brother for the payment he made to the smuggler. Although Garcia-Baez’s testimony was not entirely clear, “the evidence presented [does not] compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result.” Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1999). Therefore, the IJ’s conclusion that Garcia-Baez knowingly aided and encouraged Armente to illegally enter the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) was supported by substantial evidence. See Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, Garcia-Baez was not eligible for suspension of deportation because he was statutorily barred from establishing good moral character during the requisite period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); see also Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Garcia-Baez challenges the IJ’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure (B) holding that an alien was statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure on the basis of his failure to meet the good moral character component of 8 usc  1254e 1996 in light of his violation of 8 usc  1182a6e (C) holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation (D) holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation (E) holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed
(B)