Question: What happens to a federal case if the subject matter of the controversy has ceased to exist and there is no strong likelihood that it will be revived?

Answer: The federal case will be dismissed.


Question: What happens if a writ of certiorari to review the decision of a state Supreme Court rests on an independent and adequate state law ground?

Answer: The writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted because the U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court decisions that are based on state law grounds that are both independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment.


Question: Does a retailer of contraceptives have standing to challenge a state law prohibiting minors from purchasing contraceptives?

Answer: Yes. A retailer of contraceptives has standing to challenge a state law prohibiting minors from purchasing contraceptives.


Question: Do federal courts have jurisdiction over political questions such as foreign relations?

Answer: No. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction over political questions such as foreign relations and such suits must be dismissed as non-justiciable.


Question: Would a federal suit to enjoin denial of a license on the ground that the plaintiff graduated from an out-of-state school be decided on the merits?

Answer: Yes. A federal suit to enjoin denial of the license on the ground that the plaintiff graduated from an out-of-state school would be decided on the merits because a federal question is involved.


Question: Does a federal taxpayer have standing to challenge the exercise of congressional spending power that may be an undue governmental entanglement in religious affairs?

Answer: Yes. A federal taxpayer has standing to challenge the exercise of congressional spending power that may be an undue governmental entanglement in religious affairs because the challenge is based on a claimed violation of specific constitutional limitations on the exercise of such power.


Question: Can a federal statute grant a federal court the power to render an advisory opinion?

Answer: No. A federal statute cannot grant a federal court the power to render an advisory opinion.


Question: Does a business in another state that will be negatively affected by a state law that improperly burdens interstate commerce have standing to challenge the law?

Answer: Yes. A business in another state that will be negatively affected by a state law that improperly burdens interstate commerce has standing to challenge the law.


Question: If a state statute restricts public demonstrations in front of government buildings to certain times, does a person who intended to make a speech during the prohibited time have standing in federal court?

Answer: Yes. A person who intended to make a speech during the prohibited time would have standing in federal court.


Question: Is a suit by an unmarried couple on the constitutionality of marriage license requirements ripe for review if the couple has not yet tried to obtain a license?

Answer: No. The suit is unripe and premature since the unmarried couple has not yet tried to obtain a license.


Question: What is required for standing to challenge the validity of a federal statute?

Answer: A person must have a significant stake in the controversy and must show that he has suffered an injury in fact.


Question: Under the 'Case or Controversy' limitation of Art. III, what must a plaintiff show?

Answer: A plaintiff must show a definite and concrete personal stake in the outcome, actual injury in fact, and causation.


Question: When a state statute is declared unconstitutional by the highest state court, what is the route of appeal?

Answer: The route of appeal is by certiorari.


Question: If the state's highest court's decision on state law and federal constitutional law issues are intertwined, what must the Supreme Court do?

Answer: The Supreme Court must reverse the state court and remand to state court for further proceedings.


Question: If the state's highest court's opinion is unclear whether the decision is based on state law or federal constitutional provisions, can the Supreme Court exercise review?

Answer: Yes. The Supreme Court may exercise review if the state's highest court's opinion is unclear whether the decision is based on state law or federal constitutional provisions.


Question: Does a medical doctor have third-party (jus tertii) standing to attack a state anti-contraceptive statute?

Answer: No. A medical doctor does not have third-party (jus tertii) standing to attack a state anti-contraceptive statute.


Question: If a state court holds that a state law is valid under both state and federal constitutional provisions, can the Supreme Court exercise review?

Answer: Yes. The Supreme Court may exercise review if a state court holds that a state law is valid under both state and federal constitutional provisions.


Question: Can Congress regulate the intrastate, non-commercial cultivation, possession, and use of mushrooms for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician in accordance with state law under the Commerce Clause?

Answer: No. The intrastate, non-commercial cultivation, possession, and use of mushrooms for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician in accordance with state law is not economic, and the link between the activity and any substantial effect on interstate commerce is attenuated, meaning the activity cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause.


Question: Under the Commerce Clause, can Congress regulate any activity that has a substantial economic effect on the stream of interstate commerce?

Answer: Yes. Congress may regulate any activity, whether carried on in one state or many, which has a substantial economic effect on the stream of interstate commerce. However, Congress does not have the power to regulate a noncommercial activity with no link to interstate commerce.


Question: Is a state law requiring all trucks, including interstate trucks, that haul goods on the state's highways to register with and obtain a $50 permit from the state's highway department constitutional?

Answer: Yes. The state law is constitutional because it does not discriminate against interstate commerce since it is as burdensome on local residents as it is on out-of-state commerce, and the burden is minimal compared with the state's interest in applying its police, welfare, and safety regulations.


Question: Is Congress's power over interstate commerce shared with the states?

Answer: Yes. Congress's power over interstate commerce is shared with the states, meaning a state law may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if it does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests and its incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits arising from the regulation.


Question: If Congress finds that when combined, wages received by dry cleaning workers have a substantial impact on the national economy and on the flow of goods and services in interstate commerce, can Congress regulate wages paid by dry cleaners even if one dry cleaning store operates solely in a locality within a state?

Answer: Yes. Congress can regulate wages paid by dry cleaners even if one dry cleaning store operates solely in a locality within a state if Congress finds that when combined, wages received by dry cleaning workers have a substantial impact on the national economy and on the flow of goods and services in interstate commerce.


Question: What is required for Congressional regulation to fall within the Commerce power under the substantial effects test?

Answer: Congressional regulation falls within the Commerce power so long as the activities being regulated have a 'substantial effect' upon interstate commerce. This test expands the commerce power because there no longer needs to be a direct effect, but only a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


Question: Does Congressional legislation that directs the federal courts to reopen cases on which the courts have passed final judgment unconstitutionally violate the separation of powers?

Answer: Yes. Congressional legislation that directs the federal courts to reopen cases on which the courts have passed final judgment unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers. However, if the judgment is not final, Congress has the power to alter federal statutes and can direct federal courts to apply such new laws to all pending actions.


Question: If a defendant is found guilty of violating a federal statute, resulting in an injunction against the defendant, and the defendant appeals the decision, what happens if Congress repeals the statute with retroactive effect before the defendant's appeal is decided on?

Answer: The district court must vacate the injunction against the defendant.


Question: If a petitioner files for bankruptcy in a federal bankruptcy court, must a state court stay any pending proceedings against the petitioner?

Answer: Yes. A state court must stay any pending proceedings against the petitioner since, in addition to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Congress has the power to provide uniform rules of bankruptcy including mandating an automatic stay of all state and federal proceedings. The stay does not deprive a state court of jurisdiction over an action; it merely suspends the proceedings, which may proceed once the stay is lifted.


Question: Is it constitutional for Congress to enact a statute prohibiting discrimination in the rental of public or private residential property on the basis of sexual orientation or preference?

Answer: Yes. It is constitutional for Congress to enact a statute prohibiting discrimination in the rental of public or private residential property on the basis of sexual orientation or preference.


Question: Under the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, can Congress prohibit discrimination in the rental of privately owned residential property?

Answer: Yes. Congress can prohibit discrimination in the rental of privately owned residential property because such discrimination, when combined, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


Question: If a federal statute allows a Congressional committee to overturn a federal agency's designation of certain federal lands as biodiversity sanctuaries requiring special protection, is the statute constitutional?

Answer: No. The statute is an unconstitutional legislative veto since Congress must enact a new statute to overturn an executive agency's decision.


Question: When Congress delegates power to an agency through law, can it undo such delegation through law?

Answer: Yes. When Congress delegates power to an agency through law, it can only undo such delegation through law. A legislative veto that gives one house or committee of Congress the power to invalidate or review an agency action is an unconstitutional exercise of power because Congress cannot revise the law without going through the Constitutional lawmaking procedure of bicameralism and presentment.


Question: Is a federal statute that requires any individual or entity owning more than 100 cars to ensure that at least 10 percent of those cars are electric-powered valid under the commerce clause?

Answer: Yes. A federal statute that requires any individual or entity owning more than 100 cars to ensure that at least 10 percent of those cars are electric-powered is valid under the commerce clause and does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it regulates a commercial activity that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


Question: Can Congress enact a statute that overrules a Supreme Court decision if the statute is intended to regulate interstate commerce?

Answer: Yes, Congress is permitted to enact a statute that overrules a Supreme Court decision if the statute is intended to regulate interstate commerce.


Question: If a state vocational licensing board unfairly revokes licenses to prevent competition, may Congress enact a statute prescribing detailed procedural requirements for the disciplinary proceedings of all state vocational licensing boards?

Answer: Yes, Congress may enact a statute prescribing detailed procedural requirements for the disciplinary proceedings of all state vocational licensing boards if a state vocational licensing board unfairly revokes licenses to prevent competition.


Question: What power does Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment give to Congress?

Answer: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enact legislation to prevent or remedy actions by state or local governments that violate provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided the legislation is congruent with and proportional to the Fourteenth Amendment violations it addresses.


Question: Is a federal excise tax on products sold in the U.S. that is used to benefit U.S. residents constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A federal excise tax on products sold in the U.S. that is used to benefit U.S. residents is constitutional under the power of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare.


Question: May a federal agency issue regulations and assess penalties for violations?

Answer: Yes. A federal agency may issue regulations and assess penalties for violations, as Congress can grant legislative power to an agency, as long as Congress lays down an intelligible principle that the agency must conform to in the exercise of that authority.


Question: Is a state statute designed to prevent out-of-state takeovers that requires a majority vote of shareholders to approve an acquisition constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A state statute designed to prevent out-of-state takeovers that requires a majority vote of shareholders to approve an acquisition is constitutional because the statute imposes the same burden on both in-state and out-of-state entities wishing to acquire corporations in the state.


Question: Is state regulation of businesses permitted where there is valid justification for the regulation, and the regulation does not discriminate?

Answer: Yes, state regulation of businesses is permitted where there is valid justification for the regulation, and the regulation does not discriminate, imposing the same burdens on local businesses as out-of-state businesses.


Question: Is a federal statute that authorizes spending for the general welfare constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A federal statute that authorizes spending for the general welfare is constitutional so long as it is reasonably related to the general welfare, states concrete objectives, and provides adequate criteria for the spending.


Question: Is a uniformly applied federal tax that adversely impacts some states more than others constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A uniformly applied federal tax that adversely impacts some states more than others is constitutional under the Tax and Spend Clause.


Question: Do members of Congress and their aides have immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution for defamatory statements made in the legislative chamber?

Answer: Yes, members of Congress and their aides have immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution for defamatory statements made in the legislative chamber.


Question: What is a defense to a charge of contempt of Congress?

Answer: A defense to a charge of contempt of Congress is showing that the refusal to answer Congress's questions was because they were on matters unrelated to what Congress may legislate.


Question: When may a federal law regulating energy prices in a state be constitutional?

Answer: A federal law regulating energy prices in a state may be constitutional if, in inseverable aggregates, the domestic purchase or sale of such products has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


Question: When may a federal law requiring the registration of all vehicles be constitutional?

Answer: A federal law requiring the registration of all vehicles may be constitutional if in inseverable aggregates the thefts affect interstate commerce.


Question: Is a federal law that penalizes the recovery of federal property on state land constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A federal law that penalizes the recovery of federal property on state land is constitutional as a necessary and proper means of protecting U.S. property.


Question: What power does Congress have related to paying debts and providing for the common defense and general welfare of the United States?

Answer: Congress has the power to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States and can require that the funds will be spent as directed.


Question: Can Congress regulate the District of Columbia?

Answer: Yes, Congress can regulate the District of Columbia and can enact legislation that applies only to the District of Columbia.


Question: May Congress place conditions upon the use of its spending power, even if the congressional purpose is in effect to regulate?

Answer: Yes, Congress may place conditions upon the use of its spending power, even if the congressional purpose is in effect to regulate. Congress can use any means to seek an objective falling within the specifically-enumerated powers, as long as the means is rationally related to the objective and is not specifically forbidden by the Constitution.


Question: May Congress place conditions upon use of its spending power and a grant of highway funds if the state speed limit is 65?

Answer: Yes, Congress may place conditions upon use of its spending power and a grant of highway funds if the state speed limit is 65, supported by Congress's spending power and commerce power.


Question: May Congress spend money in aid of the general welfare?

Answer: Yes, Congress may spend money in aid of the general welfare, and the executive branch may not unilaterally stop the spending of appropriated monies.


Question: Can a Congressional spending program for granting highways funds if the state speed limit is 65 miles per hour be supported by the spending power and commerce power?

Answer: Yes. A Congressional spending program for granting highways funds if the state speed limit is 65 miles per hour can be supported by the spending power and commerce power.


Question: Is preventing U.S. citizens from negotiating with foreign governments over U.S. disputes justified under Congress's power?

Answer: Yes, preventing U.S. citizens from negotiating with foreign governments over U.S. disputes is justified under Congress's power to legislate to preserve the monopoly of the national government over the conduct of United States foreign affairs.


Question: What is the strongest constitutional basis for a federal law requiring schools receiving federal funds to regulate student aid?

Answer: The strongest constitutional basis for a federal law requiring schools receiving federal funds to regulate student aid is the power to tax and spend for the general welfare.


Question: Can a statute punishing the denial of housing, employment, or education to Black persons solely because of their race be justified under the Thirteenth Amendment?

Answer: Yes. A statute punishing the denial of housing, employment, or education to Black persons solely because of their race may be justified under the Thirteenth Amendment.


Question: Is a statute that provides that rules promulgated under the statute may be set aside by a majority vote of a designated standing joint committee of Congress constitutional?

Answer: No. A statute that provides that rules promulgated under the statute may be set aside by a majority vote of a designated standing joint committee of Congress is unconstitutional because it authorizes a congressional change of legal rights and obligations by means other than those specified in the Constitution for the enactment of laws.


Question: Does the War Power include the power to remedy evils which have occurred due to the war's progress?

Answer: Yes. The War Power includes the power to remedy evils which have occurred due to the war's progress, and it does not cease with cessation of hostilities.


Question: Can Congress enact legislation involving local matters?

Answer: Congress cannot enact legislation involving local matters unless it involves interstate commerce.


Question: Does Congress's power to appropriate funds include the power to require that the funds will be spent as directed?

Answer: Yes, Congress's power to appropriate funds includes the power to require that the funds will be spent as directed.


Question: If an appropriations statute directs $100 million dollars to be spent on highway projects, can the President spend the money on a different project or refuse to spend the funds?

Answer: No. It is unconstitutional for the President to allocate the money to a different project or refuse to spend the funds. This would violate the separation of powers by usurping the spending power vested in Congress by the Constitution.


Question: Under the Appropriations Clause of Article I, who is authorized to decide the amount and scope of federal fiscal appropriations and expenditures of tax revenues?

Answer: Under the Appropriations Clause of Article I, Congress is constitutionally authorized to decide the amount and scope of federal fiscal appropriations and expenditures of tax revenues, meaning no money can be paid out of Treasury unless appropriated by Congress.


Question: What obligation does the President have under the Take Care Clause?

Answer: Under the Take Care Clause, the President has an obligation to faithfully execute the laws, meaning he may NOT refuse to spend funds whose expenditure Congress has expressly mandated.


Question: Can Congress reserve to itself the power to remove an executive officer?

Answer: No, Congress can never reserve to itself the power to remove an executive officer (i.e., an officer charged with the execution of the law), except by impeachment.


Question: Can Congress reserve to itself the power to remove inferior officers?

Answer: Yes, Congress can reserve to itself the power to remove inferior officers, unless it interferes with the President's ability to execute the laws.


Question: Can Congress reserve to the other branches the power to remove inferior officers?

Answer: Yes, Congress can reserve to the other branches the power to remove inferior officers, but Congress can never reserve to itself the power to remove an executive officer except by impeachment.


Question: If Congress passed a statute creating a new agency to enforce federal drug laws, and the statute authorizes the President to appoint the agency's director with the advice and consent of the Senate, but prohibits the President from removing the director without the Senate's consent, does this violate the separation of powers?

Answer: Yes. If Congress passed a statute creating a new agency to enforce federal drug laws, and the statute authorizes the President to appoint the agency's director with the advice and consent of the Senate, but prohibits the President from removing the director without the Senate's consent, this violates the separation of powers because Congress cannot play any role in the removal of executive officers.


Question: Does Congress have the power to directly appoint or remove executive officers?

Answer: No, Congress has no power to directly appoint or remove executive officers except through impeachment.


Question: If a new federal statute establishes a commission that is not under the supervision or control of any federal agency to develop regulations to protect wildlife on federal lands using specified fact-finding and adjudicatory functions, who must appoint the members?

Answer: The members must be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, because they are executive officers who exercise significant legal authority.


Question: Who appoints inferior executive officers?

Answer: All other inferior executive officers may be appointed by the President alone, the courts, or department heads.


Question: Who appoints principal executive officers?

Answer: The President appoints principal executive officers with the advice and consent of the Senate.


Question: Does the President have direct control of the agenda of federal executive agencies?

Answer: Yes. The President has direct control of the agenda of federal executive agencies and can withhold or reallocate funds, provided it is not inconsistent with an act of Congress.


Question: What authority does the President have as the chief executive officer of the U.S. government?

Answer: The President, as the chief executive officer of the U.S. government, has authority to direct the actions of federal executive agencies, provided the President's directives are not prohibited by a federal statute.


Question: Are treaties the supreme law of the land?

Answer: Yes, treaties are the supreme law of the land if they are self-executing, meaning the treaty becomes judicially enforceable upon ratification, but a treaty may not be inconsistent with the Constitution.


Question: Does Congress have the power to enact legislation to enforce a treaty?

Answer: Yes, Congress has the power to enact legislation that is a necessary and proper means to enforce the treaty.


Question: If a treaty is a valid one, are state laws that conflict with a treaty valid?

Answer: No, if a treaty is a valid one, state laws that conflict with a treaty are invalid.


Question: Is the President empowered to make treaties with foreign nations?

Answer: Yes. The President is empowered to make treaties with foreign nations with approval of a supermajority of the Senate.


Question: If Congress enacts a statute that directs U.S. ambassadors to register official protests with their host countries for any human rights violations, can the President direct the ambassadors to ignore the statute?

Answer: Yes. The President can direct the ambassadors to ignore the statute since Congress has unconstitutionally intruded on the President's exclusive power to represent the U.S. in foreign affairs.


Question: Who has broad authority with respect to foreign affairs according to the Constitution?

Answer: The Constitution gives the President broad authority with respect to foreign affairs, and it is the President, not Congress, who is considered responsible for conducting U.S. foreign affairs.


Question: Does the President have both the power and the obligation to faithfully execute the laws?

Answer: Yes. The President has both the power and the obligation to faithfully execute the laws. Where Congress appropriates a certain dollar amount for a certain purpose, the President must approve this and cannot cut back or refuse the appropriation.


Question: If Congress enacts a statute establishing a memorial park for a minority group victimized by a foreign country during WWII and appropriates $5 million for this park, can the President refuse to construct the park?

Answer: No, if Congress enacts a statute establishing a memorial park and appropriates $5 million for it, the President cannot refuse to construct the park because the President has the duty under Article II to faithfully execute laws, including appropriation bills by Congress.


Question: Is a law requiring the President to appoint an ambassador from a list of candidates approved by the Senate constitutional?

Answer: No. A law requiring the President to appoint an ambassador from a list of candidates approved by the Senate is unconstitutional because it violates the President's power of appointment over high officers.


Question: Is a law that provides that Senate confirmation of a Presidential appointment of an ambassador is deemed to occur automatically if the appointment is from a Senate approved list constitutional?

Answer: No. A law that provides that Senate confirmation of a Presidential appointment of an ambassador is deemed to occur automatically if the appointment is from a Senate approved list is unconstitutional because it violates the requirement that the Senate consent to the appointment of a principal officer.


Question: Under Article II's Appointment Clause, who has the power to appoint principal officers of the U.S.?

Answer: Under Article II's Appointment Clause, the President alone has the power to appoint principal officers of the U.S. with the advice and consent of the Senate.


Question: Is the creation of an advisory council by the President to encourage public health constitutional?

Answer: Yes. The creation of an advisory council by the President to encourage public health is constitutional because it is within the scope of executive authority vested in the President by the Constitution, provided no federal statute prohibits it.


Question: How must members of federal boards exercising executive powers be appointed?

Answer: Members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.


Question: Can Congress direct the Attorney General to initiate criminal proceedings against an individual?

Answer: No, Congress cannot direct the Attorney General to initiate criminal proceedings against an individual since law enforcement is an exclusively executive power and the Attorney General may use his discretion in deciding who to prosecute.


Question: Can Congress make lower-level appointments itself?

Answer: No, Congress cannot make lower-level appointments itself but can decide who can make these appointments.


Question: Under Article II, Section 2, can Congress appoint members of a body with administrative or enforcement powers?

Answer: No, under Article II, Section 2, Congress may not appoint members of a body with administrative or enforcement powers.


Question: Does an executive agreement supersede inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress?

Answer: No. Executive agreements, though having the force of law, are subordinate to acts of Congress. Congress holds the power to make laws, and its statutes reflect the will of the people. Therefore, a conflicting executive agreement will not supersede an earlier act of Congress. The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal laws, including acts of Congress, are the supreme law of the land.


Question: Can Congress appoint officers who exercise Executive Branch functions?

Answer: No, Congress cannot appoint officers who exercise Executive Branch functions, but Congress can appoint members to delegate legislative powers, investigation, and the recommendation of new laws.


Question: Can Congress infringe on the President's power as commander in chief?

Answer: No, Congress may not infringe on the President's power as commander in chief.


Question: Can Congress move troops?

Answer: No, Congress cannot move troops as it would infringe on the President's power as commander in chief.


Question: As commander in chief, can the President deploy national guard troops to aid in relief efforts?

Answer: Yes, as commander in chief, the President can deploy national guard troops to aid in relief efforts.


Question: Does the power of the President to negotiate with foreign nations authorize the President to make executive agreements?

Answer: Yes. The power of the President to negotiate with foreign nations impliedly authorizes the President to make executive agreements that can secure the release of a state prisoner.


Question: For what crimes can a President pardon people?

Answer: A President can pardon people only for federal crimes, except for impeachment.


Question: Is the President's power over foreign affairs plenary or absolute?

Answer: No. The President's power over foreign affairs is not plenary or absolute, but the President can direct executive employees to aid in relief efforts outside the scope of their employment.


Question: Do executive agreements supersede existing state law?

Answer: Yes, executive agreements supersede existing state law.


Question: A statute is passed that appropriates funds but provides that the funds may not be expended until both houses of Congress have adopted a concurrent resolution. Is this constitutional?

Answer: No. This is unconstitutional because Congress must abide by the presentment clause and present the subsequent resolution to the President for approval or veto.


Question: Is legislative action legitimate without bicameral approval and presentment to the President?

Answer: No. Legislative action is not legitimate without bicameral approval and presentment to the President because Congress must follow the presentment clause.


Question: A senator makes a false statement about a federal employee during a speech on the floor of the Senate. Is the senator immune from a defamation claim?

Answer: Yes. The senator is immune from a defamation claim because the Speech and Debate clause wholly insulates all members of Congress from tort liability for statements made on the floor of Congress.


Question: Does the Speech and Debate Clause immunize members of Congress from criminal and civil litigation for statements made on the House/Senate floor?

Answer: Yes. The Speech and Debate Clause immunizes members of Congress from criminal and civil litigation for statements made on the House/Senate floor because it provides legislative immunity.


Question: Can the executive branch direct the actions of federal executive agencies if the actions are inconsistent with an act of Congress?

Answer: No. The executive branch can direct the actions of federal executive agencies, provided the actions are not inconsistent with an act of Congress because the executive must follow congressional mandates.


Question: Is a commission created by Congress to investigate vehicle safety and make recommendations constitutional if all its members were appointed by the President?

Answer: Yes. A commission created by Congress to investigate vehicle safety and make recommendations is constitutional even if all its members were appointed by the President because it is within Congress's investigatory power.


Question: Is a statute that creates a limited administrative power in the President to implement the statute constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A statute that creates a limited administrative power in the President to implement the statute is constitutional because it is within the President's executive powers.


Question: Under the 12th Amendment, who chooses the president by ballot in the event of a dispute involving the electoral college?

Answer: The House of Representatives chooses the president by ballot in the event of a dispute involving the electoral college because the 12th Amendment grants this power to the House.


Question: Does Congress's authority to investigate include areas in which the Constitution does not allow it to legislate?

Answer: No. Congress's authority to investigate only includes those areas or matters in which the Constitution allows it to legislate because its investigatory powers are tied to its legislative powers.


Question: Can legislative power be delegated to executive officers and/or administrative agencies without intelligible standards?

Answer: No. Legislative power can be delegated to executive officers and/or administrative agencies, provided the delegation includes intelligible standards because this ensures the delegation is constitutional.


Question: A state imposes a nondiscriminatory property use tax. Will the tax apply to federal land occupied by the National Park Service?

Answer: No. The tax will not apply to federal land occupied by the National Park Service because it is an agency of the federal government.


Question: Can a state directly tax the property or activity of the federal government under the supremacy clause?

Answer: No. Under the supremacy clause, a state cannot directly tax the property or activity of the federal government because federal activities are immune from state taxation.


Question: Is an employee of a private firm on federal land funded by the federal government exempt from state-imposed income taxes?

Answer: No. An employee of a private firm on federal land funded by the federal government is not exempt from state-imposed income taxes because they are not a federal employee.


Question: Is the federal government exempt from state taxation if the levy falls on a private firm contracting with the federal government?

Answer: No. The federal government is exempt from state taxation if the levy falls on the U.S. itself or on an agency/instrumentality closely connected to the federal government, but a private firm contracting with the federal government is not exempt from state-imposed taxes because the private firm is not part of the federal government.


Question: Can Congress command a state government to pass a particular law to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste?

Answer: No. Congress can encourage the states to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their borders, but the federal government cannot command a state government to pass a particular law because it would violate the Tenth Amendment.


Question: Can Congress commandeer the state legislatures into federal service or require states to govern according to federal government instructions?

Answer: No. Congress cannot commandeer the state legislatures into federal service or require states to govern according to federal government instructions because the Tenth Amendment prevents such federal overreach.


Question: A state levies a general tax on the gross receipts from all lottery operations within the state. Is a federal lottery outlet administered by a federal agency subject to the state tax?

Answer: No. A federal lottery outlet administered by a federal agency within the state is not subject to the state tax because it is a federal instrumentality.


Question: Can a state impose a tax on a federal lottery outlet administered by a federal agency within the state?

Answer: No. A state may not impose a tax on the federal government, its property, its agencies, or on any federal instrumentality that is so closely tied to the federal government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities because of the principle of federal immunity.


Question: Can Congress enact a statute that requires a state legislature to enact a state law?

Answer: No. Congress cannot enact a statute that requires a state legislature to enact a state law because the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from requiring states to enact laws or to administer federal law.


Question: Is a private vendor to a federal agency obligated to pay state sales tax on items purchased in state to sell to the agency?

Answer: Yes. A private vendor to a federal agency is obligated to pay state sales tax on items the vendor purchases in state to sell to the agency because the vendor is independent from the agency and the tax does not interfere with federal functions.


Question: Is it constitutional for Congress to enact a statute that forces or requires a state legislature to enact specified legislation?

Answer: No. It is unconstitutional for Congress to enact a statute that forces or requires a state legislature to enact specified legislation because it violates the Tenth Amendment.


Question: Can a law enacted by Congress that affects state legislators be constitutional if the law does not significantly interfere with state government?

Answer: Yes. A law enacted by Congress that affects state legislators may be constitutional if the law does not significantly interfere with state government because it respects the principles of federalism.


Question: Can federal law generally be applied to state legislators acting in the course of their official duties?

Answer: No. Under the doctrine of federalism, federal law generally cannot be applied to state legislators acting in the course of their official duties because it would interfere with state sovereignty.


Question: Is the national regulation of predatory wild animals on federal lands constitutional?

Answer: Yes. The national regulation of predatory wild animals on federal lands is constitutional because Congress has authority to make regulations respecting federal property.


Question: Can the federal government lease federal lands in competition with nearby local state businesses under the federal property clause?

Answer: Yes. The federal government can lease federal lands in competition with nearby local state businesses under the federal property clause of Article V, Section 3 because it has broad authority over federal property.


Question: Is a federal law that prohibits hunting on federally owned land authorized by the property clause of Article IV, Section 3?

Answer: Yes. A federal law that prohibits hunting on federally owned land is authorized by the property clause of Article IV, Section 3 because it regulates the use of federal property.


Question: Does enacting state legislation that makes all deed restrictions unenforceable implicate a state's constitutionally guaranteed sovereign immunity?

Answer: No. Enacting state legislation that makes all deed restrictions unenforceable does not implicate a state's constitutionally guaranteed sovereign immunity because it is a matter of state legislative authority.


Question: Does a ban on government door-to-door opinion polling violate the intergovernmental immunity of a federal employee?

Answer: Yes. A ban on government door-to-door opinion polling violates the intergovernmental immunity of a federal employee because it interferes with federal functions.


Question: Can federal law generally be applied to state legislators acting in the course of their official duties?

Answer: No. Federal law generally cannot be applied to state legislators acting in the course of their official duties because it would interfere with state sovereignty.


Question: Are states and municipalities allowed to interfere with federal activities or operations without Congress's consent?

Answer: No. States and municipalities are not allowed to interfere with federal activities or operations without Congress's consent because of the supremacy of federal law.


Question: Can a state prohibit advocating the use of force or violation of the law if the advocacy is not directed at producing imminent illegal action?

Answer: No. A state cannot prohibit advocating the use of force or of violation of the law unless the advocacy is directed at producing or inciting imminent illegal action and where the advocacy is likely to produce such action because it would violate the First Amendment.


Question: Can state courts issue writs of habeas corpus to aid those in federal custody?

Answer: No. State courts cannot issue writs of habeas corpus to aid those in federal custody because the Supremacy Clause prohibits states from interfering with federal detention.


Question: Is a state court allowed to hear a habeas corpus petition relating to someone in federal custody?

Answer: No. A state court is not allowed to hear a habeas corpus petition relating to someone in federal custody because the general presumption of concurrent jurisdiction doesn't extend to this situation, although state courts may issue the writs to other states.


Question: A city ordinance requires vegetables sold at farmers' markets in the city to have been grown within the city limits. Is this ordinance constitutional?

Answer: No. This ordinance is unconstitutional because it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce, and there are nondiscriminatory ways to promote the city's interest in encouraging urban farming.


Question: Will a state or local law that discriminates against out-of-towners be upheld if it is necessary to achieve an important government purpose?

Answer: Yes. A state or local law that discriminates against out-of-towners will be upheld only if it is proved that the law is necessary to achieve an important government purpose because it serves a significant state interest.


Question: Does federal legislation preclude a state from enacting laws on the same subject that may conflict with federal law?

Answer: Yes. Under the Supremacy Clause preemption doctrine, if the federal government through Congress enacts legislation on a subject matter seeking to fully occupy that field of law, the federal legislation is controlling over state laws and it precludes a state from enacting laws on the same subject that may conflict with the federal law because federal law is supreme.


Question: Have federal standards of meat labeling preempted state laws?

Answer: Yes. Federal standards of meat labeling have preempted state laws because the federal government has sought to fully occupy that field of law.


Question: Do the negative implications of the Dormant Commerce Clause apply when the state acts as a market participant?

Answer: No. The negative implications of the Dormant Commerce Clause do not apply when the state acts as a market participant because the state is operating as if it is a private entity.


Question: Is a state law that requires state-run electric plants to sell only to purchasers residing in states that accept spent fuel from the plant for storage/disposal constitutional?

Answer: Yes. This state law is constitutional because the state is not acting as a market regulator, so the market-participant exception to the dormant commerce clause applies.


Question: A state enacts a statute that imposes a fifty-cent fee on every pig raised and sold in the state to pay for a new vaccination program. Is this fee constitutional?

Answer: Yes. The court will rule for the state since the fee applies only to intra-state activities, and it does not unduly burden interstate commerce because the dormant commerce clause does not prohibit a state regulation unless it unjustifiably discriminates against interstate commerce or its burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs its local benefits.


Question: Can states use their police power to pass laws that discriminate against interstate commerce or unduly burden interstate commerce under the Negative Commerce Clause?

Answer: No. States may not use their police power to pass laws that discriminate against interstate commerce or unduly burden interstate commerce under the Negative Commerce Clause because it would violate the principle of free trade between states.


Question: A plaintiff brings a successful personal injury claim in State A under its long-arm statute against a defendant corporation headquartered in State B. Must a court in State B enforce the State A judgment?

Answer: Yes. A court in State B must enforce the State A judgment if the defendant fully litigated the issues of jurisdiction and choice of law in State A and the plaintiff still obtained a judgment because it upholds the principles of full faith and credit.


Question: Are issues of jurisdiction and choice of law entitled to full faith and credit if they were fully and fairly litigated in the court that rendered the original judgment?

Answer: Yes. If the issues of jurisdiction and choice of law were fully and fairly litigated in the court that rendered the original judgment, those determinations are entitled to full faith and credit by the recognizing court because it upholds the principles of res judicata.


Question: A state awards extraction rights on a state-owned natural gas field to a local company even though it wasn't the highest bidder. Does the highest bidding out-of-state company have a dormant commerce clause claim?

Answer: No. The highest bidding out-of-state company has no dormant commerce clause claim because the state, by acting as a market participant in selling the rights to a natural gas field that it owns, can discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of its own residents.


Question: Does the Dormant Commerce Clause apply when a state acts as a market participant rather than a regulator?

Answer: No. When a state acts as a market participant rather than a regulator, the Dormant Commerce Clause does not apply because the state may favor its own residents in its own dealings.


Question: Can an out-of-state customer enjoin a state on the basis of the negative implication of the commerce clause if Congress has enacted a law permitting a state to limit the sale of its natural resources to in-state customers only?

Answer: No. An out-of-state customer cannot enjoin the state on the basis of the negative implication of the commerce clause since Congress has broad power over interstate commerce and has explicitly given consent to the state's economic discrimination.


Question: Can Congress authorize the state to regulate even where the state law would otherwise violate the negative implications of the Dormant Commerce Clause?

Answer: Yes. In exercising its plenary powers, Congress may authorize the state to regulate even where the state law would otherwise violate the negative implications of the Dormant Commerce Clause because Congress has broad power over interstate commerce.


Question: Can a litigant re-litigate a case in another state to take advantage of a conflict of laws between the states if they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in one state?

Answer: No. If a litigant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in one state, the litigant cannot re-litigate the case in another state to take advantage of a conflict of laws between the states because it would violate principles of res judicata.


Question: Is a state law that has a purely discriminatory effect against out-of-state manufacturers constitutional?

Answer: No. A state law that has a purely discriminatory effect against out-of-state manufacturers is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because it discriminates against interstate commerce and there are less discriminatory alternatives available to protect the legitimate interests cited in the law.


Question: Can a state discriminate or excessively burden interstate commerce under the negative commerce clause if Congress allows it?

Answer: Yes. Although a state generally cannot discriminate or excessively burden interstate commerce under the negative commerce clause, a state may do so if Congress allows it through congressional authorization or permission because Congress has plenary power over interstate commerce.


Question: Is a tax permissible under the Commerce Clause if it is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the state applying the tax, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and fairly relates to the services provided by the state?

Answer: Yes. A tax is permissible under the Commerce Clause if it is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the state applying the tax, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and fairly relates to the services provided by the state because it meets the requirements for a valid state tax under the Commerce Clause.


Question: Can Congress authorize municipalities to enact legislation that burdens interstate commerce if there is a valid reason and the burden is the same on both interstate and intrastate businesses?

Answer: Yes. Congress can authorize municipalities to enact legislation that burdens interstate commerce if there is a valid reason and the burden is the same on both interstate and intrastate businesses because it is within Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.


Question: Can congressional legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing across the country be constitutional under the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8?

Answer: Yes. Congressional legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing across the country may be constitutional under the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 because such discrimination, in inseverable aggregates, could reasonably be deemed to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.


Question: Is a judgment in a state court entitled to full faith and credit in another state if the judgment is final, on the merits, and the court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction?

Answer: Yes. A judgment in a state court is entitled to full faith and credit in another state if the judgment is final, on the merits, and the court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction because it upholds the principles of full faith and credit.


Question: Is a state income tax that affects federal employees constitutional if the tax does not discriminate against persons who are employed by the United States?

Answer: Yes. A state income tax that affects federal employees is constitutional so long as the tax does not discriminate against persons who are employed by the United States because it treats federal employees the same as other state residents.


Question: Is a state statute that only allows its residents to register commercial vehicles constitutional?

Answer: No. A state statute that only allows its residents to register commercial vehicles is unconstitutional because it unduly burdens interstate commerce by discriminating against out-of-state competitors.


Question: Is a tax on all business conducted within the state constitutional even when applied to private contractors performing work under a federal contract?

Answer: Yes. A tax on all business conducted within the state is constitutional even when applied to private contractors performing work under a federal contract because it is nondiscriminatory.


Question: Is a state regulation automatically invalid if a federal statute and state statute are in actual conflict under the supremacy clause?

Answer: Yes. Under the supremacy clause, if a federal statute and state statute are in actual conflict, the state regulation is automatically invalid because federal law is supreme.


Question: If the constitutionality of a state statute that requires state employees to be U.S. citizens is evaluated under the supremacy clause, which laws will be controlling?

Answer: The treaties and immigration laws of the U.S. will be controlling because the supremacy clause ensures that federal law overrides conflicting state law.


Question: Will a federal statute preempt a state statute if the purpose of the federal statute is different from the purpose of the state statute?

Answer: No. A federal statute will not preempt a state statute if the purpose of the federal statute is different from the purpose of the state statute because there is no direct conflict between the two laws.


Question: May a state law that requires businesses in the state to purchase goods from that state be unconstitutional under the commerce clause?

Answer: Yes. A state law that requires businesses in the state to purchase goods from that state may be unconstitutional under the commerce clause because it discriminates against interstate commerce.


Question: Is a state requirement that candidates for license must be graduates of vocational schools in that state likely constitutional?

Answer: No. A state requirement that candidates for license must be graduates of vocational schools in that state is likely unconstitutional as an undue burden on interstate commerce because it restricts the free movement of professionals across state lines.


Question: Is a state statute that requires state employees to be U.S. citizens in violation of the commerce clause if the reason is to protect state jobs from foreign workers?

Answer: Yes. A state statute that requires state employees to be U.S. citizens is in violation of the commerce clause if the reason is to protect state jobs from foreign workers because it discriminates against interstate commerce.


Question: Can a state statute that requires all buses driving in the state to have safety devices be challenged as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce?

Answer: Yes. A state statute that requires all buses driving in the state to have safety devices may be challenged as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce because it imposes requirements on interstate carriers that may not be necessary for safety.


Question: Under the Supremacy Clause, which law controls if a valid federal law conflicts with a valid state law?

Answer: The federal law controls because the Supremacy Clause establishes the supremacy of federal law over state law in cases of conflict.


Question: Is a zoning ordinance that prohibits unrelated people from living together in the same dwelling unit valid under the state's police power?

Answer: Yes. A zoning ordinance that prohibits unrelated people from living together in the same dwelling unit is valid under the state's police power provided the law clearly explains the reason behind this restriction, defines the terms "unrelated" and "living together", and spells out the penalties for doing so because it serves a legitimate state interest.


Question: A state law prevents losers of primaries from becoming write-in candidates. Is this valid?

Answer: Yes. This is valid because it prevents chaos and confusion in the electoral process by ensuring that all candidates have a fair opportunity to secure a place on the ballot before the primary.


Question: Is a state prohibition against write-in voting constitutional if the candidates had ample opportunity to secure access to the ballot before the primary?

Answer: Yes. A state prohibition against write-in voting is constitutional if the candidates had ample opportunity to secure access to the ballot before the primary because it ensures orderly and fair elections.


Question: Under the UCC, how can an offer to buy goods be accepted?

Answer: Under the UCC, an offer to buy goods can be accepted by any reasonable medium, including the commencement of performance. Thus, an order or offer to buy goods can be accepted by a promise to ship or by the act of shipment itself.


Question: How can contracts be created by the conduct of the parties?

Answer: Contracts can be created by the conduct of the parties without spoken or written words. Conduct will create an implied-in-fact contract if both parties' conduct is intentional and each knows (or has reason to know) that the other party will interpret the conduct as an agreement to enter into a contract.


Question: If a party performs services at the request of another party and no price is discussed in advance, what will the court award?

Answer: If a party performs services at the request of another party and no price is discussed in advance, the court will award the reasonable value of the services rendered. If the requesting party was aware of the price prior to entering into the contract, the contract will be based on that price.


Question: Unless the offer specifically states otherwise, how can an offer be accepted?

Answer: Unless the offer specifically states otherwise, an offer can be accepted by either promise or performance. In cases where the offer calls for acceptance by performance or promise, the beginning of performance counts as acceptance and an implied promise to complete performance.


Question: Does the UCC govern any contract for the sale of goods involving one or more merchants?

Answer: Yes. The UCC governs any contract for the sale of goods involving one or more merchants.


Question: If the offeror dies before the offer is accepted, what happens to the offer?

Answer: If the offeror dies before the offer is accepted, it is revoked. However, if the offer is accepted, then death does not terminate the obligations of the contract.


Question: In a unilateral contract, what happens once the offeree begins the invited performance?

Answer: In a unilateral contract, once the offeree begins the invited performance, the offer becomes a binding option contract, which makes the offer temporarily irrevocable.


Question: Is a reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those offered an acceptance?

Answer: No. A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but a counteroffer.


Question: Before a contract is created, what must the parties have?

Answer: Before a contract is created, the parties must have a clear understanding of the terms of the agreement and an intention to be bound.


Question: Can parties be bound contractually when they have reached an agreement in principle, even if they contemplate further negotiations or the execution of a formal written contract?

Answer: Yes, parties can be bound contractually when they have reached an agreement in principle, even if they contemplate further negotiations or the execution of a formal written contract.


Question: If an offer invites acceptance by performance, what does the offeree's beginning of performance create?

Answer: If an offer invites acceptance by performance, the offeree's beginning of performance creates an option contract which precludes the offeror from revoking its offer.


Question: In a sales contract under the UCC, how can an order (offer) be accepted?

Answer: In a sales contract under the UCC, an order (offer) can be accepted either by shipping goods (either conforming or non-conforming) or by promising to do so. However, if a seller accepts by promise and then sends non-conforming goods with a notice of accommodation, it is not appropriate and results in a breach by the seller.


Question: Is a statement from a seller that he is thinking of selling an item an offer?

Answer: No. A statement from a seller that he is thinking of selling an item is not an offer but a solicitation for an offer.


Question: Under the mailbox rule, when is a contract formed?

Answer: Under the mailbox rule, a contract is formed when the letter of acceptance is mailed by the offeree, and the offeror can no longer revoke his offer.


Question: Can an offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which gives assurance that it will be held open be revoked?

Answer: No. An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which gives assurance that it will be held open cannot be revoked by the offeror for the time stated or, if no time is stated, for a reasonable time, not to exceed three months.


Question: Does a written confirmation of an offer sent within a reasonable time operate as an acceptance if it states terms additional to or different from those offered?

Answer: Yes. A written confirmation of an offer sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional to the additions. If the additional terms are not material or objected to within a reasonable time, they will become part of the contract.


Question: In a unilateral contract, what effect does the beginning of performance by the offeree have on the offer?

Answer: In a unilateral contract, the beginning of performance by the offeree makes the offer temporarily irrevocable. As long as the offeree continues diligently to perform, the offer remains irrevocable until he has finished.


Question: Once an offer is accepted, what happens to the contract price?

Answer: Once an offer is accepted, a valid contract is formed and the contract price cannot be changed by the seller.


Question: Must revocation of a unilateral offer be done in the same manner as it was made or by a comparable medium and frequency of publicity?

Answer: Yes. Revocation of a unilateral offer must be done in the same manner as it was made or by a comparable medium and frequency of publicity because it ensures that the offeree is properly informed.


Question: In a dispute over compensation between an employer and an employee, is the contract between the parties controlling regardless of any implied-in-fact promises?

Answer: Yes. In a dispute over compensation between an employer and an employee, the contract between the parties is controlling regardless of any implied-in-fact promises because it represents the agreed terms.


Question: If the mailing of an acceptance to an offer is never delivered to the offeror, can the offeror still revoke the offer?

Answer: Yes. If the mailing of an acceptance to an offer is never delivered to the offeror, the offeror can still revoke the offer because the acceptance was not communicated.


Question: Can an offer that is not subject to countermand still be revoked by the offeror?

Answer: Yes. An offer that is not subject to countermand can still be revoked by the offeror because the offeror retains the power to revoke before acceptance.


Question: Is an offeree's power of acceptance terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract?

Answer: Yes. An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract because it indicates the offeror's decision to withdraw the offer.


Question: Is an offeree's power of acceptance terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror notice not to enter into the proposed contract?

Answer: Yes. An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror notice not to enter into the proposed contract because it signifies the offeror's withdrawal of the offer.


Question: Is an offeree's power of acceptance terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract, even if the offeror told the offeree that the offer was irrevocable?

Answer: Yes. An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract, even if the offeror told the offeree that the offer was irrevocable because it shows the offeror's change of mind.


Question: Is an offeree's power of acceptance terminated if the offeree makes a counter-offer and the offeree can no longer accept the initial offer?

Answer: Yes. An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated if the offeree makes a counter-offer and the offeree can no longer accept the initial offer because a counter-offer is a rejection of the original offer.


Question: Is the offer of a prize for the completion of a task a unilateral contract that is terminable either by lapse of a reasonable amount of time or by revocation?

Answer: Yes. The offer of a prize for the completion of a task is a unilateral contract that is terminable either by lapse of a reasonable amount of time or by revocation because it depends on performance for acceptance.


Question: Does a doctor and patient enter into an implied-in-fact contract when a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient?

Answer: Yes. Any time a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient, the doctor and patient enter into an implied-in-fact contract because the patient expects to be cured and the doctor assumes he will be compensated.


Question: Is a unilateral offer effectively accepted when a person aware of the offer performs the particular act within the scope of the offer?

Answer: Yes. A unilateral offer is effectively accepted when a person aware of the offer performs the particular act within the scope of the offer because it constitutes acceptance by performance.


Question: Is a unilateral offer such as a reward terminable either by lapse of a reasonable amount of time or by revocation?

Answer: Yes. A unilateral offer such as a reward is terminable either by lapse of a reasonable amount of time or by revocation because it requires performance for acceptance.


Question: Is a promise binding if the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance and it does induce such action or forbearance, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise?

Answer: Yes. A promise is binding if the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance and it does induce such action or forbearance, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise because it prevents unfair outcomes.


Question: Is a promise by an obligor to perform the duty regardless of the occurrence of the event binding if the obligee has materially changed his position in reliance on it, even if the promise need not be in words and may be inferred from other conduct?

Answer: Yes. A promise by an obligor to perform the duty regardless of the occurrence of the event is binding if the obligee has materially changed his position in reliance on it because it protects the reliance interest of the obligee.


Question: Is cashing a check that came with a settlement offer an implied agreement to a settlement, making you liable for damages if you do not perform?

Answer: Yes. Cashing a check that came with a settlement offer is an implied agreement to a settlement because it indicates acceptance of the terms, making you liable for damages if you do not perform.


Question: Is the power to accept terminated if you find out that the subject matter of the contract has been sold?

Answer: Yes. The power to accept is terminated if you find out that the subject matter of the contract has been sold because the offer cannot be accepted once the subject matter is no longer available.


Question: Is an implied promise a promise that is considered to exist despite the lack of an agreement or express terms to that effect and the breach of which may be recognized as a cause of action?

Answer: Yes. An implied promise is a promise that is considered to exist despite the lack of an agreement or express terms to that effect because the law recognizes it as a valid obligation.


Question: If a reward offered for a particular act is effectively revoked, can a person who does the act without knowing about the reward being revoked argue that the offer was in the nature of a bounty?

Answer: Yes. If a reward offered for a particular act is effectively revoked, a person who does the act without knowing about the reward being revoked may argue that the offer was in the nature of a bounty because the elements of contract do not apply to the offeror's liability.


Question: Is a unilateral contract enforceable against the offeror by the offeree or a legal representative of the offeree once there is completion of performance?

Answer: Yes. Once there is completion of performance in a unilateral contract, the contract is enforceable against the offeror by the offeree or a legal representative of the offeree because performance constitutes acceptance.


Question: Does an advertisement followed up by words of commitment become an offer, and acceptance of the terms of the offer within a reasonable time constitute a contract?

Answer: Yes. An advertisement followed up by words of commitment becomes an offer because it demonstrates an intent to be bound, and acceptance of the terms of the offer within a reasonable time constitutes a contract.


Question: Does a prize offer that is conspicuously displayed constitute a contractual offer which is effectively accepted when a person aware of the offer performs the particular act within the scope of the offer?

Answer: Yes. A prize offer that is conspicuously displayed constitutes a contractual offer which is effectively accepted when a person aware of the offer performs the particular act within the scope of the offer because it satisfies the requirements of offer and acceptance.


Question: In a bilateral contract, is the start of performance considered acceptance and treated as an implied contract?

Answer: Yes. In a bilateral contract, the start of performance is considered acceptance and treated as an implied contract because it shows intent to be bound by the contract terms.


Question: If acceptance of a contract is conditioned upon assent to new terms, is this a counter-offer?

Answer: Yes. If acceptance of a contract is conditioned upon assent to new terms, this is a counter-offer because it proposes different terms than those in the original offer.


Question: Does an offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment normally invite acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or prompt shipment?

Answer: Yes. An offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment normally invites acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or prompt shipment because it shows readiness to contract.


Question: If a Seller seasonally warns the Buyer that the shipment of nonconforming goods is being offered as an accommodation, is the shipment a counter-offer and not an acceptance?

Answer: Yes. If a Seller seasonally warns the Buyer that the shipment of nonconforming goods is being offered as an accommodation, the shipment is a counter-offer and not an acceptance because it indicates the Seller's intent to propose different terms.


Question: Are the terms of a lifetime employment contract unenforceable if the salary is not agreed upon?

Answer: Yes. The terms of a lifetime employment contract are unenforceable if the salary is not agreed upon because an essential/material term has been left out of the contract.


Question: For there to be a valid and enforceable contract, must there be a meeting of the minds between the contracting parties on all the essential terms and conditions of the contract?

Answer: Yes. For there to be a valid and enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the contracting parties on all the essential terms and conditions of the contract because agreement on all material terms is necessary.


Question: Is there no enforceable contract if its terms are vague, indefinite or incomplete in respect to any material fact or condition, or as long as any essential element is left for future negotiations?

Answer: Yes. There is no enforceable contract if its terms are vague, indefinite or incomplete in respect to any material fact or condition, or as long as any essential element is left for future negotiations because the lack of definite terms prevents the formation of a binding agreement.


Question: If there is a dispute over a missing term in a contract and both parties ask the court to supply the term, will the court supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances?

Answer: Yes. If there is a dispute over a missing term in a contract and both parties ask the court to supply the term, the court will supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances because it ensures the contract is fair and functional.


Question: When parties have entered into a contract that is sufficiently defined but omits an essential term, will the court supply a term as directed by a statute or in the absence of a statutory directive, supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances?

Answer: Yes. When parties have entered into a contract that is sufficiently defined but omits an essential term, the court will supply a term as directed by a statute or in the absence of a statutory directive, supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances because it ensures the contract is workable.


Question: Under the UCC, if the payment and delivery terms are not specified in the contract, is the place of delivery the seller's place of business and payment due upon receipt of the goods?

Answer: Yes. Under the UCC, if the payment and delivery terms are not specified in the contract, the place of delivery is the seller's place of business and payment is due upon receipt of the goods because these are the default terms.


Question: If an offeree accepts an offer at a certain quantity, is the offer considered terminated if the offeree subsequently seeks to accept the offer for additional quantities?

Answer: Yes. If an offeree accepts an offer at a certain quantity, the offer may be considered terminated if the offeree subsequently seeks to accept the offer for additional quantities because the initial acceptance concludes the offer.


Question: If a written agreement to purchase land only refers to the land as "two acres of the land," is a defense to specific performance of the agreement that the description of the property to be sold is too indefinite to permit the remedy of specific performance?

Answer: Yes. If a written agreement to purchase land only refers to the land as "two acres of the land," a defense to specific performance of the agreement is that the description of the property to be sold is too indefinite to permit the remedy of specific performance because the property must be clearly identified.


Question: Does a promise to buy a product and pay $100 "as soon as I am able" create a binding contract?

Answer: Yes, it creates a binding contract because it imposes a condition precedent that requires the buyer to pay once able to do so.


Question: Does language in a contract that imposes a condition precedent on the obligation make the contract illusory?

Answer: No. Language in a contract that imposes a condition precedent on the obligation does not make the contract illusory because it sets a clear requirement for performance.


Question: Is a promise illusory if by its terms the promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances?

Answer: Yes, because it lacks a binding obligation.


Question: Is an offer that contains a reservation of the right to cancel illusory and thus no contract is formed?

Answer: Yes. An offer that contains a reservation of the right to cancel is illusory because it does not bind the promisor to perform.


Question: Is a contract illusory if the contract does not specify the person you are buying from?

Answer: Yes. A contract is illusory if the contract does not specify the person you are buying from because it lacks a definite promise from the seller.


Question: A general contractor mere use of a subcontractor's bid while bidding on a prime contract. Does this constitute acceptance of the subcontractor's bid and impose an obligation upon the prime contractor to accept it?

Answer: No. The mere use of a subcontractor's bid by a general contractor does not constitute acceptance of the subcontractor's bid because it imposes no obligation upon the prime contractor to accept the subcontractor's bid.


Question: A potential subcontractor spends time and expense to prepare and submit a bid on the condition that it be accepted if it is the low bid, and the general contractor is awarded the prime contract. Is this sufficient consideration to create an implied contract?

Answer: Yes. If a potential subcontractor spends time and expense to prepare and submit a bid on the condition that the bid be accepted if it is the low bid and the general contractor is awarded the prime contract, this is sufficient consideration to create an implied contract because it shows reliance and a bargained-for exchange.


Question: If a trash collector modifies a contract because of an unforeseen increase in the population of the city he services, is the second contract enforceable?

Answer: Yes. If a trash collector modifies a contract because of an unforeseen increase in the population of the city he services, the second contract is enforceable because the modification is fair and equitable in view of unanticipated circumstances.


Question: Is the pre-existing legal duty rule inapplicable to a modification of an ongoing contract if the modification is based on unanticipated circumstances and is fair and equitable in view of the circumstances?

Answer: Yes. The pre-existing legal duty rule is inapplicable to a modification of an ongoing contract if the modification is based on unanticipated circumstances and is fair and equitable in view of the circumstances because it allows for adjustments due to unforeseen events.


Question: Are promises to make a gift in the future usually unenforceable since there is no tangible consideration?

Answer: Yes. Promises to make a gift in the future are usually unenforceable since there is no tangible consideration because they lack a bargained-for exchange.


Question: If a man gratuitously promises to give his friend a boat in writing and the friend writes back promising to give him a fishing pole, but the man refuses to deliver the boat when the friend visits him to deliver the fishing pole, is there an enforceable contract?

Answer: No. There is no enforceable contract because there was no bargained-for exchange or consideration to support the man's promise as he did not seek a return promise or performance when he gratuitously promised to give his boat.


Question: If a creditor agrees to forebear on a liquidated and undisputed debt, is the agreement enforceable without additional consideration from the debtor?

Answer: No. If a creditor agrees to forebear on a liquidated and undisputed debt, the agreement is not enforceable unless it is supported by consideration from the debtor because forbearance alone is not sufficient consideration.


Question: Is performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute considered as consideration?

Answer: No. Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration because it does not reflect a bargained-for exchange.


Question: Under the common law, are any subsequent modifications to a contract, such as agreeing to more work or to do less work, not valid unless there is consideration by the other party?

Answer: Yes. Under the common law, any subsequent modifications to a contract, such as agreeing to more work or to do less work, are not valid unless there is consideration by the other party because consideration is required for contract modifications to be enforceable.


Question: Is an agreement with a lender to extend the amount of time to pay the debt valid without consideration?

Answer: No. An agreement with a lender to extend the amount of time to pay the debt is not valid without consideration because consideration is necessary for contract modifications to be enforceable.


Question: Is a debtor's promise to pay a debt which is barred by the running of the statute of limitations enforceable despite a lack of consideration if there is part payment by the debtor or an express promise in writing, signed by the debtor?

Answer: Yes. A debtor's promise to pay a debt which is barred by the running of the statute of limitations is enforceable despite a lack of consideration if there is part payment by the debtor or an express promise in writing, signed by the debtor because these actions revive the debt.


Question: Can there be accord and satisfaction when a debt is liquidated and undisputed?

Answer: No. When a debt is liquidated and undisputed, there can be no accord and satisfaction because no consideration supports the obligee's acceptance of a lesser performance.


Question: Is a conditional promise valid consideration no matter how remote the contingency, unless the condition is completely within the promisor's control?

Answer: Yes. A conditional promise is valid consideration no matter how remote the contingency, unless the condition is completely within the promisor's control because it reflects a bargained-for exchange.


Question: Can a one-sided contract where the consideration is woefully inadequate be regarded as unconscionable and not be enforced by a court?

Answer: Yes. A one-sided contract where the consideration is woefully inadequate can be regarded as unconscionable and will not be enforced by a court because it is deemed unfair and unjust.


Question: Is a written agreement to purchase an interest in property by quitclaim deed that was bargained for and supported by consideration a valid contract, even if the property has no value?

Answer: Yes. A written agreement to purchase an interest in property by quitclaim deed that was bargained for and supported by consideration is a valid contract, even if the property has no value because consideration is present.


Question: Is consideration value paid for a promise?

Answer: Yes. Consideration is value paid for a promise because it represents a bargained-for exchange between the parties.


Question: Is the act of saving a person's life generally not considered consideration unless there is a definite and substantial material benefit to the promisor?

Answer: Yes. The act of saving a person's life is generally not considered consideration unless there is a definite and substantial material benefit to the promisor because it does not typically involve a bargained-for exchange.


Question: Is a defense to a promise to pay the debts of another lack of consideration?

Answer: Yes. A defense to a promise to pay the debts of another is lack of consideration because consideration is required for a promise to be enforceable.


Question: In a unilateral contract, is performance of a request sufficient consideration if it is a bargained-for exchange, and either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor?

Answer: Yes. In a unilateral contract, performance of a request is sufficient consideration if it is a bargained-for exchange, and either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor because it constitutes acceptance of the offer.


Question: In a requirements contract, are the parties' mutual promises sufficient consideration?

Answer: Yes. In a requirements contract, the parties' mutual promises are sufficient consideration because they create binding obligations on both parties.


Question: Under the modern view, does the pre-existing duty rule apply if the duty is owed to a third person?

Answer: No. Under the modern view, the pre-existing duty rule does not apply if the duty is owed to a third person because the performance benefits a third party.


Question: If a general contractor and subcontractor sign a contract where the subcontractor will install a roof for $20,000 but the subcontractor realizes he miscalculated the square footage and should have quoted $30,000, is the contract modification to $25,000 valid if agreed upon by both parties?

Answer: Yes. If a general contractor and subcontractor sign a contract where the subcontractor will install a roof for $20,000 but the subcontractor realizes he miscalculated the square footage and should have quoted $30,000, the contract modification to $25,000 is valid if agreed upon by both parties because the modification is fair and equitable under the circumstances.


Question: Is a promise modifying a contract binding if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties?

Answer: Yes. A promise modifying a contract is binding if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties because it allows for adjustments due to unforeseen events.


Question: Under the common law, is a modification of a contract itself a contract which is unenforceable unless supported by consideration?

Answer: Yes. Under the common law, modification of a contract is itself a contract, which is unenforceable unless supported by consideration because consideration is necessary for contract modifications to be valid.


Question: Does the common law have two requirements for the modification of a contract: mutual consent and consideration?

Answer: Yes. The common law has two requirements for the modification of a contract: mutual consent and consideration because both parties must agree to the changes and there must be something of value exchanged.


Question: If O and A agree that O will give land to A if A agrees to give $100,000 to B when O dies, and then O transfers the land to A and tells A to split the $100,000 between B and C, is C entitled to anything if A refuses?

Answer: No. If O and A agree that O will give land to A if A agrees to give $100,000 to B when O dies, and then O transfers the land to A and tells A to split the $100,000 between B and C, C is not entitled to anything if A refuses because A did not consent to the modification of the contract and there was no additional consideration.


Question: In the absence of a statute requiring contract modifications to be in writing, can a written contract be modified by a subsequent oral agreement even if the contract itself prohibits subsequent oral modifications?

Answer: Yes. A written contract can be modified by a subsequent oral agreement even if the contract itself prohibits subsequent oral modifications because the parties can agree to change the terms.


Question: Once the parties agree to a modification of their contract, can either party cancel the modification with the intent of restoring the old contract without the consent of both parties?

Answer: No. Once the parties agree to a modification of their contract, neither party may cancel the modification with the intent of restoring the old contract without the consent of both parties because mutual agreement is required for changes.


Question: Under the common law, does a modification need additional consideration to be enforceable?

Answer: Yes. Under the common law, a modification needs additional consideration to be enforceable because consideration is required for contract changes to be valid.


Question: Under the UCC, are all modifications (oral or written) binding without consideration?

Answer: Yes. Under the UCC, all modifications (oral or written) are binding without consideration because the UCC allows for flexibility in contract changes.


Question: If a party to a contract has a good faith dispute over the performance of the contract, is an oral agreement to a settlement enforceable if the disputing party pays?

Answer: Yes. If a party to a contract has a good faith dispute over the performance of the contract, an oral agreement to a settlement is enforceable if the disputing party pays because the accord becomes effective and each party surrenders its respective claim as to how much is owed.


Question: Is a subsequent modification to an enforceable UCC contract valid without the acceptance of the other party?

Answer: No. A subsequent modification to an enforceable UCC contract is not valid if it is not accepted by the other party because mutual agreement is necessary for contract changes.


Question: Under the UCC, is a subsequent oral modification to a contract valid despite the lack of any consideration so long as it is done in good faith?

Answer: Yes. Under the UCC, a subsequent oral modification to a contract is valid despite the lack of any consideration so long as it is done in good faith because the UCC permits flexible contract changes.


Question: If the debtor in good faith reasonably disputes his liability or the amount of that liability, is a settlement by which the creditor agrees to take less than he thinks is due enforceable as an accord and satisfaction?

Answer: Yes. If the debtor in good faith reasonably disputes his liability or the amount of that liability, a settlement by which the creditor agrees to take less than he thinks is due is enforceable as an accord and satisfaction because it resolves the dispute with mutual agreement.


Question: Is an offer to pay for certain daily activity for each day's work actually performed considered a series of daily unilateral contracts?

Answer: Yes. An offer to pay for certain daily activity for each day's work actually performed is considered a series of daily unilateral contracts because each day's work creates a new contract.


Question: Is a promise to pay the debt of another if the creditor promises not to file an action against the debtor a valid agreement supported by a bargained-for exchange?

Answer: Yes. A promise to pay the debt of another if the creditor promises not to file an action against the debtor is a valid agreement supported by a bargained-for exchange because it involves consideration.


Question: A party makes a promise not to sue in exchange for a return benefit. Later, grounds to sue arise, and the claim is either valid or the parties reasonably believe it is valid. Is this valid consideration?

Answer: Yes. A promise not to sue made in exchange for some return benefit is valid consideration if the claim was valid, or if the claim was not valid but the parties reasonably believed the claim was valid because it involves a bargained-for exchange.


Question: Can a compromise to a dispute over a debt establish an accord and satisfaction so long as both parties acted in good faith?

Answer: Yes. A compromise to a dispute over a debt can establish an accord and satisfaction so long as both parties acted in good faith because it resolves the dispute mutually.


Question: Can a compromise of an honest dispute establish an accord and satisfaction?

Answer: Yes. A compromise of an honest dispute can establish an accord and satisfaction because it resolves the dispute mutually.


Question: Will a subsequent contractual term added to an invoice be enforced if there has already been an offer and acceptance?

Answer: No. A subsequent contractual term added to an invoice will not be enforced if there has already been an offer and acceptance because the contract is already formed.


Question: If you cash a check marked payment in full without objection, will you lose if you sue over the debt based on an unpaid sum owed?

Answer: Yes. If you cash a check marked payment in full without objection, you will lose if you sue over the debt based on an unpaid sum owed because this constitutes an accord and satisfaction.


Question: Is a non-UCC oral contract modification allowed as a compromise to an honest dispute?

Answer: Yes. A non-UCC oral contract modification is allowed as a compromise to an honest dispute because it can resolve the dispute mutually.


Question: Under the UCC, is a modification to a contract allowed if the written contract stipulates that modifications are not allowed?

Answer: No. Under the UCC, a modification to a contract is not allowed if the written contract stipulates that modifications are not allowed unless the parties waive the non-waiver clause by subsequent agreement.


Question: If O and A agree that O will pay $2,000 to A to prepare a survey of O's land and A will use his best efforts to obtain approval of a zoning change based on the survey, is O obligated to pay $2,000 to A if A completes the survey but fails to obtain the approval?

Answer: Yes. If O and A agree that O will pay $2,000 to A to prepare a survey of O's land and A will use his best efforts to obtain approval of a zoning change based on the survey, O is obligated to pay $2,000 to A if A completes the survey but fails to obtain the approval because A tried conscientiously but unsuccessfully to secure the approval.


Question: Is a promise in a contract that is subject to some degree of discretion but not broad enough to negate commitment considered illusory?

Answer: No. A promise in a contract that is subject to some degree of discretion but not broad enough to negate commitment is not considered illusory because the court implies a promise to use best efforts to impose a detriment on the party with the discretion and cure the lack of commitment.


Question: If a retailer enters into a distribution agreement to sell a distributor's widgets, which states that any order placed by the retailer will not be binding on the distributor unless expressly accepted by the distributor, is it a breach of contract if the distributor decides not to fill orders after filling orders for years?

Answer: No. If a retailer enters into a distribution agreement to sell a distributor's widgets, which states that any order placed by the retailer will not be binding on the distributor unless expressly accepted by the distributor, it is not a breach of contract if the distributor decides not to fill orders after filling orders for years because the retailer's forwarding of orders to the distributor did not give rise to an obligation on the distributor's part to fill the orders.


Question: If an agreement uses clear language indicating that the offeror's assent is expressly conditional on the offeror's agreement to the terms of the offeree's document, will the acceptance be treated as expressly conditional?

Answer: Yes. If an agreement uses clear language indicating that the offeror's assent is expressly conditional on the offeror's agreement to the terms of the offeree's document, the acceptance will be treated as expressly conditional because it makes the offeror's agreement dependent on the offeree's terms.


Question: Is a condition in a contract an event that must occur before performance under the contract becomes due?

Answer: Yes. A condition in a contract is an event that must occur before performance under the contract becomes due because it determines when the contractual obligations must be fulfilled.


Question: Can a condition in a contract be waived by silence or acceptance of the proffered performance?

Answer: No. A condition in a contract may be waived, but silence or acceptance of the proffered performance is not enough to imply a waiver because waiver requires a clear and unequivocal act.


Question: If a book contract includes a condition that the author must abstain from drinking alcohol during the two months it will take to write the book, does the publisher's failure to object and acceptance of the work constitute an express waiver if the author drinks while writing?

Answer: Yes. If a book contract includes a condition that the author must abstain from drinking alcohol during the two months it will take to write the book, the publisher's failure to object and acceptance of the work constitutes an express waiver if the author drinks while writing because the publisher's acceptance of the work without objection implies waiver of the condition.


Question: If a condition is deemed waived, can it be reinstated?

Answer: No. If a condition is deemed waived, it cannot be reinstated because the waiver releases the other party from the obligation of that term.


Question: Can a contract condition be premised on one party's satisfaction with the other's results?

Answer: Yes. A contract condition can be premised on one party's satisfaction with the other's results because it sets the standard for performance based on the party's approval.


Question: If a homeowner contracts with a builder to renovate his bathroom for $50,000 "subject to the homeowner's complete personal satisfaction," does the builder have a cause of action against the homeowner if the homeowner is genuinely dissatisfied with the work and pays only $40,000?

Answer: No. If a homeowner contracts with a builder to renovate his bathroom for $50,000 "subject to the homeowner's complete personal satisfaction," the builder has no cause of action against the homeowner if the homeowner is genuinely dissatisfied with the work and pays only $40,000 because the condition to the homeowner's obligation to pay was not satisfied.


Question: Is good faith dissatisfaction generally needed to declare a satisfaction clause violated?

Answer: Yes. Good faith dissatisfaction is generally needed to declare a satisfaction clause violated because it requires an honest and reasonable expression of dissatisfaction.