations Schemata of categories are transcendental time-determinations. In building up to a more complete characterization of what that means, I am going to start by considering the schemata of empirical concepts, a topic Kant introduces and briefly discusses at A141/B180. Categorial schemata are mediating representations that make possible the subsumption of given objects under categories, while schemata of empirical concepts (henceforth, empirical schemata) make possible the subsumption of given objects under 49 And the schemata will themselves play an important role in showing how the timedetermination of outer objects is possible, for the Analogies involve the timeschematized relational categories as. See A181/B223–4. 50 On this point I agree with Allison 2004, 217. 30 empirical concepts.51 Hence empirical schemata are not transcendental but, as schemata, they are still time-determinations. This is indirectly confirmed in the text of the Schematism itself: \"[an empirical concept] always refers immediately to a schema of the imagination as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with a certain general concept\" (A141/B180). \"A rule for the determination of our intuition\" is, I take it, a rule for determining intuitions as temporally ordered states in us, rather than a rule for determining the object of that intuition (subsuming1 it under a concept), though of course Kant needs to show that the former will explain the latter. 51 There is a debate in the secondary literature (see Pendlebury 1955; Chipman 1972; Pippin 1976; Guyer 1987; Matherne 2015) on whether empirical concepts are identical to their schemata. Even if, contra Chipman 1972, it is impossible to possess an empirical concept without being able to subsume a sensible object under it, it does not follow that they are identical, merely that they are necessarily co-occurring. The view that empirical concepts are their own schemata fits poorly with Kant's principal discussion of them: \"Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept. The concept of a dog signifies [bedeutet] a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general [. . .]\" (A141/B180). If an empirical concept is its own schema then, by the second sentence, it signifies [bedeutet] itself, which is rather awkward. 31 But what does applying an empirical concept to an object (especially an outer object) have to do with representing our intuition of that object as temporally determinate? Kant's example of a dog is not especially helpful: \"the concept of a dog designates a rule, according to which my imagination can draw the shape [Gestalt] of a four-footed animal, without being restricted to any particular shape [Gestalt] that experience may have offered me or any possible image [Bild] which I can present in concreto\" (A141/B180). One thing that is notable about this example is that Kant has, in effect, \"mathematized\" the schema of the concept of a dog by thinking of it as a schema for drawing a certain shape in space, albeit an empirically-specified shape rather than a purely geometrical one. He has partially assimilated it to the schema of a geometrical concept. However, I think Kant's example of the schema of the concept <dog>, if thought through more fully, contains the materials to understand better, not only schemata of empirical concepts but mathematical and categorial schemata as well. Subsuming a sensibly given object under the concept <dog> is thinking of that object as a dog. But, as Kant is fully aware, to think of an object as a dog is not merely to think of it as having a certain shape.52 The concept <dog> is not the concept <dog-shaped object>, for an object could be a dog-shaped cat or a dog-shaped pile of wood. A dog is an object with a certain kind of history, a certain kind of life. In an Aristotelian vein, we could say that a dog is a being with a certain nature, one that dictates how it changes and develops over the course of time and in the right environment. The form of the dog is an inner principle of change by which it assimilates nutrients from the environment, 52 If it were, Kant could have saved himself a lot of trouble in the Critique of Teleological Judgment! 32 maintains its internal constitution, grows into maturity, decays, and dies. These are considerations relevant to answering the question \"what is a dog?\" Kant, however, is concerned with the semi-transcendental question, \"what is it to represent something as a dog?\"53 But we can transform these object-oriented answers into answers to the Kantian question by internalizing them within representation: to represent an object as a dog is to represent it as having a certain kind of history determined by an inner principle of change, etc. Thus, in a Kantian vein we could say: representing an object as a dog is representing it as temporally determinate in certain ways (standing in specific temporal relations to its past and future stages). If you are representing something in front of you as having just come into existence and as about to go out of existence then you are not representing it as a dog (you may be representing it as a momentary dog-stage). The schema of an empirical concept like <dog> might, then, plausibly be thought of as a time-determination.54 But in saying all of this we will not yet have explained, or made any more plausible, the idea that schemata for empirical concepts are rules for representing our inner states 53 \"Semi-transcendental\" because transcendental cognition sensu strictu concerns how a priori cognition is possible (see A56/B80). 54 The considerations in this paragraph, and the rest of this section, are similar to the views of Sellars 1976 and Matherne 2015. But whereas Sellars focuses on the case of empirical concepts (and only makes a few remarks on schemata for pure categories), and Matherne is primarily concerned with images rather than schemata, I extend this broadly \"phenomenological\" interpretation to all schemata for all concepts whatsoever. See the following three sections for details. 33 as temporally determinate. Why should representing an object as a dog involve representing my very representation of the dog (a state of mine) as standing in some determinate range of temporal relations, rather than representing the object of that representation (the dog itself) as so standing? To return to a theme of the previous section, time is the form of inner sense; space, the form of outer sense. I take this to mean that temporal content is not \"built into\" intuitions of outer objects. Outer sense intuitions of objects do not represent temporal features merely in virtue of being the kind of representations they are (by contrast, inner sense intuitions represent temporal features solely in virtue of being the kind of representation they are).55 I can represent outer objects as having temporal features but this is not an ultimate representational fact; it stands in need of an explanation, a specification of its ground. We cannot simply say that we do represent the object (the object of an outer sense intuition) as having certain temporal features; we must say what is in virtue of which we are doing so. Kant's answer to this question-in virtue of what are we representing an outer object as temporally determinate?-involves our representing our representation of that object (a state in us) as standing in corresponding temporal relations to other representations (other states in us). In particular, to represent an object as a dog is to represent one's present intuition of it as standing in determinate temporal relations to other representations: actual and merely possible past and future intuitions of the very same object.56 To represent the 55 See A33/B49–50 (quoted above). 56 The idea that representing an object requires representing a relation among the vehicles of representation themselves (intuitions, in this case) may seem baroque, but 34 object as a dog, for instance, is to represent one's present intuition of it as a representation of the very same object as, say, one's previous intuition of it as a puppy, and one's future intuition of it as an older dog. It is, more minimally, also to represent one's current actual intuition as being of the same object as a non-actual but merely possible simultaneous intuition of it from a different spatial perspective.57 If you are representing your current intuition as being of an object that could not be represented from a different perspective, or could not have been represented in the past, or in the future, you are not representing that object as a dog (you may be representing it as your visual image of a dog).58 Kant does not draw out these consequences of his example of the schema for <dog>. In fact, there are reasons he could not have, for his considered view in the third Critique is that representing something as a dog, an organized living thing, involves representing it as having a kind of internal purposive organization not accounted for by the transcendental theory of cognition in the first Critique.59 So there are reasons to think Kant may have chosen a poor example, even by his own lights. But all of the points I have drawn out from <dog> could also have been drawn out from one of Kant's most famous examples, <cinnabar>. The difference is that cinnabar does not undergo (much) internal change and a sample of cinnabar does not need to have any particular past or consider that the natural alternative (simply representing temporal relations among the objects) is not available to Kant, given that time is the form of inner, not outer, sense. 57 This point lies at the heart of Sellars 1976. 58 A similar point is made by Pendlebury 1995, 790. 59 See Critique of Judgment §65, 5:295. 35 future as long as it maintains the same inner material constitution and causal powers that make it cinnabar. The temporal determinacy required to represent cinnabar is thus more flexible (less determinate, one might say)60 than what is required to represent something as a dog. Just as with the case of the dog, we can transpose a purely object-oriented account of what is it to be cinnabar (i.e. to have a certain causal history and causal power) into an account of what it is to represent something as cinnabar. To represent an intuited object as cinnabar is to represent one's present intuition of it as a representation of the same object as possible past intuitions of it, as a representation of the same object as possible experiences in which it passes the tests for mercury oxide, etc. In this section I have reconstructed Kant's reasons for two key claims: Schemaemp: the schemata of empirical concepts are rules for determinately1 representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the intuitions by which empirical objects are given to us. Subsumption Sufficiencyemp: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of an empirical concept (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under that concept. In the next section, I will reconstruct Kant's reasons for parallel claims about geometrical concepts. Intuitions are states of ours that represent objects. In contemporary terms, we can distinguish intuitions as vehicles of representation (states) from the content of those intuitions, which for expository purposes I will take to be their objects (though I am not assuming that objects exhaust the content of intuition). My discussion of empirical 60 Determination1 is gradable (see Section 3 above). 36 schemata will arouse in some readers the suspicion that my account falls afoul of this distinction. For on my account, schemata are determinate1 representations of relations among inner states, representational vehicles. Why, in representing these relations among vehicles do I thereby represent something about the content of those vehicles (their objects)? Why do I represent the contents of these vehicles (their objects) as subsumed1 under the corresponding concept?61 This objection can be raised at every stage in my account of schemata, so it is worth responding to it here at the outset. I think this objection assumes an implausibly strong distinction between representing (relations among) vehicles and representing (relations among) contents. To take a linguistic example, names are vehicles and (let us assume, for the sake of simplicity) their contents are their bearers. If \"Brian\" is a name coined at t1 to refer to some perceptually demonstrated person,62 and \"Alex\" is coined in the same way at t2, in representing that \"Brian\" and \"Alex\" are co-referring terms, I am representing (if we now disquote the names) that Brian/Alex exists at t1 and at t2. I have represented a relation among contents (objects, in this case) by representing a relation among representational vehicles. If, instead, I had represented \"Brian\" (vehicle) as co-referential with a host of possible names coinable through perceptual demonstration from t1 to t2, then I would have represented Brian as existing during this period in virtue of 61 Thanks to Colin McLear for pressing me on this. 62 We may have to build in the assumption that a name coined through a perceptual demonstrative (let \"Brian\" refer to that guy) at a time must apply to an object that exists at that time. Regardless of what fixes are needed, the larger point holds: we can represent relations among contents by representing appropriate relations among vehicles. 37 representing a relation among an actual name (\"Brian\") and merely possible names (vehicles).63 Likewise, if I represent my current intuition of an object as co-referential with possible intuitions during a period of time T, I am representing the object of my intuition as persisting through that period. I am subsuming1 the object of my intuition (its content, in this simplified story) under a concept (<persists through T>). So if the worry is that by representing a relation among the vehicles (intuitions) by which empirical objects are given to me, I am not representing anything about their objects (not adding additional content to my representation of the object), then the objection is based on a tempting fallacy. §5. Mathematical Schemata as Time-determinations64 63 The role of the modalities is complicated here, and this is reflected in the Kant's schemata for modal categories. However, for reasons of space, I leave my account of modal schemata out of this paper. 64 Béatrice Longuenesse emphasizes the role of schemata in the understanding's \"affection\" and thereby \"determination\" of inner sense (Longuenesse 1998, 246). However, Longuenesse never fully clarifies the meaning of \"determination\" here, i.e. the way in which schemata are transcendental time-determinations and how this explains the subsumption of objects under concepts. My account of schemata fills this gap in Longuenesse's reading. But, unlike Longuenesse, I do not, in this paper, give an account of the relation of schemata to logical functions. That must await future work. 38 I noted earlier that Kant's discussion of the schema for <dog> quasi-mathematizes this concept by treating it as the concept of a dog-shaped object. This suggests that Kant will be on stronger grounds in schematizing mathematical concepts. However, the idea that schemata in general are time-determinations faces the obvious objection that mathematical objects (e.g. triangles) are not in time,65 so it is unclear what timedetermination has to do with the possibility of subsumption in mathematics. In the Schematism, Kant uses two arithmetical examples and one geometrical example: [. . .] on the contrary, when I merely think of a number, which may be 5 or 100, this thinking is more the representation of a method for representing in an image a collection [Menge] appropriate to the concept (e.g. a thousand) than [it is] the image itself. (A140/B180) The scheme of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thoughts and designates a rule for the synthesis of the imagination in respect of pure shapes [Gestalten] in space. (A141/B180) [. . .] the pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), however, is number, which is a representation which collects together [zusammenbefasst] the successive addition of unit to (homogeneous) unit [Einem zu Einem]. (A142/B182) This leads some commentators on the Schematism to refer back to Kant's discussion of \"drawing a line in thought\" and \"representing a certain number to myself\" in the A 65 A point of which Kant was well aware; see his letter to Schultz, November 25, 1788 (10:556). 39 Deduction (A102; cf. B154).66 Kant's point in the A Deduction, roughly, is that one cannot draw a line in thought without mentally \"reproducing\" the previously drawn parts of the line.67 In drawing a line, or constructing a triangle in thought, one must not mentally \"lose track\" of the prior moments of one's construction. But if we think through the consequences of that point, we see a structure very similar to the structure I uncovered earlier in empirical schemata. A schema for a mathematical concept allows us to subsume an object under a mathematical concept, for that is what schemata in general do: they make subsumption possible.68 For Kant, there is a close connection between mathematical subsumption and mathematical construction: to subsume an object under the concept <triangle> is to represent it as the result of a possible act of construction.69 This is why the schema of <triangle> is a rule for constructing a triangle, just as the schema of a number n is a rule for generating a collection of n elements (see the passages quoted above). So if we can uncover a structure of temporal determination within the act 66 E.g. Longuensee 1998, 249–257. 67 \"Drawing a line in thought\" is Kant's own phrase but it refers, I take it, to what he elsewhere refers to as construction \"in pure intuition\" (A713/B741). I will continue to use the former expression, however, since I do not have the space in this paper to discuss Kant's complex doctrine of construction in pure intuition. 68 A138/B177. 69 I say \"possible act of construction\" for presumably I can see a figure in a geometrical proof and cognize it as a triangle without myself having to construct it, as long as I represent it as constructible. 40 of constructing the triangle we will have found such a structure in the act of subsuming an object under the concept <triangle>. The canonical construction of a triangle ABC has three parts: (1) using a ruler, construct a line segment AB of arbitrary length; (2) using a compass, construct a circle of arbitrary radius around one endpoint of length l (A); and (3) using a compass, construct another circle with radius l  (where |l – AB| < l < |l + AB|) around the other endpoint (B). Let C be the point where the circles intersect; the sides of the triangle are the line segments AB, BC, and AC. This is represented graphically in Figure I. The straight-forward reading of A102 is that one will not have constructed a circle if, at stage 2, one forgets stage 1 (likewise for stage 3 and stages 2 and 1). But a stronger claim is warranted: one is not constructing a triangle at stage 2 if one is not aware of one's construction of the circle with radius AB that it is part of a construction of a triangle, completing the construction of AB (stage 1) and to be completed by A B A B A B C Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 t Figure I 41 constructing a circle around B (stage 3); one is not constructing a triangle at stage 2 if one is not aware of it as completing stage 1 and to be completed by stage 3; and one is not constructing a triangle at stage 3 unless one is aware that this is the completion of stages 1 and 2, etc. We can represent this graphically as the idea that stage 1 must contain a representation of Figure I as a whole as well as its own place in that process; likewise for the other stages. I have attempted to convey this in Figure II. More precisely, in constructing a triangle one must be conscious at each stage of the construction that one's present constructive act stands in determinate temporal relations to past and future acts of construction. This means that construction involves not only object-directed consciousness (consciousness of the object being constructed) but consciousness of one's own constructive act, consciousness of one's own representations. Only a being capable, at stage 2, of representing that very representation, as part of some larger constructive procedure, could construct a triangle. Construction, in other words, requires self-consciousness: consciousness of one's representations as such.70 70 Consider the following objection: a computer draws a triangle, and the representational content of the state of the computer that corresponds to Stage 1 is causally relevant (it is not erased from working memory) to the representational content of the state of the computer that corresponds to Stage 2, etc. But the computer lacks self-consciousness, let us assume. Has the computer not constructed a triangle? It has not, I would answer. Constructing a triangle is a priori presenting to oneself an object corresponding to the concept (A713/B741), which is cognition (A50/B74) and cognition, according to Kant, requires self-consciousness (B137). The computer may have generated an image of a 42 In the case of mathematical concepts, I take it that it is clearer than in the case of empirical concepts <dog> that what we are representing as temporally determinate is our own representations. This is clear because the object represented (the triangle) is not in time and because it has no being outside our construction of it. The only items here that could be represented as temporally determinate are the representations that make up our complex constructive act.71, 72 triangle, but an image is not a schema (A140/B179). Schemata are products of selfconsciousness (A142/B181), and without schemata mathematical cognition and construction are impossible. A non-self-consciousness machine cannot engage in mathematical construction. 71 One might point to the marks on paper, or lines drawn in the sand, as the relevant objects. Two points about this: (i) lines drawn on paper are not geometrical lines except insofar as they being used as illustrations of a geometrical construction, so the point in the main text still holds; (ii) Kant holds that we can perform constructions without drawing physical figures, \"through mere imagination, in pure intuition\" (A713/B741). 72 This also shows how to put to rest the concern, expressed by some commentators, that the Schematism may be incompatible with the General Remark to the System of Principles (B288–94), where Kant claims that \"in order to understand the possibility of things in accordance with the categories, and thus to establish the objective reality of the latter, we do not merely need intuitions, but always outer intuitions\" (B291). The Schematism concerns the temporal relations among intuitions we must determinately represent in order to subsume the objects of those intuitions under concepts; the General Remark concerns the spatial character of the objects of those intuitions. There is no 43 The rule for constructing a triangle is what Kant identifies as the schema of <triangle>. I have argued that this rule can be understood as a rule for representing the determinate temporal relations among various representations. This explains, I take it, the sense in which even mathematical schemata are time-determinations. They are specifically transcendental time-determinations because they explain the possibility of a priori cognition: a priori construction of a triangle.73 Instead of immediately turning to the case of arithmetical schemata, in the next section I explain how schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding are transcendental time-determinations. In this section I have reconstructed Kant's reasons for two key claims: tension here. 73 See Kant's definition of \"transcendental\" at A56/B80. A B C Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Figure II A BA B A B C A BA B t 44 Schemageo: the schemata of geometrical concepts are rules for determinately1 representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states involved in constructing a corresponding object. Subsumption Sufficiencygeo: subsuming1 an object under the schema of a geometrical concept (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under the concept. In the next section, I will reconstruct Kant's reasons for parallel claims about the categories. §6. Pure Schemata as Time-determinations I have argued that schemata in general are time-determinations, rules for (self)consciously representing one's representations (inner states) as standing in determinate temporal relations. In this section I want to apply this analysis to the primary case of schemata, the schemata of pure concepts of the understanding (categories). Kant's discussion of the schemata of individual categories at A142–5/B182–4 has a recursive structure, insofar as later sets of categories are schematized in terms of previous sets. Consequently, I will discuss the schemata of the categories in the order in which they appear in the Table of Categories itself–quality, quantity, and relation. For reasons of space, I forego discussion of the schemata of modal categories.74 74 The Table of Categories derives, of course, from the Table of Logical Functions of Understanding in Judging (A76–80/B102–106). Consequently, we should expect a relation between schemata and logical functions of judging, which is directly confirmed by Refl. 5933: \"the Schematism shows the conditions under which an appearance is 45 (i) Quantity In my discussion of mathematical schemata earlier, I focused on geometrical schemata to the exclusion of Kant's other main mathematical example, arithmetical schemata for concepts of numbers. I did so because numerical schemata arise in the course of Kant providing schemata for the categories of quantity and thus deserve a separate treatment:75 [. . .] the pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), however, is number, which is a representation that collects together [zusammenbefasst] the successive addition of unit to (homogeneous) unit [Einem zu Einem]. Number is thus nothing other than the unity of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general [überhaupt], through determined in respect of a logical function\" (18:392; cf. A79/B104–5, A94/B128). The most complete attempt to relate the schemata systematically to logical functions of judging is Longuenesse 1998, ch.9–11. Longuenesse does not discuss the modal schemata, however. I tackle modal schemata in work currently in preparation. 75 Immediately before this passage, Kant writes \"the pure image of all magnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense is space; that of all objects of the senses in general is time\" (A142/B182). I am not giving an account of images, so I will not attempt to explain that puzzling claim here. The account of images in Matherne 2015 is in line with my interpretation of schemata, but does not discuss the \"pure images\" of space and time 46 which I generate [erzeuge] time itself in the apprehension of the intuition. (A142/B182)76 It is notable that Kant does not give individual schemata for each of the categories of quantity–<unity>, <plurality>, <totality>–but instead gives a single schema for quantity in general, which he calls \"number\" (Zahl).77 I take this to mean that each of the categories of quantity is to be schematized, and thus given conditions of application to sensible objects, in virtue of its role within a unified act of numbering or counting. The structural moments of such an act of counting are relatively easy to articulate. To assign a whole number n to a sensible object, and thus to think of it as an object with a quantitas, a determinate limited magnitude, is to identify a unit of numbering. This can 76 Kant's terminology here should be remarked. He schematizes the concept \"magnitude\" (Grösse) and identifies it with \"quantitas.\" A magnitude is what Kant elsewhere calls a \"quantum,\" which he defines as follows: \"Quantum is one thing, in which there is quantity [Quantum: est unum, in quo est quantitas]\" (28: 21). So a quantum is an intuitively given object in which there is quantitas, i.e. in which many other objects are also posited (\"quantitas: determination entis, quoties sit positum-Ibid; cf. A163/B204). When the quantum has determinately many parts, when the answer \"how many?\" has a determinate answer (given a specification of a unit-part), then it can be numbered and the schema given in the body of the paper applies. Infinite quantities (quanta with infinite quantitas), like space and time, cannot be numbered; their quantitas exceeds any number, so the schematization I supply below does not apply. See Longuenesse 1998, 264–271, and Sutherland 2004, 427–435, for a discussion of quantum and quantitas. 77 Longuenesse 1998, 253–4, also makes this point. 47 be as simple as picking some part of the object as the unit to be counted or as (relatively) complex as picking some standard length as the unit. 78 I will focus on the simple case of numbering the parts of a thing. First we identify some part of the object as the unit of counting. For instance, given a book we can count either chapters or pages. After that, we successively distinguish and enumerate the parts of the object that are conceptually homogenous with the chosen unit. For instance, having chosen to count the pages in the CPR, we successively distinguish each of the pages of the book. The process ceases when we have counted every part of the object, when no parts remain that were not distinguished and enumerated at previous stages. The structural moments of a whole number n as the quantity of an object, considered as a collection of parts, relative to a choice of unit, is given in Figure III. 78 The reason the second case is more complex is it requires representing the unit as itself something that is quantitatively determinate, so it depends upon a prior act of quantitative determination. For ease of exposition, in the main text I focus on the case of simply counting the parts of an object. 48 As with the geometrical example from section 4 the straightforward way of reading Kant's discussion of reproduction in the A Deduction (A102) is that at each stage of this process one must not \"forget\" the previous stages. In line with my discussion of the geometrical example, though, I think we can say something stronger: in order for any of the stages distinguished in Figure III to be parts of a mental act of counting an object, one must represent the entire process represented in Figure III as well as the relation between one's current stage and the rest of the process. One must represent one's current representation as the enumeration of the kth part, completing the enumeration of the 1 to (k-1)th and to be completed by the (k+1) to nth parts. In so representing the relation of one's current representation to previous and past representations, one is representing one's representation as standing in determinate temporal relations. This is the arithmetical version of a point we saw in geometric construction in the previous section. Represented graphically, it is the requirement that at each stage distinguished in Figure Stage 1 Stage k Stage n Figure III t . . . . . . . . . . 49 III, the whole of Figure III must be represented as well as one's current position within that process. Figure IV is an attempt to illustrate this point. Earlier I said that each of the categories of quantity is to be schematized by its role in this unified act of quantitatively determining a magnitude. In particular, when we specify some part as the unit of counting we subsume that object under the category <unity>; at each stage in the enumeration we subsume the relevant sub-collection enumerated at that stage under <plurality>; and when we complete the process we subsume the whole collection under <totality>, a single object composed of a plurality with a determinate magnitude with respect to the unit (in this case, n).79 Subsuming objects under these 79 In the Prolegomena (4:303) Kant identifies unity, plurality, and totality, with, respectively, measure (Mass), magnitude (Grösse), and the whole (das Ganze). These correspond to the structural moments of the act of enumeration described in the main Stage 1 Stage k Stage n Figure IV t . . . . . . . . . . 50 categories just is representing the intuitions in which they are given as components of this complex self-conscious act of time-determination.80 In this section I have reconstructed Kant's reasons for two key claims: Schemaquant: the schema of the categories of quantity is a rule for determinately1 representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states involved in representing a sensibly given object as a determinate magnitude. Because there is only one schema for three different categories of quality, the individual categories are schematized by their role in the complete schema specified above. Consequently, subsuming an object under the relevant moment or aspect of the complete schema is subsuming it under the corresponding category: text. To represent an object as a unity is to represent it as a measure of enumeration in some larger collection. To represent an object as a plurality is to represent it as a magnitude, as something with quantitas with respect to a unit/measure. But it is not yet to represent it as a totality, for not all of the parts have been enumerated. Representing an object as a totality is representing it as the whole, the place where enumeration ends. If you are enumerating an infinite magnitude (space, time) at every step you are representing it as a plurality without having enumerated all of its parts, i.e. you are not yet representing it as a totality/whole. Representing space and time as totalities requires starting with the whole and then proceeding to the parts/limitations; that involves a different schema. But I am limiting myself to number as the schema of determinate, finite quantitas (see above). 80 This is my detailed specification of what Longuenesse 1998 refers to as the \"understanding [affecting] inner sense'\" (259) in the case of quantity. 51 Subsumption Sufficiencyquant: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of quantity (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under quantity as such (representing it as having a quantity); subsuming an object under a specific moment of that schema is sufficient for subsuming1 it under the corresponding category. In the next section, I will reconstruct Kant's reasons for holding parallel principles about quality. (ii) Quality Kant's initial characterization of the first two categories of quality, <reality> and <negation>, is deceptively simple: Reality, in the pure concept of the understanding, is that which, in general, corresponds [korrespondiert] to a sensation. Thus, [it is] that whose concept contains in itself a being in time, while negation is that whose concept represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of the two occurs, consequently, in the distinction of one and the same time, as either a filled or an empty time. (A143/B183) The distinction Kant here draws between filled and empty time relies on the distinction between form and matter. Time is the form of inner sense (thus, the form of our inner states as intuited by us) but the matter that time \"en-forms\" is the very inner states (representations) we intuit in temporal order. The distinction between <reality> and <negation> is the difference between matter en-formed by time (\"filled\" time) and pure form without en-formed matter (\"empty\" time). The concept of <reality> is to be applied to whatever in objects \"corresponds to\" this representational matter in us, which Kant identifies with \"thing-hood\" (Sachheit) and which he will later be in a position to 52 identify as causal powers in spatiotemporal objects, once he has introduced the categories of relation.81 The difference between the positive presence of some sensory matter in us and its absence (as well as the presence and absence of the corresponding reality in the object) is continuously gradable, not discrete: Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude, by which it can more or less fill the same time, i.e. inner sense in respect of the same representation of an object, until it ceases in nothing (=0 =negatio). Consequently there is a relation and connection between, or, better, a transition from, reality to negation, which makes every reality representable as a quantum [. . .] (A143/B183) 81 \"If one regards this reality as cause (whether of the sensation or of another reality in appearance, e.g., an alteration), then one calls the degree of reality as cause a 'moment,' [. . .] But I touch on this here only in passing, for at present I am not yet dealing with causality\" (A168–9/B210). I take this to mean that we cannot represent the intensive degree of reality in our sensation as caused by a corresponding intensive degree of reality in the affecting object until we have the machinery of the Analogies in place. In this respect, Kant's original statement of the principle of the Anticipations (A166: \"in all appearances sensation and the real, to which it corresponds in the object, have an intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree\") is more precise than its replacement in the B Edition (B207: \"in all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree\"). In the A edition Kant has separated the claim that sensation has intensive magnitude from the further claim that the corresponding object does; in the B edition only the claim about the object is retained. 53 Thus, even if the complete absence of sensory matter is representable, we can still think of the total absence of reality in general as the limit of a process of continuous decrease in reality. What is more, we can think of the absence of a specific reality (corresponding to a specific kind of sensory matter, e.g. redness) as an achieved limit.82 Kant only explicitly gives the schema for quality only in the rest of the paragraph: \"[. . .] the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is precisely this continuous and uniform generation [Erzeugung] of [that reality] in time, as one decreases the sensation over time, which has a determinate degree, until its complete disappearance, or one gradually increases from zero to the magnitude of the sensation\" (A143/B183). Just as with the categories of quality, Kant does not give a different schema for each category of quality (<reality>, <negation>, <limitation>) but gives a single schema, which I take to be the schema for the whole moment of quality. Again, as with quantity, Kant specifies the schema as a single complex mental act (\"this continuous and uniform generation\"). I take it that, in parallel with quantity, the individual categories of quality are schematized insofar as they are identified with structural moments of that complex mental act, so I will proceed to analyze that complex mental act and isolate the relevant moments. The complex mental act is the representation of the gradual diminution of a sensory matter of a particular kind to the limit case of total absence of that kind of sensory 82 I talk about specific realities because I take Kant to be arguing, not only that sensation in general has a degree (one perception can be more intense than other), but that specific kinds of sensation do as well (one perception can be more intense in respect of one quality than another, and less intense in respect of another). 54 matter. Unlike the case of quantity, this mental act does not have discretely separable parts; there are indefinitely many \"degrees\" that separate the presence of a given sensory matter from its total absence (=0). To represent it as having a determinate magnitude we must represent it as generable (possibly generated) from smaller magnitudes: we must represent the sensory matter in us as the limit of some possible continuous process of increasing magnitude, and as the beginning of some possible process of indefinite continuous increase (assuming no sensory reality has an absolute maximum).83, 84 This means that in order to represent our present sensory matter (<reality>) we must selfconsciously represent it as standing in various relations to possible past and future representations: it is the limit of some possible past process of continuous increase, the beginning of some possible future process of continuous increase (<limitation>), and the beginning of some possible future process of continuous diminishment whose limit is its absence (<negation>).85 83 We ourselves do not actively generate the magnitude of sensation, for sensation is the passive result of affection; see Longuenesse 1998, 300. 84 The temporal direction is a heuristic device; we can just as well represent our present sensory matter as the product of a decrease, and the beginning of a further process of decrease. 85 To put this in familiar Humean terms, to represent a given shade of blue as a determinate gradable hue we do not need to actually represent the \"missing shade\" of blue (and then generate the given shade out of it); we must be able to represent that missing shade (and represent the given shade as generated out of it). 55 So, again we have the recursive structure we have seen already in the case of empirical, mathematical, and quantitative schemata: representing the object of an intuition as falling under a category (subsuming the object under the category) is selfconsciously representing that representation as standing in determinate temporal relations to possible past, present, and future representations. In each case, we have the structure of some temporally complex mental act (experiencing an empirical object over time, constructing a geometrical figure, counting), such that every stage in that act must selfconsciously be represented as a stage in an actual or possible such act in order to constitute a stage in an act of that type.86 In this section I have given an account of Kant's reasons for two key claims: Schemaqual: the schema of the categories of quality is a rule for determinately1 representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states involved in representing sensory matter as continuously increasable or decreasable. Because there is only one schema for three different categories of quality, the individual categories are schematized by their role in the complete schema specified above. Consequently, subsuming an object under the relevant moment or aspect of the complete schema is subsuming it under the corresponding category: Subsumption Sufficiencyqual: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of quality (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under quality as such (representing it having a quality); subsuming an object under a specific moment of that schema is sufficient for subsuming1 it under the corresponding category. 86 This is my more detailed specification of what Longuenesse 1998 refers to as \"affection of inner sense by the understanding\" in the categories of quality (298). 56 (iv) Relation Matters are significantly more complicated with the schemata of the categories of relation, for here (for the first time) Kant gives a separate schema for each category. For reasons of space, I will discus only <substance>,87 which Kant schematizes as follows: \"the schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e. the representation of it as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which remains while everything else changes [wechselt]\" (A144/B183). Kant's discussion here is complicated by the fact that he is anticipating a significant amount of material from the Analogies (especially the first Analogy), some of which appears as a parenthetical remark after the quoted sentence. Representing outer objects as \"outer\" (not transcendentally outer but \"empirically\" outer; cf. A373) means representing them not as states of mine but as objects in space that other subjects can access through their states. Kant's argument in the Analogies, which is partly anticipated here, is that we do this by representing those objects as having a temporal order in principle different from the temporal order of the inner states by which those objects are given to us.88 We, 87 The schema of <cause-effect> cannot be satisfactorily discussed here, for the relation of time and modality in that case is especially complicated. I discuss this issue further in work currently in preparation. 88 See B219. The Analogies have spawned a vast literature, to which I cannot hope to do justice here. Two highlights are Guyer 1987, 207–278, and Watkins 2005, 185–229. Whereas Guyer adopts an \"epistemic\" reading of the Analogies, on which they uncover the conditions of our knowledge of objective time (1987, 258–9), Watkins opts for a 57 in effect, externalize time by \"projecting\" it onto outer objects. Time has three structural aspects or \"moments\": unity (there is only one time; all states in time are temporally related), succession (states are ordered by an irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive relation of priority) and simultaneity (some states are neither before nor after one another).89 The unity of time, combined with its successive and simultaneous structure, entail that any two states in time are either simultaneous or successive. Kant's argument in the 1st Analogy is that in order to represent \"outer time\" (the time of the states of outer objects) as unitary we must represent an absolutely persisting subject, substance, of which the states changing in time are mere accidents.90 Kant's task in the Schematism is not to make that argument but to explain what it is in virtue of which we are able to so much as think of an outer object as substance or as an accidental modification of substance (subsumption1) and how it is possible for such \"metaphysical\" reading, on which they uncover the grounds of objective temporal relations obtaining in the first place (2005, 200–1), which itself make our knowledge of objective temporal relations possible. However, I opt for what I call a \"semantic\" reading: the Analogies uncover the conditions of the possibility of so much as determinately representing (determining1) temporal relations among outer objects. (Some remarks in Friedman 1992, 46–7, suggest a similar view.) Given Kant's transcendental idealism, objective time determination1 makes possible objective time determination2, which makes possible objective time determination4 (this is Watkins's point). But I do not have the space to spell this out here. 89 A177/B219. 90 B225. 58 objects to be substances and accidental modifications (subsumption2). We can think of the difference between these tasks as the difference between explaining how it is possible to subsume (in both senses) outer objects under <substance> (Schematism) and arguing that it is necessary to do so (1st Analogy).91 The schema of <substance> relies on the schema of the categories of quality: \"the schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time\" (A144/B183). In order to represent spatial objects as substances we must represent them as having realities, the features in them that correspond to the sensory matter of our representations. This requires the whole complex machinery explored in the previous sub-section. We further represent these objects as substances when we present their reality as persisting at all times, as the ultimate \"substratum\" in virtue of which states of outer objects are temporally determinate with respect to one another. \"Substances,\" Kant writes near the end of the 1st Analogy, \"are the substrate of all time-determination\" (A188/B231).92 I want to make two comments on this. First, in describing substance as the \"substratum\" of time-determination Kant does not mean \"substrate\" in the traditional sense in which it is synonymous with substance (that would result in the tautology that 91 Likewise, the Transcendental Deduction proves the necessity of subsuming (in both senses) sensible objects under categories, while the Schematism explains the possibility of doing so (in both senses). Similar points are made by Pendlebury 1995, 779; Dahlstrom 1984, 41; and Symington 2011, 289. 92 See A183/B226, A185/B229. 59 substances are substances)93 but in the broader sense of \"that which makes possible,\" a sense manifestly present in his description of time (which, as pure sensible form, lacks reality, hence substantiality) as itself a \"substratum\" (B224). Thinking of spatial objects as accidental modifications of absolutely permanent substance is representing this substance as the \"substratum\" of temporal determination because that substance is the background against which temporal determination is representable. Secondly, \"determination\" here once again has the semantic sense of determination1: substance is the \"substratum\" of temporal determination in the sense that it is what make it possible to determinately1 represent states of outer objects as temporally related to one another.94 Kant is not yet concerned with the conditions under which we can know (determine4) the temporal states of objects, nor the conditions under which they can be determined3 (the necessary effect of a cause)-for that requires the categories of <cause-effect> and <reciprocal action> (which come next in Kant's discussion)-nor is he yet concerned (in 93 The non-tautologous claim, which Kant does make in the Schematism, and for which he argues in the Analogies, is that the persistent (substance) is the \"substratum\" in which that which changes (wechselt) (accidents) inhere. 94 \"All appearances are in time, in which, as substratum (as persistent form of inner intuition), both simultaneity as well as succession can alone be represented. The time, therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does not change; since it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be represented only as determinations of it\" (B224–5). See also A186/B229 (\"everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time\") and A188/B231 (\"it is this very thing that persists that makes possible the representation of the transition from one state into another\"). 60 the Schematism) with the conditions under which states in space acquire determinate2 temporal relations, though all of these notions of determination will play a role in Kant's complete story (especially the second and the third Analogy). He is concerned, in the schema of <substance>, with the conditions under which we can subsume1 outer objects under determinate concepts of their temporal relations, i.e. the conditions under which it is possible to determinately represent (determine1) temporal relations in space. Yet again, in the schema of <substance>, we have the structure of reflexive selfconscious temporality that we have seen in the other cases. To represent an object as a substance it to represent it as possessing a reality (corresponding to the sensory matter in my representations) that is present at all times. This means that it is the very same substance that has been encountered in the past and will be re-encountered in the future. Obviously, to represent it as present at all times I do not need to have ever encountered it before or to ever encounter it again; I need only represent it as possibly encountered in the past and possibly encountered in the future. I also need to represent it as possibly encountered in the present, and not merely for the trivial reason that in representing it as actually encountered now I trivially represent it as possibly encountered now; it is because I must represent it as a persisting object in space that could have been represented by me in different ways now, e.g. that could have been intuited from a different spatial vantage point. In representing it as possibly encountered in the past and possibly to be re-encountered in the future I am, for reasons parallel to those given in Section 4, representing my current representation of it as related to possible and actual past and future representations. In other words, I am representing it as determinately temporally related to possible past and future representations. It is something that was 61 not encountered in the past but could have been, that will be encountered in the future under certain conditions, etc. Just as we \"transposed into representation\" the Aristotelian considerations about the possible life of a dog, we can transpose purely object-oriented considerations about the possible spatiotemporal trajectory of a substance into considerations about possible and actual past and future representations that would be representations of the same substance. Just as in the other cases, we have a relatively simple account of the mental act of representing an object under <substance> (thinking of it as persisting at all times) and then we have the more complex structure in which that structure is, so to speak, embedded in every one of its own stages. More precisely, for any stage in the cognition of a substance to be a state in such a cognitive act, one must be self-consciously representing that stage as a determinate stage in a sequence of possible and actual past, simultaneous, and future experiences of the same object.95 If one's representation of the object has this complicated, recursive temporal structure, then one has succeeded in subsuming the object under the category <substance>. In this section I have given an account of Kant's reasons for two key claims: Schemasub: the schema of <substance> is a rule for determinately1 representing the temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states by which a temporally persistent object is given to us. 95 This is my detailed specification of what Longuenesse 1998 refers to as the \"understanding affecting inner sense'\" (332) in the case of <substance>. 62 Subsumption Sufficiencysub: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of <substance> (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 the object under that concept. In concluding Part One, I hope to have established, for each of the kinds of concepts considered here and their associated schemata: Schema: the schema of a concept is a rule for determinately1 representing the temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, inner states by which an object is given to us. Subsumption Sufficiency: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of a concept is sufficient to subsume1 it under that concept. My argument for this principle has been by cases. In my defense, this is precisely how Kant proceeds in the Schematism: he provides schemata for the categories, case by case. So the argument for Subsumption Sufficiency in its full generality will be incomplete until we have explained how each of the remaining categories (<cause-effect>, <reciprocal action>, and the modal categories) are transcendental time-determinations for which Subsumption Sufficiency holds. For reasons of space I cannot do that here, but I hope that it is reasonably clear how my account can be extended to the remaining categories. Part Two §7. Homogeneity The ultimate aim of the Schematism, I have argued, is to explain the possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under categories (to answer Q2 from the Introduction). 63 Combined with Subsumption Sufficiency, which I have argued for at length, Subsumption Link has the effect of reducing this problem to the problem of subsuming2 objects under schemata. In this section and the next I will reconstruct Kant's explanation of why subsumption2 of objects under schemata is possible, the Real Possibility premise from the Introduction. This completes Kant's explanation of why subsumption2 of objects under categories is possible, his answer to Q2. Kant begins the Schematism with a humble example meant to illustrate the \"homogeneity\" between objects and the concepts under which they are subsumed: In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the former must be homogenous [gleichartig] with the representation of the latter, i.e. the concept must contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed, for that is what the expression \"an object is contained under a concept\" means [bedeutet]. Thus the empirical concept of a plate is homogenous with the pure geometrical [concept] of a circle, in that the roundness that is thought in the former can be intuited in the latter.96 (A137/B176) Since we are concerned in this section with, finally, explaining subsumption2 let us assume that is what Kant has in mind by \"subsumption\" in this passage.97 96 \"So hat der empirische Begriff eines Tellers mit dem reinen geometrischen eines Zirkels Gleichartigkeit, indem die Rundung, die in dem ersteren gedacht wird, sich im letzteren anschauen lässt.\" 97 In fact, the difference between subsumption1 and subsumption2 is already implicitly contained in the passage itself. When Kant writes \"that is what the expression 'an object is contained under a concept' means [Au's emphasis]\" he is talking about subsumption1: 64 This passage bears the mark of having been hastily written. First of all, the syntax in the second sentence is confused. To what does \"the latter\" (letzteren) refer? Grammatically, the natural answer is \"the pure geometric [concept] of a circle,\" but this makes little sense. Concepts cannot be intuited; what can be intuited are the objects that fall under concepts, so we might read \"the latter\" (letzteren) as referring to \"a circle.\"98 But, philosophically, this makes little sense: Kant would then be explaining the subsumption of a purely geometric circle (the object of the pure geometrical concept of a circle) under the empirical concept of a plate. More plausible is Hans Vaihinger's suggestion to reverse \"the former\" and \"the latter\": \"in that the roundness, that is thought in the latter can be intuited in the former.\"99 But even that is unsatisfactory, for an when I say that an object is contained under a concept, I am subsuming1 it under that concept (that is what the expression means), but I may be doing so incorrectly (it may not be subsumed2 or even subsumable2 under that concept). The meaning of the sentence \"an object is contained under a concept\" does not guarantee that the sentence is true (that the object is contained/subsumed2 under that concept). So here, at the very beginning of the Schematism, we have an implicit difference between thinking that an object falls under a concept (subsumption1) and the fact that object does fall under that concept (subsumption2). 98 This is even more awkward in German, because \"a circle\" (eines Zirkels) is in the genitive. But an awkward reading is preferable to an incoherent one, on which Kant is saying that the concept of a circle can be intuited. 99 \"indem die Runding, die in dem letzteren gedacht wird, sich im ersteren anschauen lässt\" (Vaihinger 1900, 458). Kemp Smith follows Vaihinger's reading in his translation 65 empirical concept like <plate> can no more be intuited than a pure geometrical concept! But the problems with this passage do not stop there. In the context of the first sentence, it is clear that Kant is here interested in the homogeneity of (representations of) objects and the concepts under which they are to be subsumed2. But, taken at grammatical face value, and even given Vaihinger's proposed reading, Kant explicates his example, in the second sentence, in terms of the homogeneity of two concepts: the empirical concept <plate> and the pure geometric concept <circle>. I think the best way to make Kant's example make sense, both within his own theory and specifically as an example of object subsumption2, is to read him as talking about the homogeneity between the intuition of a round object, an object subsumed2 under the empirical concept <plate>, and the pure geometric concept <circle>. So the second sentence might be rendered more perspicuously (albeit with some violence to the text) as follows: \"thus the empirical representation [rather than concept] of a plate has homogeneity with the pure geometrical [concept] of a circle, in that the roundness that is thought in the latter [the concept <circle>] can be intuited in the former [the empirical representation].\" The object is homogeneous, specifically, with one mark of <round>, one of the marks of <plate> (this is how I read Kant's reference to the \"roundness that is thought\" in the empirical concept of a plate). This example relies on there being something that can be intuited in the object (its roundness) that is also thought in a concept (<round>). The possibility of the (Kant 1909, 180); Timmerman notes Vaihinger's reading without endorsing it (Kant 1998b, 239); the issue goes unremarked by Adickes (Kant 1889, 173) and Guyer & Wood (Kant 1998a, 271). 66 subsumption2 of the object (the plate) under the concept (<round>) consists in the possibility of that very same feature being intuitable in the object and represented by the concept. Or, to put the point at a slightly higher level of generality, there are intuitable features of objects that are also represented by concepts. It is notable that Kant takes this kind of homogeneity to stand in need of no further explanation; we do not need an explanation of the subsumption2 of a round object under <round>. Instead, he uses it to motivate the search for a similar kind of homogeneity, a homogeneity between objects and categories, which ultimately is revealed to be a homogeneity between objects and schemata. The reason that Kant can take such homogeneity (between roundness in the intuited object and <round>) to be unproblematic is that the feature in question (roundness) is a feature of objects purely qua intuited.100 Roundness, after all, is a spatial feature, that is to say, a specification of the form of outer objects in general (space). I will call such features of objects intuitive features. 101 A feature F is an intuitive feature of outer (inner) 100 Hence I am not bothered by the fact that Kant equates the subsumption of an object under a concept with the homogeneity of the representation of the former with the latter (see A137/B176 quoted above). The relevant representation of an object is an intuition, and I am talking about features of objects solely qua intuited. So in this case, there is an especially close connection between the object and our representation of it. 101 What I call \"intuitive features\" corresponds to what Smit 2000 calls \"intuitive marks\". Smit's idea is that \"marks\" (partial grounds of cognition) can be either intuitively or discursive. Intuitive marks are singular features of objects, now referred to as tropes. Discursive marks are general representations of what is common to those intuitive marks. 67 objects just in case F is a determinate of some determinable D, where outer (inner) objects have D solely in virtue of being objects of outer (inner) intuition.102 For instance, roundness is an intuitive feature of outer objects because it is a determinate of shaped, and shaped is a determinable that objects have solely in virtue of being objects of outer intuition. Likewise, occurring before is an intuitive relational feature of inner objects, because it is a determinable of being successive, and being successive is a determinable that objects have in solely in virtue of being objects of inner intuition.103 So the real possibility of an intuitable object with an intuitive feature being subsumed2 under the concept of such a feature is not problematic. This is why Kant writes, a few lines later: \"In all other sciences, where the concepts, through which the object in general is thought, For instance, the roundness of the plate is an intuitive mark, while <round> is a discursive mark. Kant spells this out in a Reflexion: \"A mark is a partial representation (which), as such (is a ground of cognition). It is either intuitive (a synthetic part): a part of intuition, or discursive: a part of a concept, which is an analytic ground of cognition\" (Refl. 2286, 16:299–300; see Smit 2000, 254–9). Whereas Smit characterizes intuitive marks as marks \"found\" in space and time, I impose a more informative criterion: they must be determinates of a determinable grounded in the very nature of the form of the relevant faculty (outer sense or inner sense). 102 I am not assuming that determinates are fully determinate, but merely that they are more determinate that determinables. E.g. round is more determinate than shaped, but it is not as fully determinate as circular. 103 Chipman 1971 is after something similar with his talk of \"elementary sensory components\" (39). 68 are not so different and heterogenous [heterogen] from those which represent the object in concreto, as it is given, it is unnecessary to offer a special discussion of the application of the former to the latter\" (A138/B177). Kant is making the simplifying assumption that in sciences other than metaphysics, concepts are concepts of intuitive features, and thus there is no deep problem in explaining how the subsumption2 of objects under such concepts is possible. His considered view about \"other sciences\" is, of course, significantly more complex than this.104 I have constructed some machinery for explaining the subsumption1 of objects under categories but we can apply this machinery to give an easy explanation of the subsumption2 of objects under empirical concepts. In §4 I specified the schemata of empirical concepts. These will involve both intuitive features of objects and complex temporal relations among the intuitions by which objects are given to us. But these temporal relations are themselves intuitive features: they are determinate specifications 104 Kant's considered view is that all sciences, in the strict sense, contain an a priori part, in which a priori concepts (the categories) are applied to sensible objects. The paradigm example of this is the pure part of natural science, given in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The subsumption2 of objects under the a priori concepts involved in pure natural science does, of course, stand in need of explanation; this is why the CPR explains not only the possibility of metaphysics, but also of natural science (B17, A171-2/B213). However, even on Kant's considered view, a version of his A138/B177 point holds: the subsumption2 that primarily stands in need of explanation in other sciences is the subsumption2 he is about to explain, the subsumption2 of objects under categories. 69 of the determinable form of inner states in general (time). But my articulation of the schema of the empirical concept <dog> (Kant's example) made use of a relation among intuitions that, some readers will object, is not an intuitive feature: the relation of two intuitions co-referring, i.e. being intuitions of one and the same object. Is co-reference an intuitive feature? Solely in virtue of being intuitions (whether of outer or inner sense), intuitions have objects. As such, intuitions can have the same or different objects. This means that the very form of intuition, regardless of whether it is outer or inner, grounds a determinable relational feature having the same or different objects, of which one determinate is having the same object. By the definition of intuitive feature, it follows that having the same object is an intuitive relational feature of intuitions. Some readers will remain skeptical about whether having the same object is an intuitive relational feature of intuitions; I address that skepticism in the next section. The schemata of empirical concepts represent intuitive features of the representations by which empirical objects are given to us: intuitive temporal relations and relations of co-reference. So there is no difficulty in explaining how subsuming2 sensible objects under these schemata is possible; sensible objects can stand in these relations solely in virtue of being objects of intuition.105 Given Subsumption Sufficiencyemp (see §4) and Subsumption Link, it follows that subsuming2 objects under those empirical concepts is 105 Readers might object: schemata represent intuitive relational features of representations, not of objects (e.g. co-reference is a relation of intuitins, not of their objects). Why is subsuming (in either sense) the representations under the schemata sufficient to subsume the objects? For the answer to this question see my discussion on p. 35–36. 70 really possible. Geometric schemata (see §5) represent spatial features of their objects as well as temporal relations among the stages of the procedure by which the object is constructed. But the temporal relations they represent (stage 1 is before stage 2, which is before stage 3; see Figure II) are intuitive features: determinate specifications of determinable features objects have solely in virtue of being intuited. The very form of time determines that inner states stand in an asymmetric relation of succession (A31/B47), so in representing the determinate temporal relations among the parts of a constructive procedure, a geometric schema is not representing anything more than intuitive relational features.106 Given Subsumption Sufficiency (see §6) and Subsumption Linkgeo, it follows 106 It might seem that, on my account, schemata represent more than merely temporal relations, unproblematically allowed for by the very form of time (succession) for I spoke of stages of a constructive procedure as \"completing one another\" and \"to be completed by another.\" This kind of language might suggest that schemata represent something like teleological relations among our representations, and teleological relations are definitely not what I have called \"intuitive features.\" But the \"completion\" language was not meant to connote teleology, but, instead, self-referentiality: to be constructing a triangle at stage 2, one must self-consciously represent one's current representation as part of a larger constructive procedure, composed of a prior stage 1, and a later stage 2. This does not require that, in any problematic sense, stage 1 is \"for the sake of\" stage 2, or stage 2 \"for the sake of\" stage 3, but only that stage 1 is only stage 1 of a construction if it is followed by stage 2, etc. Since the relations thus 71 that subsuming2 objects under these empirical concepts is really possible. What is problematic, what the entire machinery of schemata is designed to explain, is the real possibility of a sensible object being subsumed2 under a concept that is not merely a concept of some feature that is a specification of the form of intuitiable objects in general. In the next section I complete that explanation. §8. Real Possibility Immediately after the plate example, Kant writes: Now pure concepts of the understanding, however, in comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogenous [ungleichartig] and can never be encountered in any intuition. (A137/B176) I take this to mean that categories are not concepts of intuitive features, because they are not concepts of features that are specifications of the form of intuitable objects as such (unlike <round> or <occurs before>). Kant goes on: Now it is clear that there must be a third [thing], which is homogenous with the category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other, and which makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet, on the one hand, intellectual, and, on the other, sensible. Such [a representation] is the transcendental schema. (A138/B177) represented among our representations are purely temporal relations, the unproblematic \"homogeneity\" of the schema with its object is secured. 72 The question now is how to understand the homogeneity of a schema with, on the one hand, the category, and, on the other, a sensible object. With respect to the former, Kant is not especially helpful: \"now a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a priori\" (A138/B177). But since all schemata are universal a priori rules this does not explain why a schema is homogenous specifically with the category of which it is the schema. However, we already have at hand an account of the homogeneity, specifically, of schemata and the categories that they schematize: Subsumption Sufficiency. Subusming1 an object under a schema is sufficient for subsuming1 it under the corresponding concept. Combined with Subsumption Link, this entails that explaining the possibility of subsuming2 an object under a category reduces to the more tractable problem of explaining the possibility of subsuming2 it under the corresponding schema. So the deeper issue is the homogeneity of objects and schemata. On exactly this point, Kant writes: [the schema] is, on the other hand, homogenous with the appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to appearances will be possible by means of the transcendental timedetermination, which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, makes the subsumption of the latter under the former possible. (A138–9/B177–8) Drawing on the example of the plate and my account of schemata as transcendental timedeterminations from Part One, a schema will be \"homogenous\" with sensible objects if the temporal relations determinately1 represented in the schema are specifications of the relevant form of intuition itself: time. If they are, then the content of the schema will 73 stand to intuitable features in the same unproblematic relation that <round> stands to roundness in objects. I will first consider the schema of quantity. Referring back to Figure IV, the schema of a determinate magnitude represents temporal relations among individual stages of a process of enumeration, individual representational of acts of identifying parts in a collection (the collection being enumerated). These temporal relations are what I have called \"intuitive features\": relations of before and after. Earlier stages of the enumeration are \"completed\" by later stages: the kth stage is only the kth stage of the enumeration of a collection of n objects if it follows previous stages of enumerating 1 . . . (k-1)th parts and is followed by later stages of enumerating the (k+1)th . . . nth parts and the subject of enumeration is self-consciously aware of these temporal relations. Again, I take these temporal relations to be intuitive features unproblematically homogenous with their conceptual representation by the relevant schema. Given Subsumption Sufficiencyemp (see §4) and Subsumption Link, it follows that subsuming2 objects under theses concepts is possible. This explains why it is possible to subsume2 objects under quantitative schemata. Without repeating my whole account of the schema of quality we can see relatively easily why it refers only to intuitive features of objects and our representations of them. The schema of quality is the self-conscious representation of the matter of one's intuition, its sensory content, as being continuously decreasable to its total absence (=0) and arbitrarily increasable. This requires representing one's intuition of the object as standing in a certain relation to possible past and future intuitions, namely the relation of having a greater or lesser degree of that sensory reality in them. The temporal relations 74 are clearly what I have called \"intuitive features\" and thus generate no inhomogeneity and no problem of subsumption2. But the specifically sensory relations of possessing more or less of a particular kind of sensory matter are also (relational) intuitive features. Solely in virtue of being objects of inner sense, our inner states possess a matter. That is to say, it follows from the form of inner sense that inner states possess matter (but of course it does not follow which matter they possess). Likewise, it follows from the very form of space that intuited objects have some shape or other, but not which fully determinate shape they possess. And just as it follows from the very form of space that one spatial object can be larger than another, and this relation of largeness is continuously gradable (there is no \"next largest\" object), it follows from the form of inner sense that the sensory matter in one state can be \"greater\" than the sensory matter in another state and that this relation of \"greater\" is continuously gradable. Thus, in representing relations of continuous gradability in the sensory content of our inner states, the schema of <reality> represents exclusively features that objects and the sensory states by which they are given are able to possess solely in virtue of the form of our (inner) intuition. Again, I take these to be intuitive features unproblematically homogenous with their relevant schemata. This explains why it is possible to subsume2 objects under qualitative schemata. The schemata of geometrical, quantitative, and qualitative concepts are, to some extent, the easy case for Kant's theory for these are concepts of features objects have solely qua intuited: they are spatial (geometry), denumerable (quantitative), and possess continuous degrees of sensory content (qualitative). The hard case for Kant will be the categories of relation. Since in Section 6 I only explained the schema of <substance> I 75 will here limit myself to explaining why the subsumption2 of sensible objects under that schema is unproblematic. I hope it will be clear to the reader how to extend this account to the other relational schemata (<cause-effect>, <reciprocal action>). Recall the schema that Kant gives for <substance>: \"the schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, that is, the representation of it as the substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which therefore remains when everything else changes [wechselt]\" (A144/B183). As I observed in §6, <substance> is explicitly schematized in terms of a previous category, <reality>. In the context of explaining the subsumption2 of objects under schemata, this recursive structure takes on an added significance, for it means that, if it is explicable why objects can be subsumed2 under the schema of <reality> then, to the extent that <substance> is schematized in terms of <reality>, to that extent subsumption under <substance> is also explicable. But there is more to the schema of <substance> than merely this reference back to <reality>. Representing an object of intuition as a substance also involves representing it as permanently present, as existing at all times. This means representing that past and future intuitions, at any time, might be intuitions of the very same objects. This requires representing two kinds of relations: (i) purely temporal relations among possible and actual intuitions (before, after) at any time, and (ii) the relation of co-referring, of being intuitions of one and the same object. I take it that it is now clear that (i) involves what I have been calling \"intuitive features,\" features that objects can possess solely in virtue of the form of intuition. Solely in virtue of the form of inner sense, the states (intuitions) by which objects are given to us can be before, after, and simultaneous with one another. So the subsumption2 of our representations of objects under (i) is unproblematic. It calls for 76 no additional explanation because it involves no \"heterogeneity\" between a sensible object and an intellectual concept. In the previous section I argued that co-reference is also an intuitive relational features of intuitions. Since the schema of <substance> involves representing reality and the possibility of co-referring intuitions occurring at any time, and all of these are either features, the subsumpion2 of which has already been explained, or intuitive features (or so I have argued), I conclude that the real possibility of subsuming2 an object under the schema of <substance> stands in no need of further explanation. By Subsumpion Sufficiencysub and Sumbsumption Link it follows that the real possibility of subsuming2 a sensible object under <substance> is also thereby explained. I anticipate some resistance to the claim that co-reference is an intuitive feature of intuitions. In particular, some readers will object that this is incompatible with Kant's procedure in the Analogies, in which he argues that in order to represent a temporal order in spatial objects distinct from the subjective temporal order of our perceptions of them, we must use the relational categories of <substance-accident>, <cause-effect>, and <reciprocal action>.107 But this does not conflict with my interpretation at all. By claiming that co-reference is an intuitive relational feature of intuitions I am claiming, not that we can represent it without concepts (of course we cannot), but that the subsumption2 relation between two co-referring intuitions and <co-reference> requires no further explanation. Perhaps the worry, then, is not that my view is incompatible with the Analogies, but that it evacuates them of any significance, for it might seem that all of 107 See Tolley 2017 for a discussion of the distinction between intuition and perception (Wahrnehmung). For the sake of space, I will not go into that difference here. 77 the significant work has already been done in the Schematism, on my reading. But I do not think this correct either. On my reading, the role of the Schematism is to explain how it is really possible for sensible objects to be subsumed2 under the categories, including the relational categories. The role of the Analogies is to argue that it is necessary to subsume2 sensible outer objects under the relational categories in order to represent them as standing in temporal relations in principle distinct from the temporal relations of our perceptions of them. Thus, on my reading, a substantial difference between these two sections remains. Now is also perhaps the time to respond to an objection that some readers will have wanted to raise since the Introduction. I have explained why subsumption1 and subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories is possible, namely, by means of subsumption1 and subsumption2 of sensible objects under schemata. But why doesn't the same problem arise at the level of schemata? Don't we need a \"third\" representation to mediate the subsumption of sensible objects under schemata (thus generating an infinite regress)? No, I claim, because the source of the \"need\" for schemata was not a general demand for a mediating representation between sensible objects and representations under which they are subsumed (in either sense); it was the fact that categories are not homogenous with sensible objects. Kant then provides schemata for empirical concepts and mathematical concepts. While these concepts are not merely concepts of intuitive features, it is relatively easy to schematize them in terms of intuitive features. But no schema or other mediating representation is required or even possible for the subsumption (in either sense) of a sensible object with an intuitive feature under the concept of that intuitive feature (e.g. the roundness of the plate and <round>). Here we 78 hit explanatory bedrock: our capacity to think of an object with an intuitive feature under a concept of that feature (to subsume1 it) and the real possibility of such an object falling under such a concept (its being subsumed2).108 I have argued that the problem of the subsumption2 of categories under schemata ultimately reduces to the problem of subsuming2 them under schemata specified in terms of sensible features. That is to say, it reduces to no problem whatsoever. §9. Conclusion I began with what I take to be the uncontroversial, if somewhat unfamiliar, truth that: Subsumption Link: if subsuming1 an object under a concept F is sufficient to subsume1 that very object under a concept F* then explaining the real possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under F is sufficient to explain the real possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under F*. 108 With respect to subsumption1 I take Kant's point in the immediately preceding section, \"On the transcendental power of judgment\" to be that the capacity to (reliably) subsume1 sensible objects under concepts of their intuitive features is the properly functioning power of judgment itself, and stands in need of no further explanation. For instance, a student who cannot reliably subsume1 sensible objects under concepts of their intuitive features cannot be instructed by further rules (which, by hypothesis, he would not reliably apply) but only by examples, and if the power of judgment is not functioning (if the student lacks \"mother wit\") then even these will not succeed. See A133–4/B173– 4. 79 The idea was this: if I can prove the real possibility of sensible objects instantiating F (being subsumed2 under F) then I can prove the real possibility of the truth of the thought Fx (for at least some sensible objects). But if the thought that Fx is sufficient for the thought that F*x (subsuming1 x under F is sufficient for subsuming1 x under F*) then by proving the real possibility that Fx I have thereby proved the real possibility that F*x. Then I reconstructed Kant's argument for the following claim, with respect to various categories and their schemata: Subsumption Sufficiency: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under a schema is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under the corresponding category. Finally, I argued that, with respect to that very same range of schemata: Real Possibility: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under schemata. From these three principles it follows that: Conclusion: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories. Since, on my reading, the primary aim of the Schematism is precisely to explain the real possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under categories, it follows that, if we grant Kant the three previous premises (one of which, I have argued, is nearly trivial) then the Schematism succeeds. 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{"text": "Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 1 2013 Promoting What We Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things Robert Tilley Catholic Institute of Sydney, rtilley@cis.catholic.edu.au Follow this and additional works at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity ISSN: 1839-0366 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING This material has been copied and communicated to you by or on behalf of the University of Notre Dame Australia pursuant to part VB of the Copyright Act 1969 (the Act). The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. This Article is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact researchonline@nd.edu.au. Recommended Citation Tilley, Robert (2013) \"Promoting What We Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things,\" Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 1. Available at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 Promoting What We Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things Abstract Of increasing influence in the Australian Catholic Church is the kind of orthodoxy associated with American conservatism in which the defence of life and family against the depredations of cultural liberalism is tied to the defence of the free market and the promotion of economic liberalism. The clearest example of this thinking being the magazine First Things, a magazine with great influence both in American and in Australia. The argument of this paper is that there is an organic and determinative link between economy and culture such that economic liberalism will inevitably give rise to, and promote, cultural liberalism. In short, that if the Church identifies herself with the promotion of economic liberalism she will find herself promoting that which she rightly opposes, namely what John Paul II referred to as the culture of death. This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/ solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 1 Promoting what we Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things Robert Tilley In 2008 as the Global Financial Crisis (the GFC as it has come popularly to be known) took hold there was what was seen to be a resurgence of interest in the Marxist critique of capitalism 1 , albeit by reference to capitalism's more recent manifestations in neo-liberal thought and hyper-consumerism. 2 As might be expected it was a rather truncated form of Marxist theory that enjoyed a new popularity, and although one could be pedantic as to whether or not Marx was being employed in a way that did justice to his thinking, nevertheless it was generally recognised that his writings had something important to say to the situation in which the world found itself. If there is one aspect to Marx's thought that resonates with those looking for a critique of our modern global economy it is that to do with commodification, a process in which the value of everything becomes increasingly defined by way of market evaluation. Again, purists might quibble with the appropriation of Marx on this score, for missing from much of the discussion is the understanding that for Marx the process of commodification proper revolves around the abstraction of labour from the labourer in order to create surplus value for the employer. But that to one side it is certainly true that commodification became a central element in Marx's thought for it related to the way in which all value and meaning (including the meaning and value of private property) had become transformed into what we would call market value. It is not too difficult to see why it was that this part of Marx's thinking should have become popular, not least because with the GFC it seemed as if the lives of many had become worthless for, having lost their livelihood, their superannuation, even their houses and businesses, they had become expendable. People's lives became little more than integers on the stock market board, the rise and fall of their personal value and meaning being commensurate with the rise and fall of the market. Succinctly put, everything was tied to the meaning of the markets. But what was lacking in many of the discussions on this matter was what was essential to Marxist thought, namely the relationship between the nature of the 1 The meaning of the term 'capitalism' can differ according to the school one is listening to, but one element appears generally to be agreed upon, and this is the freeing up of capital such that it can become something that multiplies itself, which is to say that it is not bound to an objective, concrete locus of value. The issue in Marxist and other schools of economic philosophy is how self-fructifying capital relates to the wider society. In this essay I use terms as they are commonly used, especially in Institute for Religion and Public Life journal First Things (http://www.firstthings.com), so that 'free market' theory becomes something of a synonym for capitalism. Some of us would question this identification and argue that capitalism is corrosive of truly free markets as it is of private property, the family, and things religious, but for the purposes of this article those objections have been put to one side. When I use the term 'economic liberalism' it refers to the way in which neo-liberal theory, capitalism, and the rolling back of government 'interference' in the market are all entwined. We will return to this matter of definition in the second part of this series. 2 As Tristram Hunt in his review of Terry Eagleton's book Why Marx was Right (see below) in the Observer (29/5/11) put it, there has been a \"growing appreciation for Marx's predictions of globalisation, rampant capitalism, and the instability of international finance. As the Times put it in the middle of the 2008 crash: 'He's back'.\" Eric Hobsbawm noted the same thing in his essay 'Marx Today' in his book How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism (London, Little, Brown, 2011). Hobsbawm writes that it was, in fact, the Capitalists and not the Socialists who rediscovered Marx, and he cites by way of personal example the way in which United Airlines commissioned him to write a piece on the Communist Manifesto, and how George Soros no less requested instruction on Marx (5-6). 1 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 2 economy and the consciousness that could be said to define the culture in which that economy operates, a subject to which we will return. There is much that would need to be qualified in what has been said above, but I think it true to say that Marx or no Marx there has been a growth in many and varied quarters as to the problem of commodification and its effects on society, and this in respect of topics as wide ranging as the art world, the ecology (notably with anthropogenic climate change), the integrity of the local community, the privitisation of public utilities, the treatment of refugees, and most everything else in-between. The general sentiment has been that in certain matters Marx was right, that he had traced out the lineaments of the process of commodification and that in our day this process has reached something of its apogee. But what is significant about this line of argument is what is not mentioned. And what is not mentioned is something that one might have thought would prove the clinching argument in respect of the commodification of all areas of life; and this has to do with the subject of abortion and the concomitant use of embryonic and foetal stem cells for the hoped for development of health cures, as well as for industrial aids in the development of things like better flavour enhancers for soft-drinks. What's more, abortion is defended on the lines of individual choice – hence the popular descriptor 'pro-choice' – and choice is of the essence of a consumer society especially in contemporary capitalism. 3 Furthermore, the use of embryonic and foetal stem cells in health and industrial development to make better consumer products would seem to be the height of commodification, for human life itself is now very much a commodity (and a means to better commodities). If anything proved Marx right then it would seem abortion does, and yet abortion (and its accoutrements) is rarely if ever mentioned in treatments on Marxist theory in the last few decades. By way of example take the popular presentations of Marxist theory by Peter Singer and Terry Eagleton in which although they discuss commodification (it would be difficult not to) they do not mention abortion. 4 There is something of a blind spot here, which is to say an ideological 'blank' upon which, and around which, the popular discourse concerning Marxism revolves, both before the GFC and after. But here's the thing, something similar attends more recent thinking in Christian 3 It is possibly for this very reason that in January 2013 Planned Parenthood in America launched a YouTube video advertisement calling for the end of the use of labels such as 'pro-choice'. See the discussion on the Atlantic magazine's website in response to the article (January 23, 2013) 'The End of Pro-Choice: Will 'No Labels' Really Help the Abortion Debate?'. See too Jeffrey Tobin 'Daughters of Texas: the fight for abortion rights' The New Yorker August 5, 2013). Tobin notes how it has been pointed out that Planned Parenthood is reticent in mentioning its provision of abortions. \"In January [2013]\" writes Tobin, \"Planned Parenthood released a video in response to polling data that showed a distaste for labels – 'pro-choice' or 'pro-life'\" (27). It is perhaps pertinent that in the reprint of Marshall McLuhan's first major work, The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man (London, Duckworth Overlook, 2011, fp. 1951), McLuhan reproduces an advertisement for Sun Oil from 5/1/1948 that has the slogan: \"There is only one freedom. Freedom of Choice' (115). 4 Peter Singer Marx: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, OUP, 1980. Singer doesn't engage all that much with Marx on commodification, which I would have thought central to Marx's argument, only a few short pages on how it relates to exchange value and alienation (67-71). And Terry Eagleton Why Marx was Right, New Haven, Yale Uni. Pr., 2011. It might be objected that given the scope of these books it is unfair to expect anything like a thorough treatment of Marx and global capitalism as a consumer-market economy, however both books, and others like them, affect to be popular presentations in light of contemporary concerns. That is, they are setting out to show something of the relevance of Marx to the world in which the reader finds him or herself. I would think that how commodification had reached something of its apogee in abortion (and its accoutrements) might therefore be relevant to why Marx 'was right' and why it is his thinking is relevant to our world. 2 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 3 and notably Catholic circles that pride themselves on being orthodox and steadfastly pro-life, and it is this 'blind spot' that this paper wishes to explore. In August 2012, the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton, Robert George, was a key note speaker at the John Paul II Australian Leaders Forum in Sydney. His talk, entitled Five Pillars of a Decent and Dynamic Society, among other things argued that the family and the free-market go together. So much so that they are united not only in respect of matters moral but in respect of having a common enemy, to wit \"hard left socialism,\" the kind that is attended by an \"entitlement mentality\" and a \"statist\" ideology. George went so far as to say that against enemies like this \"the market economy and the institution of marriage\" will \"in the end, stand or fall together.\" The point being that Australian Catholicism, insofar as it considers itself as conservative and even orthodox, ought to follow the lead of her American cousins and see the defence of free-market capitalism as being of a piece with the defence of Catholic morality. Essential to this argument is the proposition that the economic and the cultural spheres of a society cannot be separated for they are in some form of causal or supervenient relationship; to change one is to change the other. So it was that early in his talk, George cited the American congressman and one time Republican Party nominee for Vice President, Paul Ryan, to the effect that \"the notion of separating the social from the economic issues is a false choice\" for \"they stem from the same root.\" As to what this root is (or was) George did not say, but what he did say in quoting Ryan was something that earlier forms of \"hard left socialism\" would have agreed with. Indeed, something fundamental to the critical analysis of Karl Marx. This is that the economic and the social are inextricably entwined such that there is a causal, even deterministic, relationship between the economy a people live within and the way in which their consciousness, we might say, is shaped. Different forms of economy give rise to, or are attended by, different forms of consciousness. What Marx (or for that matter Ryan and George) meant by consciousness is unclear, but then again it is a notoriously hard subject to pin down, for contrary to what many assume consciousness means more than simple awareness. But whatever else 'consciousness' might mean it has to do with the way in which we experience the world in which we live, how we conceive of ourselves and others, and do so in respect of value and thus meaning. For George, if the family and marriage are properly to be valued and then defended and nurtured, if they are to be protected from those enemies that would destroy them, if they are to be prevented from 'falling', then it is necessary to have a free-market economy. Under capitalism the family will thrive; under socialism it will decline and presumably this is because under the former the family is valued and has meaning, while under the latter it is not valued and, as a consequence, it has little meaning. Robert George's talk may be seen by some as of little moment in the history of Sydney Catholicism let alone Australian Catholic history. And it might be thought to have even less significance for the discussion on matters of the faith in respect of culture and politics. But with this I would disagree, for whatever one's views on the merits, or lack thereof, of George's talk the fact that he was a key note speaker at the Leaders Forum indicates 3 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 4 something very important indeed, not least for the way in which Australian Catholicism might understand its mission in the near future. Succinctly put, the tendency is to identify orthodox Catholicism with the championing of limited government and a concomitant commitment to the free-market. And to do this via certain currents in America associated with the magazine First Things (which in turn has a sympathetic and collegial relationship with the Heritage Foundation, one of the preeminent think tanks in America, and one that identifies itself with the cause for limited government and liberal economic theory). Robert George is regular contributor to First Things, writing on matters political, economic, juridical, and moral. 5 George is also a regular contributor and participant in the Heritage Foundation's programs and events indeed he is described on the Foundation's website as being a non staff member. The tying together, even identifying, of liberal economic theory with conservative/orthodox Christianity is nothing new, for it can be argued that this was a process that came into its own in the mid twentieth century in evangelical Protestantism. Further, that the Catholic tendency to do the same began in earnest in the 1970s with the rise of the Moral Majority and an increasing willingness of Catholics to work alongside evangelical Protestants to counter the influence of cultural liberalism. This is not the place to rehearse the history of this phenomenon but instead to argue against its continuation, which is to say to argue against identifying orthodox Catholicism with the defence of liberal economics and free-market theory, and with the concomitant championing of limited government. And the reason for opposing this can be explained by reference to something hinted at in George's talk, something touched upon above; that there is a strong causal relationship between consciousness and the dominant economics of a society. This relationship can be summed up in the following aphorism: cultural liberalism is the expression proper of economic liberalism. In other words, where you have economic liberalism you will have, if not of necessity then certainly in all likelihood, cultural liberalism. And the obverse holds as well: where you have cultural liberalism you will have economic liberalism. In order to explain why this is the case it will be necessary to rehearse something of the history of that which is essential to the rise and formation of capitalism proper, and thus to capitalism's more modern expression in respect of neo-liberal policy vis a vis free-markets and consumerism, a history that is entwined with the topic of usury. A history, however, that will be discussed in the second part of this series. In this article we will be approaching our subject by way of 5 Indeed George's talk was pretty much an adaptation of an earlier article he penned for First Things in October 2008 entitled 'Making Business Moral'. There is one significant difference between the pieces, in 'Making Business Moral' he argues for three pillars for a good society, whereas there are two more in his later talk 'Five Pillars of decent and Dynamic Society'. In a more recent essay, 'Ruling to Serve' (First Things, April 2013), Robert George argues, via John Finnis, that the best form of government is that which best accords with what enables human nature to flourish (\"human flourishing\"), and this, as might be expected, is \"limited government.\". A theory of government based not on supplying the needs of the populace but of facilitating their finding these things themselves. It is a \"facilitative conception\" of government one that \"clearly excludes corporatist and socialist policies.\". In order for the 'facilitative' conception of government to be realised then it must maintain a \"market economy\" (41). Later in his essay, George implicitly ties together the kind of economy a people live within and whether or not they will express or be led to express \"virtue.\" The point being made is that only a virtuous people can ensure that a limited government and market economy will thrive, but one also gets the impression that limited government and a market economy will be conducive to virtue especially as, George argues, such an economic and political arrangement best squares with the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity (41). The problem being, however, that today virtue does not seem overly evident under the dominance of the market economy, a point that has prompted the discussion on liberalism and conservatism in the pages of First Things, of which more below. 4 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 5 reference to the magazine mentioned earlier, namely First Things. First Things is one of those magazines that is more than just a magazine for it represents a movement if not a force for cultural change, perhaps the only comparable magazine is Adbusters which not a few see as being the source of the Occupy Wall Street movement. First Things was founded and edited by Fr John Neuhaus and within Christian (not just Catholic) conservatism it is the most respected and the most sophisticated, not to mention the best written magazine on the market. It is an excellent read and is rarely boring or stultifying pious in the way some conservative religious periodicals can be (and which all liberal theological periodicals are). Its contributors are a who's who of major writers today in the area of religious and social matters, and among their number is Australia's Cardinal Pell. It might be compared to Commentary magazine, another American conservative journal, and the Australian secular magazine Quadrant (to which Cardinal Pell is also a sometime contributor), and though these are also well written and engaging, I do not think they have quite the same clout that First Things has. Fr Neuhaus died in January 2009 and new hands took over the reins. From at least 2011 First Things has been engaged in a period of what might be called a period of reassessment, at least insofar as its relationship to liberalism is involved. And this has occasioned not a few papers in the magazine on what liberalism is and whether or not it is wise to style oneself as a liberal. Of course, what is meant by liberalism has itself been a matter for discussion, and much of the debate has turned upon whether or not there is a liberalism that can properly be called Christian or, at the very least, be something which a Christian can feel comfortable with, of which more later. That First Things is at something of a crossroads is evident in the remarks recently made by its editor Russell Ronald Reno in his comments that served to open the symposium on this very matter. 6 First Things, writes Reno, was \"associated with an optimistic phase of American conservatism. The Reagan coalition affirmed American exceptionialism, sought to unleash the creative potential of capitalism, and was influenced by a can-do, problem-solving neoconservatism.\" \"To a great extent secular liberals and religious believers of the First Things sort united to construct a global system under American leadership with capitalism as the engine of economic development and human rights as its moral basis.\" The only problem, Reno notes, is that this was too successful. \"Today, the success of global capitalism has encouraged a secular materialism all around the world. The definition of human rights is almost entirely controlled by secular elites who are antagonistic to the role and influence of religion in public life...\" So what now? Well, now that \"global capitalism, or at least market based economic thinking is triumphant\" this reduces the need for First Things to \"defend the market economy\" even though that was \"a clear priority in the past.\" 7 But if that is not the priority then what is? It was this question that the symposium was meant to address. It is important for us that we should note that the substance of Reno's argument was that liberalism, capitalism and free-market theory are not the problem per se; rather the problem is that certain 'elites' have managed to gain enough power to skew these laudable things so as to have them serve bad ends. As we will see, this is something of the default position of First 6 R. Reno 'The Challenges we Face: A Symposium on the Future of First Things' First Things, Aug./Sept. 2013. 7 Ibid p.34. 5 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 6 Things: that cultural liberalism has no real organic or causal relationship to economic liberalism, but is in fact something of an aberration. It is this 'aberration' that First Things has been attempting to explain, at least in the years since Fr Neuhaus' death. What follows is not meant to be an exhaustive overview of the different positions argued for in the pages of First Things but I do think it is a fair presentation of the way in which the argument is going. The best place is to start with Fr John Neuhaus' own work on the subject, one that was recently reissued by reason that it has been so important on the thinking and direction of First Things. This is his book Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian Capitalist published in 1992. 8 As First Things was founded shortly before this book was published, in 1990, it is not too difficult to see how the magazine was informed by the same ethos that informed its editor's views adumbrated in his book. After all, Neuhaus would have been researching and writing the book at the same time he was giving birth to First Things. It does not seem unjust, then, to assume that both the book and the magazine arose sharing something of the same vision. Neuhaus' book is something of a commentary upon and engagement with the then recently published encyclical of John Paul II Centesimus Annus, his argument being that this encyclical is something of a vindication of free-market capitalism insofar as Catholic social teaching is concerned 9 , and that it serves to balance the approach of former Popes not least that to be found in the writings of Paul VI. 10 This is not the place to argue this point and some of us might find Neuhaus' interpretations a bit skewed if not tendentious. But our interest here is in Neuhaus' views irrespective of whether or not they coincide with the encyclical in question. Neuhaus is not blind to problems in the modern capitalist economy, only in his book these problems, especially the moral ones, notably those that have to do with the rise of abortion, appear unrelated to capitalism as capitalism and have more to do with relativism and a concomitant form of liberalism (even with Communism). 11 Indeed, the problems that can be found within a capitalist and market economy should more properly be tied to dispositions such as greed, hence it is a problem with human nature (fallen as it is) rather than with the economic system. Furthermore, the problems attendant upon sins such as greed only become exacerbated when politics tries to change things by changing human nature, socialism being a prime example of this bloody folly. 12 For its part, capitalism has never presented itself as a remedy for a world wounded by sin. 13 The point is that for Neuhaus there seems little problem with capitalism per se, except, that is, when the state involves itself in the free market. So it is that he opposes raising the basic wage, for this, he writes, is an 'artificial' remedy that will only destroy the employment prospects of those it claims to help. 14 The state should not interfere in the market; especially 8 J. Neuhaus Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian Capitalist, New York, Image, 1992. 9 Ibid p.78. 10 67. 11 209-210. 12 27. 13 40. 14 225. 6 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 7 not if it is guided by the idea that it can eradicate exploitation by reining in capitalism, this is because ultimately the problems that might attend global capitalism have little if anything to do with exploitation, but rather with exclusion. If there is a problem with modern capitalism then it is that it is not as dominant and widespread as it ought to be. The answer to the problems of poverty and unemployment will be better answered when all are included in the global market for then there will be no more \"marginalisation.\" 15 There will be no more marginalisation by reason that it is exactly this that capitalism destroys. Capitalism is about pluralism and thus inclusiveness in all spheres of human life. \"Economic pluralism is connected to political pluralism is connected to cultural pluralism.\" 16 These are big claims, and one might be forgiven for thinking that, when all is said and done, Neuhaus seems to contradict himself for in his view capitalism not only does present itself as something of a remedy for human sin, but it delivers on its claim as well! 17 Perhaps such a claim should not surprise us, if, that is, we take Neuhaus' opening premise to heart, for in the first pages of his book he asserts a proposition that would warm the heart of a classical Marxist, which is to say one who still held to the deterministic relationship between base and superstructure – that is, between economy and culture. \"Our subject,\" writes Neuhaus, \"is economic freedom, but this book is about much more than economics. That is because economic behaviour is inseparably intertwined with other social spheres, notably the political and the cultural.\" And, \"at the heart of the sphere we call culture is the moral and the spiritual.\" 18 It is this understanding of the interconnectedness of the economic, the political, and the cultural (which includes the spiritual) that not only informs his book but, as might be expected for reasons touched upon above, his magazine First Things as well. As was noted earlier, since the death of Fr Neuhaus there has been much discussion in First Things as to the magazine's relationship to cultural and economic liberalism, though this has in no way seriously brought into question its positive attitude to the free-market and the concomitant limited role of the state. The issue has instead been about the kind of liberalism with which First Things should identify itself. In this respect Wilfred McClay's essay 'Liberalism after Liberalism' is instructive. 19 McClay contrasts two forms of liberalism. The first which is primarily defined in economic terms is one that holds to a \"free-market economy\" and limited government, as well as to \"natural rights\" which rights are tied to \"upholding the independence and supreme value of the individual person as a free agent.\" This liberalism is tolerant, it holds to \"religious disestablishment\" and, echoing Neuhaus' book, is all for \"pluralism.\" 20 15 209. Thus, pace Paul VI, Neuhaus writes, the problems will not be solved by wealth distribution but by wealth creation (67). 16 264. 17 Indeed, we are even told that the capitalist system being identifiable with pluralism is thus the system most conducive to the truth being found for it is the system that allows the majority the freedom to \"decide against the truth.\" This is important for it means that truth can \"contend more effectively another day\" (271). 18 1-2 (see too 49). Elsewhere, as if by way of aside, Neuhaus appears to contradict this point when he writes of the \"seeds of democratic capitalism's distinctions between economy, culture, and politics\" (67). Given that his book, taken as a whole, is a defence of capitalism by reason that its principles of pluralism and freedom (according to his assessment) informs politics and culture (which includes the spiritual realm as well), then this comment seems more than a little inconsistent. 19 Wilfred McClay 'Liberalism after Liberalism' First Things, May 2012. 20 Ibid p.26. 7 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 8 The second form of liberalism – called by McClay the 'new liberalism' – argues that a high degree of equality is necessary for liberalism to be a reality, and more significantly it is prepared to use the state to enforce this equality. Furthermore, this liberalism is concerned about the increase in social \"atomizing\" and \"social selfishness\" which it is held attends the modern market and consumer economy. In sum, this form of liberalism is attended by a \"philosophy of expansive and activist government.\" 21 It is the first form of liberalism that finds acceptance with the writers and readers of First Things, not least because, as McClay argues, this liberalism approaches \"albeit in secular political terms, the Judeo-Christian understanding of the high dignity of the individual human person.\" 22 The responses to McClay's essay, in the same edition of First Things, took issue with some of his points but, nevertheless, agreed upon the basic premise, namely that in respect of the market the role of government should be limited. So it was that James Rogers wrote that \"because of the Fall, it is best to limit the power of the state\" for Christians should hold to a \"libertarian minimalism.\" 23 A few months later, Patrick Deneen took up the discussion in his essay 'Unsustainable Liberalism'. 24 For our purposes Deneen's essay is the more interesting of those we have discussed. This is because Deneen allows that we need to recognise the relationship between 'progressivism', which the magazine dislikes, and 'economic liberalism', which the magazine approves of. It is this relationship that is problematic, but Deneen holds that it can successfully be addressed yet how? The fundamental problem is that economic liberalism places the autonomous individual at its centre and this means that it is corrosive of the family and in general things social. Indeed, it appears that it might also be responsible for \"breakdowns in the market\" as well. 25 What is required is a \"fundamental rethinking of how law and economics are understood and employed to undergird the liberal vision of society.\" 26 Whatever this would entail it does not entail a \"cessation of free markets\" nor does it call for increased state power, rather does it call for a \"greater local autonomy\" and \"local forms of government.\" 27 Why this should answer to the problem of the concept of the self that is at the heart of economic liberalism is not clear (or at least not to me it isn't), unless Deneen means to suggest that smaller communities will necessarily inculcate a concept of self that will temper that predicated upon autonomy. Whether or not this is what Deneen is arguing for his basic premise is the same as that held by Neuhaus and First Things; that whatever the 21 27. 22 29. 23 James Rogers 'Sin's Political Lessons' First Things, May 2012 (37). Another respondent in the same edition was Yuval Levin 'After Progressivism' who argued that what was needed was a \"serious revival\" of interest in Edmund Burke – a not uncommon theme among neo-liberal conservatives. Levin contrasts Burke with those radicals who represent a \"sharp break from nature and history\" in respect of the \"Western tradition\" (35). In point of fact, Burke's whole argument was one contra the Western tradition if by that we mean something older than John Locke and Hobbes. Burke opposed any appeal to what he called metaphysics championing instead what we would see as being nascent modern pragmatism. This was the essence of his argument against the likes of Rousseau and Tom Paine; they were beholden to metaphysics and not to worldly wise political pragmatism. 24 Patrick Deneen 'Unsustainable Liberalism' First Things, Aug./Sept., 2012. 25 Ibid p.30. 26 29. 27 30-31. 8 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 9 problems may be with economic liberalism, even when it becomes apparent that it has a strong relationship to cultural liberalism (that is, progressivism), the answer is not to be sought for in curbing the markets, or in a strong centralised government, or in an increase in state influence; rather, the answer seems to be for more freedom for the local market! 28 The general upshot of the discussion in First Things is that any problems today attendant upon global capitalism is not about economic liberalism per se but with cultural liberalism which is variously identified with 'philosophical liberalism' or 'hyper-liberalism' or simply 'progressivism'. 29 How it is cultural liberalism has become identified with economic liberalism such that they seem to be fellow travellers, as it were, is certainly a problem, one that the magazine has set about attempting to answer. So far in the discussion the answers proffered carry the implicit and explicit assumption that cultural liberalism does not belong, properly so, to economic liberalism but is something of an aberration, something that is 28 In an essay published in First Things June/July 2010 entitled 'The Morality of Self-Interest', David Goldman applies this thinking to American foreign policy. He styles his approach as 'realism' (don't all political theorists?) by reason that it is an \"Augustinian realism.\" By which is meant that it is anti-statist and free market, and being so is very much like America. \"States that suppress individual rights on behalf of some expression of the collective will fail...Those that support individual rights have some chance of succeeding.\" Hence \"to the extent that other nations share the American love for the sanctity of the individual, they are likely to succeed\" (54). Of course, the issue is whether or not economic liberalism does, in fact, best serve individual rights for it clearly does not serve the rights of unborn individuals or those who, having escaped the strictures of the neo-colonialist Planned Parenthood and the reach of Melinda and Bill Gates, have been allowed to be conceived and come to term and been born into poorer climes where free-market trade deals have undermined traditional agricultural products (such as in Haiti and Mexico, among other less fortunate lands). See too Goldman's article which he co-wrote with Reuven Brenner 'The Keynes Conundrum' in First Things, October 2010. The article is, as might be expected, opposed to Keynesian economics, the conclusion being that government bureaucracies are to blame for all manner of economic problems, whereas if we listened to entrepreneurs and speculators things would all go much better. David Goldman was at the time of writing these pieces a senior editor at First Things as well the head of fixed income research at the Bank of America. This information is on the official website of First Things where all of Goldman's articles are listed, except, that is, for one, at least it was absent when I accessed it on 13/11/13. This was his 'The Morality of Self-Interest' which I think was a little bit intemperate and it might have been felt that it was best left forgotten. 29 In his reply and critique of Patrick Deneen's article (see above) Robert Miller ('Eudaimonia in America' First Things, April 2013) makes the contrast in liberalisms to be between 'philosophical liberalism' (which is the bad kind) and 'pragmatic liberalism' (which is the good kind). The latter is not doctrinaire and is, in fact, \"generally indifferent to the moral perfection of its citizens\" (29). This is the American form of liberalism and it is America's greatness. Miller opened his essay thus: \"America is under attack in the pages of First Things\" (25), hence it is his intention to defend her against the likes of Deneen. Basic to Millar's argument is that \"Social pathologies do not result primarily from philosophical mistakes\" (28). The argument is that Deneen and other like critics are wrong to critique the basic principles that inform American pluralism as these principles really have little to do with the moral problems in America today. A similar line of argument can be found in Paul Griffith's response to Deneen's essay ('Public Life Without Political Theory' First Things, Aug./Sept. 2012). Griffith writes that what is needed is \"data\" (35-36) and \"good statistical information\" (36) not theory. \"Reason is incapable (and unaware of its incapacity) of assessing the outcome of adjusting complex systems\" (36). Daniel Mahoney in his response to Deneen's essay ('The Art of Liberty' First Things, Aug./Sept. 2012) draws a distinction between 'philosophical liberalism', which is of Hobbes and Locke and the concomitant notion of the autonomous individual, and the kind of liberalism proper to America which has to do with a \"liberal republican order\" (35), an order that is \"federalist\" in nature (34). What is needed is that Americans have a pride in this order: \"Americans need pride, in themselves and in their tradition, a tradition that is not reducible to philosophical liberalism\" (34). David Yeago ('Modern But Not Liberal', First Things June/July 2012) contrasts \"ideological liberalism\" (26) to the kind of theological liberalism that has arisen in Catholicism and Lutheranism. Ideological liberalism is defined by \"individual autonomy and human rights\" (27) as well as \"individualistic voluntarism\" (28). It is simplifying in a Hegelian like way (29) and does not recognise the \"complexity and contingency\" of the world in which we live (29). In a similar manner Thomas White ('Love's Greater Freedom', First Things June/July 2012) contrasts what he calls \"hyper-liberalism\" which like all ideologies reduces \"the human person...to some one principle\" (35) and which thus ignores the complexity of what it is to be human (35), to a more moderate and Christian form of liberalism. Above all else, there does need to be a \"normative account of the human good\" for this provides a necessary tension to the autonomous choice of the individual (36). In these and other essays though the writers might differ one with the other in particulars, they nevertheless agree to distinguish between one form of liberalism, which is a bad form associated with cultural liberalism, and the good form which is, by and large, associated with economic liberalism and America properly understood. 9 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 10 probably the result of undue state interference in the market. 30 Neuhaus and other writers may have posited a inextricably entwined relationship between a good form of liberalism (that identified with pluralism and the privileging of the individual over state and 'ideological' collectives) and a liberal economy, but this relationship has little if anything to do with cultural liberalism referred to as 'progressivism'. 31 Both in Neuhaus' book and the later essays in First Things the sense is that the free-market represents the economic system that best corresponds to 'human flourishing' and it does so by reason that it alone of all such systems best respects and nurtures the freedom of the individual as well as the 'common good'. It might be said that the genius of this position is that it can, at one and the same time, style itself as being anti-utopian while insinuating that it alone is conducive to the perfection of human nature. The sense of 'utopian' in the discourse of Neuhaus and First Things tends to refer to those systems that claim to be able to change, shape, mould, or even perfect human nature. As a rule where a system is referred to as 'utopian' this implies government programs and a consequent interference in the market economy; in short, in the state imposing itself, illegitimately so, upon the freedom of the individual. But how is it that economic liberalism can be opposed to utopian claims concerning the perfecting of human nature and yet seem to be making similar claims itself? It does so by reason that in appearing to oppose state informed ideologies it gives the appearance of opposing positive prescription (which is to say laws) and thereby of promoting and preserving freedom. And, as freedom as understood by First Things is defined by reference to the individual, and as this freedom describes the proper and even perfect state of an individual, then economic liberalism not being a prescriptive doctrine but a permissive one is thus the system most conducive to the flourishing of human nature proper. It is not too difficult to see that at the heart of this matter lies the definition of 'freedom' and the relationship of freedom so defined to human nature, a topic that we will return to in the second part of this series. It ought also to be noted that recent discussions in First Things have not been as bold and forthright as Neuhaus was in his book discussed earlier. Neuhaus was not afraid in stating that his position was to be identified with capitalism; indeed the title of his book broadcast this point to all and sundry, Doing Well and Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian 30 A similar conundrum attends cultural liberals only they affect to reject any necessary link to economic liberalism, but they too are confronted by the fact that these two liberalisms have been, at the very least, fellow travellers. This is a topic to which we will return in the following essay. 31 The closest that a writer in First Things comes to seeing the inextricable link between cultural and economic liberalism is, to my mind, Edward Skidelsky's essay 'The Emancipation of Avarice' (First Things, May 2011). Skidelsky argues that usury which is the basis of our commercial economy encourages avarice and greed as well as self-love. Furthermore it strips economic activity of its ethical character (37), all of which plays into the \"familiar progressivist narrative\" of consequentialism (that is, contra a theological understanding of natural law) (38). Certainly, Skidelsky hints that the bad aspects of a commercial economy can be put down to cultural liberalism (that is 'progressivism) but he goes on to say something that did not sit well with the readers. He actually argued for \"the power of the state\" to \"discourage avarice\" (3839) which appeared to be an argument for state interference in the economy. The letters that followed, in First Things August/September 2011, were critical of this and other points, as one John Penfold wrote: \"Markets fail, often spectacularly, but left alone they self-correct. The government does not,\" this is because with government \"rot and corruption become the norm\" (8). All the replies defended capitalism and there was not one that said that perhaps Skidelsky was on to something or that he even had a point. I stress this was the case even though Skidelsky did not argue against liberal economics per se, and even took the standard line that the detrimental effects were down to 'progressivism' and not liberal economics per se. It was simply because, as far as I can see, that he did not argue for less state interference in the markets. 10 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 11 Capitalist. But that was in 1992 when capitalism could be triumphalist; whereas since the crashes and scandals of the late 1990s and on, well it is not too much an exaggeration to say that the term 'capitalism' has become a little odious. 'Liberalism' is a bit more acceptable except, of course, for the use made of it by those who are progressivists, hence the need, as we have seen above, for First Things to distinguish between different forms of liberalism. If we translate First Things more recent language into that of Neuhaus' plain language then in light of what we have charted above we can say this: that capitalism is the most conducive economic system for the flourishing of human nature, which nature is exemplified in the individual and not in a collectivity; that as an economic system capitalism not only embodies the principle proper of human nature, namely freedom, it also fosters human nature and helps to perfect it; and that capitalism is, in essence, antithetical and antipathetic to state control, which is to say government interference, for state control fosters that which is inimical to human nature being inimical to freedom proper. If we take this seriously, which First Things wants us to, and if we consider it by way of Christian theology (more specifically Catholic and Thomist theology) then we would, I think, be justified in arguing that capitalism is one of the primary natural means by which God works to bring human nature to its proper end. It is no surprise, then, that Neuhaus first of all and then First Things should think it fit that those who count themselves orthodox Catholics (and orthodox Protestants and Jews) should defend and promote economic liberalism, a program that seems to have found its way to Australia, to Sydney in particular. And it is also no surprise that they should print articles (and books) to the effect that divine revelation points to something of a similar conclusion, which brings us to the last essay from First Things to be engaged with here: Yoram Hazony's 'The Biblical Case for Limited Government'. 32 Hazony's analysis is confined to the Hebrew Bible (or Old Testament) and in particular to the historical books dealing with the kings of Israel (including Judah). His argument is that the Bible charts a middle course between anarchy (exemplified in the period of the Judges) and monarchical despotism. Although the problem of anarchy is mentioned, the accent in Hazony's article is on the state and thus his conclusion is that the Hebrew Bible is \"fundamentally suspicious of the state.\" 33 It is not too difficult to agree with Hazony's conclusion, though in agreeing with it one would also want to point out that the Bible is fundamentally suspicious of all human concerns, including everything associated with individuals acting as individuals. Why Hazony should single out the state for special mention is not hard to guess given the sentiments of First Things. The fact that the Bible is suspicious of all human concerns this side of the Fall is not something in dispute, even the most thorough going Pelagian amongst us would allow that to be the case. The issue has to do with what form of government and economy is best suited to rein in, check, and ameliorate the effects of sin, while being conducive to the encouragement of virtue. And when the issue is put like this then something very important is seen to be missing from Hazony's essay, something to which we will return shortly. 32 Yoram Hazony 'The Biblical Case for Limited Government' First Things, October 2012. 33 Ibid p.42. 11 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 12 Hazony posits the best system of government as being one in which the state has a \"dual legitimacy,\" 34 one part consists of social acclamation (a kind of social contract) and the other has to do with an \"independent standard of right,\" namely God. 35 As most Christians would agree on this it might be thought trite, or more charitably of being the enunciation of a general principle which is to be filled out and given concrete content sometime in the future. Perhaps Hazony is even now following up on this. As the essay stands, however, the only concrete content that Hazony gives to his 'dual legitimacy' model is that it ought to be attended by limited government. The Bible, we are led to understand, sees limited government as the best form of government. Thus does Hazony's essay lend biblical (and one presumes divine) legitimacy to the politics and economics championed by First Things. There is something of a cheap trick in scholarship that serves a form of one-upmanship, and this is especially evident in respect of reviews. The reviewer points out something the author has failed to mention thereby giving the impression that the reviewer knows just that little bit more about the subject than the author of the work being reviewed does. Given that no author can exhaust a subject there is always something a reviewer can find to put the author in their place. And yet, having said that there are nevertheless times when pointing out an absence is called for; when what is not included in the work under review is essential to the serious treatment of the topic in question. Often what is missing is very telling indeed in that what it tells of is blindness, only it is no ordinary blindness but might rather be described as being of the nature of ideological myopia. Whether or not this applies to Hazony's essay others can decide, but whatever the case may be there is very serious and significant omission in his argument. 'Significant' not least because what is absent might be said to undermine his conclusion. What Hazony does not mention is that the Torah prescribes a centralised theocratic state, one in which the economy is reined in by laws that severely delimit the freedom of both capital and the market. The significance of this omission might be spelt out in this way: if the laws found in the Torah were applied today then our economy (we could say the global economy) would look very different to how it looks now. For example, if usury were outlawed, if all debts were wiped every seven years, if all land reverted back to the ownership of the original extended family every forty nine or fifty years, if it was incumbent upon those who are wealthy to help those in their extended family who are poor, and if no work whatsoever was allowed on the Sabbath, and if these and other like matters were to be enforced by the state then I think it reasonable to say that the shape of our society would be very different indeed. 36 And by that I mean not just economically but politically and culturally different as well. And as Neuhaus allowed that the spiritual is a subset of the cultural, then our society would also look 34 44. 35 46. 36 Against usury Exodus 22:25, Deuteronomy 23:19-20; the wiping of debts Deuteronomy 15:1-11; Jubilee year reversion of land Leviticus 25:10; helping the extended family Leviticus 25:35-37; and Sabbath Exodus 20:8; 23:12; 31:15. And this is not to mention enforced tithing to help the Levites but also the poor (for example Deuteronomy 26:12-15). I have used the term 'extended family' in the place of 'kin' and 'tribe' so as to employ a more modern idiom. The sense is of it being incumbent upon a person to look out for those even distantly related to them. Not just being incumbent by way of voluntary and virtuous behaviour, but being incumbent by way of state sanctioned and enforced law. 12 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 13 spiritually different to boot! Our consciousness would not be quite the same if only in respect of the way in which we understand value and meaning. Whether or not it would be a good thing that the aforementioned laws be put in place, or even if Israel ever in fact enacted these laws, is neither here nor there, at least in respect of the point we are making. The point being made here is that, pace Hazony and First Things, divine revelation certainly does give a mandate for state interference in the market economy. Indeed, it would seem to do so in a rather obvious way, by which I mean that it is not too difficult to see passages in the Torah (and the rest of the Hebrew Bible) that support a strong centralised government imposing itself upon the economy. Why, then, did Hazony and First Things (or at least the editors of First Things and their reviewers) not notice what appears to be a glaring omission? There is no evidence that would suggest insincerity or conscious duplicity on the part of Hazony or anyone else at First Things, and such a charge would not only be uncharitable but evidence as well of critical laziness. The argument here, and it is one to be taken up more so in the next essay in this series, is that what the foregoing testifies to is just how powerfully the economy can shape our consciousness, insofar as this is expressed in what it is that does and does not register in our reading of the sacred text (and for that matter any other text besides). Now, whatever else the aforementioned laws would have done they would, to a significant degree, have served to redistribute wealth. Taken together the laws cited earlier would have given rise to scenarios like the following: a wealthy person would have had to help out a poorer person (at the very least one in their extended family) and do so by way of a loan with no interest attached. And not only that, for if the loan were not able to be repaid it would in seven years be wiped from the ledger. (It might be argued that such a system would be open to abuse, or it might be that rich people would in such circumstances not lend any money, but if this were the case then such behaviour was not merely a matter of personal virtue but of state sanctioned, and presumably policed, law.) An interest free loan with no threat of it ending in financial servitude certainly seems to be one way in which wealth can be redistributed to those less fortunate. Indeed, it seems to something that might actually serve to encourage 'small-business' entrepreneurship, though of course it would certainly not encourage the kind of financial speculations that fuel today's money markets, which in turn fuel modern capitalism. We might think this interference ill advised, or we might think that what the Bible mandates is more a matter of a general principles than specific rules to be applied in the same way in every situation but whatever we think it is nevertheless true that if we look to the Hebrew Bible by way of guidance on matters political and economic it is not difficult to see that the Bible gives credence to a position that is contrary to the one that First Things champions. In short, there is little in the Torah that warrants the statement that divine revelation extols limited government interference in matters political and economic. As noted above, the issue here is why this aspect of biblical revelation is ignored, simply not seen, or not given due prominence in the thinking on matters political and economic in the pages of First Things. It might be argued that this is due to the Christian and Catholic 13 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 14 approach to the Old Testament, by which is meant that the economic laws in the Torah are irrelevant to the New Testament dispensation. But this is not the case for the simple reason that First Things is not given to dispensational exegesis or any form of exegesis that could be likened to supersessionism. It might be argued that although the laws of the Torah are not dispensed with in Christian polity they are transformed, in a similar way to how the purity and priestly laws are fulfilled and transformed in Christ. Certainly, this approach finds expression in some forms of Protestantism, notably 'pietistic' forms, where it is argued that the injunctions of the Torah are now no longer ones to be enforced by the state, rather have they become principles that the individual is 'personally' to ascribe to by way of a conscious and free decision. That is, the New Testament is a matter of the 'heart', by which is meant individual and free assent, whereas the Old Testament was a matter of state imposition. Such a simplistic view of biblical theology, however, seems out of place in First Things, and I can see in its pages no explicit argument made for this take on the Bible. And yet, in its championing of economic liberalism and the privileging of the individual over communal and/or state conceptions of the human person, First Things does seem to intimate such an understanding of the relationship of the Torah to Christian polity. This may be an unfair appraisal of First Things reading of the Bible, it may even be wrong, only be it wrong, right, or unfair, such explanations are called for in light of more recent discussions in the magazine on matters economic in relation to matters biblical. I want to pursue this matter some more in the next essay, but here we ought to turn to the New Testament in order to see what is made there of the economic laws in the Torah. Before we do this we might note a rather common phenomenon: when commentators treat of the way in which Jesus fulfils the Torah they rarely discuss the way in which he fulfils the economic laws in Torah. What we might begin by doing is observing something all Christians hold to, namely that Jesus did not come to abolish the Law and Prophets but to fulfil them 37 and that the essence of the Law is to do to people what you would have them do to you. 38 The latter being something that accords with what Jesus says are the two greatest laws: to love God with your whole heart and to love your neighbour as yourself. 39 There is a hierarchical order to the laws by reference to which there is an order of derivation and orientation. In the Torah the 600 or so laws all find their proper meaning by reference to the highest laws, the love of God and love of neighbour. Informing this hierarchical system of derivation and orientation is a 'reciprocal' logic, one in which our well-being (or to use the term First Things likes, 'flourishing') is inextricably tied to the well-being or 'common good' of the other, which relationship is not something separate to, or distinct from, the state as covenantal community. Rather is the state/covenantal community both the chief expression of, and guarantor of, this relationship. It can be argued, then, that in the Torah the laws that rein in the economy are an essential element in protecting the common good of Israel and in allowing it to flourish. To put it another way, the economic laws are an essential aspect to preserving the reciprocal logic that informs the raison d'être of the Torah and, thereby, in preserving and nurturing the 37 For example Matthew 5:17 and 7:12; Luke 16:17; 24:14. 38 Matt. 7:12. 39 Matt. 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27. See Deuteronomy 6:4-5. 14 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 15 'common good' (and preserving and nurturing the 'common good' is a cause that First Things holds to be very much in its brief). How, then, are the economic laws fulfilled in Jesus? By which we do not mean how it is they are abolished, but how it is they find their perfect expression. First of all we might note that one aspect of this expression is that the laws and their logic of reciprocity are not annihilated but extended. Hence, although in the Torah usury between Israelites was forbidden it was not so between Israelite and Gentile. 40 We would thus expect this law not be abolished but to be extended so as to include Gentiles as well, and that is what we find. Although we will be discussing the subject of usury and the Fathers in the second part of this series it is apposite here to quote St Augustine from his sermon on Matthew 19:21. This passage in Matthew is the well known one concerning the rich young man who says he keeps all the Law but is told by Jesus to give away all he has to the poor. Augustine paraphrases Jesus as saying both to the rich young man and to us that in selling all and giving the proceeds away to the poor we become a usurer in respect to God. \"Give to God, and press God for payment. Yea, rather give to God, and you will be pressed to receive payment.\" 41 Augustine notes that there are two forms of usury: worldly usury which is condemned and to be avoided; and usury towards God which is praised and to be encouraged. What Augustine picked up on is what we have, by and large, missed, though when it is pointed out it becomes as plain as day. In other words, something has blinded us to what is most evident. This is that contrary to common post-Reformation notions of grace the theme of reward bulks large in the topic of salvation in the New Testament, and no more so than in the Gospels. And this theme of reward is presented in economic terms, in terms of usury (or rather contrary to worldly usury), which is to say of reward on investment; you give to God and you receive back a hundredfold more. Again and again in the Gospels salvation is presented in, and illustrated by, economic terms, and this is more than mere metaphor for the contrast drawn is between the economics of heaven and the economics of the world, where it is expected that the former will supplant the latter. 42 On a practical note it might be asked how it is we can lend to God? And the answer, as a rule, is by giving to the poor, that's how. This is not, of course, a this-worldly prosperity doctrine such as one finds in certain forms of contemporary Pentecostalism, but it certainly is a soteriology of 'investment' insofar as in 40 Deut. 23:20. 41 St Augustine Sermon 36, using R. MacMullen's translation in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 6. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1979. See too St Augustine's reflections on Psalm 37, in Volume 8. 42 For example see: Matthew 5:12, 42-48; 6:1-4, see too vs. 12 where we ask for the forgiveness of our debts as we forgive others their debts; 6:16-18; 10:40-42; Luke 6:20-23, 28-31, 35, 38; &:36-47; 8:18; 11:9-41; 12:33-34, 47-48; 14:12-14. See as well 16:1-8 and the parable of the shonky manager, the one who lessens the debts of his master's clients, which parable ends in the statement that \"You cannot serve God and Mammon.\" Also Luke 16:19-31 on the rich man in hell who did not share of his wealth with Lazarus. We are told that he had his reward, the denouement of this tale being that the rich man expressed his (and apparently his brothers) deafness to the Law and the Prophets by his failure to obey the Law and help the poor. The investment the rich man made is contrasted to that which attended the state of Lazarus. As this follows on from our being told that the Pharisees \"loved money\" (Luke 16:14-15) then the story of the rich man in hell illustrates the outcome of that love. It is state of affairs later illustrated in the presence of the money changers in the Temple (19:45-46), and their devouring widow's houses (20:47). There is one time honoured way in which the proverbial widow's house is devoured and that, of course, is by way of usury. It is pertinent to note that these and other like passages in the Gospel often revolve around the way in which the Scriptures are read so as to 'justify' behaviours that are contrary to the Law. This is a theme to which we will return in the second part of this series. 15 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 16 redistributing ones wealth one gains greater treasures in heaven. This economics of soteriology is of grace, but not a grace that works principally to the individual as individual, but a grace that perfects the reciprocal logic enunciated in the Torah. It is a grace that works, first and foremost, through mediation, the mediation of the visible, authoritative, hierarchical covenantal communion. We are given grace in order to be a means of grace to others, and the principle way in which grace works is to build up the visible community which first and foremost applies to the Church 43 , but also to the state, not least, as St Paul put it, in its capacity to be a terror to evil doers and a source of consolation and protection for those who do good. 44 Hence, God's grace works both in the visible hierarchical order of the Church and likewise in the state, what's more that which we have such that we can serve the other through the Church and the state comes from God; is of grace. In its supernatural and natural aspects grace works to establish and fulfil the two greatest laws of the Torah mentioned earlier, as well as the logic of reciprocity clearly enunciated in what is called 'the golden rule'. Succinctly put, we are able to give by reason of the grace of God, and grace works to free our wills such that we can then cooperate with grace, and we cooperate with grace by 'investing' the grace we have been given (which includes our wealth) with God by giving to those who are poor, and in doing this we are given an incredible return on our investment. 45 This is the heavenly economy, a heavenly usury, only when the attempt is made to justify worldly usury by reference to this economy then there can only be corruption; a corruption that thinks that it can serve both God and Mammon. It is in this confusion that ideological blindness finds its power. The passage from Matthew concerning the rich young man that St Augustine was commenting on is very significant in light of the above. If there is one thing that is made clear in the Gospels concerning Judah and its environs at the time of Christ it is that there was a large disparity between rich and poor, and concomitant with this there was a great amount of poverty and physical incapacity to be encountered on a daily basis. All of this was undoubtedly exacerbated by the great wealth on show in Jerusalem for such urban centres become a magnet to the impoverished and lame, the hope being that some of the wealth on show will, in today's parlance, trickle down to them. Against this background it is interesting to reread the account of the rich young man. When the rich young man says he has kept all the commandments there is good reason to argue that this, in fact, is not the case, for he is still very rich while there are many poor and crippled people around him. We might ask of this young man, what of those laws in Torah that have economic ramifications? Not least those which command the helping the poor? That he couldn't answer to Jesus' demand expresses something of why he couldn't answer to the Law's command; he loved his wealth more than he loved salvation. But of course he would not have thought of it this way, he would have justified it, perhaps by doing the time honoured trick of seeing his wealth as being a sign of God's blessing for his being pious. For our purposes we might put the issue in 43 1 Corinthians 12:1-31. 44 Romans 13:1-7. 45 The Mass is the best example of this economy of grace. We give to God the gifts of the earth and of our hands (the bread and wine), gifts that come from God, and then these gifts are given to be the body and blood of our Lord who gives his life for us. We then eat these gifts that are made truly and really so into the body and blood of our Lord. Thus, from the gifts that God gives us, we give bread and wine to God, and then we get it back a 'hundredfold' greater than it was for now it is the gift to us of the body and blood of our Lord! 16 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/1 17 the form of a question: why was the young man unable to see those laws in the Torah that we touched upon earlier? Perhaps more startling still is that this blindness was one that Jesus' disciples seemed to share for they are astonished by the outcome of this engagement. 46 When Jesus says to the young man to give all that he has to the poor, Jesus may well be demanding more than the Law commanded but he is not annulling the law in question, rather is he extending it! He expands its scope. \"Love your enemies and do good to them; lend expecting nothing in return, and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, for He is kind to the ungrateful and the selfish. Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful.\" 47 We might note that in this passage and others like it the reciprocal logic that informs the Law is made explicit, furthermore when Jesus says to lend and expect nothing in return, well that is what the Law commanded. The Law is fulfilled by being expanded such that it applies not only to a person's extended family, or even to Israel, but to all people, hence the prohibition against usury applies not only to fellow Israelites but to the enemies of Israel as well, namely to the Gentiles, which is to say to the global economy. What Jesus does is show how the economy of salvation is one in which the worldly economy of usury is turned on its head (or to paraphrase Marx on Hegel, on its feet). The common good of humanity, which is to say the flourishing of humanity, requires the transformation of the worldly economy into one that is in accord with the economy of heaven and the state certainly has a role in this. Only it is just here that many baulk, and all of a sudden the extent and reach of the Gospel is said to have reached its limit; we might say that here is where its extension is stayed. And where exactly is the limit to the reach of the Gospel? It would seem at the very borders of an economy based upon worldly usury; which is to say exactly where capital is freed from moral constraints, at the place that today we call 'the free-market'. The problem is, and it is the problem that First Things seems unable at the moment to seriously address, is that today society in all its aspects is increasingly defined by reference to the free market not least through the logic of commodification and privitisation (or more accurately 'corporatisation') and this has ramifications for all aspects of society and culture. The most obvious and yet routinely ignored example of this being the example which served to open our discussion proper, namely the commodification of human life and its subjugation to the logic of the consumer economy in abortion and its accoutrements. To translate this into the language First Things employs: the limit of the Gospel coincides with the limit to which the government can 'interfere' in the market. Both the Gospel and the government seem to reach an impasse as far as the market is concerned, for when we come to the market economic matters are now to be the concern of the individual's free choice and not to be a subject proper of government interference be it by way of law or other form of agency. The problem is that when the market becomes off-limits it does not stay in its place, it expands its reach and, soon enough, all comes under its domain, insofar as all value and 46 Note how in Matt. 19:25 the disciples are astonished to hear that rich people getting into heaven is an impossible thing to achieve. They reply \"Who then can be saved?\" The implication of their response is that any reasonable and pious Jew of the time would have thought that a very rich person who appeared to keep the Law in most particulars would be saved. To hear that this is not the case is astonishing. 47 Luke 6:35-36. This was one of, if not the, principle Scriptural passages used by the Fathers in their denunciation of usury. 17 Tilley: Promoting What We Oppose Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2013 18 meaning are determined by its logic. Like Marx, Neuhaus was right, and so too for that matter are Robert George and Paul Ryan, the economic, the political, and the cultural (which includes the spiritual) are all entwined, and so it should really occasion no surprise that it is abortion above all else that reveals the real causal relationship between economic liberalism and cultural liberalism. We will return to this subject in more depth in the next instalment. By way of wrapping this piece up we might note that there has been much debate in the Church since at least the Fathers on as to what constitutes usury proper: is it a blanket ban on making profit from investing money, or does it refer only to having money multiply by reference to no concrete external good? Is it a blanket ban on lending at interest, or does usury refer only to lending at interest to the poor? There are many other like questions raised in the course of the history of the Church and I want to return to the primary issue in the next essay – this being if the condemnation of usury was only a matter of justice in respect of contingent circumstances, or if it refers to matters of natural justice and thus has to do with metaphysics, which is to say with the very character and constitution of creation itself. Suffice it to say here that in the Church the discussion turned on the nature of usury proper, not if it should be proscribed by the state – the condemnation of usury was a given. It needs to be stressed that whatever usury was it was to be proscribed, and if that were not possible then hemmed in. The point here is that in both the Bible and the history of the Church (and this includes both Catholic and Protestant, at least in Protestantism's early years) the issue of usury and the role of the state in delimiting or even proscribing it was certainly not seen as being evidence of the Church or state overreaching itself. Indeed, it was seen as the duty of the Church and/or state to oppose usury or severely delimit its application and that with heavy penalties enforceable by law. In other words, it was seen to be the duty of the Church and/or the state to interfere in the economy. It may well be that we now know better, that now we know that freeing up capital in the way we have done is a God mandated way of encouraging 'human flourishing' and thereby of aiding the 'common good'. And it may also be the case that by reason that America has been the home both of the intellectual defence of the freeing up of capital and its application then America is to be defended by every Catholic and Christian who deserves to be called Christian and Catholic. What's more, it may well the case that through exporting this economic model, such that it becomes applied throughout the global economy, that the world will become more liberal (in the non-pejorative sense of that term), more inclusive and more pluralistic, as well as more protective of individual human rights across the globe. All of this may well be the case (though I do not think so), but if it is so then we might have expected far better biblical exegesis from the pages of First Things, not to mention a far deeper engagement with the history of the Church on the issue of usury. In other words, we might have expected a few less blind spots. 18 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol3/iss1/", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "HYBRIS nr 38 (2017) ISSN: 1689-4286 KRYSTYNA BIELECKA UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW SEMANTIC INTERNALISM IS A MISTAKE In this paper, I introduce the concept of narrow content (Section 2.1) to discuss an account of narrow content by analyzing Fodor's methodological solipsism (2.2). I point out that Fodor's formalism, that is, the position according to which the content is reduced to formal properties of mental representation, eliminates (at least as I show in Section 2.2.4 in Stich's interpretation) semantic properties in favor of the syntactic ones. In addition, it leads to the conceptual problems indicated by J. Searle, S. Harnad (Section 2.3), and T. Burge (Section 2.4). In a nutshell, semantic internalism, as reviewed in this paper, does not offer an account of content that would be properly contentful, because it provides no grounds to ascribe truth or other semantic properties to representations. In particular, it is either unsatisfactory, because it reduces content to formal properties or inconsistent, because it appeals to innate contents that itself has not been properly explicated; moreover, innate factors, as I argue, are not merely individual. Consequently, I reject semantic internalism in favor of externalism. The purpose of this paper is to argue against the usefulness of narrow content in the account of mental representation. By reviewing the classical arguments in favor of the narrow content, I show that the notion is inevitably wrong-headed. This is probably the reason why even one of the most radical proponents of narrow content, J. Fodor, changed his mind and rejected the narrow content in favor of wide content (Fodor 2008). Any future effort of defending the notion of narrow content will have to face the challenge of demonstrating that the narrow content has semantic properties. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [124] 2.1. The philosophical notion of intension and extension It is generally assumed that there is an analogy between linguistic meaning and content of mental representation (Pitt 2013). Traditionally, intension or connotation (meaning for linguistic expressions, content for mental representation) and extension (mental representation can be about something, true or false about an object, or true or false simpliciter) are attributed to mental representations and linguistic expressions.1 The correspondence between language and thought with reality can justify this analogy; both linguistic expressions and mental representations refer to reality and describe it. A complex expression is extensional if its denotation is a function of denotations of its constituent expressions (Jadacki 2001). In extensional contexts, substituting one of the constituents of an extensional expression with a constituent with the same denotation does not change the logical (or semantical) value of the whole expression. Knowing the denotation of constituents of an extensional expression is sufficient to determine the logical (or semantical) value of the whole expression. I'll illustrate this by two sentences: a) George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama in 2012. b) The last but one ex-president of the US voted for Barack Obama in 2012. Sentence b) was formed as a result of substituting one of the constituents of an extensional expression, \"George W. Bush\", with a constituent with the same denotation, \"the last but one ex-president of 1 Connotation is the minimal set of properties related to a language expression X that anyone speaking the language to which X belongs can use to recognize the referent of X. The notion of connotation is traditionally used interchangeably with a concept of intension (Copi and Cohen 2002). However, these concepts are sometimes differentiated. This happens when one assumes a slightly different sense of intension. In the Carnapian tradition, intension is the function of language expressions onto noncontradictory sets of propositions (Carnap 1947), and in tradition of twodimensional semantics it is a function onto possible worlds (Chalmers 2004). This function assigns the extension to a term (in a given possible world). For example, in our possible world, the terms \"Evening Star\" and \"Morning Star\" have the same intension across contexts, but different connotations. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [125] the US\", but the logical value of the sentence did not change. Both expressions refer to a specific person, that is the former US president, George W. Bush. An expression is intensional (referentially opaque) if and only if it is not extensional. In expressions occurring in intensional contexts, substitution of a selected constituent of a sentence with another constituent of the same logical (or semantical) value may change the logical value of the whole sentence. Intensional expressions include such sentences as \"x thinks that p\", \"x knows that p\", \"x wants p\", \"x believes that p\". Suppose that George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama, but Johnny does not know that George W. Bush is the last but one expresident of the US. I'll illustrate this by the following example: a) George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama in 2012. b) The last but one ex-president of the US voted for Barack Obama in 2012. Both constituent parts, namely \"George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama in 2012\" (in the sentence a*) and \"The last US expedition voted for Barack Obama in 2012\" (in the sentence b*), have the same logical value, but sentence a* may have a different logical value than b* if Johnny thinks that the last but one ex-president of the US and George W. Bush are two different people. 2.2. Naturalized conceptual role semantics A naturalistic account of content of mental representation that explicates the content in terms of their functional roles in a cognitive system is a promising attempt to provide semantics for psychology. By a functional role, it is generally meant: the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making (Block, 1998). This definition of a conceptual role is, however, very general. It can be accepted both by internalists, who adopt the notion of narrow content, as well as externalists, who embrace wide content. Narrow content is limited to the functional role within the cognitive system, while wide content also includes the context and environmental circumstances in which the cognitive system is situated. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [126] 2.2.1. In search of narrow content. Cognitive nature of content According to internalists, the concept of narrow content suffices to describe, explain, and predict the intentional states of all cognitive systems. They consider the concept of wide content to be defective and useless in psychology, as the concept seems to be too dependent on the circumstances of its occurrence and insufficiently dependent on the structure of the cognitive system itself. In order to evaluate these theses, I will closely examine the concept of narrow content, the arguments evoked for its defense, and intuitions underlying internalist views. Internalists point out to the mind's ability to think about things that are not the case. I will illustrate such intuitions by an example of Johnny standing at the bus stop waiting for the bus. If he has an incorrect timetable, he may still think of the bus, even though a vehicle is not arriving and will not arrive. Moreover, the same thought about the bus can reappear in the boy's head at various times and at different places: both at the bus stop and at home. So, it would seem that thoughts preserve their content regardless of their context (place or time). Johnny can also think at any time of a mountain of gold, even though he knows perfectly well that it does not exist. Thoughts also retain their content when they do not refer to anything real. The concept of narrow content preserves the independence of content of thought with regard to such factors as reference and satisfaction conditions. Thus, an internalist G. Segal describes it as cognitive content in contrast to referential/truth-conditional content (Segal 2000). Internalism opposed externalism, including Wisconsin style informational-causal theory of reference, which rejects the autonomy of content from reference. The idea of extreme externalism was spelled out by H. Putnam in his Twin-Earth thought experiment (Putnam 1975). Putnam shows that intension does not determine extension. Imagine that on a distant Twin Earth, a liquid called \"water\" does not refer to a chemical substance H2O, but to XYZ. Water from Earth is indistinguishable from water on Twin Earth: it looks the same and tastes the same. Imagine that before the discovery of the chemical structure of water, before 1750, on Earth, there was Oscar1, who had a twin brother on the Twin Earth, Oscar2. Oscars did not distinguish XYZ from H2O and for both the intension of the expression \"water\" was the same: a colorless, potable liquid. Putnam claims that the meaning of the Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [127] word \"water\" as used by Oscar1 was not the same as the meaning of a word \"water\" uttered on the Twin Earth, because these expressions differed in their denotation. It is not the case that intension fully determines extension, because the environment is also critical for meaning. Internalists claim that there was a common meaning of the word \"water\" on both planets, which is not reflected in claims of externalists, according to which the content of the same term was different on both planets. Their claim overlooks, according to internalists, an essential aspect of mental content thanks to which one can predicate the same attributes about the same object independently of external factors. 2.2.2. Determination of narrow content in terms of supervenience According to Block's definition, internalists propose to characterize content only in terms of its causal-inferential roles within an individual cognitive system. Narrow content is therefore a part of the internal structure of an individual cognitive system; it participates in its cognitive life – in its inferences, decision-making, and so on (Block 1987). The fact that it is all about the internal structure of an individual cognitive system is emphasized by Segal (who defines narrow content in terms of local supervenience), according to which narrow content is a property of mental representation completely independent of any external factors. Internalism assumes that narrow content can only be determined by the internal structure of an individual cognitive system. The content of mental representation is entirely determined by intrinsic properties of an agent or a cognitive system. An intrinsic property is a property that the object has (or not) regardless of what is the case beyond that object (Yablo 1999). An example of an intrinsic property is a square's property of having-four-equal-sides: a square always has four equal sides, regardless of how things are outside it. On the other hand, being a living organism is not an intrinsic property of an organism, because the organism would not have this property if it didn't, for example, breathe oxygen. And so, intrinsic properties of a cognitive system are those properties of the internal structure of the cognitive system that remain independent of any external factors of the system. To talk of such properties, I will use a term microstructural properties. Microstructural properties are properties of an internal structure of a cognitive system and its parts (and relationships between Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [128] them) unlike macrostructural properties which include relationships with the environment and other agents.2 The claim about the determination of narrow content expressed in terms of local supervenience states that contentful properties depend only asymmetrically on microstructural properties of a cognitive system. Segal characterizes narrow content in terms of local supervenience on the microstructure of a cognitive system. He argues that microstructural properties are sufficient to determine the neural and computational properties of a system, i.e., narrow content: Fix an object's microstructure and you fix its atomic and molecular structure, its neurological and computational properties, and so on. (Segal 2000, 14). The definition of narrow content in terms of local supervenience allows us to explicate more precisely how content is determined according to internalism, and at the same time, to indicate a problem related to the determination understood this way. Local supervenience does not allow us to precisely define the character of narrow content, since it does not provide a way to define properties independent from the external environment to the system, and narrow content depends only on these properties. On the contrary, it excludes only certain groups of (externalistic) accounts. Moreover, the consequence of a local supervenience claim is that all cognitive interactions with environment are irrelevant for content, which is fully reducible to the microstructure of the system. Here, an ontological reduction is at stake, that is, a relation between elements of the real world, such as objects, events or properties. It occurs if relationships, such as elimination, identity, superposition, realization, or supervenience occur (van Gulick 2001) ⁠. Because in internalism supervenience between properties is assumed, it is an example of such an ontological reduction. 2 The terms microstructural and macrostructural have been proposed by R. Poczobut, who formulated the supervenience claim in terms of micro and macrostructure (Poczobut 2007). Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [129] 2.3. Fodorian methodological solipsism I will now concentrate on Fodor's defense of the concept of narrow content in his methodological solipsism (Fodor 1980; Stich 1980). Narrow content in Fodor's view arises from the reduction of semantic properties to syntactic ones and to innate semantic properties as well. This reduction, is not, however, a full naturalization, as it is unclear how innate content is determined. Thus, only a total reduction of the content to syntactic properties is fully consistent and naturalistic, but such an account on narrow content deprives it, alas, of its content. Consequently, the syntactic understanding of content is contrary to what Fodor claims inadequate for psychology and cognitive sciences. Thus, conceptual role semantics that would accept only narrowly understood content would not be a semantics for psychology. 2.3.1. Narrow content in methodological solipsism Fodorian methodological solipsism plays a key role in developing the concept of narrow content in psychology and philosophy of psychology. Within this framework, Fodor attempts to defend methodologically individualist psychology as the only proper approach to psychological research. He responds to Putnam's counterarguments against the classical claim that intension determines extension 3 Narrow content in methodological solipsism is characterized by inferential roles that are syntactic and computational.4 Fodor argues that knowledge of intrinsic properties, especially formal representational properties suffices to describe the content of a 3 Later Fodor did not link individualism in psychology and methodological solipsism so closely. Moreover, he distinguished between methodological solipsism and methodological individualism (Fodor 1987). According to methodological solipsism, mental states are individuated without semantic valuation; an (externally) relational taxonomy of mental states is methodologically unacceptable. Methodological individualism, on the contrary, allows for relational individuation of mental states provided that a mental state property is only included in the mental states taxonomy if it is causally relevant (Heath 2015). 4 Identification of inferential roles with causal ones stems from the classic computational account of functionalism. Inferential roles characterized syntactically are roles in a computational architecture of mind (Field 1978; Fodor 1975). Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [130] representation. He claims that it suffices to express all content relevant to cognitive psychology. According to Fodor, a representational relation has two related members. It consists of a relation to a sentential object, described formally (syntactically), and of a relation to this object, described semantically in terms of truth and reference. However, as Fodor adduces, formal properties of narrow content are sufficient to distinguish semantically different representations. Fodor is, therefore, a proponent of a formalist account of a theory of content, whereby formal properties of signs (e.g., their shapes or structure) and syntactic rules are sufficient to characterize content. Fodor describes the mind as a so-called oracle machine, where \"oracle\" is understood, after Turing, as a procedure that settles a question in a non-computational (non-algorithmic) manner. According to Fodor, the role of oracle is played by the perceptual states of an environment: The point is that, so long as we are thinking of mental processes as purely computational, the bearing of environmental information upon such processes is exhausted by the formal character of whatever the oracles write on the tape. In particular, it doesn't matter to such processes whether what the oracles write is true; whether, for example, they really are transducers faithfully mirroring the state of the environment, or maybe the output end of a typewriter manipulated by a Cartesian demon bent on deceiving a machine (Fodor 1980, 65). Fodor claims that a formal difference makes a functional difference, which in turn makes a causal difference: The form of explanation goes: it's because different content implies formally different internal representations (via the formality condition) and formally distinct mental representations can be functionally different; can differ in their causal role. Whereas, to put it mildly, it is hard to see how internal representations could differ in causal role unless they differ in form (Fodor 1980, 68). For Fodor, this is a pragmatic argument for substituting formal properties with semantic ones in explanations. Fodor, like Davidson, defends folk psychology, and therefore points out that statements about beliefs, thus referentially opaque Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [131] contexts, are crucial in folk psychology. He even claims that folk psychology does not need anything more than an explanation of representation in opaque contexts, in which generalizations are about what people mean by propositions to which they express propositional attitudes. Propositions that occur in opaque contexts differ not only in content but also in their form. That is why such sentences do not undermine the Fodor's assumption that only intrinsic structural properties have causal powers. Formal properties suffice, according to Fodor, to adequately describe the content, such as beliefs, even in opaque contexts. Later in this paper, I will argue against Fodorian concept of narrow content, according to which a formal difference is sufficient to explain the difference in intension. 2.3.3 Concept innateness Fodor defends his own account of concepts, which is a philosophical interpretation of a classical theory of concepts, enriched by an innateness hypothesis. In a classical theory, the concept is: a class representation, covering all relevant properties of such class. A criterion of relevance is repetition an essential feature is the feature that characterizes all objects belonging to this class, i.e., in other words the common feature of all objects belonging to this class (Maruszewski 1983). Maruszewski's definition differs just a little from the classical definition of connotation, according to which connotation of z is a property which applies to all z-s and only z-s (see also Jadacki 2001, 107). The innateness hypothesis states that our basic conceptual apparatus is innate.5 We have a language of thought, that is, an internal 5 The concept of innateness is unclear and can be understood in many different ways, especially since in contemporary psychology one does not disregard the biological basis of cognition. In biology, it is by no means clear not only what is innate but also what innateness is; philosophers of biology challenge the utility of such a concept (Samuels 2002, 2004; Griffiths 2002). One of the explications of the concept of innateness on the biological ground defines innateness as a disposition to behave under normal conditions. This explication, however, must go beyond narrow content, as normal conditions always appear in an environment. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [132] code, to which all other concepts can be reduced, and we can perform proper combinatorial operations (Fodor 1975). For example, a nonbasic concept of BORING BOOK consists of basic concepts BOOK and BORING. One of Fodor's most important arguments for the language of thought hypothesis in psychology is the productivity of thought. Language is one such productive system. Fodor has to justify why it is language and not another productive representation system that is innate. The key argument for language innateness serves this purpose. Fodor (1975), analyzing psychological theories of concept learning, notes that they all regard learning concepts as a process of hypothesizing. Hypotheses can only be posed in language, and, therefore, in order for a child to pose them she must have an innate language of thought. Before she can learn concepts she must be able to formulate such hypotheses. That is why language, and not a different productive representation system, is innate: in a different system such hypotheses cannot be made. Let's go back to productivity. It is obvious that we can also think an infinite number of different thoughts; similarly, we can utter an infinite number of sentences, for example \"Giraffes do not play poker\". According to Fodor, it is impossible to explain the productivity of language and thought without assuming the compositionality of language. It is language that is so rich in structure that makes it productive. Therefore, as he claims, thinking occurs in a linguistic medium. A special case of concepts in the Fodorian account are concepts that can no longer be broken into constituent parts. These include concepts for simple sensory qualities, i.e., shapes and colors, and the simplest colloquial concepts. The structure of a concept also plays a role in deciding whether a concept belongs to a basic category: it must be a concept without which other concepts cannot be created in virtue of a compositional principle. For example, a concept BORING BOOK is a nonbasic complex concept consisting of a basic concept BOOK and a basic concept BORING concepts BOOK and BORING cannot be simplified further and these are concepts without which creating a concept BORING BOOK would be difficult. By design, methodological solipsism forbids citing environmental properties in explaining the determination of the content of such basic concepts. Thus, they remain unexplained, and the Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [133] Fodorian account can never really explain how their content was determined. The content of basic concepts remains an aporia of methodological solipsism. Within methodological solipsism, determining the content of basic concepts is logically impossible: if they are innate, they depend not only on the individual cognitive agent but also on biological inheritance, which goes beyond the agent. The hypothesis of an innate conceptual apparatus could remain consistent with the local supervenience of such narrow content on the formal properties of a conceptual apparatus, if only the formal properties of this apparatus constituted the basis of conceptual content. Fodor, however, is opposed to the total reduction of semantics to formal properties. One way to solve the problem of the determination of content of basic concepts, which would allow him to preserve methodological solipsism, is to treat it precisely as a formalistic account, that is, purely syntactic. As a result, this could strengthen and radicalize Fodor's account. Fodor does not accept the strong claim that all semantic properties can be reduced to syntactic ones, but he claims something weaker: formal properties are the most satisfactory indicator of content. I do not intend to argue with that: indeed, the form is the simplest indicator of difference in content and, in addition to this, it works well in many situations. 2.3.4. Methodological solipsism and a formalist account In this section, I will examine Stich's more radical account which argues for a complete reduction of semantics to syntax and, consequently, for the elimination of the notion of representation from folk psychology. Stich indicates to what exactly the reduction of content to formal property leads. In essence, Stich shows that an internalist concept of content is not a concept of content. This means that internalism cannot naturalize intentionality. Stephen Stich starts from a formalist interpretation of methodological solipsism, criticizing Fodor's argument for this position. Stich's counterargument can be understood as being directed against methodological solipsism as well as against psychology that uses the notion of representation. Stich's objection to Fodor's notion of narrow content shows that this notion is divergent from its folk counterpart and, consequently, cannot be used to defend folk psychology. Stich thus Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [134] argues for rejecting any concept of content. In addition, he is against representationalism because he thinks as Fodor does that computational psychology does not adhere to the principle of charity and thus, does not take the semantic properties of representations, such as truth, into account. Stich argues against Fodor that his concept of narrow content leads to undesirable consequences: First, most computational (or formal) mental states will have tokens (either actual or possible) whose contents are radically different from one another, as judged by our \"aboriginal, uncorrupted, pretheoretic intuition\". Second, there will be some computational mental state types whose tokens can be assigned no content at all by our aboriginal intuitions, though these \"contentless\" computational states will serve the purposes of the computational theory of mind fully as well as their contentful cousins (Stich 1980, 97). First, Stich observes the concept of narrow content leads to ascribing the same content in intuitively different cases. Second, he stresses that an account of narrow content typical for methodological solipsism leads to one more undesirable consequence: it does not forbid attributting content to beliefs radically diverging from our own beliefs, even if they violate common intuitions about their content. The cases of the first kind are analogous to Putnam's example of Twin Earth. I will mention one of them. In Stich example, Fodor from Yon (Putnam's Twin Earth analogue) appears and utters, analogically to Fodor from Earth: \"Jimmy Carter is from Georgia.\" On the Twin Earth far apart from our Earth, even further than Yon, there could be a Twin Fodor, uttering the same sentence \"Jimmy Carter is from Georgia\". But then, according to the Fodorian account of narrow content, the same content should be attributed to this sentence on Twin Earth. Stich notices that this is completely inconsistent with a common intuition that different Fodors, depending on where they are located, speak of a different Jimmy Carter, depending on where they come from (assuming that on Yon and on Twin Earth there is also Georgia). I agree with Stich that the context of utterance should be taken into account while assigning content to a belief. Indeed, defending an account of reference of proper names requires one to accept a causal account of content that is incompatible with methodological solipsism. Dependence of content Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [135] on context is one of the reasons for adopting the wide account of content. The notion of narrow content should also be attributed to such things or creatures to which the principle of charity would forbid attributing any content. Stich illustrates this with examples of robots whose beliefs are so distant from ours that one can never agree that, according to the principle of charity, their representational states have any content. If there was a robot simulating a human being with beliefs vastly contradicting one other, the principle of charity would not allow us to attribute content to it, because, in such a case, neither truth nor accuracy of its \"beliefs\" could be treated seriously. Fodor has no way to deny that these \"beliefs\" are meaningful by his own lights. In conclusion, Stich shows that a formalist account does not lead to a defense of folk psychology but rather to its rejection. Although he agrees with Fodor that a formalist account suffices to describe content, he goes a step further, claiming that a notion of representation should be rejected totally from folk psychology. At the same time, according to him, we must reject a notion of narrow content and substitute it with a notion of form. I agree with Stich's argument against a notion of narrow content if narrow content is reduced to formal properties. Such a reduction does not properly describe content in contexts in which expressions differ in content but not in form. I propose, however, to treat Stich's argument contrary to his intentions as a warning against an excessively hasty reduction of content to form and against the elimination of the concept of mental representation. Narrow content in methodological solipsism will not allow us to distinguish between representations whose form does not decide their meaning. This group includes homonyms (such as \"bank\") and representations whose meaning depends on the environment (Putnam's example of water on Twin Earth). Their form is the same, but the content is different because: (A) both intension and extension are different (in the case of homonyms); or (b) extension (of representations whose content depends on the environment) is different. A formalist account could deal with homonyms at the level of expressions, denying de facto their existence: by separating those sentences where the word \"bank\" in the meaning of \"a bench of the river\" is different from sentences in which there is a \"bank\" in the meaning of \"a building in which you put your money\" because of Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [136] inferential roles that these words play in sentences, and the roles determine the meaning of the word \"bank\". For formalists more difficult are homonyms at the level of the sentence, where a pragmatic context plays a decisive role: the sentence \"You have huge feet!\" uttered in a shoe store expresses the fact that someone has feet of large size, but uttered in the presence of someone with small feet is ironic. One should also remember the role played by the intonation: the same sentence said in a dismissive tone can be offensive (Dennett 1991). In the case of homonyms at the level of the whole sentence, resorting to inferential roles is practically infeasible it is impossible to distinguish sentences that are so strongly contextually dependent, purely on a syntactic level, thus invoking only their formal properties. The formalist account may, however, show the difference in meaning between the sentences \"George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama in 2012\" and \"The last but one ex-president of the US voted for Barack Obama in 2012,\" because the term \"George W. Bush\" has a different form than the term \"the last but one ex-president of the US\". The formalist account is valid in many interesting cases, in which the form of a vehicle corresponds to representational content. It would be a mistake to ignore formal properties in an account of content. However, in order for a formal account to fully replace semantics, it should be able to explain the cumbersome cases described above. Thus, the adequate account of content should not be a purely formal conception of content, since such an account is powerless in those contexts, in which the reference clearly decides about content. Twin Oscar's statement about water is therefore considered to be different from Earthly Oscar's statement in which \"water\" refers to a different chemical structure on Earth than the one to which it would refer on Twin Earth. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an adequate account of content should not be merely formal. 2.4. Arguments against the formalist account 2.4.1. Chinese Room thought experiment The most well-known polemic against supporters of a formal account of representation, in this case symbolic representation, can be found in J. Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment (Searle 1980). Searle who doesn't know any Chinese is enclosed in a room with a text file in Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [137] Chinese (\"script\") with some additional files: a set of rules (equivalent to a program) correlating the second file with the first one (called by Searle \"a story\") and a set of instructions given in English (questions), allowing to correlate elements from the third file with the first two. These instructions specify how to send certain Chinese symbols of certain shapes, responding to those shapes in a third file. Both the program and answers to such questions are for Searle purely syntactic transformations of symbols. Searle, in his room, is supposed to answer the questions given sometimes in English, and sometimes in Chinese. As it turns out, his answers to the questions in Chinese do not differ from those of a Chinese man who natively speaks Chinese. Additionally, the answers to questions posed in Chinese are as good when seen from the outside as the answers to questions in English. In the first case, Searle's answers are only non-interpreted symbols. Searle's thought experiment is supposed to deal with many philosophical issues, including consciousness, artificial intelligence, and mental representation. I will focus on the last issue, and within it, on the subject of my interest: the possibility to characterize content solely formally. For this purpose, I will appeal to one of many formulations of Searle's argument, and within it, to the interdependence of form and content (Hauser 1997). The argument has the following form: 1. Programs are purely formal. 2. Minds (or at least human minds) have semantics, mental content. 3. The syntax itself does not constitute content nor is a sufficient condition for content. Programs themselves are neither constitutive nor sufficient for the functioning of mind. (Preston and Bishop 2002). Many philosophers question the validity of Searle's argument (Dennett 1987; Chalmers 1996). I think, however, that the core of Searle's argument, that is the claim that syntax is neither identical to content, nor sufficient to describe semantic content, points out a problem that has not been solved by a formalist account of mental representation. It is the case independently of Searle's own account of intentionality (Searle 1983) that is based on his intuition about the role of consciousness. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [138] 2.4.2. The systems reply The systems reply to Searle's experiment comes down to a claim that although Searle, as a person confined in the Chinese room, does not understand Chinese, the whole system does (Searle 1980). Supporters of the systems reply point out that the fact that a person in a room does not understand Chinese does not imply that the system does not. And Searle has never shown anywhere that a whole system does not understand it. According to his opponents, Searle makes a mistake of identifying the part of a system with the system as a whole. Searle would be right only if understanding could be divided like mass. We may cut an apple into pieces: the mass applies both to an apple and to its component parts. Searle must in fact assume that every part of a systems thinks. So, if a person himself understands, a stomach or a liver, for example, understands too; if a stomach would not understand, then a person would not understand too (Copeland 1993). In response to this objection, Searle argues that, based on his opponents' arguments, a system that has memorized incomprehensible rules constitutes, together with a sheet of paper, a thinking system, which would be absurd. Searle states that there must be a difference between \"genuinely mental\" systems and those that are not genuine, and that the system itself must be able to detect the difference. Such a system displays according to him biologically \"hardwired\" intentionality. The problem posed by Searle is deep but his solution unsatisfactory. This is because Searle a priori settles the intriguing problem of demarcation between thinking systems and other systems, without showing what the differences actually are. The claim that systems are different definitely does not suffice as a solution. And why exactly are consciousness and biological brains important according to him remains unexplained. 2.4.3. Chinese Room thought experiment reloaded In this section, I will briefly present Searle's experiment in a version slightly modified by S. Harnad; here I also separate the problem of intentionality from the problem of consciousness. Harnad helps us better describe the problem of the relation between a formal symbol and reference of mental representations, which, thanks to his paper, in Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [139] artificial intelligence has been called \"the symbol grounding problem\" (Harnad 1990). Harnad's experiment has two versions. In the first version, he describes learning Chinese as the first language using only a ChineseChinese dictionary, while in the second one, he describes learning Chinese as a second language. The latter one he considers to be feasible, though difficult. However, theoretically crucial is the first one. In Harnad's variant, the Chinese Room experiment is about grounding symbols in something other than other meaningless symbols. It is not other symbols, according to Harnad, that constitute meaning, but relations of the cognitive system with the world. The problem is not whether it is possible to translate some specific language of a given linguistic form into another language of another linguistic form, but rather how to relate a linguistic form to the world. Searle's argument, which is more evident in Harnad's version of it, is that syntactic properties are not sufficient to capture semantics, because for a proper description of semantics one also needs reference and logical value. The argument is thus directed against the internalism of a formalist vein. The formalist account does not allow us to account for the reference. As Fodor shows in the case of sentences with intensional contexts, formal properties of a vehicle make it possible to infer much about truth or falsity of representation. A formalist account does not, however, provide any explanation as to why a representation can be a vehicle of truth. Even if you accept a formalist assumption that mental representations have syntax, which is causally efficacious, it is not clear at all that representations have a property of being true of false. Moreover, under formalistic assumptions, it is by no means clear what physical structure could be considered syntactic and why certain syntactic constructs would correspond to falsehoods and others to truths. 2.5. Internalism and intension determination via learning Internalists have difficulties in explaining action, which is related to their psychologically implausible approach to learning concepts. Fodor assumed that there were necessary and sufficient conditions for having concepts and that an account of narrow content should serve as a satisfactory psychological theory of learning (Fodor 1980). Such an Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [140] approach to learning does not allow, however, to take into account determination of intension via learning. Burge's argument (Burge 1979) is aimed against the account of narrow content and is based on the human capacity to learn concepts. In his example, we are dealing with a thought experiment built analogously to Putnam's experiment, but Burge argues for a role of social context in content determination rather than for the determination by some physical facts. In the experiment, we compare a person whose physical states from birth until now are the same, but which occur in two situations that differ only in the linguistic community or in the social environment. As a consequence, such a person in these two situations uses a term arthritis differently: in the first situation the person knows well the extension of the term, and in the other, he or she uses the term arthritis to designate a disease that can occur in both muscles and joints. According to Burge, the extension of the term depends on the social context in which the person is raised and in which such a term is used. A defender of narrow content could answer that in the second situation the person has only an inkling about arthritis. He or she knows only that it is a disease but he or she is mistaken about what kind of disease it is. However, the defenders of narrow content go too far. They claim that assigning to a person any knowledge of the term's extension is unjustified in the second case, since it is not known what it describes. Usually, learning concepts is time-consuming and gradual. However, according to the classical account, you have the same concept only if you mastered it completely; so the concept of arthritis that is not fully mastered is not yet a concept of arthritis. If that is the case, then we would have to assume that when we do not know necessary and sufficient conditions of concept application (and Fodor himself argues for the claim that, in general, we do not know them; cf (Fodor et al. 1980)), we do not know the same concepts. Without the assumption of innateness, this leads to a very peculiar consequence. It is not easy to indicate necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of terms such as \"game\", \"chair\", or \"animal\", and if they were not innate, then according to the classical theory of concepts, we should say that we do not know them at all. However, if they are innate, then their content is not determined individually. Here again we come across the fundamental aporia of the Fodorian account: his nativism excludes methodological Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [141] solipsism, since innate concepts must have content determined by factors that do not supervene locally, i.e., have content that goes beyond narrow content. What an internalist, such as Fodor, argues against Burge, exposes the weaknesses of Fodor's internalism. Of course, an internalist could give up also the classic theory of concepts and nativism, but then Burge's argument would strike him. So he would have to agree that some determinants of content are social. 2.6. Summary In this paper, I demonstrated that the argument of one-factor internalist account for the sufficiency of narrow content in the theory of representation is inadequate. To summarize, the characterization of narrow content leads either to ambiguity or to depriving the resulting concept of content of semantic properties. If by \"narrow content\" we mean – like Segal – the property of representational content that is completely independent of external factors to a cognitive system, the concept of content remains elusive and nobody knows what it could be. Although understanding content as partially independent from contextual factors allows us to hold content properties invariant in various situations, it seems that understanding content in total abstraction from the external factors of such properties does fit the bill. On the other hand, Fodor's formalistic account, in particular in Stich's radical interpretation, eliminates the properties of content to replace them with syntactic ones. Reasons quoted by defenders of narrow content, such as the ability to articulate thoughts independently of the context or thinking about non-existent objects, speak in favor of the concept of narrow content. Nevertheless, the concept of narrow content abstracts away from both reference and satisfaction conditions, without which it is impossible to understand how mental representations can be vehicles of content. The lack of connection to reference and satisfaction conditions makes it for the account of narrow content impossible to state anything about the adequacy of representation with regard to their targets or referents. Some of these representations apply to an environment, which, in the correct account of content, would explain adaptive behaviors of animals as based on adequate representations of an environment, such as orientation in an environment (e.g., through Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [142] cognitive mapping). Narrow accounts of content do not allow us to state that, for example, a predator made a mistake in hunting while looking for a victim. For this reason, semantic internalism is a mistake as a solution to the problem of intentionality. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [143] REFERENCES Block, Ned. 1987. \"Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.\" Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 615–78. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x. Burge, Tyler. 1979. \"Individualism and the Mental.\" Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1): 73–121. doi:10.1111/j.14754975.1979.tb00374.x. Carnap, R. 1947. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chalmers, David J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. ---. 2004. \"Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.\" Philosophical Studies 118 (1/2): 153–226. doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019546.17135.e0. Copeland, B. Jack. 1993. Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. Copi, Irving, and Carl Cohen. 2002. Introduction to Logic. 11thed. Upper Saddle River N.J.: Prentice Hall. Dennett, Daniel C. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ---. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York: Back Bay Books / Little Brown and Company. Field, Hartry. 1978. \"Mental Representation.\" Erkenntnis 13: 9–61. Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. 1sted. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. ---. 1980. \"Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.\" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 63–63. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00001771. ---. 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ---. 2008. LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press. Fodor, Jerry A., M F Garrett, E C Walker, and C H Parkes. 1980. \"Against Definitions.\" Cognition 8 (3): 263–367. Griffiths, Paul Edmund. 2002. \"What Is Innateness?\" The Monist 85 (1). Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [144] Gulick, R. van. 2001. \"Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/body Problem. A Philosophic Overview.\" Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9–10): 1–34. Harnad, Stevan. 1990. \"The Symbol Grounding Problem.\" Physica D 42: 335–46. Hauser, Larry. 1997. \"Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument.\" Minds and Machines 7 (2): 199–226. Heath, J. 2015. \"Methodological Individualism.\" In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Jadacki, Jacek. 2001. Spór O Granice Języka : Elementy Semiotyki Logicznej I Metodologii. Warszawa: Wydawn. Naukowe Semper. Maruszewski, Tomasz. 1983. Analiza Procesów Poznawczych Jednostki W Świetle Idealizacyjnej Teorii Nauki. Poznań: Wydawn. Nauk. Uniwersytetu im. A. Mickiewicza. Pitt, David. 2013. \"Mental Representation.\" Edited by Edward N Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/mentalrepresentation/. Poczobut, Robert. 2007. \"Eksternalizm Treści Umysłowej a Superweniencja.\" Kognitywistyka I Media W Edukacji2 9 (1): 82– 106. Preston, John, and Mark Bishop. 2002. Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press. Putnam, Hilary. 1975. \"The Meaning of Meaning.\" In Philosophical Papers, Vol. II : Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Samuels, Richard. 2002. \"Nativism in Cognitive Science.\" Mind and Language 17 (3): 233–65. doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00197. ---. 2004. \"Innateness in Cognitive Science.\" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3): 136–41. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.010. Searle, John R. 1980. \"Minds, Brains, and Programs.\" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756. ---. 1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge / New York: Cambridge University Press. Segal, Gabriel. 2000. A Slim Book about Narrow Content. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press. http://www.worldcat.org/title/slim-bookabout-narrow-content/oclc/42771559&referer=brief_results. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [145] Stich, Stephen P. 1980. \"Paying the Price for Methodological Solipsism.\" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 97. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00002016. Yablo, S. 1999. \"Intrinsicness.\" Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2): 479–505. Krystyna Bielecka Semantic Internalism Is a Mistake [146] ABSTRACT SEMANTIC INTERNALISM IS A MISTAKE The concept of narrow content is still under discussion in the debate over mental representation. In the paper, one-factor dimensional accounts of representation are analyzed, particularly the case of Fodor's methodological solipsism. In methodological solipsism, semantic properties of content are arguably eliminated in favor of syntactic ones. If \"narrow content\" means content properties independent of external factors to a system (as in Segal's view), the concept of content becomes elusive. Moreover, important conceptual problems with one-factor dimensional account are pointed out as a result of analysis arguments presented by J. Searle, S. Harnad and T. Burge. Furthermore, these problems are illustrated with psychological and ethological examples. Although understanding content as partially independent from contextual factors allows theorists to preserve content properties, it seems that understanding content in total abstraction from external factors of these properties is implausible. As a result, internalism is rejected in favor of externalism. KEYWORDS: internalism; externalism; one-factor dimensional account of representation; mental representation; Fodor; methodological solipsism", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Aesthetic Value, Cognitive Value, and the Border Between It is sometimes held that \"the aesthetic\" and \"the cognitive\" are separate categories.1 I disagree. I doubt that we can carve up the conceptual space so neatly. Accordingly, in this paper, I will challenge the independence or autonomy of aesthetic and cognitive categories. But I will do so in an unorthodox fashion. Most attempts proceed by arguing that cognitive values can bear upon aesthetic ones. Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims and values. They require distinct modes of attention and reward divergent kinds of appreciation. Thus, we must avoid running together aesthetic and cognitive matters. 2 I will approach from the opposite direction. I will show that a work's aesthetic merits can affect its cognitive ones and, more provocatively, its philosophical ones.3 1. Definitions Some definitions are in order. First, I will take aesthetic value to refer to that which makes an object worthy or unworthy of being perceived, contemplated, or otherwise appreciated for its own sake.4 1 See, for example, Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), 253–254, Ch. 7; Peter Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries,\" in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2006), 134. Accordingly, I will not take it to reside simply in those aspects of an object productive of sensory pleasure or its opposite, such as beauty, gracefulness, elegance, and their contraries. I will treat it as being realized by a range of fea2 Aesthetic cognitivists take this route. See, for example, Berys Gaut, \"Art and Cognition,\" in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2006); Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005); M. W. Rowe, \"Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth,\" The Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 188 (1997): 322-341. 3 For other discussions of this claim, see Lee B. Brown, \"Philosophy, Rhetoric and Style,\" The Monist 63, no. 4 (1980): 425–44; Arthur C. Danto, \"Philosophy as/and/of Literature,\" Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 58, no. 1 (1984): 5-20; Charles Griswold, \"Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues,\" Monist 63, no. 4 (1980): 530-546; Steven Fuller, \"When Philosophers are Forced to be Literary,\" in Literature as Philosophy/Philosophy as Literature, ed. Donald G. Marshall (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987), 24-39; Lawrence M. Hinman, \"Philosophy and Style,\" Monist 63, no. 4 (1980): 512-529; Bernd Magnus, \"Deconstruction Site: The 'Problem of Style' in Nietzsche's Philosophy,\" Philosophical Topics 19, no. 2 (1991): 215-243; Martha C. Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3-53. 4 Here I follow Peter Kivy, \"What Makes 'Aesthetic' Terms Aesthetic?,\" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36, no. 2 (December 1, 1975): 211; Alan H. Goldman, Aesthetic Value (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 20. 2 tures, including what Noël Carroll calls expressive properties (e.g. somber, melancholic, gay, bold, stately, pompous), Gestalt properties (e.g. unified, balanced, tightly knit, chaotic), taste properties (e.g. gaudy, vulgar, kitschy, garish), and reaction properties (e.g. sublime, beautiful, comic, suspenseful).5 I will exclude from the purview of my investigation aesthetic value properties that are cognitive in nature, such as being profound, insightful, true, or misleading. Although they qualify as aesthetic on some accounts, 6 Second, when I turn to cognitive values, I will focus on a proper subset of them, namely those we might call philosophical values. Doing otherwise would once again diminish the interest of my thesis. The general category of cognitive value includes such things as pedagogical or instructional value. including them would render my thesis trivial. Mere substitution would generate the conclusion that aesthetic value can affect cognitive value. 7 There is nothing novel or profound about trumpeting the importance of aesthetic considerations here.8 What is philosophical value such that attention to it possesses greater interest in this context? We can begin with the point that philosophical texts aim at truth. Their goal is to convey ideas that are true. Texts that move us or display eloquence and wit more often hit home. We more frequently remember them, incorporate their conclusions into our web of beliefs, and integrate their ideas into our practical deliberations. 9 5 Noël Carroll, Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1999), 190. It should be apparent from this list that, following Goldman, I do not believe aesthetic properties have to be directly perceptible. See Alan H. Goldman, \"Aesthetic Qualities and Aesthetic Value,\" The Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 27. Accordingly, their value qua philosophical texts- their philosophical value-partly consists in whether they achieve this goal. Another portion concerns how well they support the truths they proclaim. Indeed, the strength of a text's arguments is likely the most decisive measure of its philosophical merit. However, other considerations deserve mention, including the internal consistency of the text and its contributions to issues of perennial interest to the philosophical community. Although not exhaustive, this list is sufficiently informative for our purposes. 6 For a discussion of this point, see Gaut, \"Art and Cognition\"; Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts.\" 7 See Gaut, \"Art and Cognition,\" 115. 8 See Horace [Quintus Horatius Flaccus], Ars Poetica, trans. Henry Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library 194 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), lines 343–344; Peter Kivy, Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 88–89. 9 See Peter Lamarque, \"Learning from Literature,\" Dalhousie Review 77, no. 1 (1997): 10; Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts,\" 134. 3 The foregoing account of philosophical value might appear to undercut my thesis. We might wonder how it could matter to our philosophical assessment of a work whether it exhibited great literary eloquence, profoundly moved us on an emotional level, or contained that high level of implicit meaning known as \"semantic density.\"10 Indeed, of what philosophical importance could it be whether the prose of a text was lifeless, serene, dynamic, vulgar, vivid, or suspenseful? Such considerations look irrelevant to the strength of a work's arguments, its internal consistency, or the truth of its conclusions. Claiming otherwise seems to involve a category mistake.11 Nevertheless, I will defend the counterintuitive line. I will argue that the aesthetic value of a text can bear upon the philosophical value of a text. That is not to say that it always does so, or that it is ever the sole determining factor, only that it sometimes does so and to some degree. 2. Clarifications In principle, aesthetic value could bear upon cognitive value in two ways. First, some aesthetic values might be constitutive of cognitive value. In other words, possession of them could be commendatory or pejorative in a cognitive sense. Second, some aesthetic values might ground judgments about cognitive value. The fact that a work has them could provide reasons for a positive or negative assessment of its cognitive merit. I shall proceed along the latter front. I will argue that some aesthetic values bear upon cognitive values by grounding them. Now aesthetic values supervene on aesthetic properties. Such supervenience takes two forms.12 First, some aesthetic properties are themselves evaluative.13 They are bearers of aesthetic value or that in which aesthetic value resides. Thus, to say that an object has one of these properties is in part to say that the object is to some degree aesthetically good or bad.14 10 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 128–129; Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, 48. For example, to describe a work as sublime, moving, or bold 11 See Griswold, \"Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues,\" 530–531; Hinman, \"Philosophy and Style,\" 512–514; Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts,\" 134; Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" 8; Magnus, \"Deconstruction Site,\" 216–217. 12 Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 20; Göran Hermerén, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities, Studies in Aesthetics 1 (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1988), 76, 144–159. 13 I allow that evaluative properties might also be descriptive. See Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 25. 14 Hermerén, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities, 149. 4 is normally to appraise it positively. To call it dreary, derivative, or boring is typically to assess it negatively.15 Second, some aesthetic properties are not evaluative, but are nonetheless relevant to aesthetic value. More specifically, they figure into our explanations of why an object warrants a positive or negative aesthetic value judgment. 16 I will focus on aesthetic properties that are themselves evaluative. I do not merely wish to show that a work's aesthetic properties bear upon its philosophical value but that its aesthetic value does so. For example, to describe the pace of a novel as fast is not necessarily to evaluate it. Yet, we might point to the fact that a novel is fast-paced to account for why we call it gripping, which typically would be an evaluative comment. 17 3. False Starts The following observation provides a tempting point of departure. When assessing philosophical texts, we often raise considerations that fall into a category that overlaps with aesthetics, namely stylistics. We praise or criticize works because they possess or lack properties such as clarity, succinctness, awkwardness, and eloquence.18 15 Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 20. We must take care here for several reasons. First, the contribution of almost any particular aesthetic value to a work's overall aesthetic merit can be overridden by the presence of other aesthetic values of the opposite valence. For example, a work might possess elegance. However, if it is also derivative, we might consider it an impoverished work of art all things considered. Thus, aesthetic values are pro tanto in nature. Second, whether an aesthetic value property has a positive or negative valence often depends on context. For instance, gracefulness is typically a good-making property. However, it might detract from artwork intent upon exhibiting the brutality of war. See Robert Stecker, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 68. Third, whether an aesthetic property is evaluative at all may be context-dependent. Consider mournfulness. Kivy maintains that it has a positive valence in a lament, a negative valence in an epithalamion, but \"may very well be neutral if a feature of a violin sonata\" (\"What Makes 'Aesthetic' Terms Aesthetic?,\" 201.). We include \"well-written,\" or its opposite, in referee reports and in comments on student papers. The existence of such vocabulary in our critical practices suggests that stylistic considerations (and so perhaps aesthetic ones) may fall under the purview of philosophical val16 Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 20–21; Hermerén, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities, 76–79. 17 Merely showing that the aesthetic properties of a work bear upon its cognitive value will not establish my thesis that aesthetic value affects cognitive value. The reason is that we might have a common cause story on our hands. The aesthetic property in question might serve as the basis of both an aesthetic value and a cognitive value without the aesthetic value having any bearing on the cognitive value. 18 Brown, \"Philosophy, Rhetoric and Style,\" 425–426; Griswold, \"Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues,\" 529. 5 ue. After all, some scholars cite the appearance of cognitive vocabulary in art criticism as evidence that cognitive values influence aesthetic ones.19 We must tread carefully here. The fact that an evaluative judgment concerns a philosophical work does not necessarily make it a judgment about the philosophical value of that work. The reasons for the judgment matter. Why should not something of the reverse hold as well? 20 A second observation might afford better initial footing. We might defend the idea that aesthetic value can influence cognitive value by noting that we esteem some philosophical texts as highly as we do precisely because of their aesthetic merits. For instance, Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals and Quine's \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\" probably would not occupy such lofty places in the canon were it not for their incomparable wit. Augustine's Confessions likely would attract fewer readers were it less moving. Finally, Austin's \"Truth\" might have received less attention had it not contained so many quotable passages. For example, if I extol William Irwin's The Simpsons and Philosophy because it has made a large sum of money, or if I laud Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged because of its influence on American culture, my evaluations are not philosophical in nature. In neither case am I concerned with the truth of the work's the content, the strength of its arguments, its relevance to perennial philosophical problems, etc. The same point might hold with regard to assessments based on stylistic considerations. Although frequently made of philosophical works, stylistic assessments might reveal nothing about their philosophical value. At least, we would need additional reasons before ruling out this possibility. Thus, we cannot conclude from the mere existence of stylistic vocabulary in criticisms of philosophical writing that stylistic value (and thus perhaps aesthetic value) bears upon philosophical value. 21 Conceding the accuracy of these conjectures, what follows? What do we learn from the fact that the philosophical community values texts partly for aesthetic rea- 19 See Rowe, \"Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth.\" 20 See J. O. Urmson, \"What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?,\" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 31 (1957): 75-92. 21 The opening lines provide the most notable example: \"'What is truth?' said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Pilate was in advance of his time. For 'truth' itself is an abstract noun, a camel, that is, of a logical construction, which cannot get past the eye even of a grammarian. We approach it cap and categories in hand: we ask ourselves whether Truth is a substance (the Truth, the Body of Knowledge), or a quality (something like the colour red, inhering in truths), or a relation ('correspondence'). But philosophers should take something more nearly their own size to strain at. What needs discussing rather is the use, or certain uses, of the word 'true'. In vino, possibly, 'veritas', but in a sober symposium 'verum',\" (\"Truth,\" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 24 (1950): 111. 6 sons? Not much. It indicates that the philosophical community cares about more than just philosophical matters. It also implies that some texts have aesthetic as well as philosophical value.22 4. Philosophical Content and Aesthetic Properties However, neither point entails that the possession of aesthetic value affects the possession of philosophical value. Where, then, to begin? Perhaps the proper place is with the notion that a text's aesthetic properties can implicitly express statements and claims. This idea is not novel, having been suggested by Martha Nussbaum,23 Peter Kivy,24 and others.25 First, note that works of literature typically prompt us to take up the point of view of the (presumed) narrator. For example, when reading Camus's The Stranger, we find ourselves looking at the world through the eyes of Mersault. The pages of Dickens's Copperfield draw us into the title character's perspective on life. Finally, the power of Nabokov's Lolita lies in its ability to make us empathize with Humbert Humbert. However, it lacks a robust defense. I will attempt one here. The same does not hold for philosophical texts. Reading them has a different phenomenology. We do not automatically enter into the (presumed) author's world. We do not extend him or her the same leeway regarding the facts. On the contrary, we interrogate each word and sentence. We demand justifications for every assertion made. In addition to extrinsic considerations such as genre, intrinsic ones such as style, structure, and tone facilitate this effect. Take Spinoza's Ethics. It proceeds in an abstract, impersonal, and dispassionate manner. These features keep us at arm's length from Spinoza, the man. They force us to concentrate on the ideas he puts forth. Moreover, the text's geometric feel encourages us to submit it to the same cold, logical analysis we would a mathematical proof.26 22 See also Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts,\" 132. Alternatively, consider the dialogues of Plato, Berkeley, and Hume. The characters in them challenge and question each other's views. We find 23 Martha Nussbaum attributes the view to the ancient Greeks, but what she says also reflects her own position: \"Forms of writing were not seen as vessels into which different contents could be indifferently poured; form was itself a statement, a content\" (\"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" 15). 24 Kivy says, \"For the way in which the artist employs the medium is, in effect, part of the content, because it expresses something in the artist's point of view about the content\" (Philosophies of Arts, 117). 25 Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 147–148; Danto, \"Philosophy as/and/of Literature,\" 7–8; Jenefer M. Robinson, \"Style and Personality in the Literary Work,\" The Philosophical Review 94, no. 2 (April 1, 1985): 227247; Hayden V. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 1–25. 26 See Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" 30–35. 7 ourselves caught up in the process. Transformed into judges of an imaginary debate, we scrutinize the merits of their arguments. These examples show how the formal properties of a philosophical text, such as its style, structure, or tone, can influence our approach to its content. However, the aesthetic properties of a philosophical text can perform a similar function. To see why, it helps to turn to works that do not invite dispassionate responses, such as Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. The Genealogy is a moving, provocative, and even disturbing book. Most conspicuous in this regard is the passage describing the journey of Mr. Rash and Curious into the workshop where Judeo-Christian ideals are made.27 The scene comes across as something out of a horror movie. The workshop is dark and foreboding. Soft muttering and whispering emanate from hidden nooks and crannies. Noxious air overcomes Mr. Rash and Curious; he struggles to contain his stomach. His unease and disgust are contagious; they wash over us.28 These feelings in turn shape how we perceive the workshop's secrets.29 The fact that the aesthetic properties of a text can influence us in this way underwrites their ability to imply claims. The reasoning here is roughly Gricean. When engaging with others, we tacitly assume that they will act cooperatively. They glue our attention to the unnerving aspects of Mr. Rash and Curious's discoveries. Thus, when he reports that Judeo-Christian values are the product of lies and deception, the message has a jarring effect. 30 In part this means that we expect them to encourage us only in appropriate ways. We presume that they will urge us to do only what they believe suits the circumstances. Thus, when an interlocutor prompts us to pursue a specific course of action, we take it that he or she considers the course of action appropriate. In other words, the conventional31 27 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), sec. I.14. See Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 102–105; Christopher Janaway, \"Responses to Commentators,\" European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2009): 145–148; Stephen Mulhall, \"Nietzsche's Style of Address: A Response to Christopher Janaway's Beyond Selflessness,\" European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2009): 121–131. (but defeasi28 For more on emotional contagion, see Amy Coplan, \"Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the Ancients on Emotion and Virtue-Acquisition,\" Metaphilosophy 41, no. 1-2 (January 1, 2010): 132-151. 29 For discussions of how the emotions aroused by a text affect our understanding of it, see Noël Carroll, \"Art, Narrative, and Emotion,\" in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 199–203; Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105–35, 154–194. 30 H. Paul Grice, \"Logic and Conversation,\" in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 45–48. 31 The implication is not a logical one. It does not deductively follow from encouragement that the encourager thinks the activity in question is appropriate. It is always possible that the person is trying to deceive us. 8 ble)32 The existence of such implications is uncontroversial when the encouragement occurs on the semantic level. Take political advertisements. They beg, plead, cajole, and threaten to get us to vote for a particular candidate, party, or proposition. The advertisements thereby imply that doing so is right or good. It is less obvious that similar implications arise when the encouragement operates on the level of formal and aesthetic properties. However, there is no prima facie reason to treat these cases differently. As the examples discussed above reveal, the formal and aesthetic properties of a text can lead us to perform specific actions. They can prompt us to approach a text in a particular way or adopt a certain attitude while reading it. It seems plausible to say that they thereby imply that undertaking these actions is appropriate. implication of a person's encouragement is that what he or she pushes us to do is somehow fitting. 5. The Effect of Aesthetic Properties on Philosophical Value This conclusion feeds into a larger argument about the relationship between aesthetic properties and philosophical values. To begin with, the claims implied by a text's aesthetic properties do not have to align with those that comprise the text's explicit semantic content. The former can say one thing, the latter something else. These two sets of claims can contradict each other.33 A thought experiment illustrates the idea. Imagine an alternative version of Nietzsche's Genealogy. It contains all the explicit philosophical content expressed by the original work. In particular, it includes the claim found in the third essay that our emotions play an essential role in knowledge acquisition. Such a contradiction would be a philosophical defect; it would compromise the consistency of the text. Thus we can see how possessing the wrong aesthetic properties can detract from a text's philosophical value. By the same token, possessing the right aesthetic properties can support the philosophical value of a text. If the implications of a text's aesthetic properties coincided with its explicit content, the consistency of the text would be upheld. 34 32 The implication would be defeated if, for example, we had good reasons for thinking that the author or speaker were jesting. However, the fictional text differs from Nietzsche's actual one in terms of its formal and aesthetic properties. It is not written in a bombastic style. It is neither moving, nor shocking, nor unsettling. Rather, it proceeds in a dispassionate and impersonal manner reminiscent of Spinoza's Ethics. 33 For other discussions of the sort of form-content contradiction described here, see Hinman, \"Philosophy and Style\"; Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature.\" 34 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, sec. III.12. 9 Consequently, it only addresses its readers' intellects; it only arouses those aspects of their minds devoted to abstract reasoning.35 The reason for this contradiction, as well as for the loss of philosophical merit it engenders, deserves emphasis. The contradiction stems from the absence of the very properties that make Nietzsche's actual text aesthetically valuable, namely its ability to move, shock, and unsettle. Thus, the decrease in aesthetic value that occurs when moving from the real text to the fictional one results in a decrease in philosophical value. Conversely, the increase in aesthetic value that occurs when moving in the opposite direction brings about an increase in philosophical value. By way of the Gricean argument outlined above, it follows that the style of the imaginary text implies that a dispassionate approach to its content is fitting. In other words, we need not engage our emotions to grasp what it says. Such an implication, however, is inconsistent with the explicit content of the text. It contradicts the claim that knowledge acquisition requires activation of the emotions. 36 6. The Affect of Aesthetic Value on Philosophical Value We can now draw some general conclusions about the relationship between aesthetic and philosophical value. I have shown that the aesthetic value properties of a text can imply philosophical claims. These implicit claims can stand in various logical relationships with the explicit content of the text. For instance, they can entail the truth or falsehood of any part of it. Consequently, their presence can uphold (in the former case) or undermine (in the latter case) the coherence of the text. In both scenarios, the text's aesthetic value affects its philosophical value. Three cautionary notes are in order. First, the claims implied by a text's aesthetic value properties can also be logically irrelevant to its semantic content. It is possible for them to entail neither the truth nor the falsehood of anything the text explicitly says. In such cases-and they might be the majority-the aesthetic properties of the text might have no bearing on its philosophical value. Second, the properties that positively affect a text's philosophical value need not be aesthetically meritorious. Just as there is bad art and bad literature, so too are there 35 See Martha C. Nussbaum, \"Fictions of the Soul,\" in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 245-260. 36 For other defenses of the philosophical importance of Nietzsche's literary style, see Janaway, Beyond Selflessness; Magnus, \"Deconstruction Site.\" For an opposing view, see Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 13–14. 10 negative aesthetic value properties.37 Third, aesthetic value has only limited impact on philosophical value. The latter consists in a plurality of things, from the truth of the claims made by a text, to the degree of support it provides for these claims, to the influence of its arguments on perennial philosophical problems, to its overall consistency. Aesthetic properties do not bear upon all of these considerations. For those it does affect, it is not the only relevant factor. Consistency, for example, is not simply a matter of the relationship between the claims implied by a text's aesthetic properties and those that comprise its explicit semantic content. The relationship that obtains strictly between the latter set of claims also matters. Moreover, if properties with a positive valence can contribute to philosophical value, as in the case of Nietzsche's Genealogy, so too can those with a negative valence. There may be cases where the literary equivalent of Socrates's ugly visage contributes to the coherence of the text. Consequently, even when aesthetic value does bear upon philosophical value, the correlation will not necessarily be direct. Even accounting for these three caveats, the following claims still hold. In some cases, the possession of aesthetic value positively affects a text's philosophical value. Conversely, the lack of aesthetic merit sometimes engenders philosophical defects. Therefore, we must attend to aesthetic considerations when creating and evaluating philosophical works. The intuitive view that aesthetic value does not bear upon philosophical value is mistaken. 37 See, for example, Stephen Davies, The Philosophy of Art, Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 54.", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Published in The Journal of Philosophy vol. 116, no. 4 (April 2019), 181–205. 1 ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES* Arvid Båve, Stockholm University A good case has recently been made for identifying propositions with a kind of structured act types. Unfortunately, as we will see in this paper, this \"act-type theory of propositions\" entails an unacceptable kind-and amount-of ambiguity in our language. Before outlining this problem, however, let me briefly introduce the theory by relating four central points about it. Firstly, act-type theories divide into Russellian and Fregean variants. The former identifies the proposition that Socrates is wise with the act type of predicating the property of wisdom of Socrates, whereas Fregean variants would rather identify it with some act type directed toward the senses of 'wise' and 'Socrates', for instance, the act type of saturating the sense of 'wise' with that of 'Socrates'.1 (I will discuss * For valuable comments and help, I would like to thank Matti Eklund, Johan Gustafsson, Peter Pagin, and the audiences at the 2018 Workshop on the philosophy of Edward Zalta, Warsaw, the Kolloquium Fuhrmann, Philosophy Department at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, the higher seminar in Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University, and the CLLAM seminar at the Philosophy Department, Stockholm University. 1 The Russellian variant is developed at length by Scott Soames, What is Meaning? (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2010) and Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2015). The Fregean variant has not quite been identified-let alone defended-in the literature, although Wayne Davis comes close in his Meaning, Expression, and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). In Peter Hanks, \"Structured Propositions as Types\", Mind CXX, 477, (January 2011): 11–52, and Propositional Content, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), an ecumenical theory is defended, on which the proposition that Socrates is wise consists of three \"component\" act types: referring to Socrates, expressing wisdom, and predicating wisdom of Socrates. See also Jeffrey King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks, eds., New Thinking About Propositions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). Related but distinct contemporary views are found in Michael Jubien, \"Propositions and the Objects of Thought\", Philosophical Studies, CIV, 1 (May 2001): 47–62, Friederike Moltmann, \"Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products\", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXXXIII, 5-6. (2013): 679–701. Chapter 4 of Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), and Sean Crawford, \"Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?\", Philosophical Studies, CLXVIII, (March 2014): 179–210. A partly historical work on this theme is Friederike Moltmann and Mark Textor, eds., Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), where Husserl, Meinong, Reinach, and Twardowski are presented as important historical forerunners. I would consider including Locke and Arnault, but I will not argue the point here. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 2 only act-type theorists' treatments of logically atomic propositions, as logically complex propositions will be of no relevance for my argument.) Secondly, there is a very common first impression of the act-type theory-to the effect that it must be a plain non-starter-that we should mention at the outset, if only to have it out of our way. The idea is that the theory is a \"category mistake,\" since \"one cannot believe an act type\", \"act types cannot be true or false\", and so on. I take Benjamin Schnieder and Scott Soames to have responded decisively to this type of objection, so I will be content to defer to their works.2 Thirdly, the two main act-type theorists, Scott Soames and Peter Hanks, each identify propositions with some more familiar act on propositions. Soames claims that they are acts of entertaining, so that the proposition that Socrates is wise = the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates = the act type of entertaining the proposition that Socrates is wise.3 Hanks instead takes propositions to be acts of judging.4 The question which of these alternatives is preferable has generated a significant literature, but will not concern us here, as it is unrelated to my argument. Fourth, and finally, the general spirit of the act-type theory is well illustrated by listing its main alleged advantages, which include its ability to do the following: (1) solve the problem of the unity of the proposition, (2) explain how propositions can be inherently representational and have their truth conditions essentially, (3) provide an attractive model of structured propositions, (4) avoid Benacerraf problems of arbitrary identifications, (5) explain how we can have cognitive access to propositions, and (yet) (6) meet the Fregean demand of making propositions abstract, eternal and mindindependent (in the sense that they can exist without any minds existing). Now, while some aspects of the act-type theory have been explored in detail, particularly those connected with the alleged benefits above, little attention has been devoted to the question of how to develop an act-type-theoretical compositional semantics. It is in this connection that the ambiguity problem arises. It arises because many sentences have alternative analyses.5 For instance, 'Mary loves John' can be analysed in three different ways: as the result of saturating 'ξ loves John' with 2 See Benjamin Schnieder, \"By Leibniz's Law: Remarks on a Fallacy\", The Philosophical Quarterly, LVI, 222 (January 2006): 39–54 and Soames, Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning, op. cit., pp. 25ff. 3 Soames, What Is Meaning?, op. cit.; and Soames, Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning, op. cit. 4 4 Hanks, \"Structured Propositions as Types,\" op. cit.; and Hanks, Propositional Content, op. cit. 5 This term derives from Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1981), Chapters 15–16, but Frege had already discussed alternative analyses-both of sentences and of thoughts-in several places. See, for instance, Gottlob Frege, \"Begriffsschrift: a formalized language of pure thought modelled upon the language of arithmetic,\" (1879), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1879/1970), pp. 1–20, section 9; and in Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, and Friedrich Kaulbach, trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 191ff. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 3 'Mary', of saturating 'Mary loves ξ' with 'John', or of saturating 'ξ loves ζ' by 'Mary' and 'John' (in its first and second place, respectively). (Note that 'saturate' is here used in a sense related to linguistic expressions, distinct from the sense intended above, related to senses.) On the most obvious semantics to accompany a Russellian act-type theory, the sentence therefore comes out as expressing both the act type of predicating the property of loving John of Mary and the act type of predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John. But since these act types are directed toward distinct entities, I will argue, they are themselves distinct. Standard act-type theories are thus committed to taking this sentence to be ambiguous. Since this ambiguity is neither intuitive, nor supported by any other kind of linguistic evidence, I regard this argument as a reductio of standard act-type theories. The argument easily generalizes to any atomic sentence with a polyadic predicate. Worse, the number of propositions a sentence comes out as expressing increases exponentially with the number of singular terms in it, making relatively simple sentences come out massively ambiguous. As we will see, however, act-type theorists could try to avoid this consequence by positing several basic act types, say, predicating, predicating*, predicating**, and so on. The final argument will therefore take the form of a dilemma, with standard acttype theories on one horn and this \"pluralist\" variant on the other. The paper is structured as follows. §1 presents some terminology and basic facts about alternative analyses, and next argues that we have no choice but to accept that certain sentences, as well as the propositions they express, indeed have alternative analyses. §2 contains a general discussion about act types and their linguistic designators. I there defend two principles about the identity conditions of act types, which play an important role in the argument. §3 lays out the main argument in full, with the required assumptions about semantic axioms for atomic sentences, and discusses a couple of objections as well as the question whether act-type theorists may bite the bullet and accept the ambiguity. §4 presents an additional argument against pluralist act-type theories, and §5 discusses three retreat positions act-type theorists might consider in view of my argument. In §6, finally, I consider whether the argument generalizes to any theory of structured propositions but conclude that it only sets a constraint on them. It is shown that Jeffrey King's theory6 fails to satisfy it, and thus faces the same ambiguity problem as the act-type theory. I. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF SENTENCES AND PROPOSITIONS I will here explain in greater detail what alternative analyses are and why they are unavoidable. In preparation, I will first introduce some terminology. I will distinguish between simple predicates like 'ξ runs' or 'ξ = ζ', and complex ones, like 'ξ = 3', which results from saturating (in the linguistic sense) the dyadic predicate 'ξ = ζ' in 6 See Jeffrey King, The Nature and Structure of Content (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 4 its second place by '3'. (When saying that 'ξ runs' is simple, I ignore tense and mood.) Further, I will enclose expressions within square brackets, '[' and ']', to refer to the semantic correlate of the expression within. On the Russellian conception of propositions, [love] will be the loving relation, whereas on the Fregean conception it will be the sense of 'love'. Although 'semantic correlate' may on the Russellian conception seem to mean the same as 'semantic value', the latter term would not be neutral with respect to the Russellian-Fregean divide. For on Fregean act-type theories, we want the term to cover the sense of a name, but the \"semantic value\" of a name is rather ubiquitously taken to be its referent. Better, then, to use the neutral term 'correlate'. Note that on both conceptions, the semantic correlate of a sentence is the proposition it expresses. Since the argument is wholly formulated in these neutral terms, it targets at once Fregean and Russellian act-type theories. Now, we have seen that 'Mary loves John' has three analyses. Sentences with more names will have more intricate analyses. For instance, 'F(a, b, c, d, e)' can be analysed inter alia as resulting from saturating 'F(a, ξ, c, d, ζ)' with 'b' and 'e' (in its first and second argument places, respectively). Now, it is easy to see that the number of analyses of an atomic sentence is the same as the number of predicates that can be obtained from it by removing one or more names. This number grows exponentially with the number of names in it: with one name, you get only one analysis, with two names, three analyses, with three names, seven analyses, with four names, fifteen analyses, and with five names, thirty-one analyses. More generally, a sentence with n names has 2\"#$% n−i analyses. We will see below that act-type theorists must posit a separate proposition expressed for each analysis. Hence, the sentence, '6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1' comes out as expressing 31 propositions! There are two main kinds of resistance against the idea of alternative analyses. Frank Ramsey took the very idea to be incoherent, saying that propositions of the form 'Rab' would be associated with \"an incomprehensible trinity, as senseless as that of theology\".7 I side with Geach and Dummett8, however, in deeming his attitude ungrounded, and act-type theorists will scarcely want to respond to the argument by echoing Ramsey's scepticism, especially given the reasons for accepting alternative analyses I will present anon. Secondly, one may consider alternative analyses intelligible but unnecessary, and insist that, for instance, 'Mary loves John' only needs to be analysed as formed by the simple expressions, 'ξ loves ζ', 'Mary', and 'John'. Now, the reason we need to accept alternative analyses is that we have to posit complex predicates and, to go with them, complex predicative propositional constituents. But-as Ramsey correctly noted-once we do, alternative analyses are inevitable. The second part is obvious. For if there is such a predicate as 'ξ loves John', then surely it can be saturated with 'Mary' to yield 'Mary loves John', and similarly for 'Mary loves ξ' and 'John'. And this is just what it means for the sentence to have alternative analyses. The reason we need to posit complex predicates is less obvious. I think we need complex predicates for many purposes in semantics and logic, but I will focus on an argument to the effect that we need them to state certain generalizations about 7 Frank Ramsey, \"Universals\", Mind, XXXIV, 136 (October 1925): 401–417, at 406. 8 See Peter Geach, \"Names and Identity\", in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975): 139–158 and Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 264ff. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 5 inferences.9 Take the commonplace claim that the law of substitution of identicals is truth-preserving. We could state this claim thus: (SI) For any sentences of the forms 'a = b', 'F(a)', and 'F(b)', if the first two are true, so is the third. Here, a sentence of the form 'F(a)' is of course a sentence formed by saturating a monadic predicate with a name. But unless we posit complex monadic predicates, like 'ξ loves John', (SI) will not even entail such obvious instances of (SI) as, (SII) If 'John = James' and 'John loves Mary' are true, so is 'James loves Mary'. Thus, we must accept complex predicates and, hence, alternative analyses. Assuming propositions are structured (as agreed by act-type theorists), we can also show that there are alternative analyses of propositions. If propositions are structured, then a sentence 'F(a)' must be taken to express a proposition composed of the semantic correlates of 'F(ξ)' and 'a', that is, [F(ξ)] and [a]. [F(a)] is thus the value of some function f from [F(ξ)] and [a]; that is, [F(a)] = f([F(ξ)], [a]). 10 But for a sentence like 'Mary loves John', there are two choices for the respective 'F(ξ)' and 'a'. Thus, its semantic correlate, [Mary loves John], must be identical to both f([Mary loves ξ], [John]) and f([ξ loves John], [Mary]). And this is just what it means for a proposition to have alternative analyses. The idea of alternative analyses of propositions is not new. Frege writes, If several proper names occur in a sentence, the corresponding Gedanke can be analyzed into a complete part and an unsaturated part in different ways. The Sinn of each of these proper names can be set up as the complete part over against the rest of the Gedanke as the unsaturated part.11 Alternative analyses of propositions can also be established by an argument similar to the one involving (SI) above. To see this, consider how we might formulate a variant of (SI) that concerns structured propositions rather than sentences. The obvious idea is to say, (PI) For every x, y, P, if f2([=], x, y) and f(P, x) are true, then f(P, y) is true. Here, as before, f takes the semantic correlates of a monadic predicate and a name to a proposition composed by the two, and f2 takes the semantic correlates of a dyadic predicate and two names to a proposition composed of them. The variables 'x' and 'y' in (PI) range over the propositional constituents related to proper names (objects or name-senses), and 'P' ranges over predicative, monadic propositional constituents 9 This argument resembles a line of thought pursued by Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy: 273ff., but I will not discuss the relationship between them here. He actually argued for the stronger and stranger claim that we must posit such predicates as the monadic predicate, 'ξ killed ξ', but I will be content to argue merely for positing such predicates as 'Mary loves ξ', 'John gives ξ to ζ', and so on. 10 For a detailed discussion of this use of functors to designate propositions, see Arvid Båve, \"Concept Designation\", American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. 11 Frege, Posthumous Writings, op. cit., p. 192. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 6 (properties or monadic, predicative senses). But unless 'P' ranges over both simple and complex predicative propositional constituents, (PI) will fail to entail, (PII) If f2([=], [John], [James]) and f([Mary loves ξ], [John]) are true, then f([Mary loves ξ], [James]) is true. So, we must posit complex predicative propositional constituents, which commits us to alternative analyses of propositions. Objection 1: The above appeal to (PI) and (PII) begs the question against Russellians, since they are committed to taking these principles to be incoherent. This is so, since, on their view, and assuming that John = James, the second and third propositions mentioned in (PII) are identical. (PII) therefore cannot be an instance of the law of substitution of identicals, properly speaking.12 Reply: I think it is simply undeniable that (PII) is an instance of the claim that the law of substitution for structured propositions is truth-preserving, and I think Russellians must agree. It is undeniable, after all, that the following is an instance of this claim: If the proposition that Phosphorus is hot is true, and the proposition that Phosphorus = Hesperus is true, then the proposition that Hesperus is hot is true. Further, I do not see why Russellians should take (PI) to be incoherent. Their commitment to taking (PII) to concern only two propositions I think seems no more problematic than their usual commitment to identifying propositions others take to be distinct, such as [Hesperus is hot] and [Phosphorus is hot]. Perhaps what makes (PI) seem uncongenial to Russellians is merely the word 'substitution', since it suggests that one thing is \"substituted for\" another thing. But Russellians can then simply accept (PI)-as it seems they must in any case-and choose a different name for it. Russellians are also not committed to taking (PI) to be objectionably trivial. For by replacing '[=]' in (PI) with '[love]', we get a false principle. Thus, even Russellians can take (PI) to tell us something informative (as far as logical laws go) about identity. Objection 2: 'Mary loves John' has only one analysis, on which its structure is NPVP. Reply: natural language sentences plausibly have both ordinary phrase structure and predicate-argument structure. Besides, it would be bad enough for the act-type theorist if the relevant sentences of first-order logic came out as ambiguous, however things stand with natural languages. II. ACT TYPES AND THEIR DESIGNATORS The present case against the act-type theory leans heavily on two principles stating identity conditions on act types, which I will introduce and defend in this section. These principles will be formulated using such schematic expressions like 'the act type of φ-ing x1, ..., xn', with instances such as 'kissing John', 'giving a to b', and, of course, 'the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates', routinely used by act-type theorists.13 (I will mostly omit the apposition, 'the act type of', however.) 12 This objection is due to an anonymous referee for this journal. 13 See, for example, Soames, Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning, op. cit., p. 20 and Hanks, Propositional Content, op. cit., pp. 36ff. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 7 Expressions of the form 'φ-ing x1, ..., xn' will be called \"structural, canonical acttype designators\", or SCADs. SCADs are like 'that'-clauses in that they have their references independently of any empirical facts, except the facts about what their constituent expressions mean (hence, 'canonical'). 'That'-clauses are like this, too, and thus differ from such \"accidental\", non-canonical proposition-designators as 'what he said', which do so depend. Act types, too, can be referred to thus \"accidentally\": compare 'killing Caesar' with 'the act type Brutus is best known for (having performed a token of)'. SCADs are important for act-type theorists, partly because they are canonical in the sense above, but mainly because they contain designators of propositional constituents, as witnessed by 'the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates', containing 'wisdom' and 'Socrates'. They thereby enable straightforward formulations of compositional semantic axioms for atomic sentences. Note that this does not hold for our brackets: '[F(a)]' does not contain '[a]'. The most important principle about act types for the argument to come is, (A1) If the act type of φ-ing x1, ..., xm = the act type of φ-ing y1, ..., yn, then each of x1, ..., xm is identical to one of y1, ..., yn. To give an intuitive feel for (A1), suppose we have three distinct bricks, a, b, c. Surely, the act type of laying a on b cannot be identical with the act type of laying a on c or laying c on b. Thus, if laying x on y = laying z on w, then each of x and y must be identical to one of z and w, and so on for any basic act type and any number of objects thereby acted upon. Note, though, that x need not be identical with z here, since many acts are symmetrical, like putting together x and y. (When discussing act types like φ-ing x, y, ..., I will occasionally speak of φ-ing as the basic act type, and the following objects, x, y, ..., as the objects acted upon.)14 If (A1) is true, then predicating the property of loving John of Mary must be distinct from predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John, since the four objects acted upon here are distinct. (A1) thereby plays an important part of the argument for the claim that act-type theorists are committed to taking 'Mary loves John' to be ambiguous. (A1) also entails that act-type theorists are committed to holding that an atomic sentence with n alternative analyses will also express n propositions. This, as we have seen, commits them to taking fairly simple sentences to express very many propositions. To see that this is entailed by (A1), recall that each analysis of a given sentence involves a predicate of its own. Each predicate in turn has its own semantic correlate (that is, every other predicate extractable from the sentence has a distinct correlate). It follows, by (A1), that each analysis will be coupled with a unique act type. By standard semantic axioms for atomic sentences (more on which in §3), it follows that each such unique act type is a proposition expressed by the sentence. As already mentioned in the introduction, one might now try to avoid the argument from (A1) by positing two distinct act types, say, predicating and predicating*. (A1) cannot then be used to infer the ambiguity claim, since (A1) contains two occurrences of the same schematic letter, 'φ'. But one might think there is an equally plausible principle threatening this alternative version of the act-type theory: 14 Basic act types in this sense are not related to basic actions in the sense of Arthur Danto, \"Basic Actions\", American Philosophical Quarterly, II, 2 (April 1965): 141– 148. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 8 (A*) If φ-ing x1, ..., xm = ψ-ing y1, ..., yn, then each of x1, ..., xm is identical to one of y1, ..., yn. With (A*), we can infer the ambiguity claim, since we here have two distinct schematic letters, 'φ' and 'ψ'. However, (A*) is inconsistent with the plausible claim, (ID) For every act type a, a = the act type of performing a. Given (ID), performing the act type of kissing John = kissing John, but, of course, kissing John ≠ John, so (A*) is false. Another counterexample to (A*) is the following: say that x johnates y just in case x introduces John to y, and that x maryizes y just in case x introduces y to Mary. Now, plausibly, johnating Mary = maryizing John, although John ≠ Mary. Note, though, that these examples involve act types that somehow \"overlap\". Now, it is plausible to think that the only counterexamples to (A*) involve precisely such overlapping act types. We could thus qualify (A*) by requiring the act types not to overlap, and this will give us a principle that can be used in the argument against the pluralist version of the act-type theory: (A2) If (i) φ-ing x1, ..., xn = ψ-ing y1, ..., yn and (ii) φ-ing and ψ-ing do not overlap, then each of x1, ..., xm is identical to one of y1, ..., yn. The notion of overlapping requires some explanation. Let's say that act types involve other act types and objects, where this notion is governed by the schema: (IS) The act type of φ-ing x1, ..., xn involves φ-ing, as well as each of x1, ..., xn. I will not be more specific about what involvement amounts to (for instance, by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being involved in an act type). I take (IS) to be undeniable, since it is merely a stipulation, and I note that it does not force upon us any particular view about the nature of involvement. In particular, it does not require that we see involvement as somehow mereological, nor as a particularly eligible/natural relation in the standard, Lewisian sense. If these observations are kept in mind, I think (IS) must be seen as acceptable, at least pending an argument to the contrary. It would now be natural to propose that for two act types to overlap is for there to be something they both involve. But given (ID), performing is involved in every act type. Hence, every act type overlaps with every other act type in this sense of 'overlap'. I will therefore say instead that two act types overlap just in case they involve something not involved in every act type. Then, if two act types fail to overlap, they are as disjoint as act types can be. The special case of johnating and maryizing then comes out as a case of overlap in this sense, but other examples will be far between. (A2) is plausible because its antecedent is plausibly false. For suppose that φ-ing and ψ-ing do not overlap. Then, they are as disjoint as act types can possibly be, like, say, kicking and conceiving-of. Then, surely, φ-ing x1, ..., xn cannot be the same as ψing y1, ..., yn. Hence, the antecedent of (A2) cannot be true, and so (A2) is true. (A2) entails that if 'Mary loves John' is not ambiguous, then predicating and predicating* ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 9 overlap. Thus, to avoid the ambiguity claim, adherents of the pluralist act-type theory must take predicating and predicating* to overlap. I argue in §3 that this is a dubious claim. I said that (A1) is obvious, but some readers might not be convinced. I will here point to some possible misinterpretations of (A1) on which it will seems unobvious or even false (much of this discussion will apply equally to (A2)). Firstly, it is natural to say that laying a on b is \"the same kind of act\" as laying a on c, even if a, b, and c are distinct. As an observation about our lay talk of act types, this is plausible enough. But, firstly, the finer division into object-related act types surely can be made. Also, act-type theorists clearly need to make it, on pain of saying that all atomic sentences express the same proposition (on a Russellian variant, this would be the mere act type of predicating). Doubts about (A1) might also be due to conflating (i) identity with being tokens of the same type, (ii) act types with act tokens, (iii) act types with their results. That these are indeed erroneous conflations will be obvious, but we do well to make them explicit, to ward off any possible confusion about (A1). Firstly, concerning conflation (i), some readers might take (A1)–(A2) to be unobvious because they read '=' as expressing the relation that holds between two things just in case they belong to the same type. Of course, it is unclear what \"the type\" is supposed to be here, but I am merely trying to identify a possible misreading on which the relevant identities may seem unobvious. Concerning (ii), some accept the \"Anscombe-Davidson Thesis\", saying that if A φs by ψ-ing, then A's φ-ing = A's ψ-ing.15 An instance here would be, 'If I insult John by insulting his mother, then my insulting John will be identical with my insulting his mother'. This case may seem to contradict (A1), until we notice that it concerns act tokens, whereas (A1) concerns act types. Clearly, the act types of insulting John and insulting John's mother are distinct, since it is possible to perform one without performing the other. Thirdly, we might easily slip into reading phrases like 'saturating x with y' as referring to the result of saturating x with y. When speaking of 'saturating a predicate with a name', for instance, we tend to focus at the results rather than the act types of doing so (where the results in question are of course linguistic expressions). On such a \"result reading\" of the SCADs in (A1), it is false, but this is of course not a problem for (A1). It will be illustrative to see why (A1), under the \"result reading\", is false. Suppose we have three pieces of Lego, G, Y, and B (for green, yellow, and blue), and suppose that x^y is the result (not the act type) of attaching x on top of y. Here, x^y is a physical object consisting of x and y. Now, it should be clear upon reflection that (G^Y)^B = G^(Y^B). But since G^Y ≠ B ≠ G ≠ Y^B, (A1) is false under the relevant interpretation (I use 'a ≠ b ≠ ...' to say that all of a, b, ... are distinct from one another). However, the act type (as opposed to the result) of attaching G^Y on top of 15 See Donald Davidson, \"Actions, Reasons, and Causes\", Journal of Philosophy, LX, 23 (November 1963): 685–700, at pp. 697f. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 10 B is not identical with the act type of attaching G on top of Y^B, since they are not necessarily co-performed. This example helps us respond to another objection against (A1). To wit, one might object that (A1) seems plausible only so long as we focus on examples with wholly disjoint objects, whereas when we consider overlapping objects, things are less clear. Thus, predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John could be identical with predicating the property of loving John of Mary, after all, since these properties overlap (they both involve loving). But G^Y and Y^B clearly overlap, and the relevant act types (as opposed to results) are still distinct. The objector is now hard pressed to explain why the case with properties should differ. III. THE ARGUMENT We are now in a position to present in full detail the argument involving 'Mary loves John', including the necessary assumptions about semantic axioms. Any compositional semantics will need some semantic axiom(s) showing how the semantic correlate of a sentence or complex predicate is determined by the correlates of its immediate parts. The simplest and most uniform semantics will operate with some axiom like, (PA) PLUGi('F(ξ1, ..., ξn)', 'a') has plugi([F(ξ1, ..., ξn)], [a]) as its semantic correlate, where PLUGi is a mode of combination, taking an n-place predicate 'F(ξ1, ..., ξn)' and a name 'a' to the n−1-place predicate resulting from saturating (or \"plugging\") 'F(ξ1, ..., ξn)' in its ith place with 'a' (here, the n–1-place predicate may be 0-place, in which case it is a sentence). Thus, PLUG2 takes 'ξ loves ζ' and 'John' to 'ξ loves John', and so on. Further, the nature pf plugi([F(ξ1, ..., ξn)], [a]) will of course depend on whether we adopt a Russellian or Fregean conception of propositions (this \"plug notation\" is due to Zalta16). While (PA) is natural, it is not mandatory, so we should not assume that act-type theorists are committed to it. And it suffices for the argument that we suppose only that they are committed to the weaker, (P1) For any monadic predicate 'F(ξ)' and name 'a', PLUG1('F(ξ)', 'a') expresses plug1([F(ξ)], [a]), where plug1(x, y) is some act type on x and y. (In (P1), the clumsy 'has as its semantic correlate' can be replaced with 'expresses', since it deals only with sentences and propositions.) We are here presupposing that 'Mary loves John' = PLUG1('Mary loves ξ', 'John'), and so on, but this falls directly out of the definition of PLUG1 in terms of 'saturate'. The claim that 'Mary loves John' has alternative analyses can now be expressed as follows: (P2) 'Mary loves John' = PLUG1('Mary loves ξ', 'John') = PLUG1('ξ loves John', 'Mary'). 16 Edward Zalta, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1988). ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 11 It follows from (P1) and (P2) that: (C) (a) 'Mary loves John' expresses plug1([Mary loves ξ], [John]), (b) 'Mary loves John' expresses plug1([ξ loves John], [Mary]). Further, where x is the semantic correlate of a monadic predicate, act-type theorists must take plug1(x, y), to be an act type directed toward x and y. It is now tempting to infer (from (P1) and (P2)) that they are also committed to holding that, for some act type A and for any predicate 'F(ξ)', PLUG1('F(ξ)', 'a') expresses A-ing [F(ξ)], [a]. This would be fallacious, however. What follows is merely that for all predicates 'F(ξ)', there is an act type A such that PLUG1('F(ξ)', 'a') expresses A-ing [F(ξ)], [a]. A counterexample to the fallacious inference is a case with two distinct act types, A-ing and A*-ing, such that 'Mary loves John' expresses the act type of A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] and the act type of A*-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John]. This hypothesis forms the second horn of our dilemma. Grabbing now the first horn, assume first that the act-type theorist posits only one basic act type, which we call A-ing. He will then define plug1 so that, where x is a monadic predicative propositional constituent, plug1(x, y) = the act type of performing A toward x and y (in that order), or, for short, plug1(x, y) = A-ing x, y. Given these assumptions, (C) above entails (C2) (a) 'Mary loves John' expresses A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], (b) 'Mary loves John' expresses A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary]. The unacceptable conclusion that 'Mary loves John' is ambiguous follows from (C2) and the claim, (≠) A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] ≠ A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary], which in turn follows from (A1) plus the trivial assumption that [Mary] ≠ [ξ loves John] ≠ [John] ≠ [Mary loves ξ]. Showing how this argument applies to the specific views of flesh-and-blood acttype theorists, like Soames and Hanks, is now a trivial exercise. For instance, the instantiation of (≠) relevant to Soames's theory would just be (≠I) The act type of predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John ≠ the act type of predicating the property of loving John of Mary. In Hanks's case, we would also need to assume that complex act types that are composed of distinct sets of sub-acts are distinct, but this is obvious enough. Consider now the second horn of the dilemma, concerning pluralism. On this view, different basic act types must be appealed to depending on whether the predicate is of ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 12 the form 'R(ξ, a)' or 'R(a, ξ)'. Rather than (C2), pluralism is committed to there being two distinct act types, A-ing and A*-ing, such that (C2*) (a) 'Mary loves John' expresses A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], (b) 'Mary loves John' expresses A*-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary]. By (A2) plus trivial distinctness claims, we can now infer that 'Mary loves John' is unambiguous only if A-ing and A*-ing overlap. Let us now discuss this commitment. These act types would overlap, of course, if they were identical, and this is a fully intelligible hypothesis. But this just brings us back to the first horn of the dilemma. Thus, we must rather consider the hypothesis that they overlap but are distinct. But it is difficult to see just which object or basic act type these act types are supposed to have in common. Positing two distinct act types and insisting that they overlap also seems ad hoc: two unobvious claims are made here only to avoid the conclusion that 'Mary loves John' is ambiguous. To dodge this suspicion, some independent argument for this view is needed, but it is hard to see what such support might consist in. If, surprisingly, this way out should turn out viable, it would be a notable deviation from standard act-type theories, and thus we would have a significant result in any case. Let me now consider an objection against this main line of argument. According to the objection, we can only conclude that the relevant sentences are ambiguous by making the implausible assumption that if a sentence expresses several propositions, then it is ambiguous. But this is false, since context-sensitive sentences can be unambiguous and yet express several propositions. But my argument does not require this implausible assumption. It goes through on the more plausible assumption that a sentence is ambiguous if it expresses several propositions in each context. The way in which 'Mary loves John' comes out (on act-type theories) as expressing several propositions does not depend on the context, and thus it expresses several propositions in each context. Hence, it is ambiguous. Besides, this last step of my argument is not really necessary: we could have omitted the word 'ambiguous' and said merely that act-type theories are committed to 'Mary loves John' expressing several propositions, independently of context and of any lexical ambiguity in 'loves'. This commitment is bad enough. Let us now ask whether the act-type theorist can bite the bullet and accept the ambiguity that ensues from their theory. It may be thought that all I have shown is that 'Mary loves John' is syntactically ambiguous, and therefore expresses several propositions, which is commonplace. But the phenomenon of alternative analyses is different from syntactic ambiguity, as ordinarily conceived. A standard example of the latter is, 'Flying planes can be dangerous'. This sentence is clearly ambiguous, saying, on one parsing, that the activity of flying planes can be dangerous, and, on the other, that planes that fly can be dangerous. But 'Mary loves John' is quite different. A fortiori, it does not seem to \"say\" different things depending on the \"parsing\". Biting this bullet thus means hypostatizing an ambiguity where there does not seem to be one, and without any other, independent reason contrary to standard methodological principles of semantic theory. Accepting the ambiguity of the relevant sentences would also raise new, awkward questions. For instance, which of the 31 propositions expressed by '6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1' does one believe when, as we would naïvely put it, one \"believes that 6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1\"? All of them? Could one believe one but not the others? If one can, then how do the beliefs differ? Note that if one cannot, then the claim that they are nevertheless ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 13 distinct violates even the fine-grained \"cognitive significance\" test of propositional identity urged by Frege. It may be thought, still, that act-type theorists may be in a better position than other semanticists to accept this ensuing ambiguity, since they can make certain additional assumptions about act types in view of which the resulting ambiguity seems more palatable. There are three such \"additional assumptions\" I want to consider: (1) The act types related to different analyses of a sentence are just ways of performing the act type which is the proposition the sentence expresses. (2) These act types necessarily coincide: one cannot perform one of them without performing the others. (3) These act types have the same truth conditions. But (1) is incompatible with the original act-type theories of Soames and Hanks. They take the act type of predicating a property of an object to be a proposition, not an act type by which the proposition can be performed. I will discuss this account as a possible \"retreat position\" in §5, but I want to note here already that it is difficult to see why the claim would mitigate the ambiguity, even if it were available to act-type theorists. Analogous points apply to (2) and (3): why should the fact that the three act types necessarily coincide, or have the same truth conditions, make it acceptable to say that the sentence is ambiguous? There are also specific worries about (2) and (3). We have already seen that (2) violates Frege's identity conditions on propositions. It also seems that in order to perform the relevant act on a predicative propositional constituent, for instance, to predicate a property of something, one must \"think about\" that constituent in a way that requires a non-zero cognitive effort. If so, then entertaining or judging the proposition that 6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1 requires, implausibly, performing 31 distinct efforttaking mental acts. Claim (3) is also uncongenial to act-type theorists, since they take propositions to be structured, and since the main motivation for doing so is that one can thereby distinguish propositions that have the same truth conditions. Thus, saying that the ambiguity is acceptable because the act types have the same truth conditions is in tension with a major motivation for structured propositions. IV. A FURTHER ARGUMENT AGAINST PLURALISTIC ACT-TYPE THEORIES Even if the above argument against standard act-type theories was conclusive, the argument against the \"pluralist\" variant was not. In this section, I will present a stronger argument against pluralism, which is independent of (A2) and of any notion of act types \"involving\" certain entities or of \"overlapping\". The argument shows that pluralists are forced to posit infinitely many basic act types. Consider the sentence '7 + 8 = 15', from which one can extract the three monadic predicates, '7 + 8 = ξ', '7 + ξ = 15', 'ξ + 8 = 15'. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 14 If we try to avoid the conclusion that '7 + 8 = 15' is ambiguous by multiplying basic act types, we need to posit not two, but three distinct basic act types. More specifically, we would need to posit distinct act types, A-ing, A*-ing, and A**-ing, such that, (C2+) (a) '7 + 8 = 15' expresses A-ing [7 + 8 = ξ], [15] (b) '7 + 8 = 15' expresses A*-ing [7 + ξ = 15], [8] (c) '7 + 8 = 15' expresses A**-ing [ξ + 8 = 15], [7], For suppose that they are not all distinct. Then, some identity between two of them holds and then the argument from (A1) sets in, and we can infer that '7 + 8 = 15' is ambiguous. We can generate infinitely many more arguments like this, with predicates of ever-increasing complexity. Given this infinity of basic act types, certain claims that the act-type theorist will want to make cannot be finitely stated. Consider, for instance, the definition of plug1. It seems that this definition will need one clause for each of the infinitely many forms that monadic predicates may take, where these \"forms\" are, R(a1, ..., an, ξ), R(a1, ..., an−1, ξ, an), R(a1, ..., an−2, ξ, an−1, an), and so on, for each n. The simplest definition will define plug1 over predicative propositional constituents, which differ in which argument place (first, second, ...) is \"empty\". I will here consider a definition, which has one clause for each adicity: (DP) plug1(x, y) =df the entity z such that: (i) if x is monadic, then: if x is simple, then z = the act type of B-ing x, y, and if x is complex and its first place is empty, then z = A-ing x, y, and if x is complex and its second place is empty, then z = A*-ing x, y, and ... (ii) if x is dyadic, then: ... The reason why this definition cannot be finitely completed is that the adicities of predicates have no upper limit, whence the dots in clause (i) cannot be finitely filled in. Note that I am here using, 'empty' and 'place' in non-standard senses, in which, for instance, the second place in '1 = ξ' is empty, but not the first. Normally, one would say that any monadic predicate has only one place and that a place is by definition empty. But I think this alternative terminology should be obvious enough. It may be suggested that a finite formulation might still be available if, instead of merely labelling these act types 'A', 'A*', 'A**', ..., we refer to them using complex expressions containing numerals. For instance, we could posit a single, basic act type, ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 15 C-ing, which takes as objects not merely the semantic correlates of predicates and names, but also positive integers. Clause (i) can then be finitely restated as follows: (i′) if x is monadic, then: if x is simple, then z = the act type of B-ing x, y, and if x is complex and its nth place is empty, then z = C-ing x, y, n This is a finite formulation, which only commits one to an unproblematic infinity of numbers. However, this proposal is a non-starter. We are here supposed to avoid the ambiguity of 'Mary loves John' by appeal to the identity, [Mary loves John] = C-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], 2 = = C-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary], 1. But this claim contradicts (A1), given trivial distinctness facts about the objects acted upon. I conclude that pluralist act type theorists can avoid the ambiguity problem only by positing an unacceptable infinity of basic act types. V. THREE RETREAT POSITIONS By a \"retreat position\", I mean a theory that is modified so as to avoid the argument above, but that is still in the spirit of standard act-type theories. I will not define 'being in the spirit of', but one important way of assessing this is by seeing whether the position in question will have the alleged advantages of standard act-type theories listed in the introduction. I will consider three retreat positions, which say, respectively, that propositions are (i) equivalence classes of act types, (ii) results of act types, (iii) more inclusive act types (which can be performed by performing the usual act types of predicating or saturating). Option (i) is to define some relation of equivalence that makes the three acts related to 'Mary loves John' equivalent, and then identify [Mary loves John] with their set, and similarly for other atomic sentences. The main problem with this idea is that it does not take propositions to be (syntactically) structured and so is not in the spirit of standard act-type theories. More precisely, this account is committed to taking equivalent propositions to be identical, which is precisely the kind of commitment one tries to avoid by taking propositions to be structured. One might try to avoid the worst excesses of unstructured views of propositions by setting stricter conditions on equivalence. If equivalence is cashed out simply in terms of truth-in-the-same-worlds or mutual inferability, then, for any p, q, [p] = [p & (q or not-q)], which is precisely the kind of consequence we are trying to avoid. But suppose we add the requirement that act types are equivalent only if the basic act type with \"widest scope\" in each is the same. Then, A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] and A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] come out as equivalent, since the relevant basic act type in each of them is A-ing. Further, in order to distinguish this equivalence class from [Mary loves John and (p or not-p)], we could identify the latter with the act type of A+-ing [and], [Mary loves John], [p or not-p], where A-ing ≠ A+-ing. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 16 But we can still not distinguish between [p and q] and [(p and q) and (r or not-r)]. Requiring in addition equivalent act types to have the same simple constituents would not be sufficient either, since [(Fa or not-Fa) and (Gb or not-Gb)] and [(Ga or notGa) and (Fb or not-Fb)] would still come out as identical. The obvious remedy is to say that act types a and b are equivalent just in case they have identical structures and, for every entity e and node n in this structure, a has e at n just in case b has e at n. But now, A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] and A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] are no longer equivalent. This points to a general difficulty: that of distinguishing logically equivalent propositions without thereby multiplying propositions wherever there are alternative analyses. It is not clear whether any version of option (i) can meet this constraint, nor whether the resulting theory would be in the spirit of standard act-type theories. Option (ii), on which propositions are results of act types, could perhaps be independently motivated.17 But the idea as it stands is highly underspecified: we do not yet know what kind of entity propositions are, whether abstract, concrete, events, states, sets, and so on. All we know is that they result from certain acts. There is also reason to think this account, however specified, will not be in the spirit of original act-type theories, because it will not assign any real theoretical work to act types. Assume that we decide that propositions are Xs, which result in some systematic way from act types of predicating or saturating. Suppose also we define plugi in the usual act-type-theoretical (Fregean or Russellian) way and then say that propositions are the values of some function plugi, such that plugi(x, y) always results in plugi(x, y). The crux is that we can now just refer to propositions using 'plugi', and any detour via act types will be otiose. The obvious alternative to (PA), for instance, would be, (PA′) PLUGi('F(ξ1, ..., ξn)', 'a') expresses plugi([F(ξ1, ..., ξn)], [a]). Let's finally consider option (iii), of taking propositions to be \"more inclusive\" act types, which can be performed by performing the usual act types of predicating or saturating. Here, [Mary loves John] would be an act type that can be performed by performing any of the three act types associated with 'Mary loves John'. This seems to be in the spirit of the original act-type theory, since propositions are here identified with act types. So far, however, this proposal is seriously underspecified. What are these more inclusive act types, and how do we refer to them? In particular, can we refer to them using designators that contain designators of the propositional constituents? A closely related worry: toward which object(s) is [Mary loves John] directed, on this view? Is [Mary loves ξ] and [ξ loves John] among then, and what about [John] and [Mary]? These worries bear directly on the question of what the semantic axioms for atomic sentences are supposed to read. Consider, (P1′) For any predicate 'F(ξ)' and name 'a', PLUG1('F(ξ)', 'a') expresses the act type of A-ing [F(ξ)], [a]. This is not available on option (iii), since the act type of A-ing [F(ξ)], [a] is now not the proposition expressed by 'F(a)' but merely an act type that can be performed by 17 See Moltmann, \"Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products\", op. cit. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 17 performing that act type. One might, as an alternative, propose something along the lines of, (P1′′) For any predicate 'F(ξ)' and name 'a', PLUG1('F(ξ)', 'a') expresses an act type that can be performed by performing plug1([F(ξ)], [a]). But (P1′′) does not by itself associate sentences with determinate semantic correlates. It does not say which act type is expressed by a given sentence. We could try describing the proposition expressed as the act type that can be performed by performing act type A. But how do we know that this description singles out a unique act type? This proposal also does not explain toward which objects [Mary loves John] is supposed to be directed. Similar remarks apply to the proposal that we refer to the act type as \"the act type that can be performed by performing any of ...\", where the dots are filled in with a complete list of the act types that are related to the analyses of the sentence (as we have been conceiving of them throughout). Again, uniqueness is not clearly guaranteed, and we still do not know toward which objects the inclusive act type is directed. By referring to the proposition as the act type of entertaining (or judging) that proposition, uniqueness is guaranteed (let us grant), but the other worries remain. 'The act type of entertaining [Mary loves John]' does not contain designators of the relevant propositional constituents and we do not know which objects are acted upon. Consequently, it is also unclear how to formulate the semantic axioms. Let me consider one final possibility, which, while clearly related, goes somewhat beyond the original characterization of option (iii): propositions are act types directed toward simple constituents, which can be performed by performing act types directed toward complex constituents. Thus, [Mary loves John] is the act type of predicating loving of Mary and John (in that order), which can be performed by performing either of the two remaining act types. This account handles the problem of uniqueness and tells us toward which objects the act type is directed, namely, [Mary] and [John] only. But this last commitment immediately makes the account unable to compositionally handle sentences involving complex predicates. Since the act type expressed ex hypothesi is not directed toward any complex predicative propositional constituents, there is no semantic correlate to associate with complex predicates, which can help determine the semantic correlates of atomic sentences. A further, rather different complaint about this proposal is that one cannot simply stipulate that the act type of predicating loving of Mary and John can be performed by predicating loving John of Mary. This is something that must be derived from independently plausible assumptions, but it is not clear what those assumptions might be. Thus, like the two options previously considered, option (iii) raises several difficult questions, and is not, as it stands, a safe retreat position for act-type theorists. VI. A GENERAL CONSTRAINT ON STRUCTURED PROPOSITIONS Does the argument above generalize to all kinds of structured propositions, thus refuting the very idea? No, but it does amount to a general constraint on structured propositions. Very roughly, propositions may not be identified with the kind of construction that obeys a principle analogous to (A1). Since not all constructions do, however, the argument does not generalize. This, in any case, will be the upshot of this section. We will close by looking at Jeffrey King's and Edward Zalta's theories ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 18 of structured propositions, and see that while Zalta's theory is not committed to the kind of ambiguity we have been discussing, King's theory is.18 Constructions that do not obey any principle analogous to (A1) include the following: (1) the mereological sum of x1, ..., xn, (2) the state of affairs in which F(x1, ..., xn), (3) x1^x2 (from Section 2) (Note that some constructions have a determinate number of variables, as in case (3).) Now, for a construction to \"obey a principle analogous to (A1)\" is for it to satisfy the general schema, (G) If X(x1, ..., xn) = X(y1, ..., yn), then each of x1, ..., xn is identical with one of y1, ..., yn. When I use a schematic letter in the \"construction\", as in (2) above, I mean that it satisfies (G) if all of its instances do. That none of the constructions (1)–(3) satisfy (G) is shown by the following counterexamples: (C1) sum(sum(a, b), c) = sum(a, sum(b, c)), although sum(a, b) ≠ c ≠ a ≠ sum(b, c), (C2) the state of affairs in which John has the property of being loved by Mary = the state of affairs in which Mary has the property of loving John, although John ≠ being loved by Mary ≠ Mary ≠ loving John, (C3) G^(Y^B) = (G^Y)^B, although G ≠ Y^B ≠ G^Y ≠ B.19 Now, the general constraint on structured propositions that can be derived from the argument from alternative analyses reads, (GC) [F(a)] = X([F(ξ)], [a]) only if X does not satisfy (G). For suppose X satisfies (G). We know that there will be cases in which [R(ξ, b)] ≠ [a] ≠ [R(a, ξ)] ≠ [b]. From these assumptions, it follows that X([R(a, ξ)], [b]) ≠ X([R(ξ, b)], [a]), and, hence, that 'R(a, b)' is ambiguous. 18 The relevant works are King, The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., and Zalta, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, op. cit. 19 How about 'the property of R-ing x1, ..., xn'? On a coarse-grained conception of properties, this construction fails to satisfy (G). For on such a conception, the property of being a world in which John has the property of being loved by Mary = the property of being a world in which Mary has the property of loving John. How things stand with fine-grained properties is less clear. In general, it seems difficult to give a general account of which kinds of constructions obey (G) principles and which do not. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 19 While failing to satisfy (G) is a necessary condition for a construction type being identifiable with propositions, it is clearly not sufficient. For 'the mereological sum of x1, ..., xn' fails to satisfy (G), but it does satisfy the principle, 'X(x1, x2, x3) = X(x1, x3, x2)'. Thus, identifying a proposition with the sum of its constituents would entail, absurdly, that [R(a, b)] = [R(b, a)]. Let us now, finally, have a look at two extant theories of structured propositions, the theories of Jeffrey King and Edward Zalta, to see how they fare with alternative analyses. King identifies propositions with a certain kind of complex fact. The proposition that Rebecca swims is identified with the fact that Rebecca stands in the complex relation REL with the property of swimming. For now-familiar reasons, King must say that [Mary loves John] is identical both with (F1) the fact that Mary RELs [ξ loves John], and (F2) the fact that John RELs [Mary loves ξ].20 The relevant instance of (G) is thus, (GK) If the fact that REL(x, y) = the fact that REL(z, w), then each of x and y is identical with one of z and w. We will see that King's theory, like act-type theories, entails that sentences with alternative analyses are ambiguous. However, the argument for this conclusion takes a rather different route. For given the complexity and technical character of REL, we do not have reliable intuitions about (GK) as we do with (A1). Although we will soon find reason to reject (GK), this reason is an independent reason to believe that F1 ≠ F2 (from which the falsity of (GK) can be inferred). Since the claim that F1 ≠ F2 is what we ultimately aim to derive, (GK) will play no role in our argument. Now, to see whether F1 = F2, we must look closer at REL. King defines REL as holding between x and y iff there is a language L, lexical items a and b of L and a context c, such that (i) a and b occur at the left and right terminal nodes (respectively) of the sentential relation R that in L encodes ascription, and (ii) x is the semantic value of a in c, and (iii) y is the semantic value of b in c.21 In contrast to the Lewisian, abstract conception of languages, King takes a language to be actually used.22 But in that case, there will be worlds in which F1 exists but F2 does not. For instance, there is a world where there is a language containing a primitive lexical element whose semantic value is [Mary loves ξ] but no language with a lexical element whose semantic value is [ξ loves John]. I am assuming here that there can be non-composite lexical elements that designate complex properties, 20 King himself accepts these commitments: see his The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., pp. 16ff. 21 King, The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., p. 62 22 King, The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., pp. 46ff. ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 20 but this seems innocuous. If such a world exists, however, then F1 ≠ F2, even on a coarse-grained conception of facts, on which strict equivalence suffices for identity. Suppose King switches to the Lewisian conception of languages in order to avoid ambiguity. Then, however, the definiens of REL becomes a necessary truth for any values of 'x' and 'y'. Given the coarse-grained conception of facts, there is then only one atomic proposition! So the switch had better be coupled with a fine-grained, structured conception of facts. On such a conception, F1 = F2 only if (1) they have the same structure and (2) for any entity e and node n in this structure, F1 has e at n just in case F2 has e at n. But on such a conception, obviously, F1 ≠ F2, since the two facts have different entities at their nodes. (This argument equally afflicts King's actual account, coupled with a fine-grained conception of facts). I conclude that King's theory, like the act-type theory, entails that sentences with alternative analyses are ambiguous. Zalta's theory, by contrast, seems immune to the argument from alternative analyses. He refers to propositions using such gerunds as 'Socrates having wisdom', or 'Mary standing in the loving relation to John'. But, intuitively, Mary's having the property of loving John = John's having the property of being loved by Mary. Thus, at least as far as these proposition designators are concerned, Zalta's theory avoids the argument. True, these designators cannot be used to state semantic axioms for atomic sentences. For this purpose, Zalta uses a kind of technical proposition designator, but since we have no intuitions about them, there is no simple argument from an intuitive (G)-principle against Zalta's theory. The same holds for Bealer's theory. 23 This invites the anti-reductionist conclusion that in order to avoid the argument from alternative analyses, we must not identify propositions with some other kind of entity, like act types or facts of some kind. For now, however, this idea must remain a speculation. 23 George Bealer, Quality and Concept (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982).", "meta": {"pile_set_name": "PhilPapers"}}
{"text": "Why Simpler Arguments are Better Moti Mizrahi Florida Institute of Technology Forthcoming in Argumentation Abstract: In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule. Keywords: argument; deduction; elegance; explanation; induction; parsimony; proof; simplicity; theory 1. Introduction It appears that many philosophers are often bedazzled by complex arguments. They admire the depth and complexity of a philosopher's arguments even though, when pressed, they might admit that the philosopher's arguments are often not of the highest argumentative standard. This is the impression one gets when it is said with approval of philosophy in general that it is \"difficult\" (Protevi 2001, p. 150), \"hard\" (Craig 2002, p. 100), or \"complicated\" (LeBon 1999, p. 17), and of particular philosophers, like Nietzsche and Hegel, that their \"philosophy [is] hard to understand\" (Danto 2005, p. 79) or \"difficult\" (Wood 2004, p. 197).1 As Kelly (2011, p. 106) puts it: To this day, great philosophers who embraced strange conclusions are praised in eulogies for their willingness to follow the argument where it leads, and the ideal is mentioned in faculty handbooks in the context of discussions of academic freedom. I think that this is a mistake. That is to say, I think that, instead of admiring complexity in philosophical argumentation, we should prefer simplicity. In this paper, then, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, if our goal in putting forth arguments is truth, or at least rational persuasion, then we should prefer simpler arguments, other things being equal.2 1 It is also worth noting that, against the attempt by some, like Simon Blackburn, to make philosophy public, i.e., more accessible to a general audience, others have argued that \"philosophy is supposed to be difficult\" (http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/feb/25/philosophy-technical-everyday-english). 2 On the use of arguments as tools of rational persuasion, see Hitchcock (2007), Johnson (2000), and Walton (1996). The notion of rational persuasion is supposed to exclude other forms of persuasion, such as threats and other kinds of blackmail. This is also meant to deal with alleged counterexamples where it seems rational to prefer complex 2 As far as arguments are concerned, it is common practice to distinguish between at least two kinds: deductive and inductive (i.e., non-deductive) arguments (see, e.g., Copi and Cohen 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010). The premises of a valid deductive argument, if true, necessitate the truth of the conclusion. Hence, valid deductive arguments can be represented as follows: (Deduction) IF {Premise1, Premise2,..., Premisen} THEN necessarily {Conclusion} The premises of a strong inductive argument, if true, make the truth of the conclusion more probable, i.e., P(Conclusion | Premises) > P(¬Conclusion | Premises), but not guaranteed.3 Hence, strong inductive arguments can be represented as follows4: (Induction) IF {Premise1, Premise2,..., Premisen} THEN probably {Conclusion} With these basic characterizations of deductive and inductive arguments, I will argue in what follows that, of two competing arguments (either deductive or inductive), we should prefer the simpler one, other things being equal. Here is how I plan to proceed. In Section 2, I discuss two varieties of simplicity, namely syntactic simplicity (or elegance) and ontological simplicity (or parsimony). In Section 3, I sketch an argument from mathematical proofs for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In Section 4, I sketch an argument from scientific theories for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In Section 5, I sketch an argument from the conjunction rule for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. 2. Two varieties of simplicity Before I sketch my arguments for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better, a few clarifications are in order. More specifically, I need to explain in more detail what is meant by simplicity. Philosophers usually identify two varieties of simplicity. In this section, I discuss these two varieties of simplicity. I am not concerned with the justification of simplicity principles.5 Rather, I am concerned with simplicity as a theoretical virtue of arguments.6 arguments. For example, suppose that an eccentric billionaire offers a cash prize for \"Most Complex Argument.\" In this case, it seems rational to prefer more complex arguments, not for the sake of truth and/or rational persuasion, but rather for the sake of winning a cash prize. Thanks to Andrew Aberdein for this point. 3 Discussing the various concepts of probability and their interpretations is beyond the scope of this paper. For a useful overview, see Mellor (2005). 4 Note that this characterization of inductive arguments is broad enough to include non-deductive arguments like abductive arguments (or inferences to the best explanation) and conductive arguments (Govier 2010). For a useful overview, see McKeon (2013). 5 See, e.g., Sober (1988) and (1994). Sober argues that appeals to simplicity are local rather than global, i.e., they depend on local background assumptions and context for their rational justification. 3 2a. Syntactic simplicity According to Sober (1988), considerations of simplicity play a role in the so-called \"curve-fitting problem.\" To use Sober's (1998) example, suppose that scientists want to discover general relations that might hold between independent variable x and dependent variable y. They gather the following set of observations, depicted as points in Figure 1 (adapted from Sober 1998). Figure 1. Curve-fitting and goodness-of-fit adapted from Sober (1998). They then evaluate competing hypotheses, A, B, and C, depicted as curves in Figure 1. In cases such as this one, given that the possibility of error is taken into account, the standard scientific practice, according to Sober (1998, p. 781), is to use the notion of \"goodness-of-fit.\" For example, for each data point on curve A, the scientists compute the squared distance from the observed y-value to the y-value that curve A predicts. In this way, the \"sum of squares\" (SOS) 6 In this paper, I talk about simplicity as a theoretical virtue of arguments in much the same way that simplicity is taken to be a theoretical virtue of mathematical proofs and scientific theories. See, e.g., Baker (2011), Glynn (2010), and Sober (2001). On the virtues of arguers, rather than arguments, see Aberdein (2010). 4 measures how far the curve is from the data points. If SOS measures how well the data support the curve in question, then the data support curve A better than they support curve B. As Sober (1998, p. 781) puts it: Curves that are close to the data are more likely, in the technical sense defined by R. A. Fisher (1925). Curve A is more likely than Curve B (given standard assumptions about the probability of error) because A confers on the data a higher probability than B does: P(Data | Curve A) > P(Data | Curve B).7 At this point, simplicity becomes relevant, since curve A and curve C have the same SOS values. If the scientists are guided by considerations of simplicity, they will choose curve A over curve C, for curve A is smooth, whereas curve C is bumpy. As Sober (1998, p. 781) puts it, \"Curve A seems more simple.\" In other words, curve A posits a simpler relationship between variables x and y than curve C does, and is thus preferable to curve C.8 This variety of simplicity, then, has to do with the number and complexity of hypotheses. As Baker (2011), puts it, \"Syntactic simplicity, or elegance, measures the number and conciseness of the theory's basic principles.\" More explicitly: (Elegance) Other things being equal, if T1 is more syntactically simple than T2, then it is rational to prefer T1 over T2. As Gauch (2003, p. 270) notes, this is an epistemological conception of simplicity. 2b. Ontological simplicity Another variety of simplicity has to do with the number and complexity of postulated entities rather than hypotheses. Ockham's razor is perhaps the most famous formulation of this variety of simplicity. (Ockham's razor) Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. As Gauch (2003, p. 270) notes, this is an ontological conception of simplicity, which is also known as the principle of parsimony. According to the principle of parsimony, hypotheses that postulate fewer entities, causes, and/or processes are better than hypotheses that postulate more.9 7 Note that this is different from saying that curve A is more probable, i.e., that P(Curve A | Data) > P(Curve B | Data). 8 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, the assumption that smoothness is simpler than bumpiness can be operationalized in several ways. For example, the degree of a polynomial can be taken to indicate the number of bumps of the associated graph, in which case, a low degree is preferable to a high degree polynomial. As Armitage et al (2002, p. 378) put it: \"Considerations of simplicity suggest that as low an order as possible should be used; for example, we should normally use linear regression unless there is any particular reason to use a higher-degree polynomial.\" 9 See also Sober (2001, p. 14) who calls this variety of simplicity \"semantic simplicity.\" 5 As a principle of theory choice, then, the principle of parsimony states that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer a theory that commits us to a limited ontology. More precisely: (Parsimony) Other things being equal, if T1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T2, then it is rational to prefer T1 over T2. According to this principle, if a theory, T1, has all the ontological commitments of a competing theory, T2, but T2 is also ontologically committed to Fs, whereas T1 is not, then T1 is more ontologically parsimonious than T2. Thus the notion of ontological parsimony is usually cashed out in terms of Quine's notion of ontological commitment. According to Quine (1981, p. 144), T is ontologically committed to Fs if and only if T entails that Fs exist.10 Like (Elegance), (Parsimony) is also a principle of theory choice. That is, (Elegance) states that, of two competing theories, we should choose the syntactically simpler one, other things being equal. Likewise, (Parsimony) states that, of two competing theories, we should choose the semantically simpler one, other things being equal. Einstein is said to have made a similar point by saying that \"things should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.\" According to Norman (2011, p. 50), what Einstein actually said was that \"the grand aim of all science ... is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deductions from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms.\" Accordingly, simplicity is a relative property; a theory is simple only relative to another competing theory. Applied to arguments, (Elegance) and (Parsimony) state that, of two competing arguments, we should prefer the simpler one, other things being equal. More explicitly, (Elegance) states that, of two competing arguments, we should choose the syntactically simpler one (i.e., the one with fewer inferences), other things being equal. Likewise, (Parsimony) states that, of two competing arguments, we should choose the semantically simpler one (i.e., the one with fewer premises), other things being equal. With these syntactic, i.e., (Elegance), and semantic or ontological, i.e., (Parsimony), conceptions of simplicity in hand, I now turn to my arguments for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. I outline three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule. 3. An argument from mathematical proofs My first argument for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better is an argument from mathematical proofs. The argument runs as follows: (1.1) If, other things being equal, simpler mathematical proofs are better, then, other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. (1.2) Other things being equal, simpler mathematical proofs are better. 10 In terms of ontological parsimony, a further distinction is often drawn between qualitative parsimony (the number of types of entities postulated) and quantitative parsimony (the number of individual entities postulated). See Baker (2003). 6 Therefore, (1.3) Other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. In support of (1.2), consider what Russell (1918, p. 60) says about mathematics: Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty - a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show.11 In general, mathematicians prefer mathematical proofs that are elegant and simple. For example (emphasis added): Here we want to discuss another bijection proof, due to Joyal, which is less known but of equal elegance and simplicity (Aigner and Ziegler 2004, p. 174). One proof stands out for its simplicity and elegance. It was found by Ernst Witt in 1931 and combines two elementary ideas towards a glorious finish (Aigner and Ziegler 2004, p. 23).12 If mathematicians' preference for simpler proofs is rational, then a preference for simpler deductive arguments more generally is rational as well. Why? Because mathematical proofs are arguments of the genus (Deduction) and species of the same genus usually share most of their properties in common except the property that makes them different species. For example, Homo sapiens, Homo habilis, and Homo erectus are species of the genus Homo. They share most of their properties in common except the property that makes them different species, which is taken to be primarily increased cranial capacity. If this is correct, then given that mathematical proofs are a species of the genus (Deduction) in virtue of being proofs (i.e., the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, necessitate the truth of the conclusion), it is reasonable to infer that they share most of their properties in common with other arguments of the genus (Deduction), such as the property of being better arguments when simpler than competing arguments. Now, granted that mathematicians prefer simpler proofs, and that their preference for simpler proofs is rational, it is reasonable to infer that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction). 11 Commenting on Dufour's Argument and Explanation in Mathematics (2013) at the conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (May 22-25, 2013), Aberdein mentions empirical results suggesting that \"mathematicians who completed the study expected explanatory proofs to be precise, useful and not intricate. Or, in other words, simple, fruitful, and exact.\" Available at: http://www.academia.edu/3646529/Commentary_on_Michel_Dufour_Argument_and_explanation_in_mathematics. 12 See also the special issue of Foundations of Science on Mathematical Argumentation (vol. 14, issue 1-2), edited by Aberdein and Dove (2009). For example, according to Coleman (2009, p. 30), \"One proof is better than another because it is more elegant, or informative, or shorter, or easier to follow, or less conceptually demanding, or more easily generalisable, or with less fuzzy details, or more direct, or more constructive, or even more novel...\" (emphasis added). 7 To sum up, my argument in support of premise (1.1) runs as follows: (1.1a) If X and Y are species of genus G, then X and Y share most of their properties in common, except the property that makes them different species. (1.1b) Mathematical proofs and other deductive arguments are species of the genus (Deduction). Therefore, (1.1) If, other things being equal, simpler mathematical proofs are better, then, other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better.13 With this support for premises (1.1) and (1.2), I submit, the argument from mathematical proofs shows that, other things being equal, simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction) are better. 4. An argument from scientific theories According to Baker (2011), \"Many philosophers believe that, other things being equal, simpler theories are better.\" This seems to be the case especially as far as scientific theories are concerned. For instance, as van Fraassen (1980, p. 87) writes: When a [scientific] theory is advocated, it is praised for many features other than empirical adequacy and strength: it is said to be mathematically elegant, simple, of great scope, complete in certain respects: also of wonderful use in unifying our account of hitherto disparate phenomena, and most of all, explanatory.14 Now, the important question for present purposes is the following: are simpler arguments better (in much the same way that simpler theories are better, other things being equal)? Here is an argument for an affirmative answer to this question: (2.1) If, other things being equal, simpler scientific theories are better, then, other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. (2.2) Other things being equal, simpler scientific theories are better. Therefore, (2.3) Other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 13 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully pointed out, (1.1a) is consistent with there being a particular property F of species X but not Y, which are both species of genus G, that is not the property that makes X and Y different species of G. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call this kind of argument \"argument a pari\" (as opposed to argument a contrario). According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 241), \"These arguments deal with the application or nonapplication to another species of the same genus of what can be asserted about some particular species.\" 14 It is worth noting that, for van Fraassen, these features are merely pragmatic, not epistemic or truth-conducive. I will return to this point in Section 5. 8 In support of premise (2.2) consider how, like mathematicians' preference for simpler mathematical proofs, scientists' preference for simpler scientific theories is quite evident from scientific practice.15 If scientists' preference for simpler theories is rational, then a preference for simpler arguments more generally is rational as well. Why? Because scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction). To see why scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction), note that philosophers of science generally agree that successful scientific theories do not merely describe phenomena but rather explain them. In other words, successful scientific theories are explanations. As Godfrey-Smith (2003, p. 190) puts it: Science aims to tell us, and often succeeds in telling us, what the world is like. But it is also common to think that science tells us why things happen; we learn from science not just what goes on but why it does. Science apparently seeks to explain as well as describe (emphasis in original). For example, the Alvarez Asteroid Impact theory is supposed to be an explanation for the K-T extinction. The theory of evolution by natural selection is supposed to be an explanation for biological diversity. The general theory of relativity is supposed to be an explanation for what we call gravity. Now, the obvious question is this: what are explanations? Philosophers of science have proposed several answers. Which answer is the correct one is a matter of debate.16 Several philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, however, construe explanations deductively. Take, for example, the unification account of explanation. According to Kitcher (1989, p. 448), \"all explanation is deductive.\" More explicitly, Kitcher argues that an explanation consists of an argument pattern, which is an ordered triple composed of a schematic argument (i.e., a sequence of schematic sentences, where a schematic sentence is a sentence in which non-logical terms have been replaced with letters), a set of filling instructions for each term in the schematic argument (i.e., instructions for filling in the letters in schematic sentences), and a classification of the schematic argument (i.e., a description of the premises, conclusions, and rules of inference used in the schematic argument).17 For instance, consider the argument pattern Kitcher (1993, p. 83) labels \"Common Descent\": Question: Why do the members of G, G` share P? Answer: (1) G, G` are descended from a common ancestor G0. (2) G0 members had P. 15 See, e.g., Baker (2007), Forster and Sober (1994), and Glynn (2010). 16 For a useful overview of philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, see Woodward (2011). 17 An earlier account that identifies scientific explanations with deductive arguments is the Deductive-Nomological account (Hempel 1965). 9 (3) P is heritable. (4) No factors intervened to modify P along the G0-G, G0-G` sequences. Therefore, (5) Members of G and G` have P. As Kitcher (1993, p. 83) explains: This consists of five schematic sentences. We could equip it with Filling Instructions by requiring that G, G`, G0 be replaced by names of groups of organisms, and that P be replaced by the name of a trait of organisms. Similarly, the classification would declare that (1)-(4) are premises and that (5) is deduced from them (emphasis added). If Kitcher is right, then to explain is to derive descriptions of various phenomena by using as few argument patterns as possible. As Kitcher (1989, p. 423) puts it, \"Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many phenomena, using the same pattern of derivation again and again, and in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of facts we have to accept as ultimate\" (emphasis added). To sum up, then, from the following claims: Scientific theories are explanations. Explanations are a species of the genus (Deduction). It follows that Scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction). If this is correct, then given that scientific theories are a species of the genus (Deduction) in virtue of being derivations (i.e., the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, necessitate the truth of the conclusion), it is reasonable to infer that they share most of their properties in common with other arguments of the genus (Deduction), such as the property of being better arguments when simpler than competing arguments. Now, granted that scientists prefer simpler explanations, and hence simpler scientific theories, and that their preference for simpler theories is rational, it is reasonable to infer that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction). To sum up, my argument for premise (2.1) runs as follows: (2.1a) If X and Y are species of genus G, then X and Y share most of their properties in common, except the property that makes them different species. (2.1b) Scientific theories and other deductive arguments are species of the genus (Deduction). Therefore, (2.1) If, other things being equal, simpler scientific theories are better, then, other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. 10 With this support for premises (2.1) and (2.2), I submit, the argument from scientific theories shows that, other things being equal, simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction) are better. Some might object to the argument from scientific theories by insisting that, pace Kitcher, scientific explanations, and hence scientific theories, are not species of the genus (Deduction). They might point out that one form of non-deductive reasoning that is taken to be ubiquitous in scientific practice is Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), which is a form of argument of the genus (Induction), given that the premises of an IBE, if true, do not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.18 In reply, I would like to suggest that this objection actually provides a way to extend the argument from scientific theories to arguments of the genus (Induction) as well.19 To see how, consider the general form of IBE (Govier 2010, p. 302): 1. D exists. 2. H1 would explain D. 3. H1 would offer the best available explanation of D. Therefore, probably, 4. H1 is true. [Where \"D refers to data, and H1 refers to a hypothesis put forward in an attempt to explain that data\" (Govier 2010, p. 298).]20 The key premise of an IBE, of course, is the third premise. What makes one explanation the best among several competing explanations? Philosophers of science have identified the following epistemic desiderata, the so-called \"theoretical virtues,\" which make one explanation better than others: \"accuracy, simplicity, internal and external consistency, breadth of scope, and fruitfulness\" (Longino 1995, p. 383).21 Notice that one of those theoretical virtues is simplicity, which means that, of two competing explanations, H1 and H2, the simpler one is the best one, other things being equal. If this is correct, then the third premise of an IBE is true insofar as H1 is simpler than a competing explanation, H2. From this it follows that an IBE for H1 is better than an IBE for H2 insofar as the third premise of the former is true, whereas the third premise of the latter is not. In other words, arguments of the genus (Induction), namely IBEs, are better when the explanations they are arguments for are simpler than competing explanations. 18 On IBE, see Lipton (2004). Cf. Bird (2007) who argues that there is a form of IBE, namely, inference to the only explanation, in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 19 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 20 Cf. Psillos (2007, pp. 442-443). 21 Cf. Kuhn (1977, pp. 320-339). 11 Now, if IBEs are better when the explanations they are arguments for are simpler than competing explanations, and IBEs are a species of the genus (Induction), then it follows that simpler arguments of the genus (Induction) are better by (2.1a). More explicitly: (2.1a) If X and Y are species of genus G, then X and Y share most of their properties in common, except the property that makes them different species. (3.1) IBEs and other inductive arguments are species of the genus (Induction). Therefore, (3.2) If, other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better, then, other things being equal, simpler inductive arguments are better. With this argument for (3.2), it follows that simpler arguments of the genus (Induction) are better, since, other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better. That is: (3.2) If, other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better, then, other things being equal, simpler inductive arguments are better. (3.3) Other things being equal, simpler IBEs are better. Therefore, (3.4) Other things being equal, simpler inductive arguments are better. Given (2.3) and (3.4), then, it follows that simpler arguments are better. That is, of two competing arguments, A1 and A2, if A1 is simpler than A2, then A1 is a better argument than A2. So, from the following claims: Other things being equal, simpler deductive arguments are better. [(2.3)] Other things being equal, simpler inductive arguments are better. [(3.4)] It follows that Other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. Accordingly, of two competing arguments, A1 and A2, if A1 is simpler than A2, we should prefer A1 over A2. 5. An argument from the conjunction rule Some might object to the argument from mathematical proofs and the argument from scientific theories by insisting that simplicity-either (Elegance) or (Parsimony)-is a pragmatic, not an epistemic, virtue. For instance, in the philosophy of science, constructive empiricists distinguish between pragmatic and epistemic virtues of scientific theories and argue that simplicity is a pragmatic, not an epistemic, virtue of scientific theories. As van Fraassen (1985, p. 252) writes: 12 A person may believe that a certain theory is true and explain that he does so, for instance, because it is the best explanation he has of the facts or because it gives him the most satisfying world picture. This does not make him irrational, but I take it to be part of empiricism to disdain such reasons (emphasis added). In other words, according to constructive empiricists, pragmatic virtues, like simplicity, are not truth-conducive, unless one holds a metaphysical belief in the simplicity of the world. As empiricists, however, constructive empiricists think that such a metaphysical belief is unwarranted. As van Fraassen (1980, p. 90) puts it, \"it is surely absurd to think that the world is more likely to be simple than complicated (unless one had certain metaphysics or theological views not usually accepted as legitimate factors in scientific inference).\" Inspired by constructive empiricism, then, some might object to the argument from mathematical proofs and the argument from scientific theories by claiming that principles like (Elegance) and (Parsimony) are not truth-conducive because \"it is surely absurd to think that the world is more likely to be simple than complicated\" (van Fraassen 1980, p. 90). Although I have taken the rationality of mathematicians' preference for simpler mathematical proofs and scientists' preference for simpler scientific theories as basic premises in my arguments from mathematical proofs and scientific theories, respectively, I would like to offer another argument for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better by way of a response to the aforementioned objection. This argument, if cogent, shows that one can accept that, other things being equal, simpler argument are better, without a commitment to a metaphysical belief in the simplicity of the world, a belief that constructive empiricists find unwarranted. To introduce this argument, I need to take a short detour through what Tversky and Kahneman (1983) call \"the conjunction fallacy\" in probability judgments. In their famous study, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) presented the following case to participants: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable? (L1) Linda is a bank teller. (L2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Most participants choose (L2), even though (L2) is less probable than (L1), given that two conditions must hold in order for (L2) to be true, namely, that Linda is a bank teller and that she is active in the feminist movement, whereas only one of them must hold for (L1) to be true, namely, that she is a bank teller. More generally, for any two events, A and B, Pr(A & B) ≤ Pr(A) and Pr(A & B) ≤ Pr(B). Although (L2) is less probable, it appears that most people find (L2) more plausible. As Tversky and Kahneman's study show, an account rich in details often seems more plausible to people, even though the more details the account contains, the less probable it is, since the 13 probability of the conjunction of all the details is lower than the probability of each detail (by the conjunction rule). Accordingly, even though it may seem that an account rich in details is more probable, that is not the case. An account rich in details only seems more probable, because it is more plausible, but it is actually less probable, given that the more details the account contains, the less probable it is, since the probability of the conjunction of all the details is lower than the probability of each detail (by the conjunction rule). Likewise, an argument rich in details (i.e., rich in premises) might seem better than an argument with fewer premises, even though the more details (i.e., more premises) the argument contains, the probability that it is a sound argument (i.e., a valid argument with true premises) is lower, since the probability of the conjunction of all the details (i.e., all the premises) is lower than the probability of each premise (by the conjunction rule). With this understanding of the conjunction rule, and the distinction between probability and plausibility, the following argument from the conjunction rule for the claim that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better can be made: (4.1) According to the conjunction rule, for any two competing arguments, A1 with premise P, and A2 with premises P and Q, Pr(P & Q) ≤ Pr(P) and Pr(P & Q) ≤ Pr(Q). (4.2) Given the conjunction rule, of two competing arguments, it is rational to prefer the simpler one (i.e., the argument with fewer premises), other things being equal. Therefore, (4.3) Of two competing arguments, it is rational to prefer the simpler one (i.e., the argument with fewer premises), other things being equal. In other words, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments, i.e., arguments with fewer premises. If A1 has fewer premises than A2, then we should prefer A1 over A2, other things being equal. The conclusion of this argument from the conjunction rule applies to arguments of the genus (Induction) as well as to arguments of the genus (Deduction) and there is no need to assume \"that the world is more likely to be simple than complicated\" (van Fraassen 1980, p. 90). 6. Conclusion In this paper, I have argued that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I have argued that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I have sketched three arguments in support of this claim. According to the first argument, if simpler mathematical proofs are better, other things being equal, then simpler argument of the genus (Deduction) are better, other things being equal. According to the second argument, if simpler scientific theories are better, other things being equal, then simpler arguments of the genus (Deduction) are better, other things being equal. I have extended this argument from scientific theories to arguments of the genus (Induction) as well on the grounds that, if simpler IBEs are better, other things being equal, then simpler arguments of the genus 14 (Induction) are better, other things being equal. According to the third argument, the conjunction rule implies that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments, i.e., arguments with fewer premises. Admittedly, there are many questions that stem from the aforementioned arguments, which I have not addressed in this paper. For example, how do we rank arguments according to simplicity? How do we distinguish between simplicity of arguments and simplicity of statements that serve as premises and conclusions of arguments? There are more questions that need be addressed, I am sure, but that will have to wait for another occasion.22 Far from being a problem, I take this to be a virtue of the arguments put forth in this paper, since, in addition to simplicity, fruitfulness is often considered a theoretical virtue of both mathematical proofs and scientific theories. Acknowledgments I am grateful to Andrew Aberdein and three anonymous reviewers of Argumentation for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 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{"text": "Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology Paul Silva Jr. University of Cologne It is a part of our commonsense perspective on the world that we know and have some justified beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions. With these we also attempt to make our way towards a theoretical understanding of what makes these moral beliefs true, i.e. we attempt to home in on the correct normative theory of ethics. It is generally assumed that the search for the correct normative theory of ethics is not absolutely futile, i.e. at the very least we can find reasons to justifiedly increase to some degree our confidence in some normative theories over others. Certain versions of objective act consequentialism are widely thought to be among the normative theories of ethics that we should take most seriously and thus be comparatively more certain about. In a large part, this is due to its ability to explain important parts of our commonsense moral perspective. In what follows I will explain why this is mistaken from the perspective of knowledgecentric anti-luck epistemology. For according to it there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act consequentialism is true. Accordingly, if objective act consequentialism is true, we neither know nor have justified beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions. So a problematic kind of applied moral skepticism obtains. As I will explain, this kind of applied moral skepticism introduces problematic limits on our ability to use objective act consequentialism's explanatory power to justifiedly increase our confidence in its truth. This is, in part, a product of higher-order defeat as I explain in the final section. There is, however, a silver lining for objective act consequentialists. For there is at least one type of objective act consequentialism, prior existence consequentialism, that is poised to avoid at least some of the epistemic problems discussed in this paper. Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology and Justificatory Defeat Take a standard lottery case: LOTTERY I have a ticket for a fair lottery with very long odds. The lottery has been drawn, although I have not heard the result yet. Reflecting on the odds involved I conclude that (L) my ticket is a loser. Besides my (accurate) assessment of the odds, I have no other reason to think my ticket is a loser. As it turns out, my belief that I own a losing ticket is true. It is widely thought that L cannot be known in these circumstances. The explanation for the unknowability of L in these circumstances is not that I lack strong evidence in favor of L. L is extremely probable on my evidence. Rather, the unknowability of L is thought to be owed to the fact that my belief, even if true, would be in some sense true by \"epistemic luck\"–a kind of luck that is incompatible with knowing. Generally, the nature of this epistemically problematic form of luck is thought to involve a modal defect in my believing L in these circumstances. The two leading accounts of this modal defect locate the problem with my belief not at the actual world where my belief is true, but in a relation I bear toward myself in nearby possible worlds where I falsely believe 2 L. The sensitivity account and the safety account are the leading accounts of that relation. Here is a common formulation of these proposed requirements on knowledge: SENSITIVITY Had it been that P, S would not still have believed that P (had S used the method that S actually used to determine whether P). SAFETY S could not have easily had a false belief as to whether or not P (using the method that S actually used to determine whether or not P).1 If either principle is correct, then L cannot be known in Lottery for neither principle is satisfied in that case. It is easy to see why Sensitivity fails in Lottery. My belief in L–that my ticket is a loser–is based solely on my statistical evidence. But I could have that same evidence even if my belief were false, i.e. even if there is some nearby world where my ticket is a winner. Because of this, I would still believe L on the basis of that same statistical evidence even were L false. So Sensitivity offers a straightforward explanation of the idea that L is unknowable in Lottery. It is a bit trickier to see how Safety explains the same fact. The idea that a belief could not have easily been false is the idea that the world would have to be significantly different in order for the target to belief to be false. For example, I truly believe that I will not become a US Navy Seal this year. And this belief could not have easily been false in the sense that in order for it to be false the world would have to be quite different in a variety of respects: the relevant governing bodies of the US Navy would have to decide that it's advisable to lower their fitness standards (dramatically) in order for me to be considered admissible as a Seal, or there would have to be some kind of conspiracy where all relevant individuals involved in assessing Seal candidates willingly lie about my admissibility, or something else equally unusual would have to happen. Given my age, my limited physical fitness, my limited ability to persevere through physical pain, my lack of political power to orchestrate a conspiracy, and my intention not to join the Seals, etc. it could not have easily been false that I will not become a Seal this year. So this belief satisfies Safety, and so is a candidate for knowledge. In contrast, as Pritchard (2008: section 4) explains, my belief in L in Lottery could easily have been false since \"all that need be different in order for one's ticket to be a winning ticket is that a few numbered balls fall in a slightly different configuration.\" Intuitively, such worlds are not significantly different from the actual world and so my belief could not have easily been false.2 While the unknowability of L in Lottery is widely held, some hold out hope that L might never the less be justifiedly believable in Lottery (e.g. standard Lockean evidentialists about justification). But knowledge-centric theorists have generally argued for theses about the relation between knowledge and justification that are inconsistent with this view. While I cannot here go into the details, the general motivation connecting knowledge and justification has to do with the normative role of knowledge in our assessment of belief. First, not only does one intuitively fail to know in Lottery cases, one intuitively shouldn't hold, and so can't justifiedly hold, a lottery belief. If justification requires knowledge, this fact about lottery beliefs can easily be explained. Second, the idea that justification requires knowledge can explain why certain Moorean beliefs shouldn't be held, e.g. I believe P, but I do not know P. Third, a knowledge requirement on justification can explain our critical practices of assessing others' beliefs. For instance, if someone believes P, it's perfectly normal to object to their believing P on the basis of the fact that they don't know it. A knowledge requirement on justification would also explain this. 1 Pritchard (2005; 2008; 2012). 2 See Rabinowitz (2019) for further discussion of safety conditions. 3 It turns out there are different ways of putting knowledge at the center of the justification of belief. For example, some knowledge-centric theorists think that knowledge is necessary and sufficient (and to be token-identified with) justified belief (Williamson 2013; Sutton 2007; Littlejohn 2012): J↔K: S justifiedly believes that P iff S knows that P. If correct, then not only can L not be known in Lottery, it cannot be justifiedly believed in Lottery either. Alternatively, some knowledge-centric theorists have argued that justification requires something just shy of knowing: being in a position to know (Bird 2007; Ichikawa 2014; Rosenkranz 2018): J→PK: S justifiedly believes P only if S is in a position to know P. If correct, the impossibility of knowing L entails the impossibility of justifiedly believing L in Lottery also.3 Now, if it's possible to have justified false beliefs, then perhaps it's possible to fail to know L while never the less having justification for certain higher-order beliefs: the belief that one knows L (though one doesn't) or the belief that one is justified in believing L (though one isn't). But notice both J↔K and J→PK entail the defeat of these higher-order beliefs. For if either J↔K or J→PK are true, it's impossible to have justified false beliefs if they cannot ever constitute knowledge. Accordingly, it's not just first-order lottery beliefs that are unjustified, these higher-order beliefs are also unjustified. So justification for both first-order and higher-order beliefs are lost. Unsurprisingly, the idea that knowledge must be a bare possibility for one to have justification has seemed to some a difficult bullet to bite. Accordingly, some have sought to unify the intuitions driving knowledge-centric views of justification without committing themselves to the idea that knowledge or possible knowledge is required for justified belief. For example, Smithies (2012) has argued that justification for the belief that P requires that one enjoy justification to believe a higher-order claim about the knowability of P, i.e. that one have justification to believe that one is in a position to know P: J→JPK: S justifiedly believes P only if S has justification to believe that she's in a position to know P. If this is correct then there is room for both first-order and higher-order justified beliefs in L. But of course such justified beliefs are limited to those who are sufficiently ignorant of the fact that one cannot know L in Lottery, i.e. those who lack access to reasons sufficient to defeat the claim that one can know L in Lottery. Accordingly, J→JPK leaves many of us who are reflective about lottery cases in much the same position as J↔K and J→PK: we cannot know L, we cannot 3 Alternatively, some knowledge-centric theorists have argued that justification should be understood virtuetheoretically in terms of exercises of knowledge-yielding abilities, competences, or dispositions (Miracchi 2015; Silva 2017; Kelp 2018; Millar 2019): J→EKD: S justifiedly believe P only if S's belief is produced from an exercise of a knowledge-yielding ability (process, competence, disposition). Provided such competences are understood in an anti-luck fashion as requiring safety or sensitivity, then we will get the same result here as with J→PK. However, Silva, Miracchi, and Kelp all seem to allow for justified beliefs in standard gettier cases (where Safety and Sensitivity are not satisfied) and thus do not require for the exercise of those abilities that one believe safely or sensitively. Millar (2019) may be an exception to this. 4 justifiedly believe L, and we cannot even falsely justifiedly believe that we have justification to believe L. As formulated, each of the knowledge-centric principles of justification mentioned above concern only doxastic justification. It is typically important to keep in mind the difference between propositional justification (=having justification to φ) and doxastic justification (=justifiedly φing). I will not make much of this in what follows and switch freely between the two locutions. This will make no difference under the assumption that having propositional justification requires at least the bare possibility of doxastic justification. Since knowledge of lottery beliefs is impossible, this will make both doxastic and propositional justification impossible to come by on the knowledge-centric views mentioned above. In what follows I'll explain the surprising problem that anti-luck epistemology and knowledge-centric epistemology generate for ethical consequentialists. Objective Act Consequentialism For present purposes let a consequentialist about moral requirements be anyone who thinks that the truth of claims about what actions are morally required (forbidden, optional) depend solely on the long term consequences of that action in the following way: CONSEQUENTIALISM S is required to perform action A if the the long term net value of A-ing is greater than the long term net value of performing any alternative action. If the the long term net value of A-ing is less than the the long term net value of performing some alternative action, then A-ing is wrong. If the the long term net value of A-ing is the same as the the long term net value of some alternative and there is no other alternative action with a higher net value, then A-ing is optional. NET VALUE The net value of an action is the amount of value that results from that action in a specified period of time minus the disvalue that results from that action in that same period of time. This leaves open a number of dimensions along which to specify one's preferred version of (objective, act) consequentialism. One could take an egoist view on which all that matters is how one's present actions maximize the net amount of pleasure of one's experiences in their life– in which case 'the long term' is just the duration of one's life. Alternatively, one could take a classical utilitarian view on which right action is determined by actions maximizing the net pleasure for all sentient beings who stand to be impacted by one's actions–in which case 'the long term' is just the duration of the effects of one's potential actions. This could be 10 minutes from the time of action, 10 years, or 10,000 millennia. Alternatively, one could take a form of prior existence utilitarianism where all that matters for fixing right action is how one's prospective actions would impact people who already exist (our would come to exist irrespective of which action is performed)–in which case 'the long term' is limited to the lifespan of those individuals.4 While the forms of consequentialism I'm explicitly discussing are the maximizing varieties, satisficing varieties will have an equally difficult time avoiding the epistemic problem I develop for maximizing varieties.5 Also, while consequentialist views suffer perhaps the worst from 4 For critical discussion of prior existence utilitarianism see Singer (2011). 5 If Sensitivity is right, this will be because our view as to whether or not a prospective action satisfices net value will still have to rely on something like premise (1) of the CMR (see below). While if Safety is right, this will be 5 knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, any moral theory that creates space for the moral status of at least some actions to be determined by the net value of their consequences will face a version of this problem.6 Let's start by considering high-stakes moral beliefs about the actual world. The belief that it's actually wrong to murder the entire Rohingya population of Myanmar, the belief that it's actually wrong to steal large sums of money from effective charities that would use it to alleviate the suffering of many, the belief that it's actually wrong to euthanize every other baby in the world, the belief that it's actually wrong to drop an atomic bomb near a large population to observe it's negative effects across that population, etc. These are all claims about prospective actions in the actual world as opposed to merely possible worlds. When it comes to merely possible worlds, we can often a priori specify the net value of consequences of our potential actions more or less arbitrarily. Not so with the actual world. What I'm concerned with is the epistemic standing of our moral beliefs about actions we and others can perform in the actual world. One thing these moral beliefs have in common is that they concern foreseeablely high-stakes actions, i.e. these are prospective actions that are specified in such a way that it is assumed that the individual for whom they are prospective actions is in a position to know that in the near term an exceptionally bad moral state of affairs would result from performing them. Now, there can be prospective high-stakes actions in circumstances where every alternative action is also a high-stakes action (think of trolley cases where the numbers on the tracks are roughly equal). These are not the kind of circumstances I have in mind in what follows. Our moral beliefs about these kinds of high-stakes actions will be controversial and skepticism about them will be far less troubling. Rather, I'm limiting reflection to cases where a prospective high-stakes action has at least one prospective low-stakes alternative that one could easily perform. For example, a military leader's ability (a) to murder or displace all, or nearly all, of Myanmar's Rohingya population as well as his ability (b) to not murder or displace any of them. Ordinary moral judgements would affirm that performing (a) is morally wrong when–though perhaps not only when–(b) is an available prospective course of action. High-stakes moral beliefs are common, generally uncontroversial, and often function as starting points (and sometimes as fixed points) in non-skeptical moral theorizing. Their evidential usefulness in moral theorizing is owed to the fact that they seem to be justified and knowledgeable moral beliefs. But if our high-stakes moral beliefs are to be justified and knowledgeable from the consequentialist point of view, their justification and knowledgeability depends on induction in some way or other. Accordingly, we must inductively project in some way from past experience with a given action type to the conclusion that the target instance of that type will in one's present circumstances maximize net value in the long run. But the worry immediately arises: it's surely possible that a prospective action that would have horrendous near term consequences never the less maximizes net value in the long run. This is an old objection, and consequentialists have had something to say about this. For example, G. E. Moore (1903 [1988], 93) tentatively suggests the following: As we proceed further and further from the time at which alternative actions are open to us, the events of which either action would be part cause become because just as prospective actions could have easily failed to maximize net value, they could also have easily failed to satisfice net value (see below). 6 For example, one needn't be a consequentialist to endorse the following. Suppose it would otherwise be permissible either to help group A or to help group B by providing one with money. However, you know that group B would use a portion of that money to set in place a series of events whose outcomes would very likely severely and unnecessarily harm group A in the long run. Provided helping group A would not have comparably bad likely outcomes, intuitively, helping group B would (ceteris paribus) be wrong and it would be wrong because of the likely consequences of doing so. If that intuitive moral judgement is right, it is not one that could be known or justifiedly believed if the argument against consequentialism below is sound. 6 increasingly dependent on those other circumstances, which are the same, whichever action we adopt. The effects of any individual action seem, after a sufficient space of time, to be found only in trifling modifications spread over a very wide area, whereas its immediate effects consist in some prominent modification of a comparatively narrow area. Since, however, most of the things which have any great importance for good or evil are things of this prominent kind, there may be a probability that after a certain time all the effects of any particular action become so nearly indifferent, that any difference between their value and that of the effects of another action, is very unlikely to outweigh an obvious difference in the value of the immediate effects. J.J. C. (1973, 33) concisely reiterates the idea: [W]e do not normally in practice need to consider very remote consequences, as these in the end rapidly approximate to zero like the furthermost ripples on a pond after a stone has been dropped into it. Shelly Kagan (1998, 64) says that: Of course, it remains true that there will always be a very small chance of some totally unforeseen disaster resulting from your act. But it seems equally true that there will be a corresponding very small chance of your act resulting in something fantastically wonderful, although totally unforeseen. If there is indeed no reason to expect either, then the two possibilities will cancel each other out as we try to decide how to act. If Moore, Smart, and Kagan are right, then past experience allows us to reliably project the net value of a given action at least in a reasonable range of normal circumstances. For according to their suggestion, the long term effects of any prospective action will (or is objectively likely to) wash out in a way that tends to make its foreseeable near term net value representative of its long term net value. Accordingly, if any kind of action allows for this sort of projection, it's exactly the sort of high-stakes actions described above where the foreseeable near-term consequences are extremely high.7 Let's first clarify just how we can move from the informal assertions of projectability made above to outright claims about a given action being right or wrong. Here is an apparently cogent way of specifying the needed details: CONSEQUENTIALIST MORAL REASONING (CMR): (1) If up to the present A-ing in circumstances like the ones I'm in have (or would have) frequently enough maximized net value up till now, then A-ing in 7 Yet some have worried about this Moore-Smart-Kagan style response. For it's not hard to imagine a series events where, say, murdering lots of children has the highest net value in the long run, and it's not quite clear why we should think that the long term consequences will (or are objectively likely to) balance out (Greaves 2016), Moreover, Elgin (2015) points out that, under certain conditions, the mere fact that there are long term distant consequences statistically prohibits us from being able to reliably assess the net value of our prospective actions. But Elgin's criticism does not apply with equal force to all forms of consequentialism. For example, some forms of consequentialism give special place to the interests of beings that already exist (e.g. prior existence utilitarianism, ethical egoism). Once that is done, distant future consequences become irrelevant when it comes to undermining the the Moore-Smart-Kagan thesis. An upshot of the epistemic objection I present below is that one cannot retreat to something like prior existence utilitarianism to avoid it. 7 my present circumstances will very likely maximize net value in the long run. (suggested by Moore, Smart, and Kagan) (2) Up to the present A-ing in circumstances like the ones I'm in have (or would have) frequently enough maximized net value up till now. (3) Therefore, A-ing in my circumstances will very likely maximize net value in the long run. (from 1 and 2) (4) Therefore, given that I have no significant reason to think A-ing will fail to maximize net value in the long run, A-ing in my circumstances will maximize net value in the long run. (from 3 and contraction (see below)) (5) An action is wrong iff it fails to maximize net value the long run. (consequentialism) (6) Therefore, refraining from A-ing in my circumstances is wrong. (from 4 and 5) Let me say a few things about this pattern of reasoning before getting to the lottery problem for consequentialists. (1) offers us a way of specifying the underlying idea that Moore, Smart, and Kagan suggested on behalf of consequentialism. The parenthetical \"would have\" in (1) is to indicate that sometimes we can judge a possible past action's prospective net value in the near-term without the need of anyone having performed that specific action in the past. In no point in the past have 99.9% of earth's population suffered horribly unto death from the release of a virus. Yet we know (or can at any rate be reasonably certain) that if someone were to have done that five years ago, that action would have failed to maximize net value up to now–i.e. it's an action whose net value calculated up to the present moment is lower than some alternative prospective action's net value when calculated up to the present moment. Importantly, the justification for (1) is inductive: provided induction from past experience is sufficiently reliable in the case of high-stakes beliefs, then we have defeasible inductive justification for endorsing the conditional specified by (1). Of course, as noted above, the consequentialist application of (1) assumes that maximization of net value up to the present is a sufficiently reliable indicator of maximization of net value in the long run. Again, some versions of consequentialism will have a relatively easy time justifying this (prior existence utilitarianism) while other versions will have a comparatively difficult time doing so (classical utilitarianism). This is something that warrants further discussion, but I will pass it by to discuss other issues. For the most part, the justification of (1) becomes progressively easier the more high-stakes our potential actions are irrespective of the version of consequentialism one endorses. (2) stands to be justified by historical knowledge of the effects of such actions in suitably similar circumstances. (3) is a deductive conclusion from (1) and (2). (4) relies on what I'm calling a contraction principle, i.e. a principle that licenses transitioning from probabilistically qualified claims to probabilistically unqualified claims in the absence of defeating information. For example, when a radiologist examines an X-ray of your leg and concludes that you have a hairline fracture, they are (or can be) implicitly reasoning from a contraction principle. For while X-rays offer us highly reliable representations when interpreted by a trained professional, there is still some small margin of error; there is still some small chance that either the X-ray production involved some error in representation or the reader mistook something for a hair-line fracture that was not a hair-line fracture. Even so, a skilled radiologist can justifiedly judge that you in fact have a hair-line fracture, despite the small error possibilities so long as they have no reason to think the small error possibility is actual. Similarly, most of the time a jury judges (and sincerely believes) someone guilty of a crime on the basis of a body of evidence, they engage in a form of contractive reasoning from how things very likely are, to how things actually are. There is a lot to say about contractive reasoning and I will return to this below. 8 For now, it's enough to note that we regularly engage in (or could engage in) such reasoning, and that often enough such reasoning is justified. (5) is just a coarse-grained representation of the objective consequentialist thesis. If any of our high-stakes moral beliefs are to be justified on the assumption that some form of consequentialism is correct, then it has to be the case that something akin to a CMR argument underlies the justification our high-stakes moral beliefs. Applied Moral Skepticism Why think that our high-stakes moral beliefs are like lottery beliefs if consequentialism is true? The answer flows out of the different constraints that Sensitivity and Safety impose on knowledgeable belief. Take Sensitivity first. Suppose you believe A-ing is wrong on the basis of a CMR argument. Would you still hold this belief on the basis of a CMR argument even if your belief were false, i.e. even if A-ing were not wrong? You would. This is because CMR arguments are not \"sensitive\" to the falsity of the beliefs they support. The reason for this lies with premise (1), which is a conditional that relies on induction from past experience for its justification. But any reasoning that relies on the past as an indicator of the future will fail to satisfy Sensitivity. For example, believing the sun will rise tomorrow because it has always done so in the past will not count as knowledge since I would still have believed this even if, for whatever reason, the sun were destroyed or the rotation of the earth halted before it had a chance to rise tomorrow (Vogel 1987; Comesaña 2007). Similarly, it could improbably turn out to be the case that murdering all the local school children maximizes net value because that would lead to a distant future where many, many more children are saved from lethal harm they otherwise would have suffered. But even were that the unlikely truth, if my belief that it's wrong were based on a CMR argument I would still have believed that it's wrong to kill all the local school children just on the basis of the fact that such an action would foreseeably fail to maximize net value. Accordingly, if Sensitivity is true then premise (1) is unknown given its inductive justification. And if premise (1) is unknown then presumably we cannot know the moral status of an action on the basis of a CMR argument–at least not those that rely on induction for their justification of premise (1). Now, it's easy to see how little knowledge remains to us if Sensitivity is true since inductive knowledge becomes exceedingly difficult to come by in general (Vogel 1987; Comesaña 2007). For this reason, many philosophers have been reluctant to endorse Sensitivity and have turned to its contrapositive cousin, Safety, for help. Safety lacks the skeptical implications of Sensitivity for inductive beliefs. So if Safety is true, then premise (1) of CMR is not obviously in jeopardy. And if one can know premise (1) along with the rest of the premises, then it would seem that one could also come by moral knowledge and justified moral beliefs on the basis of CMR arguments also. The thing to note is that while Safety doesn't threaten premise (1), it does obstruct the derivation of it's conclusion by imposing limits on the ability of contractive reasoning to afford us knowledge. For recall that to reach (4) in the CMR we needed to rely on the idea that we can transition from claims about how things very likely are (/will be) to how things actually are (/will be). But if Safety is true, then we can only gain knowledge of actuality from knowledge of likelihoods when beliefs so based could not have easily been false. But if consequentialism is true, virtually all of our high-stakes moral beliefs are just that: they could easily have been false. To see this consider a variation on the Lottery case from above: AGENT-CAUSAL LOTTERY You're holding a lottery ticket whose number reads: 1524353214. Unlike a standard lottery, the winning ticket number is not determined through a nearrandom mechanical process. Rather, the winning ticket number is determined by the following process. Each day starting from tomorrow a new participant is selected to decide which number comes next in the series. It can be any 9 number between 1 and 5. Since there are 10 numbers on the ticket, this will take 10 days and will require 10 participants to select these numbers. Each participant is freely selected by the previous participant, while the first participant is chosen at random. And, excepting the first participant, each participant is informed as to the number selected by the previous participant and encouraged, but not forced, to choose a different number than the previous participant. Accordingly, the participants are influenced by that knowledge when selecting a number. Given this selection process, it's clear that the winning ticket number will not be chosen at random. So you know that, unlike a fair lottery, the exact chances that your ticket's number will be selected cannot be calculated in any precise way. But you do know that your chance of winning is obviously very small. So it's extremely likely that your ticket is a loser. Reflecting on the long odds involved you conclude (L*) that your ticket is a loser. Besides your rough assessment of the odds, you have no other reason to think your ticket is a loser. As it turns out, your number will not be selected in the following ten days and so your belief that you own a losing ticket is true. This is an \"agent-causal lottery\" in the sense that there is a clear non-random agent-causal path reaching from the first participant to the winning ticket number. For each participant (except for the first) is selected by the previous participant, and each participant's number selection is causally influenced by their knowledge of the previous participant's number selection (except for the first). Accordingly, the outcome of this lottery is casually produced by the actions performed by previous agents and the responses of the agents who are impacted by those past actions. Do you know (L*) that you have a losing ticket in Agent-Causal Lottery? I venture to claim that anyone convinced that you cannot know L in Lottery, will be likewise drawn to the conclusion that you cannot know L* in Agent-Causal Lottery. The parallels are too deep, and the differences are too superficial. But more to the point, if Safety is what we rely on in diagnosing what goes wrong with my belief in Lottery, then we must also rely on it in diagnosing this case. And given the parallels between this case and the original, it's easy to see where this is heading. For in the original case, my belief in L fails to satisfy Safety because it could easily have been false since \"all that needs to be different in order for one's ticket to be a winning ticket is that a few numbered balls fall in a slightly different configuration\" Pritchard (2008: section 4). And similarly, your belief in L* in Agent-Causal Lottery could easily have been false since all that needs to be different in order for your ticket to be a winning ticket is for a few people to have made a slightly different decisions about which number and subsequent participant to choose. So if Safety explains my failure to know in Lottery, it explains your failure to know in the Agent-Causal Lottery. The Agent-Causal Lottery is a trying case for non-skeptical consequentialists. For the outcomes of our high-stakes actions in the long run are a lot like the outcome in an Agent-Causal Lottery. For in both kinds of case there is an agent-causal path that produces the relevant outcome, and at each (or very many) node in that path things could easily have been otherwise. For there are almost always many alternative available prospective actions an agent might easily have performed, thereby leading to different outcomes with a plausibly different net value. Take, for example, the 2019 mass shooting in El Paso, Texas. 22 were killed and 24 were injured (if this is insufficiently high-stakes just imagine many more were killed and injured). By the lights of ordinary moral intuitions this was a wrong action and we know that this was a wrong action. But the knowledgeability of this as a wrong action doesn't just depend on (i) the known failure of this action to maximize net value in the near term, and (ii) the idea that (i) ensures that the shooting is also very likely to fail to maximize net value in the long run. For the lesson of the lottery cases is that beliefs that are highly likely to be true don't necessarily satisfy Safety. 10 According to Safety, for the belief that the shooting was wrong to constitute knowledge it has to be the case that the shooting could not have easily maximized net value in the long run. But just as in the Agent-Causal Lottery where it's easy to see how one could have easily beat the odds since each person could have easily chosen a slightly different number, in the mass shooting case too one could \"easily have beat the odds\" in at least some of the following ways. Consider that the El Paso shooting was the most lethal shooting in the US since 1949. And it comes just after a string of other disturbingly violent shootings. It is also a shooting that took place in a highly populated city in Texas–a state that ordinarily shows strong resistance to fire-arm restrictions. Now we know that, historically, social movements that bring about social change often erupt from tragic events. Could it not easily be the case that this shooting helps tip the balance in support of gunlaw reform in the US in such a way that future shootings are significantly reduced and thereby maximize net value in the long run? It's hard to see what grounds there could be for resisting this judgement in our present circumstances. But even if that fails to be the case, it could easily be the case that this shooting makes the general population much more vigilant and willing to report on people they know who might be at risk of committing a mass shooting, thus preventing many more shooting, and thereby maximizes net value in the long run. Further, it could easily be the case that this shooting has \"identity-affecting\" consequences that maximize net value, i.e. it impacts which people come into existence in long run and thereby impacts the net value of one's action. Perhaps, for example, by killing these people in El Paso the shooter has impacted history in a way that would prevent the births of what would otherwise have been the next massively genocidal dictator and thereby maximizes net value in the long run (cf. Lenman 2000). According to the thesis floated by Moore, Smart, and Kagan, these are very unlikely possibilities since they are possibilities where the near term consequences fail to accurately represent the long term consequences, but so too is my winning the lottery. And what the lottery teaches us is that the unlikelihood of an outcome doesn't ensure that the unlikely outcome could not have easily obtained. Recall that Sensitivity undermined the knowledgeability of premise (1). This was due to the fact that Sensitivity undermines inductive knowledge generally. But Safety is compatible with inductive knowledge and so it imposes no immediate threat to (1). Rather, Safety obstructs the justification of (4) by imposing a limit on knowledge-generating contractive reasoning. For recall that to reach (4) in the CMR we needed to rely on the idea that we can transition from claims about how things very likely are (/will be) to how things actually are (/will be). But if Safety is true, then we can only gain knowledge of actuality from knowledge of likelihoods when beliefs so based could not have easily been false. But, given the nature of the relation between our present actions and their outcomes (especially in the social world), consequentialism seems to imply that the vast majority of our high-stakes moral beliefs could easily have been false. This puts knowledge of our high-stakes moral beliefs out of reach. What impact might this have on the justificatory status of high-stakes moral beliefs if consequentialism is true? Well, if J↔K or J→PK are true, then our high-stakes moral beliefs are unjustified since both principles limit justified beliefs to those that are potential knowledge. If J→JPK is true, the justificatory status of our high-stakes moral beliefs fare a bit better. Since, so long as one is ignorant of the unknowability of our high-stakes moral beliefs it will be easier to have justification to believe that one is in a position to know them. This is in some sense \"good news\" for consequentialists since it carves out space for there to be some unknown yet justified highstakes moral beliefs. But the consequentialists for whom this is good news are only those who are ignorant of the fact that knowing requires either Sensitivity or Safety. Consequentialism and Self-Defeat According to many, the justification for believing (or assigning high credence to) consequentialism or any other general normative theory of ethics depends substantially on its ability to explain our \"considered moral judgements\", which includes our concrete case moral beliefs (or intuitions) that we reflectively endorse. Our high-stakes moral beliefs form an important subset of our considered 11 moral judgements about the actual world for they tend to be widely believed and are intuitively striking in the sense that their denials seem clearly to be false. This is doubtless due to the fact that, as defined, our high-stakes moral beliefs involve wantonly harming others in circumstances that have extremely bad effects in the near-term. Consequentialists have regularly argued that consequentialism can explain the truth of at least an important range of our (correct) considered moral judgements, while offering error theories for those it cannot explain. Let 'HSMBs' refer to our high-stakes moral beliefs about the moral status of prospective actions that consequentialism can explain. This will include only those HSMBs that are true by the lights of consequentialism. For example, if the HSMB is that it's wrong to murder Sam, it is an HSMB that consequentialism can explain only if killing Sam fails to maximize net value in the long run. Otherwise, it's just not true and so not the sort of HSMB that a consequentialist should expect their theory to explain. Explaining why people have false HSMBs is the job of an error theory. As is common, I interpret the evidential relevance of explanatory considerations in probabilistic terms. That is, we are to understand data that is explained by a hypothesis as increasing the likelihood of that hypothesis. Thus: Pr(Consequentialism|HSMBs) > Pr(Consequentialism) But this evidential inequality is only one part of the story of how we might be able to come to justifiedly increase our confidence in consequentialism in light of our HSMBs. For in order to justifiedly increase our confidence in consequentialism we must be able to update (e.g. conditionalize, jeffrey conditionalize, pseudo-conditionalize) on our HSMBs. But on all accounts, in order to update on some evidence, E, we have to stand in some epistemically significant relation to E. For example, standard update rules require that we have learned E. Now, it's an interesting question what it takes to \"learn\" that E. But at a minimum it should require that one have justification for believing E. The idea that one can justifiedly update on information that one doesn't even have justification to believe is very hard to make sense of. Now, the arguments of the previous section show that knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology is inconsistent with having justification for believing our HSMBs, and so knowledgecentric anti-luck epistemology is inconsistent with the justification of updating on our HSMBs if consequentialism is true. This threatens to yield a form of standard first-order epistemic defeat for consequentialism since a crucial part of the evidence that is supposed to justify it, our HSMBs, are inaccessible to us. Yet consequentialism might be false. If consequentialism is false, then our HSMBs can be justified provided the correct normative theory of ethics doesn't give the long term consequences of our actions a role in determining right from wrong (and thereby run afoul of knowledge centric anti-luck epistemology). Generally, non-consequentialist theories of ethics and rule consequentialist theories don't do this, and thereby create a more hospitable environment for the justification of our HSMBs. Now, if our HSMBs can be justified then presumably they can also be justifiedly updated on, and therefore they can function as evidence for consequentialism! This is a surprising little fact, one that gives us a bit of higher-order information about our evidence for consequentialism, namely: HOE: Our evidence (constituted by our HSMBs) supports having an increased degree of confidence in consequentialism only if consequentialism is false. Now on the probabilistic outlook I began with the question of having a justified high credence in consequentialism depends on the evidential relation between our prior confidence in consequentialism and our prior confidence in consequentialism conditional on our HSMBs. 12 Having observed the way in which HOE follows from the arguments above, our evidence now includes both our HSMBs and HOE. Intuitively, HOE should have some evidential impact on our confidence in consequentialism. But what kind of impact, exactly? Surely it should not increase our confidence in consequentialism. Put in general terms, it's beyond credulity to think one can know/justifiedly believe that (i) E, and that (ii) E supports P only if ¬P, and think that one can justifiedly believe (or increase confidence in) P on the basis of (i) and (ii).8 That leaves two options with regard to the evidential impact of HOE: either HOE lowers our posterior confidence in consequentialism, or it screens off the relevance of our HSMBs. I don't know of an uncontroversial reason to prefer either disjunct. So let us remain neutral on this issue. Accordingly, we have the following inequality: Pr(Consequentialism|HSMBs & HOE) ≤ Pr(Consequentialism) That is to say, learning HOE at the very best screens off whatever justification our HSMBs afforded us for thinking that consequentialism is true; at worst it should lower our credence in consequentialism. So unless one has sufficient reason to believe (or at least increase confidence in) consequentialism that is wholly independent of our HSMBs, consequentialism is not a moral theory that we can justifiedly believe or have high confidence in. Put differently, if justifiedly believing consequentialism depends on its ability to explain our HSMBs, then consequentialism doesn't seem like the sort of ethical theory that can be justifiedly believed. It's a kind of blindspot, a truth about the structure of moral normativity that we would seem incapable of rationally recognizing as such. There are a number of questions this raises about the methodology of justifying normative theories. I think the most salient one it raises concerns the ability of concrete case judgments or intuitions about merely possible cases to justify normative theories. For when it comes to the merely possible cases we can generally specify in the very construction of the cases whether or not the prospective action under consideration maximizes net value in the long run. If ethical theorizing can function in an epistemically robust way with only such cases to work with, then the applied moral skepticism of consequentialism would not impose a limit on our ability to justifiedly increase our confidence in consequentialism. But, as others have worried, there seems to be something epistemically circular about this.9 Whether or not it is an epistemically problematic form of circularity is a discussion for another time. It's worth mentioning that there is one form of consequentialism that may evade these worries: prior existence consequentialism. For on such views whether or not an action is right or wrong just depends on it's impact on individuals who already exist (or would exist no matter which action were performed). Now, unlike our prospective actions, we have historical knowledge of the actual outcomes of people's past actions and how those actions impacted the people who existed (or doubtless would exist) at that time. Arguably, this historical knowledge can afford us knowledge of the moral status of past high-stakes actions if a version of prior existence consequentialism is correct. For example, the dropping of a second atomic bomb on a populated area like Nagasaki was gratuitous for quickly ending war with Japan. The war could have been brought to just as quick an end if it were not dropped or if it were dropped on an uninhabited area of Japan. We know this. So we know that this past action was wrong, even if at the time those who were making the decision were not–by the lights of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology–able to know or 8 If the evidential support relation involved some kind of standard conditional (material, indicative, counterfactual, strict), then (i) and (ii) would yield a contradiction. For whichever way the conditional is interpreted, it cannot be self-consistent and non-trivially true that: (E&(E → P)) → -P. But I'm here assuming evidential support is not essentially bound to such conditionals, and can often be understood in broadly probabilistic terms. 9 See Pust's (2013, Ch. 1) discussion of Rawls and the method of reflective equilibrium. 13 justifiedly believe it. The upshot is that prior existence consequentialist views may only imply a limited form of skepticism: we may not be able to know or justifiedly believe whether or not a prospective action of ours is wrong (due to the arguments of section 3), but at least we can justifiedly increase our confidence in prior existence consequentialist views in virtue of their explanatory power with respect to HSMBs about the past.1011 References Bird, Alexander. 2007. \"Justified Judging.\" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 81–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x. Comesaña, Juan. 2007. \"Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.\" Philosophy Compass 2 (6): 781–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00076.x. Elgin, Samuel. 2015. \"The Unreliability of Foreseeable Consequences: A Return to the Epistemic Objection.\" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4): 759–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677015-9602-8. Greaves, Hilary. 2016. \"Cluelessness.\" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3): 311–39. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow018. Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. 2014. \"Justification Is Potential Knowledge.\" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2): 184–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.923240. Kagan, Shelly. 1998. Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kelp, Christoph. 2018. Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge. Lenman, James. 2000. \"Consequentialism and Cluelessness.\" Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (4): 342–70. Littlejohn, Clayton. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Millar, Alan. 2019. Knowing by Perceiving. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miracchi, Lisa. 2015. \"Competence to Know.\" Philosophical Studies 172 (1): 29–56. Moore, George Edward. 1903 [1988]. Principia Ethica. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. Epistemic Luck. 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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smithies, Declan. 2012. \"The Normative Role of Knowledge.\" Noûs 46 (2): 265–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00787.x. 10 For obvious reasons, this historical knowledge is not helpful for versions of consequentailism, like classical utilitarianism, which make the moral status of past actions depend on distant future outcomes. I'm grateful to Rik Peels for prompting me to reflect on whether our historical knowledge of outcomes could be useful in the justification of consequentialist views. 11 I'm grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation which funded this research as well as to Michael Blome-Tillmann, Michael Klenk, and Rik Peels who offered helpful feedback on this project. 14 Sutton, Jonathan. 2007. Without Justification. Bradford Books. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Vogel, J. 1987. \"Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.\" In the Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, edited by Steven Luper, 197–215. 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