The vast majority of software-based systems rely heavily on the assumption that a server and any client application are designed to interact with a “trusted” resource and therefore, the information and directives which are sent to and from the server are assumed to be “trusted” by the client. In some systems, this could constitute all aspects of the product, whereas in other more secure systems that facilitate end-to-end encryption schemes or possess limited client-server communication, the trusted authority is expected to reliably connect one peer to another for an anonymous key exchange, thus maintaining the privacy of data shared between each peer. In both cases, the central, otherwise trusted authority is still vulnerable to compromise and therefore, the assumption of a “trusted” resource, while traditionally necessary, is an inherent point of vulnerability when designing for system integrity. Further, compromise can occur by exploiting such vulnerabilities via external and internal penetration. Internal compromise is exceptionally difficult to protect against because, it requires that a system or set of processes does not trust itself, a system admin, server, or other authorizing party. This could be made to be analogous to the challenges with a body detecting and fighting cancer since the primary difficult results in detection and containment of one's own cells. In a server system, these internal parties can, through malice, compromise, or negligence, violate the integrity of the trusted server, having likely been put in a position to be a trusted resource within an otherwise secure network.
The subject matter of the present disclosure is directed at overcoming, or at least reducing, the effects of one or more of the problems set forth above.