particular time charter does not act as a basis for the time charterer’s liability to injured longshoremen. See, e.g., Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 242 n. 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981); Dougherty v. Navigazione San Paolo, S.P.A. Medafrica Line, 622 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (E.D.Pa.1984). The reason most courts have held that a time charterer generally has no such liability is that a time charterer only rents space on a vessel; it exercises no control over vessel and makes no decisions about daily operation. Admittedly, authority exists for the proposition that Clause Eight imposes liability on the time charterer for injuries to persons unloading a ship. See Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 294, 74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman (B) holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence (C) holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer (D) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous (E) holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen
(E)