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Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Tamil Nadu

ORDER P.G. Chacko, Member (J) 1. These appeals are against an order of the Commissioner of Central Excise confirming a demand of duty of over Rs. 1.8 crores against M/s. Hatsun Food Company (HFC, in short), imposing on them penalties under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act and Rule 173 Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and also imposing penalties on Shri R.C. Chandramogan (Managing Partner of the above firm) and Shri Raja K.S.P. Ganesan (Partner of the above firm) under Rule 209 A of the said Rules. The demand of duty is on excisable goods cleared by M/s. HFC to M/s. Hatsum Agro Products Ltd. (HAPL, in short) during the period 1995-96 to 98-99. It is on a value addition made by the department on the basis of the price at which M/s. HAPL sold the goods to their customers, which, in turn, is based on a finding that HFC and HAPL are 'related persons' under Section 4(4) (c) of the Central Excise Act. It appears from the records that a major part of the production in HFC's factory was sold to HAPL and the remaining part sold at factory gate to other independent buyers. The value addition proposed by the department in the relevant show-cause was opposed by HFC, who took the view that, where factory gate sales to independent buyers were available, it was the price for such sales that would constitute 'normal price' for the purpose of assessment of the goods to duty of excise and that the price at which the major buyer, whether related or not, sold that goods to the ultimate customers was irrelevant. The show-cause notice, incidentally, also proposed penalties on HFC and its partners. This proposal was also resisted. In adjudication of the dispute, the Commissioner passed the impugned order, the operative part of which has already been outlined. 2. Ld. Chartered Accountant submits that the valuation issue arising in Appeal No. E/307/2004 is similar to the issue which had arisen before this Bench in the case of Hatsun Milk Food Ltd. and Ors. (Appeal Nos. E/1845 to 1849/99/MAS) which was decided as per Final Order No. 1303-1307/2000 dated 16.8.2000 in favour of the assessee. Ld. C.A. submits that the conclusion arrived at in the said order is squarely applicable to the instant case. It is also pointed out that the said Final Order was not challenged by the Revenue and has become final and binding on them. The demand of duty requires to be set aside, following the decision of this Bench in the case of Hatsun Milk Food Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the penalties also require to be vacated. 3. Ld. SDR has endeavoured defend the order of the Commissioner by harping on the aspect of 'lifting the corporate veil". She has spoken of 'unity of interest' between HFC and HAPL. She considers that HFC is the manufacturing unit and HAPL is their marketing limb. This way, she seeks to establish 'mutuality of interest' between them and, thereby, "relationship" between them in terms of Section 4(4) (c) ibid. Ld. SDR, therefore, submits that the valuation of the goods cleared by HFC to HAPL during the material period should be based on the price at which the latter sold the goods to their customers. In his rejoinder, Ld. C.A. submits that any relationship between HFC and HAPL is irrelevant inasmuch as factory gate sale price charged to independent buyers is readily available. His reliance, in this connection, is on the Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Union of India v. Kantilal Chunilal and Ors., 1987 (1) ECC 1 (SC) : 1986 (26) ELT 289 (SC). 4. We have considered the submissions and the cited case law. We find that there is a clear parallel between this case and the case of Hatsun Milk Food. M/s Hatsun Milk Food Ltd. had sold their major production to a party who was considered by the department as "related" to the assessee, and the remaining goods were sold to buyers who were admittedly unrelated. In that case, it was also an admitted fact that the prices at which sales had been effected to the so-called related person were at levels higher than those charged to unrelated buyers during the relevant period. This Bench, by following the ruling of the Apex Court judgment in Kantilal Chunilal (supra), held that the goods sold by M/s Hatsun Milk Food Ltd. to the so-called 'related' buyer were liable to be assessed on the basis of the price at which the former sold identical goods at factory gate to other independent buyers. It was held that the relationship, if any, was irrelevant to such a valuation. We find that the factual matrix of the instant case is, essentially, the same as that of Hatsun Milk Food. The decision in the said case has become final and binding for want of challenge by Revenue and hence the same has to be followed in the instant case. Accordingly, we hold that the clearances effected by HFC to HAPL during the period of dispute are liable to be assessed to duty on the basis of the price at which the former were selling identical goods during the same period at factory gate to other independent buyers, however small the proportion of such sales may be. The assessee, in this case, valued their goods only on this basis and paid duty accordingly. They are not liable to pay any more on those clearances. The demand of duty is, therefore, set aside. Once the demand of duty is set aside, penalties should follow suit and we vacate the same. The impugned order is set aside and the appeals stand allowed.

Hatsun Food Company, Shri R.G. ... vs Commissioner Of Central Excise on 3 September, 2004

Allahabad High Court

Court No. - 34 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 818 of 1995 Petitioner :- Atar Singh & Ohters Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Another Petitioner Counsel :- S.M. Yadav,L.P. Singh,Rakesh Singh Respondent Counsel :- Madan Mohan Hon'ble Prakash Chandra Verma,J. Hon'ble Ram Autar Singh,J. Case called out. None appears to press this first appeal on behalf of the appellant. It is, accordingly, dismissed for want of prosecution. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. Order Date :- 02.02.2010. Rks.

Atar Singh & Ohters vs State Of U.P. & Another on 2 February, 2010

Gujarat High Court

Author: J.B.Pardiwala,

Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print CR.MA/15525/2011 2/ 2 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION No. 15525 of 2011 ========================================================= BHARAT @PAILOT RAMESHBHAI THAKOR - Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT - Respondent(s) ========================================================= Appearance : MR.MRUDUL M BAROT for Applicant(s) : 1, MS NAIR, APP for Respondent(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA Date : 18/11/2011 ORAL ORDER Rule. Ms. Nair, learned APP waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of State. In the meantime, trial Court concerned i.e. Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Nadiad is directed to send a report as regards the status of the trial i.e. Criminal Case No.923 of 2011 arising from First Information Report registered with I-CR No.221 of 2010 with Nadiad (Rural) Police Station on or before returnable date. The trial Court concerned shall specify as to how many witnesses have been examined and how much time is likely to be consumed for completion of a trial. S.O. to 2 nd December, 2011. [J.B. Pardiwala, J.] #MH Dave     Top

Bharat vs State on 18 November, 2011

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 32715 of 2008(T) 1. SAJITH N.L., ... Petitioner 2. SUDHEER S., 3. SUNILKUMAR S., HSST (SOCIOLOGY), 4. SABU GEORGE, HSST (ENGLISH), 5. SITHARA K.M., HSST (GEOGRAPHY), 6. PRAMEELA P.P., HSST (CHEMISTRY), 7. DOLLY K., HSST (PHYSICS), 8. DR.N.KALA, HSST (GEOGRAPHY), 9. REKHA A., HSST (ENGLISH), 10. PRAMOD S., HSST (SOCIOLOGY), 11. AJITH KUMAR V., HSST (COMMERCE), 12. ALEXANDER K., HSST (POLITICAL SCIENCE), 13. ANIL GOMEZ, HSST (COMMERCE), 14. SHYNI P.S., HSST (CHEMISTRY), 15. JAYASREE K./B., HSST (SOCIOLOGY), 16. NISHA V.S, HSST (CHEMISTRY), 17. BIJU JOHN,HSST (CHEMISTRY), 18. SIRAJI S., HSST (ENGLISH), 19. SALEEM PAUL, HSST, (MATHS), 20. PRASEETHA K., HSST (PHYSICS), 21. VIDYA K., HSST (PHYSICS), 22. MARIYA RESHMI ANTONY, HSST (ENGLISH), 23. ASSA LETHA G., HSST (HINDI), 24. RAJESH D., HSST (PHYSICS), 25. SIDDIQUE.S, HSST (CHEMISTRY), 26. DR.Y.MARYDAS, HSST (POLITICS), 27. PRASAD C.J., HSST (COMMERCE), 28. SATHYAN.M., HSST (ECONOMICS), 29. BIJUMON GEORGE, HSST (MATHS), 30. SUNILKUMAR D., HSST (ECONOMICS), 31. LALSON MATHEW, HSST (COMMERCE), 32. BIJU KOSHY ABRAHAM, HSST (C0MMERCE), 33. PRINCE J ANTONY, HSST (COMMERCE), 34. SHARON RACHEL, HSST (ENGLISH), 35. KOSHY ABRAHAM, HSST (PHYSICS), 36. ANNAMMA THOAMS, HSST (COMMERCE), 37. NAJUMA MATHAR V.M., HSST (CHIMESTRY), 38. SUNITHA S.S, HSST (PHYSICS), 39. ANITHA H.R., HSST (HINDI), 40. BINDHU K.S., HSST (CHEMISTRY), 41. LEENA K.S,HSST (MATHS), 42. ASHA VENUGOPAL, HSST (ENGLISH), 43. GIRISH P.R., HSST (ECONOMICS), 44. PRADEEP CHANDRAN B., HSST (PHYSICS), 45. MARTIN CHACKO, HSST (ECONOMICS), 46. SREELAL SREENIVASAN, HSST, 47. JOSEPH GEORGE, HSST, (ENGLISH), 48. JOSEPH V.J., HSSTG, (POLITICAL SCIENCE), Vs 1. STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE ... Respondent 2. THE DIREOCTOR OF HIGHER SECONDARY For Petitioner :SRI.ELVIN PETER P.J. For Respondent : No Appearance The Hon'ble MR. Justice ANTONY DOMINIC Dated :07/11/2008 O R D E R ANTONY DOMINIC, J ----------------------------------------------------------- W.P.(C).No.32715/2008 ----------------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 6th day of November, 2008 JUDGMENT Exts.P1 to P47 are the orders appointing the petitioners as HSSTs in the Government Higher Secondary Schools. Petitioners submit that prior to their appointment as HSSTs, they had service in aided schools and relying on Exts.P48 and P49 Govt. orders, it is contended that, for conferring higher grade, prior service in the aided school is liable to be reckoned. With that request they have moved the first respondent by filing Ext.P50 representation and in this writ petition the main complaint is that there is delay in considering and passing orders on Ext.P50. Petitioner therefore seek a direction to the first respondent to dispose of Ext.P50 on an expeditious basis. 2 Having regard to the limited nature of the relief that is sought for, I direct that the first respondent shall dispose of Ext.P50, as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within 3 weeks from the date of production of a coy of the judgment. It is directed that one of the petitioners be heard before final orders are passed. Writ Petition is disposed of as above. ANTONY DOMINIC JUDGE vi. 3

Sajith N.L vs State Of Kerala Represented By The on 7 November, 2008

Allahabad High Court

Court No. - 18 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 41650 of 2010 Petitioner :- Chandan Lal Dwivedi Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others Petitioner Counsel :- Santosh Kumar Tripathi Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,A.K.Mehrotra Hon'ble Arun Tandon,J. Petitioner has already filed Writ Petition No. 50979 of 2007 claiming therein that the advertisement of the vacancy qua the post of Lecturer Civics in Obra Intermediate College, Obra for direct recruitment is illegal, inasmuch as vacancy is to be filled by promotion within 50% quota. In the said writ petition an interim order has been granted on 24.10.2007 providing that no selection shall be made on the post of Lecturer Civics in pursuance to the advertisement dated 17.09.2007. The writ petition is still pending. By means of this petition the petitioner seeks consideration of his claim for promotion against the same post. I am of the considered opinion that the issue, as to whether the vacancy is within direct recruitment quota or for promotion, is to be finally adjudicated by this Court in Writ Petition No. 50979 of 2007, filed by the petitioner himself, and therefore he cannot be permitted to seek a mandamus for the post being filled by promotion by means of a separate petition. He may make an application, if so advised, in his pending writ petition. Writ petition is dismissed with the observation made above. Order Date :- 20.7.2010 Pkb/

Chandan Lal Dwivedi vs State Of U.P. And Others on 20 July, 2010

Rajasthan High Court

Author: S K Garg

Name of accused- Convicted under section Sentence awarded appellant Bali alias Banal Singh 376 IPC Five years' RI and a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo RI for 3 months. 450 IPC Three years' RI and a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo RI for 3 months. The above sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, in short, are as follows :- JUDGMENT Sunil Kumar Garg, J. 1. This is an appeal by the accused-appellant against the judgment and order dated 30-4-1982 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar in Sessions Case No. 34/1981, by which the learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 376 and 450, IPC and sentenced in the following manner:- On 10-1-1981, PW-1 Indobai lodged an oral report Ex. P/1 before PW-7 Mani Ram, who was SHO on that day at Police Station, Matilirathan District Sri Ganganagar stating inter alia that day before yesterday she had gone to Gurusar to take the Muklawa of her son Mahendra and Mahendra was also with her. It is further stated in the report that at her house, she has left her daughters Mst. Mukhtyaro, PW-2 (prosecutrix) aged about 28 years and Guddi, PW-3 aged about 16 years and Pappi, aged about 10 years and her husband was also out of station and had gone to Bikaner. PW-2 Mukhtyaro was married and she had one son of one and half years and for the last one and half years, she has been living with PW-1 Indobai. It is further stated in the report that on the previous day i.e. on 9-1-1981, she has come to her house and when she came she was informed by PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) that at about 2.00 p.m. when she was sitting in her house on the cot and combing her hair, Guddi and Pappi had gone to the field and accused-appellant came there and committed rape on her. It is further stated in the report that thereafter PW-3 Shishuguddi came there and she made hue and cry and thereafter, accused-appellant ran away from the scene and when he was running, he was seen by PW-5 Kartar Singh and PW-4 Chandu Ram. It is further stated in the report that as she was having no transportation, therefore, report has been lodged on the next day i.e. on 10-1-1981. On this report, PW-7 Maniram registered the case and started investigation. During investigation, PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) was got medically examined by PW-6 Dr. Rajendra Kumar and her medical examination report is Ex. P/3 and the report determining her age is Ex. P/4, where her age has been determined as 20 years. After usual investigation, a challan was filed against the accused-appellant in the Court of Magistrate and from where the case was committed to the Court of Session. On 28-7-1981, the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar framed charges against the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 376 and 450, IPC. The charges were read over and explained to the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed trial. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses and got exhibited several documents. Thereafter, statement of the accused-appellant under Section 313, Cr.P.C. was recorded. No evidence was led by the accused-appellant in defence. After conclusion of trial, the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar vide his judgment and order dated 30-4-1982 convicted the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 376 and 450, IPC and sentenced in the manner as stated above. Before proceeding further, it may be stated here that when the statement of PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) was being recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, he felt that she was suffering from mental disease and she was not in a position to give statement and, therefore, he ordered that her mental state be got examined by the doctor. On the file, there is a report of the Superintendent, Mental Hospital, Jaipur dated 27-2-1982, which speaks that PW-2 Mukhtyaro was suffering from mental retardation and her mental age was three years and I.Q. was 21. It may further be stated here that because of this fact her statement could not be recorded and proceedings have taken place in the absence of her statement. The learned Sessions Judge while recording conviction of the accused-appellant came to the following conclusions :- 1. That on the date of incident, PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) was patient of mental retardation. 2. That PW-6 Dr. Rajendra Kumar has proved X-ray report Ex. P/4 and has come to the conclusion that on the date of incident, the age of PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) was 20 years. 3. That PW-6 Dr. Rajendra Kumar has come to the conclusion that no definite opinion can be given about the commission of rape with PW-2 Mukhtyaro in the absence of FSL report and the FSL report has not been produced in the present case. 4. That the learned Sessions Judge has relied on the evidence of PW-3 Shishuguddi and after relying on her statement, he has convicted the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 376 and 450, IPC. Aggrieved from the said judgment and order dated 30-4-1982 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, the present appeal has been filed by the accused-appellant. 3. In this appeal, the following submissions have been made by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant :- 1. That there is no evidence of intercourse with PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) by accused-appellant and there is also no evidence on record which shows that PW2 Mukhtyaro has any injury on her private part and thus, there is no medical evidence in this case and in such circumstances, in absence of statement of PW-2 Mukhtyaro, the conviction of the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 376, IPC cannot be maintained. 2. That since there is statement of PW-3 Shishuguddi which shows that she saw the accused-appellant committing rape on PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix), therefore, from this point of view also, a case at the most under Section 354, IPC can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and not under Section 376, IPC, as the fact that sexual intercourse by accused-appellant with her has taken place in actual form has not been established by the prosecution. 3. That the accused-appellant is in jail for the last more than eight months and, therefore, he should be sentenced to the period already undergone by him. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor has not much controverted the above arguments, but has argued that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that a case under Section 354, IPC is made out against the accused-appellant, then, quantum of fine be raised. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the accused-appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the record of the case. 6. So far as the fact that PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) was a patient of mental retardation on the date of occurrence is concerned, there is no dispute on this point and because of this reason, she has not been examined in Court and, thus, there is no evidence of the prosecutrix herself to support the findings of conviction of rape. 7. So far as the medical evidence is concerned, PW-6 Dr. Rajendra Kumar has clearly stated in his statement that no definite opinion regarding rape on PW-2 Mukhtyaro can be given for want of FSL report and FSL report has not been produced in the present case. There is no dispute on the point that PW-2 Mukhtyaro was having no injury on her private part when she was got medically examined and she was a married woman. 8. PW-1 Indo Bai, who lodged the oral report Ex. P/1 on 10-1-1981, has stated that she was informed by PW-2 Mukhtyaro that accused-appellant has committed rape on her, but she has admitted in her cross-examination that at that time she did not find her clothes torn up. She has further stated that PW-2 Mukhtyaro is an innocent girl and her mental power is very weak. 9. PW-3 Shishuguddi is the sister of PW-2 Mukhtyaro and daughter of PW-1 Indo Bai and she states that when she came from the field, she saw accused-appellant committing rape on PW-2 Mukhtyaro and when she made hue and cry, her aunty Mst. Kako and PW-4 Chandu Ram also came there and accused-appellant ran away. 10. PW-4 Chandu Ram also admits this fact that he saw the accused-appellant running from the scene. 11. PW-5 Kartar Singh is another witness, who states that he was told by PW-3 Shishuguddi that accused-appellant teased PW-2 Mukhtyaro and, thereafter, he went inside the house and asked PW2 Mukhtyaro as to what has happened and upon this, she told him that accused-appellant has committed intercourse with her. 12. Looking to the above evidence on record and especially looking to the facts that PW-2 Mukhtyaro (prosecutrix) has not been examined in the Court; she was patient of mental retardation on the date of incident; she was married woman; she did not receive any injury on private part or other parts of her body; her clothes were not torn up; there is no actual evidence proving that sexual intercourse in actual terms has taken place with her by accused-appellant; there is statement of PW-5 Kartar Singh that he was told by PW-3 Shishuguddi that accused-appellant teased PW-2 Mukhtyaro, the case of the prosecution cannot travel beyond the offence under Section 354, IPC, as the prosecution has proved that accused-appellant used the criminal force on PW-2 Mukhtyaro with an intention to outrage her modesty and thus, the findings of the learned Sessions Judge convicting accused-appellant for the offence under Section 376, IPC cannot be maintained and accused-appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 354, IPC instead of 376, IPC. 13. So far as the conviction of accused-appellant for the offence under Section 450, IPC is concerned, the findings of the learned Sessions Judge in this respect are maintained. 14. Since the accused-appellant is going to be convicted under Section 354, IPC instead of 376, IPC, the argument of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant that he may be sentenced to the period already undergone becomes relevant. 15. As per the report on the back of the warrant, accused-appellant has been in PC and JC from 16-1-1981 to 30-1-1981 and apart from this, as per the order sheet of this Court dated 7-4-2000, it appears that accused-appellant was sent to jail and he was ordered to be released on his furnishing personal bond of Rs. 2000/- and two sureties in the like amount, but he has not furnished the same so far. Thus, he has been in jail since 7-4-2000. In my considered opinion, for the offence under Sections 354 and 450, IPC, the period which he has already undergone would be sufficient sentence to meet the ends of justice and thus, he should be sentenced to the period already undergone by him for the said offences. 16. In the result, the appeal filed by the accused-appellant Bali alias Bahal Singh is partly allowed. The conviction of the accused-appellant is altered from 376, IPC to 354, I.P.C and he is accordingly convicted under Section 354, IPC in place of 376, IPC. However, his conviction under Section 450, IPC is maintained. For the offence under Sections 354 and 450 IPC, the accused-appellant is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The judgment and order dated 30-4-1982 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar stand modified accordingly. Since the accused-appellant Bali alias Bahal Singh is in jail, he be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Bali Alias Bahal Singh vs State Of Rajasthan on 4 January, 2001

Central Government Act

[Section 30] [Complete Act]

Madras High Court

W.P.No.30839 of 2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 22.12.2021 CORAM : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.M. SUBRAMANIAM W.P.No.30839 of 2015 M/s.Padmavati Enterprises, Represented by its Proprietor, Mr.Dhanraj, No.47/1, Varadhamuthiayappan Street, Chennai -600 001 ... Petitioner Vs. 1. The Deputy Commissioner of Customs (Group 1), Custom House, No.60, Rajaji Salai, Chennai-600 001 2. The Director, Food Safety and Standards Authority of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi. 3. Authorised Officer, Food Safety & Standards Authority of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, C.1.D, Rajaji Bhawan, Besant Nagar, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 1 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 Chennai-600 090. 4. Inspection Officer, Food Safety & Standards Authority of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, C.1.D, Rajaji Bhawan, Besant Nagar, Chennai-600090. . ..Respondents Prayer : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the 3rd and 4th respondents herein to draw samples and certify petitioner's standard based on the specifications applicable under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and Regulations made thereof. For Petitioner : Mr.S.Murugappan For Respondents : Mr.SU.Srinivasan SPC for respondents. ORDER "Wholesale package means a package containing - 22.12.2021 kan/shr Internet : Yes Index : Yes / No Speaking order / Nonspeaking order To The relief sought for in the present Writ Petition is to direct the respondents 3 and 4 to draw samples and certify petitioner's standard based on the specifications applicable under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 2 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 2. The petitioner firm is an importer and trader in camphor and other chemicals. In the course of its business activities, the petitioner firm imported 4312 bags of sodium chloride from China. The net quantity imported is 107.8 tonnes in four containers with each bag of Sodium Chloride (Salt) weighing 25 kgs, net. The goods were supplied by M/s.China Salt Jitan Co.Ltd. The goods were accompanied by the suppliers' certificate of Analysis dated 02.07.2015 and also the certificate of Origin dated 02.07.2015. 3. Upon arrival of the goods at the Chennai Port, the petitioner firm filed a bill of entry with the first respondent as required by the Customs Department for due assessment and clearance of the consignment after completion of customs formalities. Since the goods imported were claimed as food grade sodium chloride, the matter was referred to the 3rd respondent for drawal of samples and giving their confirmation with regard to the food safety standards. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 3 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 4. The 4th respondent came to inspect and draw the sample as per the directions of the third respondent. However, he did not draw any sample and instead forwarded a message online as per the practice of the 2nd respondent. The message received from the 4th respondent electronically was that “Best Before/ Use by date/ Date of expiry is not mentioned where it is required under clause 2.2.2:10 of FSS (Packaging and labelling Regulation, 2011)”. Thus, an objection was raised for drawing sample on the ground that the details regarding the manufacturing date or date of expiry in the labelling were not found. 5. Thus, the request of the petitioner for conducting the lab test was denied. Therefore, the petitioner is constrained to move the present Writ Petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 4 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 of this Court with reference to the relevant rules, more specifically, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulation, 2011. Such a labelling in respect of wholesale quantity are exempted. When there is an exemption under the regulation in respect of whole sale packaging, there is no reason whatsoever to deny the benefit of lab test for the product imported by the petitioner. 7. The learned Central Government standing counsel reiterated by stating that in the absence of date of expiry and other details under the regulations, the authorities would not be in a position to draw sample, conduct test and send the same for testing in the lab. Relying on the counter affidavit, the learned Central Government standing counsel made a submission that in the present case such labelling and the particulars were missing and therefore the inspecting authorities refused to draw sample and there is no infirmity as such. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 5 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 8. Para 1.2.1:(6) of the Regulation defines "Multipiece package means a package containing two or more individually packaged or labelled pieces of the same commodity of identical quantity, intended for retail either in individual pieces or packages as a whole" 9. Clause - 12 of the Regulation states Wholesale as follows: a) a number of retail packages, where such first mentioned package is intended for sale, distribution or delivery to an intermediary and is not intended for sale direct to a single consumer; or b) a commodity of food sold to an intermediary in bulk to enable such intermediary to sell, distribute or deliver such commodity of food https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 6 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 to the consumer in smaller quantities". 10. Clause 2.6 of the Regulation contemplates exemptions from labelling requirements- Clause 2.6.1(5) enumerates that "In case of wholesale packages the particulars regarding list of ingredients, Date of Manufacture/ packing, best before, expiry date labelling of irradiated food and, vegetarian logo/ non vegetarian log, may not be specified." 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a submission that the packages in the case of the petitioner is wholesale package. The commercial invoice issued by the exporting company indicates that the Sodium Chloride (food grade) in 25 kg/PE bag (Polyethylene bags). Therefore, the salt is packed in 25 kgs baggage and is a wholesale package. When it is a wholesale package, the exemption clause has to be applied and therefore, the stand taken by the Department is not in consonance with the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 7 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 provisions of the Regulation of the year 2011. 12. This Court is of the considered opinion that it is not in dispute that the petitioner imported salt from China. Further, the invoice indicates that it is a wholesale package. As far as the wholesale package of salt is concerned, the exemption clause is applicable. Furthermore, it is brought to the notice of this Court that there is no expiry date for salt. These are all the facts which were not considered by the competent authorities. Thus, this Court is inclined to consider the Writ Petition. 13. Accordingly, the respondents 3 and 4 are directed to draw samples and certify petitioner's standard based on the specification applicable under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. The said exercise is directed to be done within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. With this direction, the Writ Petition stands allowed. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 8 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 No costs. 1. The Deputy Commissioner of Customs (Group 1), Custom House, No.60, Rajaji Salai, Chennai-600 001 2. The Director, Food Safety and Standards Authority of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi. 3. Authorised Officer, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 9 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 Food Safety & Standards Authority of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, C.1.D, Rajaji Bhawan, Besant Nagar, Chennai-600 090. 4. Inspection Officer, Food Safety & Standards Authority of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, C.1.D, Rajaji Bhawan, Besant Nagar, Chennai-600 090. . S.M. SUBRAMANIAM, J. kan/shr https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 10 of 11  W.P.No.30839 of 2015 W.P.No.30839 of 2015 22.12.2021 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis Page 11 of 11

M/S.Padmavati Enterprises vs The Deputy Commissioner Of ... on 22 December, 2021

Central Government Act

[Section 30(1)] [Section 30] [Complete Act]

Allahabad High Court

JUDGMENT 1. This is an application purporting to be under Section 151, Civil P.C. in First Appeal No. 358 of 1925. The prayer in this application is to be found in para. 8 which runs as follows: That considering that the judgment was not delivered for a considerably long time after the hearing of the argument and that it was possible to miss important points advanced in argument and considering the technical defect in delivery of judgment which makes it a nullity, it is prayed that the case may be treated as undecided and may be re-heard or in the alternative if the judgment may be considered to be a legal judgment it may be revised. 2. This application is signed by a counsel who did not appear in the case, and Mr. K.D. Malaviya on behalf of Mr. Muhammad Husain asked us to postpone the hearing as Mr. Muhammad Husain was not in Court. We did not consider that a sufficient reason for postponing the hearing when the counsel must have known that this Bench was constituted specially to hear the application today. 3. The points urged by Mr. Malaviya are that the judgment of this Court was not properly signed and delivered, because according to him on 8th August 1928, the complete judgment was not read out in Court and was not signed by either of us on that date, that under Order 41, Rule 31, Civil P.C., every judgment of this Court in appeal had to be in writing and had to be signed when it was pronounced and the Judges had to date it. He further submits that under Ch. 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court when a written judgment is delivered in an appeal it had first to be signed by the Judges who heard the case and only then could be pronounced by one of such Judges. It is urged by Mr. Malaviya that the non-compliance of the rules in view of the affidavit filed by his client makes the judgment a nullity, and therefore the case must be treated as not disposed of and an undecided case, and therefore he prays that his client should be given an opportunity of re-arguing the case before this Bench. 4. An application was presented to Dalal, J., who was the vacation Judge on 14th August 1928 supported by an affidavit that the judgment had not been signed by us and that there was no judgment in the office of the High Court. Dalal, J., directed this application to be land before one of us with an office report on the points raised in the application. The office has submitted a report which is dated 14th December 1928. 5. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru who appears on behalf of the opposite party, viz. the appellant in the case, submits that Order 41, Rule 31 and Order 20 and the rules thereunder do not apply to the Chartered High Courts when the rules relating to judgments were in force when the Civil Procedure Code was enacted. He has referred to Order 49, Rule 2, and we accept his contention that in view of the fact that before the present Code was enacted the rules were in force, viz., the rules of Court of 18th January 1898, the provisions of Order 20 and that of Order 41, Rule 31 do not apply to the High Court. He has further submitted that if the Judges had agreed to a judgment under the rules of the Court it was not necessary that the judgment should be signed by both the Judges before pronouncing the judgment. It is necessary to state exactly what happened in the case. The appeal was argued by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru on behalf of the appellant and by Mr. O'Conor and Dr. Katju on behalf of the respondent. The hearing lasted several days and at the conclusion of the hearing we reserved our judgment. Thereafter we met in chambers several times, discussed the points that had to be decided, discussed the value to be attached to the evidence called, both oral and documentary, and we agreed to what the decision on such point raised in the case was to be. There were really three points in the case. The first question was as to whether the plaintiff had proved the pedigree he had set forward, the second was whether the defendant had proved his adoption, and the third point was whether Bhagwan Das and Hira Lal were members of a joint Hindu family. As one of us proceeded on casual leave there was delay in writing out the judgment and on the 8th August the Court sat for the last time before the long vacation. By a mistake of the office the case was listed in Court No. 5 and was by an order transferred to Court No. 1. The judgment on the first question had been typed out and contained the result of the joint consultation between us. On the 8th August, the note made by the officer of the Court whose duty is to record proceedings was as follows: Judgment delivered today: parties present: appeal allowed: judgment with Hon'ble Banerji, 6. Orally it was stated in open Court, what was our finding on the two other points that we had to decide, but the reasons for the decision of the second and third point had not been recorded. The complete judgment was signed by one of us and then sent to the other for signature, but on account of his absence from the station on duty the judgment was not sent into the office until 22nd August 1928 duly signed by both of us. 7. It thus appears that although one of us had pronounced in open Court the joint findings arrived at by us, the record of our reasons was not in Court on 8th August 1928, and the judgment had not been duly signed by both of us on that date. 8. Rule 3, Ch. 7, of rules of the Court, in our opinion, requires that when a written judgment is pronounced by one of the Judges it has to be signed by both the Judges but this, in our opinion, is a mere irregularity and does not in any way affect the merits and in our opinion Section 151, Civil P.C., cannot be invoked to ask us to re-hear the case merely on account of a technical irregularity. 9. The 8th August 1928, being the last date of sittings the office could not arrange that both of us should be sitting together to deliver the judgment orally. It was for the convenience of counsel that in case the parties wanted to appeal to His Majesty in Council that we pronounced our judgment on the 8th to enable counsel to prepare the application for leave to appeal at leisure. Although Mr. Malaviya suggests that the judgment would not be illegal if we had the last page copied out and we signed the last page and then pronounced the judgment, it appears to us that no useful purpose would be served by adopting that course. There is no force in this application, and we dismiss it with costs. We assess counsel's fees for today's hearing at Rs. 200.

Banarsi Das And Ors. vs Sagar Mal on 22 February, 1929

Delhi High Court

Author: R Sodhi

JUDGMENT R.S. Sodhi, J. 1. The criminal appeal is directed against the Order dated 22.9.1992 whereby the appellants, while being admitted to the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act, were required to deposit cost of proceedings of Rs. 1,500/- each to the State totalling to Rs. 6,000/-, which shall go to the State. Learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants were released on probation and directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 6,000/-. In addition thereto they were required to pay Rs. 6,000/- by way of cost to the State. He submits that Rs. 6,000/- payable as cost to the State cannot be imposed in view of the fact that the appellants have been admitted to the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. However, Rs. 6,000/- by way of compensation can be imposed. 2. Learned Counsel for the Stage agrees with this proposition of law. 3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I direct that the fine of Rs. 1,500/- each imposed on the appellants is not payable and, therefore, modify the order to the that effect. However, the appellants will be required to pay the compensation as directed by the Court below. 4. With this, Criminal Appeal No. 171/1992 is disposed of. 5. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds and sureties shall stand discharged. 6. Non-bailable warrants issued to secure the presence of the appellants are recalled. 7. Appeal disposed of.

Virender @ Pappu And Ors. vs State on 24 July, 2001

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 15688 of 2008(P) 1. M.K.SURENDRAN, S/O.KUNHAMBU, AGED 42 YRS ... Petitioner Vs 1. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INCOME TAX ... Respondent 2. THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, 3. DIRECTORATE OF INCOME TAX VIGILANCE 4. THE CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT 5. UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE For Petitioner :SRI.C.KHALID For Respondent :SRI.P.PARAMESWARAN NAIR,ASST.SOLICITOR The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON Dated :08/06/2009 O R D E R P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON J. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ W.P. (C) No. 15688 of 2008 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Dated, this the 8th day of June, 2009 JUDGMENT The petitioner claims to be a recognized "informer" to the Income Tax authorities, on whose information, the departmental authorities conducted a raid and collected incriminating documents from the business premises and residence of the concerned evader of Income Tax. The case of the petitioner is that, the tax recovery resulted because of the contribution of the petitioner being of Rs. 3.6 crores as reward, the petitioner is entitled to have 10 % of the said amount i.e. 36 lakhs as reward, in tune with the relevant guidelines (Guidelines for Grant of Reward for Informants, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in 1993) whereas the petitioner was given only 2.75 lakhs. 2. In response to Ext.P12 lawyers' notice, the first respondent sent Ext.P13 reply, stating that granting of the benefit is in tune with the relevant 'guidelines' and to the extent the petitioner is actually entitled to have the benefit. It was also stated in Ext.P13 that, if the petitioner is aggrieved in any manner, he could very well approach the 4th respondent/appellate authority in this regard. Petitioner has approached this Court, challenging the inaction on the part of the 4th respondent, despite preferring Ext.P14 appeal in this regard. 3. A statement has been filed from the part of the first respondent seeking to sustain the stand taken by the department, also pointing out  WP (C) No. 15688 of 2008 : 2 : in paragraph 11 that, the appeal preferred by the petitioner has already been considered and disposed of, and that the petitioner was conveyed to the petitioner through Ext.R1(A) dated 1.8.2007. A copy of the minutes of the Committee dated 19.9.2006 is also produced and marked as Ext.R1(B). It is contended that the petitioner does not have any legal right to claim the reward as a matter of right, as per the law declared by Apex Court, as well as by this Court on the point. 4. It is true that the legal position as above cannot be in dispute any further. But the point involved is whether Ext.P14 appeal preferred by the petitioner has been considered and disposed of in accordance with the 'guidelines' as offered and stipulated vide Ext.P13 reply. 5. Ext. R1(A) intimation conveyed to the petitioner shows that it was only with reference to the letter dated 29.6.2007 of the 4th respondent; whereas Ext.R1(B) attached along with it, is dated 19.6.2006. That apart, Ext.R1(B) shows that, it is in respect of the proceedings granting "final award" pursuant to the proposal submitted by the Director of Income Tax (Inv.), Kochi and not with reference to Ext.P14 appeal preferred by the petitioner. Besides this, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before finalizing Ext.P14. 6. After hearing both the sides, this Court finds that, Ext.P14 has to be reconsidered by the fourth respondent with reference to the  WP (C) No. 15688 of 2008 : 3 : relevant 'guidelines' and also with regard to the actual facts and figures. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of, directing 4th respondent to reconsider Ext.P14 appeal preferred by the petitioner, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Disposed of as above. P. R. RAMACHANDRA MENON, JUDGE kmd 

M.K.Surendran vs The Director General Of Income Tax on 8 June, 2009

Orissa High Court

Author: L Rath

JUDGMENT L. Rath, J. 1. The question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the direction by the learned Magistrate in a complaint case, after recording the statements of the complainant and some witnesses, to the police to investigate into the matter Under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr PC') is illegal as the power under the section vested in the Magistrate is to either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit but not resort to both the methods. The petitioner filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar, alleging offences against the opposite parties Under Sections 342/347/348/384/465/109/392/354/34, IPC and during the enquiry held by the Magistrate Under Section 200 examined himself, his wife and son as witnesses. The learned Magistrate in his order dated 4-7-1992 held that clear evidence was not available regarding obtaining of signature and recovery of gold from the locker by the opposite parties and that such type of allegation can be properly appreciated if it is investigated by the police. He accordingly directed the Inspector-in-charge of Kharvelanagar Police Station to investigate into the allegation made in the complaint and submit the report. Because of the use of the words "either" and "or", it is clear, according to Mr. Mohapatra appearing for the petitioner, that only one of the options is available to the Magistrate but not both. The question raised by the learned counsel is no longe res Integra in view of the decision of this Court reported in Vol. 33 (1991) OJD 353 (Criminal) Mrutyunjaya Tripathy v. Naba Kumar Misra) wherein interpreting the provisions of Section 202, Cr PC it was held : "The words 'either' and 'or' in Section 202 do not mean that the options of the Magistrate are mutually exclusive in the sense that once he directs an investigation by some other authority he is rendered powerless to hold the enquiry himself. Such an interpretation may result in stiffling of the very complaint since if either the police or any other authority to whom the investigation is entrusted does not choose to carry out the direction in spite of reminders and no report is submitted, the Court would be powerless to proceed with the complaint and the complainant would be without remedy. This could never be the intention of the legislature. Hence the power is inherent in the Magistrate to stop the investigation which has been directed and instead proceed with the enquiry himself. The matter was considered in 1986 Cri. LJ 1266 (Parasuram Jha and Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Anr.) where Sandhawalia. CJ held that where alternative choices have to be given, invariably the language employed has to be in the usual form that the person being given such discretion may either resort to one or the other. It does not necessarily follow that he then cannot either resort to both or intermix the same and that the power so vested may include the exercise of both rather than necessarily exclude one from the other and that the more employment of the two words 'either' and 'or' cannot in any way be conclusive." In AIR 1976 SC 1672 (Deorapalli Laxmi Narain Reddy v. V. Narain Reddy) it was observed that Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceeding under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered Under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". Thus the object of an investigation Under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. The view that the words "either" and "or" are not mutually exclusive to each other is also supported by the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1987 (III) Crimes 379 (Pulloo Jaidev and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr.), 2. The question raised by Mr. Mohapatra being thus concluded, to excution can be taken to the order passed by the learned Magistrate. Mr. Mohapatra has also cited some decisions, namely, AIR 1992 All. 211 (Emperor v. Durga Prasad), AIR 1937 Nag. 389 (Tyab Ali Yusuf Ali Bohari v. Husainali Yusafali Bohari),AIR 1949 Pat. 36 (Radha Kishun Sao v. S. K. Misra and Anr.), 1975 Cri LJ 1367 (Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Koujalagi and Ors.) and 1981 Cri LJ 1002 (Sankar Chandra Ghose v. Roopraj S. Bhansally) taking the contrary view, but in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, no support can be drawn from those decisions. 3. In that view of the matter, this petition has no merit and is hence dismissed.

Ramakanta Mohanty vs Ajay Kumar Routray And Ors. on 22 January, 1993

Calcutta High Court

Author: T A Ali

JUDGMENT Tottenham and Ameer Ali, JJ. 1. This was a suit to recover money due upon a mortgage by the sale of the mortgaged properties, which were the five properties originally mortgaged; and it appears that some have since passed out of the hands of the original mortgagor. 2. The present owners were made parties to the suit. The present appeal has been preferred by one of those parties, the original defendant No. 12; and the point which we have to decide is whether by virtue of Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act this defendant is entitled to require the plaintiff, mortgagee, to apportion his claim amongst the various properties mortgaged, and to accept from the appellant his rateable share only. 3. The learned Pleader for the Appellant has not been able to put before us any authority for his construction of Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, nor are we aware of any such authority. 4. We think the position is not tenable, but that the lower Courts are quite right in the view they have taken of Section 82, when the District Judge says, "that the intention of the law is not that the lien of the mortgagee should be split, but simply to determine the liabilities of the purchasers inter se." Section 82 upon the face of it refers to contribution as between the various persons who may be liable with respect to the same debt. It seems to us that the lower Courts were quite right in allowing the plaintiff a decree for the whole sum claimed, making all the mortgaged properties liable for the satisfaction of that decree, and leaving it to any one of the defendants who might have to pay up more than his rateable share to recover with reference to Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act from his co-debtors. 5. This appeal is dismissed with costs.

Roghu Nath Pershad And Anr. vs Harlal Sadhu And Ors. on 4 March, 1891

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Bail Appl..No. 695 of 2010() 1. RADHAKRISHNAN @ VAVACHAN, ... Petitioner Vs 1. STATE OF KERALA, REP.BY EXCISE ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.GEORGE SEBASTIAN For Respondent :PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.T.SANKARAN Dated :22/02/2010 O R D E R K.T. SANKARAN, J. --------------------------- B.A. No. 695 of 2010 ------------------------------- Dated this the 22nd day of February, 2010 O R D E R This is an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner is the accused in Crime No.6 of 2010 of Sasthamcotta Excise Range. 2. The offence alleged against the petitioner is under Section 55(i) of the Abkari Act. 3. The prosecution case is that on 5/1/2010, the petitioner was engaged in the sale of Indian Made Foreign Liquor. A quantity of two litres of Indian Made Foreign Liquor was seized from the possession of the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested on 5/1/2010 and he is in judicial custody since then. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitioner is involved in two other Abkari cases in the year 2009 and four abkari cases in 2008. It is also pointed out that while disposing of B.A. No.6818 of 2009, filed by the petitioner, on 30/11/2009, the undertaking made by the petitioner that he will not commit any offence of similar nature while on bail in that case was recorded. The present crime was committed after the  B.A. No. 695 /2010 2 date of disposal of B.A. No.6818 of 2009. 5. The petitioner had filed B.A. No.168/2010 and that application was dismissed by the order dated 20/1/2010 in the light of the facts mentioned in paragraph 4 above. One month elapsed thereafter. 6. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, the duration of the judicial custody undergone by the petitioner, the nature of the offence and the present stage of investigation, I am of the view that bail can be granted to the petitioner. 7. The petitioner shall be released on bail on his executing bond for Rs.25,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Sasthamcotta subject to the following conditions:- B.A. No. 695 /2010 3 C) The petitioner shall not try to influence the prosecution witnesses or tamper with the evidence; D) The petitioner shall not commit any offence or indulge in any prejudicial activity while on bail; E) In case of breach of any of the conditions mentioned above, the bail shall be liable to be cancelled. The Bail Application is allowed as above. K.T. SANKARAN, JUDGE scm 

Radhakrishnan @ Vavachan vs State Of Kerala on 22 February, 2010

Lok Sabha Debates

> Title: Need for early completion of gauge conversion project on Katwa-Burdwan railway line in West Bengal. MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: Now, we take up Special Mentions. SHRI ABU AYES MONDAL (KATWA): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I want to raise a very burning problem relating to my constituency. Katwa-Burdwan is an almost century old narrow gauge railway line in West Bengal. In the last Railway Budget, all the lines have been taken up for conversion into broad gauge. While inaugurating the gauge conversion project of Katwa-Burdwan narrow gauge line, on 30th June, 2007 hon. Minister of Railways, Shri Lalu Prasad announced that the broad gauge project would be completed within two years at an estimated cost of Rs. 203 crore. The conversion from narrow gauge to broad gauge being a 50:50 venture between the Government of West Bengal and Indian Railways, no remarkable achievement has been seen so far. Therefore, I urge upon the Ministry of Railways, Government of India to take immediate action so that the said project can be completed within the estimated budget and time frame.

Need For Early Completion Of Gauge Conversion Project On ... on 4 December, 2007

Central Government Act

[Section 249(2)] [Section 249] [Complete Act]

Allahabad High Court

Author: Malik

JUDGMENT Malik, C.J. 1. The following question was referred for decision by this Full Bench. "Whether an Assistant Collector of the first class who is empowered by the Local Government to exercise all the powers of a Collector under Chapter III of the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act can transfer a case from his court to the court of any other Assistant Collector empowered under Sub-section (1) of Section 22?" This reference became necessary as a Bench of this Court had taken the view in -- 'Sampat Kumar v. Moti', 1950 All WR 103 (A), that the power of transfer given to a Collector under Sub-section (2), Section 22, did not empower the Assistant Collector to transfer a case pending in his court to another Assistant Collector empowered under Sub-section (1), of Section 22. The decision of this Court was given on November, 9, 1949, while the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act had remained in force from 1935, and during this period of more than 15 years a very large number of cases might have been transferred by Assistant Collectors purporting to act under Section 22(2) of the Act, and two of such cases were listed on the same date before the Court which made the reference. 2. In Sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act (U. P. Act No. XXVII of 1939), Collector is defined as meaning "the officer appointed as Collector of a district under the Land Revenue Act No. 3 of 1901." Section 22(1) is as follows : "The Local Government may empower any Assistant Collector of the first class to exercise the powers of a Collector under this Chapter." Section 22 is in Chapter III of the Act, and that Chapter begins from Section 9 and ends with Section 27, and only in three sections the word "Collector" is mentioned. Section 10 provides that "applications under this Chapter shall, if the principal money secured does not exceed Rs. 500, be brought before the Collector, and the word "Court" in this Chapter shall in such cases include the "Collector". It is not disputed that if a notification has been issued by the Government then an Assistant Collector can entertain an application under Section 10 of the Act. Section 23, the other section in which this word occurs, is as follows : "An appeal shall lie to the District Judge from an order of a Collector or Assistant Collector passed under this Chapter." The word 'Assistant Collector' being also mentioned, recourse need not be had to Section 22, and orders passed, whether by the Collector or by the Assistant Collector, are made appealable to the District Judge. To come back to Section 22, Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the Local Government may empower any Assistant Collector of the first class to exercise the powers of a Collector under that Chapter, and Sub-section (2) then provides that the Collector may transfer any proceedings under this Chapter -- (a) from his own court to that of an Assistant Collector empowered under Sub-Section (1); (b) from the court of an Assistant Collector subordinate to him either to his own court or to that of any other Assistant Collector empowered under Sub-section (1). If Sub-section (1), Section 22 does not govern Sub-section (2) of that section, then Sub-section (1) would only be necessary for empowering an Assistant Collector to entertain an application under Section 10, and it was not necessary for the legislature to have said that the Local Government may empower any Assistant Collector of the first class to exercise "the powers of a Collector under this Chapter." Mention of Section 10 of the Act would have been quite sufficient. 3. If the words "to exercise the powers of a Collector under this Chapter" are given their ordinary meaning, then wherever the word "Collector" occurs in Chapter 3, it would include an 'Assistant Collector' and, therefore, the word 'Collector' in Sub-section (2) will also include an Assistant Collector. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the applicants has pointed out that there may be some practical difficulties inasmuch as an Assistant Collector empowered under Sub-section (1) may not be subordinate to an Assistant Collector similarly empowered, and it will be anomalous that one Assistant Collector should transfer a case from his own court to a court of equal jurisdiction. He has pointed out that there is nothing in Sub-section (2) which empowers a Collector to transfer a case from his own court to the court of another Collector. 4. In view of the plain language of the section it is not necessary for us to go into these practical difficulties and it may be that in case of any practical difficulty, the District Judge may be able, in an appeal from an order of a Collector or an- Assistant Collector, to set things right. The fact, however, remains that Sub-section (1) provides that the Local Government may empower any Assistant Collector of the first class to exercise the powers of a Collector under Chapter III, and the power to transfer a case to the court of an Assistant Collector is a power exercisable by a Collector under Chapter III. There is no reason, therefore, why an Assistant Collector should not have the power to transfer a case. Sub-section (2) is a part of Chapter III and is governed by Sub-section (1). 5. The U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act has now been repealed and it will not be desirable to unsettle a large number of decisions by courts of Assistant Collectors to whom cases might have been transferred by other Assistant Collectors purporting to act under Sub-section (2) of Section 22. Taking all these matters into consideration we consider that an Assistant Collector who has been empowered to exercise the powers of the Collector under Chapter 3 has the power in a proper case to transfer a case to the court of another Assistant Collector empowered under Sub-section (1). 6. The Rules framed by the Local Government are in these words : "The powers of a Collector under Chapter III of the Act are under section 22(1) of the Act hereby conferred on all Assistant Collectors of the first class who are in charge of sub-divisions or who have exercised powers of the first class for more than five years." There may be, therefore, more than one Assistant Collector in a district or a sub-division who is able to take cognizance of an application under Section 10, and, if for some reason one Assistant Collector of the first class has transferred the case to another Assistant Collector of the first class of more than five years standing, there is no reason to think that there will be any practical difficulty. 7. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and overrule the decision in 'Sampat Kumar v. Moti (A)' mentioned above. 8. The answer may be sent to the Bench concerned.

Sheo Mangal vs Ram Charan on 1 April, 1954

Lok Sabha Debates

an> Title : Need to open branches of nationalised banks at Vedasenthur, Kangayam and Kallimandiyam in Palani Parliamentary Constitutency, Tamil Nadu. MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: Shri Kharventhan, in future, whenever you like to speak, first you have to go to your seat. SHRI S.K. KHARVENTHAN (PALANI): In my Palani parliamentary constituency, Vedasenthur in Vedasenthur Taluk, Kangayam in Kangayam Taluk and Kallimandiyam in Oddanchatram Taluk are all very important business centres. Vedasenthur is having nearly 30 spinning mills and a number of textile units. It is on the National Highway No. 7 between Karur and Dindigul. But unfortunately, there is no nationalised bank in Vedasenthur town. The people of the area want to have a branch of Canara Bank or any other nationalised bank in Vedasenthur.             Kangayam in Erode district is one of the famous centres for butter, ghee and textiles. Nearly 30 butter and ghee industries are functioning here. Hundreds of handloom textiles are also functioning here. The people of the region also want to have the facility of Canara Bank branch or any other nationalised bank.             Kallimandiyam is also one of the biggest centres in Oddanchatram Taluk. Kallimandiyam is famous for butter, ghee and financial institutions. Buffaloes and other cattle are transported from here to various parts of the country. Vegetables and food grains are also transported to northern India from here only. The business people of the region want to have a nationalised bank branch, particularly Canara Bank or any other nationalised bank.             I request the Hon. Finance Minister to direct the bank authorities to open bank branches at Vedasenthur, Kangayam and Kallimandiyam at the earliest.

Need To Open Branches Of Nationalised Banks At Vedasenthur, Kangayam ... on 15 December, 2005

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No.8658 of 2010 SRI RAJ KUMAR JHA Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS ----------- 3. 05.07.2010. Mr. A.S. Thakur, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, is not present. Stand over to 26th July, 2010. ( R.M. Doshit, CJ ) ( S.K. Katriar, J ) Dilip

Sri Raj Kumar Jha vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors on 5 July, 2010

Central Government Act

[Article 367] [Constitution]

Allahabad High Court

Court No. - 45 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 448 of 1994 Petitioner :- Kali Shankar Respondent :- State Petitioner Counsel :- Rajeev Sharma Respondent Counsel :- Aga Hon'ble Rajesh Dayal Khare,J. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State. This Court vide order dated 27.01.1994 had issued notice to the opposite party no.2, in the mean time stayed the further proceedings of Complaint Case No. 80 of 1993 under Sections 420, 406 I.P.C., pending before learned Ist Additional Munsif Magistrate, Kanpur Dehat. Vide office report dated 24.3.1994 indicates that the copy of present application has not been supplied by learned counsel for the applicants for service of notice upon the opposite party no.2. The present 482 Cr.P.C. petition has been filed for quashing the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 80 of 1993 under Sections 420, 406 I.P.C., pending before learned Ist Additional Munsif Magistrate, Kanpur Dehat. It is contended by learned counsel for the applicant is that no offence against the applicant is disclosed and the present prosecution has been instituted with a malafide intention for the purposes of harassment. He pointed out certain documents and statements in support of his contention.It is further contended by learned counsel for the applicants that the opposite party no.2 was married with the sister of the applicant and for want of additional dowry, the opposite party no.2 tortured the sister of the applicant for which the proceedings were drawn against the opposite party no.2 and in a counter blast, the present proceedings has been initiated against the applicant which is bad in law. From the perusal of the material on record and looking into the facts of the case at this stage it cannot be said that no offence is made out against the applicant. All the submission made at the bar relates to the disputed question of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At this stage only prima facie case is to be seen in the light of the law laid down by Supreme Court in cases of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866, State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426, State of Bihar Vs. P.P.Sharma, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cr.) 283. The disputed defence of the accused cannot be considered at this stage. Moreover, the applicant has got a right of discharge under Section 239 or 227/228, or 245 Cr.P.C. as the case may be through a proper application for the said purpose and he is free to take all the submissions in the said discharge application before the Trial Court. The prayer for quashing the proceedings is refused. However, it is provided that if the applicant appears and surrenders before the court below within 30 days from today and applies for bail, his prayer for bail shall be considered and decided in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgement passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. For a period of 30 days from today or till the disposal of the application for grant of bail whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant. However, in case, the applicant does not appear before the Court below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against him. With the aforesaid directions, this application is finally disposed off. Interim order dated 27.01.1994 is hereby vacated. The registry of this Court is directed to communicate the order of this Court passed today, to the concerned court below forthwith. Order Date :- 12.8.2010 S.Ali

Kali Shankar vs State on 12 August, 2010

Gujarat High Court

Author: Mr.S.J.Mukhopadhaya,&Nbsp;Honourable Mr.Justice Kureshi,&Nbsp;

Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print CA/1905/2010 1/ 1 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CIVIL APPLICATION - FOR AMENDMENT No. 1905 of 2010 In SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 337 of 2010 ========================================= ANTALA JETHALAL RAVJIBHAI - Petitioner(s) Versus RESERVE BANK OF INDIA & 2 - Respondent(s) ========================================= Appearance : MR AM PAREKH for Petitioner(s) : 1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, 1.2.8, 1.2.9, 1.2.10, 1.2.11, 1.2.12,1.2.13 MR AMAR N BHATT for Respondent(s) : 1, MR. A.J. DESAI ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER for Respondent(s) : 2, MR RR TRIVEDI for Respondent(s) : 3, ========================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI Date : 05/03/2010 ORAL ORDER(Per : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA) Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Prayer for amendment is allowed. Amendment be incorporated in the main petition and fresh sets be supplied within a week. Civil Application stands disposed of. Post main petition on 16.3.2010. (S.J.Mukhopadhaya, C.J.) (Akil Kureshi, J.) */Mohandas     Top

Antala vs Reserve on 5 March, 2010

Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Mumbai

ORDER T. Anjaneyulu, Member (J) 1. Heard the learned SDR and perused the written submission. 2. This is an application for rectification of mistake crept in the Final Order No. A/937/WZB/2005/CIII dated 31-3-2005 in appeal No. E/3582/2000-Murn. The applicant submits that the actual duty demand was to be recovered to the tune of Rs. 3,15,000/- and not Rs. 3,47,980/- and there was no discussion about the same in the Tribunal's order. As seen from the grounds of appeal, the applicant has not taken any ground or given any data about quantification of duty amount of Rs. 3,15,000/- instead of Rs. 3,47,980/-. It is stated that after discussing the merits involved in the appeal, the same has been rejected. This goes to show that the duty amount and penalty as confirmed by the order-in-original would stand. The applicant cannot re-agitate about the same at this stage. 3. The second ground is that the proprietor, Shri Shaymrao Ramchandra Maskar of M/s. Modern Industries is said to have died on 10-3-2005 after passing the order in the above appeal by this Tribunal. The applicant is legal heir of Shri Shaymrao Ramchandra Maskar, as such the penalty is not recoverable from him. It is stated that the entire duty amount has been paid before issue of show cause notice. The applicant has also enclosed death certificate of the deceased. He also refers to the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court decision wherein it is ruled out that in case, death of accused before recovery of the penalty amount, the same cannot be recovered from the legal representative of accused. We are convinced with the fact that the proprietor of M/s. Modern Industries died on 10-3-2005 as per death certificate enclosed herewith. We are also convinced that the applicant is legal heir of the proprietor of M/s. Modern Industries and penalty is not recoverable from the legal heir. The duty is said to have been already deposited with the department. Therefore, the penalty cannot be recovered from the applicant. Accordingly the ROM application is allowed. (Pronounced in Court)

Modern Industries vs Commissioner Of C. Ex. on 27 April, 2007

Allahabad High Court

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Babu vs State Of U.P. Thru Secy. Home & 4 ... on 27 August, 2010

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.12585 of 2010 AFSAR BABU @ RAJAN, son of Md. Jiyaul Hasan, resident of Village/Mohalla - Gaighat Babhan Tola (Alamganj Chowki), Police Station - Alamganj, District-Patna. ____ Petitioner Versus STATE OF BIHAR _____Opposite party ----------- rkp ( Ajay Kumar Tripathi, J.) 04. 1/9/2010 Prayer for bail of the petitioner was earlier rejected by this Court. A fresh application has been filed now in view of the certain developments that some other co-accused persons have been granted bail on certain conditions by the High Court. Counsel for the petitioner submits that father of the petitioner undertakes fullest responsibility for the future conduct and behaviour of the petitioner and that he shall not continue with his ways and means of indulging in the crime after he is enlarged on bail. Taking the above into consideration let the petitioner Afsar Babu alias Rajan be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.15,000/- with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in Kankarbagh P S Case No.225 of 2009. One of the sureties will be executed by the father of the petitioner on due identification by the court below and the other by a close relation, who shall file an affidavit stating the relationship with due evidence in this regard. It is further recorded that the petitioner will also be bound down by the following conditions: (i) That the bailor will undertake to furnish information to the court below about any change in address of the petitioner. (ii) That the affidavit shall clearly state that the petitioner is not an 2 accused in any other case and if he is, he shall not be released on bail. (iii) That the bailor shall also state on affidavit that he will inform the court concerned if the petitioner is implicated in any other case of similar nature after his release in the present case and thereafter the court below will be at liberty to initiate the proceeding for cancellation of bail on the ground of misuse. (iv) That the petitioner will give an undertaking that he will receive the police papers on the given date and be present on the date fixed for charge and if he fails to do so on two given dates and delays the trial in any manner, his bail will be liable to be cancelled for reasons of misuse. (v) That the petitioner will be well represented on each date and if he fails to do so on two consecutive dates, his bail will be liable to be cancelled.

Afsar Babu @ Rajan vs State Of Bihar on 1 September, 2010

Allahabad High Court

Court No. - 27 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 10414 of 2007 Petitioner :- Nakli Singh Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Principal Secry. And Others Petitioner Counsel :- Raj endra Singh Sengar,Amar Jeet Singh Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,M.N. Singh,Sandeep Chandra Hon'ble Sibghat Ullah Khan,J. List in the next cause list. Order Date :- 5.1.2010 NLY

Nakli Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru Principal ... on 5 January, 2010

Central Government Act

[Section 4] [Complete Act]

Orissa High Court

Author: R Narasimham

JUDGMENT R.L. Narasimham, C.J. 1. These two appeals arise out of the same judgment and are disposed of together. 2. Both the appeals arise out of the appellate judgment of the Additional District Judge, Cuttack partially reversing the judgment of the Munshi 2nd Court Cuttack and decreeing joint possession of the disputed properties between plaintiff No. 2 and the defendants. 3. The suit property consists of a very valuable house site appertaining to Darpattadar Khata No. 1349 in the town of Cuttack, bearing plot No. 2173 and No. 2174 of Current Settlement. 4. There was previous litigation in respect of the same property between plaintiff No. (2) and defendant No. 1 and some other defendants. The judgment of the trial Court in that case was delivered on 29-4-1950 and the suit under appeal was filed on 8-5-1950 a week after the dismissal of the earlier suit. That suit was taken up to the High Court on second appeal and the decisions of the two lower courts were confirmed by the High Court on 2-4-1956. In that litigation the main question for decision was whether the disputed property belonged to Kanungo Durgacharan Mohanty only, or else whether his brothers had interest in the same. It was finally decided that his brothers had no interest in the property. 5. For the purpose of the present litigation therefore, it may be taken as concluded that the disputed property belonged to Kanungo Durgacharan Mohanty. The suit under appeal was, brought by his son Kanungo Bishnucharan Mohanty (through his first wife) who was the sole plaintiff at the commencement of the suit. Plaintiff No. 2 claims to have purchased his interest in the suit house and was subsequently added as plaintiff No. 2. Defendant No. 2 is the second wife of Durgacharan and defendants 3 to 8 are her children. 6. The said Durgacharan Mohanty entered into an agreement for the sale of the disputed property with one Prana Dhan Das (since dead) on 8-10-1937 (Ex. E) and (according to defendant No. 1) put Pranadhan Das in possession of the property on that date. Subsequently on 7-5-38, a registered sale deed (Ex. 1) was executed by Durgacharan Mohanty in favour of defendant No. 1 who is none else but a daughter of Prana Dhana Das and she remained in possession of the same thereafter. Thus, according to defendant No. 1 full title and possession over the disputed property passed to her. 7. The case of plaintiff No. 1 however was that the suit property was the ancestral property of his father Durgacharan, that there was no legal necessity for the sale in favour of defendant No. 1 and that consequently the plaintiff's interest was unaffected by the sale. He even went to the length of saying that the sale deed was collusiva and fraudulent, that there was no passing of consideration, and that no title passed. Hence he asked for a declaration that the title to the properties still subsisted with the plaintiff and with defendants 2 to 8 (the widow and the other sons of Durga Charan). There was also a prayer for confirmation of possession of those persons in respect of the property. But there was also an alternative prayer that they be ordered to recover possession of the properties in case they be found to have been dispossessed. Subsequent to the commencement of the suit as already pointed out, plaintiff No. 2 purchased the interest of plaintifi No. 1 and also of defendant No. 3 on 13-11-1956 and he is the main contestant in this appeal. 8. The lower appellate Court held that the property was' the ancestral property of Durgacharan and not his self-acquisition and that consequently his sons also had a share in them. He held however that the sale by Durgacharan in favour of defendant No. 1 Ex. 1 was genuine and that a substantial portion of the consideration money was actually paid. But he also held that the sale was not for legal necessity and that consequently the interest of Bishnu Charan Mohanty in the property did not pass by the sale. He further held that as plaintiff No. 1 had separated from his father long ago--prior to the sale--he could not get the alienation made by his father set aside in its entirety, though his interest in the property would be unaffected by the sale. Hence, he decreed the suit for joint possession between the plaintiff No. 1 (as the purchaser of the interest of plaintiff No. 1) and defendant No. 2. 9. The main question of law argued before this Court is the question regarding limitation. According to Mr. D. Mohanty, appearing for defendant No. 1 the property passed out of Duraga-charan's family completely on 8-10-1937 when possession was delivered to Prana Dhan Das in pursuance of the agreement for sale (Ex. E) by Durga Charan and as the suit was brought only on 8-5-1950 it was barred by limitation, under Artice 142 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Panda for the contesting plaintiff, urged that Article 126 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and that as the alinee namely defendant No. 1 obtained possession of the property only on the date of the sale deed (Ex. A) viz. 8-5-1935, the suit must be held to have been filed within the period of twelve years (7th May, 1950 being a Sunday). 10. The concurrent findings of the two courts on the question of possession may be summarised. Both the courts believed the evidence of D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 and also the partial admission of the plaintiff that Prana Dhan Das put his lock in the dilapidated house that was standing on the suit land on 8-10-1937 and obtained complete possession of the same. D. Ws. 1 and 2 further stated that after taking possession Prana Dhan Das got the dilapidated house demolished, took away the materials and exercised other acts of possession over the property such as enclosing it with a fence and growing vegetables for several years. As these witnesses have been believed by the Courts of facts it must be held that the family of Durga Charan Das was completely dispossessed from the disputed plots on 8-10-1937. It is true that the sale deed (Ext. A) was taken in the name of defendant No. 1 who is none else but the daughter of Prana Dhan Das, whereas the agreement of sale (Ex. E) was executed on 8-10-1937 in favour of Prana Dkan Das, but it is the evidence of D. W. 1 (who has been believed by the two Courts of fact) that Prana Dhan Das wanted to give the property to his daughter (defendant No. 1) and hence he got the sale deed executed in her name. In that sale deed there is a recital to the effect that there was previous agreement for sale of the property by Kanungo Durga Charan in favour of Prana Dhan Das. It was the plaintiffs case all along that it was Prana Dhan who was the real defendant in this case, that he being a pleader's clerk and a veteran litigant he prevailed upon the plaintiff's father Durgacharan to transfer the property to him--see paragraph 9 of the plaint. Prana Dhan was also alive for some years after the commencement of the present litigation. Hence for the purpose of this case it will not be proper to make a suitable distinction between the possession of Pranadhan Das on 8-10-1937 on the basis of Ext. E (the agreement for sale) and the subsequent possession of his daughter (defendant No. 1) under Ext. A dated 8-6-58. The evidence of defendants 1 and 2 shows that even after the date of sale it was Prana Dhan Das who removed the building materials from the site, enclosed it with a fencing and grew vegetables. For the purpose of this litigation, it is unnecessary to say whether defendant 1 was a mere benamidar for her father Prana Dhan Das, or whether Prana Dhan Das was merely acting on her behalf from the date of agreement of sale 8-10-1937. It is sufficient to say that the possession of Prana Dhan Das and his daughter defendant No. 1 as held by the two Courts was continuous from 8-10-1937. 11. It is true that in the plaint there was no admission of dispossession in respect of the suit plots though in the prayer portion there was an alternative prayer either for confirmation of possession or recovery of possession, thereby admitting though somewhat haltingly that on the date of the suit the plots were not in possession of the plaintiff. But in view of the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts that complete dispossession took place on 8-10-1937 this question is academic. As pointed out in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib, AIR 1934 All 993 the applicability of Article 142 depends not solely on the facts in the plaint but also on the finding of the Court on the question of possession. I may quote the following passage at p. 997: "But where the plaintiff admits that he has been dispossessed by the defendant, or at any rate, it is found in the case that he has been dispossessed and is not in possession at the time he brings the suit, then he cannot start with a presumption in his favour that possession of the property was with him." See Badri Khatik v. Narain Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 185 and Chandiprasad v. Awadh Narain Jha, AIR 1952 Pat 143. 12. Mr. Panda's reliance on Article 126 of the Limitation Act seems quite futile. That article says that the limitation of 12 years commences from the date on which the alienee took possession, but there is no rule of law that an alienee's possession must be computed only from the date of execution of the registered sale-deed. It might commence even earlier on the basis of the agreement of sale--on which the doctrine of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is based. I have already shown that in this case no distinction should be made between the possession of Prana Dhan Das and that of his daughter (defendant No. 1). Hence even if Article 126 is held to apply it must be held that the alienee's possession commenced from the date of the agreement of sale namely 8-10-1937. It is true that there is a conflict of judicial decision on the question whether for the purpose of Article 142 adverse possession for 12 years by several persons in possession successively even though they do not claim from one another, would bar the true owner's claim (In Vennam Ramiah v. Kusru Kotamma, AIR 1922 Mad 59, Chenchurama Reddy v. Ademma, AIR 1949 Mad 673 and Ahmad Ali v. Hata, AIR 1939 Lah 217) which are all based on. the observations of Kay, Lord Justice in Willis v. Howe (Earl), (1893) 2 Ch. 545 and it was held that for the purpose of Article 142 possession of successive trespassers may be tacked on. A contrary view was taken in Janakinath Saha v. Baikuntha Nath, AIR 1922 Cal 176 based on Soiling v. Broughton, 1893 AC 556 where it was held that the possession of independent (though successful) trespassers cannot be tacked even for the purpose of Article 146. But this view is based on the assumption that the trespassers were independent of one another and there was some period of time however short between the possession of one trespasser and that of another, during which period the possession of the true owner is restored. But here the distinguishing features are (i) that defendant No. 1 and her father (Prana Dhan Das) are not independent trespassers and (ii) the possession of Prana Dhan Das as against Durga Charan's family has been continuous and the finding of the two courts is that there has not been even a momentary interruption of his possession. Hence it must be held that for the purpose of Article 142 the plaintiff's suit is completely barred by limitation. As this was the only point raised by Mr. D. Mohanty (for the appellant in S. A. 206 of 1962) it is unnecessary to discuss the other points involved in this litigation. 13. Both these reasons in Second Appeal No. 206 of 1962 is allowed and Second Appeal No. 152 of 1962 is dismissed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout -- to be paid to defendant No. 1 by the plaintiff. 14. There will be only one set of costs in both these appeals.

Dayanidhi Sahu vs Sarala Dei And Ors. on 24 December, 1963

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.8566 of 2011 SADDAM @ BHURA, S/o Brija Thakur @ Najimullah. Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR ----------- 02. 25.03.2011 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. The petitioner seeks bail in a case instituted for the offences under Section 414 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that with regard to the motor-cycle allegedly recovered from the house of the petitioner there is no parent case of theft and the petitioner has remained in custody since 29.12.2010 and has no criminal antecedent. Considering the same, let the petitioner, above named be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 5,000/- (Five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each or any other surety as fixed by the Court to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with Kuchaikot P.S. Case No. 269 of 2010 subject to the following conditions:- (i) That one of the bailors will be a close relative of the petitioner who will give an affidavit giving genealogy as to how he is related with the petitioner and the other bailor shall be the brother of the petitioner namely Md. Alam. The bailor will also undertake to inform the Court if there is any change 2 in the address of the petitioner. (ii) That the affidavit shall clearly state that the petitioner is not an accused in any other case and if he is he shall not be released on bail. (iii) That the bailor shall also state on affidavit that he will inform the court concerned if the petitioner is implicated in any other case of similar nature after his release in the present case and thereafter the court below will be at liberty to initiate the proceeding for cancellation of bail on the ground of misuse. (iv) That the petitioner will give an undertaking that he will receive the police papers on the given date and be present on date fixed for charge and if he fails to do so on two given dates and delays the trial in any manner, his bail will be liable to be cancelled for reasons of misuse. (v) That the petitioner will be well represented on each date and if he fails to do so on two consecutive dates, his bail will be liable to be cancelled. (Anjana Prakash, J.) Vikash/-

Saddam @ Bhura vs The State Of Bihar on 25 March, 2011

Karnataka High Court

Author: K.Ramanna

1.;Bé;S;aP%%§, IN THE'; mm: mum' 9? KARNA'TAI;{A_' * <:::R«.::Lm' BENCH A'? GULBARGA V BATES THIS THE 25TH DAY'SF"??:'13:2Ugx§Y;_2:j0%§«' BgwoRfi '--_ VA ma HGNBLE MR.J:}Jr1cE?' 5:. RA.MAN%£:!§" M.F.A.NO..1"19.§7Iu§EQO?§ 4 BETWEEN: BEi1MASHAN£<;AR, V " SJOPARAPPA s:.w;«:.g;q, ' 1; mag? ms, Q;<:;::,:»35:,:s; VELN£;~f."_>R$ _. 3 , STD, xamxgm /s_:.2é1:2'0F:;:%:£:';f;;:xg"~;:s: V' , ' :NGLEsHwAE<,,. ;f . A. RfO.KMsI51§AD£XS Bfi;£;?!%W"z'%N'E, B§J£3.PUI:2,D1S'T;°;3iJ5P'&§RA--_ '-.___ _ _-- .. APPELLANT' {gar zaé:--;§::~::g:*§?;s._'r9'{3.:@:*:xx:;{im~: ASSTS. 3 a§~m:_;j 'V g,{.;c:i;:s1m;;?P;a, E.;e"ajSH§, 'q>wm:,R r::::«*4..f1':«;:r>'.s:T:«?3::>~~'m=«;;<, Kg'-Q,E2§LBI§'¥;'§k'E;.--,_ BA$§§f€£NABA'QEWABE _ Tgzua I3§1 ST;BIJAFUR. 7 7 azzgiééczi MANAGER * "«?§AI1€;3=}§AL msamwag cmgri'-';3,$ _ .BII_§A'.'€L¥ . ., R_€S}?0:*~é'EENfS £8? SR1 E"€'V,I"3A§_"}z§GG"$§§A, §§3"'§f. FQR E%=-{Z2} §i:iz§r§iré<}2'k%§: M) '§'i~{1S MFA ES m2'.-£2 U;"'S.}';?'3[§} GP' M'-.3 aCT;'_""PRA_2%.:.i§i3_.Vifzvy MGBEFY ma, Juasmam AND AWARD QATED 23/§.g2oi<f_xz.'F:2: Tzw%J_c:" Nomzs/2905 PASSED BY THE M£XCT,.?¥©..1E{,&E3§;3§APU¥«? Ig " @113 APPEAL CQMENG 0:4 mm i¥:;:«:§;:§é 1§~ic3 9I"é¥.z $»Q;xY;.L_%;:cr§ij§f>f§ DELIVERED TI-{E FOLLOWING;~ ;_.JUDG~MR}¥;1? This is an appeal who is statexi to ba the :;i7c,¥.:€n§.*of fled lilldffil' Section 3523(1) of tiéé .1988, chauenging firm inad€qua:.t:ffVbf "_éié¢a:z;ded by MAC'?-iii, Bijapur, in wc.NV¢: 1'0%2s/256$. :33/é/200?. ...-z " .:Th€.V 1<;:a_*Vs.'t': ' G:f the agapfiflant in bziaf is that on I appefiéxt was travelkifig in a f:t:m§::~trax vahicle 08 142 belonging to 15' respondent, iasumd 'g3?i'£3:1 213$ respoudent, when the 831:3 vehicle was "'"--..§i":;ge¢€di}:1g«:'f:'om Engaleshwar to 8.8agewa,di, driver 0f the said draw: Elm same with great sgeed ami last cmatrei aver .t§1_e§:zeh_iC1a, kack '$'€'h€€§ af the said Efcflfiifilfi cams Gui mad the said " .~ i;emp<3 roiled an 13:16 roaé resuiting in grifiveus injmifis is the appsiiaxét, Thfifflffiffi, the apgaeliaflt fiigd a ciaim pfifififlii claimixzg compensation Zilldfil" the varicms heads. After c911si;rié::{ng"vthe era} and documentary avidemze placed on Bijapur, awardeci compensation of R1-:s.'6*.";};:}A()()f» ' j 6% pa from @116 data of petition til} Béifig the: quantum of compansation 3%§éi7¢§.C§; i}1e__a;3p1e}1ai:.=.f"i:aS' come up with this appeal slaimizzg €I1I"12v§i'{3.€?VV1:;;.ZiI§(;ifii{';3;1Z%'§)f céfixpanséafion. 33 Hearfi the 1<=:ar;f:'€:$<:¥_;_' 'céuiisél _:' £c§xf"».V;é17';';§§a11an'5: and the Ieazned C30'LH}.S€':I 1"6:S';§:%j;1{ieVni;« ljouvner of the vehicle am} r€s.p<§i:<Iéi;1~t';V--_SJ7eV.3 ffiompanya 4. 'c:;§';1fiVTssr»§b1V"§7{§i"'<:a:§;3€3}a11t arguefi that {hang}: the a,pp€3},a1A33:_ S11S".€Lfi.iiifff}...v;gf§;€éi'*f0'¥;i'.E'a izxjurias, flit': "§'1*ibu11a_'; awardeci 'V fi2v&;ag&';;? :slu1m. of }Qs.6f:i«.()(}'é}'f --. Thaugh the doctor has eyined that to 25% 0f disability; ma amcmnt has been awfififié {ha hem} 'fiztura loss if aarraixig and £033 af _ "€;f&j:f€iCiEy' anci also the amount awardeé tewards .__2§ii{%::1jdéL3:si chargeg is V61}? mitagm', Sfl aise amount awazded under .___""52?:5aI'i§j;:z$ othar heafis. Therefcm it is praysfii 1:313: appeal he V V 'a§}e:Wcd by enhancing this amaurzt awardxt-rd by the Tribtmai 5' heard the arguzxxsnts of 8012121331 fax' parties gtkéifised the rsccrds. 6, It is an undisputed fact that'.2§fppe1iain;*.§?.'s§é :i:fa3§%e312§11§i11 ' 3 teirapowtrax owned by respendszlt §\A§'Q'.};"-.53 a >§}§1:5's$5€:ILgf£1%~"-. §_:5:l1._-EV unfertuziatezijjg", the said vehicle ;1:1-- §1'3;14::*gti::::i:f4. met 'aéciderii due to rash and negligem 'it?s..a£fiv€r. The Txébunal is expected to $35' were sustained by the claimant .Vi13. fl3_ € af{:E$ifi:'e:;.'+f£ itravfilling £11 the vehicle. E112 %$EiE%}aalI:':'.V>i%é3.r%3.$d""'€£)uflSe1 for aPP6133~11t 3135 }3roduc&{i Vt'h€: !E§#:.P.6, which shows that Whflfl appaflant wéif-i_' Shififii Heaith Center, Basavakalyana Vin B.Bi:3gig-gewzzdi he. w:.=a;.s u3:1s:en3c:i0us as he haé sustaifiad injuxéas "*E"jk_16 dacter W119 has examined the appefiant has flQ:!..1:Cé:;.1_'§hvv3'é'Vi.'i§;}_"1£?f:ii:f'S were grievous in natuxtt and im was iakfifi V V' Tito th€ Bist;.. §;i<;s,§fii%:a1, Bijapur, an the vex}: gamze day an& the Xmay " 'rcgiraaisj. :21z;3t'iT'i:the:*e is 3 fraetum 0f the frag: pariéiai bags can the Z&_ £"t;_ si~§:i<§ chest partial azzfi he was éischargeti against the 'msdicai adviss, wihersas, ths apgaéiéargi wantezi "£9 fake treaiimsm VA higher mefiicai center, Therefare, has has censniteé D1:§%i§.V.§%am&sh.§ whc; has Stated that thcirc was a fmsrstture csf from, bone and therft was impairmsnt in heaiiug, §3§:"'»Twa3 fixamined an 2?'! 1 1/ 2906 1:0 assess the disabfiity csf agpeflant has aim cxamined the {§r.R:-1$ha11k_:ax ia. ' percentags of disabiiity s11fi"€red bf; 'on §:CcQi;u1t'ibf§:;i§1i;fi¢$: sustaineti by him in: thfi accic1e13_t._. C6;:s§id€1'i11g:.?.h§":iatu.1;é éf--. injuries sustained by appellant du€é"L«i%§:"V§mpair::1fir:t:?;f a}:1ci aiso sinus GI}. arsccaunt sffiar;;&t11re' &fi£"'fi"§:}:ifi;a}._ b9n e7,"£h"é Tribunal awarded {-1 sum of Rs.2,OQ(}/'QA ::L:'1dj'£:r;t§"1€ and stsfiefing' which requireg f£)_..7{E}v':'fi:V<E;'.Z'1h.'.7:»'.i§1ACé'::,(:'}. of Rs.15,000l- apart frsgsmigfihci afili}G'::,;::i:a»*2a1'desi, The appeilant is stataé is have spefaiga Eiugfir é};'3€;11i3';--t._ iowartis meéica} 5X§€flS€S as hf: was i:1;3.;f2{ti'zez;:'£ f£am.. iéi 2682 to 3/11;i.G{};2. 'E'h€ apgeiiajszgt E.?'é,'"i". speciafist as weii as radieiagist far '{.Z'éi:§?.'(.}}ZiZ£3f._?,_I'£ff Sustaitxed ami Ehfi ciisabiiity gufiered by him V V' gzameljga. imv_;§3i":fi1ent of hearing ta same axtcmi and 3139 S§..E1'LES. " xgzfai éviflfizécs (pf 'aha appefiant sriiscisses that 3115 flag spam: '::;1}':;.g'3?;i¢:§§'E:I€ amount for Wmch Q13 'E'":ébu:<3.a} has awaxdezi ~ tawazfig exgezzsézs emf tr€ai:n3e11i§ which £3 in pxariigr the magiicai bifls gmduced b€'.fC-P6 scam, Emwevez" it erxzici in 113%: awarding 311:; amaunt ilildfii" the hsaé 'attendam aharges', /35} V '_ .. ,.~ 'cenvayancs and nourishment'. 'Therefore, it is justiand aware} Rs.6,()€){),/ -- under the afoxesaid tigrgze 11e;:.d's; ' : , 2?. Further, accoflling tea appellaifi, h§A.had};; $'1x9p .i$29..Sf:b in 1116 KSRTC bus stand and $¢}ii11.g ::sarl3?. 200 psi; day and 3130 looking after the ag1'§C:iITiuféi1.w0r3;{,"E3u'€; §1ti: has not produced any Zease dead -519 paiéi rem ts KSRTC, He 1~z..vas:;' prod-;;:éé§i'};{;::'v;«Vg§§t fitxamined milk V€I1{i0i'[ cf milk to him is Show that_ and selhing the same in retail. Asiper has stated ':;hat in ardsr in meat tbs mzedfitai éxpéxkseé _E1i:~: izatfigxr was cempelieci to 3611 01:6, Ame Q1" fiazaciy 2§;ifs_{}.:iéV:}1A.is {mi a._§r0u11.d £0 ciaim enhanced compensatian. if 33 p e1"3;::§. '::a$.3;i$faii1ed such 3 tyye of injuréfis in a motor Vfihifjlfi acéigle-é1_£5..A}';n:.};:éi;1ii€i is sgemd such a Image monay in scazfier :0 get cyumd Err He: has also produged the R03, :9 Show that u"':«:.".4A"1;},{§".va[s 'agI*icx1ii:ural Wfifk alga, Whig}: are stafidifig in ma 3.:a,é1m:é':;:§.71:?:37.s fathézt Thérfifflffi, prmvisimzs if 33:13.? mafia by him fer ljjagzticzziturai Eand may :20': came in his Wag; £0 smyerviss. tbs saié VA '--«<fi:2$mtien, '§':a}{iI1g iittfie cfinsiéamiimn {hat ha; has 115?: §:*'aéur:€d my ::§0<:umE:;3.ts and ma: is tmaimfi as the arfiinarjg Wags game}; ii} ''2 .§/' .. K7,. _ , my opinion, the inccrme of the appefiant alight tat; _If13vé{at Rs.80/- per day. 8. As far as the éigabiiity is <:c>::1b."c:¢rJ:;;~.'_é:Tfi; aéTcQftt1i':1g:Vt«:;_L"d{§éVi§;r P.W.2 a§}3€':1L'3_Ifi: $11:iT€:rs 20 to _r:1is.3A..bi1:§ty =tbc;Wh019 ' boay but the Claims Tflbgna} VA'VkV"_n§¥.."k' axgazxiégg a};1y amcmn: towamls 3033 of awning u 02' the zciisability suffered by him." f"{1:.:=:_€:§1:;}"c M.A.C.'I'. is that the appeflang. his work is oniy to coilect the. who use the STD booth facility. any, may net came in his Way of ramming S3s'i'f_II?>%'§:<><V3'?;};;" _ J i.'{";éfiIE1.S;?"t€i{i'§7£°V1;'I:ig"""7'1"s,ai'€ fact that thfi Tribunai has :13': awarded fiixgiitizwf the head 'futurm 1033 of earraing capacity' §..€., hy.' _§i3;?i__r§gIicu1nKal Wcrk and tlsereforeg tha svidence of %TT%%«.%.%4%_W?.w,2 égggagses that appeiiant suifétrs 20 E0 23% fiisabflity :9 A which a;3pea::'s to be an 'éhfi highs: side. in my €0 s;1s§aér.=:refi viaw, it is gust ané prayer ta agges the Whale bofiy u éiisabifiitgz cf appaiiwi: at 35%, Hence; the apptzilant is entifleé '£0 fature ioss 9:? aafiziizg capacity at th& rate sf 159/"ya 0f the Whoie bed}? zéisability and his inateme is taktzn at R380] -= u§4:<:':s3 of eamiizag of the apprsilani per menth Wfilild be " €3ons:£d€z'i11g the age of appcflant, it i:;"j'11--s<t& afifi b j " multiplier '17' to assess the c0mpené5«1a.ti€%:i."'T ;f;h e agpellmat is entitled to cc>z<:ca;1)a<:1'1':§;i§;i:.;s ;t1 of " .K:,é\;;,:«ga1fi's;V V 1033 of future aamitzgs. 'F2_:_n_1s in --r:::ti$§ed to total csampensation of Rs.§4,4-433;'. ; W}1'£Ch1;iS_ of to Rs.94,500l . Thai: aforesaid am011:i1§ W013 j.'.'c'?3i'E_f€:.';éf;s't': pas frona {ha date of petitioxi €x;i é: p0é§;t3. u 18. £9: :g§s*'s'«"'i'Vu--;t."~:;Vj:{,'-* 1333; c:3mpe.nsa':ic::n is concamed the Tzébunéi h'¢i£1Vi%}Si::{§i*;<_i;é1JfitS ii and 2 jointiy azzd sevmfiaily Eiabie {:3 'pay 315'» _<§<§:ié13e§T:$;3.:ion am:3um':. N0 agptéa}. or CFOSSS V%31*;3»3E"';5€'5:;'fi"«§f%}€i1 gifixer sf E336 I'€S':§OI1{i€31{S a;-halienging the Télerefom, mspondents fie. 1 ané 2, who are {ha aiamer .}i;1:1 s11rer 9f the vrzhicie are joimfiy afld severafl}? .. j ' ';§.i':8fl3'1$ 10 §$afg__ §:ompe11safi0;1 ta {ha appe§.}a:::2't/ ciafimajzzi. Aamrémgly, £23313 appeai is ailsxxzsgi in part. The { "§fid:§g§;€ni and awaifi passaé by the "§':*ib:1:1a§ is hegflgy moiiififid. h'§'.he afipgeilamt/ciaimaxzi is enfitled ta iartai aérmgaensafion sf /". I)' R3.94,500I~ together with interest at 6% pa frail: Qéita of petition {ii} the: date of p.-gygaent. Raspendem: Company shail clsposit the aforesaid cempenss;iig2vfi.::jemfiifimt. '»*;fi3€$::V b accrued interest witbizz two montlm fi'QB}:-LE5' date:..§3f-r*éCéiptw»:..gsfAa copy caf this srder. Amount ,2ii1r§a¢§.y ~::iV_e'p0sit€:d ' ;x;?§:) g..1ci ; adjusted,' Sd/-3 JUDGE *'i}3VS -------- _

Bhimashankar vs Basappa S/O Siddappa Kashi on 26 February, 2009

Lok Sabha Debates

Title: Regarding proposed increase in excise duty imposed on readymade garments industry. श्री मदन लाल खुराना (दिल्ली सदर):अध्यक्ष जी, मैं आपकी आज्ञा से रेडीमेड गारमैंट्स उद्योग पर प्रस्तावित १६ प्रतिशत एक्साइज़ डयूटी लगाने के परिणामस्वरूप देशभर में हो रही हड़ताल और दिल्ली में बेमियादी हड़ताल की ओर सदन का ध्यान आकर्षित करना चाहता हूं।…( व्यवधान ) अध्यक्ष महोदय : खुराना जी, कल यह मामला उठाया था। श्री मदन लाल खुराना: उन्होंने केवल दो लाइनें कही थीं। अध्यक्ष महोदय : क्या अभी ज्यादा बोलेंगे? श्री मदन लाल खुराना: १४ लोगों ने लिख कर दिया है। ढाई से तीन लाख स्मॉल और कॉटेज इंडस्ट्रीज की इकाइयां सारे देश में लगी हुई हैं। देश के ग्यारह शहरों में डेढ़ लाख यूनिट्स हैं जिनमें बीस से पच्चीस लाख लोग रोजगार में हैं। मैं कह सकता हूं कि पिछले कुछ वर्षों से यह उद्योग ऐसा है जिसने बहुत डैवलप किया है, बहुत ज्यादा एक्सपोर्ट किया है। देश के एक्सपोर्ट के अंदर इसका बहुत बड़ा भाग है। कल मैंने वित्त मंत्री जी से बात की थी। उन्होंने कहा था कि हमने केवल ट्रेड मार्क वालों पर लगाया है। लेकिन उन लोगों का कहना है कि जिनका टर्नओवर १५-२० लाख है, उन्होंने भी रजिस्टर करवा रखा है। दिल्ली में अभी ४ प्रतिशत सेल्स टैक्स लगा, ६ प्रतिशत सैंट्रल टैक्स है, १६ प्रतिशत यह लग जाएगा। अगर एक उद्योग में एक साल में २६ प्रतिशत टैक्स लग गया तो वह उद्योग बिल्कुल बर्बाद हो जाएगा। अगर यह कहते हैं कि ब्रांड वालों को करना चाहते हैं तो टर्नओवर लिया जाए कि जिसका टर्नओवर तीन करोड़ से ज्यादा हो, उस पर टैक्स लगाएं, हमें कोई एतराज नहीं है। लेकिन स्मॉल स्केल इंडस्ट्री, जिसका टर्नओवर तीन करोड़ से कम है, उस पर न लगाया जाए, उसे मुक्त रखा जाए। कपड़ा मंत्री जी से भी मेरी बात हुई है। वे भी इसके ऊपर टैक्स लगाने से दुखी हैं। सोमनाथ चटर्जी : इनकी बात कोई सुनता नहीं है। श्री मदन लाल खुराना: मेरा आपसे यह निवेदन है कि क्योंकि आज दिल्ली के अन्दर और सारे देश के अन्दर इसकी हड़ताल है, मजदूर सड़कों पर आ गये हैं, पहले से ही बेरोजगारी बहुत ज्यादा है, उसमें इस तरह से ३०, ४०, ५० लाख लोगों को बेरोजगार करना बहुत बड़ा अन्याय होगा। मैं आपके माध्यम से निवेदन करना चाहूंगा कि वे हमारी भावनाओं को माननीय मंत्री जी तक पहुंचायें। आज देश की जो मांग है कि केवल‘brand’ रजिस्ट्रेशन से नहीं, तीन करोड़ रुपये से जिसका टर्नओवर ज्यादा हो, उसी पर टैक्स लगे और स्माल स्केल इंडस्ट्री पर टैक्स नहीं लगना चाहिए।…( व्यवधान ) श्री विजय गोयल (चांदनी चौक) : खुराना जी की बात से मेरा भी सम्बन्ध है। इसके कारण दिल्ली में बहुत एजीटेशन है।…( व्यवधान ) MR. SPEAKER: You can associate with Shri Khurana. … (Interruptions) SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE : Sir, I have received several representations which I have forwarded to the Finance Minister and has requested his immediate intervention because serious misery is being caused to a large number of small scale units. Lakhs and lakhs of workers are being affected. Sir, this is a very serious matter. I request him to pass it on with a strong recommendation that this should be done. I request immediate intervention by the Government. SHRI K. YERRANNAIDU (SRIKAKULAM): Sir, not only the CPM but also the whole House is supporting Shri Khurana on this point. SHRI SOMNATH CHATTERJEE : However, the CPM always gives the lead. … (Interruptions) MR. SPEAKER: Shri Jaipal Reddy, you can also support him. SHRI S. JAIPAL REDDY ( MIRYALGUDA): Sir, I would like to lend support to what Shri Khurana said. MR. SPEAKER: Shri Khurana, you are getting a lot of support.

Regarding Proposed Increase In Excise Duty Imposed On Readymade ... on 8 March, 2001

Central Government Act

[Section 12AA] [Complete Act]

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 576 of 2002() 1. JACOB JOHN, PALAMOOTTIL VADAKKETHIL, ... Petitioner Vs 1. THOMASKUTTY, GRACE BHAVAN, PARKODU MURI, ... Respondent 2. STATE OF KERALA, BY THE PUBLIC For Petitioner :SRI.PHILIP M.VARUGHESE For Respondent :SRI.SUNIL JACOB JOSE The Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT Dated :16/03/2009 O R D E R R.BASANT, J ---------------------- Crl.R.P.No.576 of 2002 ---------------------------------------- Dated this the 16th day of March 2008 O R D E R This revision petition is directed against a concurrent verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 2. The cheque was for an amount of Rs.70,000/-. Signature in the cheque is admitted. Handing over of the cheque in connection with creation of a financial liability is also admitted. But contention is raised that the cheque was not issued for the due discharge of any legally enforcible debt or liability; but was issued as security when the accused entered into a financial transaction with the father-in-law of the complainant. That cheque is being misused, it is alleged. 3. Notice of demand though duly received and acknowledged did not evoke any response. The complainant examined PWs 1 to 4 and proved Exts.P1 to P7. The accused examined a witness as DW1. PW1 is the complainant. PWs 2 and 3 are the Managers of the drawing and collecting banks. DW1 claims to have seen the real transaction between the accused and the father-in-law of the complainant. The courts  Crl.R.P.No.576/02 2 below concurrently came to the conclusion that the evidence on the side of the complainant can be safely believed and that shows that there was a legally enforcible debt/liability and for discharge of the same, the cheque was issued. Accordingly, the courts below proceeded to pass the impugned concurrent judgments. 4. Called upon to explain the nature of the challenge which the petitioner wants to mount against the impugned concurrent judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates the contention that the cheque was not issued by the accused to the complainant for the due discharge of any legally enforcible debt/liability. It was issued as a blank signed cheque as security when the accused entered into a transaction with the complainant's father-in-law. The evidence of DW1 should have been believed by the courts, it is contended. 5. I have rendered my anxious consideration to the contentions raised. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner. The oral evidence of PW1 clearly shows the circumstances under which the cheque was received by the complainant. That version of the complainant is eminently supported by the absence of a response to the notice  Crl.R.P.No.576/02 3 of demand which was duly served on the accused. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I.Act stares at the accused. The evidence of DW1 was found by the courts below to be not convincing for acceptance. I am unable to agree that there are any circumstances justifying interference with the findings of fact rendered concurrently by the court below. 6. The learned counsel finally submits that the petitioner is entitled for leniency. The sentence imposed is S.I for six months and compensation of Rs.50,000/-. I have already adverted to the principles governing imposition of sentence in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I.Act in the decision in Anilkumar vs.Shammi [2002(3)KLT 852]. I am satisfied that leniency can be shown to the petitioner/accused. Substantive sentence of imprisonment can be modified. An appropriate modification of payment of the direction for compensation coupled with a default sentence can be imposed. 7. In the result: a) This revision petition is allowed in part. b) The impugned verdict of guilty and conviction of the petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I.Act are upheld.  Crl.R.P.No.576/02 4 c) But the sentence imposed is modified and reduced. In supersession of the sentence imposed on the petitioner by the courts below, he is sentenced to undergo imprisonment till rising of court. He is further directed under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C to pay an amount of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) as compensation and in default, to undergo S.I for a period of two months. If realised, the entire amount shall be released to the complainant as compensation. 8. The petitioner shall have time till 30/04/2009 to make the payment. The impugned sentence shall not be executed till that date. The petitioner shall appear and his sureties shall produce him before the learned Magistrate on or before 02/05/2009 to serve the modified sentence hereby imposed. (R.BASANT, JUDGE) jsr  Crl.R.P.No.576/02 5 The petitioner now faces a sentence of imprisonment till rising of court/S.I for a period of ............ and there is a direction to pay the actual cheque amount as compensation and in default to undergo S.I for a period of .......... months.  Crl.R.P.No.576/02 6 R.BASANT, J Crl.R.P.No.576 of 2002 ORDER 16th DAY OF MARCH 2009 

Jacob John vs Thomaskutty on 16 March, 2009

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Author: S Khare

ORDER S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is a revision by th6 defendants against order dated 3-2-2001 of the First Civil Judge Class-I, Umaria in Civil Suit No. 97-A of 2000 by which it has been held that the valuation of the suit for purposes of the Court-fee and pecuniary jurisdiction is proper. 2. The plaintiffs case is that defendant No. 1 Ram Prasad Agrawal purchased 16 ft. x 40 ft. of land from him for Rs. 25,000/-. He took him for execution and registration of the sale-deed and then played fraud upon him. According to the plaintiff he has been defrauded on two counts. Firstly, the land which has been included in the registered sale-deed dated 28-9-1999 exceeds the area which was agreed to be sold and secondly, the amount of consideration shown in the sale-deed is Rs. 50,000/- whereas he has been paid an amount of Rs. 25,000/- only. He claims that he is in possession of the land in dispute. He has claimed the relief of declaration that the sale-deed is the product of fraud and misrepresentation and he has also claimed the relief that the defendant No. 1 be restrained from interfering with the possession of the , plaintiff on the land in dispute. 3. It is well settled that the question of Court-fee must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by final decision of the suit on merits. This principle was laid down by the Supreme Court long back in Sathappa v. Ramanathan, AIR 1958 SC 245, and has been recently referred to by the Full Bench of this Court in Subhash Chand v. MPEB, 2000(4) M.P.H.T. 318 = 2000(3) MPLJ 522. 4. The present case is covered by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. The plaintiff has claimed the relief of declaration and the consequential relief of injunction. Therefore, ad valorem Court-fee as per Section 7(iv)(c) is payable. The question is what should be the proper valuation. There is a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Badrilal v. State of M.P., AIR 1964 MP 9, which must be followed. It has been held in this case that while the plaintiff is at liberty to value the relief claimed in suits governed by the various clauses of Section 7(iv)including those for a declaration with the consequential relief of injunction, he cannot be allowed to put an arbitrary value and if he does so and the Court considers that it is too low or unreasonable in that it bears no relation to the right litigated, it may require him to correct the valuation. 5. In the present case the plaintiff is not challenging the receipt of Rs. 25,000/- and the sale of land measuring 16 ft. x 40 ft. He is challenging the receipt of remaining amount of Rs. 25,000/-. In the sale-deed the amount of consideration which has been shown is Rs. 50,000/-. Thus, the plaintiff wants to be relieved of the excess value shown in the sale-deed. In this view of the matter, the valuation made by him is proper. The order of the Trial Court holding that the valuation of the suit for purposes of Court-fee and pecuniary jurisdiction is proper, cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity. 6. The revision is dismissed.

Ram Prasad Agrawal And Anr. vs Bhagwandas on 19 November, 2002

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM MACA.No. 1255 of 2004(C) 1. DINCY, D/O. RAJU, KALAIL VEEDU, ... Petitioner Vs 1. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, KSRTC, ... Respondent 2. SAINUDEEN, SAHANA MANZIL, NEAR 3. MATHAI, PADINJAREKUDIYIL VEEDU, For Petitioner :SRI.NAGARAJ NARAYANAN For Respondent :SRI.SAJEEVKUMAR K.GOPAL, SC, KSRTC The Hon'ble MR. Justice M.N.KRISHNAN Dated :10/07/2008 O R D E R M.N.KRISHNAN, J. -------------------------- M.A.C.A. No. 1255 OF 2004 --------------------- Dated this the 10th day of July, 2008 JUDGMENT This appeal is preferred against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Neyyattinkara, in OP(MV) 1136/01. The claimant, a student, sustained injuries in a road accident. The KSRTC bus was stopped for alighting passengers and the conductor of the bus before closing the door gave the signal and the driver moved the bus forward. The door of the bus dashed against the appellant herein and she sustained injuries. It is seen that she has suffered haematoma on the left shoulder and contusion on the left shoulder. She was treated as outpatient in the Medical College Hospital and thereafter had undergone Ayurvedic treatment for some days in the Ayurveda College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. 2. The grievance of the appellant is that she has sustained 4% disability and the Tribunal has not awarded any compensation for loss of amenities and enjoyment in life. The disability certificate has not been proved by examination of the Doctor and even the claimant has not mounted the box to describe about her disability. The injuries are only contusions and abrasions. But it appears that she  MACA No.1255/04 2 had some sprain on the shoulder and it is only a temporary phenomena. There is noting to show that the accident had caused difficulty or she had undergone treatment continuously. 3. Taking into consideration the fact that she had pain and swelling and had undergone outpatient treatment for some days, I am inclined to hold that there would have been some temporary disability besides loss of amenities and enjoyment in life to the girl. She was a student and it should have affected her free movements and therefore taking into consideration that aspect, I am inclined to additional sum of Rs.4,000/- towards loss of amenities and enjoyment in life. In the result, the MACA is partly allowed and the claimant is entitled to an additional compensation of Rs.4,000/- with 7 % interest on the said sum from the date of petition till realisation from the respondents. The 1st respondent KSRTC is directed to deposit the amount within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. M.N.KRISHNAN, JUDGE vps  MACA No.1255/04 3

Dincy vs The Managing Director on 10 July, 2008

Punjab-Haryana High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Crl.Misc.No.M-29266 of 2009 Date of decision : 09.12.2009 Narender @ Soni ... Petitioner Versus State of Haryana ...Respondent Present: Mr.Rakesh Dhiman, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.Pawan Singh, AAG, Haryana. S.S.Saron, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner seeks regular bail in a case registered against him for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC - for short) at Police Station Sadar, Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar. FIR has been registered on the complaint of Subhash Chander, Assistant Food and Supply Officer, Bahadurgarh. It is alleged that Govt. of India under its policy decided to grant financial assistance of Rs.5 lacs for the year 2001-02 to New Gram Vikas Samiti, Tandaheri, District Jhajjar which was formed by the petitioner by nominating 15 members and the petitioner himself became its Secretary. Out of amount decided to be paid, an amount of Rs.2.5 lacs was directly given to the said Samiti by way of bank draft. However, the said Samiti had not opened any District Consumer Centre in the district so far. Accordingly, a decision was taken to get a criminal case registered with the police against the said Samiti for misusing the govt.grant . The petitioner was arrested on 22.4.2009. In pursuance to the disclosure statement made by the petitioner, a rubber stamp which he used for preparing documents of the Samiti was recovered. It was also found during the investigation that the petitioner did not join 12 persons out of 15 persons Crl.Misc.No.M-29266 of 2009 2 named in the FIR as members and office bearers of the Samiti, rather he himself appended their signatures and thumb impression on the relevant papers and thereby embezzled an amount of 2.5 lacs. The challan in this case has been filed and the trial of the case will take its course of time. The case is triable by the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class. The allegations against the petitioner are to be proved by leading evidence. In the circumstances, the petitioner on his furnishing personal bond and surety to the satisfaction of the learned trial Magistrate shall be admitted to bail. Petition stands disposed of. [ S.S.Saron ] Judge 09.12.2009 sd/amit

Narender @ Soni vs State Of Haryana on 9 December, 2009

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Cr.Misc. No.20500 of 2011 Karu Mian S/o late Hanish Mian, R/o Manjhla Tilha, P.S. Katoriya (Suiya) District-Banka. --Petitioner Versus The State Of Bihar --Opp.Party 2 15.07.2011 AAhmad ( Akhilesh Chandra, J.) Heard. After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner, who is an accused in Katoriya (Suiya) P.S. Case no. 11 of 2004, seeks permission to withdraw this application in order to enable the petitioner to surrender within a fornight and pray for regular bail which shall be considered on its own merit without being prejudiced of the instant withdrawal. Permission is granted. The application is dismissed as withdrawn.

Karu Mian vs The State Of Bihar on 15 July, 2011

Allahabad High Court

Court No. - 6 Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 336 of 1994 Petitioner :- State Of U.P. Respondent :- Gurunam SinghPetitioner Counsel :- S.C. Respondent Counsel :- S.A. Hasmi Hon'ble Prakash Krishna J. Three weeks' and no more time is granted to the learned standing counsel to file the counter affidavit. List thereafter. Order Date :- 5.7.2010 IB

State Of U.P. vs Gurunam Singh on 5 July, 2010

Gujarat High Court

Author: H.B.Antani,&Nbsp;

Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print SCA/5265/2010 1/ 1 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 5265 of 2010 ====================================== MUKADDAS HUSSAIN ANWAR HUSSAIN SHEIKH - Petitioner(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 2 - Respondent(s) ====================================== Appearance : MR MM TIRMIZI for Petitioner(s) : 1, MR JIRGA JHAVERI ASST.GOVERNMENT PLEADER for Respondent(s) : 1, None for Respondent(s) : 2 - 3. ====================================== CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE H.B.ANTANI Date : 29/04/2010 ORAL ORDER Rule. Ms.Jirga Jhaveri, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No.3 jail authority. The Registry is directed to list this matter for final hearing in seriatim considering the actual date of detention. Direct service is permitted qua respondent Nos.1 and 2. (H.B.ANTANI, J.) Amit/-

Mukaddas vs State on 29 April, 2010

Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Mumbai

ORDER R. Jayaraman, Member (T) 1. This is an appeal directed against the order-in-original bearing No. S/14-4-1208/83 Pint/(SD/INT/NTFD/749/83), dated 18-8-1984 passed by the Addl. Collector of Customs (P), Bombay, imposing a penalty of Rs. 50,0007- under Section 112 of the Customs Act on the appellant. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal can be stated as below: On the basis of an information, search of the godown premises of the appellant was carried out on 28-12-1983, as a result of which 7 packages containing Video Cassettes and stereo radio cassette players valued at Rs. 1,68,000/- (m.v) were seized from the loft of the godown. The seizure was effected in the presence of one Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh, Mukadam of the godown - the paid employee of the appellant. In the adjudication proceedings initiated by the Asstt. Collector the appellant as well as the godown keeper Aboo Backer Shaikh were imposed penalties apart from confiscating the goods of foreign origin. The present appeal by the appellant is only with regard to the imposition of penalty on him by the Addl. Collector. 3. Shri Arun Mehta, on behalf of the appellant, contended that this order, so far as the appellant is concerned, has been passed without any legally acceptable evidence. Elaborating on this point further, he contended that it has been brought out in the statement of the godown keeper as well as in the statement of the appellant that the godown keeper is having an independent key of the godown and he is looking after the godown. The appellant visits the godown hardly for a few hours. Even the initial statement of the godown mukadam does not inculpate the appellant as having knowledge of the storage of the goods in the loft of the godown. According to Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh, the goods were brought in by one Shri Rafiq who was known to him because he is to come to play cricket near the godown. The appellant was nowhere in the picture and the appellant has also denied any knowledge about Shri Rafiq in his statement. Even in the subsequent statement of Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh given on 12-1-1984, in reply to a specific query with regard to the knowledge on the part of the appellant. Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh has clearly indicated that the appellant is not aware of the storage of the goods in the godown. Even the appellant was served with summons on 3-1-1984 and in response to the summons the appellant appeared on the next day itself. Even in the statement given on 4-1-1984, no knowledge with regard to the storage of the goods confiscated, on the part of the appellant has been brought out. This statement as well as the subsequent statement of the appellant are totally exculpatory. The learned advocate took me through the various statements referred to above and challenged the Collector's findings to the effect that it is difficult to believe that the goods under seizure were stored in the premisses of the appellant without his knowledge from the evidence on record. The evidences do not show any nexus of the goods under seizure with the appellant. He also took me through the findings of the Addl. Collector to show that the conclusions arrived at are only based on surmises and conjectures and there is no legally acceptable evidence either in the form of statements of the godown keeper or in the form of admission in his own statement. He, therefore, prayed for setting aside the order. 4. Heard Shri Prabhu, the learned departmental representative on behalf of the department. He contended that though the statements of the godown keeper as well as the appellant do not bring out the involvement of the appellant, admittedly he is the owner of the godown, where he is conducting his business. His behaviour, as is evidenced from his own statement is strange in that he noticed one Mulla and another in the godown and he did not bother to enquire about Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh and did not question their presence without the godown keeper. This clearly indicates that all is not well with his conduct. He also did not bother to make any enquiries after the seizure. He did not appear before the Customs authorities excepting in response of the summons dated 3-1-1984. He also contended that the totality of the circumstantial evidences is adequate for coming to the conclusion that the appellant, being the owner of the premises, should have had knowledge about the storage of the goods. The godown keeper is admittedly a faithful servant of 22 years and such a servant is not expected to store the goods without his master's knowledge. He thus supported the order. 5. After hearing both the sides and perusing the available records including the copies of the statements cited by the learned advocate, the main question to be decided is whether the appellant had knowledge about the storage of the smuggled goods in the godown belonging to the appellant. For considering {his main issue, certain undisputed facts have to be kept in view. The undisputed facts are: The appellant is the owner of the godown. One of the keys of the godown is with the mukadam and was operated upon independently by him. This mukadam by name Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh was the person presented at the time of search of the godown. His statement was recorded on 28-12-1983, the date of seizure itself, wherein he was personally questioned about the owner. The owner's name and address were given by Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh. No other question has been put with regard to the knowledge or complicity on the part of the owner of the godown. No follow up action by way of contacting the appellant immediately or carrying out search of the residential premises appears to have been done. Even in the initial statement of Shri Aboo Backer Shaikh, no knowledge on the part of the appellant has been attributed. According to his version given immediately after the seizure, he received the packages from one Shri Rafiq, who used to play cricket near the godown and he kept the cartons in the godown expecting that he would get some monetary benefits. Even in the statement of mukadam, he denies the knowledge of the contents of the packages. He also says that this was the first time he kept the packages like this received from somebody. Even in the subsequent statement given by the mukadam on 12-1-1984, to a pointed question as to whether the appellant was aware of the fact of keeping such contraband goods in the godown, his answer was that he has not told his master regarding the storage of such goods. In the statement recorded from the appellant, it is observed that he has denied his knowledge about Rafiq, the person who is alleged to have kept the goods in the godown. He has, also denied any knowledge about the goods. The goods are found to have been seized from the loft of the godown. It is seen from the statement of the godown mukadam as well as the appellant that none of these statements inculpate the appellant with regard to the knowledge of the storage of the contraband goods in the godown. No other evidences have been brought out either in the form of statement or through any other document to establish any link of the appellant either with the goods or with the undesirable elements resorting to smuggling of the goods. In the context of the aforesaid factual position, penal liability has been fastened on the appellant viz. on the ground that he is the owner of the godown and some of his behaviour is somewhat unusual and his faithful servant would not have stored the goods without his knowledge. The findings of the adjudicating authority precede to inculpate the appellant mainly on the following facts. The appellant was regularly visiting the said premises. The mukadam was under the appellant's employment for nearly 22 years and hence his statement exculpating the appellant in his subsequent statement is not credible because he is a faithful servant. The persons pointed out viz. Rafiq, Mulla are nothing but creatures of Shaikh's imagination. Hence it is difficult to believe that the goods under seizure could have found their way in the premises of the appellant without his knowledge. The appellant's explanation was that when he visited the premises on 28-12-1983 at 6.30 p.m. he found it locked and he did not bother to open the godown. Likewise, when the appellant visited the premises on 28-12-1983 the mukadam was absent and one Mulla and another were present. The appellant did not ask them what they are doing in the absence of Shri Aboobaker Shaikh. The appellant has also referred to Mulla's name in his statement as the person from whom he enquired about the whereabouts of Shri Aboobaker Shaikh. Neither the appellant nor Shri Aboobakar Shaikh made efforts to produce this Mulla to clarify their stand in the matter. It is also difficult to conceive that Aboobakar Shaikh, being a trusted and long time servant of Modi, would undertake a venture of storing goods in the premises of Modi without the knowledge of Shri Modi. 6. All these facts discussed in the findings of the adjudicating authority can only raise a presumption or a cloud of suspicion. When it is not disputed that the godown mukadam was having an independent set of keys of the godown and he was generally supervising the godown, it is quite possiblethat the godown keeper would have accepted the packages without the prior knowledge of the owner. If this possibility is to be ruled out, there should have been an admission either from the godown keeper or from the appellant or by way of independent evidences showing the linkage of the appellant with the smugglers, which could provide the circumstantial evidence for coming to the conclusion about the knowledge of the appellant. In this case, I find there are no such evidences. On the contrary, none of the statements inculpate the appellant. No immediate action seems to have been taken even by the department to bring the appellant to the scene. Even the summons was found to have been issued on 3-1-1984, which was responded to by the appellant immediately on 4-1-1984. There was no allegation that the appellant was absconding. In view of these circumstances, the appellant is definitely entitled to the benefit of doubt, especially when the storage place is not in the open space of the godown but from the loft of the godown, which cannot be seen even during daily visits by the appellant. Moreover, the godown mukadam clearly indicates that he stored the goods on his own without the knowledge of the owner and there is no evidence to contradict this. In the circumstances, I extend the benefit of doubt to the appellant and allow this appeal, discharging him from the penalty imposed.

Ramesh Prabhudas Modi vs Collector Of Customs (P) on 23 May, 1989

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 20020 of 2009(V) 1. HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE/SOCIETY ... Petitioner Vs 1. P.V. KUNHIRAMAN, ... Respondent 2. K.K. NARAYANAN, PRAJINAS HOUSE, 3. COEMANT BASTAIN,KAARIKKUNNU HOUSE, 4. RAGAHVAN C,JEESHMA NIVAS, 5. M. RAGHAVAN, SHIJIL NIVAS, 6. STANELY FERNANDES, 7. M.BALAKRISHNAN NAMBIAR, 8. M. PRABHAKARAN, THEJAS HOUSE, 9. THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY UNDER THE 10. THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY For Petitioner :SRI.K.V.SOHAN For Respondent :SRI.P.M.PAREETH The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.N.RAVINDRAN Dated :06/01/2010 O R D E R P.N. RAVINDRAN, J - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - W.P.(C) No.20020 of 2009 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 06th day of January, 2010 J U D G M E N T The petitioner is the hospital development committee of Government Hospital, Thalassery. The respondents herein are ex-servicemen who were employed as Security Guards by the petitioner in Government Hospital, Thalassery, on daily wages at the rate of Rs.75/- per day. Their services were terminated and thereupon they moved the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 seeking payment of gratuity. By Ext.P1 to P8 orders passed on the same date viz. 7.7.2007, the Controlling Authority directed the petitioner to pay various amounts to the respondents towards gratuity. The petitioner thereupon filed appeals against Ext.P1 to P8 orders before the appellate authority. The appeals were dismissed by Ext.P9  W.P.(C) No.20020 of 2009 -2- order delivered on 19.1.2009. Hence this writ petition challenging Ext.P1 to P9. The petitioner contends that their establishment is not the one coming within the purview of the Payment of Gratuity Act,1972. It is also contended that the petitioner is doing an act of charity and therefore they are not bound to pay gratuity to the respondents. 2. Section 1(3) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, states that it shall apply to "every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State in which ten or more persons are employed or were employee on any day of the preceding 12 months". Section 2(15) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act defines the term 'shop' to mean "any premises where any trade or business is carried on or where services are rendered to customers". The petitioner does not dispute the fact that it provides services to customers namely patients/visitors to Government Hospital, Thalassery by providing inter-alia,  W.P.(C) No.20020 of 2009 -3- the service of security guards. Therefore, going by Section 2(15) of Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960, the petitioner's establishment is an establishment to which the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 applies. I therefore, overrule the petitioner's contention that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 does not apply to them. 3. The next contention of the petitioner is that as they are doing an act of charity, they cannot be burdened with liability to pay gratuity. It is also contended that the petitioners are drawing pension and that they had received gratuity at the time of their discharge from the armed forces. The appellate authority had considered these aspects, overruled the said contentions and held that, as the respondents were employed in Government Hospital, Thalassery as security guards by the petitioner, the petitioner is bound to pay gratuity. 4. Under Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, gratuity is payable to an employee on the termination  W.P.(C) No.20020 of 2009 -4- of his employment after he has rendered services for not less than five years. The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the respondents have rendered more than 5 years of service, or the fact that their services were dispensed with. Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 does not stipulate that, where an establishment is a charitable institution, gratuity need not be paid to employees, otherwise eligible for the same. It also does not stipulate that ex-service men who are receiving pension and have received terminal benefits at the time of their discharge are not eligible for gratuity. In such circumstances, I am not persuaded to agree with the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that they are not bound to pay gratuity to the respondents. For the reasons stated above, I hold that there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner shall pay the amount ordered to be paid towards the gratuity in Ext.P1 to P8  W.P.(C) No.20020 of 2009 -5- orders together with interest at the applicable rates within six weeks from today, failing which the competent authority shall initiate steps for recovery, in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972. P.N. RAVINDRAN (JUDGE) nl 

Hospital Development ... vs P.V. Kunhiraman on 6 January, 2010

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA MJC No.3301 of 2009 CHANDRA SHEKHAR KUMAR Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. ----------- Ibrar/- ( V. N. Sinha, J.) 5. 13.01.2011 Counsel for the State is allowed to seek instruction in the light of the statement made in the supplementary rejoinder filed by the petitioner. Put up on 27.01.2011 maintaining its position in the same list so to enable the counsel for the State to produce the notification in terms of the decision of the Departmental Promotion Committee.

Chandra Shekhar Kumar vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors. on 13 January, 2011

Allahabad High Court

Court No. - 19 Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 359 of 2008 Petitioner :- Shyam Narayan Respondent :- Sri Ravi KumarPetitioner Counsel :- Suresh Chandra Shukla Respondent Counsel :- J anardan Singh Hon'ble S.C. Chaurasia J. As prayed by the learned counsel for the appellants, list in the next cause list. Interim order, if any, shall continue till the next date of listing. Order Date :- 1.7.2010 AKS

Shyam Narayan vs Sri Ravi Kumar on 1 July, 2010

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Bail Appl No. 7793 of 2006() 1. N.S. RAJ, S/O.N. SASIDHARAN, ... Petitioner Vs 1. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.AJAYA KUMAR. G For Respondent :PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Hon'ble MR. Justice V.RAMKUMAR Dated :09/01/2007 O R D E R V.Ramkumar, J. ======================== B.A.No. 7793 of 2006 ======================== Dated this the 9th day of January, 2007. ORDER In this Petition filed under Sec. 438 Cr.P.C. the petitioner who is the fourth accused in Crime No.494 pf 2006 of Ezhukone Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 141, 143, 147, 148, 325, 353 and 149 I.P.C., seeks anticipatory bail. 2. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 3. Having regard to the nature of the allegations levelled against the petitioner and the other circumstances of the case, I am inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, a direction is issued to the officer-in-charge of the police station concerned to release the petitioner on bail for a period of one month in the event of his arrest in connection with the above case on his executing a bond for Rs. 10,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction to the said officer and subject to the following conditions: If the petitioner commits breach of any of the above conditions, the bail granted to him shall be liable to be cancelled. This application is allowed as above. V.RAMKUMAR, JUDGE. ess 9/1  BA 7793/06 -: 3 :-

N.S. Raj vs State Of Kerala on 9 January, 2007

Gujarat High Court

Author: Akil Kureshi,&Nbsp;

Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print CR.RA/595/2009 3/ 3 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION No. 595 of 2009 ========================================================= MAYUR UMIYASHANKAR VYAS - Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT - Respondent(s) ========================================================= Appearance : MR ROHIT S VERMA for Applicant(s) : 1, MR JK SHAH ADDL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for Respondent(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI Date : 07/10/2010 ORAL ORDER This revision application is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.02.2009 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad as confirmed by the learned Additional City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad by his judgment and order dated 15.07.2009 passed in Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2009. Petitioner was involved in vehicular accident. On 18.03.2002 in the early morning hours at about 4.00 A.M. by driving his rickshaw negligently and rashly, he caused the accident with scooterist who received injuries including fracture. For such act, he was prosecuted for offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and provisions of Motor Vehicles Act also. Learned Magistrate found him guilty and awarded simple imprisonment of three months and also imposed fine of Rs.500/-. I have heard learned advocate for the parties and having perused the judgments under challenge and other documents, I am of the opinion that though so far as the Courts below holding the petitioner guilty of the offences is concerned, no interference is necessary. There was evidence on record that the petitioner was driving his rickshaw and that due to rash and negligent driving accident was caused. However, I am of the opinion that at this distant point of time nearly eight years after the incident, it is not necessary to send the petitioner to jail. Mitigating factors are as follows: (1) Nearly eight years has passed since the accident. (2) Nature of injuries is not serious. (3) Petitioner is not involved in any other offence. (4) He is prepared to pay compensation which may go to the injured. Under the circumstances, I am of the opinion that though conviction may be sustained, petitioner is required to be extended benefit of probation and suspension of sentence. Under the circumstances, though the order of conviction is maintained, such sentence is suspended. Petitioner shall be on probation for a period of one year. He shall execute a bond of good behaviour before the trial court. During the period of probation if any breach is committed by the petitioner, he shall have to serve out the sentence. Additionally, he shall pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to the injured which shall be in addition to any compensation that might have been paid to him. This shall be done within eight weeks from today. Petition stands disposed of accordingly. ( AKIL KURESHI, J. ) kailash     Top

Mayur vs State on 7 October, 2010

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C) No. 6167 of 2007(H) 1. PRASANTH V.S., VADAKKEDATH HOUSE, ... Petitioner Vs 1. MAHATMA GANDHI UNIVERSITY, ... Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.V.C.JAMES For Respondent : No Appearance The Hon'ble MR. Justice THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN Dated :23/02/2007 O R D E R THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN, J ------------------------------------------- W.P(C).No.6167 OF 2007 ------------------------------------------- Dated this the 23rd day of February, 2007 JUDGMENT Heard. 2. If the application of the petitioner for revaluation is received and pending and is in order, the same shall be considered and results declared within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The writ petition is disposed of with the above direction. THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN Judge kkb.

Prasanth V.S. vs Mahatma Gandhi University on 23 February, 2007

Kerala High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM WP(C).No. 31972 of 2009(N) 1. P.V. WILSON, ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE, ... Petitioner 2. S. VIMAL RAJ, Vs 1. STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY THE ... Respondent 2. THE CONVENER (ADDL. CHIEF 3. THE DIRECTOR, GROUND WATER For Petitioner :DR.K.P.SATHEESAN For Respondent : No Appearance The Hon'ble MR. Justice ANTONY DOMINIC Dated :01/12/2009 O R D E R ANTONY DOMINIC, J. ================ W.P.(C) NO. 31972 OF 2009 (N) ===================== Dated this the 1st day of December, 2009 J U D G M E N T Petitioners are Assistant Executive Engineers in the Ground Water Department, who have completed 5 years of service. According to the petitioners, there are three vacancies in the cadre of Executive Engineers and that despite the recommendation made by the Head of the Department, DPC has not been convened so far. It is with this grievance, the writ petition is filed. 2. If as stated by the petitioners, there are vacancies and there is already a recommendation by the Head of the Department for convening a DPC, there cannot be any justifiable reason for delaying the convening of DPC and this has to be done by the 2nd respondent. 3. Having regard to the above, I dispose of this writ petition directing the 2nd respondent to convene the DPC for considering the candidates eligible for the post of Executive Engineer in the Ground Water Department. This shall be done, as expeditiously as possible at any rate within 4 weeks of production  WPC 31972/09 :2 : of a copy of this judgment. Petitioners shall produce a copy of this judgment before the respondents. It is further directed that based on the above, necessary orders of promotion shall also be issued without further delay. ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE Rp 

P.V. Wilson vs State Of Kerala on 1 December, 2009

Gujarat High Court

Author: N Bhatt

ORDER N.H. Bhatt, J. 1. These two revision applications respectively by the original defendant No. 4 and by the original defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are directed against the order of the executing court in the Special Darkhast No. 81 of 1971 pending in the court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) Surat. The challenge is laid against the acceptance of the bid at the court auction, the auction purchaser being the respondent No. 2 Hitendrakumar Jashwantlal Jariwala. The objection to the auction sale is based on the alleged irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been committed in the matter of conducting the auction sale. 2. In the latter of the two revision applications, Mr. Sanjanwala has raised one neat question of law by recourse to Order 21, Rule 86 of the Civil Procedure Code. His submission is that after having deposited 25% of the purchase price spontaneously, the auction purchaser had failed to deposit the remainder of 75% within 15 days of the date of acceptance of the bid and this having been not done, that by itself vitiated the entire proceedings and nothing further remained to be done in the matter. 3. As far as the objections on the merits or the procedural aspect of the auction are concerned, this High Court exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code would be loath to entertain them, particularly when the objectionists had an opportunity to ventilate the grievances by having recourse to Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code. On this ground, I refuse to go into those questions, though they were vigorously sought to be urged before me by Mr. R. A. Mehta for the petitioner of the first of the two revision applications. I make it clear that if it is legally possible for the objectionists now to agitate that question, they may do so and I am not to be understood to have expressed any opinion in that regard here one way or the other. The question of delay can be sought to be thrashed out by recourse to Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act and the objectionists may invoke this provision and the executing court will consider it on its own merit. 4. Coming to the main point about non-deposit of 75% of the remaining amount of sale consideration. Mr. Sanjanwala, whose arguments were adopted by Mr. R. A. Mehta, urged that provisions of Order 21, Rules 85 and 86, which are reproduced below, provide for no extension. The provisions are:-- "Time for payment in full of purchase-money. 85. The full amount of purchase-money payable shall be paid by the purchaser into court before the court closes on the fifteenth day from the sale of the property. Provided that in calculating the amount to be so paid into court, the purchaser shall have the advantage of any set-off to which he may he entitled under Rule 72. Procedure in default of payment. 86. In default of payment within the period mentioned in the last preceding rule, the deposit may, if the court thinks fit, after defraying the expenses of the sale, be forfeited to the Govt. and the property shall be resold, and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may subsequently be sold." The learned Advocates M/s. Sanjanwala and Mehta submitted that the auction purchaser had made default of payment within those 15 days mentioned in Rule 85 and so there was no alternative for the court but to order re-sale of the property. In this connection, heavy reliance was placed by Mr. Sanjanwala on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Manilal Mohanlal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed AIR 1954 SC 349. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has categorically ruled that the provision regarding the deposit of 25% by the purchaser other than the decree-holder is mandatory as the language of the rule suggests. The full amount of purchase money must be paid within fifteen days from the date of the sale, but the decree-holder is entitled to the advantage of a set-off.....If the payment is not made within the period of fifteen days the court has the discretion to forfeit the deposit and there the discretion ends, but the obligation of the court to re-sale the property is imperative. A further consequence of non-payment is that the defaulting purchaser forfeits all claim to the property." 5. A ratio of this judgment was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Uttamchand Milapchand v. Balkrishna Ramnath AIR 1961 Bom 224, which is the judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered on 26-6-1960, and as per the judgment of the Full Bench of this High Court, this is also the law of the land to be followed. In that Bombay judgment, it was laid down that "the provisions of Order 21, Rule 85 as well as Rule 86 are mandatory in the sense that in the event of the auction purchaser failing to deposit the full purchase price within 15 days from the date of the auction sale, the court will have no option but to order a re-sale of the property. This necessarily implies that the court has no jurisdiction whatever to extend the time for the payment of the balance of the purchase price as fixed under O. 21, R. 85. Where the auction purchaser fails to pay the full purchase price within 15 days of the auction sale, there is no question of any irregularity in such a sale being waived on account of the consent of the judgment-debtor to the time being extended in favour of the auction purchaser". The ratio of this judgment is that even if the extension of time is sought for and is granted by the court, even with the consent of the judgment-debtor, the rigours of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 86 of the Code, latter part, do not stand in any way mitigated. Same is the finding of A. D. Desai J., as he then was, as per his judgment dated 28-3-78 in the civil revision application No. 1088 of 1977, which was pertaining to the very parties and was pertaining to this very execution application. In that case, the auction sale was challenged on the ground that the trial court without jurisdiction had granted time to the auction purchaser to pay up the amount after the expiry of 15 days' period. The facts of that case appear in paragraph 1 of that judgment. In that case, the auction purchaser had deposited 1/4th amount of the sale price on 22-2-1977 and had to deposit the balance with the executing Court before 9-3-1977. On 7-3-1977, the petitioner there filed an application to set aside the sale. On 8-3-1977, the auction purchaser filed an application. Ex. 154, praying for extension of time to deposit the balance of amount on the ground that under the law, sanction of textile authority was necessary before the sale was effected. Upholding the contention of the judgment-debtor, the learned Judge held that the court had no jurisdiction to extend the time and reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Manilal Mohan Lal Shah (AIR 1954 SC 349) (supra). Had the matter been as simple as it was before the Bombay High Court in the case of Uttamchand (AIR 1961 Bom 224) (supra) or in the civil revision application number 1088 of 1977 before this court in the year 1977, no difficulty would have presented itself. The peculiar facts of this case present a unique picture. In this case, the bid was accepted on 12-3-1982, 1/4th of the amount was admittedly deposited soon on the bid having been accepted. The remainder of the 75% of the amount was to be deposited by the auction purchaser on or before 27-3-1982. Now it so happened that before the expiry of those 15 days' period, that is, on 22-3-1982, the original judgment-debtor Ramanlal Nagindas Jariwala filed the present civil revision application No. 597 of 1982, in this High Court with a prayer to stay the proceedings for confirmation of sale and bid of the respondent No. 2 in the special darkhast in question. On behalf of the auction-purchaser, caveat was already filed and when the matter was called out before the learned Judge A. N. Surti, J., on 23-3-1982, an objection was lodged by Mr. Mankad for the auction purchaser. That seems to be the obvious purpose of filing a caveat application and appearing before the court on 23-3-1982, Mr. Mankad in his affidavit produced on the record of the civil revision application No. 710 of 1982 shows that he had invited the attention Of my brother Surti, J. regarding deposit of the remaining 3/4th of the purchase money to be made on or before 27-3-1982 and that under the decision of A. D. Desai, J. in the civil revision application No. 1088 of 1977, already referred to above and which had arisen in the course of these very execution proceedings, the executing court would not have any power to extend the date and accept deposit after the decision of that Civil revision application No. 597 of 1982. My brother A. N. Surti, J., then passed, the following order:-- "Stay of further deposit by the auction purchaser and stay of further proceedings." It is the say of the auction purchaser now before me that the court, despite the objection being raised on behalf of the auction-purchaser, stayed not only the further proceedings but also the deposit of the 3/4th of the remainder amount ol consideration, and, therefore, this action of the court, taken in the face of the opposition by the auction purchaser cannot now go to the detriment of the auction purchaser so as to upset the whole auction sale. For the purpose of putting the record straight, I state that the civil revision application No. 597 of 1982 was filed only by the judgment-debtor, who was the defendant No. 4, Ramanlal Nagindas Jariwala, whereas the civil revision application No. 710 of 1982 is filed by the original firm and Arvindlal Bhagwandas. who were the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 in the execution proceedings. In the earlier civil revision application No. 597 of 1982, the petitioners of the civil revision application No. 710 of 1982 were however certainly parties, though they might not be present before the Court on 23-3-82, the day on which this Court took up the admissional hearing and passed the above-mentioned order. 6. In the light of the facts stated above, the only point that arises for my consideration is whether the Court's staying of even the deposit of the remainder of the purchase price by the auction purchaser can go to mitigate the rigours of provisions of Order 21, R. 86 of the Code. M/s. Sanjanwala and Mehta on the one hand asserted that as laid down in the earlier judicial precedents referred to above, even the Court has no power to rewrite the provisions of O. 21, Rule 86 of the Code and grant time. On the other hand, Mr. Mankad for the auction purchaser and Mr. G. N. Desai for the judgment creditor, urged that for no fault or default of the auction purchaser, the amount could not be deposited despite the auction purchaser's resistance before this court to the move of the original defendant No. 4 that proceedings should be stayed. These learned advocates urged that once the court stayed that part, there would be no impunity. It is evident that once this High Court stayed the payment of the remainder of the 3/4 amount of consideration, this auction purchaser, even if he had gone to the executing court with the remainder of the money, would not have found the court to accept the same. 7. It is conceded for the purposes of this judgment and even M/s. G. N. Desai and Mankad did not urge otherwise that the court has got power to extend the time, but what they argued is that if the court stalls the payment and thereby makes the auction purchaser almost helpless in depositing the remainder of the amount, they cannot be visited with any evil consequences flowing directly from the court's action. In other words, their emphasis is that this is not a case of default. 8. In Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'default' has been defined, as 'failure of something' and 'failure' is a noun from the word 'fail', which from the very nature of things refers to some volitional act. In other words, the word 'default' implies a volitional and deliberate act and if a man for no fault of his is not able to deposit the amount required to be deposited under Order 21 Rr. 85 and 86 of the Code, he cannot be said to have been within the sweep of a mandatory provision of Order 21 Rule 86 of the Code. It is truism to state that wrong assumption of law and thereby consequential non-deposit of or negligence in being ready with the money latest on the 15th day would be covered by the term 'default'. In the facts and circumstances of this case, as said above, it is evident that there is no case of any default on the part of the auction purchaser. For reasons totally beyond his control, he was prevented from depositing the amount and one of the principles known to law is that court's action, when it is suo motu and not ad invitum, cannot go to the detriment of a citizen. In my view, therefore, the otherwise rigorous provisions of Order 21 Rule 86 of the Code will not be applicable to the facts of the present case because this is not a case of any dafault whatsoever. This is a case where the supervening hand of the court intervened, and no party can be allowed to suffer because of the court's order. 9. It is to be noted that there has been produced on record the affidavit of Advocate Mr. K. N. Mankad and it is on the file of the Civil Revision Application No. 710 of 1982 at pages 12-13. He has explained that he had appeared by virtue of the caveat filed on behalf of the auction purchaser and that when A. N. Surti, J, was about to pass an order of stay of further proceedings of the Dar-khast, he had objected to the same on the ground that the deposit of the remaining 3/4th of the purchase money was to be made on Or before 27-3-1982 and that in view of the decision of A. D. Desai, J., in the Civil Revision Application number 1088 of 1977 (supra) in these very proceedings arising out of the previous sale, the executing court would not have any power to extend the date and accept deposit. Mr. Mankad then proceeds to state on oath that A. N. Surti, J. proceeded to observe that in that earlier case extension was sought for by the auction purchaser whereas this time, he (Surti J.) was on his own staying the deposit of the remaining 3/4th amount so as not to cause injustice to the present auction purchaser. 10. There being no counter affidavit to challenge the words of Mr. Mankad and from the very nature of things what Mr. Mankad stated on oath appears to be the possible picture of the time, I act on that word and hold that there was a suo motu order by the court to stay not only the further proceedings in the matter, but also to stay the deposit of the remainder of the amount, which was to be deposited on 27-3-1982. 11. Mr. Sanjanwala had requested me that in view of the categorical ruling of A. D. Desai. J., and looking to the importance of the matter, I must refer this question for the more considered opinion to the Division Bench of this court. Had there been any shred of doubt in my mind about what I have observed above, I would have very willingly referred the matter to the Division Bench, but in my view that court's suo motu action takes the auction purchaser out of the charge of default, which is a condition precedent to the further obligation of the payment of remainder of the amount, 12. The result is that both the petitions are rejected. Time up to 16th September 1982, (and no further) is given to the auction purchaser to deposit the remainder of the amount in the trial court. Rule is accordingly discharged in both the petitions with no order as to costs. Stay is also vacated in both the petitions. A copy of this operative order to be given to Mr. Mankad to-day with which he can go to the executing court and deposit the amount. In order to enable the petitioners to have further recourse in accordance with law, the further proceedings except the depositing of the 3/4th amount of consideration are stayed for a period of four weeks from today.

Ramanlal Nagindas Jariwala And ... vs State Bank Of India And Ors. on 14 September, 1982

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA MA No.22 of 2010 BIGAN CHAUDHARY Versus THE UNION OF INDIA With MA No. 23 of 2010 CHINTA DEVI Versus THE UNION OF INDIA With MA No. 33 of 2010 KARU RAVIDAS Versus THE UNION OF INDIA With MA No. 34 of 2010 SONAMATI DEVI Versus THE UNION OF INDIA With MA No. 55 of 2010 MOSTT. TETRI DEVI Versus THE UNION OF INDIA With MA No. 75 of 2010 JANKI DEVI Versus THE UNION OF INDIA ------------- Praveen ( Akhilesh Chandra, J.) 06. 14.07.2010 As prayed for, by the learned counsel for the parties, let all these Misc. Appeals be listed after two weeks, under same heading.

Mostt. Tetri Devi vs The Union Of India on 14 July, 2010

Patna High Court - Orders

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CWJC No 504 of 1998 Dr Mrs Geeta Sinha, wife of Sri Narendra Narain Rai, resident of Patel Nagar, Pakari, Ara, P S - Nawada, District - Bhojpur, at present posted as Registrar in the Department of Obs & Gyan, Patna Medical College, Patna - Petitioner Versus 1 The State of Bihar through the Commissioner -cum- Secretary, Department of Health Medical Education and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna 2 Additional Commissioner -cum- Special Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna 3 Additional Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna 4 Deputy Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna 5 Dr Raj Kumari, Medical Officer, Punpun Block, Punpun at present notified as Assistant Professor, Department of Obs and Gyan, PMCH, Patna - Respondents ----------- 6 30.09.2010 On the last date also, no one appeared to press the writ petition. The case was passed over. State was present. So is the case today. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed for non- prosecution. M.E.H./ (Navaniti Prasad Singh)

Dr.Mrs.Geeta Sinha vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors on 30 September, 2010