Jagdgeschwader 1 (World War II)
Battle of the Heligoland Bight, Phoney War
### Battle of the Heligoland Bight, Phoney War

Stab./JG 1 controlled all the following *Gruppen* (groups; wings in RAF parlance) which had a combined strength of 80–100 aircraft; II./JG 77 commanded by [Hilmer von Bülow\-Bothkamp](/wiki/Hilmer_von_B%C3%BClow-Bothkamp "Hilmer von Bülow-Bothkamp"); II./*Trägergruppe* 186 (Carrier Air Group 186; TrGr 186\) which was officially attached to [*Zerstörergeschwader* 1](/wiki/Zerst%C3%B6rergeschwader_1 "Zerstörergeschwader 1") (ZG 1—1st Destroyer Wing) but placed under Stab./JG 1 for defensive duties under *[Major](/wiki/Major_%28rank%29 "Major (rank)")* Heinrich Seeliger; 10\.(*Nacht*)/[*Jagdgeschwader* 26](/wiki/Jagdgeschwader_26 "Jagdgeschwader 26") (JG 26\) under *Staffelkapitän* (Squadron Leader) [Johannes Steinhoff](/wiki/Johannes_Steinhoff "Johannes Steinhoff"); I. *Gruppe* of [*Zerstörergeschwader* 76](/wiki/Zerst%C3%B6rergeschwader_76 "Zerstörergeschwader 76") (ZG 76—76 Destroyer Wing) under the command of *[Hauptmann](/wiki/Hauptmann "Hauptmann")* Günther Reinecke, and 2 *Staffel*; 2\./ZG 76\) under the command of *Geschwaderkommodore* [Wolfgang Falck](/wiki/Wolfgang_Falck "Wolfgang Falck"); JGr. 101 was attached to ZG 1 and eventually became II./ZG 1\. It was commanded by *Major* Hellmuth Reichardt. According to the Luftwaffe [order of battle](/wiki/Order_of_battle "Order of battle"), dated 15 December 1939, the assignment of JG 1 was no more consistent. I. *Gruppe* had one *staffel* at Neuenkirchen\-Vörden, subordinated to Luftgau XI under the command of *Luftflotte* 2\. Stab an done *Staffel*, II./JG 1, with 4\. and 6\./JG 77 plus one *staffel* from II(J)TrGr 186 (II *JagdGruppe* Carrier Group 186\) subordinated to it, were based at Jever under *Jagdfliegerführer Deutsche Bucht*. Two *Staffeln* of II. *Gruppe* were based at [Nordholz](/wiki/Nordholz "Nordholz").

Three days later, JG 1 fought in the [Battle of the Heligoland Bight](/wiki/Battle_of_the_Heligoland_Bight_%281939%29 "Battle of the Heligoland Bight (1939)"). The German fighter units were alerted late, but in a quick briefing, the JG 1 commander had told his pilots to make a beam attack as it was a blind spot for the [Vickers Wellington](/wiki/Vickers_Wellington "Vickers Wellington") bombers heading to [Wilhelmshaven](/wiki/Wilhelmshaven "Wilhelmshaven"). A stern attack was dangerous, as the gunners could then target an attacking fighter with a coordinated and concentrated cone of fire. One weakness also noted was that early types of Wellingtons lacked [self\-sealing fuel tanks](/wiki/Self-sealing_fuel_tank "Self-sealing fuel tank"). This meant if the German fighters hit the wings, the bomber was liable to burn. Stab/JG 1's *Geschwaderkommodore* Schumacher was given the credit for two of the bombers. At 13:45, the German fighters—at the limit of their endurance—returned to base. [RAF Bomber Command](/wiki/RAF_Bomber_Command "RAF Bomber Command") abandoned daylight operations and this encouraged the *[Oberkommando der Luftwaffe](/wiki/Oberkommando_der_Luftwaffe "Oberkommando der Luftwaffe")* (OKL—Luftwaffe High Command) to neglect the German day fighter force defences in Germany which had profound consequences later in the war. Historians Donald Caldwell and [Richard R. Muller](/wiki/Richard_R._Muller "Richard R. Muller") described the battle as "amongst the most important actions of the entire war." For several years, the daylight fighter defences over Germany were rarely tested.


What did historians Caldwell and Muller describe as 'amongst the most important actions of the entire war'?