Mr. Justice Blatchford
delivered the opinion of. the court. After stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:
The assignment of errors filed in this court asserts these propositions: (1) that .the information is not sufficient in law; (2)-that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, or of the property seized, or of the person of the claimant; (3) that there was no sufficient monition, attachment or seizure of the property, and no legal publication and notice of the seizure, and no valuation of the goods, as required by law; (4) that it was error to submit the case to the jury before the demurrer to the fourth paragraph of the answer was disposed of; (5) that it was error to overrule said demurrer.
In regard to the 1st, 3d and 4th assignments, the questions presented by them were not formally raised in the Circuit Court, and are not presented by a bill of exceptions, and cannot be considered here.
As to the 1st assignment, that respecting the insufficiency of the information, it is supposed, by the claimant, that his motion for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict,- raises that question. But there is no exception to the order of the court denying that motion. There is an exception to the written opinion of the court overruling a motion for a new trial, and to an order made, after judgment, overruling a motion made, after judgment, for a new trial. But, there is no other exception in the record. Assuming, however, that the point as to the information can-be raised here, it is urged that the first count, that founded on section 3257, is insufficient because the count does not set forth the facts from which the court can infer that Coffey defrauded or attempted to defraud the United States. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say, that the claimant, in his answer, denies the allegations of the first count, specifically, as they are made. After that, he cannot, in a court of error, on such a record as this, be heard to say that he did not know the charge made, and could not defend against it, although, if he had excepted or demurred to the count, the objection might have been presented for consideration. After a general verdict for the United States, one good count in the information is sufficient to uphold the judgment. Coffey v. United States, ante, 427.
The objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is overruled, in accordance with the decision in Coffey v. United States, ante, 427.
The principal question is as to the effect' of the indictment, trial, verdict and judgment of acquittal set up in the fourth paragraph of the answer. The information is founded on § 3257, 3450 and 3453 ; and there is no question, on the averments in the answer, that the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information, and covered by the verdict and judgment of acquittal, embraced all 'of the acts, attempts and intents averred in the information in this suit. The question, therefore, is distinctly presented, whether such judgment of acquittal is a bar to this suit. We are of opinion that it is.
It is true that § 3257,- after denouncing the single act of a dis tiller defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits distilled by him, declares the consequences of the commission of the act to be (1) that certain specific property shall be forfeited: and (2).that the offender shall be fined and imprisoned. It is also true that the proceeding to enforce the forfeiture against the res named must be a proceeding in rem and a civil action, while that to enforce the fine and imprisonment must be a criminal proceeding, as was held by this court in The Palmyra, 12 Wheat., 1, 14. Yet, where an issue raised as to the existence of the act or fact denounced has been tried in a criminal proceeding, instituted by'the United States, and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such person, on the subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States, where, as against him, the existence of the same act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem. It is urged as a reason for not allowing such effect to the judgment, that the acquittal in the criminal' case may have taken place because of the rule requiring guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, on the same evidence, on the question of preponderance of proof, there might be a verdict for the United States, in the suit in rem. Nevertheless, the fact or act has been put in issue and determined against the United States; and all that is imposed by the statute, as a consequence of guilt, is a punishment therefor. There could be no new trial of the criminal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent trial of the civil suit amounts to substantially the same thing, with a difference only in the consequences foliowinga judgment adverse to the claimant.
When an acquittal in a criminal prosecution in behalf of the Government is pleaded, or offered in evidence, by the same defendant, in an action against him by an individual, the rule does not apply, for the reason that the parties are not the same; and often for the additional reason, that a certain intent must be proved to support the indictment, which need not be proved to support the civil action. But upon this record, as we have already seen, the parties and the matter in issue are the same.
Whether a conviction on an indictment, under § 3257 could be availed of as conclusive evidence, in law, for a condemnation, in a subsequent suit in rein under that section, and whether a judgment of forfeiture in a suit i/n rem under it would be coni elusive evidence, in law, for a conviction on a subsequent indictment under it, are questions not now presented.
The conclusion we have reached is in consonance with the principles laid down by this court in Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat., 246. In that case Hoyt sued Gelston, the collector, and Schenck, the surveyor, of the port of New York, in trespass, for taking and carrying away a vessel. The defendants pleaded that they had seized the vessel, by authority of the President, as forfeited for a violation of the statute against fitting out a vessel to commit hostilities against a friendly foreign power, and that she had been so fitted out and was forfeited. At the trial it was shown, that, after seizure, the vessel was proceeded against by the/ United States, by libel, in the United States District Court, for the alleged offence, and Hoyt had claimed her, and she, was acquitted, and ordered to be restored, and a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure was denied. The defendants offered to prove facts showing the forfeiture. The trial Court excluded the evidence. In this court, the question was presented whether the sentence of the District Court was or was not conclusive on the defendants, on the question of forfeiture: This court held that the sentence of acquittal, with a denial of a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, was conclusive evidence that no forfeiture was incurred, and that the seizure was to. tious; and that these questions could, not again be litigated in any forum.
This doctrine is peculiarly applicable to a case like the present, where, in both proceedings, criminal and civil, the United States are the party on one side and .this claimant the party on the other.' ^ The judgment of acquittal in the criminal proceeding ascertained that the facts which were the basis of that proceeding, and are the basis of this one, and which are made by the statute the foundation of any punishment, personal or pecuniary, did not exist. This "was ascertained once for all, between the United States and the claimant, in the criminal proceeding, so that the facts cannot be again litigated between them, as the basis of any statutory punishment denounced as a consequence of the existence of the facts. This is a necessary result of the rules laid down in the unanimous opinion of' the judges in the case of Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 Howell's State Trials, 355, 538, and which were formulated thus: The judgment of a .court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, as a plea, a bar, or, as evidence, conclusive, be-, tween the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another court; and the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the sam&parties, coming incidentally in . question in another court for a different pur-' pose. In the present case, the court is the same court, and had jurisdiction, and the judgment was directly on the point now involved, and between the same parties.
In a case before Mr. Justice Miller and Judge Dillon, United States v. McKee, 4 Dillon, 128, the defendant had been convicted and punished under a section of the Revised Statutes, for conspiring with certain distillers to defraud the United States, by unlawfully removing distilled spirits without payment of the taxes thereon. He was afterwards sued in a civil action by the United States, under another section, to recover a penalty of double-the amount of the taxes lost by the conspiracy and fraud. The two alleged transactions were but one; and it was held that the suit for the penalty was barred by the judgment in the criminal case. The-decision was put on the ground that the defendant could not be twice punished for the same crime, and that the former conviction and judgment were a bar to the suit for the penalty.
There ought to have been a judgment for the claimant on the demurrer to the fourth paragraph of the answer, notwithstanding the verdict, and, as the facts set forth in that paragraph were admitted by the demurrer, and constituted a defence to the suit,
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with a direction to enter a judgment for the claimant, dismissing the information, and to take such proceedings in regard to restoring the property attached as may he proper and not inconsistent with this opinion.