to a jury trial to juveniles. See, e.g., David G. v. Pollard ex rel. County of Pima, 207 Ariz. 308, 314, 86 P.3d 364 (2004) (concluding trial court erred when it allowed a jury trial for a juvenile charged with traffic offenses because forcing a juvenile to be tried by a jury did not promote informality and flexibility of juvenile system and subjected juvenile to very stigma leg islature sought to prevent); A.C., IV v. People, 16 P.3d 240, 244-45 (Colo. 2001) (upholding statute that allowed trial court discretion in determining whether to allow a juiy trial); In re J.T., 290 A.2d 821(D.C.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 986, (1972) (upholding statute that required trial court to hear and adjudicate juvenile cases without a jury); McMullen v. Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 584, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969) (<HOLDING>); R. v. Cory, 44 App. Div. 2d 599, 353 N.Y.S.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that there is both a statutory and a constitutional right to a jury trial under erisa because congress lacks constitutional authority to limit right to a jury (B) holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials (C) holding juveniles do not have constitutional right to a jury trial but striking down statute that allowed juveniles to receive adult sentence without a jury trial three justices dissented reasoning juveniles should be entitled to a juiy trial under all cases because changes to juvenile justice code treated juveniles like criminals (D) holding juveniles do not have right to jury trial because it is a civil proceeding under states parens patriae authority four justices dissented (E) recognizing that juveniles have no right to jury trial and that juvenile proceedings unlike adult prosecutions are rehabilitative in nature
(D)