§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the upward variance. AFFIRMED. 1 . We note that the guidelines provide that an upward departure may be warranted if “the defendant’s criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the defendants conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). Calderon does not argue that if the nature of his criminal history was actually underrepresented the district court could not consider that as a factor supporting its imposition of an upward variance instead of a departure. See United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 983-84 (11th Cir. 2015) 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history (C) holding that defendants history of deportation and illegal reentry together with his serious criminal record justified the district courts upward variance (D) holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category (E) holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category
(B)