to arbitration the question of whether the successor has somehow assumed any of the obligations of the old bargaining agreement.”), with Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 145 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that a "successor [is] not bound by its predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement”), NLRB v. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1991) ("[A] successor is not bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's labor agreement.”), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir.1987) ("[A] successor employer is not automatically re quired to adopt its predecessor’s collectively bargained agreements, see NLRB v. Burns.”). 4 . Compare Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 997, 1001 (2nd Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), and Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (B) holding that the operation of a competitive business enterprise which was expected to provide a financial return that would be of benefit to the municipal corporation was proprietary (C) holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business (D) holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla (E) holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation
(A)