when did the supreme court rule that movies were a form of protected speech
First Amendment to the United States Constitution The free speech and free press clauses have been interpreted as providing the same protection to speakers as to writers, except for wireless broadcasting which has been given less constitutional protection.[199] The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information, ideas and opinions without interference, constraint or prosecution by the government.[200][201] This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as "a fundamental personal right" that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.[202] In Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938),[203] Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined "press" as "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion".[204] This right has been extended to media including newspapers, books, plays, movies, and video games.[205] While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws,[206] they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause, because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers.[200][201][207][208] This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers.[209][210][211] For example, in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the "suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by" non-institutional-press businesses.[212]
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), is the first of two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the must carry rules imposed on cable television companies. Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission (II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) was the second. Turner I established that cable television companies were indeed First Amendment speakers but didn't decide whether the federal regulation of their speech infringed upon their speech rights. In Turner II the court decided that the must carry provisions were constitutional. Under the Miami Herald v. Tornillo case, it was unconstitutional to force a newspaper to run a story the editors would not have included absent a government statute because it was compelled speech which could not pass the strict scrutiny of a compelling state interest being achieved with the least restrictive means necessary to achieve the state interest. However, under the rule of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC the High Court held that a federal agency could regulate broadcast stations (TV and Radio) with far greater discretion. In order for federal agency regulation of broadcast media to pass constitutional muster, it need only serve an important state interest and need not narrowly tailor its regulation to the least restrictive means.