Dawda Jawara
Regime survival
Regime survival
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With Jawara's precarious hold on power at Gambian independence, his low [caste](/wiki/Caste "Caste") status constituted a grave handicap and one which threatened to overshadow his strengths (most notably, a university education). The two pre\-independence challenges to Jawara's position demonstrated his vulnerability and illustrated the fact that he could not rely upon the undivided loyalty of the party's founding members. At independence, Jawara's lieutenants regarded him as their representative, almost a nominal leader, and clearly intended him to promote their personal advancement.

Given these circumstances, Jawara's task was to overcome his low caste status, assert his authority over the party, and secure control over its political direction. In doing this, he did not use coercion. Politically inspired “disappearances” were never an element of PPP rule; neither opponents nor supporters suffered harassment or periods of detention on fabricated charges. That Jawara was able to eschew coercive techniques and still survive reflected an element of good fortune, and yet his skillful political leadership was also crucial. Within his own party Jawara was fortunate to be surrounded by individuals willing to refrain from violence to achieve their goals, and yet much of the credit for this restraint must go to Jawara—his skillful manipulation of patronage resources, cultivation of affective ties and shrewd balancing of factions within the PPP. Lacking the coercive option, and given that affective ties, which had to be earned, were a medium\- to long\-term resource, Jawara initially relied heavily on instrumental ties and distribution of patronage. His limited resource base posed an obvious, though not insurmountable, problem. 

Within the ruling group, ministerial positions—which provided a generous salary, perks and for some, access to illicit wealth—constituted the most sought after form of patronage and yet, before 1970, the number of ministerial posts did not exceed seven.

By 1992, the number remained a comparatively modest fourteen. Despite these limits, Jawara skillfully used all the various permutations of patronage distribution (appointment, promotion, termination, demotion, and rehabilitation) to dramatise his power over subordinates’ political futures and entrench himself as a leader.

In response to the pre\-1965 challenges to his authority, Jawara moved to reduce the size, cohesion, and authority of the founding members as a group. Many of the party's earliest adherents (even those who showed no outward sign of disloyalty) lost ministerial posts during the early years of PPP rule. Jawara may not have used force, but neither was he hampered by sentiment; his pragmatism and willingness to demote, or even drop, former supporters in order to strengthen his personal political position was apparent. Jawara further strengthened his political position with the incorporation of new sources of support within the ruling group.

His enthusiasm for political accommodation stemmed from the closely related imperatives of weakening the influence of the PPP's original members and avoiding political isolation. The original group resented the fact that newcomers had not participated in the early struggle for power and yet were now enjoying the fruits of their labour. The secondary factor of ethno\-regional considerations compounded this resentment; those who were co\-opted came from all ethnic groups in the former colony and protectorate.

Jawara's popular support and cultivation of affective ties were crucial for easing the pressure on scarce patronage resources. Although the skillful distribution of patronage and associated tolerance of corruption (to be discussed later) played an important role in the PPP's survival, Jawara did not rely on elite\-level resource distribution as heavily as some of his counterparts.


What was Jawara's caste status at Gambian independence?