Mr. Justice MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court.
The sole question in the case is, whether the appellant was the owner of the cotton at the time of its seizure by the agents of the United States, and this must be decided as a matter of law on the finding of facts made by the Court of Claims, notwithstanding the frequent reference by the counsel of the appellant to the view which he takes of the evidence given in that court.
It is strongly urged by the counsel that, by the common law, the facts as found by the court, constituted a valid sale of-the property, and that, as there was uo statute of frauds in force in the State of Mississippi requiring delivery or a written memorandum to make a sale of personal property valid, the parol agreement set out in this finding, constituted a valid sale. Whether this would be so in the absence of such a statute as most of the States have on that subject, might admit of serious debate.
But, while there is no such provision in the authorized publication of the statutes of Mississippi of 1840 by Howard and Hutchinson, to which we have been referred, we find in the Revised Code of Mississippi of 1857, which, from our own researches, we are bound to believe was the law in force when this agreement was made,'a very stringent provision on this subject in the statute of frauds and perjuries of that code.
Article four of chapter forty-four enacts that no contract for the sale of any slaves, personal'property, goods, wares, and merchandise for the price of fifty dollars or upwards shall be allowed to be good and valid, except the' buyer shall receive the slaves, or part of .the personal property, goods, wares, and merchandise, or shall actually pay or secure the purchase-money, or part thereof, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the bargain be made and signed by the party to be charged by such contract or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized.
The finding of the Court of Claims negatives in the most express terms the existence in the agreement, by which the title of the cotton was supposed to be transferred, of each and every one of the acts or conditions, some one of which is by that statute made necessary to the validity of the contract..
To hold that an agreement which that statute declares shall not be allowed to be good and valid was sufficient to transfer the title of the property to the claimant, would be to overrule the uniform construction of this ora similar, clause in all statutes of frauds by all the courts which have construed them.'
. The Court of Claims held that the agreement passed no title, and we concur in their conclusion on that subject.
It is unnecessary to examine into the effect of the transaction as a gift inter vivos. The finding that there was no delivery would be as fatal to such a gift as to the agreement of sale. Besides there is nothing in the petition of the plaintiff, or in the findings of the Court of Claims, on which such a gift could be considered as in the issue. The finding that it was a parol contract of sale is directly opposed to the idea of a gift.
Decree aeeirmed.
Page 359.