Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error will be called the husband and the defendant in error the wife. '
The wife, a resident of the State of New York, sued the husband in that .State in 1899, and -there obtained personal service upon him.. The complaint charged .that the parties had been married in New York in 1868, where they both resided and where the wife continued to reside, and it was averred that the . husband, immediately following the marriage, abandoned the wife, and thereafter failed to support her, .and that he was the owner of property. A decree of separation from bed and-board and for alimony was prayed. The answer admitted the marriage, but averred that its celebration'was proeured by the fraud of the wife, and that immediately after the marriage the parties had separated by mutual' consent. - It was also alleged that, during the long period between The celebration and the bringing'of this action the wife had in no manner asserted her rights and was barred by her laches from doing so. Besides, the answer alleged that the husband had, .in. 1881, obtained in a court of the State of Connecticut a divorce which was conclusive. At the trial before a referee the judgment roll in the suit for divorce in Connecticut was offered'by the husband and was objected to, first, because the Connecticut, court had not obtained jurisdiction over the person of the defendant wife, as the notice of the pendency of the petition was by publication and she had not appeared in the action; and, second,. ber cause the ground upon which the divorce was granted, viz., desertion by the wife, was false. The referee sustained .the objections and an exception was noted. The judgment roll in .question was then marked for identification and forms a part of the record before us.
Haying thus excluded the proceedings in the Connecticut court, the referee found that the parties were married in New York in 1868, that the wife was a resident of the State of New York, that after the marriage the parties never lived together, and shortly thereafter that the husband without justifiable cause abandoned the wifé, and hás since neglected to provide for her. The legal conclusion was that' the wife was entitled tó a separation from bed and board and alimony in the sum of $780 a year from the date of the judgment. The: action of the referee was sustained by the Supreme Court ,of the State of New York, and a judgment for separation and alimony was, entered in favor of the wife. This judgment was . affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As by the law of the State of New York, after the affirmance by the Court of Appeals, the record was remitted to the Supreme Court, this writ of error to that court was prosecuted.
The Federal question is, Did the court below violate the Constitution of the United States by refusing to give to the decree, of divorce rendered in the State of Connecticut the faith and credit to which it was entitled?
As the averments concerning the alleged fraud in contracting the marriage and the subsequent laches of. the wife are solely matters of state cognizance, we may not allow them to even indirectly influence our judgment upon the Federal question to which we áre confined, and we, therefore, put -these subjects entirely out of view. Moreover, as, for the purpose of the Federal issue, ye are concerned not with the mere, form of proceeding by which the Federal right, if any, was denied, but alone Kave-power to' decide whether such right was denied, we do not ' inquire whether the New York court should preferably have admitted the record of the Connecticut divorce suit, and, after so admitting it, determine what effect it would give to it instead of excluding the.record and thus refusing to give effect to the judgment. In order to decide whether the refusal of the court to admit in evidence the Connecticut decree denied, to that decree the efficacy to which it was entitled under the' full faith and credit clause, we mu'st first examine the judgment roll of the Connecticut cause in .order to fix the precise circumstances under which the decree in that eaüse' was rendered.
Without going into detail, it suffices to say that on the face of the Connecticut record it appeared that the husband, alleging that he had acquired a domicil in Connecticut, sued the wife in that State as a person whose residence was unknown, but whose last known place of resilience was in the State of New York, at a píáce stated, and charged desertion by the wife and fraud on her part .in procuring the marriage; and, further, it is shown that no service was made upon the wife except by publication and by mailing a copy of the petition to her. at her last known place of residence in the State of New York.
.With the object'of confining our attention to the real question arising from this condition of the Connecticut record, we state at the .outset certain legal propositions irrevocably concluded by previous decisions of this court, and which are re quired to be borne in mind in analyzing the ultimate issue to be decided.
First. The requirement of the Constitution is not that some, but that full, faith and credit shall be given by States to the judicial decrees of otherjStates. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one State is embraced by the full faith and credit clause that constitutional provision commands that the other States shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was entitled in the State where rendered. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317.
Second. Where a personal judgment has been rendered in - the courts of a State against a non-resident merely upon constructive service and, therefore, without acquiring jurisdiction qver the person of the defendant, such judgment may not be enforced in another State in virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Indeed, a personal judgment so rendered is by operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment void as against the non-resident, even in the State where rendered, and, therefore, such non-resident in virtue of rights granted by the Constitution of the United States may successfully resist ' even in the State where rendered, the enforcement, of such a judgment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. The facts in that case were these: Neff, who was a resident of a State other than Oregon, owned a tract of land in Oregon. Mitchell, a resident of Oregon, brought a suit in a court of that State upon a money demand against Neff. The Oregon statutes required, in the case of personal action against a nonresident, a publication of notice, calling upon the defendant to appear and defend, and also -required the mailing to such defendant at his last known place of residence of a copy of the summons and complaint. Upon affidavit of the absence of Neff, and that he resided in the State of California, the exact place being unknown, the publication required by the statute was ordered and made, and judgment by default was entered against Neff. Upon this judgment execution was issued and real estate of Neff was sold and was ultimately acquired by' Pennoyer. Neff sued in the Circuit Court of the United States •for the District of Oregon to recover the property, and the question presented was the validity in Oregon of the judgment there rendered against Neff. After the most elaborate consideration it was expressly decided that the judgment rendered in Oregon under the circumstances stated was void for want of jurisdiction and was repugnant to the due. process clause of the Constitution of the United States. The ruling was based on the proposition that a court of one State could not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against a non-resident who did not appear by the mere publication: of a summons, and that the want of power to acquire such jurisdiction by publication could not be aided by the fact that under the statutes' of the State in which the suit against the -non-resident was brought the sending of a -.copy of the summons and complaint to the.post office address in another State of the defendant was required and complied with. The eourt said (p. 727):
"Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them. Pul> lication of process or notice within the State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and procéss published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his personal liability."
And the doctrine thus stated but expresseda general principle expounded in previous decisions. Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812. In that case, speaking of a money judgment recovered in the Common Pleas of Westminster Hall, England, upon per- sonal notice served in the city of Baltimore, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, said (p. 814):
"It is enough to say [of this proceeding] thát it was wholly without jurisdiction of the person, and whatever validity it may have in England, by virtue of statute law against property of the defendant there situate, it can have no validity here, even of a prima fade character. It is simply null. "
Third. The principles, however, stated in the previous proposition are controlling only as to judgments in personam and do not relate to proceedings in rem. That is to say, .in-consequence of the authority which government possesses over things within its borders there is jurisdiction in a court of a State by a proceeding in rem, after the giving of reasonable opportunity to the owner to defend, to. affect things within the jurisdiction of the court, even although jurisdiction is not directly acquired over the person of the owner- of the thing. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra..
Fourth. The general rule stated in the second proposition is, moreover, limited by the inherent power which all governments must possess oyer the marriage relation, its formation and dissolution, as regards their own- citizens. From this exception it results that where a court of. one. State, conformably to the laws of such State, or the State through its legislative department, has actedi concerning the dissolution of the marriage tie, as to a citizen of that State, such action is binding in that State as to such citizen, and the validity of the judgment may not therein be questioned on the ground that the action of the State in dealing with, its own citizen concerning the marriage relation was repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190. In that case the facts were these: Maynard was married in Vermont, and the husband and wife remove^ to Ohio, from whence Maynard left his wife and family and went to California. Subsequently • he acquired a domicil in the Territory of Washington. Being there so domiciled, an act of the legislature of the Territory was passed, granting a divorce to the husband. Maynard continued to reside in Washington, and there remarried and died. The children of the former wife, claiming in right of their mother, sued in a court of the Territory of Washington to recover real estate situated in the Territory, and one of the issues for decision was the .validity of the legislative divorce granted to the father. The statute was assailed as invalid, on the ground that Mrs. Maynard had no notice and that she was not a resident of the Territory when the act was passed. From a decree of the Supreme Court of the' Territory adverse to their claim the children brought the case to this court. The power of the territorial legislature, in the absence of restrictions in the organic act, to grant a divorce to-a. citizen of the Territory was, however, upheld, in view of the nature and extent of the authority which government possessed over thS marriage relation. It was therefore decided that the courts of the Territory committed no error in giving effect within the Territory to the divorce in question. And as a corollary of the recognized power of a government thus to deal with its own citizen by a decree which would be operative within its own. borders, irrespective of any extraterritorial efficacy, it follows that the right of another sovereignty exists, under principles of comity,to give to a decree so rendered such efficacy as to that government may seem to be justified by its conceptions of duty and public policy.
Fifth. It is no longer open to question that where husband and wife are domiciled in a State there exists jurisdiction in such State, for good cause, to enter a decree of divorce which will be entitled to enforcement in another State by virtue of the full faith and credit clause. It has,- moreover, been decided that where a bona.fide domicil has been acquired in a State by either of the parties to a marriage, and-, a suit is brought by the domiciled party in such State for a divorce, the courts of that State, if they acquire personal jurisdiction also of the other party, have authority to enter a decree of divorce, entitled to be enforced in every State by the full faith and credit clause. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108.
Sixth. Where the domicil of matrimony was in a particular State, and -the husband abandons his wife and goes into another State in order to avoid his marital obligations, such other State to which the husband has wrongfully fled does not, in the nature Of things, become a new domicil of matrimony, and, therefore, is not to be treated as the actual- or constructive domicil of the. wife; hence, the place where the wife was domiciled when so abandoned constitutes her legal domiGil until a new actual domicil be by her elsewhere acquired. This was clearly expressed in Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, where it'was said (p. 595):
"The general rule is, that a voluntary separation will not give to the wife a different'domiciliation''in law from that of her husband. But if the husband, as is the fact in this case, abandons their domicil and his wife, to get rid of all those conjugal obligations which the marriage relation imposes upon him, néither. giving to her the necessaries nor the comforts suitable to their condition and his fortune, and relinquishes altogether his marital control and protection, he yields up that power and authority over her which alone makes his domicil hers. ."
And the'same doctrine was. expressly upheld in Cheever v. Wilson, supra, where the court said (9 Wall. 123):
"It is insisted that Cheever never resided in Indiana; that the domicil of the husband is the wife's, and that she cannot' have a different one from his. The converse of the latter proposition is so well settled that it would be idle to . discuss it. The rule is that she may acquire a separate domicil whenever it is necessary or proper that she should do so. The right springs from the necessity of its exercise, and endures as long as the necessity continues."
Seventh. So also it is settled that' where the domicil of a' husband is in a • particular State, and that State is also the domicil pf matrimony, the courts of such : State having jurisdiction over the husband may, in virtue of the duty of the wife to be at the matrimonial domicil, disregard' an unjustifiable absence therefrom, and treat the wife as having her domicil in the State of the matrimonial domicil for the purpose of the dissolution "of the marriage, and as a result have power to render a judgment dissolving the marriage which will be binding upon both parties, and will be entitled to recognition in all other States by virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
Corning to apply these settled propositions to the case before us-three things are beyond dispute: a. In view of- the authority which government possesses over the marriage relation, no question can arise on this record concerning the right of- the State of Connecticut within its borders to giye. effect to the decree of divorce rendered in favor of the husband by the courts of Connecticut, he being at the time when the decree was rendered domiciled in that State, b. As New York was • the domicil of the wife and the domicil of matrimony, from which the husband fled in disregard of his duty, it clearly results from the sixth proposition that the domicil of the wife continued in New York. c. As then there can be no question that the wife was not constructively present in Connecticut by virtue of a matrimonial domicil in that State, and was not there individually domiciled and did not appear in the divorce cause, and'was only constructively served with notice of the pendency of that action, it is apparent that the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the wife within the fifth and seventh propositions; that is, vdid not acquire such jurisdiction by virtue of the domicil of the wife within the State or as the result of-personal service upon her within its borders.
These subjects being thus eliminated, the ease reduces-itself to this: Whether the Connecticut court, m virtue alone of the domicil of the husband in that State, had jurisdiction to render a decree against the wife under the circumstances stated, < which was entitled to be .enforced in other States in and by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. In other words, the final question .is whether to enforce in another jurisdiction the Connecticut decree would not 'be to enforce in one State, a-personal judgment rendered in another' State against a defendant over whom the court of. the State rendering the judgment had not acquired jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the question is this: Is a proceéding for.divorce of such an exceptional character as not to come within the rule limiting the authority of a State to persons within its jurisdiction, but oh the contrary^, because of the power which government may exercise over the marriage relation, constitutes an exception to that rule, and is therefore embraced either • within the letter of spirit of the doctrines stated in the third and. fourth propositions? '
Before reviewing the authorities relied on to establish that a.divorce proceeding is of the exceptional nature indicated, . we propose first to consider the reasons advanced to sustain the contention. In doing so, however, it must always' be borne in mind that it is elementary that where the full faith •and. credit clause of the Constitution is invoked to compel the enforcement in one State of a decree 'rendered in another, the question of the jurisdiction of the court by which the decree was' rendered is open to inquiry. And if there was no jurisdiction, either of the subject 'matter or of the person of the defendant, the courts of another State are hot required, by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, to1'enforce such decree. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257, 269, and cases cited.
I. The wide scope of the authority which government possesses over the contract of marriage and its dissolution is the basis upon whieh it is argued that the domicil within one State of one party to the marriage gives to such a State jurisdiction to decree a dissolution of the marriage tie which will be obligatory in all the other States by force of the full faith and credit clause' of the Constitution. But the deduction is destructive of the premise upon which it rests. This becomes clear when it is perceived that if one government, because of its authority over its own citizens has the right to dissolve the marriage tie as to the citizen of another jurisdiction, it must follow that no government possesses as to its own citizens, power over the marriage relation and its dissolution. For if it be that one government in virtue of its authority over marriage may dissolve the tie. as to citizens of another government, other governments would have a similar power, and hence the right of every government as to its own citizens might be rendered nugatory by the exercise of the power which every other government possessed.. To concretely illustrate: If the fact be that where persons are married in the State of New York either of the/parties to the marriage may, in violation of the marital obligations, desert the other and go into the State of Connecticut, there acquiring a domicil, and procure a dissolution of the marriage which would be binding in the State of New York as to the party to. the marriage there domiciled, it would follow that the power of the State of New York as to the dissolution of the marriage as to its domiciled citizen would be of no practical avail. And conversely the like result would follow if the marriage had been celebrated in Connecticut and desertion had been from'that State to'New York, and consequently the decree of divorce had been rendered in New York. • Even a superficial analysis will make this clear. Under the rule contended-.for it would follow that the States whose laws were the most lax as to length of residence required for domicil, as to causes for divorce and to speed of procedure concerning divorce, would in effect dominate all the other States. In other words, any person who was married in one State and who wished to violate the marital obligations would be able, by following the lines of least resistance, to go into the State whose laws were the most lax,- and there avail of them' for the purpose of the severance of the marriage tie' and the destruction of the rights of the other party to the marriage contract, to the overthrow of the laws and public policy of the other States. Thus the argument comes necessarily. to this, that to preserve the lawful authority of all the States over marriage it is essential to decide that all the States, have such authority only at the sufferance of the other- States. And the considerations just stated serve to dispose of the argument that the contention relied on finds support in the ruling made in Maynard v. Hill, referred to in the fourth proposition, which was at the outset stated... For in that case the sole question was the effect within the Territory of Washington of a legislative divorce granted in the Territory to a citizen thereof. The upholding of the divorce within the Territory was, therefore, but a recognition of the power of the territorial government, in virtue of its authority - over marriagé, to deal with a person domiciled within its jurisdiction. The case, therefore, did not concern the extraterritorial efficacy of the legislative divorce. In other words, whilst the ruling recognized the ample powers which government possesses over marriage as to one within its jurisdiction, it did not purport to hold that such ample powers might be exercised and enforced by virtue of the Constitution of the United States in another jurisdiction as to citizens of other States to whom the jurisdiction of the Territory did not extend.
The anomalous result which it is therefore apparent would arise from maintaining the proposition contended for is made more manifest by considering the instrument from which such result would'be produced, that is, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. No-one denies that the States, at the time of the adoption .of. the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce. ' No one, moreover, can deny that, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the-extent to which the States Would recognize a divorce obtained in a foreign jurisdiction depended upon their conceptions of duty and comity. Besides, it must be conceded that the Constitution delegated no authority- to the Government of the United States on the subject of marriage and divorce. Yet, if the proposition be maintained, it would follow that the destruction of the power of the States over the dissolution of.marriage, as to their own citizens, would be brought about by the operation of the: full- faith -and credit clause of. the Constitution. That is to say, it would come to pass that, although the- Constitution of the United States does not interfere with the authority of the States over marriage, nevertheless the full faith and credit clause of that instrument destroyed the authority of the States over the marriage rela tion. And as the - Government of the United States has no delegated' authority- on the subject, that Government would be powerless-to prevent the evil thus brought about by the full faith and credit clause. Thus neither the States, nor the National Government would be able to exert that authority over the marriage tie possessed byevery other ' civilized government. Yet more remarkable would be such result when it is borne in mind that, when the Constitution was adopted, nowhere, either in the mother country or on the continent of Europe, either in adjudged cases or in the treatises of authoritative writers, had the theory ever been upheld or been taught or even suggested that one government, solely because of the domicil within, its borders of one of the parties to a marriage, had authority, without the actual or constructive presence of the other,, to exert its authority by a dissolution of the marriage tie, which exertion of power it would be .the duty of other States to respect as to those subject to their jurisdiction.
II. It is urged that the suit for divorce was a proceeding in rem, and, therefore, the Connecticut court had complete jurisdiction to enter a decree as to the res, entitled to be enforced in the State of New York. But here again the argu-' ment is contradictory. It rests, upon the theory that jurisdiction in Connecticut depended upon the domicil of the person there suing and yet attributes to the decree resting upon the domicil of one of the parties alone a force and effect based upon the theory that a thing within the jurisdiction of Connecticut was the subject matter of the controversy. But putting this contradiction aside, what, may we ask, was the res in Connecticut? Certainly it cannot in reason be said that it was the cause of action or the mere presence of the person of the plaintiff within the jurisdiction. The only possible theory then upon which the proposition proceeds must be that the res in Connecticut, from which the jurisdiction is assumed to have arisen, was the marriage relation. But as the marriage was celebrated in New York between citizens of that State, it must be admitted, under the hypothesis stated, that before the husband deserted the wife in New York, the res was in New York and not in Connecticut. As the husband, after wrongfully abandoning the wife in New York, never established a matrimonial domicil in Connecticut, it cannot be said that he took with him the marital relation from which he fled to Connecticut. Conceding, however, that he took with him to Connecticut so much of the marital relation as concerned his individual status, it cannot in reason be said that he did not leave in New York so much of the relation as pertained to the status of the wife. From any point of view, then, under the proposition referred to, if the marriage relation be treated as the res, it follows that it was divisible, and therefore there wás ar res in the State of New York and one in the State of Connecticut. Thus considered, it is clear that the power of one State did not extend to affecting the thing situated in another State. As illustrating this conception, we notice the case of Mississippi & Missouri R. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485. The facts in that case were these: A bill was filed in a District Court of the United States for the District of Iowa to abate a nuisance.alleged to have been occasioned by a bridge across the Mississippi river dividing the States of Illinois and Iowa. Under the assumption that the nuisance was occasioned by the operation- of the bridge on the Illinois side, the court, after pointing out that the United States Circuit Court for the District of Iowa exercised the same jurisdiction that a state court of Iowa could exercise and no more, said (p. 494):-
"The District Court had no power over the local object •inflicting the injury; nor any jurisdiction to inquire of the facts, whether damage had been sustained, or how much. These facts are beyond the court's jurisdiction and powers of inquiry, and outside of the case."
Nor has the conclusive force of the view which we have stated been met by the suggestion that the res was indivisible, and therefore was wholly in Connecticut and wholly in New York, for this amounts but to saying that the same thing can be at one and' the same time in different places. Further, the reasoning above expressed disposes of the contention that, as the suit in Connecticut involved the status of the husband, therefore the courts of that State had the power to determine the status of the non-resident wife by a decree which had obligatory force outside of the State of Connecticut. Here, again, the argument comes to this, that, because the State of Connecticut had jurisdiction to fix the status of one domiciled within its borders, that State alsq. had the authority to oust the State of New York of the power to fix the status of a person who was undeniably subject to the jurisdiction of that State.
III. It is urged that whilst marriage is in one aspect ¿ contract, it is nevertheless a contract' in which society is deeply interested and, therefore, government must have the power to determine whether a marriage exists or to dissolve it, and hence the Connecticut court had jurisdiction of the relation and the right to dissolve it, not only as to its own citizen but as to a citizen of New York who was not subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Connecticut. The proposition involves in another form of statement the non sequitur which we have previously pointed out; that is, that, because government possesses power over marriage, therefore the existence of that power must be rendered unavailing.
Nor is the contention aided by the proposition that because it is impossible to conceive of the dissolution of the marriage as to one of the parties in one jurisdiction without at the same time saying that the marriage is dissolved as to both in every other jurisdiction, therefore the Connecticut decree should have obligatory effect in New York as to the citizen of that State. For, again, by a change of form of statement, the same contention which we have disposed of is reiterated. Besides, the proposition presupposes that, because in the exercise of its power over its own citizens, a State-may determine to dissolve the marriage tie by a decree which is efficacious within its borders, therefore such decree is in all cases binding in every other jurisdiction. As we have pointed out at the outset, it does not follow that a State may not exert its power as to one within its jurisdiction simply because such exercise of authority may not be extended beyond its borders into the jurisdiction and authority of another State. The distinction was clearly pointed out in Blackinton v. Blackinton, 141 Massachusetts, 432. In that case the parties were married and lived in Massachusetts. The husband abandoned.the wife without cause and became domiciled in New York. The wife remained at the matrimonial domicil in Massachusetts and instituted a proceeding to prohibit her husband from imposing any restraint upon her personal liberty and' for separate maintenance. Service was ma'de upon the husband in New York. The court, recognizing fully that under the circumstances disclosed the domicil of the husband was not the domicil of the wife, concluded that, under the statutes of Massachusetts, it had authority to grant the relief prayed, and was then brought to determine whether the decree ought to be made, in view of the fact that such decree might not have1 extraterritorial force. But this circumstance was held not to be controlling and the decree was awarded. The same doctrine was clearly expounded by the Privy Council, in an opinion delivered by Lord Watson, in the divorce case of Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (1895), A. C. 517, where it was said (p. 527):
"When the jurisdiction of the court is exercised according to the rules of international law, as in the cáse where the parties have their domicil within its foruiii, its decree dissolving their marriage, ought to be respected by the tribunals of every civilized country. . . . On the other hand, a decree of divorce a vinculo, pronounced by a court whose jurisdiction is solely derived from some rule of municipal law peculiar to its forum, cannot, when it trenches upon -the interests of any * other country to . whose tribunals the spouses were amenable, claim extraterritorial -authority."
IV. The contention that if the power of one State to decree a dissolution of a marriage which would be compulsory upon the oth,er States be limited to cases where both parties are subject to the jurisdiction, the right to obtain a divorce could be so hampered and restricted as to be in effect impossible of exercise, is but to insist that in .order to favor the dissolu- • tion of marriage and to cause its permanency to - depend upon the mere caprice or wrong of the parties, there should nbt be applied to the right to obtain a divorce those fundamental principles which safeguard the exercise of the simplest-, rights. In other words, the argument but reproduces the fallacy already exposed, which is, that one State must -be endowed with the attribute of' destroying the authority , of all the others concerning the dissolution of marriage in order to render sueh dissolution-easy of procurement. But even if the true and controlling principles be for a moment put aside and mere considerations of inconvenience be looked at, it would follow that the preponderance of inconvenience would be against the contention that a State should have the power to exert its authority concerning the dissolution of marriage as to those not amenable to its jurisdiction. By the -application of '-that rule each State is given the power of overshadowing the authority of all the other States, thus causing the marriage tie to be, less protected than any other civil obligation, and' this' to be accomplished by destroying individual' rights without a hearing and by tribunals having no jurisdiction. Further, the admission that jurisdiction in the courts of one State over one party, alone was thé test of the right to dissolve the marriage tie as to the-other party although domiciled in another State, would at once render such test impossible of general application. 'In other words, the test, if admitted, would destroy itself. This follows, since if that test were the rule, each party to the marriage in one State would, have a right -to •acquire a domicil in a different State and there institute proceedings for divorce. It would hence necessarily arise that domicil would be no longer the determinative criterion, but the mere ra'ce of diligence between the.parties in seeking differ ent forums in other States or the celerity by which in such States judgments of divorce might be procured would have to be considgred in' order to decide which forum was controlling.
On the other hand, the denial of the power to enforce in another State a decree of divorce rendered against a person who was not subject to the jurisdiction of the State in which the decree was rendered obviates all the contradictions and inconvéniences which are above indicated. It leaves uncurtailed the legitimate power of all the States over a subject peculiarly within their authority,' and thus not only enables them to maintain their public policy but also to protect the individual rights of their citizens. It does not deprive a State of the power to render a decree of divorce susceptible of being enforced within its borders as to the person- within the jurisdiction and does not debar other States from giving such effect to a judgment of that character as they may elect to do under mere principles of state comity. It causes the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to operate upon decrees of divorce in the respective States just as that clause operates upon other rights, that is; it compels all the States to recognize and enforce a judgment of divorce rendered in other States where both parties were subject to the jurisdiction of the State in which the decree was rendered, and it enables the States rendering such decrees to take into view for the purpose of the exercise of their authority the existence of a matrimonial domicil from which the presence of a party not physically present within the borders-of a State may .be constructively found to exist.
Having thus 'disposed of the reasoning .advanced to sustain the assertion that the courts of the .State of New York were bound by the full faith and credit clause to give full effect to the Connecticut decree, we are brought to consider the authorities relied upon to support that proposition.
Whilst the continental and English authorities are not alluded to in the argument, it. may be well, in the most summary way, to refer to them as a means of illustrating the question for consideration. The extent of the power which independent sovereignties exérciséd oyer the dissolution of- the marriage tie, als to their own citizens,- gave rise, in the nature of things, to controversies concerning the extraterritorial effect to be given to a dissolution of such tie when made'between citizens of one country by judicial tribunals of another country in- which such citizens had become domiciled. We do not deem it essential, however, to consider the conflicting theories and divergent rules of -public policy which were thus engendered. We are relieved- of the necessity of entering upon such an inquiry, since it cannot be doubted that neither the practice nor the theories controlling in the countries on the continent lend' the slightest sanction to the contention that a government, simply because one of the parties to a marriage was •domiciled within its borders, where no matrimonial domicil ever existed, had power to render a decree dissolving a marriage which on principles' of international law was entitled to obligatory extraterritorial effect as to the other party to. the marriage, a citizen of another country. Wharton, Conf. Laws, 3d ed., v. 1, p. 441, sec. 209 and notes.
It cannot be doubted, also, that the courts of England decline to treat a foreign decree of divorce as having obligatory extraterritorial force when both parties to the marriage were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the decree. Shaw v. Gould, L. R. 3 H. L. 55; Harvey v. Farnie, 8 App. Cas. 43. And, although it has been suggested in opinions of English judges treating of divorce questions that exceptional cases might arise which perhaps would justify a relaxation of the rigor of the presumption that the domicil of the husband was the domicil of the wife, per Lords Eldon and Redesdale, in Tovey v. Lindsay, 1 Dow, 133, 140; per Lord Westbury, in Pitt v. Pitt, 4 Macq. 627, 640; per Brett, L. J. in Niboyet v. Niboyet, 4 P. D. 1, 14; Briggs v. Briggs, 5 P. D. 163, 165; and per James and Cotton, L. JJ., in Harvey v. Farnie, 6 P. D. 47, 49, the courts of England,' in cases where the jurisdiction was dependent upon domicil, have enforced the presumption and treated the wife as being within the jurisdiction where the husband was legally domicled. But this conception was not a departure from the principle uniformly maintained, that, internationally considered, jurisdiction over both parties to a marriage was essential to the exercise of power to decree a divorce, but was simply a means of determining by a legal presumption whether both parties were within the jurisdiction. Of course the rigor of the English rule as to the domicil of the husband being the domicil of the wife-is not controlling in this court, in view of the decisions to which we have previously referred, recognizing the right of the wife, for the fault of the husband, to acquire a separate domicil. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
And even in Scotland, where residence, as distinguished from domicil, was deemed to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction ^o grant-divorces, it was invariably recognized that the presence within the jurisdiction of both, parties to the marriage was essential to authorize a decree in favor of -the complainant. Wharton, Conf. Laws, sec. 215, v. 1, p. 447; per Lord Westbury, in Shaw v. Gould, L. R. 3 H. L. 88.
As respects the decisions of this court. We at once treat as inapposite, and therefore unnecessary to be here .specially reviewed, those holding, a, that where the domicil of a plaintiff in a divorce cause is in the State where the suit-was brought, and the defendant appears and defends; ás both parties are before the court, there is power to render a decree of divorce which will be entitled in-other States to recognition under the full faith and credit clause (Cheever v. Wilson, supra)', b, that, as distinguished from legal domicil, mere residence within a particular State of the plaintiff in a divorce cause brought in • a court of such State is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon such court to dissolve the marriage relation existing between the plaintiff and a non-resident defendant. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175. This brings us to again consider a case heretofore referred to, principally relied upon as sustaining the contention that the' domicil of one party alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a,judicial tribunal to render a decree of divorce having extraterritorial effect, viz., Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155. The decision in that case, however, as we have previously said, was expressly placed upon the ground of matrimonial domicil. This is apparent from the following passage, which we excerpt from the opinion, at page 171:
"This case'does not involve the validity of a divorce granted, on constructive service, by the court of a State in whiqh only one of the parties ever had'a domicil; nor the question' to what extent the good faith of the domicil may be afterwards inquired into. In this ease the divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the State which had always been the undoubted domicil of the' husband, and which was the only matrimonial domicil of the husband and wife. • The single- question to be decided is the validity of that divorce, granted after such notice, had been given as was required by the statutes of Kentucky."
The contention, therefore, that the reasoning of the opinion demonstrates that the domicil of one of the parties alone was contemplated as being sufficient to found jurisdiction, but insists that the case, decided a proposition which was excluded in unmistakable language. But, moreover, it is clear, when the facts which were involved in the Atherton case are taken into view, that the case could not have been decided merely upon the ground of the domicil of one of the parties, because that consideration'alone would have afforded no solution of the problem which the case presented. The salient facts were these: The husband lived in Kentucky, married a citizen of New York, and the married couple took up their domicil at the home of the husband.in Kentucky, where they continued to reside and where children were born to them. The wife left the matrimonial domicil and went to New York. The husband sued her in Kentucky for a divorce. Before the Kentucky suit merged into a decree the .wife,' having a residence in New York sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, tó constitute a domicil in that State, sued the husband in the courts of New York for a limited divorce. Thus the two suits, one by the husband against the wife and the other by the wife against the husband, were pending in the respective States at the same timé. The husband obtained a decree -in the Kentucky suit before the suit of the wife had been determined and pleaded such decree in the suit brought by the wife in New York. The New York court, however, refused to recognize the Kentucky decree and the case came here, and this court decided that the courts of New York were bound to give effect to the Kentucky decree by virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Under these conditions it is clear that the case could not have been disposed of on the mere ground of the individual domicil of the parties^ since upon that hypothesis, even if the efficacy of the individual domicil had been admitted, no solution would have been thereby afforded of the .problem which would have arisen for decision, that problem being which of the two courts wherein the conflicting proceedings were pending had the paramount right to enter a binding decree. Having disposed of the case upon the principle of matrimony domicil, it cannot in reason be conceived that the court intended to express an opinion upon the soundness of the theory of individual and separate domicil which, isolatedly considered, was inadequate to dispose of, and was, therefore, irrelevant .to, the question for decision.
It is contended that an overwhelming preponderance of the decisions of state courts enforce the doctrine that it is the duty of the States, by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, to give within their borders the full effect required by that clause to decrees of divorce rendered in other States, where there was jurisdiction alone by virtue of the domicil of one of the parties. Whilst we may not avoid the duty of interpreting for ourselves the Constitution of the United States, 'in view of the persuasive force that would result if an overwhelming line of state decisions held the asserted doctrine, we come to consider that subject. To examine in detail the many decisions of state courts of last resort, most of which are referred to in the margin, would expand this opinion to undue length. To avoid so doing, if possible, we propose to more particularly direct our attention to the cases in state courts which are specially relied on. In doing so we shall add cases in several of the States not particularly counted on in the argument. We shall do this for the purpose of evolving, if possible, from the state cases thus to be referred to, some classification typical of all' the state decisions, hence enabling all the cases to Which we do not specially refer to be brought within the appropriate class tó which they pertain, without the necessity of reviewing them ip detail. We shall noi.confine ourselves to the particular state decisions relied on, but shall consider such decisions in the light of the general rule obtaining in the particular State.
The eases specially relied on are Thompson v. State, 28 Alabama, 12; Harding v. Alden, 9 Maine, 140; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Burlen v. Shannon, 115 Massachusetts, 438; and Felt v. Felt, 59 N. J. Eq. 606, to which we shall add for the purposés above stated cases on the same subject decided in New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana and Missouri.
New York. — It is not questioned that the courts of New York are vested by statute with authority to render decrees of divorce where the plaintiff is domiciled within the State, which shall be operative in that State, even although the defendant is a non-resident and is proceeded against by con- « structive service.
Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, and Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407, were decided, respectively, in the years 1818 and 1835. These cases, as declared by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 82, upheld the principle that a. court of another State could not dissolve the matrimonial relation of a citizen of New York, domiciled in New York, uhless he was actually served with notice within the other State or voluntarily appeared in the cause. The doctrine that an action of divorce is one inter partes was tljus clearly reiterated by Andrews, J., in Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 424:
"The- contract of marriage cannot be annulled by judicial sanction any more than any other contract inter partes, without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The marriage relation is not a res- within the State of the party invoking the jurisdiction of.a court to dissolve it, so as.to authorize the court to bind the absent party, a citizen of another jurisdiction, by substituted service or actual notice of the proceeding given without the jurisdiction of the court where the proceeding is pending."
That the principle referred to is still enforced by the New York court is shown by recent cases, viz., Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N. Y. 405; Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553, and the case at bar. And it is indubitable that under this doctrine the courts of New York have invariably refused, as they have done in the case at bar, to treat a divorce rendered in another State, under the circumstances stated, as entitled to be enforced in New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States; and, indeed, have refused generally to give effect to such decrees even by state comity.
Massachusetts. — Barber v. Root, 10 Massachusetts, 260; Hanover v. Turner, 14 Massachusetts, 227, and Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181, were decided, respectively, in 1813, 1817 and 1833. In 1835 the legislature of Massachusetts, incorporated into the statutes of that State, following a section forbidding the recognition of divorces obtained in another jurisdiction in fraud of the laws of Massachusetts, a provision reading as follows: "In all other cases, a divorce decreed in another State or country, according to the law of the place, by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both of the parties, shall be valid and effectual in this State.", And "it may be observed that this section, when submitted. to the legislature by the commissioners for revising the Massachusetts statutes, was. accompanied by the following comment (Rept. Comrs., pt. II, p. 123): "This is founded on the rule established by the comity of all civilized nations; and is proposed merely that no doubt should arise on a question so interesting and important as this may sometimes be."
In Lyon v. Lyon (1854), 2 Gray, 367, the question was as to the validity in Massachusetts of a divorce decreed in Rhode Island in favor of one party to a marriage-against the other who • yras domiciled in Massachusetts. The court refused to give extraterritorial effect to the Rhode Island decree. In the opinion by Chief Justice Shaw it was declared that the three cases which we have previously referred to sustained the doctrine, based upon general principles of law, that a decree of.divorce rendered in another State without jurisdiction of both of the parties possessed no extraterritorial force.
In Hood v. Hood (1865), 11 Allen, 196, the controversy was this: The parties were married in Massachusetts and, after a. residence in that State, moved together to Illinois. The wife left the domicil of the husband in Illinois and returned to Massachusetts. Thereafter, in Illinois, the husband sued the wife for a divorce on the ground of her desertion, obtained a decree, and married again. The case decided in Massachusetts was a suit brought in that State by the former wife against the former husband for divorce on the ground of adultery alleged to have been committed by him with the person whom he had married after the decree of divorce in Illinois had been, rendered. The Illinois decree was pleaded in bar. The question whether the Illinois decree should be given extraterritorial effect in Massachusetts, depended, under the .rule announced in the previous cases, upon whether both the husband and wife were parties to the Illinois decree. For the purpose of the determination of this jurisdictional question it was held that it'was necessary to ascertain whether the wife was justified, by the fault of the husband, in leaving him in Illinois and going back to Massachusetts. It was decided that if she was justified in leaving the husband, her legal domicil 'was in-Massachusetts, and she was not a party to.the Illinois decree, and that if she was not justified in living separate from the husband, the ordinary rule being that the domicil of the husband was the domicil of the wife, she was domiciled in Illinois, and must be considered as subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois court. Applying this legal principle to the facts in the case before it, the court held that as there was no evidence showing that the wife had justifiable cause for leaving her 'husband, the legal presumption that the domicil of the husband was the domicil of the wife prevailed, and that the Illinois decree .was entitled to extraterritorial effect in Massachusetts, and bound the wife, because rendered by a court having jurisdiction over both parties.
In Shaw v. Shaw (1867), 98 Massachusetts, 158, the facts were these: The parties were married in Massachusetts, lived there.and left together for the purpose of settling in Colorado. On the journey, at Philadelphia, the wife was forced by the extreme cruelty of the husband to leave him. She returned to Massachusetts, while he went on to Colorado. Subsequently the wife sued in Massachusetts for a divorce from bed and board. The husband was brought in by substituted service . and defaulted. The court, in the most explicit terms, recog'nized that a decree of divorce to have extraterritorial effect must be rendered with jurisdiction over both parties. It said (p. 159): "For the purposes of divorce the general rule of jurisprudence is that, a divorce granted in the place of the domicil of both parties,, and there .valid, is good everywhere." The court came then to consider whether it could render a •deciee in Massachusetts in favor of the wife. This depended upon a statute of Massachusetts, which authorized the granting of a divorce where the cause for divorce occurred while the parties had lived together as husband and wife in Massachusetts, and where one of them lived in that State when the cause for diVorce occurred. It iyas held that as at the time of the commission of the cruelty in Philadelphia charged against the husband the domicil of the parties in Massachusetts had not been lost, and as by that cruelty the wife was justified in re- . turning to.' Massachusetts, and the subsequent acquisition of a new domicil .by the husband in Colorado did not make such domicil that of the wife, there waá jurisdiction, and the divorce was granted.
Hood v. Hood (1872), 110 Massachusetts, 463, was an attempt again to assail the validity of the Illinois decree of divorce which had been adjudged valid in 11 Allen, 196, because, it was found that both the husband and wife had been parties to the decree. The Massachusetts decree so holding was therefore held to be res judicata as to all , persons and to foreclose, further inquiry into the validity of the Illinois decree of divorce.
In Burlen v. Shannon (1874), 115 Massachusetts, 438, the fapts leading up to the controversy and those involved therein were as follows: Shannon, and his wife lived together in Massa chusetts, where she left him. Without stopping to refer to prior legal controversies which arose between Shannon and his wife and between Shannon and Mrs. Burlen, which are irrelevant to be considered, it suffices to say that Mrs. Burlen sued Shannon in 1850 to hold him liable for necessary supplies furnished to the wife. Shannon resisted on the ground-that the wife had been living apart from him without his fault or consent, and this defense was maintained. (3 Gray, 387.) Shannon went to Indiana in 1855 and took up his domicil in that State, where,-in 1856, he obtained a decree of divorce, upon constructive service. Subsequently, in Massachusetts, Mrs. Burlen again sued Shannon for necessaries furnished to the wife between February 22, 1860, and February 7, 1866. He pleaded the Indiana divorce, and the validity of the divorce was assailed by Mrs. Burlen on- the ground that the wife had not been a party to the divorce cause, and therefore the Indiana decree had not extraterritorial effect in Massachusetts. The court, in effect, after reiterating the previous rulings and referring to the statute' concerning the necessity for the presence of both parties within the jurisdiction where a decree for divorce of another State was sought to be given effect in Massachusetts, also reiterated the previous ruling that the wife might acquire a separate domicil from the husband if she lived separate from him for justifiable cause, The court was brought, therefore, to consider whether Mr. and Mrs. Shannon were both parties to the Indiana decree on the ground that the domicil of the husband was the domicil of the wife. The solution of this question depended, as it had depended in Hood v. Hood, 11 Allen, 196, upon whether the wife was absent from the husband because of his fault. 'On this subject it was, decided that the previous'judgment in favor of Shannon and against Mrs. Burlen in the' prior action between the parties had conclusively determined between them that Mrs. Shannon was absent from her husband .without his fault or consent, and, therefore, under the legal presumption that the domicil of the husband was the domicil of the wife, both the husband and wife were parties to the Indiana decree and it was not subject to attack in Massachusetts. To cite, as has sometimes' been done, the language of the opinion of the court referring to the previous judgment in the earlier action between Mrs. Burlen and Shannon as if that language referred to the Indiana decree of' divorce, leading to the implication that that decree was held to be conclusive, even if only one of the parties was domiciled in the State' where the decree was rendered, not only is a plain misconception, but is equivalent to asserting that the Massachusetts court had overruled its previous decisions and disregarded the spirit, if not the letter, of the state statute without the slightest intimation - to that effect.
In Cummington v. Belcher town, 149 Massachusetts, 223, the facts were these: The parties to a marriage, celebrated in Massachusetts, lived together in that State until the wife was taken to a Massachusetts asylum for the insane, when .the husband abandoned her, ¿cquired a domicil in New York, there brought suit on the ground of fraud for the annulment of the marriage, and obtained a decree. The wife was only constructively served with process, did not appear, and was not represented. The Massachusetts court held, upon the authority of the Blackingtón case (141 Massachusetts, 432), to which we have already referred, that if the decree was to be recognized in Massachusetts, it could only be on grounds of comity. And in concluding its opinion the court said:
"Upon the ground, then, that the decree of the New York court attempts to annul a marriage in Massachusetts between Massachusetts citizens, and thus affect the legal status of the woman, .who has remained domiciled in Massachusetts, and has never been within the jurisdiction of the New York court, and deprive her of the rights acquired by her marriage, and especially because 'it declares the marriage void for a reason on account of -which by the Massachusetts law it cannot,be avoided, we are of opinion that it should not be enforced here, and that no principle of interstate comity requires that we should give it effect."
True it is the court reserved the question as to what effect might be given to a divorce if granted by a New York court under circumstances such as existed in that case. But, as a suit for a declaration of mlllity. and one for divorce are both but modes for determining judicially the status of the parties, it must in reason follow if jurisdiction over both is a prerequisite in the one class, it is of necessity also essential in the other.
Maine. — In Harding v. Alden (1832), 9 Maine, 140, the facts' Were these: While living together in Maine a husband deserted his wife. He went to North.Carolina, where he pretended to marry, and lived there with another woman: In the meantime the wife whom he had deserted took up her residence in Rhode Island, where she sued, for a divorce on the ground of the adultery committed by the husband in North Carolina. The-husband, who was notified in North Carolina, did not appear in the Rhode Island divorce cause. A decree of divorce was granted and the wife then remarried. The first husband, during the coverture, owned and alienated real estate in Maine, and a statute of that State provided that where a divorce was decreed for adultery by the husband, dower might be assigned to the divorced wife in the same manner as if the husband were dead. The divorced wife brought an. .action of dower in a court in Maine. The Rhode Island decree was held to 'possess validity in Maibe and the statute relating to dower was decided not to be limited to divorces decreed within the State of Maine. Considering the opinion in its entirety, it is plain that the Rhode Island divorce was given recognition from considerations of right and justice and upon the. ground-of state comity. Thus, the-court called attention to the fact that adultery was a cause- for divorce in both States and that divorces were granted in Maine '.against non-residents; and, it was observed, that "there would be great inconvenience in holding" that divorces ought'not to be recognized in other States when granted in the State where the injured party resided against one who had established his domicil in another State and there committed adultery.
True it is in the course of the opinion reasoning was em-, ployed tending to show that the Rhode Island court might be considered to have had jurisdiction in the complete sense and it was intimated that the full faith and credit clause might have application, but the operation of the Rhode Island decree in Maine was by the decree of the Maine court'expressly limited to the dissolution of the marriage (p. 151). How far removed this was from giving to the Rhode Island decree the benefit of the full faith and credit clause will, we think, be made clear by what follows.
Harding v. Alden was decided at the July term, 1832. Less than two years afterward, on March 5, 1834, Public Laws, 1834, c. 116, p. 119, the statute of Maine regulating divorces was supplemented by various provisions, one such being the following: "Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That in. all cases where one party has' been or shall be divorced from the bonds of matrimony, the court granting the same may, upon application therefor, grant to the other party a like divorce, on such terms and conditions as the said court in the exercise of a sound discretion may judge reasonable."^ This' provision was carried into the- Revised Statutes of 1840, c. 89,, sec. 2, and. although repealed in 1850, in .a general revision of the divorce laws, it was held that the legislature did not intend to deprive' the courts of Maine of the power, to entertain a suit for divorce brought by a person from whom the other party to- a marriage had already been divorced, and that the courts of Maine still possessed power to exercise jurisdiction over such suits. Stilphen v. Stilphen, 58 Maine, 508. In the cited case, although a.husband had already obtained an absolute divorce, a like divorce was granted to the wife, and the court allowed to her certain articles of personal property and the sum of $500. In overruling exceptions to the decree the appellate court adopted the theory that the second decree in no wise impugned, the first, and was important only ás enabling " the court to make. such .ancillary decrees concerning the property as justice and humanity may require " (p. 517). In the course of the opinion the court said (p. 516):
"There is no class of cases in which the court is so liable to be imposed upon, and a decision obtained contrary to the truth, as ex parte divorce suits. The notice is often imperfect, so that the confession of guilt implied in the default is deceptive. And it is well known that witnesses, testifying in the presence of one of the parties, and in the absence of the other, will so alter and magnify the faults of the absent, and suppress everything that makes against the party present, that it is impossible to tell where the truth and real merits of the controversy are. When both parties are present, each is sure to put the other in the wrong; and a fortiori is this true, when one of the-parties is permitted to testify in the absence of the other, as is now the case in divorce suits. We repeat, therefore, that there- is no class of cases in which the court is so liable to be imposed upon; and it seems to us of the utmost importance that the court should be possessed of the power in some form to revise their decisions in this class of cases; otherwise, the grossest injustice is liable to be done."
In the light of this decision it cannot be assumed that the courts of Maine would give to a citizen , of that State against whom a divorce had been obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, upon constructive service, a less'degree of relief than they afford as to a'decree rendered in Maine, both parties being present and bound by the decree.
Rhode Island. — Ditson v. Ditson (1856), 4 R. I. 87, was a suit for divorce on the grounds of desertion, extreme cruelty, . and non-support, brought by a wife domiciled in Rhode Island against the husband, who had never resided in Rhode Island, and whose whereabouts was , unknown. The question was whether the Rhode Island court ought to exercise jurisdiction. The opinion was mainly devoted to refuting the reasoning .employed by Chief Justice Shaw in his opinion in the case of Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray, 367, in which case, as we have previously shown, the Massachusetts court refused to give effect to a Rhode Island decree of divorce where both parties were not within the jurisdiction. The Rhode Island court (in the Ditson case) in effect declared that it would not exercise jurisdiction to grant a divorce if it considered that a decree rendered by it would not be entitled to extraterritorial effect because of a lack of actual jurisdiction over the defendant. The court, however, proceeded to reason that a suit for divorce was in effect a proceeding in rem, and that , jurisdiction over one of the parties to a suit for the dissolution of the marriage, tie drew to the court jurisdiction of the other party, and' thereby gave full and complete jurisdiction over the status of both parties, and upon that hypothesis decided that it would exercise jurisdiction, and that its decree dissolving the marriage would bé' entitled to the benefit of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and have binding efficacy in every other State.
New Jersey. — Whilst the courts of New Jersey have exercised the power to grant a divorce from a non-resident defendant- upon constructive service, those courts have from the beginning applied to, similar decrees of divorce granted in other States, when sought to be enforced in New Jersey against citizens of that State, a rule like' the one prevailing in New York, that is, they decline to enforce them even upon the principles of comity; Doughty v. Doughty, 28 N. J. Eq. 581, 586; Flower v. Flower, 42 N. J. Eq. 152. Recently, however, it has been decided, Felt v. Felt, 59 N. J. Eq. 606, that where a decree of divorce was rendered in another State, and the complainant alone was' subject to the jurisdiction of the court, but it was shown that the defendant had been personally served outside of the jurisdiction with notice of the pendency of the divorce proceeding and was afforded reasonable opportunity to make defense and did not avail of the oppdrtunity, effect would be given to such decree in New Jersey, upon principles of comity, provided that the ground upon which the decree rested was one which the public policy of New Jersey recognized as a sufficient cause for divorce. In Wallace v. Wallace, 62 N. J. Eq. 509, the subject is quite fully reviewed.
Ohio. — In Cooper v. Cooper (1836), 7 Ohio, 594, without citation of authority, a divorce granted in Indiana,- from a resident of Ohio, upon constructive service, was held to bar an application for divorce and alimony in Ohio. In Mansfield v. McIntyre (1840), 10 Ohio, 27, despite a divorce obtained in Kentucky, by a husband, upon constructive service, the divorced wife was regarded in Ohio as the widow of her-former husband after his decease, and as such widow entitled to dower.
In Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, decided at the December term, 1869, the facts were these: The husband deserted the wife in Ohio, went to Indiana and there obtained a divorce,' upon constructive service. .The wife remained in Ohio, and three, years after the granting of the Indiana divorce to the husband she sued him for divorce and for alimony, alleging abandonment and gross neglect of duty. The trial court granted a divorce and alimony. The husband appealed, but as such an appeal, under the statutes of Ohio, did no.t affect the decree as to the divorce, the District Court considered only the question of alimony and rendered a new decree for alimony against the defendant. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court of the State. In that court attention was called to the fact that under the statutes of Ohio and the-decisions of its courts jurisdiction might be exercised over nonresidents in divorce cases, and reference was made to various authorities as tending to show that public policy required the recognition of the validity of , such decrees in other States as-to the dissolution of the marriage. After stating the facts, and observing that the wife was entitled under the laws .of Ohio to either divorce or alimony, or both, at her election, and alluding to the Indiana decree, the court said (p. 512):
"The question, therefore, is, whether The ex parte decree can be made available, not merely to effect a dissolution of the marriage, but to defeat the right of the petitioner to the ali mony which the statute, upon the facts as they exist in regard to the husband's desertion, intended to provide for her.
"We think the decree ought not to have such effect.
"In arriving at this conclusion we make no distinction between a decree rendered, under the circumstances of this case, in a foreign, and one rendered in a domestic forum.
"In either case, to give to a decree thus obtained the effect claimed for it, would be to allow it to work a fraud upon the pecuniary rights of the wife. Such a result, in our opinion, is rendered necessary by no principle of comity or public policy —the only grounds upon which ex parte decrees of divorce are authorized and supported.
"It is not essential to the allowance of alimony that the marriage relation should subsist up to the time it is allowed. On appeal, alimony may be decreed by the District' Court, notwithstanding the subsisting divorce pronounced by the Court of Common Pleas. It is true'that the statute speaks of the allowance as being made to the wife. But the term' 'wife' may be regarded as used to designate the person, and not the* actual existing, relation; or the petitioner may still be regarded as holding the relation of wife for the purpose of enforcing her claim to alimony."
The following cases were cited by the court as- sustaining the right of the wife to maintain an independent proceeding for alimony, even after the husband had obtained a divorce: Richardson v. Wilson, 8 Yerger, 67; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463, and Shotwell v. Shotwell, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. R. 51.
In Doerr v. Forsythe (1893); 50 Ohio St. 726, an Indiana divorce granted to a husband, upon constructive service, was held not to bar the right of the wife to dower in lands in Ohio owned during coverture by the- husband.
Alabama. — In Thompson v. State (1856), 28 Alabama, 12, the facts were these: Thompson deserted his family in Mississippi, went to Arkansas,and .there obtained a.divorce upon, constructive service. The wife returned to her father's home in Alabama, and, after the divorce, the husband also went to Alabama, where he again married. He was prosecuted for and convicted of bigamy. The eonviction was set side, however, upon the ground that the guilt or innocence of the accused depended upon the question as to whether he had a bonajide domicil in Arkansas during the pendency of-the proceedings for divorce. Harding v. Alden, 9 Maine, 140, was' cited as authority.
. In a subsequent case, however, Turner v. Turner (1870), 44 Alabama, 437, the Supreme Court of Alabama strictly limited, as against a citizen of Alabama, the effect of a divorce rendered in another State upon constructive service. The parties were married in Alabama,, where the husband deserted the wife, and located .in Indiana, where he obtained a divorce upon constructive service. ' The wife remained in Alabama, and, after the granting of the divorce to -the husband, she sued him in Alabama for a divorce and alimony. The husband pleaded the. Indiana decree in bar. The trial court, however, - held that the wife was- entitled to maintain her suit and entered a decree for divorce and alimony. • In affirming the decree the Supreme Court of Alabama, upon, the authority of Thompson v. State, supra, said that the decree of divorce obtained by, the husband in.' Indiana might protect him against prosecution for bigamy should he marry again in Alabama, Referring to that decree it further said' (p. 450):
"But without stopping to inquire whether it was-obtained by him by fraúd, and therefore is vicious on that. account or not, it certainly cannot affect the rights .of the complainant, except her right in the husband as husband. If it is valid, it unmarries him.and sets him free from his marital-voWs to her. He is no longer the • complainant's husband. But it does not settle her right to alimony; it does not settle her right to dower in his .lands, and her statutory right to distribution, of his property in this State, in-.the event she should survive him, nor any other interest of a pecuniary character she may •have against him. . . . . It is the duty of the State to protect its own citizens, within its own borders. This is the natural compensation for allegiance. This high duty extends to all the pecuniary rights of the citizens, as well as to the rights of security of person; . No obligation of comity is paramount to this duty. Without a constant and effective exertion of it, citizenship would become a farce. . . . The wife is as much the citizen of the State as the husband, and is entitled to the protection of its laws to the same extent, so long as she remains within its jurisdiction. It would be a scandal to justice to imperil her, and sacrifice her most important and cherished rights upon a mere technicality; a technicality that often contradicts the truth.' When her protection requires it, it would be cruelly unjust for the State, of -her actual residence and domicil, to repudiate its own right of jurisdiction to give her aid. I therefore think that, the better opinion is, that she has the right to file her - bill here, and to all the relief that the court could give her, notwithstanding her husband might not be domiciled in this State at the commencement and during the whole pendency of her litigation with,him. . . .
"Then; if the state courts have competent jurisdiction in such a case, as undoubtedly they have, they may go On and exercise that jurisdiction in the manner and to the extent prescribed by their own .laws. •
" Under the laws of this State,. by the contract and consummation of á marriage, the wife, if she has ¿o' separate estate, becomes entitled to dower in the husband's lands, and a certain distributive interest in his personal estate, if she survives him, and to temporary and permanent alimony out of his estate upon a separation by divorce in her favor. These are rights 'that she cannot legally be deprived of without her consent'or her fault. . . . If'this were not so, then these 'important statutory provisions in favor of the wife would be repealed or rendered null by a foreign divorce, of which she had no notice and no knowledge, during its whole progress through the forms of a foreign' court. To sue in her own domicil is necessary for the protection 'of the wife. It, therefore, overrides the technical rule that the husband's domicil is also the domicil of the wife; . . . Here the testimony shows that the wife has no separate estate. . The witnesses for the defendants say when she was married she ' brought nothing with her.' It also appears that during her connection with the defendant Matthew'Turner, as his wife, she was a-chaste, industrious, economical, faithful, useful and obedient wife; and that the husband's property is very considerable; worth possibly not less than one hundred thousand .dollars. It is also shown that his three children by a former marriage are already sufficiently provided for.
"Under such a state of facts the sum of thirty thousand dollars was not an unreasonable sum for permanent alimony, to be allowed to the wife, nor the sum of eight hundred dollars too large for temporary alimony. . . ."
Indiana. — In Tolen v. Tolen (1831), 2 Blackf. 407, the facts .were these: Á wife, on being deserted, in Kentucky, removed to and became domiciled in Indiana, and after a residence there of five years sued for a divorce from the non-resident husband. In an opinion of great length the court considered .the question of its power to grant a divorce which would be valid in Indiana, and decided it had such power, but expressly íeserved passing on the question whether the decree would have extraterritorial force.
In Hood v. State (1877), 56 Indiana, 263, 271, it was declared that as an ex parte divorce in favor of one domiciled within the jurisdiction of a State, and against a non-resident, although founded upon constructive service, was valid as to the plaintiff, "public policy demands that it should be held valid as to both parties."
In Hilbish v. Hattle (1896), 145 Indiana, 59, certain sections of the Indiana Revised Statutes, wherein it was provided that the divorce of one party to a marriage should dissolve the contract as to both, and that a divorce decreed in another State by a Qourt having jurisdiction óf the cause should have full effect in Indiana, were held to'be applicable to a decree of divorce granted in another State, in favor of a husband, upon-constructive service, and the same effect was given to the decree, as to the rights of the wife in the property of the husband .in Indiana, as if the divorce had been rendered in Indiana.
Missouri. — In Gould v. Crow, 57 Missouri, 200, a decree of divorce regularly obtained by a husband in Indiana, on an order of publication, without personal service, was held to operate as a divorce in favor of the husband.in Missouri, so as to prevent the wife from claiming her dower in lands .in Missouri owned by the husband. Harding v. Alden, 9 Maine, 140, was relied upon as authority. A statute of Missouri, barring the claim of a wife for dower after divorce granted by reason of her fa,ult, was held to apply to all divorces, whether obtained in Missouri or in other States, and whether obtained on personal service or by order of publication.- The doctrine of Gould v. Crow was reaffirmed and -applied in Anthony v. Rice, 110 Missouri, 223.
Wisconsin. — In Shafer v. Bushnell (1869), 24 Wisconsin, 372, an ex parte divorce granted a wife in Minnesota upon constructive service of the defendant, a citizen, of Minnesota, was -held upon the grounds of comity to be conclusive in Wisconsin in respect to The .status or domestic and social -condition of the wife. The decree was held to bar an action for criminal-intercourse against the person whom the complainant in the divorce suit married after the granting of the diyorce.
In Cook v. Cook (1882), 56. Wisconsin, 195, however, in an .elaborate opinion, an ex parte divorce obtained in Michigan upon constructive service merely, by a husband who had de-' serted his wife in Wisconsin, was held not to affect the status of the-wife in Wisconsin nor'to bar her from suing in Wiscon-' sin for divorce,'alimony, allowance and a division of the property of such husband situated within Wisconsin. .
Deducing the law of the several States from the rulings of their courts of last resort which we have just reviewed and . ignoring mére minor differences, the law of such States is embraced within one or the other of the' following headings:
a. States where the power to decree a divorce is recognized, based upon the mere domicil of the plaintiff, although 'the decree when rendered will be but operative within the borders of the State, wholly irrespective of any force which may be given such decree in other States. Under this heading all of the States are embraced with the possible exception of Rhode Island.
b. States which decline, even upon principles of comity, to recognize and enforce as to their own citizens, within their own borders, decrees of divorce rendered in other States, when the court rendering the same had jurisdiction over only one of the parties. Under this heading is embraced Massachusetts, New Jersey (with the qualification made by the decision in 59 N. J. Eq. 606) and New York.
c. States which, whilst giving some effect to decrees of divorce rendered against its citizens, in other States where the court had jurisdiction of the plaintiff alone, either place the effect given to such decrees upon the principle of state comity alone, or make such hmitations upon the effect given to such decree as indubitably establishes that the recognition given is a result merely of state comity. As the greater includes the less, this class of course embraces the cases under the previous heading. It also includes the States of Alabama, Maine, Ohio and Wisconsin.
. d. Cases which, although not actually so deciding, yet lend themselves to the view that ex parte decrees of divorce rendered in other States would receive recognition by virtue of the due faith and credit clause. And this class embraces Missouri and Rhode Island.
Coming to consider, for the purpose of classification, the decided cases in other States than those previously reviewed, which have been called to our attention, the law of such States may be said to come under one or the other of the foregoing headings, as follows:
' Proposition a embraces the law of all the States, since in the decision of no State is there an intimation expressing the ex- eeption found in the Rhode Island case' which caused us to exclude that State from this classification.
Under proposition b comes the law of the States of Pennsylvania, Vermont and South Carolina. A line of decisions of the State of North Carolina would also cause us to embrace the law of that State within this classification, but for a doubt engendered in our minds as to the effect of the law of North Carolina on the subject, resulting from suggestions made by the North Carolina court in the opinion in the Bidwell case, 52 S. E. Rep. 55.
Proposition c embraces the law of Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and New Hampshire. And it is pertinent here to remark that in Michigan, 3 Comp. Laws Michigan (1897), par. 8621, c. 232, sec. 6, the obtaining of a divorce in another State from a citizen of Michigan is made cause for the granting Of a divorce in Michigan to its citizens. .A like provision is also in the statutes of Florida. Rev. Stat. Florida (1902),'sec. 1480.
Under proposition d we embrace the remaining States, although as to several the classification may admit of doubt, viz., California, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky and Tennessee.
It indubitably, therefore, follows from- the special review we have made of cases in certain States, and the classification just made of the remaining state cases which were called to our attention and which we have previously cited in the margin, that the contention is without foundation, that such cases establish by an overwhelming preponderance that, by the law of the several States, decrees of divorce obtained in a State with, jurisdiction alone of the plaintiff are, in virtue of the full faith and-credit clause of the Constitution, entitled-to be enforced in another State as against citizens of such State. Indeed the analysis and classification which we' have made serves conclusively to demonstrate that the limited recognition which is given in most of the States to such ex parte decrees of divorce rendered in other States is wholly inconsistent with the theory that such limited recognition is based upon the operation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States, and on the contrary is consistent only with the conception that such limited recognition as is given is based upon state comity. No clearer demon.stration can be made of .the accuracy of this statement than the obvious consequence that if the full faith and credit clause wpre now to be held applicable to the enforcement in the States generally of decrees of divorce of the character of the one here involved it would follow that the law of nearly all of the States would be overthrown, and thus it would come to pass that the decisions which wére relied upon as establishing that the due faith and credit clause applies to such decrees would be overruled by the adoption of the -proposition which it is insisted those decisions maintain. The only escape from this conclusion would be to say that the law of the States as shown by the decisions in question would remain unaffected by the ruling of the full faith and credit clause because not repugnant to that clause. This would be, however, but to assert that the full faith and credit clause required not that full faith and credit be given in one State to the decrees of another State, but that only a limited and restricted enforcement of a decree of one State in another would fulfill the requirements of that provision of the Constitution. To so decide would be to destroy the true import of-the full faith arid credit clause as pointed out in the outset of this opinion. Thus, in its ultimate aspect the proposition relied upon reduces itself to this, either that the settled law of most of the States of the Union as to divorce decrees rendered in one State, where the court rendering the decree had jurisdiction only of the plaintiff, must be held to be invalid, or that an important provision of the Constitution of the United States must be shorn of its rightful meaning.
.Without questioning the power of the State of Connecticut to enforce within its own borders the decree of divorce which is here in issue, and without intimating a doubt as to-the power of the State of New York to give to a decree of that character rendered in Connecticut, within the borders of the State of New York and as to its own citizens, such efficacy as it may be entitled to in view of the public policy of that State, we hold that the decree of the court of Connecticut rendered under the circumstances stated was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause. It therefore follows that the court below did not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution in refusing to admit the Connecticut decree in evidence; and its judgment is, therefore,
Affirmed.
Casés relating to the validity and extraterritorial effect of a decree of divorce rendered upon constructive notice:
Turner v. Turner, 44 Alabama, 437; In re James Estate, 99 California, 374; Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Illinois, 158; Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Illinois, 589; Field v. Field, 215 Illinois, 496; Hood v. State, 56 Indiana, 263, 270; Hilbish v. Hattle, 145 Indiana, 59; Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa, 386; Van Orsdal v. Van Orsdal, 67 Iowa, 35; Chapman v. Chapman, 48 Kansas, 636; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kansas, 483; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Hawkins v. Ragsdale, 80 Kentucky, 353; Edwards v. Green, 9 La. Ann. 317; Smith v. Smith, 43 La. Ann. 1140; Butler v. Washington, 45 La. Ann. 279; Harding v. Alden, 9 Maine, 140; Stilphen v. Stilphen, 58 Maine, 508; Stilphen v. Hondlette, 60 Maine, 447; Garner v. Garner, 56 Maryland, 127; Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray, 367; Wright v. Wright, 24 Michigan, 180; Van Inwagen v. Van Inwagen, 86 Michgan, 333; Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minnesota, 279; Gould v. Crow, 57 Missouri, 200; Anthony v. Rice, 110 Missouri, 223; Smith v. Smith, 19 Nebraska, 706; Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20; Doughty v. Doughty, 28 N. J. Eq. 581; Flower v. Flower, 42 N. J. Eq. 152; Felt v. Felt, 59 N. J. Eq. 606; Wallace v. Wallace, 62 N. J. Eq. 509; Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N. Y. 405; Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553; Irby v. Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. (21 N. Car.) 568; Harris v. Harris, 115 N. Car. 587; Bidwell v. Bidwell (N. Car.), 52 S. E. Rep. 55, 58; Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502; Doerr v. Forsythe, 50 Ohio St. 726; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. St. 375; Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. St. 308; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; McCreery v. Davis, 44 S. Car. 195; Thoms v. King, 95 Tennessee, 60; Prosser v. Warner, 47 Vermont, 667, 673; Cook v. Cook, 56 Wisconsin, 195.