a civilian to fill a position traditionally occupied by a deputy sheriff. Id. at 772. In determining whether the sheriff was justified in retaliating against Fuerst, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the notion that Fuerst spoke as a public employee under Garcetti when he criticized the proposal: Because Fuerst’s comments that precipitated the adverse action taken against him were made in his capacity as a union representative, rather than in the course of his employment as a deputy sheriff — his duties as deputy sheriff did not include commenting on the sheriffs decision to hire a public-relations officer — the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos is inapposite. Id. at 774 (citation omitted); see also Baumann v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 216, 224 (D.D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Boone, 786 F.Supp.2d. 328, 335 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech (B) holding that a police officer speaking to a public official about his concerns over public safety issues is speaking in his capacity  as a police officer and not as a citizen (C) holding that a police officers deposition in a fellow officers  1983 action alleging unlawful retaliation was protected speech (D) holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect (E) holding that police officers criticism of his departments handling of a sniper incident was protected speech because the officer spoke in his capacity as police union president
(E)