Datasets:

ymoslem

/

Law-StackExchange

like 21

[ { "answer_id": 94666, "body": "<h3>Moral luck</h3>\n<p>You have raised the issue of <em>moral luck</em>, a long recognized problem in criminal theory. The classic expositions of this issue are by <a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Nagel\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Thomas Nagel</a>, in his chapter, &quot;<a href=\"https://rintintin.colorado.edu/%7Evancecd/phil1100/Nagel1.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Moral Luck</a>&quot; (1979) and <a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Williams\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Bernard Williams</a>, &quot;<a href=\"https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/williams_-_moral_luck.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Moral Luck</a>&quot; (1976). Specifically, you are describing what they call <em>outcome</em> luck, or <em>consequential</em> luck.</p>\n<p>Driving while intoxicated vs. driving while intoxicated and causing death is not the only example where moral luck results in a distinction in punishment. Other examples are:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>dangerous driving vs. dangerous driving that causes death</li>\n<li>a successful offence vs. an attempted offence (generally resulting in a maximum sentence less than that of the successful offence)</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Nagel writes:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If someone has had too\nmuch to drink and his car swerves on to the sidewalk, he can count himself morally lucky if there are no pedestrians in its path. If there were, he would\nbe to blame for their deaths, and would probably be prosecuted for\nmanslaughter. But if he hurts no one, although his recklessness is exactly the\nsame, he is guilty of a far less serious legal offence and will certainly reproach\nhimself and be reproached by others much less severely. To take another legal\nexample, the penalty for attempted murder is less than that for successful\nmurder – however similar the intentions and motives of the assailant may be\nin the two cases. His degree of culpability can depend, it would seem, on\nwhether the victim happened to be wearing a bullet-proof vest, or whether a\nbird flew into the path of the bullet – matters beyond his control.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>... How is it possible to be more or less culpable depending\non whether a child gets into the path of one’s car, or a bird into the path of\none’s bullet? Perhaps it is true that what is done depends on more than the\nagent’s state of mind or intention. The problem then is, why is it not irrational to base moral assessment on what people do, in this broad sense? It\namounts to holding them responsible for the contributions of fate as well as\nfor their own – provided they have made some contribution to begin with. ... If the object of moral judgment is the person, then to hold him accountable for what he has done in the broader sense is akin to strict liability, which may have its legal uses but seems irrational as a moral position.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h3>Two offered justifications for making distinctions based purely on outcome</h3>\n<p>Two considerations often raised as justification for differential treatment based on outcome are (<a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Enoch_(philosopher)\" rel=\"noreferrer\">David Enoch</a> &amp; <a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrei_Marmor\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Andrei Marmor</a>, &quot;<a href=\"https://www.jstor.org/stable/27652623\" rel=\"noreferrer\">The Case against Moral Luck</a>&quot;, 26 LAW &amp; PHIL. 405 (2007), pp. 415–17)</p>\n<ul>\n<li>epistemological / evidential — the person who <em>actually</em> killed a person was more likely to have been driving more recklessly</li>\n<li>the theory that the actor should have to internalize the risk, fully, when they set out on a risky activity — if they happen to kill someone, the risk of this higher punishment was part of what they should have accounted for when deciding to embark on the risky activity</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A couple of quotes from Enoch and Marmor:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>All other things being equal, the occurrence of an accident is plausibly considered as at least some prima facie evidence for recklessness, or indeed for a higher\ndegree of recklessness.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A conception of fairness that requires\nagents to internalize the costs of their risky activities does not\nnecessarily reflect a view of responsibility or blameworthiness.\nIt may simply reflect a judgment about the appropriate distribution of the costs of risky activities.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 72 }, { "answer_id": 94674, "body": "<p>Drunk driving remains, per se, &quot;victimless&quot; - a breach of regulations - until someone actually becomes a victim. That puts less emphasis on the punitive role of the justice system and more on deterrence and rehabilitation.</p>\n<p>The standards for charging someone with DUI are much lower than with vehicular homicide. DUI is a strict liability offense, requiring no intent, no mens rea. In about half the states it's even <a href=\"https://stpetelawgroup.com/can-i-get-a-dui-if-im-sleeping-in-my-car-in-fl/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">possible</a> to get a DUI conviction for sleeping in the back seat of a car. In no state is it possible to kill anyone (other than yourself) solely by sleeping under the influence.</p>\n<p>The system of tiered offenses with different culpability requirements is about as strong a deterrent as the public can accept. It allows handing out the first tier of penalties in as many situations as possible, while allowing for heavier charges when there are consequences or aggravating factors.</p>\n<p>Not applying the penalty for the worst possible consequences for every act also avoids &quot;in for a penny, in for a pound&quot; perverse incentives, prompting one to exercise whatever amount of caution they still can.</p>\n", "score": 26 }, { "answer_id": 94677, "body": "<p>Drivers are negligent all the time. Not only by drunk driving, but also by speeding, driving when really tired, etc.</p>\n<p>The question is, what level of negligence is enough to call it recklessness?</p>\n<p>The rough method that is applied here is: If you killed someone, and the killing is connected to your negligent behaviour, then it was probably reckless.</p>\n<p>It is not the best method, but it is also not completely unreasonable.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94669, "body": "<p>Have you seen or watched the movie Minority Report? People were arrested and imprisoned based upon what they would have done in the future.</p>\n<p>While you are probably unable to drive in a reasonably safe manner in that condition, getting into an accident moves that from probably to certainly. You didn’t just subject yourself and others to an unmeasurable (possible) increase of risk to their safety, you actually caused harm.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94681, "body": "<p><strong>The question &quot;How drunk is drunk?&quot; is legally more flexible than &quot;How dead is dead&quot;</strong></p>\n<p>Ultimately, the range of &quot;Too drunk&quot; could be heavily varied - depending on the region, the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blood_alcohol_content\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Blood Alcohol Content (Or BAC)</a> can vary by jurisdiction; some countries have a maximum BAC of 0.02%, and others a BAC of 0.08%. How these limits are determined involves some math math in theory, but in practice usually involves a breath sample via an approved screening device; an important point of the mathematical side, however, does indicate that, with time, the BAC counter goes lower.</p>\n<p>The timing aspect of the BAC test result means that, ultimately, you could be charging people with a low enough (But too high legally) BAC amount for simply not waiting longer. &quot;Oh, you didn't wait another 40 minutes before getting onto the road after waiting 80 minutes, so we're going to give you extended jail time&quot; does feel a bit harsh - even if the math might be more complicated than that (See also, how body weight can affect the approximate mathematics in the above linked Wikipedia article). It's also a significantly small margin at times, and you could be punishing people who were spiked beyond the limit unexpectedly.</p>\n<p>Whereas, whether or not someone is dead, is generally much easier to ascertain (Even if there are <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_death\" rel=\"noreferrer\">legal grey areas regarding the definition of being dead</a> - if the body is found, medically they can check for brain and cardiovascular signs if brought to a hospital, where a determination can be made with more information.)- which makes the harder part determining if you drove into them, and then the hardest part proving that you were drunk at the time - where the above parts come into play.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 94710, "body": "<p>Although some of the answers make a good comparison between retributive and preventative punishment, there is a more utilitarian purpose for this difference.</p>\n<p>Simply put, the law exists so people do not need to seek whatever they want through illegal means.</p>\n<p>If someone kills a man in a hypothetical world without law, the family of the man would seek revenge for his death. Then, if they kill the murderer, the murderer's family might seek revenge for his death. This would lead to a cycle of violence, which is what often happened in tribal societies.</p>\n<p>Thus, one of the main purposes of the law is to be the arbiter between people and sole source of violence so they do not feel the need to take violence into their own hands.</p>\n<p>The reason, thus, that a drunk driver who kills people is punished more is simply because the law needs to do that if it wishes to prevent many people from feeling their desire for revenge is not fulfilled and falling into lawlessness.</p>\n<p>As for drunk driving by itself, it is only punished as a preventative measure.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94717, "body": "<p>Consider these two scenarios:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Alice has never driven whilst drunk before, but this one time she's forgotten that she came to the dinner party by car and drinks some wine. Realising her mistake, she drives home exceedingly careful and slow, which raises the suspicion of a policeman who tests her and finds the alcohol level too high.</li>\n<li>Bob routinely drives slightly drunk, but has been confident and lucky enough never to have been caught. This time though, his intoxication causes him to not notice a pedestrian who has tripped while crossing the road, and he runs her over.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>If both were punished the same way, there wouldn't really be an incentive (besides altruism) to act like Alice, which clearly is the less inappropriate thing to do. She didn't act exactly <em>right</em> either, but she certainly acted in a way that posed less danger to society.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94735, "body": "<p>We know alcohol impairs higher cognitive function, but the degree to which it does varies greatly from one person to the next (and depends heavily on other factors, such as what else you've eaten or drunk), and the ways in which it affects individuals also varies. Never mind that the same person could also be more or less drunk.</p>\n<p>So we have a legal limit where the average person would be sufficiently impaired, such that they shouldn't be driving.</p>\n<p>But this doesn't mean all those people are equally likely to drive too fast, run over traffic lights, swerve, not notice their surroundings, react too slowly, or do any of the other things a drunk person might do, that greatly increase the risk of someone dying.</p>\n<p>So charging all drunk drivers with homicide-level offenses doesn't make much sense given the amount of variation there.</p>\n<p>Also note that drunk driving is a preventative charge: drunk driving is not something that causes harm in and of itself, but we collectively agree that people shouldn't do it because of the risk it carries. Since it doesn't necessarily cause harm, it doesn't really make sense to punish it as severely as something which does cause harm. To prevent harm is one of the main reasons laws exist in the first place, so whether harm was or would've been caused is an important consideration.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>Drunk driving can be compared to some degree to driving while medicated. Medicine affects different people differently under different circumstances, so it wouldn't really make sense to say driving after taking a single aspirin is equivalent to driving after taking strong prescription pain pills, or that taking something which has no noticeable effect on you is bad because it knocks someone else out.</p>\n<p>The difference is that alcohol has a more consistent effect, it's a more common known source of accidents, and it's easier to test for.</p>\n", "score": 0 }, { "answer_id": 94739, "body": "<h2>Harming someone, or being drunker, offers different facts that violate more laws.</h2>\n<p>It's simple: if you do more stuff, you can violate more laws at the same time. And some laws are just written in such a way, that violating them is punished harder. So:</p>\n<h3>Violating some laws gets you punished harder than others.</h3>\n<p>And with drunk driving, often laws are written like escalation steps.\nLet me use the law of <a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a> as an example:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>If you are a new driver, you may not have any alcohol. 0.0 is your limit. See <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stvg/__24c.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§24c Straßenverkehrsgesetz</a> (Law on Road Traffic)</li>\n<li>Driving with <em>some</em> blood alcohol is legal, as long as you are below the limit and drive well enough. Without any signs of alcohol-related errors, you can have less than 0.5 permille.</li>\n<li>Driving under the influence of alcohol in a manner that is noticeable for the intoxication, you gain a hefty fine when caught. That is called Trunkenheit I'm Straßenverkehr (~Driving under the Influence of Alcohol) under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__316.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§316 StGB</a> (Penal Code) and can trigger as early as 0.3 permille alcohol according to the highest German court.</li>\n<li>Getting caught while driving with more than 0.5 permille gives you a hefty fine and automatic loss of the driver's license for 1 to 3 months, depending on how often you do it. This is regulated in <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stvg/__24a.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§24a StVG</a>, and is called the &quot;0.5 permille limit&quot;</li>\n<li>Driving with 1.1 permille or more means you are <em>also</em> in for a felony: very hefty fines are leveled, you can go to jail for up to 5 years, your driver's license is on the line for at least 6 months up to 5 years or permanent revocation. This falls under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__315c.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§315c StGB</a>, Endangering of Road Traffic. At this point, the BGH reasoned, you are absolutely incapable to drive a vehicle safely.</li>\n<li>Should you be caught with 1.6 permille or more, makes the test to determine if you ever can regain your driver's license mandatory. At this point, it is reasonable to suspect that the person in question is a chronic drunkard.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>All of those are <strong>just</strong> driving drunk, where no intent is needed. That's all separate from what comes when an accident happens. The moment your drunk driving harms anyone (or anything), it goes from just punishing your state of drunkenness to making your drunkenness a factor in a totally different crime, the one that revolves around doing the harm. Being intoxicated enough opens you, before anything else, to the reckless versions of harming or killing crimes.</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Killing someone by driving them over under alcoholic influence is at least Fahrlässige Tötung under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__222.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§222 StGB</a> (Reckless Killing)</li>\n<li>Harming someone but not killing them while driving in such a manner is just Fahrlässige Körperverletung under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__229.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§229 StGB</a> (reckless harming of someone)</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "driving", "sentencing" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94672, "body": "<p>See generally <em>Hamer v. Sidway</em> (1891), <a href=\"https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/archives/hamer_sidway.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">124 NY 538</a>, citing indirectly <em>Currie v Misa</em> (1875) LR 10 Ex 893:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>'A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party, <strong>or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other</strong>.' Courts 'will not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration does in fact benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any substantial value to anyone. <strong>It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to him</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94697, "body": "<p>Pretty much anything that is neither illegal nor a pre-existing obligation can be consideration. A necessary pre-condition for any trade or contract is a different valuation of whatever is being traded. Inherent in that is that judges and legislators would value it differently.</p>\n<p>Given that, who is to say that a contract with a surgeon to save the life of someones daughter, mother, pool boy, isn’t valuable to the non-surgeon party? An overgrown lawn on someone else’s property.</p>\n<p>Unconscionable contracts are a different matter, because they inherently involve either a reevaluation or someone else having an interest that wasn’t addressed.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94713, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>Consideration is usually an element of a valid contract. But consideration is not required at all for a personal guarantee of a debt, for marital agreements entered into during a marriage, or for some (but not all) forms of contract modifications (usually singled out by statute).</p>\n<p>Any benefit to one party, or detriment assumed by the other party, can constitute consideration. Consideration is often money, but it can involve mutual promises, giving up claims in a lawsuit, services, goods, promises to refrain from action, or almost anything else that is not specifically prohibited.</p>\n<p>Consideration in U.S. common law, however, cannot be &quot;meretricious&quot; (i.e. for having sex) or otherwise illegal (e.g. illegal drugs or a contract to murder someone). Likewise &quot;love and affection&quot; or other donative intent directed at the other party to the contract is not consideration.</p>\n<p>The benefit or detriment could be to someone related to, or intended to be benefited by, a party to the contract rather than to the contracting party.</p>\n<p>The consideration does not have to be proportionate to the contract validated by the consideration. Instead, the prevailing theory of consideration in the United States is the &quot;<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peppercorn_(law)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">peppercorn theory</a>&quot;.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In legal parlance, a peppercorn is a metaphor for a very small cash\npayment or other nominal consideration, used to satisfy the\nrequirements for the creation of a legal contract. It is featured in\n<em><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chappell_%26_Co_Ltd_v_Nestle_Co_Ltd\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Chappell &amp; Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd</a></em> ([1960] AC 87), which stated that &quot;a peppercorn does not cease to be good consideration if it is\nestablished that the promisee does not like pepper and will throw away\nthe corn&quot;.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The main kind of contract that is rendered unenforceable by the consideration doctrine in the U.S. is a promise to make a gift in the future.</p>\n<p>Another common application of the consideration requirement is to invalidate a contract modification (in a type of contract where consideration is required for a contract modification) which is entirely one sided.</p>\n<p>Under the doctrine of <a href=\"https://lawshelf.com/shortvideoscontentview/contract-law-promissory-estoppel-as-a-substitute-for-consideration\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">promissory estoppel</a>, detrimental reliance on a promise can substitute for consideration.</p>\n<p>Inadequacy of consideration, when there is some consideration to support the contract, is governed by the doctrine of unconscionability as between the parties to the contract.</p>\n<p>If the parties to the contract do not exchange &quot;substantially equivalent value&quot; then a buyer in a contract is not a &quot;bona fide purchaser for value&quot; (which impacts the ability of a third-party to challenge the validity of the contract vis-a-vis their rights) and the contract could be a &quot;fraudulent transfer&quot; which can be undone by a third-party creditor if the person on the losing side of the deal is insolvent.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "contract-law", "legal-terms", "consideration" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94687, "body": "<h2>Read the terms</h2>\n<p>It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law.</p>\n<p>The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them.</p>\n<p>In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them.</p>\n<p>Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part.</p>\n<p>The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win.</p>\n<p>As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment.</p>\n<p>Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94699, "body": "<p>The form most likely includes a statement somewhere that you won’t take further legal action. Your underage daughters signature would not be legally binding as she is underage, and so you could get the money and sue.</p>\n<p>Your signature on the other hand makes it a legally binding contract on your part and would probably open you up to a breach of contract suit if your daughter was to sue in her own right (either before or after majority).</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "employment", "california", "teenager" ]

[ { "answer_id": 67111, "body": "<p><strong>Currently, there is no legal means for a state to secede form the U.S.</strong></p>\n<p>A quick Google search yields <a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/so-you-want-to-secede-from-the-u-s-a-four-step-guide/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">So you want to secede from the U.S.: A four-step guide - The Washington Post</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&quot;When the Confederate states seceded in 1861 and were then defeated in\nthe Civil War, the argument is that they demonstrated that you can't\nsecede from the Union. The 1869 Supreme Court case <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/74/700\" rel=\"noreferrer\">TEXAS v.\nWHITE ET AL (Legal Information Institute)</a> determined that the\nsecession was never actually a real thing in the eyes of the federal\ngovernment. The Confederate States of America wasn't an independent\ncountry any more than your house is its own country simply because you\nsay it is. 'The Constitution, in all its provisions,' the justices\nwrote, 'looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible\nStates.'&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Also from that Post piece:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In 2006, Justice Antonin Scalia was asked by screenwriter Dan\nTurkewitz if the idea of Maine seceding from the country made sense as\na possible plot point. Scalia, perhaps unexpectedly, replied.</p>\n<p>&quot;I cannot imagine that such a question could ever reach the Supreme\nCourt,&quot; Scalia wrote. &quot;To begin with, the answer is clear. If there\nwas any constitutional issue resolved by the Civil War, it is that\nthere is no right to secede. ... Secondly, I find it difficult to\nenvision who the parties to this lawsuit might be. Is the State suing\nthe United States for a declaratory judgment? But the United States\ncannot be sued without its consent, and it has not consented to this\nsort of suit.&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>A state <em>could</em> secede if the US Constitution was amended to allow secession, but the chances of that happening are low.</p>\n<p>Also see <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secession_in_the_United_States\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Secession in the United States - Wikipedia</a></p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 67120, "body": "<p>The US Civil War is generally taken to have settled the question as to whether any state can, on its own, leave the Union. It cannot.\nIn <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/74/700\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Texas Vs White et al</em> 74 U.S. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227,\n7 Wall. 700 1868</a> the US Supreme Court confirmed this when wrote (in pars 101 &amp; 102 of the opinion):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the States.</p>\n<p>Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Notice, however, the statement that the adherence of a state to the US could not be changed: &quot;except through revolution, or <strong>through consent of the States</strong>.&quot;</p>\n<p>This leaves open the possibility of a <strong>bi</strong>lateral departure of a state.</p>\n<p>Congress has, under the Constitution, the power to admit new states to the Union, and to join stats or parts of states into new states, or to divide states, with the consent of the states involved. Another answer to this question suggested that a treaty might lawfully cede potions of the territory of the United States, and this seems plausible, although there is no explicit provision for such an action, nor is there any clear precedent in US history.</p>\n<p>So if a State were to request, via an act of its legislature, perhaps supported by a vote of its people, that it leave the US, and if the US Congress passed a law consenting to this, and declaring that the state involves was no longer a part of the US, would that law be valid under the Constitution? It might well be held to be valid, given the other powers Congress has over the extent of the Union, but it might equally be held to be invalid and void. There is no case law on that point, for Congress has never yet consented to any such attempted departure of a state.</p>\n<p>Surely an amendment to the Constitution <strong>could</strong> be passed, clearly giving Congress such a power. That is nothing but speculation, as no such amendment has even been formally proposed.</p>\n<p>Thus the question must be considered undecided at this time.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 67112, "body": "<p>No, not alone. There is no constitutional means to leave the union under the current US constitution (<a href=\"https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Art. 4 §3</a> is a one-way path). An amendment could be made to allow secession.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "constitutional-law", "federalism" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94712, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>then what stops private citizens from residing on such structures?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Nothing. Anyone who can be a tenant of a house or apartment can be a tenant of a boat.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The [general framework at a very broad and high level] of legality of mooring semi permanent barges such as the Bubby Stockholm off the British coast, whether for the government or for private citizenry?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The owner must moor it somewhere. If the mooring doesn't already exist then you need licences and/or permissions and/or consents from the relevant authorities/owners to make it. The Crown Estate owns about 50% of the UK foreshore and most of the seabed. There could be more than one authority/owner of the space to be occupied.</p>\n<p>On the inland waterways you will need either a permanent mooring licence or a continuous cruising licence.</p>\n<p>If you stay in one place sufficiently long you become liable for council tax.</p>\n<p>You will either somehow travel to the mooring or (more conveniently) the mooring is near a jetty. Does the jetty already exist or must it be built? Is there additional infrastructure to be built, such as parking, utilities (electricity, water, gas, sewerage), 24/7 security etc? To accomodate 500 people on one vessel you will need more than is required by occupants of a 34ft yacht or 70ft narrowboat.</p>\n<p>To lawfully start building things you need the appropriate permissions/consents.</p>\n<p>In the case of Bibby Stockholm and Portland Port, the government's position is that the barge is below 'mean low water'. This means planning permission to situate the barge is not required from the local authority - it is outside the LA's control.</p>\n<p>But the Mayor in her capacity as a local resident, not her office, claims the additional works such as the utilities infrastructure, exercise area and fences come into the jurisdiction of the local authority's planning powers.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "property", "any-jurisdiction", "law-of-the-sea", "coast" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94696, "body": "<p><a href=\"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.258149/gov.uscourts.dcd.258149.13.1_2.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Here</a> is one of the three Trump appearance bonds. As you can see, it is a personal recognizance bond, and not a dollar amount bond. He promises to appear, as required, and there is no money involved. There is a direct indication that he was not required to &quot;post bail&quot;, which is a stronger statement that &quot;no indication that he was&quot;.</p>\n", "score": 15 }, { "answer_id": 94700, "body": "<p>It would be an extraordinary circumstance for a defendant to be out on bail or bond without that fact being part of the public record.</p>\n<p>In general, the public has access to court records under both the First Amendment and under the common-law right of access to judicial records, and it is difficult for a party or a court to justify removing that access.</p>\n<p>That right applies to bail records, as well, as we saw in the <a href=\"https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nyed.497086/gov.uscourts.nyed.497086.22.0.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">George Santos case</a>.</p>\n<p>There, Santos was bailed out by family members, and he sought to have the bail records placed sealed to protect his family from harassment. The court granted that request, but reversed after news organizations objected and demanded access.</p>\n<p>The court reviewing those motions didn't admit that sealing those records was wrong, but it did hold that because the concerns of harassment were purely speculative, the high-profile nature of the case, the specific concerns raised about the possibility of Santos exchanging official acts for bail money, and the House Ethics Committee's interest in the records demonstrated that any interest in having the records sealed was outweighed by the public interest in disclosure.</p>\n<p>More practically, though, it would be difficult to conceal the fact of bail, as the fact that a defendant is walking around after an indictment would be a pretty good indicator that bail was granted.</p>\n", "score": 8 } ]

[ "federal-courts", "arrest", "politics", "bail", "arraignment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 30616, "body": "<p>Running a C-Corp is no easy matter, I would suggest first you look very hard at why you want to do a C-Corp vs an LLC with an S-Corp election. There is a lot of documentation/formalities that if not followed allow somebody to \"pierce the veil\" and bind the principles legally. You also miss out on tax savings opportunities with recent legislation and subject yourself to double taxation, which is beyond the scope of this question. Think carefully.</p>\n\n<p>To answer your question, the person who signs the documents is the founder/former of the corporation. You can file paperwork to remove that person from the corporation, however in your case I would not do that, and here's why...</p>\n\n<p>One of your principle shareholders will be a minor. A minor cannot be held to the same contract standards as majority adults. This means that many organizations that would otherwise gladly do business with you (like a bank account) will immediately turn away. You need an adult to bind the company and all the principles should be legal adults. You cannot allow your minor business partner to be part of any contract or a party to a signatory on a contract.</p>\n\n<p>Yes, a minor can hold \"shares\" of a corporation, but they are severely limited in that they carry no voting rights. They do give the holder dividends, but there are tax implications there too that the corporation needs to be careful of. </p>\n\n<p>You will need to disclose that your business partner is a minor in your dealings, not doing so can open you up to all kinds of trouble. That alone is enough to make many organizations walk away. I would suggest that you keep all your principles as majority adults and draft documents that transfer the shares to the minor upon the age of majority. </p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "corporate-law", "minor", "incorporation" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90549, "body": "<p>Yes, that's what that means. But if you continue reading the article that you referenced, you will see that demerit points themselves also expire after 2 years:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>When 2 years have passed from the date of a conviction, the demerit\npoints assessed for that conviction are removed from your driver's\nrecord.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "driving", "alberta" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94694, "body": "<p>If A defames B, the fact that the parties live and work in different countries is not a bar to a defamation lawsuit. This is not changed when platform C is headquartered in a third country. A choice of law question does arise, which is important because B can always sue A, but they might have a legally-better outcome if they sue in the defendant's jurisdiction (plaintiff-friendly rules) yet they might be concerned over the &quot;home courts advantage&quot;. The EU has <a href=\"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32007R0864\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a rule</a> applying &quot;to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters&quot; which expressly excludes &quot;non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation&quot; (there is no uniform EU answer). <a href=\"https://tlblog.org/multistate-defamation-cross-border-torts-and-choice-of-law/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">This article</a> touches on such considerations in transnational defamation.</p>\n<p>Whether or not some specific content rises to the level of defamation depends on the actual facts (was there plagiarism, which is not a legally-defined category unlike copyright infringement), and the choice of law.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "defamation" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94688, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>Alice's defence will be that she had an honest belief, given the circumstances, that force was necessary and the force she used was reasonable in defence of John (and possibly Alice).</p>\n<p>John's consent is irrelevant unless it had some bearing on that.</p>\n<p>Why did John oppose the use of force?</p>\n<p>Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he would rather die than cause a death? Irrelevant.</p>\n<p>Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he believed Bob was not a real threat due to circumstances X, Y and/or Z that he wanted Alice to heed? Relevant.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94689, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<h3>This is a standard defence-of-another / self-defence analysis</h3>\n<p>See</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/90858/46948\">Is it legal to use force against a person who is trying to stop you from rescuing another person?</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/92336/46948\">Is it legal to use force against a person who is illegally trying to disconnect a hospital patient's life support with intent to kill the patient?</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/93809/46948\">Can a private party shoot down an aircraft in self defense or in defense of others?</a></li>\n</ul>\n<p>If Alice believes on reasonable grounds that there is a threat of force against John, then the defence called &quot;<a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/87387/46948\">defence of another</a>&quot; comes into play. It is codified at s. 34 of the <em>Criminal Code</em>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if</p>\n<p>(a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person;</p>\n<p>(b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and</p>\n<p>(c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>&quot;Unless the accused subjectively believed that force or a threat thereof was being used against their person or that of another, the defence is unavailable&quot; (<em>R. v. Khill</em>, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/jjlbr#par52\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2021 SCC 37, para. 52</a>). Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act <em>with the subjective purpose</em> of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. There is also the final balance of reasonableness of the response, but I don't take you to be putting that into question.</p>\n<p><strong>As long as these are satisfied, then the defence is made out.</strong> And you haven't given enough information to know whether these elements are present.</p>\n<h3>Your scenario only presents evidential uncertainty</h3>\n<p>The scenario you describe only presents evidential uncertainty to the trier of fact. John's shout to &quot;Don't shoot him&quot; would just be part of the evidence relevant to establishing the reasonableness of Alice's belief that John was under the threat of force.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94686, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a> has <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__32.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§32(2) StGB</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Notwehr ist die Verteidigung, die erforderlich ist, um einen gegenwärtigen rechtswidrigen Angriff von sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden.<br />\nSelf-defense is the defense which is necessary to defeat a present, unlawful attack against oneself <strong>or another</strong>. (my translation, emphasis by me)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The question here becomes if John saying <em>&quot;don't shoot him&quot;</em> should make it clear to Alice that Bob is <strong>not</strong> making an unlawful attack. <em>&quot;Don't shoot him&quot;</em> is not the same as <em>&quot;I consent to being attacked,&quot;</em> and John cannot lawfully consent to being killed that way, anyway. It is possible to consent to being injured (many medical procedures would be assault if there is no consent), but a gun is not a suitable instrument for that.</p>\n<p>Any specific case would almost certainly be argued in court. You specified that without John's statement, the self defense would be found legal, and these circumstances are not altered by a shout in a confusing situation.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "assault", "any-jurisdiction", "defense-of-others" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94675, "body": "<p>There are several issues - one is that patents are given for specific ways of solving a problem, sometimes very narrowly different from other ways of solving a problem, not for a result. There are usually many ways to achieve a result.</p>\n<p>Another, that you bring up, is “field of use”. That comes into play in method claims but not usually in device or systems claims. A claim to a “thing”- system, device, machine etc. is infringed by another thing (that fits within the claimed definition) just sitting on a shelf in a box. Intended use is not traditionally relevant. If a device for any intended use fits the words of a claim, it infringes. In your case the preamble of a system claim says “system <em>for</em> mixing or compositing in real-time, computer generated 3D objects”. At least in the US that would not usually be limiting to that use but just taken as a description of the thing, not requiring actual specified use to infringe. Read it as “capable of being used for”.</p>\n<p>Method claims <em>can</em> limit field of use. A method for getting rust cleared from a screwdriver that had a step “provide a rusty screwdriver” would be limited to that use.</p>\n<p>Another example would be a back scratcher configured exactly as a small garden rake but claimed in a method for scratching one’s back. Assume the garden rake is known - the backscratcher as a thing could not be patented, but a method of using something of a certain shape and design (small garden rake) to scratch your back could be. Someone with a garden rake couldn’t scratch their back even though they owned the garden rake. Note that a small garden sold as good for use as a backscratcher would be committing contributory infringement unless they had a license.</p>\n<p>Something being covered by a patent owned by its manufacturer does not mean it, or its use, does not infringe some other patent owned by a totally unrelated entity. Of course it is possible a manufacturer has licensed relevant patents of others.</p>\n<p>The patent you link to is not only described as used for broadcast. Gaming and other entertainment uses are mentioned.</p>\n<p>As mentioned in another answer, the Intel device works in a way that doesn’t fall under the claims of the sited patent. It has two cameras in total while the claims require a main camera and two additional cameras to do the position determination another with other inertial sensors. Some uses of the Intel device could theoretically infringe method claims in one or more un-sighted, unknown, patents.</p>\n<p>If someone bolted the intel device to a “film camera” and used the combination as described in the method claim you might get the quality image you need and only use the intel device for the position information. Then you might infringe.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94680, "body": "<h2>It probably doesn't violate the patent because it uses two cameras instead of three.</h2>\n<p>I'm not a lawyer, but it seems pretty apparent to me that the Intel device doesn't violate the patent. The patent states the following:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(b) a pair of stereoscopic witness cameras are fixed directly or indirectly to the film camera;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The Intel® RealSense™ Tracking Camera T265 uses two cameras, not three. This is plainly visible when you look at the images of the device on the store page.</p>\n<p>Additionally, I imagine that the video quality of those cameras is probably adequate for the purposes they were designed for, but probably aren't up to the level needed for professional film productions unless you're filming a found-footage film like the <em>Blair Witch Project</em>. That's probably where a lot of the cost for the patented device you're referencing is coming from.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "patents" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94676, "body": "<p><strong>No, it's not fair use</strong>. It's also not nominative fair use (the fair use equivalent for trademarks) as another answer suggests.</p>\n<p><strong>Why is it not nominative fair use?</strong></p>\n<p>There are three conditions for nominative fair use (taken from <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Wikipedia</a>):</p>\n<ol>\n<li>The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute).</li>\n<li>The user only uses as much of the mark as is necessary for the identification (e.g. the words but not the font or symbol).</li>\n<li>The user does nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. This applies even if the nominative use is commercial, and the same test applies for metatags.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>The first two conditions really rule out any right to use a company's logo on a resume. Instead, the careful reader will notice that nominative fair use is actually the legal basis for your right to name the companies on your resume at all.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "trademark" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94673, "body": "<p>Contracts are routinely held to be valid even when there is negligible or literally zero financial “gain” (compensation, which they take into consideration in order to enter into the contract). A document purporting to be a contract might be held invalid if it is a bare promise like “I promise to give you $100 on Friday”, but you can make it an enforceable contract by including “if you give me a french fry today”. Reasoning that party “could have” done something else does not invalidate a contract, for example the party might have had $3 at the time and could have purchased a whole bag of fries. The only imaginable relevance of “I could have” thinking would be if the terms of the contract are so unclear that the party would not reasonably have understood the contract to have obligated them to pay $100, or that they would have reasonably believed that they were to receive a suitcase full of french fries.</p>\n<p>There is a (huge) difference between subjective errors in interpreting a contract and objective uncertainty. Objective uncertainty is fundamentally about the linguistic structure of the agreement, i.e. words like “it” which have no intrinsic referent, or “required books and clothing” (which could mean “required books and all clothing”, or “required books and required clothing”). There may be special rules of legal interpretation addressing how such ambiguities are resolved (this one is not well established, but is known in some spheres as the “across-the-board rule”). Personal interpretation does not enter into decisions as to the validity of a contract: if you misinterpret the words of a contract, regardless of how strong your proof is that at the time you did not understand the contract, that doesn’t matter, unless you can show that at the time you were actually not competent (did not know Armenian and could not have understood what the contract required). The courts look at the words of the contract, assume that the parties have availed themselves of wise legal counsel, and understand how the courts would interpret the contract, then they filter the words of the contract through a sieve composed of rules constituting &quot;the law&quot;, and declare what parties A and B must do.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "contract-law", "education", "school", "compensation", "school-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94636, "body": "<h2>Because there’s an exemption</h2>\n<p>Which requires denaturing.</p>\n<p>But there’s also an exemption to the exemption for when denaturing is not appropriate. Such as for laboratory use.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 94642, "body": "<h2><a href=\"https://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belastingdienst/customs/excise_duty_and_consumer_tax/excise_duty_and_consumer_tax/exemption_from_excise_duty_andor_consumer_tax/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Medical or Lab Alcohol are taxed differently</a></h2>\n<p>For the excise tax, some alcohols are not counted, as the government (Customs Administration of the Netherlands, Ministry of Finance) themselves say:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Excise goods</p>\n<p>Under certain conditions, you can be exempted from excise duty. Examples include:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>ethyl alcohol not intended for internal use by humans</li>\n<li>ethyl alcohol used for manufacturing medicines</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Those two exceptions cover all laboratory alcohol, including non-denatured spirits.</p>\n<p>Also, do note the little yellow checkmark at the end of the shopping item: to buy (and import) that alcohol for the reduced tax rate, you need to prove to the seller, that you buy it for those excise-tax-exempt reasons such as laboratory work and not to create, for example, your own Limoncello by soaking lemon peel in it.</p>\n", "score": 10 } ]

[ "european-union", "tax-law", "alcohol", "biosafety" ]

[ { "answer_id": 88850, "body": "<p>If you were in the office, and ready to take instructions what to do from your manager, then you were legally working and need to be paid. There's plenty of things you can do in an office without electricity unless it's too dark. If the manager didn't ask you to do anything, it's the company's problem, not yours.</p>\n<p>If you took the opportunity to leave for 90 minutes to do your weekly shopping, then you shouldn't get paid.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94524, "body": "<p>Assuming you are a regular employee and were present and ready to do work during your contractually agreed working hours, you are entitled to your salary for that time, even if you could not actually do anything productive.</p>\n<p>The fact that your work needs electricity is something the employer has to make sure is available, there is no way for a single employee to somehow change that.</p>\n<p>This is part of what is called &quot;Betriebsrisiko&quot;:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Der Arbeitgeber hat das Risiko der Unmöglichkeit der Arbeitsleistung aus im Betrieb liegenden Gründen schlechthin zu tragen und bleibt zur Lohnfortzahlung verpflichtet, auch wenn diese Gründe nicht betriebstechnische Störungsursachen haben oder auf einem Versagen der sachlichen oder persönlichen Mittel des Betriebes beruhen, sondern von außen auf das Unternehmen einwirken (BAG, 09.03.1983 - 4 AZR 301/80). Damit sind gerade die Ursachen angesprochen, die von außen auf typische Betriebsmittel (z. B. Maschinen, Fabrikgebäude, Heizungsanlagen) einwirken und sich für den Arbeitgeber als ein Fall der höheren Gewalt darstellen, z. B. Naturkatastrophen (Erdbeben, Überschwemmungen, Brände), Unglücksfälle sowie extreme Witterungsverhältnisse. In allen diesen Fällen hat der Arbeitgeber das Betriebsrisiko zu tragen (so BAG aaO, bestätigt durch BAG, 23.9.2015 - 5 AZR 146/14, Rn. 22).</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http://www.jura-basic.de/aufruf.php?file=6&amp;art=&amp;find=Arbeitsrecht_Betriebsrisiko\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Source</a></p>\n<p>Translation:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The employer must bear the risk of the impossibility of work performance for reasons within the company and remains obligated to continue to pay wages, even if these reasons are not due to operational disruptions or are based on a failure of the material or personal resources of the company, but have an external effect on the company (BAG, 09.03.1983 - 4 AZR 301/80). This refers precisely to causes that affect typical operating resources (e.g. machines, factory buildings, heating systems) from the outside and present themselves to the employer as a case of force majeure, e.g. natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, fires), accidents and extreme weather conditions. In all these cases, the employer has to bear the operating risk (thus BAG loc.cit., confirmed by BAG, 23.9.2015 - 5 AZR 146/14, para. 22).</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>As an example, <a href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20050128011822/http://www.lexrex.de/rechtsprechung/entscheidungen/ctg1079949363128/530.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">here</a> is a court decision of such a case.</p>\n<p>Please note that during a time when you cannot do your original job, assuming a normal employment contract that has the default clause &quot;and other tasks as required by the employer&quot; in it, your employer may ask you to do other tasks instead that day. As long as they are not dangerous, you may end up finally cleaning all your desks, watering the plants, cleaning the kitchen and sweeping the hallway. Maybe help by calling customers, landlines used to work without external electricity, maybe they still do. You get paid for working, you might be assigned other tasks.</p>\n<p>Even if you get sent home early (lets say the heating broke and the repairman is only coming the next day), <em>they still need to pay you</em> for your regular working hours.</p>\n<p>They do <em>not</em> need to pay you for overtime. Overtime is not something you can just &quot;take&quot;, it needs to be accepted by both sides and obviously the company would never accept that you work &quot;overtime&quot; staring at walls doing nothing. So saying &quot;oh, we cannot work today, great, today is the day I wanted to do 3 hours of overtime, pay up!&quot; is not going to fly.</p>\n<p>If <em>they ask you</em>, if you can stay longer than normal and work after the problem is solved, then obviously they need to pay overtime.</p>\n<p>Please note that you still need to be available for work. You cannot just decide for yourself to not come in. If you leave without the company officially sending you home, you just left work and are absent. You will not be paid for that.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 88862, "body": "<p><strong>Company office or co-working space?</strong></p>\n<p>If the workplace was provided by the company, the answer by <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/88843/work-time-when-unable-to-work-due-to-power-outage-germany/88850#88850\">gnasher729</a> applies. You were not even required to take your break at that point, if it wasn't the normal lunch time.</p>\n<p>These days some workers are working either from home or from a self-provided offices, which would put more responsibility for providing a workspace (including power and internet connection) on themselves.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "employment", "germany", "workplace" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94653, "body": "<p>So many things were not addressed, so a precise answer is not possible.<br>\nBut to try to raise the proper questions you should be thinking about:</p>\n<p><strong>Should the school have known the permission slip was forged?</strong><br>\nWas the forgery particularly bad, and the school was lax in not examining it? Did the student have a history of forging slips that the school should have been aware of?</p>\n<p>If the school was negligent in accepting an obviously bad signature, they may find their exposure is increased. If the school had no reasonable way to know the slip was forged, they were acting reasonably in taking the student on an excursion.</p>\n<p><strong>Was the injury typical, foreseeable and recoverable?</strong><br>\nSuch as a broken ankle on a hike? Minor accidents happen even when all reasonable precautions are taken. The injury will heal with time and care.</p>\n<p><strong>Was the activity that lead to the injury inherently risky / dangerous?</strong><br>\nThere is definitely a question of if the school took all reasonable precautions. Even if permission was legitimately given, the school is responsible for taking reasonable precautions, <em>especially</em> if the activity has inherit and obvious dangers. (for example, river-rafting or rock climbing)</p>\n<p><strong>What sort of &quot;responsibility&quot; are you interested in?</strong><br>\nIf you're asking who is financially responsible for the cost of treating the injury, then regardless of how it occurred, it would likely fall to the child's health insurance (presumably provided by the parents).</p>\n<p>If the school was truly negligent in allowing a forged permission slip to a dangerous activity, then they could be found responsible for extraordinary costs associated with the injury, other costs (pain, suffering, loss of opportunity, emotional consequences, etc) and perhaps even punitive damages.</p>\n<p>If you're suggesting that someone might be <em>criminally</em> responsible, then a very high bar would need to be cleared. It would need to be proven that a school representative (eg. teacher or administrator) <em>deliberately</em> put the kid in danger for some reason, <em>knowing</em> what the likely outcome would be. That standard seems extremely unlikey to be met.</p>\n", "score": 16 }, { "answer_id": 94648, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>Assuming consent is actually required¹ and the forged signature is convincing enough: in absence of statute or case law to the contrary (that I can find) I suggest that the school has accepted <em>loco parentis</em> responsibility for the child by taking him on the trip.</p>\n<p>Also assuming the injury was caused by the school's lack of proper safeguarding, negligence, recklessness etc the school would - depending on the particular circumstances - be responsible for the injury as the following government's <em>Health and safety: responsibilities and duties for schools</em> guidance would apply:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Teachers and other staff in schools have a common law duty when in charge of pupils to take the same care of them as they would as a parent.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/health-and-safety-advice-for-schools/responsibilities-and-duties-for-schools#duties-on-employees\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Source</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p>¹NB consent is not always required.\nThe government's <em>Health and safety on educational visits</em> guidance establishes that:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A school must always get written consent for nursery age children.</p>\n<p>For children over nursery age, written consent is not needed for most trips, as they’re part of the curriculum. However, it’s good practice to tell parents about them.</p>\n<p>Written consent is usually only needed for trips that:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>need a higher level of risk assessment</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>are outside normal school hours</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/health-and-safety-on-educational-visits/health-and-safety-on-educational-visits#when-to-get-consent-from-parents\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Source</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 94647, "body": "<h2>The school has a duty of care towards its students</h2>\n<p>If they discharged that duty, they are not responsible (liable); if they didn’t, they are.</p>\n<p>The duty is discharged by acting reasonably. Without knowing what the school did or did not do and how, if at all, that contributed to the injury, it’s impossible to guess if they met that standard.</p>\n<p>This is the same as the negligence standard that applies to everybody. The only difference with a school is that the duty always exists towards students and the duty is non-delegable, that is, even if control is passed to someone else (e.g. the bus or venue operator) the school still holds the duty (as well as the delegate).</p>\n", "score": 9 } ]

[ "australia", "minor", "school", "duty-of-care" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94663, "body": "<blockquote>\n<ol>\n<li>How many indictments does it take for Donald Trump to be imprisoned?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>An unlimited amount. Imprisonment is usually authorized as a result of a conviction rather than from an indictment.</p>\n<p>Pretrial detention following an indictment but prior to a conviction is permitted, but discretionary in the judgment of the judge. Also, there is a right to post a judicially determined reasonable bond to obtain release from pretrial detention after one is indicted and before one is convicted in the vast majority of cases (including the ones that President Trump is facing).</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li>Can a person who is indicted, before running for president, become president?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes. Indeed, the majority view of legal scholars (it is has never been tested in a real case) is that someone who is convicted and serving prison sentence can still become President if that is who the voters choose.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>What's the purpose of indicting Mr. Trump if indictments are only an accusation?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://i.stack.imgur.com/gzUnW.png\" rel=\"noreferrer\"><img src=\"https://i.stack.imgur.com/gzUnW.png\" alt=\"enter image description here\" /></a></p>\n<p>An indictment is a pre-requisite to trying someone for a felony in federal court. To convict someone of a crime one needs to first indict them, then have a jury trial, and then have a jury unanimously vote to convict a person, before they can be convicted of a crime and sentenced for it. Even after conviction, there is a statutory (but not a constitutional) right to a direct appeal of that conviction to an appellate court.</p>\n<p>Also, an indictment is more than a mere accusation. An indictment in a determination of a <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_juries_in_the_United_States#Rubber_stamp_for_the_prosecution\" rel=\"noreferrer\">grand jury</a> that probable cause exists to believe that the person indicted committed the crime charged. In the federal court system grand juries are composed of 16 to 23 members and 12 members of the grand jury must concur in a decision to indict a defendant on a charge for there to be an indictment on that charge.</p>\n<p>This prevents people from enduring criminal prosecutions on charges that a majority of a grand jury finds are so baseless that there is not sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the defendant committed that crime. The grand jury must base its decision to indict or not on actual evidence in support of the charges in the form of sworn witness testimony and exhibits, not just the allegations of the prosecutor.</p>\n<p>As a practical matter, the standards of professionalism in federal criminal prosecutions is so high that <a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/11/24/the-rarity-of-a-federal-grand-jury-not-indicting-visualized/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">almost all charges sought by federal prosecutors from grand juries result in indictments on those charges</a> (federal grand juries refuse to indict approximately one in 16,000 times).</p>\n<p>But, in state courts that use grand juries, which can't pick and choose only the best cases to prosecute, grand juries routinely refuse to indict defendants on a substantial share of charges brought to them by prosecutors (on the order of one in 20). One source <a href=\"http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2020/b2019_20/committees/ctte_s_jud_1/documents/testimony/20200123_04.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">notes</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Statistical figures showing a higher prevalence of grand jury\nreluctance to follow the government in ages past are almost\nnonexistent. However, a table of felony arrests in New York County\nbetween 1900 and 1907 found on page 111 of the 1926 book The Prisoner\nat the Bar by Arthur Train provides some rare illumination. In those\nseven years, some 5,214 out of 57,241 people were arrested by the\npolice on felony charges whom New York state grand jurors decided not\nto indict.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Grand juries are especially likely to decline to indict defendants in cases involving <a href=\"https://www.nfl.com/news/second-texas-grand-jury-declines-to-indict-browns-qb-deshaun-watson-on-criminal-\" rel=\"noreferrer\">celebrities</a>, <a href=\"http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2020/b2019_20/committees/ctte_s_jud_1/documents/testimony/20200123_04.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">politicians</a>, <a href=\"https://abcnews.go.com/US/breonna-taylor-case-sparks-renewed-scrutiny-grand-juries/story?id=73438566\" rel=\"noreferrer\">law enforcement officers</a>, and other <a href=\"https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mississippi-grand-jury-declines-indict-woman-emmett-killing-rcna42274\" rel=\"noreferrer\">high profile cases with political implications</a>. <em>See also</em> Kaeleigh Wiliams, &quot;<a href=\"https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&amp;context=lawjournalonline\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Grand Juries Should Not Hear Police Misconduct Cases: Grand Juries will Indict Anything, but a Police Officer</a>&quot; <em>SLU Law Journal Online</em> 79 (2021).</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94662, "body": "<ol>\n<li><p>You could have 100 indictments. You have to wait until one of the cases is finished with a &quot;guilty&quot; verdict.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The possibility may not have occured to anyone. Obviously yes if indictments end with a &quot;not guilty&quot; verdict.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>When you go to court accused of murder, until the verdict is given it is &quot;only&quot; an accusation. That's the same for all criminal court cases. &quot;Innocent until proven guilty&quot;. You start with an accusation, hopefully one that the prosecutor believes they can prove, then a judge and/or jury hear evidence, and then there is usually a &quot;guilty&quot; or &quot;not guilty&quot; verdict.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94664, "body": "<ol>\n<li>Indictments are just accusations. Until convicted, Trump is innocent.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>Jailing people between indictment and trial is considered a necessary evil, not a good thing. It's done to either protect the public or ensure the defendent shows up. In cases where neither is a problem, the accused isn't locked up.</p>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li><p>Crimes and pubishment doesn't stop anyone for running for office, or from holding office. Only the voters can stop a candidate. Even an incarcerated inmate can legally be elected president.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>You need to accuse someone before you prove they did what you accuse them of. First the accusal, then the trial.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "prison", "us-president", "indictment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94656, "body": "<p>The apportionment of fault will be highly case specific, based on ordinary principles of negligence.</p>\n<p>In one example, the fault was apportioned with 60% of the fault to the late left turner and 40% of the fault to the driver advancing imprudently into the intersection on a green light. See <em>Pierce v. ING Insurance</em>, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/1q951\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2006 NSSM 31</a> (my annotations and emphasis):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[11] <strong>I believe that Mr. Pierce [the left-turning driver] was late in entering this\nintersection. I do not accept that he could not have stopped on the\namber which he asserts. However, I am not prepared to find that he is\nsolely responsible at law for the collision.</strong></p>\n<p>[12] As stated above, I am unable to conclude with precise\nexactitude which signal light was on when Mr. Pierce [the left-turning driver] entered the\nintersection. I can conclude that the amber light had ceased and the\ngreen light for Mr. Williams [the through driver] had turned on at some point prior to the\ncollision. The intersection is a well known intersection and given Mr.\nMacKinnon’s evidence of the relative speed of Mr. Pierce’s vehicle and\nwhat I understand to be the distances involved, I cannot accept that\nthe signal light was green and turned to amber as Mr. Pierce entered\nthe intersection.</p>\n<p>[13] On the other hand I am struck by two inescapable facts.\nFirst, the fact that Mr. MacKinnon who was stopped next to Mr.\nWilliams did not proceed through the intersection because he knew it\nwould not be safe to do so. While to some extent I take Mr. Boyte’s\npoint that Mr. MacKinnon was, because of his experience with the\nintersection “hyper aware” to the prospect of drivers being late, I\ncannot entirely dismiss the fact that he obviously exercised prudence\nin not proceeding. The fact that Mr. Williams did not see Mr. Pierce’s\nvehicle is not an answer. In fact, just to the opposite in my view.</p>\n<p>[14] <strong>In my opinion, there is clear a duty on drivers stopped at an intersection to ascertain that the intersection is clear before proceeding once a light turns from red to green. Had Mr. Williams discharged this duty, the collision could well have been avoided.</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Your scenario is even more stark—not just a single late left turner, but an entire line of late left turners, readily apparent as an obstacle to safe advance. I would not be surprised if a judge were to attribute even more than 40% fault to the driver entering on the green.</p>\n<p>The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has even said (<em>Pirie v. Skantz</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2016/2016bcca70/2016bcca70.html#par14\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2016 BCCA 70, para. 14</a>):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... where a through driver ... should have become aware of the left-turning driver’s own disregard of the law in circumstances that afforded him a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident through the exercise of reasonable care, <strong>the through driver may be found wholly or primarily at fault for the accident</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 10 } ]

[ "united-states", "traffic", "accident" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94652, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>&quot;Lead defendant&quot; is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be &quot;principal defendant&quot; which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications).</p>\n<p>It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/759/rule/3.32?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii)</a> Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/drafting-indictment\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Source</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p>_{Although tagged <a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a>, I have followed the guidance from the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic\">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;}</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-states", "legal-terms" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94641, "body": "<h2>Garbled and ambiguous?</h2>\n<p>I guess it took you all of 20 seconds to work out what it meant. Why do think a court can’t do that too?</p>\n<p>Documents contain typos, that doesn’t necessarily make them ambiguous.</p>\n<p>The automatic correction of typos is known as the <a href=\"https://www.azmilaw.com/insights/courts-decision-on-obvious-typo-errors-in-contracts/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Scrivener’s doctrine</a> - a scrivener being an almost archaic term for a clerk, scribe, or notary, because documents were written for many centuries before the invention of the typewriter.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "liability", "court" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94630, "body": "<p>If there has been no trial establishing Bob's guilt, the bank does not know that it was Bob who did rob the bank.</p>\n<p>Even if the bank has Bob on the security video feed, claiming that, &quot;As my name is Bob, I will shoot anyone who does not follow my instructions&quot;, and Bob left behind his driver's licence at the heist, the bank does not <em>know</em> that it was Bob.</p>\n<p>The bank could sue Bob in a civil action in order to get the money back. It would have to follow some procedures to notify Bob of the lawsuit and, if he did not appear, it would win by default. If Bob were to appear, he could make his case about why the bank should not be entitled to that money (&quot;It was not me&quot; / &quot;I only took $1,000&quot; / whatever).</p>\n<p>After the trial had happened, the bank still could not take the money right away. Maybe Bob would offer some other assets worth $50,000 to pay the bank.</p>\n<p>After it had become evident that Bob was unwilling or unable to comply with the payments, then the bank could ask the court to seize Bob's assets. The court would decide which assets could be seized, would order to have them seized, and then would provide them to the bank.</p>\n<p>That does not mean that Bob would be free to use his $100,000 during this time. Before the trial is over, the bank could request the judge to freeze Bob's account, as a way of ensuring that he does not withdraw the money from it. The judge would evaluate the likelihood of Bob losing the trial and refusing to honour it (and whatever Bob's lawyer's objections to this are) and decide on the issue. But that would only affect Bob's ability to use the money, not his ownership.</p>\n", "score": 34 }, { "answer_id": 94659, "body": "<p>I don't know if it's normal or not, but my Credit Union's membership agreement says that they can permanently freeze the account without warning to members who &quot;cause a loss&quot;. They can also seize money for &quot;obligations&quot; though I don't know if that requires a trial or not.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>At any time and without notice we may suspend or terminate your Account or remove you from any Account on which you are an Authorized Signer or a Joint Account Holder or may require you to close your Account if...</p>\n<p>g. You cause a loss to BECU...</p>\n<p>...Suspensions may take the form of a\ntemporary or permanent “hold” or “freeze” on your Account at our\ndiscretion without prior notice to you...</p>\n<p>... If we\nterminate or close your Account, we will mail to the Primary Account Holder all funds in the Account, less any\nobligations owed to BECU by any Account Holder...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.becu.org/-/media/Files/PDF/6514.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">https://www.becu.org/-/media/Files/PDF/6514.pdf</a></p>\n", "score": 11 } ]

[ "theft", "banking", "any-jurisdiction", "robbery" ]

[ { "answer_id": 4818, "body": "<p><strong>I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days).</strong></p>\n\n<p>Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. </p>\n\n<p><strong>It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA.</strong></p>\n\n<p>Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account.</p>\n\n<p><strong>It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe?</strong></p>\n\n<p>Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks <em>may be</em> required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take.</p>\n\n<p>Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable.</p>\n\n<p>If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report.</p>\n\n<p>** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not \"cashed\" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. </p>\n\n<p>Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 4736, "body": "<p>You will need to identify a defendant in order to bring any claim.</p>\n\n<p>This isn't something you have a lot of control over - only law enforcement can require the production of surveillance records in the absence of court proceedings (you would otherwise subpoena such records from the bank). You'd need to contact the police in order to have them investigate, and until they identify a suspect, there's no way for you to proceed.</p>\n\n<p>Forgery - <a href=\"http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&amp;group=00001-01000&amp;file=470-483.5\" rel=\"nofollow\">California Penal Code 470</a> makes it a crime to commit fraud by forging a signature.</p>\n\n<p>You therefore wouldn't be bringing a claim against the defendant - the State would. I also am not aware of statutory restitution requirements for forgery in California, so you would need to rely on restitution ordered in a sentence passed upon a favorable verdict.</p>\n\n<p>Unfortunately, as far as I know, there's no statutory time limit on the production of records, however intentional and excessive delays may leave the subject of the warrant or subpoena open to action for obstruction.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94658, "body": "<p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> This depends on the jurisdiction, but probably holds in many places. I am not a lawyer licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, or a lawyer. This is just information I picked up here and there, mostly in England.</p>\n<p><strong>A bank account is a debt</strong> - you have loaned the bank money, repayable on your demand.</p>\n<p>Your account balance is not &quot;your money&quot; - it is an <em>accounting of how much they owe you</em> (or if you have an overdraft, how much you owe them).</p>\n<p>It is a debt payable on demand, and a cheque is such a demand.</p>\n<p>However a <strong>fraudulent</strong> cheque is not a valid demand, and if the bank pays on a fraudulent cheque, this does not reduce their debt to you.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&quot;So somebody pretended they were me, asked for money, and you believed them. How is that my problem?&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It does not matter:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>how good the forgery was,</li>\n<li>how much care they took</li>\n<li>whether they were negligent or not</li>\n</ul>\n<p>It <strong>only</strong> matters if it was a <strong>valid demand</strong> by you, someone authorized by you, or someone you've agreed in your contract that they may take to be authorized.</p>\n<p>(This means for example that if you give your credit card to someone, e.g. a child or spouse, then you have authorized them to spend your money, and that's your responsibility; but if your credit card is stolen, then it is not your responsibility.)</p>\n<p><strong>Who decides</strong></p>\n<p>The court decides, if it goes to court.</p>\n<p>Once you have made a valid demand for full payment, you can sue them for the full amount you are owed.</p>\n<p>Generally you must say something like this:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>What you want:</strong> I want such-and-such amount of money</li>\n<li><strong>Why you are entitled to it:</strong> Because that is what the bank owes me, and their accounting is wrong, because that cheque was a forgery.</li>\n<li><strong>What you want the court to do:</strong> And I want the court to order them to pay me.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>You will have to produce evidence. This might be:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Your cheque stubs, proving that you didn't write the cheque</li>\n<li>Your testimony on oath, swearing that you didn't write or authorize the payment.</li>\n<li>Proof you were not in the place where the payment was made.</li>\n<li>Some other form of evidence.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Once you have provided <em>some</em> evidence (even if it is only your sworn testimony) it is up to the bank to provide their evidence.</p>\n<p>The court will decide who they believe, and you will either get your money, or not.</p>\n<p><strong>What to do</strong></p>\n<p>Probably best to let the bank sort it out. This sort of thing happens a lot, and most big banks are pretty good at sorting it out.</p>\n<p>That's good if this is a genuine mistake by the bank (they paid when they shouldn't have), but if you are trying to defraud the bank, then it's bad for you, because they also deal with that a lot.</p>\n<p>It will probably take longer than you would like, but if you keep hassling them then they will probably either get to the bottom of it, or give up and reimburse you.</p>\n<p>If you suffer any consequential losses, such as from being unable to pay bills and getting penalties, they may well agree to pay those too, provided you are polite but insistent.</p>\n<p>But be careful:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>If it turns out that it was your son or daughter, you may be bringing the criminal law down on them. That's probably not what you want.</li>\n<li>So <strong>first be absolutely sure that you don't know who it was</strong>, and that you are happy to do that.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "california", "finance", "fraud", "banking" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94607, "body": "<p>Does this person have witnesses to his existence? Particularly before the age of five?</p>\n<p>Under 8 U.S. Code § 1401, native-born citizens include</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If he appears out of nowhere, he is likely to be suspect of illegal immigration. Age may be a factor there, too.</p>\n", "score": 19 }, { "answer_id": 94610, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>As a result, this individual has no SSN and might not legally exist.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>A living person exists. It is not necessary to be registered anywhere to exist.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Could they be in legal jeopardy in any way?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>They won't be able to work until they register with the Social Security Administration. As suggested in another answer, they may have difficulty establishing eligibility for a Social Security number.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Can the US or their state of birth (lets say WV) compel them to register in some way?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The US could, as could the state of residence, for example by requiring the person to explain how he or she is supporting him or herself. Under the given facts the state of birth is unknown. (If the person's place of birth is somehow determined to have been in one of the states then the person was born in the United States and the person is a US citizen, so the other problems disappear.)</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 94624, "body": "<p>It's difficult to document that a law requiring a person who cannot obtain proof of birth in the US to register his/her birth does not exist, since there is such a vast volume of state and federal law. But a document from <a href=\"https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/guides/A4en.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">USCIS</a> states</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If you were born in the United States, you do not need to apply to\nUSCIS for any evidence of citizenship. Your birth certificate issued\nwhere you were born is proof of your citizenship.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There is a footnote explaining this does necessarily apply to children of foreign diplomats.</p>\n<p>So if there is a law, it would have to be a West Virginia law, and I am not aware of such a law. If such a law does exist, and violation of the law is a crime, then the State of West Virginia would have to prove all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>\n<p>The first element would be that the person was born in West Virginia. If proof beyond a reasonable doubt exists, and is in the possession of the prosecutor, no doubt the person's lawyer could find a way to compel the state to perform the necessary registration on the basis of the evidence the state already possesses, and the case becomes moot.</p>\n<p>Another element that is likely to be in the law is that the person knows he/she was born in West Virginia. But if there isn't enough evidence to complete the registration process, the person could argue that he/she does not know if he/she were born in West Virginia.</p>\n<p>If the person works, it is likely the person will appear to violate tax laws, because even if income taxes are withheld from wages, with no SSN to connect the person to the money that was withheld, it will appear the person failed to pay taxes.</p>\n<p>In response to a comment by ohwilleke I will show why it was never the responsibility of the person who was born to file a birth certificate. The <a href=\"http://www.wvlegislature.gov/wvcode/chapterentire.cfm?chap=16&amp;art=5&amp;section=10\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">relevant WV law states</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a) A certificate of birth for each live birth which occurs in this\nstate shall be filed with the section of vital statistics...</p>\n<p>[if the birth is outside an institution the birth shall be reported\nby]</p>\n<p>(1) The physician in attendance at or immediately after the birth;</p>\n<p>(2) Any other person in attendance at or immediately after the birth;</p>\n<p>(3) The father or the mother, or, in the absence of the father and the\ninability of the mother, the person in charge of the premises where\nthe birth occurred; or</p>\n<p>(4) Any other person qualified by the department by rule to establish\nthe facts of birth.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>I think it would be absurd to interpret the newborn as being in attendance at his/her own birth, and equally absurd to consider him/her to be qualified to establish the facts of birth.</p>\n\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "birth-certificate" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94651, "body": "<p><a href=\"https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/117363/tehran-to-take-islamabad-to-court-over-breach-of-gas-pipeline-deal\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">According to reports</a>, one potential forum is the <a href=\"https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-of-arbitration/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">International Court of Arbitration</a>. All reports I see say that the agreement specifies that the forum will be an arbitration forum. Whether it can be <em>any</em> arbitration forum or if it must be the ICC, or can be selected from a list, depends on the specific wording of the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement of 2009, which I have not been able to find.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "international", "jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94120, "body": "<p>See Harold J. Berman, &quot;The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale&quot; (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 1651, p. 1691, n. 101:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>the translation of &quot;reason&quot; into &quot;reasonableness&quot; and the exaltation of &quot;common sense&quot; are English developments of the seventeenth century, to which Coke contributed.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>At p. 1718-19:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Coke had said it is the nature of law to be reasonable, and that the test of reasonableness is its ability to withstand the test of time.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See also S.E. Thorne, &quot;Dr. Bonham's Case&quot; (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 543, p. 543:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>To students of the origins of American constitutional law and theory no judicial utterance of Sir Edward Coke can surpass in interest and importance his so-called <em>dictum</em> in <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dr._Bonham%27s_Case\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Dr. Bonham's case</a>, decided in the Court of Common Pleas in 1610. It is widely regarded as foreshadowing not merely the power which American courts to-day exercise in the disallowance of statutes on the ground of their conflict with the constitution, but also that very test of 'reasonableness' which is the ultimate flowing of that power.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This concept as a ground of review arose in the context of &quot;conflict between Parliament and the Crown over the nature and limits of prerogative and the common law&quot; (Michael Foran, &quot;The Constitutional Foundations of Reasonableness Review: Artificial Reason and Wrongful Discrimination&quot; (2022) 26:3 Edinburgh Law Review 295, p. 299).</p>\n<p>In one case, the <a href=\"http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/1607/J23.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Case of Prohibitions</em> (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 E.R. 1342 (K.B.)</a>, Coke repealed a judgment of King James I, on the basis that the judgment was not grounded in the common law. Coke said: &quot;causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the <em>artificial reason and judgment of law</em>.&quot;</p>\n<p>This is in contrast to a view that Crown action would not be substantively reviewable. By defining reasonableness as something that can only be determined through the wisdom of judges, Coke was broadening the judicial power.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 94131, "body": "<p>The <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reasonable_person\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">&quot;reasonable man&quot; standard in the common law of torts</a> is sometimes attributed to the English case of <em><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vaughan_v_Menlove\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Vaughan v. Menlove</a></em> (1837).</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "legal-terms", "legal-history" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94646, "body": "<p>It appears that:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>This language was seen as a bit ridiculous and unnecessary even at the time, and more so as the 19th century progressed.</li>\n<li>The main objection is that the language is redundant or merely decorative. There was a general trend to make indictments describe the alleged offences in more ordinary language, with use of precise legal terms when needed. In particular, indictments were made to match the legal elements of the offence that were required to be proved, rather than being polemics about the wickedness of the offender.</li>\n<li>Different jurisdictions abandoned it at different rates, depending on local circumstances. There does not appear to be any particular campaign about it, and since the language was seen as <em>unnecessary</em> rather than <em>wrong</em>, some prosecutors continued to use it without problems.</li>\n<li>Religious freedom, or establishment of religion, has nothing do to with it. Much of the common-law understanding was driven from England where the constitutional settlement was completely different. Despite the mention of God and the Devil, this was a completely stock phrase that was devoid of any real religious content.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>My main sources here are 19th century legal textbooks, which contained some citations to case law. There does not seem to have been very much statutory activity.</p>\n<p>Quoting from Joel Prentiss Bishop's <em>New criminal procedure; or, New commentaries on the law of pleading and evidence and the practice in criminal cases</em> (Chicago: T. H. Flood, 4th ed., 1895), <a href=\"https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104125069&amp;seq=346\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 501 in volume 1</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>It was formerly the style, nor at the present day is it quite abolished, to charge, especially in treason and felony, that the defendant did it &quot;not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil.&quot; Both in reason and by all authority, these words are not necessary. Their original purpose seems to have been to make the accusation correspond in form to the fact; for, as Cotton Mather said, speaking of what he and others of this time believed: &quot;When men do commit a crime for which they are to be indicted, they are usually moved by the instigation of the devil.&quot; Yet even in this view, they could never have been required; because in law, no &quot;instigation&quot; to crime justifies the doer, so that the devil's instigation is wholly <em>immaterial</em>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Among other sources he cites Joseph Chitty's <em>A practical treatise on the criminal law</em>, which in an early American edition (Philadelphia: Isaac Riley, 1819) confirms <a href=\"https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=chi.37603137&amp;seq=217\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">at 240</a> that these words concerning the Devil &quot;though usual, are not necessary to be inserted&quot;, elaborating that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>where the common law, or a statute, forbids the doing of a thing, the doing it wilfully is indictable, though without any corrupt motive, and consequently it need not in any case be averred.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There are several other textbooks that discuss related but less colorful terms, such as &quot;wilfully&quot; or &quot;wickedly&quot;, using essentially the same argument for why they are unnecessary. The idea is that when somebody is being tried for murder, the prosecutor is trying to show that they killed someone on purpose - not that they were wicked while doing it, which is implicit, or that the Devil was metaphysically responsible, which is irrelevant.</p>\n<p>Many of these books seem to copy the language from Joseph Burn's <em>Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer</em> at <a href=\"https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sI4DAAAAQAAJ&amp;lpg=PA328&amp;ots=UwmVKb2q0K&amp;pg=PA349#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 11 of the entry on &quot;Indictment&quot;</a> (references omitted) in volume 3 (London: 26th ed., 1831):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The words &quot;<em>wickedly, maliciously, of his own wicked and corrupt mind, being a person of evil disposition, &amp;c.</em>&quot; are, in general, mere matter of aggravation and not material. But where an act must be done with a particular <em>intent</em>, in order to render it criminal, an evil intention must be averred upon the record; and, in such case, the intent must be proved as laid or the variance will be fatal.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>From the general tenor of these books, we can see that there were great difficulties with indictments that did not match the legal requirements of the offences to be tried: there are several accounts of defendants who were able to defeat the charges because of drafting problems. Additionally, the idea of a right to a fair trial (whether seen as a matter of natural justice, or founded in positive law such as the Sixth Amendment right &quot;to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation&quot;) added pressure on prosecutors to express the charges with precision and clarity. The textbooks are overall quite scathing about the inclusion of decorative phrases.</p>\n<p>In case law, an American case that is directly on point is from Massachusetts, <em>Commonwealth v Murphy</em> 11 Cush. 472 (1853), which apparently confirms the devil-reference as unnecessary, though I haven't located the primary source. For the general idea of these references being not essential, the textbooks mainly cite an English case from the Court of King's Bench, <a href=\"https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_English_Reports_King_s_Bench_Divisio/D5VDAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;pg=PA1365-IA34&amp;printsec=frontcover\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>R v Philipps</em> (1805) 6 East 472</a>. The Lord Chief Justice, <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Law,_1st_Baron_Ellenborough\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Lord Ellenborough</a>, considered an indictment alleging among other things that Philipps &quot;wickedly and maliciously did endeavour to stir up, provoke, and excite [someone else] to challenge the defendant to fight a duel with him&quot;. Citing <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Murray,_1st_Earl_of_Mansfield\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Lord Mansfield</a> in the seditious libel case of <a href=\"https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=AVcDAAAAQAAJ&amp;vq=formal&amp;pg=PA2666#v=snippet&amp;f=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>R v Woodfall</em> (1770) 5 Burr 2667</a>, he said that terms of opprobrium like &quot;wickedly&quot; were &quot;mere formal inferences of law&quot; and did not contribute anything material to the description of the offence and any required element of intent. The defendant's counsel in <em>Woodfall</em> had objected to what the judge described as &quot;the usual epithets&quot;, and the judge told the jury to ignore them but concentrate on the alleged facts: they were not being asked to determine whether the publication was sufficiently odious to deserve the colourful language used in the indictment. By extension, juries are not asked to make determinations about the theological circumstances surrounding sinful acts and the agency of the devil.</p>\n<p>The 1805 case, coincidentally about duelling, is from after the Burr-Hamilton duel and it evidently took a while for this logic to penetrate the legal community in general (Bishop in 1895 calling the devil phrase &quot;[not] quite abolished&quot;). Notably, while the case does not rest on any specifics of the American legal or cultural order, it does appear to have been influential on American jurists who accepted it as a statement of the common-law position. The American writers do not raise any objections to the phrase on grounds relating to religion, and universally treat it as &quot;stock&quot; language.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "legal-history", "indictment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94640, "body": "<h2>You ask the wrong question first</h2>\n<p>What do you save in the database? Let's take an example of a door:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save who passed this door?</li>\n<li>Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save when the door was opened?</li>\n<li>Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save both?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Only <strong>now</strong>, once you have established that you have any interest in the door passing at all, you have to start to figure out if it is personal data - if you have no interest in saving it in the first place, there's little reason to figure that out.</p>\n<p>Let's say you have a legitimate interest to save both, because behind the door is the server room, and physical access is limited to authorized personnel and you want to know when who was in there for figuring out if or who was responsible for changes.</p>\n<p>Now, which of the data is Personal Identifiable Data for you?</p>\n<ul>\n<li>You know where the door is. That's in itself Location Data, but if you don't know who or when the door was opened, then it is not PII.\n<ul>\n<li>It becomes PII if you connect it with a person.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li>A pin-code used by the whole department is not <em>always</em> PII, but can become PII in a very small to medium-sized department.\n<ul>\n<li>e.g. one of all the 20 000 employees in a facility is just saying &quot;an employee&quot; and is not identifiable, but one of 20 is much more likely is, as you can correlate that with <em>other</em> data to possibly identify a smaller group.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li>The Employee ID or Card would be most definitely PII if saved.\n<ul>\n<li>Similar, if the login date is saved to the account list on some server.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li>The timestamp on itself is not a PII, if <strong>only</strong> the timestamp is recorded and no other information exists. Like, if the front door only logs &quot;The door was opened/closed&quot; but not who did it, to count customers or schedule maintenance.\n<ul>\n<li>However, together with other information - such as the door being access restricted and the paystubs from timekeeping when all those access carriers were in the building and having a tight access restriction to a decently small group (see above) - that can quickly become PII.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>It is enough that the information from different information sources compiled can become enough to say &quot;it was one of these few people&quot;, as that is enough to make it identifiable under GDPR Art.4. Once you know it is PII, you need to handle it as PII. As such, you need consent or a legitimate interest. That's why I pulled the <em>other</em> test before figuring out if it is indeed PII: Ic you have already figured out that this data is required for some legitimate reason, such as that you need to know the door operation log to ensure some <em>other</em> compliance, then you can proceed through the other parts of the GDPR compliance.</p>\n<p>Now, OP asked about a login timestamp. That is <em>by necessity</em> bound to an identifier, such as a login name. As such, it is the Keycard or Employee ID example and automatically PII because it is tied to a PII.</p>\n<h3>Definitions</h3>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://gdpr.eu/article-4-definitions/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">GDPR defines PII in Article 4</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>‘personal data’ means <strong>any information</strong> relating to an identified or <strong>identifiable natural person</strong> (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is <strong>one who can be identified, directly or indirectly</strong>, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, <em>an identification number</em>, <strong>location data</strong>, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://www.dol.gov/general/ppii#:%7E:text=Further%2C%20PII%20is%20defined%20as,with%20other%20data%20elements%2C%20i.e.%2C\" rel=\"noreferrer\">US Department of labor</a> defines quite similar</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>PII is defined as information:</p>\n<p>(i) that directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address, social security number or other identifying number or code, telephone number, email address, etc.) or</p>\n<p>(ii) by which an agency intends to identify specific individuals in conjunction with other data elements, i.e., indirect identification.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 27 }, { "answer_id": 94639, "body": "<p>The timestamp being among the data related to &quot;an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)&quot;, the user, yes it is personal data.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&amp;from=EN#d1e1489-1-1\" rel=\"noreferrer\">GDPR Article 4(1)</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or\nidentifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural\nperson is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in\nparticular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an\nidentification number, location data, an online identifier or to one\nor more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,\nmental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/what-personal-data_en\" rel=\"noreferrer\">What is personal data? - European Commission</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Personal data is any information that relates to an identified or\nidentifiable living individual. Different pieces of information, which\ncollected together can lead to the identification of a particular\nperson, also constitute personal data.</p>\n<p>Personal data that has been de-identified, encrypted or pseudonymised\nbut can be used to re-identify a person remains personal data and\nfalls within the scope of the GDPR.</p>\n<p>Personal data that has been rendered anonymous in such a way that the\nindividual is not or no longer identifiable is no longer considered\npersonal data. For data to be truly anonymised, the anonymisation must\nbe irreversible. ...</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 21 } ]

[ "gdpr", "privacy", "software", "personal-information" ]

[ { "answer_id": 90446, "body": "<h2>As far as the legal powers of the organisation(s) allow</h2>\n<p>By this, I mean that if what the DEA was doing was allowed under the laws that govern the DEA, and what the NSA was doing was allowed under the laws that govern the NSA, then they can cooperate as much as they want. The could investigate jaywalking together if they wanted (of course, this would have to be jaywalking within Federal jurisdiction).</p>\n<p>Divisions in executive government are practical rather than legal. That is, the executive can carry out &quot;intelligence&quot; and &quot;law enforcement&quot; and as a practical matter, they are carried out by different agencies. However, they are functions of the executive and could be carried out by one mega-agency if they wanted to set things up that way. Indeed, the Department of Homeland Security is such a mega-agency.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94644, "body": "<h2>Intelligence <strong>is</strong> Law Enforcement.</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nachrichtendienste_des_Bundes\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">BND, Verfassungsschutz and MAD and the Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz create <strong>19</strong> branches of intelligence organisations</a>. Those are specially classed as <em>Nachrichtendienste</em> in german law, separate from the federal police branches of Bundeskriminalamt (roughly equivalent ot the FBI), the Zollkriminalamt (roughly the customs and border patrol) and other federal police or military.</p>\n<p>There is a special setup, that bans the intelligence agencies from doing policing in many areas, the <a href=\"https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trennungsgebot_zwischen_Polizei_und_Nachrichtendiensten\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Trennungsgebot</a>.</p>\n<p>However, that does not make them not law enforcement - they enforce <strong>different</strong> laws. The most relevant are the <a href=\"https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundesamt_f%C3%BCr_Verfassungsschutz#Auftrag\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Verfassungsschutz</a> (and similarly the 16 separate Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz). They are tasked with exclusively:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>investigate threats to the german democracy, such as insurgent groups or terrorist groups inside Germany.\n<ul>\n<li>being part of such a group is a crime.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li>Finding spies inside Germany.\n<ul>\n<li>spying in Germany is a crime.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li>Develop guidance documents that govern how to protect state secrets. The same documents are also suggestions for the economy how to protect trade secrets.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "any-jurisdiction", "surveillance" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94613, "body": "<p>Quite the contrary. In most European countries, shechita is - at least under certain conditions - legal.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://i.stack.imgur.com/UzeDf.png\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><img src=\"https://i.stack.imgur.com/UzeDf.png\" alt=\"Map of ritual slaughter laws\" /></a></p>\n<p>Only in the blue-marked countries is it generally forbidden; in the green-marked countries prior anaesthesia is required.</p>\n<p>That is, pre-cut stunning is required in Sweden, Belgium and Denmark (and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, but these are not in the EU). Simultaneous stunning is required in Finland. Post-cut stunning is required in Austria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia and Greece. Only in Slovenia is ritual slaughter banned.</p>\n<p>Map source: <a href=\"https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ritual_slaughter_laws_Europe_map.svg\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ritual_slaughter_laws_Europe_map.svg</a></p>\n", "score": 20 } ]

[ "european-union" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94566, "body": "<p>The primary question is whether remaining silent would constitute a breech of medical ethics. The pertinent ethical principle is <a href=\"https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/ama-code-medical-ethics-opinions-organ-transplantation/2012-03\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">AMA Opinion 2.15</a> One of the requirements is that the donor be assigned an advocate team whose interest is the donor, not the patient, and these should generally be distinct individuals in order to avoid conflict of interest. Assuming that the donor's team is aware of this fact, they have a duty to disclose it, since it materially affects the donor's willingness to donate the organ. The ethical opinion does not specifically address &quot;patient breaking up with a directed donor&quot;, but there is a general obligation to share information, and it would probably be found to be a breach of medical ethics to suppress relevant non-medical information. The ethics of directed donation from live donors is not well-developed.</p>\n<p>I will mention that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Potential donors must be informed that they may withdraw from donation at any time before undergoing the operation and that, should this occur, the health care team is committed to protect the potential donor from pressures to reveal the reasons for withdrawal. If the potential donor withdraws, the health care team should report simply that the individual was unsuitable for donation. From the outset, all involved parties must agree that the reasons why any potential donor does not donate will remain confidential for the potential donor’s protection. In situations of paired, domino, or chain donation withdrawal must still be permitted. Physicians should make special efforts to present a clear and comprehensive description of the commitment being made by the donor and the implications for other parties to the paired donation during the informed consent process.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Neither team can tell the patient that the reason the girlfriend withdrew was because they ratted him out (anyhow, we can suppose she said something to him on her own).</p>\n<p>The hospital knows this fact, and has both a duty to the patient to solve a medical problem but also to the donor to be sure that the consent is informed. The hospital would be suppressing a fact relevant to the donor's willingness to undergo the operation, which is a breach of duty. This fact is not protected by HIPAA, or any other California statute, so does not supersede the obligation to reveal relevant facts.</p>\n", "score": 15 } ]

[ "united-states", "medical", "consent", "law-in-fiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94631, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) protects\ncertain applicants and employees 40 years of age and older from\ndiscrimination on the basis of age in hiring, promotion, discharge,\ncompensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of employment.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/discrimination/agedisc\" rel=\"noreferrer\">U.S. Department of Labor</a>.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>State child labor laws establish minimum ages for certain kinds of work (e.g. working on heavy machinery, or serving alcohol), and age limitations on obtaining commercial driver's licenses and commercial pilot's licenses can as a practical matter impose minimum ages for employment.</p>\n<p>Usually, this is a minimum age for certain jobs between age 12 and 21 depending upon the nature of the work.</p>\n<p>Apart from these limitations, discrimination based upon age in employment is not prohibited in the United States.</p>\n<p>So, for example, if an employer wants to hire 25 years olds rather than 35 year olds, simply because they are younger, this is permitted by law in most or all U.S. states.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 94635, "body": "<h2>“A more junior person” is not <em>necessarily</em> age discrimination</h2>\n<p>If I have a position to fill that is suited to a new graduate then the fact that most new graduates are younger than the average workforce is not, of itself, age discrimination. Similarly, if I have a job for a senior person, they are likely to be older than average.</p>\n<p>Age discrimination happens when, all else being equal, age becomes a selection criteria. Of course, all else is very rarely equal, so I can indulge my bias, unconscious or conscious, and rationalise that I’m not.</p>\n<h2>Is age discrimination illegal?</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/age-discrimination/about-age-discrimination\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Yes</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Age Discrimination Act 2004 protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of age in employment, education, accommodation and the provision of goods and services.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94637, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p>Germany has the <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/agg/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">AGG</a>. It is based on European guidelines, so while the local laws in each country vary and are named differently, each country in the EU will have a similar law.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Ziel des Gesetzes ist, Benachteiligungen aus Gründen der Rasse oder wegen der ethnischen Herkunft, des Geschlechts, der Religion oder Weltanschauung, einer Behinderung, <strong>des Alters</strong> oder der sexuellen Identität zu verhindern oder zu beseitigen.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Translation:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The aim of the law is to prevent or eliminate discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief, disability, <strong>age</strong> or sexual identity.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The law is obviously more complex than that introductory sentence, but yes, there are laws to prevent discrimination by age <em>alone</em>. And while there are other protective laws taking priority (no, you cannot let your 5 year old work in a coal mine...), it <em>should</em> hinder employers to discriminate based on a number alone.</p>\n<p>Obviously you <em>can</em> discriminate based on other factors. For example you <em>can</em> only employ a person with at least ten years of experience. That would probably prevent any person below 30 to get that job, assuming it needs an education first. The government itself does it, allowing anyone to drive motorcycles at the age of 18, but restricting certain types to having 3 years of prior experience. So if you don't own your private racetrack where you piloted one without a license but publicly documented, you will only get a license for those specific types at 21, because you can only start accumulating that experience once you are 18.</p>\n<p>You can also (and the government is the biggest offender here) hire only people with a specific education. For example many government jobs &quot;require&quot; a BSc. But that qualification was only introduced in Germany in 2007. If you had the equivalent of a BSc from lets say 2003, you are out of luck. So any government job will either hire ridiculously overqualified people (the equivalent of an MSc from before is still accepted) or hire only people born after 1989.</p>\n<p>What you mentioned, &quot;junior&quot; vs &quot;senior&quot; has nothing to do with age. Those are experience indicators. A really good developer might be evaluated as &quot;senior&quot; at 30, having had 5-10 years of experience, learning a lot. And I have personally seen 55 year olds that I can only call &quot;junior&quot;, because they did not really learn a lot in their 30 years on the job and still repeat mistakes I would expect from a fresh graduate.</p>\n<p>So <em>&quot;I want someone younger&quot;</em> is illegal discrimination.</p>\n<p><em>&quot;I want someone less experienced&quot;</em> is stupid, but legal.</p>\n<p>But <em>&quot;I want someone cheaper, even if that means they are less experienced&quot;</em> is a perfectly legal business decision, and <em>exactly</em> what a CEO is hired to decide. Whether it is the right decision for that company at that time is something we cannot attest to, but it is always a legal and sometimes even correct decision.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "discrimination", "age" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94625, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be\nliable for her son's death?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Probably not. None of the mother's conduct seems like a basis for a homicide prosecution.</p>\n<p>Suicide is only prosecuted, in states that allow it to be prosecuted at all, for conduct with a calculated purpose to cause a suicide, or encouragement of someone to commit suicide. These facts don't show that. There is no intent to cause suicide and there is no encouragement of the son to commit suicide by on the mother.</p>\n<p>A survey of selected laws on point by the Connecticut Legislative Research Service can be found <a href=\"https://www.cga.ct.gov/2020/rpt/pdf/2020-R-0197.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>.</p>\n<p>The case law and related legal theory is reviewed and analyzed in <a href=\"https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2019/01/56-1-The-Puzzle-of-Inciting-Suicide.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">this law review article</a> with the following abstract:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In 2017, a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of\nmanslaughter for encouraging the suicide of Conrad Roy by text\nmessage, but imposed a sentence of only fifteen months. The conviction\nwas unprecedented in imposing homicide liability for verbal\nencouragement of apparently voluntary suicide. Yet if Carter killed,\nher purpose that Roy die arguably merited liability for murder and a\nmuch longer sentence. This Article argues that our ambivalence about\nwhether and how much to punish Carter reflects suicide’s dual\ncharacter as both a harm to be prevented and a choice to be respected.\nAs such, the Carter case requires us to choose between competing\nconceptions of criminal law, one utilitarian and one libertarian. A\nutilitarian criminal law seeks to punish inciting suicide to reduce\nharm. A libertarian criminal law, on the other hand, justifies\nvoluntary suicide as an exercise of liberty, and incitement of suicide\nas valuable speech. Utilitarian values are implicit in the\nforeseeability standards prevailing in the law of causation, but\nlibertarian values are implicit in the reluctance of prosecutors to\nseek, and legislatures to define, homicide liability for assisting\nsuicide. The prevalence of statutes punishing assisting—but not\nencouraging—suicide as a nonhomicide offense reflects a compromise\nbetween these values. These statutes are best interpreted as imposing\naccomplice liability for conduct left unpunished for two antithetical\nreasons: it is justified in so far as the suicide is autonomous and\nexcused in so far as the suicide is involuntary. This explains why\naiding suicide is punished, but less severely than homicide. Yet even\nthese statutes would not punish Carter’s conduct of encouragement\nalone. Her conviction although seemingly required by prevailing\ncausation doctrine, is unprecedented.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa, &quot;The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide&quot; 56 American Criminal Law Review 65 (2019).</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the\naforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Maybe the bullies could be prosecuted for homicide or some lesser charge like harassment intended to provoke a suicide or something like that. More facts would have to be developed on that point.</p>\n<p>Maybe teachers have civil liability for negligence, but not criminal liability for not intervening since they didn't intend to cause or encourage the suicide.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94626, "body": "<h2>On the facts as presented, there <em>might</em> be some criminality here</h2>\n<p><strong>But it all depends on facts not stated</strong></p>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<h2>The son</h2>\n<p>Suicide is no longer a crime in NSW.</p>\n<h2>The mother</h2>\n<p>I can see no criminality here. It is an unfortunate fact that children take their own lives, and sometimes this happens after arguments with their parents: that doesn't make the parent criminally responsible.</p>\n<h2>The bullies</h2>\n<p>Some forms of bullying cross the line into <a href=\"https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/blog/school-bullying-the-law/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">criminality</a>.</p>\n<p>Section 60E of the Crimes Act 1900, titled ‘Assaults etc at schools’, makes it a criminal offence to assault, stalk, harass or intimidate any staff member or student while they are at school. As described the bullying is <em>probably</em> harassment and <em>might</em> be intimidation but there are insufficient facts given to be sure.</p>\n<p>There are Commonwealth laws against cyber-harassment but the OP is silent on how the bullying happened.</p>\n<p>There would be evidentiary difficulties in proving either since the victim can’t give evidence, and the perpetrators can’t be forced to testify. The OP doesn’t state if there is physical evidence, or third-party witnesses to the bullying.</p>\n<p>Section 31C makes it a crime to incite suicide but there is no evidence of that in the OP.</p>\n<h2>The school</h2>\n<p>The school and the teachers have an obligation under the Work Health and Safety Act to take all reasonable steps to provide a safe environment. Failure to do so is a crime.</p>\n<p>Bullying is a foreseeable hazard, both in general and in the particular case. Whether the school acted reasonable would depend on if they had adequate policies and procedures in place and if they reasonably followed those in the particular case.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "england-and-wales", "negligence", "homicide", "manslaughter" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94602, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the\nUnited States?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order.</p>\n<p>The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so.</p>\n<p>Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case.</p>\n", "score": 16 } ]

[ "united-states", "child-support", "brazil" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94621, "body": "<p>Yes. <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/333\" rel=\"noreferrer\">47 U.S. Code § 333</a> (part of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended) bans willful or malicious interference. <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/501\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§ 501</a> imposes a general penalty for any violation of the Communications Act that doesn’t have a different penalty defined elsewhere in the Act. A first offense is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a $10,000 fine and/or up to a year in jail. Subsequent offenses are felonies punishable by up to 2 years in prison.</p>\n<p>In practice, this might result in only a civil action by the FCC. But it is forbidden by Congress and can be punished by imprisonment.</p>\n", "score": 18 }, { "answer_id": 94618, "body": "<p><strong>United Kingdom</strong></p>\n<p>It is an <strong>offence</strong>: the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/36/section/68\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006</a> states</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>68 Deliberate interference</strong></p>\n<p>(1) A person commits an offence if he uses apparatus for the purpose of interfering with wireless telegraphy.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>About the possibly narrow definition of <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless_telegraphy\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Wireless Telegraphy</a>, this <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/36/section/116\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section of the Act</a> says</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>116 “Wireless telegraphy”</strong></p>\n<p>(1) In this Act “wireless telegraphy” means the emitting or receiving, over paths that are not provided by any material substance constructed or arranged for the purpose, of energy to which subsection (2) applies.</p>\n<p>(2) This subsection applies to electromagnetic energy of a frequency not exceeding 3,000 gigahertz that —<br />\n   (a) serves for conveying messages, sound or visual images (whether or not the messages, sound or images are actually received by anyone), or for operating or controlling machinery or apparatus; or<br />\n   (b) is used in connection with determining position, bearing or distance, or for gaining information as to the presence, absence, position or motion of an object or of a class of objects.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 11 }, { "answer_id": 94620, "body": "<p>Yes. A violation of basically any FCC regulation is a criminal offense under either <a href=\"https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-47-telecommunications/chapter-5-wire-or-radio-communication/subchapter-v-penal-provisions-forfeitures/section-502-violation-of-rules-regulations-etc\" rel=\"noreferrer\">47 U.S.C. § 502</a> or <a href=\"https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-47-telecommunications/chapter-5-wire-or-radio-communication/subchapter-v-penal-provisions-forfeitures/section-501-general-penalty\" rel=\"noreferrer\">47 U.S. Code § 501</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any person who willfully and knowingly does ... any act ... in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful ... shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for such offense, for which no penalty (other than a forfeiture) is provided in this chapter, by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>And jail time is doubled for repeat offenders.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any person, having been once convicted of an offense punishable under this section, who is subsequently convicted of violating any provision of this chapter punishable under this section, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "radio", "fcc", "communications-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 23698, "body": "<p>For the USA, the FCC has a few words to say on the subject:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>“Generally, “jammers” — which are also commonly called signal blockers, GPS jammers, cell phone jammers, text blockers, etc. — are illegal radio frequency transmitters that are designed to block, jam, or otherwise interfere with authorized radio communications.”\n(<a href=\"https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf</a>)</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In addition, the FCC specifically calls out WiFi blocking devices using deauth attacks as you described, calling them “Willful or malicious interference” in a warning they <a href=\"http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0127/DA-15-113A1.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">issued in 2015</a></p>\n<p>This is the closest thing to precedent I could find, related specifically to WiFi\n.\nThat pretty much sums it up. If the device’s primary purpose involves disabling radio communication, it is illegal. It does not matter to the FCC how targeted or filtered the attack may be, it is still unauthorized. At the core of the issue, you (a private citizen) are not allowed to maliciously or willfully interfere with someone operating their radio, no ifs, ands, or buts. Drone IPS system using such an attack would most likely be illegal. The FCC may change this interpretation in the future, but for now it is illegal.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 26812, "body": "<p>In the United States -</p>\n\n<ul>\n<li><p>Flying within Class G airspace (max 400 ft.) over private property without permission is trespassing (min 500 ft.) </p></li>\n<li><p>A 107 certified pilot is not restricted to 400 ft., and may have a BVLOS waiver. (It can be difficult to assess whether a drone is above 500 feet.)</p></li>\n<li><p>In the US, it is a violation of federal criminal law to instigate <em>any</em> attack intended to interfere with the flightworthiness of a craft currently in flight. The penalties for doing so or attempting to do so are severe (especially if the attack involved ballistics, such as shooting at it with a firearm.) Throwing anything at all - a rock, your shoes, <a href=\"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOnjlyZf6LE\" rel=\"noreferrer\">a spear</a>, a towel, your shirt, etc. <strong><em>intended to deliberately cause a flying craft to free-fall.</em></strong></p></li>\n<li><p>FAA regulations explicitly disallow any attempt at \"towing\" by a craft in flight of another craft in flight. </p></li>\n<li><p>CFAA absolutely applies to a drone's companion computer, which means that targeting Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or network services (including spoofing, etc.) are all illegal. Because CFAA is part of the Patriot Act, attempting to disable a drone in this fashion could lead to a terrorism charge.</p></li>\n<li><p>The only generalized exemptions to this are reserved for the military and only for military purposes; shooting down a civilian's Phantom 4 with a Stinger missile is no more permissible than blowing up their car with a bazooka. </p></li>\n<li><p>This includes the overwhelming majority of law enforcement including state, local, and federal, who will seek to identify the pilot with the assistance of the FAA. Once they locate the pilot, they will take control of the craft or order the pilot to land.</p></li>\n</ul>\n\n<p><em><strong>The only generally \"legal\" way to interfere with a UAV in flight is to crash into it with your own drone. This qualifies as an in-air collision, and is considered an accident.</strong></em></p>\n\n<p>My startup builds aerial security drones, one of which performs autonomous nuisance drone control. We do this without using any form of ballistics, RF interference (illegal without a waiver from the FCC which are almost impossible to obtain and do not scale), EM discharge, etc. We have developed a way of disabling nuisance drones (it is not considered towing if the craft is not in flight), at which point we force the nuisance drone to ground in a controlled manner (not a freefall.) <em>At this time, we do not provide these drones to private sector pilots, including private sector commercial pilots; they are <strong>only available to law enforcement and public safety officials whose agencies / departments</em></strong> who are willing to obtain the waiver granting permission to use them (we will help them with this process, if needed.)</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 17406, "body": "<p>UK-based answer:</p>\n\n<p>With regards to rights above land, we know from <em>Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd</em> [1978] QB 479 that a person owns: \"the airspace above his land to such height as was necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures upon it\"</p>\n\n<p>Though this wouldn't allow you to sue someone for flying a helicopter or airplane above your land, I would believe that drones would count as flying low enough as to be potentially infringing on your right. </p>\n\n<p>That said, this only really means that if someone flies their drown over your land, low enough to annoy you, you could ask them to cease and desist. I don't think you would be justified in installing a \"drone-jammer\" or any system which injects commands to a drone to render it inoperable or to gain control over it.</p>\n\n<p>In the same way that if there is an intruder to your property, you can't without warning just physically shove them off of your property.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "united-kingdom", "computer-misuse-act", "radio", "fcc" ]

[ { "answer_id": 56688, "body": "<p>If you pushed her back <strong>after</strong> she slapped you <strong>and</strong> it is not clear that a second slapping would occur (<strong>or</strong> she slapped you, because you pushed her)</p>\n<ul>\n<li>then it is <strong>not</strong> self-defence\n<ul>\n<li>you (<strong>or</strong> she) did not <strong>prevent a present</strong> unlawful attack</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>If it is clear that you are <strong>going to be</strong> slapped</p>\n<ul>\n<li>then pushing her away, in a reasonable manor, is self-defence\n<ul>\n<li>you <strong>prevented a present</strong> unlawful attack</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>What is considered <strong>reasonable</strong> will later be determined by a judge.</p>\n<hr />\n<blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0186\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§ 32 - Self-defence StGB</a><br />\n(2) ‘Self-defence’ means any defensive action which is necessary <strong>to avert a present</strong> unlawful attack on oneself or another.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p><strong>Sources</strong>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0186\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§ 32 - Self-defence StGB</a></li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "germany", "self-defense" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94598, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to &quot;lawyer up&quot; if we want to be safe?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, <em>if</em> they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle.</p>\n<p>If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff.\nOtherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case.</p>\n<p>If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them.</p>\n<p>As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.)</p>\n<p>To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-states", "libel" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94589, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>The terminology in Canada &quot;not criminally responsible reason on account of mental disorder&quot; (NCRMD) (<em>Criminal Code</em>, <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-16.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s. 16</a>). A finding of NCRMD is a special verdict that results in the accused being placed under the jurisdiction of the Review Board.¹</p>\n<p>Assuming for the sake of analysis that such an outcome is made out in the circumstances that you've described (much would depend on the expert evidence), such an outcome would not necessarily lead to indefinite detention.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr06_1/p1.html#sec11\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The options available are</a>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>absolute discharge;</li>\n<li>conditional discharge; or</li>\n<li>detention in custody in a hospital</li>\n</ul>\n<p>And even when in detention in a hospital, there is a regular review and the person is released when detention is no longer necessary for public safety.</p>\n<p>The burden is not on the detained to show that the chance of a repeat is essentially zero. That would be a great exaggeration of the barrier to release and incorrectly reverses the burden. Instead, the Review Board must find evidence that there is a significant continuing risk to the public, at the time of the hearing, in order to keep the person in custody. <strong>There is no burden on the accused or on anyone to rule out future occurrences with any certainty</strong>.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr06_1/p1.html#sec11\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Latimer and Lawrence explain</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Supreme Court of Canada further clarified in <em><a href=\"https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1711/index.do\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">R. v. Winko</a></em> that Section 672.54 does not create a presumption of dangerousness. In other words, while the protection of society is paramount, there must be clear evidence of a significant risk to the public before a court or Review Board can maintain control over an accused through the imposition of a conditional discharge or detention order.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Some extracts from <em>Winko</em>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Restrictions on his or her liberty can only be justified if, <strong>at the time of the hearing</strong>, the evidence before the court or Review Board shows that the NCR accused actually constitutes such a threat</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>there is never any legal burden on the NCR accused</strong> to show that he or she does not pose a significant threat to the safety of the public</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>A past offence committed while the NCR accused suffered from a mental illness is not, by itself, evidence that the NCR accused <em>continues</em> to pose a significant risk to the safety of the public</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p>^{1. This is one major difference between NCRMD and the defence of automatism, which is a defence based on negation of the elements of the offence and would result in a standard acquittal if successful, with no jurisdiction for the Review Board to impose detention or conditions.}</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 94605, "body": "<p>If is is <em>still</em> insane, he can't be tried. If Juan is competent to stand trial (is cured), he may enter an &quot;insanity plea&quot;. Following Washington law, that means per <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=10.77&amp;full=true\" rel=\"noreferrer\">RCW 10.77.030</a> that within ten days of arraignment (or more with court permission), he files written notice of the intent to rely on that defense. If he provides satisfactory evidence that he was insane at the time, he is acquitted. The jury must also determine whether Juan is a current danger, and since by the hypothetical he is no longer insane, he will not be committed to a mental hospital. The jury answers a series of questions, following RCW 10.77.110: is the defendant a substantial danger to other persons unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions? If so, does the defendant present a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions, and is it in the best interests of the defendant and others that the defendant be placed in treatment that is less restrictive than detention in a state mental hospital?</p>\n<p>There is no automatic indefinite commitment to a mental institution for entering an insanity plea (in fact, committing him is only possible after an acquittal, and cannot be the result of merely entering a plea).</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 94597, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>There are a number of different mental disorders - and related defences - recognised in law, but to focus on the OP's question concerning insanity which has a specific meaning...</p>\n<p>The defence of insanity can <em>only</em> be successful after a trial (i.e. it cannot be accepted by the prosecution) and only applies when the jury determines the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity according to the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%27Naghten_rules\" rel=\"noreferrer\">M'Naghten rules</a>, i.e. &quot;did the defendant know what he was doing, or, if so, that it was wrong?&quot;</p>\n<p>This finding is called a Special Verdict under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/46-47/38/section/2?timeline=false\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 2(1)</a>, Trial Of Lunatics Act 1883:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>2 Special verdict where accused found guilty, but insane at date of act or omission charged, and orders thereupon.</strong></p>\n<p>(1) Where in any indictment or information any act or omission is charged against any person as an offence, and it is given in evidence on the trial of such person for that offence that he was insane, so as not to be responsible, according to law, for his actions at the time when the act was done or omission made, then, if it appears to the jury before whom such person is tried that he did the act or made the omission charged, but was insane as aforesaid at the time when he did or made the same, <strong>the jury shall return a special verdict that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity.</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>For awareness, a person deemed insane in this way is not necessarily &quot;<em>committed to a mental institution indefinitely.</em>&quot;</p>\n<p>Instead, sentencing is determined on a case-by-case basis under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/84/section/5?timeline=false\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 5(2)</a>, Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>5 Powers to deal with persons not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead etc.</strong></p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>(2) The court shall make in respect of the accused—</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a) a hospital order (with or without a restriction order);</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b) a supervision order; or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(c) an order for his absolute discharge.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-states", "insanity" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94546, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>The ethical standard for U.S. prosecutions, under <a href=\"https://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/12.1.22/Rule%203.8%20-%20Special%20Responsibilities%20of%20a%20Prosecutor.pdf?ver=h4k_BG_0T1kn7Rdgo8sLiQ%3D%3D\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8</a> (ethical rules have parallel numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction and there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for this part of this ethical rule) is to refrain from prosecuting a charge that is not supported by probable cause.</p>\n<p>Probable cause is also the standard used by a grand jury, and in an adversarial pre-trial hearing, to screen charges before they go to trial. It is also the standard for issuing an arrest warrant.</p>\n<p>The higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard for convicting a defendant at a trial on the merits of the defendant's guilt or innocence, it is not the standard for bringing a criminal charge in the first place. The job of the prosecutor at trial is to convince the trier of fact (usually a jury, but sometimes a judge in a bench trial) that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the case was thin on evidence when commenced, this may require law enforcement and the prosecutor's office to develop evidence after the criminal charges are brought.</p>\n<p>As a practical matter, a prosecutor wants to prosecute cases that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and will usually try to do that. But a belief that a case can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial is not an ethical requirement for prosecutors and is not a ground for imposing sanctions against a prosecutor. Of course, individual prosecuting attorneys' offices are free to establish their own standards that are more rigorous as an internal policy for bringing criminal cases.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94557, "body": "<p>Answer according to the OP's comment:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The question is in the title. Focus on answering the question...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Namely:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In American criminal law, do prosecutors who seek to prosecute a defendant claim to have evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p><strong>SHORT ANSWER</strong></p>\n<p>Although still used occasionally by some, &quot;<em>beyond a reasonable doubt</em>&quot; is not a prosecutor's benchmark. It is a colloquial courtroom phrase (more often than not you will now hear &quot;<em>must be sure that the defendant is guilty</em>&quot; these days).</p>\n<p>It Instead, the criterion applied is whether there is &quot;<em>sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction and if so, is a prosecution in the public interest?</em>&quot;</p>\n<p><strong>LONG ANSWER</strong></p>\n<p>The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decide whether or not to charge a suspect¹ by applying one of two tests depending on the circumstances:</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><strong>The Full Code Test</strong></a></p>\n<p>This is applied in the majority of cases, and has two stages:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>The Evidential Stage</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The relevant extracts are:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each suspect on each charge [<em>or a judicial finding they did the relevant act but are not guilty by reason of insanity</em>]</p>\n<p>A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed</p>\n<p>[it] is based on the prosecutor’s objective assessment of the evidence [which] means that an objective, impartial and reasonable jury [etc] is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged. <strong>This is a different test from the one that the criminal courts themselves must apply. A court may only convict if it is sure that the defendant is guilty</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>The Public Interest Stage</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The prosecutor must consider a number of factors, including: the seriousness and circumstances of the offence, the suspect's age and culpability, whether a prosecution is a proportionate response, and whether sensitive intelligence sources need protecting.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><strong>The Threshold Test</strong></a></p>\n<p>This test is applied when an immediate charging decision is required, but the Full Code Test cannot be satisfied as there are outstanding enquiries or evidence to be collected.</p>\n<p>There are five conditions to satisfy for this test to be applied:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person to be charged has committed the offence</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Further evidence can be obtained to provide a realistic prospect of conviction</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The seriousness or the circumstances of the case justifies the making of an immediate charging decision</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>There are continuing substantial grounds to object to bail in accordance with the Bail Act 1976 and in all the circumstances of the case it is proper to do so</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>It is in the public interest to charge the suspect</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<hr />\n<p>¹For completeness, the police also have a limited power to charge a suspect without CPS advice.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>_{Although the title references &quot;<em>American criminal law</em>&quot;, I have answered according to the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic\">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;}</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94547, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<h3>Charging decisions are at the core of prosecutorial discretion and cannot be challenged for the reason you posit</h3>\n<p>A criminal indictment or the decision to charge <strong>cannot be challenged</strong> on the basis that the prosecutors did not possess evidence proving the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a matter left to the conclusion of the trial.</p>\n<p>The decision to bring a charge is at the core of prosecutorial discretion. See <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2011/2011scc34/2011scc34.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>R. v. Nixon</em>, 2011 SCC 34, para. 21</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Without being exhaustive, we believe the core elements of prosecutorial discretion encompass the following: (a) <strong>the discretion whether to bring the prosecution of a charge</strong> laid by police; (b) the discretion to enter a stay of proceedings in either a private or public prosecution, as codified in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 579 and 579.1; (c) the discretion to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge; (d) the discretion to withdraw from criminal proceedings altogether...</p>\n<p>Significantly, what is common to the various elements of prosecutorial discretion is that they involve the ultimate decisions as to whether a prosecution should be brought, continued or ceased, and what the prosecution ought to be for. Put differently, prosecutorial discretion refers to decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it. ...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><strong>The decision to charge can only be reviewed for <em>abuse of process</em></strong> which asks (<em>Nixon</em>, para. 40):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>whether “compelling an accused to stand trial would violate those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency”, or where the proceedings are “oppressive or vexatious”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h3>Crown prosecution offices <em>do</em> consider the likelihood of conviction when deciding whether to charge</h3>\n<p>Provinces each have their own charging policies, but British Columbia's is a typical example. A charge will generally not be brought unless there is a substantial likelihood of conviction and the public interest requires a prosecution (see <a href=\"https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/prosecution-service/crown-counsel-policy-manual/cha-1-charge-assessment-guidelines.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Crown Charge Assessment Guidelines</a>). In exceptional cases, charges may be approved on a lesser standard of &quot;a reasonable prospect of conviction.&quot; In making these assessments, prosecutors need not be themselves convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but are directed to <em>consider</em> the &quot;prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.&quot;</p>\n<h3>Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a standard that can be determined by someone other than the trier of fact</h3>\n<p>See <a href=\"https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1543/index.do\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>R. v. Lifchus</em>, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320</a></p>\n<ul>\n<li>the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inextricably intertwined with that principle fundamental to all criminal trials, the presumption of innocence;</li>\n<li>the burden of proof rests on the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused;</li>\n<li>a reasonable doubt is not a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice;</li>\n<li>rather, it is based upon reason and common sense;</li>\n<li>it is logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence;</li>\n<li>it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt; and</li>\n<li>more is required than proof that the accused is probably guilty ‑‑ a jury which concludes only that the accused is probably guilty must acquit.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The following should be avoided:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>describing the term “reasonable doubt” as an ordinary expression which has no special meaning in the criminal law context;</li>\n<li>inviting jurors to apply to the task before them the same standard of proof that they apply to important, or even the most important, decisions in their own lives;</li>\n<li>equating proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” to proof “to a moral certainty;</li>\n<li>inviting jurors to apply to the task before them the same standard of proof that they apply to important, or even the most important, decisions in their own lives;</li>\n<li>qualifying the word “doubt” with adjectives other than “reasonable”, such as “serious”, “substantial” or “haunting”, which may mislead the jury; and</li>\n<li>instructing jurors that they may convict if they are “sure” that the accused is guilty, before providing them with a proper definition as to the meaning of the words “beyond a reasonable doubt”.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94548, "body": "<p>First off your title/question is missing a word (often, need, something between defendant and claim). Reading the body of your post, I presume you mean need…</p>\n<p>Prosecutors don’t need to state any degree of certainty or particular evidence in their charging documents. They don’t even need to believe a particular defendant is guilty — it’s legal to prosecute multiple people for the same crime at the same time, using the same evidence of each, and leave it up to a jury to decide, which if any are the “true” criminal.</p>\n<p>They need to have some evidence, but it needs not be conclusive or even particularly compelling.</p>\n<p>And it pretty much has to be that way, in order to avoid corruption. If they had to be “right” every time or they lost their job or even their freedom, there would be nigh irresistible pressure to <strong>be</strong> right, whatever that required.</p>\n<p>Malicious prosecution is a crime, and one I would support lowering the bar to prosecute, but mere innocence of the accused or the lack of sufficiently convincing evidence is insufficient to support punishing the prosecutor that in good faith fails to get a conviction.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94545, "body": "<h2>Beyond Reasonable Doubt <em>is</em> an <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/onus_and_standard_of_proof.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">objective standard</a></h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Proving the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is the standard of proof the Crown must achieve before you can convict [him/her] and <strong>the words mean exactly what they say — proof beyond reasonable doubt.</strong> When you finish considering the evidence in the trial and the submissions made by the parties you must ask yourself whether the Crown has established the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You may have some confusion because the trier of law will not provide the trier of fact with any further explanation beyond “<strong>the words mean exactly what they say — proof beyond reasonable doubt.</strong>” Its possible that your confusion stems from some of the questions on this site where some OPs are seeking an empirical standard or further elaboration: there isn’t any - “<strong>the words mean exactly what they say — proof beyond reasonable doubt.</strong>”</p>\n<p>The obligation on the trier of fact is not to determine what “proof beyond reasonable doubt” means but to decide if the evidence before them meets that standard. What an appeals court is required to do is determine if, considered in the best possible light, the evidence would convince a reasonable jury of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>\n<h2>Charges</h2>\n<p>A prosecutor should bring charges when they believe there is a reasonable chance of conviction. That is, they have evidence that they believe will convince most juries of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jury’s vary - some are easier to convince than others, but an experienced prosecutor has encountered all kinds and has a good feel of when they have a case and when they don’t.</p>\n<p>Of course, the prosecutor must make this decision without knowledge of the case the defendant will run. Therefore, good prosecutors make allowance for this and lay charges when the evidence is overwhelming, not just sufficient.</p>\n<h2>Indictment</h2>\n<p>In any event, except for summary offences (misdemeanours), the prosecutor has to convince a judge or grand jury that they have enough evidence. To do this, they present their case completely unchallenged by the defence. That is, they get to show the evidence in the best possible light. If that doesnt convince the judge or grand jury, then they don’t get to go forward.</p>\n", "score": 0 }, { "answer_id": 94560, "body": "<p>At federal trial: to achieve a conviction the prosecutor must prove (i.e. persuade or convince the trier-of-fact) the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>\n<p>To bring the case to trial: the prosecutor must (among other things) believe the admissible evidence will probably (i.e. more likely than not) be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.</p>\n<p>Federal <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Justice Manual Title 9 9-27.220 - Grounds for Commencing or Declining Prosecution</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal\nprosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct constitutes a\nfederal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be\nsufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the\nprosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the\nperson is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or\n(3) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.</p>\n<p>Comment. JM 9-27.220 sets forth the longstanding threshold requirement\nfrom the Principles of Federal Prosecution that a prosecutor may\ncommence or recommend federal prosecution only if he/she believes that\nthe person will more likely than not be found guilty beyond a\nreasonable doubt by an unbiased trier of fact and that the conviction\nwill be upheld on appeal. Evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction\nis required under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal\nProcedure, to avoid a judgment of acquittal. Moreover, both as a\nmatter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient\nadministration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against\nany person unless the attorney for the government believes that the\nadmissible evidence is sufficient to obtain and sustain a guilty\nverdict by an unbiased trier of fact. In this connection, it should be\nnoted that, when deciding whether to prosecute, the government\nattorney need not have in hand, at that time, all of the evidence upon\nwhich he/she intends to rely at trial, if he/she has a reasonable and\ngood faith belief that such evidence will be available and admissible\nat the time of trial. Thus, for example, it would be proper to\ncommence or recommend a prosecution even though a key witness may be\nout of the country, so long as there is a good faith basis to believe\nthat the witness's presence at trial could reasonably be expected. ...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>With regard to the prosecutor's belief about the prospect of conviction, other common law jurisdictions have similar requirements.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "criminal-procedure", "prosecutorial-discretion", "prosecution", "burden-of-proof" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94619, "body": "<p><a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=28a.225&amp;full=true\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Washington has such laws</a>. RCW 28A.225.010 states the exceptions to the compulsory attendance requirement, which includes: is attending private school or extension program, receiving home schooling, unable to attend including is in jail, religion, over 16 full-time employed and with parental consent. Also, also has GDE or has already satisfied graduation requirements. It isn't clear what graduation requirements have not been satisfied, I assume that you still must complete 1 credit of Calculus to satisfy the requirements. Therefore, you must take attend school, even if you don't take that class.</p>\n<p>If you don't attend classes at the high school, the high school is required by RCW 28A.225.020 to provide written notice to the parents. Steps are taken to assure compliance with state law, i.e. phone calls and conferences with the parents, etc. It would be the responsibility of the school district to monitor the college's scheme that allows you to take high school classes at college.</p>\n<p>The primary legal mandate is imposed on the parent:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>All parents in this state of any child eight years of age and under\neighteen years of age shall cause such child to attend the public\nschool of the district in which the child resides and such child shall\nhave the responsibility to and therefore shall attend for the full\ntime when such school may be in session</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>As described, the hypothetical child is not exempt, therefore the parents must compel the child to attend school, until the child becomes exempt. There is vast leeway in how that requirement can be satisfied, but it must be somehow satisfied.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "parental-rights", "students" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94616, "body": "<p>Alice's business sells database management software.</p>\n<p>Organisations buy or licence the software, deploy it on hardware they control and use the software to help store and, process and analyse 'personal data' within the meaning of GDPR.</p>\n<p>Alice's business has no access whatsoever to the personal data being stored and processed by those organisations.</p>\n<p>In respect of <em>that</em> personal data, GDPR is not engaged by Alice's business. The business is neither a 'controller' nor 'processor' of that personal data.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/application-regulation/who-does-data-protection-law-apply_en\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Who does the data protection law apply to? - European Commission</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/personal-information-what-is-it/who-does-the-uk-gdpr-apply-to/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Who does the UK GDPR apply to? - Information Commissioner's Office</a></p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "gdpr", "privacy", "software" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94578, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Is it legal for companies to pay salaries or bonuses as lootboxes?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The German &quot;Gewerbeordnung&quot; says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§ 107\nBerechnung und Zahlung des Arbeitsentgelts</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Das Arbeitsentgelt ist in Euro zu berechnen und auszuzahlen.</li>\n<li>Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer können Sachbezüge als Teil des Arbeitsentgelts vereinbaren, wenn dies dem Interesse des Arbeitnehmers oder der Eigenart des Arbeitsverhältnisses entspricht. Der Arbeitgeber darf dem Arbeitnehmer keine Waren auf Kredit überlassen. Er darf ihm nach Vereinbarung Waren in Anrechnung auf das Arbeitsentgelt überlassen, wenn die Anrechnung zu den durchschnittlichen Selbstkosten erfolgt. Die geleisteten Gegenstände müssen mittlerer Art und Güte sein, soweit nicht ausdrücklich eine andere Vereinbarung getroffen worden ist. Der Wert der vereinbarten Sachbezüge oder die Anrechnung der überlassenen Waren auf das Arbeitsentgelt darf die Höhe des pfändbaren Teils des Arbeitsentgelts nicht übersteigen.</li>\n<li>Die Zahlung eines regelmäßigen Arbeitsentgelts kann nicht für die Fälle ausgeschlossen werden, in denen der Arbeitnehmer für seine Tätigkeit von Dritten ein Trinkgeld erhält. Trinkgeld ist ein Geldbetrag, den ein Dritter ohne rechtliche Verpflichtung dem Arbeitnehmer zusätzlich zu einer dem Arbeitgeber geschuldeten Leistung zahlt.</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://dejure.org/gesetze/GewO/107.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Source</a></p>\n<p>Translation:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§ 107\nCalculation and payment of remuneration</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Remuneration shall be calculated and paid in euros.</li>\n<li>Employer and employee may agree on benefits in kind as part of the remuneration if this is in the interest of the employee or in accordance with the nature of the employment relationship. The employer may not provide the employee with goods on credit. The employer may, by agreement, provide the employee with goods as a credit against the employee's remuneration, provided that the goods are provided at the average cost price. The goods provided must be of average type and quality unless expressly agreed otherwise. The value of the agreed benefits in kind or the crediting of the goods provided against the remuneration may not exceed the amount of the attachable part of the remuneration.</li>\n<li>The payment of regular remuneration may not be excluded in cases where the employee receives a tip from a third party for his work. A tip is an amount of money paid by a third party to the employee without a legal obligation in addition to a service owed to the employer.</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>What does that mean?</p>\n<p>The base <em>Salary</em> can never be paid in anything but Euros.</p>\n<p>Makes sense, how would you determine whether 2 apples, an egg and a parttime timeshare of a camel each month are above or below the minimum wage? How would the employee pay their own costs from that, even it it were worth more? Taxes would be a nightmare. Good luck to the Ex-Wife and kid, getting half an apple and a stinky camel timeshare for a day as alimony. No, money is there for a reason.</p>\n<p><em>Benefits</em> like bonuses or additional agreements on top of your basic salary <em>can</em> be goods of other kinds. Loot boxes for example. Please note that the employee has to explicitely agree on that. I will assume getting an <em>additional</em> lootbox on top for free is something an employee can agree on without a second thought. Getting parts of your salary normally paid in Euros or bonus normally paid in Euros as Lootboxes would be something the employee would have to explicitely agree to, otherwise it must be Euros. You cannot &quot;force&quot; an employee to accept anything but Euros.</p>\n<p>Note the sentence that the employer can give the employee goods instead of Euros not for their made up &quot;sale&quot; price, but for the cost of making them. So for no profit. You could pay someone partially in loot boxes, but since a loot box costs about 0,01€ to make (electricity, database maintenance, the developer who has to press the button once a month), that would be a <em>lot</em> of loot boxes to pay a part of the salary.</p>\n<p>And yes, even &quot;goods&quot; will be taxed. They are part of your income. So if you get a &quot;lootbox&quot;, be preprared to pay taxes on that. If you don't play the game, paying taxes on something you don't use might not be worth it after all.</p>\n<p>It is well known that companies have employee-only pricing schemes. For example you will find that employees of automobile manufacturers will drive their brands cars, because getting a good price on a car is a big deal. Some companies allow private use of company cars for the employees that work &quot;in the field&quot;. But it is very rare that employees get actual goods monthly as part of their salary in Germany.</p>\n<p>But there is no mention of &quot;luck&quot; anywhere in the law. Assuming the employee knows about the &quot;luck&quot; factor and explicitely agrees to have that as part of their remuneration, then everything is fine.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 94586, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-kingdom\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container\">united-kingdom</a></p>\n<p>A bonus of this sort is a perfectly legal <a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-exemption-for-trivial-benefits-in-kind-draft-guidance/tax-exemption-for-trivial-benefits-in-kind-draft-guidance\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">trivial Benefit in Kind</a> (BIK) as long as it meets all the tax-exemption requirements at <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/1/section/323A?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 323A</a>, Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, which I have summarised as being:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>It is niether cash nor a cash voucher</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The (average) cost of providing the benefit is not more that £50:00 (NB this is the cost to the employer, not necessarily the value of the loot box)</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Is not given under contract or in lieu of salary etc</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Is not given as recognition of particular services carried out as part of the recipient's employment</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(There are further provisions when it is given to a company director or office-holder, or their family, which do not seem to apply here.)</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Unless these conditions are all satisfied, HMRC would (presumably) treat it as a &quot;cash equivalent of any non-cash voucher&quot; under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/1/section/87?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 87</a> of the Act and <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2006/regulation/4?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">regulation 4(1)(c)</a>, Tax Credits (Definition and Calculation of Income) Regulations 2002.</p>\n<hr />\n<ul>\n<li>For awareness and clarity:</li>\n</ul>\n<p>It is the cost to the employer that matters, not any value the bonus may have in the future.</p>\n<p>For example. If, instead of loot boxes, the employer gives each employee lottery tickets / scratch cards worth up to £50:00 as part of a work-place syndicate, this would fall within the above Trivial BIK rules so no tax is due - as long as the other conditions are also met.</p>\n<p>And... any winnings using this method belong to the syndicate, not the employer, so no employment-related tax etc is due on them either. <a href=\"https://www.mytipsandadvice.co.uk/2017-06/work-lotto-tickets-are-taxable-truth-or-myth-UKTATXAR_EU17180401\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Source</a></p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "corporate-law", "any-jurisdiction", "salary", "employee" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93810, "body": "<h2>Yes</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1914A00012\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s7</a> of the Crimes Act 1914:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any person who attempts to commit any offence against this Act or any other Act, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be punishable as if the attempted offence had been committed.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This covers offenses under the Copyright Act.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94571, "body": "<p><strong>YES</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Short Answer</strong>:</p>\n<p>As long as it's a &quot;criminal infringement&quot; and not for, say, <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/28B?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">personal copies for private use</a>, and the &quot;criminal attempt&quot; is more than <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/q/88696/35069\">merely preparatory</a></p>\n<p><strong>Long Answer</strong>:</p>\n<p>Part 1, Chapter 2 of the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988</a> covers the rights of a copyright owner and, at <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/16?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 16(2)</a>, states that:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of the copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There are numerous criminal offences within the Act covering various business, for-profit or for-gain infringement scenarios, such as <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/107?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 107</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) <strong>A person commits an offence who, without the licence of the copyright owner—</strong></p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a) makes for sale or hire, or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b) imports into the United Kingdom otherwise than for his private and domestic use, or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(c) possesses in the course of a business with a view to committing any act infringing the copyright, or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(d) in the course of a business —</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(i)sells or lets for hire, or</p>\n<p>(ii)offers or exposes for sale or hire, or</p>\n<p>(iii)exhibits in public, or</p>\n<p>(iv)distributes, or</p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>(e) distributes otherwise than in the course of a business to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright,</li>\n</ul>\n<p>an article which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe is, an infringing copy of a copyright work.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1)(a), (b), (d)(iv) or (e) is liable—</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine, or both;</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b) <strong>on conviction on indictment to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or both.</strong></p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The above emboldened provisions establish that certain types of copyright infringement are indictable offences, which brings in to play <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/47/section/1?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 1</a> Criminal Attempts Act 1981:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>1 Attempting to commit an offence.</p>\n<p>(1) If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the offence.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>(4) This section applies to any offence which, if it were completed, would be triable in England and Wales as an indictable offence, other than—</p>\n<p>[<em>list of excluded offences omitting as not relevant to the question</em>]</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "copyright", "united-kingdom", "criminal-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 87149, "body": "<p>The place of birth on the birth certificate is where the child was actually born. Indeed, usually it will be more specific than city and state or province and will also identify a hospital or residence or other place where the birth happened.</p>\n<p>So, for example, if a child is born to U.S. diplomats in Paris, France (in or out of the embassy grounds), the birth certificate will say that the child was born in Paris, France at Charles de Gaulle Hospital.</p>\n<p>But, that child will still be a U.S. citizen in all likelihood, because that child's mother, and/or married father or unmarried father who acknowledges paternity, is a U.S. citizen (in all likelihood) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409. The child may or may not be a French dual citizen depending upon the citizenship law of France.</p>\n<p>In the case of a French diplomat who has a child born physically in Washington D.C. (inside or outside the French embassy) the birth certificate will likewise state that the child was born in Washington D.C.</p>\n<p>The French diplomat's child, however, will not be a U.S. citizen since Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's first sentence (which is also found in 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)) states:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and <strong>subject to\nthe jurisdiction thereof</strong>, are citizens of the United States and of\nthe State wherein they reside.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>But a French diplomat's child is not &quot;subject to the jurisdiction&quot; of the United States, so the French diplomat's child does not gain U.S. citizenship at birth (assuming for simplicity's sake that both of the child's parents are French citizens and are not U.S. citizens) despite the fact that the child was born in the United States.</p>\n", "score": 34 }, { "answer_id": 87161, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>If we assume that the ambassador and his wife (or other embassy staff), living in the embassy residence, will give birth to a child, then what country and what place will be indicated on the birth certificate?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There is a common misconception that embassies are the sovereign territory of the country whose embassy it is. This is not the case. Embassies are <em>inviolable,</em> meaning that the country where the embassy is located can't exercise physical jurisdiction over the premises of the embassy <em>without the ambassador's consent.</em> This is established by article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The premises otherwise remain legally under the sovereignty of the country where the embassy is located.</p>\n<p>For example, if someone commits a crime in the French embassy to the US, the prosecution would take place in the DC courts according to the DC criminal code (or, depending on the nature of the crime, in the federal courts according to the federal criminal code, which is rather more likely for a crime committed in an embassy than it is for a crime committed somewhere else).</p>\n<p>In other words, the grounds of the French embassy in Washington are US territory and the grounds of the US embassy in Paris are French territory. Therefore, a birth certificate for a child born at the French embassy to the US will be issued by the District of Columbia, and it will show that the child was born in the District of Columbia at 4101 Reservoir Road NW.</p>\n<p>This assumes that the birth is reported; if everyone in attendance at the birth is a diplomat with full immunity then they could choose to ignore the requirement to report the birth. Presumably they would only do that if they had a way of certifying the birth under French law. I imagine that some countries have provisions for their capital cities to issue birth certificates for children of their diplomats born abroad, but I'd be a bit surprised if France were among them.</p>\n", "score": 23 }, { "answer_id": 87169, "body": "<p>A child's place of birth is the place where they are born (obviously). Embassies have no special status, embassies in France are all in France, and French embassies are in many different countries. Born in a Greek embassy in France, your place of birth is France.</p>\n<p>Sometimes your place of birth is legally important, but then there is a good chance that there are specific rules for that case. For example the baby of German diplomats born in the German embassy in Washington is born in the USA, but because of the special case this baby doesn't get the rights and duties that 99.9% of children born in the USA have, and would most likely instead get all the rights and duties that 99.9% of children in Germany have.</p>\n<p>(Practically, I don't know whether they would get some special entry in their passports so for example US border officers wouldn't keep asking &quot;but your place in birth is the USA, you must be US citizen. And if such a baby lived in the USA for 18 years, I wonder if they would have the right to naturalise. Same as any other 18 year old, or more rights because they were born in the USA. And now we can go totally hypothetically and ask if such a baby could eventually become US president, but I think the rule there is something like &quot;born as US citizen&quot; and not actually &quot;born in the USA&quot;. And if a golf club accepted only members &quot;born in the USA&quot;, which might be illegal discrimination or not, they'd have to accept that German child of German diplomats born in the USA).</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "birth-certificate" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94606, "body": "<h2>Don't be prejudicial</h2>\n<p>You have no idea if this person would be suitable to be on a jury based simply on this conversation. You need to wait until you are sharing the jury room and look at the way they actually behave.</p>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<p>Once empanelled, the judge will give an <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/the_jury.html#p1-470\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">opening address</a>, the jury will be given a <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/the_jury.html#p1-475\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">jury booklet and a DVD</a>, and <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/the_jury.html#p1-480\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">written directions</a>. All of which explains their role and duties. All of this is intended to disabuse jurors of any misconceptions they may have about the process.</p>\n<p>One of the duties that the materials explain is <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/the_jury.html#d5e10421\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">reporting irregularities</a>, including: &quot;that a juror is refusing to participate in the jury’s functions&quot; and &quot;that a juror appears to lack the ability to be impartial.&quot;</p>\n<p>If this describes the behaviour you witness in the jury room, you must report it. What happens next is up to the judge.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "jury" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94601, "body": "<p>This is just an instantiation of the ancient legal principle <em><a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audi_alteram_partem\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">audi alteram partem</a></em> (hear the other side).</p>\n<p>James Tully says (in &quot;<a href=\"https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/mlj/2020-v65-n3-mlj05864/1075601ar/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Sustainable Democratic Constitutionalism and Climate Crisis</a>&quot; (2020) 5:3 McGill LJ 545):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Aeschylus introduced this legal norm in <em><a href=\"https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_House_of_Atreus/The_Furies\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Eumenides</a></em>, the third play in the <em>Oresteia</em> trilogy. The Roman lawyer Cicero brought it to prominence in Roman law and the Western tradition.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94603, "body": "<p>After the collapse of the Roman Empire, Europe and the Western Roman Empire collapsed into the &quot;dark ages&quot; in which large scale government and civilized legal institutions collapsed, in favor of feudalism in which fragmented warlords ruled serfs absolutely, with lords sometimes subject to greater lords who ruled them, and society spent a thousand years trying to reconsolidate large kingdoms and to reconstruct civilization.</p>\n<p>In the feudal era, one of the customary incidents of the relationship between a lord and a lord's subjects is that the lord reserved the authority to met out justice between the lord's subjects and to resolve disputes between them.</p>\n<p>People sought to petition the lord to do justice for the simple reason that no one else was in a position to do so. The lord was the sole authority available to them, because the lord, like all governments, established a monopoly on the use of force to achieve one's ends.</p>\n<p>A petition to the lord was not really an entitlement, as the lord could refuse to hear someone's pleas. But, lords who heard the pleas of their subjects and resolved them justly found that their domains became more prosperous and their personal reputations were enhanced by doing so. The church, which was the sole force independent of secular lords in the feudal era, likewise encouraged lords to act in this way and praised them for doing so.</p>\n<p>Conversely, lords who refused to listen to their subject's pleas for justice, or ruled unjustly, found that their domains didn't prosper and that potential usurpers of their positions found many allies.</p>\n<p>As lords tired of this work, they delegated responsibility for dealing with petitions seeking justice to a learned member of their court presaging the role of a modern judge, whose decisions could be reviewed by the appointing lord, but usually weren't because the learned judges made good decisions most of the time and second guessing their decisions would defeat the purpose of delegating this burden.</p>\n<p>Once pleas for justice between subjects were delegated by lords to professionals, the process formalized and bureaucratized.</p>\n<p>Around the time of the late Middle Ages, in continental Europe, a process known as the &quot;reception&quot; of Roman law began, in which lords and the judges they appointed to make decisions for them began to try to follow the repository of Roman legal authority to guide their own decisions on the general assumption that it was legitimate to do so and that Roman law reflected principles of natural justice and good governance.</p>\n<p>As the process became delegated to professionals and formalized and fused to the rule of law over time, the notion of rule of law and a right to petition began to come to be seen as fundamental rights in a just society and open deviation from these ideals came to undermine the authorities of the lords as well, to the point where aristocrats who deviated from these norms were seen as autocrats and despots who were bad actors. This, in turn, eventually led to movements seeking democratic input (often in exchange for voluntary assent to taxation) in a constitutional monarchy sense, and then to revolutions to displace the monarchy with a republic that dispensed with the monarch all together.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "legal-history" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94595, "body": "<p>If you want to be argumentative about it, the burden of proof is on the person making the accusation. This also means the burden of production is, too. Underlying the whole matter is a claim that you've engaged in &quot;breach of contract,&quot; namely failing to pay rent. Your legal obligation is to not engage in contract fraud nor breach of contract. You are to exercise due diligence in resolving any breach of contract.</p>\n<p>You may ask the lessor to provide evidence in support of the claim while admitting that you have difficulty looking that far back into the issue. The idea here is to &quot;work with&quot; the lessor rather than immediately taking an adversarial stance. Normal people become very disgruntled by those taking an immediate adversarial approach rather than seeking to work with the other person to resolve the dispute.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-states", "rental-property", "rent" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94434, "body": "<h2>You own it</h2>\n<p>In general, if you own an object, you can do what you like with it if you otherwise comply with the law.</p>\n<p>It is possible that a particular object may be protected under heritage or similar law, but if it isn’t, and you comply with environmental and safety law, you grind that thing into dust if you want to.</p>\n<p>Of course, if it did, you would never be able to delete a voicemail, email, or throw out used notepaper - they’re all copyright.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94435, "body": "<p>Not copyright law but the jurisdiction might provide for <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_rights\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">moral rights</a> of artists and authors and such, which among other things might protect the integrity of the work or prevent its destruction.</p>\n<p>One example is the <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/106A\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A</a> (VARA), which provides for the author's right in some circumstances &quot;to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.&quot;</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Artists_Rights_Act\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Wikipedia article about VARA</a> includes three examples of when artists have benefited from that right, to varying extents.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94441, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>Under the UCC, uniform commercial code, you can find the &quot;first sale doctrine&quot;. It is an exception to the copyright law, granting the buyer of a work the right to sell, display, or dispose of the copy. It also grants the right to use parts of the copy (e.g. I can shred a painting and weave a basket with the canvas strips) to create other works.</p>\n<p>Though it says &quot;first buyer&quot; the right attaches on a transfer of the copyright (i.e. a second sale). This is implied in the &quot;dispose&quot; section. <a href=\"https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&amp;context=nulr\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ref</a></p>\n<p>This does not allow the buyer to create derivative works from the copyrighted material. One still cannot take photographs of a work and publish them as the original copyright sticks. The first sale doctrine attaches only to the material copy bought.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1854-copyright-infringement-first-sale-doctrine\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ref</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Note that the original IS a &quot;copy&quot; for the purposes of this statute, even if no other copies, as commonly understood in language, were made.</p>\n<p>The waters are muddy on digital copies or artwork that only exists in digital medium. EULAs and works sold under a license might change these rights. Such interactions are beyond the scope of this answer.</p>\n<p>Specific statutes might protect some historical or heritage artwork from destruction or further modification, though.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94442, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/brazil\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;brazil&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;brazil&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-brazil-tooltip-container\">brazil</a></p>\n<p>Under Brazilian law, there are two distinct copyright laws. The material rights, that can be transferred, and the moral rights, that are inalienable. An artist can sell the artwork and transfer the former, but the latter remains with the artist for as long as the copyright remains (death of author +70 years).</p>\n<p>The patrimonial rights are the same as in other parts of the world. But the moral rights give the author the ability to:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p><strong>Claim authorship of the work</strong>. This can lead even to defamation or libel lawsuits if claims to the contrary arise.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p><strong>Be mentioned or to sign the artwork</strong> The author may demand that their name is displayed next to the artwork, or to actually sign or place a watermark on the work.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p><strong>Artwork integrity</strong> - The author may deny modifications or changes to the artwork that may be considered harmful to the image or honor of the author.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p><strong>Keep works unpublished and private</strong> - artworks cannot be published without the author permission. This permission is implicit with the sale or licensing but an author cannot be forced to publish a new work.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p><strong>right to withdrawal</strong> the author may request works to be removed from public view, unpublished or deleted if they harm their image or honor. Exercising this right may incur a penalty or other monetary sanctions to the author, however (i.e. to repay the losses incurred to a third party).</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Some of these rights might exist or be implied in other jurisdictions but they are explicitly stated in the Brazilian copyright law.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.projuris.com.br/blog/lei-de-direitos-autorais/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ref_1</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9610.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ref_2</a></p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "copyright", "any-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 52070, "body": "<p>At the point where you copy the game files, including the WADs, onto a new machine the original licensee (your brother) does not have access to, you are infringing copyright.</p>\n<p>Merely copying the files onto a Linux partition won't constitute infringement as it's the same commercial software on the same system, just with a different OS (IIRC correctly the Steam version of Doom uses DOSBOX, a DOS emulator, to run the original code on both Windows and Linux. The only difference between the Linux and Windows versions are the DOSBOX builds, and DOSBOX is open source software that permits this).</p>\n<p>To get it to actually run on Linux, you'd need to either get a source port or a copy of DOSBOX (both are free to download), but neither actions would change the legality of it.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "eula", "online-piracy" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94590, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Does the legal usage of the word court as in a court of law derive from the idea of a royal court, as an expression of the idea that the original courts of law were ultimately simple vehicles for the exercise or discharge of royal authority on behalf of the royal sovereign?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court#Etymology\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Yes</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The meaning of a judicial assembly is first attested in the 12th century, and derives from the earlier usage to designate a sovereign and his entourage, which met to adjudicate disputes....</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 10 } ]

[ "legal-terms", "legal-history" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94570, "body": "<h2>None</h2>\n<p><strong>Transfer</strong> of copyrights or exploitation rights <strong>always</strong> requires a written contract.</p>\n<p><strong>Licensing</strong> does not require a written contract.</p>\n<h2>HOWEVER....</h2>\n<p>&quot;An author sells an article to a magazine&quot; is a special situation: that is acceptance of the written terms of sale that were in place when the article was sold. That <strong>is</strong> a written contract, and typically they buy the article with very specific rights. And... things really can get murky for really old publications like <a href=\"https://www.aetherial.net/lovecraft/conclusion.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Weird Tales</a></p>\n", "score": 11 }, { "answer_id": 94572, "body": "<h2>There is no default</h2>\n<p>The terms of each contract define what rights are transferred and what are retained. Subject to the law in specific jurisdictions …</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>In some jurisdictions, a copyright transfer requires a written agreement, in others, it doesn’t. However, I can grant an exclusive, perpetual, all-rights licence which is practically a copyright transfer without it having to be in writing.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Some jurisdictions allow a licence or copyright transfer to be cancelled after a given time period. In some this may be automatic, in others, the author must take specific steps.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Some do not allow the transfer of some rights - like moral rights, and others do not allow any transfer, while still others will let you give away the farm.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Notwithstanding, assuming the contract is lawful in the relevant jurisdiction, then what it says goes.</p>\n<p>If there is dispute about the terms of the agreement, including disputes about if there was a written agreement now lost, well, courts resolve those types of disputes all the time. The consider the evidence and who bears the burden of proof on each assertion and make a ruling about what the agreement was.</p>\n<p>There may be testimony of people who witnessed the events, there may be testimony of standard-form contracts that were typically used at the time, there may be written correspondence, there may be payment slips, etc. The trier of fact has to weigh all that and decide who’s case is proved.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94587, "body": "<p>Your conclusion is correct under US law. 17 USC 204(a) says</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is\nnot valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum\nof the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights\nconveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Therefore, the magazine only has two legal options for publishing. First, if the author is an employee, the magazine is the author and this is a work for hire, which is contrary to your presumption. Second, the work may be licensed, which can include an implicit license. A transfer has to be sufficiently explicit that it is a complete transfer of rights, and not merely suggestive.</p>\n<p>Implied licenses are valid but their conditions are not crystal clear, see for example Latimer v Roaring Toyz, 601 F.3d 1224, Pelaez v McGraw Hill, 399 F. Supp. 3d 120. <a href=\"https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/283\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">This instruction</a> on implied licenses say how the defendant can establish that there is such a license.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>the defendant has the burden of proving that:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>the defendant requested that the plaintiff create a work; 2. the plaintiff made that particular work and delivered it to the defendant;\nand 3. the plaintiff intended that the defendant [copy] [distribute]\n[use] [retain] the plaintiff's work.</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If the court cares about the first test (which is a bit ritualistic), there was never an implied license, that is, the magazine erred in not securing a <em>written</em> license. An implied license cannot be perpetual or exclusive.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "copyright" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94583, "body": "<p>Many of the titles in the U.S. Code <a href=\"https://uscode.house.gov/codification/positive_law_codification.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">are not positive codifications</a>. Instead they are consolidations, classifications, and editorial codifications made by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel.</p>\n<p>Title 42 (noted in phoog's answer) is not a positive codification. This means Congress did not choose its numbering scheme. Only the titles with an asterisk <a href=\"https://uscode.house.gov/#.xhtml\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">on this page</a> have been enacted as positive law.</p>\n<p>Instead, the law codified into Title 42 are the various public statutes passed by Congress over the years that the Law Revision Counsel has included in Title 42. It is the public statutes that have the force of law. See e.g. <a href=\"https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=97&amp;page=1301\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Pub. L. 98-183</a>, whose elements the Law Revision Counsel put in Chapter 20A of Title 42.</p>\n<p>The Law Revision Counsel says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, is a non-positive law title. Title 42 is comprised of many individually enacted Federal statutes––such as the Public Health Service Act and the Social Security Act––that have been editorially compiled and organized into the title, but the title itself has not been enacted.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://uscode.house.gov/about_classification.xhtml\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Whether a provision of a public statute is included in the U.S. Code and where it will be included is determined by the Law Revision Counsel</a>, although placement may be obvious when a statute amends an already codified statute.</p>\n<p>As for the cramped numbering (<a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/94580/why-are-some-sections-of-the-us-code-formatted-so-weirdly#comment217877_94580\">contrary to the comment of Weather Vane</a>, which says that insertions would require renumbering of subsequent clauses), the Law Revision Counsel says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Chapters based on statutes that have been amended many times may have cumbersome numbering schemes with section numbers such as 16 U.S.C. 460zzz-7 and 42 U.S.C. 300ff-111.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Where the U.S. Code skips over large portions of section numbers this could be an intentional decision to leave room for growth, especially in a title that has undergone positive codification process through Congress, or it could be the result of previous sections that have been removed after repeal.</p>\n<p>For more background, see the <a href=\"https://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">detailed guide</a> from the Law Revision Counsel.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94582, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Does Congress do this sort of thing to emphasize the &quot;separation&quot; between the types of definitions, or is it just the case that they're &quot;reserving&quot; numbers in case they need to add something (like §40 before §41)?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You could look at it both ways. The first section in a chapter or subchapter is often one more than a multiple of 100, so 1, 101, 201, etc. This emphasizes the topical grouping but it also leaves space for new sections at the end of each subchapter.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Did Congress just run out of numbers or were they trying to &quot;squeeze an entirely new section&quot; in but couldn't quite make it?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes. There are instances of both. It does create a good deal of confusion, as you've noticed.</p>\n<p>For example, <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-20A\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">chapter 20A of title 42</a> comprises sections 1975, 1975a, 1975b, etc. But section 1975 also has a subsection 1975(a). Similarly, 1975a has a subsection 1975a(a). Confusing! For some reason, congress decided to squeeze almost the entirety of civil rights legislation between section 2000 and section 2001 (part of chapter 21 and all of chapters 21A through 21G). Why, I do not know.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "legal-history", "legislative-drafting" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94569, "body": "<h2>This type of fraud is called <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shill#Auctions\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">shill bidding</a></h2>\n<p>Unless the rules of the auction allow it, a vendor is not permitted to bid on their own item. Even when they are, such vendor bids may be disclosed.</p>\n<p>The relevant laws date from well before the rise of online auctions but they are just as applicable. There have been successful prosecutions to my knowledge, including jail time, in the <a href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/aug/02/art.crime\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">USA</a> and the <a href=\"https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/ebay-shill-bidder-fined-3500\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">UK</a>. A quick Google search shows these are not unique.</p>\n<p>A victim of such a fraud can seek restitution through a civil claim.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "contract-law", "theft", "cryptocurrency" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94579, "body": "<p>It’s not “bypassing the captcha” that is the problem, but accessing a server in a way that you are not allowed to.</p>\n<p>Say you are a human being, you visit a website, there’s a captcha, and your eyesight is quite bad. The website is ok with humans using the site. So asking your nephew to enter the captcha is fine.</p>\n<p>Now you are running a bot network. The site doesn’t want your bots. The captcha is there to stop them. The problem is not these bots getting around the captcha, it’s them accessing the server. The captcha might make sure that the site counts as “protected” though, which might make accessing it without authorisation more serious.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "european-union", "france" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94581, "body": "<h3>The section exempts the plaintiff from having to prove or even plead special damages when they instead plead and prove that the words were intended to cause pecuniary (even if not yet realized) damages</h3>\n<p>This statutory exception has also been adopted in Canadian jurisdictions and they have turned to U.K. jurisprudence to understand its meaning (<em>Almas et al. v. Spenceley</em>, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/g17r5\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">[1972] 2 O.R. 429</a> (C.A.)):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Court was referred to a number of cases under the law as it then stood whereby it was strictly required that special damages be set forth in the pleading and whereby no plea of general damages would be entertained. This was changed in England by the Defamation Act, 1952 (U.K.), c. 66, s. 3 (1), and here by a similar section, s. 19(a) of the Libel and Slander Act, 1958\n(Ont.), c. 51 ...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The Ontario Court of Appeal quoted from <em>Clavet v. Tomkies et al.</em>, [1963] 3 All E.R. 610 (Lord Denning) (emphasis mine):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>All I would say is that, as I read s. 3 of the Defamation Act, 1952, <strong>it gives a benefit to a plaintiff in that it is not necessary to plead or prove special damage if the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This means that special damages (actual and provable pecuniary losses up to the date of trial) need not be proven nor even pleaded if the words <em>are calculated</em> (meaning <em>intended</em> to) cause pecuniary damage (which might have not yet occurred, but might be proven as likely future damages at trial).</p>\n<p><em>Brown on Defamation</em> confirms that generally:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>there must be an express allegation that the plaintiff has suffered some particular special damage as a result of the slander, unless there is some special statutory provision foregoing an allegation of special damages where the words are calculated to cause pecuniary damage with respect to an office, profession or trade.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h3>This is not redundant with the maliciousness element</h3>\n<p>Malice need not be the intent to cause pecuniary loss. Malice can be made out by any improper motive, including spite, or an intention to cause pure reputational harm with no regard for pecuniary damages.</p>\n<p>In my view, this section has the greatest effect at the pleading stage. I agree that in many (although not all) malicious falsehood cases, proof of malice will double for proof of an intention to cause pecuniary damages.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94576, "body": "<h2>Pecuniary and special damages are different types of <a href=\"https://www.hoddereducation.co.uk/media/Documents/magazine-extras/Law%20Review/LawRev%2014_2/LawReview14_2_poster.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">damages</a></h2>\n<p>Under UK law, a court can award:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Special damages: &quot;quantifiable financial losses <strong>up to the date of trial</strong>&quot;. These have to be proved.</li>\n<li>General damages: &quot;This term covers all losses which are not capable of exact quantification, and are further divided into pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.&quot;\n<ul>\n<li>Pecuniary damages: &quot;The major head of pecuniary damages is future loss\nof earnings&quot; - this is what s3(1) is primarily aimed at. In personal injury cases, it also covers future care costs - this could be relevant if the defamation caused mental harm.</li>\n<li>Non-pecuniary losses: Pain and suffering, Loss of amenity, and damages for the injury itself. Unlikely to be relevant in a defamation case.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n<li>Provisional damages: &quot;The general rule is that only one award of damages\ncan be made. If damage turns out to be more serious\nthan was anticipated at the time of the award, there\nis no further action available to the claimant. This\ncan cause obvious hardship in personal injury cases.\nUnder the terms of the Supreme Court Act 1981\n(s.32a) the court has power to make a provisional\naward that allows the claimant to return to court\nshould further anticipated serious deterioration occur.&quot;</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "defamation", "tort", "damages" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94489, "body": "<p>A private school in the US is not bound by the 4th Amendment requirement for searches to be &quot;reasonable&quot;, just as parents do not need a search warrant to search your room. Instead, limitations would arise from contract law. This typically means that per the contract whereby you can go to that school, you agree to certain things (as do they). This may or may not include the power for a teacher to conduct a surprise inspection.</p>\n<p>It just depends on what is said in the contract regarding dorm room searches. Typically, adjudication of this type of matter is left to parental outrage rather than courts, unless there is a clear violation of the contract terms.</p>\n", "score": 37 }, { "answer_id": 94526, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>in some cases underwear and other things were missing.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This is a bigger problem than merely entering dorms. Theft is unambiguously a crime. Additionally, theft of underwear, especially from underage girls, is likely to be a sexual offence (depending on where you are, of course). Proving it may be difficult though.</p>\n<p>If your parents agreed to the search, of course, you have no authority to complain. However I would be frankly shocked if there was not near-unanimous protest by parents at this. This is more likely the route you need to go down. A mass protest by parents at a fee-paying school tends to get the attention of the board!</p>\n", "score": 20 }, { "answer_id": 94497, "body": "<h2>Privacy</h2>\n<p>Between people, there exists a common law right to <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_laws_of_the_United_States#Modern_tort_law\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">privacy</a>, independent of the quasi-constitutional right of people against the government.</p>\n<p>In this case, the specific tort the school has committed is <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_on_seclusion\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">intrusion on seclusion</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The elements of an intrusion on seclusion claim are:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>The defendant intentionally intruded upon the plaintiff's seclusion or private concerns.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The intrusion caused the plaintiff anguish and suffering.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>There is no requirement that the defendant disclosed any facts about the plaintiff, as in a public disclosure claim. Liability attaches to the intrusion itself.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You will note that having a good reason for the intrusion is not a defence.</p>\n<h2>Defences</h2>\n<h3>Permission</h3>\n<p>There is no tort if the person (or their legal guardian) consents to the search. Such a consent might be in the contract between the student (or their parents as guardians) and the school.</p>\n<p>The consent may be in general terms such as allowing the school to “take reasonable steps” to enforce school rules or protect the health and safety of students, staff, and visitors. Whether what the did was in line with the contract would depend on the circumstances - it could go either way.</p>\n<h3><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_loco_parentis\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>In loco parentis</em></a></h3>\n<p>Notwithstanding the contract, a school stands <em>in loco parentis</em> (in the place of the parent) for any minor children in its care are control. So for anyone under the age of 18, the school can consent to the search on behalf of the student, just like a parent could.</p>\n<h3>Health and Safety legislation</h3>\n<p>There is almost surely a state law that imposes a duty on the school to provide a safe environment. Such a law may make it legal for the school to conduct a search for a firearm without needing permission.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 94531, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-kingdom\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container\">united-kingdom</a></p>\n<p>In the UK at least, boarding house parents generally operate in loco parentis of the biological parents. This is usually contractually established as part of the attendance contract.</p>\n<p>This gives the boarding house parents most of the rights the biological parents would have within the context of the boarding house. This can even extend outside of this context in-extremis if the parents can't be contacted (for example if consent for emergency surgery is needed).</p>\n<p>This, without a doubt, extends to conducting searches of students' dorms with, or without, their consent.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>That being said, if we take the events as you describe them, this sounds extremely suspect. I'd be looking to raise this with school governance as this sort of &quot;search&quot; sounds like it would clearly be against school policy.</p>\n<p>It is also unclear whether the staff-members in question would be the ones in-loco parentis. Unless they were the house parents, I sincerely doubt it.</p>\n<p>The missing underwear would also be seemingly theft. While the house-parents would have the right to confiscate property, this should usually be logged, placed in a safe, and returned to the student/parents of the student at the first opportunity (likely the next time they are going home or after a punishment period had expired). I also can't see any justifiable reason for confiscating underwear...</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-states", "privacy", "jurisdiction", "search-and-seizure", "school" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94552, "body": "<p>If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it.</p>\n<p>What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94556, "body": "<p>It is unlikely that the company can compel existing employees to enter into an additional personal membership contract with them, or use their facilities in a personal capacity.</p>\n<p>However, I wouldn't necessarily presume ulterior motives.</p>\n<p>It is extremely useful for anyone involved in customer service, to understand what exactly the customer sees and experiences as part of the interaction.</p>\n<p>Arranging to make a small payment to the workers through the payroll so that they can follow the exact sign-up process, is not just the most thorough approach, but (I imagine more importantly to the bosses...) probably perceived to be the cheapest and simplest approach.</p>\n<p>In terms of salesmanship, it probably would have been a better approach for the bosses to invite willing employees to sign up for personal membership, and to have made available the facility for an employee to request a small subsidy for the purpose.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "payment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94449, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate\nwith emergency personal?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There is no ironclad method. The law does not specify how authorities should determine contact information for next of kin. As a practical matter some of the better methods (few people use all of them) are:</p>\n<ol>\n<li><p>Create an &quot;emergency contact&quot; business card and put it that person's wallet and/or purse. Put another such card in a prominent place in their home like taped to the wall next to their phone charger or under a magnet on the refrigerator or on a cork board in the house. Make sure that the person has their own ID and medical insurance card and a card containing any medical alert information (e.g. drug allergies and blood type and religious objections to any particular sort of treatment) there as well. A &quot;wallet biopsy&quot; is standard operating procedure for first responders when the identity of a person suffering an emergency is unknown.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Enter your name as an &quot;in case of emergency&quot; (ICE) number on that person's cell phone. You can also set up their cell phone to authorize you to locate it with an app. More crudely, you can put a sticker that says &quot;emergency contact&quot; with your name and phone number physically on the outside of the person's phone. The mechanics of putting emergency information in a phone can be found at <a href=\"https://www.grangeinsurance.com/tips/in-case-of-emergency-how-to-prepare-your-phone\" rel=\"noreferrer\">this insurance company website</a>.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>If they have a medical alert or home security system or medic alter bracelet, have them put you as an emergency contact for that.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Put a medical power of attorney naming you as an agent (if the person is willing to execute one) together with your contact information in the patient file of all of the person's medical providers such as a treating primary care physician, home health care person, etc. Keep the number for these providers on hand so that you can call them to ask if there is any news or appointments have been missed.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Have the person list you as an emergency contact in places that keep records of one such as an employer, membership based gym, a college or educational institution where the person is taking some classes, and their nursing home or assisted living center (if any).</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Provide your contact information to (and get contact information from) neighbors, landlords, financial advisors, accountants, lawyers, and family members of the person who are likely to be contacted and ask that they let you know if something happens. Spend at least a little time with as many of them as possible in person, when you are in town, to the fullest extent possible. Become friends with them on social media and interact with them every once and a while in that context. Put them on your Christmas letter list. Share your excess tomatoes and strawberries with them. Send them little thank you notes and gifts when you learn that they did something nice for the person like helping them shovel snow or trimming the shrubs on their shared property line. Little courtesies create a moral impetus on their part to take the trivial effort of calling you to let you know that something is up when it happens.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Have a local contact you can have look into the situation if you are unable to reach the person at the usual times, ideally someone with a spare key and security codes to the house and/or apartment building or gated community. If there is no one who can do that, local law enforcement can be asked to do a &quot;welfare check&quot; on the person.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Have a copy of a will, power of attorney, or HIPPA release that allows a third party to corroborate your connection to the person and be in a position to tell someone local where the original will is located. It is also good to keep a log or journal of your contacts with the person so that you can demonstrate that when they go missing that it really is an unusual and concerning event and to demonstrate that you are in regular contact with the person.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n<p>For example, I have a client who died this week while his emergency contact person was visiting family in another country. When she was unable to reach him, she checked with his doctor, learned that he had failed to show up for a medical appointment scheduled for earlier that day, and then had her son who was still in town use a spare key she had given him to check in on my client, where her son had the misfortune of discovering the deceased client.</p>\n", "score": 17 }, { "answer_id": 94456, "body": "<p>New Jersey has <a href=\"https://www.state.nj.us/mvc/drivertopics/nextofkin.htm\" rel=\"noreferrer\">a very specific registry for next-of-kin</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Next-of-Kin Registry is a New Jersey statewide web-based system\nthat allows individuals at least 14 years of age to voluntarily submit\nand maintain emergency contact information through the New Jersey\nMotor Vehicle Commission. This non-public information will only be\nused by law enforcement officers to locate designated emergency\ncontacts in an event that a person is involved in a vehicle crash that\nrenders him or her unable to communicate.</p>\n<p>The Next-of-Kin Registry was established in response to &quot;Sara's Law,&quot;\nwhich was created in memory of Sara Elizabeth Dubinin from Sayreville.\nMiss Dubinin became unresponsive following a motor vehicle crash in\nSeptember 2007 and lapsed into a coma before her parents could be\nnotified. She eventually passed away. The law sought to ensure that an\nemergency contact could be notified immediately in the event of a\nvehicle crash.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>OP tagged the question for New Jersey so if the uncle lives in NJ, OP can use this registry.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 94563, "body": "<p>The Next Of Kin Registry (<a href=\"https://nokr.org/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">NOKR</a>) was established as a FREE tool for daily emergencies and national disasters... You may be able to register your emergency contacts with your state DMV or Motor vehicle office check\nwith your State agency for more information as many states have adopted this process. Currently we are aware of <strong>SC, DE, CO, NJ, <a href=\"https://www.flhsmv.gov/driver-licenses-id-cards/florida-granddriver/register-emergency-contact-information/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">FL</a>, NV and OH.</strong></p>\n<p>Appears a few states have this option directly.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "medical", "new-jersey", "emergencies" ]

[ { "answer_id": 1244, "body": "<p>You can get arrested for theft and/or fraud. This is not some new way to steal items; changing price tags started approximately the day after price tags were invented. Some state laws handle it explicitly, some implicitly; for instance, Maryland defines &quot;deception&quot; in its <a href=\"http://law.justia.com/codes/maryland/2010/criminal-law/title-7/subtitle-1/7-101/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">theft statute</a> to include &quot;(vi) remove or alter a label or price tag;&quot; theft is <a href=\"http://law.justia.com/codes/maryland/2010/criminal-law/title-7/subtitle-1/7-104/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">committed</a> if, among other possibilities,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(b) Unauthorized control over property - By deception.- A person may not obtain control over property by willfully or knowingly using deception, if the person:</p>\n<p>(1) intends to deprive the owner of the property;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In other states, caselaw says that switching price tags is deception, and doing it for gain is fraud. See <a href=\"https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11855366659164977030\" rel=\"noreferrer\">this California case</a> in which switching price tags and buying the item is completed generic &quot;theft by false pretenses&quot; if the cashier didn't know you had switched the tags and relied on the new ones (in that case, the cashier knew so it was just attempted theft); see also this <a href=\"https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11506652602115716945\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Nebraska</a> case. Notably, the deception there is not tied to a statute saying &quot;switching physical price tags is deception;&quot; rather, it's deception because it involves knowingly making a false representation of a material fact (i.e. the true price of the goods) with intent to fool the store into thinking the real price is the lower one.</p>\n<p>As a general rule, many criminal laws handle new technology by looking at how you're using it. If what you're doing would be flagrantly illegal if not done on a computer, it will likely be illegal if you use a computer.</p>\n<p>Because you used the Internet, you might theoretically face further charges. If this is considered to be deception, you could in theory be on the hook for <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1343\" rel=\"noreferrer\">wire fraud</a>. This is a federal felony offense. While small-scale offenses would more likely be prosecuted at the state level (and if you are federally prosecuted for one small fraud you'll probably face 0-6 months in jail instead of the 20-year maximum sentence for wire fraud), it is in fact a federal crime to commit wire fraud.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 1309, "body": "<p>Under the common law, you'd be committing a felony: theft by false pretenses. Each state has probably replaced the common law definition with a statute, and additionally there'd be a federal felony law for fraud via the internet. Even if the retailer noticed it and cancelled the transaction, they could still report you for attempted theft.</p>\n\n<p>It is true that you'd be unlikely to face prosecution with higher priorities in law enforcement. Nevertheless it is a terrible idea to commit multiple felonies just because you are playing the odds that no one will care enough to charge you.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94562, "body": "<p>If you do this successfully, then you used your computer's browser to hack into the company's server that handles sales. Computer Fraud Act, &quot;Knowingly accessing a protected computer and causing damage and loss to that computer&quot;.</p>\n<p>Now <em>if</em> you are successful, then some software developer should obviously be fired for gross incompetence. If your browser sends a request to buy 100 items at $20 each instead of the correct price at $100 each, that request should very obviously not be allowed. But that's no excuse for you.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states" ]

[ { "answer_id": 78541, "body": "<p><strong>Such a person is not necessarily covered by Vietnamese employment law.</strong></p>\n<p>It is common for employees from one country to work in another - that does not automatically make them subject to the second country’s employment law. Temporary overseas assignments (which can be days, weeks, months, or even years) generally do not change the jurisdiction of the employment contract providing the intention is that the employee will return at the employer’s cost at the end.</p>\n<p>The particulars depend on the details of each nation’s laws and any treaties between them as well as the terms of the employment contract and the actual situation.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "labor-law", "vietnam" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94540, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-tooltip-container\">england</a></p>\n<p>Quite the opposite; although playing cards are not specifically mentioned, gambling education is actively encouraged in schools: but through the support of charities and the voluntary sector - not by statute.</p>\n<p>The key players are:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://pshe-association.org.uk/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">PSHE Association</a> (standing forPersonal, Social, Health and Economic) who, in partnership with <a href=\"https://www.begambleaware.org/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">BeGambleAware</a> have a host of <a href=\"https://pshe-association.org.uk/news/new-lesson-plans-tips-and-podcast-gambling-harm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">educational material</a>, including the:</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://pshe-association.org.uk/cs/c/?cta_guid=50c6e0e6-92e9-4d1f-9a15-5da562241d00&amp;signature=AAH58kGSD_ed7Nvd-Kw1GkD-viQPszkjzQ&amp;pageId=56950285437&amp;placement_guid=1330646f-9d66-4093-9513-646c4315d36a&amp;click=85c43571-7b60-484d-b498-7f4f94eeef2b&amp;hsutk=885cf4a5b093076b2a6e8e673fe3e534&amp;canon=https%3A%2F%2Fpshe-association.org.uk%2Fguidance%2Fks1-5%2Fgambling&amp;utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fpshe-association.org.uk%2Fnews%2Fnew-lesson-plans-tips-and-podcast-gambling-harm&amp;portal_id=20248256&amp;redirect_url=APefjpEy83gr6SJimINCZkuhtbSYGtjRmXmVBKXHG9hYn2XVttrNiqd0lccEJs0H_GrCVxpPeV62XKkWM-z8tivNpblVYImc1OEgXhIZ2fnToQCCThEfK-smdMdeu0gsZnkaCAKBY-9WNeoI7k0pajrfbaEMdt5zpHAoIYyqI0plXDqILhiV15wCtqWGSa99nag2ylxgFXNKtguo9i5uY6Jf9hj1Eut0193Ql8-3D9x23vhlasveFkhlmSw_7G0AfydI22PoAepyAWyaW0T3zvIjbViT8SsNVJCdbqINcOwHnwVBC90-1Rud1_9p94QgsL1_wJFs3PKfT5P0LDTnngK3pLCQQ6siQfT1hAkmlIz4TdSfHeWnwvdTMLRj3WQPLr-U0kBaAhcVABYbRb6siPSN3aGLrCFJa_EZcSKv8GeJJQ8n5q14HJ4rj3FlWG_Crf3IeQHmbBKcR3wjKbETY71t2aMw9PwhrQ&amp;__hstc=266038160.885cf4a5b093076b2a6e8e673fe3e534.1691431789309.1691431789309.1691436159660.2&amp;__hssc=266038160.11.1691436159660&amp;__hsfp=3902432016&amp;contentType=standard-page\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Gambling prevention education</a> handbook</p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.gamcare.org.uk/news-and-blog/news/preventing-gambling-harms-framework-for-effective-education-launched/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">GamCare</a> alongside <a href=\"https://www.ygam.org/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">YGAM</a> and <a href=\"https://gamblingeducationhub.fastforward.org.uk/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Fast Forward</a> (from Scotland) and in line with <a href=\"https://d1ygf46rsya1tb.cloudfront.net/prod/uploads/2022/09/502048_Gam_YAD_Web-002.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">PSHE Association guidance</a> launched the Gambling Education Framework, that:</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p> provides a set of evidence-based principles to deliver effective gambling education for anyone who works with young people (aged 7 to 24) in a paid or voluntary capacity across a variety of formal and informal settings, including schools in England. </p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p>_{Although tagged <a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a>, I have answered according to the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic\">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;}</p>\n", "score": 9 } ]

[ "united-states", "education", "gambling", "school" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94551, "body": "<p>The situation in Texas is complicated. Driving faster than the posted maximum speed limit is not in and of itself a crime; rather, per <a href=\"https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/TN/htm/TN.545.htm#545.352\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Texas Transportation Code 545.352(a)</a>, it is <em>prima facie</em> evidence that the speed is a violation of <a href=\"https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/TN/htm/TN.545.htm#545.351\" rel=\"noreferrer\">545.351(a)</a>: &quot;An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing&quot;. It is theoretically possible to defeat a speeding ticket by demonstrating that the speed was, in fact, reasonable and prudent.</p>\n<p>Texas also has a law regarding minimum speed, <a href=\"https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/TN/htm/TN.545.htm#545.363\" rel=\"noreferrer\">545.363(a)</a>: &quot;An operator may not drive so slowly as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law&quot;. Since the speed limit is not a hard limit, the &quot;compliance with law&quot; clause does not protect you.</p>\n<p>If you get rear-ended while driving slower than the flow of traffic, your best defense is probably <a href=\"https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/TN/htm/TN.545.htm#545.351\" rel=\"noreferrer\">545.351(b)(2)</a>: &quot;An operator...shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle that is on or entering the highway in compliance with law and the duty of each person to use due care&quot;. The question in court becomes your claim that driving slowly constituted &quot;due care&quot; versus the other driver's claim that their speed was &quot;reasonable and prudent&quot;. It's likely that you'll win, but it's not the slam-dunk case that it would be in a state where posted speed limits were hard restrictions.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94539, "body": "<p>If you are following the speed limit and somebody rear-ends you it is because they were speeding and following too closely. They are making themselves a danger to those around them, and they are liable for the damage.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "traffic", "texas" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94507, "body": "<h2>No, but...</h2>\n<p>It is not an offense to photograph people, especially if they are just caught at the edge or out of the center of the photography. <strong>However</strong> you do not have a right to photograph people either. In fact, under German law, you have to gain the consent of people that are the centerpiece of a photo for publication, or make the photo for a number of enumerated reasons. Among such is news reporting or documenting an ongoing crime - such material is made in the public interest. If you make a photo without consent or qualified reason, possession of the photo in general is no problem <strong>but</strong> you have no right to publish the photo.</p>\n<p>To prevent such publication, the photographed person may demand deletion or destruction of the photo - however, following the demand is not explicitly required. Such a demand however is equivalent to an explicit demand to not publish the picture. As such, it gets really tricky for the photographer. <strong>Publication without a release</strong> (or a no-release statement) or one of the few excusing reasons <strong>is a punishable offense</strong>, which can land you in prison for up to one year. This stems from <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_2.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Art. 2 GG</a>, <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kunsturhg/__22.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§22</a>, <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kunsturhg/__23.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§23</a> and <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kunsturhg/__33.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§33 Kunsturhebergesetz</a>.</p>\n<p>Hindering rescue services with your camera and creating photos of injured and vulnerable people is illegal under the same reasoning. Getting into the way of the police can constitute obstruction of emergency helpers atop of that. More on that specific part of German law can be learned <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/93644/10334\">in this question</a>. Do note that such photography can also be a crime under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__201a.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§201a StGB</a>, especially if your photography shows <em>someone</em> as vulnerable.</p>\n<p>Another possibility for the approaching police might have been, that the policeman was interested to find out if you might have photographed or filmed the incident that led to the arrest. In that case, he might have requested a copy for evidentiary reasons.</p>\n", "score": 34 }, { "answer_id": 94536, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p><strong>NO</strong></p>\n<p>The Metropolitan Police offer the following clarity (which is reproduced in similar terms by the other 42 police forces and various law enforcement agencies):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.met.police.uk/advice/advice-and-information/ph/photography-advice#:%7E:text=Freedom%20to%20photograph%20and%20film,photographing%20incidents%20or%20police%20personnel.\" rel=\"noreferrer\"><strong>Freedom to photograph and film</strong></a></p>\n<p>Members of the public and the media do not need a permit to film or photograph in public places and police have no power to stop them filming or photographing incidents or police personnel.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p>_{By way of some background: there has been some misunderstanding and misuse of the stop and search powers under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/43?timeline=false\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 43</a> Terrorism Act 2000. The issue being the officer's reasonable suspicion the person stopped may be a terrorist which, on occasion, was not subjectively reasonable.}</p>\n<hr />\n<p>_{Although tagged <a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a>, I have answered according to the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic\">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;}</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94543, "body": "<p>Yes, usually it is.</p>\n<p>The more specific answer is: it depends. There is no specific law that makes it illegal to photograph police per se. However Germany has fairly strict regulations towards privacy and right to your own image and it is usually illegal to photograph a person without their consent if their face is visible in details. This also includes policemen on duty.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "privacy", "police", "germany", "photography", "schengen" ]

[ { "answer_id": 78389, "body": "<p><strong>What, if any, is the tolerance built into speed limits in India?</strong></p>\n<p>None in statute (that I can find), but the police may have an informal policy¹\nto allow for other factors like inaccuracies in one's speedometer and misreading the needle due to <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallax\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">parallax</a>.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>¹The one I am aware of is &quot;<em>10% +2</em>&quot; where, say, anyone going over 35mph on a 30mph road gets a ticket etc</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "india", "speeding" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94528, "body": "<h2>Racing parts generally lack EWG certification and thus roadworthiness certificates</h2>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.tuningblog.eu/fr/cat%C3%A9gories/wiki-de-r%C3%A9glage/Permis-d%27exploitation-ewg-235351/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">A part needs to have an EWG registration number matching to the type of vehicle to be allowed to be used on a street-legal motorcycle.</a> If a part has non street-legal parts, its whole registration usually is void. Driving a vehicle without a valid registration is illegal and generally not insured.</p>\n<p>Please check the <a href=\"https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/homologation-des-vehicules\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">regulator</a> or the <a href=\"https://www.argusdelassurance.com/dossier-ja/securite-des-pieces-de-rechange-et-homologation.39663\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">general information of insurance companies</a> about what replacement parts have to comply with. Your insurance agency usually can help you too.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94535, "body": "<p>The best thing to do is read your policy and ask your insurer.</p>\n<p>Some insurance policies do not include modifications from the factory state.</p>\n<p>If you have such a policy and do not declare the modification to your insurer, your insurer might be able to void the policy if you make a claim.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "liability", "insurance", "france", "motorcycle" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94494, "body": "<p>The only bright line regards the First Amendment. <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1512\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">18 USC 1512</a> articulates a line that is not to be crossed, but it is not clear where the line is as regards speech (subsection (a)(1) sets forth a bright line, viz &quot;kills or attempts to kill&quot;, irrelevant to the present question). Otherwise, the remaining categories fall into three subtypes:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly\npersuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in\nmisleading conduct toward another person, with intent to..</p>\n<p>(c) Whoever corruptly—</p>\n<p>(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders,\ndelays, prevents, or dissuades any person from—</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>These laws address communications addressed to witnesses, w.r.t. testimony. Case law e.g. <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/631/1398/1959568/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">US v. DiSalvo</a>, <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-murray-30\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">US v. Murray</a> all indicates that the forbidden threat must be addressed to an individual who might be a witness, whereas the above statement is not addressed, it is merely uttered (there is no clearly-intended recipient of the utterance).</p>\n<p>Similarly, <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1503\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">18 USC 1503</a> forbids &quot;corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavor[ing] to influence, intimidate, or impede&quot; a judicial officer, but this requires there to be a threat made to a specific judicial officer.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94533, "body": "<p>Witness intimidation is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1512, which imposes penalties on anyone who:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a)(2) uses physical force or the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to ... influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>or</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(b) knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Courts explicitly disclaim the use of bright-line tests in for violations of Section 1512 in cases like this, which do not involve the actual use of physical force. Instead, the courts look to the context of the speech or conduct in question to determine whether the defendant used a &quot;threat of physical force&quot; or &quot;corruptly persuaded&quot; the witness not to testify.</p>\n<p>The guidance that the courts give on those questions is fairly squishy.</p>\n<p>Under subsection (a)(2), for instance, threats of physical force would have to be &quot;true threats&quot; to satisfy First Amendment analysis, meaning that they were “serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence.” <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/counterman-v-colorado-2\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, No. 22-138, 9 (U.S. Jun. 27, 2023)</a>. And there is no bright-line test to determine whether a threat is such a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence; instead, courts must look at “all of the contextual factors” that could inform that answer. <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/virginia-v-black-5#p359\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Virginia v. Black</em>, 538 U.S. 343, 345 (2003)</a>.</p>\n<p>Subsection (b) appears to require the same totality-of-the-circumstances analysis rather than using any bright-line test:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>There is general agreement that it does not require &quot;acts, threats, emotional appeals, or persistent pleading,&quot; but does require the Government to prove &quot;a defendant's action was done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about false or misleading testimony with the hope or expectation of some benefit to the defendant.&quot; ... However, the persuasion &quot;need not be explicit&quot; to be corrupt. ... Indeed, corrupt persuasion includes situations where a defendant coaches or reminds witnesses by [**18] planting misleading facts.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-edlind-1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>United States v. Edlind</em>, 887 F.3d 166, 173-174 (2018)</a>.</p>\n<p>Therefore, the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction in <em>Edlind</em> even where the defendant explicitly told the victim to tell the truth:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Edlind's statements can be seen as attempts to confuse Kwiatkowski as to what was real and what was Chujoy's odd sense of humor. By confusing Kwiatkowski, Edlind sought to undermine his ability to testify persuasively against Chujoy in the <em>Inca's Secret</em> case. Coupled with the circumstantial evidence implicating Edlind -- the timing of events following Chujoy's June 3 letter and Edlind's constant attempts at avoiding governmental surveillance -- there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction for witness tampering. The jury was free to reject Edlind's statement to &quot;tell the truth&quot; as a shallow attempt to immunize herself from prosecution.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "freedom-of-speech" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94532, "body": "<p>It seems to not be allowed for a UK police to lie.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/contents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984</a> makes it illegal for the police to mislead a suspect in order to make them believe that the police have evidence which they do not or that the evidence they have is stronger than it is, or that there is a possibility of leniency (for example in return for ‘cooperation’) where none exists.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Realistically, there is no reason that a police officer might lie to a suspect during interview.</p>\n<p>Also see from <a href=\"https://innocenceproject.org/news/how-the-uk-police-interview-suspects/#:%7E:text=The%20law%20does%20not%20allow,do%E2%80%94I%20get%20more%20information.\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">innocenceproject.org</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The law does not allow lying to suspects, under any circumstances.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94534, "body": "<p>Further to @Daxelarne's accurate <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/94532/35069\">answer</a></p>\n<p>An undercover officer (UCO), authorised under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/29?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 29</a> Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), by the very nature of the role can lie - but only insofar as to create what's called a &quot;<em>personal or other relationship</em>&quot; (i.e. a covert relationship).</p>\n<p>Although a UCO may have additional authority for &quot;<em>criminal conduct</em>&quot; under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/29B?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 29B</a> they cannot, for example, lie to entrap a suspect in to committing a crime they would not otherwise do.</p>\n<p>Similarly, but to a lesser extent, covert surveillance officers carrying out &quot;<em>Directed Surveillance</em>&quot; under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/28?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 28</a> RIPA may occasionally lie to maintain their cover but not to the extent that creates a covert relationship. For example, Q: &quot;<em>Are you following me?</em>&quot; A: &quot;<em>Don't be daft, I'm looking for my lost dog. Goodbye</em>&quot;</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94529, "body": "<p>See <a href=\"https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol42/iss3/7\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Irina Khasin, <strong>Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation\nPractices in the United States</strong>, 42 <em>Vanderbilt Law Review</em> 1029 (2021)</a>.</p>\n<h4>Pages 1031-3</h4>\n<blockquote>\n<p>          In Europe, police officers pursue confessions with equal zeal but\nemploy different means to achieve the desired end.⁶ The modern\nframework for police interrogations in England, established by the\nPolice and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE), focuses on the\nsearch for truth by seeking reliable confessions through the use of fair\npolice practices.⁷ Rather than leaving the courts to delve into the\nemotional state of every defendant who challenges a confession,\nEnglish law establishes a uniform standard for the police to follow\nwhen conducting interrogations.⁸ To determine the admissibility of\nconfession evidence, the English courts consider whether police\nofficers have complied with PACE guidelines.⁹<br />\n          While some trickery by the police may be permissible under the provisions of PACE, English courts have held that the intentional\nmisrepresentation of evidence is unfair and violates the law.'¹⁰\nBecause this type of police deception compromises the veracity of a\nsuspect's statements, English judges routinely exclude any\nconfessions gained through deception as unreliable.11 Although\nresearch suggests that the use of fabricated evidence is rare in\nEnglish interrogations,¹² PACE enforces the prohibition by requiring the police to record every interview.¹³ Even a violation of the\nrecording requirement itself can result in the exclusion of a\nconfession from trial.¹⁴<br />\n          Although commentators have criticized deceptive police practices\nfor decades,¹⁵ American jurisprudence continues to overlook what\nEnglish courts have long recognized: deceptive police practices yield\nfalse confessions and, thus, wrongful convictions.¹⁶ Confessions\ngained through police deception are often factually inaccurate and\nuntrustworthy.17 English law limits the use of these deceptive\npractices by establishing clear rules for the police to follow and\nempowering courts to enforce those rules.'8 PACE artfully balances\npolice and prosecutorial interests with the fair and reliable\nadministration of justice. 19 In evaluating the need for reform in\nAmerican police interrogation policy, English law provides a valuable\nmodel for comparison.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h4>Pages 1051-3</h4>\n<blockquote>\n<p>          Courts considering the admissibility of confessions evidence\nevaluate police conduct for compliance with PACE section 76 and\n78.189 The cornerstones of the law governing police interrogation are\nreliability and fairness. PACE section 76 provides:</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in\nevidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to\nthe court that the confession was or may have been obtained</p>\n<p>(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or</p>\n<p>(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the\ncircumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession\nwhich might be made by him in consequence thereof,\nthe court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against\nhim except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond\nreasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be\ntrue) was not obtained as aforesaid.</p>\n</blockquote>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Applying PACE section 76, courts consider the words or actions that\ninduced such confession to determine whether the confession made by\n<em>the particular suspect</em> is likely to be unreliable. 190 Questioning that\nmight be acceptable in the interrogation of an average suspect may\nstill cast doubt as to the reliability of admissions made by a\nparticularly vulnerable or inexperienced suspect, such as a child. 191\nSection 76 permits judges to exercise considerable discretion in\nexcluding confessions on the basis of reliability. 192 Section 78 further\ndevelops the courts' power to bar confessions by allowing judges to exercise discretion in excluding evidence that would otherwise be\nadmissible on the basis that it would be unfair to offer the evidence as\nproof in a criminal trial.193 In English courts, the function of the\njudge is to protect the fairness of the proceedings. 194 Because each\ncase will turn on its relevant facts, the government has been\nreluctant to fetter individual judges' discretion by drawing bright line\nrestrictions.195<br />\n          Courts in England routinely exclude confession evidence\nobtained unfairly by some deceit or trick played on the suspect. 196\nEven before the enactment of PACE, English common law granted\ncourts the discretion to exclude confession evidence if the police made\nmisrepresentations to persuade a suspect to make the incriminating\nstatements. 197 Since PACE was enacted, defendants usually\nchallenge evidence obtained as a result of a trick as &quot;unfair&quot; under\nPACE section 78.198 If the defendant can show that the police acted\nin bad faith by making a deliberately deceitful representation, the\ncourt likely will exclude the confession from evidence. 199 In R v.\nMason, the Court of Appeal excluded a confession for such a bad faith\nmisrepresentation by a police officer.200 With no direct evidence to\nconnect the suspect to the crime, the police officer falsely told the\ndefendant and his solicitor that they had found the suspect's\nfingerprints at the scene of the crime. 201 After being presented with\nthis false evidence during his interrogation, the defendant confessed\nto the crime. 202 The Court of Appeal held that the deceit perpetrated\non the defendant and his solicitor was reprehensible and impacted\nthe fairness of the trial. 203 As the confession was the only definitive\nevidence linking the defendant to the crime, the conviction was\noverturned.204<br />\n          Although express deception by the police during the\ninterrogation of a suspect is generally prohibited in England, the\ncourts have found that some types of police deception do not warrant\nthe exclusion of confession evidence.205 For example, the English\n&quot;courts have exhibited a considerable degree of tolerance of\nsurreptitious tape-recording by ... the police.&quot;206 In Bailey, the police\nhad failed to obtain confessions from two suspects through ordinary\nquestioning; as a result, the police placed the two suspects in a\nbugged cell in an effort to record incriminating statements.207 Before\ndoing so, the officers acted out a deceptive charade to lull the suspects\ninto a false sense of security.208 The police officers suggested to the\nsuspects that they should have been placed in separate cells, but an\nuncooperative custody officer had placed them in the cell together.209\nAssuming that their conversation would be private, the suspects\nmade incriminating remarks.210 The court found that the use of\ndeception was &quot;merely a detail,&quot; refusing to exclude the admissions\nfrom evidence at trial.211</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"6\">\n<li>Aldert Vrij, <em>&quot;We Will Protect Your Wife and Child, But Only If You Confess&quot; Police Interrogations in England and the Netherlands</em>, in\nADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES\nON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, <em>supra</em> note 5, at 55, 56.</li>\n<li>See JOHN SPRACK, EMMINS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4-5 (9th ed. 2002).</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id. at 7.</li>\n<li>See Vrij, <em>supra</em> note 6, at 56 (stating that it is implied that evidence obtained by deceit and trickery cannot be admitted into\nevidence in courts in England).</li>\n<li>See generally id. at 55-79 (discussing interrogation procedures in England).</li>\n<li>PETER MIRFIELD, SILENCE, CONFESSIONS AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 11 (1997) (explaining that evidence indicates that the use of\nmanipulative techniques has declined since the enactment of the Police\nand Criminal Evidence Act); Slobogin, <em>supra</em> note 5, at 43.</li>\n<li>Code of Practice on Audio Recording Interviews with Suspects (Code E),\n3.1 (promulgated under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 67, pt. VI (Eng.)) [hereinafter Code E].</li>\n<li>See Slobogin, supra note 5, at 43.</li>\n<li>See, e.g., Magid, supra note 3, at 1169-70 (describing the criticism of commentators and the popular press of the false\nconfessions that arise from the use of deceptive interrogation\ntechniques); Margaret Paris, <em>Trust, Lies, and Interrogation</em>, 3 VA.\nJ. SOC. POL'Y &amp; L. 3, 9 (1996) (advocating the prohibition of any lies\nduring questioning); Welsh S. White, <em>False Confessions and the\nConstitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions</em>, 32 HARV.\nC.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 111, 148 (1997) (advocating substantial limits\non deception by proposing that police be prohibited from presenting\nfalse forensic evidence).</li>\n<li>White, supra note 15, at 111.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>See SPRACK, supra note 7, at 4-7 (describing how PACE develops a framework for the exercise of police powers and how it is enforced).</li>\n<li>See id. (noting that PACE sets out the framework for the exercise of police powers, accounts for the public interest and provides\nenforcement methods for courts).</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<ol start=\"189\">\n<li>See id. at 29 (describing the framework set out by Sections 76 and 78).</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id.; cf. MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 283 (&quot;[T]he mental handicap of the\naccused may properly be considered . . . for the purposes of section 76(2)(b).&quot;). The\nleading case is <em>R v. Everett</em>. See Case Comment, <em>Reliability of Confession-Mental\nCondition of Suspect: R v. Everett</em>, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 826 (Eng.).</li>\n<li>Confession and Breaches of Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) (U.K.),\n<a href=\"http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/confession_and_breaches_of_police_and_criminal_evidence_act/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/confession_and_breaches_of_police_and_criminal_evidence_act/</a> (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>See Richard Stone, <em>Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 78 of the Police and\nCriminal Evidence Act: Practice and Principles</em>, 3 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, § 11. 1\n(1995), <a href=\"http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles3/stone3.html;\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles3/stone3.html;</a> cf. R v. Houghton, (1978) 68 Crim.\nApp. 197, 206 (Eng.) (&quot;Evidence would operate unfairly against an accused if it had\nbeen obtained in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused\nperson or by a trick or by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take advantage.&quot;)\n(citations omitted); MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 12 (recognizing the &quot;emerging\nconsensus in official circles&quot; that the kind of tactics &quot;advocated by Inbau, Reid, and\nBuckley, as well as being arguably unethical, is also inimical to the gathering of\nreliable confession evidence&quot;).</li>\n<li>MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 199.</li>\n<li>Id. at 205-09.</li>\n<li>Id. at 206.</li>\n<li><em>R v. Mason</em>, (1988) 1 W.L.R. 139, 144 (Eng.).</li>\n<li>Id. at 142.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id. at 144.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>MIRFIELD, supra note 12, at 207.</li>\n<li>Id. at 208.</li>\n<li><em>R v. Bailey</em>, (1993) 3 All E.R. 513, 514 (Eng.).</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n<li>Id.</li>\n</ol>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "england-and-wales", "police", "police-power" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94519, "body": "<p>I don't think the record keeping of the lower courts that grant the majority of default judgments is consistent enough to confidently say what &quot;in person&quot; means, especially without a copy of the document to read in its full context. However, it probably means that the defendant physically attended the courtroom and was not represented by a lawyer.</p>\n<p>Arguably a defendant who does not attend could still be considered an &quot;in person&quot; (unrepresented) litigant, but I would expect the court to describe this situation with a more explicit term like &quot;no appearance.&quot; Your question also appears to indicate that the defendant was not described as &quot;in person&quot; when default judgment was entered. This typically occurs in the defendant's absence, so the addition of the words &quot;in person&quot; to the record of the later hearing suggests that they did attend the later hearing.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "legal-terms", "civil-procedure" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94515, "body": "<p>A strata lot is a unit of real property resulting from the division of property into lots as per a &quot;strata plan&quot; under the <a href=\"https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/98043_00_multi\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Strata Property Act</em></a>. This division may be <em>stratified</em> in that it can describe horizontal divisions of the property by reference to floors and/or ceilings of a building. This is a niche terminology only used in a few jurisdictions, like Australia, British Columbia, and Alberta.</p>\n<p>The owners of the strata lots make up a &quot;strata corporation&quot; with responsibility for the care and management of the common property, common facilities, and corporation assets.</p>\n<p>Many strata structures are like what are known as condominiums elsewhere (and even informally within B.C.), but stratas encompass more than just typical condominiums. A strata plan can be &quot;<a href=\"https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/housing-tenancy/strata-housing/understanding-stratas/kinds-of-stratas\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">duplexes, townhouses, fractional vacation properties—even single family homes in bare land strata corporations.</a>&quot;</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94525, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<p>A <a href=\"https://www.nsw.gov.au/housing-and-construction/strata\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">strata</a> lot is a unit in a strata title - one way of multiple people owning land. In the USA, the closest equivalent would be a condominium.</p>\n<p>Australia uses the <a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torrens_title\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Torrens Title</a> system for registering land ownership where the title is held and guaranteed by the government- if the government register says you own it, then absent fraud on your part, you own it and anyone damaged by errors or fraud on the title gets compensation from the government, not you.</p>\n<p>Forgive the diversion but I’m about to use the term “Torrens Title” to refer to a pice of land which is owned freehold which is a common usage even though “Torrens Title” also refers to the entire system of land ownership, including Strata, Company, and Community Titles.</p>\n<p>Historically, when multiple people own land as tenants-in-common or joint tenants, they own the entire land collectively. This works fine for small family and similar groups but it doesn’t really work if you want to give different people different rights - like these people can use apartment 1 and those people can use apartment 2.</p>\n<p>One workaround is a contract among the owners but it still leaves the property tied together - if one wants to sell then all have to sell (or not).</p>\n<p>Another was to form a company that owned the land with different classes of shares that gave people rights to use different parts of the building - there are still a few company title buildings (so called) around. Then if one wants to sell, they only have to sell their shares. However, this was always a bit of a kludge because company law is targeted at companies that run businesses rather than a device for real estate ownership. It also meant that anyone that managed to get more than 50% of the shares would control the building - a patient property developer could buy units as and when they became available and then launch a takeover to force people out of their homes.</p>\n<p>So, in the post-war era, Australian governments enacted Strata Title laws custom designed to manage apartment building ownership. The term strata comes from the fact that ownership is divided by floor (and by units within floors) forming a strata. When a strata title is registered, the surveyor assigns each unit a proportion of the whole in line with the amenity of the particular lot which determines their contributions to the strata title company that is formed and “owned” by the unit holders and that, in turn owns the land and the building. Each lot is registered along with the overall plan providing a permanent and government-backed record of who owns what. Units can change hands and that automatically gives the holder a say in the running of the strata.</p>\n<p>Typically, the strata company owns the building and the unit holder owns everything inside the walls, up to and including the paint. The strata is run by the unit holders through a management committee who usually engage a professional strata manager. Operational and capital budgets are determined annually (with some statutory minimums) and each unit holder must contribute their proportion in quarterly instalments. In theory, the capital sinking fund should have enough money in it to replace the building at the end of its life.</p>\n<p>It’s possible for units within a strata to themselves be a strata. I own a unit in a residential strata that is itself part of a strata that has a commercial part and a council-owned carpark.</p>\n<p>Strata title has been very successful, however, at the end of last century, they were being used to try and cope with private subdivisions where the streets, utilities etc. were not owned by local government/public utilities but supplied by the developer. Because strata is customised for apartment buildings it sort-of didn’t work very well. So, the Community Title was developed which allows for the residents to own and operate the infrastructure and have titles within the community which can themselves be Torrens title, strata title, or community title like <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matryoshka_doll\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Matryoshka Dolls</a>.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "legal-terms", "british-columbia", "any-jurisdiction", "real-property", "strata-property" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94523, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>(1) Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird und auf den die §§ 61e bis 61g und 104 Absatz 4 des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes in der am 31. Dezember 2022 geltenden Fassung nicht anzuwenden sind, beträgt...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The german is - unlike Ohwilleke complains with the english translation - quite clear:</p>\n<p>Electric energy to qualify under this paragraph needs to:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>[be produced] by implication</li>\n<li>get put into a network for public consumption [in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist]</li>\n<li>needs to not be regulated under §§ 61e to 61g or 104 (4) EEG (law partaining renewable energy)\n<ul>\n<li>§61 was repealed and removed in the 2023 version, a §104 does no longer exist either.</li>\n<li>Old versions of <a href=\"http://www.buzer.de/59_EEG_2023.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§61 EEG</a> and <a href=\"http://www.buzer.de/104_EEG_2023.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§104 EEG</a> are archived. The various §61a to g regulated which type of producer got which percentage and §104 regulated who gets money for produced energy.</li>\n</ul>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Among those regulations, which make the meaning of §7(1) KWKG <strong>very</strong> clear is <a href=\"https://www.buzer.de/gesetz/11230/al171946-0.htm?line=170891\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§61e EEG (2022)</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) Der Anspruch nach § 61 Absatz 1 verringert sich auf null Prozent der EEG-Umlage für Strom aus Bestandsanlagen,</p>\n<ol>\n<li>wenn der Letztverbraucher die Stromerzeugungsanlage als Eigenerzeuger betreibt,</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) The entitlement pursuant to Section 61 subsection 1 is reduced to zero percent of the EEG surcharge for electricity from existing systems,</p>\n<ol>\n<li>if the end consumer operates the power generation system as a self-producer,</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Under the old law, you need to actually produce <strong>more</strong> than your own requirement to be entitled to a payout, as producing less was meaning you are only an Eigenerzeuger.</p>\n<p>Even under the new requirement, Einspeisung is a standing term in Germany: It is <strong>only</strong> Einspeisung if the electrical energy is actually put into the public energy network (&quot;Zufuhr von Strom in das öffentliche Versorgungsnetz&quot;).</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 29891, "body": "<p>I doubt that it is possible to answer this question accurately based upon the text alone (having read the statute in translation), and I doubt that there are even many lawyers or accountants in Germany who would know the answer if they don't work in this industry. The statutory language is ambiguous in these circumstances, and each of the possible readings could be reasonable in the fact pattern that you identify.</p>\n\n<p>In practice, it would come down to what interpretation makes sense in light of the larger context of how the relevant utility operates its electrical grid.</p>\n\n<p>If the grid were operated by the utility with meters that only disclose net power generation, then it is quite likely that this would not be treated as contributing to the grid. </p>\n\n<p>But, if the grid were operated by the utility with meters that measured draws from the grid and contributions to the grid separately, it might be appropriate to treat the times when it did make contributions to the grid as contributions for purposes of Section 7.</p>\n\n<p>A utility administrator or engineer would probably be more likely to know the answer even though, technically, it is a legal question.</p>\n\n<p>I strongly suspect that German courts would be likely to defer to the utility company's interpretation of Section 7 so long as it had a clear, consistent and rational interpretation of what that term means. </p>\n\n<p>On the other hand, if the utility treated one co-generation plant one way, and another one down the road differently, in the face of substantially similar facts, the court would probably decide which interpretation made the most sense under the circumstances itself, and would impose that interpretation on the utility.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "germany", "legal-terms" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94522, "body": "<p><a href=\"https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/article-1/section-8/clause-17/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 17</a> states that &quot;The Congress shall have Power&quot;</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such\nDistrict (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of\nparticular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of\nGovernment of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over\nall Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in\nwhich the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,\nArsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>which then happened in <a href=\"https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/1/STATUTE-1-Pg130.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">1 Stat. 130</a> (1790). It is there referred to as &quot;a district of territory&quot; but more often simply as a &quot;district&quot;.</p>\n<p>Unlike territories, its existence for its actual purpose as seat of government is specifically enabled by the Constitution. Then via <a href=\"https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/2/STATUTE-2-Pg103b.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2 Stat 103</a> (1801), DC was politically brought within the control of Congress, so that residents were no longer residents of Maryland or Virginia. In this act it is consistently termed a &quot;district&quot;.</p>\n", "score": 8 } ]

[ "district-of-columbia" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94464, "body": "<p>You will need look up the definition of a &quot;secondary suite&quot; and include that in your question for a better answer.</p>\n<p>Where I live this is called an ADU, for Auxiliary Dwelling Unit. The definition of an ADU specifies permanent facilities for sleeping, sanitation, and food preparation. Since you can add bedrooms and bathrooms to any house without creating an ADU, it really hinges on &quot;permanant facilities for food preparation&quot;. In other words, a kitchen.</p>\n<p>Since you could have a coffee pot or microwave in your master bedroom and it wouldn't be a kitchen, it is generally considered that small countertop appliances don't count.</p>\n<p>Since many people have an extra full sized refrigerator or freezer in their garage without it being a kitchen, it is reasonable that doesn't count either.</p>\n<p>Same thing with a sink in the utility room...</p>\n<p>So where does the line lay with a &quot;kitchenette&quot;? That will depend on the exact wording of the bylaws for your locality, as well as how whoever enforces these things interprets it. Could it be a problem? Perhaps... if you advertise it for rent with a kitchen and the local authority takes notice.</p>\n<p>FMI, what is a &quot;Strata lot&quot;?</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "canada", "british-columbia", "hoa", "strata-property" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94146, "body": "<p>Your premise that California's tax collection powers are greater than federal tax collection powers is basically wrong.</p>\n<p>Both California and the federal government carry out most of their due process functions within their respective tax collection agencies in an administrative process rather than in the courts. In the federal system, the courts are usually resorted to only when that taxpayer pays the taxes due and then seeks a refund, or when their is an appeal from the final layer of the IRS administrative law system which is the Article I court known as Tax Court (in which I have litigated more than once).</p>\n<p>The Supremacy Clause is only violated when a state law violates or contradicts a federal law, which is not what happens in this case. The federal government can and has set up a system for determining whether the federal or state tax collection rights have priority in the same asset, which mostly flows from the timing of the recording of a tax lien by the relevant bodies.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "california" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94512, "body": "<p>Standards-setting by industry groups is not inherently anti-competitive and these groups do not require a licence from the government to operate. They are a prototypical example of &quot;private ordering&quot; (see David J. Teece &amp; Edward F. Sherry, &quot;Standards Setting and Antitrust&quot; (2003) <a href=\"https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/217211884.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">87 Minn. L.R. 1913</a>, p. 1987).</p>\n<p>What can be anti-competitive is when a corporation advocates for an element to be included in a standard for reasons other than technical considerations. See e.g. the International Standards Organization's &quot;<a href=\"https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/developing_standards/docs/en/competition_law_guidelines.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Competition Law Guidelines</a>.&quot;</p>\n<p>An example violation is <a href=\"https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2007/02/ftc-issues-final-opinion-order-rambus-matter\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the behaviour of Rambus, Inc.</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>According to the FTC complaint, Rambus nonetheless participated in JEDEC’s DRAM standard-setting activities for more than four years without disclosing to JEDEC or its members that it was actively working to develop, and possessed, a patent and several pending patent applications that involved specific technologies ultimately adopted in the standards.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>In its liability opinion dated July 31, 2006, the Commission found that, “Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In <a href=\"https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/antitrust-intellectual-property-law-adversaries-partners#a.%20Complaint%20allegations\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">another example</a>, Dell Computer Corporation was alleged to have</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>voted to approve the VL-bus standard and certified that the standard did not infringe its intellectual property. After the standard became very successful, Dell asserted an earlier-issued patent against several computer manufacturers using the standard.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The FTC entered a consent agreement with Dell:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>prohibiting Dell from enforcing its patent against those who wanted to use the VL-bus standard. The FTC's order also prohibited Dell from enforcing patent rights in the future when it intentionally failed to disclose those rights upon request of a standards-setting organization.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "us-federal-government", "antitrust-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94511, "body": "<p>The privacy rule is spelled out <a href=\"https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-34/subtitle-A/part-99\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>. Subpart D addresses disclosure of personally identifiable information from education records, saying when consent is required vs. not required (there being 16 conditions under which consent is not required). Mostly this refers to &quot;required by law&quot; exceptions, or &quot;for school-internal use&quot;, but also includes &quot;directory information&quot;. Information may be disclosed if the student (as an adult) or a parent (of a minor) has consented to disclosure.</p>\n<p>Under the legal definition of &quot;record&quot;, that simply means &quot;tangible information&quot; (not &quot;conversations&quot;). An education record is one that is &quot;directly related to a student; and maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution&quot;, possibly including the information that you cite – providing that the information is maintained and disclosed by the school. In addition, though, certain information can be freely disclosed, namely &quot;directory information&quot; which is:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Directory information includes, but is not limited to, the student's\nname; address; telephone listing; electronic mail address; photograph;\ndate and place of birth; major field of study; grade level; enrollment\nstatus (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time or part-time);\ndates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities\nand sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees,\nhonors, and awards received; and the most recent educational agency or\ninstitution attended.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The regulation explains that this is information that &quot;would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed&quot;. Privacy standards have changed since the law was passed – but it is allowed by the existing law.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "privacy", "personal-information", "school", "ferpa" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94505, "body": "<p>The flag of Ukraine is a &quot;Class H&quot; advertisement under Schedule 1 of the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/783\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007</em></a>, secondary to the Town and Country Planning Act.</p>\n<p>Schedule 1 of the regulation lists under Class H</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any country’s national flag</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>and it has included this since <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/783/made\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">its inception in 2007</a>.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "flag" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94492, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>See <em>R. v. Béland</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1987/1987canlii27/1987canlii27.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">[1987] 2 S.C.R. 398</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>It is therefore my opinion that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination would clearly offend the rule against the admission of past or out‑of‑court statements by a witness. All of the considerations upon which the rule is based are as applicable to polygraph evidence as to other statements. The repetition of statements by another witness adds nothing to their weight and reliability. The ultimate decision as to the truth or falsity of the evidence of a witness must rest upon the exercise of the judgment of the trier of fact. This is as true of evidence of polygraph tests as of any other evidence. In the last analysis, the trier of fact must reach its conclusion on the basis of the evidence given by a human being in court. The evidence of the polygraph operator if heard by the trier of fact adds nothing to the earlier statement of the witness which is sought to be supported.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>It was also argued that the polygraph evidence was receivable as expert evidence. The polygraph operator, as an expert, was trained and qualified to give his opinion as to the veracity of the witness, based solely on his interpretation of the significance of the responses made by the witness to the questions put on the examination.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>Here, the sole issue upon which the polygraph evidence is adduced is the credibility of the accused, an issue well within the experience of judges and juries and one in which no expert evidence is required. It is a basic tenet of our legal system that judges and juries are capable of assessing credibility and reliability of evidence.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/94502/46948\">Another answer</a> says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The real problem with polygrapher's opinions however (like policeman's opinions), is that they simply aren't reliable enough.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>But lack of reliability was not part of the Supreme Court's legal reasoning for rejecting the use of polygraph evidence in court.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94491, "body": "<p>What I say during a lie detector test might be considered a valid testimony. But the point of a lie detector test is to identify lies and state that my testimony is not true. &quot;I didn't kill my wife&quot; is valid testimony. That <em>might</em> be considered in court unless it is considered hearsay. The lie detector test saying &quot;he lied, therefore he killed his wife&quot; is not valid testimony. I never said &quot;I killed my wife&quot;, so it's not valid testimony.</p>\n<p>You would <em>at least</em> have to have an expert witness who is willing to testify that this machine can beyond a reasonable doubt detect that I am lying, and you won't find that expert witness.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "criminal-law", "england-and-wales", "civil-law", "common-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94473, "body": "<h2>Sania is entitled to a reward of 7,50€.</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p>In Germany, to reward honest finders, the finder of an item is entitled to 5% of a lost item's value of up to 500€ under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__971.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§ 971 BGB</a>. Airpods cost about 150 €, so Sania is entitled to a Fider's reward of 7,50 €. Anything more would be at the discretion of Tam, accepting less is at Sania's discretion.</p>\n<p>Do note, that denial of the finder's reward at the moment that Sania hands over the item means, that they also deny their entitlement to the reward. In fact, it is upon Sania to demand the reward, and unless they do so, it is presumed that they do not want a finder's reward.</p>\n<p><strong>However</strong> in making her entitlement to the reward known, Sania may not cross the line into coercion or blackmail (§§ 240, 253 StGB). Should Sania say, without explanation &quot;I demand a payment of 100 € for the airpods&quot;, that could be coercion, as she is not entitled to that. If she however says &quot;I am entitled to finder's reward of 7,50 €, and had expenses of 2.50 € to get the phone to you, therefore you owe me 10 €&quot; the picture is different - that is <em>exactly</em> the amount that the law says she would be owed. This is because atop the actual reward Sania can reclaim reasonable fees, such as the bus fare to get the phone to Tam under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__970.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§ 970 BGB</a>. Under § 972 BGB, Sania does not have to relinquish the item till the reward and expenses have been paid but also does not become the owner of the item.</p>\n<h4>The Fundbüro</h4>\n<p>To evade a possible claim for &quot;Unterschlagung von Fundsachen&quot; (~conversion by not reporting a found item), the Fundbüro (Found item's office) exists when the owner can't be made out rapidly. Not only does it calculate the required finder's reward, but also handing it over to the office fulfills the requirement to report a found item that is worth more than 10 € under <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__965.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§ 965 BGB</a>. It is customary to store the lost items at the Fundbüro, but that is not required.</p>\n<p>To gain the item from the Fundbüro, Tam will have to pay any required handling fees to the office but also gets notice of how much he should pay to Sania as well as her contact details. Sania will get contact details of Tam in return, together with a notice that she has a claim to a reward of such value. Should Sania not have given her details, it is presumed that she did not want the finder's reward.</p>\n<p>If Sania retained the item, the Fundbüro will inform Tam of the estimated finder's reward and contact details for Sania, so Tam can reclaim the item.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94466, "body": "<h2>Sania is not entitled to the reward</h2>\n<p>This is very much contract law 101.</p>\n<p>Tam made an offer to the world that was acceptable by performance: return my airpods and we have a contract.</p>\n<p>However, Sania did not see the ad and was therefore not returning the AirPods in response to the offer. Acceptance of an offer requires knowledge of the offer. Therefore, there is no contact and Tam is under no obligation to provide Sania with anything, not even a thank you.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 94471, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a> <a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>See <em>Williams v Carwardine</em> (1833), <a href=\"http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/1833/J44.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">5 Car &amp; P 566, 172 ER 1101</a>, aff'd 4 B &amp; Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB).</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Police were investigating a suspected murder and the brother of the deceased publicly distributed a notice offering £20 for &quot;such information as may lead to a discovery of the murder of the said Walter Carwardine.&quot;</li>\n<li>Mary Williams gave a statement to police that led to the eventual conviction of William Williams for the murder.</li>\n<li>However, the <em>reason</em> Mary gave the statement was because William severely beat her and &quot;being apprehensive of death, she made a disclosure.&quot; The common assumption is that William suspected that Mary knew something of the murder, because she had been deposed for an unsuccessful first prosecution against some other suspects.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The defendant in the contract suit did not want to pay the £20. He argued that Mary did not make the disclosure because of the reward. The trial judge put it to the jury whether Mary was induced by the handbill. They found that &quot;she did not give that information for the sake of the £20 reward, nor in consequence of the handbill, but from stings of conscience.&quot; The judge still ordered the £20 to be paid.</p>\n<p>On application for a new trial ((1833) 4 B &amp; Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB)) the judges noted the finding from the lower court that the plaintiff &quot;was not induced by the offer of the reward, but by other motives.&quot; Denman C.J. asked &quot;Was any doubt suggested as to whether the plaintiff knew of the handbill at the time of her making the disclosure?&quot; The answer: &quot;She must have known of it, as it was placarded all over Hereford, the place at which she lived&quot;: (1833) 5 C &amp; P.</p>\n<p>The judges agreed with the trial judge ((1833) 4 B &amp; Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB)):</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Denman C.J.: &quot;The plaintiff, by having given information which led to the conviction of the murderer ... has brought herself within the terms of the advertisement, and therefore is entitled to recover.&quot;</li>\n<li>Littledale J.: &quot;The advertisement amounts to a general promise, to give a sum of money to any person who shall give information which might lead to the discovery of the offender. The plaintiff gave that information.&quot;</li>\n<li>Parke J.: &quot;There was a contract with any person who performed the condition mentioned in the advertisement.&quot;</li>\n<li>Patteson J.: &quot;I am of the same opinion. We cannot go into the plaintiff's motives.&quot;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Acceptance <em>does not require subjective knowledge of the offer</em>. <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/90788/does-contract-formation-require-subjective-meeting-of-the-minds\">&quot;Meeting of the minds&quot; is an <em>objective standard</em></a>.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "australia" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94364, "body": "<p>Section 18 of the Constitution Act 1867 states:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and\nexercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the\nmembers thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time\ndefined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any Act of the\nParliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities, and powers\nshall not confer any privileges, immunities, or powers exceeding those\nat the passing of such Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons\nHouse of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and\nIreland, and by the members thereof.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Note that the Parliament of Canada is responsible for defining the privileges of its houses, and there is no default fallback. The <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-1/page-1.html#h-389926\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Parliament of Canada Act 1985</a> define the privileges in section 4 as</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Senate and the House of Commons, respectively, and the members thereof hold, enjoy and exercise:<br />\n(a) such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as, at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act, 1867, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof, in so far as is consistent with that Act; and<br />\n(b) such privileges, immunities and powers as are defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, not exceeding those, at the time of the passing of the Act, held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So in theory, the Canadian House of Commons could impeach someone right now, as an inherited power from the UK HoC, but if this was tried the Commons could fall foul of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Senate would be under pressure not to try the individual impreached.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94308, "body": "<h2>The Canadian Parliament cannot “impeach” someone</h2>\n<p><strong>They can, however, punish them for <a href=\"https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure-book-livre/en/document?sbdid=abbc077a-6dd8-4fbe-a29a-3f73554e63aa&amp;sbpid=9686d5b2-9075-4451-8082-1446f8be3c5e\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">breach of privilege or contempt</a></strong></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Any disregard of or attack on the rights, powers and immunities of the House and its Members, either by an outside person or body, or by a Member of the House, is referred to as a “breach of privilege” and is punishable by the House.[116] There are, however, other affronts against the dignity and authority of Parliament which may not fall within one of the specifically defined privileges. Thus, the House also claims the right to punish, as a contempt, any action which, though not a breach of a specific privilege, tends to obstruct or impede the House in the performance of its functions; obstructs or impedes any Member or officer of the House in the discharge of their duties; or is an offence against the authority or dignity of the House, such as disobedience of its legitimate commands or libels upon itself, its Members, or its officers.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The last time this occurred was against a RCMP officer in 2008. The punishment imposed was simply the fact that they had been found in contempt.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "common-law", "impeachment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94496, "body": "<p>The primary question is whether the target school can/must accept you. A private school is not compelled to accept you, a public school might be. Because of the law compelling you (as a minor) to go to school, some public school will have to accept you as a student. However, as a minor, your preference is low on the list of legal priorities. The primary controlling factor is the school district where you live, and their policy. They may demand that you attend the school &quot;in the area where you live&quot;, or it can be an urging of various strengths. It is conceivable that you can attend school in an entirely different district (we have some cross-district migration possibilities, but that is rare).</p>\n<p>If district policy allows for a student to go to a school outside their home zone, then the question of discretion comes up: it is highly unlikely that a district would allow a problem student to &quot;impose&quot; himself on a foreign school, so the school intended to receive the student probably has some say in the matter. Parental consent will be essential, so if the parent(s) oppose moving the student, the district is unlikely to allow the transfer. The student might also be consulted. In other words, no, student desire alone will not enable the student to transfer schools. The school that you are assigned to by default has even less direct say in the matter, but indirectly it could influence the recipient school's willingness to allow the transfer.</p>\n<p>For NYC, <a href=\"https://www.schools.nyc.gov/enrollment/enrollment-help/transfers\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a> is a preliminary page regarding transfers. Safety and accessibility concerns are easy, also moving within the city etc. but academic and social concerns are &quot;a possibility&quot;, one to be determined on a case by case basis.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "new-york-state", "new-york-city", "school", "students" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94477, "body": "<h2>These are only tangentially related to the GDPR</h2>\n<p>A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is <em>ipso facto</em> in compliance with the GDPR.</p>\n<p>That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "gdpr", "surveillance" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94360, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p>German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits.</p>\n<p>You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc.</p>\n<p>Some places in Germany differentiate their services between &quot;locals&quot; and &quot;others&quot;, for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be &quot;tourists&quot; 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a &quot;the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free&quot; approach.</p>\n<p>Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy.</p>\n", "score": 19 }, { "answer_id": 94358, "body": "<p>US states establish <em>residency</em>, used for access to services (like public libraries), things like in-state public university tuition, and paying taxes. Generally this is less of a service to the residents than a revenue source by the state (new car registration, for example).</p>\n<p>Residency is established solely by where you physically live (there are weird exceptions for people living RV-life type existences, but many will find this fringe existence difficult). There is no application for change of residency, no restrictions exist on what state you can live in. If you move there, you will be a resident there.</p>\n<p>US states don't do anything for a resident who is in another state. They have no effect whatsoever on federal courts inside their borders except for passing state laws that federal courts may use.</p>\n<p>Quasi-citizenship does exist for states. The 14th Amendment states that &quot;All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.&quot; It specifies US citizenship and thus invalidated previous theories that US citizenship required some type of state citizenship. I can find exactly zero methods to acquire citizenship in a state, certainly not in the last two I've lived in, other than residing in one.</p>\n", "score": 14 }, { "answer_id": 94373, "body": "<p>Under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of the state in which the citizen resides, a term usually interpreted to match the common law concept of domicile.</p>\n<p>There are two privileges and immunities clauses in the U.S. Constitution. One protects the privileges and immunities that U.S. citizens hold in every state which generally speaking has been narrowly interpreted to protect only rights that flow from the federal government. The other entitles a citizen of one U.S. state to the privileges and immunities of citizens of another state where the person may be present, facially seeming to prohibit discrimination based upon state citizenship.</p>\n<p>A state may insist that you are a citizen of a U.S. state to vote in that state's elections. It may also prefer state citizens in matters of hunting and fishing licenses and tuition at public educational institutions. But, a state may not limit occupational licenses in the state to state citizens.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 94392, "body": "<p>Switzerland is another example of different countries doing things differently. You become a citizen of Switzerland by becoming a citizen of a municipality. Different cantons have different laws regulating the granting of citizenship by municipalities.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 94415, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a>\n<a href=\"/questions/tagged/historical\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;historical&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;historical&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-historical-tooltip-container\">historical</a></p>\n<p>For 2023, the answer by @nvoigt is correct. However, prior to the german re-unification, West Berlin did have special status. While being a Bundesland (county) of West Germany, it was in parts governed by allied laws back from post-WW2 occupation times. The most famous effect being that residents of West Germany were exempt from compulsory military service. This made Berlin universities popular among parts of the young male population who saw studying in Berlin a way to get out of that.</p>\n<p>Also, the people of West Berlin did not have the same passport as other western Germans, but were issued a &quot;provisional passport&quot;. Here is a rare picture of one in item #5: <a href=\"https://www.t-online.de/region/berlin/news/id_90751288/berlin-vor-der-wende-10-dinge-die-nur-west-berliner-miterlebt-haben.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://www.t-online.de/region/berlin/news/id_90751288/berlin-vor-der-wende-10-dinge-die-nur-west-berliner-miterlebt-haben.html</a></p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94366, "body": "<h2>Citizenship is a national concept</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p>Australian states, territories, and local governments can and do have the concept of residency which may or may not be tied with citizenship.</p>\n<p>For example, if you are a citizen, your place of residence as recorded on the Australian Electoral Roll determines which state/territory and local government elections you vote in.</p>\n<p>Where you employ people determines in which state/territory you are liable for payroll tax and worker’s compensation insurance. Where you live determines which state/territory you must get your driver’s license etc.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94402, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>&quot;Naturalization and Aliens&quot; fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government in Canada, as outlined in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (originally enacted as the British North America Act 1867 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom). Although Canadian citizenship as a separate legal status was not established until 1947, the Parliament of Canada previously regulated the process of naturalizing aliens into British subjects in Canada, subject to the limits imposed by the British Empire.</p>\n<p>However, the law does not prevent provinces from granting certain benefits to certain classes of citizens or residents in general. Notably, it is a constitutional right to move to and take up residece in any province and to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province, but other areas are not regulated.</p>\n<p>For example, everyone who was born in Quebec, or who was selected by Quebec as immigrants, may benefit from resident tuition rates, even if they move away from Quebec immediately after their birth or landing. Resident tuition rates also exist in some other provinces (Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador), although the place of birth has no effect on the qualification there. Quebec is in many aspects a special case, as there is a strong sovereigntist movement and it runs its own immigration system (all provinces have the shared power over immigration, but Quebec is the only one exercising that power). So there was a reason to make some nationality-like thing. Nonetheless, the resident tuitition rates qualification is a really limited application and the status could not really be called as nationality or citizenship.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94417, "body": "<p>Indigenous nations have their own citizenship/membership requirements (the terminology and conception can vary from people to people).</p>\n<p>For an example within <a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a>, see the <a href=\"https://www.nisgaanation.ca/sites/default/files/legislation/Constitution%20of%20the%20Nisga%27a%20Nation%20-%201998-10-01.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Constitution of the Nisga’a Nation</a>, s. 8:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"8\">\n<li><strong>Citizenship</strong></li>\n</ol>\n<p>(1) Every Nisga’a participant who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada\nis entitled to be a Nisga’a citizen</p>\n<p>(2) A person who is not a Nisga’a participant and who is a Canadian citizen or\npermanent resident of Canada may become a Nisga’a citizen if permitted by, and in\naccordance with, Nisga’a law.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The consequences of Nisga'a citizenship are outlined in the constitution.</p>\n<p>The membership in <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-5/FullText.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Indian Act</em></a> &quot;bands&quot; is recorded on a &quot;Band List&quot; that may be controlled by the band:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A band may assume control of its own membership if it establishes membership rules for itself in writing in accordance with this section and if, after the band has given appropriate notice of its intention to assume control of its own membership, a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to the band’s control of its own membership.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The consequences of band membership are presented in this Q&amp;A: <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/94457/what-are-the-consequences-of-band-membership-under-canadas-indian-act/94458#94458\">What are the consequences of &quot;band&quot; membership under Canada's Indian Act?</a></p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94448, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h2><strong>Hunting.</strong></h2>\n<p>There are many such rules around hunting. In Ontario, <a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a>, for example, <a href=\"https://www.ontario.ca/page/hunting-licence-non-residents-ontario#section-5\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">All non-residents wishing to hunt black bear must contract the services of an operator licensed to provide bear hunting services.</a> Only Ontario residents are allowed to go hunting black bear on their own in Ontario. There is a similar rule for moose, with the exception that an Ontario resident who holds a valid moose tag can bring along a non-resident on the hunt if they are an immediate relative.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "federalism" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94479, "body": "<p>The Sixth Amendment is very specific: &quot;[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy[...] trial.&quot; There is no such constitutional right given to the prosecution, and such a right would not serve the public interest. Defendants very often waive their right to a speedy trial in order to have more time to prepare a defense.</p>\n<p>Conversely, however, the defendant does not have the right to draw out the proceedings indefinitely. When the right to a speedy trial is waived, it falls to the court (that is, the judge) to schedule the proceedings at its discretion. It may choose to take into account the wishes of the prosecution or the defense or both, but is not required to do so.</p>\n", "score": 19 } ]

[ "united-states", "sixth-amendment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94455, "body": "<p>The constitutionality of each of the charges is well supported and there is no really viable First Amendment defense to any of them.</p>\n<p>There is literally a <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download\" rel=\"noreferrer\">U.S. Justice Department handbook on how to prosecute attempts to undermine the integrity of elections</a> accumulating the wisdom its has gleaned from doing precisely what it is doing in this indictment, successfully, for generations.</p>\n<p><strong>18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States)</strong></p>\n<p>This statute states that:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against\nthe United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency\nthereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such\npersons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall\nbe fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or\nboth.</p>\n<p>If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the\nconspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy\nshall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Fraudulent statements which are protected by the First Amendment are the exception more than they are the rule. When fraudulent statements of presenting existing facts, or fraudulent concealment of presently existing facts, seek to impair someone's legal rights, it is generally constitutional to punish that conduct criminally.</p>\n<p>At noted <a href=\"https://thefire.org/research-learn/unprotected-speech-synopsis\" rel=\"noreferrer\">here</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Fraud and Perjury</strong></p>\n<p>While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for\nfalse or misleading speech, certain types of fraudulent statements\nfall outside its protection. The government generally can impose\nliability for false advertising or on speakers who knowingly make\nfactual misrepresentations to obtain money or some other material\nbenefit (such as employment). Prohibitions on perjury — knowingly\ngiving false testimony under oath — also are constitutional.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This statute requires proof of intentional fraud, and not just a good faith difference of opinion sincerely held by the defendant.</p>\n<p>Probably the most on point precedent upholding the constitutionality of this statute in an analogous context is <em>United States v. Rafoi</em>, 60 F.4th 982 (5th Cir. 2023).</p>\n<p>This case held that the statute was constitutional where the charged conduct caused harm inside United States or to United States citizens or interests, that provided sufficient nexus, as required by due process, between United States and defendant's conduct in allegedly meeting with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida, where a noncitizen defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland who was employee of Swiss wealth-management firm, conspired to violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as agent of a person while in United States, relating to alleged international bribery scheme between businesses based in United States and Venezuelan officials and the defendant has the intent or knowledge that the monies involved were proceeds of specified unlawful activity would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in United States to a place outside United States.</p>\n<p>The relevant holding in this case is that prosecuting violations of U.S. laws that exist for the purposes of insisting upon orderly and non-corrupt conduct of actions related to U.S. officials or U.S. persons through fraud under this statute, is constitutional. When it affects the conduct of U.S. government business, or of a U.S. business or person, the statute is actionable and constitutional.</p>\n<p>Also pertinent is a <a href=\"https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/03/opinions/indictment-trump-history-legal-charges-avlon/index.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">much older U.S. Supreme Court decision</a>, <em>Hammerschmidt v. United States</em>, 265 U.S. 182 (1924):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[F]ormer President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William\nHoward Taft explained in a landmark 1924 opinion, the full meaning of\nthe statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario: “It also\nmeans to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful\ngovernmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by\nmeans that are dishonest.&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In contrast, fraud in the course of a political campaign to persuade voters is protected by the First Amendment. <em>See United States v. Alvarez</em>, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that a law criminalizing false factual statements about military honors received in a political campaign called the &quot;Stolen Valor Act&quot; in the version then in force was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). But that isn't what this charged is seeking to prosecute. A <a href=\"https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol68/iss6/1/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">law review article from 2015</a> attempts to clarify the scope of <em>Alvarez</em>, distinguishing between completely unprotected lies, lies that are protected so as not to chill the expression of truthful statements, and &quot;lies that must be protected for their own sake&quot;. The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, &quot;High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment,&quot; 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435 (2015).</p>\n<p>It is notable that in <em>Alvarez</em> every conservative justice on the Court at the time other than Chief Justice Roberts, voted to affirm the constitutionality of the &quot;Stolen Valor Act&quot;, over a mostly liberal majority that held that it was an unconstitutional violation of free speech rights. Now that there is a six justice conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, if the positions of conservative justices on the issue was consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court would be even more likely to uphold the constitutionality of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 than the U.S. Supreme Court would have been inclined to in 2012.</p>\n<p>It is unclear, however, how much this conservative ruling was dependent upon the fact that the statute prohibited lying about military honors rather than about other matters. Conservatives tend to hold honor, and in particular, military honors, in greater esteem than liberals. Also, conservative justice may have been more clear than the liberal justices in that case about just how open and shut these cases were, since the truth or falsity of the statement can be determined definitively, from a single official document, the veteran's Form <a href=\"https://www.archives.gov/personnel-records-center/dd-214\" rel=\"noreferrer\">DD214</a>, which there is a strong presumption that almost any veteran capable of running for political office would understand perfectly well.</p>\n<p>Another issue which influenced swing votes in the <em>Alvarez</em> case is that the statute that the U.S. Supreme Court considered at the time criminalized fraud regarding military honors even when it was arguably immaterial (e.g. in dinner table conservations with friends or family, as opposed to only in the context of an election campaign, or only in a request for economic benefits or legal privileges). This concern is not present in this particular prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371, since Donald Trump would receive the legal benefit of being re-elected as President of the United States if his alleged election results related fraud conspiracy was successful.</p>\n<p>One critical distinction, previously noted by the Washington State Supreme Court its 2007 decision in the case of <em><a href=\"https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/washington-state-supreme-court-opinion-en-banc-pdc-v-rickert\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Rickert v Washington</a></em>, is whether, in the context of the speech giving rise to the legal consequences, &quot;the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech.&quot; This will generally be true in the case of factual statements related to election results and administration, but will generally not be true in wide ranging statements about policy issues in the course of a political campaign.</p>\n<p>An <a href=\"https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12180\" rel=\"noreferrer\">August 1, 2022 report of the Congressional Research Service</a>, the non-partisan research arm of Congress, generally confirms the analysis above.</p>\n<p>This is the only D.C. grand jury indictment for which there is even a colorable free speech argument, but given the case law, it is a weak argument.</p>\n<p><strong>18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding and Conspiracy To Do The Same)</strong></p>\n<p>Obstruction of an official proceeding in action action with an intended effect and doesn't prevent people from expressing opinions in a way that does not obstruct official government functions, so again this isn't unconstitutional. The charge in this case charges the crime that:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official\nproceeding, or attempts to do so</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison.</p>\n<p>There is already case law testing the constitutionality of this portion of this statute in the context of the same course of conduct related to the January 6, 2021 riot by a lower level minor from the D.C. Circuit whose rulings are binding precedents in this indictment. <em>United States v. Fischer</em>, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023).</p>\n<p>The foundation for this ruling is <a href=\"https://nprotected-speech-synopsis\" rel=\"noreferrer\">longstanding</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct</strong></p>\n<p>In <em>Giboney v. Empire Storage &amp; Ice Co.</em> (1949), the Supreme Court\nheld the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing\nused as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal\nstatute.” A robber’s demand at gunpoint that you hand over your money\nis not protected speech. Nor is extortion, criminal conspiracy, or\nsolicitation to commit a specific crime. Abstract advocacy of\nlawbreaking remains protected speech.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There is no constitutional basis to distinguish a direct charge of obstruction with official business from a conspiracy charge to do the same.</p>\n<p>In the case of the conspiracy to obstruct charge, the co-conspirators take actions that collectively seek to deprive people of their constitutional rights or obstruct an official proceeding, the statements made in furtherance of the group effort to achieve those ends are not legally protected speech. It is the action (either a verbal act or another kind of act) and not the expressive content of the speech that is implicated.</p>\n<p><strong>18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights)</strong></p>\n<p>A conspiracy to cause false election results to be certified to Congress to change the results of a Presidential election by two or more persons impairs the constitutional right to vote, and rights under Congressional adopted federal election laws.</p>\n<p>Notably, a conspiracy to violate rights, which is a felony punishable by up to death if the conspiracy causes someone's death (as can be plausibly alleged in this case due to a death arising from the January 6, 2021 riot) provides that the felony has been committed:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or\nintimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,\nPossession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right\nor privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United\nStates, or because of his having so exercised the same.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that prosecuting conspirators for tampering with the process of determining the correct result of the election is constitutional. <em>U.S. v. Saylor</em>, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).</p>\n<p>This also comes within the &quot;Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct&quot; exception to the protections of the First Amendment that is discussed above.</p>\n<p>FOOTNOTE: If the Justice Department sought the death penalty on this criminal charge the jury would have to be &quot;death qualified&quot; in the court of jury selection which tends to make the jury more conservative. But, there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to seek this relief in this particular prosecution of Donald Trump.</p>\n<p>As a practical matter, given Donald Trump's age, health, and the length of time necessary to fully appeal a death penalty conviction (which exceeds ten years in most cases), any criminal conviction with a sentences of ten or fifteen years or more would as a practical matter result in him dying in prison, and it is unlikely that appeals of a death sentence would be completed before he died of natural causes.</p>\n", "score": 11 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "freedom-of-speech", "elections" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94474, "body": "<p>The U.S. Department of State maintains the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and along with other government departments are charged with the process of making said designations. Under U.S. Law, it is illegal to provide material support to any FTO with Material support being defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) as:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets except medicine or religious materials.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Note that the list exempts religious materials, such as holy books or documents speaking of ideology that may motivate the group. This would serve to make clear that the law is not against expression of sympathy for the ideology, but is targeting the means by which the FTO can use violence in support of their belief.</p>\n<p>It should also be noted that the law bars entry to the United States by aliens who are known members or representatives of an FTO, but this is a higher level of Material Support as it implies that such people are actively engaged in an FTO's activities.</p>\n<p>Finally, the law states that financial institutions that operate in the U.S. that become aware of accounts belonging to FTOs should take control of the accounts and value within it and immediately report to the treasury.</p>\n<p>An FTO is by definition any organization that participates in activities that meet the legal definition of terrorism, which is neutral towards the beliefs motivating such activities and instead focuses on illegal actions.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-states", "first-amendment", "terrorism" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94472, "body": "<p>As revised, I think this question is really asking <em>why</em> the judge in <a href=\"https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2009/0219_09_0311.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Grainger plc v Nicholson</em> [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311</a> laid down the test that he did, when the statutory provision at hand used more general words.</p>\n<p>In summary, the reason why the <em>Grainger</em> test does not protect every belief is that the European Convention on Human Rights doesn't either. The judge's conclusions on the ECHR's notion of &quot;belief&quot; are mainly taken from the analysis in a House of Lords case (<em>Williamson</em>, cited below), which is binding precedent on the tribunal on that point. The new thing was drawing the line between &quot;belief&quot; in ECHR jurisprudence, and &quot;belief&quot; in the employment equality regulations, which was justified for two reasons: one, that Parliament demonstrably was trying to make the alignment; and two, that it would be incoherent with the Convention obligations to do otherwise.</p>\n<p>Note that the definitions in the Equality Act 2010 are carried forward from the 2003 regulations which were at issue in <em>Grainger</em>, the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/1660/contents/made\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003</a>, so we have to look at this text instead. In 2(1) it said, following amendments in 2006 not shown in the online text:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In these Regulations –\n<br>i. &quot;religion&quot; means any religion,\n<br>ii. &quot;belief&quot; means any religious or philosophical belief,\n<br>iii. a reference to religion includes a reference to lack of religion, and\n<br>iv. a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of belief.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This regulation was introduced in order to bring <a href=\"https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0078\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">EU Directive 2000/78/EC</a> into UK law. Although the text in the 2010 Act is not identical, it does carry forward the same effect of the Directive, and so the decision still makes sense to apply. Also, Brexit has happened, but that does not displace the reasoning.</p>\n<p>In interpreting the provision:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>Because it derives from EU law, which is meant to mean the same thing in other member states, the domestic regulation should be read consistently with the directive. The court can look to EU authorities to find out what the directive ought to mean, although there was not much to look at in this instance.</li>\n<li>The respondent said that &quot;belief&quot; should be read consistently with the language in the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning religion, belief and discrimination - principally Articles 9(1) and 14. The court was still bound to read the domestic legislation in a way that is at least <em>compatible</em> with the Convention rights, even if the scope of &quot;belief&quot; is not absolutely identical (see paragraph 19 of the judgement), but the most obvious way to make the ideas compatible is if they are the same.</li>\n<li>The parliamentary history of the amending statute shows indications that it was made in awareness of ECHR case law about &quot;belief&quot;. Courts can sometimes use this kind of information to resolve genuine textual ambiguities.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>The judge looked to domestic precedent, in particular a decision of the House of Lords (<a href=\"https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/15.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment</em> [2005] UKHL 15</a>) which looked at the same provisions of the ECHR in the context of a claimed philosophical belief in favour of corporal punishment in schools. This in turn drew on extensive case law, including even an English ecclesiastical case from 1866, as well as many more recent sources from around the world. The thrust of all of this is that not every single possible propositional belief is protected by the ECHR; when it talks about belief it does <em>not</em> mean &quot;a statement which somebody somewhere believes to be true&quot;, but rather refers to certain kinds of philosophical conviction.</p>\n<p>The application of this idea to employment discrimination is new in <em>Grainger</em>, hence &quot;the <em>Grainger</em> test&quot;, but wrangling over the scope of &quot;belief&quot; is not new. The test itself, set out in paragraph 24, is really a collation of quotations from the various relevant past judgements. I won't try to figure out the exact provenance of all of the words since that is actually already set out in the judgement. But for example,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>comes from paragraph 36 of <em>Campbell and Cosans v UK</em> [1982] 4 EHRR 293,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... the applicants' views relate to a <strong>weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour</strong> ...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Similarly,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>is there because of Article 17 of the ECHR, as interpreted in <em>Campbell</em> (citations omitted in this quotation),</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>the expression &quot;philosophical convictions&quot; in the present context denotes, in the Court's opinion, such convictions as are <strong>worthy of respect in a &quot;democratic society&quot; and are not incompatible with human dignity</strong>; in addition, they must <strong>not conflict with the fundamental right</strong> of the child to education, the whole of Article 2 (P1-2) being dominated by its first sentence</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This of course raises the question of why the ECHR's scope is what it is. That is somewhat more of a policy question than a legal one, in that the treaty reflects what its parties felt comfortable with agreeing. What matters in legal terms is that the Convention <em>is</em> binding on the UK, and the words that it uses must be interpreted according to what Convention authority (the Strasbourg court) says that they mean.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94310, "body": "<h2>It does mean any religious or philosophical belief</h2>\n<p>The Grainger test is a test to determine what qualifies as a religious or philosophical belief as opposed to any sophistry a plaintiff might espouse.</p>\n<p>The basis for this is that, under the UK constitution, the judiciary is responsible for interpreting what Acts of Parliament mean. Specifically, in this instance, what “any religious or philosophical belief” means.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "interpretation", "judiciary", "equality-act-2010" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94458, "body": "<p>The consequences of membership in a band include the following:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>this is one path to entitlement to be registered as an Indian in the Indian Register (see s. 6(1)(b)) and all the consequences of that registration;</li>\n<li>eligibility for certificates of possession on the reserve lands of the band (see ss. 20, 24, 81(1)(i)), and when residing on the reserve, being subject to the by-laws created by the band (s. 81(1));</li>\n<li>entitlement to a share of distribution of band money (s. 64);</li>\n<li>eligibility to distribution of up to $3000 of band money for infant children (s. 52.1); and</li>\n<li>entitlement to vote or run for councillor or chief (ss. 74-77).</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Note though that the <em>Indian Act</em> band structure is only one of several modes of Indigenous governance in Canada. See e.g. the <a href=\"https://www.nisgaanation.ca/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Nisga'a Nation</a> and the <a href=\"https://yukon.ca/en/agreements-first-nations\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">many First Nations with self-government agreements in Yukon</a>.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "canada", "aboriginal-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94452, "body": "<p>Government compliance with FOIA is notoriously bad. I found the following article in the Duke Law Journal illuminating: <a href=\"https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3846&amp;context=dlj\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">FOIA, INC.</a>. There are some eye-opening statistics in there, like p.1375:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>At the end of FY 2014, the oldest pending requests across the federal\ngovernment dated back to 1993.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>More details on the response times from several large federal agencies begins on p.1423. (The article goes into detail to show how, in those agencies, commercial requesters have overwhelmed even well-funded FOIA offices.)</p>\n<p>It seems that the largest issue in compliance is a lack of resources. Apparently, &quot;We don't have funding to comply with the law&quot; is an acceptable response for the executive branch.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "foia" ]

[ { "answer_id": 86756, "body": "<h2>The signed document is almost certainly a contract</h2>\n<p>See <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/6263/what-is-a-contract-and-what-is-required-for-them-to-be-valid\">What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?</a></p>\n<p>It contains all the required elements:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Intention to create legal relations.</strong> There is no doubt that the parties intended that this agreement would end their previous employment contract.</li>\n<li><strong>Agreement.</strong> Obviously.</li>\n<li><strong>Consideration.</strong> By making this particular agreement both parties are giving up rights that they had under the employment contract and at law, that is sufficuient consideration.</li>\n<li><strong>Legal Capacity.</strong> Assuming they had capacity to enter the original employment contract they probably have it now. Unless one of them was drunk. Or insane.</li>\n<li><strong>Genuine Consent.</strong> There is no information given that suggests this wasn’t a genuine agreement.</li>\n<li><strong>Legality of Objects.</strong> It’s not illegal to terminate employment.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "contract-law", "employment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 112, "body": "<p>Quoting from <a href=\"http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html\">here</a>,</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of \"Not Guilty\" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted.</p>\n\n<p>One of the first cases was in the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, where a law against libels was used against him, and subsequently nullified by a jury. It was subsequently used against the famous Alien and Sedition Acts, as well as The Fugitive Slave Laws.</p>\n\n<p>Zenger was the first case in America; <a href=\"http://www.personal.psu.edu/jph13/JuryNullification.html\">in 1670</a>, it was used in the case of William Penn and William Mead, who were acquitted of \"illegal assembly\" as Quakers. In an interesting twist, the jurors were imprisoned, as jury nullification was not explicitly legal, but they were later released.</p>\n\n<p>Interestingly enough, according to <em><a href=\"http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/jurors-can-say-no.html?_r=0\">The New York Times</a></em></p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that jurors had no right, during trials, to be told about nullification. The court did not say that jurors didn’t have the power, or that they couldn’t be told about it, but only that judges were not required to instruct them on it during a trial.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p><em>The Times</em> also wrote that nullification had been used against laws against alcohol and gay marriage, though it did not cite specific cases.</p>\n", "score": 19 }, { "answer_id": 133, "body": "<p>A jury is charged with finding <em>fact</em>, and is supposed to take the law as given to them by a judge.</p>\n\n<p>\"Jury nullification\" occurs when a jury bends the law to produce a desired result. This was made possible by English common law, which gave juries great latitude in determining what they would rule on. The underlying power may go all the way back to the Magna Carta of 1215.</p>\n\n<p>One example occurred in \"Dickensian\" England where theft of an item value at one shilling (twelve pence) or greater carried the death penalty. In order to spare a young defendant this fate, the jury valued a diamond necklace at only 11 pence.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94450, "body": "<p>It has been accepted under English Common Law for centuries, (jury trial began around 1215), that jurors have an absolute right to bring in any verdict, and are not answerable for their decision to any court of law. I believe this is also the case in other English-speaking jurisdictions such as the United States, which adopted trial-by-jury.</p>\n<p>In the United Kingdom there has been a fairly recent case involving members of the campaign group Extinction Rebellion, where the jurors did acquit the defendants out of sympathy for their motives. There are other similar cases pending I understand.</p>\n<p>This <a href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/apr/23/jury-acquits-extinction-rebellion-protesters-despite-no-defence-in-law\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">report in The Guardian newspaper 23 April 2021</a> tells you all about it.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "legal-history", "jury-nullification" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94424, "body": "<p>Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York <em>can</em> include one automobile within a family, <a href=\"https://dmv.ny.gov/forms/mv843.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">here</a> is the main form and a <a href=\"https://dmv.ny.gov/files/mv3491pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">companion form</a>. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "new-york-state", "wills", "probate" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94447, "body": "<p>You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease.</p>\n<p>P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.</p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "tenant", "residential-lease", "new-mexico" ]

[ { "answer_id": 67422, "body": "<p>Bob can certainly &quot;engage&quot; a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case...</p>\n<p>Let's take a look at the facts...</p>\n<p>In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). <strong>Bob did not do this</strong></p>\n<p>In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. <strong>Bob did not do this</strong></p>\n<p>But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company.</p>\n<p>Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined <em>in writing</em> in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability <em>should be</em> the deductible on the vehicle.</p>\n<p>Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed &quot;project vehicle&quot;, meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual <em>current</em> value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition.</p>\n<p>Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a &quot;personal injury&quot;) because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees.</p>\n<p>Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.</p>\n", "score": 17 }, { "answer_id": 67420, "body": "<p>Yes. This happens every day, possibly hundreds of times around the United States.</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 67454, "body": "<p>You don't ask about this, but there is a third option in some jurisdictions: to bring a private criminal prosecution against Ted. In my home jurisdiction of England and Wales, <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_prosecution#England_and_Wales\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">private prosecutions are allowed</a>, though not common. The Crown Prosecution Service may at its discretion take over a private prosecution at any stage, either to continue it to its conclusion, or to discontinue it; but anyone can start one.</p>\n<p>In England and Wales if you are involved in a collision which causes damage to property you must stop and give your details to anyone reasonably requiring them, and if nobody does, you must report it to the police &quot;as soon as is reasonably practicable&quot;, and in any case within 24 hours (s170, Road Traffic Act 1988). Ted's failure to do so constitutes an offence, so a private prosecution could be brought if the police wouldn't investigate, or the CPS declined to proceed.</p>\n<p>I note you don't specify the jurisdiction you're asking about, though I infer it's Texas, USA; but I thought it worth noting the option exists in some places, and may exist for Bob.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "civil-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94342, "body": "<p>Copyright law doesn't say the art isn't copyrighted if it was made unlawfully.</p>\n<p>It seems the art can be copyrighted and the act of making it can be a criminal offence.</p>\n<p>I'm not aware of any such copyright cases that have gone to trial.</p>\n<p>A fairly well known case that settled out of court is that of Jason “Revok” Williams and H&amp;M.</p>\n<p>Williams noticed his art in a photograph used in an H&amp;M marketing campaign. His lawyer sent a cease-and-desist letter to H&amp;M.</p>\n<p>In response, H&amp;M applied for a court order stating that the product of an unlawful act could not be copyrighted.</p>\n<p>Following some bad publicity H&amp;M relented and settled with Williams. H&amp;M stopped using the photograph and withdrew the application for the court order. (<a href=\"https://www.seattletimes.com/business/hms-battle-over-graffiti-fuels-debate-over-street-artists-copyright-privileges/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">News source</a>)</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... The debate over street artists’ copyright privileges has entered courtrooms quite a bit over the past few years, according to Philippa Loengard, deputy director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts. ...</p>\n<p>The [H&amp;M] claim wasn’t surprising, Loengard said, but it also doesn’t hold up. At its core, a copyright requires only two things: that the work is original and that it is a tangible medium of expression.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[Loengard said,] “ … Copyright is not a legal or illegal sanction of the activity that was done to produce the work. Copyright is a separate entity.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Another case settled out of court is that of Joseph &quot;Rime&quot; Tierney and Moschino. Tierney sued Moschino for using his art on its designs. One day before the court was notified of the intention to settle, Moschino sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that unlawfully made art could not be copyrighted. (<a href=\"https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2016/04/22/graffiti-artist-to-settle-legal-case-against-moschino\" rel=\"noreferrer\">News source</a>)</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&quot;As a matter of public policy and basic logic, it would make no sense to grant legal protection to work that is created entirely illegally.&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 37 }, { "answer_id": 94338, "body": "<h2>No</h2>\n<p>You are conflating two different ownership concepts: the art in which the copyright exists, and the artwork that is the expression of the art (my terminology).</p>\n<p><strong>The artist owns the art, the train company owns the artwork.</strong></p>\n<p>Copyright exists in an artistic or literary work as soon as it is fixed in a tangible form and the author is the owner of that copyright. The owner of the artwork is the person who owns the substrate that the expression is made on. So if I write a novel on your paper or computer, then I own the copyright in the novel, you own the physical paper or Word document.</p>\n<p>It doesn’t matter if I have your permission to use those things or not. If I don’t have your permission then what I did might be illegal and lead to my arrest or you seeing me for damages but I still own the copyright. It would be an interesting question to consider if the State could seize my copyright under proceeds of crime legislation but that’s beyond the scope of this question.</p>\n<p>So, no, the train company cannot take photographs of the art and publicly display it. They can take photographs of their trains, which would incidentally contain the art, and display those. There’s a line there that a court would have to find should it ever come up.</p>\n<p>They can display the trains as an art display because they own the artwork. They could even cut the vandalised parts off the train and display those. What they can’t do is copy the art.</p>\n", "score": 31 }, { "answer_id": 94349, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Correct.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti[.]</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Not correct. If you buy a copyright-protected painting, you own the painting, but you do not own the copyright in the painting. Similarly, if an artist creates a work on an object you own, you own the work, but the artist owns the copyright. Because the train company owns the work, it can do certain things with the work including destroying it or selling it to someone else, but they cannot sell copies of the work without permission.</p>\n", "score": 15 }, { "answer_id": 94365, "body": "<p>Maybe kind of (Speculative), but probably not, but it probably makes no difference.</p>\n<p>If the fact that it is on the train forms part of the artwork, rather than being merely a canvas, the whole piece (graffiti plus train) might be argued to be a derivative work of the train livery, which if it has distinct visual elements such as logos or other artwork, will certainly be protected under its own copyright.</p>\n<p><strong>If</strong> that's the case, the graffiti may not be protected by copyright as an unauthorized derivative work. While this doesn't mean the proprietor of the train livery owns the copyright to the graffiti, it might mean the graffiti artist cannot claim copyright, or if he can, is subject to a counter-claim for copyright violation themselves.</p>\n<p>This would protect the train company from a copyright claim, but wouldn't mean they owned the copyright themselves.</p>\n<p>This is very speculative, it is probably more likely that a court would not find a derivative work, but this would depend on the facts of the particular graffiti, and whether and how it incorporated elements of the train livery into the overall piece.</p>\n<p><strong>Consequences for the train company</strong></p>\n<p>The train company is basically safe here. Copyright violation is a civil offence, and remedies would likely be limited to financial loss and an order to stop making copies.</p>\n<p>However in order to assert his rights, the graffiti artist would have to reveal himself, which would subject him to criminal penalties for vandalism, and a civil claim for the costs of cleaning or repainting the train.</p>\n<p>If the train company are also able to claim for &quot;unjust enrichment&quot; (depending on local law) then they might be able to take the whole value of the copyright, or even the copyright itself.</p>\n<p>The &quot;artist&quot; is unlikely to come out ahead.</p>\n<p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> I am not a copyright lawyer, or a lawyer.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94411, "body": "<p>It's an occasion where the train company could claim &quot;fair use&quot; in the USA. Or say that it is criticism etc.</p>\n<p>Now if there was graffiti on some part of a train, and the train company removed that part, replaced it with a clean part, and put the part with the graffiti into an exhibition, then they wouldn't have copied anything, so copyright is irrelevant.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "copyright", "intellectual-property", "business", "property" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94437, "body": "<p>This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator.</p>\n<p>Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual.</p>\n<p>It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94438, "body": "<p>Bob's argument that you describe is simply an evidentiary argument about identity. If identity and the elements of sexual assault are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Bob's argument is no defence.</p>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>In Canada, one of the elements of sexual assault is that the touching be of a sexual nature. This is an <em>objective</em> test (see <em>R. v. Chase</em>, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/1ftlr#par11\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">[1987] 2 SCR 293, at para 11</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one: &quot;Viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is the sexual or carnal context of the assault visible to a reasonable observer.&quot;</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Touching with the motivation of punishment or humiliation can meet this test, regardless of the lack of sexual motivation of the accused. See e.g. <em>R. v. S. (V. C. A.)</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/mb/mbca/doc/2001/2001mbca85/2001mbca85.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2001 MBCA 85</a>.</p>\n<p>Depending on the circumstances, this could even render Bob's argument wholly irrelevant.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "sexual-assault", "sexual-offences", "defense" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93677, "body": "<p>I believe you will find it on page 210 of <a href=\"https://books.google.ch/books?id=r4RaAAAAYAAJ&amp;pg=PA210\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">this volume of the <em>Statutes at Large</em> in Google books</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>An Act to explain and amend so much of an Act, made in the thirteenth Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, An Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe, as relates to the Administration of Justice in Bengal; and for the Relief of certain Persons imprisoned at Calcutta in Bengal, under a Judgement of the Supreme Court of Judicature; and also for indemnifying the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and all Officers who have acted under their Orders or Authority, in the undue Resistance made to the Process of the Supreme Court</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "legal-history", "indian-constitutional-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94407, "body": "<p>This is unlikely to be a problem. There are <em>many</em> companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an <code>X</code> or the name <code>Xcom</code>. That Twitter has changed to <code>X</code> branding does not substantially change this general situation.</p>\n<p>With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as <code>X</code> or <code>x.com</code>.</p>\n<p>Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that <code>x.com</code> could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour.</p>\n<p>It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp.</p>\n<p>The <code>x.org</code> domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the <code>x.org</code> domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both <code>x.com</code> and <code>x.org</code> were among the six <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-letter_second-level_domain\" rel=\"noreferrer\">single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names</a> when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while <code>x.com</code> has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, <code>x.org</code> has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94410, "body": "<p>Trademark rights go to the first one who uses them in commerce, or who registered them with the intention to use them in commerce. So if anything, the X.Org Foundation could be a legal threat to <s>Twitter</s> X , claiming that the rebranding of Twitter infringes <em>their</em> trademark which they have already been using in commerce for decades. Not the other way around.</p>\n<p>However, a possible response of a large company discovering that they inadvertently infringed on the trademark rights of a much smaller company and now facing a legal dispute with them, is to look for a small <em>third</em> company that used a similar trademark even <em>before</em> that to obtain those <em>even earlier</em> trademark rights. I remember that mobile game developer Zynga once pulled that maneuver in a trademark dispute with another developer. But unfortunately I can't find details about that case, because thanks to the countless trademark lawsuits Zynga was involved in, this became ungoogleable. But a comment by <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/users/17112/user71659\">user71659</a> on this question mentions <a href=\"https://itlaw.fandom.com/wiki/Planetary_Motion_v._Techplosion\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a legal dispute between two email providers</a> where this maneuver was used successfully.</p>\n<p>So what <s>Twitter</s> X could now do is try to find some tech company that used the X brand for a software product even before X.Org and then buy them. But considering that the X Window System was already published in the 80s, that might be quite challenging.</p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "trademark", "domain-name" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94401, "body": "<p>Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud United States)</p>\n<p>Here the indictment's introduction alleges that Trump perpetrated:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A conspiracy to to defraud the United States by using dishonesty,\nfraud, and deceit to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful federal\ngovernment function by which the results of the presidential election\nare collected, counted, and certified by the federal government, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>temporary link to indictment pdf pending finding a better version: <a href=\"https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2023/08/trump-indictment.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer\">https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2023/08/trump-indictment.pdf</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/371\" rel=\"noreferrer\">18 U.S.C. § 371 (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute)</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against\nthe United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency\nthereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such\npersons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall\nbe fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or\nboth.</p>\n<p>If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the\nconspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy\nshall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "indictment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94430, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>If I charge users a fee, how do I define whether the fee is associated with my product or Oracle GraalVM?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>provided that You do not charge [...] including, without limitation, fees for products <strong>that include</strong> or <strong>are bundled</strong> with a copy of the Program or for services that <strong>involve the use</strong> of the distributed Program.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Your program does envision to bundle the program and the service does involve the use of the distributed Program, so you can't charge anything full stop.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "licensing" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94388, "body": "<h2>There is copyright in the recording (probably)</h2>\n<p>The person who first fixed the material in a tangible form owns the copyright. Presumably, whatever legal entity the church is, as it was made by a volunteer as a work-for-hire. That is because they were the ones who fixed it in tangible form. This is why journalists own the copyright in interviews they make with subjects.</p>\n<p>The copyright in the performance is a separate copyright from any that might exist in the composition. If the recording violates the composer’s copyright (e.g. the church did not pay the required statutory royalties to perform the songs), then there is no copyright in the recording, and the composer can sue the church for making it. There is no copyright in works that violate another's copyright.</p>\n<h2>Making an audio recording without permission is a crime</h2>\n<p>This is totally unrelated to copyright, but in most jurisdictions, you need the speaker’s permission before recording their voice. If the recording is obvious (e.g. a microphone in your face or a big sign saying services will be recorded), then permission can be implied - by knowingly speaking while you are aware you are being recorded, you have consented to the recording.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94389, "body": "<p>Assume first that the composition is still protected by copyright. Only the author can authorize public performance of the work. Everybody is an infringer if they don't have a license to perform the work. Now assume that the music director secured a performance license. Then you look at the terms of the license to see whether it is allowed to record the performance; and if it is allowed, it is allowed without restriction, or only for non-commercial purposes. If the composition is not protected by copyright anymore, then it can be recorded. The person who creates the recording (putting it in fixed form) hold the copyright to that particular work (the recording).\nCopyright law relies on the undefined concept of &quot;author&quot;, which <a href=\"https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/264\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">as the courts say</a> is a &quot;question of fact&quot;. An author originates or &quot;masterminds&quot; the original work, controlling the whole work’s creation and causing it to come into being, which is not the case with a member of the choir. More likely, the music director and sound engineer create and hold copyright in a joint work.</p>\n<p>We might assume that some of the sermon was written down in advance, which is to say that it has a fixed form, but that's far from assured; at any rate, the preacher can also conspire with the engineer and music director to create a joint work, where the engineer's contribution is putting the work into fixed form.</p>\n<p>So the transitory singing of the choir is not protected by copyright (it literally can't be copied), but the recording of a choir and sermon is protected by copyright, and the copyright is owned by the people who originated or masterminded the recording. Probably not the choir.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "copyright" ]