The Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 38 when assigned to Third Fleet, TF 58 when assigned to Fifth Fleet), was the main striking force of the United States Navy in the Pacific War from January 1944 through the end of the war in August 1945. The task force was made up of several separate task groups, each typically built around three to four aircraft carriers and their supporting vessels. The support vessels were screening destroyers, cruisers, and the newly built fast battleships.

Carrier-based naval warfare 
With the arrival of the fleet carriers the primary striking power of the navy was no longer in its battleship force, but with the aircraft that could be brought to battle by the carriers. The means by which the US Navy operated these carriers was developed principally by Admiral Marc Mitscher.  Mitscher determined that the best defense for a carrier was its own air groups, and that carriers were more easily defended if they operated together in groups, with supporting ships along with them to aid in air defense, anti-submarine defense, and rescue of downed airmen.

Said Mitscher: "The ideal composition of a fast-carrier task force is four carriers, six to eight support vessels and not less than 18 destroyers, preferably 24. More than four carriers in a task group cannot be advantageously used due to the amount of air room required.  Less than four carriers requires an uneconomical use of support ships and screening vessels."

The ships of each task group sailed in a circle formation centered on the carriers.  The supporting ships sailed relatively close by, and added their anti-aircraft fire to that of the carriers to help ward off attacking aircraft. When under attack by torpedo aircraft, the task group would turn toward the oncoming aircraft to limit attack angles. Other than this measure, the carriers in the task group would not take evasive action from their attackers. This was in marked contrast with the Imperial Japanese Navy, but the choice made for more stable platforms for the anti-aircraft fire of all the ships in the task group and allowed the ships in the group to sail more closely together. The primary defense of the group against air attack was the group's own fighter cover.

Admirals 

The individual primarily responsible for the development and operations of the task force was Admiral Mitscher. The overall command of the task force alternated between two very different admirals: Raymond Spruance and William "Bull" Halsey. Spruance was calculating and cautious, while Halsey was more aggressive and known for taking risks. Most higher-ranking officers preferred to serve under Spruance; most common sailors were proud to serve under Halsey. Their commander was Admiral Chester Nimitz who was responsible for all Pacific Ocean assets.

When the force was part of Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet, the carrier task force was commanded by Mitscher and bore the designation Task Force (TF) 58. When led by Admiral Halsey as part of the Third Fleet, the carrier force was commanded by Vice Admiral John S. McCain Sr. and its designation was Task Force (TF) 38. Planning for upcoming operations was completed when each admiral and his staff rotated out of active command. This allowed the Navy to perform at a higher operational tempo, while giving the Japanese the general impression of naval assets greater than what were actually available.

World War II 

The Fast Carrier Task Force took part in all the US Navy's battles in the Pacific during the last two years of the war. The task groups could operate independently or combine with the others as needs dictated. Raids against island strong points such as Iwo Jima or Chichi Jima might be undertaken by one or two task groups, but when a major operation was underway the task force would concentrate all four groups together.  Each group would remain distinct but operate in close proximity to the other groups to provide the task force with maximum protection and maximum striking power.

The Fast Carrier Task Force worked in conjunction with the other two major components of the Pacific Fleet: the Amphibious Force, which was much larger overall and which carried and provided direct support to the Marine forces, and the Service Squadrons of hundreds of support vessels which resupplied and maintained the fleet. The fleet and task group designation changed when the command of the fleet changed hands. When under the umbrella of Fifth Fleet, the invasion force was called the Fifth Amphibious Force. When Halsey had command of the fleet, Third Amphibious Force was the designation. By the time of the Battle of Iwo Jima in early 1945, the Task Force included eighteen aircraft carriers, eight battleships and two Alaska-class large cruisers, along with numerous cruisers and destroyers. TF 58 alone commanded more firepower than any navy in history.

The original TF 38 came into existence in August 1943, built around , and under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman. TF 58 was created on 6 January 1944 with Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher commanding, serving under the fleet command of Admiral Spruance in the Fifth Fleet. TF 38 continued to exist, but as a command structure only. TF 58 proved the success of the Fast Carrier TF concept with Operation Hailstone, a massive naval air squadrons and surface vessels attack on the Japanese ships and airfield at Truk Lagoon on 17–18 February 1944.

The only time that any aircraft carriers were used to support operations in New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific theater was during the double landings at Hollandia and Aitape in April 1944, hundreds of miles behind Japanese enemy lines and far beyond the range of short-ranged P-40 fighters of the Allied Air Forces. TF 58 and escort carriers in Task Force 78 supported the landings. TF 58 only stayed for four days but contributed much crucial air support to one of the greatest successes in the Pacific War.

With command change from Spruance to Halsey on 26 August 1944, all units changed designations again. Mitscher, who was an aviator from early training and had a masterful command of the airgroups, requested that he retain command of the Fast Carrier Task Force until his replacement, Admiral John McCain, could have proper time to become more familiar with the handling of a carrier task force. King and Nimitz concurred. Admiral Halsey, like Spruance before him, sailed with the Fast Carrier Task Force. The force grew to nine CVs and eight CVLs in preparation for the landings on Leyte. Task Force 38 was composed of four task groups: Task Group 38.1 was commanded by Admiral McCain, with its previous commander, Admiral Joseph "Jocko" Clark, remaining on as advisor, Task Group 38.2 was under the command of Admiral Gerald Bogan, Task Group 38.3 was led by Admiral Frederick Sherman, and Task Group 38.4 was under the command of Admiral Ralph Davison.

Following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Mitscher went on shore leave and planning duty, and Vice Admiral McCain took over as commanding officer of TF 38, which continued under Halsey and the Third Fleet. In January 1945 TF 38 raided the South China Sea and attacked Japanese positions in Formosa and Luzon.

On 26 January 1945, Halsey and McCain went on shore leave and planning duty, while Spruance and Mitscher returned to their previous commands. Third Fleet became Fifth Fleet, and TF 38 became TF 58.  They led the fleet through the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, facing sustained attacks from land-based Japanese kamikaze aircraft.  As the Okinawa campaign dragged into its second month, the presence of the carriers was still required to provide close air support to the soldiers on the island as the Army and its Air Corps were not as adept as the Marine Corps at quickly establishing airfields over newly occupied territory.  At the end of April, Admiral Nimitz came out to review the situation. After two months operating off the coast of Okinawa in support of Army forces engaged in battle on the island, the command staff was exhausted from the continuous pressure of fending off kamikaze attacks.  On his return to Pearl Harbor, he notified Halsey that he would have to take over command from Spruance in thirty days, whether or not the mission was completed.

On 28 May 1945, Halsey arrived aboard , his new flagship, whereupon he relieved Spruance, while McCain relieved Mitscher.  Spruance and Mitscher returned to Pearl Harbor. Fifth Fleet once again became Third Fleet, and Task Force 58 became Task Force 38. Halsey remained in command until the Japanese surrender ended the war on 2 September 1945.

See also
Battle of the Philippine Sea order of battle: Task Force 58 (June 1944)
Battle of Leyte Gulf order of battle: Task Force 38 (October 1944)
Battle of Okinawa order of battle: Task Force 58 (April 1945)
Bombardment of Tokyo and the Main Islands: Task Force 38 (July 1945)
 Combined Fleet
 British Pacific Fleet

Notes

References

Bibliography

External links 
 Details of TF 38 ships and campaigns
 Details of TF 58 ships and campaigns

United States Navy task forces
Pacific Ocean theatre of World War II
Military units and formations of the United States Navy in World War II
고속항공모함 기동부대()는 제2차 세계대전에서 1944년 1월부터 1945년 8월 종전시까지 태평양 전쟁에서 미국 해군의 주력 공격부대 단위였다. 기동함대는 여러 별동 기동단()으로 구성되어 있으며, 각 기동단은 3~4척의 항공모함과 호위함으로 이루어져 있다. 호위함은 구축함 및 순양함과 당시 새로이 건조된 고속 전함 등으로 구성되어 있었다.

항공모함 중심의 해전 
기동부대는 진주만 공습과 미드웨이 해전의 전훈을 바탕으로 구성되었다. 기동부대의 주요 공격력은 기존의 거대 전함의 주포에서 항공모함 탑재 항공기의 무장으로 바뀌었다. 따라서 항공모함을 재외한 다른 전투함은 항공모함 주위를 원형으로 둘러싸고 대공 방어망을 제공하는 것이 주요 임무가 되었다. 뇌격기의 어뢰 공격을 받을 경우 기동그룹은 적기의 진행 방향으로 침로를 변경하여 공격각을 재한하도록 기동하게 된다. 여러척의 항공모함을 동시에 운용함으로서 공격 및 방어에 사용 가능한 항공 전력에 있어 최대한 우위를 점하는 것이 목적이었다. 뇌격기에 의한 어뢰 공격의 경우 외에는 함대전투단내의 항공모함은 회피기동을 하지 않는 것이 일반적이다. 이것은 함대 내의 다른 함들이 좀 더 안정적인 대공 방어망을 제공하고, 근접해서 항해하는 것을 가능하게 하였다. 무엇보다 함대의 주력 방공 역시 항공모함이 탑재하는 항공 세력에 의하여 이루어졌다.

제독 

기동부대 건설과 운용 개념에 가장 큰 영향을 미친 것은 마크 미처(Marc Mitscher) 제독이다. 기동함대는 전혀 다른 성향을 가진 두 제독이 번갈아 가며 지휘하게 된다. 레이먼드 스프루언스(Raymond Soruance) 제독은 계산적이고 신중한 성격이었으며, 윌리엄 홀시 제독은 공격적이고 모험적인 성격이었다. 고위급 지휘관들은 스프루언스 제독의 지휘를 받는 것을 선호했으며, 수병들은 홀시 제독을 자랑스러워 하였다. 이들은 체스터 니미츠 제독의 휘하에 있었다.

기동부대가 스프루언스 제독의 5함대에 속해 있을 때에는 제58기동부대()로, 홀시 제독의 3함대에 속해있을 때에는 제 38기동부대()로 표시하였다. 각 제독과 참모는 기동함대가 실제 작전에 투입되기 이전에 작전 계획 및 준비를 완료할 수 있었기 때문에 미국 해군은 매우 빠른 속도로 연속적인 작전을 수행할 수 있게 되었으며, 일본군에게는 실제보다 과장된 전력을 가지고 있는 것과 같은 인상을 주게 되었다.

실전 

고속항공모함 기동부대는 제 2차 세계 대전 말기 2년에 진행된 모든 태평양 전선의 전투의 주역이다. 각 함대전투단은 독립적으로나 연합하여 필요한 곳에 투입될 수 있었다. 때로는 더 작은 단위로 나누어져 작은 작전에 투입되기도 하였다. 레이테만 전투나 이오지마 전투와 같은 주요 전투에서는 모두 합쳐서 거대 군단으로 기능하기도 하였다. 홀시 제독 휘하에서는 '3함대'로 표현하였으며, 스푸루언스 제독 지휘하에서는 '5함대'로 불리었다. 기동함대는 함대의 보급과 유지를 담당하는 '보급 함대(Service Squadron)'의 지원함 수백척과 함께 양륙군(Amphibious Force)의 주요 구성 요소였다. 5함대 지휘하에서 이 양륙군은 '5양륙군'으로, 3함대 지휘하에서는 '3양륙군'으로 표시되었다. 1945년 이오지마 전투 당시 기동함대는 18척의 항공모함과 8척의 전함, 2척의 전투순양함, 수십척의 순양함 및 구축함으로 구성되어 있었다. 태스크 포스 58는 역사상 가장 강력한 해군 함대였다.
태스크 포스 38는 1943년 8월에 사라토가함(USS saratoga(CV-3))를 기함으로 프래드릭 C. 셔먼 해군 소장을 사령관으로 하여 구성되었으며, 태스크 포스 58는 1944년 1월에 마크 미처 제독을 사령관으로 하여, 스프루언스 제독의 5함대 휘하에 구성된다. 태스크 포스 38의 명목상 지휘 체계는 계속 유지되었다.

1944년 8월 26일에 스프루언스 제독에서 홀시 제독에게 명령권이 이양되며, 다시 TF 38이 되었다. 함대의 초기 훈련과 항공 전력 운용 책임을 지던 미처 제독은 존 S. 맥케인(John S. McCain)제독은 해당 업무에 익숙해질 수 있는 여유를 가질 수 있도록 기동함대에 계속 남아 있기를 바랬으며, 킹 제독과 니미츠 제독은 이에 동의하였다. 홀시 제독이나 스프루언스 제독은 기동함대와 같이 항해하였다. 레이테섬 전투 직전에는 9척의 항공모함과 8척의 경항공모함을 가지는 규모로 커지게 되었다. TF 38이 4개의 함대전투단(Task Group)으로 구성되었다.

참고

각주

인용

문헌자료

외부 링크 
  Task force 38
  Task force 58

1944년 설립된 단체
1945년 해체된 단체
미국 해군의 태스크포스
태평양 전쟁에 참전한 미국의 부대
태평양 전구 (제2차 세계 대전)