Here is the extract of the case, only reply "acknowledged" for now. 

A work order is the preferred, not the mandatory, outcome where there is a choice of remedy: Galdona v Peacock [2017] NSWCATAP 64. Personal animosity is not sufficient to displace the primacy of a work order for defective work as required by HBA s 48MA, as the test is objective, but relational breakdown is an element in objective assessment: Brooks v Gannon Constructions PL [2017] NSWCATCD 12 (appeal not affecting s 48MA decision); BNT Constructions PL v Allen [2017] NSWCATAP 186 at [33]-[36]; Kumar v Sabharwal [2017] NSWCATAP 200 at [29]-[30]; Clements v Murphy [2018] NSWCATAP 152; Brennan Constructions PL v Davison [2018] NSWCATAP 210 at [15]-[21].

The parties are also under an obligation under Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (CATA) s 36(3) to co-operate to achieve the guiding principle in CATA s 36(1) which extends to the necessary co-operation, including provision of access, to ensure that work orders can be implemented in an orderly manner: Maiolo v Chiarelli [2016] NSWCATAP 81 at [40]-[46], [55]. This reinforces the express obligation in HBA s 18BA(3)(b), (5).

Such a duty to co-operate is congruent with the parties' duties to act with fidelity to the bargain, not deny the other party the benefit of the bargain, and to co-operate by doing what was reasonably necessary to secure performance of the contract: Secured Income Real Estate PL v St Martins Property Investments PL (1979) 144 CLR 596 at 607; and as to good faith, Mineralogy PL v Sino Iron PL [No 16] [2017] WASC 340 at [828]-[831]; Masters Home Improvement Aust PL v North East Solutions PL [2017] VSCA 88 at [99]; Macquarie International Health Clinic PL v SSWAHS [2010] NSWCA 268 at [12]; United Group Rail Services Ltd v Railcorp NSW (2009) 74 NSWLR 618 at [70]-[74], [100], [101].

In Little v J&K Homes PL [2017] NSWCATAP 84 at [24] an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal said that, "[i]f a builder wrongfully refuses to complete building work governed by the HBA", the Tribunal had jurisdiction pursuant to s 48O(1)(c)(i) to make a work order to direct the builder to complete specified work. The wording of the statutory provision does not include an additional element of conduct by use of the word "wrongfully". Accordingly, the Appeal Panel must have been referring to where the builder disputes liability for a defect and loses in that dispute or where the builder says it is ready, willing and able to remedy the alleged defect either in the course of completing the project or by acceptance that the work requires remediation after completion of the project.

Alternatively, the words used by the Appeal Panel may simply be introductory to or descriptive of the general work that s 48O(1)(c) is intended to do. The discussion in Little at [20]-[28] makes it clear that the Appeal Panel was not intending a restricted scope for s 48O(1)(c) in its analysis. The Appeal Panel considered that the provision, in either or both of its sub-paragraphs, extended to ordering a builder whose licence had lapsed to fulfil contractual obligations by retaining a licensed builder to carry out the completion or remediation work.

A narrow or restricted scope would not give effect to the broad words of s 48O. All that is required is for the Tribunal to be determining a "building claim" for the Tribunal to be empowered to make one or more of the permitted orders. "Building claim" is defined, for Part 3A in which s 48O appears, in s 48A(1) to mean (in summary) a claim for payment of money, supply of specified services, relief from payment, delivery, return or replacement of goods or a combination of the foregoing. The focus is on the existence and content of relief sought in the claim.

It could be argued that the exercise of the power in s 48O in conjunction with s 48MA is, or should in exercise of discretion be, affected by the conduct of the builder. If, for instance, a builder and an owner had agreed entirely on a schedule of work to be done and the builder was still entitled to the site or was being given reasonable access to the site as part of a resolution of proceedings, that may be a factor in simply noting the builder's undertaking to do the agreed remediation work, much as one would note an undertaking to a court in lieu of making a compulsive specific order, although in some circumstances it may still be appropriate to make a work order in those circumstances.

Where there is no such entire agreement - no coalescence between what an owner is prepared to accept and what the builder is prepared voluntarily to undertake - then, even if "wrongful" did have a part to play in the exercise of discretion, there would be a "wrongful refusal to complete building work" if any of the items outside of what the builder was prepared to accept voluntarily was found to be required to be completed after a contested hearing. A work order in the usual course would be required for those items. Usually there would be no obvious benefit to having a work order for some items and no work order for other items in that situation.

A work order does not enable the Tribunal in effect to impose on the builder, by that work order, a binding scope of works and/or a different practical completion date or state. In relation to exercise of discretion whether or not to make a work order, the Tribunal would ordinarily take into account whether the contract period for the works had passed, the state of the works, nature of the work compared with what remained to be completed, and the proportionality principles discussed below.

A factor in the exercise of discretion to grant a work order is the need to give confidence to both parties about, not only the scope of works complained about in these proceedings that are found to require completion or remediation, but also the time in which they are to be performed and what happens if they are not performed or if there is a dispute over performance, and associated questions such as reasonable access. The guiding principles for work orders that are set out in the cases already cited indicate there may be a benefit in an order, coupled with the necessary order for access, to achieve co-operative endeavour.

The making of a work order also fits within the mechanism for renewal of proceedings for any alleged non-compliance provided for in CATA Sch 4 para 8. The right to renew is usually expressly provided for if a party considers a work order or access order has not been properly complied with. The relations between the parties may not have been sufficiently damaged to deny the statutory preference for a work order but may mean that a renewal application to seek relief for alleged non-compliance is a real risk of occurrence. Renewal to seek an alternative order to the work order, such as monetary compensation, necessarily will bring the contract to an end if it has not already ended, as the Appeal Panel made clear in Blessed Sydney Constructions PL v Vasudevan, cited earlier, at [27], [40]-[43], [49]-[53], [58]-[75].
사건의 발췌문이며, 지금은 '인정함'으로만 답변해 주세요. 구제 수단을 선택할 수 있는 경우 작업 명령은 필수적인 결과가 아니라 선호되는 결과입니다: 갈도나 대 피콕 [2017] NSWCATAP 64. 테스트는 객관적이지만 관계 단절은 객관적인 평가의 요소이므로 개인적인 적대감은 HBA s 48MA에서 요구하는 결함 작업에 대한 작업 명령의 우선순위를 대체하기에 충분하지 않습니다: Brooks v Gannon Constructions PL [2017] NSWCATCD 12(항소는 s 48MA 결정에 영향을 미치지 않음); BNT Constructions PL v Allen [2017] NSWCATAP 186 [33]-[36]; Kumar v Sabharwal [2017] NSWCATAP 200 [29]-[30]; Clements v Murphy [2018] NSWCATAP 152; Brennan Constructions PL v Davison [2018] NSWCATAP 210 [15]-[21].또한 당사자들은 2013 뉴사우스웨일즈 민사 및 행정 재판소법(Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, NSW)(CATA) 36(3)에 따라 작업 명령이 질서 있게 이행될 수 있도록 접근권 제공을 포함하여 필요한 협력으로 확장되는 CATA 36(1)의 기본 원칙을 달성하기 위해 협력해야 할 의무를 갖습니다: 마이올로 v 치아렐리 [2016] NSWCATAP 81, [40]-[46], [55]. 이는 HBA 18BA(3)(b), (5)의 명시적 의무를 강화하는 것입니다.이러한 협력 의무는 당사자가 거래에 충실하게 행동하고, 상대방에게 거래의 이익을 부정하지 않으며, 계약 이행을 확보하기 위해 합리적으로 필요한 조치를 취함으로써 협력해야 하는 의무와 일치합니다: Secured Income Real Estate PL v St Martins Property Investments PL (1979) 144 CLR 596 [607]; 그리고 신의성실과 관련하여 Mineralogy PL v Sino Iron PL [No 16] [2017] WASC 340 [828]-[831]에서 확인할 수 있습니다; Masters Home Improvement Aust PL v North East Solutions PL [2017] VSCA 88에서 [99]; Macquarie International Health Clinic PL v SSWAHS [2010] NSWCA 268에서 [12]; United Group Rail Services Ltd v Railcorp NSW (2009) 74 NSWLR 618에서 [70]-[74], [100], [101].Little v J&K Homes PL [2017] NSWCATAP 84에서 [24] 재판소 항소 패널은 "건축업자가 HBA가 적용되는 건축 공사를 부당하게 거부하는 경우", 재판소는 48O(1)(c)(i)에 따라 건축업자에게 특정 작업을 완료하도록 지시하는 작업 명령을 내릴 관할권을 가진다고 밝혔습니다. 해당 법 조항의 문구에는 "부당하게"라는 단어를 사용하여 행위의 추가 요소를 포함하지 않습니다. 따라서 항소심 패널은 건설업자가 하자에 대한 책임을 다투고 그 분쟁에서 패소한 경우 또는 건설업자가 프로젝트 완료 과정에서 또는 프로젝트 완료 후 해당 공사에 보수가 필요하다는 사실을 인정함으로써 주장된 하자를 시정할 준비, 의지 및 능력이 있다고 말하는 경우를 언급하고 있었을 것입니다.또는 항소심 패널이 사용하는 단어는 단순히 48O(1)(c)가 의도하는 일반적인 작업에 대한 소개 또는 설명일 수 있습니다. 20]-[28]의 논의는 항소 패널이 분석에서 48O(1)(c)의 범위를 제한하려는 의도가 없었음을 명확히 합니다. 항소 패널은 해당 조항이 두 하위 단락 중 하나 또는 둘 모두에서 면허가 소멸된 건설업자에게 완공 또는 개선 작업을 수행하도록 면허를 보유한 건설업자를 유지하여 계약 의무를 이행하도록 명령하는 것까지 확장된다고 간주했습니다.범위가 좁거나 제한적일 경우 48O조의 광범위한 문구가 효력을 발휘하지 못합니다. 재판소가 하나 이상의 허용된 명령을 내릴 수 있는 권한을 갖기 위해서는 재판소가 "건물 클레임"을 결정하기만 하면 됩니다. "건물 청구"는 제48O조가 등장하는 파트 3A의 경우, 제48A(1)에서 금전 지급, 특정 서비스의 공급, 지불 면제, 물품의 인도, 반환 또는 교체 또는 전술한 사항의 조합에 대한 청구를 의미한다고 정의됩니다. 이는 청구에서 추구하는 구제의 존재와 내용에 초점을 맞추고 있습니다.48MA와 함께 48O조에 규정된 권한의 행사가 건축업자의 행위에 의해 영향을 받거나 재량권 행사에 영향을 받아야 한다고 주장할 수 있습니다. 예를 들어, 건축업자와 소유자가 수행해야 할 작업 일정에 대해 완전히 합의하고 건축업자가 여전히 부지에 대한 권리가 있거나 소송 해결의 일환으로 부지에 대한 합리적인 접근 권한을 부여받은 경우, 이는 강제적인 특정 명령을 내리는 대신 법원에 대한 약속을 기록하는 것과 마찬가지로 건축업자가 합의된 개선 작업을 수행하겠다는 약속을 단순히 기록하는 요인이 될 수 있지만, 일부 상황에서는 작업 명령을 내리는 것이 여전히 적절할 수 있습니다.이러한 전체적 합의가 없는 경우, 즉 소유자가 수용할 준비가 된 사항과 건축업자가 자발적으로 수행할 준비가 된 사항이 일치하지 않는 경우, 재량권 행사에서 "부당"이 일부 작용했다고 하더라도 건축업자가 자발적으로 수용할 준비가 된 사항 이외의 사항 중 하나라도 논쟁의 여지가 있는 청문회 후에 완료해야 하는 것으로 밝혀지면 "부당한 건축 작업 완료 거부"가 있을 수 있습니다. 이러한 항목에 대해서는 통상적인 절차에 따른 작업 명령이 필요합니다. 일반적으로