Question: Can an intended beneficiary sue for payment if the promisee has fulfilled his side of the contract and the other side has not paid?

Answer: Yes. An intended beneficiary can sue for payment if the promisee has fulfilled his side of the contract and the other side has not paid because the beneficiary has enforceable rights under the contract.


Question: Does an incidental beneficiary have rights under the contract?

Answer: No. An incidental beneficiary has no rights under the contract because they are not intended beneficiaries.


Question: Can third-party beneficiaries enforce a contract if they are donee or creditor beneficiaries?

Answer: Yes. Under American Law, third-party beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the contract if they are donee beneficiaries or creditor beneficiaries because the promisee intended to confer a benefit on them.


Question: Does an incidental beneficiary have rights under the contract?

Answer: No. An incidental beneficiary is not named in the contract and has no rights under the contract because they are not intended beneficiaries.


Question: If a contract is conditioned on the satisfaction of a third person, what is the test for satisfaction?

Answer: The test is subjective, and the only question is whether the third person honestly believed that the contract was satisfied because the opinions of other reasonable persons are not relevant.


Question: Does a direct promise need to be made to an intended third party beneficiary for that beneficiary to successfully enforce the contract?

Answer: No. A direct promise does not need to be made to an intended third party beneficiary in order for that beneficiary to successfully enforce the contract because the third party beneficiary need not be identifiable at the time the contract is formed.


Question: When does the vesting of third-party beneficiary rights occur?

Answer: The vesting of third-party beneficiary rights occurs when the beneficiary learns of the contract and assents to it, there is reliance by the beneficiary, or the intended beneficiary sues on the contract because these actions establish the beneficiary's enforceable rights.


Question: Can parties to a contract limit the assignment of rights and delegation of duties under the contract?

Answer: Yes. The parties to a contract can limit both the assignment of rights and the delegation of duties under the contract because they can control how the contract is performed and enforced.


Question: What is an assignment in a contract?

Answer: An assignment is a manifestation of intent of the owner of a right to effectuate a present transfer of the right because it indicates the intent to transfer the right immediately.


Question: If a promisor delegates a duty of performance to a delegatee whose performance is defective, who can the promisee sue?

Answer: The promisee can sue the promisor for damages if he has not released the promisor and can also sue the delegatee because the promisee is an intended beneficiary of the promisor-delegatee contract.


Question: What can an assignor assign in a contract?

Answer: An assignor can assign only the contract rights it actually has, and the assignee stands in the shoes of its assignor and takes subject to those liabilities of its assignor that were in existence at the time of the assignment because the assignee's rights and obligations are derivative of the assignor's.


Question: Is a delegator liable if a delegatee breaches unless there is a novation?

Answer: Yes. A delegator is liable if a delegatee breaches unless there is a novation that discharges the delegator's duties because the delegator remains responsible for the performance of the contract.


Question: Can a contract that requires performance of a personal nature involving reputation, taste, and skill be assigned or delegated to another person?

Answer: No. A contract that requires performance of a personal nature involving reputation, taste, and skill cannot be assigned or delegated to another person unless there is an agreement that permits delegation of these personal duties because such contracts depend on the specific qualities of the original party.


Question: Can an assignee enforce the assignment if the assignee did not know the contract has an anti-assignment clause?

Answer: Yes. The assignee can enforce the assignment if the assignee did not know the contract has an anti-assignment clause because the clause only prevents delegating one's duties to another party.


Question: If an assignee fails to perform, who can the obligor sue?

Answer: The obligor can sue the assignor if an assignee fails to perform because the assignor remains liable for the performance of the contract.


Question: Are contract terms that restrict the right to assign invalid if the assignee is a BFP who is ignorant of the prohibition term?

Answer: Yes. Contract terms that restrict the right to assign are invalid if the assignee is a BFP who is ignorant of the prohibition term because the assignment is still effective, but the obligator can bring suit against the assignor for breach of the covenant not to assign.


Question: Does a contract involving personal taste follow a subjective standard?

Answer: Yes. A contract involving personal taste follows a subjective standard because if you subjectively don't like it, it is a defense to the contract.


Question: A contract is assigned. Who is liable for damages caused by the assignee's default?

Answer: The assignor is liable for damages caused by the assignee's default, and the assignee is likewise liable for damages due to his default because both parties are responsible for fulfilling the contract's obligations.


Question: A delegation of duties materially alters the performance and creates a significant risk of diminishing the profits. Is this delegation regarded as an anticipatory repudiation of the contract?

Answer: Yes. A delegation of duties that materially alters the performance and creates a significant risk of diminishing the profits is regarded as an anticipatory repudiation of the contract because the party is unqualified, making the delegation actionable.


Question: A enters into a contract with B, and then A assigns the contract to C. If B pays A, who is liable to C for the payment?

Answer: A is liable to C for the payment because A assigned the contract to C and is responsible for transferring the payment to C.


Question: There is no clause to the contrary. Is the assignment of a contract to a person of comparable experience and reputation permitted?

Answer: Yes. The assignment of a contract to a person of comparable experience and reputation is permitted if there is no clause to the contrary because the other party must accept performance.


Question: A general assignment is made for the purpose of giving collateral to the assignee in return for a loan. Will the lender normally be deemed to have undertaken to perform the assignor's duties?

Answer: No. A lender will not normally be deemed to have undertaken to perform the assignor's duties if a general assignment is made for the purpose of giving collateral to the assignee in return for a loan because the lender is not responsible for the assignor's performance.


Question: Can an obligor sue an assignor for wrongful assignment?

Answer: Yes. An obligor can sue an assignor for wrongful assignment because the assignor is responsible for ensuring the assignment is valid and proper.


Question: Is an assignment valid if there is no clear intent from the assignor to transfer his rights completely and immediately to a third party?

Answer: No. An assignment is not valid if there is no clear intent from the assignor to transfer his rights completely and immediately to a third party because the assignment requires a present transfer of rights.


Question: A symbol of the assignment such as a bank book has been transferred to the assignee. Can the assignment be revoked?

Answer: No. An assignment cannot be revoked if a symbol of the assignment such as a bank book has been transferred to the assignee because the transfer of the symbol solidifies the assignment.


Question: The performance of a duty is delegated. Does the delegator remain liable?

Answer: Yes. The delegator remains liable when the performance of a duty is delegated because the original party to the contract retains responsibility for ensuring performance.


Question: Is a gratuitous assignment revoked if it is given to someone else?

Answer: Yes. A gratuitous assignment is revoked if it is given to someone else because the assignment is not supported by consideration and can be freely revoked.


Question: A party to a contract delegates his duties to another. Does the original party remain liable on his contract?

Answer: Yes. The original party remains liable on his contract when he delegates his duties to another because the original party retains responsibility for performance. The person owed can sue both the delegator and the delegatee at the same time.


Question: Does a subassignee have rights against the original assignor?

Answer: No. A subassignee does not have rights against the original assignor because there is no privity of contract between the subassignee and the original assignor.


Question: A contract explicitly provides that it cannot be assigned without approval. If the contract is assigned without approval, is it still valid?

Answer: Yes. A contract is still valid if it is assigned without approval despite an explicit provision requiring approval for assignment because the assignor is liable for breach of a condition, but the assignment remains effective.


Question: What is the best evidence that a party's duties under the contract were not delegable?

Answer: An exculpatory clause is the best evidence that a party's duties under the contract were not delegable because it explicitly limits delegation of duties.


Question: Are personal service contracts assignable?

Answer: No. Personal service contracts are not assignable because they depend on the unique qualities and abilities of the individual performing the service.


Question: Are long term requirements contracts assignable?

Answer: No. Long term requirements contracts are not assignable because they involve ongoing performance and obligations that are specific to the original parties.


Question: Can a gratuitous assignment be revoked even if the assignee knows about the assignment?

Answer: Yes. A gratuitous assignment can be revoked even if the assignee knows about the assignment because the assignment lacks consideration and can be freely revoked.


Question: Can the police conduct a warrantless search and seizure of historical cell phone records revealing the location of a cell phone user?

Answer: No. The police cannot conduct a warrantless search and seizure of historical cell phone records revealing the location of a cell phone user because it infringes on the user's reasonable expectation of privacy, violating the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding accessing historical cell phone location records from a user's mobile service provider?

Answer: Yes. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding accessing historical cell phone location records from a user's mobile service provider because cellular phone data revealing a person's physical location is not information that one would be aware was being conveyed to a third party.


Question: A state takes DNA samples from people who are arrested but not yet convicted of a serious crime. Is this a Fourth Amendment violation?

Answer: No. This is not a Fourth Amendment violation because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant.


Question: Is it a Fourth Amendment violation to check if DNA matches any samples from unsolved crimes in a national database?

Answer: No. It is not a Fourth Amendment violation to check if DNA matches any samples from unsolved crimes in a national database because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant.


Question: Will the Fourth Amendment prevent police officers from aiding somebody in imminent danger under the emergency aid doctrine?

Answer: No. The Fourth Amendment will not prevent police officers from aiding somebody in imminent danger under the emergency aid doctrine because the police may constitutionally enter protected areas without a warrant if three requirements are met: (1) the existence of an emergency as viewed objectively; (2) a search not motivated by a desire to find evidence; and (3) a nexus between the search and the emergency.


Question: What permits warrantless entries into dwellings or other constitutionally protected areas where extreme circumstances render the procurement of a warrant unreasonable?

Answer: The exigent circumstances doctrine permits warrantless entries into dwellings or other constitutionally protected areas where extreme circumstances render the procurement of a warrant unreasonable because it includes situations like imminent destruction of evidence, public or police safety, hot pursuit of a suspect, and imminent flight of a suspect.


Question: What is the plain view doctrine?

Answer: The plain view doctrine allows items that are within the sight of an officer who is legally in a place from which the view is made, and who had no prior knowledge that the items were present, to be properly seized without a warrant as long as the items are immediately recognizable as subject to seizure. However, the police may not manipulate objects to ascertain evidentiary value because doing so would take the objects out of plain view.


Question: If a defendant is arrested in his residence pursuant to an arrest warrant, can the police launch a protective sweep of the residence?

Answer: Yes. The police can launch a protective sweep of the residence if they have a specific suspicion that people may be hiding and an attack could be launched because the search must last no longer than necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and must be limited to where people may be hiding.


Question: Is it a Fourth Amendment search or seizure for police to examine garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home?

Answer: No. It is not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure for police to examine garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such garbage.


Question: If officers have probable cause to believe that drug dealing is routinely taking place in a particular room at a local motel, and they hear running water and a toilet flushing after knocking on the door, are exigent circumstances present?

Answer: Yes. Exigent circumstances are present because the drugs can easily be destroyed, justifying a warrantless entry.


Question: Is a warrant needed to enter private property to conduct a search unless exigent circumstances justify immediate action?

Answer: Yes. A warrant is needed to enter private property to conduct a search unless exigent circumstances justify immediate action. Exigent circumstances include situations where there is an imminent danger to officers or others, the crime has just occurred, evidence is at risk of being destroyed, or the suspect may escape if the police delay to obtain a warrant.


Question: When does the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement generally not apply?

Answer: The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement generally does not apply when only a minor crime has been committed because the seriousness of the offense and the dangers posed by waiting until a warrant is secured are important considerations.


Question: Can a stop of a driver be based upon a minor traffic violation that served as a pretext for some other ulterior motive?

Answer: Yes. A stop of a driver can be based upon a minor traffic violation that served as a pretext for some other ulterior motive because the stop is still considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.


Question: If a police officer stops a car going 3 mph over the speed limit due to suspicion of drug dealing, and sees a small bag of heroin in plain view, can the officer arrest the driver and passenger?

Answer: Yes. The police officer can arrest both the driver and passenger because the traffic stop and the officer's order to exit the car do not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.


Question: Is a stop of a vehicle constitutional if there is probable cause to stop the vehicle, regardless of the officer's subjective motive?

Answer: Yes. A stop of a vehicle is constitutional if there is probable cause to stop the vehicle, regardless of the officer's subjective motive because the stop is based on an objective standard of probable cause.


Question: A police officer, with a valid arrest warrant, finds a defendant's house unoccupied with doors boarded up and a neighbor stating the house has been empty for months. If the officer forcibly enters and finds cocaine on a table, is the cocaine admissible?

Answer: No. The cocaine is not admissible because the forcible entry in executing the arrest warrant was only authorized if the police reasonably believed, at the time of entry, that the defendant was at the location.


Question: Does an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carry the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within the dwelling?

Answer: Yes. An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within the dwelling because circumstances must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect's home and that he is within the residence at the time of entry.


Question: A police officer responds to an emergency call and sees a bleeding man on the floor through an open window. If the officer enters the house and finds a bag of cocaine on a bed nearby, is the evidence admissible?

Answer: Yes. The evidence is admissible because the contraband was found in plain view during the duration of the emergency.


Question: Can police conduct an exploratory search for contraband during an emergency once they are inside a home without a warrant?

Answer: No. Police cannot conduct an exploratory search for contraband during an emergency once they are inside a home without a warrant. They can only seize contraband found in plain view during the duration of the emergency.


Question: If the police officer searches for additional contraband by opening drawers after finding a bleeding man, is any contraband found admissible?

Answer: No. Any contraband found is inadmissible because the officer exceeded the scope of the warrantless search permissible under the circumstances.


Question: Can a police officer enter the hotel room of a suspect without a warrant if no exception such as consent or exigent circumstances exists?

Answer: No. A police officer cannot enter the hotel room of a suspect without a warrant if no exception such as consent or exigent circumstances exists because such an entry would violate the Fourth Amendment.


Question: A search warrant is issued for a specific object. Once the object is discovered, is a further exploratory search of the house justified?

Answer: No. A further exploratory search of the house is not justified once the specific object is discovered because continuing the search beyond the scope of the warrant violates the Fourth Amendment.


Question: If a search warrant is issued for a gun and it is found in a dresser, is finding an illegal object in a footlocker in the house a violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Answer: Yes. Finding an illegal object in a footlocker in the house is a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the search exceeded the scope of the warrant once the gun was found.


Question: Does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy to activities conducted in the home that are in full view of the neighbors?

Answer: No. A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to activities conducted in the home that are in full view of the neighbors because such activities are visible to the public, even if the police trespass onto the neighbor's property to observe those activities.


Question: If a defendant consents to a search of his home, is evidence found pursuant to the warrantless search admissible?

Answer: Yes. Evidence found pursuant to the warrantless search is admissible if the police officer reasonably believed that the defendant had actual or apparent authority over the premises when viewed objectively from the officer's perspective.


Question: Does the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply when evidence is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment due to clerical errors by court personnel?

Answer: Yes. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when evidence is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment due to clerical errors by court personnel because the police acted in good faith reliance on the validity of the warrant.


Question: Is the search of a car incident to arrest valid if the police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest?

Answer: Yes. The search of a car incident to arrest is valid if the police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest because it falls within the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest.


Question: When is a private citizen considered a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes?

Answer: A private citizen is considered a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes when the government knows of and acquiesces to the private search and the citizen acts to assist law enforcement because their actions are effectively on behalf of the government.


Question: If a defendant is arrested based on probable cause, is a warrantless search valid if it is reasonable in scope and made incident to the arrest?

Answer: Yes. A warrantless search is valid if it is reasonable in scope and made incident to the arrest because it is justified by the need to ensure officer safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.


Question: Does a landowner have an expectation of privacy in open fields that he owns, even if the fields are fenced and the police breach the fence?

Answer: No. A landowner does not have an expectation of privacy in open fields that he owns, even if the fields are fenced and the police breach the fence because open fields are not considered part of the curtilage of the home and are therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Do police have the authority to stop a person who is in a known drug area and who walks away from the police?

Answer: Yes. Police have the authority to stop a person who is in a known drug area and who walks away from the police because such behavior can be considered suspicious and justify a brief investigatory stop.


Question: Can a defendant charged with receiving stolen property suppress the evidence recovered if the basis for the search was a statute that deals reasonably with a highly regulated industry?

Answer: No. A defendant charged with receiving stolen property cannot suppress the evidence recovered if the basis for the search was a statute that deals reasonably with a highly regulated industry because such searches are considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Can a criminal wanted for a felony be arrested without a warrant?

Answer: Yes. A criminal wanted for a felony can be arrested without a warrant because the severity of the crime justifies a warrantless arrest under the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Does looking inside boxes in closets exceed the scope of a limited protective sweep for persons hiding in a house that may present a danger to police officers?

Answer: Yes. Looking inside boxes in closets exceeds the scope of a limited protective sweep for persons hiding in a house that may present a danger to police officers because such a search goes beyond what is necessary to ensure officer safety.


Question: Does a short-term guest in a home have an expectation of privacy if the homeowner allows the police into the home to search for the guest who is also a felon?

Answer: No. A short-term guest in a home does not have an expectation of privacy if the homeowner allows the police into the home to search for the guest who is also a felon because the guest's privacy interest is limited and does not extend to overriding the homeowner's consent.


Question: Does a tenant have standing to challenge the search of his apartment, even if he had not paid the rent and was in jail at the time of the search?

Answer: Yes. A tenant has standing to challenge the search of his apartment, even if he had not paid the rent and was in jail at the time of the search because the tenant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.


Question: Does a landlord's consent to a police officer's search of a defendant's apartment constitute a waiver of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights?

Answer: No. A landlord's consent to a police officer's search of a defendant's apartment does not constitute a waiver of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because the landlord does not have the actual nor apparent authority to permit the entry.


Question: Does police entering a person's backyard without a warrant to search for drugs violate a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy?

Answer: Yes. Police entering a person's backyard without a warrant to search for drugs violates a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy because the backyard is considered part of the curtilage of the home, which is protected under the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Does a college president's consent to a police search of a student's dormitory waive the student's Fourth Amendment rights?

Answer: No. A college president's consent to a police search of a student's dormitory does not waive the student's Fourth Amendment rights because it violates the student's reasonable expectation of privacy.


Question: Is evidence recovered from a search incident to a valid custodial arrest admissible?

Answer: Yes. Evidence recovered from a search incident to a valid custodial arrest is admissible because it falls within the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest.


Question: Can a defendant's bank records be introduced into evidence?

Answer: Yes. The introduction of a defendant's bank records into evidence is permitted because a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in records that are in the possession of a bank.


Question: Is the introduction of a defendant's bank records into evidence permitted?

Answer: Yes. The introduction of a defendant's bank records into evidence is permitted because a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in records that are in the possession of a bank.


Question: Is a search of a person's car valid if someone with sufficient standing and authority consents to the search?

Answer: Yes. A search of a person's car is valid if someone who has sufficient standing and authority consents to the search because such consent provides a lawful basis for the search.


Question: Is randomly stopping cars in a high crime area without reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct constitutional?

Answer: No. Randomly stopping cars in a high crime area without reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct is unconstitutional because it violates the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Without a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct, is randomly stopping cars in a high crime area constitutional?

Answer: No. Without a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct, randomly stopping cars in a high crime area is unconstitutional because it violates the Fourth Amendment.


Question: Must a school principal have probable cause or a warrant to search a student's backpack if the principal is acting as an agent for the police?

Answer: Yes. A school principal must have probable cause or a warrant to search a student's backpack if the principal is acting as an agent for the police because the principal is subject to the same constitutional standards as the police.


Question: A warrant is based on bad information, and the police officer who submitted the warrant application knew the statement was false. Will items seized be suppressed?

Answer: Yes. Items seized will be suppressed if the police officer who submitted the warrant application knew the statement was false because the warrant was obtained through false pretenses.


Question: A parolee is required to meet with a probation officer and answer truthfully all questions on penalty of returning to court for a probation revocation hearing. Are Miranda warnings required?

Answer: No. Miranda warnings are not required because any compulsion felt from the possibility that terminating a meeting would lead to revocation of probation is not comparable to the pressure on a suspect when he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.


Question: Are police officers required to issue Miranda warnings to every person they question?

Answer: No. Police officers are not required to issue Miranda warnings to every person they question. Miranda warnings are only required for a person whose freedom is so restricted as to be in custody and being subjected to custodial interrogation.


Question: If police observe a defendant driving 45 mph in a 25 mph zone and smell alcohol after pulling him over, are the defendant's statements about drinking admissible at trial?

Answer: Yes. The defendant's statements about drinking are admissible at trial because the roadside questioning did not rise to the level of custodial interrogation required for Miranda warnings.


Question: Is there custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings if a police officer engages in legitimate, straightforward, and non-coercive questioning necessary to obtain information to issue a traffic citation?

Answer: No. There is no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings if a police officer engages in legitimate, straightforward, and non-coercive questioning necessary to obtain information to issue a traffic citation because the questioning does not rise to the level of interrogation required for Miranda warnings.


Question: Police observe a defendant driving 45 mph in a 25 mph zone, pull him over, smell alcohol, and ask if he had anything to drink. Can his reply that he consumed four beers be used in his trial for DWI?

Answer: Yes. The statement is admissible at the defendant's trial for DWI because the roadside questioning did not rise to the level of interrogation required for Miranda warnings.


Question: Can police resume interrogations of a defendant who has exercised his Miranda rights during custody without an attorney present?

Answer: No. Police cannot resume interrogations of a defendant who has exercised his Miranda rights during custody without an attorney present because the defendant's Miranda rights carry forward for the duration of custody.


Question: If a defendant has been out of custody for 14 days, must police give a fresh set of Miranda warnings on day 15 to question him again?

Answer: Yes. Police must give a fresh set of Miranda warnings on day 15 to question the defendant again because the break in custody is sufficiently long to have dissipated the coercive effect of the initial interrogation.


Question: What are the exceptions to the rule that police cannot re-Mirandize and re-interrogate a defendant who has previously exercised his right to counsel?

Answer: The exceptions are: (1) the defendant has been released and out of custody for two weeks, or (2) the defendant is in prison, meaning the break in custody is sufficiently long to have dissipated the coercive effect of the initial interrogation.


Question: When a defendant exercises his Miranda rights, can police resume interrogations without an attorney present?

Answer: No. When a defendant exercises his Miranda rights, police cannot resume interrogations without an attorney present unless the defendant has been released and out of custody for two weeks or is in prison.


Question: Does the privilege against self-incrimination apply to corporations?

Answer: No. The privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations because it is a personal privilege that only applies to human beings.


Question: Is the privilege against self-incrimination applicable to corporations?

Answer: No. The privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege which only applies to human beings and does not exist for corporations.


Question: A grand jury witness raises her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to answer a question about her whereabouts on the day of a crime. Can a prosecutor compel the witness to testify by granting her use or derivative-use immunity?

Answer: Yes. A prosecutor can compel the witness to testify by granting her use or derivative-use immunity, which bars the use of her testimony or any evidence derived from it against her, but need not offer her more expansive transactional immunity.


Question: Can a prosecutor compel a grand jury witness to testify by granting use or derivative-use immunity?

Answer: Yes. A prosecutor can compel a grand jury witness to testify by granting use or derivative-use immunity because it bars the use of the testimony or any evidence derived from it against the witness.


Question: Can a prosecutor seek an immunity order from the judge overseeing the grand jury to compel a witness to testify after the witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination?

Answer: Yes. A prosecutor can seek an immunity order from the judge overseeing the grand jury to compel a witness to testify after the witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination because the U.S. Constitution requires only derivative use immunity, which prohibits the government from directly or derivatively using the grand jury testimony against the witness.


Question: A witness refuses to testify by exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during a grand jury proceeding. Is the government required to grant complete immunity from prosecution to compel testimony?

Answer: No. The government is not required to grant complete immunity from prosecution to compel testimony. It must grant at least use immunity, which excludes the witness's testimony or its fruits from being used against him in future prosecutions.


Question: Can a witness be compelled to testify after being granted immunity from prosecution?

Answer: Yes. A witness can be compelled to testify after being granted immunity from prosecution because there is no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination once immunity is granted, even if only use and derivative-use immunity is granted.


Question: If a grand jury witness refuses to answer a question by invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, can the prosecutor compel testimony by granting transactional immunity?

Answer: No. The prosecutor need not offer transactional immunity to compel testimony; use or derivative-use immunity is sufficient protection to require the witness to testify over Fifth Amendment objections.


Question: How is “in custody” determined for Miranda purposes?

Answer: “In custody” is determined by an objective test assessing how a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would perceive his or her freedom to leave. If the police convey that the accused is not free to leave, then that person will be deemed in custody.


Question: Police execute a valid search warrant at 3 A.M. by entering the suspect’s bedroom and immediately interrogating him on a robbery after yelling, “We’ve got you now.” Can the suspect suppress his confession?

Answer: Yes. The suspect can suppress his confession because he was under police custody, deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, and was not given Miranda warnings before the interrogation.


Question: A man who looks like a robbery suspect is stopped by police on the street by a bank and briefly questioned. If the man confesses, is it a violation of the Fourth Amendment or Miranda?

Answer: No. It is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment or Miranda because the brief questioning on the street does not constitute a custodial interrogation.


Question: What is Miranda meant to protect against?

Answer: Miranda is meant to protect against interrogation in an inherently coercive police-dominated environment.


Question: Does compelling a defendant to say the words spoken by a bank robber violate his privilege against self-incrimination?

Answer: No. Compelling a defendant to say the words spoken by a bank robber does not violate his privilege against self-incrimination because the privilege extends only to compelled "testimonial" communications.


Question: Can a grand jury compel the production of a suspect's diary without granting immunity?

Answer: No. A grand jury can only compel the production of a suspect's diary if the suspect is granted immunity to the extent allowed by law, such as use and derivative use immunity for any evidence derived directly or indirectly from the testimonial aspects of the party's immunized testimony.


Question: Is an incriminating statement volunteered by a defendant and not in response to interrogation by the police admissible?

Answer: Yes. An incriminating statement that is volunteered by a defendant and not in response to interrogation by the police is admissible because it was not the result of custodial interrogation.


Question: Police physically restrain a defendant and threaten his family if he doesn't talk. Are incriminating statements made by the defendant voluntary and admissible?

Answer: No. Incriminating statements made by a defendant to police after the police physically restrain the defendant and then threaten the defendant's family if he doesn't talk are not voluntary and therefore inadmissible because the statements were made under duress.


Question: Is it a violation of due process if the prosecution introduces in court the fact that the defendant remained silent while under police questioning?

Answer: Yes. It is a violation of due process if the prosecution introduces in court the fact that the defendant remained silent while under police questioning because post-arrest silence constitutes the defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights.


Question: Are Miranda warnings required in a non-custodial interrogation?

Answer: No. Miranda warnings are not required in a non-custodial interrogation, and an incriminating statement freely made and voluntarily given is admissible.


Question: In a non-custodial interrogation, are Miranda warnings required for an incriminating statement to be admissible?

Answer: No. In a non-custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings are not required and an incriminating statement freely made and voluntarily given is admissible because it was not made under custodial conditions.


Question: Are all fruits of an unlawful arrest suppressed, even if incriminating statements are given after Miranda warnings?

Answer: Yes. All fruits of an unlawful arrest are suppressed, even if incriminating statements are given after Miranda warnings, in order to purge the taint of the illegal arrest.


Question: Are volunteered statements given after Miranda warnings admissible if they are not the result of interrogation?

Answer: Yes. Volunteered statements given after Miranda warnings are admissible because they are not the result of interrogation and are therefore considered voluntary.


Question: Does a waiver of Miranda rights depend upon the nature of the charges that are later filed against the defendant?

Answer: No. A waiver of Miranda rights does not depend upon the nature of the charges that are later filed against the defendant because the waiver is based on the defendant's understanding and voluntary relinquishment of the rights at the time of the waiver.


Question: A defendant states he will talk after Miranda warnings but won't put anything in writing until he has a lawyer. Are the oral statements admissible?

Answer: Yes. The oral statements are admissible because the defendant's conditional willingness to talk does not invalidate the statements made.


Question: Is a grant of “use and derivative use” immunity sufficient to extinguish the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?

Answer: Yes. A grant of “use and derivative use” immunity is sufficient to extinguish the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because it provides adequate protection against the use of the compelled testimony or its derivatives in future prosecutions.


Question: Can a mentally ill person waive his Miranda rights if there was no police coercion?

Answer: Yes. A mentally ill person can waive his Miranda rights so long as there was no police coercion because the waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.


Question: Does an accused have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at an initial appearance?

Answer: No. An accused does not have a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel at an initial appearance because it is not considered a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.


Question: Is a defendant entitled to counsel at a physical lineup that occurs after the defendant has been formally charged?

Answer: Yes. A defendant is entitled to counsel at a physical lineup that occurs after the defendant has been formally charged because it is a critical stage of the proceedings.


Question: Is a defendant entitled to counsel at an initial appearance under the Sixth Amendment?

Answer: No. A defendant is not entitled to counsel at an initial appearance under the Sixth Amendment because it is not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.


Question: Is a defendant entitled to counsel at pre-charge lineups or pre- or post-charge photo identifications?

Answer: No. A defendant is not entitled to counsel at pre-charge lineups or pre- or post-charge photo identifications because these stages do not involve significant rights requiring the presence of counsel.


Question: Under the Sixth Amendment, is an accused entitled to appointed counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings once they are initiated by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment?

Answer: Yes. Under the Sixth Amendment, an accused is entitled to appointed counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings once they are initiated by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment because these stages involve significant rights and the presence of counsel is necessary to ensure a fair trial.


Question: When does an accused have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel?

Answer: An accused is entitled to appointed counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings once they are initiated by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment because these stages involve significant rights of the accused.


Question: Is proof of an out-of-court identification or an in-court identification admissible if the photographic display is impermissibly suggestive?

Answer: Yes. Proof of an out-of-court identification or an in-court identification is admissible if the eyewitness's identification is shown to be reliable under a multi-factor inquiry despite the photographic display being impermissibly suggestive.


Question: What are the two possible challenges to an out-of-court identification?

Answer: The two possible challenges to an out-of-court identification are: (1) defense counsel was not present at the pre-trial confrontation; or (2) the pre-trial confrontation was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.


Question: If a defense lawyer fails to advise a defendant that his guilty plea carries a risk of deportation, is the defendant's counsel considered ineffective?

Answer: Yes. The defendant's counsel is considered ineffective if the defense lawyer fails to advise that a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation because a reasonable lawyer would inform the client of the risk to allow the client to make an informed decision.


Question: Under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, does defense counsel have an affirmative duty to provide correct advice to a non-citizen client about the risk of adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea?

Answer: Yes. Under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, defense counsel has an affirmative duty to provide correct advice to a non-citizen client about the risk of adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea because it allows the client to make an informed decision whether to go to trial.


Question: Defense counsel fails to investigate his client's severely deprived upbringing or present mitigating evidence that may have avoided the death penalty. Is this likely ineffective assistance of counsel?

Answer: Yes. This is likely ineffective assistance of counsel because the failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence constitutes serious errors that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.


Question: What is the two-part standard established in Strickland to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal?

Answer: The two-part standard established in Strickland to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is: (1) the defendant has the burden of proving that his trial lawyer's performance was deficient, which requires showing serious specific errors of a type that a reasonably competent professional would not make; and (2) the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, meaning that counsel's errors were so serious that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.


Question: What must a defendant show to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel?

Answer: To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.


Question: What must a defendant seeking to represent himself be shown?

Answer: A defendant seeking to represent himself must be shown to have an awareness of the magnitude of the task confronting him and the disadvantages of representing himself because merely making the defendant aware of his constitutional right to counsel is insufficient to establish a valid waiver.


Question: A defendant is indicted for murder and raises an insanity defense. The prosecutor hires a forensic psychologist to impersonate a social worker to examine the defendant. Can the prosecutor call the psychologist to testify against the defendant?

Answer: No. The prosecutor cannot call the psychologist to testify against the defendant because it violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel that attached when the defendant was indicted, prohibiting the use of deception to elicit the defendant's statements relating to the crime without the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver.


Question: When does the right to counsel attach after a suspect is indicted?

Answer: The right to counsel attaches after a suspect is indicted, and it is a violation of that right for a secret agent acting on behalf of the government to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the suspect in the absence of counsel.


Question: Miranda warnings are given to a defendant during a custodial interrogation, and the defendant knowingly signs a waiver form. The defendant later states, "I think I need an attorney." Can interrogating officers continue with the interrogation?

Answer: Yes. The interrogating officers can continue with the interrogation because the defendant's statement was ambiguous and did not effectively assert the right to counsel.


Question: What must a suspect under custodial interrogation do to assert his Miranda rights post-waiver effectively?

Answer: A suspect under custodial interrogation must make a clear and unequivocal assertion of his Miranda rights post-waiver because any ambiguity or equivocation will be ineffective.


Question: Does a witness subpoenaed by a grand jury have a constitutional right to counsel inside a grand jury room?

Answer: No. A witness subpoenaed by a grand jury does not have a constitutional right to counsel inside a grand jury room because the constitutional right to advice of counsel does not extend to the grand jury room.


Question: Are statements made by a defendant to a person hired by the defendant's attorney in the course of the legal representation protected by attorney-client privilege?

Answer: Yes. Statements made by a defendant to a person hired by the defendant's attorney in the course of the legal representation are protected by attorney-client privilege because they are made in confidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice.


Question: Is the right to counsel violated if the police have an informant elicit information from a defendant who is in custody and awaiting trial, even if the informant is not interrogating the defendant?

Answer: Yes. The right to counsel is violated because the police are using the informant to elicit information from the defendant without counsel present, infringing on the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.


Question: What duty does due process place upon the prosecution under Brady?

Answer: Under Brady, due process places upon the prosecution a continuing duty to disclose to the defense evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or punishment because such evidence is considered exculpatory.


Question: Where the outcome of a case turns on the credibility of a single prosecution witness, is evidence that adversely impacts his credibility considered Brady material?

Answer: Yes. Evidence that adversely impacts the credibility of a single prosecution witness is considered Brady material because it constitutes exculpatory evidence that could affect the determination of guilt or innocence.


Question: A defendant's attorney attempts to strike a prospective juror for cause because the juror thinks they will be biased. If the judge refuses to dismiss the juror and the attorney uses a peremptory challenge to remove the juror, does the defendant have grounds to appeal if convicted?

Answer: No. The defendant has no grounds to appeal based on the prospective juror because the juror did not serve on the jury.


Question: Is a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges denied or impaired when choosing to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause?

Answer: No. A defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when choosing to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause because the juror did not serve on the jury.


Question: A defendant becomes unruly when a witness is called to testify and is warned by the judge that he will be removed if he persists in his disruptive behavior. If the defendant continues to behave disruptively, does he lose his right to be present at his own trial?

Answer: Yes. The defendant loses his right to be present at his own trial because his behavior precludes an orderly trial.


Question: Can the Sixth Amendment right to be present at one's own trial be forfeited?

Answer: Yes. The Sixth Amendment right to be present at one's own trial may be forfeited by disruptive behavior or the accused's voluntary absence after the trial has commenced because such actions undermine the orderly conduct of the trial.


Question: Can a defendant waive his right to be present at the trial or portions of the trial?

Answer: Yes. A defendant can waive his right to be present at the trial or portions of the trial because the right to be present can be voluntarily relinquished by the defendant.


Question: Does a criminal defendant have a due process constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of the trial?

Answer: Yes. A criminal defendant has a due process constitutional right to be present at every critical stage of the trial, from jury selection to sentencing, because the presence of the defendant is necessary to ensure a fair trial.


Question: Does the untimely disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense violate the Constitution if the evidence would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome had it been disclosed earlier?

Answer: Yes. The untimely disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense violates the Constitution if the evidence would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome had it been disclosed earlier because it undermines the fairness of the trial.


Question: The prosecution fails to disclose a witness's prior perjury conviction until the defense almost rests its case, and the witness is now unavailable to be impeached. If the jury convicts the defendant, must the court grant a retrial?

Answer: Yes. The court must grant a retrial because it is reasonably probable that the defendant might not have been convicted if he was given timely access to the information favorable to his case.


Question: Two defendants are tried jointly for a crime, and the first defendant makes statements to a cellmate that incriminate him and the second defendant. Can the court admit the cellmate's testimony of the first defendant's out-of-court statements?

Answer: No. The court cannot admit the cellmate's testimony of the first defendant's out-of-court statements because the limiting instruction will not adequately safeguard the jury from considering the testimony against the second defendant, thus violating his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers.


Question: When two defendants are tried together for the same crime, can the admission of one defendant's confession be cured by a limiting instruction?

Answer: No. The admission of one defendant's confession cannot be cured by a limiting instruction because it is so prejudicial to the second defendant that it violates his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers.


Question: A bookmaker is indicted for illegal gambling based solely on an in-court undercover agent's testimony that re-tells an informant's out-of-court statements. Will the judge dismiss the indictment?

Answer: No. The judge will not dismiss the indictment because the grand jury is making a probable cause determination rather than a trial verdict, and hearsay or illegally obtained evidence does not invalidate a facially valid indictment.


Question: Will a facially valid indictment be dismissed if it is based on hearsay or illegally obtained evidence?

Answer: No. A facially valid indictment will not be dismissed if it is based on hearsay or illegally obtained evidence because these rules do not apply to grand jury proceedings.


Question: Can a juror be excused for cause if his views would substantially impair an impartial decision?

Answer: Yes. A juror can be excused for cause if his views would substantially impair an impartial decision because such views prevent the juror from fulfilling his duty to decide the case based on the evidence and the law.


Question: In a capital case that could result in a defendant's life imprisonment or death, can a juror with views on the death penalty that will substantially impair his ability to impartially determine its appropriateness be excused for cause?

Answer: Yes. The juror can be excused for cause because his views on the death penalty substantially impair his ability to impartially determine its appropriateness, and excusing him does not violate the fair cross-section right of the Sixth Amendment.


Question: In state criminal trials, if a six-person jury is used, must the verdict be unanimous for the conviction to be valid under the U.S. Constitution?

Answer: Yes. In state criminal trials, if a six-person jury is used, the verdict must be unanimous for the conviction to be valid under the U.S. Constitution because unanimity ensures the reliability of the verdict.


Question: Does a prosecutor who peremptorily excuses all nonwhites from a jury based solely on race violate the Equal Protection Clause?

Answer: Yes. A prosecutor who peremptorily excuses all nonwhites from a jury based solely on race violates the Equal Protection Clause because such actions constitute racial discrimination in jury selection.


Question: Is there a constitutional requirement that all known charges be brought in the same prosecution against a defendant?

Answer: No. There is no constitutional requirement that all known charges be brought in the same prosecution against a defendant because separate prosecutions for different offenses do not violate the Constitution.


Question: If there is conflicting testimony about what crimes a defendant committed, can the jury return a verdict for either crime?

Answer: Yes. If there is conflicting testimony about what crimes a defendant committed, the jury can return a verdict for either crime because the jury is responsible for weighing the evidence and determining the facts.


Question: Can a plea be vacated if the prosecutor withdraws from the plea bargain deal?

Answer: Yes. A plea can be vacated if the prosecutor withdraws from the plea bargain deal because the defendant's agreement to plead guilty is contingent upon the prosecutor fulfilling the terms of the plea bargain.


Question: Must any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum period be proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Answer: Yes. Any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum period must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt because it is a constitutional requirement to ensure fairness and accuracy in sentencing.


Question: Will a departure from Sentencing Guidelines be upheld if the sentencing court provided acceptable reasons for the departure and the degree of departure was reasonable?

Answer: Yes. A departure from Sentencing Guidelines will be upheld if the sentencing court provided acceptable reasons for the departure and the degree of departure was reasonable because the court's rationale and the reasonableness of the departure are key factors in upholding the decision.


Question: Who bears the burden of proof to establish the affirmative defense of entrapment?

Answer: The defendant bears the burden of proof to establish the affirmative defense of entrapment because the defense must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime.


Question: Does a defendant's incompetency to stand trial depend on his mental state at the time of the trial?

Answer: Yes. A defendant's incompetency to stand trial depends on his mental state at the time of the trial because the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the defense is crucial for a fair trial.


Question: Who bears the burden of proof of competency once the issue has been raised, and by what standard must it be proved?

Answer: The prosecution bears the burden of proof of competency once the issue has been raised, and it usually must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence because it is the prosecution's responsibility to demonstrate that the defendant is competent to stand trial.


Question: Is a confession of a co-conspirator admissible at the defendant's trial if the co-conspirator does not testify and cannot be cross-examined?

Answer: No. A confession of a co-conspirator is inadmissible at the defendant's trial unless the co-conspirator testifies and can be cross-examined because the defendant has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.


Question: How is the unchanged condition of an exhibit like drugs established?

Answer: The unchanged condition of an exhibit like drugs is established through chain of custody because it proves the continuous control and unchanged condition of the evidence.


Question: Police see the defendant drop a bag of white powder and run away. A few minutes later, the police retrieve the bag after arresting the defendant. Is this sufficient to prove a chain of custody to have the evidence admitted?

Answer: Yes. This is sufficient to prove a chain of custody to have the evidence admitted because the continuous control and unchanged condition of the evidence can be established.


Question: What must evidence admitted at trial be?

Answer: Evidence admitted at trial must be authenticated because someone must lay a sufficient foundation so that the trier of fact is able to determine that the evidence is what it is supposed to be.


Question: What does the Federal Rules of Evidence bar regarding testimony or statements by jurors?

Answer: The Federal Rules of Evidence bars testimony or statements by jurors offered to prove virtually anything about deliberations, including any matter occurring or statement made, or the effect of anything on the mind or emotions of any juror, or the mental processes of the juror whose testimony or statement is offered.


Question: Each juror states in writing his opinion of what the money damages should be, and the amounts are totaled and divided by the number of jurors to reach a figure for the award. Is this legal?

Answer: No. This is illegal because it constitutes a quotient verdict that ignores the judge's instruction to look at liability and is grounds for a new trial.


Question: What is grounds for a new trial regarding a quotient verdict?

Answer: A quotient verdict that ignores the judge's instruction to look at liability is grounds for a new trial because it is illegal and improper.


Question: The defendant is charged with aggravated theft, but there is a dispute as to the value of the stolen property with the defendant arguing the crime is simple theft. Should the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple theft?

Answer: Yes. The trial court should instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple theft because there is a rational basis for the lesser charge and the jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense yet acquit him of the greater.


Question: When is a defendant entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction?

Answer: A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction if: (1) the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense; and (2) the evidence at trial is such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense yet acquit him of the greater.


Question: The defendant is charged with first-degree murder and second-degree murder. If the defendant is found guilty of second-degree murder, can the defendant be tried for first-degree murder at a new trial?

Answer: No. The defendant cannot be tried for first-degree murder at a new trial because the conviction of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder constitutes an implied acquittal of the more serious offense.


Question: What does a conviction of a lesser-included offense constitute?

Answer: A conviction of a lesser-included offense constitutes an implied acquittal of the more serious offense, thus barring retrial on that greater charge.


Question: Does the inability of a judge to complete a trial due to a death in the family constitute a manifest necessity for a mistrial?

Answer: No. The inability of a judge to complete a trial due to a death in the family does not constitute a manifest necessity for a mistrial, especially when the court sua sponte declares a mistrial without the defendant's consent.


Question: What happens if a court sua sponte declares a mistrial without the defendant's consent due to the judge's inability to complete the trial?

Answer: A second trial should be barred because it would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, as the inability of the judge to complete the trial does not constitute a manifest necessity for a mistrial.


Question: Can two different states try a person for the same crime without violating the double jeopardy clause?

Answer: Yes. Two different states may try a person for the same crime without violating the double jeopardy clause because there is no double jeopardy between sovereigns, even if it is the same exact crime with the same exact elements.


Question: What does the double jeopardy clause prevent?

Answer: The double jeopardy clause prevents a person from being tried twice for the same crime because it protects individuals from repeated prosecutions for the same offense.


Question: Can a defendant be indicted by a grand jury if a judge had previously dismissed the charge at a preliminary hearing for failure to establish probable cause?

Answer: Yes. A defendant can be indicted by a grand jury even if a judge had previously dismissed the charge at a preliminary hearing for failure to establish probable cause because the defendant was never in jeopardy of conviction on the charge.


Question: When does double jeopardy attach?

Answer: Double jeopardy attaches only when the jury or the first witness (at a bench trial) is sworn in because it is at this point that the defendant is in jeopardy of conviction.


Question: Does double jeopardy attach at a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceeding?

Answer: No. Double jeopardy does not attach at a preliminary hearing or grand jury proceeding because these proceedings do not place the defendant in jeopardy of conviction, meaning the same charges can be brought against the defendant at more than one grand jury.


Question: Can a driver who hits a pedestrian and then pleads guilty to reckless driving still be charged with manslaughter if, years later, the pedestrian dies from those injuries?

Answer: Yes. A driver who hits a pedestrian and then pleads guilty to reckless driving can still be charged with manslaughter if, years later, the pedestrian dies from those injuries because the subsequent death constitutes a new element of the offense.


Question: Can courts use bright line cutoffs such as an IQ test score of 70 to determine whether a person has severe intellectual disabilities for purposes of the Eighth Amendment?

Answer: No. Courts may not use bright line cutoffs such as an IQ test score of 70 to determine whether a person has severe intellectual disabilities because they must consider all evidence pertinent to the disability claim, including adaptive behavior assessments.


Question: Does the execution of people with severe intellectual disabilities violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment?

Answer: Yes. The execution of people with severe intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment because such individuals are constitutionally different from those without intellectual disabilities.


Question: Are children constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes under the Eighth Amendment?

Answer: Yes. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes under the Eighth Amendment because their developmental status and potential for rehabilitation must be considered.


Question: Is a life-without-parole sentence permissible for a juvenile defendant convicted of a non-homicide offense?

Answer: No. A life-without-parole sentence is not permissible for a juvenile defendant convicted of a non-homicide offense because it is an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment.


Question: What must occur if a finding exposes a defendant to a sentence beyond the maximum amount provided by the substantive statute in question?

Answer: A defendant has a constitutional right to have the required finding determined by a jury, not a judge, and that such facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt because only a jury may determine the imposition of sentencing enhancements.


Question: What test is applied in deciding whether to overturn a sentence for failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury?

Answer: The harmless error test is applied because it determines whether the failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury affected the defendant's substantial rights and the outcome of the proceedings.


Question: What happens if the prosecution fails to prove each of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

Answer: The trier of fact must find the defendant not guilty because the prosecution has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.


Question: Who bears the burden of proof for an affirmative defense in a criminal case?

Answer: The defendant bears the burden of proof for an affirmative defense because the defendant must prove each essential element of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.


Question: Who bears the burden of proof in criminal cases?

Answer: The prosecution bears the burden of proof in criminal cases because it must prove each of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.


Question: Does due process require the prosecution to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

Answer: Yes. Due process requires the prosecution to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt because it is a fundamental principle ensuring fairness and accuracy in criminal proceedings.


Question: Does the prosecution have the burden of disproving an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt?

Answer: Yes. The prosecution has the burden of disproving an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt because an alibi negates an essential element of the crime, which is the defendant's actual commission of it.


Question: If the crime of rape is defined as sexual penetration inflicted on an unconsenting person by means of force or violence, who bears the burden of proving that the victim did not consent?

Answer: The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the victim did not consent because it is an essential element of the crime of rape that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.


Question: What is required to convict a defendant of a crime?

Answer: To convict a defendant, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to prove all of the elements included in the definition of the offense because this ensures the defendant's guilt is established to a high standard of certainty.


Question: Is a state's elimination of the insanity defense constitutional?

Answer: Yes. A state's elimination of the insanity defense is constitutional because the state has the authority to define the elements of criminal offenses and defenses.


Question: Can offenses be joined for trial if they are of the same or similar character?

Answer: Yes. Offenses may be joined for trial if they are of the same or similar character because it allows for judicial efficiency and consistency in the adjudication of related charges.


Question: The defendant shoots a gun at his wife with the intent to kill her, but misses and kills her coworker. Can the defendant be charged with murder of the coworker and attempted murder of his wife?

Answer: Yes. The defendant can be charged with murder of the coworker and attempted murder of his wife because the intent to harm his wife is transferred to the coworker who was actually harmed, and the two charges need not be tried together because each is a separate and independent offense.


Question: What is the doctrine of transferred intent?

Answer: The doctrine of transferred intent applies when an individual has the intent to harm one particular individual or object, and in the act of trying to accomplish that harm, another is injured because the intent to harm the original party can be transferred to the party that actually was injured.


Question: Dan agrees with Doug to rob Paul, but Dan was unaware that Doug had a gun. Can Dan be found guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery?

Answer: No. Dan cannot be found guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery because he was unaware a gun would be used in the robbery, meaning the elements of conspiracy to commit armed robbery are lacking.


Question: Dan agrees with Doug to rob Paul, but Dan was unaware that Doug had a gun. Can Dan be found guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery?

Answer: No. If Dan agrees with Doug to rob Paul but is unaware that Doug has a gun, Dan can be found guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery but not conspiracy to commit armed robbery because Dan was unaware a gun would be used in the robbery.


Question: What are the elements of conspiracy as a specific intent crime?

Answer: The elements of conspiracy as a specific intent crime are: (1) the intent to agree, or conspire; and (2) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy.


Question: What are the elements of conspiracy?

Answer: Conspiracy is a specific intent crime involving two elements: (1) the intent to agree, or conspire; and (2) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit a particular offense, the prosecution must show not only that the conspirators intended to agree but also that they intended to commit the elements of that offense.


Question: What must the prosecution show to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit a particular offense?

Answer: The prosecution must show that the conspirators intended to agree and that they intended to commit the elements of that offense because both intents are necessary to prove the crime of conspiracy.


Question: A defendant offers to sell illegal narcotics to an undercover police officer but has no narcotics in his possession. Can the defendant be found guilty of criminal solicitation?

Answer: Yes. If the defendant offers to sell illegal narcotics to an undercover police officer but has no narcotics in his possession, the defendant can still be found guilty of criminal solicitation for attempting to cause the officer to commit the crime of possessing a controlled substance.


Question: A defendant tries to sell harmless oregano disguised as an illegal narcotic. Can the defendant be found guilty of solicitation?

Answer: No. If the defendant tries to sell harmless oregano disguised as an illegal narcotic, the defendant cannot be found guilty of solicitation because the defendant was not actually selling illegal narcotics.


Question: The defendant offers to sell illegal narcotics to an undercover police officer who immediately arrests the defendant but finds no narcotics in his possession. Can the defendant be found guilty of criminal solicitation?

Answer: Yes. The defendant can be found guilty of criminal solicitation for attempting to cause the officer to commit the crime of possessing a controlled substance because the solicitation was made with the intent that the crime be committed.


Question: The defendant tries to sell harmless oregano disguised as an illegal narcotic. Can the defendant be found guilty of solicitation?

Answer: No. The defendant cannot be found guilty of solicitation because he was not actually selling illegal narcotics and therefore did not have the intent to solicit the commission of a crime.


Question: When does solicitation occur?

Answer: Solicitation occurs when the defendant entices, encourages, or advises another to commit a crime with the intent that the other person commit the crime because the crime of solicitation is complete once the solicitation is made.


Question: When does solicitation occur?

Answer: Solicitation occurs when the defendant entices, encourages, or advises another to commit a crime with the intent that the other person commit the crime. The crime of solicitation is complete once the solicitation is made.


Question: A defendant makes a verbal agreement with a hit man and meets him for payment. Is this enough to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder?

Answer: No. A verbal agreement with a hit man and meeting him for payment is enough to find the defendant guilty of solicitation of murder but not enough to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder because these acts of preparation are not dangerously proximate to committing the crime.


Question: A defendant verbally agrees with a hit man and meets him for payment. Is the defendant guilty of attempted murder?

Answer: No. These acts of preparation are not enough to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder because they are not dangerously proximate to the commission of the intended crime.


Question: A defendant verbally agrees with a hit man and meets him for payment. Is the defendant guilty of solicitation of murder?

Answer: Yes. The defendant is guilty of solicitation of murder because these acts constitute solicitation by enticing or encouraging another to commit a crime with intent.


Question: Can a defendant be found guilty of conspiracy in a unilateral jurisdiction but not in a bilateral jurisdiction?

Answer: Yes. A defendant could be found guilty of conspiracy in a unilateral jurisdiction but not in a bilateral jurisdiction because the latter requires at least two of the alleged conspirators to intend to agree to commit the offense.


Question: Is mere solicitation enough to constitute an attempt under the common law?

Answer: No. Mere solicitation, unaccompanied by a sufficient step moving directly toward the commission of the intended crime, is not dangerously proximate enough to constitute an attempt under the common law.


Question: What constitutes an attempt under the common law?

Answer: Under the common law, an attempt requires an act that is dangerously proximate to the commission of the intended crime because mere solicitation, unaccompanied by a sufficient step moving directly toward the commission of the crime, is not enough.


Question: When is the defendant guilty of conspiracy in a unilateral jurisdiction but not in a bilateral jurisdiction?

Answer: The defendant is guilty of conspiracy in a unilateral jurisdiction if he has an agreement with another person, but not in a bilateral jurisdiction because this requires at least two of the alleged conspirators to intend to agree to commit the offense.


Question: What are the elements of solicitation at common law?

Answer: At common law, solicitation occurs when a defendant: (1) requests or encourages another; (2) to perform a criminal act, regardless of whether the latter agrees.


Question: What is the difference between solicitation and conspiracy?

Answer: The difference between solicitation and conspiracy is asking versus the agreement. Solicitation involves requesting or encouraging another to perform a criminal act, while conspiracy involves an agreement to commit a criminal act.


Question: What must the defendant intend to satisfy the mens rea necessary to commit solicitation?

Answer: The defendant must intend that the individual solicited commit the crime because solicitation is a specific intent crime requiring the mens rea of intent.


Question: When does solicitation occur at common law?

Answer: At common law, solicitation occurs when a defendant: (1) requests or encourages another; (2) to perform a criminal act, regardless of whether the latter agrees. Solicitation is a specific intent crime so the defendant must intend that the individual solicited commit the crime to satisfy the mens rea necessary to commit solicitation.


Question: Dave hires a hit man to kill Victor. Victor is murdered by the hit man. Is Dave guilty of both conspiracy and murder?

Answer: Yes. Dave is guilty of both conspiracy and murder because the crime of conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense.


Question: Diana asks Doug to murder Victor. Doug attempts the crime. Can Diana and Doug be found guilty of solicitation?

Answer: No. Diana and Doug cannot be found guilty of solicitation because the attempt absorbs the solicitation, meaning they can be found guilty of attempted murder but not solicitation.


Question: Does solicitation merge into conspiracy, attempt, and the substantive crime?

Answer: Yes. Solicitation merges into conspiracy, attempt, and the substantive crime because the solicitation is absorbed by the subsequent acts of conspiracy, attempt, or completion of the crime.


Question: Does the crime of conspiracy merge with the substantive offense?

Answer: No. The crime of conspiracy does not merge with the substantive offense because they are separate and distinct crimes, meaning a defendant can be convicted of both conspiracy and the substantive offense.


Question: If Dave hires a hit man to kill Victor, and Victor is murdered by the hit man, what crimes is Dave guilty of?

Answer: Dave is guilty of both conspiracy and murder.


Question: If Diana asks Doug to murder Victor and Doug attempts the crime, what crimes can Diana and Doug be found guilty of?

Answer: Diana and Doug can be found guilty of attempted murder but not solicitation because attempt absorbs solicitation.


Question: Can a defendant withdraw from liability for the conspiracy itself?

Answer: No. A defendant can never withdraw from liability for the conspiracy itself, but he can withdraw from the subsequent crimes of co-conspirators if the defendant gives notice and takes an affirmative step to prevent the crime.


Question: When is the crime of conspiracy complete?

Answer: The crime of conspiracy is complete once there is an agreement and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. An overt act is an open act that shows an intention to commit a crime, but the overt act does not have to be criminal in nature and mere preparation will usually suffice if the preparation was done with the intent to complete the crime. A defendant can never withdraw from liability for the conspiracy itself, but he can withdraw from the subsequent crimes of co-conspirators if the defendant gives notice and takes an affirmative step to prevent the crime.


Question: If a man wants to kill his wife and hires a hit man (who is actually an undercover cop), and pays him $20,000, is the man guilty of conspiracy to murder his wife in a jurisdiction that follows the unilateral theory of conspiracy?

Answer: Yes. The man is guilty of conspiracy to murder his wife because he believed that he had an agreement with another person that would result in his wife's death, and a unilateral conspiracy is formed when a person agrees with another person, even if the other person only feigns agreement.


Question: What is the Model Penal Code's unilateral approach to conspiracy?

Answer: Under the Model Penal Code's unilateral approach to conspiracy (adopted by most jurisdictions), the act of a single individual who believes that he or she is agreeing with another person to commit a crime is sufficient to establish a conspiracy. This means there does not need to be a meeting of the minds. A person is guilty of being a conspirator under the unilateral approach even if his or her co-conspirator is never found or identified, is not charged, or is acquitted. For example, if a man wants to kill his wife and hires a hit man (who is actually an undercover cop), and pays him $20,000, the man is guilty of conspiracy to murder his wife in a jurisdiction that follows the unilateral theory of conspiracy, because the man believed that he had an agreement with another person that would result in his wife's death, and a unilateral conspiracy is formed when a person agrees with another person, even if the other person only feigns agreement. NOTE: In addition, some jurisdictions require an overt act in furtherance of that agreement, such as paying money or procuring a needed material.


Question: If a defendant, intending to kill his mother, puts a deadly poison in his mother's glass of milk, but changes his mind and hides the glass behind a flower vase on the table, and his son accidentally drinks it and dies, what crimes can the defendant be found guilty of?

Answer: The defendant can be found guilty of attempted murder of the mother since the defendant, with a specific intent to murder the mother, took a substantial step towards killing her. As for the killing of the son, the defendant can be found guilty of murder if the jury determines his conduct as depraved indifference to human life (depraved-heart murder), or manslaughter if the jury finds only criminal negligence.


Question: What is required for an attempt charge under the Model Penal Code?

Answer: Attempt requires a specific intent to commit the crime and an act beyond mere preparation in furtherance of the crime. To be guilty of attempted murder, there must be specific intent to commit the murder and a substantial step in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of murder. For example, if a defendant, intending to kill his mother, puts a deadly poison in his mother's glass of milk, but changes his mind and hides the glass behind a flower vase on the table, and his son accidentally drinks it and dies, the defendant can be found guilty of attempted murder of the mother since the defendant, with a specific intent to murder the mother, took a substantial step towards killing her. As for the killing of the son, the defendant can be found guilty of murder if the jury determines his conduct as depraved indifference to human life (depraved-heart murder), or manslaughter if the jury finds only criminal negligence.


Question: If a robber dresses as a pirate and points a knife at a drunk man yelling 'your money or your life,' but the drunk man instead laughs and walks away without giving the robber any money, what is the most serious crime the robber can be charged with?

Answer: The most serious crime that the robber can be charged with is attempted robbery since he had the specific intent to deprive another of his property by force or fear.


Question: What are the requirements for robbery?

Answer: Robbery requires that the taking of another's property be accomplished through force or putting in fear. If the robber uses a threat of force but the victim does not take it as such, a critical element of robbery is absent, and the most serious charge the robber could be convicted of is attempted robbery. For example, if a robber dresses as a pirate and points a knife at a drunk man yelling "your money or your life," but the drunk man instead laughs and walks away without giving the robber any money, the most serious crime that the robber can be charged with is attempted robbery since he had the specific intent to deprive another of his property by force or fear.


Question: Can conspiracy be proven by circumstantial evidence?

Answer: Yes, although a conspiracy cannot be based upon mere suspicion or conjecture, conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence (i.e. evidence showing the relationship, conduct or circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts on the part of the co-conspirators to infer that a wrongful alliance has in fact been formed), and such circumstantial evidence is sufficient to allow the conspiracy case to get to a jury. For example, in a trial involving a conspiracy by travel companions to smuggle drugs, direct evidence is not required and mere circumstantial evidence is sufficient to defeat a defense motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence. Thus, a co-defendant's statement "I said to my travel companion there were too many police here" can be used to prove the element of agreement.


Question: In a trial involving a conspiracy by travel companions to smuggle drugs, is direct evidence required to defeat a defense motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence?

Answer: No, direct evidence is not required and mere circumstantial evidence is sufficient to defeat a defense motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence. Thus, a co-defendant's statement 'I said to my travel companion there were too many police here' can be used to prove the element of agreement.


Question: Can a drug dealer be convicted of conspiring to distribute drugs if the seller was an undercover officer under the common law unilateral approach to conspiracy?

Answer: No, under the common law unilateral approach to conspiracy, a drug dealer cannot be convicted of conspiring to distribute drugs if the seller was an undercover officer because there was no plurality of agreement.


Question: Can a defendant be found guilty of conspiracy if the co-defendant's conspiracy charge is dismissed under the Model Penal Code?

Answer: Yes, under the Model Penal Code, a defendant can be found guilty of conspiracy even if the co-defendant's conspiracy charge is dismissed.


Question: Is talk enough to be guilty of attempted possession of drugs in a common-law jurisdiction?

Answer: No. In a common-law jurisdiction, a defendant is guilty of attempted possession of drugs only if he took sufficient steps towards the commission of the crime. Talk is not enough.


Question: When is a conspiracy presumed to exist?

Answer: A conspiracy is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated. A co-conspirator does not need to be present at the commission of each crime, nor does the arrest of one co-conspirator automatically terminate the conspiracy if the remaining conspirators continue to carry out the goals of the conspiracy.


Question: Can a defendant who solicits a person to commit a crime be found guilty of solicitation if the defendant later changes his mind and calls off the crime?

Answer: Yes. A defendant who solicits a person to commit a crime will be found guilty of solicitation even if the defendant later changes his mind and calls off the crime.


Question: Can a person convicted of statutory rape also be convicted of conspiracy to commit statutory rape?

Answer: No. A person convicted of statutory rape cannot also be convicted of conspiracy to commit statutory rape because the victim is a protected class and therefore not a co-conspirator.


Question: What must be shown to be found guilty of conspiracy?

Answer: To be found guilty of conspiracy, the conspirators must be shown to have agreed to commit a crime and each of the conspirators must be shown to have had at least the mental state required for the object crime.


Question: Can a party that feigns agreement to conspire be prosecuted for conspiracy under common law?

Answer: No, under the common law, a party that feigns his agreement to conspire cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy since there is no agreement, and therefore no conspiracy.


Question: Are conspirators criminally liable for the acts of all conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy?

Answer: Yes, each conspirator is criminally liable for the acts of all conspirators in furtherance, and within the scope of the conspiracy.


Question: What is an argument for acquittal of conspiracy to commit burglary?

Answer: An argument for acquittal of conspiracy to commit burglary is that you did not intend to commit burglary.


Question: In a prosecution for attempted murder, if you try to kill A but shoot at B thinking it is A, but you hurt C instead. Who is the victim?

Answer: The only victim is B. Attempted murder focuses on the intent to kill a specific individual and the action taken towards that individual. B was the target of the mistaken identity, making B the relevant victim for the attempted murder charge.


Question: Are you guilty of conspiracy to commit larceny if you did not intend to steal?

Answer: No, you are not guilty of conspiracy to commit larceny if you did not intend to steal.


Question: Can a person be found guilty of conspiracy if they merely have knowledge of the unlawful act?

Answer: No. A person cannot be found guilty of conspiracy unless they helped to plan, participate, or assist in the unlawful act. Mere knowledge is insufficient.


Question: What must the solicitor intend to be guilty of solicitation?

Answer: To be guilty of solicitation, the solicitor must intend that a criminal offense be committed. For example, a defendant can't be guilty of solicitation of murder if he gives someone a gun knowing the gun is unloaded.


Question: If a co-conspirator withdraws from the conspiracy and informs her co-conspirators of the withdrawal, is he guilty of the substantive crimes committed by the conspirators after the withdrawal?

Answer: No, he is not guilty of the substantive crimes committed by the conspirators after the withdrawal, but is guilty of the conspiracy crime.


Question: Is a co-conspirator guilty of substantive crimes committed by conspirators after the co-conspirator withdraws from the conspiracy and informs her co-conspirators of the withdrawal?

Answer: No. The co-conspirator is not guilty of the substantive crimes committed by the conspirators after the withdrawal but is guilty of the conspiracy crime.


Question: What constitutes solicitation?

Answer: Solicitation occurs when the defendant, with the intent that another person commit a crime, entices, advises, incites, orders, or otherwise seeks a specific other person to commit a crime.


Question: What are the requirements for the crime of attempted murder at common law?

Answer: At common law, the crime of attempted murder requires both a specific intent by the actor to kill the victim and an act that puts the defendant in close proximity to completing the crime. (For the Model Penal Code, it must be a 'substantial step' rather than close proximity).


Question: Does the crime of solicitation merge into attempt?

Answer: Yes. The crime of solicitation merges into attempt.


Question: Is it unlawful if you conspire to rob your own house?

Answer: No, it is not unlawful if you conspire to rob your own house.


Question: What are the elements of a conspiracy?

Answer: A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more parties to commit a crime that requires: (1) an agreement (which does not have to be expressed); AND (2) an intent to agree; AND (3) an intent to pursue or achieve an unlawful objective.


Question: What is presumed if a statute defines a crime involving more than one participant but provides for the liability of only one participant?

Answer: It is presumed that the legislative intent was to immunize the other person from liability as an accomplice.


Question: What is required for an attempt to commit a crime?

Answer: An attempt requires the specific intent to commit the crime.


Question: A man having an affair with a married woman deletes an email from her phone that warned her that her husband just discovered the affair and was going to murder her when she came home. The woman goes home and her husband murders her. Can the man be found guilty of murder as an accomplice?

Answer: Yes. The man may be found guilty of murder as an accomplice because even if he did not aid in the actual murder itself, he intended to aid in the murder, and his assistance facilitated the result.


Question: What is an accomplice liable for?

Answer: An accomplice is liable for all the crimes that the principal committed and all other crimes that were a probable or foreseeable result if the accomplice aids, abets, or facilitates the commission of a crime committed by the principal with the intent that the crime be committed.


Question: A defendant drives others to a bank unaware they plan to rob it. The defendant drives them home after they come running out of the bank with bags of money as the alarm sounds. Is the defendant subject to accomplice liability?

Answer: No. The defendant is not subject to accomplice liability because he didn't specifically intend to facilitate the commission of the crime at the moment of its inception. BUT the defendant would be viewed as an accessory after the fact for driving the robbers from the scene of the robbery.


Question: What must be shown for a person to be liable as an accomplice to the crime of another?

Answer: One must aid, abet, or encourage the perpetrator with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, and a conviction for accomplice liability requires proof that the accomplice acted with a culpable mental state.


Question: A defendant keeps a watch knowing that it had just been stolen from someone else. Can he be found guilty of receiving stolen property?

Answer: Yes. A defendant can be found guilty of receiving stolen property if he keeps a watch knowing that it had just been stolen from someone else.


Question: What are the elements of the crime of receiving stolen property?

Answer: The crime of receiving stolen property requires that a defendant receives, conceals, or withholds stolen personal property that he knows was obtained by another person in a manner constituting a criminal offense.


Question: A landlord rents a room in his building to a defendant who uses the room to run a call center for prostitutes. The landlord is charged as an accomplice under a statute that reads, 'It is a felony to maintain a house or place of prostitution.' Is the landlord liable if he charged the defendant substantially higher rent than other law-abiding tenants?

Answer: Yes, because accomplice liability attaches when a person actively assists or encourages another to commit a crime with a specific intent to aid that crime and having a personal stake in the success of a crime or charging more money demonstrates intent to aid in the criminal venture.


Question: What is an accomplice?

Answer: An accomplice is a person who urges the commission of a crime or knowingly helps others plan, execute, profit from, or escape capture after a crime. A person who gains an unusual profit from a criminal enterprise can be found guilty of accomplice liability.


Question: A sister provides her brother with a bolt cutter with the specific intent of aiding him in breaking into a store to steal computers. The brother instead uses a crowbar to gain entry. Is the sister guilty as an accomplice?

Answer: Yes. The sister is guilty as an accomplice of both burglary and larceny since she provided assistance or encouragement with the specific intent of aiding the crime and the actual means of gaining entry is irrelevant.


Question: What constitutes accomplice liability?

Answer: A person is liable as an accomplice if he intentionally gives assistance or encouragement to facilitate the commission of a crime with the specific intent that the crime be committed.


Question: Is a getaway driver for a bank robber liable for an unintended murder by the bank robber during the robbery?

Answer: Yes. The getaway driver will be liable for an unintended murder by the bank robber during the robbery even if the getaway driver made the robber promise not to use his gun.


Question: What is required for a co-conspirator to be liable for murder in a common law jurisdiction?

Answer: A co-conspirator is liable for the murder of a victim by a fellow co-conspirator, even if the killing is unintended.


Question: Is mere presence at the scene of a crime sufficient for accomplice liability?

Answer: No, mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to make a person an accomplice; an affirmative act is necessary.


Question: What is required for a defendant to be found guilty of being an accessory?

Answer: The defendant must have intended to aid and abet the commission of the crime.