Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide (a) whether § 12(f) of the Military Selective Service Act, 96 Stat. 748, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(f), which denies federal financial assistance under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to male students who fail to register for the draft under the Act, is a bill of attainder; and (b) whether § 12(f) compels those students who elect to request federal aid to incriminate themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
I
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §453, empowers the President to require every male citizen and male resident alien between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the draft. Sections 12(b) and (c) of that Act impose criminal penalties for failure to register. On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued a Proclamation requiring young men to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 82 (1981).
Appellee students (hereafter appellees) are anonymous individuals who were required to register before September 1,1982. On September 8, Congress enacted the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718. Section 1113(a) of that Act added § 12(f) to the Military Selective Service Act. Section 12(f)(1) provides that any person who is required to register and fails to do so "in accordance with any proclamation" issued under the Military Selective Service Act "shall be ineligible for any form of assistance or benefit provided under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965." Section 12(f)(2) requires applicants for Title IV assistance to file with their institutions of higher education a statement attesting to their compliance with the draft registration law and regulations issued under it. Sections 12(f)(3) and (4) require the Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Director of Selective Service, to prescribe methods for verifying such statements of compliance and to issue implementing regulations.
Regulations issued in final form on April 11, 1983, see 48 Fed. Reg. 15578, provide that no applicant may receive Title IV aid unless he files a statement of compliance certifying that he is registered with the Selective Service or that, for a specified reason, he is not required to register. 34 CFR § 668.24(a) (1983). The regulations allow a student who has not previously registered, although required to do so, to establish eligibility for Title IV aid by registering, filing a statement of registration compliance, and, if required, verifying that he is registered. § 668.27(b)(1). The statement of compliance does not require the applicant to state the date that he registered.
In November 1982 the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota seeking to enjoin the operation of § 12(f). The District Court dismissed the Minnesota Group for lack of standing but allowed three anonymous students to intervene as plaintiffs. 557 F. Supp. 923 (1983); 557 F. Supp. 925 (1983). The intervenors alleged that they reside in Minnesota, that they need financial aid to pursue their educations, that they intend to apply for Title IV assistance, and that they are legally required to register with the Selective Service but have failed to do so. This suit was informally consolidated with a separate action brought by three other anonymous students making essentially the same allegations as the intervenors.
In March 1983 the District Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Selective Service System from enforcing § 12(f). After finding that appellees had demonstrated a threat of irreparable injury, the court held that appellees were likely to succeed on the merits. First, the District Court thought it likely that § 12(f) was a bill of attain der. The court interpreted the statutory bar to student aid as applicable to students who registered late. Thus interpreted, the statute "clearly singles out an ascertainable group based on past conduct" and "legislatively determines the guilt of this ascertainable group." Doe v. Selective Service System, 557 F. Supp. 937, 942, 943 (1983). The court viewed the denial of aid as punishment within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause because it "deprives students of the practical means to achieve the education necessary to pursue many vocations in our society." Id., at 944. Second, the District Court found it likely that § 12(f) violated appel-lees' Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In the District Court's view, the statement of compliance required by § 12(f)(2) compels students who have not registered for the draft and need financial aid to confess to the fact of nonregistration, which is a crime. 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(a).
On June 16, 1983, the District Court entered a permanent, nationwide injunction against the enforcement of § 12(f). The court held that the regulations making late registrants eligible for aid were inconsistent with the statute and concluded that the statute was an unconstitutional attainder. It also held the statute to violate appellees' constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
On June 29, we stayed the District Court's June 16 order pending the timely docketing and final disposition of this appeal. Selective Service System v. Doe, 463 U. S. 1215. We noted probable jurisdiction on December 5, 1983, 464 U. S. 1006, and we reverse.
II
The District Court held that § 12(f) falls within the category of congressional actions that Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution bars by providing that "[n]o Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed." A bill of attainder was most recently described by this Court as "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 468 (1977); see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383, n. 30 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315 (1946). Appellants argue that § 12(f) does not satisfy any of these three requirements, i. e., specification of the affected persons, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial.
A
In forbidding bills of attainder, the draftsmen of the Constitution sought to prohibit the ancient practice of the Parliament in England of punishing without trial "specifically designated persons or groups." United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 447 (1965). Historically, bills of attainder generally named the persons to be punished. However, "[t]he singling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons." Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 86 (1961). When past activity serves as "a point of reference for the ascertainment of particular persons ineluctably designated by the legislature" for punishment, id., at 87, the Act may be an attainder. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 324 (1867).
In Cummings the Court struck down a provision of the Missouri post-Civil War Reconstruction Constitution that barred persons from various professions unless they stated under oath that they had not given aid or comfort to persons engaged in armed hostility to the United States and had never "'been a member of, or connected with, any order, society, or organization, inimical to the government of the United States.'" Id., at 279. The Court recognized that the oath was required, not "as a means of ascertaining whether parties were qualified" for their professions, id., at 320, but rather to effect a punishment for having associated with the Confederacy. Although the State Constitution did not mention the persons or groups required to take the oath by name, the Court concluded that in creating a qualification having no possible relation to their fitness for their chosen professions, the Constitution was intended "to reach the person, not the calling." Ibid.
On the same day that it decided Cummings, the Court struck down a similar oath that was required for admission to practice law in the federal courts. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867). Like the oath considered in Cummings, the oath "operate[d] as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion" from the practice of law, id., at 377, since past affiliation with the Confederacy prevented attorneys from taking the oath without perjuring themselves. See Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 327. In both Cummings and Garland, the persons in the group disqualified were defined entirely by irreversible acts committed by them.
The District Court in this case viewed § 12(f) as comparable to the provisions of the Reconstruction laws declared unconstitutional in Cummings and Garland, because it thought the statute singled out nonregistrants and made them ineligible for aid based on their past conduct, i. e., failure to register. To understand the District Court's analysis, it is necessary to turn to its construction of the statute. The court noted that § 12(f) disqualifies applicants for financial assistance unless they have registered "in accordance with any proclamation issued under [§3 of the Military Selective Service Act]," and that Proclamation No. 4771 requires those born after January 1, 1963, to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. See 3 CFR 82 (1981). In the court's view, the language of § 12(f), coupled with the Proclamation's 30-day registration requirement, precluded late registrants from qualifying for Title IV aid. Having construed § 12(f) as precluding late registration, the District Court read the statute to be retrospective, in that it denies financial assistance to an identifiable group — nonregistrants—based on their past conduct. The District Court acknowledged that implementing regulations would allow students who had not previously registered to become eligible for Title IV benefits by registering, see 34 CFR § 668.27(b)(1) (1983), but the court declared those regulations to be void because they conflicted with what the District Court viewed as § 12(f )'s requirement of registration within the time prescribed by Proclamation No. 4771.
We reject the District Court's view that § 12(f) requires registration within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771. That view is plainly inconsistent with the structure of § 12(f) and with the legislative history. Subsection (f)(4) of the statute requires the Secretary of Education to issue regulations providing that "any person" to whom the Secretary proposes to deny Title IV assistance shall be given notice of the proposed denial and "not less than thirty days" after such notice to "establis[h] that he has complied with the registration requirement." 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(f)(4). The statute clearly gives nonregistrants 30 days after receiving notice that they are ineligible for Title IV aid to register for the draft and qualify for aid. See 34 CFR § 668.27(b)(1) (1983). To require registration within the time fixed by the Presidential Proclamation would undermine this provision allowing "any person" 30 days after notification to establish compliance with the registration requirement. This was clearly a grace period.
The District Court also ignored the relevant legislative history. Congress' purpose in enacting § 12(f) was to encourage registration by those who must register, but have not yet done so. Proponents of the legislation emphasized that those failing to register timely can qualify for aid by registering late. The District Court failed to take account of this legislative purpose. See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U. S. 870 (1984). Nor did its construction of § 12(f) give adequate deference to the views of the Secretary of Education, who had helped to draft the statute. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125, 144 (1979); see 128 Cong. Rec. 18363 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon).
The judicial function is "not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations," CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973). Section 12(f) does not make late registrants ineligible for Title IV aid.
Because it allows late registration, § 12(f) is clearly distinguishable from the provisions struck down in Cummings and Garland. Cummings and Garland dealt with absolute bar riers to entry into certain professions for those who could not file the required loyalty oaths; no one who had served the Confederacy could possible comply, for his status was irreversible. By contrast, § 12(f)'s requirements, far from irreversible, can be met readily by either timely or late filing. "Far from attaching to . . . past and ineradicable actions," ineligibility for Title IV benefits "is made to turn upon continuingly contemporaneous fact" which a student who wants public assistance can correct. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S., at 87.
B
Even if the specificity element were deemed satisfied by § 12(f), the statute would not necessarily implicate the Bill of Attainder Clause. The proscription against bills of attainder reaches only statutes that inflict punishment on the specified individual or group. In determining whether a statute inflicts punishment within the proscription against bills of attainder, our holdings recognize that the severity of a sanction is not determinative of its character as punishment. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 616, and n. 9 (1960). That burdens are placed on citizens by federal authority does not make those burdens punishment. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 470; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S., at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Conversely, legislative intent to encourage compliance with the law does not establish that a statute is merely the legitimate regulation of conduct. Punishment is not limited solely to retribution for past events, but may involve deprivations inflicted to deter future misconduct. United States v. Brown, 381 U. S., at 458-459. It is thus apparent that, though the governing criteria for an attainder may be readily indicated, "each case has turned on its own highly particularized context." Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 616.
In deciding whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment, we have recognized three necessary inquiries: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, "viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes"; and (3) whether the legislative record "evinces a congressional intent to punish." Nixon, supra, at 473, 475-476, 478. We conclude that under these criteria § 12(f) is not a punitive bill of attainder.
1
At common law, bills of attainder often imposed the death penalty; lesser punishments were imposed by bills of pains and penalties. The Constitution proscribes these lesser penalties as well as those imposing death. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., at 323. Historically used in England in times of rebellion or "violent political excitements," ibid., bills of pains and penalties commonly imposed imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property. Nixon, supra, at 474. In our own country, the list of punishments forbidden by the Bill of Attainder Clause has expanded to include legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions.
Section 12(f) imposes none of the burdens historically associated with punishment. As this Court held in Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 617, "the sanction is the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is imposed," and Congress has inflicted "nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment" or other disabilities historically associated with punishment.
Congress did not even deprive appellees of Title IV benefits permanently; appellees can become eligible for Title IV aid at any time simply by registering late and thus "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364, 368 (1966). A statute that leaves open perpetually the possibility of qualifying for aid does not fall within the historical meaning of forbidden legislative punishment.
2
Our inquiry does not end with a determination that § 12(f) does not inflict punishment in its historical sense. To ensure that the Legislature has not created an impermissible penalty not previously held to be within the proscription against bills of attainder, we must determine whether the challenged statute can be reasonably said to further nonpunitive goals. Nixon, 433 U. S., at 475-476.
The legislative history reflects that § 12(f) represents the considered congressional decision to further nonpunitive legislative goals. Congress was well aware that more than half a million young men had failed to comply with the registration requirement. The legislators emphasized that one of the primary purposes of § 12(f) was to encourage those required to register to do so.
Conditioning receipt of Title IV aid on registration is plainly a rational means to improve compliance with the registration requirement. Since the group of young men who must register for the draft overlaps in large part with the group of students who are eligible for Title IV aid, Congress reasonably concluded that § 12(f) would be a strong tonic to many nonregistrants.
Section 12(f) also furthers a fair allocation of scarce federal resources by limiting Title IV aid to those who are willing to meet their responsibilities to the United States by registering with the Selective Service when required to do so. As one Senator stated:
"This amendment seeks not only to increase compliance with the registration requirement but also to insure the most fair and just usage of Federal education benefits. During these times of extreme budgetary constraints, times when even the most worthwhile programs are cut back drastically, this Government has every obligation to see that Federal dollars are spent in the most fair and prudent manner possible. . If students want to further their education at the expense of their country, they cannot expect these benefits to be provided without accepting their fair share of the responsibilities to that Government."
Certain aspects of the legislation belie the view that § 12(f) is a punitive measure. Section 12(f) denies Title IV benefits to innocent as well as willful nonregistrants. Yet punitive legislation ordinarily does not reach those whose failure to comply with the law is not willful. Thus, in stressing that the legislation would reach unintentional violators, 128 Cong. Rec. 18355-18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 18357 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Stennis), proponents indicated that they intended to regulate all nonregistrants, rather than to single out intentional nonregistrants for punishment. In this same nonpunitive spirit, Congress also allowed all nonregistrants to qualify for Title IV aid simply by registering late, instead of choosing to punish willful nonregistrants by denying them benefits even if they registered belatedly.
We see therefore that the legislative history provides convincing support for the view that, in enacting § 12(f) Congress sought, not to punish anyone, but to promote compliance with the draft registration requirement and fairness in the allocation of scarce federal resources. Section 12(f) clearly furthers nonpunitive legislative goals.
C
Because § 12(f) does not single out an identifiable group that would be ineligible for Title IV aid or inflict punishment within the meaning of Bill of Attainder Clause, we hold that the District Court erred in striking down § 12(f) as an impermissible attainder.
Ill
Appellees assert that § 12(f) violates the Fifth Amendment by compelling nonregistrants to acknowledge that they have failed to register timely when confronted with certifying to their schools that they have complied with the registration law. Pointing to the fact that the willful failure to register within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771 is a criminal offense punishable under § 12(a) and (b), they contend that § 12(f) requires them — since in fact they have not registered — to confess to a criminal act and that this is "compulsion" in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.
However, a person who has not registered clearly is under no compulsion to seek financial aid; if he has not registered, he is simply ineligible for aid. Since a nonregistrant is bound to know that his application for federal aid would be denied, he is in no sense under any "compulsion" to seek that aid. He has no reason to make any statement to anyone as to whether or not he has registered.
If appellees decide to register late, they could, of course, obtain Title IV aid without providing any information to their school that would incriminate them, since the statement to the school by the applicant is simply that he is in compliance with the registration law; it does not require him to disclose whether he was a timely or a late registrant. See n. 2, supra. A late registrant is therefore not required to disclose any incriminating information in order to become eligible for aid.
Although an applicant who registers late need not disclose that fact in his application for financial aid, appellants concede that a late registrant must disclose that his action is untimely when he makes a late registration with the Selective Service; the draft registration card must be dated and contain the registrant's date of birth. 32 CFR § 1615.4 (1983). This raises the question whether § 12(f) violates appellees' Fifth Amendment rights because they must register late in order to get aid and thus reveal to the Selective Service the failure to comply timely with the registration law. Appel-lees contend that, under our holding in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 83-84 (1973), the very risk that they will be ineligible for financial aid constitutes "compulsion" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
In Turley we held that "the plaintiffs' [architects'] disqualification from public contracting for five years as a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege is violative of their Fifth Amendment rights." Id., at 83. However, nonregistrants such as appellees are not in the same position as potential public contractors in Turley. An 18-year-old male who refuses to register is, of course, subject to prosecution for failure to register, but he is not compelled by law to acknowledge his failure to comply. Only when he registers — includ ing a late registration — will he be asked to state his date of birth and thus acknowledge that he did not timely register.
None of these appellees has registered and thus none of them has been confronted with a need to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege when asked to disclose his date of birth. Unlike the architects in Turley, these appellees have not been denied the opportunity to register and in no sense have they been disqualified for financial aid "for asserting a constitutional privilege." Ibid.
It is well settled that, "in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself," Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 427 (1984); "[ajnswers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying," Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968). However, these appellees, not having sought to register, have had no occasion to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege when asked to state their dates of birth; the Government has net refused any request for immunity for their answers or otherwise threatened them with penalties for invoking the privilege as in Turley. Under these circumstances, § 12(f) does not violate their Fifth Amendment rights by forcing them to acknowledge during the registration process they have avoided that they have registered late.
> I — I
We conclude that § 12(f) does not violate the proscription against bills of attainder. Nor have appellees raised a cognizable claim under the Fifth Amendment.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of this case.
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. § 1070 et seq., provides financial assistance to qualified students in postsecondary educational programs. Title IV aid is available at both colleges and universities, as well as at numerous kinds of business, trade, and technical schools. § 1085(b), (c), 1088.
The regulations include a model statement of registration compliance that the Secretary of Education has indicated satisfies the requirements of 34 CFR § 668.24(a) (1983):
"STATEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE/ REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE
"_I certify that I am not required to be registered with Selective Service, because:'
"_I am female.
"_I am in the armed services on active duty (Note: Members of the Reserves and National Guard are not considered on active duty.)
"_I have not reached my 18th birthday.
"_I was born before 1960.
"_I am a permanent resident of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or the Northern Mariana Islands.
"_I certify that I am registered with Selective Service.
"Signature:_
"Date:_
"NOTICE: You will not receive title IV financial aid unless you complete this statement and, if required, give proof to your school of your registration compliance. . . ." 34 CFR § 668.25 (1983).
We agree with appellants that the statute does not single out an identifiable group and that the denial of Title IV aid does not constitute punishment. Appellants also argue that § 12(f) does not dispense with a judicial trial, noting that a hearing is provided in the event of disagreement between the applicant and the Secretary about whether the applicant has registered, § 12(f)(4), and that the decision made at that hearing is subject to judicial review. Appellants' argument is meritless. Congress has not provided a judicial trial to those affected by the statute.
128 Cong. Rec. 18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Whitehurst); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 18369 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); id., at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
Id., at 18356 (remarks of Rep. Whitehurst); id., at 18357 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id., at 18368 (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); id., at 18369 (remarks of Rep. Stratton). As Senator Stennis stated:
"I thought of the proposition here where some youngster might have overlooked signing up or might have misunderstood it or had not been correctly informed, but he is not going to be penalized for that because he still has complete control of the situation. All he will have to do is just to comply with the law, and that will automatically make him eligible so far as this prohibition or restriction is concerned." Id., at 9666.
As the Solicitor General points out, one construction of the statute that avoids a constitutional problem is to make aid contingent on registration in the manner, but not the time, required by any proclamation. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 84 (1981) ("Persons who are required to be registered shall comply with the registration procedures and other rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of Selective Service").
All of the appellees in this case had failed to comply with the registration requirements when § 12(f) was enacted. As to 18-year-olds who have entered the class of nonregistrants after August 9, 1982 — 30 days before the enactment of § 12(f) — the statute is clearly prospective; ineligibility for financial aid is merely a deprivation in addition to potential criminal liability for the failure to register for the draft.
"The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation." 328 U. S., at 324.
See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 (1965), in which Communist Party members were barred from offices in labor unions; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946), in which the law in question cut off salaries to three named Government employees; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), in which a priest was disqualified from practicing as a clergyman; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867), in which lawyers were barred from the practice of law.
Appellees argue that the underpinnings of Flemming have been removed by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976). Goldberg held only that public assistance "benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them," 397 U. S., at 262, and that due process affords qualified recipients a pretermination evidentiary hearing to guard against erroneous termination. The Court stressed that "the crucial factor in this context . is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." Id., at 264 (emphasis in original). Mathews reached the same conclusion with respect to disability benefits. Even Flemming noted that the interest of a covered employee under the Social Security Act "fall[s] within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause," 363 U. S., at 611, while holding that Congress' disqualification of certain deportees from receipt of Social Security benefits was not an attainder, id., at 617.
See, e. g., 128 Cong. Rec. 18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
See id., at 18356 (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 18369 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); id., at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); ibid, (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
The Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §453, requires certain males between the ages of 18 and 26 to register. Those who fail to register, though required to do so, are a significant part of the class to which Title IV assistance is otherwise offered. Title IV aid is available for a broad range of postsecondary educational programs at colleges, universities, and vocational schools. 20 U. S. C. § 1085(a); see n. 1, supra.
128 Cong. Rec. 9664-9665 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); see also id., at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Mattingly); id., at 18356 (remarks of Rep. Montgomery).
Applying the third part of the Nixon test, the District Court concluded that § 12(f) is a punitive measure. But the District Court relied in part on the statements of legislators who opposed the statute because they thought the statute punished nonregistrants. 128 Cong. Rec. 18358-18359 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Edgar); id., at 18359-18360 (remarks of Rep. Goldwater); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Durenberger). These statements are entitled to little, if any, weight, since they were made by opponents of the legislation. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951).
The District Court also relied on several isolated statements expressing understandable indignation over the decision of some nonregistrants to show their defiance of the law. See 128 Cong. Rec. 18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); id., at 9665 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa). But such statements do not constitute "the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which . is required before a Congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 619 (1960).
The dissent reads Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968), to create in this case an exception to the normal rule requiring assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. In Marchetti and Grosso, however, anyone who asserted the privilege on a wagering return did not merely call attention to himself; the very filing necessarily admitted illegal gambling activity. Those cases are therefore clearly distinguishable on their facts. See Grosso, at 73 (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 263 (1927).
Appellees also assert that § 12(f) violates equal protection because it discriminates against less wealthy nonregistrants. That argument is meritless. Section 12(f) treats all nonregistrants alike, denying aid to both the poor and the wealthy. But even if the statute discriminated against poor nonregistrants because more wealthy nonregistrants could continue to pay for their postsecondary educations, the statute must be sustained if rationally related to a legitimate Government interest. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 322-324 (1980). That standard is easily met here, because § 12(f) is rationally related to the legitimate Government objectives of encouraging registration and fairly allocating scarce federal resources. See supra, at 854.