disciplinary warning he had issued to Mr. Avila, and he told a group of workers that Mr. Avila should get out of the country if he couldn’t speak English right about the time he fired Mr. Avila. Thus, the record contradicts the district court’s finding that Mr. Keeffe made only one isolated remark about Mr. Avila’s language, which was months before, and unrelated to, the termination decision. We conclude these remarks are circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, and, given that two of the comments were made contemporaneous with Mr. Keeffe’s warning and termination decisions, a reasonable jury could conclude these remarks were related to those warning and termination decisions. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an individual can be a final policymaker either by operation of state and local positive law or by custom or usage having the force of law (B) holding that use of potentially derogatory term may be evidence of racial animus which could potentially show pretext depending on various factors including context inflection tone of voice local custom and historical usage (C) holding that evidence of pretext may include the use of subjective criteria (D) holding that the employers routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions (E) holding that a supervisors routine use of racial slurs constitutes direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the contested disciplinary decisions
(B)