Wilson, Judge:
The party in interest in this case, Bruno Scheidt, Inc., on April 5, 1955, imported into the United States certain tuna fish, packed in brine. This merchandise was assessed at 12% per centum ad valorem by the collector as "Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances)" under the provisions of paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by a trade agreement between the United States and Iceland, T. D. 50956, which became effective November 19, 1943, by Presidential proclamation. The duty against such merchandise under paragraph 718 (b), without the trade agreement amendment, is 25 per centum ad valorem.
The plaintiff has heretofore been held by our appellate court to be an American manufacturer of merchandise of "the same class or kind as the imported merchandise, within the meaning of section 516 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, and therefore qualified to maintain its protest under that paragraph." Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States (Bruno Scheidt, Inc., Party in Interest), 45 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 16, C. A. D. 666.
The plaintiff concedes that the classification and assessment of the merchandise are correct, if the agreement between the United States and Iceland (T. D. 50956) is valid. However, plaintiff attacks that agreement as "illegal and unauthorized" upon the ground that the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, under which the Icelandic agreement was negotiated, is "unconstitutional, null and void." Counsel for the plaintiff, in their brief, state that "the sole question presented is whether or not section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (the so-called Trade Agreements Act of 1934) is constitutional." The Government accepts this statement of the issue, and the case has been submitted solely upon that question.
The pertinent parts of the statutes here involved, except as set forth elsewhere in this opinion, are as follows:
Paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as enacted by Congress:
Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances): Salmon, 25 per centum ad valorem; other fish, 25 per centum ad valorem.
Paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the trade agreement with Iceland, T. D. 50956:
Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances):
Any of the foregoing (except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each, .and except salmon and anchovies)-12)4% ad valorem
Section 350 (a), which, is an amendment, dated in 1943, to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, amending the Tariff Act of 1930, 48 Stat. 943, 19 U. S. C., 1940 edition, section 1351:
(a) For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States (as a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present economic depression, in increasing the purchasing power of the American public, and in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among various branches of American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce) by regulating the admission of foreign goods into the United States in accordance with the characteristics and. needs of various branches of American production so that foreign markets will be made available to those branches of American production which require and are capable of developing such outlets by affording corresponding market opportunities for foreign products in the United States, the President, whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purpose above declared will be promoted by the means hereinafter specified, is authorized from time to time—
(1) To enter into foreign-trade agreements with foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions, or such additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and for such minimum periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any article covered by foreign-trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign-trade agreement that the President has entered into hereunder. No proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more than 50 per centum any existing rate of duty or transferring any article between the dutiable and free lists. The proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall apply to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries, whether imported directly, or indirectly: Provided, That the President may suspend the application to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any country because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce or because of other acts or policies which in his opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in this section; and the proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall be in effect from and after such time as is specified in the proclamation. The President may at any time terminate any such proclamation in whole or in part.

Sec. 2.
(b) Every foreign-trade agreement concluded pursuant to this Act shall be subject to termination, upon due notice to the foreign government concerned, at the end of not more than three years from the date on which the agreement comes into force, and, if not then terminated, shall be subject to termination thereafter upon not more than six months' notice.
(c) The authority of the President to enter into foreign-trade agreements under section 1 of this Act shall terminate on the expiration of three years from the date of the enactment of this Act.
Provisions of the United States Constitution invoked by plaintiff:
[Aeticlb I, sec. 1]:
All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
[Article I, sec. 7]:
1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
[Article I, sec. 8]:
Section 8 — (Powers of Congress)
1. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.
[Article II, sec. 2]:

2. He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; .
It is conceded by the defendant that this court possesses the power to adjudicate constitutional issues (citing Riccomini v. United States, 69 Fed. 2d, 480, 483-484; Morgantown Glassware Guild, Inc. v. Humphrey, 236 Fed. 2d, 670, 671-672; writ of certiorari denied, 352 U. S. 896), but the Government argues as a matter of judicial policy that questions involving the constitutionality of acts of Congress should be left for the determination of the appellate courts, unless the unconstitutionality of the legislation under attack "exists beyond a rational doubt." The adjudicated cases as well as authoritative treatises on the law appear to support this position. Mather v. McLaughlin, 57 Fed. 2d, 223, 225; International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Stranahan, 155 Fed. 428, 430. The rule of law on this point is stated in 16 C. J. S., section 93, page 303, as follows:
The exercise of such power, however, should be carefully limited, and avoided if possible, and, unless it appears clearly beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional, it is considered the better practice for the court to assume that it is constitutional until the contrary is declared by a court of appellate jurisdiction, especially where the statute is of great importance and far-reaching effect; has been in effect for an appreciable period of time, and has been followed in innumerable cases involving the rights of property. In a proper case, however, the court should not hesitate to determine the constitutionality of a statute, if this be necessary.
In any event, when a congressional enactment is claimed unconstitutional, "all presumptions are in favor of constitutionality." United States v. Smith, 62 Fed. Supp. 594, 596; Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 267 Mich. 241, 255 N. W. 579.
The plaintiff's first contention is that the statute under attack contravenes the provisions of section 8, paragraphs 1 and 3, of Article I of the United States Constitution, in that the trade agreements act under review attempts to delegate to the President of the United States powers vested exclusively in the Congress.
In support of this position, the plaintiff relies upon the cases of A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. et al. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, and Panama Refining Co. et al. v. Ryan et al., 293 U. S. 388. These two cases arose under the National Industrial Recovery Act. In the Schechter case, the President issued an executive order setting up a "Code of Pair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area in and about the City of New York." The petitioners were indicted under a criminal proceeding for violations of that code. They asserted that the code under which they were convicted was of no effect because adopted in accordance with an unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the President for the regulation of commerce.
In holding that the delegation of legislative power to the President under which the code in the Schechter case, supra, was promulgated was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States stated, page 529:
We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388. The Constitution provides that "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1. And the Congress is authorized "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" its general powers. Art. I, §8, par. 18. The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Company case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.
The Court, in the Schechter Poultry Corp. case, supra, then in effect decided that, in the statute under attack, Congress had delegated to the President legislative power "to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry." (Page 537.) Summarizing its position, the Court stated, page 541:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them.
In the Panama Refining Co. case, supra, the constitutional validity of "§ 9 (c) of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 200, 15 U. S. C. Tit. I, § 709 (c)" was called in question. The provisions of that section, as set forth in the opinion of the Court, page 406, were as follows:
Sec. 9
(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.
The Court pointed out that section 9 (c) was assailed upon the claim that:
it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The section purports to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory law. Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President's action; whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition.
After considering the provisions of section 9 (c), the Court came to the following conclusion, page 417:
This general outline of policy contains nothing as to the circumstances or conditions in which transportation of petroleum or petroleum products should be prohibited, — nothing as to the policy of prohibiting, or not prohibiting, the transportation of production exceeding what the States allow.
After analyzing the other sections of the act, the Court, in the Panama Refining Co. case, supra, found that no proper safeguards and standards had been fixed to justify the delegation of the powers involved to the President.
In the Panama Refining Co. case, supra, the Court reviewed and approved certain cases in which the delegation of power to the President had been upheld, including the case of The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382, dealing with a trade act. The Court then considered the case of Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, which will be discussed more in detail later in this opinion. The decision, in the Panama Refining Co. case, also pointed out the delegations of power by Congress to selective instrumentalities, such as the old Radio Commission and the Inter state Commerce Commission, had been upheld. However, the Court, at page 430, viewed section 9 (c) invalid because:
If § 9 (c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its law-making function.
We are of the opinion that the reciprocal trade agreements act, which is assailed in this action, is not vulnerable on the grounds upon which the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act were held invalid in the Schechter and Panama Refining Co. cases, supra. Although the fundamental principle of reciprocal trade agreements under which certain powers have been delegated by Congress to the President of the United States has been in effect for practically the full period of our national existence, and frequent attacks have been made upon the constitutionality of reciprocal trade acts, no instance has been called to our attention in which any such act has been held unconstitutional by our courts.
In the case of Field v. Clark, supra, certain provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890 were under attack. That act provided that:
to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the Government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this Act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country as follows, :
Then follows the enumeration of specific types of merchandise. In the Field v. Clark case, supra, the Court, at page 681, stated:
The plaintiffs in error contend that this section, so far as it authorizes the President to suspend the provisions of the act relating to the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, is unconstitutional, as delegating to him both legislative and treaty-making powers, and, being an essential part of the system established by Congress, the entire act must be declared null and void. On behalf of the United States it is insisted that legislation of this character is sustained by an early decision of this court and by the practice of the government for nearly a century .
[The decision referred to is The Brig Aurora, 11 U. S., 7 Cranch 382, 388 [3: 378, 380].]
The Court then reviewed The Brig Aurora case, supra, and pointed out, page 683:
This certainly is a decision that it was competent for Congress to make the revival of an act depend upon the proclamation of the President, showing the ascertainment by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations had been so revoked or modified that they did not violate the neutral commerce of the United States. The same principle would apply in the case of the suspension of an act upon a contingency to be ascertained by the President, and made known by his proclamation. [Emphasis by the Court.]
If we find that Congress has frequently, from the organization of the government to the present time, conferred upon the President powers, with reference to trade and commerce, like those conferred by the third section of the act of October 1, 1890, that fact is entitled to great weight in determining the question before us.
After reviewing the principal reciprocal trade legislation enacted by Congress throughout the nation's history, the Court, in the Field v. Clark case, supra, came to this conclusion, page 690:
It would seem to be unnecessary to make further reference to acts of Congress to show that the authority conferred upon the President by the third section of the act of October 1, 1890, is not an entirely new feature in the legislation of Congress, but has the sanction of many precedents in legislation. While some of these precedents are stronger than others, in their application to the case before us, they all show that, in the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign governments, in the interest of their people, to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations. If the decision in the case of The Brig Aurora had never been rendered, the practical construction of the Constitution, as given by so many acts of Congress, and embracing almost the entire period of our national existence, should not be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible with the supreme law of the land. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S., 1 Cranch, 299, 309 [2: 115, 118]; Martin v. Hunter, 14 U. S., 1 Wheat, 304, 351 [4: 97, 109]; Cooley v. Port Wardens, 53 U. S., 12 How, 299, 315 [13: 996, 1003]; Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57 [28: 349, 350]; The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 416 [29: 147, 148].
The Court upheld the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890, which were under attack.
In our opinion, the Schechter and Panama Refining Co. cases, supra, are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
We agree with counsel for the plaintiff that the case of J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, is in point in deciding the issue now before us. In our opinion, however, that case is not susceptible to the construction placed upon it by counsel for the plaintiff. On the other hand, the Hampton case really supports the position that the standards and limitations provided in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 are adequate to protect it against the applicability of the principles announced in the Schechter and Panama Refining Co. cases, supra. In the Hampton case, section 315 (a), Title III, of the Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, was as sailed upon the ground that the act provided for an unconstitutional delegation of power to the President. The facts, as stated in the opinion of the Court, were as follows, page 400:
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company made an importation into New York of barium dioxide, which the collector of customs assessed at the dutiable rate of six cents per pound. This was two cents per pound more than that fixed by statute, par. 12, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 860. The rate was raised by the collector by virtue of the proclamation of the President, 45 Treas. Dec. 669, T. D. 40216, issued under, and by authority of, § 315 of Title III of the Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 941, which is the so-called flexible tariff provision. Protest was made and an appeal was taken under § 514, Part 3, Title IV, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 969-70. The case came on for hearing before the United States Customs Court, 49 Treas. Dec. 593. A majority held the Act constitutional. Thereafter the case was appealed to the United States Court of Customs Appeals. Thereafter the judgment of the United States Customs Court was affirmed. 14 Ct. Cust. App. 350. On a petition to this Court for certiorari, filed May 10, 1927, the writ was granted, 274 U. S. 735. The pertinent parts of § 315 of Title III of the Tariff Act, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 941 U. S. C., Tit. 19, § 154, 156, are as follows:
Section 315 (a). That in order to regulate the foreign commerce of the United States and to put into force and effect the policy of the Congress by this Act intended, whenever the President, upon investigation of the differences in costs of production of articles wholly or in part the growth or product of the United States and of like or similar articles wholly or in part the growth or product of competing foreign countries, shall find it thereby shown that the duties fixed in this Act do not equalize the said differences in cost of production in the United States and the principal competing country he shall, by such investigation, ascertain said differences and determine and proclaim the changes in classifications or increases or decreases in any rate of duty provided in this Act shown by said ascertained differences in such costs of production necessary to equalize the same. Thirty days after the date of such proclamation or proclamations, such changes in classification shall take effect Provided, That the total increase or decrease of such rates of duty shall not exceed 50 per centum of the rates specified in Title I of this Act, or in any amendatory Act.
(e). That in ascertaining the differences in costs of production, under the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, the President, in so far as he finds it practicable, shall take into consideration (I) the differences in conditions in production, including wages, costs of material, and other items in costs of production of such or similar articles in the United States and in competing foreign countries; (2) the differences in the wholesale selling prices of domestic and foreign articles in the principal markets of the United States; (3) advantages granted to a foreign producer by a foreign government, or by a person, partnership, corporation, or association in a foreign country; and (4) any other advantages or disadvantages in competition.
Investigations to assist the President in ascertaining differences in costs of production under this section shall be made by the United States Tariff Commission, and no proclamation shall be issued under this section until such investigation shall have been made. The commission shall give reasonable public notice of its hearings and shall give reasonable opportunity to parties interested to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard. The commission is authorized to adopt such reasonable procedure, rules, and regulations as it may deem necessary.
The President, proceeding as hereinbefore provided for in proclaiming rates of duty, shall, when he determines that it is shown that the differences in costs of production have changed or no longer exist which led to such proclamation, accordingly as so shown, modify or terminate the same. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a transfer of an article from the dutiable list to the free list or from the free list to the dutiable list, nor a change in form of duty. Whenever it is provided in any paragraph of Title I of this Act, that the duty or duties shall not exceed a specified ad valorem rate upon the articles provided for in such paragraph, no rate determined under the provision of this section upon such articles shall exceed the maximum ad valorem rate so specified.
The President issued his proclamation May 19, 1924.
Tbe Court, in the Hampton case, supra, again pointed out as it did in the case of Field v. Clark, supra, page 412:
This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 175, and cases cited. The enactment and enforcement of a number of customs revenue laws drawn with a motive of maintaining a system of protection, since the revenue law of 1789, are matters of history.
More than a hundred years later, the titles of the Tariff Acts of 1897 and 1909 declared the purpose of those acts, among other things, to be that of encouraging the industries of the United States. The title of the Tariff Act of 1922, of which § 315 is a part, is "An Act to provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States and for other purposes.'' Whatever we may think of the wisdom of a protection policy, we can not hold it unconstitutional.
In the Hampton case, supra, pages 410-411, the Supreme Court, in commenting on the Field v. Clark case, supra, stated with respect to the power given to the President under the provisions of section 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890 relative to the suspension of free duty as to certain imports:
What the President was required to do was merely in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. [Italics ours.]
The Court, therefore, upheld the constitutionality of section 315 (a), Title III, of the act of 1922. The provisions of that act are in most substantial particulars similar to the act now under attack.
In the case of United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 20 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 295, T. D. 46086, our appellate court had occasion to pass upon certain provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. The court upheld section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930, citing the Hampton case, supra, and also held that the President had not exceeded the powers delegated to him by an act of Congress.
Referring now to the provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, we find the declared policy of the act to be to expand the foreign markets for United States products with the view of overcoming an existing emergency. For that purpose, regulations governing the admission of foreign goods into the United States were deemed necessary, and the President is empowered "whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purpose above declared will be promoted by the means hereinafter specified, is authorized from time to time — (1) To enter into foreign-trade agreements (2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions as are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign-trade agreement that the President has entered into It is then prescribed that the President shall not issue any proclamation decreasing by more than 50 per centum "any existing rate of duty or transferring any article between the dutiable and free lists." Section 4 of the trade agreements act provides that:
Before any foreign-trade agreement is concluded with any foreign government or instrumentality thereof under the provisions of this Act, reasonable public notice of the intention to negotiate an agreement with such government or instrumentality shall be given in order that any interested person may have an opportunity to present his views to the President, or to such agency as the President ms.y designate, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe; and before concluding such agreement the President shall seek information and advice with respect thereto from the United States Tariff Commission, from the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate.
We are of opinion that, in view of the long-prescribed reciprocal trade procedures, upheld by the United States Supreme Court, the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 set up standards sufficient to protect it against the weaknesses found by the Supreme Court in the National Industrial Recovery Act, and that, under the Hampton and Sears, Roebuck cases, supra, the standards and safeguards fixed in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 are sufficient to protect the legislation against the attack herein made upon it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the said Trade Agreements Act of 1934 is constitutional as measured by the standards set forth in the cases heretofore cited as against the contention of the plaintiff that said act attempts an unconstitutional delegation of power to the President.
The plaintiff further contends that the trade agreement act under review (T. D. 50956) violates the treaty clause of the Constitution of the United States (Article II, section 2), because it was not presented to the Senate for its concurrence. If the agreement in question is a treaty of the type requiring ratification by the United States Senate, the contention of the plaintiff must be sustained. However, all international undertakings are not such treaties.
In the case of B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583, the Supreme Court did not pass directly on the question as to whether a trade agreement negotiated under the Tariff Act of 1897 was constitutional, but it did say, at page 601:
While it may be true that this commercial agreement, made under authority of the Tariff Act of 1897, § 3, was not a treaty possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate of the United States, it was an international compact, negotiated between the representatives of two sovereign nations and made in the name and on behalf of the contracting countries, and dealing with important commercial relations between the two countries, and was proclaimed by the President.
In the above pronouncement, the Court clearly recognizes the existence of international agreements which do not require senatorial approval.
In Field v. Clark, supra, the Supreme Court, in construing the reciprocal trade provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890, held:
The court is of opinion that the third section of the act of October 1, 1890, is not liable to the objection that it transfers legislative and treaty-making power to the President. Even if it were, it would not, by any means, follow that other parts of the act, those which directly imposed duties upon articles imported, would be inoperative. But we need not in this connection enter upon the consideration of that question.
In the case of Louis Wolf & Co. v. United States, 27 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 188, C. A. D. 84, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had before it certain issues requiring the construction of treaties with Norway and Austria, as well as an agreement designated "commercial convention" between the United States and Cuba. In its opinion, the court stated, page 198:
We think that by the use of the term "commercial convention" such a trade agreement as the Cuban Trade Agreement of 1934 was intended to be included, and it is our opinion that that agreement is a commercial convention although it was not ratified by the Senate. It is true that the treaties with Norway and Austria refer to the Cuban treaty of 1902 as a "Commercial Convention" and that it was ratified by the Senate. The treaty of 1902 refers to itself as a "convention." We think it well settled that the term "commercial convention" is broad enough not only to include commercial conventions which are ratified by the Senate when negotiated by the executive department of the Government, but that it also includes certain commercial agreements which may be authorized by Congress, if such conventions are within the powers so delegated.
On this phase of the case we think it proper to say that the President, pursuant to acts of Congress, frequently has entered into agreements with foreign states. For instance, he has concluded engagements concerning commerce and navigation, and in the form of reciprocal arrangements for the suspension of duties in return for equitable concessions. See Crandall, "Treaties (etc.)," 2nd edition, paragraph 62. See also Proclamation of President Theodore Roosevelt, December 5, 1907, announcing the conclusion of a commercial agreement with Great Britain under the tariff act of 1897, Malloy "Treaties (etc.)," Vol. I, page 812.
The President is deemed to be the agent of the legislative department of the Government to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.
See also Marianao Sugar Trading Corporation v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 275, 283-286, C. D. 1481.
In the Louis Wolf case, supra, the court cited the case of B. Altman & Co. v. United States, supra, to illustrate the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement. The court also cited with approval the following language from the case of United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 330:
A treaty signifies "a compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare." Altman & Co.v. United States, 224 U. S. 583, 600. But an international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like that now under consideration are illustrations. See 5 Moore, Int. Law Digest, 210-221. The distinction was pointed out by this court in the Altman case, supra, which arose under § 3 of the Tariff Act of 1897, authorizing the President to conclude commercial agreements with foreign countries in certain specified matters.
We think that an agreement such as the one at bar relating to customs duties which may be levied upon articles of commerce between the two countries (when the agreement is authorized by Congress, although not ratified by the Senate) may be properly styled a commercial convention. We therefore hold that appellants' contentions with reference to the effect of the treaties with Austria and Norway are without merit. See E. & J. Burke, Ltd. v. United States, 26 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 374, 379, C. A. D. 44.
For the foregoing reasons, and in view of the holdings of the courts on the questions at issue, we are of opinion and hold that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 does not violate the treaty clause of the Constitution of the United States (Article II, sec. 2), inasmuch as said agreement is not a treaty requiring concurrence by the United States Senate within the meaning of the term, as used in the Constitution. We further hold that said trade agreements act is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power (Article I, sec. 1, of the United States Constitution) such as would contravene the constitutional powers given to Congress under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution to lay and collect duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Accordingly, we hold that the involved merchandise is properly dutiable as "Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner " under paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the trade agreement with Iceland, T. D. 50956, at the rate of 12% per centum ad valorem, as assessed. The protest is, therefore, overruled.
Judgment will be rendered accordingly.