within the meaning of Teague and its progeny when, on March 21, 1988, Townes’s conviction became final by virtue of the Supreme Court’s first denial of certiorari, and if so, whether it falls within a recognized exception. We answer the first question in the affirmative, for we conclude that the rule Townes seeks “was not dictated by precedent existing” in 1988. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070. In support of his contrary contention that the relief he seeks would not require application of a new rule, Townes relies chiefly upon the several cases which a majority of the Simmons Court invoked in support of its holding that the conduct there at issue violated Simmons’s rights to due process. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-87, 105 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a criminal defendant has a due process right to present evidence and that exclusion of evidence for a defense discovery violation should be imposed only if no other remedy suffices (B) holding sentencing courts exclusion of mitigating evidence proffered by defendant violative of due process (C) holding that defendant has due process right to introduce evidence on minimum parole eligibility in sentencing phase (D) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material (E) holding no abuse of discretion in trial courts exclusion of evidence where evidence was cumulative
(B)