Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellees have framed the issue here as follows:
"Does appellants' action in refusing to allow an alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings violate the First Amendment rights of American scholars and students who had invited him?"
Expressed in statutory terms, the question is whether §212 (a) (28) (D) and (G)(v) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) and § 1182 (d) (3) (A), providing that certain aliens "shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States" unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, upon recommendation by the Secretary of State or a consular officer, waives inadmissibility and approves temporary admission, are unconstitutional as applied here in that they deprive American citizens of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The challenged provisions of the statute are:
"Section 212(a). Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
"(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following classes:
"(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship .
"(G) Aliens who write or publish . . . (v) the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship; . . .
"(d)
"(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) . . . may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . ."
Section 212 (d) (6) provides that the Attorney General "shall make a detailed report to the Congress in any case in which he exercises his authority under paragraph (3) of this subsection on behalf of any alien excludable under paragraphs (9), (10), and (28) . . .
I
Ernest E. Mandel resides in Brussels, Belgium, and is a Belgian citizen. He is a professional journalist and is editor-in-chief of the Belgian Left Socialist weekly La Gauche. He is author of a two-volume work entitled Marxist Economic Theory published in 1969. He asserted in his visa applications that he is not a member of the Communist Party. He has described himself, however, as "a revolutionary Marxist." He does not dispute, see 325 F. Supp. 620, 624, that he advocates the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world communism.
Mandel was admitted to the United States temporarily in 1962 and again in 1968. On the first visit he came as a working journalist. On the second he accepted invitations to speak at a number of universities and colleges. On each occasion, although apparently he was not then aware of it, his admission followed a finding of ineligibility under § 212 (a) (28), and the Attorney General's exercise of discretion to admit him temporarily, on recommendation of the Secretary of State, as § 212 (d) (3) (A) permits.
On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Consul in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States in October for a six-day period, during which he would participate in a conference on Technology and the Third World at Stanford University. He had been invited to Stanford by the Graduate Student Association there. The invitation stated that John Kenneth Galbraith would present the keynote address and that Mandel would be expected to participate in an ensuing panel discussion and to give a major address the following day. The University, through the office of its president, "heartily endorse [d]" the invitation. When Mandel's intended visit became known, additional invitations for lectures and conference participations came to him from members of the faculties at Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Yassar, from groups in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and New York City, and from others. One conference, to be in New York City, was sponsored jointly by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Socialist Scholars Conference; Mandel's assigned subject there was "Revolutionary Strategy in Imperialist Countries." Mandel then filed a second visa application proposing a more extensive itinerary and a stay of greater duration.
On October 23 the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel orally that his application of September 8 had been refused. This was confirmed in writing on October 30. The Consul's letter advised him of the finding of inadmissibility under § 212 (a) (28) in 1962, the waivers in that year and in 1968, and the current denial of a waiver. It said, however, that another request for waiver was being forwarded to Washington in connection with Mandel's second application for a visa. The Department of State, by a letter dated November 6 from its Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs to Mandel's New York attorney, asserted that the earlier waivers had been granted on condition that Mandel conform to his itinerary and limit his activities to the stated purposes of his trip, but that on his 1968 visit he had engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes. For this reason, it was said, a waiver "was not sought in connection with his September visa application." The Department went on to say, however, that it had now learned that Mandel might not have been • aware in 1968 of the conditions and limitations attached to his visa issuance, and that, in view of this and upon his assurances that he would conform to his stated itinerary and purposes, the Department was reconsidering his case. On December 1 the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that his visa had been refused.
The Department of State in fact had recommended to the Attorney General that Mandel's ineligibility be waived with respect to his October visa application. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, see 28 U. S. C. § 510, in a letter dated February 13, 1970, to New York counsel stated that it had determined that Mandel's 1968 activities while in the United States "went far beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of which his admission had been authorized and represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country." The letter concluded that favorable exercise of discretion, provided for under the Act, was not warranted and that Mandel's temporary admission was not authorized.
Mandel's address to the New York meeting was then delivered by transatlantic telephone.
In March Mandel and six of the other appellees instituted the present action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. The two remaining appellees soon came into the lawsuit by an amendment to the complaint. All the appellees who joined Mandel in this action are United States citizens and are university professors in various fields of the social sciences. They are persons who invited Mandel to speak at universities and other forums in the United States or who expected to participate in colloquia with him so that, as the complaint alleged, "they may hear his views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange."
Plaintiff-appellees claim that the statutes are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in that they deprive the American plaintiffs of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, these plaintiffs claim that the statutes prevent them from hearing and meeting with Mandel in person for discussions, in contravention of the First Amendment; that §212 (a) (28) denies them equal protection by permitting entry of "rightists" but not "leftists" and that the same section deprives them of procedural due process; that § 212 (d) (3) (A) is an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the Attorney General because of its broad terms, lack of standards, and lack of prescribed procedures; and that application of the statutes to Mandel was "arbitrary and capricious" because there was no basis in fact for concluding that he was ineligible, and no rational reason or basis in fact for denying him a waiver once he was determined ineligible. Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought.
A three-judge district court was duly convened. The case was tried on the pleadings and affidavits with exhibits. Two judges held that, although Mandel had no personal right to enter the United States, citizens of this country have a First Amendment right to have him enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views. The court then entered a declaratory judgment that § 212 (a) (28) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) were invalid and void insofar as they had been or might be invoked by the defendants to find Mandel ineligible for admission. The defendants were enjoined from implementing and enforcing those statutes so as to deny Mandel admission as a nonimmigrant visitor. 325 F. Supp. 620 (EDNY 1971). Judge Bartels dissented. Id., at 637. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 404 U. S. 1013 (1972).
II
Until 1875 alien migration to the United States was unrestricted. The Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, barred convicts and prostitutes. Seven years later Congress passed the first general immigration statute. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214. Other legislation followed. A general revision of the immigration laws was effected by the Act of Mar. 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213. Section 2 of that Act made ineligible for admission "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all government or of all forms of law." By the Act of Oct. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, Congress expanded the provisions for the exclusion of subversive aliens. Title II of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671, amended the 1918 Act to bar aliens who, at any time, had advocated or were members of or affiliated with organizations that advocated violent overthrow of the United States Government.
In the years that followed, after extensive investigation and numerous reports by congressional committees, see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 94 n. 37 (1961), Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. This Act dispensed with the requirement of the 1940 Act of a finding in each case, with respect to members of the Communist Party, that the party did in fact advocate violent overthrow of the Government. These provisions were carried forwrard into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
We thus have almost continuous attention on the part of Congress since 1875 to the problems of immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of in creasing control with particular attention, for almost 70 years now, first to anarchists and then to those with communist affiliation or views.
III
It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 530-532 (1954); see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 592 (1952).
The appellees concede this. Brief for Appellees 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Indeed, the American appellees assert that "they sue to enforce their rights, individually and as members of the American public, and assert none on the part of the invited alien." Brief for Appellees 14. "Dr. Mandel is in a sense made a plaintiff because he is symbolic of the problem." Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.
The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or, in other words, to compel the Attorney General to allow Mandel's admission.
IV
In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to "receive information and ideas":
"It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily protects the right to receive . . . Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943) . . . ." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969).
This was one basis for the decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The Court there held that a labor organizer's right to speak and the rights of workers "to hear what he had to say," id., at 534, were both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership. In a very different situation, Me. Justice White, speaking for a unanimous Court upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine" in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386-390 (1969), said:
"It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC." Id., at 390.
And in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), the Court held that a statute permitting the Government to hold "communist political propaganda" arriving in the mails from abroad unless the addressee affirmatively requested in writing that it be delivered to him placed an unjustifiable burden on the addressee's First Amendment right. This Court has recognized that this right is "nowhere more vital" than in our schools and universities. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968).
In the present case, the District Court majority held:
"The concern of the First Amendment is not with a non-resident alien's individual and personal interest in entering and being heard, but with .the rights , of the citizens of the country to have the alien enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views; that, as Garrison [v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964)] and Red Lion observe, is of the essence of self-government." 325 F. Supp., at 631.
The Government disputes this conclusion on two grounds. First, it argues that exclusion of Mandel, involves no restriction on First Amendment rights at all since what is restricted is "only action — the action of the alien in coming into this country." Brief for Appellants 29. Principal reliance is placed on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965), where the Government's refusal to validate an American passport for travel to Cuba was upheld. The rights asserted there were those of the passport applicant himself. The Court held that his right to travel and his asserted ancillary right to inform himself about Cuba did not outweigh substantial "foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens" that, with the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis, were characterized as the "weightiest considerations of national security." Id., at 13, 16. The rights asserted here, in some contrast, are those of American academics who have invited Man-del to participate with them in colloquia, debates, and discussion in the United States. In light of the Court's previous decisions concerning the "right to receive information," we cannot realistically say that the problem facing us disappears entirely or is nonexistent because the mode of regulation bears directly on physical movement. In Thomas the registration requirement on its face concerned only action. In Lamont, too, the face of the regulation dealt only with the Government's undisputed power to control physical entry of mail into the country. See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 263 (1967).
The Government also suggests that the First Amendment is inapplicable because appellees have free access to Mandel's ideas through his books and speeches, and because "technological developments," such as tapes or telephone hook-ups, readily supplant his physical presence. This argument overlooks what may be particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning. While alternative means of access to Mandel's ideas might be a relevant factor were we called upon to balance First Amendment rights against governmental regulatory interests — a balance we find unnecessary here in light of the discussion that follows in Part Y — we are loath to hold on this record that existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form of access.
V
Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our inquiry here. In accord with ancient principles of the international law of nation-states, the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 609 (1889), and in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893), held broadly, as the Government describes it, Brief for Appellants 20, that the power to exclude aliens is "inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers — a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government . . . Since that time, the Court's general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion. The Court without exception has sustained Congress' "plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden." Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123 (1967). "[O] ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). In Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547 (1895), the first Mr. Justice Harlan said:
"The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter ably articulated this history in Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), a deportation case, and we can do no better. After suggesting, at 530, that "much could be said for the view" that due process places some limitations on congresssional power in this area "were we writing on a clean slate," he continued:
"But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history'. . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. . . . But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . .
"We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens ." Id., at 531-532.
We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider this line of cases. Indeed, the appellees, in contrast to the amicus, do not ask that we do so. The appellees recognize the force of these many precedents. In seeking to sustain the decision below, they concede that Congress could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all aliens falling into the class defined by § 212 (a) (28) (D) and (G) (v), and that First Amendment rights could not override that decision. Brief for Appellees 16. But they contend that by providing a waiver procedure, Congress clearly intended that persons ineligible under the broad provision of the section would be temporarily admitted when appropriate "for humane reasons and for reasons of public interest." S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1952). They argue that the Executive's implementation of this congressional mandate through decision whether to grant a waiver in each individual case must be limited by the First Amendment rights of persons like appellees. Specifically, their position is that the First Amendment rights must prevail, at least where the Gov- eminent advances no justification for failing to grant a waiver. They point to the fact that waivers have been granted in the vast majority of cases.
Appellees' First Amendment argument would prove too much. In almost every instance of an alien excludable under § 212 (a) (28), there are probably those who would wish to meet and speak with him. The ideas of most such aliens might not be so influential as those of Mandel, nor his American audience so numerous, nor the planned discussion forums so impressive. But the First Amendment does not protect only the articulate, the well known, and the popular. Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable under §212 (a) (28), one of two unsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive becomes a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh the strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined standard. The dangers and the undesirability of making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size of the audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas are obvious. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the Executive.
Appellees seek to soften the impact of this analysis by arguing, as has been noted, that the First Amendment claim should prevail, at least where no justification is advanced for denial of a waiver. Brief for Appellees 26. The Government would have us reach this question, urging a broad decision that Congress has delegated the waiver decision to the Executive in its sole and unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason may be given. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 357-358 (1956) ; Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U. S. 405, 408 (1960). This record, however, does not require that we do so, for the Attorney General did inform Mandel's counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver. And that reason was facially legitimate and bona fide.
The Government has chosen not to rely on the letter to counsel either in the District Court or here. The fact remains, however, that the official empowered to make the decision stated that he denied a waiver because he concluded that previous abuses by Mandel made it inappropriate to grant a waiver again. With this, we think the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power that Congress delegated to the Executive by § 212 (a) (28) and (d)(3).
In summary, plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under §212 (a) (28), Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address nor_ decide in this case.
Reversed.
Brief for Appellees 1.
E. Mandel, Revolutionary Strategy in the Imperialist Countries (1969), reprinted in App. 54r-66.
Appellees, while suggesting that §101 (a) (40), defining "world communism," and § 212 (a) (28) (D) are unacceptably vague, "do not contest the fact that appellants can and do conclude that Dr. Mandel's Marxist economic philosophy falls within the scope of these vague provisions." Brief for Appellees 10 n. 8.
Entry presumably was claimed as a nonimmigrant alien under § 101 (a) (15) (H) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15) (H), namely, "an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning (i) who is of distinguished merit and ability and who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services of an exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability . . .
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent, post, at 773 n. 4, states that Mandel's noncompliance with the conditions imposed for his 1968 visit "appear merely to have been his speaking at more universities than his visa application indicated." The letter dated November 6, 1969, from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State to Mandel's New York counsel observed: "On his 1968 visit, Mr. Mandel engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes of his trip. For this reason, a waiver of ineligibility was not sought in connection with his September visa application."
Counsel's affidavit in support of appellees' motion for the convening of a three-judge court and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction stated:
"Mr. Mandel further assured the Consul by letter on November 10, 1969 that he would not appear at any assembly in the United States at which money was solicited for any political cause. This was apparently in response to a charge that he had been present at such a solicitation during his 1968 tour. (See also Exhibit L.)
"Of course, just as Mr. Mandel had no prior notice that he was required to adhere to a stated itinerary in 1968, so Mr. Mandel was not aware that he was forbidden from appearing where contributions [were] solicited for political causes. I have been advised by Mr. George Novaek, an American citizen, who coordinated Mr. Mandel's 1968 tour, that in fact the event in question was a cocktail reception held at the Gotham Art Theatre in New York City on October 19, 1968. Mr. Mandel addressed the gathering on the events in France during May and June. Later that evening posters by French students were auctioned. The money was sent to aid the legal defense of students who had taken part in the spring demonstrations. Mr. Mandel did not participate in the fund raising. (See Ex. L, Oct. 30, 1969 letter.)"
The asserted noncompliance by Mandel is therefore broader than mere acceptance of more speaking engagements than his visa application indicated.
See, for example, Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659 (1892); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302 (1902); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 294 (1904); Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 143-144 (1909); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 210 (1953) ; cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 377 (1971).
The Government's brief states :
"The Immigration and Naturalization Service reports the following with respect to applications to the Attorney General for waiver of an alien's ineligibility for admission under Section 212 (a) (28):
Total Number of Number Applications for of Waiver of Waivers "Year Section 212 (a) (28) Granted Number of Waivers Denied
1971 6210 6196 14
1970 6193 6189 4
1969 4993 4984 9
1968 4184 4176 8
1967 3860 3852 8"
Brief for Appellants 18 n. 24. These cases, however, are only those that, as § 212 (d) (3) (A) provides, come to the Attorney General with a positive recommendation from the Secretary of State or the consular officer. The figures do not include those cases where these officials had refrained from making a positive recommendation.