Mr. Justice SWAYNE
recapitulated the facts of the case, and delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant, under a remedial statute of the State, filed the bill to enforce his claim of title to the real estate in controversy. The court below decreed against him, and he thereupon brought the case to this court by appeal for review. The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them, are as follows:
• The premises were a part of the public domain of the United States. On the 13th of February, 1850, Peter Ponein entered at the proper land office a tract of a hundred acres. The premises arc a part of that tract.
On the 28th of March, 1850, Ponein conveyed the entire tract to Pepin, by deed of warranty. On the 19th of April, in the same year, Pepin conveyed with warranty to French. On the 19th of .March, 1851, French, by deed of quit-claim, conveyed all his right, title, and claim, "both in law and in equity, as well in possession as expectancy," to Elfelt.
On the 10th of March, 1851, the Commissioner of the General Land Office set aside Poncin's entry, upon the ground that the section in which the land was situated was ¡reserved by the act of March 3d, 1849, for school purposes.
On the 15th of October, 1853, Elfelt conveyed, by deed of quit-claim, to Vau Etten.
On the 27th of July, 1854, an act of Congress was passed whereby the entry of Poucin was reinstated, and it was enacted that upon the payment of the purchase-money a patent should issue to him.
On the 19th of October, 1854, Elfelt executed to Vau Etten a further deed of quit-claim. On the 24th of October, 1854, Vau Etten, by deed of quit-claim, conveyed the undivided half of the tract to Robertson. On the 31st of the same month, Ponein paid into the land office the price of the laud, and on the 24th of March, 1855, the United States issued to him a patent for it. On the 22d of July, 1855, Robertson and Van Etten laid the tract out into lots and platted them as an addition to the city of St. Paul. • This addition is now worth more than half a million of dollars. The lots and blocks of lots in controversy are parts of this addition. All the deeds beforementioned were duly executed and recorded. .
On the 14th of January, 1856, French conveyed, by deed of quit-claim, the entire tract to Furber. On the 28th of June, 1856, Furber conveyed by a like deed to Dunn. On the 31st of July, 1856, Dunn executed a like deed to Hammond, and on the 20th of September, 1862, Hammond, a like deed to McCarthy, the appellant. The deeds to Furber and Dunn were duly recorded. Those to Hammond and the appellant have never been recorded.
The act of Congress under which the second entry of Poncin was made, is as follows: .
" An act authorizing a patent to be issued to Peter Poncin, for certain lands therein described.
" Sec. 1. Be it enacted, That the entry by Peter Poncin of the north half of the southeast quarter and the south half of the northeast quarter of section thirty-six, in township number twenty-nine, of range twenty-three, in Stillwater land district, Minnesota, cancelled by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, be, and the same is hereby, allowed and reinstated as of the date of said entry, so that the title to said lands may enure to the benefit of his grantees as fardas he may have conveyed the same; provided, that the money paid for said lands shall not have been withdrawn, or, if withdrawn, shall be again paid at said land office, and that thereupon a patent shall issue in the name of said Peter Poncin for said lands.
" Sec. 2. And be it farther enacted, That the superintendent of public schools in said Territory of Minnesota, be, and he is hereby, authorized to select other lands in lieu of said section thirty-six, as far as the same have been granted, or sold."
The first entry by Poncin was clearly void, and the commissioner was right in setting it aside. When the act in question was passed, the United States held the land as if no entry had been made. Being the absolute owners, they could grant it upon such terms and conditions as Congress might prescribe. The government united the powers of ownership and legislation, and both were exercised in passing the act. The act declared, first, that the entry should be reinstated as of its original date, and that a patent should issue to Poncin; second, that the title should enure to the benefit of his grautees as he should have conveyed the land. The law is explicit and there is no difficulty in carrying out its provisions. It must be liberally construed to effect the purposes of its enactment. By Poncin's grantees was meant those claiming title under him. Those to whom he might have conveyed were no more intended to be beneficiaries under the act, than those holding remoter links in the same chain of title. When he paid his money and procured a certificate of entry pursuant to the act, an equity vested in each of those who would have held it, if the original entry had been valid, and when the patent issued, the legal title vested in the same parties. The act applied the doctrine of relation. It made no distinction between grantees with warranty and those without it. If there bad been outstanding title-bonds, thej' also would have been within the equity of the act, and the holders could have enforced them accordingly. The law and equity of the case are with the appellees, and the decree of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.