data/问题3测试文件.txt

马英九接受《纽约时报》专访实录
Transcript of New York Times Interview With President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan

Following is a transcript, provided by the Taiwanese government, of an interview with President Ma Ying-jeou conducted by The New York Times in Taipei on Friday. Mr. Ma mainly spoke in Chinese, but briefly answered a question in English.
《纽约时报》周五在台北对马英九总统做了采访，马英九主要用中文作答，期间穿插了一些英语，以下是台湾总统府提供的采访实录：
Read the full story here.
阅读文章。
Q. The first question we wanted to ask is, since we have APEC coming up in a week and a half, what has Beijing lost and what has Taiwan lost by your not meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing?
问：请问您认为无法在这次的APEC促成“马习会”，北京有什么损失？对台湾有什么影响？
A: We have always believed that APEC was the most appropriate place for the leaders of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to meet, as APEC has already settled questions of venue, title, and capacity. Especially in Taiwan, there is great public support, but the mainland has greater misgivings. They fear it may give the outside world the misimpression that there are two Chinas. Yet on many occasions I have stressed that the Republic of China government will not promote a policy of “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence.” Our Constitution does not admit of such a thing. The mainland side is a bit overly concerned, so it is a pity that a meeting at APEC cannot take place.
答：我们一直认为APEC是两岸领导人会晤最恰当的地方，不论是场合、头衔、身分，都已经有非常具体的规划，尤其是在台湾，民众的支持度都很高，可是大陆的顾虑比较多，担心会给外界“两个中国”的印象。不过，我们在很多场合都一再说，中华民国政府不会去推动“两个中国”、“一中一台”或“台湾独立”的政策，这是我们宪法所不容许的，他们顾虑多了一点，所以没有办法在APEC见面，确实是很可惜的事情。
Q. You’ve voiced support for democracy in Hong Kong. Has Beijing’s reaction to the protests in Hong Kong changed your thinking about cross-strait relations, and are you risking cross-strait ties by voicing support for democracy in Hong Kong?
问：您曾表态支持香港民主化，北京有什么反应呢？两岸关系是否会因此萌生风险？
A: I think our support for Hong Kong’s democracy will not be at the expense of cross-strait relations. Since I took office, as concerns cross-strait ties, we have signed 21 agreements and laid down a basic foundation. We have proceeded upon this foundation — namely the 1992 consensus of “one China, respective interpretations.” That will not be affected. As a matter of fact, every June 4, I release a statement concerning the Tiananmen incident. This time it’s a different venue, but the basic concept is the same.
答：我们支持香港的民主不会以牺牲两岸关系做为代价，从我上任后，两岸到目前为止已经签署21项协议，双方建立了一个基础架构，也就是在“九二共识、一中各表”的基础上往前迈进，不会受到这个（事件）影响。事实上，我每年6月4日时都会发表感言纪念六四事件，这次换了一个场合，但基本理念是一致的。
Another key point is that we believe that if mainland China can practice democracy in Hong Kong or if mainland China itself can become more democratic, then we can shorten the psychological distance between people from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This would be a great step toward creating closer cross-strait ties over the long term.
还有一点很重要的是，我们认为大陆如果能在香港实施民主，或者大陆本身能够更民主化，对于拉近两岸人民心理的距离有非常大的帮助，所以从长远来看，这也是让两岸关系更为紧密的重要一步。
Q. Xi Jinping seemed to be voicing more support for the “one country, two systems” approach even for Taiwan earlier this week as opposed to the 1992 consensus. Have events in Hong Kong, in your view, made China potentially more eager for a more controlling role in long-term bilateral relations with Taiwan?
问：习近平支持一国两制，并且希望台湾能接受，但这与您先前提过的“九二共识”有所冲突，这次北京对香港的处理方式，是否让您对两​​岸关系的长远发展有不同的看法？
A: In fact, the mainland’s introduction of the “one country, two systems” policy was back in about 1982, before the 1992 consensus. Beijing introduced the “one country, two systems” model, and when they did so, we told them that Taiwan could not possibly accept it. Public opinion polls have consistently shown that most people oppose it. But many people in Taiwan support the “one China, respective interpretations” formulation, when “China” means “the Republic of China.” For a long period, especially during the eight years preceding my taking office, cross-strait relations were very unstable. Why was this? Because the administration at the time did not accept the 1992 consensus. When I took office, in my inaugural address, I clearly stated our support for the 1992 consensus of “one China, respective interpretations,” as a result of which the two sides quickly resumed negotiations that led to the signing of 21 agreements. So the 1992 consensus remains a key foundation undergirding cross-strait relations. The mainland has not abandoned it. The mainland came out with its “one country, two systems” formula earlier.
答：实际上，大陆提出“一国两制”政策是在1982年左右，“九二共识”是在1992年。他们主张“一国两制”，我们在该主张提出时就告诉他们，台湾没办法接受，而且历次民意调查都显示，反对的人占绝大多数。另外一点，如果“一中各表”的“一中”是“中华民国”的话，在台湾支持的人很多。看看过去这么长一段时间，尤其是我们上任前8年，两岸关系处于一个非常不稳定的状态。为什么呢？因为当时的政府不愿意接受“九二共识”原则。等到我上任后，在就职演说里即清楚表明，我们支持“九二共识、一中各表”，两岸很快就恢复协商，也才有后来签署21项协议的成果。因此，“九二共识”到目前为止还是两岸关系当中非常关键的基础，大陆也没有放弃，他们提出“一国两制”的时间更早。
Q. Changing subjects to trade. There are two competing visions now for trade in the Pacific. There’s Beijing’s Ftaap — the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific — and then there’s also the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Washington is suggesting. Which do you think fits Taiwan’s economy better? Which has more appeal for you?
问：目前亚太地区有两个在谈的贸易机制，北京主导的“亚太自由贸易区”（FTAAP），以及美国倡议的《跨太平洋伙伴协定》（TPP），您认为何者对台湾经贸较为有利？哪一个较具吸引力？
A: Both, we want both (T.P.P. and R.C.E.P.). Both are important to us. The T.P.P. (Trans-Pacific Partnership) includes 12 countries, with whom we enjoy annual two-way trade of $200 billion, or about 35 percent of our total foreign trade. The R.C.E.P. (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), meanwhile, consists of 16 countries, with whom our foreign trade amounts to $325 billion, or 57 percent of our foreign trade. These two groups share seven members. Together, these groups account for 70 percent of our foreign trade, so their importance to us is self-evident.
答：我们（TPP和RCEP）两个都要，因为两个对我们都重要，TPP有12个国家，与台湾的贸易额一年大概是2千亿美元，占我对外贸易的35%左右；RCEP有16个国家，与台湾的贸易额一年有3,250亿美元，占我对外贸易的57%。这两个团体有7个国家重复，所以合起来算，占我国对外贸易额的7成左右，重要性不言而喻。
It must be understood that Taiwan is quite behind the rest of Asia in terms of signing free trade agreements (F.T.A.s) and joining in regional economic integration.
在整个亚洲签署自由贸易协定或者参与区域经济整合上，我国的成绩是非常落后的。
Ascertaining whether a country is making sufficient efforts on these fronts involves looking at what percent of its exports is covered by F.T.A.s. For Singapore, it exceeds 70 percent, meaning that over 70 percent of Singapore’s exports are covered by F.T.A.s, so they are subject to lower-tariff, or even zero-tariff treatment. Sometimes these exports are also free from other, nontariff barriers. But for Taiwan, the figure is 10 percent, or just under 10 percent. As a result, we do not enjoy equal treatment vis-à-vis our competitors, meaning that our products’ market share in other countries will gradually shrink. This is a matter of life and death for us, because 70 percent of our G.D.P. growth is dependent on foreign trade.
要观察一个国家在这方面的努力是否足够，通常是用出口产品被自由贸易协定涵盖的量来比较，例如新加坡已经超过70%，也就是说，该国出口的货品有70%都涵盖在自由贸易协定之下，（这些货品）可能是零关税或是比较低的关税，有时候也没有所谓的非关税障碍。台湾到目前为止只有差不多10%，还差一点到10%，后果就是我们在对外竞争上没办法享受比较平等的待遇，在出口国的市场占有率就会逐渐萎缩，对我们来讲，这是生死攸关的事，因为我国GDP的成长有70%要靠对外贸易。
Q. Do you have any regrets that Taiwan did not make a bigger effort, then, to be included in the first round of T.P.P.?
问：您是否遗憾台湾无法加入TPP的第一轮谈判呢？
A: We did our best, but we will not be participating in the first round. Yet the first round has not yet finished, because of the U.S. midterm elections. Multilateral talks will resume next year.
答：我们已经尽了最大的努力，但是在第一回合，并没有机会让台湾参与，事实上，因为美国期中选举的因素，TPP目前也尚未完成，预期如果要恢复多边的谈判，时间点应该是在明年。
When nations sign free trade agreements, it is primarily for economic reasons. There are, of course, political implications. For the Republic of China, political interference is greater [than that affecting other countries]. We do not enjoy diplomatic ties with our main trading partners. When we want to trade with them, it’s fine, but when we seek an F.T.A., they hesitate for fear that mainland China will oppose it. This is one reason few countries were, in the past, willing to sign F.T.A.s with us.
国家与国家签​​订自由贸易协定，主要仍是经济的考量，当然也不是没有政治的意涵。对中华民国而言，政治的干扰确实较大，因为我们与主要贸易伙伴都没有邦交关系。当我们要跟他们做生意时，他们都会赞成，但是如果要与他们签订自由贸易协定，他们往往会犹豫，因为担心中国大陆会反对，这也是为什么过去与台湾签署自由贸易协定的国家并不多的原因。
After I took office, we signed the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (E.C.F.A.) with our largest trading partner, mainland China. Since then, we have signed an investment agreement with Japan, an economic cooperation agreement with New Zealand and an economic partnership agreement with Singapore. We hope to sign similar agreements with our main trading partners in Asia and Europe by simultaneously contacting many countries and negotiating accords with them one by one.
在我上任之后，与第一大贸易伙伴中国大陆签署《两岸经济合作架构协议》（ECFA），其后就有机会与日本签署投资协议、与纽西兰签署经济合作协定，及与新加坡签署经济伙伴协定，将来还希望以“多方接触、逐一洽签”的方式，与亚太、甚至于欧洲的主要贸易伙伴进行类似协议的洽签。
We realize that this will not be easy, because there will always be politically motivated interference.
当然我们也知道此路途非常困难，永远都会有政治因素从中干扰。
Q. I’d like to ask about the fishing agreement with Japan surrounding Diaoyu Islands and the waters there. Has that eased tensions, and was that agreement something you discussed with Beijing beforehand?
问：请问签署《台日渔业协议》之前，台湾是否曾与中国大陆进行咨商呢？
A: Last April 10, we signed the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement following about five months of negotiations. But prior to this, we had been in talks for 17 years. So it was in the 17th round of talks that we signed this agreement. Five rounds were held under President Lee Teng-hui, and 10 under President Chen Shui-bian. After I took office, we held the 16th round, but discovered that this manner of negotiating got us nowhere — it was meaningless and a waste of time. So we changed our approaches.
答：去年4月10日，我国与日本签署《台日渔业协议》，历经约五个月的谈判期间，但是在更早之前，我们与日本谈了17年，双方是在第17次的谈判上签署该协议，在李前总统登辉任内谈了5次，在陈前总统水扁任内谈了10次，而我上任后是第16次，但是发现类此谈判没有结果、也没有意义，纯属浪费时间，所以我们就改为其他的方式。
Coincidentally, the situation concerning the Diaoyutai Islands changed about this time. The result of Japan’s nationalization of the islands aroused opposition among the people of both Taiwan and mainland China. At this time, I proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative, concerned that should increased tensions lead to regional conflict, this would be extremely detrimental to the engine of global economic growth. It would not only affect Asian nations. I proposed the initiative on August 5, 2012. Japan responded in November, stating that they were willing to talk with us about this issue, and within five months, we had an agreement. In the year before we signed, we had 17 clashes over fishing rights, sometimes leading to standoffs between our nations’ respective coast guards. Since the agreement’s signing, there has been but one, for which there was no standoff and which was resolved quickly. So that’s the political implication.
此时钓鱼台的情势产生变化，因日本将之国有化的结果，激起了海峡两岸人民的反对，所以我提出《东海和平倡议》。因为我们担心紧张情势的升高会带来区域的冲突，将对这个全球经济发展的引擎非常不利，受害的不仅是亚洲国家而已，我是在2012年8月5日提出，而日本方面在11月时即回应愿意与我们商谈此一议题，并在5个月内完成签署该协议。在签署该协议的前一年，双方有17件争议案件，甚至引发双方海巡机关的对峙，但是在签署后降为1件，且没有对峙的情形，争议快速获得解决，此为政治面的意涵。
Economically, both sides have enjoyed larger catches, especially of high-quality fish like bluefin tuna. This has been beneficial to the fishermen of both sides. So we have achieved both peace and prosperity. We have set sovereignty questions aside, not allowing these to hinder resource development and relevant negotiations.
而在经济面上，双方的渔货量均有增加，尤其是高品质的渔种，例如黑鲔鱼，对双方的渔民均有助益。一方面取得和平，又增加了繁荣。至于主权问题就搁置了，不要让主权问题影响到我们对资源的开发及谈判。
Q. Do you see any possibility in reaching a similar arrangement with mainland China?
问：台湾是否考虑与中国大陆签署渔业协议？
A: Fishery issues with mainland China have been raised since I took office, since fishermen from mainland China often come to fish in Taiwan’s waters. Sometimes we escort them back for punishment, and sometimes we fine them. Fines in one year can reach $30 million in New Taiwan currency (approximately $1 million in U.S. currency), so the amount is great. However, the mainland has been reluctant to discuss a fisheries agreement with us because they are worried that if they hold such talks with us, it would involve setting boundary lines and that might lead to misunderstandings by outsiders, such as that the two parties were two countries. So there has not been much progress on this issue so far. But in terms of carrying out protection of fishermen or cracking down on illegal fishing, Taiwan has consistently been very active and we are continuing to do so right up to the present. Thus, we have not yet conducted negotiations on a fisheries agreement with mainland China.
答：我与大陆间的渔业问题，在我上任后曾经提出，因为大陆的渔民经常到台湾的海域捕鱼，我们有时候将他们带回处罚，有时科以罚金，一年罚金甚至可达到3千万新台币，金额蛮多的。但是大陆一直很犹豫，不愿意与我们谈渔业协议，因为他们担心一谈渔业协议就会涉及划界的议题，而谈及划界就易衍生外界的误会，好像双方是两国国家，因此到目前为止，这方面没有很大的进展，但在执行护渔或取缔非法捕鱼上，台湾一直非常积极，到目前为止，都还在执行中，所以我们目前并没有与大陆谈渔业协议。
However, the thinking in the East China Sea Peace Initiative, which I proposed, is that the three parties — mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan — could split up to conduct three sets of parallel bilateral dialogues: Japan-mainland China, mainland China-Taiwan and Taiwan-Japan, to carry out negotiations on various issues involving marine issues. These could include fisheries development, oil and natural gas exploration and sea rescue cooperation. We have worked with mainland China on sea rescue for years. In addition, there could be other nonconventional security issues, such as marine science research and marine environmental protection. So there is great potential for cooperation.
我所提出《东海和平倡议》的构想有三方面，亦即日本、中国大陆与台湾，可分成三组：日本及大陆、大陆及台湾、台湾及日本，进行各种海洋议题的协商，包括渔业、油气的开发及海上救援等方面。而在海上救援方面，我与大陆已合作多年。另外，尚可包括海洋科学研究、海洋环境保护等其他非传统的安全议题，合作的空间是很大的。
At present, Japan and mainland China, as well as Taiwan and Japan, have concluded separate fisheries agreements. In addition, we have carried out sea rescue exercises with mainland China for many years. All these developments are positive. Perhaps we can step by step build three bilateral mechanisms; then, if conditions are appropriate, it could perhaps become one trilateral mechanism.
目前日本与大陆、台湾与日本都有渔业协议，而我们与大陆有海上灾害防救演习，并已进行多年，这些都很正面，如此逐步地在这个区域建立三个双边的机制，然后条件合适时，也许变成一个三边的机制。
Q. Do you expect in the near future to deal with the Philippines on judicial cooperation in the Bashi Strait? And can that be the beginning of a broader cooperation with the Philippines on maritime issues?
问：有关台湾与菲律宾的渔业争议，请问您是否希望透过司法途径处理，例如在巴士海峡划界，以进一步解决与菲律宾的争议呢？
A: We began discussing that issue with the Philippines last year. In fact, talks are nearing completion. In other words, the two sides shall sign an agreement. However, ahead of the signing, we have reached three points of consensus and are implementing them. The first is that neither party may use force. The second is that before any law enforcement action, the two sides must notify each other. Third, if any personnel are arrested or vessels detained, they shall be released as soon as possible. These three points of consensus are already being carried out by both the Philippines and Taiwan. So, what remains is to sign an agreement pertaining to law enforcement. Signing a fisheries agreement would be very difficult, as it involves constitutional considerations on the Philippine side, so this is still under study.
答：实际上我们从去年就开始与菲律宾谈这个问题，目前已接近成熟阶段，换言之，双方应会签署一个协议，不过在签署此协议之前，双方已达成三项共识并已开始执行，即：一、双方都不可以使用武力；二、双方在执法前须相互通​​报；三、如有逮捕人员或扣押船只，应尽快释放。这三项共识，菲方及我方都已开始执行，剩下的就是签一个执法的协议。至于渔业协议则非常不容易，因为涉及菲国宪法等，所以目前还在研究中。
Both parties reached consensus on these points last year, although we have yet to sign an agreement; nevertheless, only one point of contention remains. The closest distance between the Philippines and Taiwan is less than 200 nautical miles. If both sides were to demarcate their respective E.E.Z.s (exclusive economic zone), there would be an overlap of over 100 nautical miles. Under such conditions, this sort of a law enforcement agreement will help reduce causes of dispute. However, looking at the long term, attaining a fisheries agreement will require much more time and effort.
去年双方达成共识后，虽然到今年还未签署协议，但受争议的案件只剩下一件。因为菲律宾最靠近台湾的领土之处，距台湾不到200海里，所以如果双方都划出自己的专属经济区一定会重叠，而且重叠会超过100海哩，在这种情况下，执法协议将有助于减少争端。但长远来看，若要达成渔业协议，恐怕还需要更长时间与更多努力。
In 1898, the United States fought a war with Spain over the Philippines. After the U.S. won, the Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain ceded sovereignty over the Philippines to the U.S. However, since there are more than 7,000 Philippine islands, it was difficult to clearly demarcate the area. So they just used latitude and longitude to roughly demarcate this area. However, after the Philippines gained independence in 1946, it regarded all of the area within the latitude and longitude coordinates as its offshore waters. Some of the islands within this area are more than 100 nautical miles from the boundary lines. Under such conditions, it is easy for our fishing vessels to inadvertently enter what the Philippines sees as its territorial waters. Since this is stipulated by the constitution of the Philippines, it is difficult for them to deal with this issue. Before these issues are resolved, it will be difficult to sign a fisheries agreement.
1898年，美国与西班牙为菲律宾发生战争，美国战胜后，（双方）签署《美西和约》，西班牙将菲律宾割让给美国，但在划界时，因菲律宾有七千多个岛屿，无法很清楚地划出来，所以用经纬度来划范围。但菲律宾于1946年独立后，就将此经纬度内的区域都视为是他们的领海，其中有的经纬度距岛屿还超过100海里，在这种情况下，我方渔船很容易进入他们的领海，因为这是菲国宪法的规定，使得他们在处理上也很麻烦，在这些问题解决之前，双方要签订渔业协议确实有其困难。菲律宾也常抱怨我国渔民越界捕鱼，进入他们的领海或专属经济区，所以在达成共识后，我们也一再告诫渔民，如果合法作业，我们一定保障，但如果进入菲律宾领海，就​​不可能保障他们，因为我们的护渔政策是“护渔不护短”。
The Philippines often complains that our fishermen transgress their borders to fish, entering their territorial waters or E.E.Z. So, after we reached consensus, we have repeatedly told our fishermen that if they operate legally, we will protect them. However, if they enter the territorial waters of the Philippines, we cannot do so. Thus, our policy for the protection of fishermen is to “protect fishing, not wrongdoing.”
问：台湾与菲律宾达成执法共识、与日本签署渔业协议来降低区域紧张趋势，台湾是否想要在南海扮演更重要的角色呢？例如进一步与菲律宾、马拉西亚及越南讨论类似协议？
Q. Given that the consensus with the Philippines and the agreement with Japan seem to be reducing tensions in those directions, do you want Taiwan to play a greater role in the South China Sea, particularly with regard to the Philippines’ claims, but also even Malaysia and Vietnam, and particularly given that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China have the same historical antecedents for their respective claims?
答：我们参与区域和平的努力都遭遇同样的困难，一方面台湾与这些国家没有正式的外交关系，双方的接触都会引起中共的关切。第二，中共并不希望我们在南海的国际场合出现，这也使得我们要扮演一个积极的角色会出现困难，但实际上中华民国是一个爱好和平的国家，至少到目前为止，南海最大的岛屿还是由我们驻守，中华民国在1947年就宣布了南海诸岛的位置图，我们的主张也非常清楚，所以还是会争取参与南海在这方面的讨论，希望能扮演区域和平促进者的角色，因为最起码各国都应支持自由航行与飞越，以及以和平方式解决争端。我们认为《东海和平倡议》适用的区域虽然是在东海，但一些基本原则是可以适用于南海的。我所说的这些观念，在《东海和平倡议》中最重要的，就是将主权与资源开发问题区隔开来。
A: Our efforts to take part in regional peace initiatives have all encountered the same difficulty. On the one hand, Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic relations with these countries, so contact between the two sides elicits concerns from mainland China. Second, Beijing hopes we will not be involved in international situations such as South China Sea controversies. This has led us to encounter difficulties in playing an active role. However, in fact, the Republic of China is a peace-loving nation, and up to the present, we have troops stationed on the largest island in the South China Sea. In 1947, the Republic of China published a map of its territories in the South China Sea, so our claim is very clear. Therefore, we continue to seek participation in discussions involving the South China Sea, in hope of acting as a facilitator of peace, since, at the least, all countries should be able to support freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight and the use of peaceful means to resolve disputes. We feel that although the East China Peace Initiative applies to the East China Sea area, many of its basic principles also can be applied to the South China Sea. The most important of these concepts in the East China Sea Peace Initiative that I’ve mentioned is that sovereignty and resource development issues can be decoupled.
在海洋法上有一个很基本的原则，就是“陆地支配海洋”。因此海域的主张都是从陆地开始，不过尽管在逻辑上是如此，但在争端的解决上，并不是不能先解决资源开发的问题，如果我们回头想想，“主权不能分割，但资源可以分享”。实际上在世界许多地区，也都有类似的发展，包括欧洲的北海，在1960、1970年代本来也有海域的争执，但当他们知道再争下去也不会有结果后改为合作，共同开发资源，使得国际石油市场出现重要品牌——“布兰特原油”。
There is a basic principle in the Law of the Sea, that land dominates the sea. Thus marine claims begin with land; however, even if it is logically this way, when resolving disputes, it is not impossible to first resolve resource development issues. If we think back to the past, sovereignty is indivisible, but resources can be shared. In fact, in many areas of the world there is already a similar kind of development, including Europe’s North Sea, which in the 1960s and 1970s was an area of dispute, but once they realized that continuing to dispute would never produce results, they changed to cooperation. Joint development of resources resulted in the emergence of an important brand on the international oil market, Brent Crude.
在东海，实际上我们也是循着这样的逻辑。与日本签署渔业协议，并没有放弃我们对主权的主张，我们认为钓鱼台是中华民国的领土、台湾的属岛，这样的立场从来没有改变。但我们在《台日渔业协议》第四条做了一个规定，就是双方在这个协议之下所采取的行动或措施，不影响我们在海洋法上的权益。用这种方式将此问题暂时搁置下来，如此一来问题就变小了，而不是变大，这样解决之后，将来如果还有机会，我们还是可以探讨有关主权的问题，否则也可以探讨其他资源的开发，像刚才提到的油气或其他新发现的资源。南海问题如果能从这个角度切入，也许可以找到一些解决问题的方案。
In the East China Sea, we are in fact following this kind of logic. When we signed the fisheries agreement with Japan, we did not abandon our sovereignty claim. We regard the Diaoyutais as territory of the Republic of China, and offshore islands appertaining to Taiwan. This stance has never changed. However, in the fourth article of the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, it says that the actions or measures adopted by both parties under this agreement do not affect our rights and interests under the Law of the Sea. By using this approach to shelve our disputes temporarily, the problem became smaller, not larger. Following this sort of resolution, in the future, if there is the opportunity, we can still explore issues pertaining to sovereignty; otherwise, we can explore other issues of resource development, such as oil and gas, or other newly discovered resources that I just mentioned. If the South China Sea issues can be approached from this angle, perhaps solutions can be found to some of them.
问：台湾已经表达希望能够自制潜舰（潜水艇），是否还是依赖美国提供技术呢？
Q. Taiwan has expressed interest in developing its own submarines. How important is that to Taiwan? And if you go ahead with developing your own submarines, would you rely on technology from the U.S. and do you expect to get that?
答：事实上，我们在2001年之前就向美国提出采购柴电潜舰的清单，美方也在当年同意了，但是因为美国从1950年代以后已经不再发展柴电潜舰，建造的都是核电（潜舰），美国已经没办法提供类似成品，但是要找到其他国家（采购）也不是很容易，所以时间耽误了很久。我们现有的四艘潜舰已经过于老旧，例如1970年代引进的茄比级潜舰，已经将近70岁了，非常需要替换。我们会走“潜舰国造”的路线，当然必须要引进外来技术才有可能（发展）。
A: As a matter of fact, before 2001, we presented a procurement list for diesel-powered submarines to the U.S. In the same year, the U.S. approved our proposal, but because it had stopped developing diesel-powered submarines in the 1950s and now manufactures only nuclear-powered ones, it was unable to supply us with the items we wanted. It has also been difficult to purchase them from other countries. This has led to a long delay. The four submarines we have are old and outdated; for example, the Guppy-class submarines we purchased in the 1970s have been in service for almost 70 years. These need to be replaced. We will continue with our indigenous submarine program; of course, we will need to rely on technologies from other countries.
问：是否已经对美国提出正式要求呢？
Q. Where does that stand? I understand that you have formal requests to the United States. Have you received any reply on obtaining submarine technology that would allow you to build subs in your own shipyards?
答：我们现在还在跟美国讨论这个问题。我们自己的造舰技术，包括炮艇、巡防舰乃至于4千到5千吨的船舰我们都可以造，但是潜舰需要的技术不一样，我们会继续跟美方讨论在技术上要如何合作。
A: We are still discussing this issue with the United States. With our current shipbuilding technology, we can build gunships, frigates and even 4,000- to 5,000-ton vessels. But the technology needed for building submarines is different. We will continue to discuss how we could engage the U.S. in technological cooperation.
问：目前台湾已经向美国正式提出技术支援的请求吗？
Q. Is there a formal recent request you made? I have heard different versions on this, a formal recent request for submarine technology that you would build into vessels that would actually be assembled in Taiwanese shipyards. Or was it not an actual recent formal request for a specific technology that would allow you to do this at all?
答：我想提出正式要求应该是最后一步，应该是在确认技术可以移转的情况下才会提出来，这主要是一个形式，最重要的是能够找到关键的潜舰制造技术，这方面我们也会继续努力，一旦有成果就会提出，但是美方在2001年已经同意。
A: Making a formal request should be the last step. It should be made only after we have confirmed that the technology can be transferred. That would mainly be a formality. The most important thing is whether we can obtain the key submarine technology. We will continue to work on this, and once we succeed, we will make a request. However, the U.S. already gave its approval in 2001.
问：美国与欧盟的企业如果在中国大陆违反《反垄断法》，通常会受到处分，但相较之下对台湾企业似乎比较宽松？
Q. Taiwanese companies have conspicuously not been punished in recent months as China has confronted multinationals from the United States, Europe and Japan, accusing them of offenses like breaking antimonopoly laws. Is this because Taiwan has an understanding with China that they are not going after your companies, that you are somehow exempt from the economic nationalism because they see you as part of China? Why is it that Taiwanese companies seem to have this exemption from the current crackdown on foreign companies, more broadly, in China?
答：台湾跟中国大陆都是世界贸易组织的成员，享有一样的权利义务，我们没有因为距离大陆比较近，或者因为语言一样，就享受到特殊优待，就我所知是没有。
A: Taiwan and mainland China are both members of the World Trade Organization. We enjoy the same rights and obligations. We do not receive special privileges because we are closer geographically or speak the same language. We don’t as far as I know.
您刚刚提到有关反垄断的法律，是不是因为台商的规模没有这么大，所以违反这些法律的机会不大，这我并不是很清楚。
You just mentioned antimonopoly laws. Could it be because Taiwan’s businesses are not so large and therefore are less likely to violate these laws? I am not sure about that.
问：您有考量以任何方式因应美国猪肉进口的议题吗？
Q. Do you foresee a way to address the pork issue with the United States such that you can get a bilateral investment agreement done with the United States before you leave office?
答：我们实际上已经跟美方恢复了TIFA协商，这是双方在1994年签订的一个协议。关于猪肉问题，因为两年前国内讨论开放美国牛肉时，美国在台协会明白地告诉我们，牛肉跟猪肉可以分开处理，所以我们当初对国人说明时，第一个原则就是“牛猪分离”。因为牛肉在台湾被食用的机会远远低于猪肉，台湾猪肉消费量很大，尤其是吃猪的内脏，倘有任何莱克多巴胺，留在内脏的残留量会比较高，我们对这方面会比较忧虑，因此到目前为止并没有同意猪肉含有莱克多巴胺。
A: We have resumed negotiations with the United States under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in 1994. Regarding the pork issue, when we were discussing opening up the market to U.S. beef two years ago, the American Institute in Taiwan told us clearly that beef and pork imports could be discussed separately. When we first communicated this to our people, the first principle we observed was that the importation of beef and pork would be considered separate issues. Taiwan consumes a far lower amount of beef than pork. Our pork consumption is very high, especially of offal. The use of ractopamine results in higher residual levels in internal organs. We are more concerned about this. This is why we have not agreed to allow pork imports containing ractopamine.
至于牛肉，在与美方多次协调后，MRL（谨注，全称为Maximum Residue Limit，指肉品残留莱克多巴胺的容许量）在10个pbb以内，我们允许进口，现在这个问题已解决。美方两年前曾经告诉我们牛肉猪肉可以分开，我们也用这个原则处理，因此这个问题双方还需要好好谈一谈。
With regards to beef, after many rounds of negotiations with the U.S., we now permit the import of beef with a maximum residue limit of 10 pbb. This problem has now been resolved. The U.S. said two years ago that beef and pork imports could be discussed separately, and we have proceeded accordingly. Therefore, the two sides will need to conduct further discussions on this issue.
第二，美国猪肉对中华民国所占的出口比例非常小，我们现在实际上开放美国猪肉进口，唯一差别是对于含有莱克多巴胺的肉类不允许进口。而美国出口的猪肉，无论是到俄罗斯、欧盟或中国大陆，都没有含莱克多巴胺。台湾进口美国猪肉量非常少，远远低于俄罗斯、欧盟或中国大陆，看不出来为什么不能让我们进口的猪肉没有莱克多巴胺？我们觉得这不是一个很大的议题，不应该因为这个议题，而阻挡在其他许多议题上的协商，尤其是两国有关双边投资协定的协商，如果是这样，就非常可惜，因为（猪肉进口）的量占得非常少。现在我们听到的口号是No Pork, No Talk，我觉得这不是一个很有智慧的说法。
Second, pork accounts for a very small proportion of U.S. exports to the R.O.C. We have opened our market to U.S. pork. The only restriction is that pork containing ractopamine is not allowed. U.S. pork exports, whether to Russia, the European Union, or mainland China, do not contain ractopamine. Taiwan imports a very small volume of U.S. pork, far less than Russia, the E.U., or mainland China. We see no reason why pork exported to Taiwan cannot be ractopamine-free. We do not think that this is a big issue. It should not impede our negotiations with the U.S. on a number of other issues, especially a bilateral investment agreement. Otherwise it would be a shame because U.S. exports very little pork to Taiwan. I do not think that the slogan we now hear — no pork, no talks — is very wise.
问：中国大陆已经超​​越美国成为台湾第一大贸易伙伴，您是否会担心因为经济过度依赖中国，使台湾失去政治与安全的弹性？
Q. Do you have any concern that Taiwan’s ever-growing economic ties to the mainland, and now that mainland China has passed the United States as the biggest trading partner of Taiwan, mean that Taiwan is losing its political and security flexibility, that it is becoming too dependent on China economically?
答：最近一段时间确实有人在讨论台湾对中国大陆的经济是否过度依赖，首先，我们要检讨什么是“依赖”，什么是“过度依赖”。例如2000年时台湾对大陆（包括香港）的出口占整体出口的24%，在2008年我执政前，台湾对大陆的出口已成长为40%，大家都认为2008年到现在，台湾对大陆的出口还会持续增加，但是刚好相反，从去年到今年9月，台湾对大陆出口约占39%，相较2008年时，不但没有增加，反而减少。其中重要的原因之一是我们分散了出口市场，例如我们与东协的贸易占整体出口的（比例），从12%成长到15%，现在已经达到19%，可说是一直都是往上成长的趋势。
A: Some people have indeed been discussing recently whether Taiwan is too dependent on the mainland Chinese economy. We must first examine what dependence and over-dependence mean. For example, in 2000, mainland China (including Hong Kong) accounted for 24 percent of Taiwan’s total exports. Before I took office in 2008, our exports to the mainland had risen to a 40-percent share. People thought that this figure would continue to increase. But the reverse has happened. From last year to September of this year, 39 percent of Taiwan’s exports were shipped to mainland China. The figure did not increase but instead decreased. An important reason is that we have diversified our export markets. For example, our exports to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations grew from a 12-percent to 15-percent share, and have now reached 19 percent. This shows a consistently upward trend.
实际上，中国大陆周边的23个国家当中，有17个都以它做为第一大贸易伙伴，双边的贸易额都非常高，因为大陆现在是全球第二大经济体及第一大出口国。我们可以看美国与加拿大及墨西哥的关系，他们有“北美自由贸易区”，墨西哥与加拿大对美国的出口占（整体）出口（量）的75%，美国出口到加拿大及墨西哥则各占两国进口（量）的50%，因此双边整体贸易的依存度是65%，远高于两岸间的贸易。有人会说美国与加拿大及墨西哥的关系与两岸关系不同，政治关系确实不一样，不过在经济的领域上，双方距离相近、同文同种，关系非常密切，贸易量多是无可避免的。我们与中国大陆的贸易量如果只占整体的10%，与美国的贸易量却占50%，这在经济（的领域）上（几乎）是不可能发生的。但是以前曾经发生过，我记得我刚从美国回来的时候，大约是1981至1988年，我们对美国的出口占整体出口的一半，超过五成，后来我们与大陆及其他国家（的贸易）慢慢平衡起来，所以这是会变化的，以目前的程度来看，尚未到过度依赖的地步。我们对大陆的贸易量确实一直在增加，但比例反而降低，以目前的情况而言，值得注意但不必过度紧张。
Mainland China is the largest trading partner of 17 of its 23 neighboring countries. Their bilateral trade values are extremely high because mainland China is the world’s second largest economy and largest exporter. We can take a look at U.S. relations with Canada and Mexico. The three countries have formed a North American free trade area. About 75 percent of Mexican and Canadian exports are destined for the U.S., while the U.S. supplies about 50 percent of their respective total imports. Therefore, their bilateral trade dependence is 65 percent, which is far higher than that in cross-strait trade. Some people might say that U.S. relations with Canada and Mexico are different from cross-strait ties. Their political relations are certainly different. Economically, however, the countries are located in close proximity, share similar cultures and ethnic backgrounds, as well as close relations. That they would have a large trade volume is inevitable. If mainland China were to account for only 10 percent of our total trade and the U.S., 50 percent, it would be [almost] impossible economically. However, this happened before. I remember when I had just returned from the U.S., around 1981 to 1988, half or more than half of Taiwan’s exports were destined for the U.S. Our trade with mainland China and other countries gradually became more balanced. Things change. Judging from the present situation, we have not yet become over-dependent on mainland China. Our trade with the mainland has indeed continued to increase, but its share of total trade has decreased. The present situation warrants our attention but does not call for excessive anxiety.
问：您支持香港的民主化，今年初台湾曾发生学运，许多人指出两者有些相同与相异之处，主要都是受到中国大陆的影响，你也曾批评过台湾的抗议学生，请问您觉得两者有什么异同之处呢？
Q. Going back to your support for democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan had protests earlier this year. Many people pointed out similarities between the two. While the details are different, the fundamental issue concerns the influence of China. But you were also critical of the protests here. Do you see any contradiction in your standpoint, or do you see any similarities or differences between the two protest movements?
答：您刚问说我对台湾学运与香港学运的看法是否矛盾，完全没有，因为我支持民主、反对暴力。台湾与香港的学运有两个地方相同，也有两个地方不同，相同之处在于双方都是以学生为主，而且学生都有极高的热诚，但是双方的目的不一样，在香港是争取普选，换句话说是争取民主，在台湾是反对政府的大陆政策，所以是反对一项公共政策，因为香港要争取的民主，台湾都已经有了。第二个不同在于政府当局的反应不同，我们是一个民主国家，所以对民众提出的诉求都会研究并且回应，例如学生在第一天提出的诉求是希望服贸协议必须逐条审查、逐条表决，实际上服贸协议还在立法院，并没有通过，而两天后国民党团就说这本来就是两党的协议，没有问题，我们可以接受。
A: You asked whether there is any contradiction in my standpoint on the Hong Kong and Taiwan protests — there is absolutely no contradiction, as I support democracy, but oppose violence. With regard to the student movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are two similarities and two differences. As for similarities, the two movements were both dominated by students, who demonstrated great enthusiasm. However, the goals of the two movements are different. In Hong Kong, the aim is universal suffrage, in other words, demanding democracy. In Taiwan, the movement opposed our mainland China policy, objecting to a public policy. Democracy, which people in Hong Kong are pursuing, already exists in Taiwan. The second difference is the reaction of the authorities. We are a democratic nation, and concerns raised by the public will be examined and responded to. For example, on the first day of the protests here, students demanded that the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement be reviewed and voted on article by article. In fact, the agreement at that time was still before the Legislative Yuan and had not yet been passed. Two days later, the Kuomintang (KMT) party caucus said that it would accept this demand, as this was already the consensus of the two major parties.
学生看到他们提出的第一个诉求被接受以后，又提出第二个诉求，要求制订《两岸协议监督条例》。实际上在他们提出（诉求）的一个月前，立法院国民党团就已经与行政院达成四阶段监督程序。行政院在4月3日，学运尚未结束前，就已经通过监督条例草案，并送到立法院，但迄今已经过了6个多月，都还没处理。
After seeing that their first demand had been accepted, they made a second. They called for the establishment of an oversight act for agreements between Taiwan and mainland China. A month prior to this, the KMT party caucus in the Legislative Yuan had reached consensus with the Executive Yuan on creating a four-stage oversight mechanism. On April 3, before the protest movement ended, the Executive Yuan approved a draft of such an act and sent it to the Legislative Yuan. Today, more than six months later, the draft still has not gotten through the legislature.
另外一方面，学生要求与政府对话。行政院江院长在3月22日从行政院走到立法院，走进群众当中要跟抗议群众对话，但是学生说“你先要同意将服贸协议退回，我们才对话”。就我记忆所及，这是中华民国第一次（有）最高行政首长走到群众当中讨论他们的诉求，这是非常不容易的，但他居然被拒绝了，只好走回行政院去。学生要求与官员对话，官员来了却被拒绝。
Meanwhile, the students called for dialogue with the government. On March 22, Premier Jiang walked from the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan, and went among the crowd gathered there for a discussion. But the students said that the trade in services agreement should first be withdrawn before they would engage in dialogue. As far as I know, this was the first time that the highest-ranking official of the executive branch of the R.O.C. government went into a group of protesters to discuss their demands — it was really quite something. However, he was rejected, and walked back to the Executive Yuan. Even though the students requested dialogue with government officials, when a government official came to talk with them, he was turned away.
后来我在第二天召开记者会说明政府立场，而后在3月25日，我提出愿意与学生在总统府就他们的诉求交换意见，而且全程公开，电视台可以全程转播。后来我一共提出7次提议，他们提出许多反对理由不跟我见面，包括如果要见面，我不可以在立法院要求国民党团执行党纪，他们甚至建议不在总统府，应该在凯达格兰大道的路中间开会。我不晓得其他国家情形如何，但是一国总统提出7次欢迎学生与总统对话的提议，都被拒绝，我想我们已经做到“有回应的政府（responsive government）”地步了。
The next day, I held a press conference explaining the government’s position. On March 25, I came out and said that I was willing to exchange views with students at the office of the president. Such a meeting would be public and could have been broadcast on television. In total, I issued an invitation for dialogue seven times, but each time, the students put forward reasons for not wanting to meet with me. For example, if we were to meet, they said, I could not request that the KMT party caucus in the Legislative Yuan exercise party discipline. They also said that a meeting should not be held in the office of the president, but on Kaitakelan Boulevard. I wonder how things are in other countries, but I, as president, extended seven invitations to speak with students, and though these were all rejected, I believe we did our part as a responsive government.
实际上我们也做到他们绝大部分的要求，除了退回服贸协议、重新协商这一项以外，这（一项）我们做不到，在国际上也不能这样。（如果）我们这样做，会被国际社会认为是一个不可靠的贸易伙伴，会影响到未来我们跟其他国家签订类似协议。所以我刚刚讲到两点：一个是目标不同，一个是政府处理态度不同，学生基本上反对我们的大陆政策，但实际上我们的大陆政策受到绝大多数民众赞成。他们（抗议民众）觉得服贸协议是“黑箱”（black box），实际上服贸协议在进入立法院（审查）之前，过程是中华民国行宪以来最透明的一个法案。
In fact, we met most of their demands, except for withdrawing the trade in services agreement and renegotiating it. We could not have agreed to that demand. Doing so would be unacceptable in the international arena. If we had done so, the international community would regard us as an unreliable trade partner, which would then affect our ability to sign similar agreements with other countries. So I have mentioned two differences, which are the goals of the protests as well as the responses of the respective governments. The students fundamentally disagree with our mainland China policy. In fact, our mainland China policy has had the support of a large majority of our people. They [the protesters] believe that the trade in services agreement is a black box accord, but in fact, before being sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation, it was handled with the highest degree of transparency since constitutional rule was instituted in the R.O.C.
在去年6月21日双方签订（服贸协议）之前，经济部已经与46种服务业、264位代表进行110场咨商，并都留有纪录。送到立法院前，三次向立法院委员会做正式报告，送到立法院之后，经济部另外举办了140多场大规模座谈，有7千9百多人参加。今年三月份（服贸协议）进入委员会审查之前，又办了20场公听会。中华民国立法院成立以来，没有任何一个议案用这么长时间进行这么多讨论，但还被认为是黑箱作业，现在已经进入立法院，又办了这么多场公听会，怎么还会不透明呢？关键是，他们（在野党）似乎不希望（立法院）审查这个法案，他们想要阻挡。
Before the agreement was signed by the two sides on June 21 of last year, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (M.O.E.A.) held 110 rounds of consultations with 264 representatives from 46 service-economy sectors. For each of these there is a record. In addition, before the agreement was sent to the Legislative Yuan, three formal reports were made to relevant committees of the Legislative Yuan. After it was sent to the Legislative Yuan, the M.O.E.A. held more than 140 large-scale seminars, which were attended by more than 7,900 people. In March of this year, before the legislative review had started, 20 public hearings were held. Since the R.O.C. Legislative Yuan was established, no bill has been afforded this much time or deliberation. Nevertheless, it still is regarded as a black box process. With the agreement having already entered the Legislative Yuan, and with so many public hearings having been organized, how can it still be regarded as not transparent? The key point is that they [the opposition] do not want this bill to be reviewed [by the Legislative Yuan]. They want to block it from moving forward.
在西方民主国家，反对党要阻挡一个议案，通常会采取的方式为Filibuster（冗长发言），从事Filibuster的议员要有不间断持续讲十几个小时的能力，否则无法达成阻挡一个议案的目的，我看到的实例中最长达23个小时。但是在我们的国会中，只要反对党用暴力方式占领主席台，会就开不下去了。从这一届以来，已经有90多次纪录，他们的目的就是不希望我们与中国大陆签服贸协议，这对台湾发展非常不利，因为与我们签署贸易协定的国家很少，对我国竞争很不利，加上中国大陆的服务业基本上没有台湾发达，若可以过去，对台湾服务业的发展是很好的机会。
In Western democracies, if the opposition wants to block a bill from moving forward, a filibuster is often the tactic used. A lawmaker proposing such a filibuster must speak uninterrupted for more than 10 hours to achieve his goal. I think the longest I have heard of was more than 23 hours. In our legislature, the opposition can simply use violence to occupy the speaker’s podium and stop proceedings. In the current session of the legislature, we have already witnessed more than 90 such instances. They do not want us to sign the trade in services agreement with mainland China. However, this will greatly harm Taiwan’s development. The number of countries that have signed free trade agreements with us is limited, hurting our competitiveness. In addition, the service sector in mainland China is not as developed as ours, and entering the mainland China market would present great opportunities for Taiwan’s service industry.
我国经济学家估计，我国对大陆服务业出口会因为这个（服贸）协议增加37%，大陆到台湾只增加9%，这个协议基本上对台湾要比对大陆更为有利。这也是为什么我们认为服贸协议还是必须通过的原因。今年因为要选举，立法院会期比较短，但是我们希望朝野两党要体认到，台湾目前面对的国际挑战，无论哪一个党执政都需要面对，阻挡的结果只会让台湾在竞争上处于更不利的地位，这也是华尔街日报提出社论《台湾自甘落后》的理由。
Economists in Taiwan believe that as a result of the trade in services agreement, our service exports to mainland China will grow by 37 percent, while mainland Chinese service exports to Taiwan will only increase by nine percent. The agreement will thus be more beneficial to Taiwan. This is why we believe that the agreement should still be passed. This year we are holding elections, so the current session of the Legislative Yuan is relatively short. However, we hope that both the governing and opposition parties are aware of the international challenges that Taiwan faces. Regardless of which party is in power, these challenges will have to be met. Blocking the agreement will only result in lowering Taiwan’s competitive standing. That is why The Wall Street Journal published an editorial entitled “Taiwan leaves itself behind.”
所以我再度强调，我看香港与台湾的学运，基本上我们“欢迎民主、反对暴力”，任何一个民主国家都无法容忍国会或行政机关被任何人（包括学生）强占，这样的做法不是民主，而是暴力。